FOOD SECURITY AND THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS: A CASE OF THE WORLD BANK-ASSISTED FADAMA III IN NIGERIA

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies and International Relations

BY

ORIEVULU, KINGSLEY STEPHEN

STUDENT NUMBER: 479450

Supervisors

DR. AMY NIANG

PROFESSOR GILBERT KHADIAGALA

October 2018

Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies and International Relations at the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. It has not, to the best of my knowledge, been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university. A part of this thesis was published in a (2014) journal article "Community-Driven Development in Nigeria: Development Projects and the Political Empowerment of the Disenfranchised." *Africa Peace & Conflict Journal*, (2014), *7*(1), pp. 68-80.



Kingsley Stephen Orievulu

29th Day of October 2018

Dedication

To the memory of Late Mrs Lucrecia Seafield. You were a Champion for Socioeconomic Rights and Access to Justice and you fought till your death for the empowerment of the voiceless and the vulnerable. I remain forever grateful for your teachings, encouragement and support throughout this journey.

Continue to Rest on in Peace Ma!

Dedication II

To my Mother, Mrs Roseline Orievulu. Thank you Mum for all your sacrifices for me!

To my Faith. Thank you for journeying with me even when it all seemed hopeless!

To you my Nieces, Nina, Ella and Prudence: May you be inspired to achieve great things!

To all women in my life, especially Eky and Patty: You have all inspired me. God bless you!

To all those battling different storms: May you see the light at the end of the Tunnel!

Acknowledgments

Glory to God Almighty who made this day a reality despite all the storms. I worship you!

Thank you to the DVS programme and the IR Department for the opportunity to pursue my PhD at the University of the Witwatersrand. I remain grateful to the School of Social Sciences (SOSS) and the Humanities Graduate Centre (HGC), in the Faculty of Humanities, for all the support, especially affording me a working space and the completion and submission grants that allowed me to finish my studies.

I am indebted to my academic supervisors and mentors, Dr Amy Niang and Prof Gilbert Khadiagala. Thank you for holding my hands through the struggles and never letting go. I am also grateful to Professors Rod Alence, M. Mucha, Eric Worby, S. Kariuki, B. Kenny, Srila, Clifford Odimegwu, P. Arthur, A. Butler, F. Harvey; Drs L. Mawuko-Yevugah and R. Orock.

My unwavering love is reserved for my parents, Chief Boniface Orievulu and Mrs Roseline Orievulu. I am thankful for the gift of Av-Placii, Nkesi, Chinwe, Amina, Confidence, Nene, Smile, Glory, Joy, and ALL my other siblings, cousins, nephews and nieces, especially Kemnesem, Nina, Emmanuella, Prudence, and Kela who stood as my pillars of support.

My 'adopted' family members: Ekeminiabasi Eyita, Patricia Muauka, Maryann Agulanna, David Samuel (Saxe), Hon Patrick Prince Obua, Noma Nyathi, Ratidzo Makombe, Rebecca Mbaya, Promise Ejieofor, C. Ohaeri, Dikeledi Mokoena, Pinkie Nkadimeng, Faith & Precious Tay, Brightlyn George, Adaugo Amara Onyenze, Mr & Mrs Tunde and Enobong Aderibigbe, and Mary Nwigwe. You ALL inspired me and gave me cause to hold on. I love you all.

I remain grateful to Prof Vincent Nmehielle and his wonderful family: Mrs Nkechi Nmehielle, Vincent Junior, Sharon, Shalom, Immanuela and Danielle. You opened your door and enabled me to spread my wings. God bless you ALL. Uncles (Chief) Luke, James, Felix Nmehielle, and the entire Francis-Orlu Nmehielle family, Uncles Cletus and Charles Orievulu, and the entire Orievulu family – I am also grateful.

A very big thank you to my UPEACE, UNFPA-ESARO, HURISA, FHR, CIVICUS, HGC and DAL families: Prof S. Ewusi, Dr Butera, Dr M. Jana, T. Obaje; Olga, Ruth, Nora, Dr Ramatu, Dr J. Ndzi, Prof R. Chima, Dr Julitta Onabanjo, Lindsay Barnes and Renata Tallarico (PhD); Corlett Letlojane, Junior, Tshepo, Sarah Motha, Avril Mafemba, Thuli Moyo and Late Lucrecia Seafield; David Kode, Teldah Mawirire, Safia, Chiedza, Lebo, Jack, Adi Misty-Frost, Cecily, Patricia and Marina; Drs Linet Imbosa-Nyakundi, J. Munakamwe, D. Lakika, E. Umeji, Gwinyai Taruvinga, Simba, Pedzisai, Michael Okpa, Elikem Tsamenyi, and G. Shamu.

I will never forget the support from: Prof Vincent Asuru, Sir Ngozi Worgu, Mr Innocent Mba, Hons Godstime Orlukwu & Emmanuel Chindah, Msgr Emmanuel Maru, Msgr John Wangbu, Fr Polycarp Henetu, Fr Stephen Dedua, Fr Emmanuel Benjamin (BuduBen), Fr Bartolomeo Uzoma, Dr Femi Adeagbo, and DVS Administrators: Pulane, Lerato Podile, and Yurisha.

I am also grateful to the World Bank (Nigeria), National and Rivers state Fadama offices and Communities for giving access to conduct my study. I am forever indebted to Sacred Heart Seminary Port Harcourt and St Joseph Major Seminary Ikot Ekpene for moulding me. My appreciation also goes to UPEACE-Africa and IDRC for the fellowship that allowed me to undertake this study. And, to everyone else whose name, I could not fit in here, Meka! Siyabonga! Dankie! Imela! Thank you all!

Finally, thank you my Smiling Sunshine, Neka! My One and Only! I love you so much.

Table of Contents

Declaration 1

Dedication 2

Dedication II 3

Acknowledgments 4

Abstract 8

Acronyms 9

Chapter One 11

Addressing the Research problem 11

1.1. Introduction 11

1.2. Background 13

1.3. Aims, Objectives of Study and Research Questions 20

1.4. Rationale of the study 22

1.5. Research Methodology 29

1.6. Conclusion and Roadmap of the dissertation 39

Chapter Two 43

Literature review and Analytic Framework 43

2.1. Introduction 43

2.2. Conceptualising Food Security and Development Partnership 45

2.2.1. Partnership: a ubiquitous development concept 45

2.2.2. Food Security: an evolving development concept 48

2.3. Understanding Food Security: Perspectives 51

2.3.1. The Entitlement Approach 53

2.3.2. The Sustainable Livelihoods approach 68

2.4. Food Insecurity: Causes and Policy-related approaches to Food Security 70

2.5. Situating Food Security with International Development Politics: The place of Power relations 73

2.6. Analytic Framework: Unravelling Power in Development Partnerships 74

2.7. The State, Transnational Institutions and Hegemonic Ideals: A Coxian Theory and neo-Gramscian approach to Power 81

2.7.1. The Neo-Gramscian perspective on Hegemony and the State 81

2.7.2. Transnational Institutions and the Internationalisation of Hegemony 83

2.8. Governmentality as a form of Power analysis in Development Partnership 86

2.9. Closing the Theoretical Gaps: Understanding Power, Participation and Capabilities in Fadama analysis 92

2.10. Exploring the Analytic Pathway for the Study 97

2.11. Conclusion 99

Chapter Three 102

Socio-Economic and Historical Background to Fadama as a food security and poverty reduction strategy in Nigeria: a background 102

3.1. Introduction 102

3.2. Background to Fadama: Pre-1999 Food Security Strategizing in Nigeria 103
3.3. Situating the World Bank within Nigeria's Food security strategizing 107
3.3.1. The World Bank, SAPs and the Economic Growth Quest 107
3.3.2. The World Bank and the New Development Agenda: Moving towards an inclusive comprehensive development paradigm 109
3.4. Wolfensohn, the World Bank and the New Development Agenda 111
3.5. The Comprehensive Development Framework: Wolfensohn's Legacy 113
3.6. Nigeria, the World Bank and the New Development Agenda 120
3.7. Introducing Nigeria's Post-1999 Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 121
3.7.1. NEEDS in Nigeria (2003-2007): Birthing a new approach to development planning 124
3.7.2. The Seven Point Agenda: Building on the gains of the new development agenda 127
3.7.3. The Transformation Agenda and the Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA): Mainstreaming food security 129
3.7.4. Identifying the World Bank in Nigeria's post-1999 Reforms 132
3.8. The Fadama Development Programme and the New Development Agenda 134
3.8.1. Some History, features and scope 134
3.8.2. Impact of the World Bank's New Development Agenda on post-1999 Fadama 141
3.9. Conclusion: Contemporary Fadama, an initiative bound in time 143
Chapter Four 145
The World Bank, Fadama and Internationalising the Mainstream Economic Rationality 145
4.1. Introduction 145
4.2. Conceptualising Fadama: A Representation of Donor Perceptions 148
4.3. Fadama Reconceptualised: What the Project Development Objective (PDO) means for Fadama 149
4.3.1. Fadama III and food security: Production, consumption, distribution and the centrality of the agricultural sector 151
4.3.2. Fadama III, Poverty Reduction and emphasis on an Inclusive Rural Development Strategy 168
4.3.3. Fadama III and the target of achieving Grassroots Empowerment 172
4.4. Co-opted Development Rhetoric: The use of inclusive discourse as strategy to actualise Fadama III's set-out targets 175
4.4.1. Participation 176
4.4.2. Ownership 180
4.5. Evaluating the World Bank's Fadama III perspective 187
4.6. Conclusion 195
Chapter Five 199
Internalising the Mainstream Development Agenda: Fadama III 199
5.1. Introduction 199
PART ONE 200
5.2. Fadama III: The National/State Implementation Story 200

5.3. Perspectives on and Evaluation of Fadama III context: An official appraisal 229
PART TWO 245
5.4. Locating power in Fadama's implementation Story: Partnership, Ownership and a 'Governmentalized' State? 245
5.5. Challenges to adequate Fadama III implementation in Nigeria 257
5.6. Conclusion 261
Chapter 6 264
Grassroots Experience of Fadama III in Rivers state 264
6.1. Introduction 264
6.2. The socio-economic context of Rivers state 266
6.3. Grassroots Experience(s) of the Implementation of Fadama: Case Presentation 267
6.3.1. Fadama in Post-Conflict Ogbakiri Community: Early beneficiaries 269
6.3.2. Fadama in Omanwa and Yeghe Communities: Late Beneficiaries 272
6.4. Research Findings 274
6.4.1. The limits of hope: creating 'unreasonable' expectations among local beneficiaries. 274
6.4.2. The failure of importing one-size-fits-all Fadama III implementation models in Rivers state 280
6.4.3. Fadama III's unfulfilled promises: Beneficiaries' perspectives on funding and support 295
6.5. Beneficiaries' Perspectives on Fadama III 313
6.6. Participation, inclusion and agency: where lies power in Beneficiaries' experience? 318
6.7. Implications of the beneficiaries' experiences 328
6.8. Conclusion 332
Chapter 7 335
Summary and Conclusion 335
7.1. Introduction 335
7.2. Recap of Research findings: Perspectives from the Bank, Government and Beneficiaries 337
7.3. Answering the Research Question(s) 350
7.4. Limitations of Study 354
7.5. Significance of findings to scholarship: theory, discourse and practice 356
7.6. Ideas for further research 360
Bibliography 362
Annexure 376

Abstract

This dissertation lies at the intersection of global governance scholarship and the emerging paradigms of development partnership and development ownership as experimental modalities. It mounts a solid critique of the various implications, for African agency, of the conceptual, institutional and policy dimensions of these paradigms both in their reproduction of common mechanisms of economic and political dependency and disciplining, and their actualization of a number of new normativities through the implementation of ever-changing development frameworks. In this sense, this study contributes and further extends scholarship on the nature of governance from a supranational perspective especially as it pertains to the dynamics of power relations as they persist in donor-led development interventions in Africa– whether aimed at food security, poverty reduction and or grassroots empowerment.

The dissertation uses a case study approach to examine important power relations underlying development interventions and the dynamics of 'partnership' that frame external intervention in the area of food security in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. It applies a neo-Gramscian world order hegemonic approach and a neo-Foucauldian governmentality approach to interrogate the nature of institutional power dynamics between multilateral donors such as the World Bank and African aid-dependent countries such as Nigeria. This relates to the conceptualisation and implementation of the National Fadama Development Programme (NFDP) in Nigeria. The dissertation also critiques the adoption of participatory development models in the implementation of the Fadama project at two levels. Firstly, as it pertains to the extent to which local targets of this project were integrated into the conceptualisation and implementation; and secondly the philosophy behind the adoption of these models and discourses – which is the entrenchment of the mainstream neo-liberal economic rationality within the local/rural economy. The findings in this dissertation draw on qualitative data from policy documents from government and external institutions, newspaper articles, non-participant observation and in-depth and semi-structured interviews with representatives of the World Bank, the Fadama project and local beneficiaries of the Fadama project in Rivers state. The findings point to entrenched institutional or macro-level power imbalance between multilateral donors and African aid-dependent countries. Beyond institutional level, the study's findings also suggest a flawed implementation of the Fadama project relative to the stated principles of inclusive development, especially when weighed against theories of participation.

KEYWORDS: Africa, Agricultural Development Initiatives, Critical Development studies, Critical IR theory, Development Partnership, Empowerment, Fadama, Food Security, Governmentality, Hegemony, International Institutions, Nigeria, Ownership, Ogbakiri, Participation, Power, Rivers state, The World Bank.

Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
ADP	Agricultural Development Programme
ATA	Agricultural Transformation Agenda
BC	Beneficiary Contribution
BLP	Better Life Programme
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CEEDS	Community Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
CNA	Community Needs Assessment
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
DCs	Developed countries
DFID	Department for International Development
DFRRI	Directorate of Food and Roads and Rural Infrastructure
FCA	Fadama Community Association
FUG	Fadama Users Group
FEE	Failure of Exchange of Entitlement
FAD	Food Availability Decline
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIPCs	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDCs	Less developed countries
LDP	Local Development Plan
LEEDS	Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
LFDO	Local Fadama Desk Office
LFDC	Local Fadama Development Committees

LFTC	Local Fadama Technical Committees
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NAFPP	National Accredited Food Production Project
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NAIC	Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Company
ODA	Official Development Assistance (ODA
OFN	Operation Feed the Nation
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PNA	Participatory Needs Assessment
PM&E	Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation
PDP	People Democratic Party
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PID	Project Information Document
RBDA	Rivers Basin Development Authorities
SMEs	Small and Medium-scale Enterprises
SEEDS	State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SDPs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNFAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

Chapter One

Addressing the Research problem

1.1. Introduction

This dissertation focuses primarily on the implementation of the National Fadama Development Programme (NFDP), hereafter Fadama project, in Nigeria.[1] It draws on an analytic framework, which combines the governmentality approach and the critical theory approach, to interrogate ideas of partnership, participation, and ownership in development planning. This framework is used to explore pertinent questions around the conceptualisation, implementation (and associated experience) of the Fadama project, with a specific focus on Rivers state. The study also explores questions of power relations at an institutional/macro-level of interactions between the World Bank and Nigerian government as well as the nature of inclusiveness and agency at the micro-levels of interaction. This relates to the experience of grassroots beneficiaries of Fadama. This dissertation thus problematizes the levels of inclusiveness or participation of local beneficiaries in Fadama III which, ostensibly, was established to empower them and ensure their food security and economic stability.

The two theoretical approaches above are useful for achieving this study's major goal of understanding issues of power asymmetry in current development assistance parlance where the discourse of partnership has become widespread. In the context of Fadama in Nigeria, these issues are revisited within the broader level of international development politics. An important reason here lies in the fact that this initiative is nationally implemented initiative (through a World Bank-assisted 'credit') – over 50 percent of the implementation cost – by the National Fadama Coordinating Office (NFCO) and its different subsidiaries in all 36 states. It becomes necessary, therefore, to understand how power has been constructed, propagated and possibly exerted within the scope of this development initiative. It is also important to explore the goal of the exertion of power within this project.

This analytical project draws from – and contributes to – the interpretative and deconstructive approach popular within critical development scholarship. It crucially lies at the intersection of global governance scholarship and emergent paradigms of development partnerships and ownership as experimental modalities. It owes its conceptual roots to the analytical tradition set out by critical neo-Gramscian (International Political Economy (IPE)) scholars like Robert

[1] I also simply use 'Fadama' to refer to the programme.

Cox (1983), and critical development scholars like Arturo Escobar (1995), James Ferguson (1990;1994), Claude Ake (1996) amongst others. These scholars critically engaged the 'development' project beyond a simplistic or even liberal acceptance of 'development' as a force for progress and a positive advancement for peoples and communities. Cox (1983) engaged with the place of international institutions as harbingers of hegemonic ideologies aligned with the more powerful and developed countries that mostly determine their policies. Critical development scholars, in their own right, focus a great deal on what the idea and practice of development means for targets of development in practice. Many of these scholars, using a political economy approach, embarked on deconstructing the idea of development (and/or the development industry). Some, like "leftist" political economists, such as Escobar (1995) sought to replace it – and its industry – (Ferguson, 1994; Ziai, 2015), some sought to reform it like Robert Chambers (Chambers, 1994c, 1994a, 1994b; Robert, 1983), while others like Ferguson (1990; 1994) set out to understand it better and more effectively expose some of its unintended, and yet powerful, effects. They drew on a, now, popular deconstructive approach (drawn from Michel Foucault's critique of discourse) where there is an emphasis on discourse and its role in the construction of subjects and 'othering' of subjects to achieve certain power-driven goals.

The place and role of institutions of global governance or International Organisations (like the World Bank) in driving this agenda or setting it in motion and normalising it, within the context of development planning, is therefore central to the current critique of the development industry. As institutions established on the back of the 'quest' to advance development to different parts of the world, post-1945, they therefore wield enormous power(s) – and resources – and are definitely well placed to continue the project of constructing the targets of development as 'poor', 'under-developed', 'food insecure' and so on (see Escobar, 1995; Ziai, 2015). This ability to construct the 'other' is also tied to the ability to construct the needs and strategies to assist the targets of development, and this has been the case over the years. As Ake (1996) contends, the idea of development partnerships, itself, became one of those 'constructed' modalities designed to address the 'problem' of 'under-development' in Africa and many other parts of the world in need of 'development'.

This critical appraisal of the idea and practice of development, especially as heralded by international institutions like the World Bank and their initial managerial development planning process and its failures and negative impacts on people and communities, crucially culminated in an ostensible re-thinking of development within these institutions. The World

Bank specifically reviewed its scope of development from a narrow focus on growth to a more holistic and humane definition and practice of development (Pender, 2001). Thus, development planning in the post-Washington consensus (post-structural adjustment) era focused on pro-poor development strategies. These strategies were characterised by inclusive planning and implementation to more effectively ensure that all partners – in the new development partnerships formed during this era – were meaningfully engaged in the project of development. It is also within this context that Fadama – the initiative under study – emerged as one strategy towards a growth-led poverty reduction agenda, especially in the post-1999 era in Nigeria. It was shaped by the new idea of development cooperation, country and local ownership, and participation; indeed, this context was characterised by the (re)construction of (local) targets of development intervention as "active" development agents and partners (Ake, 1996; Development Assistance Committee, 1996; Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

Nevertheless, despite the ostensible changes in donor-aid recipient relations in the post-1990 era, based on the 'novel' World Bank's emphasis on partnership above conditionality, inequality remains high in the rapport between aid-dependent countries and multilateral donor institutions. This study insists that not much has changed. The findings suggest that donor interests and preferences continue to determine the scope of interventions even if they do not necessarily impose their will with heavy hands. Similarly, local targets of development (initiatives) remain largely spectators despite claims of their active inclusion and involvement in the shaping and making of programmes, including through financial commitments that local targets are 'compelled' to make in certain instances. Indeed, some of the challenges of implementation experienced in Rivers state, therefore, provide important areas of focus in terms of advancing strategies to improve the lives of the poor.

1.2. **Background**

'Fadama' is an *Hausa* word designating low-land areas or plains lying close to river beds that are very suitable for irrigation especially in relation to agricultural production as well as aquatic activities to provide food for consumption as well as for market purposes (The World Bank, 2008). As a development project, Fadama is pro-poor (rural) livelihood initiative currently being implemented in Nigeria (through a partnership arrangement between the Nigerian government and the World Bank) which focuses on various agricultural and other livelihood ventures in different rural areas in Nigeria. It aims to advance food security, reduce rural and

household poverty, and empower individuals and communities through grants for micro-level projects known as subprojects. This is a critical component of the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs 2000 - 2015) and the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as the international development community attempts to demonstrate a renewed commitment to fight hunger and poverty, especially by promoting effective global partnerships for development (see MDG 8). In this light, the concepts of food security and development partnerships become very helpful to elicit a deeper understanding of the dynamics inherent within strategies, such as Fadama.

It is important to state upfront that while food security is an important concept and subtheme in this study, its presence plays a crucial role in more clearly understanding the dynamics of power (relations) within development interventions and strategies like Fadama. Essentially food security provides this study with the conceptual context or space within which to discuss the dynamics within strategies designed under the partnerships-mantra. Thus, the central focus of this study is not so much to explore how Fadama achieves the goal of food security. Rather, the goal is to interrogate, using an interpretative and critical constructivist analytical tools, how food security is constructed within the context of Fadama and how this construction is a result (and manifestation) of unequal power dynamics. This is also to demonstrate how it serves as a discursive instrument – like partnership, ownership or development and poverty (reduction) – utilised to reproduce, propagate (or internationalise) and entrench the mainstream development ideology. The point here is therefore that, as chapter four demonstrates, food security provides the conceptual space – as poverty reduction could also do but I chose food security – to interrogate power within the construction of Fadama's objectives. Essentially, this is an attempt to make sense of what these objectives mean within the broader scheme of the Fadama project as a development strategy.

Food Security and development partnership have become ubiquitous; they are also contested concepts in current development discourse and practice – internationally, regionally and nationally – given the urgency around addressing high poverty rates, diseases and high mortality and morbidity rates. Indeed, many African countries are still plagued with the burden of high poverty rates and low life expectancy due to hunger, political instability, low economic growth, poor living conditions, civil war, and repressive governments. Food insecurity and widespread poverty here are not simply borne out of the lack of food product, crops or arable lands – although certain regions are more prone to drought than others (Clover, 2003). Lack of visionary leadership, socio-political crisis, and the lack of concerted efforts by the international

community and richer states to provide adequate and genuine support to poorer countries emerge as other important explanatory factors. Added to these is the fact that many Africans are faced with what Amartya Sen refers to as entitlement failures (A. Sen, 1981b). This entails the lack (and or loss) of different forms of exchange capacity in terms of capital or skills to address their needs. In fact, even interventions targeted towards them tend to largely exclude or inadequately integrate strategies to address these entitlement failures to bring about deeper empowerment. Thus, hunger remains widespread because of poverty which is reinforced by, and also reinforces, other problematic issues in Africa (Clover, 2003; A. Sen, 1981b, 1982, 1990).

One African country which epitomises the 'paradox of poverty' amid plenty is Nigeria – the most populous black nation on earth. Poverty and Hunger have continued to pose enormous development challenges to the country despite the abundance of human and mineral resources, and a vast array of arable land and a suitable climate and topography for a successful agricultural sector. Scholars opine that over 70% of Nigerians live on less than US$1 per day (Adogamhe, 2010; Oriola, 2009) – a situation exacerbated by a massive degeneration of the agricultural sector. This culminated in the huge importation of food products into the country by government and private companies to cushion the insufficient supply of the same within the country. Indeed, this situation exposes not only the rot within this sector but the disempowerment of many people, hence the rising poverty and destitution in the country as well as increased food insecurity.

Scholarship on Nigeria's socioeconomic history analyse the negative impacts of poor leadership, corruption, externally imposed economic policies (by the IMF and the World Bank), and Dutch disease on the hitherto buoyant agricultural sector. Many Nigerian scholars reminisce about the agricultural glory days of Cocoa in Western Nigeria, Groundnuts in the North, and Palm oil down in the South (Abalu & D'silva, 1980; Feridun & Akindele, 2005; Ojo, 2007). Indeed prior to the early 1970s, Nigeria relied mostly on agriculture for its foreign exchange and local consumption, but the country soon succumbed to the Dutch disease syndrome when oil usurped agriculture as Nigeria's major source of external revenue (Ake, 1996). Thus, over-dependence on oil and irrational economic policies culminated in the collapse of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Ironically too, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) introduced by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stabilise and liberalise the economy along export lines exacerbated the problem as many of these sectors virtually disappeared, plunging many people into endemic poverty.

What followed this trend was an unconscious – sometimes conscious – construction of farming and agriculture as a demeaning venture fit only for the lower class of people. Farming became the 'poor man's job' – at least in some parts of the country – as the oil industry became so dominant. The neglect of this sector (and others) as well as the 'social stigma' attached to farming, led to a situation in which young people avoided and were dissuaded by their family from studying or venturing into the sector. This was a 'new' stereotype in Nigeria about the sector.

To add salt to injury, many institutions tasked with propelling growth in these (neglected) sectors, especially agriculture, crumbled due to poor management and accountability. Consequently, diminishing returns were obvious with minimal local production of food, wholesale importation of food from other countries and pervasive unemployment, especially among young school leavers. Many young graduates emerged from universities and colleges into the busy labour market rife with the frenetic pursuit of jobs in the oil industry while the agricultural sector was abandoned to the old and uneducated in the rural areas. This culminated in a situation in which Nigeria could neither feed its teeming population nor provide sufficient employment for people to fend for themselves or sufficiently sustain their income and secure their future (Obadan, 2001; Oriola, 2009).

The situation was further compounded by the high levels of institutional and structural corruption which continued to inhibit the resuscitation of these moribund sectors. The extent to which public officials embezzled funds earmarked towards projects and infrastructure ensured that these sectors – especially agriculture – continued to diminish. Essentially, poverty thrived (and was further entrenched) in the countryside, as institutions and mechanisms to drive accountability and efficient growth were lacking. At the same time, citizens were also politically and financially disempowered and unable to effectively speak up against, and attack, impunity.

Over the years, different strategies have been established since Nigeria's return to democratic leadership in 1999. In fact, the end of the era of military dictatorship in Nigeria and the installing of a new democratic order on 29 May 1999 ushered in a new dispensation of governance and developmental strides designed to rectify some of the development challenges in Nigeria. Interestingly, this new era coincided with a new epoch in global development – the era of the new development agenda of the World Bank and the United Nations MDGs. In this era, the global development community adopted a radical approach to development; an

approach driven towards reduced external imposition of development ideals and more country and local ownership of development strategies. There was thus an emphasis on partnerships as opposed to the old order of donor-recipient conditionality-based relations of power (Abrahamsen, 2004a; Pender, 2001). According to Abrahamsen, this period from the late 1990s was characterised by a new focus on poverty reduction through an emphasis on partnerships and inclusiveness (Abrahamsen, 2004a).

Under the post-1999 development dispensation which began with President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), various strides were designed and implemented in the same light as some of those undertaken by his predecessors such as 'Operation Feed the Nation', 'Green Revolution', and others. While some of these were economic development strategies created to guarantee macroeconomic stability and consolidation, many micro-level programmes were also introduced; others were extended. The overarching aim was to address issues of poverty, hunger, and disempowerment at the level of the grassroots poor. In fact, one of the most famous interventions instituted under the Obasanjo regime was the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). This initiative was President Obasanjo's signature economic development strategy, and it was established with the assistance of the World Bank and IMF under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) – the NEEDS was Nigeria's locally developed PRSP (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; The World Bank, 2005a). This was an important step towards addressing the development problems of Nigeria from a macro and micro level. In fact, the Fadama project under review emerges as one of the micro-level strategies identified within this broader macroeconomic strategy. This is because it is intrinsically linked to the 'non-oil sector' development plan critically identified in the NEEDS as well as the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), designed by the World Bank for Nigeria, as the secure and sustainable route to economic growth. The Agricultural Transformation Agenda (2011-2015) of the President Goodluck Jonathan was another key strategy which drew on the NEEDS to further this non-oil sector growth.

These post-1999 development strategies in Nigeria were thus established in the light of the World Bank's re-defined scope of development under James Wolfensohn (1995-2005). The Bank and many other international partners financed and technically assisted these intervention programmes, thus ensuring that they were shaped and structured in accordance with the new mainstream emphasis on country (and local) ownership, partnerships, participation and or inclusive development. This meant that, the quest to address the questions of poverty and food insecurity through such interventions in Nigeria required embedding issues of beneficiaries'

input, capacity development and agency to the broader questions of ensuring food availability, access, utility and stability. Indeed, emphasis on participation and partnerships became more apparent in strides and intervention programmes for food security as with broader development planning strategies designed to end poverty.

Essentially, this became integral to the 8th target of the MDGs which emphasised the establishment of global partnerships to improve development. However, despite this commitment, strides to effectively establish these partnerships and improve inclusiveness and ownership in development planning (even within international development institutions) appear largely rhetorical. Global power inequalities continue unabated, though subtler in certain cases, especially within contexts of development interventions led by multilateral (financial and development) institutions. Many strategies and programmes established, ostensibly, to help poor countries, have thus been accused of vitally extending various broader interests of the multilateral development partners within developing countries dependent on development assistance (Abugre, 1999; Crawford, 2003; Willett, 2005).[2] This, therefore, presents scenarios in which strategies for macroeconomic and micro level development (such as those aimed at advancing food security and reducing poverty) serve as mechanisms for extending and expanding the reach of the hegemonic agendas that are associated with institutions of global governance.

It is important to note that like many past externally funded interventions in Nigeria, the strategies adopted under the Obasanjo regime – though slightly different – continued the broad exclusion of marginal voices. Technocrats and government officials often arrogated unto themselves the role of speaking for 'the people' – displacing and marginalising the poor and their communities – in the design and implementation of interventions. Conceptualising, implementing and managing development interventions, under this platform, was reminiscent of the 'old' managerial, top-down, technocratic model of the SAPs which was hugely criticised and blamed for many of Nigeria's post-1970s socioeconomic woes. It follows that despite international resolve to prioritise multi-stakeholder consultation and involvement for effective development planning (Development Assistance Committee, 1996), many development strategies continue to reinvent the old 'elite' driven processes. These have subjected the idea

[2] These interests range from security down to the extension of hegemonic countries' economic interests – through FDIs – in many developing and aid dependent countries.

of participation and ownership to the status of mere rhetoric devoid of genuine practical application.

The Fadama project, though established by the military regime under the old technocratic order, was reconceptualised according to the 'new' pro-poor and inclusive development agenda exemplified by the World Bank's supposed new holistic development approach. The post-1999 Fadama project essentially became a new project centred on the principles of inclusiveness with emphasis on ownership, participation, and partnership. It became Community Driven Development (CDD) project – the class of inclusive and community-led development initiatives established and implemented through the World Bank's financial and technical assistance. This means that post-1999 Fadama was established to facilitate community participation, ownership, and agency towards tackling poverty and empowering people through the CDD approach that is characterised by community involvement in the design and implementation of the project. Thus, the World Bank, through this process, envisages the emergence of citizens who through their active involvement in Fadama's processes can effectively contribute towards improved and effective local governance. This is because CDD projects are said to have the capacity to enhance social capital and social cohesion in communities – qualities required to drive social change (Dongier et al., 2003; Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

It is interesting however that many a time, development strategies established within the poverty reduction mantra do not really live up to their prospects. Instead, many of them are said to be representing the old order despite the new name and the buzzwords employed to propagate them. In fact, the PRSPs as an approach remains critiqued as a reinvention of the SAPs and more importantly serves as a means towards propagating, establishing and consolidating neoliberal development models within developing countries. In addition, the approaches employed to develop these PRSPs are said to continuously exclude the vital marginal voices that the strategy ostensibly aims to promote (Abrahamsen, 2004a). It will be recalled that the NEEDS, established by President Obasanjo as Nigeria's PRSP – provided the broader macroeconomic umbrella within which micro-level strategies such as the Fadama project were established or reconceptualised – the case of Fadama since 2004. As such, many of the broader critiques of the PRSPs can be applied to Fadama. More important, however, is the need to examine the spheres of influence associated with the establishment and implementation of these initiatives by the Nigerian state along the models of development preferred by multilateral institutions. In the same vein lies the extent to which grassroots

beneficiaries are constructed and incorporated within Fadama III and its implementation process.

1.3. Aims, Objectives of Study and Research Questions

Aims and Objectives

Building on the background above, the broader aim of this study is to explore, interrogate, and analyse the nature of the existent power relations in the interaction between multilateral aid givers such as the World Bank and African aid-dependent states such as Nigeria as revealed within the context of the conceptualisation and implementation of Fadama. This is especially in terms of the claim of partnership and the emphasis on country and local ownership, participation and inclusiveness within mainstream development thinking.

To make better sense of the general aim and objective of this study, I consider the following four (4) specific objectives:

1. To assess the role of the World Bank, as a multilateral donor and institution of global governance, in the propagation and reproduction of the hegemonic transnational economic integration order within aid-dependent countries.

2. To examine the place and role of the state and its mechanisms in the entrenchment and consolidation of the hegemonic development rationality within the domestic economy through the implementation of pro-poor micro-level initiatives such as Fadama.

3. To examine the efficacy of the CDD approach of the Fadama project in deepening local ownership, participation and inclusion of beneficiaries in developing planning and execution.[3]

4. To examine the challenges of implementing micro-level and pro-poor development strategies and actualising improved local governance.

[3] This aim also involves exploring the perspectives of Fadama stakeholders since their insights provide the basis of the judgement about the efficacy of the CDD approach in Fadama

Research Question(s)

Drawing on the objective(s) of this study, it consequently attempts to answer the following major research questions:

- *What are the implications of the Fadama project, with its emphasis on partnership, for power relations between multilateral donors and African aid recipient countries?*
- *In what ways do power relations between multilateral donors and African aid recipient countries manifest in the Fadama project?*

To effectively answer these questions, they are also broken down into five (5) sub-questions that cover the chapters 3 to 7 of the thesis:

1) How did the World Bank's ostensible change in its outlook on development planning impact on post-1999 Fadama project in Nigeria?[4]
2) In what ways does the World Bank leverage its position and ideologies to advance a neo-liberal economic rationality/agenda through post-1999 Fadama within the domestic Nigerian economy?[5]
3) How does the implementation of the Fadama III represent the adoption/internalisation of the mainstream hegemonic development rationality advanced by the Bank (see question 2)?[6]
4) How (or to what extent) did the CDD approach enable an adequate identification of beneficiaries and their needs in the implementation of Fadama III in Rivers state?[7]
5) What are the challenges of implementation story, its relevance to development planning and the prospects for improved local planning through micro-level, pro-poor, development initiatives like Fadama?[8]

The central goal here is to, through an historical and empirical analytic process, demonstrate how at various institutional and grassroots levels of engagement the Fadama project has served as a point of interaction between various actors. In addition to this, it aims to show how it also

[4] This question is clearly explored in chapter 3's historical analysis.
[5] This question is addressed in chapter 4.
[6] This is addressed in chapter 5. Also note that the perspectives of stakeholders are drawn upon a great deal to also examine some of the challenges of implementation.
[7] Because this deals a great deal with the experience of the implementation process, it is mainly covered in chapter 6 drawing from perspectives of beneficiaries. This also entails some of the challenges of implementation. The next question is conceived because, overall, there is also a goal to improve local governance through the inclusive processes introduced by Fadama's CDD approach.
[8] This question is central to the discussions of the findings in chapter 7 and provides the context within which this study explicitly attempts to answer the main research(s).

serves as a mechanism to (attempt to) advance a specific model of development thinking under the mantra of inclusive and pro-poor development process for poverty reduction and food security in Nigeria.

1.4. Rationale of the study

This study appreciates that development and its associated concepts (such as 'partnership', country and local 'ownership', 'participation', 'empowerment', and even food security) are contested as much as they are employed in development discourse and practice. This means that while these concepts may simply be taken for granted and accepted at face value, critical theories, cynics and conspiracy theories alike perceive them otherwise. Essentially, while mainstream perspectives portray these concepts as crucial towards socio-economic and political empowerment for 'poor' people, alternative and critical views, insist that they only serve as convenient veils disguising real intentions such as the establishment and or entrenchment of neoliberal economic principles that ultimately favour the major economic powers. They are thus perceived more within the scope of the stark exertion of the power of bigger economic powers on smaller and aid-dependent economies. In this way, it becomes even more interesting to explore these contests within the context of the Fadama project in Nigeria and the so-called paradigm shift in development thinking – especially between aid donors and aid-dependent (or recipient) countries in the developing world.

This study is important because it lies at the intersection between development interventions designed to achieve critical goals (like food security and poverty reduction) and political economic issues of global governance. In this light, the above-stated debate helps the study to interrogate the particular discourse of development privileged in the implementation of these strategies. This relates to the nature of the partnership: what and whose idea of poverty (reduction), food security, participation, partnership, and indeed development, these development institutions represent; and what drives the decision of the receiving developing country partner in the decision to adopt the neoliberal development ideology in the implementation of such development strategies.

This study therefore contributes immensely to academic debates on the role of institutions of global governance, in the entrenchment of the hegemonic or pervasive neoliberal development paradigm within developing countries by means of development assistance. The study's

incorporation of food security – as a conceptual space to explore power in development partnerships – helps to unravel how donor-led strategies are useful in entrenching principles and attitudes associated with global capitalism. These include individuality, competition, profit-orientation, and economic accumulation (Weber & Berger, 2007). As scholars like Williams (1999) demonstrate, within this drive, there is an inherent attempt to impress attitudes and principles not only on the national economic context but also within the rural population – the people in need of development assistance to address the pertinent issues of hunger and poverty – in developing countries. As such, the study also effectively contributes to understanding the role of the national government, in the internalisation and entrenchment of this development paradigm, as it 'takes ownership' of these donor-led strategies by imbibing the principles and applying them in the light of the new development agenda of a growth-led poverty reduction.

Theoretically, this study brings together an assemblage of approaches to explore the manifestation(s) of power dynamics within the context of contemporary inclusive and pro-poor development interventions where the discourse – and indeed the strategy or practice – of partnerships as well as food security are elaborate. With Fadama as a micro-level strategy, reconceptualised on the World Bank's 'persuasion', this study contributes to the critique of participation in contemporary development programming. This includes interrogating if and how participation and participatory techniques in Fadama serve as discursive and ideological tools to co-opt people into, and legitimise, the hegemonic neoliberal development process. This transcends an isolated inquiry about the economic impact of the Fadama project – though crucial – or the conventional food security issues of availability, access, utilization and stability. Rather, it more deeply engages with questions regarding the nature of the involvement of local beneficiaries in the conceptualisation, design and indeed implementation of such strategies aimed to empower them. This even includes how local beneficiaries are interacted with, whether as politically conscious subjects or targets of development who lack any sense of history or political consciousness (Sabaratnam, 2017).

Indeed, as many critics of participation in development argue, participation has been co-opted in many ways within institutions of international development – deployed to advance interests delinked from radical political and economic transformation which critics argue that participation was designed to achieve (Alejandro Leal, 2007; Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Freire, 1970). Thus, many studies have focused on the use of participation and many other development buzzwords to actualise various mainstream development targets devoid of actual

transformation (Alejandro Leal, 2007; Cleaver, 1999; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Cornwall & Eade, 2010; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998). Accordingly, this study contributes to this debate and extends it beyond the question of the nature and extent of local participation or active beneficiaries' involvement in development planning. It adds an additional component by exploring the role of both state and international institutions in the attempt to entrench ideas of global capitalism within the domestic economic space by means of so-called inclusive development strategies (like Fadama) that ostensibly aim to enhance food security and poverty reduction. This is also an important contribution to discussions on food security and attempts to actualise it within modern societies; it moves beyond the more technical and conventional issues of production, access and nutritional value as well as the sustainability and stability of food systems to discussions of power and inclusion within strides to achieve these components of food security. Powerful global development institutions are implicated here; their place and role in institutionalizing ideals and co-opting radical concepts to push their preferred (macroeconomic development) agenda that (may) differ from the outspoken needs of communities and the rural poor is hereby interrogated (see Schanbacher, 2010).

Against this backdrop, this study also contributes crucially to the long-standing critique of mainstream development thinking and practice. Scholars that exemplified this post-development critique include Claude Ake (1996), Arturo Escobar (1995), and James Ferguson (1990; 1994). A central thesis of the post-development or critical development theorists is that development and indeed development planning and strategies are exogenous to the contexts within which they are applied. Essentially, 'interveners' (Sabratnam, 2017), 'developers' (Ferguson, 1990; 1994), planners (Ake, 1996), diagnose development challenges and prescribe 'remedies' or antidotes based on their (mainstream) perception, worldview or prejudice about development. As Ferguson (1990; 1994) demonstrates in the case of the World Bank and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded Theba-Tseka (Rural Development) project in Lesotho, CIDA's diagnosis of the development challenge of Lesotho – as the issues of lack of markets to promote livestock farming – drew on a World Bank report which constructed Lesotho as a backward, peasant economy de-linked from the international market. This top-down diagnosis of the development need of people in Lesotho culminated in a failed intervention process as far as the people were concerned. Indeed, the implication is thus that many development strategies have emerged, and still emerge, with such preconceived bias and ideas for addressing development. At the same time, the discourses used to legitimise

these processes are drawn from previously radical transformational concepts which become normalised through and within institutions of global governance like the World Bank.

This post-development critical analysis provides a crucial lens to engage Fadama in Nigeria. But, while some of post-development scholars reject the idea and practice of development because of its Western (and imperialist) roots and implications for the developing world hence calling for its rejection – anti-development (Escobar, 1995; Ziai, 2015) – the focus here is different. This dissertation is situated along the corridors of post-development scholarship (such as James Ferguson) which engages in a critical deconstruction of the idea and practice of development with a view to eliciting an understanding of the whole 'development apparatus' and its modalities (Ferguson, 1990; 1994). The goal is therefore to guide development thinking and practice towards a more bottom-up analytical and planning process through an intensive deconstruction of the discursive processes involved in development thinking and practice.

Based on the foregoing, this study further contributes to debates about power relations in development partnerships. It goes beyond a focus on the global North-South power relations as presented by Fowler (2000a) and the aid exchange relationship between the North and South (Abugre, 1999). It also exceeds an outlook on these relations of power as necessarily coercive in development planning and agenda setting (Crawford, 2003) and critically engages the optimistic focus on the said changes from conditionality to ideal partnership between bilateral and multilateral donors and African recipients (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998; Maxwell & Riddell, 1998; Pender, 2001). In fact, this study draws from a governmentality approach to power in development partnership – a contribution of Abrahamsen (2004b) to the debate – to establish the role both the donors and the recipient state in the propagation and entrenchment of the hegemonic development ideology within the recipient state within the context of development partnership.[9] The reliance of this dissertation on the governmentality approach adopted by Abrahamsen (2004b) is accompanied by a specific engagement with the neo-Gramscian (but Coxian) approach to the role of international institutions in the entrenchment of the hegemonic world order (Cox, 1981, 1983, 1993). This provides an important theoretical base to the ongoing debate on the instrumentality of development institutions and donor-led development strategies – whether macro or micro – in the establishment, internationalization, internalisation

[9] This approach is crucially integral to many post-development and critical development theory scholars as it involves, more than most, an interrogation of the construction of discourse and instruments and mechanisms of control and achieving acquiescence when power is being exerted from one actor or sets of actors on other actors.

and entrenchment of global capitalist rationality, frameworks and mechanisms within domestic economies in aid-dependent states in the global system.

Furthermore, food security, though not the central focus of this thesis, is nevertheless an important theme in this study of Fadama based on its role in understanding power manifestations in development interventions. As a discourse, food security helps to interrogate the underlying dynamics of power in the framing of development needs and intervention strategies within contexts such as Nigeria. Like development, food security serves the conceptual function of othering the others, constructing the other as having a development problem and, as a result, proposing through intervention strategies, how to address this issue. This is like Ferguson's (1990; 1994) interrogation of 'developers' construction of Lesotho in a particular light to justify continuous development assistance. In this light, the construction of Nigeria and the rural economy as 'poor', 'food insecure' and 'disempowered' provides 'developers' the justification to conceptualise strategies like Fadama that are portrayed as crucial strategies to address these needs through a particular model of neoliberal economic approach. Because any claim to know what the other needs to develop is a claim to power, food security therefore provides the space within which to understand the continued manifestation and exertion of this form of soft, and yet invasive and incisive, power on different subjects within the context of Fadama as a pro-poor development.

More still, exploring the changing debate about what food security entails, what drives food insecurity and the importance of strategies towards addressing it, is crucial to eliciting an understanding of how Fadama represents an understanding of these changes in food security strategizing. It is vital to demonstrate therefore how discourse of food security provided the framework within which local economies were constructed and "othered" in a certain light - food insecure and poor - thus justifying the modality of interventions targeted towards them as well as the entrenchment of a particular economic rationality geared towards addressing such needs in a way that's amenable to the mainstream understanding of development.

From a case study perspective, there has been meagre theoretical engagements with this Fadama project within frameworks cited above. In fact, many studies on the project tend to neglect these important conceptual issues of the role of development projects, the concepts deployed in the mobilisation process, and the end-goal of the project. They nonetheless focus on the obvious: the stated objectives and goals as they appear on the pages of newspapers, project appraisal and implementation documents and the rhetoric of poverty reduction, food

security and grassroots empowerment as proposed by the donor community in the so-called partnership with the government and people of Nigeria. These studies, many of which are conducted by research consultants on the project, focus on Fadama's economic proficiency. This includes the project's support to rural farmers and local entrepreneurs (with funds to undertake various projects) and its associated gains such as improved productivity, more capacity for beneficiaries to 'independently' implement their various micro-level projects. This especially includes such subprojects that help to provide and increase food bundles for beneficiaries and their families (Bature, Sanni, & Adebayo, 2013; Nkonya, Phillip, Mogues, Pender, & Kato, 2010; Nwachukwu et al., 2008; Olaolu, Akinnagbe, & Agber, 2013). Indeed, the provision of capacity building, advisory services, productive assets and rural infrastructure that 'benefitted' communities were some of the added benefits of the project (Nkonya et al., 2010; Nwachukwu et al., 2008; The World Bank, 2010b). A point to note however is that these views neglect or seem oblivious to the interplay of power in this project drawing on their narrow focus on its socio-economic implications. They take for granted the stated goals of such development initiatives – a failure to deeply assess Fadama as a component of international development politics, especially as it pertains to how food security, poverty (reduction) and empowerment are constructed and used to establish new economic systems. Finally, these studies, more specifically, fail to explore the possibility (if at all) for such projects to become more relevant within socio-political spheres, especially among the grassroots. These are critical entry points for this study, especially within the Nigerian context.

Thus, it becomes analytically expedient to transcend this narrow focus on the economic impact of Fadama and address how it (could) represent(s) a deeper stride to establish (and or consolidate on the gains of) the hegemonic neoliberal development ideology. This implicates the World Bank, as an institution of global governance, which is central to driving Fadama's emergence as a neoliberal development project. This point is based on a strong consideration of the changing nature of development discourse and practice over the years. It also draws from an appreciation of the endemic ironies associated with development strategies ostensibly designed to enhance the participation of the poor in development planning through ideas such as partnership, ownership, participation and ownership amongst others. The focus is also on the role of the state – developing and aid-dependent (African) countries (like Nigeria) in this sense – in advancing and internalising this rationality within its domestic space. Within this context, the state's role in entrenching this rationality, to remain 'aid-friendly', also proves vital for a deeper grasp of the issues of power relations within current development

partnerships. In fact, the focus of this study on the extent of the integration of the voices and views of the poor in the implementation process of development intervention programmes remains vital to a continuous critique of development planning. It critiques programmatic processes ostensibly conceptualised to empower the poor through direct transfer of capital and technical know-how for self and community growth and improved local governance. These important issues emerge within the context of this study.

Practically Nigeria – the most populous African country blessed with vast human and natural resources, including its vast arable lands and promising agricultural sector – remain an interesting context to study. This is especially in relation to issues of poverty, food (in) security, grassroots empowerment and even power relations with multilateral donors. One would imagine that Nigeria, with these huge potentials, would not struggle with these issues, and the country would be economically viable and capable to relate more confidently with development institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank amongst others. However, these appear to be farfetched. Consequently, many aid packages have been 'pushed down the throat' of the nation ever since the SAPs in the 1980s. Indeed, despite the so-called new pro-poor models of planning that have ostensibly accompanied current strategies, there appears to be minimal changes in how development plans are structured and what their long-term goals truly are. In fact, Nigeria seems to remain largely an implementer of an economic system designed externally, especially the frenetic pursuit of the 'new market economy' by the new Nigerian governments (since 1999) even when there are inefficient institutions to sustain it (Adogamhe, 2010; The World Bank, 2000a, 2005a). These also make this study interesting academically and within the country context.

Finally, the primary area of study is chosen strategically because over the years, studies around Niger Delta region – where Rivers state is situated – have largely paid attention to issues of oil (conflicts) and the struggle for resource control. A few studies broadly explore the impact of the oil economy on the collapse of the agricultural sector in Nigeria, but their focus on the region has been inadequate (Ahungwa, Haruna, & Abdusalam, 2014; Feridun & Akindele, 2005; Ojo, 2007). Interestingly, interviews conducted at the national level of implementation showed that the Niger Delta region, and indeed Rivers state, was under-performing as state governments were stalling – and in certain cases, defaulting – in the payment of counterpart fees and the project was not having the required impact. This is interesting considering the resource abundance in the region. Thus, as a wealthy region on paper, and one at the heart of the oil struggle, the study's focus on this location is important to reappraise the place of oil in

everything in Rivers state. In other words, the Fadama project and its links to the socio-political empowerment of the grassroots is an interesting angle to explore in relation to changing the landscape of political governance and power relations in Rivers state, specifically, and Nigeria in a broader light.

1.5. Research Methodology

This section covers the research design, sampling procedures, techniques and instruments employed to collect and analyse data with the goal of ensuring that the ensuing results that are presented in this dissertation are valid and reliable. A very important aspect of this section entails the justification for the choice of the case study approach in this quest to explore questions pertaining to power dynamics and participation and inclusiveness in development strategies. In this, the appropriateness of the Fadama project as a case study is emphasised. Furthermore, it is of vital importance to describe some of the experiences associated with data collection, analysis and some of the challenges faced during the data collection process for the development and completion of this study.

Research Design

This study adopted a single case study approach to analyse two important factors identified in the Fadama (III) project. These include power relations at the macro (and institutional) levels of power relations between multilateral aid donors and aid-dependent African countries on the one hand, and beneficiary participation and or inclusiveness in terms of the micro levels of engagement in this project. These two factors were identified to be crucial in this study because they vividly help to unravel the extent to which purported changes in development planning strategies have adequately implied a radically transformed system of development assistance for addressing poverty and hunger as well as an empowered and more involved rural poor.

The case study approach is a unique and important "empirical enquiry" in the qualitative research tradition because of its usefulness in exploring, explaining and describing the nature of a phenomenon within a real-life context. This is even enhanced by its reliance on different sources of data which are drawn from the "context of the case" to effectively engage the object of study (Jwan & Ong'ondo, 2011, p. 33). This facilitates a deeper grasp of the processes that interact within the context of this research object (Creswell, 2009; Gerring, 2007; Jwan & Ong'ondo, 2011), especially by incorporating "the views of the 'actors' in the case under

study" (W. Tellis, 1997, p. 5). It is therefore particularly useful when trying to discern the 'how' and/or why of a certain phenomenon, especially when interrogating events and issues currently experienced within different contexts within which actors' behaviour are not manipulated (W. Tellis, 1997; W. M. Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003, p. 7). Essentially various complex social phenomena such as poverty, unemployment and indeed power are vitally analysed through and within this process based on how different subjects interact with or are affected by these phenomena in the contexts within which they find themselves.

The purpose of this study, as described above, was mainly to explore the underlying issues of power relations within the context of aid-development partnership between multilateral donors (or donor institutions) and aid-recipient African countries. This attempt to use the Fadama project in Nigeria to address the issue of power relations is instrumental to more vividly grasp issues of control and influence in the sphere of development assistance and development planning between institutions of global governance (and development) and developing countries, especially within Africa. It covers issues of development assistance whether to achieve macroeconomic purposes or microeconomic goals of economic stability or poverty reduction or food security. The case of Fadama here provides a window by which to look at development assistance broadly but specifically those strategies for micro-level – pro-poor – strategies which target the poor and rural populace as part of a global drive for inclusive growth in less developed countries.

That having been said, the strategic organisation of this study, in terms of the specification of the research questions and an analytic framework, was borne from the outcome of the fieldwork and data collection processes. This is in line with the exploratory purpose of the case study method in which a generic framework of the study can be created ahead of time simply to guide the researcher in the development of a research proposal and scope. But the actual specification of research questions and analytic frameworks draws from the outcome of data collection (Jwan & Ong'ondo, 2011, p. 34).

The outcome of the fieldwork and data collection draws from perspectives on the Fadama project and experiences associated with its implementation led the study to adopt three levels of analysis to bring to the fore varying views pertaining to the project and its implementation in Nigeria. The three levels of analysis include: an analysis focused on the donor institution (an analysis of the role of the World Bank as a multilateral institution and donor) at an international level of engagement; an analysis focused on the national level of engagement

highlighting the place and role of government and government institutions in driving the project's agenda; and an analysis focused on the local (grassroots) levels of engagement which presents the beneficiaries experience of the implementation of the project in their local contexts.

Types and Sources of Data

The study made use of various sources to generate current and historical data especially in the drive toward the development of the dissertation. Some of the data that are linked to history were vital in the organisation of the empirical background chapter of this dissertation which focused on the socioeconomic and developmental context within which the current Fadama project was established. This context includes the Nigerian socio-economic context – the post-military dictatorship era led by President Obasanjo – and the World Bank's post-1995 context which was animated by the noted reforms or changes within the international development community and especially the World Bank under the Presidency of James Wolfensohn who led the reform process which signalled the ostensible redefinition of the scope of development and the Bank's approach to development and development planning strategies.

Local beneficiaries of the Fadama project in Rivers state (Nigeria), Government and World officials and Fadama facilitators were the major sources of the primary data utilised in and analysed for this study. While it was hoped that there would be Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working within the Fadama project to be incorporated into the research, this was not actualised as they were not visible especially in Rivers state – the major site of the study. The local beneficiaries were drawn from three large communities in three different local government areas – Emohua, Ikwerre and Gokana – while the government officials were mainly experts working with the Fadama National and state offices and charged with the national and state implementation responsibilities.

Concerning the secondary sources of data, the major sources included World Bank documents, Federal Government of Nigeria documents, books and reports, academic writings, journal articles, and online media reports. These sources of data were useful not only in providing insight about the Fadama project and its implementation (processes), they were also vital for enriching insights on the research questions as well as confirming issues of validity and reliability as regards the emergent data in this study.

Method of Data collection

The primary data for this study was obtained largely through open-ended semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and direct observations of meetings and workshops organised for the project. Actual fieldwork took place between November 2012 and July 2013 and involved at least two trips to each of the study sites.[10] The researcher conducted semi-structured face to face interviews with the representatives of the donor community (The World Bank, Nigeria), officials at the National Coordinating Office of the project, the State Coordinating Office (SFCO), facilitators and local beneficiaries. The participants for the beneficiaries' interviews were conducted selected from three Local Government Areas. In all, over 20 face to face interviews were conducted with the groups of stakeholders. They consisted of: one (1) World Bank official; seven (7) national and state Fadama officers; two (2) facilitators; nine (9) beneficiaries; and a retired government official. The interview questions were structured around well-defined themes in relation to the research but tailored to the portfolio of each participant interviewed: for officials, it was suited to their expertise in the project. Beneficiaries had similar questions to gain a deeper grasp of their understanding of the project, its goals as well as their perspective in relation to its impact on their lives.

The study also involved direct non-participant observation of the implementation process. The focus of the observation was mainly on beneficiary communities especially in terms of their own self-conducted FCA meetings – organised for driving their internal processes forward as well as addressing challenges faced in terms of the project. In this regard, four meetings were observed in Gokana and Ikwerre LGAs. The observation of these meetings focused a great deal on the set agenda for the meetings, the issues discussed and the manner with which they were discussed, and the extent to which community members made references about the Fadama project and its officials. I also observed a capacity building training organised for one of these communities in Gokana as well as the unfolding of events at the SFCOs in terms of relationships between officials and beneficiaries, as well as different statements and comments uttered unofficially within the vicinity of the agency.

Apart from interviews and observations, data analysed in this study were also obtained from deep review of relevant secondary sources such as World Bank and the Federal Government of Nigeria documents broadly related to the economic reformation post-1999. Specifically,

[10] About three weeks was spent in Abuja seeking audience with officials from the World Bank and the Fadama office and conducting my interviews with them. The rest of the other months were spent in Rivers state visiting communities and interviewing local beneficiaries in Emohua, Ikwerre and Gokana Local Government Areas.

reports on the Fadama project – the Fadama Project Appraisal and Implementation documents, as well as the Fadama handbook – were also vital sources of data. Academic articles and online and print media news were also important secondary data sources as they provided broader information on the implementation process of Fadama in the country. These data sources provided rich background and implementation information that vitally fed into chapters one, three, four and five.

Drawing from the case study approach, this dissertation was thus structured in such a way that it very effectively presents and samples the perspectives of various stakeholders about the Fadama project in the light of other sources of data. The aim here was to more adequately understand and present their view about the project as well as their experience of its implementation. With specific regards to local beneficiaries, this entailed a deeper interrogation of the extent to which they were adequately incorporated within the entire implementation process, and as such their views about the project was based on their lived experiences of the implementation process. This indeed goes beyond some of the very flowery stories about the project that are found on print and online media outlets as well as the reports and online platforms of the World Bank, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and rural development or the Fadama office.

Sampling and distribution of study participants

The selection of participants for this study was purposeful based on the participation in and first-hand experience and knowledge of the project. This is line with Gall et al., (1996:218) averment that the goal of purposeful sampling is "to select cases that are likely to be information-rich with respect to the purpose of the study." Thus, since this study involves people as well as development institutions and government agencies, it was pertinent to involve all major stakeholders in the process of data collection to create a deeper understanding of the core issues within the project.

At the onset when the research was conceptualised, and the proposal was completed and approved, the World Bank country office in Abuja was contacted to request permission to conduct interviews with their officials on the Fadama project. This consent was given in writing. The Bank also facilitated communications with the National Fadama office in Abuja and the Rivers State Fadama Coordinating Office (RSFCO) in Port Harcourt. The local beneficiaries of the project, as well as the community facilitators who were interviewed, were identified through the RSFCO, through the State Project Coordinator (SPC) who introduced

the researcher to the various community facilitators during a quarterly meeting to track the progress of the project in November 2012.

Drawing from the foregoing, the study participants were identified by means of a combined use of purposeful and snowballing sampling techniques as most of the participants in the study were actively involved in the project either as World Bank or government officials or local beneficiaries. Their immediate interaction with the project and the experiences gathered over a very long span of being part of the implementation process of the Fadama project – for some of the World Bank and Fadama officials – proved vital in terms of gathering the relevant data on the background, rationale for and the implementation process of the Fadama project broadly in Nigeria but also specifically in Rivers state.

While the officials were drawn from the World Bank and the National and Rivers state Fadama offices, the beneficiaries as noted earlier were drawn from three local government areas with specific focus on Ogbakiri (in Emohua local government area), Omanwa (in Ikwerre local government area) and Yeghe (in Gokana local government area). The locations were chosen because of the high levels of agricultural activities and the view that the Fadama project would vitally impact positively on the lives of beneficiaries in these communities. An interesting feature of one of the locations – Ogbakiri – is that it is a post-conflict community. Locals in this community were striving to get resettled after many years of violent and deadly conflict which led to over five years in exile – 1999 to 2005. As such, the introduction of Fadama to them seemed like a ray of hope for many of the beneficiaries in terms of tackling poverty, hunger and unemployment.

Data analysis

The data obtained in this study was largely qualitative as drawn from the interviews conducted with the participants in the research. Because of this predominance of texts and narratives that convey the experiences, ideas, perspectives and mindset of the stakeholders of the Fadama project who were interviewed, it became pertinent to utilise qualitative research analysis techniques to make sense of the emerging data. In this light, text analysis based on identified themes was applied to interpret these perspectives within the context of the broader theoretical and analytic framework adopted for the study – power relations and participation in development planning.

Based on the identified specific aims and research questions of this study, and in the light of the levels of analysis adopted, the emanating data from the interviews and other secondary sources were organised into a structure that focuses on the role of the World Bank in the adoption of an inclusive development model; the place of the government in the internalisation of this model within the framework of the Fadama project; and the challenges associated with the implementation as identified from the level of local beneficiaries of the project. This structure was utilised to highlight, describe and explore the dynamics of power in the conceptualisation and implementation of the Fadama project. It was also vital in problematizing the nature of the participation or inclusiveness emphasised within the context of the project as it pertains to the actual experiences gathered by the local beneficiaries.

Based on this, the first major theme analysed focuses on the conceptualisation. This aspect of the analysis of the place and role of the World Bank in shaping the conceptual and programmatic basis of the Fadama project examined several issues. This includes the redefinition of development and food security in the light of the new development agenda, the introduction of an emphasis on participation, ownership and value chains, and the strategic utilisation Bank's hegemonic status to popularise the neoliberal development rationality within the context of the project. This surmises the drive for the internationalisation of the neoliberal economic rationality in developing countries.

The second aspect of the analysis focused on the theme of implementation. It dealt with the internalisation of the mainstream development rationality received from the World Bank and implemented locally. Some of the adopted strategies such as consultation and sensitisation, planning, monitoring and evaluation are discussed from the perspective of public officials with a view to understanding their outlook on the project. The third theme of grassroots experience highlights beneficiaries' perception of the project based on their experience of the implementation process. The analysis focused on how the implementation process represents an attempt to incorporate beneficiaries into the neoliberal economy through the popular participatory techniques. However, beneficiaries' experience of this attempt became vital as regards understanding the adequacy of this implementation process.

Summarily, the data analysis was a process which began with the fieldwork and culminated with the final chapter production and write-up. This process involved drawing meanings from the available data and relying on significant insights emanating from academic literature on partnership, power in development planning and the broader literature on participation in

development – as well as their critiques. These were vital for a more engaging presentation and discussion of the findings and conclusions made in this study.

Challenges encountered in the Research data collection process

Conducting this study since the year 2012 has come with a number of associated experiences many of which were quite challenging especially when placed within the context of developing this dissertation. Some of the noted challenges experienced during this process have ranged from the distance of the site of interest – Nigeria – from the academic institution in South Africa down to certain participants' aversion for research interviews considering the context within which the study was being conducted and its aversion for research as an intrusive and possibly uncomfortable process. In fact, researchers are treated with a measure of suspicion based on the aforementioned reasons.

Indeed, there were some difficulties in carrying out this study. Before embarking on the fieldwork in November 2012, I made effort to reach out to the World Bank Nigeria office in Abuja regarding the possibility of conducting interviews about Fadama. This contact was made in May 2012 through a letter emailed to the office contact email. I was later redirected to the Task Team Leader of Fadama III for the World Bank, Dr Abimbola Adubi who granted me the permission to conduct the interviews. This was however not to happen until the University Ethics Clearance was approved by the Wits University Ethics committee in August 2012 – over 5 months after the submission of the research proposal which was approved in June 2012. This was an initial delay which had somewhat affected the initial work plan for the study. Nevertheless, the official fieldwork to Nigeria was undertaken in November 2012 and I had to contact the Task Team Leader (TTL) about setting up an appointment for our interview. This took quite a while to be confirmed because of communication glitches in Nigeria and the nature of the work of the TTL.

The meeting was later confirmed on 8 November 2012 but due to communication glitches and bureaucratic processes at the World Bank Abuja facility, the meeting was postponed for the next day. Upon meeting with the TTL, I was able to conduct my first official interview with World Bank official – two of them – but this had to be done under an hour as a result of the 'busy schedule' of the TTL. Although the interview was smoothly conducted and the TTL recommended more interviews with the World Bank Country Office Director, all efforts to get

through failed as there was no response to my email requests and follow up. It thus meant that most of the data drawn from a World Bank perspective emanated from the TTL's interview and secondary sources comprising of World Bank-Fadama related reports downloaded from the Bank's website and some copies handed over to me at the World Bank office. Indeed, the documents provided a great deal of information on the project but more interviews with other officials would have been of greater benefit for the study in terms of the extent to which the Bank's institutional status impacted on the Fadama project's nature and implementation strategy and style.

After the meeting with the World Bank's Fadama TTL, he referred me to the National Fadama office also in Abuja by calling and informing them of my presence and research interest in the Fadama project. This introduction was my passageway into the National Fadama office; it enabled me to gain access to a number of specialists working on the project within various portfolios. Thus, apart from officials who were unavoidably absent, I was able to interview four (4) specialists at the Abuja office of the Fadama project. But, in spite of the official introduction from the World Bank informing the office about my presence, it was nonetheless difficult to release important documents necessary for the sieving out data on the implementation process. In fact, when I requested for progress reports, I was constantly told that it required the approval of the World Bank or that I had to wait for the World Bank to publish such reports, and although efforts were made to get the World Bank's permission to get these unpublished reports and other implementation data, this was not successful and meant that the analysis had to depend largely on the perspectives drawn from the official's interviews also.

Upon my return to Rivers state, the primary site of the study in Port Harcourt, the Rivers state Fadama office initially refused to honour my request to conduct the study through their office until the World Bank had approved the same. The Rivers state office therefore only sanctioned my research or entertained me within their office after a direct email was sent by the TTL to the SPC to confirm my story and the email exchanges we had. This thus also ensured that the set timeline was also tampered with considering the time lag for the fieldwork and my return to South Africa. Nevertheless, in January 2012 during a quarterly meeting between the Fadama officers and the various community facilitators, I was introduced as a student conducting a study on the Fadama project in the state. Thus, with the help of the office, a total number of six Fadama LGAs were identified for the study to focus on. These included: Ikwerre, Gokana, Oyigbo, Etche, Degema and Abua, and I was able to meet and discuss with the facilitators for

these LGAs about a possible visit to their communities and subsequently identify beneficiaries to be interviewed. However, upon the exchange of contacts and dispersal, many of these facilitators were no longer reachable. While some meeting appointments with the facilitators were eventually arranged, many of the appointments were not honoured and some of those who managed to show requested for 'mobilisation' – money – to facilitate the process of taking me to their communities and introducing me to their FCAs. This made the process quite tedious as the lack of mobilisation culminated in cold feet. Eventually, only two facilitators agreed to introduce me to their FCAs – Ikwerre and Gokana – and this meant that I had only two out of the six LGAs initially targeted. However, to make up this deficit, I was able to include Emohua LGA where I was able to contact another facilitator and contacted two beneficiaries of the project in Ogbakiri community. This community signified the 'failed story' of the Fadama project as opposed to the other locations that were adjudged as viable and progressive cases by the Rivers state officials.

Another challenge experienced in Rivers state was related to an attempt to interview government officials and politicians working within the Ministry of Agriculture regarding the Fadama project in the state. While I was able to gain an initial audience with the then Commissioner for Agriculture (Honourable Emmanuel Chindah), he was not readily available to grant me an interview but instead mandated the Permanent Secretary to answer my questions. Upon meeting the Permanent Secretary of the Rivers state Ministry of Agriculture, I was given an appointment to return a week later for the interview. However, upon my return and meeting with the Permanent Secretary, he unpredictably declined to be interviewed but referred me back to the Rivers state Fadama office where I had already been and conducted interviews with the officials such as the SPC and the Communication Officer (CO). This refusal by the top officials of the Ministry of Agriculture in the state made it difficult get their perspectives about the project especially in relation to the state's default in the payment of the Counterpart fees since 2011. It also speaks to the aversion of government officials for research and suspicion especially for independent researchers on issues of public interest.

In general, the fieldwork experience in Nigeria – between November 2012 and February 2013 and between June 2013 and July 2013 – was insightful in relation to the attitude of the population to research and researchers. In truth, while there were cases where the participants wanted to decide the focus and interest of my study – a case of participants at the Fadama office in Abuja – there were also cases in which beneficiaries believed that I was a middleman between them and the Rivers state Fadama office and as such I 'had to convey their feelings

and worries' to the NFCO and/or RSFCO regarding the implementation process and how it was impacted negatively on them. There was also a situation in which the different categories of participants responded to questions in a bid to show the extent of their contribution towards ensuring project effectiveness. In some of these cases, there were subtle attempts to portray failure stories to be a result of the ineptitude of communities and groups that failed – a point projected by officials. Conversely, beneficiaries in certain cases blamed Fadama officials for their plight based on some issues such as ethnicity, bureaucratic hurdles and subtle forms of corruption in the implementation process. In all of these, it became very important to ensure an amount of objectivity in an attempt to synthesise and analyse the perspectives that emerged from the interviews conducted at this state and grassroots levels of engagement.

Finally, there were a few cases where participants refused to be audio recorded during the interview process. This was mainly the case among officials. In such cases, except where the interviewer totally refused to be interviewed despite other available options, I had to mitigate this by taking notes of important points raised during the discursive process. In all of these, the participants were duly informed about the research and their informed consent was taken prior to the continuation of the interview. Thus, only participants who gave their informed consent – verbally and in signed forms – were interviewed for this study.

1.6. Conclusion and Roadmap of the dissertation

This study focused on International Political Economy issues pertaining to the pervading nature of power relations within development aid and development planning frameworks such as the Fadama project under study. While the Fadama project represents programmatic strategies (with local and international dimensions) aimed at addressing the problems of hunger and poverty within Nigeria, the question of the interaction of political and economic issues that speak to the place of power and the instrumental use of transformative concepts to drive on the neoliberal development agenda remains an important issue for this study.

This chapter has, therefore, set the tone for the analyses and discursive processes within this dissertation. It has presented a case for the study based on the nature of the problems of poverty and hunger in the developing world and the quest within the international community to address this issue. The paradoxical position of Nigeria as a nation with enormous potentials and yet lacking the capacity to feed its population and thus dependent on imports and donors

– multilateral and bilateral – to attempt to address its development challenges was also addressed as an important background to this study in this chapter. The chapter has laid out the case for the Fadama project as an important micro-level strategy which enables an engagement with theoretical and practical issues pertaining to the conceptualisation, establishment and implementation of pro-poor development strategies. The chapter has therefore established an important basis for addressing the existent power dynamics in donor-led development initiatives in many aid-dependent countries – such as Nigeria – on the African continent.

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The second chapter presents the conceptual debates about food security and development partnerships. It addresses the ongoing debate about the components of food security and highlights the contested nature of the concept. This is in relation to critiques of mainstream approach to food security based on the view that this approach is animated by a neoliberal agenda as opposed to a quest to secure the rights of communities and producers to food as a way of life (Schanbacher, 2010). One thing that emanates however from the discussions on food security is that it borders on the need to address the problem of global, national, community, household and or individual hunger. As such, having been identified within the international development community as a serious threat to human development and security, strides have therefore been taken since the 1980s to address it. Indeed, while previous strides were developed under the neoliberal liberalisation mantra of the 1980s – criticised for its highly technocratic nature – the era of poverty reduction, and the adoption of the discourse of participation and partnership as well as ownership to advance a more inclusive process of addressing development challenges within developing countries, came with ostensibly newer approaches. Development strategies for addressing food security and poverty issues became more inclusive in nature and the discourse of partnership and participation became more pronounced. However, this unspoken question of the power dynamics within these new approaches in development planning and strategizing is the focal point of chapter two as it charts and develops an analytic framework for analysing power relations in the Fadama project.

Chapter three provides a description of the empirical background for this study by highlighting the historical, contextual background within which the Fadama project was established in the post-1999 era in Nigeria. This chapter provides a snippet of the socioeconomic context in Nigeria after 1999 and the role of the World Bank in reshaping the socioeconomic focus of the country. This role vitally influenced the character, goals, and strategies of the post-1999 Fadama initiative. The role of World Bank President Wolfensohn in driving this process cannot

also be downplayed especially in terms of his legacy – the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) – which signalled the said reforms in the World Bank as seen in the redefinition of its scope of development and development strategies to incorporate the voices of the Poor.

Chapter four continues from the background set out by chapter three by analysing, through fieldwork materials and secondary sources, the place and role of the World Bank in the internationalisation of the mainstream (neoliberal) development rationality within developing countries. Drawing on the neo-Gramscian perspective of Robert Cox (Cox, 1983) on the role of international institutions in the propagation of hegemonic ideologies and world order, the chapter explores how the Fadama project served as one mechanism – using the food security, participation and partnership discourse – to propagate this mainstream approach to development. In this light, the chapter interrogates the reconceptualization of Fadama in the light of the new development agenda and argues that the Fadama project became one useful initiative for the entrenchment of this hegemonic development rationality in Nigeria – as with many other aid-dependent countries.

Chapter five analyses the implementation of the Fadama III project as an approach towards the internalisation of the hegemonic development model adopted for the country and entrenched through micro-level strategies such as the Fadama initiative. The chapter provides an insight into the government's implementation strategies for the project and argues that the adoption of these strategies was immensely influenced by a strategic quest by the Nigerian state to remain favourable to the World Bank and other external donors. It argues that despite the Bank's status as the major donor and its ascertained sphere of interest, the Nigerian state acted more as a rational chooser based on its strategic interest in securing more aid for advancing its development cause as well as addressing its domestic development challenges. This accounts for the strides made to demonstrate full ownership of the project through the implementation strategies adopted for the project. The chapter, however, identified some of the associated challenges of implementation as drawn from the perspectives of officials and project facilitators. These challenges highlight the difficulties associated with effectively addressing development challenges on a programmatic level without an adequate focus on various structural issues that drive poverty and hunger in the land.

Chapter six continues on the challenges of implementation and thus provides an empirical outlook on the implementation of the Fadama III project. It analyses this implementation

process based on experiences enunciated by local beneficiaries of the project in terms of their direct interaction with the project and its officials in Rivers state. In this light, issues pertaining to consultation and sensitisation, group formation, funding, and support systems among others were explored in terms of the beneficiaries' expectations, experience and evaluation of the project. The chapter, thus, argues that despite the claims of inclusiveness, many beneficiaries of Fadama remained largely onlookers as opposed to actively driving the project. It argues that although beneficiaries seemed in control of their immediate subprojects, they were nevertheless excluded from determining how the Fadama project was going to be structured. They only had to rely on the system and structure already provided for them.

Chapter seven undertakes a collective analysis of the processes and mechanisms through which ideas of participation, and indeed partnership were effectively employed within the Fadama III project as part of a broader attempt to institutionalise the hegemonic neoliberal development agenda and an 'economic rationality'[11] within the local socioeconomic space. This chapter therefore also provides an overall on the question of power between multilateral donors and African aid recipient states.

[11] Williams (1999) analyses how the World Bank uses pro-poor development strategies to create an economic man among the developing countries where these strategies are implemented.

Chapter Two

Literature review and Analytic Framework

Food Security and Development Partnership

2.1. Introduction

Food insecurity and poverty are 'high-profile' development challenges in contemporary international development parlance; this explains the widespread adoption of approaches, strategies and plans like MDGs and SDGs in the 21st century.[12] Consequently, concepts like Food security and development partnership,[13] amongst others, have consequently become ubiquitous within mainstream attempts to address these challenges. The ubiquity associated with these concepts, I argue in this study, should be understood from the purview of their strategic importance as discursive instruments in development programming because they provide the ideological base for development practice – conceptualising and executing strides aimed at various 'development' problems. They have proved useful in 'constructing' or 'creating' and 'disciplining' targets of development – states or local beneficiaries – shaping them into 'docile' subjects (in many instances) that are amenable to the project of development. Indeed, the concepts – especially food security – represent more than a simple description of a state of affair or a signifier for strategies designed to curb hunger or poverty; they also represent the discourse that shapes the nature of these strategies, including how they are constructed to guide practices and strategies for achieving development targets.

This chapter engages these concepts and their relationship through a review of scholarly debates on food security as well as questions of power relations in development partnerships. The Fadama project represents a context wherein both concepts can be explored because it is

[12] Widespread poverty, increasing global population, devastating impacts of global change on weather patterns, food production and supply, and conflicts and associated issues of corruption, and poor economic performance, all, remain critical challenges towards addressing global poverty and hunger. Many strategies have been adopted over the years to this effect from the early 1960s with aid-for-investment in many (African) countries, including Nigeria (Easterly, 2001) to the early 1980s with the SAPs and down to current pro-poor strategies such as the PRSPs, MDGs and SDGs (Abrahamsen, 2004b, 2004a; Pender, 2001; Weber, 2004). Most of these strategies however failed to make the desired impact mostly because they failed to adequately include beneficiaries.

[13] Inclusive here is poverty reduction, which in this study, is subsumed within a broader understanding of the food security discussion. In this study, the food security, as an important aspect of the Fadama project, provides the conceptual space to discuss the manifestation of power in development interventions like Fadama. Although poverty reduction can also serve this purpose, the choice of food security centres on the meagre use of food security to discuss these questions of power dynamics in development partnerships. Furthermore, the literature review of food security, and its drivers as well as strategies towards achieving it, aims at providing a picture of how the changes in thinking about food security and its strategies stand at the heart of the discourse and implementation strategies mooted for Fadama – hence the emphasis on the role of the discourse and practice of food security in the entrenchment of the mainstream development rationality in Nigeria through Fadama.

a donor-led initiative shaped by the new development agenda in which partnership is central to its core as it pursues the MDGs and SDGs target of addressing hunger and poverty through an inclusive planning and implementation. Fadama therefore provides a very useful avenue to re-visit claims – more so, the discourse – of food security and inclusive development planning within the current mainstream development discourse.

This chapter therefore provides the conceptual basis for the study's analytic framework centred on power (relations) and its manifestations within development interventions 'wrapped' in the 'cloak' of 'partnerships' and inclusiveness. The debate on what constitutes food security provide a strong basis to look at food security and practices that have emerged to advance it, beyond the obvious technical questions of availability, access, utility and stability. This was inspired by Sen's critique of the 'hitherto' mainstream Food Availability Decline (FAD) approach to hunger and his consequent contribution(s) towards a more holistic understanding of the nexus between food insecurity and access, entitlements (or its) failure and capacities or agencies. It helps to grasp how deeply it has been transformed into a discourse, in popular development institutions, which serves to advance a particular brand of development thinking but under the guise of addressing development needs of hunger and poverty. Essentially, food security therefore fits neatly into the politics of development partnership when one begins to consider how it has been defined; whose definition is privileged in, and pervades, the development landscape; and what the goals of such a definition are in principle and practice. Thus, this chapter is aimed at a deeper understanding of mechanisms and channels by which the popular development ideology is reproduced, legitimated, normalised and entrenched through pro-poor interventions like Fadama in Nigeria. This is explored through a critical review of theories associated with mainstream strategies to tackle food insecurity and poverty in poor countries as well as theories of participation and approaches to understanding the manifestations of power within international (development) politics.

The remaining sections of the chapter explore an analytical pathway for the study – one that ties together understandings of power, participation and the entitlement/capability approaches of Sen (A. Sen, 1981b, 1981a; A. K. Sen, 1990) towards a deeper analysis of Fadama III.

2.2. Conceptualising Food Security and Development Partnership

2.2.1. Partnership: a ubiquitous development concept

Partnership generally connotes mutuality, equality, trust and sameness of purpose. A partnership can be said to exist between two or more parties who understand one another and consciously undertake important ventures together based on the levels of understanding between them. In an ideal situation, the levels of understanding here tend to present a scenario in which, no one party appears to be necessarily more important than the other (or others) since each party ought to (or) possess(es) important features and (or has) the capacity to make relevant contributions within, and to, the relationship. This is a major highlight in what is recognised as conventional wisdom regarding the ideal nature of partnerships as Roger Riddell explains:

> ... [Partnership] ... means something very different from the relationship between horse and rider, or between servant and master. It carries with it a strong sense of equality. The most important implication [here] is that by putting stress on the concept of partnership and by raising its importance, the unequal relationship between 'funder' and 'funded', between the northern and southern agencies is tempered and changed (Maxwell & Riddell, 1998, p. 259).

Ideally, therefore, development partnership involves mutual dependence and cooperation towards set-out development goals. It is "a dynamic of relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objectives, pursued through a shared understanding of the most rational division of labour based on the respective comparative advantages of each partners" (Brinkerhoff, 2002, p. 21). It also "encompasses mutual influence, with a careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision making, mutual accountability and transparency" (Brinkerhoff, 2002, p. 21). However, it is not a relationship characterised by the exertion or show of power and control of the rich and strong over the poor and dependent partners – then that would no longer be a partnership.[14]

Development partnership became popular within the post-1990 era in the context of the PRSPs and pro-poor strategies. It was constructed as a new dimension to development planning as international institutions and donors drew on the concept to emphasise local ownership, beneficiary participation and shared interests as invaluable components of interventions in

[14] There remains a whole range of debates as to what partnership should or should not entail (and they will be discussed later on) since ideal partnership is almost untenable since such relationships between donors and recipients are inherently unequal – one holds the resources while the other looks on in dependence.

order to achieve the goals of development including food security (Abrahamsen, 2004b).[15] Indeed, the said partnerships are formed at different levels – organisational, institutional and sectoral levels or even within bilateral and multilateral institutions driving development goals – with the singular aim of ensuring the effectiveness of development assistance (Abrahamsen, 2004b; Development Assistance Committee, 1996; Wolfensohn, 1999). Thus, it is argued that this concept was very important to restore legitimacy to the development architecture and indeed the whole development industry after decades of failure and myriad of critique against various models of external development assistance ostensibly geared towards addressing various development challenges in many developing countries, especially those in Africa.[16]

Since its emergence in current development discourse, partnership has been deployed mainly within the context of development assistance and cooperation between different (external) donors and developing countries. The aim has been: to enhance aid effectiveness (Development Assistance Committee, 1996)[17]; bridge the power gap between aid givers and receivers; and improve (human) capacity and technical know-how among aid beneficiaries in order to make such aid more effective (Lister, 2000, p. 2). These aims animate current development rapport between countries and institutions in the global-North and the global-South, as partnerships are perceived especially from an international donor perspective to be vital in planning, designing and establishing development projects in the light of the needs and concerns of beneficiaries – local people and their government. Here, the "expertise and resources of the outsiders" – donors – proves useful in training the local people – "Southern partners" – and empowering them with the skills and resources to address their development needs "while reducing costs and increasing legitimacy with local governments and actors" (Lister, 2000, pp. 2–3).

This perspective very importantly highlights the place of development projects in attending to the "*local needs and concerns*" of countries and people in the global-South who need

[15] It must be stated that food security is simply emphasised here because of the interest of this study on the Fadama project which aims at improving it. It does not stand opposed to development in general. It is simply assumed as an important development challenge that is the focus of this dissertation.

[16] Strategies such as the SAPs in Africa have been blamed for many of the current problems faced in Africa by countries like Nigeria. These strategies were said to have been invasive without an adequate grasp of the needs of people. Its failed top-down managerial and constraint-full mechanism compounded the problems have been criticised, hence the current focus on a more inclusive process in which the discourse of partnership and inclusiveness became more relevant.

[17] While this is the common place expression of the concept in current development parlance, Charles Gore (in (King, 2008)) tends to interpret 'partnership' differently because for him the understanding of development partners among within mainstream institutions is one in which the external donors and institutions themselves are the only ones referred to as partners. He cites the OECD (DAC) report, famous as the rubric for development partnerships, and highlights that while the donors are referred to as "development partners" whose role is to provide resources and ensure certain levels of ..." the recipients countries have stringent commitments to fulfil. These recipients are therefore implementers and beneficiaries but not 'really' partners.

assistance (Lister, 2000, pp. 2–3). Attending to these *"needs"* however, requires vital local human and social capital that must be enhanced (ibid). These will draw from the expertise generated from the global North and localised within particular socio-economic contexts to ensure the effectiveness of designed projects. Thus, development initiatives find it easier to attain their desired objectives when there is 'this' mutually beneficial relationship between donors and beneficiaries. In other words, as the donors provide resources and the technical know-how used to capacitate beneficiaries, the latter contributes to the project by learning the ropes and situating same to the local context. These will, therefore, ensure a more efficient and adequate implementation and sustainability of the project for overall benefits.

While this understanding of development partnership is widespread – within NGO, multilateral and bilateral development structures – the concept has nevertheless been in use earlier than the mid-1990s despite its current pervasiveness since the OECD (DAC) 1996 report: *Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of Development Co-operation.* In fact, its use in development dates back to the 1960s (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Crawford, 2003; Maxwell & Riddell, 1998). Many of these studies discuss partnership within the context of a quest to establish the difference between ideal and genuine forms of partnerships as opposed to partnerships as a façade (Abugre, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Crawford, 2003; Fowler, 2000a, 2000b; Lister, 2000). They show the emergence of this concept and or discourse within the mainstream, since the 1969 Pearson Commission report (entitled *Partners in Development*) and the Brandt Commission Report in 1980 (entitled *North-South: A Programme of Survival*), to understand the flaws of the aid framework with a view to proposing possible solutions towards improving development assistance through an ideal form of partnership (see Charles Gore in (King, 2008)).

This ideal partnership, which Maxwell and Riddell (1998, p. 258) contends to be a relationship which transcends mere information sharing and formal policy dialogues but rather one characterised by shared commitments respected by the partners, was a post-Cold War phenomenon. Crawford argues that the cold war aid framework was "dominated by base geopolitical considerations and economic self-interest rather than the nobler sentiments of 'partnership' in international co-operation" (Crawford, 2003, p. 140). Thus, partnerships were not really taken seriously by the dominant powers; only NGO-type relationships seemed to be productive. It only re-emerged in the mid-1990s in the OECD (DAC) 1996 report, and later the World Bank's *Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)* in 1999, as a result of the crises of development and indeed the aid industry. It thus became ubiquitous and applied to different development trajectories and targets such as food security.

In the context of this study, partnership is important in discussing Fadama, especially in terms of understanding the different actors, their interests, actions and desired outcome in their interaction. Also important is Fadama's focus on advancing food security through agricultural reforms and improved human and institutional capacities – through the World Bank's financial and technical assistance. The underlying question of what this interaction means, for how Fadama is defined and implemented and what overarching goals it seeks to achieve, is tied to the nature of the partnership, what the World Bank represents and the brand of food security and poverty reduction (strategies) it promotes. The next sub-section's treatment of debate on what constitutes and drives food (in)security provides an avenue to better understand how the mainstream approach to development influences ideas and modalities towards the drive to address food insecurity and poverty within the scope of Fadama. Thus, as Schanbacher (2010) would argue, food security metamorphosed into a discourse and practice of development mobilised in the service of the dominant neoliberal economic development model which the country and its citizens are made (or encouraged) to adopt, imbibe and internalise.

2.2.2. Food Security: an evolving development concept

Before engaging further, it is important to bear in mind that the rationale behind exploring this debate in its depth is to demonstrate how the changing nature of food security 'thinking' – and its associated palliative prescriptions – has influenced 'character' and scope of contemporary development or livelihoods initiatives like Fadama. Thus, although food security is not this study's overarching principal theme – power is – it, nonetheless, serves a very important purpose: it facilitates a deeper grasp of how power can be located within interventions like Fadama which aims to address food security and poverty issues.[18] Reiterating the point made

[18] Food security provides a strong conceptual lens and discursive anchorage – like poverty (reduction), participation, ownership and indeed partnership – to demonstrate the pervasive nature of power, beyond coercion, in the advancement of varying interests within development intervention parlance. For example, when one looks at the food security debates, it becomes obvious that the perspectives about what drives food insecurity, such as availability decline, lack of access, entitlement failures amongst others, naturally led to rethinking what constitutes food security and how to address it. Consequently, this also culminated in defining food security as a question of availability, access, utilization and stability. When this is further dissected, it exposes another dimension of thinking about who is affected by food security and who should address it as well as how it should be addressed. This is the question of actors – subjects – implicated therein, and as common-sense shows, where actors are implicated, power in nigh. Thus, in defining 'sustainable' livelihood strategies like Fadama to address the interrelated issue of food insecurity – hunger – and poverty, a specific, maybe co-opted, idea or discourse of food security is privileged over another, hence the food security versus food sovereignty debate (Schanbacher, 2010). As the chapter shows, and the overall thesis too, this is represents a form of power exercised by the actors who define and propagate this idea of food security even within the context of a partnership arrangement which exists in Fadama as with other "new development agenda" and pro-poor development initiatives of the post-Washington consensus era. It therefore follows that one cannot fully engage power (relations) within this Fadama project, and indeed in this study, without critically engaging perspectives on 'food security' – which I chose because of Fadama's agriculture focus – and how these shaped Fadama's scope. This also includes the 'construction' of the various targets as active agents of development as well as the propagation of the neo-liberal development ideals within the scope of implementing Fadama as an initiative which contributes to the growth-led poverty reduction agenda of the World Bank.

in chapter one, food security provides the conceptual space – a crucial example like poverty reduction – used to illustrate this thesis' key arguments about the pervasiveness of unequal power (relations) within current (mainstream) development interventions despite their 'novel' pro-poor, inclusive and holistic focus.

The concept of food security, in international development parlance, has been approached from various ways; it has also evolved over time in relation to changes in patterns of development thinking and development planning (Babu, Gajanan, & Sanyal, 2014; Carr, 2006, p. 2; Maxwell, 1996). The rise of this concept to current prominence has been linked by scholars to the 1970s based on the impact of the shocking rise in world food prices between 1972 and 1973 (Maxwell, 1996). The 1974 World Food Conference signalled the beginning of strides towards "securing the system against risks, like those posed by the failure of the harvest in the USSR in 1972" (Maxwell, 1996, p. 156). At this time, food security was thus conceptualised in terms of national food sufficiency, hence the definition of food security as the "availability at all times of adequate world supply of basic foodstuffs... to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption ... and to offset fluctuations in production and prices" (ibid).

This outlook on food security bordered on national supply and availability issues and thus prompted a strategic focus on addressing issues of production at global and national levels. Food security was constructed as a state's problem and so strides to address it was also state-centred. Interventions were inspired by the Keynesian belief in the role of the state to drive development. In this light, therefore, external development assistance undertaken within this context followed a 'supply' and 'managerial' model through government institutions and macro-reforms – especially agricultural reforms to address shortages in food and agricultural products (Abrahamsen, 2004a; Maxwell, 1996).

Sen's (1981b) *"Poverty and Famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation"* exposed the inadequacy of a shallow focus on food availability as it established the necessity for people to have the capacity to gain control of resources in order to more effectively enhance their odds of acquiring food resources. Maxwell (1996) therefore noted in this regard that since this intervention made by Sen:

> ... it has been impossible ... to speak credibly of food security as being a problem of food supply without at least making reference to the importance of access and entitlement. In practice, it has been more usual to define food security as being first and foremost a problem of access to food, with food production at best a route to

> entitlement, either directly for food producers or indirectly by driving market prices down for consumers (Maxwell, 1996, p. 157).

This latter understanding of food security, with its focus on individual's entitlement and access within the context of a household, community and then the state, culminated in the next outlook on food security and insecurity. According to the World Bank,

> ... 'Food security' ... is defined ... as access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. Its essential elements are the availability of food and the ability to acquire it. Food insecurity, in turn, is the lack of access to enough food (The World Bank, 1986, p. 1).

This definition addresses the issue of access in such a way that it applies to individuals or individual households or even communities. It also brings in the issue of capability and the importance of social arrangements to enable individuals to meet the dietary need that is exclusive to them. This is in such a way that they are somewhat empowered to more actively access food physically and economically.

According to Carr (2006), the emphasis on food access and the individual elicited a deeper appreciation of the social dimensions of the food question. In transcending "biophysical and economic" issues but also addressing local knowledge and perceptions (Carr, 2006, p. 15), this approach to the food question more importantly sought to incorporate the impact of the socio-political, economic as well as cultural environment on the individual's ability and capacity to command sufficient and nutritious food. In this light, the approach incorporated nuanced and contextual perceptions, experiences of, and attitudes towards, the issue of famine, hunger and starvation. This also involves how people, within different contexts, appreciate and navigate food crises. It is what Maxwell (1996) refers to as the second paradigm shift in food security thinking – one which entails a shift from a food first perspective to a sustainable livelihood perspective. In this aspect of looking at the food question, Maxwell and Smith (1992) and Maxwell (1996) therefore make reference to the choice by families or households to rather go hungry in order to save seeds for future planting seasons instead of eating first and later having to face the prospect of starvation or famine in the near future. This perspective, which springs from an analysis of coping strategies of communities during famine – an analysis based on experiences within Africa in the 1980s – thus, provided yet another important angle for conceptualising the food question. This became more of an extension of the access question in food security because there is a rational choice by individuals or individual household to establish mechanisms to sustain their control of food resources. This idea of sustainable livelihood thus entails a drive towards ensuring longevity for the source or sources of income

or food resources. In some cases, there is a drive to diversify livelihood as families, especially within rural settlements, strive to establish or devise assorted types of activities and networks of support that enable them to survive during poor income or production as well as improve their overall living standards (Ellis, 1998).

The foregoing shows how the idea of food security has continued to change based on experiences and changes within the international, regional, national and even household levels of impact. One thing to note in terms of this evolution is the prominent position accorded to agriculture and agricultural productivity in driving or actualising food security especially in terms of the global and national levels. Agricultural productivity was identified in terms of the Green Revolution strides of the early days of state-led food security strategies to boost availability for local consumption and exportation. As such many of the interventions undertaken within the international development community were done by technocratic means whereby states, especially developing countries, had to establish agricultural reform programmes aimed at addressing the national shortage of food (Maxwell, 1996). However, the critique of such macro-level focus on the food security question which simply addressed availability questions culminated in the adoption of intervention strategies linked to participatory methodologies especially in the 1990s. This was indeed the moment in development history when the perspectives of individuals and or communities were incorporated into thinking around food security within the broader scope of development planning.

2.3. Understanding Food Security: Perspectives

The literature on food security is varied with many anchor points and tributaries. The two initial approaches in the current literature are the food availability and entitlement approaches as already hinted above. Others approaches also discussed include: basic income, income-based, sustainable livelihoods and capability approaches to food security (Burchi & De Muro, 2012). These approaches also point to the continued evolution of the concept and discourse of food security.[19]

[19] It is important to note here that while these approaches are very relevant in setting the conceptual context for this study, only the Availability approach and the entitlement approach will be explored in this study. This is aimed at creating more room for a deeper engagement with the extension of the entitlement theory – this entails the introduction/development of the capability approach to food security and broader development. The introduction and incorporation of this approach in this chapter is based on the fact that the capability approach – with its emphasis on improving human capabilities and freedoms to actualize

The food availability approach to food security, it can be said, remains the oldest or initially classic approach to the question of hunger and starvation. Drawing its inspiration from the Malthusian perspective on the relationship between population growth and food production and supply, this approach intrinsically analysed the problem of hunger from the point of view of a sharp decline in food production that affects its supply. Sen notes that this "traditional approach" avers that famine is as a result of the decline in food production and supply – "... a sudden, sharp reduction in the food supply in any particular geographic locale..." resulting in widespread hunger (A. Sen, 1981a, p. 434). For Burchi and De Muro (2012), this approach emphasizes "(dis)equilibrium between population and food," and the implication for food security is that population growth and food availability must be on par – hence food security is simply a matter of aggregate (per capita) food availability" (Burchi & De Muro, 2012, p. 2). According to these authors, what this approach means for "a closed economy", is that food security "depends mainly on food production and stocks", while the issue of food trade becomes an additional variable to consider in ascertaining food security in the context of a more liberal economic system (ibid).

