THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA, 1915-1966

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in fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University, nor has it been prepared under the aegis of any other body or organization or person outside the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Anthony Brian Emmett

12 November 1987

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It would be a near impossible task to acknowledge everyone to whom I am indebted for advice, encouragement and other assistance in the preparation of this dissertation. However, special thanks are due to my supervisor [illegible] for his valued guidance, patience and encouragement [illegible]

[illegible] this dissertation [illegible] children [illegible] this thesis might have been [illegible]

The financial assistance of the Human Sciences Research Council and the University of the Witwatersrand towards this study is hereby acknowledged.

ABSTRACT

This study traces the development of anti-colonial resistance in Namibia between 1915 and 1966 in order to illustrate the various influences that led to the formation of a national liberation movement. Relatively detailed analyses are provided of the background to colonial policies and, in particular, the construction of a racial order in Namibia from the beginning of the colonial period. Two major periods of popular assertion are identified. The first of these occurred during the early 1920s when a variety of political organizations, including the Universal Improvement Association, worked to thwart plans for the incorporation of anti-colonial resistance in Namibia. The interconnection between the various manifestations of opposition and defiance of colonial authority is demonstrated and the cause of resistance analysed. The second phase of resistance after World War II led up to the formation of the contemporary nationalist movement. It is argued that three groups of petite-bourgeois: the traditional leadership, the contract workers and the intelligentsia helped to launch the nationalist movement. The discrete interests and social consciousness of these three groups in both the domestic and exile environments are analysed. Finally, the dissertation analyses the causes of conflict and disunity within the nationalist movement and the reasons for the emergence of SWAPO as the dominant nationalist organization. These issues are analysed against the background of a theoretical framework which links the rise of nationalism to the interaction of the contemporary territorial state and cultural identifications.

NAMIBIA 1963: MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS AND RESERVES



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ABBREVIATIONS

(i) Archival sources

ADM	*Archives of the Secretary of the Protectorate, 1915-1920*
A312	Accession 312: Semi-official and private papers accumulated by administrators, secretaries under-secretaries and minor officials of the S.W.A. administration, 1915-1950
GG	Archives of the Governor-General
K21	Archives of the Secretary of the South West Africa Commission
LLU	Archives of the Magistrate of Luderitz, 1915-1950
PM	Archives of the Prime Minister
SWAA	Archives of the Secretary for South West Africa, 1920-1950

Other abbreviations

AAPSO	Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization
AIS	African Improvement Society
ANC	African National Congress
APO	African People's Organization
CCD	Culture of critical discourse
CDM	Consolidated Diamond Mines
FCWU	Food and Canning Workers' Union
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union
NLO	Northern Labour Organization
NMC	Native Military Corps

NUDO	National Unity Democratic Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPO/OPC	Ovamboland People's Organization/ Congress
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
SAAPSWA	Society for the Advancement of the African People of South West Africa
SAP	South African Police / Party
SAR	South African Railways
SAUF	South Af[illegible]ed Front
SLO	Southern Labour Organization
SWA	South West Africa
SWALU	South West Africa Labour Union
SWANLIF	South West Africa Liberation Front
SWANC	South West African National Congress
SWANU	South West Africa National Union
SWAPA	South West Africa Progressive Association
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
SWASB	South West Africa Student Body
UN	[illegible]ed Nations
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
WENELA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association

INTRODUCTION: NATIONALISM, STATE AND CULTURE

Studies of nationalism typically reveal two prime but related concerns. The first relates to the centrality of nationalism in contemporary politics (particularly in the African and other Third World contexts); the second revolves around the controversial nature of nationalism, in particular its ambiguous and incomplete character and, in consequence, the difficulty of defining and theorizing about it.

The rise of capitalism on a world scale has been paralleled by the emergence of nationalist movements and the triumph of the nation-state as a central organizing principle of contemporary societies.[1] Nationalism is therefore too central and pervasive an issue to ignore in favour of other areas of research. Yet as a social and political phenomenon, it presents major and seemingly intractable problems of definition and analysis. It is common in the literature on nationalism to refer to this political phenomenon as "complex", "fuzzy", "obscure", "elusive", "incomplete" and "unstable".[2] For Marxist scholars with their emphases on modes of production and class struggles as the central determinants of conflict and change in society, nationalism has presented special difficulties, and one Marxist writer has gone so far as to identify nationalism as "Marxism's great historical failure".[3]

In large part, the difficulties of analysing nationalism and producing a universal definition are associated with its often vague and insubstantial nature; the difficulties of relating it to the major structures and processes of societies; and to the different forms that it has assumed in history. Nationalism has been associated with a broad range of

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diverse and often incompatible ideologies and regimes, and even individual strains of nationalism have manifested contradictory elements, combining rationality with irrationality, forward-looking with backward-looking ideologies. This infinite malleablity and association with both progressive and regressive movements has led to the identification of nationalism as essentially "Janus-faced"[4]

An adequate understanding of nationalism must therefore account for both its essential or generic characteristics, and its variablity or capacity to assume different forms. In relation to the first of these requirements, it may therefore be useful to begin with a broad definition. In the context of this study, nationalism is defined as essentially a contemporary politico-cultural principle which seeks a congruence between political organization and a specific unit of population, usually identified as a "nation" or "people".[5] The unit of population is usually defined in broad cultural terms, but may be based on other criteria such as common history and experience, geographical locality, and even race. In other words, nationalism may be regarded as a form of political legitimacy which requires that communal or cultural boundaries coincide with political (principally, state) boundaries, and is likely to arise in situations where there is an incongruence or tension between these two sets of boundaries.

Contrary to what nationalists might assert about the "natural" or "God-given" properties of nations, nationalism is essentially a social construction and may therefore be accommodated within a broad range of communal identifications. In Africa therefore the term nationalism would include not only the dominant territorial nationalisms, but also

"tribal" or ethnic "sub-nationalisms", as well as the broader pan-Africanist and racial nationalisms. However, not all communal identifications can serve equally well as bases of nationalism. In keeping with the proposed definition, nationalism is limited by existing forms of political organization. More specifically, as a contemporary social phenomenon, nationalism is tied to a particular form of political organization, namely the modern state. As Gellner[6] argues the problem of nationalism does not arise for stateless societies.

> If there is no state, one cannot ask whether or not its boundaries are congruent with the limits of nations. If there are no rulers, there being no state, one cannot ask whether they are of the same nation as the ruled. When neither state nor rulers exist, one cannot resent the failure to conform to the requirements of the principle of nationalism.

The existence of politically centralized states is therefore seen as a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for nationalism.

One factor determining the viablity of nationalisms is the extent to which they coincide with existing state boundaries or the ease or difficulty with which they could be accommodated within new state boundaries. In Africa, for example, it is clear that nationalisms which have coincided with the boundaries of existing states have generally enjoyed greater legitimacy than those which have attempted to establish new states (as in the case of ethnic or separatist nationalisms), or which have encompassed communal identities which were so broad that they were difficult to accommodate within any system of states (as in racial nationalisms). Territorial nationalisms coinciding with existing (colonial and post-colonial) states have enjoyed almost universal legitimacy, while sub-territorial nationalisms have most often been relegated to the denigrating category of "tribalisms".[7] As an ideology, pan-Africanism has been more easily accommodated, but only as a subsidiary to dominant

ter. itorial nationalisms.[8]

The second requirement of explaining nationalism's capacity to assume diverse and contrasting forms, is more problematic and will be dealt *with in greater* detail in a later part of this dissertation. On a purely descriptive level, however, Smith[9], for example, argues that the "original" or "core" doctrine of nationalism is incomplete or unstable, that it does not furnish a complete ideology or programme of social action. Other doctrines or ideologies are therefore needed to supplement the core notions of nationalism.

Nationalism and the state

The relationship between nationalism and the state finds its clearest expression in the universalization of the nation-state as the predominant form of political organization in the twentieth century:

> The idea of the nation stipulates that the state is not simply a jural community or *hegemonic apparatus monopolizing* force, but also the highest form of human community.1'

The relationship between state and nationalism is mediated by two fundamental characteristics of the doctrine or ideology of the contemporary state, namely the notions of territoriality and sovereignty. *As Crawford* Young observes, territoriality takes on a "qualitatively different meaning"[11] in the modern state. While a specific sphere of authority is a necessary attribute of any state form, pre-modern states were generally characterized by the concentration of authority in the centre and its diffusion on the periphery.

Pre-colonial Africa supported a rich variety of institutions, ranging from simple bands to highly developed states. Political and ethnic

boundaries rarely coincided and the continent was characterized by a high degree of mobility between communities and the expansion of the more powerful states:[12]

> Human ambitions were too pressing to allow people to remain *static* over long periods. States expanded when they were sufficiently powerful to do so. Communities competed with one another to attract settlers and thereby gain supporters. Whether newly attached persons were treated as serfs, as second-class or full citizens depended both on the incentives that attracted them and on the amount of *force that could* be marshalled to prevent their escape. Men moved to find better land or more favourable opportunities in their crafts, to engage more profitably in trade, to escape difficulties at home, to build a political following in a region without powerful rivals.

While centralization was a common feature of the more highly developed African states, such states also faced common problems relating to the delegation of authority to outlying areas and difficulties of communication.[13]

In central and southern Namibia, for example the high levels of mobility associated with the dominant forms of production[14] stood in the way of the emergence of states. In the north a series of kingships had emerged among the Ovambos, and although each king ruled over a specific territory, the boundaries of such territories appear to have been characteristically unstable and ambiguous. These communities were characterized by periodic movements of population, especially during periods of drought, disease and famine.[15] The imposition of the Western state form on African societies therefore affected "a radical reorganization of political space". The demarcation of clear and finite boundaries by the colonial state in Namibia was therefore not only new and alien in relation to the previously distinct communities incorporated, but also in the fact that they had no equivalent in pre-colonial society.

The implications of a such a redefinition of political space are immense. Not only were formerly distinct and autonomous communities brought together under the same political roof, but important spatial discontinuities were imposed between the newly created colonial states. By creating internal unity and coherence of state structures and administrative control, the colonial state thus imposed political, economic and cultural demarcations where no e had previously existed. Through its administrative apparatus the colonial state created common bureaucratic structures and a common system of laws and regulations, creating a single identifiable political community. Along with the creation of political and administrative units, the colonial state also bequeathed a common language which provided a basis for communication between formerly distinct communities, as well as a communication infrastructure which was for the most part geared to the needs and interests of the colonial state [16] In addition the colonial state helped to define a distinct and unified economic sphere through the imposition of common currencies, control over trade, taxation and economic regulations. Through these and other measures, trans-territorial movement and communication was restricted in significant ways.

The history of Namibia provides numerous examples of the ways in which the restriction of movement across colonial boundaries contributed to the creation of national consciousness confined within state boundaries. In the early 1920s, for example, anti-colonial resistance in Namibia was closely associated with international and South African political movements such as Garveyism and the populist trade unionism of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. A major response of the state was to restrict the movement of blacks both within Namibia and across its borders. In this way Namibian organizations were cut off from their

headquarters, and this contributed to their decline.[17] Despite state measures to restrict the influence of outside political movements in the territory, firm links were once again established, particularly with South African political organizations in the 1940s and 1950s. However, the state once again intervened by harassing people who had contacts with South African organizations, refusing permits and passports to travel, and deporting Namibians who had established themselves in South Africa.[18] Thus while Namibian nationalist organizations were profoundly influenced by their political counterparts in South Africa and other parts of the continent, practical difficulties, directly related to the colonial state, stood in the way of closer cooperation with movements outside the territory. Given the high degree of control exercised by the colonial state, Namibian nationalists even experienced difficulties in maintaining the necessary contacts and links between different regions within the territory.

The colonial state was also to provide the beginnings of a common cultural basis for the new territorial units it created. Among its most important contributions in this respect was the provision of a foreign, but common language which was associated with the state apparatus, and the creation of an educational system which, not withstanding its obvious shortcomings, was centralized and standardized.[19] The colonial state was also to contribute in an indirect, but crucial way to the transcendence of pre-colonial loyalties and identifications.[20] As Smith has suggested, colonial domination "created for the most part a kind of 'parallel society' in which the social structures formed by the administrative colonial apparatus were superimposed upon those of the subordinate populations." This 'parallel society' often corresponded to the

division between races, and particularly in South Africa and Namibia was to assume major importance in shaping nationalism. In general the coincidence of racial differentiation and colonial domination was to provide the basis for pan-African identifications which, while distinct from territorial or state-based nationalisms, helped Africans transcend pre-colonial divisions and eased the transition to territorial nationalism.

The other central characteristic of the modern state which was to have a profound effect on African communities was the doctrine of sovereignty. The very idea of a single source of authority was antithetical and undermining to pre-existing forms of authority, even in Europe where the modern state first emerged.[21] In Africa where state forms were externally imposed, the impact was even greater. Sovereignty provided a basis for the most far-reaching claims, including state ownership of all "vacant" land, mineral rights and extensive claims on labour.[22] The notion of sovereignty also underlay the incorporation and subordination of all pre-existing authorities within the boundaries of the colony. The diary of the Nama leader, Hendrik Witbooi, for example, contains some vivid illustrations of the alien and disruptive nature of the claims of the early colonial state in Namibia. Witbooi's responses to these claims included attempts to forge a new unity among the colonized and represent what is arguably the first expressions of nationalism in the territory.[23]

Notwithstanding notions of indirect rule, the colonial state could not tolerate alternative sources of authority that were not directly under its control. In Namibia, for example, the application of a system of "indirect rule" in the northern reserves, generated considerable contra-

dictions for both colonial authorities and indigenous rulers. While indigenous rulers were expected to "govern" and to maintain law and order in their areas, their powers were tightly circumscribed by colonial policy. Where Ovambo rulers, for example, showed any independence, military force was mobilized against them.[24] As a result the authority of the indigenous rulers was eroded to such an extent that they were no longer able to maintain control over large sections of their people.

The links between sovereignty and nationalism, however, go still deeper. Since the French Revolution and the subsequent break-up of dynastic empires in Europe, the notion of sovereignty has increasingly found expression as popular sovereignty, that is the idea that ultimate authority is vested in the people or that the state is the embodiment of the will of the community. This doctrine of sovereignty provided a direct link between the state and nationalism. If ultimate authority was to lie with the "people", then the "people" needed to be defined, and such definition could only take place in relation to the state which was to embody the will of the "people".

As early as 1789 Abbé Sièyè defined a nation as "a union of individuals governed by one law, and represented by the same law-giving assembly".[25] In those situations where there was a lack of fit between definitions of community and the existing polity, the notion of popular sovereignty was likely to lead to nationalism.

> It is where men feel strongly a discrepancy between their sense of community and the actual political arrangements of which they are part, that political nationalism develops as an integral and fundamental part of the demand for popular sovereignty. Here nationalism attempts to create a correspondence between sense of community and economic and political organisation by irredentism ... and/or by expelling or assimilating through the strongest ideological pressure what are

> ... as alien elements with conflicting interests ... For ... minorities organised as communities can be subjects, ... history has shown that it is very difficult for them to be citizens.26

While in Africa and other colonized areas, the notion of popular sovereignty was clearly not part of the ideological baggage of the colonial state, it did come to play a crucial role in the nationalist parties that arose to challenge colonial domination. The doctrine of popular sovereignty not only underlay the nationalist challenge of colonial rule, but was also expressed in the constitution of nationalist parties as "counter-states", "a sort of state in embryo, ready to take over the colonial apparatus once independence was achieved."[27]

There was yet another way in which the colonial state contributed to the creation of nationalism in Africa. It has already been suggested that where common cultural criteria were absent or too weak to provide the necessary cohesion for nationalism, the common experience of colonialism often served this purpose. It was essentially the colonial state which provided the major focus for this common experience. Thus the colonial state provided the framework of rules within which colonialism and capitalism operated, and was responsible for the implementation of colonial policies in general. It was the state that responded to the interests of settlers and foreign capital, which undertook military and police action against those who opposed such interests, and which created the basis for labour extraction. Under those circumstances in which capitalism was weak, as in the colonies, the role of the state was crucial in creating a basis for capitalist development. The colonial state therefore became the most identifiable target of resistance. Similarly, the predominant political and military power of state made unity of resistance essential.

Moreover besides providing a focus for anti-colonial resistance, the state was also to serve as the major "prize" of African nationalists. The erosion of alternative pre-colonial sources of political power, meant that colonial states represented the major sources of institutionalized political power on the continent. As a "boundary-defining unit, with a distinct territorial focus and jurisdiction", the nature of the colonial state therefore "spilt over into the definition of the nationalism that arose to challenge the rulers of the state."[28]

Nationalism and economic interests - a digression

Thus far no mention has been made of economic factors as possible influences on the development of nationalism, and it may therefore be useful to pause here to answer possible objections that may be raised in relation to the neglect of material factors as influences on nationalism. Theories of uneven development are amongst the most prominent contemporary attempts to relate nationalism to economic causes.[29] The basic contention of these theories is that nationalism is essentially a response to uneven development.

Tom Nairn,[30] for example, argues that nationalism and capitalist development are logically related because, as an ideology, nationalism became prominent at roughly the same time as there was a general acceleration of change associated with capitalist development. However, Nairn asserts that this relationship is not derived from the content of development, but rather from its uneven diffusion through the world. Nationalism is therefore not a product of the internal characteristics of development, but rather of external material forces. There has been no steady diffusion of development and its benefits to the periphery, and in general the spread of development to new areas has been accompanied by invasion and

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domination. The changes wrought were often uncontrolled and overwhelming, wreaking havoc upon existing social relations and not providing the time or opportunity for the establishment of new social relations. As a result, many areas found themselves economically disadvantaged and excluded from the benefits of progress.

As a reaction, nationalism has been profoundly ambivalent, because while those who find themselves disadvantaged and excluded desire development, they also resist it because of its intrusive and destructive nature. Furthermore, in their struggle against disadvantage, these communities can only fall back on their own resources, that is their past, as represented by their history, myths and symbols. This, Nairn argues, explains the ambivalent (or Janus-faced) nature of nationalism, for the characteristic way in which nationalism is able to combine positive and negative features, rationality and irrationality, progress and reaction.

While Nairn's account, and in particular the way in which he explains the relationship between progressive and reactionary elements in nationalism, has considerable appeal as a tool of analysis, there are a number of difficulties associated with his theory of uneven development. It has, for example, been argued that even on a purely empirical level, the theory does not stand up to scrutiny.[31] However, the major criticism of the theory is that it does not provide a complete explanation of nationalism; that while it may explain particular aspects of nationalism, it does not explain others. The theory does help to cast light on why peripheral areas should respond, why they should resort to resistance, protest and rejection. However, it does not explain why this resistance, protest or rejection should take the form of nationalism. Nationalism is

not simply a response to subjection or disadvantage, it also attempts to construct a particular type of political order. It is not every form of resistance that qualifies as nationalism.[32]

Nationalism and culture

This difficulty with the theory suggests that while economic factors may be important in providing an impetus for nationalism, economic influences are tangential rather than direct; that economic interests are associated with the specific groups and classes that combine in nationalist movements, rather than with nationalism itself.[33] An adequate theory of nationalism would have to explain the form that the response to uneven development has taken and not merely the response itself. In his own variant of uneven development theory, Ernest Gellner has provided some suggestive pointers in this direction.[34]

Gellner ties the origins of nationalism to the changing role of culture in industrial societies, specifically the crucial role that shared or common cultures come to play in industrial societies. On the very broadest level, industrial societies are differentiated from agrarian societies by their highly integrated and standardized cultural systems and their single styles of communication, within the context of large and well-centralized states. Agrarian societies, Gellner argues, were essentially characterized by the diversity, plurality and complexity of their parts, with multiple, complex and ambiguous relationships to a variety of different cultures. Under these circumstances the various segments of agrarian societies were often insulated from one another. In contrast, industrial economies are dependent on high levels of mobility and communication between virtually all members of the society. This in turn

presupposes the socialization and integration of all members of industrial societies into a unified and standardized cultural system. Such a common cultural system can only be reproduced by a monolithic and centralized educational system.[35]

Industrial societies are also dependent on sustained and perpetual cognitive and economic growth, which requires a constant process of learning and relearning in a continuing cycle of innovation, improvement and progress. "Everything is open to rethinking", Gellner[36] maintains, and roles become optional and instrumental. The imperatives of constantly increasing productivity require that the division of labour is not only complex, but also perpetually changing. While the specialisms of industrial societies are more numerous, they are also less distant from one another than those of agrarian societies. This is because the kinds of specialization characteristic of industrial societies rest on "a common foundation of unspecialized and standardized training"[37] associated with an educational system that is universal, standardized and centralized. In industrial societies therefore the various specialisms have a "mutual affinity of style". Training is no longer a function of the family or specialized groups associated with particular skills, but is centralized, distinct from local communities, and external to them. This standardized educational system is not only geared to occupational mobility, but also to the specific content of work in industrial societies:

> Work, in the main, is no longer the manipulation of things, but of meanings. It generally involves exchanging communications with other people, or manipulating the controls of a machine, ... Most jobs, if not actually involving work 'with people', involve the control of buttons, or switches or levers which need to be *understood*, and are explicable, once again, in some standard idiom intelligible to all comers.[38]

Under such circumstances, culture assumes a central role in society.[39]

> Culture is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order...; culture is now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone members of the society can breathe and survive and produce. For a given society, it must be one in which they can *all* breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the *same* culture. Moreover, it must now be a great or high (literate, training-sustained) culture, it can no longer be a diversified, locality tied, illiterate little culture or tradition.

Gellner's emphasis on the necessary dominance of a single culture has profound implications for the emergence of nationalism. In the most general sense the need for cultural homogenuity and its association with the benefits of industrial development help foster an affinity for and loyalty to a common culture that is undergirded by a state that is able to support and reproduce this common culture. In this sense nationalism is the direct product of the new form of social organization associated with industrial societies.

More specifically, as former agrarian communities are sucked into the industrial vortex, conditions are generated for the activation of specific nationalisms. Gellner distinguishes between two major situations which activate nationalism. In the context of early industrialization, latecomers to the industrial culture find themselves at a considerable disadvantage in competing with those who have already assimilated to this culture. Such newcomers may either chose to assimilate to the existing industrial culture or, if conditions are favourable, take the nationalist option of attempting to create an alternative state to support their own culture. In this situation nationalism is activated by barriers to communication arising from the contact between incompatible cultures. The tensions arising from such inequality-generating differences are likely to be resolved in latter phases through the assimil-

ation of cultural minorities.

Considerable political tensions will be generated, however, if such inequalities become associated with what Gellner calls "entropy-resistant" attributes, that is characteristics which do not become evenly distributed throughout the entire society. The prime example of an entropy-resistant attribute is race. Where an entropy-resistant trait becomes associated with inequalities based on cultural differences, assimilation to the dominant culture is prevented and the inequalities which might otherwise have been temporary, are perpetuated. Under such circumstances nationalism is a likely, but not inevitable, response.[40]

It should be clear that Gellner's theory escapes the objections raised about Nairn's version of uneven development theory. By positing an explicit relationship between state and culture in industrial society, Gellner is able to explain why nationalism (as an ideology with a specific content) is activated in industrial settings. His theory also allows one to take more seriously the claims of nationalists, and in particular the central role that culture plays in their ideologies, without simply reproducing these ideologies as explanations for nationalism.[41] However, a central problem of Gellner's theory is the level at which it is geared. In spite of its accessibility, most of Gellner's discussion is at such a high level of abstraction that it often lapses into a functionalism in which "needs" are ascribed to social entities like industrial societies, the state and culture. For example, Gellner sees nationalism as rooted in the "distinctive structural requirements of industrial society".[42] An even more extreme example of functionalism is represented by the following passage:

> So the economy needs both the new type of central culture and

> the central state; the culture needs the state; and the state probably needs the homogenous cultural branding of its stock...43

While such lapses into functionalism may merely be shorthand methods for referring to the needs and interests of concrete groups and agents, Gellner's attempts to theorize specific groups and interests at a lower level of abstraction are less than satisfactory. For example, he does not provide an adequate explanation of how or why "counter-entropic" traits come to be associated with specific groups in industrial societies, except to suggest that the association of a specific trait with a low social position will ellicit prejudice from more privileged groups. Such prejudice in turn is related to the fears of the privileged that they will be displaced from their social positions by those below them. Nor does Gellner attempt to theorize the groups involved in this process of stratification. While he specifically eschews the use of classes to explain nationalism, he also does not offer an alternative way of conceptualizing groups involved in nationalist conflict. In order to provide a more satisafactory analysis of nationalism, it is essential to explore the roles of specific groups and classes in nationalist struggles. This will be attempted in the next section.

However, before exploring these issues, it is necessary to qualify the concept of culture as it relates to Gellner's theory. Although culture occupies a prominent position in Gellner's theory, he avoids defining it, except in the loosest sense. In a recent critique of existing approaches to culture, Anne Swidler has strongly challenged the dominant interpretations of culture and in particular the construction that has been put on the relationship between culture and behaviour. Rather than seeing action as determined by cultural values, Swidler argues that

action and values are usually organized to take advantage of cultural competence. Such cultural competence involves much more than the way one dresses, talks, or performs in examinations. It also requires "an image of the kind of world in which one is trying to act, a sense that one can read reasonably accurately ... how one is doing, and a capacity to chose between alternative lines of action."[44] The causal significance of culture therefore is not so much in the defining of ends and goals, but in providing the components from which strategies of action are constructed.

In this sense, culture is defined as a "tool-kit" of symbols, stories, rituals and world views which people use to solve different kinds of problems. The views that action is guided solely by either non-rational values or interests "are flawed by excessive emphasis on the 'unit act', the notion that people choose their actions one at a time according to their interests or values. But people do not, indeed cannot build up a sequence of actions piece by piece, striving with each act to maximize a given outcome. Action is necessarily integrated into larger assemblages, called here 'strategies of action'. Culture has an independent causal role because it shapes the capacities from which such strategies of action are constructed."[45]

This view of culture fits well with Gellner's theory of nationalism, and in particular his emphasis on the single, integrated cultural basis of industrial societies. Under such circumstances, anyone who is not familiar with the dominant culture is placed at a disadvantage, which will become severe if he is prevented from assimilating into the dominant culture by means of exclusion or segregation.[46] Gellner has tended to

stress the role of formal education in socializing people into the industrial culture. However, while formal education embodied in the school system is undoubtedly of importance, adequate socialization in the industrial context depends on a variety of other processes. As noted earlier, the ease with which people are able to operate within specific cultural milieus is dependent upon a number of subtle capacities such as the ability to determine the effectiveness of their actions and to choose among alternative lines of action. This is not inconsistent with Gellner's position which emphasizes continuous cognitive growth, innovation, learning and relearning as major characteristics of industrial societies. Clearly, such processes of growth, innovation and learning are dependent on continuous interaction with the major institutions and individuals which generate or communicate the latest knowledge and cultural norms.

For example, access to the major (and even minor) political, administrative and financial institutions is often dependent on knowledge of the procedures employed by such organizations. Without such knowledge it is often difficult if not impossible to gain access to these institutions, even if one is not formally barred from access. Access to informal social circles may also be of importance in yielding both information and contacts. Finally access to specific environments such as cities and towns may yield specific advantages, not only because of their concentrated potential for interaction, but also because of the concentration of sources of information in such areas.

It is important to emphasize that the conception of culture employed here is not the ethnocentric and reified concept associated with attempts to rank cultures and civilizations. The question of culture is

a highly complex and emotive one which cannot be considered here in detail, but a few comments would be in order. Firstly, while the term "industrialized" has to some extent become associated with specific geographical areas, principally Western Europe and the United States, there is no necessary connection between industrial culture and a specific area or particular people. As Gellner points out[47], the first industrial transformation was unique and therefore all others were imitative. Secondly, the cultural fruits of industrialization (with a few exceptions which are kept secret or patented) are widely diffused through the world. There is in fact a strong sense in which industrial culture is international culture.

Thirdly, it is necessary to distinguish between the localized, specific or "folk" aspects of culture and those aspects which are more diffused, standardized or even "international". Thus while language, folk art and some religious practices are localized, science, technology, managerial skills, forms of housing, and styles of dress are for the most part "international" or cosmopolitan. Local cultural forms become important to the extent that they supply vehicles for the entire industrial culture of a specific state. In this respect the advantage of speaking a language associated with the dominant industrial culture is not a product of the language itself, but rather of the access this language affords to privileged circles and resources. Similarly specific cultural procedures and practices are accorded importance by virtue of their recognition by persons holding key positions in the society. As Gellner[48] demonstrates, such distinctions tend to be confused by nationalists who normally affirm folk culture as a positive value, while in effect nationalism encourages "the generalized diffusion of a school-

mediated, academy-supervised idiom" and the "establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture".

Race and class

In the critique of Gellner's theory of nationalism, it was argued that Gellner's functionalist explanations were an effect of the high level of abstraction at which his theory was pitched. It was also suggested that a more adequate analysis of nationalism would have to explore the roles of specific groups and classes in nationalist struggles. These issues can now be addressed. In particular the discussion will focus on the relationship between "race" and "class", not only because most African, and in particular southern African, nationalisms are essentially racial national'sms,[49] but also because the debate about race and class may be used to elucidate general theoretical problems which apply also to nationalism.

In a seminal article on the problems of theorizing racial domination, Deborah Posel has argued that the difficulties of conceptualizing the relationship between "race" and "class" in southern African historiography may be directly related to the rigid heirarchical terms in which the "race-class debate" has been cast, so that either "race" or "class" are given analytical primacy. The result has been a neglect of class by those who give primacy to race, or functionalism and reductionism by those who give primacy to class.[50] Posel does not, however, address a central problem in most attempts to relate "class" and "race", namely that the two concepts are treated as if they were analytically equival-

ent. This is clearly not the case, because while class represents a specific (and complex) theoretical entity, "race" (or more specifically, racial domination) is generally a descriptive term, used to designate un- or under-theorized social processes. To attempt to relate "race" and "class" without assigning a theoretical content to "race" is meaningless and futile, and can lead only to the primacy of class and the relegation of "race" to a purely contingent, ideological effect.

To solve this problem, "race" must be reconceptualized as a theoretical entity which is both distinct from class and transcends the specificity of "race" as either a biological category or ideology. The Weberian concept of status or *Stand* satisfies both of these criteria. (An attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of status is made in the next section.) Firstly, as Michael Hechter[51] has pointed out, "the significance of the concept *Stand* is that it countenances a basis for group formation - and consequently - stratification - that is analytically independent of the relations of production", and therefore distinct from class. Furthermore, the concept of status allows one to transcend the specificity of "race", in that status may be applied to a variety of other bases of social discrimination and exclusion such as sex, level of income, religion, ethnicity, and even nationalism.

Recasting race as status does not, however, represent a full solution, nor meet all objections raised about its theoretical adequacy. The reconceptualization of race as status does not mean that class and status can be assigned equal theoretical weights. In a recent critique of Oliver Cromwell Cox's pioneering attempts to grapple with the complexities of "race" and "class", Robert Miles[52] has argued that "race" and

"class" cannot be regarded as equivalent concepts because

> as a social construction, "race" presupposes the existence of a consciousness of physical differences whereas a consciousness of class presupposes both the existence of a definite mode of production of material life and a consciousness of the class forces to which it gives rise.

This objection is a common one, although it has been formulated in different ways. Thus Wilmot James, for example, argues that racial domination constitutes a weaker system of social relations than class because, unlike class, it has "no structural dynamic of growth, development and expansion". Class determination is therefore "superior to racial domination as a determining social force".[53] Similarly, Ernesto Laclau in an early attempt to formulate non-reductionist analyses of fascism and populism, distinguished between two types of social conflict: class contradictions and "people/power bloc" contradictions. These antagonisms, he argues, are dominant at "the abstract level of the mode of production" and the "level of a concrete social formation" respectively.[54] Although they have different emphases, all three of these approaches suggest that there are two levels of social analysis to which class on the one hand and "race" (or alternatively populism, nationalism and fascism) are respectively associated.

This distinction largely coincides with that made by David Lockwood between the level of social integration and level of system integration.[55] Essentially the distinction between social and system integration refers to levels of social analysis relating to the social linkages or relationships between purposive or decision-making actors or collectivities (social integration), and those between parts of a social system (system integration). Social integration has been seen as restricted to the organizational or interactional levels of society in which concrete social groups and actors are related to one another in face-to-face

situations or as purposive agents, while system integration is located on a more abstract level and refers to the structural underpinnings of social systems.

The distinction between social and system integration coincides with that between *conflict* and *contradiction*. Conflict, the struggle between two opposing groups of people is a "problem" of social actors and is therefore located at the level of social integration. Contradiction, on the other hand, refers to tensions or incompatiblities between *sets of social relations* or parts of a social system, such as that between the forces and relations of production or between private appropriation and socialized (collective) production. Contradictions therefore represent "problems" of the social system as they refer to tensions, incompatiblities or a lack of fit between elements of the *system*, and *not* necessarily between individuals or groups, although obviously contradictions at the systemic level can, and usually do, foster conflicts at the social level.

The distinction between social and system integration is important because it relates directly to the differentiation of class and status as theoretical entities, and therefore to the ways in which class and "race" (and therefore nationalism) are articulated with one another. While classes may be located at both levels of integration,[56] they are essentially defined at the system level of integration, that is by the positions they occupy in the structure of production. Race on the other hand is essentially a contingent factor, in that it has no direct relationship to the level of system integration. The same applies to nationalism, and all other status identifications. While the specific struct-

ural characteristics of contemporary industrial societies create the conditions for the existence of nationalism, these conditions do not specify the boundaries of the groups that will be mobilized by nationalism.[57]

> That the principle of nationalism will be operative can be predicted; just which groupings will emerge as its carriers can be only loosely indicated, for it depends on too many historic contingencies. Nationalism is fated to prevail, but not any one particular nationalism.

In other words, status groups are the direct products of interaction and are only located at the social integration level.

Status, social closure and class

It is now possible to provide a comprehensive definition of status. As argued above, status groups are a direct product of social interaction (rather than the systemic qualities of societies) and can only be defined at the level of social integration. This provides a key to the ambiguous and unpredictable ideological orientations of nationalists (and indeed other status identifications). Because nationalism is essentially a product of immediate social interaction, it is impossible to predict the configuration of groups and interests that will become involved in a specific nationalism, nor the specific historical factors that might shape this nationalism.

Status is essentially a gradational or heirarchical concept.[58] Weber conceptualized the heirarchical properties of status in terms of "status honour", that is "a specific, positive or negative social estimation of honour".[59] Status honour refers not only to relationships of deference and prestige, superiority and inferiority, but also to the assignment of social values or worth to individuals on the basis of their group membership. The assignment of such social values in a status order can have

profound implications, not only in relation to privileges and access to material resources, but also to social recognition (in terms of respect or contempt) and therefore to the constitution of subjective identities.

Status honour may be linked to any quality, real or imagined, that is shared by a social collectivity. Weber spefically stressed "styles of life" in his account of status, but it is clear that status honour may be linked to almost any quality including culture, language, skin-colour, sex, property and professional credentials. Such qualities or distinguishing marks are contingent and only assume importance when they are used as a basis for status formation, group demarcation and exclusion.

Status honour "always rests upon distance and exclusiveness"[60] which restricts social relations with groups defined as inferior or lacking in status honour. Central to status stratification therefore are processes of exclusion or social closure.

> In content, status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific *style of life* can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on 'social' intercourse.... As soon as there is not a mere individual and socially irrelevant imitation of another style of life, but an agreed-upon communal action of this closing character, the 'status' development is underway.61

As Weber pointed out, "stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities."[62] Status therefore provides an alternative, although not necessarily unrelated, basis [illegible] inequality and exploition to class differentiation. It is important, however, not to overemphasize economic exploitation as a basis of status orders. Economic exploitation is not always the most obvious or immediate grievance against status orders. The statuses

allocated to subordinate groups in racial orders, for example, are directly linked to notions of human worth and as such place a value not only on the social actor as an economic producer, but determine also the recognition he receives as a social being as well as the value that is placed on his life.[63] Given the undue emphasis placed on economic exploitation by class theorists, it is perhaps not too obvious to point out that (although there is an obvious causal relationship between the two) physical survival takes priority over economic interest.

The concept of social closure requires further elaboration. By social closure Weber[64] referred to the process whereby social groups monopolize advantages by restricting access of outsiders to resources and opportunities which they control. This monopolization is aimed at potential competitors who are defined as inferior and ineligible in terms of specific physical or social attributes such as race, language, religion, social origin or skills. Closure therefore entails two essential aspects: a process of association, of delimiting the boundaries of a group, and an active attempt to exclude outsiders by means of the identification of specific attributes associated with such outsiders. In all cases the purpose of closure is to maximize the advantages of the excluding group.

Frank Parkin[65] has extended the notion of social closure to include the collective social actions of both subordinate and superordinate social groupings. Closure strategies are therefore used not only to create privileges by means of excluding outsiders, but also by those who are excluded, as a direct response to their exclusion and as a means of reversing or undermining the privileges appropriated by dominant status

groups. It is this second type of closure, which Parkin calls "usurpationary closure", that may be directly related to nationalism. Clearly forms of usurpationary closure are tied to exclusionary closure in that the creation of privilege by exclusion, necessarily defines a subordinate, excluded or negatively-privileged group. In Parkin's words, usurpationary closure is "the other half of the social closure equation".[66] In the context of South Africa and Namibia, racism and black nationalism are related to one another in this way.

A further useful distinction made by Parkin is that between individualist and collectivist forms of closure, that is closure affected on the basis of individual characteristics such as property or credentials, and closure based on criteria of descent or lineage. This distinction largely coincides with the familiar distinction between "achievement" and "ascription", terms which are rejected by Parkin because they erroneously attribute voluntaristic" qualities to the former and "naturally-given" qualities to the latter.[67] Individualist criteria of closure are closely associated with contemporary capitalist societies, and while these forms of closure were ideally suited to the needs of a rising bourgeoisie in the process of challenging the collectivist criteria of a feudal aristocracy, they raise problems for the reproduction of dominant classes in capitalist societies. That is, individualist criteria of closure help to ensure a high calibre of new recruits to dominant groups, but are not always able to ensure safe transmission of group privileges to descendants.

In Parkin's theory, classes are defined in terms of their mode of closure rather than in relation to their positions in the productive process. This is a form of reduction and is equivalent to the class

reductionism of some Marxist theorists, although it works in the opposite direction. Such an emphasis leads Parkin to conclude, for example, that white workers in South Africa, whose positions of privilege owe more to closure against blacks than their struggle with the white bourgeoisie, therefore form part of the dominant class.[68] Such reasoning tends to rob class of all meaning, reducing it to a mere social category, and appears to be an inevitable result of not clearly distinguishing between class and status as analytically distinct categories.

Clearly white workers who mobilize against blacks are not acting in terms of class interests that may be defined in relation to the structure of production,[69] but rather in terms of interests as a segment of a racial or status group. As such they share interests with members of other classes. While these common interests may influence their political strategies and ideologies, it logically does not, and cannot, alter their class position. (It is of course possible for *some* members of the white working class to use their positions as members of a dominant racial group, to gain entrance to other classes, just as in non-racially structured capitalist societies some members of the bougeloisie may be recruited from the working class. Such mobility between classes, however, does not alter the class system nor the positions of workers who do not change their class.) As workers they are still subject to specific relations of production that define their class position, and share class interests with workers of other racial groups, even if these interests may be overshadowed by racial interests. There is no iron law that white workers will always identify with a racial group rather than a class, even in the context of a racial order. This suggests that two distinct sets of criteria exist for group formation.

Parkin's reinterpretation of class in terms of modes of closure is directly related to his awareness of the "lack of fit between all positional or systematic definitions of class and the actual behaviour of classes in the course of distributive struggle"[70] His strategy, however, does not solve this problem, but merely avoids it by reducing classes to mere social categories with no distinctive features from other social groupings.

This discussion underlines the need to distinguish between class and status relations and to relate these two forms of social relations to the levels of social and system integration. As argued above, classes are distinct from status groups in that they are defined at the system integration level, while status groups are restricted to the level of social integration. In the case of classes therefore the criteria for class formation, for the delineation of group boundaries, are pre-given by the structure of production. Classes are therefore not dependent on the identification of specific contingent attributes as a basis for differentiation and exclusion. Status groups may be influenced by the systemic properties of social systems, but are never determined at this level.

However, classes can only become conscious and involve themselves in class struggle at the social level. At this level they compete with status distinctions and become only one of many possible alternatives of group formation. At the level of social integration, it may be difficult to disentangle classes from status groups. Classes may indeed conceive of themselves or affect closure in status terms, as, for example, in the common "lower-middle-upper class" distinction. Not even Marxists seem

immune to confusions about class and status divisions, as witnessed, for example by the debate about the "middle classes" in contemporary capitalist societies.[71] There is no *a priori* method of determining whether class or status distinctions will provide the dominant forms of social mobilization:

> The answer to the question, why does exclusion and domination assume a predominantly racial form in one society, a religious form in another, and a largely class form in a third, is only explicable in historical terms. There is no general theory that could explain why some societies and not others experience the migratory and demographic movements that finally result in communal divisions.[72]

There is also no method of determining in advance the ways in which "class" and "race" might be articulated with one another except through empirical research at the social integration level. Although certain systemic qualities may favour particular outcomes, the allignment of groups and classes in specific social formations is the product of complex interactions and historical developments requiring detailed empirical research. To start out from the assumption that a particular mode of production is determinate without detailed investigation of the level of social integration can only lead of difficulties. In a recent critique of Marxist development sociology, David Booth[73] has argued that radical development sociology has reached a general impasse which is characterized by an inablity to generate theoretically informed research, increasingly arid and repetitive analyses, and uncertainty about the way forward. This impasse, Booth argues, can be traced to a common insistence on the part of Marxist theorists "that the salient features of capitalist nationalist economies can be 'read-off' from the concept of the capitalist mode of production and its laws", or alternatively derived from the nature of their insertion in the world capitalist system.

There are, however, some interesting pointers in the literature to the ways in which classes and status groups may be related to one another. It has been suggested, for example, that in capitalist societies, status heirarchies are sometimes used to stabilize and legitimize class positions.[74] Parkin's discussion of individualist and collectivist forms of closure is also suggestive in this regard. As already argued, the predominantly individualist closure employed by dominant classes in capitalist societies creates vulnerablities in the reproduction of such classes. Recourse is therefore often made to the use of collectivist criteria to bolster the predominantly individualist forms of class reproduction. It is significant that collectivist exclusion of the working class was most evident in early and mid-19th century Europe:

> The badge of proletarian status carried with it the kinds of stigmata commonly associated with subordinate racial and ethnic groups. It was a total condition which permitted little leeway for the cultivation of those small part-time identities that bring temporary release from the humilities of servile status.[75]

This resemblence between proletarian status in early capitalist Europe and the servile statuses of subordinate groups in racial orders suggests that the construction of racial orders may be associated with the vulnerablity rather than the strengths of capitalist classes. Stanley Greenberg,[76] for example, has argued that the early stages of capitalist development are characterized by an intensification of racial domination associated with the needs of specific classes. Jeffery Paige[77] is even more explicit in that he directly links the intensification of conflict to the vulnerablity of specific classes. In Namibia the elaboration of a racial order and repressive labour system was closely associated with the labour requirements of economically-marginal settler farmers and, to a lesser extent, early mining capital. In particular, the labour needs

of white farmers helped to create not only a radical distinction between whites and blacks, but also the differentiation of northern contract labour from local or police zone labour, and even distinctions among contract labourers themselves.[78]

In much the same way as dominant groups or classes strengthen their positions by manipulation of the status order, so subordinate groups also use social closure to challenge the dominance of superordinant groups. The most obvious example of this latter strategy in the African context is the reversal of servile racial statuses through black nationalism. Racial nationalism of this sort serves two major purposes. Firstly, it creates a clear basis for the definition, unification and mobilization of subordinate groups to challenge the dominant classes and to transcend small-scale, communal identities. In Namibia, racial consciousness provided a basis for unified resistance, long before any clear notion of a territorial or state-based nationalism had emerged.

Secondly, racial nationalism allows subordinate status groups to challenge and even reverse the degradation of a racial order. Whereas in the colonial-racial context "black has signified for everyone all that was vile and corrupt, now the reversal is true: black is pure, black is noble, black is beautiful."[79] A clear example of status reversal in Namibia is provided by the *Otjiserandu* or "Truppenspieler" organizations which adopted the military procedures, uniforms and ranking systems of their colonial overlords. In this way these movements were able to create an alternative and parallel status order to that of colonial society.[80]

Status manipulations may also be manifest in conflicts between distinct

groups and interests within nationalist movements. A clear example of such status conflicts is represented, for example, by the struggle between the intelligentsia and the Herero indigenous leadership for control over the nationalist movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s.[81] The Herero indigenous leadership during the 1940s and 1950s had been able to construct a strong power base by appealing to pre-colonial symbols and structures of authority. Their dominance was, however, challenged by the intelligentsia who attempted to undercut the authority of the indigenous leadership by creating a a new status order based principally on credentials such as literacy and levels of education.

