

University of the Witwatersrand: Department of International Relations



NORM EVOLUTION AND DIFFUSION: GENDER PARITY IN EDUCATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty of Humanities by:

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
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International Relations

Under the supervision of:
Professor Gilbert Khadiagala

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university.



(Nomzamo Zinhle Mkhabela)

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACHPR	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
APRC	Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction
AU	African Union
BPA	Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
CADE	Convention against Discrimination in Education
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CHARGE	Collaborative for Harnessing Ambition and Resources for Girls' Education
CNC	Chad's National Curriculum Centre
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DFA	Dakar Framework for Action
DoSE	Department of State for Education
EFA	Education for All
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
EU	European Union
FAWE	Forum for African Women Educationalists
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GAD	Gender and Development
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GMSP	Gender Mainstreaming Strategic Plan
GPA	Gender Policy and Action Plan
GPE	Global Partnership for Education

GPI	Gender Parity Index
ICESCR	International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
IDA	International Development Agency
INSEED	L’Institut National de Statistique, des Etudes Economiques et Démographiques
LEGs	Local Education Groups
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoBSE	Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education
MoHERST	Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology
NEP	National Education Policy
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NPA	Gambia’s National Plan for Action for EFA
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PAN	Chad’s National Plan for Action for EFA
PARSET	Chad’s Education Sector Reform Project
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RNEP	Revised National Education Policy
SDGEA	Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa
TVET	Technical Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDHR	United Nations Declaration for Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO	United Nations Education Social and Cultural Organization
UNGEI	United Nations Girls' Education Initiative
UNICEF	United Nations
UPE	Universal Primary Education
US	United States
WID	Women in Development
WIDE	World Inequality Database for Education

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ABSTRACT

International attention to the issue of girls' education has grown dramatically over the past several decades. Gender parity and equality in education has become a significant global development priority. The Dakar Framework for Action (DFA), which set the agenda for achieving Education for All (EFA) commitments by 2015, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were aimed at the reduction of global poverty, also by 2015, serve as the main policy blueprints with respect to the global agenda for achieving gender equality in education. Despite widespread acceptance that states ought to decrease gender disparities in education, progress with respect to achieving the related DFA and MDG goals has varied between states. Although sub-Saharan Africa continues to lag far behind other regions, there are some countries in the region that have achieved better results than others. This variation in outcomes raises pertinent questions about the constitutive influence and diffusion of norms at the national level.

This research report seeks to identify the mechanisms that determine the constitutive effects of the norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Using the Gambia and Chad as case studies, the study tests whether domestic political structures and domestic norms have a significant impact on norm diffusion processes at the national level, as well as how these factors will predict the pathways for diffusion and, ultimately, the constitutive effects of the norm. The study begins by tracing the evolution and documenting the existence of a global norm with respect to gender parity in education. The norm's emergence is shown to correlate with changes in policy and practice amongst African states at both the regional and national level; however, there remains significant differences amongst states with regards to their performance in relation to gender parity targets/goals. The central finding of the study is that domestic political structures and domestic norms explain this variation between countries and predict the key drivers of normative change. In the cases of Gambia and Chad specifically, the extent of civil society participation has significantly determined the countries' performance with respect to gender parity in education goals.

Key words: Norm evolution, norm diffusion, gender parity in education, sub-Saharan Africa mechanisms for diffusion, domestic political structures, domestic legitimacy

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, women and girls' education ("girls' education") has become a significant thematic concern in the global development agenda. In 1995, women and girls globally "constituted the single largest category of people denied full and equal educational opportunities" (Kaabwe 2000, 20). According to recent UN reports, girls continue to face disadvantages and exclusion in education (UNICEF 2015). Studies persistently show that gender inequalities in education are most acute in sub-Saharan Africa ("Africa").

As education has become increasingly recognized as an important lever for socio-economic development, girls' education now lies at the centre of development efforts globally. The Dakar Framework for Action (DFA), which set the agenda for achieving Education for All (EFA) commitments by 2015, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were aimed at the reduction of global poverty, also by 2015, serve as the main policy blueprints with respect to the global agenda for achieving gender equality in education.

Goal 5 of the DFA specifically aimed at "eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 and achieving gender equality by 2015". The target related to Goal 3 of the MDGs committed states to eliminating "gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015" (The United Nations 2015). Although both the DFA goals and the MDGs contained references to gender equality, in each set of goals, particular emphasis was placed on eliminating *gender disparities* in education as the first and significant step towards realizing gender equality more broadly.

While narrow formulations of global goals with respect to girls' education have led to significant progress in primary school enrolment, progress towards realizing gender parity, let alone equality, in education has been largely disappointing. The road towards achieving equality in education has proved long and winding, with varied outcomes and uneven progress amongst states. In 2005, countries missed the early deadline to ensure that an equal number of boys and girls are enrolled in primary and secondary schooling (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 6). By 2012, over two thirds of countries with data had achieved gender parity in primary education; however, progress towards parity at secondary and tertiary level remains staggered. Fifty percent

of countries achieved parity in lower secondary education in 2012 and only 29% achieved it in upper secondary education. In that same year, only 4% of countries had achieved parity at tertiary level.

Africa has experienced significant challenges. In terms of progress, the region continues to lag far behind other regions, having the lowest proportion of countries to have reached parity targets by the 2015 deadline. Africa has persistently performed below global averages across all the education indicators that measure parity between girls and boys. Regional averages however mask significant disparities between countries. Although countries such as Angola, Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan failed to reach gender parity targets by 2012, some countries, such as Burundi, São Tomé and Príncipe and Zambia, successfully achieved parity. In other countries, including the Congo, Gambia and Senegal, gender disparities have reversed at certain levels of education, indicating not only a slight advantage in girls' enrolment, but also an increase in the number of boys dropping out of school.

The uneven progress and varied outcomes in so far as gender parity in education is concerned raises pertinent questions about the constitutive influence and diffusion of global norms at the national level. What mechanisms influence the varied constitutive impact of global norms, resulting in different national-level outcomes? What factors inhibit or promote norm-uptake, compliance and performance? The literature indicates that there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the mechanisms that empower norms at the national level, as well as regarding what factors generate varied outcomes. Cortell and Davis (2000) identify political institutions, political rhetoric by national elites and the material interests of domestic groups as decisive factors in the norm diffusion process. Acharya (2004) argues that the agency of "norm-takers" (domestic actors); their ability to reconstitute norms to suit local realities and the degree of cultural match between the global norm and the local context are significant. Norm diffusion scholars however continue to face challenges with regards to explaining the variation in outcomes across different national contexts.

In his seminal study, Checkel (1999) provides a compelling framework for analysis. In his interrogation of the Council of Europe's norm regarding citizenship and the rights of minorities in contemporary Europe, and the correlating changes in discourse/behaviour regarding the issue

amongst states in Europe, Checkel (1999) argues that domestic political structures and domestic norms, which shape the preferences of key agents, predict the mechanisms transmitting norms to the national arena in the case of the former, and the degree to which they resonate with the local context in the case of the latter. The findings of this study support Checkel's argument. With respect to the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education, domestic political structure and domestic norms explain the variation in the constitutive effects of the norm and countries' performance with respect to meeting gender parity targets. In the cases of Gambia and Chad, the presence of civil society participation has strengthened the constitutive effects of the norm, leading to stronger performance; whilst the absence of civil society participation in Chad has weakened performance.

The significance of the study is three-fold. Firstly, Africa has faced widespread pessimism regarding its ability to fulfil global commitments, not only with respect to gender parity in education, but also with respect to other global development goals. Countries in the region are often characterised as “norm spoilers”, holding various attitudes and beliefs that go against the grain of “universally accepted” norms. The prevailing sentiment in the literature is that negative attitudes towards girls' education continue to limit progress with respect to norm-uptake, compliance and performance in the region. And yet, few studies have addressed the mechanisms that promote or inhibit norm diffusion at the level of the African state in a systematic way. This study contributes to the literature which challenges ideological assumptions about the region and provides a systematic framework and analysis for national-level factors which promote or inhibit norm diffusion.

Secondly, this study also contributes to the literature which continues to draw attention to girls' equality in education as an important issue for development, particularly in Africa. Understanding the mechanisms and the key actors involved in empowering the norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education, particularly at the national level, assists the global development community to ensure that its efforts towards ensuring that more girls are given access to schooling, and remain in school, are targeted and context-specific.

Finally, by reviewing countries' progress in relation to DFA and MDG gender parity goals, this study adds to our broader understanding of the global goals phenomenon. Despite the continued

zealous support for global development goals in general, the transformative impact at the global and national level remains mixed and uneven. This study highlights the difficulties in the successful operationalization of global development norms in the African context. And yet, despite their limitations, the international development community has adopted a new set of goals and embarked on yet another universal, integrated and even more ambitious sustainable development agenda.

The research report proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 and 3 outline the theoretical and methodological approach to the study, which frames the analysis of the mechanisms that empower the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in the African context. The report then demonstrates the eminence of gender parity in education as a global norm, which has acquired a taken-for-granted quality amongst state and non-state actors. In this regard, Chapter 4 documents the existence of the norm, by tracing its origins and development through the DFA and MDG goals; while Chapter 5 provides evidence of a correlating shift in regional/national policy debates and state practice amongst African states as a result of the norm. Chapter 6 provides an overview of African states' progress with respect to reaching gender parity targets in education. This provides a basis for the selection of the two country cases, namely Gambia and Chad. Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the role of domestic political structures and domestic norms with respect to gender parity in education in the two country cases. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings of the study.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The debate regarding the mechanisms which influence the constitutive impact of global norms is grounded in constructivist literature, whose emergence played a critical role in broadening our understanding of norms beyond their mere functional value. In an effort to overcome the shortcomings of neoliberal institutionalism and regime theory approaches, which view states as utility maximizers, pursuing their interests based on cost-benefit calculations, the main aim of constructivist research has been to explain the influence of global norms on state interest and identity formation. According to constructivists, norms do not merely constrain state behaviour; they constitute state interest.

The problem with early constructivist literature is that, due to the difficulty in measuring social phenomena, it failed to specify the factors that have an impact on norm diffusion processes. As a result, scholars such as Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) started to challenge constructivist research to pay more attention to “the causal mechanisms and processes by which...ideas spread”. Norm diffusion theory emerged as a response to this challenge and sought to address how global norms spread to national and sub-national levels. The body of literature has satisfactorily answered questions regarding the ways in which norms become widely disseminated globally, and it has successfully shown the correlative relationship between the emergence of a particular norm and shifts in policy and practice at the national level. However, scholars continue to have difficulty identifying and explaining what mechanisms make this possible and what generates cross-national variation in outcomes.


2.1. Norm Diffusion Theory

A norm may be defined as “a shared standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Norms carry a “prescriptive quality...of oughtness”, which compels actors to comply with the established standard of behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Norm diffusion literature may be broadly divided into two categories. The “first wave” of literature focused on the emergence of global norms, along with the mechanisms and processes through which they influence state and non-state behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink’s *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (1998) is one of the leading texts on this subject. Using the “norm life cycle” model, the authors analyse the evolution processes behind global norms and their mechanisms for diffusion at the national level.

The authors emphasize the fact that the causal logic underlying states' commitments to international norms varies according to the stage of the life cycle.

The norm life cycle model identifies three stages of a norm's influence (Figure 2.1.1): 1) norm emergence; 2) norm acceptance and 3) norm internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). The first two stages are divided by a threshold or "tipping point at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm".

Figure 2.1.1: Norm Life Cycle



Source: Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), 896

At the first stage, "norm entrepreneurs", also referred to as "norm leaders" start to raise awareness about an issue in international politics and attempt to persuade a critical mass of relevant states to embrace new standards of behaviour regarding the issue. Critical mass is dependent on the number of states that endorse the norm and whether or not it is supported by prominent actors in the international system. By using various organizational platforms, norm leaders secure the support of states. Once critical mass is reached, it generates a tipping point, which triggers a second stage of broad and rapid norm acceptance by previously "non-conformist states" ("norm followers"). Finnemore and Sikkink argue that states' desire for legitimation, conformity and esteem motivates them to imitate norm leaders. At this third and final stage, both norm leaders and followers fully internalize the norm and it acquires "*a taken-for-granted quality* (my emphasis) that makes conformance with it almost automatic".

Finnemore and Sikkink's model is useful to explain the manner in which norms disseminate at the global level, and how they gradually become accepted by states. The authors' work is able to facilitate our understanding of how norms emerge, the motivations behind them and how they become prominent in the international system. However, its limitation, and that of other "first wave" diffusion literature, is that it fails to engage with the mechanisms that influence norm


diffusion at the national level. Further, the norm life cycle model implies a linear progression of norm evolution, thereby failing to account for the “reciprocal and iterative” processes involved in diffusion phenomena (Chabbott and Ramirez 2000, 175).

In a sociological account of the widespread dissemination of the global blueprint for development, which prescribes education as a means for advancing economic growth, Chabbott and Ramirez (2000) provide a useful framework for understanding the various actors and mechanisms that empower global norms. The authors’ conference-declaration-national-plan (“C-D-N-P”) cycle model (Figure 2.1.2) is specific to education and development. The reader will note that unlike the norm life cycle model, Chabbott’s and Ramirez’s model is non-linear, identifying various mechanisms that feed back into each other.

In the context of the current prevailing assumption that education is good for development, both globally and at the national level, the authors argue that the diffusion process begins with abstract ideas about progress and justice being translated into rational discourse at the global level. This discourse gives rise to both networks of development professionals and international organizations, and is formalized within these institutions (Chabbott and Ramirez 2000, 174). The authors further argue that development professionals within international organizations play an extremely significant role in institutionalizing and modifying the discourse. By coordinating activities that showcase the discourse, professionals and organizations sharpen, standardize and legitimate it. Coordinated activities include international conferences, which bring together national delegations and a host of international development organizations (Chabbott and Ramirez 2000, 175). These conferences typically produce non-binding declarations and frameworks for action, which promote and facilitate norm-uptake at the national level.

According to Chabbott and Ramirez (2000), due to their embodiment of the highest ideals of progress and justice, the declarations and their associated frameworks acquire a prescriptive quality, “making it practically mandatory for national delegations to endorse them” (175). Subsequent to their endorsement, states start to develop national plans in response to the norms contained in these documents. In recent years, international, national and local non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) have played an instrumental role in promoting advocacy and monitoring and evaluating the implementation of declarations and national plans of action.

