Young Children's Methods for Exercising Agency in their Interactions with their Parents

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University. I hereby declare the following:

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Abstract

As children and parents go about their daily lives, they initiate, engage in and complete various tasks around the home; and in the process of completing these activities, they encounter the challenge of getting each other to do things. Prior EMCA research has primarily focused on how parents get children to do things through the investigation of parent-initiated request-sequences and parental pursuits of compliance through demands, threats and touch. While I also focus on request and demand sequences, I examine how children initiate and pursue a course of action to get their parents to do things, thereby identifying previously unexamined methods that children use to exercise agency and authority in interaction with their parents. I do so by adopting an ethnomethodologically-informed conversation-analytic approach to studying child-parent interaction that emphasises the need to study participant orientations to the developmental scheme and to avoid making *a priori* assumptions about asymmetries in competence, agency and authority. The data corpus consists of 9 hours of video-recordings of child-parent interactions spanning 13 days. Data were collected from two volunteer families with four-year-old children who recorded their daily lives using smart nanny cameras. In an examination of parent-initiated request-sequences, I look at how children initiate an alternative sequence of action by countering their parent's requests. I identify two types of counters; one that children can use to challenge a proposed task's roles and another that replaces a parental course of action with the child's. I also analyse child-initiated demand-sequences and children's methods for pursuing parental compliance. I then focus on a specific type of demand - the "look at X" demand - and parental responses to it. Through these investigations of children's methods, I demonstrate that young children utilise the developmental scheme as a resource for designing their actions and managing their social positions. This study contributes to a growing body of knowledge on children's methods for engaging with adults, managing their social positions (through

deontic, epistemic and affective claims) and, thus, contributing to their own socialisation; while demonstrating the importance of avoiding *a priori* assumptions of authority in interactions between parents and children.

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The world is a very different place today than it was when I started this doctoral journey as we navigate the second year of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Though it has been a tremendously challenging quest-with-no-map, I am incredibly grateful that I have been able to reach this point in the PhD journey, especially considering the myriad of personal and professional challenges that have presented themselves. I have come to believe that a doctorate is partially a degree in perseverance, not only perseverance of the candidate and their supervisor but the people in their lives. For this reason, I wish to thank my

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Research Problem and Questions

How is social order maintained and reproduced? Answering this question has been a central concern for the social sciences under the umbrella of socialisation theory which has "provided sociologists and anthropologists with a way of accounting for the maintenance and reproduction of social order, and furnished psychologists with an axiomatic[sic] for understanding the individual's social as well as moral development" (Cromdal, 2006, p. 462; Keel, 2016). Though not confined to the study of children, a key concern of grand socialisation theories (such as those of Parsons and Durkheim) and theories of child development (such as those of Piaget, Vygotsky, and Erikson) is how children become socially competent reproducers of social order under the guidance of adults who are the key socialising agents (Cromdal, 2006, 2009; Garfinkel et al., 1982; Keel, 2016). Central to this concern is an understanding that it is through adult-child interaction that children learn social competences. However, the "lived, orderly and overwhelmingly mundane practice(s)" of childhood have been mostly neglected by these (and subsequent) approaches (Cromdal, 2009, p. 1473).

Scholars adopting an ethnomethodological conversation-analytic (EMCA) approach to the study of social life have raised a number of concerns about the ways in which children have been studied. They have argued for a respecification of socialisation to avoid it being used to "gloss" over, rather than study, how culture is reproduced locally in interaction (Cromdal, 2009; Forrester, 2010; Keel, 2016; Mackay, 1975). They draw attention to the need for scholars to separate folklore from scientific inquiry by avoiding assumptions of asymmetry in competence in the parent-child relationship, as these assumptions are part of an adult ideology or developmental scheme (Gan & Danby, 2021; Garfinkel et al., 1982; Keel, 2020; Mackay, 1975; Speier, 1976). Instead of assuming that children are adults-in-the-

making and looking at them through a deficit mindset, these EMCA scholars suggest investigating children's ways of doing things, including how they manage their social positions as well as investigating how parents and children orient to the developmental scheme in interaction (Gan & Danby, 2021; Garfinkel et al., 1982; Keel, 2020; Mackay, 1975; Speier, 1976). In this thesis, I adopt this ethnomethodological, conversation-analytic approach to studying child-parent interaction while drawing attention to the need for analysts to avoid making assumptions about the distribution of authority in parent-child interaction. Furthermore, I contribute to the rich field of EMCA studies on parent-child interaction by identifying previously unexamined methods of exercising agency and authority that children can utilise to manage their social positions.

EMCA studies have investigated familial negotiations, particularly directive sequences and how parents get children to do things and how children respond to these structural impositions (see Craven & Potter, 2010; Goodwin, 2006; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013; Hepburn & Potter, 2011; Kent, 2012). Compliance is the structurally preferred response to a directive and resistance is the structurally dispreferred response; resistance in parent-child interaction routinely leads to escalated pursuits of compliance that further impose the parent's agenda on the child (Kent, 2012; Schegloff, 2007). However, Kent (2012) found that young children can respond with incipient compliance - actions signalling forthcoming, but not constituting, compliance. In this way, the child avoids escalated pursuits for compliance and establishes some autonomy under parental imposition (Kent, 2012). Similarly, in this study I contribute to an understanding of how negotiations unfold in parent-child interaction by identifying another way in which children can exercise agency in response to parental impositions: counters. I identify two types of counters, matched and unmatched, and examine how children exercise agency by using these counters to exercise control over task organisation.

Beyond Waring (2019) and Wootton's research (1981b), there has been limited investigation into how children get parents to do things and pursue parental compliance. Furthermore, when investigating children's agency, the focus has largely been on how children exercise agency by resisting authority (see Corsaro, 2020; Fasulo et al., 2007; Kent, 2012; Kuczynski, 2003; Wingard, 2012) rather than how children might exercise their own authority and agency by initiating actions in interaction with their parents. I contribute to addressing this gap in the literature by investigating child-initiated demand sequences in child-parent interaction. I examine how children make demands of their parents and pursue parental compliance, along with the methods they employ to manage their social position in doing so.

Kidwell and Zimmerman (2007) have examined how very young children point at an object to draw an adult's attention to it, and how both parties orient to the showing of an object as requiring more than a look as a response from the adult. While past research on children's use of the "look at X" demand has characterised it as a summons for parental attention, I demonstrate how this action is about more than simply establishing joint attention: it is a demand used by young children to solicit affirmative assessments from parents. Furthermore, I demonstrate how children pursue suitable assessments when these are not forthcoming. In this way children monitor their own task proficiency while reinforcing normative asymmetries of in/competence in the parent-child dyad.

By contributing to a growing body of knowledge on children's methods for engaging with adults, managing their social positions and, thus, contributing to their own socialisation, this study demonstrates the importance of avoiding *a priori* assumptions of authority in interactions between parents and children.

The aim of this thesis is to identify how young children exercise authority and agency during interactions with their parents:

(i) What practices/methods do young children employ to exercise authority and agency in interaction with their parents?

(ii) What do these methods and the responses to them reveal about the *in situ* (re)production of social relations, children's agency, and authority in the parent-child relationship?

Additional research questions emerged during the preliminary analysis of the data and subsequently guided the analysis in chapters 4 to 6. The questions relate to specific methods children employ in interaction.

(iii) How do young children demand that their parents perform an action, and how do they respond to and/manage noncompliance?

(iv) How do young children demand their parents' attention to their productions, and how do they solicit assessments thereof?

(v) How do young children redirect the course of action from the one proposed by a parent to an alternative task, thus challenging the participation structure of the task proposed by a parental request?

Chapter Overview

The research problem and research questions under investigation have been outlined in this chapter. In Chapter 2, I outline classic socialisation theories and how they have conceptualised agency and authority in the parent-child relationship. I also discuss traditional developmental theories and identify how these approaches understand parent-child interaction. I contrast these approaches with those of Garfinkel and Sacks, who respecified socialisation, childhood and parent-child interaction with propositions of a kids' culture and the developmental scheme. I position this thesis within the ethnomethodological conversation-analytic literature on parent-child interaction and authority (deontic, epistemic and affective) that Garfinkel and Sacks inspired; focusing on research examining participant

orientations to social relations within request sequences. I conclude by outlining some contemporary socialisation approaches and comparing them with the EMCA approach to studying parent-child interaction.

Chapter 3 outlines the ethnomethodological conversation-analytic approach utilised in this thesis to investigate child-parent interaction, along with a description of the data to be analysed in the subsequent sections. This chapter also includes a discussion on the analytic procedures I followed along with ethical considerations related to collecting and using the data.

There are three chapters that focus on the analysis of the data, thereby addressing the first two research questions outlined above. Each of the three chapters examines a particular method that children utilise for exercising authority and agency when interacting with parents. I introduce each chapter by examining literature most relevant to the topic at hand.

In Chapter 4, I address the third research question by investigating instances of young children exercising agency and taking on high authority stances by demanding their parents perform an action. In addition, I examine instances in which parents do not comply with initial demands and children pursue compliance. I demonstrate how children can test the boundaries of their authority and employ category-bound activities to manage their position of limited authority; yet, parental responses can restrict their influence, ultimately (re)producing asymmetries in authority in the dyad.

I answer the fourth research question in Chapter 5 where I examine a distinct type of demand – the "look at *X*" demand that young children use to not only establish joint attention over a production but ultimately to elicit parental assessments thereof. I demonstrate how children actively seek parental assessments of their productions to gauge their task proficiency, consequently reinforcing normative identities of the developing child and knowledgeable parent.

In Chapter 6, answering the fifth research question, I examine instances in which parents make a request of their children but instead of responding to the request, the children counter the request. I examine two types of counters for their implications for task-orientation, where matched types challenge the roles and responsibilities proposed by the parental request and unmatched types redirect the course of action to an alternative task. The asymmetrical nature of the parent-child relationship is (re)created during these task negotiations.

Together these three analysis chapters address the first two research questions by describing some of the methods young children utilise to exercise authority and agency during interactions with their parents and how they actively participate in their own (re)socialisation into the child role.

In the final chapter, I bring together the findings from the three analysis chapters to discuss their implications, particularly what these practices reveal about our understanding of children's agency, authority and competences, the (re)production of social relations, the developmental scheme and the process of socialisation itself. I also reflect on the limitations of the study and offer recommendations for further research.

Chapter 2: Children's Agency and Authority

Introduction

In this chapter, I position my thesis within the literature on socialisation – the means by which social order is said to be (re)produced (Cromdal, 2006; Guhin et al., in press). I outline theoretical conceptions of, and empirical approaches to, the study of socialisation; along with the roles that agency and authority play in this (re)production. I build this chapter on the work of scholars who have outlined the history of conversation analysis (Heritage, 1984b; Rawls, 2006; Rawls & Turowetz, 2019; Vom Lehn, 2014, 2019) and that of socialisation theory (Corsaro, 2020; Cromdal 2006, 2009; Gan & Danby, 2021; Guhin et al, in press; Keel 2016, 2020; Maynard & Clayman, 2003), however I re-examine the literature with a focus on children's agency and authority and their role in their own socialisation, to build an argument for why we should examine children's actions and avoid assumptions of asymmetry (particularly regarding authority) when studying the child-parent relationship.

While the histories of conversation analysis and socialisation often start with the work of Parsons, Keel (2016) and Guhin et al. (in press) go back to the work of Simmel and, like these authors, I start this chapter with an outline of the classic socialisation theories of Simmel, Durkheim and Parsons. While socialisation theory has been developed by many scholars and disciplines and thus the story of it can take many paths, I focus on the development of conversation analytic work on child-parent interaction and how it intersects with conversation analytic work on authority in interaction[1]. In doing so, I outline some of the critical responses to early conceptualisations of socialisation and, in contrast, I examine the work of Garfinkel and Sacks: first looking at how their work departs from the socialisation theories and trends in developmental psychology, and then discussing their

[1] For detailed descriptions of socialisation see Cromdal (2006; 2009) Keel (2016), Corsaro (2020) and Guhin et al. (in press).

contributions to our understanding of social action, order and socialisation. I explore Garfinkel and Sacks' critiques of studies of children and parent-child interaction, and the suggestions they and subsequent EMCA scholars have made for respecifying childhood, development, the parent-child relationship and socialisation. I outline EMCA scholars' work on parent-child request sequences and how these scholars have grappled with studying asymmetries of authority and agency in parent-child interaction. In a discussion on authority in parent-child interaction, I draw on the proposal of Stevanovic and colleagues (Stevanovic, 2018; Stevanovic & Koski, 2018; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015) for studying authority by examining participant orientations to social relations in interaction. I then draw attention to calls for the examination of adjacency pair sequences (such as request sequences) to uncover the ways in which different facets of social relations are made relevant in interaction. Lastly, I draw attention to gaps in the literature and calls by various contemporary socialisation scholars (within and outside of EMCA) for greater attention to be paid to children's practices and competences in the study of child-parent interaction, while emphasising the unique contribution EMCA studies bring to our understanding of parent-child interaction.

