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DEMOCRACY



POPULAR PRECEDENTS PRACTICE CULTURE

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TWO CONTRASTING MALAGASY REPRESENTATIONS OF DEMOCRACY:
THE PERIOD OF LEGALIST MEANS OF RESISTANCE BASED ON COLONIAL
FRENCH LAWS (1925-1945)
THE MYTH OF DEMOCRACY ALREADY AT WORK IN RURAL COMMUNITIES
DURING THE PRECOLONIAL TIMES (1930-1972)

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AFRICANA

The conquest of Madagascar in 1895, was followed by uprisings which took place between 1896 and 1915. Peasants, the elders in families, and "petty governors" played a crucial role in these events. At the same time, literate and bureaucratic elites, numerous in the High Plateaus, trained by the London Missionary Society established in the country in 1820, contributed to the peaceful transfer of power from the monarchistic administration to the French administration.

The latter used them for duties such as information, pacification, and administration. The uprising phase was hidden to a such point that Fara Esoavelomandroso and Stephen Ellis's works on the primary uprisings were only published in 1975¹.

Conversely, the administration gave a lot of publicity to the discovery in 1915 of the secret society VVS, which was composed of more than two hundreds members on the High Plateaus, students in medical school or civil servants, the majority came from the bourgeoisie. Their deportation to Comoros made them martyrs. That is why, until the early 1990s, the dominant historiography of emancipation movements in Madagascar was centred on the merina bourgeois nationalism. It linked the condemnation of VVS's heroes (like doctor Ravoahangy), the 1929 demonstration for independence in front of the governor residence in Tananarive, and finally the MDRM legalist struggle.

This party, created in 1946, experienced within one year a remarkable expansion by basing itself on a century old merina diaspora. This expansion was stopped by the 1947 popular uprising concentrated in the island's Southern East, which allowed the administration to ban the MDRM and to stifle any nationalist activity. The capital and its elites played a decisive role while 90% of the peasant population appeared to be either passive and

¹Esoavelomandroso: *Les Sadiavahe: essai d'interprétation d'une révolte dans le Sud (1915-1917)*, *Omaly sy Anio*, 1-2, Jan-Dec. 1975, pp139-167.

S. Ellis: *The Rising of the Red Shawls*, Cambridge University press, 1985, 214p.

difficult to mobilize or rebel and incontrollable.

Several young historians have recently modified this picture which attributed to the elites the role of assuring the continuity between old elites and new ones. Works focus on the short experience of the local communist party, between 1936 and 1939, which has been preceded by a kind of a proto-party called International Red Rescue. They help in understanding the forms of peasant mobilisation, and are related to Diego Suarez and his region, in the North of the island, rather than Tananarive, in the centre of the High Plateaus. Concerning myself, I attempted to appreciate the peasants behaviour on the High Lands toward the nearest and the most constraining administratif institution: the *fokonolona*. The analysis will bear on two different periods: between the two wars and the 1950-1960 period, as well as on the two types of societies.

In the sparsely populated North of the island, population groups, partially itinerant, live from breeding and cultivation. Abundant precipitation, a rich soil attracts big firms which covet peasant lands for the cultivation (sugar cane and vanilla). In the densely populated High Plateaus, groups are living from cultivation of rice and subsistence agriculture. This discourages the same firms, specialized in the collection of foods or in the distribution of metropolitan products. The administrative seizure over a company close to and belonging to the paddy-field which constitutes the problem of peasants.

I. THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS: from the Peasant Struggle to the Brief Experience of the Communist Party

Thanks to S. Randrianja, we can appreciate the importance of political activity in the Diego Suarez zone from 1920². The port where workers from the Metropolis or from the Reunion island and

²Randrianja, S: *l'Action de Ralaimongo à Diego Suarez*, in *Omaly sy Anio*, 25-26, 1987, pp 367-382.

Malagasy workers work together, was the best place for this political activity; this stage is that of the *Maritime Freight Company*. Malagasy or French sailors conduct, through this way, the transfer of trade union leaflets and brochures, especially communist ones, hidden in bundles of linen from Marseille where 600 Malagasy workers were working³. From Diego, there is an intense circulation of local news papers and manuscript articles related to the big firms encroachment upon lands. In the countryside (Sambirano, Andapa basin), agrarian conflicts increase.

