

https://dspace.org/

Relocation in Tseki & Phuthaditjhaba: A comparative ethnography of planned & unplanned removals in Qwaqwa

Niehaus, Isak A.

1998-08
http://hdl.handle.net/10539/9355

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E

African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW
4.00pm AUGUST 1989

Title: Relocation in Tseki & Phuthaditjhaba: A Comparative Ethnography of Planned & Unplanned Removals in QwaQwa.

by: Sakkie Niehaus

No. 260

RELOCATION INTO TSEKI AND PHUTHADITJHABA: A COMPARATIVE ETHNOGRAPHY OF PLANNED AND UNPLANNED REMOVALS IN QWAQWA.

Isak A. Niehaus
Department of Social Anthropology
University of the Witwatersrand

The dominant theme in the recent history of Qwaqwa has been the relocation of thousands of people from "common" South Africa into the "homeland". In 1929 Ross (1930: 88) estimated that the population of Witzieshoek (as Qwaqwa was then known) was 8 000 and wrote:

> In the past few years many folk who could make no existence on the farms outside have moved in. They are the old folk and the poor. This would have to be prohibited because Witzieshoek is already full, or Witzieshoek would have to be enlarged by the addition of nearby farms. (My translation)

Subsequent estimates of Qwaqwa's population are: 23 860 in 1970 (BENSO 1978: 9), at least 300 000 in 1980 (Murray 1985: 289) and between 400 000 and 500 000 people in 1982 (Sharp 1982: 13). These figures are suggestive of mass population relocations on a scale almost unprecedented in South African history.

It is generally possible to distinguish three sending areas. Murray (1985:290) estimates that perhaps 60% of people relocated to Qwaqwa came off white-owned farms, particularly in the northern, eastern and northwestern districts of the Orange Free State (OFS). The remaining 40%, he suggests, came from towns such as Harrismith, Bethlehem, Senekal, Vereeniging, Klerksdorp and Bloemfontein. A relatively small number of people have also been relocated from other "homelands". These include about 2 000 Basotho who came from Thaba 'Nchu in 1974 to escape harassment by Bophuthatswana Authorities (Niehaus 1984: 20-22) and several hundred Basotho and Xhosa refugees from Herschel in the Transkei, fleeing the reported harshness of Matanzima's rule and resisting the removal of their South African citizenship (vide Streek and Wicksteed 1981: 50-56).

"Forced" removals mainly affected those removed from urban areas. People have been evicted from townships for offences relating to reference books and influx control. "Old townships attached to a number of towns in the OFS have been deproclaimed and razed to the ground, in the course of which many of their inhabitants have been relocated to Qwaqwa" (Surplus People Project 1983: 159). In this way the Department of Bantu Administration and Development had "assisted in resettling" 56 229 Basotho in Qwaqwa by 1976 (Murray 1985: 290).

For those relocated from rural areas and other "homelands" Murray (1985: 290) writes: "probably the majority of people have removed voluntarily in the sense that they were not physically removed by

GG (South African government) vehicles." Rural removals need to be understood against the backdrop of increasingly-mechanized production and a constant decline in the demand from agricultural labour since the 1960s. The basis on which farmers were prepared to employ labourers had become steadily less acceptable as they were increasingly denied access to agricultural land and grazing. In their struggle to find farmers prepared to offer them more favourable terms of employment people often moved rapidly between different farms. Being denied entrance into OFS townships, thousands of these people made their own way into Qwaqwa in the hope of acquiring migrant labour contracts. Indeed, many had paid large sums of money to private carriers for transport to the "homeland". In this context, Sharp (1982: 14) has expressed caution over the interpretation of such removals as "voluntary". On the one hand, he argues, one does not wish to deny the forces shaping the lives of people. On the other hand, it is important to recognize the extent to which people were able to decide about when to move to Qwaqwa.

This paper is particularly concerned with highlighting the diverse implications of relocation for different sections of Qwaqwa's population. Despite the conceptual difficulties involved the the concepts "forced" and "voluntary", it is my intention to show that such distinctions may indeed be valuable in understanding relocation processes. It is argued that "official" removals imply at least some prior planning by the state to cater for the needs of those affected. Evidence indicates that people subject to forced removals from OFS townships by the state have enjoyed favourable access to resources and amenities in the 'homeland'. Such people are highly noticeable and taken account of by government and administration in the subsequent allocation of services in the 'homeland'. By contrast, former inhabitants OFS rural areas who have unofficially made their way into the 'homeland's' closer settlements have been severely disadvantaged. Their removals were unplanned and no administrative provisions had been made to meet even their most basic needs. Subsequently they have been largely unnoticed in the allocation of services.

This paper reports the results of fieldwork undertaken in the Apollo (plural Diapollo) housing section in the town of Phuthaditjhaba (from August 1984 until February 1985) and the closer settlement of Tseki (in April, June-July and December 1983). The housing section was opened for settlement in March 1971. Initially it was occupied mainly by former inhabitants of Harrismith who were forcefully removed to Phuthaditjhaba on SADF trucks when the old location was destroyed. In Mare's (1980) terms these present a classic case of "urban removal". Subsequently many former residents of townships in common OFS had also moved into the housing section. Of the 300 Apollo houses, 75 (25%) were sampled. As the houses were laid out in six rows, a 25% sample was taken in each row. In contrast, most of the estimated 15 000 inhabitants of Tseki were relocated from 1974 onwards and had come from white owned farms. Hardly any had been directly removed by agents of the state. During the period of fieldwork the members of 40 households were interviewed in depth, and on several occasions during the year. These households, which occupied 38 different residential sites, were randomly selected

from some 2 700 demarcated residential sites in the closer settlement. Despite the small sample size in Tseki, I feel justified in presenting basic quantitative data where this is appropriate, but I am more interested in qualitative data derived from the study.

My account is mainly ethnographic. It proceeds with a comparative account of differential experiences of relocation. Description is devoted to local government, employment opportunity resources and forms of cooperation among residents of these reception sites.

DIFFERENTIAL EXPERIENCES OF RELOCATION

The Schoonplaas Removals. The vast majority of households who occupied homes in the Apollo section of Phuthaditjhaba shortly after their construction in 1971 were forcibly removed from the old Schoonplaas location of Harrismith. With the deproclamation of Schoonplaas 300 homesteads were destroyed. 165 households, classified as Zulu, were relocated at Madadeni in Kwazulu, and 135, classified as South Sotho were relocated in Phuthaditjhaba. These households (approximately 2 000 people) were moved by lorries from the Departments of Bantu Authorities and Defence (The Friend 20 March 1971).

The Police Colonel in charge of the Schoonplaas removals was quoted as having said that they proceeded without "major incidents" and that people co-operated with the authorities. "As soon as they knew the exact date that they would be moved, they started demolition work on the houses themselves" (The Friend 20 March 1971).

Oral testimony by informants contradicts the notion that people were content to be moved. Recollections of these events elicited responses such as: "They should rather have killed us"; "If the government ever decided to move us back to Schoonplaas I'll be the first to go"; and "I don't want to talk. Thinking about these things makes me feel too heartbroken". Evidence also shows considerable resistance to relocation.

Schoonplaas was far from visibly attractive. Hawkins (1982:159), for instance described the location as:

> A village of hovels and shacks brightened only by an occassional garden plot...It was never a beautiful place and a visitor coming to Harrismith by train exclaimed upon seeing it: If this is Harrismith I am sorry I came", but it served the needs of the Natives living in town.