Classic Socialisation Theory

Socialisation (*vergesellschaftung*) (Simmel, 1909, p. 303) was first introduced to sociological theory by Georg Simmel in 1894 as *the* priority for sociological inquiry (Guhin et al., in press; Keel, 2016; Simmel, 1909). Simmel understood society to be more than a collection of individuals in space and time: for Simmel society existed "wherever several individuals are in reciprocal relationship" (Simmel, 1909, p. 296; Keel, 2016). People are brought together to fulfil purposes (such as play or instruction) or impulses (erotic or religious) and, by coming together for these purposes, people simultaneously influence them and are influenced by them. Through these occasions of reciprocity, "unity" or socialisation

is brought into existence. Thus, for Simmel, socialisation was "the *form*, actualizing itself in countless various types, in which the individuals, on the basis of those interests…grow together into a unity, and within which these interests come to realization" (Simmel, 1909, p. 297). In other words, he proposed that sociology investigate socialisation as the forms through which human beings associate themselves reciprocally and by which society is constituted. For Simmel, this line of inquiry was interested in all forms of reciprocal association and their realisation and, among many possibilities, could include inquiry into "superiority and subordination" in relationships and how these variations arise and are maintained within families (Simmel, 1909). In this thesis, I take up these critical areas of sociological inquiry by examining asymmetries in authority, knowledge and emotion within the family to critically examine assumptions of normative expectations of the superior adult and subordinate child.

Sociologist Emile Durkheim had a narrower view on socialisation than did Simmel: he understood socialisation to be the process by which passive children acquire norms, values, and feelings from authoritative adults (parents and teachers) and, thus, become social beings that sustain social order (Keel, 2016). The child is born with an individual nature that is egoistic and asocial, and through the process of socialisation another nature must be developed (Keel, 2016; Lamanna, 2002)[2].

For Durkheim, both the family and state were key socialising agents (Cromdal, 2006; Lamanna, 2002): "the parents and/or teachers initiating the educational activities have a

[2] Durkheim's work on the topic of family and socialisation is spread across his publications, many of which have not been translated to English. His book on the topic of the family was never finished. However, Lamanna (2002) gathered together the traces of his work on family and synthesised them into a book which contains a multitude of translated quotations in English, making for a valuable source of insights into Durkheim's interest in the family.

natural superiority or authority over the child due to their experience and knowledge" (Keel, 2016, p.12). The family develops the child's intellectual and moral development in accordance with their own views, while the state (through the school and teachers) plays a key role in socializing the child into adopting societal norms and expectations (Lamanna, 2002). Durkheim suggested that socialisation requires a balance between authority and autonomy. Discipline is necessary if the child is to align with social expectations and be able to conform and conduct themselves in an orderly manner; yet the development of personality should be encouraged (not repressed) and the child given room for initiative and autonomy if the child is to contribute to society. For Durkheim, family socialisation can develop limited views and compromise autonomy and thus he saw the school as critical for children's socialisation. The school acts as the child's practice ground for larger society as the child learns to conform to school rules in preparation for conforming to societal rules (Lamanna, 2002). Durkheim's conception of socialisation did not consider the child as being able to contribute to their own socialisation nor did he consider the child capable of acts of authority. Asymmetries were assumed and static: parents and teachers are authority figures and holders of social knowledge, while children have to be given opportunities for autonomy rather than seeking them for themselves. The analysis I present demonstrates a very different reality where children create their own opportunities for exercising agency, demonstrate the ability to exercise authority, and act as "agents of their own socialization" (Goodwin & Kyratzis, 2007, p.208; Keel, 2016, p.37).

In addition to Durkheim[3], a number of personality and developmental psychologists influenced early sociologist, Talcott Parsons, in his development of a grand theory of social action – structural functionalism (Heritage, 1984b; Keel, 2016; Parsons, 1955)

[3] Parsons does not directly acknowledge Durkheim's work as something he builds on, but he presents a Durkheimian perspective on socialisation (Lamanna, 2002, p. 202).

Parsons' Structural Functionalism

According to Talcott Parsons' theory of structural functionalism, socialisation takes place within the home and school as the passive pre-competent child is taught how to be a competent social member by capable and motivated parents, teachers and, later, peers (Cromdal, 2006; Keel, 2016; Lamanna, 2002; Parsons, 1951). He understood socialisation to be a learning process involving the acquisition and internalisation of social norms as "need dispositions" of the personality and "value orientation patterns" associated with "satisfactory functioning in a role" (Parsons, 1951, pp. 201-248; also see Cromdal, 2006). Initially Parson's provided a conceptual scheme involving the socialisation mechanisms involved in the internalisation of value-orientations in the development of the personality and noted that "many features of the actual process of socialisation are obscure" (Parsons, 1951, p. 214; Cromdal, 2006; Keel, 2016). However in his later work, he emphasised the role of social interaction in the process of learning (Guhin et al., in press; Rawls & Turowetz, 2019) by explaining that children are "socialised into a system of social interaction" (Parsons, 1955, p. 58) and explained in more depth how children are socialised into a common culture of social relations[4].

Parson's described nuclear families as "factories" that are necessary for the production of personalities, as these personalities are "not 'born' but must be 'made' through the socialisation process" (Parsons & Bales, 1955, p. 16). Families were understood to have two elementary functions; to socialise children to become members of society and to stabilise the adult personality that makes up the society. Families thus function as institutionalised social systems where the child is exposed to certain conditions necessary for socialisation by "more powerful and responsible persons (that) are themselves integrated in the cultural value

[4] See the discussion to follow on Garfinkel's interpretation of Parsons' later work that emphasises social interaction.

system in question" (Parsons & Bales, 1955, p. 17). The power imbalance was, for Parsons and Bales, the consequence of biology, as the child's role in the family is the result of their helplessness which stems from their physical dependence on their parents (Parsons & Bales, 1955, p. 22).

Though Parsons acknowledged that socialisation takes place across the lifetime, he also emphasised that it is during childhood that value orientations are established and that these remain relatively stable in adulthood (Cromdal, 2006; Parsons, 1951). Parsons identified five main phases of socialisation in childhood which map onto Freud's psychosexual stages of development (Freud, 1905, 1927). He noted that the individual grows less dependent and more autonomous across these stages: oral dependency, love-dependency, the oedipal-phase, the latency child, and maturity or genitality (Parsons, 1955). During the first four stages (oral dependency, love-dependency, the oedipal-phase, the latency child), children who are seeking need-fulfilment and reward (while avoiding punishment) are motivated to perform roles according to normatively appropriate conduct; and that these roles, and the values and normative conduct they espouse, are internalised over time (Parsons, 1951; also see Keel, 2016). The child is exposed to this common culture and its values through interaction within the family (Parsons, 1955).

According to Parsons, socialisation involves differentiation of roles across the developmental stages (Parsons, 1955; also see Keel, 2016). This process of differentiation of action types involves the child being part of a system of social interaction: initially the child must identify as being part of the mother-child object, then they must differentiate self from the mother (or other), after which they differentiate between "four fundamental types of status-roles" based on generation and sex (Parsons, 1955, p. 46). For example, the child differentiates roles by sex where the female roles are expressive and the male roles instrumental. Generational roles involve a power differential which requires an understanding

that the parents are "superior" and the children "inferior" (Parsons, 1955, p. 46). Parsons viewed the power axis of differentiation according to generation "almost obvious; surely the adult can affect the affairs of the family as a system more than can a small child" (Parsons, 1955, p. 46). While this quote may suggest that Parsons considered the child to potentially have some (though obviously less) effect on family affairs, the manner in which he structures parent and child roles into distinct categories within matrices reinforces a dichotomous view of agentic parent versus non-agentic child. Parsons clarified that power in this instance is referring to the degree of influence over the functioning of the family as a social system and, since the role of the family is to socialise the child, it is undeniable that the child in this system is not equal to the parent. Accordingly, children can disrupt the system but they cannot be equals in the socialisation process (Parsons, 1955)[5]. This admittedly common-sense view of family power structures is taken nowadays as fact; the parental role is high in generational power while the child role is low on such power. Nevertheless, the degree of differentiation lessens as the child matures. In the 1950s it may well have been quite inconceivable that a child could wield power within the family; nonetheless, these asymmetries in authority were not questioned or examined, but rather assumed[6]. In this study, I avoid such untested assumptions; instead, I consider the possibility of children exercising agency and authority, and I examine this possibility empirically.

For Parsons, role differentiation continues and grows in complexity as the child continues the process of socialisation at school under the influence of their teachers of

[5] See Guhin et al. (in press) for a discussion on critiques of Parsons' understanding of socialisation and power relations.

[6] See Butler and Wilkinson (2013) as well as Aronsson and Cekaite (2011) for discussions on a cultural shift in the home from children being told to "be seen and not heard" to being understood as agentic where modern childhood involves negotiation rather than coercion.

"authority and superior competence" (Parsons, 1955, p. 115). At school, older children are also understood to be crucial in socialising younger children[7]. The teenager, moving into young adulthood, is socialised out of their family of origin and the child role associated with it and into their own family of procreation, where the adult takes on the roles of spouse and parent. As parents their ability to socialise their children is dependent on them having other roles in society beyond the family, such as roles in the workplace. The multiple roles of the parent are required to socialise the child not only into family roles but extra-familial roles in the broader society, thus socialising the child into an understanding of societal roles and expectations (Parsons, 1955). In the process of differentiation of roles, the child is described as being influenced by adults or as Keel (2016, p.14) describes "the socialization process is primarily controlled and organized by the adult generation". However, there is no discussion of the child having any influence over the adults or the socialisation process. Parsons, like Durkheim, did not consider the child role as a socialising force or discuss how the child's actions influence the process of socialisation.

Parsons was not only concerned with how individuals learn to conform to cultural expectations but also how they "depart from conformity with normative standards that come to be set up as the common culture" (Parsons, 1951, p. 206). Deviancy threatens the social system with change or disintegration and thus creates problems of control. Parsons distinguished between the mechanisms of social control and socialisation; the "mechanisms of socialisation" are motivational processes in the interactional system that ensure the functioning of the social system according to established norms, while the "mechanisms of social control" involve the secondary motivational processes within the individual that

[7] Children differentiate roles between parents and siblings and then later in peer groups they differentiate roles according to sex. For the purposes of this thesis, which looks at generational power rather than sex, I will not expand further on this aspect of Parson's theory of differentiation of roles.

promote conformity over deviance through a "re-equilibrating mechanism" (Parsons, 1951, p. 206). Deviancy is the result of inadequate socialisation and is likened to personality pathology. It is the result of unresolved conflict in the personality emanating from conflicting messages/lessons from a key socialising agent. Furthermore, deviancy is subject to sanctions in the interactional system as a means of curbing disruption and maintaining equilibrium (Parsons, 1951). In contrast to this approach, Parsons' student, Harold Garfinkel, understood deviancy to be a choice rather than pathology (Heritage, 1984b; Keel, 2016; Vom Lehn, 2014). In this thesis, I examine how participants orient to actions as either sanctionable or not, rather than assuming that non-normative actions (such as children doing things that one would expect adults to do) are deviant or signs of pathology. I return to Garfinkel's approach and how it has informed my approach in due course. First, I will outline general criticisms of Parsons' understanding of socialisation.

