

are a datum in experience, it is always legitimate to ask whether there are any Ys which are necessary conditions for there being Xs. (Throughout I use 'necessary conditions' as equivalent to 'conditions of possibility', and 'sufficient conditions' as equivalent to 'conditions of existence').

In all of the above I follow the twentieth century reappropriation of transcendental arguments under the rubric of 'descriptive metaphysics'. Strawson has shown convincingly, in The Bounds of Sense, that Kant requires lobotomization to be manageable. Hence my avoidance of a 'transcendental psychology' of sorts, and a concentration on the significance of language and conceptual practices. On the other hand, I would feel distinctly uncomfortable in committing myself to what Strawson views as the 'subject matter' of descriptive metaphysics, that "...massive central core of human thinking which has no history..." (Strawson, (1959), p.10). Although the relationship between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is not a topic to be taken lightly, let me say this. For the purposes of this chapter, transcendental arguments are to be considered as just as defeasible and conditional as any other philosophical argument. Their generality does not render them impregnable. Their purpose here is that of systemization. This is not to say that Wiggins' case would not be strengthened by the formulation of a coherent transcendental argument, it would. But that does not entail the isolation of an ahistorical core of conceptual hardware.² (Of course, Wiggins might not be charmed by these transcendental crutches at all, cf. SS, Footnote 4, p.81/2 "Semantical fact is almost always more interesting than transcendental philosophical fiction; and for the imagination a hundred times more potent.").

The transcendental arguments to be presented here therefore share only a methodological form with the weightier and imposing Strawsonian type. They are more localized, weaker and homely. It is possible, however, to isolate two separate versions of varying strengths for transcendental arguments of whatever level of generality. Option A subsumes those attempts claiming to arrive at necessary conditions of experience in terms of what the world is like. This is the stronger version, where the possession of concepts is viewed as entailing that something answers to them. Option B isolates those versions solely concerned with which concepts are presupposed by experience as in fact conceptualized, and then sorting these into those which are so basic as to render experience possible, and those which merely add more detail. It is more prudent to choose the second option, transcendental arguments should not be viewed as establishing, contra various idealisms, the reality of the world, or in this case, the independent existence of substances. Such a strong construal is, at best, utopian; and while one may wonder about the fecundity of 'teasing out' what a conceptual scheme contains

² Grayling (1985), The Refutation of Skepticism. I am much indebted to this excellent study in the Strawsonian tradition.

implicitly, option B at least spares one a tedious debate about realism.³

Transcendental arguments were originally proposed as answers to the sceptical challenge. Their general strategy has been to claim that the sceptic utilizes a notion, in raising the challenge, which is constitutive of experience and then proceeds to deny it, thus denying the possibility of the question itself. (And more. For Kant, if one doubts the existence of external objects, one is doubting a necessary condition of the self-ascription of experience. One is making an incoherent assertion, from the transcendental perspective. Cf. The similar strategy in *Individuals*, chapter three, against the sceptic about other minds).

Following this historical cue, one may construe the transcendentalism imputed to Wiggins as a response to the sceptic about the supposed modal aspects of individuation, as these aspects are embedded in the use of sortals. Note that this is a 'superstructural scepticism' of sorts, it relates not to individuation per se, but rather to certain embellishments thereof. What needs to be shown is that the embellishments are in fact pivotal and necessary. At this stage, the sceptic is also not questioning the objectivity of modal reality in general, or its mind-independence. Her concerns are specific to the localized practice of individuation and, in her view, the inflated assertions made on its basis. Two questions may be put in her mouth:

- (1) 'How do sortals help with individuation?'
- (2) 'Are sortals necessary to individuation?'

These two questions overlap and combine the anthropological and transcendental stances discussed in note one. What is wanted is a description of services rendered, and then a demonstration to the effect that the practice would collapse without what renders these services.

Section 2

Strawsonian Arguments

Wiggins' description of present individuating practices may be crudely summarized in three claims. Notice that the description is not 'purely empirical' in that I have abstracted from the object-language locutions of which these various formulations are said to be determinables in one way or another. It is also assumed that the formal properties of certain notions employed may be included as part of the observational data.