In retrospect, former residents were nostalgic about life in Schoonplaas, identifying low housing rents, the large homes and gardens, and the opportunity to keep cattle, as admirable aspects of the old location. Self-built homesteads, for which as little as R1.50 site rent was paid per month in 1970, sometimes

comprised up to eight rooms with large yards in which residents planted potatoes, cabbage, sorghum, spinach and mealies. In addition many informants kept stock. Some paid nearby farm owners to let stock graze on their pastures. Others kept stock in their yards at night and hired sheperds to herd them on a nearby commonage during the day. An elderly informant, recalling that he and his father had kept 25 cattle, jokingly said: "We ate only meat everyday. We should actually have changed to vegetables". Informants also longingly spoke of the times when, with their dogs and knobkerries, they hunted dassies and hares on the Platberg and fished in the Wilge river with rods made from the branches of poplar trees. It was also said that hardly any unemployment existed in Schoonplaas. "It only depended on whether you wanted to work or not."

After residents had heard about the intentions of government to destroy the old location, a commitee was formed to oppose the proposed removals. Meetings were regularly held in a local school hall on Thursday afternoons and in the yard of the commitee leader on Saturday mornings. By all accounts these meetings drew enthusiastic support. One informant recalled:

> We were always told when there was a meeting. Many people attended and the hall was full every day... First of all the committee members talked and then the siboNda (leader)...They said that the place should not be destroyed because it belonged to us and we built the houses ourselves...Then after the meetings the people did African dances and sang songs.

She recalled that the following songs were sung:

Mahlomola a Qwaqwa.	The loneliness of Qwaqwa
E rona tjhaba santsho	We the Black nation
nomerso o re kwaetetse ka thata.	are being opressed.
A makgo ngwana Mopeli.	Oh! The children of Mopeli.
Ha Mopeli e nyane e kgolo	At Mopeli's place is a small
ntho e tsekwang	and big bone of contention.

In an attempt to prevent demolition the committee collected donations and paid a Ladysmith attorney to negotiate their demands with the representatives of local government. By November 1970, however, it became apparent that relocation was inevitable: the Administration Board offices of Schoonplaas were demolished and water supplies disconected.

The first police vehicles which arrived in Schoonplaas were stoned. The following day a large crowd gathered and attempted to march to the municipal offices in town to voice their discontent. The procession was broken up by the police, who arrested a few committee members and wounded two women in their legs. As a result the residents became demoralized: "The very same people who were fighting helped the police load their furniture". By April only a dilapidated graveyard remained. "They destroyed our houses, schools, churches and everything else".

Some Schoonplaas stockholders refused to board trucks. Instead they chose to drive their animals on foot to Qwaqwa in the hope that grazing lands would be obtainable at their destination. The journey cut through the veld and fields of farm owners and reportedly took an entire day. Household members, having been brought to Qwaqwa by truck, were assigned directly to Diapollo homesteads, offloaded and granted rations comprising a loaf of bread and a pint of milk. Initially cattle grazed south of the Diappolo, but stock keepers were soon forced to sell these as further housing was constructed in Phuthaditjhaba.

The Diapollo was not exclusively occupied by former Schoonplaas residents. People removed from Harrismith arrived in the housing section at the same time as households who had resided in a shanty town northeast of Phuthaditjhaba since the 1960s. Some, under duress removed due to employment transfers or contraventions of influx control laws. Others moved to obtain business licences or ensure schooling for their children. Living conditions in the shanty town were appalling. Here, households had lived in one-roomed corrugated-iron shacks subject to extreme variations in temperature. One man recalled that "sometimes it was so hot that we had to sleep outside and when it was cold we had to use a brazier (paola)". In contrast to Schoonplaas residents, shanty town dwellers were delighted when informed by the Phuthaditjhaba housing superentendent that Apollo houses had been made available for them. 35% of sampled households arrived after 1971 to occupy homes vacated by their original tenants. The tenants who had left had gone either to secure more desirable accommodation elsewhere in Phuthaditjhaba, or had moved to closer settlements because they had been unable to afford housing rents in the townships.

Removals from the OFS countryside All of the 40 households in Tseki had resided on White-owned farms in various parts of the OFS prior to relocation. 32 removed directly from farms in the Petrus Steyn, Viljoenskroon, Reitz, Bothaville and Clocolan districts. Of the remaining eight households three had come after a brief and unsuccessful attempts to secure a foothold in an urban area in the province. The remaining five had come from Thaba 'Nchu in Bophuthatswana. The members of these households were part of a huge influx into the 'homeland', beginning in the late 1960s. People in the study were questioned closely about the circumstances of their removal from farms. Their accounts confirmed the general trend of a decline in the demand for agricultural labour and in real wages on White-owned OFS farms in this period. Their accounts also indicate the specific factors through which these trends were mediated in local instances and in the people's own experience. The following reasons for removal to Qwaqwa were most frequently cited by informants:

1) Many perceived a decline in total wages on farms in the early 1970s, owing to the stringent enforcement of stock limitations or to a total ban on stock holding by workers in this period. Most people recalled that, at some point in the late sixties or early seventies, farmers had instructed their workers to sell off most or all of the livestock they had hitherto been allowed to graze

on the farmers' land. Some informants were quite precise about the events which had led up to this, showing that they had a good insight into the changing situation of their employers. One man explained that 'the "baas" had just bought new machines for milking his cows, which meant that he wanted all the grazing for himself. He called all the workers together, and told us that we "kaffirs" had too many animals on his land. He said we could keep two cows each, and he would sell the rest for us at the auction'.

Another ex-farm worker, who had kept a herd of five cattle and earned about R40 per annum from the sale of calves to 'whites in the town of Senekal', recalled that he was told to get rid of all his animals by his employer in 1973. In compensation he and his fellow labourers were offered a cash increase of R2 per month in wages. According to him many of the twenty households employed by the farmer left in response to this measure. He maintained that he had been able to buy clothes for himself and his mother from the sale of livestock in earlier years, and argued 'how can you buy clothes for R2? I stayed on the farm for another year because my mother did not want to leave. But then I saw we were just becoming poorer, and I persuaded her to leave'.

2) Several informants noted that after the sale of farms they had worked on, the new farm owners told them to move off the land because they 'brought along their own workers from their other farms'. Displaced workers were aware that their previous employers had been bought out by wealthy land-owners with several farms. 'The new "baas" was a very wealthy man - he even had his own aeroplane, for which we made a runway near the house. He was also very mean; he said we were all too stupid to work for him and that his own workers were much better'.

3) Old people who were nearing retirement in the early 1970s, complained that the farmers' treatment of the elderly had become more harsh in recent years. In earlier years old people had been able to stay on farms and use the latters' resources until death, in recognition of a lifetime's service to their employers. In the late 1960s, however, farmers began to expel such persons. Several informants linked this change in attitude to the fact that farmers came, at about this time, to hear that Qwaqwa was intended as the 'homeland' for the 'Basotho'. One pensioner in Tseki explained what had happened to her:

> These farmers were now only satisfied if you could work, but if you were too ill or could not work, they were not. Even if you were struggling you could not write a letter to a person here in Qwaqwa. Then the farmer would say: 'No. Now you can join them. You may now walk to the Basotho (sic)'. If the farmer had not been cruel I would still be living there.

