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# CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, NAMIBIA

**Hauanga, Edward**

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# CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, NAMIBIA

Edward Hauanga

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management)

December 2005

Declaration

I declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

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Edward Hauanga

31st December 2005

Abstract

The research report aims to fill the knowledge gap on the relationship between civil and military components within the Namibian Ministry of Defence, which have continued to co-exist without any investigation conducted on its impact on governance and management. The purpose of the research was to investigate this relationship, known as Civil-Military Relations, and its impact thereof on the institutional development and its functionality.

Interviews were carried out with Ministry of Defence officers and civilian employees. Data or perceptions were collected from a number of senior officers using set questionnaires. The findings indicate some successes in terms of the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) Model, especially where both components establish respect for each other, not only by constitutional or statutory mandate but also in terms of attitude. Some limitations of the Model emerged from the findings and these were addressed through literature. The findings indicate an unexpected degree of agreement between the two components, where they exhibited the need for further enhancement of the CMR Model within the Ministry of Defence. The study has further demonstrated the evolution of CMR, as it is often fraught with complications and setbacks motivated by socio-economic and political factors.

The classical theory of the formal separation of the military from mainstream governance, as explored by Huntington, has been interrogated. Some critics of its application argue that it fails to recognize some of the major players in the security sector who play a pivotal role in ensuring that the national security strategy addresses the real security needs on the ground. This is civil society as an institution, with ideas and interests. Schiff's concordance theory seems to arrest this concern as it calls for partnership among the major stakeholders (that is, political society, civil society and the military) to set the agenda for institutional development. In conclusion, the study offers suggestions for various designs for the CMR Model and points to the importance of a participatory approach to governance.

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List of Abbreviations

BMATT -------- British Military Assistance Training Team

CMR ---------- Civil Military Relations

CDF ---------- Chief of Defence Force

MOD ---------- Ministry of Defence

PS ---------- Permanent Secretary

## Chapter One

## Introduction

The new world order has brought many challenges in the area of governance and the development of public sector institutions. Interaction between the civilian and military components of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has become a necessity in an attempt to provide for the social good and maintain democratic principles throughout the process of governance. This research report will attempt to provide some understanding on the management of the Namibian Ministry of Defence Civil Military Relations and the interplay between the two components.

### Problem Statement

The objective of the research report was to address or fill the knowledge gap emanating from the relationship between civil and military components within the Namibian Ministry of Defence, which have continued to co-exist without any investigation conducted on its impact on governance and management. Since the inception of the British model of civil military relations in the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Namibia in 1993 (when it was formalised through a policy document), there has been no study conducted on its impact on defence operations and functions. However, there have been some internal reports on structural civil military relations' initiatives and on the governance of the Ministry, though their success is yet to be determined.

### Purpose Statement

The purpose of this research was to investigate the relationship between civil and military components of the Ministry of Defence and the impact of the relationship on the development and functioning of the defence ministry.

### Report Coverage

The research report looks at background information on the Ministry of Defence and Namibian Defence Force, and at the impact of the policy transfer from the British Ministry of Defence that created the Namibian Ministry of Defence. It pays particular

attention to the fact that civilian and military components operate together to run the administration and military functions of defence. The report also offers a literature review on civil / military relations, under eight broad themes: the characteristics of the military; military intervention in politics; the separation of military and political spheres; Schiff's critique of the formal separation of the military; African models; the South African model; how to improve CMR; respective roles and skills of civilian and military personnel, and role of the MOD. Other main issues that form part of the research report include research findings; the research results analysis; methodology, and conclusions for the report. The concept of civil military relations is defined within the literature review to ensure that the Researcher and the Reader establish a common understanding on the usage of the words. It is important to acknowledge that there is a significant body of literature, though this research has focused on Civil Military Relations in the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Namibia with special attention to its implications for management and the development of the defence institution. Discussions on civilians in this research report refer to the component of the Ministry of Defence personnel that is not military.

**Background and Description of the Organisation**

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is the department of State entrusted with overseeing the political and financial components of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF). It is responsible for the production and promulgation of defence policy. It also acts as Headquarters of the Defence Force, collocating the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) with the seat of political authority (Du Pisani, A and Negonga, IE [2003]). The Chief of the Defence Force is appointed by the President under Article 32 (4)(c)(aa) hereof the 1990 Namibian Constitution as amended. The principal advantage of this design is that it facilitates clear political control of the higher direction and management of defence (White Paper on Defence Policy, February 1993: 9-11). It also further acts as the body that procures equipment for the force, while the production of the military policy direction is entrusted with the Namibian Defence Force. The Ministry of Defence has

sixteen departments, including three offices and three arms of services. The NDF houses three arms of services: the army, the air force and the navy.

The MOD has two components of personnel, civilian and military, to reflect its dual roles and to ensure that military advice is readily available. The composition of the MOD and NDF were influenced by long bitter military and political events ('wars of liberations and counter liberations') leading to the independence of Namibia in 1990. Since the inception of the MOD, significant progress has been made. Former members of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the armed wing of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia and the South West Africa Territorial Force (the locally organized armed wing of the South African Occupying Force) were demobilised and integrated into a unified Namibian Defence Force (Du Pisani, A and Negonga, IE [2003]). The Namibian Defence Force was established by Act of Parliament (Article 118 of the 1990 Namibian Constitution as amended) with the aim of defending the territory and national interests of Namibia. This is developed further in the Defence Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990) amending the South African Defence Act (44/1957) which sets out a variety of legal requirements for the composition and organization of the Defence Force. The Mission of the MOD and NDF (White Paper on Defence Policy, February 1993:8) is to meet Namibia's defence needs adequately, namely guaranteeing territorial integrity by guarding against external attack, conventional or unconventional, and helping prevent violations of Namibia's land, sea and airspace; to operate effectively in support of the civil authorities if required; to develop a defence organization with which the people of Namibia will identify and in which they will take pride; to operate safely and with respect for the environment and to improve the morale, motivation, education, prospects and well-being of its employees. At independence, Namibia needed to transform politically from the yoke of military confrontation during the era of armed struggle for the total liberation of the country and its people. Hence the establishment of social and political military institution that is dialectically intertwined with state governance. For instance, if war becomes necessary, the state must fight as a nation in arms relying on the professionalism of the military (interview with the Namibian Deputy Minister of Defence, Victor Simunja, MP: 31st January 2005). One of the national

security or political strategic transformation initiatives was to redesign the military architecture which recognises the role of military as that of defending the state and its people rather than determining the socio-economic and political destinies of the new nation. Section 14 of the Defence Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990) prohibits a member of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) from nomination, election or appointment as a Member of Parliament or any prescribed public body. It is argued that by denying members of the armed forces the opportunity to hold public political office makes the military apolitical (Negonga: 2003). This is a contradiction, insofar as the military by law must obey and receive orders from the political head of government, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This political head makes political decisions on behalf of the state and the government of the day in the form of operational orders for the military to execute. The Commanders must be able to understand the political context of the "order" in order to pass the correct instructions on to the operations Commander on the ground, if wrong "orders" are not to lead to casualties. Hence, the military cannot remain apolitical.

The Ministry of Defence was established with the help of the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT). Namibia adopted the British model at independence in 1990 (though this was only formalised in 1993 through a White Paper on Defence Policy), in terms of structure and ranking, and the personnel were ranked and posted according to the world standards of a national force. The British Government through their representative in Windhoek at the time offered to assist the new Namibian government to design the Ministry of Defence structure at their own cost and they assigned their own personnel to assist in this regard (Researcher's direct contact and working with the BMATT Members, including David Nilsson, here in Windhoek, 1991 - 1994). The literature on policy or model transfer is critical on the negative or positive impact posed by adopting policy from different political systems and the policy environment. The Literature on policy or model diffusion is concerned with the chronological and geographic patterns of the adoptions of a policy innovation across government units. In most cases the policy transfer is limited on cross-policy transfer using one model only (Mossberger, and Wolman: 2003). Namibia was not an exception to the rule of the

international obligation to establish a defence force to provide security to the citizens; hence the establishment of the Ministry of Defence was a necessity. Mossberger and Wolman argue that policy transfer should meet the rational criteria, which is mainly based on addressing the need on the ground. At independence, amid all the excitement there was no time to do a feasibility study or design a defence force needs' strategy. The only source of information sued was that of the British Military Assistance. The British Civil Military Relations model was not drawn up with the Namibian problems and goals in mind, and the British Team simply designed a structure similar to theirs. The reasons that led to the British to design this model in the first instance were not known to the Namibian Government. The settings where it was applied in Britain were similarly not familiar to Namibia. Other local laws or institutions that would support this model were not properly constituted or suitably experienced (Internal MODO, May 1995). Mossberger and Wolman further argue that lack of proper evaluation of policy transfer before adoption and cross-national policy transfer may diverge from rational decision models, and uninformed policy transfer frequently fails: for instance the context within which the policy was used to affect the transfer and ideological preferences limits the search for good policy transfer. This understanding could have happened in the Namibian situation where the Germans and South Africans were more than willing to assist, but because of the complex colonial history with them, such an option was not viable or politically desirable. Mossberger and Wolman further suggest that policy variances are important for rational decisions; sometimes one transfers a policy that talks about best practices, but it was either untried elsewhere or the settings were not the same. Moreover, assessing programme performance is particularly difficult when programme goals are unclear and when there are a variety of programme designs operating under one policy, and this may lead to bias on the issues. The other dilemma in assessing policy success is determining whose information to trust. These issues meant that there were problems from the start, compounded by the fact that Namibia is a small country in terms of populace and thus would not require many Generals or senior officers to run it. Obviously it needs a fighting force for any eventualities, but currently the ministerial structure is saturated with senior officers and ranks down line. Therefore it experiences a considerable duplication of responsibilities, or a situation whereby some offices have

relatively few functions to perform, the reason being that as a national force it is expected to have certain positions within its force structure in order to match up to its international counterparts. The defence force is traditionally hierarchical, and needs matching ranks to meet its counterparts. Hence, institutions such as MOD and NDF would need to appoint somebody to a higher rank, although that individual may not necessarily qualify for the post. In such cases the performance of the organization is affected, wherein the individual is ill equipped to perform. Cushway and Lodge draw a synergy to this view of the organization's culture and climate having influence on the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization. They argue that "people who may be very able and efficient in their own right, but who nevertheless do not fit into the culture, for example because of the way they… will be unlikely to achieve long-term success in the organization". The Burns and Stalker Studies cited in (unknown source) also appear to support this understanding; they suggest that socio-economic and political trends affect the organization, and its management system is influenced by extrinsic factors. Extrinsic factors in this case could be the world military rankings or standard structures. This brings the Researcher to the idea of attempting to define precisely what an organizational structure is. Cushway and Lodge (1993) define organizational structure as a: "description of how accountabilities, tasks and roles are allocated within the organization". They further opine that the structure is important because of the influences it can have on people's performance at work and on the effectiveness of the organisation's processes. In the organisation in which the Researcher works, civil military relations would also be affected by the defence structure. Kibasomba (2002) sees organizational structure as an enabling model for the maximization of the usage of investment capabilities, production capabilities and learning capabilities. There would appear to be a synergy between the two definitions of organizational structure; although the Researcher has a slightly different understanding of organizational structure as the process of departmentalising an organization for efficiency and effectiveness to meet business goals, whilst at the same time monitoring through feedback from the line of authority, responsibility and accountability. (Extensive reading on the subject matter influenced Researcher's definition). The Researcher suggests CMR structure an appendices at B. The proposed structure is conservative and implies a high level of communication between the relevant

stakeholders as well as cost-effectiveness. It would facilitate the mission and strategy of the institution being implemented more efficiently and effectively. It is designed according to the new approach to selecting an organizational structure. It takes cognisance of the following criteria: The technology available; finance and accounting to integrate the organizational goals; communications to minimize mistrust and ambiguity in communications; mission-oriented process; responsibility to organizational objectives; coordination and customer relations (Avraham Shtub [1994] cited in the unknown source).

**Functions of the components of the Ministry of Defence** (***Ministry of Defence, Namibia***: Management Structure approved since 1998).

**Office of the Defence Minister**: Besides chairing the Defence Staff Council, the MOD's highest management committee, it represents the Ministry in the National Assembly and in Cabinet. Offices of the Chief of Defence Force and the Permanent Secretary directly support the office. The decision-making process of a Defence Ministry is often conducted through the hierarchy of the Defence Committees and Council and these committees are provided for in the White Paper on Defence Policy of 1993. At the apex of the Committee Structure is the Defence Staff Council, chaired by the Minister of Defence, and includes the Deputy Defence Minister, the Permanent Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force. This is the highest decision-making body in the Ministry (Du Pisani, A and Negonga, IE [2003]). They further opine that its composition guarantees healthy civil-military relations in the decision-making system of the Ministry. The second committee is the Senior Management Committee chaired by the Permanent Secretary, while the Chief of the Defence Force is a principal member. The third committee is the Military Steering Committee, chaired by the Chief of the Defence Force and its members are all Chiefs of Staff and all heads of arms of services (Du Pisani and Negonga:2003).

**Office of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF)**: This is the highest office under the terms of the Namibian Constitution for the military effectiveness of the Defence Force. The

office is accountable for the Military and its operational functions. Other responsibilities are further defined in the Defence Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990).

**Office of the Permanent Secretary (PS)**: This is responsible for the financial, administrative and political aspects of defence policy and its execution. Besides being the overall head of the civilian component in the ministry, the Permanent Secretary is an accounting officer for the Ministry of Defence.

