

**FILM POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE
NATIONAL FILM AND VIDEO FOUNDATION
(2000-2005)**

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**A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and
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the requirements for the degree: Masters of Management in Public
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ABSTRACT

The study aimed to understand and analyse the ways in which the NFVF as the institution mandated by government to implement its vision for the film industry, interpreted and executed this mandate in its inception years. Using a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation, this study applied the 5-C protocol developed by Brynard and de Coning (2006) to analyse film policy. The study assesses the process of implementation and the key factors that shaped how the NFVF carried out its policy mandate between 2000 and 2005 largely from the perspective of 'street-level bureaucrats' who were the main policy implementation officials. Implementation scholars suggest that in order to understand policy, one is required to follow its journey as it moves through the implementation process, changing its environment, and in turn being influenced by the environment within which it is located.

The study's findings are discussed under various themes that emerged from the interviews and document review. The focus is on the NFVF's policy content and implications this had on the clarity of its role and mandate. The themes that emerged from the discussion on the NFVF's policy context indicated that the governance and institutional arrangements for implementation as well as the lack of policy coherence and co-ordination contributed to a difficult operating and implementation environment. Under policy commitment, the discussion pointed to the NFVF's leadership and institutional style between 2000-2005. The NFVF's capacity to implement policy was analysed in terms of its available financial resources. Finally, the last section of the study considers the NFVF's policy clients and coalitions and how they responded to the NFVF's implementation of policy.

DECLARATION

I, Tusi Matshama Nthabiseng Fokane, declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Management in Public Policy (MM-PP) in the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in this or any other University.

Tusi Matshama Nthabiseng Fokane

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DEDICATION

For Mma, Mai-Mai and Naledi.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACTAG	Arts and Culture Task Group
ANC	African National Congress
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CIGS	Cultural Industries Growth Strategy
DAC	Department of Arts and Culture
DACST	Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DG	Director-General
DDG	Deputy Director-General
DOC	Department of Communications
DOE	Department of Education
DOL	Department of Labour
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
DPW	Department of Public Works
EU	European Union
GCIS	Government Communications Information Services
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
ICASA	Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IPO	Independent Producers Association
MAPPP-SETA	Media Advertising Publishing Printing Packaging Sector Education Training Authority
MERS	Micro Economic Reform Strategy
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NEMISA	National Electronic Media Institute of South Africa
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEF	National Empowerment Fund
NFVF	National Film and Video Foundation
NT	National Treasury
PDIs	Previously Disadvantaged Individuals
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PMG	Parliamentary Monitoring Group
PWC	PricewaterhouseCoopers
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SABS	South African Bureau of Standards
SAFTAs	South African Film and Television Awards
SARB	South African Reserve Bank
SARS	South African Revenue Services
SASFED	South African Screen Federation

SMMEs	Small, Medium, Micro Enterprises
Stats SA	Statistics South Africa
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The study contextualises and analyses the implementation of film policy through the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF). It attempts to draw out the NFVF's priorities and strategies in meeting its policy objectives for the period 2000 – 2005. This is particularly relevant given the historic tensions inscribed in the NFVF Act as addressed by policy scholars. This study aims to examine how these tensions were addressed through the implementation process.

1.2 Background

South Africa has one of the oldest film industries in the world dating back to 1895, yet the industry finds itself confronted by numerous challenges that did not entirely disappear as a result of democratisation. Despite the international accolades, there have been several reports that point out weaknesses relating to low production volumes, declining cinema audiences, a lack of transformation, industry fragmentation, inadequate skills development, production funding, bureaucracy within film development state institutions as well as the lack of a coherent policy for the film industry (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007:29; NFVF, 2001d, 2005b, 2010; Reddy, 2005:18-19).

These challenges persist despite consensus-orientated policy recommendations that led to the establishment of a statutory institution to restructure the industry. In 1994, the newly-elected democratic government was faced with the challenge of developing a South African film industry that would facilitate access and participation of all citizens. Responsibility for the development of the film industry was vested in the newly established Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST), which set up a multi-stakeholder negotiation forum to address the restructuring of arts and culture in South Africa.

In 1995 the Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG) presented its recommendations on the development of the cultural industries which culminated in the release of the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (1996). At the same time, DACST undertook a restructuring of the South African film industry, which culminated in the 1996 Film Development Strategy (also referred to as the White Paper on Film Policy), that provided policy recommendations on the restructuring of the film industry through the establishment of a statutory institution. The NFVF Act was passed in 1997, with the inaugural Council appointed in 1999. The NFVF itself became fully operational in 2000.

According to the NFVF Act, the National Film and Video Foundation was set up in order to:

- (a) develop and promote the film and video industry;
- (b) provide, and encourage the provision of, opportunities for persons, especially from disadvantaged communities, to get involved in the film and video industry;
- (c) encourage the development and distribution of local film and video products;
- (d) support the nurturing and development of and access to the film and video industry and;

(e) address historical imbalances in the infrastructure and distribution of skills and resources” (South Africa, 1997b).

Earlier studies undertaken on the policy development process indicate that the policy formation process resulted in a broad and vaguely defined mandate for the NFVF, which would make the implementation process difficult. For example, one of the questions left unattended was agreement on the role of film in South Africa. More significantly, as Karam (1997:105) and Shepperson and Tomaselli (2002:68) point out, this resulted in a significant delegation of policy-making responsibility to the NFVF with the expectation that the newly established institution would be able to mediate between conflicting interests.

1.3 Problem Statement

1.3.1 Problem

The NFVF is the implementing institution for government policy for the development and promotion of the film industry in South Africa. Researchers such as Williams, (1996), Karam (1997), Shepperson and Tomaselli (2002) and Saks (2003) have argued that the NFVF Act was the result of ideological and theoretical compromises made during the policy development process. They suggest that policy-makers, in an attempt to reach consensus during multi-party negotiations, did not consider the practical implications for implementation. Thus earlier research indicates that the early stages of policy formation failed to adequately provide the NFVF with the operational policy principles that would guide it in implementing its policy mandate.

1.3.2 Context

More contemporary research conducted on the South African film industry points to structural challenges that have not been adequately addressed despite the existence of an institution specifically set up to develop and promote the growth of the industry (Heatlie, 2011; Reddy, 2005; Treffry-Goatley, 2010).

The focus of these studies has largely been on the NFVF's role within the larger context of the industry's development. A recurring theme in these studies is the perception held by some filmmakers that South Africa lacks a coherent film policy, and that the lack of clarity on the NFVF's role and mandate has hampered the effective development of the industry. The questions raised by related studies into the South African film industry provide a basis from which to probe the relationship between policy formation and the policy implementation processes as undertaken by the NFVF from 2000 – 2005.

1.3.3 Knowledge gap

Some of the challenges identified by related studies may be rooted in how the NFVF interpreted and implemented its policy mandate against its stated objectives. Much of the earlier research on the NFVF focused on the policy formation process. More recent studies have considered different aspects of the NFVF's film strategy. Findings suggest that the expectation by policy-makers' that the NFVF would be able to mediate between conflicting interests once it was established, has not been realised. The link between the establishment of the NFVF at policy formation level and its implementation processes has not been sufficiently

researched. This study aims to fill that gap by obtaining perspectives from policy implementation actors who were instrumental in the NFVF's founding years.

1.4 Research Objectives

The study aims to examine and analyse the process of implementing film policy through the NFVF as an institution of policy. This study further seeks to explore the factors that shaped the NFVF's interpretation of its policy mandate between 2000 and 2005. Finally, the study seeks to complement existing knowledge of film policy in South Africa by considering why and how government's vision for the film industry was implemented by the NFVF.

1.4.1 Primary Research Question

The primary research question is:

- How did the NFVF implement and interpret film policy in South Africa from 2000 - 2005?

1.4.2 Supplementary Research Questions

The supplementary research questions informing the primary research question are as follows:

- What factors influenced the policy implementation process from 2000 – 2005?
- What were the implementation processes to give effect to the policy objectives?
- What were the implications of these on its ability to implement policy effectively?

1.5 Delimitations of the study

The study is limited to an exploration of the implementation of film policy as a product of public policy over a set period of time (2000 – 2005). The research does not consider issues of aesthetics, textual analysis, narratives, representation nor questions of national cinema and national identity which are typically the modes of inquiry in discussions on film policy. A related point is that this study does not engage in the film as art/culture and film as commercial activity discussion, save to the extent that such distinctions serve to highlight a relevant feature of the policy process.

Furthermore, this study aims to discern key implementation features of the NFVF's policy mandate and does not necessarily focus on specific project or programme management aspects unless they are relevant in highlighting the objectives and scope of film policy implementation.

Finally, the study limits its scope to the implementation and interpretation of policy objectives and is not an evaluation of the NFVF as an institution. As Brynard (2005:5) observes..."impact studies typically ask 'What happened?' whereas implementation studies ask 'Why did it happen?'".

1.6 Definition of terms

Cultural policy

Karam (1997:26-29) expresses the difficulties in defining cultural policy, indicating that it is a compound term that combines two contrasting value systems. Thus she offers a broad definition of the term that views cultural policy as a "dynamic, integrative process" that encompasses

cultural practitioners, bureaucrats, and the general public. Karam (1997:29) acknowledges that there is a narrower definition that views cultural policy as a “static product of state initiatives.” For purposes of analysing cultural policy implementation, from the perspective of the NFVF Act, a narrow definition of cultural policy is required.

This is provided by Roodt (2006:203) who proposes that cultural policy “could be described as authoritative documents formulated by state departments of arts and culture, local authorities or any other public institution that works in the cultural sector with a view to addressing behaviour that poses problems for cultural communities.”

Mandate

The Concise Oxford English Dictionary provides the following definition for mandate, “the authority to carry out a policy or course of action, regarded as given by the electorate to a party or candidate that wins an election.” (2006:867). Thus an institution's mandate is derived from the right to conduct itself in a certain way, in pursuit of achieving its policy objectives.

Film

Although the NFVF Act does not provide a definition of film, the Film Development Strategy (1996: iv) provides a succinct definition, namely, “...any sequence of visual images recorded on any substance, whether a film, magnetic tape, disc or any other material, in such a manner that by using such substance these images will be capable of being seen as a moving picture.” In this study, the broad definition offered, encompasses films made for cinematic release, broadcasting, and video release.

Film policy

Film is generally considered to be part of the cultural sector, as Sirayi (2006:13) observes:

...while we often refer to cultural policy, singular, as a terminological convenience, it is of course more accurate to speak of policies, in the plural, that is, that mixture of goals and means which constitutes the political reality – a heritage policy, a film policy...and so on. The combination of these discipline-based policies can be said to constitute an overall policy – that is, the cultural policy.

Film industry

The Film Development Strategy (1996:iv) once again provides a useful definition: "film and video producers, as well as those sectors required to finance, administer, distribute, market and exhibit films, etc."

Policy

Hanekom (as cited in de Coning, 2006:14) offers the following definition of policy:

Policy is thus indicative of a goal, a specific purpose, a programme of action that has been decided upon. *Public policy* is therefore a formally articulated goal that the legislator intends pursuing with society or with a societal group.

Policy implementation

Policy implementation is widely understood to encompass the processes that take place after policy has been developed, and that are aimed at the realisation of public policy objectives (Knoepfel et al, 2007:189; Brynard & de Coning, 2006:195).

For Barrett (as cited in Pülzl & Treib, 2007:89), policy implementation is the “...process of translating policy into action.”

Thomas and Grindle (1990:1165) add that policy does not end when legislation is enacted:

...implementation is an interactive and ongoing process of decision making by policy elites (political and bureaucratic officials who have decision-making responsibilities and whose decisions become authoritative for society) and managers (implementors) in response to actual or anticipated reactions to reformist initiatives.

Role

Role refers to “a person’s or thing’s function in a particular situation” (Concise Oxford English Dictionary: 1246).

‘Street-level bureaucrats’

This term was first coined by Michael Lipsky in 1980 as a collective description of public officials who are responsible for service delivery.

The term is used in this study to refer to NFVF employees in their role as policy implementing officials.

5-C protocol

The 5-C protocol, as developed by Brynard and de Coning (2006:182) provides a set of inter-related variables that can be applied when analysing policy implementation. These relate to:

- the content of the policy;
- the context under which the policy is implemented;
- the commitment of the implementing institution to implement policy;
- the institution’s capacity to implement policy and;

- support from policy clients and coalitions.

This study sets out to examine the process of translating South Africa film policy into action and considers the activities undertaken in achieving the stated policy objectives. It aims to do this by looking at how the NFVF as an institution of policy set about implementing film policy through an analysis of the following factors: the policy content, policy context, the NFVF's capacity and commitment to implement film policy and how the NFVF's clients and other policy actors responded to the NFVF's efforts at implementing policy.

1.7 Chapter outline

The research report is divided into six chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction

The first chapter provides an introduction and background to the study. It includes the problem statement, research objectives, delineation of the study, and provides a definition of terms.

Chapter 2: Literature Review:

The second chapter provides an overview of related research in the field and the theoretical frameworks that were applied in the study.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology:

The chapter discusses the research methods, data collection and analysis, as well as the role of the researcher. The chapter also provides an overview of the limitations of the study.

Chapter 4: Presentation of findings

This chapter presents the findings from the study using the 5-C protocol for policy implementation. This chapter also includes a discussion on the NFVF's key policy moments.

Chapter 5: Analysis

This chapter presents an analysis of the findings in terms of the 5-C protocol, illustrating the interconnection between the variables.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The final chapter presents the conclusions to the study.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion of the South African film policy development process, highlighting policy areas that were identified as potentially problematic by researchers. These relate mainly to the lack of explicit implementation guidelines to the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF). The second part of the chapter includes a discussion on the theoretical framework that guided the study. The theoretical framework is based on an adaptation of different approaches to policy implementation studies, and settles on the five critical explanatory variables, or 5-C protocol developed by Brynard and de Coning (2006:182).

2.2 The South African film policy development process

The challenges confronting the implementation of film policy in South African are rooted in the formation of the policy for developing the industry as discussed in the problem statement. Various perspectives have been offered by academics (and practitioners) such as Williams (1995), Karam (1997), Mistry (2002), Saks (2003), Botha (2005, 2006) and Reddy (2005). Their concerns coalesce around the ideological framing of filmmaking in South Africa. The above-mentioned studies interrogate the associated difficulties in juxtaposing film as industry within a market-orientated and neo-liberal paradigm and film as cultural activity that has, as its primary focus the development of a national cinema that is representative of national identity.

2.2.1 Devolution of policy making to the NFVF

Karam (1997) undertook an ethnographic case study on the policy development process and the resultant film policy documents, namely the White Paper on Arts and the Arts and Culture Task Group Culture (ACTAG) Report. The study provides a perspective on the policy process, and weaknesses in the underlying ideological construction of film policy. Karam's central argument is that the film policy formulation process failed to resolve key ideological and operational challenges, starting even at the policy definition stage, and she argues that this would pose problems for the new institution that would inherit these conflicts.

Foucault's notion of 'governmentality,' as adapted by cultural policy scholars and as cited in Karam (1997:101), suggests that cultural policy should be viewed as constitutive and not determinative. Karam maintains that the concept of governmentality facilitates an investigation that includes cultural policy production, implementation and practices and institutions (Karam, 1997:101). Her ethnographic insider account, describes some of the difficulties encountered in the drafting process, which largely related to lack of agreement on the role of film and cultural in South Africa and related questions on the political economy of the South African industry.

Karam (1997:81) indicates that due the consensus-seeking nature of the policy development process, there were many important issues that were not adequately resolved by the policy framework but were instead deferred to the proposed statutory body. The final film policy as articulated in the White Paper and ACTAG report failed to provide

details on the implementation of the policy. It rather limited itself to addressing the administrative aspects of the NFVF such as the nature, composition and general functions of the NFVF.

Karam's critique focuses on the lack of specific policy provisions that would govern the management of the film industry through the NFVF. Karam (1997:104) notes that:

The focus for both documents is on the "why" and not the "how". There is an emphasis on the macro-structures and not the micro-practices.

Karam's study points to the challenges of accommodating multiple perspectives in policy-making. Karam argues that the policy focus should have been on broader theoretical issues including the role of the NFVF as a cultural institution and the structure of the South African film industry.

In a critique submitted to the Ministry of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology on the ACTAG report, Williams (1997:107) raises an inter-related set of concerns that focus on four substantive aspects of Arts and Culture. Firstly Williams (1995:108) highlights the lack of "conceptual precision" on the definition of culture and argues that the multiple definitions and "semantic flexibility" might be confusing. Secondly, Williams (1995:109) points to the range of methodologies used by different authors of different sections of the report which range from the discursive to the historical and reflective. Williams (1995: 111) further examines the theoretical frameworks that informed the document, and their potential impact on policy. Whilst acknowledging the potential economic benefit of cultural activities. Williams notes that references to the economic role of arts and culture

in the document should be checked by appropriate policy guidelines. He cautions that otherwise, this could lead to the commercialization of arts and culture and which limits participation to those who already have access to capital and excludes those who do not (1995:110).

With respect to the film industry, Williams (1995:111) asserts that perspectives put forward in the ACTAG report question the historical ideological underpinnings of cinema in a capitalist society but that "the ensuing policy guidelines, however, leave unanswered implicit questions regarding the nature of society." Finally, Williams (1995:112) assesses the policy aspects of the ACTAG report and concludes that "the practical implications of certain assumptions and/or recommendations have not been mooted, let alone having being spelled out in full."

These concerns are shared by Shepperson and Tomaselli (2002:68) in a political economy critique of the film industry's restructuring contained in the White Paper. Shepperson and Tomaselli (Ibid.) challenge the hands-off approach to the policy formulation process. They maintain that the White Paper "tended to avoid controversy rather than confronting it (Ibid.).

They concur that the devolution of responsibility for policy-making to the NFVF was unrealistic, given the complexity and corporatist nature of the film industry which the NFVF was expected to regulate. They further contend that the White Paper failed to define specific policy principles for the NFVF, limiting itself instead to proposing general conditions for the NFVF's institutional form, eligibility criteria and functions (Shepperson and Tomaselli, 2002:68).

The studies referenced above show that the policy development process leading up to the establishment of NFVF resulted in the newly-established institution inheriting a set of incompatible and incomplete policy directives that failed to take into account the operational, administrative and ideological aspects of film policy in South Africa. Williams (1995), Karam (1997) and Shepperson and Tomaselli (2002) highlight that questions on how South Africa's film policy would be implemented were left to the discretion of the NFVF.

2.2.2 The policy confusion

An inter-related set of concerns with the policy development process was its failure to locate film policy within the discourse of national cinema and national identity. Critiques offered by proponents of national cinema such as Mistry (2002), Saks (2003) and Treffry-Goatley (2010) argue that film policy should focus on film as a cultural activity and national identity rather than the limited focus on economic potential. Their construction of national cinema is based on a broad classification that encompasses diversity in content and subject-matter and which, when viewed collectively, could be said to constitute a national cinema.

In an assessment of film policy and filmmaking in post-Apartheid South Africa, Mistry (2002:242) criticises the policy-makers' narrow focus on establishing the legal and policy structures that would facilitate the film industry, and which obscured more important considerations such as the promotion of a national cinema. Mistry (2002:2) writes that film policy decisions were made:

...ad hoc to accommodate particular needs of independent producers, to facilitate co-production agreements and,

sometimes, to fend off criticism about the lack of government involvement in assisting with the development of the film industry. Like many of the observations presented on national cinemas, South Africa shares the burden of conflicted agendas regarding the role of national cinema as an ideologically important space for representation versus its economic aspiration of creating an industry (Mistry, 2002:2).

Mistry (2002:v) proposes that the focus should rather have been on attempting to create a national cinema for South Africa utilising existing resources, such as broadcasting before addressing the more “daunting task” of building an industry.

Saks (in Balseiro and Masilela, 2003:132) provides another perspective on the development of the film industry within the context of national cinema discourse. Saks (2003:140) argues that the discussion around a South African national cinema is being hindered by institutional rhetoric which attempts to balance cultural aspirations with economic potential. Saks (2003) argues that the potential to create a national cinema that would address the objectives stated in the 1996 White Paper on Arts and Culture is constrained by the social and historical continuities resulting from the post-Apartheid government's fluctuating and conflicting social and economic ideology. This is exemplified by the shift from the social democratic Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the more neo-liberal Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). This contradiction, Saks argues, is embedded in film policy. Therefore Saks (2003:141) suggests that the vision of a national cinema in this context is utopian, given the difficulties in reconciling cultural needs with marketplace dynamics.

Reddy (2005:46) refers to this policy contradiction as “the central confusion.” She indicates through her evaluation of the Department of

Trade and Industry's (DTI) large budget film and television incentive that the question surrounding the dual role of film as or industrial policy has not been fully resolved.

Reddy's case study focuses on the DTI as a policy instrument and assesses the effectiveness of government's support measures for the film industry. Reddy's (2005:41) findings reveal that there has been a shift in government's policy discourse from a more culturally orientated approach during the transition period to a more economic focus in later years. Her informants' views on this policy shift were mixed. 'Cultural purists' maintained that government's interventions should not be based solely on commercial considerations (Ibid: 43). In contrast, those in favour of the economic approach maintained that the role of government policy should be to ensure commercial sustainability.

Reddy (2005:80) emphasises that the challenge in assessing the incentive's impact is compounded by the lack of a commonly understood and accepted set of objectives for the industry's development. Hence she concludes that this has resulted in a lack of coherence in policy development and implementation. Reddy (2005:80) proposes that what is required is a "compatible set of objectives" between economic and cultural aspirations in order to more effectively facilitate an assessment of the incentive's efficacy.

