

INTRODUCTION:

In the wake of state weakness almost everywhere in Africa, the declining performance of the postcolonial state has been a recurrent theme in the social sciences literature on Africa in recent years. After focusing for a decade or more on aspects of state consolidation or capabilities of the state in its incessant efforts to mold society in its image, scholarly debate has shifted to what Azarya has labelled the state's *incapabilities*, its functional decline, instability, an inability to bring about changes in society (1988:3).

This study is an attempt for approaching the difficult question of why some states succeed more and some less in realizing the vision of their leaders. It is about state capabilities or incapacities to achieve planned social change and the ability of state leaders to use the agencies of the state to get people in the society to do what they want them to do. I have turned to the experiences of two states: South Africa and Zaire as a representative sample. This selection help to give a spotlight to a study that would be impossible to achieve simply by presenting an abstract theory. I chose to compare these countries systematically because the story of their political systems explains the varying capabilities of states and the character of weak states versus strong states. The two illustrative cases offer the gamut of possibilities from one state with a very weak state, Zaire, to one with a relatively strong state, South Africa. A comparative analysis may help to identify the specific strengths and weaknesses for both countries. A number of useful lessons may be learned by considering the development of their politics.

Our main stress lies on our attempt trying to demonstrate that the relative development of South Africa and the underdevelopment of Zaire are the mainly result of efficient state organisation for the former over much of its history and mismanagement in the case of the latter. It aims at contributing in a small way to a comparative politics of African post-independence and is concerned with the challenge of nation-building in Africa.

Obviously, much of the literature on African politics has shown the vulnerability of the state with disappointing results, notably state control over the society has diminished despite

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
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife **Catherine** and our lovely children **Francis**, **Yannick**, **Dany**, **Jimmy**, and ... especially our gracious daughter, **Gracia**, who inspired me. May their love and patience yield fruit for eternity !

DECLARATION

I, GASTON D.K. KALOMBO, DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT THIS DISSERTATION IS MY OWN, UNAIDED WORK. IT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND. IT HAS NOT BEEN SUBMITTED BEFORE FOR ANY DEGREE OR EXAMINATION IN ANY OTHER UNIVERSITY.

SIGNED

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G.D.K. Kalombo', written over a horizontal line.

DATE November 10, 1997

ABSTRACT

It is widely assumed that the development of a country depends generally on the organization and the management of the state apparatus. Ostensibly the relative development of South Africa and the underdevelopment of Zaire would seem to confirm this. This study sets out to examine the validity of these assumptions by investigating the way the state apparatus is organized in Zaire and South Africa.

The central role the state has played in the developmental process is the main concern of this thesis. The thesis attempts to understand this process through an in-depth investigation of the political and economic framework in both countries. It will present its arguments in five parts. The first outlines the conceptual framework necessary to compare and evaluate the political institutions by establishing the distinction between a "soft state" and a "hard state". The second part deals with the political system of both countries and the third contains an empirical analysis of their economic structure. The fourth provides a comparative institutional and process analysis of the state's capabilities in Zaire and South Africa and largely emphasizes the state's organizational strategies adopted to solve problems.

A brief conclusion supplies an overall comparison and explanation of relative state capacity in the two countries and the consequences for development in each case of the state's degree of competence.

THE STATE'S ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: PREREQUISITES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN ZAIRE AND SOUTH AFRICA.

BY GASTON D. K. KALOMBO

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It is true that performance is related to regime and government stability. Regime and societal instability are both affected by government "performance" or government "outputs". As observed by Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, the issue of political stability has been so important that practically every examination of the political institutions of a single nation and nearly every cross-national study make explicit reference to political stability, or at least contain some implicit notions about stability or instability (1971:195). They have defined political stability as the extent of effectiveness in maintaining the regime and its governments. This is the normal usage, since political stability has been employed to indicate the absence of revolutions, the lack of internal violence factors, the lack of continual constitutional revision, the lack of anti-system protest, and the lack of institutional and governmental instability. With regard to South Africa and Zaire, no one can talk about absolute political stability in these countries due to the presence of powerful unstable factors in their political system. While South Africa is reasonably committed to accomplish the democratic path, Zaire though, until recently was still seen as a totalitarian system which does not allow subsystem autonomy and consequently all institutions are fused together and unstable factors are present in all spheres of the system. Thus, since totalitarian countries such as Zaire, are more likely than democracies to use repression to offset even the mildest forms of instability, the phrase political stability becomes less sharp.

In general the degree to which regimes and governments persist depends on the degree to which the political system is responsive to the following three interconnected characteristics: (1) the government must have effective control of the use of force in the country, and this requires that the coercive forces are loyal to the regime. (2) the regime must be the dominant focus of citizen loyalty in the state. (3) the political system must possess a decision-making unit (government) which can significantly affect the allocation of physical and spiritual rewards and punishments. The efficiency of government performance then affects the first two factors. If these three interrelated factors are all present the system should maintain itself, Jackson and Stein conclude (1971:196).

I have sampled Zaire and South Africa because I believe that the primary source of the institutional challenge is empirical and both countries present a good "sample" due to the struggle to gain a democratic society that has characterized them since the early 1990s. I

center (Azarya, 1988:7,8). In short, people lose confidence in the state's commitment to foster development and in its capacities to perform its tasks as a state.

Of course, one might say that significant differences exist from state to state and region to region in the capabilities of states. The problem with the postcolonial rulers of African states is that they have not maintained the effectiveness of administration that existed at independence and differ greatly in the levels of wealth they control and are limited in their abilities to determine how social life should be ordered. While showing, on the one hand significant strengths in penetrating societies, they are surprisingly weak in effecting goal-oriented social changes, on the other hand. In many cases, the level of performance of the state in Africa is an indication of state decline. It is true that all societies have changed enormously in the Third World over the last generation but not necessarily in the right direction. Although they have had unprecedented revenues at their disposal, built armies, police forces and civil agencies, why with such resources, asks Migdal, these states have been so ineffective in accomplishing what their leaders and others had so eagerly expected of them, while a few others have succeeded in developing capabilities in social planning, policy and action (1988:9)? Migdal responded that the answers to that question lie in the particular events and history of each state on one level. On another level, propositions can be fashioned that not only help illuminate the relevant events and history in each case but also demonstrate why the question of unfulfilled expectations arises at this juncture in history for so many states. In addition, answering the questions on this level demands an understanding of the source of resistance to the designs of state leaders and the factors that make state leaders unable or unwilling to overcome such resistance.

In the process, the state came to be seen as one of the major problems facing postcolonial states in Africa, rather than as the instrument through which solutions to those problems could be achieved. That is why states need strong institutions to meet people's aspirations effectively. Thus in our study the emphasis has shifted from the sheer size of the state and the scope of its interventions to its effectiveness in meeting people's needs. This supposes political stability that can enhance the performance of the state as a result of the organising functions of the state apparatus.

to be seen as an arena of struggle between different groups vying for control over its resources (1988:5). Consequently, the state has been variably referred as weak, soft, declined, absent, decayed, juridical, normative or overdeveloped by scholars seeking to explain its apparent failure to meet the aspirations of its society as a whole. Sangmpam argues that many of the writings define and explain the problem the same way. One can say these studies are based on the *soft state* or *declined state* paradigm, even though some of them rely more explicitly on Max Weber's notion of patrimonialism (1992:73).

Rather, some of them doubt whether they are existing. Jackson and Rosberg doubt that many African states can meet an empirical definition of the state based on its ability to exercise control (ie, to articulate, implement and enforce commands, laws, policies and regulations) over the people in the territory under its jurisdiction. What has maintained them as states, they claim, is a more juridical definition which identifies them as the recognized territorial unit of the international community (1986:270-74).

Although the literature of post-independence Africa has shown that by the mid-1980s, economic performance had given way in many countries - through a combination of bad climatical conditions such as drought or floods, external neglect and mismanagement - to pervasive poverty and debilitating famine, there are many reasons for the current economic malaise permeating the continent. But it is increasingly apparent that much of the responsibility lies with the failure of governments. Unrealistic expectations from independence, inadequate and irrelevant policies, meager incentives, poor distribution mechanisms and rampant inefficiency and corruption have combined to skew distribution patterns, alter production and limit accumulation. The outcome of this decline in state capabilities is political disengagement or withdrawal from the state by individuals, groups or communities as they form autonomous groups and survival mechanisms that compete with the state. Typical forms of disengagement include what scholars call "suffer-manage", an array of activities aimed to adapt to a declining standard of living such as moving away from the state-cash nexus to a subsistence economy or to alternate channels such as black markets and smuggling, escape via exile, labor migration, and brain drain. Some other violent forms of opposition, such as secession, civil war and regional separatism, may be part of disengagement if the objective is an effective detachment from the state, rather than an attempt to capture its

To sum up, "the new institutionalism, as David E. Apter pointed out, by bringing the state back in is in this respect like the old, anxious to show the determining power of the state, not in terms of democratic institutions to be sure, but hegemonic relationships of power, and most particularly, class power" (1991:437). In this connection, as he expressed, three main concerns characterize the new institutionalism: (i) centre and periphery relations include the impact of big firms, multinational corporations, and transnational flows; (ii) class and hegemony, and who controls state powers; and (iii) formation of public policy, the ideological preferences they contain, the conflict between various sectors and groups in society for compensatory allocations by the state.

1.2. The State in Africa

In Africa, the founding fathers of postcolonial states adopted the Western model of state, confident about the important role that centralized, mobilizing politics could play in their countries after independence. They shaped their goals on the basis of those of already established states and the dominant European nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth century. The new political leaders came to believe in their state's potential to mold their societies through virtuous planning and meticulously policies imported from West. Summarizing the situation Migdal put that the state organization became the focal point for hopes of achieving broad goals of human dignity, prosperity, and equity, it was to be the chisel in the hands of the new sculptors. This new state, it was believed, could create a very different social order, a unified channel for people's passions that until now had run in countless different streams (1988:4).

Unfortunately, almost one decade later, the jubilations over political independence were premature and misplaced because the hopes of independence have not materialized. The process of independence generated unrealistic expectations, which launched postcolonial African states into both political and fiscal bankruptcy. As a result, the earlier image of a strong political center being the motor force behind the society's rapid transformation shifted to the weakness and decline of the state. According to Azarya the term "state" paradoxically referred to the state's autonomous actions. Later, as the initial enthusiasm of decolonization waned and the postcolonial political crises and instability became more visible, the state came

ignored". All I can say is that "restoring the state" was in the air long before the neo-statist movement. "The state was never really out", states Theodore J. Lowi, "it was only overshadowed". In fact, the political scientists of the thirties, forties and fifties were strong in their appreciation of the state apparatus. An important part of their training was in traditional political theory and most of them studied public administration (1988:885).

However, the most persistent argument about "the state" is expounded expertly by the new institutionalists. The disciples of this orientation maintain that, firstly it insists on a more autonomous role for political institutions. According to Skocpol it means "states conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society" (1985:9). The claim of autonomy is necessary to establish that political institutions are more than simple mirrors of social forces, note March and Olsen. Secondly, it highlights the exploration of the "capacities of the state" to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socio-economic circumstances. Thirdly, the new institutionalism draws more heavily from political economy and has taken socio-economic factors into consideration in the analysis of a given society (democratic or non-democratic). This includes the distribution of political resources. Indeed, political institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affect the power of political actors, and thereby affect political institutions (1984:739).

In reality, as Fabrini again has observed, it seems difficult to deny that in the history of modern societies state institutions have enjoyed-and enjoy even more in today's welfare society-a particularly privileged position in the "making and implementing of political decisions". I would maintain therefore that in political terms, the state thus can play a crucial role through its political institutions in generating social attitudes, to ensure an efficient allocation of resources, to stabilize the path of economic progress and the distribution of income and wealth. It is able to mobilize social forces for maintaining order, resolving disputes, and thus promoting community among various social forces. Economically, the regulatory role of the state become more crucial because of the importance of economy in all societies.

of all kinds. Much of the debate generated by this resurgence has centered on the nature and capabilities of the state and on the potential for and actual degree of the autonomy of the state from both societal groups and classes and from external actors and forces (1984:xi).

March and Olsen emphasize that this resurgence of concern with institutions is a cumulative consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent commentary from observers of them. They revealed that renewed interest in institutions is characteristic of recent trends in economics, which has discovered law, contracts, hierarchies, standard operating procedures, professional codes, and social norms. In short, social, political and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and rather more important to collective life (1984:734-49).

Sergio Fabrini gives similar stress when he says that "the clearly central role that state institutions have come to play within the various national political systems seems also to have encouraged a revival of interest among scholars in the historical role played by these institutions in shaping of the identity of political actors" (1988:895). For instance, Fabrini drawing from Blondel, writes on the importance of state institutions:

"It may be true that political activities within the state are more important than other political activities-it may also be true that the state may have the power to regulate the political activities which take place in other organizations: for instance, the state may specify that only certain types of associations are allowed or that associations may engage in certain types of activities. This may result in political activity within the state being dominant; it does not result in the end of political activity in other bodies" (1988:896).

Therefore, the revival of interest in political institutions according to Fabrini, seems to derive from a need to specify what we might call the "institutional structure" of the political system, an important component of which is undoubtedly the structure of the state institutions.

The collection of all these new ideas on the state is labelled "the new institutionalism" as opposed to the "old institutionalism" which is rightly or wrongly charged to be "reductionist" by the "statists". It is not my intention here to be part of the polemic between the two approaches (Almond, 1988:855). As March and Olsen have remarked, "the new institutionalism is far from coherent or consistent; it is not completely legitimate; but neither can it be entirely

1 - Leaders aim to hold a monopoly over the principal means of coercion in their societies by maintaining firm control over standing armies and police forces while eliminating nonstate controlled armies, militias and gangs.

2 - Through state autonomy from domestic and outside forces, state officials have sought to act upon their own preferences, making decisions that reshape, ignore, or circumvent the preferences of even the strongest social actors.

3 - State leaders have aimed for significant differentiation of its components; thus, numerous agencies can take on the specialized complex tasks of governing the details of people's lives.

4 - State builders have sought these components to be explicitly coordinated, allowing a coherence of the parts of the state and shared purposes by those working in the various agencies. The distortion arising from taking the state for granted is an implicit assumption that all governing authorities are more or less equal in these four attributes. They are not.

In this vein, he proposes that the ideal-type definition of the state is that of Max Weber who defines the state as "an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its ways" (Migdal, 1988:19).

However, from the thirties, the apparent eclipse of the state from political discourse was evident. As pointed out by Migdal, perhaps the neglect of the concept of the state in so much of the earlier social science literature, commented on by scholars such as Nettl and Skocpol, stemmed from the fact that the state has been too much with us and, as a result, has been wholly unremarkable (1988:16).

Therefore, it might be noted that attention to political institutions has increased in recent years and literature of the past decade has placed great stress on the importance of the political executive. Authors of a "statist orientation" such as Theda Skocpol and others, have highlighted the sudden upsurge of interest in the "state" that occurred in comparative social science in the seventies. As expressed by Callaghy, since the mid-1970s there has been a major and exciting resurgence of interest in the state and in state formation among analysts

From an historical viewpoint, the state asserted its authority by invading all political, economic and social space and by affecting its citizens' lives. State activities therefore had profound implications for the interests of the general population, for collective action, and for the rights of citizens, notes Charles Tilly (1990:98). In his description of the genesis of the state, an emphasis was put on the way states come into existence. Thus states form systems to the extent that they interact, and to the degree that their interaction significantly affects each party's fate. Since states always grow out of competition for control of territory and population, they invariably appear in clusters, and usually form systems. The system of states that now prevails almost everywhere on earth took shape in Europe after AD 990, then began extending its control far outside the continent five centuries later. During the last five hundred years, the European system (of states) has spread to virtually the entire world by colonization, conquest, and penetration of non-European states. Throughout the world state formation converged on the more or less deliberate construction of national states - not empires, not city-states, not federations, but national states - according to models offered, subsidized, and enforced by the great powers. For instance, when African states turned to great powers for help in organizing markets, manufacturing, or military might the great powers commonly persuaded them to organize the *European way*. In short, in the process, Europeans created a *state system* that dominated the entire world. We live within that state system today (1990:191).

Today when one speaks of the state, one is referring to what scholars such as Tilly, Max Weber or Migdal regard as an *organization*. That means that the state is "a distinct organization that controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within a well-defined territory, and in some respects exercises priority over all other organizations operating within the same territory" (Tilly, 1990:130). Moreover, as Migdal has suggested, understanding differences in states' capabilities in various periods and places needs more than a simple definition of the state as a political organization that is the basis for government in a given territory and then leaves it at that. More important, he states that differences among states have related to variations in certain attributes of "stateness" for which political leaders have striven:

PART ONE:

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. The New Institutionalism

The central concept of this work hangs on the capacities of political institutions in the face of state deterioration almost everywhere in Africa, and especially in Zaire, while South Africa, maybe an exception to the rule, enjoys a reputation for relatively effective governance. This concept raises number of important questions about state effectiveness in its struggle for social control. Why have so many states in Africa gained so little since independence in their leaders' quest for unified rule? Why have these states failed to predominate in their societies? Why, despite abundant resources at their disposal, have most of these states been so ineffective in accomplishing their tasks as a states, while a few others have done so much better in developing capabilities in governing effectively? The answers to these questions, one can assert, implicate the ability of each state to mobilize human and natural resources.

In dealing with the problem of state capacities, I would like to draw attention to the institutional structures that organize the political process, policy-making in particular. I can argue, like Theda Skocpol that the best way to make the point is through an exploration of the issues addressed in a range of comparative and historical studies-studies that have considered states as weighty actors and probed how states affect political and social processes through their policies and their patterned relationships with social groups (1985:3).

For an understanding of the state, I think we have to look at it on the basis of current literature on its prominent role in shaping the political and economic paysage. Everywhere in the world the state has been part of our natural landscape. Charles Tilly observes that "states remain so dominant that anyone who dreams of a stateless world seems a heedless visionary" (1990:4). Migdal points out that "its presence, its authority, its place behind so many rules that fashion the minutiae of our lives, have all been so pervasive that it is difficult for us to imagine the situation being otherwise" (1988:15).

mechanisms regulate their performances. Failure to root analysis firmly in these realities invites both distortions in research and faults in planning (1988:9).

Hence our approach is broadly institutional and an attempt to understand how government prior to the 1994 general elections in South Africa was relatively strong and creative and managed the economy quite effectively whereas Mobutu's Zaire was impotent and oppressive and played only a small role in the management of the country. Why the Zairian state, endowed immensely with mineral resources, apparently strong and stable under Mobutu in the early 1970s, has gone bankrupt and discredited, the populace forced into abject poverty, becoming what Young and Turner called a "*parasitic predator*" upon its own people?

The answers to these questions, one might assert, lie on the particular performances of each political system, especially on its organizational capacities. While South Africa maintains its capabilities to implement its policies and to realize its goals, the Zairian state was experiencing a drastic decline of its administrative capacity and efficiency that explain its apparent failure to meet the aspirations of its citizens and to fill the role that it performed as a state in the genesis of Mobutu's regime.

To achieve this task presupposes the presence of effective state institutions, seen as a key factor in the implementation of such policies. This is the preoccupation of this study which contains five parts: the first looks at the conceptual framework: an approach for analyzing states capabilities with an emphasis on the strength and weakness of the two states and their capabilities as well. Part II delves into the sophistication of state apparatus in both countries: a critical period of history to demonstrate the circumstances that led to the current situation. For reasons of space, our focus is selective, concentrating upon the development of state apparatus and especially the bureaucratic organization in both countries. The race option in South Africa and of the Zairian crisis and its social implications for the people of Zaire will be featured. Part III highlights the economic patterns which paved the way for economic expansion and growth in these countries. Part IV offers an empirical comparative analysis of state's capabilities in South Africa and Zaire before our conclusion in the last part.

connection, John Ayoade observes that in most cases 'he state in Africa progressed from the "Mother Theresa" or Welfare State through the "Never-do-well State" to the "Expired State". It is this rapid transition from buoyancy at independence to bankruptcy within a quarter century that has made the African state a unique phenomenon (1988:100).

As a result, a new research focus centering on the dynamic processes of interaction between state and society is now emerging and gaining scholarly attention. The approach now consists of remaining attentive to the operations of public institutions and official agencies while highlighting coping mechanisms in the informal sector. In so doing, we have to focus on the relations between peoples and states by looking at the impact of state on society but also at how social structures affect state capabilities and explore how societies influence the character and style of states encountering great difficulties in getting people to follow their leaders. As recognized by Naomi Chazan, state institutions in Africa have undergone a cycle of attempted consolidation, the entrenchment of hegemonic domination and, more recently, deterioration, if not disintegration. The postcolonial state in Africa in the early 1980s was undergoing a crisis of not insignificant proportions (1988:124)

However, despite the state's more limited social role, scholarly interest still focused on the state itself trying to explain what went wrong with the state and the reasons for its weakness. Azarya notes that when the society was brought into analysis it was usually in order to explain why the state did not function properly. The focus has thus remained state-centric. And state positions were still regarded as the main channels of resource control.

The title of this dissertation was chosen in order to express our concern in the ability of the state to execute its basic functions in transforming the society. In what follows we have framed our analysis within the general outline of two sub-saharan countries: Zaire coming from the centre and the so-called "black Africa" and South Africa from the "white Africa" in the south. This study, embracing the central and southern regions of Africa in its frame of reference, is partly justified by its attempts to draw analytical comparisons among the two regions. The essential first step towards an understanding of the development problem of the two countries is, in Migdal's terms, to try to discover how they actually function and what

increasing repressive and extractive tendencies; corrupt and inefficient administrations have led to great waste; compliance with the law has declined and state institutions have lost legitimacy in the eyes of large segments of their population. Very different regimes were unable to stop the gradual erosion of state capabilities and a concomitant loss of legitimacy, authority, and power. As specific groups came to question the validity and viability of state institutions and organizing rules, state structures were undermined.

Of course, observers have begun to look for reasons beyond specific government policies and personal failures of leaders and attempted to discover inherent structural weaknesses of the state, ingrained in the very process of postcolonial political development in Africa. Some attribute the present weakness to the legacy of the colonial state which, despite its very authoritarian nature, touched only intermittently the lives of the people within its boundaries. Others relate it to international dependency or see it as an outgrowth of the class structure and internal conflicts. Whatever the preferred explanation, wrote Azarya, emphasis on such general underlying causes has tended to represent the state's weakness as a universal African phenomenon (1988:4).

From this viewpoint, it could be noted that some states clearly exhibit greater weaknesses than others, even though they may share certain underlying factors such as dependence on the global system or a similar colonial legacy. The turnaround in the fortunes of the states may also stem from specific current difficulties that are partially the result of policy decisions made by contemporary rulers. Hence the decline of capacities and differences between African states cannot be ascribed only to long-range historical factors. The shift in emphasis from state consolidation - which emanated from the underlying assumption that the state is a major means of bringing about societal change and fulfilling economic and social aspirations - to state decline is perhaps the indication that the state has played a lesser role in African social life than was previously assured.

Suddenly, as Azarya has expressed, the state did not seem such a formidable force in determining economic and social well-being. It was belatedly realized that influence and authority were not the exclusive domain of the state and that the earlier studies of state consolidation often mistook for fact the aspirations of the political elite (1988:8). In this

We think that Hirschman's point of view goes along with our concept of the "exit option" because it is more comprehensive in comparison with that of Goran Hyden, which focusing mainly on peasants, even if they constitute the vast majority of the population. Consequently, the softness and impotence of the state that lacks the power to enforce the systemic and authoritative allocation of values create the perfect terrain for arbitrary and violent forms of governance such as authoritarianism, dictatorial rule, and tyranny ... and "the dialectics of oppression", as we will see.

Early studies on the phenomenon have shown that societal disengagement and state repression - represent a degeneration in state-society relations. Each undermines civil society and ultimately the state. Taken to their logical conclusion, the soft state paradigm represent the dissolution of the political community with Zaire a case where more limited variants of these type of regimes did operate (Rothchild and Lawson, 1994:259).

As an extreme case of state's failure, Mobutu's Zaire exhibits in all ways, marked characteristics of a weak state. As summarized by Janet MacGaffey (1988:173,174), the huge scale of the second economy is evidence of its inability to collect many of the taxes due to the state from commerce and imports and exports. In addition, less than 50 percent of the *Contribution Personnelle Minimum* (CPM), the successor of the colonial head tax, finds its way into the state's coffers. The provision of social services is abysmally poor; public health services are practically nonexistent, the economic infrastructure is in a state of gross decay; education suffers because teachers are seldom paid and often have to be bribed to pass children through the system, which anyway lacks books, classroom furniture and even blackboard chalk. Further, the population is subject to continual harassment from police and the military in the form of extortion of money and actual violence, and a corrupt brand of justice prevails instead of the rule of law and citizen's rights. Finally, the need of members of state-based class to squeeze wealth out of their position in the state apparatus in order to maintain the patronage system, which is an important basis for their power, contributes further to the weakening of the state administration, decreasing its revenues and creating acute scarcities. That is a gloomy image of a weak state in Africa.

education services, details of pervasive, blatant corruption and government overspending were becoming known.

As a result, in the face of the decline of the state's capabilities almost elsewhere in Africa, with the state unable to collect taxes, provide social services, settle disputes or control the military, the response of society

has been resistance by withdrawing into survival activities, of which parallel markets are the most noticeable. Social groups adopt the withdrawal option from the public realm rather than confrontation assaults against the state. That is what Ghana's head of state, Jerry Rawlings, described as a "culture of silence" in national affairs to open resistance and disengagement from activities in formal economy. Thus Rotlichild and Lawson could note that a variety of informal economic activities: hoarding, currency exchanging, smuggling, barter, and so forth, spread and took place outside of state control, indicating a severe decline in the state's capacity to regulate social groups. By overstating that capacity the state elite exposed the limits of its ability to exercise control (1994:258).

As emphasized by Azarya, the concept of "disengagement is similar to the idea of "exit" proposed by Hirschman as a possible response to declining performance in various formal organizations (1988:12). In Hirschman's terms, civil society excels in an environment in which discontented actors prefer the "voice" option to "exit". "Voice" in essence, is a participation option even in criticism of and opposition to the established order. It involves an engagement, a willingness to take the risk of retaliation by the opposite side. So dissatisfaction is vocally expressed in an effort to modify the organizations's performance. The risk is taken because of the belief in one's ability to make difference and/or one's sense of responsibility and duty to try. "Exit", conversely, is an evasion of such responsibility, an avoidance of the risks of involvement, a withdrawal or disengagement from public action. Therefore, as expressed by Hirschman, the "exit option" seems to be more economic response, since it relies on market mechanisms: it reduces demand for the deteriorating product; while "voice" is the more political response insofar as it entails some kind of confrontation with the organization, trying to induce it to alter its performance (see Azarya, 1994: 97,98).

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presses its own corporate interests rather than the wider interests of the society as a whole, the state can emerge as a major consumer of scarce resources. The result is to skew the process of resource allocation (see Table 01).

TABLE 01: GOVERNMENT EXPENSES BY DEPARTMENT, 1982, 1985, 1988 (in percentage)

	1982		1985		1988	
Category	Budget	Actual*	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual
Presidency	1.4	11.5	1.6	6.1	6.2	28.6
Defense	7.9	11.0	4.3	5.8	9.4	28.4
Education*	22.6	23.6	7.6	0.5	7.6	10.1
Agriculture	2.4	2.3	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.4
Rural Dev.	0.5	0.8	-	-	0.1	0.1
Health	3.9	4.6	1.8	1.0	0.9	2.7
Women	-	-	0.04	-	0.05	-
TOTAL(Zm)	7,391.3		33,941		136,664	

NOTE:

*Actual: expenses are % of total budgeted expenses.

*Education: includes salaries for school teachers and university staff.

SOURCE: Banque du Zaire, Report, 1986, tables 58, 59, pp.143-144. Banque du Zaire, Report, 1989, tables 58-59, pp.113-4.

State employees in the capital city emerge as a tiny privileged class, draining scarce resources from the countryside and leaving the periphery neglected. Of course, this leads to economic stagnation, a loss of state and government legitimacy and, possibly, political instability. Data from the Table also reveals that in the midst of deteriorating infrastructure and health and

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Those states are regarded as unable to master a policy of more rapidly induced change - except by relying on totalitarian and monolithic methods (Myrdal,1972:35). Over the years, the concept of "soft state" has been removed from Asia and almost exclusively applied to Africa, although none of these factors are particular to Africa.

In Zaire, the state's primary function seemed to be brutally repressive extraction from the population for the self-aggrandizement of the state-based class as it pursued its own interests. The decline in competence of the state is measured by the decline in "its ability to transform allocated public resources into intended policy aims" (T.Callaghy,1985:90). This is particularly true in the rural areas, and can be correctly pointed to agriculture and infrastructure as illustrated in outlying and neglected regions such as the former province of Kivu where the capability of the state to do more than maintain basic order and extract resources is often crippled because role performance becomes ritualistic. A general insouciance permeates the administrative life of the state, a situation not conducive to the formulation and implementation of coherent state policies.

The Zairian state, one of the most cited cases of the soft state, does not function in the expected manner to provide public services and infrastructure or to safeguard civil rights. It operates instead as an instrument of class control and dominance, as those who hold state positions use their office to further their own interests. That is one of the multiple facets of patrimonialism. According to Sangmpam, the patrimonial character of Mobutu's rule has been the basis of state decay. This decay has been characterized by the state's declining capacity to rule or to maintain the conditions for the operation of its eroding productive infrastructures. He notes that three areas of decline are specified: 1) the increasing instability of the state to relate national means to policy ends, as we will see in the inefficiency of public administration, security forces, economic policies, and so forth; 2) the shrinkage in credibility expressed by "a loss of belief by the citizenry in the capacity of the state to perform its accustomed functions"; and 3) the decline in probity, manifested in the systematization of corruption (1992:75).

To quote D. Rothchild, a more commonplace problem is the high cost of the overextended state in terms of economic and social development. Obviously, as the ruling class in Zaire

considerable legitimacy and sense of purpose, the routines of state-society relations were disrupted. Economic deterioration increased state softness (i.e, the inability of the state to regulate society and to implement public policies in an effective manner, and societal demands on the state. Though perceived as the key distributor of resources, the state lacked the capacity to satisfy public demands (1994:257). In this view, the state is seen as overstaffed, overbureaucratized, overcentralized, and as a major consumer of scarce revenues, it found itself unable to implement its own developmental programs, particularly in the hinterlands.

As a result, a gap between expectations and performance weakened connections between the state and society, causing the state to assume authoritarian powers, while in fact exerting less and less control over society. As the state failed to meet public expectations, then, its legitimacy eroded, and the public began to perceive it as an alien institution "suspended, as it were, in mid-air above society". One would note that "planners begin by attempting to transform their environment and end by being absorbed into it. This pattern of failure is most evident in the poor countries of the world where glittering promise has been replaced by discouraging performance, as stressed by Wildavsky (see Migdal, 1988:7). In short, the state's policy performance can be characterized overall as a "failure to pursue the regime's own professed goals". In all instances, the state's image is weak.

From this perspective, a "weak state" can be defined, according to Stephen D. Krasner as "one that is completely permeated by pressure groups. Central government institutions serve specific interests within the country, rather than the general aims of the citizenry as a whole (1978:56). For instance, Zaire before the eruption of the rebellion in October 1996, can be thought of as such a state: public functions and positions were divided between the top members of the Mobutist party and those of Mobutu's family. There was little or no agreement on what would constitute the general good or the collective interest of the country.

Gunnar Myrdal, who was the first to use the term "soft state" to characterize the states in South Asia, has captured the soft state as one in which government require extraordinarily little of its citizens and obligations that do exist are enforced inadequately if at all (1968:896). In other words, policies decided on are often not enforced, if they are enacted at all, and in that the authorities, even when framing policies, are reluctant to place obligations on people.

legitimizing ideologies and is unable to convince the majority of the populace that the state's central purpose is to act in the interests of its citizenry. The best example is given by Zaire where political institutions organized initially to hold a divided society together, to end tribalism and to diminish sectionalism in order to build a centralized nation, had turned into a regime tending to maximize the personal power of its head and to treat criticism as essentially subversive.

Any way, the question here is to what extent one state can be seen as a soft state and another as a strong one. According to its performances, a state can be defined strong or weak. Despite its efforts to strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, the Zairian state, as agreed by number of analysts, remains weak, ineffective, fragile and soft, lacking a strong institutional core or the supporting norms which would allow it to function as a state, while the state in South Africa enjoys high capabilities to compete these tasks. Thus what means weak state and what means strong state?

1.3.1. ZAIRE AS A "SOFT STATE":

The literature on postindependence Africa showed the weakness of domestic political institutions in most of countries throughout the continent with Zaire representing an especially extreme example of the deterioration of state capacity. Scholars have portrayed these states as more often illusion than reality. They have remarked on their inept, bumbling nature as well as the instability and ineffectiveness governing bodies have demonstrated in trying to carry out their grand design. In weak societies such as Zaire, the state is almost totally impotent in the swirl of dizzying social changes that have overtaken them, changes largely independent of any impetus from the state itself (Migdal, 1988:6). Although there are, of course, some exceptions to this rule, as in South Africa, the majority of states in Africa remain backward and helpless. "Governments simply do not govern", points Huntington (1968:2).

African state theorists, such as D. Rothchild and L. Lawson, have supplied explanations of the weakening of the state in Africa, of which Zaire might be considered an extreme form. They have suggested that as African economies deteriorated and states institutions lost

(2) THE POLITICAL PENETRATION OF SOCIETY: this means national leaders and governmental institutions secure effective hegemony over intermediary and ground-level political actors and social units. This reflects the state's efforts to affect national, regional and local socio-political structures, enabling state institutions to wield substantive control over any political sphere.

(3) THE EXTRACTIVE CAPABILITY : the extraction of resources from the most productive economic sectors, especially peasant agriculture (in the case of Zaire). This enables the state to draw "from a largely agricultural population a reliable income sufficient to support the regime's expenditure needs". In other words peasants become the set and main source of the state's extractive measures.

(4) THE IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION: that is the promulgation of official doctrines to defend and justify the achievement of autonomy, penetration and extraction to the populace over which they rule and to external economic actors. In part, legitimacy is assumed through constitutionalizing authority, which casts it in the form of a solemn contract between state and civil society. In Forrest's terms that is "a battle of belief", embedded in legitimacy doctrines that are often concerned with the creation of illusion and ideological manipulation bordering on mystification. They tend to be syncretic, diffuse, and eclectic blends of "nationalism, popularism, socialism, Leninism, anti-imperialism, and pan-Africanism, with strong traditional, quasi-traditional and personalistic overtones. Zairian legitimation has taken the form of "Mobutism" and was expressed in the president's praise-names, as we will see. In South Africa, it was better known as "apartheid", a policy or system of segregation or discrimination on grounds of race.

But in many cases in Africa, the search for state hardness ends up in state softness because of "enormous limitations" they are facing with and which fundamentally reveal the weakness of their political institutions, as follows: (1) National leaders and administrators remain closely linked to societal actors and groups. (2) States are not able to thoroughly consolidate the political penetration of local-level political and social institutions. (3) State officials have encountered severe limitations in appropriating peasant resources and in establishing regularized official control over rural trade which presents an especially problematic challenge to the state's economic growth. (4) The ruling class has effectively failed to employ

state-society coalitions that restrict the ability of political elites to act independently, as points out by Skocpol (1988:11). In addition, our view of the state corresponds to the concept of the state and its relationship to capabilities, as described by B. Badie and P. Birnbaum when they put: "the progress of state building can be measured by the degree of development of certain instrumentalities whose purpose is to make the action of the state effective: bureaucracy, courts, and the military, for example. Clearly, the more complex and highly developed these instrumentalities are, the greater the capacity of the state to act on its environment and to autonomously impose collective goals distinct from the private goals generated within the social system itself. In this situation, the state's autonomy corresponds to a tangible reality" (B.Badie and P.Birnbaum, 1983:35).

Both Zaire and South Africa like other African states, have moved to consolidate their power through the establishment of bureaucratic, behavioral, and decision-making autonomy from social and economic forces in society. But in searching for "state hardness", the former failed in its attempt to do so because it was unable to decisively realize its state-building goals while the latter succeeded relatively well. The search for state hardness implies the search for political sovereignty, a powerful ideological weapon of the state in its pursuit of hegemony.

In Forrest's opinion, the state's quest for hardness thereby represents the interests and activities of its leaders and institutions and may be viewed as constituting a general purpose and effort on the part of the state as a constellation of leaders, officials, political institutions, administrative agencies, and military and police organizations that holds centralized political power in a given territorial domain. This approach includes the pursuit and the achievement of four distinct goals:

(1) **THE SEARCH FOR STRUCTURAL AUTONOMY:** the imperative of autonomy means that state institutions, leaders and officials effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences and are thereby able to act and make decisions independently of social forces. The aim is the separation of state institutions from societal actors, to prevent the formation of intractable state-society coalitions that restrict the ability of political elites to act independently.

1.3. State Hardness and State Softness

Before proceeding, it is well to recall that in what might be called "neo-Weberian" circles, the habit of speaking of "strong" versus "weak" states has flourished. In contrast to Marxists who have taken the position that states are not autonomous but act as instruments of dominant-class interests, will, scholars in the Weberian tradition tend to take for granted that states are potentially autonomous and that the controllers of the means of coercion and administration may pursue goals at variance with dominant classes or any other social group. What more directly interests scholars in this tradition are variations in state capacities. Some of them started labelling states, especially modern national states, "stronger" or "weaker" according to how closely they approximated the ideal type of centralized and fully rationalized Weberian bureaucracy, supposedly able to work its will efficiently and without effective social opposition (P.B.Evans, *et al.*, 1985:350-51).

However, it is important to note that the state's capacity to manage domination is based on an autonomy. Considerable agreement exists among analysts regarding the autonomy of the state in Africa. The concept of autonomy involves assumptions about the power of public decision-makers to formulate and implement policies that set economic activities in motion and define the terms of inter-group and inter-agency relationships. It supposes that the state, at some time or other, can act independently of social constraints, can pursue a course of action which brings it into conflict with immediate social interests. Migdal has argued that autonomy in the domestic context means that state officials can act upon their own preferences. In this way the state can reshape, ignore, or circumvent the preferences of even the strongest social actors (1982:6). In other words, modern states are conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people. They may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society.

Thus, it is essential for states to achieve at least a modicum of autonomy from society in order to secure their power and exercise their hegemony, as Forrest suggests (1988:424). In this sense, the search for political sovereignty becomes an effort to establish structural autonomy: to separate institutions from societal actors, to prevent the formation of intractable

witnessed the process of change in these countries: very slow and now stalled in Zaire and more rapid and successful in South Africa. I have not compared these countries systematically, but sought to explain the varying capabilities and then characters along the spectrum of weak and strong state. We agree with Lowi when he argues that "political science meant realism, empiricism, loyalty to what was seen now. The highest art was description, good narrative. Quantification was important, but it simply meant description taken to a higher and more sophisticated level. Explanation was important too, but that was nothing more than describing two or more things simultaneously, each in relation to the others. He states that Key and his predecessors, were past masters at it. For them political reality was institutional reality-legislatures, executives, parties, policies, elections, and organized groups" (1988:886). For March and Olsen, the primary source of the institutionalist challenge is empirical observers of processes of decision-making regularly discern features that are hard to relate to an outcome-oriented conception of collective choice. The pleasures are often in the process (1984:741).

Thus what follows now is the outcome of my observations and researches centred on South Africa and Zaire. It is an attempt to show in which way both South Africa's and Zaire's states are managing to achieve and sustain economic progress. Yet while South Africa possesses an effective and legitimate government, Zaire is still a battlefield where government continually changes its personnel. As a result, it cannot act decisively and the public have lost faith in the institutions of the regime and find other means of effecting decisions. It is clear that the incapacity and instability of the Zairian political institutions have reduced this country to a mere "soft or weak state" in comparison to South Africa which in relative terms can be viewed as a "strong or hard state".

As the state is a set of central decision-making institutions and roles that must confront internal as well as external opponents, the central analytic characteristic that determines the ability of a state to overcome domestic resistance is its strength in relation to its own society. From this quantitative perspective, the presence or absence of that strength help to understand why one state can be viewed as strong and another weak.

of the world looks at the entity in question. This implies the establishment of the specific goals that the system espouses. As expressed by Pottholm, these goals are multiple and may be those of the population at large, interests of certain socio-economic groups within the country, desires of the leadership personnel within the political structure itself, or a combination of all three.

Finally these goals are in the process of constant mutation although broadly speaking, they may be categorized as active or passive (in terms of the system's intent) and realistic or chimerical (in terms of the system's capabilities - the core of this analysis). This includes the involvement of the state as the key player in the policy process.

The study of the political systems of Zaire and South Africa lead us to discover their underlying propensities as well as their actual performances over a given period of time. These propensities or the psychological dimension of the political system are described by scholars as the "political culture" which consists of the attitudes, beliefs, values, and skills which are current in an entire population, as well as those special propensities and patterns which may be found within separate parts of that population. Such a system can be viewed as consisting of "inputs" from the society or from within the political system itself, the conversion of these inputs within the system, and the production of "outputs" into the society. Outputs may produce changes in the environment, which in turn may affect the political system or "feedback" (reactions) (Almond & Powell, 1966:23). The importance of these two concepts (inputs and outputs) lies in a better understanding of performances and capabilities of the phenomenon under consideration.

INPUTS:

By *inputs*, we understand "demands" and "supports" made upon the political system. According to Easton *demands* can take many combinations, forms and degrees of intensity. Society may face demands for allocations of goods and services (wage and hour laws, education, recreational facilities, roads, transportation); demands for regulation of behavior (public safety, health and sanitation); demands for participation in the political system (right to vote, political associations, etc...); demands for communication and information. Whereas *supports* can be understood as attitudes enabling the maintenance of the system such as

definitions imply legitimate, heavy sanctions; the rightful power to punish, to enforce, to compel. Max Weber's definition emphasized this contention when he argued that "legitimate force is the thread that runs through the action of the political system, giving it its special quality and importance, and its coherence as a system" (Almond & Coleman, 1960:7). The political authorities, and only they, have some generally accepted right to utilize coercion and command obedience to it.

While its relation to coercion is its distinctive quality, we are saying that the political system is not only concerned solely with force, violence, or compulsion, but also with goals. Indeed, national leaders are usually concerned with goals such as national expansion or security, social welfare, the aggrandizement of their power over other groups, increased popular participation in politics, and the like; but their concern with these values as politicians is related to compulsory actions such as law making and law enforcement, foreign and defence policy, and taxation as Almond and Powell have suggested.

In addition, as pointed out by Potholm, a "political system" can be viewed as essentially a demand-processing, image-projecting, goal-seeking entity, embedded within an international environment. As such, it may be regarded as a group of mutually influencing variables of a social, economic, and political character that interact over a period of time. It is made up of people who place demands upon it, recognize its control or authority over them, support it and, on occasion, oppose it. In order for it to continue to exist, the political system as a whole must satisfy some demands, moderate others, and ignore still others. It must rally support from within the societal groups it governs and decide which of these groups have the more legitimate demands or the most useful supports (1970:2).

In brief, the political system is the sum of its institutions, sources of legitimacy, discernible structures, personnel, and laws which, taken with the way it functions, produces its image. In this perspective, I can assert that each political system is the reflection of its institutions. Strong or weak. Sophisticated or loose.

Besides, the ways in which the political system meets the demands placed upon it and elicits the supports it needs to survive and maintain itself determine, in large part, the way the rest

One might note that the more basic governmental functions - to maintain order, provide national defence, collect taxes, regulate access to scarce resources, and settle disputes among citizens - are essential to any ordered society and prerequisite to the development activities referred to above. Each political system might provide for the effective representation of the major social and economic strata within such a system. A system of separation-of-powers was more likely to be stable and libertarian.

Thus among the central concerns of the functional theory are the nature of legislature, executive, and judicial power; the question of how best to maintain their separateness; the values resulting from such separation; and the problem of how best to mesh these separate institutions of government with the structure of society. To maintain the equilibrium of the system, the three principal institutions of executive, legislature and judiciary had provided for a regulated system of "multifunctionality" (checks and balances), a mixture of functions which, by preventing the aggrandizement of any institution at the expense of the others, maintained the balance of the power.

In the similar vein, I believe it is useful to introduce the concept of *political system* as used in this paper. The term "political system" has become increasingly common in monographs and texts in the field of comparative politics. Its importance in that field lies in the fact that terms such as "government", "nation", or "state" are limited by legal and institutional meanings to describing what is called political system.

Almond and Powell have expressed that this concept has acquired wide currency because it directs attention to the entire scope of political activities within a society, regardless of where in the society such activities may be located". In fact, the political system includes not only governmental institutions such as legislatures, courts and administrative agencies, but all structures (kingship ties and caste groupings); anomie phenomena such as assassinations, riots, and demonstrations; as well as formal organizations like parties, interest groups and media (1966:17).

Another aspect of the concept of "political system" is its association with the use of legitimate physical coercion. There is general agreement among scholars on this concept. All their

it was a common habit among social scientists and others to think of society as being like an organism. Among some idealist philosophers the state came to be regarded as an actual organism even to the extraordinary extent of having a soul, as men were often thought to have souls. For people of this bent the state was not *like* an organism, it *was* an organism. If society was an organism, or even if it was only very much like an organism, then the methods of investigation appropriate to actual organisms would be appropriate to the investigation of societies. If one investigated organisms in relation to their *needs* (for food, for shelter, for security and so on) then it followed that it must be reasonable to investigate societies in relation to their needs, seen in this context, as the moral fulfilment of its members or the "necessary conditions of existence" (see Jones, 1967:5). In short, the functionalist movement developed from the idea of society as an organism whose parts were closely interrelated. Deprived of its metaphysical and propagandist content the organism became a system. The structured parts of the system were conditioned by the system as whole, and the functions performed by the parts maintained the general existence of the system.

The growing influence of functionalism on political science led to the formulation of the theory of separation of powers, the doctrine that political action involved the distinguishable process of legislation, administration, and adjudication. Hence political systems would provide for specialized institutions to handle these particular functions, or powers.

According to Huntington, it is, indeed, impossible to apply a functional approach without employing some concepts of the political system. The varieties of theory encompassed in this general category are reflected in the names: Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Leonard Binder, Fred Riggs. The principal contribution of these scholars has been to develop a set of concepts and categories, central to which are those of "system" and "function", for the analysis and comparison of types of political systems. Among their other key concepts are: structure, legitimacy, input and output, feedback, environment, equilibrium. These concepts and the theories associated with them provide an overall model of the political system and the basis for distinguishing types of political systems in terms of the structures which perform the functions which must be performed in all political systems (1974:423)

that Political Science is concerned with investigating and explaining political events. Scientific explanation commonly takes form of relating an occurrence to a general concept. So functionalism falls into this pattern of explanation and investigation. First, it is a way of explaining social and political occurrences by clearly indicating the nature of their functions: for example, political parties may be explained by delineating the functions they perform, one of which may be to aggregate varying individual and group demands into coherent policy proposals. Secondly, functionalism provides the stimulus and the tools for social and political investigations: as a way of explaining and a way of investigating, it is using a number of concepts. The first and most obvious concept involved is that of *function*. The definition of this concept is by no means the simple matter it may seem.

As stated by Jones functionalism is a broad intellectual movement, and social scientists think of functions with differing degrees of precision and stringency. At its broadest *function* is synonymous with *use*. An illustration shows that the functions of a cog in a machine can only be meaningfully explained by relating the cog to the actions and demands of the machine as whole. A similar approach can be applied to political structures such as political parties. They do not exist in isolation, but in the concept of political systems. They are therefore to be explained in relation to a concept of political system. From this viewpoint the meaning of *function* is that of an activity, performed by a structure, which maintains the system of which it is a part. A political party is a structure and this structure is part of a political system. The system is maintained because certain functions are performed: support for policies is mustered, interests are satisfied and so on. Besides political parties, formal institutions such as legislatures may play a major part in fulfilling functional requisites.

The functional approach to comparative politics goes back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and if one thinker could be held originally responsible that man would probably be Charles Darwin. His principle of natural selection is full of functional implications. The explanation of the characteristics of a particular species are framed in functional terms: how do its distinctive shapes and customs contribute to the perpetuation of the organisms (or systems) concerned. The system is primary, functions maintain the systems, structures (limbs, habits, organs) perform functions. The essence of functionalism is the system-maintaining activity. The structure performing this function is secondary. Thus in the nineteenth century

approximately the mid-nineteenth century to the recent past - corresponding to what he called the *phase of specialization*, military force grew as a powerful specialized branch of national government; the organizational separation of fiscal from military activity increased, the division of labor between armies and police sharpened, representative institutions came to have a significant influence over military expenditures, and states took on a greatly expanded range of distributive, regulative, compensatory and adjudicative activities (1990:29). In an effort to bring out the activities of the state vis-a-vis its domestic society, he has suggested that, as time went on, it was clear that a state's essential minimum activities form a trio: (1) *statemaking*: attacking and checking competitors and challengers within the territory claimed by the state; (2) *warmaking*: attacking rivals outside the territory already claimed by the state; (3) *protection*: attacking and checking rivals of the rulers' principal allies, whether inside or outside the state's claimed territory. However, no state last long that neglects a crucial fourth activity: (4) *extraction*: drawing from its subject population the means of statemaking, warmaking, and protection (Tilly,1990:96).

State activities therefore had profound implications for the interests of the general population, for collective action, and for the rights of citizens. So the state should exhibit its ability in dealing with these functions.

For his part, Migdal suggests that the best basis for evaluating states is to measure what states actually do in the four activity clusters (extraction, regulation, penetration, appropriation or use of resources in determined way) against their declared intentions as established in legislation, policy statements, and so on (1988:5). Therefore, among the works of those who have written about states capabilities, the most notable is that of Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell. They refer to the overall performance of a political system in its environment. They have listed five clusters of activities: *regulative, extractive, distributive, responsive* and *symbolic*.

From this perspective, I have chosen the structural-functionalist pattern as portrayed by these scholars and others to compare meaningfully the two political entities upon our search for common denominators (Gabriel A. Almond & G.Bingham Powell,1966; G.A. Almond & James S. Coleman, 1960; Christian P. Potholm,1970; Roy E. Jones, 1967). It might be noted

state's capacity to intervene. An inadequately developed bureaucracy limits the state's capacity to intervene. In a state without a fully developed bureaucratic apparatus, construction of any specific administrative organ must be considered a long-term institutional problem rather than a short-term organizational one. Even if state elites make a correct diagnosis of the kind of intervention that is indicated and have the political will and command over the material resources necessary to undertake the action, they may not be able to carry it out. Simply because the required bureaucratic machinery cannot be created in time. I think that the case of Zaire is the best example of this contention. Indeed, the literature on Zaire is rife with examples on the demise of the bureaucratic body.

To sum up, effective bureaucratic organization as well as competence and factual knowledge are required for state intervention. I have argued that the development of each country depends generally on the organisation and the management of its state apparatus; that development cannot take place without political stability which implies the creation of political institutions involving and reflecting the moral consensus and mutual interests on the entire population. It seems now that bureaucratic organisation is the means by which a state can be portrayed as a "strong state" or a "weak one", and is the salient feature which makes the state apparatus more effective in its intervention. It means the performances of the state, its capacities or its functions.

1.4. The Structural-Functionalist Approach:

In an attempt to compare the South African political system with that of Zaire, a meaningful conceptual framework is now necessary. The defining characteristics of state hardness and softness will allow us to bring out the extent of the *states's capabilities or performance* of each country. As it was argued the capabilities of states to make the operative rules of the game for people in the society include the capacities to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources, and *appropriate* or use resources in determined ways. Number of scholars have written about political capabilities, using a variety of definitions and criteria.

As capabilities are related to states activities or functions, Charles Tilly explicitly shows how throughout world state formation, the increase in state activities happened. From

"expansion". It was capable of integrating and coopting into its own institutions potential allies and even antagonistic elements. It was relatively autonomous and can extract certain sacrifices from the ruling class and make certain concessions to popular classes. The integral state was not above society. It was integral precisely because the ruling class had achieved hegemony. However, the integral state can emerge only when the ruling class has consolidated its rule to a point where its material, intellectual, and moral leadership is unquestioned or at least consensually accepted by the subordinate classes (Fatton, 1988:254).

Finally, the fourfold typology on state hardness by Forrest, is closely related to the capacities of a political system and contains similar elements to those described by the structural-functional paradigm, as well as Crawford Young (1994:35-40).

At this stage, I would like to emphasize that the establishment of efficient and effective political structures remains a prerequisite for state hardness. Martin Doornbos has indicated that one of the first requirements of the state was seen to be its "penetration" of society and the enhancement of its capacity to implement policies. Quoting James Coleman's definition, he points that "political penetration" refers to that ensemble of processes by which the political-administrative-juridical centre of a new state (1) establishes an effective and authoritative central presence throughout its geographical and sectoral peripheries, and (2) acquires a capacity for the extraction and mobilization of resources to implement its policies and pursue its goals (1990:184). Skocpol adds another dimension when she states that "sheer sovereign integrity and the stable administrative-military control of a given territory are preconditions for any state's ability to implement policies. She stresses that beyond this, loyal and skilled officials and plentiful financial resources are basic to state effectiveness in attaining all sorts of goals (1985:16).

The accomplishment of this aim presupposes the existence or the presence of a strong and efficient organisation that could allow effective state intervention. Thus for Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Peter B. Evans, Max Weber's bureaucratic organisation is the most efficient form of organizing large scale administrative activities (1985:50). They assume that the existence of an extensive internally coherent bureaucratic machinery is the first prerequisite for effective state action. Moreover, an effective bureaucratic machinery is the key to the

African society, due to its control of the organs and resources of state and has never, not even in recent years, been seriously challenged in this respect.

Until the 1970s, the dynamism of the South African economy was undeniable. The development of the agricultural sector and the mining industry contributed to creating the economic shape of modern South Africa and accelerated the growth of the economy. Yet today South Africa is only relatively developed economically. Although the country is still a primary product-exporter of gold, coal, diamonds, food ..., its manufacturing is inefficient and uncompetitive and depends on imported machinery. But despite its declining performance, South Africa remains the most developed country in Africa.

For a major part of its history, the South African state was recognised as legitimate by its subjects even if for many of them this was only because there were no effective alternative sources of political authority. Since the 1994 general elections, the country has entered a new era and the legitimacy of the government of national unity cannot be controversial. In contrast, the Zairian state has failed to achieve and sustain domestic legitimacy and the result is the eclipse of legitimacy doctrines leading to the creation of illusion and ideological manipulation bordering on mystification.

In short, the South African state was an independent political entity with definable interests, a huge bureaucracy, with a definite ideology or theory about itself, that may or may not, depending on the particular circumstances, have coincided with the interests of business, labour, church, educational or other political interest groups. Although it was reasonably flexible in deploying its policy, it was subject to tensions and divisions within its own ranks.

Despite these divisions which were magnified during the 1980s, the South African state has considerable structural autonomy. It is the dominant authority throughout the regional and local level of the nation. State institutions wield substantive control over local level groupings and socio-political structures.

From this perspective, the South African state could be viewed as an "integral state". In Fatton's terms it means a state of a hegemonic ruling class and as such capable of

strong state. In all cases the result was similar: a rapid deterioration of existing bases of social control and strategies of survival. The second is the channeling resources to indigenous organizations capable of extending social control throughout the society (Migdal:143).

In Africa, South Africa is seen as an exception, an unique case compared to other African states in collapse (Sipho Shezi,1995:191), an African country but with specific differences. That is what Mahmood Mamdani calls the "South African exceptionalism" (1996:27). The contemporary outcome in South Africa reflects the features generically African and those specifically South African. Rather, I should point out that until the last decade of apartheid, its political institutions seemed quite capable of governing. As such the South African state resembles that defined by Forrest as a "hard state", in contrast to the Zairian "soft state". In particular, South Africa's state institutions are characterized by a degree of structural autonomy whereby state institutions, leaders, and officials effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences and are thereby able to act and make decisions independently of social forces. The administrative reforms and the legislation introduced by the Milner administration in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War and consolidated by its successors after the Act of Union helped to consolidate a powerful state apparatus capable of decisive intervention within the economy and of acting independently of the immediate interests of economically dominant social groups (Yudelman:1984; Marks and Trapido,1981).