4) The sample included people who, in response to the perceived decline in conditions on farms, had decided to move to Qwaqwa on their own account, in the hope of securing migrant labour contracts to the industrial centres of common South Africa. People had heard about the rise in wages on the mines, and in industry generally, in this period. They were tempted by the prospect of a better future for them and their children: and complained bitterly about the absence of school facilities on or

near most farms.

People on the farms had also heard the grandiose claims broadcast by Radio Sesotho, which urged them to join 'their' chiefs in the 'homeland'. One person recalled that:

> The radio said: 'Come and enjoy yourself in Qwaqwa. All the black people must come to this homeland where they will find fields and lots of jobs. Your chiefs will look after you'.

Given the possibility of earning higher wages in other sectors of employment as migrants based in Qwaqwa, it was frequently the younger people who had paid most attention to these inducements to leave the farms. On the other hand, many of their older family members had been most reluctant to quit farms where they themselves had not been threatened with eviction. The decision to leave a farm was frequently, it appeared, a source of domestic conflict within family groupings. In several instances in the sample this conflict had endured until the time of fieldwork.

5) There were also cases in which households had been expelled after younger members had left to take up migrant labour contracts while their dependants and elders continued to reside on the farms. In these instances the responses from farmers were uneven, depending on their differing needs for seasonal and other forms of 'casual' labour. Some farm owners were reported to have encouraged the sons of farm labourers to engage in labour migration, so that their remittances could help to support family members whose labour was only occasionally required by the farmers themselves. Others were greatly opposed to farm-based labour migrants. One informant mentioned that, on his farm, the police were frequently called in to deal with women whose husbands were away working: 'Sometimes these raids took place during the day, but mostly after midnight. The women were taken to the courts and fined R20 or twenty days for trespassing'. He continued: 'It was impossible for the women to join their men in the compounds. They had no option but to stay on the farm and risk a second fine of R40'. In this manner his own daughter-in-law had been arrested and fined several times, so that eventually the whole family had decided to move to Qwaqwa.

6) Several people recorded their impression that, as a result of the developments mentioned above, there had been a general increase in the incidence of quarrelling between farmers and their workers, and amongst workers themselves, in the period in question. They also claimed that cruel treatment of workers by farmers was on the increase at this time, with the latter more ready than in earlier times to resort to sjamboks and other forms of punishment for workers who were tardy in doing their work or broke the various norms of behaviour established, and changed at their own whim, by individual employers. In this period, as the people saw it, the old relationships of tolerant paternalism and willing subservience were finally broken down, and people who were unable to adjust to this left the farms and made their way to Qwaqwa.

EARLY EXPERIENCES IN PHUTHADITJHABA AND TSEKI

Differential processes of relocation had vast implications both for early experiences, and for subsequent developments, in Qwaqwa. In the case of "forced" removal the reception of former Schoonplaas residents was planned for. They were accommodated in state-provided houses in Phuthaditjhaba. By contrast the arrival of former people from the OFS countryside in 1974 was unanticipated. They were arbitrarily assigned to, and left to their own devices in Tseki. The subsequent provision of infrastructure and "development" has definitely favoured former Schoonplaas residents. In this respect they have been highly visible, whereas former residents of the countryside have been systematically ignored.

Experiences in Phuthaditjhaba. People removed into Phuthaditjhaba in 1971 were accomodated in 300 semi-detached, four-roomed, double-storey houses. These houses were built by the Orange Vaal Administration Board (OVAB) starting in 1970. Of them The Star (16 July 1973) notes:

> They come as a surprise in the dun, winter-coloured valley below the Lesotho border. The little houses are quite attractive, painted rust and ochre and cream.

Locally these houses soon came to be referred to as the Diapollo. Jokingly, the name makes explicit reference to the American space shuttle which landed on the moon two years prior to the relocation. It expresses feelings about the height and size of these new homes.

Initially the Diapollo lacked sanitary facilities, having only a single outside stand pipe tap. In contrast to Schoonplaas homes, which were supplied with a bucket toilet system, residents were forced to dig pit-latrines in their yards. In 1977, however, flush toilets were built in outside rooms previously used for storage purposes and wash basins were installed. The monthly rents for these homes, including water, amounted initially to R3.50. But there were various subsequent increases: to R6 in 1975; to R10 after the home improvements of 1977; and to R16.60 in 1981. The first of these three increases evoked much discontent. Residents claimed that they had not been informed of the increase, marched to the housing office and refused to pay arrears. Some people went to court, others were given enough time to pay.

In Phuthaditjhaba the building of Apollo homes ceased in 1974. They had proved unpopular among residents; elderly people complained that, in the dusk, it was dangerous to climb the steps leading up to the bedrooms on the second storey. The numerous people who had arrived in the town subsequently were housed in 4000 residential units also built by the Orange Vaal Administration Board. These are more spacious than the Diapollo

and of the N51/9 type found in most 'homeland' towns, and are locally referred to as either of the Single (bungalow) or Double (semi-detached).

With the development of Phuthaditjhaba as a major town, residents of the Diapollo have benefitted greatly from a number of "development projects". On the initiative of the Qwaqwa Development Corporation (QDC) three industrial parks have been established on the outskirts of the town. QDC involvement in trade has led to the establishment of a number of tripartite companies, a beer hall, the "international" Hotel Qwaqwa and two major shopping centres. Qwaqwa government departments have been responsible for the erection of two teachers' training colleges, an old age home, a town hall, a great number of schools, an ostentatious new magisterial complex, a roofed central bus terminus, and have installed a network of powerful mast lights which illuminate the town's streets at night. Construction of a new hospital in Phuthaditjhaba began in 1977. The lavish five-storey building has been planned to accommodate 450 beds and will be fitted with the most up-to-date medical equipment. In 1981 the estimates costs of the project were R18 million (The Friend 3 March 1981). These projects have served to accentuate the difference between township and closer settlement residents.

Early experiences in Tseki. People who came to Tseki were given no choice about where to settle. Trucks from the farms were instructed by the Bakwena Tribal Authorities and chiefs in other closer settlements to come to Tseki, because it was the area which was being filled at that time. Upon arrival the names of newcomers were registered by the local headman, or his wife who deputized in his absence. Thereafter they were handed a piece of paper which indicated the number of their particular site. Most informants mentioned that they had had to pay the headman or one of his iinduna (assistants) a sum which ranged from 50c to R10, for directing them to their site. According to the headman's records over 2 000 households moved into Tseki in this manner between May and October 1974 (Rand Daily Mail 2 October 1974). This means, we estimate, that well over 10 000 people were dumped, over a brief period, in a confined area where they were left to fend for themselves. Those who arrived usually slept the first night in the truck which brought them, after which they were forced to sleep in the open until they had built themselves their first shelter. Tin shanties were constructed from materials brought from their previous place of residence. In the early days many shacks collapsed from the wind, posessions were jumbled up, and many lost in the confusion. Houses were later rebuilt with mud bricks.