Structural functionalism and its understanding of socialisation has been critiqued for its incoherence and its deterministic view of socialisation (Corsaro, 2020; Cromdal, 2006; Guhin et al., in press; Keel, 2016; Speier, 1970). It has been further critiqued for not considering children's competences, agency and contributions to family life. Finally, it is criticised for being no more than a reflection of normative understandings of childhood, where children are asocial sponges that need to be developed into social beings (Corsaro, 2020; Cromdal, 2006; Guhin et al., in press; Keel, 2016; Speier, 1970). Furthermore, this Parsonian view of socialisation assumes pre-set asymmetries of knowledge and authority, with the parent influencing the child but not vice versa, thus dismissing children's contributions to their socialisation without considering children as agentic beings (also see Keel, 2016). In this thesis, I avoid making *a priori* assumptions of asymmetries in the parent-child relationship by examining whether, when, and how asymmetries are oriented-to and (re)produced in interactions. In addition, I avoid taking the "obvious" as fact but instead

investigate real instances of children exercising authority and agency during interactions with their parents.

Criticisms of structural functionalism and what has been termed "traditional" socialisation theory has led to a decline in publications on socialisation, along with a rise in proposals for alternative concepts (Guhin et al., in press). However, social sciences' interest in how social order is reproduced prevails, with it being addressed indirectly in other social theories, with debates continuing to surface as to the usefulness of the concept of socialisation, and how socialisation may be approached to avoid the pitfalls of traditional socialisation theory (see arguments by Corsaro, 2020; Guhin et al., in press; Kuczynski, 2003).

Despite these critiques and debates, Parsons' perspective on childhood persists in varying degrees in contemporary socialisation theories within sociology, anthropology and developmental psychology (Cromdal, 2006; Kuczynski, 2003; Speier, 1970). This "classical formulation of socialisation" sees socialisation as a developmental process and childhood as a stage of life in which children gradually grow or fail to grow in competence necessary to function in a given culture (Cromdal, 2006, p. 464; Speier, 1970, p. 98). Consequently, contemporary socialisation theory and developmental psychology often rely on folklore about children or "massively commonsensical and normative notions of children and childhood" for the purposes of scientific inquiry (Cromdal, 2006, p. 463) despite many decades of opposition and research to the contrary (Kuczynski, 2003). I return to this perspective on children as incomplete beings and how this view has been respecified by ethnomethodological conversation analysis in due course, but first I outline Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and Sack's conversation analysis: subsequent approaches to understanding social action (Keel, 2016). Next, I examine the theories that inspired a student of Parsons, Harold Garfinkel, in his development of an alternative approach to studying social life. Despite Garfinkel

challenging a number of his predecessor's claims, he used Parsons' theory, among others (including the work of Schutz, 1953), as a "primer" or base for his own approach to social inquiry: ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 2019; Rawls & Turowetz, 2019).

Primers of Ethnomethodology

Garfinkel highlighted the importance of studying people's everyday practices and how members of society use mundane knowledge and reasoning in the reproduction of social reality (Heritage, 1984b, p. 4; Vom Lehn, 2014, p. 79). Garfinkel's work is often placed in radical opposition to that of his supervisor, Parsons (Rawls & Turowetz, 2019). Yet, Garfinkel's manuscript, "Parsons' Primer" (written in the late 1960s but published in 2019 by Rawls and Turowetz), is a defence of many elements of his supervisor's work. He explained that a lot of the criticism of Parsons' structural functionalism arose from a lack of understanding of how to read his work: Reading Parsons' work requires that you "read past what Parsons writes to see what he is talking about" (Garfinkel, 2019, p. 111). For Garfinkel, what Parsons' later work was talking about, but which was unacknowledged, was the need to centre social interaction as culture in social theory (Rawls & Turowetz, 2019). This shift in Parsons' later work is reflected in these words by Parsons and Bales: "The level of generalization of orientation which can legitimately be called "cultural" is, we feel, bound to the phenomenon of interaction and could not arise or be long sustained without it" (1955, p. 32). Garfinkel shared this view and expressed being indebted to Parsons for placing import on interaction as "a system of sanctionable rules and expectations grounded on (an) implicit social contract" (Rawls & Turowetz, 2019, p. 10).

For both Parsons and Garfinkel, social order is produced and reproduced through interactional practices; culture is achieved in systems of social interaction made possible by a shared social contract (Rawls & Turowetz, 2019). They both viewed the empirical observation of sanctions as evidence of norms, values or rules and they shared an

understanding that a social theory should be able to explain the actual actions of actors through empirical research. Furthermore, they were both concerned with sociology's disregard for contingencies which led to an interest in how order was established in the face of interactional contingencies (or, as Parsons referred to them, "exigencies"). However, the way they dealt with contingencies was where their theories diverged: "For Parsons these variations are problems, while for Garfinkel they are part of the solution" (Rawls & Turowetz, 2019, p. 18). For Parsons, external social authority brought situated variations in interaction under control, while for Garfinkel external authority was not necessary for social order, as contingencies were indexical resources used by reflexive participants to bring order to situations (Rawls & Turowetz, 2019). In this thesis, I adopt this approach of Garfinkel's by investigating how children and parents, as reflexive beings, manage contingencies to bring order to situations.

This view of Garfinkel's was inspired by phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz (Heritage, 1984b; Rawls & Turowetz, 2019; Vom Lehn, 2019). For Schutz (who built on the work of Husserl), meaningful social action is possible because of social actors' common-sense knowledge of the world – a "stock of knowledge" developed through experience, but taken-for-granted (Schutz, 1953, p. 6). This common-sense knowledge is not a private affair but "intersubjective or socialised" (Schutz, 1953, p. 7), not only gathered through personal experience but "socially derived to me by my friends, my parents, my teachers and the teachers of my teachers" and shared through the "vocabulary and syntax of everyday language" while assuming variation in the actual stock of knowledge from individual to individual (Schutz, 1953, pp. 9-10). When two social actors are engaged in interaction such as questioning and answering, the questioner assumes the answerer will understand their action as a question which will prompt the answerer to understand that a response to the question is expected; and for the questioner to see the answerer's next action

as a response to their action of questioning, i.e. as an answer (Schutz, 1953). In this way, a social actor performs meaningful social actions, in the here and now, by utilising these typical course-of-action types in common-sense experiences, while the observer makes common-sense interpretations of these actions in turn. This socially derived and approved common-sense knowledge that allows for meaningful and contingent social action is taken-for-granted by social actors (Schutz, 1953). Schutz's approach, the understanding of situated meaning for social action, brought into question the possibility of a grand theory of social action such as structural functionalism (Vom Lehn, 2014). Garfinkel took Schutz's understanding of intersubjectivity further: for Schutz, intersubjectivity was possible because of shared assumptions about co-participants' orientations to a situation (a sort of shared mentality). For Garfinkel, however, intersubjectivity is a practical accomplishment as participants' orientations to a situation are observable for one another in their actions (Vom Lehn, 2019).

Schutz distinguished between the sociologist's theoretical perspective, and the everyday actor's pragmatic perspective, of the social world (Schutz, 1953; Vom Lehn, 2014). He accused social science of creating a puppet living in a pre-constituted environment:

> The puppet exists and acts merely by the grace of the scientist; it cannot act otherwise than according to the purposes which the scientist's wisdom has determined it to carry out. Nevertheless, it is supposed to act as if it were not determined but could determine itself. A total harmony has been pre-established between the determined consciousness bestowed upon the puppet and the pre-constituted environment within which it is supposed to act freely, to make rational choices and decisions. This harmony is possible merely because both, the puppet and its reduced environment, are the creation of the scientist. And by keeping to the principles which guided him, the scientist succeeds, indeed, in discovering within the universe, thus created, the perfect harmony established by himself (Schutz, 1953, p. 37)

For Schutz, social actors encountering unfamiliar situations are able to interact by drawing on their self-constructed typologies, and it is the actor's use of this knowledge in everyday situations, rather than their own analytic categories, that the social scientist should study (Vom Lehn, 2014). Though Garfinkel was inspired by this phenomenological approach, Schutz's work was theoretical in nature and still privileged the scientist's voice as he sought to develop a matrix of typologies or schemata; while Garfinkel considered theoretical approaches to social action highly problematic and believed that a new way of thinking about sociological enquiry was necessary (Rawls, 2006; Vom Lehn, 2019). Garfinkel took Schutz's critique of social science further in his development of a "sociological attitude" (Vom Lehn, 2019), rejecting any attempt to use scientific typologies in the study of social action (Rawls, 2006) and calling on social scientists to see "things anew" (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 101). He called for the empirical observation of social actors' practices to unveil the taken-for-granted practices that constitute social action: "learning to *see differently* sociologically means learning to see social orders in their details as they are achieved in real time *by* persons *through* the enactment *of* those details" (Rawls, 2006, p. 6, emphasis in original).

Ethnomethodology

Garfinkel developed a distinct theory of social action, one that fundamentally disagreed with sociological and psychological trends that viewed normative rules as determinants of social action, and intersubjectivity as founded on pre-established rules and meanings (Heritage, 1984b)[8]. He argued that such an approach to the understanding and study of social action rendered "the person-in-society" as a "judgemental dope" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 68; also see Cromdal, 2006; Keel, 2016; vom Lehn, 2014; 2019). In other words, the predominant sociological approaches during this time viewed social actors as unreflexive

[8] The early work of Parsons could be critiqued in this way but Garfinkel explains in the Primer that Parsons' later work placed interaction at the centre of his theory and was exempt from this charge.

sponges that internalise and blindly reproduce norms and values, and whose tendencies to disobedience are a product of incomplete or incorrect socialisation (Heritage, 1984b; Keel, 2016; Vom Lehn, 2014). In contrast, Garfinkel, like Schutz, viewed social actors as reflexive beings that use common-sense knowledge to make judgements based on the contingent circumstances they find themselves in and, thus, deviance is considered a choice rather than pathology (Heritage, 1984b; Keel, 2016; Vom Lehn, 2014). This is an important deviation from classic socialisation theory that informs how I approach studying children's methods. Instead of assuming that children exercising authority in a situation are deviant and not acting as children should, I investigate it as a choice that children are making as reflexive social actors. I will revisit this idea when outlining Sacks, Garfinkel and colleagues' work on parent-child interaction.

Garfinkel looked at reflexive courses of action as a topic of study and critiqued social sciences for treating people's use of common-sense knowledge of social structures in managing "here and now situations" as "epiphenomenal" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 68). Garfinkel was interested in members' techniques or methods ("ethnomethods") for making social organisation both "observable and reportable" and thus "accountable" within the occasion of their production (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 1; Keel, 2016; Vom Lehn, 2014, p. 82). Garfinkel became interested in this idea while listening to audio-recordings of jurors in deliberation. He wanted to know what jury deliberations involved and what made the jurors, jurors. During analysis he became interested in "jurors' uses of some kind of knowledge of the way in which the organised affairs of the society operated – knowledge that they drew on easily, that they required of each other" (Garfinkel, 1974, p. 15). The jurors were doing methodology: just as ethnobotany is the shared knowledge of botanists about what makes for adequate methods when engaging with botanical matters, jurors had a shared understanding of what it meant to do "deliberations". "Ethnomethods" are thus the means by which social actors, drawing on

shared knowledge, do social life; and "ethnomethodology" is the term Garfinkel cautiously coined to refer to the study of common-sense knowledge and the methods used by ordinary members of society to navigate their circumstances (Heritage, 1984b, p. 4; Keel, 2016).

Importantly, Garfinkel described social actors (children included) as agentic beings capable of reflexive action, who draw on the common-sense knowledge that they acquire through socialisation (Vom Lehn, 2014, p. 15). Socialisation is then more than an internalisation of rules allowing for the maintenance of social order, since rules alone cannot explain a specific course of action (Heritage, 1984b). Instead, socialisation is "a process in which actors acquire, and/or are treated as having acquired, a body of normatively organised knowledge in terms of which they treat their own and one another's actions as accountable" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 131).

Ethnomethodological studies examine indexical actions and the local order they (re)produce, as it is understood that an action does not hold meaning in and of itself, but that it is action being produced in context that produces meaning (Vom Lehn, 2019). Consequently, action is considered "doubly contextual in being both context-shaping and context-renewing" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 242) and social order is not predetermined but practically accomplished *in situ*. Similarly, Garfinkel respecified intersubjectivity as a practical accomplishment (rather than a shared cognition) as participants' actions make their orientations to a situation observable for one another (Garfinkel, 2006; Vom Lehn, 2019). By examining the sequential unfolding of participant actions, it is possible to describe the local organisation of social actions from the participants', rather than the analyst's, standpoint (Garfinkel, 2006; Vom Lehn, 2019).

Common-sense reasoning is largely taken-for-granted by social actors; or, as Garfinkel put it, these tacit resources are "socially standardized and standardizing 'seen but unnoticed,' expected, background features of everyday scenes" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36).