By the 1980s, against international political and economic sanctions and internal pressure, state institutions and South African leaders affirmed their structural autonomy and proved their capacity to withstand considerable external pressure and deprivation for a long time (Lewis, 1990). But state autonomy in South Africa was qualified by the Afrikaner supremacy over other societal actors. Groups and state institutions remained closely linked to the Afrikaner community.

South African state structures penetrate society quite deeply. National leaders and governmental institutions assume net hegemony over intermediary and ground-level political actors and social units. In this sense, the South African state played an important part in the development of the country. Indeed, the government still occupies a strong position in South

societies by promoting some groups and classes while repressing others and simultaneously maintaining autonomy from any single group or class.

As people like the rightness of a state's having high capabilities to complete its functions, I mean a strong state, it is arguable that increased capabilities of states include and rest upon increased state social control. The concept of social control is very important for our concern because it involves, as Migdal maintains, the successful subordination of people's own inclinations of social behavior or behavior sought by other social organizations in favor of the behavior prescribed by state rules. In short, social control is power, the currency over which organizations in an environment of conflict battle one another. With high levels of social control, states can mobilize their populations, skimming surpluses effectively from society and gaining tremendous strength in facing external foes. Internally, state personnel can gain authority from other social group in determining their own preferences; and they can monopolize coercive means in the society to ensure that other groups do not stand in the way of enforcing state rules (Migdal, 1988:22,32).

In other words, one can say that the strength or the weakness of the state organization in an environment of conflict has depended, in large part, on the social control it has exercised. The more currency - that is compliance, participation, and legitimation - available to state leaders, the higher the level of social control to achieve state goals. Thus a strong state is that one with the capacity or the ability to implement social policies and to mobilize the public, according to the structures of society.

To summarize, a strong state is characterized by: (1) its ability to use social control; (2) its capacity in delivering of mundane services such as housing, jobs, and education; (3) its autonomy against challenges from society; and (4) its capacity of survival from crisis to crisis. In addition, there are two necessary and sufficient conditions for creating a strong state : one is rapid and universal dislocation. For instance, deep social dislocations that undermined people's existing strategies of survival universally preceded the emergence of strong states. Such extraordinarily powerful states have only existed immediately after major revolutions: France after 1789, Russia after 1917, China after 1949, Japan after 1945 ... and South Africa after the Anglo-Boer War (1902) and later after 1948. Zaire after 1960 failed to become a

To sum up, the weakening of the Zairian state, can be viewed as a "function of the detachment of social groups from involvement in central activities. The incapacity of the state is the end result of the disengagement of social forces from the public sphere", Rothchild and Lawson expressed (1994:270). The state in Zaire failed to become integral, thanks to its ruling class which has deprived it of the relative autonomy that makes reform possible, despotism unnecessary, and liberal democracy viable. According to Fatton, in African conditions where hegemony is nonexistent or embryonic, the state is not likely to take seriously into account the interests of those classes over which the ruling class seeks to impose its domination and authority. Not surprisingly, the rule of most African ruling classes is authoritarian, brutal, and violent. Compliance is the result of coercion and not consensus, and popular resistance is seldom frontal and revolutionary (1988:254). To Krasner, the logical terminus of the weak end of the spectrum is civil war and the complete disintegration of the state (1978:56). That is what happened in Zaire after Kabila toppled Mobutu over power last May following a seven month war.

1.3.2. SOUTH AFRICA AS A "HARD STATE":

At the other extreme from a state completely weak is one that described by Krasner as able to remake the society and culture in which it exists - that is, to change economic institutions, values, and patterns of interaction among private groups (1978:56). This is a strong or hard state which is characterized by a reliable administrative apparatus, participate exclusively in economic activities, and can enforce government policies because of popular acceptance of the state's right to exact obedience to its rulers (J.MacGaffey, 1988:173). In Migdal's view, strong states are those with high capabilities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways (1988:4).

Scholarly studies show that the major focus of proponents of the strong state paradigm has been on capabilities involving state penetration of society and extraction of resources. Many of them have written about microlevel state policies, such as regulation and taxation of foreign corporations or certain types of income transfer. They have stressed how states reshaped

powerful regulative capability and willingness to utilize whatever force necessary to maintain itself, and hampered by a lack of political organization and leadership, African enthusiasm for revolt was lacking. In short, the thrust for non-European participation in the decision-making process served primarily to legitimize counterterror on the part of the government and to solidify most Europeans behind existing regime. From Sharpeville in 1960 to Soweto in 1976, the government acted swiftly and decisively to counteract these movements.

Thus, the exhibition by the state of its strong ability in the area of social control could be seen as an exercise of sovereignty. Hans Kelsen, quoted by Young (1994), points out that "nothing in the nature of the state or the individuals prevents the national legal order from regulating any subject matter in any field of social life, from restricting the freedom of the individual to any degree" (Young, 1994:29). Broadly speaking, the notion of sovereignty encodes that of autonomy which has two faces: external and internal. Externally, autonomy embodies the drive for independence, the most elemental of survival instincts. The quest for autonomy within the global system of states is perpetual, governing policy choices for states large and small.

Internally, the state can be defined, according to Eric Nordlinger, solely in terms of the function of its human agents, who are said to be acting autonomously as long as they are not deliberately giving in to demands by societal actors. In this vein, the South African state has been defined as "autonomous" to the extent that it translated its preferences into authoritative actions, the degree to which public policy conforms to the parallelogram of the public officials resource-weighted preferences. To Nordlinger, state autonomy may be operationally defined in terms of the overall frequency with which state preferences coincide with authoritative actions and inactions, the proportion of preferences that do so, the average substantive differences between state preferences and authoritative actions, the average differences between state preferences and authoritative actions, or some combination of the three (Nordlinger, 1981:19-20). Thus, no effective state action can proceed without state autonomy.

successful in acquiring any decision-making authority. Faced with intensified government harassment, wracked by personal and ideological differences within their leadership, lacking sufficient funds, and hobbled by a lack of organization and fluctuating membership, the movement lost force. The weakness of these groups was exposed on March 21, 1960, at Sharpeville, outside of Vereeniging, when the police opened fire on an orderly crowd of 5000 led by the Pan African Congress (PAC). Ambrose Reeves (1961) reported that sixty-nine Africans were killed and 178 wounded.

Accordingly, the role of the South African state in policy making and social change could be adequately understood through the internal complexity of state structures. In narrowing political space, the South African state was pursuing two traditional goals of a state: the achievement of maintenance of order and the extraction of resources from domestic population. The realisation of these goals supposes a relative autonomy which is necessary to effective state intervention. As seen, the search for political sovereignty becomes an effort to establish structural autonomy. Indeed, in a "semiperiphery" society such as South Africa, "growing state activities and an increasingly deep penetration of economy and society by state interventions seem to have played a critical part in enabling capitalist political economy to foster economic growth and manage socioeconomic conflicts" (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985:68).

Rueschemeyer and Evans have postulated that in order to undertake effective intervention, first the state must constitute a bureaucratic apparatus with sufficient corporate coherence. Second, a certain degree of autonomy from dominant interests in a capitalist society is necessary not only to make coherent state action in pursuit of any consistent policy possible, but also because some of the competing interests in economy and society, even structurally dominant ones, will have to be sacrificed in order to achieve systematically required "collective goods" that cannot be provided by partial interests.

The demonstration of the central political authority capacity to control the opposition, and the growth of European support for the government prompted by the turmoil of the late 1950's, the early 1960's, and the mid-1970's, hampered any group seeking to alter the status quo. But, as Pottholm pointed out, in the face of the government's exceptionally

CHAPTER ONE:

THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

2.1.1. CHARACTERISTICS :

The investigation of the South African political system enable us to draw the salient features of state hardness in South Africa and its ability as a state to execute its capabilities in its environment, as shown by the complexity of its institutions.

One of the most developed and modern countries in Africa, South Africa was a highly developed political system with very extensive control over politics and competing ideologies, yet it maintained one of the freest presses in Africa. In addition, it was characterized in part by its various, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic communities. But, the existence of a plural society, a variety of interest groups, multiple national political parties, even the presence of a vibrant opposition press and considerable latitude in interest articulation, should not obscure the fact that the South African political system was controlled by a small number of decision-makers of European descent.

A look to the elaborate framework of the South African constitution shows that politics was based on the primacy of an aristocracy of color - a rigid hierarchy of racial castes - with a direct correlation between one's skin color and the efficacy of one's political participation. The principal decision-makers were all European and, generally, Afrikaans-speaking while there was continual repression of African associational groups, particularly those of an economic and political nature, wrote Potholm (1970:57).

As evidenced by events, the leaders of the South African political system, in addition to narrowing the formal political arena, had also drastically curtailed attempts of individuals and groups to move outside the framework. This claim was exemplified during the end of 1950's and early 1960's when various non-European, multiracial, and European groups attempted to achieve decision-making status through a series of boycotts, stay-at-homes, strikes, mass protests and other protests against pass laws. All these groups were not

ability of decision-makers to achieve their goals. A short structural comparison on political system capabilities in both South Africa and Zaire will close up the following chapters with regard to this issue.

Second, there is the parliamentary system: in this case the executive is meshed with an elected legislature, whose confidence it must retain if it is to remain in office. The role-players in these two branches are intermingled: normally an effort is made to separate and protect role-players of the judicial branch.

Third, there is the convention type of system: this is typified by a revolutionary situation in which one all-powerful assembly rules. There is no separate executive in any sense: the assembly deals with affairs through its committees, as the case in France in the 1790's and in the Soviet Union briefly after the 1917 revolution. Today, no true convention system operates.

So constitutions are usually concerned with the arrangement of powers and it is quite obvious that group arrangements and constitutional arrangements are closely related. However, one can assert that no authoritative institutions could easily exist for long without at least the tacit consent of those affected: it is almost impossible to think of a set of rulers being able to force everyone to obey them indefinitely. That is why support entering the political system was said to be distributed among the political community, the regime, and the authorities.

As Jones has suggested, political institutions might be said to consist of some combination of the regime and the authorities in the model. Authorities referred to the actual occupants of formal, or constitutional, authoritative roles. The regime has several components: it is, in part, the set of values which determine the tolerable bounds of the broad objectives at which the system may be aimed; it is, in part, the day-to-day informal and formal rules of the political game; and it is, in part, a hierarchy of authoritative, or institutional roles. In this way the model is fairly specific (1967:42)

Having made this general point it is now appropriate to contemplate in this chapter particular arrangements of political institutions in South Africa and Zaire. However, this chapter is not designed to be a description of all aspects of the political history of both countries but an attempt to examine the institutional framework in order to discern the

PART TWO:

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAIRE

INTRODUCTION

A frequent habit in Comparative Politics is the use of various "frameworks" or "models". The use of a model of some sort is central to the fully functionalist explanation of politics. Functions concern systems. Our model, as seen, would be the South African and the Zairian political systems viewed as a reflection of their political institutions. By "political institutions" we would like to refer to legislatures, executives and bureaucracies which were taken to be the structures within which authoritative decisions about individuals and societies were made.

Drawing from Roy E. Jones (1967:41-42), it would have noted that normally, a society's arrangement of political institutions is set out in a constitution. A constitution is usually taken to be some kind of superior law: it is the law of how ordinary laws should be made and applied. Commonly, two primary elements can be distinguished in constitutions. First, there are the greater or smaller number of emotive preferences for the norms and goals of the society concerned. Second, there are a set of specific governmental arrangements, set out with a greater or lesser degree of detail.

In addition, constitutions usually arrange the organisation of authoritative institutions by referring to one or more of three available blueprints. First, there is the presidential system: this is typified by an attempt to separate the role-players of the executive branch (with its supporting administration) and the legislative branch and the judicial branch. Attempts are made to delimit the power of these three branches, with a certain amount of overlapping, in a way conforming with their technical descriptions. In effect this is virtually impossible: the political framework of South Africa, despite its functional separation of power, included the supremacy of the executive over the legislative and the judiciary. Meanwhile in Zaire, Mobutu's dictatorship did not allow the country to enjoy separation of powers: he was the law and his word was the law.

it is better to have a strong state than a weak one; a weak state may be unable to pursue the general interest because it is frustrated by particular societal actors. However, this does not imply that an authoritarian regime is desirable. Democracy is not incompatible with a strong state. The ability to vote political leaders out of office is the critical check on abuse of power, as Krasner has stressed (1978:69).

experiences of childhood and early adulthood - family, church, school, work group, voluntary associations - are prepolitical citizenship experiences. Its end product is a set of attitudes - cognitions, value standards, and feelings - toward the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents.

5. THE SYMBOLIC CAPABILITY or the image, domestic and international, that the system projects; i.e. the ability to create symbols whereby the legitimacy of the regime can be enhanced.

With these functions we can now see the extent to which the political system, in both Zaire and South Africa, possesses the ability to respond to the demands emanating from the various interest or sub-groups in the system as a whole. Data from each criterion would show which of the two political entities is less or more responsive.

When judged on the basis of these criteria, the performance of the two systems, obviously, does not evoke similar responses but puts an emphasis on the softness of the Zairian one and the hardness of the latter. Thus, as Krasner noted, there is no reasons to assume *a priori* that the pattern of strength and weakness will be the same for all policies. One state may be unable to alter the structure of the medical system but be able to construct an efficient transportation network, while another can deal relatively easy with getting its citizens around but cannot get their illness cured (1978:58). Many political analysts recognize that in fact strong states have been a rarity. Migdal argues that the image of the strong state found in the social science literature has stemmed in large part from the rapid expansion of the state organization in Latin America, Asia, and Africa during the last generation, as state leaders have set out to offer the elements for viable strategies to the populace and win people over to the state's rules. But it is true that only a handful of Asian, African and Latin American states fall high on the continuum of "stateness" or "state capabilities". Israel, Cuba, China, Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, North and South Korea, have been among the highest in state capabilities (Migdal,1988:265,269). And South Africa could be added to this list.

Furthermore, some of the normative consequences of an analytic framework focussing on the strength and weakness of the state could be noted. One of them is an obvious implication that

engaged in a senseless struggle with civil society to extract the resources necessary for the performance of its other roles. And, in pursuit of its revenue imperative the state is cast in a predatory role.

3. THE DISTRIBUTIVE CAPABILITY, i.e. the ability of the system to reward its members by the allocation of goods, services, status, and opportunities of various kinds.

4. THE RESPONSIVE CAPABILITY, is a relationship between *inputs*, coming from the society or the international political system, and *outputs*. It is an estimate of the degree to which outgoing activity is the consequence of demands arising in the environments of the political system. It implies operational measures, i.e. a given quantity of responses to demands over the total of the demands. For the sake of this work, we have preferred dealing with the *rejuvenative capability* instead of the responsive one, taking in account Potholm's typology on capabilities (1970:19). The reason is simple: the political systems in Zaire and South Africa were known as totalitarian systems. This meant, in conversion or process terms, the flow of inputs from the society was suppressed or strictly regulated. Consequently, we cannot speak of interest groups, media of communication, and political parties as constituting an autonomous political infrastructure. They were to be viewed more as mobilization structures contributing to the regulative, extractive, and symbolic capabilities than as substructures creating the basis for a responsive capability (Almond and Powell, 1966:312).

In this way, the REJUVENATIVE CAPABILITY, implies the ability of the political system to reinforce itself, to maintain and alter its institutions, structures and processes, and to replenish its personnel. In other words, it refers to the capacity of system-maintenance. The political entity must concentrate upon the processes of political *socialization* and *recruitment*, the problems of informational inputs, and the institutionalization of change. Rather, people must be recruited into the roles whose performance is necessary to the maintenance of the system. So there must be accepted ways of producing judges, voters, town clerks, and so on. To maintain the system it is also necessary to condition the members of the system to accept the system's way of doing things: in a variety of ways the members of the system must be socialized. Political socialization is the process by which members of a political system are civically educated and inculcated with the values of the system. In a sense, the socialization

search for autonomy. The amount of regulation necessary to preserve the political entity and to achieve its goals differs from system to system, depending upon the nature of its environment: the type of society involved, the choice of goals, and the levels of social, economic, and political development attained. Related to this capacity is the imperative security. According to scholars, the state seeks to uphold and advance its security.

This imperative is shaped by the incorporation of the state in an international system politically dominated by nation-state actors, and lacking any higher authoritative institutions. The patterned anarchy of the world system, and the disposition of each state to unilaterally define its own interests within it, means that force, actual or threatened, is an important component of interstate relationships: states thus arm themselves, within the limits imposed by their material resources and internal political structures, to meet individually calculated quantum of security. This concealed power is deemed necessary for preserving sovereignty, for averting territorial dismemberment, and for defending material interests. Thus it is clear now the regulative capability includes not only the imperative of security, but also that of hegemony twinned with that of autonomy.

2. THE EXTRACTIVE CAPABILITY is the ability of the authorities to obtain resources from its environment and mobilize them in order to carry out the functions of the state. The size of a country's population and its inherent richness are of great importance in determining a nation's capacity to attain its goals. Related to this imperative is that of accumulation. Here state action in response to other imperatives invariably requires material resources. Because the delicate mission of the state is to sustain conditions in its economic management conducive to investment, while simultaneously pursuing revenue-consuming distribution policies indispensable to its legitimation.

The necessity of a fiscal base which could sustain the expansion of the state in its warfare role is a crucial issue in the implementation of policies and strategies. Meeting the revenue imperative decisively orients many of the policy pursuits of the state. But Young and Turner argue that for the contemporary state, the revenue imperative goes beyond simply meeting state consumption needs, the state itself in nearly all modern economies, socialist or capitalist, is a direct participant in the broader process of accumulation. In other words, the state is

Powell. All of them have found that it has provided a useful way of systematically collecting data about the process by which states attain their goals. Thus, the capabilities of a political system appear as an orderly way to describe its over-all performance in its environment. And other criteria such as the "conversion processes" (transformation of demands and supports into authoritative decisions and their implementation) and the "system maintenance and adaptation functions" are related to the system's capabilities. That is why most of these authors have stressed that the analysis of capabilities enable us to treat political phenomena more precisely and more comprehensively, to classify and compare political systems more effectively and to deal more directly and effectively with the problem of political change.

In other words, reference to the capabilities of a political system is, in effect, an attempt to measure the performance of that political entity in organizing and utilizing its human and natural resources in order to accomplish the goals of the decision-makers. To comprehend the reality of political institutions in South Africa and Zaire, we have to adopt a more productive approach to that proposed by de Crespigny and Shrire, in order, firstly to determine a relative level of performance on the basis of a comparison of the performances of the states under study; secondly, to examine the degree to which certain levels of performance can be attained and maintained by the authorities; and finally, to observe the flexibility of performance, eg. the way in which the decision-makers respond to circumstances of severe stress (1978:27).

It is evident now that the performance of both political systems, on the levels indicated above, can be described in terms of the functional criteria, in accordance with the structural-functional paradigm. Because when we compare individual political systems with one another, we need to compare *inter alia* capabilities. We may turn now to definitions of the five categories of capability, as listed by Almond and Powell, and Potholm to a certain extent. Thus we want to refer to the regulative or the imperative of autonomy or security; extractive or revenue imperative; distributive capacity; responsive - but I prefer rejuvenative capacity closely linked to the symbolic or imperative legitimacy. All constitute the capabilities or outputs of a given political system.

1. THE REGULATIVE CAPACITY is the ability of the system to exercise control over the behaviour of its populace and to influence its membership to behave in certain ways, in its

material supports (payment of taxes or other levies, public works or military service), participatory supports (voting and other form of political activity); obedience to laws and regulations; attention paid to governmental communication, manifestation of deference or respect to public authority, symbols and ceremonials (D.Easton, 1957:383-408).

Broadly speaking, one can note that demands (goods and services) affect the policies or goals of the system, while supports such as taxes, obedience and deference, provide the resources which enable any political system to extract, regulate and distribute- viz. to carry out its goals.

OUTPUTS:

In terms of the state's organizational capacity, the *outputs* correspond closely to the supports listed above and they may or may not be responsive to demands, depending on the kind of political system which is involved. These outputs coincide with the capabilities of the system and help to determine the softness or the hardness of the given political system. Hence the importance of this concept with regard to this study.

Moreover, the flow of inputs and outputs includes transactions between the political system and the components of its domestic and foreign environments. This leads logically to a consideration of the "functions" of political systems. Moving from the structural-functional approach, it is arguable that the "ability to explain and predict in the social sciences is enhanced when we think of social structures and institutions as "performing functions" in systems. Thus, by comparing the performance of structures and the regulatory role of political culture as they fulfill common functions in all systems, we may analyze systems which appear very different from one another, as Almond and Powell have argued.

At this level, we need to consider the activities, or *functions* of political system and in comparing disparate political systems, the area of *capabilities* or the ability of the decision-makers to implement their goals, is one of the most important. The capabilities of the system in its functioning can be considered as its operation as an "individual" in its environment, the way in which it performs as a unit in such environment. This aspect of the conceptual framework was inspired by the structural-functionnal approach of sociologist Talcott Parsons and applied to political systems by Gabriel Almond, James Coleman and later by G.Bingham

2.1.2.1.2. The "Native Question":

As a matter of fact, the proper place of Africans in South African society was the crucial point for the white group. This reason explains the constant search for mechanisms to remove the "Native Question" from the political arena and to remove questions of politics from the consideration of the "Native Question".

For scholars (Dubow,1989; Ashforth,1990; Hanekom,1986), the imperative of removing "politics" from consideration of the "Native Question" has been a central theme of official South African discourse. This imperative is directly related to the structural exclusion of Africans from political citizenship and the consequent denial by the ruling orders of their right to be heard in the main forums of political representation. Ashforth stated that in the first half of this century, the central issues of state and society formation in South Africa were spoken of by the ruling orders as the "Native Question". At this time the "Native Question" was the intellectual domain in which the knowledge, strategies, policies, and justifications necessary for the maintenance of domination were fashioned.

In the period after the South African War and during State formation, the "Native Question" was perceived by those in command of state power as being a primary matter for political resolution and this matter concerned, first of all, the problem of securing an adequate supply of cheap labour for the gold mines of the Witwatersrand.

Moreover, we cannot forget firstly that the prevailing opinion was not to permit white people to fall to the level of Blacks or to undertake *kaffir* work for wages. White people could not be allowed to fall below standards regarded as appropriate for "civilized" persons and accordingly irrespective of their level of productivity, Whites could expect to be paid a wage permitting them to enjoy a level of living considered in keeping with European standards. Secondly, the Constitution of the Union of South Africa, represented, especially, what Manzo calls "the codification of the scientifically justified western principle of white supremacy". When the Union took effect, farmers were active in politics - in 1910 over 50 percent of MPs in the governing South African Party (SAP) were farmers. Between 1910 and early Nationalists period, 1948-56, commercial farmers

race lines were pervasive and formalized, affecting questions of social and economic privilege and access to the State. Land and labour became race questions. Hence the *Native Question*, as we shall see in the following section.

Therefore, for historical motivations it is important to remember that the modern South Africa state emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century from what Ashforth (1990:22) calls a *crucible* of war: the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 between imperial British troops and the forces of the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In terms of the South Africa Act, 1909, the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State united in a legislature and administrative arrangements of the Union were largely based on those that had been in operation in the four colonies when the Union was established in 1910. Legislative and executive authorities of the Union were in terms of the Constitution, vested in the British monarch. The new country was part of the British empire and thus accepted the authority of the British Crown over certain of its affairs. Whites dominated the government and controlled political and economic decision-making power. The Africans, the majority of the population, had virtually no voice in government.

About the question of the Union, Plaatje (1969), has remarked laconically that "in 1909, His Majesty's Government passed the Union Constitution....In that Act, they practically told South Africa to do what she liked with the "Natives" in these three colonies and South Africa is doing it".

In this paper, the term "native" refers to all black South Africans without exception. Why the "Native Question" and how did the State resolve it? It is very important for us to understand this matter because we cannot discuss the development of the "Native Administration" without saying anything about the "great question"; the "Native Question"

!

Liberal scholars saw antecedents of segregation and apartheid in the "shepstonian" policies of colonial Natal. It is in Natal that the demarcation of Native reserves, the State's use of Chiefs for administrative purposes and the recognition of customary law, were pioneered.

The segregationist movement took on a magnitude with the discovery of diamonds in the Cape and gold deposits in the Transvaal. These discoveries were to lead to complications requiring more rigid substance in the definition of divisions in the labour market. Dubow (1989:22-23) asserted that for the Witwatersrand, it was an event with effects which were to ramify into practically every aspect of life in the subcontinent, as vast amounts of capital and legions of workers converged upon the new town of Johannesburg. For Tinley (1942:x-xi), the labor question had emerged as a distinct problem in South Africa only from 1870, coincident with the development of the mining industry. The expansion of diamond mining from 1870 and particularly of the Witwatersrand gold mines from 1886, has had a profound influence upon subsequent economic development in South Africa.

The new *paysage* brought subsequent changes in the political and economic structures of South Africa. Especially the measures taken by the government since the end of the First World War to guide the economy of that country in the direction of greater self-sufficiency, have contributed to making the "Native labour question" an interesting and baffling problem for the following decades.

These changes saw the beginning of a new era in race relations in South Africa and notably a ferocious antagonism mainly between Blacks and Whites. In the earliest years of the twentieth century, South African society was defined into class and racial differences. And the role played by the state apparatus in this matter was significant: first by *official practice* and then by legislation. The notion of a white survival line was to dominate and Whites were to be protected from the competition of non-Whites at all costs even if this meant a *permanent distortion of the economy*.

Under these circumstances, the expansion of the market economy and European settlement, as Greenberg (1980:53) observes, raised questions about land and labour that were answered in race terms. In the period before capitalist relations dominated these societies,

of colonial life, formed the basis of a distinctive new white-dominated multi-racial society.

Quickly, Whites felt the *peril* represented by other communities especially, the black community or "Africans". Thus they were consequently to be protected from the competition of non-Whites, and the form it took was to vary over years. The early years saw a development of new attitudes among white settlers towards any other racial group they saw as inferior. They reinforced their growing prejudices by reference to the Old Testament which they believed as giving divine sanction to white Christian superiority. To be Christian and White was seen as being civilized. A civilized Christian was White and consequently anyone who was not white was uncivilized. For historians this line of false logic may have been naive but the consequence was the inevitable division of South Africa into racially determined compartments.

When the various missionary groups working in the Cape in the nineteenth century preached that a civilized man was still seen as a Christian but he could also be a non-white, the Boers found that this was unacceptable. They were soon to leave the jurisdiction of the British Crown to establish the Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. They had firmly expressed their belief in their racial superiority, initially in the Trekkers manifesto and later in the Constitution of the Transvaal. By the 1830s, the pre-industrial economy in South Africa was dominated by a "paternalistic Master and Servant relationship simple in substance and practice" (Konczacki *et al.*, 1991:1-210).

It has been suggested too that the experience of British rule in Basutoland provided a model for some of the early theorists of segregation, as well the provisions of Cecil Rhodes's 1894 Glen Grey Act. The 1894 Glen Grey Act suggested the division of the land into surveyed private four-morgen holdings. Moreover, it was intended to limit the numbers the land could carry and thus, indirectly, to force the surplus into the capitalist sector. Larcey (1981:14) argued that the success of Rhodes's scheme was that it increased the government's control over Africans in Glen Grey and laid down that areas could be drawn into the system by the simple device of proclamation. Afterwards, the Glen Grey Act would seriously influence the segregationist legislation in the period post-Union.

The other set of traditional enemies comprised the black people of southern Africa. San and Bantu speaking Africans were seen as bloodthirsty savages who blindly resisted the spread of white Christian civilization. As Venter has observed, the republican issue ensued in white politics. It would be a long, divisive and arduous struggle, dividing Afrikaners in particular and white South Africans in general on the issue of a republican form of government. It was to be the organising theme of Afrikaner politics for the next thirty years until they won the 1948 elections.

Another major issue which had dominated South African politics since the Union was the Native Question in the political process. When the four colonies became the provinces of the Union in 1910, they were administered as separate entities. This led to differences of opinion among the representatives of the four provinces during discussions on the place Blacks would occupy in the proposed constitutional establishment. At this stage, I think this crucial question deserves more attention and I will focus on the origins of racial discrimination in South Africa and on the development of the "Native Question", why and how it was resolved through the "Native Administration" and "Native Policy".

The period between 1910 and 1948 was one characterized by the implementation of segregationist legislation and the consolidation and intensification of racial discrimination. At this time, racial differences determined the entire organization of society. For a comprehensive survey of this question, we shall start here briefly with the racial option which origins dated back to the earliest years of the Dutch settlement at the Cape in 1652. Because segregation in South Africa was intimately related to the "Native Question", it is impossible to talk about one without talking about the other.

2.1.2.1.1. The Racial Option

In the Cape Colony a European administration, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), ruled over a mixed population of white settlers and their servants, African and Asian slaves, Khoikhoi and San peoples with different cultures. The Europeans brought with them to the Cape ideas about race, religion and status which, in the concrete circumstances

executive is responsible to Parliament, and in which the Cabinet could not initiate legislation, did not have any authority over the colonial armed forces, and no right to conduct foreign policy. Its jurisdiction was strictly related to circumscribed internal matters.

In the wake of the Union, the new system of government accepted the Westminster form of constitutional monarchy. The Union was an autonomous polity with the British Empire and could, like other "White" dominions (Australia, New Zealand, Canada) receive independent status within the Empire. Thus, by 1934, the Union of South Africa was a self-governing and independent dominion within the British Commonwealth, capable of making independent foreign policy decisions, accrediting diplomats, belonging to international organisations.

One should point out that the years between 1910 and 1961 were a period of constitutional development for the Union of South Africa. There were a number of important constitutional questions which had to be solved, especially the conflict between Afrikaners and British and the political rights of Natives in the state to be decided. Despite their numerical inferiority in the new Union, it was English-speaking South Africans who dominated the twentieth-century political economy of South Africa. For them nationalism was an alien and perhaps unnecessary ideology.

Meanwhile, many Afrikaners were not satisfied with the international law status of the Union and saw themselves as unwillingly bonded to the British Empire. Confronted with the economic domination of English-speakers, the more radical Afrikaner nationalists objective came to be the capture of the state through ethnic mobilisation. For them, the rest of the world, so far as it had been concerned with them, had been hostile. They discerned two sets of traditional enemies. One is composed of the British government and South Africans of British descent: the British government was seen as the oppressor of the Afrikaner people for as long as it had power in South Africa, and the British settlers, as its Trojan horse, as Thompson & Prior have remarked.

as the result of the specific processes of class formation and class struggle in which capitalist relations of production were established on a large scale in South Africa.

Accordingly, the development of capitalism in South Africa subjected Blacks to a range of specific highly coercive measures such as racially discriminatory land laws, the pass system regulating their mobility, special taxes to drive them into wage labour, the compound system, and so on.

Meanwhile, the executive authority was vested in an executive council which acted as the Cabinet or Ministry, but no mention of which was made in the constitution. Like the Belgian Congo, a Governor-general acted as representative of the British monarch. In consonance with the Westminster parliamentary tradition, the Cabinet had to have the confidence of the lower house to remain in power.

The Cabinet was chaired by the Prime Minister who was the leader of the majority political party in the house of Assembly. He was in effect the chief executive officer of the Union government and was the constitutional head of state. He acted on the advice of the cabinet. With regard to the subservience of the South African parliament to the British parliament, the Governor-General constitutionally had to act on the advice of the British Cabinet. This meant that the Governor-General could effectively veto legislation of the South African Parliament, and could therefore still exercise an amount of real political power.

On the provincial level, each province of the Union received a provincial council which elected an executive committee and regional authorities were subject completely to the sovereignty of Parliament. Each province was to be administered by a cabinet-appointed administrator, who chaired the meeting of the executive committee, but was directly responsible to the central government.

One can note that the system of government of the new Union of South Africa in essence perpetuated the system of responsible colonial government of the previous former colonies. That system was the typical parliamentary form of government or executive, in which the

2.1.2.1. The Union of South Africa

Historically, modern political institutions (A.Venter,1989) were instituted in 1910 when the former four colonies were united to form the Union of South Africa. Thus by the South Africa Act, 1910, the Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910. This Act, as Venter points out, was in effect the constitution of the Union of South Africa and provided a central bicameral legislature named Parliament and consisted of a House of Assembly (lower house) and a Senate (upper house). For all the peoples of South Africa, new ethnic identities emerged around 1910 when the state was being constructed as a single entity out of the British colonics, the conquered Afrikaner republics and African kingdoms in the region. Marks and Trapido point out that this unification did not lead to a single pan-South African, pan-ethnic nationalism was the outcome of a history of regional divisions, the racism and social Darwinism of the late nineteenth century and the specific political-cum-class struggles which were being legitimated by the discourse of nationalism (1987:2).

The new parliamentary system excluded virtually all the Black population. Their political rights in South Africa have been a thorny and controversial political issue. The House of Assembly was elected by universal White adult male franchise and a qualified vote-Coloured, Indian and Black males in the Cape and Natal. Transvaal and the Orange Free State maintained the status quo ante-Union and no people of colour received the vote there. The vast bulk of the black population was excluded from all representation in, and access to, state structures. Power was transferred to the minority and in doing this, Britain sanctioned the regime of white supremacy that deprived Africans of political rights in their own country and treated them essentially as a pool of cheap labour, as we will see. The formal exclusions inscribed in the state have been accompanied by a complex of racial laws and sprawling bureaucratic and police agencies, and, in the end, have been confirmed by the courts and prison system.

For scholars, administration in South Africa was basically controlled by a central government that operated within a "Westminster" framework. This form of state emerged

which the society operates. This system of rules was structured on the basis of a legislature, a judiciary, an executive and an administration.

According to historians, it is arguable that although there was already a well-established human settlement in South Africa, the arrival of Jan Van Riebeeck at the Cape in April 1652 marks the beginning of Dutch colonisation and the start of what scholars describe as the political and constitutional development of a white, Western-oriented state in South Africa. Some others have outlined that for much of the twentieth century, an exclusive form of white Afrikaner nationalism, with its explicit objective the capture of the state by the white Afrikaner "nation", has confronted its counterpart, a pan-South African black nationalism, which has sought the incorporation of Africans into the body politic. The exclusivism of Afrikaner Christian nationalism with its roots in late-nineteenth-century European nationalism has been confronted by a black nationalism which, despite strong Africanist underpinnings, has in general espoused the nineteenth-century liberal values of multiracialism (Marks and Trapido, 1987:1).

Most of those academics agreed that, structurally and functionally, the system of central government and administration in South Africa was a variant of democratic constitutionalism of primarily British origin (see Denis Worrall, 1975, 31-74; A. de Crespigny and R. Shrire, 1978, 1-15; L. Thompson and A. Prior, 1982, 79). The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa closely resembled that of the United Kingdom in its structure, procedure and practice. This is largely the outcome of the historical-constitutional process and a continuation of a larger and growing version of the system of representative and responsible government which landmarked the Cape Colony's constitutional development in 1872 and that of the former British South African colonies at later dates. The Cape was under a progressively relaxing form of British colonial rule from 1806, Natal from 1845 and Transvaal and Orange Free State from 1903, after losing their independence at the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.

From this perspective, it could be argued that the most important thing in South Africa politics after 1902 was the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and later the system of Apartheid after the 1948 NP's victory.

decision making and electoral contests (a whites exclusivity) for key executive and legislative posts.

Along these lines, it is worth looking briefly at the nature of the South African institutions and the struggle for their control by state leaders. The context in which government and politics take place has an important influence in determining how political life is conducted and what issues absorb the attention of policy-makers. This section summarizes many of the important characteristics of this context and relates them to the dominant concepts of autonomy, penetration or control and legitimacy especially in contemporary South African politics. Let us now investigate the political organisation of the South African political system by examining the extent of its constitutional arrangements.

2.1.2. POLITICAL ORGANISATION

It should be said that state managers would not be able to implement correct policy unless they have at their disposal a previously constructed bureaucratic machinery with appropriate capacities for action. From a Weber's view, effective state intervention is predicated on the existence of a well-developed bureaucratic apparatus. And the historical character of the bureaucratic apparatus must be taken into account in any attempt to explain its capacity, or lack of capacity, to intervene (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985:59).

An important characteristic of South African society is the diversity of the population. During the period prior to the 1994 elections, it was made up of several racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. But racial diversity was perhaps the most politically important characteristics. In April 1994 the estimated ethnic composition of the total population (40,436,000) was as follows: Blacks: 30,645,157 (76,67%); Whites: 5,171,419 (12,84%); Coloureds: 3,435,114 (8,53%); Asians: 1,032,943 (2,56%); Source: Africa South of the Sahara 1996:877.

In an ethnically heterogeneous society the state should play a significant role by protecting cultural plurality. In this sense the state was viewed as only one of the groups through

of them may serve as a basis for increased state autonomy. Thus the major cleavages in a social structure are based on interests. In a divided society like the apartheid state, ethnic and religious solidarities and exclusions tended to be diffuse and all-embracing rather than instrumental and therefore responded less readily to state policy. In addition, the state's claim to be the embodiment of universalistic interests - and therefore its legitimacy were particularly difficult to sustain, as we will see. However, when these racial or ethnic cleavages are hierarchically ordered and when a single ethnic group manages to gain continuous control over the state apparatus, they may enhance state autonomy. The relative autonomy of the Afrikaner state vis-à-vis the Anglo economic elite was perhaps the most obvious example.

Obviously, South African leaders, by the use and the threat of force and by the legal framework and enforcement of laws sought to control the population under their jurisdiction and to regulate its behavior. These images of a strong state offer suggestive ideas about the relationships of a potentially but problematic autonomous state to its socioeconomic environments, to dominant and subordinate classes, and to politically active or potentially mobilized groups. This leads Rueschemeyer and Evans, over again, to demonstrate that increased penetration of civil society by the state activates political responses and increases the likelihood that societal interests will attempt to invade and divide the state. Increasing intervention makes the states more clearly an arena of social conflict and makes its constituent parts more attractive targets for takeover. In other words, the contradictions of civil society become more embedded in the state as the state more deeply penetrates civil society, potentially undermining both coherence as a corporate actor and its autonomy (1985:69). However, as Theda Skocpol has put, "state autonomy" is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go (1985:14).

One could note that a political system willing to maximize its power will therefore seek not only to control its population, but to enable it to meet its expectations. This supposes the existence of a bureaucratic system. It should be remind that administrative, legal, extractive and coercive organisations are the core of any state. In South Africa they were structured and embedded in a constitutional-representative system of parliamentary

In addition, scholarly debate reveals that the state offers, in the context of a capitalist economy as in South Africa, a contribution that is both unique and necessary. Unique because it transcends the logic of the competitive market and necessary because a capitalist economy requires, for its development as well as its maintenance in the face of changing conditions, the supply of "collective goods" that cannot be provided by the competitive actors in the economy. From this view, it must be possible to sacrifice the interests of certain segments of capital in the pursuit of policies that maintain the viability of the socioeconomic system and preserve the general rate of return.

Rueschemeyer and Albritton (1985:64-65) have suggested three conditions leading to greater autonomy. These conditions should be subsequently considered within the South African context:

1. The division within the dominant class. In South Africa, dominant class actors, including mining and farming capitalists helped make the South African racial order. As a more complex elite structure that included urban and industrial groups emerged, the state expanded its intervention in the domestic economy.
2. Increased pressure from subordinate classes. Oddly, increasing levels of class conflict probably enhance the state's autonomy vis-à-vis society in general. The South African state emerged accordingly, "as single-dimensional and ahistorical", pressed by social definitions to coercive regulation of its African population. In the absence of shared sentiments such as patriotism, love of the country, loyalty and the like, there loomed an ominous brutishness - coercion exercised on a large scale and the threat of social disintegration (Greenberg, 1987:6). As the state apparatus is called on to take a more active role in repressing subordinate groups, it becomes more willing to move against dominant group as well.
3. Constellations in which the pact of domination has serious cleavages within it, in which threats from below induce the dominant classes to grant greater autonomy to the state, or in which subordinate classes acquire sufficient power to undo monolithic political control by the dominant classes. A wide variety of such constellations can be envisioned, and each

and chiefs, and the chiefs were expected to co-operate in getting their people to work for Whites.

3- The Transvaal and the Orange Free State both had a blatant "master-servant system", and the administration of Africans there was geared to preserve this relationship.

Under Hertzog in 1927, the new administrative policy cut across the assimilationist trends of the Cape and was rejected by Africans throughout the country. The fundamental change of the new policy was basically a return to "tribalism". The tribal system and native law, under proper administration, appears to have been the most efficient machinery of government in definitely native areas. Absolute control was the aim of this policy as Herbst (1929-30:478-89) explained that "the 1927 Native Administration Act was an attempt to put on a proper footing the whole administration of Natives throughout the Union."

The 1927 Native Administration Act also gave the power to make use of that control when the state officially adopted the Natal system of having a Supreme chief with the right to rule by proclamation. The Act gave the Governor-General vast powers by appointing him nominal Supreme-chief of all Africans, except those in the Cape. Likewise, the Minister of Native Affairs and his NAD staff could act in his name and so use that authority. Not only did the Supreme-chief wield vast powers, but he could rule by proclamation, and Africans had no recourse to the courts. With all this authority, the Supreme chief was also empowered to "modify, vary or alter any of the said provisions of Native Law".

In short, the 1927 Native Administration Act succeeded, in addition to creating a separate administration for Africans in the Country, in enabling the government to prevent African entry into any area designated as a pass area. The 1917 Native Administration Bill and especially the 1927 Native Administration Act enabled the government to find a framework for its "Native policy" and gave the government the opportunity to use race laws and *ipso facto* to control the mobility and the proletarianization of African workers.

subsequent shaping of white-supremacist rural economy. It defined scheduled areas to form the nucleus of the reserves. Tom Lodge, critically argues that "the Land Act of 1913 and complementary labour legislation were the legal tools employed to destroy a whole class of peasant producers, forcing them into already crowded reserves or driving them into new and arduous social relationships - as farm workers, as mine labourers, and later in the least skilled and most badly paid positions in urban industrial, municipal and domestic employment" (1983:2).

Ultimately this Act had devastating consequences for the African population. For decades after its passage, African leaders bitterly denounced it and its consequences raised a strong protest against the Act. Yet the Natives' Land Act became law and was operating as soon as it could be promulgated, despite protestations.

2.1.2.1.3.3. The 1927 Native Administration Act:

The Administration Act was promulgated in 1927. It was a veritable *coup* for the "Native Administration". Its passage enabled the NAD to establish successfully the legislative framework for its future expansion within the segregationist and, later, apartheid state. Scholars considered this Act as a "political centrepiece" of segregation. In this context, Dubow interpreted the Administration Act not only as a major triumph for segregationism, but also as the mechanism by which the NAD attempted to recapture the authority it had lost to the Department of Justice after 1922.

Meanwhile, the disunity in African administration was a reality, a legacy of the past, as we have seen above. Each of the four pre-Union States had a social structure of its own, and in each the administrative system had evolved to suit the local scene. For instance:

- 1- The Cape had always worked towards breaking the tribal system and the chiefs' authority.
- 2- Natal did the very opposite. There the tribal structure was retained as far as possible, along with "native" law and custom. Administration depended on the authority of parents

The salient feature of this Act was the rush for its promulgation. Indeed, in less than two months the Natives' Land Act was law. A deeply upset Plaatje noted: "with a rush, the Natives' Land Bill was dispatched from the Lower House to the Senate, adopted hurriedly by the Senate, returned to the Lower House, and went at the same pace to Government House, and there, receiving the Governor-General's signature, it immediately became law. This excited haste suggests grave misgivings as to the character of the Bill. Why all the hurry and scurry, and why the Governor-General's approval in advance? Other Bills are passed and approved by the Governor ... the beginning of the next calendar year, or of the next financial year?"

It is perhaps Feinberg who has better responded to Plaatje's preoccupations. When he emphasized that the aim of the Bill's supporters was segregation. And segregation was the chief object of the Native Land Act, the vehicle to achieve this goal was to prevent Africans from buying land in White South Africa. This followed discussions on the idea of segregation at various level among Whites between 1910 and 1913. Political party manifestos, newspaper editorials, and statements by politicians, religious figures and others promoted the efficacy of segregation for South Africa. High-ranking politicians supported the idea of segregation presented by Hertzog publicly during 1912 and 1913, as well as in private meetings with Africans, suggesting a gradual division of South Africa into white and black territories. During the debate on the Bill, approval of segregation was almost unanimous. Most of them agreed that the principle was segregation of the races, which was to be achieved by the separate occupation and ownership of land. And they believed that the main purpose of the Bill was to promote segregation.

Increasingly upset, Plaatje observed that "if anyone had told us at the beginning of 1913 that a majority of members of the Union parliament was capable of passing a law like the Natives' Land Act, whose object is to prevent natives from ever rising above the position of servants to whites, we would have regarded that person as a fit subject for the lunatic asylum".

For Konczacki *et al.* the Land Act was widely regarded as the single most important statute in the shaping of South Africa's racial order and did lay the foundations for the

At this time no representations could stop it. It was so important because it was the first major piece of legislation that would later comprise the legal structure of apartheid. It was only repealed in 1991. Authors such as Feinberg (1993:65-109), Greenberg, Plaatje, Dubow, Manzo, Ashforth, Lodge, Rich, etc... had have an opportunity to analyse and discuss the above Act deeply. Essentially the Land Act established the principle of territorial segregation under which Africans and Whites were to acquire and occupy land in separate, designated areas. But it was also an attempt to suppress squatting and other unauthorised occupation by Africans of Crown and private lands, and to outlaw certain forms of tenancy on white-owned farms.

According to Feinberg, "the Natives Land Act included a "schedule of native Areas", incorporating all the African reserves that had been established in the various provinces prior to 1913. The Act carefully delineated the boundaries of these reserved areas". In addition, the most important provision of the Act stated that "Africans could no longer buy, lease, or in any other manner acquire land outside a scheduled area, except by acquiring that land from Africans, and Europeans were prohibited from buying or leasing land from an African. Only Africans could buy land within the scheduled areas".

In other words, the Natives' Land Act provided the basis for territorial separation of White and African in the rural areas, and was derived from the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC).

It effectively froze existing "tribal" areas, scheduling about 10,5 million morgen of land as areas for exclusive African occupation - primarily in Zululand, Ciskei and Transkei, but it also stopped Africans from acquiring additional land outside these areas. The Act also undermined the rights of African sharecroppers on white farms, but preserved labour tenancy. In this Act, as the *Reader's Digest* (1939) has maintained, was the source of one of the chief black grievances against the white government: Africans were given ownership rights in just over 7 percent of the land area of South Africa (extended to 13 percent in 1936).

is impossible. The white man must rule, because he is elevated by many, many steps above the black man; steps which it will take the latter centuries to climb, and which it is quite possible that the vast bulk of the black population may never be able to climb at all... And Blacks were necessary only to supply cheap labour without threatening economically the natural superiority of Whites". In short, 'his vision was of "a white man's country" in which a largely increased white population could live in decency and comfort'.

The Act of Union was a stunning triumph for the Boer negotiators of 1908-9. Because it was a unity built on their terms: except in the Cape, Blacks would not have the right to vote; and in the delimitation of constituencies, loading procedures would give greater weight to the rural vote to ensure future Afrikaner political control. They broadened agreement that only unification and a consistent "native policy" would secure white control in South Africa.

Despite protestations from educated Africans who reacted to the Act, a draft constitution was completed in February 1909, debated by the four colonial parliaments, and finally accepted locally with amendments by the Convention and was then sent to London for approval and enacted by the British Parliament without alteration.

2.1.2.1.3.2. The 1913 Natives' Land Act :

The most important segregation laws of the century is the Act of 27 of April 1913, the Natives' Land Act which took effect on June 19, 1913, less than three years after the formation of the Union of South Africa. The *architects* of Union had agreed that the "thorny question" of a common "native policy" would be left to the first Union parliament - and it was not long in coming: the 1913 Natives' Land Act divided South Africa into "white" and "black" areas - and led to the ejection of African "squatters" from their homes. This Act was and is still considered as one of the cornerstones of segregation, a far more draconian Bill which was rushed through Parliament by the Liberal J.W.Sauer, the new Minister of Native Affairs - who was seen as "a friend of Blacks".

democratic face of "responsible government" for white citizens and had to be justified separately. As we have seen with the SANAC Report, the emergent South African state was built through political notions of "tribalism" as the identity-constituting basis of "the Native" and "civilization" as that of "the European".

As Ashforth has formulated, this required the permanent establishment of a uniform political status for the "Native" population which in turn could only legitimately be achieved through a division of the State based on differential sovereignty over fundamentally divided territory.

The outcome of these issues was a series of measures that were enacted and which pointed out the fact that many scholars, in a rather disjointed fashion, had analysed successive legislation in South Africa in the twentieth century that sought to exclude Africans from land-ownership and citizenship rights in urban areas.

Historically, we can note that in the early 1900s, South African legislators, motivated by insecurity and greed, set out to devise a defensive bastion against black advancement and to ensure that African labour remained cheap and easy to control. The result was the so-called *bedrock* legislation - in which the basic principles of segregation were enshrined in statutes. "Native Policy" is well defined in a series of segregationist legislation.

The main structural components of the divided state's political constitution were *inter alia* enshrined in the South Africa Act of 1909, the 1913 Natives Land Act, and the 1927 Native Administration Act.

2.1.2.1.3.1. The South Africa Act of 1909 :

The Act of Union succeeded in bringing the four colonies under one flag, but it failed to unite the country by excluding Blacks and sowing the seeds of discontent. It was preceded by the *Selborne Memorandum* of 1907 which backed single "native policy" for a future united South Africa; perhaps influenced by *Milner's* belief. Milner believed firmly in the political superiority of Whites. According to him, "a political equality of White and Black

opportunity in 1917 when it proposed the Native Administration Bill, which remained an important piece of legislation in the development of "Native Administration".

2.1.2.1.3. The Development of Native Policy:

Throughout the nineteenth century, it was easy to say that the colonial administration and settler regimes helped regulate the mobility and service contracts of Africans workers and forged a labour framework which consisted of a medley of hut taxes, pass laws, influx control and restricted African reserves. All this eroded African peasant society. Firstly, there was a State willing and able to construct repressive policies and the use of race laws constituted the beginnings of what has become the essence of "apartheid". Obviously we can take note of this intention which can be translated as an involvement of the State in the "official solution" to the "Native Question" and an important element shaping the further elaboration of the racial order.

Secondly, indeed, the role played by the State before and after Union as regards "native policy" was remarkable. Thus, in the first two decades after Union in 1910, there were four major issues facing successive governments, as a writer has schematised:

- i. How to inhibit further the growth of an independent African peasantry so as to force all Africans to become migrant workers dependent on the wage sector for their survival.
- ii. Where to settle African share-croppers, half-share farmers and cash tenants said to be squatting illegally on white-owned farms.
- iii. The mass influx of Africans to the towns, which created a new and urgent problem for the State, one which reached crisis point in the early 1920s.
- iv. What to do with African townsmen?

In the aftermath of the Union, significant segregationist legislation was firmly planted and the racially exclusive character of the South African state sat "uneasily" with the ostensibly

4- In Natal magistrates were also attached to the Department of Justice, where necessary they were assisted in matters of native administration by a staff of "Inspectors of Locations and Mission Reserves", who belonged to the NAD.

5- In Orange Free State, native administration, such as it existed, was likewise administered by Justice magistrates.

In 1907, the Botha government first established a Government Labour Bureau in Transvaal in order to regulate the supply of labour to the mines. Operating parallel to the NAD was the Native Labour Sub-Department, created in terms of the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act. The Native Labour section was responsible for the supervision and control of African workers in industrial areas.

The result of these complexity and sophisticated administrative arrangements was the fragmentation of the NAD, and its weakness and lack of influence at national level. The NAD was fragmented by divergent, if not contradictory sources of authority. With the exception of the Transkei where the NAD was coherent and homogeneous, elsewhere, NAD control was at best tenuous and it was invariably subordinate to the Department of Justice, whose dominance contributed in no small measure to the NAD's poor image. Many scholars have stigmatized this state of affairs and then pointed out that the NAD during the early 1920s was in no position to generate an ideology of segregation, much less to take the initiative in its implementation or administration. In short, the NAD's weakness was especially exacerbated by the fact that it lacked an effective departmental head and any dynamic sense of direction.

But from the late 1920s, the NAD expanded to become a major force within the state. Thus the Department was more concerned with re-establishing its effectiveness as an administrative entity than with planning a segregationist programme. Hence a massive reorganization of the Department, despite the open conflict with the Public Service Commission (PSC) on the one hand and the Department of Justice on the other. Meanwhile, in the field of "Native Administration", the Botha government took an

2.1.2.1.2.2. The Department of Native Affairs (NAD):

Responsibility for administering the laws relating to "Natives" which proliferated in this period lay with the "Department of Native Affairs" (NAD). This department was established at the time of Union, but the diverse systems of administration were not effectively unified after the proclamation of the Native Administration Act of 1927 which constituted the NAD as a "state within a state" for "Native" subjects and institutionalized a form of administration on "tribal" lines that was greatly resented by many Africans.

The legislative and ideological continuity of segregationist policies was severely disrupted during the First World War and its immediate aftermath. At this time the NAD was weak and poor. It was small, managing to attract only a tiny fraction of the state's total expenditure and was not well represented within the country. Many observers regarded the NAD as the *Cinderella of the ministerial family* and its prestige was correspondingly low. Among them was Dubow who argued that "as a Department "without honour", it lacked "both adequate organization and, even, a real head".

The result of Union was the merging of three separate Departments of Native Affairs, each with distinctive administrative characteristics. One can note that the new Union Native Affairs Department was unified in name only. Schematically (Dubow, 1989:77), the structure of the NAD after 1910 can be summarized as follows:

- 1- In the Transkei a chief magistrate administered native affairs with the aid of twenty-seven magistrates, all of them were attached to the NAD.
- 2- The Ciskei was administered by magistrates of the Department of Justice. They were aided by " native super-intendents", who belonged to the NAD.
- 3- In the Transvaal, all magistrates were controlled by the Department of Justice, and they were also native commissioners *ex officio*.

Because traditional authority structures amongst colonized peoples had in many instances been commandeered by colonial administrators in fact, the "tribal system" became a ready-made administrative instrument, a vehicle for achieving uniformity in the system of administration. In short, as Ashforth has argued, as an "official solution" of the "Native Question", the SANAC Report embodies a scheme of legitimation in which the elements of land, labour and legitimation are combined in a distinctive fashion for twentieth-century South Africa: a scheme for a division of territory and a socio-spatial distribution of people according to a pattern that would become known as "segregation" and, later, "apartheid".

2.1.2.1.2.1. The Development of "Native Administration"

The South Africa Act of 1909 containing the political "Constitution" for South Africa, was a "compromise formula". For the most part, it maintained the *status quo* of colonial practice on the "Native Question" while introducing a form of central government for "Europeans" of the Union based on principles imported from Westminster. Except to a limited degree in the Cape (because of the Cape Natives Franchise) where the South Africa Act admitted some Africans to the vote, the political system of the Union was constructed as a parliamentary democracy of white (male) citizens coupled with an authoritarian government of "Natives". However, in 1930 under the Women's Enfranchisement Act (no.18 of 1931) "European" women were given the vote. But, the majority of the population - Blacks - was excluded from participation within the central organs of state power and precluded from citizenship by boundaries drawn on lines demarcated by criteria of "colour" or "race".

During this period, the implementation of policies seeking to establish the political uniformity of the "Native population" as a subject race in practice was effective.

The purpose of the Commission was "to inquire into and report on" the following matters:

- 1- The status and condition of the Natives; the lines on which their natural advancement should proceed; their education, industrial training; and labour.
- 2- The tenure of land by Natives and the obligation to the State which it entails.
- 3- Native law and administration.
- 4- The prohibition of and sale of liquor to Natives.
- 5- Native marriages and the extent and effect of polygamy.

The commission's task was to find organizational principles capable of unifying the structure of administration. The Commission was constituted as a body of experts on the "Native Question" representing the colonial governments. It was not a representative body in the broad sense of representing social groups or economic interests. There were neither African members, nor missionaries.