Indeed, much of the literature on food security have attempted to address the predominant issues of food availability, access and utilization as the major dimensions of food security – with the question of stability also thrown into the mix. In Maxwell's (1998) view the competing narratives in terms of appreciating the problems of food in the world include an interpretation focused on a "growing shortfall in aggregate supply, resulting from the interaction between rapid population growths and slowing increases in agricultural productivity" and another narrative which "gives greater prominence to the short-term crisis of under-nutrition currently existing in the world" (Maxwell, 1998, p. 221). This is the food first perspective which Burchi and De Muro (2012) links to the basic needs approach to food security. The importance of the competing narrative – beside the traditional food availability approach – is seen in the aforementioned conceptual and policy shifts from a global, national or regional aggregation of food outputs in terms of availability based on these aggregated scales, to current debates bordering around a shift in focus in the direction of nutritional adequacy for individual well-being and active and healthy life. Thus, the concepts – *availability, access, utilization and even*

their potentials – necessary includes the involvement of the poor in identifying and addressing their development needs. This involvement thus brings in the question of participation in development planning and strategizing with the goal of enhancing social capital and social cohesion towards addressing the development goals for the poor. It is instructive here that the Fadama project, as an agricultural project designed in this form with the aims of addressing food security and poverty issues in Nigeria, fits in neatly within this conceptual and theoretical framework where the question of power in development strategizing remains a vital issue.

stability became constituents of contributions of scholars such as Sen's (1982) engagement with the food problem; Maxwell's (1996) post-modernist perspective; and Carr's (2006) *rethinking the role of society in food security*. Clearly, Sen appraised the food problem from a political economy perspective – food was more a society-focused problem, a social question than a nature-focused question (Sen, 1982). In other words, for policy to adequately address the food problem, policymakers must accept the fact that a conceptual focus on food availability on the national and regional level is insufficient to grasp the ebbs and flows of the crisis of food insecurity. Sen, therefore, argued that addressing food security should focus on the 'entitlement' question – the question of how people can gain command over food resources (A. Sen, 1982). For Maxwell, the two competing narratives imply different implications for policy. He states:

> A narrative which focuses on aggregate supply shortfalls is likely to lead to policies which emphasise increased production, often in high potential areas.... In either case, production may be remote from poor people, many of whom will live in mountainous, arid or other low potential areas in developing countries, or in growing urban slums. [However] A policy narrative which focuses on the food and security of the poor is likely to give greater emphasis to problems affecting access to food, and therefore to focus on income-earning activities and social safety nets. Seen from this perspective, a food production strategy may help the poor indirectly, by leading to a reduction in the price of food, but will be insufficient on its own to tackle hunger (Maxwell, 1998, p. 221).

This critical appraisal of the availability approach, it must be said, draws a great deal of inspiration from the critique of the Food Availability Decline (FAD) approach as noted by Sen (1976) when he initially developed the Failure of Exchange Entitlements (FEE) approach for a deeper analysis of famine and indeed hunger and starvation within an exchange economy. This was the first expression of the entitlement approach to food security which very importantly addressed the question of food access to the poor within a socio-economic and political system.

2.3.1. The Entitlement Approach

Sen criticised the "FAD" approach to the question of hunger and famine as insufficient in analysing this problem, especially within an "exchange economy" – an open economy where markets, economic behaviours and other economic forces interact to affect food access (Sen, 1976). The availability approach is useful for aggregating food production levels within a country, region or sub-region hence the use of national, regional and sub-regional food balance

sheet to acquire requisite information on food availability. This approach is thus helpful for designing policy on production and supply issues, but the approach has nevertheless been criticised to fall short in relation to an adequate and more holistic representation, analysis and understanding of household food problems as well as the dynamics of food security question in the end. On this note Babu et al (2014) aver, drawing on Sen's (and other) critiques of the "FAD", that "information on food availability" which "usually comes from national, regional and sub-regional food balance sheet database" for "individual countries and regions ... provide no information on consumption patterns and relate only to the supply or availability of food at the national level" (Babu et al., 2014, p. 19). These aggregated food balance sheets therefore only "... depict annual production of food, changes in food stocks and imports and exports and describe national dietary patterns in terms of the major food commodities" (Babu et al., 2014, p. 19). It can thus be said that although "... they are useful to understand, aggregate indicators (such as macroeconomic and demographic factors) on food consumption, using the national food balance data, [they] do not provide information on food security at the household level" (Babu et al., 2014, p. 19).

Indeed, Sen (1982) addresses this point even more in his distinction between the natural focus on food production levels in relation to population growth and the broader dynamics of famines. For him, despite the relevance of the availability question, it flies in the face of the issue of entitlement failures since, without entitlement, which gives people command over food resources and bundles, famine and starvation remain imminent even in the abundance of food in a country. This famine according to Sen (1982) occurs mainly among an occupational group (of people – the rural poor mainly) – who do not have sufficient buffers or command over food resources.

❖ Entitlement (failure) and the question of food access

One of the major contributions to the food security debate – one that changed perspectives and attitudes to the food question – is the entitlement theory introduced by Sen (1976, 1981a, 1981b).[20] In 1976, he set out to propose a different approach to analysing famines. This was an approach centred on the question of failures of exchange entitlements as an important explanatory factor in famine and starvation analysis as opposed to the traditional "food

[20] Sen noted in his essay on entitlement and deprivation (Sen, 1982b:1 footnote 2), that the entitlement approach was first presented in this 1976 article, *Famines as Failure of Exchange Entitlements,* and was later extended in the 1981 article on *"Ingredients of famine analysis: Availability and Entitlements"* (Sen 1981a) and the more renowned 1981 book titled *"Poverty and Famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation"* (Sen 1981b) which set the stage for what is now commonly referred to as the entitlement approach or theory of food security.

availability decline" (FAD) approach that was mainstream. The FAD approach was hinged on the Malthusian perspective that population growth is outstripping food production and availability. In this light, the goal for Sen (1976) was to expose the weaknesses of the food availability approach especially within "the context of an exchange economy" by presenting and emphasising on "exchange entitlement" (A. Sen, 1976, p. 1273).[21] The exchange entitlement of what an individual owns describes the "set of all alternative bundles of commodities" that can be acquired by an individual within a socio-economic context "in exchange for what he owns" (A. Sen, 1981b, p. 3). These set of alternative bundles of commodities are of utmost relevance in determining what such an individual can truly acquire and command; they thus enable one to understand how starvation may likely occur for and affect such an individual. In this situation, Sen (1976) contended that the Failure of Exchange of Entitlement (FEE) approach provided a more robust explanation of conditions for famine within modern societies that he referred to as exchange economies. This is because the FEE approach focused on the ability of people – individuals or families – to continue to undertake various forms of (economic) exchange using their available resources such as labour, land, household items, and or skills, to secure the required amount of food bundles they need to avoid starvation. In this light, he noted:

> ... a family's ability to buy food depends [not simply on availability of food but importantly] on the rates at which its labour or other possessions can be exchanged ... with other commodities especially food. If something leads to a sharp decline in the food that these possessions can command in exchange, the family will have to starve. This elementary recognition opens up another dimension in the causation of famine (A. Sen, 1976, p. 1273).

Going further he contended that:

> The crucial fact is that in an exchange economy, the distribution of a particular commodity is the result of exchange, and whether a family has something to eat [or not] depends on what it can sell and the prices that are fetched by what it can sell in comparison with the prices of food (ibid).

Hence:

> An economy in a state of comparative tranquillity may develop a famine if there is a sudden shake-up of the system of rewards for exchange of labour, commodities and other possessions. A sharp revision of 'exchange entitlements' can precipitate a famine even when there is no overall shortage of food. It is this type of causation

[21] He draws on an empirical case study of the 1943 Bengal famine to highlight the weaknesses associated with the food availability approach to famine as presented in the Malthusian analysis of famine.

> that the approach to the failure of exchange entitlements (FEE) is aimed at capturing (ibid).

This view highlights the important contribution of systems of exchange within a society and various socioeconomic factors and actions to the situation of famine or starvation that is experienced by people. It shows the extent to which changes within various systems of exchange play a role that goes beyond the simple food availability decline or shortage in production and supply within the economy. This introduction of the failures of exchange entitlement, with its identification of various circumstances that affect people's command of food resources beyond the Malthusian emphasis on food shortages vis-à-vis population growth, is thus the first representation of the entitlement approach to food security which has since been expanded since 1981 in terms of the constituents of the entitlement approach.

Indeed in *Poverty and Famines* (A. Sen, 1981b) and later writings, Sen addressed the issue of entitlement failure as a major driver of famine and starvation, and by extension food insecurity. He began his argument on the importance of entitlements and ownership (structures) for food security with a note on what starvation is or is not. He notes:

> Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is not characteristic of there being not enough food to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many possible causes. Whether and how starvation relates to food supply is a matter for factual investigation.... Starvation statements are about the relationship of persons to the commodity (or that commodity group). Leaving out cases in which a person may deliberately starve, starvation statements translate readily into statements of ownership of food by persons. [Therefore] in order to understand starvation, it is... necessary to go into the structure of ownership (A. Sen, 1981b, p. 1).

This introductory statement brings to bear the idea that to understand hunger, starvation and indeed famine, one needs to more adequately analyse and grasp the nature of the socio-economic system or context within which individuals and households exist. It also entails understanding how various structures, behaviours and circumstances or changes within this system impact on the ability of these individuals or households, as well as their capacity, to acquire and control the required food bundles that they need in the face of continuously rising food prices, loss of property or entitlements due to flood or drought, loss of employment, and the lack of social security buffers among others as the case may be.

Sen's emphasis on three conceptual categories, endowment set, entitlement set, and entitlement mapping (or E-mapping), provides a deeper understanding of his perspective on the interaction between socio-economic systems and people's access to and control of food resources (Nayak,

2000).[22] The importance of entitlement and ownership structures is addressed in the sense that an economic system which advances private ownership and develops structures of exchange and transfers to legitimise individual ownership. Within this context therefore, the ability of an individual to control or own any resource, including food bundles, is contingent on his/her ability to actively participate in the act of exchange and transfer and indeed owning enough to really partake in the economic process – especially within an open market economy where private ownership of goods and services is fundamental. What this implies is that when an individual or a household faces a situation in which there is not enough to exchange in order to acquire a resource or commodity such as food, then hunger and starvation become imminent. This is especially where there are no external support systems.

Sen describes the entitlement approach as an approach which pays special attention to "the ability of people to command food through the means available in the society, including the use of production possibilities, trade opportunities, entitlements vis-à-vis the state, and other methods of acquiring food" (A. Sen, 1981b, p. 45). This approach, while emphasising individual's "entitlements to commodity bundles, including food", also conceives that "starvation as resulting from a failure to be entitled to any bundle with enough food" (A. Sen, 1981a, p. 434). Thus, having defined the entitlement of a person as "the set of different alternative commodity bundles that the person can acquire through the use of various legal channels of acquirement open to someone in his [or her] position", Sen (1987) insisted on the need to strengthen individual and household entitlement to food or resources that can serve as means towards food acquisition. This viewpoint is clarified further in his position that,

> ... a person is reduced to starvation if some change either to his endowment (e.g. alienation of land or loss of labour power due to ill health), or in his exchange entitlement mapping (e.g. fall in wages, rise in food prices, loss of employment, drop in the price of the good he produces and sells), makes it no longer possible for him to acquire any commodity bundle with enough food (A. Sen, 1987, p. 8).

This point reinforces the idea that when an individual's or household's entitlement set lacks the required amount of food to escape starvation, especially when there are no buffers or

[22] Purusottam Nayak clarifies these concepts as such: "The *endowment set* is defined as the combination of all those legally owned resources by a person conforming to established norms and practices. The said resources include both tangible assets, such as land, equipment, animals and intangibles such as knowledge and skills, labour power, or membership of a particular community. The *entitlement set* is ... the set of all possible combinations of goods and services (not just the one actually being enjoyed) that a person can legally obtain using the resources of his endowment set. The use of the resources to get final goods and services may be either in the form of production, exchange or transfer. The *entitlement mapping* called E-mapping, is simply the relationship between endowment set and entitlement set. It is the rate at which the resources of the endowment set can be converted into goods and services included in the entitlement set"(Nayak, 2000, p. 60).

external support systems, then there is a case of the "failure of food entitlement" (Nayak, 2000). Elaborating even further on this idea, Burchi and De Muro (2012) explain:

> Entitlements depend on two elements: 1) the personal endowments, which are the resources a person legally owns such as house, livestock, land, and non-tangible goods (Osmani 1995); 2) the set of commodities the person can have access to through trade and production, i.e. the "exchange entitlement mapping" (Sen 1981: 435). Starting from a situation in which an individual has just enough means of subsistence, a decline of endowments can obviously lead the person to starvation. However, with the same endowments, a person can still fall into hunger because of a decline in the exchange entitlement mapping; for instance, a sharp reduction of the price of commodity that the individual produces, due to external causes, reduces its capacity to buy food (Burchi & De Muro, 2012, p. 10).

The overarching idea here is therefore that in any attempt to analyse famine or starvation, it is pertinent to take cognizance of individuals' and families' socio-economic position in terms of what they own and can exchange. It is also crucial to consider the socio-economic context – the nature of the economy – and how it impacts on people's abilities to exchange what they own if they own anything. This also includes the extent to which what they own, when traded or exchanged, can adequately cater for their food needs. When this happens, then one may begin to speak about food security in the sense of people having the required access to food bundles. However, when the opposite is the case, then there is a failure of entitlement, which accounts a great deal of hunger, and starvation even if their production and supply of food produce are abundant within a socio-economic context.

The foregoing demonstrates that this theory of entitlement provides a systematic approach to the definition and assessment of vulnerability since it implies that "... an individual's entitlement is rooted in his/her endowment ... which is transformed through production and trade into food or commodities which can be exchanged for goods (Maxwell and Smith, 1992:10–11). It highlights the fact that famine, starvation – except those that are self-inflicted – and hunger are not caused by a single factor, such as food decline and rising population, but instead by multiple factors that are social, political and economic in nature and within and specific socio-economic context (A. Sen, 1981b). According to Osmani (1993: 48), this approach vitally explains the important issues associated with the plurality of causes as it applies to famine as well as the asymmetric nature of the impact of famine on different people. Sen (1981b) stresses on this point while discussing *exchange entitlements, modes of production and social security and employment entitlements*, within the context of the manifestation and

experience of entitlement failures and ownership issues within a context and even between different groups of people. In one instance he noted following:

> The exchange entitlements faced by a person depend, naturally on his position in the economic class structure as well as the modes of production in the economy. What he owns will vary with his class, and even if exactly the same E-mapping were to hold for all, the actual exchange entitlements would differ with his ownership position. But even with the same ownership position, the exchange entitlements will be different depending on what economic prospects are open to him, and that will depend on the modes of production and his position in terms of production relations. For example, while a peasant differs from a landless labourer in terms of ownership (since he owns land, which the labourer does not), the landless share-cropper differs from the landless labourer not in their respective ownerships, but in the way they can use the only resource they own, viz. labour power. The landless labourer will be employed in exchange for a wage, while the share-cropper will do the cultivation and own part of the product. This difference can lead not merely to contrasts of the levels of typical remuneration of the two... but also to sharp differences in exchange entitlements in distress situations. For example, a cyclone reducing the labour farm may cause some casual agricultural labourers to be simply fired, leading to a collapse of their exchange entitlements, while others are retained. In contrast, in this case the share-croppers may all operate with a lower labour input and lower entitlement, but no one may become fully jobless and thus incomeless (A. Sen, 1981b: 5).

These differences characteristic of famine, its experiences and impact, and the need to appreciate them and incorporate them into any analysis of famine and indeed food security, by extension, make the entitlement approach more holistic in contrast to a perspective which focuses narrowly on a decline in food availability. In fact, by demonstrating that starvation involves people's lacking enough food as opposed to food insufficiently produced and supplied (see A. Sen, 1981a: 434), the entitlement approach opened up a new pathway in food security analysis and planning that emphasises the issue of access. This culminated in the later and more popular definitions of food security by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1984) – food security entails that "all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food they need" – and the World Bank (1986) – food security as "access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life (see Burchi & De Muro, 2012: 11-12). Thus, as Maxwell and Smith (1992) and Sen (1987) contend, food availability decline was therefore not a sufficient grounding upon which famine analysis should be built on since hunger or famine could occur in the absence of any change in production if the value of people's production and work activities decline relative to the cost of stable food. As a result, therefore, a focus on food availability fails to adequately tackle the issue in the same manner as the entitlement approach which clearly presents the impact of

entitlement failure on people's access to food. The latter very importantly brought to the fore the second dimension or component of food security – that is the question of access.

It is instructive to highlight here that what is meant by food access may include physical access to food in the market or economic access to food at the household level. According to Timmer (2000), this involves "access by households and individuals to adequate resources to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritious diet..." (Timmer, 2000, p. 286). It thus means that while "food availability at the national and regional levels and the associated infrastructure such as roads and market outlets to buy food determine physical access to food, economic access depends on the purchasing power of the household and the existing level of food prices which could depend on the physical access to food" (Babu et al., 2014, p. 20). This means that a good indicator of food access may be a household's ability to spend on food.

❖ Limits of Entitlement as a theory or approach to famine and food security

The entitlement approach as noted earlier was very instrumental in providing a more holistic outlook on the issue of food security that includes various factors that affect people's access to enough food. Indeed, Osmani (1993) notes that the insights that this approach has provided have been very usefully applied to research and policy aimed at "combating endemic hunger" and this has "forever changed the way" the problem of hunger and famine are perceived (Osmani, 1993, p. 1). Despite the extent of these contributions, especially to the food security debate, the entitlement approach has also faced criticisms from scholars as it pertains to its position on what famine entails as well as the place of entitlements in understanding famine, hunger and starvation, and indeed, in the contest of this dissertation, food (in)security. Among the myriad of critics, the perspectives explored here include those of Amrita Rangasami (1985), Peter Bowbrick (1986, 1987), Alex de Waal (1990), and Stephen Devereux (1988, 2001). These critiques represent a broad array of thematic issues that represent general criticisms of the approach as far as its adequacy and rigour in analysing famine is concerned.

Rangasami's response to Sen's (1981b) *Poverty and Famine* was one of the earliest reactions to the entitlement approach. Rangasami's (1985) critique of Sen and the entitlement approach focused on two main points – the definition of famine and the historical and conceptual contribution of the entitlement approach. In the first place, she criticised Sen's presentation of famine simply as a biological and demographic event that culminates in mortality for victims.

This 'victim-alone' focused perspective which tends to address starvation and famine from the point of view of the failure of entitlement for individuals or families, according to Rangasami (1985), fails to appreciate that in every famine situation there are those who benefit and those who are victims. It also neglects the reality that famine victims undergo various forms of social, economic, political as well as other forms of pressures that may eventually culminate in mortality after a long period of starvation. Thus, to define famine, it must be seen more as a "... process during which pressure or force (economic, military, political, social, psychological) is exerted upon the victim community, gradually increasing in intensity until the stricken are deprived of all assets including the ability to labour. This is famine: The 'pressing down' (Mayua) as the Akamba tribe of Kenya have noted" (Rangasami, 1985, p. 1749).

This critique of Sen's entitlement theory definition of famine in my view more than anything else tends to expand on Sen's outlook on drivers of famines and starvation beyond a simple reliance on the food availability decline. The important role of the social, economic, military, political as well as psychological pressures in reducing people's control of food bundles are pointers to the varying ways by which the problem of food insecurity within a society can be better understood and explored. It also opened up an important avenue for policy reformulation in the light of the identified drivers of food insecurity. This is especially in terms of her identification of three phases of famine before it becomes fatal or leads to the death of victims (or "victim communities" in her words). What this implies is that attempts to address issues of hunger, famine or food insecurity must need to understand these stages – how it all began and how it continues until it culminates in mortality – to endeavour to nip it at the bud before it escalates. Rangasami's (1985) position was therefore that due to the flawed perspective of famine and by extension food insecurity within specific societies, interventions are mostly undertaken late – at the time when mortality has become an issue. Thus, in her view, the "state as well as the do-gooders, the voluntary agencies do not enter the arena, until the process is resolved against the victims. [In essence, the] famine accounts we have today, begin even with the moment of state intervention" (Rangasami, 1985, p. 1750).

The second aspect of her critique of the entitlement approach centres more on the theoretical contribution of the approach that she describes as a failure in the sense that such 'entitlement-thinking' was not necessarily new when Sen introduced it because such thinking exists in old traditional literature on food interventions in India. Rangasami (1985) contends that the "late nineteenth-century literature in Indian famines was based on the spirit, if not the language, of the entitlement approach" (Osmani, 1993, p. 40; Rangasami, 1985, p. 1797). This draws from

her review of a number of colonial discussions on the causes of famine and a juxtaposition of those discussions with the basic tenets of the entitlement approach. According to Osmani, in reviewing the reports of different Famine Enquiry Commissions (FEC) and the refined Famine codes established within the context of the British administration, Rangasami acknowledged "a certain ambivalence in official views [of the causes of famine], as reflected in the FEC Reports on the one hand and the Famine Codes on the other. The Reports, she notes, often take the typical FAD view, but the Codes appear to exhibit a keen awareness of entitlement-based thinking" (Osmani, 1993, p. 41). Osmani notes further:

> She explains this duality in the following manner. The Reports were designed to exonerate the administration from any blame for the famines; and by attributing famine to the stinginess of nature, the FAD view fitted nicely in this design. In contrast, the framers of the Codes, whose business it was to organise relief, presumably took a more pragmatic approach; they recognised that "the coming of famine was due to a number of causes; the decline of food availability, for whatever reason, was one of them", and that even when such decline occurred "it had to be considered within its social and economic context". (Rangasami 1985, p.1798). Rangasami suggests that such pragmatism not only led to the adoption of what was essentially an entitlement-based approach in the Codes, but also influenced the later reports to come round to this approach (Osmani, 1993, p. 41).

Her point in addressing the issue here was to demonstrate that many, if not all the elements of the entitlement of exchange entitlements theory can be found in the constituent elements of the causes of famine identified within these Codes. Thus, if this is the case, the entitlement approach was just a rehashing of the traditional frameworks of conceptualising the causes of famine and driving interventions. It is therefore not an extension or an upgrade of such patterns that already exist in Indian famine literature.[23]

Another critic of Sen and the entitlement approach was Bowbrick who was engulfed in an interesting debate with Sen between 1986 and 1987. In his initial presentation, he set out to dismiss the entitlement approach by refuting the empirical basis of the approach. Focusing on Sen's (1976; 1981) analysis of the 1943 Bengal Famine, Bowbrick argued that food availability decline remained the most important cause of famine as opposed to the loss of entitlement due to war-induced inflationary pressure as suggested by Sen (Osmani, 1993, p. 23). From his perspective, the theory of famine proposed by Sen through the entitlement approach will lead to wrong diagnosis and wrong remedies for famine and it will, as a result, worsen the situation

[23] Her critique of Sen's entitlement approach was however criticised by Osmani especially in terms of the duality that she tended to emphasise between the official perspectives of famine and the perspectives represented in the Famine Codes. See more in Osmani, 1993: 40-46.

and experience of famine (Bowbrick, 1986, p. 105).

Browbrick (1986) contends that every discussion of famine necessary begins by taking account of issues of aggregate food supply and no discussion without this is complete. In essence, a drastic reduction in food supply precipitates all famine. This stance is buttressed through his introduction of three degrees of food shortage in which the first degree entails a condition that whereby widespread starvation can be mitigated within a context despite the reality of food shortage. This can be achieved through an appropriate way of redistributing food,

> ...but the second and third degree shortages are such that not even a perfect distribution of food can avoid famine. Thus famine will inevitably occur in the event if second and third degree shortages, and very well occur even in the case of first degree shortage owing to practical constraints on redistribution, especially if the population is already living close to the level of bare subsistence (Osmani, 1993, p. 24).

His perspective about the entitlement approach is one that sees the approach to propose "a redistribution hypothesis, according to which famines are caused simply by redistribution of command over food (away from the poor and the vulnerable), unaccompanied by any reduction in aggregate food availability" (ibid). In this light, the 'alleged' focus of the approach on purely distributional terms culminates in misdiagnosis and consequently leading to aggravated cases of famine especially since the policy recommendations may mean a refusal to recommend food imports to cover food shortages since the approach seems to diagnose distribution as the problem and not food shortage (ibid, 25-26).[24]

Yet another critic of the entitlement approach in the early 1990s was de Waal (1990). One of his major quarrels with the presentation of the entitlement approach was borne out of his view that the approach tends to deny famine victims agency and freedom of choice. Essentially, the entitlement approach represents victims of famine as people lacking any agency in choosing how to react or manage food crises having lost their entitlements (Waal, 1990). In doing this, de Waal (1990) contends that the entitlement approach was also "overly economistic". Thus, despite Sen's recognition of social disruptions, migration and disease as important variables to help understand famines, the entitlement approach abandons these other important variables

[24] Osmani (1993) contends with this view and argues that the argument made by Bowbrick (1986) lies in the assumption that if redistribution causes famine, then the only viable option in policy is to turn to redistribution in terms of famine-relief. His stance is thus that the entitlement approach does not limit itself to this since it is a general approach for famine analysis. It allows policy to attempt to address issues including total supply by giving extra food to help the victims as opposed to trying to only restore the original distribution of the existing supply. In essence, since entitlement focuses on victims' loss of their command over food; it strives to restore that command through all possible policy means such as restoring the original distribution or by bringing extra food to the needy (Excerpt from Osmani, 1993: 26)

and "instead concentrates only on command over food through production and exchange" within various economic contexts (de Waal, 1990, p. 473).

De Waal (1990) surmised his critique of the entitlement approach under two specific issues – choosing to starve and the epidemiology of famines. He contends that the view presented in the entitlement approach regarding the impact of entitlement loss on people's control over food bundles (such as loss of endowment sets and exchange entitlement) implies that they are (or become so) impoverished that they are faced with lowered food consumption which leads to starvation and death. The entitlement approach in this sense tends to exclude people who rather than sell their valuable/productive assets to raise their food bundles, choose to starve. According to Osmani,

> De Waal suggests that, accounting for such famines – where people 'choose to starve' – is outside the pale of the entitlement approach. The reason is apparently a simple one. According to the entitlement approach, a famine occurs when a lot of people 'have to starve because their entitlement sets have shrunk in such a way that starvation cannot be avoided no matter how much resources are allocated. But here are famines in which people didn't have to starve – rather they chose to starve. So apparently, the entitlement approach doesn't work; and the reason for its failure seems to lie ... in its inability to recognize that people can choose to starve with a view to protecting their future livelihood (Osmani, 1993, p. 35).

De Waal's position here springs from case studies from famines in Ethiopia and Sudan wherein it was clear that many people within the famine-stricken communities designed coping strategies aimed mostly at securing their way of life in spite of the extent of the famine experience (Waal, 1990, p. 479). In juxtaposing these choices against Sen's entitlement approach, de Waal thus contends that the entitlement approach implicitly holds that people who choose to starve rather than sell their productive assets are forfeiting their future entitlements because they will be unable to claim these entitlements since they will have been dead. This is because the damage done to their entitlement leads to serious starvation and death – they cannot come from the dead to claim their entitlements (ibid)

Going further, de Waal (1990) explained in his second critique of the entitlement approach that the cause of famine deaths transcends starvation and incorporates a lot of other factors. This view criticised what seems to be the entitlement approach's "preoccupation with food" in the sense that the loss of command over food culminates in starvation and death. But this fails to appreciate that "the effects of social disruptions related to wars" as in many African famines contribute to "mass migration, unhygienic living conditions and the outbreak of disease, which have a profound impact on mortality and morbidity" (Osmani, 1993, p. 36; see Waal, 1990, p.

480). The importance of these 'excluded' variables in an analysis of famine, especially in Africa cannot be overlooked from de Waal's (1990) standpoint. Thus, it becomes vital to revise the entitlement approach in such a way that the loss of entitlement to food which shares the same explanatory category with the threats to long-term social and economic viability – these are threats to assets and claims (de Waal, 1990, p. 488). This is because, in de Waal's perspective, people starve when their coping strategies fail after exhausting all they can do to cope with famine and entitlement loss. This exhaustion is precipitated by the violence they experience within their context and the disruptions that this violence unleashes on them.

The foregoing shows that Rangasami (1985) rejected the entitlement approach as a theoretical failure based on her conclusion that it adds nothing new historically and conceptually while Bowbrick (1986) attempted to refute and dismiss it as theoretically and factually wrong – an approach that will lead to misdiagnosing the problem and engendering wrong policy recommendations. De Waal (1990) instead called for a re-assessment and revision of the approach drawing on two major inconsistencies within the theory. The seeming confusion with "the issue of 'choosing to starve rather than selling vital assets' and the issue of mortality in famines from other causes other than starvation" thus represents some important shortfalls in Sen's entitlement approach (Waal, 1990). As such, it becomes important to re-position the approach through a "revised account of famine" which takes cognisance of the uniqueness and "distinctiveness of at least some famines" as well as "the centrality of social disruptions to mortality in famine..." (de Waal, 1990, p. 483).

Indeed, there are also assessments of many of these critiques of the entitlement approach as it relates to their contribution to the analysis of famine. While many of these perspectives have their merits and make some cogent points regarding some of the shortcomings of the entitlement approach of Sen, they have nonetheless been appraised as views that emanate from a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the thesis of this approach. In fact, Osmani (1993), a firm defender of the entitlement approach posits that many of these perspectives are based on a reading of the entitlement approach as a new hypothesis developed to disprove or dismiss the Food Availability Decline (FAD) hypothesis. This, in his view, is an erroneous reading of the entitlement approach which is clearly a general framework of analysis of famines and its causes. Thus, any engagement with this approach should begin with this understanding as opposed to perceiving it as a hypothesis which sets out to disprove the FAD hypothesis which in itself, according to Osmani (1993) and Devereux (2001) remains an integral aspect of the entitlement theory in terms of the failure of the entitlement of production.

In this same light, Devereux contributes to this reassessment of the entitlement approach as well as its critics and thus contends that in spite of the immense contributions made by these critiques, they remain fundamentally flawed (Devereux, 2001). This view is an extension of his initial perspective that there are specific elements to specific famines whereby there are cases in which food availability decline and food entitlement decline occurred together, affecting different classes of people. In this case, the rich are victims of food availability decline while the poor face the failure of exchange entitlement.[25] In this contribution, especially as regards the question of choosing to starve as opposed to selling vital productive assets, Devereux (2001) argues that the critics "erroneously conflate the individuals making decisions about resource allocation (asset disposal, food procurement and intra-household food distribution) within the household with the people who will face the consequences of these difficult choices and trade-offs (in terms of increased nutritional, morbidity and mortality risk)" (Devereux, 2001, p. 250). Thus, Devereux (2001) in identifying some of the faults in the critiques of the entitlement approach also identifies some faults in the approach as an analytic framework. By assessing the claims of the entitlement approach as a general conceptual framework for analysis of famines in the light of the four themes of *'choosing to starve', 'starvation or epidemics', 'fuzzy entitlements' and 'extra-entitlement transfer'*, Devereux argued that the entitlement approach failed to "recognize individuals as socially embedded members of households, communities and states, and ... that famines are political crises as much as they are economic shocks or natural disaster" (Devereux, 2001, p. 259).

His conclusion was thus:

> The result [of these failures] is an elegant analytical framework that privileges the economic aspects of famine and excludes the social and political: the importance of institutions in determining entitlements (at intrahousehold or community level), famine as a social process (mortality due to communicable diseases) and violations of entitlement rules by others (complex emergencies). Without a complementary social and political analysis, the entitlement approach can illuminate only a small part of a very complex phenomenon (Devereux, 2001, p. 259).

These critical evaluations are crucial to identifying some gaps in the entitlement approach developed by Sen in his attempt to construct a more holistic framework for analysing famines beyond a simple reliance on food availability decline. As some of these critiques highlight, the approach has seemed to pay more attention to economic issues and little attention to socio-

[25] This view was criticised by Osmani (1993:27) who posited that this attempt to assign FAD to the rich and FEE to the poor is short-sighted and an incorrect representation of the thesis of the entitlement approach.

political and historical issues that are useful in providing context to any analysis of famines and indeed hunger. It also appears to de-emphasise the relationship between entitlement and food as a human right – an important discourse in current parlance. In fact, as Chen and Kates (1994) pointed out, one vital way of adequately addressing the food problem is to construct food as an inalienable right of every human being which must be enforced. It that way, it becomes a responsibility – an imperative – beholden to governments to ensure that irrespective of the socio-economic or socio-political context, people's right to food must be secured and protected. Nevertheless, it suffices to state here that many of critiques explored here tend to implicitly reiterate some of the general thesis of the entitlement approach. They reinforce the stance that analysis of famine and starvation, and indeed food security, transcends a simple outlook on the decline in food availability but encapsulates a much deeper understanding of interconnected socioeconomic and political issues that generally impact on people's ability to gain access to food resources.

These views very importantly highlighted some important issues and limitations that were also acknowledged by Sen in *Famine and Poverty* and later writings. One of these issues involved the limitations of the entitlement approach's seeming narrow focus on access and not adequately paying attention to the nutritional value of food – the question of utilisation. Indeed, Sen noted in this light, that there should be a further shift beyond food security towards nutritional adequacy (Sen, 1994).[26] This implies the need for individuals not only to have access to food but to be able to take in food that will enhance their psycho-physical development. To buttress this point, he offers the following explanation:

> ... a person with a parasitic disease ... may fail to be adequately nourished even if she gets to eat the amount of food that would have been more than sufficient for her had she been fully healthy. So epidemiological conditions and public health facilities may also be important for eliminating hunger in the modern world (Sen, 1994, p. 6; see Osmani, 1993).

The utilization question on food security, therefore, relates to how food consumed is translated into nutritional and health benefits to the individual. This involves the consumption of food both in quantity and quality, sufficient to meet energy and nutritional requirements. It is in this sense that Maxwell and Smith (1992) contend that food security is a necessary but not sufficient

[26] Also see Burchi and De Muro (2012: 18) where they cite Dreze and Sen, 1989 in relation to the insufficiency of access and the cruciality of the question of utilisation. According to Sen and Dreze, "The object, in this view, is not so much to provide a particular amount of food for each. Indeed, the relationship between food intake and nutritional achievement can vary greatly depending not only on features such as age, sex, pregnancy, metabolic rates, climatic conditions, and activities, but also access to complementary inputs (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 13).

condition for adequate nutrition. The other conditions are care and health even though they are closely related. The importance of care and health establishes the dichotomy between household food consumption to individual utilization of food. It also points to the fact that food risks can differ even among members of the same household based on certain psycho-physical conditions and differences. Hence, the adequate utilization of food bundles for individual nutritional requirement becomes a very important aspect of the food security discourse.

It is therefore important to restate that the entitlement approach provides an important angle towards a general understanding of the nature of the food problem. One thing that the entitlement approach implicitly brings to bear is the importance of addressing entitlement failures or mitigating them through social safety nets and food for work among others (Sen, 1982). Because people lose their endowment sets and are faced with 'starvation sets' if there are no buffers within society, it becomes necessary to design important ways to enable them to build or establish these buffers on their own as much as possible. This is in a way a stride towards securing the future – something in the same light of the 'coping strategies' emphasised by de Waal (1990). Indeed, de Waal's (1990) critique of the entitlement approach's confusing representation of people's decision to starve as opposed to selling their productive assets opens up another important dimension to the food problem which Simon Maxwell (1996) describes as the move from a food first approach to a livelihood perspective. This is thus another important vantage point in the food security discussion.

2.3.2. The Sustainable Livelihoods approach

The sustainable livelihoods approach is an important approach to the food problem in the sense that it focuses on the ability of people to sustain not only their food production but also more importantly their way of life. This, according to Burchi and De Muro (2012) and Scoones (1998, 2009), is a more practical – policy-driven – approach that is popular among practitioners and aid organisations in recent times with the aim of enhancing people's ability to cater for their food needs beyond a particular time frame. It is indeed a drive towards addressing issues pertaining to the way of life of people, building on local people's knowledge and survival strategies, especially in their bid to actively secure their future. This is linked interestingly to De Waal's (1990) perspective that the food problem goes beyond a quest for securing food for consumption towards securing a people's way of life; their existence. The coping strategies adopted by the various communities in Sudan and Ethiopia, in which people sought to secure

seedlings and cattle during famine instead of consuming them, points towards concerted efforts for ensuring future production of farm produce and cattle which were significantly associated with the identity of such communities. Thus, from this perspective, food insecurity, therefore, occurs when these coping strategies fail because of the social disruptions associated with famines and conflicts (Waal, 1990).

As an approach to food security, sustainable livelihood has been traced back to Chambers' 1983 *Rural Development: Putting the last first* (Robert, 1983) and expanded much further in Robert and Conway (1992) *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century* (Chambers & Conway, 1992). This outlook on sustainable livelihood demonstrated the importance of rural people in achieving developmental goals especially those focused on improving their lives through participatory and sustainable means of production and practices (Burchi & De Muro, 2012; Scoones, 2009).[27] In fact, drawing on Maxwell's (1996) perspective on the transition from a food first perspective about food security to a sustainable livelihood perspective, it becomes even clearer that this approach entails a drive towards ensuring longevity for the source or sources of income or food resources. In some cases, there is a drive to diversify livelihood as families, especially within rural settlements, strive to establish or devise assorted types of activities and networks of support that enable them to survive during poor income or production as well as improve their overall living standards (Ellis, 1998).

This approach to food security according to Burchi and De Muro (2012) is more encompassing and practical when compared to the availability and entitlement approaches mainly because it not only addresses issues pertaining to the necessities of life and people's ability to gain a living, it also pays attention to the how of actualising these. In other words, it encapsulates elements of basic needs and the entitlement approach especially with its concerns with available assets that people – individuals or households – command in a bid towards addressing issues of food insecurity. In fact, the concepts of vulnerability, sustainability and coping strategies that are akin to this approach are important pointers to its forward-looking character and its attentiveness to unique socioeconomic, political as well as cultural contexts – something the entitlement approach is said to lack (Scoones, 2009; Burchi and de Muro, 2012, pp. 15-

[27] Ian Scoones, one of the scholars who popularise sustainable livelihoods approaches in development, however argues that the genealogy of livelihood thinking goes far beyond this period. According to him, "there is a rich and important history that goes back another 50 or more years where a cross-disciplinary livelihoods perspective has profoundly influenced rural development thinking and practice" (Scoones, 2009: 173). Be that as it may, the focus of this review is however simply to explore the importance of this perspective to the food security debate especially as it applies to recent strides towards addressing the food question in many parts of the developing world.

16).

This approach nevertheless has its own shortfalls such as its fixation with agricultural activities and rural areas while macroeconomic issues and a broader economy-wide issue are hardly its focus. More still, it is said to be more suitable in "analysing food crises and emergencies, famines, or extreme food poverty, rather than more general food security and development issues" (Burchi and De Muro, 2012, p. 16). These authors also argue that it fails to adequately recognise the importance of freedom and agency when considering food security as well as neglecting the idea of food utilisation – with its focus on community production and sustenance. Finally, the approach is also said to fail in addressing inequalities and power dynamics in terms of intra-household distribution and access to food. This aligns with Devereux's (2001) critique of the individualism of the entitlement approach which concerns the choice to starve in a household in which the power to make such decisions resides with specific individuals to the detriment of other members of the household, especially the weak and the frail, during times of food crises.

These shortcomings of the sustainable livelihood approach – especially its 'alleged' inadequate integration of the components of freedom and agency therefore imply that food insecurity is presented simply as a failure of constructing sustainable food structures and or assets – national, physical, human, financial, and social – required to support people's coping strategies. The importance of freedom and agency are emphasised as by Sen, as he expands his entitlement theory beyond a specific focus on food security to broader development. This is the capability approach to food security and development in which the improvement of people's capabilities proves vital towards addressing not only food security questions but also overall development concerns with various contexts.

2.4. Food Insecurity: Causes and Policy-related approaches to Food Security

The perspectives surveyed above bring to the fore some of the important drivers of food insecurity such as aggregate food production and supply decline; the question of inadequate access to food resources because of the collapse of entitlements within different socio-economic as well as political and cultural contexts. They also emphasise the collapse of coping strategies within contexts that are not simply economic in nature. These perspectives also establish four important components of food security: food availability, access, utilisation and

stability. Indeed, an engagement with these perspectives on famine, hunger and starvation, especially within the context of the identified components or dimensions of food security also open up important factors associated with food insecurity. This is especially when one considers the need for and the quest towards policy response(s) to this development question in Sub Saharan Africa.

In the light of some of the factors associated with food insecurity, Clover (2003) draws on some of the surveyed studies to highlight factors such as natural hazards famine, conflicts, structural poverty, HIV/AIDS, economic crisis, and politics to be closely related to food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Her view is that natural hazards such as droughts and landslides are products of climate change, deforestation, soil degradation, waterlogging and salinization, all affect agriculture. These, therefore, lead to famine, which is the lack of food for the population to keep them alive and active in society. She argues that conflicts also help in no positive way to improve things because, according to her, there is a strong relationship between drought and conflicts contributing immensely to a great number of deaths most of which are famine-related. In her own words, "... virtually every country [in Africa] that has suffered famine in the past 20 years has suffered a war at the same time ..." (Clover, 2003, p. 8). The role of conflict in famine – food insecurity – is also highlighted by Sen (1982) who insists on the use of famine as a weapon of war in conflict-ridden areas. However, this point is even more emphasised in de Waal's (1990) revision of the entitlement approach as de Waal addresses the role that conflicts play in destroying peoples' coping strategies thus leaving them vulnerable to various negative outcomes of conflict. This implies that besides the economic aspect of the crises associated with conflicts and famines – as can be seen in the hike in the prices of food items, closure of markets, destitution and displacement of people, disruption of trade and aid flows – there is also a huge tendency for governments to starve off 'rebelling' regions of food (see Clover, 2003, p.8).

In an extended angle, the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the health and productivity of people especially in Africa (where there are limited health care facilities to ensure that people lead a healthy life even under the situation) has been proffered as a problem for food security. Clover (2003) argues that the statistics show more women infected by the virus in Africa, and considering that majority of Africans depend on subsistence agriculture with women at the fore. It becomes glaring that with the population weakening; and more people dying out of the lack of facilities due to this pandemic, the problem of food insecurity heightens especially at household levels, thus:

> ... the relationship between HIV/AIDS to food security is bi-directional: vulnerability and food insecurity feed into the very risky behaviour that drives the HIV/AIDS pandemic; and the impact of HIV/AIDS exacerbates food insecurity, which again feeds into the risks ..." (Clover, 2003, p. 10).

As an addition to these problems, issues related to economic crises and international as well as internal politics also inform food security, especially in Africa. It is indubitable that the global economic meltdown had its effects on access and availability questions either in the hike in the prices of food products or the inability of individual countries to meet up the demands of international trade due to the volatility of market prices that are unfavourable for African states. Clover (2003) also points how internal political issues such as those of land redistribution in Zimbabwe has led and can lead to retrogression within the sector as well as incurring international 'hatred' thus leading to undermined growth and labels. This feeds into the international political economy issue and the use of multilateral powers to cause a stampede in the socio-economic growth of these labelled states. It is indeed within the framework of Amartya Sen's discourse on the political economy of Hunger (see Sen, 1982).

In view of these challenges to food security, a number of policy recommendations have been provided over the years. These are against the backdrop of the perceived issues and problems discovered by the different scholars around food security. Based on the consensus among scholars that the agricultural sector is indispensable in the quest towards poverty alleviation, a number of scholars suggested the need to improve agricultural production within the developing country. Mellor (1999) alludes to the fact that agricultural growth is important both for economic growth as well as poverty reduction. In this way, targeting food problems will naturally require boosting agricultural productivity so as to improve food availability, enhance income generation for the rural poor farmers and an improved ability to control food bundles around the vulnerable groups (Mellor, 1999; A. Sen, 1982).

Attaining these prospects requires an active role of the government in terms of policies and programmes that have targets – not misplaced programmes and policies lacking teleology. Thus, some of the recommendations focused on: the need for policies and programmes, and interventions to influence prices for inputs, crops and foodstuffs; the provision of services; the adoption of new technologies and the development of farm systems that are flexible, efficient and sustainable over the long term (Kasperson, 1990).

> These programmes cut across the expansion of the availability of... food production information and materials and credit for people; provision of improved infrastructure for distribution of needed inputs and for marketing of crops; and

finally the employment of new technologies that minimize food losses before, during and after harvest, including storage, transport and ..." (Kasperson, 1990, p. 288).

This view is an allusion to the majority of views among food security scholars with regards to mechanisms for ensuring food and nutritional security in the world at large and specifically in the developing countries rife with structural poverty and conflicts. Among the recommended programmes and policies were issues of the need for empowerment, employment and sustainable (rural and infrastructural) development. Others focus on food relief programmes, social security nets and alternative employment. The overriding tendency, therefore, is the need to provide necessary, adequate and sufficient networks for securing peoples' ability to control and command food bundles around them and to be able to adequately withstand the unforeseen circumstances that follow the precariousness of food with the adequate buffers provided by means of adequate policies regarding food and agricultural production.

2.5. Situating Food Security with International Development Politics: The place of Power relations

The discussion above reveals the varying perspectives about the nature of the food question and related approaches towards understanding and addressing it. A critical appraisal of strides aimed at addressing the current situation of hunger and poverty from an international perspective reveals attempts to adopt some of the models presented above such as the entitlement approach and the sustainable livelihood approach. Indeed, intervention programmes – both macro and microeconomic – had in the light of the MDGs 2000 – 2015 (targets 1 and 8) focused on agricultural production, capacity building as well as institutional support and reform amongst others. International development institutions and bilateral donors within many African countries – including Nigeria – within the context of development assistance, have actively undertaken these strides.

In the current context – the era of poverty reduction and inclusive and sustainable development – the emphasis has been on building and strengthening partnerships to ensure sustainable growth through active citizen participation in development planning and implementation. In this light, the Fadama project, which focuses on food security and poverty reduction, provides that avenue by which these development principles are being applied in the Nigerian context. This is especially because of the important role of the World Bank in conceptualising and

implementing this programme. However, it remains a fact that donor-led development strategies have been greatly criticised for their focus on rhetoric instead of reality. Indeed, the World Bank, and other external donors – mostly Western – had in the post-1990s era adopted poverty reduction and inclusive development strategies that emphasised participation, ownership and partnership. But, critics insist that their interventions have continued to lack genuine beneficiaries' participation and partnership even though they rely on the hypothesis that more local involvement will ensure the effectiveness of development programmes (Abugre, 1999; Fowler, 1999; Abrahamsen, 2004b; Crawford, 2004).

This study thus fits into this new model of development thinking which is anchored on the discourse of partnership and participation. Irrespective of the pervasiveness of this rhetoric in the Fadama initiative, existing literature on donor-led strides – including those aimed at food security and poverty reduction – are mired in the question of the genuineness of their claims and the issue of unequal power dynamic. Thus, considering the role of the World Bank, IMF, and other global governance institutions, in shaping development policies and programmes, it becomes, even more, glaring their impact in defining modalities to address poverty and food insecurity within contexts where development programmes such as Fadama are established. This brings to question the nature of the partnerships that are ostensibly formed to address these development needs and the extent to which participation is actually practised. It also conceptually situates this study's focus on food security within the debates surrounding partnership within international development politics. This is because there is an intersection between these development strategies (situated within developing countries) and relations of power between aid-dependent African countries (like Nigeria) and their multilateral 'partners'. The next section discusses, therefore, theories of power relations in the context of development assistance within international politics. This is aimed at presenting an analytic framework that addresses the questions of power in development partnerships – in this context, the partnerships established to deal with food security and poverty problems, especially in Africa.

2.6. Analytic Framework: Unravelling Power in Development Partnerships[28]

The politics of development partnerships simply denotes the place of power in development partnerships; power (relation) emanates naturally within analyses development assistance and

[28] While discussions on power relations are very important for this study, and I draw on theories of power from Dahl (1957)

its features. This accounts for the scholarly analyses of the nature of power, its construction and manifestations within a plethora of strategies established in terms of the partnership that has become a common rhetoric in international development circles. Indeed, many mainstream perspectives about partnerships in development planning emphasise its importance for resolving inequality in aid relations as well as aid effectiveness (Development Assistance Committee, 1996; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998; Wolfensohn, 1999). In fact, the 1996 OECD (DAC) report – the precursor of the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank and the Millennium Development Goals – speaks of the need for more cooperation between donors and beneficiaries of aid to make it more effective, while the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank highlights the pertinence of inclusiveness, in terms of consultations, and local ownership within development strategies to bring about maximum gain in developmental strides (Development Assistance Committee, 1996; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998; Wolfensohn, 1999).

In spite of this 'faith' in partnership, critics and sceptics have argued that partnership is merely a novel mainstream development discourse which veils old forms of power relations and invasive development planning techniques and mechanisms (Abugre, 2000; Crawford, 2003; Fowler, 2000a; Lister, 2000). Many of these scholars call for a deeper engagement with and deconstruction of the entire gamut of the concept to ascertain its true nature within the context of international development (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Cornwall & Eade, 2010; Fowler, 2000a). They are critical about the nature of development partnerships in various contexts, and the reality versus the rhetoric of the concept in practice – this is also a question about how genuine the concept is in practice.

The criticisms of the use of this concept also resonate with its status as a development buzzword – a concept co-opted and mainstreamed, stripped of its originally radical meaning, and used within development circles to legitimise mainstream development strategies which are mostly characterised by the old top-down, interventionist models. Critics such as Abugre (1999), Fowler (2000a),[29] and Crawford (2003) perceive the concept as a veil covering the true nature

---

and Lukes (1974; 2005), suffice it to say that I will not attempt to go in-depth into the entire gamut of their theoretical positions. I am however, interested in those aspects of the theories which directly help in analysing and explaining different manifestations of power (relations) within the context of this study. Secondly, it is now common knowledge that no one theory can exhaustively explain empirical research phenomena and the emerging trends in my study. Thus, I have chosen to be eclectic in my approach to theories that explain power dynamics in development partnerships – I chose to triangulate between these theories – since each of them in one way or another is helpful in explaining particular but important trends within the context of this study.

[29] Alan Fowler views partnership more as "a terminological Trojan Horse" because it serves as "an instrument for deeper, wider and more effective penetration into a country's development choices and path". He insists that the concept is fatally inadequate for the role it is designed to play and should be replaced with terms such as "cooperation" and "solidarity" which

of the power relations in development interventions; a Trojan horse concealing the true intentions in aid relations; and a development rhetoric masking the interests of the donors in the actual implementation of development strategies within the developing world. In fact, as Heloise Weber (2004) notes, partnership, like the concept of the *"Third World"*, is one of those terminologies that are useful in the continuous promotion of the aid industry within the developing world and entrenching the hegemonic market-led economic model in these parts of the world. This is reminiscent of Claude Ake's view that in post-colonial Africa, imperial powers "contrived the concept of partnership in development to maintain a presence and some leverage in the colonies and to gain allies in the battle against communism" (Ake, 1996, p.8).

Despite their continued usage by mainstream development institutions and agencies like the World Bank, USAID, DFID amongst others who emphasise their necessity to meet developmental goals, these buzzwords have not shed off the issues that critics allude to. Truly, these institutions assert 'partnerships' in their ODAs to countries and undertake programmes in partnership with different actors – both public and private, and other multilateral bodies (see Crawford, 2003) – with the aim of advancing various development goals. However, as many critics would argue, the interests of these donors override the needs within the countries where interventions are undertaken. It is thus against this backdrop that the theoretical discussions regarding the question of power in development partnerships remain relevant.

Power has been defined and constructed in various ways, and a very popular submission draws from Dahl's (1957) linkage of power to domination and stark control. This entails the ability of one actor (A) to influence or coerce another actor (B) to behave in a certain manner that is not necessarily in the latter's interest (Dahl, 1957, p. 202-3). This perspective identifies one actor to have the ultimate power to, in most circumstances, force another or other actors to accept a situation and act accordingly even if they are reluctant to do so. This is so because of actor A's *base, means, scope, and amount of power* which gives it so much leverage to determine the cause of actor B's choices (Dahl, 1957). This form of power was rampant in terms of aid relations between the powerful West and many African states during the cold war and it characterised the *aid for allegiance* framework of this era (Crawford, 2003). The SAPs era also featured this power dynamics, especially in relation to African states, through the World Bank and IMF loan packages and its conditionalities (also see Ake, 1996). Thus, Abrahamsen notes:

---

for him possesses the capacity to actualise more than what is referred to as partnership (Fowler, 2000, p.1, 7).

> Power in [development] partnerships is conceived primarily as domination, a capacity clearly visible in the ability of A (donor) to get B (recipient) to do what B would otherwise not do. Specifically, this translates into the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies and practices of good governance that is perceived to benefit western interests, frequently at the expense of African governments and/or their poor population" (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p.1458).

Indeed, this representation of power is couched in the term of a conflict of interest. But, power as simply a conflict of interest was not a sufficient analytical framework for understanding the far-reaching manifestations of control and influence, hence Bachrach and Baratz's (1963) second dimension of power and Steven Lukes' (1974; 2005) radical approach. These views address issues such as the control of agenda and a holistic psychological control over people by means of an ideology which enables the one who holds power to get those upon whom power is acted to accept a particular state of affair as normal. Bachrach and Baratz (1963) contend that Dahl's analysis had focused narrowly on "concrete decisions" while "failing to recognize that power is not just a relation between individuals but sustained by the 'socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups'" (Lister, 2000, p. 6). Power may, therefore, be exercised through the control of agendas in the political space and to prevent certain issues from entering public debate (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1458). According to Crawford (2003), power within this scope is that in which actor A controls what B can do through actor A's "control over the *agenda* of political decision making, that is, to determine which issues can be discussed and which ones are excluded as detrimental to the interests of the powerful" (Crawford, 2003, p. 144).

Accordingly, exercising this kind of power happens mainly "through institutions and the 'mobilisation of bias' that is built into them" (Crawford, 2003, p. 144). This is a situation in which "individuals or groups can limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial issues by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals" (Lorenzi, 2006, p. 90). Thus, power is "located in the capacity to create or reinforce barriers to public airing of policy conflicts" (ibid). Here, agendas that are not in the interest of the dominating actor(s) or group(s) are stifled out of the political agenda through what Lukes describes as the sphere of *'non-decision-making'* (Crawford, 2003, p. 144). Maximiliano describes this *'non-decision'* as:

> ... a decision designed to avoid the emergence of values and interests contrary to those of the decision-maker" or the one(s) who wields more power in a partnership... Thus non-decision-making [becomes] a means by which demands for change in the allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated, kept covert, or prevented from gaining access to the relevant decision-making arena (Lorenzi, 2006, p. 91).

This exercise of power, especially in the context of programmes or strategies designed within partnership frameworks between donors and aid recipients, has been linked to "non-negotiable character of economic liberalism" (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1458). Within this context, this form of power can be exerted largely through global development institutions that shape global political (and development) agenda setting and mostly represent the interest of donors and/or rich economies. The exercise of power in this context lies greatly in the manner in which these institutions are able to stifle the presentation of issues with the capacity to stir controversy – any dissent worldview – within the confines of the predetermined terms of the partnership that may be claimed to exist between the rich countries and aid-dependent countries in the foreign aid framework (Abrahamsen, 2004b; Béland, 2006).[30]

An important representation of this second dimension of power within the context of development partnership is found in Crawford's (2003) interrogation of power relations in the implementation of the *"Governance reforms program in Indonesia"*. He argues that while the rhetoric of partnership was quite widespread in the project, it nonetheless reflected huge levels of uneven power relation, especially in what appears to be a stark exertion of influence and control by the donors; same as the nature of aid relations in the SAPs. Here, quite several important reform issues as raised by the people were left off the political reform agenda as adopted for the project. In addition, the committee formed to execute the project reflected mainly the interests of government and the donor community; same as the reform programmes adopted (Crawford, 2003). Here, power seemed to be the ultimate reserve of donors to push their hegemonic and neoliberal interests within the Indonesian political space without really involving the 'people'. Thus, despite the rhetoric of partnering with the government and people of Indonesia to actualise a governance reform programme that serve the interest of the people of Indonesia, donors retained powers to direct development strategies in line with their own desires. Power relations as a result continues to be skewed even in contemporary discourses of equal and beneficial partnerships.

The view proposed by Bachrach and Baratz (1963) was also deficient in terms of adequately addressing how, through the control over the psyche of people, they accept particular norms, values and standards as unchanging and unchallengeable (Lukes, 2005). Lukes (1974; 2005) contends thus that it is vital to understand power within the scope of its ability to control people's choices, preferences and actions through the construction of 'ideals' and their

[30] Linked to the food security discourse, the preponderance of the liberal conception of food security in mainstream development over the alternative, food sovereignty, idea is a classic example in view.

propagation among those upon whom power is acted. This is the thesis of Lukes' third dimension or radical approach to power; this is psychological control, by a strong and resourceful actor or set of actors, over weaker actors and more dependent actors within partnerships. Indeed, power is exercised here by means of ideological co-optation – the control and/or shaping of people's preferences, needs and even aspirations. According to Lukes, actor "A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants" (Crawford, 2003, p. 144; Lukes, 1974). In his view, this is the deepest, most invasive and powerful form of power. He notes:

> Is this not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their [place and] role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they set it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained or beneficial? (Beland, 2006, p. 1).

This form of exercise of power does not rely on violence but the construction of reality through discourse by which subjects are ideologically co-opted and conditioned into accepting norms, values and standards. It can be said that this exercise of power is characterised by the use of a 'seductive' rhetoric, logical and coherent predictions. Hence, concepts like poverty, food security, *Third World* and *under-developed* have been useful in constructing identities for African countries and its people and they are used to justify the wanton flow of foreign aid to Africa (Ake, 1996; Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990, 1994; Weber, 2004). In the same light, concepts such as development, security, and/or 'good' governance have been useful in co-opting African states into adopting the Western economic models as unfailing development models over the years despite their failures (Ake, 1996). Indeed, different growth-driven strategies, within the neo-liberal capitalist economic model, have been and are still being adopted by states based on their perceived effectiveness and efficiency towards advancing growth in many of the more advanced economies in the world. Consequently, poorer countries striving to escape the poverty trap come to believe – by means of the many development buzzwords – that the wholesale adoption of the neoliberal economic paradigm is the only option for development.

In this light, power entails the propagation and entrenchment of the neoliberal economic rationality within state structures and among the citizenry – this becomes the surest way to

establish a market-led economic model within a socio-economic context.[31] This can be seen in some of the donor-engineered reform processes within countries characterised by the cutting down on public expenditure through the reduction of welfare packages, reduction of the civil service; privatising previously government-owned industries; deregulation; liberalisation of trade; and creating of opportunities for competition within the open market system.[32] While there is no attempt to make any value judgement, regarding the rightness or wrongness of these approaches, some states may have bought into the 'false' belief that they were acting in their best interest and in the best interest of its people when they accepted to take on these strategies. The ideology of development thus became a vital tool for hegemonic states, through hegemonic institutions like the World Bank, to exert wholesome influence over many of these poor states – beyond the simple use of the carrot and stick approach which was popular during the SAPs era.

From the foregoing then, Lukes contends that power is broadly based, and its manifestations are more subtly felt than a stark element of control and the control of agenda. It rather appears more "as the imposition of internal constraints, and those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their consent or their adaptation to domination, by either coercive or non-coercive forms" (Lorenzi, 2006, p.88). This is a radical perspective regarding power and how it is exerted on subjects at different levels of engagement, especially in view of the current discussion regarding the nature of power relations within development partnership and development assistance contexts (see Crawford, 2003; Abrahamsen, 2004b). These outlooks on power help to elucidate the nature of power relations in development partnership frameworks that animates donor-led development assistance initiatives such as Fadama within developing and under-developed countries.

Although these representations of power are vital to fully grasp the questions posed in this study, they present very broad explanations about power as domination and influence against the interest and freedom of actors who are under the influence of power. Luke's radical conception of power which is said to be largely similar to the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony (Lorenzi, 2006; Swartz, 2007), addresses the role of ideological co-optation in

[31] Extending this further, the case is also that citizens (within many of these states) were being co-opted and 'sensitised' to (or rather ideologically coerced into) accepting the stories told by government as regards enhancing progress in the economy and for the people. This view does not imply that there are no elements of rebellion against attempts to ideologically co-opt citizens or states themselves. The idea is simply that power can be exerted in this form to a great extent towards advancing the interest of the hegemons.

[32] In the early 1980s, an author argues that redistribution – the welfare state approach – does not necessarily bud well for growth – economic, social and entrepreneurial – but the more neo-liberal/capitalist approaches are important to keep people industrious and hardworking.

exerting control over subjects (such as states and individuals). It however does not adequately address mechanisms by which these deep forms of control are actualised especially within the context of development cooperation. This important aspect of the question of power asymmetry in development partnership is better demonstrated in terms the neo-Gramscian hegemonic approach – specifically the place of the state and the role of transnational or international institutions in expanding hegemonic ideals. The neo-Foucauldian governmentality approach also provides a strong analytical perspective with its focus on modalities of governance in a liberal globalised world where supra-national institutions play very vital roles in driving an economic agenda among development partners.[33] Indeed, these critical theory and post-structuralist engagements with the question of power and the use of discourse in the construction of identities as a means of control and or governance vitally improve understandings about power in development partnerships between multilateral institutions/donors and aid-dependent African states.

2.7. The State, Transnational Institutions and Hegemonic Ideals: A Coxian Theory and neo-Gramscian approach to Power

2.7.1. The Neo-Gramscian perspective on Hegemony and the State

The neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony is centred on how an ideology is used to exert control over subjects, and the role of (hegemonic) institutions in entrenching it within the context of the state and beyond. According to Rupe Simms (2000, p. 166), hegemony is "a type of ideological leadership in which one class exercises authority over another through the control of popular beliefs and worldviews, that is, through the control of culture." Gramsci conceptualised hegemony as the ideological control of discourse within a socio-political space. The control of ideologies within this space is found within a historic bloc who constitutes the hegemonic class. Within the state, hegemony is entrenched and propagated through institutions and groups; hence a particular mode of thinking – 'culture' – permeates through the very embers of societal existence within the state. In essence, the bourgeoisie class, in Gramsci's view, does not need to be in power to propagate their hegemony since they control the

[33] While neo-Gramscianism places emphasis on the place of the state and role of international institutions in the establishment, propagation and entrenchment of world order hegemony within a socio-economic context, governmentality approach emphasis the instrumentalisation of ideas of freedom and autonomy as a mechanism of governance from a distance within the current advanced liberal rule in a globalised world.

institutions that help shape and perpetuate culture. In other words, the state and all its apparatus of government become a representation of the 'will' of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Cox argues:

> When the administrative, executive and coercive apparatus of government was in effect constrained by the hegemony of the leading class of a whole social formation, it became meaningless to limit the notion of the state to those elements of government. To be meaningful, the notion of the state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society (Cox, 1983, p. 164).

Within this context, it becomes vivid why Gramsci's conception of the state is broad and inclusive. It incorporates civil society and institutions such as the church, the education system, the press and all the institutions that serve as agents of socialisation which help create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations that are consistent with the hegemonic social order (Cox, 1983). The state is thus the centrifugal point in the birth, dispersion and entrenchment of hegemonic ideologies, and the historic bloc within this state controls the discourses that are propagated through these different institutions.

Referred to as the "way in which the leading social forces within a national context establish a relationship with contending social forces", the historic bloc is a concept used in neo-Gramscian analysis to explain the relations within civil society with the state in the pursuit, entrenchment or propagation of a hegemonic ideology (Morton, 2003, p. 157). According to Morton (2003), this concept transcends a simple "political alliance between social forces represented by classes or factions of classes" but represents more of "the integration of a variety of different class interests that are propagated throughout society 'bringing' about not only the unison of economic and political aim, but also intellectual and moral unity ... on a universal plane" (ibid). It is therefore within this scope of understanding that one understands how important the historic bloc is in the control of ideological discourses within a state. This is because "hegemony filters through structures of society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology" (ibid). Through these avenues, it impinges on how individuals or groups internalise or accept values, opinions, and standards that shape their reality and existence within different physical, institutional, moral as well as ideological situations (Morton, 2003). Thus, the existence of a strong historic bloc within the state implies that a particular discourse will be dominant within that socio-political and economic context.

Since there are always opposing forces within the state, the nature of the historic bloc that exists within a state can determine the extent to which counter-revolutionary or counter-hegemonic ideas can emerge or be sustained within such a state. Hence, a leading hegemonic class ensures

that it has ideological control of the state to guard against the emergence of any rival ideology within the polity. The historic bloc is vital in this process of entrenching hegemony through its relations with the state and its integral institutions (including institutions of violence such as the military, civil society, institutions of socialisation such as the church, schools, the press etc.). This is why the state, according to Critical International Relations theory, is not a neutral actor but one which essentially is an "expression of class, race, and gender-based power" – or specifically the interest of a particular class within a polity (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013, p. 210). Thus, once hegemony has been consolidated at a national level, it may expand beyond a particular social order to move outward on a world scale and assert itself through the world order (Cox, 1983, 1987, pp. 149–150). This expansion of hegemony beyond the domestic (state) frontier signifies an extension of Gramsci's outlook on hegemony.

Essentially, while Gramsci's notion of hegemony contrasts with realists' conception hegemony as domination in International Relations theory, it remained within the context of the state.[34] Neo-Gramscian scholars such as Robert Cox and Stephen Gill (amongst others) however extended the application of this approach into the international (political and economic) sphere, and they highlight the role of international institutions – transcending Gramsci's domestic institutions/structures – in propagating hegemonic ideologies among peripheral states that interact with the hegemonic (core) states that control these institutions.

2.7.2. Transnational Institutions and the Internationalisation of Hegemony

Theorising hegemony at an international level (beyond the scope of the state) was core to the works of many neo-Gramscian scholars (Bieler & Morton, 2004; Cox, 1983, 1987; S. Gill, 1992, 1993; S. R. Gill & Law, 1989; Morton, 2003). Their outlook on hegemony broadened Gramsci's initial domestic engagement with the concept: they described in much deeper terms, mechanisms by which hegemony is propagated and entrenched on a global scale beyond the immediate domains of hegemonic states. Their focus was thus on the mediums by which hegemonic (socio-economic, cultural and possibly, political) ideologies are transferred to various parts of the world. It is in this light that they dealt with the notions of the transnational economy and the internationalisation of hegemony with the global economic world order (see Cox 1987; S. R. Gill & Law, 1989; Morton, 2003).

[34] For details about the neo-realists conception of hegemony as domination, see Cox 1983.

Cox (1983) had highlighted that within international relations, the state remains a basic entity and in fact, the place where social conflicts take place and hegemonies of social classes can be built. The state is the arena where a historical bloc can be established; it is also the space within which possibilities for the emergence of counter-hegemony reside due to constant competition between various (social) forces (of production). However, there is more to the international dimension to the entrenchment of hegemony with regards to the relationship between states – core versus peripheral. Thus, (re)echoing Gramsci, Cox highlights:

> At the purely foreign policy level, great powers have relative freedom to determine their foreign policies in response to domestic interests... [and the] economic life of subordinate nations [and smaller powers] is penetrated by and intertwined with that of the powerful nations. This is further complicated by the existence within the countries of structurally diverse regions which have distinctive patterns of relationship to external forces (Cox, 1983, p.58).

In the light of this understanding of the inequalities among nations, Gramsci had explained that the socio-political and economic development that exists within these powerful nations had been achieved through years of revolution and the entrenchment of the hegemony of a dominant class. Thus, the consolidation of this hegemony at the national level soon spilled over national boundaries and was borne mainly by intellectuals and institutions which consist a strong anchorage for the development of a historical bloc – or in this case a transnational historical bloc. At the international level (or the sphere of the world order) therefore, it becomes a world-hegemonic model that, for Cox (1983), is more intense and consistent at the core but more laden with contradictions at the periphery. This is because:

- "The world hegemony is an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class;
- The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad;
- This expansive hegemony impinges on the more peripheral countries as a passive revolution, but while they may adopt some economic and cultural aspects of the hegemonic core, they are less well able to adopt its political models" (Cox, 1983, p.61).

Thus, hegemony at this level of international partnerships is not merely an order among states but also "... an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links other subordinate modes of production" (Cox, 1983, p.62). Hegemony within the world order, therefore, involves "an integration of social, economic

and political structures that can never be conceptually separated..." and is "... expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for the forces of civil society that act across national boundaries" – rules that support and help the propagation and entrenchment of the dominant mode of production (Cox, 1983).

Going further in this direction, international development institutions, as well as organisations, emerge as harbingers and facilitators of world order hegemony; they are mechanisms through which universal norms of a world hegemony is expressed. Thus, in Coxian terms, they "... function as a process through which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed", and they have five features which express their endemic hegemonic role:

1. "They embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders
2. They are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order
3. They ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order
4. They co-opt the elites from peripheral countries
5. They absorb counter-hegemonic ideas" (Cox, 1983, p.62)

Indeed, these international organisations or institutions include the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as other multilateral institutions. The Bretton Woods Institutions (also broadly referred to as International Financial Institutions (IFI)), since the 1970s, have been potent mechanisms for control and transposition of the hegemonic world order in developing countries. This is because they serve as global governance institutions laden with the authority to define the scope of development, and many a time their scope bears the imprints of the dominant economic principles favoured by the dominant class in the core states. Again, these institutions provide funds and credit facilities, ostensibly designed, to help boost development; and they are what have been described as mainstream development institutions because of their history, position and role in development. In fact, they are used to mainstream development strategies aimed at food security and poverty reduction as well as other global development strides such as MDGs, allegedly in the interests of the more powerful economies in the global order. These institutions are controlled by the powerful countries (which in turn are constrained by the dominant social forces within their domains). So, the five characteristics identified by Cox (1983) demonstrate the idea that these IFIs play pivotal ideological roles by justifying and legitimising policies that in the long run assist in the expansion of the dominant mode of production within smaller

economies. This is achieved, as Cox (1983) notes, through co-optation and some level of stark coercion based on the nature of hegemony as a mix of coercion and consensus – the imagery of the centaur.

This neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony thus represents power beyond stark coercion and conflict of interest, but more as the diffusion of the hegemonic ideals using various structures laden with the ability and capacity to propagate these ideals. Here, power is more benign than assertive, and it is exerted by means of co-optation. Within the context of development assistance and the propagation of the neoliberal market-led development rationality, it depends on international institutions and mechanisms to co-opt and influence domestic state institutions and structures to advance and legitimise the hegemonic ideals of global capitalism. This, indeed, is the core of a critical theory approach to power in terms of place of the state and its interaction with different forces – material, ideational and institutional – that interact at the levels of "production relations, state-society complex and historically defined world orders" (Dunne et al., 2013, p. 210). This approach addresses unequal power dynamics between, within States, and between states and multilateral partners – shaped by the interest of the hegemonic social class in the West – hence the call for social change.

2.8. Governmentality as a form of Power analysis in Development Partnership

The governmentality approach addresses issues pertaining to governance from a distance. This approach dates back to Foucault's outlook on mechanisms and techniques of domination and or control of subjects. In this form, it represents a process of governance in which there is a strong relation between the "techniques of the self" and 'structures of domination" based on the fact that Foucault centred his attention on the capacity of an "autonomous" individual for self-discipline and how this also relates to "forms of political and economic exploitation" (Lemke, 2002, p. 4). As a way of governing subjects, governmentality entails strategies designed to "constitute governable subjects", and it is therefore all about "defining the very boundaries of action" – 'the conduct of conduct' – rather than simply acting directly on people (Cornwall, 2004, p. 80). This essentially presupposes that these subjects are rational actors who understand the need to abide by certain constructed norms and values. It implies therefore that the nature of governance identifiable within a governmentality framework as Foucault envisioned was one in which power is not necessarily tangible or physically noticeable. Power is rather imbued within the structures of governance and the construction of subjects (and their

identity), the construction of knowledge or regimes of truth through language and the propagation, internalisation and normalisation of such norms within structures of governance and everyday existence of subjects that eventually shape their identity (Campbell, 2007; Dunne et al., 2013; Edkins & Griffiths, 2007; Linklater et al., 2005). In this light, the idea of individual freedom and liberty within a context implies that the governance of subjects therein requires the establishment of regimes of truths that help to shape these subjects and their identity in the light of the interest of the one who wields power.

This method of governance has been linked to neo-liberalism in the sense of attempts within the era of globalisation to govern subjects – citizens and states – based on the principles of freedom and autonomy. This neo-Foucauldian application of the concept of governmentality applies beyond the scope of a specific socio-political setting. Larner (2000) observes thus:

> The most important post-structuralist theorization of neo-liberalism is associated with the neo-Foucauldian literature on governmentality. This literature makes a useful distinction between government and governance, and argues that while neo-liberalism may mean less government, it does not follow that there is less governance. While on one hand neo-liberalism problematizes the state and is concerned to specify its limit through the invocation of individual choice, on the other hand it involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market (Larner, 2000, p. 12).

Her argument here aims to clarify the view that it is important to understand "neo-liberalism as governmentality" because it entails a process of conditioning people and states along the principles of extended market relationships. Reliance on the liberal principles of individual freedom, unhindered and unfettered markets, and the importance of institutions in the governance and control of economic activities within the globalised space, is therefore crucial (Larner, 2000, pp. 1, 6).

The foregoing shows the need to understand governmentality as a form of power, within the context of globalisation, built on the construction of identities based on ideologies or regimes of truth that emphasise freedom, agency and entrepreneurship that serve as techniques by which subjects – individuals or states – are made to discipline themselves along particular economic behavioural patterns that are incidentally in sync with the neo-liberal growth path. It is within this context that governmentality has been described as a way through which governments or hegemonic actors try to create citizens or individuals best suited to fulfil its socio-political and economic interests. In other words, it involves organised practices in which the psyche is

influenced through conceptually reasonable techniques that become largely potent in the governance of individuals, institutions, states, etc (Lemke, 2002; Neumann & Sending, 2007).

Based on these, Lemke argues that governmentality is vital for analysing power relations in the context of development cooperation and indeed partnership, because it entails: a view of power beyond a narrow fixation on consensus or violence; a strong linkage between technologies of the self and the technologies of domination; and an understanding that power may not necessarily have a negative effect irrespective of the nature of the relationship that exists (Lemke, 2002, p. 2-4). These features represent a transition in power analysis from a simplistic manifestation of direct confrontation to subtler and yet effective ways of exerting influence; it shows different levels of power in terms of which an actor is able to dominate another. This is important in conceptualising governmentality as a framework for analysing power relation in development partnerships.

Indeed, Abrahamsen (2004b) highlights the importance of "analyses of governmentality in modern liberal societies", especially in relation to understanding "development partnerships" from a different perspective (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p.1453). This is basically in terms of understanding development partnerships as "a form of advanced liberal rule that increasingly governs through the explicit commitment to the self-government and agency of recipient states" that form part of a circle of actors within existent relations within development assistance initiatives (Ibid). She argues that it is necessary to revisit power analysis beyond the conventional recourse to Dahl's pluralist and behaviourist outlook, and even beyond Lukes' three dimensional radical outlook (Ibid, 1454).[35] This is mainly within the context of the changing nature of the international system, especially as regards global governance and the relationships that exist between states and more importantly relationships that exist at the supranational level – beyond states relations. This form of power relation may not necessarily be equal in her view, but this does not imply that it is necessarily oppressive or in the sheer interest of the donor within the context of development assistance (Lemke, 2002). In fact, it is a form of power that relies on freedom, individual rational choice, discipline and promises. In essence, the nature of power when analysed within the governmentality framework is one in which aid recipients are transformed into agents – choosers and decision makers – as regards

[35] It may be recalled that these theories of power show how a particular actor determines the action of another actor based on the amount of power the former wields in comparison to the latter. This can either be through physical force – coercion – or ideological control in which the lesser actor can be made to believe that the actions that he/she undertakes, or beliefs, are truly theirs and in their interest whereas the opposite is the case. This later manifestation of power is clearly expanded in Lukes' three-dimensional radical outlook.

important issues that will eventually impact on their development. This form of power, which relies on freedoms and self-governance in her view, can be regarded as governmentality (Abrahamsen, 2004b).

Abrahamsen's introduction of governmentality in development partnerships remains linked to Foucault's application to government. Here government entails "an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them" (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 68). Government is portrayed here to involve "techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour" (Ibid). It is within this sense that he stated that the "government of children, government of souls and consciences, government of a household, of a state, or of oneself" all constitute important aspects of understanding governmentality as a process involved in controlling people by means of important and effective strategies (ibid). These are pointers how research began to focus on the depth of strategies aimed to govern individuals and groups within a context. The research agenda thus attempt to reveal and understand these strategies that are employed by different actors to exert and achieve different levels of control (and/or influence) over – or elicit various forms of behaviour from – subjects or objects of power. It is thus in this light that governmentality is important in analysing the system of governance from a distance which is mostly invisible and bereft of obvious forms of coercion and or violence.

Drawing on this submission, Abrahamsen considers governmentality more as an important analytical tool to understand the nature of power relations in development partnerships (Abrahamsen, 2004b). This happens mainly through a new form of rationality – a neo-liberal governance rationality – that animates development partnership in its current form and draws from the dictum that 'to govern less is to govern better'. Governmentality thus entails an analysis of strategies developed within a domestic political setting as well as the global governance system. In the former, a government tries to elicit a form of behaviour from citizens as rational and free people; in the latter, where states interact and where supranational and multilateral institutions also relate with states, 'partnerships' are established, and strategies are adopted to obtain different (desired) outcomes based on reactions from actors (states) on the receiving end.

Abrahamsen describes governmentality in this form as "a particular modern form of power … characterised by an increasing reliance on pastoral care and techniques of normalisation and

consensus" (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1459). Power relations in this context, she argues, does not constitute an "antithesis of freedom; instead governmentality is based around and works through the [very] exercise of freedom" (ibid). Within this context of development partnerships, understanding power must thus transcend a narrow focus on the subject – people, states and or individuals – to equally pay attention to its overall effects.[36] In this sense, power works "through systems of knowledge and discursive practices to provide the meanings, norms, values and identities that not only constrain actors but also constitute them" (ibid). Thus, in her view, governmentality analyses power in a way that the "modern self is both the object of improvement and the subject that does the improving" mainly because the modus operandi for control is freedom (ibid).

The approach to governance within this modern liberal rationality is one in which there is increased "decentralisation and pluralisation of power and decision-making" between state, "non-governmental organisations and institutions" while there are new mechanisms and techniques of auditing, accounting, monitoring and evaluation" which links all actors back to the state (Abrahamsen, 2004b). At the international level where states interact with supranational institutions within the framework of development partnerships, it involves the signing of contracts and a commitment to self-discipline and striving for self-growth, improvement and empowerment.

Abrahamsen's "technologies of agency" is a useful concept for a more effective understanding Foucault's discourse of governmentality. It elucidates the strong link between technologies of the self and technologies of domination within the drive towards governing subjects within a socio-political space and even from a distance; this is the main idea in governmentality as a form of neo-liberal political rationality in current development parlance. The discourse of partnership for her thus represents a 'technology of agency and responsibilisation' wherein developing countries are referred to as "drivers" in developing strategies. They take on the responsibility of ensuring that specific goals and targets are set and met; and in fact, it is only when they are able to manage these peculiar issues of their development that they can appear worthy enough for development assistance.

[36] This view echoes Ferguson's idea of the "anti-politics machine" – the role of the development industry in de-politicising development in its discourse while it is inherently political and brings effects that are not necessarily intentional. Essentially, his point is therefore that the 'influx' of development practice and ideas may fail in their objectives but remain inherently impactful in establishing effects. As a result, analysis of development planning must therefore transcend a single dimensional look at the 'imperialist' rationale of development to deeply engage with its effects which as in the case of Lesotho unintended (Ferguson, 1990; 1994).

This "technology of agency" is supported by the "technologies of governance" by which the partners can keep each other in check. This mainly applies to the recipient subject/state or partner in the partnership who undertakes a number of reformative actions based on the prospects or promises attributed to such actions. Abrahamsen notes that one

> ... of the key effects of the technology of agency is that self-government or self-discipline takes on a particular significance. In principle, donors are willing to enter into partnerships with all developing countries – the onus is on them to prove that they are committed, responsible and willing to govern themselves wisely (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1461).

Within this light, technologies of governance are those mechanisms by which the recipient partner demonstrates self-discipline by introducing aspects of accountability through auditing; acceptance of international standards of procurement within development projects and other aspects of transparency; and openness to international standards. An important aspect of this openness includes a willingness to establish institutions, and this implies developing the capacity to improve bureaucratic practices and technological resources (Abrahamsen, 2004b). The Nigerian government – chapters 3, 4, demonstrates this inclination and 5-show evidence of this – as the implementation story is full of actions and activities that demonstrate the government's commitment to self-governance as it pertains to the Fadama project.

The place of the donor in these areas cannot be under-estimated despite the 'productive' nature of power manifestation within this context. Its productivity – 'creating' subjects (development partners) and nudging them towards actions capable of improving their position – means that development partnership is not necessarily deceptive since there is a striving towards improving the overall impact of development assistance among developing countries.

From this outlook, especially Abrahamsen's expansion on the 'technologies of agency', it becomes critical to state that governmentality provides a very useful analytic framework to interrogate strategies, designed under the 'partnerships' mantra, to improve development prospects. This because it is based on the assumption that subjects or states – developing countries' partners – are free rational actors within the international development circle; that power, within this partnership parlance, works through the freedom of the subjects or developing countries' government; and that freedom is also used as a medium of influence. Thus, among development partners, the neo-liberal governance rationality is pre-eminent and so is the neo-liberal economic model that pervades development thinking. It therefore follows that concepts such as poverty reduction, food security, ownership, participation and

empowerment that are central to current development discourse can very importantly be drawn out within this framework. In other words, the emphasis on such concepts represents a strategy towards ensuring that developing country partners actively undertake the tasks of investing productively in development assistance programmes.

In the context of this study of Fadama, the applicability of this analytic tool cannot be overemphasised. These concepts, especially food security and poverty reduction and other associated buzzwords applied towards achieving these (above) goals – that are in themselves discourses – are crucial to attempts by the World Bank apply the technologies of agency and governance on its Nigerian partners to achieve a goal broader than 'food security' and poverty reduction. This, I argue, is a goal to deepen and/or normalise the neo-liberal economic rationality in the country.[37] In the interaction between the World Bank and Fadama subjects – both government and local targets – as a 'partnership, power as domination appears inappropriate to explain the Bank's ostensible handing over of the initiative of implementation and strategizing for a successful implementation process. However, there tends to remain questions pertaining to the authenticity of the partnership arrangement that exists especially between the Bank and Nigeria as a developing country dependent on aid. Thus, a governmentality analysis of power relations or the strategies of governance from a distance in this partnership provide a very useful lens with which to analyse the diverse manifestations of power as can be identified within official accounts of and perspectives about Fadama.

2.9. Closing the Theoretical Gaps: Understanding Power, Participation and Capabilities in Fadama analysis

As this chapter has shown so far, the neo-Gramscian hegemony or International Political Economy strand of critical theory approach usefully explains the role of international institutions like the World Bank in conceptualising, propagating and legitimising the ideologies underpinning this development strategy. This tends to reinforce the underlying hypothesis of this study: the Fadama project serves as a means for progressively cultivating and entrenching the hegemonic neoliberal (market-led) economic rationality within the broader Nigerian economic space. This is especially in the grassroots economy, which is the major focus of this project. The role of the World Bank, in ensuring that the project's objectives are intertwined

[37] This is because it the dissertation focuses issues connected to the implementation of this donor-led development strategy by the Nigerian government through the National Fadama Coordinating Office and its subsidiaries in various states in the country.

with the hegemonic economic world order, is therefore important and equally interrogated within the framework of this study. Thus the Fadama project was integrated into the broader strategic economic reform processes within post-1999 Nigeria through the internationalisation process aimed to progressively liberalise the economy along a market-led, profit-driven, economic growth development model. In this light, the ideas of partnership and participation within this project tend to mask the underlying asymmetric relations of power within Fadama while discourses of food security and poverty reduction help to normalise such neo-liberal underpinnings of development strategies that Fadama represents.

Despite the contribution of the neo-Gramscian Hegemony or International Political Economy approach to understanding power dynamics in development partnerships, critics see it as limited.[38] Its emphasis on the role of the World Bank, as a co-opting agent, in driving the interest of its hegemonic board member-countries to expand the neoliberal market economy across domestic economies is also criticised. One point noted in this regard concerns the extension of domestic hegemony on a transnational scale. In fact, critics argue that adaptations of Gramsci's concepts to global politics are overreaching beyond their capacity. This includes attempts to extend concepts such as the nation-state to a global network of global network of non-state actors (Dunne et al., 2013). In fact, Germain and Kenny (1998) contend that neo-Gramscian scholars in the discipline of International Relations fell into this trap because they failed to critically interrogate whether Gramsci's key concepts (from an International Relations point of view) can be internationalised in the way that they propose and whether these concepts are fully adequate to comprehend the nature of social order in the contemporary period.

Apart from these alleged shortfalls, the approach does not adequately accord the state enough agency (except that it is a manifestation of the interest of the dominant class) in its relations with various institutions on an international level. Hegemonic ideas seem to be thrust on to the state and it only passively acts based on the ideas that have been implanted into its structures by these international institutions through their financing and advisory roles (Ünay, 2010). However, many current development assistance contexts of development planning have revealed that developing countries aiming for economic empowerment show good appreciation and understanding of the need to pursue certain, economic reforms for the 'good of the country' (see Cornwall and Brock, 2005). This shows elements of rationality and a thought-out

[38] Note here that emphasis here is on the role of the World Bank (as a co-opting agent working against the interest of the local population in the quest to push through the hegemonic development agenda onto a developing country

discursive process. Therefore, it becomes important to look beyond co-optation and force in examining the nature of the power at play within such frameworks.

Furthermore, the neo-Gramscian approach does not adequately or clearly explain the normalisation of techniques of the values and norms into which states, and citizens, are co-opted. Although legitimising particular development paradigms through the use of hegemonic international organisations (such as the WTO, IFIs, and even OPEC) seems to explain how power relation is normalised and accepted, it appears largely inadequate to explain why states and its citizens seem to internalise and own these 'foreign' principles and norms. It is this missing link that the neo-Foucauldian governmentality approach (with its focus on governance from a distance) provides a relevant theoretical anchorage for a deeper grasp of the relations between the World Bank and Nigeria. The emphasis, in governmentality, on the strategic use of advanced liberal forms of governance – built on principles of freedom, self-governance and 'self-interest' – also elucidates this study's focus on understanding the behaviour of the Nigerian government within the context of the Fadama project and the broader economy. Governmentality proves useful for analysis of the choices made by the government in relation to the pressures, if at all, emanating from the World Bank. The agency at work here, and indeed the choices made, are vivid in government's adoption of the norms and values of fiscal discipline, inclusive development planning and liberalisation within which the Fadama III project was (re)conceptualised and implemented.

Although these two theoretical approaches enable a good appreciation of the nature of power relations within Fadama at an institutional level, their ability to effectively explain the experiences of the beneficiaries of the projects is somewhat limited. The governmentality framework has been argued as unsuited to explain governance outside of the scope of advanced liberal societies such as Africa. This view contends that it limited in adequately explaining causality – such as why people are 'governmentalized' and others are not or why the governing principle seems to work in some contexts and not in others (Death, 2011). Death (2011) argues however that governmentality must be seen more as an approach for the analysis of different relationships within global politics where power can be deciphered or seen – it should not be conceptualised as a form of power that is necessarily contextualised to work or not in advanced liberal societies versus despotic societies.

Beyond this, Sabaratnam (2017) faults the 'Eurocentric analytic' character of many critics who use the governmentality framework to critique development interventions and external donors'

attempts to govern subjects in Africa. In her view, these attempts have truly "contributed to the debate by refocusing the gaze of the analyst of the lived experiences of interventions, particularly through the multiple ways in which interveners and targets negotiate the space of intervention..." (Sabaratnam, 2017, pp. 5–6). By this token, they "have offered a sensibility which is more attuned to the ways in which power and legitimacy are expressed and mediated in intervention contexts" (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 6). In spite of this contribution, she contends that these analytic attempts have largely excluded local targets of interventions from the analysis of interventions while privileging the interveners. This "methodological and analytic exclusion" according to Sabaratnam (2017) was not a product of omission, but an inherent habit of "intellectual Eurocentrism" which gives precedence to "Western agency as the terrain ... of the political" but denies African targets of interventions of the same agency (ibid, p. 25). As such, critically engaging scholars such as Richmond (2005), Chandler (2009, 2010), Richmond and Frank (2009), and Duffield (2001, 2005, 2007), she contends that overarching critique of international interventions, using the governmentality framework, has tended focus on how they have been conceptualised (by the interveners) rather than of the impacts they generate. It follows that such analyses fail to,

> ... engage with the activities or behaviour of particular peoples targeted by interventions since these were not considered relevant to the overall framing of this part of the research. Rather, such projects focused on making sense of the genealogies, contradictions and trajectories of intellectual traditions associated with the 'West' as the key object of intellectual concern (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 23).

This methodological exclusion culminates in an analytic exclusion in which many of these scholars prioritised the "agency and subjecthood" of interveners while largely neglecting those of the targets of interventions. Since many of the attempts to deconstruct interventions, using the governmentality approach, neglected the aspect of the "political subjecthood" of targets of interventions, these targets are represented as people without a history, political consciousness and or agency. Based on these shortfalls in the major governmentality literature, Sabaratnam (2017) proposes a decolonised account of interventions drawn from bottom-up. That is, an account of interventions from the perspective of the targets of development interventions. This would take into consideration issues of their "historical presence", "political consciousness" and "material realities" (Sabaratnam, 2017, pp. 37-141). As such, while many governmentality approaches bypass local targets of development – ignoring that they had a history; that they are also politically engaged in various situations; and that they face the realities associated with different interventions in addition to their daily material realities – a decolonised approach

would more effectively help in a better dissection of the problems and challenges associated with development interventions.

This contribution to the governmentality framework shows how useful it is in unveiling issues of power relations in development partnership. It more importantly also demonstrates the weakness of the governmentality approach especially about understanding the level of inclusiveness advocated within current development planning processes. In other words, the framework helps to understand governance mechanisms within the context of development partnerships – some of these include the emphasis on ensuring that development planning is participatory. However, it does not specifically address this participatory aspect of development partnership as well as the internal dynamics – the gamut of the experiences – associated with the development intervention for which these partnerships are established within African countries. Understanding the questions pertaining to participation and empowerment are integral to the Fadama project as a CDD project. The whole idea of development partnership, within this context, presupposes an attempt to ensure more participation. This transcends an emphasis on cooperation between aid donors and recipient states; it also prioritises the integration of the citizens in the planning, designing, implementation as well as the monitoring and evaluation of development programmes. In fact, this is at the heart of the participatory discourse in current mainstream development thinking. It is the root cause of the reconceptualization of the Fadama project from a supply-driven (top-down) implementation model to its current states as a CDD project that is essentially a participatory implementation model. It thus follows that the incorporation of the voices of beneficiaries in the project is vital to the nature of the project.

It is however clear that the simple act of assigning labels to development projects and utilising development buzzwords such as partnership, ownership, participation and ownership amongst others, does not imply that such project or programmes are truly inclusive. At an analytic level, these buzzwords have in fact been viewed to be used to exert power over – governmentalize[39] – citizens in different ways; and they serve as tools for control and influence, instead of serving their true transformative purposes (Alejandro Leal, 2007; Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Cornwall & Eade, 2010). In this light, the claim that development strategies, such as Fadama that are designed as inclusive and participatory, have the capacity to bring about grassroots empowerment and even improve local governance is largely questioned. This is both

[39] Note that governmentality here is described as a approach to analyse modalities of governance riddled with power relations (Death, 2010).

theoretical and practical in the sense that these claims are borne out of a mainstream development thinking while the actual experience of the implementation of such strategies tend to suggest that they actually lack the capacity to achieve such goals because they were not in fact designed to achieve such transformative goals in the first place. It is against this backdrop that this study transcends a mere analysis of power asymmetries between multilateral donors and recipient developing countries as it also undertakes an analysis of the nature of the project vis-à-vis the lived realities of the local targets of development assistance in Nigeria.

In the light of the ongoing discussion, it suffices to note that the two major theories of power in partnerships (such as hegemony and governmentality) that have been explored are useful to unravel some of the stated dynamics with external interventions in Africa. This has been through an outlook on the mechanisms of conceptualising and propagating ideas as well as the modalities of control and governance of subjects. Indeed, both theories show how the concept of partnership emerged to complement the participation rhetoric in current development planning context. Thus, in exposing its flaws, both theories demonstrate that they are two sides of the same coin – two interlinked dimensions – in the critique of the incorporation and practice of partnerships and participation in externally funded development strategies in developing countries, especially in Africa. This means that both the neo-Gramscian hegemonic approach and the neo-Foucauldian governmentality approach to development partnerships are not very separate categories in an analysis of power asymmetries in development assistance parlance. They are rather two approaches that help to clarify the ongoing mainstream process of legitimising the flawed participatory ideologies and processes that were strategically established within an external aid structure, which has continued to face series of crises due to its failures.

2.10. Exploring the Analytic Pathway for the Study

The foregoing shows that while power asymmetry, from an International Political Economy perspective, is very useful to appreciate issues within Fadama, the analytic framework remains incomplete without incorporating theoretical questions about participation and capabilities. Indeed, participation from a mainstream perspective is unequivocally vital for effectiveness and so its relevance in this study is clear. In other words, apart from power relations, the other theoretical approaches that are useful in explaining and understanding the empirical issues

within this study are the capability approach (to food security and development), participation, and social capital.

The capability approach is a broad approach to human development introduced by Sen (A. Sen, 2001), and pertains to the development of people's agency which enables them to freely actualise their possibilities for growth. It has been applied to food security as an extension of the entitlement approach in that it goes deeper than questions of loss of endowments and entitlement failures to questions about the utilisation of the food taken in. In a broader outlook, it also entails a recommendation about the establishment of strategies and or structures that not only address entitlement failures but also empowers individuals and societies to adequately and independently – where necessary – address their development needs including food (Alkire, 2005; Burchi & De Muro, 2012; A. Sen, 1987). This approach, therefore, opens up an avenue for participation in the sense that strategies aimed at empowering people must involve them – individuals and communities. This is the importance of participation in this study.

