

PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION



VOL3 NO1
March 1978

House journal of the Faculty of Education of the
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

© Faculty of Education
University of the Witwatersrand
1 Jan Smuts Avenue
Johannesburg 2001
South Africa

Printed by Central Print Unit
University of the Witwatersrand
1 Jan Smuts Avenue, Johannesburg

See the back cover for Table of Contents

DISCUSSION

COLOUR OR CLASS PREJUDICE? A RESPONSE TO 'THE EDUCATED KAFFIR'

Raymond Tunmer

In Webster's comments (1) on Limerick's article on "The Educated Kaffir" in Vol 2 No 3 of Perspectives in Education (2) he suggests that any analysis of the history of Education should be located in the political economy of the time. It should be pointed out that in Limerick's fuller work (3) (only part of which was reproduced in the article) the points raised by Webster were dealt with in fairly considerable detail. She shows, for instance, that the attitudes of the colonists were far from homogeneous and that these attitudes seemed to reflect differences not only in occupation but also in locale. The first of these conditions could obviously determine whether an African or (in Webster's work) an Indian threatened the livelihood of the colonist. Locale, for instance, was reflected in the fact that support for African education came more strongly from towns than from farming areas. It must, however, be recognised that in this example occupation and locale were linked. Limerick herself would be able to expand more thoroughly upon these issues.

All the contributors to this Interchange, however have stressed that attitudes to education were dependent upon attitudes towards colour. Van Aswegen, (4) for instance, comments that "black education ... forms part of a larger set of racial attitudes which are deeply embedded in the history, hearts and minds of white South Africans" (p 198), and he explains that there was a strong belief that educated blacks "became unfit and/or unwilling to work and were

thus educated out of the labour market" (p 199). Morris (5) implies that South Africa got the education system it deserved (p 201).

It is important to realise, however, that the arguments used in South Africa in the 19th Century (and indeed well into the 20th Century) were not isolated, nor were they entirely a product of the colonists' thinking. In the same way, it is only partly true that these attitudes could be explained by the "contradictory nature of colonialism itself" (Webster p 194).

They can be found again and again in Europe in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Here, however, the prejudices reflected class or social rather than race attitudes. In some respects, the fears reflected in class prejudice were greater than those engendered by race or colour prejudice, for in a racially homogeneous society a man can disguise his class origins much more easily than can a black in a society in which power lay in the hands of men of a different colour. In expanding upon this comparison between class and colour prejudice, attention will be confined to British examples for two reasons. Firstly, the ruling group in the Cape and Natal in the 19th Century were English-speaking, and ideas from Britain reached South Africa far more easily than any emanating from Europe. Secondly, Britain retained into the 20th Century attitudes to class which assumed that there was a fairly strong (although never absolutely rigid) hierarchial concept of society. Furthermore Britain, unlike France and America, did not go through a revolution which attempted to undermine or disregard differences of class.

It must also be remembered that at the very end of the 17th Century a "psychological" theory appeared which suggested that education was highly efficacious and that it could transform individuals, regardless of their origins. By extension, therefore, education could transform societies. This theory was popularized by Locke, even if he did not originate it. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (6) Locke claimed that at birth the mind could be assumed "to be ... white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas ... Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself" (Locke Vol 1 p 121). This idea is repeated again and again in his writing. It is echoed in On the Conduct of Understanding (1697) and, in the first page of his Some thoughts Concerning Education (7), he

declares "that of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education" (p 1). Locke's writings were very influential throughout the 18th Century and the implications of the 'white paper' theory were enormous. If man was formed almost entirely by his environment, then a shift in an ordered environment could produce a monarchist as easily as a republican, a reactionary as easily as an anarchist. From the point of view of religion, the environment could be manipulated to produce either a Catholic or a Protestant, and, on a narrow front, an Anglican or a dissenter. As far as occupation was concerned, any man had the potential to be a lawyer or a labourer. Finally, from the point of view of class, the environment could be structured to produce a society in which all men were equal or in which there was a hierarchial stratification in which the privileges of birth (or their absence) could be re-enforced to ensure that men remained in the class into which they were born and did not develop aspirations to move from that class to another. Locke's own preferences were for a monarchy curbed by the 'social contract' origins of that monarchy; a Protestant religion (Anglicanism) which eschewed the extremes of enthusiasm and naive faith untempered by reason; and a society in which property was held in high esteem and was not endangered by radical shifts in class and political power. In his *Some Thoughts ...* the education he describes is that of a gentleman, for whom he prescribes a radically different curriculum to that which in 1697 he advocated for poor children in workhouse schools where their experience from the age of three would be almost entirely limited to spinning and knitting (pp 189-191).

Most Englishmen supported Locke's picture of the world, but whether his conservative or another's more radical interpretation of the possibilities of the 'white paper' theory were adopted, it was clear that any education scheme deserved very careful study in terms of the product that would emerge from training.

The real first challenge that faced the followers of Locke's theories came very shortly after he had published his major works. Beginning in 1699 and continuing well into the 18th Century there was an early experiment in fairly large-scale popular education, known as the Charity School Movement, led by the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (the SPCK). Concern about the 'growth of vice and debauchery' in English society and a conviction that the 'teaching of poor children ... to read and write and repeat the Church Catechism' could have major benefits in the development of 'Christian virtue' led many middle-class

men and women to set up Charity Schools throughout England and Wales, Jones (8) (p 38). At the height of this movement, which by the end of the first quarter of the 18th Century was 'educating' about 25 000 children, two types of doubts were being expressed. Both were the outcomes of the belief that there would be effective and long-lasting results from this kind of schooling. The first type of doubt was expressed by supporters of the movement, who were determined to limit the curriculum to meet the precise purposes for which the movement had been started. In 1775 the Bishop of Norwich, while preaching at a service in which the collection was to be used for a local charity school, spelled out very clearly the need to maintain class divisions and the dangers of holding too wide a view of the purposes of education. "There must be", he explained, "drudges of labour, (hewers of wood and drawers of water the Scriptures call them), as well as counsellors to direct and rulers to preside ... To which of these classes we belong, especially the more inferior ones, our birth determines ... These poor children are born to be daily labourers ... It is evident then that if such children are, by charity, brought up in a manner that is only proper to qualify them for a rank to which they are not to aspire, such a child would be injurious to the community" (Jones p 75). By the same reasoning, a charity school which had introduced solo-singing by some of its pupils was ordered by its sponsors to stop such training as "it tended to a more polite education." (Jones p 91). The help of God was frequently invoked to ensure that success did not go beyond the limited aims of those who supported the schools. In the Poor Girls Primer, printed and sold by the SPCK, children read and learned by heart a prayer which included the words: "Make me dutiful and obedient to my benefactors. Make me temperate and chaste, meek and patient, true in all my dealings, and content and industrious in my station." (Jones p 75). (Author's italics.) The second type of doubt was that expressed by the opponents of the movement. It suggested that simply because of the effectiveness of the schooling being provided, the labouring classes would be diverted from their ordained rôle in society. "The more a shepherd and a ploughman know of the world, the less fitted he'll be to go through the fatigue and hardship of it with cheerfulness and equanimity", wrote Mandeville (9) and he pointed out that "to divert children from useful labour until they are 14 or 15 years old is a wrong way to qualify them for it when they are grown up." (P 294). It can easily be seen that these complaints were identical to those made so frequently in the Cape and Natal whenever the question of education for Africans was discussed. It must be stressed, however, that arguments about man's

receptivity to his environment were not completely consistent. Men could as easily claim that the labouring classes were inherently different from others and so education would be wasted upon them, as they could claim that education, because it was effective, could distort and endanger the existing structure of society. Mandeville at times seems to support this idea of inherent differences between classes, and Defoe characterised the English as "the most lazy-diligent nation in the world ... There is nothing more frequent than for an Englishman to work until he has got his pockets full of money, and then go and be idle or perhaps drunk till 'tis all gone and perhaps himself in debt ... Ask him in his cups what he intends. He'll tell you honestly, he'll drink so long as it lasts, and then go to work for more", (Cited in George (10) p 59). Such sweeping generalisations of class characteristics, apparently based on inherited tendencies, were often made of races in Africa.

Had they been true in England, that country's industrial domination of the world in the 19th Century could not have been achieved. A strikingly similar example of inaccurate race generalization in South African can be found in the justifications for the importation of indentured Indians for Natal's sugar farms.

Support for Charity Schools diminished towards the end of the 18th Century, but the growth of urban population during the industrial revolution produced even more alarming social evils than those encountered in the early years of the 18th Century. Recognition of these evils coincided with a new teaching technique devised independently by the Quaker Lancaster and the Anglican missionary Bell. The technique used pupils (or monitors) to teach other pupils in a highly mechanical fashion. After some years of suspicion between the men and their supporters (engendered by religious rivalries) two independent societies for fostering schools run on the Monitorial system were established. In words which could have been written one hundred years earlier, the National Society (linked to the Anglican Church) set down its aims and stipulated their limitations: "To confer upon the children of the poor the inestimable benefit of religious instruction, combined with such other requirements as may be suitable to their stations in life and calculated to render them useful and respectable members of society." (Cited in Lawson and Silver (11) p 243) (Author's italics).

In 1807, before the final split between the two men, a Bill was introduced into the House of Commons by Samuel Whitbread

who tried to link state support for Monitorial Schools (which were cheap) with an extension of the first Factory Act of 1802 which had attempted to regulate the employment of children. The Bill was not passed and one speech against it, delivered by Giddy, reflected very clearly the unchanging concern about the effects of education upon society held by so many members of the middle classes. "However specious in theory," Giddy explained, "the project may be of giving education to the labouring classes of the poor, it would in effect be prejudicial to their morals and happiness; it would teach them to despise their lot in life, instead of making them good servants in agriculture and other laborious employments to which their rank in society had destined them; instead of teaching them subordination, it would render them factious and refractory ..." (Cited in Barnard (12) p 55). Such a statement could be translated directly to the South African situation merely by substituting "blacks" or "kaffirs" for labouring classes. As in the 18th Century, there were men in the early 19th Century who planned for an education system that would transform society. Owen, in commenting upon his work at New Lanark declared that "any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large", (Cited in Lawson and Silver p 247). The unpredictable effects of an education system upon the status quo undoubtedly prevented the passing of Roebuck's 1833 education bill in the reformed and reforming British Parliament, although other far-reaching social legislation (abolition of slavery, the first effective Factory Act, the reform of the poor law, of Municipal corporations and of prisons) followed in the three years after the Great Reform Act of 1832.

The link between the extension of political representation and the broader provision of education was not a serious consideration in 1832, when the actual extension of voting rights was extremely limited. Some 200 000 voters were added to an electorate that prior to reform was little more than 430 000, (Woodward (13) p 84). By 1867, with the passing of the Second Reform Act, the extension of the franchise went considerably further down the social scale. This Act added 900 000 voters to an electorate of just over a million and Woodward notes that "in towns working-class voters were in a majority, but most of the new country voters came from the middle class," (p 180). It was this extension which caused Robert Lowe (14), the author of the Revised Code of 1862 which introduced Payment by Results, to warn "we shall have to ensure that our future masters (ie the working classes) know their letters."

Even this realisation, however, did not lead Lowe to advocate an education system which might jeopardise social-class divisions. In the public debate which eventually led to the passing of the first Education Act of 1870, Lowe argued for the maintenance of curriculums which were based upon class roles. In 1867 he wrote that "the lower classes ought to be educated that they may appreciate and defer to a higher cultivation when they meet it; and the higher classes ought to be educated in a very different manner, in order that they may exhibit to the lower classes that higher education to which, if it were shown, they would bow down and defer" (Lowe, 1867). Such ideas could be seen in operation as the first school Boards commenced their work after 1870.