³ 'Tedious' in the sense that it chides the Kantian for claiming to have established something which she obviously has not. The point is that she need not claim as much, qua Kantian, as Kant himself did (cf. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, 'The Refutation of Idealism', chapter two, section four of the Transcendental Analytic). An option B reading of Strawson's derivation of the necessity of the unperceived existence of objects for their spatiotemporal incorporation, similarly defuses Stroud's (1968) charges of implicit verificationism.

(A) From the view that identity with a is to be expanded into the form 'a is the same something as a' ('Everything is something'), it is concluded that the elucidation of any identity question will depend on what (kind) the object in question is.⁴ I have deliberately stated this claim in its formal identity mode in order to be clear about its exact status. Wiggins states it as 'a is the same something as b'. Now, formal identity statements contrast with material identity statements in that their falsity do not entail that they are about two things. In the case of material identities, this is the case; 'Hesperus is the same planet as Phosphorus' appears to be about distinct things, and its subject matter depends on its truth-value (i.e., if true, it is about one thing; if false about two distinct things). This is perhaps an unhappy way of putting matters. The point is simply that whereas identity statements of the form 'x = y' leave open the possibility of a denial of identity, those of the form 'x = x' do not. The formal mode version of the claim that everything is something is arrived at by combining the Wigginsian view that 'Fx' is short for 'x is the same F as x' (SS, p.31); and the claim that for any a and b, 'a is the same something as b'. The latter, if true, is about one object; hence an instance of the quantified schema.

Wiggins' general presupposition in employing the 'a - b' rather than 'a - a' form, is that the point of any identity question is a transtemporal one, if it has one at all. This can be clearly seen in his examples of the going method for the resolution of identity questions: "Is a, the man sitting on the left at the back of the restaurant, the same person as b, the boy who won the drawing prize at the school I was a pupil at in the year 1951?" (SS, p.49). The answer depends on, firstly, the notion of a continuous path allowing one to trace b since 1951 (a man-path) and, secondly, the notion of coincidence under a sortal ('human being'). The kind of continuity in question depends on the relevant coincidence under a concept, on what b is. But then this is the logically prior notion. Synchronically, at any time, a must be the same something as a, if it is to be the same something as anything specified for a time distinct from the time in question.

The foregoing combines naturally with the related view that one cannot directly reidentify bare space-occupying matter. This is no doubt true, as long as this claim is not put forward as a motive for some sort of essentialism. It is uncontroversial that individuators do not single out matter as undifferentiated stuff in their daily commerce with the world, they single out demarcated particulars. Such individuation proceeds, again uncontroversially, via some property of the particular. But this does not entail that any property is essential to the particular in question, or that it must satisfy some one predicate throughout its existence. There must be other grounds for this claim. Of course, the insufficiency of spatial position for singling out is

⁴ Cf. SS, p.38 for the epistemological version of this point, i.e., the view that there can be no access to "... the sameness of things that was perfectly independent of x and y's being the same something or other, ..." As was pointed out in the final section of chapter one, this 'overinflates' the notion of identity (cf. section five of this chapter).

plausible on independent grounds, provided one accepts the converse of Locke's principle that no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time.⁸ If, as the postulation of a constitutive 'is' implies, the statue is distinct from its matter, specification of spatial position will underdetermine the referent. Something is needed in addition. The possibility of spatially-coinciding objects also illuminates another aspect of the supposed importance of examples of the 'Lot's wife' sort for the Wigginsian (cf. *SS*, pp.60-62). It is no doubt true that the pillar of salt is in the same spatial position as Lot's wife was, but mere specification of that position will not yield Lot's wife again. Specification of kind is also necessary. The implausibility of this case attaches mainly to the supposition that something can exchange complete principles of identity. However, this last is an independent thesis, which, it seems, may be challenged without thereby discrediting the insufficiency of spatial position for singling out at a time.