The activity of leftist militants such as Ralaimongo and Dussac is related to this milieu. Ralaimongo experienced the 1914 War in France, he met Ho Chi Minh and had contacts with the League of Human Rights before to go back to country in 1921. Through his network of freinds, he alerted the French press of the Left and also sent to the *L'Aurore Malgache*, towards Pondichéry, the West Indies, Indochina, thanks to sailors, and of course toward the ancients of Paris. He had a remarkable aptitude to place the Madagascar colony in the context of international imperialism. Deprived of access to the English-speaking world, he did not know much about Kenya or South Africa, both so close to his country.

He described to his friends living outside Madagascar injustice committed in the rural world and actions undertaken in justice by compatriots against the theft of land. This activity increased when he was placed under police surveillance in Port Bergé for five years, in 1930. In 1932, he helped ti write a book of demands signed by 102 Tsimihety. During the same year, 500 peasants occupied the prison and the Port Bergé barracks and launched a tax strike.

Descendant of Reunionian aristocrats owning sugar cane plantations in Nosy Be, Dussac joined the movement in 1927. Remarkably although he grew poorer, he managed to master legal procedures.

³This is the 1929 figure. At this time, there were only 19 Malagasy students in France.

Profiting from his French nationality, he owned a newspaper in which he denounced the authorities' behavior. As a native, Ralaimongo could not do the same without being arrested. Through the Civil Code and the support of some lawyers, he caused incessant problems to the local administration. Using an unstoppable logical line of reasoning, these people demanded for the "annexed" Malagasy full inheritance of the Republic, that is to say, citizenship by collective naturalisation. S. Randrianja reveals that combination of pragmatism in the action and of historical references to the French or even internationalist inheritance, constituted the specificity of Ralaimongo's force despite his daily simplicity in the province.

These characteristics, proximity of the peasantry and utilization of sailors, became less important when the emancipation movement transferred its main location from Diego Suarez to Tananarive because of a demonstration at the general governor residence in 1929. French authorities could not hide the repercussions of the event. While Diego was recently created, the capital still preserved its basic hierarchy among merina statutory groups, in which the nobility maintained values of caste. Tananarive's condescension "*Ville-Lumière*" (*Light-City*) vis-à-vis countrymen and people living on the coast did not easily allow the mobilization "from below" of population like along the line of that which occurred thanks to Ralaimongo and Dussac in the North. This does not signify that the capital did not face social problems, but slave descendants, numerous in suburbs and neighbouring countryside, were servants integrated into in the relationships of old personal dependence. These relationships hid the phenomenon of exploitation by former masters who had become bosses. The tone is set by the petty and middle bourgeoisie made up with former managerial staff of the merina monarchistic administration and youth trained in French schools. Though this bourgeoisie was dominated, it also dominated over rural masses.

Two periods of political life will be analyzed in order to understand the turning point which both joined together and

divided the bourgeois élites against the peasantry (90% of the Malagasy population). These periods are 1936-1939 and 1950-1960.

The communist party, heir of the International Red Rescue (ISR) established in 1930, was created in 1936 in the context of a relative liberalisation of local political life authorized by the accession to power in France of the Popular Front. This party had already a popular grassroot thanks to the ISR and to several strikes taking place throughout the capitale in 1936. The network of adherence to the party follows toward the island Northern East and the Southern East, the railroad route (by which newspapers circulate) and ends up in the Eastern coast ports. Railwaymen, dockers, and the petty bourgeoisie joined the party. According to S. Randrianja, the party numbered between 5,000 and 15,000 adherents. Among members, there were Dussac and the former of the VVS such Ravoahangy. Always pragmatic, Ralaimongo, manifested some reserve and the party grew in two opposed directions.

a) The party from below

Militants, actors and propagandists, in the core of many strikes in 1936: strike of 250 SICE workers in Tamatave, *pousse-pousseurs* in Tamatave, Rochefortaise Society in Antsirabe, manifestations in Farafangana. Grassroot gets information related to strikes and factory occupations in France from the reading of Malagasy newspapers. Identifying themselves with French workers, it acts. Such is the case of twelve migrant farm workers coming from the capital who crossed through Ambositra, the metropolis of missionary activity. Hearing that French workers were on strike, they marched with red flags, demanding salary increases; they telegraphed their boss (who obviously refused to grant the increase) and retired home by foot.

b) The Communist Party from above: a club of notables

Party financing and patronage are assured by powerful traders (hardware dealers Andriambololona and Andriantsifahoana) who seek

through their assistance a means to recover a clientèle and to handle events. Those dealers own 60% of the shares of the party newspaper. Contradictions between the party's grassroots and its leadership are so intense that the organization collapsed itself at the end of 1937, before its legal suppression, because of the France's into the war in 1939.

