

https://dspace.org/

Perspectives in Education: Journal of the Faculty of Education of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and the Johannesburg College of Education 5(3)

Wally Morrow; Brian Holmes; George Bereday; Linda Chisholm; Tony Fluxman ...

1981-11
University of the Witwatersrand
https://hdl.handle.net/10539/29002
Morrow, W. (Ed.) (1981, November). Perspectives in Education: Journal of the Faculty of Education of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and the Johannesburg College of Education, 5(3).

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION



Vol 5 No 3
November 1981

Journal of the Faculty of Education of the University of the Witwatersrand and the Johannesburg College of Education

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

PENNY ENSLIN
FRANCIS FALLER
MICHAEL GARDINER
WALLY MORROW
JOE MULLER
MICHAEL RICE

TYPING LIAISON

LLEWELLYN HAWKEN

DISTRIBUTION

SHIELA SCHLESINGER

This journal is distributed free to anyone who wishes to receive it. All enquiries should be addressed to

Shiela Schlesinger
Johannesburg College of Education
27 St Andrew's Road
Parktown 2193

Copyright of editorial material is vested in the Editorial Committee

'Perspectives in Education' is edited collectively, published jointly by the Faculty of Education of the University of the Witwatersrand, 1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Johannesburg and the Johannesburg College of Education, 27 St Andrew's Road, Parktown. Printed by the Central Printing Unit of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

The views and opinions expressed do not purport to be those of the Faculty of Education or the Council of the University of the Witwatersrand, or the Johannesburg College of Education.

DISCUSSION

REVIEW OF RM RUPERTI'S *THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA*

Brian Holmes

Comparative educationists have always agreed that one of their legitimate aims is the study of educational systems in other countries in order better to understand their own. Whether it is legitimate to compare national systems in order to justify certain policies rather than others is an open question. Some comparativists set out to do this and it must be said that, whatever her intensions, Professor Ruperti (1) provides a framework of assumptions which, if accepted, justify policies of separate development. It is this aspect of her book which is of most interest although the data, now somewhat dated, about South Africa, South West Africa, the five black states (Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia (pre-independence) and Madagascar are useful. For the most part a distinction is made between South Africa and South West Africa and "other countries", which suggests an ethnocentric perspective.

The system of classifying data is unexceptional and is not dissimilar to that used by Unesco in preparing the World Surveys of Education. Details of legislation are followed by information about administration, school and college systems, ancillary services, supplementary education, supervision and planning. Frequent reference is made to the 1971 volume of Unesco's World Survey and data are drawn from it, other international services and from national legislation and official documents. In each chapter the information about South Africa, South West Africa and 'other countries' is prefaced by general comments on an aspect of

education identified in the taxonomy. In the countries other than South Africa and South West Africa analyses are made of British, French and Portuguese influences as appropriate.

The volume thus includes data and analytical explanations about systems (not the system!) of education in Southern Africa within traditions established by Nicholas Hans and Sir Michael Sadler and a taxonomy approved by Unesco. The information provided in Part II of the book is useful and presented systematically. In so far as a reader wishes to evaluate the interpretations inserted throughout the second part of the book which is headed 'Analysis' it is necessary to digest the framework of analysis which is provided in Part I 'Orientation'. This part is indeed the more significant and if its assumptions are accepted it would be possible to justify policies of separate development. The strength of the framework presented lies in traditions established by comparative educationists. Its weakness lies in the way in which these traditions have been interpreted and used and in a failure to take account of developments in comparative education methodology.

Ruperti could, for example, claim the authority of Nicholas Hans and Sir Michael Sadler for the framework within which she writes. The factors which determine educational policies and practices are divided into two main classes - natural and cultural - and further subdivided into factors which would have been approved by Hans. Among those he regarded the religious and linguistic factors as most important and I do not think Ruperti would disagree with this assessment. She goes further than Hans however by asserting that a spiritual factor - the 'ground motive' of a community guides the factors which determines the culture of a community. It would be possible, I think, to say that this 'ground motive' is not dissimilar to the 'living spirit' which for Sadler informed a nation and its educational system. Sadler, however, maintained that a nation's 'living spirit' inhibited cultural borrowing, Ruperti in contrast claims that the 'ground motive' or spiritual force "is the driving power behind all thought and action of an individual or a community" (p 5). It is under the guidance of a 'ground motive' that "cultural advance including the development of an educational system" (p 5) takes place.

So far so good if a comparative educationist wishes to compare and place in rank order systems of education and identify different 'ground motives' and evaluate them in order to place associated educational systems in a hierarchy of excellence. Marxist comparative educationists are inclined to do this from their clear perspective. By implication Ruperti does it from her, vastly different,

perspective. She classifies 'ground motives' as religious (Christian, Buddhist and Mohammedan), as secular (empiricism, communism, pragmatism) and pagan. Logically, educational systems can be classified as essentially Christian, Buddhist, Moslem or Communist. They are bound to be different. Some will be better than others and Ruperti's judgement is clear. The Western European 'ground motive' is not only the best but also the strongest particularly when compared with 'ground motives' in pagan Africa. Moreover the 'ground motive' determines rates and ultimate levels of cultural development. Ruperti would, I suspect, have no difficulty in ordering systems in Southern Africa and, I believe, in the world on the basis of quality and potential.

An issue on which she is not nearly so clear is whether processes of acculturation can succeed. How far can a 'ground motive' be transplanted successfully? In comparing British, French and Portuguese colonial policies she is aware that the British adopted a laissez-faire approach, the French set out to bring the advantages of Christianity and the French language to those in their colonial territories who had the potential culturally to become Frenchmen. The Portuguese set out to Christianise Black Africans and introduce them to Portuguese culture. On this issue Ruperti hedges her bets, pointing out that a transplanted 'ground motive' may not be able to develop roots in the new environment and hence will not be able to stimulate cultural development. At the same time, as I follow the argument, a transplanted stronger 'ground motive' may destroy the indigenous 'ground motive' and thus may prevent indigenous cultural development. Between the extremes of the complete assimilation of colonial peoples and an absolute rejection by them of a foreign 'ground motive' several possibilities lie. It is only when discussing the historical approach of the Hollanders and the influence of the Afrikaners' 'ground motive' that Ruperti's preference for self development can be inferred. She claims that the British, Germans and Afrikaners were "opposed to intermarriage between themselves and non-White people" (p 29) and that British policy was directed towards the eventual self-sufficiency of her colonies. These policies were not assimilationist. Those of the French and Portuguese were. The conclusion Ruperti draws is that South Africa, once it had thrown off the shackles of colonialism, was first to "continue the process of decolonising politically subject peoples - not in a distant overseas empire, but within its own borders." (p 29)

The conclusions any logical reader would reach on the basis of this set of assumptions are that decolonisation means that subject peoples are no longer to be implicitly or explicitly assimilated; that such policies are in any case

bound to fail because superior and stronger 'ground motives' cannot be taken over in a way which would promote cultural development; and that the development of different communities should be based on their own 'ground motives'.

If the logic seems inescapable from my perspective the approach fails to take account of methods of enquiry in comparative education which leave assertions about the quality of normative systems problematic and which insist that in the light of problem analysis alternative policy solutions should be formulated and the less viable ones rejected in the light of their possible outcomes. Such an approach would require a much more sophisticated analysis of the problems of development in multi-cultural societies and communities than is presented in Ruperti's book. It would require the formulation of alternative policies: - which might well be identified as assimilationist or separate development. It would then require some assessment under specific circumstances of future political, economic, social and educational outcomes of the alternative policies.

Ruperti's analysis is unnecessarily parochial. It does not discuss policies pursued in multi-cultural societies outside Southern Africa and gives the impression, regardless of the consequences which may flow from such a commitment that the policies pursued in the Union of South Africa since 1961 (based upon the assumptions that a Western European Christian 'ground motive' is the best, will ensure maximum cultural development but cannot really be absorbed by Black Africans) are the best. The logic may be perfect provided the assumptions on which the case rests are accepted. The notion that comparative empirical evidence may throw light on the validity of the assumptions and hence the soundness of the logical conclusions is not considered seriously.

Failure in this book to evaluate policies in the light of international experience constitutes, in my judgement, a most serious weakness. My inability to accept as a comparative educationist several of the qualitative assertions from which logical conclusions are drawn makes it impossible for me to accept the logic of the case implicitly advanced. Equally logical but different logical systems have been proposed and are currently debated among educationists. I am prepared to examine and compare the assumptions on which these systems depend. I do not think it is my task, as a comparativist, to accept one rather than another 'ground motive' in order to rank order systems of education and propose educational policies in accordance with my commitment. This, rightly or wrongly, I consider Professor Ruperti has done. I find her book interesting and well argued but I am not convinced by its logic, in the light of empirical evidence from other

parts of the world.

Note

(1) RM Ruperti The Education System in Southern Africa, Pretoria: van Schaik, 1976.

REVIEW OF AJ VOS & SS BARNARD'S *COMPARATIVE EDUCATION FOR STUDENT TEACHERS*

George Bereday

Professors Barnard and Vos (1) are to be commended for providing South African Teacher Education with a compact and clear introductory summary of comparative education. This field, intended to open international vistas upon school systems, may seem minithink and a pedantic quibble to persons comfortable with narrow regional views. But to believers it is a much needed broadening which is obligatory to seekers of full intellectual visions. Professors Barnard and Vos have helped to bring about these increased insights. The precise scholarship provided is much enriched by a self-evident enthusiasm and commitment to the field investing their entire work.

Chapter one is especially lucid and valuable because it is a clear blueprint of the field's accumulated literary heritage. At the distance of South Africa the authors managed to accumulate an impressive list of sources and provided succinct and accurate summaries of each writer's contribution. The interest evinced by past writers of theory of comparisons seems well taken to avoid the multiple scholarly but also personal and political misrepresentations literally infesting all comparative fields. The introductory chapter alerts the reader to these dangers and hopefully commits him to seek the visions that will avoid the multiple distortions that lurk inside comparative research.

The two succeeding chapters though valuable are less in the mood of the first. The able cartography of the forces within the educational system, often dwelled upon by our predecessors, more properly belongs to the disciplined study within sociology, or politics, or anthropology of education. The authors touch upon very novel and intriguing components such as kinematic (demographic) or biotic (psychic and health) or even pistic (spiritual) factors investing the work of school systems beyond the more conventionally perceived factors. But treatment of all of these outside the framework used by social science scholars exposed past comparative educators to the charge of amateurism and reinforced the adverse image of scholarship from which workers within professional pedagogy have long suffered throughout the world's academic circles.

The fifth chapter on the authors' native country is most

valuable as an insiders' account. The level, measured reporting and the calm tone with which these matters, some of which inflammable, are treated commands admiration. There is only one reference to the possibly impending "unitory" (sic) school system (p 96) in a country in which the racially pluralistic school system evokes understandable curiosity and in which reporting on the schools for the Coloured, a product of race mixtures, does not explain the effect of the not mentioned laws against miscegenation. The authors show that in a great many countries tact and diplomacy is much needed to treat with the more explosive and sometimes prohibited issues. Perhaps the danger to distort true comparative vistas is lurking when the academics must prudently work within such constraints. But such reticence may seem superior to those unimpressed with unbridled and chaos-creating unrestricted freedom of expression.