Aims and preview of the dissertation

Having set out a broad explanatory framework for nationalism, it is now necessary to show how these theoretical considerations relate to the main body of the thesis, to examine the underlying aims and assumptions of the dissertation, to identify limitations and possible weaknesses in its structure, and to suggest ways in which the issues explored here might be extended. Before addressing these issues, however, it is essential to set out the aims of the thesis and to provide a brief preview of the dissertation in order to introduce the reader to the major issues and underlying structure of the study.

The central aim of the thesis is to explore the social forces which have shaped the development of a movement of national liberation in Namibia and in this way contribute to a deeper understanding of nationalism in general. The emphasis is therefore on the origins of Namibian nationalism and the various groups and interests that brought it into being, rather than on the history of the nationalist movement itself. A second-

ary aim is to provide an historical overview of the development of black nationalism in Namibia. Clearly this aim has to be seen in the context of the relatively extensive period covered and the plethora of themes and issues that are relevant. The various difficulties associated with this secondary aim will be discussed in greater detail towards the end of this introduction.

The dissertation is divided into fourteen chapters, organized in four major sections. Two of the sections deal with the social context within which Namibian nationalism arose, in the "police zone" (central and southern Namibia) and the northern reserves respectively. The two remaining sections are devoted to analyses of the two distinct phases of Namibian nationalism.

In keeping with the emphasis placed on the role of the state in this introduction, section one (chapters one to three) essentially focus on the role of the colonial state in the elaboration of a racial order and in creating the conditions for the first phase of nationalist resistance in the 1920s. The role of the state is considered within the context of a number of specific conditions. The first of these relates to the nature of imperialism. Both German and South African policies in Namibia, it is argued, were essentially products of social, rather than economic, imperialism. That is, imperial interests in Namibia were shaped by the disruptive consequences of industrial capitalism in Germany and South Africa, rather than by the direct economic requirements of the capitalist metropoles. One major consequence of this form of imperialism is that it made the colonial state highly receptive to settler interests and provided one of the bases for the elaboration of a racial order in Namibia.

A second vital factor in explaining colonial policies and their outcome in a highly repressive racial order, relates to the ecological and climatic conditions of Namibia. The specific ecology of Namibia, it is argued, not only intensified the struggle for control over the territory's resources, but rendered settler agriculture extremely vulnerable, creating pressures for radical state intervention. These pressures were manifested initially in demands for the transfer of agricultural resources, principally land and livestock, to the settlers, and later for radical control over black labour. In spite of early attempts by the state to resist such pressures (during the governorship of Leutwein, and the South African military period, for example), the racial order that emerged was a direct reflection of settler interests and in particular those of the settler farmers.

Relations between colonized, settlers and the state also developed within a political context shaped by radical notions of state sovereignty and territoriality. These doctrines of the state played a prominent role in early conflicts between indigenous communities and the state, affecting a radical redefinition of economic and political space and opening the way for new political identities that transcended pre-colonial bases of group formation.

Section one also focuses on the crucial consequences of the transition from German to South African rule, emphasizing discontinuities in the change of regimes. The contradictions and constraints generated in colonial policies during this transitional period, it is argued, are directly related to the intensification of resistance between 1920 and

1925.

These first three chapters therefore set the stage for the analysis of the first phase of nationalist resistance in section two (chapters four to seven). Previous analyses of this crucial period of Namibian history have tended to focus on the discrete rebellions of 1922 and 1925 and have generally failed to show the close inter-relationship and extensiveness of anti-colonial resistance. A primary purpose of this section therefore is to provide a detailed analysis of the various political organizations and instances of resistances as part of a broad movement of popular assertion.

Essentially, this popular movement was a product of a transitional and socially fragmented society in which pre-colonial political identities were in a process of disintegration and transformation, but in which no firmly based alternative identities had yet emerged. The movement was therefore characterized by a loosely defined pan-Africanist or racial nationalism associated with the Garveyist movement.

While the colonial state had succeeded in affecting a radical reorganization of pre-colonial communities, the new structures had not been in existence long enough to create the conditions for a territorial or state-based nationalism, which was to characterize the second or contemporary phase of Namibian nationalism. Furthermore, the temporary weaknesses of the state during the transitional period, allowed for greater physical mobility and for the diffusion of external political ideologies and movements across state boundaries. However, within the context of a colonial state which was rapidly recovering from the confusions and uncertainties of the transition of regimes, identification with external

movements proved very tenuous. Under pressures from a revitalized state, the movement disintegrated and there was a reversion to political identifications based on pre-colonial and communal divisions.

Sections one and two relate principally to developments in the police zone, the nucleus of colonial power and the area of white settlement. Section 3 (chapters eight and nine) shifts the discussion to the areas beyond the police zone, and in particular to Ovamboland. In spite of being incorporated into both the German and South African colonies, the northern reserves retained an identity of their own and were kept isolated from the police zone by strictly enforced regulations controlling movement between the two sectors. The essential link between the northern reserves and the police zone, however, was migrant labour, and with time the northern reserves (and in particular Ovamboland) came to occupy the position of major supplier of labour to the police zone.

Section three therefore focuses on the impact of colonial administration on the northern reserves and on the origins and development of the system of contract labour. In relation to the latter, it is argued that environmental factors are crucial in explaining the origins of the contract labour system. Following an analysis of the relative interests and changing fortunes of mining ar settler agriculture in Namibia between 1925 and 1948, it is concluded that the interests of settler farmers played a central role in shaping the contract labour system. Through the vehicle of the contract labour system, white agriculture introduced new complexities into the racial order by supplementing status distinctions between blacks and whites with additional distinctions between contract and local labour, as well as distinctions between

different "grades" of contract labour.

These developments are directly related to the undermining and disintegration of political and economic structures in Ovamboland between the two world wars. The dominance of settler agriculture was to lead to the transfer of the bulk of migrant labourers from mining to farm labour, with a consequent drop in wages and the weakening of the bargaining capacities of migrant workers. These struggles were played out against the backdrop of drought, depression and severe food shortages, increasing pressures on the land, taxation, and the erosion of the authority of the indigenous rulers in Ovamboland. A crucial aspect of this process, however, was that in spite of the erosion of pre-colonial structures, Ovamboland was prevented from adapting to its new industrial context by its enforced isolation and the insistence of the colonial authorities in propping up decaying "traditional" institutions and practices. Even within the context of the rigid racial order, Ovamboland therefore represents a special case of restricted access to the common "industrial culture".

Together these first three sections lay the foundations for the analysis of the second or contemporary phase of Namibian nationalism in the final section (chapters ten to thirteen). Essentially three groups of interests helped to bring the contemporary nationalist movement into existence. These were the indigenous ("traditional") leadership which took its bearing from pre-colonial symbols and structures; the contract labourers who for the most part were also Ovambos; and a group of educated and urbanized persons identified as the "intelligentsia".

Perhaps because nationalism originated in the West and because of the

common assumption that ethnic or sub-territorial nationalisms are irreconciable with state-based nationalisms, accounts of African nationalism have tended to underestimate the importance of indigenous inputs. Section four therefore begins with a discussion of the different strands that came to constitute the indigenous leadership of the nationalist movement, and in particular of the Herero Chiefs' Council.

Essentially two distinct, but related responses of the Herero grouping in the post-1925 period may be identified. The first of these coalesced around the indigenous leadership which had been incorporated into the colonial administrative structure of the police zone. The second was tied to the more proletarianized and "detribalized" Hereros in the towns and on the farms, who formed themselves into a para-military organization known as the *Otjiserandu*. This proto-nationalist movement provided for the expression of resistance in a covert or symbolic manner and offered an alternative status heirarchy and basis of political authority to that of colonial society The development of powerful symbols for both Herero and Namibian nationalism was closely associated with these two strands, which after a period of struggle for dominance, were incorporated into one political body. This body, the Chiefs' Council, emerged as the most powerful political force in Namibia and was largely responsible for laying the foundations for the nationalist movement which emerged in the late 1950s.

The role of contract workers in the launching of the nationalist movement is closely related to the fundamental changes that took place in their social consciousness and political responses in the 1940s. This

change, it is argued, should be seen not only against the background of their dual involvement in the subsistence and wage economies, but also in terms of their employment in both the industrial and agricultural sectors of the wage economy. With the developing crisis in Ovamboland (described in section three), northern contract workers became more dependent on wage labour. However, while this entailed a greater degree of proletarianization of the contract labour force, migrant labourers were also subject to specific conditions which differentiated them from other labourers. In spite of their increasing dependence on wage labour, contract labourers were forced to return to their sending areas and were consequently subjected to the restraining influences of the peasant economy and indigenous authorities. Furthermore, the nature of the contract system meant that there was a constant turnover of the contract labour force in specific localities. These structural conditions, it is argued, made contract workers politically vulnerable and oriented them towards a nationalist, rather than a class strategy.

Moreover, the partial proletarianization of the contract labour force took place in the context of a number of other changes, including unprecedented growth of the colonial economy after World War II, a new influx of white settlers, further development of commercial agriculture and the intensification of competition between different sectors of the Namibian and South African economies for contract labour. These developments helped to diversify employment opportunities for contract workers and provided new opportunities for mobility between different work settings. The harsh conditions of farm labour - to which nearly every contract worker was subjected at one or other time in his life - served to radicalize them and encouraged the development of a variety of strategies, including the boycotting of specific employers, desertion and the

assumption of alternative ethnic identities in order to escape the controls of the contract labour system. On the other hand, industrial employment with its concentration of workers in specific localities, allowed new opportunities for collective organization and resistance.

Most important, however, were the opportunities for mobility between alternative work settings and in particular the access Ovambo workers were able to gain - both legally and illegally - to employment in South Africa. This mobility not only undermined the rigid control of the contract labour system, but also exposed a central weakness of the territorial state, namely its inablity to control events beyond its boundaries. This weakness was to prove crucial firstly in the launching of the Ovamboland People's Organization by migrant workers in Cape Town, and later in the launching of diplomatic and military offensives against the colonial state from abroad.

Development during the post-World War II period, and in particular urbanization and the expansion of black education, also played a key role in transforming political responses to colonialism. These developments were particularly crucial for the emergence of the third component of the Namibian nationalist movement, the intelligentsia. Just as increased mobility helped to free contract workers from the bondage of the contract labour system, so the intelligentsia was able to break away from the constraints of the indigenous leadership and the "ethnic" organization of politics, by means of the opportunities that arose from urbanization and changes in the education system for police zone blacks. Not only did urbanization concentrate the black labour force in specific locations - thus facilitating communication and mobilization - but it

also encouraged the transcendance of ethnic or parochial identities. It was essentially the towns which served as centres for the common industrial culture associated with the capitalist economy and territorial state. Furthermore, state policies which attempted to limit the influx of blacks into the urban areas, intensified the conflicts inherent in a racial order within an industrializing context, and served to radicalize the urban black population. It is no coincidence therefore that the first major issue taken up by the newly-formed nationalist organizations in the late 1950s was the forced removal to the Katutura township in Windhoek

Education played a similar role to urbanization. It too offered a source of access to the shared or standardized culture, and opportunities to transcend parochial identities and the control of indigenous authorities. Like urbanization, Western education with its egalitarian emphases, challenged the existing status orders of both the broad racial system and the indigenous leadership, and helped to radicalize those blacks who had obtained an above average education. In particular education allowed the intelligentsia to put forward alternative credentials for leadership of the nationalist movement from those of the indigenous authorities. Thus the intelligentsia emphasized its education and "modernity", in relation to the lack of education and "backwardness" of the indigenous leadership. Of the three major groupings that made up the nationalist movement, the intelligentsia were also the most ardent nationalists. This was related not only to their participation in a broad cultural discourse, but also in the nature of their identity as intellectuals and the consequent tenuousness of their bases of popular support. The intelligentsia were essentially identified by their education, and were not part of an existing social group in the same sense as a class or

ethnic group is. As other avenues of political power and support were closed to them, they were most likely to use the boundaries of the state as a basis for group formation and political mobilization.

The main body of the thesis ends with an analysis of the nationalist movement until 1966 when SWAPO launched its guerrilla war. Specifically, this analysis focuses on two major issues: the failure of the nationalist movement to achieve unity and the ascendancy of SWAPO as the major popular grouping. It is argued that the resolution of these issues can be related to the specific interests and orientations of the three groups that made up the movement, and also to the peculiarities of the international environment that the major leaders of the movement moved into after 1960.

Namibian nationalism in context

It is clear from the preview that considerable emphasis has been placed on locating the rise of Namibian nationalism within its socio-political context. In particular, emphasis has been placed on the role of the colonial state and colonial policies, on the elaboration of a racial order in Namibia and on early "proto-nationalist" forms of resistance. These emphases require explanation because they are related to some of the key assumptions and orientations of this study and also touch on a number of vital theoretical issues in the analysis of nationalism in general. The relevant issues revolve around the questions of what may legitimately be classified as nationalism, the relationship between nationalism and other forms of protest and resistance, the location of nationalism within the broad processes of social change in developing societies, and the assumptions that guide our thinking about change or

"development".

In the early literature, African nationalism was distinguished from other forms of protest and resistance by recourse to the concepts of "primary" and "secondary" resistance. These concepts were firmly located within the ethnocentric and teleological framework of modernization theory which saw developing societies as progressing through a series of evolutionary stages towards more "western" and "rational" forms of social organization. Thus one of the earliest proponents of the primary /secondary distinction, characterized primary resistance as "negative and spontaneous" because it was an attempt "to protect or recreate the old by protesting against the new". "Secondary resistance" or nationalism, on the other hand, was seen as distinct, "rational and positive" largely because of its acceptance of Western innovation.[82] These concepts are based on a model of social change which assumes that all societies develop in essentially the same direction and places a higher value on one end of the scale of "evolution" than the other. Without these normative assumptions, primary and secondary resistance become little more than residual sequential terms, indicating that primary resistance occurred prior to secondary resistance - a necessarily true, but not very enlightening proposition.

Although the original formulations of modernization theory no longer enjoy respectablity, the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" resistance has remained influential,[83] and evolutionary assumptions still shape much of our thinking about developing societies. In Marxist and underdevelopment writings on the Third World, the crude notion of the evolution of "traditional" societies into "modern" societies is replaced by an emphasis on continuities associated with processes of

capitalist and imperialist penetration.[84] The underlying tendency of both modernization and radical theorists therefore is to depict the development of social movements as a succession of stages or as a progressively unfolding consciousness.[85]

Besides resting on a number of dubious assumptions about change in general,[86] evolutionary approaches to social change impose a number of constraints on our thinking about nationalism. Firstly, they tend to shift the burden of the explanation of nationalism onto foreign and imposed structures (such as capitalism, Western industrialism or the colonial state) and therefore devalue the unique contributions of indigenous communities to the development of nationalism.[87] A central assumption guiding this study therefore was that existing theoretical perspectives need to be adjusted to accommodate the indigenous as well as the external, the "cultural" as well as the "structural", characteristics and origins of nationalism. More specifically, there is a need to address the question of what is uniquely African about *African* nationalism.

Secondly, the evolutionary approach creates too sharp a break between nationalism as a "modern", "rational" or "progressive" movement and earlier, supposedly "traditional", "irrational" and "regressive" forms of protest and resistance. It is indeed possible to distinguish between nationalism and initial responses to colonial conquest, but there was nothing "irrational" or "regressive" about such responses because they involved the reactions of integral communities to foreign invasion. Later responses, following colonial conquest and the imposition of colonial domination, also do not easily lend themselves to classification in terms of rational/irrational and progressive/regressive

reactions. While not all of these later responses can be classified as nationalist, those which were not nationalist could only be seen as "regressive" if one assumes that "traditional" societies remained static and that all non-nationalist responses were aimed at the restoration of an old order. In as far as indigenous societies were transformed by colonial domination, their perceptions of the "old order" are likely to have been influenced by these changes. This is why attempts to establish "connections" between primary and secondary resistance (or nationalism)[88] are doomed to failure because they remain rooted in a paradigm which has erected an artificial and inpenetrable barrier between "traditional" and "modern" societies. In the final analysis, however, whether an act of resistance or a social movement can be understood as "progressive" or "regressive" is *an* empirical question and not one which can be settled *a priori* by means of over-simplified typologies.

Thirdly, the evolutionary approach places the emphasis on continuities, on a "natural" and progressive series of stages which emulate the sequences of biological growth. Besides the built-in ethnocentic assumptions about the "immaturity" of non-industrial societies, this approach tends to obscure the discontinuities in the development of nationalism and other forms of resistance. Again, whether nationalism develops in a progressive or sequential manner is a matter for empirical investigation.

In this study therefore assumptions about the evolution of societies and ideologies were "bracketed". That is, the study was embarked upon without the assumptions that nationalism developed in a "natural" or sequential manner; that nationalism was a more progressive or rational

response than other political responses; or that nationalism arose solely in response to external stimuli. The definition of nationalism utilized in this study specifically focuses on the relationship between "external" conditions (such as the state and the imperatives of industrial society) *and* "internal" political and cultural identifications. In this way nationalism (especially in a colonial context) may be seen as a process of adaptation and redefinition in response to externally-imposed structures. Particularly in Africa, nationalism has been closely associated with social transformation. It has been at its strongest during periods of change, of transition from one social order to another. Once the transition was made, once colonial conflict came to an end and independence was gained, African nationalisms have generally lost momentum and waned. From this perspective therefore nationalism may be regarded as more of a social *process* than a social *product*.

This interpretation of nationalism has a number of crucial implications. Firstly, it suggests that as a response and adaptation to externally imposed structures, nationalism cannot be understood except within its political and socio-economic context or political economy. This is not only because it is impossible to understand a response or adaptation without understanding that which elicited the response or adaptation, but also because the social unit that responds or adapts is at least partly defined by external contextual factors. In Namibia the crucial contextual factor was the racial order. It has already been argued that most, if not all, African nationalisms were racial nationalisms, that they were responses to the racial orders associated with the colonial system. As such the racial order provides one of the bases (together with the boundaries of the colonial state) of nationalist identifications in Africa.

Nationalism and time

The interpretation of nationalism adopted also has important implications for the relationship between nationalism and other forms of resistance. At the risk of stating the obvious, nationalism (and in particular African nationalism) is a form of resistance or struggle. This is clear, for example, from the close association and at times even identity, between nationalism and the struggle against colonialism. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that nationalism represents a specific type of resistance in that it aims to establish a specific kind of political order. The specificity of nationalism, however, must be seen within the context of our understanding of it as a process. What this means essentially is that although it is possible to identify "pure" or "fully developed" varieties of nationalism within contemporary Africa, such nationalisms did not arise in a vacuum, nor did they emerge fully-developed from the womb of colonial society, but were rather born in processes of conflict, adaptation and the redefinition of social and political identities. The failure to understand this leads to the confusion of nationalism (the process) with nationalist organizations (the products).

These arguments may be illustrated by reference to the forms of resistance that occurred in Namibia during the early 1920s. While these forms of resistance differed from the more developed manifestations of nationalism that emerged in the late 1950s, they nevertheless represent a significant phase in the development of Namibian nationalism. Analysis of this phase of resistance reveals a number of characteristics that establish a close connection with "purer" forms of nationalism. Firstly,

it is clear that this phase of Namibian history was marked by a profound redefinition of political and social identities. This was most clearly manifested in the doctrine of racial unity espoused by Namibian Garveyites, but it was also apparent in less obvious attempts to forge alliances that transcended pre-colonial identities. As already argued, racial nationalism is one of the distinguishing criteria of contemporary African nationalisms, but Namibian Garveyism went further than simply asserting black unity. In their calls for black unity, Namibian Garveyites repeatedly mentioned the major Namibian groupings, the Ovambos, the Hereros, the Damaras, the Namas and sometimes even the San. Implicit in these calls for unity therefore was the idea of uniting all black groups included within the boundaries of the colonial state. Similarly, this early notion of Namibian unity was implicit in the idea of a general rebellion which would involve all the major black communities, in the close collaboration of Basters, Hereros, Namas and Damaras in the Rehoboth rebellion, and even in the failed attempts of the Bondelswarts to draw other black communities into its revolt against the colonial state.[89]

The one characteristic of contemporary nationalisms that was absent or, more accurately, only weakly present during this early phase, was the idea of the political order that would succeed colonialism. Except for one reported comment of the UNIA leader Mungunda to the effect that a new administration should be established,[90] the "new political order" remained undefined - at least within the sources consulted in this study. However, it is possible to argue that the millenarianism latent in Namibian Garveyism was not simply an irrational and regressive response, but that it represented an attempt to come to terms with the present and create a new future. As there is no evidence to suggest that

Namibian Garveyites expected to reestablish the pre-colonial political order after expelling the colonialists, this suggests that the idea of a "new age" latent in millenarianism may have substituted for more conventional notions of a national political order.

This attempt to demonstrate the vital links between the resistance of the 1920s and later manifestations of nationalism raises questions about the discontinuity between the two major phases of resistance in Namibia. If the resistance of the 1920s represented an early and "underdeveloped" expression of nationalism, why was there a gap of more than thirty years before a clear form of nationalism manifested itself? This is an issue which is explored in some depth in the study, and which again underlines the importance of locating expressions of nationalism within their appropriate contexts. The reasons for the disappearance of expressions of nationalism, and indeed of almost all forms of resistance barring the most covert manifestations, from the mid-1920s, must be sought in the repressive capacities of the state. Thus besides acting as a major stimulus for nationalism, the colonial state also actively sought to repress all expressions of nationalism or black unity in Namibia. The brief upsurge of resistance in the 1920s is associated with a short transitional period in which the colonial state was not able to exercize full control over the colonized, while the reassertion of nationalism in the 1950s was linked to changes in the balance of power between colonized and colonizers that followed changes in the colonial economy and the international order.

These issues and related, questions such as how the colonial state was able to suppress nationalism for such a long period, are discussed at

some length in the body of the dissertation. The most relevant issue to emerge from this discussion, however, is the general or theoretical point which links expressions of nationalism to the resources controlled by colonizers and colonized respectively. As Theda Skocpol[91] has argued in her study of revolution, the occurence of resistance is not simply linked to objective contradictions, or even the consciousness of such contradictions, but also to the relative resources and capacities of political actors:

> It is one thing to identify underlying, potential tensions rooted in objective class relations understood in a Marxist manner. It is another thing to understand how and when class members find themselves *able* to struggle effectively for their interests. When and how can subordinate classes fight successfully against those who exploit them? And when and how do dominant classes have the capacity for collective political action? For answering such questions, the political conflict argument that collective action is based upon group organization and access to resources, often including coercive resources, is especially fruitful.

When applied to the issues under consideration, this discussion suggests that even when nationalism is not manifest, it might continue to subsist as a potential which can again become active when the balance of resources between political actors changes in favour of subordinate groups. Thus resistance was not completely absent between the mid-1920s and 1950s although strategies differed. While markedly different from the forms of resistance of the 1920s, the 'Truppenspieler" movement in part addressed similar concerns to those of the 1920s movement. In spite of the collapse of dreams of black unity and deliverance from abroad, the "Truppenspielers" continued to challenge the racial order, not by risking confrontation with the colonial state, but by creating an alternative status order. Mobilization on the basis of ethnic groups, especially by the Hereros, bears a closer resemblence to nationalist strategies. Although this mobilization had a narrower basis of unity than the

movement of the 1920s, this is not crucial to the definition of nationalism, particularly as the Hereros showed little inclination to return to a pre-colonial order. As already observed, ethnic or cultural nationalisms belong to the same genre as territorial and racial nationalisms, even though they were less favoured than territorial nationalism in Africa.

This discussion of discontinuities in Namibian nationalism should not, however, detract from the recogition of continuities in the nationalist struggle. While the organizations of the 1920s did not survive, the ideological links between the two phases of resistance have already been demonstrated. Furthermore, there were some continuities in personnel, particularly of the Herero leaders. Thus Hosea Kutako, one of Namibia's longest surviving political leaders was prominent in the Garvey movement, in Herero politics during the interlude between the two phases of nationalism, and in the founding of the nationalist organizations in the 1950s. A continuity in the symbols of resistance is also evident. This is particularly apparent in the contemporary nationalist movement's inheritance of symbols from the "Truppenspieler" movement and Herero nationalism. It is suggested also by similarities of style between the millenarianism of Garveyism and the troop movement of the later period, particularly in the manipulation of symbols to redefine communal identities.

Nationalism and space

In general therefore this study adopts a more "holistic" or integrated approach to the periodization (location in time) of Namibian nationalism and rejects typologies which draw radical distinctions between different phases in the development of nationalism and anti-colonial resistance.

The emphasis of the analysis is rather on exposing the vital links and subtle changes between different periods of resistance rather than categorizing and classifing the responses associated with these periods. A similar approach is adopted to the location of nationalism within its spatial contexts.

Throughout the dissertation, spatial issues form a recurrent theme. This is related to the theoretical model adopted in the study. The colonial state, it was argued, created the conditions for the emergence of nationalism by the radical redefinition of political space. This was accomplished both by the creation of spatial discontinuities where none had previously existed and by the incorporation of formerly discrete communities within a single sovereign state. This restructuring of political space in turn created tensions or contradictions between existing socio-cultural and political identifications and new political boundaries, and fostered the need for the redefinition of political and cultural communities.

The redefinition of space did not simply involve the drawing of external state boundaries, but also the reorganization and control of space within such boundaries. This reorganization of space was reflected in such practices as the creation of reserves, the distinction between the police zone and northern territories, the demarcation of privately-owned settler farms and white dominated urban areas, and the radical control over movement between the different areas. Moreover, this reorganization of space was imposed on pre-existing communities with their own definitions and dynamics of spatial management. It is for this reason that considerable attention has been devoted to ecology and its formative

impact on pre-colonial definitions of space, on patterns of physical movement, and conflicts between competing spatial systems. Ecologically-oriented definitions of space, it is argued, played a crucial role in early conflicts between colonizers and colonized.

However, the reorganization of space also had more direct implications for the development of nationalism in Namibia. For example, the late emergence of formal nationalist organizations may be directly linked to the creation of reserves, the rigid enforcement of the division between police zone and northern areas, and the strict control exercized over movement.

Each of the three groups which helped launch the contemporary nationalist movement was subject to specific spatial conditions within the broad colonial order, and these profoundly influenced their respective political responses. That the Herero indigenous leadership constructed its power base in the reserves proved decisive in conditioning its ideological and political orientations, its relationship to the colonial authorities, and ultimately the kind of nationalism it espoused. Similarly the intelligentsia's specific approach to nationalism, its relationship with the indigenous leadership and its major sources of support were intimately tied up with its relationship to the urban areas and its urban and western cultural orientations. Perhaps the most interesting products of the colonial spatial order, however, were the northern contract workers. Their involvement in both the northern reserves and the police zone as well as their distribution between settler agriculture and the industrial sector, it is argued, profoundly influenced their political responses to colonialism. Furthermore, the strategies they devized to deal with the spatial constraints of the contract system

is shown to be related to the development of SWAPO in exile.

Structure of the dissertation, limitations and gaps

To conclude this introduction it is necessary to say something about the underlying structure of the dissertation, its limitations, and those areas and issues which are in need of further research.

The central aims of the dissertation to trace the origins or roots of Namibian nationalism and provide an overview of its development, presented the researcher with a number of problems and difficult decisions. As Namibia's political history is relatively under-researched and the historical period covered by the study relatively extensive, a number of crucial choices had to be made about the issues that would be addressed in the study. On a more general level, the researcher was faced with the choice of sacrificing detail in order to cover a broad range of issues and events, or to narrow the focus to a smaller range of issues. In keeping with the general theoretical orientation, and in particular the emphases on nationalism as a process, the importance of the political economy and the significance of indigenous and pre-colonial inputs, it was decided to concentrate on specific strategic themes rather than present a more general and necessarily superficial account. A great deal has already been said in the preceding discussion to justify the decision to treat the first phase of resistance in detail. A further reason for doing so was to establish a basis of comparison for the assessment of later events and changes. As this phase and the period leading up to it only ten years, it did not present major problems of selection.

The second phase (and the period leading up to it), however, cover a

fairly extensive period and therefore required a careful selection of themes. Here the strategy was to focus on the major components of the nationalist movement, namely migrant workers, Herero indigenous leaders, and intellectuals. These themes and their associated issues were selected on the basis of a number of criteria:

(1) A comprehensive analysis of secondary source material;
(2) a broad survey of state archival sources; and
(3) in-depth interviews with leaders of the nationalist movement.

While each of these sources has its limitations, it was felt that in combination they offered a broad enough overview from a variety of different perspectives. State archival material in particular was useful in identifying those organizations and movements considered a threat to the colonial state. Clearly not every file in the archives could be read, but the titles of files (where listed) served as a useful guide, and use was also made of the knowledge of archivists in identifying relevant material.

This approach to the study meant that a number of interesting issues and topics had to be sacrificed for the sake of a more thorough analysis of issues considered to be of greater importance. The decision to focus on indigenous leaders, contract labourers and intelligentsia as the major groups constituting the nationalist movement after World War II has necessarily meant the neglect of other groups and institutions which contributed to Namibian nationalism. One major area of neglect is related to the various church groups and religious movements in the territory. Of particular importance were the breakaways from the Rhenish Mission Society and the establishment of independent churches such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the *Oruuano* or Protestant

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Unity Church in the 1940s and 1950s. Although there was a degree of continuity between these churches on the one hand and the Nama and Herero indigenous leaderships and the African Improvement Society on the other, the role of these religious movements was of a different order from that of the three key groups which launched the nationalist movement in the 1950s.

Because of the prominent role of the Ovambos (contract workers) and Hereros (indigenous leadership and intellectuals) attention has been focused on these groups while the roles of other groups such as the Namas and Damaras have been relatively neglected. The structure of the thesis has also meant a bias towards urban politics and the neglect of rural politics during the second phase mainly because the major thrust of contemporary nationalist politics in Namibia has been in the urban areas. This does not of course mean that rural politics were irrelevant or even unimportant, but rather reflects a major shift in the direction of nationalist politics towards the urban areas after World War II. A similar shift in the focus of nationalist politics occurred in the early 1960s when the major nationalist leaders moved into exile and international issues assumed increasing importance. The final chapter of the thesis therefore concentrates on exile politics.

The basic structure of the thesis thus bears much in common with a pyramid in that the focus on themes and issues is progressively sharpened in order to accommodate major shifts in nationalist politics and to focus on specific and crucial issues. Thus the study starts out from a broad-based analysis of the political economy and resistance involving a wide range of groups and communities in both the rural and urban areas, including the reserves. The focus then narrows to two key ethnic groups,

the Ovambos who made up the greater part of the contract labour force, and the Hereros who played the leading role in resistance during the two major phases. From the mid-1950s the focus is again sharpened to concentrate on developments in the urban areas and more specifically on events related to the launching of the nationalist organizations. From 1960 the focus is narrowed still further in order to concentrate on exile politics and the relative performance of the two major nationalist groupings.

It is clear therefore that a number of topics and issues have had to be neglected. The neglect of these topics and issues do not necessarily reflect on their importance or relevance to the history of Namibian nationalism, but are rather a product of the limitations imposed by the scope and nature of the study. Given that Namibian history is relatively under-researched, it would be absurd for a single study to attempt to cover all issues relevant to the development of nationalism in Namibia. Nevertheless this discussion provides a number of pointers in respect of issues which require further research.

In conclusion, a few words need to be said about the sources used in this study. Although a relatively large range of sources were consulted, clearly there was a limit to the number of sources that could be used and the time that could be devoted to each source. For example, missionary and church archival sources represent one major area of neglect. Because of the extensiveness of these sources and the marginal relevance of their major concerns with religion and evangelization, it was considered more appropriate to concentrate on othermore directly relevant sources,[93] than to attempt a superficial and piecemeal study of church

and mission sources. These sources therefore represent another area which could be addressed by futher research.

The interviews conducted with nationalist and other leaders was also limited in some respects. For a number of practical considerations, interviewing had to be restricted to those persons within Namibia. As the majority of SWAPO leaders (and especially those who were involved in the nationalist movement prior to 1966) were still in exile, this represented a significant restraint. Furthermore persons involved in radical nationalist politics were understandably reluctant to discuss their political involvement and the strategies of their organizations. On the other hand, those leaders who were only marginally involved in politics at the time of the study or who had changed their political affiliations were the best sources of information. The study therefore relies rather heavily on SWANU and *former* SWAPO leaders. To compensate for these constraints, however, interviews were conducted in depth, in some cases extending over a number of sessions each, consisting of several hours of intensive interviewing.

To sum up therefore this study does not set out to provide a definitive political analysis or history of Namibian nationalism. At the most it aims to raise some pertinent issues relating to the rise of nationalism in Namibia and to clear some of the ground for the massive and challenging task awaiting future historians and political analysts.

Endnotes for introduction

1. See, for example, A. Giddens, *A contemporary critique of historical materialism: Vol. 1, Power, property and the state*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 182; D. Seers, *The political economy of nationalism*. London: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 9-12; A.W. Wright, 'Socialism and nationalism', in L. Tivey (ed.), *The nation-state: the formation of modern politics*. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981, pp. 148-68.

2. See, for example, E. Kamenka, 'Political nationalism - the evolution of the idea', in E. Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: the nature and evolution of an idea*. London: Edward Arnold, 1976, p. 3; F. Hertz, *Nationality in history and politics: a psychology and sociology of national sentiment and nationalism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, p. 1; W. Gungwu, 'Nationalism in Asia', in E. Kamenka (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 83; A.D. Smith, *Theories of nationalism*. London: Duckworth, 1971, p. 15.

3. T. Nairn, 'The modern Janus'. *New Left Review*, No. 94, 1975, p. 3.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Although differing slightly in emphasis, this definition is essentially the same as those offered by Ernest Gellner and Andrew Orridge. Gellner defines nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (E. Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 1. See also p. 43), while Orridge refers to nationalism as the "notion that there is or should be some intimate connection between broad cultural similarities and political organization" (A.W. Orridge, 'Varieties of nationalism', in L. Tivey, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40). See also R. Emerson, *From empire to nation*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, p.96.

6. Gellner, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

7. While a case may be made for seeing certain forms of "tribalism" or ethnic separatism as distinct from nationalism, this does not apply to all (or even a majority) of those movements which have been labelled "tribalist". Gellner, for example, distinguishes between "culture-mediated nationalism" and "structure-mediated tribalism", with the latter characterized by its emphasis on kinship and attempts to restore pre-industrial forms of community. However, he insists on the difference between this analytical distinction and that based on the "language of praise and invective". In this latter sense, "nationalisms are simply those tribalisms, or for that matter any other kind of group, which through luck, effort or circumstance succeed in becoming an effective force under modern circumstances. They are only identifiable *ex post factum*. Tribalism never prospers, for when it does, everyone will respect it as true nationalism, and no-one will dare call it tribalism." (Gellner, *op. cit.*, p. 87)

8. Thus far all significant attempts at unity broader than the territorial state have failed in Africa. Membership of and participation in the OAU, for example, is, with the exception of territorially-based liberation movements, also state-based.
9. Smith, *op. cit.*, 1971, pp. 15-21.

10. C. Young, 'Ethnicity and the colonial and post-colonial state in Africa', in R. Brass (ed.), *Ethnic groups and the state*. London: Croom Helm, 1985, p. 63. A notable exception to the trend of associating nationalism and the state is Anthony Giddens who favours a radical distinction between nationalism and nation-state. Without such a distinction, he argues, confusion is likely between the effects and interests of the state and those of nationalism as a largely psychological phenomenon. Giddens' approach, however, tends to depoliticize nationalism, reducing it to a psychological and cultural phenomenon involving "felt needs and dispositions" of communality. Giddens, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-195.

11. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 60-1.

12. E. Colson,'African societies at the time of the scramble', in L.H. Gann & P. Duigan, *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Volume I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 31.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

14. See chapter one, below.

15. See chapter eight, below.

16. Young, *op. cit.*, p 65.

17. See section two, especially chapters 5 and 7.

18. These issues are discussed in some detail in chapter eleven.

19. The role of education in the generation of nationalism will be examined in more detail below.

20. A.D. Smith, *State and nation in the Third World: the Western state and African nationalism*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983, p. 29.

21. C. Navari, 'The origins of the nation-state', in L. Tivey (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 31.

22. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

23. For a discussion of Witbooi's responses to the colonial state, see chapter one, below.

24. See, for example, chapter nine, below.

25. Abbé Siéyé quoted by Kamenka, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

26. Kamenka, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

27. Smith, 1983, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 50. For John Breuilly (*Nationalism and the state*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, pp. 1-2), for example, nationalism is a form of politics, and as politics is about power, and power in the modern world revolves around control over the state, nationalism

is therefore inextricably linked to the aim of controlling the state.

29. See, for example, M. Hechter, *Internal colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975; Nairn, *op. cit.*; E. Gellner, *Thought and change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964.

30. T. Nairn, *The break-up of Britain: crisis and neo-nationalism*. London: New Left Books, 1977.

31. Andrew Orridge, for example, argues that the causal links between nationalism and underdevelopment are tenuous. Nationalism has manifested itself in both less developed and more developed regions, as well as between regions which have no marked development differences. Furthermore, he cites examples of regions which are unevenly developed, but which are not characterized by distinct nationalisms. A.W. Orridge, 'Uneven development and nationalism: 2'. *Political Studies*, 29, 2, 1981, pp. 181-90.

32. *Ibid.*; A.D. Smith, *The ethnic revival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 39-40.

33. To associate nationalism directly with economic interests also creates difficulties in explaining the highly divergent ideological orientations of some nationalisms and the combination of diverse and often antagonistic class interests within the same nationalist movement.

34. Gellner, 1983, *op. cit.*

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-141.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-3.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-8.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-87.

41. Dan O'Meara, for example, has pointed to the dangers of taking nationalist ideology at face value and of therefore using ideologies as explanations. While the validity of such assertions are not in question here, it should be noted that O'Meara simply side-steps the issue of explaining why nationalists commonly resort to cultural emphases in their ideologies. Even if one accepts that such cultural emphases are merely means of disguising material interests, one is still left with the problem of explaining why this specific "disguise" or interpretation is so commonly used. (D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, 1934-1948*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983.)

42. Gellner, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

44. A. Swidler, 'Culture in action: symbols and strategies'. *American*

Sociological Review, 51, 2, 1986, p. 275.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 276-7.

46. Similar associations between cultural exclusion/isolation and disadvantage or poverty have been made from a variety of theoretical perspectives by social theorists working in the traditions of the culture of poverty, labelling theory and the theory of stigmatization. See, for example, O. Lewis, 'The culture of poverty', *Scientific American*, 215, 4, 1966, pp. 19-25; B. Schaffer, 'Policy makers have their needs too: Irish itinerants and the culture of poverty', *Development and Change*, 16, 3, 1985, pp. 375-408; G. Wood, 'The politics of development policy labelling', *Development and Change*, 16, 3, 1985, pp. 347-73; C.I. Waxman, *The stigma of poverty: a critique of poverty theories and policies*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.

47. Gellner, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

49. It is not the intention here to assert an identity between racism and racial nationalism. Although they may share certain similarities, the two phenomena are distinct. Racial nationalism is a form of nationalism (rather than a form of racism) in which racial, among other, criteria are used to de[illegible] popular unit seeking congruence with a state. Not all forms of [illegible] however, have this nationalist component, that is, they d[illegible] sarily aim to establish a congruence between people and state. [illegible]ore, African (racial) nationalisms are essentially a reaction to the or other form of original racism associated with colonial domination. Their orientations therefore differ from racism in that they are challenging, rather than attempting to construct, discriminatory and exclusionary social mechanisms. See discussion on exclusionary and usurpationary closure below.

50. D. Posel, 'Rethinking the "race-class debate" in South African historiography'. *Social Dynamics*, 9, 1, 1983, pp. 50-66.

51. M. Hechter, 'Group formation and the cultural division of labour'. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84, 2, 1978, p. 293.

52. R. Miles, 'Class, race and ethnicity: a critique of Cox's theory'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 3, 2, 1980, p. 185.

53. W. James, *Class and race: materialist methods*. Paper to annual conference of the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2-5 July, 1984, p. 12.

54. E. Laclau, *Politics and ideology in Marxist theory*. London: Verso, 1979, pp. 105 and 108.

55. D. Lockwood, 'Social integration and system integration', in G.K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds.), *Explorations in social change*. London: W. Routledge, 1964, pp. 244-57; N. Mouzelis, 'Social and system integration: some reflections on a fundamental distinction'. *British Journal of Sociology*, 25, 4, 1974, pp. 395-409; A. Giddens, *Studies in social and political theory*. London: Hutchinson, 1979, pp. 125-9; D. Mason, 'Race relations, group formation and power: a framework for analysis'.

Ethnic and Racial Studies, 5, 4, 1982, pp. 421-39; D. Mason, 'Nationalism and the process of group mobilization: the case of "loyalism" in Northern Ireland reconsidered'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 8, 3, 1985, pp. 408-25; J. Wickham, 'Translator's introduction', in C. Offe, *Industry and inequality*. London: Edward Arnold, 1976, p. 7.

56. That classes may be located at both levels of integration is clear, for example, from the depiction of classes as both positions and concrete social groups. On one level, the antagonism or contradiction between classes is vested in the positions classes occupy within the structure of production, rather than in the constituents of concrete groups. In this sense classes are conceived of as positions, and their nature is not altered by the constantly changing incumbents of such positions. On another level, however, positions can obviously not engage in class struggle or be conscious of class interests. Classes must therefore be conceptualized as both positions and groups, depending on the level of analysis.

57. Gellner, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

58. In this respect it also differs from class which is a relational concept. See E.O. Wright, *Class structure and income determination*. New York: Academic Press, 1979, pp. 5-8.

59. M. Weber, *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, edited and translated by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, p. 187.

60. *Ibid.* p. 191.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-8.

62. *Ibid.*, 190.

63. This is illustrated, for example, by Herero leader Hosea Kutako's evidence before the South West Africa Commission. Blacks, he said, were shot, hanged and beaten to death by whites in Namibia without the police or courts taking action. This, he maintained, was because whites had assigned blacks to the status of "kaffirs", and "kaffir meant beat to death". State Archives, Pretoria, K21, Archives of the Secretary of the South West Africa Commission, 1935, vol. 7, p. 479.

64. M. Weber, *Economy and society*, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. New York: Bedminister Press, 1968, p. 342.

65. F. Parkin, *Marxism and class theory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-4.

69. Robert Davies (*Capital, state and white labour in South Africa 1900-1960*. Sussex Harvester Press, 1979, p. 23), for example, has argued that white wage earners "employed as supervisors, in the state's repressive

or ideological apparatuses, or in mental positions within the circulation process or service sectors are members of the new petty bourgeoisie". However, without entering into a discussion of Davies' use of these criteria for delimiting classes, it is clear that he is unable to account for all white wage earners in terms of such criteria. Furthermore, Davies' analysis pre-empts a discussion of the origins of the differentiation between white and black wage labour. For example, the supervisory functions of most white wage earners, it may be argued, owes little or nothing to their class basis or to the capitalist mode of production *per se*, and everything to the racial structuring of the mode of production. It is also clear that the supervisory functions of white wage earners within a racial order is qualitatively distinct from the positions of supervisory and managerial personnel in non-racial systems, in that the distinctive structuring role of race is only present in the former situation.

70. Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

71. The very term "middle classes" is suggestive of gradational rather than relational terms of reference. For a recent and valuable contribution to the burgeoning debate about defining the "middle classes", see, for example, E.O. Wright, *Classes*. London: Verso, 1985. In an analysis which attempts to combine the Marxist and Weberian traditions, Wright identifies the "ownership of skill assets" as one of the bases of class exploitation. It is to his credit, however, that he expresses misgivings about seeing skills as the basis of a class relation. Instead, he suggests that it may be more appropriate "to treat skill exploitation as the basis of internal divisions within classes" (p. 95), a formulation which has much in common with the approach adopted here.

72. Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

73. D. Booth, 'Marxism and development sociology: interpreting the impasse'. *World Development*, 13, 7, 1985, pp. 761-87.

74. See, for example, S.M. Lipset and R. Bendix 'Social status and social structure: a re-examination of data and interpretations'. *British Journal of Sociology*, 2, 1951, pp. 249-50; K. B. Mayer and W. Buckley, *Class and society*. New York: Random House, 1970, pp. 47-8.

75. Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

76. S. Greenberg, *Race and state in capitalist development*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1980.

77. J.M. Paige, *Agrarian revolution: social movements and export agriculture in the underdeveloped world*. New York: Free Press, 1975.