To see this, it seems plausible that someone could say 'That's Lot's wife', pointing to the pillar. He need not thereby mean that her brain-programme now supervenes on a crystalline structure, but merely that since the woman is neither decomposing somewhere nor non-spatiotemporally located, where else can she be said to be? 'Woman-pillar' would become a necessity to make sense of the story. (cf. Chapter one, Section three). But it is now clear that this retort to Wiggins in fact does question the insufficiency of spatial location. The pillar has not moved, it is rooted when one says 'That's Lot's wife', pointing to a pillar. I conclude that the example is a bad one to make clear Wiggins' position, and shall ignore it henceforth.

(B) The co-restrictiveness of the various different sortals which might be used in the singling out of a particular a, implies that a is a substance of some one kind. This goes hand in hand with Wiggins' denial of R, and consequently, with the view that all alternative individuations of a will yield the same answer (if any) to the question of its identity with b.⁹

(C) "... the singling out at time t of the substance s reaches backwards and forwards to times before and after t:..." (*SS*, p.5).

These three descriptive claims about actual individuating practice do suggest the links isolated in the five 'transcendental' quotations from Wiggins in Section one. The connection between identity and persistence is made via (b) and (c), insofar as the implicit temporal spread of individuations are to be accommodated by substance sortals which exceed and encompass

⁸ Cf. Wiggins' (1968) defence of Locke's principle in 'On Being in the same place at the same time' and Doepke (1982), 'Spatially coinciding objects' for an anti-reductionist defence against a materialist preference for fundamental constituents.

⁹ "The abstraction we need is what results from the ascent from particular kinds of substance to the determinable substance of some kind." (*SS*, p.5). This denies a bare substratum conception, where 'substance' designates what is left over after property-abstraction.

the temporal extent of any specific restricted sortal used on a specific occasion. (a) and (b) link the absence of purely stipulative persistence and identity conditions with the thought that substance sortals isolate kinds which determine such conditions.

A possible transcendental manoeuvre at this stage is to simply subsume these claims under the more general ones established by weighty arguments à la Strawson. To do so, one need only assume that the working conceptual scheme employs continuant concepts and a unified spatiotemporal framework. One then views substance sortals as a kind of, or even as equivalent to, continuant concepts, and inquire into the conditions of possibility of possessing such concepts. These conditions would include the possession of criteria of reidentification, the notion of numerical identity, etc. But this is too easy. It is also not specific enough to explain away the "... mystery...about how a notion of the exigency that we are disposed apriori to ascribe to the identity relation can find application in the uncertain and ever changing world of our experience." (SS, p.2).

Suppose one argues initially then, for the idea of numerical identity, showing that substance concepts are a necessary condition of that idea, which in itself is a condition for something else the users of (any) conceptual scheme cannot do without. Such an argument can be adapted from the first three sections of Chapter one of Individuals. Strawson summarizes his position at p. 38: "...particular identification in general rests ultimately on the possibility of locating the particular things we speak of in a single unified spatiotemporal system".

Now, the incorporation into such a scheme as a condition on identifiability arises from problems associated with non-demonstrative reference. Since such reference cannot be secured by means of general descriptions only (there being no guarantee that any description is individuating in the sense of applying uniquely), one needs the common reference-point of the 'here and now' by means of which to relate such objects. That is, one requires a coordinate system and a specific point of view. However, since the 'here and now' is itself not stable, some elements in the scheme must be (re-) identified as common to different occasions of identification. This is where the idea of numerical identity comes in. One can reidentify any particular *a* as 'the same thing again' if and only if one has criteria of reidentification. But since reidentification is a necessary condition of the idea of numerical identity, which in turn is a necessary condition of the notion of a unified spatiotemporal scheme, and since the current conceptual scheme contains the latter, there must be such criteria. The only concepts which embody criteria of reidentification are sortals. Therefore, sortals are a necessary condition of the idea of numerical identity; the latter idea has empirical application only if there are sortals.

A sceptic might not be convinced, for it is open to her to claim that, in fact, all such embodied criteria of reidentification are fabrications. Things pop in and out of existence with a shift in.

attention, and it is only the ontological discomfort consequential upon this realization which induces one to postulate sortals. Criteria, far from guaranteeing numerical identity, simply serve to disguise a reprehensible cowardice in the face of the metaphysical facts.