The book ends with a very well staked out topographic account of four major educational systems. One wistfully regrets that schools of the Netherlands are not included. Some of the noble traditions extending to far flung regions of Indonesia or Surinam must or should evoke a good echo in South Africa. Other countries treated are very well presented. But perhaps a model of a third world agricultural country could be in addition to Holland also fruitfully included.

One wishes that chapter four which ably compiles the work of international organizations were placed as a last chapter to replace the vacuum created by lack of global comparison. In fact, the already mentioned chapters 2 and 3 could also be easily reworked to tell the readers at the end of the book that now that they have studied various areas they might aim higher at reaching for an emerging world school system as a synthesis from the study of several countries. Comparative education in the end aims to convert those whose good fortune is to guide the development of young minds into citizens of the world. Professors Barnard and Vos, few criticisms of treatment not withstanding, have made firm steps to lead their country towards such enhanced understanding.

Note

(1) AJ Vos & SS Barnard Comparative Education for Student Teachers, Durban: Butterworths, 1980.

ARTICLES

IDEOLOGY, LEGITIMATION OF THE STATUS QUO, AND HISTORY TEXTBOOKS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Linda Chisholm

South African history textbooks are goldmines for those interested in how the status quo is legitimated through ideology. They are useful in showing how dominant minority attitudes, finding expression in certain interpretations and phraseology, can be responsible for the creation of those attitudes which characterise, underpin and sustain the status quo. On the other hand, the discrepancy between a reality described by ideology and the reality experienced by its recipients, the pupils, has been exposed by recent events in South Africa, namely the Soweto uprisings and boycotts since 1976 which were a rejection of an education system steeped in racist (minority) attitudes. One of the most important parts of this curriculum is history teaching textbooks, since it is through history that the present distribution of power and wealth is justified and that acquiescence with this distribution is fostered.

In order to pinpoint the crucial role played by ideology in history teaching in South Africa it is necessary to see what precisely the ideology of apartheid entails. This will also involve a discussion of the notion of ideology, an investigation into a history textbook to see how its construction is thereby affected and a further look at the problem of objectivity in this context. Finally it will be necessary to work out alternative methods of teaching the same syllabus within the same conditions.

The notion of ideology owes much to Marx who used it in a

variety of contexts, the most important of which is that ideology ('the system of ideas and representation which dominate the mind of man or a social group') is the means by which the dominant class obscures or justifies the reality of class conflict. For Althusser, (2) who has significantly developed this conception, conflict is contained by the Repressive State Apparatuses (police courts, prisons, and army) and the Ideological State Apparatuses (religion, the family, law, politics, trade unions, media, culture and education). Education is the dominant ISA and is a crucial apparatus for facilitating and ensuring the reproduction of labour power. School is seen as an overwhelming determinant of social and individual character; as an agent of cultural reproduction. Ideology, in this conception, is all-embracing, finding expression in and through all the political, religious, legal and educational institutions of a society, penetrating into the very existence, the actions, which individuals perform as part of these institutions. The Ideological State Apparatus of education operates to minimise the need for Repressive State Apparatuses. "... The educational state apparatus... drums into them (school children)... a certain amount of know-how wrapped in the ruling ideology... somewhere around the age of 16, a huge mass of children are ejected 'into production': these are the workers and small peasants. Another portion of scholastically adapted youth carries on... Each mass ejected en route is practically provided with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfil in class society..." (3) Thus Paul Willis (4) speaks of 'learning to labour' and thus various South Africans have spoken of Bantu Education as 'education for barbarism' or 'education for servitude'. (5)

While this broad conception of ideology as something which constitutes thought processes and which reproduces social relations of production in the school is useful in providing a framework for understanding how attitudes are formed and ideology operates through educational practices and values embodied in these, it is nonetheless too restrictive to be wholly satisfactory. Resistance to such thought-creation in the actions of students and teachers (6) and the active development of alternative ideologies exposes its weakness as a comprehensive theory. In short, Althusser's theory, in its original expression, fails to come to grips with the contradictions within the educational ISA, capable of giving rise to resistance.

To locate this understanding within the South African education system, it is necessary to look at the specific components of the ideology of <u>apartheid</u> and how this relates to education generally. As indicated in the meaning of the word, <u>apartheid</u> ideology has intrinsic to it the notion of

separation. It is usual to understand this separation in purely racial terms, but it can also be said that apartheid is a class ideology designed first and foremost for control over the working people. Indeed, control over the working people through racial differentiation, and the ideological justification of it in terms of ethnic differences necessitating differential treatment, is the means whereby the dominant group preserves its power, privilege and prosperity. (7) Hence all institutions are governed by an ideology which implements racial segregation and subordination and which fosters racial prejudice and hostility.

What is taught in the classroom, ie practice, conforms closely to a directive published in 1946 by the articulators of the apartheid ideology. It conforms as closely to the particular needs of the South African economy for a small group of highly trained and skilled people to run the country's factories, government and schools and for a much larger number with limited skills, capable only of manual and semi-skilled work - with both accepting and not questioning the inequalities and injustices in the society which give rise to such an educational system. CNE and 'gutter education' are the institutional forms for ensuring the specific amounts of know-how attained by specific groups and also for ensuring that each is 'provided with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfil in class society'.

The abovementioned document was published by the Institute for Christian-National Education and laid down the basic principles which underlie the South African education system. For white children, schools are to be 'places where our children are soaked and nourished in the cultural, spiritual stuff of our nation. In this struggle we (the Afrikaners) will have nothing to do with a mixture of language, of culture, of religion, of race.' (8) In other words, the purity and survival of the race must be preserved by passing on the appropriate attitudes. The purpose of history, therefore, for white youth, is to obtain 'a clear vision of the nation's origin, its cultural inheritance, and of the content of the proper trend of inheritance.' (9) The inheritance that is taught in history is the western, white, religious inheritance. This is not the inheritance of the black child, for whom there exists a separate Department of Education and for whom history must be something very different. The African child must be equipped with only those skills which will 'enable him to meet the demands which the economic life of South Africa will impose on him.' (10) These demands are identified as 'manual labour.' (11) In order, then, to create a large docile, labour-force, with

minimal skills in literacy and numeracy, not only must the emphasis in white schools be on a training for leadership and superiority and in black schools upon manual work and docility but history must function as a pacifier for both.

The history that is, as a result, taught the African, Indian or Coloured denies his existence as it is a heroic tale of the rise of the Afrikaner; the heroism of black resistance to their conquest is hardly charted. The implications of this are two-fold. On the one hand, by denying blacks a history, it is intended to prevent the growth of a national/class consciousness and to reduce as much as possible any desire for a radical alternative. On the other hand, the kind of history which has as its purpose the glorification of the status quo and the denigration of reformist and revolutionary movements and their protagonists must of necessity invite reflection on its objectivity, the desirability thereof and the role of the teacher in teaching this kind of history.

In the first few pages it has been implied that if an ideology legitimating a certain set of economic, political and social relations is passed on through school history, then these will, of necessity, be biassed and propagandistic, the obverse of what is understood by 'objective history'. It will be necessary to see what is meant by a history textbook being objective if we are to understand the ideological content and shortcomings of the textbook to be analysed.

For a whole number of reasons historians have been found incapable of objectivity as understood in the natural and physical sciences. Historians' work is subjective in that the historian is always present in his work: he selects from his evidence those aspects which are important in terms of his frame of reference; the language he uses embodies his point of view and his arrangement of his 'data' in some interpretative whole is the product of his own personality, views, beliefs, philosophy. The question then arises as to whether there can ever be an objective rendering of the past if all that remains of it is evidence; if the historian's method cannot produce their replication and if the historian's work is going to be suffused with 'subjectivism'.

Walsh, while not providing all the answers, does open up new insights when he maintains that the question is not one of establishing some absolute 'truth' about an historical event. It must be recognised that no historian is free from prejudice, from the limitations of his time, and that there, therefore, can be no absolute truth; but this does not prohibit an historian from constructing an account or interpretation which 'really does justice to all the evidence recognised.' (12) Thus a criterion of intellectual integrity

in the use of evidence, a criterion of scholarship, is established. This is reinforced by Gordon Leff who maintains that 'The historian is subject to the same canons of reasoning and technical competence which apply to all intellectual disciplines. If he omits or distorts or makes a faulty implication his failure will be just as palpable as similar shortcomings in the exact sciences would be; and they will have a no less distorting or invalidating effect upon his work. The historian is as accountable to his evidence and the correct way of reasoning from it as the practitioners of any body of knowledge. (13)

However, one then comes to a position where one may have two equally scholarly historians using their evidence in intellectually honest ways, but the one is conservative, the other Marxist. How does one reconcile these two? Is one to accept them as equally 'objective'? Are both not ideological? Is it possible to differentiate between historians, to establish some works as better than others, if scholarship is to remain the only criterion? As Walsh says 'historians do constantly go further; and think it part of their proper job that they should do so; they do criticise each other's presuppositions, and attempt to evaluate different points of view. They are not content to stop with a plurality of different histories written from different points of view; they remain obstinately convinced that some views are sounder, nearer the truth, more illuminating, than others. And they believe they can learn from the interpretations of their fellow historians, profiting from their mistakes and incorporating in their own work what they find of value there.' (14) What the criteria for these are Walsh does not define, but Barrington Moore does provide one with an idea: 'In any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide about the way the society works. For all students of human societies sympathy with the victims of the historical processes and scepticism about the victors' claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology.' (15)

In other words we return to Marx's notion of ideology which is not the relativist notion usually attributed to him, namely that all thought, qua thought, is per se ideological. On the contrary, ideological thought is only thought which serves class interest through values which consecrate the status quo and denigrate praxis. (16) In the South African context, then, ideological thought is thought which obscures, justifies and legitimates the interests of the dominant class. It is thought which operates as a smoke screen over real conflict in South Africa; it is thought which treats the status quo as natural and God-given, in order to foist acceptance of inequality.

With these two considerations borne in mind, then, one can begin to isolate the elements which makes up the propaganda. An analysis of a South African history textbook on the basis of its recognition of all the evidence and on the basis of the arguments employed, in whose service they are, will indicate that its interpretation of South African history is not only an ideological creation designed to foster the interests of the ruling class in very specific ways, but also a travesty of what is known about the South African past. It is hoped, by using a standard of scholarship (checking language usage, omissions, simplifications, deliberate suppression of evidence, creation and use of stereotypes), and by bearing in mind the avowed intentions of the formulators of Christian National Education, that this textbook will emerge as a protean propagandistic device. It is also hoped that, through such an exposition, an alternative sounder interpretation will become clearer.