In the SANAC Report, we can detect the idea of devising a state structure founded on territorial division inspiring and deriving from what Ashforth calls "a combination of the experience of Shepstone's reserve system in Natal, the principles of Rhodes's Glen Grey Act of 1894 in the Cape, the racial exclusivity of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State policies, imperial law of conquest, and general British colonial policy on the governance of "Native" races. In this vein, Lacey observes that, post-Union segregationist law certainly drew on the SANAC recommendations, but those had first been inspired mainly by Rhodes's Glen Grey system. In that Report, the SANAC proposed that because the "Natives" were deemed to be a largely homogeneous population, in this account, there must be a single unified system of administration for the "Natives" as a whole and the foundation of "Native Administration" was to be the system of "tribalism".

constituted the largest single bloc in Parliament and, particularly, in the governing parties; their constituencies and their concerns provided the principal issues for the State.

This bias is often cited as an example of how the Trekker mentality has prevailed in a South African policy dominated by Afrikaners. It became an imperious necessity for them to protect the prestige and privileges which the dominant group enjoyed because of its position and function in the world of production and power. In Hofmeyer's terms "the important thing is not the native's inferiority, or his equality, or his superiority; what is important is just the fact that he is different from the white man. The recognition of this difference should be the starting-point in South Africa's "Native policy" (1931:311-2).

I can assert that the "Native Question" found its way on to the agenda of the 1903 Bloemfontein Conference; where an Inter-Colonial Customs Conference assembled under the chairmanship of Viscount Milner, the British High Commissioner to South Africa, with delegations from all the British colonies of the South African region. There the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) was appointed for a short period of three years (1903-5) by Milner following a resolution of the 1903 Conference.

At that time the most pressing problem facing the Bloemfontein Conference was the chronic shortage of "Native" labour in the gold mines. Both short-term and long-term solutions for this problem were canvassed by the Conference. As a short-term solution, they endorsed the Chamber of Mines' proposal to import indentured labourers from China. On the matter of a long-term solution to the "Native Question" discussions were based on the assumption that, although potential supplies of labour certainly existed within the region, they could only be liberated and employed through a modification of the "deep-seated conditions" of "Native" life. At Bloemfontein, the "Native Question" found its "official solution".

The Conference charged the Commission (SANAC), "in view of the coming Federation", with the task of gathering "accurate information on certain matters relating to the "Natives" and "Native Administration" with the object of arriving at a common understanding of "Native policy", according to Ashforth (1990) and Dubow (1989).

than in the past. The term rationalisation refers, in this context, to the grouping in units of the past proliferation on the public sector. It refers to a reform action which is focused upon the optimisation of government services on the basis of maximum efficiency. Rationalisation has to do with the division of the functions of the central civil service concerning responsibility and efficiency, as well as the internal restructuring of the central state departments as part of administrative reform (1986:217-29).

This programme must be viewed as an attempt to meet the demands of time and circumstances and it was primarily concerned with the following objectives: the abolition of duplication; the swift completion of tasks and an easier government machinery to handle during a crisis. Table 02 shows the growth in the number of central state departments from 1910 to 1980:

in 1957 that it managed to have its position and authority legally entrenched. As Marais observes, this entrenchment gave it a position of strength to increase the size and the interest of the civil service.

During this period, the role of the departments was to a large extent controlling rather than service orientated. This was in line with the role of the State as it was conceived at the time, namely that it was protective rather than service-rendering. After the take-over of government by the National Party an increased emphasis was placed on separate development, and a number of departments were established to put this ideology into practice.

Second, in the early 1950s, the civil service set out on a programme of self-development, starting off with in service-training, which was gradually extended and improved and was augmented by academic studies, as well as contact with civil service developments overseas, particularly in Britain.

It is important to recall that government institutions were steadily on the increase after unification, when a considerable number of public institutions were created to provide public products and render public service services. But there was a reversal of this trend and the number of public institutions was decreased. This was evidenced by the rationalization programme undertaken since 1974 which led to the amalgamation of various public institutions. Nevertheless efficient service remained a primary objective.

Rather, the establishment of the "Commission for Administration" has played a determinant role in administrative matters in South Africa. Its major functions included overseeing effective personnel management, conditions of service, training, protection against nepotism, recruitment and publicizing of careers in the public services.

The third phase started on 1 April 1980 with the rationalisation of the South African civil service. Rationalisation appears to be a shift away from fragmentation, towards unity. According to Brynard, rationalisation in the South African context implies the restructuring of public executive institutions in order to be able to pursue public policy more efficiently

and developed an Afrikaner dominated central civil service, it did not always find the British traditions convenient. In the implementation of the National Party's racial policies, the Afrikaner-dominated bureaucracy played an important and enthusiastic role in the application of their government's policies.

It is arguable that naturally the circumstances prevailing in a country will play an important role in determining the number of public institutions and the allocation of functions to such institutions at a specific point in time. Circumstances and attitudes in a specific country change continuously, and the public institutions will therefore have to be adapted to meet the demands resulting from changed conditions and attitudes.

According to Tom Lodge, an indication of the South African state's administrative capacity is the share of its revenue derived from personal taxation; at forty per cent in 1995 much higher than is the case with most African governments which chiefly finance themselves through customs receipts. Other good indicators of administrative reach or state penetration into society are primary school enrolment and social security coverage: most South African children attend at least a few years of school and all adults over 65 are entitled to a very small pension though access to education and other state services is historically racially skewed.

In South Africa, the development of the civil service from 1910 to 1994 can be divided into three phases: that of 1910 to 1948, from 1949 to 1980 and from 1980 to 1994. I would suggest that the present period can be considered as a transitional period during which all non-racial institutions will be implemented.

First, the period between 1910 and 1948 can be seen as one of institutional adaptation and historical flux, both internally and externally. This meant that with the unification of the former four colonies into a unitary state, the civil services of the four colonies had to be welded into a single civil service with the creation of a new departmental infrastructure, and the appointment to newly created posts for the personnel of the colonial civil services. The establishment of necessary departments was followed by that of a Civil Service Commission which had to attend to civil service matters on a continuous basis. It was only

H.C. Van Zyl argues that policy-making is the primary function of the political arm of government, but without the advice on factual and value implications from the administrative side, any government will find it difficult to arrive at decisions on many aspects of government operations. In translating government policy into practice - the function of the administrative arm - the administrative and the political decisions will again be so closely interrelated that one must inescapably affect the other. Thus, in most routine matters of state administration in South Africa, policy is initiated by the civil service (Cloete, 1977:38-39).

Moving from Max Weber's theories, the concept of organisation was extremely important, because society is built around obfuscating organisational units of diverse kinds. In order to maintain the organisation, certain role players have definite tasks. So he considered the presence of a leader, together with the necessary subordinates, as contributing factors towards effective organisation. Hence the ideal form of organisation was the bureaucracy, which he viewed as an administrative system consisting of permanently appointed government officials. Obviously, the rapid development of bureaucratic institutions can be found in the technical supremacy of the bureaucracy above any other form of institution.

Weber's contention is true in South Africa where bureaucracy appears as the "best form of executive government" (Hanekom *et al.*, 1986:72-84). According to scholars, the South African state has developed a professional and well-trained bureaucracy since its inception as a Union in 1910. Modelled on its British colonial past, it inherited much of the British traditions of administration in manner and form. This includes the anonymity and impartiality of civil servants to public eye and the neutrality of the civil service whose members are the loyal servants of the political authority (government) of the day.

This means that the civil servant is not allowed to carry out policies selectively or to favour special interest groups above others. The civil servant should not be involved in party politics or public issues. However, these restrictions while severe in Britain, were much more relaxed in South Africa where civil servants may belong to political parties and actively participate in party affairs, but these activities may not be undertaken in an officer's official capacity. But, Venter argues that when the National Party came to power,

Moving from the institutional sophistication, it is already clear that the South African State has played a decisive and crucial role by creating the necessary underlying network of physical infrastructure for the economy and by generating social attitudes. There is a strong relationship between the development of the political system and the economic process. This relationship is extremely complex, as these systems interact both positively and negatively with one another. As Nattrass has outlined, it is the government which bears the responsibility for overseeing the introduction of the necessary social and political reforms which will meet the aspirations of the groups who are gaining economic power.

2.1.2.3. The South African Bureaucracy:

Early studies have shown that the ideology brought in by the PACT government in 1924 produced a dramatic change in government attitudes towards the economy and in the way in which the State perceived its own economic role. All things considered, the outcome was not only the development of the country but also the entrenchment of the preferential position of Whites and the creation of the policy of racial separation. This supposes the presence or existence of an effective organisation capable of implementing policies. This role was allotted to the bureaucracy.

As suggested by Leftwich states to be effective in promoting economic growth and development require an elite oriented to development, investment, etc, a bureaucracy insulated from society, a society which is subordinated to the state (rather than the other way around) and a state which can combine repression, legitimacy and performance (Lodge,1996).

The dynamism of South African institutions and their capacity to adapt to changed circumstances is evidenced by the undeniably high quality of its administration or bureaucracy. In Cloete's terms "the bureaucracy of a country is a product of its history as well as of its social and physical characteristics. Therefore, the bureaucracy of each country is a unique phenomenon. In South Africa it constituted undoubtedly a formidable force..." (de Crespigny & Schrire,1978:54-76).

Apart from the usual functions of a head of State, the new State President was also the chief executive as well. This means the removal of the functions of a Prime Minister and their fusion with those of a State President, who became the Chief executive officer of the State and was both the head of government and the head of State. All members of the Cabinet were appointed by him. As the head of State, he had real legislative and executive powers. His legislative powers took force even before any bill could be presented to parliament.

Naterras contends that the lack of general support for the tricameral parliament was evidenced by the continuing and growing levels of social unrest and it remained clear that a real solution to the political problems would not be found until a genuine process of negotiation took place between the true leaders of all the race groups regardless of whether or not these leaders were seen as acceptable to the then apartheid regime.

It is arguable that few constitutional changes were effected during the period after the Constitution Act, 110 of 1983. What was effected, as Marais states was a radical movement towards the opening up of the political life of South Africa. The process of laying the ground work for negotiations and a new constitutional dispensation was begun.

Drastic constitutional changes resulted from this process which began timidly under President Botha and openly inaugurated by FW de Klerk on his appointment as State President on 6 September 1989. This process, apparently accepted with some major or minor reservations by most Whites, is by no means an "across-the-board" acceptance by all Whites. Consequently on 15 October 1989, several leaders of the ANC were released from jail, followed by the official unbanning of the ANC on 2 February 1990 and finally the expected release of Nelson Mandela from prison on 11 February 1990, after 27 years in jail.

The net result of the process of extending democracy to all in South Africa reached a critical stage with the historical all races general elections held on 27 April 1994 as a symbol of the beginning of a new era in a new South Africa.

Ministerial appointments were the prerogative of the Prime Minister. However, as pointed out by Venter, "the party system bequeathed by Westminster put the Prime Minister in a fairly powerful position, since he was the leader-in-chief of the majority party in the House. It gave him pre-eminence in party affairs, in political patronage and in controlling the flow of important political and state information".

Sharpeville events in 1960, Soweto uprisings in 1976 and the international "onslaught" against South Africa, put the Prime Minister in an especially powerful position, e.g. the ministries of Vervoerd, Vorster and Botha were marked by the top position of the Prime Minister. As a result, the 1961 constitution led to a strong proclivity towards executive dominance over the legislature. Venter states that the unitary system of government, the position of the Prime Minister, preferential access to information, the caucus system, executive patronage, complexity of government affairs, the security crisis and the financial pre-eminence of the cabinet, gradually usurped the political role of the Parliament to one of a policy-legitimising body, rather than one of policy leadership, as it will be seen later.

In the face of several political crises like those of Sharpeville, the Black labour strikes of the early seventies or those of Soweto, and in order to address the problem of political rights for non-White people, the Vorster government appointed a Cabinet committee to design a "new constitutional dispensation". The new constitution was adopted in 1983 and its purpose was chiefly to accommodate the political aspirations of Coloureds and Indians by including them in a Parliament consisting of three houses. Obviously, the African group was not represented in this Parliament and it was argued that their political needs were met through the "homeland governments.

This Act brought to an end the existence of the so-called Westminster system of government based on a majority system in one Parliament. The new South African Parliament was a unique tricameral Parliament, comprising three Houses, namely the House of Assembly (Whites), the House of Representatives (Coloureds) and the House of Delegates (Indians). The legislative power of the Republic was vested in the State President and the Parliament of the Republic.

was established on 31 May 1961. While the creation of the Union in 1910 marks the beginning of a new era in British politics in South Africa, the passage into the Republic in 1961 can be seen as a break in the British hegemony in South Africa. But the new constitution changed little in form or substance.

According to scholars, the striking features of the new constitution are its similarity with the old, and the lack of fundamental changes. It was basically a re-enactment of the South Africa Act, except for terminological and other minor changes. The general constitutional structure has remained unchanged since that time. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961 ended British sovereignty and fulfilled a major goal for Afrikaner nationalism: to be a free nation and a sovereign independent Afrikaner-dominated republic, free from any constitutional or symbolic connections with Britain.

With the advent of the republic, the change of the head of State from a Governor-General to State President, is a change from dependence to independence, a change to republicanism, as Marais has observed. The new South African monarch or State President was elected by secret ballot by an electoral college consisting of the members of the House of Assembly, at a meeting presided over by the chief justice or his deputy. He holds office for seven years and could be removed from office only on the grounds of misconduct or incapacity.

The State President was a nominal head of State with little legislative power and acted on the advice of the executive council or Cabinet. But, although a part of the executive authority, he was not a member of the Cabinet. Thompson and Prior observe that the functions of the State President in South Africa remain similar to those of the British monarch in Britain; whereas in Britain the duties are determined largely by convention, in South Africa many, though not all, of the British conventions are spelled out in the written constitution.

The Cabinet was led by the Prime Minister who was appointed by the State President, and by convention had to have the support of a majority of members in the Assembly.

1950s to monitor and control African employment, placed increasingly severe constraints on Africans' freedom of movement and occupational choice. The Apartheid system, like its segregationist predecessor, was geared towards the simultaneous pursuit of white political supremacy and white economic prosperity.

In addition, the making of Apartheid has exemplified both unifying and fragmenting features of the state. Thus, relying heavily on the services of the Broederbond or the brotherhood of Boer supremacists, the Nationalist government therefore pursued a vigorous programme of "Afrikanerisation" within all state institutions, transforming the bureaucracy increasingly into an organ of Afrikaner nationalism generally and the *Broederbond* in particular.

This restructuring was one of the Nationalists' major successes of the 1950s, without which the ambitious social engineering policies of the 1960s would not have been possible. Another crucial facet in the Nationalists' restructuring of the state, as Posel has emphasized, was the increasing centralisation of control in central state bureaucracies, especially the NAD, at the expense of the local authorities. This in turn necessitated a significant increase in the size of central bureaucracies, to facilitate taking over a range of responsibilities hitherto adapted by local authorities. The proliferation of new bureaucratic structures, such as the labour bureaux system, contributed further to extending the reach and breadth of the NAD's bureaucracy (1991:271).

Between 1948 and 1961 most of the symbolic ties with the British Empire/Commonwealth were severed and abolished and exchanged for South African symbols. The most important were the Privy Council in London, the Union Jack as official flag, "God save the Queen" as national anthem, even official stationery stamped "on Her Majesty's service". When South Africa became a Republic in 1961 and left the British Commonwealth, it was practically an independent State.

For the formation of the Republic, it was decided to put the issue to the voters. The referendum took place on 5 October 1960 under Vervoerd government, and the result was 850 458 votes in favour of the formation of a Republic and 775 878 against. The Republic

(1979), and Ciskei (1981) as independent States; KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa, Kangwane, Gazankulu and KwaNdebele as Self-Governing States or National States.

To conclude with the "native" issue, I shall assert that, segregationist methods, the use of force and the sophistication and the complexity of the "Native Administration" from 1910 strangely resembled those of Belgian administrators in the Congo at the same period. That likeness was not a *hazard*. That was effectively the triumph of the white supremacy over *Natives* in South Africa and *Indigènes* in the Congo, according to the white "Great Colonial Campaign" in Africa.

Rather, under the new system of Union, the colonial authorities transferred the larger part of their powers, functions and resources to a central authority and became subordinate provincial authorities of the new unit. As Worrall has suggested, despite some disagreement among constitutional lawyers about the exact nature (in federal and unitary terms) of the Union, the new enlarged unit acquired a basically unitary system of government with some federal characteristics which have since been obliterated - *de facto*, if not *de jure* - by a gradual process of cumulative over-all centralization and increasing financial dependence of the provincial authorities on the national exchequer.

2.1.2.2. The Impact of the Nationalists' Victory:

Venter argues that all these changes were not without political controversy, indeed a bitter and divisive struggle was fought between British jingoes and Afrikaner chauvinists. In 1948 the National Party won a watershed election. As the main political voice of Afrikaner nationalism, it put into motion a restructuring of South African society that would lead to South Africa becoming a Republic and fulfilling a feverish ideal that had burnt within the Afrikaner people since the British victory in 1902.

As described by Posel (1991), from its election victory in 1948, the NP steadily consolidated its hold on the state, with a greater degree of ideological fervour than any previous ruling class. Long-standing state controls over the African labour market were restructured and greatly intensified. A national system of labour bureaux introduced in the

much of the legislation governing the political lives and status of "Natives" in South Africa was passed in the Union Parliament.

Moreover, the early 1920s saw the consolidation of segregation and its development has, in many ways, been located in the urban areas in South Africa. Many other Acts were passed and the impact of these segregationist legislations on other sectors of life was a disaster for Africans.

For scholars and especially D. Marais, over a period of time, the approach to the political development of the Blacks went through various changes. Before, and circa 1910, the approach was one of the segregation of the races. In sequence of evolution, segregation first became differentiation, then parallel development, apartheid, separate development and by 1967, separate freedoms (1989:15-16) and since April 1994, democracy.

In addition, segregationist policies led to the creation of the so-called "bantustans". In 1959, the Act promulgated by Verwoerd known as the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act can be seen as the basis of the independent homelands policy. This Act explicitly formalised and recognised the existence of ten ethnic Black groups. The acceptance of this act terminated the communal representation of Blacks in Parliament by White members. By 1970, with the passage of the Black Citizenship Act, defining every Black person as a citizen of his Black ethnic homeland, Africans were supposed to exercise their "political rights" through tribally oriented structures based on the bantustans. R. Davies *et al.* reacted as follows: "although the first Bantustan proposals were advanced by the regime in the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, its roots go back to the last century" (1984:199).

They were based on what used to be called "the Native Reserves" -those areas of land which were designated as the only areas of the country in which Africans could own land, and where the majority of South Africans had any political "rights" and constituted the reserve army of labour. Thus the period between 1961 and 1994 saw the Republic of South Africa subdivided into four provinces under White control and into ten African homeland regions or Black States namely Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda

Lacey argued that many Africans deplored the attempts to reinstate the tribal system, especially, in the 1928 Chiefs' Convention in Bloemfontein where they criticized retribalisation and the extra powers of the white Supreme-chief under the 1927 Act. Unfortunately, despite their objections, the thrust of the new policy was towards retribalisation, as we have seen.

For the political future of South Africa, this Act marks an important phase in South African state policy and Hertzog's "final solution" to the "Native Question". After the passage of the Administration Act, and according to the "Grand Tradition" of the "Native Question", a central institution within the South African state used to resolve the issues of power and knowledge was the "Commission of Inquiry".

Between 1910 and 1948, three commissions of inquiry have occupied, in Ashforth's terms "a central place in the formulation of what used to be known as "Native policy". The first was the South African Native Affairs, 1903-5 (SANAC) which established a tradition recognized by most South African authors. It was followed especially, by the Native Economic Commission, 1930-2 (NEC) and lastly by the Native Laws Commission, 1946-48 (FAGAN). Despite the scientific character of the Report of these commissions, notably the NEC and the FAGAN, they had practically no impact upon the course of events in South Africa.

In other words, it means that, as Ashforth has argued, the principles of state division, which were elaborated in the earlier documents of the "Grand Tradition" (SANAC and NEC Reports), were parts of complex schemes wherein "Natives" were constituted as a singular and relatively undifferentiated labour source. Within these schemes, "Natives" were relegated to a permanently subordinate political status within the State.

Thereby, the central aim of the ruling orders in South Africa was the necessity of "uniform administration" and "differentiated citizenship" for the "Native population" in terms of the state's "civilizing" or "advancing" mission on behalf of a higher "European" civilization. A series of measures then were enacted to wipe out all forms of resistance to domination and

hospital at Keiskammahock. To Tom Lodge, homeland governments as well as those central government agencies which interfaced with them were particularly susceptible to financial misbehaviour. According to *The Star* of 9 October, 1995, in 1995 the Skweyiya Commission of Inquiry drew attention to a R177 million power station which had not produced a single unit of power and which duplicated facilities already available: altogether the Commission found that the Mangope administration had misused or misappropriated R200,000 of public funds.

For scholars, bureaucratic corruption in the 1980s was attributable to a growing culture of official secrecy as well as an increasing embourgeoisification of the Afrikaner governing class. Until the 1980s, though, the South African state had a well demonstrated capacity for removing itself from the influence of specific social classes. This has been explained by Yudelman (1983) as being caused by the relative strength of a "legitimation imperative" arising from the institution of democratic politics (for whites) before the creation of an industrial society.

In addition, early studies have shown that the historical development of politics and administration in South Africa was stamped with the centralisation of institutions. A scholar explains that "the unitary nature of the South African state eventually led to the development of a strong centralized system of government and administration. This state of affairs naturally influenced the development, powers and functions of local authorities which are organisationally located on the lowest or third level in the total governmental structure and who are directly and indirectly subordinate to the provincial and central authorities respectively. The strong unitary nature of the state and the increasing centralisation of governmental functions over the years undermined the status and "autonomy" of local authorities in South Africa (W.L.J.Adler, 1986:113-4).

To sum up, we maintain that the exceptionally strong executive, the proliferation of the public institutions at the central level of government coupled with the politicisation of the civil service which transformed South Africa, for all purposes into a one party state and its relative impartiality due to a special relationship with the ruling National Party, deeply

maintained in the 1980s when corruption within one central government department prompted an official enquiry to comment that "billions" of Rand had been lost through theft, fraud and incompetence with the complicity of senior management (Danny Sing & Malcolm Wallis, 1995:142-143).

Thus, despite the quality and the high standard of its cadres which prevent public functionaries to be confronted with the most common ethical dilemmas, mainly corruption, diminishing administrative capacity was however signalled in the 1980s by a series of major financial scandals affecting high levels of government. Although Cloete points out that the control exercised over the personnel administration and the financing of the state departments permits the bureaucrats little opportunity to use patronage and the conferment of financial benefits for the achievement of improper objectives, Venter notes that petty corruption had long been a feature of lower echelon administration particularly in the rural homelands and in black townships but large scale venality in central government was a relative novelty (1989:76).

The period between 1989 and 1992 was that of continued allegations of financial mismanagement and corruption regarding some state corporations and certain homeland administrations. One can recall the Special Report of the Auditor-General concerning the Independent Evaluation of the MOSSGAS Project in 1989. Investigations in this regard are, even today, incomplete despite what the Auditor-General has called "some very minor corruption by the site workers". Other signs of "bureaucratic degeneration" included the Auditor-General's reports on five non-independent homelands (KaNgwane, KwaNdebele [Parsons Commission], KwaZulu, QuaQua, Lebowa [De Meyer Commission]) which were tabled in Parliament in September 1993. These reports found that overexpenditure and losses amounted to about R50 million over this period and theft, mismanagement, malpractices, administrative incompetence and serious lack of control were common practices (Survey of Race Relations, 1992-93:26,27,63,417).

Venter too points out the corruption and graft which prevailed in Transkei, as the inquiry into the gambling licence affair of the Matanzima brothers showed in February 1988. Instances of corruption were reported in Ciskei in 1985, relating to the building of a

reallocation of state department functions, the professionalisation and politicisation of the higher rungs of the civil service as well as the centralisation of executive power.

The most important contributory factor which facilitated these moves was the formal system of government of South Africa, namely the unitary form of state. In this system, all governmental power was placed in the hands of the central government and Parliament. There are no other sources of original government powers and all sources of subordinate power such as provincial and municipal powers emanated from the central government. Many powers of provincial and municipal government have been systematically usurped, i.e. provinces were stripped of their powers of taxation: from having received a fifty per cent subsidy to supplement their revenue in 1910 until the scrapping of elected provincial councils in 1986, provinces were for the most part dependent on central government for public funding.

As a result, Venter finds that this placed the central government in firm financial control and patronage of the provinces. Consequently, provinces were nothing more than central state departments with the convenient fictional nomenclature of regional administration. And the demise of elected provincial councils was one of the strongest acts of centralisation in South Africa. The power of Parliament and the lower levels of public authority such as municipalities and provinces has systematically been usurped. This standpoint is also shared by Professor G.C. Olivier when he observes that "one of the most important functions of the cabinet is to formulate public policy. In South Africa, as in most industrialised societies, the trend towards "big government" is strong and irreversible. A corollary of this phenomenon is a growing complexity of the role of government in South African society, the ever-increasing usurpation of power by the central authorities and the decline of legislative and judicial influence." (see de Crespigny & Schrire, 1978:26)

By the 1970s entry into the administrative ranks normally required a university degree but remained uncompetitive. A Public Service Commission was meant to ensure against nepotism and political favourism: its recommendations were on several occasions overruled in the 1950s. However patronage was strategic rather than personal, geared to Afrikaner Nationalist social objectives. This degree of integrity, on scholar notes, may not have been

organised religious life (which) bequeathed a curiously non assertive and reactive leadership style based upon a lifetime of conformity and propriety (1993:486).

However, this sophisticated bureaucracy must face some handicaps. This can be illustrated by the following arguments. What muddles the issue and restricts its independence is the executive domination of other government institutions and the politicisation of the public service. It must be stressed that contemporary problems of economic planning, the preparation and supervision of financial policy, the regulation of industrialisation, the maintenance of security and welfare, and the accommodation of international conflict emphasize the need for coordination, quick action and technical expertise. As Macridis observes, "all governments are becoming more and more comprehensive in their functions and more powerful in implementing them" (see de Crespigny and R.Schrire, 1978:54-76).

To Venter, the growing importance of the executive is a controversial issue which cannot be avoided. In South Africa, as in other industrialised countries, the governing of society has become a complex exercise in political management, with many demands being made on the central government and its executive with many powers placed into its hands as a result of its racial policies. After the National Party came into power in May 1948 the South African bureaucracy remained subject to an executive or cabinet which was gaining steadily in legitimacy, stability, power and administrative expertise.

This means that the National Party got the opportunity to implement its own version of political solutions in the country as a whole. This also implies that the values and party-political interests of the ruling party are applied in a coercive manner. Meanwhile Marais considers that, in terms of the present-day politicised public service, a further implication is that the ruling party gains the entire public service as an instrument to carry out its political objectives and also uses it as an instrument to propagate political ideas.

From Union there has been a strong and marked proclivity towards executive dominance by the central executive and its concomitant administrative institutions, at the expense of parliamentary and judiciary powers. Under Prime Minister and later State President P.W. Botha, this tendency has been significantly strengthened through many Cabinet reshuffles,

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constitutional court. Central government retains the power to overrule most laws made by regional assemblies.

South African public administration scholars tend to agree that South Africa enjoys an exceptional bureaucracy in Africa and that present-day civil servants are no longer the pen-pushers of years gone by. They are trained and highly experienced, particularly in the higher echelons. Because the civil servants are better trained and educated, it has resulted in closer union between the senior civil servants and policy-makers. But despite a more sophisticated administrative environment developed during past years the Commission for Administration has made strides towards the professionalisation of the administrative division of the public service. These efforts have resulted in a sophisticated lower, middle and higher level administrative class of what the Commission itself now terms "public managers".

According to Tom Lodge, with its 1.7 million employees, South Africa's public sector is the largest in Africa and its division until 1994 into four nationally sovereign separate entities and further ten ethnically or racially designated administrations made it one of the most bureaucratically fragmented. This figure includes half a million employees of parastatal corporations. The civil service proper included in 1994 the 420,000-strong Public Service of South Africa, 170,000 teachers, 431,000 employees of homeland governments and 70,000 in "other services" (see *Infospec*, 44, August 1995:9). 65,6 per cent of employees in the public service in 1994 were black. Wislon stated that its growth was fastest in the 1950s and it began to slow and even shrink in some sectors in the mid 1980s. Its expenditure represents less than a third of GNP, relatively low for an African state (1990:231).

In addition, the bureaucracy which has presided over these developments has in its upper echelons since the 1930s been chiefly recruited from white Afrikaans speakers; in the 1950s promotion and recruitment policies discriminated in favour of supporters of the ruling National Party (S.Trapido, 1963:75-87 and R.Schrire, 1994). As Annette Seegers has noted, from the 1940s the bureaucratic elite came from an Afrikaner culture which contained "infantilising family dynamics", an "in built tendency to divide" and "an

Table 06: Public Service and Self-Governing territories

Depts/Adminis.	30 Sept.91	30 Sept.92	Increase Decrease	%
Serv./Instit.	197,780	195,650	-2130	-108
Own Affairs	197,149	186,451	-10,698	-5,43
Prov. Admnis.	211,851	213,983	2132	1,01
Black Educat.	76,406	80,756	4350	5,69
Other	80,946	74,427	-6519	-8,05
TOT.CEN.GVT	746,132	751,267	-12,865	-1,68
SELF GOV.TER.	186,610	207,821	19,211	10,19
PARASTAT.INS	69,643	68,567	-1076	-1,55
TOTAL EXCHEQUE PERSONNEL	1,022,385	1,027,655	5270	0,52

Source : Annual Report 1992.

Moreover, a new constitution in 1994 established nine new regional governments in place of four provincial administrations and ten ethnic homelands, granted universal suffrage and made executive and legislative institutions subordinate to a presidentially appointed

1992	751267	2,8%
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Source :

- Annual Reports. Self-Governing Territories excluded.

* Figures not available between 1915 and 1938.

According to the establishment figures released between July 1939 - shortly before the outbreak of the War - and 1st January 1947, the phenomenal rate of growth during that period had been demonstrated. The number of posts in the Public service rose by 89,8% over a period of ten years whereas the population of the Union increased by about only 20% during the same period.

Data from the payrolls shows that during the period 1 October 1991 to 30 September 1992, the number of persons employed by the central government and the provincial administration (i.e. the Public service) decreased by 12,865 persons, whereas the number of persons employed by the Self-Governing Territories increased by 19,211, as illustrated by Table 06.

It is interesting to note that the South African public service developed and expanded empirically after 1910 because of the tendency towards proliferation of public institutions, as seen in the table 02. The creation of new institutions, Botes notes, has had the inherent advantage of creating new work opportunities, together with which has been a high investment rate which has improved the general welfare of the inhabitants of South Africa (1986:221). This organisational problem led to duplication and overlapping of functions, which in turn had created coordination problems and an increase in the number of public servants and in state expenditure. Table 05 shows that the growth in public executive institutions (see table 02) leads to growth in the size of public service, as follows:

Table 05: The growth in the size of the public service, 1914-1992

Years	No of Posts	% of Increase
1914	44455	-
1929	- *	-
1939	57025	28,2%
1949	108256	89,8%
1959	144287	33,2%
1969	155326	7,6%
1979	179362	15,4%
1989	730694	307,3%

Before the advent of the Constitution of 1993, the Republic of South Africa was effectively divided into 11 separate countries (the White South Africa and the 10 Black States), each with its own constitution, legislation and administrative system.

However, in 1994, in terms of the constitution, the administration of the Public service had to be restructured by amalgamating the former public services of the RSA, TBVC States and the Self-Governing Territories into one Public Service, comprising national departments and provincial administrations. This certainly represents the most extensive and arduous organizational restructuring process in the history of the country. The current figures are as follows:

TABLE 04: The Amalgamation of the Public Service, 1994

Public Service	No of Depts	No of Persons
RSA	38.00	750000.00
TBVC	76.00	210000.00
S-GT	62.00	270000.00
TOTAL	176.00	1230000.00

Source: Annual Report of the Public Service Commission, 1995.

Meanwhile, the political executive powers to administer existing laws, had to be reassigned between the national and provincial levels of government in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and concomitant functions had to be reallocated to the national departments and provincial administrations.

2.1.4. The Post-Apartheid South Africa:

The transitional phase which began with the 1993 Constitution is also the period of the implementation of new constitutional dispensations after the demise of the apartheid state. According to the The Annual Report of the Public Service Commission (1995), the public service which consists of persons employed by the departments and administrations, should be neither too large nor too small. Its size should be commensurate with what is required for the performance of the programmes of Government as reflected in the Budget and that the public service must be affordable. Then effective government will only be possible if it is supported by a stable well-founded and professional corps of public servants.

In accordance with the 81st Annual Report 1993 of the Commission for Administration, on 30 September 1993 the public service in South Africa consisted of 746,378 persons. The grouping of personnel per group of departments/administrations is as follows:

TABLE 03: Size of Public Service, 1993

Group	Number of Persons
Own Affairs Administrations	173743.00
General Affairs: * Services Departments	193266
* Provincial Administrations	215090.00
* Civil Departments	164279.00
TOTAL	746378.00

Source: Annual Report 1993.

TABLE 02: Growth of central state departments*

YEAR	No STATE DEPTS.	% GROWTH
1910	12	-
1920	21	75
1930	22	48
1940	24	9
1950	30	25
1960	33	9
1970	41	24
1980-81	39+	-48
1982	22	-44
1983	22	-
1984	22	-

Sources: *Worrall 1971:2, and **Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa 1980-1984 (excluding the four provincial administrations).

However, for the Commission for Administration which is responsible for ensuring efficiency in the public Service, the purpose of the programme of rationalisation was "to place the central administrative system on a basis that will ensure that it will be able to function efficiently in any set of circumstances and will at all times be manned by an adequate and competent body of staff." (1980:5). In brief, with the rationalisation of the civil service as well as the introduction of a tricameral parliament in 1984, the South African civil service was in the throes of excessive change.

and ethnic and regional fragmentation was encouraged.

It is important to sort out the impact of Belgian rule in Zaire because it deeply came to affect both indigenous culture and indigenous state system. We believe that the roots of the economic crisis which has beset Zaire can be found in colonial policies and in the nature of the colonial economy. This was an economy oriented to the production of primary mineral and agricultural products for export, supported by a road, rail and navigable waterway network and abundant hydroelectric power. The principal instrument of this penetration of capitalism was a ruthlessly effective state administrative apparatus, backed by a military force, noted J.MacGaffey (1987:31). Accordingly, in the colonies as well as in the metropolitan centers, the entity or institution constituting the central objective or economic and political struggles was the access to power within the state apparatus. And the colonial state has used all its means to accomplish this objective. By the time of independence, scholars of all persuasion emphasized the role of the Zairian postcolonial model as a continuation of the former colonial regime (see M.Kankwenda,1993; J.Depelchin,1992; J.MacGaffey,1991, 1987; N.Nzongola,1986; D.Gould,1978; R.Sandbrook,1988; C.Young,1965 and Young and Turner,1985). As Young has outlined, a sustained inquiry (then nearing completion) into the contemporary state in Zaire deepened the conviction that a grasp of the constraining legacy of the colonial state was crucial to any understanding of present dilemmas (1994:11). In order to understand the present political context, therefore, we must examine in some detail the type of regimes from the colonial state (the Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo) to the postcolonial state (the First and the Second Republics).

2.2.2.1.1. The Congo Free State: 1885-1908

The Congo Free State was the personal creation of Belgian King Leopold II, who instigated an empire under the guise of international humanitarianism. It was the beginning of one of the most sophisticated colonial administration in Africa. It functioned as an absolute autocracy in theory as well as in practice. It was true that the King's commercial ambitions in the Congo became paramount, and the desire to make the Free State a lucrative venture brought his agents there into open conflict with the local population. The focus, wrote Leslie, was on the extraction of resources, the unification of the territory through military conquest, and the

2.2.2. POLITICAL ORGANISATION

2.2.2.1 THE COLONIAL STATE:

In general, the colonial penetration was very impressive and impacted on the formation of the contemporary political system. The colonial state was not only authoritarian and centralized, but also tentacular thanks to its devastating intrusion on Congolese life. The level of regulation was so high that the colony soon became known as *Bula Matari*, a reference to the explorer Henry Morton Stanley, meaning "he who crushes rocks". In the colonial context it evoked the image of an all-powerful state, forcibly imposing its will on the local population, regulating every aspect of colonial life, and crushing all resistance to its policies (Young and Turner, 1985:30-37; Leslie, 1993:13; Sandbrook, 1985:54). Besides this image, *Bula Matari* came to represent this intrusive alien authority more generally. The metaphor captured well the crushing, relentless force of the emerging colonial state in Africa. European administrators found this semiotic imagery congenial, as it suggested the irresistible hegemony deemed necessary to performance of their guardian role. In the everyday informal discourse of rule, the prefectural agents of Belgian colonial power widely employed the term as a synonym for "state": a summons from *Bula Matari* was an order from the government. In its symbolism, the term did not apply to the layers of African intermediaries who in a number of settings partially concealed it from village view, it referred solely to the alien, white domination that was the energizing force in the superstructure of imperial hegemony. For the native populations, *Bula Matari* signified terror. Until 1956 Congolese society has been totally submerged by the leviathan colonial superstructure that had been methodically constructed by the Belgians.

As we will see, the Belgian government, corporations, and Christian churches had established a comprehensive political, social, economic and cultural hegemony. There was a strong accent on economic development. The Belgians introduced widespread medical facilities and primary and technical education, but drastically limited the number of Africans attending secondary and university facilities. For example, prior to independence 60% of school age children in the Congo were in primary school, 2,2% in secondary education (Dodge, 1966:51). Neither political parties nor independent trade unions were allowed until just prior to independence,

in this way, the breakdown not only of the government superstructure but also that of the societal infrastructure. Thus like all other African states, the Zairian state was in search for state hardness, we mean in search for autonomy. The state is engaged in ongoing struggle with civil society to preserve the capacity of autonomous exercise of state action. Meanwhile society battles to impose its will on the state and seeks to make the state a passive register of its preferences, and the lines of conflict are reproduced within the state apparatus. So reason of state can operate in pure form only with autonomy. The state in Zaire failed in its attempt to do so because unable to decisively realize its state-building goals and therefore remained, to a large extent soft.

We need then to investigate the relationship between the postcolonial state and its counterpart at the time of colonization. It is unthinkable, if not impossible to separate the Belgian period in Congo and the post-colonial state from the realities of the Zairian society; the legacy of the colonial state remains deeply embedded within its postcolonial successor. The chaotic institutions of Zaire at independence highlighted the turbulent past of this country which has experienced foreign conquest, colonial exploitation and finally decolonization. As pointed out by David Gould, the colonial state was part of a colonial society. In this sense, the capitalist West's role has been malevolent and destructive in destroying indigenous African economy and culture, replacing them with a foreign-oriented economy and oppressive class structure, and installing a colonial - and later supporting a neo-colonial-state with an oppressive administrative apparatus reflecting foreign orientation and interest (1978:10). The postcolonial period from 1960 to now elegantly reflected this legacy: violent upheaval and tenuous stability on the political front have been coupled with brief periods of growth in the midst of general economic decline.

The physical occupation of the country by Belgium can be considered to have been a continuation of the previous historical phase, that of the Atlantic slave trade. This, contrary to scholars who believe that the colonization of the Congo was coterminous with Belgian colonisation. According to Depelchin (1992,35), the Berlin Conference did not arise out of thin air. It marked the end of an old phase in the history of the exploitation of the human and material resources of the African continent, as well as the beginning of a new phase with the creation of the Congo Free State in 1885.

breakdown of good governance, law and order, in short the breakdown of state institutions. As some political analysts have argued, "without strong and stable political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to realize its common interests" (Huntington, 1968).

What is notable is the fact that the Zairian crisis should not be taken as an isolated phenomenon, but should be linked to the general pattern of state formation in Africa. Recent studies show that the concept of crisis in Africa was in air soon after independence. Njuguna Ng'ethe points out that, in the 1960s, social scientists of the modernization school warned that successful state formation would have to confront several crises (Binder 1986). These were (1) the crisis of identity, through which the people learn to identify themselves as citizens of the nation-state rather than as members of a particular ethnic subgroup; (2) the crisis of legitimacy or the development of the sense, on the part of the governed, that the government in power has the right to rule; (3) the crisis of penetration or the development of the state's capacity to enforce all decisions within its territorial jurisdiction; (4) the crisis of participation, or the provision of means and opportunities for the citizens to influence state decisions; and (5) the crisis of distribution, or the evolution of the will and the means to solve at least the most glaring aspects of social, political, and, especially, economic inequalities (Zartman, 1995:255). From this perspective, it can be said that the Zairian state failed to transcend these crises because it could not longer perform the functions required to pass as state, the functions that need to be performed for the coherence and the effectiveness of the polity - anywhere. In this sense the Zairian crisis becomes more understandable.

Throughout its history, Zaire went from one crisis to another. According to Herbert Weiss, it is a society, that is suffering an incredibly great lowering of material standards of living - one in which abuse of power, corruption, and arbitrary application of the law were rampant. It was a society whose leaders have not only ignored the interests of common people; in their avid greed, they have destroyed the goose that laid their golden egg (see Zartman, 1995:158). For instance, the production of copper, the main export commodity, dropped from almost 500,000 tons in the mid 1980s to a mere 43,000 in 1996. The effectiveness of the state, since then, gained ground through repression and neglect, in destroying the regulative and regenerative capacities of its society. As a profit entity, the "collapsing state, stresses Zartman, contracts, isolates itself, retreats. As it imp'odes, it saps the vital functions of society", causing

Faced with a deep political, economic and social crisis, the situation in Zaire has always been viewed as an extreme case of what Zartman (1995) calls "state collapse". He identifies state collapse in contemporary African history with the famous events associated with the collapse of the colonial state in the Congo (Zaire). While Congo was just an isolated exception to the otherwise successful transfer of authority from colonial to independent rule throughout the continent, the case is of greater relevance for its lessons about state reconstitution. On 30 June 1960 in the Congo, the state that collapsed was the colonial state, marked by the refusal of state institutions (army, executives, local governments, and populations) to recognize each other (Leslie, 1993). When these characteristics reappeared in independent state collapse in the following decade, the means of restoring the state and the elements in its gradual collapse again two or three decades later, came in the form of an international intervention to restore law and order, and a strongman installed with foreign connivance (Zartman, 1995:2). This became a rule during the Mobutu era: when things were going wrong for the regime, external intervention was appreciated and seen as one of its main support.

In functionalist terms, state collapse, according to Zartman, means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state. As the decision making center of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983). As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action (Dyson, 1980; Migdal, 1987). As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organization (Poggi, 1978). As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs (Weber, 1958; Ferrero, 1942). As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives supports from nor exercises controls over its people, and it no longer is even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule (Zartman, 1995:5). The collapse of postcolonial state in Zaire, rather, the poor performances of state functions - representation, interest articulation, output efficiency - means the

CHAPTER TWO: **THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**

2.2.1. CHARACTERISTICS

Disarray and decline have characterized politics in Zaire since its independence in June 1960. In addition to widespread institutional fragmentation, there was the degeneration of overlayers of monitoring and coordination, as well as decay in the central capacity to apply *raison d'Etat*, the logic that governs state action (Young, 1994:23). The amplitude of disarray and decline led Ilunga Kabongo to stress that today like yesterday, Zaire stands as the unique and somewhat unexplainable case of African politics. The country was simply - even to the most familiar observer of its life - a puzzling paradox and a big brain teaser (Nzongola, 1986:27-36).

It is notorious that crisis has marked the history of Zaire, from its inception as the Congo Free State and its later restructuring as the Belgian Congo through the period of chaos and secession following decolonization in the early 1960s and the establishment of the authoritarian rule of Mobutu in 1965. The continuous crisis that shook this country since independence could be seen as a "fundamental breakdown in the equilibrium of its social structure" (Nzongola, 1986:5). A major aspect of this social and institutional crisis was the chronic inability of this country with its rich resources to generate and sustain economic growth and development and its incapacity to manage strong and stable state institutions. Accordingly, despite vast resources, crisis has also plagued the country on the economic front resulting into the stagnation of economic growth and the escalation of debt, inflation and unemployment. Although it is potentially one of the richest countries in Africa, given its vast natural resource endowments, the fortunes of the majority of Zaire's citizens have not improved. Nevertheless, Zairians have shown an amazing resilience and a determination to survive and cope, often against tremendous odds. Leslie states that abundant natural resources and the accompanying possibilities for development have to be placed in a context of the country's historical beginnings when the political and economic configurations of the state were established (1993:3).

degree of relative autonomy from the dominant classes and all fractions thereof". And Dan O'Meara dismissed the view that the state can be analysed "as an undifferentiated instrument in the hands of a political party representing specific and purely economic interests". Nevertheless, their writings still bore the hallmark of a class instrumentalist view, namely, its limited notion of the autonomy of the state: "independence" is exercised only to the extent that conflicts must be settled between different sections of capital (industrialists and financiers) and between "domestic" capitalism and pressure generated by international capitalist markers (Posel,1991:19).

Nevertheless, increasingly South Africa was ruled by the state, argues Slabbert, not by a political party or an independent government. As illustration, even homelend administrations have ably succeeded in reproducing *Pretoria's* elaborate system of social and political controls, through adopting the same security legislation and extending the national state of emergency, curfews, emergencies, bannings, union bans, detentions, the suppression of opposition, and activist fatalities became features of politics in homelands. All this aimed to maintain control over the state's power, privilege and patronage. So the South African government increasingly became part of the machinery of state and not the other way around (Swilling,1990:76).

Finally, one can argue that it was not enough simply to locate the state at the nexus of broader economic, political, and ideological forces (complex and important though this was), it was also necessary to link this exercise to a series of hitherto rather unfashionable questions about the ways in which state institutions enabled and constrained the powers of various state actors, in historically specific ways. The launching of the democratic state in South Africa out of its collapsing predecessor does not take place in a political vacuum. It is being constantly shaped by the historical and material conditions existing on the ground.

power. These internal contradictions and tensions between the ruling elite and its constituency were reflections of the broader crisis of legitimacy facing the state and its surrogate forces. The manifestation of this crisis were diverse, but they laid the basis for the subsequent development of the 1990s.

We can note that, in the wave of new ideological thinking in the early 1980s, the state became more independent. The search for hegemony led some state officials, Afrikaner intellectuals and businessmen to begin to question the ideological orthodoxy and to construct a new, more incorporative, to universalise the scope of hegemony, states Greenberg (Marks and Trapido, 1987:391). The ideological project included negating the racial character of the state, diminishing the direct and visible role of the state in the labour market and workplace and shifting the locus of prestige to the private sector. The intellectuals, especially denied the appropriateness and efficacy of state intervention in the economic realm, they opposed the centrality of the state, counterposing it to a decentralised, depoliticised, non-racial and limited political order. This shift saw a fundamental change in the role of the NP caucus in political decision-making.

Despite the loss of legitimacy, we assume, as did most of the literature on the nature of the South African state that the state in South Africa was seen as an independent actor. It consisted of identifiable groups of people with more or less influence in directing the state's course but with a common set of interests in maintaining the state as independent actor. For example, the State Security Council with its subsidiary bodies, the Permanent Force of the SADF, the SAP, Homelands governments, RCC's, etc... were essentially groups of people with more or less interest and influence in maintaining the structure of the state intact. The interests of the state may or may not coincide with the interests of the business community or "the church" or a particular political party. Civilian and accountable politics were subservient to the interests of the state. This point became abundantly clear especially between 1984-88, as observed by Slabbert (Swilling, 1990, 75).

As Posel has explained, a strong tendency in much of the South African literature has been to conceptualise the state as an instrument of capitalist interests. From this perspective, Robert Davies, for example, stressed the fact that "the state has necessarily to assume a

primacy of the state; it made no place for african workers, except as "aliens" in South Africa and as citizens of distant imaginary African states. (Greenberg,1987:124-125).

In addition, apartheid ideology, momentarily coherent and hegemonic, has itself become an enormous obstacle to state management of the emergent African working class. State control efforts have proved increasingly costly, insufficient, and contradictory, but the ascendant ideology has made it excredingly difficult to contemplate or reconstruct the order of control. As Greenberg has summarized, the state consequently stood philosophically preeminent, yet exposed - partial and exclusive, hopelessly illegitimate, and the object of the growing African resistance.

The policies and administrative practices of the state cannot be understood fully without identifying the impact of what Posel terms "*struggles from below*". In the case of South Africa, the state never enjoyed any legitimacy to exercise political authority, as Sipho Shezi maintains. The immorality of its ideological framework always put into question its legitimacy as the supreme institution of political authority over the inhabitants of its political terrain. Here state's survival and legitimacy were a matter of controversy and political contest between the white minority and the black majority (Zartman,1995:191-192). For example, the attempt to impose mechanisms of political control and authority of the black majority through the establishment of the black local authorities, intensification of repression through the imposition of the state of emergency, mass detention and political trials, and assassination of political activists failed to achieve the intended political objective. Equally, the failure of the homeland system, as well as the tricameral system of 1983, which included the participation of the Indians and so-called Coloured communities in Parliament to the exclusion of the black majority, proved beyond any reasonable doubt the inability of the government to orchestrate some form of legitimacy for the South African state.

According with Sipho Shezi, the failure of these initiatives further eroded even that very limited level of legitimacy that the state claimed as a justification for its continued survival. Most particularly, contradictions and tensions developed not only within the white constituency in general, but also between owners of capital and the holders of political

cohesive, effective and powerful machine, the South African state stood illegitimate and repressive before its own people and political institutions were facing a severe crisis of legitimacy. As a state it was fundamentally engaged in the protection and preservation of its rule. Posel asserts that nurturing a stable and prosperous economy is one of the ways in which its power was maintained. Another, as Max Weber pointed out, is through its monopoly of the legitimate use of force. While every state is founded on force, its stability depends on its capacity to secure the "sole right" to use violence. One of the distinguishing features of the state, therefore, is its quest for legitimacy amongst (at least some of) its subject peoples, buttressed and complemented by the institutionalised use of coercion to retain power.

It should be reminded that the crisis of legitimacy in South Africa went back to early 1900s when the political framework of contemporary South Africa was being established (Schrire, 1981:1). Legitimacy was then associated with power and colonial rulers legitimized their control over indigenous peoples on the basis of their overwhelming military and administrative powers. Doctrines of race and racism supplemented and strengthened this identification of power with legitimacy. White domination over black has been its core characteristic and has, thus far, resisted all domestic and international pressures for change. The state's racial character provided its *raison d'être*. The state at the center of South Africa's political economy was the possession of the white minority, as seen, and was invested with its symbols, history, and interests. This racially exclusive state was at the same time expansive, further narrowing the scope for legitimacy. As the ultimate arbiter of the nation's destiny, the state subordinated and regulated all social processes. By managing markets in particular, the state assumed direct responsibility for market results, conflicts, and inequalities. This led Greenberg to point out that under Nationalists' rule, the ideological discourse in South Africa centered on the problems of control or penetration and legitimation: how to manage labor markets and the proletarianization of the Africans? The state effort to subordinate markets and gain control over African proletarianization was sustained by a resonant ideology that privileged white identity, asserted the primacy of the state, and helped cement the state's foundations in white society. Apartheid, the ideological accompaniment of that process, came to assert the

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undermined the action of the bureaucracy. All these factors had a weakening effect on the civil service in limiting its independence as a self-effacing and loyal corps of personal proclivity. Paradoxically as Professor Cloete emphasizes, executive domination is the very factor which weakens the bureaucracy and gives it an appearance of strength far beyond the real situation.

The tradition in South Africa, however, is that the top public officials remain the background while their political chiefs are always in the limelight. The leading bureaucrats in South Africa cannot, therefore, be regarded as competing against ministers and other political office-bearers for political power.

While the proliferation of the public institutions on the central level of government no doubt has a weakening effect on the bureaucracy, this situation also prevented public officials from becoming a unified force and thereby influencing policy. The control exercised over the personnel administration and the financing of the state departments permitted the bureaucrats little opportunity to use patronage and the conferment of financial benefits for the achievement of improper objectives. In South African politics, the power struggle between the executive and state bureaucracy was striking. Posel argues that the bureaucracy's bid for supremacy within the state stems partly from bureaucrats' control of information and their technical expertise. The complexity and breadth of the executive's task was such that political decision-makers may have to draw heavily on the specialised knowledge and accumulated experience of state administrators. This gave the bureaucracy considerable leverage in advising policy-makers, and in defining and weighting the options between which the policy-makers had to choose (Posel, 1991:21). Thus, despite its limited independence, South African bureaucracy was nevertheless weak in relation to an exceptionally strong executive.

Across a broad range of perspectives on South Africa, there is a presumption that the South African state was in reality an awesome combination of repressive structures, lording it over society and the African majority: the state was seen as repressive, unified of purpose, internally coherent, effective in pursuit of its ideological goals, and efficient in embodying and representing constituent interests (Greenberg, 1987:19). Despite this

had no recognized end point. For example, in Belgian Congo, the *évolués* class framed its revendications in terms of a status securely differentiating itself from the mass of the population, as a Europeanized social category. The first major political statement came from the Cercle des Evolués in Karanga (Luluabourg), who in 1944 asked for "if not a special statute, at least a special protection of the government, shielding them from the application of certain treatments and measures which could be applied to a retarded and ignorant mass" (Young, 1994:227). At this time, it was impossible for the emergent Congolese elite to imagine a future outside the framework of a reformed colonial polity that opened status opportunities to them. Although entrenched for what was still believed to be the *longue durée*, the colonial state had fully developed its singular features, as a pure model of alien bureaucratic autocracy, a relatively autonomous body which mediated among class forces in the colony, a political bureaucracy, a form of rule in which bureaucrats are politicians and in which political actors outside the bureaucracy are suppressed or given a minimal role. Such a political formula was inherently unstable and indeed it was.

Some signs in the wind came on the eve of World War II which brought new challenges to bear on Belgian colonialism. The ideology of the state, the *mission civilisatrice*, gave way to the idea of a Belgo-Congolese community, which was an attempt to reconcile *évolué* demands and the desire on the part of the local European population to retain its privileges. The *évolués* who had been granted access to education beyond the elementary level, primarily in mission schools, began to question their true role in the Belgian system, demanding equal treatment with Europeans: "what will be our place in the world of tomorrow?", asked one of them, Paul Lomami-Tshibamba in the second issue of *La Voix du Congolais*. We think that was the beginning of the decolonization process which ended with the demise of the colonial rule. During this process, the *élite* played a capital role through their demands for equality. Let us now cope with one of the main issues at stake in the aftermath of World War II: the *évolué question*. How legitimate was the extent of its claims?

institutions significantly affected the traditional social systems. The consequences of the exercise of colonial authority were several. As stated by Wallerstein, one was the revamping, often the undermining, of previously existing systems. Whether, as in many hierarchical systems, the "chief" was weakened or, as in some systems, his powers were increased, in all cases the form and operation of the authority system were altered to suit the needs and desires of the colonial power.

In this vein, the colonial state played an important part in fashioning the new African *élites*, as underlined by Martin Kilson (Gann and Duignan, 1970:351). This is not surprising, for colonial society necessarily bore an authoritarian character, not necessarily in a repressive, but always in an administrative sense. In order to regulate their subjects, the colonial rulers required an effective state machinery; in order to govern, they soon needed indigenous as well as expatriate civil servants. The colonial rulers were thus forced to educate some of their subjects, and the trained African official in turn became a member of a new *élite*. Thus the incorporation of chiefs into the colonial bureaucracy, and small urban clerical and professional bourgeoisie, who were largely Christianized. As a result, the establishment of colonial rule brought about essentially two types of changes, as Wallerstein has summarized. One occurred in the composition of the groups primarily engaged in the alliance of the Western world and Africa, from merchants with merchants, to administrators with chiefs and clerks. And the second type of change is to be found in the structure of the African social system: the creation of new territorial units and the subsequent involvement of these units in specific imperial economic networks.