People relocated to Tseki were by no means "resettled". This was made clear by the headman's wife in a newpaper interview in which she pointed to the absence of necessary amenities in Tseki. She was quoted (Rand Daily Mail 2 October 1974) as saying:

> We are worried about the increasing numbers. It will ultimately bring slum areas into Witzieshoek due to the lack of sanitary, schooling and other facilities

> which should be provided for the incoming families. I am wondering what to do. I envisage a breakdown of the whole system as more and more people arrive causing the government of Basotho Qwaqwa more embarrassment.

People soon discovered the fraudalunce of Radio Sesotho broadcasts: "The radio lied. Here there was no grazing for cattle and people had to wait a long time for work". Informants revealed that numbers of people returned to the farms soon after they arrived. Informants commented:

> The people were so angry that they returned to the farms. Not to the farms which they had left, but to any place which would take them. Some of my friends left within six months after getting here. If Qwaqwa gained independence I would also leave, even though I know what it is like now on the farms. Many people would try to run away...Nowadays many people want to return (to the farms), but Mopeli does not want such things to happen. He would stop this by making some policemen stand on the Harrismith road.

There was no clean water in Tseki in 1974 and, in the absence of taps, people were forced to fetch water from a few wells on the nearby mountain slopes. Informants recalled that people got rashes, and sores in their mouths, from drinking the well water, which rapidly became polluted.

> We heard that the water was killing people...during that time my sister-in-law just collapsed while walking around. We don't know the reason why she died. It might have been the water, or because we had to pay a lot for transport to get here and had no money to buy food with.
>
> Many kids died from drinking that water. Sometimes when you were sitting you might see three or four coffins passing by.

Taps were provided late in 1975. Although the taps were few in number, and fetching water was still an arduous and time-consuming occupation in the late 1980s, people noted the immediate improvement in health and hygiene which resulted from the provision of clean water.

People who had been used to a free and abundent supply of firewood on the farms, were appalled by the lack of fuel. The few trees in the area were rapidly consumed, and people had to go further and further into the mountains to fetch wood. After a few years small businesses selling wood and coal were established in the area, but in 1983 a small bundle of wood ("enough for two days") cost R2.50, and the price of a bag of coal ("which lasts a week when it is not too cold") was R4. Most households could not afford to spend R12-15 a week on fuel, and most women were still walking to the mountains to bring back wood. By the 1980s people had to go all they way to, and sometimes over, the Lesotho border

to find a ready source. Women banded together to make a journey, and armed themselves with sticks and axes, claiming that "dissidents" form Lesotho had attacked and raped women collecting wood on their own in the past. The round trip took more that eight hours, and on numerous occassions women were stopped by the headman or his iinduna as they re-entered the closer settlement, deprived of their wood, and fined for "creating tensions on the border".

The one facility which was provided quickly in Tseki was schools. Four- comprising one primary, one preparatory, and two high schools- were established in the mid-1970s. Indeed, as Robinson (1983) has shown, schools popped up like mushrooms in Qwaqwa in the 1970s. Through this vigorous building campaign educational facilities were not provided simply for the children of families relocated to the area: SeSotho-speaking pupils whose parents continued to reside in common South Africa were also attracted. In this way schooling was used as a means to create and foster a link between the "homeland" and its far flung "citizens". Tseki High School is particularly well known for the boarding facilities it offered to scholars from as far afield as Soweto. Otherwise, by 1984 "development" in Tseki was confined to five poorly-stocked and expensive general dealer stores, a bottle store, a "village garden", medical clinic and police station. Unlike inhabitants from Phuthaditjhaba, commuters from the closer settlement continue to use bus stops without shelter from wind or rain. Outpatients from Tseki are also unlikely to find the new hospital any more accessible than they did the old one.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY RESOURCES

To both Diapollo and Tseki residents the most drastic impact of relocation occurred in the field of employment. Here the impact of relocation was also far from uniform. Since the early 1970s Diapollo residents have enjoyed advantageous access to existing employment opportunity resources.

Most wage earners relocated in the Diapollo retained their jobs after relocation. With the destruction of Schoonplaas employers in Harrismith were informed by government that their employees were to be relocated to Qwaqwa. For these purposes they had granted their employees a few day's leave. However, these wage earners now had to commute a distance of approximately 50kms between their place of residence in Qwaqwa and workplace in Harrismith. In response to employer demands a hostel accommodating 50 men was constructed in Harrismith's new African township. Other workers secured accommodation with relatives in 42nd Hill, or at their workplaces in town (domestic workers and hotel employees). They travelled to Phuthaditjhaba over weekends only. However, most workers had become daily commuters. At the time of relocation Qwaqwa's Setsokotsane Bus Company had only one bus on the Harrismith line (Informa 1982: 50). To meet the increased need for transport the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) donated four new Leyland buses to Setsokotsane. Subsidized bus fares were also negotiated for daily commuters (The Friend 20

March 1971). Nonetheless workers found it possible to commute only with great difficulty. The poor condition of the untarred Harrismith road frequently led to bus breakdowns, and buses were in constant need of repair. Buses were overcrowded and slow. Of the 21 informants who were employed in Harrismith whilst resident in Schoonplaas, five had lost their jobs subsequent to relocation. Some said that because buses were too full they had been unable to arrive at work regularly and were dismissed. Others said that they did not always have enough money for bus tickets. Moreover when commuters worked overtime or night shifts they were unable to take buses home as the service did not extend into late night hours. Case 3.1 below illustrates some of the extreme difficulties faced by commuters during this period.

Case 3.1: The dillema of a shift worker, 1971-1975.

From 1971 to 1975 EM worked as a manual labourer at the Harrismith agricultural Co-Operative. "My job was to put sacks under machines which filled them with mealie meal...Luckily there was not a lot of work to do, but they only paid me R10 per week and that was not enough." EM's dillema was that he had to work alternate shifts weekly: from 06h00 to 14h00, and from 14h00 until 22h00. When working the morning shift he usually woke at 03h00, took the 04h30 bus to Harrismith and the 15h00 bus home. However, when he worked the evening shift he could not find a bus to Qwaqwa until 04h00. "I'd first sleep at work and then take the bus. At home there would be no time for sleep...I'd just look for food, buy wood and coal for my family to make a fire and then work in the garden before taking the eight o'clock bus back to Harrismith...At work we slept on empty mealie bags. But the manager did not want us to sleep there and we sometimes also hid ourselves in the waiting room at the railway station. But the station master told us that the waiting room was only for people waiting for the trains. Then we again went back to hide ourselves at the Co-operative and to sleep on those empty bags. When the manager found us he scolded us. We tried to explain the transport problem, but he just said: You must make use of your own means of transport to go to Qwaqwa if you want to work here...I spent all those nights without sleep... my eyes were tired and just stared in front of me." EM was eventually dismissed for stealing hessian bags at work.

In this context people who were formerly employed in Harrismith increasingly took up migrant labour contracts to work in the major South African industrial centres. A TEBA labour recruiting office for the goldmines of the OFS and the Transvaal, as well as a district labour bureau at the magisterial office had been in operation in Phuthaditjhaba since the 1960s.