78. See chapter eight, below.

79. A.D. Smith, *Nationalism in the twentieth century*. London: Martin Robertson, 1979, p. 114.

80. See chapter ten, below.

81. See chapter twelve, below.

82. J.S. Coleman, 'Nationalism in tropical Africa'. *American Political Science Review*, 48, 2, 1954, pp. 404-426.

83. Thus a "progressive" writer like Basil Davidson uses the terms to distinguish between different phases of anti-colonial resistance. B. Davidson, *Africa in modern history*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, pp. 150-153.

84. In particular theories of underdevelopment retained the evolutionary assumptions of modernization theory and normative interpretations of development and change: "Just as the process of modernisation is legislated by the models of sociology and political science, the notion of 'normal' capitalist development, realised in the centre but denied the periphery, encourages the conceptualisation of the latter in terms of a shortfall from the norm." H. Bernstein, 'Sociology of underdevelopment vs sociology of development?', in D. Lehmann, *Development theory*. London: Frank Cass, 1979, p. 92.

85. For examples, see A.B. Emmett, 'Popular resistance in Namibia, 1920-1925', in T. Lodge, *Resistance and ideology in settler societies, Southern African Studies, Volume 4*.Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986, p. 7.

86. For example, see M. Granovetter, 'The idea of "advancement" in theories of social evolution and development'. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 3, 1979, pp. 489-515.

87. Basil Davidson has argued that "there is no sense in considering the phenomenon of nationalism as being somehow apart from the responses of indigenous culture. In as far as nationalism has acquired real substance, this is because the masses have breathed life into it." B. Davidson, 'Questions about nationalism'. *African Affairs*, 76, 302, 1977, p. 44.

88. T.O. Ranger, 'Connections between "primary resitance" movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa, Parts 1 & 2.' *Journal of African History*, 9, 3 & 4, 1968.

89. The rather detailed treatment of the Bondelswarts and Rehoboth rebellions requires some explanation. Although these two rebellions form relatively discrete episodes in the diverse patterns of resistance of the 1920s, they were nevertheless tightly integrated into the more general traditions of resistance of this period. The significance of the Bondelswarts rebellion (and, to a lesser extext, the Rehoboth rebellion), for example, may be found in the fear they created of a general rebellion in Namibia and in the consequent brutal suppression of this seemingly insignificant rising. The rebellions also serve to illustrate in very concrete terms the general contours of colonial society, the racial system, the relationships between settlers, state and colonized, the key role played by settler agriculture and the strengths and vulnerablities of the colonial state. These rebellions and their suppression are also crucial for understanding political responses after 1925, and therefore in explaining the interrupted development of nationalist politics and consequent late emergence of a "fully-developed" nationalist movement in Namibia.

90. See chapter six, below.

91. T. Skocpol, *States and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 13-14.

92. See, for example, Z. Ngavirue, *Political parties and interest groups in South West Africa: a study of a plural society*, Ph.D thesis, Oxford University, 1973, pp. 274-283; EDU190, 742/7, 'Native education general: AMEC schools'; SWAA A48/25.

93. For example, state archival material was considered more relevant because the state was a party to the nationalist conflict.

Chapter one

ECOLOGY AND CONFLICT IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA

The relevance of ecology

Ecology occupies a central position in the unfolding drama of Namibian history. The struggle with the environment not only laid the foundations of forms of production and the socio-political organization of pre-colonial social formations, but also strongly conditioned the responses of settler farmers who entered the environment in direct competition with existing forms of production. The specific features of Namibia's natural environment have thus had a distinct impact on both the evolution of colonial policies and the developing conflict between colonizers and colonized.

In a critical review, John Tosh has argued that the major theories of agricultural production in Africa have not taken sufficient cognizance of environmental constraints and the restrictions imposed on African communities by the demands of food production:

> What passes for 'agricultural history' is all too often agrarian history with most of the agriculture left out.[1]

Although Tosh's article deals specifically with crop production in tropical Africa, his corrective emphasis is also applicable to the more arid conditions and predominantly pastoral economies of Namibia. In the drought-prone and ecologically fragile regions of south-western Africa, physical and economic survival is even more intimately linked with human strategies evolved to meet ecological and climatic contingencies. Namibia has the driest climate in Africa south of the Sahara.[2] It falls within the rain-deficient zones of Africa which extend as a broad band

over the northern and eastern parts of the continent, as well as covering a smaller area in the south-west. Some of Africa's poorest countries fall within these arid zones[3] and although Namibia, with its substantial mineral wealth, may be an exception to this general rule, agricultural production has, for the most part, remained marginal.

Physiographically, Namibia is dominated by a high, and in parts mountainous, plateau which extends over most of the central areas of the territory, with narrower projections jutting into the southern and northern parts. Marginal to the plateau are two other major physiographic regions, the Namib desert in the west and the sandveld of the eastern and northern areas. The Namib coastal belt, a narrow strip of desert between 130 and 60 kms in width, runs parallel to the Atlantic Ocean, extending along the entire coastline.[4] This region which has an average rainfall of less than 25 mm, supports very little vegetation, and has been described as "a barren desert, wholly unsuitable for any form of agriculture".[5] In contrast to the plateau and parts of the Namib, the sandveld areas are characteristically flat. The northern sandveld which lies in two distinct drainage basins, the Etosha and Okavango plains, has a higher rainfall than the eastern or Kalahari sandveld. However, the soils of the sandveld are less fertile than the plateau hardveld, and particularly in the eastern sectors are deficient in nutrients such as phosphates. The sandy soils of these areas also tend to absorb rainfall quickly so that surface water soaks away early in the dry season.[6]

The plateau and sandveld regions are in turn intersected and diversified by significant variations in rainfall and other sources of water supply.

Moving from north-east to south-west, the average rainfall decreases significantly while its variability increases. Thus while the Caprivi Strip and the Okavango region have a maximum rainfall of 625 mm, this decreases to 375 mm in the central areas, and between 250 and 50 mm in the extreme south.[7] In spite of these regional variations, nearly the whole of the territory is subject to prolonged and devastating droughts. Only the Caprivi and Okavango regions, which together accommodate less than 15 per cent of the total population, appear to be exempted from the more destructive effects of drought, which render food production and commercial agriculture marginal. For the greater part of the territory rainfall is both variable and unpredictable. An official report described Namibia as having

> no 'normal' rainfall as expressed by the mean annual amount of precipitation. What must be accepted in this connection is that *drought and floods are normalities*; also that there is no regularity in the occurrence thereof; no cycle or secular change can be worked out on the available data that will have any value in the planning of farm management.[8]

On the basis of annual rainfall figures for the years 1883/84 to 1959/60, Wellington calculates that southern and northern Namibia have experienced 34 and 30 years of drought respectively within the 77-year period.[9] Even in years of normal rainfall, seasonal variations in precipitation create "hunger periods" in which the nutritional value of grazing declines, leading to a weight loss of livestock unless they are provided with supplementary fodder. Even a slight deficiency of rainfall can be significant, because it can exacerbate deficiencies in subsequent years.[10] The timing and distribution of the rainfall is also of importance. Because of high rates of evaporation, early rains followed by an extended dry period may do as much damage to crops and grazing as a severe drought. Rainfall also tends to be unevenly distributed within

regions, so that the location of showers can determine the difference between normality in one area and drought in an adjacent or neighbouring area.[1] As most of Namibia's rainfall comes in convectional thunderstorms, heavy downpours can do extensive damage by sweeping away the topsoil.[12] Besides the problems associated with rainfall, Namibia also suffers from a scarcity of surface water. The territory is characterized by an absence of perennial rivers in the interior and high rates of evaporation linked to the hot and arid climate. Furthermore, subterranean water in some regions is characterized by a high level of salinity.[13]

These general ecological and climatic conditions have had important and far-reaching implications throughout the known history of the territory. For pre-colonial social formations, the characteristic response to ecological constraints was a high degree of physical mobility. This applied not only to the pastoralists and hunter-gatherers of the more arid central and southern regions, but, to a lesser extent, also to the more sendentary cultivator-pastoralists of northern Namibia and southern Angola.[14] The introduction of settled and commercial farming during the colonial period had enormous repercussions on pre-colonial patterns of migration, and therefore on food production.[15] Although even settler farmers resorted to moving their stock, by road or rail, during periods of drought, this option was gradually closed off by the occupation of alternative pastures by the 1940s.[16]

In order to meet the contingencies of ecology and climate, settler or commercial farming was heavily dependent on state aid and on extensive farming areas.[17] These strategies of survival in turn produced consequences at other levels. Extensive state aid to settler agriculture, had

the effect of increasing the commitment of the colonial state to settler farming, and allowed white farmers considerable influence in the formulation of colonial policies.[18] The extensive tracts of land required by settled stock farmers not only intensified conflict over land, but also made heavy demands on the territory's labour supply.

> With farm sizes ranging from 3,000 to 20,000 ha. (7,400-49,00 acres) the availability of labour becomes a matter of utmost importance to the farmer.[19]

It was estimated that in 1946 out of the total black labour force of 52 000[20] involved in the settler economy, 34 000 were employed on farms. However, in spite of these favourable conditions, settler farming has not escaped the devastations of periodic droughts, and its essential marginality has contributed extensively to the intensification of conflict in the territory.[21]

Pre-colonial economic and political divisions

Regional variations in rainfall and other water supplies have largely determined land usage in Namibia. Moorsom has distinguished four major agricultural zones in Namibia.[22] A mixed farming zone, where crop cultivation is combined with stock-raising, is located in the north-eastern parts of the territory. This zone comprizes only 6,5 per cent of the total land surface of Namibia. With a few minor exceptions where irrigation from natural springs or dams have allowed small-scale cultivation, the rest of the country is only suitable for stock-raising. The large-stock zone is more extensive and covers a large part of the central and northern areas of the country adjacent to the mixed farming zone. This zone has a rainfall of above 350mm which provides for the denser pasturage needed by cattle. However, the large-stock zone is differentiated by soil conditions which ensure better grazing in the plateau hardveld than

in the sandveld with its mineral deficiencies and high salinity. Between the large-stock and small-stock areas is a transitional zone, where limited cattle-raising may be combined with small-stock farming. The remaining small-stock area covers 30 per cent of the land area of the territory, including the whole of the plateau hardveld between Rehoboth and the Orange River. Here an average rainfall of less than 250mm provides pasturage which is too sparse for cattle.[23]

As previously stated, regional variations have also played a central role in the determination of pre-colonial forms of production and social organization. In pre-colonial Namibia the cultivation of crops was restricted to the northern areas, principally Ovamboland and the Okavango and Caprivi areas. Particularly in Ovamboland, mixed farming allowed for a greater concentration of population and for the evolution of more cohesive and centralized social and political structures. The central and southern regions of the plateau were dominated by pastoral groupings, although the more arid conditions and poorer pasturage of the south required both greater mobility and a heavier reliance on hunting and foraging as a supplement to stock-raising. In the peripheral areas of the Namib and the Kalahari sandveld, hunting and gathering predominated.

In terms of population figures alone, the Ovambos are the most important grouping in Namibia and maintained dominance over the northern sector of the territory. Estimates of the population of Ovamboland range between 46,5 and 53 per cent of the total population of the country.[24] While the rainfall of Ovamboland (400-550mm) is marginal to sub-marginal for the cultivation of crops, rainfall is supplemented by the overflow of the floodwaters of the Cuvelai River in southern Angola. These floodwaters,

known as the *efundja*, flow southwards through the flat terrain of Ovamboland by means of a network of shallow channels called *oshanas*.[25] The major crops are millet (*omahangu*) and sorghum. The combination of floodwaters and seasonal rains make possible both crop cultivation, and stock-raising which requires greater mobility. Food supplies of grain, milk and meat are supplemented by fruit, and fish brought down by the floodwaters. Intensive land-use and the relatively sedentary form of production allowed for dense settlement and more cohesive and centralized political structures in pre-colonial Ovamboland, which was dominated by a series of independent kingdoms.

The powers and functions of the Ovambo kings included the "ownership" and distribution of land, supreme administrative and judicial powers (under the supervision of a council of commoners), the determination of the planting season, the conservation of natural resources such as fruit trees and forests, and the exaction of military service. However, before the late nineteenth century surplus-appropriation was minimal and social mechanisms allowed for the redistribution of wealth. Production was organized around the extended family, and the sexual division of labour provided for the involvement of men in herding, hunting and heavy agricultural work, while women were responsible for cultivation, fishing and domestic work. The dense pattern of settlement, and the "thirstveld" which separates Ovamboland from the rest of Namibia afforded a degree of protection to the Ovambos against pre-colonial and colonial intrusions.[26]

Other "ethnic" groups in the northern sector of the territory have played far less significant roles in Namibian history than the Ovambos,

largely on account of their smaller numbers and their location in even less accessible parts of the country. Although under colonial rule a distinction has been made between the people living in Ovamboland and those who occupy the area along the Okavango River to the east, the latter consist of Ovambo communities which have developed independently of the main group in Ovamboland.[27] In spite of their ethnological similarities, the Okavango and Ovamboland formations are distinct in that the latter live in a region with a higher rainfall, are less densely settled than in Ovamboland and have therefore suffered less pressure on land resources.[28] The eastern Caprivi is populated by a variety of ethnic communities, the major groupings being the Masubia and the Mafue both of which are related to communities in Zambia. In the extreme west of the northern sector, the marginal Kaokoveld is inhabited by a diversity of groupings, including Herero sub-groups, such as the Ova-Himba and the Ova-Tjimba, Namas, Damaras, and San.[29]

The rest of the territory (which during the colonial period became known as the "police zone") was dominated by two major groupings, the Hereros and the Namas. Although they were challenged from time to time by Nama incursions from the south, the Hereros held sway over the prime hardveld areas of the central and northern plateau. Widely recognized as outstanding and dedicated cattle farmers, the Hereros maintained the most exclusively pastoral form of production in pre-colonial Namibia. Wagner maintains that the Hereros have "persistently clung to the pastoral mode of life", and in spite of repeated disasters which have resulted in heavy stock losses, have "displayed a proverbial skill in replenishing their herds after every major catastrophe."[30] As in other pastoral communities cattle played a central role in the economic life and social organization of the Hereros. Other forms of production such as crop

cultivation and the raising of small stock were regarded with disdain, and the Hereros were less reliant on hunting than the Namas. Social status was also largely determined by the size of a person's herd, and the authority of an *omuhona* (chief) was determined less by his following than by the number of cattle he owned.

A person who owned no cattle had little standing in pre-colonial Herero communities, and even today many urbanized Hereros maintain cattle in the reserves. Various religious and ideological prescriptions governed the acquisition and disposal of cattle. According to Wagner, for example, cattle were regarded as "more than just a material possession" and little value was attached to other goods.[31] Although during the mid-nineteenth century the Hereros appeared relatively willing to barter or sell their cattle, this was probably a result of the need for arms and ammunition created by the increasing incursions of Nama raiders into Hereroland during this period.[32]

As in other pastoral communities, intermittent migration was an essential feature of the Hereros' form of production. Although they established villages and family *werfts*, seasonal expeditions were undertaken with large herds and herding parties to distant cattle-posts. Land was not allocated for private ownership or use. Largely because of their physical mobility and communal ownership of land, the Hereros had no fixed idea of boundaries, and this was later to become a major source of conflict with settler farmers and colonial authorities:

> To the Herero ... boundaries are vague; in pre-European times the attitude was the chiefs' claim "where my cattle have grazed is Hereroland".33

During the pre-colonial period the Hereros lived mainly from the milk of

their cattle and from foraged veldkos. Little or no meat was eaten except on ceremonial occasions or when stock died.[34] Mobility and environmental constraints also conditioned the forms of social and political organization. Although the Hereros possessed a complex kinship system and displayed a greater degree of social cohesion than the Namas, their form of production required a wide dispersal of population and decentralized political authority. The latter was vested in the 'priest-chiefs' of which there appeared to be many in the pre-colonial formation.[35] A 'paramount chief' did not emerge until the colonial period, and then only as a result of direct colonial intervention.

Although the form of production of the Namas (or Khoi-Khoi) bore much in common with that of the Hereros, their pastoral activities were rendered more marginal by the arid conditions of the southern regions, and as a result they were forced to rely more heavily on strategies more commonly associated with hunter-gatherers. As in the case of the Hereros, the Namas regarded stock as personal property, while land was a communal resource to which all the members of the community had access. Boundaries also tended to be fluid. However, the marginality of their environment compelled the Nama to be even more mobile than the Hereros.[36] The Nama herds were smaller, and they relied to a greater extent on small stock. Constant mobility and the scarcity of water and grazing made necessary smaller migratory units than those of the Hereros. Furthermore, the Namas had a greater reliance on meat from their herds and from hunting, the latter providing an important supplement to pastoral activity. Finally the Namas can be distinguished from the Hereros by their greater dependence on raiding.[37] The marginality of the environment also found expression at the social and political levels, particularly in the relative lack of social cohesion and centralized authority

among the Nama groupings.[38] Political and judicial authority was vested in a chief or captain assisted by councillors and magistrates.

> In times of peace the powers of the chief are very limited. Without having consulted a mass meeting and without the decision of the councillors the instructions of a chief are of very little consequence. The form of government of a chieftainship is very democratic.[39]

Only in the case of war, were the captains allowed to assume absolute powers.

The marginal pastoral economy and fragmented socio-political structures of the Nama were not purely a product of ecological factors, but also of their proximity to white settlements in the Cape and the ripple effect this produced on the social formations of Namaqualand and southern Namibia. In general a distinction has been made between "indigenous" Nama groupings in Namibia, and the Oorlam or emigrant Khoi whose close contact with Cape settlers had resulted in their assimilation of elements of Boer culture. In response to pressures from white settlement in the Cape and the expansion of trade and agriculture, the Oorlams had begun moving into southern Namibia from about 1800. The origins of the "indigenous" Nama formations have not been firmly established, and Moorsom has suggested that they may have been the product of earlier migrations from the northern Cape.[40] Whatever the explanation of the origins of the "indigenous" Nama groupings, the penetration of Oorlam bands into the area during the nineteenth century had profound effects not only on Namaland, but on central and even northern Namibia. Not only did these incursions place further pressures on the meagre grazing and water resources of Namaland, but the Oorlams were instrumental in introducing guns and horses into Namibia and displacing pastoral forms of social and economic organization with the highly mobile 'commando'

dependent on hunting, raiding and trading.

As refugees from white expansion in the Cape, the Oorlams brought little stock with them and were therefore dependent on stock-raiding to establish themselves as pastoralists. Perhaps even more important, these immigrant bands had through their sustained contact with settler and trading communities in the Cape, become familiar with, and thus dependent on, the implements and trappings of Western trade and culture. They introduced innovations such as guns, horses and ox-wagons into Namibia, and their presence and impact on existing social formations attracted and helped to consolidate the positions of both traders and missionaries in the area.[41] Finally, the conflict generated between the different groups of Namas and Hereros for land and livestock, helped to create a political vacumn, a "no-man's land", in central Namibia. Into this vacumn moved first an immigrant "coloured group", the Basters, and later, and with more far-reaching consequences, the first colonizers of Namibia.[42]

On the margins of the dominant Nama and Herero social formations of southern and central Namibia, lived the Damaras and San, conquered groups which had been forced into the peripheral areas of the Namib and the Kalahari, or who had attached themselves to the Hereros and Namas as servants and dependants. Essentially both the San and the Damaras were hunter-gatherers, although the latter combined hunting and gathering with small-scale stock-raising and cultivation, trading and crafts such as iron smithing. Ambiguity and controversy surrounds the question of the ethnological origins of the Damaras. Although the Damaras speak the same language as the Namas the tendency among most historians and ethnologists is to see them as a distinct group, basing this distinction

largely on the negroid features and dark skin colour of the Damaras.[43] However, it has been argued that there is no evidence to suggest that the Damaras were ever a distinct community or formed a coherent group, before colonial authorities, ethnologists, and historians created a distinct identity for them.[44] While an investigation of the orgins of the Damara - who today form a relatively distinct ethnic stratum of the Namibian social formation - falls outside the scope of this dissertation, it is relevant to this study that the Damaras possessed very little social cohesion. Even the historian and ethnologist, Heinrich Vedder, who has written extensively on the Damaras as a distinct ethnic group, conceded in 1928 that

> no real tribal community exists amongst them and a chieftainship is unknown to them, every family of any size leading a separate life ..."[45]

The San had also been forced into the agriculturally peripheral areas, particularly the Kalahari desert areas along the eastern and north-eastern borders of present-day Namibia. Unlike the Damaras, they were exclusively hunter-gatherers, and because of the extreme aridity of the areas they inhabited, organized into small, highly mobile, and widely scattered hunting bands. In pre-colonial Namibia some of the San had attached themselves to dominant groupings like the Hereros and the Ovambos (and later the white settlers) as herders and servants. Each hunting band operated within a specific area, separated from other areas by "neutral" zones. Territorial boundaries were scrupulously observed even by closely related groups.[46]

Pre-colonial production and colonial conflict

Pre-colonial forms of production and their corresponding forms of social

organization have played an important, but little researched, role in shaping the relations between indigenous and colonizing groups. The dense settlement patterns and cohesive social organization of the Ovambos, for example, provided an important contraint on colonial penetration of the area. Initially settlement and colonial land appropriation was restricted to the more sparsely populated plateau regions, and particularly the large-stock areas of the northern and central plateau. This brought the white settlers into direct conflict with the Herero and Nama pastoralists of these regions. Although hunter-gatherer groupings were also affected by colonial penetration, particularly when white settlement began expanding into the more peripheral areas of the sandveld and fringes of the Namib, they were clearly less centrally involved in the colonial struggle than were the pastoral communities. The social cohesion of pre-colonial formations also appears to have played a role in the responses of indigenous grouping to colonial intrusion. The two most cohesive pre-colonial groupings, the Ovambos and the Hereros, have offered the most intense and consistent resistance to colonialism. The example of the Hereros is especially striking. In spite of concerted efforts by the colonial authorities to destroy the economic and political bases of this pastoral grouping (efforts which during the 1904-07 wars took on the dimensions of genocide), the Hereros were able to re-emerge in the 1940s and 1950s as the most powerful indigenous political force in the police zone, if not in the entire territory.[47] In contrast, the more dispersed and poorly integrated Damaras, who account for a slightly higher percentage of the population that the Hereros, have continued to play a peripheral role in the politics of resistance.

These broad-based generalizations are difficult to sustain, and require more detailed research and analysis. A more specific, and possibly more

fruitful, avenue of exploration is the relationship between conflict and specific forms of production. In particular, the inherent conflict between pastoralists and settler farmers is suggestive. Although the pre-colonial history of Namibia provides clear illustrations of the conflicts between pre-colonial forms of production, such as those between pastoralists and hunter-gatherers,[48] and those between specific groups of pastoralists,[49] none of these come near to matching the ferocity and single-mindedness of the conflict between pastoral groupings and white settler farmers, particularly during the early phases of colonial settlement in Namibia. To attribute the intensity of this conflict to the imperatives of capital accumulation, as some writers have attempted,[50] begs rather than answers the question, particularly if one bears in mind that the most intense and destructive colonial conflict, the 1903-07 wars, took place in a period preceding the penetration of the colony by significant capital interests.[51]

In order to expose the inherent contradictions between pastoralism and settled livestock farming, it is necessary to explore some of the basic characteristics of pastoral economies. In common with hunter-gatherers, pastoralists are characterized by "low overall human population density in relation to land, and high physical mobility".[52] These two forms of production share another common trait. Both hunter-gatherers and pastoralists have been regarded as remnants of archaic (and therefore inefficient) socio-economic systems, while their persistence has been seen as an irrational response and a barrier to "progress" or "development".[53] Such assumptions of course conceal evolutionary biases against pre-technological forms of production, which recent research has shown to be groundless.[54]

While prejudice against pastoral forms of production still exist among government planners and aid organizations, researchers are becoming increasingly aware of the economic rationality and "ecological fine tuning" of pastoral strategies.[55] Comparisons between pastoralists and commercial ranchers in Kenya, for example, have shown that in spite of the heavy capital and technological inputs in the latter, indigenous nomadic pastoral economies are capable of supporting 15 per cent more people on the land than are settled commercial farmers.[56] By means of high physical mobility, pastoralists are able to maximize the intake of the most digestible forage over large areas, leaving until last forage of low nutritive value. Pasture quantity and quality and water supplies vary considerably over both time and space in the arid climatic zones. In particular, grazing has greater nutritive value during the growing stage when plants contain a higher quantity of digestible proteins and carbohydrates. Pastoral mobility may also be related to a variety of other factors such as the need for mineral salts, avoidance of disease and predators, and the displacement of game (in many cases an emergency food supply for pastoral communities) from the most favourable pastures.[57]

On the basis of on-going research, Swift concludes that pastoral systems are ecologically more efficient than commercial ranching, even though pastoralists often share their environment with wildlife competitors for grazing.[58] In relation to extensive dryland agriculture, pastoralism has been shown to have lower land productivity, but higher labour productivity. Perhaps most important, however, is the resilience and stability of pastoral economies in extremely arid and fluctuating environments. During years of drought pastoralists tend to increase mobility over both time and space to compensate for deteriorating pasturage.[59] Besides

their strategies of mobility, pastoralists also compensate for environmental fluctuations by the expansion of their herds, sometimes beyond the carrying capacity of available pasturage. Konczacki argues that the stock accumulation and overstocking so often associated with pastoral economies, is a form of insurance or security against the disasters of drought and livestock epidemics. The larger the herd, the larger the number of animals that are likely to survive droughts and epidemics, and thus the greater the potential of recovery by rebuilding depleted herds. Pastoralists

> treat livestock as capital, and ... the harsh environment made it imperative on them to accumulate it.60

The imperatives of accumulation are probably also related to the reliance of such groupings as the Hereros on milk rather than meat, to the association between status and cattle ownership, and to the various ideological prescriptions attached to the disposal of stock.

This brief discussion of pastoral forms of production allows one to chart some of the points of conflict between pastoralists and settled livestock farmers. It will be argued that conflict between these two forms of production go beyond the mere competition for scarce resources such as land, livestock and labour, although clearly such competition is an essential component. The pastoralists' imperatives of mobility and stock accumulation intensified competition for land with settled farmers because both strategies were premised on the availability of large tracts of land. Different conceptions of land ownership and land boundaries are, however, also of vital importance. In common with pastoral communities in other areas, those in Namibia regarded land and water supplies as communal and open resources. Pastoral communities laid claim to those areas where their stock grazed or had grazed in the past.

However, both seasonal migrations and the use of peripheral reserve areas during periods of drought made for fluid and ill-defined boundaries. The contrasting emphasis of white settler farmers and colonial officials on private property and clearly demarcated boundaries provided considerable scope for conflict, not only in relation to differing concepts of the sale and use of land, but also in relation to delimitation and differentiation of privately-owned and communal grazing areas.

Conflicts between pastoralists and settler farmers were also likely to be exacerbated during periods of drought when available grazing and water resources were pushed to their limits. Under such conditions pastoralists required access to grazing and water supplies not needed during periods of "normal" rainfall, while settler farmers were hard put to defend the already over-extended resources of their privately-owned properties. In an environmental context like that in Namibia, where drought is a recurrent if not "normal" feature of climatic conditions, conflict may thus have been expected to reach unprecedented heights.

However, the basis of conflict between pastoral and settled systems of stock-raising go beyond differences in the definition of boundaries and conceptions of land ownership and usage. The underlying logic of these two forms of production are inherently incompatible and antagonistic, so that the survival of one system is dependent on the destruction or strictly-enforced limitation of the other. There are at least three reasons for this. While pastoral systems are based on unrestricted physical mobility, settled farming and private property are premised on the demarcation of clearly defined boundaries, on fencing, and on strict control over the movement of stock. Secondly, private property and

settled farming demand veld conservation strategies based on planned stocking and the strict limitation of stock numbers. These are diametrically opposed to pastoral strategies which emphasize the accumulation of stock as a compensatory mechanism against droughts and epidemics.

These two contradictions are in turn related to a third which revolves around the labour requirements of the two forms of production. It has already been noted that pastoralism has a high labour productivity. Although pastoral communities such as those of the Hereros and Namas drew on the labour of subjected groups like the Damara and San, they were essentially capable of functioning from internal labour resources. Labour inputs into stock rearing were economical in relation to settled or commercial ranching. For example, livestock was allowed to wander over fairly extensive areas, which of course provided another source of conflict with settler farmers because untended stock would wander onto private property and thus pose a threat to the grazing of settler farmers. Conversely, the straying of minimally-tended stock across government imposed boundaries and onto private property provided both temptation and pretext for wholesale confiscations by colonial authorities and land owners. In contrast, settler farmers with their need for stricter stock management and their lower ecological efficiency, were heavily reliant upon external labour inputs. This was particularly true in Namibia where the size of ranches made a large labour force necessary. Pastoral groups like the Herero were aware of the different labour requirements of indigenous and commercial farming strategies, and, as Vedder testifies, held the latter in some contempt:

> Labour in the European sense is unknown to the Herero. According to him the white man makes unnecessary work whereby he only worries himself and others; and he despises that.61

Although the labour requirements of settler farmers provided the most

enduring contradiction between indigenous and colonized communities, this should not detract from the importance of other contradictions, particularly during the early phases of colonization.

Similar contradictions existed between settler-farmers and hunter-gatherers, but as the hunter-gatherers occupied areas peripheral to those suitable for commercial ranching, conflict was less intense - although it was by no means absent.[62] The social organization of hunter-gatherers also made effective and concerted resistance difficult - and their most common form of retaliation to encroachment by other groups was thus stock theft. Furthermore, hunter-gatherers like the San and Damaras, had already been subjected by the dominant pastoral communities, so that the entry of another group of stock farmers into the area did not fundamentally alter existing patterns of conflict. As Margo Russel has argued in relation of Botswana, "the relationship between Kalahari Afrikaners and the Bushmen has been very similar to the relationship between Bantu peoples and Bushmen, not because the Boers have explicitly imitated Blacks, but because their circumstances as cattle-keepers have led them into similar solutions to the problems of co-existence with these hunters and gatherers".[63]

The major focus of conflict during the early years of colonial rule in Namibia was therefore with the two major pastoral groups, the Namas and the Hereros. That the greatest destruction of this conflict was wreaked on the Hereros is consistent with their occupation of the best cattle-rearing areas in the territory and with the purity and effectiveness of their pastoral form of production. With the exception of initial resistance to the establishment of political control by the colonizers,

conflict between 1884 and 1904 coalesced around the issues of land and cattle, and the undermining of pre-colonial forms of production in order to make room for the establishment of settler farming. As early as 1889 the German colonial representative in Namibia, Curt von Francois, argued that it was necessary to "crush" the Herero. He called for military reinforcements, arguing that the "larger the force the greater the benefits resulting from the capture of the sizeable herds of the Herero".[64] Similar views were expressed by his successor, Theodor Leutwein, who became the first governor of German South West Africa. In 1894 Leutwein complained to the Reich Chancellor that the Hereros were an obstacle to colonial development because they refused to sell land to white settlers, "but are only prepared to allow them to live there". Furthermore the Hereros were averse to selling their cattle and instead built up vast herds. Because the white settlers did not own the land they occupied, they did little to develop it and in consequence the progress of the colony was hindered.

> Besides, the colony's future depends on the gradual transfer of the land from the hands of the work-shy natives into those of the Europeans ... In being exclusively concerned with the enlargement of their cattle herds, the Herero are becoming unproductive for our trade and industry.[65]

Similar arrangements were envisaged for the transfer of livestock from indigenous owners to the settlers, so that the African population would eventually become a propertiless labouring class in the service of white enterprize. Leutwein's ambition was to transform the colony into "a cattle-raising country able to compete on the world market".[66] The colonial administrator had few illusions about what this would entail:

> (A)ny way you look at it, colonial policy is an inhumane thing. In the last analysis it can, after all, result only in the restriction of the rights of the native population in favour of the intruders ... Whosoever disagrees with this must be basically opposed to all colonial policy, a viewpoint

that is at least logical.[67]

The nature of German imperialism

The struggle between settler farmers and pastoralists was intensified by the economic marginality and political insecurity of the latter. The German settlers faced not only a harsh and unpredictable environment, but were dependent on a metropolitan government which was not fully committed to the colonial project and gave little in the way of financial and political support to its colonists, particularly in that crucial period that led up to the 1904-07 wars. In his influential study of German South West Africa, Helmut Bley puts the emphasis on administrative and legal policies as the major causes of the 1904-07 confrontation. In particular, he singles out "the fallacies underlying Leutwein's strategy" as leading "inexorably to the Herero and Namas risings of 1904".[68] Whether or not one agrees with Bley's emphasis, the policies of colonial administrators like Leutwein are only comprehensible within the broader context of the specific nature of German imperialism. Like any other colonial administrator, Leutwein chose from the limited range of options allowed him by the constraints of the situation.

Hans-Ulrich Wehler has argued that German imperialism was essentially a response to the social dislocations and disruptions caused in Germany by rapid industrialization and economic growth, and in particular by the depression following the economic crash of 1873. The drive for colonial acquisitions was intimately tied to attempts by the German government under Bismarck to legitimize its authority and divert attention from internal problems in a situation of increasing social tension and dissent.

The growing enthusiasm for colonial empire can surely be

> understood as a crisis ideology channelling the emotional tensions, the hysteria, and the growing frustration - which then, as later, accompanied periods of economic depression - towards a vague external goal. ...the 'colonial fever' often worked as a form of escapism from the socio-economic and political problems resulting from Germany's transformation into an industrial society.69

Building on and refining Wehler's theory of German social imperialism, Woodruff Smith has identified two major trends in German colonial ideology. One of these, the "emigrationist theory", saw colonial expansion as a solution to the massive emigration from Germany during the 19th century, and the creation overseas of an idealized, pre-industrial peasant society. "Economic colonialism" on the other hand envisaged no large-scale settlement, but saw colonialism as a means of protecting trade and providing the necessary food and raw materials for industrialization. During the depression of the 1870s, these colonial ideologies allowed a convergence of at least three major groups of interests in Germany. For the leaders of industry and finance, "economic colonialism" provided an ideological justification of demands for state assistance and intervention, precipitated by falling profit rates brought on by the depression. Mercantile interests in the tropics also favoured state intervention in order to compensate for their economic vulnerablity and to protect them against the encroachment of British and French merchants. Finally, for the lower middle class, threatened with a loss of status and possible proletarianization by the depression, colonial emigrationist ideologies provided an outlet for anti-industrial and anti-liberal sentiments. This convergence of ideologies allowed Bismarck to consolidate his position by drawing together these divergent interests,[70] but held a number of negative implications for the colonies. In particular, the competing demands of "emigrationist" and "economic" ideologies had the effect of deepening the ambiguities in Germany's

commitment to settlement.

Because the acquisition of the colonies was prompted by considerations which had more to do with conditions in Germany itself rather than with their intrinsic value, the commitment of the imperial state and the major classes in Germany to the colonies was minimal. As Wehler points out, Bismarck was wary of the financial, political and military liabilities of colonial possessions and would have preferred to hand over the colonies to syndicates of private interest.[71] However, enthusiasm for the colonial project soon waned, and Bismarck discovered that the trading companies had neither the means nor the intention of managing the colonies.[72] In spite of the dominant influence of the "economic" ideology on the central colonial administration, emigrationist ideologies continued to exercize some appeal, particularly in relation to South West Africa which, after an initial phase as a trading colony, was considered the most promising area for settlement.

Although attempts were made to encourage small-scale farming in the area, the German government continued to look to private capital to develop the colony.[73] However, as surplus capital was scarce in Germany and German investors cautious, more German capital flowed into the British than the German colonies. In order to induce the flow of capital to Namibia, the German authorities freely granted concessions for mining, railway construction and land settlement. The granting of concessions did nothing to aid settlement, and if anything was detrimental to the establishment of a secure white farming community in the territory. The land companies preferred not to sell their land to settlers, but rather hoped to profit from speculation. In those cases

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where concession companies were prepared to sell land, prices tended to be beyond the reach of most prospective settlers. As a result settlers were either compelled to buy land from the colonial government, or to acquire land directly from the African people. The latter course often consisted of simply occupying land on the fringes of tribal settlements. In an attempt to generate capital, one concession company, the Land Settlement Syndicate, proceeded to sell land to which it held no legal title.[74]

The incompatible aims of the emigrationist and economic versions of colonial ideology therefore not only helped to foster land disputes and other conflicts, but contributed to the general insecurity and marginality of settler agriculture in Namibia. Measures to curb the abuses of the concession companies and put settler agriculture on a more secure basis were only implemented after the 1904-07 wars.[75] The German settlers coming to Namibia during this phase lacked both capital and experience, and, in common with German administrators, approached agriculture with inappropriate and even romanticized European notions.[76] Most of the settlers were either small farmers from Bavaria or East-Elbian Prussia, or soldiers recently discharged from the *Schutztruppe*. The majority of both categories lacked capital to buy stock and implement the necessary improvements to their farms.[77] One of the guiding principles of German colonial policy was to keep expenses as low as possible, and state aid to settlement during this early phase was limited.[78] Settlers therefore often combined farming with trading, particularly in order to acquire stock for their farms.[79]

The nature of the colonial state

It has been argued that the insecurity and marginality of settler farm-

ers in German-South West Africa can be directly related to the specific ecological and climatic conditions of the territory and to the nature of imperialism. However, the attempt to resolve this insecurity by the creation of a rigid and repressive racial system can only be understood in relation to the interventions of the colonial state. It is therefore necessary to explore the nature of the colonial state and in particular the notions of sovereignty and territoriality which guided it.

From the beginning of Germany's colonial involvement in south-western Africa, German imperial ambitions were strongly influenced by notions of sovereignty derived from the European system of states. In spite of Bismarck's reluctance to assume direct responsiblity for the colony from the German Colonial Society, the *Allehochste Kabinettsorde* of 13 April 1885 stated that

> ...all measures of the German government aim at procuring the rights of sovereignty for the society in the territory placed under the protection of the empire between the Orange and the Kunene and at transferring its execution to the sovereignty of the empire.80

However, German control over the territory remained tenuous throughout the 1880s and early 1890s, and it was not until Theodor Leutwein assumed the governorship that the full implications of the emphasis on sovereignty became apparent. The historian Helmut Bley has attributed the new direction in colonial policy after 1894 to Leutwein's "personal disposition to think in terms of state authority",[81] but it is clear that, whatever Leutwein's personal inclinations, the concern with state supremacy was shared by the imperial government. Shortly before Leutwein's appointment, Chancellor Von Caprivi had announced an important change in German colonial policy which signalled a new commitment by Germany to

the colony:

> ...we wish to become masters of the country and to consolidate our sovereignty without bloodshed. We possess South-West Africa once and for all; it is German territory and must be preserved as such.82

The implications of state sovereignty were made even more explicit after it became apparent that German supremacy could not be attained without war. In 1904 the German jurist H. Hesse, for example, identified the struggle for control over land as the central cause of the Herero rebellion. "The price of victory will and must be the unconditional and absolute power of the Germans over the South West African soil", he wrote.[83]

> The nature of sovereignty is decribed by the sentence *quid est in territoria, etiam est de territorio*, i.e. whatsoever is in the territory is absolutely subject to the ruling state administration. This total subjection of the natives under the government of the empire has to be brought about in the course of the rearrangement of affairs in South West Africa, that is by abolishing all existing privileges.84

The unacceptability of European notions of sovereignty to black communities in Namibia is vividly illustrated in the diary of the Nama leader Hendrik Witbooi. At a meeting with the German commissioner, Von Francois, for example, Witbooi strongly rejected the idea of German "protection", a euphemism for sovereignty during this early period:

> It seems strange and impossible to me, and I cannot understand it. Each chieftain rules over his own people independently. It is he who governs his land and people. It is his duty to protect his people against any danger or disaster. It is for this reason that we have various kingdoms and each chief has his own people and land to govern. When, however, one chief is subordinate to another, the former is not independent.85

Witbooi went on to argue that Africa was "a country which belonged to our Red Chiefs". If an African chief was threatened and was too weak to

meet the threat on his own, then he should appeal to other Africans to help defend the territory. Africans, he maintained, belonged together and the political sub-divisions that existed between them were "trifling". That Witbooi's rejection of German sovereignty should take the form of what is arguably the earliest expression of nationalism in Namibia, is probably associated with his missionary education and his greater familarity with European conceptions of the state.[86] In spite of his clearer understanding of German colonial intentions, however, the political and economic organization of the Khowesin (Witbooi's people) was similar to that of other Nama communities and was therefore threatened in much the same way as other indigenous communities. Among the immediate threats faced by the Khowesin were German attempts to put a stop to raiding and the control that territorial boundaries afforded over the arms trade. Both of these threatened the political independence and livelihood of the majority of Nama communities. German military action against the Khauas in 1894, for example, had devastating effects on this Nama community. Bley argues that "not only had the chief been made liable to desposition, but no substitute was found for their nomadic life of raiding and hunting. Their whole tribal structure was shattered."[87]

For those communities which depended heavily on cattle raiding therefore, the application of European notions of sovereignty and territoriality was sufficient to undermine the basis of their economic existence. The ideas of sovereignty and territoriality were closely related to one another in the minds of the colonial authorities. This is illustrated, for example, by Leutwein's reference to the territorial unity of the colony when Witbooi demanded to know why he should sacrifice his

independence to German sovereignty.[88] The major sources of conflict in the period preceding the 1904-07 wars, however, centred on the establishment of boundaries and the inherent antagonisms between settler and pastoral forms of production. Ecological conditions, pastoral strategies, and the haphazard pattern of settlement combined to make the demarcation of boundaries a difficult task and a highly explosive issue. In particular pastoral strategies of mobility created fluid or ill-defined boundaries. Large tracts of "unoccupied" land were often kept in reserve for use during periods of drought. German settlers tended to regard such land as "ownerless" and therefore free for occupation. As Schrank points out, "a fundamental clash of concepts" was involved between the notions of private property of the settlers and the communal use of land by pastoral communities like the Hereros.[89]

Conflicts over territorial rights were not new to Namibia. What was new, however, was the existence of a sovereign state which took upon itself the right to determine and enforce boundaries between competing communities and to appropriate land which was not immediately occupied. Also alien was the notion of clearly demarcated and immutable boundaries in what had previously been a highly mobile and constantly changing situation. Moreover, besides being alien, the interventions of the state clearly favoured the interests of the white settlers above those of indigenous communities. Although Leutwein resisted settler demands for military action against black communities and for their immediate dispossession, his policies were guided by the assumptions that economic development depended on European enterprize and that a gradual dispossession of black communities was both inevitable and desirable.[90] Furthermore in the pursuit of state sovereignty, the creation and manipulation of internal boundaries provided an ideal instrument for the

containment of black communities. This manipulation of political space was premised on the state doctrines of sovereignty and territoriality, and finds its clearest expression in policies of divide and rule, the establishment of boundaries between white settlers and pastoral communities, the creation of reserves, and the drawing of a rigid boundary between the police zone and the northern territories.

Adding to the complexity of the boundary issue was the existence of a substantial strip of unused or "no-mans" land between the major Nama and Herero groupings, which was largely a product of pre-colonial struggles for dominance between these two groupings. The German colonial authorities had taken advantage of the temporary vacuum created by the Herero-Nama conflict to establish their administrative and military headquarters in this strip. In turn the security provided by the presence of the colonial forces and the existence of unoccupied land, both attracted white settlers and prompted the Hereros to move their herds further south. In order to secure further land for settlement and to create greater security of tenure for the settlers, it was imperative for the colonial authorities to establish clear and stable boundaries.[91]

The colonial administration therefore entered into negotiations with the Herero chief Samuel Maharero, and in 1894 Leutwein and Maharero agreed to the demarcation of a southern boundary for Hereroland. However, as Maharero had no authority to act on behalf of all Herero communities in Namibia, the boundary was not accepted by all Herero groupings, particularly by the eastern tribes whose land claims were most seriously affected by the arbitrary delineation of the boundary. The colonial authorities repeatedly sent in troops "to drive out Herero cowherds from

European land that was being despoiled".[92] In order to force the Hereros to respect the boundary, provision was made for the confiscation of five per cent of all cattle that crossed the boundary. Maharero was to receive half the profits of the sale of such cattle. The provision for the confiscation of cattle was implemented in the latter half of 1895, and by March 1896 had precipitated a rebellion by the Eastern Hereros under Kahimema and Nikodemus.