Apart from these sharp contradictions, this party suffered from Madagascar's insulated character, remote from any revolutionary agitation. In contrast of Vietnam, militants, largely petty-bourgeois from the capital, forgot peasant problems and started to claim the inheritance of the French Revolution, to demand, at the 150th anniversary of 1789 in 1939, their collective naturalisation. The party leadership lost its notables who were financing the press, and some other activities while the grassroots continues to recruit new members.

S. Randrianja notes that a great part of the Communist Party networks survived because it organized cooperatives; day after day, it structured at the grassroots a genuine peasant political consciousness. Their hidden activity explains difficulties they face to co-ordinate with workers strikes in plantations during coffee harvesting season in 1938.

Relocated in the secret society Jiny during the Second World War, when political expression was prohibited, the grassroot Communist Party militants are the "missing link" restored by S. Randrianja's work which explains the force of the 1947 uprising in Manakara zone (Southern East coast). B. Ramanantsoa-Ramarcel's thesis on secret societies shows that the starting of violent action (contrary to MDRM's legalism) was a result of the articulation of petty bourgeoisie and peasants of the East coast, ten years after the break-up in the PCRM and its separation from the urban bourgeoisie.

This division probably did not surprise Ralaimongo who was a supporter of a pragmatic extension of the International Red Rescue

in the countryside, itself a realistic structure rather than the formation of a party. The latter would involve an ideology of notables involving an oscillation between claims of assimilation and demands of independence.

Already in 1936, Ralaimongo, writing to a French friend who was a communist militant, paraphrased a text from Tsimihety de Vohémar: "We are from the nobility for fighting with the French administration over inheritances... All we are claiming is to be able to breed our bullock herds and to farm our lands like in the past...". He added: "In France you have several parties: communist, socialist, radical-socialist, royalist, etc.. we have nothing to do with your 'ists'; the masses of peasants have nothing to do with politics and they are not wrong. I agree with them". The short experience of the communist party strengthened his suspicion.

Native of the Southern Plateaus, victim of a thieves' raid during his youth and freed from slavery at the arrival of French troops, Ralaimongo was a teacher. People round about him were hoping to be elected members of the parliament through the party. This is Planques' reproach to Dussac in a letter he wrote about the latter to the manager of *L'Humanité* newspaper in Paris. Later, Ravoahangy, elected for the French legislative Assembly in 1946, will be arrested in violation of his parliamentary immunity during the March 1947 uprising.

A hard phase of silence and constraint will follow this uprising. The country will be unequally involved in the uprising: the South and the Western coast will have a lesser involvement contrary to the East coast which will remain traumatized by the extent of repression and confrontation between Malagasy supporters of the MDRM or conversely of the PADESM. On the High Plateaus which are not involved in the violence (violence started in Moramanga), the administration, profiting from the general helplessness, arrests leaders of the MDRM on the basis of denunciation letters, brutal questioning or previous adherence to the communist party.

Malagasy candidates can only be elected if they obtain administration support.

Plateaus' population, Christian and mainly protestant, and educated, blamed the "pagan", illiterate peasant for having spoilt, negotiations which could have brought legal independence, because of their violence. Catholic missions, foreseeing a dark future despite the destruction of "rebels", argued that Marxist subversives were waiting for opportunity to reach the masses of peasants of the island, which with their Asian characteristic would be attracted by maoism.

Thus, in a context of political silence which lasted until 1956, the works of Malagasy and foreign scholars begins with multiple references to a rural institution, the *fokonolona*, which had to rebuild and to "repair" the Malagasy identity. We have presented in a first section the picture of a peasantry confronted with the encroachment of big colonial firms on their lands, and compelled to migrate from the aride South to the plantations of the far North, and aroused in 1947 on the eastern coast because of the overexploitation due to the war. All these realities have been ignored and rejected in the background.

These texts popularise a picture launched by High Lands intellectuals which was slowly accepted as representing all Malagasy peasant units. The *folokolona* picture cannot be ignored when one works or travels to Madagascar.

II FOKONOLONA AND MYTH OF GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY

1. Its perverse historical evolution

This term refers to the merina "villager communities", whose members are not necessarily linked by kinship, but by relationships created by the life in the same rural area (*fokontany*), and

which are exploited by all. While le *foko*, in the ancient Imerina of the XVII century was made up of both parents and their relatives, the notion of common territory came to predominate because of the continuous attempts by sovereigns aimed at to settle people in ricefield-based areas. At the end of the XVIII century, the *fokonolona* was the basic territorial unit able to govern itself. The state in construction aimed to utilize its capacity to mobilize people.