Reddy (2005:82) identifies four additional factors that have had a negative impact on the film incentive: the lack of a strategy for film within the DTI, industry fragmentation and lack of transformation, film industry market structure and the limited availability to private capital. Reddy's (2005) study emphasises the lack of policy direction at a national level

and amongst the various state entities established to promote the film industry and the impact that this has had on government's support measures to the film industry.

The debate around the NFVF's mandate has not abated as Heatlie's (2011) study on the competitiveness of the South African film industry illustrates (2011:61). His analysis of the NFVF's policies and programmes for film financing reveals that there was some support for the NFVF and its programme. Some informants were however critical of the manner in which the NFVF interpreted its mandate, with one informant referring to it as the "NFVF's horribly muddled mandates" (Ibid.). The informants in Heatlie's study pointed to the NFVF's shortcomings which include the lack of a coherent film policy, confusion about transformation imperatives, and lack of clarity on its mandate. This dissatisfaction relates primarily to the perceived lack of strategic direction by the NFVF in relation to the transformation of the industry and its increasingly more commercial approach towards funding. Heatlie's research confirms some of the findings in Reddy's (2005) study and indicates this as an area that requires further investigation.

In a social-political analysis of South African post-apartheid cinema Treffry-Goatley (2010) agrees with Saks' assertion that the policy confusion has its origins in the ANC's broader neo-liberal reform agenda which "...has resulted in tensions and contradictions between different aspects of state policy" (2010:4). Based on interview findings, Treffry-Goatley (2010:85) observes that "...it is clear that there are some contradictions between the visions that filmmakers have of the industry and the planning and ideology of the state."

The above contextual overview illustrates the historical and political complexities surrounding the development of film policy in South Africa. More significantly it foregrounds the policy formation and implementation responsibilities placed on the newly established statutory body. The NFVF was expected to intervene in the policy landscape without adequate or clear direction on its mandate, nor any guiding principles as to how it should go about achieving its objectives. These expectations were made the more challenging by lack of explicit agreement on issues such as the cultural or economic orientation of film policy in South Africa.

Hill and Hupe (2002: 162) highlight that an implementation gap can sometimes occur when policy-makers think that policy documents are clear and give little direction to implementers. They note that "...often the formulations in such policy documents are the result of compromises, of various natures..." and can contain ambiguous messages to implementers. Furthermore, they suggest that policy compromises are the result of ideological and political debates right from the policy formulation stage. The literature review discussed above confirms that this was the case with South African film policy. Film scholars are in agreement that South Africa's film policy was the product of consensus between different stakeholders and consequently failed to adequately address the question of the NFVF's role in the industry.

2.3 Theoretical framework

This section discusses different perspectives on policy implementation. It includes an overview of the three generations of implementation

research. It also includes a discussion on the critical explanatory variables or 5-C protocol for assessing policy implementation.

2.4 Understanding policy implementation

Implementation research emerged as a distinct field of study from as early as the 1970s. There are however still various debates on what constitutes implementation. Traditional approaches to policy implementation tended to view it as the next sequential step after policy had been formulated. Over the years implementation studies have revealed that policy-making continues well into the implementation phase and that the two processes are in fact inter-linked.

In trying to understand the process of policy implementation, it may be useful to briefly consider where implementation occurs in the policy cycle. The policy process model provides a functional framework for understanding where implementation is located within this cycle. According to Kraft and Furlong (2003:71), "...the policy process model posits a logical sequence of activities affecting the development of public policies." This process model, also referred to as the policy stages model, identifies six distinct stages in the policy cycle. These include: agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy legitimization, policy implementation, policy and program evaluation, and policy change.

Although the model is useful in locating policy implementation as the set of activities that take place after policy has been formulated, it has however been criticised for not taking into account the dynamic and iterative nature of the policy process. Critics argue that the policy

stages model overlooks the ambiguous and contradictory interpretations of policy by policy-makers, implementers and beneficiaries alike. Its utility as an analytical tool can however be improved by more closely analysing the interplay between the different policy phases.

Scholars such as Pretorius (2003:17) argue against the conceptual split between policy-making and policy implementation. Pretorius asserts that policy-making and implementation are influenced by the political outcomes and conflicts that are inherent in the policy negotiation process (Ibid.). This is a particular feature of South Africa's consensus-seeking and multi-party policy-making landscape. Policy implementation therefore is "...incremental, iterative and reflexive" and is influenced by the policy process which is often "...tentative and incomplete" (Pretorius, 2003:17).

Pretorius' view is supported by May (2002:228) who asserts that decisions made during policy formulation shape the implementation of policy, as the quote below illustrates:

The process of policy design and implementation is not simply one of assembling parts and plugging in implementation machinery. The compromises that are necessary to gain support for a given policy explain why policy designs and implementation structures are often messy...

From this perspective, policy implementation is thus seen as a continuation of the policy formulation process as policy actors continue to make policy decisions about a range of actions which include organisation, interpretation and application. Interpretation, in particular is understood as the translation of the plans, mandate and

regulatory requirements into a form that is understandable to those for whom the policy was developed (Jones, in Kraft and Furlong, 2003:82).

For Brynard and de Coning (2006:194) implementation can be understood as both a noun, and as a verb. As a noun, implementation is "...the state of having achieved the goals of the policy." As a verb, implementation "...is a process – everything that happens in trying to achieve that policy objective" (Ibid.). Brynard and de Coning (2006) suggest that in order to understand the complex processes involved in implementing policy, one is required to follow policy as it moves through the implementation process, changing its environment, and in turn being influenced by the environment within which it is located. They propose that by following policy on its implementation journey, one can gain a better understanding of where improvements can be made in order to better achieve stated policy objectives.

The characterisation of implementation as dynamic and fluid illustrates that analysing policy implementation involves exploring the complexities involved in the process of implementing policy. This includes looking at the actions and motives of different policy actors who all have a stake in the policy outcome.

2.4.1 Development of policy implementation theory

As discussed in the previous section, policy implementation research is a contested area. There is yet to emerge a unitary approach to implementation (Brynard and de Coning, 2006:182). This may partly be attributed to the multi-disciplinary nature of implementation but could more readily be ascribed to the on-going debates on normative,

methodological and theoretical underpinnings of policy implementation (Hill & Hupe, 2002:82). Up until the early 1970s implementation was thought to follow a linear path. This was based on the assumption that policy-makers issued clear directives and policy implementers simply carried out the mandate as instructed (Hill & Hupe, 2002:42). Recent developments in the field have contradicted this assumption, as implementation has proven to encompass more than just complying with policy directives

Implementation research is characterised by three main categories, or generations of implementation scholars (Goggin, as cited in Pülzl & Treib, 2007). The first generation researchers and early implementation literature which emerged in the 1970s was overly pessimistic and focused almost exclusively on examples of “implementation failure” without providing any real policy recommendations as Colebatch (1998:56) observes. Consequently, the first generation of implementation researchers have been criticised for failing to add to the theoretical understanding of implementation as a field of study.

Implementation theory improved significantly under the second generation of implementation scholars who produced two contrasting theoretical frameworks - the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches (Pülzl & Treib, 2007, Brynard & de Coning, 2006; Colebatch, 1998 and Hill & Hupe, 2002). The top-down school of thought is premised on the assumption that policy-making, and therefore implementation is vested solely within formal structures of hierarchy and authority. The bottom-down school on the other hand, rejects this hierarchical approach and proposes that the focus rather should be on the role that implementing officials play in carrying out policy decisions.

The third generation of implementation scholars, the 'implementation synthesisers' or 'hybrid theorists' (Pülzl & Treib, 2007:95) advocate for a combination of top-down and bottom-up frameworks in order to more adequately account for the complexities and dynamics inherent in implementing policy.

2.4.2 Top-down perspectives

According to Pülzl & Treib (2007), top-down approaches to implementation are derived from the stagist or classic policy process model discussed earlier. The underlying assumption in many top-down perspectives is that clear policy directives are issued by policy-makers and therefore implementation is simply "...the carrying out of a basic policy decision" (Mazmanian & Sabatier, as cited in Pülzl & Treib, 2007:94). Another assumption is that policy-makers have the legitimacy to control the implementation process by supplying implementing agencies with the necessary resources and administrative procedures. Therefore the key characteristic of top-down research is based on what Pülzl & Treib (2007:91) describe as the "rational model approach" where policy implementation follows a linear process.

A major critique with the top-down model is the idea that policy-makers will always behave in a rational manner and therefore possess the ability to articulate clearly defined policy goals. As a result implementation failures are therefore blamed on administrators for not executing the policy correctly. Matland (1995:147) criticises the rational model of implementation for presuming that there is agreement between policy-makers, implementing officials and target groups on the policy goals to be achieved, which is rarely the case.

For theorists such as Yanow (1987), the top-down perspective also ignores the influence of policy debates that occurred prior to implementation. Yanow (1987:109) proposes that policy language is not always clearly defined and that policy objectives are sometimes purposefully ambiguous in order to accommodate the multiple interests involved in the policy-making process. The implication is that the policy meaning may be obscured and may be open to multiple interpretations by different policy actors.

A related perspective offered by Matland (1995:147) is that top-down approaches fail to take into account the influence and actions of other policy stakeholders, preferring instead to emphasise legislation to the exclusion of the policy-making context. For Colebatch (1998:56) a further limitation with top-down implementation models is the prescriptive assumption is that it is purely an administrative and institutional responsibility. This ignores the presence of contextual and other factors that influence the process.

These critiques on top-down theories clearly demonstrate that policy implementation is not simply a bureaucratic matter that can be determined by a linear relationship between policy-makers' goals and implementation. Policy outcomes can be influenced by a range of other factors such as goal ambiguity and policy actors' interpretations.

2.4.3 Bottom-up perspectives

The 'bottom-up' perspective developed in reaction to the rational model of implementation offered by top-downers. Bottom-up theorists argue that policy implementation should not be viewed solely from a

centrist perspective (Brynard and de Coning, 2006; Colebatch, 1998). The bottom-up approach proposes that policy implementers, rather than policy-makers are key to implementation and execute policy objectives through a network comprised of other policy actors.

Bottom-up theorists are strongly influenced by Lipsky's (2010) analysis of public servants that revealed that 'street-level bureaucrats' are critical actors in the implementation process because of the discretionary powers afforded to them by the roles they occupy. Lipsky (2010:3) initially used the term 'street-level bureaucrat' to describe civil servants responsible for providing welfare-type services (such as policing, education, healthcare etc). The phrase has since been appropriated by policy scholars to more generally refer to all categories of civil servants who:

...are public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work (Ibid).

Lipsky (2010) argues against the hierarchical model of implementation and calls for more emphasis to be placed on implementing officials. He proposes that "...the latitude of those charged with carrying out a policy is so substantial that...policy is effectively 'made' by the people who implement it." Lipsky (2010:3) further argues that policy implementers' actions effectively become agency policy because of the roles they occupy. Lipsky (2010) maintains that policy implementers develop various coping strategies to enable them to function under conditions of goal ambiguity and conflict based on different expectations of their roles.

As Hupe and Hill (2007:285) point out, street-level bureaucrats can fulfil:

...*de facto* policy-making and therefore political roles, it is not the substance of the legislation or policy statutory alone that is guiding their behaviour.

Building on from this perspective, Berman (1978 and 1980) and Hjern (1982, as cited in Matland, 1997:148-149) concur, stating that implementation should be understood from a micro-implementation level. They suggest that implementation research should analyse the goals, strategies, activities and problems of implementing officials in order to effectively assess policy implementation.

The bottom-up approach provides a more nuanced perspective from which to view implementation. It has however, come under criticism from researchers such as Hogwood and Gunn (in Hill and Hupe, 2002:173) for "...taking an oppositional stance to elected officials..." and not acknowledging the legitimate authority of political actors who exercise discretion over the implementation process.

2.4.4 Implementation synthesisers

Implementation synthesisers offer an alternative approach to implementation analysis based on a combination of bottom-up and top-down perspectives (Brynard & de Coning (2006:191-192), Hill & Hupe, (2002:57-84) and Matland (1995:150-153)). Whilst not offering a definitive theoretical framework as such, this approach considers the broader content and context of the specific policy being implemented (Brynard & de Coning, 2006:191).

Implementation synthesisers advocate for the inclusion of other variables that link policy formulation and policy implementation. Pölzl

& Treib (2007) provide a critique and overview of these variables in their analysis of three decades of implementation research. Jenkins-Smith, for example (1993, as cited in Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 95), proposes an 'advocacy coalition framework' that analyses the policy problem from the perspectives of multiple actors such as policy-makers, implementers and policy beneficiaries. A further contribution is made by Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O'Toole (1990, as cited in Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 96) who argue that implementation officials are also political actors that require negotiation between themselves and their political principals for implementation to succeed. Scharpf's (1978, as cited in Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 96) advocates for a policy networks approach that entails analysing the processes of partnership and harmonisation between mutually dependent role-players.

Another key contribution to the synthesis approach is provided by theorists that emphasise the importance of the type of policy to be implemented. The type of policy types involves different stakeholders and contains different levels of conflict that impact on implementation (Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 96).

Synthesisers such as Winter (1990, as cited in Pülzl & Treib, 2007: 96) focus on how the characteristics of the policy influence implementation. Different policy types involve different stakeholders. Policy types can be categorised as either distributive, regulatory or redistributive (Lowi, as cited in Brynard & de Coning, 2006:196). Distributive policies aim to provide public goods for the general welfare of the population and non-controversial (Brynard, 2005:17, Kraft and Furlong, 2004:88).

Redistributive policies, on the other hand, are more controversial and attempt to distribute resources and benefits to some groups over others (Kraft & Furlong, 2005:88, Brynard, 2005:17). Regulatory policies are characterised by restricting choice and behaviour through specific rules of conduct and sanctions for non-compliance (Kraft & Furlong, 2005:88, Brynard, 2005:17).

The other category of policy type is symbolic policy (Hill, 2013:210, Matland, 1995:168). Symbolic policies are often the product of politicians' desire to be seen to supporting certain goals or principles effecting change, without actually introducing any real changes to political systems (Hill, 2013:210). Such policies are enacted "...without any intention to secure implementation" (Ibid.). Symbolic policies are formulated in response to conflict and ambiguous situations.

2.4.5 Interpretive policy analysis

Despite the insight that implementation synthesisers brought to the field, Püzl & Treib (2007:99) maintain however that the synthesiser or "hybrid theories" approach is still inadequate in that it fails to give direction in terms of the specific factors or explanatory variables to be considered when undertaking implementation research. Püzl & Treib (2007:99) therefore suggest that policy actors should also consider a more interpretive approach to implementation analysis.

Interpretive policy analysis is concerned with how policy meaning is constructed and communicated in complex ways, rather than being purely rational and goal-oriented. Püzl & Treib (2007) propose that the interpretive paradigm is useful in distilling the complexities of

implementation by analysing the conflicts and multiple interpretations inherent in the process.

Drawing largely on the work of Dvora Yanow, a pioneer theorist in the field, Pölzl & Treib (2007:100) propose that interpretive analysis examines “the very definition of the problem” by exploring the construction and communication of the meaning of policy statements. According to Yanow (2000:8), interpretive policy analysis is concerned with the meanings policies have for a wide-range of policy actors.

Interpretive approaches consider the ‘how’ as well as the ‘what’ in examining the actions of legislators and decision-makers, and implementing agencies, which may be as critical in interpreting policy as the founding legislation itself. Interpretive policy analysis aims to explore the tensions and contradictions between policy intent, and policy action. Yanow (2000:9) points out that interpretive analysis should examine the understandings of different policy actors in the process. Yanow (Ibid.) concludes that “...what implementors do, rather than what the policy “says” in its explicit language, constitutes the “truth” of policy (and thereby the state’s) intent.”

Yanow (2000:10) suggests that traditional approaches to implementation analysis are limited in their use of policy intent as a point of reference, and suggests that “...implementation problems are often created by different understandings of policy language, it is important for analysts to access these other interpretations...”

In her view, interpretive policy analysis also "...explores the contrasts between policy meanings as intended by policymakers – "authored texts" and the possibly variant and even incommensurable meanings – "constructed" texts – made of them by other policy-relevant groups" (Ibid). Yanow (2000:10) identifies three main communities of meaning – policymakers, implementing agency personnel, and affected citizens or clients, who all interpret policy differently from statutory intentions. She notes further that policy debates "...do not die once a piece of legislation has been passed: they survive and resurface in subsequent debates, as well as in implementation actions." For Pülzl & Treib (2007:100), the implementation analyst's main task is "to examine how different actors interpret this policy culture and then track down the effect of these multiple understandings on the implementation process."

2.4.6 Variables for analysing policy implementation

Despite the lack of definitional clarity or epistemological consensus in the policy implementation field, Brynard and de Coning (2006:182) highlight the emergence of a set of key explanatory variables identified by implementation scholars over the years. These inter-related variables assist in providing a broad framework of factors that impact on the implementation process. They are derived from the implementation synthesiser approach, or hybrid theories discussed earlier. Brynard and de Coning (2006:182) highlight five critical explanatory variables (or 5-C protocol) which relates to: policy content, policy context, policy commitment, policy implementation capacity and policy client and coalitions. These protocols aims to take into account the complexity of the implementation process

Earlier contributions to developing explanatory variables were made by Van Meter and Van Horn (as cited in Brynard, 2000:171) who formulated a similar set of six inter-related variables for assessing implementation from a top-down perspective:

- The relevance of policy objectives and standards;
- Available policy resources;
- Organisational communication and enforcement;
- The nature of implementing agencies
- The broader economic, social and political environment and;
- The nature of implementing officials.

These implementation variables were further refined by Mazmanian and Sabatier (in Hill and Hupe, 2002:168). They proposed six "...sufficient conditions of effective implementation." Their requirements are that:

- 1) The enabling legislation should provide clear and consistent policy objectives;
- 2) Policy objectives should be based on a sound theoretical framework that empowers implementing officials to achieve their mandate;
- 3) The enabling legislation should structure the implementation process in a manner that supports implementation agencies, including supportive institutional arrangements, enabling rules, financial rules and access to supporters;
- 4) The management of implementing agencies should have sufficient managerial and political skills and should be committed to legislative goals;
- 5) The agency should have support and input from constituents and policy-makers during the implementation process, and that;

6) Legislative objectives should not be eroded by conflicting policies nor by changing socio-economic conditions that question the basis for the state's support.

Hill and Hupe (2002:123-136) further add to the development of explanatory variables by proposing a checklist of independent variables that are useful in analysing implementation processes. These include factors related to: the formation of policy, inter-governmental relations, factors affecting implementation agencies, horizontal inter-organisational relationships with institutions with a similar mandate, beneficiaries' response to the policy, and the broader policy context.

The inter-related variables proposed by the above-mentioned scholars share similar characteristics to the 5-C protocol developed by Brynard and de Coning (2006) and can be used to highlight key or common variables to consider when undertaking implementation research. The variables are interconnected and impact on each other in different ways depending on the implementation context.

Authors such as Hogwood and Gunn (1984:198) do however, argue against the prescriptive nature of the pre-conditions highlighted above, stating that 'perfect implementation' is impossible to achieve due to a variety of external factors and the dynamic nature of policy implementation. Nevertheless, the value of the common variables is that they offer an analytical solution to undertaking implementation research. The critical explanatory variables are discussed in more detail below.

2.4.6.1 Policy content

There is consensus that the content and characteristics of a policy are key determinants of policy implementation. Mazmanian (1979:545) stresses that for effective implementation to occur, the underlying legislation should be based on a sound theoretical framework that takes into account the factors and linkages that affect policy objectives. This should be done in order to empower implementing officials to achieve their mandate. Further Mazmanian (Ibid.) calls for the enabling legislation to provide clearly defined priorities for implementing agencies.

In addition to the policy types and statutory obligations highlighted earlier, the scope of the policy and tractability of the problem will also influence how implementation is undertaken. For example, May (2002:229) highlights that a more contained policy will be easier to implement. On the contrary, a broader, more heterogeneous policy will be more challenging to implement due to the degrees of similarity or difference amongst beneficiaries. Such policies will therefore require more adaption to ensure that they meet the different needs of diverse policy beneficiaries (Ibid).

2.4.6.2 Policy context

Brynard and de Coning (2006:198) propose that a more comprehensive understanding of the policy context can be established by analysing social, economic and political factors that might impact on the policy environment. Smith (1973:205) refers to these environmental factors as "...a sort of constraining corridor through which the implementation of policy must be forced."

Implementation literature recommends that the political and socio-economic environment should be stable and support policy implementation.

One of the key contextual considerations is the top-down prescript that responsibility for implementation should be vested in a single institution which does not depend on other agencies for successful implementation. The rationale behind this requirement is that implementation is less likely to be successful if there are a large number of agencies that are required to give consent or agree to a particular course of action (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984:199). These theorists, however, note that this condition is unrealistic because implementation often occurs across multiple agencies and implementation actors.

A more appropriate view offered by Hjern and Porter (1981, as cited in Colebatch, 1998:57) is that the entire relationship of policy actors should be analysed. They refer to this as the “implementation structure” (Ibid.) which takes into account both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of policy implementation. The vertical dimension has to do with the authoritative and hierarchical structure of the policy issue. The horizontal dimension is concerned with negotiating inter-organisational relationships regarding policy processes and the meaning of policy amongst policy actors who share the implementation responsibility (Ibid.).

This concept of horizontal relationships to effect implementation is further supported by May (2002:230) who asserts that it is no longer feasible to speak of a single implementation agency as it has become

necessary to consider the interplay of multiple implementation institutions in implementation structures. May (2002:230) views this structure as one that “both reflects the philosophy of the policy and engages entities that are committed to and have the capacity to carry out the policy.”

2.4.6.3 Commitment to policy implementation

The commitment of implementing officials to the policy goals is critical for effective implementation. May (2002:229) suggests actually building the commitment into the policy design. For example, the policy should contain “...features that encourage or compel intermediaries to carry out requisite actions for implementing the policy...” (Ibid.).