In the early colonial period there began to emerge an embryonic social class defined by its capacity to enter the new roles defined by colonial encounter. The colonial rule itself needed subaltern personnel literate in the colonial language, as did the colonial corporations and trading companies. In these interstices of the colonial order a new *élite* took form. Its unique skills was its grasp of the discourse of the colonial state. But this new social category was just the realization of a colonial state project: its needs for a fragmentary legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects. The aim was the creation of an embryo of a "civil society" and to find out the intellectuals, the persons of standing and relative autonomy, to achieve its formula of "domination-hegemony", accordingly. Yet, before World War II the language of domination

Belgians adopted the practice of *indirect rule* by the 1933 decree which embedded *indirect rule* in colonial legislation. This principle meant that "the administration maintained traditional organization to implement its own organization, but it has not left to the former its independence. On the contrary, the administration intervenes to a large degree in order to make the population evolve, instead of letting them crystallize in the conceptions and customs of the past" (Magotte, 1952:50-51).

The tendency of indirect administration by which territorial administrators might do everything themselves and place immediate efficiency above political education, persisted until the end of colonization. While it is true that colonial state power was more exceptionally centralized than the British model or the German type, another salient feature of that state was the interaction between it and the financial sector. Gann & Duignan claim that no other country achieved anything like the same measure of interpenetration between capital and state as did the Congo, as we have seen previously.

What is also undeniable is the fact that the Belgian bureaucratic system succeeded in penetrating and organizing the Congolese society and in creating an elite in its own image whose access to the modern world was mainly through the subaltern ranks of the administration. This issue deserves more details.

The colonial episode, as has been pointed out, affected profoundly every aspect of African life. In this regard, although the extent of the influence varied, of course, from colony to colony, depending upon circumstances, it was very impressive in Belgian Congo especially the issue involving change in the social structure. Anyway, one effect, however, as argued by Immanuel Wallerstein, appears to have been more or less general. This is the change which colonial rule brought about in the essential frameworks within which social action in Africa occurred. In the process, the relative importance of various social groups shifted considerably (Gann and Duignan, 1970:399). In Congo, likewise all colonies in Africa, the European powers, for instance, gradually began to subject all peoples to a central administration, to shape the economic framework with the colony becoming part of an international economic network, to support missionary activities, to promote education and to subsidize some health services. The set up of modern administration of a bureaucratic kind, and all these new

Under the Belgian dispensation, a civil servant could be promoted from the personnel inférieur to the higher strata of the Administration, just as a sergeant was eligible for promotion in army. This classification, like that of the French, was based on the assumption inspired by military and bureaucratic notions rather than by the ethos of the gentleman. It had no equivalent in the British colonial administration, where every district officer was supposed to be a gentleman.

One may note that Belgian administration was characterized by its density as well as its interference in people's lives. For example, Young notes that the density of government was higher in the Belgian Congo than on British colonies. In the 1930s, at the peak of the high colonial period, French Africa had a population of over 18 million and was ruled by fewer than five thousand colonial officials. The Belgian Congo with a population of about 9 million, was ruled by 2,500, and 10,000 at independence, whereas Nigeria, with 20 million, was governed by fewer than 1,400 (Duignan and Jackson, 1986:28). In addition another example was given by its ideology called *paternalism* based on the social and political immaturity of the Congolese population. For the colonial administration, paternalism meant a particular solicitude for the welfare of the child - African are like big children - ensuring that his illnesses were tended, his education provided, and his physical comfort guaranteed. It meant that a proper parental concern needed to be shown for his moral upbringing. It meant that the adolescent frequently had to be protected against himself, responsibility was accorded parsimoniously and under supervision. It meant that it was frequently necessary to take harsh measures and impose some duties whose value was beyond the child's immature scope of understanding.

Impressive achievements of this ideology began in about 1926 with the labour shortage and the rapid expansion of the economic and social infrastructure after World War II. To stabilize their working force, companies pioneered industrial paternalism with the delivery of decent housing, family allowances were paid to the workers, schools built for the children and foyers sociaux established for the women. But paternalism was constrained by colonial policy which was riddled with regulations and requirements predicated upon the social and economic sphere as well as what Young called the political "immaturity" of the colonial charges.

EXPENDITURES	
Central administration	159,000
Administrative service	6,415,000
Force Publique	5,935,000
Navigation	2,373,000
Health	619,000
Public works	1,870,000
Religion and Education	873,000
Agriculture	1,935,000
Domanial cultivation	6,572,000
Repayment of loans	4,167,000
Justice	1,387,000
Postal services	140,000
Miscellaneous	3,315,000
TOTAL	35,760,000
EXPENDITURES	

Source: Belgium, Sénat de Belgique, *Rapport de la Commission Spéciale, 1908*, no.11, (Brussels, 1908), pp.22-23.

At this administrative level the Congo was divided into *districts* (14 in 1906), later known as *provinces*. Gradually these were split into *zones*, each supervised by a *Commissaire de district*. The zones were divided into *secteur* each run by a *chef de secteur* who in turn supervised the local *chef de poste*. There was an intricate order of rank: the highest provincial officials or higher functionaries were the *Commissaires Généraux* constituted in three classes (1,2,3). The lower functionaries - the *personnel inférieur* - were the *chefs de secteur*, also in three classes, and the *chefs de poste*.

Having first practised a ruthless form of what Gann & Duignan call *rubbwirtschaft* (German word meaning *destructive exploitation*), Belgium subsequently encouraged new forms of economic enterprise and made a start in providing modern services. Above all, they built a Western-type army and a Western-type administration. In addition, the administration became less military and more predictably bureaucratic in its operation. While the impact of the Congo Free State had been restricted by its inability to govern the outlying parts of the territory in an effective manner, the new administration was more effective.

One of the most elaborate administrative characteristics in early colonial Africa was that of the Congolese district which reproduced many of the hierarchical complexities of the administrative system in the metropole. As it was noted, governance was expensive; hence the local population were forced to bear a heavy tax burden (see Table 07).

Table 07: Congo Budget, 1906 (in Belgium Francs).

REVENUE	
Products derived from domain land and taxes paid in kind	16,100,000
Customs duties	6,350,000
Income derived from transport and similar services	6,400,000
Income from stock	5,000,000
Direct and personal taxes	600,000
Miscellaneous	1,425,000
TOTAL REVENUE	35,875,000

copper in Katanga, diamonds in Kasai, gold in the north-east. Even the most powerful Belgian financial group, the Société Générale de Belgique (SGB), despite the large holdings by the royal family itself, remained deaf to Leopoldian appeals until 1906. In fact the concessionaries brought little capital - a mere 8,000 pounds in the case of ABIR, and instituted the reign of terror sufficient to provoke an embarrassing public-protest campaign in Britain and United States at a time when the threshold of toleration for colonial brutality was quite high (Young, 1994:104).

In addition, the interpenetration of state and capital was more evidenced by the incorporation of commercial companies such as mines and plantations into the superstructure of hegemony. Then they were licensed as agents of the state and given long-term monopolies over the resources of vast areas in return for sizable tax payments. State action provided cheap labor to support these activities through direct coercion, through labor recruitment with the cooperation of tribal chiefs, as seen, and indirectly through the taxation of all adult males, forcing them to seek wage employment. As pointed out by Young, through the common practice of controlling estates that housed workers, enterprise monitoring and management of labor extended far beyond the market sale of workplace services. Where the subjugation of the work force was most complete, as in the Katanga copperbelt, Fetter can argue that a veritable totalitarian society existed. The copper corporation Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), in alliance with the state and the Benedictine mission, had achieved "full control over its human milieu", extending to "virtually all aspects of the life of its African workers". In this "hegemonic bloc" of state, mission, and corporation, the distinctions were hard to draw for the subject at the high tide of colonial rule. To the Congolese, as Douglas observed, "they were as one", the orders of each carrying the irresistible weight of Bula Matari (Young, 1994:157).

Indeed it was the capital accumulation which constituted the economic basis of colonial economy. As the target of the colonial state in sum, was the extraction of immediately salable resources. Gran (1979) argued that the installation after 1890, of a state monopoly on natural resources and the management, directly or through concessionary companies, or their exploitation furnished the financial base necessary for the continuation of colonial policy.

excruciating difficulties. How could this be accomplished? What to do to foster accumulation? There were three basic strategies that appeared available : to attract metropolitan capital, to induce European individual or corporate commercial farming, and to reorient African agriculture toward export-crop production. All three of these avenues of accumulation, Young states, dated back to the first phase of the colonial state, but they took on new importance and stress after the Great War (1994:176).

Jewsiewicki argues that modern European colonization in Africa probably constituted the most extensive western attempt to build an authoritarian and technocratic state on the myth of the welfare state. Among the many attempts of industrial systems to impose *rational* management on both human and natural resources, the Belgian colonial experience was especially interesting (1980:45-75). According to him, from the time of Leopold II, intimate links were established between the colonial state and Belgian finance and the second decade of the century saw the development of one of the dominant traits of Belgian colonialism: the interpenetration of the state and finance capital. Belgian finance capital found in the administration a *patriotic* support in its efforts to *Belgicize* the colony. In fact, under the Charte Coloniale the central government in Brussels made the Belgian colony responsible for financing its own expenditures. The Congo had to be profitable, and therefore by the 1920s large financial and commercial conglomerates were firmly entrenched in the local economy, developing the mineral and agricultural sectors with the blessing of the state.

The basic compact with these chartered companies was a grant of virtually unrestricted delegated sovereignty, in return for their capitalizing and organizing the initial framework of hegemony. In recompense for sovereign services, the concessionary companies were awarded trade monopolies within their domains, and they could use the proceeds both to finance their exercise of domination and remunerate their shareholders. The most notorious of the concessionary companies operating in the Leopoldian state were the Anversoise and the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company (ABIR). These concessionaries were awarded vast tracts in the central Congo basin, with a licence to collect wild rubber by whatever means might occur to them in return for assuming responsibility for control over the area. But in most Africa public investment during this period was small, and private capital influx even smaller. Capital was reticent despite early identification of major mineral deposits such as

2.2.2.1.2. The Belgian Congo: 1908-1960

At the time of *Reprise* or the takeover, the Congo was governed under the *Charte Coloniale* of 1908 which granted the King legislative authority, but limited the supremacy and the influence of the Belgian monarchy over the colony. All executive and legislative decisions made in the King's name had to be countersigned by the newly appointed minister of colonies, who was both a parliamentarian and a member of the Cabinet. A system to exercise centralized rule from Brussels was created with the objective of stamping out abuses in the Congo. Most analysts have outlined that after Leopold's private empire was taken over by the Belgians in 1908, a variety of reforms were introduced. The King of the Belgians ceased to be the absolute sovereign of the Congo. The new colony was administered through a tightly knit partnership of government, missions, and interlocking companies. The introduction of changes in the colony had far-reaching consequences and provided the basic infrastructure of modern transport.

Nevertheless, the Belgian Congo stood at its apogee in its quest for autonomy. According to Young, the progressive institutionalization of its state apparatus, and the professionalization of its cadres liberated the colonial state from detailed management by its metropole. Internally, the completeness of its domination freed the state from responsiveness to its subjects to a remarkable degree: only the strength of the settler community, and corporate interests could significantly constrain its choices (1994:159). Practically, colonial ministries had final statutory power, acting on behalf of the holder of sovereignty. But it exercised this power with a light hand, so long as no deficit occurred, no unsavory military operations were required, and no other scandal attracting public attention appeared. In Belgium, Parliament devoted even less time to colonial affairs, except briefly in the 1930s when a bailout was needed. Although it voted on the colonial budget, the administration in the Congo was free to shift expenditures from one category to another; frequently, the budget was not submitted until six months after the fiscal year began. The Colonial Ministry termed this system "the empire of silence".

But, with *mise en valeur* now an integral part of colonial state discourse, development became an active item on the agenda. Meeting the revenue imperative, however, posed

Initially the Free State exacted levies of soldiers and contract workers from each district, and imposed taxes in kind: quotas of rubber, portage, paddlers and food or wood. This labour tax of the Congo Free State was extraordinarily onerous. A decree of 1903 exacted forty hours of labour a month from the population, for which they were supposedly paid; in practice they were underpaid and subject to additional obligations. The Belgian colonial government replaced the labour levy by the head tax in 1910, forcing people into wage labour to earn the necessary cash, but communal labour was nevertheless still required. Communal labour was of two kinds: (1) *unpaid*, which involved keeping the village clear of brush, building a jail and dispensary and carrying out health measures. (2) *paid*, which consisted of road maintenance and building bridges, schools and European rest houses.

Briefly, this compulsory labour, was limited by law to sixty days a year, only five in any one month, but the decree was not honoured in practice and more labour was demanded. What could be noted is the fact that such centralized control sparked protests by Belgian government officials and private companies, and Leopold accordingly permitted private exploitation of one-third of the unowned lands beginning in 1892, reserving another one-third as his private domain. Accounts soon reached Europe from missionaries and commercial agents describing abysmal conditions in the Congo and the brutal methods used by state agents and concessionary company representatives to collect rubber and ivory. This was this blatant exploitation of human and natural resources fostered by the Free State that signed its own demise and left a bitter legacy in relations among various ethnic groups. This mutual suspicion and animosity made it difficult to achieve political and administrative cohesion during the early colonial period. On 9 September 1908, the Free State formally became a Belgian colony.

As Leslie pointed out, although perhaps the more offensive and obvious abuses of the Free State were abolished, there was a basic continuity between the goals of Belgian colonialism and those of the Free State (1993:11), mainly in terms of attitudes and assumptions regarding the aims of colonization, as well as a basic similarity with respect to policies adopted to fulfill these aims.

local *corvées*. As time went on, the Force Publique came to resemble a European-style force with a tight bureaucratic structure. But the use of brute force resulted in Leopoldine colonialism to being considered as one of the worst in modern African history.

The administration of the Leopoldian state was relatively simple, but the demise of the Congo Free State gave way to a more complex, more centralized and more dense administrative system. For example, the authors of *The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884-1914*, describe the functioning of the system between the central structure in Brussels and the local administration in the Free State, thus:

"Correspondence was placed in files that were divided by "direction générale" and subject. Documents had to be drafted, copied, minuted, and collated before they could be sent from Brussels to the Governor-General. A routine communication concerning, say, personnel might take two months to be drafted, processed, and despatched. Considerable attention was devoted to form and precedence. During this process a good deal of information was accumulated on the way from official to official, so that the center became increasingly well informed with regard to developments in the Congo itself" (Gann and Guignan, 1979:88).

This system was qualified by Berriedale Keith as "an arrangement ideally continued to multiply correspondence and to paralyse effective action" (Slade, 1960:118). It is true that the coercive role played by the colonial state was undeniable and the level of its extractive and regulative capacities very high. The state extracted surplus value by political coercion in the form of products. MacGaffey remarked that in the period up until the forties, the colonial state and capital transformed production, firstly by the appropriation by the state of land held to be unoccupied, which was allocated in vast concessions, and secondly by mobilizing a labour force. Labour recruitment in the Congo was carried out under more direct compulsion than in French or British colonies. It was reported that Congolese were taken en masse from their native villages and forced to work for seven-year periods under the supervision of state agents (*chefs de poste* and *capitas*) from different tribes. State agents had a vested interest in the system, as their compensation was directly related to production levels in their territories. Accordingly, brutal methods - floggings, torture, and execution - were employed when villagers could not meet their assigned quotas. *Capitas* were often required by their supervisors to produce the left hands of individuals they had killed as proof that they had administered the appropriate punishment (Leslie, 1993:9).

economic destruction of preexisting kingdoms. But the *raison d'être* of the Free State was the extraction of resources. In the pursuit of profit, Leopold devised a restrictive system of land ownership under which Europeans in the Congo had to register their landholdings, leaving all unowned lands and their products the property of the Free State. Locals were barred from collecting rubber and ivory except for sale to the state. Existing trading posts were closed to further consolidate the state's trading monopoly (Leslie, 1993:9).

All legislative and executive power in the Congo was concentrated in the hands of the King. He was the master-mind which directed every aspect of policy, and his agents in Africa had only to carry out the royal will. Leopold II endeavoured to supervise every detail of its government. In practice, of course, it was hardly possible to do this from Belgium, but legally speaking, all authority vested exclusively in him. As an absolute sovereign, he delegated very little real authority to his subordinates. One can note that the heart of this system had been its bureaucracy.

With system and purpose, it had penetrated and organised the Congolese society. It created an elite in its own image, whose access to the modern world was through the subaltern ranks of the administration (Young, 1965:398). Meanwhile Slade (1960) notes that the central government of the Congo Free State was in Brussels, where the King could supervise its day-to-day work. It consisted of a Secretary of State, three Secretaries-General and a Treasurer-General.

The local administration in the Congo was in the hands of a Governor-General, who could issue temporary laws in urgent circumstances and was assisted by a Vice-Governor-General, by four Directors in charge of government departments, and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Force Publique, the colonial Army. Law and order could not be enforced in the Congo State without an army, known as the Force Publique. This corps was formally constituted in 1886 as a small organisation serving a multiplicity of purposes. During the 1890s the army expanded rapidly. The Force Publique (FP) amounted to 3,186 men in 1891; 10,215 in 1894, and 19,028 in 1898. Between 1892 and 1914, a total of 66,000 men, including 2,260 Whites passed through the ranks of the Force Publique, as reported by Gann and Duignan. The Belgians employed their new army for a wide variety of tasks, including the enforcement of

2.2.2.2.1. The First Republic: 1960-1965

Although the First Republic was characterized by chaos, breakdown and crisis, it is notable that the Republic of Zaire has been marked by a continuous crisis since its independence in 1960 to the present. The Zairean crisis can be traced to the earliest days of its independence. The independence of the former Belgian Congo was proclaimed on 30 June 1960 with Joseph Kasavubu as President and Patrice E. Lumumba as Prime Minister. But the fragile stability achieved with nationhood was undermined by a Congolese army mutiny less than a week after Independence. Indeed, this new development led the country plunging into chaos, into despair, into poverty. The mutiny began on July, 4, after a provocative sermon from the Belgian commanding general, Emile Janssens. While summoning Africans NCOs, he strode to the blackboard and wrote: AFTER INDEPENDENCE = BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, meaning the army was to "continue as before". Lumumba dismissed him and promoted all soldiers one grade.

Their demands were partly satisfied by the replacement of General Janssens by a former army sergeant-major, Joseph Désiré Mobutu, promoted Colonel and Army Chief of Staff. With the rapid departure of Belgian army commanders, the FP was totally ineffective in the midst of the chaos. Many Belgians rapidly fled the country, especially Belgian civil servants, causing irreparable damage to the new institutions, as well as the economy. It might be noted that at independence the size of the civil service was relatively small and composed as follows:

Europeans: 9,801	Africans : 11,803	TOTAL : 21,604
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Source: INCIDI, Staff Problems in Tropical and Subtropical countries, p.124, and C.Young, *Politics in the Congo*, 1965:402.

At that time there were some 100,000 Belgian citizens in Congo. What began as a local incident fanned the flames of discontent throughout the country, provoking violent upheavals

politically conservative multinationals in the Congo. Political figures of this group included Moïse Tshombe, Albert Kalonji, Joseph Iléo, Joseph Mobutu, as Leslie states. Federalism was viewed as a realistic means of allaying fears and insecurities while preserving the territorial unity of the country. Whereas unitarist nationalists saw it as thinly disguised separatism, a camouflage for the secessionist tendencies that were threatening to destroy the new state at its birth; federalists saw unitarism as camouflage for a desire to dominate hinterlands groups - to the detriment of the "sons of the soil". The unitarist and pluralist paradigms of the nation-state remained locked in combat throughout the First Republic (1960-1965).

It might be noted that despite these political changes, no efforts were undertaken to Africanise the top reaches of the administration or army and Belgians continued to dominate the big companies and the Roman Catholic Church. Commandant in Chief of Force Publique remained opposed to African promotion - no Congolese officer at independence. Growing discontent among clerks and lower rank soldiers. Promotion to higher ranks in civil service would require a university degree: impossible for existing functionaries. Upper administration of the civil service had four categories or grades: 800 Africans in 1959 had appropriate qualifications for the bottom grade which required a full secondary education. By the end of 1959 only six Congolese as opposed to 4,500 Belgians occupied the superior grades. Army's africanisation programme would produce first Congolese officer by 1963. In 1960 the FP consisted of 1,000 white officers and 20,000 Africans NCOs and soldiers. It had become clear to soldiers in the FP ranks that self-determination would not mean greater Congolese control over the military. The roots of the continuing Zairian crisis lie in the gross negligence of this issue. As a result, the formula *le pari congolais* will last exactly five days, swept away by the mutiny of the once feared and well-disciplined FP. These factors constitute the bridge that leads us from the Belgian rule to independence. The postcolonial political history of Zaïre may be instructively divided into two periods: the First Republic (1960-1965) and the Second Republic (1965-1990), including the democratisation process which started in April 1990. But for our concern, our focus will be on the period from April 1990 to April 1994 which coincided with the appointment of Kengo as new prime minister and the stalling of the overall process. Meanwhile in South Africa the same period witnessed the demise of the apartheid system and the organization of multiracial elections and the beginning of a new era.

plan for decolonization. Political organisations were initiated very late and at a local and regional level rather than on a national basis. Absence of a western educated middle class elite helped to explain the late formation of political parties. Existing ethnic organizations therefore became the vehicles for mobilization, resulting in the formation of dozens of political parties based largely on ethnic loyalties, as seen. Among such organizations, three emerged as nationally based parties: the National Congolese Movement (MNC) headed by Patrice Lumumba; the Bakongo Alliance (ABAKO) led by Joseph Kasavubu; and the National Progressive Party (PNP) led by Paul Bolya. But all these parties remained very weakly organised, fragmented and regional. After the riots of January 4, 1959, colonial authorities convened a Round Table conference in January 1960 to discuss Congolese independence. Elections were set for May that year, with independence to follow in June, and a new draft constitution, the *Loi Fondamentale*, was drawn up and passed by the Belgian Parliament. Plans were made in earnest to establish a Western-style parliamentary democracy in the new state or the *pari congolais*, as it was known. According to Young, this was the calculation that an amicable transition after formal independence would result from transfer of sovereignty and constitution to a wholly African political sector - parties, assemblies, ministers - while keeping the administration and security forces under almost exclusive Belgian personnel at executive and command levels (1994:197). After May 1960 elections, Lumumba became prime minister and Kasavubu was appointed state president, following what Leslie called "an uneasy compromise" between them. Lumumba's party gained a narrow victory with only 24 percent of the Assembly's 137 seats. As a result, it was necessary for him to enter political alliance with other parties, such as ABAKO, to form a government (1933:20).

These two leaders found themselves engaged in the battle over the plural and unitary visions of Zaire that constituted the major aligning focus in the tumultuous competition among the burgeoning political parties. The constitutional slogans of "federalism" and "unitarism" gave content to this battle. While Lumumba symbolized the "unitarist vision" and was belonged to the "radical group", Kasavubu was "federalist" and was seen as "moderate". The "radicals" were committed to obtaining "authentic" independence in both the political and economic spheres and stressed nonalignment on the international front. They enjoyed grass-roots support. Other members of this group included Antoine Gizenga and Pierre Mulele. The "moderates" enjoyed the support of the Belgians, other Western governments, and the

as late as 1958 made thirty-year timetables for political autonomy audacious, was unseen ways growing more brittle in the late 1950s. Its fragility was suddenly demonstrated by the trauma of the eruption of urban discontent into days of rioting in Kinshasa in January 1959. In the months that followed, the colonial administration found itself confronted with wide spread civil disobedience in the Congo zones between Kinshasa and the sea, and later in Maniema and Kwilu districts. The reliability of the once feared Force Publique, engaged over time in repression of nationalist outbreaks across the country, no longer seemed sure.

Thus shattered, hegemony could not be reconstructed at any reasonable price, notes Young; this premise of the official mind led to the astonishing January 1960 acceptance by Belgium of the maximal demand of Congolese nationalists - *immediate independence*. As the locus of sovereignty itself came into question, power drifted upward to the metropolitan capital, which asserted control over the final phases of political evolution and negotiated the terms of power transfer. Consequently, the loss of autonomy for the Belgian colonial state was as sudden as the decolonization process overall. For instance, when in the wake of the January 1959 Kinshasa riots King Baudouin promised independence, the colonial administration was not consulted at all. In the tumultuous final year of colonial rule, the governor-general became all but irrelevant, as power transfer terms were finally negotiated between the Belgian parliamentary parties and the major Congolese nationalist parties. Bula matari, so long apparently omnipotent, was "short-circuited in the decision-making process. It passively observed the institution of a policy it disliked or even roundly disapproved of". The final disgrace was dispatch of a minister from Brussels to supervise directly the final moments of power transfer (Young, 1994:207). This resulted in a progressive loss by the colonial state of its capacity for initiative, of its ability to respond to the autonomy imperative. One might remember that the harsh oppression and relentless extraction of the colonial state for most of its life cycle disappear, none can wish the return of those years.

2.2.2.2. THE POST-COLONIAL STATE: 1960

Unfortunately, there was very little serious preparation by Belgium for the independence of this huge African country. The quick loss of legitimacy by the Belgian administration in the future of the Congo as a viable colony was the proof of incapacity in constructing a coherent

believed that independence meant the sudden redistribution of a very large number of high-level positions. To hold such posts meant to exercise meaningful power. It supposed high status, and a level of remuneration that made the holder relative to the mass of citizens, a wealthy man. After independence, put one observer, the dynamics of class formation altered radically, with politics playing the central role, and the social group then known as *intellectual* positioned to take advantage of the changing social structure. The process of decolonization and the Africanization of key jobs in public service led to the generation of great tensions.

However, as Young has argued, the bureaucracy is of crucial significance not only as fulcrum of conflict but also as the primary armature of the modern state. The role of public administration in a developing country goes far beyond its tasks in industrialized societies. Not only does it provide essential public services but it serves as a major element of cohesion in the face of the risk of disintegration. Unfortunately this did not occur in the Congo.

The Africanization issue at independence has been a prime source of tensions at all levels of disorder. The bureaucracy was a crucial element in the political system of Congo and the heavily bureaucratic tradition of the Belgian colonial system has left an indelible mark.

Nevertheless, the relative failure of decolonization in Congo was, in large part, the work of politicians. Ryckmans contends that "the formula for decolonization was the creation of a political sector outside the bureaucracy, rather than introduction of a real program of Africanization within it. And a salient feature of independence has been the relative failure of the political sector and the resurgence of an Africanized bureaucracy" (Young, 1965:33-398).

Despite pressure from the group, the Belgian colonial state concentrated its policy efforts of defining a special status for the *évolué* class, with some corresponding privileges: exemption from the battery of discriminatory measures that permeated colonial practice. However, in contrast to British and French adaptation of the colonial state, no access to authority or share in hegemony was offered. Not until 1959 was the term *independence* officially uttered, or provision made for African access to the executive ranks of the administrative service. Unable to interpret the signs of the time, the seeming solidarity of Belgian colonial hegemony, which

clubhouses were built. They did serve as a forum for discussion of all évolués problems. However, they were usually closely monitored by the administration, which was normally represented by a European functionary at the meetings.

Meanwhile the alumni associations were under mission sponsorship; the major ones were Association des Anciens Elèves des Pères de Scheut (ADAPES) which had been formed with official approval in 1925. After the Second World War, its membership significantly shot up to 15,000, and many future leaders emerged from its ranks. Others circles were the Brothers Marists (UNELMA), the Christian Schools (ASANEF), and the Schools of the Jesuit Fathers. The names of practically all the present Zairean leaders appear as officers in these "harmless" associations.

The tribal associations were the most important pre-political groups and by their nature included both elite and mass. They were, in Young's terms, "the only effective, wholly African organizations, formed to help adjust to the colonial situation, both in the humble functions of mutual benefit and in assertion of comprehensive political programs" (Young, 1965:292). The oldest and well-known were the *Fédération Kasaïenne* (1916), the *Fédération Kwangolaise* (1925), the Alliance des Bakongo (*Abako*): 1950, the *Lulua Frères* (1952).

Describing this class Young notes that by the end of World War II, in the larger centers, there had appeared in the shadow of the Bula Matari state small clusters of young men possessing a post-primary education, the capacity to express themselves well in French, and dexterity in using a European model for their external behavior and life style. This petty bourgeoisie in embryo, laid claim to a status and treatment different from that applied to the mass. But the opening up of the political process after 1957 offered évolués a new pathway to fulfillment of their status aspirations and a redefinition of their self-concept. This generation, born between 1925 and 1935 was strategically positioned to be catapulted by a political conjuncture - the anti-colonial revolution - to levels in the state apparatus previously foreclosed, and above all to control over the state machinery (Young and Turner, 1985:111).

With the advent of independence, the new elite, without training for the exercise of power

to the Western way of life, it was an overwhelming disappointment to them, when they became aware of the attitude of the great majority of the Europeans towards their aspirations, expressed in such modified forms of the colour bar as were beginning to make themselves felt in the Congo, especially in the sphere of social relations. Generally, Europeans attitudes showed how little the whites desired to extend their privileged position to include even a small group of African.

Moreover, criticisms came not only from those évolués who felt that immatriculation did not go far enough in satisfying their demands but also from those who felt that it threatened African solidarity, artificially splitting the African community and making the immatriculés a caste apart from their fellows. Thus, many who could have qualified, including the majority of Congolese priests - refused to apply for immatriculation.

The concept of a solid African middle class, as Legum has noted, with its bourgeois vested interests in the *status quo*, is clearly not without its attractions. Its weakness lies in the failure to learn from history that revolutions are not made by hungry peasants and by slum-dwellers but by middle classes and the skilled workers: this development finally occurred in the Congo. This began by what scholars have called "the revolt of the élite" in an obscure fashion through the formation of what might be likened to old boys' clubs (Legum, 1961:49-50). At this time, political associations were prohibited, so the educated Congolese invariably turned to non-political associations that can be divided into four categories: unions, alumni associations, cercles des évolués, and tribal associations (Young, 1965:291; Vanderlinden, 1985:44-62). In the first instance, in 1946, the tidily-dressed and ambitious clerks and other salary-earners in the Administration and in commerce formed themselves into a nation-wide association of employees, APIC (Association du Personnel Indigène de la Colonie). This body offered a forum for employees to talk about their wages and conditions, their lack of opportunities, and their experiences. It played a significant role in exerting pressures for a unification of the civil service statutes and access for Congolese to the upper ranks of the colonial administration.

The *Cercle des évolués* and the alumni associations shared certain common features. The former were organized under the patronage of the administration immediately after the war. They were set up not only in the major urban centers but in many smaller towns; attractive

of custom, while V.G. Pons, in a sample of 1,894 males of sixteen years and over living in Stanleyville in 1952-3, discerned 176 white-collar employees. The proportion of *évolués* to the whole sample was about one-eleventh. By the end of the Second World War, therefore, a sufficient number of *évolués* had emerged for them properly to be termed a class, as Ansley has noted.

The only trouble with this system of "assimilation" by integrating and absorbing blacks into the society of the *élite* was that it would not work, as stated by Colin Legum (1961:45). The common characteristic of the measures taken in this regard is that they constituted only a late and limited departure from the original segregation. As Ansley has pointed out, "limited" is a key word, for what seems to have impressed the Africans who stood to benefit by these reforms was not so much the benefits they obtained, but the fact that those benefits did not in the aggregate come near to constituting full social equality with Europeans (1966:208-9).

Criticisms of the decree were all governed by a hostility to the emerging African elite. The denial of this equality took various forms. There were in fact, as expressed by Young, three crucial misunderstandings between colonizer and colonized as to the content of the new system; these made the immatriculation experiment an unqualified failure: (1) there was a misunderstanding about whom the immatriculated status was in fact destined for. In fact, in 1948, a special committee was appointed in Brussels, headed by Sohier, to seek a more permanent solution to a number of perplexing issues regarding the *évolués* question. The original project of the Sohier Commission foresaw a two-tiered arrangement in which the top rung would be accessible only to a very small group: African priests, two or three paramount Chiefs, such as the Bami of Rwanda and Burundi and Antoine Mwenda Munongo of the Bayeke, a couple of the successful traders, and eventually university graduates when they began to appear (1956). (2) there was a misunderstanding as to what advantages the card would bring. (3) there were insoluble difficulties in establishing procedures and criteria for granting immatriculated status.

All these problems besides with the humiliating character of the process were the evident cause of the failure of the "immatriculation experiment". Although the *évolués* were turning their backs on traditional Bantu society, and saw their best hope for the future in assimilation

well in French, and dexterity in using a European model for their external behavior and life style. This petty bourgeoisie in embryo, employed in the clerical ranks of public and private hierarchies, laid claim to a status and treatment different from that applied to the mass. It was at this point that the term *évolué* came into general circulation (1985:111). A man might truly be an *évolué* if he thought himself one. Representative figures were the clerk, the male nurse, the teacher.

To Ståde, only a very few Congolese - mainly among those in the towns - would be seen as *évolués*, as they began to be called. It was those Africans who had received more education than their fellows and could speak French with fair ease, had renounced polygamy, and were comparatively well-off - the "middle class" whose creation Belgian policy had encouraged (1960:11). It was these men who at the end of the War were beginning to compare their position with that of the Europeans, and to ask the reason for the great gulf which existed between white and black.

Thus any African who satisfied to these requirements was eligible for the *carte de mérite civique*, created in 1948 to ensure for Africans a gradual development towards European juridical status. It assured its holder of a certain assimilation in matters of court procedure, movement at night and some other advantages. The reward for the successful candidate was that he was allowed to become subject to European and not customary courts, have all rights under civil code and have similar treatment with Europeans on public transport vehicles and other matters.

Yet due to economic expansion, there was usually a considerable demand for African labour. The relative intensity of economic development led to an increasing proportion of men coming to live outside the sway of custom. Figures given by Roger Anstey (1970:196) show that by 1939, 444,634 men, or about 14 per cent of the adult male population, were officially regarded as living outside the village. By 1947 the figure had risen to 637,878 and the percentage to 20.6; by 1958 the figure was 956,615 and the percentage 26.8.

Evidently only a minority of these men were *évolués*. Van Wing hazarded their number as 40,000 in 1947, that is, about one-sixteenth of the total of all males living outside the sway

Separate treatment was thus denied to the *évolués* - and this despite the fact that, in principle, there had been provision since a decree of 1892 for the emergent African to secure *immatriculation* which would bring him under the civil law applying to Europeans. *Immatriculation* was first instituted by a decree of May 4, 1895, in the Congo Free State days. Immatriculation was a registration in the category of civilised persons granted to an African by a court ruling, preceded by an enquiry proving that the applicant was living according to European standards. It was then apparently designed to bring under European civil law those Congolese who had entered European service and wished to renounce their traditional status. It was next extended to cover automatically certain categories of Africans, such as soldiers, workers, or those attached to the mission settlements.

But this first attempt towards creating a new status for detribalized Africans, though enshrined in Article 4 of the *Charte Coloniale* of 1908 at the time of Reprise, conferred no worth-while privileges and the procedure fell into disuse. Nor did anything come of a proposal in 1923 to reform *immatriculation*, nor of another attempt in the 1930s, when it was sought to create through *immatriculation* a new, intermediate category, distinct both from Europeans and from the mass of Africans.

By the end of the Second World War, a number of observers of the Congo scene had come to see the position of the Congolese élite as one of the colony's major problems. Anstey notes that the veteran Jesuit, Father J. van Wing (1945:584-605, 1947:8-22) drew attention to this issue. To Legum, the creation of an African middle class was a central feature of Belgian policy; an élite of *évolués*, it was believed, would become the ally of the rulers in maintaining stability and in pursuing reforms in a slow and orderly fashion (1961:49). In the same way, Young has asserted that élite satisfaction was the central issue in colonial policy and that was accepted in the early postwar years by all sectors in colonial society (1965:74). A plea of the Luluabourg *évolués* consideration of their situation, written in the aftermath of the Luluabourg Force Publique mutiny of 1944, likewise received considerable publicity.

As for the term *évolué*, Young and Turner suggest that in the period after the Second World War, in the larger centers, there had appeared in the shadow of the Buia Matari state small clusters of young men possessing a post-primary education, the capacity to express themselves

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2.2.1.3. The Decolonization

"The days of colonialism are over", declared Pierre Ryckmans, then Belgian proconsul in a 1946 speech. The hour was at hand, he argued, to lead colonial populations toward an ill-defined emancipation (Young and Turner, 1985:38). This reasoning assumed a central place in the state ideology of the terminal era. Running in tandem with this new strategy was a significant expansion in social services (health and education) along the lines of the welfare state. This period saw the acceleration of the pace of economic exploitation and the Congo became vital as a supplier of the resources which helped the economic reconstruction of war-devastated Belgium. As one could recognize a more sophisticated state apparatus was needed to administer a large urban population as the state began to assume some of the functions which hitherto it had delegated to missions and companies. However, while such efforts were widely applauded on the one hand, they were clouded by the continuation of a harshly oppressive regime in the countryside, on the other hand. In fact Africans remained subject to fierce racial discrimination and the only way to escape the exactions of customary law was to qualify for the status of "immatriculation". But, according to scholars, what seemed as a paradoxical situation was the fact that, on the one hand a very harsh compulsive state which attempted to minutely regulate the economic life of its subjects, backed by very considerable military force, as well as the legacy of fear engendered by the brutalities of Leopold's initial colonial venture. On the other hand the state delegated many of its responsibilities: schooling, health, welfare, housing, town planning, etc... to private agencies - companies and missions, and each of these in their particular domains exercised a different style and conceptions of social order: with the effect of fragmenting the state very considerably.

Thus with the growing nationalism and politization of the Congolese, *évolués* played a more significant role in the new political paysage. The foundation of organizations, in many instances along ethnic lines, provided them with their first introduction to politics in the Western European tradition. If we look into Congolese history, we learn that the position of Congolese *élite* or *évolué* quickly became one of the colony's major problems. Many scholars who have tackled this problem asserted that "Belgian policies in the Congo had taken no account of the fact that a class was emerging significantly different from the untutored mass" (C. Young, 1965:75, 1985:111; Roger Anstey, 1966:208, 1970:194-225; Ruth Slade, 1960:11-17).

and by staking a claim to philosophical innovation with the label of "authentic Zairian nationalism", a sacred invocation of national unity. By 1970 the ideology took on a more cultural cast and was transformed first as "authenticity". And subsequently personalised, as "Mobutism" in 1974 as its doctrines were to be discovered in the words and actions of the president.

Yet at the time the image of force, power, and strength seemed real enough; the state at the high tide of its expansionist phase was an astonishing personal hegemony. Until 1973 this political formula appeared to be successful. However, in 1974 Zaire entered a prolonged phase of crisis whose end point came in sight with the collapse of the Mobutu regime. As Young has stigmatized, although this personalized caricature of popular ideology was swiftly swallowed up in the subsequent crisis; the domestication of the vocabulary and symbols of radical anticolonial nationalism in the early years of the Mobutu regime had genuine meaning (Duignan and Jackson, 1986:138). At the peak of its prosperity, the Mobutu regime enjoyed a real degree of autonomy, sought diversity in its external economic partners, and enjoyed widespread respect in African diplomatic circles.

Phase 4: 1974-1994: Crisis and Decay

This phase witnessed the opening of a new epoch of state deflation. As we shall see, several events triggered the deflationary spiral, some of which were unrelated to the character of the Mobutist state. Thus, the once-imposing hegemony of the Mobutist state corroded and became what Callaghy pictured as the "lame leviathan", losing its hold on civil society and international standing. Copper prices broke; a large debt acquired almost overnight in the early 1970s affixed the stigma of bankruptcy. By 1976 it was becoming clear that a crisis was unfolding which would shake society to its foundations. As the crisis deepened and persisted and hopes for its end all but vanished, as pointed by one observer, symptoms of state decay appeared and became general.

It could be noted that much of the preceding phase of state expansion had been made possible by the exceptional availability of the country resources. Young and Turner recall that for most of the period 1967-74 copper prices were very favorable - with one through from late 1970

institution of the land through which popular sovereignty was exercised. As the personal incarnation and authoritative interpreter of this general will, Mobutu led the party, appointed its key officials, and spoke in its name. All Zairians, by reason of birth, were automatic members. And conversely, the MPR claimed to embody their sovereign collective personality.

This explains why ascendancy was also expressed through the expansion of the state into organizational spheres having well-established traditions of autonomy: trade unions, youth, women, student, merchants and all existing associations were forced to unify their corporate bodies into a single organization. In 1970, the MPR was institutionalised by an extraordinary congress of the party as the supreme instrument for the management of the patrimonial state. Even the Catholic seminaries were forced to permit the grouping of their students into party cells at the beginning of 1970s - a move that provoked bitter but unsuccessful opposition from the church hierarchy. The prime icon of this ideology - the effigy of the president - was everywhere. The nation was metaphorically represented as a vast village whose chief was a venerated, sanctified, paternal figure. He was adorned with various heroic titles: founding father, supreme guide, helmsman. At this stage, adoration of the president was elevated into a national cult. Rather, spokesmen for the regime were comparing the MPR to a national church, and its leader, Mobutu, was likened to a messiah.

Phase 3: 1970-1974: Expansion

This stage was that of the systematic expansion of state control into as many spheres of social life as could be managed, coupled with the political monopoly of the party. Having control over whole the country, Mobutu was free to pursue his ambitions in all fronts: externally, by active pursuit of African leadership; economically, by luring a diverse assortment of capital to the country, while simultaneously capturing "economic independence" through Zairianization. Internally, through the MPR's ever-enlarging hegemonical claims, now extended to the church and the army. Not only were the hegemonical claims of the presidential political core of the regime extended over the religious sphere, but they were also applied to the formal institutions of the state itself after 1972, especially the security forces, as well as the administration. Ideologically by claiming to have exclusive hegemony

Phase 2: 1967-1970: Ascendancy

This phase was marked by the achievement by Mobutu of personal ascendancy over the state and the patrimonialization of the state. The First Republic key leaders were shunted aside and were replaced by figures whose promotion depended upon presidential grace. The personalistic nature of the regime became increasingly salient. This process was accompanied by a steady reduction in sphere of autonomous activity.

To scholars, patrimonialization is a system in which high office is bestowed in return for personal favours or loyalty to the ruler. Office holders are tied to the ruler by links of clientelism. A regime wholly was controlled by a single leader and a small circle of persons loyal to and dependent on him. As pointed out by Ergas (1985), "both the many parts of inherited colonial administrative structures and the newly created state and party institutions have been hijacked by extremely corrupt power elites". This smaller circle which consisted of individuals closely connected to Mobutu was better known as the "Binza group". In such systems, and in Zaire this was especially the case, the client had the right to exploit his office for his own benefit. Similarly the presidency became the set of absolute power and concentrated control over public resources in his own office. Direct expenditure by the president was about 20 per cent of the government budget from 1970 onwards. Much of this money was spent on personal projects but some was dispensed on public welfare but in such a way as to make it appear that a clinic, a school or a road was being built as a consequence of the president's special favour, with generous disbursements accompanying triumphal sweeps by the president and his entourage through the countryside. All state projects were described as "a gift from Papa", as state was identified with family (Schatzberg, 1988:71-98).

As stated by Young (Duignan and Jackson, 1986:137), the new regime recognized that the original legitimacy conferred on it by the overwhelmingly negative perceptions of the First Republic would not persist indefinitely. The Mobutu state sought to gain a long-term legitimacy by borrowing institutional weapons fashioned in the armory of radical African nationalism. This aim was pursued by means of the creation of a single national party, the MPR which projected itself as "the nation politically organized", claimed to be the supreme

Following Young and Turner (1985:47-77), the history of the Zairian state between 1965 and 1994 can be schematically divided into five distinct phases: 1965-1967: consolidation; 1967-1970: ascendancy; 1970-1974: expansion; 1974-1990: crisis and decay; 1990-1994: democratization process.

Phase 1: 1965-1967: Consolidation

After the ousting of Kasavubu and Kimba as state president and prime minister, on 24 November 1965, Mobutu moved quickly to consolidate his power. He embarked on a systematic dismantling of the political superstructure that the decolonization settlement had grafted onto the authoritarian bureaucracy. The declaration of a *Régime d'exception* for five years created a reservoir of unlimited power vested in the presidency. Political parties were dissolved and the twenty-one provinces - by this time all paralyzed by factional divisions that reinforced the popular vision of the first republican state as an emblem of disorder - were reduced to eight. By 1967, provincial assemblies were abolished and the Parliament dissolved, a new one was only constituted in 1970, at the end of the initial five-year period of Mobutu rule. This phase led to the creation of the comprehensive regime party, the MPR, on 20 May 1967 to which all Zairians had to belong and the adoption of a new constitution in June 1967. This constitution enshrined the presidential system: presidential hegemony was assured both with respect to the ministers, whose function was simply to execute the decisions and policies of the president, and the legislature, whose role was circumscribed by the concurrent power of the president to make laws. During this period the First Republic machinery was progressively dismantled, the institutional framework of the New Regime was created, and the most dangerous opposition dispersed or coopted.

On the economic side, though the UMHK (Union Minière du Haut-Katanga) struggle wound up with a compromise solution, Zairian sovereignty over the mineral industry was at least nominally established through the nationalization of this colonial company in 1 January 1967. The well-executed 1967 financial stabilization plan eliminated inflation until 1973, and projected an image of both strength and competence.

2.2.2.2. The Second Republic: 1965-1997

The Second Republic, in pursuit of an elusive legitimacy for the state it sought to build, initially projected itself as a caretaker authority whose mission was the restoration of a strong state. With civil society risking dissolution through the intensity of its unrestrained struggles, salvation, for most, seemed to reside in a program of state resurrection. A short-lived legitimacy was available for the Mobutu regime through this transitional mission. But the regime had more extended ambitions; it sought a formula for indefinite perpetuation of its rule, and a fusion of the fortunes of the regime and the state.

Mobutu quickly started the consolidation of his power. Important to the immediate success of the *coup* was the strong support it enjoyed from the Parliament where he was constitutionally empowered to legislate by decree. There was also strong support from the West, especially Washington and Brussels, followed by its acceptance elsewhere in Africa. After his coup, Mobutu stated categorically that he would act as interim president for only five years to restore national unity and order after which free and fair elections would be held. Nevertheless, in true Machiavellian fashion, he opted to change course to ensure his political survival.

After five years of turmoil, Mobutu took power because of the incapacity of the new leaders to attack the massive problems of organizing the administration. The 1965 *coup d'état* was, among other things, the expression of the failure of the emergent politico-administrative class and other elite elements of postcolonial Zaire to find a consensual political and ideological formula. Peemans remind us that the "Binza group", which was the first nucleus around Mobutu, could impose itself on the different fractions of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie which were fiercely fighting each other since 1960, because it had much more of an external legitimation than an internal (Nzongola, 1986:67-83). This failure was expressed in the form of governmental instability, coercive practices and violence in the period before 1965, as Young (1965) and Willame (1972) have expressed.

bring order out of chaos, to end the endemic conflict among social groups and to forge a nation out of a congeries of diverse groups. According to Young and Turner, the nation-state model proposed by Mobutu in 1965 as a synthesis enjoyed at its genesis a remarkably broad consensus of approval as a political formula. Mobutu as a leader was privately contested by some, but the centralized, strong nation-state vision of the polity seemed to most the only salvation (1985:43). The new regime, known as the Second Republic, stressed unity and it has had a measure of success. This new departure carried at least the hope of improvement and radical change. In our effort to identify the nature of the Mobutist state, we shall begin, in a very succinct way, by presenting the periodization of regime development with particular focus upon its institutional and ideological dimensions. Then we will examine the salient characteristics of the bureaucracy in its search for autonomy.

effective machinery for overseeing and hierarchically controlling the provinces. The state commissioners who, according to the constitution, were intended to represent central authority in the provinces were never able to function. The breakdown of the state financial apparatus, which took place almost immediately, gave the province *de facto* budgetary autonomy. The regional administrative apparatus, including district commissioners, territorial administrators, and police also operated autonomously, unimpeded by central monitoring mechanisms. The six original provinces, now fragmented into twenty-one, were assured a large autonomy by the weakness of the center. As stressed by Young and Turner, beyond the particular issue of ethnicity, the state itself in the First Republic had come to be viewed as a zone of disorder. The authoritarian order of Bula Matari had degenerated into *la pagaille* (a shambles). The image of *pagaille* and ethnicity unchained in popular consciousness served as an antithesis to the Bula Matari state which had collapsed in the face of the nationalist challenge in 1959-1960 (1985:42-43).

In functionalist terms, it might be argued that, in such system, many institutions ceased to function properly or important symbols lost their efficacy, but they continued to exist although the capabilities of the political system decayed. The central authority was no longer able to regulate society, let alone develop it. Many of its symbols became outdated and unable to elicit support. Its ability to rejuvenate itself was drastically curtailed. Its political elite targeted on a series of irrational goals and destroyed the system in an attempt to achieve them. In short, the decline of political efficiency, decreased institutionalization, irrational decision making, reduced participation, and structural and functional rigidity are perfectly logical results of sudden changes in societal and political activity. The First Republic political system in the Congo was the victim of these malfunctions thanks to its congenital weakness.

For most scholars, because the state itself in the First Republic had come to be viewed as a zone of disturbance, then Mobutu's political *coup* marked the end of the First Republic and contributed to the restoration of a relative stability. In the eyes of the Congolese, the independence experience had so far been disappointing. It was reported that Mobutu came to power with the blessing and assistance of the US, establishing himself as firmly anticommunist and a reliable ally of the US. The main tasks Mobutu set for himself were to

deterioration of the precarious constitutionalism. On the 24 November 1965, the impasse of the struggle between Kasavubu and Tshombe paved the way for the second military intervention led by Mobutu, who found overwhelming support for the unitary concept of nation for which Lumumba died in 1961.

With the collapse of the state between 1960 and 1965, the basic functions of state were no longer performed, and there has been a corresponding deepening of a crisis of legitimacy for the state itself. As the authoritative political institution, the state has lost its legitimacy and so has lost its right to implement decisions and conduct public affairs. With the breakdown of social coherence, society as the generator of institutions of cohesion and maintenance, could no longer create, aggregate, and articulate the supports and demands that are the foundations of the state. As seen, the pursuit of legitimacy is a prime imperative conditioning the action of the state. Thus, a certain prescriptive legitimacy may reside in the simple prolonged exercise of state power by rulers whose authority appears beyond challenge, wrote Young and Turner (1985:185). The elements of tacit legitimacy enjoyed by the colonial state rested essentially upon the effective and sustained monopoly of coercion, given ideological articulation in the doctrines of trusteeship, the *civilizing mission*, and parsimonious dispensation of welfare for its subjects. This basis for state legitimacy was largely dissipated in the *pagaille* years by the spectacular deflation of state authority. As a result, the breakdown of the state was marked by the loss of control over political and economic space.

As the collapse of state led to the degeneration of state functions, the quest for autonomy became a more difficult task. Thus, Belgian military intervention in the wake of the mutiny, was seen as a violation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Congolese government. Accordingly, the Congolese government broke diplomatic relations with Belgium and appealed to the United Nations Security Council to provide military assistance and to secure the withdrawal of Belgian troops.

Although, the 1960 provisional constitution was a compromise between federalism and unitarism, the primacy of the central institutions was preserved and an autonomy was accorded to the provinces by means of their elected assemblies and representative governments. In practice, this autonomy became much greater than intended; there was no

added to the 11,842 (1965:417).

With the breakdown of the administration, the functionaries, lacking top-echelon personnel and government directives, found it impossible to make the administrative machine function. The public services were paralyzed by absenteeism and riddled with the gangrene of political favoritism. In parallel with Sekou Touré Guinea, the Congo was the only country in Africa where the clerks were suddenly confronted with the entire burden of managing the country, with virtually no direction at the top in the early days of independence. In addition, the new rulers were viewed as black version of the colonizer who had retained the same privileges and in similar fashion had appropriated the resources of the state. This disappointing experience was ended by the 1965 Mobutu coup.

The government between independence in June 1960 and Mobutu's takeover in November 1965 were trapped in chaos generated not only by ethnic and regional particularism as a major factor, but also by widespread disorder and the lack of trained personnel to lead municipal services, the breakdown of central authority and its aftermath in 1960-61, provincial fragmentation in 1962-63, rebellions in 1964-65 and social disharmony among ethnic groups with the anti-Luba riots: Lulua versus Luba in Luluabourg (1959) and Luba-Katanga versus Luba-Kasai in Elisabethville (1960-63). The east and north-east of the country were under rebel control. As result, the decomposition of central authority and its incapacity to exercise its theoretical powers led to the fragmentation of the six provincial units into twenty-one through a process tantamount to ethnic or local self-determination.

In March and April 1965, the coalition led by Tshombe, who was invited by Kasavubu in July 1964 to become interim prime minister, pending elections, won 122 of the 167 seats in the chamber of deputies in accordance with the new Constitution known as "the Luluaburg Constitution (1964). One can note that Tshombe was the former leader of secession in Katanga (1960-63) and both he and Kasavubu were the two outspoken partisans of the federalist paradigm in 1960. At that time both appeared as supporters of a more centralized state, like Lumumba. But, once again, President Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe despite his victory and appointed Evariste Kimba as new prime minister. There was thus a second political deadlock. So all the conditions propitious for a *coup d'état* were created by the

The deterioration of administrative control began with the sudden explosion of leaderless violence in Leopoldville on January 4, 1959, and was intensified by the mutiny of Congo's Army in the days immediately following independence on 30 June 1960. According to Young (1965), the whole atmosphere at this time was charged with uncertainty and insecurity. As a result, the effort to transform overnight the colonial juggernaut into a functioning independent African state had failed, and the Congo became a world crisis of the first magnitude followed by the fragmentation of the polity which reached its nadir with the exodus of European functionaries, the splitting of the country into four principal fragments (Katanga, South Kasai, Leopoldville, and Stanleyville), and the arrest and murder of Prime Minister Lumumba.

Meanwhile the crucial element in the situation created by the departure of the Europeans was the transfer of power into the territorial service. Although little was noted at the time, as Young argues, the way in which this transfer took place was a crucial shift in power toward the provinces which took on the function of naming Africans to replace the departing Belgians. In fact, in most cases the leader of the dominant political group in the region supervised the nominations, usually on the basis of administrative criteria and regional-ethnic compatibility. Despite the predominance of the latter criteria, one may observe that for the most part, nominations and promotions to key posts were made within the ranks of the administration. Thus, the senior clerk, who in many instances had already been named "auxiliary" at the beginning of 1960, was in general the first logical choice if he was not for some reason ethnically or politically incompatible. Moreover, dominant ethnic groups tended to be heavily represented in the ranks of the clerks. As it was expected, the replacement of the departed Europeans and the consequences of inadequate appointments seriously affected the public service. The problem was the complete disorganization at the central level engendered by the crisis which left the ministers powerless.

As termed by Young, "the extravagant degree of administrative fragmentation not only drains away public funds from potential investment uses but establishes numerous duplications of functions which absorb the energies of public servants in jurisdictional contests". Thus, in January 1961, the Congolese government still employed 2,268 Belgian civil servants. In 1962, there were 11,842 functionaries and 100,000 persons occupying menial positions in the employ of the state. But they were hired "under contract". In April 1962, 10,000 of them were

The *Loi Fondamentale* had the fatal flaw of providing no method to secure a definitive interpretation of constitutional ambiguities. The Lumumba revocation on September 5, 1960, set the stage for another vital dimension to the breakdown: the collapse of the constitutional parliamentary regime (set up by the *Loi Fondamentale*). Indeed the Article 22 of the constitution which simply stated that "the President names and revokes the Prime Minister" was a textual replica of Article 65 of the Belgian constitution. The problem with its insertion in the Congo document was that it was not accompanied by the accumulated political traditions relevant in Belgium. Young states that at that time, however, it was contrary to Belgian constitutional usage, if not letter, for the King to use this clause. Kasavubu by revoking Lumumba had just imitated King Baudouin who by August 1960 was reported to have summoned Prime Minister Eyskens to inform him that he no longer had confidence in his government. Eyskens, however, indignantly refused to resign and defied the King to invoke Article 65 and revoked him. Quite obviously, for Baudouin to have done this would have reopened the *question royale*, so the matter was dropped. It should be added that in these precedents the article was not formally involved as in the Congo case (1965:326).

Unfortunately there was nothing in the *Loi Fondamentale* that made Belgian usage binding on the Congo, even if it were unambiguous. Indeed, Young adds, it was by no means clear what the role of the President was to be. Obviously, a Chief of State elected by Parliament cannot be compared to a hereditary monarch.