South African history textbooks are usually divided into two broad sections, the one covering general European history and the other covering South African history as it has been written and understood by Afrikaner historians. For this reason I will look at one texbtook for the Std 8 used in Coloured schools dealing with South African history. I will indicate how the ideology of white supremacy is maintained and perpetuated by looking at specific events in the light of what is omitted, at underrepresentations, misrepresentations, inaccuracies and the creation of stereotypes.

The texbtook embodies the standard interpretations of South African history. The first chapter deals with the arrival of Europeans at the Cape of Good Hope and the later British immigration and anglicization. This chapter also deals with slavery, the termination thereof and the first contacts of Bantu with European on the Eastern frontier. The second chapter, a very short chapter, deals with the Southward migration of the Southern Bantu during the 15th and 16th centuries; with the groups (tribes) that settled in Southern Africa and, very briefly, with possibly one of the most significant events in the history of the whole of Southern Africa, namely the process known as the Difaqane (meaning 'dispersal' or 'diaspora'). The third and longest chapter involves that event which has become one of the most important national legends in the history of South Africa: the dissatisfactions of that section of the European community living on the Eastern frontier with the emancipation of the slaves by the British and with their subsequent 'Great Trek' into and settlement of the interior. This chapter is presented as a struggle for existence against savage tribes and imperialist England on the part of the heroic Boers. Several points can be made about an

interpretation of this kind:

a) By beginning with the arrival of the Europeans, there is an implication that South African history begins in the seventeenth century with the arrival of Europeans; a typically Eurocentric approach which ignores the history of the peoples living in the area prior to the arrival of Europeans;

b) By omitting to mention the history of Southern Africa prior to the coming of Europeans, it is assumed that there was no-one in South Africa, and that, if there was, these people are insignificant in the making of South Africa;

c) Such a history, which concentrates almost exclusively on the role of the white man, as colonizer, settler and conqueror, can be seen as a history not of South Africa and all its peoples, but as a history of its present rulers. By presenting its own history as 'South African history', the Afrikaner historian is denying the very important and active role of the black man in the shaping of South African history; he is denying him a history by presenting to him a history in which he is portrayed as an enemy standing in the way of the fulfilment of the Boer destiny in South Africa.

d) Such an interpretation, which simplifies the complexity of all the processes, the conflict and interaction between precapitalist and capitalist modes of production, to a struggle for existence on the part of the white man, can and must be seen as an inadequate attempt to write a history of South Africa. It must also be seen as an attempt to reinforce an ideology of white supremacy and black inferiority; of a dominant and a subordinate class; of a past which proves this to be necessary and inviolable.

It is important to note that such an interpretation is based on several historical inaccuracies, omissions and misrepresentations. It assumes that the European right to the land is based on two factors: his being the first to settle it and his civilization proving superior to that of the black man. Thus:

> Southern Africa is not the original home of the Southern Bantu. They, like the whites, are also immigrants... It is not precisely known when the van of immigration reached South Africa, but there is considerable evidence to suggest that it occurred shortly before or during the fifteenth century... The

> first party of whites known to have contacted coastal Bantu were the survivors of the wreck of the Sao Joao in 1552, on the Pondoland coast. From Pondoland to Delagoa Bay, however, they saw very few and no sight of settlement. Only in 1770 did the vanguard of Xhosa immigration meet, with the whites at the Fish River. (p 82)

Not only is this exerpt attempting to justify present European domination of South Africa, but it is also suggesting that whites came to South Africa before the Africans from the North. This is false. It has been established that, long before the expansion of the Southern Bantu from the North, there were groups of people living and working in what is now South Africa. Archeological finds have revealed Stone Age implements which strongly suggest that there were groups in the interior as early as the ninth century AD, particularly in the vicinity of Phalaborwa. (17) The claim that a superior white civilization was necessary to bring an end to the 'murder and slaughter' (p 86) between Bantu tribes does two things. First, it implies that all activities of blacks were murderous and destructive; and, secondly, it misrepresents the Difaqane, a complex and central process of nation-building and economic sophistication in pre-capitalist Zulu society. The relationship between the Difaqane and the Great Trek is thus deliberately falsified to underplay the part played by black history in the formation of South Africa, to mask and obscure the real nature of South African society. Extensive investigation into the evidence surrounding the Difaqane has developed an interpretation which differs substantially from that of Nationalist State historians.

As a result of the greatly increased numbers, strength and sophistication of the Zulu empire in Natal in the early eighteenth century, it became necessary for Shaka, the king, to expand his area of occupation. For a number of reasons connected with this massive rise in the power of the Zulu empire, the space left for expansion had markedly diminished. To the South were the Europeans; to the North were the Portuguese with whom they had established an elaborate trading system and to the East lay the sea. The only way out was westwards, but here lived several other Bantu tribes whose land claims conflicted with Zulu needs. A war of conquest, begun by Shaka, leader of the Zulus who had developed the military tactics of his army to an astonishing extent, had tremendous effects. The tribe upon which he first fell, in turn fell upon another, and so a chain-like movement developed which led to great turmoil in South Africa for a number of years. Different tribes were displaced from ancestral homes and either forced to take refuge in secure,

mountainous areas or become threatened with extinction. These wars raged for several years at the end of which the interior was almost depopulated except for those mountainous areas where pockets of refugees had remained to be organised into powerful striking forces by leaders like Mosheshwe. The Difaqane has been described as both a destructive and a constructive process; a process in which traditional tribal links were severed, on the one hand, and in which, on the other, new powerful kingdoms were forged. (18)

Such an interpretation, links the Difaqane very definitely with changed economic and state patterns. It involves a careful analysis of African state formations. It sees it as central in the creation of the 'wide, open spaces' into which the Voortrekkers moved and central in the creation of modern capitalism; South Affican history is seen in terms of the interaction between two powerful economic systems in South Africa, a struggle for land and resources.

The textbook approach sees the Difaqane as a relatively minor incident, indicative only of the barbarism of the Africans and hence European necessity to subdue and 'civilize'. The origins and reasons for this diaspora are massively simplified to present a totally distorted picture, not of the reality that the evidence suggests, but of the relationships between events:

> Difaqane means forced migration through wars of extermination waged by the Bantu in the 1820s. These wars had their origins in Natal, and the man responsible was the Zulu king, Shaka. It was as if he had struck a great anvil and the sparks spurted westwards... they set South Africa on fire and sowed death and destruction.

Certainly a very vivid description, but it is made at the expense of the childrens' understanding of the complexity of the historical process and evidence and at the expense of the achievements of the Zulu empire. The Difaqane, essentially both a destructive and constructive process, is further seen as solely destructive:

> With his fearsome war machine he embarked on a decade of terror. First he destroyed most of the tribes east of the Drakensberg... from hunger and privation they were forced to cannibalism... After 1820 the waves of terror spilt over the Drakensberg... This wave of terror had hardly abated, when a new one followed. (p 85)

Not only is the Difaqane a primitive and meaningless

expression of black savagery, but it is the product of one man. Not only does such a presentation perpetuate stereotypes of Africans, but it also misrepresents, yet again, the complexity of the historical process. The results of the Difaqane are described as follows:

> The Difaqane left the interior of South Africa devastated and empty. Natal... was most depopulated. West of the mountains the tribes in the North had been exterminated or driven away... Here and there remnants of the original tribes sheltered in inaccessible hiding places. Into this comparatively empty region the Voortrekkers moved, helping to bring to an end the murder and slaughter of the Difaqane, and offering some remnants of the Bantu peoples the opportunity of restoration and development. (p 86)

A fitting ending, the saviours of mankind arriving to save the black from himself and ushering in an era of prosperity and renewal! Although the destruction so heavily emphasised is perfectly true the ommission of the more positive aspects of the Difaqane - it being the result of greater sophistication in state formation; it leading to the creation of new, powerful kingdoms - are hardly mentioned. This makes for a misleading impression of what the evidence suggests. The impression that is left with the school child is that of the insignificance and barbarity of the African in South African history. By emphasising white destiny, resource and power; by underplaying black achievement, economic development and state formation, by negating the reality of a society based on conflict, stereotypical images of black and white are developed. These have implications for the way in which the white child sees himself; for the very way in which the white child perceives his role in society and for the way in which the black child sees himself and his role. Finally, it has implications for the way in which each perceive each other.

Another issue dealt with in this texbtook which serves to identify twentieth century roles for blacks and whites in the labour process, is that of slavery. Here I will simply quote from the textbook at some length

> British action against slavery was directed mainly against slave labour on the plantations of the West Indies... Foreign visitors had always commented very favourably on the treatment of the slaves at the Cape, and the differences between these conditions of slavery and those of the West Indies where grim cruelties were practiced, were not taken into consideration. Legislation directed at the West

Indies was indiscriminately applied to the Cape. (My underlining; p 68)

The attempt by the British to emancipate slaves was seen by the Boers, and is still so described in the textbook, as unjust interference in the affairs of the colonists. The argument, which is still used to justify apartheid and relationships between employer and employee, is that South Africa was unique (see above quotation), that this was the natural relationship between black and white, and that interference in this relationship of master and slave exacerbated race relations and strained the good feeling that existed between the two groups. The black is presented as the happy slave; the white as the benevolent paternalist, protector of the innocent and uncivilized:

> The philanthropic fanaticism which prompted this legislation (curtailing rights of slave owners) deepened the estrangement of the colonists with the British government and an unsympathetic relationship was created between owner and slave. (p 68)

Emancipation is presented as an unsympathetic blow by the British governor against the legitimate property of slave owners. This aspect, that of the 'impoverishment' of the slave owners is always emphasised:

> Emancipation meant a heavy financial loss to the Cape Colony... The majority of the slave owners were obliged, in desperation, to sell their claims to speculators. The result was that they received at the most a fifth, and in the majority of cases, much less than this of the value of their slaves...
>
> These miseries were increased by the manner in which the philanthropists exercised control over the subsequent apprenticeship period. Moreover, all freed slaves now enjoyed the same privileges as the Hottentots under Ordinance 50. The result was a significant increase in vagrancy. However much one abhors the concept of human slavery, one must bear in mind that this system made a substantial contribution to the economic prosperity of the Cape... The abolition of slavery did not ultimately harm the economic life of the Cape Colony. In practice, the vast majority of freed slaves settled down as servants working for a wage, often in the employ of their former owners. (p 69)

This section makes an interesting comment on the development

of capitalist relations of production and wage labour, although it is not seen as such. It is interesting to note that historical truth, here, is what was truth for the colonists. No mention is made of slave experiences, of the content of 'increased vagrancy', of labour laws controlling movement/'vagrancy'. Always the slave, the black is seen as subsidiary to the white, never in relationship to him. He is a shadow creature whose truth is the truth of the employer, whose existence has been created, as it is created, by the white.

For a teacher working with textbooks of this kind, textbooks which not only abound in inaccuracies and unjustifiable simplifications, but also develop an interpretation of history designed to have a distinct effect on the pupils self-perceptions and perceptions of history as either a heroic saga (in the case of white pupils) or as lies and just another technique of control (in the case of black pupils) there are several problems. These relate to questions of how to counteract the syllabus within the confines set. One can label these confines as those external to the teacher's control, and those over which she has a moderate degree of control.