Commitment can be considered in two ways. Firstly one needs to consider nature of the implementing agency and ensure that there is sufficient commitment to policy goals. Secondly, one should consider the role of implementing officials in the process. For Brynard (2000:181), commitment to policy implementation by implementing agencies should also take into account the willingness and ability of implementing agents. Sabatier (1979:553) adds that commitment to statutory goals should be accompanied by leadership skills that drive resources towards achieving policy goals. He focuses on two specific aspects of leadership skills – political and managerial skills. Political skills encompass the development of good working relationships with political principles, the ability to convince critics and beneficiaries that the agency is adhering to good governance, the ability to mobilise support from neutral parties and the ability to use media and public

relations effectively. Strong managerial skills are required to put in place proper financial controls and to maintain staff morale. Sabatier (1979:553) further adds that leaders of implementing agencies should also be able to manage internal dissent when it arises. The leadership style and nature of leadership play a crucial role in the implementing agency's commitment to carrying out the policy objectives.

2.4.6.4 Capacity to implement policy

Brynard and de Coning (2006:199) advise that capacity considerations include tangible and intangible resources. Tangible resources include human, financial, material, technological and logistical resources. Intangible resources comprise of qualities such as leadership, courage, motivation etc. Brynard and de Coning (2006:200) caution however that the question of resources is as much a political one as it is administrative.

The availability of requisite resources to capacitate policy implementation also entails questions of how this "...capacity can be created and operationalised" (Ibid.). The availability of financial resources in particular is critical in determining the extent to which policy will be implemented successfully.

2.4.6.5 Policy clients and coalitions

The fifth critical variable for policy implementation, as described by Brynard and de Coning (2006:199), is the support of policy clients or beneficiaries, and outside coalitions or interest groups. May (2002:226-227) distinguishes between two types of policy implementation scenarios - 'policies with publics' and 'policies without publics.'

Policies with publics can be policy clients that are loose associations and highly fragmented. These types of policy clients can influence policy decisions by engaging strategically in the policy cycle. In addition, Smith (1973:204) maintains that the degree of organisation of the policy clients will also affect how they interact with the policy process.

For 'policies with publics' policy clients can make it difficult to reach consensus on policy issues as their actions could undermine decisions made by other policy actors (Ibid.). In such cases, the policy implementer's main focus will be on managing and structuring the relationship between clients and implementers. Policy implementers may also seek to influence clients' behaviour by, for example, creating a crisis in order to justify the introduction of new policies (Ibid.).

Policies that are implemented without publics allow implementers much greater autonomy. In this scenario, policy implementation can occur without pressure from active coalitions. The challenge however, is that it may be difficult to define the actual policy beneficiaries. In such cases, May (2002:227) suggests that policy implementers might "...stimulate the formation of publics. Mobilization of publics is appropriate when such participation of stakeholders is necessary for successful policy implementation..."

2.5 Framework for assessing the NFVF's implementation process

From the discussion above, it may be possible to highlight key or common variables to consider when undertaking implementation

research by combining and expanding on the clusters of explanatory variables from the perspective of street-level bureaucrats. These are presented in the table below:

Table 1: Framework for policy implementation variables

Implementation variable	Description
Policy content	The enabling legislation should provide clear and consistent policy objectives; The relationship between policy formation and implementation should be clear and take into account the impact on the policy mandate.
Policy context	Legislative objectives should not be eroded by conflicting policies nor by changing socio-economic or political conditions that question the basis for the state's support; There should be sound institutional relationships for policy implementation; The inter-organisational relationships with institutions with a similar mandate should be clarified.
Commitment of implementing institution	The nature of implementing agencies and the role of implementing officials should support the implementation process; There should be an element of participatory decision-making in policy implementation; Management of implementing agencies should have sufficient managerial and political skills and should be committed to legislative goals.
Institution's capacity to implement policy	Sufficient policy resources should be made available.
Policy clients and coalitions	There should be support from constituencies and policy-makers during the implementation process; The beneficiaries' response to the policy impacts on the implementation process.

Source: Adapted from 5-C protocol (Brynard and de Coning, 2006:182, Hill and Hupe, 2002)

2.6 Conclusion

Implementation theories offer a useful framework for analysing the processes of policy implementation and interpretation as undertaken by NFVF. Lipsky's (2010) study on the behaviour of street-level

bureaucrats is particularly helpful for this case study as the literature review suggests that the NFVF was given wide-ranging discretion over the implementation process. Top-down theories provide a set of valuable preconditions from which to assess implementation activities, although as noted by Hogwood and Gunn (1984:198) 'perfect implementation' does not exist. Bottom-up perspectives facilitate a better understanding of the role of implementing officials in the policy cycle. The implementation synthesiser approach, as elaborated in the 5-C protocol provides a useful framework from which to undertake an analysis of the NFVF's implementation processes.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This section outlines the methodology that was used to implement the research question which examines the implementation of film policy through the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF) between 2000 - 2005. The researcher conducted a qualitative study to understand the process of policy implementation. This section also discusses the role of the researcher in conducting the study. The research adapted and designed an analytical framework based on Brynard and de Coning's (2006) 5-C protocol, or critical explanatory categories used in the collection of data.

3.2 Research methods

The research method was qualitative in nature to allow for a complete understanding of the circumstances that influenced the NFVF's implementation of policy. Qualitative research assumes that knowledge and meaning are negotiated through socio-historical contexts and that this enables the researcher operating in this field to interpret the subjects' meaning and understanding of events (Creswell, 1994). In the interpretive paradigm, the researcher seeks to develop a detailed understanding of the various components of an issue and then to reconstruct the relationship of each component to the whole. In this way, the researcher is able to gain a deeper understanding of how the subjects' assign meaning to the events taking place around them (Neuman, (1997:72).

The qualitative approach used in this study allowed for an analysis of the complexity of views and variables embedded in the film policy implementation process.

3.3 Research design

The research project was undertaken as a case study in order to analyse the process of implementing film policy through the NFVF as an institution of policy. According to Merriam (1988:9), case study research may be undertaken in order to answer “how” and “why” questions. Thus it was an exploratory in that it attempted to find answers to the “how” questions, which were related to how the NFVF understood and implemented its policy mandate from 2000 - 2005. It was also explanatory in trying to unpack the “what” questions that considered the factors that influenced the policy implementation process.

Wilson (in Merriam, 1988:11) proposes that a case study is a process “...which tries to describe and analyze some entity in qualitative, complex and comprehensive terms not infrequently as it unfolds over a period of time”. Case studies are thus useful in attempting to observe multiple factors in order to gain a complete understanding of an event or situation (Badenhorst, 2007:1). Given the complex nature of the implementation process, the case study approach was found to be the most suitable.

Merriam (1998:11) proposes that there are four elements that typify a case study. Firstly, the specificity of case studies enables them to “...concentrate attention on the way particular groups of people confront specific problems, taking a holistic view of the situation.” Secondly, case studies are descriptive, and offer a “thick” description of

the issue being investigated. Case studies allow for an examination of different variables to provide an in-depth description of the issue.

Thirdly, case studies also have a heuristic element that enables the reader to better understand, or re-consider a particular issue. This was necessary in analysing the NFVF's attempts at interpreting and implementing its policy mandate. Finally, because case studies are inductive, hypotheses emerge from an assessment of data and the context (Merriam, 1988:130).

For Yin (in Tellis, 1997:3), case studies are also useful in explaining causal relationships in situations as they describe the "real-life" context in which the event has occurred. The case study method was found to be appropriate given the nature of the questions that formed the basis of the research problem. The study sought to understand the linkages between the policy formation and implementation processes vested in the NFVF.

3.4 Data collection

Case study data may be collected from various sources. These include: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and artefacts. In this case, data was collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews and documentary evidence (Yin in Tellis, 1997:3).

The researcher collected primary data from in-depth interviews with participants. Interviews were supplemented with documentary evidence and official records in an effort to triangulate the data and corroborate the findings. Triangulation allowed the researcher to

assess multiple perspectives arising from participants' responses and official documents. This was to insure against interviewee bias or inaccurate recollection. Triangulation also ensured that policy texts could be read against respondents' views.

Interviews were conducted with eight participants between September and October 2012. Seven of the interviews were recorded (and later transcribed) with the participants' permission and the researcher took notes during the interviews. One interview was conducted telephonically and the researcher made detailed notes. Emails were sent to all participants, and followed up with telephonic confirmation of the interview date and location.

3.4.1 In-depth interviews

The interview method of data collection was relevant to this type of research as it aims to explore the various factors involved in interpreting a policy mandate and the development of an institutional response. The use of interviews in case studies can present more targeted and insightful information. Informants who were selected were in the main 'street-level bureaucrats' who were the implementing officials of film policy between 2000 and 2005. They were selected on the basis of their understanding of the policy issues and proximity to the policy implementation process.

The interviews followed a semi-structured but comprehensive guide to allow informants the flexibility to discuss issues of importance from their perspective, but also ensure that responses address themselves to the

research interest. As a result, not all questions were covered with all informants. Most interviews took between 1 – 1.5 hours to conduct.

The instrument that was used for data collection was an interview guide that was developed using an adaptation of the 5-C protocol from implementation literature. This enabled the researcher to gain an understanding of the key factors that impacted on the NFVF policy implementation process in relation to theoretical assumptions about implementation. The interview guide is attached as Appendix A.

3.4.2 Documentary analysis

The second set of data collected was derived from the following official documents:

- The Film Development Strategy (1996);
- Cultural Industries Growth Strategy (1998);
- Profile 2000: Towards a viable South African film industry (2000);
- National Film and Video Foundation Act (No. 73 of 1997);
- National Film and Video Foundation Strategy Documents;
- National Film and Video Foundation Value Charters (2004a, 2009);
- National Film and Video Foundation Annual Reports (2001-2005);
- Indaba reports (2001b, 2005b); and
- National Film and Video Foundation presentations to the Portfolio Committee on Arts and Culture.

3.4.3 Population and sample

The unit of analysis in this case study is the implementation of film policy through the NFVF as an institution. This unit of data collection represents a known population, hence the value of using purposive sampling. Interview informants were selected on the basis of their involvement and proximity to the policy implementation process. The

sample was largely made up of 'street-level' bureaucrats, who were tasked with implementing the policy.

Informants were selected using non-probability purposive sampling. A purposive sample is selected on the basis of the researcher's personal judgement (Babbie, 2005:189). This was an appropriate sampling technique as key informants were selected on the basis of their intimate knowledge of the policy development and implementation process and association with the NFVF. Official documents were sourced from the NFVF itself and from the government website.

3.5 Data analysis

Creswell, 2003:133) states that qualitative research follows an inductive logic in that the researcher gathers data from sources, then identifies broad patterns or themes, that are assessed against theoretical assumptions and existing literature. Thus the data analysis and interpretation was based on the interviews and documentary evidence. The broad areas under investigation were contained in the interview guide based on the 5-C framework discussed in Chapter Two. These were an assessment of: the policy content, policy context, commitment and capacity of the NFVF to implement policy, and relationship with clients and coalitions.

Interview data was transcribed and arranged according to the themes that emerged based on the theoretical framework. The themes were based on the research question which was to examine the implementation of film policy through the NFVF from 2000 – 2005.

The documentary analysis was similarly undertaken using the 5-C protocol. In addition, the researcher relied on the advice offered by Ginger (2006:347) when analysing policy texts. The researcher should consider: the authority given to policy documents by the responsible signatories, the authors of the text, their interests in the specific context and in the policy context more generally, and how the process of producing the policy documents fits into the broader policy process and context. For Bowe, Ball and Gold (1992, in Hill and Hupe, 2009: 143), qualitative research into policy implementation should also include an analysis of policy texts as "...policy is not done and finished at the legislative moment...it evolves in and through the texts that represent it, texts have to be read with and against one another – intertextuality is important."

3.6 Validity and reliability

There are four main tests that have been used to ensure the quality of case study research. These include: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability Yin (2009: 40). For purposes of this study, construct validity, external validity and reliability will be more applicable.

Construct validity refers to the identification of the most appropriate measures for the concepts being studied. External validity will refer to the extent to which the study's findings can be generalised. Reliability is the extent to which the study can be replicated with the same results. The following three methods are useful in increasing construct validity: the use of multiple sources of evidence, the establishment of a chain of evidence and a review of the draft case study by key informants (Yin, 2009:42). In

this case study the researcher relied on data supplied by respondents and documentary evidence.

In this research, external validity is qualified by analytical generalisation of a particular theory (Yin, 2009: 42). To ensure reliability, Yin (2009:45) proposes that "...the general way of approaching the reliability problem is to make as many steps as operational as possible and to conduct research as if someone were always looking over your shoulder." Merriam (1988:183) further proposes that a case study's reliability can be enhanced by an explanation of assumptions and theories that informed the research, through engaging in data triangulation, and by thoroughly explaining how the research was conducted

For Yin (in Tellis, 1997:4), the use of data triangulation in case studies is to ensure "accuracy and alternative explanations." Merriam (1988:183) concurs with this view and advocates for the use of triangulation, data checking and interpretation, and clarification of researcher bias and assumptions in order to enhance a case study's internal validity, or approximation to reality. However, both Tellis (1997:3) and Merriam (1988:184) concede that external validity – the generalisability of findings – is difficult to achieve in case study context given the specific of the investigation

3.6.1 Researcher's role

The researcher's interest in the study was to gain a better understanding of the NFVF's policy trajectory from formation to implementation phase during the first five years of the NFVF's existence.

The researcher was employed at the National Film and Video Foundation in 2006 and 2007 and has interacted professionally with

most informants. The benefit of this experience for the study was the researcher's knowledge of the policy issues and key areas of operation. The researcher's former position at the NFVF enhanced access to informants ensuring that they were willing to participate in the study. A major consideration was the potential for researcher bias which may have implications for the study's external validity. The researcher relied on policy texts and interviews to enhance the study's validity.

Another cautionary note in any qualitative study is the potential for interviewee bias based on the researcher's presence and the act of being interviewed. The researcher attempted to focus informants' responses on the research topic and exclude observations that were not relevant to the topic. Where this was not possible, the researcher attempted to assess the informant's anecdotal evidence in terms of how their perspective might have influenced their role in the implementation process.

Creswell (2003:182) states that all qualitative research is "fundamentally interpretive" given that the researcher makes value-judgments about which questions to ask, thematic areas to explore and in drawing conclusions. However, Creswell (Ibid.) suggests that all researchers "filter data through a personal lens" and that the element of personal interpretation will always be present in qualitative studies. Thus the researcher should "use *rich, thick description* to convey the findings" in order to maintain the validity of the findings. This approach entails providing sufficient detail for the reader to assess the evidence presented by the data in relation to the researcher's conclusions (2003:196).

The researcher acknowledges that case studies cannot lay claim to generalisability due to their specificity. It is doubtful that another researcher using the same methods might arrive at exactly the same conclusions. However, the value of this study is the use of theoretical models of policy implementation theory.

3.7 Limitations of the study

As the study analyses an historic process, namely, the implementation of policy from 2000 to 2005, the validity of the study may be compromised by informants' recollection of events given the time lapse. The study was conducted in 2012 and related to events that took place from 2000-2005. This may be a serious limitation to the study but the researcher has relied closely on documentary evidence to triangulate the findings.

Another limitation was that the study is based on the perspectives of eight key informants who were central to how the implementation process unfolded at the NFVF. The researcher requested interviews with other participants who were former NFVF Council members and former employees but they were either unable or unwilling to participate in the study. However the informants interviewed provided adequate scope for analysis and there was sufficient material in official records to enable the researcher to re-construct the implementation process.

The researcher also attempted to interview representatives of other industry associations but they were unavailable during the research

period. The unavailability of key informants, particularly from policy clients/beneficiaries was a serious limitation to the study. Their views may have enhanced the research findings by providing insights from the perspective of those for whom the policy was intended to benefit. Further research on this topic could be enhanced by expanding the participant base to include other clients and beneficiaries of the NFVF's programmes.

3.8 Ethical considerations

The researcher explained the purpose of the study to informants before data collection. In the interview guide the researcher indicated to participants that participation is voluntary and that they have the right to withdraw at any point during the interview. The researcher verbally sought consent to record the interviews, explaining that they would be used for transcription and analytical purposes. Although some informants were comfortable to reveal their identities, the researcher assured all participants that their identities would not be disclosed.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter presented the methodology that was used in the research. The study used a qualitative methodology in the form of an exploratory and explanatory case study. The case study enabled an analysis of different explanatory variables to provide an in-depth description of the policy implementation process through the NFVF. The research adapted the 5-C protocol in order to examine the policy implementation process from the perspective of street-level

bureaucrats. Data obtained from official policy documents was triangulated with interviews from respondents to allow for depth of coverage of the research question.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This section presents and discusses the findings gathered through a qualitative analysis of documentary evidence and in-depth interviews. The findings are presented in terms of the policy implementation framework, or 5-C protocol discussed in Chapter Two. The 5-C protocol emphasises the following key aspects related to policy implementation: policy content, policy context, commitment of the implementing institution, capacity to implement policy and policy coalitions and clients.

In addition, the findings are discussed under various themes that emerged from the discussion. Under policy content, the discussion focuses on the clarity of the NFVF's objectives, interpretational issues, the NFVF's role and mandate, contestation on the NFVF's role in policy-making, the NFVF's cultural and commercial mandate as well as identified policy gaps. The themes that are discussed under policy context include: the governance and institutional arrangements for implementation as well as the lack of policy coherence and co-ordination. Under policy commitment the themes are: leadership and institutional style, consultation and decision-making, and strategy development. The NFVF's capacity to implement policy is discussed in terms of financial and human resources as well as implementation successes and challenges. Finally, the last section discusses the NFVF's policy clients and coalitions.

Most informants indicated that they would prefer to remain anonymous and therefore are referenced from A- H in the order in which the interviews were conducted.

Table 2: Informants

INFORMANT	ROLE IN THE POLICY PROCESS	DATE
Informant A	Former NFVF Senior Manager	17 September 2012
Informant B	Member of the Inaugural NFVF Council / Filmmaker	20 September 2012
Informant C	Former NFVF Executive	20 September 2012
Informant D	Department of Arts and Culture Representative	28 September 2012
Informant E	NFVF Manager	28 September 2012
Informant F	Former Senior Manager	05 October 2012
Informant G	NFVF Executive	09 October 2012
Informant H	Industry representative /Filmmaker	23 October 2012

4.2 Policy content

The first variable that was analysed related to the policy content. The researcher asked the informants to provide their perceptions on the clarity of the policy objectives in the NFVF Act. The researcher particularly sought to assess policy actors' understanding and interpretation of the NFVF's mandate. Four main themes emerged from the discussion, namely: the clarity of the NFVF's policy objectives, the NFVF's cultural and commercial mandate, the role of the NFVF in policy implementation, and any identified policy gaps that were not addressed by the Act. Interview responses are discussed below and consolidated with findings from the document review.

4.2.1 Clarity of the NFVF's policy objectives

Informants were all in agreement that the NFVF Act provided sufficiently clear policy objectives which were based primarily on

Object 3(a) which is to "...develop and promote the film and video industry." They understood this to encompass both industry development and cultural objectives.

The second significant policy objective highlighted by informants was the transformation of the industry. Informant B's comment captures the general sentiment, which indicates that from a street-level bureaucrat's perspective, there was a comfortable nexus between the goals of promoting the industry commercially, and cultural development and transformation:

The mission was to be a leading player in the film world both locally and internationally so that we could compete on a commercial level but obviously with a cultural imperative of ensuring that we were putting across the story of the country and to ensure that there was obviously transformation. Transformation was key throughout the process (Interview, 20 September 2012).

4.2.1.1 Interpretational issues

Although informants agreed that the objectives of the Act were clear and realistic, they raised questions about the precise meaning of the terms 'to promote' and 'to develop' which were not clearly defined in the Act and were, as a result, open to interpretation.

Informant G, an NFVF Executive, (Interview, 09 October 2012) points to the challenge in defining the directive 'to promote and develop' and asks "...what does that word 'develop' mean and what does that word 'promote' mean...?" The informant notes that established filmmakers might interpret 'promote' to mean that they should be supported in the same manner that emerging filmmakers might

interpret development to mean that there should be more training offered for them.

Informant D, a DAC official, (Interview, 28 September 2012) picks up on this point, stating that the term 'development' is quite broad and may have a dual meaning:

...development is wide so there is development in the area of economic growth but there's also development in the true sense of the word, developing at an entry level so there are those two aspects of development.

Former NFVF Executive, Informant C, welcomed the broad interpretation the Act provided, stating that:

... We had a broad interpretation. What you always had to look at was the spirit of the Act, what is the Act meant to achieve. You can't come up with a very narrow interpretation" (Interview, 20 September 2012).

However, for Informant A, the lack of definitional clarity meant that sometimes the NFVF missed the mark, noting that the beneficiaries of the NFVF's development initiatives were often the larger more established Gauteng-based companies (Interview, 17 September 2012). The lack of specificity in terms of the objectives is echoed by Informant D who comments that there was broad focus on the need to grow the industry but the question of what kind of growth or economic impact the policy envisaged, was not considered (Interview, 28 September 2012).

The ambiguity contained in the film policy was transferred to the NFVF through the Act. There were multiple interpretations of the NFVF's

policy objectives but this did not seem to pose a challenge at an operational level. The implementing officials interviewed accommodated the development and promotion of both more established professional and entry-level filmmakers.

4.2.2 The NFVF's role and mandate

Informants stated that the NFVF Act provided sufficiently clear policy objectives from which they were able to distil two main policy objectives – the development and promotion of the film and video industry and the transformation of the industry. Their views on the role and mandate of the NFVF and perceptions of how the industry and policy-makers viewed the NFVF indicate that there were different understandings on what the NFVF's role should be. This invariably resulted in a contestation of space which led to questions on the NFVF's function and authority over film policy and implementation in South Africa. The following quotes below illustrate the differences in how the NFVF perceives its role and how the industry perceives its role.