It can be said that participation is very much an important aspect of this study based on Fadama's inclusive nature. Theories of participation show that there are variant perspectives as to what it entails to participate. For example, the ladder of participation approach develops criteria to measure what can be described as adequate or true participation as opposed to what is in practice within many development institutions and programmes (Arnstein, 1969). Participation is said also to be riddled with unequal power relations – a view that is also addressed within the ladder of participation – as donors and development 'partners' dictate the terms and set the agendas (Cleaver, 1999; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Cornwall, 2004). This has led to a description of participation as "the new tyranny" (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). The question of beneficiary inclusion in development planning is, therefore, a very important aspect of this study that not only looks at institutional levels of relationship between the World Bank and the government of Nigeria but also the experiences of beneficiaries in terms of the entire implementation process.

In the same light, an additional component of this participatory focus of the study is the question of social capital and what it means for social change or transformation. This has to do with the transformative component of participation as many of the development strategies are aimed at improving social capital and social cohesion among citizens and communities to actualise development goals. While there are different theoretical perspectives about social capital and the role of inclusive development strategies in improving social cohesion to drive

local change or transformation, there remains the fact that this study's focus on the Fadama project cannot be adequately and sufficiently analysed without a look at the potentials for the project to advance change through social cohesion.

2.11. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the central conceptual debates around food security, engendering a deeper appreciation of power asymmetries within international development interventions designed to achieve development goals in developing countries. The debate, sparked by Sen's (1976; 1981a; 1981b) critique of the failure of availability decline and an emphasis on entitlement failure and capabilities, did not only provide a 'blueprint' for the 'development industry' to introduce – or as it appears, reconceptualise established – strategies to confront food (in)security and poverty on a broad scale. It also shaped the ensuing discourse and practice around these issues. This created the platform upon which different actors and interests converged establishing various dynamics of power in these 'attempts' to (re)define food security, poverty reduction and indeed broader development strategies to become more inclusive, empowering and less myopic in economic scope.

As the theoretical approaches demonstrate, these attempts mostly undertaken through institutions of global governance like the World Bank represented newer forms of unequal power dynamics. It was facilitated by the deployment of the concept of development partnership which cynics like Ake (1996) saw as a strategy adopted by the West "when the rising tide of nationalism [in Africa] showed that colonialism could not survive". Crucially, the neo-Gramscian and neo-Foucauldian hegemonic and governmentality framework enrich critical perspectives on development partnerships by unveiling of the questions of power dynamics within partnerships.[40] These views implicate institutions of global governance as harbingers of the dominant neo-liberal economic ideology (favoured by core states) and its custodians, through intentional and strategic techniques of governance of subjects or targets of

[40] Abrahamsen (2004b) alludes to the inevitability of unequal power relations in partnerships within the context of global governance. But she also contends that the conventional literature on power which tends to analyse these manifestations of power is largely inadequate to do so, hence her choice of the concept of governmentality as a form of power in current development parlance, in this study I attempt to explain the events based on these available theoretical approaches, including governmentality. This is an eclectic approach aimed at drawing from all the important literature that help analyse power representations and manifestations within this project being studied.

development from a distance. In this way, development partnership provided the context upon which these intentional processes of creating and disciplining subjects were set in motion.

There is no gainsaying that these approaches are crucial for a deep understanding of the Fadama project and its arrangements, including the actors, their interests as well as the discourses (such as food security, poverty reduction, partnership, participation, ownership amongst others) used to achieve its goals. This is especially because of the insight they offer into the ordering of things in the transnational world order, the propagation of modes of thinking and the co-optation of people into these specific modes of thinking, the place of freedom and agency as governance strategies over rational (and composite) individual subjects – citizens and states – under the guise of partnerships as well as the extent to which concepts can play vital roles in concealing different forms of inequality in development relationships – especially those that are participatory in nature. All these are vital for an in-depth analysis of Fadama.[41]

These insights notwithstanding, these theoretical perspectives as critics showed appear inadequate to address questions pertaining to the deeper realities and experiences link to the actual implementation of development interventions like Fadama. They also do not adequately address the underlying philosophy in the conceptualisation and implementation of Fadama as a strategy – focused on food security and poverty reduction – but is inextricably linked to attempts in the mainstream to incorporate elements of the entitlement and capability approach. This thus culminated in the more practical approaches to food security, poverty reduction and development planning in general. This accounts for this chapter's argument that the Fadama project can be better explained through an inclusion of capability approach to food security and development and, in turn, warrants an interrogation of the nature of participation within these development interventions. Thus, it is not simply a question of power inequality at an institutional level between donors and states, but it is also a question of the philosophy of the project and the extent to which those being targeted for intervention adequately contribute towards the stride designed to empower them.

To conclude, this chapter argues that understanding Fadama as a strategy within a broader scheme of international development social engineering requires a deeper grasp of the philosophy underpinning its establishment and implementation. In other words, the identity of the project as well as the actors within it, and their interactions therein, are shaped by the

[41] In fact, post-structuralism generally – critical theory and governmentality – are useful in understanding how power representations in aid relations can be deciphered.

construction of an understanding of food security and strategies designed to address it from an international development perspective. Indeed, this perspective becomes that which shapes what obtains at the national, domestic and local levels of interaction and implementation of strides aimed at addressing the interconnected development challenges of food insecurity and poverty. Consequently, the World Bank's role become crucial as this study interrogates and deconstructs the philosophy behind Fadama's conceptualisation, its establishment and the goals it was set up to achieve in Nigeria. This is what the next chapter helps to establish as it explores the empirical background to unravel some of these issues and how Fadama was shaped into what this thesis describes as a mechanism within a strategic attempt to entrench the neo-liberal economic rationality beyond the national economic context down to the (local) grassroots economy.

Chapter Three

Socio-Economic and Historical Background to Fadama as a food security and poverty reduction strategy in Nigeria: a background

3.1. Introduction

The preceding chapter's conceptual and theoretical debates establish the foundation upon which this chapter situates Fadama within a historical process of economic and agricultural reforms that is deeply rooted in the changing nature of international development thinking and practice. The aim here is to clearly implicate the World Bank as a central actor within these historical processes; it is also to demonstrate how the Bank's internal structural and ostensible ideological reforms or changes account for the (re)conceptualisation of Nigeria's approach(es) to development strategizing in general and the Fadama project in particular. Consequently, this chapter argues that Fadama is a project in time, (re)conceptualised along with the changing face and phases of development thinking at the World Bank. My point here is that through the changes at the World Bank, driven specifically by James Wolfensohn-led new development agenda exemplified in the Comprehensive Development Framework, Nigeria's pursuit of socio-economic growth through different sectors, including agriculture, culminated in the adoption of different strategies and development modalities that also affected Fadama's modalities and overall image. This empirical background, this chapter contends, is crucial to a deeper grasp of Fadama's evolution as an inclusive development initiative, and a tool – I maintain – in the quest to entrench, if not establish, the dominant neo-liberal economic rationality within the national and rural economies in Nigeria.

The chapter begins with the background to development and food security strategizing in Nigeria before 1999; it links this to the place and role of the World Bank in internationalising 'development' – its constructs and 'ideals' – within developing countries.[42] It also explores development reforms in Nigeria's post-Military era when the *'neo-Fadama'* framework was developed.[43] Its emphasis is on the nature of development thinking between 1995 and 2004

[42] The intellectual contribution of James Wolfensohn is vital here.
[43] The Neo-Fadama framework here is simply the reconceptualisation of the Fadama initiative along the terms of principles of the new development agenda of the World Bank, and broadly in terms of the new phase of development thinking within the development community.

(within the World Bank) when Fadama was reconceptualised along the principles of inclusive development. Here, the intellectual contribution of Wolfensohn (1995-2005) and Joseph Stiglitz is explored in light of the paradigmatic changes at the Bank and its idea of development (strategies). Section three describes Nigeria's economic reforms as undertaken by Presidents Obasanjo, Yar'Adua and Jonathan (1999-2015) with a view to demonstrating how the World Bank was critical in (re)shaping the focus of Nigeria's post-1999 economic reforms since 1999. It is also meant to identify Fadama as one important micro-level development strategy that has been vitally incorporated into these economic reforms as part of the drive to address the MDGs poverty reduction and hunger eradication target. In the last section, I briefly introduce Fadama and present it as an initiative (re)designed in time based on the changing face and phases of development thinking; its vital importance to the World Bank's effort to address rural poverty and development in Nigeria buttresses the point further.

3.2. Background to Fadama: Pre-1999 Food Security Strategizing in Nigeria

The Fadama project that commenced in December 1993 is currently one of the most popular donor-led and country-owned pro-poor rural (agricultural) development programmes in Nigeria. In December 2018, the project will have attained 25 years since its inception in 1993. This timeline makes it the second longest surviving donor-funded development strategies in Nigeria – only to the Agricultural Development Programme (ADP) which was established in 1974 (The World Bank, n.d.). This status easily makes Fadama the most 'successful' rural agricultural development strategy in comparison to its predecessors because of its longevity and perceived impact.[44] Indeed, this status implies that there have been very many programmes and strategies established overtime to address the food security concerns in Nigeria since the country became independent in 1960, and many of them have not had the same impact and success.

The post-independence era in Nigeria's economic history, precisely between 1960 and 1966, was predominantly agrarian. Chukwuemeka (2014) notes that during this period the sector "employed about 70 to 80% of the country's labour force ... and contributed 60% of the nation's gross domestic product ... and foreign exchange earnings..." in comparison to the oil

[44] Fadama has also become a household name within the donor community, the Nigerian agricultural sector and among rural dwellers because of its presence and perceived achievements in various parts of the country.

sector which contributed only 2.6% of the GDP as at 1960 (Chukwuemeka, 2014, p. 056). During this period, the three major socio-political regions had unique agricultural products that accounted for Nigeria's foreign exchange – groundnuts in the North, Cotton and Cocoa in the West, and Oil Palm in the Southern region. Agriculture was therefore at the heart of the Nigerian economy and the problem of food security was largely minimal because people were able to produce what they ate and there were enough to be exported out of the country. For example, oil palm was exported to Malaysia and while groundnuts, cocoa, rubber, cotton and rubber were other cash crops readily exported outside the shores of Nigeria (Oriola, 2009, p. 133).

These early years of the Nigerian post-independence experience have been referred to as the agricultural glory days, but this era was immediately followed by an era of utmost dependence on oil – oil was indeed at the heart of the bloody 1967-1970 (Nigeria-Biafra) civil war. There was indeed an absolute and criminal neglect of the agricultural sector and this culminated in a massive food crisis in the country. Thus, coupled with corruption, institutional decay and lack of political will, Nigeria was struck not only by the Dutch-disease syndrome, which condemned the country to one-commodity, but also by low productivity, labour mobility away from the agricultural sector towards the oil sector, high rates of unemployment and a consequent scenario of endemic poverty and hunger among most of its population. It was therefore imperative for different regimes, and indeed the international development community, to strategize towards addressing these challenges.

In this regard, several intervention programmes and structures were established between 1970 and 1999. Some of these included the National Food Operation programme and the Nigerian Agriculture and Cooperative Bank with the goal of providing financial support for agriculture in the country and assisting farmers. This strategy was mainly based on the need to improve food production across the country. The National Accredited Food Production Project (NAFPP) – a less pronounced strategy – was also instituted during this period, by the General Gowon administration after the civil war, to contribute towards improving food production in some parts of the country with a focus on staples such as cassava, rice, sorghum, wheat and maize (Ehigiamusoe, 2012, p. 17). In the same light, ADPs, sponsored by the World Bank, and Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) were also established as well as the Rivers Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs) and the Green Revolution which was established under President Shagari from 1979 to 1983 when he was deposed through a military coup. Other intervention programmes and structures established during this period include: The Nigerian

agricultural insurance company (NAIC), Directorate of Food and Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), the Better Life Programme (BLP) for rural women, and the National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA), National Centre for Agricultural Mechanisation (NCAM), Agricultural and Rural Management Training Institute (ARMTI) and Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF). In addition to these, this era also saw the establishment of the Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB)/agricultural bank, Specialised Universities for Agriculture, Root and Tuber Expansion Programme (RTEP) and rural banking schemes amongst others (Chukwuemeka, 2014, p. 056). The aim of these interventions was clear – boost farm production and improve supply, especially for local consumption and foreign exchange, and indeed promote economic growth. The NAFPP, for example, had the goal of increasing "the yield of seed varieties and enhance fertilizers use and promote extension and credit services as well as adaptive research and staff training" across "national crops centres" established in "Ibadan", "Zaria", and "Umudike" along various staples such as rice, maize, sorghum, millet, wheat and cassava (Ehigiamusoe, 2012, p. 17). This programme did not last long mostly because of the absence of political support.

Among all these policies, programmes and structures, only the ADPs remain. This owes a great deal to their transformation from temporary intervention programmes (for various "enclaves" or state-wide investments and services for rural agricultural ventures) to more permanent institutions within different states that are supporting agricultural and rural infrastructural development efforts across the country. With the World Bank's loan at their inception in 1974, the ADPs have played vital roles within various states in Nigeria in areas of the establishment of "agricultural investment and services", the construction of "rural roads and village water supplies", and support for the smallholder sector – rural subsistent farmers – to improve their productivity (The World Bank, n.d.). This programme was initially small scale – in some South-Western locations and some Northern states – at inception but was later scaled-up to all the states in the country. Currently, all states have ADPs linked to their Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the programme has contributed towards the quest to increase "food production and farm incomes" based on the belief that the "use of improved technology, especially planting material and fertilizers" will vitally improve yield (The World Bank, n.d.). The project's early achievements within the context of Fadama programmes established within some Northern ADPs provided the impetus for the establishment of a more robust Fadama project since these small-scale Fadama programmes were quite successful in

driving up the production of high-value vegetable crops using very cheap techniques of extracting shallow-ground water for irrigation (ibid). The ADPs have continued to (partially) function within the states despite changes in regimes and government types, unlike other programmes. It has thus remained one important intervention that has remained vital in the quest to address food security and rural poverty across Nigeria, and it is currently playing an important role in contributing towards the goals of the Fadama project under review in this study.

From the foregoing, it suffices to say that many of these strategies were designed within the context of National Development Plans (1962-1968; 1970-1974; 1975-1980; and 1981-1985) and vision 2010 as established by different regimes in the country (Sanusi, 2012, pp. 3–4). They were also implemented within the context of development categories described by Chukwuemeka (2014) as "agricultural project strategy", "direct government production strategy", and "integrated rural development strategy" (Chukwuemeka, 2014, p. 056). In terms of the National Development Plans, many of these strategies were broadly conceptualised as strides aimed: to accelerate growth "by prioritizing agriculture and industrial development"; to "reconstruct and rehabilitate infrastructure that were destroyed during the civil war years"; and to "reduce dependence of the economy on a narrow range of activities and broaden the economic base as well as develop the technological based" (Sanusi, 2012, pp. 3–4). Some of these strategies were established by democratic regimes while many others were established by military regimes. However, these strategies focused mostly on driving the agenda of agricultural productivity to service demand and supply, and indeed lead to economic growth. Indeed, because the country faced a backlash from an over-dependence on oil revenue (from the oil boom era (1966-1977) and beyond), the quest to diversify the economy away from this primary commodity dependence called for targeted strategies to revitalise the agricultural, industrial and manufacturing sector. There was also a perceived need to deregulate – this was a call for lesser government interference in the economy as was heralded by international financial institutions. The idea was, therefore, that to boost growth and drive development, Nigeria had to undergo a series of structural stabilisation and adjustments. This was the dawn of the emergence of international interventions for addressing development in Nigeria, especially in the 1980s. Put in the context of this study, this suggests the place of the World Bank as it pertains to strides in Nigeria towards addressing food security.

3.3. Situating the World Bank within Nigeria's Food security strategizing

3.3.1. The World Bank, SAPs and the Economic Growth Quest

While describing the economic history of Nigeria from the post-independence era up to the Fourth Republic in 1999 as it pertains to the quest to advance growth in the country, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (2011-2015), Sanusi Lamido Sanusi stated:

> The economic downturn of the early 1980's necessitated the implementation of Economic Stabilization Measures and later the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was aimed at creating a more market-friendly economy and to encourage private enterprise through the removal of cumbersome administrative mechanisms in economic management. The economic deregulation and liberalization policies of the late 1980's and 1990's had the goal of fostering effective allocation of scarce resources. Furthermore, Nigeria's Vision 2010 was aimed at "transforming the country and focusing it firmly on the path to becoming a developed nation by the year 2010". According to the document, the private sector was expected to be very active, within a market-oriented, highly competitive, broad-based, private sector-driven development process... (Sanusi, 2012, pp. 3–4).

This excerpt carries with it a succinct summation of the paths undertaken within the Nigerian socio-economic landscape with an aim of improving development. As the previous section has alluded, Nigeria enjoyed a huge oil boom in the 1970s but instead of translating the huge foreign exchange earnings into important developmental gains, Nigeria undertook senseless capital-intensive projects and irrelevant spending and loan subscription – in addition to internal looting and corrupt practices by its leaders. There was also wholesale dependence on oil and a neglect of other sectors – agriculture and manufacturing suffered a great deal from the impact of the resource curse. But this honeymoon period would soon elapse and the country would face huge economic crises that required a great deal of work and resources, hence the economic stabilisation and adjustment programmes heralded by the World Bank and IMF (Sawyerr, 1990).

It will be recalled that the era of the 1980s – the SAPs era or the era of the Washington consensus – was characterised by an emphasis on limited government in quests to drive economic growth. It meant that government's "direct intervention in the productive and distributive sectors of the economy" had to be reduced; they were thus restricted to "the creation, mainly through the manipulation of official and monetary instruments, of an institutional policy framework conducive to the mobilisation of private enterprise and initiative" (Sawyerr, 1990, p. 10). Thus, Sanusi's (2012) averment points to actions taken across the international development landscape to address questions of economic

underdevelopment. The World Bank and IMF, acting as institutions of international development in the 1980s imposed the SAPs aimed to address economic collapse and improve growth through various aid conditionality including trade liberalization, reduction in public sector funding and smaller government (Sawyerr, 1990). Within this context, the drive to actualise food security and addressing poverty was subsumed in the trickle-down rhetoric - economic growth, through improved production and supply, and indeed more private sector-focused economy would eventually lead to reduced poverty.

The imposition of SAPs also ensured the imposition of internal mechanisms that affected people and communities in Nigeria. The ADPs, which were implemented through the World Bank loan, utilised supply-driven approach in that World Bank and government technocrats decided what communities would need and went about establishing rural infrastructure, providing farmers with fertilizers, and so on, without adequately consulting with communities to identify their needs. In the same vein, the better life programme, and many of the programmes also established to address rural development issues within the context of the SAPs era had a top-down implementation framework and many of them were short-lived as soon as specific regimes were out of power.

An important point to note was that the implementation of programmes designed to improve food security and rural development was based on the overarching understanding of development – its aims and how to achieve it. Food security and rural development strategies were thus constructed in the light of the World Bank's outlook on development as synonymous with economic growth. This understanding, therefore, culminated in the wholesale imposition of conditionalities attached to development assistance or loans given to Nigeria as with many other African countries in economic crisis to enable them to bounce back (Sawyerr, 1990). However, as history has shown, and scholars have noted, SAPs increased hunger and poverty levels especially in the 1980s. Indeed, the quest to address economic growth to the detriment of other components of development, and indeed the suffering associated with the World Bank and the IMF SAPs, culminated in the crises of development assistance and a crisis of legitimacy for these multilateral donor institutions. There was, therefore, an urgency to rectify this image and reinvent themselves, and indeed the development architecture. This was the beginning of the move away from a myopic or narrow conception of development towards a more holistic conception and a new rhetoric of poverty reduction, inclusive growth and sustainable development. This was the hallmark of the new development agenda at the World Bank in the 1990s, specifically under James Wolfensohn (1995-2005).

3.3.2. The World Bank and the New Development Agenda: Moving towards an inclusive comprehensive development paradigm

As noted above, the crisis of development and external development assistance as led by the Bretton Woods institutions and other bilateral and multilateral donor led to newer efforts to reinvent and re-legitimise development and its framework. One strategy within this quest entailed revisiting the scope of development from a narrow focus on economic growth and the trickle-down hypothesis to a more inclusive and holistic outlook on development (Pender, 2001). This also involved the adoption and mainstreaming the discourse of participation and partnership, and indeed ownership within development assistance. The new hypothesis became: development co-operation and or participation and ownership are potent means towards actualising aid effectiveness (Abrahamsen, 2004b; Development Assistance Committee, 1996; Pender, 2001). Within this framework, partnerships and participatory techniques became even more emphasised as the international development community strove to make the targets of development strategies more involved in the developmental process.

To actualise this 'new' approach to development, a number of policy documents emerged – the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) of the World Bank exists as one of these important policy reforms. This document is linked a great deal to the OECD (DAC) 1996 report, *'Shaping the 21st century: The contribution of Development co-operation'*, and the previous 1995 'Development Partnerships in the New Global Context' – these documents also inspired the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Abrahamsen, 2004b). It must be said that the CDF was an important intellectual contribution of President Wolfensohn (1995-2005) in 1999 to the reconstitution of development and the new development architecture centred on development cooperation, participation and sustainable development. Indeed, a major commonality about these documents was how central they were in terms strides embarked upon to reform the development architecture. They proved very vital in the new perspective of prioritising stakeholder involvement, and indeed development cooperation, to facilitate and ensure effective development assistance. They, thus, provided the policy bases for the new emphasis on (country or local) ownership, stakeholder consultations, and broad level involvement – participation – (of different sectors – private and public alike – including civil society and non-governmental organisations) within the context of development planning and the implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of development strategy. This became the benchmark for development co-operation. In fact, within the World Bank, these became associated with the new development agenda premised on human development as a

core aspect of development, and thereby reducing the premium given to economic growth as the *'conditio sine qua non'* for development (Pender, 2001).

The new development agenda of the World Bank under Wolfensohn entailed a redefinition of the scope development from a fixation on economic growth to a more holistic outlook on growth, sustainability, human development and security, democratic governance, accountability and the empowerment of the mostly poor population in the less developed societies (Pender, 2001). These goals implied a theoretical and ostensibly practical shift towards particular models of governance; of development trajectories; of understandings of poverty and defining means towards alleviating or reducing it. This shift also affected the definition of who constitutes the poor; what environmental sustainability means; and how to actualise it, amongst others. A critical appraisal of these ostensibly shifts nonetheless shows that the goal seems to remain largely in line with a mainstream development agenda that tilts towards ensuring that development assistance is more effective, and ensuring that the mainstream development thinking remains relevant and dominant. In this light, Heloise (2004) contends that the whole aid industry, and development studies itself, is still relevant because of the persistence of the concept of the Third World where aid is needed to propel growth and to alleviate or reduce poverty. Nevertheless, the point here remains that there was an effort to reform development in its construction of ideas as well as its implementation to more adequately embrace broader socio-economic and political issues that impede on growth.

The World Bank, within this framework, focused its attention greatly on drastically reducing poverty and its effects in developing countries. Drawing from its history and transformation from the status of an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in Europe to an institution, which broadly focuses on poverty reduction in the world, the Bank, has taken many steps towards actualising this goal of addressing world poverty. It has therefore conceptualised, designed and implemented a plethora of programmes in various parts of the world and is also heavily involved in loans, capacity building and professional assistance involving countries in the global south. Although in Africa, the Bank and the Fund (IMF) obtained a notorious reputation for their perceived ignoble roles in entrenching poverty and destitution through the 'failed' structural adjustments of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Bank has continued to be involved in different strategies aimed at driving development and growth on the continent (Pender, 2001). Thus, apart from the SAPs, the Bank has also contributed through the PRSPs and HIPCs (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) for African countries (as with other developing countries), and many of these post-1990 interventions were designed within

the context of the new development agenda aimed at empowering people to become effective agents of development. In fact, there have been programmes designed to promote health, education as well as food security, environmental security and sustainability, amongst others. But one important point to note is that within this post-SAPs intervention (or poverty reduction) era, the place of Comprehensive Development Framework, introduced by James Wolfensohn, in heralding the revitalisation process for the World Bank cannot be overemphasised, especially in terms of its impact on the nature of the Fadama project under review.

3.4. Wolfensohn, the World Bank and the New Development Agenda

Wolfensohn was the 9th President of the World Bank who served from 1995 to 2005 – a period in which the World Bank strove to address poverty reduction very distinctly. He is described as the "voice for the world's poor" (The World Bank, 2005b). Wolfensohn's emergence at the Bank signalled a new dawn from two perspectives: the re-legitimisation of the Bank after years of external and internal criticism (Kagia, 2005); and the re-definition of the identity and scope of the Bank as one strategically aimed at poverty reduction through inclusive growth or a holistic development paradigm. He emerged at a time when the Bank was mired in legitimacy crisis based on failures to deliver the promised development and the continuous impoverishment of the poor and the enrichment of richer states through various means. This included the use of restrictive policies to stop the flow of trade from poor nations as well as the use of aid to impose draconian economic reform programmes that caused devastating destitution in many developing countries and in Africa.

The emphasis on poverty reduction within the Bank under Wolfensohn, it has been argued, demonstrated changes within the Bank – mostly because of the attention paid to the human and social dimensions of development (Bourguignon, 2005). In in this light, Sen noted that one of the achievements of the Wolfensohn era was "to make poverty reduction the overarching priority of the World Bank" (Kagia, 2005, p. 148). This draws from Wolfensohn's more "humane – and also more productive – conviction that what is needed is constructive help in advancing 'comprehensive development'" as opposed to "a severe view of development as a 'fierce process that constantly demands 'blood, sweat and tears'" (ibid). Thus, Angus Deaton notes:

> Under Jim Wolfensohn, the Bank's poverty reduction mission is clear, and it has held steady to that course for long enough... The institution has also become serious about

> monitoring poverty, which was never previously the case. The Millennium Development Goals mark to a significant degree the adoption of Wolfensohn's World Bank agenda by the world as a whole... (Kagia, 2005, p. 152).

This focus on poverty reduction signified the re-evaluation of the previous focus was on growing economies in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through economic stabilisation and structural adjustments characterised by trade liberalisation, currency devaluation, reduced public expenditure, openness to foreign investment and price stabilisation – all in the bid to drive economic growth as a means to development. As Bourguignon notes, with the arrival of Wolfensohn, the new agenda became one in which the "emphasis on poverty reduction was fully articulated in growth, no longer antagonistic to it" (Kagia, 2005, p. 107). In other words, a quest to overcome poverty, Sir Nicholas Stern argues, had to recognise the need for economic growth:

> Success in fighting poverty and improving living standards and well-being in the developing has three prerequisites. It requires, first, an understanding of the meaning of poverty and of development; second, an understanding of what drives them; and third, a strategy focused on these drivers together with the stability to translate that strategy into action" (Kagia, 2005, p. 149).

Indeed, re-defining the scope of development also meant re-conceptualising poverty. It meant, moving away from a SAPs-era narrow focus on lack of income, low income, inadequate supply or consumption to broader issues pertaining to individual and community development consisting of the inability to achieve standards. The latter addresses some of the questions raised by Amartya Sen in his entitlement and capability approaches to development. Thus:

> People are defined as poor if they are unable to live the kind of life they value. Lacking adequate food or shelter, they also lack the education or healthcare that would permit them to live better. They are extremely vulnerable to illness, violence, economic dislocation, and natural disaster. They are poorly served by institutions of state and society. And they often find themselves powerless to influence key decisions affecting their lives (Kagia, 2005, p. 11).

This definition, it must be said, is carved out of the perspectives emanating from the voices and experiences of many poor people across the world and sieved through the interviews conducted by the World Bank under Wolfensohn to understand poverty from the voices of the poor. It is thus from these perspectives that it became even clearer that poverty transcends "higher consumption and income" as the poor emphasised broader issues pertaining to "access to a secure social environment, freedom from violence, a voice in decision making, and the power to hold others accountable for their actions" (ibid). In addition, this newer understanding of poverty required the establishment of effective and consistent strategies that recognise these

economic, human and social dimensions of poverty so as to more adequately address them. The proposal and subsequent adoption of the CDF in 1999 was thus a major turning point in this new quest to address poverty from a multi-dimensional approach.

3.5. The Comprehensive Development Framework: Wolfensohn's Legacy

The CDF represents Wolfensohn's major contribution to reshape the development landscape and modalities at the World Bank. This framework was proposed serve as a blueprint for actualising a comprehensive development paradigm in an era of poverty reduction. This is in the light of its call for a new holistic, integrated and all-encompassing approach to development (Blake, 2000; Kagia, 2005; Pender, 2001). The CDF has four interdependent principles, namely: "long-term holistic vision; country ownership; partnership; and a focus on development results" (The World Bank, 2001, p. 1). These principles envision the establishment of institutions, structures and indeed a culture or system of action geared towards ensuring aid effectiveness and sustaining development in an all-encompassing manner. This will address economic as well as physical, social and human development issues, especially poverty reduction among the world's poorest regions.

Due to the failures of SAPs in sub-Saharan Africa and the consequent criticisms targeted at the Bank, IMF, WTO and others, Wolfensohn's emphasised the need to "redirect" the World Bank to an institution "that is results-based and not volume – or – procedure-based" in the quest towards adequately addressing poverty (The World Bank, 2005b, p. 129; Wolfensohn, 1999). The CDF was thus extremely important in this quest in that it provided a foundational basis upon which long-term sustainable development programmes could be established, implemented and monitored for results. In his proposal, Wolfensohn averred:

> The Comprehensive Development Framework I am proposing highlights a more inclusive picture of development. We cannot adopt a system in which the macroeconomic and financial are considered apart from the structural, social and human aspects, and vice versa... A wrongful step on the macroeconomic side can have dire consequences for the structural, social and human dimensions. In addition, profligate and unbridled spending without regard to resource constraints and fiscal and monetary policy can also have dire consequences (The World Bank, 2005b, p. 132).

He went further to highlight the importance of the new framework to be flexible in order to provide room to accommodate various country-specific conditions for implementation and enable the strategic organisation and streamlining of policies, programmes and project and

indeed internal reform processes (Ibid, 133). Indeed, these require intense attention, especially since programmes within this new focus on development require longer planning and implementation times as undertaken within the context of partnerships that are country-led and country-owned. This also importantly entails consultations and collaborations within a multi-stakeholder framework that includes donors, the private sector, multilateral partners, United Nations (UN) agencies, local civil society as well as the Bank. Indeed the programmes established through these partnerships and or cooperative efforts must therefore also measurable so as to track results and its impact in the quest to reduce poverty (Wolfensohn, 1999). On this note, Wolfensohn and Fishcer (2000) highlights the centrality of CDF within the World Bank's new development agenda. Its focus lies on the need to address poverty through an integrated process that involves countries, their citizens, and various other partners (private sector, donors and civil society), within a structured framework that is forward-looking and able to engender a balanced implementation of "good macroeconomic and financial management with sound social, structural and human policies" (Wolfensohn & Fisher, 2000).

A crucial point about the CDF concerns its avowed "voluntary" process where each country decides and owns its "priorities and programs" especially through partnerships and coordination at different levels and with different actors to enhance "efficiency and coherence" in development planning (Wolfensohn & Fisher, 2000). These indeed draw from the four vital principles of the CDF that emphasise the importance of development programmes that have long-term impacts and are owned and led by countries and are also targeted at results in the long run – results that are measurable to enable an understanding of milestones achieved in quests to address poverty and under-development.

In this regard, Stiglitz reiterates the crucial responsibility on countries to steer partnerships and own development programmes for a deeper attainment of the trickle-down effect on poverty (reduction) proposed through the CDF:

> The framework emphasised the need for each country to identify facets of its economy – and of society more broadly – that were in most need of being strengthened. Identifying and acting on these key bottlenecks would yield returns elsewhere because of the strong linkages among the sectors. For example, improved productivity in the rural sector or better access to export markets would do little good if the country lacked roads and harbours for transporting crops. More positively, in a malaria-infested country, a malaria eradication program could increase production and even increase effective land supply as parts of the country that were almost uninhabitable because of infestation become liveable. And if more


> individuals live longer because of better health, that would increase the returns to education and hence the incentive to invest in it (Kagia, 2005, p. 151).

Drawing on this, it is clearer to understand how important the CDF has been in the current strides within the Bank, especially in the development of strategies such as the PRSPs (within the context of the HIPC), MDGs and even the nascent SDGs that aim to address development from a more holistic approach in which poverty reduction remains central. Its vitality in the Bank's quest to more effectively monitor and improve development planning is emphasised by Francois Bourguignon. He notes that the Bank "... was orientating itself towards doing business in a medium-term perspective, moving away from ad hoc investment projects to program lending with adequate fiduciary safeguards and towards policy-consistent frameworks with clear targets for results and progress monitoring" (Kagia, 2005, p. 14). Thus, in driving towards a system rooted on results and performance, the CDF proved very vital as it usefully provided "a clear monitoring framework" for the Bank's engagement with "governments and other donors" as well as a vehicle for coordination and harmonization among donors" (ibid).

Within the CDF context, the actors include government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, including regional banks, the private sector, civil society and indeed citizens (Wolfensohn, 1999). The central ideas within this framework are country ownership and partnerships in development planning towards advancing the goal of poverty reduction. Since the CDF was borne out of the quest to re-invent the Bank as one which has the interest of the poor at heart, its modalities were designed to transcend the aid conditionality process that characterised development assistance couched in the Washington consensus rhetoric. In Bourguignon's perspective, this former order "devoted little attention to policies need to reduce poverty... And they said nothing about governance and institutions, empowerment, democratic representation, country ownership for successful policy reform or cost and pace of transformation – issues closely related to the political economy of reform" (Kagia, 2005, p. 14). These were the issues that the CDF helped to centralise. Specifically, within the context of the 'Two Pillars of Development' strategy adopted by the World Bank, under Wolfensohn, they were shaped to ensure that development assistance helps to reduce poverty and drives growth in developing countries while paying attention to specific contexts and their uniqueness (Kagia, 2005, p. 149).[45]

[45] Here, Sir Nicholas Stern speaks about these two pillars of development as a very important aspect of Wolfensohn's contribution to the World Bank's drive to centralize poverty reduction in its workings.

Wolfensohn believed that actions and actors within the development arena needed a point of interaction to actualise poverty reduction. This is because the CDF emerged on the back of the view that "the way aid is delivered, not just its content, has an important influence on its effectiveness, and that poverty reduction is the fundamental goal of international aid" (McEuen, 2003, p. 1; The World Bank, 2003, p. 1). As part of the reconceptualization of development and its scope, Wolfensohn set out a "possible framework for presenting and managing a holistic approach to the structural, social and human aspects of development" which are themselves aimed at balancing the macroeconomic considerations for development (Wolfensohn, 1999, p. 10). Within the context of this framework, the structural aspect of development consisted of a "good and clean government" – which required the country to have "an educated and well organized government" and "capacity building, an open legislative and transparent regulatory system, properly trained and remunerated officials and an absolute commitment to clean government" – "an effective legal and justice system", "a well organised and supervised financial system" and "a social safety net and social programs" (Wolfensohn, 1999, pp. 10–11). The human development aspect of this framework includes: "Education and Knowledge institutions" – involving the establishment of the universal primary education for boys and girls, an open and competitive system of secondary and tertiary education as well as adult literacy programmes designed along the technological and social needs of the country – and "health and population issues" (ibid, 13-14). The physical issues considered in this framework include Water and Sewerage; Power or Energy; Roads, Transportation and Telecommunication; and Sustainable Development, Environment, and Cultural Issues. Finally, in relation to specific strategies, this framework pays attention to rural and urban strategies as well as the private sector and other special national considerations that are country specific (ibid, 18-20). These aspects of development in Wolfensohn's view had to be linked to the various actors to enable the actualisation of the goal as exemplified in the diagram below.



(Source: www.worldbank.org)

It must be said therefore that the CDF Matrix[46] designed along with CDF proposal (as shown above), demonstrates the areas of intersection between different actors within the process of establishing development programmes aimed at addressing poverty and underdevelopment. As Richard Blake argues, "the core of the CDF is a matrix showing the interaction among the structural, social and human elements of development and actors involved with development" (Blake, 2000, p. 162). This matrix helps to graphically represent where these interactions and partnerships can be built between the government who leads the process and steers the partnerships within the context of national programmes for poverty reduction and economic growth.

As the Matrix shows, the horizontal columns reflect the four human aspects of development as conceptualised by the World Bank, namely: structural and institutional; social (human, gender and labour); Infrastructural (rural, urban and the environment); and Macroeconomic (finance and trade). The vertical column shows the various actors spanning from the government – all levels, including parliamentary bodies – multilateral and bilateral agencies (such as United

[46] http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01013/WEB/IMAGES/CDFMATRI.PDF

Nations agencies, European Union (EU), Regional Banks (like the Africa Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank and IMF), civil society in all its forms and the private sector – both domestic and foreign (Wolfensohn, 1999, pp. 21–22). In identifying the various aspects of development and intervening actors, the CDF matrix enables a system of information flows that enables a transparent process for the coordination of efforts and monitoring and evaluating how effective programmes and strategies implemented are. To reiterate the essence of country ownership of development strategies established within the context of the CDF, Wolfensohn noted that matrix does not give the World Bank the role of coordinating programs within the matrix. On the contrary, "it is a tool to have greater cooperation, transparency, partnership" (ibid, 23).

Within the context of the four major principles of the CDF, Blake argues that the matrix is designed to assist the identified development actors to effectively coordinate their efforts using these principles as follows:

> First, individual countries ... should take the lead in setting their own development goals and strategies as well as ... ownership of development policies and programs, with other actors assisting through the coordination of the host country. Second, development should be holistic, focusing on social problems as well as economic ones... Thus, a development policy that addressed urban education to the exclusion of rural health would not be considered ideal. Third, all development actors should be involved in formulating and implementing development policy. As national governments set their development agenda, they should use the CDF matrix to include other actors in the planning of programs and projects. The CDF should promote transparency, information sharing, and overall coordination among the various actors by providing a place where all actors can "see quickly what is [and what is not] going on in a country from the point of view of structural and social development." The CDF thus focuses on the important process of formulating development policies, as well as the identification and coordination of the actors who will implement them. Finally, development should be a "participatory process" with development policies taking a long-term focus. As far as possible "within the political climate prevailing in each country," development should be based on broad national consultation and consensus (Blake, 2000, pp. 163–165).

From this excerpt, the CDF vividly appear to be centred on the principles of partnerships, ownership and indeed multi-stakeholder participation in decision making towards addressing challenges that transcend simple macroeconomic considerations. It is in this light that Wolfensohn concluded his remarks on the CDF stating: "I personally believe that unless we adopt this approach on a comprehensive, transparent, and accountable basis, we will fail in the global challenge of equitable sustainable development and poverty alleviation. We will fail to build a sustainable international architecture for the coming millennium" (Wolfensohn, 1999,

p. 31). It is interesting therefore to note that this singular framework with its underlying principles provided a basis for action and indeed the foundation for development planning towards addressing poverty as donors bought into this strategy and adopted the framework and it thus became ubiquitous in the post-2000 era.

Indeed, the ubiquitous nature of the CDF can be further seen in terms of the major vehicle established to implement it – "the poverty reduction strategy process adopted by the World Bank and the IMF in 1999" (Kagia, 2005, p. 13). According to Wolfensohn and Fischer,

> The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is based on CDF principles. It integrates poverty-reducing policies into a coherent, growth-oriented macroeconomic framework. As with the CDF, national governments are responsible for the preparation of PRSPs with the participation of domestic and external partners. External partners are encouraged to assist governments in preparing PRSPs, and to link their development efforts to them... Thus, the PRSP is an operational vehicle - which can be a specific output of the CDF or of processes based on CDF principles – that is intended to translate a country's poverty reduction strategy into a focused action plan (Wolfensohn & Fisher, 2000).

It follows that most of the national strategies for poverty reduction within many developing countries (such as the initial pilot countries of the PRSPs like as Ghana, Uganda and Bolivia) were conceptualised according to the four principles of the CDF with emphasis not only on participation, country-ownership and country-led partnerships as well as results orientation, but also in line with the overarching perspective that poverty reduction can be achieved through international aid and economic growth. This is a central point in the 'two-pillars of development' strategy, especially in the post-2000 era, which holds that overcoming poverty requires economic growth – growth driven by the private sector, hence the necessity of building an investment climate conducive to private sector growth and productivity. In Sir Nicholas Stern's view, therefore, "investing in and empowering people", particularly the poor would enable "them to participate in growth, both as drivers and beneficiaries". Thus, empowerment is both "an instrument for achieving development" and "a central element of the development" (Kagia, 2005, p. 149). These are important features of the CDF that were integrated into countries development plans, established in partnership with the Bank. Thus, it becomes necessary to identify the significance of this framework in the establishment of post-1999 pro-poor economic development strategies in countries like Nigeria.

3.6. Nigeria, the World Bank and the New Development Agenda

It is instructive to note that with the emergence of the CDF, a number of pro-poor development strategies were established under the mantra of the PRSPs designed under the auspices of the HIPC initiatives. One of these countries where development strategizing was made to fit into this new development framework was Nigeria in the post-military dictatorship era and the return to civilian rule in 1999. After those long years of military interference in governance and a less fruitful development interaction between Nigeria and the World Bank – especially by 1995 when the Bank and other international development partners suspended their activities in Nigeria – there was a new zeal to re-establish a development system in Nigeria. This 'new' system was moulded in the image of the dominant and pervasive neo-liberal market-led economy within the international development space (The World Bank, 2000a, 2005a).

The establishment of this development system commenced in 1998 – during the interim government of General Abdulsalami Abubakar. It was consolidated under President Obasanjo as intensive economic reforms were undertaken in the country in line with guidelines and principles set out by multilateral and bilateral 'partners' or donors for the incoming democratic government (The World Bank, 2005a). In fact, the May 2000 *Country Assistance Strategy* (CAS) *Note* of the World Bank for Nigeria, highlighted that the new regime led by President Obasanjo agreed to follow the principles of the CDF which was the poverty reduction implementation framework of the World Bank under President Wolfensohn. In fact, the document states that the World Bank initiated the "CDF process in Nigeria" in the year 2000 within the framework aimed at enriching "the preparation of the CAS" (Bank, 2000, p.23).

There were two goals set out for this post-1999 reform process. One involved refocusing the economy on a growth path through a multi-dimensional development pathway where the private sector was to play a vital role within a diversified economy. The reforms envisioned a non-oil focused economy. The other goal was to reduce poverty within the revitalised economy through development programmes that empowered people and at the same time led to economic growth. It was indeed a reform process built on the two pillars of development characteristic of the Wolfensohn World Bank (1995-2005) in which poverty reduction is said to be achievable through economic growth led by the private sector within a conducive investment climate.

It is in this light that that it can be said that since the re-establishment of the rapport between Nigeria and the World Bank, three important but closely linked reform processes have been

undertaken, between 1999 and 2015, to drive growth and address poverty, hunger and under-development.[47] In this chapter, however, these reforms are mainly explored to the extent of their link with Fadama; this study argues that the programme was designed and reconceptualised within the context of the grand scheme of economic reforms in Nigeria under the guidance of the World Bank and its new development agenda. These were accepted and undertaken as the government tried to restore Nigeria along the path of mainstream conceptualisation of development. The three reform programmes explored here include: the NEEDS introduced by President Obasanjo under the PRSP framework (2003-2007); the Seven Point Agenda and Vision 2020 set out by late President Umar Musa Yar'Adua (2007-2011); and the Transformation Agenda – with a focus on the Agricultural Transformation agenda – of President Goodluck Jonathan (2011-2015).

These three reform epochs are explored here because of their role in shaping the post-1999 development and poverty reduction landscape in Nigeria within which Fadama was conceptualised and implemented. The role of the World Bank and its sister institution in shaping these reforms is very instructive as can be seen in the relationship between these reform policies and the CPS (papers) of the World Bank for Nigeria (2005-2009; 2010-2013; and 2014-2017).[48] It remains important to note that the framework set out by President Obasanjo – within the context of the NEEDS which was developed as Nigeria's PRSP in line with the CDF principles – played an intrinsic role in shaping the nature of reforms that followed since 2007. This is also important since it was the starting point of the reduction of Nigeria's foreign debts and the institutionalisation of a market-led economy in which the private sector was becoming quite prominent and foreign investments and deregulation happened too.

3.7. Introducing Nigeria's Post-1999 Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy

Upon Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999, the new democratic government thus had several bilateral and multilateral partners ready on hand to 'assist' them 'pick up the pieces' of

[47]The closeness of these reform epochs is the centrality of the World Bank in the development of an agenda that resembles current mainstream development models of capitalism with emphasis on privatization, diversification, etc. suffice it to say that they may differ in some ways but central to the argument is that Nigeria tries to keep itself and the economy in a way that internal donors, investors and partner will be comfortable contributing to the country. These include actively pursuing continuous GDP growth rate per annum since 2003 until recently, and pursuing a market-led economy model in Nigeria.

[48] The goals of these documents are transmitted into each of the policy frameworks adopted in Nigeria post 2005. Interestingly, Fadama was situated within these reforms under the umbrella of agricultural and rural development goals.

what was left of the Nigerian economy and rebuild it. There was considerable optimism about the country's undoubted potential for growth considering its vast array of human and natural resources, including a relatively conducive environment for agriculture. However, there was also the reality of massive structural issues that posed considerable challenges to growth.[49] Reform was imperative to stabilise and progressively set the country back on the path of economic development. Within this context, the World Bank was a critical partner in setting out a framework, in collaboration with the new government, towards 're-structuring the economy along a growth path to address poverty and under-development (The World Bank, 2000a, 2005a).

The new government of President Obasanjo earlier on set out to resolve Nigeria's foreign debt issues; this also included a drive to stabilise the country from identity-based conflicts and re-attract foreign investors (Gyong, 2012; Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Omotola & Saliu, 2009). It means that two phases of reforms characterise President Obasanjo's regime: one, 1999 to 2003 involving political stabilisation, and two, 2003 to 2007 characterised by a comprehensive economic reform agenda (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). This chapter focuses mainly on the second period wherein the NEEDS can be identified. This reform period under Obasanjo is instructive in situating the Fadama project within the broader context of Nigeria's economic reform history. It is also useful to understand the place or role of the World Bank in guiding the country's steps even within the design, framing and the broader implementation of Fadama as a form of poverty reduction and food security strategy through empowerment within the broader international MDGs pursuit.

President Obasanjo had inherited an economy ridden with international debts, dilapidated infrastructure, endemic corruption and over-dependence on oil to the detriment of other sectors including agriculture and manufacturing (The World Bank, 2005a). He also inherited an economy in which poverty was pervasive and development (including poverty reduction) strategies had failed to make an impact. The task of transforming the country was, therefore, an arduous one, and while it remains debatable, the extent to which the reforms introduced were successful in Nigeria, it is safe to say that it created opportunities for the government to embark on the comprehensive reform agenda. One can argue that it was within this context that

[49] Issues of corruption, dilapidated infrastructure, ineffective institutions, violent crisis in the Niger Delta region as well as inter-religious crisis in the north among others were identified by the CAS report as potentially problematic in the drive towards resuscitating the economy politically and more importantly economically (see CAS 2000; CPS 2005)

the first major economic reform of the post-1999 era was born – the NEEDS that was introduced in 2003.

The reform process – 2003 to 2007 – began with debt relief negotiations and the development of a medium-term development strategy to set the country back on the growth path. The aim was to reduce oil dependence, boost non-oil sector growth, and address poverty through economic growth centred on the private sector (The World Bank, 2000a). There were thus three aspects of the Nigerian economy that were targeted during this comprehensive reform agenda: macroeconomic; structural; and institutional cum governance issues (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). They were targeted because:

- One, it was vitally necessary to stabilise Nigeria's macroeconomic situation to curb volatility and reduce the high levels of public expenditure that made the economy to bleed money profusely;

- Two, structural reforms which paid attention to the importance of privatisation, civil service, banking sector reforms as well as trade policy reforms was of necessity to enhance efficiency and free trade for improved internal non-oil growth; and

- Three, institutional and governance reforms were important to engender a drastic reduction in corruption levels in Nigeria, especially within the public sector. This was meant to reduce levels of fraudulent activities that are evident importantly within different procurement activities (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007).

Thus, within these reform areas, important measures were developed and instituted to ensure change, and as Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaaka (2007) argued, remarkable progress was made for growth through these reforms. A significant reform programme under this comprehensive reform agenda was the World Bank-IMF inspired NEEDS which Nigeria produced as its interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 2005. This was an offshoot of the Debt relief, which the country gained after negotiations with the Paris Club of 7 bilateral donors.

3.7.1. NEEDS in Nigeria (2003-2007): Birthing a new approach to development planning

NEEDS was rolled out in 2005 by the Obasanjo administration as his signature project towards economic revitalisation and poverty reduction.[50] It was Nigeria's first major economic reform project exercised under the guidance of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) within the framework of the poverty reduction agenda or the new development agenda of the World Bank which gave priority to poverty reduction through economic growth. The IMF 2006 progress report on Nigeria's NEEDS and SEEDS benchmarking exercise highlighted some of the reasons behind the adoption of this medium-term plan for economic recovery, growth and development. They include:

> Near collapse of social and economic infrastructure; [Stagnant or slow growing] per capita GDP [between 1990 and 2003]; [massive] external and domestic debt – 70% of GDP [that the country struggled to service thus leading to these debts rising to about] 200% between 1999 and 2002 – about $9.0billion... [domination of the real sector] by primary production sectors: agriculture 41%, crude oil 13%, manufacturing 5-7% of GDP; High macroeconomic volatility (exchange rate, inflation rate, budget deficit, GDP growth rate, GDP per capita – among the worst in the world); Finances at all levels of government in poor shape (pension crisis, arrears of salaries, huge debt misallocation and mismanagement); High poverty rate (about 70%); Dysfunctional education system (low standard, institutions decay, youth militancy etc); Unfriendly business environment (public sector dominance, rent seeking, weak institutions, corruption, high cost of doing business)"; and "General insecurity of life and property (The World Bank, 2007, p. 1).

The report referred to the Nigerian economic situation as at this period as "parlous" hence the dire need for "an integrated and coordinated development approach" designed and coordinated effectively to manage these challenges and a bring about a new era of growth-led poverty reduction in the country. This was thus the essence of establishing the NEEDS and its state, local government and community level equivalents.[51] This was to ensure that these levels of government also developed "complimentary medium-term plans" built around the broader NEEDS' founding goals of poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation, and value re-orientation (Ibid, 2).

NEEDS was conceptualised as a poverty reduction strategy paper and inspired by the CDF since the PRSPs served as vehicles for the practical implementation of the CDF. This meant

[50] It is not the first programme established by the administration as there was NAPEP and others, but this was the first one designed within the context of the PRSPs in line with the CDF of the World Bank in terms of driving a holistic development plan in Nigeria – remember the long term and holistic principle of the CDF (and others) highlighted earlier.

[51] These equivalents include: State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS), Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (LEEDS) and Community Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (CEEDS)

that NEEDS was designed to adopt the four fundamental principles of the CDF reflected in the PRSP, namely: long-term holistic framework; result orientation; country-ownership; and country-led partnerships. These four principles of the CDF were adapted into the PRSPs with an additional principle of prioritising programmes "so that implementation is feasible, in both fiscal and institutional terms" (Cheru, 2006, p. 356). These principles emphasised the necessity of multi-stakeholder participation and partnership in the development, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of this reform programme in Nigeria. Indeed, drawing on the CDF matrix, it even becomes clearer the importance of different players in addressing the four important aspects of development and poverty reduction – macroeconomic, institutional and structural, human/social dimension, and physical/infrastructural dimensions.

The NEEDS programme was established on the three pillars of "empowering people and building a social capital", "promoting private enterprise", and "changing the way government works" in Nigeria (The World Bank, 2005a, p. 17). This foundational basis of the reform process meant that it had to pay detailed attention to issues of improved healthcare and service delivery in the country as well as well-rounded and effective education and educational systems in the country. It also entailed addressing issues of unemployment, insecurity, and social welfare more effectively while a great deal of work had to be employed to ensure the more active contribution of different sectors of the economy to its growth – especially the private sector. Very importantly, this reform process also involved prioritizing the improvement in the "performance in agriculture and [Small and Medium-scale Enterprises] SMEs in order to build a stronger connection between growth, employment and poverty reduction" since the NEEDS believed a great deal that "private sector led growth and a sound macroeconomic framework are ... key elements of Nigeria's economic transformation" (ibid, p. 18). In the same light, it emphasised the urgency for "privatization, de-regulation and [economic] liberalization to take hold in the country as well as more positively resolving challenges in areas such as power, transportation and communication to improve the effectiveness of the private sector in driving growth (ibid).

This reform process also required the establishment and strengthening of structures and institutions to ensure its effectiveness and consolidation. Thus, the NEEDS focused a great deal in the establishment of mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating programmes and budgetary issues in the economy as well as anti-corruption frameworks and bank consolidation and taxing system (Utomi, Duncan, & Williams, 2007, p. 28). This was an integral way of "changing the way government works" in Nigeria and re-orientating people and institutions away from

'business as usual' towards a more results-based approach to development and effective development planning and implementation for growth-led poverty reduction in the country (The World Bank, 2005a). Indeed, these reforms processes and institutional innovation were at the heart of growth and a better investment climate for investment – local and foreign – and indeed private sector growth that culminated in high GDP growth recorded between 2005 and 2008 which the IMF believes to have contributed towards pro-poor programmes (The World Bank, 2007).

It is important to assert that the approach to poverty reduction characteristic of the PRSPs – drawn from the CDF – accounted for NEEDS' focus on human development, growth and good governance within the ambient of a growth-led poverty reduction. Indeed, NEEDS sought to address poverty, within the framework of the MDGs, through an economic growth paradigm focused on growing the non-oil sector to improve productivity, creating employment opportunities and empowering citizens to actively participate in the development process. The logic, therefore, is the trickledown effect of economic growth for reducing poverty to the barest minimum. This inclination towards a growth-led poverty reduction is thus apparent in the emphasis on growing the private sector, implementing a social charter, reforming government and institutions of governance, tackling corruption and promoting transparency and accountability, financing needs and reducing or eliminating wasteful spending, reforming the tax system and privatising public assets as well as attracting foreign direct investment and obtaining debt relief.[52] These are important aspects of driving economic growth, and this emphasis on the private sector and the reduction of the role of the state in economic processes represents a strong neo-liberal turn in Nigeria's development landscape.

The importance of this strategy in Nigeria's post-1999 development planning is enormous. This is not simply because it is the first comprehensive development programme adopted within the context of the Wolfensohn-led World Bank and its new development agenda – as well as the broader poverty reduction agenda within international development parlance. It is also because this strategy laid the foundation for reconceptualising development planning and implementation in Nigeria towards multi-stakeholder participation. It will be recalled that the

[52] In relation to debt relief, the IMF 2006 report states that as part of the successes of the NEEDS (I and II), in "2005 Nigeria secured significant debt relief from the Paris Club amounting to US$18.0 billion debt relief." It goes further to say: "With the payment of the balance of US$12.4 billion to the creditors Nigeria exited the Paris Club debt in March 2006. Nigeria also exited the London Club debt on 4th April, 2007 after paying off outstanding Par Bonds and Promissory Notes. This achievement, coupled with fiscal discipline, led to the establishment of a stable and favourable macroeconomic environment. It also led to the favourable rating of Nigeria by International Credit rating agencies as "BB-". The annual savings of about $1 billion in 2006 has been channelled into pro-poor social projects to deepen poverty reduction" (IMF, 2007:8).

NEEDS had to be "home-grown" in the sense that it would be an outcome of multi-stakeholder, multi-level consultations (government, external and local development partners, external and local private sector actors, civil society, including churches, media and grassroots citizens) and partnerships led or coordinated by government. This process encouraged inclusive development planning in Nigeria as citizens became constructed as active agents in the quest towards actualising the goals of development and poverty reduction.

Interestingly, the first implementation of this strategy from 2004 to 2007 became known as NEEDS-I, while NEEDS-II was prepared to take place from 2008-2011 as a result of the noted successes of NEEDS I (see IMF, 2007: 20). This second phase of the PRSP process for Nigeria – described by Cheru (2006:356) as the "full PRSP" (Cheru, 2006)[53] – became the basis of the second comprehensive reform programme in the post-Obasanjo era in the form of "Vision 20:2020". It became the blueprint upon which various medium-term strategies were developed, namely: the "Seven Point Agenda" (2008-2011); and the "Transformation Agenda" (Federal Government of Nigeria, National Planning Commission, 2009, p. 4; The World Bank, 2014, pp. vii–viii). The Seven Point Agenda can be referred to as Nigeria's NEEDS-II as it was to be an improvement on, the consolidation and implementation of the plans set out *ab initio* in NEEDS-I – the interim PRSP for Nigeria (The World Bank, 2007, p. 20).

3.7.2. The Seven Point Agenda: Building on the gains of the new development agenda

The implementation of the NEEDS set the country along the path of a relatively neoliberal market-led economy in spite of its shortfalls. This was the economy upon which the new administration (2007-2011) had to stand on to drive growth and continue with the goal of achieving the MDGs, especially as it pertains to poverty and hunger. The framework set out through the NEEDS programme was therefore vital in the adoption of the next 'home-grown' economic reform programme – the "Seven Point Agenda" – by the President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's administration.

The 'Seven Point Agenda' was designed to further engender inclusive economic growth through a diversified economy free from an unhealthy dependence on oil revenue. It drew on

[53] He adds: "The PRSP preparation involves a two-stage process... Countries must first prepare an interim PRSP (I-PRSP), which is intended as a roadmap for preparation of the full PRSP. The I-PRSP paves the way for the country to qualify for its 'decision point' and interim support (or a loan) from the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility ... Upon submitting the full PRSP, countries are allowed to jump through the 'completion point', which qualifies them for full debt stock reduction, but only after one additional year of good macroeconomic performance" (Cheru, 2007:356).

the foundational basis of the World Bank's CPS for Nigeria in which the Bank, and other partners such as DFID, supported the country's drive to promote human development, pursue private sector-led growth and promote good governance (The World Bank, 2005a). This development agenda emerged from President Yar' Adua's 2007 People Democratic Party's (PDP) manifesto – "Plan Implementation" (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2008) and was later "... properly conceptualised and comprehensively articulated and the implementation strategies adequately laid out, to ensure the realization of Vision 20:2020" in Nigeria (Nigeria High Commission, United Kingdom, 2009, p. 1). The agenda was also highly influenced by the NEEDS. Thus, it became a follow-up medium-term strategy – after NEEDS-I – designed to actualise a more comprehensive long-term (Nigeria's) development agenda further enunciated by the Yar'Adua administration. This was an agenda of situating Nigeria as one of the top 20 economies in the world by the year 2020; this comprehensive long-term agenda is known as "Vision 20:2020" (Nigeria High Commission, United Kingdom, 2009; The World Bank, 2010a, 2014).

The Seven Point Agenda, in this light and, as a new medium-term strategy for actualising Vision 20:2020 was bound by the principles of the Comprehensive Development Framework. As a medium-term strategy for actualising this vision, it was also aimed at promoting growth through the private sector and within other sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, trade and industry amongst others. As the IMF 2007 NEEDS report importantly notes, the intervening period 2008-2011 was one in which agriculture; solid minerals and oil were identified to be the major growth driving sectors in Nigeria – projected to yield an average annual overall GDP growth rate of 10.7% (The World Bank, 2007, p. 20). Based on this, the agenda targeted key aspects of the economy such as power and energy, food security and agriculture, wealth creation and employment, mass transportation, land reform, security, and qualitative and functional education (Onakuse, 2011).

A critical look at these aspects of the economy will point one directly to the four dimensions of development as identified by Wolfensohn in the CDF (Wolfensohn, 1999). For example, the agenda's focus on fixing issues of power and energy as well as transportation speaks directly to the infrastructural dimension of the CDF based on the imperative to establish or rejuvenate public infrastructure such as roads, rails, power plants amongst others to facilitate an adequate response to the needs within this aspect of the economy. In the same vein, the focus on agriculture and food security, wealth creation, employment, land reform, security, and qualitative and functional education has all the makings of addressing many inter-related issues

ranging from the human and social dimensions of development down to the institutional or structural as well as the macroeconomic aspects. This is simply because human capital development through qualitative and functional education is vital for productive activities that would eventually yield benefits to the macroeconomic dimension – the same goes for agriculture. Indeed, all these require functional, effective and capable institutions and structures within the country to more effectively harness all the potentials and reduce excesses. In essence, it becomes clearer how this Seven-Point Agenda was also crafted and shaped, based on the initial implementation of the NEEDS and in the light of the overarching growth for poverty reduction mantra, to address human and social development issues together with structural, institutional, governance, physical and infrastructural, and indeed macroeconomic issues within the country.

It is important at this juncture to reiterate that underlying the CPS papers for Nigeria within which the NEEDS-I and NEEDS-II (Seven Point Agenda under Vision 20:2020) were structured and implemented, was a central idea of improving growth through the non-oil sector. Thus, the government's reform was a step in that direction.

3.7.3. The Transformation Agenda and the Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA): Mainstreaming food security

The third reform agenda discussed here in relation to the post-1999 economic reform strides is the *Transformation Agenda* undertaken by President Goodluck Jonathan who succeeded President Yar'Adua after his death on 5 May 2010. President Yar'Adua's death, before the end of his tenure, implied that the new president had to carry on the mandate of their administration until after the 2011 elections when he fully established his own governance identity through his "Transformation Agenda". While it is argued, by some scholars that the transformation agenda deviated from the paradigm which underlay the two previous reforms carried out under Obasanjo and Yar'Adua (see Gyong, 2012), this interpretation fails to appreciate the importance of the CPS papers – adopted by Nigeria's international donors or development partners – in shaping policy frameworks in Nigeria post-2005. Thus, the argument in this study remains that the Transformation Agenda (2011-2015) was a continuation of the reform policy process which began with the NEEDS-I medium-term strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction. Its goals were streamlined according to the principles of the CDF, in a home-grown fashion but nevertheless along the foundational pillars – improving governance,

maintaining non-oil growth and promoting human development – characteristic the Country Partnership Strategy (2010-2013 and beyond) adopted and supported by Nigeria's development partners such as the World Bank, IMF, DFID, USAID, AfDB and CIDA amongst others.

The Transformation Agenda, like the Seven Point Agenda, was also a medium-term strategy for growth-led poverty reduction in Nigeria – designed within the framework of the CDF, which emphasises a private sector-led economic growth to address poverty and under-development. This medium-term strategy, also like its predecessor, was aimed at actualising the vision of putting Nigeria as one of the top 20 economies by the year 2020 – Vision 20:2020. According to the CPS (2014-2017):

> ... the Vision 20:2020 aims to: (a) optimise the country's human and natural potential to achieve rapid economic growth and (b) translate that growth into equitable social development for all citizens. The medium-term strategy for achieving these goals, the Transformation Agenda, aims at: (a) creating a sufficient number of jobs to address the protracted problems of unemployment and long-term poverty; (b) laying the foundation for a robust and inclusive growth of the Nigerian economy; (c) improving and sustaining the well-being of all Nigerians regardless of their personal circumstances and location (The World Bank, 2014, p. viii).

In this light set out to implement critical programmes to:

> (i) address structural problems of access to power and to finance; (ii) unlock agricultural potential; (iii) create opportunities for job creation; and (iv) implement some safety net programs (ibid).

This excerpt from the CPS (2014-2017) shows the broad focus of the Transformation agenda; it also critically shows similarities between this third reform process and the NEEDS-I and the Seven Point Agenda before it. This can be clearly seen in areas such as the quest for driving growth (where the private sector is crucial); the quest for job creation, human development and indeed institutional and structural stability within the country. In this light, like the other post-1999 reform agendas, the Transformation agenda also set out to achieve lofty goals within the framework of a growth-led poverty reduction strategy. This led to an intense focus on strategic sectors of the Nigerian economy with a strategic goal of engineering a radical change within them and, for the same reason, improve Nigeria's holistic growth prospects.

According to the country's planning body under President Jonathan, this agenda emerged out of the dire need to change the status quo in Nigeria wherein "development efforts have over the years been characterized by lack of continuity, consistency and commitment (3Cs) to agreed policies, programmes and projects as well as an absence of a long-term perspective"

(National Planning Commission, 2011, p. 6). As such, it was an agenda developed with a real intent of triggering an enormous change in Nigeria's socio-political and economic striving. The Jonathan Administration thus conceived this strategy as a way to "deepen the effects and provide a sense of direction for the ... administration ... based on the "... set priority policies and programmes which when implemented will transform the Nigerian Economy to meet the future needs of the Nigerian people" (Ibid).

The policy issues that this agenda set out to address included Nigeria's macroeconomic framework and its economic direction; issues related to the improvement of governance; and issues concerning key prioritised sectors – their policies, programmes and projects – that are indispensable in terms of the direction taken by the administration. Importantly, the policy document of this strategy categorised these sector priority policies, programmes and projects into thematic areas such as: "the real sector, infrastructure, human capital, enablers of sustainable development (which include private investment, finance mobilization, external economic relations and diplomacy, among others), and monitoring and evaluation" (Ibid, 7). These thematic areas form the fulcrum of the Jonathan administration growth strategy for the country through an enormous but effective reform process. The ultimate drive within this Transformation agenda was thus to enhance job creation, good governance, food security through agriculture, national security, and power, amongst other issues (Oladimeji & Opeyemi, 2013, p. 56). This can be seen in the various aspects that were identified in the reform process, namely: Macroeconomic framework and economic direction, Job creation, Public expenditure management, Governance, Justice and judiciary, Foreign policy and economic diplomacy, Legislature, Education, Health Sector, Labour and productivity, Infrastructure policies, programmes and projects, Power, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Niger Delta, and Transportation. The idea here, one might argue, is that effectively addressing strategic socio-economic areas of concern will culminate in a very prosperous Nigeria that is thus capable of sufficiently providing for its populace.

A prominent aspect of this Transformation Agenda was a focus on agricultural reform – a vital aspect of the real sector – to attain food security. This strategy constructs agriculture as a strategic sector and a major driver of growth for the economy. The reforms in the agricultural sector, with its emphasis on food security, were conceptualised to be implemented in order to "secure food and feed needs of the nation"; "enhance generation of National and Social wealth through greater export and import substitution"; "enhance capacity for value addition leading to industrialisation and employment opportunities"; bring about efficient "exploitation and

utilization of available agricultural resources"; and "enhance the development and dissemination of appropriate and efficient technologies for rapid adoption" within this country (National Planning Commission, 2011, p. 14). This was the core of the ATA which was being implemented through the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development since 2011. It is also under this framework that the Fadama Development project, under review in this study, was being implemented. Indeed, ATA was a major reform programme, which garnered a lot of support – financially and otherwise – from local, multilateral and bilateral partners who bought into its strategies and implementation framework to contribute more intensely towards rural development. Its popularity among donors also draws on its developmental and investment prospects, especially through private sector involvement, for an increased market presence for local food products as well as improved production that would eventually contribute immensely towards economic growth.[54]

3.7.4. Identifying the World Bank in Nigeria's post-1999 Reforms

The overview of the post-1999 economic reform strategies undertaken in Nigeria towards addressing the issue of poverty and under-development shows, largely, the place of the World Bank in post-1999 socio-economic engineering. These strategies beginning from the NEEDS-I (2004-2007) through the Seven Point Agenda (2007-2011) down to the Transformation Agenda (2011-2015) – both of the latter aimed at actualising Vision 20:2020 – point to a progressive process of establishing a system of addressing socio-economic issues within the Nigerian economy by means of a framework or a development blueprint. This blueprint, as argued in this chapter, draws inspiration from the Comprehensive Development Framework and its emphasis on long-term holistic and comprehensive programmes, results-orientation, country-ownership of strategies, and country-led partnerships for developing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating these strategies.

While three different political leaders in Nigeria – under the PDP-led government (1999-2015) represent these three medium-term strategies, they do not represent separate and far-removed strategies, as many Nigerian scholars tend to believe when they argue that there was no continuity of process and ideology under these programmes. On the contrary, the presence of

[54] In fact, the agricultural sector, through this reform programme grew a great deal more than all other sectors during this period (2011-2015). Hence the view that agriculture will usurp oil as Nigeria's best sector in the nearest future. See Adesina (Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development), 27 January 2015. "Agriculture will soon overtake Oil". Online: http://www.fmard.gov.ng/hmevent_inside/OVERTAKE-OIL

the World Bank and other external donors within the Nigerian economic landscape, who subscribe to the principles and foundational basis of the various Country Partnership Strategy documents, provide the basis for this chapter's contention that these programmes were borne out of the same stock and are aimed at the same ultimate goal. It is instructive at this point to note that the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) "represents the World Bank Group's (WBG) program under the Country Assistance Framework (CAF) developed by Nigeria's partners to coordinate interventions based on each partner's comparative advantage in order to deliver rapid results" (The World Bank, 2014, p. vii). This is why the initial CPS for Nigeria (2005-2009) details the "World Bank Group-DFID approach for assisting Nigeria to implement its program[s] to boost growth and achieve the MDGs" (The World Bank, 2005a, p. 21). Upon completion, the donors collaborating in this 'Nigerian growth project' increased "under the second phase" (2010-2013) with USAID and the AfDB joining the initial partners – the World Bank Group and DFID. This meant that "the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) partners account[ed] for over 80 percent of Nigeria's development assistance" (The World Bank, 2009b, p. v). The importance of these CPS documents in shaping Nigeria's economic reforms since the early 2000s can therefore not be underestimated.

This view also draws from the goals set out through these CPS documents for the reforms and their relationship to the various reform strategies. For instance, CPS 2005-2009 "takes as its starting point the vision of wealth creation, value re-orientation and establishment of a social charter for human development and empowerment as outlined in Nigeria's home-grown poverty reduction strategy – the NEEDS" (The World Bank, 2005a, p. 21). This vision enunciated for the period was in line with the NEEDS and had to be implemented according to the four principles of the CDF that were a guide for the PRSPs – the principles of a long-term holistic framework, results-orientation, country ownership and country-led partnerships. Going further, the second CPS (2010-2013) focused on three pillars – "improving governance", "maintaining non-oil growth", and "promoting human development as identified by the government and reaffirmed through stakeholder consultations" (The World Bank, 2009b, p. v). It is important to state that the initial CPS (2005-2009) had emphasised the importance of non-oil sector growth to ensure economic diversification, and so "maintaining non-oil growth" was a step forward building on the initial gains from the CPS 2005-2009. The Seven Point agenda and Vision 20:2020 were designed along the frameworks created through the PRSP process as well as the specific goals enunciated in the second CPS document. This is clear in terms of strategy's focus on addressing transportation and communication issues, food security, power

and energy, education and human capital development, national security, land tenure reform and home ownership, and wealth creation. The Transformation agenda was in the same light supported through the CPS programme within a framework aimed to promote "diversified growth and job creation by reforming the power sector" and enhance "agricultural productivity" while also "increasing access to finance". Its focus was also to improve "the quality and efficiency of social service delivery at the state level to promote social inclusion"; as well as strengthen "governance and public sector management, with gender equity and conflict sensitivity as essential elements of governance" (The World Bank, 2014, p. viii).

My rationale in pointing out the similarities between these reform programmes as well as their link to the CPS is to unequivocally situate the World Bank centrally as the hub wherein the various strategies for re-constituting development in Nigeria are located. The Bank's introduction of the CDF in the late 1990s, within the context of its new development agenda, was therefore vital in changing the scope of development thinking and planning in the post-1999 era in Nigeria as the country pushed towards addressing issues of poverty and under-development. Indeed, the Bank's presence and guidance – in collaboration with other external donors – enabled Nigeria to begin a new developmental process in which there was a major emphasis on non-oil growth and indeed a private sector-led growth.

Within this 'new' quest for a non-oil growth, the various CPS documents highlight the importance of the agricultural sector and this explains its central position as a major medium for addressing (rural) poverty as well as unemployment in Nigeria. Indeed, the ATA of the President Goodluck Jonathan Administration became credited for an immense progress within the sector. There has nevertheless been a strategic programme within these strides, through the agricultural sector, to address food insecurity and poverty among the rural population since the mid-2000s – within the ambient of the country's drive to achieve the MDGs. This programme is the National Fadama Development Programme – the programme under review in this study

3.8. The Fadama Development Programme and the New Development Agenda

3.8.1. Some History, features and scope

The Fadama project was established through a 'partnership' arrangement between the World Bank, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and rural beneficiaries. It emerged as an intentional stride to address the twin problem of poverty and hunger, especially among the

rural poor, through a rejuvenated agricultural sector. When the United Nations adopted the MDGs, Fadama was restructured and aligned with the targets of the MDGs, especially target one: reducing poverty and hunger by 2015. It, therefore, attracted additional funding from the African Development Bank (AfDB) which partly funded the implementation of the second phase – Fadama II. The third phase of the project began in 2009, was billed to close in 2015 following the MDGs timeline but was extended to 2019 across various states and value chains based on its said successes and to support Boko Haram affected communities in the North-East (The World Bank, 2016)).

Nigerian agricultural sector is only rain-fed, and these lands, though suitable for production of variety of foodstuff and the provision of required materials for the production of livestock and other agricultural activities, are mostly wasted all year long since the end of the rainy season implies the end of cultivation on such lands (FPM-RVADP, Interview, 10 December, 2011). Thus, with an 'artificial' irrigation of these lands, which are strategically located close to river banks/basins, an all year-round cultivation is achieved, and more productivity assured as well. This was one of the key aspects of the emergence of the Fadama project in Nigeria.

When Fadama I began, the aim was to improve agricultural productivity – mainly crops based production. This phase of the project coincided with a Nigeria under the military regime led by General Abacha characterised by gross human rights violations, corruption and a centralised form of rule and governance of all sectors of the economy – development was centrally organised and managerial or top-down in nature. The Fadama project was established at this time to enhance food productivity – food security was synonymous at this time with productivity.[55] It was established to address this issue in certain regions of the country, especially in Northern Nigeria wherein Fadama was mostly implemented at inception. The target goal at this point was an all year production of food in the low-lying plains found mainly in the northern region. The idea then was that since the Nigerian agricultural sector was mainly rain-fed, it would be important to plan how to keep the soils within these plains very fertile through the storage of the rainwater as a form of irrigation system and to guard against soil erosion and leaching due to high levels of flooding during the rainy season (FPM-RVADP, Interview, 10 December, 2011). Fadama was therefore funded with the World Bank's loan at this early stage so as to more adequately prepare soils for farmers in order to enhance the level of food production within the country to streamline levels of food insecurity and vulnerability

[55] This initiative was established before the 1996 World Food Summit and indeed the broadening of the definition of food security to include dimensions of access and utilisation.

in the country. It was therefore relatively successful especially in increasing food production in areas where it was implemented.

This first phase was implemented mostly through the ADP offices; it was an implementation process in which technocrats at government offices decided what farmers needed based on their estimation (Africa Development Bank, 2003; The World Bank, 2010b). It was only carried out in twelve (12) states – mainly as pilot programmes – consisting of Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, and Taraba (Africa Development Bank, 2003). These states received funds for the projects mainly from the World Bank through the different state ADPs that controlled the project (see The World Bank, 2010b). The funding targeted issues like the provision of fertilizers, new and improved breeds of crops, artificial irrigation systems, and boreholes among others. Since the target was mainly improved food production, attention was paid towards ensuring that farming practices were adequately improved and that farmers had the required instruments and better varieties of crops that yield better. The implementation strategy was also top-down and managerial even though local farmers continued to receive assistance to produce more crops and to ensure that more food availability for people.

As the World Bank Fadama II completion report highlights, the birth of the second and third phases of the Fadama project (that is Fadama II and III) owes a great deal to the (2005-2009) CPS wherein different developmental strategies were put forth by the Nigerian government. It is also linked to the shortfalls witnessed over the years in many aspects of the implementation of Fadama I (The World Bank, 2010b) such as the technocratic modality – as noted above – in which beneficiaries were excluded from participating in the process of implementation. Thus, the emergence of Fadama II is linked to a novel "Rural Development Strategy" adopted by the Government in 2001 which pays attention to many of the shortfalls of Fadama I and adjudged by the AfDB to be on par with its stance on "poverty reduction, private sector promotion and participatory approaches to development" (Africa Development Bank, 2003, p. 1). According to the AfDB, this new strategy "stresses the principles of non-intervention; consistency; sustainability and greater equity in access to and benefits of resources. The strategy aims to contribute to food security and increased access to rural infrastructure facilities" (ibid). This was how the AfDB appeared in 2001 to fund a number of states in the implementation of the second phase of the Fadama project at the request of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

The approach used in implementing Fadama I did not adequately factor in (or consider) a number of important context-specific issues like conflict over the use of natural resources (such grazing land for pastoralists), storage facilities, access to markets, and gender empowerment. Thus, although Fadama I was able to improve food production, farmers still recorded different levels of losses because they could not adequately store or preserve farm produce for a long time after harvest and they lacked the capacity to do so. In addition, access to markets was limited because of poor road networks and inadequate networks, and more importantly, there were constant conflicts between farmers and pastoralists over the use of land and water resources for irrigation, feeding of livestock and growing crops. In fact, the project had failed to pay attention to impending conflict(s) between farmers and pastoralists (herdsmen) who together use the same resources.[56] Thus, it happened that many farmers and pastoralists clashed over ownership and control of these resources such as grazing land, water sources and pathways (ibid).[57] The project also did not have a systematic response to issues of improvement of the capacity of its beneficiaries and was almost like a technocratic strategy which people were coerced into based on their needs as 'identified' or 'conceptualised by the government (officials) and/or the technocrats. These were some of the challenges associated with the first phase of the implementation of Fadama in Nigeria.

Fadama I was concluded in 1999 as Nigeria transitioned from military rule into a new democratic dispensation under Chief Obasanjo. This period also coincided with the poverty reduction era and President Obasanjo's comprehensive economic reform agenda. These radical economic reforms were implemented in Nigeria through the guidance of the international development community mainly through the World Bank (Adogamhe, 2010).[58] Thus, as Fadama I was concluded with noted successes and recorded challenges apparent, negotiations began to scale-up the project beyond 12 states. At this time, the World Bank insisted that the project must take on a new direction and a new approach. It must become participatory and must be rid of the technocratic nature of many of previous development strategies/projects (also

[56] There is a plethora of literature on the conflicts between pastoralists/herdsmen and farmers in the use of natural resources such as grazing lands and sources of water supply. In many cases many lives and property were destroyed in the process. As such, reducing these conflicts became a major objective in subsequent phases of the Fadama project.

[57] The AfDB report highlights that "Fadama I focused mainly on production but largely neglected downstream activities such as processing, preservation and conservation and rural infrastructure to ensure efficient evacuation of farm output to markets." The report also argues that that phase of the implementation failed to take into account "other resource uses such as those for livestock and fisheries production" which thus resulted in series of conflicts between different users of the resources, and this also limited the benefits of the project to only a few beneficiaries.

[58] President Obasanjo heralded a radical turnaround in the socio-economic direction of the country shown in his role in the cancellation of a number of the nation's foreign debt by the Paris Club in 2001, the introduction of privatization policies, the development of development strategies such as the NEEDS, and other 'pro-poor' or pro-growth policies – all influenced mainly by different multilateral and bilateral 'partners' in the bid to restructure the economy.

in Nigeria) that were known to have failed in adequately understanding and addressing the needs of the people (The World Bank, 2010b). Since this was the era of the 2000/2001 World Development Report of the World Bank titled *Voices of the Poor* within which the Bank 'vowed' to pay attention to what the poor had to say about their own development (needs), it is no surprise that the World Bank insisted on changing the nature of Fadama. It, therefore, meant that Nigeria had to incorporate all these elements before the next phase of the project could be sanctioned for funding.

Nigeria finally completed its incorporation of the participatory components of the project in line with the World Bank's *CPS* and the *Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Bank Group Policy (2000)* of the African Development Bank ((Africa Development Bank, 2000, p. 28, 2003, p. 1; The World Bank, 2010b, p. 1). This meant that phase II of the project was relatively delayed pending the final incorporation of the new conditions in the credit agreement. In the light of these, Fadama II was designed to be implemented using the CDD approach. Its objectives were broadened, having taken into account the shortfalls of Fadama I as well as the current needs and challenges facing the poor/beneficiaries in a globalising world where trade is interconnected with production and consumption. In other words, within the framework of Fadama II, the approach to the project changed drastically to include issues of capacity building, advisory services, marketability of produce, reduction in internal conflicts among users of Fadama resources, among other issues.

The implementation of Fadama II commenced in September 2005 (within 20 different states in Nigeria) with funds from the World Bank and the African Development Bank (Nkonya et al., 2010; Nwachukwu et al., 2008, p. 4; Yahaya et al., 2008). Initially Fadama I had focused on 12 World Bank-funded states, and so in Fadama II, the African Development Bank provided funds to implement the project within an additional 8 states. It was also separated from the ADPs, thus changing its image. Although Fadama is currently almost independent of the ADP, it still collaborates with the ADP. For example, issues of technical assistance, capacity building and the provision of advisory services are in certain cases carried out with the help of the ADP, and Fadama supports the ADP, in different beneficiary states in the country. Thus, the Fadama project is implemented also with the assistance, expertise and experience of the ADP in terms of the drive towards improving productivity in the agricultural sector of the Nigerian economy. Fadama, through this collaboration with the ADPs, has over the years targeted many poor (rural) farmers to improve their productive capacity but more recently, it has become a multi-stakeholder venture, predominantly focused on all users of Fadama resources – land and water

resources. In this vein, other important aspects of the agricultural value-chain – from processing and marketing, and including issues of conflict management and resolution, environmental sustainability and inclusive decision-making among all stakeholders – have been incorporated into the Fadama initiative. As an added incentive to the strategy, rural infrastructural development was also added to provide for communities and people broadly, within the context of the broader CDD approach was adopted as the implementation strategy in the current format of the project to reflect more of the views and needs of the people according to their decision. Based on this review and reform of the project, it must be said that it has received a lot of plaudits from its implementers and the donors; it became famous in Nigeria and within Africa because of its perceived successes in Nigeria. This status thus accounted for the call, and indeed the scramble, for a nation-wide implementation of the project.

This second phase was to be completed within five (5) years. Its broad objective involved 'sustainably' increasing "the incomes of Fadama users through empowering communities to take charge of their own development agenda, and by reducing conflicts between Fadama user groups" (World Bank, 2010: 2). This was initially adopted within the context of the approved Project Development Objectives (PDO), which required that:

- By the end of the project, 50 percent of Fadama resource users benefiting from the project have increased their average real income by 20 percent compared to the baseline;
- By the end of the project, 60 percent of the Fadama Community Associations (FCAs) have successfully implemented their Local Development Plans (LDPs) and other projects funded activities using environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive practices; and
- By year six, conflicts between Fadama users have been reduced by 75 percent (The World Bank, 2010b, p. 2).

Added to these initial objectives was the broadening of the definition of the beneficiaries of the Fadama initiative. There are thus direct and indirect beneficiaries. While the former consisted of farmers who directly received grants to pursue their business ventures, the latter was composed of other community members who benefit from the outcome of the project implementation. Thus, the project targeted about 3 million households of "Fadama resource

users and non-resource users who live in Fadama communities" (ibid, p. 3). There were also five important components, designed to assist in the process, namely: capacity building, rural infrastructure, pilot productive asset acquisition support, demand-responsive advisory services and project management, monitoring and evaluation (ibid, p. 3-5). These were the key indicators under which the project was at this stage was designed, and these were the targets to be met by means of empowering the (mainly) rural beneficiaries through funds transferred directly to them as well as different levels of institutional and social support – through facilitation, training, capacity building and the provision of other resources.

The funding of Phase II was premised on 'participation of beneficiaries' (Africa Development Bank, 2003) and the use of the CDD approach to facilitate 'decentralisation' in the implementation of the project (The World Bank, 2010b). Furthermore, this participatory condition was designed to animate the core of the development of Local Development Plans (LDPs) – LDPs themselves are the hallmark of a grassroots-led project. It was at this phase of the implementation of the Fadama project that participation was really mainstreamed through the introduction of the CDD approach in needs assessment, the preparation of the LDPs as well as the implementation and evaluation of projects. This also included strives to sustain implemented or completed projects by means of participatory governance.

At the end of the implementation of this phase in 2008, the World Bank set-targets, based on the chosen indicators that emanated from the PDOs, were met on a large scale. This accounts for many claims of success regarding the implementation of the Fadama project in Nigeria. It follows therefore that Fadama II built on the successes and limitations of the Fadama I and became even more successful. This provided a platform upon which the third phase of this project, known as Fadama III, agreed upon in the year 2008 (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012).

Upon its launch, Fadama III became a nation-wide phenomenon mainly because other states, learning from the successes recorded in the second phase, requested to have their states included (The World Bank, 2010b, pp. 9–10). Thus, the World Bank assisted the FGN with the *credit*[59] required for a nation-wide implementation of the project. Each participating state government, including the FCT, were made to sign a subsidiary loan agreement with the World Bank and FGN in order to have the project implemented in their states. From the implementation of the project between 2009 and 2013 (*when Fadama III was meant to be*

[59] Credit is a soft loan from the World Bank which has softer terms in terms of repayments.

concluded), there is a relatively large body of claims within Nigeria that express the said successes of Fadama.[60] The study on Rivers state and emergent qualitative empirical data are situated within this timeframe.

3.8.2. Impact of the World Bank's New Development Agenda on post-1999 Fadama

The discussion so far in this chapter has shown the evolving process of development thinking within the World Bank which culminated in the adoption of the holistic approach to development during the Wolfensohn-decade at the Bank. This new agenda for development soon affected the nature of the development strategizing within economies in which the Bank operated – this chapter focused on Nigeria and the evolution of post-1999 economic reforms in the country. As initially argued, the establishment of the three most popular economic reform programmes in the post-1999 era – NEEDS, Seven Point Agenda and Transformation Agenda – bore the imprints of the Comprehensive Development Framework, and this automatically affected the nature of programmes designed under the aegis of these reform strategies for addressing poverty.

The Fadama project, which had to be reconceptualised between 1999 and 2004 when it was relaunched for phase two, was marked with this character of the new development agenda. This is especially because it became a vital tool for achieving two important MDG targets – poverty and hunger. In fact, considering the fact that the CDF established that development strategies aimed to actualise the holistic development agenda had to be comprehensive and long-term in themselves, it becomes even clearer that the integration of Fadama within the process of all of Nigeria's three economic reform programmes was strategic.[61] This also means that the current nature of the Fadama project can be linked back to the Wolfensohn-decade at the World Bank (1995-2005) within which the CDF played a prominent role in shaping development programming which was built on the two pillars of an enabling environment for private sector-

[60] Although these "successes" can be debated based on what is defined as success in relation to what is being discussed, but suffice it to say that the pedigree of the project has risen so high within the structural framework of the World Bank to an extent that any research into the project within the local or state level must first be approved by the World Bank Country office in Abuja. This has implications however on the power relations mechanisms in the project.

[61] The Fadama project was incorporated within the NEEDS within the context of the poverty reduction mantra within which agriculture was vital towards addressing this need. This was also the context within which Fadama was reconstructed as an inclusive development programme in line with the new approach to development planning and implementation. Going further, the programme was also integrated within the Seven Points Agenda –NEEDS II – within the framework for agriculture and food security with the aim of not only improving production but also contribution to employment and poverty reduction. Within the Transformation agenda, Fadama became even more prominent within the Agricultural Transformation Agenda. It was mainstreamed and scaled-up as part of the ATA for the actualisation of Nigeria's Vision 20:2020 which the Jonathan administration carried on from its predecessor.

led growth and the necessity of citizens' empowerment to contribute towards that growth – the required ingredients for poverty alleviation (Kagia, 2005; Wolfensohn, 1999). Within the context of Fadama, this can be exemplified in the new implementation strategy adopted post-2004; the institutional and structural framework for implementation; the funding strategy as well as the frameworks for ensuring results. These are surmised here as the impacts of the new development agenda on Fadama today.

Impact of the World Bank's new Development Ethic on post-1999 Fadama in Nigeria

With the adoption of the new development agenda within Nigeria in terms of the NEEDS I programme in 2005, the Fadama project that became an integral part of this new development framework was also reconstituted. The first point of call was a change in the implementation strategy from a top-down model of technocratic control to an inclusive model of project conceptualisation, implementation and monitoring. In essence, Fadama became a CDD project – implemented using the CDD approach, which emphasised inclusiveness, broad level participation and community-led processes of, needs identification and problem-solving.[62] Having being designed with the major objective of "increasing the income of users of land and water resources on a sustainable basis" (NFDP, 2010, p.1) – and contributing effectively to the value chain (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November 2012), its process of implementation had to transcend a process in which citizens were treated arms-chair beneficiaries of development with nothing to contribute. Thus, a supply-driven model in which the project reflected the ideas and perceptions of technocrats (or government institutions) and policy-makers in the offices of the WB or government agencies, including the ADP offices, was replaced by a 'demand-driven' process that speaks to Robert Chamber's (1994) famous *'handing-over-the-stick' idea* (Chambers, 1994c, 1994a, 1994b). As such, consultations, community-led needs assessment, planning, monitoring, and evaluation became important processes for the Fadama project to emphasise community participation and ownership of the initiative. This thus led to the formation of cooperatives with the aim of building and enhancing social capital for better inclusive deliberations in the interest of communities.

[62] In fact, the World Bank contends that the start of Fadama II was delayed because there was an impasse on the Country Strategy Paper presented by Nigeria over the proposed implementation of the phase. The World Bank insisted that ADPs do not run the project, rather the people must choose what they want and execute the projects while the ADP only provides advisory supports. It had discovered that Fadama I had taken a 'supply-driven' approach where decisions came from the top – the ADP – and the people at the grassroots had to obey.

Apart from Fadama's reconceptualization as a CDD project in which citizens' participation empowers them to participate in development planning and decision-making on issues that affect them, there was also the establishment of an institutional and structural framework to ensure efficiency in the implementation process. (Suffice it to say an important dimension of development within the CDF is Institutional and Structural dimensions of development). Thus, Fadama had to be implemented through an institutional arrangement that spans from the national level down to the community level where community Fadama User Groups (FUGs) had to be formed. This process of incorporating institutions also saw the integration of microfinance banks and collaborations with the state ADPs.

In addition, a funding strategy was also adopted – a tranche-based model of funding – established to ensure direct funding to various communities participating in the Fadama programme. This ostensible direct funding of farmers and local entrepreneurs within the project was a break from previous models in which funds were channelled through government ministries or agencies. To enable beneficiaries to effectively navigate the end of funding, an exit strategy was also launched through the establishment of Fadama-Federated units within each participating state. This was also a vital process of weaning states and establishing new funding avenues for project or sub-projects' sustainability.

Finally, the monitoring and evaluation component for development programming was critically introduced within the Fadama framework in the light of the CDF's emphasis on results-orientation that is based on adequate monitoring of the progress of development strategies. This is not only to gauge its impacts but also to ascertain growth areas for lessons to be drawn for the future. The adoption of a results-based monitoring and evaluation process thus transformed Fadama into a strategy in which both quantitative and qualitative outputs and targets are measurable for record keeping.

3.9.Conclusion: Contemporary Fadama, an initiative bound in time

This chapter has so far, through this historical outlook, situated the Fadama project within a historical and intellectual timeframe characterised by changes in international development thinking and planning, especially within the World Bank. The overview of pre-1999 economic strides to address poverty and food insecurity in Nigeria and the role of external donors within the era of the SAPs illustrated the manner in which development and indeed food security was

understood and practised during that era. Modalities for development and development assistance changed however in the era of the 1990s - the poverty reduction era of development – based on the Bank's quest to re-legitimise development and itself as an institution dedicated to addressing global poverty, especially among poor countries.

In this light, Fadama as a product of this post-1990 thinking became one important means towards actualising the MDG goal of poverty reduction and food security. Having initially been established as a top-down technocratic project implemented through the ADPs, Fadama was reconceptualised as a CDD project in the light of the new development framework, and within the context of three important post-1999 economic reform strategies aimed at ultimately addressing poverty through a growth model exemplified in the CDF. This meant that Fadama evolved with the changing times and thinking within the World Bank and can thus be described as a development initiative that was designed in time with specific targets and focus and has evolved through time in line with the changing thinking. The true extent of this evolution of the Fadama project, especially as it pertains to the World Bank's conceptualisation of development and food security as well as approaches towards actualising them is, therefore, the focus of the next chapter of this study.

Chapter Four

The World Bank, Fadama and Internationalising the Mainstream Economic Rationality

4.1. Introduction

This chapter expands on the previous chapter's allusion to the place and role of the World Bank in constructing, propagating and entrenching the mainstream development principles – the neo-liberal economic rationality – within the Nigerian socio-economic context. Here, Fadama as the chapter showed appears to be one of the various strategies designed for this purpose. The chapter contends that although these established interventions may be 'theoretically' targeting issues of poverty, food insecurity and empowerment – the stated objectives – the ultimate goal is nevertheless one of establishing and entrenching the ethics of modern global capitalism.[63] This is based on the belief in economic growth, and the trickle-down hypothesis, as the panacea for development and indeed poverty reduction. However, what has obtained in most cases has been that a less than critical engagement beyond such stated attempts to address the urgent needs of the poor will fail to unravel the much deeper intentions and motivation underlying development interventions. Essentially, these deep intentions implicitly animate how the goals of many development interventions are defined, especially within developing countries. This is one of the major critiques of buzzwords in development because, they, "partnership", "participation", "ownership" and "empowerment", are adopted, co-opted and mainstreamed within development interventions to serve a strategic purpose in the interest of popular development.

Critics have argued that discourse is used to exert various forms of control over recipients of development assistance (Fowler, 2000a; Abugre, 1999; Crawford, 2003; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Cornwall, 2010). Aid-dependent countries are not only constrained to adopt policies based on donor-conditionality, in many instances, many of them have been conditioned to accept or believe that the neo-liberal – economic growth – development model is the 'ultimate solution' to development challenges (Cornwall and Brock, 2005).[64] This seems to be the case in Nigeria especially as it relates to strategies employed in the context of development

[63] In addition to addressing all these, especially among the teeming grassroots population, there is also a drive to enhance the involvement of the poor or targets of development within decision making structures, for projects and broader local governance, with the aim of improving local governance of development initiatives. It can therefore be said that improving governance through grassroots engagement and participation has also become intrinsic here within these drives.

[64] Here, the authors allude to Wolfensohn's speech in which he stated that countries are accepting the new development agenda because they understand that it is the right thing to do.

interventions as they are shaped to mirror this development model in the quest to address poverty and hunger through strategies like Fadama in Nigeria.

This chapter, as a result, interrogates how post-1999 Fadama was conceptualised, and now represents a strategic development initiative that proves useful to entrench the hegemonic neo-liberal development work ethic broadly across the Nigerian economy, and specifically among the grassroots poor. It engages with how instrumental concepts – like 'food security', 'poverty reduction', 'grassroots empowerment' as well as 'participation', 'ownership' and 'partnership – have been crucial in shaping the identity of post-1999 Fadama. This also entails how these led to a particular behavioural tendency within government, among Fadama target-communities and groups, along the desired mainstream developmental path. The chapter seeks to demonstrate that the World Bank's operationalisation of these concepts shaped the identity of the Fadama initiative as well as its long-term goals. This also helps to more adequately demonstrate the display of different forms of power relation in the Fadama project. This is especially as it pertains to the direct relationship between the World Bank and the Nigerian government in shaping Fadama within the context of the credit provided to implement it. In other words, the World Bank's perception and perspectives about Fadama emanate from how it conceptualises 'food security', 'poverty reduction', 'empowerment', 'participation', 'ownership', 'partnership', and other buzzwords associated with Fadama. The tacit imposition of these definitions on Fadama, and how the government must implement the project along the accepted and acceptable mainstream development norms associated with these concepts, is symptomatic of the nature of the power relations in this project. This is the institutional level of power relation which this chapter seeks to demonstrate.