Figure 2.1.2: Mechanisms for Carrying Blueprints of Development and Education



Source: Chabbot and Ramirez (2000), 874

As indicated, the C-D-N-P cycle provides a framework for the narrative of the institutionalization and dissemination of the global blueprints for development and education. Out of the various mechanisms involved, Chabbott and Ramirez (2000) identify international development professionals as key actors in the diffusion process. They “re-enact the role of objective experts and rational managers, engaged in highly legitimate activities associated with some of the most taken-for-granted notions of progress and justice at the global level” (Chabbott and Ramirez 2000, 182).


Since the aim of their study is to explain the persistent spread of these global blueprints, despite evidence of the tenuous link between education and development, the authors’ focus is not on local-level actors and domestic factors that influence diffusion at the national level per se. Nevertheless, despite their limited explanatory power with respect to the posed research question, both the norm life cycle model and the C-N-D-P cycle serve as useful tools to describe the actors and mechanisms involved in empowering gender parity in education as a global norm. Figure 2.1.3 represents my adaptation of the two models, as they apply to gender parity in education. I will return to this figure in Chapter 4 and 5.

“Second wave” norm diffusion literature intends to address the shortcomings of the early literature. Norms under investigation have included a wide range of issues, such as torture, land mine usage, political rights, democratization and environmental protection (e.g. whaling in Japan) (Cloward 2015, 6–7). There are varying perspectives in the literature regarding what factors or mechanisms play a decisive role in diffusion processes at the national level. Furthermore, constructivist scholars have struggled to provide measurable and observable phenomena, which will allow for meaningful analysis of the mechanisms that generate variations in different contexts. The dominant perspectives in the literature are summarised below.

2.2. Top-down and Bottom-up Processes, Political Structures and Legitimacy

Two dominant mechanisms are identified in the literature as impacting norm diffusion at the national level: political pressure, which is a “bottom-up” process, and social learning, which is a “top-down” process (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Checkel 1999). In the first instance, non-state actors and policy networks mobilize in support of a particular global norm and coerce elite decision-makers to change state policy in accordance with its prescripts (Checkel 1999, 88).

Figure 2.1.3: Mechanisms for Empowering the Global Norm vis-à-vis Gender Parity in Education



In the second instance, change is not induced through political pressure, but rather occurs through social learning, as elite decision-makers develop and internalize a shared understanding of the prescripts of a particular norm. As a result of exposure to the norm, which requires them to behave in a particular way, decision-makers start to adopt new interests (Checkel 1999, 88).

A number of different factors are identified as having an impact on bottom-up and top-down diffusion processes, namely political institutions, political rhetoric by national elites and the material interests of various domestic groups (Cortell and Davis 2000); norm-taker agency and the ability of domestic actors to reconstitute norms to suit local realities (Acharya 2004) and the norm's degree of congruency or cultural fit with the local context i.e. domestic legitimacy (Checkel 1999; Cortell and Davis 2000; Acharya 2004). In his seminal work on the Council of Europe's norm regarding citizenship and the rights of minorities in contemporary Europe, and the correlating changes in discourse/behaviour regarding the issue amongst states in Europe, Checkel (1999) argues that domestic political structures and domestic norms, which shape the preferences of key agents, best predict the mechanisms transmitting norms to the national arena in the case of the former, and the degree to which they resonate with the local context in the case of the latter (Checkel 1999, 91).

Checkel's thesis is that both domestic structures and domestic norms are variables that intervene between global norms and national-level outcomes (Checkel 1999, 84). He understands domestic structures in terms of state-societal relations and identifies four categories of structures that impact these relations. Using states in Europe as empirical cases, Checkel uses these categories to predict the likely domestic actors empowering norms at the national level, and also to explain the variation in the constitutive effects of norms across countries (Checkel 1999, 91). He further shows that norm diffusion occurs more rapidly when a global norm resonates with historically constructed domestic norms ((Checkel 1999, 87).

Checkel's assertions are supported in more recent norm diffusion literature. Cortell and Davis (2000) affirm that domestic political structures are significant because they determine access to policy-making and privilege certain actors. Acharya (2004) argues that the constitutive effects of a global norm depend on the opportunities for domestic agents to build congruency between the norm and the domestic context.

2.3. Conclusion

There remains considerable uncertainty in the literature regarding what mechanisms play a decisive role in diffusion processes at the national level, as well as what factors generate cross-national variation in norm-uptake, compliance and performance. First-wave norm diffusion literature focuses on the correlative relationship between the emergence of a particular norm and the changes in discourse and behaviour at the national level, in line with the prescripts of the norm. However, it fails to specify the mechanisms that make this possible. Nevertheless, the norm cycle models developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Chabbott and Ramirez (2000) provide a useful framework for understanding the various actors and mechanisms that aid the global dissemination of norms. In Chapter 4 and 5, I use an adapted model (see Figure 2.1.3) to trace the emergence and development of the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education, and its impact on state policy and practice amongst African states.

Second-wave diffusion literature goes a step further in terms of identifying the mechanisms that empower global norms at the national level. Scholars identify two dominant mechanisms which are involved in norm diffusion, namely political pressure (a bottom-up process) and social learning (a top-down process). These processes are impacted by various factors, including political institutions; political rhetoric by national elites; the interests and influence of various domestic groups and policy networks, and competing domestic norms.

One of the major challenges that arises in the literature is researchers' limited ability to provide measurable and observable phenomena, which will allow for the meaningful analysis of the mechanisms that generate variations in different national contexts. As an authoritative work in this field, Checkel's *Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe* (1999) provides a compelling and systematic analysis of the ways in which domestic political structures and domestic norms have an impact on norm diffusion processes, as well as generate cross-national variation in outcomes. Having tested his hypotheses in the context of citizenship and the rights of minorities in contemporary Europe, Checkel leaves it open to constructivist scholars to test his analysis in other contexts. In the following chapter, I use and adapt Checkel's framework to develop a methodological approach for analysing what mechanisms impact the diffusion of gender parity in education as a global norm and generate variation in norm-uptake, compliance and performance in the context of African states.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION

3.1 Variables

The main variables under consideration in this study are the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education (independent variable); state-level policy and discourse with respect to the norm (dependent variable); domestic political structures and domestic legitimacy (intervening variables).

3.2 Hypothesis

These variables are linked via a hypothesis which states the following: in the context of the global norm with respect to gender parity in education in Africa, domestic norms, which shape the preferences of agents, predict the degree to which the norm resonates and has constitutive effects at the national level; whilst domestic structures identify these key agents and how they will vary cross-nationally.

3.3 A Five-Stage Methodology

The study follows a five-stage methodology:

Firstly, I document the existence of a global norm with respect to gender equality in education (the independent variable) and establish whether its development correlates with changing state policy and practice amongst African states (the dependent variable). In order to establish the prescriptive qualities of the norm, I conduct a textual analysis of existing conventions, international and regional instruments, explanatory reports and policy documents. Using these documents, together with the adapted model, which depicts the mechanisms that empower the gender parity norm (Figure 2.1.3), I trace its evolution and identify the key actors involved in its widespread dissemination, as well as their motivations. This analysis is significant, as it establishes a foundation for determining whether there is shared meaning between international actors and domestic agents regarding the prescriptions of the norm, and whether it fits the domestic cultural context.

Secondly, I select my case studies. Using the Gender Parity Index (GPI), I narrow down the 49 African states under consideration to two cases, namely Gambia and Chad. The GPI is the

primary measure used to facilitate discussions regarding gender differences in education, and it is used to compare countries' progress and performance with respect to DFA and MDG goals and targets (Fiske 2012, 21). The GPI is a measure which reflects the relative access to and participation in education of males and females. It shows the ratio of female to male values with respect to a given indicator, such as enrolment, completion rates, attendance and literacy rates. An index value of 1 indicates parity between males and females; a value of less than 1 indicates a disparity in favour of males and an index value greater than 1 indicates a disparity in favour of females. In order to allow for some measurement error, UNESCO has defined a GPI value between 0.97 and 1.03 as the achievement of parity (Fiske 2012, 21).

In terms of performance, Chad is shown to be a consistent underperformer across various GPI indicators. Contrastingly, Gambia has been widely lauded as a leader in the promotion of gender equality in education on the continent. The country has performed relatively well, achieving better results across various GPI indicators than Chad. My selection of the two cases is based on the assumption that the constitutive effects of the norm regarding gender parity in education have been stronger in the country that has performed better in relation to GPI indicators (Gambia) than they have been in the country that has performed poorly (Chad). This method-of-difference approach to case selection is supported in the literature as being the best approach for this type of study (Cortell and Davis 2000, 85).

Thirdly, I code Gambia's and Chad's domestic political structures (intervening variable) using Checkel's (1999) framework. According to state-societal relations, the author outlines four distinct categories:

1. **Liberal structure:** the role of elites is highly constrained and policy is formed more through bottom-up processes (societal pressure);
2. **State-above-society structure:** the state sits apart from and exercises considerable control over society (elite learning);
3. **Corporatist structure:** the presence of policy networks connecting the state and society result in both societal pressure (primary) and elite-learning (secondary) playing a role in policy-making and decision-making; and

4. **Statist structure:** elite-learning plays a more dominant role in the process through which norms first reach the development agenda and societal penetration and organisation of social interests is weaker than in liberal or corporatist structures, such that the likelihood that power from below will empower norms is reduced.

I rely on the research of regional experts and specialists on political institutions in Africa, as well as state-societal indicators to aid me in coding the domestic structures of the selected country cases.

Fourthly, I establish the domestic norms that relate to gender parity in education in each of the country cases. This allows me to determine the degree of congruency between the global norm and the national context i.e. domestic legitimacy (intervening variable). Cortell and Davis (2000) argue that a norm is legitimate domestically if it is “presumptively accepted as a guide to conduct and a basis for criticism...legitimate norms give rise to feelings of obligation by social actors and, when violated, engender regret or a feeling that deviation or violation requires justification”. Given this definition, there are conceptual difficulties in measuring variations in the domestic legitimacy of global norms. I measure the domestic legitimacy of the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education by determining the extent to which it converges with a combination of the state’s constitutional, regulative and/or judicial system; bureaucratic agencies; national policies and discourse.

Finally, I analyse my findings and establish whether the pathway through which norms diffuse, and have effect (constitutive or otherwise), in the selected case studies is consistent with the stated hypothesis.

CHAPTER 4: GENDER PARITY IN EDUCATION—A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION

The MDG and DFA goals relating to gender parity in education are grounded in a broader international normative framework, which provides for the right to education and gender equality. This framework forms the basis for states' obligations to ensure quality education and equal access to educational opportunities for girls around the world. It is the bedrock upon which the widely disseminated global blueprint, which places girls at the centre of development efforts, is based. With reference to the adapted model depicted in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.1.3), this chapter will address the emergence, development and widespread dissemination of the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education. The last part of the chapter also highlights some of the key debates around the norms conceptual foundations, rationale and appropriateness for the landscape of developing countries.

4.1. International Treaties and Covenants

World Cultural Blueprints for Development (a)¹

After WWII, a discourse which emphasized global cooperation and integrated development began to emerge. This new global development agenda was based on what Chabbott and Ramirez (2000) would refer to as ideals about progress and justice. According to Caron and Margolin (2015), three assumptions underpin the global development narrative, namely:

that with proper planning, investment of resources and careful technical coordination of its economy, any country can industrialize, overcome its backwardness and increase its rate of economic growth; that the state is an inefficient driver of economic growth; and that the benefits of development will eventually trickle down and reach society's marginalized and poorest groups (Caron and Margolin 2015, 886).

These three assumptions uphold the proposition that makes the development world go around—economic growth is a universal good, which benefits every individual and all countries should strive towards it (Caron and Margolin 2015, 886).

¹ In this section, the letter of the alphabet which follows each heading corresponds with the mechanisms as they are portrayed in Figure 2.1.3 on page 10.

Over time, the rationalizing discourse about development constructed a central role for education (Chabbott and Ramirez 2000, 175). The development of individuals and nation states became intimately tied to citizens' education. The logic of the argument is that individual development is the key to national development and individual development is achieved through individual education. This logic appears in many UN documents, including the Universal Declaration for Human Rights (UNDHR) and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 26 of the UNDHR (1948) defines education as a fundamental human right and Article 13 and 14 of the ICESCR (1966) elucidate the nature and scope of this right and outline states' obligations. For instance, in terms of Article 13(2)(a), read with Article 14, states have a duty to take steps towards realizing compulsory primary education for all.

A Changing Global Discourse: Women, Education and Development (b)

In the 1970s, feminist scholarship started to draw attention to the fact that women were missing from the post-WWII global development agenda. The presence of women in some economic sectors was decreasing; women held low-paying positions and they continued to be marginalized in the economy. Recognizing the gendered nature of global development initiatives, transnational women's movements began to advocate for the integration of women into the globalizing workforce. Through women's advocacy efforts, CEDAW was adopted by the UN in 1979, and entered into force in 1981. The treaty achieved near universal ratification by UN member states, with 187 states currently having ratified it.

Historically, two main gender narratives can be identified in global development discourse. These narratives were the products of the debates that began to arise in the 1970s and 1980s regarding the ways in which women were represented and integrated into international politics. The 1970s were characterized by the women in development (WID) approach, which focused on women as an instrument for increasing the economic and social efficiencies of development processes (Kanyangarara et al. 2012, 4). The problem with the WID approach is that it ignores larger social dynamics and processes, which results in simply adding women to a system without transforming elements of patriarchy and improving women's disadvantaged positions.

In the late 1980s, the gender and development (GAD) approach sought to challenge the WID approach and address the root causes of gender inequality. These include men's continued

dominance in all spheres of political, economic and social life, unequal power relations between men and women, gender-blind laws and policies and social and cultural norms, which perpetuate women's marginalisation and discrimination. The GAD approach therefore emphasizes women's empowerment—increasing women's agency and giving them the power to take control over their own lives (Kanyangarara et al. 2012, 4). Its primary focus is achieving societal change by challenging conventions and gender-related norms and stereotypes (Caron and Margolin 2015, 887).

