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Masters Research Report

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Instruments of Power: China's use of Soft Power in Africa

Declaration

I bear witness that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts by coursework and research report in the field of International Relations to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted to any other University or Faculty for any degree or examination

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Abstract

The rise of China and the implications thereof has created much furore in literature, be it academia or popular media. Western concerns are significantly different to those of African states and, typically, discourse focuses on Western concerns and interests in Africa. Chinese support of African states has been referred to as a ‘new scramble for Africa’ or a form of ‘neo-colonialism’; whereas China invokes the principle of sovereignty in dealing with these states. Chinese motives are numerous, from access to resources to shoring up political support – not significantly from that of Western objectives; this research report will seek to understand China’s motives and Western reactions thereto. Upon reaching such an understanding, an evolution of Singapore’s foreign policy will be introduced and her successful engagement with China will be referenced. A possible solution will be inferred from Singapore to the African case study, that of Angola, as well as any weaknesses to such an inference.

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Introduction

Title

Instruments of power: China's use of soft power in Africa.

Aim

The primary aim of this research report is to understand the impact of China's use of soft power and the implications for African states. By means of understanding China's methods and goals, this paper will then seek to propose an appropriate response that would leave the continent less exposed to yet more exploitation, and rather benefit from the Sino-African relationship.

Rationale

Views of Chinese expansion into Africa range from those who welcome them as liberators from traditional Western oppression to those who believe that Chinese involvement is merely another form of neo-colonialism, and many ambivalent appreciations in between these two. What one can be sure of, however, is that China, like all states, is interested in advancing her own standing in the world – Africa merely provides her stepping stone in this regard. Africa offers many opportunities for a state that is willing to fund spurious governments, and China possesses the financial wherewithal and has a history of dubious dealings with less than legitimate regimes; that China has a history with many African states that fought for liberation is also noted. Soft power has been the *modus operandi* for the Chinese dispensation in recent years, and has been effectively applied in her backyard; states such as Singapore and Malaysia have experienced as much for a longer period than African states and therefore afford one the opportunity to understand the methods of Chinese engagement and the effects thereof. Singapore, despite its relative weakness when compared to China, has displayed a remarkably pragmatic means of engagement. By understanding how Singapore reacted to Chinese influence and by analysing where Angola relatively, an appropriate response will be proposed.

Theoretical framework

The concept of power may be analysed in many different ways, namely as a goal, as a measure, as reflecting victory or the attainment of security, or as control over resources and capabilities – these are all realist based paradigms. The power used in this analysis was proposed by Joseph Nye, namely that of soft power. He describes soft power as an attractive power that “occurs when one country gets other countries to *want* what it wants”.¹ Whilst soft power has been the recipient of criticism most notably by historian Niall Ferguson, who stated that the “trouble with soft power is that it’s, well soft”,² Ferguson goes on to cite soft power uses by the British empire in the nineteenth century in terms of the spread of its culture, thereby merely disputing the efficacy of soft power (mostly American), but not the existence thereof. This is not universal, however. Whilst being a fundamentally realist paradigm and even touted by liberal schools of thought in its soft version, power is still in need of a definitive clarification, in soft or hard forms; the mutable nature of power makes it very difficult to pin down. Hard power is conventionally quantified, *inter alia*, by measuring GDP, military expenditure, and product output of a state. Soft power rather, lends it self to a qualitative analysis, and is perhaps more efficient in explaining the changing nature that is power. The “weakness” that soft power is far too elastic to be measured, is also disputed - Nye noting that this criticism fails to understand the power resources and behaviour of soft power, and that one can “measure and compare the cultural, communications, and diplomatic resources that might produce soft power for a country.”³

Methodology

This research report will make use of a qualitative analysis of the issue at hand. Whilst soft power is not immune to a quantitative analysis, a deeper theoretical understanding of China’s engagement by means of soft power is sought, an analysis far more conducive to a qualitative method. Case studies of the states from Africa and Asia will be carried out to assess the effects and their respective responses to Chinese soft power.

¹ Nye, J.S. “Soft Power”. *Foreign Policy*, No. 80 (Autumn 1980), p. 166

² Ferguson, N. “What is Power?”. Retrieved 21 April 2009 from <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3058266.html>

³ Nye, J.S. “Think Again: Soft Power”. Retrieved 17 April 2009 from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3393

Chapter outline

Chapter One: The Nature of Power

The theoretical underpinnings will be dealt with here, power will be defined and the concept of soft power will be introduced and dissected.

Chapter Two: Chinese Instruments of Power

China's development and use of soft power will be analysed in this chapter. The effects of China's economic position on her soft power status will be considered, and will also be compared and contrasted to their hard power standing.

Chapter Three: Singapore in Review

Chinese soft power interactions *vis-à-vis* Singapore will be investigated, and especially how such a small state responds to and utilises soft power.

Chapter Four: Angola's Precarious Position

The African case study of Angola will be referred to here, her current standing in terms of Chinese soft power, as well as her regional and continental standing, and ambitions.

Chapter Five: A Suitable Response

Once having understood the nature of Chinese soft power as applied in her region and Angola, a response will be developed here. The aforementioned issues in terms of generalisability will be and the Singapore method of response will be contextualised in terms of Angola, thereby developing a suitable response.

Chapter One

The Nature of Power

Traditionally power has been the preserve of the realist theorist; this school of thought's influence has waxed and waned, particularly rising to the fore during the Cold War and then seeing a decline in the initial post-Cold War era. Post 9/11 saw a Bush doctrine take a decidedly Hobbesian leaning and a concomitant dwindling in liberal policy. This chapter will introduce the traditional concept of power and evolution thereof, and then introduce Joseph Nye's "soft power".

Power defined

The definition of power is not one which can be considered in a vacuum, it needs to be understood in terms of competing theories and temporally. Its primary proponent, namely realism narrowly describes power as the ability for one to get what one wants either the threat or use of force⁴. Amongst the first realist writings, albeit not a strictly international relations theory text, was E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) which delivered a scathing attack on contemporary liberal thought that had characterised the 1920s under Woodrow Wilson. Post-World War Two saw Hans Morgenthau produced *Politics Among Nations*, setting the tone for international relations theory for the Cold War period to come⁵. The concept of power then came to be predicated upon the centrality of the state – that sole entity, according to Max Weber, for whom a monopoly of the legitimate use of force exists⁶. The notion of statehood is underpinned by four essential criteria as defined by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, namely: a permanent population, defined territory, government, and foreign relations⁷. Whilst not being absolute, these criteria do provide one with a yardstick. Exceptions have included, *inter alia*, the TBVC⁸ states created under the apartheid regime in South Africa as well as the Palestinian Authority, the former an attempt to quell international outrage and the latter who, for a significant period,

⁴ Dunne, T. & Schmidt, C. "Realism" in *The Globalization of World Politics*, (2nd Ed.) Baylis, J & Smith, S (Eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 144

⁵ Burchill, S. "Liberalism" in *Theories in International Relations*, (2nd Ed.) Palgrave, London, 2001, p. 70

⁶ Dunne, T. & Schmidt, C. *Op Cit*, p. 150

⁷ Carolan, C.J. "Republic of Taiwan". *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 75, No. 429, p. 450

⁸ Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei

were not territorially based⁹. By whichever means a state comes about or is recognised, it is crucial that it possesses power; this power is not only the ability to influence others, but also to manipulate outcomes.

Liberal theory proposes that the *raison-d'être* of the state is to maintain the basic rules of the game in a pluralist arena and that there are no explicit or consistent national international interests¹⁰. Liberals maintain that the “endogenous determines the exogenous”, that intra-state political arrangements impact on relations between all nation-states. Further, liberals insist that state power is being eroded by processes such as globalisation and the rising power of transnational organisations such as the UN and WTO¹¹. Due to the nature of interdependence, liberals believe that states’ constraints are determined only by the level of interaction and this contributes to an incremental, constant change when actors become involved in new relationships¹². Essentially, liberalism pays the least attention to the “threat” the international system presents, viewing it rather as an arena for interaction. Liberalism has come to appreciate the concept of power as defined by one of the founders of neoliberalism, Joseph S. Nye, who noted that power comes in many guises and that soft power, so often derided by realists, is essential to the understanding of international relations. Understanding the origins of soft power, however, requires an understanding of the realist perception of power and of the state.

Realism insists that the state is a unitary actor on the world stage, limited only by the anarchical nature of the international system. Sovereignty is of the utmost importance, and authority to govern matters within her own borders are at the sole discretion of the state¹³. Morgenthau notes in his second principle of realism that international politics is defined in terms of power, thereby facilitating an understanding between “politics and the facts to be understood”; further he insists that power is what “sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics, ethics, aesthetics, or religion”¹⁴. The traditional realist notion of setting power above all else is crucial as realists insists that it primarily informs state decisions, versus the liberal view of contextualising the

⁹ Mingst, K.A. Essentials of International Relations, (4th Ed) W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2008, p. 100

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 104

¹¹ Burchill, S. Op Cit, p. 63

¹² Mingst, K.A. Op Cit, p.97

¹³ Ibid, p. 104

¹⁴ Morgenthau, H.J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power, (7th Ed.) McGraw-Hill, 2006, p. 5

state within the greater international polity. This does not however, exclude the influence of economics and the like; Morgenthau stresses that the 'national interest' is always defined in terms of strategic and economic capability¹⁵. The concept of mutability under realism also needs to be addressed. Realism, under Morgenthau, posits that political realism is not only theoretical but also normative¹⁶, resulting in the rational nature that is realism. Even though realist dogma strictly advances the principle of autonomy, it also accepts the exogenous political realities and the influences they exert on foreign policy, affording realism a pragmatic element. This pragmatism allows one to not only clearly define power and its sources, but also reasons why states pursue power.

Mearsheimer notes five bedrock assumptions why states pursue power and seek hegemony in the international system. Alone, none of these assumptions mould a state's behaviour, collectively, however, they predict a world wherein states have reason to think and (sometimes) act aggressively¹⁷. The first of the assumptions is the perennial realist reference to anarchy. Anarchy does not denote absence of order or the existence chaos, rather it depicts a world characterised by security competition and war, but anarchy is not a *sine qua non* for war either. By itself, it is an ordering principle positing that states have no higher authority thereby underscoring the principle of sovereignty¹⁸. Offensive military capacity is Mearsheimer's second assumption; he proposes that all states inherently possess this capacity and, therefore, the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. Parity does not exist in this offensive world and, accordingly, some states present a greater threat than others. Thirdly, we find uncertainty as to other state's intentions, especially in light of the above mentioned offensive military capability. These intentions may be said to be benign, but may change quickly, implying that one "can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities"¹⁹. Survival is the primary goal by a state, the fourth assumption by Mearsheimer. Herein territorial integrity and autonomy of domestic political order are paramount, *sans* which a state is unlikely to be able to pursue its primary aims; Mearsheimer quotes Stalin, saying "[w]e can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist"²⁰. Finally, states are assumed to be rational actors, that they are aware of their external environment and strategise

¹⁵ Burchill, S. Op Cit, p. 79

¹⁶ Morgenthau, H.J. Op Cit, p. 9

¹⁷ Mearsheimer, J.J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, 2001, p. 29

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 30

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 31

²⁰ Loc Cit

how to survive in it. Of significance is the awareness that states have of their actions on the behaviour on other states and how other states' behaviour is likely to affect their own strategy.

This awareness of other states' possible intentions leads one to a fundamental tenet of realist understanding of power, that of relative power. As noted by Krasner: "Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment..."²¹. This facilitates the "pursuit of power" as defined by realists, for whom power is the "currency of great power politics"²². Pursuing power in this anarchical environment is informed by a Hobbesian state of nature – even if momentarily free from the predations of other states, the shadow of the future looms dark and informs power seeking behaviour. That states act differently towards friends than enemies is indicative of this "relative pursuit of power" competition, anarchy does not explain who and who is not a friend, however²³. This crucially informs the pursuit of power because, as noted in Mearsheimer's third assumption, one can never be sure as to the intentions of any other state. Projecting into the long term is difficult as state power may vary significantly, and it is therefore difficult to estimate how much power is actually necessary, hence the pursuit of hegemony now – Mearsheimer maintaining that this is the only assured method of ensuring security²⁴. This pursuit of relative power is what leads to a "security dilemma, where a state's increase in security inevitably leads to the decrease of all other states' security.

Power may be defined in many terms and is certainly not immutable. Traditionally power was defined by natural sources, namely geography, natural resources, and population²⁵. These merely describe power potential – it is the exploitation of these sources that traditionally saw the rise of powers. Upon examining these traditional measures of power, Niall Ferguson found that while population may be correlated with power, he highlights that by this measure India ought to be the second most powerful state in the world²⁶. In a similar vein he notes that military power is also not as great an advantage as it was once deemed, citing the rapidly narrowing technology gap; here he actually notes that the military advantage that the US

²¹ Krasner, S. "Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy". Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 39

²² Mearsheimer, J.J. Op Cit, p. 12

²³ Wendt, A. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics". International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 397

²⁴ Mearsheimer, J.J. Op Cit, p. 35

²⁵ Mingst, K.A. Op Cit, p. 109

²⁶ Ferguson, N. "What is Power?" Retrieved 29 April 2009 from <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3058266.html>

maintains actually occurs at a significant cost as a result of a diminishing law of returns because of the narrowing of the technology gap²⁷. This demonstrates how what appears to be a major power advantage may come at a cost that negates this advantage. Morgenthau's third principle of political realism emphasises that power is "an objective category that is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all"²⁸. Further, he notes that both historical and political contexts are important and that power "may compromise anything that establishes and maintains control over man"²⁹, and hence power covers a wide range of social means, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties.

Soft power

Nye's conceptualisation of soft power came about at the end of the Cold War, a dynamic period that saw the end of multipolarity and heralded Francis Fukuyama's "End of History". While introducing soft power in his founding article in 1990, Nye refers to the traditional definition of power, namely the "ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not"³⁰. He goes on to cite the Soviet demise, European disunity, Japanese military weakness and Chinese lack of development as deficiencies in challenging the United States, and that barring any *significant* changes, the US would remain the military, economic, scientific, cultural, and ideological superpower for the foreseeable future³¹. Continued US hegemony, Nye suggested, was not dependent on merely maintaining these power advantages, but rather on another source of power, namely the ability to change the behaviour of states by means of attraction or co-opting other states – by means of soft power, defined by Nye as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opt people rather than coerce them" without the use of inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks")³². This, he proposes, will lead to other states admiring the dominant soft power state, emulating its example and wishing to attain its level of prosperity.

Nye may have coined the term "soft power" in 1990, but this was merely putting a name to a form of power that has long been part of a state's diplomatic tool box. Ferguson refers to the

²⁷ Loc Cit

²⁸ Morgenthau, H.J. Op Cit, p. 11

²⁹ Loc Cit

³⁰ Nye, J.S. "Soft power". Foreign Policy, No. 80, (1990) p. 154

³¹ Ibid, p. 155

³² Nye, J.S. Soft power, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. 5

United States' hegemonic predecessor, the United Kingdom, in tracing soft power's lineage, noting that Britain actually pioneered the use of soft power by means of missionaries' sermons and the dissemination of British culture, including sports such as cricket and soccer, as well as spreading English tea³³.