For people relocated into Tseki, adjustment was a far more harrowing experience. For most relocation meant a complete loss of a wage income and a change from predominantly farm to industrial employment. Such conditions were exacerbated by the fact that there was no labour bureau in Tseki for the first two years after relocation. A bureau administered by the Bakwena Tribal Authorities was opened in the area only in 1976. Yet this

bureau was seldom visited by employers. Whereas the Phuthaditjhaba bureau offered a total of 8 489 contracts in 1983, only six migrant labour contracts were attested at the closer settlement bureau in the first half of 1983. Evidence from Qwaqwa hereby bear out the findings of Greenberg and Giliomee (1983) that Tribal Authorities exercise a limited role in the recruitment of labour from the "homelands". Over half of the workseekers in the households we studied took more than six months after arrival to gain wage employment; nearly 20% of these workseekers stayed unemployed for more than a year. During this time households without access to wage remittances were forced to rely exclusively on savings, money gained from the sale of livestock before arrival, and the help of kin and neighbours. This is illustrated in case 3.2 below.

Case 3.2. Passing through a period of Distress

AM's father worked on a farm in the Bothaville district of the Free State in the early 1970s. The farmer gave AM permission to work in Welkom and to leave his wife and children on the farm. The farmer died in 1973. The farm was sold, and the new owner expelled AM, who told us that "the new farmer did not want people to live on the farm who did not work for him". AM said that he had no option, but to hire a truck and come to Qwaqwa, as this was the only place where he could obtain a permanent place to live. AM's father, who was some years off retirement, refused to accompany his son, and one of AM's daughters, who was 15 at the time, also remained on the farm because she was employed as a domestic worker by the farmer's wife.

Soon after arrival in Qwaqwa misfortune struck. AM lost his job in Welkom owning to the unplanned period of absence from work at the time of relocation. He was unable to find another job for more than a year. His children were too young to work, and his wife was unable to look for work because she had to care for them. Their savings lasted only a short time, after which the household was without a cash income. "At that time we were struggling", AM's wife recalled. She said that in the bitter winter of 1974 they had been reduced to burning some of their furniture to keep warm. During that winter AM's youngest two children died, and the older ones suffered from serious malnutrition. AM's wife took them to the doctor in Harrismith once, but the doctor told them that their illness was "a wrong way of eating", and advised her to feed them milk, meat and fresh vegetables. "His advice was no good", she said "I knew what was wrong with them, but we had no money for these things."

AM's first response to this crisis was to send two of his children back to the farm to be cared for by their grandparents, who fed them and sent them to the farm school. "We were lucky that my father stayed on the farm", AM said, "because many others round here had left as whole families.. When their children were ill there was nowhere to send them". AM and his wife also asked - their neighbours for assistance, and said that a great deal of help, in the form of money and food, had been forthcoming. "In those early months", AM explained, "We all stood together. Now this has changed: if people see their neighbours hungry today,

they look the other way".

In 1975 AM found work at a construction firm that built a college near Tseki, but was again unemployed for four months after the contract was completed. Towards the end of 1975 he left Qwaqwa illegally to look for work independently, and found a job at a plumbing concern in Welkom. Once he began to remit home, the physical survival of his household was no longer threatened, but he complained: "I did not know what I was working for...I just worked for the neighbours to return their money".

AM's strategy of securing a migrant labour job by "unofficial" means was the option most frequently embarked upon by Tseki's wage earners. Many men ignored Tseki's labour bureau, and travelled to the bureau in Phuthaditjhaba instead. The mother of an unemployed young man explained:

> If you are eager to go on contract you go to the Phuthaditjhaba labour bureau every day. My son was anxious to get work, and walked there since the beginning of the year, because he did not have the money for busfare. Only some days when he was tired did he not go; then he just walked down to the Tseki labour bureau. But that was just an excuse to get out of home and go to talk to the other young men; there are never any contracts in Tseki.

Other workseekers bypassed both the local and district labour bureau and went on their own to look for work in common South Africa. By doing so they risked arrest under influx control legislation. They hoped to find an employer who would have their jobs regularized retrospectively by specific requisition.

The advantageous position of Diapollo residents with regard to employment opportunity resources is borne out by Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. Table 3.1 depicts the access of households in these respective areas to wage incomes in the 1980s. It shows that Diapollo households (despite smaller sizes than those in Tseki) had greater access to wage earnings. 8% of Diappolo households were without any access to wage earnings and 13% of Tseki households. 52% of Diapollo households, in contrast to 31% of Tseki households, had access to the earnings of two or more wage workers.

Table 3.2 depicts the distribution of people of working age in the Diapollo and Tseki samples between different places of employment. From the table it is evident that Tseki had a larger proportion of unemployed people, with women from the closer settlement being particularly disadvantaged: 69% were unemployed in contrast to 25% in the Diapollo. Whereas the periods of unemployment experienced by Diapollo residents were fairly short term, many Tseki workseekers had been unemployed for exceptionally long periods. At least two workseekers in the sample had been unemployed for nine years i.e. ever since their arrival in Tseki in 1974. Diapollo wage earners were employed in

TABLE 3.1: NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS PER HOUSEHOLD IN THE DIAPOLLO AND TSEKI SAMPLES BY SIZE OF SUCH POPULATIONS (1983-1985).

	DIAPOLLO (1984/85)			TSEKI (1983)		
Number of wage earners	Number of households	Household sizes Range	Mean	Number of households	Household sizes Range	Mean
0	6 (8%)	2- 7	4.6	5 (13%)	1-11	6.2
1	29 (40%)	3- 9	5.3	2 (55%)	3-11	7.1
2	19 (26%)	2-10	5.2	8 (21%)	3-11	7.3
3	13 (18%)	3-11	8.0	2 (5%)	6-13	9.5
4	5 (7%)	7-11	9.2	2 (5%)	9-15	12.0
7	1 (1%)	17	17	0 (0%)	0	0
TOTALS	73 (100%)	2-17	6.3	38 (99%)	1-15	7.1

Notes: (1) All figures are de jure
(2) Inadequate data - 2 Diapollo households

TABLE 3.2: LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE DIAPOLLO AND TSEKI SAMPLES ACCORDING TO PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT (1983-1985).

	DIAPOLLO (1984/ 85)				TSEKI (1983)			
EMPLOYMENT STATUS	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	(%)	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	(%)
NOT EMPLOYED								
Attending school	16	17	33	(14%)	12	16	28	(22%)
Health reasons	10	5	15	(6%)	2	4	6	(5%)
Domestic reasons	0	15	15	(6%)	0	10	10	(8%)
Unemployed	22	20	42	(18%)	12	18	30	(24%)
TOTAL	48	57	105	(44%)	26	48	74	(59%)
EMPLOYED								
Inside Qwaqwa	28	28	56	(24%)	2	3	5	(4%)
In Harrismith	25	27	52	(22%)	5	1	6	(5%)
As migrants	20	5	25	(11%)	36	4	40	(32%)
TOTAL	73	60	133	(56%)	43	8	51	(41%)
TOTAL	121	117	238	(100%)	69	56	125	(100%)

Notes: (1) Informants of working age are regarded as older than 15 but younger than 66 years in the case of males or 61 years in the case of females.
(2) All figures are based on data of de jure residents in the two areas.

a broader range of jobs: earning from less than R80 per month (domestic and unskilled workers) to more than R600 (salespeople paid on commission, high school teachers, senior bus drivers and clerks in Qwaqwa's public service). 42% worked locally, 39% in Harrismith and 19% as migrants. By contrast only 10% of employed Tseki residents worked in Qwaqwa, 12% in Harrismith and as many as 78% as migrants.