This chapter draws on qualitative data from an in-depth interview with the World Bank Fadama Task Team Leader and from policy documents/reports on the Fadama project produced – and some published – by the World Bank. These include the Project Appraisal Documents (PAD), Project Information Documents (PIDs), Project Implementation Reports, the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) document and Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) document that refer to Fadama. In addition to these documents, grey literature on programming for development and food security were also incorporated into the analysis of the available data. This was aimed at exploring discourses employed within the (re)conceptualisation of Fadama, and how they point to the nature of power relations existent within the context of post-1999 Fadama. In essence, critically engaging the discourses and concepts (being) used by the Bank to describe and promote this project enriches any appraisal of manifestations of unequal power

relation in the conceptualisation of Fadama's goals and its eventual implementation. It suffices to say therefore that an interrogation of the Bank's expectations for this project, its preferred model of implementation and the goals associated with the project – paying attention to how the Bank defines these goals – are all vital for a deeper grasp of the location of power in this partnership as well as how power has been exerted on the various subjects and actors.[65]

This chapter, as such, explores the perception of the World Bank about the project. The analysis is based on the researcher's interpretation of World Bank's perspective of the project as a perspective emanating from the Bank's image as a hegemonic institution of international development. This image thus drives the Bank to incorporate the Fadama initiative (and its goals) into the broader mainstream development framework driven mostly by the primacy of driving economic growth.[66]

The chapter is divided into 6 sections. Section two explores how Fadama has been conceptualised in the post-1999 era within the context of the World Bank's development discourse on development and food security. It situates Fadama-analysis within the broader context of the Bank's perspectives on food security, poverty reduction and empowerment. Here, agriculture and agricultural sector reform are constructed as a dynamic way of achieving these goals. Section three engages the discourse utilised by the World Bank, based on what the Bank conceptualises as the potent mechanisms to actualise Fadama's set goals. These goals are fundamentally integral to the broader process of reforms for the agricultural sector in Nigeria. Here, the concepts and ideals associated with partnership are utilised – especially 'participation' and 'ownership' because of the emphasis on inclusiveness and a country and community-led implementation processes that characterise Fadama. Analysis of these concepts, thus, buttress the extent to which ideals are constructed and 'sold' to the aid-recipient countries within the scope of interests of the donor, especially as it relates to the development initiative being funded. This analysis ultimately culminates in fourth section which critiques the overarching narrative of the Bank's outlook on the Fadama project vis-à-vis the analytical

[65] It can thus be argued that power here is useful in advancing and actualising the goals of entrenching the dominant neoliberal economic model through Fadama in Nigeria, but these goals are concealed by means of the buzzwords employed for Fadama.
[66] Other related and important documents that help in this analysis include: The Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2005-2009 (which provides the theoretical platform for the implementation of the project based on a broader development agenda); the Financing Agreement(s) for the project; and reviews of the project from the World Bank perspective. Also important to this analysis are interview data collected from the World Bank Nigeria office, regarding the project. These are analysed in the light of the emerging issues from the documents which enable the study to interpret the levels and manifestations of power. In fact, these sources of data are instrumental in my argument that inequality remains rife in this partnership arrangement while various elements of control are still obvious in the manner in which the World Bank propagates this initiative along a pervasive global economic model. This is irrespective of the whole rhetoric of equal partnership widespread within the World Bank perception of development partnership within which the project was reconceptualised.

framework which presents the World Bank as an agent of international hegemonic blocs, a mechanism for, and a facilitator in the transfer of world order hegemonic (economic) values and ideals into the developing world. This reaffirms the level of inequality which still dominates the international development arena. It also shows the ultimate location of power in the development partnerships that ensue within this arena. The fifth section concludes this chapter and sets the tone for the next chapter of the dissertation as it helps to demonstrate the position of the Fadama project as an important micro-level initiative which, with its broad aim of addressing hunger and rural poverty, is utilised to popularise and entrench the dominant neoliberal development model in Nigeria.

4.2. Conceptualising Fadama: A Representation of Donor Perceptions

Fadama is one of various important pro-poor micro-level development programmes which the World Bank supports in Nigeria. It aims to reduce poverty, enhance food security and empower the poor within the country – the poor have over the years been voiceless and excluded, in decision-making processes within Nigerian which also faces many governance deficiencies[67] (The World Bank, 2000a, 2005a, 2008). The Bank sees the project as an important strategy to assist and capacitate people to more effectively pull themselves out of the poverty trap in Nigeria. The project aims to support the transformation of beneficiaries into active development partners – agents of their own development – since they are said to be integrated into the process of Fadama's conceptualisation, design, implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of the (progress of the) project at various levels and in different locations in Nigeria. Through this means, the principle of self-sufficiency and the actualisation of the essence of the capability approach are aimed to be achieved while the anomaly of dependency (as a downside of development assistance) will be mitigated.

To actualise these goals, the Bank established some objectives for the project to serve as success or failure indicators. (These were ostensibly established in partnership with the Nigerian government). The Bank also (re)defined concepts deployed within the project and

[67] Corruption is the biggest problem identified and it feeds into other aspects of the socio-political and especially the socio-economic life of the country accounting for a poor business environment, emergence of incompetent leaders in many cases, a population consisting of many uninformed people, poor institutional capacity among others. These are highlighted in the first Country Assistance Strategy note in 2000 after Nigeria's return to democracy.

designed an implementation standard that would serve to achieve the ultimate goals for the project – economic growth.

From the first phase in 1993 down to the current phase – three – which has been extended with "additional financing", there have been a set of financial agreements[68] that have been signed by both major parties to the design and implementation of the Fadama project – the World Bank and the Federal Government of Nigeria. These agreements – in 1993, 2005, and 2012, including additional financing agreements – set out terms and conditions for the implementation of the project; they defined terms and concepts used within the project; and they assigned dates for the beginning of the implementation, dates and modalities of, and for, the withdrawal of funds as well as the lifeline of the entire phase of the project. These agreements and the ensuing appraisal documents were thus vital in more explicitly defining the aims and objectives of the project. The focus of this chapter is mostly on the post-1999 era when Fadama was reconceptualised as a community-driven development (CDD) project with emphasis on beneficiary involvement towards actualising the goal of food security, poverty reduction and grassroots empowerment.

Post-1999 Fadama was designed to facilitate the MDGs and it remains relevant within the current SDGs. This prospect is nonetheless still hinged on the belief that economic growth, especially growth in the rural economy, will be actualised through increasing the income of the rural poor and enhancing their capacity to help themselves. This belief accounts for the project's current status as a CDD project characterised by direct transfer of financial and technical resources to poor beneficiaries with a view to empowering them in various productive ventures to achieve results for their own development. This was indeed a redefinition of Fadama towards an all-inclusive, holistic and multi-stakeholder initiative. This is captured in a deeper reading of the three important targets within the broader project goal.

4.3.Fadama Reconceptualised: What the Project Development Objective (PDO) means for Fadama

As already set out, Fadama – especially Fadama III – is broadly aimed at food security, poverty reduction and grassroots empowerment. These goals are drawn from the PDO set out by the

[68] In the first phase of the project (Fadama I) it was "Loan Agreement", while in the last two phases, including the extension given, it is also called "the financing agreement".

World Bank in Fadama III's PAD – the document prepared by the Bank to shape, define and establish the nature, scope and focus of Fadama III.[69] Here the objective is to "sustainably increase the incomes of Fadama users." The World Bank argues that through this process, Fadama "will help to reduce rural poverty, increase food security" and thus "contribute to the achievement of a key Millennium Development Goal" (The World Bank, 2008, p.2).

The emphasis on increasing income as a means to reduce poverty and enhance food security, especially with reference to the MDGs, demonstrates a strong inclination to commercial interpretations to the problem of hunger and poverty and ways to tackle them. The roles of interventions, like Fadama, that provide the poor with resources to work towards self-sustenance, become even more strategic. Fadama's targets, thus, provide a useful guide to unravel the World Bank's perspective about Fadama, what constitutes or drives food (in)security, its links to poverty, and how addressing poverty helps in tackling hunger.

It is instructive that underlying the World Bank's approach to poverty reduction, especially under President Wolfensohn, was a growth-led process. As noted in chapter three, the Bank upholds private sector-led growth as crucial for poverty reduction (Kagia, 2005). This entails a multifaceted approach in which different players contribute towards achieving the long-term goals set out by the CDF. Consequently, food insecurity, conceived as a facet of poverty, has seen similar programmatic prescriptions from the World Bank and its sister Bretton Woods institutions as those set out for addressing economic instability. On this point, Schanbacher notes:

> ... food security is increasingly sought through economic policies including trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation of the national industry, and the opening of economic markets. The guiding principle of these multilateral institutions is the idea that economic growth, via market mechanisms, provides the most sustainable solution for curbing poverty and achieving food security. However, critics of these strategies point to how a purely market-based approach to food security remains entrenched in neo-colonial power structures that have failed to create a just global food system (Schanbacher, 2010, p. viii).

This position points to the extent to which the mainstream perspective of poverty, and how to tackle it, impacts on how food security or the food question is also understood and tackled. It also follows that, under the new agenda of inclusiveness and participation for addressing

[69] Note that each of the three phases of Fadama had its own Project Appraisal Document developed by the World Bank to clearly define their pathways for implementation. In Fadama III, the Project Implementation Manual (PIM) – a huge implementation guide – was introduced, for various Fadama stakeholders, to provide more details about various implementation issues that are set out in the PAD.

poverty, the representation of the food question within the context of Fadama III has taken on both the mainstream understanding of a growth-led poverty reduction and the inclusive modalities of the new development agenda. In this light, Fadama III's goals of poverty reduction, food security and grassroots empowerment are rooted within this mainstream belief in the trickle-down effect of economic growth.

The sections below present some of these issues clearer within the three specific targets or goals that were drawn out of the PDO. This is especially in terms of what they mean for nature, scope and reach of Fadama.

4.3.1. Fadama III and food security: Production, consumption, distribution and the centrality of the agricultural sector[70]

One of the expected outcomes of sustainably increasing the incomes of Fadama beneficiaries was to enhance food security. As noted in chapter two, food security as a concept has undergone a great deal of transformation over the years and its definition and practice have as such changed along with the changing phases of development thinking (Jarosz, 2011). Interestingly, the World Bank's (1986) definition of food security comes after Sen's (1976; 1981b) famous critique of the Failure of Availability Decline (FAD) approach to the famine. The Bank, thus, endeavoured to transcend a narrow focus on availability, consumption and supply issues on a national level to integrate individual and household issues of food security which includes food access as well as utilization. Essentially, while it embraced the idea of addressing problems associated with access and utilization on the food question, it retained components of production and supply – food availability and distribution.

Schanbacher notes:

> ... food security [for global governance institutions like the World Bank] is primarily an issue of producing enough food to feed the world's poor. As such, we need strategies that produce food in the most efficient and cheap way possible. Once food is secured, we need a distributive paradigm that delivers food in the most efficient and cheap way (Schanbacher, 2010, p. 4).

This viewpoint highlights how the World Bank's perspective has attempted to address questions of production, supply and consumption as well as access and distribution. However,

[70] Although the World Bank's highlighting of the goals puts poverty reduction on the list, I have decided not to follow that order intrinsically because I do not want to deal with poverty reduction as a conceptual issue since it is not core to my study conceptually.

at the same time, it demonstrates an emphasis on global market structures that underlie the distribution process that this conception of food security calls for. These include "unregulated trade liberalisation, privatization, and deregulation" – all elements of the free market system which in many cases have been said not to favour the local economy (Schanbacher, 2010, p. 4). It is in this light that the World Bank's perspective of food security is criticised as overly economic growth driven – neoliberal in character. It tends to discount, or be dismissive of, the internal needs and identities of communities and or the local economy since the quest is to integrate local economies into the larger global capitalist market structure. Alternative perspectives believe that this serves the interest of big businesses instead of the needs of local farmers and communities (Schanbacher, 2010).[71]

In fact, this approach to food security is argued to expose the local farmers and communities to the forces of global capitalism and the vagaries of the markets. It not only creates more markets (for cheap labour and raw materials) for corporations, and clients for (microfinance) banks, but also engenders enormous competition within these contexts thus impacting negatively on the social base and the identity of the people through a focus on profits and natural resource exploitation for profits (Fioramonti, 2017).[72] Food is thus a business from the food security perspective of the World Bank; subsistence is relegated to the background (Schanbacher, 2010).

Drawing on these, Schanbacher (2010) argues that despite slight differences in formulation, the World Bank and the UN institutions such as the FAO and IFAD share substantially the same conception of food security. Although the World Bank has in recent times through its new development agenda ostensibly prioritised people (and poverty reduction) in its development programming, which includes food security, it remains intrinsically biased in favour of 'economising' the food question – it remains business inclined (Moore, 2007; Pender, 2001; Schanbacher, 2010).[73] This way of conceptualising food security is thus criticized by

[71] For a detailed engagement with this debate see Schanbacher (2010). This involves mainstream versus alternative perspectives – the battle between food security and food sovereignty. It must be noted that food security remains a contested concept in academic as well as policy circles. While concepts such as food sovereignty have emerged in recent years in an attempt to over throw the mainstream position on the problem of hunger, food security remains a fundamental development problem in current development policy/planning within national and international circles. This debate comes against the backdrop of issues bordering on the mainstream disposition towards the concept which alternative views perceive to be too neo-liberal in orientation. For the latter, the neo-liberal mind-set that guides the mainstream definition of the problems also guides and shapes the nature of the approaches or strategies being designed by (international) development institutions such as the World Bank. In other words, this same foundation engenders the propagation of the same old neo-liberal market driven development ideology or agenda within the context of newer approaches to approaching the food question.

[72] He criticises a focus on growth that leads to an unsustainable and reckless exploitation of human and natural resources for the purpose of profits and economic growth – GDP as opposed to building a Wellbeing economy.

[73] Apart from Schanbacher whose focus is strictly on food security question, the others are focused broadly on development and the new attempt by development institutions such as the WB to place the people at the centre of development – through

scholars and activists who take an ethical route.[74] These latter insist that food is a fundamental human right, and people should not be made to struggle (through trade barriers and politics) to be able to provide food for themselves, their people and their country (see Schabacher, 2010; Chen & Kates, 1994).[75]

In identifying food security as one of the key targets of Fadama III, it suggests that the World Bank actively sought to establish and entrench this 'neoliberal' angle to the food question within this initiative. This entails an attempt to increase production, access to improved and or genetically modified or enhance seedlings, access to markets and networks, access to credits and or loans from microfinance banks to drive community and groups subprojects, as well as increased capabilities through skills transfer through technical assistance and advisory services. All these are markers of the changing perspectives around the food question from simple production and supply to the question of access, utilization, vulnerabilities, stability, trade, and genetically modified food (Collier, 2007; de Waal, 1990; A. Sen, 1982).

Importantly, growth in the non-oil sector was one of the higher objectives that the World Bank believed that Fadama III would contribute to. According to the PAD:

> The proposed Project supports the government's strategic objective to enhance growth in sectors other than oil in order to achieve increased food security, reduce poverty, and create employment and improved opportunities in rural areas. The Project will do so by: *(i) financing investments in productive community infrastructure to increase agricultural productivity and diversify sources of livelihood [emphasis added];* (ii) building the capacity of community organizations to increase the stock of social capital; (iii) strengthening the capabilities of participating states and local governments to deliver services to the rural poor; and (iv) promoting socially-inclusive and environmentally sustainable management of natural resources. The Project will also contribute to achieving the goals of the New Agricultural Policy (NAP) and the Rural Sector Strategy (RSS) as well as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) target of 6 percent agricultural growth, objectives of TerrAfrica Partnership and its GEF Strategic Investment Program (SIP) for Sustainable Land Management (SLM) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SIP is led by the Bank and NEPAD) (World Bank, 2008, p.11).

This excerpt highlights among other things "financing investments ... to increase agricultural productivity and diversify sources of livelihood" (ibid). These are crucial issues central to food

participation (to know what they need and how they want things done (Moore, 2010 in the World Development Report 2001), and in changing development definition from economic growth to broadly human and sustainable development under Wolfensohn and Stiglitz (Pender, 2010))

[74] Take note of food as a business in analysing the Fadama and agriculture-focus in Nigeria and WB discourses.

[75] This same critique also targets the UN institutions (IFAD and FAO) that are actively involved in food security campaigns through widespread projects and initiatives all over many of the developing countries of the World. Although they are more inclined to people's needs in their approach, they are said to remain intrinsically neo-liberal and market oriented in their efforts.

security debates in academic and policy circles. The emphasis on investments draw from the assumption that it would trigger larger quantities of food production, improve storage and distribution capacities, and thus culminate in the establishment of networks of stakeholders to facilitate processes of production, storage, distribution and re-investment. These networks, including microfinance banks, markets or business partners linked to farmers through Fadama III, therefore, provide the platform upon which livelihoods will be secured. In this light, there was an attempt incorporate elements of De Waal's (1990), and sustainable livelihoods', concern about the need to address vulnerabilities associated with the food question – things that make coping strategies to fail.

Achieving the World Bank's target of food security in Nigeria implied a strategic focus on the agricultural sector since it is the epicentre of production. This accounts for situating Fadama mainly within this sector. The excerpt about lends credence to this view. It also lends credence to the aforementioned argument that post-1999 Fadama is a mechanism for advancing the mainstream economic rationality. This is in the sense of constructing the project as a vital contributor towards the actualisation of CAADP and other agricultural growth objectives within donor-funded African institutions like NEPAD that have been criticised to represent donor interests in Africa.

The result of adopting the mainstream conception and understanding of the food question, are policy initiatives and development partnerships (being) established in the light of 'ensuring that food becomes more available and accessible to all peoples to ensure a healthy and productive life'. Thus, within the post-1999 context, Fadama emerged as one of such policy initiatives designed to effectively respond to the food question. One way to achieve this, as identified also by the World Bank, has been through the agricultural sector which has also been said to employ more than 70 percent of the Nigerian population (The World Bank, 2000a, 2005a, 2008). The next subsection analyses the drive to ensure food security through revitalising Nigeria's struggling (and largely subsistent) agricultural sector. The reason for highlighting this sector is mainly because the Fadama project was fundamentally agriculturally driven – all other components of this initiative have some linkages to this sector.

Revitalising Nigeria's Agriculture to enhance food security

A burgeoning agricultural sector in Nigeria has been identified to be critical for reducing hunger and improving people's lives (The World Bank, 2000a, 2005a, 2009b, 2014). In this light, the sector was identified to possess the potential to set Nigeria on the path of growth and improved human development (World Bank, 2000a, p. i).[76] In 1998 when the World Bank restored development relations with Nigeria, efforts to revitalise this sector commenced; it was an intrinsic aspect of the proposed economic reforms carried out under the Obasanjo administration (1999-2003; 2003-2007). Thus, the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Nigeria, prepared under the presidency of Wolfensohn, outlined various strategies towards refocusing the Nigerian economy back on the path of growth. Agriculture was one of the non-oil sectors mostly emphasised. This is not surprising since it is intrinsic to the World Bank's perspective about addressing poverty (see Schanbacher, 2010; Jarosz, 2011).

In a similar vein, the Bank identified agriculture as responsible for employing about 70 percent of Nigerians and contributing about 37 percent of the country's GDP (World Bank, 2010: 1). This is in sharp contrast to the oil sector which usurped most of the stakes in the economy but only employed about 4 percent of the Nigerian labour force (see World Bank, 2008:1 (footnote 1)). As a result, it was imperative to prioritize the non-oil sector to boost the diversification of the Nigerian economy beyond oil and along agricultural, manufacturing, industrial and export-oriented lines (The World Bank, 2000, p. 2-3).[77] Thus, in the light of the millennium development agenda for development intervention in Nigeria, the fight to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (MDG goal 1) entailed (re)defining food security in line with enunciated principles for restructuring Nigeria's agricultural sector.

These reforms proposed to the government largely took on a relatively universal approach. The prescriptions for reforming economies across the developing world were set in motion for Nigeria. Drawn from different socio-economic and political contexts, as well as lessons learnt from previous experiences and shortcomings, these processes of economic stabilization, debt

[76] This drive for economic growth was also identified to be led by the market economic model where the private sector plays an intrinsic role (see (The World Bank, 2000a, p. i) – Executive summary).

[77] In this CAS report, the Bank argues that "the oil price boom in the 1970s led to a spending boom, an overvalued foreign exchange rate, and other associated policy distortions that caused the collapse of virtually all agricultural exports, further reinforcing the dependence on oil." It also argued that a "similar rise in the oil price in the early 1990s led to the government abandoning its economic reform program that was being supported by the [World] Bank." Also, the CPS (2005) argues that in terms of drives towards reduced poverty and meeting the MDGs, Nigeria would need to attain "rapid and sustained growth of the non-oil economy [which includes agriculture], creating employment and opportunities for small businesses and improved livelihood. Achieving the health, HIV, water and education MDGs will require resources to be reallocated to the social sectors and demand created for quality services, which will improve institutional capacity" (The World Bank, 2000, p. 6).

relief and associated conditionality, privatisation, deregulation, and reduced public sector and public-sector spending were all prescribed for Nigeria. The same went for development programmes (The World Bank, 2005a). Following this trend of thought then, food security was (re)constructed within the context of agricultural reforms within a broader economic reform process in Nigeria. It thus had to incorporate growth and profit components profitable to the economy in terms of GDP and the people in the long term. This, therefore, accounts for the emphasis on privatisation, reduction and or total removal of subsidies in the agricultural sector. There were also emphases on competition and cash crops for export reasons, devaluation of the currency as well as trade liberalisation (The World Bank, 2005a, 2007). These are the hallmark of economic reforms led by the World Bank and IMF who were engaging the Obasanjo administration regarding retracing the country's steps back to the development/growth path.[78]

In this context of Nigeria's socio-economic and political history post-1999, and specifically in relation to the Fadama project, food security thus remained intrinsically embedded within mainstream development model, similar to Schanbacher's (2010) thesis.[79] In Fadama, food production is ostensibly designed to essentially cater for local needs as opposed to attending to export-related exigencies – this aspect would be the handled by another agency within the same agricultural sector. In fact, drawing from the experiences in Fadama's second phase, one of the considerations for the design phase III included production for export reasons. This was not incorporated because Fadama should attend mainly to local availability and access needs (see The World Bank, 2008, p. 27).[80] While this can be said to give a twist to the understanding of the Bank's disposition to food security through its humanitarian-focused development strategies, what remains constant is the drive towards the market-led economy even within the grassroots economy. The ostensible humane focus of the project still creates more clients for microfinance banks through various loan schemes, and it also creates markets for cheap raw

[78] It is argued that African countries had no muscle to resist these 'prescription' towards economic engineering from the international institutions during the SAPs era. Thus they became distinct guinea pigs in the trial versions of the Washington consensus approach to development led by the World Bank and IMF technocrats (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2004).

[79] Remember here that he argues that the approach to food security is synonymous to the mainstream versions of development which is outward driven, competition based and led by private sector approach for profit maximizing.

[80] Here there are a number of alternatives considered to constitute part of the project's components, but these alternatives were rejected for a number of reasons. For example, a "component for commercial agriculture and export" was rejected because the team – the bank and government – wanted the "project to retain its focus on small scale operations amenable to a CDD approach, and to address other activities under a separately developed Commercial Agricultural Development Project." It states further that many of the "subprojects [in the Fadama project] addressing livelihood and income generation under Fadama III, however are commercial in nature, but on a small scale" (p. 27). What this means that although priority is given to small scale production in the Fadama project, not for export reasons, there could still be reasons to have export components indirectly but to be channeled through the new and emerging Commercial Agricultural Development Project. So, the mainstream market-driven models remain largely at play still.

materials and competition through the emphases on profits. These are components of the reform agenda proposed by the World Bank and IMF in the early 2000s through its Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, 2000) and Country Partnership Strategy (CPS 2005-2009) documents for Nigeria.

Certainly, the World Bank's approach towards reforming Nigeria's agricultural sector in the quest to attain food security is apparent in its recommended policies and strategies. For example, Fadama II was only approved after fulfilling the requirements set out in the 2005 CPS.[81] This strategy paper built on the initial 2000 CAS document. Here, the World Bank identified strategies to assist "Nigerians build their capacity to manage their own resources effectively and to implement policies that will attract private sector investment while assisting the government to implement programs that directly alleviate poverty" (The World Bank, 2000, p. i).[82] It offers hope for the future through reforms in the economic system to stem structural violence issues characterised Nigeria's transitional era due to the multiplicity of challenges in the country.[83]

The CPS was prepared by the Bank as part of Nigeria's "National Comprehensive Framework for Reform, Growth and poverty reduction" (The World Bank, 2005a, p. vi). It highlights *Nigeria's efforts towards transforming itself into a market-led economy* under the leadership of the prime reformer in current Nigerian history – Obasanjo who began an ambitious economic reform programme under the guidance of the World Bank and the IMF (The World Bank, 2005). One important economic reform programme of Obasanjo's administration was the NEEDS (programme) which was based on the pillars of empowering people and improving social service delivery; growing the private sector and focusing on non-oil growth; and changing the way government works and improving governance (The World Bank, 2005a, p. vi). Despite the efforts being made to ensure a reformed economy, the document notes that Nigeria remained highly challenged with disproportionate population vis-à-vis its economic productivity, hence the need for foreign aid to assist Nigeria's reform programmes. It proposed

[81] Fadama II completion report highlights that it was "structured to address five pillars of the CPS" (The World Bank, 2010, p. 1).

[82] This document begins by stating categorically that "economic growth in Nigeria was only attainable through the market economy led by the private sector", and that there was a consensus among citizens and government alike about this viewpoint. The question that this raises is whose voice represents the citizens in question here? In essence the question that follows here is: who are the Nigerian population that agreed to this view at that point in time; and whose views really constitute the so called 'Nigerian people'.

[83] Structural violence issues here relate to the fact that religious violence in the North, and economic violence in the Niger Delta and other issues may escalate if the systemic corruption and poor leadership characteristic of previous leadership continued and adequate economic reforms do not take place to fix issues that could light the fire of violence again or throw people back into these feelings.

to step up financial and technical assistance to signal strong support for government's reform efforts and help finance investments necessary to remove obstacles to growth and development. The paper also highlighted the need for Nigerian reformers to, more than anything else, have the political will and a broadening consensus and constituency for sustaining change (The World Bank, 2000a).

The ideas enunciated in this strategy paper can be surmised as the quest for reforms to enhance growth in Nigeria, especially through the non-oil economy. As already stated above, the agricultural sector was identified as one of these 'economies' – a critical sector in the quest to balance the economy and drive it along the path of growth.[84] Other sectors in this important reform process were: manufacturing and industrialisation; and prominently, the private sector. From the foregoing then, the importance of reforms emphasising agriculture in Nigeria became even more urgent to help boost growth through employment and capacity in the country (The World Bank, 2005a, p. 12).

Within this reform process, the strategy documents (CAS and CPS) emphasised the need to fix problematic economic decisions of the past such as large amounts of monies wasted on fertilizer subsidies by different administrations (The World Bank, 2000, p. 4). Thus, to revitalise this sector, it was important to introduce more efficient and cost-effective reforms that would, in the long run, propel economic growth (The World Bank, 2005a, p. 12-14). (The place of the private sector was highly mooted.) In essence, aspects of the reforms in the agricultural sector, to improve productivity and effectiveness, included the removal of subsidies (on fertilizers which was characteristic of many administrations including Abacha's regime), privatisation and private sector involvement in the provision of services, and the availability of markets and creation of networks for improved marketing and distribution of produce. These were essential for improving production, availability, access to food, as well as profits to individual farmers and the broader economy especially with regards to export within the free trade agreement. These are important aspects of the reforms which the World Bank incorporated in its outlook on also achieving a food secure country.

A look at Fadama shows that these reform components are obvious. For instance, there was an imperative for the government to ensure that Fadama was implemented in line with the dictates of the CPS which has growth as its central idea – there is also an emphasis on inclusiveness (Africa Development Bank, 2003; The World Bank, 2008, 2010b). The Fadama project was

[84] In this strategy paper, the use of the concept of growth was also widespread.

also designed to focus on food production for local consumption while the private sector contributed through providing several services, including loans. These were geared towards improving production and access, as well as the quality of crops and agricultural products that would emerge from the initiative. In this light, an intrinsic aspect of Fadama which has become very popular within the sustainable livelihoods circle is the incorporation of the value chain approach to the project. This is important because of its efficacy in the different levels of production and marketing for long-term goals of growth and sustainability.

Based on the discussions above, it can be argued that food security under Fadama, even within this context of the Bank's 'novel' approach under Wolfensohn, remains fundamentally driven along the mainstream tenets associated with donor driven reforms in agricultural sectors (Moore, 2007).[85] In fact, agricultural sector reforms – within the broader economic reform programme – were guided by the neoliberal-market economy ideal which the World Bank and IMF embody. Both institutions were central to the post-1999 reforms in Nigeria.[86] These ideas included; ensuring availability and access to food through production and marketing; private sector involvement; removal of subsidies; and export-driven agricultural production to boost economic growth (The World Bank, 2000, 2005a). Thus, although the representation of food security within the Fadama-specific context drifts a little because the export component is less emphasised (but transferred to another agency), it does not imply that it is totally devoid of the mainstream development model. In fact, the provision for the emerging Commercial Agricultural Development Project, where export commercial activities could be channelled to, is also available even for the small-scale Fadama III subprojects which are supposed to help in actualising improved livelihood and income generation (see The World Bank 2010, p. 27). This creates room for export-related discussions as well as redirects the focus to issues of market dynamics. In essence, while it is not disputed that the Bank sees in the Fadama project, an effective strategy towards improving the availability of and access to food for Nigerians, especially people within the rural areas, it remains analytically coherent to argue that the approach remains intrinsically based on mainstream orientations that emphasise markets, private sector, exports, competition and profits. This becomes clearer when analysed within the context of donor insistence on agricultural reforms in Nigeria. Another point that further

[85] In chapter fifteen of this book, Marcus Taylor and Susanne Soederberg's *'The King is Dead (Long live the king?)'* reveal the fundamental similarities between the structures, practices and ideologies within the World Bank after Wolfensohn and during Wolfowitz.

[86] The CPS (2005) highlights levels of negotiations between the Obasanjo regime and the IMF, and this triggered quite a number of reforms. In fact, Obasanjo stands out as one of the most potent "reformers" in Nigeria as he negotiated the debt relief, and kick-started economic reforms that saw privatization, deregulation, reduction in subsidies, public service reforms, and anti-corruption campaigns amongst others.

strengthens this case concerns the introduction of the value chain approach in the post-1999 Fadama programming (The World Bank, 2010).

The Value Chain: Broadening Fadama's approach to the food question

The imperative for improved agricultural productivity necessitated the design of a programme endowed with the capacity to effectively respond to this challenge of low productivity in the country – hence Fadama. Initially, the loan of $67, 500 000 (million) was provided to the government through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1992 to assist in the implementation of Fadama I in 12 states – many of these states were in Northern Nigeria (Legal Dept of World Bank, 1992). According to the completion report for Fadama I, the objectives of the project were realistic and consistent with the agricultural development objectives of the FGN "to increase self-sufficiency in basic food commodities, increase production for export and local industries, and prevent environmental degradation. They were also consistent with the recommendation of the 1989 Bank Sector Strategy report to raise the agricultural sector through small scale irrigation" (The World Bank, 2000b, pp. i–ii).

At this point of project conceptualisation, the major ideas revolved around producing more food. This was merged with the need for adequate irrigation systems to facilitate the target of attaining an all year long production of food crops. The project, however, had failed to factor in issues associated with distribution, sustainability and more importantly storage. Thus, it was identified in the design of Fadama II that there was a huge lapse in terms of ensuring that a wider spectrum of the population benefitted from the initiative. In fact, many farmers suffered losses due to the lack of means of storing their produce and selling them at a later stage (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012). The singular focus on production had its problems and as such latter phases of Fadama project had to be broadened in terms of their scope, objectives as well as stakeholders and techniques of implementation. Other components of food security that facilitate production, access, processing, marketing, transportation and storage of goods became incorporated into post-1999 Fadama processes. This created the room for the incorporation of the *value chain approach.*[87] Fadama began to address issues, beyond farming

[87] This approach though not unique to Fadama since it is linked to business organizational modus operandi is important to highlight in terms of the reconstruction and refocusing the goals of the project along the lines of the New Public Management approach wherein there is high emphasis on efficiency and productivity and deliverables. Thus, the value chain approach becomes useful in ensuring the movement of goods and services from the initial producers, in this case the farmers, to the final

practices, such as processing, distribution and transportation of goods. In addition to this, activities such as aquaculture, livestock rearing, and poultry farming where emphasised within the broader goal of empowering women, youths and vulnerable groups.

This shift, especially the inclusion of value chains, came as a result of noted challenges within the agricultural sector. Some of these sector issues, as identified by the World Bank included "developing markets and *value-adding activities*." According to the World Bank,

> The single greatest challenge facing Nigeria is how to foster the development of markets to serve agriculture. This in turn implies strengthening the capacity for value addition, including increased support in three priority areas: (i) ensuring a favorable business climate; (ii) ensuring adequate infrastructure that provides reliable and reasonably priced transport, communications, power, and water services; and (iii) developing human capacity" (The World Bank, 2008, p. 57).

Thus, in the Bank-identified Fadama III strategic choices – such as addressing "limited access to productive infrastructure" and "improving livelihood opportunities" – the emphasis on value chains becomes clearer (ibid). Thus, in striving to improve livelihood opportunities, the Bank noted:

> A key constraint to rural development in Nigeria has been the lack of opportunity to intensify smallholder agriculture and stimulate growth of commercial agriculture, downstream processing and other nonfarm activities. The Project will [therefore] diversify income and employment opportunities through support for productive activities, technical assistance and investment in both social and economic asset and infrastructure as well as the associated advisory services identified by communities as being most relevant to their welfare. The Project focuses on expanding the existing livelihoods of the poor by improving their skills, providing resources, identifying local opportunities and gaps in the value chain at all stages – inputs, outputs, value additions, marketing – to ensure that the poor are better positioned to take advantage of farm and non-farm employment opportunities... (The World Bank, 2008, p. 59).

The idea here is therefore that Fadama III's "... project-funded diversified livelihood activities are expected to also lead to a strengthening of the forward and backward linkages in the rural economy that stimulate investment, employment, and incomes in rural non-farm enterprises" (Ibid).

Fadama III's component 5 – "Acquisition for Individual FUGs/EIGs *US$150.0m (of which US$105.0m financed by IDA)*" – also provide useful details about the strategic importance of

consumers. This demands different types of facilities and activities to ensure that goods and services are more efficiently distributed (like in a proper business venture).

value addition to Fadama, hence the necessity for applying value chain models. This is demonstrated in the results framework for monitoring Fadama III project in the table below.[88]

Table 1: Fadama III Results Framework

NIGERIA: THIRD NATIONAL FADAMA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (FADAMA III) Results Framework		
Project Development Objective	**Project Outcome Indicators**	**Use of Project Outcome Information**
1. Sustainable increase in the income of Fadama users.		
Intermediate Outcomes	**Intermediate Outcome Indicators for each Component**	**Use of Intermediate Outcome Monitoring**
Component 5: Acquisition for Individual FUGs/EIGs **Increased value-added to agricultural products. Increased access to agricultural product markets.**	20% increase in income from sales of value-added agricultural products. 30% of FCAs have access to market information.	The results will be analyzed to assess the level of off-farm income generated as a result of value addition to agricultural products. This will be used to ascertain the coverage of market information dissemination under the Project.

(Adapted from: The World Bank, 2008, p. 76)

It is in this light that the appraisal document thus notes: "Based on the experience in Fadama II ... the menu of subprojects is ... to include [amongst others] ... equipment and support for processing and value addition..." (The World Bank, 2008, pp. 21, 90). This is corroborated by a World Bank representative who explained the shift towards the value chain approach for Fadama in the excerpt below:

> Fadama I ...was more of production... [In] ... Fadama II and III, we have shifted to looking at the value chain in which case we are looking at the production, the processing and the marketing. So, if you go down South ... you will see more of processing and marketing of the product... and then if you also go a little down South you will see more of gender ... involvement ... and then also more of empowerment of women and youth groups.... Fadama's main objective is to increase income of farmers, and in increasing the income of farmers, we are not only looking at the production, we are also looking at the processing aspects as well as the marketing (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).

This shift from a narrow focus on production to a more holistic engagement with various stakeholders and networks for successful businesses became the hallmark of Fadama initiative since 2004. This is more so as the overall drive within this shift to value chains was to ensure

[88] This table was adapted from the World Bank PAD, 2008 for Fadama III to focus only on the "Value Addition" aspect of Component 5".


GDP growth through the contribution of Fadama III. This is clear in the "economic benefit assessment" of Fadama II in which the World Bank projected "an expected contribution of ... US$2,568.4m to the GDP over the 15-year period..." to Nigeria's coffers. According to the estimation, this would be "made up of US$1,759.3m from productive activities; US$630.5m from agro-processing; and US$178.5m from rural infrastructure" (The World Bank, 2008, p.137)." From this outlook, it becomes even apt to suggest that this somewhat accounts for the adoption of this approach in the President Goodluck Jonathan-led Agricultural Transformation Agenda (2011-2015).

Conceptually, value chain falls within the family of concepts described as chains that subsume "companies (or individuals) that interact to supply goods and services" (Webber & Labaste, 2010, p. 9). Other concepts within this family include supply chains, productive chains, distribution chains, marketing chains or filières (ibid). All these chains possess the same character akin to those attributed to the value chain because irrespective of the specific focus, "they all seek to capture and describe the complex interactions of firms and processes that are needed to create and deliver products to end users. Moreover, they all strive to identify opportunities for and constraints against increasing productivity" (ibid). A fundamental definition of the value chain conceives it as "the full range of activities required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use" (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001, p. 4). Following this vein, Webber and Labaste (2010) describe the concept in this manner:

> ... Value chains include all of the vertically linked, interdependent processes that generate value for the consumer, as well as horizontal linkages to other value chains that provide intermediate goods and services. [In fact] Value chains focus on value creation – typically via innovation in products or processes, as well as marketing – and also on the allocation of the incremental value (Webber & Labaste, 2010, p. 9).


The following diagrams help to give a graphic representation of the interlinkages and interdependence that is characteristic of various value chains. These will make the most sense when they are linked to the important aspects of relations and outsourcing that constitute part of the Fadama initiative itself.

Figure 1. Simple Value Chain




Source: (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001)**: Four Links to a Simple Value Chain**

Figure 2. Extended Value Chain (the forestry, timber and furniture value chain)



Source: (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001)

Figure 3. Unconventional value chain flow



Source: (Hellin, Ndjeunga, & Trench, 2010, p. 6).[89]

Similar to these value chains, the value chain in agriculture[90] may be described in terms of a broader array of goods and services that play significant and important roles in the transition of agricultural products from the producers to the final consumer. The concept is linked to Michael Potter's (1985) illustration of how companies could achieve 'competitive advantage' by adding value to their organization (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001, 2014). Although it was developed within the context of business organisations, it has been incorporated within Fadama III to add value to products and enhance efficiency in their distribution across different types of stakeholders.

This illustration usefully enables a clear grasp of the agricultural value chain to entail the transformation and movement of goods and services – mostly agricultural products – from the

[89] Figure 3 here shows the flow of income from markets to primary producers, rather than the conventional flow of goods in the opposite direction. This counterintuitive view emphasises a demand-led perspective. This has to do with the period when goods and services have been transformed and ultimately become profitable to the primary producer.
[90] Note that Fadama is located within this sector.

rural producers and farmers to the final consumers through a broader framework of processing, marketing, institutions and networks. The process involves many people to ensure a more efficient process of transferring agricultural products from the first source to the final consumer. Within the context of Fadama III, these different networks – officially referred to as stakeholders in the project – include the local farmers or entrepreneurs who constitute the FCAs and FUGs, the service providers ostensibly employed by the local farmers, the Fadama office, private sector partners that contribute to packaging and distributing products, (microfinance) banks, and the World Bank. This means that all these actors or stakeholders play vital roles within the Fadama project's process of 'value addition' to the primary products produced at the grassroots levels to ensure a more efficient and effective distribution of these products beyond the local space to the national and even international market space. This process also ostensibly enables an effective inward flow of funds or capital (back) to the primary (grassroots) producers as demonstrated in the unconventional flow of goods, services and capital (see figure 3 above).

As it can be gleaned from the World Bank's disposition towards the value chain approach, Fadama's role within the agricultural sector as a growth driver became somewhat aligned with the prospects of the value chain model. Essentially, in applying this model to Fadama III, there is added value to products through processing, and this improves their standing in the world market. This technically means improved foreign exchange and gross domestic product for the country.[91] It is in this light that the value chain approach is an intrinsic component of the World Bank's progressive prescriptions for agricultural reforms within developing countries; it has thus become very popular among other international development agencies including the FAO and the IFPRI (Haggblade, Theriault, Staatz, Dembele, & Diallo, 2012; Riisgaard, Ponte, & UNIDO, 2011). Indeed, these facets of transforming agricultural output thus constituted part of what a country like Nigeria was 'advised' to incorporate into its reform especially within the context of the agricultural sector.

Fadama, from all indication, thus became a target initiative for introducing and incorporating this universal (business) principle to achieve long-term productive effects akin to corporate

[91] In Webber and Labaste (2010, p. 1) above, the World Bank highlights the relevance of the value chain in sustaining growth in SSA, especially in increasing the incomes of the rural poor. They argue that irrespective of "the successes of many African exporters in selling to the new market, without further improvements to their business environments and to the competitiveness of their export commodities, many SSA countries risk being trapped into producing low-skill, low-value products and services, struggling to obtain a significant value-added share in global trade." Thus, "raising the productivity and increasing the efficiency of agriculture value chains are basic to the success of SSA rural economies and to the growth of incomes of their rural population."

standards in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, proficiency and profits. This is even more vivid based on the World Bank's 'trust' in a (private sector-led) growth model as the 'cure for all ills' in the light of its quest to drastically address to (grassroots) poverty and food security as an integral component of this challenge.

4.3.2. Fadama III, Poverty Reduction and emphasis on an Inclusive Rural Development Strategy

Poverty reduction is another important target in Fadama III's quest to increase incomes of Fadama users. In this drive to reduce rural poverty, financial improvement stands out as the World Bank defines Fadama III's goals (The World Bank, 2008, p. 2-3). Underlying this goal is a construction of poverty, within Fadama, as the apparent lack of financial income; the lack of physical sources of income, hence the need for "increasing the income of Fadama users" (The World Bank, 2008). Conceptualising poverty in this sense usefully enabled the Bank to determine the nature of intervention required, recommended or established within the project. There is also a representation of poverty, in the definition of the targets of Fadama, as the lack of capacity and technical know-how to drive production growth and channels for the distribution of goods and services from primary production to the wider market. This perspective justifies or legitimises the introduction of components like capacity building and advisory services as part of the technical assistance offered to beneficiaries to enhance their productive capabilities and the marketability of their agricultural produce. (Beneficiaries were assisted to improve their agricultural output. In the same vein, capacity building and information sharing were also critical to increase their levels of knowledge of the techniques as well as important aspects of their socio-economic and political life).

This conception of poverty seemed to be reinforced by the Country Partnership Strategy (The World Bank, 2005a). Here, the Bank argued that the Nigerian rural (agricultural) economy lacked required and necessary technical know-how and information needed to improve productivity and output as well as long-term economic returns on their investment (The World Bank, 2005a). Hence, rural poverty reduction became a major target which Fadama would assist the World Bank to achieve. In this context, the direct transfer of financial, technical and technological assistance to beneficiaries was identified to be critical in this regard in line with the CDD nature of post-1999 Fadama. The goal here entailed improving farming techniques, high yield species of groups and livestock and business cum networking techniques. The

underlying view here is that these would increase the probability of reducing the levels of poverty and hunger in the country.[92] Also, these were believed to be necessary to unlock the productive potentials of beneficiaries.

The inclusive nature of post-1999 Fadama draws from Bank's advancement of participation within development strategies designed to eliminate poverty, thus propelling development within developing countries. This redefinition of Fadama thus gained impetus from the Bank's own internal reform. This included redefining how to 'do' development especially in terms of strategies for poverty reduction – food security being an intrinsic aspect of the poverty question. Thus, considering the time in history when Fadama was reconceptualised, under Wolfensohn regime, it necessarily had to be inclusive – multi-stakeholder-led. This is why the World Bank strategically embedded Fadama within a cohort of World Bank-sponsored grassroots empowerment/poverty reduction programmes established and implemented across the globe (J. Arcand & Bassole, 2006; Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, & Spector, 2010; Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Labonne & Chase, 2011; Orievulu, 2014).[93] This meant that beneficiaries within Fadama had to be – or at least seem – actively involved in the design, formulation and execution of the reform processes taking place within interventions. This is the essence of the CDD approach which 'insists' on: treating beneficiaries more as actors, partners and agents of development; giving beneficiaries adequate and direct financial and institutional (capacity) support to undertake their productive ventures; and ensuring that the initiative pays attraction to, and factors in, their needs and preferences (Dongier et al., 2003; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Beneficiaries' participation in post-1999 Fadama emphasised the idea that beneficiaries' inclusion enables better implementation and effectiveness of development strategies – hence the focus on "empowering" Fadama beneficiaries to "collectively decide on how resources are allocated and managed for their livelihood activities and to participate in the design and execution of their subprojects" (World Bank, 2008, p. 2-3). This is also evident in numerous policy reforms characteristic of the new development agenda era characterised by the rhetoric

[92] This idea leads to the inference that the Bank defines the poverty of these people to be mainly income related hence the need to distribute money. The other definition of poverty that appears here is the lack of technical know-how and required mechanism(s) towards making the most of business opportunities. This accounts for the capacity building component that is intrinsic to the Fadama project. It all goes back to an old critique of the development cum aid discourse based on the assumption that the people do not have the required technical knowhow and ability, so to speak, to pull themselves out of the dull-drums of poverty. The question that this critique poses is this: "how have they managed to survive all these while without the World Bank or any other aid as a matter of fact"? One thing that remains largely conspicuous in this conceptualisation of the poverty of the people in need of help is the Bank's linkage of poverty mainly to accumulation, and this is thus the impetus for the push for economic income for beneficiaries of the project.

[93] . These include, "livelihood projects" in "South Asia" like "India" and others in South American countries like Peru and Brazil, amongst others, established under the CDD mantra (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012). Others include: Senegal, Indonesia and Philippines.

of partnership, participation, and ownership among others. Grassroots empowerment is, therefore, an intrinsically fundamental aspect of this new approach that becomes apparent in the Fadama project.

As a strategy designed to support the fight against poverty and extreme hunger, especially within the context of the MDGs, Fadama drew inspiration from the underlying ideology of the Bank's new development agenda. This ideology of a growth-led poverty reduction is pervasive within post-1990 policy the documents such as the CDF (which also draws inspiration from the OECD (DAC) (1996) report), the PRSPs, and, in the context of Nigeria, the CAS, CPS, NEEDS and Fadama-specific policy documents. The CPS document, since 2005 till 2017, established the ideological and policy framework within which post-1999 economic reforms in Nigeria have been undertaken. This was why the streamlining of Fadama along this ideological framework became the *conditio sine qua non* for commencing Fadama II.[94]

The first post-1999 CPS for Nigeria was drafted by the World Bank as a "National Comprehensive Framework for Reform, Growth and Poverty Reduction" for the period 2005 to 2009. It was, in fact, the framework within which Nigeria's PRSP – the NEEDS – was to be implemented. The central policy focus of the CPS was the stimulation of the growth of the non-oil sector for which agriculture constituted a critical part (World Bank CPS, 2005a, p. 14). It also emphasised the importance of an inclusive pattern of development planning to ensure effectiveness having recognised the negative impacts of poor leadership and governance (choices) on the Nigerian economy; on poverty reduction and growth.

The document's emphasis on the critical place of the private sector in driving growth to address poverty drew directly from the CDF prescription (see Kagia, 2005). In this light, development initiatives such as Fadama III had vital roles, identified for them, within the process of economic diversification drive for Nigeria. This included the process of adding value to primary products which also involves various private sector actors that would provide different forms of service within Fadama as well as serve as linkages between local farmers and the wider markets. Through this process, sectors such as agriculture could be resuscitated and revitalised to the point where they are effectively capable of employing more people and improve livelihoods. With Fadama as a vital contributor to agriculture with its associated funds,

[94] The World Bank notes that the project had to be delayed until Nigeria had complied with all the principles that were developed within the CPS (see The World Bank, 2010; 2008)

technical assistance and the incorporation of the value chain approach, levels of income among the populace will eventually be reasonably boosted.

Consequently, reviews of the Fadama project so far reckon that large amounts of income have been generated among beneficiaries through different levels of engagement within the newer and more effective practices introduced within the Fadama project since 2004 (Nkonya et al., 2010; The World Bank, 2010b). The end result of this can be seen in the fact that the sector rose enormously between 2010 and 2015, accounting for an increasing amount of the country's GDP ((The World Bank, 2008).[95] These increased household incomes recorded in Fadama II's completion reports and the contribution of Fadama to the GDP growth – the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Nigeria economy – represents a major progress in poverty reduction strides for the World Bank.

To ensure poverty reduction, therefore, Fadama was tacitly embedded with various economic reform agendas in Nigeria from 2003 to 2015. This began with President Obasanjo's wide-ranging economic reform from 1999 within which the NEEDS emerged.[96] Thus, the Fadama initiative had to take on elements of the new development paradigm to which the country's government and development technocrats had bought into with the goal of positively inducing growth in other non-oil sectors of the Nigerian economy. However, while the Fadama project had the prospect of positively contributing to the economy, it was mostly designed in a humanitarian fashion with the glaring goals of contributing in MDG goal of drastically reducing hunger and poverty by the year 2015. One thing that remains though within a deeper and critical outlook on the nature of the design of the initiative is the fact that it remains inherently linked with the principles that governed and guided the economic reform agenda of the country. Such things include the role(s) of the private sector especially within the value chain; the openness to trade liberalisation and more open markets to enhance trade; and ultimately the push for competition and profits to boost individual and household income levels – all within the framework of reducing poverty through the dynamics within the Fadama project. This attempt to tackle poverty through the involvement of many more stakeholders also targets improvements in the levels of employment among these grassroots poor as more

[95] See Annex 1 of the report.

[96] NEEDS started in 2003 under President Obasanjo's economic reform programme. It was Nigeria's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper which was prepared under the 'close-marking' of the IMF and the World Bank in the bid to ensure that it is in consonance with the principles of the liberal economy in which the private sector plays an important role since there was an ostensible consensus among Nigerians that a market economy was the only way to impact growth in the Nigerian system (see CAS, 2000).In fact, the Privatization of many sectors in Nigeria – Banking, Telecommunication, the oil sector, the sugar, cement and flour industries during this period saw the emergence of the Richest African Businessman Alhaji Dangote.

private sector players are encouraged to invest in the agricultural sector (as with other related institutions such as microfinance banks for providing loans), all in the bid to enhance diversification and growth.

4.3.3. Fadama III and the target of achieving Grassroots Empowerment

The third target of Fadama III involves ensuring grassroots empowerment. Empowerment in this context can be construed in two ways, namely, socio-economic and socio-political. In this sense, the goal is to ensure that beneficiaries are capacitated to drive economic growth and also influence (local) political processes within the confines of the implementation of their projects and even beyond. The first part of this goal – contributing to economic growth – is emphasised by Stern (2005) who argues that "investing in and empowering people" – with special reference to the poor – would "enable them to participate in growth, both as drivers and beneficiaries" (Kagia, 2005, p. 149).[97] In this way, socio-economic and socio-political empowerment plays a vital role in actualising development even as it remains a core goal of development.

Fadama III's PDO clearly identified this target in terms of the empowerment of beneficiaries of the project to collectively decide on how resources are allocated and managed for their livelihood (The World Bank, 2008). This involves providing beneficiaries with the capacity – financial, technical know-how and knowledge base – to push for and drive the change they want to see in their economic life as well as their political environment. The assumption is that the project could eventually lead to the empowerment of the grassroots poor who in many cases (seem to) lack the knowledge and capacity to help themselves or even positively impact governance in the country in the long term (Orievulu, 2014).[98] This suggests that Fadama, from the World Bank's projection, would be a useful mechanism for actualising a set of development goals within the changing socio-political and economic landscape in Nigeria.

This understanding of empowerment resonates with the 2000/2001 World Development report's definition of empowerment which reads:

[97] This was the contribution of Sir Arthur Stern.

[98] Such a view tends to forget about an important issue when deconstructing the politics of partnerships (especially with regards to beneficiaries-donor dynamics – the other aspect of governmentality which deals with the agency of the aid recipients at the lowest level). Here beneficiaries consciously choose to accept terms and conditions of aid but use the money or resources (when received) for the particular issues that appeal to them. This brings in questions around credible commitment to the micro-level partnership relations where these exist. This is an issue that will be touched on as this study continues.

> ... enhancing the capacity of poor people to influence the ... institutions [of state, whether local or central] that affect their lives by strengthening their participation in political processes and local decision making. And it means removing the barriers – political, legal and social – that work against particular groups and building the assets of people to enable them to engage effectively in markets (Kanbur et al., 2000, p. 39).

Empowerment and poverty reduction are so entwined in Fadama because of the Bank's attitude towards it mainly from a business venture perspective of economic returns. The emphasis on social capital and cohesion serves only instrumentally to drive profits and growth. Grassroots empowerment is critical to actualise the goal of reducing poverty since beneficiaries have been reconstructed as active agents of development; they are also rational actors who understand and are motivated to ensure that their (individual group's) business activities are successful.

The importance of empowerment as a mechanism towards – and as an outcome of – a food secure and less poverty-stricken society can be drawn from Stern's (2005) already stated viewpoint (Kagia, 2005). In the context of the conceptualisation of Fadama III, this comes out clearly in the World Bank's view that central to Fadama's social development indicators is "the empowerment of communities that have the capacity to take charge of their own development agenda" (The World Bank, 2008, p. 48). Its defining constituents within the project are in the form of: "access to information, inclusion/participation, accountability and local organization capacity enhancement" (The World Bank, 2008, p. 48). As such, the World Bank emphasises the necessity of capacity building to improve beneficiaries' grasp of techniques of production, modalities of distribution and aspects of business (planning) to enable them to achieve the goal of improved incomes. Capacity building requires trained personnel – facilitators and project officials – to guide beneficiaries along these ideals. The acquired knowledge base enables beneficiaries to more actively take charge of their subprojects and also demand accountability where this is required. This would help to actualise the goal of the CDD approach in the Africa region focused on:

> ... improving empowerment, service delivery and local governance through: (i) empowerment of communities; (ii) empowerment of local governments, hence decentralization; (iii) realignment of the sectors to improve service delivery given the increased roles of communities and local governments; (iv) accountability, transparency, and communication at all levels; and (v) a learning by doing attitude, capacity building while implementing (The World Bank, 2008, p. 71).

In spite these enticing interpretations, the construction of empowerment along the lines of improved income remains open to yet an interesting connotation of empowerment within Fadama. This is in relation to the number of beneficiaries recorded within the project who are

said to have been "empowered" through (participating in) the project.[99] With a focus on an aggregate number of people – groups and community associations – who received financial assistance and monetary transfer, including those who attended workshops, the construction of empowerment within Fadama takes an interesting turn. Essentially, it came to be seen in terms of cash receipts and participation in workshops which were meant to increase individual and group capacities to maximize the opportunities created through the project. The underlying question here would then be whether cash transfer really equates empowerment or whether simply attending a capacity building workshop would automatically culminate in a knowledgeable populace capable to tackle various issues within their socio-economic and political context.

The targets explored here so far are important for the World Bank in actualising its broader interests in reinventing Fadama within its new quest to address poverty across the world. Thus, in setting out these targets and defining them within Fadama, it was also a necessity to design an effective strategy to drive these goals forward. This strategy is meant to ensure that ideas developed within, and for, Fadama were 'persuasive' and 'convincing' enough to co-opt government, citizens and community groups to buy into the Fadama agenda. This is especially since these targets are drawn from the World Bank's revised scope of development in terms of the CDF. It follows that apart from encouraging the Nigerian government to embark on a broad scale economic reform (within which agricultural sector reforms was undertaken), the World Bank deployed different strategies to entrench its broader ideals through Fadama. This included the inclusion of 'co-opted' and 'de-radicalised' transformative concepts within Fadama in the light of the revised international development agenda which emphasises cooperation, partnership and inclusion (Alejandro Leal, 2007; Cornwall & Eade, 2010, pp. 89–100). This is, therefore, the focus of the next subsection – interrogating the use of transformative development concepts to entrench the hegemonic neoliberal development ideal underlying the Fadama project. The position of the World Bank as a hegemonic development institution remains very critical.

[99] The number of people who were given monetary assistance and also attended a number of workshops and facilitators worked in their communities or with them in a project are referred to as empowered people. In essence empowerment here refers to the cash receipt and participation in workshops meant to increase individual and group capacities to maximize the opportunities created through the project.

4.4. Co-opted Development Rhetoric: The use of inclusive discourse as strategy to actualise Fadama III's set-out targets

In her article '*What Buzzwords do for development policy*', Cornwall and Brock (2005) noted that development concepts such as 'poverty reduction', 'participation', 'empowerment', 'ownership' and 'partnership', amongst others, play an important role in the framing of solutions (or in development interventions) within the mainstream. These buzzwords, as critics of mainstream development call them, are laden with ideologies strategically crafted to achieve pre-determined goals of neoliberalism. Some of these include the establishment of initiatives to address poverty within developing countries and ensuring governments' and citizens' buy-in to entrench the underlying rationality within such strategies across the economy. The ability to control discourse – in this context – as well as the definition and application of these concepts, suggests enormous power and influence. Thus, the place of the World Bank as the driver of development and poverty reduction across the world, its capacity to define these concepts and influence their application with Fadama is an important issue for analysis of power relations in the project.

The World Bank currently identifies partnership as a core component of its stride to actualise its goals for development. This is because partnership provides the framework that "... allows the Bank to enhance the effectiveness of its actions by building on the comparative advantage of partners who share the vision" (Kamel et al., 1998, p. 1). Since its integration in light of the PRSPs/HIPCs, partnership has continued to animate discourses around global poverty and development strategies. It has also been used reiterate the centrality of participation within the World Bank renewed mission to "fight poverty with passion and professionalism" (Kanbur et al., 2000). In fact, just as participation and empowerment are closely linked within frameworks to ensure poverty reduction so also were partnership and ownership crafted and emphasised within the context of the PRSPs/HIPCs (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p. 1051). (It can be said then that these four concepts are mostly similar; differentiated only in terms of an emphasis on a contextual application such as donor-recipient country notions of partnership and ownership as opposed to beneficiary incorporation within the process of designing, planning and implementation of development initiatives in terms of participation). It is in this light that, developing countries have been encouraged to imbibe participatory techniques especially in the implementation of World Bank-assisted interventions such as the Fadama project in Nigeria.

Accordingly, any attempt to adequately understand the changes within Fadama since 2004 necessarily requires a deeper interrogation of the ostensible paradigm shifts within the World Bank development agenda. Recall that the epoch (1995-2005 and beyond) in development history was characterised reforms in development approach; even the concept of a post-Washington consensus was mooted during this epoch. This transformation which seemed to build up momentum with the 2000/2001 World Development Report continued to animate the entire gamut of development planning. Thus, partners in development such as the Nigerian government had to 'key-in' to this paradigm shift in which participatory approaches became radically integrated into development interventions – strategies in this light were consequently required to address (or factor in) issues of human development, accountability and environmental sustainability.

4.4.1. Participation

Despite overarching critique of its use and practice, participation remains an invaluable mainstream development discourse. It colours development intervention strategies promoted by the World Bank in its 'quest' to fight poverty, enhance food security, and drive reforms across countries. Participation in development practice hinges on the view that the primary targets of development interventions – the poor – should actively contribute in shaping policies aimed at alleviating poverty based on their first-hand experiences (Kanbur et al., 2000; Moore, 2007).[100]

Beneficiary participation, within Fadama, commenced in Fadama II as a result of the World Bank's insistence on changing its status from a top-down (supply-driven) project to a Community Driven Development project – hence, a change in approach. The purpose of this reform was clear: Fadama had to be attentive to the concerns and needs of its targets. It must also give them a voice. This new focus meant the adoption of techniques designed to incorporate local beneficiaries, as active agents, within project planning, implementation and sustainability. This is in line with the conscious construction of the targets of intervention as active change drivers within the context of the CDD approach (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

Participation in Fadama consisted of beneficiary (or community) consultations, including consultations and involvement of civil society organisations or non-governmental

[100] Moore (2007) refers to modes of governing the poor through the World Bank's participation ideology.

organisations (NGOs) in project planning, implementation and monitoring. Participation here, for the Bank, required different forms of stakeholder involvement/consultations. Ideally, in charting this course, one may argue that it was envisaged that at every point, from conceptualisation onwards, all necessary stakeholders would be consulted, integrated and incorporated within Fadama, to ensure that the project accounts for and factors in the real needs of the people for whom it was designed. This was alluded to by the World Bank representative during our interview discussion where he insisted that various stakeholders' perspectives were sought and incorporated, during the consultation phases, prior to actual implementation. He elaborated on targeted consultations and sensitisation processes embarked for Fadama III as marked indicators of its inclusive and participatory nature, especially within the context of the World Bank targets. He noted:

> ... NGOs were part of the consultation process at the beginning... The whole idea of the Community Driven Development project was eh mooted by the World Bank ... But the NGOs, the wide stakeholders, they were all consulted... When we started, we wanted to try whether this thing could work. We did sensitisation workshops all over the country and we involved the NGOs, CBOs, the community groups, the farmers themselves, the government officials, the policymakers, the project people – they were all sensitised and they brought their opinions... So, they were part of the conceptualisation. Some even suggested ways in which we can make the thing better. Ah, but NGOs are not only part of the consultation; they are also part of the implementation because we involve them. They also go and do independent monitoring of the projects and make reports that eventually we utilise in [re]shaping the project (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).[101]

The World Bank identifies the Local Development Plan (LDP) – an innovative planning tool conceptualised in Fadama II – as a major aspect of Fadama which enhanced beneficiary (and multi-stakeholders) participation. It also promoted community ownership. The LDP, which was modelled in line with the CDD approach, assisted to create a useful platform for the application of various participatory techniques such as the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), Participatory Needs Assessment (PNA) or Community Needs Assessment (CNA) and Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) within post-1999 Fadama programming. Applying these techniques aided an effective process of identifying community needs and priority areas thus reducing possibilities of irrelevant projects[102] and possible conflicts among users of land and water resources. In fact, the World Bank associated the adoption of the LDPs and its adequate application accounted for reduced conflicts between pastoralists and farmers

[101] Something interesting here was that he never mentioned any specific NGO partners in this entire process. This point is important for later analysis.

[102] This includes the establishment of projects that are of no economic benefits to communities, either because they already have such projects, some of which have been abandoned, or the project has no resonance with the community's way of life.

during Fadama II (The World Bank, 2010, p. 8). The reason was that the LDP process ensured that beneficiaries and communities deliberated intensively and identified key resources and areas of need within their communities that Fadama could address. Thus, through adequate consultations and sensitisation as well as groups and community deliberations, priority areas would be more adequately identified to address needs, improve incomes and reduce conflicts.

The World Bank's preference for participation within this context is clearly captured in its stance on the establishment of community subprojects. According to the Bank's completion report of Fadama II,

> Any investment subproject that is not reflected in the approved LDP is not eligible for financing by the project. Approval of an LDP is subject among other things to passing a test indicating that the integrity of the LDP process, especially in terms of social inclusion and participation has been respected (The World Bank, 2010, p. 12).

This rule, which did not only apply for Fadama II, serves as the underlying principle of post-1999 Fadama. As such, the adjudged effective incorporation of this participatory component within Fadama II sealed its CDD status. It also ensured that participation as the 'go-to model' in the drive towards success and sustainability of Fadama-borne rural development initiatives in Nigeria.

Indeed, this emphasis on participation accounted for 'bottom-up'[103] calls to scale up Fadama to a nationwide project in Fadama III. For the Bank, this was also about consolidating on the gains of participation through the decentralisation of decision-making processes and structures for Fadama. Hence, in conceptualising Fadama III, the Bank asserted:

> The proposed project will utilize the existing institutional structure of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources [now Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development], its federal and state level coordination offices as well as state Ministries of Agriculture without creating any add-on project implementation unit. [However] the management of the project will be based on a decentralized, demand-responsive structure that will grant community organizations as much decision-making authority as possible, and will promote community ownership of and responsibility for operations and maintenance of infrastructure investments (The World Bank, 2008, p. 5).

[103] These were hardly bottom-up since they were made by Governors of states which did not participate in previous phases of Fadama. They simply wanted to receive the World Bank's funds aligned with the initiative.

Building on this, a representative of the World Bank also provided a perspective about its position on participation within Fadama in this way:[104]

> ... the Fadama project that you are talking about is a ... project in which ***we*** [the Bank] *have put people to be in charge of their own development,* and it is actually the way it is being said. When ***we*** started in 2004, I was part of the project at the beginning and ***we*** sensitised the top policymakers that there is going to be a paradigm shift. Rather than there to be top-bottom approach, it is going to be a bottom-top approach in terms of ... development agenda; in terms of driving things. They thought it would not be possible but now it is so clear to them because *we have practised it and it is working.* There is real paradigm shift ... for many reasons on the project because one, the community themselves decide on what they want to do. They prepare, through the help of facilitators, the local instrument which is the Local Development Plan (LDP); and then secondly, funds are transferred directly to the communities for the implementation of their project. So that ... shows that the paradigm shift is real and that shows that the people are actually at the vanguard or at the seat of their own development agenda (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).

This view explains the emphasis on participation and inclusiveness in the design as well as the implementation of Fadama III. The official's perspective shows that this is borne out of the new CDD image of Fadama, apparently giving the poor a voice and transforming them into agents of development. This is essentially the "paradigm shift" from top-down to bottom up, and it is the Bank – "we" – that is 'empowering' the poor and putting them "in charge of their own development". The emphasis on participation here thus animates the entire post-1999 Fadama rhetoric clearly stated in the project objectives where the World Bank emphasised the pertinence of empowering beneficiaries to identify and determine their own development agenda.

Looking at how the participant emphasised the "we" in the excerpt above, it is clear the premium placed on participation by the World Bank within the context of Fadama – to achieve its goal and targets. Whether the goal is indeed people-oriented in the final analysis remains a question for analysis (Alejandro Leal, 2007; Cornwall & Eade, 2010; Moore, 2007). However, within this context, it is perceived, conceptualised and propagated as a necessity; an imperative in the quest to achieve the project targets – food security, poverty reduction and broad level grassroots empowerment. Thus, just as partnership is not an end in itself but a means toward an end – the fulfilment of the shared objectives of the partners – so too is participation not an end in itself. Its purpose is the actualisation of the ultimate goals and objectives set out in 'mutual consent' and understanding between all the partners in the Fadama project based on

[104] Note the use of "WE" versus them –"PEOPLE". This is an active way of 'othering' the local beneficiaries.

the development exigencies that the Nigerian economy and people face. This also takes cognisance of the particular development epoch within which it is applied for Fadama.[105]

So far, the discussion around consultations, sensitisation, and the broad level involvement of government sectors, public officials, beneficiaries and even NGOs in the entire process, was indeed to demonstrate the importance of multi-stakeholder participation in Fadama, especially Fadama III. This goes to reinforce the extent to which the World Bank emphasised participation; how the Bank defined it within the context of Fadama III; and how it ensured that the idea was accepted and adopted within the project by the Nigerian government– as well as the projects' beneficiaries. An interesting observation in the interview excerpt that speaks about NGOs consultation is that although the participant noted NGO involvement, no specific NGOs were mentioned and their input. While this may be under-emphasised here, another point worthy of note is another interpretation of 'participating' in Fadama – that is, simply being registered as a beneficiary (community) whether or not people were well and truly involved in the Fadama processes. This aspect of being 'well and truly' involved – activity and agency, even in decision-making processes – forms the corpus of the next 'co-opted' concept deployed within the World Bank's post-1999 Fadama conceptualisation. This is the concept or idea of (country and or local) ownership.

4.4.2. Ownership

Ownership and participation share a broad semblance in development discourse since active participation is said to mean 'taking ownership'. Indeed, both concepts may be loosely interchangeable. This is a scenario which plays out many times within the context of discussions about Fadama and its implementation in Nigeria. It is about internalising the project and contributing to it very strongly.

However, this is simply one aspect of ownership – local ownership. Within the wider development landscape, ownership is conceptualised first as 'country ownership', and this draws a great deal from the CDF and the post-1990s quest to reform development assistance (Development Assistance Committee, 1996). It was an intrinsic part of the new rhetoric of reshaping development cooperation between the rich countries of the North and the developing

[105] Here the idea is that the Fadama project and its goals were developed to respond to specific development needs based on the universally accepted development models and needs within international development circles such as the MDGs which was prominent in the early 2000s aiming at certain targets by 2015.

nations of the South, especially in Africa (Abrahamsen, 2004b; Cornwall, 2004, 2007; Cornwall & Eade, 2010).

Abrahamsen argues that the "emergence of partnerships as a new framework for North-South relations can be explained in large part as a response to such persistent and long-standing charges of undue interventions, and donor self-consciously present[ed] partnerships as a way of returning power and influence to African states" (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1455). Her view presents the emergence of the ownership discourse as an attempt to 'hand power back' to developing nations. This is especially within the context of development initiatives hatched to improve lives and socio-economic conditions within states. Ownership within this partnership framework implied thus little or no 'foreign' or 'exogenous' pressure or intervention (OECD-DAC, n.d.). It, thus, behoves on countries – the government and people – to conceptualise, implement and manage development initiatives along with development concerns that are identified through a process that is receptive and accommodating of diverse groups and interests in the polity. The motivation here was, as Abrahamsen argues, the "... recognition among the donor community that conditionality-based lending [characteristic of the SAPs] had failed to generate desired results in terms of economic growth and good governance..." (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1455).

Ownership in this light became a prerequisite for the effectiveness and sustainability of development assistance and socio-economic engineering. This is captured in the OECD-DAC 1996 report which links its goals with the definition of the broader goal of sustainable development – to help people attain a "higher quality of life [which] means that people will attain increased power over their own future" through effective development assistance (Development Assistance Committee, 1996, p. 8). This report states further that the achievement of the broad goals identified and set out in the report, as well as the specific targets, set by different donors will require:

> ... agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their own national goals and locally-owned strategies. They can be realised only through concerted actions developed through a process of dialogue and agreement in a true spirit of partnership (Development Assistance Committee, 1996, p. 8).

This is because success within this perspective will

> ... depend upon the broad acceptance of a comprehensive approach, drawing on the resources, energies and commitment of institutions and individuals in government at all levels, in the private sector, in non-governmental

> organisations – in developing and industrialised countries and in international organisations. It will depend equally upon an individual approach that recognises diversity among countries and societies and that respects local ownership of the development process (Development Assistance Committee, 1996, p. 8).

This report concludes by stating the call for a change of attitude towards development in these words:

> We will need to change how we think and how we operate, in a far more coordinated effort than we have known until now (Development Assistance Committee, 1996, p. 8).

This can be interpreted in different ways. The report may be saying: 'we need to re-strategize and re-invent our approach in a way that will be more amenable to people's understanding of their needs while we continue to pursue the fundamental goal of integrating these developing economies into the broader economic market to ensure a singular development model that will be in line with our own principles.' It could also mean a genuine attempt to reform official development assistance for a deeper appreciation of and empathy towards the needs of people and societies as identified by them. This also entails allowing them to effectively contribute to designing and implementing remedies for these needs based on the specific resource of experience and geographic setting that they can manipulate to attain their long-term development goals. All the same, the broader attempt in all of this, it seems, was to ensure that there was a drastic reduction in an exogenous intervention within development engineering that cuts out important local knowledge and contribution. Thus, ownership provided the framework upon which developing countries' governments had to recognise their roles as well as those of different groups within the country to push development agenda to successful ends.[106]

In the CDF proposal, Wolfensohn laid the groundwork upon which the view of the World Bank on ownership was conceptualised when he stated:

> It is clear to all of us that ownership is essential. Countries must be in the driver's seat and set the course. They must determine goals and the phasing, timing and sequencing of programmes. Where there is not adequate capacity in the government to do this, we must support and help them establish, own and implement the

[106] The outlook provided on ownership within the OECD 1996 report is instructive in showing how the concept broadly encapsulates the agency of state actors and local actors in what may be termed Country Ownership – predominant in World Bank parlance – and Local Ownership of development strategies or initiatives. The emphasis on this aspect in the new development arena cannot be over emphasised at any given instance. It must be stated here upfront that in as much as the Bank's outlook on ownership mostly emerges in the form of "Country Ownership" in which the emphasis rests mainly on the country and it government of the day in taking the lead in development initiative, the concept loosely appraised could still be (and has been) open to other levels of ownership especially local ownership when considered within the Fadama project. This aspect of ownership should remain in the horizon as this study engages broadly with the concept within the Fadama project in Nigeria

> strategy. And we must work to achieve the strategy with our colleagues in the government, in the international development community, the civil society, and the private sector. In some countries, the long and short term goals will be set by a process of public debate and consensus building led by the government with all sections of society. In other countries, the establishment of goals will continue to be set more centrally (Wolfensohn, 1999, pp. 9–10).

This view shows how the Bank conceived the concept as something of a necessity to make countries much more involved in pushing development initiatives that are mostly in concomitance with the broader development agenda identified within the international development community.[107] The important emphasis on the place of government, multilateral and bilateral donors/partners, the private sector, civil society and non-governmental organisation, and grassroots peoples/groups is fundamental to the principles of inclusiveness in development planning. However, as the excerpt above shows, the process of developing development initiatives does not necessarily depend on the large consensus from the 'lower level' participants – since in some countries the "establishment of goals will continue to be set more centrally" – and the government does not also have to wait to ensure that this consensus is attained too. It stems from the position of the state as the main (macro-level) partner to lead the process – and ownership is still attained here (Cornwall, 2007).

It follows that the World Bank's outlook on ownership privileges "country ownership" in spite of its call for more local ownership to facilitate better results. Thus, while the concept of country ownership places enormous emphasis on the country, its government of the day and its fundamental role in leading the scheme of things in development initiative, local ownership can be understood loosely to be one which captures roles open to citizens and groups who are not necessarily state actors, donors. This may include civil society, NGOs and community groups or even the private sector. This aspect of ownership emerges importantly in the discourse when considered in relation to the roles of these groupings to sustain specific development strategies such as the Fadama project.

In the Fadama project, ownership is highly emphasised to ensure programme effectiveness and consequently achieving economic growth and sustainable development. This emphasis involves both country and local ownership of Fadama. In other words, the government and its institutions – including but not limited to the NFCO representing the Ministry of Agriculture – had to obligation to conceptualise, design and chart the focus of the project – also leading the

[107] Within this development community, the prominence of donors and their broader interests must not be forgotten however, despite the whole discourse of sustainable development and human development.

implementation process based on the agreed standards and principles associated with the terms of the credit agreement. Similarly, beneficiaries' ability and readiness to grasp, accept and buy into the broad development goals captured within Fadama rubrics (as proposed by the Bank) exemplifies local ownership. The goal here entails sustaining the successes (if any) of the initiative. A participant corroborates this point:

> ... Like I said, the World Bank has not been in the vanguard of always pushing things at the throat of a country. But the issue has always been that there are some things in which the World Bank sets conditions and say: 'Look, for you to be able to access this fund, you must meet these conditions.' Like in development policy operations, we look at the policy environment and we say: 'For you to access funds in this area, you must be able to ensure that these policies are reformed in your country.' So you have that. But there are certain projects in which you have the World Bank coming in and, because of the nature of that project, they want it to be highly participatory. Ah, maybe you can say that they were ... It's not as if we have not been putting the country to be at the forefront of what we are doing, but maybe we are doing it more than before. Because what we are doing now is to ensure that the nation or the country is at the driver seat.... We just push from behind; we allow the nation to seat there and push their own agenda (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).

Important things to highlight in this argument include the fact that there are development policy operations and there are inclusive development projects. The former is highly structured along strict conditionality where the government must reform along the lines of agendas set by the international donor institution. The latter, on the other hand, is more oriented towards in-country development ideology where initiatives from the country actors intrinsically characterise development strategies. In both of these cases – country and local – ownership is required to achieve the stated goals of the loans requested. In the latter case, however, ownership is more pronounced and emphasised by the donors themselves too. It can nevertheless be argued here that the insistence on ownership by the Bank – although it should naturally be the case with states – suggests continued elements of coercion in spite of the partnerships discourse applied to the new order of development assistance. This is the domain of an analysis of power relations and would be later discussed. Nevertheless, where development strategies are pursued in an inclusive manner based on the novel drive to get more out of them, ownership has been highly emphasised, and the government is allowed to be "at the driver's seat" to push the agenda. In doing this, they also incorporate other groups within the society while the Bank nudges the government and tacitly pushes its own broader agenda "from behind" (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).

The importance of instituting this ownership regime cannot, therefore, be overstated especially within the scope of the so-called new development agenda that has been largely universalised as the most effective way of governing development aid. It is a model that is tried and tested and proven to be effective, hence it becomes extremely relevant to make the project very successful (The World Bank, 2010b). It is within this same ideological lens that the Bank argues for the institutionalisation and incorporation of strategies such as Fadama within the fabric of the country's development blueprint for the duration of its lifespan. It is no wonder that Obasanjo's regime incorporated Fadama within its locally initiated NEEDS programme and the Yar' Adua and, subsequent, Jonathan regimes situated it with the Seven-point agenda and Transformation agenda respectively.

In relation to this need to situate the new Fadama project – Fadama II and III – within the new development framework built on the principles of sustainability, growth, human development, democratisation as well as good governance, there was a period of hiatus between the completion of Fadama I in 1999 and the approval and commencement of Fadama II in 2004/2005. This issue is succinctly captured in the completion report of Fadama II. The report reads:

> These innovations proposed by the Bank during the project preparation phase initially did not correspond with the Government's initial concept of the project, which was focused on getting the ADPs serve as the institutional home, thereby maintaining the prevailing top-down, supply-driven approach to rural development planning and implementation. Reconciling the contrasting views, especially with regards to the institutional framework and implementation arrangements of the follow-on Fadama II project led to a protracted (2 year) preparation and appraisal period... (The World Bank, 2010b, p. 6).

The view above pointed to the extent to which the donors in the project – the World Bank and the African Development Bank – insisted that the government had to ensure that all the principles of the new development ideology were incorporated such as participation at all levels, consultations, grassroots ownership and contributions among others. These issues were intrinsic to the development frameworks laid out within the Bank's 2005 Country Partnership Strategy and the AfDB's Rural Development Strategy that determined the final approval of Fadama as it is currently implemented (see AfDB, 2003; World Bank, 2010b; World Bank, 2008).

While the role of the government is highly emphasised in the higher level of the partnership created for this project, the place of other groups within the lower cadre of the partnership is

as well not underestimated. It is in this light that Fadama was designed to assign responsibilities even to the local targets. While the state had to involve various state and non-state actors, including NGOs, Fadama beneficiaries were also tasked to make financial and practical contributions – as active partners – towards the project's sustainability and longevity. An aspect of this ownership discourse, as it applies to beneficiaries, is the introduction of Beneficiary Contributions (BC) in 2004.

BC is a percentage amount of money, asset or services which direct beneficiary groups are obliged to contribute before they are funded in the Fadama project. Introducing beneficiary contribution aimed to create a sense of responsibility, attachment and obligation within and among beneficiaries towards their Fadama-funded livelihood subprojects. This also explains Fadama's funding focus on groups – Economic Interest Groups (EIGs) or Fadama User Groups – but not individuals. These groups are supposedly business groupings within different communities driven by a sense of purpose to actualise their business ideals and generate incomes for themselves and their families.

While BC is intrinsically beneficiary-focused, another aspect of Fadama that encapsulates the 'local' ownership discourse is the inclusive development of the LDPs. Local Development Plans are proposals for community projects – usually undertaken by the Fadama Community Associations (FCAs) – and developing them had to be inclusive. It usually begins with identifying community needs and priorities, and FCA facilitators help them to apply the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Community Needs Assessment techniques in this quest. Upon identifying these needs, and developing the LDPs, an internal peer review process, at the local government level of the Fadama Local Desk office, culminates in the approval and subsequent adoption of subprojects for implementation. The point to emphasize here is that from conceptualising community subprojects and reviewing LDPs, down to local monitoring of project implementation and its successes, Fadama III was conceptualised to ensure that beneficiaries were actively engaged. This drives home the very essence of ownership as conceptualised by the Bank (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012).

The foregoing points to how important an ideological position resonates with the World Bank, especially in the pursuit of a goal. The growth-led poverty reduction ideology underpins the Bank's focus on Fadama to increase incomes to address food security, poverty reduction and grassroots empowerment in Nigeria. Thus, having identified this goal – and its associated targets – the Bank aligned Fadama's strategies to the broader global economic order.

The findings so far suggest that the Bank's perspective on addressing Nigeria's development needs is diverse. It encompasses the importance of cooperation, partnerships, external funding, good (national) economic policies, political will and commitment as necessities (The World Bank, 2000a, 2005a). From an ideological perspective, the most important recipe for actualising targets enunciated within Fadama is simply economic growth – all the components listed above must work to advance growth. This is an unshaken standpoint that pervades the World Bank's prescription for addressing poverty and under-development. This was also integrated within Fadama, and they are symptomatic of World Bank 'antidotes' for poor economic climates that countries like Nigeria are mired in. In exploring the internationalisation of the mainstream economic rationality through pro-poor development strategies, the place, and role, of the World Bank is central to such a discussion. This also includes a discussion of the nature of power relations between this hugely hegemonic institution and the Nigerian government which depends on such development assistance – like within Fadama to address poverty and under-development. It becomes necessary to critically engage how the World Bank's position and perspectives on development, poverty reduction, food security – and means to achieve them – reproduces different forms of power dynamics that are not necessarily clear cut in development partnership parlance.

4.5. Evaluating the World Bank's Fadama III perspective

A notable feature of the Coxian theoretical outlook on hegemony is the role of international organisations in propagating the hegemonic world order within peripheral countries (Cox, 1983). His focus on the flow of hegemony which transcends a statist approach and emphasises transnational institutions and their usefulness to the hegemonic transfer process provides a useful vantage point to understand how hegemonic ideologies and economic models are developed and entrenched through institutions of international development such as the World Bank. (These institutions are said to serve the interest of the hegemonic class within hegemonic states that hold high stakes within these institutions.)

As one of these institutions based on its origins and the role it has played over the years, the World Bank's role in the establishment and (re)conceptualisation of post-1999 Fadama is therefore critical. This is especially in the drive to propagate the neo-liberal economic agenda in Nigeria and to legitimise it by means of a humanitarian project and co-opted or 'mainstreamed' development concepts. The Bank's position here is also critical since it not

only provides financial support for the project but also possesses the status of an institution that defines development. In this light, it defined the goals of this development intervention in Nigeria or at least influenced the definition of the goals as well as the various strategies towards attaining the desired goals. This capacity to somewhat influence the agenda of Fadama at the macro-level is a signifier for power – the amount of power the Bank wields in this partnership with Nigeria.

The above averment draws from Cox's argument that five characters of transnational institutions make them "effective mechanisms through which universal norms of a world hegemony are expressed because they function as arenas for the development, institutionalisation and propagation of a hegemonic ideology" (Cox, 1983, p. 62). These include their status as institutions that "embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders"; the fact that "they are themselves products of the hegemonic world order"; their ability to "ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order"; their ability to "co-opt elites from the peripheral countries"; and their nature of absorbing "counter-hegemonic ideas" (ibid).

The Fadama III project is one development intervention that has gained a lot of coverage in Nigeria and especially within the World Bank context. This is because it is one of the Bank's most successful rural development interventions since the Agricultural Development Programmes (ADP). Part of Fadama's successes, as this chapter has shown, has been the perceived integration of beneficiaries within the planning processes for the establishment of community and groups' (sub)projects for their empowerment. In addition, the broad spectrum of stakeholders contributing in different ways within Fadama and enabling a system in which various sectors intersect within its implementation of the project, is another perceived success – the expansion of Fadama's value chain. However, these perceived successes, so far, draw mostly from their alignment with the World Bank's favoured approach to development, poverty reduction, food security and empowerment.

This suggests that the Bank used its position as an embodiment of the rules which 'facilitates the expansion of hegemonic world orders' (Cox, 1983) to ensure that Nigeria embarks on a broad economic reform process along the path of the Bank's new development agenda. This created an avenue to implement pro-poor strategies like Fadama in a manner amenable to neo-liberal economic principles. 'Garnished' with developmental prospects which serve to placate and convince the country, its elites and citizens, the Banks recourse to buzzwords, also referred

to as *'fuzzwords'* because of their broad applicability, to legitimise the deeper intentions within this strategy (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). As Leal contends, the de-radicalization or co-optation of transformative concepts such as participation, empowerment, and partnership (amongst others) within mainstream institutions like the World Bank, only serves their interest of in driving and controlling actions and reactions to development initiatives (Cornwall, 2007; Cornwall & Eade, 2010).

These concepts, also deployed within Fadama, were thus strategically adopted development rhetoric to legitimate the actual stride towards establishing the dominant neo-liberal capitalist rationality in Nigeria, especially at the level of the local/rural economy that was mostly subsistent. To consolidate this, the role of local elites – technocrats trained within the dominant neoliberal economic models – was also critical. In working together with government and the Bank, these technocrats proved useful to sustaining reform processes, 'educating and sensitising' citizens about the necessity of the reforms especially in implementing development initiatives like Fadama along the growth-to-poverty reduction pathway (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007).

The World Bank's narrative of the Fadama initiative is one centred on ideas of food security, poverty reduction and grassroots empowerment or rural development in terms of infrastructure and capacity development. The implementation of the project to actualise these targets was premised on the adoption of the CDD approach to ensure that different stakeholders are afforded the opportunity to play a role in the project. In advancing this approach for Fadama, and also achieving the aforestated targets, concepts broadly related to the targets were equally emphasised. This was the root of the emphasis on beneficiary and community participation and local ownership (at the micro-level). In the same vein, the concepts of partnership and country ownership in addition to others such as good governance and accountability constituted part of the loan agreement in terms of the principles of the CDF (at the macro-level) within which Fadama was reconceptualised in the early 2000s.

Suffice it to say here that in defining the targets of the Fadama initiative as food security, poverty reduction and grassroots empowerment, and in impressing it on the Nigerian government that the approach to the project's implementation process must entail participation and local ownership (in addition to the country's responsibility of exercising ownership and good governance), the World Bank inadvertently inserted this project within the broader mainstream development agenda. In this light, food security was mostly constructed in terms

of questions of availability, access and commercialisation. The emphasis on Fadama as a business venture (as will be seen in the next chapter) therefore highlights the essentiality of linking agricultural produce and other outcomes from Fadama community subprojects to market elements so as to 'improve' the income of beneficiaries. Although production is meant to improve local consumption, it is ultimately directed towards commercial purposes where goods are produced for sale and eventual profit making – this is a view of food security which advocates of food sovereignty vehemently oppose (see Schanbacher, 2010). In fact, many of these alternative views argue that food should be considered a human right and interventions in this light must not destabilise the local production units for the purpose of mass production for commercial purposes, thus destroying the very embers of the domestic life.

It must be said that the World Bank, also emphasises environmentally sustainable practices in the implementation of projects and subprojects in terms of Fadama (The World Bank, 2008; 2010b; Pender, 2001). This is aimed to forestall against environmentally harmful practices as part of the implementation process. However, the incessant impression on beneficiaries about the need to make profit creates rooms for practices that may, in the end, be harmful to the environment. Apart from the definition of food security which pervades the Bank's outlook on Fadama – a position aimed at creating a capitalist mentality among beneficiaries in terms of massive production for commercial purposes and with profit intent – the Bank's expression of poverty reduction and grassroots development, and the means to achieve these targets within Fadama, shows an intent to progressive create an economic culture driven by the ideologies which the Bank represents. In this sense, the Bank aims to progressively control the agenda that pervades the economic space, and the incorporation of the voices of the poor or the integration of grassroots beneficiaries in the management and governance of their subprojects becomes a viable way to legitimate the broader target of entrenching a capitalist development model in the local economy.

It has to be said then, that the Bank plays a crucial and an enormous role in the expansion of this neo-liberal market economic model to many parts of the world where resistance had not been successful (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2004).[108] Thus, apart from Argentina and a few South American and South East Asian countries that tried, not many developing countries were

[108] They highlight that only a few nations were able to starve off the onslaught of the broad economic reforms (structural adjustment reforms) designed by the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s. Only Argentina and Venezuela in South America and the South East Asian Tigers in Asia managed to rebuff the World Bank-IMF attempts, while Africa was the wholesale guinea-pig for the structural adjustment experiment of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s as there were relatively little or no strong opposition to it.

successful in pulling off any form of resistance against the economic models pressed down on them since the early 1970s in the name of structural adjustment (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2004). During the SAPs era, African countries were mostly very submissive –had no resistance to show – and they were the experimental cases in the implementation of the development model that pervaded the 1980s which many have argued to have been a major failure in Africa save for a couple of relatively successful stories in Uganda and Ghana. This historical antecedent tends to place the World Bank squarely within the analytic framework in which it said to continually exhibit the norms of the pervading world order.

As already highlighted in chapter three, the post-1999 socio-economic era in Nigeria witnessed many reforms to stabilise the economy and redirect it towards a path of 'economic development'. The trickle-down effect of economic growth was central to this drive. This was the view that a stable economy where there is an annual growth rate, especially within the non-oil sector, will be an effective platform upon which poverty reduction and even eradication could be attained. As soon as President Olusegun Obasanjo was inaugurated, and after a few years of attempts to stabilise the country politically, there was an aggressive drive towards the 'comprehensive reform' process for the Nigerian economy which was guided by the World Bank and the IMF (Okonjo-Iweala & Osafo-Kwaako, 2007).

These reform processes began with President Obasanjo and continued down to President Jonathan through various economic plans or blueprints for implementing reforms in the Nigerian economy. The World Bank's presence in Nigeria's development landscape has been critical at various levels such as credit ratings, economic indicators, and policy reforms among others. The Bank represents the hegemonic economic development model, I argue that the government had to reform the economy along the same path. Thus, the implementation of Fadama III had reflect this 'recommended' developmental path even though Nigeria was not under (undue) coercion to accept the terms. Drawing on recommendations such as privatisation, deregulation, trade liberalisation, public service reforms, among others, proffered by the Bank, IMF, the AfDB and the Paris and London Clubs) to the then Obasanjo regime within the context of the PRSP and HIPC (for debt relief, poverty reduction drives and economic stabilisation), it becomes clear that Nigeria was strategically being restructured into a classic neo-liberal market economy. Since the classical features of a neo-liberal market-driven economy include serious competition, innovation, dominant private sector, a free and unhindered market system, a reduced public sector (and the resultant public sector spending), as well as high levels of economic diversification and openness to Foreign Direct Investment

(FDI) as a result of a healthy and welcoming business climate with 'seductive' tax regimes and trade incentives, it can be argued that the World Bank was driving towards re-establishing the SAPs in Nigeria through a benign approach. It was thus within this drive that the Fadama project was reconceptualised to have a human face while exhibiting all other characteristics of a modern contemporary profit-focused commercial venture.

As for the Fadama project, it was redesigned in a manner amenable to the broader economic reforms ongoing in Nigeria. This meant that the project design had to agree with the provisions of the conditions explicitly and implicitly mooted in the 2003 Country PRSP (see The World Bank, 2010b). This suggests that Fadama became marked with all the features development initiatives driven by the goals of economic growth. This makes the project an intrinsic aspect of current drives to advance food security in terms of improving the base of food production, supply, marketing, distribution, and introducing private sector actors through (microfinance) bank loans. In Nigeria's context, these steps were intrinsic to the drive also to revitalise the agricultural sector as an effective way of enhancing food security.

Achieving the above required the establishment of policies such as reducing the civil service, improving trade policies for the inflow and outflow of goods and services, providing financial facilities to farmers, and broadening the base of service providers and private sector partners in the implementation of the project – including issues relating to procurements. All these are important aspects of the broad reform process that also impact on the agricultural sector in the country. However, these do not immediately imply an internally generated idea towards reducing poverty in the country through initiatives such as Fadama. As the narrative sounds, these appear more like strategies exogenously impressed upon the government and people of the country within the context of the development assistance that it sought. Although it seemed to have been developed along the path of the Nigerian experience, and with inputs from the 'people', these strategies remained largely broad, universal, and developed along the tenets and blueprints set out on the broader global development dictionary.

The place of the World Bank in bringing legitimacy to mainstream development constructs can never be overstated. Although its modalities have changed over time since the development crisis of the 1970s triggered initially by the debt crises that necessitated the structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, the Bank has so far become an institution that has tended to be more and more driven towards the needs of people – the poor (Pender, 2001). It nevertheless remains within the deeper structures of world order hegemony (Schanbacher, 2010). This status

of the Bank, as a pro-poor organisation, makes it specifically strategic to propagating the mainstream neoliberal development ideology, especially within the developing world. The Bank also represents the interest of and it carries out the demands of its Board of Directors who have the power to veto any decision on the contrary. Its ability to harness all these interests and also engage developing country governments, civil society and NGOs, and the grassroots poor, situates it better to more effectively maximise its status to legitimise the norms of the world economic order' as Cox (1983) reckons.

The question regarding how it manages to achieve this lies in the rules of the game involved in different economic reforms that the Bank engineers within aid-dependent African countries like Nigeria. It is also importantly found in the 'buzzwords' and 'fuzzwords' used to redefine and propagate the entire development architecture and blueprint especially in the countries open to reforms. Important among these constructs within Fadama include the idea of food security itself within the framework of poverty reduction. The other obvious concepts include participation, ownership, and empowerment. These have been useful to drive the poverty reduction agenda of Fadama. These concepts have also served, and still serve, as subtle control mechanisms utilised by the World Bank, and other multilateral donor organisations, to 'coerce', 'co-opt' or encourage Nigeria to adopt the economic growth model as the only trusted approach in the country's strive for economic recovery and institutionalisation of poverty reduction strategies for its people.