In the XIX century, the state utilized it to recruit soldiers and to build houses for important personalities. It became an instrument of oppression. Through Gallieni, Frenchs were interested by this form of administration, less costly and autoritary behing a democratic facade. They restored it from 1902 in order to reinstitute chores, the collective responsibilities vis-à-vis taxes and the problems of local police.

The person in charge of this institution, the head of quarter, who was chosen among three personalities proposed by notables of the place, became and remained a channel through which orders came from above. He could therefore not be perceived by peasants as their spokesman. The Second World War, with its pétainist then Gaullist local phase, exasperated this situation. More free work was required. Rich people paid the head of quarter in order to facilitate their black market activities. In 1944, surprisingly, the Brazzaville Conference proposed the restoration of the *fokonolona*, which was supposed to develop the collective sense of responsibilities!

In these circumstances, what can explain the 1950-60 infatuation for this institution become totally perverted? The Malagasy First Republic, indifferent to the close collaboration which was required from those notables after the 1947 events, instituted the district and then the *fokonolona* because it is appropriate in providing with free workers on the village scale. Yet, excellent

analyses, such as that of P. Ottino, clearly demonstrated the nearly total disappearance of solidarity among villagers and the end of the community based on reference to ancestors.

2. A repairing image

Noting three initial points is useful. Writers of these texts are all merina, none of whom provides answers to questions relating to the limits of the institution outside Imerina. They seem to use the ambiguity created by colonizers who extended the *fokonolona* organization to the whole island, giving the impression that this institution had always existed throughout the entire country. However, they neglect to underline the total perversion of this structure under the colonial period, a kind of amnesia or indifference aimed at arguing that the democratic essence of the *fokonolona* has never been lost.

The question is to search into the past without waiting for political fights the opening of the road towards a radiant future, to attain democracy, this word, made popular in colonies after the war. Finally, all these authors in the Malagasy side, are from the bourgeoisie. They wrote about rural community while living in town.

Local bourgeois scholars as well as missionaries have an approach which based upon two cultures. As S.Randrianja wrote about the bourgeoisie, "this duality allows a differentiation from the ancestor inheritance which becomes therefore susceptible to be ideologized, that is to say, utilized and reshaped towards specific goals.

The question to be posed and which has never been answered by historians is: what is the actual social functioning of the *fokonolona* in XIX and XX centuries? How can the fact that during the period between the two wars this institution almost never appeared as the framework for the peasant struggles be explained?

If the *fokonolona* was to such an extent an instrument of oppression, why the merina élites promote this democratic "picture"? Why was this structure ideologized initially by the liberation movement, but when utilized by President Tsiranana's First Republic, perceived as a France's creation"?

3. State Violence, Grassroots Passive Resistance

There are two reasons explaining why we do not know much about the actual functioning of the *fokolona*. A massive quantity of land and judicial archives have yet to be examined. The Imerina gives the wrong impression to be well-known. All one has done is the repetitive history of important families, palaces, and sovereigns. One can catch sight of history "from below" on the basis of fragmented works. There is a certainty: the XIX century is already characterized by a nearly colonial oppression. During Radama I and Ranavalona I between 1810 and 1861, the army had decimated free peasants, participants of the *fokonolona*; they were compelled to interminable stays in the areas around the capital for building sovereigns and other important personalities' monuments.

At the occasion of expeditions in the Northern west and during huge works, many of them died from hungry and breathlessness. They were removed at the end of the XIX century (after 1885) for working in the mining where adults and entire school classes of children were brought; many families have therefore been scattered. Let's add to these misfortunes, those of the two wars of 1883-85 and of 1895 opposing France and Merina.

Missionaries and French technical assistants employed in the administration constituted one of the channels through which we understand the tragic peasant situations. Although they were in the minority, Jesuits were closer to the truth in their letters and reports than the LMS, which kept silence about all that happened in the countryside. In this regional and national

context, the *fokonolona* was a structure devoted to provide to the administration the mainpower, and not to reveal the situation prevailing in the grassroots.

The oppression extends to the religious domain. I have reported the collective conversion of the countryside to protestantism after the royal conversion in 1869 essentially on loyalist grounds. One then assists to the extension of violence to the religious domain during the compulsory *autodafé* of village and clan talismans. Until this time, army and chore were the two domains in which state violence was implemented upon population. Religious and cultural domains were also codified as a duty by the state. Since that moment population lived as if it was colonized from inside. Loyalist vis-à-vis the monarchy, it blamed itself for not easily entering into the new modes of thought.