Echoes of each of this small sample of quotations from British Educational history can be found in comments made in South Africa about education for Africans and Indians. South African attitudes were clearly not unique. They were common in Britain and were imported into South Africa by immigrants, by Colonial officials and in books. Here they were strengthened by the obvious differences between whites and blacks, but in no circumstances could it be said that these attitudes were indigenous to South Africa. Class consciousness easily developed into colour consciousness; prejudices, already existing, took root and flourished in colonial society.

References

- (1) E Webster "Brigid Limerick's Abstracted Empiricism" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 3 August 1977
- (2) B Limerick "The 'Educated Kaffir' and the prejudices Surrounding Education for Blacks in Natal in the Late Nineteenth Century" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 3 August 1977
- (3) I B Limerick Education and Prejudice: the Natal Native Commission of 1882 unpublished B Ed dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1975
- (4) H van Aswegen "Further Perspectives on Late Nineteenth Century Attitudes" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 3 August 1977

- (5) P Morris "Every Country gets the Circus it Deserves" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 3 August 1977
- (6) J Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding A C Fraser (ed) Oxford University Press, 1894
- (7) J Locke Some Thoughts Concerning Education R H Quick (ed) Cambridge University Press, 1913
- (8) M G Jones The Charity School Movement: A Study of Eighteenth Century Puritanism in Action Cambridge University Press 1938
- (9) B Mandeville The Fable of the Bees, including An Essay on Charity and the Charity Schools P Harth (ed) Penguin 1970
- (10) D George England in Transition Penguin 1953
- (11) J Lawson & H Silver A Social History of Education in England Methuen 1973
- (12) H C Barnard A History of English Education from 1760 2nd ed University of London Press 1961
- (13) E L Woodward The Age of Reform 1815-1870 Oxford University Press 1946
- (14) R Lowe Primary and Classical Education

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR VILJOEN

Hannah Gluckman

I read, with great interest, Professor T A Viljoen's letter (1) in which he refutes my basic thesis (2) concerning pedagogic authority. However, despite his assertion that I have misinterpreted Vandenberg, after a thorough study of the American's book (3) I am even more strongly convinced that my original standpoint is correct: the findings of the Afrikaans writers referred to in my article are greatly at variance with Vandenberg's findings in this field.

Rather than go through Professor Viljoen's letter point by point, which I feel would be tedious to those readers who are not at home with pedagogical writings, I would rather handle his criticism of my article in general terms. This has, to a certain extent, been forced upon me by the way in which the professor has chosen to rebut my points. To give a series of counter quotations, without stating how these quotations have been interpreted, or what point is being made, is to assume that all writings are construed by all people in exactly the same way. However, I aver that just as presuppositions influence one's 'scientific' findings, so they influence the way in which we 'read' another's words. Thus in many cases Professor Viljoen quoted statements from Vandenberg to refute what I had said. According, though, to my interpretation of these words, the professor actually corroborated my assertions. One example of what I am referring to must suffice.

Under (I) "How the different Writers Justify Authority" I had averred that Vandenberg views authority from the child's point of view. He justifies the imposition of authority only insofar as it provides the child with the safety and security he needs in order to play, and only insofar as it provides the child with the help and guidance he needs, in order to expand his world. As rebuttal of this point, Professor Viljoen gave the quote, "A precarious, unstable, threatening, and hostile world does not invite exploration, nor does it encourage him to go to it....." (Vandenberg p 63) Surely this was the very point I had made: that when the world threatens, then the child welcomes authority. What point was Professor Viljoen making? Moreover, Viljeon's sole comment on the eight quotations he cited from Vandenberg under (I) was that the latter is vesting his

authority in the teacher as a guardian. Exactly. It would appear then, that despite his original assertion to the contrary, Professor Viljoen and I agree as to how Vandenberg views pedagogic authority. But my point was that the Afrikaans writers quoted in my article do not see authority in this way. Let me once again spell out the difference.

Throughout his book Vandenberg justifies the imposition of authority in terms of the child's safety and the child's own request for help. i.e. he stresses that the child must ask for help and the imposition of authority, before he will willingly accept that help and authority. The following quotations prove this assertion. "The teacher can be acknowledged to possess the authority of the parents, the community, her expertise in the scholarly world and in pedagogic methodology, and nevertheless lack it in the eyes of the child - the only place it counts towards grounding education." (p.59-60) "... when the child explores the world with such intensity he knows he requires help to continue, for then he asks for help.... The help given each time it is requested enables the child to be independently... The child dwelling in a safe world is aware of help when he needs it in his explorations and in accepting whatever help he requires in order to be someone himself, he grounds educating.... When what is said helps the child, it is accepted. Because such help is fully accepted only when it is fully asked for, the child constitutes the authority of the teacher." (p.67) "Before this (achieving moral freedom) he accepts help as a matter of course; after this he can choose to accept or reject help." (p.73) The phrases that I have underlined all show the stress that Vandenberg puts on the child having freedom to accept or reject help. As I will show later, this is not the finding of the Afrikaans writers I quoted.

Vandenberg also insists that there is to be no coercion. Professor Viljoen observed (on p.49 of his article) that Vandenberg expects all children to attend school, "even against their own liking - (this) shows that the child has got to subject himself to a master (dominus) within pedagogic accountable bounds".

This however, is an incorrect reading, for Vandenberg clearly states that children do have a choice of whether to go to school or not. He writes, "The person who is having his being as a pupil, in each and every case, even in compulsory schooling, is in class precisely because he wants to be there, precisely because of his own perfectly gratuitous choice to be there." (p.135) and, "Either the

pupil or the teacher could have committed suicide last Saturday, but they did not; because they did not they are in class together of their own free choices to be there, all things considered." (p.136)

Therefore I cannot agree, as Professor Viljoen stated, that Vandenberg is attaching a very special meaning to the word 'dominated'. In fact, the latter regards subjection to a 'dominus' as not within 'pedagogic accountable bounds', for he states that the child must choose whether to obey or not because he is aware of the difference between what he is permitted to do and what he wants to do. However, states Vandenberg, it is not the 'dominus' who decides what is permitted (as the Afrikaans writers quoted, aver) but the situation in which the child finds himself. "The importance of being able to make this distinction (i.e. between what is and what is not permitted) ... cannot be overstated. Without it there can ... never be moral choice ... because there can never be the experience of moral value as something independent of what particular persons want, as something demanding by the situation." (p.75) (My underlining)

The following quotations show even more strongly Vandenberg's abhorrence of the idea "that the child has got to subject himself to a master (dominus) within pedagogic accountable grounds". (Viljoen in PIE p.149) "The use of commanding within the pedagogical relation aggravates that which it is intended to cure." (p.135) "The pedagogic relation brackets out any form of commanding/obeying in order to come into being." (p.135) "It (commanding/obeying) is precisely opposed to what can bring the pupil back into a pedagogic relation with the teacher because it encourages him to submit to domination when he should be striving to be independently." (p.137) (In this regard I would be pleased if, firstly, Professor Viljoen would spell out the difference between "to be independently" and "to be independent" when they are both PUT INTO PRACTICE, and secondly, if he would state what point he was making by drawing my attention to the alleged difference.)

The fact that Vandenberg has a whole section of a chapter entitled "The alienation of commanding/obeying" shows very clearly that his finding in relation to the concept of pedagogic authority differs markedly from that of the Afrikaans writers quoted in my article, who stated the following: "Viljoen and Pienaar (4) wrote that the child, 'if necessary be compelled to change his present course, and to follow the correct course". (p.102) and "It is the duty and responsibility of the educator not to hesitate and allow himself to be ordered, but he must do the ordering

himself...." (p.102) Gunter (5) asserted that the educator "has the right to prescribe to the educand what he must do and how or what he must not do, while the educand has to respond by accepting what he says." (p.144) As can be seen from the underlined words, for these writers, no choice is to be given the child. Compare this with Vandenberg's constant stress on free choice. Thus it is obvious that Vandenberg's "pedagogic accountable grounds" differ from the Afrikaans writers quoted. For Vandenberg, these bounds are set by the child or youth himself once he has reached the stage of "moral freedom". Thereafter, the initiative must always come from the child, i.e. he must ASK for help. However, "pedagogic accountable grounds" for the Afrikaans writers quoted, gives the adult the initiative and he decides whether the child needs help or not.

At this stage, I must answer Viljoen's criticism that the age at which children are to be granted freedom does not belong to the field of the pedagogician, but to the field of the pedagogue. I am fully aware of the difference between these two, but this difference is dependent on the belief that a pedagogician is able to work scientifically. As my article set out to show, the claim of the pedagogician to be doing this, has not been proved since there is no universality of findings. (For further proof of this assertion see Gluckman's thesis (6).)

But more importantly, I suggest that by asserting that this question does not belong to the field of the pedagogician, Professor Viljoen is neatly avoiding the issue. I believe that this question of when to grant freedom, and to whom, is vital to the whole question of education, and not only of education but of social life as well. Unless the Afrikaans pedagogicians produce a finding on this matter, ideally or not, as Vandenberg has done (and he obviously believes that this is a matter for the pedagogician) what is to stop the individual pedagogue from withholding freedom completely? To say that this is an academic question and would never occur is to ignore this very practice over into our own South African society. I refer here specifically to the freedom denied to millions of adult and often well-educated people in choosing their own reading and viewing matter, on the grounds that a few hundred censors believe that they are not yet ready for this freedom. Therefore, Professor Viljoen, I submit that the stage at which freedom is to be granted is crucial and too important to be left to the whim of a relatively untrained pedagogue. This being so, as a pedagogician, would your finding on this matter agree with Vandenberg's?

Specifically now, I wish to answer just one aspect of Professor Viljoen's letter. This is his assertion that Vandenberg does give "prevalence to the historic becoming of the individual - this colloquial language calls tradition." (p.149 of Viljoen's article) Unless the professor is defining 'historic becoming' in an esoteric way, there is no logical link between this phrase and 'tradition'. While these two words suggest an awareness, possibly even an appreciation of the ideas, events and practices of history, 'tradition' involves the aping of these ideas and practices. In no way can one assume that because one is aware of something, one will necessarily put it into practice. Even should one appreciate some aspect or other in history, changed circumstances often make it unwise or unrealistic to follow it. 'Historic becoming' can thus not be equated with 'tradition' since the former involves choice based on understanding and acceptance, and the latter involves what often becomes a mindless repetition. A close reading of Vandenberg shows he does not accept unthinking adherence to tradition. In trying to prove that he does, Professor Viljoen gave two quotations from Vandenberg. The first deals with "the singular inappropriateness of his (the youth's) ideals to what can actually be done." The second, "that societal-historical problems are ... complicated ... and that his simple norms are hardly applicable". Again, the professor does not specify what these quotes were meant to prove. I will assume they were offered as evidence that Vandenberg approves of the authority of the group. (See point 3 of my article.) But as before, I must disagree. The fact that one becomes aware that one's ideas are too idealistic or too simple does not mean that one must now perforce accept the norms of the group. These too, could be unsuitable. Why should not a youth in such a situation rethink the position and come up with more realistic solutions, which could, but do not necessarily have to tie in with group or collective norms? So on this point too, bearing in mind the quotes I gave in my original article, I reiterate that the American writer does not accept group or collective norms. He therefore comes to a different conclusion from the Afrikaans writers quoted in my article, who embrace the "accepted values and norms of ... the group to which he belongs," (Viljoen and Pienaar p 95)

There are other points in Professor Viljoen's letter that I could query. (e.g. What has 'moral hypocrisy' to do with Vandenberg's acceptance or rejection of Divine Authority?) I feel, however, that I am entitled to conclude that my original thesis remains: Vandenberg's findings, as regards

pedagogic authority, differ from those of the Afrikaans writers quoted. Over to you, Professor Viljoen!