**Chief of Staff: Operations** (**COS:OPS):** He/she is responsible for the operational functions of the force, its doctrines, tactics and strategies. He/she falls directly under the command of the CDF.

**Chief of Staff**: **Personnel** (COS: PERS): He/she is responsible for the personnel matters of the Ministry of Defence and Namibian Defence Force. He/she is also responsible for recruitment and any other human resources matters. This is where the division headed by the Researcher falls. It is directly under the command of the CDF.

**Chief of Staff: Logistics** (COS: LOG): He/she is responsible for defence logistics management, including control and supply. He/she falls directly under the command of the CDF.

**Chief of Staff: Military Intelligence Directorate** (COS: MID): He/she is responsible for auxiliary services. He/she falls directly under the command of the CDF.

**Chief of Staff: Medical Directorate** (COS: MED): He/she is responsible for the health-care services of the serving members of the force. He/she has military doctors, nurses and medical institutions that assist his/her operations. He/she falls directly under the command of the CDF.

**The Army**: These are the ground troops. Besides being under the Army Commander, it falls directly under the commandership of the CDF**.**

**The Air Force**: It is responsible for the management of airspace and to supply airpower. Besides being under the Air Force Commander, it falls directly under the command of the CDF.

**Navy**: It is responsible for the safeguard of Namibia's maritime domain and coastline against attack. Besides being under the Navy Commander, it falls directly under the command of the CDF.

**Information System Division**: It is responsible for the management, supply and maintenance of information technology systems. It falls directly under the command of the Permanent Secretary (PS).

**Central Staff Divisions**: It falls directly under the command of the Permanent Secretary (PS). It is responsible for the coordination of the activities of the defence; in other words it is a vehicle CV Joint of the works of defence ministry. It has four components that play a vital role in execution of the functions.

1. Defence Secretariat Division;
2. Policy and Plans Division;
3. Public Relations Division;
4. Protocol and Foreign Liaison Division.

All these divisions constitute the body of knowledge management for the Ministry of Defence.

**Directorate of Finance**: It is responsible for safe-keeping of defence finances, and falls directly under the command of the Permanent Secretary (PS).

**Procurement, Research and Development Division (CPRD)**: Its responsibility is that of its name. It falls directly under the command of the Permanent Secretary (PS).

This structure, assuring political and management control of defence, is shown in Appendix A to this research document. The proposed alternative structure is also shown in Appendix B to this research document.

It is further reported that the interaction between civilians and military staff in the defence ministry is business-like, and civilians are employed on a permanent basis while the military officers are deemed to be on a duty tour, rotating between defence force units. Civilians formulate defence policy and are responsible for the political dimension of defence. Military officers execute defence policy and contribute to policy formulation based on their technical expertise (Negonga, IE [2003]). However, Negonga does admit that there are some challenges facing the Namibian Model of Civil Military Relations, in particular the insufficient resources to maintain the military as there are competing national socio-economic and political needs also to be addressed by the same source. He further alleges that the military opines that the state should increase the defence budget to enhance military professionalism and thus boost healthy civil-military relations. However, on the other hand, Parliament expects the principle of transparency to apply to all the activities of the state including those concerning the NDF. Furthermore, the executive power of the President to deploy the defence force in accordance with a threat assessment and national interest is sometimes criticised by the opposition in Parliament as an irrational option or mandate (Negonga, IE [2003]). The arguments of Negonga on the status of the Namibian Civil Military Relations could not be verified as rational conclusions because there is no conventional or unconventional (undercover) study carried out in this area to determine the knowledge gap between the two components of the Ministry of Defence. The Researcher would be interested to know the methodology used to draw those conclusions. If surveys were conducted, what was the nature of the questionnaire? Was a qualitative or quantitative method used? The source of data or perceptions would help the Researcher to draw some verification information for his research work.

Chapter Two

## Literature Review on Civil Military Relations

### Introduction: Civil Military Relations

The end of cold war between the world's most powerful nations, early in the 1990s, has witnessed many nation states redesigning and re-engineering the roles and functions of the new defence sectors. The nation states' military institutions were to be transformed from the premise of armed forces having considerable political and institutional power of influence, with no clearly-defined civil control and overseeing mechanisms. Some studies argue that once the military is granted such powers of political influence, it is often used to undermine the government and threaten its inhabitants (Ngculu, J: 2003). It is argued that too much power for the military diminishes public support of its primary functions or operations. The loyalty and professionalism of the military is affected, resulting in a lack of transparency and accountability to the public that enjoys its service. These kinds of the military institutions have been characterized by suppression of the masses with diverging views, and the torture and disappearance of those individuals with a social and political agenda that may threaten the power relations of the military institution. This understanding is also echoed by Edmonds, M (1988), who provides the common indicators of a militaristic nation-state as encompassing a high percentage of GDP devoted to defence, a frequent incidence of service intervention or interference in politics, the participation of service personnel in decision-making bodies, a high content of military subjects in the artistic, literary, and recreational life of the people, a coincidence of military values and priorities in the every day life of the nation and, perhaps the most relevant of all, the extent of aggressive, service-backed, foreign policies.

This has prompted many nation states to seek social and political models that minimize the powers of the military, and also best manage the military apparatus, given the scarcity of economic and developmental resources for competing national and global needs. Many countries transferred policies that appeared to address and accommodate historical patterns of civil military relations: i.e. the broad domestic political, economic and social

context. The rational criteria would be a model that enjoys constitutional mandate, or wherein the executive has a greater constitutional mandate to control the military in terms of resources and management. The new strategy is to redesign the culture of military and 'professionalise' it to meet its new primary mandates of security. This would lead the discussion towards a definition of the concept of civil military relations and the literature review would then explore the characteristics of the military; military intervention in politics; the separation of military and political spheres; Schiff's critique of formal separation of military; African models; the South African model; how to improve CMR; respective roles and skills of civilian and military personnel, and the role of the MOD. Discussions on civilians in this research report refer to the component of the Ministry of Defence personnel that is not military.

## Civil Military Relations Definitions

The literature defines Civil Military Relations (CMR) as the interaction between military institutions and civil authorities. This could be in terms of the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a given country. The main concern here is to "measure and evaluate the relative influence of military officers and civil authorities in decisions of the state concerning war, internal security, external defence and military policy in the country" (Phiri, BJ: 2003). This understanding is shared by Omari, AH (2003) who defines CMR as the arrangement of political and military power, assuming that the manner in which both types of power are exercised and controlled is as crucial as who wields them. In this case the democratic principle is that the military is subordinate and accountable to the civilian authority (Phiri: 2003). Phiri (2003) goes further to provide the purpose of civilian control of the defence force as that of guarding against military subversion while ensuring that military strategy remains a tool of national political goals under the civilian government. The executive branch of government plays a significant role in maintaining civil control of the military, while the legislative branch of government maintains a strong influence in military affairs. This is achieved through the principle of separation of powers, an essential element in democracy. However, some critiques of this understanding define CMR as: "…

representing a complex set of inter-relationships, established norms and practices between the armed forces and other social structures. The spheres (where) it is most apparent include Politics, the Economy, Science and Technology" (Samuel P Huntington and Andrew J Goodpaster in Rupiya, MR: [2003]). All the definitions of CMR have in common the concept of power relations and how they interact between armed forces and civil authority. This understanding provides the basis for this research report.

Characteristics of the Military

Huntington in Sarkesian, SC; Williams, JA and Cimbala, SJ (2002) provides three major characteristics of the military that determine its professionalism or existence as an institution, which is also shared by both Chuter (2003) and Edmonds (1988). The first characteristic of the military is the expertise in the management of violence for the protection of the constitutive element of political society and also to consolidate democracy, which is a historical and social construct. Although it is a debatable issue, the current Iraqi conflict has witnessed the USA Armed Forces consolidating democracy in this contested Iraqi terrain, according to the public speech of USA President G.W. Bush early in 2005 on their military operations in Iraq.

The high degree of expertise in the management of violence in the military makes it different from other operational sectors of state governance. If combat is mismanaged, members of the armed forces risk being killed by their opponents or adversaries. Hence their survival in combat is ultimately dependent on the cohesion, morale, discipline and preparation of the fighting group of which each person is a part. It has been said that the interrelationship of organization and destructive potential is the distinguishing characteristic of military practices that makes it professional. In realizing this objective the military has devised structures that are hierarchical in nature and that interrelate and integrate functions, ascribe authority and define office (Edmonds, M: 1988).

The second characteristic of the military is the responsibility for the defence of the state with the mandate to create hegemony, protect sovereignty and maintain stability through coerciveness when necessary to do so. In executing its responsibility, the military must observe and practice a professional culture that upholds the values, norms and symbols of

state. If the military fails to adhere to the military disciplinary codes, then it is liable under martial law for acts of negligence, incompetence or disobedience (Edmonds: 1988:31, 36, 41, 43). However, what Huntington fails to appreciate is that the nature of the military characteristic is shaped by the individual nation state's ideological preferential policies and is constrained by the military strategy for the management of violence in war or peace. The role of the military has now been re-defined to contribute towards nation and state building, and a humanitarian assistance role. Rupiya (2003) argues that the characteristics of the military are defined by their role outside sphere of daily workplace: for instance, one would determine their level of expertise by examining its manner of resolving conflicts and disputes.

The third characteristic of the military is its corporate nature; that is, its institutional self-awareness and organisation. This characteristic deals with the internal institutional and soldier transformation issues that determine corporate identity and morale issues. The military must behave in a manner acceptable to the society it serves and to the government in general. The military must demonstrate its neutrality, impartiality, commitment and dedication when in the line of duty in serving the state and the public at large. Hence, its members are required to remain professional and apolitical as they serve the shared interest of a diverse society, and loyal to the government of the day. They must maintain a high morale as an attribute that inspires them individually and as a unit to exceed organizational expectations, and holds men and units together under extreme stress. Factors such as the quality of training; a normative commitment to the task to be fulfilled; a strong sense of identity with the unit to which the individual is attached; a pride in the specific job that he or she has to do; and a certain degree of patriotism and love of one's country must be package for success (Chuter: 2003 and Edmonds: 1988).

Military intervention in politics

Githiora (1999) provides a context for the military profession with some political externalities. He contends that the inherited traditions of war and political determination by the government of the state using the military expose it to state governance. This is arguably where the military learns how to lead and govern. In many instances it acts as a

state and government agency for the protection of national and foreign policies, and the supreme laws of the country. In so doing, the military, as a structured and organized institution, performs the following functions concurrently with the state. The military generates legitimacy for governance through coercion, by penetrating societal social formations to develop hegemony and control of the governing state apparatus. This understanding is shared by Edmonds (1988:31,36,41,43) who contends that the military replicates public or state functions which makes it almost a 'state within a state'. It runs its own navy, controls the airspace and land, and religious institutions, medical and other auxiliary services using stringent military disciplinary codes to govern. This is how they test the social and political power, which it sometimes becomes necessary to extend to other state machinery for governance. In many cases this happens when civilian authority can no longer deliver the social goods and does not possess the capacity to develop hegemony within the country. This understanding is shared by both Chuter (2003:25) and some reports on the deliberations at an Indian Seminar on CMR downloaded on website http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm, which argue that some commanders would want to influence internal politics, if a political vacuum exists. The military's first incursion into politics is helped by factors such as the weaknesses of civil society, lack of cohesive elites in politics and the political process, the gross failures of civilian governance, distortions of the political economy, weak societal institutions, and the intense struggles for political power by civilian political elites. It is further argued that in a parliamentary democracy there is an assumption that, in some form at least, parliament is putting into effect what the people want. But, even a functioning parliament may not actually represent public opinion particularly closely. Chuter (2003:25) further argues that "politicians may confine themselves to squabbles and manoeuvres for advantage as the nation falls apart. This judgment about the danger of political disunity provides a semi-intellectual underpinning for intervention by the military".

However, Chuter further alludes to the need for the military, in stating that all states pursue a variety of domestic and foreign policies, and that sometimes these policies need to be underwritten by the use, threat or appearance of violence, and military forces exist

to supply this (Chuter: 2000). He argues that the military is necessary to deter war, defend the constitution and as a source of stability for the region and should never be used to suppress the citizens. He further outlines the factors that influence the structure of the military as inter alias: its involvement in domestic politics in the past; its use as an internal security force; its past status, and the use it has made of that status; its success or otherwise in foreign wars and its regional or international reputation. The Chinese military for instance is still referred to as the People's Liberation Army, although it did its liberating half a century ago (Chuter: 2000:14-15).

Separation of military and political spheres

The separation of military and political spheres relates to state governance initiatives of social and political transformation. It examines political, cultural, human and organizational transformation for efficient and effective management of business goals. The separation of military and political spheres further provides a mirror for understanding the function of the state. The state's capacity to develop hegemony would require the provision of peace and human development. The separation of the two spheres therefore provides structural conditions for a democratisation process or a functioning democracy. The institutional separation of the military ensures that politicians run the state and retain the military (Huntington: 1957). It is sometimes called the Western Institutional-Separation CMR model, based on formal model. The interaction between the state and security sector ensures that there is formal and objective control of the military by the political elite. Some critics of this model argue that this approach underplays the role played by non-institutional forms of civil control and the role which civil society and culture in determining the parameters of a country's civil-military relations. This understanding is shared by Carnovale, who opines that different cultural contexts influence the patterns of democratic control of the armed forces. The "one size fits all" model does not work everywhere; the individual landscapes of nation states influence the nature of CMR. This approach also makes the security sector accountable to the government of the day, and more likely to be subject to abuse by the civilian authority if it seeks to suppress the society in achieving its political agenda. There is little room for the public scrutiny of security programmes and agendas. Efficient

and effective civil military relations should and must ensure that politicians, civil society and the security sector have a platform on which to interact on policy and programmes for national security interests. The tripartite dialogue would also help to educate the military on civilian expectations of the armed forces (http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm). Similar studies contend that on the one hand there are forces separating armed forces from civilians, making them functionally distinctive, professional, and structurally subservient to a political authority; whilst on the other there are equally strong forces drawing the armed services closer to the parent society, which strengthens common values. This theory could offer some explanation as to why the relationship between the two is different between states and societies (Edmonds: 1988). Another dimension is on the suggestion made at the Rose-Roth Seminar, that military establishments tend to reflect the societies from which they are formed. If, for example, a society is profoundly divided, these divisions are likely to be mirrored within the military. Hence, there is no single best CMR model to adopt, and the great variety of structures and practices within SADC or nation states only confirms this. Democratic control can mean very different things in different cultural contexts. However, critics of this classical theory have come up with suggestions on the CMR realistic models, one of which is Schiff's critique.