In the 1980s, as the women's movement continued to gain momentum, UNICEF started to draw attention to the problems of gender neutrality in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). According to UNICEF, discrimination against girls was pervasive and remained unseen in many societies. The organization specifically focused attention on child marriage; female infanticide; sexual violence and, most prominently, lack of educational opportunity for girls. Girls' exclusion from the education system soon became a primary concern and development actors posited girls' lack of education as the main obstacle preventing them from realizing their full potential. Women's right to education had already been codified in CEDAW. According to the Convention (1979), states have an obligation to realize women's equal access and participation at all levels of education with men, both as an entitlement and as a means of empowerment (Singh 2012, 7). Article 10 of CEDAW necessitates "access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality" for female students (UN General Assembly 1979, Article 10(b)). CEDAW also provides for equal access to scholarships and grants and commits states to the reduction of female drop-out rates.

The Role of International Organizations (c) and International Professionals (d)

International organizations and development professionals began to rationalize the discourse around girls' education and development. Girls were increasingly seen as important instruments for national development. According to the World Bank, girls' education is crucial not only as a human right, but as a "strategic development investment" (The World Bank 2015). The Bank refers to a "multiplier effect" to educating girls. Investing in girls' education develops more educated women, which leads to women becoming healthier; to their increased participation and productivity in the formal labour market; income growth; improvements in maternal and child

health; more sustainable families and poverty alleviation (The World Bank 2015). This *instrumentalist* approach to girls' education echoes the WID approach, is pervasive in the literature and is not unique to the World Bank. Many scholars in the field cite compelling research regarding the extensive and wide-ranging benefits of investing in girls' education (Herz and Sperling 2004, 1). The rights-based approach or transformational approach to girls' education is more prevalent in UN documents. Both approaches are embodied in the global development blueprints, which have become widely disseminated across countries.

4.2. International Conferences, Declarations and Frameworks for Action (e)

The World Conference on Education for All

In 1990, more than 150 states, represented at the World Conference on Education for All, accepted by acclamation the Declaration on Education for All. The Declaration reiterates the rights and consequences with respect to education and reaffirms the belief in the connection between education and development at the global, national and individual level (Chabbott and Ramirez 2000, 176). The conference further drew attention to the fact that “girls constituted two thirds of children without access to primary education and women constituted the majority of adults without basic literacy skills (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 6). Despite this recognition, states did not take the opportunity to establish concrete connections between the EFA movement and the transnational women's movements that were pushing the gender equality agenda in education (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 6). States agreed to massively reduce illiteracy and to make primary education accessible to all children by 2000; but, they did not explicitly address the problems girls face as a result of the gendered nature of education (Fiske 2012, 8).

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action

In 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPA) were adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, marking the first time that a global policy framework made *specific* reference to ensuring the rights of women and girls to equal education (UNESCO 2015, 3). The BPA established a global framework for realizing gender equality and women's empowerment in various critical areas, including in education and training (UN Women 2015). They also emphasized the need for men and women to “participate fully in all actions towards

equality”. The Declaration set clear targets for gender equality and called on states to “to provide universal access to basic education and ensure completion of primary education by at least 80% of primary school-age children” by 2000; to “close the gender gap in primary and secondary school education by year 2005 (and) provide universal primary education in all countries before 2015” (United Nations 1995, para 80(b)).

The Dakar Framework for Action

At the turn of the millennium, the international education community assembled in Dakar, Senegal to review progress of EFA commitments and to set an agenda for achieving education for all by 2015. At this World Education Conference, members of 164 countries, together with representatives from regional groups, international organizations, donor agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society adopted the Dakar Framework for Action, aimed at delivering EFA commitments (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 5). The DFA contained six goals with associated targets, along with twelve strategies to which stakeholders could contribute (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 5). Three of the goals made explicit reference to gender (Table 3.2.1). Goal 5 in particular addressed gender parity, calling for the elimination of “gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality”.

The Millennium Development Goals

In September 2000 at the United Nations Millennium Summit, world leaders representing 192 member states approved the MDGs, which established an agenda for reducing global poverty encapsulated in eight goals. In framing this agenda, education was given a prominent position as an important lever for socio-economic development. The targets associated with MDG 2 and MDG 3 (Table 4.2.1) made specific reference to gender and education, with goal 3 providing for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women, including a target to “eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels no later than 2015”.

The DFA and MDG goals comprise global blueprints for development, which place gender parity in education at the centre of global (and national) development efforts. The blueprints

have been widely disseminated, promoting a multifaceted and integrated approach to achieving gender parity targets (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 6). Through various activities, campaigns and initiatives, international organizations and agencies have played an important role in diffusing DFA and MDG blueprints across countries.

Table 4.2.1: Gender Related Goals in the Dakar Framework for Action and Millennium Development Goals

DFA Goals	MDG Goals
Goal 2: Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality.	Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education. Target 2A: Ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.
Goal 4: Achieving 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all.	Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.
Goal 5: Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.	

4.3. International Initiatives and Campaigns (f)

The United Nations Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI) has been one of the most visible global initiatives associated with promoting gender equality in education. The UNGEI was launched by then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, at Dakar in 2000. Driven by DFA and MDG commitments, the organization is a multi-stakeholder partnership "committed to narrowing the gender gap in primary and secondary education" (UNGEI n.d.). In addition, "it seeks to ensure that, by 2015, all children complete primary schooling, with girls and boys having equal access

to free, quality education” (UNGEI n.d.). The UNGEI’s activities include advocacy efforts to raise awareness regarding the importance of girls’ education; to improve the efficacy of global policy through coordinated action, knowledge exchange, sharing of evidence-based solutions and learning and strengthening institutional development of the partnership at the global, regional and national levels (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 31; UNGEI n.d.). The Initiative further generates a vast array of resources and research on girls’ education and equality, including an annual report, which highlights the UNGEI’s activities and programmes. Of the 49 countries that comprise sub-Saharan Africa, only 18 claim partnership with the UNGEI.

The UNGEI has established strong ties with the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), which was launched in 2002 as the EFA Fast Track Initiative to accelerate progress towards EFA goals (Singh 2012, 9). The GPE specifically supports girls’ education as one of its five objectives (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 31). Other notable international initiatives promoting gender equality in education include Plan International’s *Because I am a Girl* Campaign (2006); the Girls’ Education Challenge, which was launched by the UK Department for International Development in 2012; the Global Clinton Initiative’s CHARGE (Collaborative for Harnessing Ambition and Resources for Girls’ Education), which was launched in 2014 and is aimed at improving learning and leadership opportunities for young women and girls and the *Let Girls Learn* Campaign (2015)—a collaborative effort between First Lady of the US, Michelle Obama, which is aimed at expanding access to education for adolescent girls around the world (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 31; Peace Corps 2015).

4.4. Key Debates and Issues

One of the dominant debates which arises in the literature regarding gender parity in education relates to the continued prevalence of WID approaches to gender programming in education. When applied to education, the WID approach is marked by an emphasis on opening the doors to access for women and girls, which is linked to economic growth and social efficiency (Kanyangarara et al. 2012, 4). This instrumentalist approach to girls’ education is prominently featured in the concept of gender parity, which focuses primarily on increasing the number of girls in school in comparison to boys. Although international development agencies acknowledge the fact that achieving parity is nowhere near sufficient to tackle girls’ inequality and

disadvantage in education, the need for short-term, scalable results to meet rational/scientific targets continues to exclude transformational approaches.

The simplification of girls' experiences in the rationalized gender and development discourse is another concern. Mukhopadhyay criticizes the codification in international agreements of the single,

generic gendered female body—the poor woman with an expertly understood set of needs and rights...a colonised, poor and marginalised woman who needed to be managed, educated, trained for work and local decision making and controlled reproductively and sexually through a series of development processes designed for 'women's empowerment' (Mukhopadhyay 2014, 358).

Some argue that the creation of this one-dimensional female “other” in gender and development discourse is self-limiting—it is paternalistic and flattens women and girls' experiences into digestible chunks for the expediency of global development goals. Caron and Margolin (2015) argue that a failure to reconceptualise the ideological foundations that underpin gender and development, and gender and education, has led to the continuous repetition of the same ineffective approaches. The authors argue that such instrumentalist approaches to gender and education constrain the efficacy of global efforts to achieve not only gender parity, but gender equality (Caron and Margolin 2015, 888)

These debates are important to note, as they have an impact on the manner in which national agents rationalize their behaviour and activities around the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education. The conceptual and ideological arguments advanced by these agents in relation to gender parity goals may provide significant clues as to whether global conceptualizations of the norm match the local context.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter documented the existence of gender parity in education as a global norm, tracing its emergence, the motivations behind it and its development in the international system. The norm's emergence and prominence in the global arena has been rooted in ideals about progress and development, which first placed education, and then girls' education specifically, at the centre of development efforts. Through various mechanisms, which include international

organizations, such as the UN and World Bank; development professionals within these organizations and international conference and declarations, gender parity in education has become institutionalized as a norm in the international system. In its discussion of EFA commitments, the BPA, the DFA and the MDGs, this chapter also outlines the various behavioural claims that the norm makes on both state and non-state actors. As a result of the prescriptive qualities of the norm, states and international agencies have embarked on various campaigns and initiatives to advocate for increasing the number of girls in school and promoting parity and equality in education. In the following chapter, I show how the emergence of the global norm with respect to gender parity in education has led to changes in state practice and behaviour amongst African states in particular. These changes further affirm the fact that the legitimating activities of various actors has empowered and entrenched the norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education in the international system.

CHAPTER 5: GENDER PARITY IN EDUCATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA— CHANGING POLICY AND PRACTICE

Following the tumultuous years immediately after the Cold War, Africa entered the millennium with a myriad of challenges, including severe crises in education. Although the region made some progress in the 1970s and 1980s, by reducing the number of out-of-school children, particularly in primary education, the combined effect of political and economic instability threatened previous gains. In 1990, the region accounted for nearly one-third of the world's out-of-school children (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012, 1). The figure declined, at a much slower rate than other regions, from 38 million children in 1990 to 31 million in 2010. By comparison, South West Asia reduced the number of its out-of-school children by two-thirds, from 39 million to 13 million, within that same period (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012, 1).

Africa also lagged significantly behind other regions in so far as gender parity and equality are concerned. At the beginning of 2015, only 2 out of 35 countries with data had reached gender parity targets (UNICEF 2015). At present, Africa has the lowest proportion of countries that have achieved parity in education; however, regional averages mask the significant differences between countries. Some countries in the region have taken significant strides in improving parity in education, whilst others continue to struggle.

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the primary instruments for mainstreaming gender in education at the regional and national level on the continent. As indicated previously, the normative developments in the African Union's ("the AU") framework with respect to gender parity in education correlate with the global development of the norm in this regard. This chapter will show the ways in which the norm has been empowered by African states at the regional and national level, which attests to its prescriptive nature. As I do in the previous chapter, I also make reference in this chapter to Figure 2.1.3, which depicts the various mechanisms and actors involved in the diffusion of the norm.

5.1. Regional Mechanisms for Diffusion and Plans of Action (g)

The AU's commitment to achieving gender equality in education features prominently in the AU's institutional and legal architecture. As a supranational body on the continent, the AU plays the role of encouraging member states to "adopt, ratify, implement and domesticate treaties, conventions and decisions" and to coordinate efforts to fulfil international obligations (Martin

2013, 9). Its “gender architecture” is comprised of four mechanisms, namely: the AU’s Constitutive Act; the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), which is reinforced by the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa; the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) and the AU Gender Policy Action Plan (GAP). The Decades of Education for Africa (1997-2006 and 2006-2015) and the African Women’s Decade (2010-2020) further provide frameworks for implementation of the continent’s education and gender goals. The language of these instruments, and the behavioural claims they make on African states, echo the global mechanisms that empower the norm in the international system.

The AU’s Constitutive Act

The AU’s Constitutive Act provides a constitutional basis for the promotion of gender equality on the continent in general. The Act was adopted in July 2000 and had the effect of abolishing the previous Organization of African Unity (OAU). According to Article 3 of the Act (2000), the AU is committed to the “promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance”. Article 4 (2000) further provides that the role of the organization is to promote and “protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the ACHPR, and other human rights’ instruments”, as well as to promote “gender equality”.

The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights

The ACHPR was adopted in July 1981, and entered into force in October 1986, under the auspices of the OAU. Arising from the milieu of political and socio-economic crises and the struggle for independence, the aim of the Charter was to advance the human rights and freedoms of the African people. Although the Charter recognizes “sex” as a ground in its non-discrimination clause (1981, Article 2) and obligates states to “ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and (also to) ensure the protection of the rights of women and the child, as stipulated in international declarations and conventions” (1981, Article 18(3)), it was heavily criticized for excluding express provisions on women’s rights and gender equality. Some AU member states (Botswana, Egypt, Eritrea and Tunisia) counter-argued that their national laws and international instruments, to which they are signatories, offered adequate protection to women (Martin 2013, 12). Women’s groups also drew attention to the fact that the Charter

emphasizes cultural values, thereby creating a “dualism of norms regarding women’s rights” (Martin 2013, 12).

As a result of the criticism, the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa (“the Women’s Rights Protocol”) was adopted in 2003 in order to remedy the omissions in the Charter with respect to women’s rights. The preamble of the Protocol recognizes and makes reference to all the major international instruments and frameworks for gender equality and women’s empowerment, including the UNDHR, the ICESCR, CEDAW, the BPA and the DFA. It further emphasizes the crucial role women play in the “preservation of African values”. The Women’s Rights Protocol covers a wide range of women’s entitlements, including the right to dignity, life, integrity and the security of the person; the right to participation in political and decision-making processes; the right to protection in armed conflicts; health and reproductive rights; the right to a healthy and sustainable environment and the right to freedom from harmful practices (OAU 1981). Women’s right to education and training is enshrined in Article 12 (Table 5.1.1). Although less comprehensive, Article 12 of the ACHPR incorporates some of the major commitments made by states in paragraphs 80 and 81 of the BPA. Table 5.1.1 highlights the similarities in the themes covered by the two instruments. Some of the major commitments include promoting equal access and opportunity to education for women; eliminating all forms of discrimination; eliminating gender disparities; increasing girls’ enrolment and retention and promoting women and girls’ literacy, amongst other things.

The Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA)

The AU’s commitment to ensuring gender equality in various sectors, including in education, is further buttressed by the SDGEA, which was adopted by member states in July 2004. The SDGEA reiterates previous commitments made by member states to gender mainstreaming and establishes a reporting mechanism for states to submit annual reports on their progress in this regard. The Declaration covers six thematic areas, namely: health, peace and security, governance, human rights, education and women’s empowerment. With respect to education, the Declaration recognizes women’s disadvantaged position in relation to literacy and education and the negative impact this brings to women’s lives. Article 8 (2004) commits states to taking “specific measures to ensure the education of girls and literacy of women, especially in the rural areas, to achieve the goal of “education for all””.

Table 5.1.1: Article 12 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the BPA

Article 12 – Right to Education and Training	Beijing Platform for Action – paragraphs 80 and 81
<p>1. State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to:</p> <p>a) eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and guarantee equal opportunity and access in the sphere of education and training;</p> <p>b) eliminate all stereotypes in textbooks, syllabuses and the media, that perpetuate such discrimination;</p> <p>c) protect women, especially the girl-child from all forms of abuse, including sexual harassment in schools and other educational institutions and provide for sanctions against the perpetrators of such practices;</p> <p>d) provide access to counseling and rehabilitation services to women who suffer abuses and sexual harassment; and</p> <p>e) integrate gender sensitisation and human rights education at all levels of education curricula including teacher training.</p> <p>2. States Parties shall take specific positive action to:</p> <p>a) promote literacy among women;</p> <p>b) promote education and training for women at all levels and in all disciplines, particularly in the fields of science and technology; and</p> <p>c) promote the enrolment and retention of girls in schools and other training institutions and the organisation of programmes for women who leave school prematurely.</p>	<p>Strategic objective B.1. Ensure equal access to education – Actions to be taken:</p> <p>80. By Governments:</p> <p>(a) Advance the goal of equal access to education by taking measures to eliminate discrimination in education at all levels on the basis of gender, race, language, religion, national origin, age or disability, or any other form of discrimination and, as appropriate, consider establishing procedures to address grievances;</p> <p>(b) by the 2000, provide universal access to basic education and ensure completion of primary education by at least 80 percent of primary school-age children; close the gender gap in primary and secondary school education by the year 2005; provide universal primary education in all countries before the year 2015;</p> <p>(c) eliminate gender disparities in access to all of tertiary education by ensuring that women have equal access to career development, training, scholarships and fellowships, and by adopting positive action when appropriate;</p> <p>(d) create a gender-sensitive educational system in order to ensure equal educational and training opportunities and full and equal participation of women in educational administration and policy and decision-making...</p> <p>(f) increase enrolment and retention rates of girls by allocating appropriate budgetary resources; by enlisting the support of parents and the community, as well as through campaigns, flexible school schedules, incentives, scholarships and other means...</p> <p>Strategic objective B.2. Eradicate illiteracy among women – Actions to be taken:</p> <p>81. By Governments, national, regional and international bodies, bilateral and multilateral donors and non-governmental organizations:</p> <p>(a) Reduce the female illiteracy rate to at least half its 1990 level, with emphasis on rural women, migrant, refugee and internally displaced women and women with disabilities...</p> <p>(c) eliminate the gender gap in basic and functional literacy, as recommended in the World Declaration on Education for All (Jomtein).</p>

The Decades of Education for Africa

In 1996, the OAU proclaimed Africa's First Decade for Education for the period 1997-2006. It focused on 4 priority areas, namely: equity and access to basic education; the quality, relevance and effectiveness of education; complementary learning modalities and capacity building (AU 2006, 1). In spite of member states' efforts, most of the goals set in the Decade Plan were not achieved. This is partly because the Plan was not adopted until 2 years after its formal launch and it had little support from Africa's development partners, who created their own specific programmes (AU 2006, 1). These programmes were not connected to the Decade and, as a result, there was no integration between the work of development partners and the goals set in the Plan.

As a result of the failure of the first, the AU launched Africa's Second Decade for Education in 2006. The Second Plan draws on the capacities of existing institutions, including UNESCO and its major EFA partners. The Plan recognizes education as a means to improve socio-economic development, asserting that education forms the basis for developing innovation, science and technology in order to allow Africa to compete in the global knowledge economy. The Plan further emphasizes education's role in entrenching a culture of peace, gender equality and African values.

The objectives of the Second Decade included attaining full gender equality in primary and secondary education and eliminating the gender gap in participation in maths, science and technology in tertiary education (AU 2006, 3). The Decade's Action Plan further makes a positive connection between gender, education and culture. As a goal, AU member states commit themselves to eliminate gender disparities and to ensure gender equality and girl's and women's empowerment throughout the education system, while enriching the system with positive aspects of African cultural values (AU 2006, 5). This is a peculiar inclusion, which is not contained in global development blueprints. Although global initiatives recognize that cultural values can collide with the goal for girls' education, their Eurocentricism often tends to ignore the important cultural dynamics that have far-reaching effects on girls' lives, beyond merely keeping them out of school.

The African Women Decade

The adoption of the AU Gender Policy facilitated the launch of the African Women Decade in Nairobi, Kenya, in October 2010. Under the theme “Grassroots Approach to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment”, the Decade hopes to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches, inclusive of grassroots participation, to advance gender equality. The overarching purpose of the Decade is to accelerate the implementation of Dakar, Beijing and AU commitments to gender equality and women’s empowerment (AU 2010, 3). The Decade covers ten thematic areas, including Education, Science and Technology. In this area, the Decade aims to achieve parity in education at secondary and tertiary levels and higher retention rates for girls; achieve increased literacy levels for women through adult education and increase women scientists’ contribution to Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) (AU 2010, 3–4). The Decade’s Action Plan does not include any commitments in relation to primary education.

According to the Plan, each member state is expected to establish national committees, which include members from “all segments of society”. The national committees are responsible for proposing one good practice project for each of the ten themes on an annual basis and the AU Fund for Women is committed to providing support for one project in each country per year. This means that the Fund would be responsible for supporting 53 projects every year for ten years.

The Women Decade is currently in its second stage of implementation. The first stage ran from 2010 to 2015; the current stage began in the latter year and will continue to run until 2020. The Decade’s 2015 review was meant to be concomitant with the MDG Review in the same year; however, at the time of writing, an official report had not been made available by the AU.

5.2 National Plans of Action, Changing State Policy and Practice and Civil Society (h, f, g)

The emergence of the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education has also led to various African states themselves adopting national action plans and including gender parity and equality as goals within their education-sectoral frameworks. According to the EFA 2015 Sub-regional Review, one of the key impacts of global education goals has been the reshaping of national education policies and strategies and the institutional reorganization of education ministries in line with global commitments (UNESCO 2014, 55). An analysis of the region’s country reports

shows that the most significant reforms undertaken are generally indicated as being “the selection of laws, policies, strategies, national programmes and action plans, (which are either) elaborated or updated, voted or approved, and implemented” (UNESCO 2014, 55). The Review further indicates that in relation to DFA goals, 24 countries in the region overall have elaborated a national EFA action plan and a further 21 countries have an education sector strategy in accordance with their global commitments (UNESCO 2014, 56).

Civil society organizations and NGOs have further played a role in ensuring states’ accountability. The UNGEI is active in a number of African countries, often in collaboration with local NGOs. For instance, in an effort to increase member states’ accountability, *Make Every Woman Count*, an African women-led organization established in 2010, has produced yearly reports on states’ progress in relation to gender equality and women’s empowerment commitments; despite, funding and resource limitations continuing to have an adverse impact on its activities.

5.3 Conclusion

Africa as a whole has adopted various instruments and mechanisms to advance gender parity and equality in education in the region. The institutionalization of the norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education at the regional level has been inspired by the empowerment and dissemination of the norm at the global level, as discussed in the previous chapter. An analysis of the AU’s education and gender goals, in comparison to global goals, shows that there is a shared understanding between global and regional actors regarding the prescriptive nature of the norm. African mechanisms contain similar themes and, in some instances, identical goals to those contained in the global blueprints for achieving gender parity in education. African states themselves have further adopted or elaborated upon education-sectoral policies and strategies in line with their global commitments. In light of the emergence of the powerful global norm promoting gender parity in education, the correlative shift in policy and state practice provides evidence of the taken-for-granted quality of the norm. The peculiar provisions and emphasis on African cultural values contained in the AU’s rights’ framework highlights the fact that the degree of cultural match may be a significant determinant of the norm’s legitimacy or resonance at the national level. I address this issue in Chapter 7. In the following chapter, I analyse Africa’s progress with respect to DFA and MDG gender parity goals, which provides the basis for case study selection.

CHAPTER 6: AFRICA'S PROGRESS WITH RESPECT TO DFA AND MDG GENDER PARITY GOALS, 2000-2015

Despite widespread commitments to gender parity and equality in education, in the form of ratification and accession to various international treaties, declarations, regional policies and decisions, Africa continues to face significant challenges in relation to reducing the gender gap between girls and boys. Comparative international data persistently places the region on the bottom rung with respect to progress towards achieving DFA and MDG goals (Kane 2004, 40). In terms of gross enrolment rates at primary, secondary and tertiary levels; completion rates and adult and youth literacy rates, Africa performs below global averages and, in most cases, worse than other developing regions. However, there are individual country exceptions and, at certain levels, some countries have made laudable progress.

Global trends indicate that most countries have made significant progress with respect to gender parity in primary education; however, while regions tend to converge towards parity at primary level, wide disparities persist at secondary and tertiary level (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015, 16). According to UNESCO (2015), gender parity was achieved by 69% of countries globally at primary level, compared with only 48% at secondary level. African countries have displayed similar trends, with countries making significant progress in relation to primary school enrolments. However, parity figures tend to deteriorate at secondary and tertiary level. Compared to other regions in the world, Africa has the lowest proportion of countries that have reached DFA and MDG gender parity targets. According to UNESCO (2015), only 2 out of 35 African countries with data achieved parity in education.


6.1 Enrolment and Gender Trends in Primary Education

The commitment to achieve universal primary education (UPE) is encapsulated in both the DFA goals and the MDGs. It arguably constitutes the bedrock upon which all EFA commitments are based. Since the world's out-of-school population has been disproportionately female, UPE and gender equality are inextricably linked. Global trends indicate an increase in access to education at primary level for both girls and boys (Fiske 2012, 27).

Africa has experienced the most dramatic increases in its gross enrolment ratios² (GER) for both genders. The region's GER rose from 90% in 2000 to 104% in 2013 for males and 77% to 97% for females (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). It is worth noting that Africa's gross enrolment rates at primary level have increased at a faster rate than its rapidly growing school-age population (Fiske 2012, 37).

Despite the rapid gains in primary school enrolments, Africa still has one of the lowest primary school participation rates, in comparison to other regions around the world (Figure 6.1.1).

Figure 6.1.1: Gross enrolment ratio at primary level, both sexes (%)



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016

² Gross enrolment ratio (GER) expresses the number of children, regardless of age, who are enrolled in primary school as a percentage of the corresponding population in the theoretical age group for that level of education. The GER can exceed 100% if there are significant numbers of under and over-age children enrolled in primary schools (Fiske 2012, 31-32).



Similarly to other indicators, the regional average for primary level enrolments conceals large disparities between countries. In 2012, the ratios for countries in Africa ranged from 4% in Chad to 110% in Liberia (Fiske 2012, 29). Although girls have benefitted from the expansion of primary enrolments, GPI values indicate that they remain disadvantaged. Figure 6.1.2 shows that Africa has the largest proportion of countries with a GPI below 0.97 i.e. a GPI that favours males. Between 2000 and 2012, Africa's GPI increased from 0.85 to 0.92, which denotes progress; however, the latter figure is still below parity.

Tables 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 show the GPI for African countries in the years 2000 and 2012 respectively. According to the figures, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Botswana, Mauritius, Uganda, Namibia, Malawi and Mauritania had all achieved parity in primary education in 2000. Chad and the Central African Republic recorded the lowest GPI figures, with both countries scoring below 0.70. In some countries, such as Gambia, Malawi, Mauritania, Congo (Brazaville) and Senegal, the GPI reversed in favour of females by 2012 (Table 6.1.2). As indicated previously, a reversal in GPI does not necessarily mean that conditions for girls have improved; it may mean that conditions for boys have worsened.

In order to obtain a clearer picture of which countries in the region have shown the most improvement between 2000 and 2012, I recorded the change in GPI over time (Figure 6.1.3). It appears that Burkina Faso, Benin, Senegal and Burundi lead the pack, with Gambia and Guinea also having achieved impressive growth during this period. Although Chad's GPI remains low relative to other countries, starting from a lower base, the country still recorded greater improvement than many other Africa countries. Between 2000 and 2012, Zimbabwe and Kenya experienced the least improvement in GPI and GPI values actually depreciated in Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia, Cape Verde and Lesotho. However, apart from Cape Verde, these countries still maintained parity despite the depreciation.

Drop-out and Completion Rates

Drop-out rates continue to be an issue, even at primary education level. They are particularly significant at this level because they threaten progress towards achieving UPE. In 2009, nearly two-thirds of African countries had a drop-out rate greater than 30%, compared to only 13% in the remaining regions of the world (Fiske 2012, 44). In that same year, 48 countries had a drop-out rate of less than 5% and only one of them (Mauritius) was in Africa (Fiske 2012, 44).

**Table 6.1.1: Gender Parity Index,
Primary Education, 2000**


Country	GPI
Chad	0.68
Central African Republic	0.69
Niger	0.72
Benin	0.77
Burkina Faso	0.80
Guineau	0.80
Mali	0.80
Djibouti	0.82
Burundi	0.84
Cameroon	0.84
Ethiopia	0.84
Mozambique	0.84
Nigeria	0.85
Togo	0.85
Sudan	0.88
Congo (Brazzaville)	0.93
Swaziland	0.94
Zambia	0.94
Cape Verde	0.95
Equatorial Guineau	0.95
South Africa	0.95
Ghana	0.96
Kenya	0.96
Madagascar	0.96
Senegal	0.96
Tanzania	0.96
Sao Tome and Principe	0.97
Seychelles	0.97
Botswana	0.99
Mauritius	0.99
Uganda	0.99
Namibia	1
Rwanda	1
Lesotho	1.01
Gambia	1.03
Malawi	1.03
Mauritiana	1.03

**Table 6.1.2: Gender Parity Index,
Primary Education, 2012**

Country	GPI
Central African Republic	0.74
Chad	0.76
Guineau	0.84
Niger	0.84
Cote d'Ivoire	0.85
Cameroon	0.88
Democratic Republic of	
Congo	0.88
Mali	0.88
Benin	0.89
Sudan	0.89
Djibouti	0.9
Cape Verde	0.91
Mozambique	0.91
Swaziland	0.92
Togo	0.92
Burkina Faso	0.95
South Africa	0.95
Ghana	0.96
Botswana	0.97
Lesotho	0.97
Namibia	0.97
Sao Tome and Principe	0.97
Equatorial Guineau	0.98
Burundi	0.99
Madagascar	0.99
Mauritius	0.99
Sierra Leone	0.99
Zambia	0.99
Zimbabwe	0.99
Kenya	1
Rwanda	1.02
Seychelles	1.03
Tanzania	1.03
Gambia	1.04
Malawi	1.04
Mauritiana	1.05
Congo (Brazzaville)	1.07
Senegal	1.08

Source: Millenium Development Goals Indicators 2016

Figure 6.1.3: Change in Gender Parity Index, sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2012




Thirty three other countries registered drop-out rates that were greater than 30% and 20 of these were in Africa (Fiske 2012, 44). The largest drop-out rate is found in Chad, where nearly 70% of pupils dropped out before completing the full primary education cycle (Fiske 2012, 46). You will note from Tables 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 that Chad has also registered one of the lowest GPI values in the region.