In discussing soft power, Nye distinguishes between soft power and influence – influence, he insists, may also rest on the hard power of threats or payments, whilst also noting that soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to motivate people by means of argument. Simply put, he notes, “soft power resources are the assets that produce [...] attraction”³⁴ that leads to acquiescence. In comparing hard and soft power, one may compare the variety of ways one can obtain the desired outcomes. Hard power requires economic inducements or threats of force, or the restriction of one's preferences. Soft power's means of attraction, appealing to shared values and purposes, without any explicit threat or exchange taking place, is observable but intangible – much as our marketplace decisions are guided by Adam Smith's “invisible hand”. That both hard and soft power aim to achieve similar goals, that is to say affecting the behaviour of others, means the distinction between them is also one of degree, in terms of nature and in the tangibility of the resources; Nye proposes that power is measured along a continuum rather than as a binary, each point associated with a likely resource³⁵:

	Hard	Soft
Spectrum of behaviours	coercion inducement Command ← *-----* -----	agenda setting attraction -----*-----*----- → Co-opt
Most likely resources	force payments sanctions bribes	institutions values culture policies

The correlation between soft and hard power is undeniable. A state's who's hard power is on the wane is certainly likely to see a concomitant decrease in soft power; this is because its hard power resources endow it with the ability to shape the international agenda to some extent and hence some of its attractiveness – Nye notes that even both Stalin's and Hitler's

³³ Ferguson, N. Op Cit

³⁴ Nye, J.S. (2004) Op Cit, p. 6

³⁵ Ibid, p. 7

hardened regimes sought to establish myths of invincibility so as to attract other states³⁶. Correlation does not necessarily imply causation as soft power, whilst complemented by hard power, is not dependent on hard power – as demonstrated by the soft power wielded by the Vatican that elicited the response from Stalin: “How many divisions does the Pope have”³⁷. The Soviet Union’s soft power actually declined after they invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia even though their economic and military resources increased; the same can be noted with the US post 9/11, much of the sympathy that was afforded the US was lost when the US flexed her hard power muscles upon invading Iraq. The reciprocal also applies; states who punch above their hard power weight include, *inter alia*, Norway, Canada, and South Africa. Institutions facilitate soft power as well; the dominant state is likely to form an institution that represents its ideals, thereby advancing its agenda³⁸. The ability to shape international rules that are congruent with one’s state will increase said states legitimacy on the international stage and possibly even increase the states attractiveness.

Soft power, as with hard power, relies on sources. As felt by the US post Iraq war, it has become more costly to use traditional methods of power for a multitude of reasons, namely: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, “the spread of technology, and changing political issues”³⁹. Today states have three sources of soft power: culture (only where it is appealing to others), political values (when seen to be employing them at home and abroad) and foreign policy (only when it is legitimate)⁴⁰. Soft power, unlike hard power, is not only the preserve of the state; NGOs, industry and others beyond the control of the state may also attract (or repel) other states. Nye notes fundamentalist Christian groups and Hollywood images that might be offensive to Islamic nations that achieve the latter⁴¹. These sources of power also need to be effectively exploited and developed, something the US is not doing as demonstrated by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld professing to not even understand soft power⁴². This is further represented by the funding allotted to the United States Information Agency (USIA) which dropped ten percent in the ten year period after the end of the Cold War⁴³ - this saw Washington sponsored

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 9

³⁷ *Loc Cit*

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 10

³⁹ Nye, J.S. (1990) p. 160

⁴⁰ Nye, J.S. (2004) p. 11

⁴¹ *Op Cit*, p. 15

⁴² Nye J.S. “The Decline of America’s Soft Power”(1990b). *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 3, p. 16

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 17

broadcasts reach 70-80% of Eastern Europe and approximately half of the Soviet Union; on the eve of 9/11 only 2% of Arabs listened to Voice of America. Nye is stressing a link between the importance ascribed to soft power by the US dispensation and their attraction in predominantly Islamic states – he believes that soft power has usurped hard power in international relations. Ferguson, however, poignantly notes the soft power is “well, soft”, that in spite of America’s soft power in the form of Coke, Big Macs and Hollywood, the majority of the Muslim world still does not love America; he cites the aforementioned deterioration of the British empire example as proof of the limited efficacy of soft power⁴⁴.

Soft power is limited, possibly even more so than hard power, due to its relatively nebulous nature that does not easily lend itself to quantification. Traditionally, when observing power cycles of dominant states or when, with slightly more hubris, trying to predict the wane of the current power, military and economic statistics have been taken into account. This is feasible, considering the nature of international politics hitherto. Nye compiled a table representing dominant states from the 1500s on, producing Table 1⁴⁵. The abovementioned power sources are readily quantified, whereas soft power, as per Nye, needs to be assessed in focus groups, opinion polls, and in other far more subjective measurement environments. Upon re-examining Charles F. Doran’s *Power Cycle Theory*, Dylan Kissane too highlighted the quantifiable quandary that soft power presented⁴⁶. He does, however go on to highlight the observable effects of soft power in terms of the EU. Kissane cites Parag Khanna’s labelling of the EU as the “metrosexual superpower”, and how it has facilitated the EU’s rise to a powerful international position⁴⁷. Significantly, Nye observes that “Eastern Europeans and Turks gave the EU higher marks than the United States for playing a positive role on a variety of issues – ranging from fighting terrorism to reducing poverty to protecting the environment”⁴⁸.

⁴⁴ Ferguson, N. *Op Cit*

⁴⁵ Nye, J.S. (1990b) *Op Cit*, p. 183

⁴⁶ Kissane, D. “Curves, Conflicts, and Critical Points: Rethinking Power Cycle Theory for the Twenty First Century”, p. 49, retrieved 6 July 2008 from <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=dylankissane>

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 76

⁴⁸ Nye, J.S. (2004b) “Europe’s Soft Power”. *The Globalist*, 3 May 2004, retrieved 25 November 2009 from <http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3886>

Table 1:

Leading States and Major Power Resources, 1500s-1900s

Period	Leading State	Major Resources
Sixteenth Century	Spain	Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary armies
Seventeenth Century	Netherlands	Trade, capital markets, navy
Eighteenth Century	France	Population, rural industry, army
Nineteenth Century	Britain	Industry, political cohesion, navy, liberal norms
Twentieth Century	United States	Economic scale, scientific and technical leadership, military forces and alliances, liberal international regimes

The limits of soft power are also highlighted by Nye. These limits, however, assume the existence of soft power, unlike the sceptical views mentioned above. Rather Nye notes when soft power will and will not lead to the desired outcomes. A disparity in terms of culture is likely to lead to a decrease in attractiveness⁴⁹, that questions the validity of Niall Ferguson's criticism that "Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears, and DVDs starring Tom Cruise"⁵⁰ does not make the Islamic world love America anymore; here the US would have to develop more contextually appropriate soft power tools. A regime whose power is more widely dispersed is more likely to respond than a more authoritarian regime – that is to say soft power is more likely to be recognised in democracies. Finally, soft power's effects are more

⁴⁹ Nye, J.S. (2004a) *Op Cit*, p. 15

⁵⁰ Ferguson, N. *Op Cit*

likely to be more diffuse and therefore impact on the general goals that a country seeks, rather than achieve specific goals that hard power is more likely to achieve. That soft power is generally beyond the control of the state is another limit according to the critics, highlighting examples such as the anti-war movements in Vietnam and 2003 Iraq wars⁵¹. For Nye this is not a limitation of soft power, rather he believes that this is more reason for governments to ensure that their own actions and policies are congruent with their soft power.

Nye explicitly states that soft power occurs by means of attraction only, that neither sticks nor carrots classify as soft power, and that soft and hard power are on the opposite ends of the continuum. Further, he highlights that hard power may facilitate soft power. From these two statements, one may infer that the reciprocal may also be true, that soft power may facilitate hard power. This might be ably demonstrated in Africa today where the attractiveness of China may ease their entry into African markets; China's model of development is the best example of this, seeing as China has displayed remarkable growth in the post-Mao era, something Africa would dearly like to emulate. This alone does not afford China her diplomatic advantage in Africa, however; one needs to be cognisant of other power factors along the power continuum, *inter alia*, China's financial clout and her friendship on the UN Security Council. Therefore, whilst analysing China's use of instruments of power in Africa – specifically soft power, one needs to be aware of the fact that hard and soft power aren't merely points at the opposite ends of a continuum, linked by some tenuous thread, but rather they are inextricably linked to each other and need to be considered as such. Lest we choose to forget the effects of statements like Donald Rumsfeld's "I don't know what it means"⁵²; that the US is bogged down in her current Middle Eastern wars adds much to the meaning of this reply.

It must also be noted that it is no coincidence that Nye's soft power thesis was produced at the end of and was able to take root after the Cold War – before this the efficacy of soft power was relatively limited in Africa, a continent where *realpolitik* reigned supreme. While soft power was part of the American arsenal against the Soviet machine in Europe and other more developed countries, in Africa the hard rule of hard power reigned supreme, as demonstrated by the proxy wars that took place in the post-colonial era; even today this must be taken into account. As observed by Nye, the efficacy of soft power is enhanced when the disparities

⁵¹ Nye, J.S. (2004a) *Op Cit*, p. 14

⁵² *Ibid*, p. IX

between the states are minimised. In terms of both polity and economics, Africa is about as disparate from the developed world as one can be, and not only on an inter-continental basis, but also intra-continently; this may disproportionately sway the power continuum towards the hard side. Additionally, this intra-continental disparity diminishes African states' power, soft or hard. That has often been noted that China has an Africa policy, Africa does not have a China policy⁵³ is indicative of the losing power struggle that Africa is playing.

⁵³ Loc Cit

Chapter Two

Chinese Instruments of Power

China's foreign policy has proven to be exceptionally mutable since the end of the Chinese civil war after World War Two; this has been dictated to a great degree by the nature of the Chinese leadership – Mao representing the hardened ideological era, his successors choosing a more pragmatic route. China's relationship with Africa through both these periods will be explored here, as well as China's goals – regionally and internationally. The "China threat" will also be briefly addressed.

In theory...

In order to understand a state's foreign policy objectives, one needs to understand the underlying theoretical principles that inform the international system, most prominently that of realism and liberalism. The post-Cold War era saw Fukuyama's "End of History", spelling out the end of the realist paradigm, a thesis vociferously rebuffed by Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilisations" and Mearsheimer's "Tragedy of Great Power Politics". Mearsheimer proposes that the bipolar system of the Cold War era is the system that "produces the least amount of fear among the great powers"⁵⁴. Liberals sought to explain this period not only in terms of a struggle for democracy but also in terms of economics⁵⁵. The end of the Cold War era and the collapse of the bipolarity saw Huntington challenging Fukuyama, claiming that "[i]t is human to hate" and that humans need identity and acquire it through the enemies they choose⁵⁶; he also attacked the more liberal views of globalism and the dissipation of the state, proposing that nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, with the principle conflict occurring between nations and different civilisations⁵⁷.

The realist impression offered here is one of irreconcilable differences between states, that of a zero-sum game, and that foreign policy is distinctly based on these power relations.

⁵⁴ Mearsheimer, J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Nortons, New York, (2001) p. 45

⁵⁵ Beinhart, P. "The Rehabilitation of the Cold-War Liberal" retrieved 1 March 2008 from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/30/magazine/30liberal.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin

⁵⁶ Kurtz, S. "The Future of "History": Francis Fukuyama vs. Samuel P. Huntington". *Policy Review*, June/July 2002, No. 113, p.44

⁵⁷ Huntington, S.P. "The Clash of Civilisations?". *Foreign Affairs*, No. 72, Vol. 3, p. 22

Whilst representing a portion of the realist view, realists are not wholly averse to cooperation, and do not operate under a zero-sum belief all the time – here one needs to distinguish between offensive realists and defensive realists. In applying the prisoner's dilemma model, Jervis finds that offensive realists such as Mearsheimer do not believe that prisoner's dilemma represents international politics because the model does not highlight the most crucial aspects of power, that of pursuit of security⁵⁸. Defensive realists do not take this point of view, however, claiming that prisoner's dilemma includes the aspect of security insofar that the manner in which one state attempts to increase its security decreases the security of others – presenting us with the security dilemma⁵⁹.

In classical realist tradition, Morgenthau believes that the means of enacting power, that is to say foreign policy, is the primary method of understanding political and non-political facts, and that history bears out this assumption⁶⁰. In the first of his “Six Principles of Political Realism” Morgenthau proposes that political realism is dictated by objective laws that have their roots in human nature, and that these laws are resistant to change⁶¹, and is an “autonomous sphere of action” independent from “other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion”⁶². Cooperation under this paradigm is explained solely in terms of power, negating all non-political facts that would prevent one from applying a systematic measure of order to the political sphere⁶³. Classical realists focus on power does not, however, mean that they are necessarily belligerent. In assessing the 2003 Iraq war in terms of Morgenthau's principles, Mearsheimer highlights the fact that realists believe that power exists in a world wherein balance is important⁶⁴. By invading Iraq, the neoconservative movement believed they would precipitate a domino or cascading effect in the region; Morgenthau's perspective would have been very different though, rather highlighting the fact that because of the balancing effect the

⁵⁸ Jervis, R. “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate”. *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, p.48

⁵⁹ *Loc Cit*

⁶⁰ Morgenthau, H.J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th Edition. Knopf, New York, 1978, p. 6

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 5

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 6

⁶³ *Loc Cit*

⁶⁴ Mearsheimer, J. “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: realism versus neo-conservatism”. Retrieved 10 February 2008 from http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp

“Axis of Evil” powers would not automatically abandon their nuclear ambitions, but would in fact work harder to offset the threat of the US and to balance themselves against it⁶⁵.

Liberal foreign policy is best explained by Doyle best in terms of Kant’s “separate peace”, today usually referred as “democratic peace theory”. Democratic peace theory states that cooperation comes as a result of “economic rationalism” and that “free states”, that is to say those that enjoy economic and political freedom, demonstrate considerably less levels of conflict than “non-free” states⁶⁶. Here is a fundamental clause of liberalism, the role of economics: it is posited that the higher the transnational relations, the higher the interdependence⁶⁷. Doyle goes on to explain that Kant argues that cooperation may be achieved by means of three “definitive articles”, namely: the existence of a republican state – a political society that has mastered the art of “combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order” and has addressed the issue of separation of powers; two: establishment of peace by means of a pacific union – that is to say a federation of free states that maintain the rights of all member states; and three: creation of a cosmopolitan law that defines “rules of hospitality”⁶⁸. This theory questions the important realist claim that foreign policy is forever to be a tool of state security competition, and that the nature of the international system rather than the state type should inform us as to a states behaviour⁶⁹.

As dichotomous a front liberalism and realism present, they share what is viewed by some as a fundamental basis, that of rationalism. Wendt argues that this rationalism results in a fundamentally behavioural conception of both process and institutions, and this also leads neoliberals and neorealists to “share generally similar assumptions about agents: states are the dominant actors in the system, and they define security in “self-interested” terms”⁷⁰. This criticism is particularly levelled at positivism, the quest for reliable, cumulative knowledge about the world, with the assumption that, ultimately, society and nature have the same

⁶⁵ Loc Cit

⁶⁶ Doyle, M.W. “Liberalism and World Politics”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, p. 1154

⁶⁷ Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. Introduction to International Relations Theories, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 112

⁶⁸ Doyle, M.W. Op Cit, p. 1158

⁶⁹ Rosato, S. “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4, p. 585

⁷⁰ Wendt, A. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. International Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 392

quantifiable sources of behaviour⁷¹. That fundamental tenet of realism - anarchy - is called into question. Wendt believes that anarchy from the practises of states that create and instantiate a particular structure of identities and interests, rather than another⁷². Mearsheimer's first "Bedrock Assumption" is that the international system is anarchic; an assumption that he assumes is sound and a "reasonably accurate representation of an important aspect of life in the international system"⁷³. Parsimonious such an approach may be, however, it is an assumption that Mearsheimer chooses not to test, not even by means of the effect of economics on the international, which he insists is at all times subordinate to anarchy. What these criticisms of liberal and realist reductions of foreign policy demonstrate is that each on its own theory is necessarily limited, that the anarchical system truly seems to be what states make of it and is not statist, and the interactions of the economic system is predicated on reductionist beliefs of "economic man" similar to Hobbes's aggressive man where individuals are depicted as existing as separate from nature.