Informant C, a former NFVF Executive provides this perspective:

I can assure you, at a political level, the Minister says to me “no man , let's just give people [money] to tell their stories” and I say ‘ja ja Minister’ but I can tell you this that our people want houses so let's just give people money to build their own houses. You know what's going to happen? First rains – people need to understand that there's got to be a foundation. And that with filmmaking you need to have a script as a foundation and people need to be trained, and we're not training people... (Interview, 20 September 2012).

In contrast, Informant H, a filmmaker and industry representative provides the following view on the NFVF's role:

What I do think is exciting is that there's a group of young filmmakers that have emerged that are borrowing R5 000 from their grannies and uncles and aunties and they're making these little films and they're selling them out the back of their cars and they're doing good stuff and they're formalising themselves... – they do not want a nanny role from the NFVF – they want financial liberation. And all they want is to have put in place, opportunities for them to mine, as opposed to somebody mining it for them...

The quotes above demonstrate that the NFVF and industry essentially differed on what was the best strategy for the industry's development.

4.2.2.1 Contestation around the NFVF's role in policy-development

Informant E, an NFVF Manager, notes that the biggest challenge confronting the NFVF in its formative years was the "...expectation that the NFVF will come and it will alleviate all the problems in the industry" (Interview, 28 September 2012. Informant's E's experience was that filmmakers felt that the NFVF was obliged to give them money without question:

...And don't forget that at the time, there were very few prominent black filmmakers in the industry. They thought they would have free reign in terms of the money, just give them money and they go away and do whatever they wanted. And the production sector was mainly white-driven and they also had this expectation of just give us money and we'll go do things our way. Because with the interim film fund from the DAC, they used to just give out money. But when the NFVF was established, we set up systems, so when you get funding you needed to account for it... (Informant E, Interview, 28 September 2012).

The perspective offered by Informant E echoes the sentiments expressed by Informants C and G that filmmakers tended to view the

NFVF solely as a funding institution, and failed to accommodate its role as a policy-making institution as well. This was also a site of contestation between the NFVF and its oversight body, the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC).

Informant G adds that:

...I mean they [the industry] felt back then that why are we developing policy? 'You should be funding us'. And maybe from the DAC's point of view, it was like 'you should just be funding projects and funding the kinds of projects we tell you'. I think in all that time, it was for the NFVF to cement its role that we are policy-drivers and that for anything film-related, we are the authority. We were supposed to be the authority (Interview, 09 October 2012).

But for Informant F, a former Senior Manager at the NFVF, the NFVF itself prioritised funding as it was viewed primarily as a funding agency, and then it later started initiating programmes around development and training.

There was no dispute over the NFVF's role as a funding institution. Its funding mandate was clear and welcomed by its stakeholders. Furthermore it was a statutory requirement as per the Act. What was at issue was the fact that the NFVF saw itself as more than just a funding body. It aspired to play a more strategic and more policy-orientated role in the development and promotion of the film industry in its formative years. This was questioned and criticised by its beneficiaries, as Informant H, an industry representative articulates below:

I do think that in recent years the NFVF made enemies in the industry when it started to delve into distribution because it felt like the NFVF was being competitive with industry itself instead of saying 'who in the industry is working on finding interesting

distribution mechanisms and how can we support them?.' The NFVF was saying 'we're going to start creating a distribution...and therefore there was a feeling that if you wanted to get funding, and then suddenly somebody was talking about distribution...and you know it became complicated. And I think in that particular period, there was a loss of confidence and a loss of trust.

Informant G (Interview, 09 October 2012) provides a different perspective as an implementation bureaucrat:

No it [the Act] just says you must develop and you must promote, and you may give grants and you may give loans... and I think a big one at the moment is distribution because the Act says you may be involved in distribution. And of course some of the distributors are saying, actually, that means you must give us the money and we can do with it whatever we want and we're kind of saying, no, we want to develop a distribution policy that will ensure that there's enough players in the market, that films get seen by all South Africans you know so I think there's always those kind of challenges but again a lot of it has to do with consultation and trying to get a meeting of minds. Earlier this year we had a distribution forum where we thrashed out a lot of these issues where people came and said well that's our view and why do you think this way. So I think we'll always have you know this communication around what certain words mean, and how do we operationally put those words into practice.¹

4.2.2.2 The NFVF's cultural and commercial mandate

The question of whether or not the NFVF should focus on film as cultural or commercial activity was not generally perceived to be the most critical nor problematic aspect of the NFVF's role and mandate.

¹ The distribution policy was negotiated in 2012, and therefore falls outside the scope of this study's time period. However, the perspectives offered by Informants G and H indicates that the lack of specificity around the NFVF's role and mandate continued to present itself as a challenge that impacted negatively on implementation.

Informants were of the view that its dual function was implied in its broader mandate and policy objectives.

The quotation below, from Informant H, an industry representative and filmmaker captures the nuance of balancing the cultural and commercial mandates:

Firstly a commercial mandate is simple on the one hand. You want to support commercial ventures, you want to support an industry that's going to be commercially viable, I mean the country needs it. That's got to be the focus. On the other hand you're talking about an industry that is the collective memory of our country, of our stories, of our history, of all these things that are really important. And how do you encourage that? I do think that one needs to separate the two and say these are projects that are for the benefit of our nation, and they should be funded and supported and they should be understood that they're not necessarily commercially viable (Interview, 23 October 2012).

From Informant G's perspective, the NFVF made a conscious shift from a more cultural to commercial mandate in response to government's pronounced policy shift towards economic development and job creation. This also resulted in the NFVF modifying its funding criteria to include recoupment and commercial potential as preconditions for funding. Informant G (Interview, 09 October 2012) states that:

Government is looking no longer just at the soft issues and I think it's also because we are in the space where we are contesting for resources and in that space it was the kind of things that would appeal to the policy-makers and Treasury would be, 'Are you creating jobs? What economic benefit are you bringing towards the country?' So that's the kind of thing they were looking for and obviously that then would determine the choices we had to make. So then we came up with the recoupment policy, looking at projects that are more

commercially viable, looking at projects that would be sustainable.

Informant F offered a similar perspective, indicating that balancing cultural and commercial imperatives is a general challenge “especially for state owned entities that have a development mandate but in a commercial environment” (Interview, 05 October 2012). For the informant, the specific challenge was that:

...the NFVF was mandated to support South African cinema but South African films were not successful in terms of theatrical release. Money was being spent in funding production but the audience was just not there. The challenge was to create content that is commercially viable. The challenge was to create content that is commercially viable. The only people who were doing this well and benefitting were historically experienced producers.

There were a number of interventions. The NFVF had a developmental objective but the product was not proving to be competitive. This was due to poor scripts which resulted in the finished product being compromised. That's why we launched Sediba to address the skills challenges in script development.

The views from informants indicate that the NFVF was aware of the need to balance commercial viability with cultural obligations but that it was constrained by the need to ensure the ‘competitiveness’ of South African film product. Informant H, an industry representative and filmmaker, elaborates on this point further:

...So on the one hand you're wanting to promote local, not only local content and local development, but also transformation in that, but on the other end you're competing with a very competitive industry around the world that doesn't have any of those agendas so they can be fiercely aggressive. And I think that often creates that dynamic tension which is healthy because I think it's the dynamic tension of our country so it's a

complex and interesting space. And I think the NFVF sits in that sphere (Interview, 23 October 2012).

The arguments put forward by informants are that poor scripts, the obligations of transformation and lack of audience development presented an obstacle to the NFVF's commitment to cultural content. In response, the NFVF initiated a number of development initiatives such as the introduction of script-writing workshops. The NFVF also developed a recoupment policy in an attempt to mirror government's broader macro-economic objectives of job-creation and sustainability.

4.2.3 Policy gaps

Informants identified specific policy gaps that had not been adequately addressed by the Act. For Informant G (Interview, 09 October 2012), an Executive at the NFVF, these include a lack of regulations that accompany the Act, which might, in the informant's view, have assisted with interpretational issues. However, Informant H, a filmmaker and industry representative resists the proposal for regulations to the Act, arguing that:

...on one hand you need an industry that can move quickly and that can make decisions quickly and can be responsive. And regulation can often make things incredibly bureaucratic, and make the decision-making process incredibly slow" (Interview, 23 October 2012).

Informant B, a member of the Inaugural NFVF Council and filmmaker, identified a policy loophole with regard to exhibition. This informant argues for the development of a charter to force exhibitors to promote South African films, (Interview, 20 September 2012).

Informant H raises a similar concern in the context of the NFVF's policy role in addressing intellectual property rights issues. Informant H argues that the NFVF's actions are self-defeating and makes the point that:

the NFVF goes on all these junkets and presents itself at Cannes or etc...you're selling such a small group of people because you're only selling a few that have got the financial means to own their own [intellectual property] IP...Because it's a big industry but the very people that they say they are trying to help in transformation are struggling to enter that market... (Informant H, Interview, 23 October 2012).

Informants highlighted the difficulties encountered when the type of policy being implementing is redistributive which points to some contradictions in policy. These as articulated by Informant D (Interview, 28 September 2012), related to whether or not the NFVF, as a development institution can engage in income generating activities, such as recoupment and granting loans.

Informant E's (Interview, 28 September 2012) concerns revolved around the establishment of the NFVF's two funds, the Film and Video Initiative, and the Film Development Fund. From the informant's perspective, the Act's silence on specific allocations between the two funds proved to be problematic as it gave no indication of the details of how the two funds would operate. As a result of the NFVF's budgetary constraints the NFVF did not establish two separate funds and "...just carried on with its mandate of funding." For Informant E (Ibid.):

...if you say you're going to have a film fund, you need to be very clear to say what it is you're going to fund and for how much. And the Act didn't do that because whilst we provide for development, you also need a lot of money for production. And we know that R18m is the budget for one film.

For Informant G (Interview, 09 October 2012), the challenge relates to the NFVF's scope and how open it is to different interpretations by decision-makers, as the quote below illustrates:

I think because generally acts are quite broad that has presented challenges because firstly it's actually how people understand what the Act means and secondly, it comes to interpretation. So I think at various points, and this is always what generates the debate, as to what is it the NFVF is supposed to be doing and I think even ten years on you will see, especially if a new Council comes in, you always see people having their own take on what it is they think we should be doing. I think that is probably the nature of how Acts generally are because they are supposed to be all-encompassing and they are trying to address a wide range of issues.

The reflections from informants reveal the ambiguity embedded in the design of the policy and in policy goals. The NFVF was given a broad mandate to promote and develop the industry with no further direction as to the form that this support should take. Yanow (1987) reminds us that policy language may sometimes be purposefully ambiguous in order to accommodate conflicting interests. This is explored further in a review of key policy documents below.

4.2.4 The Film Development Strategy and other policy developments

The goal of South African film policy was always to effect progressive change in the South African film landscape with the twin requirements of commercial sustainability. This is a recurring theme in many of its policy documents.

The final report submitted by the Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG) (1995:283) clearly frames the redistributive objectives of the film

industry against the backdrop of the imperatives of the RDP, noting that:

The RDP places an emphasis on affirmative action promotion of a country and personal talent, to the same extent as does the motion picture industry to unlock the energies and creativity suppressed by racism and discrimination. As to the creative development of talent, no other industry allows for the promotion of a country and personal talent, to the same extent as does the motion picture industry.

Yet in the very next paragraph of the document, the long-term aim of the restructuring exercise is described as being "...to put it [the industry] on a sound commercial footing, to enable it to become internationally competitive." The drafters conclude that the goals of the RDP will have been "...affirmed and met" through restructuring the industry:

...focusing on promoting the development of an indigenous, national South African film industry free of racism and sexism; adopting affirmative action policies to redress imbalances of the past; supporting training of film-makers, script writers etcetera; supporting wider distribution and exhibition of films and videos, particularly in areas which currently have the least access to audiovisual communication, funding ongoing research into audiovisual technology; making the information available as widely as possible and creating economic opportunities (ACTAG, 1995:283).

As far as the government was concerned, the industrialisation of the sector was almost a prerequisite to other priorities and strategic objectives identified for the sector. The transformation of the sector through affirmative action, which was constructed in terms of "equity" and "redress", would to a large extent be facilitated by promoting South African culture, driven by entry and access to international

markets. DACST even went so far as to kick-start the process through the allocation of a R10 million Interim Film Fund².

According to chapter 4 of the Film Development Strategy (1996b:7), the objectives of the soon-to-be-established South African Film and Video Foundation (SAFVF) were to:

- (a) promote the development of an indigenous, national South African film industry, which caters for all language and cultural groups and provides entertainment, education and information;
- (b) effect affirmative action policies to redress the imbalances of the past;
- (c) support the training of creative personnel and personnel working in the associated business functions of the industry;
- (d) support wider film distribution and exhibition, particularly in areas which currently have the least access to film communication facilities;
- (e) promote ongoing research into film policy;
- (f) disseminate information on film as widely as possible; and
- (g) provide funds both for production purposes and for training and development.

The strategy document (South Africa, 1996b:8) does, however, acknowledge that the new statutory body should fund a diversity of films, and emphasises that whilst film production may be viewed as commercial products, they are also products of “culture, education and information,” and that “commercial viability should not be the sole criterion for the Foundation's support of locally made films and videos.” The document further proposes that the NFVF intervene and advise competition authorities on monopolistic practices in the industry.

² Although not without its fair share of controversy and allegations of favouritism, prompting the Minister to note that “The distribution of the State subsidy earmarked for the film industry has evoked mixed feelings. Concerns have been expressed about lack of even-handedness and serious disparities in allocations to applicants.” (Mtshali, 1997).

The theme of the economic development of the arts sector as a whole continued in the period leading up to the establishment of the NFVF in 1999. This pressure brought on by government's macro-economic policy resulted in the arts and culture sector having to justify its existence and funding requirements in economic terms, as illustrated by an excerpt from then Minister Ben Ngubane's speech in 1999:

When I took up the position of Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology in 1994 a great deal of my time and energy was spent in trying to persuade South Africans and many of my colleagues in Government of the importance of the arts and culture in the economy, nation building and the imaging of South Africa...Much of our time was spent on proving that the cultural industries are an important economic sector with the potential to create jobs and to stimulate rural economies (March 29, 1999).

However, despite Minister Ngubane's push for cultural development, the requirement for the film industry to 'unlock' economic potential was so entrenched; it became a recurring refrain even within the NFVF when it was established. From the onset, the film industry was being conceived as a mechanism that would resolve a number of very important socio-economic challenges, including nation-building.

The rhetoric of developing the film industry to attract foreign investment and to effect transformation and nation-building became a familiar chorus over the years with various Ministers and NFVF leaders addressing themselves to this matter. There developed a comfortable nexus that could be used interchangeably depending on the audience, and one which enabled the government to switch between film as a cultural activity that could play a role in nation-

building and film as a key component of job-creation, foreign investment and tourism promotion.

4.2.5 The Cultural Industries Growth Strategy (CIGS)

The next key policy moment leading up to the establishment of the NFVF was the development of the Cultural Industries Growth Strategy (CIGS). DACST appointed the Cultural Strategy Group, a consortium of consultants, to provide an analysis and policy recommendations into the development of the 'cultural industries', which were defined as "...a wide variety of cultural activities which all have commercial organisation as their prime motivating force" (DACST, 1998:8). The CIGS report was a fairly sober and well-researched document which undertook a value-chain analysis of all aspects of the film industry (including production, distribution, and exhibition), and identified roles for both public sector and private sector actors, including the NFVF.

The document provides an economic analysis of the opportunities and constraints confronting the industry in a fair and objective manner. CIGS presented the economic case for film, whilst maintaining the redistributive language of the Film Development Strategy. The significance of the CIGS was that it provided government with a benchmark that enabled it to move beyond the "policy and legislative framework, and move towards the implementation programme, which, once more, required the collation of detailed information" (Ngubane, 16 November 1999).

4.2.6. The NFVF Act

The NFVF was launched after the CIGS. The NFVF Act, No 73 of 1997, was passed 03 December 1997, and promulgated in October 1999. The NFVF was launched at the South African International Film and Television Market (Sithengi) in 1999, and the NFVF started operating in April 2000.

At a media statement announcing the approval of the National Film and Video Foundation Bill, Minister Ngubane asserted that the proposed legislation:

...will ensure that equity and access are addressed and put into operation in a concrete fashion. It also signifies the Government's commitment to these sectors...Once approved, these Acts will translate statements of intent and policies into action (Ngubane, July 1996).

The NFVF Bill was introduced as legislation that would establish a fourteen member Council that would be responsible for finance, research, and development and education in order to promote the industry. The Minister also announced the establishment of the two funds (the Film and Video Initiative and the Film Development Fund). In the Minister's view, the legislation represented "the Ministry's on-going efforts to transform this sector" (Ngubane, July 1996).

Whilst the objects of the Act contain similar provisions to those catered for in the Film Development Strategy, the language and focus is significantly watered down. Whereas the Film Development Strategy contained a much clearer directive to the NFVF in terms of language and cultural obligations, the NFVF Act that was passed did not overtly

contain such a stipulation. For example, the requirement to “promote the development of an indigenous, national South African film industry, which caters for all language and cultural groups and provides entertainment, education and information” and to “effect affirmative action policies to redress the imbalances of the past” were diluted to “providing opportunities for persons, especially from disadvantaged communities” to participate in the industry and “to address historical imbalances in the infrastructure and distribution of skills and resources.”

The NFVF Act contains only two instances of the word “culture” and even then it was in reference to the terms “Arts, Culture, Science and Technology Director-General” and “Arts and Culture Ministry”. In contrast, the Act is littered with the use of the word “industry”, which appears at least fifteen times in the text. The Act does not provide a definition which might assist with interpretation of the terms. The Act also uses the term “to promote” (which appears four times) and “to develop” (used seven times) but once again fails to provide any definitional clarity on what those words mean or how they are to be interpreted.

The lack of definitional clarity notwithstanding, the Minister launched the NFVF at a gala dinner at Sithengi in 1999. His address covered the historical legacies and consultation processes that led to the restructuring of the film and television industry. According to the Minister, the establishment of the NFVF was an illustration of the successful implementation of one of the policy recommendations of the Film Development Strategy, and emphasised quite quickly that the:

...Ministry was therefore empowered to take the document to international forums, such as Cannes, to announce to the international community the manner in which this democratic government was intending to support and develop the South African film industry (Ngubane, 16 November 1999).

From his address, the Minister made a clear pronouncement on the immediate goals of the NFVF, indicating that the DACST was in the process of negotiating with the European Union (EU) to host a film summit that would produce “a common vision and strategy to finance co-productions between South Africa and the member states of the European Union” (Ngubane, 16 November 1999).

The cursory mention of the challenges confronting the domestic industry, and the focus on international partnerships set the tone for the newly inaugurated Council and newly established implementation agency. In order to facilitate the NFVF's ambitious plans, Parliament passed the Cultural Laws Amendment Act (No. 36 of 2001) to amend certain sections of the NFVF Act. One of the key changes proposed was a clause that enabled the NFVF to “establish a separate legal entity for purposes of investing in film and video projects” subject to the approval of the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology and the Minister of the Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa, 2001:18). The additional amendments to the Act required the NFVF to submit a business plan to the Minister at the start of the financial year, and directed the NFVF Council to brief the Portfolio Committee on its annual report.

4.2.7 Translating the policy objectives into an implementation strategy

The newly-established NFVF, in collaboration with DACST commissioned a research study to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), an international consultancy firm, to lay the groundwork for the upcoming SA-EU Film Symposium. Entitled "Attracting international donor organisations as well as film investors and producers to South Africa", the mandate for the project was to investigate "...how to create an initiative to attract international donor organisations, as well as film investors and producers to South Africa" through an analysis of the film industry, international best practice and an economic impact analysis (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000a:4).

The 600-page research report, widely referred to as "Profile 2000" is recognised as the first action plan for the development of an internationally competitive South African film industry. The primary research included a questionnaire sent to 120 stakeholders (which yielded a mere 38% response rate). It included 16 face-to-face interviews with established film and television companies. These were two animation companies, two commercial/facilitation production companies, two corporate video companies, three feature film companies, two broadcasters, one wildlife documentary company, two post-production houses and two distributors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000a:25).

The report examined all aspects of the value chain, including content creation, finance, production, marketing, distribution and exhibition. The PWC report highlighted three key objectives for the growth of the industry, these were investment growth, internationally commercially viable product, and skills development (2000a:3). The report

recommended a fundraising strategy and the implementation of a fund allocation strategy. Some of the detailed action steps proposed included a recommendation that the NFVF prepare a five-year projection of capital requirements, the development of a fundraising plan that includes both private and public sector contributions, the development of a tax strategy and measurement mechanisms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000a:99-101). PWC further recommended possible lottery funding and levies on international work permit applications and the skills development fund. Private funding from the industry, as noted by informants in the report, was viewed as potentially difficult unless:

...they [the industry] are given specific responsibility and ownership in a central fund...and allowed to play a prominent role in deciding on funding opportunities as they know 'what will work and what will not' (2000a:7).

The established production industry made it clear that it would not contribute to government's funding efforts, unless it could dictate the criteria for accessing such funds. The implication being that the predominantly largely white film industry informants interviewed, would not participate in supporting government's initiatives unless they could ensure that funding would be directed where into areas they deemed relevant based on their experience.

The PricewaterhouseCoopers report was of necessity focused on the international co-production market as per the brief it received from DACST. Survey participants were drawn from the established industry and their interests formed the basis of the NFVF's plans for the development of the industry. There was little emphasis on empowerment / transformation in the action plans, save for the

rhetoric to improve skills in order to presumably contribute to a skilled supply of labour to meet industry's demands. This lends credence to an observation by Mistry (2002:10) that this was "...the contestation between "old" expectations of privilege and "new" feelings of entitlement by those once disenfranchised from the state funding system."