Consequently, Garfinkel had a challenge – how to access "unnoticed" common-sense reasoning for empirical inquiry (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). To this end, he devised a series of breaching experiments (or, as he preferred to refer to them, "demonstrations") to study order through the creation of disorder (Maynard & Clayman, 2003; Vom Lehn, 2019). Since common-sense methods of social interaction remain hidden so long as they are functioning (and thus all is in order), Garfinkel's breaching experiments aimed to render these ethnomethods inoperable, resulting in disorganisation that would be evident and observable (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). These demonstrations took place in everyday settings where participants would encounter unexpected events (like university-aged children acting like lodgers, rather than family, in their parents' homes) resulting in (parental) confusion and frustration and thus shattering what Garfinkel called "trust" in the orderliness of social life (Vom Lehn, 2014).

For Garfinkel, it was the responsibility of the analyst to uncover the sequential organisation of social action from the point of view of the participant. Yet it was Harvey Sacks, Gail Jefferson and Emmanuel Schegloff (see Sacks et al., 1974), who developed an approach to do just that - conversation analysis (Vom Lehn, 2014; Keel, 2016). Together these three colleagues found an alternative means of accessing unnoticed common-sense reasoning for empirical inquiry that did not rely on ethnographic observations or breaching demonstrations, but utilised recordings of everyday interactions to study talk-in-interaction that privileges participant orientations to actions and studies actions within the sequential context of their production (Sacks et al., 1974; Smith et al., 2020; Vom Lehn, 2014). This approach to studying social life has been applied to the study of socialisation and parent-child interaction. To understand how this ethnomethodological conversation-analytic approach to studying interaction has been applied to this domain of inquiry, I will first outline the approach itself. Since this approach is not a grand sociological theory of society, social order

and socialisation but rather an empirical approach to investigating how people do things in society, I will first outline how conversation analysts study social order as an accomplishment before looking at how taking this approach to studying social order has informed our understanding of the (re)production of social order (socialisation).

Ethnomethodologically-informed Conversation Analysis

"Top down" theories of social order (like those of Durkheim and the early work of Parsons) see culture, norms and other social structures that are independent of social events as responsible for social organisation, while ethnomethodology takes a "bottom up" approach to understanding and studying social order (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). For ethnomethodology, social order is:

> an emergent achievement that results from the converted efforts of societal members acting within local situations. Central to this achievement are the various methods that members use to produce and recognize courses of social activity and the circumstances in which they are embedded. The mundane intelligibility and accountability of social actions, situations and structures is understood to be the outcome of these constitutive methods and procedures (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 174)

Considering that social order is a contingent achievement of social actors *in situ*, Garfinkel advocated for empirical research of "real" social encounters within "actual" society to uncover members' methods for producing recognisable social action (Garfinkel, 1988). In this thesis, I examine real encounters between parents and children to examine children's actual methods for exercising agency and authority in interaction.

Garfinkel's understanding of the indexical nature of social action and the need to study real encounters (see Garfinkel, 1967) inspired Harvey Sacks, who, in collaboration with Gail Jefferson and Emmanuel Schegloff, developed a similarly "bottom up" approach to

studying local order called "conversation analysis". This method grounds all theoretical claims in the observable orientations that participants display to one another in interaction (Heritage, 1984b; Keel, 2016; Maynard, 2013; Maynard & Clayman, 2003). Like ethnomethodology, conversation analysis is interested in uncovering the competences that constitute social actions; yet it is focused on "describing and explicating the competences which ordinary speakers use and rely on when they engage in intelligible, conversational interaction" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 241; also see Keel, 2016).

Sacks and Garfinkel's personal and professional relationship meant that each of their approaches informed the development of the other (Maynard & Clayman, 2003; Smith et al., 2020). While they generally approached the study of the accomplishment of local social order differently, with Garfinkel using ethnography and quasi-experimental demonstrations and Sacks analysing audio- and video-recordings of naturally occurring interactions, their approaches shared many theoretical assumptions and analytical concerns, as well as a common interest in the everyday life of social actors (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). At times their topics of interest converged (Maynard & Clayman, 2003) as with a co-authored paper on the properties of natural language (see Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970) and their unpublished project on kids' culture (see Garfinkel et al., 1982; also see Danby, 2020; Gan & Danby, 2021; Keel, 2016; 2020) which I will return to in some detail.

In addition to ethnomethodology, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson were influenced by a rich tapestry of scholarly approaches to the study of social life from Goffman's[9] theory of interactional order, linguistics (in reaction to Chomsky), sociolinguistics, psychology (Freud

[9] Though Sacks and Schegloff studied under Erving Goffman, and Sacks recommended Goffman's work as background reading to prepare students for his lectures, Goffmanian sociology is sparsely mentioned in the lectures (Maynard, 2013). Schegloff credited Goffman with having brought interaction into the realm of sociological inquiry (Maynard, 2013).

sparked an interest in dialogue), ethnography and more, in their development of a fundamentally unique and revolutionary "approach for the doing of sociology" (Maynard, 2013; Schegloff, 1995; Smith et al., 2020, p. 5).

Considering that "human interaction lies at the very heart of social life" and that "it is primarily through interaction that children are socialised, culture is transmitted, language is put to use, identities are affirmed, institutions are activated, and social structures of all kinds are reproduced" (Clayman & Gill, 2004, p. 589), it is surprising, if not ironic, that the majority of social science theories had not looked at interaction as a topic for study prior to conversation analysis. These theories assumed adults teach children to be suitably social beings through daily interaction, yet despite this understanding that interaction is of critical importance to the socialisation process and to social life itself (cf. Schegloff, 2006), interaction was not directly studied despite its assumed relevance. Importantly, how interaction accomplishes socialisation was not a question that was investigated. In fact, it was erroneously assumed that interaction was too disorderly for study and was merely a by-product or epiphenomenon of larger social structures (Clayman & Gill, 2004; Heritage, 1984b). Conversation analysis, however, avoids assumptions of how sociality is achieved and instead investigates this "primordial site of sociality" (Schegloff, 2006, p. 70).

Conversation analysis was borne out of a concern over the idealisation of language practices rather than the empirical investigation of everyday language as real indexical events (Heritage, 1984b, pp. 233-292). Grand sociological theories (like those of Durkheim and Parsons) and their generalisations about all things sociological could not explain actual social events. Sacks believed that for sociology to be a natural observational science it needed to investigate "the details of actual events, formally and informatively" (Sacks, 1984, p. 26).

In the 1960s, when Sacks was developing his new approach to sociological inquiry, there was a predominant view that random influences on actual conversation made it an

unsuitable topic for analytic inquiry (Heritage, 1984b). Yet, Sacks argued that there is "order at all points" (Sacks, 1984, p. 22; also see Keel, 2016) including in conversation. He noted that seemingly mundane utterances like "I had a good breakfast this morning" had not previously been topics of study, but, as a result, questions about "what language can do, what people can do with language, what results of an analysis of 'I had a good breakfast this morning' would involve, what kind of program it poses for a field" had not been investigated (Sacks, 1984, p. 24). He proposed that by studying small or seemingly mundane acts we can come to an understanding of how people "do things" (Sacks, 1984, p. 24) and thus how social life is achieved.

Sacks (1984) suggested that to understand how people really "do things" we should avoid hypothetical scenarios but instead closely observe actual events to reveal phenomena we might not be able to imagine or assert exist, but that actually happen in interaction. To allow for this "close looking at the world" (Sacks, 1984, p. 25), Sacks worked with tape-recordings of conversations so that he could replay them, transcribe them and study them repeatedly and in their detail (Sacks, 1984; Keel, 2016). Furthermore, the recordings were a form of evidence - available for others to scrutinize and analyse (Heritage, 1984b, Keel, 2016). He approached each interaction in an "unmotivated" way (Sacks, 1984, p. 27), taking an inductive approach to data analysis (Sidnell & Stivers, 2013). By studying these recorded conversations (the product of interactional machinery or vehicle for social action), Sacks aimed to uncover the interactional machinery (or social actions) responsible for social order (Sacks, 1984; Sidnell & Stivers, 2013).

Unfortunately, as a result of Sack's untimely death in 1975, much of his work was not captured in formal published papers (but see Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Sacks, 1972; Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973); but his radically different and evolving way of thinking sociologically was captured in the transcripts of his many lectures (Keel, 2016; Smith et al.,

2020). Sacks delivered these lectures between 1964 and 1972 at UCLA Berkley and Irvine. Most of them were transcribed and edited by Jefferson (Smith et al., 2020). Initially circulated among like-minded academics, they were later published in 1992 as two separate volumes and later as one book containing both volumes in 1995 (see Sacks, 1995). These lectures, along with Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson's critically important papers on turn-taking and sequence organisation (Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) as well as repair (Schegloff et al., 1977) and person reference (Sacks & Schegloff, 1979), continue to be vital sources for conversation analysts exploring a wide array of topics (Heritage, 1984b). Schegloff, Jefferson and others continued Sacks' project building a vibrant international community of scholars interested in examining social life through the empirical investigation of situated interaction (Maynard, 2013). Just as conversation analysis was inspired by a plethora of approaches to studying social life, the approach has become more and more interdisciplinary (Watson, 2020) and is used across the social sciences from linguistics, social psychology, discursive psychology (see Potter & Hepburn, 2007), anthropology, and communication studies to cognitive science (Heritage, 1984b).

According to Heritage, conversation analysis relies on three assumptions; (i) the structural organisation of interaction (ii) the contextual nature of interaction and (iii) that "no order of detail can be dismissed, *a priori*, as disorderly, accidental or irrelevant" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 241). A fundamental assumption of conversation analysis is that interaction exhibits orderly and stable patterns of action and participants orient to these patterns in demonstrable ways. Interactants bring their knowledge of organisational patterns to interactions, which impacts their conduct and their understanding of others conduct (Heritage, 1984b). These generic organisational structures are independent of individual interactants and their psychology and these structures are considered stable and recurrent practices that are available for analysis (Heritage, 1984b; Schegloff, 2006). The next

assumption is that actions are "doubly contextual in being both context-shaped and context-renewing" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 242). Every utterance is designed to fit a specific context in response to preceding actions (context-shaped) while simultaneously creating a new context for the proceeding next actions (context-renewing) (Heritage, 1984b). Consequently, actions should be studied in context and in the sequence within they are produced (Schegloff, 2006), thus, analysts ask the question "why that now?" (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) to uncover what is accomplished by a particular action at a particular point in an interaction (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Waring, 2016). Importantly, they ask that question precisely because participants are pervasively dealing with this question in interaction (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). The final assumption builds on the first two and requires the analyst to look at every detail of an interaction to see what it is accomplishing in that interaction and not to dismiss any detail of that interaction as insignificant (Heritage, 1984b). Consequently, analysis is data-driven and looks at actual actions within the sequence of their production with a focus on participant orientations to actions (Heritage, 1984b). As explained by Schegloff and Sacks (also see Heritage, 1984):

> We have proceeded under the assumption (an assumption borne out by our research) that insofar as the materials we worked with exhibited orderliness, they did so not only to us, indeed not in the first place for us, but for the coparticipants who had produced them…Accordingly, our analysis has sought to explicate the ways in which the materials are produced by members in orderly ways that exhibit their orderliness, have their orderliness appreciated and used, and have that appreciation displayed and treated as the basis for subsequent action (1973, p. 290)

These assumptions are reflected in the way that conversation analysts conduct research from the kind of data they source to the way they analyse and represent the data.

Following the example of Sacks, conversation analysts have avoided the use of interviews (where verbal accounts substitute actual actions), field-notes, hypothetical musings, and experimental methodologies involving manipulation which result in idealisations of social events (Heritage, 1984b). Instead, conversation analysts analyse audio- and video-recordings of naturally occurring interactions that are transcribed in great detail (Jefferson, 2004) to uncover how interaction works in context (Heritage, 1984b). Naturally occurring (rather than contrived or researcher-provoked) data is analysed so as to see what people actually do in their everyday lives[10]. However, what makes for naturally occurring data is a topic of debate (see Potter, 2002; Potter & Wetherell, 1995; Speer, 2002).