These differences are due to a number of factors. By virtue of prior residence in urban areas Diapollo residents were better schooled and had had considerable experience of the urban work setting. Skills acquired in the urban context have enabled them to compete successfully for relatively skilled and sought after jobs after relocation. By contrast the former residents of the OFS countryside were poorly schooled with little prior experience of the urban work setting.

The relative advantage of Diapollo wage workers stretches beyond mere skill levels. It is also based upon their favourable geographic location in relation to employment opportunity resources in and around Qwaqwa. With the inauguration of the South African government's decentralization scheme in 1980 local employment had become a realistic option. In terms of this scheme Phuthaditjhaba was officially designated a "growth point" and three industrial parks were constructed on the outskirts of the town Diapollo. By 1985, 83 industries had been established here offering 8 561 jobs. Of these 7 061 (82%) were held by women (QDC 1985:1-4). As workseekers are recruited fronm factory gates on an almost first-come-first-serve basis it stands to reason that Diapollo residents have easier access to these jobs. They are far more likely than closer settlement residents to know where and when employment is offered. Very few of Tseki's wage earners were employed inside Qwaqwa: in fact none were employed in Tseki itself. Informants complained bitterly that local jobs were monopolized by people from Phuthaditjhaba. One woman, who had been unemployed for four years, looked for work only in the industrial parks: "We all go to the factory gates, and then maybe the foreman would call one of us and say, "Hey you, Come!". She continued, "foremen at the factories select only people they know - their relatives, and women from Phuthaditjhaba whom they meet in the shebeens."

Since 1979 employment in Harrismith as commuters had become a more feasible proposition than before. In that year a new tarred road was completed between Harrismith and Phuthaditjhaba. The journey was shortened and less taxing on buses. The scale of the Setsokotsane Bus Service had also been considerably expanded. By 1984 it operated a fleet of approximately 90 buses. With subsequent population relocations into other residential areas in Qwaqwa residents of the Apollo have, however, faced increased competition for Harrismith jobs. Nonetheless they (particularly former residents of Schoonplaas) are placed at an advantage due to their knowledge of the town's labour market and ties of kinship and acquaintance with the inhabitants of 42nd Hill. Commuter labour has not presented itself as a significant option to Tseki's residents who regard Harrismith as a "foreign" town.

Another problem encountered in securing Harrismith jobs was that a direct bus line between Tseki and Harrismith was established only in 1983. Prior to this commuters had to travel to Phuthaditjhaba before departing for Harrismith. Commuters left their homes at 3h00 and seldom returned before 19h00.

Reasons for the greater participation of Tseki residents in migrant labour contracts are not readily apparent. It is partly because men in the closer settlement had experienced farm-based labour migration prior to relocation. Most of Tseki's male workseekers had their eyes set on migrant contracts. They were often unwilling to take up low-paid and insecure local employment, reasoning that if they accepted such jobs they would not be available at the labour bureau at the crucial moment when an employer arrived with secure and better-paid migrant contracts. The higher participation of closer settlement men in the labour market as migrants could also be due to the fact that labour histories in Tseki were collected earlier than those in Phuthaditjhaba. Between 1980 and 1982 there had been a great demand for unskilled labour for the construction of the Sasol plants in the Northern OFS. Contracts were, however, available only for a two year period and jobs were completed upon the termination of such plants.

Diapollo workseekers generally found contracts less desirable. They agreed that such contracts often offered higher wages than local employment, but pointed to other undesirable factors associated with labour migration such as long periods of absence from home and spartan living conditions in the compounds. It was also noted that higher earnings did not necessarily imply greater remittances. Labour histories showed that remittances from different migrant workers varied widely. Some workers sent home as little as R300 during the year, while others remitted amounts in excess of R2 000. Some remitted regularly, and others very occasionally. Variation in the kinds of jobs held was only one, and not necessarily the most important, reason for the unevenness of remittances. In addition to this workers themselves drew attention to many other factors which affected the amount and flow of remittances from any given worker. Accommodation while at work was frequently mentioned. Municipal hostels, mine hostels, hostels in small towns, and hostels in or near large cities were, the workers insisted, very different environments in which to live. Depending on where they lived, there were greater or lesser demands on their wages for their own requirements, leaving smaller or larger amounts to be remitted to their dependents. One migrant who earned R250 per month in Welkom found it possible to remit only R60 per fortnight. "Where I stay", he said, "this is not easy to do. You have to save as hard as possible. When you send money home you don't have enough for yourself, and there is usually nothing at all to put into the bank." He explained that at the municipal hostels where he stayed no food was provided for migrants, but there were kitchen facilities. "Each must provide for himself. There are no storage places, and very much food gets wasted and stolen when you are at work". Unlike the mine hostels, the municipal hostel was close to the township, which provided large scope for men to spend their wages before they could be sent home. There was, for instance, a beer hall right

next to the hostel, which was often frequented by prostitutes from the township.

SUBORDINATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

As a result of relocation people have been subject to vastly different structures of local government/control inside Qwaqwa. Whereas Phuthaditjhaba residents have maintained some degree of autonomy from the Qwaqwa government, closer settlements such as Tseki are directly subordinate to a system of Tribal Authorities and "hereditary" chiefs (the power base of the ruling Dikwankwetla Party).

Since the 1970s the Department of Bantu Administration and Development assumed direct responsibility for the management of Phuthaditjhaba's affairs. Over and above his other duties the district magistrate acted in the capacity of mayor. In 1979 the first steps were taken to grant residents some say in local government. A Community Council was elected to serve the magistrate in an advisory capacity. The magistrate at that time noted that in its three year term of office only two Council meetings were held. Only twice did Council members approach him with problems experienced in the town. He said that he would have been surprised had anybody known of the Council's existence.

In line with developments throughout South African townships at that time arrangements were made for the election of a new Community Council in 1982. However, after a meeting with nominated candidates Chief Minister Mopeli cancelled the election. Plans soon got underway for a Town Council to be elected in September 1983. The Town Council was to have had increased powers including control over the allocation of housing and the granting of business licences. It was to have become financially self-sufficient with housing rents as its major source of revenue. On 31 September 9 candidates were elected to the Council with a percentage poll of 9% among 5 465 registered voters. Eight of the successful candidates campaigned under the slogan Nna Le Mmuso (I with the government). They were allegedly sponsored by Dikwankwetla.

Councillors ascribed widespread disinterest among Phuthaditjhaba's voters to poor communication. Anouncements made on loud hailers in the streets had little effect because people were at work during the day and notices at the superentendent's office were seldom read. Bank (1984: 50-55) has shown that teachers and civil servants chose not to vote due to political considerations. They saw voting as an indication of support for the "homeland" system. He also shows that most votes came from pensioners and the urban poor who sought to forge relations of patronage with power holders. They believed that councilors could upgrade dwellings, improve tha garbage removal system and take firm action against criminal elements.

Although the Diapollo is located in the ward of Phuthaditjhaba's new mayor, Town Council affairs were hardly ever discussed during fieldwork. Some informants did not know about the elections. Others said that they ignore 'homeland' elections and would leave once Qwaqwa gained 'independence'. One man remarked that the "mayor is a wealthy shopowner who doesn't understand our problems, so how can he help us?" It was evident that up to 1985 the existence of a Town Council had hardly any impact upon everyday life in Phuthaditjhaba. Informants did not perceive the Council as particularly "oppressive". They rather felt that this body had in fact done nothing. Plans to introduce creches and a fire station, had been impeded by a lack of financial resources. Local sentiments are echoed in an editorial comment of The Pinnacle (11 May 1984) which asks:

> What have these councillors done so far? Streets are as dilapidated as ever, there are no signs of recreational facilities, ashbins remain in the streets over long periods without being attended to...Is the Town Council really proud of this pathetic state of affairs?