4.2.8 The EU-SA Film Symposium

The next key step in the NFVF's founding years was the European Union-South Africa Film Symposium (EU-SAFS) which was held on 8-10 November 2000. It was a high-profile event, attended by representatives of EU member states, Members of the South African Parliament, Members of provincial Executive Councils representing the arts, CEOs of EU member states' film commissions including British, Dutch, Irish Swedish and French representatives, CEOs of film and television production companies, broadcasters and film industry organisations.

The Minister's speech highlighted the four objectives of the Symposium, which were: to develop and sustain co-productions between EU and South African filmmakers, to provide a variety of content for co-production partners, to develop a framework for developing SMMEs in the industry, and to establish a framework for the financing of co-productions. His speech emphasised the need for a partnership approach between the government and industry and the key steps in this regard (Ngubane, October 2000).

The first step would be to ensure that the film industry takes its rightful place in South Africa's industrial development strategy, and the second would be to ensure the correct levels of inter-governmental co-ordination between DACST, Finance, Trade and Industry, Communications and Tourism, with the NFVF as "...the main driving force for strategic development and implementation" (Ngubane, October 2000).

The Minister's address also reminded delegates of the evolution of film policy which included discussions at international forums to acquaint the international film community with the South African government's policy focus. As the Minister (Ngubane, 2000b, p.3) stated:

In crafting our legislative framework, many of you present today, contributed generously in ideas which led to the birth of an act that whilst it addresses itself to South African specificities, its enabling framework as well as [its] intention is to accommodate both the cultural and business components of this industry point to compatibility with the international norms.

From media reports at the time, the EU did not share the same sentiments as the South African government. The Head of the EU's delegation, Ambassador Michael Laidler, reportedly said that "We won't make promises and hand out cheques" (Pople, 2000, ¶19).

Filmmakers who were interviewed by media after the Symposium were vocal in their criticism of the entire process and argued that that the NFVF should rather have consulted with the local film industry first before the Symposium in order to hear their views and develop a South African industry perspective on co-productions and financing (Pople, 2000, ¶15) before reaching out to the international community. Local filmmakers made several 'counter-proposals' and requested a

consultation between government and industry, further discussion on developing guidelines on a tax framework, an independent research study on the economic and tax implications of incentives and levies, and proposed new partnerships between the EU and South Africa (Pople, 2000, ¶18).

One filmmaker commented that “The symposium did more harm than good. Clearly there is a lack of transparency and communication over several problems in the industry” (Pople, 2000, ¶14). There were signs quite early on that the implementation of an export-market orientated policy for film in South Africa was going to prove problematic in the context of a struggling domestic industry.

4.2.9 Indaba 2001

Following on from the EU-SAFS, Indaba 2001 can be regarded as the NFVF's first real attempt at consultation with the industry on the development of the local film industry. The process was a fairly consultative and transparent one, the NFVF invited filmmakers to serve on four industry panels, which were responsible for undertaking research and consulting with various stakeholders months prior to the Indaba in order to propose recommendations on the future development of the industry.

Indaba 2001 was framed within the context of the international film market as noted in the Interim Report, with the development of the local industry as an ancillary aim. It was seen as a “...vital step towards South Africa becoming an important and viable partner for international players, and also as a means of working towards consensus within the industry on a common vision for growth and

development" (NFVF, 2001b). In essence the purpose of Indaba 2001 was to fix the bugs in the system so that negotiations could continue with international investors.

The stated objectives of the Indaba were to develop consensus and an action plan for the industry to "...state their needs, to identify opportunities and prioritise them..." for the NFVF, to focus on policy issues and for government to present opportunities for the industry. In outlining its expectations for the day, the NFVF indicated that it hoped to clarify its role in relation to government and industry, and to receive key recommendations for government.

The need to clarify the role of the NFVF and its mandate was a sentiment echoed by industry members as well. Indaba 2001 came up with a staggering fifty-nine recommendations and action points, prompting the then NFVF Chairperson, Shan Moodley to acknowledge in a presentation to Parliament that the implementation of the recommendations would require "...a lifetime of work..." (NFVF, 2001c).

The recommendations covered all aspects of the industry. For example, the finance, funding and taxation panel made a strong case for more transparent allocation of NFVF funds and suggested that the NFVF establish an Advisory Panel and an NFVF Funding and Finance Office in this regard. In addition, the delegates mandated the NFVF to investigate alternative funding sources such as the lottery fund, section 24F administered by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and DTI incentives. The delegates also proposed that there should be a clear distinction between the cultural/development fund

and the commercial fund. This panel also pointed out the missed opportunity of South Africa having signed a bi-lateral treaty with the EU, which effectively precluded it from accessing funding made available via the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States (NFVF, 2001a).

There was a considerable amount of time and effort dedicated to analysing and making proposals on the state of the industry and its future direction. Indaba provided the newly established institution with a range of options and action points, but not much in the way of focus and priorities. Given the sheer volume of recommendations, the NFVF Chair stated that the priorities identified by the new Council for their term of office were: the establishment of alternative funding sources, audience development, training and development and the marketing of South Africa as a film location. Indaba 2001 also announced the appointment of Eddie Mbalo as the CEO of the NFVF.


4.2.10 The NFVF Strategy

The NFVF strategy formulation process began in February 2002, culminating in the Value Charter in October 2002. The underlying logic of the document is that the NFVF's funding (which was R18m per annum at the time) needs to be increased (to R65m per year as per the Value Charter) in order to facilitate the "rapid growth" of the industry. The dominant focus was on the institutionalisation and funding of the NFVF to ensure its longevity beyond 2022.

As Figure 1 indicates, the NFVF strategy, which was only formulated in 2002, dispenses of the NFVF's earlier years as follows:

- The founding phase (1997-1990) where the focus was on the implementation of the Act, under the direction of the then DACST.
- This was followed by the second phase from 1999-2001, which was the forming and establishment period wherein the focus was on “institutional development” (NFVF, 2002b:12 and 2004a:4).
- The main focus of the strategic thrust is on the “rapid development and growth” phase which is envisioned to be occurring from 2002 to 2007 (NFVF, 2004a:4) and which emphasises sectoral development which entails expansion, market penetration, new services and capital formation. More importantly however, the rapid growth phase enabled the NFVF to lay claim to an annualised budget of R325 million per annum (Ibid).
- In the next phase, maturity (2007-2022), the NFVF's anticipated revenues would be R3 billion, and would reach R10 billion post-2022 (Ibid).

Figure 1: NFVF Lifecycle



Source: NFVF (2004a:4) ³

The NFVF strategy references historical moments in film policy development, such as the PricewaterhouseCoopers report and Indaba 2001 to give both context and legitimacy to the strategy. There was considerable focus on “capital formation,” the rationale being that:

...the identified sources of funds are what constitute a legitimate economic claim. Policy must be developed to restructure the sector and facilitate access to these funds; this would constitute a quantum leap in restructuring the fiscus of South Africa (Mbalo, 2002, ¶30).

³ This is a slightly revised version of the NFVF Organic Life Cycle which also appears in the 2002 Annual Report.

In addition to new ways of thinking about film, the other key objectives highlighted by the CEO were: a joint workshop between the NFVF and the Portfolio Committee on the strategy, assistance with positioning the NFVF as the custodian of film, collaboration on “competitive intelligence programmes and investigations on best practice,” financial assistance and on-going engagement with the Committee, ambassadorship and advocacy, greater co-ordination between all entities of government (Mbalo, 2002, ¶13).

The NFVF's strategy was replete with technical and business management terminology and was premised on the notion that the film industry needed to be projected into a future that required a significantly larger budget that would almost certainly guarantee its place in the new world.

4.2.11 The NFVF Value Charter

The NFVF Value Charter (2004a) is often referred to as “the outcome of the Strategy Document as adopted by the Council of the NFVF” and as “the strategic interpretation of the NFVF Act” (NFVF, 2004a). The Value Charter has been used by the NFVF as the policy document that has informed the development of its programmes (and the basis for requests for additional funding to meet its mandate). The first Value Charter is a glossy 23-page booklet that outlines the NFVF's vision for the industry, but more significantly casts the NFVF in a central role in the development of the South African film industry.

Both the NFVF strategy and Value Charter reference historical moments in film policy development, but the Value Charter went even

further to entrench itself in South African political history by mirroring the ANC's Freedom Charter (which was a statement of freedom demands and liberation principles adopted by the ANC in 1955).

In a response to the Ministerial budget vote in 2005, the NFVF (2005, section 1) argues for the utility of film “as a medium of the voices of liberation in South Africa” in opposition to the “oppressive forces” that used film “disguised as entertainment” to carry out their political objectives. In this particular presentation, the NFVF makes the case for film as constructing national identity and as a tool for nation-building. The NFVF makes the point that the Value Charter provides the basis for “legitimate political, policy and programme formulation” (2005a, section 1). In an effort to further justify the legitimacy of the NFVF it asserts that “the charterist character of “the Value Charter” is encapsulated in the moral imperative which reads:

It is a national imperative to create facilities for ordinary South African to bear influence in the expression of their own images, thereby deepen democracy and create prosperity. The National Film and Video Foundation strives for the realisation of this noble ideal (NFVF, 2005a, section 1).

The political rhetoric is contained throughout the presentation, and expands on the social and democratic ideals in the Value Charter by associating the Value Charter with notions of the social contract, social cohesion, equity and justice (NFVF, 2005a, section 1).

The NFVF envisaged a grand strategy for itself that would deliver on government's macro-economic goals of job creation and economic growth but in order to “deliver massive measures of economic

aggregation" the strategy required an expansion of the NFVF's "stature and capacity" (Ibid).

The emphasis on macro-economic indicators in the NFVF's strategy undoubtedly has its roots in government's broader economic policy, and could be read as a response to the DTI's Micro-economic Reform Strategy (MERS), which was first mooted in 2001, revised and officially released in May 2002. The MERS acknowledges the progress achieved as a result of government's macro-economic interventions which resulted in single-digit inflation, a reduction in the budget deficit and increased government revenue (South Africa, 2002:3).

The challenge identified by the MERS was that growth had been slow and uneven, and the MERS outlines the government's approach to identifying and removing obstacles to economic growth. The MERS identified priority 'export' sectors that held potential for higher growth returns and job creation. These were specifically agriculture, tourism, ICTs and the cultural industries, which included film and television. In order to give effect to the latent potential of these key sectors, the state committed itself to develop sector strategies that would focus on job creation, "value addition, export growth, small business development and black economic empowerment" (Ibid).

From its genesis, the NFVF's strategy for film policy was essentially an industrial policy plan for film development in South Africa. It was primarily about job creation, economic growth and access to export markets in order to enable South Africa to become internationally competitive but was being implemented in a policy context that left many unanswered questions on the form and shape of the institution.

Furthermore, it was strongly influenced by the needs of the existing production sector whose focus was on accessing co-production funding. The secondary aim, which was almost incidental, was the development of a 'national cinema'. The NFVF had succeeded in crafting an industrial strategy for film development within an arts and culture environment, which did not at the time, take into account the factors that would need to come into play for it to be successfully executed.

Based on interview responses and the documentary analysis, the policy formulation stage overlooked questions on the precise role of the NFVF and mandate and the implications these would have on policy implementation.

4.3 Policy context

The second implementation variable that was assessed related to the socio-economic and political environment that prevailed from 2000 – 2005. The researcher sought informants' opinions on whether or not these presented any challenges to the NFVF's implementation of its policy mandate. Informants indicated that whilst the government had shown to its commitment to developing the industry through the establishment of the NFVF there were several factors in the political environment that constrained the effective implementation of government's vision for the film industry. The key issue was the lack of consensus around the NFVF's role in relation to the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC). The second area of concern was the lack of policy co-ordination and coherence in relation to the NFVF and other government institutions with a similar mandate. Informants views are supplemented by an analysis of key documents that provide further

insight into the socio-economic and political context for film policy implementation from 2000 – 2005.

4.3.1 Favourable political climate

Most informants indicated that the post-liberation socio-economic and political environment that gave birth to the NFVF was conducive and receptive to the establishment of a new agency that would re-configure the film industry. Post-Apartheid South Africa was coming out of a long period of darkness and was trying to reclaim its space among the democratic nations of the world. The publication of reports such as the Cultural Industries Growth Strategy (CIGS) provided support and impetus to the establishment of the NFVF, yet the potential that the creation of the NFVF represented, was only partially realised. Informants provide different reasons for this. Informant G, an NFVF Executive, provides this perspective:

There was this euphoria that there would be this new organisation that was going to come and radically change the industry, and obviously that didn't happen initially and that obviously posed a challenge and then I think resources also posed a big challenge because I think when we started out our budget was R10-R12 million and you know even at that stage, it would cost R6m to make one film (Interview, 09 October 2012).

Informant F, a former Senior Manager, agreed that the political environment was supportive and that there was a lot of support "...not necessarily financial as the government had other priorities at the time such as housing, job creation and economic development" (Interview, 05 October 2012).

For Informant A, a former Senior Manager, the political environment presented an opportunity for institutions like the NFVF that were the result of grassroots or bottom-up processes of policy-making:

...and it was understood that it was about transition and transformation of the industry. The relevance of the Act is that was based on public participation even though when the process got to Parliament there was no public input. The policy thrust was based on sector stakeholders, and that came with its own set of challenges. One of the objects of the Act was to develop the industry but if you take closer look at the beneficiaries, they were large established companies, who were mostly from Gauteng... (Interview, 17 September 2012).

Informants were in agreement that the political climate leading up to the establishment of the NFVF was supportive to new agencies established to reflect the country's democratic culture. There were some constraints as described by informants. The lack of adequate funding was one, as was the dominance of established production companies that influenced the policy and implementation process.

4.3.2 Governance and institutional arrangements for film policy implementation

Informants acknowledged the favourable political climate that facilitated the NFVF's existence. They were largely in agreement that the specific political challenge that confronted the NFVF once it was set up was the lack of consensus around its role in relation to the DAC. The contestation centred on the NFVF's role as an agency of the state, rather than being an agency of the Department, as articulated by Informant G:

I think the biggest political problem is how is the NFVF linked to the DAC? Are we independent of the DAC? Or are we just a department of the DAC? So I think politically that was really quite an issue and even within the DAC itself there were different views around that. You might have had a [Director-General] DG who thought we were just part of the Department and we must do what they tell us to do. And you might have had a Minister who thought we're independent and might have to account differently, or a Portfolio Committee who thought differently. And that was the political environment within which we needed to operate and to try and find our own feet. I think in many ways we were successful in trying to say to the DAC, we are separate and we are completely autonomous and we're allowed to make our own decisions within the mandate of the Act and within broader government policy but we're not just another department (Interview, 09 October 2012).

However, according to Informant C, this should not have been a point of issue as the Act was sufficiently clear in establishing the NFVF's independence and creating an "arms-length relationship" with the DAC (Interview, 20 September 2012). Informant C presents this view, emphasising the NFVF's independence:

The NFVF is an autonomous organisation. The NFVF is not an agency of the Department; the NFVF is an agency of the State. Because once you start doing that that's where you control and limit (Informant C, Interview, 20 September 2012)

In contrast, Informant D, a DAC official, states that there was no legal or other basis for contestation:

If you look at the Act, the Act is clear. The Minister appoints the Council, so it goes without saying that the Council reports to the Minister. The CEO is appointed by the Council so the CEO reports to the Council. The CEO does not report to the Minister. So the communication lines should be as such that if the CEO wants to communicate with the Minister, the CEO should go through the Council or the CEO should go through the Department, which is your DG or DDG level. But because of the

personalities I think the CEO does have access to the Minister as it were, and I don't think that is a problem, but when it comes to governance issues and just proper protocol, it is the Council that communicates to the Minister because it is the Council that reports to the Minister (28 September 2012).

Informants D and E provided two related explanations for the lack of role clarity between the NFVF and DAC. Informant D (Interview, 28 September 2012) raises the question of personalities blurring political reporting lines, which in turn impacted negatively on governance:

... So there's just been a thin line between the personal relations between the political administration at that point and the Council and maybe the level and the profile of the Council at the time also does make a difference.

A similar observation was by Informant E, an NFVF Manager:

Most of the senior officials within the DAC kind of resented this institution because they didn't have an understanding of the industry the NFVF was operating in. The second part is how the institution conducted itself because the institution was much closer to the political heads than the administrative section and work gets done through the administrative section and that created some kind of tension (Interview, 28 September 2012).

The result of the compromised working relationship between the NFVF and DAC according to Informant E was that "...we didn't know what discussions were going on and we couldn't do any lobbying. So you wouldn't get a heads-up on government thinking" (Ibid.).

Another perspective offered by Informant D (Interview, 28 September 2012) was that the tension may have been fuelled by the industry itself, which was then able to play the DAC off against the NFVF:

...The industry is able to play the two institutions off against each other, but it's also how the NFVF is presented there because the fact of the matter is the NFVF is a DAC institution. It reports to the Department but there was a level and a manner at which it's presented as this individual institution vis-à-vis the Department when in fact the Department established the NFVF as a tool and as an intervention for the film industry.

4.3.2.1 Impact on service delivery

The contestation around the NFVF's role in relation to the DAC was not simply a matter of clashing personalities. The breakdown in the relationship between the NFVF and the DAC became so pronounced that the NFVF became the first institution to take a government department to Parliament over "their lack of support to mobilise additional funding with respect to the Content Industry Strategy" (Informant C, Interview, 20 September 2012). In its statement to the Portfolio Committee, the NFVF indicated that the Council had passed a resolution in July 2005 declaring a "state of delivery crisis" (PMG, 2005:1).

The NFVF Chair at the time, Mfundu Vundla, indicated that the "current state of affairs compromised the NFVF in carrying out its mandate as per the NFVF Act" (PMG, 2005:3). The dispute centred around DAC's refusal to act on Cabinet's authority regarding the NFVF's allocation from the Content Industry Strategy. According to the NFVF, it had complied with all the requisite bureaucratic processes and presented its business case and draft Cabinet Memo to the DAC for Cabinet approval in 2004 (NFVF, 2005a:7). Despite this, the DAC indicated that it would submit a general memorandum to Cabinet, not taking into account the planning processes that had resulted in the Content Strategy and the additional funding allocation due to the NFVF.

The NFVF delegation in its presentation outlined their numerous attempts to engage with the DAC. They had even tried, without success to convene a meeting with the Minister to resolve the matter. As a result of the strained relationship with the DAC, the NFVF Council stated that “it was no longer in a position to fulfil its statutory obligations” (PMG, 2005:5). The NFVF then also released a press statement to the effect that it would not be able to consider any further funding applications for the remainder of the year.⁴

The NFVF argued that since the Council was appointed by Parliament, it was therefore accountable to Parliament and was therefore appealing to the Portfolio Committee to mediate between the NFVF and DAC (PMG:4). The then CEO, Eddie Mbalo, provided further examples of the strained relationship, citing the DAC’s non-attendance at the NFVF’s 2005 Indaba.

In addition, he brought it to the Committee’s attention that the DAC had continued funding certain film projects in direct competition with the NFVF rather than providing an oversight role. The CEO concluded by saying that “if the Department did not want an institution like the NFVF it should close it down as it was a waste of money to be merely running the institution” (PMG, 2005:7).

Mbalo then tabled the NFVF’s proposals on how to ameliorate the NFVF/DAC relationship. He indicated that the starting point would be to clarify the role of the NFVF, maintaining the autonomy of the NFVF as an agent for the growth and development of the film industry

⁴ In response, the DAC placed an advert on 18 November 2005 entitled – “There comes a time when the young have to stand on their own feet.”

(NFVF, 2005c:22). In this scenario, the budgetary allocation would still be provided through the DAC but the NFVF would be at the centre of film development and would have the necessary authority to engage with other government departments and stakeholders. Mbalo argued that the “institution was keen to be placed at the centre of this program as it was the only institution established by Parliament to develop the film industry in the country. The NFVF had to be at the centre of this development” (PMG, 2005:9).

Mbalo also called for a Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the NFVF and DAC to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the two entities. He mentioned that the NFVF had presented a draft SLA to the DAC in 2004, and was yet to receive a response. In addition, he also recommended the drafting of regulations to the NFVF Act (Ibid). The NFVF also called for “commensurate resources to the mandate” to enable it to function effectively.

The Portfolio Committee proposed a joint meeting between the NFVF and the DAC, which was attended by the Minister and Director-General, to resolve the matter. The meeting only took place in June 2006, where both sides were given the opportunity to present their views. The matter was eventually resolved with the DAC undertaking to meet with the NFVF and committed to provide the NFVF with further funding.

The discord between the NFVF and the DAC was attributed to a number of factors. Informants stated that some DAC officials did not understand the industry they were overseeing, some indicated that perhaps there was a strong element of rivalry between the two state

institutions. There was speculation as to the cause of dissent. Informant D indicated that perhaps the industry was able to use the situation to its benefit and play the two entities against each other. Whereas for Informant E, the root cause was the NFVF's undermining of the DAC administration, forgetting that the administrators, and not the policy-makers, maintain overall responsibility for matters related to funding and submitting memos to Cabinet for approval.

It is evident from the above description that the strained relationship between the DAC and NFVF was a source of frustration to both the department and the institution. The ambiguity around the NFVF's role in relation to the DAC was key constraint to effective policy implementation. The lack of definition around the institutional relationship compromised the NFVF's ability to deliver effectively on its mandate.

4.3.3 Lack of policy co-ordination and coherence

Most informants attested to government's enthusiasm to develop the film and television industry. Informant D, a DAC representative, states:

...so there was a lot of support, a lot excitement and film was seen as one of the focus sectors and I think it continues to enjoy that attention...(Interview, 28 September 2012).