Schiff's critique of the formal separation of military

Schiff, cited by Williams (2003), is critical of the Western model of the institutional separation approaches, which argue that the armed forces remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions. She argues that the military is part of the whole society, and is in fact an element within the society that depends on the individual contextual setting for its existence. For instance the military requires publicly approved resources or funding for its operations, and the government, as an agent of the state should oversee the functions of the military. Hence, in a way there should be tripartite interactions among these institutions of influence. Schiff's argument or theory is that there are three partners: the military, politicians and citizenry, who should work together to develop a concord or common framework in a cooperative way. She proposes a concordance theory to achieve political and development initiatives in developing

countries. A Tanzanian case study argues that civil military relations work not because of any formal structures, but because the military, political and civil society all worked together towards a common purpose. The military policy articulates the political policies of the government. Hence, we should see the military as part of the institution of the state, and that what is needed is collaboration (Omari, AH: 2003). There is a need for partnership between the military, politics and the citizenry and a mix of objective and subjective control in order to maintain civil military relations. Subsequently supplementary instruments and support make for strong civil military relations. South African civil military relations are dominated by the politics of compromise and negotiation where dialogue and negotiation characterise a vigorous CMR rather than a statutory emphasis on formal mechanisms of control. Hence, the disengagement of the military from the mainstream governance or political institutions will isolate them and affect the quality of their roles, which should be influenced by the political institutions that enjoy their free security service (Williams, R: 2003). The collaborative-partnership model of CMR remains to be investigated for its sustainability, as it may be constrained by funding especially in maintaining mutual support for CMR agenda programmes.

African models

There is a strong indication that the patterns of Civil Military Relations in many African defence sectors that emerged during the post-colonial period closely mirrored the historical relationship between the colonisers and the colonised. Although the ethnic and racial composition of the armies of the newly-independent countries changed significantly in the first decade following independence, their culture, traditions and corporate identity remained strongly influenced by the discourses and ideological themes of Western armed forces (Williams: 2003). The Namibian CMR was influenced by the British Model of military governance, one of the founding architectures of African colonialism. On the contrary, Steyn argues that the South African CMR was influenced by historical political developments that preceded the 1994 multi-racial general elections, concluded through compromise and negotiation where dialogue and negotiation were the viable options for a free South Africa for all its peoples, including the military. Although there are diverging patterns of CMR, it transpires that the CMR model for each nation

state has some historical context, be it colonial influence or societal political and social settings at the time of security sector reform. Other influences of CMR become secondary transformation initiatives – for instance, regional or global mandatory reforms.

Nevertheless, many African States continued to adopt a Western approach to military governance that ensured the subordination of the armed forces to civilian power through legal or constitutional structures. Githiora (1999) contends that it was the clear intention of Parliament when establishing the Kenyan Armed Forces to make them subordinate to the civil power. The President, with the constitutional designation of Commander-in-Chief, is empowered in Section 3(3) of the Armed Forces Act to retain responsibility for the organisation and command of the armed forces. He is entitled to assign and vary names to units of the armed forces and section 5 (6) appoint the Chief of General Staff and Commanders of each service. The overall control and direction of the armed forces is entrusted to the Defence Council, the highest policy organ of the armed forces, whose Chairman and Vice-Chairman are, respectively, Minister and Assistant Minister, appointed by the President. A unique model would be that of Swaziland, where clan politics and loyalty to the monarchy play a critical role in the appointment of senior officers in the Swaziland Defence Force – much to the chagrin of younger, educated and modern Swazi Officers (Williams, R [2003]).

South African model

Steyn provides a South African case study where there is a tendency to address social and political strategic goals by granting considerable freedom of action to commanders in the field, provided their operational decisions do not contradict political-strategic guidelines. This understanding is shared by Williams, R (2003) who stratifies the nature of civil military relations into two types: "Countries possessing a stronger legislative tradition tend to emphasise the role of those legislative mechanisms entrusted with the task of civil oversight – parliamentary committees, ombuds' systems and approval of the budget for example. Other countries with a stronger executive culture may rely more extensively on the regulatory role of civil servants, Finance Ministries and Presidential control to ensure the subordination of the armed forces to civil control." He further provides some models

that could be found in such set-up, especially in SADC countries. The first would be that of party-political interpenetration, which plays a critical role in ensuring the loyalty and subordination of the armed forces in countries such as Zimbabwe and Namibia. However, the Researcher who was one of the founding members of the Namibian Defence Force and is currently a permanent member, opines that Williams lacks insight into the Ministry of Defence's human transformation initiatives. At the time of writing this Report, Swapo is the ruling party and there are no identifiable Swapo cadres within the ranks of the Force. It is improper according to national and institutional legal instruments for someone to be identified through a particular political party. The ruling party does not have any direct influence on the activities of the Force. However, it may do so through an appropriate platform, such as through Parliamentary overseeing of the military, and all parties are represented here and sometimes through the Executive Branch of the Government, especially in ensuring that provisions of public policies are carried out. The Namibian CMR was designed to ensure that there is little influence of one political party on the functions of the military. However one cannot entirely rule out the notion that the hand that feeds you (i.e. pays your salary) could influence your institutional activities. Williams (2003) further contemplates that the politics of compromise and negotiation have left an indelible imprint on South African civil-military relations where dialogue and negotiation characterise the maintenance of healthy CMR rather than a legal emphasis on formal mechanisms of control. Its long-term sustainability however has not been seriously tested, and a situation has not yet arisen where a deadlock for negotiation and dialogue is reached. If political institutions were unable to meet the conditions of services of the members due to constraints within the national budget, what would happen then? Are there legal instruments to contain the military from mutiny? Answers to these questions might lead to improving or adapting an appropriate CMR model for Africa, and Namibia in particular.

How to improve CMR

Classical theory suggests that the relationships between the civilian and military components could be rationally achieved to the extent whereby the power of military groups is reduced. "From a civilian point of view, the basic problem in defining civilian

control is: how can military power be minimised?" For instance, subjective civilian control maximises civilian power, while objective civilian control maximises military professionalism (Huntington [1957] cited in Steyn). According to Huntington (1957), subjective civilian control has been identified with the maximisation of the power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms. While in the case of objective civilian control, the distribution of power between civilian and military groups which maximise military professionalism and objective civilian control varies with the compatibility between the ideology prevailing in society and the professional military ethic. Huntington (1957) further opines that if the ideology is inherently anti-military (such as liberalism), the military acquires substantial political power but only by sacrificing its professionalism and adhering to the values and attitudes dominant within the community. On the other hand, in a society dominated by an ideology favourable to the military viewpoint, military power may be increased greatly without becoming incompatible with a high level of professionalism. The realisation of objective civilian control thus depends upon the achievement of an appropriate equilibrium between the power of the military and the ideology of society.

Some literature suggests ways of improving civil military relations. Evident is the Nigerian case that advocates for a need to maintain serious dialogue between the military and civilian politicians. It is argued that the dialogue will open opportunities for exploring how best to restructure the military (http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm). It is further suggested that it is important to organise joint seminars and workshops on the political re-education of the military to emphasise that the military has no duty to intervene in the political process, but to complement it. Civil-Military Relations must be cordial at all times. This understanding is shared by Nigerian Defence Minister Danjuma, who believes that civil-military relations would be improved through improved living conditions in the barracks and by confining soldiers to the barracks, although this view is debatable, especially if one looks at the Tanzanian case where the military was part of the whole political engineering process and it worked to some extent. He further opines that training, including holding joint military exercises with other military bodies, is equally part of 're-professionalising'

the armed forces. A complementary view is also expressed by Du Pisani: that the security forces and agencies should be adequately trained and resourced to carry out their activities professionally and in a manner consistent with democratic norms and human rights.

Respective roles and skills of civilian and military personnel

There is a need to examine the institutional context of both the military and civilian components of the Ministry of Defence. The military operates from a military sphere of governance, and the civilians from a political sphere of governance. Edmonds (1988) defines the military as the standing, permanent, trained, state organisations, which have clearly defined duties and responsibilities, involving the application of coercive means to achieve political ends. He further states that the military enjoys a monopoly of certain categories of weapons and equipment, and is responsible for the constrained application of violence or coercive force to eliminate or deter any thing or anybody considered a threat to the existence of the nation-state (that is to say the area within recognised territorial boundaries) and the interests, singly and collectively, of its citizens.

Chuter (2000:23) however proposes new military roles for the purposes of transforming the military into a transparent and accountable institution. These include the full participation of the military in the policy-making process; appearance by military officers in support of government ministers at press conferences and presentations of government policy to demonstrate their commitment to the policy; on- or off-the-record briefings of the media on military issues and the appearance of military officers before parliament to explain technical military issues. Proponents of Civil Military Relations within the Ministry of Defence argue that the military lacks skills on finance, and that they have demonstrated that they are not efficient at working out a cost-effective solution to society's security needs (Edmonds: 1988). He supports his argument with the case of a successful civilian component by Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Secretary of Defence, who in the 1960s introduced into the Defence Department numerous civilian economists and analysts whose largely academic skills were brought to bear both on general national security problems and specific issues of weapons choice. "This development has not

only become institutionalised, but has also developed to the extent that their advice and input into defence policy decision-making invariably outweighs that of the armed services themselves".

Conversely, Chuter has identified areas in which the military must not be involved. These would include taking policy decisions on declaring wars and alliances: "At the highest strategic level, governments are jealous of their right to declare war and make treaties and deciding on public finances". He further contends that states are very unlikely to allow the military to decide what the absolute level of defence spending should be. In almost all systems of government, accounting for expenditure (including on defence) has to be done to parliament, because it is parliament that allocates the money to be spent on defence and the taxes that raise it. He opines that usually, spending decisions are political ones, and permanent officials (not politicians and certainly not the military) have to defend the propriety of the way money is spent. He also contends that political or civilian dimensions of the MOD deal with the formulation and administration of defence policy which may involve public money, and can therefore attract criticism and create presentational problems, nationally or abroad; they require the consent of parliament or negotiation with other nations and also involve negotiation or compromise with other government institutions (Chuter: 2000:48). This implies that for CMR to succeed, one would need a tripartite arrangement: the military, politicians and citizenry who should work together to develop a concord or common framework cooperatively. Hence the Schiff theory of concordance to achieve political and development initiatives in the developing countries becomes relevant and a reality.

Nevertheless, there are some areas that fall within the military domain in the Ministry of Defence. For instance, the complex nature of modern warfare and military operations in the field are the primary domain of the military, which does not share the physical burden with civilians, either in time of peace or war besides the involvement of humanitarian organizations (Edmonds: 1988). Edmonds further demonstrates that their primary role is that of being involved operationally in managing the application of violence, or directly in a combat situation. The military are generally characterized by norms and values of personal discipline, uniformity and conformity as some of their unique characteristics.

**Role of the Ministry of Defence**

Subordination to civil power

Findings of a Rose-Roth Seminar held in Odessa, Ukraine expressed the view that no country can claim to have democratic control of the military if civilians are not placed within the defence ministry. Politicians, and not military leaders, must be in charge of the defence ministry. This can spark tension, but that tension works against military professional inertia. This understanding is shared by Mosca, cited by Edmonds (1988), who argues on theories of CMR that "organisations would not survive without people with the ability and talent to organise, and others to protect and defend it physically against coercion from outside, thereby guaranteeing its continued existence". Civilian predominance is particularly crucial in budgetary matters, as democratically-elected leaders are better positioned to ensure that the allocation of resources is rational and balanced; hence the need for the two components to correspond. The Seminar's findings further indicated that it is vital that the Minister of Defence be a civilian and a politician. The Defence Minister should ideally not be simply a manager, but a representative of broader strata of society, and have arrived at his/her position in parliament through some form of electoral democratic processes. This makes him or her accountable to the state and the general public, or civil society. Chuter questions this kind of arrangement, taking into account the fact that by its nature, democracy is divisive. Hence, there is no guarantee for the proper functioning of CMR. He wonders whether this divisiveness surfaces within the military confines, (Chuter: 2000:24) and argues that there is no single process that applies to all nation states in the name of the ministry of defence with two components of personnel. Every country's experience and starting-points are different. In any case the co-location of both civilians and military in one institution is meant to manage and control at close range the functions of the military and to ensure that the military behaves as servant to a nation and society, of which the state is an agent (Chuter, 2000:27-28). The Civil Authority provides employment to the military and in return expects military loyalty to the state. Hence civilian control of the military implies that the military should be obedient to the civil authority. However, Chuter (2000:30) questions the credibility of this kind of arrangement, contending that the military being

obedient to civil authority does not necessarily imply that there is good CMR. This view is shared by Edmonds (1988), who argues that isolating the military from mainstream governance leads to information deficiency on the transformation of the military institution. There would thus be a knowledge gap between two powerful institutions of governance. The military would retain its functional secrecy, which could assist the civilian authority to take informed decisions on resourcing the military through funding and other requirements of institutional governance.