Nevertheless, at the time of the Round Table, the problem was posed in a somewhat false light; the issue debated was not the merits of the dual executive, but whether the Belgian monarch should continue to serve as Chief of State for the independent Congo. A majority of both Belgians and Congolese wanted to leave open the possibility that King Baudouin might be chosen Chief of State, further, this was the standard model of constitutional democracy as practiced in western Europe at this time. Thus, the dual executive was written into the provisional constitution of the new state. By the time the first Congolese government was invested in June 1960, there was no longer any support for retaining the services of the Belgian monarchy. And that was Kasavubu who became the first Chief of State and not the Belgian King.

and precipitating a series of events known internationally as the "Congo crisis". The Africanization of the FP came late. The situation severely deteriorated, resulting in countrywide attacks on the European population. Belgian troops intervened to protect their nationals, and at the same time the provinces of Katanga and south Kasai decided to secede. Lumumba requested help from the UN and was dismissed by Kasavubu in September 1960. But Lumumba refused to accept his dismissal and asked the legislature to remove President Kasavubu, instead. The result was the political deadlock resolved by the first intervention of the army under Mobutu's direction on 14 September 1960. Mobutu announced the suspension of all political institutions and assumed control of the country, ruling with the assistance of a "*collège des Commissaires Généraux*", mainly comprising young university graduates. In February 1961, Mobutu restored power to President Kasavubu after the Lumumba's arrest and his transfer to Katanga where he was assassinated by secessionist forces led by Tshombe, on 17 January 1961.

But the military and administrative breakdown of institutions on the threshold of independence generated new developments and new attitudes. As expressed by Mackenzie, when the time comes to transfer power, the colonizer inevitably satisfies his conscience as to the integrity of his act by implementing a system modeled upon the democratic values and their structural embodiment which are cherished at home. The colonized likewise demands that, as surety for the sincerity of the power transfer act, he is bequeathed a constitution which is a replica of the metropolitan format (Young, 1965:176). One can understand now why the constitutional system adopted by the two Round Tables of Brussels in January and February 1960 and consecrated by the *Loi Fondamentale* - the then constitution - was a parliamentary regime copied from the Belgian blueprint.

Yet, as it will be seen, this system of democracy was not the most suitable for the needs of the Congolese populations, for a very good reason! It carried a major anomaly which crept into the constitutional framework with inadequate consideration of its consequences: the implementation of the duality between the Chief of State and a Prime Minister. This dichotomy was an invitation to conflict and instability which led inevitably perhaps to the *decolonisation ratée* of the Belgian Congo.

ministers since April 1990 without succeeding in effectively managing the country. Presently, wrote Robin Hallett (*The Star*, Feb.1, 1995), Zaire is a country where "when the water system breaks down, the poor get cholera, the rich buy Perrier".

Zaire has declined in relative importance. In this perspective, Leslie argues that this apparent lack of interest from the rest of the World, if sustained, may be ideal. Zairians would then have to rely on their own initiatives to change their future. He believes that ideally, the electoral process will permit a new regime to emerge but even then there was the very real danger that the existing structural weaknesses in the state will remain. The reality was that Zaire may not be able to mitigate the effects of its historical and Mobutist legacies for some time to come.

Although the country was in transition, in principle, and the modern Zairian polity has attributes of patrimonialism and personal rule, the key authoritarian features of the colonial state have persisted. In 1994, the Zairian state was centralized and coercive, yet weak and insecure. Meanwhile, people were agonizing faced with a pervasive, intrusive state in tandem with weakened state capacity with respect to economic and social welfare. State institutions could not deliver basic services. This constrained citizens increasingly improvised and fended for themselves outside the system. The exit option. Everywhere life were just as harsh as during colonial times. And the Zairian state unable to deliver the goods remained largely soft.

Rather, the restoration of democracy in Zaire did not bring any capital change for the populace. The situation went from bad to worse politically as well as economically. The devaluation mirrors the sorry state of the economy, reported Frédéric Fritscher (*The Weekly Mail*, August 6, 1993). According to a report issued jointly by the Banque du Zaire and the National Institute of Statistics the economy stopped growing and began falling early in the eighties. There was negative growth of 1.2 per cent in 1982 and 10.6 per cent in 1992. Inflation, which was running at 100 per cent in 1983, rose to 3,333 per cent by 1992 and close to 10,000 per cent in 1993.

named a rival government in appointing Faustin Birindwa - a UDPS dissident member and former adviser of Mobutu - as prime minister; went back to his old MPR constitution and convened his old parliament. But the Birindwa "administration" lacked any legitimacy and was denied official recognition by the Western "troika" which talked though but did nothing to avoid Mobutu to act. Until mid-1994, Zaire was in the unusual situation of having two prime ministers, two governments, two parliaments, two currencies and one president.

To put an end to this paradoxical situation and the "bipolarization" of institutions, Mobutu decided in January 1994 the mergence of the two legislatures to form a parliament of transition. In the end he came out victorious with a majority in a new and leviathan parliament of 780 members. In April, the new parliament endorsed the transitional constitutional Act to regulate the transition to democracy. In June 1994, the legislature held elections for the post of prime minister in a flagrant violation of the transitional Act which did not make provision for the case of the kind. However, Mobutu's supporters exhilarated by their majority in this body, decided to do so!

Kengo wa Dondo who served as prime minister twice (1982-1986 and 1988-1990) but in the wake of the 1990 speech had later joined the opposition in creating his own party, the Union de Démocrates Indépendants (UDI), emerged from this election as a clear winner with 72 percent of the votes and was expelled from the Union Sacrée together with his party. For the ordinary people, the violation of the Act is seen as an imposture which sanctioned the illegitimacy of the Kengo administration. For the "troika", Kengo who is seen as a man of the centre with the reputation for efficiency is preferable to Tshisekedi, a man of the people who is perceived as a radical nationalist and was still regarded as the only legitimate candidate.

Now, wrote one observer, "confronted with the *fait accompli* of Kengo's election, ordinary Zaireans have displayed an extraordinary collapse of morale". In spite of the backing of the Western "troika" at Kengo's sides, things remained the same. "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose! After the demise of the MPR, the Mobutu regime lost significantly its legitimacy that led to the erosion and complete decline of others capabilities, resulting in the incapacity of the state to function as a state. Realist observers expressed their doubts about the ability of the new government to tackle the country's problems as Mobutu went through eight prime

In Kinshasa, the political interests of Tshisekedi and Mobutu clashed almost immediately when the president declared his intention to promote the adoption of a "semi-presidential constitution", in opposition to the parliamentary system favoured by the Conference. As Nzongola (1994) has observed, "less than four months later, the people's victory turned out to be hollow. After his friend and ally Jonas Savimbi defied international public opinion and went back to war after losing a free and fair election, Mobutu did not see why he should live with a situation he dislikes. He carried out the third coup d'Etat of his political career on December 1, 1992", when he declared the Tshisekedi government dissolved, following the demonetization by the Prime minister of the 5 m. zaire notes which was widely rejected by the population and a call for foreign military intervention to oust Mobutu.

On 6 December the National Conference hastily dissolved itself and was succeeded by a 453-member High Council of the Republic (HCR), headed by Mgr Mosengwo. Mobutu called on the new transitional parliament to elect a new prime minister. The HCR and Tshisekedi himself have refused to recognize what in effect has been his dismissal. As a supreme interim executive and legislative authority, the main task of the High Council was to amend and adopt the new constitution and to organize legislative and presidential elections. It was empowered to examine allegations of corruption brought against Mobutu and his "coterie".

As a result, Mobutu ordered the suspension of the HCR and the government, in violation with the Transitional Act. Despite Mobutu's attempts to obstruct the convening of the HCR, Mgr Mosengwo who enjoyed the support from the "troika", declared Mobutu to be guilty of treason, on account of his mismanagement of state apparatus, and threatened impeachment proceedings unless he recognized the legitimacy of the Tshisekedi government. In reprisals for this affront, Mobutu sent off several units of the army for rioting, pillaging, raping and killing people. 65 individuals, including the French ambassador to Zaire, were killed and military contingents from France and Belgium - once again! - came to rescue and restore order. The Union Sacrée condemned the intervention by foreign troops as an effort and an attempt to save and to protect the dictator.

In early March 1993, Mobutu convened a special "conclave" where his supporters formed themselves into a group calling itself the Political Forces of the Conclave (FPC). There, he

sunset". Broadly speaking, Tshisekedi's election was widely applauded as a victory for pro-democratic forces within Zaire as well as it was also welcomed by the international community, particularly the "troika" (USA, France, Belgium) and the European Community (EC) as a positive step toward democracy.

At the same time, observers could note that Mobutu continued to maneuver - with considerable success - to weaken and spilt the Union Sacrée. This was done in several ways, following Weiss (Zartunan, 1995:164): first, leading personalities were induced to switch sides. Former members of the opposition leadership who followed this path included Mungul Diaka, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, Faustin Birindwa and Kengo wa Dondo were all appointed prime minister by Mobutu. Second, ethnic antagonism was encouraged, resulting in campaigns of ethnic cleansing, especially in Shaba, where close to 100,000 people were expelled from their homes, subsequently from Shaba and deported to Kasai. Thousands were killed and their personal property and goods confiscated or burnt. Others have fled in large number to neighboring Zambia and other ones to South Africa. The campaign began in January 1992 far before Tshisekedi's election from rural areas of Shaba such as Fungurume, Mwadingusha, Kapolowe, Kasumbalesa and Luambo to the inner cities of Likasi, Kolwezi, Kipushi, and Lubumbashi especially. The move was supported by Mobutu and the new separatist provincial governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza - regional president of the UFERI. Nguza further fueled tensions by stating that Shaba would not recognize Tshisekedi's authority. As they did in July 1960, local leaders in Shaba took this opportunity to demand independence from the central government. According to Mbila, more than 1,000,000 of Kasaians whose returned home were living in refugees camps destituted of any means of living (Mbila, November 1993). Those who were living in Likasi particularly - after the DSP had expelled them from the station where they were waiting for a possible train to Kasai - were staying in public schools and were sleeping in the open. Third, the fact that Tshisekedi was a Luba-Kasai and that this ethnic group has aroused considerable antagonism has been used to orchestrate distrust and divisions among opposition ranks, especially his own party the UDPS. Fourth, with the passage of time and radically worsening economic conditions, and freewheeling brutality by security forces, support for opposition demonstrations and strikes has declined from the standards set during the optimistic high of 1990 and 1991.

of Senegal. Nevertheless, the Union Sacrée was largely excluded from Nguza government and Mobutu's allies heavily represented. Nguza and his UFERI were subsequently expelled from the Union Sacrée for treason and participating in a Mobutu-orchestrated government.

Mgr Laurent Mosengo, the Catholic archbishop of Kisangani, head of the Episcopal conference and a dedicated campaigner for the extension of democratic rights was elected president of the National Conference and Joseph Ileo of PDSC vice-president. There was a humiliation for pro-Mobutists camp. Officially, Nguza moved to the Mobutu's side and the outcome of this move came when, he arbitrarily closed this forum on 19 January 1992 after consultation with Mobutu.

From January to February 1992, violence intensified as the Union Sacrée and churches attempted to mobilize people to demonstrate against the suspension of the Conference. On Sunday, 16 February 1992, in a Christian march, thousands of people left church, candle and Bible in hand, to join massive demonstrations all over Kinshasa for reopening the Conference. Mobutu's security forces opening fire and killing over 30 people. These incidents greatly weakened Mobutu's international standing with his Western allies, leading to pressure for the National Conference to be reinstated, and suspension of aid. Isolated and under pressure at home and abroad, Mobutu, against Nguza's wishes, agreed to re-open the Conference on 6 April 1992. The main role of the Conference was to "take stock of what had gone wrong since the independence of the country and chart a new course for the future; to define a draft constitution which would be put to a referendum, and to establish a timetable for legislative and presidential elections".

After many frictions between the Conference and Mobutu, on 23 July it had been agreed that the Conference would elect a transitional Prime minister who would appoint a government, establish a high council of the Republic, and oversee the implementation of the Conference's decisions. Obviously, in a direct challenge to Mobutu's rule and Nguza's government, the Conference voted overwhelmingly to reinstate Tshisekedi to the position of Prime minister. Accordingly, on 15 August, Etienne Tshisekedi - the people's candidate - was elected by the Conference with 71 % of the vote to 27 % for Thomas Kanza, the candidate of the status quo. In Nzongola's terms, "the whole country erupted into a joyful victory dance from down to

Tshisekedi had himself refused the nomination - under pressure from his supporters - the first time; and three weeks after the second appointment he was dismissed by Mobutu (Zartman, 1995:162).

These developments, Weiss wrote, preoccupied the elites of the regime and the opposition, as was reflected in the complex tug-of-war over the organization, membership, and power of the imminent national conference. At the same time, a massive decline in the economy was taking place, accompanied by runaway inflation (the zaire - once pegged at \$2 for Z1 - by midsummer 1991 was at \$1 for Z7,500).

Finally, the long-awaited "Sovereign National Conference" known as "the people's conference" opened on August 1991 with 2,850 delegates, including 900 representing opposition political organizations, only to be disrupted in September as a result of looting by poorly paid soldiers. By 23 September, increasing frustrations with the national conference, massive inflation and aggravated hardship, erupted into a week of rioting and looting. Massive destruction of properties and business premisses took place and a large number of deaths were reported. French and Belgian troops - as they did in 1978 during Shaba II - were dispatched to suppress the rioting and to protect the European population.

Under foreign pressure it was agreed that cohabitation by Mobutu and Tshisekedi was essential to peace, economic recovery and the progress of the democratization process. Once again Tshisekedi was appointed as Prime minister on 2 October 1991. But he only survived in this post until 18 October when Mobutu put an end to the "government of crisis". Situation due to Tshisekedi's wish to present his own government to the National Conference and to reject representation of the MPR, his refusal to swear an oath of allegiance to Mobutu, and his depiction of Mobutu as a "human monster".

Tshisekedi was replaced by Bernadin Mungul Diaka, leader of a small, lesser-known opposition party in the Union Sacrée - but was also once a close political associate of Mobutu. Without legitimacy, he only survived until 28 November when Nguza Karl-I-Bond was appointed prime minister - the fifth of the transition - after the agreement signed on 22 November under new initiatives undertaken to break the impasse by President Abdou Diouf

Mobutu orders. Strong condemnation was voiced by many humanitarian organizations, Zairean University professors and opposition parties. Foreign reaction, especially in Belgium, was extremely critical, as was that of many Zairians. The Lubutu nevertheless, there are some parties known for their fight against the dictatorship before 1990, nominally the Lumumbist group, especially the PALU (Parti Lumumbiste Unifié) of Antoine Gizenga from 1962 and the UDPS (1982). The 1996 Massacre became what Weiss calls a "milestone" in the deteriorating relations between Belgium and Zaire - or, more precisely, between Belgium and Mobutu (Zartman, 1995:160). The Belgian government announced the immediate "freezing" of all official bilateral assistance to Zaire and the suspension of other official schedules between the two countries.

In response, the key opposition parties - the UDPS, the Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien (PDSC) led by Joseph Iléo and the Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants (UFERI) led by Nguza Karl-I-Bond - formed the United Front which became later the Union Sacrée (Holy Alliance) in order to take a common position against the regime. By the end of July 1991, the Union Sacrée counted about 130 parties and had decided to take part in the "Sovereign National Conference", as a result of its growing influence and the weakening of Mobutu's power base. Despite various parties into the Union Sacrée, nonetheless, the Alliance was unanimous on one central issue: Mobutu's unconditional departure from the political scene and political and economic reform were not possible with the Mobutu's continued presence and influence over local developments.

As pointed out by Weiss, political jockeying between the regime and the growing opposition had taken on the characteristics of a duel between Mobutu and Tshisekedi. This was often misinterpreted as a "personality conflict". In fact, it had to do with the fact that Tshisekedi was seen, and in fact apparently was, the one person who would not allow himself to be manipulated by Mobutu. As Braeckman pointed out in 1992: "The cause of Tshisekedi's charisma resides in the tenacity which he demonstrated when confronting Mobutu ... his popularity in Zaire is immense" (Braeckman, 1992:333 and 335). At any rate, during the period of tactical retreat by Mobutu, Tshisekedi was twice appointed prime minister (July 1991) and (September 1991); but, when it became apparent that he intended to control government finances and the armed forces, these attempts at "compromise" collapsed, rapidly.

not have a mass base. In general, their founders were for the most part "cliques of ambitious individuals" who were positioning themselves for political office in the new order. Among them most of Mobutu's single party well known collaborators, including former prime ministers (Kengo wa Dondo, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, Boboliko Lokonga, Mungul Diaka, ...), former ministers (Kamitatu Massamba, Nsinga Odjuu, Mandungu Bula Nyati, Kamanda wa Kamanda, etc ...) and other high-level officials founded their own parties. There is reason to believe that all pretended to belong to the opposition side which meant people and change. Obviously, with the hope that by identifying themselves with change, they would prevent punishment by the people for crimes committed while working for Mobutu.

Nevertheless, there were some parties known for their fight against the dictatorship before 1990, nominally the Lumumbist group, especially the PALU (Parti Lumumbiste Unifié) of Antoine Gizenga (1962) and the UDPS (1982). All enjoyed a high degree of popular support but that was the UDPS which enjoyed the greatest support among the populace. Nzongola states that this was due primarily to the popularity of its major leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, who has captivated the popular mind by his courage and strong commitment to change in the face of a brutal regime. In Zairian imagery, "God and Satan had names in Zaire": one was Tshisekedi and other Mobutu. In religious terms, this appeared as a duel between the forces of good (Tshisekedi) and the forces of evil (Mobutu) and led undoubtedly to weaken the Mobutu regime (1994:24).

As a result, Mobutu no longer felt at home in Kinshasa, the capital of all Zairian institutions. Then, he fled to Gbadolite, a new town built right in the middle of the Zairian forest located in Equateur, his province of origin, where he was living in kingly fashion. Against him was ranged the population, with no arms and no money. On one side there were "the people and the forces favourable to change" and on the other side Mobutu with his "fortune", his "army" and his "bank".

Since the speech of 24 April 1990, Zaire slid further in an unparalleled reign of violence. One can remember unrest occurred in early May when students at Lubumbashi University staged anti-government demonstrations. About hundred students were subsequently killed by members of the presidential guard the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP), acting on

Indeed, facing an increasingly desperate internal social and economic crisis and an international constellation that sharply lowered foreign support, Mobutu decided to organize popular consultations in which the general public would be free to submit memoranda detailing its grievances against his regime. Mobutu was convinced that he could control the process of democratisation and secure his own continuing political supremacy. After travelling across the country with the intent of listening, he was surprised and perturbed by the result: 5,000 memoranda out of 6,000, many of them extremely critical, demanded Mobutu resignation. Popular consultations and earlier policies with the stated goal of liberalization were all attempts to undermine opposition and appease foreign supporters.

The next step was the famous speech by Mobutu on 24 April 1990, which appeared as a "funeral oration" for the MPR, a "personal lashing failure" with the collapse of the single party system, as a whole. There were two linked elements which may characterized this speech. The first was the establishment of "democratic rules" and the second the restoration of the multiparty system. The passage of dictatorship to a new more democratic republic well known as the "Third Republic" was seen as the "people victory" on "evil forces". The new Republic might have to start on 1 May 1991, but five years later, people were still waiting for its advent.

In what was seen by many observers as an attempt to defuse the growing tension which threatened his regime internally as well as externally, Mobutu then announced at the same time that leadership of the government would be relinquished to a prime minister, and himself as president would be "above politics" in his new capacity as "referee" of the political process. He resigned as chairman of the MPR but rejected calls for his own resignation and retained the office of president. All political institutions for the "Third Republic" will be set during the transitional period of one year. This includes the multiparty system which initially comprising three parties including the MPR. Kengo wa Dondo was replaced by Lunda Bululu as prime minister of transition.

However, under pressure from partisans of an integral multipartism, in early October 1990, a full multiparty political system was introduced. From this time, there are now in Zaire more or less two hundreds political parties. Most of them were created after 24 April 1990 and do

collapse of the regime to fend off effective and sustained cooperation between them (ibid.,p.224). In other words, there were very slim chances for reforms because such reforms appeared as a direct threat to the patrimonial administrative state and any threat to the viability of the regime might be avoided at all costs. Hence the limitations of external pressure. In this perspective, external pressure for reforms may only be able to slow the rate of decline of the downward sloping economic nerve, to dampen the pillage.

To sum up, there was general agreement on the collapse of the Mobutist state. It was then clear that Zaire was in deep trouble as it faced mounting bankruptcy, total breakdown of vital services, military incompetence and repression, mass impoverishment, crescendo regime unpopularity and increased dependence on foreign banks creditors and foreign soldiers. In the mid-1980s, it appeared that while the gap between rich and poor widens, as a result of the self-serving use of the bureaucracy by the "regime barons", general dependence on Western investors, creditors, and praetorian protectors grew. In other words, as Young and Turner have summarized, during the phases of ascendancy and expansion, the state enjoyed an appearance of force and power. While not as effective as its colonial predecessor, the trends all pointed toward a restoration of its hegemony. This imagery was then exploded by the period of decay and crisis, in which the infirmities of the state again became conspicuous. Thus, Zairianization, radicalization, Angola, bankruptcy, the "Shaba wars" - all exposed the limited competence of the state, while its legendary venality was described in chilling details even by Mobutu himself. As a "lame Leviathan", the state consumed the national wealth without producing justice, welfare, or security, to the helpless and demoralized bewilderment of its populace (1985:77).

Phase 5: 1990 - 1994: Democratisation Process

Recent analyses and comprehensive discussions already exist with regard to this process and number of observers (Leslie,1993; Nzongola,1994; Weiss,1995) have noted the resurgence of civil society and independent press. Great emphasis was put on the national conference, the struggle between Mobutu and Tshisekedi both in search of legitimacy and the fact that the opposition forces did not possess or develop sufficient power at grassroots level to force the regime to abandon its control over the state apparatus.

nature of this state and the unproductive character of its political aristocracy make the regime more dependent on external actors. In part this explains obviously the survival and the longevity of the Mobutu regime.

As Young and Turner have written, this crisis utterly voided the regime's legitimacy at home, and through exposure of its infirmities and derelictions destroyed its credibility abroad. Yet the external world became heavily implicated in the patchwork of expedients that kept the regime lurching forward. The IMF became more heavily immersed in the internal processes of coping with the Zairian payments crisis than it had ever been in the internal processes of other countries. The private creditors silently endured a default in payments. In Verhaegen's terms, the circle was closed by the coincidence of interest between the supplier of technology and the hegemonic class within Zaire. The growing technocratic class of university-trained functionaries, most of whom sought employment in public or private bureaucracies, found that "a part of their revenue depends on the 'coefficient' of corruption which they can derive from technological transactions." Indeed, the major participants in this process - foreigner and Zairian alike - transferred abroad as many of their liquid assets as possible, which suggested that they shared an underlying lack of confidence in the future of the country. The evident solution for financing development projects was for the state to borrow the capital, thus shouldering the risks, while the foreign technology purveyors and the politico-commercial class divided the immediate gain (Young and Turner, 1985:391-92).

The Zairian ruling class believed that the revenue collected by the state belonged to them, and then they should be able to spend it as they saw fit. According to Callaghy, Zaire's severe debt crisis illustrated that Mobutu and his political aristocracy could fend off significant efforts by external actors to change the policies and very structure of the regime without forgoing continued support. This trend was shown after the failure of externally-induced political liberalization and military reorganization efforts in the wake of Shaba I in 1977 when Mobutu and his group fended off political and military demands by external actors without jeopardizing crucial support to the regime (see Nzongola, 1986:222).

The result was what Callaghy calls the "sabotage of change" which consists of manipulating the external actors' partially conflicting interests and fears about the consequences of a

to early 1972 - and in 1974 they surged to an all-time high. In addition, the state had substantially increased its fiscal pressure on the mining sector; tax revenues from copper increased sixfold from 1965 to 1974, though production was up only 50 percent. State revenues rose from Z 186 million in 1968 to 539 million in 1974, mainly with the extraordinary availability of external credit. The external debt, fuelled by a grandiose packet of costly investment schemes, soared from next to nothing to nearly \$3 billion by the late 1975, when the international financial community suddenly discovered that Zaire was virtually bankrupt. The sudden pulsating surge of resources through the state was largely devoted to patrimonial purposes; in this way the emergent politico-commercial class rapidly accumulated wealth (1985:71).

The extractive capacities of the state at this time were also expressed through its dependency upon a harsh regime of financial exploitation of the countryside. State crop purchasing organisations controlled prices which declined steadily between 1960 and 1974 and the old colonial coercive production quotas were retained as was the head tax. People also paid huge concealed taxes through state levies on imports and exports. Coercion was very extensive. In the Lisala zone (Equateur) between 1969 and 1974, for example, about one third of the adult male population had served short prison sentences for non fulfillment of agricultural quotas. Confronted with such penalties and with the poor conditions of rural areas people fled to the cities which included most of the state's public investment, in particular Kinshasa and Lubumbashi: 90 percent of electricity consumption, 50 percent of health expenditure, 53 percent of oil consumption. Between 1940 and 1970, Zairian cities expanded ten times and by 1974 one fifth of Zaire's population was urban.

As could be argued, during the crisis years, the international environment became much more difficult for the Zairian state forced to evolve in constant receivership, limped from one external debt impasse to another, and was an object of derision even among its Western supporters. However, the recourse to external element was one of the most important manoeuvres performed by Mobutu to maintain power as a broad survey on the crisis has shown. Indeed, several analyses and comprehensive discussions abound with regard to this matter. The involvement of exogenous forces in the economic and political life in Zaire reflects their ability to influence the national arena. As Callaghy has observed, the patrimonial

The cause of Zaire's failure and the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of its bureaucracy, were what Callaghy identified as the "project of self-aggrandisement" of the state-based class as it pursued its own narrow personal and class interests. In short, corruption seemed to be linked to the growth of the state sector and to the increasing temptations open to civil servants to provide licences, permits, and contracts in return for cash or other reciprocal favors. This is what Heidenheimer (1970:483) has called "a pattern of top-heavy corruption" which means that most of the corrupt revenue was paid to a small political group. To Mac Gaffey, the arbitrary selection of those in authority and power and their general incompetence as well as their corrupt practices, paralyse administration

In such case corruption could become a major obstacle to economic development and a major cause of political instability. According to Mac Mullan (Heidenheimer,1970:317-18), other evils which widespread corruption may be expected to bring are: injustice, inefficiency, mistrust of the government by the citizens, waste of public resources, discouragement of enterprise, particularly foreign enterprise, repressive measures and restriction on government policy. All of these scourges were easily "palpable" in Zaire.

When one examine the political or economic dimensions of the crisis in Zaire as we did, it becomes striking that the soft state paradigm exists really and is not a "wrong target" as suggested by some academics such as Sangmpam (1992:92). Once the deflation of the state machinery begins, argues Young, it becomes enormously difficult to resurrect it. As a result, the civil society becomes rapidly autonomous by developing a parallel economy into which much of the populace begins to direct its energies. Over time this "zone of nonexistence" is likely to acquire its own structures; the state becomes increasingly irrelevant to its functioning. The apolitical character of this underground economic sphere provides protective coloration; its strategy for dealing with a shrinking state apparatus is one of avoidance rather than confrontation (Duignan and Jackson,1986:156). Some kind of disengagement from the state was taking place.

In the theoretical realm, the powerful inquest into state decay from Chazan's study of Ghana can be applied to the Zairian case. An examination of the state deflation process, notably the anatomy of the recession of power, authority, autonomy and legitimacy of the state revealed

— court tampering, and military and police shakedowns.

It is clear that the administrative system served the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". So the overall impact of public administration on society was in Gould's terms "underdevelopment with the majority of the Zairian population peripheralized, repressed, impoverished, and underdeveloped". Instead of the management of social change, there was the "stewardship of penury, the management of mass discontent, the "logic of repression".

Thus corruption appears as one of the most used strategies of access and dominance by the Zairian ruling class. In 1982, according to Leslie, the corruptive practices of these individuals were vehemently denounced by Erwin Blumenthal, a former head of the international department of the German Bundesbank, and the team leader of a team of experts charged by the IMF to assume direction of the Bank of Zaire. Four years early, in December 1978, when his team took the head of Zairian financial institutions, Blumenthal embargoed foreign exchange to some fifty companies tied to members of the politico-commercial class, including Mobutu's relatives (1993:118-19).

In his 1982 report, Blumenthal told a story of widespread corruption with allegations that the government had regularly bribed Belgian politicians and made generous gifts of diamonds to visiting dignitaries, including French officials. This angered Mobutu who, in order to protect his "henchmen", acted to limit the damage caused by Blumenthal's critical report. He lost his post and left in disgust. However, the presence of these experts was an attempt to bring some rational order to the chaos of Zairian "mismanagement". But in a political centralized system such as Zaire, that was the president's task to replace administrators and specialized ministers in decision-taking and economic revenues were concentrated in the hands of the small privileged circle surrounding him and owing him personal allegiance.

Huntington can assert that corruption, in the case of Zaire, was, of course, one measure of the absence of effective political institutionalization. Public officials lacked autonomy and coherence, and subordinated their institutional roles to exogenous demands. In this country, corruption succeeded to weaken or to perpetuate the weakness of the government bureaucracy, and was, in this respect, incompatible with political development.

dollars from his "children": no theft, no corruption, no exploitation; only grateful "children" repaying their generous "father". This long parenthesis explain in which context the Mobutu's speech on 20 May 1976 has occurred. The result was the systematic pillage of the state's resources by a small class of people with privileged access to the levers of bureaucratic power.

In his study on corruption in Zaire, D. Gould (Gran, 1979:87-107) illustrated and established major corruptive techniques used at every level of the Zairian public administration. These techniques are subdivided in two categories:

1^o-Corruption in the routine course of government business includes:

- bribes paid to have compromising documents removed from files
- fraudulent use of official stationery
- payment for office visits
- payment for letters of recommendation
- kickbacks for hiring
- permanent kickbacks (no-fault-bribes)
- phony travel documents and official travel-related peccadilloes
- misuse of official housing
- two salaries and neglect of public service for outside business
- embezzlement

2^o-Corruption in the exercise of substantive government programs:

Here, corruption took many additional specific forms, notably:

- false bills
- income tax fraud
- excise tax fraud
- import tax fraud
- export tax fraud
- business quota fraud
- tax stamp fraud
- postal fraud

and continuing" crisis where insecurity both personal and political, became the order of the day. As personal, political and economic insecurity increase, people in power were seeking to accumulate resources as rapidly as possible from those who occupy contextually inferior position in the social hierarchy. " Power was quickly gained and rapidly lost" (1988:3). In other words, the Zairian ruling group used the state as the vehicle to obtain economic power, and the means to protect, maintain and reproduce that power at the expense of the majority of citizens.

The result was pervasive corruption and venality within the state. A number of analysts recognized the high level reached by corruption in Zaire. This level was so high and venality totally permeated the state. Describing this phenomenon, Gould, one of the most prominent observers of the Zairian administration, concluded that corruption and venality became the system in Zaire and made the system work. Rather, it was a system by which the powerful exploited the less powerful, who in turn exploited the powerless. Briefly, as Young and Turner have observed, corruption has become the most visible defining property of the Zairian state. On May 20, 1976, Mobutu himself set an example when in his popular meeting, he suggested to the people to steal, not to much but a little carefully in a nice way.

This bizarre behaviour merits comment and may be understood as the consecration of the misapplication of the "authenticity policy" when Mobutu presented the MPR as a national family and identified himself as the good father of that family, or nation. Sociologically, in Zairean culture, like other African countries, the influence of society and culture affects both administration procedures and the relationship between citizens and state. The images of father and family pervade all levels of political thought and discourse. The comparison between family and administration, or family and political party, or family and nation is striking.

This image, as Schatzberg (1988) has demonstrated, is constantly cataloging the Guide's magnanimous paternal solicitude through each material progress, each infrastructure development. All these were "gifts" from the "father" to his "children". These "gifts" subtly reminded people of their moral obligation to reciprocate father's generosity. This created an implicit moral and material debt, a system in which all he received was but the demonstration of a culturally embedded concept of mutual exchange. Mobutu then can extract billions of

of the term would then include both bribery and auto-corruption, and may be defined as "the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognised duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal" (Heidenheimer, 1970:56-61). In extreme cases today, such as Zaire, as shall be seen below, corruption was viewed as a major obstacle to economic development and one of the important causes of political instability.

After visiting Zairean urban areas in February 1994, Richard Dowden, *The Independent's* Africa correspondent wrote that "there is no such thing as society here. There are the rich, a besuited clan of about 100 families and there are 40 million poor people. The lucky ones are "clients", protected by a "patron" in a hierarchy of wealth. The rest live in the Iron Age". This description is the better illustration on what we can call "the victory of ruling class" through the pillage of the state's resources. The emergence of this elite, indeed, has had disastrous repercussions in the country, as a whole.

Among other things was its tendency to use the economy for self-aggrandizement, practices of corruption and its indifference to the consequence of economic malfunctioning for the welfare of citizens. The Zairian disaster was mainly the consequence of embezzlement, mismanagement, profit-seeking, and personal enrichment at the expense of ordinary people. Zaire was seen to be a huge field of incompetence, a pervasive state decline and an ocean of corruption. Here, corruption rhymed with Zaire.

To place this thorny question in its Zairean context, one must take into account the fact that one of the salient features of Mobutu regime was clearly his intention to control all political activities and to eliminate any political institutions with other ideas. Scholars have remarked that in the years between 1965 and 1970, Mobutu reshuffled his cabinet eight times, each time for reasons that remain largely obscure. Thus, promotion to minister was increasingly viewed as a passport to exile. The main reason of these continuous changes within the government, observed Willame, was his possible threats to his position from people who by reason of ethnic or political appeal might have summoned a large following.

This situation is better described by Schatzberg who perceives Zaire as a land of "unending

TABLE 09: The Size of the Public Service: 1988-1993

1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
367,2	362,8	362,4	403,4	421,9	423,1	429,0

Source: Banque du Zaïre, *Rapport Annuel*, 1994, p.61.

The provision of foreign aid as a means of developing backward economies strengthen local bureaucratic lobbies, promoted prodigal and unprofitable expenditure, encouraged the diversions of funds into the private bank accounts of the newly ruling group, or even accelerated inflation.

As a result, corruption became endemic and the disease became so serious that it threatened the operation of government. Young and Turner argue that while the exploitative and oppressive character of the colonial state was recognized, its honesty was not in question. In contrast the progressive permeation of the patrimonial Mobutist state by venality to the point where corruption itself became the system eroded its credibility, and in turn its legitimacy (1985:221).

Corruption exists in all governments and in the public services of all countries. Some countries, however, suffer from a greater degree of corruption than others. In the Zairian case, we may argue like Huntington that, corruption was most prevalent because the country lacks effective political parties and the interests of the individual, the family, the clique or the clan predominate. The weakness of political parties has been reflected in a "clientelistic" pattern of politics in which corruption has been a major factor (Huntington,1970:500). Studies of politics and administration in Zaïre, almost invariably comment upon the prevalence of corruption on the part of both politicians and civil servants. One can see for himself that standard of public morality were deplorably low. All domestic and foreign observers have confirmed this impression and both widely condemned it.

However, to conceptualize corruption and the perverse character of the Zairian state, we may borrow the definition from Brooks's study when he states that corruption in the widest sense

state personnel, as Table 08 shows.

Table 08: State Consumption Levels: 1970-1975 (in million of zaires)

Years	Commercialized GDP	Government Expenditures as % of GDP
1970	857.3	43 %
1971	918.5	44 %
1972	1003.4	43 %
1973	1354.2	43 %
1974	1663.4	56 %
1975	1626	47 %

Source: Young and Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, 1985:324.

Comparatively, the colonial state was similarly authoritarian in approach, and it paid its officials relatively high salaries. However, the European official presence and the highly salaried establishment was small. The state had a limited mission during that period. In contrast, Zaire expanded the size of its bureaucracy and enormously increased the role of the state. Despite the drastic cuts occurred in 1983 and 1984 to keep with IMF adjustment program, the size of government increased manyfold. In 1983, pursuing its efforts to trim the rank of civil service in an attempt to reduce government expenditures and curb the budgetary deficit, Kengo administration fired thousands of employees - many of whom in truth, held non-existent postes obtained through patronage. In mid-September, prior to the opening of the 1984-85 academic year, no fewer than 7,000 employees of the secondary and higher education systems were dismissed, in addition to 16,743 civil servants (15% of effectives) scheduled for retirement in 1983, bringing down their number to 93,538 (*Africa Contemporary Record* 1983-84; 1984-85). In fact, 140,000 were dismissed at that time as we shall see.

Zaire employed 11,000 national public servants in 1960, over 200,000 in 1970, and over 300,000 in 1985, excluding army (see Table 09).

little change from the old order. The system was highly centralized as the case with Leopold's Belgium. The chain of command ran through the Governor-General, the six provincial governors, the district commissioners, and the territorial officers, all of whom were Belgians. There were eight administrative department in Leopoldville each with offices in the provincial capitals and eight grades in the administrative service. At the end of 1959, the size of the civil service was relatively small and comprised 21,263 including 9,835 Europeans (Hoskyns, 1965:11-12). By the quality of its civil servants, the Congo had what was from some points of view the most efficient administration in Africa, as asserted by Hoskyns. Standards were high and the services which were supplied were near to the level of similar services in Belgium. In 1962, in addition to the 21,842 civil servants, 90,000 persons were hired under contract as state employees. There is a general consensus that the period after independence witnessed a rapid expansion of the bureaucracy and the growth of state-owned corporations (parastatals). This growth of the state-system, which paid salaries totally out of proportion to state resources, was a primary cause of economic stagnation. For example, a member of Political Bureau earned \$6,000 per month in 1974 (Young and Turner, 1985:118).

In order to develop the country, the new politicians, because of the colonial legacy looked to the state, rather than the private sector, to end the conditions of poverty and low productivity. Authentic Zairian nationalism, complete with central planning and state regulation and ownership were the best road. These attitudes and ideology led directly to the growth of an expensive, expanding, inefficient bureaucracy, which further weakened the private sector and discouraged agricultural growth. Lacking knowledge, skill, experience, and risk-taking ability, this bureaucracy was ill-equipped to develop the nation's economy.

As Duignan and Jackson have stressed, there was often no countervailing private sector against which the performance of the state might be measured. There was no political opposition to restrain the bureaucracy and make it accountable. Ministries and parastatals became almost autonomous bodies, uncontrolled by anyone in the central government. As a result, except in South Africa, the bureaucracy became corrupt and inefficient. Each year government staffs expanded (about 7 to 8 percent a year), acquired higher salaries, and consumed much of the state's revenue (1986:18). In Zaire, the state consumed a remarkably high fraction of the GDP (47% in 1975) and most of the operating budget went to remunerate

This attitude on the part of national elites have recently led Rothchild to conclude that the state constitutes "a partially autonomous authority center" with an ability "to distance itself from ... domestic (and international) class and ethnic interests", giving public officials "room to overpower or ignore some of the less pressing interests demands and to expand their administrative functions and powers" (Ergas,1985:121). Zolberg find that it was the result, of a steady drive to achieve greater centralization of authority in the hands of a very small number of men who occupied top offices in the party and the government" (Forrest,1988:425). Under Mobutu, they were closely linked to societal actors and groups, including ethnic, regional, religious, linguistic, emerging class structures and other particularisms, annihilating to some extent state autonomy.

As a result, partial autonomy led to unrealized hegemonic goals. Thus, the autonomy seeking moved toward state hardness, while vigorously pursued and resulting in partial success, it has been tempered by a significant degree of state-society linkage that obligates national leaders to act within the constraints of "an as yet substantially soft state", as observed by Forrest. Having regard to the general situation in Zaire, its notorious that political community and experienced institutions became fragmented and weakened more and more government's position. As a weak state, "Zaire was unable to collect taxes, provide social services, settle disputes or control the military, while at the same time the absence of law, order and predictable administration led to decline in state revenues and reduces the opportunities for class formation through the state", as MacGaffey as stigmatized (Rothchild and Chazan,1988:173).

While the weakness of the Mobutist state remains, the widespread scale of the second economy as an evidence of its inability to collect taxes; the virtually non-existence of social services; the prevalence of corruption instead of the rule of law; the banning of the rights for citizens and their subjection to continual harassment from the security forces. As time went on, far-reaching processes of decline affected the very nature of the state that reached its peak with the collapse of the Mobutu regime in 1997.

In addition, like other African countries, Zairian bureaucracy has grown enormously in the past thirty years. The pattern of government and administration in January 1960 showed very

Although bureaucracy was the core of the colonial state, the perpetuation of this model after independence could be seen as a failure, especially during the Mobutu era: the system of delivery of services to the public was inadequate, inaccessible, ineffective, and unaccountable. As we have seen, the permanent feature of crisis in Zaire during its first five years, led the country not only into the atomization of the state apparatus but also laid bare its incapacity to act as a state and to implement its tasks when the state began shrinking in the mid-1970s. Such system could not adjust to the swift expansion of the public sector and this impression was strengthened by the very huge extent of the Zairian crisis. Forrest defines this state as the constellation of leaders, officials, political institutions, administrative agencies, and military and police organizations that held centralized political power (1988:423). This included the executive branch (the president, prime minister), the political party in power (MPR), the government, and the parliament. But its institutional character, according to Young and Turner, is best portrayed by the Jackson-Rosberg model of personal rule, defined as "a system of relations linking rulers not with the *public* or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the *system*" (1985:28). From Forrest's view, it is arguable that while Zaire had managed to establish partial political autonomy it remained to a large extent beholden to and dependent on social forces, on contrary to its South African counterpart.

The breakdown of the Zairian bureaucracy helps to understand political facts and explains the extent to which the Zairian government governed the country effectively. Moving from new institutionalists' viewpoint, we may suggest that the state in modern societies appear as an "arena of relative autonomy" in so far as it can affect all societal forces. Hence the crucial role it can play in the search of more political autonomy in consolidating state sovereignty and attempting to further assert state hegemony. However, Forrest describes Zaire as an "arena of partial autonomy" which was formed in order to make possible the subsequent domination of societal forces at all levels, and even external actors (1988:424). State strategy focused on severely narrowing the scope of permissible political participation and interest articulation so as to allow the political elite to more completely dominate the now restricted political arena. National leaders moved to consolidate their power through the establishment of bureaucratic, behavioral, and decision-making autonomy from social and economic forces in society.

jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. Provincial assemblies became purely consultative bodies. Provinces, districts, territories, became regions, subregions, and zones. The hierarchical chain of command was as follows: *collectivité*, zone, subregion, region and Kinshasa.

At territorial level, as in the colonial period, territorial units became purely administrative subdivisions under Kinshasa supervision and territorial personnel posts were converted into politico-administrative positions. All activity at each administrative level has to be reported to Kinshasa. Territorial agents became purely the marionettes of the regime's political control and extraction. This is what Young calls "the integral state" (1994:287-89), in which all organs of the state were subordinated to the presidential will. "Unity of command" was resurrected as the core state principle, with a comprehensive centralization of all institutions. Customary chiefs were declared to be mere "politico-administrative" cadres, subject to bureaucratic transfer, simple central agents at the bottom of an integrated hierarchical ladder.

In the countryside, in spite of the state's sweeping powers, order and control have been difficult. As Leslie has observed, territorial officials have found control most difficult in the zones and their subunits, known as the local collectivities. It is at this level that the rural majority in Zaire came in contact with the regime and the traditional institutions of authority compete with the state. Using what scholars have termed a "cover-over strategy", the regime superimposed its territorial administrative framework on a myriad of existing traditional structures controlled by chiefs (1993:39). In many cases, these structures were weakened but not destroyed and peasants remained "uncaptured". Directives from the central authorities were often brushed aside and ignored by the local population, and traditional practices were the order of the day. Thus the peasants' resilience and open defiance by chiefs after the abolition of the autonomy of the collectivities in 1973 constituted a direct challenge to the central authority in its search for excessive authority and control in outlying areas. Furthermore, this constituted the limit of interaction between traditional authority structures and the administrative state apparatus. Like the Belgians, the Mobutu regime has met with limited success. It was clear that the early Mobutu years appeared to reflect a progressive implementation of the Leopoldian absolutism with the centralization of the authority of the state. Its hegemonical thrust eclipsed not only institutional autonomy at lower echelons of the state apparatus, but also claimed tutelary control over all spheres of activity.

2.2.2.2.3. The Bureaucracy

Observers have noted that in Zaire the state no longer has the capacity to finance and organize in any sustained and efficient way the public services that it should provide. The administration existed only in the form of thousands of state employees who have not been paid for a long time: between 6 and 12 months in the cities and 1 and 3 years in the countryside. Despite its potentially rich resources, Zaire has piled up a \$ 10 billion foreign debt and was going bankrupt. The country's infrastructure was in a state of near-total collapse. Of the extensive road network at the time of independence in 1960, notes one observer, 85 percent were reckoned to have reverted to bush. Hospitals and a number of public schools have been forced to close for lack of funds and a widespread malnutrition. If nothing worked any more in Mobutu's Zaire, the crux of the problem lied in the organizational capacity of its state, through its bureaucracy or its public service.

There are elements of continuity and similarities between the colonial and the present period in terms of the territorial organization and the role of the state or the public service in the society. Thirty-five years, after independence, the basic continuities between the contemporary state and its past have already been stressed. The reality is that, Mobutu has perpetuated and institutionalized the worst aspects of the Belgian economic and political legacy, producing a kind of postcolonial colonialism, as Leslie has emphasized. The democratic process started on 24 April 1990 remains dead letter seven years later, just to be disrupted on October 18, 1996 by a Tutsi rebellion in the eastern regions.

As seen, Leopold's Congo was highly centralized. The King kept all the threads of administration in his own hands. This centralization continued under Belgian rule. All directives came from the Ministère des Colonies in Brussels. In practice, like the Belgians, Mobutu reverted to a form of centralized administration, at a national level as well as a local level. He adopted the oppressive aspects of Belgian rule as part of his own political consolidation process. He progressively dismantled the institutional remnants of the First Republic. The recentralization was soon extended to the provinces to prevent a resurgence of leadership or opposition. The number of provinces was reduced from twenty-one to eight. Provincial governors became administrative officials of the central government under the

administration and some new taxes. Indubitably, analysts note that in colonial time linkages between economic structures in the colony and the fiscal system were strong, and this trend continued to be dominant in the post-colonial period. A decade after independence, the main economic sectors in the colonial economy which contributed up to 80% of GDP and provided 90% of fiscal revenue continued to play a dominant role in the backbone of the economy, as illustrated in the following table.

TABLE 11: Contribution to GDP by selected economic sectors from 1960 to 1970.

Sector	% of Share	Contribution to GDP
1. Mining & Metallurgy	22	43
2. Commerce	16	7
3. Banks & Financial Instit.	13	4
4. Manufacturing Industries	10	24
5. Transport	10	17
6. Agriculture	9	4
TOTAL	80	99

Source : National Bank Reports, Reports, Statistical services, Ministry of Finance (Kankwenda, 1993:265).

From this perspective, the lessons to be drawn are very impressive: it is quite clear that Zaire's fiscal patterns from 1960 to 1970 were adapted to an underdeveloped and dominated economy. Economists contend that the business of that economy was predominantly oriented towards the export of primary products and the import of a wide range of items used either

3.1.1. State Involvement in the Economy:

According to Zairian economists and especially the *Annual Report* from the National Bank of Zaire in 1967, from 1960 to 1962 there had been no budget at all, and throughout the period public sector financial control was weak. The GDP, which stood at \$ 1,268 million (1958 prices) in 1959, fell to \$ 1,196 million in 1964. Commercial agricultural output was only 64 percent of the 1959 figure by 1965, although mineral production had generally held up and inflation had increased before finally being brought under control in 1967.

Since independence, inflation was essentially caused by disorder in public finances and monetary expansion to cover government deficits. Technically, it was a result of the complete absence of specialists in the management of public finances. The lack was most acutely felt with regard to the selection of projection methods and the allocation of public expenditure. Nevertheless one should note that from 1960 to 1970, the Zairian economy made some substantial and quantitative progress. However, this movement was barely perceptible and not enough to ensure the kind of significant structural change that might have brought about an overhaul of the fiscal system inherited from the colonial period. New mechanisms were established by the public authorities just after independence to mobilize financial resources needed for operating the administrative system.

The most notable was the exchange tax law of 9 November 1963. This new source of fiscal revenue, as Kankwenda suggests, involved an original adaptation to the new conditions under which the Zairian economy now operated. It was a tax on profits from purchases and sales of foreign exchange on the official currency market. For example, the Central Bank of Zaire bought foreign currency at the rate of 150 Congolese francs to the US dollar. The foreign currency was then resold at the rate of 180 Congolese francs to the dollar. The state pocketed the difference between the purchase price and the sale price. This system was quite well adapted to the financial situation from 1963 to 1967. It allowed the Zairian currency to be pegged.

But with the 1967 stabilization program the budget was brought into balance. Expenditure was held close to its previous level, while revenues were greatly increased both by better fiscal

However, as an underdeveloped economy which is predominantly oriented towards the export of primary products, the main source of state revenue remains the minerals which dominate the economy (see Table 11). For example, in 1988 minerals accounted for \$1,075m of the \$2,178m total exports (The Africa Review 1995:214). In 1990 mining, mineral processing and petroleum extraction accounted for about 17% of gross domestic product (GDP) and around 75% of total export earnings (Africa South Sahara 1994:952). Let us now get through and examine how the state managed to strengthen its extractive capacity.

CHAPTER ONE: THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY

In terms of extractive capability, the South African economy is much more developed compared with that of Zaire. Admittedly, the Zairian situation is generally presented as a fiasco. Over a quarter century after independence, the country is in a parlous economic situation, much more disastrous than at the time of political independence. The decomposition of the state at the centre has been marked by a grave loss of control over public finances. Nevertheless, from 1967, when the stabilization plan was implemented, until 1972, overall state operations had been under reasonable control. Public expenditure soared and revenues also rose between 1973 and 1974. But when the full impact of the copper price decline was felt, revenues fell sharply. Table 10 shows the appearance of huge deficits, along with large-scale budget overruns.

TABLE 10 : Public Finance, 1970-1977 (in million of Zaires, at current prices)

Years	Government Expenditures	Government Revenues	Surplus/ Deficit
1970	369	343	-26
1971	405	324	-81
1972	431	338	-93
1973	578	429	-149
1974	936	592	-344
1975	604	432	-172
1976	799	486	-313
1977	1,008	699	-310

Sources: • Banque du Zaire, *Rapport Annuel*, 1975:100; US Department of Commerce, "Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, Zaire", June 1978.

To Depelchin, economic criteria have become not only the unique reference point, but also the procrustean bed against which the history of every people must be measured. Thus to finance all activities capable of increasing the flow of goods and services, modern day governments mainly have recourse to two financial sources: taxation (direct or indirect) and borrowing (the funding of large scale public sector investment projects as well as the expansion of the public corporations).

Early studies on the matter are meaningful enough to show the extent of the extractive capability of both countries. This supposes the development of an extractive apparatus to ensure this. In fact, as claimed by Potholm (1970:15-16), the development of such a bureaucracy is often crucial to economic development. Some writers like Skocpol have suggested that an efficient and effective bureaucracy is a prerequisite for modernity. Meanwhile they maintain that no one can study the capacities of states without using the concept of "policy instrument" to refer to the relevant means that a state may have at its disposal.

Thus most governments, when forming their taxation policies, aim not only to raise the required quantity of funds in the most efficient (cheapest) manner, but also seek to use the fiscal system as a means of achieving some of their social and economic goals, such as a degree of income redistribution, the stimulation of economic activity, the development of backward areas or groups of people and even, in some instances, the control of inflation.

PART THREE:

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY

INTRODUCTION

Besides effective bureaucracy, there is a correlation between economic conditions and political stability. Scholars have found that in those countries defined as stable there was a relationships between internal stability and the country's levels of wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization (Jackson & Stein,1971:204). So Skocpol argues that "a state's means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more than could any other single factor about its existing (and immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen state organisations, to employ personnel, to coopt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises and to fund social programs". Therefore, economic conditions remain the spine of the state and have been the subject of constant debate.

As expressed by Nattrass (1990), economic growth is more easily maintained in an economy that has a well developed financial infrastructure which "oils the wheels" of the economy and greatly facilitates the generation of the required increases in output. Accordingly, an adequate financial infrastructure makes it easier for businesses to obtain the funds that they need for expansion, and provides a simple link between the people in the economy who are saving and those needing the investment funds. Further, a well developed monetary system provides the state with a significant increase in the weaponry of its armoury for use in the fight against economic instability, which, in its turn, also helps to create a stable economic environment conducive to progress.

Finally, the analysis of the organizational apparatus of the political system, has shown that a system with a well-developed and effective bureaucracy as in South Africa, can sustain levels and ranges of performance impossible in a system depending on a more primitive officialdom as in Zaire. Nonetheless, one of the characteristics of modern political systems, as Almond and Powell have alleged, is that the presence of differentiated and specialized political structures and of secular cultural patterns makes it possible for such systems to attain and sustain high capability levels in many areas. In modern systems not only is capability levels higher on a day-to-day basis, but the range itself is greater. The system may be characterized as having a high level of versatility and much flexibility in dealing with the various problems which it may confront. Thus, particular patterns of socialization and recruitment are needed to maintain the trained personnel for such organizational resources (1966:207).

Furthermore, the leaders of the system will seek to feed, clothe, educate, and organize the population so that time, effort, and wealth of the population may be utilized by the political authority. This implies that the political system must develop an extractive apparatus, or bureaucracy, to insure the system. In fact, the development of such a bureaucracy is often crucial to economic development, and some writers have suggested that the existence of an extensive, internally coherent bureaucratic machinery is the first prerequisite for effective state action and modernity. The investigation of state apparatus in Zaire and South Africa has confirmed these assumptions.

inclusive and is an acceptance, even approbation of the state's rules of the game, its social control, as true and right. Thus, the strength of the state organization in an environment of conflict depends, in large part, on the social control it exercises. The system needs to be able to draw on popular support for its activities if it has to sustain them at given levels of effectiveness and efficiency.

South Africa was characterized by the lack of national symbols and the low levels of loyalty to the nation state, as opposed to the loyalty to one's particular ethnic group or caste. Moreover, the entire theoretical structure of Apartheid was based on the existence of "contiguous nations". This subnational fragmentation provided the country with two powerful sources of identification, one for blacks, another for whites. The maintenance of the system by fear, terror and repression led to the negative legitimacy for the system; and the illegitimacy of the state.

In Zaire, the search for legitimation was undertaken by creating a new ideological doctrine for the state - nationalism, authenticity, Mobutism - by weaving together the inherited image of the colonial state's technocratic efficacy with new inspirational designs for grandiose development, and by projecting the regime as the institutionalization of the Zairian nation by creating the MPR. This design, executed with methodical skill, required the progressive clientelization of erstwhile colleagues. However, the ruling class has effectively failed to employ legitimating ideologies and was unable to convince the majority of the populace that the state's central purpose was to act in the interests of its citizenry. The result was the eclipse of legitimacy doctrines leading to the creation of illusion and ideological manipulation bordering on mystification.

The consequences of illegitimacy in South Africa and the eclipse of legitimacy in Zaire were the signs of low levels of support or compliance which hindered the development of high levels of capability reflected in tax evasion in Zaire and civil disobedience in South Africa. By the same token, decline in support levels for certain activities has affected capabilities. One of the great problems faced by these "transitional" societies was that loyalties were given to tribe or clan and not to the national system and its goals. The outputs of their political systems came in form of repression and coercion.

3. The extraction of resources from the most productive economic sectors, especially peasant agriculture in the case of Zaire, enabled the state to increase revenues collected from the peasants and others. Now the state, rather than local tax-farmers or other intermediaries, relentlessly administered the new revenue policies down to the level of the individual. In South Africa, producers found it impossible to flee or hide, particularly in the face of new administrative revenue-collection techniques inherited from British. Not only did state *religieusement* rate and collect taxes more efficiently, but it also often fixed the tax rates instead of varying them. As a result, the tax rates in South Africa are amongst the highest in the world, thanks to the relatively high degree of administrative capability provided by its bureaucratic system. The country maintained a balanced economy with an extensive physical infrastructure.