Participation as an important aspect of the CDD approach used to implement Fadama III bears revolutionary connotations and is used side by side with empowerment. This entails driving radical change in socio-political settings against an oppressive system (Cornwall, 2007; Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Cornwall & Eade, 2010). In the context of the Fadama project, participation has been adapted and reformed to express beneficiaries' inclusion into Fadama as well as their active involvement in decision-making processes, especially about their subprojects. In various ways, beneficiaries can 'participate' in monitoring and evaluating progress in their vicinity and contribute to identifying needs priority areas for intervention. Thus, in impressing it on the government to shape Fadama along these lines – setting the inclusion criteria for the project – the World Bank exerted its power as a donor as well as a way of guiding the implementation processes of the project.

Like participation, the World Bank also placed emphasis on ownership – country and local/community ownership of Fadama. As Cornwall and Brock, (2005) highlights, ownership

and partnership are two concepts that emerged within the context of the PRSPs and HIPCs to emphasise the essence of inclusiveness and cooperation in the implementation of development strategies for poor countries (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). In Fadama, Nigeria had to take ownership in terms of the aid relationship between the government and the multilateral donor to fulfil the principles of partnership within the context of the new aid agenda to promote effectiveness (Development Assistance Committee, 1996). As part of this country ownership requirement, the recipient state – the Nigerian government – had to establish institutions and develop strategies to implement Fadama to get the required result. One of the strategies in this vein was for the government to emphasise community ownership through the introduction of Beneficiary Contributions since 2004. The rationale for developing this component was to ensure that unlike previous government-led community development projects, Fadama III will have a piece of community's (financial or material) contributions tied to them. This would ensure that these communities will not abandon these projects after a while. The World Bank thus argues that this local ownership of the initiative would transform grassroots beneficiaries from arms-chair aid recipients to active agents of development. This is in fact what the Bank conceives as the best way to make development more effective – 'when people own them'.

By ensuring that grassroots beneficiaries are actively incorporated into the Fadama project, the World Bank argues that empowerment becomes attainable through beneficiaries' inclusion in various decision-making platforms. Empowerment here is thus linked to an increase in social capital and social cohesion among communities and the poor – those receiving Fadama grants. This is in the sense of increasing their income and enabling them to make decisions as collective units based on the need identified collectively within the community, and in the context of Fadama community meetings. This ensures an empowered people. It must be said that while empowerment is not stated as a condition, but a target of Fadama, it nonetheless serves the purpose of advancing strategies and institutionalising the neoliberal economic idea of development within the country (Cornwall & Brock, 2005).[109]

Cox (1983) emphasised the role of peripheral countries' elites in the propagation and legitimisation of world order hegemony. These elites are mainly 'educated along', 'co-opted into' or 'schooled within' the ideals of international institutions; they had initially sought to reform these institutions from within as counter-hegemonic agents. The Nigerian post-1999

[109] Increased food security, improved household income and improved participation of people/communities in decision making platforms within their immediate socio-political and socio-economic spaces are end results of empowerment; they also show that people are empowered.

economic reforms can be attributed largely to the contributions of notable Nigerian technocrats – highly schooled (development) economists, financial accountants, Bankers and political economists – who had made their mark in international development institutions. This crop of technocrats – Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (former Finance Minister), Oby Ezekwesili (former Education Minister),[110] Patrick Utomi, Charles Soludo (former Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)), and Sanusi M Sanusi (former Governor, CBN) among others – were instrumental in shaping the local economy along a growth-focused path. A point to reiterate is that these technocrats are embodiments of the mainstream development model which the World Bank represents. For example, two of Nigeria's finest women in the post-1999 policy environment – Ezekwesili and Okonjo-Iweala – were senior employees of the World Bank at international levels. While Ezekwesili is a former Regional Head of World Bank Africa, Okonjo-Iweala worked directly under Wolfensohn (and was a contender for World Bank President). These figures played major roles in shaping the post-1999 socio-economic epoch in Nigeria which has been coloured by a drive to establish and consolidate a market-led development structure in various policy reforms of administrations in the country.

It suffices to say that incorporating learned Nigerians within the broader Nigerian economic reform processes was vital in propagating the mainstream development agenda across all sectoral reforms processes, including Fadama III. As an initiative linked to the agricultural sector, Fadama became a major non-oil sector programme laden with the responsibility of driving growth and thus contributing to poverty reduction and community development. It meant that local elites, especially technocrats, were useful to the Bank within this context to legitimatise and propagate the growth ideology even within pro-poor development strategies like Fadama III.

4.6. Conclusion

The foregoing brings into focus the position of the World Bank in world development influence and how Fadama was reconceptualised in the post-1999 period. This position proved vital in defining and shaping the nature, scope and strategies for Fadama. The chapter so far shows that power within Fadama lies a great deal in the definition of the development strategy that underlies the project. The project was reconceptualised and redesigned in such a way that it

[110] She was also the head of the Budget Monitoring and Intelligence Unit of the Federation and the Minister of Solid Minerals under Obasanjo before she moved to the World Bank in 2007.

ultimately is aligned to the overall standards of international development goals: a stronger economy based on free and unfettered markets where the private sector plays an enormous role. There is the manifestation of power in terms of the Bank's laid-down guidelines and precepts in the different arrangements about the project's conceptualisation. The power balance thus lies squarely in the World Bank's ability to co-opt and sometimes coerce the government to accept and undertake a growth-focused economic reform and also reconceptualise Fadama along the lines of a growth-led process of poverty reduction and food security.[111]

The post-1999 economic climate in Nigeria – the context within which this study focuses – has the World Bank as a key development partner of Nigeria. Within this period, three CPS documents were developed by the World Bank to support different development strategies and economic reforms of the country. It is important to note the central theme of all these documents (since CAS 2000) is economic growth. Despite the subtle changes in rhetoric and the incorporation of a pro-poor ideology and pro-poor policies, the goal of institutionalising the neoliberal economic growth model remains unshaken. This has filtered into Fadama and many other pro-poor initiatives, and the goal is to create the *"homo oeconomicus"* (Moore, 2007; Williams, 1999) through internalising these business and profit-focus ideals within the local economy.

It follows that although newer considerations have become incorporated due to the changing socio-political, economic and environmental challenges, the substance of the Bank's drive remains ultimately the same – a neo-liberal capitalist economic world order. This is a view that scholars such as Moore (2007) ascribe to when they analysed the fundamental difference, if any, between the World Bank leadership under Wolfensohn and later under Wolfowitz. The final argument remained that the substance of the Bank's ideology remained the same despite the ostensibly obvious difference between both heads and the nature of the governance system back in the United States of America.

This chapter has explored a framework for understanding the location of power in the narrative which pervades and characterises the description and implementation of the Fadama project in Nigeria. The central argument in this chapter is that in the process of reconceptualising Nigeria's Fadama project, the World Bank activated the pursuit of an economic system built

[111] The next chapter explores how the Nigerian government has managed to internalise these precepts and guidelines in its conceptualisation and implementation of the project within the immediate socio-economic landscape. This is useful in teasing out a related manifestation of power and control within the framework of the government's relationship with the bank as it tries to make the project feasible within the country.

around the hegemonic neoliberal development model. The idea of an internationalisation of the market-led development ideology vividly emerges in the way in which the Fadama project was strategically integrated into the broader economic reform process which began under the Obasanjo regime in the year 2003. This period of economic reformation thus provided the ideal platform for the international hegemonic class to entrench the hegemonic development framework into Nigeria. This was in form of the broader development model adopted by the government and specifically reconceptualising Fadama as a mechanism for economic growth. In doing this, the World Bank, however, remained sensitive to previous accusations of pursuing growth without human development and as such emphasised elements of participatory development and human and environmental security within the context of pro-poor initiatives like Fadama III so as to address other important aspects of the lives of citizens.[112]

An analysis of the Bank's conceptualisation of Fadama III which is centred on widely mainstreamed radical concepts like poverty reduction, participation, ownership and empowerment importantly pointed to the sphere of influence in the partnership. It is from its position of power that the Bank impressed it on the Nigerian government to implement Fadama along the current path. This particular situation also impinges on how the government may understand, conceptualise and also propagate the inherent ideology within the Fadama project among the Nigerian population in order to ensure that the project fulfils its major aims of creating an economic rationality that adheres to the hegemonic neo-liberal market economic model.

In conclusion, this chapter submits that the power dynamics unveiled within Fadama is the classic donor – aid recipient relationship in which the donor (*Actor A*) ensures that the recipient country *(Actor B)* acts in a certain manner based on what the donor has conceived to be the better option for the country to improve the country's economic standing. In doing so, the donor continues to push its own broader interest of creating a thinking process within the country that would be long-lasting for the broader the interest. The scenario here, in Fadama, transcends Dahl's conflict of interest in power relations, but it definitely reflects the existent inequality in the interaction between the Bank and Nigeria. The ability of the World Bank to use its position to redefine development goals and targets, and how to achieve it especially within the context

[112] Environmental focus is based on the resurgence of sustainable development, and so a focus on food security essentially emphasizes the need for environmental sustainability and people centric development framework.

of Fadama and Nigeria, shows the extent of the power it wields within this partnership arrangement.

An interesting finding from this chapter deals with the freedom within Fadama for the state to own Fadama processes within the ambit of exercising the principles of good governance, accountability and transparency. In some aspects of Fadama III implementation such as contract bidding and approval processes, the Bank allowed the government to determine how the project is implemented, in as much as they followed international standards. From an analytical perspective, this freedom to determine aspects of the project must be analysed by appreciating the broader principles and circumstances surrounding possibilities for continued funding. This provides another avenue to explore how much influence the World Bank actually exercises over the Nigerian government when considers from an outlook of governing from a distance. Such a level of control, as it pertains to the actual implementation process, can best be described in a particular form or manifestation of power – what is referred in Foucauldian terms as governmentality. This is a major feature of the next chapter in which this study examines that national narrative of the Fadama initiative which puts into perspective the government's conceptualisation, implementation and propagation of Fadama III.

Chapter Five

Internalising the Mainstream Development Agenda: Fadama III

5.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the implementation of Fadama III within the context of the renegotiated arrangement between the Nigerian government and the World Bank for the continuation of the project. It explores government's implementation strategies and argues that the adoption of these strategies was immensely influenced by the World Bank. As chapter four demonstrates, this emanates from the Bank's status as the donor as well as an institution of global financial governance; an institution that defines the ideals of (mainstream) development. Since this is a question of power and influence, the chapter explores the manifest power dynamics within this 'new' partnership arrangement where Nigeria seems to be a 'docile' partner in its implementation of Fadama III in alignment with the precepts and principles of the World Bank's new development agenda. Thus, transcending the scope of chapter four, this chapter takes a step further to demonstrate how the hegemonic status of the Bank lies at the heart of Nigeria's adoption and implementation of mainstreamed strategies within and beyond Fadama III. This is therefore an analysis of the of the state as a rational agent which makes rational and strategic economic choices based on what it perceives to be in its best interest.

Drawing on Abrahamsen's adaptation of the governmentality framework of analysis (Abrahamsen, 2004b), this chapter contends that the government's approach towards Fadama III is broadly influenced by a strategic drive to remain acceptable to the World Bank (and other donors). The desire for, and need to attract, (more) external funding and foreign investment to drive 'development' in Nigeria, I argue, 'encouraged' or dare I say, constrained the government to steer Fadama's implementation towards adherence to the 'prescribed' guidelines of the World Bank's new development agenda. The government understood that to keep different donors happy, it had to demonstrate a great deal of fiscal discipline and an efficient adherence to mainstream development ideals, including embracing the 'novel' inclusive pro-poor growth-focused approach(es) and ostensibly relinquishing its bureaucratic control over the project such as the direct control and transfer of grant to grassroots beneficiaries. This in my view represents a strategic choice to adhere to mainstream ideals of limited state role in development, accountability, transparency, and a growth-led poverty reduction and development strategizing.

Based on these, the chapter argues that the existent power relation between the World Bank and the Nigerian government is best explained by a system of governance from a distance centred around 'pastoral care' or facilitation as opposed to an overly stringent insistence on a set of rule.[113] The World Bank was thus able to encourage the Nigerian government to undertake a broad range of economic reforms and also adopt the market-led economic model because the government 'understood' the economic implications of accepting the norms of global governance in general and (mainstream) development planning and practice in particular.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one details Fadama III's National implementation story. This focuses on its institutional and administrative framework, the implementation strategy, funding arrangement, and exit strategy. This also incorporates the process of internalising this strategy in Rivers state as well as perspectives of officials regarding Fadama III. Part two provides a theoretical appraisal of the chapter's findings and highlights some of the perceived successes and challenges of implementing Fadama III in Nigeria. This part's continued discussion on the manifestations of power (relations) in Fadama III thus sets the stage to also explore beneficiaries' experience in chapter six.

Part One


5.2. Fadama III: The National/State Implementation Story

Fadama III was approved by the Board of the World Bank on July 1, 2008 (The World Bank, 2010b, p. 10), and in November 2008 the agreement which set the implementation of this third phase in motion was signed between the World Bank and the Federal Government of Nigeria. This ensured the nation-wide status of Fadama III. The World Bank thus approved $250 million (USD) as a credit facility for the execution of this third phase – it was estimated at over $450 Million (USD). This meant that the World Bank provided more than 55 percent of the total estimated cost while 45 percent was to be borne by the government – Federal, States and Local – and the beneficiaries of the project (see figure 2 below). Here, the government contributed to the *Counterpart fund* while beneficiaries were also required to make a contribution by paying

[113] It does not mean that there were no rules to be followed. But the World Bank mostly took on a facilitator role in this project.

the *Beneficiary Contribution (BC)* – smaller in relation to contributions by the state and local governments.

Figure 4: Sources of Fadama III funding



(Source: Author's design with data from World Bank, 2010b)

Fadama III's implementation, from a national perspective, cuts across the six (6) geopolitical regions and thirty-six (36) states and the FCT, Abuja.[114] According to the completion report, its target group included:

> (a) the rural poor engaged in economic activities (farmers, pastoralists, fishermen, nomads, traders, processors, hunters and gatherers as well as other economic interest groups); (b) the disadvantaged groups (widows, the handicapped, the sick and other vulnerable groups, including people living with HIV/AIDS and unemployed youths; and (c) service providers, including government agencies, private operators, and professional/semi-professional associations operating in the Project areas" (The World Bank, 2016, p. 5).

The choice of this target group, as previous chapters have demonstrated, was based on the desire to empower people mainly from the rural areas to more effectively undertake various business activities to yield sustainable incomes to tackle hunger, poverty, unemployment and social exclusion. Fadama III, as the excerpt shows, primarily focused on poor men, women, youths and the vulnerable groups located in rural areas. Other stakeholders within the broader

[114] It is important to note that Fadama III was not to be implemented in all parts of the country because the money assigned for implementation in each state was meant for implementation in only twenty local government areas, and as such states that have more than 20 LGAs but still want to implement in all the states will have to make other arrangements in order to do this.

agricultural value chain also constituted intrinsic parts of the broader target group because of their contribution towards the actualisation of the goals of the project. Apart from the primary economic interest areas of FUGs, subprojects within Fadama III also included community infrastructural projects (undertaken by FCAs) aimed at reaching out to a broader range of beneficiaries – often called indirect beneficiaries of Fadama III – who are mostly members of the community and others for whom the infrastructural projects also prove useful. In addition to these, it remains vital to note that Fadama III implementation paid special attention to gender issues – women empowerment – and the empowerment of youths and the vulnerable. Altogether, "a total of 967,157 households" across Nigeria benefitted from the implementation of Fadama III. When disaggregated by gender, "383, 058 (40 percent) female [main beneficiaries] were recorded compared to 582, 099 (60 percent) male(s)" (The World Bank, 2016, p. 5). These figures represent a total of "64, 347 FUGs and 5, 507 FCAs [that] benefited directly from the project" (ibid).[115]

In Rivers state Fadama began in 2009 and was focused on twenty (20) LGAs, namely: Abua/Odual, Ahoada-East, Ahoada-West, Akuku-Toru, Andoni, Degema, Eleme, Emohua, Etche, Gokana, Ikwerre, Khana, Obio-Akpor, Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni, Ogu-gbolo, Okrika, Omuma, Oyigbo, Port Harcourt, and Tai.[116] As a subsidiary (loan) signatory, Rivers state was among the nineteen (19) new states that had commenced participation in Fadama after its reconceptualization. The state's Fadama III (2012) Midterm Report notes: "realising the importance of this programme, the Government took necessary steps to ensure that they meet the eligibility criteria set out by the Federal Government and the World Bank" (RSFCO, 2012, p. 13). These steps included among other things, the payment of the initial counterpart fee in addition to signing the subsidiary loan agreement. This was geared towards bringing 'home' some of the noted achievements of Fadama such as improved incomes and productivity. This move was motivated by a desire to reduce poverty, unemployment and destitution in the state – this was in line with the broader agenda of drastically cutting down poverty levels across the country.

[115] According to the report, it was expected that the project would reach at least 2 million indirect beneficiary households, as members of the Fadama communities not benefitting directly from subprojects, and non-Fadama communities who will gain from the investments in public infrastructure and additional income and employment effects.

[116] The non-participating LGAs include: Asari-Toru, Bonny and Opobo. The major reason for their non-participation is linked to their inability of their LGAs to pay the required participation counterpart funding fee support local/grassroots beneficiaries from these LGAs.

Fadama III involved six components that were yardsticks in the measurement of project success. These include:

- "Capacity building, communication and information support (estimated at US$87.5m (of which US$28.2m was financed by the World Bank's IDA))
- Small-scale community-owned infrastructure (estimated at US$73.57m (of which US$66.06m was financed by the IDA))
- Advisory services and input support (estimated at US$39.5m (of which US$24.6m was financed by the IDA))
- Support to the ADPs, sponsored research and on-farm demonstration (estimated at US$37.43m (of which the IDA provides US$6.43m)
- Asset acquisition for individual FUGs/EIGs (estimated at US$150.0m (of which the World Bank provides US$105.0m))
- Project management, monitoring and evaluation, and EMP compliance (estimated at US$59.30m (of which US$17.0m is financed by IDA)" (The World Bank, 2008, pp. 3, 14–25).

These components represent the changes introduced in the implementation of Fadama III. This is because Fadama III transcended beyond an exclusive focus on agricultural activities by incorporating other important aspects of the value chain such as marketing, processing, the creation of networks, the creation of avenues for domestic soft loans from government and commercial banks, among others. These aimed to create more impact among the poor and vulnerable, especially as the World Bank noted that over 50 percent of beneficiaries are women and the vulnerable groups in the society.

Fadama III: The Nigerian state and the establishment of a national implementation strategy and the Rivers state internalisation experience

The governmentality approach, explored in chapter two, alludes amongst other things to the normalisation of systems of control through a facilitating strategy. Besides 'creating' subjects in the 'influencers' image, the approach also alludes to the 'disciplining' of such 'subjects' in a manner that enables the achievement of specific goals in the (long term) interest of the one

who exerts control. In normalising the control process, the subject embarks on series of self-disciplining actions that, although may not be necessarily opposed to its self-interest or well-being, ultimately advance the underlying goal of the one who wields power.

This is a critical direction to which the findings of Fadama III's implementation story – this chapter – point: it begins with the adoption of a new implementation strategy by the Nigerian government (in 2004) spurred by World Bank's new approach to development (thinking) which the preceding chapters (3 and 4) allude to. Adopting the (now) popular CDD approach and subsequently adapting it to the local context through the 'ostensibly' 'novel' Local Development Plan (LDP) approach – in a manner that seemed devoid of massive coercion, but persuasion from the Bank – is reminiscent of processes of self-governance and, what Abrahamsen refers to as, the technologies of agency where the subject under the influence of power acts out its own agency while inadvertently advancing the ultimate goal of the influencer (Abrahamsen, 2004b). The goal nevertheless was to effectively implement Fadama as a CDD project and thus incorporate the poor within development (planning) processes aimed to address their needs with them as 'active' participating agents of development.

The implementation story thus usefully uncovers how the 'government-led/established' administrative, structural and institutional frameworks, its adopted participatory methodologies and other implementation strategies, represent the state's *'governmentalized'* agency. It portrays the Nigerian state as the object of power, constructed by the World Bank as one in need of intervention. It also shows how the Bank's construction of the state as a partner – making it a subject actively invested in the intervening – is manifested in the government's continued quest to demonstrate effective ownership over this development initiative in the bid to remain 'donor' friendly. For the purposes of this study, the first action that is analysed in this chapter is the structural and institutional framework of implementing Fadama. This deep engagement with the different actions/steps undertaken by the Nigerian state is thus crucial for a stronger grasp and subsequent critique of Fadama III's nature and implementation process.

Structural and Institutional Framework of implementation

Since 2004, Nigeria's implementation of Fadama has been through an 'institutional arrangement' which spans from the national, zonal (based on the 6 geopolitical zones in Nigeria), state and local Government, to the community level where the beneficiaries are

located. This arrangement, the government contends, facilitates decentralisation, enhancing holistic inclusion and participation of grassroots partners and ensuring an efficient and effective "... monitoring and supervision of [this enormous national] project" (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012). Fadama coordinated from the national level through the National Fadama Coordinating office (NFCO), on-behalf of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), by team of experts.[117] Among other things, this team ensures that Fadama "...operates according to the Project Implementation Manual" (PIM)[118] sanctioned by the World Bank. They also develop "withdrawal application forms to [the] IDA" and liaise with "the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) and states to ensure timely release of Borrower's counterpart contributions" (NFDP handbook, 2010, pp.10-11). Overall, the NFCO ensures the nation-wide "day-to-day" coordination of the Fadama project (NFDP handbook, 2010, p.11).

The six geopolitical zonal offices also established by the government consist of South-South; South-east; South-west; North-central; North-east; and North-west. These zones house the different State Fadama Coordinating Offices (SFCO) nation-wide (see table below).

Table 1: National Coverage of Fadama III by Geo-Political Regions

THE SIX (6) GEO-POLITICAL ZONAL FADAMA OFFICE AREAS IN NIGERIA					
South-West	**South-East**	**South-South**	**North-Central**	**North-West**	**North-East**
Ekiti	Abia	Akwa Ibom	Benue	Kaduna	Adamawa
Lagos	Anambra	Bayelsa	FCT	Kano	Bauchi
Ogun	Ebonyi	Cross River	Kogi	Katsina	Gombe
Ondo	Enugu	Delta	Kwara	Kebbi	Taraba
Osun	Imo	Edo	Nasarawa	Jigawa	Yobe
Oyo		Rivers	Niger	Sokoto	*Borno
			Plateau	Zamfara	

(Source: Author's design with data from Fadama database)

The SFCOs, headed by State Project Coordinators (SPCs) and assisted also by a team of experts, coordinate implementation processes at the state level. They collaborate with the ADP – a parastatal of the State Ministry of Agriculture – to undertake rural agricultural interventions. The SFCO reports to the Permanent Secretary of the State Ministry of Agriculture who also heads the State Fadama Technical Committee (SFTC) (NFDP handbook, 2010, p.15). Here,

[117] A team of experts in Community Development, Technical Operations, Monitoring and Evaluation, Environmental issues, Accounts and Procurement.
[118] The Project Implementation Manual is the 'rubric' that gives guidelines to different stakeholders and different components of Fadama III in Nigeria.

the SFCO is responsible for the "proper and timely provision of IDA resources ... for the implementation of project activities" as well as providing "technical assistance in launching rural participatory processes through organised training of trainers and ... the elaboration of the LDPs". The SFTC receives reports, assesses progress and reviews the SFCO's annual work plan and budget for funding (NFDP handbook, 2010, pp.15-16). This state – SFCO – level is the next important bureaucratic structure in Fadama's implementation arrangement and it is the point where Rivers state, as the location of study, enters the fray in this implementation story.

As the aforementioned (RSFCO) report highlights, preparations to establish and subsequently implement Fadama III in Rivers state began in 2007 when an office accommodation was procured (within the ADP Premises in Port Harcourt); staff recruitment was conducted, and subsequent sensitisation campaigns began. Accordingly, the "SFCO ... embarked on capacity building through participation in trainings and workshops as well as organising same at the state and local level in order to acquire the necessary skills for effective take off" (Ibid). This training process included the core staff as well as the facilitators recruited to be the foot-soldiers for the dissemination of the Fadama III initiative across various communities.[119] Indeed, this preparatory process was aimed at ensuring that there was a ready staff body, as well as a broad sense of readiness within the state government, to effectively implement the project within different LGAs and to ensure adequate returns in terms of productivity or success at these (mostly) grassroots or rural levels of project implementation.

The third level in this arrangement – the Local Government Area (LGA) – houses the Local Fadama Desk (LFD) and the Local Fadama Development Committee (LFDC) which the LGA chairman leads. The LFDC decides on and approves community projects and subprojects through a participatory (peer) review process of communities' LDPs; a process designed to ascertain and ensure that LDPs appropriately fit into the overall framework and trajectory of the World Bank's scope for Fadama. To facilitate this process, the LFD collects LDPs submitted by FCAs, screens them and presents them before the LFDC for approval before these are sent to the SFCO for disbursement.

[119] According to one facilitator, they underwent an intensive one-week training in Calabar – i.e. another state in Nigeria - (after they had been recruited in August 2007). This "one-week training was actually not supposed to be a week training because it was so cumbersome that so many things that we are supposed to know before we go in [to the field] was now, was now jam-packed and then given to us in one week. Yeah, lectures, seminars and all what not – we had them all. And when we came back, we needed other hands to also help us know more about it. [So] the Fadama office Rivers state here, sought the assistance of facilitators in other eh states that had keyed-into Fadama II. So, they came in here, also gave us a little [one-day] training. They gave us more training to meet the challenges on, on the field" (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013).

At the last level is the FCA, regarded as the "apex association" and the entry point for the implementation of the project at the community level, which houses the different EIGs and FUGs (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012). These EIGs or FUGs vary in terms of their economic interests and areas of economic focus – hence the different sub-projects they choose to pursue within the Fadama framework. They are formed as cooperatives with interests in development areas – their development plans must, however, coincide with the PIM as well as the overall Fadama objective, as highlighted in chapter four. As such groups' sub-project must reflect the goals of the project, and their activities are guided by project facilitators provided by the state office. These facilitators are selected to bridge the gap between the Fadama office and the people and provide support and guidance to local beneficiaries. (This is because they are supposed to understand the context under which the people (co)exist.) The service providers assist the people in the procurement of the required materials and machinery for the execution of their sub-projects; they are also very important in terms of the implementation process – its success or failure – as they relate with both the local beneficiaries and the state implementing office.

This level of institutional and structural arrangement is thus central to the entire implementation process. It is also an arena where different forms of interactions, laced with enormous power relations, take place. This is because local beneficiaries tend to have minimal or non-existent contact with the World Bank – their interactions (may) happen only during mission visits of the Bank to selected locations. Analytically, this institutional and structural arrangement, as well as the associated and inherent actions and activities therein, demonstrate an important aspect of Abrahamsen's (2004b) expression of partnership as a form of liberal power, and governmentality as a way of understanding this power dynamics over subjects. By constructing Nigeria as a 'partner' to implement Fadama, the Bank imposed a sense of responsibility on the state to think as a rational actor how best to design and implement Fadama III in a manner that is amenable to the Bank's preferred modalities for and scope of development planning.

Participatory Methodological Approaches for Fadama III implementation

CDD and LDP in Fadama: Embedding a local approach within a broader framework

Nigeria's quest to demonstrate ownership of Fadama, in line with CDF, obvious when it 'consciously' restructured Fadama III[120] – now a CDD project – around a variety of participatory approaches. Significant here was localising the CDD approach as the LDP approach as a crucial implementation strategy. In mastering the CDD approach, after Fadama II, to implement Fadama III, the government was aware of how central it is to World Bank's new discourse of inclusive pro-poor development planning as evident in this statement:

> Community-Driven Development (CDD) is an approach that gives control of development decisions and resources to community groups. Poor communities receive funds, decide on their use, plan and execute the chosen local projects, and monitor the provision of services that result. It improves not just incomes but also people's empowerment, the lack of which is a form of poverty as well (The World Bank, 2009a, p. 1).

This description is expresses the CDD approach's potential to encourage the emergence of strong and cohesive communities with the capacity to identify and drive their own development (processes) with (minimal) external financial and technical support. This also entails the potential for empowered communities to be the catalyst for the establishment of "accountability norms and leadership patterns which in due course will help improve governance at the local level" and therefore "widen and deepen participatory processes" in the country (Aiyar, 2001, p. 7).

These prospects amongst others constitutes the promotion of this CDD approach in the mainstream, hence the encouragement that Nigeria received to reconstitute Fadama. A crucial element of the CDF was country ownership of development intervention processes, including such interventions like Fadama, and indeed the 'treatment' of developing countries as partners. In line with this, the onus was on Nigeria to 'act' like a partner though aware of the preferences of its multilateral partner(s). Adapting the CDD approach to the local context through developing the LDP approach represented a significant by which the government attempted to demonstrate country ownership of Fadama.[121]

---

[120] Fadama I was outside the context of the new development agenda, having been established in 1993 before James Wolfensohn's emergence at the World Bank. However, when Fadama II was being conceptualised, the World Bank under Wolfensohn – though he was already preparing to leave the World Bank – insisted that the project had to be restructured in terms of the principles set out within the CDF.

[121] Chapter four alludes this approach as the perceived 'silver bullet' to within Fadama's quest to improve individual and household poverty and food security in Nigeria.

The CDD approach was consolidated as an implementation strategy in Fadama III to enhance development planning from the grassroots up to the local government. This began, as can be seen in the structural and institutional arrangements, with the decentralisation of implementation responsibilities across the various levels of government in Nigeria to facilitate participation for different stakeholders in the implementation, monitoring and governance processes – grassroots beneficiaries especially. This implied aligning Fadama's practices to the World Bank's renewed drive to 'think' and 'do' development according to the needs and interest of the poor as opposed to the narrow focus on development as economic growth (Moore, 2007; Pender, 2001; Schech, 2007).[122]

Consequently, the government adopted and applied recognised participatory tools to deepen beneficiaries' integration – rural farmers, hunters, fishermen, horticulturists, and pastoralists amongst others – into the implementation process. This accounts for the 'people-centred' implementation strategy which ostensibly prioritized beneficiaries' capacity to define and conceptualise their own needs within an implementation document called the LDP. This means that the government adopted the LDP approach in a strategic bid to more adequately internalise and/or localise the CDD approach, and thus identify local needs and priority areas, for Fadama III intervention. Deep-rooted consultations among several community groups was therefore inevitable, in this regard, to build consensus around specific development choices.[123] Hence, as the World Bank notes,

> The LDP was a culture change in the sense that the planning of community development activities followed an inclusive and participatory process, whereby all potential Fadama resource users – farmers, pastoralists, hunters, fisher folks, traders, agro-processors – participated in collective decision making in setting the priorities for their community and how the funds from the project could be utilized to meet their collectively-identified needs (in the form of subprojects) (The World Bank, 2016, p. 3-4).

What this meant in Rivers state was that the RSFCO had to draw on the broader national implementation strategy (developed broadly for implementing Fadama III) to apply same to the Rivers state context. In fact, the also RSFCO also had to 'own' or internalise this implementation strategy to ensure its maximum benefits for the state. Implementation activities

[122] Sussane Schech and Sanjugta vas Dev, in chapter six of this book, interrogated this 'new' emphasis on the participation of the poor in development planning through processes that are actually designed to sample the views of the poor without actually integrating them.

[123] An important rule associated with LDP is that "[any] investment subproject that is not reflected in the approved LDP is not eligible for financing by the project. Approval of an LDP is subject among other things to passing a test indicating that the integrity of the LDP process, especially in terms of social inclusion and participation has been respected" (The World Bank, 2010, p. 12)

and plans within the SFCO drew on the CDD and LDP approach, and its various elements. This included participatory methodologies[124] implemented within the following processes: community consultations (with) and sensitisation of the (prospective) beneficiaries; the formation of Economic Interest Groups (EIGs); identification of local priority areas and needs for intervention; development, approval, funding and implementation of Local Development Plans (LDPs); and inclusive Monitoring and Evaluation of subprojects. Interestingly, these methodologies are highly popular models of contemporary development planning and intervention, and an adept application and implementation of these models required high levels of capacity building among Fadama officials, including facilitators, and especially the beneficiaries to enable them adequately to undertake these processes on their own.[125] Also, the associated components of this implementation strategy provide a useful vantage point to better understand Fadama III's implementation process in Rivers state. The themes below describe the findings on the implementation of these processes in Rivers state.

i. Consultations and Sensitisation of Beneficiaries: Identification of locations for project implementation

Beneficiary consultation and sensitisation had been identified as intrinsic to the CDD approach adopted to implement Fadama III. In Rivers state, these components were prioritised to target prospective beneficiaries and incorporate within the process of identifying intervention areas. To facilitate a direct interface with the beneficiaries, facilitators and fieldworkers were trained and subsequently sent out into communities to speak to local paramount rulers and obtain permission to speak to communities – this began with the initially identified communities, representing the pilot areas.[126] A facilitator clarified:

> After the training, we came back and we were asked to mobilise to the communities and start sensitising them ... telling them what Fadama is all about; who and who is supposed to benefit; and what do they stand to get if they are [in the] Fadama family.... Okay, before the coming of Fadama [III], preparation to the coming of Fadama, [the] ADP as an organ, the Federal Ministry of [Agriculture], went to the communities, told them that we will like to incorporate you. Since you are ... producing for your consumption and for the larger country too, we want to include you in the Fadama family – preparing their minds against what we'll be coming for. Then after ... the eh Calabar retreat that we went, we were now given letters to meet

[124] Some of these include: Participatory Rural Appraisal[124], Participatory Needs Assessment (within the Community Needs Assessment), and Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E).
[125] Although community groups had their facilitators to assist them, they eventually had to own their subprojects, hence the importance of adequate capacity building.
[126] The ADP which houses the Fadama III office in Rivers state was also vital in initially creating awareness for Fadama III within these communities.

> the Ochimbah [a title for community rulers] or the chief of a particular [community], the CDC [Community Development Committee]... or whosoever is in charge of that community ... The letter is introducing you to the community so that they will now gather; there you will sensitise them more on what we have for them (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013).

This meeting with the local chiefs, it can be said, commenced the consultation and sensitisation processes in communities preceded by the visit of World Bank officials who were accompanied by the Rivers state Fadama officials. In some cases, the RSFCO conducted these community visits.[127] These visits, after the initial "community entry"[128] by facilitators, were used to raise further awareness about Fadama III among the rural population, especially its (supposed) real benefits to beneficiaries and communities. It must be said that the frequency of these meetings was quite low because of the vast number of communities that were to be reached as well as the frenzy to roll-out the project as quickly as possible in the state. These meetings also served the purpose of registering prospective beneficiaries for the project as temporarily assigning them to groups for the commencement of project implementation in these communities.

ii. Groups formation

The formation of groups was a logical outcome of the consultation/sensitisation process as people who indicated interest in participating were instructed to form groups according to their areas of economic interests (CD-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). This is in accordance with the requirement that beneficiaries of the initiative must belong to cooperative groups – not individuals – and they must work together within particular economic interest areas.[129] It is crucial to note that the formation of these groups varied depending on communities and people's activities and interests. In some cases, already existent cooperatives simply indicated their interest while others formed new groups based on specific interests in order to benefit from the project. While registration was the first obligation, another important task was the development of LDPs[130] for the approval of the LFDC. The approval of these LDPs determined if a subproject was funded or not.

---

[127] One participant noted that World Bank officials visited their community to tell them about the benefits of participating in Fadama III (see Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

[128] This refers to the initial attempt to reach out to communities to obtain their buy-in to the Fadama process. In fact, it also provided the basis for the formation of economic interest groups within communities that eventually became beneficiaries of Fadama III.

[129] This is why they are called Economic Interest Groups (EIGs) or Fadama User Groups (FUGs) (NFDP Hand Book, 2010, p. 10).

[130] LDPs are mainly for FCAs while subprojects are for FUGs. This is because the Mid-term report shows that LDPs in Rivers state are targeted towards 200 (commensurate with the target for FCAs) while subprojects are more.

During the process of group formation, interested individuals were made to submit their (groups') names to the RSFCO through facilitators at the meeting. A facilitator notes:

> ... [At the onset] ... we allow the community [and] the particular group ... to choose what they are into. At times you see now when you go to the communities after sensitisation, they ask them that those who want to be into cassava farming should be [on] one side, they go [t]here; those who are after yam [farming], because as we go to the community you see those who are yam farmers – they farm a lot of yam, so we [also] group them. You will see that somebody who is from a different arm of the community coming into another arm to join another so that they can produce more. [So] we ask which one do you want to go into, and when they tell us, we will tell them what it takes to belong to that group and what and what they will get and with it if they are comfortable we will guide them [until] they kick off (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013).

This process set in motion the establishment of many FUGs and FCAs in Rivers state, firstly among the early beneficiaries and, later on, among the late beneficiaries.[131] From the excerpt, what is not mentioned was the writing of names – this is assumed in terms of the disaggregation of the potential beneficiaries into various farming activities (such as cassava farming, yam farming or even fish farming). It can be said that the list which emerged from this process was later used by the RSFCO to prepare and organise the structure for implementing Fadama III in these communities in the state.

Establishing EIGs or FUGs, it seems, constituted the popular 'handing over' of decision-making processes to local beneficiaries, ensuring that their chosen activities would reflect needs within their communities. This represented the first stride towards entrenching local ownership of Fadama among beneficiaries, constructing them as partners and active agents capable to identify their own needs and acting towards actualising them within the confines of the Fadama process – an attempt to *governmentalize* local beneficiaries.

Group formation is a fundamental aspect of Fadama's implementation strategy – especially, to governmentalize local beneficiaries – because FUGs serve as focal points for the implementation of specific subprojects. They also provide the personnel and resources for the FCA which is the peak of Fadama community's institutional or governance structure. FUGs' importance can also be linked to the foundation they provide or represent for the potential establishment and/or entrenchment of a particular economic model within beneficiary communities. Also crucial is the fact that projects and subprojects cannot be sited in any part(s)

[131] These groups were formed in the latter part of the project – around 2011/12 towards the initial closing date of 31st December 2013.

of the community if FUGs are not formed.[132] This emphasis on group formation was re-echoed by an official who insisted that "Fadama is not dealing with individuals [but] groups [to foster group dynamics" (CD-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). Consequently, the RSFCO managed this process and assigned facilitators to communities to support them. Altogether a total amount of six hundred and ten (610) FUGs/EIGs and eighty-five (85) communities received funding in Rivers state as at 2013 although the proposed target was two thousand (2000) FUGs and two hundred (200) communities (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). The role of the facilitators to Fadama III success in the communities is so crucial to the extent that groups' failures, in many instances, were attributed to facilitators' inefficiency.[133] As FUGs and FCAs prepared to apply for subproject grants, facilitators assisted them to draft their proposals and facilitated their internal process to identify and prioritize areas of need.

iii. Needs Identification and LDP development and funding issues: Participatory processes in action

Needs identification and prioritisation was another popular Fadama III implementation strategy in Rivers state Here, various participatory tools/models were employed and applied in terms of the CDD framework.[134] This particular stage also entailed a continuous process of sensitisation as beneficiaries required a deeper grasp of Fadama, and had to be actively involved, through the help of facilitators, in the identification of areas of need within the community. This necessitated the application of PRA[135] techniques to more adequately appreciate local development needs. Beneficiaries were thus assisted, by facilitators, to assess and rank these needs through participatory needs assessment. This assessment, also called Community Needs Assessment (CAN), involved members of the FCA (and FUGs) within a particular a community in deciding projects – infrastructural or agricultural – to be pursued in the community. A facilitator explained:

> ... when we go to the community, we ... tell them to list out their needs in the order of preference. They tell us ... 'we are into poultry'; some are into poultry, cassava

[132] This is so because FCAs are formed by members of FUGs and this selection of personnel from various FUGs to form to executive body of the FCA implies that there cannot be an FCA without the FUGs.
[133] It is important to note that facilitators needed motivation too to do their work. But without job security and good pay, it is difficult to see them give their best.
[134] Note that the consultation and sensitisation process are 'denoted' as inclusive since beneficiaries' buy-in was the prerequisite for implementation.
[135] PRA is described as "a family of approaches, methods and behaviours that enable people to express and analyse the realities in their lives and conditions, to plan for themselves what actions to take and to monitor and evaluate the results" (Chambers, 1994c).

> production, [and] yam [production]. Out of these activities, we will ask them: 'which one do you think you'll do better among these three activities [that] we listed'? Some will say ... cassava; some will say yam. So, we ... put them into voting. We prioritise them: the first one comes first. When, during the voting, anyone they vote for, that the number is much [more] we take that as what they want because the voice[s] that voted for that will also participate in making sure that the thing goes [on well] (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013).

It must be said that these prioritised needs necessarily had to fall in line with the World Bank's approved *positive list*[136] of economic interest areas for groups' subproject funding as well as community's infrastructural project. Facilitators had to make this clear – a view emphasised below:

> ... when we get to the community, we tell them the list of our positive projects and negative projects, and within the positive projects we play it, we present it, to them [and] they now decide among the group members. They come together and have a meeting. We tell them; we go away [and] give them some weeks to deliberate as FUGs. Then they will come up; they decide how [and] what projects they [want] in their meeting... they decide what projects they... want to go into. Eh, maybe you know ... from their meeting, they said they had a kind of voting system. Because there will be different suggestions, then at the end they vote and agree on a particular project they want to go to (Participant-IIFAC-ORV, Interview, 24 June, 2013).

The foregoing shows that this identification and prioritisation process was very vital for FUGs (as well as FCAs) mainly because the Fadama III grant could not have been secured if the identified needs area had fallen outside the scope of the funding area. This accounted for the deliberative nature of the required prioritisation process among the FUGs and FCAs alike, and decisions had to emerge either through consensus or through voting assisted by their facilitator(s).[137]

At the end of this process, the LDP development and approval for FUGs and (later) FCAs became the next hurdle towards the disbursement of the Fadama III grant to the rural farmers and local entrepreneurs in Rivers state. As noted in chapter 4, the importance of LDPs to the reconceptualised Fadama process cannot be over-emphasised, mainly because they provided the framework for the adequate integration of beneficiaries in identifying needs and actively contributing in implementing strategies towards addressing them. Upon the attaining consensus

[136] In relation to this, the Fadama III Project Implementation Manual (PIM) and the Fadama III Handbook provides for a list of projects that can be funded within the context of Fadama III and those that cannot and will not be funded (as approved by the World Bank). It follows that while groups can be formed along various economic interest groups, their LDPs must bear subprojects that fall within the ambient of the fundable projects; else such LDPs would not have been approved for funding. The same was the case for community infrastructural projects.

[137] This is supposedly participatory but according to a participant, the facilitators in most of the cases (are paid to) prepare these LDPs because of issues of time constraint, illiteracy and the magnitude of work involved.

within FUGs and FCAs, various FUGs embarked on developing their LDPs based on their identified economic interests with which they applied for the Fadama grant. These proposals were then submitted to the LFDO for evaluation and approval by the LFTC or LFDC within the LGAs. According to the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, RSFCO, these committees evaluated and approved the LDPs, and also made recommendations to RSFCO about proceeding with funds disbursement (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). It is also useful to note that these committees – in the participating LGAs – are constituted by members of various FCAs and headed by the Local Government Chairmen. This ensured that the LDPs' scrutiny and evaluation process in the state was a peer-review process (ostensibly devoid of external interference); inclusive and participatory.

A point to note from the overarching strategy, within which these components of implementing Fadama III in Rivers state were drawn, is that it reiterates the conscious effort undertaken by Nigeria's government, through its implementing agency – the NFCO – to adopt participatory methodologies for the entire project. This effort thus reinforces the point that this was a quest to demonstrate ownership of the initiative and to foster partnership with the local targets of Fadama III. This was also clear in the broad construction of the grassroots poor (beneficiaries) – drawing from the CDD rule book – as active participants. This was indeed a crucial part of an intentional implementation strategy designed to be aligned with popular methodologies of inclusive, yet growth focused, development planning. The next strategy adopted in this light is the funding strategy designed to entrench an idea of responsibility among different stakeholders.

Funding strategy: Counterpart, Beneficiary Contribution and Tranches

Fadama III's funding strategy emphasises two funding arrangements: A 'four-way' 'contribution arrangement' involving all 'partners' – the Bank, Federal, State and Local Governments, and beneficiary groups and communities; and a 'three-way' tranche disbursement process, for beneficiaries, which is preceded by the screening and approval, undertaken at the LFTC level, on the (sub) projects of FUGs and FCAs. The rationale for this predominantly tranche-based funding arrangement – as a crucial component of Fadama III's implementation strategy – is that the government, inspired by the Bank, used it to emphasise and 'promote' the idea of country and local ownership. The strategy aims to engender an

efficient national implementation process for the larger (national) project as well as communities' and groups' subprojects.

iv. Counterpart fees and Beneficiary Contributions

Regarding the four-way 'contribution arrangement', both Federal and State Governments had to pay counterpart fees in relation to the financial agreement and subsidiary credit agreement (respectively). Local government also had counterpart fees 'responsibilities' to ensure that Fadama III is implemented in specific LGAs – especially within the 20 LGA benchmark required by the Fadama III Project Implementation Manual. In Rivers state, the World Bank's IDA loan package earmarked to implement Fadama III was US$ 7.8 million dollars – about one billion, one hundred and seventy million naira (N1, 170, 000, 000). The disbursement target was two thousand (2000) cooperative groups or FUGs in two hundred (200) FCAs within twenty (20) LGAs. The state government on its part had the responsibility of paying a counterpart fee of fifty-six million naira (N56, 000, 000) per annum for the duration of the five (5) years to implement Fadama III. Participating LGAs were also obliged to pay two million naira (N2, 000, 000) per annum for the same (five-year) duration (2009-2013). Beneficiaries also had a role to play as they were required to pay their BCs (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

Within this arrangement, it is interesting to note that about 40 percent of the World Bank's IDA funds had already been disbursed and used to target about 610 FUGs (out of the targeted 2000) and 85 FCAs (out of the targeted 200) by the year 2013. But, the state government had only paid the counterpart fee for the year 2009 and was in arrears of 4 years (having defaulted in payment since 2010). In the same vein, some of the twenty (20) supposedly participating LGAs failed to pay their required counterpart fee. This meant that as of 2013, when Fadama III was initially billed to close, Rivers state was still lagging behind in many areas of the implementation. It had only registered about 40 percent disbursement rate for FUGs whereas the World Bank wanted this rate to be increased to 70 percent if the state was to be considered for additional financing – an extension to 2015 (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

Beside the counterpart fees of the other stakeholders in Fadama III, local beneficiaries had their own obligations such as: registering as EIGs or FUGs to form an FCA; developing LDPs for approval; and, most importantly, paying their *Beneficiary Contribution* (BC) which is a major yardstick for groups to receive the grants for their subprojects. This BC was described by the M&E Officer (RSFCO) as "a token percentage of the total amount [of money] that is being

disbursed to them" (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). It is a small percentage of the entire estimated cost of the subproject to be borne by beneficiaries and it is usually the smallest when compared to the contribution of the World Bank, the Federal Government, the State government and the Local government.[138] However, FUG members were obliged to contribute (in cash or kind) to fulfil the BC requirement. They also had to open a savings account and deposit the money because an important aspect of beneficiaries' screening process entailed presenting a proof of payment of the beneficiary contribution before subproject are approved for funds disbursement by the SFCO. Upon approval, the funds do not go to the FUGs directly as they are channelled through the FCA as the umbrella body; this structure, ensures the disbursement across the different FUGs in the community but not before fulfilling their BC obligations.

In this light then, FCAs in Rivers state had to pay 10 percent of the entire cost while the FUGs had to pay 30 percent of the cost of their individual subprojects (as they were valued by the RSFCO). This was because in terms of bearing the cost of the component called "asset acquisition", the World Bank's IDA (through the Fadama office) covers 70 percent of the cost while the remaining 30 percent had to be covered by the beneficiaries – hence the necessity of paying the BC. Suffice it to say, some groups, especially the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (such as widows, unemployed youths, the disabled and people living with HIV), BC was waived, and they only paid in kind by showing commitment through producing evidence of preparedness to be funded. This could be by showing the availability of land for farming or existing business infrastructure (CD-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013; RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

v. Tranche-based disbursement approach

The tranche-based disbursement system as adopted for Fadama III gets activated once all requirements above have been fulfilled – FUGs' subprojects approved and FCAs' LDPs too, but only after subprojects have been initiated already (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013). In this granting model, beneficiaries receive an initial – first – tranche to set up their subprojects. The second and third tranches are disbursed subsequently based on

[138] In some cases, some levels of beneficiaries – (unemployed) youths and the disadvantaged (and vulnerable groups) are exempt from paying BCs because of their status. For a group to be eligible (save in the case of community youths' sub-projects which does not necessarily require the beneficiary contribution), that FUG must have paid its *beneficiary contribution* into an approved Bank Account with which all their transactions will be processed.

progressive output as evaluated by the SFCOs. This emphasis on output draws from the idea of Fadama as a business where beneficiaries must be result-oriented. Thus, an official elaborates:

> [In] Fadama ... the money ... given to communities is ... released in tranches. So ... if you are preparing a plan for two million naira as a group ... [it] is not going to be released to you at once. Maybe, they first look at what you have, and there must be your own contribution [BC]. Let's say your own contribution is two hundred [thousand], they look at what you will do in the first phase of the project [and] probably it is four hundred [thousand]. So out of two million, they will release only two hundred [thousand] to join with your own two hundred [thousand] making it four hundred [thousand naira]. They see what you have done. When you have done something, and they see [it] on [the] ground, [then] they release another tranche for you. [That] tranche release of money is ... [for people] who are serious about business... (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).

The perspective above depicts the rigours associated with receiving the IDA Fadama grant for the rural poor: from registration, LDPs and subprojects' proposals review, down to BCs, bureaucratic hurdles and funding hassles. But, as with other locations, in Rivers state this disbursement of funds – in tranches – to the FCAs and FUGs signalled the practical commencement of Fadama III's implementation within its communities. The funds helped with establishing subprojects, infrastructural projects and procuring productive assets within communities. Each tranche of the Fadama III grant received was used to execute specific stages of (sub)projects' implementation such as land leasing, bush clearing, foundation laying, purchase of birds and other livestock, and the purchase of machinery until the final/third tranche was finally disbursed. It must be reiterated here that the use of the disbursed funds was strictly linked to the World Bank broadly identified areas of intervention – in collaboration with the Nigerian government. These were items on the 'positive list' of projects and subprojects such as crop production, livestock production, fisheries, agro-processing and agro-forestry in terms of value addition to Fadama III. This meant that there was a fairly 'limited opportunity' for beneficiaries to look beyond and be adventurous as they also had to abide by certain laid-out procurement standards – stipulated by or aligned to the Bank's prescriptions.[139]

Procurement is an important issue within the funding and disbursement arrangement due to the requirements laden on beneficiaries to undertake best practices provided within the Fadama implementation guidelines (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012). A central

[139] The World Bank TTL seemed to debunk this argument when he averred that beneficiaries could still do whatever they intend after receiving funds. But it begs the question of the established tranche-based disbursement system which monitors what beneficiaries undertake and may lead to funds withdrawn if they fall outside the prescribed scope.

aspect of this issue emanates in the hiring of service providers to procure necessary productive assets for FUGs (and FCAs as the case may be). FUGs, as a result, were mandated to hire service providers based on the World Bank bidding and procurement guidelines. One of the Fadama officers explained this:

> ... The World Bank has given us standard rules for community procurements. I can tell you, that why we have ... in any procurement matter in any community there should be invitation of bids; there should be bid opening; there would be selection from three service providers of [which] one that use one language – eh the procurement people will not have that language but you select the best whose cost is not necessarily high and who has the professional competence to implement, and in the selection of the service provide, it is not done by the office; it is done by the community themselves. They have the choice to select who would implement this project for them – you know! And then if they don't have, we have a pool from the office list of service providers that they can now select [from]. But the rule is that they are the people who would be selecting service providers by themselves (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

The introduction of service providers into the implementation process was broadly based on the idea of a broad value chain and a broad range of stakeholders participating in Fadama III.[140] The situation in Rivers state entailed on in which beneficiaries were also mandated to surrender cheques to these (hired) service providers to make procurements on their behalf. As a result, beneficiaries did not have direct access to the funds but could only sign cheques while service providers undertook the actual procurement. It must be said that this strategy of conditioning beneficiaries along specified and standardised procurement procedures, and to work with various service providers, served to bolster the value chain approach adopted for Fadama III. This is also based on the fact that the World Bank emphasised the adoption of the principles of transparency, good governance and accountability in development programmes, especially those that they funded.

This relatively predetermined scope for the use of Fadama III funds does not only points to a, stark but benign, determination of beneficiaries' choices. It also implies an important implementation strategy designed and consciously adopted to ensure that the 'standards and rules' of the World Bank were followed systematically since the grant required beneficiaries to undertake specific economic activities that have been appraised to have the capacity of

[140] So as stakeholders, service providers also had a major role to play not only in providing beneficiary groups and communities with productive assets but also providing the required professional technical know-how for ensuring the longevity of the procured assets and the sustainability of the subprojects. Some of the things procured by beneficiary groups and communities within the period (2009-2013) included livestock, agricultural inputs and improved seedling, cassava processing machines, fingerlings, poultry birds, advisory services, agricultural input support, leased lands, and farming tools amongst others.

increasing their income.[141] Apart from subprojects designed to empower the direct Fadama III farmers, other projects approved in this light included: 7km-10km roads, small culverts and bridges, boreholes and cold-rooms amongst others. These projects were funded to support groups and communities in different ways. The question of sustainability loomed wide and as such it was vital for the implementation strategy to include a monitoring and evaluation component to track progress at the different levels of implementation. This was indeed another important aspect of the implementation of Fadama III in Rivers state.

The foregoing suggests that this funding strategy, and its intricacies, was designed to filter beneficiaries in a lot of ways – including astute business skills. This view draws on the fact that the rigorous nature of the entire process and the requirements associated with the BC served as strong tools for the exclusion of many prospective beneficiaries some of whom lacked the financial and temperamental capacity to manage the intensity of the processes involved. This, however, begs the question whether the poor must really understand the 'rubrics' of business before they can be assisted. But this is a question for the future.

It is noteworthy that this funding strategy – built on 'counterpart funding and tranche disbursements' – for development initiatives has become somewhat 'commonplace' in contemporary development assistance parlance. The World Bank and many other donors are employing this approach more often, and it is used a great deal to emphasise 'partnership' and encourage adequate beneficiaries' participation. It is intrinsically linked to the concept of ownership. Country ownership here entails an institutional relationship between donors and states; and community or local ownership when community beneficiaries are within the framework of the partnership arrangement for such programmes. In essence, the BC which beneficiaries were made to pay in Fadama III served as a means to ensure that they were well invested in the project to ensure that it is adequately sustained, and not abandoned, soon after by the beneficiaries. It must be said that while this strategy had its flaws and shortcomings, it was a generally accepted official view that BC was vital to achieve Fadama III's sustainability and success. One way to track progress and ensure success was, therefore, a monitoring and evaluation strategy. This was also essential to Fadama III.

[141] An interview with a World Bank representative suggested that the issue of the nature of fundable project tended to depend on what eventually the beneficiaries wished to do with the grants which they have received. In this view the bank or the Fadama office cannot determine what the beneficiaries eventually decide to do with the money as far as their business interests are concerned. However, this position fails to factor in the fact that based on the tranche disbursement of grants; beneficiaries who do not continue with the approved subprojects may lose certain instalments of the grant money if they have deviated from the initial plan. This also brings in the question of power and decision-making processes within this project.

Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are an important strategy employed in project management to track progress. In Fadama III, it became another intrinsic aspect of the implementation strategy which Nigeria adopted, in line with the results-based focus of the CDF, to track results and ensure that its targets and goals were being met, and that the set-out procedures and implementation strategies were also working in accordance with the underlying philosophy of the project. On a national level, this strategy was incorporated within Fadama's institutional and administrative structures as established to coordinate the project. The M&E team within the NFCO led this process but the broader process of monitoring and tracking the project nationally entailed working with other actors such as the World Bank, civil society actors as well as independent institutions and local beneficiaries who are said to contribute through a process referred to as Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012; SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012). The latter entailed responses to a variety of surveys conducted within the implementation timeframe, and many of these surveys were analysed and synthesised into Fadama III completion report prepared by the World Bank (see The World Bank, 2016).

Explaining the embedded institutional processes of monitoring Fadama III, an official noted:

> We have zonal offices in each of the six geopolitical zones and the essence is to decentralise the monitoring and supervision of the project. So yearly we have two ... joint supervision mission[s] between the Federal Government and the World Bank every six months ... and it is usually elaborate in the sense that you have to bring in the nine ministries, people that are members of the SEGC [State Executive Governance Council], environment, land and FDA, fisheries, livestock and all that. Then other agencies that we collaborate with, you know, to undertake the supervision mission, and the essence of it is to appraise progress... and you may find out if there are implementation challenges, and of course to proffer solutions to them. So, we have had, as it were, six supervision missions, and don't forget we are in the fourth year and we have had a mid-term review of the project. So, in each state, we have an M&E set up, you know, [with] different templates for data collection both from the community... up the line, and eh with the groups we have what we call monitoring sub-committee. We [also] have procurement subcommittee; we have administrative... subcommittee. So, because it is a community demand-driven development [project] which has in it the feature of participation, so at that level all that they do is participatory – participatory community procurement, participatory M&E – where the people themselves comes up [sic] with the kind of indicators, you know, they will want to use to monitor ... the project apart from the conventional [techniques] which we oversee (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012).

This excerpt's detailed information reiterates the decentralised nature of the implementation process. It also helps to deepen a grasp of the processes undertaken in Rivers state as the monitoring process cuts through the State government level down to the Local governments, communities and groups levels of engagement in terms of averment that this 'inclusive' and/or decentralised M&E framework was to guarantee meaningful engagement by all stakeholders in tracking and ensuring effective and efficient functioning and productivity of FUGs', FCAs' projects and the broader Fadama III project in the communities, the state and the country.

From the state level, the RSFCO M&E team coordinated activities geared towards tracking daily events and developments within Fadama LGAs and communities. In line with the national strategy in which collated data had to be disaggregated based on gender, disbursements, productive assets acquisition, advisory services and input support and capacity building; supervisory missions to sites of implementation; and the establishment of reporting hotlines for rural beneficiaries to attempt to make direct complaints which would enable the national office to keep track of events happening in these locations and to respond accordingly. The RSFCO thus, collected implementation data and regularly analysed them to keep abreast with the performance of the state against the national baseline and targets. The availability and nature of implementation data depended immensely on communities' adherence to the reporting framework given to them by the RSFCO M&E team since this framework was meant to ensure uniformity in the reporting format for effective data capturing and analysis. The M&E officer elaborates:

> The monitoring method or procedure as to track down key performance indicators for the implementation of this project or to track down progress have been designed both from a national level and I can tell you that even at the group level they have their reporting format in a very simple form as to track down [their progress]. It is our reporting format that the group uses through the facilitators to make sure that these things are reported. Of course, besides the field monitoring that we do, there is also the issue of monthly reporting; there is also ... quarterly reporting. So, through all those instruments, we were able to track down [progress]. In fact basically, even before we go to the field, on a monthly basis – this is why I told you that data generation starts from the group level to the community level, from the community to the [LGA] council Fadama office, from the council Fadama office we are able to ask the desk officer to forward to us monthly reports of the performance of groups. So, this is how we operate, and our reports have been up to date (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

The in-depth perspective describes the extent to which M&E was integrated into the implementation of Fadama III in Rivers state to ensure adequate knowledge of the performance of the initiative within the participating LGAs, communities and groups. It paints a picture of

concerted efforts made within the RSFCO to effectively monitor and report on the entire implementation process. The data collection strategy, which ostensibly starts with FUGs and moves upwards to the M&E officer's office, points to a useful involvement of all Fadama stakeholders within the process. While groups and communities engaged internally in self-evaluative processes as well as their overall experience of the project – monthly or quarterly evaluations – the local Fadama desks, represented by the desk officers, had to conduct site visits monthly with the local Fadama technical committee which goes to these communities once every three months. Apart from the self-participatory monitoring – the participatory M&E – undertaken by beneficiaries' monitoring committees (and reported through the facilitators to the local Fadama desks), the local Fadama desks had to adequately follow up with the implementation process within the LGAs in order to feed the RSFCO with recent data and updates on happenings within the LGAs and their communities.[142]

The importance of the data generated from the community and LGA level for the overall project implementation process since they support record keeping, especially about the disbursement and usage of Fadama grants. The data also facilitated deeper understanding of the situation participating communities and groups grapple with such as (internal) crises and challenges. An official, in buttressing the vitality of this decentralised M&E and reporting framework, explained:

> ... you can see ... all these files; each FCA ... and ... group have a file. When you pick up that file, it has a detailed activities implemented [sic]. If I pick one file, it will give me all the information about that group, and how we are doing... So even before you go to the field, the file in your hand will tell you what they have said about the implementation status of the project ... and you now compare that with what you are seeing on the ground... and this method has been helping us track down projects. We are able to know, probably 6210 groups. If there is any problem anywhere we can easily know in this state (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

A crucial point emanating from the entire M&E strategy is that it deeply draws from mainstream process of tracking progress and results, thus ensuring that there is value for money spent on any project. This is an approach that is very popular with the World Bank especially in contemporary times (see The World Bank, 2016, p. 13).[143] The role of the RSFCO in keeping

[142] At the community level, the M&E process is conducted by beneficiaries. The FUGs provide representatives to the FCA, and these representatives constitute the FCA M&E committee. This committee is usually composed of 2-10 members and leads the self-participatory monitoring processes. Individual FUGs also have this monitoring committee to conduct their context specific M&E.

[143] In this report, the World Bank notes that Fadama III "had well-developed result-based Participatory Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (PME&L) system with a strong focus on project processes, results, impacts and outcomes in addition to input and output monitoring" (The World Bank, 2016). This is a classic result (or logic) framework for monitoring and evaluating projects within multilateral institutions undertaking various development plans.

track records of its implementation of Fadama III in Rivers state was vital to identify successes and gaps (to derive lessons) and also to 'fill in the tick-box' of carrying out project evaluation across the state.

The importance of this strategy for Fadama III implementation cannot be over-emphasised when considered against the backdrop of the its contribution to the improvement of local capacities as various stakeholders, especially communities and their facilitators, received training on the importance of keeping track of projects' implementation. As part of Fadama III's implementation processes, communities were capacitated through their facilitators, the ADP and hired consultants on a number of areas such as basic record keeping, developing LDPs and management and tracking project progress. The facilitators were vital to the process because they aided Fadama officials in collecting basic information from the beneficiaries – having taught them to keep routine records of their activities. This became resourceful to understand FUGs' and FCAs' strengths, weak-spots and progress areas; it also enabled the NFCO to keep a track record of implementation and, in some cases, to support struggling communities. The downside to this strategy was that many communities in need were not really supported in their crises; many of them were simply written off as outliers or 'a lazy bunch'.

At this point, it is useful to note that this particular strategy has been tried and tested as a contemporary development planning and project management modality – popular within the World Bank structures. Thus, adopting it became a matter of good judgement for Nigeria in its quest to adequately actualise the goals of growth through pursuing the food security and poverty reduction targets established within Fadama. However, the implementation and monitoring process is simply one aspect of actualising this goal, the other aspect entails ensuring its sustainability. This explains the establishment and adoption of an exit strategy for Fadama III since it only had a life-span of five (5) years (from 2009 to 2013).

Fadama III Exit strategy: FUEF and Fadama Federated

An important drive within Fadama III was to ensure the sustainability for projects and subprojects established through this initiative. One way to actualise sustainability was therefore to conceptualise an exit strategy which would ensure that beneficiaries sustained their

subprojects and productive assets for the continuous inflow of capital.[144] As already highlighted, projects are meant to be sustained mainly through the profits that emanate from each individual group's business venture or sub-project. The Fadama Users Equity Fund (FUEF) was established as an important exit strategy to enable FUGs to develop a means of sustaining their subprojects through savings. One of the outcome indicators for Fadama III was that ten (10) percent of the replacement value of all assets will be saved annually, and so to achieve these, groups had to make profits and save them in a savings account to assist them during crises and also to venture into new economic areas and increase their economic standings.

Besides the FUEF, in 2012 an idea was developed to widen the broad-based level of Fadama cooperatives in the country. This idea is known as the Fadama Federated where all FUGs and FCAs are 'federated' and linked with different other groups all around the country. The idea was to generate an overarching cooperative body under which all other groups can relate to and through which it becomes more and more possible to access credit/loan facilities at cheaper interest rates from different credit institutions and microfinance banks in the country. Through this means a buffer could be created to keep groups and sub-projects strong in the event that the Fadama initiative closes in line with its timeline as proposed in the credit agreement. An official thus elaborated:

> We have ... within the country ... varying degrees of comparative advantage of one commodity over ... the other. And so ... we now have to federate on commodity basis. So, you now have federated ... maize farmers FCA and all that. So, what this is going to do is to be able to, you know, pull resources of these groups together. Are you getting me now? And the purpose is to migrate them to become ... microfinance ... institutions. So now, some of these our federation have started this revolving loan scheme which they are doing, and you know [that] by the time they are able to begin to ... mobilise enough savings, you know, they can now come up. So that after the implementation phase of the project, this federation now, now serves as the one now overseeing and doing exactly what... the project [that is Fadama III] was doing before. So instead of now giving grants, these people now have access because we have built their capacities now in business planning and all that. They will now have access to all the funds which they can use for expansion and to diversify... (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012).

Although Fadama III has been extended to 2019 (from its previous culmination date of 31st December 2013, 2015 and 2017), the Fadama Federated is one important exit strategy which remains on the card to ensure longevity to the Fadama initiative and give sustainability to the

[144] It may be important to note that part of the indicators developed to track success in Fadama III was that at the end of the project FUGs' savings would have risen up to a certain amount (see Completion report for correct indicator)

different projects that have been (and are still being) undertaken in the country. This is to ensure that its achievements continue to be felt in the long term within the Nigerian socio-economic space. It can be argued that this is one important strategy adopted within Fadama III which not only secures the future for rural beneficiaries because of the large value chain it provides, it is also important for developing self-sustaining structures for local development. Very importantly, it displays the extent to which the government internalised the 'funding strategy' within the broader development approach encouraged by the World Bank for addressing poverty and food security permanently. One crucial way of aligning these, as chapter four showed was through the adoption of the value chain approach which was adopted for a variety of reasons: to enhance the reach of products; to involve a variety of additional actors in this quest to achieve the ultimate goals of a growth-led process of addressing poverty through Fadama; and indeed to entrench the construction of 'development problems and thus advance solutions or make prescriptions based on these constructed problems.

The Value Chain approach

Fadama III was projected to reach over 2 million indirect beneficiaries – people and communities who are either not registered or have no Fadama communities (The World Bank, 2016). While these groups of people or communities are not direct targets of Fadama III, its capacity to reach them and impact positively on them depends on the networks – chains of supply – that are established and fostered within the implementation process. This is one of the relevance of the value chain approach which the Nigerian government adopted to implement Fadama III.

A Fadama III official offers a lucid description of the value chain in his overview of the project:

> Let me quickly mention that the Fadama project is an agricultural diversification programme of the Federal Government; diversification in the sense that it encompasses all ... of agriculture from production to processing, marketing and even to the consumer level. So, it is a holistic arrangement, and anybody with this [value] chain, from production to consumption is accommodated in the Fadama arrangement. So, we have several stakeholders. The beneficiaries are stakeholders, the local government are stakeholders, the state government are stakeholders, the federal government and the World Bank, even the service providers are equally stakeholders because it is the service providers that deliver the services directly to the beneficiaries (SP-FAP, Interview, 25 January, 2013).

The emphasis here falls on the broadened nature of the project to attend to the specifics of the value chain approach which spans from the production of goods and services from the first producer to the final consumer through a long line of different interrelated stakeholders and activities. The participant refers to it as a "holistic arrangement" in which everyone involved in Fadama III becomes a stakeholder in the project – the immediate beneficiaries, the different levels of government, the World Bank, civil society, media, as well as service providers at different levels of the project. This broad array of stakeholders goes a long way to show a radical redefinition and rearrangement of the scope of Fadama, and entire attempt to actualise specific goals within and through Fadama.

This representation of the nature of the value chain in Fadama III is also shared by another official who highlighted the extent in which Fadama III brought together a broad range of beneficiaries and networks. They helped, this view implies, to actualise more deeply embedded successes of the business venture that would emerge through the foundations laid by the Fadama initiative through the federation of Fadama communities across various lines of production and economic interests.[145] This is based on the fact that Fadama III was also aligned to the Agricultural Transformation Agenda of President Goodluck Jonathan's administration (The World Bank, 2016).

This approach, as demonstrated in chapter four, entailed interactions between primary producers and local farmers with service providers, microfinance banks and middlemen in some cases. It also involves the consultants as service providers employed to train local beneficiaries, community facilitators supporting FUGs and FCAs, the SFCOs and other stakeholders like microfinance banks, and private companies who either deal on locally produced goods or those who market them and distribute to different locations. The same goes for consumers, in different locations, who are crucial to the value chain due to their contribution in the upward flow of capital to the primary producers.

It follows that in adopting this value chain approach, the government looked beyond the initial goals of production, building on the said achievements of Fadama II, to reach out to a broader range of direct and indirect stakeholders of Fadama III. This makes Fadama more beneficial even to the larger Nigerian economy as the production and transformation of primary goods to finished products becomes more efficient, profitable and encompassing through the various

[145] This is in terms of an exit strategy for Fadama III, and it is an important implementation strategy which will be discussed later on in the chapter

value chains incorporated into Fadama III. The essence of this strategy, I must add, lies in the entrenchment of market-led economic process within the rural economy. This is where the World Bank's role is clearly implicated within this 'partnership' because, like Ferguson (1990; 1994) contends in the case of Lesotho, poverty and underdevelopment had been constructed within Fadama to include the lack of access to markets for locally produced food resources (The World Bank, 2008). Partnership – within Fadama, and other development interventions mooted by the World Bank in Nigeria – enhanced the speed with which the Nigerian government understood, accepted and adopted this model as an important component of the growth-led poverty reduction process constitutive of the Bank's CDF.

As noted even within the broader Nigerian economic reform – specifically the Agricultural Transformation Agenda (2012-2015) when Fadama III was aligned to this agenda – the value chain approach can be seen as an important strategy also adopted by the government to fulfil its responsibilities in the 'partnership' with the World Bank. In mainstreaming the value chain approach, the government strategically aligned itself to a popular development planning strategy which donors like USAID, FAO, IFAD and the African Development Bank are keenly pursuing, even in Nigeria as part of a broader strategy of linking domestic and grassroots economy to the wider global economy.[146] Linked to Fadama, the value chain approach thus became an implementation strategy designed to create and entrench a market-based economic rationality within Nigeria's rural economy under the guise of increasing the incomes of (rural) farmers and households. Thus, facilitating this process, I argue, ensures that the government will be viewed by donors as a docile and trustworthy partner that can be relied on to drive 'development' and, is thus open to foreign investments and more partnerships. Indeed, this strategy is veritably in tune with the broader strategy of commercialising the focus of Fadama – the approach that focuses on the business (and economic accumulation) aspects of Fadama beyond the social capital and possible participatory gains of the project.

This section (above), through its description of the implementation strategy of Fadama III and its internalisation in Rivers state, has clearly situated the Nigerian state centrally within a drive to entrench systems of development practice that align with popular development planning techniques preferred by the World Bank. Each of the specific strategy explored proved useful in presenting the state as an active player and a rational partner in its interaction with the World

[146] There are a plethora of development programmes currently running in Nigeria which are funded by these institutions with specific focus on developing value chains in Nigeria. The mainstreaming of this approach across Nigeria by means of external donor funding to boost agriculture and growth in Nigeria, says a great deal about the intensity of this approach as part of the mainstream development ideology which Nigeria is made to adopt in her quest to advance its development plans.

Bank and its decisions to pursue the course of action which would serve the ultimate (self) interest of the state – the continued influx of development assistance. Essentially, with Fadama III's implementation under this framework of a 'governmentalized' state, this next section engages how the government has gone about interpreting and evaluating Fadama and how these perspectives have continued to shape the nature of this development initiative – in my view – as a mechanism to effectively entrench neoliberal economic principles within the national as well as the domestic – rural – economy where beneficiaries are located.

5.3. Perspectives on and Evaluation of Fadama III context: An official appraisal

Broadly speaking, Fadama III is regarded as a progressive development initiative geared towards improving the income of its rural beneficiaries by providing them with financial resources, capacity building and access to markets and networks (value chains) that add value to their primary agricultural produce (Official-I, Interview, 28 November, 2012).[147] Based on the ideologies underlying the transformation of this project and the goals of driving growth within national economies, it can be said that Fadama III is, in fact, a strategic development programme structured to engineer a new capitalist mindset among the mostly subsistent farmers and other players in the rural economy. This is to broaden the scope of their business acumen, actions and activities in order to drive profits for improved individual as well as household income and otherwise.

Against this background and based on the interview data from both national and state Fadama officials, three important viewpoints are flagged (here) for discussion. These include the perspectives of Fadama as: a highly participatory development project (based on its nature as a CDD project which also developed a uniquely Nigerian Local Development Plan approach); a predominantly commercially focused development initiative prioritising profit maximisation and a business work-ethic within the rural beneficiaries; and a reliable national success story of a result-based inclusive development programme.

[147] These points were taken as notes during this interview session in which the official chose not to be recorded.

Fadama III: A highly participatory and inclusive initiative of the Nigerian Government

In addressing some of the factors that affected the implementation and outcomes of Fadama III, the World Bank's interim completion report for Fadama III states:

> The project was prepared in a highly participatory manner. The government assembled a multi-sectoral team of stakeholders who played a critical role in the implementation of the project. The team ... included key staff of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), Federal Ministry of Environment, Federal Ministry of Information, The Agricultural Development Programmes (ADPs), State Ministries of Agriculture, National Fadama II Coordinating offices, Federal Ministry of Finance, and some notable NGOs (The World Bank, 2016, p. 9).

This excerpt tries to show the depth of efforts taken at the governmental level to ensure adequate participation of various stakeholders long before actual implementation commenced for Fadama III. In an interview with the World Bank Task Team Leader in 2012, he also reiterated the point that there was a concerted effort, both from the World Bank and government perspective, to ensure that Fadama's inclusive character was adequately internalised. This was both at government levels and among the vast majority of potential beneficiaries. As such, the consultations and workshops as well as capacity building sessions organised with government staff, potential facilitators or fieldworkers, civil society and NGOs as well as the potential beneficiary communities were meant to demonstrate strong emphasis on the paradigm shift in Fadama (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).

The findings so far in this chapter, demonstrate an eagerness from an institutional level (by government) to highlight the depth of inclusiveness within Fadama III's implementation processes across the country and specifically in Rivers state. The implementation strategy hinged on the CDD/LDP processes, the multi-stakeholder value chain system, as well as the funding, and monitoring and evaluation strategies, all point to a clear attempt to portray how effective the participatory goal of Fadama has been so far. This participatory 'victory' is even more elaborate within a perspective that boasts of 'handing over decision-making powers to the poor'. This involves the supposed freedom of beneficiaries to make various choices regarding the nature of their projects when it boils down to deciding what to do with grants directly transferred them, as FUGs or FCAs. These represent dynamic strides, within Fadama that ostensibly ensured that beneficiaries determined their needs and advanced strides towards addressing them in line with the principles of the CDD approach. It is in this light that the interviewed officials consciously tried to demonstrate the extent to which the project has been

very inclusive. For example, in Abuja, one Fadama III official stressed on the extent to which Fadama III was structured within the office to ensure that it incorporated the views and interests of the grassroots masses. In explaining the essence of the demand-driven approach adopted for Fadama III instead of the previously utilised supply-driven approach, this official noted:

> In Fadama we practice what we call demand-driven or what we call bottom-top approach and not supply-driven. When it is supply-driven you are not giving the people chance to choose what they want. They should choose; own their decision; choose who will work for them and choose what they want to do. By so doing, the ownership is increased (Official-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012).[148]

It must be restated that the CDD approach provided the basis for the participatory practices of Fadama III. In that light, various participatory techniques were adopted and ostensibly implemented; the LDP approach was consolidated in Fadama III after its emergence in 2004. In determining the depth of inclusiveness in Fadama III, the chosen indicator also included the number of LDPs produced by communities towards the establishment and implementation of community projects (The World Bank, 2010). It will be recalled that the development of the LDPs involved Community Needs Assessment or Participatory Needs Assessment. These were participatory techniques that beneficiaries were put through to enable them collaboratively identify areas of needs within the community and decide on areas of priority for intervention. It also required them to undertake the Participatory Rural Appraisal which entailed transect walks, community (resource) mapping and jointly identifying such needs. The ability of beneficiaries to imbibe these techniques and effectively utilise them in needs identification and subsequently arriving at a consensus, with the help of their facilitators, on specific FUG or FCA projects represents a major milestone and success in terms of inclusive decision making. This accounts for the premium also placed on the production of LDPs as an indicator for participation in Fadama III.

The discussion above shows how Fadama III is perceived to be highly participatory drawing on the supposed integration of beneficiaries in various aspects of the project. It is instructive, as chapter four alludes, that participation in Fadama III also entailed the registration of grantees or farmers as FUG or FCA members as recipients of the grant and implementing a subproject. It also connotes contributing in some form to FUG and FCA processes as well as paying the required beneficiary contribution (in cash or kind) as part of the participating process. These views of participation draw on the fact that official respondents in this study continuously

[148] This official requested to be anonymous.

referred to the grassroots beneficiaries in a language that portrays them as participants based on fitting into the above-mentioned categories. It can be argued that this inclusiveness was really meant to prioritize investments and elicit a profit-minded orientation among beneficiaries. This commercial focus or the drive to create a *'homo oeconomicus'* among rural farmers through this project is the focus of the next pervasive perspective of Fadama III.

Fadama: A profit-oriented and competition driven approach to growth

The interim completion report for Fadama III prepared by the World Bank states that:

> Promoting sustained economic growth, reducing poverty, inequality, and unemployment is at the core of [the] development challenge for Nigeria. [Thus] Improving income, especially of the rural population considering the high poverty rate in the rural areas, is fundamental for meeting the Government of Nigeria's development agenda and the World Bank's twin goals. The project [therefore] remains fully consistent with the objectives of the World Bank's CPS for FY 2014-2017 which focuses on promoting diversified growth and job creation by enhancing agricultural productivity as one of the strategic clusters (The World Bank, 2016, p. 18).

This view clearly demonstrates the rationale for establishing Fadama as one mechanism towards advancing strides to actualise economic growth in Nigeria through a focus on the rural population and agriculture. The initial aligning of Fadama III "with the World Bank Country Partnership Strategy 2005-2009 which supported the implementation of Nigeria's economic growth and poverty alleviation strategy as outlined in the ... NEEDS" was a strategic means towards this goal (The World Bank, 2016, p. 4). This report reiterates a major claim of this study that the Fadama III project was designed in such a manner that the poverty reduction tag ascribed to it provided the foundation upon which economic or commercial definition of food security could be applied and entrenched. This would create a conducive atmosphere for competition among grassroots farmers for profits. The focus of the project, while directed towards empowering rural farmers, was mainly driven towards advancing an economic rationality among them with the purpose of driving economic growth in the final analysis.

The intensity of this 'bottom-line inclination'[149] of Fadama III is exemplified in an overarching official perspective of Fadama as a business; it re-echoes the phrase: Food as a business (Schanbacher, 2010). Essentially, the provision of grants to the rural beneficiaries was simply

[149] This bottom-line inclination simply refers to a quest towards accumulation to drive more profits among beneficiaries.

meant to increase production, increase competition and drive profit to bring about improved individual and household income. As already noted in the previous chapter, this outlook on food security was centred on agricultural reforms and prioritised production, value-addition, marketing and distribution. According to Schanbacher (2010), the core focus of the World Bank in drives such as Fadama is driving "broad-based economic growth that centers on rural agriculture" (Schanbacher, 2010, p. 14). Based on this focus, economic accumulation – the commercialisation of the food security – was highly prioritised above all other outcomes for Fadama.

This is instructive in the Project Development Objectives (PDOs) which broadly focused on "increasing the incomes of users of rural land and water resources on a sustainable basis" (The World Bank, 2016, p. 18). More specifically, the indicators for Fadama III PDOs entailed: an increase in the average real income of 75 per cent of the beneficiaries "by at least 40 per cent" as well as the achievement of a "20 percent increase in yield of primary agricultural products (disaggregated by crops/agroforestry, livestock, and fisheries etc.) of participating households" (The World Bank, 2016, pp. 19–22). In addition, groups were required to have "a 10 percent replacement value of the common asset used for income generating activities of FUGs saved annually (with effect from year two)" (ibid).

What these set-goals and the indicators implied for Fadama's implementation was an intense and frenetic emphasis on the need for beneficiaries to be profit-oriented in their strides to implement their various subproject. This is because the success of the project in any given location (and the country at large) was premised on variables such as the number of recorded or registered beneficiaries, the amount of profit recorded and also saved in the FUEF account. This speaks especially to indicators 1 and 3 as was the focus on the continuous production, packaging, marketing, sales and distribution of the primary agricultural products of various groups. In this light, the Rivers state Fadama Coordinator, in 2013, assessed Fadama III in the state as such:

> ... from my own assessment ... they are doing well. We have recorded a savings from a group that sold this Christmas [period]. They paid it in and the facilitator came here with the [bank] statement to show that they have paid in about a million [naira], which means they are doing well (SP-FAP, Interview, 25 January, 2013).

This appraisal and emphasis on profits saturated the capacity building workshops as well as field visits organised for beneficiary communities in Rivers state. These workshops served as avenues to reiterate the need for FUGs to commit their funds to the project and even save

money within the cooperative to execute their subprojects.[150] Beneficiaries were "instructed ... to liaise with the Fadama office and service providers to market their goods for profit making. Essentially the mood around this project is one of generating [incremental and sustainable] economic gains" (Orievulu, 2014, p. 76). The language of these capacity building workshops was simply the language of growth – production, marketing, competition and profits. Beneficiaries had to 'learn' these to succeed.

The data from the interview conducted with officials – both at national and state levels – also demonstrated this high premium placed on economic accumulation and the commercialisations of food/agricultural produce. Although it is a CDD project premised on participation and inclusiveness, and inclined towards social empowerment, Fadama has been couched mainly as a commercial venture designed for entrepreneur-minded members of communities. This is a perspective that emerged in one of the interviews with the TTL of Fadama who argued that Fadama involves a lot of dedication and sacrifice in which the potential beneficiary must go through different hurdles prior to becoming eligible for the loan. In his view:

> ... it is clear ... [Fadama] is not a way of government sharing money in the community because ... it is not easy to access the money. ... [For] you to access Fadama money ... you must belong to a group. If you belong to a group ... [this] group ... must be ... functioning. You're having meetings regularly, and you are also keeping minutes of records and you are working together. Then after that, that group must also belong to an umbrella body that consists of about 10 or 15 other small small groups.[151] Ok, it is at that level that you now prepare ... the local development plan (LDP).... When you now prepare ... the Local Development Plan, with the facilitators assisting you, then you go to Local Government to submit that. There must be lots of capacity building, training ... [and] assessing. So, you can imagine the kinds of problems that people go through before they get Fadama money. ... [In] Fadama, even after you have done all that, the money that is going to be given to the communities is also released in tranches...[152] So ... that tranche release of money is not something that any individual want to [struggle with]. So, you discover that those who eventually stay with Fadama are really people who are serious about business (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).

From the foregoing, it can, therefore, be said that the rationale of this perspective is that the pursuit of improved individual and household income by means of Fadama III is a rather intensive and tedious process that requires a great deal of endurance, strategy and commitment to the rules of business. The excerpt's message transcends a mere representation of the stressful

[150] Field Note on June 25, 2013 at Yeghe community at the Capacity Building workshop organized by Rivers state Fadama office.
[151] "Small small" groups is a Nigerian way of referring to smaller groups (of people, things and so on).
[152] Tranche disbursement refers to a way of disbursing money to beneficiaries in instalments.

issues associated with groups' eventual qualification as beneficiaries but highlights the essentiality of deep perseverance in the face of the rigours of business for Fadama beneficiaries in pursuit of economic breakthrough for themselves and their families.

Going further, this perspective also reveals a misunderstanding among many inadequately informed potential beneficiaries at the onset of the project. Some potential beneficiaries had conceived the project to be a scheme for government redistribution. As the excerpt shows, the project was not designed as such. In fact, it was designed along the World Bank outlook on food security through agriculture. This is an outlook that presents agriculture and farming more from a business or commercial perspective rather than an ethical or cultural perspective. Its emphasis is less on food as a human right and a cultural and identity issue but more as a means to profits (Schanbacher, 2010). This situation is more vivid in the view of the Community Development officer at the Rivers state Fadama office wherein she waded into the issue of the attitude of people to Fadama III in Rivers state. She stated:

> ... Fadama is so real that if you teach the people what they ought to know, it is just a question of [either] you 'key-in' or you are out. You understand my point? When somebody tells you: this is what the project is all about, after all, said and done ... if you want to 'key-in' you will join. Most of them that backed out; the reason for their backing out as far as I am concerned and which we all know was that they thought that it is 'kill and divide' matter – 'bring the money let us share'. Fadama is not a money sharing eh venture. You understand? This is [about] sustainably increasing the income of the rural farmers. Sustainably increasing your income, that is helping you. The thing that the groups want to do, said that they want to do, Fadama will help you to build you to a level – making you to know, you know, get up from where you are. But most of them think that the money, they will just rush and come, thinking that when the money will come, we are giving them 'dash' [i.e. handouts] so that they will share it... Even when we go for ... verification ... some of them will say: 'ah, we are 25 in number oh. Now you are giving us one point something million divided by twenty-five'. They will calculate oh. The people will calculate and tell you how much it is; *whether nah 100, 100 thousand e go reach them or nah 20, 20 thousand e go reach them as members [speaking in pidgin-English]*. They will ask: 'what will this do for me'? What will this do for me? We told them it is not an individual matter; it is a collective effort. That was why they said, 'form yourselves into groups... If it is fish farming your group wants to do, they will build the fish pond for you ... [and] stock it. The Fadama money will be enough for you to feed till sales. When you now sell, you continue from there to re-stock and then, it is then becomes your money [sic]. The group now will be guided, they will put, keep their FUEF, make their saving, continue with the other one, you know, as a cooperative.... Those of them that decided to 'key-in', they have seen the benefit.... *We have told them that we are not, Fadama is not, a political eh [thing].... We are out for business because farming is a business which we always teach them. We make them know that farming is a business. Farming is not 'come*

> *and share money'. It is a real business; when you are serious over it, you will make it.* So, we have been preaching that... (CD-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

In this interview excerpt, the participant deeply uncovered the extent of the populations' initial misunderstanding of the Fadama project in Rivers state. This accounted for the lethargy noticed among the rural population in the state at the onset. There was a concerted effort by the state office to diffuse this misnomer and set the record straight that Fadama is more of a business venture hinged on the view that farming is a business. It also became important to school the rural beneficiaries on the importance of farming as a business, beyond subsistence, and as a way of life within a community. In this light the participant further noted:

> ... as an individual... like most of our farmers, it was observed that – we observed that – most of them don't know that farming is a business because they don't keep records. I am coming from that angle because this record keeping is very important even as an individual farmer. When you farm, like most of them when we go for this verification I will ask them 'how many of you can tell me how much you spent year before last in farming?' They will say they don't know.... Every year they put in money, they don't know whether they are benefitting or not; whether they are making profit or not – which they out to record when their farming begins, from clearing until harvesting, they ought to have records so that at the end of the day when they harvest and sell, they will know whether they made profit or not. The following year too you will know so that you can compare and know where your mistakes are. So that keeping of record and savings, they don't do because savings helps you plan.... That is why I keep telling them that 'if you fail to plan, you've planned to fail', and all these comes out from when you keep your records, you make your savings, it enables you [to plan] just as we preach to them on these FUEF savings for the replacement of assets.... FUEF is replacement of assets so that when ... things happen ... you just go there, take money buy those things and continue with your business, because it is a business. It is not just something you take for a child's play. That's why we always tell them, farming is a business ... (CD-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

Based on these, it becomes even clearer that the implementation of Fadama III provided a strong platform for the education of the rural farmers and local entrepreneurs of the economic importance of farming and the strategies for deriving profit from farming activities. The emphasis within this excerpt on record keeping and saving, especially among this mostly rural poor (and illiterate) farmers, also points to this drive to strategically structure rural agriculture in the semblance of viable businesses. In this way, it becomes even more possible to transform the ventures at this level to more economically driven modalities as opposed to the predominant subsistent (and cultural) modality of farming. This, thus, remains a strong point for the description of Fadama, in this dissertation, as a strategy designed to drive growth – although with a focus on the rural poor.

One thing that this approach resulted in was the emergence of local entrepreneurs within different locations. The emergence of these entrepreneurs also correlates with increased incomes as well as improved productivity within the agricultural sector. This became a major anchorage for another predominant perspective of Fadama III that is Fadama as a national success story in spite of some challenges therein.

Fadama: A National Success Story

The view of development interventions as successful is in most cases contested because the defining success is somewhat subjective depending on the evaluator and the yardsticks chosen to evaluate such programmes. Despite this fact, the Fadama project is largely perceived, and it has been highlighted, as a major success story in Nigeria based on some of its noted achievements – achievements evaluated in the light of the set-out objectives and indicators as well as its longevity in the country.[153]

This perspective draws on the fact that the programme is over two decades old – 23 years already since phase I (1993 – 1999), phase II (2004 – 2009), phase III (2009 – 2015), and the additional financing to 2019 – and it is still active in Nigeria. This is a huge success on its own as there has not been a single economic intervention or project in Nigeria – save the ADPs which is more a shadow now – that has survived this long and remained active and funded. Fadama is thus the classic case of *'the reward for money well spent is more money; the reward for foreign aid well spent is more foreign aid'*. This longevity and the perceived achievements have seen Fadama usurp the ADP as the largest agricultural development intervention in Nigeria (Nkonya et al, 2007). As such the ADP currently exists as an important state institution which provides support in the implementation of the Fadama project. Accordingly, the NFCO, in conformity with the World Bank, sees it as a project which has risen in rank among major development projects in the developing world because of its effectiveness over the years in the fight against poverty and hunger. In their view, it is one of the most successful in recent times.

This perception of success comes against the backdrop of the efforts and inputs, and the resultant output, which had been recorded since Fadama's emergence. Its transformation from a technocratic government-led initiative to an inclusive multi-stakeholder initiative (in its current outlook) has been perceived as a huge leap in development strategizing and an

[153] However, there are some unmet indicators as highlighted in the 2016 Interim completion report.

achievement of a great feat. In the same light, the number of people who have benefitted from the funds provided through Fadama since 1993 is another angle through which the success of this initiative has been seen. This is mainly because there has been an incremental rise in the number of beneficiaries to the project – from a few thousand farmers (in the mostly Northern part of the country and a few pilot states in the country) in Fadama I to hundreds of thousands. These entailed a broad and diverse range of beneficiaries – farmers, gatherers, hunters, pastoralists, horticulturists, business people amongst other economic interest groups – within the revamped phases of Fadama II and III. This is a very important aspect of the national success story – the vast range of people positively impacted on (directly or indirectly) by the initiative.

Fadama's 'success' has been linked to some factors. Initially, it took a period of four to six years to (re)strategize and get the framework right – from 1999 to 2005 when Fadama I ended and when Fadama II started. This time lag, as the World Bank noted, was used to re-negotiate the implementation strategy for the project – a 'new approach had to be introduced, and the project itself had to make more impact beyond its initial scope. Besides, as already highlighted earlier, this Fadama reconceptualization period coincided with the ideological restructuring within the World Bank under Wolfensohn, hence the imperative to reshape it along that 'changing' development thinking. In this light new approach which set the poor (and their voices) as a priority in development planning became the hallmark for implementing Fadama II and III – this was the emergence of the community-driven development (CDD) approach within the Fadama literature. This novelty led to the second important thing that happened to the Fadama project – multi-stakeholder participation and partnerships in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project. This inclusiveness which became characteristic of the initiative became the rallying ground for the entrenchment of the idea of ownership – country and local ownership – within the project.[154] It was within this context that the idea of Local Development Plan (LDP) became prominent as an intrinsic aspect of the Fadama initiative.[155] This 'new' idea was very useful in identifying problems (through the PNA and CNA approaches); targeting priority areas of economic importance and people in need to empower them; situating (sub)projects for general community needs; and discussing, analysing

[154] As already explained initially, country ownership deals with the imperative of the country to internalise the initiative and develop it according to the needs identified in the country (as well as its context) while local ownership is linked directly to the masses at the grassroots level who also have to make the initiative their own in the light of their diverse economic interests and needs in their communities and their immediate social contexts.

[155] Remember that the LDPs were like development proposals developed by the potential beneficiary communities (as FCAs) by means of a participatory process – which sometimes involves voting by members of the groups – through the help of their facilitators based on their identified needs within the approved development priority areas in their communities.

and possibly resolving (potential) conflict issues (when they arise). Thus, the more inclusive nature of Fadama since 2004 through the introduction of the CDD approach (and its local offshoot, the LDPs), in the national narrative, has accounted for the many beneficiaries linked to the project; the large amounts of development projects and subprojects embarked on and completed since 2004; the reduced record of conflicts among various users of the Fadama resources countrywide; and the very importantly, the improvement in household and individual incomes of direct beneficiaries and indirect beneficiaries of the project among other important success issues recorded.

The interim 2016 completion report projects over 2 million indirect beneficiaries and hundreds of thousands of direct beneficiaries; about "965, 157 households comprising of 383, 058 (40 percent) female and 582, 099 (60 percent) male, grouped into 64, 347 FUGs and 5, 407 FCAs" (The World Bank, 2016, p. 5). The report also highlights thousands of projects implemented across the country. It is linked to the said achievements of Fadama II that initially gave the impetus for the nationwide implementation of the third phase of Fadama built on Fadama II's objectives, targets as well as indicators.[156] A study undertaken on the impact of Fadama II on the socio-economic status of farmers in Kaduna state found that there were high levels of improvement in household income, crop yield and overall living condition among these beneficiaries (Kudi, et. al., 2008, pp. 11-12). This study also attempted to assess the extent to which participation in the project enhanced levels of production efficiency. Its findings seemed to validate the perceived achievements of Fadama as highlighted in World Bank (2010) report. According to the report, the set baseline based on the project objective or target was met (and even exceeded). This demonstrated, for the Bank, the level of success achieved as a result of applying the CDD approach to implement Fadama II. Thus, at "... the project completion, the real income of 50 percent of beneficiaries ... increased by 63 percent (The World Bank, 2010, p. 11).

This was a huge success story, especially when considered in relation to potential beneficiaries as well as the fear of actually identifying and positively impacting these groups. An increase as much as 63 percent for beneficiaries' real income in Fadama II was indeed unprecedented. In fact, an assessment carried out under the auspices of the International Food Policy Research Institute had argued that barely one year after the initial implementation of Fadama II,

[156] Different levels of income accrued to beneficiaries as a result of this Fadama initiative are largely highlighted in World Bank (2010) completion report as well as the AfDB (2003) appraisal report. These reports highlight increase in beneficiaries' income that far exceeded those of non-beneficiaries of the project.