Speer (2002) warned against seeing the distinction between "contrived" and "naturally occurring" data as an ontological distinction. It is not that there are two types of data but that there are two ways of working with data; "All data can be natural or contrived depending on what one wants to do with them" (Speer, 2002, p. 520). For example, if one is studying a recording of an interview to understand how an interview works then it is being treated as naturally occurring but if the interaction within the interview is not being studied then the data is being engaged with as contrived data. While Potter (2002) agreed with Speer that what makes for naturally occurring or as he prefers to refer to it, naturalistic data, is complex, he argued that making a distinction between naturalistic and contrived data is important: "what is gained by studying a video of a family therapy session is very different from the retrospective accounts of participants" (Potter, 2002, p. 541). He advocated for the dead social scientist test when making a distinction between the data forms: the test asks if the data would be the same or exist at all if the scientist died on their way to collect it. Interview data would not exist if the scientist died, making it contrived data; however, a

[10] See Keel's (2016) brief discussion on the importance of video or audio recordings as data for studying parent-child interaction.

family therapy session would still have happened without the arrival of the scientist, making it naturalistic data (Potter, 2002). Importantly, Potter emphasised a number of important features of naturalistic data; including, that it allows for access to participant orientations rather than reinforcing researcher categories and agendas, it studies the topic itself rather than inferences about it, its inductive nature allows for the discovery of the unexpected or unknown, and it is a rich record of people's actual rather than reported lives (Potter, 2002).

The detailed transcription conventions used by conversation analysts were pioneered by Gail Jefferson as an analytical tool to capture the momentary and consequential features of the recorded interactions (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017; Jefferson, 2004). The Jeffersonian conventions have been built upon by others such as Goodwin (1981), Hepburn (2004) and Mondada (2006), particularly as more nonverbal conduct was analysed in video-recordings. It has been demonstrated time and again that the little things that would be missed by orthographic transcripts, such as overlapping talk, a pause, intonation, volume and so on, but that are indicated in Jeffersonians transcripts, are of critical importance in interaction (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017; Jefferson, 2004). These little acts are consequential for how the interaction unfolds; they are relevant not only to the analyst trying to understand how an interaction is unfolding but, most importantly, to the participants in interaction. By using these transcription techniques, the analyst is looking at what is being done in an interaction (without dismissing any details) and how that action is accomplished, in order to understand why the interaction is organised in that way (Clayman & Gill, 2004).

Through the detailed analysis of naturally occurring interactions, conversation analysts have indeed shown that talk-in-interaction and the non-verbal conduct that accompanies talk are, as Sacks proposed, orderly and reproducible (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017). In this thesis, I adopt this ethnomethodologically-informed conversation-analytic (EMCA) approach by examining naturalistic data of parent and child interactions to examine

children's methods for exercising agency and authority in interaction with their parents. Importantly, my approach is informed by Sacks' unique approach to studying parent-child interaction. In his many lectures, Sacks repeatedly refers to children's social competences in their interactions with peers, parents and adults; and this work has both informed and inspired continued ethnomethodological and conversation-analytic investigations into childhood and parent-child interaction (Danby, 2020). Sacks' approach to studying children in their interactions with adults and his conception of Kids' culture can be found both in his lectures and in an unpublished paper by Garfinkel and colleagues (Garfinkel et al., 1982; also see Danby, 2020; Gan & Danby, 2021; Keel, 2016, 2020)[11].

Kids' Culture and The Developmental Scheme

"Studies of Kids' Culture and Kids' Talk" is an unpublished proposal that was developed by Garfinkel, Girton and Livingston after the untimely death of Sacks in 1975, but that was based on Sacks' later published 1960s lectures (Keel, 2016, 2020; see Sacks, 1972). In this paper, Garfinkel et al. (1982, p. 5) recommend an alternative approach to studying children that is attributed to Harvey Sacks' preliminary investigations of children in interaction; that there exists "kids' talk and kids' culture" worthy of empirical study (also see Danby, 2020; Gan & Danby, 2021; Keel, 2016, 2020).

Harold Garfinkel and colleagues (1982) raised concerns about the manner in which children and their relationship with their parents were studied. Numerous theories on

[11] Keel's (2016, 2020) examination of this unpublished text has reinvigorated Sacks, Garfinkel and colleagues critically important argument about the developmental scheme. I am grateful to Keel for sharing the original unpublished work with me. For an explanation as to how she same across the document and how it has influenced her work see Keel (2020). Also see Danby's (2020) reflection on the importance of Garfinkel et al.'s (1982) argument as well as Gan and Danby's (2021) argument for the need for child-centered analysis that builds on the work of Garfinkel et al (1982).

children, their development and their relationships with their parents have been developed and studied since Sigmund Freud shone a spotlight on this relationship with his psychoanalytic theorising of psychosexual development (Freud, 1905, 1913, 1927). Numerous scholars (including Parsons) subsequently produced theories building on or responding to Freud's work, resulting in a rich body of theories of mind (the internal psychological processes of parents and children) (Wootton, 2005). In addition to the sociological theories of socialisation outlined in this chapter, there are parent-child theories of personality development, such as Bowlby's (1988) theory of attachment and Erikson's (1977) theory of psychosocial development. There are learning theories, including Skinner's (1974) behaviourism and Bandura's (1977) social learning theory. There are humanistic perspectives, such as those of Rogers (1965) and Kelly (1963), as well as structuralist theories such as Chomsky's (2012) nativism, as well as Piaget's (1959) and Vygotsky's (1962) theories of cognitive development (also see Forrester, 2010) and broad approaches such as systems theory (Brofenbrenner (1979) was a key proponent of this perspective). These theories differ in many respects, including; how they view the role of nature versus nurture in the development of the child (i.e., the role of biology versus parental influence), whether people are seen as primarily rational or emotional beings, the degree of agency attributed to children, and the direction of influence in the parent-child relationship (i.e., whether the child is passive or active in their interactions with the parent and thus their development), the role of emotion in the parent-child relationship, and the degree to which the role of interaction is emphasised in development (Bayer & Stafford, 1993).

Vygotsky's (1962) theory of cognitive development emphasised that learning is fundamentally social as children develop linguistic and cognitive abilities through interaction

with more competent adults (also see Keel, 2016) [12]. His work inspired subsequent theories of language socialisation; like that of Ochs and Scheiffelin (1995) who investigated how children become competent members of society primarily through talk; as well as the work of Tomasello and colleagues on cultural learning (Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello et al., 1999) that understands learning to take place in interaction, with an interest in studying the cognitive competences children bring to their development and socialisation (Keel, 2016). Importantly psychology's "…dominant understandings of children were driven through a research agenda focused on children's development, and not on how children demonstrated interactional competence and structural understandings of culture in their everyday worlds" (Gan & Danby, 2021, p. 3). However, the way in which ethnomethodological conversation analysis has approached the study of interaction between parents and children is markedly different from these approaches, despite their shared interest in interaction. As explained in the previous section, the assumptions that underly ethnomethodological conversation analysis, along with the detailed investigation of naturalistic data, make for a wholly different understanding of interaction, and, as I will now outline in particular, parent-child interaction and socialisation.

Garfinkel et al. (1982, p. 1) highlighted a problem: "A flood of work on children and child development in the past twenty-five years lacks basic descriptions of kids' culture. Few studies of kids' ways, enterprises, talk and interactions have been done". At the time, they were not alone in this observation as the Harvard University Laboratory of Human Development's final report in 1973 noted that the work on children's development was based on parental reports and, at the time, there was not a single paper on children's everyday

[12] See Keel's (2016) work on socialisation for an in-depth description of Vygotsky's impact on the field and how his work inspired other scholars such as Ochs, Schieffelin, the CELF group and Tomasello and colleagues.

experiences (Garfinkel et al., 1982). Furthermore, according to Kuczynski and Parkin (2006) scholars in the late 1960s were recognizing the bidirectional nature of socialization where both children and parents were considered agentic beings capable of both initiating and resisting influence. Evidently, this call for more attention to be paid to children's agency and competences has been repeated and expanded upon within and beyond EMCA; and I will revisit this in detail later in the chapter. In addition to this concern over a lack of studies of children's ways, Garfinkel, Sacks and colleagues (1982) highlight a particular problem with the way socialisation and childhood have been specified in these studies (Danby, 2020; Keel, 2016).

The community of adults - from parents and teachers to theorists of human development – share a view on children and childhood that Garfinkel et al. (1982, p. 2) label as the "developmental scheme"[13]. This "reasonable account" of childhood and children's ways of being and doing understands children to be "adults-in-becoming", where socialisation is the process of training children in the practices of adults: children are developed from incompetent non-adults to competent adults able to work within and perpetuate the pre-existing cultural order (Garfinkel et al., 1982). Furthermore, through the lens of the development scheme, adults understand children to be "faulted speakers" (Garfinkel et al., 1982, p. 4). According to this scheme, families and schools are the institutions that, through child training practices, provide the solution to the social problem of socialisation (how to (re)produce social order):

> these incompetent persons, who in their incompetence are unavoidably and necessarily subservient to the greater knowledge and skills of parents whose care they

[13] See Speier (1970, 1976), Mackay (1975), Cromdal (2006), Danby (2020), Keel (2016, 2020) as well as Gan and Danby (2021) who discuss and expand on the work of Sacks and Garfinkel et al. (1982) on socialisation and the developmental scheme.

> require. The family is the means for providing required, necessary care during an inevitable period of childhood dependency, in the course of which they are brought along to a dependable acceptance of adult responsibilities (Garfinkel et al., 1982, p. 3)

When this developmental scheme is adopted by the social scientist, the "incompetence" of children at particular stages of development is understood to be a topic of study or a "discoverable matter" (Garfinkel et al., 1982, p. 4). Through this lens, the socialisation process is portrayed as unidirectional with parents influencing children (Keel, 2016). This understanding precludes the examination of children's contributions to their socialisation or their contributions to intelligible interactions (Keel, 2020). Furthermore, this common-sense scheme partitions the parent-child population into two categories of asymmetrical competence with children in the less competent category and parents in the more competent category (Keel, 2016, 2020). It is noteworthy that the child's subservience or lack of authority is a critical assumption of the developmental scheme as outlined in the quotation above. Thus, the two asymmetrical categories are not only that of the less competent child versus more competent parent but the dependent (the less competent, subservient) child versus the dependable (the more competent, authoritative) adult.

Based on Sacks' proposition that there exists a "kids' talk and kids' culture" worthy of empirical study, Garfinkel et al. (1982) proposed an alternative approach to studying children (Keel, 2016). Sacks was inspired by the work of Peter and Iona Opie in their 1959 (see 2001/1959) book "The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren" (Garfinkel et al. 1982; also see Keel, 2016). They reported that children have their own ways and knowledge that are shared among them (a shared culture among children) across generations, and yet outsiders are not privy to it (adults are non-members). With the possibility that "a realm of young people exists, distinct and separate from the adult world" (Warner, 2001, p. 6), Sacks' deduced that there is in fact a kids' culture operating in society (Garfinkel et al., 1982). In

social interaction, children can recognise and count on kids' ways while these ways are elusive to adults who are, nevertheless, alumni of this culture. From the child's perspective, the adult is no longer a member with insider knowledge; rather the adult is incompetent in the ways of kids' culture. Though an adult can take time out from being the adult and play the child, where the child allows the adult to play as the child for a period of time, the adult must return to their adult world of corresponding competence. This time of acting as the child is under "special arrangement" as allowed by the competent members of this culture – the children (Garfinkel et al., 1982).

For Sacks, the developmental view is an adult's account as well as a common-sense account for children's ways and, thus, it is a method utilised by members of the adult culture to understand non-members, i.e. children (Garfinkel et al., 1982; Keel, 2020). As Garfinkel stated, this developmental scheme "is a way in which members of society can act. It is not to be taken seriously as a sociological account of orderliness of children's enterprises" (Garfinkel et al., 1982, p. 9). Garfinkel et al. (1982) argued that the developmental scheme is a common-sense view of children and, thus, should be understood as an adult's account for a child's actions and not confused for sociological fact (also see Keel, 2016, 2020).

Essentially the authors were calling for a respecification of socialisation, and childhood (Danby, 2020), in two ways: (i) orientations to the developmental scheme and the asymmetrical categories in parent-child interaction should be sociological topics of inquiry; and (ii) instead of attributing children's actions to a developmental stage, children's competences and how they deploy certain actions to deal with their social position should be investigated empirically (Keel, 2016, 2020). I return to a discussion of how conversation analysts have continued to respecify socialisation and childhood after exploring Sacks' work on children's ways of managing their social position.