The secondary sources on this phase of Namibian history tend to place the emphasis on political factors such as the rivalry between Samuel Maharero and other Herero chiefs, and colonial policies of divide and rule,[93] and do not allow for an adequate analysis of underlying economic conflicts. There are, however, some suggestive pointers. For example, the revolt of the Eastern Hereros occurred towards the end of the 1885/86 season, during which the southern sector of the territory experienced one of its lowest recorded annual rainfalls.[94] Although the secondary sources are silent on this point, it is likely that the drought put pressure on existing Herero grazing areas and thus increased frontier violations. Furthermore, as Bley points out, it was unlikely that the Hereros would observe the frontier without a reduction in the size of their cattle herds. The size of the Herero herds also kept down the price of livestock, providing yet another obstacle to settler farming.[95] Both the confiscation of Herero cattle which crossed the boundary and the consequent revolt served to reduce the numbers of Herero-owned cattle, as the revolt was used as a pretext for further confiscation of livestock.[96]

That the issue of boundaries between settled farmers and pastoralists played a crucial role in bringing about the Herero rebellion of 1904 is

strongly suggested by the assessment of the missionary Mayer of Otjimbingwe:

> As the main reason for the Herero revolt, the land question and the credit nuisance have to be regarded. The consequences followed promptly. One piece of land after the other was lost to the Herero nation, and it was felt its existence was being threatened. *As long as the people could still freely move with their cattle, no friction occurred. But the land owners finally made use of their right and often asked them to stay within their boundaries.* These were drawn so *narrow*, however, that the natives grew afraid. ... The biggest and best portions of usable land were already in the hands of the whites; the *remaining lands were scattered and poor.*[97]

In the build-up of tension over the frontier, many of the settlers strongly favoured military action against the Hereros. In January 1896, only two months before the revolt of the Eastern Hereros, Leutwein called a meeting of settlers in Windhoek after farmers in the frontier area had threatened Herero headmen with war. At this meeting the farmers made it clear that they favoured a "military solution" to the frontier problem. With the support of the more established traders, whose commercial interests would be threatened by a war, Leutwein was able to rally sufficient support for the alternative strategy of negotiations. However, the following day more than half of those who had been present at the meeting withdrew their support for a peaceful solution of the frontier problem.[98] Until the outbreak of the 1904-07 wars, settler interests continued to agitate for military action against the indigenous population.[99]

Colonial society after the 1904-07 rebellions

When war with the Hereros and other indigenous groupings in Namibia finally came in 1904, it erupted with such ferocity that an estimated 80 per cent of the Hereros, 50 per cent of the Nama and 30 per cent of the

Damaras perished.[100] The 1904-07 wars not only resulted in a calamitous loss of life, but drastically reshaped colonial policy.

> The demographic, social and political effects on the tribes who took part in the war were devastating. It was a catastrophe, caused not only by the effects of the war but by German measures during the war and the native policies of the post-war years.[101]

Already in 1904, during the first phase of the wars, the German colonial authorities were aware of the implications of the racial struggle that had erupted. With all that had happened, it would be "very difficult for blacks and whites to co-exist unless the former are kept in a state of forced labour, i.e. a state of quasi-slavery", the Chief of the Army General Staff in the colony reported. "The racial struggle that has erupted can be brought to an end only by destroying one side or reducing it to serfdom."[102]

With the end of the war in 1907, the land and livestock of all black groups which had participated in the rebellions was confiscated. Only those blacks, such as the Rehoboth Basters, the Damaras and the Berseba Namas, who had stayed out of the wars as a group, were allowed to retain their land and stock. The one exception to this general rule was the Bondelswarts who had negotiated a treaty with the Germans at the beginning of the Herero rising, and were allowed to retain a small part of the area that they had occupied before the wars. The post-rebellion measures drew a clear legal distinction between 'whites' and 'natives'. 'Natives' could only obtain land rights if they had the permission of the governor. The governor's permission was also needed to breed cattle or keep horses. During the remainder of the German period no new land passed into the possession of blacks, and individual exceptions to the ban on stock-breeding were allowed only after 1912.[103]

The regulations further made it compulsory for all Africans above the age of fourteen to carry passes. Any African without a pass would be refused food, lodging or any other assistance, and could be arrested by any white person. In addition to this pass, blacks were also required to carry a 'service book' into which their labour contracts were entered. Those without labour contracts were without any legal rights, and could be punished as vagrants.[104]

Besides laying the groundwork for forced labour in the colony, the regulations aimed at destroying the social and political organization of the indigenous people. Not only were the chieftainships of the various defeated indigenous communities abolished, but it was also laid down that not more than ten black families could live together on one plot. Black settlement would be arranged in such a way as to serve settler needs and to preclude any form of tribal regrouping.[105] Complete expropriation took place in spite of a *Reichstag* resolution to allow the Hereros enough land and cattle to be self-sufficient. The confiscation of land and cattle was justified in terms of the needs of settlement policies, and to compensate settlers for damages caused by the war.[106]

At the basis of these post-war policies were the economic interests of the settlers, and in particular the settler farmers. Although in 1911 there were only about 1 000 farmers in a total white population of 14000, this minority held enormous political sway in the territory, particularly in the shaping of colonial labour policies. Bley maintains that demands for self-government "were intimately connected with the farmers efforts to achieve pre-eminence over the rest of the European population".[107]

> The farmers' campaign for supremacy reached absurd proportions as they became aware that they would always remain a

> minority. Their political activism revealed itself not only in their aggressive debates on the various local committees, but in a lengthy and impassioned press campaign, in renewed struggles for control of the Press, and in tensions within their own organisations...108

In order to bolster their claims for dominance within the colonial community, the farmers maintained that, with the possible exception of craftsmen, they were the only productive element within the settler population. "Shop-keepers, traders, and publicans were a group 'living only by trade and alcohol, not being usefully productive. They merely consumed what others produced'."[109]

These claims received some recognition from the colonial authorities. In 1908, for example, Governor Schuckmann declared in an address to the Governor's Council that the

> prosperity of the country is dependent ... primarily on the success of our farmers, and secondly on the growth of mining.110

The farmers, however, were not satisfied with such concessions, and continued to press their claims. The reasons for the extremity of the farmers' demands are to be sought not only in their economic marginality and political and military insecurity, but also in the failure of the drastic measures adopted during and after the war. The high expectations that had been vested in the "military solution" before the 1904-07 wars, failed to materialize following these wars. Neither the military policy of genocide, nor the forced labour regime that followed it, produced the stability for which the settlers had hoped.[111] The settlers had clearly envisaged the creation of a stable class-structured society with the indigenous population as a dispossessed proletariat. However, the creation of a proletariat requires not only a dispossessed population, but also the generation of new skills and values. New social and political institutions have to be forged in place of the disrupted pre-capitalist

institutions in order to incorporate, and thus stabilize, the emerging proletariat. Most important, existing economic structures must be capable of absorbing and maintaining the labour that is shaken loose from the pre-capitalist countryside.

None of these conditions were present in the German colony after the rebellions. With the exception of the diamond mines, no strong industrial sector had emerged in Namibia. The mines were able to absorb only a small proportion of the labour force, and sharp fluctuations in the prices of minerals, and in particular diamonds, created the need for a migrant rather than a fixed labour force.[112] While settler agriculture had the greatest labour needs,[113] it was, for the most part, incapable of sustaining a wage labour force, particularly following the destructive impact of the war on the settler economy. It was only through extensive state assistance that a general bankruptcy of settler farmers was averted after the wars.[114] Farmers faced a variety of problems, including high capital costs, inadequate transport facilities, inadequate water supplies, drought, and shortages of livestock, food and building materials.[115] They also lacked appropriate farming experience. Many of them were former soldiers who had been offered farms at the end of their military service in the territory.[116] Although state assistance in some ways compensated for these difficulties, it sometimes also proved counter-productive by encouraging people without the necessary financial resources to become farmers.

> Building up a farm on insufficient or borrowed capital meant that quick success had to be sought. Patient, pioneering labour was not possible when creditors had to be kept at bay. This increased still further the demands for effective state assistance, and bankruptcy caused resentment against the state.117

However, the settlers' dependence on the state went beyond economic

assistance. Without the backing of the political and military power of the state, settler agriculture was incapable of maintaining its labour force. Following the Herero-Nama wars, "farm-work did not provide an adequate livelihood for a workman and his family".[118] In 1912 the demographer, Johannes Gad, conducted a survey of central Hereroland which contained some of the best grazing lands in the country. Gad found that although food rations made up a substantial part of farm labourers' wages, in 75 per cent of cases the food provided fell well below what was then regarded as a minimum calorific and protein intake. Farm labourers were thus forced to supplement their rations by scavenging, hunting, cattle-stealing, cattle-poisoning and the collection of carrion.[119]

Low wages were not purely a product of capitalist avarice. Namibia during the early 20th century was, in Bley's words, a "fluctuating society", with both blacks and whites constantly on the move in search of new economic opportunities. The economic existence of farmers was particularly tenuous. Many were forced to give up their farms on account of accumulated debts, while others found that they were unable to make a profit without considerable capital investment.

> The farmers in SWA were ... fundamentally short of capital. They therefore had to limit their expenditure, particularly on their labour force. They were constantly short of cash to pay wages, and were primarily concerned to cut down their deficit and save up for new investments in their farms. In the second phase of building up a farm - a period of consolidation - additional investments were needed to lay the foundations of the farmers' social status.[120]

In order to avoid cash payments, farmers attempted to substitute cash wages with food or payment in kind. This practice continued well into

the mandate period. Particularly during the drought and post-war recession of the early 1920s, there were frequent complaints that the wages of farm labourers were paid in kind, that wages were far too low, and that in some cases no payment was made at all.[121] The farmers' inability to sustain a wage-labour force did not lessen the need for labour. From 1904 the country experienced severe and chronic labour shortages. For the mines, railways and military which could afford to compete with wages outside the territory, the solution was to import labour.[122] For the farmers, who could not compete with wages outside the territory, however, the only solution was to call for a greater share of political power and for the use of even more force on labourers. A farmers' conference in 1909, for example, demanded an "increase in the police force, more sweeping powers to use firearms against natives, (and the) transfer of police duties to trustworthy farmers..."[123] From 1907 every white had the right to exercize private police functions over blacks, and corporal punishment inflicted by the police on black servants increased dramatically. Moreover, farmers arrogated to themselves the right to punish their labourers themselves, a practice euphemistically called "parental chastisement", but which sometimes involved masters beating their servants to death.[124] Towards the end of the German period, the colonial authorities began to fear that the brutality of white employers against their servants would give rise to "a new uprising born of sheer desperation".[125]

This increasing brutality was in large measure a product of the contradictions and strains, in short the unworkablity, of the labour system imposed after 1907:

> The Germans learnt ... that although they could dictate external circumstances they could never achieve the total control over people that they needed. The security they had

> hoped for did not materialise: all that was left in SWA were totalitarian tendencies imposed by the German masters, which finally poisoned all human relationships.126

However, not even the most brutal repression could ensure total control, because in the long run the adoption of extreme measures tended to defeat its own purpose.

> The Africans were ... always ready to escape into the bush ... since they might as well starve there as in European employ.127

Although both settlers and colonial authorities were aware of the contradictions in the labour system, they were unable to affect the necessary changes. "We all know full well that it is pointless to accept a native workman who is compelled to apply to us for work", a member of the Territorial Council argued in 1908. "The employer must recruit his own workmen; he must find opportunities of talking and negotiating with them so that they come voluntarily to work."[128]

The futility of such suggestions in the context of a system which precluded the payment of liveable wages and which was heavily dependent on military force, must have been apparent even to this speaker, who went on to support the labour laws, and to argue that any "circumstance which promotes the independence of the natives increases their power and will have to be paid for with European blood."[129] In 1907 a colonial official, Captain Kurt Streitwolf, was dispatched to Bechuanaland to attempt to induce the Hereros who had fled there to return to Namibia. It is hardly surprizing that Streitwolf's mission failed, but some of the responses he received from the Hereros provide insight into black perceptions of conditions in Namibia in the post-rebellion period. For example, one Herero told Streitwolf that he feared to return to Namibia because neither the Germans nor the Africans would ever forget the war:

> What should he do in our land where he could perish from fear, where he could be shot down like a Klippbock, where he could no longer have a weapon? When I asked him whether he had fear of me or of the Governor, he said no, that he had fear of the entire country.[130]

Towards the end of the German colonial period, attempts were made to create centres for future black reserves, and the ban on cattle raising was relaxed.[131] However, the labour system remained intact, and settlers continued to argue that "any decrease in the German forces would undoubtedly be seen by the Hereros, the Hottentots, and the Bastards as a signal for them to unite and make another attempt to win back their former rights from their hated usurper."[132]

The destruction of pre-colonial institutions was not limited to the economies of indigenous groupings, but extended also to their social and political structures. As the settler leader, Conrad Rust, pointed out, "the destruction of the tribes had left behind a social vacuum that the labour organizations had done nothing to fill ... (L)ow productivity ... was a product of the African's social situation. Even the Nama, who were generally reckoned to be economically worthless, acted quite differently in other circumstances, for instance in the Cape Colony".[133] As Bley implies, the failure of a new form of social integration to emerge following the destruction of the tribal system, not only precluded the emergence of a proletariat (in any meaningful sense of the word), but might also have strengthened ethnic or tribal allegiances. In the absence of alternative sources of social security, Africans had no alternative but to attempt covertly to revert to former tribal structures and customs. In spite of the repressive measures of the colonial authorities,

> there was a persistent and secret movement among African to reassemble. This was especially true of the Herero. They

> left the labour camps in the south and on the coast and slowly collected in their former areas.134

The former leaders stealthily took up their old positions of authority, assuming new names which they frequently changed. Hereros and Namas also turned increasingly to Christianity which provided a degree of social security as well as the only legal means of expressing solidarity. Although the settlers and colonial officials were aware of these developments, they were unable to prevent such regrouping.

The contradictions of the German colonial period were inherited by the South African regime which took over the administration of Namibia during World War I, and continued to play a major role in the evolution of colonial policies in the territory after 1915. Under South African rule a limited reconstitution of the tribal system was allowed, provision was made for the establishment of reserves, and blacks were allowed, within strictly defined limits, to own livestock. However, within the context of the colonial society that emerged from the destruction of the 1903-07 wars and the aims of the new colonial authorities, these changes generated contradictions of their own, which were to create new insecurities and conflicts within the dominant colonial classes.

End notes for chapter one

1. J. Tosh, 'The cash-crop revolution in tropical Africa: an agricultural reappraisal'. *African Affairs*, 79, 314, 1980, p. 80.

2. R. Moorsom, *Transforming a wasted land*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1982, p. 11.

3. Z.A. Konczacki, *The economics of pastoralism: a case study of subtropical Africa*. London: Frank Cass, 1978, pp. 1-6.

4. Republic of South Africa, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, 1962-63* (subsequently Odendaal Report), R.P. 12-64, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1964, p. 13.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 21; Moorsom, *op. cit.*, p. 11; J.H. Wellington, *South West Africa and its human issues*. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 17-22.

7. Republic of South Africa, Odendaal Report, p. 267.

8. Quoted in Odendaal Report, p. 17. On the other hand, Moorsom (*op. cit.*, p. 14) maintains that there is "a broad 15-year cycle of severe and prolonged droughts...."

9. Wellington, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

11. Moorsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

12. Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

13. Republic of South Africa, Odendaal Report, p. 19; Moorsom, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Wellington, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 and 81.

14. See, for example, J.R. Dias, 'Famine and disease in the history of Angola c. 1830-1930', *Journal of African History*, 22, 1981, pp. 349-378; J.C. Miller, 'The significance of drought, disease and famine in the agriculturally marginal zones of West-Central Africa'. *Journal of African History*, 23, 1982, pp. 17-61. See also chapter 8, below. Moorsom (*op. cit.*, p. 15) estimates that droughts and floods have affected Ovamboland in 63 of the past 105 years.

15. Some of these issues will be examined in greater detail below. See also chapters 8 and 9, below.

16. See, for example, Wellington, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44.

17. It has been argued that in spite of massive state aid, commercial agriculture in Namibia has failed to establish itself as a viable economic enterprize and has remained "essentially parasitical" on other sectors of the economy. See W. Schmoekel, *The myth of the white farmer: commercial agriculture in Namibia, 1900-1983*. Paper presented at 26th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Boston: Massachu-

setts, December 7-10, 1983.

18. See chapters 3 and 8, below.

19. Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

21. See below, chapters 1 and 3.

22. Moorsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-14; Wellington, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-101.

23. Moorsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-14.

24. M-L. Siljunen, 'The land and its people', in R. Green, M-L. Siljunen and K. Siljunen (eds.), *Namibia, the last colony.* Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1981, p. 27; R. Moorsom, 'Labour consciousness and the 1971-72 contract workers strike in Namibia'. *Development and Change*, 10, 2, 1979, p. 207.

25. Moorsom (1982), *op. cit.*, p. 14; Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

26. R. Moorsom, *Colonisation and proletarianisation: an explanatory investigation of the formation of the working class in Namibia under German and South African Rule to 1945.* MA thesis, University of Sussex, 1973, pp. 14-17; Wellington, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142; G. Clarence-Smith and R. Moorsom, 'Underdevelopment and class formation in Ovamboland, 1844-1917', in R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds.), *The roots of rural poverty in Central and Southern Africa.* London: Heinemann 1977, pp. 98-99. See also section three, below.

27. Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

28. In 1970, for example, it was estimated that while nearly 34 000 Ovambo households were forced to find a livelihood outside of agriculture, the Okavango region could have accommodated an additional 18 000 families. R.J. Gorcm, *Mines, masters and migrants: life in a Namibian compound.* Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977, p. 32.

29. M-L. Siljunen, *op. cit.*, p. 28; Wellington, *op. cit.*, p.145.

30. G. Wagner, 'Some economic aspects of Herero life'. *African Studies*, 13, 3/4, 1954, p. 118.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 130. The accounts of traders who penetrated Hereroland towards the end of the 18th century indicate that the Hereros were at this time adamantly opposed to trading their cattle. See, for example, H. Vedder, 'The Herero', in C.H.L. Hahn, H. Vedder and L. Fourie, *The Native Tribes of South West Africa.* Cape Town: Cape Times, 1928, p. 157.

33. Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 145. See also Vedder, *op. cit.*, p. 155; Moorsom (1973), *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

34. Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 147; Moorsom (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 18; Vedder, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

35. See, for example, Vedder, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

36. *Ibid.*, p.147; Moorsom (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 21.

37. Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 118. See also Moorsom (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 21 and Vedder, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

38. See, for example, Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

39. Vedder, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

40. Moorsom (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 20. For a succinct and competent analysis of the impact of the Oorlams on southern and central Namibia, see B. Lau, 'Conflict and power in nineteenth-century Namibia', *Journal of African History*, 27, 1, 1986, pp. 29-39.

41. Lau, *op. cit.*; A. Kienetz, 'The key role of the Orlam migrations in the early Europeanisation of South West Africa (Namibia)', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 10, 4, 1977, pp. 553-572.

42. See below.

43. See, for example, H. Vedder, 'The Berg Damara', in Hahn, Vedder and Fourie, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-77; Wellington, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.

44. B. Lau, *A critique of the historical sources and historiography relating to the 'Damaras' in pre-colonial Namibia*. Honours dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1979.

45. Vedder, 'The Berg Damara' *op. cit.*, p. 42. See also pp. 43-44.

46. See, for example, L. Fourie, 'The Bushmen of South West Africa', in Hahn, Vedder and Fourie, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

47. See, for example, chapter 11, below.

48. For example, the practice of Damara hunters to burn large sections of the veld in order to attract game, was a major source of conflict with the pastoral Hereros who believed that indiscriminate veld-burning would threaten their herds. See Vedder, 'The Berg Damara', *op. cit.*, p. 43; Moorsom (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 22. Stock-theft was also a major source of conflict between pastoralists and hunter-gatherers.

49. For the greater part of the 19th century Nama and Herero pastoral communities were involved in a succession of conflicts, largely over land and livestock resources. See, for example, I. Goldblatt, *History of South West Africa from the beginning of the nineteenth century*. Cape Town: Juta, 1971; H. Vedder, *South West Africa in early times*. London: Frank Cass, 1966.

50. See, for example, D. Innes, 'Imperialism and the national struggle in Namibia', *Review of African Political Economy*, 9, 1978; R. Green and K. Kiljunen, 'The colonial economy: structures of growth and exploitation', in Green, Kiljunen and Kiljunen (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 30-58; South West Africa People's Organisation, *To be born a nation: the liberation struggle in Namibia*. London: Zed Press, 1981.

51. The production of copper at Tsumeb commenced in 1906 and diamonds were discovered on the Namib coast in 1908.

52. J. Swift, 'The future of African hunter-gatherer and pastoral peoples'. *Development and Change*, 13, 1982, p. 159.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168; M.G. Guenther, 'Bushmen hunters as farm labourers'. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 11, 2, 1977, pp 202-203; Wagner, *op. cit.*

54. For a general critique of evolutionary social theory, see M. Granovetter, 'The idea of "advancement" in theories of social evolution and development'. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 3, 1979, pp. 489-515. For more specific studies dealing with San hunter-gatherers, see, for example, R.B. Lee and I.DeVore, *Man the hunter*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968.

55. Swift, *op. cit.*, pp. 159 and 167.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 163. See also D. Western, 'The environment and ecology of pastoralists in arid Savannas'. *Development and Change*, 13, 1982, pp. 183-211.

57. Western, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-193.

58. Ecological efficiency is defined here in terms of "food chain efficiency", ie. the food consumed by animals as a proportion of the food available. Swift, *op. cit.* p. 164. See also Western, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-198.

59. Swift, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165; Z.A. Konczacki, *The economics of pastoralism: a case study of sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Frank Cass, 1978, p. 24.

60. Konczacki. *op. cit.*, p. 44. See also pp. 29-33 and 40-47.

61. Vedder, 'The Herero', *op. cit.*, p. 183.

62. See, for example, chapter 6, below.

63. M. Russell, 'Slaves or workers? Relations between Bushmen, Tswana, and Boers in the Kalahari'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2, 2, 1976, p. 179.

64. H. Drechsler, *'Let us die fighting': the struggle of the Herero and Nama against German imperialism (1884-1915)*. London: Zed Press, 1980, p. 44.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

66. G.I. Schrank, *German South West Africa: social and economic aspects of its history, 1884-1915*. Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 1974, p. 99.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

68. H.Bley, *South West Africa under German rule 1894-1914*. London:

Heinemann, 1967, p. xviii. See also pp. xvii-xix and 99-104.

69. H-U. Wehler, 'Industrial growth and early German imperialism', in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the theory of imperialism*. London: Longman, 1972, p. 85.

70. W.D. Smith, 'The ideology of German colonialism, 1840-1906'. *Journal of Modern History*, 46, 1974, pp. 641-662.

71. Wehler, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

72. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 652.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 655-660.

74. Schrank, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-94 and 127-129.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94; A. Kienetz, *Nineteenth century South West Africa as a German settlement colony*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1970.

77. Schrank, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.

78. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Schrank, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

79. See, for example, Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 76; Wellington, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-192. In order to build up their herds as quickly as possible, many of these traders indulged in "sharp practices", such as providing unlimited credit to Herero herdsmen and "confiscating" cattle in lieu of payment.

80. Quoted by J.L. de Vries, *Mission and colonialism in Namibia*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978, p. 19.

81. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

83. Quoted by De Vries, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

85. G.M. Gugelberger (ed.), *Nama/Namibia: Diary and letters of Nama Chief Hendrik Witbooi, 1884-1894*. Boston: African Studies Centre, Boston University, 1984, p. 70.

86. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 31

89. Schrank, *op. cit.*, p. 108. See also Bley, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

90. Drechsler, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

91. Bley. *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23; Schrank, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.

92. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 54. See also pp. 50-61; Schrank, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-110.

93. See, for example, Bley, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23 and 50-61; Schrank, *op. cit.*, Drechsler, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-96.

94. See Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 42-43.

95. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

96. Drechsler, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

97. Quoted by De Vries, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

98. Bley, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-81.

99. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-86.

100. Drechsler, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

101. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

102. Drechsler, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

103. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

105. See, for example, the recommendations of Deputy Governor Hans Tecklenburg, Drechsler, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

106. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

108. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 198. See also p. 199.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

112. Notwithstanding frequent difficulties in maintaining the supply of migrant labour, the mines consistently used migrant labourers both under German and South African rule. [illegible] some police zone labour was employed during the migrant la[illegible], in the 1920s, the proportion of local labour employed on [illegible] mained marginal. See section three, below.

113. In spite of rapid economic development following the 1904-07 wars, the agricultural sector continued to employ the largest share of the labour force. In 1913, for example, farmers employed 12 523 labourers in contrast with 9 541 in the larger industrial concerns. One should bear

in mind, moreover, that the majority of labourers employed in the industrial sector were migrants from Ovamboland and South Africa.

114. Bley, *op. cit.*, pp. 180 and 193.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 193, Schrank, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-232.

116. Union of South Africa, *Report of the Commission on the Economic and Financial Relations between the Union of South Africa and the Mandated Territory of South West Africa*, U.G. 16-35, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1935, p. 5; A. Kienetz (1970), *op. cit.*

117. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

119. *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.

120. *Ibid.* p. 254.

121. Union of South Africa, Administrator's reports, 1921, U.G. 32-22, 1922, p. 12; 1922. U.G. 21-23, 1923, p. 21; 1924, U.G. 32-25, 1925, p. 22. See also chapter three, below.

122. See, for example, W. Beinhart, 'Cape workers in German South West Africa, 1904-1912: patterns of migrancy and the closing of options on the Southern African labour market'. *The societies of southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, vol.11: collected seminar papers No 27*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1981, pp. 48-65' Drechsler, *op. cit.* p. 233. Also see chapters five and six, below.

123. Drechsler, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

124. *Ibid.*, pp. 234-235; Bley, *op. cit.*, pp. 1 4 and 226.

125. Drechsler, *op. cit.* 235.

126. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 253. See also Goldblatt, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

128. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 243

129.'Deutsche Südwestafrikanische Zeitung', 8/5/19, cited by Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

130. Schrank, *op. cit.*, p. 208. See also Goldblatt, *op. cit.*, p. 148. Drechsler (*op. cit.*, p. 234) describes the 1904-15 period as "a time of suffering and misery" for the black population. "Those among them who had managed to escape capture became the target of virtual manhunts. Even the Governor found it necessary after some time to protest against the indiscriminate killing of Africans."

131. Bley, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-274.

132. N. Solf, diary entry for 28/6/12, cited by Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

133. Bley, *op. cit.* p. 245.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 256 See also pp. 257-258. The migration of Hereros back to their former areas was particularly pronounced during the early years of South African rule. See, for example, ADM 1534, Military magistrate, Grootfontein - Secretary, 4/3/16.

Chapter two

NAMIBIA UNDER MARTIAL LAW, 1915 - 1920

The transition from German to South African rule

On July 9, 1915 the last German troops defending the colony of South West Africa surrendered to the numerically superior South African forces at Khorab, ending 30 years of German colonial rule and initiating a new phase in Namibian history which was eventually to have vast international and internal repercussions. For the next five years the former German colony remained under military occupation and rule by martial law. Although South Africa had long-standing and clearly defined ambitions of annexing the territory, its administration of South West Africa was provisional, pending a final settlement at the end of World War I. South Africa's hopes of annexation were, however, to be frustrated, and in September 1919 it accepted a mandate for the territory as a compromize to "anexation pure and simple".[1]

> Provisional government under martial law prevailed, and while continuity with the previous regime was a feature, the way was being prepared for permanent Union control.[2]

Although South Africa's administration of Namibia has aroused the world's interest and scrutiny, with a few limited exceptions,[3] historians have devoted little attention to the years of military occupation which helped to lay the foundations for permanent South African control of the territory. At the basis of this neglect has been a widely held assumption of an essential continuity between the German and South African administrations of the territory. Although this assumption has taken various forms and been incorporated within a variety of different analytical frameworks, its implications have been consistent: Namibia

merely passed from one set of imperialist interests to another; conditions within the colony remained unchanged and it continued to evince the typical characteristics of imperialist subjection and capitalist exploitation[4]; the "mode of exploitation" did not "change in the slightest, and its form only in minor aspects"[5]; South African rule in Namibia "emulated" that of the Germans[6]; if anything "the theoretical restraints and safeguards" of the mandate system "undermined the bargaining position of Namibian workers and deleteriously affected their lives" because it afforded South Africa greater security of tenure in Namibia[7]; African responses to German and South African rule were essentially similar because there was "no appreciable difference in approach" between the two administrations[8]; the repression of the Bondelswart rebellion of 1922 demonstrated to the colonized that "under the new rulers nothing had changed for them"[9]; the South African administration "reproduced, if in slightly less draconian form, the essentials of the German labour code."[10]

As with most misleading propositions, there is an element of truth in the assumption of continuity in the colonial rule of Namibia. The goals and interests underlying South African rule were indeed similar to those of the preceding regime. South Africa also was the direct beneficiary of the policies of domination and expropriation of the Germans. Exploitation and a highly repressive labour system were the hallmarks of South African rule in Namibia as they were of German colonial rule. These similarities or continuities, however, do not exclude the possibility of dissimilarities and discontinuities. Only an analysis of the transition from one colonial regime to another can establish whether there were in fact discontinuities and whether the discontinuities played any signifi-

cant role in the development of Namibian history. The major aim of this chapter is accordingly to focus on the transition of colonial policy during the period of martial law.

Although the most obvious aspect of this transition was the change from German to South African rule, it should be borne in mind that this change of regime took place against a background of momentuous shifts of power on a world scale. The change of colonial rule was in effect a direct product of World War I, as it had been one of the war aims of the allies to secure the German colonies.[11] Simililarly, many of the important developments that followed the war - such as the frustration of British, French and, more specifically, South African ambitions to annex the former German colonies and the creation instead of a mandate system, were also tied in with the massive shifts of power taking place on the international level.[12]

Richard Rathbone has concluded from a series of studies on the impact of World War I on Africa, that the War "was very much a reality for Africa, a period of immense and significant change of which we have only just scratched the surface."[13] He suggests that World War I helped to accelerate the process of political and economic change in colonial Africa, bringing the colonies into more centralized relationships with the metropolitan powers and radically altering the "style" of colonialism.

> Before 1914 Africa was for the most part a dream for the greedy speculator. From 1918 it seems likely that her role was more centrally related, as part of the empire, to the very heart of the metropolitan economies.[14]

These general trends appear to coincide with the different emphases of German and British/South African colonial policies in Namibia. As Knoll

points out, a distinctive feature of German colonial history is that it was the last European power to enter the colonial arena and had just begun rationalizing its colonial policies when the War broke out.[15] Britain and its sub-metropole, South Africa, on the other hand had long established traditions of colonial administration. South Africa's occupation of the former German colony and its subsequent administration of the territory under the mandate, also brought Namibia into immediate geographical proximity with South Africa and thus served to cement the colony's economic, political and cultural ties with its metropole.

South African interests in colonizing Namibia

British-South African interest in the area between the Orange and Kunene rivers dates back at least to the 1860s. Between 1861 and 1866 the Cape Colony had taken possession of the rich guano islands off the Namib coast.[16] Following appeals for British protection from Rhenish missionaries in Hereroland and from the Herero chief, Maharero, the Cape government had dispatched a special commissioner to the area in 1876, to conclude treaties with local chiefs. Although the commissioner, William Coates Palgrave, recommended British annexation of the territory, the British authorities restricted themselves to the annexation of the harbour of Walvis Bay and its surrounding area. Walvis Bay was annexed on the assumption that "Britain, either directly or through the Cape Colony, was entitled to take over the administration of the Territory when local conditions justified the expense. No alternative claimant was thought of."[17] The British were taken by surprise when Bismarck in August 1884 declared a protectorate over the interior after acquiring an alternative harbour at Angra Pequena (renamed Luderitzbucht after the German merchant, Adolf Luderitz, who spearheaded Germany's thrust into South West Africa.)[18]

The creation of a German colony in southern Africa heightened tensions between the imperialist powers in the sub-continent. Fears that the Germans in South West Africa might expand to join up their territory with the Boer republics, the Portuguese in Mozambique, or even the Germans in East Africa, prompted Britain to declare a protectorate over Bechuanaland, thus keeping open the route to the north.[19] While the outcome of the Anglo-Boer wars partially dissipated these tensions by bringing the Boer republics (and the Transvaal goldfields) under British control, it succeeded also in encouraging sympathies between the Boers and the Germans. Many Boers, for example, volunteered for service in the German colonial army during the Herero-Nama wars of 1904-07.[20] This affinity between Boers and Germans created considerable anxiety for the British and Union governments and was finally consummated in the Maritz-Beyers-De Wet rebellion of 1914. In some circles the 1914 rebellion was seen as the culmination of years of intrique by the Germans in South Africa.[21] At the very least the German presence in the sub-continent was seen as a source of support for Afrikaner nationalists who wanted to sever imperial ties with Britain. These fears were confirmed when General S.G. Maritz, a prominent rebel leader who had long-standing ties with the German colony, fled to South West Africa in 1914.[22] Thus besides the immediate military objectives of occupying the German colony in order to silence the German radio stations and prevent the territory from being used as a base for German submarines,[23] the Union government also aimed to prevent a possible military offensive from the colony by Afrikaner rebels in alliance with the Germans.[24]

South African interests in the territory however, went far beyond these immediate military and strategic aims. The occupation and control of the German colony also held important economic and political advantages. Of the economic considerations, the rich diamond fields in Namibia were the most important. As Lenzen convincingly demonstrates, the South African diamond industry had from at least the 1890s been dominated by policies which aimed at limiting and controlling the output of diamonds in order to keep their price from dropping. However, this guiding principle of the diamond industry "could be applied successfully only after a certain degree of centralized production control had been attained",[25] and in this respect the Namibian diamond fields posed a significant threat. Alluvial diamonds were discovered in the German colony in 1908, and by 1913 South West Africa was [illegible] 21 per cent of the world's total output. Moreover, the high qu[illegible] Namibian diamonds and their relatively low costs of production, increased still further the impact of the colony's output on the world market. South African diamond interests, led by De Beers, therefore exerted themselves to obtain some control over the production and marketing of diamonds in Namibia. Their efforts, however, served only to antagonize the Germans who felt their national interests threatened, and until 1914 prevented diamond producers in the two territories from reaching an agreement. Although agreement was finally reached in 1914, it could not be implemented because of the outbreak of war.[26] South Africa's takeover of Namibia finally solved the problem, and in 1919 South African interests gained control of the majority of Namibian mines with the formation of the Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM).[27]

Another major reason for wanting control over Namibia lay in its potential as a settlement colony for South Africa. The development of mining

and subsequent commercialization of agriculture in South Africa had resulted in a series of crises and social dislocations in the newly constituted Union. The forces that had been unleashed led to massive displacements of both black and white populations from the rural areas to the towns and to increasing polarization of classes in both rural and urban areas.[28] The newly-constituted Union government was coming under increasing pressure, p ticularly from its white electorate. A series of strikes in 1913/14 had led to the proclamation of martial law in January 1914. The ruling South African Party (SAP) had suffered heavy losses to the Labour and Nationalist Parties in the Transvaal provincial elections of 1914 and the general elections of 1915.[29] The SAP government believed it could strengthen its political support by opening up the former German colony to whites in search of land and jobs.[30] Even before the Germans had surrendered, Botha wrote to Smuts about the possiblity of using the lures of land and jobs to neutralize dissatisfaction,

> particularly amongst the Afrikaners. We shall have to make a point of it in the elections that the territory will now afford an opening particularly for acquiring land, as well as openings in the police and administration.[31]

In 1919 Smuts outlined his plans for Namibia as a settlement colony in the House of Assembly. South West Africa, he said, "offered great potentialities and could accommodate a large population.... It would be necessary to open up the country, put in water bores, etc., so as to make the land more useful for settlement purposes."[32] The geographical situation of the colony made it seem ideally suited for South African expansion. In 1918 Gorges referred to the boundaries between the two countries as "merely arbitrary lines drawn across the map."

> Germany has made but little use of the land and the total number of farmers established here under her aegis barely exceeds one thousand.[33]

Constraints on South African policy

A number of divergent, and sometimes incompatible, requirements and influences helped shape South African policies in the territory during the military occupation. Notwithstanding South Africa's interests in the German colony, its legal hold over the territory was tenuous. The invasion of German South-West Africa had been undertaken on an official understanding with Britain that all occupied territory would be put at the disposal of the Imperial government for a yet indeterminate settlement at the end of the war.[34] Thus, until after the War when the mandate system was framed, South Africa's status as an occupying power was both temporary and ambiguous.

After the successful conclusion of the military campaign, South Africa thus set about establishing its claim to the territory. This was based on two major arguments: That South West Africa was essential for South Africa's national security and, secondly, that the Germans had proved themselves unfit to rule the colony.[35] In order to lay the foundations for its second claim, the South African administration in SWA began collecting evidence on the injustices and atrocities of German rule of the colony. The evidence was published in an Imperial "Blue Book" in 1918.[36]

However, this strategy imposed certain conditions on South Africa's administration of the territory. Clearly it was not only necessary to persuade the world of the inadequacies of German colonial policy, but also to establish that South African rule represented an appropriate improvement on German rule. Certain minimal reforms were thus necessary in order to secure control over the territory. The administrator reported to Smuts in 1918 that he had ordered the district magistrates "to do

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their utmost to suppress any attempts of the ill-treatment of the natives pointing out that a clean record in this matter was essential if we wanted to use the German maltreatment of the natives as a reason for keeping this country."[37]

Besides the requirements of propoganda, there is evidence that South African officials actively disapproved of German colonial practices. While both Germans and South Africans shared common interests in exploiting the colony, the South Africans were critical of the costs and efficiency of German policies.

> Thousand of European lives have been lost and millions of pounds have been wasted in this country through the crass stupidity in their relations with the natives of those German who were sent here in the earlier days either as soldiers, officials or settlers.38

In addition to their ideological differences with German colonial policy, South African officials also perceived a more direct threat to South African interest in German practices. It was argued that in its colonial wars Germany had destroyed the indigenous labour supply and was thus forced to import labour from external sources, including South Africa. Furthermore, a danger was perceived in "the existence just beyond the Union borders of a native population in a constant state of dissatisfaction and unrest having close family ties and relationships with natives on the Union side of the line."[39]

Prior to the military occupation of the territory, the Germans had themselves come to realize the counter-productivity of their policies, particularly those of Von Trotha who had conducted the extermination campaign against the Hereros. The German colonial official Paul Rohrbach stated that

> (n)ot only with regard to the menaced destruction of the most valuable labour-material for the carrying on of our farming pursuits or on grounds of humanity was the policy of General von Trotha loudly and aversely criticised, but also above all things, because, on account of his so-called extermination programme, the restoration of peace was further delayed and the war costs increased out of all proportion..."[40]

After Von Trotha was recalled to Germany in 1905, the new governor, Von Linquist, issued a special proclamation addressed to the Hereros "offering them work and promising to spare the lives of all who came in and surrendered voluntarily".[41] Shortly before the war and invasion of the territory by South African forces, the German colonial government had begun liberalizing its approach to the black population in a bid to stabilize its labour force. Some of the harsh Native regulations introduced in 1907[42] were dispensed with or modified and plans were discussed to create centres for future African reserves "in order to promote a physical regeneration of the Herero".[43] In 1912 the German governor Seitz in a secret circular to his magistrates warned against "the brutal excesses of Europeans against natives". "A desperate feeling" was becoming prevalent among the blacks of the territory, the governor said, and this could lead to "another native rising". It was therefore essential that white mistreatment of blacks should be curbed. To this end the governor suggested that those whites who persisted in ill-treating their black servants should "no longer be supplied with native labour".[44]

Thus when South Africa took over the administration of the territory in 1915, the need for reform was already recognized, even within the narrow limits imposed by the colonial system. Change had become a prerequisite for the maintenance of the system, and the change of administration and disruptions caused by the war served further to reinforce this need for reform. The breakdown of the rigid system of labour control during the

war had resulted in numerous desertions, and the new military administration was inundated with complaints about the shortage of labour:

> Natives had deserted right and left from farms on which they had been located before our troops occupied the country. There was a strong disinclination in many cases to re-engage with former masters, and when engagements were entered into refusals to remain were frequent.[45]

While farmers blamed these developments on the administration, the latter felt that the breakdown of the system of labour control was a direct result of the colonial policies of the former regime.[46]

The changeover also altered the relationship between administration and settlers. The South African administrators found themselves in the unusual situation of being faced not only with a hostile, or potentially hostile, black population, but also a hostile white population. In the other German colonies, most of the German settlers were expelled or repatriated. Namibia was unique among the mandated territories in retaining a large German community.[47] The possibility of a black rebellion therefore posed a double threat to the military administration, because the German community might take advantage of the opportunity to rebel against the occupying forces and reintroduce German rule. This is clearly illustrated by the administration's quandary in 1916 when it decided to send a military expedition against the defiant Ovambo chief, Mandume. Fears that the German settlers in the south of the territory might rebel while a large contingent of South African troops was engaged in the north, prompted military administrator E.H.L. Gorges to telegraph General Jan Smuts for reinforcements from the Union.[48]

In part therefore military insecurity favoured a more conciliatory approach to the black population. Far more important, however, was the

lack of identification between administration and settlers. Especially during the closing phase of German rule, the settlers had wielded considerable political influence.[49] With the change in colonial regimes, however, the settlers were reduced to the status of enemy subjects, and this allowed the new administration greater freedom to pursue alternative goals and interests. It was not until after the granting of the Mandate that the settlers, and in particular the farmers, were able once again to impose their influence on colonial policy.[50]

In addition to the need for change, a number of constraints operated to produce a continuity rather than a break with the past. The objectives of the military administration were strictly limited by the framework of the Hague Convention, in particular Articles 43 and 48. Although the authority of the state passed into the hands of the occupying power of a conquered territory, it was incumbent on the occupant to maintain order with a minimum of change to the existing legal and governmental structures.[51] This state of affairs is acknowledged by the administrator in his report of 1915/16:

> Throughout the occupation... the most scrupulous care has been exercised to adhere to the rules of International Law recognised in civilised countries. The ordinary life of the people has been interfered with as little as possible. A drastic change has necessarily been made in the treatment of Natives. Movements of the people have been curtailed and the possession of arms and ammunition regulated. Otherwise except in matters with a purely Military objective very little has been done to interfere with the population.[52]

South Africa's tenuous hold over the territory was also a factor limiting change. Not only was the future of the territory undecided, but the new administration experienced a variety of difficulties in the implementation of its policies. These difficulties were associated with the newness and temporary nature of the administration during the period

of martial law, and included staff shortages, lack of experience and information on local conditions, and the incompetence of local officials and police.[53] Under these circumstances, policy options were severely limited. Towards the end of the military period, the Secretary for the Protectorate pointed out to the Union government that the administration regarded the changes that had been introduced as inadequate. The administrator, he reported, did not consider the existing policy as "a proper one", but regarded it as "foreign to our traditions" and indefensible either in Parliament or the League of Nations.

> (T)he Administrator is of opinion that this system of law, even as modified, whilst it was justified as a means for exercising close control over the aborigines during the existence of the war can not longer be continued.[54]

Although there were clear differences between South African and German policies, there were also important affinities between the two policies. As Bley points out, German colonial law had been drawn from a variety of different sources, including South African laws.[55] In particular the Cape Colony's Masters and Servants Act had had a formative influence on German labour policy in Namibia.[56] Thus when South Africa assumed power in the territory in 1915, many of the German laws relating to blacks were regarded as "satisfactory" and retained.[57]

A prominent feature of German colonial rule was that it telescoped the colonial process into a relatively contracted period, achieving the expropriation of police zone blacks and the creation of a rigidly controlled labour force within little more than 20 years of formal colonial rule. The destruction of black political, military and economic power was achieved with dramatic suddenness and finality as a direct product of military force applied during the suppression of the 1904-07

rebellions. The major laws promulgated during and after 1907 matched the harshness of the suppression of the rebellions.