However, as Informant E noted, government failed to provide strategic direction to the development of the industry, preferring instead to adopt a piecemeal approach (Interview, 28 September 2012).

The unfortunate part is that whilst the NFVF was being set up, government was also looking at other parallel processes which

for me I think hindered the growth of the industry because film falls within four or five departments. "There's Arts and Culture, which is supposed to be responsible for development and production of content. Then you have the Department of Communications, which is also playing in that space, you have DTI in terms of enterprise development but they also play in the production development space. Training – department of Education (the then Department of Labour, with the SETAs). And then you also have Home Affairs, which is responsible for the Film and Publications Board that looks after exhibition. So you have all this and politically you find that they are more powerful in terms of money so they go and do their own things so there's not synergy in terms of film programmes and strategies. You then also have ICASA, which does its own thing. Also the NFVF doesn't have regulatory powers, it can only advise so it couldn't prescribe to people what to do other than in the space in which it was playing. So that causes conflicting mandates (Informant E, Interview" (28 September 2012).

Informant G, an NFVF Executive, expresses a similar sentiment:

I think also the mandate is so broad it was trying to figure out in which space we need to play, and then there's all these different players in the industry and I think it was also trying to co-ordinate all of this. Because you've got the broadcasters on the one hand, ICASA, the DAC and it's also trying to co-ordinate all of that. And at that time I think also the industry was very fragmented. There really wasn't any cohesive industry body. SASFED was only formed after we had our second Indaba in 2005 and that's when we started speaking about industry bodies coming together. And even government organisations coming together and people speaking with one voice and I think those were the challenges in the early days (Interview, 09 October 2012).

The reasons for the disjuncture in government's approach to film have been varied. Informant B, a former NFVF Senior Manager, speculates that one of the causes may have been the rivalry between different government departments such as the DAC and DOC. For Informants

C and E, the problem in their opinion, was that government did not understand that film is a cross-cutting issue.

Informant E, an NFVF Manager, states that:

Well, people didn't understand film, or the industry itself, and that when you say content, you can't separate, content cuts across – be it feature, or animation or documentary so you can't separate to say this department will focus on that mandate, that one, that mandate. So you're actually doing the industry a dis-service, and in a way, hampering the growth of the industry and becoming counter-productive...

For Informant C, a former NFVF Executive, the challenge was that:

The DAC didn't understand that issues of film cut across every sector of society, including trade and industry, arts, communications etc and that's why we looked at alternative sources of funding such as the DTI.

From the informants' perspectives, there was a complex implementation structure requiring multiple clearing points between the NFVF and the DAC, as well as between the NFVF and other government departments with a film-related mandate.

The NFVF Act made provision for the NFVF to engage with other government departments in furtherance of its mandate. For example, Informant E draws attention to the fact that the Act makes provision for the NFVF to engage with members of provincial councils but "...it does not state who or how." In addition, Informant E comments that provinces "...were also bogged down with their own needs and film was the last thing on their minds..." (Interview, 28 September 2012). Despite the legislative provisions of the Act, one of the challenges to implementing effective institutional arrangements for policy

coherence and co-ordination has been the lack of formal mechanisms to effect the NFVF's policy mandate, particularly amongst government departments and agencies (NFVF, 2005b:7).


The criticisms notwithstanding, the informants welcomed the development of the Content Industry Strategy, a joint programme between the DTI, NFVF and DOC. Most informants reported that the DTI Incentive was by-product of the joint strategy. However, as Informant D highlighted:

I don't think that strategy was implemented to the T given the various factors I mentioned earlier. Given the changing politics, the change in administration, the change in focus...so we keep playing around with what impacts on the sectors. But I think personally that that strategy still needs to be implemented. Before the content strategy there was the film development strategy immediately before the Act came into being (Interview, 28 September 2012).

4.3.3.1 The Content Industry Strategy

The *Strategy for the Development of Content Industries* represents the government's first real attempt at a co-ordinated action plan for developing the content sector. It was approved by Cabinet in December 2003 with a committed budget of R160m for the DAC/NFVF to develop broadcast content and co-productions over a three-year period. The DTI was allocated R115m, and subsequently developed the Large Budget Film and Television Incentive from this allocation. The DOC was allocated R195m for digital content development.

Figure 2: Content Industries Strategy



Source: NFVF (2011, 7)

The Content Industries Strategy came about as a result of commitments made in the Macro-economic Reform Strategy (MERS). For the NFVF, the MERS and Content Industries Strategy outlined a clear path for the sectoral approach to the development of the content industries with the necessary incentives that government had committed itself to, and these policy directives emboldened the newly formed NFVF to develop a strategy with annual budget of R200 million.

Table 3: Proposed initial three-year MTEF funding

Funding component	Foreign Feature and Film and Commercial Production in SA (DTI)	Broadcast Content and Co-productions (NFVF/DAC)	Digital Network Content Development (DOC)	Total
Research and Development	R10m	R10m	R10m	R30m
Content Production	R75m	R100m	R125m	R300m
Marketing and Distribution	R15m	R20m	R30m	R65m
Human Capital Development	R10m	R15m	R15m	R40m
Institutional Development	R5m	R15m	R15m	R35m
TOTAL	R115m	R160m	R195m	R470m

Source (NFVF, 2008:10)

The Content Industries Strategy was never fully implemented by the DAC and NFVF as Informant D (Interview, 28 September 2012) indicated. This presented a major implementation challenge for the NFVF as it was not able to access the funding it required for its programmes.

4.3.3.2 Government agencies with a similar mandate

The NFVF Act contains a number of provisions for collaboration between the NFVF, government and other stakeholders. Through the Act (South Africa, 2001: 4), the NFVF is empowered and mandated to:

- Liaise with a member of the executive council of each province designated by the Premier of the Province, in order to promote the film and video industry more effectively throughout the Republic and to ensure co-ordination in the distribution of funds at national and provincial level (section 4(1)(g));
- Nationally and internationally facilitate liaison and promote liaison between individual and institutions (section 4(1)(1));
- Co-operate with any person, organisation and institution (section 4(1)(k));
- In conjunction with the Departments of Trade and Industry and of Education, investigate the viability of establishing a national film school section (4)(2)(e);

- Liaise with the Independent Broadcasting Authority to encourage the use of local content programmes on television (section 4(2)(g)) and;
- Approach the film and video industry and other interested parties for financial contributions to the Film and Video Initiative (section 4(2) (h)).

Despite the legislative provisions of the Act, one of the challenges to implementing effective institutional arrangements for policy coherence and co-ordination has been the lack of formal mechanisms to effect the NFVF's policy mandate, particularly amongst government departments and agencies (NFVF, 2005b:7). Examples of other government agencies with a content-related mandate are illustrated in the diagram below:

Figure 3: Government funding bodies

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Source: NFVF (2011:29)

Department of
Trade and Industry


4.3.3.3 The NFVF's attempts at co-ordinating government's film – related activities

The NFVF had a legal basis, and requirement to interact with the various government stakeholders that have a competency over film matters. Over the years, the NFVF tried to co-ordinate government's activities in the film industry, with varying degrees of success. Perhaps the most successful collaboration, as the informants confirmed, has been with the DTI over the Rebate scheme. The NFVF is represented on the DTI's Rebate Committee as it is responsible for issuing advance and final rulings for co-production certification.

The NFVF has over the years, defended its position as the key state institution for implementing film policy in South Africa. This position has

been made all the more challenging by the existence of a myriad of other government departments and agencies with a con-current mandate in film development. The NFVF's proposal was that it should play a central co-ordinating role, as the diagram below illustrates:

Figure 4: The role of the NFVF



Source: NFVF (2011)

The then CEO presented this model as the proposed mechanism that “could be used to unravel some of the institutional, organisational and collaboration gaps” (Mbalo, 2005:2). This central co-ordinating role has been a key feature of the NFVF's institutional aspirations since its founding. This point is further illustrated by the quote below:

The NFVF recognises that the development and growth of the film industry is a concurrent competency of a number of government departments at national, provincial and local levels. The NFVF sees its role in the ambit of this as that of an initiator of policy recommendations, initiator of the programmes, and implementation agent for programmes initiated by other government (sic) under a contract, a coordinator, and an advocate of national initiatives. The coordination and creation of synergy out of all the initiatives undertaken by all the industry

players is one of the fundamental reasons of existence for the NFVF (NFVF, 2004b:2).

For Informant E, an NFVF Manager, there needs to be a political solution to the lack of co-ordination amongst government departments. The informant observed that:

“...It's a political alignment, only the President can say take all film-related activity and move it to the NFVF” (Interview, 28 September 2012).

The discussion on the NFVF's policy context points to a complex implementation structure that required the participation of multiple actors. The challenging vertical and horizontal relationships required to implement film policy reinforces the observations made by Reddy (2005) and Heatlie (2010) that the country lacked a coherent film policy.

4.4 Policy commitment

The third variable examined the NFVF's institutional character and leadership style, and the extent to which informants thought this facilitated or hindered policy implementation. Informants were also asked to provide information on the NFVF's policies and strategies, as well as consultation processes. There were three key themes that emerged from this discussion – leadership and institutional style, strategy development and consultation and decision-making processes.

4.4.1 Leadership and institutional style

There were varying interpretations of the NFVF's leadership and institutional style, and the impact these had on facilitating effective implementation. Some informants indicated that the NFVF had an open, inclusive and consultative institutional approach that enabled it to respond to issues more flexibly.

Informant F's perspective was that the NFVF's institutional style was "quite visionary and so it took a while for the industry to catch up" (Interview, 05 October 2012). According to the informant this caused:

... a disconnect between the industry and there was resistance as they perceived the NFVF to be a bully that was trying to beat it into shape (Ibid.).

For Informant G, the NFVF's institutional style promoted the growth of the industry as it was able to play a mediating role amongst conflicting industry views, even though sometimes the NFVF was forced to make unpopular decisions. Informant G provides the following perspective on the NFVF's leadership style:

I think particularly between 2001 and 2005, the leadership style was very much...I use this word with caution – authoritative – but I think it needed to be, because at the time we were dealing with an industry that was fragmented, and we were trying to pull this industry together... (Informant G, Interview, 09 October 2012).

Informant A indicated that the NFVF's institutional character was "...a single-person vision and the institutional style didn't provide for an easy way to implement its mandate" (Interview, 17 September 2012).

Informant B described the NFVF leadership as:

...heavy-handed and very much rules by the fist. It's my way or no way (Interview, 20 September 2012).

According to the informant, this resulted in resistance from the industry. Informant B notes however that the industry was more conciliatory towards the NFVF in its founding years, given that the establishment of the institution had been on the policy agenda for years.

The NFVF's authoritarian approach towards the industry was also mentioned by Informant H who said:

I think sometimes the NFVF sees itself as we'll find the solution and we'll tell you what the solution is. So I think they use their power in a way that I think sometimes can be difficult because I think they can enter at the top level with negotiation with SABC or IDC or DTI and often they do so without full consultation so the industry finds itself in a way fighting a little bit for consultation. And when it does, the NFVF consults and so the process works so I think that's where the tension lies (Informant H, Interview, 23 October 2012).

The informants views, when read together paint a picture of an institution that had a difficult working relationship with the industry due to its strong leadership style. Informant G points out that this could be justified given that the NFVF was faced with a fragmented industry and disjointed government, and found itself in a operating in a new and difficult environment (Interview, 09 October 2012).

4.4.2 Consultation and decision-making

There was some agreement from informants that the NFVF's strategies were developed in consultation with the industry. The NFVF instituted a variety of forums to try and engage with the industry. For example, the NFVF convened the Indaba sessions where it presented its

strategies to the industry. In between the Indaba sessions, the NFVF would consult with the industry on a number of policy-related matters. The challenge, however, according to Informant E, was that the overriding concern from the industry was always on how “this translates into money” (Interview, 28 September 2012).

Informants C, F and G also comment on this aspect of the industry, pointing to the fact that filmmakers were more interested in discussing funding than policy issues. According to Informant C (Interview, 20 September 2013):

...so it started at that level, and then we took it to the Indaba so there were all those fora where we had to consult. And the weakness with all those consultations especially around strategy is that people are not interested. What we found is that a lot of people were really always concerned about ‘am I going to get money’ so when you discuss high-level strategy, people are not participating when you talk filming. And everyone immediately is saying ‘how can I get the money; you see, that’s the problem. A related challenge, brought up most informants is that consultation with the industry was often difficult due to its fragmented nature. Informant C describes the challenges as follows:

Unfortunately, sometimes, and this is the role that the NFVF had to assume, that leadership role. It’s good to consult but sometimes you need to impose because if you rely on the professionals or ordinary people, then you might not achieve your goals because everyone has their own idea of how things should be done. So whilst we took into account everyone’s views, we still have a responsibility as professionals, as those that are tasked with the responsibility to lead and to guide, to put programmes that not everyone would agree with at the beginning but if they saw the benefits or the outcomes, then they would celebrate (Informant C, Interview, 20 September 2012).

Informant H was also sympathetic to the NFVF's challenges around consultation, and offers this perspective:

I think what happens at the NFVF, they go into a think –tank and obviously the industry is huge. How the hell do you consult with these disparate voices, and whose agenda is pushing what voice? It's complicated. So I think what the NFVF does it try and formulate its own policy, its own view of what people running the NFVF feel is the right direction. I think certainly they consult around those views although it might be somewhat selective consulting. And it's in those moments where they come up with a position (Informant H, Interview, 23 October 2012).

According to most informants, the NFVF engaged in regular consultations with the industry. These took on many forms from regular industry briefings with representative associations, to consultations on policy developments. The more formalised consultative forums were the Indaba sessions held every four years. The success of the Indaba was however open to question as the 2001 Indaba proposed a myriad of recommendations without providing much in the way of priorities. The 2005 Indaba was more focused and provided more pragmatic suggestions, some of which were later implemented. Some of these include the formation of a sectoral umbrella body, which led to the formation of SASFED.

4.4.3 Strategy development

Informant B, a former Council member indicates that the NFVF Council spent its first two years in office developing the NFVF's vision, mission and values. As Informant C recalls, the Council looked at every object in the Act and tried to translate that into an operational objective. According to Informant C, the NFVF strategy development process was unique in that it was developed by NFVF staff members. Although

Informant C notes that “The Value Charter was, and is a very high-level strategic document which I think a lot of people struggle to get to grips with” (Informant C, Interview, 20 September 2012).

According to other informants, the NFVF developed a variety of policies which include the funding, language and co-production policies and there was industry input and consultation. Informant G states that the NFVF attempted to consult both the industry and DAC in its strategy development (Interview, 09 October 2012).

There were times that the NFVF amended its strategy in order to influence the content landscape. Examples of this are provided by Informants F (Interview, 05 October 2012) and E (Interview, 28 September 2012) regarding the NFVF's policy of thematic funding. According to Informant E, the NFVF wanted to introduce more feel-good, “nation-building projects” which Informant F describes as an attempt to ensure that the industry was “telling the South Africa story.” According to Informant E, the NFVF did not consult with the industry on this as it was “purely an administrative issue.” Informant F indicates that the industry viewed this as NFVF “wanting people to make political films but we were trying to document South African history.”

4.5 The NFVF's capacity to implement policy

The fourth variable focussed on the NFVF's capacity to implement its policy mandate in respect of both financial and human resources. Policy actors were asked for their perspectives on the NFVF's implementation successes and/or challenges. The major theme to emerge from this discussion was the inadequate funding the NFVF received from 2000-2005. Most informants indicated that this was one

of the biggest challenges facing the newly established institution. They provided varying perspectives on the reasons and implications thereof. An analysis of key policy documents also revealed that the NFVF's funding issues constrained its ability to implement its policy mandate effectively.

4.5.1 Inadequate financial resources

One of the main challenges regarding the implementation of the NFVF's strategy was the issue of funding as Informant C, a former NFVF Executive, explains:

The only weakness of any policy implementation programme is if it's not budgeted for. I think the starting budget that the NFVF got was a joke actually. My attitude has always been, this is seed funding, let's justify. We were given an opportunity to come up with strategies and programmes that would justify why more money should be put into the NFVF. So you can start by saying, hey, we need R200m but if you don't have strategies and plans of how you're going to spend that money I would actually not give it to you...we had to put in place programmes that justified why we needed to exist, so if we just looked at one way, we would have closed shop. My approach was we need quick victories, there are certain things we need to do to show that there's an opportunity and I think with hindsight some of the decisions we took, we'll fund less projects but we'll fund them more adequately, it was enabling.

For Informant A, the NFVF budget constrained its ability to fully implement its strategy:

...for the first time, the NFVF had a strategy but no real capacity to implement it. The NFVF then realised that it needed to mobilise funding at a national, provincial and local level (Interview, 17 September 2012).

This view is echoed by Informant E (Interview, 28 September 2012) who raises concerns around the NFVF's ability to attain its required budget:

The NFVF strategy was based on a wish list, and there's nothing wrong with that but what that would then mean is that you're playing in a political space so you would need to lobby a lot because there were a lot of figures bandied about like R150m, R200m, and that's a lot of money.

Informants all expressed their frustrations that the NFVF was not adequately funded, particularly when taking into account that:

...it's a very, very expensive endeavour because the cost of production is so high" (Informant B, Interview, 20 September 2012).

Informant B (Interview, 20 September 2012), further commented that the general funding climate posed a challenge for filmmakers, many of whom were small businesses.

For Informant C (Interview, 20 September 2012), the NFVF was a victim of its own success as:

...the reality is that resources will never be enough because the more money you get, the more programmes you develop, then the queue is actually also getting longer. I'm not one to use the non-availability of resources for things not working. We had money to do certain things and I'm happy to say that's why we got all the clean audits because we worked within legislation, we managed our resources very well and I think we were able to mobilise more resources outside and that was done in different ways.

Informant H, on the other hand, was of the divergent view that the NFVF had not done enough to raise additional funding, and had failed

to engage the business sector to become involved in film financing. Informant H argued that:

I think that the NFVF has been under-resourced. I don't think its budget has been big enough. This is an expensive industry. And I think that it has had resource issues. But on the other hand I think that the NFVF has not been particularly good at finding other sources of funding. It has not leveraged its government support and government funding strategically with business, and with the commercial sector. I don't think the NFVF has put enough energy into that. But it's about creating platforms for it, we get X amount from government, how do we work with big business to access resources to fuel our industry. I mean that's got to be the interface. How do we take the R40 million that we've got (I don't know what their budget is) and turn that into R400 million. What policies do we need to be promoting to be making that ...if you want to get participation from outside of government then you've got to look at viable structures for people to want to put their money into this industry because it's a high-risk industry. I'm not sure that there's been enough engagement in that sector (Informant H, Interview, 23 October 2012).

Informant C held a different opinion, emphasising that the film industry should bear the responsibility for fund-raising:

The truth is locally people say the private sector should be investing in film; you're saying people who are making money in mining should put money into films? Why? So you need to have people skilled enough in the film industry to be able to go to the miners, or to the people who're making money to say there's an opportunity there. In fact, we didn't have dealmakers (Interview, 20 September 2012).

Informant H in contrast, views the question of fund-raising as one of the NFVF's roles:

...Maybe it doesn't view that as its mandate. But my understanding of the NFVF when it was first started initially was that it was supposed to become self-sufficient. So with that in mind you've got to find other sources of funding, or you've got to find that the industry is eventually funding you. And how do you get the industry to fund you. And I think it takes that kind of

approach and you can't constantly be looking at yourself simply as the conduit between government and the private sector. You have to be more...

The reasons for the lack of adequate financial resources were varied. For Informant G, the NFVF was constrained by the implementation structure as it was an agency within the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC). Informant G elaborates:

We were sitting in Arts and Culture and I think there's that perception, even today, that Arts and Culture deals with the softer issues. Why should Treasury give money to filmmakers when there are people out there that don't have houses? So you're dealing with that kind of thing and you're still dealing with that kind of thing. This is why I think the important thing we did was to make the economic case, which is that if you're contributing to GDP, you are still making a positive contribution and you're not just eating out of the fiscus. But we are capable of giving back to the fiscus.

From Informant's D's perspective the NFVF's funding challenges were embedded in the NFVF Act, which only caters for 25% of the budget to finance administration and operational costs. The reason provided by the informant is that:

Well, it's simply that the allocation doesn't grow that much from government. The allocation has never really increased that dramatically... (Interview, 28 September 2012).

Informant E (Interview, 28 September 2012) attributes the considerable under-funding of the NFVF to its dysfunctional relationship with its lead department, the DAC. Consequently, the NFVF missed out on opportunities to more fully align its programmes with government's thinking:

The NFVF wasn't talking to the appropriate people, and there was resentment from state officials about this entity that was making all this noise and making them look bad, so you could sense a bit of sabotage. For me there was no proper engagement, so if you engage properly you build relationships. As well, whilst the NFVF was reporting to the DAC, it did not have the best of relationships with the DAC...and that hurt it badly because it meant politically you don't get the right kind of support... The other thing that might have worked against the NFVF is that some of the programmes might not have been in line with what government was thinking because what happens when they allocate funds they look at what's the in-thing and then you become secondary. I guess that's why we're also lagging behind the other sectors.

Informant C's views on the possible reasons for the NFVF's underfunding resonate to some extent with those presented by Informant D. The NFVF's relationship with the DAC is once again identified as a hindrance to effective implementation, as demonstrated by the quote below:

... I think this is where my criticism of the Department of Arts and Culture comes in, where they failed to recognise film as a cross-cutting activity. Whilst we were reporting to the DAC, it was equally an agency of the DTI, an agency of DOC, an agency of the DOE. And I think that's where there was a disjoint...I think if we had looked at the DAC alone, that's where we would have failed because the officials at the Department were doing everything to make the NFVF not work...you know it was like jealousy. They were not happy. Instead of taking the successes and claiming them, they would actually try and work against what the NFVF was actually trying to do, so if you're a strategist, you look at what to do, you look at alternatives...I became much closer with the DTI, to an extent that they were worried that we might decide to move [to the DTI] and we were close actually, to making that call. Especially around 2005, that time when we took them to Parliament.