Unlike previous indicators, the GPI relative to drop-out rates favours girls. The number of countries with a higher drop-out rate for males is significantly larger than those with a higher drop-out rate for females. Substantial gaps favouring females are found in Lesotho, where the rate is 62% for boys and 44% for girls and in Sudan, where boys are five times more likely than

girls to drop out of primary school (Fiske 2012, 46). There are countries where the drop-out rate favours females. For instance, in 2009, Togo had a 38% drop-out rate for females and only 24% for males.

By definition, reducing drop-out rates has a positive impact on completion rates. By lowering the number of students that drop-out in primary education, countries increase their primary school completion rates and set the stage for children to progress through to lower secondary and post-secondary education and training (Fiske 2012, 48). Starting from a relatively low base in comparison to other regions, Africa experienced sharp increases in its primary school completion rates between 1999 and 2009. In that period, completion rates rose from 47% to 64% for girls and 55% to 71% for boys. For the countries for which data is available, GPI values show that primary completion rates in the region predominantly favour boys (Figure 6.1.4).

Figure 6.1.4: Gross Graduation Ratio from Primary Education, GPI, 2011



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016

6.2 Enrolment and Gender Trends in Secondary Education

As indicated previously, the progress made in secondary education has not been as rapid as the progress that has been made in primary education. The extent to which girls are disproportionately excluded from education therefore remains higher at secondary level than it is at primary level; however, there has been a general upward trend in terms of GER at secondary level for both males and females (Fiske 2012, 60). The global average GER for males rose from 48% in 1970 to 69% in 2009, whilst it increased from 39% to 67% for females. In 2012, Africa was the only region with GERs below 45% for both sexes (Fiske 2012, 60).

Table 6.2.1: Gender Parity Index, Secondary Education, 2012

Country	GPI	Country	GPI
Chad	0.46	Mozambique	0.89
Central African Republic	0.51	Ghana	0.90
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.59	Ethiopia	0.91
Niger	0.67	Sudan	0.91
Burundi	0.73	Kenya	0.93
Djibouti	0.77	Madagascar	0.95
Eritrea	0.80	Zimbabwe	0.97
Burkina Faso	0.81	Swaziland	0.99
Sierra Leone	0.84	Seychelles	0.99
Mauritania	0.85	Mauritius	1.05
Cameroon	0.86	Botswana	1.06
Tanzania	0.86	Rwanda	1.07
Congo	0.87	Cape Verde	1.17
Malawi	0.89	South Africa	1.20
		Lesotho	1.40


Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016

The GPI in secondary education has also experienced an increase over time, although progress has been modest and uneven across the various regions. Gender parity in lower and upper secondary education combined has been achieved in 39% of countries. The remaining countries are equally divided between those where GPI favours males (31%) and those where GPI favours females (30%). Similar to other indicators, males are predominantly favoured in Africa (Table 6.2.1). In 2012, the GPI favoured females in only six African countries, namely: Mauritius, Botswana, Rwanda, Cape Verde, South Africa and Lesotho. According to UNESCO data, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Seychelles achieved parity in secondary education in 2012 (Table 6.2.1).

Table 6.2.1 also shows that Chad remains one of the lowest ranking countries in relation to GPI indicators.

The data for secondary completion rates is quite sparse; however, the data that is available shows that the GPI for lower secondary completion tends to favour males. Only three countries achieved parity in lower secondary education, namely: Seychelles (0.99), Botswana (1.00) and Zambia (1.00). Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, Guinea, Togo and the Central African Republic all had a GPI below 0.60. Africa's poor performance with regards to lower secondary completion is concerning because it means that a large majority of its children, majority of them girls, are not progressing to higher levels of education. This severely undercuts the gains made in primary school enrolments.

Figure 6.2.1: Gross Graduation Ratio from Lower Secondary Education, GPI, 2011 (Angola, Eritrea and Seychelles), 2012 (Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mauritius and Sudan) and 2013




Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016

6.3 Enrolment and Gender Trends in Tertiary Education

Access to tertiary education remains a challenge in many countries. Nevertheless, the last four decades have seen a major expansion of higher education in every region across the world. The global GER for tertiary education increased from 32 million students in 1970 to 165 million in 2009 (Fiske 2012, 76). According to Fiske (2012), women have been the principal beneficiaries of this expansion. In the past 40 years, female enrolment at tertiary level has grown twice as fast as that of men, as women attempt to enhance their social mobility and income potential (Fiske 2012, 74). Women now account for a majority of students in most countries. Women possess an advantage in 93 out of a 149 countries with data (62%), whilst men are favoured in 46 out of the 149 (Fiske 2012, 78).

Figure 6.3.1: Gross Enrolment Ratio, Tertiary, GPI, 2001, 2009 (Eritrea, Chad, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire), 2012 and 2013 (Burkina Faso)



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016


The GPI trends for tertiary education in Africa are peculiar in that they continue to favour males, as opposed to following the global trend, which favours females. Although there were some sharp increases in GPI values between 2009 and 2013 (Figure 4.2.3.1), such as in Congo, Rwanda and Botswana, gender disparities in tertiary education persist. No country in Africa has achieved parity at this level of education. In Sudan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Lesotho, gender disparities are in favour of females (Figure 6.3.1).

Increased access to higher education for women has not translated into better career opportunities. Despite the narrowing gender gap in tertiary enrolment globally, significant differences are observed in the fields in which men and women choose to pursue their studies and earn their degrees. Women are overrepresented in fields such as the social sciences, business and law and education remains one of the most popular fields among women (Fiske 2012, 81). Males constitute the majority of graduates in fields such as engineering, manufacturing and construction (Fiske 2012, 82). Across the globe, gender norms continue to have an adverse impact on the economic livelihoods of women.

6.4 Gender Trends in Adult and Youth Literacy

The number of illiterate persons has declined globally since the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2009, global literacy rates rose from 76% to 83% overall (Fiske 2012, 92). Despite the increase in literacy rates, 793 million adults lacked basic literacy skills in 2012—two-thirds of them (508 million) were women. Even though the size of the global self-reported illiterate population is shrinking over time, the female proportion has remained virtually steady at approximately 64% (Fiske 2012, 92). The gender gap in adult literacy rates, which favours males, is particularly striking in Africa.

Figure 6.4.1: Average Adult Literacy, Sub-Saharan Africa, Male and Female, 2015



Source: Calculated Using Data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016

The regional average for adult literacy rates in 2015 was 59% for females, compared with 72% for males (Figure 6.4.1). For the 42 countries with data, the average GPI for adult literacy was 0.75 in 2015 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016), which was below the global average rate.

Figure 6.4.2 shows that there are also huge disparities between males and females in relation to youth literacy rates. In most African countries, the rates favour males. Guinea, Benin, Niger, Mali, Mozambique and Sierra Leone are some of the countries with the largest disparities.


6.5 Conclusion

As indicated in the previous chapter, African countries have adopted various instruments and mechanisms to advance gender equality in education on the continent. The changes in policy and practice at both the regional and national level indicate that there is shared meaning between global and local actors regarding the prescriptive nature of the norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education. However, this widespread adoption of the norm has not translated into similar and positive outcomes. Progress in relation to DFA and MDG gender parity goals in the region has been uneven and largely unimpressive for the majority of GPI indicators. GERs at primary, secondary and tertiary levels consistently favour males, as do completion and literacy rates. Despite their commitment to achieving gender parity in education, many African countries failed to reach their DFA and MDG targets and huge disparities persist between countries. On the one hand, countries such as Chad, the Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire consistently underperform, with low GPI scores across the various indicators. On the other hand, countries such as Gambia, Tanzania and Zambia have been lauded for their progress.

If we operate under the assumption that successful performance denotes the fact that the norm has had strong constitutive effects; whilst poor performance denotes the fact that the norm has had weak constitutive effects, then the pertinent question becomes: what causes this variation in outcomes? What mechanisms generate cross-national variation in the constitutive effects of a global norm? This question goes beyond the issue of mere correlation between the emergence of a global norm and the changes in policy and practice at state level, which are discussed in previous chapter. In the following chapter, I use Gambia and Chad as case studies to test the hypothesis which states the following: in the context of the global norm with respect to gender parity in education in Africa, domestic norms, which shape the preferences of agents, predict the

degree to which the norm resonates and has constitutive effects at the national level; whilst domestic structures identify these key agents and how they will vary cross-nationally.

Figure 6.4.2: Youth Literacy Rate, Sub-Saharan Africa, Male and Female (%)




*Source: World
Inequality
Database on
Education 2016*

CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDIES—THE GAMBIA AND CHAD

The aim of this study is to go beyond mere correlation between global norm emergence and change in state policy and practice—it is to determine what mechanisms have an impact on the constitutive effects of global norms at the national level, as well as what mechanisms generate cross-national variation in these effects. The main hypothesis under consideration is that, in the context of the global norm with respect to gender parity in education in Africa, domestic norms, which shape the preferences of agents, predict the degree to which the norm resonates and has constitutive effects at the national level; whilst domestic structures identify these key agents and how they will vary cross-nationally. In other words, both domestic political structures and domestic norms are variables that intervene between the global norm and national-level outcomes (Figure 7.1) In this chapter, I use Gambia and Chad as case studies to describe and test this theory.

Figure 7.1: A Graphic Depiction of the Hypothesis and Variables in this Study



7.1 Case Selection

The previous chapter provides an analysis of African countries' progress with respect to GPI across various indicators, as well as at different levels of the education system. Chad is highlighted as a consistent underperformer across various GPI indicators. Girls in the country continue to be disadvantaged in relation to GERs and completion rates at all levels of the education system, as well as in relation to literacy rates. Contrastingly, Gambia has been widely lauded as a leader in the promotion of gender equality in education on the continent. As indicated in the previous chapter, the country has performed relatively well, achieving better results across

various GPI indicators than Chad. My selection of the two countries as case studies is based on this variation in outcomes.

Figure 7.1.1 summarises African countries' comparative performance in relation to GPI by ranking them according to their attainment of gender parity at different levels of the education system. According to the figure, 11 other African countries are ranked above Gambia in terms of GPI attainment; however, with respect to the degree of improvement, Gambia has seen a significantly greater change in its overall GPI between 2000 and 2012 than any of these countries (see Figure 6.1.3). On the other hand, Chad is shown in Figure 7.1.1 to rank amongst the countries which have not achieved parity at any level of the education system. Being ranked 5th out of the 21 countries in this category, Chad is not the worst performing out of the lot. However, in the case of both countries, case selection was also based on the richness of existing literature regarding the issue of gender parity in the two countries, and not on the quantitative data alone.

Figure 7.1.1: Ranking of SSA Countries According to their Attainment of Gender Parity, 2012

Gender parity achieved for:			Gender Parity Not Achieved
Primary, Lower and Upper Secondary	Primary and Lower Secondary	Primary	
10 Countries	5 Countries	11 Countries	21 Countries
Botswana Cabo Verde Lesotho Mauritius Namibia Rwanda Sao Tomé and Príncipe Seychelles South Africa Swaziland	Congo Gambia, The Kenya Madagascar Senegal	Burkina Faso Burundi Equatorial Guinea Gabon Ghana Malawi Sierra Leone U. R. Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe *	Angola Benin Cameroon CAR Chad Comoros Côte d'Ivoire Djibouti DRC Eritrea Ethiopia Guinea Guinea Bissau Liberia Mali Mozambique Niger Nigeria Somalia South Sudan Togo

Source: UNESCO 2014, 32

The main issue for the purposes of this study is that the country cases show sufficient variation in outcomes. The section below provides a more detailed analysis of the two countries' performance in relation to various GPI indicators.

7.2 Gambia and Chad's Progress with Respect to DFA and MDG Gender Parity Goals, 2000-2015

The Structure of the Education System

The structure of formal schooling in Gambia, which has been in place since 1996, is 6:3:3 (Table 7.2.1). The formal age of entry for primary school is 7 years (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2015, vii). Primary education ("Lower Basic") consists of 6 years of schooling (from grade 1 to grade 6). Secondary education is divided into two cycles, namely lower secondary education ("Upper Basic") and upper secondary education. Both cycles consist of 3 years of schooling, with lower secondary spanning grades 7 to 9 and upper secondary spanning grades 10 to 12. In principle, primary and secondary education in Gambia are free and compulsory.

Table 7.2.1: Gambia's Schooling System, Primary and Secondary Levels

Level of Education	Duration	Official Ages	Grades
Primary	6 years	7-12 years old	Grade 1-6
Lower Secondary	3 years	13-15 years old	Grade 7-9
Upper Secondary	3 years	16-18 years old	Grade 10-12

Source: Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2015, vii

Chad's schooling system is slightly different and has a 6:4:3 structure (Table 7.2.2). Primary school has an official entry age of 6 years (Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) 2014). The system is structured in such a way that primary education lasts a period of 6 years (from grade 1 to 6). Secondary education is divided into two cycles, namely: lower secondary and upper secondary education. Lower secondary education lasts 4 years and consists of grades 7 to 10 and upper secondary education last 3 years and consists of grades 11 to 13. In principle, public education in Chad is free.