However, proponents of these arrangements (the formal separation CMR Model) argue that the influential role of the military is not undermined, but that this separation transforms the military and assigns roles that it is best able to perform. The studies provide the example of the mistake made by US General Westmoreland during the Vietnam War, wherein he believed that "the only way to win was to kill a sufficient number of enemy soldiers. He overlooked the political consideration of winning the hearts of the Vietnamese people which should have permitted a political resolution of the conflict" (Githiora: 1999). There would appear to be synergy between the understanding of Githiora on sub-culture of military and the view expressed by John Keegan cited by Sarkesian, SC; Williams, JA and Cimbala, SJ (2002) that "soldiers are not as other men – that is the lesson that I have learned from a life cast among warriors. The lesson has taught me to view with extreme suspicion all theories and representations of war that equate it with any other activity in human affairs. War is … fought by men whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the every day world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time, and the warrior world adapts in steps to the civilian. It follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the culture of a warrior can never be that of civilian itself." On the contrary Chuter (2000:64) argues that formal arrangements of responsibility for military is not the only answer to the success of CMR, but there are hidden moral and ethical values that tie the two components together. This must be taken into account when designing the institution. He further contends that "the most important characteristic of a successful complex organisation like a defence ministry is mutual respect, or, failing that, mutual tolerance. The argument of military

necessity, or the argument that 'you wouldn't understand it, you're only a civilian', must be resisted."

Findings of the Rose-Roth Seminar held in Odessa, Ukraine further indicate that the lack of military expertise in the ranks of civil servants and politicians is an area of concern. The fact that some incompetent civilians have had an influential role has generated tension within military establishments. This lack of expertise runs through national bureaucracies, parliaments, the media and civilians. Much contemporary literature appears to suggest that the separation of military sphere and majoring in only objective civilian control sometimes interferes with military operations' strategies and in many instances leads to regrettable results. A case in point is what transpired in Kosovo, where the advice of politicians produced catastrophic results, "….where the view of many military observers is that the handling of the early stages of the 1999 Kosovo crisis helped turn a humanitarian tragedy into a disaster because civilians interfered in military operations, as civilian leaders pushed for a military confrontation with Serbia yet ruled out the use of ground forces" (Sarkesian, *et al.:* 2002). Another challenge for the democratic governance of the military is restricted financial resources, which could complicate civilian efforts to assert control over the military. An additional challenge for nation states to exert their civilian control over the military is the involvement of regional or global pacts, such as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs which has drawn up regional planning orders. The role of national civil authority can potentially be diminished. Another factor that may affect CMR is conditions of service for the military, if not maintained or improved. Chuter has identified issues such as remuneration and allowances, education and training, posting policy and family welfare that increasingly preoccupy the modern officer, if he or she is to retain a skilled and motivated military force, and so become important issues in the management of defence. In most cases they affect the morale of troops if not handled realistically and maturely. A tripartite approach between all the stakeholders could address the situation better, and avoid imposing on an institution something it may not necessarily want, especially on re-prioritising resources and programmes.

One of the proponents of the establishment of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) being staffed by two components (civilians and military), Githiora, TK (1999), contends that the MOD oversees the management of the Armed Forces, thus completing the formal constitutional, legislative administrative relationship between the military and the government. Some studies state that the MOD as an organization is designed in such a way as to effectively apply coercive means to achieve the specific objectives of the government (Edmonds: 1988). Chuter provides some strategies for the existence of the Ministry of Defence, where he contends that besides its major roles covering issues such as budgets, organisation and accountability, it begins with more fundamental questions about the role of the armed forces and their place in society, and the way in which the defence community makes and implements defence policy. Steyn contends that the roles of political and military subordinates should be defined according to the macro structural choice of the organisational model which determines the relation between government structures, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces themselves. He talks about organisational and human transformation issues of development. A synthesis of science, political, military and public administration and generally-accepted management practices should be re-engineered in the whole transformational institutional agenda. There is correspondence between the understanding of Steyn and that of Edmonds (1988) who looks at the leadership qualities to lead the defence sector that would ensure the incorporation of two elements: first, there is the officers' social and moral orientation, including such qualities as integrity and maturity, the ability to tackle complex problems with intelligence, judgment, and practical common sense; and second is the ability to operate within a service organisation and group context, which by definition must include the responsibility for both the operational effectiveness of the unit under his or her command, and the lives of people in it, in difficult and dangerous situations.

The British Strategic Defence Review of 1998 discusses the structure of the British Ministry of Defence as follows: the Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for the formulation and conduct of defence policy, and for providing the means by which is conducted. He is supported by a Minister of State for the Armed Forces, dealing with operational and policy issues; a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister for

Defence Procurement dealing with equipment development, acquisition and defence exports; and by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister of Veterans who takes responsibility for service and civilian personnel in terms of policy, veterans, environmental and regulatory issues. The Secretary of State and his three Ministerial colleagues are accountable to Parliament – which votes public money to the MOD for defence purposes – for all defence matters. Parliament exercises its overseeing role through parliamentary questions and debates in both houses of parliament on defence-related issues. The Review provides the role of the MOD as inter alias: providing strategic direction, vision and values; objectives and targets, establishing the key priorities and defence capabilities necessary to deliver the MOD's Departmental objectives; resource allocation and strategic balance of investment to match defence priorities and objectives, and performance management – managing and driving corporate performance. The British Strategic Defence Review of 1998 further motivates reasons for such a structure that co-locates the two components as aiming to have defence functions under a single Ministry to simplify the chain of command, reduce duplication of effort across the three Services, encourage an integrated approach to operations (a philosophy known today as 'jointness') and to improve the quality of defence advice (rather than Single Service advice) to politicians. However, critics of such co-location argue that even if the two are located together (as in Norway, where it is reputed to have worked), there will be communication problems. "Two centres of power will always compete with each other, especially if they work for the same master who, in practice, must choose between their advice" (Chuter: 2000). In comparing the British and Namibian Ministries of Defence on Military Management Structure, it can be seen that the British structure has provision for a National Military Commander (NMC), who is the commander of the armed forces of the nation in war. He/she is also responsible for the operational deployment of military units and for exercises in peacetime. He/she operates from a national military headquarters (NMHQ) and a Chief of Defence (CHOD), who is the professional head of the national military forces, and also the chief advisor on military affairs to the ministry of defence and the government as a whole (Chuter: 2000:56). In the case of Namibia however, both functions belongs to one Chief of the Defence Forces, a constitutional appointment. This is where the policy transfer context setting applies.

However, Chuter seems to suggest that such arrangements could differ from one country to another. Chuter contends that the British Model has three levels of control of the forces, which is similar to the Namibian case, where the strategy refers to the overall political direction and military policy at the highest level. This will be where ministers are involved. There are management committees that effect communication between the tiers of management. The committees have been alluded to earlier in the Namibian case study. The second level is the operational level, where strategic objectives become military ones and operational directives are given to the commander. This level involves the military and its civilian advisors. The last one is the tactical level where the planning and conduct of the operation itself occurs (Chuter: 2000:57). There are parallel structures where the defence function is divided into a defence HQ which deals with technical military issues, and a defence ministry, largely staffed by civilians, which handles political and financial issues and supports the minister. They are all housed in one building in the case of Namibia. Chuter, in support of such co-location, maintains that there has to be constant contact between the military and civilian staff, and that it should be a fundamental principle of the ministry's operations that there is a single source of advice to ministers, reflecting both military and civilian views. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasised. "No matter how violently the civilians and the military may argue at the lower levels, they need to sort out a position between them which they can jointly put to ministers" (Chuter: 2000:59-60). The defence management structures usually take a top-down approach, and Chuter seems to suggest that top-down systems tend, by their nature, to pursue longer-term strategies, whereas bottom-up systems are mainly concerned with tactics, and often move via a bureaucratic structure and eventually good intentions, when they reach the top are either diluted or lost in the process (Chuter: 2000).

Further similarities between the British and Namibian defence ministries lie in their functions of command and control of operational forces; operational planning and exercises; peacetime recruitment, training and administration of military personnel; intelligence analysis and sometimes collection; formulation of defence policy; implementation of defence policy; equipment research and development; equipment

procurement and administration of the organization itself (Chuter: 2000:55). Although he appears to support such functions for the defence sector, he questions the personnel equation within the Ministry, which if not properly staffed may affect the productivity of these national tasks. He contemplates that this is the most advanced form of organisation of a defence ministry, and probably the most efficient. But it does require civilians and military officers to be content to work for each other, which is a little beyond where most system of governance would be prepared to go. It should be noted that "there is no need for a 50/50 split or any other kind of prescriptive limitation". In each case, the test should be whether a given job could be performed more effectively by a civilian or by a member of the military. In such cases – such as operational planning – most or all of the personnel will be military. In others – such as those responsible for civilian personnel – the opposite will apply (Chuter: 2000:61). The argument of Chuter does not consider the importance of power and strength relations, which if not properly balanced with the democratic approach to governance, particularly when important decisions have to be made and where people must vote for options, could affect the success of CMR.

Nevertheless, Chuter provides some challenges that influence the nature of defence structures from the policy perspective: its size and position in the region and beyond; its allies' and neighbours' strength and capabilities; the money available to decide on its strength and capabilities; domestic political factors on national strategy; formal allies (which in the Namibian case would be mainly SADC); large neighbours would pose threat to its existence; political and economic dominance, and military assets (Chuter: 2000:69-70). He further contends that the relationships between military officers, civilian politicians, diplomats and officials to work together best will necessarily differ from country to country, and there is no magic formula which works well everywhere. This is partly because they occupy very different places in the security communities of different countries, and because each country has a different set of experiences in war and peace. It is for this reason that the process of conceptualising defence transformation has to begin from the situation in which the country finds itself (Chuter: 2000:13). The context setting plays a major role in deciding the nature of CMR in a particular locality or nation state.

Findings of the Rose-Roth Seminar held in Odessa, Ukraine further stress the need for a Ministry of Defence where the civilian component plays a significant role, and contend that the military secrecy syndrome affects its developmental progression. Hence the role of civilians is to open up the process of decision-making, which must be transparent, and requires objective scrutiny. Military establishments have a natural propensity for secrecy, but scrutiny provides the military with incentives to improve. Unchecked and unwatched, the effectiveness of military establishments will tend to diminish over time. Dynamic debates over everything, from procurement to grand strategy, illuminate the way towards optimal solutions. Other areas that affect CMR involve statutory provisions; social and political arrangements binding both military and civilian components together; the strength equation of individual components and the nature of responsibility for the individual component.

## Conclusion

The major conclusions drawn from the literature review based on the role of civil military relations in governance and development are firstly that the importance of CMR in today's political and social arenas for governance cannot be overemphasized, especially in the area of containing the military within the realm of civilian control. With diminishing public funds, the challenge of subjecting the military to public scrutiny in terms of transparency and accountability is more a necessity now than ever previously. The quality of delivery of security and its new diverse challenges require the concerted efforts of all major stakeholders for its sustainability. Hence the need to review the current CMR within the MOD, Namibia.

## Chapter Three

### Methodology

The Researcher has conducted qualitative research, informed by data gathered through direct interviews with selected personnel of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of the Republic of Namibia – cadres at varying rank parameters. The Researcher opted for qualitative research because it was less sensitive in terms of security for the Ministry, since it mainly concerned perceptions of the respondents and their general interpretation of civil military relations, which the Researcher then verified and evaluated. It was hoped that this approach would generate less suspicion towards the report, particularly in the context of the security environment. Those interviewed described their experiences in terms of relations within the Ministry, and not what others said about them. Moreover, the nature of the research issue requires qualitative research. The issue of relations has multidimensional and multi-layered aspects based on individual exposure, and to get to the core of the situation it is important to examine the context, and for this reason, a qualitative approach was the best option. This understanding is shared by the following authors: Creswell (1998), Guba and Lincoln (1988) in Leedy, P.D and Ormrod, J.E (2005:133), who argue that there may be multiple perspectives held by different individuals, with each of these perspectives having equal validity, or truth. It was anticipated that some twenty officers and men (in this research report, men would also include women soldiers) would be interviewed. The figure was supposed to include former members of the MOD currently assigned other duties in the public sector. This approach however was not entirely successful, as the targeted Permanent Secretary was not prepared to take part in the interviews, for reasons known to himself. However, the Researcher was content with the current Defence Permanent Secretary, who provided information on behalf of his office.

### Delimitations/limitations

The research focused on the experiences of a selected number of directing and operational staff (Ministerial office, permanent secretary, Chief of Staff, Generals, Col, LTC and Civilian Personnel). The Researcher planned to conduct a total of twenty (20)

interviews for data or perception gathering. Some of the interviews involved senior cadres of the Ministry of Defence and ranks under line. The Researcher anticipated that it could be difficult to get senior cadres to respond to interviews owing to constraints on their time, and this coupled with uncompromising deadlines for the submission of the research report that would not necessarily match with their time schedule, was one of the major limitations to data gathering. It transpired that the objective was in fact realized within the time schedule, although other difficulties emerged. The non-commissioned officers and junior staff were not able to respond to the research questionnaires, since the kind of information sought was unfamiliar to them, being in nature more management-oriented questions. However, the responses were taken from the selected middle- and senior-management cadres (their details are appendices to this report). The Researcher was unable to get the former Permanent Secretary for an interview owing to reluctance on his part to participate in the exercise. In response to the request for an interview, he said: "I am no longer interested in discussing anything related to the Ministry of Defence or the military for that matter since I left that office". The request had been sent to him in February 2005 by telephone, and the research questions were also read to him.