In 1963, Garfinkel, Sacks and Bittner were part of a panel discussion on the topic of children's culture (following a presentation by Garfinkel on these "reasonable accounts" at the Colorado Conference on World Affairs at the University of Colorado in 1963). During the discussion, an audience member asked how authority functions when a parent is acting as a child, suggesting that the parent remains the authority (though not a "punishing" one), and concluding that this parental authority is thus an inherent part of society (see exhibit 7 in Garfinkel et al., 1982). Bittner expanded on this conclusion to describe the parent's authority over the child as a political arrangement. However, Sacks responded that "the notion that you are an authority is something we are not about to grant" (see exhibit 7 page 8 in Garfinkel et al., 1982). Though this statement was unfortunately not expanded upon in the panel discussion, I take this statement of Sacks' to be questioning the assumption of the parental *authority* figure that is regularly taken as fact and unexamined in theory and research on parent-child interaction. The notion of the parental *authority* figure is part and parcel of the adult's reasonable account that understands children through the lens of the developmental scheme, i.e. it is a member's account. An analyst can then study this member's account rather than adopt it as fact. I argue that, along with avoiding the unquestioned adoption of a developmental scheme where the child is considered incompetent (Garfinkel et al., 1982; Keel, 2016, 2020), the analyst should avoid assumptions of the parent as the *authority* over the *subservient* child, should they wish not to merely perpetuate common-sense views of children. Rather, when examining conversations between children and their parents, the assumption of childhood incompetence *and subservience* needs to be suspended to allow room for new questions to be investigated by the analyst, such as questions about children's methods for working with non-members. When looking at children in their interaction with their parents through the lens of the developmental scheme, questions about how children exercise agency *and authority* remain elusive unless it is to look at them as deviants.

However, to consider children as competent authorities within their own culture opens up the possibility of investigating their competent methods, a task I take up in this thesis: investigating children's methods of exercising authority and agency in interaction with their parents.

When asked what data could be studied to uncover and investigate this kids' culture, Sacks suggested that one way was to look at stories that parents tell (parental accounts) about their interactions with their children (see exhibit 7 in Garfinkel et al., 1982). He gave an example of how a parent reports that they observe their child playing with a rock like it is a house, but that when the parent says as much to the child, the child responds with indignation and to the contrary - that they are playing with a rock and not a house: "can't you see?" (see exhibit 7 page 15 in Garfinkel et al., 1982). It is in these accounts that the two distinct cultures become apparent. Overall, he suggested "listen to the conversations that you have with children; that the children have with each other" (see exhibit 7 page 15 in Garfinkel et al., 1982). What Sacks was suggesting is the empirical examination of real conversations using conversation analysis, the approach I adopt to look at parent-child interaction in this thesis.

In a ground breaking lecture on children's stories (informally titled "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up"), Sacks (1995, pp. 236-266) looked at children's practices for starting a conversation (also see Butler & Wilkinson, 2013; Forrester, 2010; Keel, 2016, 2020 for descriptions of Sacks' lecture on this practice). He pointed out that three-year-old children start conversations by saying something like "you know what, daddy?" or "you know something?" (Sacks, 1995, p. 256). Sacks spoke of "a pair or objects, questions and answers" thus drawing on the concept that would later be called an adjacency pair – the basic unit of sequence construction and turn-taking – to explain why children start conversations in this way (Sacks, 1995, p. 264; Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2007; also see Keel, 2016). In

general, when someone asks a question, the hearer is obligated to respond and the questioner can then talk again after the response – what Sacks called the chaining rule (Sacks, 1995). Interestingly, in the case of a child asking, "you know what?", the answer is itself a question ("what?"). This inverts the question-answer rule for question-question and the child is now obligated to answer the parent's question rather than follow the chaining rule of question-answer-question-answer. The child has set the parent up as a questioner so they "do not proceed on their own say-so, or by reference to the chaining rule, but as obliged to talk under the position of an answerer" (Sacks, 1995, p. 257). The open "what?" question response allows the child to answer in whichever way they wish to – to start their own conversation on any topic. Consequently, Sacks was suggesting that children circumvent their restricted rights to begin a conversation by using a "ticket" ("do you know what?") which is designed to solicit a question, specifically, "what?". The response to the ticket opens up the space for the child to have their say under the obligations of an answerer to a parental question (Sacks, 1995).

Sacks characterised this solution and the three-year olds that use it as "clever" (Sacks, 1995, p. 257). These open questions are not indications of incompetence in starting a conversation, but rather indications of children's understanding of their social position and "restricted rights to talk" (Sacks, 1995, p. 256) in conversations with adults (Keel, 2016, 2020). Consequently, the use of these tickets demonstrates children's competence in managing their social positions by using sequential resources to solve their "problem of beginnings": how to start a conversation from a restricted position (Keel, 2016, 2020; Sacks, 1995, p. 256). He acknowledged that this hypothesis was an assumption that would need to be confirmed through analysis but based the discussion on his observations of three-year-old children interacting with their parents (Butler & Wilkinson, 2013; Sacks, 1995). While it is certainly plausible that it is due to children's understandings of their restricted rights that they

use these tickets[14], the use of tickets also points to the idea that children have practices for garnering their parents' attention in pursuit of their own agenda. For example, Kidwell and Zimmerman (2007) examined how very young (1 to 2.5-year-old) children show adults objects so as to establish the mutual attention necessary for interaction to occur. By doing so the authors demonstrate how a phenomenon – establishing joint attention - that is usually characterised by psychologists as a cognitive or perceptual act is in fact an interactional accomplishment (Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007)[15]. Importantly, in his lecture, Sacks addressed some important considerations – how to analyse children's competences from outside the developmental scheme, and how one might analyse asymmetry in interactions (also see Keel, 2016). In this thesis, I examine children's methods/competences in their interactions with their parents and their orientations to asymmetries in their relationships. Though Garfinkel et al. (1982) noted that Sacks' proposal of a kids' culture was based on conjecture, preliminary analysis of 16 hours of video recordings of young children (aged two to four years of age) and their parents at two daycare centres showed promising results.

EMCA studies of Childhood Interaction

Unfortunately, few EMCA studies of adult-child interaction have addressed Sacks' proposal of a kids' culture or the developmental scheme as a topic of study (Keel, 2020). However, ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts such as Speier (1970; 1976), Mackay (1975), Wootton (1981a, 1981b, 2012), Danby (2020) and Keel (2015, 2016, 2020) have studied parent-child interaction contributing to the respecification of socialisation in order to answer Sacks' question: "what happens if we try to take seriously the notion of

[14] See Butler and Wilkinson (2013) for an example of a young child's pre-sequence (or ticket) "guess what" and what they term "restricted rights to engage/of action"

[15] See Keel's (2016) discussion of Kidwell's interactional explanations in relation to Tomasello's cognitive explanations of children's actions.

children's culture?" (Garfinkel et al., 1982, p. 6); and their investigations demonstrate the value in taking this question seriously (Gan & Danby, 2021). Nonetheless, EMCA scholars have taken up Sacks' interest in childhood interaction and children's competences with a large body of research focusing on topics like children's play activities, familial negotiations and respecifying theories of mind from developmental psychology as interactional practices (Keel, 2016). These studies have examined a range of contexts including homes and schools (Gan & Danby, 2021; Keel, 2016) with an expanding body of literature on classroom interactions between peers as well as children and teachers. In this section, I briefly examine the EMCA research areas of classroom interaction, children's play and respecification of theories of mind before dedicating the next two sections to respecification of socialisation and then EMCA work on familial negotiations.

While this thesis focuses on parent and young child interaction in the home, it is worth noting that EMCA scholars have investigated young children's interactional competencies with peers and adults in the classroom, some of which pay particular attention to issues of agency in early childhood education. Widespread educational policies and theories stipulate children should be given agency or opportunities to make choices or decisions in the classroom and EMCA scholars have investigated how this can be achieved in interaction (for example: Church, 2010; Church & Bateman, 2019; Houen et al., 2016; Theobald & Kultti, 2012). As seen with Houen et al. (2016), who investigated how preschool teachers carve out opportunities for children to exercise agency with "I wonder…" formulations, classroom interaction is often teacher-led where opportunities for agency are given to students by teachers. In reference to the work of Sacks (1995) and Speier (1976), they write that "adults, whether teachers or parents, have differing rights to hold the conversational floor than do children; in that adults typically manage children's speaking turns" (Houen et al. 2016b, p. 261; see also Church & Bateman, 2019). In contrast, Church

and Bateman (see Church; 2010; Church and Bateman, 2019) investigated child-initiated interactions in the classroom and how teachers' responses influenced the trajectory of the conversation suggesting that despite expectations of asymmetrical rights to speak, children may well take opportunities to initiate action and teachers may respond in ways that extend that conversation or bring it to a close. Similarly, Theobald and Kultti (2012) investigated how teachers involve students as participants in learning activities and found that underlying social orders involving the roles of teacher and student shape participant contributions to interactions. There is a tension between teaching in a participatory manner and the expectations of institutional roles (Theobald & Kultti, 2012).

As previously mentioned, Sacks was inspired by the Opies' work (Opie & Opie, 1969) on children's games, and he gave a lecture on how the children's game "button button, who's got the button" could be a training ground for children to develop interactional skills (Sacks, 1995, pp. 363-369) and, as such, actively socialise themselves through play (Keel, 2016)[16]. Subsequently, scholars such as Marjorie Harness Goodwin (see for example Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992; Goodwin, 1982, 1990, 1998; Goodwin, 2006; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Goodwin et al., 2002), have continued to investigate play and talk (including arguments) within peer groups, providing evidence for children being "agents of their own socialisation" (Goodwin & Kyratzis, 2007, p. 280; Keel, 2016). The findings in this thesis provide further evidence for children actively participating in, and at times, driving, their own socialisation.

Earlier I mentioned the work of Kidwell and Zimmerman (2007), who examined how very young children show adults objects to establish joint attention that is necessary for interaction; and how this research respecified a perceptual act as an interactional one. This

[16] See Keel (2016) for a detailed discussion of the Sacks' lecture on this game as well as the work of Marjorie Harness Goodwin.

paper by Kidwell and Zimmerman is one of the many conversation-analytic studies that have challenged classic and contemporary theories of mind in their respecification of psychological and cognitive concepts of the mind as interactional accomplishments (Keel, 2016). In line with a discursive psychology approach which positions "psychological phenomena as things that are constructed, attended to, and understood in interaction" (Potter & Hepburn, 2007, p. 160) and respecifies "core theoretical notions from orthodox cognitive and social cognitive psychology (knowledge, attitudes, perception, emotions)" (Potter & Hepburn, 2007, p. 177) these studies challenge the work of Tomasello (1995) and colleagues (Tomasello et al., 1999). In particular, the work challenges the roles of cognition in intersubjectivity, intentionality and establishing joint attention, by undertaking detailed investigations of children's interactions to show how concepts that are treated as cognitive in nature are socially derived and socially consequential (Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2006, 2007). In chapter 5, building on the work of Kidwell and Zimmerman (which I expand upon in more detail), I engage with young children's methods for establishing joint attention and I do so within the context of familial negotiations, particularly where children are demanding parental attention. In fact, all three analysis chapters build on and contribute to EMCA work on familial negotiations and what these say about children's agency and authority as well as children's *in situ* socialisation practices; which is why, after examining the work of EMCA scholars on respecifying socialisation, I examine studies on familial negotiations in more detail.

Respecification of Socialisation

Speier (1970; 1976) and Mackay (1975) built on Sacks' concept of a kids' culture in their critiques of socialisation theory (see Cromdal, 2006; Forrester, 2010; Gan & Danby, 2021; Keel, 2016, 2020). Mackay (1975) referred to the developmental scheme used by socialisation theorists as the "normative sociological study of socialisation" (Mackay, 1975,

p. 180) while Speier called it the "classical formulation of socialisation" (Speier, 1970; 1976, p. 98). By referring to the normative or classical way of studying socialisation they were referring to adult professionals' use of folklore or common-sense in their study of socialisation: "an adult ideology about children that differs from lay ideology only in so far as it is systematically working out professional problems and solutions that are responsive to the ideology" (Speier, 1976, p. 98). Sociology, being deeply embedded in and dependent on the everyday world, confounds topic and resource in the creation of a professional folklore, rather than studying the folklore as a member's resource (Mackay, 1975; Zimmerman & Pollner, 1970). Thus, the normative study of socialisation adopts the views of the dominant adult culture and treats these as scientific findings, using the concept of socialisation to "gloss" over rather than study how adults and children interact (Mackay, 1975, p. 181).