In Zaire the underdevelopment of the system capabilities, in addition to its exceedingly low level of economic production places very real and immediate limitations on the extractive capability. From this point of view, it should be said that it was impossible for the Zairian system to create an extensive extractive capability by drawing on its internal economy. The weakness of the bureaucracy and low levels of popular support intensify the problem. Although Zaire escaped the "liberal" economic system during Belgian times, the colonial state subjected the population to the ravages of increased revenue collection. The use of forced labor (*corvée*) by the Belgian as a direct form of taxation and as an outgrowth of other types of taxation, was perpetuated and maintained by the post-colonial leaders. In appropriating peasant resources and in establishing regularized official control over rural trade, they have encountered severe limitations and especially the problematic challenge to the state's economic growth.

Generally speaking, the implantation of state law in place of fragmented customary or feudal law through the extension of the court system, was essential in inducing people to behave as state leaders wanted them to behave and not according to dictates of local lords or others. Thus, improved tax collecting allowed expanded agencies of the state, including the courts and a standing army. The army, of course, provided the force necessary to back up the demands and decisions of the tax collectors and judicial authorities.

4. Legitimation is the most potent factor accounting for the strength of the state. It is more

2. In the area of regulation, the employment of legitimate coercion to control behavior is the distinguishing capability of any political system. In characterizing regulative performance we have considered what individuals and groups were being subjected to regulation, what areas of individual and collective life were affected, and what frequency or intensity of intervention was exercised. In South Africa and Zaire, considered as having extremely high regulative capability, the political system endeavored to control every aspect of the lives of its citizens. The central government ran all business and services and has attempted to direct all resource allocations. It has attempted to eliminate the family as we understand it, and to become directly involved in procreation, child care, and religious beliefs. All interpersonal contracts were subjected to constraint. Speech, movement, association, and press have been all regulated.

While regulation in Zaire affected the general population and chiefly the peasant, in South Africa the group affected was that of non-Europeans whose all political rights were denied. And this is the arena of political life that regulation becomes particularly significant for the individual, as Almond and Powell have stressed. If this area of life is relatively open, then other regulations can be fought and protested. But if political activities are prohibited, if news is heavily censored, and if freedom to associate and to travel is restricted, then the individual is truly at the mercy of the system (*ibid*,197).

Moreover, regulation goes hand in hand with penetration which reflects state's efforts to affect national, regional and local socio-political structure, enabling state institutions to wield substantive control over any political sphere. The effectiveness of the apartheid system in South Africa, despite its sharp decline in the 80s, was an undeniable proof of this process. While in Zaire, the state was unable to thoroughly consolidate the political penetration of local-level political and social institutions and the pattern of failure was most evident when glittering promise were replaced by discouraging performance.

In short, as pointed out by Almond and Powell, regulation, like extraction, obviously underlies much of the performance of other capabilities. These two capabilities are in themselves interdependent. A system needs resources in order to regulate, but it is through the use of control, and of coercion or its threats, that resources are obtained (*ibid*.).

group in general. We can say that South Africa was characterized by strong and relatively autonomous governmental structures that sought to impose on the society a system of interest representation based on enforced limited pluralism. In this domestic context, autonomy meant that state officials could act upon their own preferences, by reshaping, ignoring, or circumventing the preferences of even the strongest social actors.

In other words, the imperative of autonomy in such society and in Forrest's terms, enables state institutions, leaders and officials to effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences and can act and make decisions independently of social forces. The aim is the separation of state institutions from societal actors and to prevent the formation of intractable state-society coalitions that restrict the ability of political elites to act independently. This is the image of a strong state which is characterized by a reliable administrative apparatus, participate exclusively in economic activities and can enforce out policies.

In the Zairian case, the search for state hardness ends up in state softness with national leaders and state institutions remaining closely linked to societal actors and groups, due to the pervasive aspects of patronism, better known as patron-client relationship. In such society, central government institutions serve specific interests within the country rather than the general aims of the citizenry as a whole. Public functions and positions were divided between top members of the MPR and those of Mobutu's tribe. There was little or no agreement on what would constitute the general good or the collective interest of the country.

In both cases, according to Almond and Powell (1966:205), the goals and actions of the political elites are a major factor in shaping capability patterns. Political structures do not fluctuate blindly in response to pressures and demands. The human beings who perform elite roles have goals and fears, perceptions and beliefs. Elite responses to societal and international inputs of demand and support are a major factor affecting levels and patterns of capability. Accordingly in an authoritarian and repressive system such as Zaire and South Africa, elites responses to inputs or demands took the form of repression which required an increase in the regulative capability of the political system.

a progressive loss of control over resource flows, and a sharp contradiction of the real revenue base of the state. Its ability to deliver valued services steadily corrodes, and its institutional structure grows increasingly irrelevant. It ceased to be a significant source of social stratification; wealth, prestige, and power are no longer sought within its framework (Young and Turner, 1985:45).

Thus the ubiquity of corruption reinforced the skepticism of the citizenry and undermined the legitimacy of the state apparatus. With the swallowing up of Mobutism in the deepening crisis confronting Zaire, the helmsman turned captain of a ship engulfed in a sea of disaster, drifting from one expedient to another, and too busy seeking any safe port to exalt his clairvoyance.

To conclude this chapter, we think that it will be useful to synthesize our assumptions by structurally comparing the two systems in order to draw similarities and differences.

STRUCTURAL COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND ZAIRIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The ongoing analysis highlights similarities and differences between the two systems. In comparing the functioning of political systems in South Africa and Zaire, one comes to find that the analysis of their capabilities is the best way to determine the hardness or the weakness of each state. By capabilities we mean the capacities to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources and *appropriate* or use resources in one way or another. Strong states are those with high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states are on the low end of a spectrum of capabilities. As scholars have suggested, the best basis for evaluating states is to measure what states actually do in these four activity clusters against their declared intentions as established in legislation, policy statement, and so on. We believe that this approach did prove very useful over all.

A structural comparison of our "models" leads us to the following conclusions:

1. In terms of autonomy, the South African state was able to reshape its society by promoting the Afrikaner group and defending white supremacy while repressing the non-European group (Africans, Coloureds or Indians) and simultaneously maintaining autonomy from the white

In principle, this process was a predictable outcome of the growth of government activities. But when it became a regular growth industry in its own right, it raised serious questions concerning the management of the state. The process resulted in the reproduction and the birth of new agencies which had then tried to swallow the parent ministries they were supposed to serve as specialized agencies. Such as the case of the Ministry of Agriculture, that of Economics and Industry, and that of Transport and Industry. Furthermore, agencies like the RVM, RVF, RVA, ONATRA and SNCZ have been known to jostle each other for power. The reproduction process resulted also in the proliferation of corporate bodies doing business in just one specialized branch of activity. For example, there were many GECAMINES companies: GECAMINES-Holding, GECAMINES-Commerciale, GECAMINES-Exploitation, GECAMINES-Development.

Although each of these enterprises was hell-bent on achieving its own autonomy, all were blissfully unaware that in the process they have been cheapening the concept of public administration and giving it a bad name. This meant the development of the administrative and management structures of the state was a process of uncontrolled growth resulting in disaster for the country. Thus, most analysts have generally considered parastatal organizations to have failed at least in terms of economic efficiency criteria (Africa South of the Sahara, 1994:16).

3.1.4. The Politics of Debt

Politically, the international dimension of Zairian politics dates from the earliest days of its independence. Decolonization and later independence in 1960, suddenly allowed Zaire to become a Cold war battle-ground with a number of forces competing for political influence especially Belgium, the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) with its peacekeeping forces. But the dependency of the state between 1960-1995 was mainly political and economic interests played a secondary role.

The period between 1966 and 1974 was marked by an extraordinary state expansion due to the high price of copper, financial and technical aid from the US and especially the favourable and excellent economic condition in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Rapid economic

achieving autonomy. Officials got into the habit of turning current expenditure allocations into opportunities for the embezzlement of public funds, for running up new bills for social services, and for all sorts of unjustified acquisitions and prerequisites, as stigmatized by Professor Mulambu (Kankwenda, 1993: 49). Each simple department for instance was inflated into ministry.

Meanwhile, there is actually little precise data on the size of the public sector in Zaire. From independence to 1970 the public enterprises accounted for as much as 80% of GDP and provided 90% of fiscal revenue (Kankwenda, 1993: 265). The expanded use of parastatal bodies ideally complemented a range of domestic economic development philosophies, such as, Zairian nationalism authentic, Zairianization or whichever term applied to the mode of economic planning. For the government the private sector could not, or would not, help to improve living conditions. This led the state to create gargantuan production units like GECAMINES, SNCZ or SNEL. Efficient management of these companies was beyond the capacities of the state centralized administrative structures.

In the area of public administration, parastatal agencies such as the corporations set up in the period of Zairianization (ONDE, HEVEA, CACAO, OZACAF, FONAMES, CEPLANUT, AND, ANI, ONPTZ, RVM, RVF and RVA) were unduly fragmented or specialized. This led to the mushrooming of parallel administrative structures, with new ones being established and old ones dismantled every time the government was reshuffled or ministries reorganized. For instance, from October 1966 to April 1994, there were at least 60 ministerial reshuffles. This is what Mulambu has called "the fissiparous reproduction" (Kankwenda, 1993: 63). This means the reproduction of an organism through division, a process of procreation whereby a given organism splits into two. In Zaire, it occurred in a variety of forms. It might be political or administrative. Its modalities were equally varied. It might be achieved through the dissection of existing bodies, or through the transfer of empowering attributes from one body to another. Sometimes it resulted in an injudicious accumulation of organisms. This made it impossible for ministers and directors to get a comprehensive grasp of the operations of the bodies they are supposed to control. The result is a loss of efficiency.

was operated by the Société Zairo-Italienne de Raffinage (SOZIR) located in Moanda (Bas-Zaïre). SOZIR was owned half and half by the Zairian government and Italian interests. Internal distribution was controlled by the state agency Petro Zaïre through designated dealers.

Other big state corporations included the Société de Chemin de Fer du Zaïre (SNCZ), a railroad company owned and operated in part by private companies and in part by government agencies until 1974 when it was established as a national authority to take over and operate all lines; the Société Nationale d'Electricité (SNEL), a government monopoly in the production of electricity, REGIDESO, for water and SONAS, for insurance. However, despite its high level of official participation in parastatal organizations, especially the country's sub-soil resources, the state was evidently no more able to pursue the ambitious policy of the years 1973-1974 when it tried to take control of the agricultural surplus and to substitute itself as well to foreign agroindustrial capital than to national commercial capital. As issued by Emoungu, then it was realized that public sector participation in development was proportional with the level of national resources mismanagement, and the *departicipation* of the most important national resource-the people. Fewer and fewer people participated in the production, distribution and utilization of the national economic surplus (Nzongola, 1986:162). Thus, the investment financing came principally from loans accorded by foreign funding agencies. The availability of such funds depended on the profitability of the operations involved, as well as on the speed with which investments can be recouped. Finally, this in turn depended partly on prospects for the minerals in question, partly on Zaïre's credit status on the international money market. However, Zaïre was, though, in such a critical situation that it had its hands full trying to pay its huge foreign debt, to import spare parts and to bring in consumer goods. Foreign investors have therefore developed cold feet.

3.1.3. The Size of the State

It should be maintained that the extravagant growth of the state's administrative and institutional structures has worsened problems confronting Zaïre. The design and organization of the state's administrative agencies and structures have contributed to the persistence of the country's economic crisis: one reason for the depletion of the meagre resources available to the state was the proliferation of parallel administrative agencies each hell-bent on

working yet. The Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI) was engaged in mining operation of cassiterite concentrates from the area, and those of tungsten, columbium, and tantalum. They all were exported for refining abroad.

In the third category come international consortiums in which the state was a junior partner with only a tiny share, accorded mainly because it has ownership rights to the sub-soil resources exploited. SODIMIZA and Gulf Oil company were examples of this type of enterprises. The government from the late 1960s took the position that expansion of copper production was highly desirable from the standpoint of increasing foreign exchange earnings. It not only pressed for the expansion of GECAMINES' operations and facilities but also granted exploration and mining rights to two new companies. In 1969, the first, the Société de Développement Industriel et des Mines du Zaïre (SODIMIZA), in which the government took a 15-percent interest with the remaining 85 percent held by a consortium of Japanese companies was set up in the Zaïrian section of the Zambian copperbelt, in Shaba province. Production of concentrates were shipped to Japan for refining. In 1990, SODIMIZA has been brought under Gécamines-Exploitation as a wholly state-owned enterprise. The second venture, the Société Minière de Tenke-Fungurume (SMTF), was by parallel, commonly owned exploration and mining companies established in 1970, in which the government held 20 percent and an international consortium of American, British, French, and Japanese interests held 80 percent. A large deposit, having a high copper and cobalt content, was found west of Likasi in the area of the towns of Tenke and Fungurume (Shaba). But financial difficulties caused by increased costs and the closing of the railroad to Lobito, the use of which was essential to make the operation profitable, led indefinitely to the suspension of the project in early 1976, while awaiting more favourable market conditions. It is since then mothballed without ever having produced a single ton of copper.

In the petroleum sector, an initial agreement was signed in this period between the state and the Zaïre Gulf Oil company and ratified in October 1969. Until 1975 Zaïre was completely dependent on imports of petroleum. Exploration for oil in the offshore coastal area began as early as 1958, but initial commercial production began in late 1975. Production was carried out by a consortium of Gulf Oil Zaïre, Japan Petroleum Zaïre, and Société du Littoral Zaïrois, a Belgian company. The government held a 15-percent interest in the operation. The refinery

Half or more of the annual GECAMINES copper production was refined by the company domestically, and the remainder was shipped to Belgium for processing by SGM for the account of GECAMINES.

The OKIMO (Société des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto) is the only major gold mining operation. This state-owned company worked both alluvial and underground deposits, chiefly in the far northeast, Ituri subregion in Haut-Zaïre where the largest known deposits were located. The colonial state held 98 percent of the votes in the Kilo-Moto gold mines. In July 1966 the corporation was dissolved and a new Zaïrian parastatal was created in place of the colonial company; the private interests, by now small, kept their shares, thus avoiding the compensation issue.

The Société Minière de Kisenge (SMK) exploited the only one deposit of manganese in the southwestern Shaba near Kisenge on the Angolan border, in which the government had one-half controlling interest and a three-fifths profit share. Annual production was over 300,000 tons in the early 1970s and the ore was exported via the Benguela railroad to the Angolan port of Lobito until the Angolan conflict closed the railroad in 1975. Production continued at a reduced rate, however, and ores were stockpiled; shipment through other transportation channels was too costly. The Shaba incident in 1977 brought all operations to a halt at the mines, and until now they had not restarted yet.

The second category comprises mixed private corporations such as MIBA, the ZAIRETAIN corporation and SOMINKI. In these corporations, the state operated in partnership with major Belgian companies. The Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), successor of Forminière which operated the Kasai diamond mines and some forestry enterprises, was created in 1966 as a new company with few private shares. In 1974, the exploitation of the mining of diamonds in Kasai has been a fully government-owned company, as part of the radicalization program. The state took 100 percent control of MIBA, but in 1978, SIBEKA, a Belgian company, was brought in with a 20 percent share. ZAIRETAIN: exploitation of tin (Shaba). 50 percent of mining operation was owned by the government and 50 percent by a Belgian company, the Compagnie Géologique et Minière Belge (GEOMINES). The ZAIRETAIN corporation has practically been out of business for the past several years and is not longer

TABLE 13: State Ownership in Mining Enterprises

Enterprises	Total Capital in Zaires	% State Share	Principal Products
GECAMINES	259200000	100	Cu, Co, Zn, Cd, Coal
OKIMO	230000	100	Gold
S.M.K.	500000	100	Manganese
MIBA	300000	30	Ind. Diamonds
ZAIRE-ETAIN	5000000	50	Tin, Tantal-Co., Coal
Enterprises	Total Capital in Zaires	% State Share	Principal Products
SOMINKI	6000000	28	Tin, Wolfram, Tantal-Co.
SODIMIZA	3000000	20	Copper
ZAIRE.	150000	15	Petroleum
Zaire Gulf Oil Cnie	50000	15	Petroleum

Source: Kankwenda Mbaya, "Zaire: What Destiny, 1993:323.

The GECAMINES (Générale des Carrières et des Mines), formerly UMHK, and by far Zaire's largest mining consortium, was nationalized the 1 January 1967 as a first step in recovering the control of the mining resources. With its creation the government took over its rights in thirteen subsidiary companies in Zaire. The mining and processing of copper, cobalt, and zinc were synonymous with the operations of this company. The GECAMINES concession in southern Shaba covered about 18,000 square kilometers. The corporation had rights to any minerals in the concession and processed a number of by-products from its copper mining operations, including zinc, cobalt, cadmium, germanium, gold and silver.

the quest for personalized wealth led to the acquisition of businesses by the public sector in order to increase the pool of resources to plunder. The acquisition process started in 1966 with the nationalization of the copper mining complex; and culminated with the Zairianization policies of the late 1973. To scholars, the movement of acquisition was so significant that the number of public enterprises increased by 118 percent between 1966 and 1980 - from a total of 88 in 1966 to 192 in 1980 (Nzongola, 1986:171).

The public sector penetration into and plundering of the private sector targeted principally the most profitable, centralized, and capital intensive enterprises. This meant the marginalization of the peasant economy and of the small indigenous private sector. Thus, the mining sector remained the only sector capable of generating a substantial surplus and even these days it is the real base of accumulation. The involvement of the state in economic life was impressive. Table 37 indicates that the level of Zaire's official participation in the mining of the country's sub-soil is very high. Shares involved are mainly state-owned.

Three types of enterprises were involved in mining: the first category comprised state enterprises which were entirely state-owned. They included the mammoth mining corporation GECAMINES, the Kilo-Moto Mining Broad (OKIMO) and the Kisenge Mining Corporation (SMK).

with private firms and in some cases as an outright owner. Government-owner and controlled firms, however, were bound by and functioned according to the same rules that applied to the private sector.

It is helpful to remember that economic decision making had been seriously affected by the political and economic uncertainties of the 1960-65 period, and the responsibility for it and authority to implement decisions had become unclear. As seen, the introduction of the presidential system in 1965, formalized by the constitution of 1967, led to a centralization of this power in the office of the president. This was followed by growing state participation in the economy, either by partial acquisition or, in some cases, through a complete takeover of enterprises in the productive sectors. The purpose of state participation has been given as the need to secure for the Zairian people the benefits of the nation's riches. The inherited system of free enterprise was not questioned, however, nor were there any implications either of a partial or, eventually, complete socialization of the economy. In fact the promotion of a mixed government-private enterprise has been reaffirmed as a major objective of the government on numerous occasions by Mobutu and his "cronies".

As part of Mobutu's policy of authentic Zairian nationalism, the government embarked on what it claimed was a quest for economic sovereignty and economic development. Consequently, the government began to reevaluate the status of the large conglomerates such as Union Miniere with a view to transferring their resources to local and state control. With respect to economic development, the government had visions of a powerful Zairian state that would be a leading regional economic force in Africa. Achievement of this goal would necessitate centralized government control in directing a major industrialization thrusts as well as in further development of the mining sector, all with the assistance of foreign capital.

The involvement of the state in Zaire's economic life was more visible in the mining sector and the sector's importance has been reinforced since independence. In the post-colonial model, agriculture and mining, as under the colonial model, remained the basis for accumulation process. The agricultural surplus, however, has shrunk, and now, except in rare cases, practically none of it goes into financial or industrial capital. It was channelled instead into the petty trading sector, which did not invest any of it in productive development. In fact,

been dominated by the private sector. At the same time, fulfillment of the state autonomy imperative through economic independence was a critical goal of the New Regime. This was resolved by making a distinction between old capital - legacy of colonialism, almost exclusively Belgian, heavily concentrated in a few financial thrusts - and new capital, which entered on terms freely negotiated by the new order. Young and Turner state that to deal with new capital, the key was diversification of sources (Japanese, American, West German, French, Italian), which would assure a variety of partners and a number of countries with an interest in the well-being of the regime. Further, the Zairian state generally acquired a minority share of enterprise ownership in return for its grant of a concession (1985:65). The fact that it had multilateral Western support gave it some room to reconquer control of the economic resources by skillfully weakening the unilateral ties of dependence with the former colonial capital. Moreover, the indigenous private sector was too weak for the challenge, and the foreign private sector was too powerful and independent of the new regime. The only alternative left to the new ruling elites was to plunder the public treasury in order to create an economic base for themselves.

It is crucially important for the survival of any country that the state maintains its hold over its natural resources. Hence the determination with which corporations work to keep the exploitation, development and marketing of these resources under tight control. Such control also holds out the promise of quantitative increases in production, qualitative improvements in productivity and the prospect of better technological options on the nation level. The potential benefits also include greater financial solvency as well as serious industrialization, the key to overall development. From this perspective, the role played by the Zairian state was much crucial for the development of the country.

Several studies on Zaire (Kankwenda, 1993:319-361; Leslie, 1993:99-112; Kaplan, 1979:183-243), have proved that the economic policies followed by the country's leaders since independence have generally aimed at the same goal of the promotion of private initiative that characterized economic operations in the modern sector in the colonial period. In this overall context, as Kaplan has shown, the economy has been managed through a combination of direct government decision and reliance on regular market mechanisms, while the government itself has increasingly participated in economic activity through varying degree of partnership

As an attempt to suppress the crisis, public authorities turned to debt-relief measures which gave the country a bit of breathing space. Kankwenda Mbaya observes that under reasonable circumstances, one might have hoped to see past deficits really invested in productive projects, and that eventual payments on rescheduled debts would not be so heavy as to mortgage the country's future. Unfortunately, neither hope is justified.

Meanwhile, various expedients have been resorted to in attempts to finance Zaire's budget deficits: overdrafts from the Bank of Zaire, credits from banking and other financial institutions, public Treasury Bond issues, conditional foreign aid, external borrowing. Over the entire period, fiduciary financing has served as a safety valve, accounting for 80% of resources used, as against 20% from other sources.

The system of using fiduciary currency to finance the budget deficits started in 1975 and continues to the present. Scholars claim that the systematic financing of budget deficits mainly through fiduciary currency has been the principal cause of inflation (Kankwenda, 1993:284). The reason is simple: the extra demand thus created gets directed into purchases of imported consumer commodities. It therefore has no positive impact on local production.

3.1.2. State Participation in Parastatal Organizations

Most observers suggest that the role of parastatal organizations is central to the understanding of direct state involvement in the Zairian economy, as elsewhere in Africa. These organizations' influence and involvement in the society have been of particular concern in overall economic policy debates. After independence, Zairian government like many others in Africa, had three fundamental choices about how to develop and manage its economy, and how specifically to encourage industrialization in the broadest sense. It could (i) nationalize existing entities; (ii) try to attract private investment incentives; or (iii) invest heavily in public enterprises. The government used combinations of all three, but virtually opted for heavy parastatal involvement having only few other options at its disposal.

Most of the early corporations operated in natural monopoly areas: large infrastructural projects and social service entities. Government soon moved into areas that had previously

TABLE 12: Percentage of Public Expenditure, 1968-1970.

Category	1968	1969	1970
Political	35	50	54
Economic	15	5	3
Social	21	28	25
Services	29	17	18
TOTAL	100	100	100

Source: Budgets, Ministry of Finance, 1968-1970.

Also, public expenditure in the social category - mainly in the education and health sectors - was secondary and reflected of the desire of the newly independent state to train executives to run the country while improving living standards for the population (see Table 12).

Earlier studies (Young & Turner, 1985:323; Kankwenda Mbaya, 1993:282) have shown that between 1970 and 1974 the public authorities were to cover recurrent expenditure and still have a net surplus left over from the state's own resources. The surplus, however, kept decreasing, from 50 million Zaires in 1970 to 16 million in 1974. Unfortunately the situation turned critical from 1975 to 1980 and the state was no longer able to cover recurrent expenditure from its own resources, and the result was the appearance of huge deficits (Table 12Bis). From 1981 to 1988 the overall deficit rose from 4,200 million Zaires to 109,000 million Zaires.

Table 12Bis: Global deficit (million Zaire)

Year	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Deficit	42	56	61	151	135	105	282	103	1167

Source: Bank of Zaire and Ministry of Planning.

as inputs by local industries or as consumer commodities. GDP was largely made up of contributions from this business. Moreover, economic structures have a way of becoming, with time, a traditional part of the social lifestyle and were hard to change. Thus, during that period, changes in the fiscal regime were adapted both to the capabilities of the fiscal system and to the growth of taxable resources.

On 24 June 1967 the Zairian government announced a monetary reform leading to the liberalization of exchange mechanisms. The Native tax was accordingly abolished, as Kankwenda states. The aim was a further adaptation of the fiscal regime to changing economic circumstances. This took the form of the imposition of consumer taxes on a wider range of items. In addition, the stabilization plan of June 1967 was a comprehensive scheme designed both to restore a monetary equilibrium and to lay the foundations for long-term development, as highlighted by Young & Turner.

The plan sought to halt inflation, to place government finances on a sound and stable basis, to encourage exporters and rural producers, to make possible an end to import controls, to eliminate the commercial rackets built around the licensing system, and to create conditions of confidence which would make longrun development possible.

In spite of obstacles, particularly inflation, public finances were in relative equilibrium by the end of 1967, a balance which was to last for six years. Broadly speaking, by 1968 the stabilization operation was clearly a success and contributed decisively to the credibility of the regime, which appeared to possess both the authority and the competence to carry off a difficult and delicate operation.

The establishment of new political institutions responsible for administering an independent state entailing emoluments for political and military posts, led to the allocation of a substantial portion of the budget to the administrative category, which absorbed as much as 50% of budgetary expenditure.

assigned to white rather than black agents. It has intervened in the class struggle to ensure that certain sectional economic concessions have been made available to white wage-earners, and it has intervened to incorporate white wage-earners into various "industrial relations" apparatuses from which the African working class has been excluded. These state interventions have had important real effects both on the class structure and on the pattern of class relations in the social formation. The state has also played an important role in helping to organize the supply of black labour to various sectors; especially mining and agriculture.

The economic development of South Africa shows that at the establishment of the Union, the economy was based mainly on farming and mining, but both these sectors suffered serious setbacks in the build-up to the Great Depression. During the first four years of the Union (De Kock, 1936:70-99) the foundations of the new nation's policy of economic development had been laid down, and substantial progress was being made. Now a broad policy of general economic development was followed. But this was violently disturbed by the outbreak of the Great War in July 1914 and of the South African Rebellion two months afterwards, which had occasioned a serious disturbance in trade industry and revenue.

In 1915, however, despite the outbreak of the European War and the South African Rebellion, a rapid revival of trade and industry set in. At this time, the war afforded an abnormal stimulus to farming and manufacturing in South Africa. Several factors combined to bring about this favourable state of things:

- 1° - A considerable rise in prices and an abnormal demand for foodstuffs and raw materials in Europe.
- 2° - Because of the War, South Africa was unable to import many articles not ordinarily produced locally or not produced in sufficient quantities. As result, local producers and manufacturers were induced to take advantage of the opportunity created by the diminution of foreign competition and the rise in prices.
- 3° - Banking and credit facilities were considerably expanded and stimulated increased production.

interference have steadily tightened. Successive governments have continually paid lip-service to upholding the principles of free competitive enterprise. Nattrass states that in a capitalist or mixed market economy such as the South African economy, the basic institution on which the system rests is the right to individual ownership of property and it is the market mechanism that performs the role of linking the production and distribution aspects of the economic problem.

By its interventions and the efficiency of its bureaucracy, the South African state appears as a "hard" state. We will try to show how South African society is what Innes (1984:17) calls "a particular capitalist society" characterized by monopoly capitalism and why it should have become involved in intervening, during the major formative period between 1900 and the early 1960s. This is essentially a capitalist system of production in which private enterprise, like the "Anglo-American Group", plays the major role, but does so in an economic environment that is managed by the state. It must be noted that this group is a major force in the economic, political and social life of South Africa and is involved in gold, diamond, coal and copper mining operations in Southern Africa.

Most scholars have suggested and described the role of the state as an actor in the development process in South Africa and pointed out its involvement in the economic life. While Schrire argues that the government should play a critical role in establishing a policy framework which is both internally consistent and conducive to socio-economic development, Abedian and Standish suggest that one of the most important debates for South Africa concerns the appropriate economic role for government. The outcome of this debate will play a decisive role in the economic make-up of the country. All of these writers find that the overriding objective of the government should be the maximization of the general standard of living and that the efficiency of government impacts directly on the economy.

The period from 1900 to 1939 was characterized by various forms of state intervention. In this vein, Davies (1979, 1-228) states that over the course of this century the South African state has been involved in a number of interventions, the effects of which have been to create a "privileged white stratum" within the wage-earning classes. The state has intervened in the process of class formation to ensure that particular places in the division of labour have been

Following I. Abedian and B. Standish (1992, 1), A. Leftwich (1994, 30-31), R. Schrire (1990, 274), Nattrass (1990, 20-32), it can be argued that it was the discovery of diamonds and gold in the latter half of the nineteenth century which gave South Africa economic dynamism. It was the location and inaccessibility of these resources which heralded the beginnings of economic development. It is important to state that the diamond and gold fields were situated in the then undeveloped interior of the country. In addition, gold deposits were rarely of the alluvial type, so heavy equipment, power supplies and large forces of organized labour were required to extract and process the ore. These factors were responsible for the establishment of a rail system; the opening up of the coal fields for the generation of electricity; and the establishment of urban concentrations, commercial farming and manufacturing interests in the interior.

The period from 1886 to 1910 was referred to as the "Golden Era", due to the pace of economic development in South Africa as a whole. This was the beginning of industrialization in South Africa. It began a little later than in Japan or Russia; fully one hundred years after Britain and at least fifty years after the U.S.. And this, it must be remembered, was only the beginning. The development of a diversified industrial economy as a secondary consequence of the development of the gold mining industry dated only from the 1920s, about twenty years behind Japan.

The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, has proved to be a political event of great economic significance for several reasons. Especially the uniformity of national policy which was adopted in the place of four distinct policies and the transferring to the Union Government and administration of all the railways, harbours and ports belonging to the four colonies at the establishment of the Union. Since 1910 a large variety of labour and industrial legislation was passed by the Union Parliament for the purpose of improving the lot of industrial workers in the Union.

This situation was made possible by the South African state which has played an active and positive role in the economic process by the creation of the necessary underlying network of physical infrastructure and its intervention in the labour market. Since the end of World War II, this trend has been apparent for many decades and the reins of state participation and

3.2.1. State Involvement in the Economy

South Africa has had more or less complete political sovereignty since 1910 from a comparatively early stage a considerable proportion of its economy has been controlled by the people settled in, and fully identified with it, from Cecil Rhodes onwards. In this way South Africa was able to escape from the normal colonial situation. Developments in South Africa, though, soon began to differ from the usual expatriate colonial pattern. In the main the settlers preserved their literacy, their cultural identity and their technological inheritance. But they began to adapt their life style to the continent rather than to mould its physical features to their original economic or social heritage. In a sense they became rural new Africans.

The South African industrialization has been presided over by a minority, but a South African minority, and the effect has been crucially different from the picture in any true colony where the ruling minority has been either absentee or a non-independent garrison on behalf of a colonial power.

The European immigrants which constituted this minority succeeded in establishing settlements alongside, and subsequently a precarious hegemony, over a very much larger African population. Throughout the development of this country, the crucial questions regarding social justice in a society which is not affluent are "inequality" of living standards and "inequality" of opportunity. The consequence of this inequality in South Africa is exceptional and nobody can deny that one of the effects and also one of the purposes of racial discrimination is to protect differentials of wealth.

Hence too the development of an exceptional system. The logic of this system was that for the development and maintenance of "an economically powerful white supremacy", it was necessary to deprive Africans "of access to and control of economic power". This restriction of access is achieved by imposing "trade union, educational and income colour bars" and these constitute "the core structure" of labour discrimination or, given their function in the system, "the core labour structure of white supremacy" (Leftwich, 1994:65).

CHAPTER TWO: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

The South African State not only played a determinant role in the establishment of segregation policy, as was argued in the previous section, but also helped to implement the basis and structure of one of the most sophisticated and the largest economies on the African continent.

In contrast with the Zairian poor performances as the net result of the inefficiency of the administrative system, the Republic of South Africa appears as one of the strong African economies. More than any other sub-saharan African economy it bears comparison with the economies of other rapidly developing countries, like Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, it appears as the dominant economic power in the entire Southern African region and all other territories are dependent on it in important respects.

Paradoxically, South Africa presents two facets. One is its strength as a relatively strong economy in Africa. The second is its exceptional inequality with regard to wealth. This inequality correspond closely with race due to the maintenance of a systematic and inescapable racial stratification. Its strength lies in considerable and varied natural resources, a reserve of under-tapped potential manpower, and the capital investment and entrepreneurial experience that have accumulated during the century following the discovery of diamonds and gold, which triggered the process of modernization.

Our focus will be once again on the involvement of the state in the economy, following by the establishment of state corporations, the size of the state and finally the crucial problem of public debt.

evidence of true government commitment to economic and political reform. In September 1991 the IMF formally suspended lending to Zaire, declaring it ineligible for further borrowing due to arrears of approximately \$100 million (Leslie, 1993:123-125).

As adequate solutions to remedy this critical situation Zairian academics such as Rwanyindo (Kankwenda, 1993:285) have suggested that structural reforms in the existing fiscal system have to be introduced in gradual stages. However, they will succeed only if far-reaching changes are made in the country's economic structures. Otherwise, piecemeal fiscal reforms will continue providing mere quick fixes and short-lived palliatives for the public finances, leaving the real problem intact. Financial allocations for public expenditure in Zaire are often based on inaccurate or fanciful estimates. Sometimes funds get diverted from their intended uses. Public expenditure has thus proved incapable of stimulating production, helping create new jobs, improving the national income distribution system, or helping to ensure the stability of Zairian currency at home and abroad.

In other words, I believe, to bring order into the management of Zaire, public finances, and the laws of proper financial accountability should be applied to all Zairian citizens. But before this can happen, ruling class mentalities and attitudes will have to be changed in this respect. Meanwhile, for the last 20 years, budget deficits have become a chronic fact of life in Zaire and the crisis continues. Finally, with regard to the budget deficit, one might emphasize that the negative terms of trade between state and society reflect a crisis far more profound than that of 1965 - a crisis whose ultimate implications and final resolution evoke the most somber perspectives.

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continuing support from private creditors and international institutions (IMF, World Bank) is an indication that the regime has friends abroad. However, while Mobutu and his clique enjoy resources and assistance provided to them by the Western actors, they cannot afford to comply fully with their demands for reform and are more able to resist Western demands and intrusions.

This ambivalence of the Mobutist state find its explanation in the fact that the implementation of bureaucratic changes would undermine the very basis of their power - access to and free use of the state's resources. Nevertheless, one can observe that borrowing and non payment of debts are central features of the Zairian state. As at the end of 1993, the country's total external debt stood at an estimated \$10 billion. Blumenthal's harsh verdict was shared at this time by many of Zaire's creditors, when carefully, he pointed out the incapacity of the country to pay its debts, was mostly ignored. In his own terms, the regime counted on the generosity of its creditors for an indefinite rescheduling of their loans. There was no possibility on the horizon, as he has claimed, that the numerous creditors of Zaire would recover their funds. And the "corruption of the ruling group" was the root cause "which destroys all possibilities" of recovery (Leslie, 1993: 118-119).

Over the years the debt crisis illustrates the incapacity of Mobutu's state to cope with external creditors. According to Leslie, throughout 1987 and 1988 Zaire fell steadily behind in payments to its creditors and failed several IMF performance criteria. Inflation, the money supply, and the current account all increased significantly. In June 1988 the government unilaterally halted payments to the IMF on the grounds that the existing arrangements were resulting in a negative transfer of resources. As a result, the structural adjustment credits negotiated the previous year were blocked by both the IMF and the World Bank.

In the aftermath of *perestroika* in the late 1980s, Mobutu's perceived usefulness to the West has been irreparably undermined. With the anti-Communist argument gone, Western donors appear determined not to fall into the familiar Mobutu trap and have openly acknowledged the total lack of credibility of the Zairian regime with respect to reform. As a result, the IMF and the World Bank have taken a strong position and appear determined not to extend further structural adjustment and balance of payments funding to Zaire until there is sustained

reforms. Clearly, as Gould indicated, the "West had become concerned with the Mobutu regime's ability to make "rational" decisions and to maintain a climate in which Western investments and indeed the regime's own security would be safeguarded".

For instance, in January 1978, a colloquium on Zaire held by the US State Department, revealed the existence of US government decision to achieve concert of policy with other governments that had invested heavily in Zaire, along with the 126 creditor banks and multinational corporations to which Zaire owed money, with a view toward "not breaking ranks". While Gould found that working through such agencies as the World Bank and the IMF, these foreign powers could maintain a united front and impose reforms on Mobutu, Peemans observes that this pressure was that of foreign capital on the Zairian ruling group.

In the midst of examples of securing Western goodwill one can note that to sustain the economic breakdown in 1983, the Kengo government embarked Zaire upon the acceptance of an austerity programme much favoured by the IMF, the World Bank and Western governments. Between 1983 and 1985, this program brought further discomfort to the ordinary people: loss of jobs in the civil service and teaching profession with the dismissal of 140,000 employees, devaluation and increasing inflation (Kankwewnda, 1993:278). The series of austerity budgets that followed provoked widespread dissatisfaction.

Thus by 1986, following five years of economic austerity, there were few tangible positive results. There was little, if any, real growth in the economy and no improvement in the balance of payments. Net outflows of foreign exchange from Zaire now exceeded inflows into the country and the proportion of export earnings devoted to servicing the external debt was more than 25%. But, following vigorous protests by the Zairian government, a Consultative Group meeting of Western donors in 1987 acted as a catalyst for net transfers totalling \$1,092m. between 1987-89, of which \$326m. came from the World Bank group, with the African Development Bank, the EC, the USA and Japan also providing balance-of-payments support (Africa South of the Sahara 1994:955).

In this episode, the Zairian state appears as the dependent instrument of the Western capitalist order although the ruling group would like to demonstrate to the population that Zaire's

TABLE 14: Total Foreign Aid, 1979-1989 (net disbursements, \$ mil.)

Categ.	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Bilat.	228.7	316.8	277.1	250.8	197.2	241.4	213.0	322.2	359.7	424.1	461.2
Belgium	153.6	169.7	123.7	103.6	92.7	75.9	80.0	143.1	121.6	136.9	95.9
France	24.9	39.4	25.1	24.7	23.1	27.3	29.9	39.4	42.0	80.1	103.4
USA	44.0	11.0	21.0	16.0	23.0	37.0	39.0	41.0	56.0	53.0	54.0
Japan	3.1	39.4	51.3	42.8	3.0	26.4	9.3	10.5	28.0	23.4	90.8
Categ.	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Multilat.	122.9	105.7	102.0	91.8	120.6	107.1	119.1	156.1	292.6	179.8	212.3
IDA	26.3	19.6	17.1	38.0	42.2	50.8	58.5	82.2	213.9	89.0	91.0
EC	19.3	23.0	44.5	18.5	50.7	35.0	21.3	24.0	22.3	38.3	61.0
UNDP	5.7	11.6	10.2	9.2	5.3	0.8	7.6	9.5	7.6	9.7	11.0
Total	411.6	422.5	379.1	342.6	317.8	348.5	332.1	478.3	652.3	603.9	673.5
Grants	266.4	264.1	247.7	210.0	195.6	188.9	202.5	238.5	272.6	316.5	368.7

Source: W.J.Leslie, "Zaire: Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State", 1993:117.

To protect their economic interests, virulent criticism of the Mobutu regime came from his Western supporters, both private creditors and international organisations. In their own analyses of the Zairian crisis, they all proposed institutional reforms within the Zairian state as a solution, and stressed administrative and managerial modernization. Indeed, their analyses, stressed Gould, pinpoint mismanagement as one of the major causes, if not the most major cause of the crisis.

In addition, the World Bank and other international financial institutions singled out the problems of "waste and mismanagement of public funds". They condemned the Zairianization and nationalization measures of 1973-1974 which were ill-conceived and poorly implemented and only worsened one of the constraints on economic development which perennially plagued Zaire's economy like the weakness of management structures. Dismayed by the Zairianization measures and alarmed by radicalization, in which Mobutu was striking close to their interests, foreigners weighed in with strong recommendations to mitigate the impact of the measures. This external strong action led to stabilization and retrocession, and later, devaluation and

- 2°- 1983-1986: was viewed by donors as a bold step, in which Zaire largely adhered to a rigorous austerity program.
- 3°- 1986-1995: sharp break with the IMF program in the midst of heavy debt service payments that were not tempered by increasing aid. Generally poor economic performance, unsustained efforts with respect to structural reform, and steadily declining standards of living once again become the norm. This phase is still continuing.

Nevertheless, 1978 was the beginning of unprecedented external creditor involvement in Zaire's economic affairs. As analysts (Africa South Sahara 1994:954; Leslie, 1993) have pointed out, the World Bank and Western donors have made consistent efforts to facilitate rehabilitation of the economy. Among important trading partners and Western donors, one can mention the dominant position of Belgium as the former colonial power, the USA, France, Germany and Japan. Thus with money flowing into the country to support grandiose developments, such as the Inga hydroelectric station and the steelworks in Maluku, Zaire's import bill rose sharply (\$ 1,579 m. in 1974) and a recurrent trade deficit began to accrue, although for several years this was offset to some extent by external borrowing and inflows of foreign aid as Table 14 indicates.

Cushioned by these inflows of funds, the government made little serious effort to regulate the economic situation until the early 1980s. But as the flow of aid and in particular, commercial loan began to decrease, the import bill had, perforce, to be cut. Furthermore, the shortage of foreign exchange proved to be a major obstacle to production in other sectors such as agriculture and industry. Consequently, the economic dislocations caused by Zairianization and the closing of the Benguela railway during the Angolan civil war, as well as rising prices of oil and other crucial imports, were all factors that plunged the country into an economic crisis.

expansion and political stability did not occur without foreign support. Many observers note that confidently and with ascendancy assured in the early 1970s, Mobutu embarked Zaire on a high-risk, externally financed, mineral-based development strategy, legitimated by the ideological doctrine of economic nationalism. This strategy collapsed due to several conjunctural misfortunes, notably the break in copper prices in 1974; the rising oil costs following the "petroleum boom" and the world recession; the disastrous consequences of Zairianization measures which appeared as a colossal miscalculation politically and economically; the adventurous and unfortunate military intervention in the Angolan civil war, which led to the closure of the Benguela railway - the cheapest, the shortest and the fastest trade route for the Shaba copperbelt - in August 1975. This forced Zaire to rely on a longer, more expensive route through Zambia and Zimbabwe to South African ports, in addition to the "Voie Nationale" from Shaba to the port of Matadi (2,000 km).

In addition, political factors also played an important role through massive and rash spending and borrowing when revenues were high; rampant corruption and fiscal mismanagement; grandiose and unproductive development schemes such as the Inga-Shaba powerline and especially the Maluku steel mill ; the almost total neglect of agriculture and of the transportation and production infrastructure; lack of understanding and concern about the rapidly deteriorating situation by Mobutu and his henchmen.

And, of course, the result was that described by Adelman (*African Affairs*, 77, 1978:37) when he noted that by early 1976 Zaire was in the middle of a grave economic and financial crisis which "pushed the state to the brink of international bankruptcy, and the Mobutu regime to the brink of disaster".

For analysts (Leslie, 1993:99-135), Zaire's economic crisis can be viewed in three distinct phases:

- 1°- 1974-1983: initially marked by assumptions on the part of both government and external donors that problems were of a short-term nature.

government investment also increased as a percentage of total investment over this period and, together with investment by the public corporations, on average accounted for a massive 53 per cent in the years 1978 and 1979. This proportion however, declined in the 1980s to reach 44 per cent in 1986.

The other interesting aspect of the changing structure of government spending is the increasingly important role that is being played by the public corporations. It is largely through this medium that the South African state provides the products that it believes are of strategic economic or political importance, and the massive increase in state expenditure in this area largely reflects an increasing state commitment to self-sufficiency in the fields of fuel and power and the production of military hardware.

TABLE 15: State Involvement in South African Economy

	Years						
	1946	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980	1985
Current Gvt Expenditure (R Millions)	291	351	695	2182	5157	12085	3316
Percentage of GDP	16.6	13.2	13.1	16.9	18.8	19.5	5
							27.6
Gvt Investment Expenditure (R Millions)	97	138	350	1075	2713	3909	6905
Percentage of GDP	5.5	5.2	6.6	8.3	9.9	6.3	5.8
Total Public Sector Spending (R Millions)	388	489	1045	3257	7870	15994	1007
Percentage of GDP	23.7	19.2	21.0	27.1	30.5	25.8	0
							33.6
Public Corporations (R Millions)	20	38	159	437	1124	3362	9195
Percentage of GDP	1.14	1.4	3.0	3.4	4.1	5.4	7.7
Total State Economic Activity (R Millions)	408	527	1204	3694	8994	19356	4926
Percentage of GDP	23.3	19.8	23.7	28.6	32.8	31.2	5
							41.0

Source : South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin for selected years

and 1987, partly as a result of the new tricameral parliamentary system, employment in the government sector - excluding the TBVC states - increased by 304 000. This represented 82 per cent of all additional employment in this period.

During the same period, the manufacturing sector - the main engine of growth in the economy - shed 67 000 jobs.

The same approach was made by J. Nattrass (1990, 266-80) during the period between 1946-1986 when he asserted that a significant proportion of the total economic activity in South Africa rests directly in government hands. Throughout this period, the public sector's contribution to GDP averaged about 30 per cent of the total. Estimates of the national fixed capital suggest that the state's overall direct economic control may have been even greater, as the public sector's share of this capital rose from 49 per cent to 57 percent of the total during this period.

Nattrass pointed out the fact that the relative economic size of the public sector is not so surprising when one remembers that, in South Africa, the government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order, repression of escalating political dissent, national defence, education at all levels, the major proportion of health care, the payment of social pensions, the postal and telecommunication network, the road networks, the railways, the harbours, the airways and for generation of power. In addition, the South African state is heavily involved in the industrial sector through the large public corporations and it produces iron and steel, chemicals, fertilizers, oil from coal and enriched uranium through this medium.

The illustration of the size of the state and its involvement in the economic process clearly appears through Table 15 below. This table contains data relating to government expenditure over the period 1946-1985.

The period covered in this table, according to Nattrass' comments, shows a rising trend in the importance of the state's share in economic activity. Of even greater interest, however, is the way in which the structure of government spending has changed over this time period. Government investment activity rose steadily to reach 9,5 per cent of the GDP by 1975;

The extent of government involvement in the economy is significant too in other state initiatives such as agriculture and transport. G. Maasdorp argues that in agriculture, assistance to white commercial farmers through subsidies, rebates and tariffs, and the establishment under the Marketing Act of 1937 of producer-dominated control boards with monopoly powers over marketing have long been controversial issues. The role of the state in agriculture is a "steadily increasing one". Transport has been a highly regulated sector with the state owning ports, railways and the national airline, as well as providing roads.

The increasingly active role the state has played in the economy over the years has allowed the public sector to expand not only in absolute terms, but also relative to the rest of the economy. By this, I mean that the true size of the state can be explained in "expenditure terms", as most analysts have illustrated.

Thus, defining state expenditure as current and capital outlays by central, provincial, local and homeland administrations, and state and public corporations, Abedian and Standish find that state expenditure grows as a proportion of national expenditure from 29 per cent in 1920 to 63 per cent in 1982 (Abedian & Standish, 1984:392) - an increase in real terms of 6,2 per cent per annum.

Initially government intervention in the economy after 1948 was designed to constrain English economic power and promote Afrikaner entrepreneurship and economic interests, and since 1960 the costs of homeland development and other apartheid policies have further increased the state's share of total expenditure. According to Browne (1983:166-117), between 1946 and 1981 there was a steady increase in final expenditure by public authorities in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), and also of current government revenue and expenditure relative to GDP. For Gouws (1989:2) the total public sector expenditure as a proportion of GDP increased from 21,9 per cent in 1962 to 37,8 per cent in 1985 before falling again to 35,1 per cent in 1987. General government current spending similarly increased: consumption expenditure by government, for example, rose from 10,4 to 19,2 per cent of GDP between 1962 and 1987. And finally, the increasing state share of total GDP is paralleled in employment statistics: the numbers of civil servants increased by 61 per cent between 1973 and 1988 as against only 17 per cent in private non-agricultural employment. Between 1980

commodity, oil. For the first time in South African history, a state corporation was established without even the offer of shares to the public.

The second was the Phosphate Development Corporation (FOSKOR) established in 1951 under government ownership to develop South Africa's phosphate deposits.

One can point out the fact that since taking power in 1948 the NP government has turned increasingly to state corporations to implement the economic facets of apartheid. The expanded state sector, and parastatals such as ISCOR, FOSKOR, and SASOL were used as training grounds for Afrikaans entrepreneurs.

Finally state corporations have also come to bear the burden of the physical enforcement of apartheid as evidenced in the establishment of the Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR) in 1963 following the imposition of an international arms embargo against South Africa. This state corporation was established to protect the country's access to military weapons. But in addition to the more direct applications of state economic policy to the maintenance of apartheid, state corporations have continued to exemplify the economic constraints under which industrialisation takes place inside South Africa, Bonner wrote. But despite the apparent politicisation of the mandate and purpose of state corporations since 1948, they have continued to operate largely according to the economic precepts developed during their earlier years.

3.2.3. The Size Of The State

It is clear that government involvement in the manufacturing sector has taken many forms especially by the establishment and the ownership of many industrial enterprises (ISCOR, ARMSCOR...); the development of agencies established and controlled by government with interests in a wide variety of manufacturing industries (IDC) and finally, government has had an all-pervasive influence on manufacturing and on the economy generally through a multiplicity of legislation and regulation. In other words, the state in South Africa has, by international standards, played an unusually active role in attempting to influence the location of manufacturing industry.

power under Malan in 1948. But they reversed the limited, vacillating reforms of the wartime UP (United Party) and, in defiance of worldwide trends, proclaimed their belief in segregation and racial inequality and their intention of extending apartheid. And they did so.

Lipton states that later, economic growth and "Afrikaners First" policies gradually transformed white labour into a bureaucracy and created a group of Afrikaners urban and mining capitalists, who came to share the interests of other employers... These diverging class interests eventually tore apart the nationalist alliance. In fact, the 1948 election marked the exclusion of the economically-dominant English from political power. For the first time since Union, the party in power was exclusively Afrikaans.

So the Nationalists used their powers of patronage to favour Afrikaans business interests. Central and local government authorities shifted their accounts from English to Afrikaans financial institutions such as Volkskas. Government contracts were steered to Afrikaans companies. The IDC, state instrument for encouraging expansion of manufacturing, entered into joint enterprises with private Afrikaans companies like Federale Kunsmis (Lipton, 1986:22-23, 272-295).

Meanwhile, state corporations became a tool of Nationalist government policies as a result of their own experiences of political control. Soon after, the new government announced and began to implement its vision of a severely stratified programme. In fact, there was great continuity in the corporations' policies despite the appearance of the new government. The new heads of the three state corporations - ESCOM, ISCOR, IDC - continued those policies forged during and immediately after the war years. The IDC demonstrated the most explicit continuity with previous policy and support for the new political agenda.

The editors of *"Apartheid's Genesis"* stated that the Nationalist government was suspicious of private enterprise and supported the IDC's role in establishing new state industries. Thus in 1951 two more state corporations established through the IDC dwarfed all the corporation's previous undertakings: the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) in which the government clearly sought complete control over what it perceived as a strategic

Thus the period under review witnessed the growth of the urban working class which could be controlled if industry was to benefit from its labour. To illustrate the point, Innes maintained that the state did not limit itself only to financial support for industry. The early years of the war brought with them rapid inflation and a corresponding intensification of black workers' demands for wage increases. Through a combination of concessions and repression the state sought to contain these demands and restrict the rise of militancy among black workers. This was the reaction against the full white employment during the war.

O'Meara observed that "large numbers" of Africans began to move into operative positions in a wide range of industries. The growth of black trade unions was followed by the strike waves of 1942 and 1944. Attempting to stop this wave, the state was only partially successful in this regard. The crucial question which could threaten the favourable conditions that prevailed was the danger posed by the more militant black working class and which was amplified by the 1946 mine-workers' strike. All that the state had succeeded in doing to was attempt to resolve the labour question through a protracted and elaborate process of restructuring which further extended the repressive controls over black labour.

After the 1948 elections and the victory of the National Party, while inherently racialistic legislation existed prior to 1948, apartheid marked a turning point in racially repressive legislation, as we have shown in previous sections. In order to establish the apartheid state, a plethora of legislation was introduced. By the mid-1950s, as P. Bonner *et al.* (1993:65-95) have pointed out, the economic realities of industrialisation in South Africa and the political development of an explicitly separatist racism, apartheid, emerged jointly as a profoundly complementary political economy.

As Merle Lipton has noted, the Nationalists did not (as businessmen and liberals believed) want to halt industrialization but to control it, so as to make it compatible with the traditional hierarchical race structure and the preservation of white (particularly Afrikaner) identity. They believed this required the reinforcement of racial divisions against the social forces released by industrialization and modernization. As a result, they drew sharper lines between whites and all black (including coloureds) and resorted to more legal intervention to enforce this. It is arguable that apartheid was not the invention of the Afrikaner National Party elected to

Chain (US); Dunlop, Firestone, Siemens, Babcock and Wilcox, Dorman Long, Stewarts and Lloyds, Davy Ashmore and General Electric (British). In addition, other foreign companies already established in South Africa, like ICI and Lever Brothers, expanded their local plant (Legassick, 1974:263).

After the Second World war, the state emerged as a strong economic player and was ready to play a direct role in promoting the economic process. In this vein the Smuts speech in 1940 can be considered as a government programme. General J.C. Smuts argued that:

It is generally recognized that a great opportunity has arrived for us to push forward industrial development in this country. The great world crisis now upon us may prove a unique opportunity for forwarding our industrial development. The war must inevitably throw us back on our own resources. Much that has been imported will now have to be manufactured locally. Much that has been exported will now, with restricted sea transport have to be worked up and processed and consumed in this country. It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good, and this world blizzard may mean much for the economic process of South Africa. It is for this reason that the government has decided to ask Parliament to establish an Industrial Development Corporation which will be able to help to finance and guide our industrial development and prove for industry the sort of boom that the Land Bank has proved for agriculture.

In addition, the State's role in fact went far beyond simply the establishment of the IDC in 1942. During the War the state also:

- embarked on an important expansion programme for ISCOR;
- built and financed annexe factories under the control of private companies;
- assisted in the organization and provision of a market for a number of industries;
- and through a change in the administration of tariff policy effectively increased protection for industry.

One can note that much of the finance for these ventures came from the war taxes which were imposed on the gold mining industry after 1940.

3.2.2. The Establishment Of State Corporations

Between the wars the South African government established the first two "state corporations" in an attempt to spur on the country's lagging industrial development. In 1922 the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) was set up to build new power stations and provide electricity, chiefly for the government railway system but also to promote general industrialisation. ESCOM was established under the electricity Act of 1922 but was not brought into existence until 1923. It had been established, in part, to meet the demands of the government-operated South African Railways (SAR) for government-controlled power stations.

In 1927 the PACT government formed the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) to manufacture cheap steel, create jobs for white South Africans and consequently further promote the country's industrial development. ISCOR was established under the Iron and Steel Industry Act of 1928. The major concern of the first two state corporations was to gain access to customers in markets already dominated by foreign companies.

In 1942, the state established the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) as a "financial institution specializing in industrial finance, namely, in the systematic and thorough investigation of new propositions and the underwriting and selling of securities". The IDC was intended to spearhead new state industrial enterprises in the post-war period.

All these state corporations tried to push or buy out their competitors, and chose labour policies designed to coerce and co-opt black and white workers alike. Nevertheless, only ESCOM largely succeeded in gaining control over both its competition and its labour. Innes claims that through these financial and other provisions, the state sought to stimulate production in agriculture and manufacturing, while at the same time reorganizing the overall political conditions of labour supply and control.