Furthermore, the process of seeking information for the research report indicated that the institution had human resources problems that could pose a security hazard if such information were to go beyond the borders of the institution. Although this had been anticipated to some degree, it transpired to be a non-issue for this research, since the type of questions were fairly general management questions that were not particularly sensitive. Moreover, the fact that the Researcher was from within the system and was exposed to many of the issues raised in the research meant that many officers were ready and willing to participate without anxiety. Hence this was not a limitation to the research.

The strategy of appreciating that the majority of the cadres that the Researcher would interview were housed in the Ministry of Defence, which is a defence headquarters where the Researcher was also stationed might have contributed to the successful execution of the research plan. He also had the advantage of daily contact with them at work, and this facilitated the fixing of appointment times for interviews.

Questioning Methodology

The methodology of the questioning process was intended to identify, determine and explore the nature of the relationship between the civilian and military components of the Ministry of Defence, from both the structural and chain of command aspects of defence governance. The research questions were designed to extract written or oral information through direct interviews. This was the first of its kind to be conducted from within the Ministry as a context for the data collection. The following questions were used for the research to determine the relationship between the two components of this Ministry.

1. Structures of Governance: how do the civil and military components interface:

   - ✓ Lines of communications: who reports to whom and under what circumstances would reporting be effected?
   - ✓ Are there any tensions that emerge in the process of communication?

2. What factors contribute to the success of Civil Military Relations Model of military reform?

3. What kind of challenges do the civil military relations as a model of defence or development pose on **Civilian** Staff of the ministry?

4. What kind of challenges do the civil military relations as a model of defence or development pose on **Military** Staff of the ministry?

5. How do these challenges affect the management and development of the Ministry of Defence?

6. How can these challenges be overcome, if at all?

7. Besides the experiences you referred to earlier on the British Civil Military Relations Model, is there anything you would like to add that might improve the sustainability of the model?

8. How do you see the future of Civil Military Relations Model in the Ministry of Defence? Can the organisation sustain itself without this Model?

Quality of Research

The Researcher has presented a balanced, objective piece of qualitative research work that enjoys high levels of validity and reliability. These standards were determined or realised with the use of substantially credible and dependable literature on civil-military relations. The literature review has created a context and set standards for the development and presentation of the research report. However, its main use was to provide logical and solid empirical support for the research report, and also to provide a context for the research topic, knowledge on the topic, explanation of methodologies used and the significance of the problem.

Role of Researcher during Interviews

During interviews, the Researcher attempted as far as is humanly possible not to influence the outcome of the interviews, by playing a facilitative role, where the content of the responses was that of the members themselves. Blanche T. M. and Durrheim, K (1999) argue that there is a tendency of researchers, when conducting an interview, to provide leading questions ('answers') that influence the outcome of the responses, and this affects the validity and reliability of the whole study. The Researcher's position in the Ministry of Defence had little influence on the outcome of the study, except to provide access to those who participated in the interviews. The Researcher ensured that his office or role with the respondents would not affect the outcome of the interviews. He explained the purpose of interview upfront, outlined the kind of questions he would ask, and avoided leading questions to allow the respondents to 'own' the interview. The Researcher only assisted on questions of clarity. The Researcher had an ethical

responsibility to report evidence even if it ran contrary to his point of view. He ensured that he had a proper interview method in place, free from bias. The Researcher has maintained all the perceptions expressed by individual respondents as appendices for reference and as an indication of the objectivity of reporting. The Researcher believed that through keeping his role minimal on the outcome of the study, he avoided a situation whereby he could not 'see the wood for the trees'. The Researcher was cautious and wary of bias in processing the respondents' expression of their experiences in respect of the Ministry of Defence Civil Military Relations. He attempted to create confidence and trust in the members, and informed them before the interviews on the requirements and purpose of the exercise: that is, that the views expressed in the interview must be their own and that the Researcher was there simply to facilitate the process. Immediately following each interview the Researcher would read the responses to the participant to confirm the accurate capture of his or her information or data on the individual questions to avoid misquoting them. After each day of interviews, the Researcher would type up their responses into a word document without adding or subtracting ideas. This was strictly to avoid bias on the part of the Researcher. The selection of individual respondents was based on one person per office or directorate. The Ministry of Defence has a population of about two hundred personnel, of which some ninety are civilians. The sample represented just nine percent of Ministry personnel. It was a representative sample, as virtually every office was represented in the study. However, in some instances a respondent would give more than one answer to a question, and this affected the figures for the number of respondents per response at the time of analysis of the research findings. Hence the total number of respondents could be more than the actual number of respondents for interviews, who numbered eighteen.

Interviews Strategies

The Researcher intended to interview the following rank parameters for primary perceptions or data as tabulated below, with reasons for choice.

Table A

| SERIAL NUMBER | RANK | REASONS FOR CHOICE |
|---|---|---|
| 01 | Minister's Office | Political oversight of the military |
| 02 | Permanent Secretary (Former) | Financial and Administrative adviser (civil) |
| 03 | Permanent Secretary (Present) | Financial and Administrative adviser (civil): CMR issues |
| 04 | General | Military Adviser, CMR issues and Commander |
| 05 | Brigadier General | Military Operations Adviser |
| 06 | Brigadier General | Chief of personnel (military) |
| 07 | Brigadier General | Chief of Finance (former civilian, now military) |
| 08 | Colonel | Military Operations Adviser |
| 09 | Colonel | Military Operations Training |
| 10 | Colonel | Military Operations doctrine |
| 11 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Operations Adviser |
| 12 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Operations Training |
| 13 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Operations doctrine |
| 14 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Recruitment |
| 15 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Personnel Training |
| 16 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Personnel |
| 17 | Deputy Director | ICT: CMR issues |
| 18 | Deputy Director | Finance: CMR issues |
| 19 | Control Officers | Civil: CMR issues |
| 20 | Accountant | Civil: CMR issues |

KEY: CMR → Civil Military Relations

ICT → Information Communication Technology

However, the Researcher was in fact only able to interview the following Ranks (Table B). It transpired that some of the first choice Ranks were not in the country, as they were on a United Nations Peace Missions in Liberia and other parts of the world where Namibia had contributed troops. The Researcher was pleased to interview 18 officers. This figure includes both components of the Ministry of Defence, and is tabulated below.

Table B

| SERIAL NUMBER | RANK | REASONS FOR CHOICE |
|---|---|---|
| 01 | Minister's Office: Deputy | Political oversight of the military |
| 02 | Permanent Secretary (Present) | Financial and Administrative adviser (civil): CMR issues |
| 03 | General | Military Adviser, CMR issues and Commander |
| 04 | Brigadier General | Chief of personnel (military) |
| 05 | Deputy Director | Chief of Finance (former civilian, now military) |
| 06 | Colonel | Military Operations Adviser |
| 07 | Colonel | Military Operations Protocol |
| 08 | Major | Military Medical Services |
| 09 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Legal Adviser |
| 10 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Rations Officer |
| 11 | Lieutenant Colonel | Military Operations Logistics |
| 12 | Lieutenant Colonel | Policy and Plans |
| 13 | Major | Military Intelligence |
| 14 | Senior Personnel Officer | Personnel: CMR issues |
| 15 | Deputy Director | ICT: CMR issues |
| 16 | Chief Personnel Officer | Personnel: CMR issues |
| 17 | Control Officers | Civil: CMR issues |
| 18 | Senior Chief Control Officer | Civil: CMR issues |

KEY: CMR → Civil Military Relations

ICT → Information Communication Technology

The first step was to approach the Permanent Secretary, who would then write a letter to the Office of the Minister and the Chief of Defence Force, to explain why such a study was needed in the Ministry. However, no letter was written, and instead there was a verbal communication between the three offices using the Researcher's questionnaire as a reference point. The Researcher actually took an informal early 'warning approach' to all the stakeholders on the impending interview on Civil – Military Relations. The security of the questionnaire was cleared and the highest offices sensitised other structures down the line, asking them to participate in the interview as it enjoyed their support. This was a verbal order and the Researcher would like to thank the MOD Leadership for taking such a bold decision and providing assistance to allow him to conduct his exercise within the organisation. There was in fact a high demand for individual members to participate in this exercise after the clearance, although the Researcher had to be selective, at least to

obtain responses from each Directorate for cross-fertilisation of perceptions. The Researcher approached the participants directly to schedule appointments, as mentioned earlier in the report. The Researcher took notes in each case, unless the individual preferred to present his/her responses in writing, although the Researcher had doubts about this, as the individuals are highly security-conscious. It was only the Honourable Deputy Minister who preferred to present his responses in writing.

The former Permanent Secretary was approached by the Researcher himself, using a 'comradeship' approach, but this did not work. The Researcher did not indicate or allocate a specific duration for individual interviews, as this relied mainly on their programmes, although it emerged that an hour per interview was sufficient for all the respondents. The format of the questions is indicated above.

Reason for the selected target group

The strategy of the Researcher to target the most senior ranks in the organisation bore fruit, it is assumed because of the corporate culture wherein the junior officers and men would be reluctant to participate in an interview without the appropriate directive from above or instruction from the General or Directing Staff. The questions were designed for senior officers at strategic and operational levels. Personnel at the tactical level did not seem to understand the questions or did not have answers for them. Some suggested that such questions should be directed to their commanders. The contributions of the juniors to this research were thus somewhat limited, although it was important for the outcome of the study, especially at the tactical level of the organisation.

The secondary data was gathered through the literature reviews, which also formed part of the data analysis strategies.

Table C RESEARCH INTERVIEW EXERCISE IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY

| TARGETS | OVERALL INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | ASSUMPTION | TYPES OF INDICATORS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overall Goal | Determine knowledge gap on MOD CMR since inception | ✓ Milestones<br>✓ Logframe<br>✓ Benchmarking<br>✓ Awareness meetings | ✓ Ministers & general staff buy-in for interviews.<br>✓ In-security fear for evaluation information to end-user minimized.<br>✓ Capacity of MOD to conduct credible Interviews.<br>✓ Getting the right people on time for interviews.<br>✓ Commitment to Interview exercise.<br>✓ Compliance effects | ✓ Means of communication identified.<br>✓ Meetings took place.<br>✓ Evaluation activities conducted on set timeframe.<br>✓ The CDF and Wits University get their Research report on time and accepts or approve the Report output & outcomes.<br>✓ Compliance to time-line |
| Evaluation Purpose | Identification of critical success factors of CMR | | | |
| Outputs | Interviews on knowledge gap conducted | | | |
| Activities | Organise one-on-one interviews.<br>Debriefing of Officers & Men | | | |

Table D: MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMPONENTS TIMETABLE FOR INTERVIEWS

| **MONTHS** | **MILITARY COMPONENT** | | **CIVILIAN COMPONENT** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | DATE OF INTERVIEW | TIME OF INTERVIEW | DATE OF INTERVIEW | TIME OF INTERVIEW |
| January 2005 | 20th January 2005 | 12h00 | 31st January 2005 | Written Interview Submitted: 15h00 |
| | | | | |
| February 2005 | 4th February 2005 | 08h00 | 3rd February 2005 | 10h00 |
| | 4th February 2005 | 10h00 | 7th February 2005 | 10h00 |
| | 7th February 2005 | 08h00 | 7th February 2005 | 15h00 |
| | 7th February 2005 | 14h00 | 11th February 2005 | 16h00 |
| | 9th February 2005 | 16h00 | 14th February 2005 | 08h00 |
| | 15th February 2005 | 12h00 | 16th February 2005 | 08h00 |
| | | | | |
| July 2005 | 11th July 2005 | 11h00 | 11th July 2005 | 09h00 |
| | 11th July 2005 | 15h00 | | |
| | 12th July 2005 | 14h00 | | |
| | | | | |
| **NB: TOTAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED: 18: Ten Military and Eight Civilians** | | | | |

All interviews were conducted at the Ministry of Defence, except in the case of the Army Commander whose interview was conducted at the Army Headquarters (AHQ) in Grootfontein. The Researcher was on tour of the Namibian Defence Force Army Formation Headquarters, when he interviewed one of the founding Generals of the Ministry of Defence. The Hon. Deputy Minister was prepared to submit a written response to the questionnaire, and he submitted to the Researcher all his responses in written form.

Confidence Building Measures

On the question of trust and the building of confidence among the officers to be interviewed, the Researcher provided a security plan that ensures that their individual views were not going to be transferred to any third party other than the University of Witwatersrand (Wits), and that their identities would not be disclosed beyond the borders of the Ministry of Defence if it posed security threat. The previous arrangement was that Wits would not know even their identities, but it transpired that there was no threat to

disclose their identities. However, the Researcher took responsibility for guaranteeing these appropriate basic security measures.

## MANAGEMENT PLAN, TIMELINE AND FEASIBILITY

The Researcher believes that with any research to be conducted the logframes are indicators for the realisation of the set objectives. Hence, the Researcher envisaged the following tabulated research phases.