In contrast people in Tseki saw local government as oppressive and consistently blamed it for interfering in their lives. Tseki was divided into seven wards, each presided over by an iinduna (overseer) appointed by the headman. The headman of Tseki was responsible to the district chief of Bolata (a neighbouring closer settlement) and, through him, to the Tribal Authority in the main Bakwena village of Namahadi (the seat of the paramount chief). Tseki's office had been downgraded as part of the reorganization of the Tribal Authority structure in the 1950s (vide Chapter One). The present incumbent's title was ramotse (headman), whereas his father had been a morena (chief). Implementation of the 1982 Administration of Authorities Act left him a headman, because he was a member of a relatively junior branch of the Mopeli clan. The newly created district chief in the neighbouring village was genealogically senior to him. An elderly iinduna, appointed by the present headman's father, explained that prior to the restructuring of "Tribal" government:

> The chiefs were respected leaders who stood up to the (South African) government. But today the power of the chiefs is gone! At the pitso (assemblies) they only execute the commands of Dikwankwetla. I continue my job only because it was given to me by S's father, whom I respected.

This induna had lived all his life in Tseki and understood the nature of the changes to the institution of chiefship since the 1950s. The vast majority of people in Tseki, having arrived in the 1970s, had no background in these matters, and saw the headman and his iinduna as nothing more than petty functionaries within the homeland bureaucracy, whose role was to intrude into people's lives and hand out summary punishments for infringements of a host of arbitrary rules. People listed a whole series of 'offences' for which they were liable for punishment at the hands of the headmen and his iinduna. These included (i)

failure to register births and deaths promptly (ii) failure to pay the annual setabataba (site tax) or special Development Tax (vide Sharp and Martiny 1984) (iii) quarrelling or fighting with neighbours (iv) failure to keep domestic yards tidy (v) failure to attend the funerals of neighbours (vi) failure to contribute to special levies, for example for "the headmen's daughter's wedding a couple of years ago" (vii) fetching firewood (viii) failure to observe conservation rules by, for instance, taking soil from outside one's own site to replaster the walls of the house (ix) "wasting water" (x) hanging washing on the line between 10h00 and 14h00 in the summer months, thereby causing "hailstorms to strike the village". People found guilty of disobeying these conventions were arrested by iinduna and taken before the headman. Fines of between R5 and R20 were imposed for a first offence. For failure to pay fines, or for second or more serious offences, people were sometimes lashed by the headman, or taken to the "supreme Tribal court" in Namahadi, where, as one informant put it, "they could be lashed by head office chiefs". The ultimate penalty, which as far as we could tell had never been imposed, was the suspension of residential rights in Tseki.

The well known saying Morena ke Morena ka Batho (A chief is a chief by the people) was of little applicability in Tseki in 1983. No one person who was questioned mentioned a single positive aspect to the functioning of the Tribal Authority Structure in Tseki. Indeed, when asked what the greatest problem in Tseki was, one woman replied: "The headmen and his iinduna. She continued

> I hate the headmen and his iinduna. Even if people fight I would just walk past and won't tell the iinduna. In 1974, when we arrived, the headman stayed in a rondavel. His wife was in charge then because he was just a migrant worker and was always away at the time. Now it seems as if he is living better from all these fines. He has built a house, and even a shop near the clinic. He also drives an El Camino truck now.

Another woman recalled that in the summer of 1982 she had hung her baby's nappies on the washing line during the day, and that an induna had approached her and said that it was wrong to hang out washing because this would cause hail.

> He then fined me R10 on the spot. I told him that it was only a few nappies. He replied: "You talk too much. pay another R5." Because I was still stubborn he raised the fine another three times until it stood at R30. I then told him I was poor and could not pay so much. He said he would return when I had the money but I'm not going to pay him. I will just tell him I have stayed poor. Not all Basotho believe that washing causes hail. These iinduna want to make all Basotho the same.

In fear of punishment people got up in the middle of the night to fetch firewood, and to dig for soil in order to make the mud plaster for their homes:

> for taking soil for plaster. These fines are to make us buy bricks from Mopeli's brickyard own brickyard in Phuthaditjhaba, where large bricks cost R80 and smaller ones R60 per hundred.

At the time of fieldwork in Tseki, the "village council" scheme had not yet come into operation. Indications are, however, that most closer settlement residents would view this scheme, when introduced in the following year, as another imposition from above and as an adjunct to the arbitrary power of the headman.

THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY

Insofar as cooperation and mutual aid is concerned people relocated into the Diapollo and Tseki shared many similar experiences. Informants in both areas commented on the extent to which people had helped each other during the initial period in Qwaqwa, saying "there was good spirit here", "we stood together" and "you never asked whether other people could pay you back". The difficulties which people faced were, in many ways novel: Qwaqwa presented a new and daunting experience of deprivation which was a profound shock to all and, at the outset, engendered a grim cameraderie.

In both areas fieldwork revealed three basic types of mutual aid associations beyond the household. These were burial societies, stokvels (saving clubs) and phabadimo (givings to the ancestors) as found in most South African townships. Most working class households in these areas were members of burial associations. Members (from about 50 to more than 300) paid monthly fees of 50c to the association and R2 whenever a fellow member, or close relative of such a member, died. Such contributions were used to assist families of the deceased with funeral expenses. Members also assisted with funeral arrangements. Stokvel clubs, comprising between only three and six members, had a less permanent existence. Monthly payments of R10 was made to the member whose turn it was to hold a stokvel. Such money was used to prepare food, tea and beer for sale to neighbours. All profits accured in this process belonged to the holder. Stokvels were popular and often attended by more than 30 people. Phabadimo feasts attracted as much public interest as stokvels. They were held yearly by most households to thank the badimo for luck in the past and to request luck for the future. On these occassions wealthier households often assisted poorer households by contributing food, snuff and ingredients for home brewed beer.

Despite these similarities there were also clear differences in patterns of coopertation and social interaction between the Diapollo and Tseki. These differences can be seen as resulting from differential experiences of relocation. The effects of relocation upon the formation of social networks for mutual support and assistance is particularly important.

Among Diapollo residents, who had experienced collective removal, social networks were eroded rather than destroyed. Informants relocated into the housing section from other areas recalled that since their arrival people from Harrismith have formed a closely knit community. They said that they were resented by, and that they themselves resented those from Harrismith.

> From the beginning we did not get on well...We were happy to come here (to the Diapollo), but they were not...They didn't like Qwaqwa and said that Qwaqwa was like a farm. They thought that they were clever and better than us and formed their own groups. They never mixed with us...We were taken to be the have nots...
>
> We really did not get on. Those from Harrismith were fighters. If you had a problem with one of them they would all be against you...A fight between the kids always resulted into a fight between the adults: even with stones.