A mutable Chinese Foreign Policy

Like all states, China's means to attaining her foreign policy objectives are not immutable - they are how, however, reasonably predictable. This is for two reasons: firstly as defined by the theoretical schools of thought described above; secondly as outlined by means of explicit statements by the PRC dispensation⁷⁴. These goals are, *inter alia*, to "preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" and create an environment conducive to her development on the world stage; this "harmonious policy" contrasts greatly with her ideologically based roots of the Maoist era. This evolution of foreign policy from its ideological beginning to her more economic oriented policies of today will now be tracked in order to understand the root of the relationships China is now able to take advantage of in Africa.

Throughout the reign of Mao Tse-Tung, China's African policy was geared to "exporting revolution". Post civil war, Chinese foreign policy was significantly influenced by the

⁷¹ Onuf, N. "The Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations". In Tickner, J.A. (Ed.) "(Re)Constructing Constructivist International Relations Research" Retrieved 29 February 2008 from <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/tia01/>

⁷² Wendt, A. *Op Cit*, p. 395

⁷³ Mearsheimer, J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. *Op Cit*, p. 30

⁷⁴ "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace". Retrieved 17 October 2009 from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm>

contemporary international environment and, accordingly, she placed herself at the forefront of the struggle against “colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the Third World”⁷⁵; this situation was expedited by the Sino-Soviet split. Communist victory in 1949 saw China signing a “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” with Russia in the following year, affording China significant support from her northern ally, financially as well as logistically. The Chinese borrowed heavily from the Soviet model, even emulating the Russian “Five-Year Plans” to stimulate industrialisation⁷⁶. Mao played a more subordinate to the USSR, or more specifically to Stalin. Upon Khrushchev’s ascension to power and his relatively soft position *vis-à-vis* the United States, Mao saw China’s foreign policy diverging from that of Russia’s. This was noted as early as 1955, when the Soviets were not invited to the Bandung Conference of nonaligned nations, where the Chinese sought to establish themselves as the leaders of the emerging nonaligned group⁷⁷.

The Bandung Conference saw Africa being placed in an “intermediate zone”, that is to say neither socialist nor imperialist, in Mao’s view⁷⁸. This was contrary to other communist views of the period who sought to include Africa as a main force against imperialism and hegemonism. The nature of Third World countries’ politico-social system was not conducive to altering the fundamental contradiction between the Third World and imperialism, according to China. Rather, by means of independence, liberation and revolution, the Chinese believed that these countries could be included in the resistance against imperialism and hegemonism, and the people’s rising political consciousness would precipitate a revolutionary force⁷⁹. Accordingly, revolution “could not be exported” *à la* Che Guevara, its success depended more on the accumulation and expansion of revolutionary forces as well as on the domestic conditions within each country. By these means, China – in her limited military and financial capacity – was able to distinguish herself from the two superpowers thereby serving her non-alignment and neutralisation aspirations well. Complementing this was China’s nuclear stance in terms of arms control and disarmament: China’s declaration of “no first use”

⁷⁵ Li, A. “China and Africa: Policy and Challenges”. China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 70

⁷⁶ Judge, E.H. & Langdon, J.W. A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the Cold War, Prentice-Hall, 1996, p. 203

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 204

⁷⁸ Cheng, J.Y.S. & Shi, H. “China’s African Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”. Journal of Contemporary Africa, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 88

⁷⁹ Loc Cit

of nuclear weapons and never using them against non-nuclear powers also gained significant Third World support for the PRC⁸⁰.

This is not to say China did not directly support any African struggles; China supplied important military aid under Mao's rule, even while undergoing the strife of the Cultural Revolution at home. It is estimated that between 1955 and 1977 China sold \$142 million worth of military equipment to Africa, accounting for 75% of all military aid to the continent⁸¹. Ultimately China's intentions were ideological, however, primarily to counter the recognition of Taiwan as the Chinese representative at the UN, shoring up enough votes to oust the Taiwanese from the UN, of (marginal) secondary importance was the competition with the West and the USSR. The Soviet rivalry is best demonstrated by an "African Sino-Soviet split" in support for revolutionary groups; in Zimbabwe China won out by supporting Robert Mugabe's ZANU, while the Soviets backed the losing ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo⁸²; whereas Angola saw China's support of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA bear less fruit.

Until Mao's passing, this means of ideological policy characterised China's African relations. A new dispensation under Deng Xiaoping saw a more introspective China an interest in Africa waning. Deng introduced the "Four Modernisations" in China, requiring significant resources and manpower to be spent at home, thereby relegating Africa to a distant placing. This is not to imply that Africa was wholly cast aside. At the 12th CPC National Assembly, Chinese African policy was officially changed from one which stressed "war and revolution" to that of "peace and development", as demonstrated by China's *Four Principles on Economic and Technological Cooperation with Africa*, namely: equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in form, and attainment of common progress⁸³. This was an attempt to camouflage a precipitous decline in foreign aid in the 1980s, China began to stress this South-South cooperation, in stark contrast to Zhou Enlai's eight principles on Chinese foreign aid nineteen years previously, which had all but guaranteeing that Chinese aid would be the most generous in the world⁸⁴. Given China's now more limited financial capacity and focus on internal development, her relations with the two superpowers and the developed world took precedence; Africa took more of a rhetorical role with very little

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89

⁸¹ Meidan, M. "China's Africa Policy: Business Now, Politics Later". *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 73

⁸² *Loc Cit*

⁸³ Cheng & Shi. *Op Cit*, p. 89

⁸⁴ *Loc Cit*

economic significance. The period from 1981 to 1988 critically saw China's GDP nearly doubling and annual trade growing from \$4.4 billion to \$10.3 billion. This was mostly due to interaction with the developed world, which all but came to a screeching halt in 1989. The Tiananmen Square crackdown saw the West balk at Chinese policy and, given the end of the USSR empire due to economic over-stretch, China was now significantly isolated. China saw that their close relationship with the West was now under threat sanctions and, most importantly, was open to criticism of affairs that China held to be sovereign.

The general lack of criticism from the developing world, those neglected by China throughout most of the 1980s, was also noted by China. In the three years following the Tiananmen Square protests Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichan visited fourteen African states, setting in motion the Chinese diplomacy that we see today⁸⁵. In the post-Tiananmen era, Africa afforded China many opportunities, namely: as a bulwark to the Taiwan question; numerical support in the UN General Assembly; and, after China became a net importer of oil in 1993, a more strategic resource supply⁸⁶. The first two points noted above have significantly benefitted China insofar that Taiwan has been marginalised to such an extent that no developed or developing state of importance recognises the island's claim to independence, and in terms of the latter, Africa's representation in the UN is over one third and holds considerable voting sway in the UN, as well as in the WTO, a fact that China will and does leverage to great effect. The latter point of resource diplomacy will be dealt with in greater detail below.

What is important to note is that while much has changed in the last three decades, much has also stayed the same. China still plays the south-south card, thereby creating a sense of camaraderie between developing African states and the emerging dragon, proposing that China may even be a developmental model for Africa⁸⁷. The Chinese still prefer to maintain bilateral relations with African states⁸⁸. China's resolute stance with regards to sovereignty has also not wavered, most obviously demonstrated by any Tibetan or Taiwanese issues raised

⁸⁵ Tull, D.M. "China's Engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences". Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 462

⁸⁶ Niquet, V. "China's Africa Strategy". Retrieved 3 September 2009 from <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0805-Niquet-ANG.pdf>

⁸⁷ Large, D. "Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush': The Study of China-Africa Relations". African Affairs, Vol. 107, No. 426, p. 53

⁸⁸ Mohan, G. & Power, M. "New African Choices? The politics of Chinese engagement in Africa and the changing architecture of international development". Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 7

in international fora. Respect for sovereignty is also a fundamental instrument of engagement for the Chinese dispensation, the weaknesses and strengths of this policy will be highlighted further on. Also of note are exogenous factors affecting Chinese foreign policy – China does not exist in a vacuum and today, China’s Africa policy is also affected by contemporary affairs, particularly those of the US who are still Africa’s single biggest trading partner.

Chinese aspirations

This leads us to question the *raison d’être* of Chinese foreign policy in Africa. In January 2006 the Chinese government produced a document called “China’s Africa Policy”⁸⁹. This six part manuscript outlines - in exceedingly diplomatic terms - China’s peaceful development path in terms of mutually beneficial cooperation, essentially an extension of the aforementioned “Four Principles”. Scratching below the surface of this document, cognisant of the theoretical outlines presented earlier, it will be presented that “mutually beneficial cooperation” is but one facet of China’s many foreign policy goals.

The aforementioned resource diplomacy and political shoring up are important to China and most often referred to in contemporary academia and popular media; this is, however, a reductionist (and untenable) view. The goals and benefits may be inferred from China’s relations with her eleven ethnically, politically and economically diverse Southeast Asian partners. The PRC stated they are:

“persisting in building good-neighborly relationships and partnerships with the neighboring countries, ... pursu[ing] a policy of bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbours and and dedicate ourselves to strengthening mutual trust and cooperation with the fellow Asian countries, easing up hot spot tensions and tranquillity in Asia.”⁹⁰

China fully demonstrated this commitment during the 1997 Asian financial crisis when they did not devalue their currency, which would have severely impacted on her neighbours, thereby adopting a significant political and economic role in the region⁹¹. However, of particular importance was China’s relationship with the United States when, in 2001, China

⁸⁹ “China’s Africa Policy”. Retrieved 16 August 2009 from <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm>

⁹⁰ Sheng, D. “To Build A “Harmonious World”: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South”. Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 203

⁹¹ Loc Cit

chose to change regional policy so as to avoid direct criticism or opposition to American policies in the region⁹². China has even assured Southeast Asian elites of their support for territorial status quo, an important bone of contention in the region, thus transforming herself from a feared state to that of partner⁹³. Given the nature of bilateral relations, ironically China is moving away from this manner of regional relations in Southeast Asia, viewing such arrangement as a “holdover from the Cold War”, and wants to institute a multilateral security framework⁹⁴. Noteworthy is the shift in regional perception of China, away from that of the “China threat” to that of “friendly elephant”, in stark contrast to the perception of the US under the Bush regime.

Here is what we find most crucial in modern Chinese foreign policy, that of “soft power”. Joseph Nye noted in 1990 that “the great powers of today are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past”, and that there were at least five trends that contributed to the diffusion of power, namely: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues⁹⁵. Soft power is what Nye posits as the substitute for the older, realist paradigms that have traditionally dominated foreign policy, defining it as “when one country gets other countries to *want* what it wants”⁹⁶. Nye’s original definition of soft power is very strict, not allowing for any carrots, such as economic incentives, and has also been criticised for lacking clarity and for being unquantifiable⁹⁷. This American-centric view, however, results in a rejection China’s version of soft power, because the American version of soft power is based on the political ideals she espouses, most notably a rights-based democratic system and individual and human rights⁹⁸, neither of which feature strongly on the PRC dispensation’s radar.

China seeks to use soft power as a basis to build up *its* desired international order. To achieve these ends, President Hu Jintao, upon presenting the aforementioned “harmonious world policy”, proposed:

⁹² Percival, B. The Dragon Looks South, Praeger Security International, 2007, p. 1

⁹³ Ibid, p. 3

⁹⁴ Sheng, D. Op Cit, p. 204

⁹⁵ Nye, J.S. “Soft Power”. Foreign Policy, No. 80, p. 160

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 166

⁹⁷ Ferguson, N. “What is Power?” Retrieved 21 April 2009 from

<http://www.hoover.org/publication/digest/3058266.html>

⁹⁸ Percival, B. Op Cit, p. 111

- The importance of multilateralism to realise common security objectives
- Settlement of international disputes by means of negotiations and consultation
- Mutually beneficial cooperation amongst developed nations in order to facilitate common prosperity
- The spirit of “inclusiveness” must be advocated, thereby making coexistence possible.⁹⁹

China understands that at this moment her hard power resources are inferior to the other major powers, and rationally chooses this path as it is the best means of development for her. In dealing with nations in the global south, whose hard power is significantly weaker than China’s, the PRC is taking an increasingly pragmatic stance. By virtue of the fact that so many developing states have been marginalised by either the US or the international financial institutions (IFI’s), such as the World Bank and IMF, China has quite easily been able to re-establish ties from her ideological era

For African states, over and above Western isolation, China’s status as the world's greatest developing power is especially attractive, a fact that China ably exploits. Superficial analyses would propose that importing the Chinese model of development would be wholly advantageous for African, with Robert Mugabe noting in 2005 that “[w]e must turn our faces to the East, where the sun rises”¹⁰⁰. The appeal of Chinese development is often based on the comparison of post-World War Two Sino level of development and Africa’s post-independence levels, where it is noted that they are on similar levels. China makes the most of this situation by invoking the sovereignty card, deliberately decoupling economic relations from political reform, in direct opposition to Western forms of cooperation. This is clearly an issue not only for Western states who are loathe to deal with ‘dubious’ African government, but also for their industries who are either prohibited from doing business in these states or are encountering Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) who, under the auspices of the Chinese dispensation, are less concerned with making a profit and rather seek penetration into untapped markets.

⁹⁹ Sheng, D. *Op Cit*, p. 197

¹⁰⁰ Niquet, N. *Op Cit*, p. 2

That China “respects state sovereignty” is also particularly attractive to many developing states, and is in fact the ideological cover used by the Chinese state as part of its resource diplomacy and construction of diplomatic ties. The flaw in this assertion, however, is that the states with which China carries out her duties, a policy so wholly predicated on sovereignty, are anything but sovereign; China is in fact dealing with “quasi-states”. In claiming sovereignty, a state (in the Weberian sense) must possess the ability – or even be inclined – to meet the socio-economic needs of the citizenry, buttressed by an independent judicial system¹⁰¹. This argument is best demonstrated by the case of Eritrea who, by virtue of their intense defence of their sovereignty, ought to be ideal Chinese allies. In this case, sovereignty seems rather to hamper Beijing’s aspirations, seeing as she has little or no influence over the Eritrean government¹⁰². That is to say Chinese dealings with Africa, whilst predicated on sovereignty, seem to be conducted with states with the most spurious claim to such. Additionally, Chinese reasoning for invoking sovereignty needs examining: the challenging of sovereignty in any state is vociferously challenged by China; should such a precedent be established, China may see international involvement in her Taiwan, Tibetan and Xinjiang issues. China is not the only sovereignty obsessed state, it must be noted; Russia, by virtue of her “break-away state”, Chechnya is also an ardent sovereignty proponent. Both these states have demonstrated this by blocking Sudanese sanctions in the past¹⁰³. One might also note that it is not only Beijing that does not support UN Security Council Resolutions with regards to Sudan; Resolution 1593 (2005) also had the US and Brazil listed as abstentions in referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court¹⁰⁴. Whilst China has a history of abstentions at the UN Security Council, these are usually in issues that will not impede on her foreign affairs or issues that will impact on the sacred alter of sovereignty. That China is (relatively) more acquiescent in the Sudan issue is not necessarily indicative of a more cooperative China in the international system, but rather a more pragmatic stance on behalf of Beijing; international pressure bore down on China, especially in the run up to the 2008 Olympic games, and China also saw possible economic sacrifices. In the post-Great Recession era, one would be hard pushed to believe China would concede quite so easily

¹⁰¹ Taylor, I. “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa”. *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 5, p. 955

¹⁰² *Loc Cit*

¹⁰³ “Russia, China Block Sudan Sanctions”, retrieved 12 January 2010 from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/39703.html>

¹⁰⁴ United Nations Resolution 1593 (2005), retrieved 1 June 2010 from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf?OpenElement>

In light of the changing nature of China's penetration into Africa, the "China threat" thesis has become more prominent. Her insistence on "respecting" sovereignty even in dictatorial states has been seen as a manoeuvre by some to just surreptitiously gain access to resources, whereas China maintains that "[t]here are no rogue states. China has been labelled this in the past and other governments should not criticize"¹⁰⁵. Chinese strategies, as proposed by realist thinkers, are that she seeks security in both the political and economic fields. Mearsheimer proposes that China will seek regional hegemony, thereby displacing the United States, and also maximise the gap between itself and its neighbours, namely Russia and Japan¹⁰⁶, ultimately imposing a "Monroe Doctrine for East Asia" of sorts for the Chinese. China, realists would have us believe, will also seek security further afield, namely Africa. As already noted, Africa could (and often does) provide China with a significant number of political votes, and Africa's resource wealth is of growing importance to a voracious Chinese economy. The Chinese strategies that have seen her influence rise in Africa are: lower risk-averseness by Chinese firms versus their Western counterparts, especially in unstable regions such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and disputed oil fields in Nigeria; the Chinese focus on specific sectors, particularly infrastructure, where there is a dearth of Western interest; and Chinese willingness to pursue relations with states that have been turned into niche markets by the West due to sanctions and afford China a free-riding opportunity, as in Sudan and Zimbabwe¹⁰⁷. Taylor, however, notes that "common sense" needs to be applied when assessing Chinese-African ties and three realities need to be borne in mind¹⁰⁸. Firstly China is not a unitary actor: that China is swathed in corruption and weak rule of law at home is indicative of the fact that China lacks the capacity to direct this "China Inc.", Chinese trade ties have actually become more "normalised" according to Taylor. China is being made into a scapegoat, is the second point made – that China is taking advantage of a "helpless continent" by flooding Africa with cheap labour and goods and exploiting the populace through the dubious African regimes. The article argues that many Africans cannot provide these skills at the moment and that the collapsed markets that China is now selling to were that way long before the Chinese arrived – due to Western influence. Finally that it is up to African states to manage African-Chinese relations, China's function is not to "look out" for other states' well being. Taylor too goes on to pointedly note that while China has an Africa policy, Africa does

¹⁰⁵ Taylor, I. *Op Cit*, p. 945

¹⁰⁶ Mearsheimer, J.J. *Can China Rise Peacefully?* Retrieved 22 October 2009 from <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Aoo34b.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ Tull, D.M. *Op Cit*, p. 468

¹⁰⁸ Taylor, I. *CommonSense About Africa's Ties with Africa*. Retrieved 18 August 2009 from <http://csis.org/blog/common-sense-about-china's=ties-africa>

not have a China policy¹⁰⁹. This is in stark contrast to Singapore who, by virtue of their proximity to Beijing and other better endowed states, was acutely aware of their foreign relations and the possibly pernicious side-effects thereof.