The first problem, one which lies outside the control of the teacher, and the one to which many of the others are related, is that of an exam which is based on the textbook. The exam demands that a certain amount of work be covered by a certain date. The amount of work that has to be covered usually precludes any extra time for an additional or alternative approach to be taken. To a certain extent the existence of an examination which depends on the textbook dictates the teaching methods that have to be used, namely talk and chalk or note-taking by passive pupils. For the teacher who feels she has a 'duty' to help the pupils pass the exam, it seems hardly possible to present them with an alternative approach using alternative methods when an alternative approach would necessitate the choosing of different 'facts', different constellations of facts, to be internalized for the examination. There is the question of time, but there is also an additional one which needs mention even if it does not fall strictly within the scope of teaching practice. In South Africa the teacher's conformity with the official interpretation is demanded, and therefore any attempt at making certain evidence available to the pupils in exciting ways challenging thought, is extremely limited.

The second problem, and one over which the teacher has a limited degree of control, is that of objectivity. Given the fact that the textbook is often not only erroneous but distorts whole sections of history, it is the task of the

teacher to attempt to help the pupils discover these on their own. Thus, although not in a position to provide them with an alternative interpretation, she is in a position to teach them the conceptual tools which they need for such detection. In this sense, history is doubly a detective game. Handing down one set of facts within a certain interpretative framework, which is the general practice in such situations, is hardly likely to teach the pupils anything, least of all an understanding and liking of history. It is not enough for the teacher to replace one biassed simplified picture of the past with another which, of necessity, has to be so. Both approaches, bowing to the dictates of the exam and the state are a long way from helping the pupils to develop historical skills and critical thought which include the ability to recognise bias and propaganda, to question evidence and to understand how history is constructed, how there can be variety of interpretations and how to distinguish between them.

But how does one teach pupils to recognise bias, to be sceptical of what they are reading, not to take the written word of the textbook as God-given? The latter problem is one which exists in any history teaching situation, but one which is perhaps exacerbated within the one described, since it is this which defines the pupils' historical self-concept.

One of the principal ways of teaching pupils to recognise bias is to develop in them a perenially sceptical and critical attitude towards everything that is presented to them. In so doing one would be training them not in historical attributes alone, but one would also be equipping them with the necessary skills to differentiate between intellectually honest and dishonest work. One can encourage this through, for example, work with evidence. One can present the class with documents relating to a certain historical event and, through an analysis of the documents come to individual 'reconstructions'. In this process of document-analysis, crucial questions will be asked, and it is this type of questioning that the teacher can foster and encourage. For example, questions relating to the person/s who wrote the document, their expressed and unexpressed motives for doing whatever they were doing, overt and covert factors influencing their mode of expression, their interest as related to their socio-economic position in society, etc. Thus pupils can be taught to learn from the written word, or rather from the absences between the written words, what actual intentions were. I am not suggesting that one can, by document-analysis alone reach such conclusions; it is merely the mode of questioning which can be taught to produce unlooked-for, and not immediately obvious, results. A mode of questioning must, in turn, be based on an understanding of

educational content as contradictory, designed to legitimate an unequal distribution of wealth and power and to foster acceptance of the status quo.

Having constructed their own individual accounts and hereby seeing how each one differs, and discussing the reasons for this, one can then provide the pupils with two conflicting, standard accounts of that same event. Again reasons may be attempted to be found for the differences between the two accounts, language can be analysed to see its effect, and so on. It is clear that in such work the teacher works in accordance with Barrington Moore's dictum that 'in any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide'.

The teacher can also use the textbook for the same purpose of developing a certain form of questioning. She could let each child choose a page, or a paragraph, and get each one to ask as many questions as possible of the text. This can be done in other ways as well. Advertising, for example, although seemingly employing different methods from the historian, is susceptible to the same process of analysis and questioning. It can be extremely useful in showing the pupil, in fairly obvious and stark terms, how and with what techniques, material can be distorted to present a certain image to reach a certain market and the effects of this. In this way, by trying to develop in pupils a critical attitude towards sources and to what they are read and told, a teacher can make her task that much easier, for then it will no longer be necessary to point out fallacies and dubious statements in the textbooks as she goes along: spontaneous criticisms and questioning should become the order of the day.

It can be argued that developing this kind of critical attitude and using these methods is not being strictly historical in that the skills that are being taught are not those that the historian uses. I would argue that it is precisely a generally critical stance which is the hallmark of the good historian.

For teachers in white schools, then, the task is to begin not only to challenge the structures of control which entraps them personally (such as exams), but also to make children in South Africa aware of the comfortable myths and prejudices which they carry away with them from their history textbooks. Here the task would be extremely difficult, as the teacher would not only be trying to get the children to see how differing interpretations are produced from the same evidence and how abuse of such evidence can lead to badly distorted accounts. She would also be trying to get the children to

confront their own prejudices and to understand how they have been formed. In this way the pupils can be brought to see history as constructed in their textbooks as the product of the hands of specific people, not necessarily related to available evidence or varying ideas and opinions about them. In trying to give them a sense of history which is not biassed and propagandistic, the best thing to do, as already mentioned, is to provide them with the conceptual tools with which to recognise interests and motives, with which to analyse secondary material and with which to question all sources, primary or secondary. In this way history can become a powerful tool in the hands of the pupils as well as of the teacher. The techniques and skills taught through history, as legitimate practice, can be skills used more widely and to the greater benefit and advantage of all in South Africa.

Notes

(1) The author wishes to note that this paper was written in 1978, and thus still contains some crudely developed ideas on ideology and education. However, the importance of alerting teachers to the possibilities of using educational material to foster a critical consciousness in pupils remains crucial - it is hoped this paper can make a contribution in this field.

(2) Louis Althusser, "Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, New Left Books, 1972.

(3) Ibid, p 147.

(4) Paul Willis, Learning to Labour, London, 1978.

(5) For eg, IB Tabata, Education for Barbarism in South Africa, London, 1960.

(6) As demonstrated annually by South African students subjected to "gutter education".

(7) Johnstone, "Power Privilege and Prosperity in South Africa", unpublished paper, Institute of Commonwealth studies, London University.

(8) Christian National Education Directive, published in Edcom, UCT, 1976.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Verwoerd, Hansard, 7 June 1954.

(11) Verwoerd, Driver Paper, 1962, p 15.

(12) Walsh WH, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, p 113.

(13) Gordon Leff, Historical Knowing, London, 1976

(14) Walsh, op cit, p 113.

(15) Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin.

(16) See Joe McCarney, The Red World of Ideology, Harvester Press, 1980, for the most recent scholarly study on ideology.

(17) See the first 4 chapters of the Oxford History of South Africa, Vol 1, edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson

(18) D Owen-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Allport, Gordon W: The Nature of Prejudice, (Anchor Edition, New York, 1958.

2. Althusser, Louis: Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays (New Left Review Editions, London, 1971).

3. Auerbach, FE The Power of Prejudice in South African Education, (Cape Town, Balkema Editions, 1965).

4. Becker, Carl: 'What are Historical Facts?' in Meyerhoff (ed): The Philosophy of History in our Time (Anchor, 1959).

5. Carr EH: What is History? (MacMillan, 1961).

6. Draw, William H: Philosophy of History (Prentice-Hall, 1964).

7. Education beyond Apartheid: Report of the Sprocas Education Commission (SPROCAS, Johannesburg, 1971).

8. Garnet, McDiarmid and Pratt: Teaching Prejudice: A Content analysis of Social Studies Textbooks Authorized for Use in Ontario (Ontario, 1971).

9. Goldstein, Leon J: Historical Knowing (University of Texas Press, London and Austin, 1976).

10. Horrell M: Bantu Education to 1968 (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1968)

11. Leff, Gordon: History and Social Theory (Merlin Press, London, 1969).

12. MacCrone, ID: Race Attitudes in South Africa (OUP, 1952).

13. Marree, Lynn: Bantu Education, MA Dissertation, Goldsmiths 1976.

14. Joe McCarney: The Real World of Ideology, Harvester Press, 1980.

15. Marquard, L: The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (OUP, 1952).

16. Marx: The German Ideology.

17. Miliband, R: Politics and Society, (London, 1977).

18. Omer-Cooper, J: The Zulu Aftermath, (Longman, 1966).

19. Passmore, JA: 'The Objectivity of History' in Dray (ed) Philosophical Analysis of History (Harper & Row, New York, 1966).

20. Tabata, IB: Education for Barbarism (Prometheus Printers, Durban, 19

21. Troup, F: Forbidden Pastures: Education Under Apartheid (International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1976).

22. Walsh, WH: An Introduction to the Philosophy of History.

23. Williams, R: The Long Revolution (Chatto and Windus, London, 1961).

24. Wilson and Thompson (eds) Oxford History of South Africa (Vol I) (Oxford University Press, 1969).

25. Working Papers in Cultural Studies 10: Ideology (Birmingham, 1977).

26. Young and Whitty: Society, State and Schooling (Falmer Press, London, 1977).

EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMY: A CRITIQUE OF S BOWLES & H GINTIS'S *SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA*

Tony Fluxman

Schooling in Capitalist America is a work of major importance in the field of education. A large part of the book contains a well-documented and comprehensive critique of established American perspectives on education. However the authors are not content to demonstrate the inadequacy of accepted theories of education, but also attempt to provide an alternative theory on the role of education in capitalist societies, basing their alternative on their own particular version of Marxism. While there is no doubt that their work constitutes a significant advance in the sociology and political economy of education, the alternative theory they develop is problematic. The result is that they fail to provide a theory which is capable of explaining the complex operations of education in capitalist society.

The book is divided into four main parts: part one contains a discussion of the failure of educational reform in the US to alter, in any meaningful way, both socio-economic inequalities in general and inequalities in the education system per se. The section ends with the suggestion that the causes for the persistent failure of reform lie in the constraints that the capitalist economy imposes on the educational system. In part two, the authors investigate the functions that educational institutions perform in relation to the needs of capitalist production, the central idea being that the social relations of education correspond to the social relations of the work situation, thus facilitating the integration of students (future workers) into the hierarchical social division of labour. Part three contains a history of struggles both in education and the economy from the early 19th century to the present day; the effect of each phase of struggle was to make education conform to the needs of the capitalist economy. Part four contains an assessment of the possibilities for radical change in the US educational system in relation to the overall task of building a socialist America.

My critique concentrates on part two in which Bowles and Gintis develop their notion of the structural correspondence between the educational and economic systems and on part three, especially the final chapter entitled "Capital Accumulation, Class Conflict and Educational Change", in

which the authors draw theoretical implications from their historical analyses about the nature of the interaction between the two systems. It is here that the major theoretical assumptions underlying the whole book are presented.