Within this adult ideology, the child is a distinctly deficient social actor that is constantly learning to adapt and conform to adult norms under adult supervision and training; and the social scientist, by adopting this ideology, is investigating how well the child has conformed to the normative structures of adults (Mackay, 1975; Speier, 1976). Speier (1976) suggested that this is the adult's problem and not that of the child. The social scientist who adopts this classical formulation is then prevented from asking questions about children as conversationalists while investigating only one side of the interactional story – the adult's side. Consequently, socialisation theory and research has been in the business of confirming adult culture while ignoring children's culture (Speier, 1976). Socialisation is then a deficit theory about how children are less than adults and ignores children's competences (Keel, 2020): "When adult-child interaction is formulated as the process of socialisation, children as a phenomenon disappear and sociologists reveal themselves as parents writing slightly abstract versions of their own and other children" (Mackay, 1975, p. 181). Furthermore, Mackay (1975) pointed out the paradoxical nature of adult-child interaction in his study of

teacher and child interaction. To teach the child, the teacher assumes the child has particular competences that allow them to interpret what the teacher says, but at the same time the teacher treats the child as incompetent. When this contradictory ideology is adopted by professionals, certain topics of inquiry become unavailable – specifically how adults and children interact and how this interaction is accomplished (Mackay, 1975). Speier (1970, 1976) proposed that the adult ideology be examined as part of any study of parent-child interaction and that socialisation is a member's term and should not be used by analysts as a technical one.

Building on Sacks' lecture on children's restricted rights to speak, Speier looked at parental rights to speak in interaction with their children, such as parents' right to restore silence upon children, to refuse to respond, to intervene in children's interactions, to terminate a conversation, and to dismiss or remove a child from a situation (Speier, 1976; also see Keel, 2020). According to Speier (1976), within the adult-child relationship there is an asymmetrical distribution of rights to speak where adults have control, and children are required to allow that control or alternatively risk sanctions. This asymmetry in the rights to speak is a recognition of adults' authority over children (Speier, 1976). His analysis was focused on parental actions and less so on the children's responses (how they may resist or oppose parental claims to these rights), and the asymmetrical nature of the relationship was treated as static with fixed categories that sit in stark opposition to one another: parents as authority figures and children as subservient to them. Essentially, Speier fell into the analyst's trap of glossing over the interaction by utilising normative structures to explain restricted rights to talk while not grounding his analysis in participant orientations to asymmetries (Keel, 2016). I argue that if we are to take seriously the idea of children as competent beings, particularly within their own culture, we need to be careful of seeing authority as the realm of adults alone, as this is a common-sense view of adults and does not

consider the children's competences or culture, or the potential local contingencies that may shape participant orientations to authority. To build on Sacks' question: What if we try to take seriously the idea of children's agency and authority? Might there be circumstances in which children exercise authority? How might children claim rights to speak? By asking these questions we might approach the analysis of parent-child interaction differently, which is what I aim to do in this thesis.

While Sacks argued that we should take seriously the possibility of kids' culture, it is important to note that it is the "possibility" that we should consider so that what children actually do in interaction is investigated rather than neglected. We should not, however, replace one set of assumptions (or one ideology) for another, such as assuming children's competence (Cromdal, 2009). In the tradition of conversation analysis, we want to avoid *a priori* assumptions of asymmetries and the relevance of categories, and investigate what kids and parents actually do and what they orient to as relevant in interactions. As Keel (2020, p. 163) recently argued, it is in the moment-by-moment unfolding of an interaction that "participants' orientation to and reflexive constitution of the developmental scheme as an omni-relevant sense-making device is observable (or not)". We can uncover how concerns about children's competence or orientations to teaching children the ways of society play out in interaction – something I do in this thesis. In comparison to Speier's approach noted above, Wootton (1981a, 1981b) took a more cautious and nuanced approach to examining parent-child interaction that inspired a growing field of EMCA investigations into parent-child interaction and request-sequences in particular (Keel, 2016).

Familial Negotiations

Wootton (1981b, p. 511) investigated two request formats (the declarative "I want X" and the interrogative "Can I have/do X") of four-year-old children, and demonstrated how they used different forms when re-requesting in pursuit of parental compliance. By using "I

want X" (a request that does not propose a yes or no response) as a re-request children object to the parental position of non-granting and seek a solution to the problem at hand. Children use the "can I" re-request when a parent has not responded to the initial request with a yes or no and the re-request is adapted to manage contingencies providing a version of the request that is grantable, while avoiding a no response (Wootton, 1981b). This investigation demonstrated young children's interactional competences when negotiating with their parents.

In another 1981 paper, Wootton examined parental responses to 4-year-olds requests where the "child asks the parent if it can have or do X, if the parent will do X for the child, or if the parent will give X to the child" (1981a, p. 61). Wootton (1981a) demonstrated how parents show an interactional preference for granting requests and avoiding refusals in the same way that adults have a preference for granting requests in their conversations with one another (Keel, 2016). Non-grantings are organised so as to minimise the occurrence of rejection forms through delays, omitting refusals or, where they cannot be avoided, mitigating refusals. When parents do not follow this preference organisation and refuse a request outright, it is used to display the non-negotiable nature of a request. Granting or refusing a child's request thus relates to parental tasks or their management of their practical affairs (Wootton, 1981a) rather than parental superiority or authority (Keel, 2016):

> Instead of relating parents' use of a specific format to grant/refuse their children's request to a presumed asymmetrical relationship between interactants, Wootton suggests that different formats may allow parents to express different positions: manifesting firmness versus openness to negotiation, for example. In this sense, he proposes nuances for Speier's account of parent-child interaction and at the same time opens up a huge field of investigation whose first aim is to discover and analyse particular interactive patterns in adult/parent-child interactions, and whose second is

> to compare and discuss them in light of EM/CA findings on adult-adult conversation (Keel, 2016, p. 46).

As Keel states above, Wootton (1981a, 1981b)[17] opened up a growing field of investigation into adult/parent-child interaction, particularly into request sequences. Subsequently, conversation-analytic research into request sequences in parent-child interaction have mostly focused on parental directives and pursuits of compliance (Waring, 2019) where directives are understood to be actions (like requests, commands and threats) designed to get a recipient to do something (Kent, 2012). Overall, these investigations have demonstrated how, in pursuit of compliance, parents adapt the format of their re-requests, limiting the children's response options, scaling up from requests to demands, utilising threats and/or physical enforcement (Antaki & Kent, 2015; Goodwin, 2006; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013; Hepburn & Potter, 2011). However, little attention has been paid to children's methods in this "tug of war" or negotiation sequence (Waring, 2019, p. 117) or *child*-parent rather than *parent*-child studies (see Ochs, 1979) of request sequences. This thesis aims to contribute to closing this gap in the literature by focusing on child-parent interaction, specifically children's methods in familial negotiations.

The limited investigations into children's interactional resources in request sequences have examined children role playing as adults (Waring, 2019), as well as their response options (Kent, 2012), and emotional displays (see Butler & Edwards, 2018; Waring & Yu, 2017; Wootton, 2012). For example, Wootton (2012) examined his two-and-half-year-old daughter's displays of distress when she was either not granted her request, or when her parents unsuccessfully attempted to grant her request. He noted that child advice literature explains that two-year-old children are not capable of being reasonable and that they need to develop these capacities as they grow. However, his analysis demonstrated that the child has

[17] Keel only refers to the 1981a paper on parent's responses to children's requests.

interactional and sequential skills, and that the displays of distress can be understood to be in response to an unexpected change in shared understanding. These displays of distress occur when a parent's actions are incongruent with previously established public expectations; expectations of "an accountable world of shared understandings" the child is keeping to (Wootton, 2005, p. 135). The child's distress indicates a parental breach:

> So, in order to account for the "spoilt" behaviour of the child, behaviour which in fact turns out to have quite orderly properties, the first things we should look for are ways in which the sequence has been "spoiled" by the parent. Orderly, local sequential understandings lie at the heart of the (distressing) events (Wootton, 2005, p. 135)

Importantly, this analysis demonstrated that distressing incidents could only be understood by reference to the sequential expectations that the child brings to them and not by reference to theories of mind.

Conversation-analytic papers on familial interaction have explored socialisation as an interactional co-constructed accomplishment and the "tension between child autonomy and parent control" (Wingard, 2012, p. 574) in interaction (see Antaki & Kent, 2015; Fasulo et al., 2007; Kent, 2012; Sirota, 2006; Waring, 2019; Wingard, 2012). It is noteworthy that when discussing or investigating such matters, it is the child's autonomy that is investigated and the parent's authority, but not the parent's autonomy and the child's authority. In this sense, parents are the authority figures and agents of influence (with assumed agency) and children are subservient respondents to influence who must claim agency: a set asymmetry is assumed without consideration of the child's actions as influential in an authoritative sense or the parent's actions as being responsive in an attempt to claim autonomy. As a result, we run the analytical risk of missing the ways in which children influence parents and in which parents establish agency in interaction; or alternatively of seeing children's acts of authority

as deviance or play through the lens of adult ideology. In this thesis, I consider these possibilities in an investigation of children's methods of influence.

Recently Waring (2019) investigated how her three-year-old daughter Zoe exercised agency by role-playing as an adult during dinner times. According to Waring, the child performed controlling acts, such as directing and deciding, that are category-bound to the adult role, and in so doing "voiced authority" and acted beyond her age (Waring, 2019, p. 164). Crucially, the parental responses of amusement oriented to the child's directing and deciding actions as "imitating" adult actions. By voicing control the child actively fostered autonomy and actively engaged with her own socialisation (Waring, 2019). However, in her discussion, Waring questioned her conclusion that Zoe's actions were role-playing acts:

> Zoe's conduct may be seen as an endeavour to obtain greater autonomy on her own terms rather than aspiring to be a developmentally higher category. Insofar as autonomy is a key category-bound attribute of the adult, however, I would argue that the two appear to be symbiotic – at least in Zoe's case (Waring, 2019, p. 164)

I suggest that the case Waring is putting forth, that the child is role-playing as an adult by directing her parents, reflects the adult ideology; To describe a child's actions as imitation of parental actions is to invoke the developmental scheme (Keel, 2016; Sacks, 1995). After all, it is the parental orientations to the child's actions as incongruent with her child role that constitutes the evidence that the child is role-playing, rather than any orientation on the child's part. Consequently, I would argue that when the child performs actions like directing and deciding, which assume authority over the parents, parents can treat a child as role-playing as an adult and treat the actions as incongruent with their expectations of the child's low authority status. The question remains as to what children are doing by directing and deciding. It is this question which I take up in this thesis by investigating young children's methods for exercising authority when demanding actions of their parents.

In a study on children's methods for establishing autonomy in parent-child interaction, Kent (2012) focused on children's response options to parental directives (parental actions designed to get children to do things). When children are responding to a directive, compliance is the structurally preferred response characterised by immediate and embodied compliance to a directive; while the dispreferred response displays resistance with no indication that compliance is forthcoming (Kent, 2012; Schegloff, 2007). Additionally, Kent (2012) found that there is a third response option that children utilise: incipient compliance (Schegloff, 1989). This response involves an embodied display of preparatory steps towards a compliant response which creates space for a verbal response that reformulates the child's actions as self-motivated rather than motivated by the parent's deontic authority (rights to influence actions) (see Stevanovic, 2018). Unlike a resistant response that routinely leads to escalated directives or threats from parents pursuing compliance, incipient compliance allows the child to maintain some autonomy without provoking escalation in response (Kent, 2012). When a child responds in this way, they are orienting to an asymmetry in deontic authority (rights to control and agency) in their immediate relationship with their parents while demonstrating interactional competence in managing these restrictions (Kent, 2012; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014). Kent (2012) did not conceptualise authority as a character trait, but rather looked at participant orientations to deontic authority by drawing on the work of Stevanovic and colleagues (see Stevanovic, 2018; Stevanovic & Koski, 2018; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015).