Three major enactments issued in August 1907 regulated the lives of blacks in German South West Africa between the Herero-Nama rebellions and World War I: the pass or registration law, the regulations relating to the "control" of blacks, and the laws regulating labour contracts. Bley succinctly sums up these laws as aiming not only at the destruction of the Africans' economic power and forcing them to work for the whites, but also destroying their tribal organization and making it impossible for even a loose association of tribal units.[58]

The pass law stipulated that all blacks above the age of seven (with the sole exception of the Basters of Rehoboth) had to register with the authorities. On registration each African was handed a numbered metal badge, which served as a pass and had to be displayed prominently on his person, and a service book (*dienstbuch*) which was used as a second source of identification. It was an offence to give passless blacks "any work, support or assistance", and the law enpowered any white person to arrest blacks without passes and hand them over to the police.[59]

In terms of the "Order of the Governor of SWA Pertaining to Measures for the Control of Natives" no black could obtain right or title to fixed property or own cattle or horses without the consent of the governor. Although certain exceptions were made to the ban on the ownership of livestock after 1912, permission to own land was not granted to any black between 1907 and 1915. The law also forbad more than ten families or individuals from residing on any one farm or property. This regulat-

ion applied also to mission lands.[60]

The third enactment, that relating to the form and conditions of labour contracts, stipulated that all blacks without visible means of support should be employed. Blacks without labour contracts possessed no legal rights and could be punished as vagrants.[61] The Imperial Blue Book of 1918 comments as follows:

> Having ensured that no native would be able to acquire possessions from which to exist, the law goes on to state that natives wandering about "without visible means of subsistence" are punishable as vagrants.[62]

The laws relating to the punishment and "disciplinary control" of blacks were contained within an enactment in 1896. This enactment was administered directly by the police and under it black servants were punished for a variety of offences, including "laziness", "negligence", "vagrancy", "insolence" and "disobedience". An established practice in the rural areas was for the employer to send his servant to the nearest police station with a note stating, for example, that the bearer "was cheeky to me", "refused to obey my orders", or "is lazy and does not work well". At the police station the servant was flogged, the number of lashes depending on the police's assessment of the seriousness of the 'offence'. More serious offences were referred to the district administrative officials. Sentence of death and more than six months imprisonment were subject to confirmation by the Governor.[63]

As the simplest and least expensive form of punishment, flogging was used extensively during the German period. Between January 1, 1913 and March 31, 1914 there were 2 787 sentences to lashes and 46 719 individual lashes administered.[64] In 1900 the Imperial Government in Berlin complained that the number of blacks punished in Namibia was out of all

proportion to the population and commented on the frequent recourse to corporal punishment. The German government expressed concern "that public opinion in Germany would draw very unfavourable conclusions as to the success of German methods of civilisation". The Imperial Blue Book of 1918 suggests that pressure from Berlin was probably responsible for the further decentralization of the German system of punishment in Namibia and the tacit acceptance of the "parental right of correction" as a semi-legal category. The doctrine of "fatherly right of correction" (*Vaterliche Zuchtigungsrecht*) regarded the German employer as acting *in loco parentis* to his black servants and therefore having a "parental" right to administer punishments, including beatings. Although this right of "parental chastisement" was not expressly provided for in the law, it was both allowed and encouraged by administrative officials and recognized by the local courts. Questions were only raised in those cases where servants were so severely beaten that they died or had to be treated in hospital, and even then the situation was rationalized. As Leutwein pointed out, "beating to death was not regarded as murder; but the natives were unable to understand such legal subtleties".[65]

Changes in colonial policy

Taken individually, the changes introduced by the South African administration during the period of martial law appear both superficial and insignificant. Although the more draconian measures of the German system were removed or modified, even the administration was prepared to concede towards the end of the period of military rule, that the system of forced labour was still in existence, and that it amounted to little more than "a modified form of slavery".[66] The German system of registration, together with the *diensbuch* (service book) and brass badge, were abolished and replaced by a pass law. However, the major provisions of

the former law, that every black person should carry a pass and should be employed, remained in force. Besides raising the age of those required to carry passes from seven to fourteen and abolishing the humiliating brass badge, the only meaningful change introduced was the "Certificate of Exemption from Labour" provided for those who could show "visible means of support." To qualify for this certificate, which cost ten shillings a year, the applicant had to own at least ten head of large or 50 head of small stock. The German law had also made provision for the exemption of those with "visible means of support", from the strict labour requirements, but the necessary criteria was never defined and in practice had little if any significance.[67]

As under the German law, blacks were barred from obtaining any right or title to fixed property without the consent of the administrator. They were, however, allowed to acquire and own livestock. This the deputy-secretary of Native Affairs in Windhoek reasoned would "tend to make the native more contented and law abiding".[68] The South African administration clearly did not envisage that the right to own cattle would be allowed to interfere with the flow of labour, rather it saw the right as an inducement to accept labour, as the following reference to the German law indicates:

> The inhumanity of this measure, apart from its injustice, is emphasized when one recalls what a blow such a prohibition must have been for the cattle-loving Hereros. What inducement was there to work? A native might slave for years and years but the prospect of having in his old age a few cows and calves of his own, on which to subsist when labour was no longer possible, did not exist.69

The Masters and Servants Act (Proclamation No.2 of 1916) provided "for those deficiencies or shortcomings of the German laws which experience has taught are indispensable for the proper control of natives and the

satisfactory settlement of breaches of contract between masters and servants".[70] The major aims of this law was the systemization, formalization and centralization of labour relations in the colony. The German system had allowed for a considerable degree of decentralization. Both the local police and settlers had been given substantial powers to enforce the labour control system.[71] For example, the police could punish black servants without reference to judicial authority. Only the more serious offences were referred to the local administrative and judicial official, the *bezirksamptmann*. However, this district officer was not only an administrative and judicial official, but also the district police chief.[72]

Although, ultimately, the South African authorities subscribed to the same objective of labour control, they insisted that this control should be more centralized and that there should be a stricter separation of magisterial and police functions. In other words, labour control was seen as the prerogative of the state, not of the individual employer backed up by the state. There was thus during the period of martial law, a growing tendency for the central authority to define and regulate relations between blacks and whites, employers and employees. Between 1916 and 1920 the Masters and Servants Law was revised twice, in order to make the regulation of labour relations more comprehensive and detailed. This law in turn was backed up with other legislation such as the laws relating to "the control and treatment of natives employed on mines and works in the Protectorate" (Proclamations Nos. 3 and 5 of 1917) and a comprehensive vagrancy law (Proclamation No. 25 of 1920).[73]

Besides carefully defining the respective obligations of employers and

employees, the Masters and Servants laws outlawed the practice of "fatherly correction" (whereby white employers had the right to beat their servants) and put a stop to the practice of flogging which magistrates were urged to "make special efforts" to prevent.

> It should be widely made known to the natives that masters and policemen have no power to flog, and any complaints of flogging must be carefully investigated and the offender prosecuted without respect of person.74

Spurred on by the need to discredit the former German regime and to contrast German rule with its own, the South African administration actively enforced the new provisions of the law. Between September 1915 and January 1918 more than 310 cases involving ill-treatment of black servants were brought before the lower courts alone.[75] The more serious cases of murder and assault against white settlers were given prominent attention in the 1918 Blue Book and elsewhere.[76] In one case the Special Criminal Court took the unusual step of sentencing to death a farmer, Frantz Ernst Becker, for the cold-blooded murder of six San (Bushmen). The administrator commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment and commented as follows:

> It has been a constant endeavour of this Administration since its establishment to break down the traditions of German native policy and to replace it by a respect and fear of the law; but this is not the work of a day, and I fear that for some time to come attention must be given to considerations which would not be allowed to weigh elsewhere or in more normal times.77

Before attempting to examine the significance of these changes, it is necessary to outline some of the difficulties that stood in the way of the implementation of the new laws. Many (possibly even most) black labourers did not report assaults on them for fear of their employers or the police.[78] Besides widespread opposition to the new laws, many

farmers felt that too much time and effort would be wasted on a trip to the nearest police station to report complaints against their servants and so continued to resort to pre-War methods of "correction".[79] For farm labourers the distances from both the courts and police obviously presented difficulties in laying charges against their employers.[80] Similar difficulties were involved in making complaints to the police. There is considerable evidence that the local police force identified strongly with the farmers and had little sympathy for black complaints.[81] Incidents where police in the rural areas defied administrative policy by flogging blacks are well documented.[82] In spite of these difficulties of implementing its policy, the administration itself showed reluctance to enforce its laws fully. In 1916 the magistrates of the larger towns were instructed to direct all complaints under the Masters and Servants Law to the Officer in Charge of Native Affairs in their districts. This official would then decide whether prosecution was "considered desirable". A few months later an instruction went our from the Crown Prosecutor that Masters and Servants cases "should not be taken up unless the employer wishes it."[83]

Strains and contradictions in colonial policy

In spite of these constraints and the seeming insignificance of the changes made to German laws, the modified policies of the new administration caused an outcry among the settler community. The settlers tended to see the changes in the labour system in absolute terms. For example, the military magistrate of Karibib reported in 1917 that the

> whole attitude of the Germans to the natives was very aptly stated by the Chairman (of the Farmers' Union), who said that the British principle was equal rights for all, whereas the German principle was that the native was in all things subservient to the European. It was urged by several members (of the Farmers' Union) that it might be taken for granted that whenever a native spoke he was lying.84

Similar attitudes to the change in policy were adopted by settlers from the Union.[85]

These attitudes can only be understood against the background of the economic weakness of farmers in the colony.[86] Jeffery Paige has argued that because of their economic weakness, dominant agrarian classes require the intervention of the state to compensate for their vulnerable economic situation.[87] In Namibia the extreme vulnerablity of the settler class required extreme measures. In spite of the relatively favourable economic conditions until 1920, many farmers appeared unable (or unwilling) to pay wages to their labourers. They consistently complained about the cost of black labour, and in 1916 the administrator reported that "probably 90 per cent of the complaints brought to our officials by natives are for the withholding of wages due to them".[88] Thus what might appear as minor changes to an outsider, assumed far greater significance to the settler farmers.

However, in order to understand the impact of the changes on the settler farmers, it is necessary to examine these changes a little more closely. The policy that emerged during the military period did not simply involve the substitution of one system of labour control for another. Rather the policy was a combination of elements of two different systems. As already argued, South African policy in Namibia during the military occupation was shaped by a variety of contradictory influences and constraints, so that what finally emerged was a combination of both German and South African colonial policies. While these policies shared the common goal of exploiting the labour resources of the colony, they were not necessarily compatible as they differed in the means they

employed to secure this common goal. Furthermore, the situation was complicated by two additional factors. The need to discredit German rule and project an image which would be acceptable to the international community was a factor which was extraneous to the normal concerns of a labour-extractive system. It helped to produce, in the upper echelons of the administration, a tentative liberalism which was out of pace with the rest of the colonial society and which quickly evaporated after the granting of the Mandate.[89] A second set of complications resulted from the logistic difficulties associated with creating a new administration under conditions of war.[90]

Given the configuration of factors which were operative in the situation, it is not surprising that contradictions and inconsistencies manifested themselves in the system of labour control. While it retained the general framework of the German forced labour system, the South African administration removed some of the means by which labour had been extracted. Arising as it did out of the brutal suppression of the 1904-08 rebellions, the German policy of forced labour was dependent on a generalized and decentralized violence for its survival. The frequency with which flogging was used to "discipline' the labour force has already been ment dispersal of the white population, the practice of "parental chastisement" was an important means for maintaining control over the labour force. When the South African administration prohibited the use of these two measures, strains occurred within the system of control. Instead of being able to "discipline" their labourers themselves, farmers were now obliged to travel to the seat of the district magistracy. This often involved the inconvenience of travelling long distances and of being absent from their farms for a number of days.[91] Besides the loss of time and other expenses entailed, the farmers feared that absence from their

farms would result in other labourers deserting, stealing their stock, or neglecting to take proper care of their farms.[92]

Within the context of the violent history of the colony, the poor wages paid to farm labourers and the compulsion used to extract labour, these fears do not appear unrealistic. In addition to this, there was the uncertainty of whether the farmer would be able to secure a conviction against his servant. Some of the magistrates were regarded as too "lenient" towards black servants.[93] However, in those cases where a conviction was secured and the labourer was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the farmer would be deprived of his labourer for that period. In the situation of chronic labour shortage, farmers were in a vulnerable position. Black labourers appeared to be aware of this and prepared to exploit it. It was reported from Gibeon, for example, that

> in cases brought by masters against their servants I have found that the accused almost invariably refused to pay their fines, stating that they preferred to serve their time in Gaol. The prospect of a short period of imprisonment not only fails to alarm the native but actually provides him with a lever wherewith to undermine the authority of his employer ... when threatened with legal proceedings they openly state that they do not fear the law of the English as they could be locked up for a while ... and they would then have the satisfaction of knowing that their masters have to herd their own stock. The unfortunate employer who is short of labour is *forced to condone all kinds of offences because if the* natives are convicted and imprisoned he loses their services for a time and there in no improvement in the conduct of the servant when he returns.... (I)n my opinion there is only one remedy for the evil, and this is the infliction... of... corporal punishment .... By adopting this method of punishment ... the native feels that he has been punished and his master can make use of him almost immediately afterwards.94

A second contradiction arose out of the relaxation of restrictions on the ownership of stock. While the ban on the ownership of large stock was repealed and provision made for the exemption of certain black stock

owners from the labour requirement, no clear policy emerged for the allocation of land to the colonized. The German law which prohibited blacks from obtaining "any right or title to fixed property" remained in force.[95] The question of reserves was held in abeyance until after the granting of the mandate when South Africa's tenure over the territory became more secure. This inconsistency in the policy of the military administration held a number of important implications. As the number of black-owned stock increased, so obviously did the need for land. In order to meet the land shortage, black stock owners adopted a variety of strategies. In some cases they simply moved onto vacant Crown land or unoccupied farms. Some of these squatter settlements were later recognized as temporary reserves by the administration.[96] Squatting on white farms also became common during this period, particularly as it provided a source of labour at a time of severe labour shortage.[97] In other cases government, municipal or private land was hired for grazing.

These loosely structured arrangements generated conflicts, many of which only came to a head in the period that immediately followed the granting of the mandate.[98] Temporary reserves like Orumba and Okatumba in the Windhoek magisterial district soon became overstocked and overcrowded. As a result conflicts arose with the white farmers who complained of stock thefts and trespassing on their land.[99]

When more permanent reserves were finally established in the early 1920s, the administration decided to close the temporary reserves and met with strong resistance from their occupants.[100] The accumulation of stock by blacks who had been formerly prohibited from doing so, also threatened the interests of settler farmers. Settlers complained that their farms were being overrun by the stock of their labourers. They

claimed that if they tried to limit the number of stock kept by their servants, they ran the risk of losing them - a serious eventuality in a situation of chronic labour shortage. The farmers also complained that stock diseases were being spread by labourers who moved their stock from farm to farm. Blacks should be forced to keep most of their stock on the reserves, or the ban on large stock should be reintroduced.[101]

The inconsistency, ambiguity and temporary nature of administrative policy during the period of martial law also created problems at the bureaucratic and administrative levels. An analysis of magistrates' reports in 1920 revealed some startling inconsistencies in the implementation of administrative policy at the local level. The administration concluded that "too little control" was exercized over native administration in the districts.

> (M)agistrates and N.A. Officers carry out such portions of the Native Memorandum (ie. the major document which laid down Native Policy during the military period) as they like: every man has his own policy and there is no coordination.[102]

Administrative efficiency was further hampered by the small and inexperienced staffs, pa- icularly of the district magistrates. For example, the magistrate of Otjiwarongo complained that although his district extended over nearly 20 000 square miles with 150 widely dispersed farms, only nine men had been provided to police the area. Of these nine men, five were tied to clerical or town duties, leaving only four men for patrol work. "In these circumstances I often wonder that the situation is not worse", the magistrate commented.[103] From the beginning of the occupation period, the administration received complaints about the closing of some of the police outposts that had been maintained by the Germans.[104] Following demobilization at the end of the war, a number of other rural

police posts were closed down. According to the magistrate of Omaruru, this removed a "restraining influence" on black labour - "the knowledge that small forces of police were stationed at posts among the rural population served in some measure to check evil among natives."[105]

Contradictions in the transitional policy of the miltary period led also to conflict between the administration and the police. In an extensive memorandum compiled in 1919, the administrator complained to the Union Government that abuses "in the treatment of the aborigines of this country by members of the local police force (the Military Constabulary) are still existent."

> Chains and the liberal use of the sjambok by the police will clearly not secure that clean sheet which I am so anxious to present when the existing military occupation of this country comes to an end.[106]

The police, who identified with the settler farmers and were responsible for enforcing colonial law, clearly did not share these sentiments. A senior policeman, for example, had authorized the police under his command to flog blacks in order to avoid overcrowding of the lock-up, and because members of the farming community had asked him not to imprison labourers as they could not do without them.[107] In another case reported by the magistrate of Okahandja, a corporal in charge of a police outpost had flogged blacks and had been paid by farmers for doing so.[108]

The police distrusted the magistrates, "regarding them as people who create work and trouble for them rather than as their friends and advisers."[109]

> The complaint is made that certain over zealous magistrates go out of their way to find cause of offence against the police on every trivial complaint made by natives against them. The natural result being that not only are the police disheartened but are hampered in the execution of their duty

> as they fear to imperil their position, but it further brings about a want of that harmony between magistrate and police which is so essential to the good administration of any District, while it also encourages the native to think that the police are in the wrong and are inimical to them thus leading to the insolent attitude complained of - an attitude in marked contrast to what it was under German rule.110

In the event of conflict between magistrates and police, the police were not without recourse. The administrator pointed out in 1919 that where the magistrates complained to higher authorities about the conduct of the police "matters are immediately made unpleasant for them":

> In almost every previous incident when a magistrate has reported misconduct by members of the Constabulary .. the reply has taken the form of a personal attack on the magistrate 111

The problems experienced with the police were but one symptom of a more general malaise that permeated the administration. The magistrate of Okahandja succintly summed up the situation in 1920:

> When one looks back at the past four and a half years and with what we have had to contend - dealing with an hostile population, wholly insufficient and inefficient staffs, incompetent and almost useless police, a complete change of native policy, the disorder following on active warfare, and, above all, an Administration which was necessarily unstable and to a certain extent temporary and uncertain - it is not to be wondered at that conditions today are still far from ideal or even satisfactory. The instructions laid down in the native memorandum (of 1916) ... were a big step forward in the right direction. Unfortunately - and here I think one touches on the crux of the whole matter - it has not been found possible in the absence of constant and firm supervision, with the staff and police at our disposal, to carry out the excellent directions laid down.112

Imcompetence and inefficiency among the police and administrative personnel appear to have been widespread during this period. In 1917 Gorges wrote to Smuts[113] to complain that the territory was being neglected by the South African government. It had struck him, Gorges wrote, "that responsible people in the Union are either exceedingly

indifferent about their large and important territorial acquisition, or else they repose an extraordinary amount of faith in my capacity to govern this Colony as it should be governed."[114] He went on to complain about the quality of police officers sent to the territory, giving specific examples of officers who had to be dismissed or disciplined for drunkeness, embezzlement, taking part in shady horse and cattle transactions, or being "too fond of the ladies".[115]

> Staff matters have been a terrible worry and I have been saddled with a lot of misfits. I have received on the whole very little assistance from Union Departments and it has been a most difficult matter to obtain really suitable men from them. I am fortunate in having the services of a few really tip-top men ... but I regret to say that the tendency on the part of some Departments has been to try and pass off their bad bargains on to me.... You will perhaps hardly credit it, but of the eighteen magistrates I have here, only three are full magistrates in the Union, the rest are nearly all clerks in the Union, some of them only of the second grade.[116]

It is likely that the poor quality of administrative personnel in Namibia at this time was connected with the attempts of the ruling party in South Africa to win favour with the white electorate by providing jobs for South Africans in the territory.[117] Although there may have been a few exceptions in the lower echelons of the administration, South African policy was to replace all German officials with South Africans. At the end of the war, 6 374 German citizens, representing about half of the colony's German population, were repatriated from Namibia. Of this total, 3 718 (or 58 per cent) were officials or members of the military and police. The remainder was made up of "undesirables" (1 223) and people who had requested repatriation (1 433).[118]

Responses of the colonized

The administrative malaise served not only to dilute still further the already weak reforms of the new administration, but also impaired the

control the colonial state was able to exercize over the colony and the colonized. In other words, not only was the administration unable to implement properly the changes it had introduced, but it was also prevented from effectively executing those functions of dominance and control central to the colonial enterprize. Within this context the black work force was able to devize various strategies to resist or by-pass the system of forced labour that was still a part of the colonial situation.

Although desertion had become a well-established tactic even under German rule, the shortage and inefficiency of the police, the removal of police powers from the settlers, and the general inefficiency and lack of control of the administration, made desertion and the withholding of labour even more attractive and feasible strategies during the period of martial law. The disruptions and confusion caused by the miltary campaign and change of administrations, provided further opportunities for desertion and other forms of resistance. Following the Union's invasion and occupation of the territory, desertions, particularly from farms, reached unprecedented levels, precipitating a severe labour crisis. The Imperial Blue Book of 1918 states, for example, that black labourers deserted "right and left from farms on which they had been located" and that many showed a "strong disinclination" to return to work.[119] According to the military aqdministrator in 1916, there was "plenty evidence that black labourers "work for their German masters only under the greatest pressure and that they were inclined to be insolent to them."[120]

By 1918 the situation had not changed. The administrator in his report

for that year noted that

> (t)he demand for natives (sic) far exceeds the supply, and few natives can be induced voluntarily to work for German farmers....121

Complaints poured in from the farming community:

> The absence of any authority in this place has created conditions which are going to destroy the existence of our farm and that of other Farmers in the vicinity. Knowing that there is nobody in this place to punish them the natives refuse to work. They run away and prefer to live in the bush. There they get plenty of food, they make hundreds of traps to catch the game .... The kaffirs feel no constraint to work, they sit idle, I know where they are hiding but I have not the power to force them back. The natives are informed of this and therefore they dare to run away, one after the other .... The kaffirs of this country needless to say only work as long as they fear the Police, when Waterberg gets a small Garrison the conditions I think will really improve, only then normal conditions will settle.122

Although not adequately documented, the strategy of living off the veld by hunting and foraging appears to have been widespread. Settler interest groups complained frequently about the increase in the number of dogs owned by blacks.[123] By 1917 the administration had adopted its first dog tax and active measures were taken to destroy dogs owned by blacks.[124] Another way of circumventing the repressive labour system was by accumulating enough stock to qualify for an exemption certificate. The magistrate of Otjiwarongo reported in 1920 that the Hereros were "straining every nerve to acquire large and small stock, in order that he may again become independent and relieved of the necessity of working." He maintained that between 1914 and 1920 black-owned small stock had increased from "no more than a few hundred" to more than 4 000 in his district.[125] In the minds of both the settlers and the authorities, the dramatic increase in black-owned stock was closely linked to increasing stock thefts during this period.[126] Although the available evidence makes it difficult to confirm or refute this link, it would

appear that losses of small stock in particular were very heavy. It was even alleged that because of stock theft, small stock farming was no longer viable in the territory.[127]

However, for the majority of blacks in Namibia the strategies outlined above were not immediately available. At the low wages paid during this period, it would have been impossible for most blacks to obtain sufficient stock to qualify for exemption from forced labour. Strategies such as stock theft, desertion and living in the veld held their own costs and difficulties. Even for those blacks who were able to acquire exemption certificates, problems still arose as to where they could keep their stock as there was little land available to black stock-owners during this period. In the situation, the majority of blacks fell back on the widespread strategy adopted in other parts of Africa against forced labour, poor wages and other conditions of colonial repression. In the words of the settlers and colonial authorities, they became "insolent", "lazy", "inefficient" "unreliable" and negligent".

By 1920 complaints of this sort had reached a climax and permeated every level of settler society.[128] The administration showed some awareness of the relationship between the inefficiency of black labour and the repressive labour policy of the state. The magistate of Otjiwarongo, for example, referred to "a passive resistance movement, at present confined to doing the work as badly as possible",[129] and the Secretary for the Protectorate pointed out that "large numbers" of blacks

> work only because the law compels them to do so, and in consequence they do their work with very little grace and with only so much effort as circumstances demand. This is the reason for the general complaints about the inefficiency of labour in this country...130

Another unanticipated consequence of the change in colonial administrations during World War I was the generation of unrealistic, but firmly held, expectations of reform among the black population. The defeat of the German colonial power during the war helped foster the belief that their lands would be returned to them. As late as 1946, a Herero witness told Michael Scott:

> What we don't understand is that when two nations have been at war, such as Britain or Germany or Italy, and when one or other of those nations is defeated the lands belonging to that nation are not taken away from them. That nation remains a nation, and their lands belong to them. The African people although they have always been on the side of the British people and their allies, yet have their lands taken away from them and are treated as though they had been conquered.131

Because they wished to convey the impression that the South African administration was welcomed to the territory by the indigenous inhabitants, official sources played down black agitation over the land issue. However, in his preface to the Imperial Blue Book of 1918, administrator Gorges stated that

> the native ... in their simple way of thinking unable to understand why after having conquered the Germans here, we did not utterly despoil them of their property, have also since the Occupation provided a considerable amount of difficulty for the Administration.132

Expectations like these appear to have been widespread among police zone blacks during the military period.[133] It is probable that these beliefs were encourage by administrative policies during this period. Although the changes introduces were only minor concessions, war propganda, the prosecution of German employers and the tensions that existed between settlers, police and administrators, undoubtedly made an impact, as did the recognition of squatter-occupied land as 'temporary reserves".[134] These expectations were, however, to be rudely shattered in the period

that immediately followed the military administration, and played a significant role in the concerted resistance to colonial rule between 1920 and 1925.[135]

Strong settler opposition to the policies of the administration was evident throughout the military period, but reached almost hysterical proportions in 1920. During that year the Deputy Commissioner of Police conducted an extensive tour through the police zone. On completion of his tour, he reported that "a universal complaint" had been made to him "by every section of the white population at every place I visited, without exception, and that is the attitude of the Native as regards work, his insolent demeanour, laziness, unreliability and thieving propensities."[136] The administration approached the magistrates for comments and suggestions. In almost every case the magistrates reported similar complaints to those outlined by the Deputy Commissioner and suggested tighter control of the black labour force. Farmers had made representations to both the South African prime minister and the administrator.[137] For most of the farmers and some of the magistrates, the obvious solution to the problem was to reintroduce flogging.[138] In spite of its ideological objections to this aspect of German policy, the administration shared this opinion, but felt that it could not afford to alienate international opinion. In a letter to the magistrate of Gibeon, the Secretary of the Protectorate conceded that although the "decreased efficiency" of black labour was "due to the prohibition of corporal punishment ... the infliction of corporal punishment for offences against the Masters and Servants Laws is not within the range of practical politics."[139]

The intense resentment that the policies of the new administration aroused in the settlers may be explained on an economic, military and ideological level. It is clear that an economically vulnerable community which is dependent on state intervention to provide it with a cheap and docile labour force, will be threatened economically if the state appears unwilling or incapable of providing such a labour force. However, there were other dimensions to the fears of the settlers. It is to be expected that fear of rebellions and reprisals would be a feature of a community as steeped in violence and brutality as the settler community in Namibia. An investigation of the German administration's files had shown that from at least 1910 the colonial authorities "were in a constant state of nervous apprehension" over the possibility of a black rising.[140] During the military campaign of 1915 white settlers had been moved from the outlying districts to the more densely populated areas along the railway lines because of fears of reprisals.[141] These fears were proved at least partially realistic by the Baster rebellion and other more limited incidents of looting and violence directed against the settler community during the war.[142] Following the occupation of the territory by South African forces, the German settlers had been compelled to surrender their arms, and this had had the effect of intensifying their fears.

> For some months after the close of the campaign applications were received from Germans in large numbers for the return to them of the arms they had surrendered, in order to afford them some protection from the natives. After November last alarming rumours were set in circulation by the Germans of an impending rising of the natives, during which no European life would be safe. They reached every corner of the Protectorate and thoroughly alarmed the rural population.143

On an ideological level, the defiant attitude (or, in colonial parlance,

"insolence") of the colonized represented a direct threat to the system of oppression. Eugene Genovese has argued that

> (a)ll forms of class oppression have induced some kind of servility and feelings of inferiority in the oppressed; failure to induce these means failure to survive as a system of oppression.144

That colonial policy in Namibia during this period had at least partially failed to inculcate the required servility and deference in the colonized was for the settlers (and even some of the administrators) a clear indication that the colonial state was not adequate to its task.

It was against this background of settler fears and agitation against the policies of the military administration, that South Africa was granted the mandate to rule Namibia. Developments during the five years of military rule played a prominant role in shaping the responses of both blacks and whites in the period that followed. Although flogging was not officially reintroduced during this early mandate period, many of the demands made by the settlers during the military period for tighter control of the labour force, branding laws, a heavier dog tax etc.,[145] were introduced during the first five years of the mandate. The tentative liberalism of the military administration disappeared and settler interests once more reigned supreme.[146] The rebellion and defiance that characterized the first few years of the mandate was also rooted in the military period, not only because the expectations that had been nurtured during this period were frustrated, but also because, for a brief period, the colonial state had revealed its weakness.

Endnotes for chapter two

1. M.H. Swanson, 'South West Africa in Trust, 1915 - 1939', in Gifford, P. and Louis, W.R. (eds.). *Britain and Germany in Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 643.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 647.

3. For example, S.J. Schoeman, *Suidwes-Afrika onder militêre bestuur 1915-1920*, MA thesis, University of South Africa, 1975; I. Goldblatt, *History of South West Africa*. Cape Town: Juta, 1971, pp. 206-209; M.H. Swanson, *op. cit.* While Schoeman's study is the most comprehensive, it is essentially descriptive and fails to provide an adequate analysis of the transitional period.

4. See, for example, D. Innes, 'Imperialism and the national struggle in Namibia'. *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 9, 1978.

5. South West African People's Organization, *To be born a nation*. London: Zed Press, 1981, p. 20.

6. M. Scott, *In face of fear*. Johannesburg: M. Scott, 1948, p. 37.

7. K. Gottschalk, 'South African labour policy in Namibia, 1915-1975', *South African Labour Bulletin*, 4, 1 & 2, 1978, p. 77.

8. A. Graham, *The responses of African societies in South West Africa to white administration 1915-1939*. MA thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 1971.

9. H. Dreschler, *Let us die fighting*. London: Zed Press, 1980.

10. R. Moorsom, *Colonisation and proletarianisation*. University of Sussex, MA thesis, 1973, p. 74. Most of these studies provide little, if any, evidence to back-up their claims, an indication that the proposition is regarded as self-evident.

11. R. Rathbone, 'World War I and Africa: Introduction', *Journal of African History*, 19, 1, 1978. p. 4.

12. See, for example, R.W. Imishue, *South West Africa: an international problem*. London: Institute of Race Relations, 1965, pp. 2-5; G. Barraclough, *An introduction to contemporary history*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, pp. 118-124.

13. R. Rathbone, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 3. See also E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and underdevelopment in East Africa*. London: Heinemann, 1978, pp. 115 - 138.

15. A.J. Knoll, *Togo under Imperial Germany, 1884-1914*. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1978, p. 1

16. G-M. Cockram, *South West Africa Mandate*. Cape Town: Juta, 1976, p. 7; Z Ngavirue, *Political parties and interest groups in South*

West Africa. Ph.D. thesis, Vol. 1, University of Oxford, 1972, p. 86.

17. L. S. Amery, cited by G-M. Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 8; See also H. Dreschler, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

18. H. Dreschler, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-26; G-M. Cockram, *op. cit.* pp. 9-10; T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: a modern history.* London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 130 ; C.W. de Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa.* London: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 109 - 110.

19. See for example, A. Sillery, *Botswana: a short political history.* London: Methuen, 1974, pp. 75-76; C. Colclough and S. McCarthy, *The political economy of Botswana : a study of growth and distribution.* London: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 12.

20. W. Crowell, *The evolution of South African control over South West Africa (Namibia).* Ph.D. thesis, St John's University, New York, 1975, pp. 59-62.

21. See, for example, W. Eveleigh *South West Africa.* Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1915. In listing the reasons why South West Africa should remain under British rule, the administrator of the territory maintained in 1918 that for "the past 30 years at least Germany has entertained hopes of securing a position of domination in South Africa". University of the Witwatersrand Library, J. C Smuts Papers, A842, B4 (subsequently Smuts Papers), E H.L. Gorges - L. Botha, 21/1/18.

22. See T R.H. Davenport, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-186; G-M. Cockram, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-23.

23. G. Schrank, *German South West Africa: social and economic aspects of its history, 1884 - 1915.* Ph.D. thesis, p. 15, New York University, 1974, p. 244; G-M. Cockram, *op. cit.*; T.R.H. Davenport. *op. cit.*, p. 184.

24. In December 1914, Botha reported that Maritz had "succeeded in escaping into German South West Africa and from there, equipped with fresh arms and artillery, and supported by (his) .... German allies, will seek to invade the Union. Our next duty is to deal with this danger, and to make it impossible for German South West Africa to be used in future as a secure base from which to threaten the peace and liberties of the Union." P.H. Park, cited by G-M. Cockram, *op. cit.* p. 23.

25. G. Lenzen, *The history of diamond production and the diamond trade.* London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1970, p. 164. See also p. 158-159.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-164.

27. Union of South Africa, Administrator's report 1919, U.G. 40-20, 1920, p. 6.

28. See, for example, C.W. de Kiewiet, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-207; C. van Onselen, *Studies in the social and economic history of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, Vol 2: New Nineveh.* Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1982, pp. 111-170; S. Trapido, *Landlord and tenant in a colonial economy.* Centre of International and Area Studies: University of

London, 1977; W.M. MacMillan, *The South African agrarian problem and its historical development*. Johannesburg: Council of Education, Witwatersrand, 1919; Report of the Carnegie Commission, *The poor white problem in South Africa* (Five volumes). Stellenbosch: Pro-Ecclesia, 1932; R. H. Davies, *Capital, state and white labour in South Africa 1900-1960: an historical materialist analysis of class formation and class relations*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979, pp. 43-143. The relationships between socio-economic and political problems in the Union and South African policies in Namibia will be examined in greater detail in chapter three below.

29. T.R.H. Davenport, *op. cit.* pp. 184-186.

30. I. Goldblatt, *op. cit.*, p. 226; G. L. Lewis, *The Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922*. MA Thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1977, p. 189.

31. Botha, Karibib - J. Smuts, 2/6/15, W. K. Hancock and J. van der Poel (eds.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 639.

32. *Rand Daily Mail*, 13/9/19, cited by G-M. Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

33. Smuts Papers, Gorges - Botha, 21/1/18. Gorges listed a number of other reasons for keeping the colony under South African rule. For example, the Germans had erected a strong tariff barrier against South African imports, so that only 12,2 per cent of South West Africa's imports came from South Africa as against more that 80 percent from Germany. Gorges saw Walvis Bay as "the key to South West Africa and to central South Africa, but without the ownership of the south-western hinterland it would be useless in the future development of those areas". Furthermore, he expressed disapproval of German colonial policies which he saw as creating "unrest" which might spread to South Africa.

34. M.W. Swanson, *op. cit.*, p. 632.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 637.

36. South West Africa (Administrator's Office), *Report on the Natives of South West Africa and their treatment by Germany*. London: HMSO , CD9146 (subsequently, SWA, Report on the Natives).

37. S.J. Schoeman, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

38. Smuts Papers, Gorges - Botha, 21/1/18.

39. *Ibid.*

40. SWA, 'Report on the Natives', p. 97.

41. *Ibid.*

42. See chapter one above.

43. For example, H. Bley, *South-West Africa under German rule 1894 - 1914*. London: Heinemann, 1971, pp. 172 & 275.

44. SWA,'Report on the Natives', p. 120.

45. E.H.L. Gorges, Preface, SWA,'Report on the Natives', p. 6.

46. Union of South Africa, Administrator's reports, 1918, U.G. 34-19, 1919, p. 5; 1919, U.G. 40 - 20, 1920, p. 6; SWA,'Report on the Natives', pp. 112-113; South West Africa (Administrator's Office) *Native Affairs Memorandum* Windhoek, 3 August 1916, (Subsequently SWA, Native Affairs Memorandum.)

47. R.W. Imishue, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

48. S.J. Schoeman, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

49. See, for example, H. Bley, *op. cit.*

50. See above, chapter three.

51. Union of South Africa, *Report of the Commission on Economic and Financial Relations between the Union of South Africa and the Mandated Territory of South West Africa.* Pretoria: Government Printer, U.G. 16 - 35, 1935.

52. State Archives, Pretoria, PM 214/8/1916, 'Report of the Administrator on the Administration of the Protectorate of South West Africa, 9th July 1915 to 31st March 1916'.

53. See above.

54. ADM 567/2, Part 3, Secretary for Protectorate - Secretary to the Prime Minister, circa 1919 - 20.

55. H. Bley, *op. cit.*., p. 171.

56. K. Gottschalk, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

57. See for example, SWA, Native Affairs Memorandum.

58. H. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 172; See also chapter one, above.

59. SWA, 'Report on the Natives', p. 112; S.J. Schoeman, *op. cit.*, p.83; H. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

60. SWA, Native Affairs Memorandum, 1916, p. 8; SWA, 'Report on the Natives', p. 111-112; S.J. Schoeman. *op cit.*, p. 84; H. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

61. S.J. Schoeman, *op. cit.*, p. 83; H. Bley, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

62. SWA, 'Report on the Natives', p. 113.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 120. See also pp. 158-159 and chapter one above. The Chief Justice of the German SWA ruled on 26/1/1911 that in "addition to the

right of the state to punish offenders, the right to inflict mild punishment upon natives cannot be entirely denied to white employers in the Protectorate. The Supreme Court has always adopted this view and sees no reason for departing therefrom. It is not feasible for the master to apply at once to the state punitive authorities in every case of insubordination or disobedience, quite apart from the fact that the great distances often make it quite impossible." ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Luderitz - Secretary, 15/6/20.

66. ADM 567/2, Part 3, Secretary for SWA - Secretary of Prime Minister, undated.

67. *Ibid.*; SWA, 'Native Affairs Memorandum', 1916, pp. 6-7.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

69. SWA, 'Report on Natives', pp. 112-113.

70. SWA, 'Native Affairs Memorandum', 1916, p. 9.

71. See chapter one, above.

72. SWA,'Report on the Natives', p. 154.

73. SWA, Official Gazette, 16/3/17.

74. SWA, 'Native Affairs Memorandum', 1916, p. 10.

75. SWA,'Report on the Natives', p. 7.

76. Union of South Africa, *Papers relating to certain cases dealt with by the Special Criminal Court for the Military Protectorate of South West Africa at its first and third sessions, with a resume of the contents of the Imperial Blue Book Cd 8371.* U.G. 22-17, 1917 (subsequently, Papers relating to certain cases).

77. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

78. See for example, Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1918, U.G. 34-19, 1919, pp. 6 and 8.

79. S.J. Schoeman, *op. cit.*, p. 87. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1918, U.G. 34-19, 1919, p. 6.

80. The following statement of an Ovambo labourer taken by Michael Scott some years later, provides a vivid illustration of the difficulties experienced by black labourers who took their complaints to the police: "These Ovambos when they go to the farms and find that some of them do not treat them well sometimes ask for a permit because they want to go to the police. The masters of course refuse them a permit and then they go off on their own to the police. When they arrive there the first question is "Where is your pass?" Reply is "I have no pass" Question "Why?" Answer is "I ran away from my master he treats me badly." Question "Where are you from?" Answer: "So and so place". Answer: "All right, because you got no pass we stick you in jail. You got no right to come here with no pass, no permit, no nothing. So you see these poor men they get the sjambok from their masters but the law

they cannot make it understand." M. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

81. See below.

82. See ADM 567/6 series.

83. ADM 567/2, Administrator's Office - Military Magistrate, Windhoek, Keetmanshoop and Karibib, 4/5/16; A.J. Water - Deputy Secretary, 20/7/16.

84. ADM 567/2, Part 2, Magistrate, Karibib - Secretary, 18/12/17.

85. ADM 567/2, Secretary of Protectorate - Secretary to Prime Minister, undated; Magistrate Gibeon - Secretary 4/6/20; Magistrate, Outjo - Secretary, 30/6/20.

86. See chapter one above.

87. See chapter three below.

88. Union of South Africa, Papers relating to certain cases. See also Union of South Africa, Administrator's report, 1918, U.G. 34 - 19, 1919, p. 1.

89. See chapter three, below.

90. See below.

91. ADM 567/2. For example the Verband der Verwertungs Vereiningungen of Windhoek complained (to the Secretary, 7/1/20) that some farmers lived more than 200kms from the nearest magistracy and might be compelled to spend 8 - 14 days away from their farms.

92. ADM 567/2, Magistrate Maltahohe - Secretary, 23/6/20; Deputy - Commissioner - Secretary, 7/5/20.

93. ADM 567/2 Deputy - Commissioner - Secretary, 7/5/20; SWA Police Warmbad - Magistrate, Warmbad, 26/7/20; Magistrate, Maltahohe - Secretary, 23/6/20.

94. ADM 567/2, Magistrate Gibeon - Secretary, 3/1/20; See also Magistrate, Windhoek - Secretary, 21/8/20.

95. SWA, Native Affairs Memorandum, 1916, p. 8.

96. W. Swanson, *op. cit.*, p. 649, See also ADM 3077.

97. See for example, Administrator's Report, 1924, U.G. 33 - 25, 1925, p. 22.

98. See chapters 4 - 7 below.

99. ADM 260/3.

100. See chapter three below.

101. ADM 567/_, eg. Verband der Verwertungs Vereinigungen - Secretary,

7/1/20 ; Agricultural Society, Karibib - Magistrate, 30/4/16.

102. ADM 567/2 Memorandum, Magistrate's Report on Native Question, 14/7/20.

103. ADM 567/2 Magistrate, Otjiwarongo - Secretary, 9/6/20. See also Magistrate, Outjo - Secretary, 30/6/20.

104. ADM 13/23, M.v.H. Nass - Magistrate, Otjiwarongo, 2/11/15; ADM 533/5 Agricultural Society, Karibib - Magistrate, 30/6/16.

105. ADM 567/2 Magistrate, Omaruru, Secretary, 21/7/20.

106. ADM 567/2 Adminstrator - Acting Prime Minister, 8/4/19.

107. *Ibid.*

108. ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Okahandja - Secretary, 18/11/17. It appears that many of the police, including its highest officers entertained notions of becoming settlers themselves. For example Gorges reported to Smuts in 1917 that "all the Constabulary are enthusiastic about the country... and I think a good many of them would like to settle here. Colonel Kruger fancies the south, and says there are places in Keetmanshoop which can not be surpassed in the Union as sheep veld.... Colonel Fouche ... fancies Rehoboth, and so, I think, do a great many more. The fact that this lazy and degenerate crew of Basters owns Rehoboth is gall and wormwood to the majority of the arme and opregte" (Afrikaners) here. I verily believe that nothing would please them better than to precipitate a row with the Bastards with the view to dispossessing the latter of their lands." Gorges - Smuts, 25/2/17. Hancock and Van Der Poel, *op. cit.*, pp. 454 - 455. Cockram comments that it is "curious" that both the Basters and Bondelswarts rebelled in the period that followed. Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 138. * poor (and) pure-bred.

109. *Ibid.*

110. ADM 567/2, Magistrate Outjo - Secretary, 30/6/20.

111. ADM 567/2, Administrator - Acting Prime Minister, 8/4/19.

112. ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Okahandja - Secretary, 9/3/20.

113. Gorges - Smuts, 25/2/17, Hancock and Van der Poel, *op. cit.*, pp. 453 -456.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 453.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 455.

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 455-456.

117. See above.

118. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1919, U.G. 40-20, 1920, p. 4. See also Administrator's Report, 1939, U.G. 30 -40, 1940, p. 14; I. Goldblatt, *op. cit.*, p. 226. The figures relating to repatriations include women and children.

119. SWA,'Report on the Natives', p. 6.

120. State Archives, Pretoria, PM 214/8/1916, Report of the Administrator on the Administration of the Protectorate of South West Africa, 9/7/1915 - 31/3/1916.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

122. ADM 13/23 M.v.H. Nass - Magistrate, Otjiwarongo, 22/11/15.

123. See for example, ADM 567/2, Agricultural Society, Karibib - Magistrate, 30/4/16; Verband der Verwertungs Vereinigingen, 7/1/20.

124. ADM 557/2, Native Affairs, Windhoek - Secretary, 15/1/17; Magistrate, Otjiwarango - Secretary, 9/6/20.

125. ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Otjiwarongo - Secretary, 9/6/20.

126. ADM 567/2, eg. Deputy Commissioner - Secretary, 7/5/20.

127. ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Maltahohe - Secretary, 23/6/20; Verband der Verwertungs Vereinigungen - Secretary, 7/1/20.

128. See ADM 567/2.

129. ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Otjiwarongo - Secretary, 9/6/20.

130. ADM 567/2, Secretary - Acting Prime Minister, undated.

131. Testimony of Fridoline Kazombiaze, M. Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

132. SWA,'The Report on the Natives', p. 6.

133. G. Lewis, *op. cit.*, for example, refers to the pathetic belief of the Bondelswarts in British justice.

134. M.W. Swanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 648-9 and above.

135. See chapters 4-7, below.

136. ADM 567/2, Deputy Commissioner - Secretary, 7/5/20.

137. ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Gibeon - Secretary, 11/6/20.

138. ADM 567/2, Secretary - All Magistrates, 16/7/20.

139. ADM 567/2, Secretary - Magistrate, Gibeon, 30/1/20.

140. SWA, 'The Report on the Natives', p. 120.

141. State Archives, Pretoria, PM 214/8/1916, 'Report of the Administrator on the Administration of the Protectorate of South West Africa', 9/7/1915 - 31/3/1916.

142. See, for example, S.J. Schoeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69; Union of South Africa, Papers relating to certain cases, p. 6.

143. State Archives, Pretoria, PM 214/8/1916.'Report of the Administrator on the Administration of the Protectorate of South West Africa', 9/7/1915 - 31/3/1916.