By attempting to get the masses adherence to protestantism through intimidation, officials sent by the Queen acted very brutally: representative of *fokonolonas* assured military envoys of popular assent. The community was both "trapped and protected" by the assurances of representatives. "Unanimity is always perceived as ideal to reach; but it has become a trap, the point of violence implementation. What protects is also what deprive the subject from his humanity". The type of relation of slavish obedience generated in the army thus extended to all relations between rulers and subjects.

From the XIXth century and under colonization, the only ones possible attitudes to adopt by the grassroots were the absence of any initiative, the passive resistance. A number of temple and church or colonist houses are intentionally set on fire but this is done anonymously. Many punitives actions (stones throwing on shutters and doors) are perpetrated during the night and are attributed to *mpamosavy* (sorcerers).

Numerous camouflage behaviours are organised agreements by representatives of *fokonolonas* and villagers: temples are built in

provisional materials, then allowed to break. Parents pay a *bakchich* to missions teachers in order to escape from the obligatory schooling decreed by the state. At this stage of colonization, there was progress within the system: true leaders within the *fokonolona* will not be elected, but only puppets will be elected official representatives.

Nowadays, it is very difficult to detect the truth in social and political reports within such a system in which the power from above is apprehended as absolutely vital to the organisation of rice agricultural land and as generating slavery.

These attitudes of silence and passive resistance will suddenly change in 1972. The fall of president Tsiranana, due to student and urbanite manifestations helped a government of transition to take power. In this government the most representative officer of "reformists" gendarmes conducted the ministry of home affairs. He sent some of his colleagues to interview village communities; these interviews were broadcasted daily on the state radio. This moment is unforgettable and one still speaks about it today.

Thus, the *fokonolona* may also be different from a slavish community. 1973, the year of the wording of the decree related to the *fokonolona*, was an euphoric year. Keeping all proportions, one may compare this moment to the "night of August 4", during which the three orders composing the pre-Revolution French society declared the abolition of feudal rights system. A misunderstanding allows the convergence of opposed interest groups towards the hope of a Malagasy democratic renovation.

These groups are united momentarily by a common critique of parliamentary western democracy. In spite of the convergence of their critiques, socio-cultural grounds of their discourses are fundamentally different. These divergences are easily perceptible in the High Lands where are published several reviews and newspapers. G.Roy and R.Rakotinirina organized during the 1960s remarkable enquiries as reveals the typology hereafter.

a) **Old and pauperized peasants** denigrate First Republic's institutions because they were imposed without taking into consideration Malagasy modes of consultations and decision making. Deputation and election modes for deputy were particularly criticized. "Politics" are perceived as the art of using trickery for divising. The idealized old *fokonolona* allowed the free expression of all individuals by starting with the elders who symbolized the wisdom. The unanimity was required before to act.

b) **Pétainist conservatives.** This trend of bourgeois thought was not elaborated enough. It probably had some influence because of a strong relationship between Malagasy traditional values and those of France of Pétain: family, work, religion, strong link to the land, and worship of the past. It is worth noting that Pétain established an autoritary power from the ruin of parliamentarism as notes L. Rabearimanana when he says "...French colonists and certain Malagasy notables established links between basic traditional principles of the *fokonolona* and Marshall Pétain's slogan. Ramarohetra, eminent member of the Economic and Financial Delegations of Madagascar, write...in 1941, that at Marshall Pétain's time, the *ombalahibemaso* of France, solidarity wakes up from its lethargia and takes its actual place: family, *fokonolona*, Nation, Homeland, French Empire". Pétainism, in Madagascar like in France tends to be a flashback with values of solidarity and collective mutual aid related to the homeland and kinship. There is thus a double denunciation of the Third Republic's parliamentarism and of the Bolchevic danger. This is similar to the 1960's denunciations against communism and the First Republic.

c) **Protestants** constituting the transmission channel between town and countryside were attracted by the picture of the *fokonolona* as it is Malagasy, at a period during which there is certain rejection of foreign contribution. In the religious domain, for example, several worships to rural ancestors openly took place. Emphasis on the reestablishment of local institution counterbalanced attachment to temple.

What is not said (another case of amnesia) is that the parish assembly of temple and that of the *fokonolona* had became joined institutions in the second half of the XIX century. Pushed into temple, this foreign and imported playground, by their loyalism monarchic, but apprehending resemblances between the LMS parish assembly and the assembly of the *fokonolona*, population has progressively malagasized this institution and its leaders.