Much of part two is concerned with criticizing the belief that the skills individuals learn at school are likely to determine their future positions in the economy, in terms of opportunities, income, status, etc. On this view, individuals who are most educated tend to fill places at the top of the economic hierarchy, those with less education, intermediate positions and so on down to the least educated who fill the lowest places in the hierarchy. By means of a wide range of statistical studies, Bowles and Gintis argue that individuals' educational skills and cognitive abilities have only a tenuous connection with the socio-economic positions they attain. Not only do cognitive abilities have little to do with a person's economic success, but the development of cognitive abilities is not even the main purpose of the educational system in capitalist societies. Instead, the educational system's major function is to instill in individuals forms of behaviour that are functional to the capitalist economy's hierarchical division of labour. Thus the authors devote considerable space towards showing that the kinds of personality traits developed in educational institutions parallel those which the capitalist economy requires for its continued reproduction. As such, a major function of schools is to develop personality dispositions like submission to authority, internalized control, etc., as well as "modes of self-preservation, self-image, aspirations and class identifications", - in short, characteristics "consonant with participation in the labor force" at whatever level. (1)

If individuals' positions in the economy are not determined by their particular cognitive abilities and skills, then what is the point of the elaborate system of testing and grading in schools? The authors argue that the major purpose of grading according to merit is an ideological one, namely that of legitimating the unequal positions that individuals occupy in the economy. It does this by fostering the belief (which they have just shown to be false) that an individual's success really does depend on his skills and cognitive abilities:

> The educational system legitimates economic inequality by providing an open, objective, and ostensibly meritocratic mechanism for assigning individuals to unequal economic positions. The

> educational system fosters and reinforces the belief that economic success depends essentially on the possession of technical and cognitive skills - skills which it is organised to provide in an efficient, equitable manner on the basis of meritocratic principle. (2)

Bowles and Gintis make the interesting remark that in the US, meritocratic ideology, by instilling in individuals the notion that success in economic life bears a relation to their own objectively tested merit, has made other forms of legitimating class inequality, for example, in terms of racial or sexual characteristics, archaic. (3) Even if the economy and society in general still function, in real terms, on the basis of race and sex (not to speak of class), the ideology of merit makes this appear not to be the case.

For Bowles and Gintis, then, educational practices have two main functions: (a) they contribute towards the production of personality traits and behavioural characteristics (in short, forms of consciousness) required by capitalist production and (b) by virtue of the meritocratic ideology they perpetuate, educational institutions legitimate the inequalities in production and in society in general.

The authors attempt to provide an explanation for how educational institutions manage to produce forms of consciousness suitable to capitalist production. The answer, they give, is that the social relations of education correspond to social relations in the economy. The structure of social relationships in education parallels the structure of social relationships in the economic sphere and it is because pupils become accustomed to social hierarchies, lack control over their education in terms of curricula, and participate in competitive and destructive learning processes, that by the time they leave school they are attuned to the hierarchization, fragmentation and alienation that is customary in capitalist production. (4) It is this "correspondence between school and class structure" which makes intelligible the functioning of education with respect to the capitalist economy. Nevertheless the authors do not merely assume that educational institutions always correspond to the economy. They show how this correspondence was continually produced by struggles emerging out of transformations in the American economy of various phases in its history.

> ... the organisation of education - in particular the correspondence between school structure and job structure - has taken distinct and characteristic forms in different periods of US

> history, and has evolved in response to political and economic struggles associated with the process of capital accumulation, the extension of the wage-labor system, and the transition from an entrepreneurial to a corporate economy. (5)
>
> ...we have been able to show more than a correspondence between the social relations of production and the social relations of education at a particular moment: we have shown that change and the structure of education are associated historically with changes in the social organisation of production. The fact that changes in the structure of production have preceded parallel changes in schooling establishes a strong prima facie case for the causal importance of economic structure as a major determinant of educational structure. (my emphasis, TF) (6)

It is apparent that Bowles and Gintis are asserting the following:

(i) there is a correspondence between the social structures of education and the economy in terms of the nature of authority and power relations in both systems, which they refer to as the "correspondence principle";

(ii) the basis of this correspondence lies in the economy's causal role in producing a social structure in education which corresponds to its own solid structure.

Bowles and Gintis's position, therefore, seems to be that developments in education are caused by developments in the economy. It is these two central claims, concerning the relationship between the economy and education, that will be the focus of attention in the following pages.

2 This article does not intend to assess the validity of the statistical methods that Bowles and Gintis use in the preparation of their results; neither does it assess how valid an interpretation of US economic and educational history the authors have produced. Instead its aim is to examine the theoretical status of the general claims that are made about the interaction of economic and educational institutions.

In their historical account, the authors attribute a fundamental structural change in the social relations of

education to the introduction of Taylorism into the economy. * After the introduction of scientific management, and after centralized decision-making in the labour-process had replaced control of the labour process on the part of skilled workers, centralized bureaucratic control came to dominate the sphere of education, replacing local teacher and community control:

> The concentration of decision-making power in the hands of administrators and the quest for economic rationalisation had the same disastrous consequences for teachers that bureaucracy and rationalisation of production had on most other workers. In the interests of scientific management, control of curriculum, evaluation, counselling, selection of texts and methods of teaching were placed in the hands of experts. A host of specialists arose to deal with minute fragments of the teaching job. The tasks of thinking, making decisions, and understanding the goals of education were placed in the hands of high-level administrators. Ostensibly to facilitate administrative efficiency, schools became larger and more impersonal. The possibility of intimate or complicated classroom relationships gave way to the social relations of the production line. (7)

However, Taylorism is not limited to the factory and school, since its effects are felt in the commercial sector, the service professions like medicine and even the family.(8) This lead Bowles and Gintis to adopt the view that the structure of production should be taken as the model for the other sphere of the economy - exchange and distribution - as well as for the various apparatuses operating to reproduce society as a whole.

The idea that production is the model for all other social institutions is highly dubious. While it is undoubtedly true that rationalization, hierarchization and fragmentation of skills and jobs, in both economic and non-economic sectors of social life, have increased substantially in the last century, this claim on its own is so general that it has the effect of obscuring the different functions and modes of operation of different solid institutions. In fact, the relations of power and authority differ widely from

---

* (Taylorism involved, amongst other things, the scientific organisation of production, concentration of knowledge in the hands of management, and the simplification of tasks in the labour process. See S Bowles and H Gintis, op.cit., p 185)

institution to institution: the social cohesion of the family is maintained by the following kinds of things: love, respect, physical strength, guilt, legally sanctioned authority; that of the school via different forms of humiliation, different kinds of punishments, rewards and legal sanctions; that of the firm, by manipulation, duty, humiliation, respect, and above all by the economic compulsion to work. The assertion of a simple correspondence between production and other spheres of social life in terms of social structure is therefore highly simplistic. Hence the ability of the educational system and, indeed, other reproductive systems to produce forms of consciousness functional to capitalist production cannot be accounted for only by reference to structural features that they possess in common with production. In order to be able to provide an explanation of the functioning of these different kinds of institutions, a theoretical account of the specificity of power relations in each has to be produced.

According to Bowles and Gintis the "correspondence principle" entails a "correspondence between the social relations of production and the social relations of education." (9) The problem is that the authors fail to notice an ambiguity in their usage of the notion, "the social relations of production." "Social relations of production" usually refer to relationships of ownership and control of the means of production which determines who appropriates the product produced by the process of production. The types of ownership will differ according to whether the process of production is capitalist feudal, primitive, communist, etc. Capitalist society is defined primarily by the fact that one class, the class of capitalists, owns and controls the means of production, while the other major class, the working class, is excluded from ownership of the means of production, owning only its labour power which is sold to the capitalist class in return for wages.

"Social relations of production" can also refer to a different set of relationships in the sphere of production, that is, the relationships between the various participants in the labour process - workers, supervisors and managers. "Social relations of production", in this sense, concern the relations of power and authority in the labour process and are conceptually distinct from the solid relations that characterise the ownership and control of the means of production. Instead, they belong to the description of the forces of production.

The specific combination of the elements used in a production process is called a force of production. In more technical terms, a force of production denotes a specific

form of organisation of means of production (raw materials, machines, etc.) and labour power. (10) Thus Marx, in Capital, distinguishes between two basic forms of organisation of the capitalist labour process, the manufacturing share of capitalism, in which the labour process was organised on the basis of the pre-existing skills that the labourers brought to the factory, and the phase of modern industry, in which labourers were incorporated into a pre-existing scientifically organised labour process, which required the development of specific skills demanded by the logic of the production process itself. (11) (It is the replacement of manufacture by industry which provides the major impetus for the bureaucratization, hierarchization and fragmentation of the labour process characteristic of Taylorism). All forms of organisation of the labour process imply particular relationships between the participants. In class societies, the solid portions of the work-place take the form of relations of domination and control.

It is clear that in Schooling in Capitalist America, the focus is on relations of control in the labour-process and that the "correspondence principle" entails a correspondence between the social relations in education and the social relations in the labour-process. The role of education is conceived of as producing forms of consciousness suitable to the reproduction of capitalist forces of production. However, the definition of capitalist production includes capitalist relations as well as forces of production. If capitalist production is understood as a combination of capitalist forces and relations of production dominated in general by the latter - this combination is customarily referred to as the capitalist mode of production (12) - then the reproduction of the conditions necessary for capitalist production to continually take place must include the reproduction of both capitalist relations and forces. Moreover, the reproduction of the forces of production is directly affected by the reproduction of the relations of production. It is not merely the reproduction of means of production and the social relations in the work place that explains why the labour process continues to function. The reproduction of the relations of production is perhaps more important since it is the fact that workers are excluded from ownership and control of the means of production (and, therefore, the means of subsistence) that explains why workers are continually prepared to subject themselves to forms of domination in the labour process itself.

Concentrating on the relations of production enables us to specify the different power relations operative in production, on the one hand, and education, on the other. For example, school children are not forced to go to school

by dint of economic necessity but go because they are legally and socially compelled to go. On the other hand, the workers' economic dependence on the capitalist class is complemented by the power they can assert in relation to the capitalist class because of the dependence of the latter on the working class for the production of surplus-value. Teachers are not similarly dependent on pupils. An analysis of the specificity of power relations in various social structures will therefore reveal different structural conditions which determine the forms of social conflict likely to emerge within them. Much more detailed analysis needs to be done to determine the specificity of power relations in both the sphere of the economy and in the sphere of reproduction: education, the State, the family, the church, the prison, mental institutions, etc. (13)

For a start, an examination of what each apparatus produces may provide important insights into the forms of struggle possible within each. For example, capitalist production produces commodities, while educational institutions produce knowledge "wrapped up" in the ruling ideology. (14) The fact that all educational institutions are engaged at least partially in the production of knowledge and, more importantly, are to some degree legitimated on this basis, constantly creates the possibilty of students becoming aware of the contradiction between what they are supposed to learn and what they actually learn. Bowles and Gintis, because of their tendency to see all social structures in terms of the model of the forces of production, are prevented from developing an understanding of education along these lines.