The informant's views paint a picture of an institution that did not have the requisite resources to enable it to fulfil its policy mandate effectively.

The second observation that emerges from the findings relates to the different values expressed particularly by Informants C and H regarding funding. Informant H interprets the NFVF's policy mandate to encompass fundraising for the industry at large. Moreover, the Informant suggests that the NFVF was expected to become self-sufficient at some point in its existence. Informant C's responses, on the other hand, reflects the view that the industry should be self-sustaining and able to fund-raise for itself. The third aspect of the findings above relates to perceptions around the causes of the NFVF's lack of financial resources. The NFVF's relationship with the DAC is mentioned by three informants who all offer contrasting opinions on how this impacted on policy implementation. Informant's G's view is that the NFVF's implementation structure was a disadvantage as arts and culture funding is not a key government priority. Informants C and D on blamed the lack of funding on perceived 'sabotage' and jealousy' from the DAC.

4.5.2 NFVF's institutional capacity

The NFVF attempted through the years to impress upon government the strategic importance of the film and video industry arguing that the economic benefits of the film industry could only be unlocked through increased government investment in the sector. In various presentations and representations to Parliament, the NFVF sought to demonstrate how it had always complied with government's corporate governance requirements and funding cycle, pointing out that "...the NFVF has developed programmes and the pertinent business plans to implement the strategy and to respond to environmental trends and developments" (NFVF, 2005:8).

On paper, the NFVF complied with all the necessary bureaucratic requirements for accessing government funding, however the DAC responded with an “incremental budget” that seemed oblivious to the NFVF’s funding requirements if it were to have the desired impact on the development of the industry. The DAC’s argument was that the NFVF should not lose sight of the fact that it was part of a cluster of government agencies and that resources needed to be spread equitably amongst all DAC entities (NFVF, 2005d: 8).

Despite the fact that the NFVF presented a strategy and a budget that required R325 million per annum (NFVF Value Charter, 2005), or R200 million (NFVF Annual Report, 2002b:1, the actual allocation remained well below the budget requests the table below illustrates.

Table 4: NFVF Funding

Year	Income / Amount (Rm)
2000/2001	R10 782 000
2001/2002	R13 214 022
2002/2003	R21 351 525
2003/2004	R43 816 569
2004/2005	R38 438 437
2005/2006	R29 545 396

Source (NFVF Annual Reports, 2000-2006)

The NFVF’s focus as the CEO’s forward in the Value Charter is on the need to create the “appropriate institutional capacity” and on the “rapid growth phase of the institution” (NFVF, 2004a). One informant pointed out that the NFVF seemed more focused on its survival rather

than the development of the industry. This view is supported by a statement that introduces the NFVF life-cycle in the 2002 annual report: "...we are now in the rapid growth phase where the growth of the Foundation will be the main focus" in order to "...address the strategic gap that exists in the capacity of the NFVF, a commitment if R200 million per annum is needed" (NFVF, 2002b:12-15).

One of the themes that emerge from the interviews is the need for the NFVF to "...justify its existence and budget through developing strategies and programmes" (Informant C, Interview 20 September 2012). The annual budget of R200 million was anticipated to have a multiplier effect of R1.2 billion over a five year period, and an investment multiplier of 6 (NFVF, 2005:28). The NFVF also estimated that a production budget of R15 – R20 million could create up to 200 jobs in the industry (Ibid).

These were the key arguments advanced by the NFVF in support of their sizable budget. The NFVF was not expecting this budget to be financed entirely through its annual allocation from the Department. The CEO indicated in its annual report that funding for the Film and Video Initiative could be sourced from the National Empowerment Fund, the Skills Development Levy, co-production treaties and television license fees (2002:14). In addition, the CEO suggested that funding for the legal entity to invest in film could be established through a joint MOU between the NFVF, DAC, DTI and the private sector (Ibid).

4.5.3 Funding Priorities

The NFVF's inaugural annual report acknowledged the immense work that lay ahead for the Foundation, noting that "...it needs substantially greater funding to ensure a viable and internationally competitive" in order to develop the South African film industry (2001a). The challenge, even in its first year of existence was always how to balance the twin requirements of supporting the established industry and developing "emergent filmmakers" as per the inaugural Chairperson's comments (NFVF, 2001(d): 6).

From the outset, the NFVF took the decision to "...support only a limited number of projects...to ensure quality and completion", as it was felt that "making numerous smaller grants will dissipate the effectiveness of our funding efforts and will impact on the long-term growth of the industry ((NFVF, 2001(d): 6). This focus on providing support to projects that would support the broader goals of economic development was further re-iterated in the NFVF's 2004 annual report when the CEO's report stated that funding would be directed towards films that could "contribute to the sustainable development of the film and video industry in South Africa" (NFVF, 2004c:5). The NFVF's slate funding initiative, introduced in 2004, was an attempt to contribute to greater sustainability on the sector (NFVF, 2005d: 21).

In its first five years of operation, the NFVF provided production funding for 108 documentaries, 29 features length films, 29 short films and supported 6 animation productions. The NFVF also provided 165 bursaries for students and supported 41 education and skills development programs (NFVF, 2005a:30).

The NFVF was vindicated when a number of South African feature films began gaining international acclaim and recognition (NFVF, 2005d:

22). These include: u-Carmen e-Khayelitsha (Golden Bear - Berlin), Drum (Golden Stallion and Best Art Direction - Burkina Faso), Zulu Love Letter (Best Actress, and European Union Prize - Fespaco), Max and Mona (Best First-Time Director – Fespaco), Beat the Drum (SIGNIS Prize, Health and Security and City of Ouagadougou Prize – Fespaco). The NFVF's viewed the Academy Award nomination of "Yesterday," and "Tsotsi's" Academy Award (in the category of Best Foreign Language Film), as testament to the hard work, effort and strategic direction it had adopted (NFVF, 2006:4).

4.5.4 Human Resources

Informants provided divergent perspectives on the NFVF's skills and capacity during its founding phase. There was broad agreement amongst most informants that NFVF Council members brought valuable skills to the NFVF based on their expertise as industry practitioners.

Informant F felt that the NFVF had sufficiently skilled staff heading up the various NFVF departments: training, marketing, finance, policy. For Informant G (Interview 09 October 2012), the NFVF had sufficient policy, government relations and industry skills but lacked production and funding skills. Informant C cited a skills shortage in finance, policy and industry experience (Interview, 20 September 2012).

Informant E (Interview, 17 September 2012), on the other hand commented that the NFVF's organisational structure was more administrative than functional:

Administratively it was very skilled but lacked the specific technical skills. That's why much later more technical people were brought in to deal specifically with productions. Whilst it was an administrative body, you needed to make it less administrative and more orientated to the industry.

From the informants' views, the NFVF had sufficient skills in the administration of the institution. The one area that was cited as a gap was funding and production experience. The Council members however were brought the required production experience.

4.5.5 Implementation successes and challenges

The informants noted that the NFVF had managed to achieve some of its policy objectives in its first five years. Informants cited the increased number of South African films and numerous awards as an example of this success. The introduction of the DTI incentive was also mentioned as a major accomplishment. The NFVF was also applauded for the extensive marketing of the country as a film destination. Some informants commended the investment the NFVF has made into skills development. For Informant B (Interview, 20 September) one of the NFVF's key successes was putting the film industry on government's agenda. From Informant G's perspective, one of the NFVF's major implementation successes was getting the industry more organised as well as its ability to leverage off its partners.

For Informant C, the central success and focus from 2000-2005 was on creating and establishing an institution that had credibility and visibility. As Informant C says:

For me it was about focussing right at the beginning on building an institution that would last for the next 100 years...so it was about developing these programmes that created visibility for

the organisation, institutional development...And then in later years it was about developing long-lasting programmes...

The areas of weakness identified by informants included the lack of technical skills and high-end directing and producing skills. There was a perception from two informants that the NFVF had invested money into skills that were not necessarily in line with industry's requirements.

One of the key criticisms was the lack of transformation in the industry. As Informant E states:

...we still don't have sufficient black producers or black producers with experience doing big-budget films. Transformation (if any) has been very slow. Industry's perception of blacks hasn't changed much – they're seen as perpetual trainees. We're still lagging behind in terms of script-writing.

Informant E attributes the slow pace of transformation to the NFVF's approach. From the informant's perspective, "...it was business unusual but we went about it as though it was business as usual". The informant adds that the NFVF did not take a holistic view of the industry. It failed to consolidate its activities and failed to set clear timeframes (Interview, 28 September 2012).

Informant B echoed also raised the lack of effective transformation as an issue. Informant B states that:

I think that's where the NFVF has really failed us and maybe that's because they're not producers, they're more policymakers, administrators, they don't come into it from a business point of view. They don't have an understanding of being producer. As a producer and a small business in South Africa, the legislative framework, accountability and administration takes a lot of time and money and energy. It's very hard. It's not an easy industry. And there's a resistance in

the country where people don't want to invest in the industry because they think it's high risk.

The lack of transformation in the industry was also highlighted by Informant F, who says:

...The NFVF has recently completed a study that looks at transformation in the industry and found that black people do not stay in the industry and are still lacking certain key skills. There are still not enough black script-writers and producers, particularly black women. One of the challenges has been how to build the industry, and businesses (production companies).

The industry has not transformed to the extent possible, particularly PDIs and women... Also black filmmakers still lack technical skills, and you see this at the SAFTAs. A lot of international productions coming to South Africa are serviced by white film crews. We neglected the technical skills and that's why black filmmakers have not really developed in that area (Interview, 05 October 2012).

For Informant G (Interview, 09 October 2012), one of the main challenges that the NFVF experienced in implementing policy was the perceptions that the NFVF was overstepping its mandate in as far as developing policy.

The informants acknowledged the NFVF's achievement in implementing film policy despite its resource constraints. These included the increase in South African films, and increased film activity in the country. Informant C (Interview, 20 September 2012) in particular highlighted the establishment, credibility and visibility of the NFVF as a major implementation success. The lack of skills development and lack of transformation were seen to be a failure in implementing policy. The reasons advanced for this included the NFVF's lack of

industry experience, ineffective skills development and a lack of clear action plan and targets for transformation.

4.6 The NFVF's policy clients and coalitions

The final variable discussed related to the NFVF's policy clients and partnerships. These questions also tried to assess policy actors' perspectives on how filmmakers have responded to the NFVF's interpretation and implementation of its policy mandate. The main theme that emerged was on the film industry's state of fragmentation and the implications this had on policy implementation as the NFVF had to contend with competing industry expectations.

4.6.1 Industry fragmentation

The discussion on the NFVF's policy clients revealed that industry fragmentation and funding challenges presented a challenge to the NFVF's implementation of film policy. This is confirmed by interview responses as well as the following statement from the then CEO's review in the NFVF's first Annual Report (NFVF, 2001d: 12):

The South African film and video industry remains fragmented with more than 20 professional associations and societies, many affiliated to international entities. The industry is characterised by passionate and dedicated professionals who acknowledge the merits of a coherent and united approach to the future.

To draw the industry together under an effective umbrella body which will ensure progressive growth, create development opportunities, and take maximum advantage of existing opportunities, are the National Film and Video Foundations (*nfvf*) *raison d'être*.

Informant B indicated that it was difficult to assess how filmmakers responded to the NFVF's implementation of policy as:

...One would have to ask do they speak on behalf of the industry or their own personal/company interests. The question of how effective industry bodies have been is still a relevant one.

Informant F indicated that the industry was more vocal in public but that filmmakers would write to the NFVF, acknowledging its role and contribution. The major challenge, as highlighted by Informant F above, was the lack of cohesion within the industry:

But collectively they were more vocal and highlighted areas that they felt needed to be improved. The NFVF has always said we need a united industry that speaks with one voice and we supported the formation of SASFED (even though for a long time, the IPO was not a member). Our challenge was that we were getting fragmented views and contradictory opinions dealing with different industry bodies. Over time, the industry has really come to acknowledge the NFVF as a key institution. We received a lot of industry support when the NFVF was experiencing strained relationships with the DAC" (Interview, 05 October 2012).

This view is echoed by Informant A (Interview, 17 September 2012):

Between 2002 and 2005 the CEO went on a drive to encourage the formation of industry representative bodies so that the NFVF had people to talk to represent constituencies. The challenge is that industry bodies are weak and badly organised and tend to be dominated by powerful interests.

Informant C (Interview, 28 September 2012) describes this slightly differently:

...so what the IPO and SASFED failed to do was to professionalise the industry and that was always my call when I was part of the

formation of the IPO, I said we need to accredit people. We need to be able to decide who can work in this industry...

In contrast, Informant H (Interview, 23 October 2012) argues that the NFVF tended to view the organised sectors of the industry with mistrust, stating that:

...and I find it so strange because on the one hand people are saying 'we want industry to speak with one voice.' When industry does try to speak with one voice, obviously the bigger and stronger companies will be at the forefront of that because that's where the experience lies and then immediately it becomes 'oh' and there's a mistrust towards that grouping and that has been incredibly difficult because you can't be constantly negotiating in a space where there is perpetual distrust. Actually there has to be a situation where one says 'all parties want the same thing, all parties want there to be a vibrant film and television industry that is self-sustaining specifically.'

From Informant H's perspective, the fragmented nature of the industry enabled the NFVF to take on a "...nanny role" in instances where it felt the industry is unable to reach consensus. This was compounded by the fact that even within the industry itself, there were different expectations of the NFVF's role. Informant H suggests that there was one section that viewed the NFVF as a facilitator and expected it to create a conducive environment to promote growth and to have a more hands-off approach, given that "the industry should be out there making deals." On the other hand, there was another group that wanted the NFVF to be more involved in developing and funding the industry, with a more-hands-on approach (Interview, 23 October 2013).

Informants E and G indicated that the industry's support of the NFVF was dependent on whether or not they had received funding from

the NFVF. Filmmakers were more inclined to be supportive when the NFVF was giving them money. Informant G captures this as follows:

Look I have to say and it's probably as true today as it was then that if you receive funding it's fine. If you don't it's a problem (Interview, 09 October 2012).

Informant E also relates the industry's support or lack thereof to the broader funding environment:

It depended on the environment at the time. If it was on an upscale industry would be very happy with the NFVF. If it was during a down phase, industry would get very frustrated with the NFVF, and felt that the NFVF was moving very slowly so the environment dictated their responses. If whatever policy is being devised is not going to rock the boat, it's fine but if it is, it's viewed with a degree of scepticism (Interview, 28 September 2012).

The reason for the industry's fragmentation and concerns around funding are articulated by Informant H (Interview, 23 October 2012) who suggests that:

And the reason why there are so many hotly contested positions is that the pool is small, the pie is small and when the pie is small people are always looking for different ways to make it more advantageous to themselves. So in that regard the NFVF sometimes has a role to play to ensure that the smaller role players are not marginalised in those circumstances. However, there's a danger in that that can sometimes lead to skewed to policy. Because policy cannot be protectionist because protectionism sometimes protectionism prevents development because actually you do need the aggressive approach to build an industry. They have got quite a difficult role.

From Informant's F's perspective, a related challenge was that the industry viewed the NFVF as another industry body and did not fully appreciate its role as a state institution. The industry would also expect

the NFVF to lobby and intervene on its behalf (Interview, 05 October 2012).

The views on the industry's expectations of the NFVF as put forward by Informant H (Interview, 23 October 2012) indicate that the NFVF was dealing with multiple competing interests. There were filmmakers who welcomed the NFVF's more interventionist or 'nanny role' and there were those who saw the NFVF as more of a facilitator. These contrasting views point once again to questions on the role of the NFVF within the industry and the different meanings industry had of the NFVF.

Taken together, the informants' views indicate that the NFVF's role was not well defined and open to different interpretations from its beneficiaries in 2000 - 2005. This obviously led to questions on the nature and scope of its mandate and contestations on how adequately it was fulfilling its mandate. Role ambiguity played a key part in how effectively the NFVF was able to execute its mandate, often requiring policy adjustments and negotiation with affected stakeholders.

4.6.2 Policy coalitions and partnerships

According to most informants, the NFVF was able to develop more successful partnerships with the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI's) Film Unit and the Industrial Development Corporation's (IDC's) Media and Motion Pictures Unit. The NFVF participated in the DTI's Rebate meetings and partnered with them at international markets such as Cannes and MIPCOM. The NFVF formed a close collaboration

with the IDC around funding and development of projects (Informant F, Interview, 05 October 2012).

The documentary analysis reveals that the newly established NFVF was critically aware of the need for effective relationships, and embarked on a process of engaging other national and international stakeholders on its strategy. These included the following collaborations: the then Kwa-Zulu Natal Film Congress; the Western Cape Government and Unicity on the Film City; the Eastern Cape government on the establishment of a film office; discussions with Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA) on outward film missions and also concluded an MOU with the Media Advertising Publishing Printing Packaging Sector Education Training Authority (MAPPP-SETA) on skills development (NFVF, 2003:12). Another successful venture which most informants cited, was the partnership in conjunction with the Maurits Binger Film Institute on the production of 17 documentaries to celebrate ten years of freedom and democracy in South Africa (Ibid) in partnership with the SABC.

In its first year, the NFVF forged relationships with international organisations in Australia, Canada, France, India, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. According to Informant F, who was a Senior Manager at the time, the NFVF would regularly meet with their foreign partners at international markets (Interview, 05 October 2012). In addition, the NFVF participated in a number of international markets and film festivals such as the Cannes Film Festival, Banff, the AFCl Locations Expo, Mipcom, the International Indian Film Festival and

Mumbai Film Festival, Rotterdam, Cinemart, Toronto, Berlin and Gutenberg (NFVF, 2003, NFVF 2004c:12) and Venice in 2005⁵.

4.7 Conclusion

This section presented the findings gathered through a qualitative analysis of documentary evidence and in-depth interviews. The findings were presented in terms of the 5-C protocol. The findings were themed according to the issues that informants raised. Some of the key issues that emerged from the findings were the lack of clarity on the NFVF's role an mandate and the implications this has on policy implementation. In addition, the implementation structure for film policy was discussed in relation to the NFVF's relationship with the DAC. The findings also revealed that the NFVF did not have sufficient financial resources to carry out its mandate effectively.

⁵ There has been criticism and doubt expressed at the value and cost of attendance at these festivals with some critics arguing that the funds could have been better utilised to fund South African films.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

This section presents an analysis of the findings as per the 5-C protocol. This section highlights the inter-relatedness of the five key variables. The analysis revealed that the content of the policy, framed in vague ambiguous language resulted in questions on the NFVF's role, which in turn impacted on all the other variables.

5.2 The NFVF's policy content

The discussion on the clarity of the NFVF's policy objectives provided a wide range of perspectives that illustrate the complexities that the NFVF faced in interpreting and implementing its policy mandate. What is striking is the informants' assertions that the NFVF Act is sufficiently clear and provides an unambiguous directive to the NFVF to "promote and develop" the industry yet the nature of its support and role in the industry were open to multiple interpretations. The perspectives offered by informants highlight the NFVF's flexibility in adapting to meet competing demands but also hint at the difficulty of promoting developmental imperatives such as transformation and cultural promotion within the context of a globally competitive industry and an inadequately funded public institution.

Implementation scholars argue that the policy formulation process is muddled and full of compromises and that the call for clear and

consistent goals is unrealistic given that "...passage of legislation often requires ambiguous language and contradictory goals to hold together a base of power..." (Matland, 1995:149). The question then, is how the officials responsible for implementing policy, the street-level bureaucrats, make sense of the inherent ambiguity in the policy design.

The views from informants suggests that they were comfortable with the ambiguity contained in the NFVF Act, with Informant C (Interview, 20 September 2012) welcoming the broad mandate which allowed them the flexibility of introducing new programmes to address challenges such as script development and sustainability. Hupe and Hill (2007:281) remind us that street-level bureaucrats enjoy a large degree of discretion that is embedded in the structural rules. These rules may be ambiguous and contradictory, as in the case of the NFVF Act, and street-level bureaucrats are forced to make choices. In these cases, street-level bureaucrats constantly seek out ways to maximise their discretionary power. The implementation challenge was that the scope of the NFVF's role was not clearly defined, leading to different expectations amongst policy beneficiaries. For example, the industry and DAC questioned the NFVF's role in policy-making, preferring for it to focus on its role as a funding institution. In addition, development was skewed towards larger production companies because the type of development or promotion was never defined in the Act. The NFVF's modification of its funding criteria to include recoupment and more commercial terms was another example of how street-level bureaucrats used the discretion afforded to them by the wide scope of the NFVF Act.

A related observation with ambiguous policy design is that it allows for multiple interests to be put on the policy agenda (Thomas and Grindle, 1990:116). This is an outcome of accommodating disparate viewpoints and results in "...a stockpile of proposed changes. Some items on the agenda are acted upon, but many are not, often because of the preferences, perceptions, and actions of policy elites..." For example, Informant E (Interview, 28 September 2012) noted that the NFVF never set up the two funds described in the Act due to lack of funding.

The review of policy documents in conjunction with the interpretational issues referred to by informants reveals that the NFVF Act is characteristic of what Matland (1995:168) describes as symbolic policy-making arising from the consensus-seeking approach to policy-making during the early 1990s. Matland maintains that symbolic policies are characterised by high conflict and high ambiguity (1995:145). This was described by informants as the need to 'shift' from a more cultural to commercial mandate to ensure that South African films could become more competitive, yet was constrained by the lack of good scripts and transformation imperatives.