¹⁰⁹ Loc Cit

Chapter Three

Singapore in Review

Singapore's foreign policy is particular interest to Africa for a multitude of reasons. Firstly, Singapore shares a colonial past with Africa, that of being under the control of the British Empire. The island state gained independence in the 1960s and her foreign policy was also shaped in the Cold War era. A significant distinction between Africa and Singapore is the resources endowed to both. The former is well endowed in natural and human resources; the latter is afforded none of these. This chapter will introduce Singapore's foreign policy, track its evolution, and analyse how it interacts with China. Particular attention will be paid to the rule of law dispensation and how it facilitated Singapore's interaction with China and influenced development in the city-state. Finally it will highlight the generalisability shortcomings when inferring from Singapore to Angola.

Realpolitik of a vulnerable state

Realpolitik is the most common discourse when referring to Singapore foreign policy. Upon their unanticipated separation from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore immediately experienced a sense of vulnerability as a result of the absence of a protective British military¹¹⁰. The ruling party, the People's Action Party (PAP), has consistently represented the separation with Malaysia as an eviction and has facilitated intense suspicion and antipathy between the polities of the two states. Additionally, a resolution between Malaysia and Indonesia in August 1966 highlighted ethnic divides between Singapore and her neighbours; the former comprising 76 percent ethnic Chinese, whilst the latter are ethnic Malay¹¹¹. Ideology, however, holds very little sway in Singaporean foreign policy resulting in what is occasionally considered "schizophrenic" or even "oxymoronic" foreign policy¹¹². This is ably demonstrated by an initial declaratory commitment to non-alignment and a denunciation of

¹¹⁰ Leifer, M. Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping Vulnerability, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 5

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 4

¹¹² Tan, S.S. "Riding the Dragon: Singapore's Pragmatic Relationship with China", in The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan. Tsunekawa, J. The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan. Retrieved 18 August 2009 from http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/joint_research/series4/pdf/4-1.pdf

US involvement in Vietnam; six months later, however, Singapore provided American forces with rest and recreation bases in the war¹¹³.

Singapore is also one of the smaller and lesser endowed states in the region and therefore needs to rely on nimbleness and liveness in its foreign policy. The city-state is a mere 648 square kilometres with permanent resident population of approximately 3.2 million people¹¹⁴. Unlike some resource rich small Middle Eastern states, Singapore lacks any significant resources, and in actual fact even relies on Malaysia for a constant water supply. In 1966, Singapore's first foreign minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, noted that the fundamental problem facing Singapore was:

“how to make sure that a small nation with a teeming population and no natural resources to speak of, can maintain, even increase, its living standards and also enjoy peace and security in a region marked by mutual jealousies, internal violence, economic disintegration and great power conflicts.”¹¹⁵

This relative lack of national endowments as well as external threats combined to produce a “siege mentality” according to Leifer, who insists that Singapore then adopted an image of a “poison shrimp” – small, not invulnerable, but by no means a pushover¹¹⁶. The shrimp analogy symbolises a Singaporean state that may be bested in confrontation, but will inflict significant damage on any state that it faces. That Singapore displayed such a hard-nosed policy virtually from day one indicates that this policy did not emerge from nowhere. Whilst the system may be considered *sui generis*, it is underpinned by a high level of authority – a legacy of Singapore's colonial years. Typically, ex-colonial states often suffer from “colonial hangover”, characterised, *inter alia*, by weak states and xenophobia. Singapore, on the other hand, made no fetish out of rubbing out their colonial record and history, they chose rather to recognise the British legacy of high standards of professionalism and probity in public¹¹⁷. Under the British protectorate, Singapore's primary role was that of entrepôt and a minimal industrial base; whilst this may have all but vanished, Singapore was a booming metropolis

¹¹³ Leifer, M. “The Conduct of Foreign policy”, in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Sandhu, K.S. & Wheatley, P. (Eds.) Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1989, p. 969

¹¹⁴ Leifer, M. (2000) Op Cit, p. 10

¹¹⁵ Tan, S.S. Op Cit, p. 25

¹¹⁶ Leifer, M. as cited in Tan, S.S. Ibid, p. 22

¹¹⁷ Leifer, M. (2000) Op Cit, p. 11

pre-independence and its post-independence economic development certainly benefitted significantly from these strong foundations¹¹⁸.

All the references to the vulnerability leads one to believe that hard core realism underpins the foreign policy (and internal policy) of Singapore. This Hobbesian school of thought was propounded as recently as 1997, with Foreign Minister, Professor S. Jayakumar noting that “[t]he dynamics of international relations bears a striking resemblance to the laws of the jungle; not all creatures are created equal and only the fittest survive”¹¹⁹. That Singapore has since 1966 identified the primary task of foreign policy as the safeguarding of the nation’s nascent independence from “external threats”, underscores this Hobbesian bent. Additionally, this is also demonstrated by Singapore’s use of hard power, a power that is supposed to be the domain of middle and great powers alone. Singapore, however, chose to use hard power to reduce the vulnerability of the city-state by:

- Strengthening national defence capability;
- Entering into defence arrangements with other states either on a bilateral, special multilateral or regional basis;
- Underpinning security through economic growth by adopting sound national policies as well as advancing regional cooperation;
- Promoting internal cohesion; and
- Adopting a sound diplomacy at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.¹²⁰

To these ends, Singapore has signed a number of military agreements, including, amongst others: border Military-Security Cooperation with its immediate neighbours, especially Malaysia and Indonesia; Intelligence Sharing with most ASEAN states as well as important strategic partners such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia; investment in the Five Powers Defense Arrangement, which, in addition to Singapore, involves the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia – the United Kingdom chose to utilise this as part of a decolonisation exercise whereby it retained a military presence in the region, even though its

¹¹⁸ Loc Cit

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p. 15

¹²⁰ Singh, B. “The Military and Small States : The Role of Hard Power in Singapore’s Domestic and Foreign Policy”. Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference, 12-15 September 2007, Turin, Italy, p. 6

troops were withdrawn in 1971¹²¹. Here we find a crucial characteristic of Singapore's foreign policy, it "borrowing" external had power to shore up its security, because whilst Singapore may seem to ascribe religiously to realist dogma, she is not blind to the benefits of regional cooperation.

By the 1970s, Singapore's foreign policy had matured to the extent that it had come to be distinguished by a quality of authority so that it held sway amongst its neighbours and was taken cognisance of. Whilst often punching above her weight, Singapore is acutely aware of her stretch and even the possibility of overstretch, understanding that "[she] has little capacity of its own to shape the main course of world events... [e]ssentially, for its survival and economic well-being, its foreign policy has to respond to the realities of the regional and international environment"¹²²; to counter this Singapore promotes regional fora as a means of balancing power – a significant foreign policy tool. In order to facilitate such balance of power objectives, Singapore, as noted above, has entered into multiple security arrangements. However, liberal theory has to be applied here too, in terms of economics. Realism's dearth of explanatory power lies in it ascribing too much influence to power, limiting its ability to account for the efficacy of multilateralism and regionalism and the benefit of economics. As Ganesan notes:

A clear core of realist self-reliance is layered with the demands of a competitive trading state that requires a liberal international trading regime. Hence both competitive and cooperative philosophies undergird Singapore's foreign policy. Accordingly, whereas Singapore's preoccupation with vulnerability is an enduring feature of policy output, it is arguable that cooperation and prosperity are better obtained through liberal arrangements.¹²³

To these liberal ends, Singapore has formed economic cooperative relations with regional powers, including China – over and above the security arrangements with the US, Singapore also has significant economic ties with America; American investment in Singapore amounts to \$40 billion, Chinese investments at 2007 had yet to crack the \$1 billion barrier¹²⁴.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19

¹²² Leifer, M (1989), p. 965

¹²³ Ganesan, N. *Realism and Interdependence in Singapore's Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 2

¹²⁴ Kurlantzick, J. *Charm Offensive*, Yale University, New York, 2007, p. 87

Singapore has also used economics in lieu of diplomacy; Singapore utilised the Bank of China in the city-state as a means of unofficial diplomatic contact until a trade office was opened in 1981¹²⁵. Singapore, like Beijing, presents a bifurcative policy – delinking politics from economics, this allowed them to establish economic ties with Taiwan, while not entering into formal consular relations with the island; Singapore ascribed to the one-China policy from the outset, and China was, therefore, not an obstacle in terms of regional association in Southeast Asia¹²⁶. What is less evident, however, is that Singapore’s realism is less faithful to the classical definition, but so is her ascription to liberal economics somewhat muddled, and here we find somewhat of a misnomer when separating economics and politics. Both realist and liberal oriented theories, to a greater or lesser extent, see “low” economic issues as a starting point, this, according Ripsman, is a *non sequitur*, noting that arguments separating the low politics of economics from the high politics of national security were overstated¹²⁷. He goes on to argue, firstly, that economics are the underpinnings of military might and national security; second, that it exaggerates the independence states have from the international economy when mobilising economic resources in support of security objectives; and finally it does not account for states who may use economic means in an interdependent world to achieve national security objectives, by means of sanctions or economic incentives for example¹²⁸.

Balancing of power demonstrates how Singapore combines politics and economics. As noted by Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s balance of power strategy depended not on linking Singapore’s fortunes to one overbearing partner, but rather depended on the competing interests of several big powers in the region. By these means, the big powers kept each other in check, “allow[ing] small states to survive in the interstices between them”¹²⁹. Instead of seeking to counter each potential hegemon, Singapore chooses to rather assess whether or not a potential or actual hegemon is a benign or malign factor for the city-state¹³⁰. The most strategic and enduring of these hegemon has been the United States. For

¹²⁵ Leifer, M. (2000), p. 112

¹²⁶ Loc Cit

¹²⁷ Ripsman, N.M. “False Dichotomy: Why economics has always been high politics”. Retrieved 20 April 2009 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/3/8/p73388_index.html, p. 2

¹²⁸ Loc Cit

¹²⁹ Leifer, M (2000), p. 98

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 99

Singapore, the US is unmatched as a security guarantor and key balancer in Asia, sans American influence, Singapore would most likely be at risk¹³¹.

Hedging is an important balance of power instrument for Singapore. In international relations, hedging involves strategies aimed at avoiding a situation wherein states cannot decide on more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality¹³². Rather, hedging allows Singapore to adopt a middles position, avoiding choosing either side at the expense of the other. The phrase has often been applied the manner in which Japan and other Southeast Asian nations have chosen to engage China: often deepening security ties with the US as well as taking part in multilateral institutions so as to facilitate constructive Chinese participation in regional issues¹³³; the latter in the hope that China will eventually develop a vested interest in regional security and be compelled to participate at a multilateral level. The efficacy of hedging will depend on a state's geography, military and economic power, and the perception of threat, and is both an offensive and defensive strategy. Singapore literally finds herself at a crossroads in the region; she is deeply connected to Western finance and business interests, yet rooted in Asian cultures¹³⁴; Singapore is able to use this to good effect in terms of hedging as she has "a foot in both camps".

These common points of interest facilitate Singapore's soft power in the region. The term "global city" challenges the staunchly realist paradigm directed at Singapore. This demonstrates that Singapore's foreign policy is not wholly defined by balance of power and self-help considerations, but is also informed by soft power considerations that would attract the interest of other powers. The aforementioned crossroads afford Singapore the opportunity of being a "land of opportunity"¹³⁵ in the region as well as being an exemplar for the region. This is clearly demonstrated by Deng Xiaoping who, in 1978, acknowledged Singapore as a model of economic development and political economy and even saw Singapore as a counter to Soviet regional influence¹³⁶.

¹³¹ Tan, S.S. *Op Cit*, p. 36

¹³² Percival, S. *The Dragon Looks South*, Praeger Security International, Westport, 2007, p. 27

¹³³ *Ibid*, p. 28

¹³⁴ Keong, T.T. *Soft Power Workshop – Lessons from Singapore*. Retrieved from <http://spirit.tau.ac.il/government/downloads/singapore.pdf>.

¹³⁵ *Loc Cit*

¹³⁶ Leifer, M. (2000), p. 114

The global city uses numerous soft power methods, even those of security linked to traditional hard power have been softened in the last few decades, especially in light of worsening relations with its immediate neighbours in the late 1980s and post-Cold War. Singapore's traditional concerns with regard to vulnerability led to a security dilemma in the region which came to a head in 1988, leading defence minister Goh Chok Tong to note that a strong defence capability was important, but Singapore was not a threat to the region, noting that:

A defense policy based only on deterrence will end up like two strangers staring at one another in the face. Each misreads the other's stare. Suspicious thoughts go through their minds, ending up very often in punches. The staring analogy teaches us that the force of arms alone cannot keep the peace.¹³⁷

Singapore would not viably give up its defence arrangements; rather it chose to invest in defence diplomacy as a supplement to its strong but untested military. Over and above the aforementioned military arrangements that have been developed, Singapore also assists other countries, especially its neighbours in times of crisis¹³⁸. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) allows Singapore to employ methods of regionalism; ASEAN may be seen as an embryonic security community or, less ambitiously, as an extant diplomatic community. Additionally, ASEAN provides Singapore the framework within which cooperative relations with neighbours as well as where wider ASEAN-based regionalisms are concerned¹³⁹. That Singapore is the most trade dependent state in the region, means that it benefits significantly under ASEAN6 trade agreements wherein tariff lines of over 20% pre-2005 were dropped to 5% by 2009 and are set to fall to zero in 2010, with certain "sensitive" products having longer phase-out periods¹⁴⁰.