The transcendentalist may now run the circle the other way around. In order to think of the world as a system of objective, determinate particulars in a unified space and time, one must possess reidentification criteria which are thought of as satisfiable. But a condition of possibility of thinking that these criteria are satisfiable is the construal of the reidentified items as existing unperceived.⁷ The sceptic is now answered by arguing for objects which last longer than any one experience or perception of them. And such objects must be reidentifiable, hence subsumable under sortals. Again, the sceptic need not be much impressed. Transcendental arguments are supposed to have an initial premiss which is synthetic while all later premisses (and the conclusion) are analytic with respect to it. While such a structure may be discerned in the above, it is not helpful, as regards the specificity of what conditions individuation as such, to be told that substance sortals are entailed by a conceptual scheme which also incorporates a unified spatiotemporal framework of individuation. It would seem that the Wigginsian is entitled to something less than substance sortals. This works as follows.

Grant Wiggins that R is false, D (if $\underline{a} = \underline{b}$, then $\underline{a}$ is the same something as $\underline{b}$), and that indiscernibility is an incomplete account of identity in the sense that "... the idea of a traceable path or a life story is what any elucidation ... must recapitulate if it is to catch hold of the use ... of the identity concept." (SS, p.50).⁸ And this is granting a lot, for only the falsity of R has so far been firmly established. However, grant this much, and it seems plausible that D(i) is also true of continuants:

$$(x) (t) (x \text{ exists at } t \rightarrow (Eg) (g(x) \text{ at } t));$$

i.e., for all things and all times, if x exists at a specific time, then there is a sortal predicate applicable to x at that time. From here Wiggins moves on to D(ii):

$$(x) (Eg) (t) [(x \text{ exists at } t) \rightarrow (g(x) \text{ at } t)];$$

i.e., for all things and all times there exists a sortal g such that, for any time at which x exists, g applies to x at that time. 'g' is said to range over individuating predicates which answer what

⁷ The formulation in terms of 'the conditions of thinking thus and so' is utilized in order to avoid the factual premiss 'We know our best criteria of reidentification are satisfied'. If such verification is imported, transcendental arguments become superfluous (cf. Stroud (1968)).

⁸ This assertion is premised on the plausible assumption that for any identity statement ' $\underline{a} = \underline{b}$ ', there will be predicates whose applicability to $\underline{a}$ or to $\underline{b}$ can only be settled by first ascertaining whether $\underline{a}$ is in fact identical with $\underline{b}$.

is x?, i.e., substance sortals. These are further glossed as those sortals for which 'x is no longer g' entails 'x is no longer'.

It is far from clear that D(ii) is the only proper development of D, as Wiggins claims.⁹ The supposed argument for D(ii) merely proceeds to point out that the denial of R ensures that for any set of sortal concepts satisfied by x, these will agree in the persistence condition they ascribe to x (a 'sortally concordant' set, SS, p.65). The conclusion appears to be that an entity could violate this argument for D(ii) only by lacking a determinate principle of identity and persistence. But this is not the only way a possible counterexample to D(ii) could arise. Perhaps there is a weaker principle which also precludes, as against the most typical opponent of D(ii), that the only way to ascertain whether a = b is by determining whether they are indiscernible. Consider the principle DD, such that for any times t1 and t2 at which x exists, there is some sortal that x satisfies throughout the period t1 - t2.¹⁰ x at t1 can thus be the same f as x at t2, without entailing D(ii). DD would collapse into D(ii) only if the following were a necessary truth: 'Every sortal restricts some ultimate sortal not restricting any other sortal'. But Wiggins never appeals to this claim in his argument for D(ii); in fact, he rejects it in note 2.08 (SS, p.201).