References

- (1) Adriaan Viljoen, Letter in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 3 August 1977
- (2) Hannah Gluckman "Phenomenology and Education: a Comparison of the Findings of Researchers in Two Different Countries" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 2 May 1977
- (3) D Vandenberg Being and Education: an Essay in Existential Phenomenology Prentice-Hall 1971
- (4) T A Viljoen and J J Pienaar Fundamental Pedagoics Butterworth 1971
- (5) C F G Gunter Aspects of Educational Theory translated by G van Wageningen University Publishers and Booksellers 1974
- (6) Hannah Gluckman A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Education which undergirds the Teaching of Educational Studies in Afrikaans Teacher Training Institutions in the Transvaal M Ed Thesis submitted to the University of the Witwatersrand 1976

ARTICLES

LEARNING HOW TO POLICE THE MATCH: MODELS FOR TEACHING PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Arthur Clark

"The dethroned philosopher ... can sit on the touchline policing the match, clarifying other people's vagueness."(1)

Philosophy of education is both a field of knowledge and a family of skills. As a field of knowledge it draws on established branches of philosophy, and brings together those segments that are relevant to educational issues (2). As a family of skills - the art of philosophizing about education - it involves analysing and clarifying educational concepts, teasing out hidden implications and assumptions, and justifying value judgments, recommendations and prescriptions (1,3,4). A course which concentrates on structuring the field of knowledge through lectures is in danger of being seen as remote from classroom issues, whereas one which focuses on philosophizing in small groups risks being regarded as 'mere talk', 'common sense', perhaps stimulating at the time but empty of content in retrospect. Milner (5) has highlighted the tension between the two approaches, both of which he claims are necessary and complementary. He suggests that lectures and discussions form a spectrum in which there is infinite gradation. It is the purpose of the present paper to examine this spectrum in more detail, in the light of recent studies of tertiary education (6,7). Some aspects of the methodology may be of use to those teaching other educational disciplines.

TEACHING MODEL A : LECTURES AND MIXED LECTURE/DISCUSSION APPROACHES

- (i) Continuous exposition;
- (ii) Step-by-step lecture, with pauses to discuss major points;
- (iii) Interrupted exposition, with pauses for questions and clarification;
- (iv) Interrupted exposition, with controlled discussion, including buzz groups;
- (v) Lecture preceded by discussion activities, e.g. buzz groups, brain-storming, problem centred groups;
- (vi) Lecture followed by discussion, problem centred groups or buzz groups.

Variations: (a) specific readings provided beforehand;
(b) printed summary or other handout;
(c) assistance with note-taking, e.g. advice, outline on overhead projector, proforma.

For all modes apart from (i), problems of organisation and student participation are greatly increased when the class has more than 30 students. Some departments divide the class into groups of less than 30, taught separately. Modes (ii), (iii) and (iv) are commonly employed. This arrangement provides good opportunities for disputation and queries in a structured setting.

Lectures may achieve certain objectives effectively, such as providing a conceptual framework for further study, illustrating or simplifying arguments, and summarizing the views of several writers. Research has indicated that they are less effective in stimulating thought or changing attitudes (7), and they are widely regarded as less popular among students than participatory methods. Nevertheless, 'lectures providing a simple introductory survey, with information sheets' were rated the most useful method for a principles of education course at Rhodes, out of 15 methods used.

TEACHING MODEL B : DISCUSSIONS

- (i) The discussion paper (published). The focus is a paper or chapter from a printed source. A list of discussion questions is circulated beforehand.
- (ii) The discussion paper (unpublished). The paper is drafted by the tutor for distribution beforehand. It may include study hints, a summary of salient points culled from several texts, with page references and discussion points.

- (iii) Problem-centred groups. The class is divided into three or four discussion groups, each with a different set of questions. Later a plenary session is held.
- (iv) Syndicates. As in (iii), but reports are written. The development of the syndicate as a vehicle for peer teaching is described by Collier (8).
- (v) Free group discussion. The tutor attempts to move himself from the pivotal position, allowing the group to correct errors (9).
- (vi) Leaderless groups. With no tutor present, student participation increases, and is more equally distributed (10).
- (vii) Self-directed student learning groups. Course materials are provided. The tutor is available as consultant (11).
- (viii) Learning cell or dyad. Random sorting of student pairs, who take turns to teach and question each other on topics (11).

Small group discussion is regarded as capable of attaining objectives such as changing attitudes, reducing prejudices, developing oral skills, self awareness, and critical thinking, and the understanding of complex issues. There are opportunities to challenge, inquire, and develop counter arguments, to test theories through the reaction of others, and to move from partial understanding to a reasoned and perceptive grasp of issues. Modes (iii) to (viii) reduce the risk of dominance of the group by the 'noisy tutor', and the inhibiting effect of his authority. His role should be to encourage participation by all, to protect divergent points of view, to allow the group to be self-corrective, and to philosophize sparingly. Teaching can be best done by keeping a summary of arguments for discussion later, and by indicating possible readings at the end of the period. Baumgart's typology of observed tutorial roles should be a warning to the tutor who favours the objectives listed above (12). Stenhouse (13) favours the establishment by the group of rules and conventions appropriate to educational aims, and a student view is that group processes should be frankly discussed (14).

TEACHING MODEL C : TEAM TEACHING VARIATIONS OF A AND B

- (i) Variations of Model A, with two or more lecturers, a panel, etc.
- (ii) The 'phil box' and 'ed cox' approach. A large class is divided into small groups, timetabled to have the following sessions in, say, half a morning:

- (a) 'teaching session' with the philosophy specialist, dealing with the basic philosophical issues of a topic, summarised on an information sheet. A blend of exposition and discussion, with the focus on helping students to understand the issues;
- (b) 'discussion of the educational implications' with a non-specialist tutor or teaching assistant, possibly using questions and material prepared by the specialist. We used this method for a moral education unit. Two tutors taught topics such as indoctrination and the nature of morality under (a), while four tutors discussed under (b) such topics as John Wilson's 26 suggestions for moral education in schools, using as guidelines in each case: (i) Is it practicable? If so, to which age groups does it apply?; (ii) Are there any dangers of indoctrination or other undesirable effects using this approach?

TEACHING MODEL D : MIXED DISCUSSION AND INDEPENDENT STUDY

- (i) Assigned topics given to individual students to investigate and report back to the discussion group.
- (ii) 'Six statements worth making! As in (i), but the student has to produce six statements worth making on his topic, representing personal belief and reflection. In discussion he tries to enlist the support of the group (15).
- (iii) Set book seminars. Used for authors such as Plato, Dewey and Illich. Students or pairs are each allocated a chapter to present to the group. A separate theme is set for each week, for which particular chapters are required reading. Guidance is provided, for example: (a) What, very briefly, is Holt trying to say in this chapter?; (b) How sound is his argument?; (c) What prescriptions, if any, is he making for teaching, and what are the implications of the chapter for you as teachers?
- (iv) Essay seminars. Assignments are suggested by the students for major areas of study, and tutorials given on approach and sources. Essay topics are grouped and calendared for presentation to the class, who are advised about key readings. The student is given a short period to present his summary for discussion.
- (v) Problem solving seminars. Students may be asked to choose a problem, explicate it, propose a solution,

and provide supporting argument (16). Alternatively the problem may involve study of a text, eg. for B Ed: which of Scheffler's 'philosophical models for teaching' is closest to the one you favour for your own teaching subject?

- (vi) Seminars on a theme. A list of articles and readings on a theme is circulated. Each student selects or is given a reading to prepare. Short reports are given, or the tutor calls for comments according to a plan which is not disclosed to the students. Needs a firm and knowledgeable chairman!

TEACHING MODEL E : INDEPENDENT STUDY.

Independent study has been defined as the self-directed pursuit of academic competence in an autonomous manner as the student is able to exercise at a particular time (17). Seen as the capability to continue one's own learning with little or no institutional support, it is arguably the most important goal of teacher education. Study skills developed in undergraduate work should be utilised at HDE level. Some students may not need or want the highly structured learning experience, implicit in some of the approaches above. Alternatives include:

- (i) A modular curriculum, to enable students to select individual units for independent study.
- (ii) Choice of assignments including 'choose your own title'.
- (iii) An extended piece of work, long essay etc.
- (iv) Giving the option of reducing class attendance requirements and increasing individual oral and written reports.
- (v) Passages for analysis.
- (vi) Matching exercise - matching various philosophical criteria and educational principles with quotations.

CONCLUSION

What principles are there to guide our choice among the methods surveyed? First, some features of the HDE course should be noted - its introductory character, the large size and wide range of experience of the group, and the relatively short amount of teaching and independent study time available for the philosophy component, all pointing towards the utilisation of some of the team teaching variations of Models A, B and D. In contrast, the relatively small full-time B Ed group may be more suited for Models A (iii) and (v); B (i), (ii), (iv), (v) and

(vii; D (i), (ii), (iv) and (vi); and E. Part-time B Ed's may need more of Model E and a greater amount of the structure provided by Model A (iii).

Next, we should bear in mind Dubin and Taveggia's findings from 91 research papers. "there is no measurable difference among distinctive methods of instruction when evaluated by student performance in the final examination." (18) But ought not courses of professional education to be vocationally orientated, and may not a written examination on traditional lines introduce other more academic goals?

Our third principle, then, should be that the choice of methods will depend to a considerable extent on the course objectives, a full consideration of which would necessitate another article. As an example, 'to produce thoughtful practitioners, not to hand over prepackaged thoughts', suggests a blend of Models B, D and E, rather than an exclusive use of A.

Fourthly, consideration must be given to student preferences. Ratings of 15 methods at Rhodes for several years on a five point scale showed that every method was rated A or B by a proportion of the students, while even the most popular of the methods were rated D or E by 5-10% of the group. The use of a variety of methods caters for these divergences.

Furthermore, research is indicating that different methods suit different personality types. Poorly motivated students achieved more in philosophy in a conventional lecture/discussion format, whereas highly motivated students performed better in independent study (16).

In conclusion, we ought to begin with carefully thought out and realistic aims and syllabuses, and then select appropriate techniques from all the major models, at the same time building in electives, and ensuring that there is as much formal and informal feedback as possible on student progress and responses. 'Rationality', 'freedom', 'responsibility' and 'needs' are key concepts in our courses, and ought to be manifest in our procedures.

References

- (1) R Barrow "What's wrong with the philosophy of Education?" in British Journal of Educational Studies xxii, 133-146, 1974

- (2) P H Hirst & R S Peters The Logic of Education
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1970
- (3) H L Hudson "The principles of education and philosophy" in Rhodes University Department of Education Bulletin iii 21-31, 1974
- (4) H Freeman "On the nature of philosophy of education and its practice in colleges and departments of education" in Education for Teaching No 98, 37-46, 1975
- (5) B Milner "Teaching philosophy to teachers-in-training: tensions and contrasts" in Education for Teaching No 87, 69-75, 1972
- (6) E Beard Teaching and Learning in Higher Education
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972
- (7) D A Bligh What's the Use of Lectures? Penguin,
Harmondsworth 1972
- (8) K G Collier "Syndicate methods: further evidence and comment", in Universities Quarterly 431-436, 1969
- (9) S A Barnett "An experiment with free discussion groups", Universities Quarterly, xii, 175-180, 1968
- (10) J P Powell "Small group teaching methods in higher education", Educational Research, xvi, 163-171, 1974
- (11) B and M Goldschmidt "Peer teaching in higher education: a review", Higher Education, v, 9-34, 1976.
- (12) N Baumgart "Verbal interaction in university tutorials", Higher Education, v, 301-317, 1976
- (13) L Stenhouse "Teaching through small group discussion: formality, rules and authority", Cambridge Journal of Education, 18-24, 1972
- (14) C Seale "The discussion group", Journal of Further and Higher Education, i, 1977
- (15) S Nisbet "A method for advanced seminars", Universities Quarterly, xx, 349-355, 1966
- (16) W L Blizek, K Jackson and J C Lavoie, "Short course vs conventional structures for teaching philosophy". Journal of Experimental Education, xliii, 25-33, 1974
- (17) P L Dressel and M M Thompson Independent Study,
San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1973
- (18) E Dubin and T C Taveggia The Teaching-Learning Paradox
University of Oregon, 1968

THE ARENA OF MORALITY

John Burchard

A categorical distinction is often made between facts and values. Facts, it is said, are verifiable and values are not. Since morality is concerned with values it is argued that there are no moral facts, that morality is merely a matter of opinion. In this paper I intend to show that such dismissal of moral facts is indefensible.