The China Connection

China-Singapore relations are complicated not only by the proximity of the city-state to China, but also by the majority of ethnic Chinese that reside in Singapore. Sometimes referred

¹³⁷ Singh, B. *Op Cit*, p. 21

¹³⁸ *Loc Cit*

¹³⁹ Tan, S.S. *Op Cit*, p. 28

¹⁴⁰ Biden, J.R. Committee on Foreign Relations - United States Senate, headed by Biden, J.R. jr. *China's Foreign Policy and "Soft Power" in South America, Asia, and Africa*. Retrieved 23 August 2009 from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>, p. 96

to as the “third China” after mainland China and Taiwan, Singaporean policy makers are acutely aware of the near 76% ethnic Chinese that constitutes its population¹⁴¹. This effect should not be played down as, even during Singapore’s colonial period, these ethnic Chinese maintained a strong separate cultural identity and strong links with their ancestral land by means of remittances¹⁴². China, whilst acknowledging that “Chinese Singaporeans are citizens of Singapore”, have gently prodded the city-state by routinely visiting Singapore on fact-finding missions, affording millions Chinese tourists Singapore as a travel destination, and promoting Singapore for education and employment, thereby attempting to deepen the cultural roots the Chinese have in Singapore¹⁴³. On a less soft note, China is not averse to castigating Singapore, noting once that “one thousand three hundred million Chinese are very angry” with Singapore¹⁴⁴. Reciprocally, Singapore has not acquiesced to the Chinese dispensation, condemning the Chinese over the Tiananmen massacre and, more recently, after Singapore’s Prime Minister designate visited Taiwan, the “explosion of anger” from Beijing and subsequent cancellation of Chinese visits to Singapore did not bow the city-state into submission¹⁴⁵. Reflecting the “vulnerable” domestic political scene, Singapore has even developed a reputation of crushing its internal communist opponents, thereby differentiating itself even further from China¹⁴⁶.

These may suggest strained ties between the two nations; however both are aware of the underlying tensions and, more applicable to Singapore, the importance of maintaining good diplomatic relations with each other. Singapore is cognisant of not only the economic benefits of successfully engaging the Chinese dispensation, but also in terms of general security benefits; in fact this pragmatic and inconsistent characteristic of Singapore foreign policy efficiently explains Singapore-Chinese relations. China’s sheer enormity in the region cannot be ignored by Singapore and therefore heightens Singapore’s already keen sense of vulnerability. Singapore has chosen two methods to assuage this feeling of vulnerability, namely the aforementioned security arrangements it has entered with numerous others, especially the United States, and engaging China in regional fora and ensuring that China has a vested interest in the region.

¹⁴¹ Tan, S.S. *Op Cit*, p. 35

¹⁴² Leifer, M. (2000) *Op Cit*, p. 109

¹⁴³ Percival, B. *Op Cit*, p. 62

¹⁴⁴ Shing, H.P., “Singapore Culture Unlikely to Emerge: MM.” As cited in Tan, S.S. *Op Cit*, p. 33

¹⁴⁵ Percival, B. *Op Cit*, p. 60

¹⁴⁶ Leifer, M. (2000) *Op Cit*, p. 111

As with Singapore, many other states, particularly the US, are concerned with the “China threat”. John Mearsheimer proposes that China and the US are likely to engage in an intense security competition in the next few decades, with a high likelihood of war. Mearsheimer predicates this thesis on American history, and how by virtue of her “Manifest Destiny” she grew to become an expansionist power of the first order¹⁴⁷. Thus, true to realist dogma, Mearsheimer insists that China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, and try push the United States out of Asia. China, however, continues to promote the image of a “Peaceful Rise”. Singapore’s concerns include the intent and capacity of China to disrupt regional stability and prosperity, delimit Singapore’s policy choices, and upset ASEAN cohesion¹⁴⁸. Singapore, whilst aware of its “vulnerability” and the military threat China may possibly represent, understands that in the short-term economics are central and a successful China best serves Southeast Asia. Therefore, contemporary wisdom holds that economic liberalisation will precipitate political liberalisation. This will come about as a result of the growth of a middle class that is educated, becoming more affluent and will demand “Western political freedoms”, an independent judiciary and an end to the corruption that is rife¹⁴⁹. This school of thought proposes that an economically acquiescent China will integrate into the world system and not ascend in any belligerent manner.

Given the higher order nature of military politics, Singapore has yet to develop the trust necessary with China to build up military alliances. Singapore, being more obstinate than her ASEAN contemporaries, has sought to encourage Beijing to increase her transparency in terms of military plans¹⁵⁰. China has even offered Singapore training facilities on the island of Hainan, as a substitute to Taiwan, Singapore declined the offer noting that they were “always willing to listen, but any decision on Hainan could not impinge on existing [training] relationships”¹⁵¹; thus any sophisticated military equipment is purchased from the US or Western Europe. This may prove to be problematic in the future, especially as China’s influence in the region grows, as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is the only security forum serving Central Asia – and is headed by China.

¹⁴⁷ Mearsheimer, J.J. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise”. *Current History*, April 2006, p. 161

¹⁴⁸ Tan, S.S. *Op Cit*, p. 37

¹⁴⁹ Li, R. “Security Challenge of an Ascendant China: Great Power Emergence and International Stability” in Zhao, S. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour*. M.E. Sharpe. (2003), p. 31

¹⁵⁰ Percival, B. *Op Cit*, p. 62

¹⁵¹ *Loc Cit*

Singapore does vociferously promote regionalism via ASEAN, however, as well as other pan-Asian regional organisations, such as APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3, and most recently EAS; this engagement policy is referred to as “binding engagement” or “omni-enmeshment”¹⁵². Additionally, Singapore not only seeks to enmesh China in the system, but also hopes that China will uphold the regional status quo. ASEAN suits both Singapore and China’s policies in terms of respect of sovereignty, as the association has demonstrated a longstanding commitment to non-interference and a gradualist approach to regionalism¹⁵³. Singapore’s trust in ASEAN was minimal until the 1970s; it viewed the forum as a weak instrument for economic cooperation and a possible medium of hegemony for Indonesia. Within a multilateral context, though, it became apparent to Singapore that even seemingly insignificant states could wield power and disproportionate influence based on their willingness to shoulder a large share of diplomatic burden¹⁵⁴. Singapore also seeks to employ “cooperative security”, whereby tensions are relieved by improving the overall regional climate rather than through direct attention to problem-solving and defence cooperation¹⁵⁵; this too is appealing as direct attention impinges too much on sovereignty for the Chinese.

So as not to impinge on sovereignty, Singapore chooses to explicitly separate “high” and “low” politics, thereby engaging China on economic terms. While China was only Singapore’s fifth largest trading market, comprising of eight percent of exports, trade with the Greater China region (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China) amounted to \$19.4 billion – exceeding Singapore-US trade for 2004¹⁵⁶. Singaporean investment in China accounted for thirteen percent of direct investment abroad, making Singapore China’s seventh-largest investor, primarily in manufacturing and real estate¹⁵⁷. Singapore, however, is acutely aware of the growth potential of future trade with Beijing, especially in light of the 2008 credit crunch. One also need note that China surpassed the United States with ASEAN; a free trade agreement (FTA) signed between China and ASEAN in 2002 that is currently being implemented, will boost this trade even more, thereby enhancing China’s influence in the region¹⁵⁸. This may impact on security arrangements Singapore has with America because, as

¹⁵² Tan, S.S. *Op Cit*, p. 42

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 42

¹⁵⁴ Leifer, M. (2000) *Op Cit*, p. 24

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 25

¹⁵⁶ Percival, B. *Op Cit*, p. 61

¹⁵⁷ *Loc Cit*

¹⁵⁸ Biden, J.R. *Op Cit*, p. 88

noted earlier, economics ultimately underpins a state's military might and as China's influence grows in the region, she may begin attach conditionalities with her economic clout.

Moreover, small states, and especially Singapore in light of her severe lack of natural resources, tend to be vulnerable to external events and also tend to be price takers, and therefore have less influence in terms of setting the terms and conditions of trade relations¹⁵⁹. Singapore's primary instrument of defence is its strong government, that colonial hangover, which cognisant of long-term objectives and is not bound by four-year time frame¹⁶⁰. This is significant as democracy has been touted as the best path for development by Western powers for decades now, especially in the post-Cold War era. What Singapore demonstrates, however, is more of a "benevolent dictator" or rather rule of law. Wei Pan notes, when analysing the possibility of democracy emerging in China, that rule of law suits the current regime as it maintains the system of one party rule that is "aimed at meeting the need of economic reform and reclaiming legitimacy based on improving the people's standards of living rather than on ideological correctness and mass-mobilization"¹⁶¹. In distinguishing "rule of law" from "democracy, or rule of people", Pan highlights that the two clearly indicate different paradigms, and one could exist without the other. He explains their essential differences as follows:

1. Democracy and rule of law differ in political philosophy. The former entrusts "good governance" to the extensiveness of political participation out of people's concern for their welfares – the root cause of the people's demand for power. Rule of law entrusts good governance to limiting the power of the government, as defined by Basic Laws, so that people enjoy unrestricted liberty under these defined laws. Significantly, rule of law is not swayed by partisan politics as in most modern democracies
2. The fundamental approaches of the two differ. Democracy authorises an elected few to govern the majority by means of consent. Rule of law is designed to regulate government instead of creating government. As in a democracy, rule of law relies on separation of powers so as to ensure accountability, however, rule of law tells

¹⁵⁹ Keong, T.T. *Op Cit*, p 10

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 13

¹⁶¹ Suisheng, Z. "Political Liberalization without Democratization: Pan Wei's proposal for political reform", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 35, p. 348

government what it may do and does not allow it to manipulate the law to its own ends.

3. As a result of their different approaches, the two differ in political agenda as well. Democracy focuses on *law making* by means of majority within the polity. Rule of law emphasises *law enforcement* so long as it is constitutional, that is to say compliant with Basic Laws.
4. Their sources of power are also different. Rule of law consists of non-elected law enforcement offices, whereas democracy relies on elected law making offices.
5. Because of the abovementioned point, democracy and rule of law differ radically in game rules. The former features regular elections plus relative majority votes, whilst the latter regular examinations plus constant evaluations. Partisan interests, therefore, may dominate the democratic system, while rule of law sets up a more efficient system of accountability.¹⁶²

Rule of law dispensations have been compared to democracies and been found to operate better, according to Pan. He uses the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong versus Taiwan, strengthening the validity of Pan's comparisons is the fact that all three of these states are mostly ethnic Chinese, thereby precluding (to some extent) the extraneous Western variable. Post 1997 Hong Kong and Singapore are characterised by a government power that is efficiently separated from law making so as to ensure an effective mechanism of checks and balances, making the Law above any one person or power – says Pan¹⁶³. Taiwan, on the other hand, is split by partisan politics, negatively impacting on the efficacy of rule of law, which democracies claim to support. He also goes on to highlight that Hong Kong and Singapore are the two least corrupt regimes in East Asia.

Underpinning regionalism is trade, the life-blood of Singapore; exports and imports are more than twice Singapore's GDP¹⁶⁴, demonstrating Singapore's vulnerability and dependence on trade. Conversely, a number of states have a stake in Singapore as a result of a Cold War policy that sought to attract multi-national corporations to the state. That

¹⁶² Pan, W. "Towards a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China". *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 34 p. 9

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 33

¹⁶⁴ Keong, T.T. *Op Cit*, p 15

Singapore's economy is the most open in the world informs their reliance in and promotion of a multi-lateral system - ASEAN and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are therefore crucial to Singapore's foreign policy strategy, as these organisations are seen to uphold and enforce the rules of the trade system. Given that Singapore has no "attractive" resources to speak of, and she is limited to promoting her talent, technology and tolerance to other states. The efficacy of such a policy is limited, and therefore Singapore continuously seeks to find a balance between safeguarding her vulnerable status and her significant reliance on the region.

Chapter Four

Angola's Precarious Position

Attached to most international loans is the requirement of democratic reform, a condition that most African states loathe; this will be contextualised in terms of the Angolan dispensation. With or without democratic reform, Angolan diplomatic and economic interactions with the West will continue alongside the Chinese, whose financing practices will be discussed next, by means of the China Export-Import bank. Angola's biggest trading partners are still the EU and the US, the importance of this will be briefly noted.

Angolan democracy

Most democratic reform throughout Africa has not occurred without significant external pressure being applied; this pressure has varied with the nature of the international political system. The effect of the Cold War, and the proxy war in post-independent Angola in particular, saw development and democracy taking a back seat to *realpolitik*. Angola demonstrates this perfectly, suffering the effects of a much delayed colonial struggle, followed by a proxy war until the end of the 1980s, and then descending into civil war after the disputed 1992 elections, precipitated by José Eduardo dos Santos's reneging on the electoral rules that stated that the failure of any candidate to secure more than fifty percent of the vote would result in an election run-off¹⁶⁵. Relative peace in 2002 came about as a result of the death of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, and saw parliamentary elections taking place in 2008 – albeit of somewhat disputed legitimacy.

The 2008 elections were, according to dos Santos, going to be an example to Africa; Pawson maintains that they were significantly more¹⁶⁶. She notes that the elections were an example rather on how to hold *faux* democratic elections, whilst “annihilat[ing] the opposition and regress[ing] to a one-party state”¹⁶⁷. An EU observer mission stated that the elections failed to

¹⁶⁵ Wiseman, J.A. “Democracy and the new political pluralism in Africa: causes, consequences and significance”. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 445

¹⁶⁶ Pawson, L. “Angola's Elections: The Politics of No Change”. Retrieved 11 May 2009 from <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/angola-s-elections-the-politics-of-no-change>, p. 1

¹⁶⁷ Loc Cit

meet international standards, demonstrating pro-government bias in radio, print, and television; but the same report goes on to note that the poll was peaceful and displayed the electorates “clear commitment to the country’s democratic process and desire to leave behind a past marked by decades of war and civil conflict.”¹⁶⁸ Significantly, the 2008 elections were not followed by a civil war *à-la* 1992, influenced in part by the fact that approximately half of the electorate were born after 1974, mitigating any direct colonial or bush war experiences, with the 1992 elections also having less influence¹⁶⁹. Common electoral issues arose as well, however¹⁷⁰; the National Electoral Commission (CNE) tasked with the oversight and coordination of the elections consisted of a central panel, with six of the eleven members as politically proportionate representation and the remaining five as government/MPLA appointees, and therefore severely skewed in the MPLA’s favour – undermining the CNE’s credibility¹⁷¹. That the MPLA also had unequal access to state funding further highlights the inefficiencies of the 2008 elections; the government restricted access to opposition party funding whilst allowing the MPLA to start campaigning with said funds over and above additional donor funds up to four months before the opposition were afforded access to their funding¹⁷². Additionally, Human Rights Watch goes on to highlight the following oversights: unequal access to public facilities and spaces, government obstruction of independent national observers, and irregularities in conduct of voting, counting, and tabulation¹⁷³. Again, this begs the question of a Western democratic system in an African country that had the Weberian state thrust upon it.

That portions of the population remains armed and did not move to arms, indicates either reasonable satisfaction with the 2008 elections or a placated populace, however; by what means the Angolan dispensation either satisfies or placates the populace is of importance. In terms of the former, it would typically come about as a result of normal democratic processes where the government would feel accountable to its voters and an efficient allocation of resources would take place; the latter would come about as a result of an unempowered,

¹⁶⁸ Allen, M. “[Angola’s ersatz elections - the wrong lesson for Africa](http://www.demdigest.net/blog/698/angolas-ersatz-elections-wrong-lesson-africa.html)”. Retrieved 15 May 2009 from <http://www.demdigest.net/blog/698/angolas-ersatz-elections-wrong-lesson-africa.html>

¹⁶⁹ Campos, I. “Angola’s Elections: A Democratic Oil Giant?” Retrieved 19 May 2009 from http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/120404_bp0908angola.pdf, p. 20

¹⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch. “Democracy or Monopoly?” Retrieved 1 June 2010 from <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/02/23/democracy-or-monopoly>

¹⁷¹ “IV. Electoral Institutions and the Legal Environment.” Retrieved 1 June 2010 from <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/80926/section/6>

¹⁷² “VI. Flaw in the 2008 Election Process.” Retrieved 1 June 2010 from <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/80926/section/8>

¹⁷³ Loc Cit

poorly educated populace who expect very little from the government or, worse, fear the government. Western governments and NGO's insist this last point is being facilitated by the Chinese loans, and a function of what has become the typical African resource curse.