DD could be made more accessible with the aid of an example. Is it not plausible that there could be an everlasting entity such that it satisfies 'is bored' during its first millenium, 'is wrapt in self-contemplation' in the second, etc., but no sortal g throughout its existence? The example is in fact implausible, and I can think of no better one. For what, Wiggins may ask, is it that is first bored and then wrapt in self-contemplation? Bored things per se have no principle of individuation or persistence. If this bored thing can last a thousand years, it must be a specific kind of bored thing. It will not do to say that it is eternal. That merely solves the problem of general persistence by dissolving it, but one still cannot single out this amongst the eternal bored things; the square root of 9 may be as bored as the universal being white, but one will differentiate between them via the sortals number and universal.

The advocate of DD may, at this stage, legitimately object that the example is unfair. It will naturally favour Wiggins' position insofar as neither 'is bored' nor 'is wrapt in self-contemplation' are sortal predicates. Furthermore, DD, like D(ii), is a thesis about three-dimensional

⁹ Notice that the distinction between substantial and non-substantial sortals cuts across the restricted / unrestricted distinction. The restricted sortal female human being can apply to an x throughout its existence. This is not to say that a sex-change is fatal, but merely that it is outside intervention of such magnitude that it is to be grouped, perhaps, with miracles. Perhaps not, as such operations become more routine. However, whichever way the above is decided, no sex-change turns 'female' into a phase-sortal of some androgynous being. It might become one of ordinary one-sex-at-a-time humans as they start swapping sexes to suit their fancy. Despite its present substantial status, 'female' cannot be viewed as determining a natural kind (cf. Dupre, 'Sex, Gender and Essence' in French, Uehling and Wettstein (1986)).

¹⁰ Cf. Noonan (1973), pp.264-266.

continuants, not one about abstract, eternal objects. Consider then this three-dimensional continuant called 'Socrates'. The advocate of DD wants to say that Socrates can be a human being for the interval $t_1 - t_2$, and a rock for the interval $t_3 - t_4$. She is not merely uttering the sentence 'Socrates can turn into a rock', it has definite content for her. Notice that not even the sortal 'animal' is available in the present case, as it was in Section three of Chapter one. One is stuck with the unhelpful 'continuant' or 'substance'. The appeal of the Wigginsian D(ii) in preference to DD must, in the present case, reside in the fact that most individuator do not treat 'human being' as a phase-sortal. This surprising fact does not establish that the utterer of the above sentence is simply wrong. Wiggins could, I think, allow this substance-sortal relativization to a speaker, whilst simultaneously denying that a conceptual scheme embodying 'human being' as a phase-sortal will make much headway with causality, prediction and explanation. The above informal defence of D(ii) still falls short, however, of a transcendental justification. To the possibility of such a justification I now turn.

Section 3

A Transcendental Justification for D(ii)

It is important to note that Wiggins' linking of the notions of identity and substance is not only an elucidation of the former, but also of the latter. At present, what is at issue is the necessity of employing substance sortals in individuation. The full elucidation of 'substance' per se must await its further association with the notion of natural kinds.

A first attempt at a transcendental argument in this area might look as follows (call it 'A', all arguments are to be viewed as B-option ones):

A

- (1) Current use of the notion of identity is committed to the notion of a traceable path or life-history;
- (2) A necessary condition of the idea of a traceable path is that of continuity under a concept, there are no pure 'matter' -paths that are identifiable by beings employing concepts, hence no bare continuity.
- (3) But continuity is only intelligible on the supposition that it is determined when any one instance of a continuity begins and when it ends, i.e., if there are criteria of ceasing to be and coming into existence for different kinds of continuants;
- (4) Hence the concepts under which continuity is apprehended must embody such criteria in order for there to be justifiable use of the notion of a life-history, and hence of

identity;

- (5) The only concepts which clearly demarcate the beginnings and endings of their instances in time are substance concepts; so substance sortals are a necessary condition of coherent sense to the notion of transtemporal identity of a continuant;
- (6) If, in order to single out a determinate object in time, one must single out an object with a definite past and future, all individuations which are determinate with respect to certain stretches of an object's existence will proceed by means of predicates which are restrictions of one subsuming the object's life-history as a whole. But these are substance sortals; hence the possession of substance sortals is a condition of possibility of determinate individuation.