> ... [Project] beneficiaries had acquired productive assets, such as agro-processing ad small-scale irrigation equipments, and had been able to reduce their travel time to the nearest town – factors that would likely continue to increase their incomes. The percentage increase in the value of productive assets was significantly higher for the poor people than for other groups, suggesting that the project successfully targeted poor and vulnerable people with its support for productive asset acquisition (Nkonya, 2007: no page number).

To add to these, the Interim Completion report for Fadama III shows nuanced levels of achievements as regards the targets set out for the third phase. The report highlights that the overall achievement of the five major indicators for Fadama III was substantial. This is based on the fact that in the average income of beneficiaries increased by 62 percent (that is N276, 294) above the national baseline of N170, 548 – this gain was however eroded by a massive inflation thus reducing the real increase to 20 percent. Despite this shortfall, the project more than achieved the 20 percent target of increase in "yield of primary agricultural products (disaggregated by crops/agroforestry, livestock, and fisheries etc.) of participating households" by recording 29.7 percent average yield increase (The World Bank, 2016, pp. 20–21). The bulk increase was recorded among crops such as maize, rice, sorghum, millet, groundnut, cowpea, soybean, yam and cassava while there was also high percentage acquisition of livestock assets (in seven of the thirty-six participating states) as well as increases in poultry and fisheries. Other important achievements also included the adoption of good agricultural practices within the Project Implementation Units (PIUs) since Fadama II and within Fadama III. The report therefore states:

> IFPRI end evaluation ... measured adoption of food agricultural practices. The evaluation demonstrates that Fadama II and III had positive impact on adoption of soil fertility management practices reported.... Impact of both FII &FIII on adoption of crop production technologies shows that both phases of Fadama projects increased adoption of improved varieties by at least 30 percent, and as high as 46 percent for FIII. FIII impact on adoption is significant and largest for improved seeds, inorganic fertilisers and irrigation .... Based on the available data, the project resulted in significant yield and achieved its targets ((The World Bank, 2016, p. 21).

In terms of sustainability, the project also substantially achieved its target in that the project was able to lead to the establishment of FUEFs for FUGs and FCAs to enable them to save 10 percent of the replacement value of their productive assets. The report notes that on a country level, over 21, 126 FUGs (53.2 percent) saved N842, 047, 315. 41 (that is: 7.32 percent of the replacement value of their productive assets). In the same light, 37 Fadama Federated Community Associations were established across the country with 15 functional and 7 of them in the process of becoming microfinance banks having generated enough capital and expertise.

The achievement of this milestone thus provides a veritable exit strategy for Fadama users in the country, especially within the states where these institutions are becoming strong.

Going further, the report also highlights 88.58 percent average beneficiaries' satisfaction rate in relation to the operation, maintenance and utilisation of assets as well as a record of over 125, 582 (84 percent) productive assets in good condition out of a total of 150, 187 assets procured. This was based on the analysis of various monitoring surveys conducted across the country in 2013.

In addition, Fadama III is also said to have been very successful in targeting women as part of the broader nature of the project. In fact, the percentage of women largely increased to over 45 percent across the board (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012). This accounts for the level of inclusiveness that the project has been able to attain since the incorporation of the CDD approach. This is a major achievement, and it couples with the number of vulnerable people who have been able to benefit from the initiative too as well as the incorporation of issues of gender, health and even rights. It can be said that the rising participation of women is a major high point for the Fadama project especially as it evolved down the years since its second phase down to Fadama III. It is in this light that the Interim completion report notes that Fadama III was more successful in targeting the poor and women than the middle class drawing on the fact that:

> The impact assessment [undertaken by the IFPRI in May 2016] indicate that average income increase of Fadama beneficiaries, in comparison to the control group, was 28.4 percent, however, the increase was much higher for female-headed households (31.3 percent) as compared to male households (27.8 percent)... [which] shows that the project had a significant impact among land poor beneficiaries and non-significant impact among beneficiaries with medium and high endowment. These results underscore Fadama success in targeting the poor and women (The World Bank, 2016, p. 19).

This high level of women beneficiaries in the project thus points to the depth of achievement of Fadama III across the country, especially in its current form.

It will be recalled that Fadama II had focused a great deal on reducing conflict between pastoralists and farmers (as users of land and water resources) in addition to improved productivity, access to markets and gender involvement.[157] This remains a major success area

[157] This was after the World Bank and the FGN had agreed that Fadama I was largely successful in relation to the major goal of improving all-year round productivity, thus engendering improved the availability of food produce as well as household income. It is instructive to highlight that Fadama III focused a great deal more on value-addition and introduced the value chain to help in adding value to primary produce.

for Fadama (on a broad level) drawing on the perspectives of officials and the Fadama II completion reports based on the marked decrease recorded – over 80 percent above the baseline of 75 percent reduction – in these conflicts based on clash over Fadama resources (AfDB, 2003; Nwachukwu, et al., 2008; World Bank, 2010b).[158] The report states:

> Fadama I did not address mechanisms for conflict resolution in the Fadama project areas. It failed to adequately consider the needs of other users of Fadama resources other than sedentary farmers. As a result, conflict sometimes broke out between them [farmers] and pastoralists who found their traditional routes to water and pasture blocked. These confrontations result in physical injury and destruction of properties (Nwachukwu et al., 2008, p. 9).

The achievement of these objectives within the implementation timeframe represented, for the implementers, a huge national success story for the project. This is in addition to other add-ons such as the provision of soft loans for different (thriving) groups; as well as enhanced social capital and community cohesion; the national implementation of Fadama III is in fact attributed to socio-political pressure exerted on the government by different (social) groups who demanded the project to be scaled up nationally (The World Bank, 2010b). All these represent some of the qualitative achievements of Fadama beyond the already noted quantitative achievements highlighted by the donor and country Fadama implementing institutions.

This perspective which portrays Fadama as a success story also incorporates achievements within Rivers state. It is interesting to note that Rivers state is said to be one of those states struggling with implementation challenges but are nonetheless included as part of the national success story. This is considering the fact that many of the beneficiaries of Fadama III also come from the state and projects and subprojects have been implemented based on the Fadama grants allocated to the state. The successful disbursement of funds in the state, as well as the establishment of various community infrastructural and groups' productive assets, were all indicators of success within this official narrative of success.

Within Rivers state, Fadama has been said to be successful in targeting local farmers and entrepreneurs as well as the vulnerable groups – inclusive of unemployed youths within the state. One of the mainly highlighted achievements within the state is the disbursement of capital to the local farmers to embark on their various subprojects. This is a success because the project was vital in positively impacting on the number of beneficiaries targeted in terms of improving

[158] Some of these issues included: neglect of storage and preservation issues that accompany improved productivity; non-involvement and empowerment of key stakeholders, including civil society in the design and implementation of projects – questions around ownership and sustainability; and a narrow focus on crop production to the detriment of other important issues within the value-chain such as processing, among others.

their income through the profits generated from their businesses as it pertains to their chosen economic interest areas. According to one of the Rivers state officials,

> Even though we had envisaged that by now we would have covered a thousand or more beneficiaries, but ... the 615 [direct beneficiaries] which we have, [the question is] how well are they doing? From my assessment, they are doing well because that is where I am going to be looking at... Just in the last Christmas period that we had a lot of festivities here and there, a lot of our poultry farmers sold so much to the extent that even as we are speaking here, we are still looking for markets for some of the poultry farms to buy off what they produced in the previous ... year. ... Here at Rumuodomanya Rukpokwu, we are trying to establish ... an automated poultry processing centre whereby if there is a lot of production like we have now, the poultry farmers will only take their birds down to the automated processing centre to be processed and packaged so that from there they can now look for markets here and there to be able to sell their birds.... So, from my own end, I see that our people are – the few, the 615 we have been able to impact on – are doing well. Look at it, at least 70 percent – am not saying that its 100 percent; there must be some that will be on the other side, but at least 70 percent of them – are doing well. We have; we recorded a savings from a group that just sold this Christmas [period]; they paid it in and the facilitator came here with the [bank] statement of account to show that they have paid in about a million [i.e. N100, 000 naira] into their account which means that they are doing well. If they didn't sell, there is no way that they would have paid in a million into their account and then a statement will be given to them. So, from my own end, I think that with what we have done so far, over 70 percent or more percent of them are on the right track (SP-FAP, Interview, 25 January, 2013).

This viewpoint presents quite a handful of issues within the implementation story of Fadama III in Rivers state. Although it culminates in an appraisal of the project as a success based on the impact achieved on a handful of rural farmers within different economic interest areas, especially those actively making profits from their businesses, it nonetheless points to a lot of other issues. One of such issues is the correlation between increased production and success and the other is the importance of a market for the marketing of the massive produce attained by farmers. Here, the Rivers state Fadama office had to work extremely hard to help identify markets and strategies to help the farmers to sell off their produce. This particular scenario falls in line with the position that in defining and conceptualising food security within the scope of the World Bank and its sister institutions (including the FAO and IFAD), success tends to be measured in massive production and the availability of markets to facilitate the selling of these agricultural products. This is with a long-term goal of generating profit hence improving rural household and individual income baselines (Schanbacher, 2010). This fixation on profit and the commercialisation of the food security discourse remains an integral aspect of the Fadama

III project and forms an important indicator for measuring its successes even within Rivers state.

It is important to highlight another important perspective regarding Fadama III as a success story, within the context of its implementation in Rivers state, involves the implementation or establishment or construction of community infrastructural projects aimed to assist communities broadly (such as road graded in Umuechem community) (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013). In addition to this, and in the same light of the broader impact of the project, the Fadama project has been viewed to enlighten and empower farmers through lessons from the bottom-up approach of Fadama to stand for their right and ensure that their voices are heard instead of being dwarfed by community elites. Fadama III has been vital in dislodging elite – reducing elite capture – within the context of development interventions aimed to assist farmers such as in the context of the distribution of fertilizers in a community in Etche Local Government in Rivers state. This view is elaborated by one participant as such:

> ... Actually, the Federal government actually gave fertilizers. They gave fertilizers to farmers.... They gave fertilizers to farmers, but they said: '... before you will get it, you have to fill a form; you have to register. The registration is not by paying money, but you will give us your data, so we would send [them] to the federal government. When we send your information to the federal government they keep them ... they keep the data. Then [when they] send any of the projects they want the farmers to benefit from, those names ... in their database [will be used]. So those our farmers who are in Fadama having known how they benefited [from Fadama III] ... were able to tell the community: 'look these things is actually made for us who are in farming.... Those of you who are in Port Harcourt that are enrolled in farming, you don't need it; it is for us. [So] they grouped themselves and said it's mainly for [rural] farmers and it was given to [the] farmers (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013).

This is a scenario of speaking for themselves as opposed to allowing elites to capture development interventions meant for the real farmers in need of fertilizers to improve their farming activities. This indeed is another scope of the perspective of Fadama as a success story in Rivers state which entailed giving a voice to the previously voiceless rural farmers or as it seemed.

It must be noted here that what pervades this said success story is the quantitative achievements attributed broadly to Fadama, largely in terms of quantifiable impact. While there are a few references to qualitative impacts such as reduction in gender gap and gender mainstreaming – more women in leadership positions and about 40 percent women participation – as well as local beneficiaries' active engagement with public officials and community elites in the sense

of advancing their interests and dislodging elite capture of the programme, most of the references to Fadama as a success within Nigeria owes a great deal to its impact on income, productivity and the marketization and commercialisation of the goods through the various value chains created in terms of Fadama.

Part Two

5.4. Locating power in Fadama's implementation Story: Partnership, Ownership and a 'Governmentalized' State?

So far, this chapter has deeply described and explored the gamut of Fadama III's implementation story, by implicating the Nigerian state as a crucial (role) player in the quest to ensure that Fadama 'succeeds'.[159] The discussions have been important towards understanding the entire implementation process – Fadama III implementation strategy and its practical – from the national to the state level with Rivers state representing an example for analysis. The findings reiterate this centrality of the state, either acting independently or through its implementing institution, the NFCO. They also reveal that the strategies adopted by the state for Fadama III, and the perspectives on and evaluation of the project itself, suggest the presence of a 'not-so-invisible hand' of the World Bank which, as this study contends, represents the hegemonic neo-liberal development paradigm.[160] Factually also, is the Bank's position as the major financier of Fadama III which adamantly argues that it did not force the implementation strategy for Fadama on Nigeria but that the Nigerian government saw the need to accept the conditions attached to the project because it is the right way to go (see TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012).[161]

The data from the interviews conducted with the officials linked to the Fadama III project – from the World Bank down to the national and state levels – suggest that the World Bank plays an important role in driving the implementation of Fadama III. This ranges from the initial conditionality of the credit, through the various implementation guidelines that are drawn from

[159] This statement is neither a confirmation nor denial of Fadama as a success or failure. It is simply to show how it may be perceived by those implementing the project.
[160] This involves the Bank's role in Nigeria's adoption and implementation of Fadama III's ('revised') implementation strategy while also keeping in mind that the AfDB contributed to Fadama II and supported the same revised implementation ideology which is symptomatic of an overarching inclination towards a system of doing development in the 21st century.
[161] Cornwall and Brock (2005) contends that such statements are used by the Bank to legitimise some of its practices in developing countries ostensibly aimed at driving growth by means of the mainstream development model which the Bank represents.

the World Bank's 'rulebook' – including issues of procurement etc. – and down to the monitoring and evaluation missions undertaken by the Bank to ensure that the project was and is still being adequately implemented and adequately targeting to rural poor. There is a great deal of interaction between the government – also represented by the NFCO and the SFCOs – and the Bank, and very importantly, the Bank refers to Nigeria as a committed partner in Fadama's implementation due to successive governments' demonstrable commitment through policy strides to continuously integrate Fadama firmly within the country's broader agricultural reform processes such as the NEEDS, 7-point Agenda and the ATA (The World Bank, 2016). The question that follows borders on whether this 'not-so-invisible hand' coerced the state – robbing it of some of its sovereignty and agency to choose its own path in approaching the Fadama III initiative – or whether there is another form of power implicated here.

To effectively address this issue, a theoretical inquiry into how partnership as a concept implicated in Fadama III serves as an important conduit for the conveyance of power in the interaction between the Nigerian state – including as it is represented by government and Fadama officials – and the World Bank is crucial to this chapter's mandate. From the findings, the government's strides and its perception and evaluation of Fadama III may be more effectively understood from how the state's understanding and acceptance of its role within the partnership shapes its choices, actions and perspectives around Fadama III. Intrinsic to all of this is its agency especially in its attempt(s) to demonstrate ownership.

Partnership: the making and shaping of a disciplined government

Africa's experience with the SAPs, and even Post-Washington Consensus-era development interventions couched as partnerships, lies at the heart of scholarly critiques of this concept due to the kind of power dynamics that it represents. For instance, Crawford's (2003) insistence that partnership is a façade which conceals stark power relations between donors and aid recipients – revealed in the case of the *Governance Reform Programme (GRP)* in Indonesia – expands this scepticism against partnership.[162] Despite the claim of a partnership between various multilateral donors and the Indonesian government, Crawford (2003) argues, the programme failed to reflect the real interests of citizens and pertinent needs within the country.

[162] Critics like Abugre (1999), Fowler (2000a), Lister (2000) had also evoked these sceptical sentiments.

Instead, echoing a conflict of interest-ridden power dynamics between a dominant actor and subordinates, Crawford argues that the programme simply reflected donor and elite interests.

Applied in this light to Fadama, this would imply that partnership helps to detract from, or conceal, the fact that the Nigerian government was 'forced', against its will, to adopt programmes and implementation strategies that would neither benefit it as a (collective) subject nor its citizens who need and deserve a better life. This can be linked to how several aspects of the implementation process (pertaining to reporting and procurement standards as well as decisions regarding possible continuation and/or scaling up of the project within certain Project Implementation Units (PIUs) or states) were heavily influenced by the Bank. For example, the standards for procurement were set out using the World Bank's (proposed) framework, and until about the year 2012, every transaction undertaken within the context of Fadama III had to go to the World Bank for clearance (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012). This may represent a high level of influence to ensure accountability, but begs the question of, it is argued by an official, whether the Bank asserts undue influence on Nigeria in Fadama:

> I wouldn't say the Bank has [undue] influence ... [over] what the project does. But to some extent, they have to agree... But it is the borrower who has the absolute authority ... based on the project document... So, we prepare ... the work plan and budget for the 12-month period and ... the Bank will review and express their no objection. By implication, they have to concur to what we intend to do within the particular year [before we can undertake same] (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012).

This viewpoint addresses issues pertaining to the extent to which the Bank influences the daily running of Fadama III but in a less invasive but normal manner of ensuring that the credit given to the state is effectively managed. An interesting aspect of this influence involves the establishment of a list of products or brands that can be procured with Fadama III – products of World Bank member countries. This means that "some products ... [were] not eligible if they come from countries not allowed to be part of World Bank contract" (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012). Clearly speaking, these are possibly countries facing sanctions – maybe from the United States of America or the United Nations – and so it does not matter if Nigeria has any form of bilateral relations with such countries. This situation is interestingly linked to the view of the World Bank official on the nature of the relationship of the World Bank and Nigeria in the context of Fadama III where he insisted that it does not push "things at the throat of a country" but "ensure that the nation ... is at the driver's seat", allowing them "to push their own agenda" (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012). However, a critical

engagement with this finding – the procedural issues around procurements, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, and indeed the entire implementation strategy built around the World Bank principles – seems to suggest an intense difficulty to justify the claims made of country ownership in Fadama III. It seems to reinforce the idea of the imposition of donor interest – a perspective that coheres with Abugre (1999), Fowler (2000), and Lister (2000) whose critique of North-South relations, even within an NGO context, emphasised the intrusive and unproductive implications of partnerships on recipients of development assistance; hence Fowler's (2000) insistence on partnership as a 'Trojan horse'.

Based on the foregoing, and the fact that the Bank's evaluation and sites verification missions are important means by which the Bank's influence is felt in Fadama (such as the decision on states to be funded in the additional financing to build on the value chains like cassava, sorghum, yam, etc.), the obviousness of the Bank's influence is unquestioned. This apparent unequal power dynamics linked to partnership notwithstanding – Fadama III more than confirms this 'reality' – these scholars' view is still limited. Their dogged thesis of pervasive conflict of interest and coercive domination, within several contexts and between different actors, seems to remove all (or any) forms of agency from state actors since donors are perceived to ostensibly control everything in such powerful terms. The findings from this chapter however suggest otherwise as it puts the Nigerian state centrally in the design, strategizing and implementation of Fadama III. The Fadama project also shows the agency of other actors too: the government, Fadama officials and, more importantly, beneficiaries. The actions of many of these agents – the next section and bits of chapter six clarify – demonstrate that in spite of the Bank's macro-level influence (regarding rules and guiding principles to shape Fadama III along its trusted models), it tends to struggle with actions of some of the stakeholders. This is why issues such as beneficiary collusion and states' default in counterpart funds payment remain elusive within attempts to explain project ineffectiveness. These are some aspects of Fadama that the World Bank has not managed to adequately grapple with as it strides to imprint its broader developmental goals unto the Nigerian economy by means of this project; a way in which the Bank has tried to curb this entails a total withdrawal of funding assistance to such states or local governments as seen in the local governments not experiencing the project, but this itself leads to the exclusion of many of the poor people that the project targets and aims to empower.

Drawing on the theoretical contribution of the governmentality approach to the role of partnerships in development intervention, the findings suggest that the Nigerian state appears

more as a rational actor whose adoption of various models of development planning – strategies for Fadama III - was borne from a calculated cost-benefit analysis of choosing to act in a certain way or not (and understanding the political-economic ramifications of such a choice). This does not absorb the state from the influence of power – chapter four demonstrates this unequivocally – but it means that such power is "productive." It transformed the state into a 'disciplined' subject which rationalises its choices and actions through its own internal (self) governance mechanisms. This is what governmentality scholars have referred to as governance through freedom (Abrahamsen, 2004b). Essentially, partnership serves a productive purpose – power – 'creating' a disciplined state capable (and willing) to undertake reforms and establish strategies that would guarantee the ultimate goal underlying development interventions.

This chapter shows that the government's reconceptualization of Fadama along the World Bank's 'reformed' focus on development was 'conscious', rational and 'somewhat calculated'. Its choice action within its renegotiated partnership arrangement with the Bank was, to design an implementation strategy, for Fadama III, which would (attempt to) internalise and entrench the constituent components of the CDF. This implementation strategy, as I have shown earlier on, therefore entailed practices aligned to mainstream (post-Washington Consensus) development approaches such as inclusive and decentralised planning (processes), locally developed and owned methodologies for planning, designing, implementing and monitoring the national project as well as the local (sub) projects. Thus, developing and adapting the LDP to the CDD approach and implementing methodologies like the CNA, PNA and PM&E, was not only aimed to ensure an effective inclusion of local beneficiaries in project planning but more importantly to shape Fadama III as an important project among the army of World Bank-assisted CDD projects across the world. This local LDP innovation and the government's introduction of the value chain approach – linked to the ATA and adapted for Fadama III – were also strategic for Nigeria to align Fadama to the Bank's new development agenda.

Nigeria's alignment of Fadama III's implementation strategy to mainstream development principles cannot simply be explained by insisting that the World Bank imposed these ideas and processes through conditionalities. Although 'soft' conditionalities do exist within Fadama, a deeper grasp of the manifestations of power in this macro-level partnership is enhanced through an outlook on governmentality which Michel Foucault describes as the 'conduct of conducts' (Abrahamsen, 2004b). As Jonathan Xavier Inda notes, governmentality scholars:

> ... have been most concerned with exploring those practices that take as their target the wealth, health, security, and happiness of populations. More specifically, they have been occupied with studying those assemblages of authorities, knowledges, and techniques that endeavor to shape the conduct of individuals and populations in order to effect individual and collective welfare. They have thus drawn attention to the intrinsic links between strategies for knowing and directing large-scale entities and schemes for managing the actions of particular human beings – to how the conduct and circumstances of individuals are connected to the security and wellbeing of the population as a whole (Inda, 2005, p. 7).

This excerpt makes an important point about the importance, in governmentality analysis, of identifying the place and role of (powerful) institutions – the state or supranational institutions – as well as knowledge structures, including constructed norms, value systems and principles, and "techniques" that are mobilised intentionally to govern (or order the actions of) populations towards a preferred 'goal'.[163] Beyond the original state-centric use of the governmentality approach to explain techniques of controlling rational and autonomous populations, development partnership provides another context at a supranational level of inter-state relations as well as states and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. This refers to the place, position and role of the World Bank as an institution of global governance, empowered to create (development) knowledge and, at the same time, to support, direct and (sometimes) initiate development ideals – through development assistance – in many developing countries. This position also endows on the Bank the capacity to construct what development entails; what practices are required to achieve it; who needs 'development'; who should implement it; and how it should be implemented. When analysed in terms of the partnership arrangement for Fadama, as with broader development planning contexts, it becomes even more obvious the depth of the interactions and associated power dynamics between Nigerian and the World Bank. It would seem obvious that the place of the Bank gives it the leverage to determine the course of Fadama III, but a governmentality approach also helps to locate the agency of the state though governmentalized through the institution – the Bank – and its knowledge structures and techniques of governance.

The discussion of governmentality in chapter two clearly demonstrated this by exposing different mechanisms, strategies and techniques of domination and/or control designed and exercised over of rational subjects to make them "governable". This, according to Cornwall is achieved by "defining the very boundaries of action" rather than simply acting directly on these

[163] In Discipline and Punish, Foucault uses the analogy of the surveillance of prisoners and the role of prisons in creating or constituting subjects that have been 'disciplined' – not necessarily reformed for better in society but – to serve and advance the interest of the state which utilises this technique of government or governance over them.

subjects (Cornwall, 2004, p. 80). Very importantly, this type of governance is exerted on 'rational', 'autonomous' and 'free' subjects capable of recognising that they are being 'watched' and thus able to understand the need to order their actions according to the norms and values that shape the context in which they find themselves. This is why Larner (2000) linked governmentality to the "post-structuralist theorization of neoliberalism" because within neoliberalism lies a process of predisposing people and states (as subjects) to the principles of extended market relations through the instrumentality of the liberal principles of (individual) freedom, autonomy, and indeed 'sovereignty'.

Looking at this chapter's findings, these views help to clearly understand the position of the Nigerian state as a *'governmentalized'* subject within its partnership with the World Bank to drive various development initiatives, especially Fadama III. In this partnership, the government, as a collective individual subject is a rational actor, and within the context of liberal global ordering of power and the post-Washington consensus era of development planning it had to be dealt with as a sovereign state which can drive its own development. To achieve the deeper aim of entrenching the hegemonic neoliberal economic agenda through Fadama III, as one avenue, the Bank's approach towards the Nigeria relied less on strict conditionality. Instead it drew on an approach characterised by "an increasing reliance on pastoral care and techniques of normalisation and consensus" working through the very "exercise of freedom and through systems of knowledge and discursive practices to provide meanings, norms, values and identities..." (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1456). In simple terms, the World Bank utilised its position as the advocate of the neoliberal development ideology and practice (as the 'veritable approach' to development), to ensure that the Nigerian state understands that it is 'being watched' and that it also serves its best interest to adopt the practices aligned to the CDF as an important way to address its development challenges.[164] The government, in this partnership, thus understood its position, its development challenges, its interests and, as a result, embarked on a series of economic reforms (such as the NEEDS, the 7-Points Agenda and the Transformation Agenda). Within them Fadama III was a crucial strategy in the country's non-oil sector growth drive; it was (re)structured to embody features

[164] Inda (2005, p. 8) notes thus: an "important concern of governmentality scholars is with the problem-oriented nature of political reasons (Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1999). They note that government is inherently a problematizing sphere of activity – one in which the responsibilities of administrative authorities tend to be framed in terms of problems that need to be addressed. These problems are generally formulated in relation to particular events – such as epidemics, urban unrest, and economic downturns – or around specific realms of experience: urbanism, poverty, crime, teenage pregnancy, and so on. The goal of governmental practice is to articulate the nature of these problems and propose solutions to them. Guided with this perspective on government, the governmentality literature tends to explore how certain events, processes, or phenomena become formulated as problems."

of market-led economic principles as part of the economic diversification process in which agriculture was identified as a vital sector to drive growth. Indeed, within the processes of economic revitalisation and consolidation initiated under each of the three reforms, the government gave Fadama a place as a vital initiative to support and boost agricultural production and households' income. Tracking back to the governmentality approach, it can be argued that 'alerting' Nigeria about its country's 'development needs' constituted an important aspect of the governmental strategies utilised by Bank, and Nigeria responded rationally by accepting and adopting these economic reforms along the mainstream principles that the Bank represents.

One important component of the governmentality literature is the role of discourse (such as partnerships) in constructing subjects and knowledge or 'regimes of truth.' Discourse is also crucial in propagating and normalising the ensuing norms, values and principles within structures of governance, such as the World Bank, and thus shaping the identity of subjects in their reception of and engagements at the international sphere. In the context of the government's strategy for Fadama III, the mainstream construction of the neoliberal market-led paradigm as the preferable route to development, was more effectively normalised through the construction of Nigeria as a development partner laden with the responsibility to develop strategies to achieve the development goals of Fadama III. In establishing Fadama, the Nigerian government ensured that it was shaped by the four pillars of the CDF as well as the structural and institutional, social (human, gender and labour), infrastructural (rural, urban and the environment), and macroeconomic aspects of the new development framework (see Wolfensohn, 1999; Blake, 2000). This is in addition to the emphasis on a result-based process of implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes in the CDF.

Incorporating Fadama within this framework thus suggests intensive processes of planning as well as training on the CDF and how to adapt and internalise it within the ambit of Fadama III and the broader economic planning for Nigeria. This is especially reflected in Fadama's new tag as a CDD project which transformed it into an inclusive development strategy built on beneficiary participation and integration. However, the role of the World Bank in all of these processes remained obvious here as Nigeria had to depend on technocratic expertise and technical assistance from the World Bank and its fellow multilateral institutions as it actively pursued its implementation of Fadama III's strategies. Apart from the emphasis on beneficiary engagement, the project was structured to drive a commercial – profit-driven – discourse around food security and poverty reduction, and as such the entire implementation strategy was

made to reflect these mainstream positions about development planning for poverty reduction and food security – a discourse centred on a trickle-down effect from economic growth. Fadama's inclusive nature, as well as its grassroots' empowerment and social capital enhancement targets, were intrinsically linked to economic accumulation which is reflective of the commercial perspective which pervades Fadama's food security discourse. This meant that Fadama III became more than a pro-poor initiative but also an avenue to actualise both micro and macroeconomic development prospects in Nigeria. All these happened under the banner of partnerships which served to encourage the government to reconfigure Fadama along the growth-led approach to development and poverty reduction.

Looking back at the findings, it becomes instructive as Abrahamsen (2004b) notes that through the concept of partnership, Nigeria – like other aid recipients in the poverty reduction era – was constructed as an active agent and partner in development planning in Nigeria's post-1999 development era. In doing this, as the governmentality literature contends, Nigeria became not only the object of intervention but also a subject imbued with the capacity and responsibility to ensure that the goal of this intervention is achieved. This is where the technologies of governance and agency converge eliciting systems of self-discipline and responsibility within the subject (see Abrahamsen, 2004b). Essentially Nigeria was 'conditioned' through this liberal governance mechanism to embrace its responsibilities as an active partner to establish systems within its own structures to ensure the achievement of Fadama III's goals. Abrahamsen referred to this as the 'technologies of agency and responsibilisation':

> Modern liberal rule ... governs through the management of freedom, and the retreat from state interventionism is simultaneously a positive technology of government through various strategies of 'responsibilisation' and empowerment. In the case of development partnerships, technologies of agency and responsibilisation are clearly evident. The discourse of partnerships places developing countries 'in the driver's seat', assigning them prime responsibility for their own development strategies. This reconfiguration of the subject of government confers obligations and duties, at the same time as it opens up new possibilities for decision and action (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1460)

Abrahamsen's introduction of these concepts of agency and responsibilisation point to another related dimension in this chapter's findings: the exercise of ownership in Fadama. This is crucial in terms of the broader concept of 'country ownership' which is intrinsic to the CDF which the idea and discourse of partnership helps to elucidate, especially when analysing power dynamics in development cooperation.

Country Ownership: partnership begetting 'governmentalized' state agency

Country ownership of development strategies has, already in this study, been shown to be an intrinsic component of the CDF – chapter 4 more specifically demonstrates how, in Fadama, this idea Fadama was constructed by the World Bank. It connotes an obligation on the government and its institutions – like, but not limited to, the Ministry of Agriculture, Finance and Economic Planning, including the NFCO – to conceptualise, design and drive the course of Fadama III according to the credit agreement and in alignment with the principles of an inclusive, but, growth-led process of poverty reduction. It also connotes active agency and ingenuity on the part of the state to undertake its perceived best possible line of action to advance its best (development) interest.

The findings in this chapter show how the Nigerian government endeavoured to demonstrate its ownership of Fadama III through the various strategies and actions undertaken to make sure that the project works. As Abrahamsen (2004b) demonstrates, the tag of partner – which Nigeria is constructed as – is imbricated with inherent responsibilities; it pushes the state to use its agency to conceptualise and implement Fadama along principles and norms that fit into donors' preferences. This implies that the government understands that 'taking ownership' – country ownership of development planning within its locale – resonates with development thinking among major donors. This is clear from the OECD-DAC (1996) report's emphasis on "... the commitment from developing country partners, through their own locally owned strategies ... in a true spirit of partnership" as a precondition towards ensuring effective and sustainable development assistance (Development Assistance Committee, 1996, p. 8; see chapter 3). As a report which served as the basis of the CDF and the MDGs, this helps to grasp how Nigeria saw that it was in its best interest, as a rational actor, to demonstrate ownership in Fadama's implementation through a conscious inclusion of different stakeholders – local partners – and modalities to achieve the project's targets.

To demonstrate ownership within the context of its partnership arrangement with the World Bank, Nigeria's action tends to fulfil Abrahamsen's view that partnership has be understood in a deeper way as "a form of advanced liberal rule that increasingly governs through explicit commitment to the self-government and agency of recipient states" (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1453). As she argues, this is crucial to understanding the actions and choices of Nigeria in establishing three levels of Fadama III's governance structure – national, zonal and state; adopting World Bank-approved standards of procurement and results-based monitoring and

evaluation; and incorporating consultative and participatory processes of planning, needs identification, and project implementation within its locally adapted variant of the CDD approach – the LDP approach.

In demonstrating ownership through the processes mentioned above, the Nigerian government also tapped into another important component of partnership: benefitting from capacity improvement. This is what Mercer and Harrison in Abrahamsen (2004b, p. 1462) respectively refer to as "the performance of partnership" and "pantomime of ownership". This implies a process of in which rational actors within a partnership, like Nigeria in its relations with the World Bank for Fadama and other initiatives, can 'turn the table around' and utilise their own strategies to achieve their own internal goals irrespective of how asymmetric the power dynamic is in that partnership.

Linking Fadama to the new development agenda in which several partners – conceived by the OECD-DAC (1996) Report to be crucial for effectiveness – such as private sector actors (businesses and microfinance banks), CSOs, CBOs, NGOs, and bilateral partners like Japan were key to Fadama's broadened value chain, the country amassed a great deal of benefits not only in terms of financial and infrastructural support but also skill and capacity development for staff and beneficiaries in the project. This ensured that Fadama became more than a largely irrigation-based project targeted at crop production in the largely northern parts of the country but a very broad and robust business enterprise that cuts across different sectors of the Nigerian economy. While demonstrating ownership and upholding its partner-connotation in this rapport with the World Bank, the Nigerian government's actions also represent an intention that transcended the obvious scope of Fadama. By simply adhering to all the principles that aligns the project to the mainstream development ideology and practice, the government hoped to remain a donor and investment friendly actor. Thus, Abrahamsen notes:

> The emphasis on self-discipline aside, the donor community recognises that many poor countries lack the necessary bureaucratic and technological resources to prepare their own poverty reduction and development plans, and partnerships are generally combined with various programmes for capacity and institution building. Countries that are willing to enter into partnerships, but do not have the capacity to formulate their own strategies are offered various forms of assistance and training. The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), for example, runs a Poverty Reduction Strategies Learning Group and there are numerous other training opportunities... While capacity building initiatives are presented by donors as technical transfers of knowledge and procedures, and as such a crucial part of development, it is important to recognise that they are also political interventions designed to produce particular modern subjects. Through such initiatives

> governments have the opportunity to learn to practice their freedom responsibly and in this way capacity building is simultaneously empowering and disciplinary, in that it both constitutes and regulates the identities, behaviour, and choices of their target countries (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p. 1462).

What the foregoing demonstrates is thus the productive power of partnerships and how as a rational actor, the Nigerian state was able to discipline itself – acting in freedom and responsibly – to achieve the benefits associated with mainstream development through its demonstration of effective ownership of Fadama III. The important point remains – from the state's perspective – that (re)structuring Fadama according to the precepts of (or the changing trends in) global development discourse considering the role and position of the World Bank in this arena is crucial to understanding the kind of power relations revealed in this partnership and how the state navigates them.

It is in this light that the argument that this chapter makes lies more with the view centred on the rational and strategic agency of the Nigerian state in taking calculated steps aimed to engender its perceived best possible action – a continued flow of foreign investment and aid. Each action taken was part of a building block towards the ultimate goal of remaining donor-friendly and an investor heaven. Power relations become much more complex than Dahl (1957) will portray it as a simple conflict of interest where dominant actors impose their will on weaker subjects. Instead, the implementation story of Fadama III unveils how deep and complex the existent power dynamics is.[165] By demonstrating the agency of the state in its interpretation of the Fadama initiative beyond donor's understanding of it as an avenue to entrench neoliberal ideals to a medium by which it – the state – can remain as open as possible to further development assistance, the governmentality approach shows how actors also navigate unequal power relations in a productive way even while they also imbibe the principles of self-discipline and self-governance.

Abrahamsen (2004b) also concedes, unequal and stark forms of power relations remain as the study reveals, and in the interactions between the Bank and the NFCO and SFCOs, as many of official interview data suggest, the Banks presence remains not-so-invisible as the governmentality approach may suggest. For example, in conducting this study, the researcher

[165] This is because the Bank did not seem to have forced the Nigerian government into any decision that is potentially bad for its economy or its people, neither has the conditions of the credit demanded that the Bank spearhead the project. Instead the Bank has mainly occupied the seat of a facilitator and assisted with capacity where they were needed. Although there are some aspects of the project implementation that are suspected to be largely influenced by the Bank's position as the provider of the loan, one thing remains certain and it is that the Nigerian government has the task of implementing this project and ensure that it is successful for its people and for the overall economic benefit of the nation.

requested to conducted interviews with the NFCO in Abuja but this was only possible after the intervention of the World Bank. The same experience was rehearsed in Rivers state where the RSFCO would not entertain the researcher until a direct email and phone call was received by the SPC from the World Bank. This was the first point of reference in this study to the intensity of the Bank's influence. Beyond that incident, when the researcher interviewed some NFCO specialists and requested specific data and reports on the implementation progress, these were not readily given based on the grounds that permission had to be obtained from the World Bank. The researcher had to wait for an online publication from the World Bank before accessing it because "it is their project" and as it is a "chunk of our database that we have to give..." (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012).

The question of influence over Nigeria within the context of this project, as the findings suggests is more nuanced and various actors demonstrate varying forms of agency that somewhat serve as constraining – or even frustrating – factors for the World Bank, and sometimes, the Nigerian government in their attempts to 'governmentalize' other (sub-ordinate) actors. These are some of the issues that emerge in the next section's discussion of some of the (perceived and real) challenges of implementing Fadama III in Nigeria.

5.5. Challenges to adequate Fadama III implementation in Nigeria

The implementation of Fadama III in Nigeria faced a few challenges. Official reports and interview data highlight issues such as: state and local government' defaults in counterpart fees payment; perceived beneficiaries' reluctance and/or delays to pay BCs; beneficiaries' inadequate grasp of, and associated laxity towards, Fadama's scope; beneficiaries' collusion with service providers; facilitators' plight and consequent lack of commitment in certain area; and the issue of time.[166] These negatively affected the achievement of some of the set targets and overall project's performance in some locations like Rivers state.

While aligning Fadama III to President Jonathan's ATA in 2012 was a welcome development since Fadama was a key point within the reform's targets, it also engendered some setbacks for Fadama. Some state governments'-established rural development strategies somewhat usurped Fadama III and resulted in the lack of commitment paying the required counterpart fees to

[166] A noteworthy challenge highlighted also was the impact that Boko Haram insurgency had on the project in eroding many of the achievements of the project in the north-eastern region of Nigeria (The World Bank, 2016).

continue its implementation within these states. Rivers state was a notable case study, with its Songhai project was central to delays in paying Fadama's counterpart fees since 2011 while it focused on this state-owned agricultural project (The World Bank, 2016; SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November, 2012).

The emergent data from Rivers state also suggests that this issue metastasized within the state – from state's counterpart fees default (2011 to 2013 when fieldwork was concluded) to beneficiaries' struggle with raising the required 30 percent for their Beneficiary Contribution, down to issues pertaining to job insecurity (and poor pay) for project communities' facilitators. The state government's default – for over 3 years out of the 5 years of the initial Fadama III timeline – impacted negatively on Fadama implementation process despite the efforts of the managers to 'steady the ship' and keep the project afloat by re-strategizing with the available funds. A government official, throwing light on this impact, highlighted that the state government's delay in the payment of the counterpart fund negatively affected the implementation of a number of project components such as advisory services and capacity building (SP-FAP, Interview, 25 January, 2013). In buttressing this point, another official highlighted thus:

> Currently, because of the challenges we are having, we have disbursed up to about ... 4.2 million dollars ... to 610 cooperative groups and then 85 communities.... If you take the ratio disbursement in relation to the amount we were supposed to disburse, we have reached 40 percent disbursement. But this is short of expectation and this happens because we have challenges. One of those challenges is non-payment of the state government counterpart fund for which they have signed legal instrument for the World Bank and the Federal Government. The state is owing us counterpart funds between 2010 and 2012. That money is necessary because of the operational expenses of the project because the funds coming from the IDA is going directly to the beneficiaries. There is not much provision for the operational expenses. That is why the counterpart fund is needed. So, since Rivers state is owing in arrears of about 3 years, that poses a limitation to the extent we can go. Our ability to draw down from the IDA account is kind of slowed because of that (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

While state government's default impacted negatively on implementation, the lack of payment of any local government summarily excluded potential beneficiaries from such local government. Many potential beneficiaries of Fadama III in Rivers state were excluded from partaking in Fadama III as a result of the refusal of their local government chairmen to pay the counterpart fees. What this also meant was that Fadama in Rivers state failed to reach its target

of reaching out to 20 LGAs within the state. This was also an important implementation setback within the state.

In addition to the counterpart fund debacle, beneficiary contribution proved to be another issue that led to implementation setbacks in the state. The RSFCO monitoring and evaluation officer noted that one of the reasons behind the state's poor performance in terms of targeting farmers was the fact that many of the registered farmers were unable to raise the required beneficiary contribution. This was a major setback because these poor farmers could not receive Fadama grants and capacity building since they were unable to raise the money to pay for the BC. It is interesting to note that many groups and communities went against the 'instruction' of not securing loans from banks or money-lenders to pay their BC because such loans would, in the long run, affect them negatively. One must understand that these farmers were desperate to benefit from Fadama III because of its prospects and as such had to do what they could do to raise the money. The result in many cases was that the grants were taken back by the banks once the grants were paid into FUGs or FCAs' accounts even before the subproject began, thus culminating in project failure in such communities (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). It must be reiterated that the problems associated with counterpart fees and beneficiary contributions accounted for the low rate of beneficiaries targeted and (sub)projects executed; in fact, it also contributed enormously to the tag which Rivers state received, from a national perspective, as one of the low performing states in Fadama III (SM&E-ABJ, Interview, 29 November 2012).

The role of facilitators is invaluable in driving Fadama III within communities because they serve as the interface between the Fadama office and the local beneficiaries. It means that these individuals required adequate training, motivation and support to enable them carry out their tasks effectively. In Rivers state, the facilitators assigned to the communities are made up of two categories, namely: core project facilitators and facilitators on secondment. While the former was those deployed directly into the project, the latter were facilitators drawn from different departments of government. It is interesting to note that among the core facilitators, job security was not guaranteed, and the remuneration attached to the position was also very meagre. The facilitators' salaries were not encouraging for these men and women who toiled daily to ensure that beneficiaries understood the rubrics of the project. The unsavoury working conditions and low pay structure initially led to a massive exodus of the secondment staff – many of them returned to their initial government appointments – while the remaining core Fadama employed facilitators had to manage the pay (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23

June, 2013). What this implied was that many of them paid little attention to detail and to the work.[167] In such circumstances of lack of commitment to the cause of the project due to inadequate motivation, many communities and groups failed. This was an important experience in some communities within Rivers state – an issue of utmost concern as it related to the achievement of the overall goal of Fadama to reduce poverty among the rural populace.

The other issues that the data highlights are issues of beneficiaries' collusion with service providers to ensure that they were able to get hold of the Fadama III grants to do whatever they wanted. This collusion mostly happened against the backdrop of the project's insistence that the grants would be accessed only by the service providers during procurement – that is: the FUG executives were required to sign cheques and hand over to the chosen service provider to make purchases for them. As highlighted by some of the Fadama officials, the project had noticed cases in which communities and groups colluded with service providers to procure substandard goods or machinery that in the long run were ineffective to carry out what they were required to do. In such cases, the project also suffered and the actualisation of the targets of Fadama III suffered the same fate – this was also a nationally experienced situation.

The data suggest that the implementation of Fadama III in Rivers state faced a great deal of serious structural and social challenges. While issues of initial mistrust for the project by communities as well as beneficiaries inadequate grasp of the project and the role of the oil economy played their part in negatively affecting the adequate actualisation of the goals of the project in Rivers state, it suffices to state that the lessons learnt from the implementation process would prove vital for the future. On a broader level too, it can be stated that the national and state implementation story of Fadama III points to the extent to which the Nigerian government went to adequately structure this development initiative. It was aimed to address all concerns associated with decentralising development programmes and integrating beneficiaries within the process. The project's alignment with the agricultural reform process of successive governments and the implementation strategy adopted suggest a strong adherence to the principles of mainstream development planning as heralded by the World Bank – an indeed the role of the Bank in this process appears apparent. This culminated in the said gains actualised in Fadama since 2004 as attributed to the inclusive nature of the project through the

[167] One of the reasons for being unable to reach all the initially targeted local governments and Fadama communities was the fact that some facilitators requested 'mobilisation' – cash – from me. Since this was not readily available, they were reluctant to take me to their communities.

CDD and LDP approaches. Be that as it may, the challenges highlighted so far are pointers to several practical gaps in the implementation of the project in dire need of attention.

5.6. Conclusion

Abrahamsen (2004b) criticises a perspective on power relations within the context of development partnership in which donors are perceived to drive their own agenda against the interest of the aid recipient countries and its locals in spite of the claims of inclusiveness, participation, partnerships and country and local ownership. In her perspective, power within this context transcends such pessimistic and narrow viewpoints, and as such it is important to employ a broader conceptualisation of power that "takes account of how strategies of partnerships can themselves act as forms of power through the production of specific forms of legitimate action" (Abrahamsen, 2004b, p.1454). In governmentality as a useful analytic framework to discuss power in development partnerships, power is presented as one that is actively employed with ideas of freedom, autonomy (reinforcing sovereignty) and choice; hence the governance of states by institutions of global governance builds on this advanced liberal form of governance through various technologies of governance that prove vital in shaping behaviour of sovereign states within the context of aid relations in the partnership era of development. In this light, a major assumption that follows is one that asserts that states in the international realm are rational actors driven by their self-interests to assert themselves and their economic survival within this realm. In the context of multilateral aid institutions, such as the World Bank, and aid recipient nations, such as Nigeria, this can be couched in terms of the actions and choices taken by the government in the drive to re-situate the economy along the path of growth by drawing on the assistance of the world bank to drive pro-poor growth.

The implementation story of Fadama III in Nigeria, with a special focus on Rivers state, presents several issues that when set in line with the assumption of the governmentality principle, presents a deeper outlook on the rationale behind the choices taken by the Nigerian government. This is especially within the broader quest to reform the Nigerian economic system along the hegemonic neoliberal, market-driven and private sector intensive, development model. The transformation of Fadama into a CDD project in 2004, and an emphasis on the value chain model which amplifies the role of the private sector – in line with the broader commercial dimension of the initiative – are pointers to the ideological direction which the World Bank, under its President Wolfensohn, was pushing Nigeria. This was a

strategic nudge towards establishing the mainstream development model and incorporating the rural poor into this developmental path.

What was interesting was the role of the Nigerian government as a rational actor who weighs its actions against costs and benefits to maximise profits or its own economic security. In this context the embrace of the overarching mainstream development ideology which the World Bank proposed was strategic for the Nigerian government beginning with President Obasanjo and down to President Goodluck Jonathan. Drawing on Abrahamsen (2004b) argument, the government exercised its agency in choosing to adopt the principles that would eventually transform the economy along neoliberal economic lines. This was because of a deeper quest to remain favourable to the donor community and also to accentuate the said benefits of the trickledown effect of economic growth.

It is important to highlight that the view of Nigeria as an independent, rational and autonomous actor in the international sphere, and specifically within the context of the relationship between the state and its multilateral partners such as the World Bank, comes against the backdrop of the insistence that Fadama is a home-grown establishment in which the Bank provides certain levels of financial and technical assistance. In other words, these forms of assistance do not necessarily imply that the World Bank drives the decision-making processes but provides certain levels of guidance. The buck lies with the government as the owner of the project to make important decisions about its implementation. This choice, therefore, to structure the project strategically along the mainstream development planning guide suggests a rational drive to remain donor-friendly. The governmentality approaches allusion to the agency of the subject of power thus help to show that this drive towards establishing these institutional arrangements has its roots in the quest to strengthen donor confidence in within the project and ensure continued support.

It is important to reiterate that Fadama III was designed with the major objective of sustainably increasing the income of users of land and water resources. The aim also entailed contributing to the value chain, and the achievement of these goals was premised on an inclusive implementation process based on the needs of beneficiaries.[168] The inclusive nature of the Fadama III exemplified Chambers (1994b) dictum of *'handing-over-the-stick'* because local

[168] In fact, the World Bank contends that the start of Fadama II was delayed because there was an impasse on the Country Strategy Paper presented by Nigeria over the proposed implementation of the phase. The World Bank insisted that ADPs do not run the project; rather the people must choose what they want and execute the projects while the ADP only provides advisory supports. It had discovered that Fadama I had taken a 'supply-driven' approach where decisions came from the top – the ADP – and the people at the grassroots had to obey.

beneficiaries were ostensibly integrated into processes of consultation, needs assessment, project plan development, project(s) implementation and monitoring, and governance for sustainability. This was meant to improve their ability to act as a unit –cooperatives – to build and enhance social capital to drive their local development goals. Fadama III thus had to be structured by the government to advance and achieve these goals based on an obvious realisation of the importance of incorporating development beneficiaries into the development process as important actors. The interesting part of this drive is that the World Bank was very instrumental in nudging the government towards this new path while the government as a rational actor adopted the same path towards actualising its goals.

A question that requires a deeper answer concerns the extent to which the implementation story in Rivers state actually shows the active involvement of the grassroots poor in Fadama III implementation. This is a question about the level of input contributed by beneficiaries in Fadama's entire process, and if truly their needs were adequately incorporated in the real planning process. These are some of the issues to be discussed in the next chapter which provides a closer outlook on the experiences associated with the implementation process of Fadama III as drawn from the perspectives of the Fadama III rural beneficiaries in Rivers state, Nigeria.

Chapter 6

Grassroots Experience of Fadama III in Rivers state

6.1. Introduction

This chapter explores and examines the empirical implementation of Fadama III in Rivers state based on direct experiences of local recipients of the grants. It interrogates the consultation and sensitisation processes adopted in Fadama III to integrate local farmers, women groups, youth groups as well as communities into the planning and implementation of Fadama III. It also describes and analyses various expectations, experiences and evaluations emanating from beneficiaries based on the actual implementation process within their communities. Sampling these experiences allowed for an analysis of the nature of participation' as a key component of Fadama III. This analysis also opens an avenue to explore possible areas of power relations that interactions between Fadama officials, tasked with overseeing the project, and local targets help to reveal. This chapter sheds light on the experiences associated with development programmes which mainstream accounts of participation, ownership and indeed partnership tend to conceal. These experiences demonstrate that in spite of the promises associated with the establishment of the Fadama project, its implementation in Rivers state failed to live up to the publicity it has garnered in many instances. This prompts questions around the widespread belief in the nationwide success of the project based on a set of indicators identified by implementers which in many instances fall short of real experiences of the beneficiaries.

The findings presented here are drawn from interviews conducted in Rivers state among two categories of Fadama beneficiaries – early beneficiaries from a post-conflict community, who participated at the onset in 2008/9, and the late beneficiaries, who joined Fadama III in 2011/2. The findings show that beneficiary communities' acceptance of Fadama is linked to the 'hope' discourse usefully employed by the Fadama and World Bank officials while sensitising communities.[169] As enunciated in chapters four and five, the 'hope' discourse is critically tied to the objective – "improved income" – and associated targets – "poverty reduction, food security and grassroots empowerment" – that the Bank strategically constructed and got the government, through Fadama officials, to adopt and promote. The narrated experiences

[169] This involved the promise of *alleviating poverty and improving incomes.* These promises were acceptable to the people who were (and are still) desperate to move out of poverty. Thus, the acceptance of the Fadama project is based on a form of co-optation through promises, and the acceptance of the initiative is borne out of an understanding of the need to internalize development strategies and fit them to particular circumstances.

exposed the pitfalls of a development framework in which the hope discourse elicits relatively 'unreasonable' expectations among poor people. The chapter shows the difference between the hope discourse used to co-opt beneficiaries and the real outcomes of the project, especially as evident in the experience of the early beneficiaries.

Overall, I argue that there was an overall sense of unfulfilled promises among beneficiaries, which is indicative of the practical limitations of development practices that adopt a *one-size-fits-all model* in driving development initiatives. Some of the identified issues include: disparities in the amount of money promised versus the actual amount received, the level of support promised and expected versus the perception of abandonment by the beneficiaries, the experience of deeper poverty despite the promise of a better life, and the experience of non-recuperated and unrecognised (intense) energy and severe capital losses suffered by individual members of Fadama groups in a bid ensure subprojects survival.[170] These experiences, coupled with an implementation strategy bedevilled by inadequate sensitisation and capacity building, ensured that despite the publicised gains of Fadama it remains largely a development strategy driven from the top. It simply fails to exemplify a beneficiary-led process as its CDD nature tends to ideally portray because beneficiaries are simply as mere 'targets of intervention' – not as partners. Thus, they must simply accept whatever is handed onto them, and do whatever is required of them, without question.[171] As a result, beneficiaries tended not to consider themselves as partners either. They were consigned to a condition in which they did not think that their contributions truly matter. This condition as seemed to incapacitate – some of – them in terms of critically interrogating the implementation processes or effectively demand accountability from officials. This situation was enhanced because of their place (or position) in the rung of power in the Fadama hierarchy – as beneficiaries.[172]

This chapter begins with an overview of the socio-economic context of intervention and implementation. This is followed by the presentation of the findings associated with the implementation of the Fadama project in Rivers state based on the voices of the beneficiaries. These views of beneficiaries, which are disaggregated into expectations, experiences and evaluation, provide a window on how the implementation of the project directly impacted on them. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the findings and what it means for the

[170] It is important to note that these are not stand-alone issues but more inter-related with each issue feeding into or reinforcing others. It thus makes it difficult speak of them separately.
[171] Borrowed from Meera Sabaratnam (2017) who defined recipients of development interventions as targets because their participation in many development programmes are somewhat imposed on them and they are treated as objects without political consciousness and history amongst others.
[172] This contradicts the ideal construction of the poor, within CDD projects, as beneficiaries and active agents of development.

partnership discourse enunciated in the new development agenda under which the Fadama project emanated.

6.2. The socio-economic context of Rivers state

River state is rich in mineral resources especially crude oil and natural gas; it is one of the richest regions in Nigeria based on estimates of the contribution of oil to the economy of Nigeria. It consists of 23 Local Government Areas (LGAs) and over 200 communities. The major occupation of Rivers people includes fishing, farming and trading, but with the advent of the oil economy many people tend to prefer to work in the oil sector because it is lucrative although to achieve gainful employment in this sector remains difficult. The public sector is still thriving, and it employs many people. The local and state levels of government thus accounts for many of the labour force in the public sector. In Rivers state, unemployment is very high – a syndrome that cuts across the Nigerian federation. This is despite the strategic position of the state in the oil production of Nigeria since oil was discovered in commercial quantity in the early 1970s. In essence, the presence of oil wells and oil companies exploring and exploiting crude oil and natural gas has done very little in creating job opportunities for the people of this state as seen in the many graduate roaming the streets of Port Harcourt without jobs, and people generally struggling to actualise sustainable means of livelihood.

The state is characterised by a relatively dominant rural economy which includes subsistence agriculture – the production of cassava, yam, plantains, oil palm, groundnuts, rubber trees, raffia and maize amongst others – as well as fishing and various forms of trading activities (Orlu, n.d.). A great number of the emerging population are abandoning the rural economy and are seeking blue collar jobs in the private and public sectors – hence a great deal of rural-urban migration. This includes job seekers, university students, people working in both public and private sectors, and business people in various works of life. It must be said that compared to recent years, fishing and farming were more lucrative economic occupations in Rivers state as the agricultural sector, traditionally was very strong prior to the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the late 1970s. The height of the oil boom led to the retrogression of the agriculture-based economy in the state while oil economy was accorded infrastructural development and thus attracted the youth and active people. Agriculture suffered a huge setback since then; remaining mostly subsistent and without enough government and public investment.

Due to the increasing poverty levels within rural communities and the quest for improved standards of living, many people abandoned the rural areas and the agricultural sector in search for "white-collar" jobs in the public service (skilled and unskilled) or in the oil sector. Many people preferred to work in the Multinational Oil companies although decent jobs were hardly available even for those educated in such field of study – many positions made available were unskilled and the oil corporations consigned most of those to their host communities whose farm lands and waterways had been converted to oil fields. The other option was to venture into public service, for the lucky few, with the hope of gaining promotion until they are able to afford reasonable salaries. However, not many people still had interest in farming as a full-time occupation mostly because it had become associated with poverty and those who practiced it were mocked and disrespected and addressed as common farmers.

Within this particular socio-economic setting, the introduction of the Fadama initiative, as a strategy designed to improve the lives of the mainly poor rural farmers, was therefore an important turning point for many people who really seemed to have no hope of lifting themselves out of the poverty trap in which they found themselves. The 'hope' discourse used to introduce this project was a motivation for many people, especially the farmers themselves, who thought farming should be given its pride of place, farmers respected, and infrastructure provided to enable farmers to produce and process farm produce for added value and increased profitability and income; and to ensure a better livelihood. However, as in many cases, promises can sometimes differ from reality.

6.3. Grassroots Experience(s) of the Implementation of Fadama: Case Presentation

Funds from the World Bank to commence Fadama III in Rivers state were made available in early August 2009 and project was launched in Rivers state in December 2009 (RSFCO, 2012). Rivers state thus embarked on a wide range of sensitisation exercise among several LGAs and rural communities to get them on board the project. As mentioned above, this was leveraging on Fadama III's processes to empower people economically in terms of food production and improved income.

In Emohua LGA, a community which quickly embraced this 'new' initiative was the Ogbakiri Community. Member of this community had returned from years of exile to their homes after violent clashes in 1999 led to the invasion of the community by the state military police in

response to the activities of armed youths clashing in two villages, which later enveloped the entire community. Ogbakiri, therefore, represents the early beneficiaries of Fadama in Rivers state. Other LGAs that participated in the project are Ikwerre and Gokana, amongst a group of seventeen (17) other LGAs – making them twenty (20) LGAs – who benefitted from the implementation of the project in the state. Two communities within Ikwerre and Gokana LGAs, namely Omanwa and Yeghe respectively, make up the late beneficiaries due to their later participation in Fadama between 2011 and 2012. This was towards the end of the initial project life of December 2013 before its extension to 2015 in the light of the end date of the MDGs. These three communities were therefore the focus area for this study, providing vital information that culminated in what is referred in this study as the grassroots' beneficiary experience of Fadama III.

Fadama III emerged as a result of the scaling up of the programme based on the noted successes of previous phases (The World Bank, 2008). Consequently, its modalities were mostly the same, especially as it concerned benefitting from the IDA grant for communities. This required state and local governments to pay counterpart fees as mandated by the terms of the subsidiary loan agreement signed between the states, the Federal Government and the World Bank. Since Fadama III became a nation-wide project, each participating state paid the initial counterpart fees. However, for specific LGAs to take part, they also had to pay the required counterpart fee; failure to do this meant excluding communities within such LGAs from the programme. Although the subsidiary loan agreement stipulates that only twenty LGAs may be funded with the IDA funds even if there were more LGAs in a state, it leaves room for a state to bear the cost of funding other LGAs if it wants to include all of them. This provided a leeway for an all-LGAs implementation in Rivers state where there are twenty-three (23) LGAs, but this was not the case as only twenty (20) LGAs were truly funded. The situation was that the state government seemed to have accepted the responsibility of providing the funds to ensure the participation of all the LGAs. This left the onus on the LGAs (and later the communities themselves) to pay their counterpart funding fees and beneficiary contributions respectively. However, the fact that only twenty (20) LGAs in the state were participating in the project, as at July 2013,[173] implies that the non-participating LGAs had not paid their Local Government Counterpart Funding fees.

[173] This was the period when the last interviews were conducted in Rivers state. Recall that Fadama III was also billed to end in December 2013 before it was later extended to 2015.

The consequent non-participation of many communities in the state also shows the extent to which many people were excluded from Fadama III in the state. They were also excluded from any form of empowerment that emanated or would have emanated from participating in the programme – these are mainly people within non-participating LGAs. This chapter focuses less on those excluded from the project as a result of LGAs' non-payment of counterpart fees and more on grassroots beneficiaries in whose communities Fadama III's intervention was established. Nevertheless, it acknowledges that such a situation elicits issues like the exclusion of a certain population of citizens from development programming for reasons that were not their fault. This chapter seeks to establish the narrative of failed promises, unfulfilled expectation and imperfect programme implementation regarding Fadama III in Rivers state as they emanate from local beneficiaries' experiences – experiences of farmers, petty traders and or local entrepreneurs who took part in Fadama within Rivers state.

The interview questions presented to the respondents from the three Fadama locations, focused on beneficiaries' motivation for registering for and expectations about Fadama III – why did you choose to participate in Fadama III? Interview questions also probed into beneficiaries' understanding of Fadama's origin and objectives as well as their recollection of the first encounter with World Bank and Fadama representatives in their community – "how did you hear about Fadama"; "what in your opinion do you think the Fadama project is aimed at"; "how did you get chosen"; "what was your experience of the consultation and sensitisation"; "what has Fadama done, or what do you think it is capable of doing, for you"; and "how did you come up with subprojects"? Finally, specifics aspects of participants' experience of group dynamics, implementation challenges and the views about Fadama officials also constitute vital areas of analysis in this chapter.

6.3.1. Fadama in Post-Conflict Ogbakiri Community: Early beneficiaries

Wezina, popularly known as the Ogbakiri is a popular community in Emohua Local Government Area of Rivers state. The community has six villages comprising Rumu-Ada, Ahai, Rumu-Okani, Oduoha, Okporowo (with Rumuogbakiri sub-community), and Rumu-Oro-nesi (known as Rumuoro). The community though a peninsular is strategically situated in Rivers state and has an expanse of arable lands. The people of Ogbakiri are traditional farmers, fishermen and traders. Even though the Ogbakiri people are also teachers and educationists,

businessmen, civil and public servants, and a minority of people working in the oil sector, many of them frequently returned to their lands to farm after retirement.

There is a famous legend of "Ahia Ngbakiri" (translated to mean "Ngbakiri market") located in ancient Ahai community. "Ngbakiri" is a tree, and this 'Tree market' is said to have boosted the trade and barter of farm produce and sea food amongst traders and buyers as far as Bele and the Kalabari kingdoms, who came to Ahai Ogbakiri to do business (Avplacii, Interview, 15 January 2015). It would seem that the name 'Ogbakiri' originated from the tree which the Ahai people called "*Ngbakiri Ahia*". And for strangers in the ancient times, the name, Ogbakiri was synonymous with the Ahai market. However, in 1999 Ogbakiri witnessed a devastating violent internal conflict. The community was engulfed in wide spread destruction of people, homes and livelihoods. The people became estranged from their land and means of livelihood for the three years that the conflict persisted. The year 2002 marked the gradual return of the exiled from Ogbakiri. Peace-building was accelerated in 2005 and relative stability was gained around the year 2008. Consequently, Ogbakiri people impoverished by the conflict started struggling to return to their main sources of livelihood. The emergence of the Fadama initiative was viewed as new lease of life as people looked forward to stabilising their lives after those years of exile from their homes and farm-lands.

One of the participants noted that sensitisation exercises began in the year 2008. World Bank representative were seen in the company of other officials at the Rivers State Fadama Coordination Office (RVSFCO) in Port Harcourt. The team's mission was to inform the community of this 'novel' development strategy that would "alleviate their poverty" (Participant-AWC1FUG, 2 February, 2013). According to this participant, the sensitisation exercise happened twice in the year; hence their knowledge of the Fadama project in Ogbakiri Community came directly through the World Bank as facilitated by the Rivers state Fadama Office. At these meetings the Fadama project was introduced to the people as well as its aims and objectives. There were a lot of promises made to the people especially based on the highlighted successes of the initiative in other parts of the country where other different phases of Fadama had been implemented. Promoters focused especially on the how participation in the project would effectively improve the lives of the people – who had themselves just returned from exile and were struggling to get themselves resettled in their communities and begin to fend for themselves and their families.

The names of interested people were subsequently forwarded to the SFCO to organise in preparation for the commencement of the implementation process in the community. The Fadama implementation Handbook provides that the management of the Fadama Community Association (FCA) consists of different executives from the FUGs. The FCA – though the apex organisation of the economic interest groups – existed only after the formation of groups whose executives become the core management of the FCA.[174]

In Ogbakiri FCA, there are about ten (10) FUGs based on economic interests such as: cassava production, cassava processing, poultry farms, fish farming, and yam production amongst others. Ogbakiri community is known for agricultural activities with cassava, yam, maize and groundnut (peanut) production topping the list – this explains why the formation of groups along agricultural produce was predominant. The formation of these FUGs and establishment of Ogbakiri FCA heralded the onset of the Fadama initiative in this community. With income below half a dollar to two dollars, most people who had survived by selling their labour, saw a prospect for them to actively get involved in gainful self-employment and a more secure future.

Analysis from this case thus focuses mainly on two cassava processing FUGs in Ogbakiri community, situated in Ahai. These FUGs had received funds from Fadama to implement their subproject upon meeting all the criteria for registration and membership. Both FUGs faced similar challenges ranging from inability to collectively raise the beneficiary contribution fees – leading to individual leader's bearing the cost – and suffering breakdown of the cassava processing machines procured for them due to poor quality. As the participants noted, the machine broke down in less than three months making it difficult for money to be made through the cassava processing machine. The need to raise funds to repair the machine or purchase of new ones, and other associated problems, became pre-eminent. In truth, issues of poor group dynamics within this context ensured that all the task of saving the FUGs were left to the group leaders, from one village and a few, others to cater for while group members from other villages in the community hardly paid attention or contributed. It followed that people became disillusioned about the project's success, especially their ability to cater for themselves and their families through the help of the venture, and many of them preferred to focus on their personal businesses other than the Fadama III project. All these plunged these FUGs into many problems that culminated in the status of Fadama III in Ogbakiri as a largely 'failed' story.

[174] The implementation handbook also states that this FCA management must not exceed twelve (12) members (see NFDP Handbook, 2010, p. 21).

6.3.2. Fadama in Omanwa and Yeghe Communities: Late Beneficiaries

Omanwa community is situated in Ikwerre Local Government Area. It is a central community in Ikwerre land as it shares bothers with Isiokpo, Ubima, Ozuoha and Omagwa communities. This makes it a strategic community in terms of trade in the local government. The major economic activity in Omanwa is agriculture with cassava, yam and plantain as very popular products in the community. The major focus on agriculture stems from the fact that the community has only fresh water and this does not give room to intensive fishing activities. Omanwa is a large community consisting of eight (8) large villages with a considerable large number of farmers who are mainly subsistence farmers. While many of the farmers produce for their families, they also make room for some minimal sales of these agricultural produce to boost their household income, especially to enable them to send their children to school.

Yeghe community, on the other hand, is a community in Ogoni-land which though is politically located within Gokana LGA, can be said to be located within two local governments – that is Khana LGA and Gokana LGA as evident in the struggle between the people of Yeghe and the people of Zaakpon (in Khana LGA) over the ownership of Bori city which is central to Khana LGA. The people of Yeghe are also predominantly farmers who produce a variety of agricultural produce ranging from Cassava to Yam. They also engage in minimal fishing activities as they have access to fresh and salt water – though this also was affected by the environmental degradation that sprang from the role of multinational oil exploitation in Ogoni land. This community, like many others in Rivers state, also faces enormous poverty as there are many poor and unemployed people – young and older people alike. Although the people supplement their income through farming, petty trading, local entrepreneurial activities, and some are public servants, the community remains largely poor in terms of an adequate enjoyment of opportunities for individual and communal growth. This became a vital area for Fadama III's intervention to make an impact.

Fadama III, within these two communities, began quite late compared to the early beneficiary communities such as Ogbakiri which were part of the early starters in 2009. The implementation of this Fadama III project began in these locations between 2011 and 2012, and it tended to draw on some of the lessons and shortfalls of initial implementation experiences so as to forestall against a repeat of the mistakes of the past. In Omanwa, there are thirteen (13) FUGs under Omanwa FCA, and these comprises mainly of people within the ages

of 27 to 45.[175] In Yeghe, the demographics of the beneficiaries of the Fadama III initiative tended to be more in favour of women. There seemed to be more women within the two FCAs that were combined in Yeghe community.[176] There were a few men – old and young adults – but there were more women during the first field trip that was conducted by the researcher to the community. In terms of age, beneficiaries of the project range from young adults of between 25 to 65 years – some beneficiaries were young local entrepreneurs; some, pensioners who had retired from public service and teaching; while others were just local farmers, traders and dependants of public servants. In all, many beneficiaries in Yeghe were predominantly people seeking assistance to improve their lives as much as possible.

In conducting this study, two beneficiaries from the early beneficiary community and three beneficiaries from each of the two late beneficiary communities were interviewed based on their understanding of the project. The selection of the participants for the interviews was purposeful in the sense that it was focused mainly on beneficiaries who took part in the daily running of their cooperatives – FUGs or EIGs – or the FCA. These beneficiaries consisted of two women, who headed their different FUGs within the post-conflict Fadama community, and six men, five of who were executive members of Omanwa and Yeghe FCAs and leaders of their respective FUGs. The choice of these specific participants was based on the fact that they could provide relevant information about the experience of the implementation process drawing from their interface with their fellow beneficiaries, as it pertains to organising their groups, and the Fadama office, as it pertains to pushing their groups' agenda or subprojects towards their desired goals. It is important to note that the perspectives of these beneficiaries, though not readily generalizable, are very vital in teasing out an understanding of the experience of the project within this community and are useful to get a glimpse of the project in terms of how it has been experienced across Rivers state, and even Nigeria to some extent.

In this chapter therefore, the experiences described and analysed were also critical in teasing out the expectations of many beneficiaries of Fadama – those who initially jumped at the opportunity to be empowered through the Fadama project but (who) later on abandoned the initiative because of the 'tougher' times that they experienced in the project; those who saw it as a new avenue to develop their communities; and those who expected it to be a means of

[175] The average age of members of the cooperatives/groups within Omanwa is 36 years old as opposed to Ogbakiri where the average age of beneficiaries seems to be 51 considering that members of these groups aged between 37 to 65 years.
[176] This conclusion was drawn from observation of members who attended both January 27, 2013 meeting which the researcher observed as well as the June 25, 2013 capacity building workshop organised by the Rivers state Fadama office. Yeghe community has two FCAs – Gbeneyagoro and Yeghe. Both of these FCAs combine to have their meetings together and take decisions as they jointed impact on them as a collective.

sharing money. In this vein, real experiences of real grassroots people who interfaced with the implementation process is described here. Their experiences accounted for their overall evaluation of Fadama III and the officials overseeing its implementation. These views are analysed in light of the impact of the project of the initiative on the grassroots in the long run.

6.4. Research Findings

6.4.1. The limits of hope: creating 'unreasonable' expectations among local beneficiaries

Hope is a very powerful force and so are the expectations that hope brings. These expectations can impact the choices and actions of actors if they hope for something.[177] Fadama III's advent in Rivers state, and its epiphany among beneficiary communities, was met with fanfare. This draws from the expectations created around it both actively by the World Bank and NFCO officials' statements and passively by the beneficiaries based on what they had been told. It follows that to understand beneficiaries' expectations, it is crucial to revisit the claims about the CDD approach and its associated projects. According to the World Bank, this approach ensures beneficiaries' active inclusion and contribution to development planning (Rao and Mansuri, 2004). Linked to this prospect is the promise of addressing poverty through initiatives like Fadama. As is characteristic of CDD initiatives, the popular discourse is that more local involvement is required for effective development planning – hence the emphasis on local ownership by beneficiaries – individuals and communities alike.

In implementing Fadama III in Rivers state with this rhetoric of participation, ownership and indeed the promise of improved life, beneficiaries developed series of expectations. When the local farmers, hunters, fishermen, and entrepreneurs within the participating communities in Rivers state decided to take part in Fadama III, they expected that the project would positively impact on their situation – individually and or collectively. They banked on the 'hope discourse' utilised to invite them into the programme. The World Bank and the Fadama

[177] Expectation entails a belief in something to be or happen in a particular way. In a partnership or even a donor-beneficiary relationship, expectation is a two-way street, and as such it is also a vital aspect of Fadama III as far as understanding what was going on in the mind of Fadama III beneficiaries upon signing up to be a part of the project. The expectations of beneficiaries may determine how they interact with officials of the project – this may also be a window by which the exertion of power or influence on beneficiaries can be grasped. There are various ways by which expectations can lead to the exertion of power and influence. In Fadama, as the findings show, this can be in the form of what beneficiaries were expected to do, and had to do, because of their place as poor people who were being helped by the World Bank and the Fadama officials. This means that beneficiaries appear subservient in many ways within the context of Fadama III's implementation.

officials, on the other hand, 'expected' local beneficiaries to fulfil various responsibilities. They expected beneficiaries to diligently 'tick' certain implementation boxes: forming groups, paying BCs, holding regular FCA and FUG meetings and adroitly implementing groups' subprojects according to its stipulated or accepted norms, values, rules and regulation. In fact, beneficiaries had to act the part within the context of the accepted ways of implementing grassroots development programmes within the mainstream. Essentially, this was an attempt to 'govermentalize' the beneficiaries by establishing these Fadama processes which beneficiaries will 'rationally' choose and internalise because of their desperate quest to escape 'poverty'. But as Ferguson's (1990; 1994) case study of Lesotho demonstrate, local perceptions of needs – and by the same token, expectations – differ from interveners. Hence a marked difference in the poor's engagement with Fadama, especially as it pertains to their expectations.

Data from beneficiaries' interviews suggests that a major expectation among local beneficiaries was that the Fadama project will assist them to escape poverty. This was the major motivation for participating and adhering to the expectations of the donors and the local Fadama officials on how the project should be run within the communities. This expectation is consistent with the promise of alleviating poverty that animates the Bank's mission of 'fighting poverty with vision and professionalism'. The consultation and sensitisation exercises carried the same message. It can be argued that having been told of the impacts of Fadama in other parts of the country, as regards rapid increases in individual and household income, food production and community infrastructure among other things, it became easier for local communities and people to be persuaded to buy-in to this seeming prospect of positively improving their lives.

Evidence from the early beneficiaries' interview data shows that there was also an expectation that through Fadama III, the government would fund individual farmers and entrepreneurs with direct capital – loan or grants – to assist them in their ventures. Among the local women especially in Ogbakiri, this was the overarching belief prior to registering as a beneficiary noted:

> ... we were thinking that they will bring money to assist people do their farm work. We didn't know that it will be something like to form a group for you to get the money [to] start doing the work yourself in order to earn your gain (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

This expectation is linked to the fact that many of the beneficiaries in this community were women, whose major source of livelihood is agriculture – farming on cassava, yam, maize, and groundnuts. In a context where women lacked claims to farm lands but receive allocated

farmlands from their fathers, husbands, uncles or siblings, Fadama III seemed to be associated with a prospect to improve their levels of income since the government was said to be willing to support them with capital and improved cassava species.

This expectation of government's financial and technical support to farmers is accompanied by another close expectation of beneficiaries' direct control of Fadama grants to them. It is worth noting here that in the first case, Fadama III, like Fadama II, required the formation of cooperatives, and the grants from the World Bank would be given to cooperative groups – FUGs within the cooperative community, the FCA – and not individuals. In the same vein, the choice of groups' projects must be aligned with the 'positive list of subprojects' for Fadama while control of the grant will be relatively monitored by the Fadama office based on various levels of progress. Before this became very clear to beneficiaries, they expected that funds would be channelled directly to them to execute their subprojects once their LDPs are approved. This was because they were made to choose executives and also made to open individual FUG's bank account where funds will be deposited to undertake the execution of their subproject. They were also meant to hire a service provider, and with the help of the facilitator assigned to them by the state coordinating office, they could procure the productive assets and undertake the implementation of their subprojects.

A third expectation which is much broader, among early beneficiaries, was a progressive positive transformation of their sources of livelihood. In a broad sense, this tallies with Fadama III's focus of supporting progressive accumulation of gains – income and social capital. These will culminate in self-sustenance for individual groups' subprojects and the establishment of progressive ventures within communities. On this note a beneficiary highlighted this:

> I was hoping that it [Fadama] would be a progressive something that in the end if there is progress let's say our cassava processing in a month we can get something it will aid the women. At least it will help them to buy their bush [i.e. farm land lease], ground [i.e. process] garri [i.e. cassava]; they [people will get] money: press they pay money; fry they pay money [i.e. process cassava into garri and people pay for it]. From that little little thing these women at the end ... they will have their gain and that gain can assist them like during the planting season they can buy groundnuts, farmlands, to help themselves. But something like that did not happen (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

What is described here includes context-specific challenges faced by communities and the rural poor which any attempt to establish an intervention programme must consider. Thus, prior to defining the objectives, scope and focus of an intervention programme such as Fadama,

adequate consultation and sensitisation exercises could have enhanced a grasp of individuals' and communities' needs since beneficiaries' expectations would mirror context-specific challenges (see Ferguson, 1990; Sabaratnam, 2017). This is very important especially when there are concerns raised by beneficiaries, as will be shown later on, about disparities between funds promised and funds received; between the rating and ranking of similar subprojects within different geographic region which determines the funds disbursed; between levels of support promised and actual support received or the perception of abandonment; and between the promised better life and the actual experience of a deeper plunge into poverty. These are some of the issues pertaining to the expectations among early beneficiaries of Fadama III in Ogbakiri.

The expectations among the late beneficiaries in Omanwa and Yeghe communities represented some of the pertinent contextual issues affecting the population. Interestingly, while the beneficiaries within these communities involved a great deal of young adults, especially in Omanwa community, the case was different for Ogbakiri community where many of the participants were adults between the ages of 40-70. Some of the expectations, while seeking to address broadly the same issues of poverty and disempowerment, specifically focused on issues such as 'improved business strategies' (Chairman, Interview, 2 February, 2013), 'human capacity development and empowerment for business' (Participant-PhD, Interview, 2 February, 2013; Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013), 'job creation and improved employment opportunities', 'improved economic viability for Fadama communities and groups' (Deedum-Yeghe, Interview 2012), and 'increased variety of food products for market and consumption purposes as well as reduced food prices (Etlorich, Interview, 2 February, 2013; Deedum, Interview, 27 January, 2013). Indeed, the expectations relayed here can be summed up to suggest that the late beneficiaries expected that participating in Fadama III would bring about broad-level socio-economic empowerment[178] as well as improved levels of food production. Indeed, some of these expectations included relative belief in the importance of a deregulated market system in which consumers would have more access to food products at cheaper rates (Etlorich, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

While the early beneficiaries focused on how the funds were to be distributed, the late beneficiaries focused on the broader potential of the project towards answering specific needs

[178] Empowerment here includes improvement in individual and group's business acumen through a capacitation that is vitally consistent with the goal of the project.

within their immediate society. Although, the early beneficiaries also highlighted these needs, what is peculiar to the late beneficiaries, was their focus on what the project could help them actualise within the socio-economic space. Some of the issues highlighted by participants when asked about their expectations all point towards the specific needs of their context. These include the hope that Fadama III would assist in improving their individual and groups' business ideas; that it would accelerate food production and create jobs for many unemployed graduates; and that it would broadly empower individuals and groups within the communities. They also expected it to help reduce the cost of food produce through increased production, and enhanced variety, of food produce within the community. Essentially, Fadama III would be vital for the economic viability of communities, individuals and groups.

What is expressed here by beneficiaries is a signifier of the nature and intensity of facilitation received prior to actual implementation. Beneficiaries' responses consequently focused on specific issues that Fadama III was designed to address. Early beneficiaries whose expectations tilted more to individual needs – some of which did not fall in line within the broader scope of Fadama III as set out by the World Bank – seems to differ from this. One may argue that based on the lessons learnt from a relatively short period of implementing Fadama III, the RSFCO became much clearer about the overarching aims and objectives of the project. This forestalled against the initial problem identified among the earlier beneficiaries who had expected direct transfer of funds to them or had misconceived the grant as an aspect of government's drive to redistribute capital among the rural population.[179] In fact, the expectations highlighted by many late beneficiaries from Yeghe and Omanwa communities showed a great deal of *'in-depth tutoring'* on the goals of the project as well as the negative areas or the non-priority issues that Fadama would not be funding.

While many of the expectations described here are in line with Fadama III goals, it is useful to discuss the experiences associated with the actual implementation process. One reason here is that beneficiary experiences help to open up variant aspects of Fadama III – aspects that early beneficiaries may not have emphasised. Although later beneficiaries seemed to understand the project better, their experiences also bring to the fore different aspects of the project – including elements of power relations. It follows that while nuances of experience can be highlighted, the core issues of power dynamics still exist within the entire implementation process despite

[179] People however in these new locations did not really embrace it for this same reason – some people refused to participate anymore upon realizing that the money was not to be shared while others did not want to get involved because they thought politicians were going to meddle and share money to their own stogies.

the levels of understanding of, and commitment to the project, its goals and objectives as well as the way these objectives can be practically pursued by the beneficiaries of the project.

Many of the highlighted expectations, it must be said – especially those of the early beneficiaries – were not achieved, leading to some beneficiaries abandoning it and returning to their daily activities to ensure survival. Although some of the expectations expressed by participants in Ogbakiri community are not out of place, some of them are not directly aligned with the framework of Fadama III which focuses mainly on collective funding and empowerment. The problem observed is that although the goal of the Fadama project was to improve the lives of the farmers as a group, the technicalities to achieving this goal was not understood by the people. There may have thus been a misinterpretation – a 'disconnect' between what the farmers wanted, how their consent was obtained to participate in the Fadama project and the language and rendition of the Fadama facilitators. Somewhere, there may have been distortions in the communication between the implementers and the people. But, this represents what Sabaratnam (2017) describes as the arrogance of interveners and, this is at, the root of the failure of many externally designed development interventions because they are based on "a construction" of the context that "bears little relation to the prevailing realities" (Ferguson, 1994, p. 176).

In a more practical sense, this also represents a case of inadequate sensitisation militating against an effective grasp, among prospective beneficiaries, of the intricacies involved in receiving Fadama's grants. However, for the moment, it seemed that the implementers were more comfortable with projecting the promises aligned with 'participating' in the project – poverty reduction and food security through empowerment. This action, though it attracted many beneficiaries towards the project, did not prepare them for the unforeseen issues that were ultimately going to surface as participation in the project continued. Some of these practical issues hereby constitute some of the experiences relayed by the beneficiaries in this study. This is content of the next section of this chapter which presents a narrative of the experiences of the Fadama III beneficiaries in Rivers state.

6.4.2. The failure of importing one-size-fits-all Fadama III implementation models in Rivers state

The experiences described here emanate from the responses of participants, who were actively involved in the implementation of their FUG subprojects and the broader community wide (FCA) processes of Fadama III in Ogbakiri, Omanwa and Yeghe communities in Rivers state. Their responses covered issues like: sensitisation and consultations, group formation, internal group dynamics, funding, service provider, support systems, and abandonment. These issues clearly explain the intensity of their experience of the project away from the more fantastic pictures painted in progress reports. Here issues such as an inadequate consultation and sensitisation process; complaints around funding issues; perceptions of inadequate support and aggravated levels of poverty, amongst other issues, are some of the pictures painted within the findings on local beneficiaries' experience of the implementation process of Fadama III.

The findings here are presented in two categories. First, it highlights the pitfalls of mainstream development planning and implementation, especially attempts to establish new communities through development programmes and programming. Second, the fall out of the experience of the implementation strategy on beneficiaries, some of whom then developed a perception of unfulfilled promises based on their experience of the implementation process in areas such as funding, support systems/networks etc. A third category engages the experiences associated with Fadama implementation in relation to the rhetoric of inclusion in current development planning parlance.

Development planning in recent times has become very inclusive in rhetoric and at best, lacking in practice. Beyond the veil of the rhetoric are attempts to establish structures and communities that will internalise the ideals associated with such development programmes – whether aimed at poverty eradication, reduction or alleviation or food security and grassroots empowerment (Moore, 2007; Williams, 1999). This entails the development of mechanisms to enhance the attempts at establishing the systems required to actualise the more often unspoken goals of development programming.

In Fadama III, such attempts at building new communities to carry on the goals of development are at the heart of the implementation strategy adopted for the project. In this light, one notices the adoption of consultation and sensitization processes as a means of integrating communities and beneficiaries into the project. Other processes include strategies for project implementation such as group formation, funding and subproject implementation and sustenance as part of the

task of each community and or groups. These are vital aspects of Fadama III that grassroots beneficiaries in Rivers state engaged in, but their importance for actualising the expectations of the mostly poor local targets remains doubtful based on what experiences associated its implementation suggest. It follows that despite beneficiaries' belief that Fadama would address their socio-economic needs, the association between applying its processes and truly achieving the dreams of beneficiaries is not straightforward – communities' nuanced experiences elucidate this point. The first among these experiences had to do with consultations and sensitisations.

Shortfalls of Fadama III implementation strategy: Sensitisation and Consultation

Consultation and Sensitisation are very important aspects of inclusive development strategies especially within the post-Washington consensus era within which the CDD approach became very popular. It will be recalled that the CDD approach is one centred on community demands and participation in identifying needs and actively engaged in the process of addressing those needs. This is why Chambers (1994c, 1994a, 1994b) spoke very insistently of 'handing over the stick' and allowing local communities to lead the process in interventions aimed at improving their lives – the outsider must not lead this process. Development literatures are riddled with participatory rhetoric wherein the consultation of would-be beneficiaries of development strategies is extremely vital to the siting of such initiatives while sensitisation remains of utmost importance as per attempts to achieve an adequate implementation building on the level of awareness and understanding among the beneficiaries of the intricacies involved in the implementation of the project. The process of implementing Fadama III, as a CDD project, characteristically included consultations and sensitisations as the activities undertaken prior to commencing project (and continued as part of its) implementation in Rivers state. Consultations and sensitisation here aimed at obtaining community buy-in and adequately preparing beneficiaries for the actual project implementation process within their communities.

In Ogbakiri community, sensitisation and consultation were done in the year 2008 just as the Fadama III project was being introduced to the state. It entailed the visit of World Bank and Fadama officials from Abuja and Rivers state to the community. During this visit, people were summoned to the community hall to hear what the 'visitors' had to say. The meeting was organised by the paramount ruler who, according to one participant, had already been consulted

by the fieldworkers or facilitators to inform him about the intention of the Rivers state Fadama office to site this project in his Community (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013).

The method of consultation and sensitisation involved a presentation about the Fadama project and its prospects and promises. This presentation also took advantage of prevailing socio-economic situations and painted pictures of how they believed that Fadama has the capacity to positively impact the lives of people within this community. A participant from Ogbakiri explained:

> Well ... they introduced themselves [when they came]. They said that they were going around ... to see ... mostly areas that were [in need]... Mostly that time that Ogbakiri people came back from their exile. So, they are helping people in this area at least to get their food; assist them to do whatever they want to do. So, they told [us] the story. Some people were explaining their problems. They were promising to solve their problems, but not much questions [were asked]. Rather we listened to their story and hope[d] that they will do as they said (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

The experience of this component of Fadama III was similar across Rivers state with slight nuances. For both Omanwa and Yeghe communities the knowledge of Fadama came to the community through sensitisation visits from the Fadama office to these communities. While this was largely the case, Yeghe community accepted this initiative based on the intervention of a previous LGA chairman who hails from the community and had previously worked within the Rivers state Fadama systems. His role was vital towards the successful implementation of Fadama III in the entire Gokana LGA when he was the chairman of the LGA (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013; Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

What this experience shows is that although consultation and sensitisation may be two different concepts, especially as regards development projects being 'thought-out' for a particular community, in this Fadama project they appear to have been practically taken to be the same. It is interesting to note that, consultation may imply 'reaching out' to the community and informing them about Fadama and maybe asking for their permission to site the project or asking about their view on where to site it or how to implement it – in some cases, how to plan or design it. However, sensitisation may rather entail an active process of 'educating' these communities about the project – including its intricacies such as the nature of funding, eligibility criteria, and its importance for people. Many times, sensitisation is utilised within the context of a project or initiative that has already been designed or developed without the knowledge of the beneficiaries – beneficiaries may not even know that the initiative exists.

They become aware of the initiative and its prospects largely through the sensitisation process. This enables them to decide whether or not they want to be part of the project. In Rivers state however, the consultation and sensitisation exercises were undertaken almost together. The project had already been designed long before it was introduced to these three communities; it had also been implemented elsewhere before it came to Rivers state. The consultation process may have thus been redefined to include seeking permission to site and implement the project in a community.

Drawing from this situation, it can be argued that Fadama III, irrespective of how inclusive it appears to be, remains mainly a top-down development strategy. This is in the sense that it had already been fully designed and even implemented in other parts of the country before it was introduced into these communities. While it can be argued that Fadama III was a scaled-up version of the ongoing Fadama project in the country, drawing on past lessons and adopting additional milestones and focal points, what remains undeniable is the attempt to actualise its development targets through a specific model or strategy irrespective of the context. This goes back to a major critique of the reproduction of models of development practice regardless of context specificity. Thus, while communities' experience of Fadama within Rivers state does not represent single case studies of these attempts to reproduce models in different contexts, it goes a great deal to show that this practice has remained and continued despite successive failures (see Ferguson, 1990). It goes back to the entire development architecture in which strides to achieve development targets continuously build on so-called 'tried and tested' models with little or no modifications to pay attention specific and unique contexts. This questions the value of the idea of beneficiary inclusion or participation in designing and planning interventions that impact on them and reinforces the idea of tokenism in participation.[180]

Convoluted processes of group formation and choice of (sub) projects

As deduced from responses of participants, the formation of FUGs according to varying areas of economic interest beneficiary communities is one major aspect of Fadama III's implementation process. It draws from the co-operative logic of post-1999 Fadama which beneficiaries had to form – Economic Interest Groups (EIGs) or FUGs (NFDP Handbook, 2010). Consultation and sensitisation processes were thus used to emphasise this idea that Fadama is not for individuals but for groups. Its aim was to advance social cohesion and enable

[180] Critics of participation argue that beneficiary inclusion in development planning is simply window dressing as opposed to making any meaningful contribution to the process of the development and implementation of interventions (see Giles and Mohan, 2001: Participation, from Tyranny to transformation (Governmentality chapter)..

groups to pull resources, capacities and capabilities together to actualise specific business interests that would eventually benefit the communities where the different economic ventures are situated while individuals within the groups increase their incomes and productive capacities. Consequently, many women, men and youths from target communities had to be enrolled as participants or beneficiaries.

While the 'Project Implementation Manual' (PIM) requires people to form groups, the experiences in Ogbakiri was one in which names were submitted and later groups were imposed on different people regardless of their preferred areas of economic interest. The participant cited above highlighted on this issue as follows:

> When we were writing the names, personally I put myself under cassava production... But bringing the list, they gave us cassava processing. I was thinking that ... we can use some of this money [i.e. the grant] to buy land and make cassava [farms] but when the real thing came, they said it was ... buying of [cassava processing] engine and processing equipment[s]. They placed us ... though [initially] I did not show concern but when they said they put us under cassava processing, I didn't like it but I just kept quiet. I even regretted when I saw everything (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

This situation also involved the appointment of people as leaders of groups without prior information. Another participant echoed this point when she threw some light into how she got involved in the Fadama project – initially without prior information. She explained:

> How we heard about this project is just that they brought us the ***'paper' – [the information]***. The ADP people brought us the 'paper' and shared it. With regards to this 'paper' that they shared, they put different people in-charge of different groups; there was also a person that they put in charge as somebody who does the writing – [a secretary]; there was also a person that they put in charge of keeping the money – [a treasurer]. Just like that. They are the people who brought that 'paper'; they also listed names inside that 'paper' (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

She continued:

> ... I was not around then. By that time we had not returned [from the exile due to the community crises]. What... I know is that they just brought a paper to me when I came back in my house and said that this is the group that they have given to me to look after... (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

Reiterating this point, she continued:

> I did not even know. That is just the truth. I did not even know when they wrote the names. What it is, is just that they brought me a paper in this my house, and I saw too that my name is in the list and those of other people that they had put

> for me that I will lead. So, I accepted and started with the group (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

She continues:

> I had said I would not participate. I did not want to lead the group. This is because I had overworked myself during the days of the Enruoma project [a previous project in the 90s]. Because of this, I said I was not going to involve myself in this kind of thing again. This because that time, the way I was and now are no longer the same. That time (long time ago) I had the capacity to hop on any motor to run errands that are related to the project. I could go up and down, and still come back and continue. But now, I can no longer run around like that. When things happened, and I was able to relatively insist formerly but when they persuaded me to an extent, then well, then I said, let me follow them and do what they are doing now (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

This experience appears to be in stark contrast with the idea that prospective participants had been duly informed about the project and that they could decide on their specific areas of economic interest. This experience seemed to differ from those of beneficiaries in Omanwa and Yeghe who reportedly had the 'freedom' to choose their areas of interest and formed their own groups based on such economic interests.. The choice of their individual group's subprojects and the implementation of these subprojects were within the limits of their needs in the community. Fadama officials, from this narrative, did not dictate for – or impose a pre-set list on – them. Rather, beneficiaries simply submitted their membership lists, as cooperatives, to the Fadama office and were recognised after fulfilling the eligibility criteria as set out in the PIM.[181]. Thus, contrary to early beneficiaries' experience, they insisted that they oversaw their own processes. For example, a participant argued that the "Fadama office does not always tell [them] what to do" (Participant-PhD, Interview, 2 February, 2013). Another participant adumbrates:

> ... why would they change name(s)? Do they know the groups, the people in all? Where would they even fix the name? Would they fix name for me whom I don't know; who do not know how come about land? You understand? They don't ... I doubt ... that. In fact, I've not experienced it among all the groups we have in our jurisdiction. Here nobody has experienced it. *It is none of Fadama's business to begin to change names for you because they know that the participants here know their selves. If you bring an outsider who do not know how we started, the position of the land, who owns the land, he ... will be floating* [in other words the outsider-

[181] These included, among other things, showing proof of a location for siting the economic activities, paying the beneficiary contribution (in some cases), and having existing farmlands which could serve as the foundation upon which Fadama III's matching grant could be provided

> participant will not be on the same page with other members of the group] (Etlorich, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

This view buttresses the amount of perceived freedom that beneficiaries within these communities had in deciding their fate while benefitting from Fadama. It fails to take into consideration the possibility of certain human elements and errors within the Rivers state Fadama office. The fact that there are individuals who have specific interests within the office may affect certain aspects of the organisation process for the project remains an important variable to consider in relation to that claim. The view that beneficiaries were free to make their own choices reinforces the idea that despite the fact that these beneficiaries are recipients of aid, they have moved beyond the level of strategies being imposed on them. Rather they actively participate in the implementation of a strategy designed to lift them out of the poverty trap.