The paper is in two parts. In the first part I argue that morality if based upon fact, that the distinction between moral facts and other facts is a distinction between two categories of facts rather than between facts and non-facts. In the second part I examine the historical and anthropological evidence usually used to support subjectivist views of morality and point out the inevitable contradictions inherent in relativism.

PART ONE

Before talking about moral facts it is necessary to be clear about what a fact is. A fact is not simply something that exists in the world. ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' is accepted as a fact but it is clear that it does not have any concrete physical existence. A fact also has no temporal dimension; ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' is a fact, always was a fact and will always be a fact.

Central to the notion of a fact is that it is given. A fact is in no way a personal or social construct. The notion of fact is dependant upon the notion of a real world that exists independently of people's thought and actions. In establishing a fact we establish something about the nature of that real world.

The problem with this account of the nature of facts, is that it provides no means for discriminating between what is a fact and what is merely believed to be a fact. Even when we hold a false belief we believe something, although that something has no existence outside the belief. The problem is how to distinguish between a fact that exists independently of our belief, which is given; and the object of a false belief which is dependent upon our believing, which is constructed.

The only way we have for distinguishing between what is given and what we construct is by our intersubjective agreement on the matter. We presume that a real world does exist and that it is experienced in the same way by everybody. My account of my experience of this world will correspond with everybody else's account of their experience of it. We can only experience the real world subjectively but when our experience corresponds we assume that we have all experienced the same thing, that it is not constructed, that its existence is a fact. Our only criterion for the acceptance of a fact is that there must be general agreement about the nature of the fact.

This is not an entirely satisfactory way of deciding what is fact for it is frequently the case that a false belief is sufficiently widely held to be accepted as fact. When this happens we remain unaware that what we hold to be a fact is a belief until such time as a contradictory belief emerges. We then have to decide which of our beliefs is true, which of our beliefs has as its object a fact.

At this point it is possible to make a distinction between two categories of facts. We can verify the nature of facts in the one category by inter-subjective agreement only. The facts in this category are those that relate to non-concrete things. Moral facts fall into this category together with mathematical facts, aesthetic facts etc. This category of facts is distinct from the category of empirical facts. Empirical facts relate to the nature of concrete things, individual cases of which can be manipulated to confirm predictions based upon the agreed nature of such concrete things. The accuracy of the prediction is accepted as evidence of the correctness of the inter-subjective agreement.

Those who believe that moral facts do not exist base their belief upon the purely intersubjective way in which we determine the nature of such facts. We cannot confirm their existence or their nature by means of experiment and this is considered as evidence for their not being facts. This distinction is both arbitrary and invalid. There is nothing implicit in the concept of a fact that makes empirical verification a prerequisite for a fact. To show that this distinction is arbitrarily applied I will define what would count as an example of a moral fact and compare it with other more widely accepted non-empirical facts.

Morality is concerned with human activities and their effect upon human welfare. This is implicit in the con-

cept of morality. It is the agreed definition of morality and the characteristic shared by all moral principles. We can only classify a principle as a moral principle insofar as it is concerned with the effect of human activities upon human welfare.

At a physical level moral facts are empirical facts. What is beneficial to a person's physical welfare is not only a matter of intersubjective agreement, it can be confirmed by the nature of physiological events. Denying a person food will be an action that is detrimental to his physical welfare. This moral fact can be experimentally confirmed, we can arrange events to provide verification for this prediction. The outcome of such an action is invariable, it is given.

Doubts about the nature of moral facts at a physical level can only arise about special cases or from a confusion between wants and needs. It is possible that it would be beneficial to withhold food from a person suffering from peritonitis. This is a special case. What is normally beneficial to persons' welfare constitutes their needs. Things other than needs which people believe to be beneficial to their welfare are their wants.

Disagreement about the nature of moral facts is largely confined to the area of human wants. It is difficult to see that these are given and not constructed. This difficulty is a consequence of man's dual nature. He is at once a physical object and a potential constructor of false beliefs. To show that his wants are part of his physical nature it is necessary to show that his beliefs about his own nature are subject to the same process of verification as his beliefs about the nature of other physical objects.

It is clear that a person's wants do not have any concrete existence nor need they have any empirically verifiable effect upon human welfare. This does not mean that they have no independent existence. It is meaningful to talk of the existence of many things that have no concrete existence nor any effect upon the nature of concrete things. We can, for example, talk of justice, of ideas and of beliefs. All of these things exist in the real world. It is in no way contradictory to talk of the existence of even a false belief as a fact. The object of the belief does not exist, but the belief itself does and its existence is experienced by the holder of that belief in much the same way as he experiences the existence of any other fact.

The nature of human wants is determined by people and is concerned with that people believe about their welfare. The object of their belief is their welfare, and their welfare is as much a given fact as is the welfare of their cattle. The nature of human wants is not arbitrarily constructed. What is beneficial to people is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of fact. The nature of any individual's wants is both determined by, and contributes to the categorical notion of human wants. An individual's wants are only recognisable as such if it is a meaningful want for other people. If they are not meaningful they are not normal wants and must be explained before they can be classified as wants. The nature of human wants is determined as is the nature of other facts by intersubjective agreement. In this case there is agreement on the nature of individuals' wants. This intersubjective agreement is the only assurance we have of the standard and stable nature of human wants, and of our standard experience of them.

Our experience of moral facts is not like our experience of empirical facts. We are aware of moral facts without actively having sought them. They impose themselves upon our consciousness in much the same way as things that we see and hear do. We experience moral facts directly and inadvertently. Our experience of moral facts does not come through our senses, but is no less valid a form of experience than seeing or hearing. That such experience is inadvertent indicates that what is experienced is given, not constructed.

The nature of our experience of things in the world upon which we base our agreement about moral facts is not physical. It occurs concurrently with our experience of concrete events which have some effect upon human welfare. The experience of witnessing the event is distinct from the experience of the moral facts. This is not a peculiarity of moral facts, it is characteristic of our experience of all non-empirical facts including mathematical facts. Mathematical facts are, like moral facts, given. In a very real sense they exist in the world independently of our awareness of them.

In that our experience of moral facts is not physical it is held that moral facts are less objective than empirical facts. Objectivity has nothing to do with the nature of the facts that we experience, there are no such things as objective facts. Objectivity is a human performance and has to do with how we decide what is fact rather than how we experience the facts. Inter-

subjective agreement not only presupposes the existence of a real world but also a standard way of interpreting the facts that are given by the real world. The particular way in which we interpret the facts is determined by the area of enquiry to which the facts are appropriate. In each area of enquiry we have an agreed decision making procedure that ensures that contradictory facts do not arise. The nature of this procedure is a matter of prior agreement determined by the nature of the results we seek rather than the facts. The use of such procedures constitutes objectivity. To be objective in the sphere of morality is to use the same standard procedure to evaluate our own actions and the actions of others. Given the same facts from two distinct events, our moral evaluation of these events must be the same in both cases.

The difference between mathematical and moral facts is a difference in the areas of enquiry to which each is appropriate. There is no difference in the way in which we experience these facts, in the degree of objectivity associated with each nor in their relationship to concrete things in the world. Mathematical and moral facts are equally facts and if mathematics is factual so too is morality.

The similarities between what are generally counted as facts and moral facts are sufficient to show that a denial of the existence of moral facts is the result of a misunderstanding of the nature of facts generally rather than any peculiarity of moral facts.

PART TWO.

What are the grounds for supposing that morality is not factual? What is the subjectivist's evidence for his claim that morality is merely a matter of opinion?

The subjectivist would start his argument with historical evidence to show that morality is not stable. He would point to the evolution of our concept of morality as evidence of the changing nature of morality. This, he would say, shows that morality is arbitrary, subject to conscious change. Moral facts are not given, they are social constructs. However, historical evidence shows that there are very few stable facts, that most of what we hold as true is subject to change. It was once held

that the world was flat and this is no longer true. This does not mean that there are no geographical facts or that geography is merely a matter of opinion.

The subjectivist would also produce anthropological evidence for his argument. He would say that the difference in various societies' moral principles shows that there are no generally accepted moral facts upon which these principles are based.

Warnock (1) argues that the differences evident between the moralities of various societies are the result of non-moral differences. They may be the result of different beliefs about the consequences of actions and not be moral differences at all. Alternatively such differences may arise out of differences in environment in which case the differences will be moral, but based upon different facts. To clarify what Warnock says imagine that in a certain society it is said to be immoral to throw water on the ground. This belief may have arisen because:

- a) They believe that the earth retains the water it absorbs. There is a limited amount of water available and allowing any of it to touch the ground hastens its exhaustion. This is a belief about the natural consequences of the action.
- b) They believe that water that falls to the ground provides a breeding place for evil spirits. This is a belief in the supernatural consequences of actions.

Both these beliefs are false. Throwing water on the ground has no detrimental effect upon people's welfare and in neither case is the prohibition of this behaviour a moral principle.

A similar prohibition against wasting water in a desert community may well be a moral prohibition based upon a moral fact. Where water is scarce its wastage may have a detrimental effect upon human welfare. In this case the peculiarity of this society's morality, its prescribed use of water, is based upon a moral fact.

The subjectivist could argue that although these are adequate explanations of the reasons for observed differences in moralities they do not prove that moral facts exist. In the absence of facts truth cannot be a criterion for morality and there is no way of determining which moral principle is the best other than in terms of their social function. Since morality is

arbitrary it is probable that each society has adopted the morality most suitable to its needs. All moralities are thus equally good, the use of the term 'moral' is socially determined and whatever moral principles you adopt you will be as moral as the next man.

There are two contradictions in this argument. The first concerns the claim that the nature of morality is arbitrary, a claim that is inconsistent with the recognition of the existence of different moral principles. The fact that the subjectivist recognises that entirely different, perhaps even contradictory principles are moral principles, clearly indicates that they all share some common characteristic that allows him to classify them as moral principles. In that all moral principles have to have this characteristic their nature is not entirely arbitrary.

The second inconsistency concerns the claim that morality is socially relative. This Bernard Williams (2) calls the 'anthropologist's heresy, possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced in moral philosophy.' The relativist argument is that morality is to be judged on the criterion of social function alone, that each morality is right for the society that develops it and that there can be no justification for criticising another society's morality. The contradiction inherent in this view of morality can best be explained by restating the relativist argument in two propositions: "'Right' means right for a certain society" and "It is not right for one society to judge another society's morality." Taken together these two propositions are contradictory; the 'right' of the second proposition transcends the limit set on rightness in the first premise.

A similar contradiction is implicit in any subjectivist position on morality. The subjectivist who says that he cannot say whether somebody else's behaviour is right or wrong brings into his argument the very thing he says does not exist, objective rightness, a moral principle that exists independently of his opinions and which is based upon fact.