Table 7.2.2: Chad's Schooling System, Primary and Secondary Levels


Level of Education	Duration	Official Ages	Grades
Primary	6 years	6-11 years old	Grade 1-6
Lower Secondary	4 years	12-15 years old	Grade 7-10
Upper Secondary	3 years	16-18 years old	Grade 11-13

Source: Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) 2014

Enrolment and Gender Trends in Primary Education

As discussed in the previous chapter, the commitment to UPE is very closely linked to the goal of achieving gender parity and equality in education. The data suggests that the number of out-of-school children in Gambia has actually increased between 2000 and 2015. Figure 7.2.1 shows that the rate of out-of-school children stood at 27% for both males and females in 2000, it then fluctuated by a few minor percentage points across the years, until it settled on 31% in 2014. In the same year, 28% of girls were not in primary school, compared to 34% of boys (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016).

Figure 7.2.1: Gambia, Rate of out-of-school children of primary school age, both sexes (%)




Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2016

By comparison, Chad experienced a very dramatic decline in the number of out-of-school children of primary school-going age. In 2000, a staggering 48% of children were not in school (Figure 7.2.2). This figure reduced by 32 percentage points to 16% in 2013 (Figure 7.2.2). In that same year, 29% of girls Chadian girls of primary school going age were not in school. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics estimates that only 5% of boys were not in school in 2013.

In 2000, Gambia had an 84% GER for females (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). Chad's GER for females for that same year was 49% (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). In line with the sharp decline in the number of its out-of-school children, Chad has experienced dramatic improvements in its GERs. By 2013, Chad had an 88% GER for females in primary education. Gambia's GER for females peaked to 94% in 2004; however, by 2014, the figure had dropped to 88%. Despite improvements in female enrolments in primary education, girls in Chad remain at a disadvantage. In comparison to the 49% of females who were enrolled in primary schools in 2000, the male GER in Chad was 79% (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). Girls therefore remain disproportionately affected in relation to access to schooling.

Figure 7.2.2: Chad, Rate of out-of-school children of primary school age, both sexes (%)




Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2016

Although primary school enrolments have experienced some fluctuation in relation to both sexes in Gambia, the gap between males and females remains significantly better than in Chad. This is

reflected in the GER GPI values for both countries. Figure 7.2.3 shows that there is an average of about 20 percentage points between the gender gap in Gambia and the one in Chad. Figure 7.2.3 also shows that in terms of enrolment rates, Gambia reached parity in 2003, attaining a GPI of 0.97. In 2005, GERs in primary education began to favour females.

Figure 7.2.3: Gambia and Chad, Gross Enrolment Ratio, Primary Education, GPI




Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016

The data for primary school completion rates is sparse; however, the data that is available depicts similar trends between the two countries—the gap between males and females is significantly narrow in Gambia, whilst the gender gap in Chad remains gapingly wide. In 2011, the total percentage of females who entered the last grade of primary education, regardless of their age, was a dismal 27% in Chad, compared to 43% of males (Figure 7.2.4). That is a difference of 20 percentage points. Although these figures improved to 30% for females and 47% for males in 2013, they remain extremely low and the gender gap remains alarmingly wide. By comparison, the rate of primary school completion in Gambia is significantly better for both sexes. In 2011, the rate of completion for females stood at 70% and at 68% for males (Figure 7.2.5). An equal proportion of males and females entered the last grade of primary school in 2012 (70%). In 2013, the rate for females increased to 72%, whilst the male figure reverted to 69%.


It is clear that the challenges relating to primary school completion are acute in Chad. The available data shows that a majority of Chad's children do not survive beyond primary education, which significantly undercuts efforts to achieve UPE, as well as gender parity and equality goals.

Figure 7.2.4: Chad, Primary Completion Rate (%)



Source: The World Bank 2016

Figure 7.2.5: Gambia, Primary Completion Rate (%)



Source: The World Bank 2016

Enrolment and Gender Trends in Secondary Education

In the previous chapter, I indicated that the global trends in relation to secondary education show that the gender gap is significantly wider in most countries. Many countries did not achieve parity in secondary education by the 2015 deadline. Gambia is one of the countries that successfully achieved parity in lower secondary education. The country's GPI for lower secondary enrolments increased from 0.69 in 2000 to 1.04 in 2011 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). In 2014, the GPI value was 1.03 (Table 7.2.3). By comparison, Chad did not achieve parity in secondary education; however its GPI did improve from 0.30 in 2000 to 0.50 in 2012 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). Although this is a significant improvement, Gambia still experienced a greater change in its GPI than Chad in the period 2000 to 2012.

Table 7.2.3: Chad and Gambia, Gross Enrolment Ratio, Lower Secondary, GPI

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Chad	0.30	0.32	0.36	0.34	0.36	0.37	0.39	0.41	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.48	0.50
Gambia	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.79	0.84	0.87	0.90	0.94	0.96	1.00	1.02	1.04	1.03

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016

In terms of their upper secondary school enrolments, both countries did not meet parity targets. Gambia had an estimated GPI of 0.88 in 2008, which decreased to 0.85 in 2010 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). Chad had a GPI of 0.25 in 2000, which increased to 0.37 in 2014 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). With GPI values that favour boys in secondary education, both countries are experiencing challenges in terms of increasing girls' enrolments at higher levels of the education system. The challenges in Chad are significantly more severe.

As indicated previously, since Gambia's GPI reversed in favour of girls in primary education, the MoBSE has emphasized the need to sustain the gains registered in improving girls' access to education, whilst simultaneously ensuring that boys do not become disadvantaged.

Enrolment and Gender Trends in Tertiary Education

Gambia had no data available in relation to GPI values for enrolments in tertiary education on international databases, namely on the UNESCO and World Bank databases. Its 2015 EFA National Review Report also does not contain data in this regard; however, it includes gender

disaggregated data for enrolment in its Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programmes. According to the 2015 review, women constitute 49% of enrolments in the aforementioned programmes (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 23). Females are very strongly represented in Secretarial programmes and Horticulture (84.3% and 78.8% respectively) (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 24). In 9 out of the 13 programmes offered by TVET colleges, women are underrepresented. They are the least represented in Welding and Fabrication (3.5%), Construction (4.8%), Electrical Electronics (12%) and Motor Mechanics (12.5%) (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 24). The professions that are traditionally reserved for men therefore continue to be dominated by them.

In Chad, the wide gender gap between males and females persists in tertiary education. In 2000, Chad had a GPI of 0.18 with respect to tertiary enrolments (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016). This figure marginally increased to 0.20 in 2014 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2016).

Gender Trends in Adult and Youth Literacy

The data with respect to literacy rates in both Gambia and Chad is limited. In respect of youth literacy, the two countries started with a GPI base of 0.64 and 0.42 respectively. UNESCO estimates that youth literacy rates have improved significantly in both countries and, in fact, more significantly in Chad. The UNESCO estimate for the GPI for youth literacy in Chad in 2015 was 0.91, and the Gambian estimate is 0.94 for the same year. Despite the steady increase in youth literacy rates, both countries remain below parity.

Adult literacy also remains a challenge for both countries. In 2000, Gambia and Chad had a GPI of 0.31 and 0.51 respectively. UNESCO estimates place the 2015 GPI figures at 0.75 in Gambia and 0.66 in Chad. In line with global trends, women constitute the majority of illiterate persons in both countries.

7.3 Domestic Political Structure

Political History

The Republic of the Gambia is a small country located on the West of Africa. It is almost completely landlocked by Senegal, except for the boundary which borders the Atlantic Ocean on the west of the country (Figure 7.3.1). As the smallest country on the mainland of Africa, Gambia has an area of approximately 11 300 km² and an estimated population of 1.9 million people, made up of different ethnic groups and languages (The Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBoS) 2014, 6). At 95.7% (2013 estimate) Muslims constitute the majority of the population (Central Intelligence Agency 2016a).

Figure 7.3.1: Map of The Gambia



Source: Central Intelligence Agency 2016a

In 2015, the Gambia was declared an Islamic republic (*The Economist* 2016). Islamic ideologies therefore feature prominently in the public and political discourse (Manion 2012, 233).

In terms of its political history, Gambia gained independence from the UK in 1965 (Saine 2008, 61). After independence, the country's first elected president, Dawda K. Jawara, established "modest development goals, pursued a moderate foreign policy" and expressed Gambia's unwavering commitment to democracy, human rights and an open-market economy (Saine 2008, 61). Gambia projected this image to the rest of the world and maintained its multiparty democracy and relative stability for several years. Saine (2008) however indicates that this image was merely a facade used by President Jawara to conceal the true nature of his authoritarian tendencies (Saine 2008, 61). The year 1981 saw an unsuccessful coup attempt on Jawara's regime by paramilitary forces. The coup was quashed by Senegalese forces, which intervened at Jawara's behest. Following Senegal's successful intervention, the two countries agreed to the formation of the Confederation of Senegambia, which collapsed in 1989 (Saine 2008, 61).

In 1994, due to prevailing discontent, particularly amongst young people, with the ruling party's leadership, Yahya Jammeh led a bloodless military coup against the Jawara regime (Perfect 2010, 53–54). The coup successfully overthrew President Jawara and was followed by a ban on all political activity. Jammeh's political party, the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC), announced a four-year period of transition before Gambia would return to civilian rule. However, due to pressure from the international community, which condemned the coup, and the economic stability that resulted from the political turmoil at the time, the government was compelled to reduce the transition period from four to two years (Perfect 2010, 54). A new constitution was subsequently drawn up by a Constitutional Review Commission, and was later endorsed by referendum in August 1996. The first presidential elections were held in September of that same year. As a result of the political ban, three major political parties could not participate in the election. The ACPR won 56% of the votes and Jammeh was elected to power (Saine 2008, 62).

The 1996 elections were mired in controversy and were characterised by violence, intimidation and electoral impropriety. Under the same dark cloud of controversy, President Jammeh has won all four subsequent elections since he took power in 1996. In his time as president, he has also survived several coup attempts. By ruling over the nation with an iron fist, Jammeh has maintained his grip on power for over 21 years, making him one of Africa's longest serving presidents.

The Republic of Chad is located in Central Africa and shares borders with six other African countries, namely: Libya (north), Niger (west), Nigeria (west), Cameroon (south west) Central African Republic (south) and Sudan (east) (Figure 7.3.2).

Chad has an approximately 1.3 million total square kilometre area and ranks 5th among the largest countries in Africa (L'Institut National de Statistique, des Etudes Economiques et Démographiques (INSEED) 2016). A large proportion of the terrain is mostly desert, particularly in the north of the country.

Figure 7.3.2: Map of Chad



Source: Central Intelligence Agency 2016b

Chad has a population of approximately 11.7 million people (July 2015 estimate), which is six times the size of Gambia (Central Intelligence Agency 2016b). Due to ongoing conflicts in neighbouring countries, particularly in the Sudan and Central African Republic, Chad's population also includes a large number of refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of June 2015, Chad had a refugee population of approximately 420 774 people (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2015).

The Chadian population consists of at least 200 ethnic groups and over 120 distinct languages and dialects (Central Intelligence Agency 2016b). Muslims constitute 53.1% of the population and are predominantly found in the northern parts of the country. The southern part of the country is populated mostly by Christians (who constitute 34.3% of the population) and those who practice traditional/indigenous religions.

Chad gained its independence from France in 1960 and, like many other African countries, its post-independence history has been marked by conflict and instability (May and Massey 2000, 108). The significant ethnic and linguistic differences within the newly independent Chad increased the propensity towards factionalism. Since independence, Chad has endured three decades of civil war, mostly arising from tensions between the predominantly Arab-Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south (May and Massey 2000, 109).

In 1990, President Idriss Déby came to power, ousting Chad's previous dictatorial regime (May and Massey 2000, 111). Déby promised freedom and justice and began to make efforts to set up a new type of republican government, which would be governed by democratic principles. A new democratic constitution was drafted, which set up Chad's two-chamber parliament, consisting of the National Assembly and Senate; the High Court and the Constitutional Court. The government further allowed the participation of more political parties and promised free and fair multi-party elections (May and Massey 2000, 111).

Despite all this posturing, there was no doubt that Déby would maintain his grip on power. The run-up to the elections was characterized by violence and suppression and government forces participated in the massacre of individuals suspected to be members of opposition groups (Central Intelligence Agency 2016b). According to May and Massey (2000), Déby's response to opposition was often as brutal as his predecessors. Flawed presidential elections were finally held in 1996, and again 2001. Déby won both elections and in June 2005, he held a referendum and successfully removed constitutional term limits (Central Intelligence Agency 2016b). This led to another controversial win in the 2006 elections. In 2011, Déby was again re-elected to his fourth term in office.

Although democratic reforms brought some semblance of stability to Chad following its decade-long civil war, the country continues to experience periods of sporadic violence and insurrection. Several peace agreements between the government and insurgents have failed to stop the fighting. Chad is also adversely affected by the conflict in Darfur (May and Massey 2006, 444). In 2004, a conflict in neighbouring Darfur spilled over the border into Chad, as Chadian troops clashed with pro-Sudanese government militias.

The political climate in Chad remains highly volatile and the country continues to be characterised by conflict and turmoil. Sporadic rebel campaigns and violent clashes continued in the country throughout 2008 to 2014. In 2015, the Chadian government imposed a state of emergency in the Lake Chad region following multiple attacks by Boko Haram (BBC News 2015).

Liberal, State-Above-Society, Corporatist and Statist Political Structures

In this section, I code Gambia's and Chad's domestic political structures using Checkel's (1999) framework. As already indicated, Checkel outlines four distinct structures according to state-societal relations (Table 7.3.1). State-society relations are defined as "interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people" (GSDRC 2016, 3). The relations between state and society are significant because they "structure the game of politics and...policymaking within countries" (Checkel 1999, 88). In order to have powerful constitutive effects, global norms must be empowered in the national arena i.e. their prescriptions must, through changes in discourse or behaviour, become the focus of domestic political attention or debate. The empowerment of global norms therefore involves elite decision-makers and, in some cases, other societal actors.

According to Checkel (1999), since elites are "gate-keepers" who wield the power to control the political agenda, they are a necessary, but not always sufficient condition for empowerment to occur (88). The nature of state-society relations determines the degree to which elite decision-makers are privileged in policy-making processes. In other words, state-society relations determine whether policy is formed as a result of societal pressure acting on elites (bottom-up processes) or as a result of elite learning (top-down processes).