Table E

| PHASE | ACTIVITY | MONTH | YEAR | BY WHOM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **One** | Θ Design and produce research topic<br>Θ Submit to the Supervisor | November | 2004 | Researcher |
| **Two** | Θ Prepare to defend your research proposal | February | 2005 | Researcher |
| **Three** | Θ Refine interview questions<br>Θ Literature review<br>Θ Conduct interviews | March | 2005 | Researcher<br><br>Researcher<br>Officers & Men |
| **Fourth** | Θ Literature review<br>Θ Develop Analysis Methodologies | April and May | 2005 | Researcher |
| **Fifth** | Θ Data Analysis<br>Θ Preliminary results | May | 2005 | Researcher |
| **Sixth** | Θ Develop Research Report Chapters | May, June and<br><br>July | 2005 | Researcher |
| **Seventh** | Θ Submit the first draft of the Report to the Supervisor | July | 2005 | Researcher<br><br>Supervisor |
| **Eighth** | Submit the Final Report to the Research Officer | August | 2005 | Researcher |

Research Feasibility

On the question of feasibility of the research report, the Researcher ensured that there would be no direct costs arising from the design and production of the Report itself. The research was conducted 'on the job' and during the time when Researcher was at his work place. All necessary stationery for the report was readily available without cost, and major reference materials were obtained through local means or regional network resource centres without cost. However, the Researcher anticipated costs to be incurred from the binding of the final two reports for submission to the University, and this remains the case, although this cost was easily met by the Researcher's monthly salary.

PHASES OF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT OUTLINE



## Conclusion

This research report was developed based on suggestions for research design from the reference materials itemized at the end of the formal report. The Researcher believes that the data or perceptions gathered and analysed are addressing each research question, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the British Model of Civil Military Relations adopted by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Namibia.

Chapter Four

## Research Findings

This is a summary of the responses of individual participants put together in corresponding columns for comparative analysis. Some respondents provided more than one response, as mentioned earlier, and also some motivated their responses by expanding their explanations of the response, and this affected the allocation of percentages to each response. However, the Researcher was careful to ensure that similar responses enjoyed the same percentage without discrimination of either view. The explanation of the responses in the chapter on methodology is more precise than the one on this chapter, which is more detailed, including views expressed by single respondent. But this did not affect the allocation of percentages that are more accurate.

The tables **F** to **L** below provide condensed perceptions of the respondents on each question and their total number. The percentage was worked out based on the total number of responses to one question, put together as a denominator of each response and the total response multiplied by a hundred.

Questions 1 to 7: M = Military view; C = Civilian view

1. Structures of Governance: how do the civil and military components interface:
   - ✓ Lines of communications: who reports to whom and under what circumstances would reporting be effected?
   - ✓ Are there any tensions that emerge in the process of communication?

Table F

| RESPONSES Interface* | | NO. OF RESPONDENTS PER RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Both components interface through committees, mainly led by political head of the Ministry M+C | 6 = 26% |
| 2 | CMR is about the subordination of military to civilian authority. Hence military reports to civilian authority M+C | 6 = 26% |
| 3 | Military reports to civilians on finance M+C | 3 = 13% |
| 4 | Civilians reports to military and military on the issue for communication C | 6 = 26% |
| 5 | The military falls under Defence Act, and does not receive instructions from either the Minister or the Permanent Secretary by law. The Military Disciplinary Code (MDC) has provisions for the Management of Military and does not cover civilians. We have nothing to do with them, they are under Public Service Act M | 1 = 4% |
| 6 | The Military is supposed to report to PS as an accounting officer for MOD, but practically PS is ordered to implement the decisions of the military C | 1 = 4% |
| TOTAL | | 23 |
| Tension* | | |
| 7 | Discussions on budget and budgetary allocations. Defence priorities do not always meet the budget allocation and this has implications for the conditions of services for the military personnel M+C | 5 = 28% |
| 8 | Overlapping of responsibilities between the PS and CDF, e.g. Where to receive Orders brings tension M | 1 = 5% |
| 9 | Different conditions of services of the two components brings tension M+C | 4 = 22% |
| 10 | Corporate culture of the military order affects civilians, who do not want to be ordered C | 1 = 5% |
| 11 | Lack of financial understanding of the military brings tensions when they are told of budgetary constraints C | 4 = 22% |
| 12 | Bureaucratic structure of the military coupled with secrecy affect communication between the two components, leading to tension C | 3 = 17% |
| TOTAL | | 18 |

2. What factors contribute to the success of Civil Military Relations Model of military reform?

Table G

| RESPONSES | | NO. OF RESPONDENTS PER RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Statutory and administrative subordination of military under civilian control and the understanding thereof M+C | 6 = 22% |
| 2 | Joint meetings between both components build confidence and trust among them, and good communication M+C | 6 = 22% |
| 3 | Both components have inter-linked functions that ensure they work together as a team M+C | 7 = 26% |
| 4 | Mutual respect for each other's functions and individual potential to succeed: i.e. commitment and skills C | 5 = 19% |
| 5 | The comradeship attitudes towards each other, especially old Freedom Fighters contribute to the success of the CMR Model M | 2 = 7% |
| 6 | There is no where that it might succeed within our organization. Remove the civilian component M | 1 = 4% |
| TOTAL | | 27 |

3. What kind of challenges does the civil military relations as a model of defence or development impose on **Civilian** and **Military** Staff of the Ministry?

Table H

| RESPONSES | | NO. OF RESPONDENTS PER RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The military secrecy syndrome constraints information sharing C | 2 = 7% |
| 2 | Thin line of responsibilities between PS and CDF M | 1 = 4% |
| 3 | Lack of financial resources to sustain the military C | 2 = 7% |
| 4 | Co-location of two components with two statutes and different corporate cultures: i.e. civilians no respect for orders and application of compliments to their seniors. This affect the level of discipline within the force M | 9 = 32% |
| 5 | Different conditions of service for both components bring challenge to individual members M+C | 6 = 21% |
| 6 | Military respect only their members, while no sign of respect for civil component C | 4 = 14% |
| 7 | Lack of knowledge on government budgetary procedures by the military is a challenge to civilians C | 3 = 11% |
| 8 | Lack of recognition of military role functions by civilians and how to transform to know and accept the military M | 1 = 4% |
| TOTAL | | 28 |

4. How do these challenges affect the management and development of the Ministry of Defence?

Table I

| RESPONSES | | NO. OF RESPONDENTS PER RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The military secrecy syndrome constraints information sharing, affecting budgeting and budgetary allocations and trust among both components M+C | 3 = 16% |
| 2 | Different conditions of services (statutes) affect the equitable and effective management and development of MOD M+C | 10 = 53% |
| 3 | Individual disrespect lowers morale, leading to lower productivity which affects the whole management and development of the MOD C | 3 = 16% |
| 4 | Organisational structure – few civilians represented at senior management level C | 1 = 5% |
| 5 | Unprocedural military orders for money affect the transparency and accountability of the defence finance system C | 1 = 5% |
| 6 | They do not affect management and development of MOD as it happens at lower level M | 1 = 5% |
| TOTAL | | 19 |

5. How can these challenges be overcome, if at all?

Table J

| RESPONSES | | NO. OF RESPONDENTS PER RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Foster an element of trust, improve on transparency and accountability through joint meeting for confidence building as well M+C | 9 = 38% |
| 2 | Improve communication and provide clear demarcation of responsibility. Conduct joint training and situation exposure for both components M | 7 = 29% |
| 3 | Rationalise conditions of services for the same job performed by both components C | 2 = 8% |
| 4 | Establish one military component only, for discipline purposes M | 2 = 8% |
| 5 | Train military for good staffing and budgeting skills for cost – effective purpose C | 4 = 17% |
| TOTAL | | 24 |

6. Besides the experiences you referred to earlier on the British Civil Military Relations Model, is there anything you would like to add that might improve the sustainability of the model?

Table K

| RESPONSES | | NO. OF RESPONDENTS PER RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Joint training, conducting seminars and workshops on military activities, where soldiers and civilians interact C | 4 = 17% |
| 2 | No M | 3 = 13% |
| 3 | More resource support and components with potential skills and attitudes to sustain CMR M+C | 4 = 17% |
| 4 | Respect towards each other C | 4 = 17% |
| 5 | Encourage dialogue among both components in good faith M+C | 2 = 9% |
| 6 | I do not like the Model, so I do not need to suggest improvements on it M | 1 = 4% |
| 7 | Improve power relations between PS and CDF M+C | 2 = 9% |
| 8 | CMR rank conversions to be rationalized C | 1 = 4% |
| 9 | There is a need to localize the Model to address local needs with local solutions M+C | 2 = 9% |
| TOTAL | | 23 |

7. How do you see the future of Civil Military Relations Model in the Ministry of Defence? Can the organisation sustain itself without this Model?

Table L

| RESPONSES | | NO. OF RESPONDENTS PER RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | We get more benefits for having the CMR Model: i.e. multiple of skills and human resources to tap on, and learn to work together as a team M+C | 15 = 43% |
| 2 | CMR co-location Model is the best, takes away suspicion among stakeholders and also cost-effective because all are under one roof and civilians are cheaper to maintain – no military uniform M | 3 = 9% |
| 3 | This is a global tread to maintain democracy, therefore we need the Model M | 6 = 17% |
| 4 | Both two components are inter-linked, hence they need each other M+C | 6 = 17% |
| 5 | Militarise the whole system we can survive without this Model M | 1 = 3% |
| 6 | Improve on the style of operations management C | 1 = 3% |
| 7 | The integration of both civilian and military components contribute to improved military capability and political security of the country M | 1 = 3% |
| 8 | CMR Model contributes to improved intelligence services, as both components would represent a diverging cultural societal information M+C | 2 = 6% |
| TOTAL | | 35 |

The analysis of the findings is covered in Chapter Five, which also reconciles perceptions of both components per question.

Chapter Five

**Analysis of Research Findings**

Structures of Governance: how do the civil and military components interface:

- Lines of communications: who reports to whom and under what circumstances would reporting be effected?

The majority view of some 26% of the total number of the respondents from both components that suggests the military is subordinated to civil authority as statutory mandate, and usually the military reports to the Civilian components. The interface is normally communicated through committees and other management structures. The statutory mandate has provision to interlink both components functions: for instance the Military needs civilians to approve their staffing and support resources. Civilians need the military to accomplish their mandate. Hence, both components are interlinked functionally and this makes it necessary for them to report to one another. However a minority view held by just 4 percent of the total number of respondents suggests that there are no formal interfaces because the two components do not fall within one statute. The military are governed under Defence Act, while the civilians fall under the Public Service Act. The minority view seems not to be clear as both components are co-located in one institution of defence headquarters and there is a daily official interaction between the two components. The Military reports directly to the Minister of Defence, a civilian. In any case this view was expressed by one respondent, which does not constitute a widely held or representative view.

Proponents of the Civil Military Relations Model argue that the subordination of the military to civil supremacy ensures that the military is not granted powers of political influence that could undermine governance of the state and its people. The military would have a limited and specialised role to play and would be made to account to civil control, such that it is able to maintain the democratic principle of governance. The tendency in the past of apportioning too much power to the military was characterised by

the suppression of the masses and an exorbitant cost to national taxpayers' survival resources, resulting in the military losing public support for its primary functions or operations. It is also reported that loyalty and professionalism in the military is affected once it enjoys too much power. Hence, the Civil Military Relations formal Model intends to strike a balance between the role the military can and should play, and the power of influence of civil authority it must exert on the military as a public sector to govern (Ngculu: 2003). This understanding is shared by Githiora, TK (1999) who argues that the structure of governance of the military that subordinates it to civilian authority addresses some of these social and political constraints associated with the nature of military behaviour if left loose without close management and restraint. He contends that it is not meant to diminish the social and political powers of the military, but rather is about transforming the military and assigning the roles that it can best perform.

Many of the responses to the questionnaire alluded to the structural problem of the Ministry wherein communication and proper coordination of activities remain significant stumbling blocks for institutional development. The components do not know to whom they should report; for instance some of the functions of the Permanent Secretary overlap with those of the Chief of Defence Force. The structure itself provides lines of communication and subordination, but it seems that instead of the military being commanded by the CDF, only the PS can instruct, in certain instances. Hence the line of authority is not always clear. Cushway B and Lodge D (1993) define organisational structure as a "…description of how accountabilities, tasks and roles are allocated within the organization". The Researcher through his extensive studies on the subject of structure moves from the premise that organisational structure is the process of departmentalising an organisation for efficiency and effectiveness to meet business goals, whilst at the same time monitoring through feedback from the line of authority, responsibility and accountability. The Researcher's suggested CMR structure is annexed at B. Both Cushway B and Lodge D in Kibasomba (2002) suggest that the structure must demonstrate its appropriateness to the needs of the organisation and must support the mission and strategy of the organisation for any development to take place. Schiff's

theory of Concordance might pave the way for a representative communication between the major stakeholders.

- Are there any tensions that emerge in the process of communication?

Both components (military and civilian) opine that financial constraints cause tension, which represents a majority view of 28 percent of the total number of the respondents. There seems to be general agreement between the two components that the military component lacks understanding of financial procedures as laid down by Treasury instructions and State Finance Act. It is reported that this lack of understanding causes tension when the military demand funds to sponsor their operations, and civilians refuse to act according to their demand. However both components concede that individual attitudes can on occasion cause tension rather than the Civil Military Relations model itself.

A small military component of just 5 percent of the total number of respondents felt that there is duplication of responsibilities between that of the Permanent Secretary and that of the Chief of Defence Force that also gives rise to tension. However it transpires that the bone of contention is not duplication of responsibilities per se, but that military personnel have a problem with obeying orders from a civilian authority, while they are governed under the Defence Act. A similarly small proportion of civilian staff refuses to receive orders from the military and does not respect their senior officers, which also gives rise to tension. This is limited to 5 percent of the total number of the civilian respondents. They argue that the military just issues orders, and when given advice on the status quo of their financial request they feel that civilians disobey their orders. However, this is a simplistic argument. Looking to the bigger picture provided by a study of the problems of democratic control in Central Europe, which involved serious financial shortages, showed that poor conditions of service of the military is a major challenge that brings tension between the two components, as civilians fail to meet what the military are asking for. This makes military planning as well as civilian scrutiny a more difficult task leading to tension between the two components, and provides a practical argument that restricted

financial resources can greatly complicate civilian efforts to assert control over the military.