Conversely, the LMS has thereby proposed new models of individual behaviours within a group, preparing the ground for a western type of future political practice. This entails the election of one or two pastors and that of a dozen of deacons at public ballot following the announce of candidates. Only communicants (men and women) may vote, but their recruitment is done in a larger scale than in Britain. Sermons, pronounced by various preachers members, as well as by pastor, succeed one another like the *kabary* (discourse) of *fokonolona*, and problems related to the village topicality are clearly raised. There are a progressive transfer of the *fokonolona* activities toward parish which play the role of an institution of substitution.

When protestants evoke the *fokonolona*, functioning principles of parishes came to superpose like a filter on previous Malagasy realities. The corpus concerning those protestants helps in pointing out following affirmations: Andrianampoinimerina's advisers were elected by the *fokonolonas* (Ranaivo); all adults voted in the *fokonolona* and even women; values of ancient *fokonolona* were fraternal love, an open mind, freedom of opinion and non-violence (Ramasindraibe); decisions were unanimously adopted.

However, according to Roy, this transitional way to democracy through temple was vigorously contested by old and poor peasants during debates within the *fokonolona*. They address critiques to churches because they favour the promotion of literate or rich. Gradually, churches have legitimized the existence of a new class of elders: wealthy persons rather than ancients who are close to

mediator ancestors. Yet wealthy christians do not redistribute their richness because they obey to the churches' advices concerning to saving and cautiousness.

d) Other progressist trends made up with disparate elements: foreign researchers like G.Roy and G.Althabe, gendarmes and servicemen in contact with the rural world, militants of the anti-colonial struggles and university students under strong French influence in Tananarive. Analysing the rural world crisis as a result of agricultural community practices related to the appropriation of lands by a well-off minority exploiting poor wage-earners, this trend utilized the notion of *fokonolona* as a mobilizer theme, insisting on values of solidarity and redistribution. They criticize the neo-colonialism of the First Republic, suspecting the electoral process to be a comedy.

All tendencies criticize the functioning of parliamentary democracy imported from the West with its multiple parties dividing the opinion and candidates coming from towns and pitchforked into rural electoral areas. This explains the success of the 1973 administrative reform centred on the revival of the *fokonolona* as the basic unit of development. It also justifies motivations of the new power led by D.Ratsiraka to establish democratic centralism, after the assassination of R.Ratsimandrava: the notion of multipartism and the role of assemblies had been discredited in the view of a part of the grassroots. One only has to substantiate the unanimity associated to the functioning of the *fokonolona*.

Let's come back to the assimilationist trend represented by Ralaimongo and Dussac: they demanded citizenship and entire functioning of the French democracy in Madagascar. However, after 1960, the people voted for a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. There is a wealth political parties' life, newspapers are active even if they especially read in towns. The "transitor operation" increases the number of listeners of the radio. The forms of western democracy are present but they lack the image of the

French Revolution and its slogan which mobilized in the past people's hope.

The First Republic régime was the target of two distinct camps: reactionaries, longing for the return of age-old *fokonolona*, and progressists who perceived its kinship with maoism. Apart from these two camps, there is the petty and middle bourgeoisie which cannot clearly define its positions: its members are numerous in the administration which subjugate peasants, controlling lands these latter are working on. Analysing its reports, one may note that it admits its dominant role, its class position.

Intellectuals escape to the idealization of the past and build an image of a society in which reign harmony and solidarity, like Kaunda and Nyerere models of the Humanism and Ujamaa. Social contradictions existing on the state level must be eliminated to the level of village, the latter being the place Malagasy humanism, called *fiHAVANANA*, is concentrated in.

In conclusion, there is a remark: town-countryside, merina administration-peasantry, parish-*fokonolona* interweaving gives to Plateaus' situation opaqueness for reading and ambiguity of behaviours and language which are not experienced in the Northern coasts analyzed in the first section. The success of the *fokonolona* notion results from this ambiguity, this misunderstanding. Mobilization from below which promised this structure in the Plateaus will pave the way, after 1975 to "democratic centralism".

Comparing these two moments, we note that political militants are more efficient when they are outside of their society of origin. In the struggle movements of the period between the two wars, there are a lot of migrants in both leaders and peasants sides. It is also easier to mobilize oneself against anonymous foreign corporations than against the notable neighbour. Kinship, Clientele, hierarchy constitute obstacles toward the class

consciousness in the High Lands.