144. E. Genovese, *The world the slaveholders made*. New York: Vintage Books, 1971, p. 6.

145. See for example, ADM 567/2, Verband der Verwertungs Vereinigungen - Secretary, 7/1/20 and Agricultural Society, Karibib - Secretary, 30/4/1'.

146. See chapter three, below.

Chapter three

THE MANDATE AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SETTLER STATE

The years 1920-1925 represent a watershed in Namibian history, not only in terms of the new direction assumed by the colonial state, but also in the build-up of resistance to colonial rule in the territory.[1] The foundations of South African policy in Namibia were laid during this period, and were in turn to condition indigenous responses to foreign domination. The policies that took shape out of the uncertainties and ambiguities of the military period were a product of forces both within and outside the German colony. On a global scale, the creation of the League of Nations and the granting of a mandate to South Africa to rule Namibia as a part of its own territory, provided greater security for both colonial officials and settlers. The security of tenure that came with the mandate meant that the colonial administration need no longer pander to international opinion by presenting a liberal image to the world. Colonial policies could now follow colonial interests, and the benevolent paternalism of the Gorges adminstration could be stripped away to reveal the grim realities and requirements of the settler economy. With the end of the war and international recognition of South Africa's right to Namibia, the German settlers could be welcomed back into the fold as fellow whites and colonial masters. There was no longer a need, as there had been in the earlier period, to depict them as brutal and vicious in their treatment of blacks. The ranks of the colonial society were closing.[2]

However, changes in the direction of colonial policies in Namibia were not only a response to the new international status of the territory,

but also reflected the developing political crisis in South Africa. It was argued in the previous chapter that one of the major reasons for the Union wanting control over Namibia was to ease pressures in South Africa by providing land and jobs for whites in the former German colony. Rapid industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture had brought with them landlessness, unemployment, accelerating urbanization, proletarianization and social degradation for large segments of the black and white populations. It was essentially the marginalized whites, the 'poor white problem', which caused the greatest concern, and came to pose the greater threat to the South African state.[3]

With the onset of the world recession in 1920, the political crisis deepened, culminating in the 1922 Rand rebellion and the erosion of the political base of the ruling South African Party (SAP).[4] The political crisis in South Africa and the granting of the mandate therefore lent further urgency to colonial projects, and particularly settlement policies, in Namibia, while removing the major inhibitions to the active exploitation of the colony. These changes in turn increased pressures on the indigenous population, accounting for increasing resistance to the colonial state in the early 1920s. Although there had been widespread defiance of colonial authority during the military period, this had not crystallized into a confrontation with the colonial state.[5] There are several possible reasons why a general rising had not taken place during the 1915-20 period. Central to these were the nature of indigenous communities in Namibia and the conciliatory policies adopted by the colonial state during this period.

German colonial policies had shattered the social integrity of indigen-

ous communities in the police zone and, although the colonial state was particularly vulnerable during the military period, the colonized had neither the organization nor the military resources with which to challenge the colonial authorities. The consolidation of black communities was therefore essential before any attempt could be made to rise against colonial domination. However, the tenuousness of state power during this period meant not only that the state was more vulnerable, but also that it was unable to keep effective control over the black population who were able to exploit the weaknesses and loopholes in the repressive labour system and thus to consolidate their economic positions by way of the accumulation of stock and the occupation of open or government land.

Economic changes and the realignment of colonial policies

In spite of the disruption caused to the economy by the military campaign, the years during and immediately after the war provided an ideal opportunity for economic consolidation. Following the South African occupation of the territory, the military administration devoted considerable attention to restoring farming, commerce and industry in the territory.[6] Mining was resumed although on a smaller scale than previously[7] and farming flourished owing to the ready markets for farm produce during and immediately after the war. Not only did the presence of the Union garrison provide a market within the territory, but there were also excellent markets for slaughter stock both in South Africa and overseas. The abnormal prices realized for stock resulted in turn in high values being placed on land. Partly because of the high values of land and the uncertain future of the territory, few settlers entered the country during this period.[8] The smallness of the settler population in turn ensured both that the level of agricultural production would remain

low, thus maintaining the high pr: es, and that there would be more open land available for blacks to occupy either legally of illegally. Here again conditions conspired to ameliorate the conditions of blacks and to promise further improvements in the future.

However, within two years of the war the economic boom came to an end, and by 1932 the territory, along with the other parts of the world, had entered the depths of the post-war recession. The disbandment of the military garrison after the war meant that an important local market for farm produce was lost. The end of the war had also seen the reorganization of agriculture on a world scale and the consequent contraction of markets for slaughter stock and other produce both in South Africa and overseas.[9] At the same time a severe drought overtook the territory. The situation deteriorated further with the reversal of the inflow of capital from Germany to the territory and with the speculation in paper marks which resulted in numerous bankruptcies during the early 1920s.[10]

In this decade the administration also began pursuing an active settlement policy. Between 1920 and 1922, 730 settlers, mostly from the Union, were to occupy 583 holdings, comprizing 4 884 626 hectares,[11] and to provide further competition for an already shrinking market. The drought was followed by heavy floods and an infestation of locusts in 1923. In spite of the damages caused by both floods and locusts, farming in Namibia recovered temporarily. Moreover a severe drought in the Union created a good market for fat stock and large numbers of cattle were exported. However, many farmers anxious to take advantage of the improvement in the market, disposed of their best breeding stock until the administration introduced legislation to prevent a futher reduction

of breeding stock.[12] Whatever hopes were raised by the 1923 rains were dashed in 1924 when another drought occurred and locusts once again attacked crops and grazing. The territory suffered severe stock losses which in some districts amounted to 30 per cent of total holdings.[13]

In 1921 the administrator summed up the position of the mining industry as "disastrous".[14] The slump in the market for diamonds and other minerals produced in the territory, resulted in a drastic drop in production. Diamond exports which had risen from £834 314 in 1917 to £1 060 087 in 1918, £2 204 326 in 1919 and £1 599 849 in 1920, dropped steeply to £492 513 in 1921, one quarter of the previous year's figure. There was only a slight improvement in 1922 with recovery following in 1923. Thereafter diamond production continued on a fairly steady keel until 1931 when it again dropped steeply.[15] The production of other major minerals showed a similar decline during this period.[16] The situation was particularly serious for the administration which relied heavily on the diamond industry for its revenue.

As the country began entering the recession, many farmers who had overstocked or overcapitalized their farming operations during the prosperous war years, found that they were only able to sell stock at low prices, if at all.[17] However, an over-optimistic report of the Farmers' Produce Commission during the early years of the mandate had resulted in extensive investments in infrastructural development.[18] This together with the administration's heavy reliance on an unstable mining industry had the effect of committing the state to a long-termed settlement policy.

The early mandate years also saw a partial rapprochement between the

administration and the German settler community. Furthermore, the settlement policy of the administration began changing the composition of the white population in favour of the South African component. The new administration of the mandated territory clearly saw its major aim as bringing the administrative and legislative structures of Namibia in line with those in South Africa. In his report for 1920, the administrator stated that

> (u)nderlying the whole of the measures introduced has been the principle laid down by the Treaty of Versailles, under which the Territory is to be governed as "an integral part of the Union of South Africa".19

With the establishment of the mandate, a more sympathetic policy was adopted to the settler community. Early in 1921 an Advisory Council was appointed to represent settler interests. The Council consisted of six members selected by the administrator, and represented "farming, commercial, mining, wage-earning and native interests". Government officials were not eligible for appointment except in the case of the member appointed to represent "native interests".[20] There are strong indications that the Advisory Council helped influence administrative policies in relation to the indigenous population. In 1921, for example, the administrator stated that he had sought the advice of the Council on a number of issues including native reserves, the pass laws, the masters and servants proclamation, the branding of small and large stock, and the dog tax.[21] As we shall see, all these issues were to have an important bearing on black protest and resistance during this period.[22] By 1922 the Advisory Council was expanded to nine members, with four representing farming interests, two commercial interests and one each for mining, white labour and native administration.[23] The administration's attitude to the settler community was clearly illustrated by the

administrator when he addressed a conference of district magistrates in 1920. The magistrates, said the administrator, were "the chief agents of the administration":

> They were there to direct and cheer the would-be settler, and to assist and protect him once he had anchored himself; it was equally their duty to protect the native as to punish idleness and vagrancy, and to see that all available labour was utilized - they were, in fact, *the golden bridge between the farmer and the native labourer.*24

Soon after the granting of the mandate a Farmers' Produce Commission was appointed to investigate the export market problems of farmers in the territory. The Commission which consisted of white farmers and businessmen, gave a highly optimistic report of the country's agricultural potential, claiming that it could carry between two and three million head of cattle in addition to a large number of small stock.[25] According to D.W. Ballot, it was largely as a result of this report that the administration committed itself to extensive infratructural developments and speeded up its land settlement programme,[26] with little or no regard for black interests. Ballot's comments on the administration's policy, which was to prove economically disastrous even for the settler community, are an accurate reflection of the administration's approach to the question of land distribution at this time:

> ...an administrator who neglected settling and developing the *waste places* of the country in the face of so favourable a report on the Territory's potentialities... might possibly have been regarded as criminally negligent of the country's interests.27

At the same time as land was being made available for white settlers, the administration was in the process of creating the long-awaited reserves for blacks. Already in 1921 the administrator reported in relation to black reserves that "at this late stage there are difficult-

ies in the way of procuring sufficient or suitable ground on account of vested rights having to be considered."[28] Yet in 1924 in a similar report, the administrator stated that there were "hundreds of good farms"[29] still awaiting settlers. Clearly different standards governed the availability of land for blacks and whites in the territory.

Land settlement policy

During the military period from 1915 to 1920, no legislation existed under which land settlement could be carried out. Although the administration[30] generally discouraged settlement during this period, a number of stock farmers crossed into Namibia from South Africa and were issued with grazing or occupation licences in the southern parts of the territory. In 1920, however, the land settlement laws in force in the Union were applied to the territory and a Land Board was established to facilitate settlement.[31] Initially the jurisdiction of settlement in the colony fell under the Union government, but with the withdrawal of martial law in 1920, this was transferred to the SWA administration. The first settlers under the new scheme were granted farms in the Warmbad and Keetmanshoop districts towards the end of 1920[32] - a fact which, as we shall see, was not unconnected to the outbreak of rebellion in this area in 1922.[33] From the start generous assistance was given to the settlers and early in 1921 a Land Bank, similar to that in the Union, was established.[34]

Without even taking into consideration black land needs, the decision to launch a large-scale settlement programme in the later half of 1920 was at best ill-timed. The first signs of the post-war recession began to manifest themselves in about September 1920 when business began dropping

off and the price of stock fell.[35] By 1921 the combined effects of recession and drought were already taking their toll of both new settlers and established white farmers. Rather than back down on its settlement programme, the administration continued to dispose of land in vast quantities. Between 1920 and 1923 662 farms comprizing 5 650 087 hectares were provided for 831 settlers. The largest allocations were made in 1921, 245 farms comprizing 2 125 154 hectares. After 1921 the number of farms allocated declined to 169 (1 163 600 hectares) in 1922 and 79 (765 461 hectares) in 1923.[36] With the height of the drought in 1923, fewer farms were allocated because of the difficulties of finding water supplies. The demand for farms also declined because of the effects of the recession on prospective settlers from the Union.[37]

Instead of restricting the inflow of settlers, the administration adopted a short-sighted and finally disastrous policy of providing extensive aid to the strickened white farming community. At the end of 1921 important amendments were made to the land settlement legislation to provide more favourable conditions for settlers. Provisions were made for the remission of rent owed to the Land Board. The already generous provisions for loans (£500 for the purchase of stock and farming implements, £400 for permanent improvements, and the costs of boring operations which were added to the purchase price) were substantially improved. The minimum capital requirements for settlers was lowered from £500 to £250 and a new provision was introduced to cover the transport costs of not only the settler and his family, but also his furniture, farming implements and breeding stock.[38]

Unusually generous conditions for settlers characterized the administration's policy until 1935, when the collapse of the farming industry

which followed in the wake of the 1929 to 1933 depression, could be ignored no longer even by the myopic authorities. From 1935 farms were allotted for a probational period of one year, without financial assistance or improvements, and settlers' tenure of their farms depended on the success they were able to make of their farming operations. These measures prevented settlers from over-capitalizing their operations and living beyond their means. According to an official assessment made in 1939, the new policy was proving a success.[39]

Prior to these changes, however, the Land Settlement Commission[40] was to report in 1935 that the misguided settlement policy was largely responsible for the precarious position in which the majority of farmers found themselves. The Commission also drew attention to such difficulties as droughts, inadequate water supplies, stock diseases, predators, transport costs, low prices, and the lack of markets. The main thrust of the report, however, focused on the hasty and inefficient implementation of the settlement policy and the "liberal loan policy" followed by the administration:

> In the opinion of the Commission the liberal policy as regards advances is likewise one of the great causes why many of the settlers are today economically unsound eg. advances for dwelling houses, fences, camps, kraals, reservoirs, dipping tanks etc.41

Advances were granted without proper supervision or control. Loans for dwelling houses were not merely offered to the settlers, "but were also practically forced on him, even before he was able to frame his plans as to the general development of the farm and before he had gathered sufficient knowledge of the economic value of the farm."[42]

The native reserves policy

If the settlement policy pursued by the administration was detrimental to settler agriculture, it was doubly disastrous for the indigenous population. The vigorous settlement policy not only meant that very little land was provided for blacks, but also that the administration, in a bid to save the ailing white farming community, adopted radical measures to force blacks onto the labour market. Colonial land and labour policies under both German and South African rule were of course closely interconnected, with the demand for labour as the primary determinant.

For Gysbert Hofmeyr, the man who headed the administration between 1920 and 1926, there was no doubt that the "native question" was "synonomous" with both the "labour question" and the "land question".[43] The "labour question", however, took precedence. Towards the end of 1920 Hofmeyr appointed a small commission to investigate the supply of labour in the territoy. The following year both the membership and terms of the commission were expanded and it was charged with making recommendations for "the allotment of suitable areas for permanent native reserves".[44] It was this commission which laid the basis for the reserves policy adopted by the administration.

The policy which began to take shape during the early mandate period was rooted in conditions that had prevailed during the transitional military period. At the very basis of these conditions was a fundamental contradiction between earlier German policies and those of the military administration during the war. German native and labour policies not only depended on a highly repressive and decentralized system of regulation, but also on expropriation of the land of the majority of blacks in the

police zone. The existence of a landless work force completely dependent on employment in the settler economy was reinforced by the restrictions placed on the possession of livestock by blacks. With the removal of the ban on large stock, the creation of a system of labour exemption for black stock owners, and the loosening of other labour controls during the military occupation, the numbers of black-owned stock increased rapidly.[45] With the increase of black-owned stock, the need for land, particularly among those groups which had been dispossessed, also increased.

No definite reserves policy was formulated during the military period. Those black areas which were recognized by German treaties were preserved, and a limited number of government farms were set aside as temporary reserves for Hereros and Namas.[46] For the most part, however, it appears that black stock owners were able to obtain grazing through their own efforts. In a number of cases open Crown land was simply occupied. For example, Hoachanas, an area just outside Rehoboth, which before the war had been a mission station and police camp, was occupied by Namas during the invasion.[47] In other cases government, municipal or private land was hired for grazing. Squatting on white farms also became common particularly as it ensured a supply of labour under conditions of chronic shortage.[48] Many black stock owners also moved into the Rehoboth reserve as squatters, or hired grazing land from the Basters. In fact the Rehoboth community became so dependent on black payments for grazing or squatting rights that it suffered a serious economic set-back when blacks were moved to the reserves after the Rehoboth rebellion.[49]

The establishment of temporary reserves held its own problems. Besides the common settler complaint that potential black labourers were being "idle" in the reserves, the creation of small and overcrowded reserves near white farms, resulted in conflict between black and white stock owners. For example, the Orumba and Okatumba reserves established for Hereros in the Windhoek district in 1916, attracted large numbers of cattle owners and were soon overcrowded. In 1917 the superintendent of locations reported that stock was coming into the reserves at a rate of about 400 head a week. He estimated that Orumba which was 9 500 hectares in extent, could accommodate no more than 500 cattle and 6 000 small stock, while Okatumba (4 500 hectares) would hold about 400 cattle and 2 000 small stock.[50] By May 1918 the two reserves were already carrying 1 900 cattle and between 2 000 and 3 000 small stock.[51] An official count in August 1918 revealed that there were more than 2 000 cattle and 5 000 small stock on the two reserves.[52] With the overstocking of these reserves, friction with neighbouring farmers became inevitable. As a superintendent of reserves reported in May 1918:

> ... it is impossible where there are over thirteen hundred head of cattle together, as is the case on Orumba, a farm of approximately 9 500 hectares, to prevent a few head of cattle from straying on to the adjoining farms ...[53]

The three-cornered conflict between occupants of the Orumba reserve, neighbouring white farmers and the administration reached a head in 1919, when the officer-in-charge of Native Affairs for Windhoek, Captain O. Bowker, burned down all the huts in a certain part of the reserve because cattle had strayed into neighbouring white farms.[54] In September 1919 a deputation of Hereros from Orumba went to Windhoek to see the Secretary for South West Africa to complain about Bowker's harsh action and the overcrowding of the reserves.[55] Thereafter conflict centring on

Orumba and other temporary reserves grew. These reserves became less and less able to support the stock of their occupants. Neighbouring white farmers continued to complain about stock thefts and trespassing of reserve cattle. The acting-magistrate of Windhoek reported in 1922 that "there is considerable risk of violence breaking out between the farming and native community of that locality (ie. Orumba) in the near future unless some immediate steps are taken by the Administration to relieve the congestion in the reserve."[56]

Even before this, however, the administration had decided to abandon Orumba and the other temporary reserves.[57] In 1916 the Native Affairs Department was investigating the possibility of establishing more extensive and consolidated reserves in order to prevent conflict between blacks and white settlers and to facilitate control.[58] The Report on Native Affairs for 1917 stated that "(f)rom more than one point of view the retension of Okatumba and Orumba, which are situated in the heart of the populated area and surrounded by European farmers, is undesirable."[59] It is clear that as early as 1916 the administration has decided to retain the best farm land for the settlers. In that year Captain Bowker of the Native Affairs Department had taken a group of headmen on a tour of an area proposed as a future reserve. The response of the headmen to the proposed reserve was anything but favourable:

> They are however not favourably impressed with the country, shrewdly observing that all the land in that part of the country suitable for farming is occupied by the white man.... It may be mentioned in this connection that the possibility of a settlement has given rise in the native mind to a dream of again occupying their old haunts, which are, as is well known, west of Windhoek northwards...60

Black land demands, particularly in the post-war period, also played an important role in shaping the reserves policy. The occupation of the

territory by South African forces raised expectations among blacks that at least some of the land taken from them by the Germans would be returned.[61] Early in 1916, for example, the magistrate of Grootfontein reported that Hereros who were previously resident in the northern parts of the territory were moving southwards and "from facts already on record it is clear that these people hope, eventually, to be permitted to occupy at least a portion of the country from which they were expelled by the German Government."[62] Expectations of this sort were not exclusive to the Hereros. The largely Nama community at Hoachanas were reported in 1916 as subscribing to the belief that the "English came to give us back our land and re-establish us as a nation."[63]

Expectations of being granted land were raised again at the end of war and when the Mandate was established.[64] On both occasions these expectations were rudely disappointed. In August 1919 Captain Bowker announced the end of the war to the residents of Orumba. The war, he said, signalled an important change in the laws and government of the country. Rather than mention land claims, the Native Affairs officer upbraided the residents for not standing up and taking off their hats when an officer of the administration approached:

> Now on the first day of the new government this is the first lesson I will have you learn. When your officer leaves his house to open his office, you will rise and greet him.[65]

By the early 1920s expectations were giving way to frustration and resentment. In the context of mounting resistance, the administration was forced to pay at least some attention to black land demands. The provision of reserves, it was felt, would help to defuse the situation in bringing about more "settled conditions, contentment".[66] The Bondel-

swart rebellion of 1922 had clearly demonstrated to the administration that even a seemingly isolated and easily repressed revolt could have major diplomatic repercussions. It is therefore significant that in his report for 1922 the administrator maintained that the delimitation and occupation of reserves had "done much to allay the undoubted unrest which existed among the Natives."[67]

Perhaps the central motivation of the administration in establishing reserves, however, revolved around the question of control. On one level, this involved removing the contradictions that had emerged in colonial policies during the military period. Remnants of German policy which clashed with South African policy had to be removed and the country brought into line with administrative practice in the Union. On another, more practical level, however, were a variety of considerations relating to administrative convenience and the facilitation of control. On this level larger, more consolidated reserves were preferred to smaller, fragmented reserves, while any form of government-controlled reserve was preferable to squatter communities on white farms, or in the Rehoboth *Gebiet*. Because the administration was manned largely by recruits from the Union civil service, these practical considerations tended to merge with the more abstract requirements of consistency with Union policies.

Some of the contradictions that faced the administration of the mandated territory were inherited from the German administration. The Germans had not dispossessed all blacks in the police zone. Certain reserves such as the Rehoboth *Gebiet*, the Okambahe reserve for Damaras, and reserves of the Bondelswarts and Bersaba Namas were maintained and were recognized by German treaties. The abolition of these reserves would have been

unacceptable to the League of Nations and would have resulted in protracted resistance in the territory. Yet the continued existence of these reserves was inconsistent with the complete dispossession of the Hereros and the majority of the Namas. This inconsistency was exacerbated by the decision of the military administration to relax the restrictions on the ownership of stock by blacks. The newly aquired stock had clearly to be accommodated somewhere. The creation of small temporary reserves therefore raised more problems than it solved. Furthermore, the existence of a substantial landless population accelerated urbanization and encouraged squatting.

The administration was opposed to both tendencies, mainly because it made control more difficult. The administrator stated in 1922 that it was "undesirable to allow surplus natives (*sic*) of various races to crowd into municipal locations and similar places, where, even under the best control ... they generally deteriorate physically and morally besides embarrassing the white population in regard to the use of commonages and water."[68] "Everything possible", the administrator said, should be done to encourage both blacks and whites "to go back to the land".[69] Already in 1917 it had been pointed out that if blacks were allowed to keep stock in the reserves, they would be less likely to migrate to the towns and perhaps more amenable to farm labour.[70] For the administration, urbanized blacks provided a marked contrast to those in the reserves, particulary those in the isolated northern part of the territory. For a number of reasons which will be examined later, labourers from these northern areas were both cheaper and easier to control.[71]

Contradictions between the settlement and reserves policies

Thus, at the beginning of the 1920s there were a variety of ready reasons for embarking on an extensive reserves policy in the police zone. However, the establishment of reserves conflicted with the administration's vigorous settlement programme. Even more important, a reversal of the process of proletarianization set in motion by the German administration would negate the administration's attempts to extract a sufficient supply of labour under conditions of chronic shortage. The dilemma was summed up by administrator in 1921:

> The majority of the population is still living in accordance with native custom in the Ovamboland, Okavango and Kakoaveld areas, and although the progress of civilization and the country's economic requirements do not permit of a reversion to or extension of the tribal system, these people as a rule are more amenable to authority and require less supervision than those who, after years of contact with Europeans, have lost much that was good in their old code and acquired some of the vices connected with civilized centres.72

In South Africa the major thrust of native policy was to frame legislative and administrative devices to draw labour out of the reserves.[73] German colonial policies had attempted the proletarianization of a majority of the population in the police zone by means of military force. The existence of a large landless population, however, posed problems of control for the South African administration in the territory. The policy that emerged during the early 1920s was therefore an attempt to steer a course between the two apparently contradictory demands of establishing reserves (in order to facilitate control, reverse, or at least control, black urbanization, and standardize administrative procedures) and at the same time ensure an adequate supply of labour. As the Native Affairs official Captain Bowker pointed out in 1916, the two goals were not necessarily incompatible:

> ... it may prove more economical to consider the possibility of establishing one large settlement for all the Protectorate Natives in an area such as the Kaokoveld, where the natives would be entirely segregated from the European

> farming community, and from which, through economic pressure, they would be forced to seek employment, the labour market thus not being seriously affected; on the contrary, it is felt, that such a course would act as a stimulus to labour, for the natives would be under closer control and the payment of such taxes as may be levied could be effectually enforced and such money would have to be earned.74

In broad outline therefore the policy of the early mandate administration made provision for the creation of reserves to accommodate the residents of the temporary reserves, squatters on both white farms and in the Rehoboth *Gebiet*, and the "surplus" populations of the urban areas. The amount of land allocated was, however, strictly controlled. Furthermore, land was allocated largely in those areas of the country which were less suitable for farming. A variety of economic pressures such as grazing fees, dog taxes and the strict control of "informal sector" economic activities, were imposed to facilitate the efflux of migrant labour. These measures were incorporated into an over-arching system of legislative and administrative controls which applied to all blacks in the country.

The findings of the Native Reserves Commission in 1922 laid the basis for this policy. Its major recommendations were that (i) the country should be more clearly segregated into black and white settlement areas; (ii) squatting on white farms should be prevented; (iii) there should be more efficient control of the reserves; (iv) reserves which were recognized by German treaties should be maintained, but the temporary reserves established during the military period should be closed; (v) new reserves (which did not disturb "vested rights") should be established; and (vi) further land should be earmarked for the future extension of these reserves. An "extensive area" to the east of the Gobabis and Omaterberg districts and bordering on Bechuanaland was recommended.[75]

This area fell in the Sandveld or Kalahari region which although attractive in appearance, lacks surface water and has grazing with low protein and phospherous contents. The low phospherous content of grazing was particulary serious because it caused *gallamsiekte* or "sandveld disease".[76] The administrator reported in 1918 that where cases of *gallamsiekte* had occurred, white farmers had been advised to move their cattle elsewhere.[77] Although the South African Native Land Act (no. 27 of 1913) was not made a law of the territory until 1928,[78] the general principles of this Act were applied *de facto* to the territory at least from the beginning of the mandate period. In 1921, for example, the Prime Minister's Office informed the Secretary for South West Africa that in the absence of legislation like the 1913 Land Act in the territory:

> The Acting Prime Minister is of the opinion that the South-West Africa Administration should divide the country roughly into what will ultimately become native areas and European areas respectively, then to apply the same policy as in the Union.[79]

During the military occupation blacks were prevented from acquiring legal title to land (without permission of the government) by Section One of the Ordinance of the Imperial Governor dated 18 August 1907 which remained in force for the duration of the South African occupation. However, in terms of proclamation 21 of 1919 all laws which were in conflict with the tenets of Roman Dutch law as applicable in the Cape Province, were repealed. In the view of the Attorney-General of SWA in 1926, the 1907 ordinance was also repealed and there was not "anything in the law of this Territory which makes illegal the acquisition of the ownership of land by a native."[80] As late as 1948 there still appeared to be some doubt as to the applicability of the Imperial Ordinance in

the minds of both the Registar of Deeds and the Attorney-General.[81] Such legal niceties, however, did not appear to influence the early Mandate administration in its strict application of territorial segregation in Namibia.

Segregation allowed the administration to keep rigorous control over both the allocation of land and the communities that were establish on it. With the exception of the 998 101 hectares that made up the reserves recognized by the German treaties, the only land that could be occupied by blacks was that allocated by the administration. This not only allowed the adminstration to determine the amount and location of land occupied by blacks, but also to charge grazing fees for this land. In this way, farmlands could be reserved for white settlers and economic pressures could be put on the reserves to supply the required labour. Furthermore, the granting of land could, as the administrator pointed out in his 1922 report, be made conditional on "good behaviour".[82]

In terms of the 1921 recommendations of the Native Reserves Commission, 655 650 hectares would be allocated for the proposed reserves and a further 636 881 hectares "earmarked for reserves in case of future extension, or of unsuitability of the proposed reserves." Together with the reserves that had been created during the German period, the total allocation of land for Africans, as envisaged by the Commission, amounted to 2 237 874 hectares.[83] This was only slighted more than the 2 125 154 hectares that had been allocated to 311 settlers in 1921 alone.

In spite of the meagreness of the proposed areas, the opening of the reserves was delayed by drought and inadequate water supplies.[84] By the end of 1903, 634 000 hectares had been allocated. The insignificance of this area can be gauged from a comparison with the more than 1,9 million hectares allocated for settlers in 1922 and 1923 at the height of the drought. A further 349 782 hectares were added to the reserves in 1924 and about 754 360 in 1925.[85] With the proclamation of Otjimbingwe (77 498 hectares) after 1925, the programme of the Reserves Commission was completed.[86] In 1925 the various reserves in the territory accommodated a total population of 11 740 people, as well 49 250 large stock and 227 834 small stock.[87] Information relating to the size of the reserves established during the first five years of the Mandate is given in table 3.1 below, while comparative figures relating to settlement between 1920 and 1925 are presented in table 3.2.

TABLE 3.1: RESERVES ESTABLISHED DURING EARLY MANDATE PERIOD[88]

Reserves recognized by German treaties	998 101 ha
Reserves established in 1922/23	634 000 ha
Land allocated in 1924	349 782 ha
Land allocated in 1925	754 360 ha
Otjimbingwe (proclaimed after 1925)	77 498 ha
TOTAL	2 813 741 ha
Total population of all reserves, 1925:	11 740
Stock on all reserves, 1925:	
Large stock	49 250
Small stock	227 834

TABLE 3.2: WHITE SETTLEMENT DURING THE EARLY MANDATE PERIOD[89]

Year	No. of holdings	No. of settlers	Area in Hectares.
1920	169	203	1,595,873

1921	245	311	2,125,154
1922	169	216	1,163,600
1923	79	101	765,461
1924	123	157	1,047,322
1925	95	118	783,961
	880	1,106	7,481,371

Because of the differing quality of land allocated, a direct comparison of the quantities of land set aside for white settlement and black reserves is difficult. However, the fact that about 28 times more land per person was allocated to settlers during the first five years of the mandate than was allowed for all blacks in the police zone during the same period, provides a rough but clear indication of administrative priorities.

The implementation of the reserves policy, based *de facto* on the 1913 Native Land Act, excluded the private transfer of land to blacks and ensured that the administration retained complete control over the allocation of land. Both the quantity and quality of land occupied by blacks could be controlled to ensure that there would be no obstacle from that quarter to the administration's vigorous settlement policy and to guarantee a continuous flow of labour to mines, farmers and other white enterprizes. In spite of the small quantities of land set asides for reserves, other measures were also used to ensure the continued supply of labour. A system of grazing fees was introduced early during the military period. In 1917, for example, £3 782 was collected in grazing fees. Although there is no breakdown of the relative sums contributed by blacks and whites, it is clear that the larger part must have come from blacks who held 1 475 of the 1 733 grazing licences and leases effective during that period.[90]

With the establishment of reserves during the early Mandate period, grazing fees were extended to all reserves with the exception of those granted under German treaty. Stock was taxed on a sliding scale with the obvious intention of limiting the number of stock kept on the reserves. Thus large stock was taxed on the basis of 2d. per head per mensem for one to 25 head, and 3d. for herds of 26 or more. Similary the grazing fees for small stock was 1/4d. for herds of 100 or less and 1/2d. for those above 100.[91] The strategic aims of grazing fees are clear from the report of the Natives Reserve Commission of 1928.[98] The major aim of the Commission was to devize measures to ensure the steady flow of labour form the reserves. It recommended stricter control over both the occupants of reserves and their livestock. In order to ensure control over black stock and increase the labour supply, the Commission recommended a new scale of grazing fees, which in effect doubled the fees of reserve residents below the age of 55 (in other words, all potential labourers), and placed further economic pressures on owners of large herds. The Commission concluded its comments on the new grazing fees scales with the following statement:

> Owing to the urgency of the labour problem and the fact that there are too many natives in the reserves, we cannot too strongly recommend the above.92

In the reserves recognized by German treaties, grazing taxes were not imposed. However, a dog tax, also based on a sliding scale, was levied under Proclamation No 16 of 1921.[93] Particularly in the early 1920s the dog tax proved an effective instrument for forcing labourers from these reserves onto the labour market and was an important contributory cause of the Bondelswart rising in 1922.

As noted earlier, the reserves policy implemented during the first five years of the Mandate was incorporated into a general framework of legislation controlling the employment, movement and economic activities of blacks in the police zone. A series of laws aimed at tightening the controls introduced during the military period, was passed between 1920 and 1922.[94] The Vagrancy Law (Proclamation 25 of 1920) made it punishable offence for a person to "wander abroad" without "visible lawful means or insufficient lawful means of support." This law also made provision for the removal of squatters from Crown and mission land or land set aside for native locations. Further measures to control both squatting and the movement of blacks were introduced under the Native Administration Proclamation (No. 11 of 1922). This law not only aimed at controlling the movement of blacks within the territory, but also movements of blacks entering or leaving the territory: In all such cases permits dependent on the "discretion" of the administration, were required. As we shall see below, these measures provided an important means of controlling the various black organizations established during this period. The Native Administration Proclamation also made it 'llegal for blacks to squat on private property unless they were employed by the owners or leasees of the property or had obtained the permission of the administration. The number of families employed on farms and other properties were also limited to ten.

In 1921 the branding of all cattle was made compulsory (Proclamation No. 36). Although this law applied to both blacks and whites, it required that branding irons allocated to blacks be kept by local administration officials and that the branding of black-owned cattle be conducted under the supervision of the local authorities. Other measures such as the

curfew regulation (Proclamation 33 of 1922) and regulations for the management and control of locations (Government Notice 45 of April 1921) aimed at the control of blacks in the urban areas. Following the implementation of the reserves policy, the administration aimed to reduce (or at least control) the number of blacks in the urban areas because urban townships proved more difficult to control and insulate from outside influences. It would appear that the administration was at least partly successful in this aim in that the black populations of Windhoek and Okahandja decreased between 1921 and 1925.[95] Rural or reserve-based populations were easier to control for a number of reasons. Indigenous ("traditional") institutions and tribal authorities were relatively easy to manipulate and recruit as agents of the colonial administration. Because agrarian communities are tied to the land, they have fewer alternatives when economic pressures are brought to bear on them. Furthermore, rural communities can be more easily isolated from external political influences than urban communities. Lastly, if rural communities are organized according to tribes and ethnic groups, they can provide an important barrier to nationalist or populist organizations and the unity of the oppressed.

Conclusion

To sum up, the first five years of the mandate saw an important shift in colonial policies, away from the limited reformism of the military period and towards a more rigorous system of control. In part this shift was a result of the administration's need to rationalize its policies, both by bringing them more in line with those in the Union and by resolving the contradictions that had arisen from the blending of South African and German colonial policies during the military period.

What is most striking about the development of colonial policies during the first five years of the mandate was the degree to which the interests of settler farmers shaped both colonial policies and anti-colonial resistance in the police zone. The dominant tendency in the recent historiography of Namibia has been to see colonial policies of this period evolving in response to the requirements of British capital represented by the large mining operations in the territory. There is a good case for arguing that the settlement policy so vigorously pursued by the adminstration was a by-product of industrialization in the Union and the attempts of the Union government to alleviate the dislocations this had caused among the white population. However, to go on to argue that the colonial policies which aro. in response to settler interests also served the interests of British or South African capital, is to blur the distinction between the causes and effects of the settlement policy. While industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture in South Africa may be seen as influencing the policies that evolved in Namibia, it is nevertheless important to draw a clear distinction between the requirements of white settler farmers in Namibia and those of industrial and commercial capital in South Africa.

The Namibian mines played a very small part in determining the evolution of native and labour policies in the police zone as they drew the great majority of their labour from beyond the boundaries of this zone. In order to minimize competition for labour between different sectors of the economy, the administration had segmented the black labour force, reserving Ovambo and other migrant labour for the mines, and police zone labour for the farms.

It has already been established that settler agriculture in Namibia, particularly during the first five years of the mandate, was extremely vulnerable.[96] Besides the difficulties experienced in relation to shortages of capital, distances from markets, and the fluctuating prices of agricultural produce, white farmers were particularly vulnerable to the severe ecological conditions that characterize this rain-deficient area. The major implication of the economic vulnerablity of the settler farmers was that they were able to pay only the lowest wages, and in times of drought or recession many farmers paid their labourers in kind, or even failed to make any form of payment.

The situation of the mining industry, particularly the diamond mines, provides a significant contrast. Because of their stronger economic positions the mines were able to pay more competitive wages - although they did so only under pressure. For example, from the start of South African rule in Namibia, Ovambo migrant workers showed a distinct preference for mine labour above farm labour, at least in part because of the higher wages paid by the mines. The mines also showed a greater readiness to improve living conditions in their compounds when their labour force was threatened or they were subjected to pressure by the administration. While the overall wage structure in Namibia was lower than that in South Africa, and the Namibian mines clearly took advantage of this, they could afford in times of labour shortages to recruit labour from the Union and other parts of southern Africa. This option was not open to farmers. Structural differences between farming and mining also affected the ways in which these two sectors responded to financial crises. For the mines the most common strategy in times of financial stress (for example, a sharp drop in the demand and prices of diamonds and other minerals), was to stop or limit production, thus

cutting down on production and labour costs. This is one of the reasons why the mines preferred a migrant labour force. Farmers on the other hand could not cut down on their labour force without risking heavy stock losses. Their responses to financial crises precipitated by drought or a drop in the price of farm produce, was to reduce wages or to substitute wages with payment in kind.

The extreme economic vulnerablity of settler farmers in Namibia thus made them heavily dependent on extra-economic coercion, on the political and the military power of the state. At various stages in the history of Namibia the intervention of the state has been crucial.

While an element of compulsion is characteristic of all systems of labour extraction, a clear distinction may be made between those systems which rely on political power to extract labour and those which are primarily dependent on the labour market. It is essentially on the basis of this distinction that Barrington Moore's identification of "labour repressive systems" hinges.[97] Extra-economic coercion is also seen as a major distinguishing feature of feudalism in the debate over the transition of Europe to capitalism.[98]

The work of Stanley Greenberg also traces the origins of racial domination to the essentially coercive nature of pre-capitalist agrarian relations between dominant and subordinate classes:

> Coercive methods of organizing agricultural production and a labour force and later maintaining them in the face of expanding markets were as much a part of colonial history as Livingstone's expedition to the Zambezi and Magellan's circumnavigation of the world.[99]

In a more formalistic manner, Jeffery Paige spells out these issues in

clear and unambiguous terms. Dominant landed classes are dependent on the state both for the control of land and the repression and disenfranchisement of those classes which provide their labour force:

> Since free markets do not favour the landed upper class and more efficient forms of production threaten its existence as a class, it must adopt a rigid opposition to completely free markets. The continued existence of the landed upper class in the agricultural export economy depends, therefore, on political restrictions on the working of the markets in land, labour and capital.... The economic weakness of the landed upper class forces it to rely on political means to attain economic objectives.100

In the precarious physical environment of Namibia, the dependence of settler farmers on the political, and at times military, intervention of the state for their survival was intensified. In spite of large injections of financial aid from the state, settler agriculture maintained only a tenuous hold in Namibia, and although profits increased after 1935, the vicissitudes of climate continued to play havoc with the economic security of farmers. In the final analysis, the forms and strategies of agricultural production adopted by settler farmers was inappropriate to the environment and could only survive by exacting an increasingly heavier toll from the indigenous population. In a recent study of agriculture in Namibia, Richard Moorsom exposes the heart of the matter:

> One of the most fundamental contradictions in a semi-arid environment is the ecological rigidity of relative small-scale private enterprize farming in an environment which requires flexible methods and very extensive units of pasture management. The divisions of the hardveld into a mosaic of fixed separate ranches deprived stockfarming of the mobility over wide areas which in pre-colonial times was a crucial means of coping with an unreliable rainfall.101

Endnotes for chapter three

1. The resistance of the indigenous population during this period is examined in some detail in section three (Chapters 4 - 7) of this dissertation.

2. About half of the German population of Namibia, consisting mainly of administrative and military officials, was repatriated in 1919. The remaining Germans were incorporated into the settler population and provision was made for them to assume South African citizenship (See for example, Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1939, U.G. 30-40, 1940, pp. 14-16). In 1926 the SWA Legislative Assembly adopted a resolution to the effect that copies of the 1918 Imperial Blue Book, 'Report on the Natives of South West Africa and their treatment by Germany', should be removed from official files and libraries and destroyed. This proposal was later implemented. (H. Drechsler, *Let us die fighting.* London: Zed Press, 1980, pp. 10-11).

3. W.M. MacMillan, *The South African agrarian problem and its historial development.* Johannesburg: Witwatersrand Council of Education, 1919; J.F.W. Grosskopf,'Rural impoverishment and rural exodus', *Report of the Carnegie Commission: the poor white problem in South Africa,* Vol 1. Stellenbosh: Pro Ecclesia, 1932; C.W. de Kiewiet, *A history of South Africa: social and economic.* London: Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 178-207; C. van Onselen, *Studies in the social and economic history of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914: Vol. 2, New Nineveh.* Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1982; R.H. Davies, *Capital, state and white labour in South Africa 1900 -1960.* Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1979.

4. Davis *op. cit.,* p. 159; T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: a modern history.* Johannesburg: MacMillan, 1977, pp. 187-196 and 410-411.

5. Resistance was of course not completely absent during the military period. Military conflict had taken place between the Ukuanyama and the Union forces in 1917 and there were indications that the Bondelswarts were planning to rebel during the same period. However, special circumstances surrounded both the campaign against the Ukuanyama and the abortive revolt of the Bondelswarts in 1917. Mandume's rebellion against the administration was closely tied to developments in Angola and with the specific circumstances of the Ukuanyamas which straddled the border between Namibia and Angola. That the Bondelswarts rather than some other black group in the police zone seem to have come closest to an active rebellion during this period was also associated with unusual circumstances - the degree to which their economy was disrupted during the war and the apparent inability of the state to provide relief. See chapters 4 and 8, below.

6. University of the Witwatersrand Library, Smuts Papers, A 842/B1, Ballot, D.W.F.E., Memorandum, 20/7/1935 (subsequently, Ballot memo.), p. 7.

7. See, for example, mining figures for diamonds and copper, 1910-1927, in Union of South Africa,'Report of the Government of the Union of South Africa on South-West Africa for the year 1927' (U.G. 31-28). Cape Town: Cape Times, 1928, p. 87.

8. Ballot memo, p. 7.

9. See for example, Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1920, U.G. 26 - 21, 1921.

10. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 7.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

12. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1923, U.G. 21 - 24, 1924, p. 7.

13. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1924, U.G. 33 - 25, 1925, p. 15.

14. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 20.

15. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1927, U.G. 31 - 28, 1928, p. 87; Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1931, U.G. 17 - 32, 1932, p. 121.

16. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 20.

17. Ballot memo., p. 8.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-12.

19. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1920, U.G. 26 - 21, 1921, p. 1.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

21. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 5.

22. See chapters 4 - 7, below.

23. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 3.

24. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 5. (Emphasis added)

25. Ballot memo., pp. 9-11.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

28. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 13.

29. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1924, U.G. 33 - 25, 1925, p. 51.

30. ADM 940, Major F. Muller - Secretary, 20/1/16; Administrator's Office - Magistrate, Griqualand West, 2/2/16.

31. A312, Item 25, 'Land settlement in SWA, 1939'. This judgement needs to be seen in perspective. Although the commercial agricultural sector did recover in the late 1930s and 1940s, its recovery was at least partly dependent on abundant supplies of very cheap contract labour. See chapter nine below.

32. *Ibid.*

33. See chapter 4, below.

34. A312, Item 25; Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1919, U.G. 40 - 20, 1920, p. 5.

35. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1920, U.G. 26 - 21, 1921, p. 6.

36. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1923, U.G. 21 - 24, 1924, p. 38.

37. *Ibid.*

38. A312, Item 25, 'Memorandum: Amending land settlement proclamation, 31/12/21'; 'Land Settlement in SWA'.

39. A312, Item 25, 'Land settlement in SWA'.

40. SWA, 'Report of the Land Settlement Commission Windhoek', 1935.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1920, U.G. 26 - 21, 1921, p. 13. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 33 - 22, 1922, p. 13. As Montague Yudelman has observed, land and land rights "are enveloped in a host of political, institutional, and sociological implications that give it a meaning far beyond its market value." (p. 57). For the state, the allocation of land is often a basic element of policy, reflecting its broad economic, political and even ideological objectives and those of the major classes that control it. For the settlers, the allocation of land related not only to their economic survival, but also to the preservation of their "way of life" and the maintenance of their dominance over colonized communities. For indigenous communities, land represented "the only visible and tangible basis for sustenance and subsistence, and therefore it has an importance that transcends purely economic considerations." (p. 60). In Namibia, Herero land claims, for example, were closely tied to the social cohesion and political mobilization of the Hereros. (See chapter 11, below.) M. Yudelman, *Africans on the land: economic problems of African agricultural development in Southern, Central and East Africa, with special reference to Southern Rhodesia*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964, pp. 57-61.