The symbolic nature of the NFVF Act can be traced back to the policy formulation stage when the more distributive language of the Film Development Strategy (South Africa, 1996b) which called for the "...development of an indigenous, national South African film industry, which caters for all language and cultural groups and provides entertainment, education and information" was significantly watered down to symbolic expressions of "redressing the imbalances of the past" (South Africa, 1997b).

The discussion on the NFVF's policy content shows that implementation is influenced by its legislative environment. The promulgation of the NFVF was characterised by compromises and lack of agreement on the orientation of film policy in South Africa, a fact that was alluded to by policy scholars such as Williams (1995), Karam (1997), Mistry (2002), Saks (2003), Botha (2005, 2006) and Reddy (2005). This did not seem to pose a problem for street-level bureaucrats who devised various coping strategies to deal with the ambiguity. However, the lack of explicit agreement on the NFVF's role continued to present a challenge during the implementation process during 2000-2005.

Colebatch (1998:55) reminds us that policy choices embody a theory of cause and effect. During the policy formulation process, the government's rationale was that the industrialisation of the film industry through the NFVF would attract foreign investment. This in turn would result in job creation, transformation and would also deliver on cultural commitments. However this was not the case as government continued to under-fund the NFVF, and at some point actually withholding a portion of its allocation.

5.3 The NFVF's policy context

The discussion on the NFVF's policy context reveals that on one hand the post-1994 political environment was favourable to the establishment of democratic agencies such as the NFVF that were being set up to effect transformation and inclusivity. The challenge as indicated by informants was the lack of political will in terms of funding the NFVF's mandate. This was further complicated by the lack of clarity on the NFVF's autonomy and role. The DAC maintained that the

NFVF was created by the DAC to implement government's vision for film development, and was therefore subordinate to the department. The NFVF, on the other hand, maintained that the Act provided it with the necessary autonomy and independence.

The implementation of policy during the period 2000-2005 was constrained by a complex implementation structure between the NFVF and DAC. It was further compounded by the lack of policy co-ordination and coherence at a horizontal or inter-organisational level. The government had concurrently set up a range of other state organs that had a film-related mandate. The NFVF's main appeal during 2000 – 2005 was for it to be recognised as the only legitimate institution set up to develop the film industry. The NFVF was attempting to achieve greater 'statutory coherence' (May, 2002:224) in an effort to simplify the implementation structure. It fought to legitimate its role as a co-ordinator for film policy implementation in the country. The lack of co-ordination and coherence as well lack of clarity on its relationship to the DAC proved to be a hindrance to the effective implementation of film policy.

Hogwood and Gunn (1984:205-206) note that communication is important in ensuring effective coordination and implementation. The challenge, however, is that coordination also requires "...the exercise of power" over institutions with a similar mandate. This was problematic for the NFVF because of its difficult vertical relationship with the DAC, which constrained its ability to engage with other government departments without the DAC's consent. As Informant C (Interview, 20 September 2012) noted:

...government departments like to stick to each other.... Departments can be narrow-minded. They feel they need to protect each other... There wasn't much support from other government departments because even though they may have agreed with us in private, they were reluctant to go against one of their own government departments.

As Hogwood and Gunn (Ibid.) further explain, the level of discretion increases as "...alliances and understandings can be used as levers on others..." Informants indicated that the NFVF attempted to use its political muscle and relationship with the Minister to force the DAC's hand. The NFVF attempted to use a bureaucratic/politico-legal solution to force the DAC into compliance. Whether or not this would have resulted in an improved working relationship is questionable. Brynard and de Coning's (2006:198) observation that "bureaucratic contexts favourable to implementation more often grow out of human interactions than hierarchical regulation" emphasises the importance of good working relationships that are formed out of mutual trust, which was lacking between the NFVF and DAC during 2000-2005.

The common thread between this discussion on policy context and the previous analysis on policy content is the ambiguity on the role and meaning of the NFVF. Different policy actors interpreted its role in different ways. The NFVF's complex policy context and related challenges with the DAC echoes an observation made by Hogwood and Gunn (1984:216) that "...Even when one government body is formally subordinate to another, they will often be *interdependent*." This was evident in the relationship between the DAC and NFVF, where both institutions were able to exercise some discretion over the implementation process.

For Stone (1980, as cited in Palumbo 1987:95) this type of conflict is inherent in the implementation process as a "...certain amount of goal modification is inevitable as abstract policy ideas are converted into concrete programs of action."

5.4 The NFVF's commitment to implement policy

According to Mazmanian (1979:547), policy implementation is inherently complex and requires "...implementers who are not merely neutral but sufficiently persistent to develop new regulations and standard operating procedures, and to enforce them in the face of resistance from target groups and from public officials reluctant to make the mandated changes." The picture painted by informants was that the NFVF's institutional style was at times consultative and inclusive. However the overwhelming perception was that the NFVF was seen to be authoritative, with Informant F (Interview, 05 October 2012) indicating that the NFVF was seen as a "bully." Another informant described its management style as "heavy-handed" (Informant B, Interview, 20 September 2012). The implication, as described by Informant A, was that its "institutional style didn't provide for an easy way to implement its mandate." (Interview, 17 September 2012).

The NFVF's management style was characterised by what Matland describes as "coercive methods" of ensuring compliance (1995:156). This tactic is used when there is policy conflict and policy actors' responses are based not on reaching consensus on goals, but on "reaching an agreement on actions (means). (Ibid.)." Informants pointed out that the NFVF used this as a coping strategy in an attempt to provide leadership to a disjointed and sometimes hostile film

industry. In the same vein, the NFVF resorted to enforcing its autonomy and mandate in a coercive manner with the DAC as well, rather than seeking co-operation.

Informant H (Interview, 23 October 2012) mentioned that the NFVF did not always consult effectively with the industry, preferring to take on a “nanny” role. Relating this to the general discussion on how the NFVF conducted itself as an institution, reflects the point made by May (2002:230) regarding street-level bureaucrats that sometimes “...inconsistent use of discretion can result in *de facto* policies that differ greatly from policy intentions as well as inequitable policy implementation.” Informants provided various perspectives on instances when implementing officials modified funding requirements without necessarily consulting the industry. Examples of this include the shift to more commercial criteria in funding and subsequent recoupment policy. Another example is decision to introduce themed funding in an effort to tell a more South African story.

The NFVF was in a difficult position and was required to assert its autonomy in relation to the DAC. At the same time, it was also required to assert its authority in relation to the industry. This contributed to making its operating and implementation environment more hostile because of its institutional character, which caused a disjuncture between the NFVF and the industry. This point brings to mind May’s (2002:229) suggestion of building commitment into the policy design. As Matland (1995:167) observes “...ambiguous policies can breed limited accountability and can lead to the creation of minifiefdoms with leaders pursuing their own interests. These may have little, if any, connection to the public interest.” The NFVF’s

management and institutional style had a constraining effect on how effectively it was able to implement its policy mandate during 2000 – 2005.

5.5 The NFVF's capacity to implement policy

The implementation of South African film policy was characterised by laudable policy goals, without the provision of the requisite policy means to achieve the state's intent. For example, the Department of Arts and Culture commissioned the PWC report that recommended an annual funding allocation of R260m p.a. to make the local industry internationally competitive, yet the actual funding provided to the NFVF from 2000 - 2005 was an average of R25 5252 910 p.a. This was hardly sufficient to secure South Africa's place in the international film community and to deliver on the government's stated outcomes.

The informants all agreed that the NFVF was grossly underfunded given the scope of its mandate and coupled with the fact that the film industry is an expensive business. Informants provided various perspectives as to why the NFVF did not receive adequate funds. One view was that the government had more pressing funding priorities. Another view was that the government did not understand how the industry functions. Another perspective was the NFVF's dysfunctional relationship with the DAC resulted in the institution being deliberately under-funded. This situation relates to a statement by Hogwood and Gunn (1984:199) that "...politicians sometimes will the policy 'end' but not the 'means', so that expenditure restrictions may starve a statutory programme of adequate resources."

The NFVF used various coping mechanisms to overcome its funding challenges. For example, the decision to fund fewer films but to fund them more adequately was an attempt by street-level bureaucrats to make more strategic funding decision. Of course this when coupled with the introduction of the recoupment policy, meant that the NFVF was limiting its funding to projects that had more commercial potential. Another strategy employed by the NFVF was to forge closer relationships with institutions with a similar mandate, such as the DTI for example.

The discussion above can be understood from the perspective provided by Elmore (1979) that criticises how policy-makers frame policy problems. Policymakers frame problems in ways that are:

...broad, abstract, and disconnected. They tend to focus on immediate problems of policy formulation rather than more distant problems of implementation. Allocation of funds among competing agencies tends to dominate, even though the consequences of allocation decisions for the delivery of services are vague and unspecified.

The NFVF's lack of resources constrained the institution in as far as its ability to carry out its mandate. At an organisational level, the NFVF had sufficient skills to carry out the administrative requirements of the Act but as informants pointed out the NFVF lacked production and industry skills in its first five years of operation.

That being said, informants pointed out that the NFVF managed to achieve certain objectives despite the limited funding. These included its international marketing and promotional activities, which raised the country's profile as a filmmaking destination.

The key implementation challenge addressed by most informants was the lack of transformation, which was one of the NFVF's core mandates. The reasons ascribed to this were that the NFVF failed to devise proper strategies to ensure that transformation imperatives would be met. Given that the NFVF's budget was so limited, the agency took a decision to focus on more commercially viable productions that may not have accommodated the transformation objectives.

The informants views on the lack of transformation in the industry is interesting considering their responses that transformation was the second most important policy objective for the NFVF. It is the researcher's view that the lack of specificity on the NFVF's goal, role and mandate resulted in certain policy objectives receiving priority over others.

5.6 The NFVF's policy clients and coalitions

The discussion on the NFVF's policy clients and coalitions highlights the challenges with managing client and stakeholder expectations of policy. The NFVF was faced with both scenarios of 'policies with publics' and 'policies without publics'. One of the challenges as highlighted in the 2000/2001 Annual Report was the NFVF's observation that the film and television industry has historically been fragmented resulting in divergent views and contradictory opinions on policy issues.

The film industry was characteristic of what May (2002:226-227) referred to as highly fragmented policy clients who at times were able to question and influence the NFVF's policy direction. At the same time the NFVF was also faced with the challenge of creating policy for

an industry that was sometimes absent, and only focused on funding, resulting in 'policies without publics'.

One of the 'coping' mechanisms that the NFVF developed is exemplified by its attempt to 'organise' the industry so that it could engage with a single 'public.' The call by the NFVF for the formation of a single industry body was an attempt to eliminate the multiple competing voices in order to better define and manage its policy beneficiaries and the policy implementation process. This was emphasised by the then CEO's active efforts at the creation of a representative industry body.

From an implementation perspective, the NFVF adopted an interventionist approach, on the basis that the industry lacks the capacity to 'self-regulate.' The NFVF's role, vis-à-vis policy clients and beneficiaries, reflects what Brynard and de Coning (2006:200) refer to as 'ideological determinism' where stakeholders propose a maximalist or minimalist role for the state. The NFVF continued to view itself as an authority of the industry, whereas there were some sections of the industry that preferred for it to play a more minimal and facilitative role. Brynard and de Coning (Ibid.) suggest that a more moderate approach is offered by "alternative service delivery mechanisms" where the state need not directly control and produce all public services itself. This entails a shift from "rowing to steering" where the state's role is to facilitate, co-ordinate or enable the delivery of services.

5.7 Conclusion

This section analysed the findings in terms of the 5-C protocol, illustrating the interconnection between the explanatory variables. The lack of agreement on the NFVF's role proved problematic in respect of the implementation process.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to analyse the ways in which the NFVF interpreted and implemented its policy objectives from the perspective of street-level bureaucrats. Brynard and de Coning (2006) remind us that in order to understand the complex processes involved in implementing policy, one is required to follow policy as it moves through the implementation process, changing its environment, and in turn being influenced by the environment within which it is located.

The study used an adaptation of the 5-C models, or critical explanatory variables to follow film policy on its journey through the implementation process. The 5-C protocol emphasises the following key aspects related to policy implementation: policy content, policy context, commitment of the implementing institution, capacity to implement policy and policy coalitions and clients. The critical explanatory variables were assessed in relation to the implementation activities of NFVF staff who were the officials responsible for implementing policy.

The context of the study was influenced by concerns raised by policy scholars that the policy formulation process that led to the establishment of the NFVF was the result of compromises between various policy actors during the negotiation phase. Policy scholars such as Williams (1995), Karam (1997), Mistry (2002), Saks (2003), Botha (2005, 2006) and Reddy (2005) raised questions around the lack of operational principles for the NFVF, and a perceived lack of clarity

regarding its mandate. More significantly earlier studies on the NFVF were concerned about the wide discretion given to the NFVF, including the devolution of policy-making.

The study revealed that the process of implementing government's vision for the film industry was a complex one that was open to multiple meanings and interpretation. In addition, the study also demonstrated how the explanatory variables interact and impact on each other.

There were two major constraints to the NFVF's implementation activities. The first relates to the policy ambiguity with respect to its role and mandate which remained unclear during its first five years of operation. The thematic discussion of the findings indicated that the lack of agreement on the NFVF's policy role led to contestation on how it was interpreting its mandate. This in turn had an impact on how it went about implementing this mandate.

The second constraint relates to the implementation structure for film policy and the NFVF's relationship with the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) which impacted negatively on its ability to access funding and engage with other government departments. This also had an impact on its ability to implement its policy mandate effectively. These factors are discussed further in the sections below.

6.2 Policy content

The NFVF Act is characteristic of what policy scholars refer to as symbolic policy. That is policy that Hill (2013:210) describes as

“...complex, obscure, ambiguous or even meaningless.” Such policy is the result of compromise and negotiation during the policy development phase. The implementation of such policy is also subject to negotiation and compromise (Ibid.). As discussed earlier, policy formulation requires compromise between various stakeholders and conflicting goals. As Matland (1995) observes “...ambiguity is often the prerequisite for getting new policies passed at the legitimization stage.”

Furthermore, the policy language was crafted in such a manner that it is “...sufficiently ambiguous that diverse actors can interpret the same act in different ways. This is a natural and inevitable result of the working of political processes” (Ibid.). The implications of this are that policy is understood and interpreted differently by multiple stakeholders. This study provided examples of how differently the NFVF Act was understood by different role-players.

The three main policy actors were the officials at the NFVF who were responsible for implementing policy, the officials at the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) and the film industry who all understood the policy differently. The NFVF perceived itself as deriving legitimate authority from the NFVF Act. For the NFVF, this authority conferred on it the right to introduce, change, shape and develop policy for the industry.

From the DAC’s perspective, the NFVF Act and the NFVF itself were the brainchild and by-product of the department. As such, the Act provided the mechanisms through which the NFVF and DAC should co-operate. For the film industry, the NFVF Act provided the means through which the industry should be supported and developed. The

challenge was how the NFVF perceived its role in this regard. The symbolic nature of the Act, lacking in specificity and definitional clarity resulted in contestation around the NFVF's role and operating and implementation parameters.

6.3 Lack of clarity on the NFVF's role and mandate

The contestation around the NFVF's role is rooted to a large extent in the policy formulation process. The findings indicate that policy actors shared a similar understanding on the objectives of the Act, which were to promote and develop the industry. The problem as identified by policy actors was the different interpretations and expectations of the NFVF.

As Karam (1997:104) pointed out, the NFVF Act addressed the 'why' and not the 'how' of film policy implementation. The policy process and Act made provision for the broad macro-structures and not the micro-practices. This ambiguity led to conflict on almost every aspect of the NFVF's operations. For example, the NFVF had to defend its programmes and policies to its client, the film industry which admittedly was fraught with its own challenges. The introduction of even 'administrative' policies (such as thematic funding) were subject to negotiation. Informants indicated that even the NFVF's role as a policy-making institution was questioned.

The lack of clarity with respect to the NFVF's role and relationship with the DAC had a huge impact on its operating environment which impacted on its capacity to implement policy. The study indicated that the DAC at some point withheld a portion of the NFVF's funding;

resulting in an announcement that it was no longer able to provide funding to filmmakers.

6.4 Discretion of street-level bureaucrats

A second key observation relating to the NFVF's policy implementation process was that the ambiguity embedded in the Act paved the way for implementing officials to interpret policy in a way that enabled them to cope with the ambiguity and difficult implementation context. The point at issue is not the NFVF's legitimate use of its authority to make operational decisions. Rather the point of emphasis is on how the policy environment at times restricted the NFVF's ability to implement policy effectively and at other times provided the NFVF management with the latitude to adapt to the environment by prioritising certain objectives over others. The study showed how the NFVF was required to be flexible to meet multiple demands and to respond to its environment.

6.5 Complex implementation structure

The third key aspect of the implementation journey was the complex implementation structure that housed the policy. The study discussed the tensions between the DAC and NFVF and there can be no doubt as to the impact this had on the implementation process. Informants reflected on the challenges related to financial resources and political and administrative support for the NFVF. In addition to the difficult vertical relationship, the situation was compounded by an equally complex horizontal structure for implementation. Film policy, through the NFVF had to fight its way through a myriad of government

departments and funding arrangements. A central feature of this was the NFVF's attempts at asserting itself as the only legitimate state institution for film policy in South Africa.

6.6 Areas for further research

This case study examined how film policy was implemented through the NFVF by looking at the perspectives of different policy actors. In particular, this case study sought to examine the implementation process from the perspective of street-level bureaucrats. There is scope to add to this understanding by conducting a more in-depth analysis of film industry practitioners in order to analyse policy implementation from the perspective of policy clients and beneficiaries. Another focus area for future research could be an evaluation of the NFVF's programmes given the challenging implementation context between 2000- 2005.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Interview Guide

University of the Witwatersrand
Graduate School of Public and Development Management
Student Number: 0302900X

Dear Informant

Request for participation in a research study – A case study of the National Film and Video Foundation's interpretation and implementation of film policy in South Africa

My name is Tusi Fokane and I am studying towards a Masters of Management in Public Policy (MM-PP) at the University of Witwatersrand (student number: 0302900X). As part of my studies, I am conducting a research study that seeks to explore how the National Film and Video Foundation (NFVF) interpreted and implemented the policy objectives of the NFVF Act from 2000-2005.

My interests include finding out how the NFVF defined its mandate and how this was translated into a set of operational principles guiding the institutions work. I am also interested in exploring whether there were any challenges posed by the implementation of film policy, and how these were addressed.

I am interviewing a number of people who were instrumental in interpreting and implementing the NFVF Act, and I am interested in obtaining your views as someone who can provide a perspective on the NFVF as an institution of policy. The information gathered during the interviews will ONLY be used for the purposes of my studies and shall not be published or shared with other people. The discussions remain confidential and you may remain anonymous.

Participation in the study is voluntary and no incentive shall accrue as a result of participation. As a participant, you have the right to withdraw from the interview at any point. If you are agreeable, I would like to record the conversation ONLY for the purposes of accurately capturing all the points you raise. The recorded information will be transcribed for analytical purposes.

This interview will take approximately one hour. Kindly refer to interview questions on page 2.

Kind Regards

Tusi Fokane

Could you kindly provide background on your professional association with the NFVF?

1. Policy content

- 1.1 In your opinion what were the main policy objectives of South Africa's film policy?
 - 1.1.1 Were these policy objectives sufficiently clear in the NFVF Act?
- 1.2 Was there a common understanding amongst the industry and government of the NFVF's role and mandate?
- 1.3 Given the wide scope of the Act, which policy objectives, in your opinion, were prioritised and why?
 - 1.3.1 How realistic were these objectives?
- 1.4 Some people have argued that one of the challenges with South Africa's film policy was the lack of clarity on whether the primary role of the NFVF was to focus on film as cultural or commercial activity, what are your views on this statement?
- 1.5 Should the NFVF have been given more explicit objectives?
- 1.6 Did the NFVF Act sufficiently empower the Council and Management of the NFVF to execute its policy mandate?

2. Policy context

- 2.1 Can you describe the socio-economic environment at the time? And what kind of challenges/opportunities did it provide in the NFVF's implementation of its mandate?
- 2.2 What was the political landscape at the time and how did it impact on the NFVF's capacity to meet its policy mandate?
- 2.3 Did these factors present any conflicts between the policy and implementation?

3. Commitment of implementing institution

- 3.1 Are you aware of any policies/strategies developed by the NFVF between 2000 – 2005 to assist it in implementing its mandate?
- 3.2 Who was consulted in drafting these policies/strategies?
- 3.3 To what extent did the policies/strategies reflect the views of the industry?
- 3.4 Did the Council or Management encounter any (interpretational) difficulties in translating the policy objectives into a set of operational principles to guide the industry?
- 3.5 How would you describe the NFVF's institutional style, and to what extent did it facilitate the implementation of policy??
- 3.6 How would you describe the NFVF's leadership style, and to what extent did it facilitate the implementation of policy?

4. Institution's capacity to implement policy

- 4.1 Did the NFVF have the necessary resources to enable it to fulfil its policy objectives?
- 4.2 What particular skills did the NFVF have at its disposal that enabled it to implement its policy objectives?

- 4.3 What were the NFVF's main successes in interpreting and implementing film policy in its five years of operation?
- 4.4 What, if any, were the challenges identified in implementing film policy in its five years of operation?

5. Policy coalitions

- 5.1 Who were the NFVF's main supporters in assisting it to implement its policy objectives?
- 5.2 Who were the NFVF's main critics of its policy implementation mandate?
- 5.3 How were these relationships managed and co-ordinated?
- 5.4 How did beneficiaries (the industry) respond to the NFVF's interpretation and implementation of its policy objectives?
- 5.5 How were these responses measured over the years?
- 5.6 Has there been any monitoring of the NFVF's implementation of its mandate over the years? By whom?
- 5.7 Were there any specific criteria or measures for success?

Do you have any other additional input/comments?

Thank you for your time!