The focus on capitalist relations enables us to see a further point. The reproduction of capitalist relations entails the reproduction of forms of consciousness which are not necessarily synonymous with the forms of consciousness required by the labour-process. This is because social relations in the labour-process do not correspond to the social relations of production. As PQ Hirst puts it:

> ...the division of the labour force into categories and into the relations of production do not correspond in capitalism. Classes and divisions of the labour force into functional groups are not the same thing. Capitalist production creates the conditions of the following economic classes: wage-labourers, capitals (industrial, commercial, interest-bearing and landed), petit-bourgeoisie (independent producers, small capitals, etc.) These classes do not correspond to the divisions of the labour force: managerial, manual/non-manual, skilled/unskilled, etc. These latter may all be

> properly wage-labourers who do not own the means of production. (15)

Of course, economic classes, such as those listed here, are never defined purely economically, since they are always overdetermined, in any concrete social formation by non-economic variables. In a previous article I wrote:

> Neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat are classes defined purely economically, that is, in terms of the abstract conceptualisation of the capitalist mode of production. Both these classes and other classes, like the new petit-bourgeoisie, are defined, as well, by the various political and ideological practices the social agents that compose them are inserted into. Hence the working class and the bourgeoisie always operate in terms of particular ideologies (nationalism, liberalism, social democracy, Marxism-Leninism, Christianity, etc.) ... There are also other social groupings that are defined only in terms of political and ideological criteria, one example being the group of individuals who fill the places in the state bureaucracy, another being that of the 'intellectuals defined by their role in elaborating and deploying ideology.' (16)

Thus the reproduction of economic classes will include the reproduction of ideologies which reproduce the complex class structure of capitalist society. These will include ideologies of a distinctly political type, such as racism, nationalism, sexism as well as ideologies whose referent is economic practice - the ideologies of 'free enterprise', private property and the ideology of the free and equal contract entered into between worker and capitalist. Central to the reproduction of capitalist society is the reproduction of economic ideologies: it is the fact that the exchange between worker and capitalist is considered a free and equal one that legitimates the system of wage labour and capitalist exploitation and by implication the necessity of labour subjecting itself to the forms of coercion in the labour-process. It is therefore clear that ideologies which contribute to the reproduction of the class structure will be different from those ideologies that are conditions of existence for capitalist <u>forces of production</u>. The latter, as we have seen, involve the ideology of merit, ideologies of race and sex, as well as ideologies of 'expertise', 'technical necessity', the superiority of mental over manual work. Though there is an overlap between ideologies which support the continued existence of <u>relations of production</u>

and those that support the continued existence of the forces of production - for example, racism and sexism - in general their ideological conditions of existence differ greatly.

While Bowles and Gintis have provided valuable insights into the role of education with regard to the reproduction of capitalist forces of production, particularly their understanding of the legitimating role of meritocratic ideology, their theory of education is both simplistic and incomplete. It is simplistic because it explains the functioning of education in capitalist society primarily by the correspondence between the social structure of education and that of the labour process. This "correspondence principle", we saw, does not hold up to much scrutiny. We observed that, even if there are parallels between the labour process and education in terms of the hierarchy, fragmentation and bureaucracy in each, there are also sharp differences between the types of power and authority relations possible in each structure. We suggested that the structural characteristics peculiar to educational systems are more crucial for understanding their behaviour than the structural features they might have in common with production.

The theory is also incomplete; because it fails to consider the role of education in relation to the reproduction of the relations of production. This lacuna, we have seen, stems from the profoundly inadequate theory of the economy the authors have presented, in which the complex nature of production as the combination of two structures, forces and relations, dominated in general by the latter, is basically overlooked. (17) In our view, the school also contributes towards the reproduction of the relations of production, through its contribution to the reproduction of the class structure of the whole. Nationalism, racism, sexism, etc., are as prevalent in the schools as in any other institution. Nevertheless, the school is not the only apparatus producing the dominant ideologies; there are a host of other apparatuses which contribute to the production of the dominant ideologies - the communications apparatuses, the churches, the parliamentary system, the judiciary and the family. Moreover, it seems likely that the school has a less important role in the production of the specifically economic ideologies - the communications media, the parliamentary system, and the judiciary playing a more fundamental role in this regard. However, given as L Althusser puts it, "no other ideological State apparatus has the obligatory (and not least, free) audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist social formation, eight hours a day for five or six days out of seven", educational institutions still play a large part in reproducing the relations as well as the forces of production.

I now wish to turn to an examination of the second major claim of Bowles and Gintis, ie that developments in education are caused fundamentally by the economy. However, no consistent position is to be found on the extent of the economic determination of education. On the one hand, it is argued that the two systems possess fairly distinct and independent internal dynamics of reproduction and development:

> ...the independent internal dynamics of the two systems prevent the ever-present possibility of a significant mismatch arising between economy and education. We have seen in the previous three chapters that the educational system acquires its economic importance and contributes to the reproduction of the class structure through a correspondence of its social relationships with the social relations of economic life. Yet the historical dynamic of the capitalist economy involves continued change in the social relations of production and transformation of the class structure. Thus, the relatively static educational system periodically falls out of correspondence with the social relations of production and becomes a force antithetical to capitalist development. (19)

And in the last pages of the book, when assessing the role socialist educational reform might have on transforming the economy in a progressive direction, they argue that the struggle to democratize the schools "should be viewed as part of an effort to undermine the correspondence between the social relations of education and the social relations of production in capitalist economic life," (20) thus suggesting that the schools could break free of the constraints of capitalist production. On the other hand, this seems inconsistent with the arguments quoted above, namely that, education evolves in response to economic changes and that "economic structure is a major determinant of educational structure." (21) Moreover the "correspondence principle", so central to the book's major argument, would seem to suggest that the spheres of reproduction, the educational system and the family, for example, retain very little autonomy, if any, from the economy.

It is only when one analyses the specific mechanisms, that the book discusses, by means of which the educational system is continually adjusted to the economy, that a fairly consistent position can be discerned. According to Bowles and Gintis, there are two ways in which the educational system adjusts to new economic conditions. Firstly, in non-crisis periods, adjustment is the result of decisions by

"millions of individuals" - parents. school committee members and others - whose individual actions combine to produce the overall effect of transforming the educational institutions so that they conform to the needs of the changing capitalist economy:

> Parents desirous of a secure economic future for their children often support moves towards a more 'vocationally relevant education'. The several government inputs into the educational decision-making process seek to tailor education to the personal needs of their various political constituencies. These elements of pluralist education provide a strong latent force for re-establishing a 'natural' correspondence between the social relations of education and production. (22)

On the other hand, during periods of intensified social conflict, "the school system appears less as a cipher impartially recording and tallying the choices of millions of independent actors and more as an arena for struggle among major social groups." (23) It is at these points in history that the force of class interest becomes dominant. At each of these crisis points, the capitalist class, through its power in the state, and its extensive control over finances for education, has been successful in orientating education towards satisfying its own needs. It is also at these points in time that opposition to capital's moves has been most actively expressed. Thus foreign workers, the labour movement and students, have each opposed the extensions of the new capitalist structures into education, in some cases substantially altering the educational models proposed by members of the capitalist class. (24)

There are fundamental problems in the account of how education adjusts to the economy. In the first place, if one employs a Marxist theory of social change, it is not possible to argue that classes and class struggle enter the historical stage only at specific points in history, and that in the remaining periods class struggle disappears, leaving history to be the outcome of a multiplicity of individual actions. As GS Jones has argued:

> Contradiction is not episodically, but continually present; the antagonism between the producers of the surplus and the owners and controllers of the means of production extracting the surplus, is a structural and permanent feature. Thus class conflict is a permanent feature, not a sign of breakdown... (25)

At the very least, then, Bowles and Gintis, in order to be consistent, would have to revise their accounts of the struggles over education so that all periods in the history of US education could be understood in terms of class struggle, periods in which minor changes occur being just as much expressions of class struggle as periods in which major changes are produced. In such an analysis, periods of crisis would represent phases of class struggle when the contradictions in capitalist society had become sharpened.

Secondly, even when changes in education are seen as the products of class struggle, the model of class conflict proposed is basically a simple one, that is, a struggle between capital and labour originating in production and expressing itself in the spheres of reproduction. Despite the fact that social forces beside capital and labour- students, farmers and immigrant workers - play a role in the historical process - Bowles and Gintis tend to see education as an arena of struggle between capital and labour only:

> The major actors with independent power in the educational arena were, and continue to be, labor and capital. We conclude that the structure and scope of the modern US educational system cannot be explained without reference to both the demands of working people - for literacy, for the possibility of greater occupational mobility, for financial security, for personal growth, for social respect - and to the imperatives of the capitalist class to construct an institution which would both enhance the labor power of working people and help reproduce the conditions for its exploitation. (26)

We noted earlier, that in the analysis of concrete social formations, the use of purely economic definitions is highly inadequate. Class struggle is always overdetermined by ideological and political factors, even at the level of the economy. Secondly, capital and labour are not homogeneous entities, since they are composed of various fractions - the labour aristocracy, commercial capital, finance capital, etc. Furthermore there are other social ensembles besides capital and labour which have pertinent effects on class struggles in capitalist social formations - the petit-bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and the bureaucracy. The outcome of any historical situation must therefore be analysed in terms of the combined effects of all the diverse classes, fractions, strata, categories (27) in operation in a specific capitalist social formation.

4 A theory which relies on the simple model of class struggle between capital and labour cannot be employed to analyse the complexities of class struggle in concrete social formations. With regard to education and the sphere of reproduction in general, such analyses cannot account for the roles ideology and politics play in class struggle. On the contrary, the theory tends to reduce struggles in the sphere of reproduction to being the mere effects of 'pure' class struggles between capital and labour generated by the accumulation process. This is precisely how struggles in education are conceived of in Schooling in Capitalist America. Education is seen as a site for the displacement and containment of struggles between capital and labour arising out of the contradictions in the accumulation process:

> The ever-present contradiction between accumulation and reproduction has been submerged or channelled into demands which would be contained within the outlines of capitalist society. The contradiction has been temporarily resolved or suppressed in a variety of ways: through ameliorative social reforms; through the coercive force of the state; through racist, sexist, ageist and credentialist and other strategies used by employers to divide and rule; and through an ideological perspective which served to hide rather than clarify the sources of exploitation and alienation of the capitalist order. The expansion of mass education, embodying each of the above means, has been a central element in resolving - at least temporarily - the contradiction between accumulation and reproduction. (28)

Bearing in mind our critique of the "Correspondence principle" earlier on, it would seem to be the case that Bowles and Gintis are 'guilty' of a double reductionism: on the one hand, a reductionism of structure - all social institutions possess basically the same social structure, namely, that of production; on the other hand, they have produced a reductionist account of class struggle, the complexity of struggles in education and in the economy (indeed, the social formation as a whole) being reduced to the effects of the simple contradictions between capital and labour.