References

- (1) G J Warnock The Object of Morality Methuen 1971
- (2) B Williams Morality Penguin 1973

POWER, AUTHORITY, AND EDUCATION

Helder Marques

Abstract

A distinction is made between power and authority on the basis of the obligation of the individual. It is argued that the school is a microcosm of society and hence is subject to the same analysis. The need for properly constituted authority in the school community is discussed.

1 Introduction

One of the most challenging questions in the philosophy of education is that concerning the authority of the teacher. Much has been written on the subject and will, no doubt, continue to be written. Three recent articles in this journal (2,3,4) dealt with the interrelation of authority and education at some length. Unfortunately no attempt was made to arrive at an adequate definition of the notion of authority and the notion of authority appeared to be confused with the quite different notion of power.

An attempt will be made to distinguish between these two concepts using the obligation of the individual to underline the dissimilarity. It will then be argued that the analysis is applicable to the school community and the necessity for properly constituted authority in the schools will be discussed.

2 Power and Authority (5)

An unfortunate result of common usage is the synonymity often attached to the notion of power and the notion of authority; indeed, some writings in political philosophy do little to dispel the confusion, tending rather to augment it. To say that one has authority to issue a command, and to say that one has the power to see that one's orders are carried out are not necessarily the same thing. The distinction between the two lies in the obligation attached to the command.

If someone is said to be in authority then he has the right to issue commands. Furthermore, he has an associated right to expect those commands to be obeyed. For a person who is in authority over a group has been placed in that position by virtue of group consent (the route whereby that consent is achieved being essentially unimportant) and implicit in that consent is an undertaking to obey the rules and regulations promulgated by the person in authority within specified limitations. Therefore there is associated with the command issued by a person in authority a moral obligation on the part of those commanded to obey. Authority, as Raphael says, is a right of recipience.

Naturally, authority is not entirely divorced from power; the two are interrelated. Behind the command of a person in authority stands the coercive power of the state. The use of that power is usually justified on the grounds that the whole fabric of the social system would fall, due to the activities of socially maladjusted persons were the authorities to have no power to enforce the law.

What is important, however - and this is frequently not appreciated - is that commands can be made to be obeyed without the existence of authority behind such commands. For example, one can ensure that one's orders are carried out by threatening to withhold food or money, or by threatening physical violence. Those being ordered under such circumstances might feel that they are obliged to obey, but their obedience stems not from a moral obligation to do so, but rather from a fear of the unpleasant circumstances which disobedience might bring. Their obedience has no moral dimension; their consent has never been sought; there is no question of freedom of choice. Obedience is achieved by threat, and those who obey do so because they find it prudent to do so. The obligation they experience can therefore be termed a prudential obligation. It is readily appreciated that this sort of obligation is quite different from the moral obligation outlined above.

Authority, therefore, while usually backed by coercive power, has a moral dimension; the exercise of power does not.

3 Rationalising authority

The existence of authority within a community requires rationalising, for its very existence is an affront to

the dignity of the individual since it necessarily entails a curbing of what de Tocqueville called "the circle of freedom (that) exists around each individual". This fact has been recognised amongst political philosophers for centuries and despite the unpalatable limitations on human freedom it is generally agreed that some form of authority is required to ensure the survival of the human community.

The formation of human communities stemmed from the realisation that the communal structure offered the best hopes for survival of the individual. The whole point of the communal structure was that it could best serve the achievement of the common good as determined by the rational will. The ultimate aims of the communal structure therefore provided the justification for the existence of authority of the state, with each individual being placed under moral obligation to adhere to the law as promulgated by those in authority.

It has often been the case in the history of our civilisation that individuals or groups of individuals have seized power and prostituted the ideal system. Authority is forfeited and government from a position of power is instituted. The whole fabric of the human community has ceased to have any meaning; the common good as ultimate aim is forgotten; the social structure has ceased to have any meaning. If the situation is to be remedied, then revolt, revolution, and the overthrow of those in power are the only means whereby the community can be once more geared towards its true goal.

4 The school

The human community, as we have said, was established for the pursuit of a common goal, this, surely, is the rationale behind the establishment of schools: the producing of reasonably mature, reasonably educated, reasonably aware, reasonable young men and women, and hence the transmission from one generation to another of those norms and values which define our civilisation. Schools, therefore, like the greater community in which they are established, form agglomerations of human beings united towards the achievement of a single purpose. Consequently, the analysis to which we subjected the greater community is equally valid for the smaller community; the school is a microcosm of society.

Of particular interest to us is the question of authority in the school community, and it follows from what was said above that the nature of authority in the school can also be analysed on the grounds of obligation. However, one must be aware of another dimension to the notion of authority when discussing it in relation to education and the school community. This is, as Peters (6) points out, the notion of the teacher being both an authority and in authority.

It is assumed that the teacher is to some extent an authority in some particular field of human endeavour, and, moreover, an authority on the teaching of children. This notion of the teacher as an authority in these spheres results in society conferring upon the teacher authority over children in the school. De jure, therefore, the teacher is in authority over a pupil because of his being an authority in some field of knowledge. However, as we have said, the school community may be subjected to the same analysis as the human community. Consequently, it does not necessarily follow that the de jure authority of the teacher is recognised by the pupils unless some attempt is made to make them aware of the advisability of the existence of authority in the teacher. In other words, consent for the authority of the teacher must be obtained from the pupil. If, and only if, such consent is obtained will the de jure authority of the teacher become de facto authority.

It might be argued, perhaps with some justification, that the average high school pupil is simply not mature enough to forward his consent to authority; competence in giving consent is obviously necessary. The argument might then go that what one requires is in fact de facto power rather than authority. Whatever truth there is in such a view does not rule out the fact that an attempt should be made to gain the consent of the pupils for the authority of the teacher. A school rule should not be a decree from the hierarchy; its purpose should be clearly explained to the pupils. Consider as example the question of disruptive behaviour in the classroom. This cannot be tolerated because it infringes upon the right of another member of the class to attend to the lesson. This is reasonable, and it would be a very unreasonable pupil indeed (one that was not competent to give consent, in other words) that would question the advisability of such a rule. But then consider as a second example the rule governing the length of boys' hair. The rule has no sound educational purpose;

to enforce the rule is to be unreasonable. The dynamic interaction which characterises the exercise of authority would have the first rule upheld and the second abolished. If all rules governing the everyday running of a school were similarly handled, then the authority of the teacher would be a de facto authority. And as we have said, it is only by the exercise of authority, as distinct from the exercise of power, within the school community, that the ultimate ends of that social organisation can be achieved.

Unfortunately, experience has shown that in the vast majority of the schools in this country power rather than authority is exercised. The result is a sense of diffusion of the aims of the school; the maintenance of short hair rather than the education of individuals appears in the minds of the pupils to be of paramount importance. As in any tyranny, obedience might be ensured because of the unpleasant consequences which engender prudential obligation; but resentment is never very far below the surface. To beat the system rather than to work with it becomes the order of the day. Rebellion, opposition and resentment begin to characterise the behaviour of pupils, instead of a sense of comradeship and cooperation, a pulling-together towards the ultimate realisation of the aims of the institution. Until our schools abandon their unfortunate tyranny over their pupils, abandon the exercise of power and replace it with the exercise of authority, the school system can never function efficiently towards the realisation of the aims for which the human community created it. Instead of being a social service, the school will continue to be a social liability.

Footnotes and References

- (1) Present address: Department of Chemistry, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
- (2) Hannah Gluckman "Phenomenology and Education: a Comparison of the Findings of Researchers in Two Different Countries" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 2 May 1977

- (3) Astrid Kuijper "Knowledge and the Authority of Teachers" in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 2 May 1977
- (4) Adriaan Viljoen, Letter in Perspectives in Education Vol 2 No 3 August 1977
- (5) The analysis owes much to DD Raphael Problems of Political Philosophy Macmillan, London 1970
- (6) RS Peters Ethics and Education George Allen & Unwin, London 1966.

INTERCHANGE

PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

Don Margetson

Participation is among the more fashionable notions of the past decade or two. It is the season's fashionable cloth, worn to signify one's warm humanitarian feelings. Together with democracy and education it forms a three-piece suit advertising one's enlightenment and fellow-feeling, showing one's good taste and sympathy, and putting one among the pure and innocent. But is it this, and is it no more than this? Must we be content to regard participation as something currently in vogue, to be lightly discarded if we so choose? Does the concept of participation not commit us to something more substantial than this?

In its most vacuous usage, "participation" is indeed little more than an approved slogan. Much more sinisterly, it is often seen as no more than a subterfuge which is useful in achieving what the user is after. Persons generally do not like to be manipulated by others, but if manipulation can be disguised behind a favourable facade expressing humanitarian "participation" then the victims might be manipulated with so much less fuss. The naked iron claw can be counter-productive, so it is useful to disguise it in a velvet glove; the victim is then not only hurt, he is first smothered. This is an insultingly patronising form of "participation" which consists in the chummy back-slapping bonhomie which leaves the manipulator freer to achieve his authoritarian aims than if he had shown his iron claw for what it was. But how is it that the victim could allow himself to fall into this evil state?

A central reason seems to be that there are invaluable features of participation which naturally make it very attractive and which, when displayed, provide *prima facie* grounds for feeling that something good is under way; one crucial feature of participation is that it does indeed seem to be essential to the concept of humanity. Strawson (1) has articulated this by contrasting "participant attitudes" with "objective attitudes", where objective attitudes imply a detachment from the involvement and reciprocity which is essential to human relationships:

What I want to contrast is the attitude (or range of attitudes) of involvement or participation in a human relationship, on the one hand, and what might be called the objective attitude (or range of attitudes) to another human being, on the other. Even in the same situation, I must add, they are not altogether exclusive of each other; but they are, profoundly, opposed to each other. To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided, though this gerundive is not peculiar to cases of objectivity of attitude. The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways, but not in all ways: it may include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with others in interpersonal human relationships; it cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other. If your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel, or to reason with him. (1,p9)

Participant attitudes, then, are necessarily among those things which make human life distinctively human, they are central I imagine to what Wittgenstein meant by a shared form of life and to what Marx meant by our species of being. Such a form of life is not something created by the "expert" single-handedly, and which the mass of ignorant sheep

obediently and blindly follow. To say this is not to belittle the notion of leadership, provided that leadership is not - as it all too often is - confused with such concepts as directorship or management in the brazenly manipulative sense of these terms. The distinction between genuine leadership and such concepts as directorship rests, I suggest, on this point; directors, from privileged positions of power, tell others what they ought to do and are in a position to back this with various forms of coercion (the scope for objective attitudes and authoritarianism here is vast); genuine leaders show others, by example, what they - like the leaders - ought to be doing. Directors are two a penny, leaders are regrettably rare. Genuine leadership depends for its success on, among many things, attitudes which express a sincere regard for others as sympathetic responsible persons. As such they must participate in their activities in a way which exercises their capacities for sympathetic and responsible action. A leader shows (he does not dictate) what these activities are in such a way that others will voluntarily follow his lead because they see the good sense of doing so. By contrast, persons can be directed, or ordered to do certain things, or even be "managed" in such ways that they will do these things. But then this must be to some extent an expression of objective attitudes towards these persons, since a sympathetic and responsible person would of his own volition do what needed to be done in appropriate circumstances and would therefore not need to be directed, or ordered, or "managed" (2)