At a first glance, this seems in order as far as the transcendental form of the argument goes. The first premiss is synthetic, based on current use of the concept of identity, while the rest of the premisses and conclusion are analytic in terms of it. A closer examination of the actual mechanics of the argument, however, reveals certain hidden assumptions which are not self-evident. For instance, premiss (5) is a purely definitional matter, and may be questioned. I have allowed it to stand in order to bring to the fore the relation of this definition to Wiggins' overall project. Another problem relates to premisses (1), (2) and (3). It is not clear that the 'current' notion of identity is anything more than the strict Humean one of identity at a time. Whether or not it is used as if transtemporal identity is unproblematic, is not at issue. It may even be granted that such use of a formal notion in a world of flux necessitates additional assumptions, but then the A-argument hardly establishes that the assumption of a more than grammatical noun/adjective distinction rests solely on apriori knowledge of the formal properties of identity. Wiggins explicitly postulates such apriori knowledge of the notion of identity, but it is unclear how information about transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity and congruence makes the diachronic extension of identity unproblematic.

It is open to the Wigginsian to reply that he has been misunderstood. To say that identity is committed to the idea of a life-history, is precisely to imply that transtemporal identity is not unproblematic, but mysterious. What is basic and unproblematic is coincidence, being in the same place at the same time. Using 'C' to represent coincidence, this claim may be spelt out as :

Cab iff a and b occupy the same place

Now, if it is granted that things coincide, if they do, only under concepts, the above may be expanded into an equivalence to the Wigginsian 'a is the same f as b' thus:

a is the same f as b iff fa & fb & Cab for all times at which a exists and at which b exists.

But if the object of the A-argument is to establish the plausibility of D(ii), this modification is not much help. It is once again assumed that there are sortals which apply throughout something's existence. Moreover, there is an independent implausibility in construing coincidence as basic in that it implies a version of the Identity of Indiscernibles ((P) (Px iff Py) $\rightarrow$ (x = y)), the converse of Leibniz's Law rendered second-order by means of a second-order quantifier over properties). According to the idea of coincidence as here developed, it seems possible to say that I have two noses, such that a is a nose and b is a nose and a and b coincide whenever each one of them exists, and therefore, that they are the same nose.

The point is that Wiggins vehemently rejects the Identity of Indiscernibles, even for relational predicates (SS, pp.55-57). He therefore cannot be committed to anything which implies it. But it seems that he is. Finally, the coincidence claim :

Cab iff a and b occupy the same place,

has the counterintuitive consequence that a table and the matter comprising it do not coincide because they are not identical. This is surely outrageous.

The main objection to the A-argument is perhaps that the first premiss does not sit well with the conclusion. After all, Wiggins' concern is with 'individuative sortalism', so the synthetic premiss should concern individuation per se. This thought may be developed by means of another transcendental argument, call it B.

B

- (1) Individuation is determinate in the sense that de re thoughts about impinging objects are the result of singlings out;
- (2) To say that individuation is thus determinate, is to say that the objects singled out have determinate identity and persistence conditions, i.e., determinate principles of individuation;
- (3) But objects have determinate principles of individuation only if they have determinate beginnings and endings in time, i.e, determinately bounded histories;
- (4.C1) Hence, in order to think of individuation as determinate, it is necessary to think

of some questions of persistence as having definite assertions and denials;

- (5) But many things have definitely ceased to exist;
- (6) To think of any x that it has ceased to exist, is to think of x as having ceased to exemplify those functions and properties definitive of it;
- (7) There must then be some one predicate such that its ceasing to apply to x entails x 's non-existence.
- (8.C2) Such a predicate must be one which applies to x at all times during its existence, if x is an 'individuable' object.
- (9) Every individuation proceeds under some predicate(s) or other;
- (10) But no qualitative predicate needs to be constant for any individuated object, i.e., change is possible.
- (11) A necessary condition of having a distinction between change and destruction is the survival of the entity undergoing the change.
- (12) But then a condition of possibility of making such survival intelligible is that there be a sortal satisfied by the entity in question both before and after the time t of the change;
- (13) Such a sortal will specify possible changes the entity can survive, and hence provide criteria of persistence;
- (14) But any sortal with these characteristics will apply to x at all times it exists, it will therefore be a substance sortal making an Aristotelian identification of the form ' x is an f ';
- (15) Any objects individuated under Aristotelian identifications have determinate principles of individuation as the instances of kinds;
- (16.C3) A condition of possibility of the determinacy of individuation is the existence of substance sortals which apply to objects at all times at which they exist.