By the time of fieldwork, approximately 14 years after the Schoonplaas removals, relations between these categories of people were still tense. The nucleus of networks of sociability in the housing section in particular, and Phuthaditjhaba in general, tended to comprise people relocated from the same township such as Harrismith, Senekal, or Bethlehem. I have heard some men of such networks referring to each other as "home-boys". There is a rather ironic similarity between the "home boy" concept in Phuthaditjhaba and the amakhaya networks identified among Xhosa speaking migrants in Cape Town and East London by Wilson and Mafeje (1973: 47-56) and by Mayer and Mayer (1974: 124-134) respectively. "Home- boy" networks in Phuthaditjhaba facilitate social support among relocated people. This is not unlike the support which these links were said to have in the urban environment. These authors also argued that these networks enabled migrants to sustain contact with the reserves which was essential in maintaining control over land and stock to which one could retire. This is paralleled by "home-boy" groups in the Diapollo. For these people contact with Harrismith carries important benefits. The town has remained a significant centre of employment and networks can be utilized as a resource in abtaining accurate information about the labour market.

A large number of home-brew-selling shebeens in the housing section were almost exclusively patronized by former inhabitants of Harrismith. They provide the venue for discussions concerning current labour issues and reminiscences about life in the old location. There seemed to be an almost conscious tendency among attendants to dissociate themselves from Qwaqwa at an ideological level. Ethnicity was even evoked to these ends. People claimed that they did not actually belong in Qwaqwa as they were Bakgolokwe, rather than Basotho, who spoke Sekgolokwe rather than Sesotho proper. Many said that the stokvels and phabadimo, held in these shebeens were sometimes attended by current residents of 42nd Hill, whereas former shanty-town residents were only cautiously invited to these.

In Tseki, where households were relocated in isolation rather than collectively, such amakhaya- type networks are absent. Households in the closer settlement were far more likely to be isolated from those who could be related to them by ties of kinship and prior aquaintance by vast geographical distance. This severely limited the extent to which households in Tseki were able to mobilize relationships of kinship as a source of support during times of severe financial crisis. [See Sharp and Spiegel (1985) for a comprehensive analysis of the erosion of kinship in "betterment" and closer settlement areas.]

Such isolation had also made Tseki households vulnerable to robbery and theft. Vulnerability was exacerbated by the fact that a large number of Tseki's men were absent migrants. Informants complained that people who returned home on the late buses were often robbed by itsotsi and said that Tseki was particularly dangerous at night. Comments included: "At night you cannot even walk from here to the church"; "It is better to stay at home and to lock the doors, because when you die it's better to die at home"; and " If you have only 20c in your pocket they'll steal it". In Tseki gangs of young men reportedly broke down the doors of homes at night and demanded money or domestic posessions (dishes, pots, cuttlery and pans) from inhabitants. In addition some residents recalled several incidents of kidnapping in the closer settlement.

CONCLUSIONS

The study of relocation processes from common South Africa into the "homelands" has been dominated by attempts to compare and contrast the experiences of relocation prior and after the event. The analysis of the Suplus People Project (1983) and Platsky and Walker (1985) has been particularly impressive in recording the devastating effects of population relocations on a national scale. This approach has also been characteristic of excellent studies of particular local instances of population removals. Such accounts include Western's (1980) study of influx control removals from Mowbray in Cape Town, Whisson's (1981) account of relocation at Glenmore in the Eastern Cape, as well as the analysis by Lodge (1982) and Pinnock (1983) on the respective destruction of District Six and Sophiatown.

With this in mind, this paper has attempted to present a comparative ethnography on the diverse types of relocation and their differential implications for different sections of Qwaqwa's population. It is suggested that whilst a comparison of experiences prior and after relocation are indeed valuable, such a focus may well obscure significant differences among relocated people. Residents of the Diapollo were unanimous in their agreement that life in Qwaqwa compared unfavourably to life in the old Schoonplaas location. On the other hand, residents of Tseki were more ambivalent. Some said that they had preferred living in the OFS countryside. Others were adament that closer settlement life in Qwaqwa was more desirable. Yet this paper has shown the numerous ways in which households of the Diapollo have

enjoyed favourable access to resources in the "homeland" relative to Tseki households.

It is my contention that, insofar as Qwaqwa is concerned, such differences may partially be accounted for by the important distinction between removals which were officially planned ("forced") and those which were unplanned ("voluntary"). The contention that removals due to directly planned action by the state may imply favourable access to resources does not detract from the devastating impact upon the lives of those affected. It rather serves to highlight the desparate plight of the less visible and more marginilized sections of Qwaqwa's population who had been subject to unplanned removals.

At the present it is difficult to assess the extent to which this trend holds true of other South African "homelands". Tentative support for this hypothesis may be found in the position of Mdantsane, whose residents were forcefully relocated with the destruction of Duncan Village, relative to other areas in the Ciskei (vide Mayer and Mayer 1974: 294-318). The experience of Glenmore, on the other hand, contradicts this hypothesis (vide Whisson 1981). It is only through further comparative research that greater clarity can be gained.

REFERENCES

Bank, L.
1984 Town and "closer settlement" in Qwaqwa. Unpublished B.A. Honours Dissertation, African Studies, University of Cape Town

BENSO
1978 Qwaqwa Economic Review. Johannesburg. Bureau for Economic Research and National Development

Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA)
1985 Qwaqwa Development Information. Sandton.

Greenberg, S and Giliomee, H.
1983 Labour Bureaucracies and the African Reserves. South African Labour Bulletin 8 (4).

Hawkins, E.
1982 The Story of Harrismith. Harrismith Rotary Club.

Lodge, T.
1983 Black politics in South Africa since 1945. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Mare, G.
1980 African population relocations in South Africa. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Murray, C.
1985 Struggle from the margins: Rural slums in the Orange Free State. in Cooper, F (ed) Struggle for the City. London. Sage Publications.

Mayer, P and Mayer I.
1974 Townsmen or Tribesmen. Cape Town. Oxford University Press.

Niehaus, I.
1984 The problems, experiences and responses of relocated people: Closer settlement life in Qwaqwa. Unpublished B. Soc. Sc. Honours dissertation, Social Anthropology, University of Cape Town.

Pinnock, D.
1984 The Brotherhoods. Cape Town: David Philip.

Platsky, L and Walker, C.
1985 The Surplus People. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Quinlan, T.
1986 The tribal paradigm and ethnic nationalism: A case study of political structures in Qwaqwa.Transformations (2).

Ross, Eerwaarde J.J.
1930 Die Sending te Witzieshoek. Bloemfontein. Nasionale Pers Beperk.

Sharp, J.
1982 Relocation and the problem of survival in Qwaqwa. Social Dynamics 8 (2).

Sharp, J and Martiny, J.
1984 An overview of Qwaqwa. Carnegie Conference paper no. 64. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.

Sharp, J and Spiegel, A.
1985 Vulnerability to impoverishment in South African rural areas: the erosion of kinship and neighbourhood as social resources. Africa 55 (2)

Streek, B and Wicksteed, R.
1981 Render unto Kaiser. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Surplus People Project
1983 Forced Removals in South Africa. Volume 3. Cape Town. The Surplus People Project.

Western, J.
1980 Outcast Cape Town. Cape Town: David Philip.

Whisson, M.
1980 Resettlement in Glenmore. Nash, M and Charton, B. (eds) An Empty Table? Grahamstown: South African Council of Churches.

Wilson, M. and Mafeje, A.
1973 Langa. Cape Town. Oxford University Press.