I can only indicate very schematically some of the conditions which a non-reductionist theory of education in capitalist society would have to fulfil. Such an analysis would have to take cognisance of the specificity of the structure of educational apparatuses (embryonically begun above) (29) as well as the complex nature of class struggle. Though Bowles

and Gintis specify the functions of education, they fail to recognise that, since education belongs to the sphere of reproduction, its position in the social formation is fundamentally different from that of the economy. In short, it is an ideological State apparatus (ISA) belonging to the politico-ideological level of capitalist society. In general, class struggles, occurring at the politico-ideological level, are subject to different mechanisms from those taking place at the economic level of society:

> While class struggles occur at the economic level of capitalist society (over the length of the working day, working conditions, worker control, the wage), since the political level is relatively independent of the economic level, class struggle also takes forms peculiar to the political and ideological levels of capitalist society. These include popular struggles between the bourgeoisie and the working class for control over the state apparatuses. Within this terrain of political class struggles, there is the field of political class struggle between fractions of the bourgeoisie. Fractions of the bourgeoisie engage in struggles for political power so that their particular political and economic interests can be realised, at the expense, if necessary, of the interests of rival fractions. Poulantzas calls this 'field of the political practices of the ruling class in a capitalist social formation', the power bloc. The various fractions of the bourgeoisie participate in political struggles to gain dominance in the power bloc and to gain hegemony or political and ideological dominance of the social formation as a whole. (30)

The fact that education belongs to the relatively autonomous sphere of political and ideological practices (in short, that it is an ISA), has been sorely neglected in Schooling in Capitalist America, in which education has been examined only in relation to the economy. (31) As a result, its role in accomplishing state policy and contributing to the reproduction of the dominant ideologies in the social formation, has largely been ignored. Since education is an ISA, it is subject to the effects of the struggle between classes, class fractions, social strata and categories which are constituted at the level of politics in general, specifically the state, as well as being subject to the effects of struggles occurring at the level of the economy. Thus an adequate analysis of education would have to incorporate an investigation of the role the educational ISA in any specific social formation plays in the production of the ideology of the hegemonic fraction in the State. It

would also have to allow for the possibility that ideologies that contradict the hegemonic ideologies (either ideologies of rival fractions of capital or fractions of the working class) might develop and even become dominant within the educational ISA. Furthermore, it would have to take account of other social fractions, social strata and categories which would have specific effects on the production of ideology in the educational ISA (their interests not always being equivalent to the major classes) - the bureaucracy (at both state and local levels), intellectuals (university committees and academic bodies) and the petit-bourgeoisie (especially the new petit-bourgeoisie, in this case, teachers, inspectors and administrators).

It is our contention that such an approach opens up paths for research into education which can account for its specificity as a particular apparatus in capitalist social formations, as well as the limits that the capitalist economy places upon its operations.

Notes

(1) S Bowles and H Gintis Schooling in Capitalist America. London: RKP, 1976, pg 139, pg 9

(2) Ibid pg 103

(3) This point is obviously relevant to the whole question of educational institutions in South Africa, where legitimation of socio-economic inequalities has always been of an explicitly rascist nature. Given the recent attempts of the State to move away from rascist forms of legitimation, a grading system in terms of 'merit' could become more prominent in legitimating socio-economic inequalities.

(4) Bowles and Gintis op.cit pg 130

(5) Ibid pg 13

(6) Ibid pg 224

(7) Ibid pgs 204-205

(8) Ibid pgs 147, 205

(9) Ibid pgs 131, 224, for example

(10) For a useful account of the forces of production, etc. see L Althusser and E Balibar Reading Capital, London: NLB, 1970, pgs 235ff.

(11) K Marx Capital, Vol I, Penguin, 1976, chs 14, 15

(12) Cf B Hindess and PQ Hirst Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, London: RKP, 1975, pg 9ff

(13) For an analysis of the problem of power in different social institutions, see the works of M Foucault, especially Discipline and Punish Allen Lane, 1975. For an interesting critique, cf. B Fine, "Struggles against Discipline: The Theory and Politics of Michel Foucault" in Capital and Class, No 9

(14) L Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, London, NLB, 1971, pg 148

(15) P Hirst On Law and Ideology, London, Macmillan, 1979, pg 48

(16) T Fluxman "Recent Developments in Marxist Theory - A Review of the contributions of the Althusserian school to historical materialism", due to be published in JD Brewer (ed) Modern Sociological Theory: A Challenge to South African Sociology
It should be noted that the theory of classes I am using is based on the work of N Poulantzas, the most important text being Political Power and Social Classes, London, NLB, 1973. For a less difficult as well as revised account of his position of N Poulantzas State, Power, Socialism, Verso, 1980

(17) Relations of production are briefly mentioned (pg 67), but the concepts' implications for a theory of education are not developed at all.

(18) L Althusser op.cit pg 148

(19) Bowles and Gintis op.cit pg 236

(20) Ibid pg 287

(21) Ibid pg 224, cf p.3

(22) Ibid pg 237

(23) Ibid pg 238

(24) Ibid cf pgs 175 ff, pgs 191 ff, pgs 213 ff

(25) GS Jones "Class Expression versus Social Control? A Critique of Recent Trends in the Social History of 'Leisure'" History Workshop, 4, Autumn 1977, pg 165

(26) Bowles and Gintis, op.cit pg 240

(27) For a clearer account of the kinds of social ensembles possible in capitalist societies, see N Poulantzas "On Social Classes", New Left Review, 1978. Also see the index to Political Power and Social Classes

(28) Bowles and Gintis op.cit pgs 232 - 233

(29) See pg 5 ff

(30) T Fluxman op.cit pgs 16 - 17. It has become commonplace to reject the Poulantzas claim that the political level of capitalist society is relatively autonomous from the economic level and to argue instead for the unity of the capitalist social formation as a whole. However, in another paper I argued that this position is basically regressive: 'These theories basically regard the separation of the political level from the economic level of capitalist society as a mere appearance and affirm instead the units of social relations throughout the social formation. Consequently they deny the real separation between these levels, which implies that though the unity of the social formation is not to be denied, there is at the same time a real dislocation between the political and economic levels which is rooted in the specific nature of the capitalist mode of production. As Poulantzas argued in Political Power and Social Classes, the structure of the capitalist mode of production implies the relative autonomy of politics from the economy. The fact that, unlike other modes of production, the actual extraction of surplus is effected purely by economic means of coercion implies the political is not a direct instrument of surplus appropriation and hence exists at a level removed from the functioning of the economy, its function being to reproduce, maintain and, if necessary, create the political and ideological conditions of accumulation rather than being the actual instrument of accumulation. It is to Poulantzas's credit that he has taken the point seriously and produced a set of concepts aimed at understanding these relatively autonomous operations of the state: hegemony, power bloc, forms of state,

fractions, strata, social categories." T Fluxman, "Political Problems in Analysing the South African State" unpublished mimeo pg 2

(31) The state is mentioned only very occasionally, cf pg 238 for example, where its role is alluded to, moreover, in a simplistic (ie instrumental) fashion.

THE NEO-MARXIST CONCEPT OF 'PRAXIS' AND ITS EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Berndine Nel & Fairoza Sirkhot

1 IN RETROSPECT

The German word 'praxis' is equivalent to the English 'practice', but the term was given two unified connotations by Marx and the Marxists. In order to clarify these two meanings in English, it is necessary to make a distinction between 'practice' and 'praxis'. Given a state of affairs, Marx would demonstrate critically how it came about; how it produced itself as part of a more or less blind self-mediating historical process, and then how it would tend to resolve its contradictions into a higher level. The relatively blind everyday activity which carries this process along we term 'practice'. Marx sought a unity of theory and practice. He believed that in the ideal of a just, rational, self-determining society, philosophy would be sublated as the real, and reality would meet and merge in real human self-conscious 'praxis'.

Hegel had philosophy ensconced in an ivory tower of idealist thought in a way that completely neglected the material conditions in Prussia at that time. Hegel's totalitarian philosophical constitution reflected the alienation of philosophy from reality ie the reality of the bourgeois who had access to the world of culture as opposed to the miserable plight of the proletariat who had to labour in order to subsist. Hegel had given the world 'philosophical form'; however his theory was none the less alienated from reality or practice. Therefore, Marx said that 'philosophy must become worldly.' (1)

Marx and Engels were at first identified with the circle of left-wing critics and interpreters of Hegal known as the 'left-Hegelians' and were attracted to Ludwig Feuerbach's 'materialist inversion' of Hegel's philosophy. They soon distanced themselves from the left-Hegelians. Since then Marxist and non-Marxist interpreters have conceptualized the relationship between Marxism and Hegelianism in terms of a setting 'right side up' of Hegel's philosophy.

In German Ideology, Marx makes it clear that, for him, conflict arises from man's creative and productive activities ie through labour. It is through labour that man's environment is changed and, in accordance with it, the

infrastructure and ideological superstructure. Thus Marx analysed the worker in the process of production, concluding that the existence of the workers is alienated from their essence. He transformed the alienation of productivity into the alienation of labour, and therefore the alienation of classes. Hence, Marx asserts that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of the class struggle.

Man's self-emancipation occurs when practice and theory merge in the act of productive labour, through which the world is changed in such a way that existing conflicts are overcome. Through such an act of labour, metaphysical values such as Truth, Beauty, Justice and Harmony are realized in practice because nature, society and man's private interests are in harmony with the general interests. (2)

Marx holds that men can act so as to make 'reality' coincide better with 'thinking'. He retains the Hegelian conception of history as a process comprising various stages, each proving the truth of the previous one, so that the self-developing historical process strives to realize what it is. Each stage of development points to a different essence or potentiality for practical realization. There is therefore no final state of truth. According to Marx, practice and praxis should not be seen separately. They are aspects of a historical process of becoming. Practice carries the potential of becoming praxis. Rosenstreich remarks: 'The practice that creates reality also creates the correspondence between essence and reality: that is, it is truth.' (3)

NEO-MARXISM

During the 20th Century a re-interpretation of Marx's philosophy and thus his ideas on praxis was formulated by the so-called 'Neo-Marxist Movement.' In order to clarify this concept of praxis, we confine our exposition to the views of Horkheimer and Habermas. The reason for this is that Horkheimer is generally regarded as the founder of this school of thought. The choice of Habermas can be justified if we regard him as the main theoretical exponent of the same school. (4)

HORKHEIMER

As a student he was mostly interested in philosophy and although his doctorate was in philosophy, he never regarded philosophy as an historical recapitulation of previous systems or the cultivation of a new one. (5) He regarded the task of philosophy not only as a reflection on man, but

also as a reflection on the state and society.

Horkheimer's prominence is due to the rise of the so-called Critical Theory which gathered strength especially during the 1960s.

Traditional theory is, according to Horkheimer, theory as posed by the natural sciences as had been adopted by many sociologists. Quantitative methods of research invariably produced contradiction-free results which satisfy criteria for optimal achievement. (6)

Horkheimer, who was strongly influenced by German Idealism, looked for a theory of society based on a link between philosophy and empirical research. (7) He saw the task of a Critical Theory as that which contributes to enlightenment and a humane reconstruction of society. To elaborate this would be to state that he intended critical theory to expose a deified social reality not by totally rejecting traditional theory or by posing an ideal utopian society, but by constantly revealing the 'pseudo-independence to the dependence on its ongoing unconscious human construction.' (8)

Traditional theory is therefore transcended in a critical theoretical activity.