This is an impressive argument for the view that there are some sortals which individuate

have to treat as invariant (cf. SS, p.117). It is more convincing than the A-argument in that it explicitly introduces the problematic of persistence through change, a fundamental datum for the users of the current conceptual scheme. Not all of the premisses are analytic in terms of (1), though; an important hidden premiss which guides the argument from (10) onwards is that of mutually irreducible predication in the category of substance as opposed to those of quality and relation. It might therefore be objected that any transcendental argument attempting to prove D(ii) cannot proceed with an assumption which virtually entails it. But I think there are independent grounds which Wiggins can give for the thesis of irreducible substantial predication. Firstly, there are his arguments against indiscernibility as an account of identity (cf. SS, pp.55-57): "... to determine correctly the answer to our continuity question about the traceability of things through their life-histories is ... to settle that [P_a iff P_b]: and... that it is impossible even in theory to conceive of a way independent of the prior discovery that $a = b$ by which to establish that, for all $[P]$, no matter what property $[P]$ is, [P_a iff P_b]." (SS, p.50). If this is right, indiscernibility as an account of identity puts everything back to front. How can the applicability of some predicates to a or b only be settled by first inquiring whether $a = b$, if indiscernibility for all possible predicates is to tell one when things are identical?

This argument is convincing in Wiggins' own terms, and it may therefore be conditionally granted that the identity of things are not independent of the sorts of things they are. Of course, this view is built into (1) of the A-argument, and also into (10) though (15) of the B-argument via the irreducibility of substantial predication. But a transcendental argument is not thereby invalidated, its interest lies in its showing how such presuppositions fit into a more general picture. Again, the initial objections to the A-argument could be repeated, the concept of identity has been misdescribed by concentrating on continuants. I think it has been misdescribed, only because individuation has been overdescribed as always involving reidentification. If individuation is so construed, then identity will be more than indiscernibility, and individuation not independent of sortals. But this is an altogether different argument, questioning (1) of the B-argument as a truth only by overdescription. I shall proceed to this argument shortly.

A second reason Wiggins might give, at this stage, in favour of his 'dual-predication' view, is the falsity of R. I have avoided the invocation of its falsity in arguments A and B merely to see what could be accomplished without it. But it obviously can and does play a crucial role in substantiating D(ii), and through it, the substance/phasal distinction (cf. Chapter one, p.16). That the co-restrictiveness of co-satisfiable sortals is needed, can be seen in the transitions from (6) to (7) and from (13) to (14) in the B-argument. These are rather abrupt, and may be smoothed over by invoking the denial of R and in its trail the irreducibility of substantial predication.

The ramifications of the co-restrictive entailment of the denial of R are more problematic than it would appear at a first glance. For there is the distinction between successively and simultaneously satisfied sortals to which Wiggins does not give enough attention. What needs to be shown, if some one (substance) sortal is to extend from any part of (adjacent) phases in the life-history of the object to the history as a whole, is that the relation of sortal restriction is transitive. This must be shown both for two sortals satisfiable at a time and at two different times. The first claim to be established may be put as follows:

- (i) If two sortals F1 and F2 can be successively satisfied by x such that the F1-phase and the F2-phase of its existence are temporally adjacent but non-overlapping, then F1 and F2 must restrict a common sortal.¹¹