Over and above the question of legitimacy of the 2008 elections, one need question the effect of the elections; dos Santos has postponed the 2009 presidential elections until a constitution has been drafted¹⁷⁴. What function a constitution may fulfil might not conform with Western ideals, and may actually create an even more presidentialist system or fulfil no real function at all; as noted by Ricardo Soares de Oliveira: "...the fact is real power relations take place on an extra-constitutional level"¹⁷⁵, again facilitated by the fact that Angola's political elite are insulated from donor pressures, funded significantly by the oil industry. Over the last thirty years under dos Santos has demonstrated no real desire to democratise, either his state institutions or the MPLA party; he heads the government, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as well as appoints the president, decides who is in government, and cannot be removed from power by means of a vote of no confidence¹⁷⁶. While this concerns the west, the Chinese, by invoking sovereignty, are content with it, and Angola even provides a modicum of stability, relative to its Zimbabwean and central African neighbours.

Monday Okoro, a vice-president of oilfield services company Schlumberger, insists that under the thirty year rule of dos Santos Angola affords investors a safe haven; a sentiment echoed by French oil company Total who invested \$4 billion during 2009, adding further to the vested interested in the state¹⁷⁷, thereby strengthening the current dispensation's hand. These "spurious democracies" are often touted by the West as the root of Africa's woes, and successful democracies such as South Africa and Ghana are the shining examples. The origins of these strong democracies may be explained by Benjamin Disraeli, writing in *The Vindication of the English Constitution* he maintains rule of law is a *sine quo non* for establishing a democracy, that democracy was the fruit of civil order¹⁷⁸. His contemporary

¹⁷⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. "World Factbook". Retrieved 4 January 2010 from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html> and Pambazuka News. "Angola: Election postponed to 2010". Retrieved 4 January 2010 from <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/57854>

¹⁷⁵ Allen, M. *Op Cit*

¹⁷⁶ Pawson, L. *Op Cit*, p. 4

¹⁷⁷ Redvers, L. "Oil & Gas: Hydrocarbons push the country to the top". *The Africa Report*, December 2009-January 2010, p. 78.

¹⁷⁸ Tanenhaus, S. "Conservatism Is Dead". Retrieved 30 December 2009 from <http://www.tnr/article/politics/conservatism-dead>

example was that of the United States, which easily made the transition from colonial protectorate to that of an independent constitutional society, whereas their South American neighbours did not. The same may be inferred in Africa today; the state that was able to establish a stringent set of laws post independence, as well as during an egregious oligarchical era was that of South Africa. That Angola suffered under the yoke of an exceptionally oppressive Portuguese colonial regime until the mid-1970s and then tumbled into nearly thirty years of war, means that no reasonable rule of law was established... the roots of a liberal Western democracy. What this has thus far done for Angola, is afford it the aforementioned economic stability, but lead it to being labelled “failed yet successful” as a result of its poor record on governance and transparency flanking consistent economic growth¹⁷⁹, aided to great effect in recent times by China’s investments.

ExIm Bank

China may have shifted from an ideologically driven policy to a more pragmatic economic-based one, but not to the whole exclusion of politics; however, the pragmatic economic aspect is certainly dominant, albeit tenuously linked to politics. This will be expanded upon by referring to the China Export-Import bank (ExIm) and the methods they undertake in financing Chinese ventures in Angola.

An ExIm bank’s function to facilitate credit financing between two states, allowing products and services from the participating states to benefit from a single export credit agency (ECA) financing package¹⁸⁰. ExIm banks, like all foreign policy instruments, are designed to serve the country providing the service, by a number of means, *inter alia*, create employment in the financing state, provide a platform for export growth for local industry to the funded state, and counter trade subsidies of other governments¹⁸¹. Critically, ExIm banks provide protection against the political and commercial risks offered up by international trade. ECAs, under the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have stipulated

¹⁷⁹ Redvers, L. “Oil keeps the economy burning bright”. *The Africa Report*, December 2009-January 2010, p. 75

¹⁸⁰ Export-Import Bank of the United States. “Products and Policies”. Retrieved 17 September 2009 from <http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/index.cfm>

¹⁸¹ Shields, J.C. “Export-Import Bank”. *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Vol. 4, No. 18, p. 1

guidelines to which they pledge to adhere, referred to as the “Common Approaches”¹⁸². The common approaches are crucial in preventing a free-rider in the system, *sans* which a state may utilise different criteria in terms of corruption ratings, environmental concerns, and the establishment of market-related minimum interest rate¹⁸³. By this carrot method the West has sought to introduce conditionalities with their loans to developing states that all (OECD) states would apply, thereby minimising the possibility of defection by another state... China, however, is not part of the OECD.

ExIm banks most often utilise concession loans, defined as a “loan provided to poorest countries with lower interest rates and longer repayment periods than typical or standard market or multilateral loans, i.e. less than market interest rate and extended grace period.”¹⁸⁴ Specifically, the OECD, in terms of official development assistance (ODA), defines a loan as concessional only when it entails “flows to developing countries provided by official agencies which have a clear development purpose and are at least partially concessional in nature.”¹⁸⁵ These loans come with conditions that are meant to promote the ideals that the lenders wish to advance within the states that are being lent to, violating any of the conditions may see an unfavourable revision of the repayment terms (given the length of the loans, they are periodically subject to revision), withholding of funds or outright cancellation of a loan and even legally prohibiting any loans to a state. As with private industry, countries are “rated” and the US ExIm, for example, produces a country limitation schedule (CLS), ranking a state by public and private sectors¹⁸⁶.

China ExIm Bank...

While Taylor may insist that China is not an Orwellian state in complete control of its citizenry, one would be hard pressed to find a state that is as intricately involved in its

¹⁸² AllBusiness. “Export Credit Agencies: Movement Toward Common Environmental Guidelines, but National Differences Remain”. Retrieved 22 October 2009 from <http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/executive-legislative-other/668918-1.html>

¹⁸³ Export-Import Bank of the United States. “Exposure Fee Advice”. Retrieved 17 September 2009 from http://www.exim.gov/tools/exposure/fee_advice.cfm

¹⁸⁴ “Concessional Loan.” Retrieved 29 September 2009 from <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/glossary/item.shtml?x=344934>

¹⁸⁵ Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. & Pushak, N. Building Bridges: China’s Role as Infrastructure Financier for Africa. Retrieved 1 September 2009 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Building_Bridges_Master_Version_wo-Embg_with_cover.pdf, p. 6

¹⁸⁶ Export-Import Bank of the United States. “Country Limitation Schedule”. Retrieved 17 September 2009 from http://www.exim.gov/tools/country/country_limits.cfm

foreign lending process. China ExIm bank provided 92 percent of the recorded Chinese infrastructure investment finance commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2001-2007¹⁸⁷. This is of great consequence, as the Chinese ExIm bank operates in a fundamentally different manner to that of the OECD states' ExIm banks, and differently from even fellow developing state India's ExIm bank. Though, China ExIm bank, as with other ExIm banks, does aim to "implement state policy in industry, foreign trade and economy, finance and diplomacy"¹⁸⁸

Foster, et. al. carried out an in-depth analysis of the finance of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. The nature of the Chinese ExIm bank meant that direct measurement of Chinese infrastructure could not be direct and many of their findings were based on extrapolation of available data¹⁸⁹. A paucity of information as to the Chinese investment methods also calls into question the veracity of Chinese claims, and comparing Chinese infrastructure investment with Western ODA is a misnomer. Traditional ODA is usually a North-South cooperative effort for development purposes, delivered by means of bilateral or multilateral aid agencies¹⁹⁰. The ultimate (and explicit) goal of this ODA is poverty reduction, harmonised by OECD guidelines meant to untie contracts and develop safeguards; China differs significantly in this regard. Post Mao saw ideology being afforded less weighting in terms of foreign policy, as well as China's view of traditional aid. This view changed when end 1982 beginning touring Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang outlined China's emphasis on cooperation rather than aid, mostly in order to cover a Chinese reduction in foreign aid¹⁹¹.

...in Angola

Chinese financial flows to Africa mostly take place by one of three methods, namely: grant aid, which is mainly aid in kind; zero interest loans, 90 percent of which are considered as written off over time; and concessional loans, almost always through the ExIm bank¹⁹². This

¹⁸⁷ Foster, V., et. al. *Op Cit*, p. 40

¹⁸⁸ The Export-Import Bank of China. "Mission". Retrieved 16 September 2009 from <http://english.eximbank.goc.cn/profile/intro.shtml>

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6

¹⁹¹ Cheng, J.Y.S. & Shi, H. *Op Cit*, p. 89

¹⁹² Reisen, H. "Is China Actually Helping Improve Debt Sustainability in Africa?" *International Conference "Emerging Powers in Global Governance"* – Paris, 6-7 July 2007 Retrieved 28 August 2009 from http://www.iddri.org/Activities/Conferences-internationales/070706_PaperReisen_confpaysemergents.pdf

has dramatically increased in Angola post 2002, with the end of the civil war China's engagement swung from military interests to almost solely investment. The result of this is best demonstrated by the fact that in 2008 Angola was listed as the number two oil supplier to China, which can be greatly attributed to the first \$4 billion Chinese loan to Africa¹⁹³. This Chinese venture has been so successful it has come to be referred to as the "Angola Mode" and will be referred to in greater depth now.

The Chinese Construction Bank (CCB) and ExIm Bank opened relations with the Angolan government in 2002, providing the first funding for infrastructure development; the Angolan Ministry of Trade had little input, however, as CCB and ExIm Bank funding was provided directly to Chinese firms – what was to become the *modus operandi* for the Chinese financiers. A 'framework agreement' was signed in late 2003 and on 21 March 2004 the first \$2 billion financing package for public investment projects was approved by the Chinese Ministry of Trade; the loan is payable over twelve to fifteen years at a highly concessional interest rate, with a grace period of up to three years¹⁹⁴. It is divided into two phases, with \$1 billion assigned to each; the first phase was broken down into health, education, energy and water, agriculture, transport, social communication, and public works for a total of \$1,109,287,188.28¹⁹⁵.

The aforementioned Angola Mode is the method by which China is providing these loans to states that cannot provide adequate guarantees to back their loan commitments. By this method China is able to gain physical security over resources at *normally*¹⁹⁶ discounted rates. Little is known about the details but experience suggests that the price of the resource (oil in the Angolan case) is not fixed over the period of the loan and that the terms of the loan are typically adjusted, for example if the price of oil increases the repayment period decreases.¹⁹⁷ Framework agreements signed with China see very little (if any) transfer of funds to Angola; rather infrastructure investment programs see contracts being carried out by Chinese firms, while at the same time the petroleum rights are awarded to a Chinese firm. Angola will then

¹⁹³ BBC "Angola praised on Asian oil deals". Retrieved 28 August 2009 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8193484.stm>

¹⁹⁴ Campos, I & Vines, A. "Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership". Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, "Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation," December 5, 2007. Retrieved 16 September 2009 from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080306_angolachina.pdf, p. 7

¹⁹⁵ Loc Cit

¹⁹⁶ Normally because, as noted earlier, SOE's do not always operate with the sole objective of making a profit, but sometimes subordinate profit to foreign policy objectives and are known to pay over market value.

¹⁹⁷ Foster, V., et. al. Op Cit, p. 43

instruct China to carry out these infrastructure projects, supported by ExIm Bank credit¹⁹⁸, for whom 70 percent of the contracts must be awarded to Chinese firms^{199, 200}. Angola then proceeds to repay the loan with oil produced by the Chinese company.

This is not to say Angola is not wholly obsequious in this process. The credit facility afforded Angola is managed by Angola's Reconstruction Office, *Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional* (GRN) which is directly accountable to the Angolan presidency²⁰¹. The GRN's *raison d'être* is manage large investment projects and ensure rapid post-war infrastructure reconstruction, under the auspices of General Helder Vieira Dias "Kopelipa", in order to provide work for a demobilised military and under the assumption that the other Angolan ministries would not have the organizational and technical capacity to manage the large inflows of money directed to the GRN; sources approximate that GRN projects are valued at \$10 billion²⁰².

Bane or boon?

Criticism of Chinese intervention in Africa abounds, often referred to as the "new scramble for Africa" and even being labelled "neo-colonialists" by then British foreign secretary Jack Straw, noting that "what China [is] doing in Africa now was much the same as Britain had done 150 years before"²⁰³. China's unwillingness to attach conditions to their massive loans and her willingness to deal with pariah states has drawn even greater criticism. Both points of view will now be further explored.

The vagueness of the terms of the contract afforded Angola present, for the West at least, a significant problem. For them, this is endemic of nefarious Chinese dealings, not least of all with states that are on the West's *verboden* list. This is a misnomer, however, as one can also gauge the terms of these deals by sheer observation, as carried out by Foster, et. al., who were able to reasonably measure the effects of the infrastructure finance provided. Additionally,

¹⁹⁸ Loc Cit

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 21

²⁰⁰ The US ExIm bank applies a similar criterion, albeit only requiring 50 percent of contracts to be awarded to US companies or affiliates; Shields, J.C. Op Cit

²⁰¹ Campos, I & Vines, A. Op Cit, p. 9

²⁰² Ibid, p. 10

²⁰³ Mohan, G. & Power, M. Op Cit, p. 2

China did not deal in Angolan infrastructure finance pre-2002 as the risk was too great, thereby demonstrating that whilst the Chinese are less risk averse, they still act rationally and therefore predictably.

That Angola does benefit considerably is difficult to dispute. As a pariah state in terms of lending credit – she is not afforded any loans exceeding a seven year period by the US ExIm bank, for example – Angola has been given a credit supply line that is so crucial in post-war construction. China has also provided a significant amount of debt relief to African countries of at least US \$780 million since 2000, with Angola being a major beneficiary²⁰⁴. This has reduced country indebtedness enormously and fiscally freed up Angola thereby allowing Angola to (responsibly) assume much needed credit. Nor are the terms as onerous as many Westerners offers; as understood Angola repays the loan in kind as follows – the revenue from oil sold is placed in an escrow account from which the exact amount due in terms of the debt is deducted, the remainder is handed over to the Angolan government²⁰⁵. The interest rates for the 2004 \$2 billion loan have been estimated to be at an exceptionally low 0.25 percent with a three year grace period and fifteen year repayment. Thus far one would be hard pressed to identify exploitation by the Chinese dispensation. Shortcomings are numerous, however.

Most notably, and most often called attention to by Western governments and institutions, is the impact China has on transparency and governance, and development, as well as China's perceived lax corporate standards on corruption, worked safety and environment²⁰⁶. China's relatively free flowing funds are bound to give rise to competition for control these massive funds, and it has in Angola. In Angola the GRN was established to kick start the following:

- Rehabilitation of the 497.5-kilometer highway from Luanda to Lobito;
- Rehabilitation of the 1,107-kilometer highway from Malanje to Saurimo,
- Saurimo to Luena, and Saurimo to Dundo;
- Phase II of the rehabilitation of the Luanda Railway;
- Rehabilitation of the 1,547.2-kilometer Benguela Railway and of the

²⁰⁴ Foster, V., et. al. *Op Cit*, p. 48

²⁰⁵ Campos, I & Vines, A. *Op Cit*, p. 9

²⁰⁶ Schiller, B. "The China Model". *Open Democracy*. Retrieved 17 September 2009 from http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-africa_democracy/china_development_3136.jsp

- 1,003.1-kilometer Moçâmedes Railway;
- Drainage and improvement works in the city of Luanda;
- Construction of 215,500 residential units in 24 different cities across
- Angola's 18 provinces;
- Construction of a new Luanda International Airport at Bom Jesus;
- Studies and projects for the new city of Luanda.²⁰⁷

The first Chinese loan seemed to trigger a struggle within the Angolan leadership for these funds and that senior presidential advisers may have been sidelined after the Chinese became concerned at rent seeking. Further, allegations of mismanagement of funds allegations have emerged²⁰⁸. In 2007 Angolan security chief General Fernando Garcia Miala, on trial for attempted insurrection, threatened to reveal the names of individuals in senior government positions who had benefited from the diversion of funds from Chinese lines of credit²⁰⁹. Preceding the internal issues in 2007, however, many of these projects came to a halt as the China International Fund Ltd. (CIF) had difficulties in raising the funds. This resulted in the Angolan Ministry of Finance having to raise \$3.5 billion in domestic funding by issuing treasury bonds²¹⁰. This put the Angolan government in the tenuous position of actually funding Chinese firms so as to ensure the completion of the projects.