The above stated notwithstanding, the selection process for beneficiaries from these two communities followed the template of the PIM in which the formation of groups paved the way for participation. Thus, one participant explained:

> ... [When] we started getting this programme, that's the Fadama in this community, they ... said that Fadama get their guideline, their procedure. So, they started eh, called eh, the first thing is to call the member, explain the reason why Fadama, what they will do [for] people if we decide to register ourself with this thing. Then on the process we accept. Then when we accept, we form group. Then in the group, after we form some group, then we have ... the chairman and from the election the person that carry the vote – we vote as the chairman, the secretary and treasurer. On that process after we get this, we went eh to go and register as a cooperative. That is how we start this eh Fadama (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

This excerpt also points to issues on how leadership and governance were established within FUGs, through elections to adequately attain the legal status of cooperatives. This is an experience that cuts across all beneficiary communities, although within the early beneficiaries, there were no elections as leaders were mostly selected – a point highlighted by one of the early beneficiaries above and reiterated in this conversation.

> **I: You say you are the chairperson of the FUG: Who made you the chairperson? Did you people vote or the office?**
>
> **P**: Well ... everything came from the office. Though, as they came gave us the posts, the members too they asked the members to confirm. They said, 'if you know that this [or that] person cannot chair you, protest'. But they did not protest so most of us were given the headship from the office – the chairperson, the secretary and the treasurer (Participant-AWC1FUG, 2 February, 2013).

Forming groups along specific interest areas has a logical impact on what kinds of subprojects beneficiaries could embark on. Early beneficiaries' interviews show that while they were allocated to random groups – something that impacted negatively on their disposition towards the project and the overall experience of the project in Ogbakiri – the late beneficiaries seemed to have taken up their subprojects based on their interests and capacities. Areas of need as identified within the community that could also reach Fadama's indirect beneficiaries were also covered. For example, the participants interviewed from the late beneficiary communities were engaged in different economic activities and their FUGs were formed based on their internal identification of people who shared the same goals and interests. In essence, FUGs such as the Piasso FUG (engaged in Poultry production), Etlorich (Fish production), Omanwa Omadyke Youth FUG [aka Omanwa Omadyke Youth Livestock Farmers Cooperative Investment and Credit Society limited] (Piggery), Owhor Youths (Plantain Plantation), Leko FUG (Poultry Farm), and Deedum FUG (Snail Farming), were all formed with people of likeminded interests and also mostly from the same location or village. This is in opposition to beneficiaries from Ogbakiri who were affixed into groups from different villages and with conflicting interests as well as lingering post-conflict hatred.

It can be said that the experience of group formation seemed to favour the late beneficiaries but not the early beneficiaries; it impacted negatively on the latter's ability to chart their own course of action. This aspect of the implementation of Fadama III still shows a great deal of planning along externally fixed models within which beneficiaries were integrated. It differs from a beneficiary-led process in development planning – added to this is the use of manuals and templates and rubrics to condition the actions of beneficiaries to achieve the desired outcome for the project. This exemplifies a top-down managerial strategy devoid of true community initiative or contribution. This is irrespective of the extent to which 'participation' is included in the language used to describe the group formation process. Lastly, this process goes a long way to determine how actors within these groups adequately participate towards achieving goals and dreams or visions that they did not set for themselves within this project. In essence, internal group dynamics are an offshoot of the nature of groups' formation in Fadama III – something that was found to be problematic across board although more intense among early beneficiaries.

Group dynamics

In the Fadama programme, as in most CDD projects, the importance of group dynamics was highly emphasised especially in the context of fostering social cohesion and enhancing social capital. Actualising these goals would enhance the possibilities for more effective utilisation of the grants received towards particular economic ventures. It would be beneficial towards an all-round progress within these communities and contribute immensely towards improving local governance systems.

The Fadama project relies heavily on groups' cohesiveness in its drive towards ensuring a maximum actualisation of the goals of the project. This is mainly because the project is said to have been developed with an outlook on beneficiaries as 'active partners' – they cease to be armchair receivers of development hand-outs. Within this spectrum beneficiaries are required to proactively work towards ensuring the success of their projects and the broader success of the larger project.

In order to achieve this goal, groups must undertake to meet a number of requirements. The first among these requirements involved the selection of individual group leaders who would eventually represent such groups within the larger FCA level as FCA executives. Regular meetings were required for specific groups and FCAs. Its essence was ensuring that all beneficiaries actively contributed within the process of developing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the project. Essentially, it is what happens within these groups – and broadly the larger FCA body – that determines the extent to which the Fadama project becomes a success in the locations where it has been sited.

Group dynamics as conceived by the designers of the Fadama project was not experienced in the same light among many beneficiaries. Their experience varied a great deal. How groups were formed, the struggle for internally organising members and issues of mistrust among members of the groups are some experiences associated with the groups in Ogbakiri. All these culminated in what became an awful experience of the implementation of Fadama III in Ogbakiri community.

As early beneficiaries reported, group formation was a randomised process which saw people from different villages arbitrarily lumped into groups that they did not necessarily choose. Such an organisational process also meant different challenges – the ability of groups to meet regularly as well as their ability to manage previous forms of rancour drawing on the post-

conflict nature of the community. Basically, beneficiary FUGs in Ogbakiri found faced difficulties with organising themselves. This is clear in a participant's response to a question regarding meetings:

> **I:** ***Now thinking about running these subprojects, how do you people do it? Do you people convene meetings to think about how you'd be getting your subproject?***
>
> **P:** At the early stage when the groups were formed, members I was looking for them from house to house. Only few have been coming to the meeting at that time. but when there is a gathering they Fadama office from Ph always visit so when they fix it all of them will come. At times we meet there. When we meet there, we discuss if it is the time of levy there was a time we levy paying for counterpart fund, paying for bye law and the other big book, I have forgotten the name. We levied N5000 [each person] which not many of them paid but I was the one that steered everybody (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).
>
> ***I: Ok. When last did you call for a meeting and the people came for your group meeting?***
>
> P: Since 2011 we have not had any meetings because nobody is coming around. You call people, you tell people they will give one reason or the other (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).
>
> ***I: So in your FCA do you people have meetings?***
>
> P: FCA?
>
> ***I: Yes, do you people go for meetings?***
>
> P: Yes, we do. We did attend meetings last year. We have normal meetings, [but] last year I don't know how we attended FCA meetings. But I know that we had [some] meetings (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

Further conversations bothering on this subject of (FUG/FCA) meetings elicited the following responses from participants (*Participant-AWC12FUG as 'P', and Participant-AWC1FUG as 'P2'*) as seen below:

> ***Q16: Okay, ah your group and then your FCA, do you even do meetings?***
>
> **P [exclaims in dialect]:** *Chooii!* Are you seeing trouble oh!! It's has taken a long time oh.
>
> **P2 [adds]:** it has been a long time ago. That group thing; nobody is interested anymore.
>
> **P [exclaims again]**: Are you people seeing trouble oh?
>
> **P2 [chips in again]**: People who think that about the counterpart fund and think that they will ask them to refund the money.

P [adds]: Yes. There is not even anybody that is listening to us.

The story behind the excerpt above has to do with beneficiaries' engagement within their groups which consisted of people from different villages and in the context of the already stated failed expectations. So, since group members were from different villages, it was difficult to adequately convene meetings and develop effective strategies timeously to ensure that groups' projects took off in time. As stated above, it was extremely difficult at the onset to get people to attend meetings. People only attended FUG meetings when they heard that the Fadama officials were visiting the community. There were therefore many inactive, ineffective and unsupportive members of within FUGs in the community. These also contributed a great deal to the challenges that were faced.[182]

The difficulty regarding active participation of members draws from several issues – finance or capital is a massive issue here. It will be recalled that FUGs, save for youth and vulnerable people groups, were required to raise 10 to 30 per cent of the subproject cost as "Beneficiary Contribution."[183] Group members had to be levied in order to raise the required capital sum, and as the interview excerpt above shows, they had to contribute about Five Thousand Naira (N5000 – about US$20) to pay for the purchase the Fadama Project Implementation Manual (PIM), machine maintenance and produce their by-law (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013). As already stated, many of these villagers lived on less than US$1 per day and could barely afford to feed themselves and their families. Yet, Fadama required them to pay beneficiary contribution (before benefitting). That was very discomforting to members and scared them away from meetings or even participating in other activities, hence the challenges of convening meetings.

The hurdles and financial requirements of Fadama, coupled with perceived slow accrual of benefits – mostly financial – culminated in increased disenchantment with and disassociation from Fadama among many FUG groups in Ogbakiri. Fadama III's failure to fulfil its promise of alleviating their poverty in the short term meant recourse to other forms of livelihood – Fadama had failed to meet their expectations despite the hope it dispersed. This was despite the sacrifices they were required to make coupled with a realisation that they would not have direct access to the grant to sort out their immediate problems. The reaction was an obvious

[182] Some of the challenges included group members who failed to contribute towards the sustenance of the subprojects financially or otherwise. This view was highlighted by these participants (see Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013)

[183] This is a percentage of money paid by beneficiaries before they qualify to receive grants based on the Fadama project.

retreat and an abandonment of subprojects to their leaders and/or those who had invested their individual funds and energy to the groups' project. FUG members' lack of active involvement – exemplified in their lack of interest in meetings – dealt a serious blow on building cohesive units for addressing challenges within the groups.

A factor which also tended to compound the problematic group dynamics among the early beneficiaries relates to the arbitrary lumping of people from different villages into the same group. Membership of the two cassava processing FUGs, as were the other 8 FUGS, in Ogbakiri cut across all the six villages. A participant thus noted:

> ... if you come to my group you will see Okporowo people are many; Rumoro people are there; Oduoha people and Rumuokani people are all there. It is their people that mentioned them and we were given the group. If it is the group that you gave formed [by yourself], it would be been better than this..." (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

Considering the post-conflict and reconciliation context of Fadama III's emergence, this was not the most context-sensitive group formation modality to have been adopted and applied to ensure Fadama III success in Ogbakiri. This draws from the fact that village rivalries, rancour and enmity were still largely existent, and peace was still fragile. In addition, this post-conflict context also meant mutual suspicion among members, especially suspicion of leaders – where information is not clearly disseminated – about funds management. One of the participants thus noted that the lack of direct handling of cash by leaders, since they only signed cheques – prevented their members from persecuting them on ground of suspected embezzlement of funds when their project failed (Participant-AWC12FUG, 17 July, 2013). These levels of suspicion were definitely counterproductive for group cohesion and project success.

Compounding these problems were also issues relating to distance and the management of the subprojects – the site of the cassava processing machine, the type of equipment and the manpower to manipulate it. The participant noted that a big community like Ogbakiri only had two Fadama cassava processing units – not innovatively different from others owned by individuals in the community. Siting them in a particular village meant that people had to travel long distances to process cassava while there are other individually owned ones closer. The lack of adequate contribution by members coupled with the fact that members of the cassava processing FUGs were women of advanced ages meant that the capacity to drive the processing machine around the community to meet needs was lacking. It also meant that they had to employ services to truly manage the project, but lack of capital militated against employing

anyone. It became even more difficult to manage the subproject because of the problems of group dynamics within the community.

While early beneficiaries struggled, as shown above, late beneficiaries fared better in the sense that after group formation, they maintained contact and attended FCA and FUG meetings. There seemed to have a sense of common purpose to actualise the goals of their subproject. This was demonstrated in their efforts to ensure that they had regular meetings for internal deliberations on different issues as it pertained to their subprojects, the FCA and a few other issues such as contributing funds to assist a bereaved member.[184] These meetings also enabled beneficiaries within different groups to participate or air their views regarding the broader Fadama project, individual groups' subprojects or the cross-FCA projects.[185]

It must be stated that while no specific FUG meeting was observed, the two FCA meetings observed showed the importance of group dynamics towards the sustenance of the Fadama project. In the first instance, the Gbeneyeagoro and Yeghe cross-FCA meeting held in November 2012 was very vital towards understanding the nature of the group dynamics amongst beneficiaries in Yeghe. During this meeting which was held twice monthly, all the members of both FCAs in Yeghe community convened at the Anglican Church in Bua-Yeghe on Sunday to discuss different matters arising based on their Fadama experience and beyond. Some of the issues discussed on the day included: the impact of the beneficiary contribution 'imposed' on them; the late disbursement of funds; discussion on how to tackle issues pertaining to loans procured by groups, from the LGA revolving loan-system, which were much higher than the amount value for their projects by the Fadama office; and deliberations about the structure of governance within the cross-FCA (Orievulu, Field Note, 27 January, 2013).

In Omanwa, the meeting convened by the facilitator to introduce the researcher to the beneficiaries in Omanwa FCA coincided with their FCA meeting in December 2012. This provided an opportunity to also observe the interaction between beneficiaries during the meeting and its modus operandi. It was an opportunity to understand how late beneficiaries went about developing consensus on subprojects. While the meeting focused mainly on matters such as the payment of levies for different projects within the FCA, one thing that stood out

[184] Contributing to support an FCA member who suffered the loss of a family member was discussed during the meeting at Omanwa in December 2012.
[185] The Cross-FCA project is a type of subproject in which the entire FCA gets involved and pulls resources together to implement a project that would largely benefit the community at large.

was that there was no case of researcher influence on participants because they went about their business not minding the presence of the researcher. It can also be said that the agenda for the meeting was set out based on the specific issues that required to be treated on the day of the meeting although it remained somewhat orchestrated by the needs associated with participating in the project such as the payment of levies by individual members of FUGs, and individual FUGs within the FCA. These levies were imposed on them as part of their contribution towards the cross-FCA project (Orievulu, Field Note, 29 January, 2013).[186]

The internal dynamics within late beneficiary communities must not be taken to be ideal since there were also reported cases of lethargy among members. Some participants also decried that many beneficiaries hardly attended meetings except when it was established that Fadama office was visiting or they suspected that money would be shared. There were also experiences in which community and group leaders were abandoned to individually bear the burden of handling the daily running around and bureaucratic hustles regarding their projects (Etlorich, Interview, 2 February, 2013; Chairman, Interview, 2 February, 2013). These remain similar to the broader issues experienced even among early beneficiaries in Ogbakiri.[187]

Drawing on the above findings, as they concern Fadama III implementation issues such as consultation/sensitization, group formation and internal group dynamics, a few analytical points come to the fore. Firstly, there is an implicit, if not overt, top-down process at play in Fadama III's design and practice. Having been implemented in other states in the country and having also implemented several CDD or livelihood projects within different parts of the world, this project clearly reflects a replication of development models in new locations and enclaves by the World Bank and official partner – the Nigerian government. The modalities were therefore set out *ab initio* with the goal of achieving similar goals without an attempt to 'control for' context-specificity. This explains the woeful implementation experience in Ogbakiri – a post-conflict context – as far as these three components were concerned, especially group dynamics which is required to drive any cooperative project. Moreover, Fadama's implementation is based on a set of rules laid out in the project implementation manual. The PIM was used to stipulate Fadama III's implementation modalities as a cooperative project. In also determining the nature and type of projects to be adopted as well as the number of

[186] This field note analysis was based on the observation of Omanwa FCA meeting in January 2013. This was when I was introduced to beneficiaries from the community.

[187] These factors negatively affected their ability to work together. Very importantly, the after effects of the Ogbakiri crisis – such as feeling of hate or anger by one or two villages towards others – could also be felt in the way the group formation happened and how members interacted towards organising their FUGs. This issue did not seem to have been considered in the attempt to establish Fadama units within this post-conflict setting.

participants or beneficiaries, the World Bank and the Nigerian government were leading beneficiaries 'by the nose' towards the goals prioritised by the donors in their ostensible poverty reduction stride. Interestingly, this process excluded many poor people in dire need of help.

Secondly, the nature of the implementation process, especially group formation and questions around group dynamics demonstrate to an attempt to build new communities through development projects. Establishing FUGs and FCAs as community cooperative groups became an endeavour for building new 'community' of local farmers and entrepreneurs along the principles of competition, accumulation and profits within the context of the growth-led poverty reduction focus of Fadama III. This was irrespective of existing structures. As such, in spite of Fadama III's claim to be building community institutions to contribute towards addressing development needs, these processes represent a more strategic stride to leverage these structures for creating new economic thinking and procedural patterns that are ostensibly proven to elicit progress or positive development outcomes. For example, while cooperatives may be generally good for communities and their economic improvements, the ideology underlying the goals they are meant to pursue how these goals are actualised may not necessarily be in the interest of the rural poor. They may prove rather useful for opening up the rural economy to the larger markets of microfinance banks and international trade chains which although the argument put forth is that they help the poor but in reality, the poor gain very little (Schanbacher, 2010). There are nuances in how cooperative systems operate in different contexts and there are regions or communities that are better equipped than others. But Fadama III set everyone on the same pedestal, and this was an arrogant approach to development intervention.

Thirdly, the findings show that the implementation process did not distinguish between post-conflict communities and relatively stable communities in Fadama III in Rivers state. It follows that in attempting to implement Fadama in contexts such as Ogbakiri, the post-conflict circumstances were importantly to be considered, but instead they were also 'painted with the same brush' as other contexts. It is no surprise that people quite easily abandoned the project in this part of Rivers state and as such it was not a success there. This failure, and some of the problems highlighted so far, points to an inadequate consultation/sensitisation process before the project was undertaken. This inadequacy led to the shortfall in the implementation process as noted in this section. Above that, these short falls led to a perception of unfulfilled promises from Fadama III in Rivers state. These are drawn from experiences associated with funding,

support levels as well as experiences of hardship linked to participating in Fadama. These feelings of betrayal thus form the basis of the next section of this chapter.

6.4.3. Fadama III's unfulfilled promises: Beneficiaries' perspectives on funding and support

Interviews with beneficiaries revealed several concerns on issues such as (delayed) funding and disbursement and management. There were also challenges associated with beneficiary contributions as well as inadequate systems of support to assist beneficiaries to achieve their goals and actualise the potentials of Fadama in beneficiary communities. Some of the specific complaints reflect disparities between the promises made by officials about Fadama and the actual experiences and challenges that beneficiaries faced within the project. These concerns among beneficiary communities culminated in feelings of betrayal and unfulfilled promises among beneficiaries whose voices make up the content of this chapter's outlook on grassroots' experience of Fadama III in Rivers state.

Fadama III's Funding Conundrum: disbursements, service providers and procurement challenges

Funds disbursement is a fundamental aspect of Fadama III because beneficiaries are then called 'empowered' after receiving the grants to embark on their projects. Essentially, funds transfer signals the commencement of implementation for FUGs' subprojects and possibly FCAs' community projects. According to one facilitator, beneficiary communities in Rivers state were advised to mainly focus on identifying and implementing their individual FUGs subprojects: the FCA projects – usually an infrastructural project that benefits the broader community – could then follow after (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013). This was meant to ensure an adequate utilisation of funds procure the machines and relevant materials (plus labour) required to push through various FUGs subprojects to yield benefits for Fadama III's direct beneficiaries.

From the implementation strategy described in chapter five, it is clear that prior to the funds' disbursement, beneficiaries would have shown proof of a capacity to undertake projects. These were in the form of land acquisition – through leases or donations – as well as proof of the

payment of the beneficiary contribution. Beneficiaries should have also identified the sites for their subprojects so that once funds were disbursed, implementation would be in 'full gear'. In the Fadama locations where interviews were conducted for this study, all these requirements were met as early as beneficiaries were required to do them. Majority of beneficiaries reported late disbursement of funds for them to 'kick-start' their FUG subproject, for some reason or another, but due to some office-related issues. Some of the participants' perspectives below allude to aspects of this experience:

> Let me tell you in this year, Fadama we have only two poultry and the two poultry was the last people even, they were trying to, with the politics of things ... Why is it that they have already given money to everybody? But I find out by myself that it's because of the money, that little money that involve and the money is what we are working now where it is very difficult for us (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

***

> It was just yesterday that they bring the second quota of the money [since 2011], and if you look at that money, that money cannot feed that bird up to the end of when that bird will start laying the eggs, the production will start. [So, I was asking the consultant] if they will go there to help the people at the office in other way to make sure that ... their disbursement is fast; that when the disbursement is delayed that the thing affect us. It make us to go here and there in other way to make sure that we stand (Piaso Poultry, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

***

> I think that one of the thing that delayed our money, that counterpart funding the [LGA] refused to pay earlier. So we had to use through Mrs. Chukwuigwe to help us (Etlorich, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

***

> The other day in their office why I was frowning at that man there was because of this Ethlo-rich file has been lying down in one office for a long time ... Why? Is it that there is fault, or the file movement has stopped or what? By now as at December [it] was still there all through. This January has finished [and it] is still there. Before December even, the file has been there. So, what is holding it (ibid).

***

> Some people favour their people; others look for money. They don't process your files; that is the problems we are having like since November those two files we [are]... asking the facilitator to help us. Since October or November, the files had been in the man's office up till now he refused to process the files because we are not giving them money (Chairman, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

***

> **P1:** ... When that money even came, we the members of the ... [group] were not even aware. The people in the [Fadama] office, the money had already come but they

> acted as if nothing had happened. It was one woman who came... (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013)
>
> **P2 [adds]:** Abuja people came (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).
>
> **P1:** When the Abuja people came, one woman who came with them – that woman ... She went 'crazy' that day when she realised that that money has not been paid for the owners [the FUGs] to use to buy and begin to work on whatever they are working on. That was it. It was only when this came to limelight that we became aware that money had come long ago (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

All these comments point to delays in disbursements and suspicions about the reasons for such delays. These points were also reiterated during a cross-FCA meeting held in Yeghe community by members of Yeghe and Gbeneagoro cross-FCA. It was revealed that while some beneficiary groups had received cheques to start up their subprojects, some were still waiting despite having completed every requirement. Many of the beneficiaries present at the January 2013 cross-FCA meeting of Gbeneyeagoro and Yeghe FCAs within Yeghe community complained bitterly funding issues ranging from an FCA not having received payment down to slow disbursement processes that led to their inability to purchase feed for birds and piglets procured as well as paying for the weeding of their Cassava farms (Orievulu, Field Notes, 27 January 2012). A major point that emerged at this meeting was that groups had received loans from the local government to begin their projects while waiting for Fadama grants with which to offset these loans. These loans were far more than what many groups received in terms of Fadama grants – some loans were about N950, 000 compared to N350, 000 Fadama grant – as revealed within the course of the meeting. These delays and their attendant consequences on groups' ability to progress with their projects thus became a source of intense frustration among beneficiaries, as illustrated in the excerpts above. It led some beneficiaries to abandon the project.

In line with the principles of the CDD approach, funds in Fadama III had to be transferred directly to beneficiaries to undertake their projects of choice. It was an attempt to move away from the previous models of centralised control and management of project funds by government and its ministries. Ideally, Fadama grants seemed to go directly to the recognised FCA and FUG bank accounts, which beneficiaries were mandated to open prior to receiving funds. Practically, however, this was not the case. Beneficiaries did not really have discretionary rights over the funds even though they were in the FCA or FUG account. In fact, the Fadama office still had a lot of influence about funds allocated to subprojects and their utilisation. The Fadama office disbursed such funds only when groups had satisfied all the

requirements for funds disbursement and the Local Fadama Technical Committee had approved the LDPs. A troubling aspect of this experience is the disparity between funds promised to groups and the actual funds disbursed to them to execute their subprojects. For example, one participant from Ogbakiri explained:

> ... the day they were talking about how much a group is going to have... they said [it will be] about a million, I think 1.5 [million naira]. That's what they said. But before ever, when the money came, out counterpart fund is what? 150,000 [naira]. I think what they paid us was ... 542000 (Naira) plus our own counterpart fund (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

Reinforcing this view, another participant also noted the following:

> The money that they gave us after they had told us was not how they gave us. Okay, as what they gave us was not what they had initially promised us, the people who were supposed to be leading us ... told us that this is how we must follow and that is how we must follow in order to succeed. So we followed the way that they said (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

According to this second participant, her group was initially promised about 1.5 million naira but ended up receiving only about five hundred thousand naira (N500, 000) to purchase the cassava processing machines, lease/rent a piece of land, and set up a tent for the processing activities amongst other things. This point was reiterated by another participant in the conversation below:

> **I**: In general, how much are they, are you expecting for your own?
>
> **P**: Eh, in general, according to our proposal, because we make a proposal and say small-scale this thing, that we are supposed to have like *one point something million.* Let me say, one point five (1.5) for that small running of ... this thing.
>
> **I**: But did they approve the 1.5 million?
>
> **P**: No
>
> **I**: How much are they approving?
>
> **P**: They did not approve. They approve like eh, one (1) million, one point five, fifty (1.50) like that.
>
> **I**: Ok, about one million?
>
> **P**: One million, yeah (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

This participant also highlighted that some of the money that some FUGs were meant to receive were deducted on grounds of utilising them to provide capacity building whereas that should have been covered by one of the five components funded by the IDA funds. He noted: "When

we were collecting this money, they deduct some money for [stutters] those, for this kind of training that they will be coming often to train us but they have, we have not been seeing that in this community" (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013). Other ways by which beneficiaries funds were reduced were described as "fuelling their car ... [and] showing appreciation for what they have done" (Chairman, Interview, 2 February, 2013); "... compulsory pay[ing] their transport" ... "to inspect your projects" (ibid); "thank you for visits" (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013) and "deducting their transport from any money that they give you ..." (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013). While these appeared intangible, they still went a long way in affecting the available capital for beneficiaries to effectively manage their projects.

With huge disparity between the money earmarked and promised to the beneficiaries and the actual funds received, some subprojects, especially those in Ogbakiri ran into crisis and even failure. This was despite beneficiaries' religious obedience to officials' instructions, facilitators' directions and the project implementation manual. One major factor that contributed a great deal to the crises early beneficiaries faced, apart from funds disparity, was procurement and the role of service providers in bungling this process. The procurement of assets to help subprojects' execution was the root of some of the painful experiences of beneficiaries.

Fundamentally, procurements in Fadama III were guided by the World Bank's procurement rules (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012). Goods and services, including the hiring of service providers for groups, could only be procured after some bidding procedures had been satisfactorily concluded. The M&E officer of the RVSFCO noted that there were service providers on the books of the office (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013) while the NFCO procurement officer emphasised that machinery and other products had to be manufactured from World Bank approved countries (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012). These rules were at the back of the mind of beneficiaries as recruited service providers to procure their productive assets.

In Ogbakiri, beneficiaries initially thought that funds would directly come to them to procure their productive assets. This belief is essentially in line with the view of the World Bank Task Team Leader who noted that beneficiaries had the freedom to what they would do with the funds that were transferred to them (TTL-WBA, Interview, 9 November, 2012). In spite of this personal opinion and the beliefs held by beneficiaries, the procurement arrangement drawn from the Fadama implementation guide meant that all funds were saved in FCAs' and FUGs'

registered bank accounts. In the procurement, executives had to sign cheques and handed these to service providers who procured the assets. This experience was widespread among all beneficiaries in Rivers state, but it was much more difficult for early beneficiaries who had awful dealing with their service provider.[188]

In the selection of service providers, beneficiaries were required to choose the most reasonable service provider whose prices were cost effective (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013) According to an early beneficiary, this was the root of their crises as they employed someone who procured substandard cassava processing machines for them. She decried the procurement process in these words:

> Well, the people in the office never allowed us at least. What they said: 'choose your service provider from your community, and the person you choose will be the person that will give you least quotation. That is what we followed. If they had given us the chance at least [and said], 'this is your money; think on how to use this your money; decide on how you will use this your money rather than it is the service provider that will do everything.' You only sign the cheque and give to the service provider and the service provider will have the money, buy those equipments instead of the owners to think of how to use their money. It is not, that one personally it never looked fine in my own eye. It is one of the failures that cause failures... Like our own service provider, he did it in a way that as if there is something wrong with us; bought everything, dropped [i.e. dumped], and since then till his death he never one day came to us to see how far all those things he bought [were doing]. All the receipts he bought those thing; 'give to us nah, No.' [He refused to surrender the receipts]. We reported to the [Rivers state Fadama] coordinator, 'he did not give us receipts'. 'Hey, am I to give you receipt'? [was his response] and the coordinator closed [his] mouth. Up till today nothing was given to us as receipt. And that was how everything started to spoil. If they had advised us to use the money ... I think what we should have done is just to buy one engine, buy one presser and we start with that one. Gradually ... we will go on. But every money was used, and the whole money used at the same time and everything finished (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

Her view was supported by another beneficiary who also berated the entire process of service providers having to procure everything for them. She stated:

> Okay... what happened is that they did everything for us the way that they liked it. Ehe! While we are here as the people leading the groups, they went and chose another person [for us] – a provider; service provider – that will go to the market for us to buy us things; things that we will use to do that work oh. That person went to the market [and did the purchases] from the top; from the engine [i.e. the cassava processing machine] down to the kitchen knives that we use in preparing the raw

[188] It is noteworthy that the rules that established the fact that groups do not directly control money was based on the need to ensure that money is adequately accounted for. However irrespective of the good intentions – and possibly drawing from previous lessons learnt from direct transfer of funds to people – the idea of not letting the people control these finances directly shows lack of trust, and lack of belief in the ability or capacity of these people to make the right decisions if and when entrusted with finances.

> cassava tubers for processing... I am sure that is where problems began to enter us in the body [i.e. problems began to affect the group] because all of those engines that he picked and dropped for us then – nothing [but all spoilt] (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

The role of the service provider here in procuring faulty assets for beneficiaries was crucial, in a negative sense, to the pressure that they felt and consequent collapse of their subprojects. Their position as poor rural women did not help either because they were unable to enforce their rights, maybe to the point seeking recourse in the criminal law. Lacking the power to enforce their rights, they however sought recourse from the Fadama coordinator, as one of the excerpts showed, but did not get any adequate response. Their woes were compounded by the death of the service provider and this meant that they could neither get their monies back nor hold him accountable. Their case became desperate because the substandard machinery, which broke down as early as they were procured, set in motion years of painful strides to salvage the FUGs' subprojects in this community to no avail.

The funding and procurement conundrum, coupled with the actions of dishonest service providers, culminated in beneficiaries' feeling that the promises made in Fadama III were largely unfulfilled. In describing some service providers as people who "... feel that this money is a '*dash*' [that is, free handouts] given to people, so they must take their own part too" (Deedum, Interview, 27 January, 2013), Fadama III beneficiaries reiterated the ignoble roles that service providers played in the negative experiences associated with Fadama III in the state. This is beside the fact that beneficiaries did not really control the funds that disbursed to them because officials and donors never seemed to trust them to make good rational decisions – yet beneficiaries were partners and agents of their own development according to the CDD approach. Explaining these failures and challenges also goes beyond identifying this mistrust for beneficiaries' ingenuity; it opens up the question about the role of facilitators, the institutional implementation partners and all other role players or stakeholders in forestalling against these failures or providing a soft-landing plain for 'failed stories'. This is another important aspect of Fadama III's failure of living up to its promises as presented in the next section – the failure of support systems.

Support Systems

Support systems are indispensably vital for the survival and sustainability of any community – led and community-based grassroots development project such as Fadama initiative in Rivers state. This is because they provide succour and security for beneficiaries, especially in their

time of need. Support systems are diverse and can vary depending on the roles they play. Within the context of Fadama III, one support system may have been non-governmental organisation (NGOs) working on various development issues including social justice, human rights and food security. Such support systems would have been vital to the implementation process – if they were involved – to pressure the state government to pay up the counterpart fees which it owed. They would have also been able to speak for beneficiaries, especially the women groups, whose service provider had bungled their procurement process and help them to seek remedies; and they would have also been able to contribute towards capacitating local (and mostly uneducated) beneficiaries about investments, human rights, as well as sustainable farming or investment procedures.

Other areas of support systems that Fadama beneficiaries would have found useful include: spending of capital or investments in productive assets for a more sustainable/futuristic project, where microfinance banks or cooperative experts could have provided vital information and education to effectively and continuously guide beneficiaries on best practices for utilising the capital they received for their FUG's projects. This would have also included particular aspects of what would have been subsumed in the advisory services component of Fadama III. This would have improved their capacity in areas such as suitable cropping choices, the types of seeds to procure for high yield and resistance to diseases, and better storage and marketing strategies. Through these forms of support, beneficiaries would have also become more empowered in issues of business, development and health issues that are intertwined within the Fadama initiative. In the same vein, Fadama facilitators, assigned to beneficiary communities them, constituted the most immediate support systems to beneficiaries because it was their task to guide them in most, if not all of their decisions. The role of NGOs, various institutional partners within Fadama and facilitators, was critical to enable Fadama III beneficiaries in Rivers state to reap the benefits of this pro-poor programme.

As the previous section showed, the groups of early beneficiaries encountered problems at the early stages of the implementation of the Fadama III project. As beginners within the development trajectory, the need for necessary support – technical, logistic and strategic counselling – cannot be under estimated or taken for granted. The state Fadama office which the groups reported to would have been of great service to the beneficiaries; it would have been active in checking the activities of service providers hired to help the groups.

Facilitators in the system constitute the first line of support. The project manual makes them the go-between for the grassroots communities and the Fadama implementing body. How the groups fairs with their facilitator, no doubt affects the progress of the project. In the case of the Ogbakiri groups, it was apparent that their facilitator who was supposed to be the link – the middle man – between them, the Fadama office and even the service provider – was largely inefficient. This facilitator, it was said: provided them with the wrong information; failed to provide the requisite guidance on the way the project ought to be operated; and seemed to be largely absent (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013; Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013). The facilitator's ineptitude could be linked to inadequate training and/or poor motivation to do the work. The end result was that the people and their subproject suffered.

Unlike the Ogbakiri experience, participants from Omanwa and Yeghe communities were full of praise and appreciation for their facilitators who, according to them, were very efficient and effective in carrying out their task of bridging the communication gap between the RSFCO and the grassroots beneficiaries. These facilitators were said to be very resourceful and knowledgeable about the project and this reflected positively on beneficiaries' optimism. They were also very useful in the mobilisation of the people towards the project, especially by ensuring that their FCAs and FUGs were holding regular meetings to discuss cogent matters affecting their projects' implementation. In fact, meetings with members of Yeghe, Gbeneyeagoro and Omanwa FCAs for this study were organised by the facilitators after an initial meeting with them at the RSFCO in Port Harcourt in November 2012.

At the meeting in Yeghe where both Yeghe and Gbeneyeagoro FCAs had a cross FCA meeting, I met with some of the beneficiaries who agreed to participate in the study. This was only made possible by the facilitator who introduced me to the FCA chairman and he informed me of the meeting wherein I mainly observed the proceedings of the meeting. Although the facilitator was not present at that meeting, beneficiaries readily discussed various issues about Fadama within their community. In Omanwa, the facilitator accompanied me to the community and the FCA meeting where beneficiaries deliberated on ways to adequately implement their individual and community projects. The work ethic of the facilitators of these two communities endeared them to beneficiaries who had only words of praise for them.

Adequate capacity building – sound training for beneficiaries – would have led to a better grasp of the intricacies of Fadama III. Training on the business skills, prudent application of finances

and crisis management would have better positioned beneficiaries for the task ahead. However, these were not readily available for beneficiaries – both early and late beneficiaries – as the interview data shows. Among beneficiaries in Yeghe and Omanwa where there seemed to be more efforts towards an ideal implementation, the first and only real capacity building workshop experienced by the farmers, traders, small businesses established by groups, amongst others, was organised on June 25, 2013 which the researcher attended. It was the first beneficiaries had experienced in the state since 2009 – the Fadama office however claims to be organising regular sensitisation workshops during field visits to Fadama sites. According to one participant,

> Right now, today is the first day they are coming for ... for training [us] since we started this thing in 2012. When we were collecting this money, they deduct some money for ... this kind of training that they will be coming often to train us but ... we have not been seeing that in this community. Today is the first training we are receiving from Fadama. So, meaning that those people are not coming, we only work with our, like me now since we have just started, I work with my service provider (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

In addition to the slow pace of, or inadequate, capacity building which the office blamed on the state's default in payment of its counterpart fees commitment, the ADP was also not very visible to assist beneficiaries. Data drawn from Fadama officials suggests that the consequence of this default, between 2011 and 2013 (when these interviews were finalised), unavailability of funds to provide the required advisory services for beneficiaries (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). Contingency plans were however made by the Fadama office for officers such as the CDO, the M&E Officer, and even the SPC to use field visits also as capacity building platforms on various aspects of Fadama III.. It must be said that as an intrinsic component of Fadama III, the Rivers state ADP also had a role to support these capacity building efforts and also provide advisory services to beneficiaries. The available data, from beneficiaries, seems to suggest that the presence of both the Fadama office and the ADP in beneficiary communities was mainly limited to field visits and the commissioning of projects as opposed to structured processes of in-depth capacity building (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

It follows that capacity building exercises were rarely organised to equip and assist beneficiaries to cope with unforeseen circumstances destined to occur in the life of projects. It meant that beneficiaries did not actually receive in-depth capacity building prior to the implementation of the project in their communities and in fact before the funds for their groups' subprojects were disbursed. This accounted for so many mistakes among the early

beneficiaries, and although later beneficiaries seemed more confident, enthusiastic and optimism, only time will tell.

The absence of adequate technical support programmes was not the only difficult experience of beneficiaries; they also lacked effective support networks. Officials of the World Bank and the Fadama office had noted that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and NGOs were integral to the establishment and monitoring of the project, but these were conspicuously absent within Fadama locations in Rivers state. Available data from beneficiary communities suggests that no CSO agent or NGOs were part of the planning and implementation processes. In terms of individual observation, the researcher also found no CSO agents or NGO actively involved in Fadama in Rivers state; their presence was not felt in any beneficiary community studied. In fact, responses to the question of NGO's involvement were unequivocally in the negative. Beneficiaries were asked: *"are there any other groups or organisations that are part of this project with regards to educating you people; that has been educating you people, maybe church, NGOs or any other civil society groups? Is there any other group that has come"?* Some of their responses were thus:

- "I don't understand that one. I have not seen any such group oh!" (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013);
- **"No!" (**Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013**);**
- **"**No" (Deedum, Interview, 27 January, 2013);
- "For now there is none" (Participant-PhD, Interview, 2 February, 2013);
- "I have not seen" (Chairman, Interview, 2 February, 2013);
- "None" (Etlorich, Interview, 2 February, 2013);
- "Eh, no, no, no, no. There is not [sic] people like that apart from the today" (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

In fact, in responding to this question one late beneficiary retorted:

> No, I, because why I am saying this is, I am a secretary now for the FCA. So, if anybody want [sic] to come like that, at least I will be aware eh? If that one [referring to the NGOs] was coming on community basis, we can say the community-base, we can say the community. Eh, but under the Fadama user, FUG, we have not seen any people like that (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

Civil Society and NGOs, especially those working on social justice and human rights issues, would have played crucial roles to bridge the state's implementation gaps within Fadama III. As stated above, speaking for beneficiaries, supporting project implementation and capacity

building would have been vital areas of contribution towards strengthening rural Fadama groups. Their absence or exclusion from Fadama's processes implied that most of what beneficiaries learnt emanated from the Fadama office. The apparent lack of necessary funds and adequate capacity in all the spheres of development it became difficult for these beneficiaries to attain the best possible level of capacitation. Importantly, because of the apparent absence of civil society, a huge gap thus remained open and unfilled; the gap which civil society fills in within any society, especially the democratic ones geared towards incorporating the voices of the people. This meant that many FUGs in trouble and groups suffered without responsive networks and organisations to assist them.

Beneficiary Contribution (BC)

BC, like counterpart funding fees, is an extremely important component of post-1999 Fadama. Ideally, BC was a major precondition for FCAs and FCAs to receive Fadama grants save for youth and vulnerable groups. In many cases, as alluded to, communities, like LGAs, that failed to meet this condition to pay the required fee of 2 Million naira faced exclusion.[189] Where LGA Chairmen refused to pay counterpart fees, the LGA was excluded and where FCAs or FUGs could not raise the BCs, many of them did not receive the grant.[190] As stated in chapter four, BC is a small percentage of the total cost to be borne by those beneficiaries who are also categorised as Economically Active Poor (EAP) and are required to pay this percentage upfront into a registered bank account before they can receive the Fadama grant. According to the Fadama Asset Acquisition Manual "the Fadama III matching grant [for project implementation at the grassroots] is 70% of the total investment of a user group that is classified as Economically Active Poor (EAP) or its sub-groups can request for assets up to a maximum amount of the equivalence of US$5,000 per FUG and US$25,000 per FCA" (NFDP III-Asset Acquisition Manual, 2009, p.3). This implies that the remainder of the total investment must be provided by the beneficiaries themselves – those who fall within the category of the EAP.

While beneficiaries within the EAP category were required to pay 30 percent of the entire cost as BC, there was also room for a category of beneficiaries referred to as the Vulnerable Groups. They consisted of widows, unemployed youth, the physically challenged, the elderly, and

[189] Chapter five highlights these issues associated with defaulting on counterpart fees from both state government and local governments and its impact on the implementation process.
[190] The M&E officer highlighted that in a bid to meet the state's target, the RVSFCO decided to devise new strategies to help communities raise their BCs. Sometimes elites were encouraged to assist FCAs and FUGs in this regard.

People Living with HIV (PLWHIV). In this regard, "the matching grant" for "vulnerable group[s] or the Poorest of the Poor (POP)" was set at "100% of the total investment" (NFDP III-Asset Acquisition Manual, 2009, p.3). The entire cost of productive assets was covered by the grant and they were not required to pay BCs. Beneficiaries had to earn below "N10, 000 net worth"; they must have "less than primary school certificate qualification"; they had to be "unskilled" and lacking knowledge of "any trade"; they must "have more children of school age out of classroom than those in class"; and they must have "little or no social networks that can rescue [them] in crisis situations" (NFDP III-Asset Acquisition Manual, 2009, pp.16-17). This was the precondition to qualify as a vulnerable or POP group.

These requirements did not deter many of the beneficiaries from indicating their interest to partake in Fadama III mainly because they hoped for the long-term benefits associated with it. The experiences associated with BC remained quite challenging for many of the beneficiaries. It must be said that while some of them managed to raise the money to pay, as was the case among the early beneficiaries, some others could not manage and so fell out of the process even before it started. Interviews with beneficiaries sampled from Ogbakiri, Yeghe and Omanwa showed that Fadama III beneficiaries were instructed to pay different amounts of money as BC depending on the nature of their projects. This ranged from: "N150 thousand (naira)" (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013) and "N117 thousand (naira)" (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013) in Ogbakiri to "N300 thousand (naira)" in Yeghe. To raise funds for the BC, beneficiaries within these communities had to meet regularly to discuss about it and consequently levy themselves. One participant recounted this experience as follows:

> ... when we start[ed] to attend meeting, even when they never bring anything, we start to pay our levy, paying something, tax ourselves, open an account, paying counterpart[191] [beneficiary contribution], believing that things like this that one day that the thing will come to pass. Not, as we are talking about, that World Bank that they give us money, that they just give us money free ohh. They ask us; eh we contribute within our groups, register eh. Before ... when they say that we should open accounts, we open the account. They told us to pay counterpart, we paid counterpart. In each of the pay counterpart that we pay, that makes the money to come in according to our counterpart that we pay. That is how the thing was lingering on. We thought at a time even when we were paying the counterpart we were shivering eh! But the chairman was giving us assurance, ah? That in case if we don't see, if they don't respond, that we should hold him, eh, responsible (Piaso Poultry, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

[191] Counterpart contribution was used synonymously with Beneficiary contribution among beneficiaries in Fadama III.

Because beneficiary communities, and groups by extension, faced the risk of exclusion from Fadama (mainly if their LGAs failed meet the counterpart fee precondition and also if they could not afford their BC) regular FCA and FUG meetings became a necessity.[192] Where FCA and FUG meetings revealed that raising BCs could prove difficult, beneficiaries resorted to borrowing as a means of fulfilling this BC precondition. This was the case among many groups in both early and late beneficiary communities. For Ogbakiri Women Cassava Processing GUG, the chairperson used up her own savings to cover the BC cost of the entire group. She had hoped to recoup her money once Fadama released her FUG's grants. Her hopes were dashed because BCs were integral aspects of groups' subproject funds and beneficiaries did not really have the liberty of retrieving funds directly – a point already made above. She complained:

> That counterpart fund ... really scared people ... since we don't have enough money in our fund and people are meant to contribute and they are unable to contribute. Like my own group ... we agreed to borrow money ... so that we can refund when we have the money ... everybody deserted because of fear of the money. So ... that introduction of the counterpart fund is very stressful; very very stressful. You want to help me [but] you say unless I bring something, that help will not be there. Really, we did not understand it if not personally, I shouldn't have even included myself. I should have even used that counterpart fund to just start my own business. It would have been better for me than to put it where it has made no [impact]; it did not generate anything for me, and there is no way to get it back (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

The decision to borrow, though ill-advised, signifies beneficiaries' desperation to partake in Fadama based on its promises of 'alleviating' poverty. The action was ill-advised because the Fadama officials, interviewed in this study, insisted that beneficiaries were not allowed to solicit loans to execute their projects since it would plunge them into debts as a result of the interests that such loans may accrue (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013). However, such worries were only secondary for beneficiaries since being part of an initiative promising to improve their livelihood was a more important choice to make. Thus, groups got loans to supplement whatever funds they had in order to pay their BCs – they did not want to lose out on such an opportunity.

As beneficiary interviews and sentiments from beneficiary communities' members (observed during a field trip to Yeghe community) revealed, loans had to be procured to set groups' projects in motion. In Yeghe especially, groups took out loans from the Gokana LGA roving

[192] The M&E officer highlighted that in a bid to meet the state's target, the RVSFCO decided to devise new strategies to help communities raise their BCs. Sometimes elites were encouraged to assist FCAs and FUGs in this regard.

loan established by the LGA chairman who had introduced them to Fadama III. Community members complained about the negative impact of BCs on their ability to embark on their projects because raising 30 percent of the entire project cost was too high for them to afford considering the status as peasant farmers. It weighed heavily on the pockets, incomes and enthusiasm of beneficiaries. This was similar to early beneficiaries' situation because the BC was a source of initial crisis – an eliminating factor for many people who wanted to be within the project but could not afford to contribute any money towards it. For people who decided to pursue to prospects promised in Fadama III, loans were therefore helpful in paying the BC, in some cases, despite the instruction to desist from loans.

While beneficiary groups who took out loans may have 'disobeyed' the instruction or rule about loans in Fadama III, a more pertinent point to note here concerns the idea of BCs in the first place. This is when considered against the income levels of many grassroots poor who eagerly and genuinely believed in Fadama's promises. In setting BCs as a precondition – an exclusion criterion – the World Bank clearly set in motion a situation in which beneficiaries had to make rational decisions about Fadama. One of such decisions was to gamble with falling into debt instead of being excluded from the project – may be excluded LGAs would have benefitted their communities if they made this choice to borrow than be excluded instead of failing their people. The other decision would have been to abandon the project – a decision taken by individuals who eventually found Fadama III very daunting. However, FUGs that took loans to pay their BCs did so because beneficiaries believed in Fadama's prospects, and so the consequences of such loans must be seen from a deeper interrogation of the impact of the imposed BC condition on beneficiary groups. Thus, speaking about BCs and beneficiaries' experiences, a participant also stated:

> The money that I used in completing my own money [i.e. the beneficiary contribution of her group], an Anambra (state) person who sells iced-fish with me in *Woke-Oma* market at the UNIPORT junction ... was the person that I went to borrow money from which I used to complete the money for our counterpart fund (contribution). [After some pause] If that child was a bad person, the interest on that loan, I will not be able to repay it in a very long time. This is because that money – [the debt] – spent a lot of time with me (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

Beneficiaries' (ir)rational choice to take out loans and pay their BCs, and undertake some internal group actions designed to set their FUGs or cooperatives in motion – mostly after groups formation and in anticipation of Fadama's grant – is linked to hope. In other words, deciding to take loans was accompanied by an expectation that grants for groups would be

reasonably high to allow them to undertake their projects and also gradually commence the payment of their loans. As the funding section revealed, these expectations were not met as many of beneficiaries reported disparities between funds anticipated, and in some cases, funds promised. This accounted for the regret which characterised one of the early beneficiaries' responses about Fadama, specifically when asked about the BC and "what has the project done for her and her group":

> That counterpart fund ... personally is not good. If you want to assist me, assist me with the little you have then I can go on than asking me... [to pay money]. Those who are unable to provide the counterpart fund did not participate because there were unable to raise the money (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

She continued:

> ... [sighing in resignation] personally at the early stage I was trying to be somehow liking the project, but when I went into it, the project became a very big stress to me in that the expenses I started incurring because the group had not formally formed and people were not able to do contributions. So, I found the group stressful. Personally, I have not gained anything from the group. Rather, instead of gaining, I losed [lost] what I have. Even what I have even lost can make me get my own private processing equipments, and so much involvements paying FCA, transportation, paying for this, paying for that. You will run the group hoping that something will come out. When things come that you will at least have back your money. So, all these things, there is nothing; no gain. I have not gained anything, I lost (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

Another beneficiary also stated:

> When I begin to talk about this Fadama people, things get me angrier oh. I am telling you the truth. No matter that I did not do it with an individual face to face, I get angrier whenever I talk about it. The kind of long walks [literally stressful journeys], enormous borrowings, taken people's money and begin to pay back [these loans] when you have nothing that you are doing [i.e. no employment] (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

Although some beneficiaries, especially youth and vulnerable groups, had fairly different experiences with BCs since they were not required to pay it, some other beneficiaries reported pain and regrets. This is especially among individuals within groups who had to sacrifice their individual resources to ensure that their FUG projects worked. This included spending their own savings to cater for the beneficiary contribution of the group with the hope of recovering it when the grants are given; and spending their own resources, time and energy towards not only organising their FUGs but also repairing broken down machinery resulting from the actions of service providers. These issues and associated problems relative to fundraising for BCs, bureaucratic hurdles that delayed disbursements as well as inadequate support systems

and capacitation culminated in failure stories and feelings of abandonment, especially among early beneficiaries. Although the feeling was slightly different among late beneficiaries, these issues remain undoubtedly critical to consider in analysing Fadama III.

Failure Abandonment

One important finding that is worth highlighting in this study is the abandonment of failed stories. The early beneficiaries in the study noted that they were summarily dumped by Fadama implementers after their subprojects failed to live up to expectation or 'failed'. In fact, one can say that the challenges faced by the early beneficiaries led to failures and caused the project to be systematically abandoned. For example, the implementers labelled beneficiaries as 'empowered', without paying attention to the situations being faced by beneficiaries within the subprojects, simply because they had received the last tranche of the Fadama grant.[193] When FUGs in Ogbakiri faced serious challenges with the faulty processing machine acquired, the Fadama office gave initial support, but that support did not last long. In fact, they were left to deal with the issues themselves without adequate internal capital to do so.

There was a great need and pressure on the groups to keep the productive assets in effective working condition, even with enormous financial and emotional challenges. The result was that leaders were abandoned by their members who saw no future in the business. The Rivers state Fadama office which had tagged the group 'empowered' could not assist the leaders who sought its help at those very challenging periods of these subprojects. The subprojects collapsed, leaving financial and psychological burden on the leaders who shouldered the economic burdens of the group. The conversation below interestingly demonstrates the efforts put in place by one of such leaders to push on despite the struggles and lack of support. It also reveals the perception, within this community, about the RSFCO.

> ***I: Have you been thinking about how to make this project sustainable even though it has not been very productive or are you thinking of just abandoning it?***
>
> P: Well as an individual, my members have all run away. Formerly I was working with three women but when they saw that there was nothing going on, they left. But as an individual, I am still using my money to make sure that whether at least one of

[193] This term – 'empowered' – is used by officials to refer to beneficiaries whose subproject has become 'fully funded', and the FUG at that stage is no longer supposed to receive money from the IDA funds as part of the productive asset acquisition. Thus, when a particular subproject has had the final disbursement paid out to them, it is termed 'completed' and the beneficiaries are known to have been empowered. This can be seen in an official's averment that "over 7000 people have been empowered in Rivers state."

> the engines can be alive and to generate little little ... money even if we cannot come together let it be that that name is still existing and then any little thing that one gets can be dropped in the bank. If there will be other people who will be interested to join (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).
>
> P: Well as a chairman ... of an organisation it is not all that good to leave what is in your hand to die totally. You will try your best to see what you can do to sustain something that is placed in your care. If you can work and it cannot, well one cannot kill himself [or herself] provided. You cannot close eye[194] and leave it to die like that. I want it to be sustained like anything you are doing in Fadama they must remember the group. If there is any contribution they will remember the group. Like the other day they said that there is something to be done, they levied the groups, they came here [and] in the name of the group I had to do something. So, it needs to be sustained the group names will still continue to exist (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

This response also demonstrates something that is largely neglected in any of the official perspectives about beneficiaries, especially about failed stories. This is the continued quest and desire among many of them to continue striving; the willingness to attempt to save their subprojects, if only genuine assistance – financial and technical – was within their grasp. However, in many of the cases, this was not readily available.

It is noteworthy that once the project was termed 'completed', the implementers turned their focus to new areas, leaving beneficiaries to sort themselves out. The crucial attention which ought to have been accorded those subprojects as pilot projects requiring re-visitation were not accorded to them. Instead, beneficiaries felt abandoned as implementers seemed to look away. The conversation below demonstrates how early beneficiaries felt about this.

> ***I: How do you think the Fadama officials are implementing this project?***
>
> P: Well... it has taken long since I have not been to the office oh. Since ... this thing [group] is not going on well, I have never been there. Right from the time they gave us the new engine, and that engine too is not doing well. But what I know is that those areas there is something they, I think they make sure they see those side. There is no money [in] this area because they cannot come here and go empty hand: you can't give them drink; you can't give them transport money. So, there is nothing here, so they can't come. If they are coming in secret to see [things] I don't know (Participant-AWC1FUG, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

The forgoing suggests that it appeared easier to write-off this location and their subprojects as failure stories instead of appreciating the efforts being put and the latent resilience being

[194] To close one's eyes and do something is a local idiomatic expression which denotes forgetting upheavals, challenges and every obstacle to seek out someone's target or goals. It means that you have nothing to lose if you try your best and if you do try your best and it does not work then you won't have posterity accusing you of not trying at all. It's based on the saying that ones who fails to try tries to fail.

demonstrated. The 'failure stories' was liked to people who failed to understand the requirements of the project or failed to implement it according to the required modus operandi. Thus, it became more convenient for these implementers to go on with other projects in other locations and did not really bother about post-subproject advisory and remedial services which should have helped ailing subprojects.[195]

The beneficiaries perceived this situation as one of abandonment since they appeared neglected and lacked any real support during their crises. The apparent abandonment of groups by Fadama III implementers culminated in projects' failure as well as the summary abandonment of the project by the villagers themselves – they regretted that their investment in Fadama III failed to improve their lives and livelihood. Very importantly, their experiences rekindled massive distrust for 'government' development programmes, because they do not really seem to make any real, positive impression on the lives of the mostly rural poor beneficiaries, and Fadama III project did not show them otherwise.

6.5. Beneficiaries' Perspectives on Fadama III

The experiences highlighted above point to the reality of the implementation of Fadama III and its impact on the life of many beneficiaries of Fadama III in Rivers state and possibly other parts of the country (Bature et al., 2013).[196] In evaluating Fadama III, the level of confidence (or lack thereof); its' assumed potentials; its overall observed outlook and impact on their lives and communities adds up to the perspective of Fadama beneficiaries in the state. Their evaluative responses present a pessimistic viewpoint pertaining to the capacity of the development initiative to adequately elicit real empowerment for individuals – despite claims of the project as a possible and potential tool for social change. The evaluation of the project emanating from early Fadama beneficiaries in Rivers state is presented here as early beneficiaries' perspectives on Fadama III. Themes such as project funding, internal and external assistance (support networks), project's effectiveness, and lessons drawn from

[195] It is instructive to note that sensitisation was largely very poor among these early beneficiaries. There was little, or no form of advisory services provided to the earlier group because of the claim of lack of funds to the State Fadama implementers, a condition blamed on State government's failure in paying its Counterpart Fees between 2012 and 2014 (RM&E-FAP, Interview, 14 June, 2013).

[196] This study on the implementation of Fadama III in Abuja shows that despite the acquisition of productive assets, the Fadama beneficiaries still experienced decrease in their net income. This study attributes this to the impact of the 30 per cent beneficiary contribution imposed on would-be beneficiaries.

participation in the initiative set the stage for an assessment of the nature of the Fadama III implementation and its language of implementation.

Data available through the interviews convey an overall sense of unfulfilled promises. In fact, the overriding evaluation of the project among early beneficiaries was one of failed promises, and although some of the late beneficiaries share a rather optimistic perspective, elements of the implementation process show varying levels of an imperfect intervention. The failed promises associated with Fadama III in the Rivers state are drawn from a number of areas such as: disparity in amount of money promised and the actual funds given; the level of support promised and expected versus perception of abandonment; hope for better life turned to a deeper plunge into the mire of poverty; and monies and energies expended but never recovered (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

It follows that the hope of achieving the benefits promised within this project was largely unachieved for the early beneficiaries. Many of the late beneficiaries remained optimistic with their view that the initiative has been vital towards knowledge acquisition for entrepreneurial prowess and creating jobs for people who may not necessarily have the required skills to thrive in the corporate environment (Chairman, Interview, 2 February, 2013; Participant-PhD, Interview, 2 February, 2013). According to one of these beneficiaries, Fadama has been very helpful because it has "created job opportunities to us" and I have gained more knowledge from fishing and poultry management" (Chairman, Interview, 2 February, 2013). Another beneficiary noted that the initiative brought [business] enlightenment and that it is eye-opening. In fact, people now visit Fadama farms, and maybe from now people will start embarking on such kinds of projects (Participant-PhD, Interview, 2 February, 2013). Yet another beneficiary highlighted that the project has enlightened them – that is beneficiaries of the project – and as such "most people are regretting why they did not join..." (Etlorich, Interview, 2 February, 2013).

There is a variant voice amidst all these optimistic ones which disagrees that Fadama is an agent to improve lives in their community. This view draws from a perception that funding is too limited, and yet accompanied with vast responsibilities capable of making beneficiaries to abandon the project. Using his group's poultry financing as an example, this participant faulted the emphasis on a particular (small) and manual poultry type when this lacks the capacity of any meaningful impact. As a result, he noted:

> ... if you want to develop in other part[s] of the world or in locality here where you find World Bank is sponsoring them, we have a standard – mechanised – poultry... Why [did] they refuse to do that here so that we can be able to employ other people that [will] bring development... But this 10 by 15 is there; what can develop 15 members? It is not like that but we just ... take it because there is no hope anywhere. Let us find where we can earn a living and put a little bread on our table. That is why we are struggling ... to make sure that that thing is happening. So, I [can't] say [I] see it as a development because some people that did not have courage may fall on the road... they can decided [sic] to [say] 'okay, no hope no hope'... So, if it is something that maybe bring development: after this forming ... eh Fadama or starting this project that we are now, there is a place or there is a private [company] or there is some industrial bank eh loan like that they will attach to this cooperative(s) that are under this Fadama. Eh, that time we will look at it that okay, since Fadama start from here – these people sponsor us or give us loan – we can increase to a large number where it can become a source of developing us in our area. But with this standard that Fadama is giving to us in our locality now, I am telling you that without working hard [implying overworking], it will be like a politics, let me just tell you (Lekoo, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

This long excerpt culled from the view of this beneficiary presents a deeper meaning to the issue of the perceived impact or prospects of Fadama III in its current format and the implementation strategies therein. It highlights deep-seated concerns among people who conceive of development in a different light and are critically engaging the information fed to them as well as the project's implementation status within their immediate environment. The source of this participant's disagreement with the view that Fadama III portends improvement in the lives of its beneficiaries lies in the feeling of discontentment regarding the nature of the subprojects prescribed within the implementation plan within the location. This involves the size of FUGs, subprojects and accruable funding for such FUGs and subprojects. It also lies with the struggles associated with 'benefitting' from the project beyond the 'normal' struggles of ensuring that individual group's projects were properly managed for optimal growth. Each group had to struggle with several other challenges associated with the broader Fadama III project implementation such as low funding, lack of capacity building, and the absence of industrial banks to support SMEs or cooperatives growing and the search for loans to augment the small funds that were disbursed late. All these impacted negatively on the actualisation of any development prospects hence the view that the project does little in terms of improving the lives of its beneficiaries.

Some of the issues of discontentment highlighted here are ideally integral to the Fadama project, but the extent to which some beneficiaries were able to access these things tended to be very low. Many beneficiaries, as the early beneficiaries' experiences show, never got to access these components. This is also a point highlighted by the consultant hired by the Rivers

state government to undertake capacity building for beneficiaries in Rivers state – the consultancy is called *Noble's Consultants*. His view was that the implementation of Fadama in the South-South region of Nigeria was in no way near the same with its implementation in the Northern region where there are enormous credit facilities and support systems available to beneficiaries to improve their productivity (Orievulu, Field Note, 25 June 2013).[197] The implication of this observation is that implementation within the South-South, where Rivers state is also located, largely suffered from series of implementation lags partly because of lack of political will – defaults in counterpart fees commitments and the prioritisation of northern Nigeria. It also means that the same level of institutional support was not applied countrywide – this itself shows various levels of inequality even in the implementation process. That notwithstanding, many of the beneficiaries within Omanwa and Yeghe remained optimistic and mostly thankful for the establishment of Fadama III in their communities. They see it as a privilege to be able to benefit from the project.

Another important evaluation of the project had to do with the level of sensitisation and capacity building undertaken prior to the actual commencement of the implementation process. Early beneficiaries, specifically, complained a great deal of the lack of understanding of the project – many of them only learnt after their projects had failed. Some of these beneficiaries accuse the implementers of the project of misleading them.

A third evaluation emanating from these early beneficiaries suggests that the project lacks the capacity to bring about overarching and sustained improvements in the social and economic status of communities. This emanates from its disengagement with socio-political questions or activities that create awareness about the role of political position holders in government and the operators of the programme. The gap, participants opine, coupled with the loss of income contributed to disempower beneficiaries instead of empowering them. The strains beneficiaries experienced, and the financial and physical losses incurred within Fadama, negatively impact on the capacity to lead any form of socio-political dynamism and dramatic economic change for beneficiaries. Thus, only limited economic improvement in individual income and interaction levels are attainable through Fadama. This is because the problems of group dynamics and the challenges experienced by beneficiaries further reduced beneficiaries' ability to form cohesive units. Essentially, the negative impacts of Fadama III's problematic aspects – on the lives of beneficiaries – means limited possibilities to attain the minimum required

[197] This field note analysis draws from my observation of the capacity building workshop hosted in Yeghe Community and conducted by Noble Consultants under the auspices of the Rivers state Fadama office.

levels of socio-economic and political empowerment to contribute effectively towards social change. The lack of adequate capacity building in this regard even portends more scepticism for the social change discourse.

The perception of the Fadama initiative as a privilege draws from the view that only a select number of beneficiaries were chosen countrywide since Fadama was not open to so many poor communities and people in the country. Many beneficiaries thus considered themselves privileged to have been 'selected to benefit from the project, which they saw as devoid of government "meddling". The forms of exclusion, apparent in Fadama III, not only 'created' grateful beneficiaries, it also emboldened implementers to treat beneficiaries as beggars and inferior humans in their interaction with them. The picture below speaks volumes about this latter point: notice the man on the red carpet giving out cheques to beneficiaries and what it signifies.

PRESENTATION OF CHEQUES TO FADAMA GROUPS DURING THE 2011 WORLD FOOD DAY



Some of these attitudes towards beneficiaries are further exacerbated by consultants hired to 'educate' beneficiaries. The consultant who conducted a capacity building workshop – the first of its kind since Fadama III implementation in Rivers state – was shouting at a woman who was talking during the workshop and threatened to kick her out of the training. He also shouted down a beneficiary who asked a question for clarity. Instead of answering the question, the consultant called him "immature" and inattentive although his question was quite cogent

(Orievulu, Field Note, 25 June, 2013). These forms of interaction with beneficiaries, and their broader experiences for the early beneficiaries, turned privilege into disillusionment as the hope for better life was not realized. For the late beneficiaries, it keeps them docile and grateful irrespective of the fact that their voices did not really matter in the larger scheme of things.

A final evaluation worthy of note was the view that Fadama in comparison to a previous project in the community was disorganised. Beneficiaries compared the Fadama III project to a previous community project called "Enruoma". In this comparison they noted that Fadama lacked adequate planning and organisation, and that division of people into small groups did not really assist in effectiveness as planned (ibid). In comparison, Enruoma was a cooperative initiative for community women in which they creatively strategized about how to make their projects work and it was more successful in providing faster and more reliable services to people in the community than the Fadama project.

6.6. Participation, inclusion and agency: where lies power in Beneficiaries' experience?

In this Rivers state experience of Fadama III's implementation, the emphasis has been on the local beneficiaries of this initiatives: their 'hope-filled' expectations; engagement with the internalised implementation strategy of the state in the form of the similar modalities deployed among all beneficiary communities; the 'perceived' unfulfilled promises; and associated evaluation of the project. This chapter crucially engaged Fadama from the lens of the local beneficiaries who often than not are excluded from the deep analysis of the development interventions. Deeply engaging these experiences exposes all the actors implicated at this level of engagement – the Bank, the state and the beneficiaries. However, a central point revealed at this level concerns how the 'governmental' power over the Nigerian state 'productively' culminated in the implementation strategy which was established to (possibly) 'governmentalize' the beneficiaries – to shape them – according to the underlying ideology and philosophy of mainstream development thinking which Fadama is, I have argued, used to propagate, entrench and/or consolidate.[198]

Interview data from beneficiaries in this chapter suggests that the government's reconstitution of Fadama as a CDD project and its consequent propagation of the 'virtues', prospects and

[198] The challenge however was to ensure that the 'governmentalization' process succeeds – which this case study seems to negate.

achievements (in poverty reduction and community empowerment) of this project – the 'hope' discourse – was central to the cultivation of different types of expectations among beneficiaries. The government's adoption, adaptation and execution of 'mainstreamed' implementation strategies and methodologies, represented more than an attempt to simply integrate beneficiaries into these processes, exerting a form of liberal governance over them.[199] It also shows that these modalities – specifically the inclusive methodologies by which beneficiaries were constructed as active partners and drivers – raised an expectation among beneficiaries about the project and what they can desire, and the modalities towards achieving their desires. This follows that some likely 'undesired' and 'irrational' expectations (may have) ensued thus militating against the actualisation of the objectives – spoken or unspoken – of Fadama III among these beneficiary communities.

The data also suggest that many of the 'failures' witnessed in Rivers state, and portrayed in this chapter, can be linked to the introduction – better yet, an imposition – of ideas and techniques to drive this initiative. The 'mainstreamed' participatory strategies employed were designed based on a unitary or homogenous construction of communities culminating in a one-size-fits-all model of development engineering. It follows that the consultation and sensitisation, group formation and its associated dynamics, the funding strategy, its tranche-based disbursement and BC model, and their associated procurement procedures were applied across board without an adequate or intentional attempt to be context specific. This is a major reason why many development initiatives have failed, especially in Africa because they are based on a construction of countries, communities and their needs in a manner that "bears little relation to the prevailing realities" (Ferguson, 1994, p. 176; Ferguson, 1994). When there is a preconceived idea of what people need to develop, it follows that embarking on the so-called community/ beneficiary consultations and sensitisation and applying the CNA, PNA, PRA and RRA simply represented a legitimation exercise – ticking the 'box' of integrating beneficiaries into the planning process.

[199] That is, expecting beneficiaries to conform – as rational actors like the state, choosing to conform – to the modalities of mainstream development thinking because it helps to actualise its own strategic interest. While this is possible in this case, this expectation faces off against series of local expectations about the project based on how it had been constructed and 'sold' to beneficiaries (as addressing their needs). Many of these beneficiaries' expectation may have shocked the government and the donor – may have been unexpected – but the fact is that the incentives are different as well as the leverage available to the different actors. While in the context of the donor-state relations, it is about a loan that must be repaid as well as future prospects for development assistance; for beneficiaries-state-donor relation, it is a grant, and the state has the responsibility of driving grassroots development even as the beneficiaries believe that the project is government's initiative. Thus, with more interest in surviving and the minimal fear of losing donor-funding, beneficiaries' incentives to abide by all rules and conform to every system may be different and minimal than the donor or the state would have expected.

Francis Cleaver criticises this approach to development as "unsatisfactory" because it emanates from a "strong" but misplaced "assumption in development that there is [only] one identifiable community in any location..." (Cleaver, 1999, p. 603). In his view, when a community is defined within the ambient of a development strategy such as Fadama, this necessary creates exclusions because it clearly identifies "those who are 'included' in rights, activities, benefits and those who are excluded because they do not belong to the defined entity" – the community which is presented as a "kind of natural, desirable social entity imbued with all sorts of desirable values..." (ibid). However, as argued above, this homogenization of beneficiaries, and the consequent adoption or imposition of a homogenous implementation approach, is at the heart of many of the noted shortfalls of Fadama III within different communities in Rivers state.

The foregoing – interview data – seems to suggest that Fadama III witnessed series of failed attempts at adequately '*governmentalizing*' beneficiaries – directing them to the desired cause of action. This culminated in the recourse by government, through the NFCO, to the use of subtler forms of coercion – using rubrics and a possible carrot and stick approach. The role of the discourse of participation and inclusion in 'imposing' ideas and models on beneficiaries seem apparent but also nuanced at the same time. This is especially when analysed in terms of the nature of power relations at play at this level of Fadama III implementation and experience. In this light, an engagement with critiques of participatory development is crucial to engender a deeper understanding of how, beyond governmentality, beneficiaries of Fadama III experienced the impact of power within the various techniques and modalities that they were subjected to.

Participation as process and "anti-politics machine"

As this study has shown, Fadama III is rooted within the family of participatory development interventions known as CDD projects. What this means is that it prides itself as a highly inclusive strategy aimed to put beneficiaries in charge of actualising their own development prospects. To actualise these, a plethora of methodologies was introduced and implemented and various 'inclusive' and 'social capital-building' components were also mooted to get beneficiaries to engage more effectively in the processes of Fadama's project design, implementation and governance, monitoring and evaluation. However, the extent to which these reflected genuine inclusion and indeed beneficiaries' participation remains in doubt.

Drawing on the critiques of participation, and indeed participatory development, the findings associated with beneficiaries' experiences suggest that the inclusive discourse within Fadama obfuscates the reality of the programme. Cleaver's (1999) idea of 'invited spaces' puts this in perspective demonstrating how processes within development initiatives are used by development institutions and practitioners to show how beneficiaries are integrated or are contributing to the initiative. The chapter reveals that there is so much emphasis on processes within Fadama III. These include: the establishment of guidelines; the use of templates for needs identification and assessment, reporting, monitoring and evaluation; and beneficiary obligations and actions amongst.[200]

These correlate with what Cleaver (1999) refers to as the "tyranny of techniques" in that participation has been summarily reduced to a bunch of techniques thrust down on the targets of development because these techniques are adjudged to be the "solution to locally based development" (Cleaver, 1999, p. 600). This focus on processes, deemed to be the best way to actualise the goals of Fadama III within beneficiary communities and groups, therefore detracts from the purpose of participation as a tool for radical social change (Leal, 2007).[201] One of the reasons here lies in the warped idea that "considerations of power and politics on the whole should be avoided" because they are perceived as "divisive and obstructive" (Cleaver, 1999, p. 598). Interestingly, this attempt to remove politics from development planning reiterates what Ferguson (1990; 1994) refers to as the "anti-politics" machine.

While Ferguson (1990, 1994) emphasised how the "development apparatus" in Lesotho served as an "anti-politics" machine used to de-politicise the development interventions which in their very nature were inherently political, in this case Fadama was de-politicised and participation was crucial in this process.[202] This was mainly through the conscious integration of participation as synonymous with the various processes within which beneficiaries were locked in – processes of planning and executing project plans, series of meetings and procurement processes – which facilitated the neglect or total abandonment of the social change component of the CDD approach within which Fadama was integrated.

[200] For example, prospective beneficiaries were required to hold frequent meetings to ascertain the legitimacy of their cooperative and to build group dynamics. They were also required to open a certified current (bank) account with a reasonable amount of money within it to prove that they are really into a business venture.
[201] In fact Cornwall and Brock (2005) and Leal (2007) insist that these processes are the imitation of what participation entailed as a radical form of collective action required to achieve radical transformation.
[202] Note here that even Fadama beneficiaries de-linked the project from politics because of this same 'disruptive' tendency which Cleaver (1999) alludes to.

In incorporating beneficiaries within these processes, where politics has been removed from the agenda, one can argue that this amounts to controlling them through rubrics – guidelines – instead of enabling them to take up the spaces and decide the courses of action to take based on the identified transformative needs around them. Fadama beneficiaries became subjects of power engrossed in processes and 'spaces' that they were invited into as opposed to creating those spaces. It became rather difficult to radically critique the socio-political and economic structures in a bid to drive social change. Since participation, as defined by the World Bank, also entails consultation, beneficiaries were ostensibly consulted. They could speak, and to feel included, their ideas and concerns as well as verbal inputs were heard. However, these were hardly incorporated into the design or implementation: those were already pre-designed prior to any beneficiary community consultations.[203] These are elements of power dynamics and asymmetries as far as participation is concerned in development.

Participation as 'Presence'

Beside the manifestation of participation in Fadama III in the form of processes and 'techniques', beneficiary inclusion within this project was less meaningful. Meaningful participation here refers to an adequate incorporation of their perspectives in the design of the project based on their needs; effectively contributing to the direction of the project in a broad sense; and sufficiently taking up spaces as political agents to demand accountability even within the context of the project. The findings associated with beneficiaries' participation in Fadama III however can be likened to a simple 'presence' or representation within the project's processes. This was all about 'being present' during consultations, sensitisation exercises, meetings, capacity building workshops, and needs identification and assessment processes within different participating FCAs, and possibly choosing areas of economic interest to pursue within the 'pre-defined' scope of Fadama III. It was somewhat all about 'ticking boxes' where necessary, for official implementers, to demonstrate depth of beneficiaries' inclusion. This correlates with findings about participatory processes within various PRSPs across Africa in which diverse stakeholders were invited to identify various needs, but in spite of the relatively genuine outcomes of such processes, the final documents did not truly reflect the voices of the poor (Abrahamsen, 2004a). In this light, participation simply implied presence – 'filling seats'

[203] Also, the control of resources or funds linked to pro-poor development strategies are controlled by the donors and government. So, they literally set the broader agenda associated with such development strategies irrespective of the immediate agendas within the reach of the beneficiaries.

– and ticking boxes to show local – or poor – voices where invited to the conversation space even if the end-product of such processes did not truly represent their views.

Participation as Local Resistance: Beneficiary radical agency

The foregoing notwithstanding, participation within Fadama III also entailed taking up spaces. While the overarching experience demonstrated an "invited" space where beneficiaries were "invited to participate by ..." official Fadama implementing partners within the context of "one-off forms of consultations", opportunities to claim such spaces were still evident (Cornwall, 2004, p. 76; Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 35). In other words, Fadama III beneficiaries as the study found were able to maximise the opportunities created through the project. They were able to seek out loans from different sources when the Fadama grant was delayed or when their subprojects were struggling. This contradicted the 'order' that beneficiaries should not take loans to undertake their projects. Cornwall Notes:

> The contrast ... between spaces that are chosen, fashioned and claimed by those at the margins – those 'sites of radical possibility' – and spaces into which those who are considered marginal are invited, resonates with some of the paradoxes of participation. Yet the boundaries between such spaces are untenable: those who participate in any given space are also, necessarily, participants in orders; moving between domains of association, people carry with them experiences and expectations that influence how they make use of their agency when they are invited to participate, or when they create their own spaces (Cornwall, 2004, p. 78).

This excerpt represents the other part of participation within Fadama which draws more from an analysis of beneficiaries' engagement with and navigation of the entire Fadama III processes. Beneficiaries in certain situations 'broke' some rules based on their understanding of their own needs in contrast to implementers' instructions and expectations. In a bid to make the most of the opportunity created through Fadama III, some beneficiary communities consciously designed strategies. These strategies enabled them to 'side-step' the procurement procedure which required them to simply hand over cheques to service providers without controlling what was being procured. Indeed, for the implementers, this meant "collusion" (Participant-Fab-II, Interview, 29 November, 2012). But, judging from experiences such as those of the early beneficiaries whose experiences with service providers were not favourable, this can be seen as a form of 'resistance' and 'owning' or claiming the process. This goes to show that local beneficiaries of Fadama III, in many cases, were not simply inactive agents – without any form of agency – who just 'stood and watched' while the Fadama processes were 'imposed' on them.

Participation and social change

This active agency of beneficiaries of Fadama represents an important aspect of participation which emerges within this study. From an implementation point of view, participation was a means to an end. Fadama III was an avenue for actualising the growth-poverty reduction nexus, and beneficiary inclusion was the key. It may be recalled that Fadama belongs to the family of CDD projects which are said to increase social capital, social cohesion, empowerment and eventually sustainable development and growth (J.-L. Arcand & Bassole, 2007; Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010; Dongier et al., 2003; Labonne & Chase, 2011; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). For example, Labonne and Chase's (2011) study of the KALAHI-CIDSS project in the Philippines found "increased participation in village assemblies" and "a positive impact on" improving trust for strangers – "local officials" or external organisations (Labonne & Chase, 2011, p. 348; Orievulu, 2014).

Participation here culminates in social capital improvement as the study argues, and as Arcand and Bassole's evaluation of the *Programme Nationale d'Infrastructures Rurales* (PNIR) in Senegal suggests, these CDD projects also impact positively on improving "access to clean water", "health services" and progress in the fight against "child malnutrition" due their inclusiveness and demand-driven processes (J.-L. Arcand & Bassole, 2007, p. 1). Many other studies also point to various prospects and positive impacts of the participatory components of CDD projects like Fadama, especially in heralding grassroots empowerment which can serve to positively lead to social change (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010; Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Platteau, 2004; Wienecke, 2005).

In the same light, official perspectives of Fadama III have emphasised the vitality of the various processes within Fadama – consultations, sensitisation, capacity building, PRA, CNA or PNA. Internal group dynamics are said to lead to social capital improvement, social cohesion, collective action and improved incomes amongst others. Apart from minimal gains in income generation and collective action within the context of subprojects – this is even questionable - beneficiaries' experiences from this study demonstrate that the prospects of social cohesion, collective action and social change appear relatively far-fetched. The prospects for social change are even worsened by the dissociation of participation, within Fadama as with many mainstream 'development' contexts, from politics and power relations based on the perspective that these are obstructive and disruptive (Cleaver, 1999; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004).

Indeed, beneficiaries' experiences suggest that participation within Fadama would struggle to achieve most of these goals of social cohesion and social change. This correlates with findings of Labonne and Chase (2011) that CDD projects did not increase community meetings to discuss issues outside the context of the donor-funded projects. Although there seemed to be more trust for and openness to strangers, collective action was hardly achieved. This is in fact evident in the beneficiaries' experiences, especially in terms of group dynamics, as FUGs and FCAs struggled in some cases to adequately meet to move their projects forward. When this is the case, it becomes difficult to imagine any adequate future collective action outside the scope of Fadama aimed at actualising different goals, including social change.

It also resonates with the view that the insistence of the World Bank on beneficiaries financial contributions to CDD projects and the continued top-down approach to implementing these projects remained major shortfall of participation within these projects (Wienecke, 2005, pp. 31–34). Like Fadama where the goal was to increase beneficiaries' income, and as such food security and reduced poverty, the imposition of fees – even one-time fees – as a way of enforcing participation and ownership is tantamount to creating "an additional strain on the already limited financial resources of the poorest of the poor" (Wienecke, 2005, p. 34). It follows that the practice of participation – the discourse of inclusion – within Fadama III remained mostly problematic especially when considered in the light of the World Bank's growth-led poverty reduction perspective.

Participation, Partnership and Power in Fadama III

The experiences associated directly with the Fadama III project among beneficiaries were highlighted in this study in terms of categories such as consultation and sensitisation; group formation and subprojects choices, as well as group dynamics; beneficiary contribution – including vulnerable groups; and funding, procurement and service provider. Issues such as the absence of support systems, abandonment due to failure and tacit corruption within bureaucratic hurdles also formed integral aspects of these implementation experiences. The rules and regulations that were so laid out for beneficiaries to follow were designed in such a way to enhance participation and empower beneficiaries in the drive towards enhancing food security and poverty reduction, but these beneficiaries had to choose if to abide by these rules or fail to be part of the project. This is one of the major forms of participation that the Fadama project presents – it also shows the underlying nature of power dynamics therein as the local

citizens were somewhat hard-pressed to make the best decision in this regard as it pertains to doing what is best in other to have a glimpse of the supposed 'promises' of Fadama III.

In exploring elements of power relation from the foregoing, in explicit relation to the experience of the implementation process of Fadama III among the community beneficiaries, it can be said that despite claims that various categories of beneficiaries were allowed to run their FUGs and to make decisions based on what they perceived to be right, the fact that these groups were still bound by the aforementioned issues implies that genuine participation was questionable while power was obviously being exerted on them. It is in this light that a statement by one beneficiary is instructive. He noted that "... anything that they don't want, you cannot do it... everything that you will do, you have to do it by their *order"* (Piaso Poultry, Interview, 25 June, 2013).

This view, in fact, presupposes a great deal of control within this invited form of participation in Fadama III. Although it can be argued that such forms of control may not necessarily be opposed to the overall good of these beneficiaries (Abrahamsen, 2004b) but it nevertheless shows a great deal of power inequality and obfuscates the ideal of participation in this development initiative. In the same vein, the existence of 'gatekeeper' or 'sentinel' institutions within this implementation process – institutions established to ensure its adequate implementation. The fact that the community beneficiaries remain somewhat answerable to these institutions (while the reverse is hardly the case), goes to some length to show the nature of power relations existent in the implementation of Fadama III. This is because the project and its implementation involve those procedures, rules and an important institution to execute it.

This institution – the Fadama office – has the power to (dis)approve beneficiaries' LDPs and disburse funds to the beneficiaries (or not) based (sometimes) on the whims of the officials working there. The office wields enormous powers over the beneficiaries as far as these disbursements and the giving out of instructions are concerned – especially since these local people have no direct access to the World Bank. (This is even if there is a said hotline that can be used which many of them do not know about and have no access to.) Within this context, it is also the case that beneficiaries' participation or acceptance of Fadama (and subsequent submission to the idiosyncrasies of the Fadama officials) is purely borne out of their needs and also facilitated by the promise (made to them) of a better life through the project.

It can be said therefore, that beneficiaries' adherence to the rules, procedures and sometimes excesses noted within the Fadama project is explained by two major reasons: one, the fear of exclusion and failing to benefit from the project; and two, the understanding that keeping the rules and following the model being driven by the implementers of the project could guarantee them economic sustainability. Whatever sacrifice that could be made became part and parcel of the motivation towards ensuring that they are 'likeable' and open enough to be funded. It must be noted that such motivations for participating in the project do not seem very empowering especially in the radical sense of the word. It also shows a great deal of insecurity and uncertainty for these beneficiaries and this does not mean well for partnership because partnerships are not built on fear but on mutual interests.

Tracking back to the other specifically highlighted experiences associated with the Fadama project (among these beneficiaries) above, questions around the extent of participation resurface. These problematize the very idea of partnerships within Fadama – the intensity of power inequality herein is the major anchor point here. An example of these experiences involves the idea of the formation of groups for potential beneficiaries to participate in and/or benefit from the project. This idea did not emanate from the beneficiaries, but they were 'instructed' to do it, and they 'understood' the importance of forming these groups for the purposes outlined in this project.[204] The idea of group formation, it has been said, was part of a pre-planned process or developed procedure. What this implies is that local beneficiaries in Rivers state, and maybe their entirety across Nigeria, were not really consulted. They did not participate in deciding that cooperative groups are the best ways to deliver the goals set for Fadama III. They were neither at the forefront of the idea – they did not push the government for this because they needed it – and neither were they invited to participate in this process. Instead, they were only informed about it during some of the consultations and sensitisations undertaken. (These were themselves more elitist in nature because the rural farmers and widows did not participate in these sessions.) The idea of partnership seems defeated as far as the decision to implement the project in this cooperative format without an adequate prior buy-in from rural beneficiaries. This also shows its own kind of power dynamics in terms of the imposition of ideas and strategies on local communities with the hope that they will 'own' it and run with it since it is for their own good.

[204] Some of these include social cohesion for undertaking group and community subprojects and thus improving productivity and growth within the communities and the broader region.

Community beneficiaries had the freedom to reject the above idea if it did not suit their interest. This is one clear area to demonstrate the freedom to choose. However, such a choice has its consequences. It meant risking exclusion from Fadama – a project which could potentially be a catalyst for possible economic empowerment which they desperately needed, and which the project promised. This situation left many potential beneficiaries – local farmers, widows and unemployed youths – with little or no choice to accept or reject the conditions placed before them. In fact, this situation demonstrates a lot of unequal power relations and shows a great deal of subtle imposition of development strategies on people.

Finally, the consultation, sensitisation and capacity building processes showed levels of the power imbalance between the facilitators and the beneficiaries, even in the locations that were dubbed 'success' stories by the implementers of the project. These facilitators in many instances dished out instructions to the people because these people are perceived as not knowing what they are doing. This attitude draws a great deal from the kinds of relationship apparent between the Fadama office and the beneficiaries as highlighted above.

6.7. Implications of the beneficiaries' experiences

In her book *Decolonising Interventions* Sabaratnam (2017) criticised methodological processes of research design and analytical processes that tend to critique development interventions in the global South but bypass its targets. Her critique of these aspects of the critical development debate centres on the premium that she places on the experiences and perspectives about interventions as they emanate from these 'targets of development' – beneficiaries. This entails a research methodology and an analytic process built on an analysis of interventions drawn from beneficiaries of development programmes. These experiences in her view vitally engender a deeper engagement with modalities of development interventions as well as its impact on the lives of these so-called beneficiaries of development projects. It follows that experiences associated with the implementation of interventions have imbued consequences for communities or individuals – in terms of adequate involvement in development planning or the actualisation of expectations – within this context. This situation resonates a great deal with the reported findings pertaining to beneficiaries' expectations, experiences and evaluation of Fadama III and its implementation within communities. The components identified come with various implications for them and the broader development architecture where models are

readily reproduced without an adequate appreciation of the uniqueness of various contexts and communities.

A major finding bearing enormous implications for Fadama III is the inadequacy of consultations and sensitisation – sensitisation failure. As shown in the case of the early beneficiaries, this failure eventually led to poor grasp of the intricacies of the project, resulting in mistakes from the beneficiaries in the implementation or management of their projects and subprojects. It must be stated that although the late beneficiaries reported a slight improvement in this regard, the implementation was still not near perfect. The relatively more improved sensitisation process was useful in enabling late beneficiaries to grasp the project better and also how to manage their projects but many FCAs and FUGs struggled to adequately grasp the full requirements of Fadama III.

As such despite the *instruction* to desist from collecting loans, beneficiaries in Yeghe and Gbeneyeagoro cross-FCAs went about collecting loans from the LGA to assist them in undertaking the project with the hope that the Fadama funds would be able to assist them pay back. They later discovered that the amount of money approved for them was much lower than the loan they had taken – this plunged them deep into panic.[205] Added to this, is the fact that the capacity building or education sessions tended to be like instruction sessions as opposed to interactive workshops. They appeared more as publicity stunts to demonstrate the dedication of the RSFCO to drive the implementation process forward instead of a concerted effort to adequately capacitate beneficiaries where necessary and also incorporate them within the process.

While it could be easily stated that these EIGs or FUGs, as cooperatives, should know how to manage their groups and projects, the fact remains that many local Fadama beneficiaries are poor. They are largely uneducated in the capacity, system design and professional business attitude of the particular developmental strategy they had to apply themselves to. Adequate sensitisation is a critical component of any inclusive development initiative. It is important to highlight that within the context of Fadama, poor sensitisation impacted negatively on beneficiaries' overall grasp of the project culminating in some of those who initially believed that the grant being provided was meant to be shared. It had an adverse effect on the specific targets of the project. Because while the goals mooted by the World Bank and the government

[205] Observation from researcher's first attendance of the Joint-FCA meeting of Yeghe and Gbeneyeagoro FCAs in January 2013.

included improved individual and household income, improved agricultural productivity and improved access to markets for agricultural produce from rural farmers, they were largely unattained because the beneficiaries did not adequately understand the goals of the project. Sometimes, these goals also seemed too far off since beneficiaries had immediate needs to satisfy.

It is crucial to note that poor sensitisation impacted negatively on groups' crises management. In this context, facilitation or the role of the facilitators allocated to different groups or communities is critical in not only enabling beneficiaries to have a full grasp of the project, but also in assisting them to effectively avert management crises. As the experiences showed, some facilitators were inefficient and contributed to the procurement mistakes groups recorded. This created ultimate doubts that resulted in the crises and bad experiences noted among early beneficiaries.

Groups' formation, and subproject choices, was another experience that had negative impacts on the beneficiaries as noted in the data. The views from the respondents showed that some people were grouped together against their choice. Although this does not necessarily mean that such arrangements may not work, it nonetheless has an impact on their participation in these groups. A situation in which an old, visually impaired, woman was chosen as a secretary of a particular *Cassava Processing FUG* in Ogbakiri[206] points to the extent to which enforced group formation can inhibit progress. It shows just one aspect of the negative impact; the other aspect involves the highlighted facet of group membership shared across the length and breadth of the community which made it almost difficult for them to harness themselves effectively for progressive economic activities. Groups struggled to have aligned interests, and the distance between villages where productive assets were located, as well as squabbles between people from previously conflicting villages, compounded the situation. It can be said that the experience of groups' formation and dysfunctional group dynamics culminated in more challenges regarding the sustainability of the project among early beneficiaries.

Funding experience also negatively impacted (early) beneficiaries. The stipulated BC which potential beneficiaries were required to pay also de-incentivised the poor. This was especially the case for Ogbakiri where groups were formed by internally displaced persons. While the BC is relatively small based on the estimation of the official government implementers of the

[206] Recall that one of the participants narrated the situation in which a blind elderly woman was chosen as her secretary even before the group had converged (Participant-AWC12FUG, Interview, 17 July, 2013).

project, it must be noted that many of the beneficiaries are poor rural farmers with little or no income or starting afresh to find a means of livelihood. To raise the BC, groups had to tax their respective members and, based on the experiences highlighted in relation to funding, many of these people were unable to pay the money. Many of them began to abandon the group, making it even more difficult to continue the groups' stride towards getting the grant required to commence their subproject implementation.

The other impact of the imposition of the BC was that it led to a situation in which groups or individual members of the groups either had to take loans to raise the required base capital upon which the IDA grant will be paid. The decision to solicit loans or use personal saving emerged from two beliefs: one, the grant to be received would be enough to settle the loan and continue with the project implementation; and two, that the personal capital can be retrieved as soon as the subproject grant has been disbursed. The experiences showed that none of these beliefs became true. The disparity in the amount initially promised and the amount received implied two things: firstly, that the approved project amount was largely inadequate to offset loans taken by groups to undertake the project; and secondly, that the disbursed amount of the money was not sufficient for effectively implementing subprojects. In the end, some groups were plunged into financial crises. Individuals could not retrieve the capital deposited as BC. Some members also lost considerable amounts of their life savings to the project, and that created strong impact on the attitude of people towards the initiative. Even though, funds disbursement arrangement for the Fadama project may be argued to be intended to create a sense of belonging on these early beneficiaries, its implications for people's outlook and attitude towards the initiative appeared calamitous.

The absence of support for the beneficiaries proved to be another very important experience. As highlighted above, support systems for beneficiaries were largely non-existent. For example, there were no civil society organisations or Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) actively involved in the implementation or monitoring processes or providing groups with advisory services. The ADP was never really on the ground to provide this support; capacity building exercises were not really organised for these early beneficiaries.[207] Ill-preparedness for the project sensitisation, ineffective and inefficient facilitation and the lack of adequate capacity building and systems' support literally forced beneficiaries to 'throw in the towel'. The RSFCO in Port Harcourt also appeared incapable of assisting since it was constrained in

[207] It should be noted that Fadama III was billed to close in December 2013 before it was extended to 2017.

terms of the amount of money it could disburse. That there were no NGOs actively involved in the implementation of the project and to speak on their behalf or pressurise the government or implementers or even report cases directly to the World Bank implied that beneficiaries struggled all alone and battled-on without adequate help.

Bad experiences of beneficiaries lead to failure stories in relation to development initiatives targeted at poor people. However, bad experiences alone do not culminate in these failure stories. They are helped a great deal by the neglect of 'failure stories' by the implementers of the project – the World Bank, the Government and its parastatals which is the Fadama office. Even though these early beneficiary locations, like Ogbakiri community, served mostly as pilot areas of the project implementation in Rivers state the fact that labels such as unserious, lazy, and outliers are used to describe them irrespective of their experiences show the extent to which implementers are committed to adequately address poverty at the core of these development projects. The reality is thus that instead of empowerment, many of the beneficiaries of the project in Rivers state were impoverished and even disempowered.

6.8. Conclusion

This chapter has narrated the lived experiences of some of the beneficiaries of the Fadama III project in Rivers state. It highlighted the expectations and experiences of grassroots beneficiaries of the initiative as well as their overall evaluation of the initiative based on their experiences. It also showed the implications of these experiences for the sustainability of the Fadama project among early beneficiaries based on the impacts it had on their individual and groups' lives. The project at the onset promised a great deal in terms of improvement in the lives of beneficiaries who were impoverished by a devastating communal crisis, but empirical evidence suggests that was not achieved.

The chapter showed that the reason for which many beneficiaries accepted Fadama – the promise of poverty alleviation – was defeated. Many of them complained about the difficulties experienced within its processes, including becoming mired in debts or losing all their savings because of their participation in the project. The findings thus show a great feeling of regret and abandonment among these beneficiaries because of their participation in the project. The fact that both consultation and sensitisation showed elements of the old top-down approach

implies that the implementers of Fadama III still lack trust in the capacity of people to identify their own problems and adequately actualise it with minimal censorship.

It means that some of the sensitisation deficits as noted above will lead to mistakes in the future – the experience of the early beneficiaries will not be the last. More still, the fact that beneficiaries had to fulfil various criteria as laid out in a manual, especially in areas marked as specified 'positive list' projects, implies that their choices remained limited. Broadly, it shows that no real consultations were undertaken in the first place, thus the beneficiaries had to make do with what they were given. They remained practically dependent on the Fadama grant – 'aid handouts' – and had to abide by the rules of the project. This does not mean that they do not try to deviate in some ways, hence the view that they sometimes do what they like instead of what they are supposed to do.

The question of perceived tacit corruption and bureaucratic hurdles within the implementing institution as mooted by some of the beneficiaries provides another cause for alarm. The fact that beneficiaries felt that their files were being deliberately delayed because some officials wanted to be bribed is an indictment of the personnel working within this institution. This dents the image of the Fadama office and engenders mistrust towards the officials. Besides that, the delays could also cost some beneficiaries the opportunity to use certain productive assets, which they may have acquired. More still it could lead to a loss of interest in participating in the initiative thus depriving people of the promised empowerment.

The absence of other possible networks of support such as NGOs working together in the implementation of the Fadama III project in Rivers state implies that independent monitoring of the project is largely non-existent in spite of the official position that there are independent monitors. It means that when crises arise for late beneficiaries, there will be little or no support from outside – government, NGOs or other external actors – to assist them weather the storm. This is another recipe for failure as people would then have enough reasons to abscond and totally leave the project.