- What factors contribute to the success of Civil Military Relations Model of military reform?

  Once properly understood by both elements, and as long as trust has been established between the two, the statutory principles of subordinating the military to civilians contribute to the success of Civil Military Relations. 26 percent of respondents to the questionnaire suggested that both components should demonstrate that they need each other in one way or another for their individual existence. In addition the military feels that appropriate staffing levels and relevant training will also contribute to success. Both components however further need to understand the business goal of their organization. Another contributing factor is that the majority of the members of the Ministry of Defence are comrades from the liberation struggle, hence they know each other from that epoch, although this is a minority view of just 7 percent of the total number of the respondents. These patterns of interaction within an organisation or between individuals are reported to have impact on the development of the organisation. Some studies suggest that the social, informal interactions between the two components are very important in ensuring that the CMR model is built on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance. These are some of the interactions not commonly considered within every organisation, but they can uncover the hidden potential and reserved behaviour of an individual which could also be used for further harmonisation and the development of a shared institutional value system (Chuter, 2000:64)

  Although the legal provisions that subordinate the military to civil authority is reported to have contributed to the success of the CMR model, within the Ministry, what the literature and the Respondents are failing to refer to is the question of sustainability. How will a developing country like Namibia (classified by the UNDP

2004 nation states development indexes) with substantial economic constraints which do not address all the national developmental needs, including matching the defence budget with the sectoral transformational initiatives every financial year, ensure the maintenance of the current provisioned MOD structures of governance? It was reported in the literature in the preceding chapters that civil authorities are in a dilemma on how to control the military, especially when the 'power of the purse' is becoming smaller by the day. There is a strong feeling that the structures of controlling and managing the military will collapse once the state or government fails to live up to its obligation of sustaining the military. The role of the military will be defined by the nature of resources available for its use. Hence, the statutory subordination of the military to civilian authority is not a permanent guarantee for democratic state governance.

Moreover, it is reported that regular joint meetings help build confidence and trust between the two components. One wonders to what extent this is the case. The Researcher feels that both the level of representation and power relations play a part in the value of such meetings. If the meetings are dominated by the military in terms of number and rank, the civilian component is most likely to be influenced democratically if meetings are concluded with a vote. Of course one could talk about allocating quotas per component, but the fact of the matter is that the number of participants and rank are denominators of democratic governance. The literature is silent on this matter, although Chuter (2000) and Rupiya (2003) dispute the importance of 50/50 equation to balance the representative levels of both components, especially at management level. They argue that a positive environment for development between the two components can be created not necessarily by equal representation of components, but by creating a context that enhances tolerance, dialogue and good interpersonal skills among them.

- What kind of challenges does the civil military relations as a model of defence or development pose on C**ivilian or Military** Staff of the ministry? Both questions three and four responses will be discussed in the following paragraphs, as they are closely interrelated.

32 percent of respondents raised concerns over the application of two statutes in one institution as a major challenge to staff complement and the discipline of its members. However, 4 percent of respondents suggested that PS and CDF roles are not well defined, and this poses a challenge to those who receive instruction from them, insofar as they do not know whom to obey. Another view expressed by the military is that the civilian authority does not properly understand or recognise their roles; thus the military would want to ensure that this is addressed and rectified.

Some members of the civilian component expressed the opinion that sustaining the force and improving conditions of service is a challenge to them as sponsors of the military. The other major challenge is the issue of military secrecy that limits the civilians in knowing the priorities of the military for budgetary allocation purposes. There is a need to display maturity in attitude when dealing with the military, as negative attitudes could spark serious tension. However, on the other hand the military feels that use of the two Acts affects the level of discipline within the command chain: for instance, civilians' refusal to obey orders, and significant differences in conditions of service for both components also present a challenge. A relatively small proportion of the civilians argue that their structural adjustments for promotion make advancement for them difficult, while for the military this is not the case. A further concern was raised by 11 percent of respondents, who cited the inability of the military to understand financial systems, issues and language generally as a challenge that affects the whole financial strategic planning of the institution and leads to overspending of resources. Chuter (2000:69-70) contends that the relationships between the major stakeholders that work the best will necessarily differ from one contextual setting to another, and that there is no 'best approach' that fits all. This is partly because they occupy very different places in the security

communities of different countries, and their landscapes have different sets of experiences; for instance, in war and peace-time. Political and economic factors could also pose challenges for the sustainability of CMR Models in many nation states, and the Namibian CMR's major challenges could have their origin in both. This could include political decision-making in the allocation of defence budgets, and the economic status of the country. Namibia as a developing country, and economic constraints affecting the ability to improve conditions of services of the serving members will continue to pose a danger to the management of the force. For instance, in order to ensure that a member maintains his or her uniform neatly and to the required standard, the state should be able to supply all the necessary accessories to the member, whilst the state on the other hand might be under considerable pressure to support national health and education programmes. There is a need to engage all the stakeholders or their representatives at the national budget design stage, and for budgetary allocations to be clearly indicated, in order that the difficulties inherent in revenue collection, distribution, expenditure and budgetary deficit be properly understood. The available CMR literature is silent on the issue of financial constraint and the resulting inability to sponsor the necessary development programmes and projects.

On the question of secrecy, this is a management issue which would require redefining and redesigning security strategy and should involve all the major stakeholders in order for them to be accountable and to 'own' it on behalf of the State and its people. Some of the literature contends that the military secrecy syndrome affects the developmental progression of the Ministry of Defence. Thus the involvement of civilians can open up the process of decision-making, which must be transparent, and this requires objective scrutiny. Military establishments have a natural propensity for secrecy, but scrutiny can provide the military with incentives to improve. Unchecked and unseen, the effectiveness of military establishments will tend to diminish over time. Dynamic debates over everything from procurement to grand strategy illuminate the way toward optimal solutions (The Rose-Roth Seminar). Critics of such arrangements argue that even if the two are located together (as in

Norway, one of few countries where this seems to work), there will be communication problems. Two centres of power will always compete with each other, especially if they work for the same master who, in practice, must choose between the recommendations of each (Chuter: 2000). This implies that the military uses the concept of secrecy to maintain its power relations with the civilian component, but in so doing there are some opportunity costs for them that leave the civilians not knowing the actual needs of the military. However, Chuter qualifies his view and further contends that there has to be constant contact between the military and civilian staff, and that it should be a fundamental principle of the ministry's operations that there is a single source of advice to ministers, reflecting both the military and civilian views. No matter how vehemently the civilians and the military may argue at the lower levels, they need to establish a unified position between them that can be presented to ministers as such.

On the question of the inefficiency and lack of understanding of the military on financial matters, proponents of Civil Military Relations within the Ministry of Defence confirm that the military lacks financial skills and has demonstrated that it is not proficient at finding cost-effective solutions to society's security needs (Edmonds: 1988). Chuter has identified areas in which military should not be involved, especially in taking policy decisions on declaring wars and alliances. It is the job of governments to declare war and make treaties, and to decide upon public finances to be used in military operations, taking into account the national economic status quo.

- How do these challenges affect the management and development of the Ministry of Defence?

There is a strong indication from some 53 percent, constituting a majority view of respondents, that different conditions of services affect the equitable and effective management and development of the Ministry of Defence. 5 percent of respondents contend that organisational structure and unprocedural military orders for funding for their operations are two institutional management and developmental challenges. They

also feel however that this happens at a relatively low level of the Ministry and thus has an insignificant impact.

A minority view suggests that military secrecy affects budget allocations to military activities, hence affecting the development of the institution. It was also reported that resource constraints affect the development of the institution in a number of ways, which include lowering the morale of troops if their conditions of services are not improved leading to lower productivity in terms of institutional functions. Financial constraints also lead to threats to national security and mistrust as a result of, it is suggested. It is also reported that the two diverging Acts affect the command and control line, leading to delayed execution of operational mandates and also affecting the level of trust among the components. A further minority concern was insufficient civilian representation at decision-making level, resulting in little significant contribution to the development of the institution on their part.

On the question of structural problems emanating from dual statutory mandates, the literature seems to suggest that this leads to poor motivation and morale; poor communication; no adherence to corporate goals and objectives; divisiveness and lack of co-operation, with everyone trying to protect their own domains; an inability to respond effectively to changing conditions or to innovate; higher costs and inefficiency, and finally, failure to provide suitable opportunities for the development of future officers and business goals (Kibasomba: 2002).

Concerning the issue of poor representation of the civilian component at senior management level as having an impact on the productivity of the organization, the literature seems to support a balanced personnel equation within the Ministry, with the argument that inappropriate staffing levels may affect productivity in the prickly issue of defence tasks. The literature further indicates that this is the most advanced form of organisation of a defence ministry, and probably the most efficient, if it accommodates a level playing field. However, it does require civilians and military officers to be content to work for each other, which is a little beyond where most bureaucracies would be

prepared to go. It should be noted that there is no need for a 50/50 split, or any other kind of prescriptive limitation. In each case, the test should be whether a given job could be done more effectively by a civilian or by a member of the military. In such cases – such as operational planning - most or all of the personnel will be military. In others – such as those responsible for civilian personnel – the opposite will apply (Chuter: 2000:61)

The issue of financial constraints has been said to diminish the influence of civilian authority within the military if it is not handled maturely. Chuter observed that improved conditions of service of members contributes immensely to the development and maintenance of a healthy CMR Model, but this remains a challenge to the Namibian Ministry of Defence as reported earlier, where the size of revenue continues to fall short in matching the sectoral growth demands, and this is implicit in the steady defence budget deficits. Year after year there is overspending in the millions, yet the same problem exists and no permanent solution is found (Auditor General Reports for the years 1999:6; 2000:11-13; 2001:2 and 2002:6). This will continue to affect the development of the institution.

- How can these challenges be overcome, if at all?

There is a strong implication that these CMR challenges could be overcome by fostering an element of trust, and by introducing improvements in transparency and accountability through the holding of joint meetings for confidence- and relationship-building. This was a majority view expressed by 38 percent of respondents. However, 8 percent of respondents contended that there is a need to establish one institution and to rationalise the conditions of service to improve discipline and service delivery. There was a general feeling among respondents that the allocation of resources needs re-prioritising and planning to address the issue of the burden of financial constraints. It was further contended that there is a need to review the Ministry of Defence structures and responsibilities, in order to streamline them, and to further re-examine the CMR model strategies. Also a review of recruitment strategy was suggested, for both components to improve their conditions of service equitably. There is a need to develop and maintain

military ethics and professionalism. Finally there is a need for social integration of both components to build trust and confidence between them. These were some of the views expressed by individual respondents, though they do not constitute a majority view for serious concern, although they could be important for future interrogations.

On the question of addressing challenges posed by the CMR Model at institutional level that could be adapted in the Ministry of Defence, Cushway B and Lodge D talk about re-engineering and reorganising the organisation's culture and climate. These influence the efficiency and effectiveness of the institution. They argue that "people who may be very able and efficient in their own right, but who nevertheless do not fit into the culture, for example because of the way they… will be unlikely to achieve long-term success in the organization". The suggestion from the respondents that there is a need to re-prioritise organisational activities (including budgeting) would appear to address some of these challenges, which carry with them the socio-economic and political elements that affect the organisation and its management system. Some of the literature advocates for the maintenance of serious dialogue between the military and civilian politicians, which will eventually offer opportunities for exploring how best to restructure the military. Such dialogue would also help to educate the military on civilian expectations of the armed forces. The studies further suggest that it is important to organise seminars and workshops on the political re-education of the military to emphasise that the military has no duty to intervene in the political process. Civil-Military Relations must be cordial at all times: http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm. The other aspect that emerges from the literature is the issue of positive attitudes that can also address some of the organisational development challenges alluded to above. Edmonds (1988) looks at the leadership qualities required to man the defence sector, which would ensure that it encompasses elements of officers' social and moral orientation and the ability to operate within a service organisational and group context, which, by definition, must include the responsibility for both the operational effectiveness of the unit under his or her command, and the lives of people in it, in sometimes difficult and dangerous situations.

- Besides the experiences you referred to earlier on the British Civil Military Relations Model, is there anything you would like to add that might improve the sustainability of the model?

There was an impression from 17 percent of the respondents that there is a need for an intensification of joint training, more resource support and the recruitment of components with the requisite skills and attitudes to sustain CMR, coupled with good interpersonal skills and a positive attitude. Nevertheless, a marginal view of just 4 percent contends that there is no need for CMR Model, and that all personnel should simply be military. This was a single respondent view, which probably does not therefore constitute a serious concern. Other minority views suggest that there is also a need to recognise individual efforts within the organisation, to boost morale and confidence among the two components, and that a further adaptation of the British Civil Military Relations Model to local needs is a necessity. Earlier on the Researcher alluded to the fact that the British Civil Military Relations Model was not drawn up with the Namibian security problems and goals in mind, but that the British Team merely designed a structure similar to theirs. The Namibian Government did not know the rationale that led to the British to design this Model. The context where it was applied in Britain were not known to Namibia. Other local laws or institutions that would support this model, such as parliamentary over-seeing for example, were not properly constituted (internal MODO, May 1995). Mossberger and Wolman assert that a lack of proper evaluation of policy transfer before adoption and a cross-national policy transfer may result in divergence from 'rational decision' models, and that uninformed policy transfer frequently fails: for instance the context in which the policy was used affects the transfer, and ideological preferences limit the search for a good policy transfer. The problem of two Acts that do not appear to complement each other could have been avoided if there were other options of Civil Military Relations Models. The option chosen by the Namibian Authority was meant to address administrative governance requirements: i.e. governance that presupposes an efficient, open, accountable and audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to help design and implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is. It advocates for an independent Judiciary system to uphold the law

and resolve disputes arising in a largely free market economy. This is the position of the World Bank (Leftwich, 1993:611).