It would be going too far to claim that directorship and similar notions, except perhaps in their most authoritarian forms, were necessarily the result of purely objective attitudes, for directors and even benevolent dictators could claim that their directives were in the best interests of all. But this would be a very weak form of participant attitude. For it would allow in considerations such as the welfare of those directed, but rule out consideration of what those persons believed they wanted, or desired, or sought. And to rule out such considerations is to rule out some of the matters which are crucial to distinguishing persons from other kinds of object in the world. It seems then that participant attitudes can be held fully or only partially. Distinguishing the partially held from the fully held allows us to explain how it is that partially held participant attitudes can be used to mislead people: these partially held attitudes do contain a grain of goodness, even though it is abused. The nature of this abuse suggests that the abuser

is operating with a mixture of participant and objective attitudes, for an intention to manipulate others is part of what it is to adopt an objective attitude rather than a participant one. It would not be putting the matter too strongly, I think, to call this kind of mixed attitude "pseudo-participative" for reasons connected with another dimension of what it is that we participate in when we are said to participate. This other dimension is to be found in the writings of the classical democratic theorists (3). According to these theorists, participation meant, quite unequivocally, participation by persons in the making of decisions which affected them. Later this view was attacked, mainly in the USA by the "contemporary" democratic theorists on the ground that scientific research had shown the view to be untenable. But many sins are committed in the name of science, and it seems that this particular research has turned out to be a good deal less rigorous than those who are wont to flaunt the term "scientific" should find comfortable. However, a crucial difference between the classical theory and the contemporary theory is this. The classical theory considers it a necessary part of democratic theory that persons affected by decisions should have a direct part in the making of these decisions. The contemporary theory, by contrast considers that most persons are not capable (for one reason or another) of making such decisions; a necessary part of the contemporary theory therefore is that elites have to be elected to make decisions. In the classical theory persons make their own decisions; in the contemporary theory most persons elect a small elite to make their decisions for them. The notion of participation does come into both theories, but clearly in the contemporary theory the participation open to most persons is of an extremely limited and indirect kind. It is for this reason that Pateman considers the classical theory to involve genuine participation while the contemporary theory involves only pseudo-participation. Just as the surrender to others of a significant part of the range of decisions which should be open to one places one in a position of pseudo-participation in regard to those decisions, so diluting one's participant attitudes with objective attitudes places one in a position of pseudo-participation in relation to other persons. The point I wish to pursue is that the claim that participation meant participation by persons in the making of decisions which affected them has a close connection with fully participant attitudes, sufficiently close to be a necessary connection.

For if one has a genuinely participant attitude then one regards others with respect as persons; one sees them as taking part, in a full sense, in being human and therefore to be taken seriously. That is, persons are *prima facie* responsible agents with feelings, wants, desires, intentions, purposes, thoughts, and so on, and as such must have some power of decision-making over matters which affect their lives. To accept that all persons have an equal right to decide for themselves what kinds of lives they would like to lead is a natural consequence of adopting fully participant attitudes towards others. The matter could be expressed conversely, by saying that the assumption that persons should have the power to make decisions which affect their lives is dependent on adopting participant attitudes towards others. Given the one, the other must follow. How could one, logically, adopt participant attitudes but deny decision-making power in the area suggested; or how could one accept that persons should have these decision-making powers, but adopt objective attitudes towards persons?

The complementarity of these attitudes and powers must result in agreement of some kind, either on substantive issues, or, failing that, on procedures for settling these issues. For the only alternative to such agreement, in a situation where people are in an active relationship with each other, is conflict. Such conflict would be understandable if only powers of decision-making were taken into account, for people might simply make conflicting decisions. But how could conflict over both substantive and procedural issues be compatible with participant attitudes? These attitudes necessarily involve sympathetic consideration of the feelings and thoughts of others. At best, then - which is unlikely, the world being what it is - each person would find all his legitimate wants, desires, etc satisfied (where what is legitimate is what is compatible with the attitudes and powers under discussion). At worst, a mutual exercise of these attitudes would result in an agreed compromise. Anything less than this would not be compatible with fully participant attitudes on the part of all those concerned, for anything less than compromise would involve some kind of unresolved conflict. Such unresolved conflict could occur only if there was either a lack of sympathetic consideration between some of the parties, or if some parties unilaterally overrode the views of others. But, in the first case, to show a lack of sympathetic consideration would be to fall short of exercising a fully participant attitude, since such an attitude demands that - where decisions have to be taken -

the parties concerned agree either on the decision itself or on a mutually agreeable procedure for making a decision (for example, in the simplest cases, the taking of a vote after due discussion, or the appointment of an arbitrator). In the second case, unilateral decision-making would clearly be incompatible with the right to equal powers of decision-making within a context of sympathetic consideration for the views of others that is demanded by the notion of full participation.

The third concept to be touched on, very briefly, in this context is that of education, and again the classical democratic theorists provide some useful insight. A crucial element in their theory was the notion of education in a wide sense. Decision-making is not something that one can learn adequately by studying it at a distance. Rather one learns to make decisions by participating in the making of decisions. This process of decision-making is educative in that one learns to do something by doing it, and learns how better to do it by practising it; moreover, it is not some kind of preparatory exercise (terminating perhaps in the award of a certificate) to be put to use later. It is, therefore, a significant aspect of a way of living; it is not merely a bit of detached learning which, hopefully, will one day be "applied" in some relevant activity. Participation, then, understood as the adoption of fully participant attitudes and participation in decision-making, is educative in that it is itself a learning process with the crucially valuable function of developing what is essentially human about persons.

On this account the conclusion must be that participation is not something to be lightly discarded if we so choose. On the contrary, to the extent that we discard the notion of participation we discard our humanity. To regard persons as objects to be manipulated, for whatever ends, is to deny the humanity of those persons; to deny persons the rights and real opportunity to participate in the making of decisions which effect them is again to deny the same humanity; and to call anything "education" which does not promote participant attitudes and abilities is to degrade education to the level of a mere instrument of control (4).

Notes

- (1) PF Strawson "Freedom and Resentment" in Freedom

and Resentments and other essays (London Methuen 1974)

- (2) In the little space available here it is possible to consider only the central case of a normal person. Strawson, in the essay cited, gives some consideration to abnormal persons.
- (3) Carole Pateman Participation and democratic Theory (CUP 1970) Ch 1 - 2
- (4) A form of this is aptly named by Althusser an 'Ideological State Apparatus.' L Althusser "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"
in Cosin (Ed) Education: Structure and Society (Penguin).

PARTICIPATING IN EDUCATION

Wally Morrow

- 1 In Don Margetson's paper there are two central positive theses. The first thesis can be summarized in the following sentence: '... the claim that participation meant participation by persons in the making of decisions which affected them has a close connection with fully participant attitudes, sufficiently close to be a necessary connection.' The second thesis is summarized in the following sentence: 'Participation, then, understood as the adoption of fully participant attitudes and participation in decision-making, is educative in that it is itself a learning process with the crucially valuable function of developing what is essentially human about persons.'

The first thesis is put forward in connection with what I take to be a defence of 'classical democratic theory' against 'contemporary democratic theory.' According to Margetson, 'classical' theory has been attacked on the ground that 'scientific research' had shown it to be untenable; but that 'research' was not genuinely rigorous, and, on other grounds, 'classical' theory can be shown to be preferable to 'contemporary' theory. This is done by showing that the notion of participation embodied in 'classical' theory is logically related (it is necessarily connected) to 'fully participant attitudes' in a way in which the notion of participation embodied in 'contemporary' theory is not; and 'fully participant attitudes' are valuable because they are 'necessarily among those things which make human life distinctively human.' I am in no position to comment on the accuracy of the interpretations, particularly in regard to how the notion of participation is understood, of the two types of democratic theory. What I wish to pick up, below, is the emphasis given in these accounts to the idea that participation means participation by persons in the making of decisions which affect them, and the idea that to take up 'fully participant attitudes' towards someone is necessarily to recognise his right, and give him the opportunity to participate in decisions which affect him.

The second thesis is put forward much more briefly than the first; consequently the arguments in support of it are much slighter. Participation is said to be the adoption of fully participant attitudes and participation in decision-making; and participation, so understood, is said to be educative because it has the following features: (a) one learns to participate in making decisions by participating in the making of decisions, (b) such participation is not some preparatory exercise but a significant aspect of a way of living, participating in the way specified develops what is essentially human about persons, and, (d) such participation is profoundly opposed to manipulation and the idea that education is a 'mere instrument of control.' I think these are good reasons for saying of any process that it is educative, and I also think it is true that participation, as Margetson has characterised it, does have the features he claims it does. In other words I have no wish to argue that the second thesis is not true, I think it is true, but I do wish to argue that it simply avoids the crucial and central problems in relation to participation and education. Those problems revolve around a version of the following dilemma: a person can't learn how to participate in decision-making 'at a distance', the only way to learn how to participate is by participating, but how can anyone participate until he has learnt how to participate? Part 2 of this paper is partly concerned with this dilemma - the remainder of this part is concerned with some problems which arise in Margetson's paper and are related to the central dilemma.

I shall discuss three such problems. The first has to do with what Margetson says about degenerate forms of participation, the second to do with the relationships between participant attitudes and morality, and the third to do with how the emphasis on participating in decision-making might commit one to an untenable form of individualism. In general my view is that there is a lack of a developmental perspective in Margetson's approach.

Early in his paper, and again subsequently, Margetson discusses the pathology of participation and participant attitudes. The problems he is concerned with have to do not so much with participation as with pretence, insincerity and deception. These things are important in relation to education, particularly in South Africa with its well engrained tradition of paternalism and what might be called, following Margetson, 'pseudo participant attitudes'.

Throughout Margetson expresses a strong preference for such things as sincerity, lack of pretence, and non-deception over their contraries. But if one is thinking of education rather than, say, political negotiation, then one might legitimately wonder whether the issue is as straightforward as this. Margetson favours 'leadership' over 'management' and 'directorship'; 'genuine leaders show others, what they - like the leaders - ought to be doing.' But this might involve a leader in being insincere, in deceiving others as to his emotions, in pretending to hold views he does not really hold and so on. To take an extreme case: faced with some dangerous circumstances a leader might be terrified out of his wits, but, realising that any sign of fear on his part will weaken the resolve of others around him, he might pretend to be unperturbed, he might deceive his followers into believing him to be unmoved by the circumstances which threaten them all. And by these subterfuges he might inspire his followers to be of good heart - thereby improving everyone's chance of success, maybe even survival. Similar kinds of consideration apply in the case of teaching. There are occasions on which to be able to further his educative purposes the most fruitful strategy is for the teacher to pretend to hold views he does not, to put forward a strong case in favour of a position which he thinks unacceptable and so on. As I implied above, there is no straightforward position on the role of sincerity and the like if one is thinking of teaching, including educative teaching.

We need to avoid trying to make the distinction between participant and detached attitudes too sharp (1). I think this is particularly important in relation to teaching. Strawson make the following comment, 'if your attitude to someone is wholly objective (ie detached)... you cannot quarrel with him ... you cannot reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel or reason with him.' (pg 9) But the distinction between being brave and pretending to be brave is often in practice difficult to draw; and the same can be said about the distinction between genuinely arguing, reasoning, or having a conversation with someone and pretending to argue, reason, or have a conversation with someone. Between the extremes there are many intermediate cases. Two experts in a specialist sphere might genuinely argue about some issue (they are not necessarily genuinely arguing - one or both might allow extraneous factors to influence what he says), but if one of the experts were talking to a novice about some issue within the specialist sphere he cannot genuinely argue. If the expert were intent on teaching the novice he might begin by pretending to argue - to help the novice to come to an under-

standing of what argument is like in that sphere - but as the novice becomes more expert the argument might gradually become more genuine. There is no clear break between taking up a 'pseudo-participant attitude' - pretending to argue, and taking up a 'fully participant attitude' - genuinely arguing.