Table: 7.3.1: Domestic Political Structures

Liberal structure:	The role of elites is highly constrained and policy is formed more through bottom up processes (societal pressure).
State-above-society structure	The state sits apart from and exercises considerable control over society (elite learning).
Corporatist structure:	The presence of policy networks connecting the state and society result in both societal pressure (primary) and elite learning (secondary) playing a role in policy-making and decision-making.
Statist structure:	Elite learning plays a more dominant role in the process through which norms first reach the development agenda and societal penetration and organisation of social interests is weaker than in liberal or corporatist structures, such that the likelihood that power from below will empower norms is reduced.

In the liberal structure (row 1), individuals and groups play a dominant role in policy-making. Norm-induced change is therefore likely to be driven by them and, in this context, societal pressure explains the domestic empowerment and possible constitutive impact of global norms. Checkel (1999) argues that since the circle of actors in liberal structures is large, elite learning is irrelevant to the empowerment of global norms and is, in fact, less probable in these cases (89).

In the opposite extreme, the state-above-society structure (row 2) is characterised by a top-down policy-making environment. Consequently, elite-learning is necessary if global norms are to be empowered at the domestic level. Checkel (1999) further indicates that elite learning is more likely to occur in this much less politicized environment.

Row 3 and 4 represent somewhat of a middle road, where both mechanisms are at work, but to varying degrees. In the corporatist structure (row 3), state decision-makers play a greater role in bringing about normative change than in the liberal case; however, this does not mean that they are able to dominate the policy-making process in the same way as elites in a state-above-society setting. The corporatist structure is characterised by policy networks, which connect the state to society, thereby according society a significant role in decision-making processes (Checkel 1999, 89–90). In this way, both societal pressure (primary) and elite learning (secondary) drive norm empowerment at the national level.

Finally, in the statist structure (row 4), learning by elite decision-makers plays a much more dominant role in the process through which global norms first reach the domestic agenda. However, since both societal penetration of the state and the organization of social interests are weaker than in liberal or corporatist structures, the likelihood that pressure from below will empower norms is greatly reduced (Checkel 1999, 90).

There is no one globally agreed measure for the strength of state-society relations. There are a number of indicators and approaches, which have been used by scholars across different disciplines. These include measures of state efficacy, the nature of political regimes and the strength of civil society. Scholars may place particular emphasis on a subset of governance indicators, such as state responsiveness, social barriers, social institutions and social capital; the nature of political regimes, governance and the rule of law; economic rights (measured by property rights) and political rights (measured by accountability and the extent of clientelist

relationships between citizens and public officials); as well as free and fair elections, the presence of democratic political parties and the nature of democracy (Narayan 2005, 19).

In his study, Checkel (1999) relies on his extensive knowledge of the politics of Europe and the work of regional experts to assist him in coding the domestic structures of the European countries under consideration. He focuses his study on the following countries: “liberal Britain; corporatist Germany; statist Russia and state-above-society Ukraine”. Since we now have the benefit of global governance indicators, which have become stronger and more reliable to a certain degree, for the purposes of this study, I use a combination of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and literature relating to politics, governance and the strength of civil society within the two country cases to code their domestic structures.

The WGI are a research dataset which reports on six broad dimensions of governance for 215 countries over the period 1996-2004. Governance is defined as consisting of

the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann and Kraay 2016).

The six dimensions of governance are summarized in Table 7.3.2 below. The indicators are reported either in their standard normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 or in percentile rank terms from 0 to 100, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. The standard units represent a scaled estimate of governance. Values on the lower end of the scale correspond with poor governance; whilst higher values correspond with better governance. The percentile rank indicates the rank of a country among other countries in the world. Zero corresponds with the lowest rank and 100 corresponds with the highest rank. A key feature of the statistical methodology used to create the six aggregate indicators is that it generates margins of error for each governance estimate, which improves the accuracy of the measures (Kaufmann and Kraay 2016).

Table: 7.3.2: The Six Dimensions of Governance (WGI)

Voice and Accountability	Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.
Government Effectiveness	Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies
Regulatory Quality	Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of Law	Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of Corruption	Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

Source: (Kaufmann and Kraay 2016)

To assist me in coding the domestic political structures of Gambia and Chad, I compare the WGI of the two countries in 2000 (the period when the norm vis-à-vis gender parity became institutionalized in the DFA and MDGs) and 2014 (the most recent data). I then rank both countries amongst Checkel's country cases, namely Liberal Britain, Corporatist Germany, Statist Russia and State-Above-Society Ukraine, for the same years. This provides a clearer picture of the categories in which Gambia and Chad may lie. Finally, using the above, together with

literature in relation to the politics, history and the civil society interactions of each country, I code Gambia's domestic political structure as statist and Chad's as state-above society.

Governance and Civil-Society Participation as Indicators of State-Society Relations in Gambia and Chad


Figure 7.3.3 portrays the WGI figures for Chad and Gambia in 2000. In relation to Voice and Accountability ("VA"), Chad ranked at 19% and Gambia at 16%. The figure shows that there is a significant overlap between the margins of error for both countries in relation to the measure. The differences between the two countries cannot therefore be interpreted as statistically significant. There is a similar overlap with respect to the margin of error in relation to Government Effectiveness ("GE"), where Chad ranked at 24% and Gambia at 37%. Consequently, in terms of VA and GE in the year 2000, Chad and Gambia ranked similarly.

In contrast, there are significant differences between the two countries with respect to Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism ("PSAVT"), Regulatory Quality ("RQ"), Rule of Law ("RoL") and Control of Corruption ("CoC"). In terms of PSAVT, Chad ranked at 13% and Gambia at 64%. The propensity for politically-motivated violence and instability was therefore much higher in Chad, than it was in Gambia in 2000. This interpretation is line with the political background provided earlier in this chapter, which characterizes the highly volatile political climate in Chad in the early 2000s.

The RQ indicator is significant for the purposes of determining the nature of state-society relations, as it relates governments' ability to formulate sound policies and regulations and implement them effectively. Although the measure is confined to policies and regulations that permit or promote private sector development, it remains a good indicator for states' institutional capacity. Again, Figure 7.3.3 shows a notable difference between Chad's and Gambia's rankings. Chad ranked at 20% in relation to this measure; whilst Gambia ranked at 38%. The margin of error in relation to the two values is not significant, which indicates that the recorded differences are more precise. We can therefore conclude that in 2000, the Gambian government had greater ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations than the Chadian government.


The RoL and CoC indicators are also significant, as they measure confidence in legislative and judicial systems and frameworks, through which citizens are able to exercise and enforce their rights, as well as the degree of accountability of public officials and the extent of state capture by elites and private interests i.e. levels of clientelism. In the case of RoL, Chad ranked at 17% and Gambia ranked at 48%. In relation to CoC, Chad ranked at 23%; whilst Gambia ranked at 41%. The margins of error with respect to these two measures indicate that the reported readings are quite precise. We can therefore conclude that in 2000, Chad had comparatively weaker institutions supporting the RoL and preventing corruption than Gambia.

Figure: 7.3.3: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Percentile Rank, Chad & Gambia, 2000



The governance scores, depicted in Figure 7.3.4, support the overall picture presented above, which is that Gambia has comparatively stronger governance institutions than Chad. Both countries' governance scores are below 0, with the exception of Gambia's score of 0,45 with respect to PSAVT. This indicates that the two countries have weak governance institutions in comparison to other countries in the rest of the world.

Figure: 7.3.4: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Governance Scores, Chad and Gambia, 2000



Gambia's stronger GE (-0.50) and RE (-0.28) governance scores indicate a strong state, with a greater ability to formulate, implement and regulate policies effectively than the Chadian state. The stronger RoL (-0.30) and CoC (-0.41) scores further indicate that there is a stronger presence of checks and balances to modulate the authority of the state in Gambia than there is in Chad. My expectation therefore is that both political and societal pressure are at play in policy-making processes in Gambia, as well as in Chad. However, given Chad's score of -1.08 with respect to RoL and -0,82 with respect to CoC, I expect the role of society to be comparatively weaker in Chad than it is in Gambia.

The indicators follow a similar trend for the year 2014, with the exception that there is no longer a margin of error in relation to GE. Chad and Gambia continue to rank similarly with respect to VA, as there is significant overlap between the margin of error. In terms of GE, Chad ranked at 6% in 2014, and Gambia ranked at 28% for the same year. In relation to PSAVT, RQ, RoL and CoC, Chad ranked at 8%, 11%, 10% and 8% respectively. In comparison, Gambia ranked 42%, 34%, 30% and 29% for the same measures. Gambia therefore continues to rank above Chad in terms of governance overall. The governance scores depicted in Figure 7.3.6 further support this overall picture.

Figure: 7.3.5: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Chad and Gambia, 2014





Figure: 7.3.6: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Chad and Gambia, 2014




Although the WGI measures provide a basis for making assumptions in relation to state-society relations in the two country cases, they do not provide definite answers. Therefore, in the following section, I compare Chad’s and Gambia’s rankings to Checkel’s country cases.


Figure: 7.3.6: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2000



Country	Percentile Rank
Liberal Britain	91
Corporatist Germany	90
Statist Russia	37
State-Above-Society Ukraine	29
Chad	19
Gambia	16




Country	Percentile Rank
Corporatist Germany	95
Liberal Britain	79
Gambia	64
State-Above-Society Ukraine	29
Chad	13
Statist Russia	10




Country	Percentile Rank
Corporatist Germany	94
Liberal Britain	94
Gambia	37
State-Above-Society Ukraine	25
Chad	24
Statist Russia	23

WGI Percentile Rank, 2000




Country	Percentile Rank
Liberal Britain	98
Corporatist Germany	92
Gambia	38
State-Above-Society Ukraine	29
Statist Russia	28
Chad	20

WGI Percentile Rank, 2000



Country	Percentile Rank
Corporatist Germany	99
Liberal Britain	94
Gambia	48
Chad	17
Statist Russia	13
State-Above-Society Ukraine	13

WGI Percentile Rank, 2000



Country	Percentile Rank
Liberal Britain	96
Corporatist Germany	93
Gambia	41
Chad	23
Statist Russia	17
State-Above-Society Ukraine	8

Figure 7.3.6 shows Chad and Gambia's rankings across the six WGI measures in relation to Liberal Britain, Corporatist Germany, Statist Russia and State-Above-Society Ukraine in the year 2000. In relation to VA, Chad and Gambia ranked significantly lower than the other four countries, with Liberal Britain and Corporatist Germany falling in the upper 90 percentile and Statist Russia and State-Above-Society Ukraine falling in the 30th and 20th percentile respectively. Since VA measures the extent to which citizens are able to participate in political processes, Chad and Gambia's low ranking indicates that societal pressure plays a less significant role in political processes than it would in the countries ranked above them. This indicates that the domestic political structure of the two countries is more likely to be statist than it is likely to be liberal or corporatist.

In relation to GE and RQ, Gambia ranks below Liberal Britain and Corporatist Germany; whilst Chad ranks lower than Statist Russia and State-Above-Society Ukraine. The Gambian state would therefore appear to be stronger and more effective than the Chadian state; however not to the extent of meeting the requirements of a liberal or corporatist domestic political structure. Chad's regulatory and governance institutions are comparatively weaker, which indicates the state's inability to formulate and implement policies effectively.

With respect to the RoL and CoC, Chad and Gambia ranked in the middle of the countries under consideration. At 48% with respect to the RoL, Gambia ranks significantly higher than Statist Russia, State-Above-Society Ukraine and Chad. On the other hand, Chad ranks above Statist Russia and State-Above-Society Ukraine with respect to the two measures. However, its rankings are closer to the latter two than they are to Gambia. Gambia therefore has a stronger framework which supports the rights claims of individuals and society and their enforcement, as well as stronger checks and balances on public officials and corruption.

The above ranking comparison eliminates the liberal and corporatist state structures from consideration with respect to coding Chad and Gambia. My expectation is that the two countries fit more closely either with a statist structure or a state-above society structure. Gambia appears to fit more closely with the statist category, in which elite decision-makers play a dominant role in the process through which domestic norms first reach the national arena, with society exerting at least some influence on decision-making. On the other hand, Chad appears to fit more closely with the state-above-society category, in which the state sits apart from society and changes in

state policy and practice occur as a result of elite-learning. In the case of Chad, elite decision-making and efficacy is greatly affected or hampered by an unstable political environment, particularly in the early 2000s. This explains Chad's poor performance in relation to gender parity goals, despite the presence of a dominant state.

A reading of the literature, particularly in relation to civil society activity in the two countries supports this view. In the context of increased political instability, the civil society environment in Chad is more fragile, in comparison to Gambia. In the context of the continued restrictions on civil liberties as a result of political unrest, civil society mobilisation remains limited (Collet 2016). Although the number of NGOs and CSOs has increased in the country, their ability to have an impact on political processes remains extremely hampered.

In contrast, Gambia's level of civil society participation, particularly in relation to gender parity in education, is higher by comparison. The role of CSOs, though limited, has supported the dominant state in policy and decision-making with respect to the global norm. According to the Gambian MoBSE, NGOs and civil society play a very important role in monitoring the extent to which educational policies and programmes deliver desired objectives and outcomes (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 13). NGOs and civil society organisations in the country have been particularly active in local education groups (LEGs), whose role is also to monitor policy implementation and provide technical advice to education authorities (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 13).

7.4 Norm Congruence and Domestic Legitimacy

In terms of congruence with domestic norms, the literature does not indicate that the norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education has met with significant challenges from institutionalized competing norms in either Gambia or Chad. A survey of the literature shows that constitutional protections and policies with respect to gender equality existed prior to the year 2000. Existing interpretations have since been conceptualized and developed in line with the prescriptions DFA and MDG commitments.

Gambia has had a relatively long history of state-led efforts to promote women's rights and empowerment (Manion 2012, 232). It has further maintained extensive connections with global development partners, established government civil-society partnerships and, as indicated above,

a vibrant civil society in the education sector (Manion 2012, 232). Since the late 1990s, national education policy documents and strategies in the Gambia have explicitly expressed formal political commitments to enhancing girls' education, particularly framed in human capital terms towards the goal of alleviating poverty (Manion 2012, 234). Similarly, Chad has adopted a number of national policies and strategies to promote progress towards fulfilling gender parity and equality goals in education. In 1998, Chad adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy aimed at improving economic growth and reducing poverty (Hassan 2010, 6). In 2000, the country reinforced its commitment to growth and fighting poverty when it endorsed EFA and MDG commitments.