Horkheimer also criticizes the theory of the so-called phenomenologically-oriented social scientists in their claim to uncover 'essential laws' which are largely hypothetical by nature. (9) He maintains that what such scientists regard as the essence of theory, actually corresponds to the tasks they set for themselves and thus manipulate freely a practice which is encouraged by the technological 'atmosphere' of bourgeois society. (10)

According to Horkheimer the origins of traditional theory lie in the Cartesian dualism which still dominates the core of bourgeois thought. (11) This subject-object split caused false emphasis to be placed on the individual as an autonomous being confronted with a given reality. (12) It is therefore the task of a 'critical attitude' to question blind rules which at present govern society, and to 'relativize the separation between individual and society.' (13)

It has to be understood, however, that Horkheimer's ideas should be seen in a certain historical context. Evidence of this can be found in his continual references to the economic crisis in 1929 as well as to the rise of German National Socialism. (14)

JÜRGEN HABERMAS

According to Habermas, the relating of theory to practice in the major tradition of philosophy, always referred to the good and righteous and to the life of individuals and citizens. However, since the 18th Century, such theory now deals with 'the objective, overall complex of development of a human species which produces itself, which is as yet only destined to attain its essence: Humanity.' (15)

Theory still claims to provide orientation in right action and praxis has now been extended to cover stages in emancipation. Rational praxis is interpreted as liberation from externally imposed compulsion, and theory as that which provides enlightenment. This theory which enlightens is essentially critical and presupposes a specific experience of emancipation by means of 'critical insight into relationships of power.' (16)

Habermas holds that, as our civilization becomes increasingly scientific, being industrially advanced it bases its survival on expanding its technical control of nature and/or using social organization to refine the administration of human beings and their relations to one another. The relationship of theory to practice has become the rational application of techniques assured by empirical science which, together with the analytical sciences, makes technical recommendations, but does not provide answers to practical questions. Socially effective theory is now directed to the behaviour of human beings who manipulate.

We can no longer distinguish between practical and technical power, but we cannot escape practical questions. Instead of attaining the rational consensus on the part of the citizens concerning the practical control of their destiny, 'the attempt is made to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society.' (17) This is an impractical, unhistorical attempt, according to Habermas.

Research, technology, production and administration are functionally interdependent in the interlocking system into which they have coalesced, and although we are bound to it by a network of organizations and a chain of consumer goods, it is shut off from our knowledge and our reflection. Habermas maintains that this can only be altered 'by a change in the state of consciousness itself, by the practical effect of a theory which does not improve the manipulation of things and of reifications, but which instead advances the interest of reason in human adulthood, in the autonomy of action and in the liberation from dogmatism. This it achieves by means of the penetrating ideas of a persistent critique ...' (18)

Habermas distinguishes 4 levels of rationalization on which we extend our technical powers of control qualitatively. On the first two levels, technologies exclude normative elements from the process of scientific argumentation. On the third and fourth values which are judged irrational are subordinated to technological procedures, which then establish themselves as values. These four levels are not indifferent to values.

Habermas maintains that a rational administration of the world (based on the questionable thesis that man can control his destiny rationally to the degree to which social techniques are applied), does not solve the practical problems posed by history. History cannot be rationalized by 'an extended power of control on the part of manipulative human beings, but only by a higher stage of reflection, a consciousness of acting human beings moving forward in the direction of emancipation.' (13)

3 EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The critical philosophers of education, (the Neo-Marxists) (20) do not consider specific action possibilities in the light of 'whichever' goals. They reflect no goals themselves and their realization in praxis as problems. According to them these goals are predetermined by their historico-social contexts, and the scientist is confronted by this coercive character of goals. (21)

Central themes in the works of philosophers of education following this school of thought, are the following: (22)

(a) Reflection on the social and political predetermination of educational statements and the negation of a pretence to autonomy.

(b) Relativizing knowledge claims by hermeneutics and empiricists by pointing out meaningful presuppositions of each praxis of science.

(c) A problem analysis of the knowledge claims of the two previously mentioned schools of thought by means of a social analysis of the background of problem choice and evaluation (theory-praxis problem, etc.)

(d) Theory is always, or should always be critical theory: Educational praxis should be analysed by rational discussion in the light of technological and ideological suppression. This should be conducted in view of the fact that the realization of educational

goals and educational 'responsibility' can be measured only in praxis.

(e) The 'leitmotiv' is emancipation: How the educational situation should be structured in order that the educand's rational progress can be realized adequately. (23)

If the concept of 'praxis' can be analysed from the foregoing it will be clear that education is seen as 'praxis' an active intentional involvement of theory with practice, whereby the so-called 'critical attitude' is a necessary condition. (24) Education as praxis should have emancipation as the criterion for progress and therefore also as intrinsic goal. The final goal would be reached if and when a state of 'communicative competence' is reached. (25) (26)

An interesting fact is that the idea of 'praxis' also dominates the scientific educational views in some so-called phenomenological circles; although we believe that this influence is not purely Neo-Marxist in origin. (27)

CONCLUSION

From this brief analysis of the concept of praxis in Neo-Marxist views, it can be concluded that many valuable implications for educational theory and practice exist within the very context of an educational praxis. Ideological critique forms the main core of this theory, and does this not seem a worthwhile component of adulthood?

A critical view of presuppositions could be an extremely valuable educational exercise. It seems a sound criterion by which to guide the educand towards a responsible, critical and anti-dogmatic view of social reality.

Notes

(1) R Kilminster Praxis & Method, London, 1979, pgs 9-12

(2) Information taken from HP Adams Karl Marx in his Earlier Writings, London, 1965

(3) P Connerton (ed) Critical Sociology, London: Penguin, 1976 (reprinted 1978)

(4) This is according to our views (BFN & FS)

(5) BC Van Houten Tussen Aanpassing en Kritiek, Deventer, 1973 (2de druk), pg 116

(6) See (1) pg 185, and compare also (3) pg 208

(7) See (5) pg 116

(8) See (1) pg 195

(9) See (3) pg 210, and compare also local criticism in BF Nel From Fundamental Pedagogics to Educology - A Solution or a Substitution (SAAE Monograph 1980 - 4)

(10) See (3) pg 211

(11) See (3) pg 212

(12) This concept is common amongst Neo-Marxist philosophers; compare Horkheimer, Habermas, and Adorno

(13) Compare (3), and see K-H Dickopp Die Krise der anthropologischen Begründung der Erziehung, Henn Verlag, 1973, esp Chapter IV

(14) See (5) pg 117

(15) Our translation (BFN & FS), J Habermas "Theories and Praxis" in Sozial philosophische studien Neuwied, 1963

(16) Ibid, compare also J Habermas Erkenntnis und Interesse, Merkur Nr 213, 19 (1965) pgs 1139-1153

(17) See (3) pg 332

(18) See (16) pgs 1139-1153

(19) Ibid, compare also Habermas's views as expressed in J Habermas Dialektik der Rationalisierung, Merkur Nr 78,8 (1954) pgs 701-724

(20) These are mostly exponents from the Frankfurt School of thought. Well-known names are eg Klaus Mollenhaner and Klaus Hurrelmann

(21) K Mollenhauer Theorien zum Erziehungs-Prozess, München, 1972, Chapter 1

(22) HD Feil Erziehungwissenchaft zwischen Empirie und Normativität, Kohlhammer, 1974, pgs 38-40

(23) Compare also the view of BF Nel Authority, a Sociopedagogical Perspective, unpublished D Ed thesis, University of Pretoria, 1978, and see also (21)

(24) See (1)

(25) To reach this state seems a little more satisfactory than the commonly-stated 'adulthood' as a goal of education (BFN & FS)

(26) The first theme mentioned by Feil (see (22)), seems to us to be useful when an intentional misinterpretation is presented, for instance in the publication by W Brezinka Die Pädagogik der Neuen Linken, Stuttgart: Seewald, 1973 (in which the educational views of the 'new left' and the 'critical school' are happily confused)

(27) AJ Beekman Dienstbaar Inzicht: Opvoedingswetenschap als sociale plan wetenschap, Groningen, 1972, pg 23

NOTICES

THE DE LANGE REPORT

Now that the De Lange Commission's report and the government's White Paper have been tabled, Perspectives in Education is to devote a special issue to comments on and responses to both documents.

Since the scope of the Commission's report is so large, the editors wish to suggest to contributors that articles are likely to be of greater interest and value if specific areas of the report are examined and discussed than if attempts to comment on the whole are undertaken. It is our intention to publish a range of responses covering different aspects of the report and its reception.

The closing date for articles to be included in the special issue of Perspectives in Education is 1st February 1982.

George Bereday — Department of Juvenile Law, Sociology, and Education, Teachers' College, Columbia University.

Linda Chisholm — Department of Education, University of the Witwatersrand

Tony Fluxman

Brian Holmes — Department of Comparative Education, Institute of Education, University of London

Berndine Nel — Faculty of Education, University of Durban-Westville

Fairoza Sirkhot — Faculty of Education, University of Durban-Westville

INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Editors will welcome contributions in the form of comments on local events or questions, original articles, discussion of articles published in previous issues, reviews, items for the 'Notices' section, and so on.

Contributions should be sent to:

Wally Morrow
Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand
PO Box 1176
Johannesburg
2000

OR

Michael Gardiner
Department of English
Johannesburg College of Education
27 St Andrew's Road
Parktown
2193

Contributions should not ordinarily exceed 3000 words in length, and should be typewritten on one side of A4 paper, double spaced, with ample margins. Two complete copies should be submitted. Proofs will not be sent to authors for correction unless this is explicitly requested.

There is to be no separate 'Bibliography". References should be kept to a minimum. All notes (which includes 'footnotes' and references) are to be numbered consecutively in the text (in Arabic numerals, in parenthesis, on the line of the text), and should be listed at the end of the article, as 'Notes'. Titles of papers or chapters cited are to be enclosed in double quotation marks; titles of books are to be underlined. Examples:

Notes

(1) Carole Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

(2) PF Strawson "Freedom and Resentment" in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London: Methuen, 1974, pgs 15-23.

(3) L Althusser "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in BJ Cosin (ed) Education, Structure and Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, see pg 81.

Substantial quotations (more than about 3 lines) should be indented, shorter quotations should be enclosed in single quotation marks. Omissions from a quotation should be indicated by three dots.

CONTENTS

DISCUSSION

127 Review of RM Ruperti's The Education System in Southern Africa — Brian Holmes

132 Review of AJ Vos & SS Barnard's Comparative Education for Student Teachers — George Bereday

ARTICLES

134 Ideology, Legitimation of the Status Quo, and History Textbooks in South Africa — Linda Chisholm

152 Education and the Economy: A critique of S Bowles & H Gintis's Schooling in Capitalist America. — Tony Fluxman

171 The Neo-Marxist concept of 'praxis' and its educational implications — Berndine Nel and Fairoza Sirkhot

NOTICES

179