In response to this Margetson might say that I had failed to consider the following characterisation of 'partially held participant attitudes' (which a few lines later becomes 'pseudo-participant attitudes'): 'But this would be a very weak form of participant attitude. For it would allow in considerations such as the welfare of those directed, but rule out consideration of what those persons believed they wanted, or desired, or sought.' And this takes us into a discussion of the relationships between participant attitudes and morality.

Morality is about the welfare of persons. There are indeed difficulties here, difficulties about how we are to determine, in particular cases, what is in someone's interest, or what will be beneficial to him. One might say that if one is thinking of a normal mature adult there is a presumption in favour of his being the final arbiter of what is in his interest; but if one says that the person himself, no matter what his condition, situation or circumstances, is always the final arbiter of what his welfare consists in, what will be beneficial to him, or what is in his interests, one lands oneself in the crudest kind of subjectivist theory of morality. But I don't think that this is the direction in which Margetson is going.

I think, rather, that what he wants to insist on is a relationship of some kind between participant attitudes and morality. And in this he is surely correct (2), but the relationship is nothing like straightforward. In the space available here I can do little more than make a few assertions, which are more like signposts in a bog than freeways to our destination.

I think we need first to notice that not all participant attitudes are, in some sense of the word, positive. Participant attitudes include not only such things as sympathy, gratitude, forgiveness, and in general a regard for others as centres of consciousness with purposes, desires and wants of their own, but also anger, revenge, antagonism, retaliation and resentment. This consideration alone should make us hesitate about too close an identification between participant attitudes and morality. There are occasions on which our antagonism

towards someone becomes so damaging to him that moral considerations should curb our antagonism. In other words, participant attitudes cannot be given a blank cheque in advance. Sometimes the demands of morality are such that rationally we ought to inhibit our participant attitudes. To drive the point home - and to try to articulate what I think has gone wrong in this regard in what Margetson says - consider the following remark: 'For if one has a genuinely participant attitude then one regards others with respect as persons.' Against this we might say that the principle of respect for persons requires in some cases that we (temporarily) abandon towards them our participant attitudes.

This is important if one is thinking of education. Education consists among other things, in transforming the way a person sees himself and his world. In this process his understanding of what he wants, of what is in his interest, and of what is beneficial to him, is modified. Before the transformation is under way he might have a quite mistaken or unrealistic view about what is in his interests (3). But this, of course, does not mean that what he thinks is unimportant or irrelevant; for it is what he thinks that becomes transformed. Education does not consist in imposing on a person something quite foreign or alien to him, and discovering what a person thinks (feels, desires, wants, etc) involves giving sympathetic consideration to his actions, taking seriously what he says, and so on. In other words it involves taking up towards him participant attitudes.

The possibility of education is based on the presumption that some people know and understand more than others. Parties to the enterprise are, in this dimension, not equal to each other. One might agree, if one were thinking of political negotiation that 'all persons have an equal right to decide for themselves what kinds of life they would like to lead', but if one is thinking of education this requires modification. In a certain sense of 'manipulation', education is a kind of benevolent manipulation. To the extent that this kind of manipulation is incompatible with 'fully participant attitudes', 'fully participant attitudes' are not appropriate between the educator and those for whose education he is responsible. Anyone who finds this conclusion unpalatable should ask himself the meaning of the words 'true', 'right' and 'beautiful'.

Polemically one could say that education has not very much to do with decisions but everything to do with

discoveries. Determining what is 'true', 'right' or 'beautiful' is never a question of taking a decision but of making a discovery. We are moving now into a discussion of what I previously called 'an untenable form of individualism.'

If one asks the quite general question: 'What is it that we participate in when we are said to participate?' I suppose that the only adequate answer is that we participate in activities. There are countless kinds of activity and one of these kinds might be called 'making decisions'. A subclass of this kind of activity might be called 'making decisions which affect one.' According to Margetson, when the 'classical democratic theorists' spoke about participation they meant '...quite unequivocally, participation by persons in the making of decisions which affected them.' But of course this yields a very limited answer to the question of what we participate in when we participate.

Now in certain contexts, particularly maybe in the context of political theory, it could, I suppose, be argued that such a limitation of one's focus is legitimate. After all, it might be said, the crucial aspect of the political process is how, and by whom, decisions which affect the lives of people are taken. But in the context of education such a limitation of one's focus has two kinds of unacceptable consequence

In becoming educated one is learning how to engage in certain kinds of rule-governed activity. But which such activities? This question must arise, if for no other reason that life and time are short, there is not enough time is a single life to engage in all possible rule-governed activities. And the answers given to this question certainly affect the lives of people. One might now start talking of the rights of parents, or the rights of the persons who are going to engage in these activities, or democratic processes, or of 'participating in decisions which affect one' etc. But one crucial fact needs to be borne in mind. The kinds of rule-governed activity we are talking about when we are talking about education are precisely those which it is not possible to understand, or to understand the value of, prior to engaging in them.

Prior to engaging in them, any 'decision' to engage in them can only be irrational ('I like the teacher') or made for inappropriate reasons ('I want to be a civil engineer'.) In the sphere of education 'To accept that all persons have an equal right to decide for themselves what kinds of lives they would like to lead.....' is to

commit oneself to the false idea that all human activities, including some of the most worthwhile, can be surveyed by anyone with a view to deciding which he would like to engage in. In reply one can say that only a person who is already in some measure educated could take such a decision rationally.

But I think there is an even more unacceptable consequence. To emphasize 'decisions' as the prime activity in which persons participate is to fail to give enough emphasis to the extent to which everything we think, desire, want or decide is governed by the conceptual schemes in terms of which we understand ourselves and our world. These conceptual schemes result not from some form of natural growth, or private invention, but from our participation in a human community. In thinking of participation and education one can't presuppose 'individual wills' or already existent rationality; such things are the product of education, they do not exist prior to education.

As this is a point Don Margetson himself brought clearly to my attention I am fairly sure it is one which he himself accepts. What I have been saying is that to limit one's consideration of participation to 'participation in making decisions which affect one' is to run the risk of committing oneself to an untenable form of individualism.

Throughout this section my general point has been the following: whatever one might argue about participation in the wider political sphere needs to be modified, and in some cases profoundly modified, if one is thinking of education. In general I think Margetson's paper fails to take proper account of this. I think his treatment of participation lacks the developmental perspective which is necessary if one is talking about participation and education. In the section which follows I shall try to gather together a few loose threads.

- 2 Maybe one way of forcing the issue out into the open, and clearing the ground for a more satisfactory account of the connection between education and participation, is to say that there are two notions of participation, somewhat different from each other. Participation (a) refers to a kind of negotiating mechanism or bargaining process. Here participation is seen as a tool for conflict resolution, a process by means of which competing interests are modified towards compatibility; here one can talk of people's right to participate in decisions which effect their lives. We might talk of the 'perfect self-interest

utility maximizer' who, if he is properly rational, will work out his personal calculus of the costs and benefits of taking part in collective decisions and thus compute the 'value' of participating or not.

(b) By contrast there is a notion of participation in respect of which this whole way of thinking is inappropriate. Imagine trying to subject to this kind of analysis something like participating in the activity of rock climbing or a conversation. It makes no sense at all to talk about a person's right to participate in a human community, all rights presuppose some human community; or of his subjecting to a cost-benefit analysis his participation in language, the analysis presupposes participation in language. I shall call this second notion, participation (b).

Participation (a) is the notion of participation in terms of which one talks about worker participation in industry; and this, too, is the notion which underlies the attempts to democratize the Dutch sociology institutes (4). The Dutch example is instructive. In the wake of the student unrest in the USA and Europe during the late 60's there was a drive to transform Dutch sociology institutes, and particularly the one associated with Amsterdam University, into participatory democracies. At Amsterdam a General Meeting, which consists of all staff, students and technical personnel, meets bi-annually to elect, on a one man one vote system, a General Committee which is the principle governing organ of the institute. As Punch says: 'Overall, the reforms mean that students are represented on virtually every sub-committee and have a say in all policy including the appointment of staff, the content of courses, the administration of research grants and so on.' (pg 3) But I don't think that the connection between education and participation is such that it entails turning schools and similar institutions into participatory democracies. Participatory democracies are themselves potentially educative, and I take it that this is the point which underlies Margetson's second thesis, however, one can't confine what needs saying about education and participation to this consideration. And this is not simply a point about efficiency (5) but about the nature of education.

There is one sphere related to education in which the notion of participation (a) is entirely appropriate and, particularly in South Africa, very important. This is the sphere of schooling policy, and maybe it was this sphere which Margetson had in mind in some of what he says. We are here in a more strictly political sphere; decisions need to

be taken about the allocation of resources and the structure of curricula and examinations, which decisions have wider implications for life-chances in society, and so on. In this sphere the right of communities to participate (a) in forming policy and arriving at collective decisions is manifest, and any system which systemically excluded whole communities from contributing to such decisions is clearly unjust. But the crucial fact, which makes it appropriate here to think of participation (a), is that we are talking about parties who already have well-formed and rational views about what will be beneficial to, or in the interests of, the communities they represent.

But if one is thinking of education in general it is participation (b) which is at the centre of the picture. This provides a strong reason for saying that it is fitting, in thinking of participation and education, to begin from a consideration of the contrast between participant and detached attitudes. There is precious little space for me to pursue this line of thought but I shall say something to point the direction in which it would go.

In becoming educated one is learning how to participate, or to participate more successfully, in a certain range of rule-governed activities. At least some (6) of the activities in question cannot be understood prior to participating in them. What I mean by this is that these activities cannot be understood merely from a description of them or merely from observing others participating in them; to use a remark of Margetson's, by 'studying them at a distance' one cannot learn how to participate in these activities. But how can we explain how there can be such activities?

One way is to remember that not all our knowledge is discursive, we cannot spell out to articulate everything we know. Polyani (7) makes much of this point. He sets out to show that we know more than we can tell in a wide variety of spheres. He begins with examples such as being able to recognise the face of a friend in a crowd of thousands without being able to say how we do this, and moves towards a discussion of the impossibility of explaining how a research-worker can recognise an original research problem. 'For to see a problem is to see something that is hidden. It is to have an intimation of coherence in hitherto not comprehended particulars.' (pg 21)

In Wittgensteinian terminology we can say that the rules of an activity can never give a complete specification of the activity because the rules need always to be interpreted in practice. While we might have some rules for

interpreting the first set of rules, the rules must somewhere have an end, and here we can do nothing but say 'this is something that we do.' 'We are brought back to the primitive unreasoned reaction on which the system of rules or reasons is grafted.' (8)

We might also consider Wittgenstein's remark that when one learns language one does not learn how to translate one's pre-existent thoughts into language, one learns how to think. It is clear that analogous remarks are appropriate about human activities other than language. When one learns the mathematics one does not learn merely how to translate one's current 'mathematical thoughts', into a public code, one learns how to have mathematical thoughts', how to participate in 'mathematical thinking.' Similarly when one learns how to appreciate visual art from an aesthetic point of view one learns not simply how to discipline one's present responses and perceptions, one learns new ways of seeing and responding to visual art. Etc.

Now we are in a position to recast the dilemma which is at the heart of any discussion of participation and education. At least some of the activities with which education is concerned rest on foundations which cannot be fully spelt out, cannot be fully specified in their rules, and open up new ways of understanding which cannot be grasped in advance. In the case of such activities the only way to learn how to participate in them is by participating in them. But how can this be possible? How can I participate in an activity unless I have already learnt how to participate in it?

The naive answers to these questions are, I think, the correct ones. When someone first participates in one of these activities, he is participating in a relatively blind and embryonic manner. We might put the point by saying that he is not really participating at all but simply doing something or other which a person who does understand the activity could interpret as participating in that activity. The crucial point here is that human actions are inherently ambiguous; a person intent on furthering someone's education persistently describes the learner's actions in ways not yet available to the learner and thus gradually helps him to come to understand more adequately what the activity consists in.