A fact also emphasised with regards to Chinese infrastructure investment is that of “white elephants”. This older, cruder style of Chinese investment involves building “prestige projects” with little benefit to the people or they are utilised for the wrong purposes. This occurred in Ethiopia when housing for flood victims were occupied by the military; China took no interest, stating “It was a political task for us and so long as the Ethiopian officials are happy, our goal is fulfilled”²¹¹. China’s unswerving “respect” for state sovereignty is also problematic. As mentioned earlier, China invokes sovereignty with often spurious and therefore often unstable states, should a regime change take place or the infrastructure not benefit the majority in the long run, China may just come to be viewed as a neo-colonialist in hindsight. Contrary to the Chinese requirements are Angola’s rigorous demands for local

²⁰⁷ Campos, I & Vines, A. Op Cit, p. 10

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 11

²⁰⁹ Loc Cit

²¹⁰ Loc Cit

²¹¹ Schiller, B. Op Cit, p. 5

content that international firms are required to ensure that two-thirds of their workforce is Angolan, as well as ensuring that training and local development take place²¹².

Versus the rest

While China may not be number one in absolute investment terms in Angola, they are making significant inroads into traditional former Western colonies. Angola, however, is growing tired of stressing that China's influence is overplayed. Angola is mostly straight forward about their cooperation with China, as well as not wanting to depend on any one nation, with dos Santos stating at the end of 2008 that "...globalization naturally makes us see the need to diversify international relations and to accept the principle of competition, which has in a dynamic manner, replaced the petrified concept of zones of influence that used to characteri[s]e the world."²¹³ Upon analysing the trend in investment in Angola, one certainly notices an increase in Chinese numbers, but not disproportionately so, given their development expansion in the international field on a whole. Whilst the EU, with the exception of Portugal, has lost the greatest share from 1977 to 2004, India, South Africa, and Brazil have all gained in terms of imports into Angola; a large number of these imports are cheaper Chinese substitutes for more expensive Western goods, also attributable to a strengthening euro. Deputy Governor of the Angolan National Bank notes that the expanding relationship with China should be viewed as a logical reorientation of trading partners rather than a "current phenomenon"²¹⁴. China has taken a sizeable chunk of EU and US Angolan exports, mostly represented by the gains made by the Chinese in the oil industry, and even though Angola is now the number one African oil supplier to China, the US is still the main importer of Angolan oil, although losing significantly to China and even South Africa in relative terms²¹⁵. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to Angola is still small when compared to Western FDI, even in the oil sector which is still dominated by Western companies such as Chevron, Total, BP, and ExxonMobil; not surprisingly, Portugal still dominates industries outside the extractive field²¹⁶.

²¹² Redvers, L. "Oil & Gas: Hydrocarbons push the country to the top". *Op Cit*, p. 80

²¹³ Campos, I & Vines, A. *Op Cit*, p. 20

²¹⁴ *Loc Cit*

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 21

²¹⁶ In 2006 Portugal represented 56% of total FDI to Angola, \$200 million. This is in no small part facilitated by the colonial ties, presenting the Portuguese with far fewer logistical quagmires in terms of bureaucracy and language barriers

These figures, however, conceal an underlying fact about Western investment in Africa, over and above the conditions that usually come attached. Whilst Chinese loans to Angola may realise very little cash value, they do materialise in the form of civil projects, and, most notably, in the current term. The US and EU struggle to compete with China when it comes to cash flows and, even given the financial wherewithal, it is the commitment that is usually lacking; whether being railroaded by civil society in the West or bulwarked in their political systems under pressure from lobbies, Western investment often takes an inordinately long time to materialise, if ever. Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade noted that a contract with the World Bank takes up to five years to discuss, negotiate, and sign, whereas the Chinese can complete the same process within three months²¹⁷. This is facilitated, in most part, by the Chinese system of rule wherein civil society is subordinated, which has also contributed to the phenomenal Chinese growth witnessed over the past thirty years. This provides a possible exemplar for Angola.

²¹⁷ Wade, A. "Time for the West to practise what it preaches". New African, No. 471, p. 20

Chapter Five

A Suitable Response

In determining a suitable Angolan response, one needs first establish whether or not there is a true threat posed by China. The China threat thesis is mostly informed by Western discourse and compares China's expansion into Africa to the original late nineteenth century European scramble for Africa. This chapter will start out by highlighting the significant differences between the original push into Africa and contemporary Sino-African relations. Inferring from Singapore to Angola also has its limitations; this will be discussed as well as the similarities highlighted. Both the hard power options, in the form of democracy and internal governance, and soft power options, in the form of regionalism and trade, will be introduced

China threat?

One needs first to consider the nature of the "China threat". It has been referred to as the second wave of colonialism, following on from "The Scramble for Africa", explained to great effect by Thomas Pakenham. Then, as now, there were concerns not only with old world colonisers, but also China; Chinese labourers were seen as a threat by indigenous Africans to their wage rates and possibly their land as well – Europeans were as concerned that the Chinese would "slip out of their compounds, subvert the morality of the unspoilt 'natives', steal European jobs and businesses, and [turn] Johannesburg [into] 'practically a Chinese town' "²¹⁸. History, however, pays little notice to the Chinese threat of just over one hundred years ago, rightly so in light of the decades that followed that fateful Berlin Conference of 1884²¹⁹. The exploitation that characterised the era that persisted until the early 1960s, and 1975 in Angola's case, is being compared by some to the contemporary Chinese breach of African markets. As earlier noted, this is a mode of thought rife amongst international theorists of a realist bent, such as Mearsheimer, who view China's rise as a competition to the US and the increase of Sino-African relations as a loss to them; NGO's and other states insist

²¹⁸ Snow, P. in Alden, C., Large, D. & Soares de Oliveira, R. (Eds) *China returns to Africa*, Hurst, London, 2008, p. xiv

²¹⁹ See Pakenham, T. *The Scramble for Africa*, Abacus, London, 1991

that China is merely exploiting a weakened and divided continent. Most African states, however, see it in a different light.

Comparing modern day Africa to that of late nineteenth century Africa has severe limitations. With the exception of long standing colonies such as South Africa, most of Africa was still considered a “dark continent” and thus not privy to the Weberian state, and the protections afforded such states as set out by the Treat of Westphalia. Today all fifty three African states are represented at the United Nations and, thus, afforded the rights (and duties) of a recognised state, as spurious as some of them may be – it is by these means, as sovereign states, that the Chinese dispensation engages many African states. One may question the efficient and fair allocation of resources in these “spurious states” and, accordingly, impose limitations on trade with them, but they are sovereign states nonetheless, albeit perhaps outside of the Western democratic ideal; the efficacy and validity of democracy will be addressed further on. Therefore, whilst a “China threat” hypothesis may faintly plausible, there are many caveats, *inter alia*, China is not preoccupied with Africa – whilst Africa may be a significant supply of resources, it is ultimately only three percent of total annual Chinese trade; following on from point one is China’s vulnerable international base, the interdependence that China shares mostly with the US – the long-terms benefits of any African trade are significantly outweighed by the extremely favourable trade with the US; locally, Chinese development is very uneven and the “domestic base for Chinese prosperity is in fact politically volatile” – while not to a democratic states extent, this limits the Chinese investment and it is, therefore, not the wanton throwing of money at despotic states, as so often portrayed; the previous point leads onto the proposal that the “Shanghai School” may supersede the “Washington Consensus”, with even the Indians emulating the former rather than the latter – this does lock the investing state, be it China or India, into the African states in the long-term however, and a key omission in the “Shanghai” model is how to ensure Africa is stable during this period²²⁰, contrary to China’s current sovereignty card. Any options considered further in this chapter will be cognisant of the “China threat”, but will also be pragmatic in this regard while considering the influence of the West.

²²⁰ Chan, S. “Ten Caveats and One Sunrise in Our Contemplation of China and Africa”, in Snow, P. in Alden, C., Large, D. & Soares de Oliveira, R, (Eds). China returns to Africa, p. 340

Too great a divide?

Inferring a solution from Singapore to Angola presents a number of issues, namely: a cultural divide, historical disparities, and geographical differences; these have also all been of importance when comparing why Africa has failed to develop whereas Southeast Asia has boomed in the same period.

Generalising from an Eastern culture to Africa impacts on validity issues insofar that Singapore, being predominantly Chinese, is informed by more than two millennia of Confucianism as a result of a united Chinese kingdom. Africa, on the other hand, is a continent of disparate cultures, each developing at different rates and down different paths. Singapore is not a democratic institution, as promoted so vociferously by the West in Africa. African states, theoretically, are bound by short election terms and therefore are not able to implement the long term strategies as applied by Singapore.

Geographically, Singapore may be Angola's polar opposite, lacking natural resources, a large populace, and only covering 648 square kilometres, but the responses to the vulnerability that arises from these characteristics may be applied to Angola nonetheless. Singapore learnt to offset her geographical shortcomings by developing a strong political system, applied domestically and regionally; Angola could exploit her resources to even greater effect were she able to emulate such a system, with minor adjustments to suit her needs.

Looking to the East as a "developmental model" has mostly relied on Western interpretations of secondary English language sources, and is thus limited. Deborah Brautigam contends, however, that "[China] has a deep history and as broad a range of experience as any experience established in the West"²²¹. Shared colonial histories are an important common point with Singapore, as are the vulnerabilities that Angola faces today, relative to her more powerful southern neighbour. Cultural dissimilarities are negated somewhat by the trend of globalisation, as the system promotes less the dissimilarities and builds rather on shared opportunities; given that Singapore's ascension occurred within this globalised network and actually benefited from it is an indication that cultural differences may be

²²¹ Brautigam, D. as cited in Large, D. "Beyond the Dragon in the Bush: The Study of China-Africa Relations". Africa Affairs, Vol. 107, No. 426, p. 53

negligible. Similarities such as the vulnerability of the state may be exploited, as well as development issues; whilst Angola may be endowed with resources, its capacity to independently exploit these resources is limited, thus placing it in a similar position to Singapore in her pre-development era. Replicating a Singapore rule of law system underpinned by a sense of vulnerability, as well as recognising the importance of regional integration are models that supersede cultural discrepancies.

The resource curse may also be invoked here and its impact on Angolan versus Singaporean government policy and objectives. The Angolan government, with the option of being a rentier state, is relatively insulated from pressures, domestic, regional, and international. Singapore, being even water scarce, is in a far more precarious position, and thus will have different economic ambitions and, by inference, government policies to implement as much. Singapore evolved to become one of the “Asian Tigers” and is therefore significantly influential in the region. Angola, whilst not insignificant in Southern Africa, still plays a distance third fiddle to South Africa and Botswana in practically all financial indicators. This is not to say Angola is powerless, especially in light of South Africa’s declining relative power in the region²²². Angola is resource endowed, has an unfettered coastline, and has developed significant economic partnerships with both the West and China as a result of the former.

Considering options

As with Singapore, Angola needs to apply techniques that lean toward both the hard and soft ends of the power continuum, the former at home, invoking sovereignty, and the latter beyond Angola’s borders, to counter regional state weakness.

Hard power - governance

The West vociferously insists that good governance and development will follow democracy, and accordingly attaches conditions to most loans and assistance; the alternative to a Western

²²² See Alence, R. “SACU and the Political Economy of Regionalism: Towards Deeper and Broader Integration?” South African Institute of International Affairs Trade Policy Briefing, No. 12, June 2006, wherein the impact of 2002 agreement was analysed using a game theoretic analysis, noting how South Africa’s strong arm of unilateralism was on the decline

democracy will be explored here and its viability, as well as Singapore's form of autocratic rule with regards to Angola will be expanded upon.

The development of the Weberian African state was not one forged under normal circumstances as in Europe, where states faced existential threats and formed rule of law regimes accordingly; in Africa, South Africa under the apartheid regime believed it faced such a threat and, combined with the lengthiest colonial rule, developed and maintained a strict rule of law system, *à-la* Singapore. Africa's state system was mostly an imposed one, one which was exposed to the proxy wars of the Cold War period, and therefore never came to mature into the examples of their progenitors; this has led to a subversion of democracy of sorts in Africa, thereby severely limiting its efficacy. The evolution of many African democracies has seen the separation of the governing party from the leaders and representatives, the glorification of political power, and the rise of the system of patronage²²³. It is not merely patronage and separation of the leadership from the social base that characterises and sustains African powers, it is also sustained by means of contact with the Western world, from whom the bureaucratic structures are imported and who provide much of the financial resources needed to maintain the organisation²²⁴. The failure of this system was mostly attributed to the Cold War, where dictators like Mobutu Sese Seku retained power by means of appealing to their respective patrons, namely the United States or the Soviet Union; Fukuyama's "End of History" theoretically saw the end of this support of these *faux* governments in favour of supporting democracies. That the West chose to infer from its democratic successes has proven to be erroneous.

In the twenty years since the Berlin Wall fell democracy has had no true competition on the African continent and therefore had all the space in which to flourish; additionally, the relative isolation after Tiananmen Square cast a shadow on the authoritarian systems, such as China's system. Angola was on a particularly hard receiving end, only gaining independence from Angola in 1975 but then being plunged into consecutive wars until 2002, the last civil war as a result of a disputed democratic election in 1992. That the 2008 election results were again contentious and the 2009 presidential elections have been continuously postponed

²²³ Clapham, C. "The African State", in Rimmer, D. Africa Thirty Years On, Royal African Society in association with James Currey and Heinemann, London, 1991, p. 92

²²⁴ Ibid, p. 97

indicates that perhaps Angola requires a stepping stone on the path to democracy, particularly one that will lead to the establishment of a rule of law system.

Rule of law would bring confidence in the state far quicker than would democracy; the latter does not guarantee it at all, as demonstrated by Angola's credit record with international lenders. Rule of law would also see a reduction in the system of patronage; whilst democracy (theoretically) increases accountability, an ambivalence of accountability has emerged in underdeveloped states – these regimes of accountability were considered to be external creations, thereby creating an awareness of Western government as an alien and imposed institution²²⁵. Rule of law will also counter the ambivalence of power; post-colonial Africa saw the rise of many “artificial” states, so long as the state's own hierarchy and social groups continue to benefit from it, challenging its legitimacy will be difficult, and African rulers have generally failed to recognise the fragility of the base upon which their power rested²²⁶.