The result was a resurgence of foreign investment in South Africa and in particular, a significant rise in the level of both foreign and mining investment in manufacturing production. The most prominent among these were many of the leading American and European monopoly concerns, like Nestlé's Cadbury's, Ford, General Motors, Mc Kinnon

From this point of view, numerous studies have shown that the development of economic policy is indelibly linked to the interests of the ruling government. However, despite its attempts to rebuild the economy, in the 1924 elections, the Smuts government was swept from power. The new government, known as the PACT government, an alliance of Nationalists and the Labour Party was voted into office and was dedicated to the stronger protection of local industries and to transform agriculture. The PACT government initiated what was to become extensive government intervention in the economy. While this coalition did not survive the next election, many of its policies and philosophies did, Abedian and Standish pointed out. At this time, the ruling economic philosophy was that of liberalism in trade and, as the Rand Rebellion of 1922 demonstrated, repression of labour.

As a way of protecting itself from perceived foreign economic threats economic policy focused on national self-sufficiency. And central to implementing the new government's politico-economic policies were South African state corporations established to take an increasing role in the making of a new society.

cartelised control. This permitted both the introduction of new technologies and an effective reduction of labour costs. Such economic reorganization was made possible by important shifts in bourgeois politics and ideology and significant changes in the form of the interventionist state to secure the necessary economic, political and ideological conditions for the dominance of monopoly capital and to ensure its profitable operation.

In this sense, the manufacturing sector was the political victory of the PACT government in 1925 which brought with it the replacement of *laissez-faire* economic philosophy, and the subsequent promotion of manufacturing, as Abedian and Standish have stated. The PACT took active steps to encourage industrialization. This promotion has taken many forms, especially "direct state involvement" in the economy and "import substitution" which was implemented behind a barrier of trade restriction including customs tariffs of a protective nature, import quotas, and currency rationing. This permitted South Africa to develop a manufacturing industry behind high tariffs walls. The new state policy and the overall share of the public sector in the economy began to increase substantially. The consequence was the establishment of public corporations in the manufacturing industry, as we will see later.

At this stage the government appears as an actor in the development process and was committed to an extensive role in restructuring the economy in accordance with the twin objectives of growth and redistribution.

This was the consequence of increasing pressure from European capitalist classes on industrial production in South Africa and other peripheral countries, as Innes has observed. Faced with these pressures individual capitalists, including the mine-owners, turned to the state to support their industrial investments. In 1921, the Smuts government responded by establishing the Board of Trade and Industries to redraft the Customs and Excise Tariffs and "to advise the government in respect of assisting and developing industries in the Union". As a result Tariff Protection was extended to a further sixteen industries. However, the response to these measures from individual groups of capitalists was less than enthusiastic and by about 1923 it seemed clear that the state's piecemeal approach to the issue of protection was inadequate to stave off the mounting pressure of overseas competition.

on catering for the needs of the poor whites and continued with the NP victory in 1948 with the further expansion of the state sector. The creation of a new Department of Labour in 1924 allowed the establishment of areas of employment in which whites would be protected from black competition.

Statistics attest to the success of these "civilized labour" policies. In 1921 there were 4 705 white unskilled employees in the state railway system; by 1928 the number had expanded to 15 878, wrote Pierre Hugo (Schrire, 1990:115-116). However, like most countries, the creation of a truly fully employed economy has long been a formal public objective of government policy. As the Minister of Labour claimed in the House of Assembly in May 1972, the first and major objective of the government was to offer opportunities for employment to the entire population, white and non-white. Thus, in terms of an Act of 1945 the Department of Labour began to register, and so to place in employment not only whites and other coloureds and Indians but also black workers, through the Department of Bantu Administration and its various regional authorities.

Finally, the impact of the Great Depression on the economy precipitated significant changes in various branches of capitalist production. Farmers faced various international and domestic crises; gold mining suffered under a falling real gold price and a militant growing white trade union movement. The exploitation of the gold and diamond resources began to show distinct signs of slowing. The diminishing importance of mining during the first decade of this century marked the end of the first gold mining boom. The second started in 1933 and showed its first signs of slowing only in the 1970s.

Meanwhile, since that time agriculture has been of decreasing importance domestically, like most developing countries, and contributed only 6.21 per cent to the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990.

O'Meara (1983, 21-22) claimed that economically, the resolution of this crisis occurred on the basis of a significant restructuring of capital both nationally and internationally. Particularly important here was the general trend towards the reorganisation of all sectors of capitalist production on a more capital-intensive basis under increasing monopoly and

- 4° - The natural protection which South African industries enjoyed due to a great distance from Europe and America, was increased by the rise in freight, insurance and other import charges.

Subsequently, the combination of all these factors caused a considerable expansion of agriculture and stock farming and an unprecedented development of manufacturing enterprises in South Africa.

Moreover, the inflation and expansion of the War and post-War periods (1915-20) were followed by a severe economic depression in South Africa as in every other country. Indeed, in spite of a temporary economic upswing from 1924 to 1929, the long stagnation in the accumulation of capital since 1913 culminated in the Great Depression of 1929 to 1932. The symptoms of this depression were, namely, falling prices, dwindling profits, contraction of trade, heavy losses, bankruptcies, budget deficits, unemployment, wage reductions and strikes. The expansion of economic activity as a whole was retarded by the continuing financial chaos and depression in Europe and by the ravages of drought and locusts over large areas of the Union during the latter part of 1923.

In addition, as G. Maasdorp has remarked, the resultant "poor white" problem became a major political and social issue after Union and was exacerbated by the Great Depression of 1929-32 (Schrire, 1990:188-214). The Carnegie Commission of Inquiry estimated that there were 300 000 poor whites in 1929-30 and that almost 50 per cent of white children were inadequately clothed and fed. But the general response to the "poor white" problem was the so-called "civilized labour policy" formulated in 1924, whereby the public sector fulfilled the role of employer of last resort: any unemployed white who could not find a job in the private sector could obtain one in the public sector or other public bodies which were also encouraged to employ more whites.

The "poor white" problem merits brief elaboration here. The bureaucracy in South Africa was run mainly by whites and provided limited advancement opportunities for persons of other race groups. The Afrikaner first entered public service in substantial numbers at the lower-grade levels under the PACT government's "civilized labour" policies which explicitly focused

extractive, distributive, symbolic, rejuvenative and responsive capabilities. In addition, the introduction of the capabilities level of analysis, helps to enhance not only our capacity for scientific prediction and explanation, but also our capacity to talk about policies as they may affect political change in desired directions, as asserted by Almond & Powell.

As evidenced by previous data, the analysis of the institutions of both South Africa and Zaire, allows us to demonstrate that institutional weakness leads to the state's evident lack of capacity, bringing about the dislocation of the system as a whole in Zaire, whereas, South Africa is able at times to initiate and implement decisions that set economic activities in motion and define the terms of inter-group and interagency relationships. From the situational nature of the state, South Africa and Zaire are both centralized and bureaucratized, but while South Africa appears as a sophisticated mobilizer and allocator of scarce public resources on the one hand, the Zairian state is viewed as a means of access to power and a vehicle of wealth for the ruling group, on the other.

PART FOUR:

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE'S CAPABILITIES IN ZAIRE AND SOUTH AFRICA

The performance of the capabilities function does not include all the other political functions, but it constitutes instead a necessary prerequisite for the performance of other functions. According to a purely structural-functional approach, one useful category of analysis in comparing disparate political systems is the area of "capabilities" or the ability of the decision-makers to implement their goals.

Analysing the categories of capability, Almond and Powell have considered that some political systems are primarily regulative and extractive in character. The Zairian system as a totalitarian one has suppressed the demands coming from the society and is unresponsive to demands coming from the international environment. At the same time, it regulates and coerces behaviour in the society, and seeks to draw maximum resources from the populace but its distributive capability remains very low.

South Africa, while being an oppressive state particularly during the reign of the Nationalists (1948-1994), also enjoyed the institutional apparatus for limited democracy. Thus, in this system, outputs of regulation, extraction, and distribution are more affected by inputs of demands from groups in the society. By deduction, we may speak of democratic societies as having higher responsive and rejuvenative capabilities

To sum up, it is arguable that all these concepts of capability, are simply ways of talking about the flows of activity into and out of the political system and tell us how a system is performing in its environment, how it shapes this environment, and how it is being shaped by it. Thus, the confrontation of a system-development problem may be related to the changing patterns of political-system capabilities - i.e.; growth or decline in regulative,

but also by generally poor economic decision-making. In other words, while South Africa can attempt to achieve its overall economic objectives by influencing the economic system through its fiscal and monetary policies; in Zaire, the state's inability to provide basic services has exacerbated the plight of the average citizen. As a result, consumer purchasing power has been eroded because of devaluation and increasing prices, in the face of an impotent government. Hence Zairians have developed various coping mechanisms outside the formal sector in the second or parallel economy.

Accordingly, as Leslie points out, a strong argument can be made that on a fundamental level, the Zairian economic crisis, though it was precipitated by a fall in copper prices, was caused by a series of disastrous economic policies that were politically based. Since 1965 the perpetuation of such policies has formed a powerful element of continuity in the Zairian state.

policies (such as protectionism, subsidies,...) which the PACT government introduced. These measures succeeded in providing space for industry, affording it, in what Innes calls "a kind of cocoon" within which to develop. By capitalising the major sectors of production in the 1930s, the state by its intervention was able to reconcile the different capitalist interests involved and promote expansion in all sectors of the economy. And after the Second World War, it was ready to play a direct role in promoting the economic process.

However, a number of academic studies have warned the government against the magnitude of its impact on the economy and that it should avoid ordering its administrative priorities to ensure that government activity in fact continues to influence the economic variables in the direction that will achieve its overall objectives.

Generally speaking, it appears that each economic system is subject to fluctuations caused either by external factors such as warfare or world prices, or by internal shocks such as a drop in the level of total demand, or low levels of investment. In this sense, the object of the macro-economic policy is to reduce the impact of such fluctuations through economic stabilization which means maintaining a balance both internally and externally. In practical terms the internal balance amounts to maintaining high economic growth, and hence price stability and a low level of unemployment. Thus the means available for implementing macro-economic policy consist mainly of fiscal and monetary measures.

Fiscal measures include taxes and government spending, as well as fiscal regulations that govern production. Monetary tools, on the other hand, include interest rates, money supply, exchange rates and financial regulations. While fiscality plays an important role in the South African economy, the issue is nonexistent in Zaire where neither fiscal measures nor monetary reforms have succeeded since the beginning of the crisis in the early 1970s. The fiduciary financing of Zairian economic activity marks the amplitude of this crisis. Under these circumstances, one cannot speak about economic performances because there is simply no production.

The vulnerability of the Zairian economy caused by its overdependence on mineral exports for foreign exchange has been complicated not only by rapidly escalating debt and corruption,

involvement in the economy is determined by what economists such as Abedian or Standish call the existence of "market failures" which are caused by positive and negative externalities, by the presence of asymmetric information and by the different time-horizons which exist between private decisions and public needs.

Nevertheless, it is important with regard to this question to argue that the state's role in the development process should be clearly specified. And in addition to its traditional economic role which is clearly interlinked with the legal and political roles, two principles can be stated: the first is that the allocation of public resources must be in terms of the stated development objectives and the second is that frequent meddling with the policy, once established, must be avoided at all costs.

From this analysis there is no doubt that the South African state appears as a *"hard state"* because of its economic and political weight in the society as a whole and especially in the sense of bureaucracy capacity in comparison with the Zairean *"weak state"*. The South African government has played a crucial role in determining the nature and rate of economic growth, especially through its ability to influence and mould certain aspects of economic development. The state developed a social environment where satisfactory economic progress took place because the existing social, legal and economic infrastructures were favourably placed for this to happen.

Moreover, economists find that the two major roles played by the South African government were the creation of the necessary underlying network of physical infrastructure for the infant economy and intervention in the labour market so as to assist the mines to establish an adequate supply of low cost labour. Finally, the degree of interdependence of its trade with world markets and the size of its domestic market gave the South African economy the ability to maintain real growth and to resist the cyclical ills of the world. By the 1980s, for example, against international pressure and political and economic sanctions, the South African state affirmed its structural autonomy and proved its capacity of withstanding considerable external pressure. There is no doubt that the government plays a major role in the South African economy and that this role can be a significant force in achieving particular objectives. Thus, it was argued that the key to explaining South Africa's industrial growth lies in the economic




Figure 2.3 Interest on public debt as percentage of government budget: South Africa 1960-90


Source: Abedian & Standish, "Economic Growth in South Africa", p.35.

As sustained by Abedian & Standish on this issue, it is unlikely that with the present budgetary system, the government will be in a position to reduce expenditure noticeably. In fact there is every reason to believe that there will be pressure for higher government spending. Raising taxes, on the other hand, would only exacerbate the tax burden on individuals, which is already high. The problem tackled from the macro-economic and micro-economic viewpoint brings some clarification into the fiscal system.

In macro-economic terms, the only way out of the impasse is a rise in public debt. This will be particularly conducive to growth if accompanied by a fundamental change in the expenditure pattern of the fiscus. A decline in the rate of inflation, brought about via a consistent monetary policy will reinforce the process. Evaluated on the basis of supply-side economics or micro-economy, the South African fiscal policy was shown to have generated a continuous process of fiscal drag, with implications for the disposable income of taxpayers, as well as numerous distortions in the composition of national savings and the placing of the tax burden. To solve the problem of bracket creep, fiscal policy has to address the problem of inflation and adjust personal income tax rates.

To sum up, it was argued that South Africa is among countries where industrialization has proceeded with substantial intervention by the state. Theoretically, the extent of government

Figure 2.2 Stock of public debt



The figure shows that the trend of South African debt as a ratio of the GDP rose in the 1980s with a risk to announce fiscal difficulties if continued over time. While the interest on public debt in 1960 and 1970 were 4.9 per cent and 8.6 per cent respectively, it constituted 15.6 per cent of the central government expenditure in 1987 (see Figure 2.3). The result of such high interest payments is perceived in the importance of consequences for both the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget. Thus on the expenditure side, it has a high opportunity cost. Instead of being spent on education, socio-economic infrastructure, and other productive outlays, fiscal revenues are used on an increasing scale to finance defence objectives and mainly to service public debt of the same "face value". The "face value" is the nominal value as printed or stamped on money.

On the revenue side, the fiscal authority's reluctance to borrow more heavily has had substantial tax implications. Depending on the sources of finance, individual, corporate, or other types of taxes have been raised to finance this portion of the debt service requirements. Taxation, rather than borrowing has been used to finance expenditure and in the 1980s the response of the fiscal authorities to the rapid increase in interest rates was to raise taxes instead of augmenting public debt.

for the servicing of the government debt. In this respect the composition of government expenditure is of prime importance. For example, when one looks at the changing structure of government expenditure in South Africa, it appears that expenditure on health care and other services grew very much more slowly than total expenditure and declined in relative importance. Although government spending on justice, police, prisons and defence grew very much faster than the average and increased in relative importance, as evidenced in Table 17. The increase is explained by the absolute necessity to maintain the system of "apartheid" and expenditure on defence had to increase because of "strategic" considerations, as argued by the lobbying group.

TABLE 17: The comparison of government current expenditure for selected years.


Category	1949-1950	1959-1960	1969-1970	1975-1976
Justice, police, prisons, defence	11	12	21	25
Education (all races)	18	19	19	19
Health & Hospitals	13	13	8	7
Agricultural services & subsidies	6	7	7	6
Income generating services	12	11	12	16
Other services	23	18	19	14
Transfer payments	8	10	7	7
Other	9	10	7	6

Source: Mc Grath 1976 b; Nattrass 1981:239.

Most countries in the world are confronted by a debt problem. But public debt does not still constitute a problem for South Africa because it depends to a great extent on the conduct of the monetary policy. Earlier studies have shown that although the stock of public debt has been rising since the 1960s, as a proportion of the GDP its share has been generally declining over the period, as shown in Figure 2.2 (Abedian & Standish,1992:34).

3.2.4. The Public Debt

Scholars such as Abedian and Standish have tackled this issue and have found that in 1990 the South African fiscus had an actual expenditure of close to one third (31.84 per cent) of the country's GDP. In 1960 this figure was 13.20 per cent. The macro-economic significance of the fiscal allocations grew steadily between 1960 and 1990, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.



Source: Abedian & Standish, "Economic Growth in South Africa", p.32.

Moreover, the share of fiscal revenue during the same period also increased markedly, from 14.10 per cent of the GDP to 28.71 per cent. Such remarkable increases reflect the rising economic importance of fiscal allocations over the period. This trend implies a low fiscal stimulus as measured by the size of the deficit, and in general the stock of public debt.

Economists have suggested that in economic terms, public debt is regarded as problematic only if its growth rate exceeds the rate of growth of the economy over time, as we have seen earlier in the case of Zaire. In essence, it is the taxable capacity of the economy that matters

TABLE 16: Sources of Government finance, 1950-1979.

PERIOD	TAXATION		OTHER		DEBT (Inc)	
	Amount (Rm)	% of Total	Amount (Rm)	% of Total	Amount (Rm)	% of Total
1950-59	5967	79	694	9	938	12
1960-69	13199	72	2257	12	2942	16
1970-79	52316	74	3863	5	15000	21

Source: Quarterly Bulletin of the Reserve Bank, Various issues.

As Nattrass remarks, it is interesting to note that despite the relatively conservative financial policy, the national debt still increased at an annual average rate of 11 percent from 1960-1979 and debt financing grew in importance as a source of funding for the state over the 30 years period covered in the table.

monopoly over the right to issue currency. The Reserve Bank is also the banker to the government itself, handles all South Africa's foreign exchange transactions, is responsible for marketing the country's gold output and is the vehicle through which the government attempts to control the financial sector of the economy.

Fiscally speaking and according to official materials (Worrall, 1975:91-91), the major sources of revenue of the South African authority are, in order of importance, loan revenue, income tax, sales tax, customs and excise, state enterprise revenue, sundry revenues and from September 1991, the Value Added Tax (VAT). All this income is not expended by the public service (state departments) alone but by a vast number of other public institutions - including local and provincial authorities - which receive annual and ad hoc subsidies and transfer payments either through annual budgetary or fixed statutory appropriations. All matters of public finance in South Africa are rigorously regulated by several statutory instruments.

As we have seen, taxation and borrowing are the principal sources of government finance. In South Africa both taxation and state loan financing involves the transfer of resources from the private sector to the public sector. The major difference between the two sources is that taxation payments are usually mandatory and earn no revenue for the person paying them, whereas with the loan capital an element of choice is present and the state normally pays some reward for the sacrifice, in the form of interest. The dominant role that has been played by taxation in government financing throughout the period 1950-1979 is highlighted in Table 16.

The lessons to be drawn from this observation are significant. This clearly reflects the role of government in the South African economy and at the same time it indicates to what extent government, by means of its spending power alone, can force the economy in a desired direction. Yet according to a popular impression conveyed by many observers of the economic scene in South Africa, government spending is too large for the size of the economy. Abedian and Standish have just observed that this might be correct in relation to the public sector, but not if the size of the central government only is addressed. The public sector is enormous and includes all levels of government. While the relative size of the public sector is too large, the same is not true of central government. In 1989-1990, the percentage of GDP compared with other countries, shows that South Africa's budget is amongst the lowest in the world for both developed countries and comparable developing countries. The composition of outlays is more important than the size of government spending. Expenditure on economic services, public services and other administrations constitute the bulk of government spending.

Moreover, state revenue comes from taxes - direct and indirect. Taxes form the most important part of current revenue. It is significant that total taxes, expressed as a percentage of total revenue, fluctuated more moderately than either of the two components and that, on average, income from direct taxes tended to become more important. The Franzsen Commission - a Commission of Enquiry into Fiscal and Monetary policy in South Africa (1968-1970), observed that throughout the post World War II period the relative importance of indirect taxes in the form of customs and excise duties had steadily declined as a proportion of total tax receipts. Immediately prior to World War II, indirect taxes had accounted for approximately 55 per cent of tax revenues of the central government. Excise duties are presently payable on a range of imported and locally produced goods including spirits, beer, cigarettes, petrol and tyres (South Africa: An Appraisal, July 1977).

Nattrass and Worrall recall that the principles which the South African system of public financial administration are geared to uphold are derived from the system introduced into the British civil service in the seventeenth century and can be traced right back to those on public auditing expounded by Aristotle in his *"Constitution of Athens"*. The principles centre mainly on regularity and accountability. The present South African financial system is controlled by a Central Bank, the South African Reserve Bank, which was established in 1920 and has a

According to a regional survey on Africa South of the Sahara 1994, p.801, it is in mineral deposits, though, that South Africa's greatest wealth lies. The discovery of, first, diamonds and then, more importantly, gold during the latter part of the 19th century is the basis of the country's modern economic development. A huge complex of heavy and light industry, based initially on the gold mining industry, has grown up in the interior. In fact, the economic shape of modern South Africa began to take form with the expansion of the mining industry. By the early 1880s diamonds made up 40 percent of the country's exports, and by the turn of the century gold and diamonds accounted for about 65 percent of total exports, which had more than quadrupled in the preceding 30 years.

TABLE 20: The distribution of mine workers in 1990

COAL MINES	103,304
GOLD MINES	484,738
OTHER MINES	127,128
TOTAL	715,170

Source: Race Relations Survey 1991-92, pp.232-39.

On the eve of World War I, mining represented 27 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and South Africa accounted for nearly 50 percent of the world's gold production (Table 21). After the second World War, gold accounted for about 80 % of South Africa's mineral production in 1946 but the proportion had fallen to only 50 % by 1990. South Africa's share in world gold production declined from 70% in 1980 to 37% in 1989, owing to a fall in the average grade of ore mined and an increase in output in other parts in the world.

Meanwhile, South Africa had many economic assets, as Duignan and Gann have pointed out. The gold industry provided the country with a ready export that could be easily taxed to provide indirect support for agriculture and other industries. The country possessed a stable system of government and administration, a substantial reservoir of technical skills, a solid

According to Nicoli Nattrass, government revenue constituted about 30 percent of GDP. This was high compared to other developing countries. About half of the revenue raised by the government came from indirect taxes such as VAT, customs and excise, etc...In the 1991/2 budget, VAT was introduced (taking effect in September 1991) with minimal exceptions. Because covers items of food previously exempt under the old system, it was regressive in that the poor suffered most from its introduction. The rest of government revenue came from direct taxation, mainly on individuals and companies. Tax revenue from companies in all sectors of the economy (including mining) fell from 36 percent of total revenue in 1980/1 to 19 percent in 1989/90.

Table 19 : Comparative Tax Rates

Country	Per. Tax Rates	Comp. Tax Rates
SWEDEN	20	52
USA	28	40
UK	40	35
JAPAN	50	51
GREECE	50	46
SPAIN	56	35
GERMANY	53	50
TURKEY	50	46
SOUTH AFRICA	43*	48*

* As of the 1991/2 budget, the top tax rates have been reduced from 44 to 43 for personal and from 50 to 48 for companies.

Source: N. Nattrass, Profits and Wage, Penguin Form Series, 1992:41.

However, despite this heavy rate of taxation, businesses in South Africa have been remarkably good at combining the available deductions - designed to encourage activities such as investment - in ways which eliminate their tax liability.

important index of the extractive capability and includes the size of markets, the population and their purchasing power, as seen in the previous chapter. If the economy is balanced, with multiple products and an industrial base, it is less likely to be exposed to the vicissitudes of international economic changes than is a monocrop, non-industrialized economy.

Following Almond and Powell (1966:195), we should suggest that as the extractive capability of a political system refers to the range of system performance in drawing material and human resources from the domestic and international environments, the capability to obtain such resources underlies the possibilities of attaining various goals for the system and the society. Thus, in dealing with the extractive capacity we should want (1) to consider the amount of resources which flows into the government at various levels; (2) to know what means are used to obtain the extractions. Are there threats of force and coercion, with armed bands accompanying the tax collectors?; (3) to look to the structures and procedures of extraction in analyzing the extractive capability. Does the system rely on an efficient bureaucracy, capable of continuous, equitable, and effective activities over long periods of time? Or does it rely on "tax farmers" who keep all they can get after the central government has been paid a particular amount?; (4) in some cases like those of South Africa and Zaire, it is useful to probe even deeper in explicating the basic extractive resources. For example, South Africa is largely dependent on gold and diamonds while Zaire depends mainly on copper, cobalt, and relatively on diamonds.

In the South African case, it should be noted that natural resources have given to the country its ability to pursue its major internal and external goals. According to analysts the South African economy has shown strong growth rates at times and could enjoy excellent expansion. South Africa is the most highly developed and the only significant industrial power in sub-Saharan Africa. It constructs huge harbors, coal-to-oil plants, super highways, and highrise buildings. Thanks in part to gold and diamonds, South Africa can buy whatever technology it needs from advanced countries. It maintains a balanced economy with an extensive physical infrastructure and has ample capital for investment.

In fiscal terms, it should be noted that South Africa enjoyed a high rate of taxation, especially company tax rate which was amongst the highest in the world (see Table 19).

for anyone to attempt to persuade a worker, by offering higher wages, to break his contract. The famous 1913 Land Act not only restricted black access to land but also introduced strict measures against "squatting" on white farms, in order to increase the supply of cheap black labour. This exacerbated the steady impoverishment of the black peasantry and gave rise to a growing black proletariat, as S. Terreblanche and Nicoli Nattrass have expressed (1990:8).

All these Acts and many others were intensified by the victory of the National Party, representing militant Afrikanerdom. South Africa's already highly regulated and segregated system was soon further strengthened. As expected, its program for reshaping the economy and the society was based on racial classification and separation in all aspects of life in South Africa. New discriminatory laws were added to the existing arsenal; the bureaucracy and parastatal sector was enlarged in order to generate Afrikaner employment opportunities, and a variety of welfare projects were launched to redistribute wealth and uplift the poor white population.

4.1.2. The Extractive Capability:

In order to determine South Africa's and Zaire's capacities to attain their goals, the extractive capability will be appraised, according to Potholm (1970:15-17), in a variety of ways including: (1) the size of a country's population and its inherent richness, seen as a factor in a realistic formation of those goals. In general, the larger, healthier, more educated and highly organized the population, the more powerful will be that country. However, if the population of a country is often on the brink of starvation, illiterate and ill, the political system in question simply will not have the same opportunity to utilize that population. (2) The development by the political system of an extractive apparatus, or bureaucracy, not only to achieve the control of its population, but to enrich it as well. In terms of human resources, the ability of a political system to insure this task is an index of its extractive capability. (3) The ways in which the political system is able to employ its population provides a useful point of departure for examining the ability of that system to extract the effort and wealth necessary to achieve this goal, but also to develop its natural resources. (4) The percentage of taxes assessed compared to the percentage of taxes collected and the amount of force necessary to insure collection. (5) The economic structure of a political system is also an

In South Africa, as illustrated by Potholm, the crime rates may help significantly in ascertaining the regulative capacity. Since the early 1960s especially, the government was content to tolerate a high incidence of crime in the African urban areas. This might be an indication of a low regulative capability and a sign of serious difficulty. Yet, in terms of the maintenance of the political system in existence at that time a high rate of civil crime may have been beneficial: it helped to sublimate African frustration with the situation, turning it away from political avenues and providing a lucrative outlet; it encouraged a variety of societal groups such as Indians, Chinese and Malays to look to the Europeans authorities for protection; and it increased the willingness of Europeans to accept increasingly repressive measures against the African.

Moreover, the police increasingly became a law unto themselves; a process aided by the State of Emergency which exonerated police from civil or criminal prosecution for acts of violence and criminality, provided they were carried out in "good faith", as stated by Cawthra. Even so, the number of police convicted of serious offences was alarmingly high. Between 1988 and 1991, 74 were convicted of murder, 148 of culpable homicide and 1,652 assault (Cawthra, *op.cit.*, p.2).

To sum up, the South African Police (SAP), according to Cawthra, has been cast as the arch-villain in the struggle against apartheid. Today, as South Africans attempt to build a new non-racial society, the force throws its shadow across the process of political transformation. The transition from apartheid to democracy has been threatened more than once by police and military involvement in political killing, but, without effective policing, democracy itself is impossible. The process of change depends on a climate of laws and order and free political competition: in the absence of external armed intervention, it will be largely up to the SAP to ensure this.

Economically, the political system of South Africa exhibits a strong regulative capacity. Between 1910 and 1922, a flood of racially repressive legislation which undermined the economic position of blacks was introduced, as we have seen. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 laid the basis for the statutory colour bar in the workplace, and the 1911 Black Labour Regulations Act made it an offence for a black miner to break his employment contract or

The police share of state spending, which accounted for over 4 per cent in 1960, had dropped to just over 2 per cent in the early 1980, compared to around 15 per cent allocated to the SADF. During the 1980s, however, a perceived increase in domestic threats moved the state to redress this imbalance. Under De Klerk, the police have been pampered: an increase of over 50 per cent in 1991/2 and 22 per cent in 1992/3 pushed police expenditure to R 5,600 million, accounting for five per cent of the state budget. These trends have continued since the 1994 elections.

The absolute size of the police force has increased nearly fourfold since 1960. There were 72,000 members of the police at the end of the 1970s and no more 100,000 in the early 1990s. 120,000 by 1993, according to Cawthra.

Briefly, the Army and the Police forces are used in South Africa as well as in Zaire as oppressive arms to regulate the behaviour of the masses who were challenging the security of the state internally as well as externally. In South Africa particularly, the armed struggles launched by African nationalists in 1960s further militarised and politicised the SAP, a process accelerated by its role in suppressing mass rebellions like the 1976 Soweto uprisings. By the 1980s the state had adopted a "Total Strategy" in which all aspects of policy were subjugated to the security imperative, and government was dominated by what Cawthra calls military and policy "securocrats".

Meanwhile, periodic political massacres were but one reflection of the readiness of SAP to revert to the power of the gun rather than persevering with the power of persuasion in their day-to-day operations. Cawthra noted that in the early 1970s, South Africa's police killed an average of 84 people a year - twice the rate of police killings in the USA. The killing rate increased dramatically after the 1976 Soweto uprisings. The annual tally ranged from a low of 163 in 1979 to 763 in 1985; in that year another 2,500 people were wounded in police action. The overwhelming majority of those killed and injured have been black (only three of those killed in 1985, for instance, were white). To those figures must be added, in most years, additions to the mounting toll of deaths of people in police custody.

but by the end of the eighties, the influence of the army declined, especially on the expenditure side. Current figures (*African Security Review*, 4,4,1995:8)¹²² show that whereas South Africa spent 4,3% of its GDP on defence in 1989, by 1993 this had shrunk to 2,6% and by 1995/96 it was estimated to be about 2,2% (10,535,000). The global national average is between 4,5 and 5 per cent. Defence spending as a percentage of government expenditure was only 9,8% of the total budget in 1992 (down from 16,3% in 1989), while economic services received 13,4%, education 21%, and social services 23,3%. These cuts were achieved through the disbanding or scaling down of various former South African Defence Force (SADF) units, the closure of military bases; the reduction in national service from two to one years and the eventual replacement of conscription by a volunteer system.

According to the official South African Yearbook (1979) as well as to Gavin Cawthra (1993), the South African Police (SAP) before 1994 was a "semi-military organization constituted on a national basis". The SAP though, normally, operate within the framework of the law, even if the law has given them extraordinary powers and paved the way for extra-legal operations. One of their main jobs as in all societies, was to enforce the laws of the land, and they worked in tandem with the courts and civil administration. Their functions were the preservation of internal security and law and order, criminal investigation, and crime prevention.

Previously the dominant security apparatus of the state, the relative importance of the SAP declined in the 1980s while that of the military increased. This led Cawthra to point out that during the 1970s the SAP was neglected as resources were poured into the SADF. Nevertheless, they played a crucial role in the preservation of the system of apartheid. The political tasks of the police were overlaid with military imperatives. Between 1966 and 1990 the SAP waged war against the liberation movements fighting for the independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia and for freedom in South Africa, notes Cawthra (1993:2). The militarized nature of the force was reflected in its rank structures, its equipment and training.

¹²² see *African Security Review*", working paper series, vol.4, n°4, 1995, p.8.

- ❶ The Courts and Prisons, and
- ❷ The Security apparatuses of the Bantustans (armies, police forces, intelligence services, courts and prisons).

The period since the mid-1970s and particularly since P.W. Botha's accession to the premiership in 1978, witnessed a rapid and extensive militarisation of the state. This situation was partly a consequence of the rapid expansion of military forces in response to the advancing liberation struggle. Figures show that between 1959-60 and 1977-8 the defence budget increased by over 1000 % from R 40 million to R 1,654 million. Under Botha's premiership, it nearly doubled again between 1978-9 and 1982-3 to reach R 2,688 million. As a percentage of the GNP, military spending rose from 0.75 % in 1960, to roughly 5 % in the 1980s. A intensive effort to expand its size and its total strength was embarked upon.

TABLE 18: Estimated strength of the Defence Force:

	1960	1967	1974	1977	1979
Permanent Force	11500	13000	21500	28000	4000
Nat.servicemen	10000	23000	26000	27000	60000
Citizen Force	2000	30000	120000	180000	230000
Commandos	48500	75000	90000	120000	150000
Civilian Employ.	6000	8000	11500	12500	14000
TOTAL	78000	154000	269000	367000	494000
Standing Operational Force	11500	42000	47500	105000	180000

SOURCE: "The Apartheid War Machine" (London, International Defense and Aid Fund, 1980); R. Leonard, "South Africa at War", 1985:108.

those laws. It should be pointed out that in pursuit of state building, the South African political elite needed new structures and organizations designed to "penetrate" the society in order to regulate behavior in it and draw a larger volume of resources from it. This process, note Almond and Powell, is associated with significant increases in the regulative and extractive capabilities of the political system, with the development of a centralized and penetrative bureaucracy related to the increase in these capabilities, and with the development of attitudes of obedience and compliance in the population which are associated with the emergence of such a bureaucracy (1966:35).

In most cases, the conduct of regulation was carried out by the police force, the army and other specialized forces. Generally, regulation was performed in terms of and limited by certain procedures which protected the individual as long as he stayed within the clearly defined boundaries of the law. This means that the style of regulation is legal rather than customary or arbitrary. The focus of this section will lie on those particular forces, as part of the regulative capability.

While the police force had been substantially improved, in terms of quality and training of manpower, and numbers since the establishment of the South African Special Branch which had the special task to combat "subversive" organizations; the army, too, had been expanded and upgraded with a shift in emphasis from international (World Wars I and II) to internal concerns (see Table 18).

It should be noted that the apartheid system depended for its continued existence on a high level of repression, both to enforce the wide range of regulations and controls over the exploited and oppressed masses and to respond to the growing challenge posed by the advancing liberation struggle, as argued by Rob Davies *et al.* (1984:178-79). The principle repressive apparatuses of the apartheid state included:

- ☐ The Military: the South African Defence Force (SADF);
- ☐ The Police, including the Security Police;
- ☐ The National Intelligence Service (NIS), successor to the Bureau of State Security (BOSS);

plunge their roots deeply throughout the history of South Africa, and the post-1948 laws often merely legalized existing custom. "Native reserves" were set up in the 1840's, codified and expanded in the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. Acts and regulations regarding urban migration and political activities for non-Europeans existed prior to World War II. The systematic application of apartheid, however, awaited the Population Registration Act of 1950 and the complete classification of all persons in South Africa in a National Register on the basis of appearance, general acceptance, and repute or association.

With the division of South Africa into "racial" groups and the setting-up of areas, the process of regulation was further enhanced by the Native Act of 1952 (Abolition of passes and Coordination of Documents), which instituted a new process of internal control.

Meanwhile the Police had gained considerable power and their enforcement of existing laws had taken on new dimensions. The Public Safety Act of 1953 increased the ease with which police could be granted emergency powers. Through the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act (1955) the police gained the right to dispense with search warrants if their procurement would result in the escape of the suspect. The General Law Amendment Acts of 1962, 1963 and 1964, contained the most significant regulatory statutes like those contained in the "Sabotage" and "No-Trial" Acts, which enabled the government to declare a state of emergency almost at will, provide for arrest without a warrant, indefinite detention without charge, and imprisonment without trial for individuals who had served a jail sentence for political crimes. Sabotage had been further categorized as any attempt to encourage social or political change and provided for a variety of punishments ranging from banishment and banning, house-arrest, confiscation of property, and imprisonment to capital punishment. In 1967, over 750 persons were banned in South Africa (Horrel, 1967) and 1439 were arrested and jailed for "political" crimes, according to figures given by then Prime Minister Vorster in an interview (Drury, 1968:416).

These laws taken together with other provisions have given the South African political system wide latitude in insuring conformity of behavior and in regulating most of the political activities of its citizens. Significant was the ability of the internal security forces to enforce

control the flows of cheap labour required by different sectors of the economy, embark upon a programme of secondary industrialisation, and incorporate an enfranchised white labour aristocracy (Lodge, 1996).

In comparison with the rest of Africa, the capacity of the South African state is very impressive. As outlined by Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann (1986:283), South Africa is the only modern, capable state in sub-Saharan Africa. Most importantly, before 1994, South Africa had become both an oppressively interventionist state and by far the most extensive and comprehensive welfare state in Africa. In these characteristics, South Africa is essentially modern and comparable, not to black states, but to semi-industrialized countries in the world. This implies that, contrary to popular beliefs, South Africa is neither rich nor highly developed. Nevertheless, its capacity for effective rule is not equaled by any black-ruled state on the continent, where the state is often ineffective and is run by what scholars term "predatory elites", as seen in Zaire. In South Africa the state machinery works and the state effectively enforces its laws, can provide goods and services.

Early studies have shown that South Africa is an excellent example of the importance of examining in detail the various capabilities of its political system. Among the chief influences on this paper has been the work of Christian P. Potholm (1970) who has suggested that "only through such an examination it is possible to explain the ease with which the small, ethnocentric, racial minority of South Africa was able to maintain its privileged position" and bring about the spectacular development of the country.

4.1.1. The Regulative Capability:

The regulative function of the South African political system is impressive. A look at the legal structure and its enforcement, information regulation, or political and economic controls leads to the conclusion that the central political authority is extremely powerful. For example the *legal framework* of apartheid was both extensive and sophisticated.

As seen in previous chapters, racial segregation, European domination, and strict law enforcement did not originate with the coming to power of the Nationalists in 1948. They

CHAPTER ONE:

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SYSTEM

Considerable agreement exists among African analysts regarding the role of the South African state in the institutionalization process of public power and economic development. This role was so significant that currently South Africa appears as a strong or hard state politically and economically. A strong state is viewed as a state "capable of maintaining social order and devising and implementing diverse policies" (Sandbrook 1986:327). This implies the notion of autonomy from society. Quoting Jowitt, Zaki Ergas notes that "Jowitt's metaphor of the state as a castle surrounded by a moat is useful in this respect. In such a model the state has optimal autonomy, since the drawbridge is lowered only to permit the "sovereign" (in Hobbesian's term) to collect taxes, wage war and possibly hunt deer (Ergas, 1985:6).

As an autonomous actor, the South African state, in Rothchild's terms, is characterized by its capacity for action, its ability to accumulate power in executive or bureaucratic hands, and a perception of corporate interests which distinguishes it from society at large. More important is that, Rothchild writes, the state's ability to distance itself from domestic (and international) class and ethnic interests gives public officials room to overpower or ignore some of the less pressing interest group demands and to expand their administrative functions and powers.

In the same vein, number of scholars have pointed out that until the 1980s, though, the South African state had a well demonstrated capacity for removing itself from the influence of specific social classes. This has been explained by Yudelman as being caused by relative strength of a "legitimation imperative" arising from the institution of democratic politics (for whites) before the creation of an industrial society. This help to account for the state's extraordinary attentiveness to the needs of farmers until recent decades and the ambiguities in its relationship with big business. In its early development, revenues derived from gold-mining taxation enabled it to develop the bureaucratic apparatus needed to channel and

benefit from differential access to employment as well. For illustration, we will just take the percentage of total income received, as stressed in table 26.

TABLE 26: Measures of income distribution, 1917-1985.

Year	White	Coloured	Asian	African	Total	%
1917	75	na	na	na	25	100
1924	75.2	5.3	1.6	17.9	24.8	100
1936	75.9	4.5	1.9	18.7	25.1	100
1946	73.6	4.3	1.9	20.2	26.1	100
1956	72.6	5.2	2.1	20.1	27.4	100
1960	72.3	5	1.9	20.8	27.7	100
1970	71.9	5.9	2.2	20	28.1	100
1980	60.8	7.4	2.9	28.9	39.2	100
1985	56.8	7.8	3.1	32.3	43.2	100

na = *not available*.

Source: S.R.Lewis,Jr., 1990:39.

According to Katzen, despite an improvement in the racial distribution of personal income in recent years, income remains very unevenly distributed in South Africa. An estimate of the Gini Coefficient (index of income inequality) for South Africa in 1985 puts it at 0.64 - one of the highest in the world. It was estimated in 1988 that the white population received about 54% of total personal income, while Africans received only 36%.

The same pattern is reflected in the difference in earnings between Whites and Africans, broadly reflecting the differential between skilled and unskilled wage rates. In 1988 the differential in earnings between Whites and Africans in the manufacturing sector was 3.5:1, rising to 5:1 in mining and quarrying. For Mc Grath (1990:94), the degree of inequality in South Africa's distribution was revealed when the Gini (1975) of 0.68 for South Africa was

TABLE 25: Relative wages in South African gold mines, 1911-1985.

Real Earnings in 1986 Prices (current rand)			White/African
Year	White	African	Ratio
1911	666	57	11.7:1
1916	709	59	12.0:1
1921	992	66	15.0:1
1926	753	67	11.2:1
1931	753	66	11.3:1
1936	786	68	11.5:1
1941	848	70	12.1:1
1946	1106	87	12.7:1
1951	1607	109	14.7:1
1956	2046	132	15.5:1
1961	2478	146	17.0:1
1966	3216	183	17.6:1
1970	4545	227	20.0:1
1975	7629	889	8.6:1
1980	12419	2068	6.0:1
1985	24564	4320	5.7:1

Source: S.R.LEWIS, Jr., "The Economics of Apartheid", Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990, p.176.

Moving from wages to total income as the base of comparison, one may note that the differentials become considerably wider; physical and financial asset ownership is even more highly concentrated in white hands than is the distribution of education and skills; Whites

Figures from the Department of Mines (*Race Relations Survey 1980-81*) show that in 1979, there were approximately 900 mines in South Africa employing 800,000 people and paying R 3,440 m in salaries.

On the migrant worker side, although influx control was abolished in 1986 the incidence of migrancy continued to remain high in many industries including mining. From 1986 to 1990 the average number of migrants employed on gold coal mines affiliated to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, fluctuated by less than 15 % on each side of the 500,000 mark.

Research conducted by the South African Institute of Race Relations, published in 1991, suggested that employment of foreign migrants on the mines would continue to decline. According to the Annual Report of the Department of Mineral and Foreign Affairs, the average number of persons employed on all mines in South Africa during 1990 was 715,170 (see Table 20), compared with 740,804 in 1989. The 1990 figures represented a decrease of 13 % on the 1980 employment figure, which was 824,432. The reduction in employment on the mines is attributed to the rationalisation of labour on the gold mines resulting from the persistently low gold price.

Increasing inequalities of income offers the best example of disproportionality in the allocation of rewards. The easiest to do and to understand are those based on wage comparisons in the same industry or geographic area. In his study on the "Economics of Apartheid", Lewis find that the longest series available on relative wage rates is for gold mining, an industry of fundamental political and economic importance. Data from Tables 25 and 26 tells the story.

TABLE 23: The employment of SADCC citizens in South Africa

Country	1983	1984	1986 (30 June)
Angola	68	48	22
Botswana	25963	26433	28244
Lesotho	145797	138443	138193
Malawi	29612	29268	31411
Mozambique	61218	60407	73186
Swaziland	16773	16823	21914
Zambia	743	1274	2421
Zimbabwe	7742	7492	7304
Other	70105	71072	75430
TOTAL	358021	351260	378125

Source: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986.

One can note that gold mining dominates the mining sector, and in 1986, 533,656 workers of the black labour force were employed in the mines and perhaps another million labourers from these countries are employed in South Africa illegally. In 1986, 225,000 Mozambicans were employed illegally.

TABLE 24: SADCC Citizens in South African gold mines.

Measure	1896-1898	1906	1926	1946	1966	1975	1985
Number (000)	35	62	119	179	253	220	195
As % of Black Workers	64.6	77.1	58.7	58.7	66	68.4	43.2

Sources: Stephen R. Lewis, Jr, "The Economics Of Apartheid", 1990, p.87.

4.1.3. The Distributive Capacity:

In analyzing the distributive capability of a political system we are concerned with the basis of allocation. Are the rewards of the system allocated on the basis of talent, merit and service or on the basis of ascription? Are certain groups excluded or do others obtain a disproportionate share of rewards? The stumbling block is found in the area of human resources where there are indications of diminished capability. Quantitatively and qualitatively, rewards in South Africa are distributed largely on the basis of race. Studies show that because of discriminatory practices in education and access to skilled jobs, the white population has been drawn more rapidly into the high-income modern-sector jobs, while most of the black population has been relegated to the lower-paid unskilled and semiskilled positions. To enhance and preserve white welfare and security, South Africa's rulers restricted black access to land, education, training, and credit; limited the movement of workers and their families

The discovery of diamonds and gold gave the economic shape of modern South Africa and initiated an economic revolution. The resulting labour shortage led to the importation of Indian workers to Natal and the flow of Africans from neighbouring countries to work in South Africa, principally in the mines but also in other sectors.

With that latter category South Africa became of fundamental economic importance to the rest of the region. In 1980, the nine independent countries of the region - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). According to Stephen R. Lewis, Jr (1990:87), the employment of black workers from Southern Africa has been substantial and important to the economies of the Southern countries and South Africa since the beginning of the diamond and gold mining industry in South Africa. While the exact number of black workers from neighbouring countries employed in South Africa is difficult to establish, officially, 350,000 citizens from these countries have had recorded contract employment in South Africa, as shown in table 23.

to produce 25,000 barrels a day of petrol and diesel for 30 years (*Africa Review* 1995:179-80, 18th ed.)

The more serious flaw is the waste of human resources. Before and even after the April 1994 elections, because three-quarters of the population was poorly nourished, inadequately educated, and denied social, economic, or political advancement beyond certain rudimentary levels, there is an enormous waste of talent, as observed by the UN Economic Commission for Africa in 1963 and UNESCO in 1967. Besides, just as it is impossible to compute the human suffering caused by apartheid, so it is extremely difficult to even estimate the loss of talent, time, and treasure, both in terms of maintaining apartheid and in terms of its effects, Potholm has suggested. Moreover, he argues that in many ways, of course, this is the supreme irony and tragedy of South Africa. The land is rich enough, the population dynamic enough, and the industrial base already extensive enough to support the entire population at a level that would warrant the envy of most of the world.

One other measure of the South African state's extractive capacity was its ability to conscript military personnel from the white population. As we have seen this was quite impressive through much of the apartheid era. By 1972 the annual intake of national servicemen had increased to 26,357 (Frankel, 1984:91). By 1986 two thirds of the SADF's mobilized strength was depended on conscription. An increasing number of whites were failing to respond their call ups, 7589 in 1985 as compared to 1536 in 1982, underscored the government's vulnerability in this sphere (Baynham, 1987:123).

To sum up, on balance, the extractive capability is strong and powerful, and reasonably secure. During the apartheid era it gave the regime wide latitude in the area of rewards, paid the costs of internal security, and together with South Africa's strategic position astride the world's trade routes, gave it a good deal of leverage in the international community.

the expansion of manufacturing from relative insignificance in 1910 is, without doubt, the most important structural change to have taken place in the South African economy.

Yet, the South African extractive capacity is not without flaws. The lack of indigenous oil deposits is a major weakness for the country. From the early 1960s, South Africa took steps to reduce her reliance on sources that could be eliminated through boycotts and sanctions. Thus the Arab oil-exporting countries imposed an oil embargo on South Africa in 1973. The effectiveness of this measure increased following the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, who had been South Africa's major oil supplier, Lewis says. According to him, the oil embargo has probably been the costliest international action against South Africa to date. Pressure for an oil boycott, as well as South African planning to respond to it, existed for a long time. Since the boycott began, South Africa was not deprived of oil, but it had to pay substantial premiums, particularly in the tight oil markets of 1979-1982.

The South African government responded to the boycott in several ways: stockpiling of crude oil; conservation; substitution of other energy sources for oil; increased exploration for oil and gas; and construction of the SASOL coal conversion plants, which make liquid fuels from coal an expensive process, but one which already yields 80 million gallons a year. The boycott has involved costs to the South African economy beyond the higher price of oil in the international market.

On the other side, the decisions forced on South Africa by the oil boycott have resulted not only in higher costs. But the program to extract oil from coal through SASOL has pushed South Africa into international leadership in coal conversion technology; and the forced march into greater self-sufficiency has had positive economic spinoffs. Policy actions by the government effectively mitigated both the economic costs and the disruption of the oil embargo.

However, the virtual absence of indigenous oil reserves means the country is still heavily dependent on imports of petroleum products, particularly diesel, although SASOL has somewhat reduced this dependency by expanding its oil-from-coal conversion programme. Meanwhile, large gas reserves have been discovered off the southern Cape coast sufficient

normally exported. These products normally account for about one-third of total export earnings.

Table 22 shows that agriculture has declined as a share of GDP and presently accounts for only about 5%, which is low by the standards of upper-middle-income economies.

TABLE 22: Percentage distribution of GDP by sector, 1911-1985

Year	Agriculture	Mining	Industry	All over	Total
1911-12	17.4	27.1	6.7	48.8	100
1924-25	19.9	17.4	12.4	50.3	100
1932-33	12.2	24.3	13.6	49.9	100
1938-39	12.6	20.7	17.7	49.0	100
1946	13.0	11.9	21.3	53.9	100
1950	17.8	13.3	22.9	46.0	100
1960	12.3	13.7	26.0	47.9	100
1970	8.1	10.0	30.0	51.8	100
1980	7.0	22.0	28.7	42.4	100
1985	5.2	16.1	29.5	49.1	100

Source: *"The Economics of Apartheid"*, S.R.Lewis, Jr., 1990:25.

We can note that the contribution to national income of the three main productive sectors - manufacturing, mining and agriculture - has changed markedly over the years. In 1911/12 mining contributed 27.1% of net domestic product, agriculture 17.4% and manufacturing 6.7%. Manufacturing steadily increased its relative position, overtaking mining as the leading sector during the Second World War. By 1992, manufacturing contributed 24.9 of GDP at factor cost, mining and quarrying 9.6% and agriculture only 3.9%. As Katzen has claimed,

aggravating effect of the disturbances following the Soweto events in June 1976 and the unsettled situation in countries surrounding South Africa. This had had a particularly discouraging effect on foreign investment in South Africa, which in the past had played a major role in maintaining a high rate of growth.

However, Katzen observes, in 1979, the economy grew significantly, at a real growth rate of 4.2%, and 8% in 1980, as the high price of gold and other export commodities compensated for the lack of foreign capital. But as in the 1970s, growth was slower in the 1980s, averaging only 1.4% per annum in real terms over the decade. Factors that contributed to this contra-performance included unfavourable commodities prices in international markets - in particular a weakening of the price of gold; drought in 1983 and 1984; from the mid-1980s, the damaging effect of political instability in causing a net outflow of foreign investment and low overall investment in the economy; also the effect of sanctions on foreign trade in some markets such as coal exports (*Africa South of the Sahara* 1994:806).

The third sector of the South African economy is agriculture. South Africa's agricultural base, however, is not impressive, as analysts have observed. The vagaries of climate and unstable world prices are largely responsible for this. One half of its total area is near-desert, and 86% of it is semi-arid. Only 6% is under cultivation, and that portion is characterized by poor soil and low yields. Soil erosion and a lack of dependable rainfall likewise contribute to low yields. In de Kiewiet's terms, "agriculture in South Africa is poor and precarious. Much of it is beyond the reach of modern science and technical progress. The expenditure and effort required to overcome many of its handicaps are too great to be profitable. Indeed, South Africa is not an agricultural country. It has no natural advantages which, by the help of science and organization, could win for its agricultural products a truly commanding position in the markets of the world" (de Kiewiet, 1957:259).

Despite these thorny problems and the declining of this sector, Katzen states that agricultural products continue to feature prominently in South African exports and the country remains a net food exporter. Depending on the volume of output, a large percentage of the local production of wool, maize, sugar, groundnuts, tobacco, citrus and deciduous fruits is

export markets, exports increased significantly, with shipments of 50.1m. tons earning R4,300m. in foreign exchange.

Unlike its counterparts in Zaire and in the rest of Africa, South Africa's manufacturing industry is the largest sector of the national economy, measured in terms of contribution to GDP. In 1991, it contributed R66,567m. to GDP at factor cost, employing 1,218,145 workers. The mining industry, with the exception of a limited number of industries servicing it, did not, at first, stimulate local manufacturing to any extent and little protection was offered to local manufacturers. It was only in 1925 that an active policy of protecting local industry was first adopted. As a consequence, industry grew significantly in the latter half of the 1920s. That period also saw the foundation of heavy industry under state auspices, with the establishment of the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa (ISCOR) in 1928.

In the post-war period the manufacturing sectors expanded rapidly - employment grew by 50 percent in six years - in response to the wartime isolation of southern Africa from sources of supply in Europe, notes Lewis. By 1945 GDP in industry, broadly defined, exceeded that of mining by nearly 50 percent and of agriculture by more than 60 percent. South Africa came out of the war in a strong financial position, holding substantial foreign exchange reserves. The government had aided investment by allowing for a free-market system in some sectors while insuring control by substantial investment and participation in the commanding heights of the economy: railroad, airline, fuel, fertilizer, telecommunications, hydroelectric, and iron and steel industries.

The expansion trend increased in 1960 with rapid industrial progress. Its contribution to GDP, at factor cost, increased by an average of 10.2% per annum between 1961-70, the physical volume of production by 8.5% per annum and employment by 6.1% per annum, indicating increases in productivity over the same period. Table 10 illustrates the percentage distribution of GDP by sector during the period 1911-1985. Finally, real growth was much slower in the 1970s, with the physical volume of production increasing by an average of only 2.9% per annum, while employment grew by 2.6% annually. Among the main reasons to explain this relatively poor performance, one can note the recession of 1975-77 followed by the instability of the world economy in this period. But mention must also be made of the

companies was owned by foreigners. The virtual exclusion of Afrikaners from the gold and diamond mining industries led to strong anti-British and anti-semitic feelings. As a result, the tension between Boer and Briton, which had been present from the earliest days of British settlement in the Cape, grew with the extension of British influence in the gold mining industry in the Transvaal. The outcome was the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

In other words, diamonds and gold transformed the country from an agricultural and trading backwater to an economy of some organization. They also set in motion the basic forces - economic, legal, demographic, and political - that have governed the development of modern South Africa ever since.

Meanwhile, the output of other minerals rapidly gained in importance since the second World War. Thus there has been a great expansion in the output of uranium, platinum, nickel, copper, coal, antimony, diamonds, vanadium, asbestos, iron ore, fluorspar, chromium, manganese and limestone, to name only the most important. These minerals are prominent in South Africa's exports, earning R10,177m. in 1990. Mineral exports, including gold, were valued at R28,998m. in 1990, equivalent to 48 % of total exports (gold was equivalent to 65% of mineral exports). Diamonds, traditionally the country's second most important export commodity have also been overtaken by coal in recent years. Production has been in decline since 1987, when 8.6m. carats were mined. Output in 1988 declined to 8.42m. carats, recovering marginally to 9m. carats in 1989. Output in 1990 was 8.5m. carats; in 1991 production totalled 8.2m. carats and in 1992 10m. carats were mined.