The 'teacher' (9) has thus necessarily to have a particular attitude (10) towards the learner whose education he is concerned to further. He must see the learner as a participant in the activity in question. The attitude we need here cannot be a detached attitude because the learner must

be seen as a person, with all that this implies about his understanding in some way, maybe at the start a grossly inappropriate or inadequate way, but in some way, what he is doing. But also the attitude we need, as I argued in Part 1, cannot be a 'fully participant attitude' if we mean by that the kind of attitude which would be appropriate towards a fully competent participant in the activity.

And in this way, and in this sense, furthering someone's education must involve a kind of 'manipulation.' When I talk of 'manipulation' here I am not talking of anything sinister, such as treating persons as means rather than ends, I am simply trying to gesture towards the fact that someone trying to further the education of a learner is guiding him along paths the direction and goal of which the learner is not, and cannot be, aware before he has been along them. I am trying to give proper emphasis to the fact that although becoming educated involves coming to participate in some activities which cannot be understood prior to participating in them, people can, and do, come to participate in them.

Footnotes & References

- (1) I am referring, of course, to Strawson's distinction, used by Margetson. See PF Strawson "Freedom & Resentment" in Freedom and Resentments and other essays Methuen 1974. Strawson says that these two broad kinds of attitudes, although not exclusive of each other are profoundly opposed to each other, and I also think he is right. A number of points, which I do not have space to bring into the main text, need noting, and I shall mention them here:
 - (a) Strawson uses different words at different times to mark the distinction between the two kinds of attitude. In the quotation given by Margetson, for instance, Strawson contrasts 'participant' with 'objective' attitudes and Margetson picks up these two words and uses them in what he wants to say. I think the word 'objective' is an unfortunate choice for this purpose. It might be taken to imply that developing a science of persons must involve taking up towards persons a 'non-participant' attitude. But (see DW Hamlyn "Person-perception and our understanding of others" in T Mischel (ed) Understanding Other Persons, etc) a science of persons must rest on taking up participant attitudes towards persons. I thus prefer the terminology 'participant' and 'detached' which does not so easily beg this crucial question.

- (b) Strawson claims that this distinction lies in the roots of our conception of the world and ourselves; it is extremely fundamental, and stands behind all rationality, intelligibility and the like. An implication of this is that we might lose sight of the role it plays in our lives, or simply distort it, in our attempts to intellectualise about it or make it sharp.
 - (c) That a distinction is not sharp does not mean that it is not clear or that it cannot be used in philosophical argument.
- (2) See B Williams Morality (Penguin 1972), in the first chapter of which he concludes: 'It does not follow from this that having a sympathetic concern for others is a necessary condition of being in the world of morality, that the way sketched is the only way 'into morality.' It does not follow from what has so far been said; but it is true.' (pg 26) It is clear that if anything is a participant attitude, 'having a sympathetic concern for others' must be.
 - (3) For this view persuasively argued see the works of Paulo Freire.
 - (4) Maurice Punch "Democratizing a Dutch sociology institute" in Universities Quarterly Vol 29 No 1 Winter 1974
 - (5) "At the moment there is a strong faculty reaction to the democratization on the grounds that it absorbs so much time and generates so many antagonisms that many staff and students claim that they simply cannot concentrate on their work." (Punch pg. 5)
 - (6) This section, which in fact is crucial to the thesis I want to advance about participation and education, suffers multiple unhappineses. In particular I leave quite unresolved the important issue of whether only some or whether all of the activities coming to participate in which is what it is to become educated are activities in the case of which the only route to coming to understand them is by participating in them. There is also the huge question of why we think that it is a good thing to engage in these activities. I am not sure, but I think that I would support an Aristotelian kind of reply, maybe one such as that hinted at by Margetson: engaging in such activities has 'the crucially valuable function of developing what is essentially human about persons.'
 - (7) Michael Polanyi The Tacit Dimension RKP 1967
 - (8) See A Kenny Wittgenstein Penguin 1973

- (9) This need not be 'a teacher' but simply anyone (a parent, an uncle, a cousin, a sibling, or even, maybe, an aunt) who intends to further someone's education. My assertion at this point simply spells out one logical requirement for that intention to be realistic.
- (10) Discussions of 'teacher-pupil relationships' are usually most unhelpful in clarifying what this 'particular attitude' must be. Usually such discussions get hopelessly tangled in sociological-type considerations about roles in schools. I hope I have made it perfectly clear (a) that I regard it as a crass error to fail to distinguish properly between education and schooling, (b) that the few sentences which follow are barely more than ghostly signposts written under the shadow of the end of space.

NOTICES

THE FUTURE OF PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION

With production costs soaring we are finding it increasingly difficult to fund this journal. We would be most grateful if you could send us a small contribution, say R3, to help us to keep going. Please see the sheet enclosed with this issue of the journal.

COMPLETE LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS PERSPECTIVE IN EDUCATION
TO VOL 3 NO 1

Drew Archibald
Michael Arnheim
Franz Auerbach
Julian Barling
Paul Beard
Toni Borowsky
Chris Bresler
John Burchard
Wendy Carstens
Arthur Clark
Mario Colussi
Frank Fincham
Michael Gardiner
Hannah Gluckman
Adele Gordon
Ken Hartshorne
Peter Hewson
Harold Holmes
Peter Kallaway
Susan Kramer
Isaac Kriel
Astrid Kuijper
Robin Lee
John Lewin
Brigid Limerick
Rosemarie Lindner

Donald Lomax
Paddy Lynch
Don Margetson
Judy Maguire
Helder Marques
Margaret Meyer
Patricia Morris
Wally Morrow
Clive Nettleton
Christopher Orpen
Jonathan Paton
Johan Pauw
Shirley Pendlebury
Tessa Phillips
Helmut Schirmer
June Schneider
Mervyn Skuy
Raymond Tunmer
Zak van Straaten
Henning van Aswegen
G van Wageningen
John van Zyl
Adriaan Viljoen
Eddie Webster
Douglas Young
Allen Zimble

CONTENTS OF PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION VOLUME 1 - 1976

	No	Pages
Michael Arnheim	2	76-79
Julian Barling (with Zimble)	2	112-121
Paul Beard	3	143-146
Chris Bresler	2	53-55
Frank Pincham	3	173-175
Michael Gardiner	2	86-89
Peter Hewson	1	19-21
Peter Kallaway	1	11-18
Susan Kramer	3	168-177
Donald Lomax	2	69-75
Don Margeson	1	1-0
	1	32-39
	2	56-62
	3	133-139
Margaret Meyer	3	176-185
Patricia Morris	2	45-46
Wally Morrow	2	47-52
	2	63-66
Clive Nettleton	3	159-167
Jonathan Paton	2	90-96
Tessa Phillips	3	140-142
Helmut Schirmer	1	29-31
June Schneider	2	80-85
Mervyn Skuy	1	22-28
	2	67-68
Zak van Straaten	3	147-153
Douglas Young	2	97-111
Allen Zimble (with Barling)	2	112-121
	3	154-158

	No	Pgs
Drew Archibald	1	7-14
Franz Auerbach	1	19-21
Paul Beard	1	15-18
	1	48-63
	1	73-75
Toni Borowsky	1	64-67
Wendy Carstens	1	22-24
Mario Colussi (with Lynch)	1	36-47
Frank Fincham	2	87-93
Hannah Gluckman	2	104-116
Adele Gordon (with Maguire and van Zyl)	2	81-86
Ken Hartshorne	2	131-133
Harold Holmes	2	134-136
Isaac Kriel	3	195-197
Astrid Kuijper	2	117-122
Robin Lee	1	25-32
John Lewin	2	123-130
	2	140-142
Brigid Limerick	3	180-192
Rosemarie Lindner	3	156-158

Paddy Lynch	Teachers' Opinions Concerning the Assessment of School Practical Work in Science	1	36-47
Judy Maguire (with Gordon and van Zyl)	Association for the Education of Gifted Children in South Africa	2	81-86
Margaret Meyer	English Poetry and the Second Language Student	2	96-103
Patricia Morris	'Gifted Children' or 'Children'?	2	94-95
	Every Country gets the Circus it deserves	3	201-202
Wally Morrow	Margetson on Pedagogics	3	151-154
Christopher Orpen	Student Evaluation of Teachers: the Effect of Attitude Similarly	1	33-35
	Course Evaluation Questionnaires: The Effect of Student Expectations	3	164-167
Johan Pauw	Some thoughts on Education in a Changing Society	2	137-139
Shirley Pendlebury	Education and Change: A Critique	1	1-6
	Talking of Dragons	3	155
	A Modest Proposal?	3	159-163
Henning van Aswegen	Further Perspective on late Nineteenth Century Attitudes	3	198-200
Zak van Straaten	The Reality of Language Correction	1	71-72
C van Wageningen	Aspect of Human Nature in which Education is Rooted	3	168-179
John van Zyl (with Gordon and Maguire)	Association for the Education of Gifted Children in South Africa	2	81-86
Adriaan Viljoen	Letter from Professor T A Viljoen	3	145-150
Eddie Webster	Brigid Limerick's Abstracted Empiricism	3	193-194
Douglas Young	Grammaticality: Correctness of Appropriateness	1	68-70

- JOHN BURCHARD - Graduate Student
Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand
- ARTHUR CLARK - Department of Education
Rhodes University
- HANNAH GLUCKMAN - Department of Educational Studies
Johannesburg College of Education
- DON MARGETSON - Formerly of the
Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand
- HELDER MARQUES - Former Student
Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand
- WALLY MORROW - Department of Education
University of the Witwatersrand
- RAYMOND TUNMER - Department of Education
Rhodes University

INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Editor will welcome contributions in the form of comments on local events or issues, original articles, discussion of articles, reviews, items for the 'Notices' Section and so on.

It would be helpful if contributions were submitted according to the following specifications:

- (i) the length should ordinarily be no longer than about 3 000 words;
- (ii) the contribution should be typewritten on one side of A4 paper, double-spaced with good margins all round;
- (iii) three copies should be provided, as well as an indication of length;
- (iv) references and footnotes should be kept to a minimum but, if required, should appear at the end of the contribution.

Proofs will not be sent to authors for correction unless this is especially requested. Contributions for the Discussion section can be published anonymously provided that the contributor's name is submitted to the editorial committee. The Editor encourages the submission of short abstracts with articles longer than 2 000 words. The date by which contributions for the next issue must be with the Editor appears on the back cover.

All contributions should be sent in the first instance to the Editor:

Wally Morrow
Department of Education
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

If you want any further information please get in touch with a member of the editorial committee:

Paul Beard	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand
Huw Davies	Department of Educational Studies Johannesburg College of Education
Patricia Morris	Department of English University of the Witwatersrand
Wally Morrow	Department of Education University of the Witwatersrand

DISTRIBUTION

If you know of anyone who has not received this journal, but would like to, please let the Editor know.

CONTENTS

DISCUSSION

- | | | |
|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | Colour or Class Prejudice? A Response
to 'The Educated Kaffir' | Raymond Tunmer |
| 9 | A Reply to Professor Viljoen | Hannah Gluckman |

ARTICLES

- | | | |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 15 | Learning How to Police the Match: Models
for Teaching Philosophy of Education | Arthur Clark |
| 22 | The Arena of Morality | John Burchard |
| 29 | Power, Authority, and Education | Helder Marques |

INTERCHANGE

- | | | |
|----|----------------------------------------|---------------|
| 35 | Participation, Democracy and Education | Don Margetson |
| 42 | Participating in Education | Wally Morrow |

NOTICES

55

Contributions for the next issue must be sent to
The Editor by 29 April 1978