National Legislation and Policies Promoting Gender Parity and Equality in Education

Education is a constitutionally enshrined right in both Gambia and Chad. The right to education is protected in terms of Article 30 of Gambia's 1996 constitution. According to the provision, all persons have the right to equal educational opportunities and facilities, with a view of achieving full realisation of that right. Article 30(a) further provides that basic education shall be free, compulsory and available to all. In terms of Article 30(d), functional literacy shall be "encouraged or intensified as far as possible". In terms of Article 35 of the Chadian Constitution, every citizen has the right to education (Ruchti 1996, 8). The provision further provides that public education is secular and free and that basic education is compulsory. In terms of Article 36, the state has an obligation to establish the conditions and institutions required to ensure and guarantee the education of all children.

The above constitutional provisions undergird Gambia's and Chad's national education policies and strategies, which are aimed at improving access to educational opportunities for *all* children, particularly girls. In 1998, Gambia revised its national education policy to include an emphasis on "equity" and the reduction of gender disparities with regards to access and retention in education (Manion 2012, 234). The Revised National Education Policy (RNEP), along with the Education Master Plan 1998-2005, outlined various commitments to creating equal opportunities for women and girls. The government's aim was to begin to create an enabling environment for women and girls to compete equally with men and boys. Between 1998 and 2005, with the assistance of the World Bank, Gambia implemented its very first programme targeted at girls'

education (Manion 2012, 234). The Girls' Education Programme focused on lowering the cost of education for girls and providing a clean, safe and supportive environment for their learning, as well as establishing partnerships with communities in order to develop local, innovative solutions to tackle the challenges that girls face (Manion 2012, 234–35).

In 2004, Gambia's Department of State for Education (DoSE) introduced its new National Education Policy (NEP) (2004-2015), which made explicit reference to DFA and MDG goals and aligned them to the Department's existing framework for achieving gender equality in education. The NEP emphasizes the need to eliminate educational inequalities in order to achieve gender parity and equity in education, in line with global development goals.

Up until 2007, the DoSE had been solely responsible for the delivery of education at all levels. After 2007, the Gambian government created two separate education ministries, namely: the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) and the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology (MoHERST) (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 10). In 2012, both these ministries began another process of revision and reformulation of national education policy. The MoBSE finalized the revision of its policy in 2013, whilst the MoHERST validated and introduced a new policy for tertiary and higher education that same year (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 11).

The ministries' new policies and plans are aimed at consolidating the gains that Gambia has already made in relation to addressing various challenges in its education system, particularly in relation to gender equality. By 2013, Gambia had achieved gender parity in primary and lower secondary education; however, the gender gap remains at other levels of the education system. In primary education, the gender gap has actually reversed in favour of girls. In order to maintain the gains made with respect to girls, whilst simultaneously tackling boys' disadvantage in education, the government has shifted its focus to *gender*, as opposed to the girls-only-focus which prevails in the discourse.

In order to cater for education goals post the 2015 agenda, Gambia formulated the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) (2014-2022). The ESSP emphasizes the need to move away from programmes that are focused on education cycles (basic, secondary and tertiary), as well as the

need to begin to introduce integrated, results-oriented interventions, which focus on the education system as a whole (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 12).

As in the case of Gambia, Chad's national education policy makes commitments to achieving gender parity and equality in education. There are three main national policies and strategies in this regard, namely: the Education Sector Reform Project (PARSET) (2003-2015); the National Strategy for Accelerating Girls' Education (2004-2015) and the National Plan of Action for EFA (PAN). According to the Ministry of Education's 2004 Report, the common objective for all of Chad's educational programming was to achieve UPE by 2015 and to ensure boys' and girls' equal access to educational opportunities (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 2). Chad's emphasis on UPE echoes the objectives contained in the global development blueprints for gender equality in education.

PARSET was adopted by the Chadian government in 2003 as a long-term project aimed at reforming the country's education policy and institutions (Diop 2013, 114). The Project is ongoing, is supported by the World Bank and executed in five-year phases (The World Bank 2003, 2). The objectives of the Project are to achieve UPE, realize equity and improve the quality of education in the country (The World Bank 2003, 2). PARSET places emphasis on establishing strategic and effective partnerships between the state and communities; building national technical capacity for curricula and textbook development and promoting girls' education (The World Bank 2003, 2; Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 23).

In the early 2000s, Chad's national curriculum was criticised for being extremely outdated. Adopted in 1984, the national curriculum failed to address national realities. In order to improve effective teaching and learning, the 1984 curriculum, along with all teaching materials and textbooks, needed to be revised and adapted to suit the Chadian context (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 24). For these purposes, Chad established the National Curriculum Centre (CNC). The CNC's initiatives include the development of Chadian textbooks in French and Arabic for primary and secondary education in order to promote the use of national languages for teaching and learning (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 4).

The CNC has further placed significant emphasis on eliminating gender stereotypes in curriculum content (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 24). Following the

recommendations of a study, which found that Chadian textbooks contained negative stereotypes in relation to girls, the CNC initiated a programme to develop new teaching and learning materials that would: reduce discriminatory stereotypes in curriculum content; balance sexed characters in illustrations and ensure that they play equal roles, as well as ensure that the social composition of the country is reflected, including minorities (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 24).

Aside from curriculum development, PARSET also promotes gender equality in relation to access to schooling, as well as with respect to girls' and boys' experience of the learning environment. Under the auspices of PARSET, the Chadian government established a technical unit that would focus on the issue of girls' education. The Ministry's Report (2004) indicates that the unit was allocated a budget of 158 000 000 Central African (CFA) francs to promote girls' enrolment for the period 2002/2005 (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 28). Particular attention was given to girls in rural areas, where enrolments remain significantly low. The unit provided support to various programmes, which distributed free textbooks and school supplies to girls in rural areas (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 25). PARSET also targeted the school environment and aimed to improve learning conditions for both boys and girls. The Project therefore focused on the rehabilitation of existing school infrastructure, particularly on ensuring that boys and girls had access to separate and safe ablution facilities.

In line with the World Bank's EFA Fast Track Initiative Programme, Chad's National Strategy for Accelerating Girls' Education was launched in 2004, with the assistance of UNICEF (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 23). The Strategy is part of the *25 by 2005* Initiative, which was established by UNICEF to accelerate progress towards getting more girls in school in 25 countries by 2005 (UNICEF 2003). By adopting a national strategy in line with the goals of the initiative, Chad joined other countries in Western and Central Africa, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria, who were also working closely with UNICEF to help them achieve gender parity targets (UNICEF 2003).

The National Strategy therefore complements PARSET's objectives to promote girls' enrolment and realize equality between girls and boys in education. It defines various commitments, made on behalf of the state and its development partners, to achieve gender parity in primary and secondary education, based on clearly defined indicators (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale

2004, 6). The Strategy also emphasizes the need to develop coordination, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to keep the country on track towards achieving DFA and MDG gender parity goals (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 6).

Chad's National Plan of Action for EFA focuses on a number of areas, which include: early childhood development, UPE, secondary education, functional literacy, technical and vocational training and girls' education. The PAN sets very specific targets in relation to these areas. The Ministry of Education outlines the Plan's objectives as follows:

- (1) to achieve UPE by 2005;
- (2) to raise the proportion of girls to 50% of the schooling population by 2015;
- (3) to increase girls' enrolment rates to at least 30% in primary education and girls' primary completion rates to 70% in 2015; and
- (4) to increase the number of functionally literate adults to 500 000 by 2015 (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004).

Gambia has a similar National Plan of Action for EFA (NPA) in place. It accompanied the country's first proposal to the World Bank to join its EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) in 2005. In order to be endorsed as an EFA-FTI partner country, Gambia had to include commitments to girls' education as part of its plans and proposals for educational reform. The NPA therefore contains similar objectives to those outlined in Chad's PAN. It specifically identifies the attainment of gender equality in primary and secondary enrolments as key policy targets.

Partnerships with Multilateral Agencies

Due to capacity and resource constraints, both the Gambian and Chadian governments rely heavily on partnerships with various stakeholders in education to drive progress. These partners include bilateral and multilateral agencies, private entities, communities, as well as NGOs and civil society organizations. In its 2015 EFA Review Report, Gambia's MoBSE identifies the World Bank's International Development Agency (IDA) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) as the largest partners supporting systemic issues in education (Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MoBSE) 2014, 12). The World Bank played an integral role in developing Gambia's NPA. It further continues to support the EFA-FTI, which seeks to accelerate progress towards achieving gender parity and equality in education.

In its 2004 report, Chad's Ministry of Education indicates that the World Bank is also a major development partner in the country. As indicated previously, the World Bank is a significant supporter of PARSET. The overall cost of PARSET's initial phase was USD120 000 000 (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 14). The Chadian government put up 17% of the funding and the World Bank provided 36% (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 14). The remainder of the funding came from other donor partners.

In order to enhance school enrolments, the World Food Programme (WFP) currently supports a school-feeding scheme in Gambia, with the hopes of establishing a nationally managed home-grown feeding scheme in the future. UNICEF also provides support to the Programme for Improved Quality and Standards in Schools (PIQSS) in the country. The organisation is also a significant partner in Chad. Prior to the adoption of Chad's national strategy to accelerate girls' education, the government ran a project together with UNICEF, which was aimed at increasing girls' enrolment at primary level, improving women's literacy and creating innovative solutions for basic education in nomadic areas (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 13).

UNESCO has further played an integral role in institutional and policy development in relation to Chad's education system. The organisation played a very significant role in the development of the PAN. Prior to its launch, UNESCO organized and funded a national consultation, involving NGOs and civil society, to discuss the challenges of the Chadian education system, particularly in relation to girls (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 14). Through providing technical training and income generating activities, UNESCO has also been heavily involved in strengthening the capacity of NGOs and civil society organisations operating in Chad (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 14). UNESCO has further introduced educational innovations, particularly in nomadic areas, which remain a challenge for Chad's Ministry of Education (Le Ministere de l'Education Nationale 2004, 14).

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter highlights six things: (1) Gambia has a statist domestic political structure, which dictates that elite decision-makers are the main drivers of the policy-making process, with individuals and society playing a limited role; (2) Chad has a state-above-society structure, which predicts that elite learning is the main driver of normative change; (3) the differences between the two countries' domestic political structures explains the variation in their

performance, with Gambia performing significantly better than Chad with respect to DFA and MDG gender parity goals; (4) Gambia has performed significantly better than Chad with respect to these goals as a result of not only a stronger and more effective state by comparison, but also as a result of stronger civil society participation; (5) Chad's performance in relation to DFA and MDG goals has been comparatively weaker as a result of its main diffusion pathway (elite learning) being hampered by political instability; and (6) in both country cases, the effect of competing domestic norms on the constitutive effects of the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education has been limited.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Gender parity and equality in education has received widespread international support and has become an integral part of the global development agenda. The global norm supporting girls' education is deeply embedded in the international normative framework concerning women's human rights and is encapsulated in global blueprints for development. Institutions such as the UN and the World Bank have championed the cause for girls' in developing countries, particularly in Africa, by setting a global standard aimed at improving girls' positions in education and then establishing rational, scientific and measurable targets to ensure progress.

Chapter 4, which charts the development of the global norm vis-a-vis gender parity in education, along with its widespread acceptance by states, shows how the activities of international organisations, such as international conferences, have legitimated the norm and resulted in states adopting the same rational, legitimate activities of policy creation and standard-setting at both the regional and national level. Chapter 5 discusses the correlative shift in state policy and practice amongst African states as a result of the emergence of this norm.

Chapter 6 charts Africa's progress with respect to DFA and MDG gender parity goals, which provides the basis for case study selection in Chapter 7. Africa's progress is shown to be staggered and uneven, with large disparities and variations between countries. In an effort to explain this variation in the constitutive effects of the global norm vis-à-vis gender parity in education, Chapter 7 uses Gambia and Chad as case studies to show how domestic political structures and domestic norms influence norm diffusion processes. On the one hand, Gambia's statist political structure predicts that elite learning plays a dominant role in policy-making processes, with societal pressure contributing to a limited degree. On the other hand, Chad's state-above-society structure predicts that elite learning plays a more dominant role. Where gender parity in education is concerned, a strong state, together with strong civil society participation, has led to the stronger constitutive impact of the global norm in Gambia. In the case of Chad, political instability is shown to be a severe constraint on elite learning, consequently leading to comparatively weaker constitutive effects in Gambia.

The role of competing domestic norms is shown to be limited, due to the presence of pre-existing norms supporting gender equality and education in the national legislative framework and national discourse of both countries.

The findings of this research report suggest that the global development goals phenomenon promote external consistency, and not necessarily transformation at the national level. The codification of certain ideals of progress regarding development and education in international documents led to a creation of a rational discourse, which placed girls at the centre of global development efforts. In response, various international actors started to engage in legitimating activities, which serve to reinforce the discourse. The production of global policy relating to gender parity and equality in education in turn led to nation states and regional bodies engaging in legitimating activities of their own. Countries across the globe, including in Africa, translated global development blueprints into national policies, plans and strategies for achieving gender parity and equality in education. These mirror the language of global blueprints, including their various targets, measures and indicators. However, this study highlights the continued relevance of conditions on the ground, particularly in relation to domestic political structures. Mere compliance with existing norms does not denote strong constitutive effects. Countries' rates of success in terms of performance continues to be determined by their unique domestic characteristics.

The different outcomes in terms of Gambia and Chad's performance in relation to DFA and MDG goals raise interesting and challenging questions for norm diffusion scholars, as well as international development practitioners. Global norms are certainly useful in that they establish standards of appropriate behaviour for states in the international system and they help to garner support for important causes which relate to human rights and advancement. However, when faced with varying national contexts, we have to confront the limitations of global policy in relation to effectively addressing issues that are so closely tied to local realities. Education and gender are both politically charged subjects, with various decision-makers determining the fate of girls in relation to their education. Norm diffusion theorists therefore need to grapple with the fact that there is a distinction between the national, the sub-national and the local. In countries with severe disparities between regions and social groups, there may be multiple local realities.

Given all of the above, it remains important for international development practitioners and researchers to continue to grapple with national-level factors that have an impact on the constitutive effects of global norms. With respect to the norm vis-à-vis gender parity in

education, greater attention needs to be paid to the role of domestic political structures and the role of civil society in the norm diffusion process.

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