44. *Ibid.*

45. See chapter 2 above.

46. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1921, p. 13; ADM 2163/3, Part 1, *passim.*

47. ADM 3077, Military magistrate, Rehoboth - Secretary 25/10/16.

48. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1924, U.G. 33 - 25, 1925; ADM 2163/3, Natives Affairs, Windhoek - Secretary, 24/11/19.

49. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1926, U.G. 22 - 27, 1927, p. 5. See also chapter seven, below.

50. ADM 2163/3 Part 1, Superintendent of Locations - O/C Native Affairs, Windhoek, 8/3/17.

51. ADM 2163/3 Part 1, Superintendent of Reserves - O/C Native Affairs, Windhoek, 17/3/18.

52. ADM 2163/3 (1) Native Affairs, Windhoek, - Secretary 15/10/18.

53. ADM 2163/3 Superintendent of Reserves - Native Affairs, Windhoek, 17/5/18.

54. ADM 2163/3, See for example, 'Meeting of Natives on Orumba on the subject of their cattle trespassing on neighbouring farms', 21/7/19.

55. ADM 2163/3, Report by Captain Bowker, Windhoek, 2/9/19.

56. ADM 2163/3, Acting-magistrate, Windhoek - Secretary, 18/1/22.

57. ADM 2163/3, Native Commissioner - Chairman, SWA Native Reserves Commission, 14/5/21.

58. ADM 2163/3, Native Affairs Department, Windhoek - Deputy-Secretary, 10/7/16; Native Affairs, Windhoek - Secretary, 19/9/17.

59. ADM 3390, 'Report on Native Affairs for 1919', p. 20.

60. ADM 2163/3 (1), Native Affairs Department - Deputy Secretary, 10/7/16.

61. See chapter two, above.

62. ADM 1534, Military magistrate, Grootfontein - Secretary 4/3/16.

63. ADM 3077, Military magistrate, Rehoboth - Secretary, 25/10/16.

64. See chapter 2 above.

65. ADM 2163/3 (2), 'Address to residents of Orumba', 1/8/19.

66. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 13. See also Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G 21 - 23, 1923, p. 13.

67. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 15.

68. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 13. See also Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 13.

69. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 13.

70. ADM 2163/3 Native Affairs, Windhoek - Secretary, 19/3/17.

71. See section three below.

72. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 12.

73. See, for example, C. Bundy, *The rise and fall of the South African peasantry*. London: Heinemann, 1979.

74. ADM 2163/3 (1), Native Affairs Department - Deputy-Secretary, 10/7/16.

75. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 13.

76. J.H. Wellington, *South West Africa and its human issues*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 278.

77. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1918, U.G. 34 - 19, 1919, p. 11. See also Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 32 and ADM 2163/3 (1); Native Affairs, Windhoek - Deputy-Secretary, 10/7/16.

78. SWAA A50/64, *passim*.

79. SWAA A50/1 Prime Minister's Office, Pretoria - Secretary 3/8/21. See also Grench and Co, Keetmanshoop - Secretary, 9/10/20.

80. SWAA A50/1 Attorney-General, Windhoek - Native Commissioner, Windhoek, 17/4/26.

81. SWAA A50/1 Registar of Deeds, Windhoek - Attorney General, 6/12/48.

82. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, p. 13.

83. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1921, U.G. 32 - 22, 1922, p. 14.

84. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 1923, p. 13 and Administrator's Report 1923, U.G. 21 - 24, 1924, p. 13.

85. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1924, U.G. 1925, p. 24 and Administrator's Report 1925, U.G. 26 - 26, 1926, p. 29.

86. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1924, U.G. 33 - 25, 1925, p. 24.

87. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1925, U.G. 26 - 26, 1926, p. 29.

88. Compiled from Union of South Africa, Administrator's Reports 1923 - 1925.

89. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1925, U.G. 26 - 26, 1926, p. 59.

90. See ADM 3370/2 (2).

91. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1924, U.G. 33 - 25, 1925, p. 21.

92. South West Africa, 'Report of the Natives Reserves Commission', L. A. 2 -28, Windhoek, 1928.

93. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1924, U.G. 21 - 24, 1925, p. 21.

94. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1922, U.G. 21 - 23, 1923, pp. 16 - 18.

95. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report 1925, U.G. 26 - 26, 1926, p. 21.

96. See chapters one and two above.

97. B. Moore, *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Harmandsworth: Penguin, 1966.

98. See, for example, R. Hilton (ed.), *The transition from feudalism to capitalism*. London: Verso, 1980.

99. S. Greenberg, *Race and state in capitalist development*. Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1908, pp. 53-69.

100. J. Paige, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

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Chapter four

THE BONDELSWART REBELLION

Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the acute tensions underlying the relationship between settler farmers and the indigenous people was the Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922. That this rebellion was led by the Bondelswarts rather than some other group is the product of a convergence of circumstances and events, some of which can be traced back to the German and pre-colonial periods.

The Bondelswarts under German rule

The Bondelswarts, a Nama grouping had established itself in the extreme south of Namibia between the Orange and the Fish Rivers. Even before the colonization of the area, they had maintained a strong tradition of political and military independence. Unlike most other Nama groups, they had never fallen under the suzerainty of the Red Nation, and had generally remained aloof from Nama disputes and the larger Herero-Nama conflict. However, their position in the extreme south had placed them in the path of the Oorlam migrations from the Cape and facilitated their absorption of the trading and military traditions of these groups. Moreover, the Bondelswarts had established direct contact with the Cape Government from which they had secured supplies of arms and ammunition.[1]

It is probably significant that their rising against German colonial rule in 1903 helped set in motion the great rebellions of the Hereros and Namas between 1904 and 1907. Like the 1922 rebellion, the 1903 revolt was tied up with the encroachment of settlers on Bondelswarts territory and the heavy-handed intervention of the local police. The

Bondelswarts were able to inflict heavy losses on the German forces, but the war was cut short when the Herero rebellion broke out in January 1904 and the Bondelswarts captain, Johannes Christian, accepted the offer of peace from the German colonial governor, Leutwein. However, the peace agreement was not recognized by all Bondelswarts, and by July 1904 under the leadership of men like Jacob Morenga, Abraham Morris and Jacobus Christian, the Bondelswarts once again engaged the German forces, after which the rebellion endured until October 1906.[2]

The 1903-06 rebellion held a number of important implications for the revolt which took place sixteen years later. The eventual suppression of the earlier rebellion had precipitated the flight of a number of Bondelswarts, including Marengo, Morris and Jacobus Christian, across the Orange River into the Cape Colony. Although Marengo was killed by British forces, many of the Bondelswarts remained in the northern Cape. Their return to Namibia from about 1919 helped to create the conditions for the 1922 confrontation with the new colonial power. In terms of the peace treaty signed in December 1906 the Bondelswarts were confined to a reserve of 175 000 hectares, as compared with the 40 000 km^2 they had occupied previously.[3] This loss of land undoubtedly contributed to the economic decline of the Bondelswarts community, which was reaching serious proportions by the outbreak of the 1922 rebellion. Even more important, however, was the fact that the Bondelswarts, unlike other groups which had rebelled between 1903 and 1907, had managed to retain some territory. That the Bondelswarts retained a territorial base not only contributed to the anxiety of neighbouring settlers, thus increasing the tension that led up to the 1922 rebellion, but provided the essential social cohesion for the Bondelswarts to be able to launch

their revolt. As will be argued later, one of the reasons for the failure of a more general revolt against colonial rule during the early mandate period may be attributed to the lack of cohesion or fragmentation of the largely landless and scattered black communities during this phase of Namibian history.

It is also possible that the form which the 1903-06 rebellion took played a role in the rebellion of 1922. That the Bondelswarts had achieved significant successes against the German forces and that their revolt had helped to spark off a more widespread rebellion, may have helped to persuade the Bondelswarts to pit their small and poorly equipped force against the formidable military power of their colonial adversary in 1922. Finally, the military successes enjoyed by the Bondelswarts in 1903 - 06 appear to have played a part in the decision of the German colonial authorities to move a substantial part of the Bondelswarts community to the north of the territory shortly before the invasion by the South African forces.

The Bondelswarts later estimated that they had lost more than 15 000 head of small stock and 120 cattle during the move.[4] This was another important cause of the severe impoverishment of the Bondelswarts during the first years of South African rule. In September 1915, shortly after the Bondelswarts had been repatriated to their reserve in the south, the Keetmanshoop Native Affairs Department reported acute food shortages and starvation in the reserve.[5] The Bondelswarts who had been resettled to the north of the territory were provided with about 400 cattle by the Germans, as a source of food for the displaced community. Following the South African occupation, these cattle were sold and it was agreed that the proceeds would go towards buying cattle for the

Bondelswarts once they had returned to their reserve. However, a year elapsed before compensation was paid. The delay was largely a result of the bureaucratic confusion and ineptitude that characterized the first few years of South African rule, although the interests of farmers may also have played a role. At one stage of the proceedings the administration was undecided whether to pay compensation in stock or cash. Although the Bondelswarts had specifically requested cattle, the administration felt that cash might provide more incentive for the Bondelswarts to offer their labour to farmers in the area.[6] When compensation was finally paid, it was in the form of goats, and deductions were made for the rations supplied in the interim.[7]

Relations with white farmers

Conflict between the Bondelswarts and white farmers was evident from the beginning of South African rule. In 1915, for example, the Native Affairs Department reported that although the Bondelswarts were "anxious to obtain employment ... several absolutely set their faces against accepting work with farmers. On being asked for reasons I was told in almost every instance, that the farmers were used to dispense Justice without reference to anyone." There could be little doubt, the Department argued, that the "great shortage of farm labour" was a natural reaction to the "ill-treatment meted out to farm labourers in the past, by German and Dutch farmers alike ". In spite of this the Department was using "every effort and persuasion" to induce the local black population to accept labour.[8] In the same year the officer in charge of Native Affairs reported that several incidents had been brought to his notice

> where farmers engage boys at 15/- per month, and when paying them off, they give them the equivalent in stock. The equivalent of a

> goat usually being 15/- ... I need not point out that 15/- is much in excess of the value of an ordinary breeding goat, which is worth from 5/- to 10/- according to size.9

Nor had the situation changed for the better in 1920, when the Military Magistrate of Warmbad blamed deteriorating relationships between whites and blacks in the area on the "poor wages, improper treatment (and) poor food" to which farm labourers were subjected. The farmer, he said,

> looks upon the Hottentot as a kind of animal, not a human being and his first impression is that a Hottentot because he is a Hottentot should have a hiding once a day.10

In 1921 the Native Reserves Commission had recommended a minimum wage of 15/- a month with food for black men, and 10/- a month for black women. It is not known whether these recommendations were ever implemented, but they had certainly not been implemented by the time the Bondelswarts rebellion erupted in 1922.[11] According to a draft report of the Native Affairs Commission charged with investigating the Bondelswarts rebellion, average wages paid in the district inhabited by the Bondelswarts were between 10/- and 15/- a month with food. This, said the Commission, was "not a living wage", and it was doubted whether even these meagre wages were paid during the drought and depression that preceded the 1922 rebellion.[12]

Although an official settlement policy was only inaugurated after 1920, numbers of settlers entered the territory from the Union between 1915 and 1920. Because of its proximity to the South African border, the magisterial district of Warmbad became an important area for the settlement of farmers from the Union during this period. For example, in 1917 the administrator had referred to the "importance" of Warmbad as a border district which was "attracting a steady flow of settlers" from

the Union.[13] Many of the settlers attracted to the Protectorate by low interest loans were farmers possessing little capital or stock, and contemptuously known as "bokboere" (goat farmers) by the more established settlers. In his evidence before the Commission, the Secretary for the Protectorate conceded that many of these farmers were unable to pay adequate wages.[14] In 1919 the military magistrate of Warmbad came to the conclusion "that the majority of farmers (and particularly the new comers) ... are not worthy of being supplied with servants."[15]

The defeat of the German colonial forces and the occupation of the territory by South Africa had raised hopes among the Bondelswarts that their former tribal lands would be returned to them.[16] These expectations were not totally groundless: the Bondelswarts leader, Abraham Morris, had acted as a scout for the South African forces during the SWA campaign and many of the Bondelswarts had been moved to the north because the Germans expected them to join up with the South African forces. However, their lands were not returned to them and instead they found themselves in competition with settlers who occupied land which had previously belonged to them.

> The Bondelswarts watched their tribal lands irrevocably being divided up and settled by whites on an unprecedented scale. And as the pressure on the land grew, so did the pressure on the borders of the Bondelswart reserve.17

In 1917, the Bondelswarts complained that government stock was being grazed on their reserve, but as there was no vacant Crown land in the vicinity it was decided to continue using the reserve.[18] White farmers also made use of certain parts of the reserve to graze their stock, in spite of the opposition of the Bondelswarts and, on at least one occasion, contrary to the instructions of the local magistrate.[19] Consequent

pressure on the land produced border disputes. In 1918 some of the Bondelswarts who had established themselves on Crown land adjoining the reserve were subjected to "gentle" pressures to move back into the reserve. This resulted in a dispute with the administration over where the reserve boundary was located.[20]

Conflict between the settlers and the indigenous population was of course intensified by environmental and economic conditions. Below average rains fell in southern Namibia between 1918 and 1922, culminating in a very severe or "third degree" drought in the 1921/22 season[21] which immediately preceded the outbreak of the rebellion. This situation was of course worsened by the post-World War I recession of the early 1920s. As pointed out above, complaints about low wages were common from the beginning of South African rule. These, however, intensified during the drought and depression of the early 1920s. The administrator, for example, reported that in 1922 because of the depression, "many farmers not of the really poor class, unfortunately find themselves unable to pay wages in cash and some are unable to feed their employees properly". Although the administration was opposed to the payment of wages in kind, the administrator said he saw no immediate "option but to countenance the payment of wages in kind where the native does not object."[22]

Although the largely marginal settler farmers were even less able than usual to pay adequate wages during the early 1920s, pressures to force blacks into the farm labour market increased substantially during the same period. Ironically, the most important of these pressures involved cash payments (of taxes etc.) at a time when many farmers were unable or

unwilling to pay cash wages.

The dog tax and other state measures

For the Bondelswarts the most severe pressure to which they were subjected was the dog tax. Because their reserve was recognized by German treaty, the Bondelswarts were not expected to pay grazing fees. However, through some strange twist of colonial logic, they were subjected to the regulations in regard to exemption certificates. These certificates which exempted bearers from seeking employment, could be bought by those who possessed sufficient numbers of stock. The Berseba Nama community which had not rebelled against German rule, was not obliged to buy exemption certificates. The administration, however, argued that the Bondelswarts had "forfeited their original treaty rights through rebellion, and accepted German Law as the Law of their country".[23] This differential treatment provided another source of discontent on the part of the Bondelswarts.

Dogs played a central role in the economy of the Bondelswarts. They were essential for the protection from and destruction of vermin, particularly jackals. Dogs were also used in hunting which provided an important means of supplementing the income of the already marginalized community.[24] According to the Catholic missionary at Gabis the local Bondelswart community had in 1922 attempted to do without dogs, but their flocks had almost immediately been attacked by jackals. The missionary maintained that "after a while there would be no flocks left at all without the dogs."[25]

A dog tax was first introduced by the German authorities, but had only been enforced in the urban areas.[26] In 1917, in response to complaints

that blacks were "roaming about rural areas with a number of dogs ... to supply them with food", a tax of 5/- per dog was extended to the rural areas. Initially only whites were allowed one dog free of tax, but this exemption was extended to blacks in 1919.[27] However, in 1920 the new administrator, Gysbert Hofmeyr, toured the country and found that blacks and a "certain class of European squatters" were still making extensive use of dogs to hunt game, instead of earning a living by what Hofmeyr called "honest labour". Farmers, particularly those in the south, put pressure on Hofmeyr to increase the dog tax so that blacks would be forced to seek work.[28]

The new tax, which was imposed by Proclamation No. 16 of 1921, provided for payment of £1 for the first dog, £2.10 for two dogs, £4.10 for three dogs, £7 for four dogs and £10 for five dogs. Even without taking into consideration the low wages paid in Namibia and the non-payment of wages or payment in kind, the tax was absurdly high. As the missionary Krolikowski pointed out, the Bondelswarts were aware that in the Union the dog tax was 2 shillings and six pence.[30] In those cases where the tax was not paid, the police were empowered to seize and destroy dogs. Prosecution of Bondelswarts for non-payment of the tax commenced in September 1921, and by January 1922 the Warmbad magistrate had tried 140 cases.[31] The average sentence was a fine of £2 or 14 days imprisonment.

Although Hofmeyr later denied that the tax had been imposed to force blacks to seek work, and claimed that its purpose was to protect game,[32] evidence suggests otherwise. In his submission to the Native Affairs Commission, a local farmer said that white farmers had told Hofmeyr that if "the Hottentots were not made to pay this tax, they (the farmers)

would not be in a position to get labourers. The main idea was to get the Hottentots to come out and work."[33] This was supported by the magistrate of Warmbad, who said that the tax was imposed after the farmers made representations to the administrator about the dogs owned by the Namas.[34] Even the evidence of the Secretary of the Protectorate, Major Herbst, contradicted the administrator's claims. Herbst said that the farmers had been "irritated" by the way in which blacks used dogs for hunting. "If they could live by hunting they would not work." According to Herbst, the tax had been made particularly heavy in order "to do away with the dogs".[35]

In April 1921 the Bondelswarts had petitioned the administrator, saying that the dog tax was beyond their means.[36] The administrator was also petitioned by the Catholic missionary at Gabis, who argued that the tax was threatening the survival of the already impoverished Bondelswarts:

> (T)o demand of such paupers as most of our natives are, a tax of £1 or else to go without dogs means to condemn them to starvation that the jackals may live.37

Although the tax was reduced by 50 per cent just before the outbreak of the rebellion in 1922,[38] it was too late to avert the confrontation that had been developing between the Bondelswarts and the state. The Bondelswarts were forced into revolt by the dog tax, Christian Marcus, said after the rebellion:

> When we paid the dog tax the people prepared for war. They said they would rather make war because they were suffering too much.35

A number of other, more subtle pressures also operated on the various black agrarian communities in Namibia. The Branding of Cattle Proclamation of 1921 was strongly resisted in many black communities. The Proclamation made the branding of stock compulsory and applied to both

blacks and whites. However, while whites were allowed to keep their branding irons, blacks were not, even though they also paid 30/- for them. In the case of black stock owners, branding irons were retained by government officials who also supervized branding.[40] The branding regulations therefore not only entailed an added cash demand on the Bondelswarts and other black communities, but also another source of humiliation. In February 1922 the Bondelswarts had petitioned the administrator to give them permission to keep their branding irons. By using a branding iron that was retained by the superintendent of the reserve, the Bondelswarts felt that they were transferring ownership of their stock to the state. Further resentment was caused by the regulations relating to the compulsory dipping of small stock and the strict quarantine measures. The quarantine regulations prevented the Bondelswarts from selling their stock on the most profitable markets. The dipping regulations demanded regular dipping which in some cases actually killed the stock. The missionary at Gabis complained in 1921 that a number of Bondelswarts had been imprisoned because, although they had dipped their stock, they had not succeeded in eradicating the disease. The agricultural inspector had said that if the stock had been dipped frequently enough, they would have been cured of the disease. However, a number of goats had died after being dipped by the inspector.[42]

Besides the attempt to limit hunting by the imposition of a dog tax, the Bondelswarts and other pastoral communities had to contend with strictly enforced game laws. Most of the pastoral communities in Namibia at this time were trying to build up their flocks and herds, and thus hunting provided an important source of meat. For the Bondelswarts, however, the restrictions on hunting imposed by the game laws, also raised other problems. At the height of the drought in the early 1920s, vast herds

of springbok invaded the Bondelswart reserve, not only competing with stock for scarce grazing and water supplies, but also spreading scab and other diseases among the livestock. As the missionary at Gabis put it, the conservation of game might be good, but it was absurd that "the original owners of the land should rather die of hunger than to reduce this plague...."[43]

These laws and regulations operated within the context of the more general repressive legislation outlined in the preceding chapter.[44] The law still required all blacks who did not possess ten cattle or 50 head of small stock to offer themselves on the labour market[45] - no matter how inadequate the wages farmers were able or prepared to pay. Influx into the towns where better paid jobs might have been available, was still strictly controlled, and the vagrancy law was still in force. According to Wellington, the vagrancy law provided a "useful means of supplying farmers with labourers", because offenders could be sentenced to a term of work for the administration or a private person.[46] Another part of this broader canvas is provided by the traders who kept Bondelswarts in debt by allowing unlimited credit at exhorbitant interest rates, who paid low prices for goods sold to them, or who refused to pay cash for stock, but instead paid in "good-fors" redeemable at their stores.[47]

By the beginning of the 1920s the combined assault of legislation, drought and depression had reduced the Bondelswarts to a desperate poverty. In 1920 the Catholic missionary in the Bondelswart reserve reported that the situation of the Bondelswarts had become "next to unbearable".[48] Even the Chief Native Commissioner who visited the

reserve in 1921 was forced to concede that the circumstances of the Bondelswarts were worse than those of "most natives elsewhere."[49]

> I saw some poverty-stricken looking women and children living in wretched huts in the neighbourhood. These people state that in former years they had been able to earn by washing and other labour sufficient to live fairly comfortably, but owing to smallness of wages and rations now obtainable in the district, high prices charged by the traders for even the smallest clothing requirements and loss of most of their stock as a result of the war, they were in distress.[50]

Military threats and political constraints

A labour extraction system of the type that operated in Namibia during the early mandate period, is not only dependent on the state to dislodge a labour force from the countryside, but also requires the assistance of the state to counteract any political or military organization (or even individual defiance) on the part of the labour force or potential labour force. Political organization and rebellion of course not only posed a threat to the labour system (and thus the labour supply), but obviously also a more direct threat to the lives and property of the settlers.

From the beginning of South African rule until the actual eruption of the 1922 rebellion, persistent reports of threatened risings had become a common feature in the white farming areas adjacent to the Bondelswarts reserve.[51] The characteristic response of the administration was to dismiss such reports as a ploy by the German settlers, who had been disarmed following the change of administration, to obtain arms and ammunition, or as an attempt to discredit the new administration. This attitude did nothing to allay the sense of alarm that spread through the white community in the rural areas, and tended also to make the administration less responsive to the very real grievances of indigenous communities such as that of the Bondelswarts.

There were strong, although not altogether conclusive, indications that at least a section of the Bondelswarts were planning a rebellion towards the end of 1916 at the time when the administration was preparing to take military action against the Ukuanyama in Ovamboland.[52] The Warmbad magistrate was sufficiently convinced of the possibility of a rising to call for police reinforcements, and a force of about 100 men was dispatched from Keetmanshoop to the area. It is clear from correspondence captured by the authorities that the Bondelswarts planned to take some urgent, but unspecified action. "The time is short", the Bondelswarts leader Adam Pienaar wrote to Hendrik Sneeuwe of Kalkfontein. "The time agreed between Jacobus Christian and me is short. On the 15th December we shall meet again at Ramans Drift." Adam Pienaar's plans went awry, however, because a crucial letter addressed to Jacobus Christian was not delivered on time, and because the suspicion of the authorities had been aroused.

Nevertheless by mid-December a number of Bondelswarts had begun assembling in Warmbad in compliance with Pienaar's request. The presence of armed men was reported in the area, and an attempt was made to blow up a telegraph line between Kalkfontein and Warmbad, although it was never clearly established that the saboteurs were Bondelswarts. When Adam Pienaar was ordered to report to the magistrate in Warmbad, he and some followers fled to the mountains and allegedly threatened war against the administration. A few days later Pienaar entered Warmbad and was arrested. The authorities, however, were unable to obtain sufficient evidence against him and his closest supporters to secure their conviction for fomenting a rebellion.[53] Whether or not Pienaar intended to lead a rebellion remains an open question, but there is no doubt that

the settlers, and some officials, regarded the Bondelswarts as a potential military threat.

Under such circumstance the police would clearly play a major role in the suppression of any defiance or organization on the part of subordinate groups. The Native Affairs Commission which investigated the 1922 Bondelswart rebellion stressed the deteriorating relationship between the Bondelswarts and the police as a major reason for the rebellion. Even during the military period when the state had tried to moderate the repressive role of the police, the locally based police force had continued to play the role expected of them by the settlers.[54] This had in some cases resulted in conflict between magistrates (and other local level officials) and the police force.[55] One of the most persistent complaints of the settler community - particularly towards the end of the military period when settler protest reached a crescendo - was that blacks were "cheeky" or "insolent". This complaint was almost always accompanied by appeals for more active intervention by the police.[56]

The past rebellions and military successes of the Bondelswarts were a potent source of anxiety for the settlers. Following the 1903-06 rebellion, the German colonial authorities had been strongly criticized by the settlers for being too lenient with the Bondelswarts.[57] As the Bondelswarts had been able to maintain a territorial base in spite of their rebellion against the German colonial authorities, they were able to retain a certain degree of communal identity and political organization. Settlers and state thus sought to limit and control the political organization of the Bondelswarts. These efforts largely took the form of preventing the Bondelswarts from obtaining effective leadership.

From the beginning of South African rule, the Bondelswarts wanted the appointment of Jacobus Christian, a Bondelswarts leader who had fled to the Cape in 1906, as their captain.[58] Initially the state resisted all moves to secure the appointment of a captain. The position of the administration was clearly stated by the magistrate of Warmbad in 1917:

> I cannot in my opinion too strongly advise the Administration not to appoint a Captain or Chief over the Bondels as that would immediately combine the nation which could then give endless trouble.[59]

However, in 1918 the administration modified its strategy by allowing the appointment of a captain, although it continued to oppose the appointment of Christian to this post. Thus, under the supervision of the administration, Willem Christian, a man described by the local magistrate as "a harmless idiot who was incapable of influencing his people in any way or even showing any interest in them", became the captain of the Bondelswarts in 1918.[60]

When Willem Christian died in December 1918 following the influenza epidemic, the Bondelswarts again asked for the appointment of Jacobus Christian. This was resisted by the administration, and early in 1919 Hendrik Schneeuwe became captain. The Bondelswarts, however, objected to Schneeuwe's enthusiasm in helping to round up labour for local farmers and accused him of embezzling tribal funds. An enquiry into the Bondelswarts allegations against Schneeuwe was held in March 1920 and he was subsequently asked to resign.[61] The administration again resisted demands for the appointment of Jacobus Christian, and Timotheus Beukes assumed the captaincy. In 1921 Beukes was commended by the Warmbad magistrate for being "of great assistance" in persuading the Bondelswarts to pay the dog tax and in helping the magistrate in "obtaining information". It appears that Beukes was generally regarded by the

Bondelswarts as a stooge and labour-gatherer, and was described by the Chief Native Commissioners as having "no desire or particular ability" to lead the Bondelswarts.[62]

In spite of these officially recognized headmen, the majority of Bondelswarts continued to regard Jacobus Christian as their "hereditary and ... al foreman and spokesman."[63] The Secretary for the Protectorate said later that "the administration's man drew the money and the other man (Jacobus Christian) wielded the influence."[64] Christian had returned to the Protectorate with a group of about 50 followers in July 1919. The return of the Bondelswart leader had resulted in a panic-strickened response from the settler community and a consequent confrontation with the police. Christian was subsequently charged with illegal entry into the Protectorate, possession of firearms without permits, and bringing stock into the territory without a permit.[65]

Following Christian's return to Namibia, various other Bondelswarts periodically crossed the Orange River into Namibia, heightening the level of tension in the district and helping to set off rumours of unrest.[66] These tensions climaxed with the return of Abraham Morris, the lieutenant of the guerrilla leader Jacob Morenga and the most prominent living military leader of the Bondelswarts.

The tensions aroused by the return of Morris can only be understood against the background of developments preceding his return. For both the settlers and the administration, Morris represented the past military prowess of the Bondelswarts and thus a critical threat to the tenuous labour arrangement with blacks in the area. The Bondelswarts,

on the other hand, required effective leadership if they were to respond to the intolerable pressures to which they were being subjected. Before the return of Morris, the Bondelswarts had shown some dissatisfaction with the leadership of Jacobus Christian,[67] who had been unable to affect any improvement in their condition. For the Bondelswarts therefore Morris represented their last hope of unified and effective action against their predicament. The combination of these circumstances made a confrontation near inevitable.

Shortly after Morris and his party arrived at Haib in May 1922, he was visited by the police who demanded his permits for entering the colony, and for introducing weapons and stock into the country. As Morris was unable to produce the required permits, the police attempted to arrest him, but were prevented from doing so by the Bondelswarts. It was later claimed that the policeman who attempted to arrest Morris had threatened the Bondelswarts with war. The negotiations which followed were characterized by a deep mistrust on the part of the Bondelswarts, a rigid and uncompromizing position on the part of the administration, and blatant ineptitude on the part of the local officials and policemen who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the authorities. When these negotiations reached a deadlock, the two parties to the conflict began to prepare themselves for war.[68]

The rebellion in context

The suppression of the Bondelswarts rebellion raised a barrage of criticism and ridicule not only abroad, but in the Union and the territory itself.[69] Hofmeyr, the adminstrator, had taken personal command of the South African forces in the campaign against the Bondelswarts and was accompanied down south by the Secretary for South West Africa and sixty

recruits from the civil services in Windhoek.[70] On 26 May, a day before even the first armed clash had taken place, two aircraft were flown in from Pretoria. Three days later Guruchas, the mountain refuge of the Bondelswarts, was bombed by the aircraft and shelled by mountain guns. The bombing was continued on the following day, although by this time Morris and the main body of fighting men had broken through the cordon around Guruchas. Morris was killed in the fighting that followed, and the remaining Bondelswarts surrendered on 7 June.[71] [illegible]00 Bondelswarts were killed[72] in a campaign which lasted less than [illegible] weeks.

The ferocity and single-mindedness of the military campaign against the Bondelswarts shocked even the local settler press. An editorial in the *Windhoek Advertiser* maintained that "the mind revolts at the thought of a bloody campaign against a body of ill-armed savages. The nobler course would have been one of patient perserverance rather than ferocious punishment."[73] Although the newspaper was clearly using the Bondelswarts campaign as a stick with which to beat the administration in order to further the cause of settler self-government,[74] the strange conduct of the administration during the rebellion remains to be explained. This is particularly so as the entire Bondelswart community was made up of fewer than a thousand people (including women and children) of whom no more than 200 were armed.[75]

In the campaign against the Ukuanyama in 1917, the administration had been content to wait several months for favourable weather before moving against an enemy which was far more numerous and better armed than the Bondelswarts. The Ukuanyama were of course isolated in the far north of

the country, far away from white settlements. However, although the Bondelswarts did raid neighbouring farms in order to obtain supplies of arms and foodstuffs,[76] they did not attack local settlers - nor is there any evidence that they planned to do so.

In accord with that segment of settler society represented by the *Windhoek Advertiser*, Freislich attributes the puzzling aspects of the campaign to the personal failings of Hofmeyr - his vanity, ambition and fear of criticism.[77] Although there were signs of panic (initially, difficulty was experienced in raising a force for the campaign) and even clearer indications of bungling due to Hofmeyr's lack of military experience, Freislich's explanation is not a complete, nor a convincing one. It seems improbable that Hofmeyr would have been retained as administrator of the territory until 1926, if his personal failings had been so glaringly obvious, particularly as the suppression of the Bondelswarts rebellion raised an unprecendented international furore.

Hofmeyr's own account of the campaign suggests that the administration was taken by surprise, and that there was an element of panic in its responses. The administrator maintained that rumours of native unrest had been rife in the territory for several years, and had "caused panic and not infrequently the periodical abandonment of farms". Initially the administration had dismissed these reports as the product of "scaremongering persons", but as the reports of unrest and rebellion continued to accumulate the administration began to experience doubts. Shortly before the outbreak of the rebellion, Hofmeyr had received reports of "considerable unrest" among black communities, particularly in the Keetmanshoop and Gibeon districts. There were also indications that some of the black communities in the south were "in league with the Bondel-

swarts" and would co-operate with them in the event of war. Hofmeyr said that "nearly every responsible person believed that a general rising was pending", although he maintained that until the outbreak of the rebellion neither he nor the Secretary for SWA believed a general rising might occur. He felt, however, that immediate action was necessary to reassure the public. It was only after his arrival in the south that he received information that convinced him "of the possibility if not probablity, of the whole country going ablaze and the history of German times being repeated unless a peaceful settlement was quickly announced ...or a decisive blow was quickly struck."[78]

Hofmeyr's account appears consistent with the evidence available on the rebellion and its context.[79] There is considerable evidence in the administration's files on "native unrest",[80] that the authorities exerted themselves to suppress rumours of rebellion and that local officials were frequently cautioned against spreading alarm. Only a few months before the outbreak of the Bondelswart rebellion, the magistrate of Keetmanshoop, which borders on the district of Warmbad, had been reprimanded[81] for suggesting that there was serious unrest in his district. Although the sudden realization that the territory might after all be faced with a general rebellion, may have caused the administrator to exaggerate the dangers involved, there is evidence that major elements of the black population did consider the possibility of a general rebellion - even if they lacked the means to match the military resources of the colonial state. The relevant evidence will be discussed in chapters six and seven.

If the administration had believed in the possibility of a general

rebellion, this would explain why Hofmeyr considered it imperative to strike "a decisive below"; why it was also thought necessary to bomb the Bondelswarts into submission; and why the Union government was prepared to sanction the use of aircraft so soon after the outcry caused by their employment during the Rand rebellion. It also makes more comprehensible Hofmeyr's premature announcement after the bombing of Guruchas, that the rebellion had been crushed, although Morris and a large body of rebels were still at large.[82] It appears that even the Union government believed that the revolt might spread to the Northern Cape, because, after the suppression of the rebellion, an armed patrol under Lieutenant-Colonel Trew had been sent through the Richtersveld in the northern Cape "as a show of force and to show the inhabitants that the area was not as impregnable as it was commonly regarded."[83] In the protectorate Hofmeyr took his own precautions by asking the head of the military unit in SWA "to watch events most carefully in the central and northern parts of the territory and to hold himself ... in readiness to organize and proceed to any point of danger, should the exigency arise."[84]

The context of a threatened general rebellion is also consistent with the conduct of the Bondelswarts during their rising. Lewis is puzzled by the fact that a small and poorly armed community like the Bondelswarts could consider rebellion when the result would inevitably be disastrous for them.[85] A possible solution to this problem is that the Bondelswarts did - as Hofmeyr suggested - expect support from other black groups in the territory. In 1903 the Bondelswarts had helped to spark off the great Herero rebellion, and in 1916 when the colonial authorities were preparing for war against the Ukuanyama, the possibility of a rebellion appears to have been considered by them.[86] It was

clear, however, that the Bondelswarts had not anticipated that their rebellion would be brought to such a swift end by the destructive impact of aircraft and modern artillery. As experienced guerrilla fighters, they had in the past been able to hold out for long periods in the mountainous country to the south of their reserve. With the introduction of aircraft, however, the possibilities of guerrilla warfare were substantially reduced.

The bloody suppression of the Bondelswarts rebellion brought home to most black Namibians their vulnerability in the face of the enormous military power wielded by the colonial state. Although resistance against the colonial state continued for a number of years after the rebellion, it is clear that the brutal suppression of the Bondelswarts helped to condition some of the forms resistance took after June 1922. In particular, it throws some light on the millenarian tendencies of the Garveyist movement in the period immediately following the rebellion.

Endnotes for chapter four

1. G.L.M. Lewis, *The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922*. MA thesis, Rhodes University, 1977, pp. 3-11.

2. H. Drechsler, *Let us die fighting: the struggle of the Herero and Nama against German imperialism (1884-1915)*. London: Zed. Press, 1980, pp. 106-111 and 179-195; Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-19.

3. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

4. ADM 599, Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 14/6/16; Lewis. *op. cit.*, p. 25.

5. ADM 599, Native Affairs, Keetmanshoop - Native Commissioner, 22/9/15. See also Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 14/6/16: "... these people have little or nothing to eat, they are feeble and unable to withstand disease. In some cases they may be said to be pratically dying of hunger".

6. ADM 599, eg. Magistrate, Warmbad - Native Affairs, Keetmanshoop, 1/12/15.

7. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

8. ADM 599, Native Affairs, Keetmanshoop - Native Commissioner, 22/9/15.

9. ADM 599, Native Affairs, Keetmanshoop - Native Commissioner, 25/11/15.

10. ADM 567/2, Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 9/6/20.

11. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 158 and 168.

15. ADM 3353, Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 1/5/19.

16. G-M. Cockram, *South West African Mandate*. Cape Town: Juta, 1976, p. 142; Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

17. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

18. ADM 599/2, Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 26/12/17 and 19/2/18; Secretary - Magistrate, Warmbad, 1/3/18.

19. ADM 3353, Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 1/5/19.

20. Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

21. J.H. Wellington, *South West Africa and its human issues*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 21.

22. Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1922, U.G. 21-23, p. 21.

23. ADM 3353, Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 1/5/19; Administrator's Office - Magistrate, Warmbad, 16/8/19.

24. See, for example, Union of South Africa, 'Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Rebellion of the Bondelswarts, 1923', U.G. 16 - 23, subsequently 'Bondelswarts Commission report', pp. 2 and 8-9; Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

25. ADM 3604/9, Catholic Mission, Gabis - Administrator, 3/5/21.

26. Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 48 - 49.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

28. Union of South Africa, 'Report of the Administrator on the Bondelswarts Rising', 1922, U.G. 30-22, p. 3.

29. Union of South Africa, 'Bondelswarts Commission report', 1923, p. 8.

30. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*, p. 174. See also Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

36. ADM 3604/9, Bondelswart petition, Haib, 30/4/21.

37. ADM 3604/9, Catholic Mission, Gabis - Administrator, 3/5/21.

38. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

40. Union of South Africa, 'Bondelswarts Commission report', 1923, p. 9; Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

41. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 170; ADM 3604/9, Catholic Mission, Gabis - Administrator, 3/5/21.

43. ADM 3604/9, Catholic Mission, Gabis - Administrator, 29/11/20. See also Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 170 and 178. The administrator's claim that the dog tax had been introduced to protect game was rejected with contempt by the Johannesburg newspaper, 'The Star'. The newspaper *reported in the aftermath of the rebellion that "Springbok in large* numbers periodically visit Kalkfontein (in the area of the Bondei

Reserve). Only last week some three or four thousand swept through the place. Some had to be driven from the drinking troughs with sjamboks the entire extermination of game it was necessary to tax the scanty native population up to four pounds a dog." Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

44. See chapter three, above.

45. Union of South Africa, 'Bondelswart Commission report', 1923, p. 11.

46. Wellington, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

47. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

48. ADM 3604/9, Catholic Mission, Gabis - Administrator, 29/11/20.

49. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

50. Union of South Africa, 'Bondelswarts Commission report', 1923, p. 11.

51. See, for example, Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 143; Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61 and 191-192; ADM 3353.

52. See chapter eight, below.

53. ADM 599, 'Bondelswarts Rebellion - Enquiry into', 25/6/17; ADM 3370/2, Native Affairs Report, 1917; ADM 3353, 'Rex versus Adam Christian', undated; Administrator - Secretary for Defence, 2/1/17 and 16/1/17; Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 20/12/16, 27/12/16 and 3/1/17.

54. Union of South Africa, 'Bondelswarts Commission report', 1923, p. 11. See also ADM 3353, Administrator - Secretary of Defence, Pretoria, 16/1/17.

55. See chapter two, above.

56. The Administrator commented in 1919 that the typical response of settlers to the labour shortage was to demand "greater powers to the police" which, he maintained, was "merely a euphemism for 'powers of punishment to be vested in the Police'". Union of South Africa, Administrator's Report, 1919, U.G. 40 - 20, p. 5.

57. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

58. ADM 599, Native Affairs, Keetmanshoop - Native Commissioner, 22/9/15.

59. ADM 599/2, Magistrate, Warmbad - Secretary, 30/8/17. In a submission to the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1923, the Secretary of SWA stated that Jacobus Christian had not been appointed captain because "he was a dangerous man". Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

60. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

65. ADM 3353; Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-33; Cockram, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135. Jacobus Christian was finally given a suspended sentence.

66. ADM 3353, SWA Police, Warmbad - District Commandant, Keetmanshoop, 12/3/20.

67. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-83.

69. See, for example, A.M. Davey, *The Bondelswarts affair: a study of the repercussions, 1922 - 1959.* Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1961; Cockram, *op. cit.*, pp. 163 ff.

70. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-94.

72. Davey, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

73. 'Windhoek Advertiser', 7/6/22, quoted by M. Scott, *In face of fear: documents relating to the appeal to the United Nations of the Hereros and of the South West African people.* Johannesburg: M. Scott, 1948, p. 41.

74. 'Windhoek Advertiser', 14/6/22, quoted by M. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 42. The editor of the 'Windhoek Advertiser' was later to become a prominent member of the SWA Legislative Assembly.

75. I. Goldblatt, *History of South West Africa from the beginning of the 19th century.* Cape Town: Juta, 1971 p. 216; Davey, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Cockram, (*op. cit.*, p. 142) maintains that the Bondelswarts had 568 fighting men in all, of which at most 200 were armed. Only 70 rifles were accounted for after the rebellion.

76. R. Freislish, *The last tribal war: a history of the Bondelswarts uprising which took place in SWA in 1922.* Cape Town: C. Struik, 1964, p. 32.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 33 and 52-52. Perhaps the most extreme personalization of the conflict is that of Cockram, who describes the Bondelswarts rebellion as "more a battle between two men, than between a tribe and the government officials". According to Cockram, these "two men" were Hofmeyr and Abraham Morris. Cockram, *op cit.*, p. 129. See also pp. 21-23.

78. Union of South Africa, 'Report of the Administrator on the Bondelzwarts Rising', 1922, U.G. 30-22, pp. 4-5.

79. See chapters six and seven, below.

80. SWAA A396 series.

81. SwAA A396/10. See below.

82. Freislich, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

83. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

84. 'Report of the Administrator on the Bondelzwarts Rising, 1922, p. 4.

85. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

86. See above.

87. It is clear from the evidence assembled by Lewis from the minutes of the Bondelswarts Commission that the devastating effects of the bombing of Guruchas and the strategic advantages that aerial surveillance afforded the colonial forces, completely disrupted the Bondelswarts' plans for the rebellion. See Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 94- 97 and 220- 222. In their rebellion, the Bondelswarts did not necessarily aim for an eventual victory over the colonial forces (as Lewis seems to imply), but more likely hoped that the rebellion would allow them to negotiate more favourable terms with the colonial authorities. Major Herbst, the Secretary for South West Africa, subscribed to this view: "Probably they thought that, by rebelling and resisting authority, certain negotiations might take place whereby they could get certain things. They wanted Christian recognised by us as the Chief of the Bondelzwarts tribe and the tribe reconstituted...". Cockram, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

Chapter five

THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS' UNION IN NAMIBIA

In spite of the massive dispossession that had taken place during the German colonial period, the overwhelming majority of the black population remained rooted in the rural areas where it served the labour needs of settler agriculture, or attempted against heavy odds to eke out an independent existence from stock farming, supplemented by hunting and foraging. Industrial activity during this period was dominated by the mines, in particular the diamond mines, which relied almost exclusively on migrant labour drawn from neighbouring territories or from the reserves beyond the police zone. It was thus in the rural areas that the major struggle of the early 1920s took place.

Resistance was not, however, restricted to the countryside. By the 1920s a small permanent work force had settled in the major towns to provide labour for smaller industrial concerns, such as the fish and meat processing factories, the lower echelons of the administration and police, and the commercial sector. This urban work force formed a distinctive stratum of the Namibian social formation, differentiated from rural labourers by its higher wages, its greater command of industrial and commercial skills, and its social composition. Foreign skilled and semi-skilled labourers, drawn predominantly from South Africa and the West African coast made up an important component of the urban work force, and played a key role in introducing new forms of political organization into Namibia.

At this phase of Namibian history, Luderitz was the major industrial enclave in Namibia. Besides being the centre of the diamond industry, it had a small but flourishing fishing industry and a harbour of some significance. It was in Luderitz that the first branches of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) were launched. Both of these organizations closely reflected the distinctive composition and interests of the urban work force. The ICU, in particular, remained isolated from and peripheral to the majority of black Namibians in the rural areas and labour compounds. This isolation, together with its origins and leadership, tied it firmly to its mother organization in South Africa.

Formation of the ICU branch in Luderitz

There are some important connections between the formation of a branch of the ICU in Luderitz in December 1920 and the launching of the mother organization by Clements Kadalie in Cape Town nearly two years earlier. Although when the ICU was established in Cape Town, the South African economy was still on the upswing and both industrial output and employment opportunities were on the increase, considerable discontent existed among black labourers because of low wages, and inflation which had sent the price of basic foodstuffs soaring.[1] The early activities of the ICU in Luderitz were "chiefly confined to wages and the cost of living", as a local official of the Native Affairs Department pointed out in a letter to the administration in Windhoek.[2]

> The native generally does not realise that living everywhere has gone up. All he knows is that he has to pay perhaps 100% more for food and clothing than he did before the war, that though he may have received a 25% advance in wages he is more often hungry than before, and that it is probably the fault of the white man, and some attempt will have to be made to standardize native wages generally or to ensure that they are raised to a rate which corresponds to the cost of living and thus demonstrate to the native that Unions are not essential

to his welfare.