In order to adopt a consultative rule of law regime, Pan notes a six-pillar structure that needs to be instituted:

1. The establishment of a neutral civil service system. This would be critical in combating the rampant corruption in Angola today.
2. An autonomous judicial system, a meritocratic system ensuring the civil system is checked and balanced' and as authority of judicial review – serving as the upcoming constitution's final “gatekeeper”.
3. Extensive social consultations. The MPLA as the ruling party would be the basis of this consultation system that would balance and check the legal procedures of law making, and ensuring civil service is transparent.
4. An independent anti-corruption system. Neutrality, history has proven, is not as much of a danger to Angola so much as corruption, this institution would be another check on the civil service.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 98

²²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 97

5. The independent auditing system. Given that public office is most often accused with abusing government financial incomes, this system would be critical in preventing that abuse.
6. The freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. These do not constitute any government institutions *per se*, but are a standard and principle and standard by which government must abide, and are an indispensable part of any modern and civilised society, and especially for a rule of law regime.²²⁷

As per Singapore, Angola needs to incorporate rather than reject its colonial heritage; instituting new structures would be an act of redundancy. These structures afford it an advantage when dealing with traditional partners such as Portugal and former Portuguese colonies such as Brazil. Whilst Angola was not assigned the role of entrep t as Singapore was by Britain, that very little technological knowledge was imparted to either state puts Angola in a similar position; this is as a result of the colonial legacy wherein subjugate states mostly supplied materials and were afforded development only to meet those ends, as Singapore's primary role was that of entrep t, she was assigned greater administrative development, Angola was afforded very little of this development under the Portuguese, however. This has not stopped the Angolan dispensation from trying to develop what was there after independence in 1975 and especially post-2002. That this is mostly at the behest of international financial institutions is likely, however it does not mean Angola does not need some form of a constitution; rule of law systems are also guided by a constitution, merely one that does not enshrine democracy in its fundamental tenets.

From a hard power/military perspective, Angola would like to play a more constructive role in the region but is pragmatic and afraid of over-stretch. The country still faces difficulties in implementing the ambitious disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program from the civil war era, a secessionist Cabinda province, as well transnational crime and refugee movements across the DRC border²²⁸. Whilst the Chinese government has a history of supporting Angola, they supported the FNLA (as did the US), while the USSR and Cuba supported ultimate victors, the MPLA. What is notable, is that Angola's military relationship

²²⁷ Pan, W. (2003a) *Op Cit*, p. 34

²²⁸ Mai, V.A. & Wisner, F.G. *Toward and Angola Strategy: Prioritizing US-Angola Relations*. Retrieved 15 January 2010 from www.cfr.org/content/publications/.../AngolaCommissionReport.pdf, p. 26

with the US is limited, but exists nonetheless. The US, seeking a stable Gulf of Guinea, funds the International Military Education and Training program, providing English-language training to the FAA and professional training to law enforcement officers; additionally, the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement is supporting continued de-mining efforts by NGOs and the Angolan government to the tune of \$6 million until 2013²²⁹. These amounts may be relatively insignificant, but offer the Angolan dispensation a base upon which to build further ties that do not bind it to any single country. Significantly, Chinese purchases from Angola are not in the same mode as Sudanese-Chinese purchases, where nearly 80 percent of Sudan's \$500 million in annual oil revenues are used to purchase (mostly) Chinese weapons and even Chinese built three weapons factories near Khartoum with the assistance of the Chinese²³⁰. Currently, China's military dealings with Angola are typical of its *modus operandi*, namely that of selling small weapons, in addition to eight Chinese built Su-27 SK fighter jets²³¹, but China's assistance to the MPLA run administration is limited when compared to other African states, possibly as a hangover from China's support of the FNLA. This does not imply that China is not pragmatic, however, and given the opportunity she would most likely expand military ties with Angola, as demonstrated by her White Paper released in 2006, "promis[ing] to intensify arms sales and military training in Africa, expand intelligence sharing, and deepen cooperation between Chinese and African law enforcement agencies."²³² Angola would do well to be wary of China in the short term, and rather engage her in local fora.

Soft power – regionalism

Singapore utilised regionalism to great effect, without it impinging on its sovereignty, it actually employs regionalism for both security and economic purposes; the island's regional vulnerability informs this to a great degree. Unlike Singapore, Angola does not stand at any significant regional crossroads, geographically or culturally, she is however still a major trading partner with the West as well as increasing trade with China at a significant rate – this

²²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 31

²³⁰ Brookes, P. & Shin, J.H. "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States". Retrieved 17 January 2010 from <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm>

²³¹ Butts, K.H. & Bankus, B. "China's Pursuit of Africa's Natural Resources". *Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College*. Retrieved 15 January 2010 from Leadership, US http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/CCS1_09_ChinasPursuitofAfricasNaturalResources.pdf, p. 9

²³² Mohan, C.J. "Losing Africa to China". Retrieved 16 December 2009 from http://www.financialexpress.com/old/latest_full_story.php?content_id=114676

affords Angola the opportunity to cement ties with her current partners whilst stepping up Sino trade.

Given Angola's relative weakness *vis-à-vis* her main trading partners as well as compared to the dominant force in the region, South Africa, she needs to adopt a hedging strategy. That Angola is China's biggest African oil supplier is to be noted, however, China's future is likely to be that of sharing power with the US, even in the long-term, and Angola should be aware of this and plan accordingly. For Angola, the continuing China ExIm bank relationship is the most beneficial for the time being, IMF and World Bank loans are too onerous when compared to the Chinese loans. The conditions that come with the Chinese loans need to be re-negotiated, however. Whilst conforming to China's seventy percent requirement, they are contrary to Angolan policy, but given China's recovery from the global economic crisis, her demand for resources will continue unabated for the foreseeable future, affording Angola greater leverage, especially seeing as the West still dominate Angolan trade and the Chinese will need "woo" Angola. This does depend, however, on regional cooperation, as Angola's competitors may undercut her *à-la* prisoner's dilemma and it is therefore in Angola's best interest to develop significant regional relations.

Regional integration for Angola would have to take into account South Africa, the regional hegemon. The disadvantage of entering a forum dominated by South Africa is best demonstrated by the South African Customs Union (SACU); even after the 2002 re-negotiation of the SACU agreement, we still find South Africa dominating the union as a result of her advanced rate of industrialisation and the dependence of the other member states on her²³³. South Africa would periodically increase the common revenue pool to pre-empt serious consideration withdrawal by other the states²³⁴, thus contributing to the longevity of the SACU. In promoting pan-regionalism, SACU goes down a similar path that NEPAD and the APRM go down, that of impinging on sovereign affairs. NEPAD's explicit *raison d'être* is to "correct Africa's multiple political, economic, and structural inadequacies"²³⁵. To these ends, NEPAD promotes democracy, observing a lack thereof is the root cause of poor economic performance and political governance. Democracies, NEPAD insists, reduce the

²³³ Alence, R. *Op Cit*, p.4

²³⁴ *Loc Cit*

²³⁵ Ikome, F.M. *From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for Africa's Development*. Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, South Africa, 2007, p. 146

possibility of conflict and promote conditions necessary for growth²³⁶. This is of course assuming that a democracy is working efficiently, and not the “spurious” democracy that characterises some African states. These conditions, as applied by NEPAD and the APRM, would be contrary to the implementation of any rule of law system by Angola, and therefore complying with the criteria would see the promotion of an already inefficient democratic system. SACU does, however, afford Angola a common external tariff under the 1999 Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) between South Africa and the European Union²³⁷, thereby integrating Angola further into the world economy and reducing her reliance on any single partner, whether it is China or the West.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 147

²³⁷ Alence, R. *Op Cit*, p. 7

Conclusion

China's expansion into Africa, whether a threat or not, is a reality that both the African continent and the West have to deal with; ascertaining whether or not it is a threat and the nature of the expansion, however, will afford Angola a greater position of authority. African attraction to China as of late has been facilitated by soft power; however, soft power in its strictest definition precludes carrots and, according to Nye, is generally beyond the control of the state²³⁸. As noted however, soft and hard power are not mutually exclusive polar opposites, rather they exist on a continuum, and in fact inform each other. Accepting this, one needs assess what China hopes to benefit from her soft power manoeuvres in Africa.

China's pragmatism under soft power is clearly informed by the limited nature thereof in its purest form. Soft power is said to be beyond the control of the state and achieves diffuse rather than specific goals, and profoundly influenced by civil society – a branch that is limited at best in China. Africa's disparate nature also limits the efficacy of a Chinese version of soft power, fundamental intra-African differences as well as Sino-African differences. It is therefore difficult to claim that pure soft power informs Chinese foreign policy, rather one needs to contextualise Chinese foreign policy – that is to say China is far more likely to lean toward the soft power of the spectrum when dealing with a less threatening state that she has traditional ties with, as with many African states; however, as demonstrated by the recent Copenhagen Climate summit, China leans toward the hard power pole when confronted by her natural international competitors and when she believes her national interests are under threat²³⁹.

China uses this blend of soft and hard power to great effect; she has traditional hard power links from her more ideologically oriented era as well as providing an alternative and very successful developmental model. This model, coupled with China's funding has significantly

²³⁸ Nye, J.S. (2004a) *Op Cit*, p. 14

²³⁹ See Rennie, D. "Europe and an inscrutable China". Retrieved 3 February 2010 from http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=3856661&story_id=15330572. Rennie goes on to note how in 2004 EU member France and Germany were proposing dropping the arms embargo on China, influenced in part by Chinese overtures to the EU and a shared multi-lateral interest; however by 2009 China was the only major nation who walked away from Copenhagen hailing the outcome as "excellent" – mostly because her sovereignty was not impinged on. This, *inter alia*, burst the multi-lateralist bubble that China has projected.

increased her soft power in Africa. That China explicitly seeking mutually beneficial cooperation amongst developed nations in order to facilitate common prosperity puts her head and shoulders above the West. This is not to say that China's soft power is all conquering, limits as a result of cultural disparities and a difference in political regimes tends to limit the efficacy of soft power, according to Ferguson. The former is significant when referring to Africa and China, the latter less so; the gap between China and many African states' political dispensations is not as great as the gap between the West and some African states, thereby facilitating soft power further.

China's traditional dealings with Africa, under the ideological guise, were primarily of a hardened realist bent; Taiwan recognition and ideology on the whole is no longer an issue and access to resources in Africa is better facilitated by the use of a soft power oriented. However, in light of the recent global economic crisis and the greater clout afforded to the Chinese dispensation, they have demonstrated a significantly more hardened position in the international arena²⁴⁰. Chinese increase in influence in Africa needs also be considered; China has less reason to rely on soft power as she "has her foot in the door" already, so to speak – Angola demonstrates this ably. China has significant long term financial contracts in Angola, these contracts bind the Angolan government to an almost onerous degree – extracting the Angolan government from these contracts would be impossible. China is cognisant of this and, in light of her recent bellicosity on the world stage; she may easily revert to a more hardened stance. In the interim China's use of soft power, the diluted version that China proffers, is utilised to great effect.

Angola's attraction for the PRC is primarily that of resources as well as Angola's vote at the UN General Assembly. This is reductionist to some extent; China also seeks to promote her version of multilateralism, especially countering the Hobbesian oriented, Bush driven doctrine of a post-9/11 United States, which saw American soft power plummet world-wide. China also seeks to practice what she preaches – demonstrating that she is prepared to deal with sovereign states without interfering in their internal affairs and, accordingly, China expects to be treated the same. What is contentious, however, is the manner in which China invokes sovereignty. Again, here we find West vociferously criticising China, whilst promoting its

²⁴⁰ See the recent row over proposed US arms sales to Taiwan – which would ordinarily elicit protest from China – has drawn exceptionally loud reprimand from the PRC; China has also been reluctant to revalue her currency, keeping the Yuan under valued *vis-à-vis* the US dollar and Euro; significantly, China is far more vocal in these issues in the post "great recession" world.

political ideals in Africa, even attaching conditions to significant loans. That China is dealing with Angola as an internationally recognised sovereign state, undercuts the argument in this case study from the international perspective for the PRC.

The IFIs, transnational groups and the US are particularly vocal about China's *modus operandi*, especially when China invokes the sovereignty card. Western concerns revolve primarily around China's impact on transparency on the African continent, how Chinese funding undercuts efforts to improve accountability and establish democratic institutions. Of course, from a less altruistic perspective, the West is also seeing access to traditional former colonial strongholds decrease and access to resources within these regions. The drop in the world price of oil during the Great Recession saw Angola's importance diminished somewhat, seeing as the economic climes are on the increase – especially China's – the impact of resources on foreign policy will increase accordingly. Traditionally Africa, and Angola in particular, has proven to be a sparring ground for external powers, however, post-Cold War ideologies were afforded less weight and democracy came to the fore.

For Angola, the democratic path has proven to be a thorny one. The modicum of stability afforded by the dos Santos regime, as illegitimate as the 2009 elections looked, has proven to be a boon for Angola, more so than any potential democracy, especially given the region's success with democracy. That Angola suffers from transparency and patronage issues, as demonstrated by the wrangling in the GRN, indicates that rule of law is lacking. Democracy alone will not provide Angola with the credit rankings and political transparency that it requires; effective implementation of rule of law will make far greater strides in terms of transparency and development, as demonstrated by the Singaporean system. The leverage of Western institutions has been offset by China's financial assistance; Angola is therefore under less democratic reform pressure. That Angola has significant oil reserves puts her in a greater position of strength, allowing her to court both China and the West; here Angola needs to hedge, as Singapore has done. While Angola will still encounter pressure to reform politically, and should improve governance and transparency issues, the onus is upon the Angolan dispensation and should not necessarily have to follow Western exemplars that are not necessarily suited to the historical or current Angolan state of affairs.

Singapore presents a viable alternative model for both withstanding Chinese and Western influences as well as introducing a political alternative to Western democracy, albeit with

generalisation issues. That Singapore shares a colonial past with Africa strengthens any inference from the city-state, as well as Singapore's perceived sense of vulnerability – a sentiment shared by Africa since the era of independence. By separating high and low politics Singapore engages on an economic level with China and hedges against the PRC by establishing security ties with, *inter alia*, the US. The ascent of the China, not only regionally, but also internationally may impact on this hedging arrangement, this is offset to a degree by hedging. Similarly, Angola may benefit from implementing an effective hedging strategy – currently China may not be Angola's biggest trading partner, however, relative Chinese growth and the nature thereof (the size and penetration of the loans as well as Angola being obliged to cover any Chinese *faux pas*²⁴¹) means that Angola is likely to become significantly more dependent on the PRC.

Over and above any internal resolutions, Angola needs to be cognisant of her neighbours and regional integration will impact her. Singapore too was reluctant to take an active role in ASEAN, viewing it in the 1970s as a weak instrument and a possible launching pad for Indonesian hegemony; similarly Angola is in the position of interacting within a NEPAD structure under possible South African hegemony, not to mention the limited efficacy of NEPAD thus far. What Singapore learnt, however, was that even seemingly insignificant states could wield disproportionately large power relative to their size by being willing to adopt a larger share of diplomatic burden – this benefited Singapore insofar that tensions were relieved by improving the overall regional climate, rather than through direct attention to problem-solving. This would benefit Angola significantly; she borders the Democratic Republic of Congo, who happens to geographically separate them from the Angolan enclave of Cabinda – greater DRC stability and cooperation could assist in the resolution of the Cabinda separatist issue, thereby increasing security in Angola. Democratic reforms as prescribed by NEPAD have thus far proved testing for the Angolan regime. However, should Angola be able to successfully implement the aforementioned political reforms by means of rule of law, she would be able to comply to the most important of NEPAD's requirements, possibly besting her neighbours. Regionalism will also offer Angola protection, reducing her reliance on any single state. As the recent economic crisis has demonstrated, the Western market is not infallible, and nor should it be assumed the Chinese market is fail-safe.

²⁴¹ See page 49

This paper recognises the weakness of inferring from an Eastern society such as Singapore; however, given the nature of globalisation and the relatively limited understanding of native Eastern language texts, the issue of validity lessens. It does not propose that Angola do an about turn on current policies – much Western discourse focuses on Chinese exploitation of the former Portuguese colony, a claim which is clearly rubbing the Angolan dispensation up the wrong way. Rather, this paper proposes that Angola needs to hedge against possible future over reliance on China, especially in light of the latter's meteoric rise and surprising resilience throughout the great recession. Whilst this may be a motive to increase ties with the (potential) next hegemon, it will also render Angola vulnerable to the whims and wills of a single nation. Additionally, the concept of regionalism has been proposed in light of the benefits it would afford Angola, not least of which is stability – something African states and African regional organisations long for dearly.

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