Besides, the coal mining industry, which stagnated for many years because of low prices and slow growth, has acquired renewed vigour since the petroleum crisis. Coal exports have grown rapidly in recent years, helped by the opening of the new rail link and coal terminal at Richards Bay. Coal exports in 1986 were 45.5m. tons compared with 44.9m. tons in 1985, but earnings were down from R3,127m. to R3,069m. By 1987 coal exports were estimated to have fallen to 42.6m. tons, while the value of export fell to 2,294m. in 1987. Total production in 1986 was 175m. tons of coal, valued at R5,282m., employing 96,255 people. By 1991, with the recovery of international coal prices and the removal of economic sanctions by most of the countries which have traditionally been South Africa's major coal

infrastructure of banking and commercial undertakings, and efficient railways and ports (1986:321). Furthermore, industrial development expanded tremendously during World War II and its aftermath, when South Africa was forced to manufacture all manner of weaponry and civilian equipment. By 1945 manufacturing accounted for a larger portion of the GNP than any other economic pursuit; twenty years later, the share of manufacturing was larger than that of agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying combined. Unlike the rest of Africa, South Africa became capable of supplying the bulk of its investments from its domestic savings.

TABLE 21: Gold and diamonds production in the world

		Western		World	
R.S.A.	Production	RANK	%	RANK	%
Gold	20,000 T	1	62	1	50
Diamonds	365,000 Carats	2	27	2	24

Source: Chamber of Mines, August 1986.

Despite having given way to manufacturing as the leading sector, mining is still of great importance in the economy and gold still remains the heart of the country's economy. It is gold that has over the years, attracted foreign investment in large enough amounts to develop a physical infrastructure, stimulate subsidiary manufacturing, and provide for a favourable balance of trade.

Foreign capital, principally British, flowed in to finance the mining ventures - £ 145 million before World War I, or the equivalent of several billion dollars at today prices - as South Africa's fabulous mineral wealth made a dramatic impact on the consciousness of European and North American investors. A few large companies, which provided finance, management and technical skills for a number of individual mines, came to dominate the gold industry. Financial resources, control, and management of the mining houses was chiefly in the hands of English-speaking, notably Jewish, South Africans, although most of the stock in these

supervising the Bantu Community schools, the Government Bantu Schools, and those Missionary Schools still in existence. The entire purpose of this comprehensive program, wrote Potholm became clear when H. Verwoed put it quite simply:

"Education must train and teach people in accordance with the opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live. Good racial relations cannot exist where education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the native himself" (1970:125).

Despite the new curriculum designed "to arouse the pride of the Bantu in all that was good in their past", a 1962 UNESCO report on apartheid outlined that the South African education system was designed to perpetuate African occupations at the "menial" levels of society and to maintain and reinforce the status quo (ibid.)

Brief, as in the case of the family, the school contains a particular pattern of authoritative decision making to which all students are exposed. Participation in decision making at school can do something to make up for a lack of it at home - or can reinforce the previous patterns. This problem of participation and authority patterns is important at the adult as well as the primary level of education.

Besides the family and the school, there are several other important sources of attitude formation, such as peer groups or reference groups which play an important role in shaping values and orientations. Experiences in employment may also shape political orientations. The job and the formal and informal organizations built around it - the union, the social club, and the like - may be channels for the explicit communication of political information and beliefs. Participation in the process of collective bargaining or involvement with a strike can be a powerful socializing experience for worker and employer alike.

Another part of the participation process is political recruitment. The term refers to the function by means of which the roles of political systems are filled. Recruitment into political roles may be based on universalistic criteria or general criteria on the one hand, or particularistic criteria on the other. The recruitment function cannot be fully separated from the socialization. Recruitment from a particular group of society brings into political roles people with different propensities, interests, values, and attitudes. The selection of office

From this assertion, it could be argued that for any political system to operate effectively, there must be some level of agreement on the basic nature of politics, the general role of government in the society, and the legitimate goals of policy and participation. The question of changing and adapting the political culture bring social scientists to the "system maintenance and adaptation level of functions, and particularly to political socialization". As seen, political socialization is the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed. Through the performance of this function individuals are inducted into the political culture; their orientations toward political objects are formed. According to Almond and Powell, the family unit plays a significant role in this process. The latent and manifest influences inculcated at the early stages in life have a powerful and lasting influence. General attitudes by the family toward the political system can make a great impression on children..

Although the family unit is the first socialization structure encountered by the individual, we believe that the school structure is a second powerful influence in political socialization. Hence the importance we have allotted to the organization of schools and particular problems experienced in this sector in South Africa and Zaire. Studies in many countries without exception, as stressed by Almond and Powell, have found that educated persons were more aware of the impact of government on their lives, paid more attention to politics, had more information about political processes, and manifested a higher degree of political competence. This is presumably the effect both of manifest transmission of political knowledge, and of the development of general awareness of one's social environment and of experience participating in it (1966:67).

Furthermore, schools can also play an important role in shaping attitudes about the "rules of the political game", as the Apartheid state in South Africa has worked very hard to prevent the build up of African forces. Europeans were civically educated and could resist pressures on them to accept the mores of the system. The regulative aspects of the system reinforced the non-Europeans' lack of faith in their ability to change the political structure. Schools can bring an awareness of other values and circumstances, providing a basis for new political aspirations. They can reinforce affection for the political system, and can provide common symbols for the expressive response to the system. In South Africa, since the Bantu Education Act of 1953, the central government has taken over African education by

4.4. The Rejuvenative Capability:

The rejuvenative capability is closely connected with the symbolic capability of the system. It is mentioned here instead of the responsive capability which is very low in both countries. One can note that as authoritarian and repressive systems both South Africa and Zaire had suppressed demands coming from their societies and thus were unresponsive to demands coming from the international environment. Hence the quest for support to maintain their systems. As system maintenance, the rejuvenative process includes the processes of political socialization and recruitment which affect the internal efficiency and propensities of the system, and hence condition its performance. Thus, before examining the rejuvenative capability in South Africa and Zaire, we believe the moment opportune to elaborate extensively on it.

For scholars, while Potholm argues that political socialization is the process by which the members of a political system are civically educated and inculcated with the values of the system, Almond suggests that political socialization is the process by which political cultural perceptions and attitudes are acquired. The concept of political culture represents the "collective perceptions" of individuals as they attempt to understand the political institutions, processes, and formal beliefs of the political system within which they are located. In other words, political culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system. Further, it is the subjective realm which underlies and gives meaning to political actions.

According to Almond and Powell, such individual orientations involve several components, including (a) *cognitive orientations*, knowledge, accurate or otherwise, of political objects and beliefs; (b) *affective orientations*, feeling of attachment, involvement, rejection, and the like, about political objects; and (c) *evaluative orientations*, judgements and opinions about political objects, which usually involve applying value standards to political objects and contexts. Thus individual orientations toward any political object may be viewed in terms of these three dimensions, which are interrelated and may be combined in a variety of ways, even within the same individual as he considers various aspects of the political system (1966:50).

minister, with non-discriminatory provision of educational services for all" (The Buthelezi Commission's report of the education specialist working group, 1982:272).

Although the inequity has been reduced over the period 1975-1985 and the share of educational expenditure received by blacks has risen from 11 per cent in 1930 to over 25 per cent in 1970, it is still at an unacceptable level, particularly when coupled with the perceived inequalities in the standards of education of the black and white systems (Trotter, 1990:251-2).

Thus, it is clear that the African group (Blacks, Coloured, Indians) were almost excluded from the distributive process which, whether of land, wealth, or education, was inequitable. This led Potholm to argue that "the distributive capability is far more uneven and less impressive than either the regulative or extractive capability, although the economic rewards of the system probably, in the context of southern Africa, constituted a support for the political system".

Moreover, the inequitable distribution of the rewards available may well circumscribe the limits of political action, influence the process of goal selection, and, occasionally, threaten the very existence of the apartheid regime. As occurred in South Africa in the early sixties with the beginning of the armed struggle by the ANC's armed wing - Umkonto we Sizwe (MK) - after the failure of passive resistance.

Yet, Trotter states that the most recent available statistics on educational expenditure are those provided by the Institute of Race Relations which argues that the total expenditure budgeted, for all the education departments in South Africa for the year ending March 1988 was R 8133 million, distributed as follows:

TABLE 30: Educational Expenditure in South Africa, 1987-88

Department	Amount
Black Education in "white" areas	1.487.840
Self-governing states	1.116.427
Independent states (TBVC)	795.983
Coloureds Education	1.007.569
Indian Education	404.647
White Education	3.320.700
TOTAL	8.133.166

Source: Race Relations Survey, 1987, 88:150.

In the budget for 1992/93, education was allocated 21.0% of total projected expenditure by central government; of the planned expenditure on education in 1991/92, the education of blacks outside the "homelands" was to receive 43.6%, the education of whites 32.4%, coloured 17.3% and Indian 6.7%. Thus, all these facts indicate that the government was recognizing and beginning to address the problem of inequity in schooling expenditure, but there are still considerable differences in the provision of education for the different racial groups, and there is still a long way to go. The average black pupil was still receiving one fifth as much of the resources allocated to the average white. 58 per cent of the teachers in the black educational system and 38 per cent in coloured schools do not have a post-secondary qualification. Hence the necessity for "equal opportunity for education for every inhabitant irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex" (see The de Lange Committee Report, 1981, p.14) and "a need for a unified system of education under the direction of one

TABLE 29: School pupil numbers (in thousands) 1987, and forecasts for 2020.

Group	1987	2020
Blacks	6645	12401
Coloureds	837	778
Indians	237	228
Whites	1062	899

Source: Dostal, *"Note Book on Educational Trends and Perspectives"*, Stellenbosch, Institute for Futures Research, 1988:18.

However, in examining the educational system prior to 1985, one should note that despite segregationist laws in the sector, the apartheid government has shown significant interest in the improvement of black education. This was true on the expenditure side especially between the seventies and the eighties. As argued by George Trotter (1990:247-49), between 1975 and 1985, expenditure by all government authorities on all levels of education increased in current terms from R 1045 million to R 6563 million, or by a multiple of 6,3. The amounts spent on black education rose from R 165 million to R 2178 million, or by a multiple of 13,2. The white institutions, however, still received just over half of the funds in 1985. Fifty-eight per cent of all the expenditure went to the primary schools, and 41 per cent to the secondary schools.

The increase in expenditure per pupil over the decade in real terms for all groups, can be viewed in relation to inflation and the changes in pupil and student numbers. Figures demonstrate that the highest annual increase is that of blacks at 9 per cent, and the lowest for whites at 2 per cent; while increases for coloureds and Indians were 6 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. Even at the tertiary educational level, in comparing the groups, only blacks experienced an annual increase in expenditure per student (6,4 per cent) while the annual decreases for the other groups were 0,1 per cent for coloureds, 0,2 per cent for whites, and 4 per cent for Indians.

TABLE 29: School pupil numbers (in thousands) 1987, and forecasts for 2020.

Group	1987	2020
Blacks	6645	12401
Coloureds	837	778
Indians	237	228
Whites	1062	899

Source: Dostal, *"Note Book on Educational Trends and Perspectives"*, Stellenbosch, Institute for Futures Research, 1988:18.

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TABLE 28: Average annual rates of increase of student numbers, all tertiary institutions, 1975-85, 1985-87 and 1975-87.

Group	1975-85	1985-87	1975-1987
Blacks	876	1610	995
Coloureds	919	80	775
Indians	na*	na*	612
Whites	481	-480	315

* = *no available*. Source: N.Nattrass & E.Ardington, "The Political Economy of South Africa", 1990:245.

According to this source, over the entire 12 year period, the number of black students increased at a rate of almost 10 per cent per annum and whites at only 3 percent, while the coloured and Indian growth rates fell between these two extremes. Despite some change over the first decade in the annual increase in numbers in coloured tertiary education, the annual rate of increase in black students in tertiary education was irreversible and nearly doubled to 16 percent over the period 1985-87; the coloured student population hardly grew at all; and the number of white students fell at an annual average rate of nearly 5 percent.

Many factors explain this state of things especially the fact that several universities, including those traditionally regarded as "black" rapidly became non-racial. For Dostal, the future growth in the number of pupils will come from blacks, while coloured, Asian and white pupil numbers show a declining tendency over the long term as highlighted in Table 29 which forecasts pupil numbers for the year 2020 together with the totals for 1987.

2. Tertiary Level:					
		Africans	Whites	Coloureds	Asians
<u>University</u>					
Students:		110,130	157,432	19,575	21,035
Teachers:		615	8,620	267	309
<u>Training:</u>					
Students:		35,795	8,620	7,851	1,726
Teachers:		1,878	2,115	506	149
<u>Technical:</u>					
Students:		14,490	50,907	5,711	5,327
Teachers:		270	2,567	267	144
<u>Technikons:</u>					
Students:		24,228	53,795	6,942	5,864
Teachers:		28	1,975	93	123

Source: Department of National Education, Pretoria.

Thus, proportionally and absolutely, there were more Europeans being educated than Africans at every stage in the educational process (Table 27). The African in-school population falls away rapidly after the first few grades, for example, from 221,234 in standard 1 to 948 in standard 10. For the Year Book 1966, fifty-five thousand Europeans attend universities versus 956 Africans (RSA Year Book 1996:99-106). But current figures show that between 1975 and 1987, an interesting pattern of growth in the number of tertiary institutions has been revealed. Data from Table 28 show this trend.

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compared with the Gini coefficients for the developed western economies, which ranged between 0,35 and 0,40. The extent of inequality is however, highly dependent on the wide disparities that exist in the relative levels of income of the race groups.

As we have seen, the reason is simple. The objective of South African governments since the 1920s, especially since the National Party came to power, has been to eliminate the class of poor whites. The civilized labour policy and all its successors put a floor under white incomes at the expense of blacks.

In terms of land, the South African system has also rewarded whites well, albeit at the expense of "Natives". The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 added 7% of the area to that portion reserved for Africans, but this merely brought the total area set aside to 13%. The other 87% was reserved for the 20% of the population that was white. Land tenure was extremely inequitable and a major source of "Native" irritation.

In the educational area, the process of role allocation was likewise quantitatively and qualitatively uneven. Quantitatively, whereas European education was compulsory and free, for Africans it was neither. Whereas the government spent in the sixties \$240 per year on each European child, the figure for Africans was \$20. According to a United Nations' survey (UN Economic Commission, 1963:63) in the sixties, 99% of Europeans in the 7-15 age groups were in school, only 37% of Africans were.

Table 27: Education: number of pupils per group, 1991.

1. Primary and Secondary Levels:

	Africans	Whites	Coloureds	Asians
Teachers: Prim. + Sec. + Sp.	142163	63722	37590	12781
Pupils: Prim. + Sec. + Sp.	5.794,100	1.021,442	874315	255529

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CHAPTER TWO:

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ZAIRIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Literature on African sub-saharan politics has shown that instability has been a striking characteristic and black Africa's forty-odd states are among the weakest in the world. State institutions and organisations are less developed in the sub-saharan region than almost anywhere else. Political instability (as indicated by coups, plots, internal wars, and similar forms of violence) has been prevalent in the first two and-a-half decades during which the region gained independence from colonial rule (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986:258-80).

The Zairian state under Mobutu's rule was notorious for its massive and pervasive corruption, economic incompetence and gross mismanagement. Since gaining sovereignty in 1960 Zaire entered a phase of deep crisis almost immediately after independence and experienced sudden and drastic changes in government, brought about by mass demonstration, riots, rebellions and coups. The "soft democratic" government of the First Republic (1960-65) proved particularly vulnerable. This was followed by a cycle of revival and restoration from 1965 to 1973. But the more authoritarian regime that replaced it has been equally incapable of maintaining its hold on power. In 1974 the country fell into a new durable period of decay and regression. The ultimate consequences of this was the collapse of the Mobutu regime in mid-1997. This collapse is the outcome of maladministration, corruption and patrimonialism, as we have seen.

Zaire suffered from "a profound political and economic crisis which has resulted in the dramatic deterioration of the physical infrastructure of the country, there are shortages everywhere", the US Embassy in Kinshasa observed in September 1994 (Marek, *Africa* August 1995). In reality, the economic situation was so bad that a free market economy, as South Africa, will not work. What was working, despite its legacy of despair says, Young, was the parallel and shadow structure of the state, developed quietly by the society, the "rapid expansion in second economy". In Mac Gaffey's terms it meant here "an unmeasured and unrecorded activities that deprive the state of revenue or involve misuse of state position.

Greenberg says that "across a broad range of perspectives on South Africa, there was a presumption that the South African state was in reality an awesome combination of repressive structures, lording it over society and the African majority: the state was seen as repressive, unified of purpose, internally coherent, effective in pursuit of its ideological goals, and efficient in embodying and representing constituent interests".

In brief, the South African state is an independent political entity with definable interests, a huge bureaucracy, with a definite ideology or theory about itself, that may or may not, depending on the particular circumstances, coincide with the interests of business, labour, church, educational or other political interest groups. Although it is reasonably flexible in deploying its policy, it is subject to tensions and divisions within its own ranks.

Despite the limitations notably imposed by race relations, which have magnified in recent years, the South African state has considerable structural autonomy. It is the dominant authority throughout the regional and local level of the nation. State institutions wield substantive control over local level groupings and socio-political structures.

One can note that the "total strategy" package was adopted in the early 1980s because it was both a set of means and a coherent conception of ends. The ends comprised a grand reformist vision of a stable multi-ethnic society coupled to a set of means whereby reform could be managed from above by carefully deploying the finely honed instruments of state power. In the end, "total strategy" failed because the state proceeded from the assumption that it was neutral and above social conflict and could, therefore, define solutions as if the apartheid state form itself was not the cause of the problem.

Consequently, as highlighted by Hyslop (*ibid.*), although the vaunted National Security Management System succeeded, through the counter-revolutionary onslaught of 1986-8, in re-establishing the state's physical control of those urban areas which had been swept by insurgency the state made little progress in creating a new hegemonic political order. Limited economic resources prevented it from instituting sufficiently widespread material improvements in social conditions to buy off discontent, while refusal by the Nationalists during the PW Botha era to treat with the ANC had prevented the government from drawing any significant sector of black opinion into its attempts at constitutional restructuring.

Finally, the explosion of mass resistance in 1984 not only led to the collapse of the pre-1984 reform policies, but directly challenged the apartheid state form itself. It was in direct response to this threat that the state of emergency was declared and the "counter-revolutionary warfare" strategies implemented.

But, despite these signs of weakness South Africa possessed a relative strength in the early 1990s and state autonomy was qualified by the Afrikaner supremacy over other societal actors and groups, and state institutions remained closely linked to Afrikaner community. In contrast with those of Zaire, state structures penetrate society quite deeply and one may note that national leaders and governmental institutions secure clear-cut hegemony over intermediary and ground-level political actors and social units. Accordingly the South African state has played an important part in the development of the country. Indeed, as we have seen, the government still occupies a strong position within the society, and it still sets the agenda for change because it controls the organs and resources of state and has never - not even in recent years - been seriously challenged in this respect. That is the state about which

without strictly controlled population distribution. This necessitated a considerable degree of coercion through the implementation of influx control and population removals. Max Coleman and David Webster note that the government's programme of reforms was implemented only by coercion and not consensus (1987:111-136). The Botha administration's attempt to implement its reform package was brought crashing down in ruins by the revolt of 1984-86. Thus from 1985 it was clearer than before that the security police played a political role to keep the apartheid power bloc in control.

According to Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips (1989:68-90), "the highly complex and disorganised decision-making structures of the pre-Botha state, a 1980 white paper on rationalisation argued, "made it difficult for the central executive machinery to act swiftly and effectively to solve problems and crises". By restructuring state decision-making structures, this report argued, "a more manageable machinery of government to meet new challenges and crises" was created. The re-organisation of state decision-making structures was one aspect of what became known during the early 1980s as the "total strategy programme" which targeted at three goals: maintain state security, reform the political environment and co-ordinate all state action.

But the failure of this strategy became a bitter reality. As evidenced by Swilling and Phillips "total strategy" failed because its intentions were thwarted by a sustained period of black resistance. This exacerbated, highlighted and brought to the fore the key structural contradictions that original "total strategy" reforms failed to address. As a result, all the manifestations of resistance and oppositions short-circuited key state strategies and prepared the way for new ones, forcing government to move beyond the original parameters of the "total strategy" programme and creating the need amongst state planners for the formulation of alternatives. This led the government to adapt its power structures to manage and co-ordinate resources under emergency conditions. The declaration of the state of emergency on 21 July 1985 resulted in a rapid increase of detentions and repression under the Public Safety Act. In the process, an authoritarian decision-making structure emerged with the state president at its epicentre and the security system operating as its most important executive arm.

capacity of withstanding considerable external pressure and deprivation for a long time, Lewis notes.

However, the South African political system showed significant signs of weakness in the early 1980s which include: (1) increase limits to its coercive capacity, (2) the breakdown of influx control, (3) increasing public deficit, (4) increasing corruption.

According to scholars, since the late 1970s, the apartheid state has faced a sustained and deepening crisis of legitimation. This crisis was exacerbated by the attempt, and failure to implement the post-Soweto "total strategy" reforms - reforms which left the territorial and political basis of apartheid intact. At this time, the crisis of political legitimacy was amplified by the slide into economic depression, and the scope for concessionary economic reforms was drastically curtailed (Swilling, 1985:137).

To Karl von Holdt (1986:303-319), recession in the 1980s was the result of the profound economic crisis which was maturing over the last decade. This crisis sprang from several factors. South African industry was stagnating - and consequently profits are falling - for lack of sufficient markets. Closely related to this was the balance of payment problem. World demand and world prices for South Africa's traditional exports were declining, while every phase of economic growth stimulates massive import increases. The result was a balance of payment deficit (importing more than was exported) and increasing foreign debt. A further cause of crisis was the large portion of national wealth required to maintain the apartheid state. Rampant inflation, the low value of the rand, balance of payment deficits, were all manifestations of the crisis.

In addition, the conflicts of the 1980s tested the limits of political possibility for both the dominant group and the popular oppositional movements in South African society, as Jonathan Hyslop has emphasized (1989:1-2). Indeed there was an attempt to find a constitutional formula for "urban African population" political participation and at the same time entrench the division between this group and that of rural outsiders through intensified attempts to curb future urban migration. Forced control of movement was applied through influx control and population removals. It was clear that such a policy cannot be implemented

tone. Yet, because of its strong capabilities, it was the system which was to endure despite internal opposition and pervasive international hostility to its ideology. However, the real tragedy of the South African situation was thus not only the denial of basic human rights for three-quarters of the nation, but the needlessness of that denial.

For Professor G.C.Olivier (see de Crespigny and Schrire 1978:25) when judged on the basis of capabilities criteria, the performance of the South African government will obviously not evoke similar responses from the various white and non-white sectors of the population, the reason being the imposition of the policy of separate development, or plural democracy, in a manner which is not fully equitable to all segments of the population. Thus even economically integrated, the African majority stood outside the established order as legal "aliens" who may not associate with the nation. And as put by David Easton, "no system could endure for very long if it did not seek to build up a reservoir of support-frequently described as patriotism, love of country, loyalty, and the like".

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, until quite recently, South African political institutions seemed quite capable of governing in contrast to the Zairian ones. Our investigations have evidenced that South Africa could be seen as a "hard state" which is portrayed by Forrest's "fourfold autonomy seeking, penetrative, extractive and legitimating effort". Its political institutions possessed a degree of structural autonomy whereby state institutions, leaders, and officials effectively remove themselves from the influence of societal actors and influences and are thereby able to act and make decisions independently of social forces.

For instance, the administrative reforms and the legislation introduced by the Milner administration in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War and consolidated by its successors after the Act of Union helped to consolidate a powerful state apparatus capable of decisive intervention within the economy and of acting independently of the immediate interests of economically dominant social groups (Yudelman (1984) and Trapido (1963)). Also by the 1980s, against international political and economic sanctions and internal pressure, state institutions and South African leaders, affirmed their structural autonomy and proved their

consensus was ascendant. What constituted and ultimately held these societies together was not a common "social will" but domination by a distinct section of the population. In Kuper's words "the binding mechanism was government regulation, and ultimately force" (Greenberg, op.cit.p.7). And in the absence of common beliefs, there loomed an ominous brutishness-coercion exercised on a large scale and the threat of social disintegration.

The seemingly endless laws and acts which covered the land three and four tiers deep, and the need for a legal cloak to justify disenfranchisement, repression, and inequitable allocation of rewards all have pointed to a strong European belief in the need to legitimize political action. This belief came close to being an obsession. Many incidents which occurred under the General Law Amendment Act of 1962 and the new Terrorist Act Extension coupled with the vast legal charade that was undertaken to remove Coloureds from the common roll in 1956, illustrate to what extent a belief in the law supported the system.

But it was the "merit" of the regulative, extractive, distributive, and rejuvenative capabilities or the power of the system which further enhanced the South African symbolic capability. For Europeans, the system simply worked: it delivered the goods. It gave most Europeans wealth, job, security, safety, deference, and status; it gave them the right to command, and promised to maintain these payoffs far into the future. The merit of the system and the European belief in the fundamental legality of the system have provided the major source of support for the regime. As a result, the white ruling class succeeded in reaching the paramount goals of most political systems: the "survival". And typical of the South African regime was the continuation of the segregationist form and style of command decision-making and the maintenance of the status quo. In addition, the ancillary goals of freedom from external pressures and the desire for international influence, have provided the major thrust for the South African political system. Other goals seem of little concern.

Scholars from different theoretical persuasions have argued that the goals of the South African system, when taken with the analysis of its decision-making process and its capabilities, lead to the following conclusions: that the South African political system prior to 1990 was a syncretic alliance between the agricultural and industrial elite of the country, both groups being European. That political system was oligarchical in scope and racial in

terror, and repression helps to explain the tranquillity which seemed to exist within the Europeans during the apartheid era.

On the European side, there was another type of legitimacy that elicited their support for the system. It was based upon "legality" and "merit". There were also strands of charismatic legitimacy in the careers of Paul Kruger, Dr D.Malan, and even Dr H.Verwoerd, but these seem overshadowed by "legality" and "merit" for Europeans. From a historical perspective, South Africans are deeply concerned with legalism and it pervades the entire political system.

However, that legitimacy was categorically contested by Stanley B. Greenberg as indicated in his work *"Legitimizing the Illegitimate"* (Greenberg,1987). For him, coercion and state violence-not legitimacy and hegemony-seemed the common coinage of that illegitimate regime. Clearly, he demonstrates that perhaps more than any other state and social order, South Africa stood illegitimate and repressive before its own people. This is not the illegitimacy of a capricious or brutal regime, indifferent to popular needs and indulgent of privilege and police violence. For South Africa, illegitimacy-the lack of "validity", in Weber's terms-is a defining characteristic of the social order. Weber argues that, a social order or institutions only have validity when rules are regarded by actors as "obligatory or exemplary". Such legitimate orders tend toward greater stability than those held together by force or expediency, as they enjoy the "prestige of being considered binding" (Weber,1978:31). In a narrow sense, legitimacy is an attribute of rules and laws: they are thought to be good, proper, and obligatory.

According to Greenberg, like other instances where social definitions create a structured illegitimacy such as Israel with the Palestinian question, Northern Ireland with the Catholics, the American South (prior to 1964) with the Black Americans, Iran (since 1979) with the Kurds question and non-Islamic groupings, and Zaire with the Kasaians question, South Africa is a notable example of a society where "illegitimacy" is a defining characteristic of the social order. Illegitimacy in South Africa derived from two aspects of state and society: first, the identification of the state and nation with an ascendant racial minority, and second, the particular way that ascendance has been articulated with developing capitalist relations in South Africa - the deep interpenetration of state and markets. Here, conflict rather than

4.5. The Symbolic Capability:

As capability is a profile of rates of performance, the symbolic capability as a reflection of the regulative, distributive and rejuvenative capabilities and their interaction, can be regarded as a rate of "effective symbol flow" (Easton, 1974: 148-194) from the political system into the society and the international environment. And when one refers to the credibility of the political authority, he is referring to its symbolic capability, its believability, the acceptance of the decision-maker's authority to issue and enforce commands, as one writer put it. Because at the heart of the political process lies the notion of legitimacy.

In the South African case, most of scholars think that the apparent strength of the South African political system and the willingness of its principal decision-makers to use that power to insure the maintenance of their primary goals, accounted for the system's symbolic capability. The lack of national symbols and the low levels of loyalty to the nation state have been noted until the birth of the republic in 1961. There were three *de facto* "national" anthems: "*N'kosi Sikilel'i Afrika*" for Africans, "*God Save the Queen*" for the British and "*Die Stem van Suid Afrika*" for Afrikaners.

The demise of the Union of South Africa led to the fall of the British anthem. In addition, the social, ethnic, and historical fragmentation would militate against a common and mutual experience, while the entire, theoretical structure of apartheid was based on the existence of what Potholm terms "contiguous nations". Despite these flaws in the political system, two powerful sources of identification should be pointed out which, taken together, provided South Africa with a strong symbolic capability.

There were for the Africans, the levels of governmental repression, the elimination of non-European leaders, the anomie and isolation of individual Africans and the hopelessness most felt at the prospects of removing the segregationist regime; all have provided a powerful conditioning force. The pervasive fear and the kind of hopelessness that enervate revolutions led the Africans to what is called by Weber a "negative form of legitimacy based on apathy, resignation, fear and lack of information and hope". The maintenance of the system by fear,

Prominent members of the National Party were on the controlling boards of these institutions as well as those of the influential Afrikaans dailies such as *Die Burger*, *Die Transvaaler*, and *Die Vaderland*. B.J. Vorster, for example, was on the board of directors of two of the three Afrikaans newspaper concerns. The outlets, coupled with the extensive publications of the Department of Information, ensured that the government's position on most matters was well known and championed.

As highlighted above, much of the propaganda was based on the rather fragile notion that black Africa was the Africa of violence, hatred, anarchy, and reverse racialism. It was also, of course, in the minds of Whites, an Africa taken out of context, a fragmentary and half-real world, tailored to suit the demands of the moment, a world view in which the African past replaces the future and the present in terms of causal efficacy.

For the propagandists of apartheid, very little information on how Africa was operating ever filtered into the thought patterns of the white South African. What was important, even crucial, was the publication of incidents that seem to justify the continuance of apartheid and in portraying the options open to the white community in very harsh terms: *baasskap* or chaos. They showed their already sophisticated capability to jam foreign broadcasting and were encouraging the use of FM rather than AM frequencies. Newspapers and periodicals such as "*Drum*", "*Post*" and "*World*" intended for non-European audiences, were also closely watched and subjected to harassment.

Thus, the weak aspects of the rejuvenative capability seem probably more than balanced by the substantial regulative, distributive and extractive capabilities. These alone, as Potholm has asserted, have assured the European minority of the strength to maintain its material status for the foreseeable future.

drawn from the society. To the white middle class child, the policeman is usually characterized as a friendly, warm, protective figure. To the township inhabitant, on the other hand, the policeman is "the enemy", a symbol of the repressiveness and abuses of a bigoted white society in its efforts to control and exploit the non-white, especially the black. These different political cultural perceptions led to what Almond calls "an inherent tension". This tension is evident at a less than routine level when the township perceptions become transformed into "resistance" and other forms of civil disobedience and liberation struggle.

The control of *information* is also an important aspect of the process of political socialization. We believe that the role of the *mass media* in political socialization must not be overlooked. Government has used it to both encourage and discourage certain types of activities. In addition to providing information about specific and immediate political events, the mass media act over the long run to shape the individual's basic "cognitive map". Certain facts are emphasized; other facts are not. Certain symbols are conveyed in an emotive context, and the events juxtaposed with them take on the affective color. Brief, a controlled system of mass media can be a powerful force in shaping political beliefs, and can provide bases of support as important to a totalitarian state as its police forces, as Almond and Powell have pointed out (1966:69).

Propaganda and the process of symbolic manipulation are obvious facets of this process. In this fashion, every citizen and office-holder is dependent upon the information he receives and the effectiveness of the messages he transmits. That is why democratic theorists have insisted on the necessity of freedom of the press and of speech in order that the people may check the activities of their rulers. Unfortunately, South African leaders, like other authoritarian leaders in the world, have invariably attempted to dominate such institutions and to manipulate the information available to the citizens and communication structures were subject to a high degree of control by them.

During the apartheid era, the South African government controlled the South African Broadcasting Corporation and its variety of radio stations as well as the South African Press Association. Both organisations gave full play to unpleasant developments in the rest of Africa, race relations in the U.S., and the threat of the black African states to the north.

holders by lot, by election, or by some proof of ability or performance, such as an examination, are illustration of recruitment on the basis of universalistic criteria. On the other hand, recruitment from a particular tribe or ethnic group is illustrative of particularistic criteria of recruitment, as the case in South Africa and Zaire.

In South Africa the rejuvenative capacity of the political system was the least impressive of its capabilities. The inordinately large role played by ascription in the process of role allocation definitely sets limits on the search for talent. In examining the different political systems in Africa, one may note that staffing the bureaucracy of the government, for instance, is a continual problem. Like many African political systems, South Africa was often alleged to base recruitment upon ethnicity in that the "white tribe" tended to dominate the society as a whole (Seegers, 1993:486). In Potholm's terms, it is ironic, but true, that "ethnicity" and "tribalism", particularly white tribalism, were more pronounced in this political system than in most other African systems. Generally speaking, political, economic, and social recruitment was based upon one's "racial" group (Potholm, 1970:124). Even within the European community, as seen, there was a definite bifurcation, with the English-speakers gravitating toward business and commerce and the Afrikaners more likely to be absorbed into the bureaucracies, army, police, and politics, as well farming. However, it should be noted that the recruitment and operation of the bureaucracy are often critical determinants in the survival of the political system.

Rather, the lengthy and comprehensive process of socialization which the Afrikaner elite underwent provided for a basic loyalty to the political system and gave the decision-making group a kind of toughness and solidarity that was not found in many other political systems. The *laager mentality*, the feeling of being against the world, had many objective flaws, but over the short term at least, it provided a cohesion to the internal center of the political system. But in the end the system did demonstrate a capacity for internal reform - but only after severe weakening in the 1980s.

In connection with the concept of "collective perceptions", an effort must be made to understand how "objective" political objects are understood subjectively by the population within the "old political system", what is meant by this might be understood in the distinction

Persistent abuses by the FAZ reached the peak in September 22, 1991, when Mobutu's inability to pay soldiers and other government employees helped to trigger a mutiny in the Zairian army. According to American newspapers published between September and December 1991 especially *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, the mutiny was sparked off by 3,000 unpaid paratroopers from the 31st Brigade stationed in Kinshasa; unrest also broke out in Kolwezi, Likasi, Kamina and Lubumbashi in Shaba Province (south), in Kisangani in the north, in Mbuji Mayi in central Zaire, in Bukavu in the east and in Kisantu in the west. The rioting and looting by soldiers, who were soon joined by ordinary citizens suffering economic hardship, lasted almost one week. Particular targets were the homes and businesses of wealthy Zairians, as well as companies and small shops owned by Lebanese, Greeks and Portuguese - groups long resented by Zairians for their treatment of locals, as Leslie has pointed out (1993:45).

The widespread lawlessness and instability resulted in over 250 dead and 1,500 wounded and led to the accustomed scheme of foreign intervention by French and Belgian troops to evacuate the expatriate population. The Bush Administration provided several US Air Force C.141 "Starlifter" heavy transporters for the operation, crews were sent to airlift European troops and their equipment into Zaire, and to evacuate nearly 8,000 foreigners, including hundreds of Americans.

In almost the same fashion, abysmally low wages again resulted in violence in January 1993. Soldiers began looting shops and opened fire in the capital, protesting payment in the new Z5 million banknotes commissioned by Mobutu, whereas the banknotes had been demonetized by the "sacked" Prime Minister E. Tshisekedi. In the confusion that followed, the French Ambassador Phillipe Bernard, was killed. Fighting soon spread to Lubumbashi, Kisangani and other Zairian cities, becoming a confrontation between soldiers loyal to Mobutu and those loyal to Tshisekedi. More than 1,000 dead were reported in Zaire fighting (*The Washington Post*, February 2, 1993:A17).

Since then the civilians were living in permanent fear of reprisals from the garde Civile and the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP), in addition to the Secret Police, the AND (Agence Nationale de Documentation), known since 1990 as the Service National d'Intelligence et de

of the capacity of Zairian army completely unable to cope with the threat and it had to be rescued by the West. The two consecutive invasions of Shaba clearly dispelled the remaining illusions concerning the capabilities of the FAZ and highlighted the army's incompetence in battle. One observer notes that "the inability of the state security forces (in spite of their expansion, re-equipment, and widely publicized retraining to cope with this feeble incursion) punctured the mystique of strength that the regime had cultivated (Willame,1978). Kabila's armed victory is the clear demonstration of these allegations.

To analysts the very deterioration of the formal capacities of the FAZ made them more dangerous for the unarmed civilian population, as there was neither recourse to nor protection from the depredations of uniformed personnel. Reasons for this incapacity were multiple. But what was often mentioned was the poor morale and the resentment of the troops, provoked by pay irregularities, the often miserable living conditions of the enlisted ranks, supply shortages, and the transparent venality of a segment of the officer corps. Pilferage and exactions visited by the troops are undertaken partly for subsistence. For the ordinary people who have no recourse or protection, the net result was harassment from security force members.

Harassment could take the form of roadblocks allegedly to check for papers but in reality was a shakedown for money. Thus travel in Zaire quickly became a nightmare. In numerous cases, ordinary soldiers in the FAZ were unarmed and powerless, with the exception of specialized units such as the presidential civil guard and the presidential special division (DSP). Mobutu feared the consequences of arming the FAZ rank and file. So the local soldiery have lost credibility as a repressive force. Victims of long pay arrears, they were reduced to begging for food; lacking ammunition, they could not longer commandeer supplies at the marketplace. This led Young and Turner to argue that Zairian military forces earned their living through banditry and became the scourge of society (Young and Turner,1985:274). Meanwhile, stories of atrocities committed by the army against the civilian population, reports of rape involving schoolgirls in various regions, assaults against women for their participation in a demonstration protesting economic conditions in Kinshasa in 1989, were legion (Leslie,1993:43-49).

were jailed, tortured and banished to detention centres. Despite coercive pressures, they created a party of their own titled the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS). Although illegal, the new party became instantly popular with the masses. One of the thirteen, Etienne Tshisekedi emerged and is well known as the most popular leader in the country due to his courage and strong commitment to change in the face of an oppressive as well as repressive state apparatus.

The treatment of the UDPS leaders had major repercussions in Europe and America, particularly in Belgium and in the USA. There was an extreme tension between Mobutu and his external "patrons" over human rights in Zaire. And one can argue that from the 1980s onwards the political arena in Zaire was the theatre of a hard struggle between the single party, the MPR and the illegal one, the UDPS, in their face to face domination of the political space. In this regard, 13 MPs were regularly arrested, imprisoned, tortured, amnestied, rearrested, some later placed under house arrest or sent into internal exile.

Besides the repression of opposition activities, the multiple violations of human rights, included military harrasment, pillages, and the like, could be noted.

Thus the role played by the security forces from the Congo Free State to the takeover of power by Kabila and his allies remained impressive. Since the Zairian army came to power in 1965, it has served paradoxically as the source of security for the Mobutu regime and as the principal creator of havoc and insecurity for the Zairian people. Although the Mobutist army's legendary indiscipline and repeated incapacity to defeat even small and poorly armed forces made it an object of scorn, as demonstrated by recent events which led Mobutu to flee the country last May; in terms of terror and intimidation, it was one of the few branches of the state that operated with some efficiency. From this perspective, the FAZ (Forces Armées Zairoises) was one of the visible control mechanisms in the Mobutist state

Despite substantial Western aid (training and equipment), as well as Chinese and North Korean aid in 1973-1975, the FAZ has been unable to adequately protect the regime in times of crisis. The humiliating defeat in the Angolan War, followed by the fiasco of its encounters with the small and meagerly equipped FLNC invaders in 1977 and 1978 deflated the myth

Ironically, observed Schatzberg, Mobutu's initial success in building his own power base and stabilizing the regime to eliminate the endemic social and political instability of the First Republic has generated new forms of personal insecurity which are new characteristic of the Second Republic (1988:3). Security of state and regime inevitably remains a commanding priority for each country. Thus controls over the political life in Zaire were numerous and civil liberties have been curtailed since the Mobutu coup. Nevertheless application of government repression and authoritarian control should not obscure the fact that the government was prepared to go to considerable lengths to maintain order and its dominant position.

In practice, the Mobutu regime acted arbitrarily or even illegally, if it felt that societal order and its preeminent position were threatened. There were no preventive detention act, for example, but persons accused of planning crimes against the state were often detained without warrant or subsequent trial and either imprisoned, deported missing or killed. Examples in Zairian politics abound: one should recall the "Pentecost plot" on 30 May 1966 - just 6 months after the seizure of power - followed by the hanging of four former cabinet ministers of First Republic, arrested on treason charges, tried at once before a military tribunal, and publicly hanged three days later. Then the vile execution of Pierre Mulele; the bizarre kidnapping of Tshombe in June 1967 after the hijacking of his plane to Algiers where he was imprisoned and his death in 1969; the students massacre in 1969, 1971, 1989, 1990; the execution of thirteen civilian and military figures at the time of the purported new plot in March 1978; the bad treatment suffered by the thirteen members of Parliament over the 1980s due to their opposition to the MPR; the massacre of Christians on February 16, 1992 and that of PALU (Parti Lumumbiste Unifié) followers in July 29, 1995. However, the episode of the thirteen MPs deserves more attention because of the impact and the implications of this movement during the past decade.

Indeed, in spite of the "liberalization" of the regime, when, in November 1980, thirteen deputies - with meticulous respect for the formal legality and constitutional requirements of the regime - challenged the system by sending a 52-page open letter to Mobutu, demanding political reforms and denouncing venality and waste, their action was seen as an "intolerable affront". The regime reacted against what it considered was a "temerity" and the thirteen

Young recalls, was by no means that of a commander over his subordinates in a tightly hierarchical military organisation; it was more analogous to that of a patron over a network of clients, whose loyalty was open to frequent renegotiation as the situation evolved. He quotes House who had described this situation particularly well when he wrote:

"From 1960-1965 ... Mobutu succeeded in gaining the allegiance of the more powerful officers, many of whom had their respective fiefdoms within the ranks. Mobutu used ties of personal loyalty and the politics of threats and rewards to overcome the absence of organized command. With tactical advice and financial support from the U.S., Mobutu established his authority to the point where he could threaten, pay or influence in other ways the upper ranks ... By rotating officers often and encouraging them to report every piece of news or rumor to him personally, Mobutu established his supremacy over the command structure" (see Young, 1985:262).

Showing the importance of this contention - that is a crucial point that perhaps justifies the Mobutu survival - House adds that the solidification of relative control over the armed forces was the most basic factor in positioning Mobutu to seize supreme power in 1965. While the army was unable to defeat the insurgents ... and had to commission mercenaries to perform this task, it was still the strongest single organized group in the First Republic. His allegation that "the ability to control army politics has been Mobutu's basic political strength" remained valid into the 1990s. Political control has been central to Mobutu's strategy of state consolidation.

After seizing power, Mobutu restored order while recentralizing the authority and power of the state as he exerted an increasingly personalized and autocratic style of rule. One can note that in a number of respects the Mobutist state resembled the personal autocracy of the King Leopold II from 1885 to 1908. The colonial principles of centralization of power, unity of command, hierarchy of the state apparatus, provided an ample base on which to reconstruct an autocratic state. Until the mid-1970s, Mobutu was a truly popular leader by increasing personal security in much of the country, and had seemingly made lighter the harsh and difficult conditions of Zaire's early years. Then it seemed the state entered a phase of pervasive decline and dissolution until Mobutu's collapse. As Chatzberg has expressed, by this time Mobutu's political capital had gradually diminished, and ordinary Zairians were increasingly victims of extraction, exploitation and oppression at the hands of the state.

insurrections which the ANC was unable to contain.

With the Tshombe premiership in June 1964, an auxiliary force of white mercenaries was created and, several thousand former Katangan secessionists were incorporated into the national army. Tshombe obtained military aid from Belgium and the United States to turn back the insurgents. Many months were to pass before the rebellions were defeated - at great cost - and the country finally pacified. The national army performed poorly and was clearly unable to maintain order without external reinforcement. After the defeat of the insurgents, the humiliated national army wreaked its revenge upon those suspected of complicity and, in the process, revealed its own indiscipline. Most importantly, these actions imprinted on the populace an indelible fear of disorder and insecurity that still exists.

However, the legacy of the security forces was thus the brutality of the colonial era wedded to the mutiny of the First Republic. The tenuous control of the independent state over its forces meant that brutality was less focussed - from the standpoint of the Leopoldian state, less instrumental. The use of violence was more capricious and random. While a sense of fear among the populace was sustained, the heightened unpredictability of coercion perhaps made its instrumentalities even more disliked.

The authoritarian legacy of the colonial state provided an ample reservoir of juridical doctrine supportive of the Mobutu venture. Taking advantage of the fact that the fractured parliament proved unable to carry out its task of electing a chief of state and the Kasavubu-Tshombe tussle, Mobutu and his army found a pretext to install themselves in power on November 24, 1965. Young has argued that the Mobutu coup occurred at a singularly propitious conjuncture of the national psychosis, which was in a Hobbesian mood. The public realm was a zone of disorder. Immediate past experience validated the gloomy analysis of the philosopher of absolutism; in the absence of effective authority, life was "nasty, brutish, and short" (Young, 1986:137). The "very existence of the Nation was threatened, the social economic, and financial situation of the country is catastrophic", proclaimed Mobutu justifying his coup.

The army in the Mobutist state became merely an instrument of the political system and an organ of coercion. It must be borne in mind that the authority Mobutu held over the army,

by about 1,200 Belgian officers, and enjoying a reputation as one of the best trained and disciplined forces in central Africa, was disintegrating. The deep-seated grievances and frustrations that existed beneath the calm, professional-appearance of the force were either ignored or unperceived by the Belgians, and when released by the mutiny, the resentments quickly destroyed the army. The newly named army had degenerated in many cases into armed gangs of renegades whose loyalties went to strongmen of various ethnic groups or regions rather than to the national government".

Because of the general breakdown of security and order, and in an attempt to stabilize the military situation, the then Prime Minister P.E.Lumumba placed Congolese in top positions of the army. It was under these circumstances that Mobutu was catapulted into the top ranks of the new army, the *Armée Nationale Congolaise* (ANC), promoted to colonel and made chief of staff. As pointed out, Lumumba mistakenly believed that he could rely on the political loyalty of Mobutu, who was one of the few members of the 1960 political class who had any military background. During the critical period from July to September 1960 Mobutu was able to assume a limited but decisive control over the army units closest to Kinshasa.

To complete the process of breakdown, the constitutional impasse on September 5 between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, led Mobutu to neutralize both of them and to install his "College of Commissioners" who operated under the dubious legal cover of President Kasavubu. Lumumba who was arrested and unable to regain effective control in Kinshasa, tried to escape from his house arrest in Kinshasa in order to take charge of his rival regime erected in Stanleyville (Kisangani) by the Lumumbist bastion. But he was captured by Mobutu's soldiers, sent to the secessionist Katanga, and, in January 17, 1961, assassinated.

As Young has speculated the complicity for this murder was shared by the Katanga government led by Tshombe and the Kinshasa authorities - in reality Mobutu - and indirectly, by the American intelligence (CIA). Until early 1964 the armed forces became as much a threat to state authority as an instrument of it. The potential threat to the state from poorly controlled armed groups was partly countered by the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force. When they withdrew a third of the country was quickly engulfed in

until the mid-1950s - was a formidable aggregation of power. Its security apparatus - the FP - sustained the hegemony of the colonial state through its reputation for crushing force, violently and brutally applied at the slightest challenge.

Yet this formidable machine was finally shattered and its will undermined by its incapacity to master spontaneity, "in a scenario which bears intriguing resemblance to Eastern Europe in 1989", as Young as noted (1944:247-63b). The pivotal event which triggered the unravelling process was the wave of rioting in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in January 1959; and by the end of the year, the regime suffered a spiralling deflation of its authority. Throughout the colonial period there were no African officers in the armed forces. The Belgian government assumed that, following independence, Belgian administration and military officers would remain in *de facto* control. They did not foresee the tension that would result from the appointment of junior African civil servants to ministerial posts, while "the noncom" African officers remained as they were. The decolonization was not long in coming. Within five days of independence, the entire army dissolved in mutiny, provoked by resentment over the fact that independence brought no change to the status of the Zairian troops. The mutiny began in a camp near Kinshasa and quickly spread throughout the country.

In swift succession, the administration broken-down, the state lost its territorial integrity, and the constitutional arrangements became inoperative. UN forces occupied the territory, and Cold War rivals discovered a new battleground. Within days, European officers were ousted from the command structure; a small number stayed as advisors. Their places were filled by Zairian noncommissioned officers who had only uncertain control over their men; much of their energy was absorbed in purchasing their continued service by seeing that the payroll was met (Duignan and Jackson, 1986:120-161). The army mutiny panicked the European community. The situation was exacerbated by the subsequent intervention of the Belgian army to protect the European residents. Within ten days of sovereignty, a massive exodus of European civil servants followed that of the army officers.

Observers like Young and others (Kaplan, 1979:258; Young and Turner, 1985:248-275) have noted that "the Force Publique, numbering about 25,000 Africans troops at independence led

even after the "reprise" in 1908 the Force Publique remained a bulwark of the colonial state. As we have seen, the Force Publique (FP) was created in 1888, and by 1897 it had fourteen thousand African troops; its European officers and noncommissioned cadres numbered 360 in 1905. The exclusively European officer corps maintained a ruthless discipline over the troops. During its early years the FP was in almost constant military operation. It had already experienced serious mutinies in 1895, 1897, and 1900, which led to what Young and others have called "a careful strategy of ethnic blending down to the smallest unit level" (Young, 1994:106a). In 1908, the Leopoldian Congo had only 756 European civilian officers and 482 military cadres to assure domination over nine hundred thousands square miles, Duignan and Gann note.

What was impressive was the use of force. The revenue imperative led the troops to impose brutality, force and intimidation upon subject society. The extreme cruelty displayed by the troops to exercise the hegemony of the state, reflected the images of overwhelming, crushing force by which its subjects knew them: "*Bula Matari*". Military and police functions were not clearly distinguished. Local unrest resulted at once in a show of force sufficient to sustain the superstructure of intimidation - what led Bruce Fetter to note that a "totalitarian society" had been created (Fetter:1973:38).

For instance, in the agricultural sphere, the coercive arsenal of the state was stocked with legal weapons, especially the Ordinance of 20 February 1917 which imposed upon peasantry 60 days of obligatory cultivation annually according to norms established by the state. The penal sanctions accompanying this legislation equipped them with "the means necessary to induce cultivators to expand their crops", and that they "were nothing other than military or police occupation".

In addition, a comprehensive legal web of segregationist regulations, as in South Africa, was spun around African behaviour. Thus, voluntary migration was subject to the pleasure of the territorial administrator, whose issue of a pass was indispensable. Urban Africans were denied the right of land ownership, unauthorised presence in European quarters in the evening, and viewing of any film not approved by a rigorous censor. The Print media was subject to careful control. To sum up, the colonial state, at its peak-from the early 1920s

Moreover, the First Republic lost strength in its symbolic capacity, that capacity which is supposed to compensate for weakness in other areas. Unable to satisfy the demands rushing in upon it and lacking the mechanisms for conducting an ongoing process of political socialization or conflict resolution, the system lost its ability to cope with the situation and drifted from crisis to crisis. The breakdown of state institutions paved the way to the military coup led by Mobutu in 1965 and the beginning of the new era.

All this argumentation becomes a reality once one begins the analysis of the capabilities of the Zairian political system since independence. There is an evidence that the Zairian political system was distinguished by strong regulative and extractive capabilities, mixed symbolic capability and weak distributive and rejuvenative capacities.

4.2.1. The Regulative Capability:

The political system of Zaire possessed effective instruments of regulation for use in law enforcement and the preservation of societal order. Its regulative capacity in the early 1990s was based on its armed forces, the coercive arm of hegemony. For Schatzberg, the very notion of coercion is built into the idea of the state, and all states, be they liberal democracies or more authoritarian regimes, rely to a greater or lesser degree on coercion to control their population and maintain their territorial boundaries (Schatzberg, 1988:53).

The presence of the armed forces in Zairian politics was impressive and they were one major dimension of the crisis of the contemporary state. That is why the national dimension of the coercive superstructure deserves more mention. As Young and Turner have argued, the hegemony and power of the state rests upon the force it controls, but that force is unreliable in times of crisis; its depredations undermine the credibility of the state, and its capricious actions may threaten the state itself. Paradoxically, the armed forces in post-colonial Zaire were both the pillar of the state and the scourge of the society. This paradox becomes plausible when one examines the legacies of the "Bula Matari" era and the chaotic First Republic.

It should be noted that the armature of the Leopoldian state had been largely military, and

As a modern African state, the Zairian state, according to Rothchild, could appropriately be characterized as "soft" because it was limited in its control over society and therefore incapable of implementing its regulations effectively throughout its territory and of achieving its many-faceted goals. To the degree that the state's ability to formulate and implement policy was in doubt and the explicit and implicit rules of political relationship were yet to be accepted, the state was weak, with the power of its institutions dependent upon elite networking, coercion, and the distribution of resources within society (1985:126).

However, it is important to point out that the notion of "soft" state as defined in this work can be misleading as it masks the overdevelopment of state structures, the authoritarian character of the Zairian state and the uneven and biased impact of state intervention. Because this state struggled to gain support for its goals, it was not "soft" with regard to its repression of dissenting forces. The Zairian state was best known for its oppressive methods. Its efforts to reorganize the countryside were geared at regulating the state's will, not allowing decision-making power to the people as a whole.

Nevertheless the authoritarian side of this regime did not prevent its stagnation and decay, as well as its fragility and atrophy. Ergas has asserted that while Zaire was capable of "extracting" (stealing is perhaps a better word) resources, it was incapable of managing the economy or mobilizing the people for developmental tasks.

In systemic terms, soon after independence the Zairian government began to suffer from a progressive hardening of its political arteries and experienced a marked decline in all its capabilities. The First Republic was unable to implement "right" decisions. For many analysts, this failure to develop a set of effective institutional buffers meant that when the euphoria of independence wore off and the societal demand pressures built up, there was no way to channel them away from the political centre. The lack of a functional political net to absorb or at least moderate the demands carried the system itself to be threatened. Despite the promises of the political elite, the end of colonial rule did not mean the radical transformation of the socio-economic system. Everywhere in Africa, independence merely meant an alteration of elites and little change in the lives of the average citizen of the country. At the same time, there occurred what Zolberg has called an "inflation of demands".

Some of these activities were illegal; others were legal in themselves but made illegal because they were carried out to avoid taxation or to in some other way deprive the state of revenue (MacGaffey:1994:189-204). The 1997 Zaire represents one of the tragedies of the post-colonial experience. The country has enough arable land and hydro-electric potential to feed and power the entire continent. It has been reduced by a caricature of a venal African dictator, to one of the five poorest countries in the world.

The stumbling block in the Zairian case, as with many other sub-saharan countries was the inability of the Zairian state to respond sufficiently to legitimate demands and to be effective in implementing its policies throughout the country. The Zairian state was characterized by the following elements: (i) the prevailing shortage of economic resources that leads to economic dependence, in spite of its scandalous riches; (ii) the lack of coherent social relations (ie, absence of group interactions on a regularized basis); (iii) the overdevelopment of state structures; (iv) the inadequacy of state legitimacy and; (v) the magnitude of state coercive power.

The incapacity to convert its preferences into policies weakened the state and left it soft. From our observations and findings, the Zairian state seemed to be the prototype of a "soft state".

Many scholars have stressed that despite the "centrality" of the Zairian state which seemed omnipresent, controlling, directing and misdirecting the economy, consuming major shares of available resources in salaries, investments and corruption, at the same time, the state was weak, ineffective, fragile, "soft". In practice it lacked a strong institutional core or the supporting norms which would allow it to function as a state (Ergas,1986:304) and could not control the flight of its citizens into informal political activities (Chazan,1983), illegal practices, a parallel underground economy of massive dimensions (Kasfir,1983) or physical and psychological withdrawal into the "economy of affection" (Hyden,1983), as Otwin Marenin has emphasized (1985:65). Thus Young characterizes Zaire as a most advanced example of this process, a "decayed state" which has reached pathological depths in its failures of "competence, credibility and probity" (Young,1984:80-82).