What sort of argument does Wiggins offer for (i)? Consider a case where the A2-phase of something is spatiotemporally contiguous with an earlier A1-phase of something (henceforth I use 'A1' and 'A2' for the objects which satisfy these sortals). It may now be asked, transcendently, what conditions must be satisfied for it to be the case that $F1 = F2$; i.e., to construe the phenomenon as one of something continuous changing into F2 as opposed to replacement by F2? The only possible basis for an identity claim here seems to be the divergence of a distinct G-phase which is contiguous with F1 but non-coincident with F2. If so, then clearly $F2 \neq G$; but then $F1 = F2$ iff 'F1' and 'F2' restrict a common sortal. This is hardly a convincing argument. Shoemaker offers Wiggins the following argument. If F1 and F2 are so related that it is a conceptual truth that an A2-phase continues an A1 in existence, then there must be a common sortal they restrict. If F1 and F2 both restrict another sortal H, they would share a common principle of individuation in that the tracing of an A1 and the tracing of an A2 would both be tracings of an H. It is not obvious that Wiggins would be happy with this. He explicitly invokes empirical facts to amplify Aristotelian identifications. But then, for any such identification of the form 'x is an H', it is the facts which determine that A1 and A2 are phases of an H, no one stipulates it. It is discovered that 'tadpole' is a phase-sortal of the Batrachian species. Perhaps it becomes a conceptual truth after such discovery.

The second claim to be established if the denial of R is to support D(ii) is:

- (ii) If F1 and F2 can be simultaneously satisfied by one thing, i.e., so that the A1- and A2-phases partially or wholly coincide, then F1 and F2 restrict a common sortal.

Now suppose that two sortals, G1 and H1, are both restricted by a genuine sortal F2 and therefore co-satisfiable. It may be asked, again, what the necessary conditions of sortal co-

¹¹ Cf. Shoemaker (1970).

satisfiability are? What will show any two sortals not to be co-satisfiable will be a case of the following sort. Take the sortals person and human being. Imagine that a person and a human being can exactly coincide at a time, but that they need not do so throughout their histories. That is to say, imagine one person inhabiting different bodies at different times (as in Kafka's story, but the bodies may all be human, to make things easier). So a necessary condition of co-satisfiability is coincidence throughout their histories of the instances of the respective sortals. Then, going back to G1 and H1, it must be the case that a G1 and an H1 cannot coincide at one time and not at another, if they are instances of co-satisfiable sortals. But a condition of possibility of such coincidence is the sharing of a common principle of tracing by these sortals. And a necessary condition of having such a common principle is the restriction of a common sortal.

This mini-transcendental argument from co-satisfiability presupposes, of course, the principle that no two things of the same kind (two instances of the same sortal) can coincide at one time and not another. Since Wiggins accepts the Lockean principle that no two things of the same kind can occupy the same place at the same time, he could not object to the above principle. Even if the Lockean principle were in fact false, a weaker principle could still yield the result that if two sortals are co-satisfiable, they share a common principle of persistence and identity. This weaker principle may be stated as follows:

If F1 and F2 are co-satisfiable, then if an F1 and an F2 coincide at t such that neither coincides with more than one F1 or F2 at t, then the F1 and the F2 must be identical and hence coincide throughout their histories.

Wiggins thinks, in fact, that Locke's principle is "... a sort of necessary truth." (cf. (1968), 'On being in the same place at the same time', p.93). After showing that purported counterexamples to the principle, such as that of a tree and the aggregate of cellulose molecules which compose it, do not in fact disprove it, he goes on to list three sources of conceptual support for it. The most important of these is his criterion of identity for material objects: "A is identical with B if there is some substance concept f such that A coincides with B under f..." (*ibid.*, p.93). It is then said that this criterion logically implies Locke's principle, and consequently, if it is an apriori truth, then so is Locke's principle. Rather than accept this dubious 'derivation' of Locke's principle, I would prefer to grant its necessity as primitive. Or, alternatively, to construe any thing's kind as one of its properties, and hence to say that two things of the same kind cannot have the same spatiotemporal properties. Such a claim would be based on the truth of a version of the Identity of Indiscernibles which includes relational properties.

This concludes the excursion into the implications of the denial of R. The conditions which it

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