Although the Researcher recognises that the view (reported in chapter four, regarding the interface between the two components) expressed by a single respondent cannot be seen as representative by any means, it does raise a question on the design of the Model itself. There are three major stakeholders with ideas and interests in a liberal participatory democracy: i.e. the political society (represented by MOD civilians), civil society and the military, that play crucial role in setting the agenda for collaborative institutional governance. This is not to argue for civil society to participate in day-to-day Ministry of Defence functions, but rather to have a platform from which to influence the agenda of the interface between the two components. If the minority view is to be entertained, the civil society will then link the two statutes, as their constituent security interests would be the main features of discussion between the two components. This is to avoid the unilateral setting of security agenda for civil society, as Carnovale argues that the theory of 'one size (of security) fits all' does not work in all national landscapes and value systems; some are either weaker or stronger to participate in a healthy CMR arrangement.

Finally, debates around morale-boosting for the force appears to be linked to the conditions of service, which in a way are products of the two statutes which must be re-visited in an attempt to rationalise their impact on the strength of the Ministry of Defence.

- How do you see the future of Civil Military Relations Model in the Ministry of Defence? Can the organisation sustain itself without this Model?

The view of 43 percent of respondents contends that the institution derives more benefits by combining two components with diverse capacity and experiences to learn and work together as a team, as means of development and governance, than would be the case were they separated. On the contrary, a minority view of just 3 percent of the

respondents suggests that the institution must be militarised to sustain it, although some of them feel that co-location improves the military capability and political security of the country. The Researcher feels that maintenance of cross-fertilised human capital contribution is necessary for institutional development and democracy in the country, especially as a consequence of the subordination of military to civil power through the CMR Model. Hence, the MOD without this Model cannot sustain itself. Building a relationship for peace and stability for a professional institution of the security sector is less expensive to maintain than the alternative.

The literature on the establishment of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) staffed by two components (that of civilians and military) contends that the MOD oversees the management of the Armed Forces, thus completing the formal constitutional, legislative administrative relationship between the military and the government (Githiora: 1999). This thinking is underscored by Chuter and others, who argue that the statutory CMR model arrangement would not work unless issues of attitudes and values are taken into account when designing such a model. The Researcher is satisfied with this understanding, as he believes that attitudes and values are context-specific attributes which require local exposure and inputs. The Model might have cross-fertilisation of skills from both civilian and military components, but it ignores the underlying personal attributes as discussed earlier. It is reported in the literature that the executive branch of government plays a significant role in maintaining civil control of the military, while the legislative branch of government maintains a strong influence in military affairs. This is achieved through the principle of separation of powers, an essential element in democracy. However, some critics of this understanding define CMR as "… representing a complex set of inter-relationships, established norms and practices between the armed forces and other social structures" (Samuel P Huntington and Andrew J Goodpaster in Rupiya: 2003).

Chapter Six

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The research report investigates the relationship between the civil and military components of the Ministry of Defence and the impact of this relationship on the development and functioning of the defence ministry. The research looks at the structure of governance within the Ministry of Defence, in order to draw examples of how civil and military components could interface, for transformational governance. The fact that a political appointee, who is a civilian, heads the Ministry generates considerable interest. The structure also has two positions subordinated to the Minister, i.e. the Permanent Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force, the former being a political appointee as civilian, responsible or accountable for the administration and management of the Ministry, and in charge of resources, both human and material. Conversely, the CDF although at par with the Permanent Secretary, is constitutionally appointed and is military. By virtue of his or her position, notwithstanding that both PS and CDF are expected to report to the Minister, the latter can have access to the Commander-in-Chief of the Namibian Armed Forces, the role that seems to give the office of CDF more seniority than that of the PS. Some critics of either a militarily domineering or a politically accessible role argue that "Once the military are granted with power of influence politically then usually that power is used to undermine the government and threatens its inhabitants" (Ngculu and Githiora). However, some literature has reconfigured CMR best practices as entailing the establishment of constant dialogue and negotiations on issues of paramount importance to a functioning democratic government (Steyn and Williams). The report acknowledges the cultural and political transformation challenges of the CMR model and the complexities inherent in managing them successfully. This is sometimes reflected through management structures of the ministry. The Research further acknowledges the type of tension that could be a result of attitude, incompetence or lack of commitment on the part of individual components. This understanding is shared by some scholars including Williams, who argues that the process of taking decisions that would hurt one function would cause tensions within the

institution. These are problems that would require human and organisational transformations through technocratic and human relations' processes. Rupiya argues that CMR components could demonstrate mutual respect and competence and not tension. There should be existing relationships that indicate effective observance of the parameters regulating civil military relations. On the contrary, Chuter contends that two centres of power will always engage in some kind of competition concerning whose influence dominates the institutional functional activities. Sarkesian, SC; Williams, JA and Cimbala, SJ (2002) arguement that in the process of taking decisions that would hurt one function would cause tension within the institution, provide generic contests depended on the degree to which the military can or should try to influence government decisions (e.g. on the defence budget, or on structure or the use of force) and remains controversial or contentious subject. These are some of the difficult decisions CMR is facing, especially when dealing with organisation and human transformational matters.

The Researcher further conducted a literature review to investigate what various other sources or books say about the civil military relation concept and its relevance to the security sector for democratic governance within the Ministry of Defence. The literature review interrogated the relationships between the military and the civilian society as a whole because of limited sources focusing on MOD Civilian and Military domains, but nevertheless some of the wider literature is relevant for this research. It is further observed that the literature available is somewhat limited, specifically on the internal operations of the Ministry of Defence, as opposed to general views on CMR social context. The literature could not provide sufficient information on MOD institutional and human transformation initiatives or frameworks, and this remains an area requiring further research. However, the Researcher identified some debates on the CMR concept that include views expressed by Chuter, who questions the subordination of military to civil authority as to whether it is real or not. He questions whether the military obeys the state, or whether, on the contrary, the military tries to usurp the functions of other parts of the state apparatus. In the latter, the consequences may be serious not only for civil-military relations, but could in fact be disastrous in terms of the interests of the state (Chuter: 2000:27-28).

The literature identifies some functions of the Ministry of Defence as inter alias: providing strategic direction, vision and values; objectives and targets-establishing the key priorities and defence capabilities necessary to deliver the MOD's departmental objectives; resource allocation and strategic balance of investment to match Defence priorities and objectives; and performance management – managing and driving corporate performance. The Researcher has interrogated the British CMR design, and concludes that the Namibian Ministry of Defence transferred the major functions of the British CMR policy model onto Namibia, but still the question of context setting for application remains open to debate. The relevance and long term sustainability of the model within the Namibian milieu is another question, given the current economic constraints. Nevertheless, the literature has motivated reasons for such a structure that co-locates the two components with defence functions under a single Ministry, to simplify the chain of command, reduce duplication of effort across the three services, encourage an integrated approach to operations and to improve the quality of Defence advice (rather than single service advice) to politicians (the British Strategic Defence Review).

Although Chuter (2000) concurs with the proponents of the CMR model on its usefulness for governance, he pinpoints some of the problems that affect the success of the CMR as inter alia: constitutional constraints; the social or other ties binding civilians and the military together; party political controls; restrictions on strength of the force and delineation of spheres of responsibility. He further questions the modality that justifies the success of CMR as a subjective conclusion, which implies the cooperation of the military, and attempts to coerce the military into behaving acceptably, which implies the opposite (Chuter: 2000:30). The literature establishes the base for the data, or perception analysis. The common problems of Civil Military Relations model identified by Chuter – in particular statutory mandates, social and political compliance, and restrictions on strength of the force – resurfaced as major problems for the Ministry of Defence of Namibia. The other major concern, which Chuter did not emphasise but which emerged as a stumbling block to the proper functioning of CMR in Namibia, is financial

constraints that inhibit pertinent institutional initiatives in instances where there are no funds to execute them. This frequently causes tension between the two components.


Nonetheless, there have been some noticeable achievements in CMR since the inception of the model. There have been some positive developments in ensuring that the military is subordinate to civilian control as per provisions by relevant national statutes. There has been some positive dialogue and direct interactions at formal and informal structures of the organisation that have built confidence and trust among the components. The literature has also alluded to patterns of interactions as having an impact on the governance and development of the organisation. These could also include the norms and values of individual members of the force pertaining to attitudes towards each other, level of respect and tolerance of each other's views and concerns. Both components had a general feeling that the CMR model seems to work well in the Namibian context. There was however a relatively small number of respondents that felt the model is not working properly, and that the institution must be militarised in order to maintain discipline. The use of statutes, one for military and the other for civilian components was reported to be cumbersome for the command chain or communication procedures of the institution: for instance where one component refuses to receive orders from the other, claiming it is illegal because it is not featured in individual provisions of their Act.

The lack of financial understanding and skill by the Military was also reported to have a negative effect on the productivity and functioning of the institution, as it poses as a threat to normal working relationships between the two components. There is always tension between the two components on the issue of funding for military operations. The other major issue that seems to emerge from the study or research is the separate conditions of service that affect the morale of both military and civilian components. The structure of the civilians is rigid and there are few promotion opportunities for them, resulting in a member staying in one post for many years, which leads to boredom or becoming demoralised and the level of commitment to the organisation lessening with time. The civilians further argue that they work with the military and know each other's capacity and potential, but that the military gain promotions very easily and become their

seniors within a given timeframe. The problem is placed squarely at the door of the two statutes, which do not seem to take into consideration personal needs of the two components concurrently.

The other equally important element to emerge from this study is personal qualities that must be conducive to both components to sustain the CMR model: that without acceptable and sound personal qualities one may find it hard to operate within the military environment. Training and joint programmes were also reported to be useful for the sustainability of the CMR model. The need to take into account policy transfer goals of policy from the originating country was raised as very important, as landscape setting can affect the proper implementation of the CMR model. The implementing structure of the institution must be flexible and adaptable to address situational needs as they emerge from the failure of statutory provisions such as those mentioned above. Having read extensively on the CMR model, the Researcher suggests or recommends the following approach for implementation of CMR model that the literature seems to have overlooked despite its importance. This is merely based on the conclusions drawn from the findings expressed by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Namibia respondents to the questionnaire.

Hauanga Model on Healthy MOD CMR interactions: the relationships between strategic decisions, distinctive competences, resources & operational ethics: 2005



The Model is intended to bring some improvements on the interactions between the Military and Civilian components within the Namibian Ministry of Defence. The political and social factors derive from the policy-making domain, and normally this would be Namibian Parliament. These would include public and government policy. It would also entail the reconciliation of conflicting interests of individuals and groups, the needs and expectations of the population, and also policies of political parties. Awareness of CMR would entail all the information about CMR, and this is the design stage for the whole process of CMR. The next step would be assessment of available statutes for implementation. The decisions are taken here, where one looks at the resources available to implement the CMR, the attitudes and behaviours of those implementing components and as to whether they have shared information or there is too much of secrecy in information sharing that might affect the proper implementation of CMR. Once the response is positive, one moves to the context, looking at its relevance and conduciveness to the proper functioning of CMR. If it is positive, one goes ahead and applies the CMR model. But if the findings are negative one goes back to the political and social factors to re-address the situation. If the issue is funding, it comes from Parliament, and if the problem is the introduction of two statutes, it is parliament that can review it. If it is a question of attitude, then one would also need the political and social context to exchange negative attitudes for better, shared ones. It is further recommended that to overcome suspicion, joint training and integrated programmes would build confidence among the components. There is a need to review the MOD functional structures and corporate culture to be inclusive of both components value systems.

There is strong evidence that many of the responses confirm that the MOD has successfully made strides in the areas of cultural and political transformation, but it is still battling with the human and organisational transformation trends within the institution. There is also a strong feeling that both components are content with the CMR model for governance, although there is a recommendation to 'localise' it to be appropriate to the Namibian context.

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
APPENDICES

List of Interviews (Personal Data)

- Lt Col Maiba: MOD Defence Policy
- Col Hafeni Hamunyela: MOD Military Adviser
- Mr H. Shigwedha MOD Secretariat.
- Major T Shaanika: MOD Auxiliary Services
- Mrs M Lensing: Personnel Administration
- Mrs H. Wagner: Personnel Recruitment

- Mrs W. Shivute: MOD Budget Adviser
- Col Thommy Uukunde: Defence Protocol
- Lt Col TJ Lambert: MOD Legal Officer
- Mrs E. Mboti: MOD Gender Focus Point
- Lt Col J. Namoloh: MOD Logistics
- Maj M. Muvangua: MOD Medical
- Mr FU Tjikuua: MOD Information Technology
- Maj General Martin Shalli: Army Commander
- LTC Boshoff: MOD Rations
- Maj Gen Shalumbu: COS: Personnel
- Mr Petrus Shivute: Permanent Secretary
- Hon. V. Simunja : Defence Deputy Minister


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MOD APPROVED STRUCUTRE AS OF 1998

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCUTRE

APPENDIX B




MOD APPROVED STRUCUTRE AS OF 1998