To conclude, Sabaratnam's (2017) critique of methodological and analytical exclusion of targets of interventions indicts many scholarly discussions on the role of external donors that fail to prioritise the experiences and perspectives of the real people. These people are at the receiving end of these initiatives of development programmes. This chapter's focus on the local beneficiaries' experiences of Fadama III in Rivers state remedies this, contributing to filling this gap. By engaging with how beneficiaries navigate and negotiate different development

interventions targeted at them while at the same time negotiating their everyday hustles and hassles. This approach gives back agency and 'subjecthood' to local beneficiaries of the Fadama project in Rivers state. The findings that were explored also reinforce the vitality of creating the nexus between lived experiences of development interventions and the analytic framework of inclusive development and associated power asymmetries. This would more effectively engender a better understanding of the relationship between the global development discourse, its national implementation and the grassroots experiential narratives around Fadama as it pertains to all the actors involved and the nature of power relations between them.

Chapter 7

Summary and Conclusion

7.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, this study used three unique levels of analysis, drawing on interdependent theoretical lenses, to demonstrate that Fadama III was conceptualised as an instrument within a broader development agenda promoted by the World Bank in developing countries. The quest to institute or promote, if not consolidate, the neoliberal, market-driven, economic model within the domestic economy – even in hitherto subsistent rural economies – therefore animated the establishment of mechanisms and strategies to implement Fadama to achieve 'food security' and 'poverty reduction'.

The vitality of these two goals in the advancement of the largely unspoken goal of inculcating capitalist ideals – profit-orientation, competition and surplus production – within the rural population cannot be under-estimated. This is, as the different chapters demonstrate, because these concepts created strong avenues to establish layers of control and spheres of influence over decision-making processes among Fadama beneficiaries.[208] The 'novel' participatory techniques applied to Fadama III were thus vital in creating a sense of belonging among beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the roadmap introduced to them to assist them out of poverty seemed to emphasise more production for profit, (more) markets, and (more) business partners like microfinance banks for loans. Indeed, it emphasised more private sector partnerships to provide the necessary materials for the project and communities. These draw from the overarching perspective within the World Bank that poverty reduction is possible through economic growth's trickle-down effect, led by the private sector.

Experiences linked to the implementation process of Fadama III, drawn from the targets of the programme in Rivers state, shed deeper light on the pitfalls of the implementation process as well as the broader development architecture. It is a problem associated with the diagnosis of a development challenge, by external actors, with an already laid-out agenda on how to tackle it. It involves the age-old development problem of 'painting everyone and every situation with the same brush'; treating communities, targets or beneficiaries as homogenous within programming; and attempting to create or establish new communities or 'cultures' within a

[208] These were in the sense of what different groups and/or communities could or could not do, and how best they could do these things to achieve the best possible outcomes.

context that already has its ways of doing things (Ferguson, 1990, 1994). This is also the age-old problem of top-down development planning and programming where participation remains simply a token while the old power dynamics remain unchanged. It is a scenario in which targets of development remain largely constructed as people who do not know how to, or cannot help themselves, hence the need for an outsider to show them the 'true path'. In fact, it is also a scenario in which many critiques of donor-led interventions have "methodologically" and "analytically" excluded the targets of development interventions – denying them "political subjecthood", "agency" and a sense of "history" (Sabaratnam, 2017).

This chapter summarises all these findings to demonstrate how these important development issues facilitate the reproduction of systems of unequal power relation even within a post-Washington consensus era of development planning ostensibly characterised by inclusiveness and a pro-poor agenda. By interrogating how the mainstream economic and development perspective shapes the construction of food security, and modalities to actualise it as part of a poverty reduction strategy, this chapter reiterates the argument that discourses such as food security and poverty reduction help to institutionalise and inculcate the hegemonic neoliberal development agenda and its attendant 'economic rationality'[209] within the local socioeconomic space.

Additionally, this analysis unveils elements of power relations between the World Bank and the Nigeria government at all levels. This relates to the government's adoption of the modalities of the CDF for Fadama as well as its acceptance of the obligation to "own" Fadama and also emphasise 'local ownership' for target communities and beneficiaries. The analysis also demonstrates other levels and manifestations of power relations, especially as it pertains to local beneficiaries and their experience of Fadama III. The modalities of project implementation and the issues related to consultations, funding, support systems and failure abandonment, as emanating issues, show the shortfalls of programme implementation and its strategies. They also demonstrate highly skewed power dynamics that affect beneficiaries who are targeted by development interventions.

This appraisal feeds into this study's major aims: to explore the nature of power relations between multilateral donors like the World Bank and African aid-dependent states like Nigeria;

[209] Williams (1999) analyses how the World Bank uses pro-poor development strategies to create an economic man among the developing countries where these strategies are implemented.

and to interrogate the extent to which targets of development are included to actively participate in development planning for their own development.

7.2. Recap of Research findings: Perspectives from the Bank, Government and Beneficiaries

Mainstreaming neoliberal ideals through Fadama

To understand the World Bank's perspective about Fadama, one must look back at changes within the Bank itself. Under Wolfensohn, the World Bank ensured that Fadama was reconstituted as an inclusive and pro-poor initiative structured in line with the principles of the CDF. Thus post-1999 Fadama's reflected the changing principles within the World Bank. As chapter three showed, Fadama's reconfiguration was aligned to the CDF's emphasis on a growth-led poverty reduction strategy – the central tenet of the new development agenda under Wolfensohn (Wolfensohn, 1999; Pender, 2001). The World Bank consequently sees Fadama as a mechanism to advance the course of the holistic, inclusive and sustainable growth agenda. As a poverty reduction strategy, Fadama, very importantly, became an invaluable strategy which was revitalised to drive growth as a result of the underlying belief in the growth-led poverty reduction hypothesis of the Wolfensohn era (Kagia, 2005; Wolfensohn, 1999).

Constructing food security and poverty reduction as post-1999 Fadama goals had a strategic link to the overall economic perspective which the World Bank promotes. Thus, its conception of food security and poverty reduction directly determined how these goals were conceptualised and practised within Fadama. It is instructive here to reiterate that the food security within mainstream development focused essentially on production and supply for a long time until the 'Sen revolution' (Sen, 1981b) which drew attention to questions of entitlement failure. This culminated in the emergence of the entitlement, capability and human development as well as sustainable livelihood approaches to food security. However, as Schanbacher (2010) argues, the World Bank's approach to food security remains more linked to economic models of production, marketing, profits, competition, exports and international markets as opposed to subsistence. This approach is arguably linked to its belief in the trickle-down hypothesis of growth-led poverty reduction. Therefore, adopting the food security and poverty reduction targets for the post-1999 Fadama suggests a strategic incorporation of mainstream (neoliberal) strategies to actualise these targets.

Fadama represents an avenue by which more production of crops, livestock, and poultry, among others, are promoted to drive increased income levels within EIGs. It served to fuel intense competition for profits within different FUGs or between EIGs/FUGs and non-Fadama business entrepreneurs. It creates an opportunity for microfinance institutions and private sector partners to cash in. This means that just as the idea of creating market avenues for crops and products emanating from Fadama producers is promoted, new clients are also created within the heightened quest to activate profits through the project. In this light, it becomes vivid that the World Bank's belief that more growth would lead to poverty reduction accounts for its insistence on re-structuring Fadama along the path of accumulation, profits and competition within communities.

The modalities and mechanisms employed to implement Fadama, as the findings show, were instrumental towards advancing the World Bank's preference for a neoliberal economic development process within developing countries. Within Fadama, this is subsumed in the adoption and/or establishment of popular modalities to implement development strategies based on the neoliberal economic ideology. This ideology was then backed up with transformative concepts.[210] It entailed an immediate incorporation of Fadama within the broader framework of agricultural reforms in Nigeria. Productivity, consumption, supply, trade and exports where highly emphasised above subsistence, especially within the context of the ATA where Fadama III was located.

Next, a strategic introduction of the value chain approach within Fadama followed. The goal was to incorporate multi-stakeholders – beyond the simple producers to include other actors like service providers, manufacturers, distributors and the likes – into the Fadama process. Since value-addition improved primary products, the wide range of actors within the chains meant different networks of capital. Also, politically radical concepts such as 'participation', 'empowerment', and 'ownership' were adopted and utilised for their transformative purposes to legitimise the processes involved within Fadama. These were crucial within this attempt to construct an image for Fadama – an initiative independently conceptualised and steered by the Nigerian government and free of any forms of donor-pressure.

Based on the principles of the CDF which requires country-led development programming, Fadama was presented as a programme whose agenda was set by the country in consultation

[210] Reconceptualising the project to become inclusive and demand-driven was therefore only useful to 'tick the transformation boxes' of incorporating citizens in their own development.

with various (local) stakeholders. This also ensured the emphasis on local ownership and participation so that the programme will eventually actualise the goals of empowerment. It can be argued that local ownership, participation and empowerment were 'targets' in their own rights. They were also 'means' towards actualising other goals within the context of Fadama. This is because the World Bank envisaged local ownership of, and participation of communities in, Fadama community projects and that these will culminate in (grassroots) empowerment. These would eventually culminate in more food secure and economically vibrant communities where poverty and disempowerment would be displaced.

Williams (1999) contends that the World Bank has over the years utilised pro-poor programmes within countries to establish a system of economic thinking aimed at creating a "*homo oeconomicus*" – the economic man (Moore, 2007). This seems a practical reproduction within post-1999 Fadama, especially when analysed within the context of the CDF, the 2005 – 2014 World Bank's Nigeria CPS papers,[211] and broader post-1999 economic blueprint in Nigeria where the NEEDS and the Transformation agenda were central. As noted in chapter three, the centrality of the World Bank within these post-1999 policy frameworks, and their inclination towards an economic growth-led model of development and poverty reduction, ensured that Fadama was structured along the same market-led principles. There was a human development focus to these strategies based on the focus on poverty reduction components of development planning. Situating the Fadama III project within this broader development architecture, its role in transposing the mainstream development rationality into the Nigerian domestic economic space becomes clear. This includes creating new types of entrepreneurs, business climates and rationality among recipient communities.

Williams (1999) presents case studies of development initiatives in the Philippines and Ghana where the World Bank was actively "engaged in detailed micro-level institutional reform with the aim of creating autonomous individuals who can be subjected to the discipline of the market" (Moore, 2007, pp. 101–102). In the Philippines, it was a "community development project designed and funded to support" the 1988 "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP)" of the government, while in Ghana it was a "community water and sanitation project" in 1994 in which there was a drive to enhance the capacity of community groups through education – i.e. sensitisation – to ensure sustainability of the project (ibid).

[211] The World Bank's 2000 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) paper was another policy document used to shape the reform process under president Obasanjo, and the broader World Bank's redefinition of the scope of development, that Fadama was reconceptualised in 2004.

While these projects were designed and implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they bear a great deal of similarity with the Fadama project. This is because they were aimed at "developing rural infrastructure and promoting farm production and other income-generating activities through technical support, marketing assistance and credit provision" (Moore, 2007, p. 109). Also, NGOs were invited to assist with capacity enhancement for communities in various aspects such as "familiarisation with commercial practices, improvement of accounting skills, and the project was designed to increase family incomes by providing economic support services..." (ibid).

Like Fadama, community groups were made to "contribute towards the capital costs of the project (5 to 10 percent)" – a plan designed to ensure 'commitment' to the project, "to ensure that revenues were collected and to help communities see 'a clear relationship between services rendered and tariff charged" (ibid, p. 111). Williams notes that the World Bank argued that community groups need their capacity enhanced to ensure project sustainability, of which an indicator included the groups' ability to effectively operate, maintain, repair, collect revenue, keep records and accounts, evaluate and resolve issues. A show of events that can be calculated and easily reportable (ibid). It becomes clearer that in undertaking these projects, the World Bank effectively strove to create *'governmentalized'* beneficiaries familiarised with, and responsive to, the principles of the markets through the establishment and implementation of community development projects ostensibly aimed to improve their lives. This is a mechanism through which the hegemonic neoliberal development agenda is institutionalised within developing countries dependent on aid.

In addition to the creation of *"homo oeconomicus"* through development programmes, the World Bank also exists as an institution, like other multilateral institutions, which represents a mainstream development perspective. These institutions serve as mediums for the propagation of the ideals of this pervasive model of development. This is a popular view held by Robert Cox (1983) in his perspective about the role of transnational institutions in the propagation of a transnational world order or the hegemonic neoliberal economic ideology. Within the context of Fadama, as the findings and analysis so far show, the Bank wields a great deal of influence over the Nigerian government as far as the preference for a more capitalist driven economic model than a welfare system. These principles animate Fadama's implementation. This level of influence is writ large despite the claims of country ownership within development partnerships (Crawford, 2003; Fowler, 2000a).

Within Fadama, the Bank used the leverage of its position as the project's major financier to impress the Nigerian government into employing an inclusive approach to achieve the Bank's goal of poverty reduction through economic growth. Fadama was a means to this end. To make certain that Fadama fulfilled this role, the Bank ensured that the Nigerian economy was restructured along a market-led process where privatisation, diversification and commodification of resources were emphasised (IMF, 2007; CPS, 2005; CAS, 2000). The post-1999 economic reform programmes such as NEEDS and ATA were critical not only in shaping the economy but also integrating Fadama within the broader drive to build a strong economy based on the private sector.[212] Thus, drawing on the CDF, Nigeria endeavoured to restructure its economy along a neoliberal development path; ensuring that various pro-poor development initiatives, such as Fadama, primarily designed to drive the growth of the rural economy, were immersed into this popular developmental path. In this way, Fadama became one subtle strategy for introducing the neoliberal market economic model more.

Practically, the partnership arrangement within Fadama was one in which all actors had different levels of contribution to the project.[213] The findings suggest a contradiction between donor's perception of beneficiaries in theory and practice. In one instance, beneficiaries are presented as 'active partners' and collaborators in the sense that they were consulted, and that the project was restructured based on their needs as identified from these consultations. In another instance, they were presented as though they are oblivious to their own needs and how to undertake and manage strategies that are aimed at assisting them to escape the poverty trap. This dual and contradictory representation of the beneficiaries shows a disjuncture between theory and praxis. This is because the former perspective is found to dominate mainstream discourse on the new development agenda and partnerships (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010; Dongier et al., 2003; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Maxwell & Riddell, 1998) whereas the latter is found in the actual experience of the implementation process and officials' viewpoints about beneficiaries.

Drawing on these points, it becomes clearer that the conceptualisation of the Fadama III project shows how the Bank continues to propagate the neoliberal development agenda and an economic rationality within developing countries dependent on the Bank's financial and technical assistance. Fadama III, thus conceptualised, became one of many strategies towards

[212] The Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) documents from 2005 to 2017 clearly lay credence to this point and the centrality of the World Bank in Nigeria's development planning since its return to democracy

[213] The financial, technical and otherwise contributions of the various stakeholders qualified them as partners.

actualising the goal of promoting this hegemonic neoliberal development agenda and model in Nigeria. As chapter four demonstrates, the goals set for Fadama – food security especially – were set according to an economic growth model of food security centred on improved productivity, improved access as well as capacity building and asset acquisition towards ensuring viability and sustainability of production and individual and household income (Schabancher, 2010). Establishing mechanisms and strategies, such as the value chain system and emphasis on transformative development buzzwords – ownership, participation and empowerment – towards achieving this goal are instructive to suggest the institutionalisation of this economic model within the rural space. However, to adequately achieve this process, the Bank had to leverage on its status as a donor to ensure that Fadama had to be reconceptualised along its desired focus. Beyond this, the Bank adopted a "pastoral care" strategy[214] as described by Abrahamsen (2004b). This application of 'pastoral care' became more evident in the actual implementation process in which the government designed an implementation strategy for the project.

Domesticating neoliberalism and rational choice

Broadly, the findings from this study suggest that based on the World Bank's insistence on reconceptualising Fadama, the Nigerian government 'consciously' designed an implementation strategy aligned with the mainstream. A key aspect of this process involved adopting an implementation strategy which focused on the establishment or use of a decentralised institutional framework for managing, governing and implementing Fadama in line with the precepts of the CDF. This also involved conceptualising and implementing methodological approaches – such as LDP, PRA, PNA, PM&E – to ensure beneficiaries involvement. Conceptualising the LDP and introducing the value chain approach were strategic in aligning Fadama with the World Bank's new development agenda.

Within this agenda, food security as a central idea in the quest to address poverty, was also constructed through an economic growth lens based on the trickle-down effect hypothesis. The implementation strategy adopted included decentralised institutional governance frameworks, inclusive planning processes, tranche-based and counterpart funding processes, results-based monitoring and evaluation systems and an exit strategy for project sustainability. All these components bear the features of development programmes designed according to the four

[214] This is described by Abrahamsen (2004b, p.1460) as a way of governing subjects not by force but rather on a reliance on their ability to act as free rational agents. This is based on the neoliberal rationality that "to govern less is to govern better".

pillars of the CDF and its four major focus areas of development – structural and institutional; social (human, gender and labour); Infrastructural (rural, urban and the environment); and Macroeconomic (finance and trade) (Wolfensohn, 1999; Blake, 2000).

This suggests that the implementation process for Fadama III involved an intensive process of planning, strategizing and training on the CDF and how to adequately adapt and internalise it in the development of a national plan of action for development programming, monitoring and evaluation. This also implied a great deal of technocratic expertise and technical assistance to ensure an adequate grasp of the technicalities of the participatory methodologies as well as the management, design and structuring of Fadama and community subprojects within Fadama. Considering that the CDF emphasised a results-based process of implementation and M&E, specific expertise in various areas of procurement, M&E, operations and financial management, amongst others, were critically required. Thus, it implies a great deal of World Bank support to actualise the macroeconomic as well as microeconomic prospects Fadama.

Fadama III's implementation story also revealed, from the perspectives of officials, that it is considered as a highly participatory and inclusive initiative based on its CDD model and the adoption of the LDP approach. It has also been presented as a massive success drawing on the various claims, mostly of improved incomes since Fadama II. Although Fadama III successes in this area were slightly diminished by the high inflation rates within the period under review, the interim completion report nevertheless argues that many of the project targets were attained, some were even exceeded, thus making Fadama a successful case (The World Bank, 2016). This accounts for the additional funds given to Nigeria by the World Bank to scale-up in specific value chains and in post-conflict regions in the north (The World Bank, 2016). One point to highlight in this perception of success is the focus on incomes and profits, some of which were disaggregated along gender line to show the gender dimension of the success story (The World Bank, 2016). This was also reiterated in Rivers state as shown in chapter five.

Internalising Fadama's implementation strategy in Rivers state, as the study shows, crucially introduced local communities into the processes of the project. It also aimed to immerse them deep within Fadama's implementation, governance as well as monitoring and evaluation processes to achieve Fadama's desired results. Within this drive, the LDP approach, developed as an aspect of the CDD approach, was critical in community projects' identification. According to participants, this entailed for communities the development of local development plans as well as internal processes of voting for leadership roles and priority needs by

communities. However, because many communities lacked the technical capacities to developing LDPs, facilitators had to prepare most LDPs and got remunerated (Participant-IFAC-ERV, Interview, 23 June, 2013). The institutional bodies established to govern various facets of Fadama in the state were significant in Rivers state's implementation story especially as it pertains to reviewing community LDPs and disbursing funds – the LFTC and the state Fadama office were critical in this sense.

The finding suggests however that Fadama in Rivers state was performing below expectation despite adherence to the broader implementation framework rolled out nationally in partnership with the World Bank. This was a result of several challenges highlighted by participants such as state and local governments defaulting on the payment of counterpart fees. This stalled implementation. The impact of aligning Fadama III to the ATA seemed to culminate in the state government's neglect of Fadama and the outstanding counterpart fees. There were some perceived reluctance and/or delays by beneficiaries to pay the beneficiary contributions as well as inadequate incentive systems for facilitators. This impacted negatively on the latter's commitment and contributions to the project. Also, problems associated with beneficiaries' inadequate grasp of the nature of the project, and perceived beneficiaries' collusion with service providers to divert Fadama grants to purposes outside the scope of the project, seemed to further complicate the implementation process in Rivers state. The data shows that these challenges also militated against the RSFCO's ability to reach its set-targets in terms of improving incomes of over two thousand EIGs/FUGs and two hundred FCAs.

The story of Fadama III's implementation, as noted earlier in this section, describes the use of modalities and mechanisms to ensure effective actualisation of the project's prospects. In this light, modalities of project implementation, such as procurement, and monitoring progress, such as the logic or result framework, were crucially drawn from the World Bank. In fact, many officials reported having to align procurement processes to the procurement guidelines provided by Bank. While the Bank does not necessarily make the decision, it must, however, institute a 'no-objection' order before certain key decisions especially those related to procurement can be made. The *logic* or *results-framework* used to monitor and evaluate projects is a very popular corporate M&E practice which the World Bank prescribes. It is interesting that this modality became highly emphasized for development programming for poverty reduction within the context of the CDF and programmes designed under its umbrella since 1999 (see Wolfensohn, 1999; Kagia, 2005). This became one important model for monitoring Fadama III.

The implementation story suggests a strong demonstration of adequate country ownership of Fadama III by the Nigerian government in line with the principles of the CDF. The project's conceptualisation and implementation processes were also driven by an attempt to ensure that Fadama is holistic and long-term; involves multi-stakeholders – 'partnerships'; and lead to results that can be measured. This is critical in contemporary development programming within the World Bank. The data generated from official perspectives around Fadama such as on the perspectives on its inclusiveness, its profit orientation for an economic growth-led poverty reduction and its successes, are also crucial pointers to the actual underlying neoliberal-economic ideological base of Fadama III.

In establishing institutions, creating platforms for Fadama local targets to be incorporated within the process of needs identification and project implementation and monitoring, and ensuring that project results are tangible, it would seem clear that the government 'owned' and led the process and advanced Fadama according to 'local needs'. The extent to which these local needs were actually people-driven remained largely questionable drawing from perspectives of local beneficiaries. The government ensured that Fadama was not externally led but nationally and internally 'conceptualised and managed'. But despite the government's judicious adoption of the principles of the CDF and the inclusive development agenda towards implementing Fadama III, the project's implementation process noted varying challenges. These challenges contributed immensely to shortfalls in the extent of positive impacts made by Fadama III on varying target groups especially in Rivers state. This suggests a major difference between the project's ideals and its realities.

The foregoing also suggests that Nigeria's implementation of Fadama III was coloured by a strong awareness of the ideological leadership of the World Bank. In other words, the implementation process was carefully designed to ensure that Fadama does not fall below the preferences of the World Bank: that is, stimulating growth from the rural economy. Various elements emphasised by the World Bank to ensure that the goals set out were achieved were followed meticulously, and the rationale for adhering so 'obediently' to mainstream development guidelines may be attributed to the fear that the Bank may withdraw its funds. That perspective does not seem to tell the entire story.

Another useful way to make sense of this case is thus: In setting out Fadama III along the ideological development path recommended by the Bank, the country situates itself in a better standing to the multilateral donor community, and this makes it easier to receive more funds

either to scale-up the project or to embark on other like-minded projects with the possibility of longer-term implementation. In essence, while fear plays a possible role in this process at the macro or institutional level, it is the promise of greater prospects for development assistance that spurred a more conscientious adoption of the development model favoured by the World Bank (see Abrahamsen, 2004b).[215]

Country ownership, in this context, entailed taking responsibility for the implementation of the project and ensuring that it lives up to the goals and objectives set out in terms of its conceptualisation. The findings therefore suggest that while the World Bank remains the major financial contributor to Fadama, it does not seem to coerce the government into action but acts as a facilitator, nudging the 'free' and *'governmentalized'* state along the desired development path. This facilitating role, however, does not imply that there is an equal playing field, but it very well represents a type of productive power which enabled the state as a rational actor to choose to internalise and domesticate mainstream development principles within Fadama III. In doing this, it also attempted to exert the same form of 'governmental' techniques on local beneficiaries. The extent to which this was successful – like it was for the Bank – on the poor appears tentative.

Domesticated process: Associated hopes and Latent Resistance

Beneficiaries' perspective on the Fadama project echoes their initial expectations and beliefs about its prospects prior to taking part in the project. Within the context of Fadama III initiative, it goes without saying that poverty accounts for the major reason why people embraced the project as clearly indicated by beneficiary participants' responses which allude to the promise of poverty alleviation and better business prospects.[216] The question, however, is the extent to which Fadama actually impacted positively on their lives as far as reducing their poverty was concerned.

The study found nuanced stories of the impact of Fadama from both a national perspective and the Rivers state perspective. In chapter five, some noted milestones achieved such as increased household incomes of Fadama beneficiaries as well as increased involvement of women, young

[215] Abrahamsen uses African states subjecting themselves to APRM as a strategic way of pleasing donors without being forced to. In relation to Fadama, the project has been scaled up since the end of phase one in 1999 down to the current extension of the life of the project from 2013 to 2019.

[216] It must be said that although the interview conducted was not on all the beneficiaries – especially non-vocal and non-strategic members of FCAs or FUGs mainly because many of them may not adequately relay the experiences of bearing the burden of running the cooperative – those beneficiaries interviewed actively undertook the daily running of their FUGs as well as the constant interaction with the Fadama officials. This is one reason that it was more necessary to focus on specific respondents.

people and the vulnerable groups were highlighted. In addition to these, the Rivers state accounted described evidence of profits made by some FUGs and the level of capacity improvement among rural beneficiaries. Indeed, some of these 'successes' were also captured among beneficiaries, especially late beneficiaries. They described the project's promises of improved employment, access to funds to execute businesses, access to products due to subprojects within communities, the establishment of community infrastructure (such as graded roads, cold-rooms for storing fish and poultry products), improved business know-how and capabilities, and improved networks for the distribution and sale of products. These said or 'perceived' successes, demonstrate how well Fadama performed in transforming lives of individuals and communities in Nigeria, but specifically in Rivers state.

Despite these prospects, the study's findings suggest that some beneficiaries are still stuck in the poverty trap. The project seemed to have contributed to increasing the poverty levels of some of its beneficiary participants based on the physical, mental and financial losses they sustained in their quest to adequately 'participate' in Fadama's processes. For instance, in the case of beneficiaries in Ogbakiri community who invested all their own life savings towards their subproject but ended up losing it in its entirety because their subproject failed and there was limited support from the Fadama office or the government towards salvaging their situation. This scenario is similar to Sabaratnam's (2017) critique of external development interventions and interveners as it relates to the attitude to beneficiaries as static people who had no life before interventions. Interventions as such are not cognisance of their impact on the targets of intervention such as what the failures of programmes do to beneficiaries. Instead, when one fails, interveners move on and others return to continue while the targets remain waiting for them (Sabaratnam, 2017).

In this study, the data drawn from beneficiaries – in their interaction with, and experience of, the project – mostly showed elements of regret, pessimism and scepticism among many beneficiaries. Many of them included farmers, retired teachers, retired public servants, unemployed youth, self-employed local entrepreneurs and vulnerable groups (mostly widows).[217] There were noted deficits in consultation and integration of the voices of the beneficiaries in the conceptualisation, design, and implementation as well as monitoring and

[217] There were also those who were optimistic although they had just been incorporated into the project and had not faced the hardships associated with the project.

evaluation of the project as promised in the project documents. The findings suggest that applying these components were below par in contrast to official narratives and reports.

The view about deficits in consultation and people-driven processes of design and implementation mostly draws from the fact that Fadama had already been conceptualised before 1993 when Fadama I was initiated; restructured in 2004; and scaled-up in 2009 to include Rivers state.[218] This means that the issues for intervention had already been identified and predefined as positive projects into which beneficiaries had to align their own needs. Community consultations and sensitisation exercises that were undertaken, at the onset of Fadama III, to legitimise the process were thus largely misplaced. The errors made by many groups emanate from the shortfalls within these important components that were supposed to have been adequately catered for prior to project commencement.

The study also found that support systems were largely absent – or in some instances/cases, inadequate – throughout the implementation process in Rivers state. The interviews showed that NGOs and civil society were not really involved at any level of the project implementation, at least in Rivers state. Support systems are vital not only in assisting communities to better understand the project but also to speak on their behalf when the project is failing them. Their absence thus implies that there was no real support network or support system to provide extra capacity to the communities and the local beneficiaries, or even provide support to groups or communities struggling to adequately grasp the project. As a result, failed stories were recorded but more so, many so-called beneficiaries were left worse off than they were when they accepted to be 'empowered' by the Fadama project.[219] The most difficult part of this experience was the abandonment of these failure stories and the attachment of the label of 'outliers' on these communities thus providing a justification for implementers to move on to other areas that seemed more viable. This is an indictment on an initiative which claims to quantitatively and qualitatively improve the lives of grassroots poor – in terms of improved income and productivity as well as social capital, social cohesion and social empowerment. The quick abandonment of the less economically viable cases towards more prospective ones is a major indictment, and it supports the view that local targets within external interventions are treated as disposable and treated as "people without histories or ideas, or ongoing other activities" (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 134). In the case of Fadama, officials justify this situation with the

[218] The Bank argues that the voices of the poor prompted the need to change its scope of development in the first place, but as some scholars showed that process was itself flawed (Moore, 2007; Schech, 2007).
[219] This is exemplified by the participant who lost her own savings while trying to assist her group.

argument that funds are limited for a country or state-wide project despite the many communities and EIGs that also need development assistance.

Beneficiaries' interviews revealed challenges associated with funding processes and procurement procedures with a special focus on the role of service providers. Their views suggest that funding and procurement were sources of grief to many beneficiaries because of the tediousness of the process and the idiosyncrasies of service providers. There were also cases in which initially promised funds for particular subprojects were abruptly reduced; cases of similar projects rated and funded differently depending on contexts, which made some people feel cheated; and the situation in which the funds were not directly controlled by beneficiaries but rather directed to the service providers to undertake all procurements for groups. Many beneficiaries found this upsetting especially when such service providers procured substandard products that failed to adequately serve the purposes for which they are procured.

To crown these experiences associated with funding, the idea of beneficiary contribution was also a major issue of concern. This is because while the concept was developed to enhance local ownership and buttress the responsibility of beneficiaries as partners in the project, it tends to ignore the fact that most beneficiaries are poor and may not be able to afford even the least form of capital contribution to the project. In fact, the inclusion of this concept implies the exclusion of certain members of the population – this is despite the introduction of the vulnerable group category consisting of youths and widows. The conditions that constitute what is known as beneficiary contributions – financial commitment before eligibility or contribution in kind in certain cases – appears somewhat like 'taxes' on the poor. In insisting that the poor must contribute financially – about 30 percent cases – to the total cost of subprojects, the programme 'digs too deep' into the 'pockets' of poor people who in many cases cannot afford such amounts. However, beneficiary contribution – either in cash or kind – is insisted upon as a proof of 'partnerships' in that beneficiaries must contribute something to demonstrate their participation and indeed 'ownership' of their subprojects. In 'taxing' the poor who the project ostensibly seeks to empower, the question that follows is the extent to which this empowerment can be achieved if, and when, the project literally exposes the poor to more poverty. This is especially if the project fails to adequately provide the promised goals as has been seen over the years.

The findings suggest that many of the prospects would not be realised. This is despite some of the perceived successes recorded such as improved overall household income, community

infrastructure and access to markets and improved farming techniques and better productivity and disease resistant crops. I have argued that the implementation of the project failed to incorporate the voices of the people, and while the CDD approach used in this project tended to show the integration of the beneficiaries into the entire process of the project, the fact remains that meaningful participation remained problematic. In fact, beneficiaries hardly participated in the conceptualisation, design and implementation processes. Even during the implementation, beneficiaries had to manage what they were fed with by the implementers and their facilitators. One aspect of this inadequate involvement of beneficiaries was the reported case of group selection within one of the beneficiary communities.

The experiences among the early beneficiaries, of a selected process of groups formation, breaches the idea of a people-led process. Although this was not a widespread experience – late beneficiaries reported differently – the experience nevertheless blights the idea that group formation was voluntary, and people had the right to determine the economic interest areas and to lead their project implementation processes. In fact, the noted interferences to the processes meant that donors and officials did not truly 'hand-over-the-stick' to beneficiaries as partners and active agents of their own development (see (Chambers, 1994c, 1994a, 1994b)). Instead the exposed power dynamics seemed to reflect a direct influential and coercive dynamic at play within this level of interaction even though it is more nuanced than a clear case of stampeding the interest of the local beneficiaries of development intervention.[220]

7.3. Answering the Research Question(s)

Building on the foregoing, it becomes necessary to revisit the major questions that shaped this study. They are: What are the implications of the National Fadama Development Programme with its emphasis on 'partnership' for power relations between multilateral donors and their African aid recipient countries? And, in what ways do power relations between multi-lateral donors and African aid recipients manifest in the Fadama project? The other complementary questions are summed up as questions regarding the perceptions of stakeholders about Fadama (and their similarity or difference); the extent that the CDD approach in Fadama reinforces partnership and factors-in the development needs of beneficiaries; the challenges of

[220] Essentially, there a mix of governmental techniques and benign coercion is revealed through this level of beneficiaries' experience.

implementation; and the prospects for social change – improved local and national governance – through the emergence of grassroots social forces in Nigeria.

From the findings discussed above, this study contends that the fact the Fadama III project remains riddled with unequal power relations implies that donor-led development strategies in Africa continue to show various elements of unequal power relations despite the incorporation of the concept of partnership. The study shows that there tends to be a transition from a totally top-down relationship between multilateral donors and recipient states in terms of pro-poor strategies. The study shows that while donors continuously press home their demand for strategies to be implemented in particular models, the onus rests on the state to own such strategies and implement them accordingly bearing in mind the needs of the local population.

In the same token, the 'handing over the stick' to national implementers in the Fadama III project, the World Bank took on the mantle of a facilitator while the state is the implementer. In this relationship, the state remains a rational actor who realises the importance of undertaking the relevant economic reforms that are in tune with the ideological leanings of the multilateral institution which provides such development assistance. This is because market-driven development ideology is one shared among mainstream development institutions and could thus be a catalyst for more assistance – after all the reward for money well spent is more money in the aid industry. Essentially, the study shows that although there is unequal power relation within the Fadama III project, this form of power is not necessarily repressive or counter-productive. Instead, it is productive in advancing the neoliberal economic ideologies, and subjects that act according to these ideologies, with the long-term aim of actualising the economic growth vision of mainstream development planning.

The perceptions explored showed divergent understanding of and attitude towards the Fadama III project between implementers (donors and government) and beneficiaries of the initiative. For implementers, the Fadama project represented a mechanism for improving food security and reducing poverty by empowering the grassroots poor to actively participate in developing planning and execution. This perception showed nuanced interpretations as the idea of improving food security or reducing poverty entailed a commercialisation drive in which beneficiaries were to be schooled in various 'arts' of business that would, in turn, prove vital for their socio-economic empowerment. This commercialisation agenda, it must be said, is heavily linked back to the hegemonic market-led economic ideology in which the private sector plays an enormous role – hence the introduction of the value chain system in the project. The

value chain system ensured that a variety of players got involved in the process of implementing Fadama III. These people and institutions provide services of various kinds, thus creating a chain of relations within the project.

The view of Fadama as inclusive and participatory is one mostly carried on by the Fadama officials as opposed to the beneficiaries. As the study shows, many of the beneficiaries in Rivers state only saw Fadama III as another government project aimed at supporting them in their various ventures. The participatory aspect of the project did not seem to be of interest to many of the beneficiaries whose concerns centred on how the project could boost their bottom line and support their families. So, while this study focused on the question of unequal power relations between donors and beneficiaries, they seemed less bothered about questions about inclusiveness or where the power lies; they simply wanted to escape poverty. This finding reiterates Sabaratnam's (2017) insistence on giving analytical centrality to the perspectives and experiences of the targets of development; how they negotiate and analyse interventions. Indeed, the situation of Fadama beneficiaries in Rivers state is linked to the broader Nigerian socio-political and economic context wherein poor citizens have been stripped of a voice and many of them have somehow given up on the idea of citizens-led transformation. This can also be seen in the religious nature of many Nigerians – especially the Christians who tend to want to leave everything to God instead of actively seeking out means of driving change.

Development initiatives such as Fadama III which are said to be Community Driven Development project are touted as transforming beneficiaries to development agents; giving them a voice to speak out and contribute to their own development (Orievulu, 2014; Rao and Mansuri, 2004). These projects also enhance social capital and social cohesion thus propelling grassroots empowerment for collective action as regards various socioeconomic and political concerns within their environs. The actualisation of the goals attainable through these projects rest on their participatory nature – participation ensures that partnership is relevant, and it also ensures that the true socioeconomic needs of citizens are effectively identified for intervention.

In the Fadama project, the LDPs provide the conceptual basis for the participation of beneficiaries in the project implementation. As highlighted in chapter four, the LDPs are the documents upon which a group's subproject can be approved for implementation. The process of coming up with an LDP for any group is ostensibly participatory in the sense that the beneficiaries identify their immediate needs based on a PNA/CNA strategy mediated by a facilitator. Upon identification of various needs, the need to narrow these needs down to

specific items could entail voting for consensus building among beneficiaries to ascertain specific economic interest areas to focus on. In the end, these interest areas are developed into the LDP document submitted to the Local Fadama Desk for approval by the NFTC before such subprojects may gain disbursement from the IDA funds given by the SFCO.

Suffice it to say that this participatory system is flawed. This is mostly because there are only a handful of economic activities that are part of the World Bank/Fadama positive list of subprojects for funding. The areas of need had already been predetermined before the beneficiaries were even selected. What follows is that beneficiaries are 'forced' to limit their choices to these predetermined areas and they cannot think beyond that. What this implies is that their needs had already been identified for them while the process of consultation, the conducting of the PRA and PNA techniques for them to identify areas of need were merely formalities to ensure that all the boxes for the implementation strategy were ticked. It also follows that while some of the economic interest areas tended to be useful within the context in which they were identified, many of them did not. Hence the project did not adequately factor in the true needs of beneficiaries in Rivers state.

The prospects for social change through a participatory development initiative such as Fadama III hinges mostly on the prospects for building social capital for collective action. It also hinges on the radical and transformative connotations of participation and empowerment as opposed to the co-opted versions of these concepts within mainstream development parlance. In looking at the prospects of heralding social change as a possible outcome of the Fadama III project, it will entail the incorporation of a citizenship-based capacity building component to enable citizens to fully understand their roles within their socio-political context. The Fadama project does not focus on this aspect of citizen empowerment in its scope. It is focused on business and the commercialisation of resources. Because, as Ferguson (1990; 1994) contends, it is an "anti-politics machine", it follows that it becomes difficult to actualise this possibility because it is not truly part of the agenda.

The Fadama III project is riddled with a lot of inefficiencies that impact on the beneficiaries in various ways. The impact of BCs on poor beneficiaries; difficulties associated with accessing their funds and maintaining their groups, subprojects and even productive assets; problems associated with the lack of adequate support systems for capacity building and other forms of support when crises loom; and most importantly, the nature of the Nigerian socio-political space which has rendered many activist toothless are all issues that militate against this

prospect for social change. This is because many beneficiaries are struggling to make ends meet, and with a development initiative which saps their productive energies away like the Fadama III project, it becomes even more difficult to conceptualise possible avenues to hold public office holders and politicians accountable. This is especially because Fadama III has not succeeded in enhancing social cohesion effectively among beneficiaries in Rivers state.

From the discussion so far, this study contends that the Fadama project inevitably shows nuanced forms of power relation based on the different levels of engagement involved – from the World Bank, through the Nigerian government which serves as a middle-man in the development relationship, down to the grassroots beneficiaries consisting of local farmers and entrepreneurs, vulnerable people, unemployed youths and women and widows. The interaction between the World Bank and the state shows a kind of power dynamic in which pastoral care tends to be at the core of this relationship created.[221] At the level of the beneficiaries, different forms of power dynamics appear especially in relation to the participatory nature of the Fadama project – the CDD approach employed to give a voice to the voiceless local/poor citizens. The data from the experience of these beneficiaries showed deficits in relation to an adequate integration of these beneficiaries in the process of design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation despite claims of involving them. The data also showed various difficulties associated with participation in the Fadama III project among the beneficiaries interviewed. All these point to a conclusion that achieving social cohesion by means of this project seems largely untenable, at least in the short term. In such situations of stress and perceived abandonment, many beneficiaries would abandon the project thus culminating in the lack of a possibility for future enhancement of social capital based on the project within Rivers state. This also then means that driving social change also becomes largely impossible.

7.4. Limitations of Study

While this study makes the above claims, there are limits to which this study covered. Firstly, this is mostly a qualitative study which means that there was no attempt to establish causality in this study. Thus, the claims made in this study are based on an interpretation of the

[221] As I have argued earlier, the goal entailed internalising the liberal market economy within Nigeria mostly by means of the drive to restructure the Nigerian economy, and specifically by the use of development strategies such as Fadama III to integrate the economic rationality within the local economy.

documents and interview data associated with the implementation and experience of the implementation of Fadama III in Rivers state, Nigeria.

The case study approach adopted for this study has its own methodological limits even though it was chosen to ensure parsimony in the study and ensure a deeper engagement with the Fadama III project beyond the progress reports by the World Bank and national implementers of the initiative. This parsimonious approach nevertheless tends to limit the scope and range of this research. In other words, a comparative study of a larger number of case studies within and beyond Nigeria may shed illuminate and add nuance to the dynamics and experiences associated with donor-funded pro-poor development initiatives such as Fadama. This is mainly in relation to beneficiaries' experience but also in relation to donor/developing countries aid relations.

It is also clear that the case study approach does not give a lot of room for generalisation hence the difficulty of any attempt to generalise from this study. Nevertheless, as Stake (1995) contends, one can draw a measure of generalisation or interpretation based on the nature of the core issues identified and how they can possibly apply to different other contexts. This is especially so when it comes to interpreting the role of international development institutions in driving the neoliberal development agenda within developing nations, especially in Africa. However, these IFIs are the vessels for propagating this agenda, it becomes somewhat possible to make certain general claims about the initiatives that they promote. Particularly, in relation to the long-term targets envision irrespective of contextual differences regarding how these initiatives are implemented and experienced.

Another issue of note is that in carrying out this qualitative study in Nigeria, which also entailed conducting interviews with public officials, the researcher observed a measure of apprehensiveness towards the study. In fact, there seemed to be a great deal of suspicion and a level of fear among some prospective participants thus culminating in one high profile participant refusing to be interviewed after having accepted to be interviewed initially. This situation made it difficult for the researcher to get vital official information regarding the Fadama III project in Rivers state as far as questions about the involvement of the state government in the project – note that the state had failed to pay its counterpart fee between 2011 and 2013 when this fieldwork was conducted).

It should be noted that after the fieldwork was completed in 2013, the Fadama III project, especially from the national office, was extended by the World Bank until 2017 instead of the

initial completion date of 31 December 2013. This additional financing was fixed for some states alone and excluded others. The point here is that the analysis undertaken in this study does not cover the activities or implementation post-2015. This limits the study's focus to the period until 2015 when the MDGs were finalised. It would be useful going forward to undertake a study on Fadama III post-2015 to examine any differences.

Finally, the study emphasises the perspectives of local beneficiaries of Fadama III from a very broad sense. It does not delineate between different categories of beneficiaries although it acknowledges that a critical stakeholder group within Fadama is made up of women. In this sense, a gendered analytical focus – a feminist lens – would have also added more gusto to the study of power dynamics and how local targets of interventions navigate the curves of development intervention strategies and their process.

7.5. Significance of findings to scholarship: theory, discourse and practice

International Relations and International Development Politics and Critical Development studies

This dissertation contributes to critical development theory and the study of International Relations (IR) in a myriad of ways. From an IR perspective, the findings of the study contribute to critical theory and IPE approaches that focus on engagements between state and non-state actors. This is with a special focus on the place of the state as non-neutral actor, who in interacting with hegemonic institutions, aids in the propagation of the dominant ideologies of the world order. Very importantly, this study's interrogation of the place and role of the World Bank in advancing the neoliberal economic agenda – using Fadama as a conduit – provides deeper insight not only on the nature of global governance but also how international development institutions remain largely driven to entrench hegemonic ideals across the developing world.

Crucially, this exposes the nature of power in development parlance as well as relations within the international sphere where power is seen in the construction of identities and the making of subjects – be they state or citizens (Abrahamsen, 2004b). Thus, even the idea of development becomes power ridden within the international sphere and, as Abrahamsen also notes, "through its interventions the underdeveloped subject becomes known, categorized, incorporated into statistics, models, and graphs, which in turn legitimate practices and facilitate the emergence

of the developed, disciplined subject" (Abrahamsen, 2007, p. 116; Griffiths, 2007, p. 116). The findings associated with the conceptualisation, implementation and experience of Fadama within this study demonstrated various aspects of the making and disciplining of identities and subjects – of the Nigerian state as well as the local beneficiaries. These findings have been vital to provide a deeper grasp of the role of multilateral institutions in entrenching the goals of neoliberalism even within the context of poverty reduction strategies couched in participatory terms.

The findings associated with beneficiaries' experiences of Fadama III in Rivers state crucially contribute to critiques of external development interventions. It contributes importantly to the critique of the critiques of these forms of intervention that apply the governmentality framework of analysis. With a critical focus on how local targets of development interventions experience and navigate the processes involved with the implementation of such projects, like Fadama, this study contributes to the growing literature on decolonisation: "decolonising interventions" and "decolonising international relations" (Sabaratnam, 2017). While Sabaratnam (2017) criticises theories that adopt the governmentality approach to analyse interventions from a 'colonial' standpoint – a narrow focus on interveners' perspectives – to the detriment of local targets' experiences of realities associated with such interventions, the three levels of analysis adopted in this study provide a useful framework to fill that gap. By interrogating in detail how local beneficiaries in Rivers state grasped Fadama III, their encounters with various stakeholders – the Bank, Fadama officials, facilitators, service providers and other beneficiaries as well as their immediate socio-political space – the study fills the gap of previous methodological and analytic exclusion of local targets in the critique of development interventions. This is very evident in terms of the positionality of beneficiaries as recipients of development interventions.

The study's findings suggest that the interveners tended to treat local beneficiaries as 'static' and 'homogenous' groups who are disposable and constantly on hold while waiting for donors' programmes – the arrogance of interveners in Sabaratnam's (2017) terms. As demonstrated within the study, many people who felt that Fadama III was not addressing their needs consciously abandoned it to continue their life pursuits while others who had a great deal to lose chose the alternative of hanging on and conceptualising different ways to reinvent their subprojects or stay afloat instead of sinking. Some of the actions taken by beneficiaries have been called 'collusion' in official terms, but they nevertheless demonstrate agency – the will to resist what was not in their perceived best interest. It was only a deeper engagement with

beneficiaries' experiences of everyday life as well as their navigation of the Fadama project that would have enabled a better understanding of how they negotiate interventions.

The driving force underlying the emphasis on beneficiary participation in development planning and project execution draws from the assumption that adequately involving them in the supply and management of resources, service and facilities and monitoring and evaluating the progress and impact of such initiative, will solve the problem of sustainability in development interventions. This is similar to the assumption that partnership is the recipe for greater effectiveness for development assistance (Development Assistance Committee, 1996). This assumption accounts for the mainstreaming of strategies such as the CDD approach within pro-poor development initiatives such as the Fadama project with the aim of giving them a voice. The goal includes "strengthening and financing inclusive community groups by empowering them with information and an enabling environment to pursue business ventures attuned to their needs" (Orievulu, 2014, p. 70). In essence with the Fadama III project, it was used to ensure beneficiaries' participation not only for identifying the needs in the community but also to ensure project sustainability – thus transforming them into agents of development (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). The approach not only enhances grassroots involvement in development planning but is also vital for the enhancement of social cohesion among beneficiaries and, in the same light, empowerment.

Despite these prospects, the practical realities associated with mainstream participation, and its apparent or veiled power dynamics, imply that many of these prospects tend to be unrealised. The same goes for the assumption underlying the participatory approach and the partnership rhetoric as the Fadama III case study reveals. This dissertation shows that the concept of partnership and participation have been instrumental in the stride for the internationalisation of the neoliberal market economic principles in the local economy. As literature has also shown, the participation rhetoric has also been used in the mainstream as a means of control where discourse is controlled, and agenda is set for those invited to participate as has been seen in the Fadama project. The extent to which beneficiary participation is vital for project sustainability has been questioned because many of such local beneficiaries lack the technical skills for project sustenance (Khwaja, 2004). This, therefore, poses even more problem for participation.

This study has shown that a number of components associated with the project which was aimed at enhancing participation and heralding empowerment have not adequately benefitted the poor. In fact, these components have been vital in excluding them from reaping the said

benefits of the initiative. One of such is the introduction of the beneficiary contribution which hinges on the view that as partners, beneficiaries must have something to bring to the table. As the case study in Rivers state shows – supported by literature (Wienecke, 2005) – these issues led to a great deal of hardship among beneficiaries. In the same vein, Fadama III's fixation with economic accumulation (and the inadequate nature of capacity building, advisory services and support networks), ensured that beneficiaries were struggling to understand the project instead of adequately benefitting from it. It also meant that many farmers were plunged back into poverty instead of escaping the poverty trap.

Against the backdrop of these issues, it would be relevant for planners and designers of the project, and subsequent projects with similar goals, to consider reviewing even further the views of beneficiaries. More time must be allocated to capacity building and sensitisation prior to and within the course of the implementation process to assist beneficiaries along the process. Finally, the fixation with economic accumulation, while useful in driving upwards the income of beneficiaries, does not adequately incorporate other transformative ideas linked to participation. This must also be revisited if the goal of actualising social change in the form of improved local governance is to be achieved.

Food security discourse and practice

This study's findings very importantly also contribute to food security studies or debates about the discourse and practice of food security in the international development domain. Chapter four helps to put this into perspective by exposing how the mainstream definition of food security – a mutilated form of the entitlement approach of Amartya Sen (1981a; 1981b) – shaped the construction of what constitutes food security within the ambient of the Fadama project in Nigeria. In this light, food security can be understood as a socially constructed idea which is laden with enormous power. The findings related to Fadama reveal that the actor(s) who wield more power within the international sphere is endowed with the capacity to define and/or constructs what food security means within the context of development assistance and/or international development parlance.

Essentially, this means that the emphasis on more production, access to markets and buying power, access to credit facilities, institutional structures to facilitate the selling and dissemination of food resources from the primary producers in the villages to consumers – the

value chain – constitutes part of a neoliberal understanding of food security which the World Bank helps to secure. Findings in Rivers state where Fadama officials were equating food security to the amount of poultry produced by a particular group of beneficiaries reinforce this point. Consequently, the SFCO identified ways to link the affected FCAs with various partners and networks to enable beneficiaries not only sell their poultry during festive seasons but also to establish an automated cold-room for storage and packaging for improved value.

Apart from production, value-addition through processing, the creation of networks, marketing of the final produce and profiteering from production are the hallmark of Fadama III demonstration of food security. In the same light, while the World Bank's construction of rural peoples – communities – within Fadama as food insecure (due to the lack of the aforementioned structures) may be factually incorrect – since many of these 'supposed' rural poor produce their own food and have cultural means of securing sustainable food resources –it demonstrates more importantly the power to 'create' a development issue and consequently propose remedies as is consistent with the development industry (Ferguson, 1990; 1994). This is a major contribution of the neo-Foucauldian governmentality approach to the food security debate as it helps to locate the role of discourse in creating knowledge and advancing behavioural patterns associated with the issue of food security in the international development arena.

7.6. Ideas for further research

Rethinking analysis of the politics of development partnerships

Based on the foregoing, especially as it relates to research, it would be crucial to consider the impact of facilitators employed within pro-poor CDD programmes like Fadama on the success or failure of such initiatives. This is because this study identified that facilitators' levels of training and motivation – job security and incentive structures – were important factors that explain their contributions to FCAs' and their understanding and implementation of projects. In the same light, it would be interesting to consider a study on the possible prospect of introducing social media platforms and cell phone apps, within the context of Information Technology (IT) revolution, to improve local beneficiaries' interface with the World Bank for enhanced project effectiveness.

With the resurgence of violence and killings involving nomadic herdsmen, local farmers and communities in the Middle-belt region, it becomes pertinent to re-evaluate the role of Fadama

III and other micro-level initiatives, in addressing and limiting these conflicts. Although the region under question is not directly within the scope of this study, the issue remains vital because one of Fadama II's major success claims, which filtered into Fadama III, was a high percentage of reduced conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. The resurgence of these conflicts may suggest lack of sustainability in Fadama's gains; it may also be linked to inadequate ownership of the project which revisits the question of adequate community involvement and input in the design of development interventions. Exploring further into the possible role of micro-level interventions in avoiding and adequately mitigating these conflicts will be interesting. This is especially as it seems that new (political) actors are implicated.

On a different level, the role of rich national private investors in funding pro-poor development strategies within the country is put under question. There needs to be a strengthening of local accountability mechanisms and financial institutions to ensure that governments – where loans are procured from local billionaires – effectively pay back and where grants are properly managed, to effectively actualise the targets set for such programmes. The inclusion of local billionaires as grantors or funders of domestic development initiatives will also go a long way in changing institutional power dynamics especially in relation to reducing the so-called foreign influence on domestic development trajectories.

To conclude, this dissertation contends that development partnerships must be true to their name if the projected goals are to be actualised. As the findings from this study demonstrate that emphasis on partnership tends to further obfuscate the idea of participation instead of enriching and enhancing it, the question of the genuineness of current development partnerships resurfaces. This dissertation thus argues that the Fadama project which was established drawing on the changing discourse of international development, and specifically within the World Bank, shows various elements of continued power imbalance. This ranges from the interaction between the Bank and the government of Nigeria down to the incorporation of beneficiaries within the project in terms of the principles of participation in development. Although power relation here centres more on a realisation, by the 'disciplined subjects' of the need to advance developmental ideas drawn from the mainstream approach to economic development. A deeper engagement with the everyday realities of the local targets of development will prove valuable for the emerging literature on decolonising intervention and international relations.

Bibliography

Abalu, G. O., & D'silva, B. (1980). Nigeria's food situation: problems and prospects. *Food Policy*, *5*(1), 49–60.

Abrahamsen, R. (2004a). Review essay: poverty reduction or adjustment by another name? *Review of African Political Economy, 31*(99), 184–187.

Abrahamsen, R. (2004b). The power of partnerships in global governance. *Third World Quarterly*, *25*(8), 1453–1467.

Abrahamsen, R. (2007). Postcolonialism. In *International relations theory for the twenty-first century* (First Edition, p. 111). Routledge: Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Abugre, C. (1999). Partners, Collaborators or Patron-Clients: Defining Relationships in the Aid Industry. *A Survey of Issues, Canadian International Development Agency, Partnership Branch, Ottawa, August.*

Abugre, C. (2000). Still Sapping the Poor. A Critique of IMF Poverty Reduction Strategies. World Development Movement. Online: http://www.eldis.org/document/A29670. Accessed October 25, 2018.

Adelman, I., & Morris, C. T. (1997). Development history and its implications for development theory. *World Development*, *25*(6), 831–840.

Adogamhe, P. G. (2010). Economic Policy Reform & Poverty Alleviation: A Critique of Nigeria's Strategic Plan for Poverty Reduction. *Poverty & Public Policy*, *2*(4), 49–80.

Africa Development Bank. (2000). Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Bank Group Policy. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from https://www.afdb.org

Africa Development Bank. (2003). Republic of Nigeria Fadama Development Project Appraisal Report. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from https://www.afdb.org

Ahungwa, G. T., Haruna, U., & Abdusalam, R. Y. (2014). Trend analysis of the contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic product of Nigeria (1960-2012). *Journal of Agriculture and Veterinary Science*, *7*(1), 50–55.

Aiyar, S. S. (2001). *Sourcebook for Community Driven Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.* The World Bank. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org

Ake, C. (1996). *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Alejandro Leal, P. (2007). Participation: the ascendancy of a buzzword in the neo-liberal era. *Development in Practice*, *17*(4–5), 539–548.

Alkire, S. (2005). *Valuing freedoms: Sen's capability approach and poverty reduction.* Oxford University Press on Demand.

Arcand, J., & Bassole, L. (2006). Does community driven development work. *Evidence from Senegal. Études et Documents, 6.*

Arcand, J.-L., & Bassole, L. (2007). Does Community Driven Development Work? Evidence from Senegal. *The World Bank*, 1–42.

Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, *35*(4), 216–224.

Babu, S., Gajanan, S. N., & Sanyal, P. (2014). *Food security, poverty and nutrition policy analysis: statistical methods and applications*. Academic Press.

Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1963). Decisions and non-decisions: An analytical framework. *American Political Science Review*, *57*(3), 632–642.

Bature, Y. M., Sanni, A. A., & Adebayo, F. O. (2013). Analysis of Impact of National Fadama Development Projects on Beneficiaries Income and Wealth in FCT, Nigeria. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, *4*(17).

Béland, D. (2006). Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View. *Canadian Journal of Sociology Online*, *2*.

Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2004). A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations. *Capital & Class*, *28*(1), 85–113.

Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P., de Regt, J. P., & Spector, S. (2010). *Local and community driven development: Moving to scale in theory and practice*. World Bank Publications.

Blake, R. C. (2000). New Developments: The World Bank's Draft Comprehensive Development Framework and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development. *Yale HR & Dev. LJ*, *3*, 159–191.

Bowbrick, P. (1986). Causes of Famine. *Food Policy*.

Bowbrick, P. (1987). Rejoinder: an untenable hypothesis on the causes of famine. *Food Policy*, *12*(1), 5–9.

Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Government–nonprofit partnership: a defining framework. *Public Administration and Development*, *22*(1), 19–30.

Burchi, F., & De Muro, P. (2012). A human development and capability approach to food security: conceptual framework and informational basis. *Background Paper*, *8*.

Campbell, D. (2007). Poststructuralism. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 203–228.

Carr, E. R. (2006). Postmodern conceptualizations, modernist applications: Rethinking the role of society in food security. *Food Policy*, *31*(1), 14–29.

Chambers, R. (1994a). Participatory rural appraisal (PRA): Analysis of experience. *World Development*, *22*(9), 1253–1268.

Chambers, R. (1994b). Participatory rural appraisal (PRA): Challenges, potentials and paradigm. *World Development*, *22*(10), 1437–1454.

Chambers, R. (1994c). The origins and practice of participatory rural appraisal. *World Development*, *22*(7), 953–969.

Chambers, R., & Conway, G. (1992). *Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century*. Institute of Development Studies (UK).

Chandler, D. (2009). Critiquing liberal cosmopolitanism? The limits of the biopolitical approach. *International Political Sociology*, *3*(1), 53–70.

Chandler, D. (2010). *International statebuilding: the rise of post-liberal governance*. Routledge.

Chen, R. S., & Kates, R. W. (1994). World food security: prospects and trends. *Food Policy*, *19*(2), 192–208.

Cheru, F. (2006). Building and supporting PRSPs in Africa: what has worked well so far? What needs changing? *Third World Quarterly*, *27*(2), 355–376.

Chukwuemeka, D. (2014). Impacts of agricultural reforms on the farming sector in Nigeria. *African Journal for Agricultural Marketing*, *2*(1), 056–063.

Cleaver, F. (1999). Paradoxes of participation: questioning participatory approaches to development. *Journal of International Development*, *11*(4), 597.

Clover, J. (2003). Food security in sub-Saharan Africa: feature. *African Security Review*, *12*(1), 5–15.

Collier, P. (2007). Bottom billion. *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization*.

Cooke, B., & Kothari, U. (2001). *Participation: The new tyranny?* Zed books.

Cornwall, A. (2004). Spaces for transformation? Reflections on issues of power and difference in participation in development. *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation*, 75–91.

Cornwall, A. (2007). Buzzwords and fuzzwords: deconstructing development discourse. *Development in Practice*, *17*(4–5), 471–484.

Cornwall, A., & Brock, K. (2005). What do buzzwords do for development policy? A critical look at 'participation', 'empowerment' and 'poverty reduction.' *Third World Quarterly*, *26*(7), 1043–1060.

Cornwall, A., & Eade, D. (2010). *Deconstructing development discourse: Buzzwords and fuzzwords*. Oxfam GB.

Cox, R. W. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory. *Millennium*, *10*(2), 126–155.

Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. *Millennium*, *12*(2), 162–175.

Cox, R. W. (1987). *Production, power, and world order: Social forces in the making of history* (Vol. 1). Columbia University Press.

Cox, R. W. (1993). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, *26*, 49–49.

Crawford, G. (2003). Partnership or power? Deconstructing the 'Partnership for Governance Reform' in Indonesia. *Third World Quarterly*, *24*(1), 139–159.

Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Mapping the field of mixed methods research*. SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA.

Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. *Systems Research and Behavioral Science*, *2*(3), 201–215.

Dasgupta, A., & Beard, V. A. (2007). Community driven development, collective action and elite capture in Indonesia. *Development and Change*, *38*(2), 229–249.

de Waal, A. (1990). A Re-assessment of Entitlement Theory in the Light of the Recent Famines in Africa. *Development and Change*, *21*(3), 469–490.

Death, C. (2011). Foucault and Africa: Governmentality, IR theory, and the limits of advanced liberalism. In *BISA Annual Conference* (pp. 27–29).

Development Assistance Committee. (1996). *Shaping the 21st Century: The contribution of Development Co-operation* (p. 24). Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/dac/2508761.pdf

Devereux, S. (1988). Entitlements, availability and famine: a revisionist view of Wollo, 1972–1974. *Food Policy*, *13*(3), 270–282.

Devereux, S. (2001). Sen's entitlement approach: critiques and counter-critiques. *Oxford Development Studies*, *29*(3), 245–263.

Dollar, D., & Easterly, W. (1999). The search for the key: aid, investment and policies in Africa. *Journal of African Economies*, *8*(4), 546–577.

Dongier, P., Van Domelen, J., Ostrom, E., Ryan, A., Wakeman, W., Bebbington, A., ... Polski, M. (2003). Community driven development. *World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*.

Duffield, M. (2001). Governing the borderlands: decoding the power of aid. *Disasters*, *25*(4), 308–320.

Duffield, M. (2005). Getting savages to fight barbarians: Development, security and the colonial present: Analysis. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *5*(2), 141–159.

Duffield, M. (2007). *Development, security and unending war: governing the world of peoples*. Polity.

Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (2013). *International relations theories*. Oxford University Press.

Easterly, W. (1999). The ghost of financing gap: testing the growth model used in the international financial institutions. *Journal of Development Economics, 60*(2), 423–438.

Easterly, W. (2001). *The elusive quest for growth: economists' adventures and misadventures in the tropics*. MIT press.

Easterly, W. (2002). The cartel of good intentions: the problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid. *The Journal of Policy Reform, 5*(4), 223–250.

Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth? *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17*(3), 23–48.

Easterly, W., & Easterly, W. R. (2006). *The white man's burden: why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*. Penguin.

Edkins, J., & Griffiths, M. (2007). International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction.

Ehigiamusoe, U. K. (2012). A comparative analysis of agricultural performance between the military and civilian regimes in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 1*(1), 13–20.

Ellis, F. (1998). Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification. *The Journal of Development Studies, 35*(1), 1–38.

Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the third world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Federal Government of Nigeria. (2008). The Nigeria Project Agenda. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NIGERIAEXTN/Resources/7Point_Policy_Nigeria.pdf

Federal Government of Nigeria, National Planning Commission. (2009). Nigeria Vision 20:2020 Economic Transformation Blueprint. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from http://www.nationalplanning.gov.ng/index.php/national-plans/nv20-2020

Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2009). Third National Fadama Development Project (Fadama III) – Volume 1: Project Implementation Manual (Manual No. 1). Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.

Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2009). Third National Fadama Development Project (Fadama III) – Asset Acquisition Manual (Manual No. 8). Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.

Ferguson, J. (1990). *The anti-politics machine: 'development', depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. CUP Archive.

Ferguson, J. (1994). The anti-politics machine: Development. *Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994)*, *27*.

Feridun, M., & Akindele, S. T. (2005). *Nigerian Economy: Essays on Economic Development*. Lulu Press, Inc.

Fioramonti, L. (2017). *Wellbeing Economy: Success in a World Without Growth* (1 edition). Pan Macmillan SA.

Food and Agriculture Organization (Ed.). (1984). *The state of food and agriculture 1983. World review: the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa; women in developing agriculture.* Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Fowler, A. (2000a). Introduction beyond partnership: getting real about NGO relationships in the aid system. *IDS Bulletin*, *31*(3), 1–13.

Fowler, A. (2000b). NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic innovation? *Third World Quarterly*, *21*(4), 637–654.

Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York. *Continuum*, *72*.

Germain, R. D., & Kenny, M. (1998). Engaging Gramsci: international relations theory and the new Gramscians. *Review of International Studies*, *24*(1), 3–21.

Gerring, J. (2007). *Case study research: principles and practices*. Cambridge University Press,.

Gill, S. (1992). Economic globalization and the internationalization of authority: limits and contradictions. *Geoforum*, *23*(3), 269–283.

Gill, S. (1993). *Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations* (Vol. 26). Cambridge University Press.

Gill, S. R., & Law, D. (1989). Global hegemony and the structural power of capital. *International Studies Quarterly*, *33*(4), 475–499.

Griffiths, M. (2007). *International relations theory for the twenty-first century: an introduction*. Routledge.

Gyong, J. E. (2012). A social analysis of the transformation agenda of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. *European Scientific Journal, ESJ*, *8*(16).

Haggblade, S., Theriault, V., Staatz, J., Dembele, N., & Diallo, B. (2012). A conceptual framework for promoting inclusive agricultural value chains. *International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Mimeo (Online Document)*.

Hellin, J., Ndjeunga, J., & Trench, P. C. (2010). Using qualitative market mapping to explore Aflatoxin contamination along the Maize and Groundnut Value Chains. *Afla Control Project, IFPRI*.

Hickey, S., & Mohan, G. (2004). *Participation–from tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development*. Zed books.

Inda, J. X. (Ed.). (2005). *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics* (2005 Edition). Blackwell Publishing.

Jarosz, L. (2011). Defining world hunger: Scale and neoliberal ideology in international food security policy discourse. *Food, Culture & Society*, *14*(1), 117–139.

Jwan, J. O., & Ong'ondo, C. O. (2011). Qualitative research: An introduction to principles and techniques. *Eldoret, Moi University*.

Kagia, R. [editor. (2005). *Balancing the development agenda: the transformation of the World Bank under James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005* (No. 32596) (pp. 1–0). The World Bank.

Kamel, N., Cholst, A., Funna, J. S. A., Guerrero, P., Hilton, R., Mitchell, J., & Nishio, A. (1998). *Partnership for development: proposed actions for the World Bank - a discussion paper* (No. 51605) (pp. 1–62). The World Bank.

Kanbur, R., Calvo, C. M., Das Gupta, M., Grootaert, C., Kwakwa, V., & Lustig, N. (2000). *World development report 2000/2001 : attacking poverty* (No. 22684) (pp. 1–356). The World Bank.

Kaplinsky, R., & Morris, M. (2001). *A handbook for value chain research* (Vol. 113). Idrc Ottawa.

Kaplinsky, R., & Morris, M. (2014). Developing industrial clusters and supply chains to support diversification and sustainable development of exports in Africa. *Report for the African Export-Import Bank. Cairo: African Export-Import Bank.*

Kasperson, J. X. (1990). Overcoming hunger: promising programmes and policies. *Food Policy*, *15*(4), 286–298.

Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S. (1998). Africa and the donor community: from conditionality to partnership. *Journal of International Development*, *10*(2), 219–225.

Khwaja, A. I. (2004). Is increasing community participation always a good thing? *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *2*(2–3), 427–436.

King, K. (2008). The politics of partnerships: Peril or promise. *Norrag News*, (41).

Labonne, J., & Chase, R. S. (2011). Do community-driven development projects enhance social capital? Evidence from the Philippines. *Journal of Development Economics*, *96*(2), 348–358.

Larner, W. (2000). Neo-liberalismi policy, ideology, governmentality. *Studies in Political Economy*, *63*(1), 5–25.

Legal Dept of World Bank. (1992). *Conformed Copy - L3451 - National Fadama Development Project - Loan Agreement* (pp. 1–1). The World Bank. Retrieved from

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/595831468120854950/Conformed-Copy-L3451-National-Fadama-Development-Project-Loan-Agreement

Lemke, T. (2002). Foucault, governmentality, and critique. *Rethinking Marxism*, *14*(3), 49–64.

Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., & True, J. (2005). *Theories of international relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lister, S. (2000). Power in partnership? An analysis of an NGO's relationships with its partners. *Journal of International Development*, *12*(2), 227.

Lorenzi, M. (2006). Power: a radical view by Steven Lukes. *Crossroads*, *6*(2), 87–95.

Lukes, S. (1974). *A radical view*. London.

Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. (2004). Community-based and-driven development: A critical review. *The World Bank Research Observer*, *19*(1), 1–39.

Maxwell, S. (1996). Food security: a post-modern perspective. *Food Policy*, *21*(2), 155–170.

Maxwell, S. (1998). Saucy with the Gods: nutrition and food security speak to poverty. *Food Policy*, *23*(3–4), 215–230.

Maxwell, S., & Riddell, R. (1998). Conditionality or contract: perspectives on partnership for development. *Journal of International Development*, *10*(2), 257–268.

Maxwell, S., & Smith, M. (1992). Household food security: a conceptual review. *Household Food Security: Concepts, Indicators, Measurements. Edited by S. Maxwell and T. Frankenberger. Rome and New York: IFAD and UNICEF.*

McEuen, C. [editor. (2003). *Toward country-led development: a multi-partner evaluation of the CDF* (No. 27652) (pp. 1–4). The World Bank.

Mellor, J. W. (1999). Pro-poor Growth: The relation between growth in Agriculture and Poverty Reduction. *Prepared for USAID/G/EGAD. Http://Agronor. Org/Mellor1. Htm.*

Moore, D. (2007). *The World Bank: development, poverty, hegemony*. University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.

Morton, A. D. (2003). Social forces in the struggle over hegemony: Neo-Gramscian perspectives in international political economy. *Rethinking Marxism*, *15*(2), 153–179.

Moyo, D. (2010). *Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for Africa*. Penguin.

National Planning Commission. (2011). The Transformation Agenda (2011-2015): Summary of Federal Government's Key Priority Policies, Programmes and Projects. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from http://nationalplanning.gov.ng/images/docs/Transformation.pdf

National Fadama Development Programme (NFDP). (2010). *Third Fadama Development Project (Fadama III) handbook,* Abuja.

Nayak, P. (2000). Understanding the entitlement approach to famine. *Journal of Assam University*, *5*(1), 60–65.

Neumann, I. B., & Sending, O. J. (2007). The 'International' as governmentality. *Millennium*, *35*(3), 677–701.

Nigeria High Commission, United Kingdom. (2009). PRESIDENT YAR'ADUA'S SEVEN POINT AGENDA AND POLICY THRUSTS. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from http://www.nigeriahc.org.uk/pdf/seven_point_agenda.pdf

Nkonya, E. (2007). *'Fadama II', International Food Policy Research Institute,* Washington, DC. Online: http://www.ifpri.org (accessed 23-08-2013).

Nkonya, E., Phillip, D., Mogues, T., Pender, J. L., & Kato, E. (2010). *From the ground up: Impacts of a pro-poor community-driven development project in Nigeria.* Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

Nwachukwu, I. N., Agwu, N. M., Ezeh, C. I., Mbanasor, J. A., Onyenweaku, C. O., & Kamalu, C. E. (2008). Evaluation of Second National Fadama Development Project in Nigeria: A Rapid Policy Appraisal. *MPRA Paper No. 12914*. Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12914/

Obadan, M. I. (2001). Poverty reduction in Nigeria: The way forward. *CBN Economic and Financial Review*, *39*(4), 159–188.

OECD-DAC. (n.d.). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Retrieved January 9, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf

Ojo, S. O. (2007). Improving efficiency in food crop production for food security in Nigeria. *Agricultural Journal*, *2*(1), 9–15.

Okonjo-Iweala, N., & Osafo-Kwaako, P. (2007). Nigeria's economic reforms: Progress and challenges. *Brookings Global Economy and Development, Working Paper 6.*

Oladimeji, A. D., & Opeyemi, A. I. (2013). A Mid-Term Evaluation of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Transformation Agenda (May 2011-May 2013). *Journal of Research and Development*, *1*(1), 53–69.

Olaolu, M. O., Akinnagbe, O. M., & Agber, T. (2013). Impact of national Fadama Development project phase (II) on poverty and food security among rice farming beneficiaries in Kogi State, Nigeria. *Nigeria American Journal of Research Communication. Available on Http://Www. Usa-Journals. Com/Wp-Content/Uploads/2013/09/Olaolu_Vol110. Pdf.*

Omotola, J. S., & Saliu, H. (2009). Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa's development: problems and prospects. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, *16*(1), 87–102.

Onakuse, S. (2011). Nigeria's Seven-Point agenda and the financial crisis: Implications for growth and development.

Orievulu, K. S. (2014). Community-Driven Development in Nigeria: Development Projects and the Political Empowerment of the Disenfranchised. *Africa Peace & Conflict Journal*, *7*(1).

Oriola, E. O. (2009). A framework for food security and poverty reduction in Nigeria. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, *8*(1), 132–139.

Orlu, W. (n.d.). Rivers state: Overview. Retrieved March 8, 2018, from https://riversstate.gov.ng/overview/

Osmani, S. R. (1993). *The entitlement approach to famine: An assessment*. UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Parpart, J. L., & Veltmeyer, H. (2004). The development project in theory and practice: a review of its shifting dynamics. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne d'études Du Développement*, *25*(1), 39–59.

Pender, J. (2001). From 'Structural Adjustment' to 'Comprehensive Development Framework': conditionality transformed? *Third World Quarterly*, *22*(3), 397–411.

Platteau, J.-P. (2004). Monitoring elite capture in Community-Driven development. *Development and Change*, *35*(2), 223–246.

Rangasami, A. (1985). Failure of exchange entitlements' theory of famine: A response. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1747–1752.

Richmond, O. P. (2005). *The transformation of peace*. Springer.

Richmond, O. P., & Franks, J. (2009). Introduction: A framework to assess liberal peace transitions. *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*, 1–17.

Riisgaard, L., Ponte, S., & UNIDO. (2011). Pro-Poor Value Chain Development: 25 guiding questions for designing and implementing agroindustry projects.

Rivers State Fadama Coordinating Office. (2012). *Third Fadama Development Programme (FADAMA III) Rivers State (Unpublished Report)*. Rivers State Fadama Office, Port Harcourt.

Robert, C. (1983). *Rural development: Putting the last first*. Longman Scientific Technology.

Rose, N., O'Malley, P., & Valverde, M. (2006). Governmentality. *Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci.*, *2*, 83–104.

Sabaratnam, M. (2017). *Decolonising intervention: international state-building in Mozambique*. London; Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Sanusi, S. L. (2012). Nigeria's Economic Development Aspirations and the Leadership Question: is there a Nexus? *Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria. P1-18.*

Sawyerr, A. (1990). The politics of adjustment policy. *The Human Dimension of Africa's Persistent Economic Crisis. London/New York: H. Zell/Economic Commission for Africa.*

Schanbacher, W. D. (2010). *The politics of food: The global conflict between food security and food sovereignty.* ABC-CLIO.

Schech, S. (2007). vas Dev, S. (2007) "Governing Through Participation? The World Bank's New Approach to the Poor." *Moore, D.(Ed.) The World Bank: development, poverty, hegemony.* University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.

Scoones, I. (1998). Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis. *IDS Working Paper 72.*

Scoones, I. (2009). Livelihoods perspectives and rural development. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *36*(1), 171–196.

Sen, A. (1976). Famines as failures of exchange entitlements. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1273–1280.

Sen, A. (1981a). Ingredients of famine analysis: availability and entitlements. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *96*(3), 433–464.

Sen, A. (1981b). *Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation.* Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. (1982). The food problem: Theory and policy. *Third World Quarterly*, *4*(3), 447–459.

Sen, A. (1987). *Hunger and entitlements: research for action.* Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University.

Sen, A. (1990). 2 Food, Economics, and Entitlements 57. *The Political Economy of Hunger: Famine Prevention*, *2*, 34.

Sen, A. (2001). *Development as freedom.* Oxford Paperbacks.

Sen, A. K. (1990). Development as capability expansion. *The Community Development Reader, 2nd Ed.; DeFilippis, J., Saeger, S., Eds*, 319–327.

Simms, R. (2000). Black theology, a weapon in the struggle for freedom: A Gramscian analysis. *Race and Society*, *2*(2), 165–193.

Stake, R. E. (1995). *The art of case study.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Swartz, D. L. (2007). Recasting power in its third dimension. *Theory and Society*, *36*(1), 103–109.

Tellis, W. (1997). Introduction to Case Study. *The Qualitative Report*, *3*(2). Retrieved from http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/ vol3/iss2/4

Tellis, W. M. (1997). Application of a case study methodology. *The Qualitative Report*, *3*(3), 1–19.

The World Bank (Ed.). (1986). *Poverty and hunger: issues and options for food security in developing countries*. Washington, D.C., U.S.A: World Bank.

The World Bank. (2000a). *Nigeria - Country strategy note* (No. 20309) (p. 1). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2000b). *Nigeria - National Fadama Development Project* (No. 19730) (p. 1). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2001). *Comprehensive development framework: meeting the promise? Early experience and emerging issues* (No. 30365) (p. 1). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2003). The comprehensive development framework : a multi-partner review. *OED Reach*, 1–3.

The World Bank. (2005a). *Nigeria - Country Partnership Strategy* (No. 32412) (p. 1). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2005b). *Voice for the World's Poor: selected speeches of the World Bank president James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005* (No. 34362) (pp. 1–0). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2008). *Nigeria - Third National Fadama Development (Fadama III) Project* (No. 39489) (pp. 1–175). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2009a). *Community-Driven Development: delivering the results people need* (No. 51976) (pp. 1–9). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2009b). *Nigeria - Country partnership strategy for the period 2010-2013* (No. 46816) (pp. 1–131). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2010a). *Nigeria - Growth Employment and Markets in States (GEMS) Project* (No. AB5620) (pp. 1–25). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2010b). *Nigeria - Second National Fadama Development Project* (No. ICR1160) (pp. 1–58). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2014). *Nigeria - Country partnership strategy for the period FY2014-FY2017* (No. 82501) (pp. 1–161). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2016). *Nigeria - Third National Development Project: Implementation Completion and Results Report* (No. ICR3895) (pp. 1–87). The World Bank.

The World Bank. (n.d.). Agricultural Development Projects in Nigeria - Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). Retrieved October 27, 2017, from http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/

The World Bank, T. W. (2007). *Nigeria - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report and Joint IDA-IMF Staff Advisory Note* (No. 39960) (pp. 1–49). The World Bank.

Thomas, C. (2001). Global governance, development and human security: exploring the links. *Third World Quarterly*, *22*(2), 159–175.

Timmer, C. P. (2000). The macro dimensions of food security: economic growth, equitable distribution, and food price stability. *Food Policy*, *25*(3), 283–295.

Ünay, S. (2010). Hegemony, Aid and Power: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the World Bank. *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, *3*(2), 39–52.

Utomi, P., Duncan, A., & Williams, G. (2007). Nigeria: The political economy of reform; strengthening the incentives for economic growth. *Brighton: The Policy Practice Available online at: www.Thepolicypractice. Com/Papersdetails. Asp*.

Webber, C. M., & Labaste, P. (2010). Building Competitiveness in Africa's Agriculture: A Guide to Value Chain Concepts and Applications. *The World Bank.*

Weber, H. (2004). Reconstituting the 'Third World'? Poverty reduction and territoriality in the global politics of development. *Third World Quarterly*, *25*(1), 187–206.

Weber, H., & Berger, M. T. (2007). Global poverty and inequality. In *An introduction to international relations: Australian perspectives Edited by Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke and Jim George* (pp. 283–294). Cambridge University Press.

Wienecke, D. (2005). Community-driven development in Central Asia: a World Bank initiative. *Critique-a Worldwide Journal of Politics, Illinois State University*.

Willett, S. (2004). Development and security in Africa: a challenge for the new millennium. *Achieving Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cost Effective Alternatives to the Military. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies*.

Willett, S. (2005). New Barbarians at the Gate: Losing the liberal peace in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, *32*(106), 569–594.

Williams, D. (1999). Constructing the economic space: the World Bank and the making of homo oeconomicus. *Millennium*, *28*(1), 79–99.

Wolfensohn, J. D. (1999, January 21). A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework. Retrieved October 27, 2017, from http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01013/WEB/IMAGES/CDF.PDF

Wolfensohn, J. D., & Fisher, S. (2000, April 5). Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). Retrieved October 27, 2017, from https://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/pdf/cdfprsp.pdf

Yahaya, K., Adebowale, G., Arokoyo, T., Kato, E., Nkonya, E., Phillip, D., … Pender, J. (2008). From the Ground up. *International Food Policy Research Institute.*

Yin, R. K. (2003). Design and methods. *Case Study Research*. (3rd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing.

Ziai, A. (2015). Post-Development: Premature Burials and Haunting Ghosts. *Development and Change*, *46*(4), 833–854.

Face to Face Interviews

Interview with TTL-WBA, Abuja, 9 November 2012.

Interview with SM&E-ABJ, Abuja, 29 November 2012.

Interview with Participant-Fab-II, Abuja, 29 November 2012.

Interview with Official-II, Abuja, 29 November 2012.

Interview with Official-I, Abuja, 28 November 2012.

Interview with SP-FAP, Port Harcourt, 25 January 2013.

Interview with RM&E-FAP, Port Harcourt, 14 June 2013.

Interview with CD-FAP, Port Harcourt, 14 June 2013.

Interview with FPM-RVADP, Port Harcourt, 10 December 2011.

Interview with Participant-IFAC-ERV, Etche Local Government Area, Rivers State, 24 June 2013.

Interview with Participant-IIFAC-ORV, Ikwerre Local Government Area, Rivers State, 23 June 2013.

Interview with Participant-AWC1FUG, Emohua Local Government Area, 2 February 2013.

Interview with Participant-AWC1FUG, Emohua Local Government Area, 17 July 2013.

Interview with Participant-AWC12FUG, Emohua Local Government Area, 17 July 2013.

Interview with Lekoo, Gokana Local Government Area, Rivers State, 25 June 2013.

Interview with Piaso Poultry, Gokana Local Government Area, Rivers State, 25 June 2013.

Interview with Deedum, Gokana Local Government Area, Rivers State, 27 January 2013.

Interview with Etlorich, Ikwerre Local Government Area, Rivers State, 2 February 2013.

Interview with Chairman, Ikwerre Local Government Area, Rivers State, 2 February 2013.

Interview with Participant-PhD, Ikwerre Local Government Area, Rivers State, 2 February 2013.

Interview with Avplacii, Emohua Local Government Area, Rivers State, 15 January 2015.

Other Sources (Email Correspondence)

Abimbola Adubi, The World Bank Country Office, TTL-NFDP III, E-Mail Correspondence, Abuja, 27 April 2013.

Annexure

Annex 1: Definition and Operational application of Key Terms and Concepts

This study grapples with a plethora of interdisciplinary terms and concepts based on its focus on the interconnected issues of food security and poverty reduction. Current strides toward addressing these issues have brought to the fore discursive turns within scholarship and practice within development circles. Hence terms such as partnership, ownership, agency, and inclusiveness have become synonymous with strides to address such development issues. Within the context of this study also, a number of terms appear very often, and it is important to provide a clear understanding of how these terms are used within the context of this study. Such terms include beneficiary community, beneficiary contribution, government or Fadama agency, and counterpart fees. Since all these concepts are used within the development arena in which various actors, institutions, and actions converge, it becomes very apt to commence with an attempt to operationally define the concept of development before engaging with others.

Development

Development is contested and mainstream and alternative perspectives also perceive development strategies differently. Although within mainstream circles the concept is described to be synonymous with economic growth – growth in the gross domestic product (GDP)[222] in many cases, it actually entails the exploitation of human and natural resources (Fioramonti, 2017). As a result of the massive critique from alternatives and the noted practical shortfalls of this classical perspective of development exemplified in the SAPs, the post-SAPs era saw a redefinition which incorporated the discourse of poverty reduction and participation into mainstream development thinking. Nevertheless, this ostensibly new approach has not changed the narrow inclination of towards growth.

In contrast, therefore, this study employs a more holistic outlook on the concept of development. It draws, but expands, on Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris' use of the term economic development (as distinct from economic growth) because the former entails "widespread, widely shared, sustainable economic growth accompanied by significant structural change in production patterns and in economic and political institutions and by generalized improvement in living standards" (Adelman & Morris, 1997, p. 831). In this

[222] This is despite current strides towards a more holistic definition of development in the post-1990 World Bank.

context, development entails improvement not only in a country's economic growth but also in the living conditions of people and the environment. It involves the ability of people to determine their future and participate more actively and effectively towards the improvement of their lives. And drawing from Sen (2001; 1990), it involves the capacity of people to be free – this is the idea of development as freedom.

Development Assistance/Foreign Aid

The mainstream view of development as a trend whose models can be propagated and transferred from one part of the world to another to achieve the same effects lies at the core of the strides to do development in many parts of the developing world. It is indeed the root of the concept of development assistance or foreign aid as an official means for advancing development within the LDCs through various forms of assistance such as bilateral and multilateral loans and credits for boosting investment and driving growth. In truth, the issue of foreign aid to the Third World to combat poverty and under-development has also been a major debating point in development theory and practice. This idea emerged based on the Harrod-Domar model that external assistance is required to fill the "financing gap" which poor developing countries need for economic growth – development – to "take-off'; they need a "big push" to steer them towards development (Easterly, 1999, 2001). Thus, many scholars, including Susan Willett, contend that Official Development Assistance (ODA) remains indispensable for economic growth as well as poverty alleviation in Africa (Willett, 2004, 2005). She nevertheless criticizes the policies and interests of the external donors that are not really focused on benefitting the poor.

Despite this optimism, development assistance was suspect for scholars like William Easterly as well as Dambisa Moyo. For Easterly, development assistance based on the big push is an unnecessary "White Man's Burden" on the poor African countries (Easterly, 2001; Easterly & Easterly, 2006). This is also built on the fact that aid tends to induce rentierism, patronage networks and authoritarian and unaccountable regimes in many aid-dependent states (Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Easterly, 2002, 2003). Hence, in his view, foreign aid neither boosts nor propels economic growth or development. In the same light, Moyo (2010) contends that it drives dependency and stifles the growth local industries. Indeed, the critique of development assistance draws from many experiences of the negative impact of ODA on developing countries' economies ranging from poor economic growth to poor socioeconomic wellbeing

of citizens and poor leadership as well as the destruction of local industries based on the impact of the Dutch disease syndrome associated with foreign aid.

Despite the criticisms ODAs, aid continues unabated. However, since the mid to late 1990s development assistance was refocused to address issues beyond economic stability towards issues of poverty alleviation, poverty reduction, social development, health and microeconomic issues. This was obviously in response to the criticisms faced by mainstream development institutions because of the SAPs and its noted impacts in African countries. The focus, it seems has thus been directed towards broader issues of (human) development and security. In fact, within the World, issues of democratization, environmental sustainability, human rights and inclusive and participatory governance became vitally integrated within a broader outlook on development and development assistance. Thus, development assistance was directed towards addressing issues of a more holistic development challenge within the developing countries – a focus which transcends the previous narrow focus on economic growth based on the flawed trickle-down effect hypothesis (see Pender, 2001).

Based on this background, the concept of development assistance in this dissertation is used to subsume financial, technical and otherwise assistance rendered to countries of the developing world to stimulate both macro and micro level and social development. In this case, development assistance supports country-led strides aimed not only at economic sustainability on a national level but also towards empowering the grassroots poor comprising of local farmers, entrepreneurs, unemployed youths, widows and other vulnerable people within Nigeria. In this way, the reach of development assistance transcends capital investments to integrate investments in human capital for actualizing a broader level of human development and growth. It can thus be said that the establishment of strategies such as the Fadama project – within a broader macroeconomic development policy known as the NEEDS and others after 2003 – was based on an understanding or a perspective within the mainstream on the nature of poverty within the country which required intervention.

Food Security and Poverty Reduction

Poverty has been diagnosed by the institutions of global governance as one of the major problems facing human security in the universe today (Thomas, 2001). This is responsible for the millennium declaration and the drive towards the drastic reduction of poverty by 2015 as enunciated by the MDGs. This quest brought about a new dimension in which development became the new 'security' in the post-9/11 era of United States of America (USA) foreign

policy where development assistance was constructed as a means towards fighting terrorism and curbing radicalism (Willett, 2005).

Poverty exacerbates food insecurity because it tends to limit people's access to food resources as well as their freedom to actualize their potentials in life (Schanbacher, 2010). It is instructive to note that in this study food security and poverty reduction are intrinsically intertwined as the study unpacks the 'veiled' goals underlying the establishment and implementation of Fadama in Nigeria.[223] The view enunciated here is that Fadama represents a stride designed to reduce rural poverty by means of a development strategy which focuses on farmer's income and productivity above all other concerns. Improving incomes here is essentially linked to the production, sale and distribution of food resources. This essentially leads to an adequate response to the questions of food availability, access, utilization as well as stability.

It is interesting to highlight that one thing that can be observed, drawing from the mainstream perspectives about development and how it is actualised in developing countries, is that development assistance has over the years focused on a number of identified sectors. This is especially in terms of the current drives to address the issues of poverty and food security. In this light, many a time, the agricultural sector has been identified for intervention in this quest. This is because achieving the goal of food security necessarily implies an outlook on the role of this sector in the improvement of food production within a country (Jarosz, 2011; Schanbacher, 2010). However, as the literature on food security or the politics of the food problem shows, there remain disagreements between the mainstream perspectives on what constitutes food security and the alternative perspectives that criticise the mainstream focus on grounds of its neoliberal focus that neglects issues of food as a human right and a cultural and identity issue.

While this study acknowledges this debate, and the cases it endeavours to highlight, the focus on food security, however, is linked to theoretical questions about the nature of the partnership established at both macro and micro levels of interaction within Fadama. Since the Fadama project represents donor-led micro-level development strategies for addressing myriads of development challenges in developing countries like Nigeria (and other African countries), this study focuses on questions around partnership, participation, ownership and, indeed, power as evident in the conceptualisation and implementation of this initiative. The nature of

[223] This is besides the fact that it is conceptually focused on food security and the politics of development partnership.

these projects, their targets, goals and mode of implementation – towards actualising predefined goals – is argued in this study to be largely dependent on the nature of the power dynamics which exists in the partnerships established for these strategies.

Participation and Ownership

One important feature of the era of poverty reduction strategies in international development circles, or the new agenda for development planning during this era, is the emphasis on participation. Participation broadly connotes active involvement of a variety of actors in the context of a possible action to be undertaken. In development parlance, participation entails the inclusion and involvement of beneficiaries of development assistance in the planning and execution of such strategies aimed at empowering them. From an institutional level, it may involve a state receiving development assistance in the sense that they play very active roles in the conceptualisation of the development strategy for which they are receiving assistance. This was the core of the introduction of the concept of (country) ownership to 'lay to rest' the 'old order' of the structural adjustment policy interventions where countries were constrained through stringent conditionality (by external donors) towards structuring their economic policies according to the interests of the donors.

This study understands the application of these terms within current development parlance. It also acknowledges the contention between critics of the mainstream application of the concepts of participation. Many critics such as Leal (2007) argue that participation is simply a buzzword used in development practice to show how the poor are integrated without actually transforming anything. In other words, the poor's voices do not really matter despite the claim that they are part of the process (Cleaver, 1999). Instead, the poor's inclusion simply serves to legitimise the strides within mainstream circles to expand and entrench the hegemonic neoliberal development agenda across the developing world. This also applies to the concept of ownership – the view that countries or local recipients of various forms of development assistance must take on such programmes; they must take leadership in advancing the goal of such strategies; and they must be actively invested in such programmes. Critical perspectives also see this as a legitimisation agenda that masks the real intentions and real players within development assistance frameworks. This means that donors continually push their own agenda while countries or local beneficiaries are presented as being in the forefront of inclusive (and country-owned) development strategizing and planning.

In this study, these concepts are important in relation to the inclusive nature of the Fadama project. As such, there remains an understanding of the long-standing debate around participation and ownership in development planning – especially in term of official development assistance frameworks. The study nonetheless adopts an outlook on participation and ownership which highlights the extent to which the beneficiaries of the Fadama project actively participated in the conceptualisation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project in Nigeria. Participation here, therefore, entails the nature of the consultation and sensitisation processes undertaken for the project to get beneficiaries on board for the project. It also involves how much input was made by the local beneficiaries at the various local, state and national levels of engagement in the structuring and execution of the project, and how much of these inputs or perspectives (from the ground) constituted important aspects of the project design and subsequent implementation.

In the same light, ownership in the study is delineated between country and local ownership of the Fadama project. While ownership broadly entails the active role of beneficiaries of development assistance – a state or local beneficiaries within that state – this study delineates between country ownership and local ownership. The former is presented in terms of the macro level institutional interaction between the Nigerian government and the World Bank in terms of the country's responsibility to effectively lead and set the agenda for Fadama despite the financial and technical supported from the World Bank. The latter describes ownership from a community perspective. This aspect of ownership – local ownership – can also be described as community ownership in that the beneficiary communities or groups that receive the Fadama grant are required to take active steps to ensure that the Fadama project in their communities and vicinities were adequately implemented. This required them to invest their time and capital to ensure that the project is not abandoned.

Power

Underlying the idea of the politics of development partnership is the notion of power. The concept of power has been described and analysed in various forms and manner. Within the context of international relations, power has been conceptualised in terms of the ability of one actor to influence or coerce another to act in a manner that such an actor may not necessarily be comfortable with. This is a conception of power that is liked to Robert Dahl's pluralist approach that describes a conflict of interest in interstate relations. Power is thus the ability of

a state to control the behaviour of another state and this comes from a position of military and economic capability.

This outlook on power when applied to partnerships, especially within the context of development assistance, highlights the extent to which various bilateral and multilateral donors constrained aid recipient states to adopt development policies that were not necessarily in the interest of the local population in these developing countries. Thus, it is the interest of the states and the board of directors of many of the multilateral institutions that are pushed within partnerships established in terms of development planning for the aid-dependent states. In fact, this conception of power underlies the many critical perspectives that contend that partnership is a concept in current development landscape used to veil the actual nature of power relations between bilateral and multilateral donors with aid-dependent states.

While there are several alternative perspectives about power in the partnership debate, this study adopts a poststructuralist (International Relations) focus on power which assumes that power is pervasive and identifiable through various structures, discourses and actions. This outlook on power helps to more clearly understand various mechanisms and instruments used to advance and expand the neoliberal development agenda in current development planning strategies such as the Fadama project. It follows that power in development partnership transcends the question of conflict of interest and the control of agenda but also incorporates the use of discourse and the construction of meaning and the creation of identities that help to advance a particular form of knowledge or a particular development ideology or framework. The place of the World Bank in advancing this particular hegemonic development paradigm is a vital focus of this study on the Fadama project in Nigeria.