However, besides certain similarities in economic conditions, there were also important links between Cape Town and Luderitz that clearly facilitated the early establishment of a branch of the ICU in the Namibian town. From 1904 when the German colonial wars against the Hereros and the Namas disrupted the labour supply in Namibia, large numbers of African migrant workers had made their way from the Cape to the German colony. These Cape labourers were used in the war efforts against the Namas and Hereros as well as for the buildings of railways from the ports of Swakopmund and Luderitz.[3] Although this flow of labour from the Cape tailed off after 1912, migrant labour from South Africa continued to be used in South West Africa, particularly on the mines and for skilled jobs on the harbours and railways. While some recruiting was done in the Eastern Cape, Cape Town was the most important collection point for recruiters from German South West Africa.[4] That Kadalie's ICU initially drew most of its support from the docks and railways in Cape Town[5] probably also played a significant role in establishing links between Luderitz and Cape Town.

The nature of these links with South Africa played a vital role not only in determining the composition of the ICU in Luderitz, but also its subsequent development. The Luderitz branch was launched late in 1920 shortly after the arrival of a Cape Coloured called Pieterse in the Namibian town. In Luderitz Pieterse, who was believed to be a member of the Cape executive of the ICU, established contact with two West Indians, John de Clue and a local storekeeper called Hannibal, and together they launched the organization. It is possible that Pieterse was sent to Luderitz as an emissary of the Cape ICU, as the administration suspected, because shortly after the formation of the Luderitz

branch he left for Grootfontein in the north of the territory to take up employment with a storekeeper there.[6]

Also prominent in the establishment of the Luderitz branch was James La Guma who was later to become assistant general secretary of the ICU and one of Kadalie's most important lieutenants, until his expulsion in 1926. La Guma who was born in Bloemfontein in 1894, had gone to German South West Africa in 1910 after being apprenticed as a leather worker in Cape Town. In 1918 he led a diamond miners' strike in Luderitz.[7] La Guma became the first secretary of the Luderitz branch with a salary of £5 a month.[8] At the invitation of Kadalie, La Guma returned to the Cape in 1921 to become secretary of the Port Elizabeth branch.[9] His successor, William Adrianse, was also a South African and was described by the Native Commissioner for South West Africa as "a respectible looking Cape Coloured person."[10]

It would appear that from the start the Luderitz branch of the ICU was dominated by South Africans, particularly from the Cape.[11] This was to have important implications for the organization. Like the West Africans who dominated the Universal Negro Improvement Association, black South Africans in Namibia formed an expatriate community distinct from the local population. From the German colonial period - when chronic labour shortages had forced recruiters to offer relatively higher pay to labourers recruited outside the territory - the wages offered to South African labourers were markedly higher than those paid to the local black population.[12] Preferential treatment was also accorded to expatriate blacks, particularly Cape Coloureds. In terms of an administrative circular sent out to municipal authorities in 1922, it

was pointed out that the "Cape Coloured persons and people of that class" did not fall under the pass laws, the curfew regulations, and the municipal by-laws which required blacks to keep off sidewalks of certain Namibian towns.

> With the exception of the prohibition against their obtaining liquor, these people are entitled to be placed on an equal footing with Europeans in so far as the law is concerned.13

The circular also advised that "wherever possible separate areas should be reserved for coloured persons at some distance from the ordinary locations". In general a "liberal and progressive attitude" was advised in regard to all blacks in urban areas.

Although the relaxation of the harsher laws appeared to be aimed specifically at Coloured people, there were considerable ambiguities in the status of Africans from the Cape. In official documents of this time, the favoured term, "Cape Boys", appears to have been used sometimes to refer to Coloureds, sometimes Cape Africans and sometim both. For example, the Secretary for South West Africa pointed out in a letter to the head of Native Affairs in Luderitz that curfew regulations did not apply to "coloured persons, viz: Cape boys and such people".[14] Initially the administration regarded the ICU as an organization representing the Cape Coloured community and early documents even refer to the ICU as the "Industrial Coloured Workers Union".[15] That these perceptions of differential status were shared by the leaders of the ICU and UNIA is made explicit in a report by the Native Commissioner for South West Africa on a meeting with the ICU and the UNIA leaders in March 1922:

> It was noticed that although this deputation seemed concerned about the welfare of visitors - presumably natives as a rule - they said they thought their class should not have to live in proximity to raw natives.16

The distinctive class basis of the ICU in Namibia manifested itself on a number of levels, in the kind of organization it became, in its activities, and in the attitudes adopted towards the ICU by both the administration and local blacks. The constitution adopted by the Luderitz branch, for example, was "imported" directly from South Africa, apparently without any consideration for the conditions that existed in the territory. Members were required to pay an entrance fee of 1/6 and a contribution of 6d a week. A further charge of 1/- was made for a copy of the "rules" (ie. the constitution).[17] Given the wage structure and composition of the labour force in Namibia, these fees must have put the organization well beyond the financial reach of all but a small and, for the most part, expatriate elite. The constitution also imposed fairly complex debating procedures which were clearly prejudicial to uneducated members.[18] The constitution and structure of the ICU, Luderitz, seemed almost designed to prevent effective action by members on the labour front. For example, the constitution laid down that "No strike shall be declared before a ballot has been taken at a meeting summoned for that purpose and must be carried by a two-thirds majority of those present."[19] Disputes had further to be referred to the Executive Committee in writing. Throughout its brief existence the Luderitz branch showed a heavy reliance on headquarters in Cape Town - a weakness which was successfully exploited by the administration.

Activities of the ICU, Luderitz

In its activities the ICU branch never got much beyond its not altogether successful attempts to maintain the organization, and the occasional articulation of grievances of the elite urban groups. Early discussions were confined to wages and conditions in Luderitz.[20] These

early attempts at organization did not seem to disturb the authorities unduely. The major anxiety of the administration was that the movement might spread to the contract labourers working on the mines near Luderitz. Both Pieterse and De Clue were warned by the authorities in Luderitz to confine their activities to the "educated classes". The two men had promised to do this, but had enrolled a number of non-contract Ovambos.[21] The first real cause for concern came in October 1921 when De Clue attended a conference of the ICU in Port Elizabeth. As an official representative of the Luderitz branch, De Clue addressed the conference about the position of black labour in Namibia, wages, the treatment of blacks on trains, and police brutality. He called for the abolition of the "seven-day pass system" and for the establishment of proper hospital facilities for blacks. After debating the report, the conference decided to send a three-man delegation to Namibia to investigate the situation and interview the local authorities.[22]

After receiving reports of the Port Elizabeth conference, the authorities decided to take action. Shortly after his return to Luderitz, De Clue was interviewed by the district magistrate and asked for a statement to substantiate the allegations he had made in Port Elizabeth. After checking the statement with the police who, quite predicably, denied all knowledge of policemen ill-treating black prisoners, the magistrate dismissed De Clue's statement:

> From what I know of this coloured person there is little doubt that he did make sweeping statements and from his own admission before me took no action to ascertain any facts before preceding to the conference.23

Within a few months of De Clue's return from Port Elizabeth various pressures were brought to bear on members of the ICU in Luderitz, and

urgent pleas were made to Kadalie in Cape Town to provide assistance. "We are surrounded here with all manners of troubles just now and the clouds look rather dark on our side, in short the authorities are pressing us on all sides and I am not prepared to say what the consequences will be, however if ever we required assistance now is the time and it would have been a grand chance to fight the storm if our leaders from headquarters could have been here to assist us in our grievances which are too much to write down ..." the secretary of the ICU branch, Adrianse wrote to Kadalie.[24]

In another letter Adrianse stated that

> since Mr De Clue has returned from the Port Elizabeth conference, the Local authorities have never left him in peace and the result is that his private interests are suffering through it, as you are perhaps aware he is carrying on a little business as a General Dealer in the Location. This privilege it appears that the local authorities are bent on taking away from him.[25]

This situation had compelled De Clue to spend money on legal assistance. De Clue had also been told that he would have to obtain permission from the Town Council in order to reside in the location. On applying for permission, he "was informed through the Local Supt. that according to instructions received that no permission will be granted to him .... However they always remind him of Port Elizabeth conference." Adrianse complained also of the introduction of a new curf·· regulation, heavy site taxes for location houses, the high price of water, decreasing wages and unemployment. The native population of Luderitz, he said, had "decided not to carry any pass neither to pay tax at the rate fixed by the local authorities."

> They are willing to pay tax but taking the present high cost of living into consideration, compared with the scarcity of work it means nothing else but "political slavery."[26]

These and other letters were sent to the administrator of South West Africa by Kadalie to support the ICU's request for permission to send a delegation to the territory to assist the two branches of the ICU established in Luderitz and Keetmanshoop.[27] The administrator promptly grasped at this opportunity to delay giving an answer to the request. He maintained that the grievances outlined in the letter were of such a serious nature that he would like to have them investigated before considering the ICU's request.[28] The Native Commissioner, C.N. Manning, was therefore dispatched to Luderitz to inquire into the grievances.

The delegation from the ICU which included the president of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, Fitz Herbert Headley, adopted a conciliatory approach to Manning. The various grievances enumerated in the letters supplied to the administration by Kadalie were discussed. Manning skilfully isolated those grievances which directly affected the interests of the ICU elite from those which affected the wider black population.[29] Trading rights of blacks in the Luderitz location were treated with sympathy. Manning says in his report that "it was understood that on instructions from Windhoek de Clue's (trading) licence had been restored." Not long after Manning's visit, municipalities were instructed to adopt a more lenient attitude to "native and coloured" traders, "provided applicants (for trading licences) were fit and proper persons".[30] Manning also pointed out to the delegation that site taxes and water charges were still under consideration by the administration and that administrative officials in Luderitz were making enquiries with a view to establishing fair rates.

Other issues such as the pass laws, raids by the police and the arrest

and harrassment of the unemployed, were treated with less sympathy and willingness to compromize. The delegation was informed, however, that "the new Pass Law would only affect Luderitz in as far as travelling is concerned." Manning came to the general conclusion that "whilst most of the complaints are frivilous or exaggerated to support political aspirations and in some cases quite unfounded", there was "room for improvement" in such matters as (a) trading rights for Coloured people and (b) sanitary arrangements on trains which "were not only very primitive but most likely to humiliate respectable coloured persons and natives having to conform to them." Manning also recommended that "Kroo Boys (West Africans) and such foreign coloured people ... be encouraged to leave this Territory whenever possible, and in cases of proved crimes against them, they should be deported."

During the course of his interview with the ICU delegation, Manning had asked them "in what way they thought a mission from the Union could improve matters." The delegation had replied that there "was no particular grievance which it could enquire into, but a mission could expedite 'organization' for general betterment."[31] Clearly this attitude reinforced the administration's doubt about letting an ICU delegation into the country. No attempt was made to communicate with the ICU in Cape Town, however, until August, when Kadalie wrote to the administrator to inform him that the organization was "anxiously waiting for the results of the investigations and also for the desired permit for our mission to the Territory".[32] The application for a permit was turned down with the observation that "the administrator regrets that he does not think it advisable, in view of the present disturbed condition of the country".[33] However, while in Cape Town in September the admin-

istrator reversed this decision and granted a permit to J.G. Gumbs, acting President-General of the ICU, to visit the organizations' branches in the territory.[34] This change of heart probably had more to do with conditions in the Union than in the Protectorate. The Smuts Government had obtained only a narrow majority in the 1920 election and was therefore eager to maintain the support of the black and coloured electorate. It was probably for similar reasons that the South African Minister of the Interior had in 1921 reversed a decision which declared Kadalie a prohibited immigrant into South Africa.[35]

Gumbs' movements in the territory were carefully monitored by the administration, and it appears that he restricted himself to the internal affairs of the ICU branches at Luderitz and Keetmanshoop in compliance with the conditions laid down by the administration. However, it is perhaps indicative both of conditions in Namibia at this time and of the gap between ICU leaders and the indigenous population that Gumbs' visit became associated with a general rising of blacks in the territory. The Luderitz police reported that from the information they had gathered

> it appears that at least an impression exist among a certain section of natives - South West Africa tribes - both here and at Keetmanshoop, that Gumbs' mission was of a war-like purpose and for the recruiting of men for a so-called "Regiment" required for service by Gumbs in a general rising against the white man. I am informed also that at Keetmanshoop the Natives talk of a rising which is to take place in January next. Certain natives have even confused this rumour with the object of Gumbs' visit and such expressions as "stand together" have apparently been misinterpreted.[36]

Another attempt to secure a permit for Kadalie to visit Luderitz was made in June 1923 following urgent appeals by De Clue, who was then president of the Luderitz branch for assistance from headquarters.[37] De Clue had reported to Kadalie that the affairs of the organization were

"in a very bad state" because members of the executive failed to comply with regulations. In particular the new branch secretary was neglecting his duties and had repeatedly failed to attend meetings. De Clue also suspected him of embezzling ICU funds.[38] The administration was clearly opposed to the proposed visit by Kadalie. It had already adopted a clear policy of attempting to split and weaken black organizations in the territory,[39] and the news that the Luderitz branch of the ICU was in trouble must have been welcomed by the administration. However, probably because of the sensitive issue of the black electorate in the Union, the administrator wrote to the prime-minister asking his advice in relation to Kadalie's application for a permit.[40] With characteristic skill, Smuts endorsed the reluctance of the administrator to issue a permit to Kadalie without taking any personal responsibility for the decision.[41] Kadalie was therefore informed by the administration that there was "no need" for him to go personally to Luderitz as the suspected misappropriation of funds had been reported to the public prosecutor "who will make all the investigations necessary and will give any assistance in his power."[42] Kadalie protested against the "unreasonable attitude" of the administration but without results.[43]

Further unsuccessful attempts were made in 1924 to secure permission for an ICU representative to visit the territory, and the executive of the ICU resolved, in accordance with a conference resolution, to take up the matter with the Union government.[44] An ICU delegation consisting of Kadalie, La Guma, S.M. Masabalala and "Professor" James Thaele saw Minister of Mines and Industries P.S. Malan in March 1924 to discuss labour conditions in both the Union and South West Africa. Nothing concrete appears to have come from this meeting.[45] As Wickens points out, the Pact Government of Hertzog was from the start pre-occupied with

the "poor whites" and white workers[46] and was therefore less likely to be responsive to the difficulties of black labourers, particularly those in South West Africa.

Although documentation of this period of the ICU in Namibia is at best sketchy, it would appear that the Luderitz branch did not survive the organizational difficulties it experienced in 1923/24. As for the Keetmanshoop branch, there is no evidence that it existed in anything but name. According to a resolution adopted on South West Africa at the Port Elizabeth conference in 1924, the ICU had four branches in the Protectorate.[47] This is highly unlikely, unless of course the ICU was counting UNIA branches in South West Africa among its own. Even Kadalie who was not above exaggeration, admits to only two branches of the ICU in South West Africa in his autobiography.[48] However, Kadalie does maintain that the congress held in Kimberly in December 1927 was attended by large numbers of delegates from all over the Union and South West Africa."[49] There is, moreover, evidence that in 1926 the ICU made attempts to recruit members among the contract workers in Walvis Bay. An ICU recruiter from South Africa had apparently been holding "nightly meetings" in the Walvis Bay compound. The man who is identified only as "Timothy" was assisted by a secretary called Napthali and had been collecting funds for the ICU. According to the compound manager, "although the financial support given to Timothy was not very great, he never lacked a good audience to listen to his outpourings against the White Man."[50] Both Timothy and Napthali were repatriated back to South Africa on the grounds of being "undesirables", although Napthali managed to find his way back to Walvis Bay and obtain employment at the radio station there.[51]

Attitudes of the administration to the ICU

From the beginning of the establishment of the ICU in South West Africa, the administration's main concern was that the organization would spread from the "educated" expatriate elite to the local population - particularly the Ovambo migrant workers who made up a significant part of the Namibian labour force. The founders of the organization in Luderitz were therefore warned to confine their activities to the "educated class" of blacks.[52] The very first communications informing the administration in Windhoek of the formation of an ICU branch in Luderitz expressed anxiety about the recruitment of non-contract Ovambos in the town and the effect the ICU might have on mine labourers.[53] The officer in charge of Native Affairs in Luderitz pointed out that he was "fully alive to (the) danger (of the) movement spreading to mine labourers" and said that he had already taken steps to prevent this by stopping Ovambo passes between the adjacent diamond fields and the town of Luderitz. The police had also been asked to supply additional patrols, presumably to prevent contacts between the town and the labourers on the diamond fields.[54] The magistrate of Luderitz advised that:

> anyone who attempts to influence the Ovambos in this direction should in my opinion be deported as a menace to the good order of the territory.55

Some anxiety was also expressed over the possibility of farm labourers being recruited by the ICU:

> The native Unions are apparently countenanced in the Union and they may be of assistance to the natives but what may give rise to trouble in this territory is the enrolment of the uneducated class of natives such as Hottentots and Ovambos, and this it will be difficult to prevent as the leaders are naturally out for subscriptions from all and sundry to provide salaries for themselves.56

As if the precautions already taken were not enough, the Secretary for South West Africa instructed the Natives Affairs Department of Luderitz

that on "no account should native strangers be allowed on the Diamond fields."[57]

In a letter to the South African prime minister about the ICU and Kadalie's application for a permit in 1923, the administrator observed that he had recently authorized the Consolidated Diamond Mines to recruit a certain number of black labourers in the Union. However, he and the CDM representative had concurred that it would be "highly undesirable... that the Union and our natives should come into contact with each other, and it was decided that the local natives employed at Kolmanskop should be transferred and the Union natives placed there."[58]

These measures to isolate the ICU from the major labour force in the territory had important implications for the organization. They meant that the Luderitz branch would be restricted to the small, largely skilled, and relatively privileged residents in the Luderitz location. The isolation of Luderitz from other urban, or even rural settlements - the Namib Desert effectively cut the town off from its hinterland - further served the cause of the administration in this regard. All this contributed towards making the membership of the Luderitz branch a small and distinctive grouping dominated by expatriates with interests of their own. This would in turn mean that they would incur the suspicion of the local black population and be more vulnerable to the manipulations of the administration.

Some of the ways in which the administration was able to manipulate the ICU leadership have already been discussed. Because of the class-base of the leadership of the ICU in Luderitz they could easily be brought under

pressure, for example, by threatening their business interests. Furthermore, certain concessions could be granted to this small group without affecting the "native" and labour policies applied more generally in the territory. This selective treatment would in turn widen the gap between ICU leaders and their prospective base, and arouse the suspicion and distrust of the indigenous population. The expatriate composition of the ICU branch also increased its dependence on its headquarters in Cape Town, and the administration was not slow to exploit this dependence. Soon after the establishment of the Luderitz branch, administrative officials suggested the introduction of a permit system for black and coloured people attempting to enter South West Africa. It was also suggested that travelling passes within the territory should be more tightly controlled.[59] The introduction of the permit system meant that the ICU branches in the Protectorate could be effectively isolated from their headquarters in Cape Town - a situation which finally proved fatal to the Luderitz branch. It may be possible on this score to criticize Kadalie for moving La Guma - perhaps the most effective organizer associated with the Luderitz branch - from South West Africa to the Cape. Restrictions on mobility within the country also ... enormous obstacles in the way of the black organizations' attempts to extend their activities into other parts of the country, or to coordinate the activities of their branches.

The South West African National Congress

The measures described above did not exhaust the administration's ability to put obstacles in the way of the organizations established in Luderitz and other parts of the territory. A major tactic adopted by the administration was to encourage splits in these organizations. Here it was clearly aided by the suspicion that had been aroused among local

blacks about the foreign origins and the privileged status of expatriate blacks in both the ICU and the UNIA. The clearest example of this strategy was related to the formation of the South West African National Congress (SWANC) in Luderitz in the latter half of 1922.

The major catalyst for the establishment of the SWANC in Luderitz was S.M. Bennett Ncwana, a rather strange figure who flits in and out black politics in the Cape and South West Africa. Ncwana was an early and fairly prominent member of the ICU,[60] who moved periodically between the ICU and its rival the ICWU. After defecting from the ICWU, Ncwana joined the ICU for a short period before deserting this organization in 1921 and launching a bitter attack on it in his newspaper, *The Black Man*. Later he again joined the I[illegible]r, helped found the African Land Settlement Scheme with the ob[illegible] assist the Government by inducing natives living in towns to settle on the land."[61] At other times Ncwana also acted as general organizer of the Cape Native Voter's Organization which mobilized black voters for the South African Party,[62] and according to Kadalie helped write the election literature for the Nationalist candidate Professor Schoeman who stood against Margaret Ballinger in the 1949 election.[63]

Ncwana must have had contacts in Luderitz from an early period. In May 1921, the Native Affairs Department in Luderitz reported that Ncwana's newspaper, *The Black Man*, was regularly send to Luderitz and that the editor of the newspaper had been expected to pay a visit to the town two months before.[64] Ncwana did eventually pay a visit to South West Africa in the latter half of 1922, at roughly the same time that the ICU was having trouble persuading the administration to grant it a permit

to send a delegation to the territory. How Ncwana managed to get into the territory is not known, but according to a report in the *Windhoek Advertiser* he had been discovered to be without a permit and was given fourteen days grace to leave the country.[65] Why Ncwana was given fourteen days grace rather than been arrested or sent back to Cape Town immediately may well be connected to the attitude the administration adopted to the organization he was attempting to launch in South West Africa.

The Natives Affairs Department in Luderitz was first informed of the inauguration of the South West African National Congress in September 1922.[66] The assistant secretary of the organization announced that the newly-formed SWANC would be conducted on the same principles as the South African Native National Congress and that the organization would "always solicit the guidance and fatherly advice of the Native Affairs Department." A list of the office holders of the new organization was included. It shows a mixture of different tribal groupings, including Namas, Hereros, Ovambos and various South African blacks. Jacob Jantjes, a Nama who had been on the executive of the ICU, was listed as chairman and Ncwana as "chief organizer". Ncwana stated in Cape Town that he had consulted "the petty chiefs of the different tribes in South West" and that they had been favourable to the "extension" of the organization in the territory.[67]

According to the Luderitz Native Affairs Department which had interrogated members of the new organization, the SWANC "was the outcome of dissatisfaction on the part of South African and South West African Natives with the I.C. Union (chiefly dominated by Cape Boys) and the U.N.I. association (introduced and directed by West Indian and West

Coast natives) which is continually calling for funds for American propaganda purposes":

> The Local Natives have apparently realised that they were being made use of by the others and now wish to look after their own interests. It is difficult to ascertain what their aims in this direction were except that they were desirous of helping one another.68

According to Ncwana, the major grievances of Namibian blacks were the "unsympathic administration, no outlet for discussing native grievances, unreasonable taxation considering the absence of profitable work, and the absence of native educational facilities." Ncwana was apparently also "emphatic in his professions of being desirous to work in harmony with the authorities":

> "I have been a moving spirit," he said, "in the native movement, but never an agitator. I did adopt an aggressive policy in my paper, but I found that it was not judicious. I dropped the paper and tried to start afresh on the lines of educating European opinion."69

Although the SWANC planned to adopt the constitution of the SANNC, it was intended that the Namibian congress would be an entirely separate body and not a branch of the South Africa organization.

The administration was not slow to realize the potential usefulness of an organization like the SWANC to its attempts to curb organized black resistance in the territory. In a letter informing the administration in Windhoek of the formation of the SWANC, the officer in charge of Native Affairs in Luderitz clearly outlined the strategy which the administration was to follow with considerable success.

> In the absence of any law forbidding the formation of native unions the most this department can possibly do to minimize the dangers which may arise from such unions is to endeavour

> to split the membership into different factions - as has been done here - but there is little doubt that determined efforts will be made by one of the older bodies to eventually bring them under the same banner again...
> It is probable that a purely native congress can be handled more easily than the UNIA or the ICU - especially with a few Union Natives, with an ingrained respect for the white man's authority at the head of affairs - and, if the congress were taken under the wing of the Government, at its formation, with some unobtrusive, but effectual, provisions for Govt supervision it might be a good policy.
> We are at present fighting the native union menace with ineffective weapons and I beg to submit that the question of control or prohibition should be dealt with without delay.71

Key officials in Windhoek completely endorsed these views. The Native Commissioner, C.N., Manning pointed out in a note to the Secretary for South West Africa that "under official guidance this new association of South African natives (*s/c*) might prove very useful in upsetting dangerous, irresponsible foreign doctrines". He added that the "combination of native races in South West Africa" had been "unknown in former years" and that this was causing alarm among white residents of the territory.[72] The Secretary in turn endorsed without reservation the views of the officer in charge of Native Affairs in Luderitz:

> ... the more so that this Association appears to be the outcome of dissatisfaction on the part of South African and South-West African Natives against the ICU ... and the Negro Association ... It is also noted that this new Association declares that it will "always solicit the guidance and fatherly advice of the Native Affairs Department" ... it is thought that under discrete official guidance the new Association referred to might prove very useful in splitting up political combinations and upsetting dangerous foreign doctrines.73

The organizational and leadership problems experienced by the ICU in Luderitz early in 1923 should be seen against the background of this strategy adopted by the administration. Already isolated from the major labour force in the area, the ICU had only a small pool of leaders (and even members) to draw from. The emergence of a third organization in a

district which in 1921 had a total black population of 2 155,[74] must have severely strained the human resources available to the ICU. Similar difficulties must have been experienced by UNIA, particularly after Herero and other leaders broke away from the Windhoek branch of the organization.[75]

Two other organizations, both of which were associated with the Cape coloureds in the territory and were based in Windhoek, were launched in the next three years. In February 1923, a branch of the African People's Organization was launched in Windhoek "for the defence of the social, political and civil rights of the Cape Coloured Community throughout the S.W. Protectorate".[76] In 1925 a branch of the African National Bond was also established in Windhoek with the broad objective of furthering "the advancement of the Coloured Community." Notification of the administration of the formation of the branch was accompanied by a circular from the head office of the society which pointed out

> the necessity of getting our people well organised so as to enable us to hold our own in the future, as far as political, economic, and industrial rights are concerned.77

Although these two organizations had aims and structures, which were adapted to an urban and industrial setting, it is clear that they confined their activities to only one section of the population - the Coloured community - which although black, was not indigenous. Even the APO which in South Africa, under the leadership of Dr A. Abdurahman, had strong radical and nationalist tendencies,[78] appears to have restricted itself to representing the coloured community in South West Africa. In his 1924 report, the administrator comments with obvious satisfaction that the APO branch members "have always been loyal supporters of the

Administration and do not appear to interfere with matters where their own welfare is not concerned."[79] In a later report[80] the administrator maintained that the APO had alligned itself with the South African Party, while the African National Bond alligned itself with the National Party.

The major weakness of all the organizations discussed in this chapter was their isolation from the bulk of the Namibian population in the smaller towns and rural areas. All of these organizations had had their origins in South Africa and were more closely geared to the interests and needs of the more urbanized and proletarianized black population of the Union. Although the South African ICU did penetrate into the rural areas of the Union in the mid-1920's,[81] it was still essentially an urban based organization in the early 1920's when the Luderitz and Keetmanshoop branches were functioning. Of all the organizations introduced into Namibia during this period, only the Universal Negro Improvement Association was able to make an impact on the rural population. The penetration of this organization into the Namibian countryside will be the subject of the next chapter.

Endnotes for chapter five

1. P.L. Wickens, *The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 20; S. Trapido, Introduction to C. Kadalie, *My life and the ICU: the autobiography of a black trade unionist in South Africa*. London: Frank Cass, 1970.

2. ADM 152/C248, Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 26/5/21.

3. W. Beinart, 'Cape workers in German South-West Africa: patterns of migrancy and the closing of options on the southern African labour market'. *Collected Seminar Papers No. 27: The societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1981, pp. 48-65.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Wickens, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

6. ADM 152/C248, *passim*.

7. T. Karis, G. Carter and G. Gerhart (eds.), *From protest to challenge: a documentary history of African politics in South Africa 1882-1964, Volume 4*, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1977, p. 53.

8 . *Ibid.*, ADM 152/C248, Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 26/5/21.

9. Karis, Carter and Gerhart, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, pp. 53-54; Kadalie, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

10. ADM 152/C248, 'Report of the Native Commissioner on SWA, Coloured and Native People, Luderitz: Alleged Grievances', 24/4/22.

11. See for example, ADM 152/C248, Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 7/9/22.

12. W. Beinart, *op. cit.*

13. ADM 152/C248, Circular to all municipalities: 'Control of Natives and Coloured Persons in Urban Areas', 20/7/22.

14. ADM 152/C248, Secretary - Native Affairs, Luderitz, 9/9/22.

15. ADM 152/C248, Magistrate, Luderitz - Secretary, 5/1/20 (Letter misdated, should be 1921); SWA Police, Windhoek - Secretary, 29/12/20.

16. ADM 152/C248, 'Coloured and Native People, Luderitz: Alleged grievances', 24/4/22.

17. ADM 152/C248, ICU, 'Rules and regulations', undated.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. ADM 152/C248, C.N. Manning - Secretary, 8/6/21; Natives, Luderitz - Prosec, 31/12/20.

ADM 152/C248, Natives, Luderitz - Prosec, 31/12/20.

22. ADM 152/C248, *E.P. Herald*, 24/4/22 and 29/10/21.

23. ADM 152/C248, Magistrate, Luderitz - Secretary, 8/12/21.

24. ADM 152/C248, W. Adrianse, Luderitz - C Kadalie, Cape Town, 19/1/22.

25. ADM 152/C248, Adrianse - Kadalie, 26/1/22.

26. *Ibid.*

27. ADM 152/C248, Kadalie, Cape Town - Administrator SWA, Cape Town, 22/3/22.

28. ADM 152/C248, Secretary SWA - General Secretary, ICU, 25/3/22.

29. ADM 152/C248, 'Coloured and Native People, Luderitz: Alleged Grievances', 24/4/22.

30. ADM 152/C248, Circular to all municipalities: 'Control of Natives and Coloured Persons in Urban Areas', 20/7/22.

31. ADM 152/C248, 'Coloured and Native People, Luderitz: Alleged Grievances', 24/4/22.

32. ADM 152/C248, Kadalie, Cape Town - Administrator SWA, 1/8/22.

33. ADM 152/C248, Secretary SWA - General Secretary ICU, 23/8/22.

34. ADM 152/C248, Administrator - Secretary, 1/9/22; Secretary - Magistrate, Luderitz, 1/9/22; Kadalie - Administrator SWA, 6/9/22.

35. Wickens, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

36. ADM 152/C248, SWA Police, Luderitz - Magistrate, Luderitz, 4/11/22.

37. A312, Item 77, Kadalie - Administrator SWA, 6/6/23.

38. A312, Item 77, J. De Clue, Luderitz - Kadalie Cape Town, 14/5/23.

39. See for example, ADM 152/C248, Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 7/9/22; Secretary - Native Affairs, Luderitz, 29/9/22. Also see section on the SWA National Congress, below.

40. A312, Item 77, Administrator - J.C. Smuts, Cape Town, 18/6/23.

41. A312, Item 77. J.C. Smuts, Pretoria - G.R. Hofmeyr, Windhoek, 3/7/23.

42. A312, Item 77, Secretary SWA - Kadalie, Cape Town, 21/7/23.

43. A312, Item 77, Kadalie - Secretary, SWA, 30/7/23; Secretary SWA - Kadalie. 21/8/23.

44. ADM 152/C248, Kadalie, Cape Town - Hofmeyr, Cape Town, 25/3/24. The resolution was taken during the ICU conference in East London during 1924.

45. ADM 152/C248, *Cape Times*, 26/3/24. James Thaele was a prominent Garveyist in Cape Town. He had attended Lincoln University in the United States and was nicknamed "Professor", although he never actually held this position. See, for example, Karis, Carter and Gerhart, *op. cit.*, Vol 4, pp. 154-155.

46. Wickens, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-82.

47. ADM 152/C248, C. Kadalie, 'Resolution', undated.

48. Kadalie, *op. cit.*, pp 145 and 221.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

50. SWAA A494/1, J. Flord, Walvis Bay - Port Officer, Walvis Bay, 6/6/26.

51. *Ibid.*

52. See above.

53. ADM 152/C248, CID, Windhoek - Secretary, 29/12/20; Natives, Luderitz - Prosec, 31/12/21; Magistrate, Luderitz - Secretary, 5/1/20 (Letter misdated, should be 1921).

54. ADM 152/C248, Natives, Luderitz - Prosec, 31/12/21.

55. ADM 152/C248, Magistrate, Luderitz - Secretary, 5/1/20 (Letter misdated, should be 1921).

56. ADM 152/C248, Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 25/5/21.

57. ADM 152/C248, Secretary - Native Affairs, Luderitz, 23/6/21.

58. A312, Item 77, Administrator - J.C. Smuts, 18/6/23.

59. ADM 152/C248, Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 26/5/21; C.N. Manning - Secretary, 8/6/21. In terms of the Native Administration Proclamation (No. 11 of 1922) no black person could enter SWA without a permit, unless for the purpose of employment. Furthermore, blacks required a permit in order to travel within or leave the territory. Local authorities were empowered to refuse to issue permits and the administrator had "full authority or discretion in any case to order the issue or refusal of passes", Union of South Africa, Administrator's report, 1922, U.G. 21-23.

60. Wickens, *op. cit.*, p. 61; Kadalie, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

61. Wickens, *op. cit.*, p.66. See also Kadalie, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

62. Wickens, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

63. Kadalie, *op. cit.*, p. 57 fn.

64. ADM 152/C248, Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 26/5/21.

65. SWAA A50/13/1, undated report from *Windhoek Advertiser*, reprinted from *Cape Argus*, 21/9/22.

66. ADM 152/C248, B. Bambaloza - Native Commissioner, Luderitz, 1/9/22.

67. SWAA A50/13/1, undated report from *Windhoek Advertiser* (see fn 65 above).

68. ADM 152/C248 Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 7/9/22.

69. SWAA A50/13/1, undated report from *Windhoek Advertiser* (see fn 65 above).

70. ADM 152/C248 Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 19/9/22.

71. ADM 152/C248 Native Affairs, Luderitz - Secretary, 7/9/22.

72. ADM 152/C248, Internal memo. C.N.M. - Secretary, 14/9/22.

73. ADM 152/C248 Secretary - Native Affairs, Luderitz, 29/9/22.

74. Union of South Africa, Administrator's report, 1925, U.G. 26-26, p. 21.

75. See ch. six, above.

76. ADM 152/C248, APO, Windhoek - Native Affairs, Windhoek, 4/2/23.

77. SWAA A240/21, Native Affairs, Windhoek - Secretary, 27/3/25.

78. State Archives, Pretoria, GG 50/1041, *Cape Times* reports, 4/4/23, 5/4/23 and 6/4/23.

79. Union of South AFrica, Administrator's report, 1924, U.G. 33-25, p.28.

80. Union of South Africa Administrator's report, 1925, U.G 26-26, p. 30.

81. See, for example, H. Bradford, *The ICU and the Transvaal rural popular classes in the 1920's: protest in the country side.* Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop, February, 1981.

Chapter six

GARVEYISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE NAMIBIAN COUNTRYSIDE

The Universal Negro Improvement Association in Luderitz

The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA & ACL) was launched in Luderitz in 1921. The catalyst for the formation of this branch of the Garveyist organization was a small group of West Indians who had settled largely in the coastal towns of the territory. The majority of this group orginated from Liberia, the Cameroons, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, and had been brought into the territory by the Germans before and during World War I. In 1910, for example, fifty men and a number of women and children were deported from the German colony of Kamerun to Luderitz, following a mutiny among the black *Schutztruppe* in the West African colony. The majority of this group were returned to West Africa after the occupation of Namibia by South African forces, but a number who were working in Luderitz stayed behind.[1] Other West Africans, particularly the Liberians, had been brought to Namibia by the Woermann shipping company. Some of these had been deck hands on the Woermann ships and had been stranded in Luderitz and other coastal towns when war broke out in 1914.[2]

During the war members of the West African community in Nambia appealed to the administration to send them home. In response to pressure from the administration the Woermann Line arranged for the passage of some of these West Africans to Monravia, but refused to take any more after two of them deserted their ship at Cape Town.[3] Although the administration appeared to be eager to be rid of the West Africans, it was not prepared to foot the bill for their repatriation. Furthermore, a number of West

Africans were skilled dock workers and therefore difficult to replace. In 1925, for example, the South African Railways specially recruited twenty West Africans for the Walvis Bay docks on account of their skills as winchmen and because it was "impractical to employ white men on this work, since they will have to learn the work under these Kroo men".[4]

Although they intermarried with the local people, the West Indians and West Africans formed a distinctive segment of the Namibian population. They were far more urbanized than the local population and some earned relatively high wages.[5] Others lived on the fringes of their community, supporting themselves by gambling or petty crime. The magistrates of Luderitz and Swakopmund complained frequently about the "gambling and thieving propensities" of the West Africans in their districts. The West Africans were "the cause of a lot of trouble", the magistrate of Luderitz complained in 1920. Many of them lived "by swindling the aborigines of their hard-earned wages by card sharping".[6] The police believed that they were "corrupting" the local blacks and were the cause of an escalating crime rate in Luderitz,[7] but perhaps most troublesome to the administration were the "political inclinations" of some of the West Africans.[8]

Although Marcus Garvey first launched his organization in Jamaicain 1914, it was only when he turned his attention to the United States that his efforts bore fruit. Garvey arrived in New York in 1916 and by the end of the war had created the basis for the first mass Afro-American movement. Conditions during and shortly after the 1914-1918 War were highly favourable for the launching of a mass movement amongst American Negros. World War I had created a rising demand for American manufactures and the Northern industries were critically short of unskilled

labour because the war had stemmed the flow of immigrants from Europe. At the same time restricted war-time markets for cotton, and infestations of the boll weevil helped to displace the poorer sectors of the agrarian population in the South. As a result a large-scale migration of Southern blacks to the industrial cities in the North took place. Between 1916 and 1918 about half a million blacks migrated to the North, where competition for housing and jobs resulted in inter-racial tensions and conflicts. The end of the war was marked by an economic slump in which blacks generally found that they were the last to be hired and the first to be fired. After the war there was a resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in both the North and South. The demobilization of 400 000 Black soldiers added to the tensions that precipitated the wave of race riots that swept the country in 1919. Although Garveyism also took root among the rural workers in the South, the black migrants, newly displaced from an agricultural economy and making the transition to an industrial proletariat, formed the basis for the Garveyist movement in the United States [9]

The first formal connection between Namibia and the Garveyist organization occurred in 1919 when the UNIA sent commissioners to the Versailles peace conference in an unsuccessful attempt to influence the plans being framed for the former German colonies. [10] A similar attempt was also made by Dr W.E.B. Du Bois, the organizer of the 1919 Pan-African Congress. Du Bois's plan was for the creation of an "internationalized" state consisting of the German colonies, the Portuguese colonies and the Congo. [11] In 1920 the Declaration of Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World was adopted at the first international convention of the UNIA. The declaration called "upon the various governments of the world to

accept and acknowledge Negro representatives who shall be sent to the said governments to represent the general welfare of the Negro peoples of the world."[12] In 1922 a UNIA delegation was sent to Geneva to petition the League of Nations to turn the former German colonies over to black leadership. The League was also urged to appoint a black representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission. Another petition relating to the Mandates was issued by Garvey in 1928, but enjoyed as little success as the other attempts.[13] Although Garvey's ambitions for the former German Colonies failed to have any impact, the ideas propogated by his organization were of considerable significance to Namibia. In fact Garveyism and its various mutant versions provided the first coherent, if somewhat fanciful ideological framework within which the various Namibian communities could unite in their efforts to resist colonialism.

The first branch of the UNIA was established early in 1921[14] in Luderitz, not long after the first African branches of the organization were established on the north-west coast of the continent.[15] Towards the end of 1921 the Luderitz branch had a membership of 311 and had collected £41-10-0 in subscription fees.[16] These figures should be seen against the size of the town's black population (there were 2155 black people in Luderitz, according to the 1921 census[17]), the low wages, and rising cost of living during this time. The organization catered for both the welfare and the political needs of its members. Its welfare benefits included assistance in the time of sickness, funeral expenses, and assistance to relatives of deceased members. Its membership covered the whole spectrum of black groups, both local and foreign.[18]

From the information available on the UNIA in Namibia, it would appear

that the Luderitz branch was dominated by men who were both foreign and relatively well-off. Administrative officials (whose perceptions were often clouded by ideological considerations) maintained that the Luderitz organization was dominated by West Africans and West Indians.[19] Only two members of the UNIA executive are mentioned recurrently in the available documentation on the Luderitz branch: Fitz Headley, the president, who was clearly the dominant figure in the organization, and John de Clue who was a prominent member of both the UNIA and the ICU. Both men were West Indians. John de Clue was the owner of a cafe in the black township, while Headley was chief stevedore at the Luderitz docks and earned a daily salary of seven shillings plus rations.[20] According to a summary of wages drawn up by the Native Affairs Department of Luderitz from labour contracts approved by the Department, the average daily wage for blacks ranged between one shilling and 2/6.[21] When members of the UNIA and ICU in Luderitz broke away from these two organizations to form the South West African National Congress, the reason given was that the two organizations were dominated by West Africans and South African blacks respectively.[22]

Although Garveyism only made an impact on West Africa towards 1920, pan-African and racial-nationalist ideologies were common in West Africa at least fifty years before the appearance of Garveyism. From the 1860s Africanus Horton and Edward Blyden were spreading the doctrines of racial pride and African unity on the West coast of the continent.[23] Thus the West African and West Indian (Blyden, for example, was a West Indian) community in Namibia was the logical launching ground for Garveyism in the territory.

The issues taken up by the Luderitz branch of UNIA were also indicative

of its domination by interests distinct from those of the overwhelming majority of the local black population. Although the Luderitz organization did call for racial unity and freedom from colonial oppression on behalf of all blacks, these appeals were characteristically couched in the vaguest of terms.[24] On the other hand the available documentation shows that where the Luderitz branch expressed more concrete grievances, it was representing the interests of a small and privileged minority, an isolated and largely foreign black petty bourgeoisie. This is clearly illustrated by a letter written by Headley as President of the Luderitz branch to the *Negro World* in 1921.[25] Headley begins his letter with a protest against the "tyranical system of sorfdom and injustice" applied in Luderitz and other parts of Namibia. Towards the end of the letter he criticizes the inadequate medical facilities provided for blacks in Luderitz.

However, sandwiched between this show of altruism and taking up the larger part of the letter, is a clearly spelt out appeal on behalf of black traders in Luderitz. This marginal trading class had established four small businesses in the black township, but were being threatened by white-owned stores operating on the periphery of the township. Significantly Headley asks the newspaper to note that the white businessmen concerned are "German Jews" - demonstrating the strong racist bent of his ideological approach. The question of black trading rights in Luderitz was a leading issue for both UNIA and the ICU. When black delegations representing these organizations petitioned the magistrate of Luderitz in 1921 and the Native Commissioner in March 1922, black trading rights were a central grievance.[26] This issue also came up in correspondence between the Luderitz branch of the ICU and Kadalie.[27] In

this regard it is perhaps significant that at least one of the owners of the four black businesses in Luderitz, John de Clue, was a prominent member of both UNIA and the ICU.

The Luderitz branch of the UNIA most accurately reflected the structure of interests and ideological approach of the wider Garveyist movement - and in particular the American base of the movement.

> Garvey's was the voice of the Negro petty bourgeoisie, seeking to secure the leadership of the Negro people by subordinating their national feelings and needs to class interest. ... Planning to create a great Negro state in an industrialized Africa, Garvey was obviously speaking not merely in the vague, indefinable terms of "race", but in concrete and definite concepts of bourgeois nationalism. What he had in mind for Africa was some kind of replica of capitalist society in the United States...28

Garveyism and millenarianism in the interior

However, once the movement spread beyond Luderitz, its composition and activities underwent fundamental changes. In particular, the Windhoek branch of the organization assumed a character markedly different from that of the Luderitz branch, although the initiative for its formation had come from Luderitz and it was initially run by West Africans.[29] However, by January 1922 when the Windhoek branch applied to the local municipality for permission to erect a hall, the executive of the branch had already come under the control of local black leaders. Herero leaders, in particular, were prominent in the organization. These included Hosea Kutako, who was later to emerge as the dominating figure in Herero politics and the most powerful indigenous leader in the police zone, Aaron (John) Mungunda, the brother of Kutako, Traugott Maharero, the Herero leader in Okahandja, and Nikanor Hoveka, another prominent Herero leader and later headman of the Epukiro Reserve. Although the Hereros appeared to be the dominant force in the Windhoek branch, the leaders of