Authority in Interaction

Like socialisation, power and authority have been central sociological concerns (Stevanovic, 2018). Since they have generally been considered to be macro-level social phenomena, "social science has paid little attention to the actual practices through which

authority is instantiated" (Griswold, 2007, p. 292; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012). However, conversation analysts have, since the 1990s, examined how participants orient to authority, specifically epistemic rights[18] and more recently deontic and emotional rights[19], in the moment-by-moment sequential unfolding of interactions (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014) as it is at the nano-level of moment-by-moment interaction that power and authority are "constructed, negotiated and maintained" (Stevanovic, 2018, p. 2).

When people talk, their actions reveal what they know and what they expect others know (the distribution of epistemic rights), what their influence is over others and what they think others' influence is over them (the distribution of deontic rights), as well as what emotions they can display and what emotions they expect others to display (the distribution of emotional rights) (Stevanovic & Koski, 2018; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014). How a speaker designs an utterance and a hearer interprets an utterance shapes, and is shaped by, the context of that utterance, as well as implicit assumptions of the social relations (participants' domains of influence) that make up the momentary relationship of the participants in interaction (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014). Therefore, authority is not binary and static with "have and have nots"; rather rights to knowledge, emotion and influence differ from one domain to another and one moment to the next (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014). Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2014) proposed that in any given moment in interaction the relationship between individuals is made evident by reference to how they are designing their actions to be recognisable to one another. This organisation of human action is then embedded in three facets of this relationship to which their actions orient (i.e. three orders of social relations): emotional, epistemic and deontic. Individuals' orientations to knowledge distribution in the momentary relationship are grounded in the epistemic order; their orientations to their rights

[18] I examine the work of Heritage on epistemic rights in more detail in chapter 6.
[19] I examine the work of Stevanovic and colleague son deontic and affective rights in chapter 4.

to determine their and others' actions are anchored in deontic order; and their and others' rights to affective expression are based in emotional order (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014). In other words:

> participants deploy their sociocultural, personal and local knowledge to make judgments about their epistemic, deontic and emotional statuses relative to each other and use their judgments as resources as they design their actions to be recognised as such by their co-participants (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014, p. 201).

Though these three facets are part and parcel of any momentary relationship between participants, one of these is usually treated as more salient than the others at any given time (Stevanovic & Koski, 2018; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014).

It is in each utterance and responsive action that orientations to the orders of social relations are displayed and participants' deontic, epistemic and emotional rights are negotiated (cf. Stevanovic, 2018). In essence, people in interaction take turns to talk in sequence and the basic unit of a sequence is the adjacency pair (Schegloff, 2007). There is an initiating action (a first pair part) like a request that makes a responsive action (second pair part) like granting the request relevant (Schegloff, 2007)[20]. I will use Kent's (2012) study as an example: by initiating an action like asking a child to do something, the child is obligated to respond to the request. Furthermore, by making a request, the parent makes claims to deontic rights – the right to influence the child's actions. The child, under an obligation to respond, may comply, resist compliance or comply in an incipient manner (Kent, 2012). These responses can affirm, deny or challenge the parental claims to authority while orienting to the child's claims to autonomy (cf. Kent, 2012). By studying adjacency pairs, analysts can uncover how rights to knowledge, influence and emotion, and asymmetries in these orders, are realised and negotiated in interaction (cf. Stevanovic, 2018). In this study, I analyse

[20] I explain the adjacency pair in more detail in the analysis section of this thesis.

agency and authority at this nano-level of social organisation by investigating adjacency pair sequences – specifically request and demand sequences – in child-parent interaction.

Importantly, by utilising Stevanovic and Peräkylä's understanding of deontic authority in interaction, Kent's (2012) study of children's incipient compliance suggested a way forward for studying asymmetries in parent-child interaction that does not make *a priori* assumptions about authority and agency in parent-child interaction. Instead, she investigated participant orientations to the momentary and local distribution of deontic rights in parent-child interaction. The study highlighted

> the need to take situated meanings and sequential understandings into account and to avoid assuming that social roles or perceived status hierarchies grant an automatic entitlement to direct. Further work is needed to fully unpick the distribution and negotiation of deontic rights in interaction in a similarly fine-grained manner to the existing work on epistemic rights (Kent, 2012, p. 727).

In this thesis, I avoid making assumptions about asymmetries in the parent-child relationship by grounding my analysis in child and parent orientations to "who they are to each other" in interaction (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014). In particular, I investigate parent and child orientations to the three orders of social relations: epistemic, deontic and affective orders, as and when they are made relevant to the interaction, thus contributing to the need to further investigate the distribution and negotiation of deontic rights as suggested by Kent (2012), and meeting the challenge raised by Stevanovic and Peräkylä "to unravel the exact ways in which deontics, epistemics, and emotion work together to make utterances to appear, not only as intelligible actions, but also as intelligible sequences of action" (2014, p. 202).

The argument I have outlined so far has focused on one of many paths that the study of socialisation has taken and, before concluding this chapter, I will expand on my earlier

commentary about the general criticisms of classic socialisation theory by briefly mentioning some other recent and critical approaches that emerged out of and in reaction to it.

Contemporary Socialisation Theories

EMCA scholars are not the only ones concerned with the ways in which children and socialisation have been studied (Cromdal, 2006) as groups of scholars across the social sciences have questioned the classic model of socialisation that dominated the work on parent-child interaction prior to the 1970s and continues to influence research on the topic despite the resounding critiques (Kuczynski, 2003). In essence, a number of alternative approaches to studying parent-child interaction and conceptualising socialisation have developed from, and in reaction to, classic formulations of socialisation.

Language-oriented ethnographers such as Ochs, Scheiffelin and Corsaro have focused on the crucial role that language plays in children's socialisation (Cromdal, 2006). For example, Corsaro (2020), through his longitudinal ethnographic studies of children interacting particularly in peer groups, concluded that the concept of socialisation is inherently problematic to the extent that it should be eliminated, and that alternative concepts should be considered, such as his "interpretative reproduction" (2020). For Corsaro, interpretive reproduction describes a process by which children contribute to society in innovative and creative ways while still being constrained by it. Corsaro (2020) adopted a Goffmanian lens in his investigation of children's agency in peer culture in which he observed how children challenge and resist adult rules: "children's desire to challenge adult authority and gain control of their lives and develop a collective identity" (Corsaro, 2020, p. 7). On the other hand, Ochs, Scheiffelin and colleagues at the Center on the Everyday Lives of Families (CELF) at UCLA have also conducted detailed ethnographic research on language socialisation in family interactions (Keel, 2016). Their studies have led to a conception of socialisation as an interactive process whereby both parents and children are

mutually socialised by one another as they develop in their respective roles, thus positioning children as active agents in their own socialisation (Goodwin & Kyratzis, 2007; Keel, 2016).

James and Prout (1997) argued that there was a growing critique of traditional conceptualisations of children and childhood that was building into "a new paradigm for the study of childhood" but that the paradigm remained relatively hidden (see Aronsson & Cekaite, 2011; Cromdal, 2009; Gan & Danby, 2021; Keel, 2016). These scholars made it their priority to synthesise and further develop the paradigm through theoretical debate and empirical study. Central to this approach is that childhood is a social construct that intersects with other social constructs and that children's cultures and relationships should be studied, not only as social constructions by adults, but in their own right (James & Prout, 1997). They argued for the adoption of ethnography as an appropriate method for studying children, rather than experimental and survey research which stifles children's voices (James & Prout, 1997). Despite the new paradigm's critiques mirroring those of EMCA scholars on traditional socialisation, Cromdal (2009, p. 1474) has argued that this new paradigm has overlooked "the actual interactional practices through which childhoods are being produced, lived and experienced".

Meanwhile, Kuczynski (2003) distinguished between approaches to studying socialisation that take a unidirectional view where parents influence children (like classic socialisation theories), and those that take a bidirectional view (like the work of Corsaro and James and Prout), by acknowledging children's contributions to their socialisation; thus treating socialisation as a reciprocal process. Ultimately Kuczynski (2003, p. 4) proposes a "bilateral model of parent-child relations" that, in contrast to unidirectional models, assumes bidirectional causality in the parent-child relationship and models equal parent and child agency as well as interdependent power asymmetries. Importantly, scholars working with this bidirectional framework, have noted that children both resist and influence parents

(Kuczynski & Parkin, 2006). I argue that reformulating the problems of classic socialisation theory with opposing models of causality risks replacing one adult ideology with another, while missing how parents and children actually manage agency and authority *in situ*.

Most recently, Guhin et al. (in press), have argued for a post-functionalist agenda for research on socialisation. They suggest that socialisation research declined in popularity as a result of multiple critiques, and where it continued, did so in siloed subfields within the social sciences. They suggest that scholars come together in the development of a new interdisciplinary theory of socialisation that avoids the pitfalls of the classic approach (Guhin et al., in press).

These approaches, that of CELF scholars excluded, aim to replace one theory of socialisation with another, where EMCA has instead advocated for an alternative approach to studying what parents and children actually do. All in all, these reactions to traditional socialisation theory differ in the extent to which they revise the concept of socialisation and how they propose studying it, but share the common critique that socialisation is not a unidirectional process where parents train children in the ways of society, emphasising that children are active rather than passive social actors and arguing for more attention to be paid to children's ways.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined theories of socialisation from Simmel to Sacks while drawing attention to how the earlier theories treated "obvious" or taken-for-granted conceptions of children and their relationships with their parents as scientific fact; and that this adoption of common-sense as science is still pervasive. Children's agency and authority are invisible to such theories, limiting the range of research questions being asked by analysts. Furthermore, despite the recognition by theories of socialisation and children's

development that it is through interaction that parents socialise children, the ways in which parents actually interact with children were generally assumed rather than studied.

Sacks and colleagues drew attention to the need to study interaction *in situ* to uncover how people actually do things. They also questioned the suitability of adopting common-sense notions as scientific fact and, by doing so, began a new tradition of studying parent-child interaction that takes seriously the possibility of a kids' culture and promotes the examination of orientations to the developmental scheme in interaction as a topic of study. This approach to studying children in interaction opened up opportunities for analysts to reconsider children's competences and their contributions to socialisation practices in interaction with their parents and peers. In other words, instead of assuming that parents and children fall into two asymmetrical categories where children are passive, incompetent, subservient, developing non-adults; and adults are active, developed, and superior in competence and authority, participant orientations to these categories can be examined along with children's methods for engaging with the adult culture. I argue that in addition to avoiding assumptions about asymmetries in agency and competence in parent-child interaction, analysts should avoid assumptions of asymmetries in authority, as this too is part of the developmental lens.

I have located this research within the growing EMCA literature on parent-child interactions, particularly on request sequences and negotiations in parent-child interaction and have drawn attention to the current trend of investigating children's agency and parental control which suggests parents are active and children are reactive without investigating the ways that children act, and parents respond. In response, I take seriously the idea of children's agency and authority by asking questions about children's methods for exercising both in interaction.

EMCA studies have demonstrated how agency and authority are negotiated *in situ* and are available for empirical study by examining participant orientations to epistemic, deontic and emotional facets of their social relationships. In the chapters to follow, I examine children's methods for exercising agency and authority in interaction with their parents, grounding analysis in participant orientations to avoid adopting the adult ideology as scientific fact, thus building on the work of Sacks and adding to the limited number of studies of *child*-parent interaction and children's interactional competences, particularly in relation to request sequences in interaction. Furthermore, the analysis is a direct response to calls for further investigation into the negotiation of social relations in interaction and how deontics, epistemics and emotion work together in interaction.

EMCA scholars were not alone in their critique of socialisation theory and studies of children and their development. A number of different approaches have emerged in reaction to classic socialisation theories' pitfalls and their continued and pervasive adoption across the social sciences. Unlike EMCA, these approaches mostly propose the replacement of one ideology with another. However, like EMCA, they point to the need for further investigations, like this one, into children's methods of being in the world and the need to avoid letting assumptions of asymmetries guide our investigations.

Chapter 3: Methods

Introduction

I begin this methods chapter by outlining the analytic approach I have adopted in studying children's methods for exercising agency and authority – ethnomethodologically-informed conversation analysis. I then describe the data used in this study; how it was collected, analysed and transcribed. Thereafter, I outline the ethical considerations related to collecting and using the data.

Analytical Framework and Approach

In this thesis, I "describe methods persons use in doing social life" (Sacks, 1984, p. 21). More specifically, I analyse children's methods for getting their parents to do things. The analytic framework used in this study is ethnomethodologically informed while the specific analytic approach is conversation analysis. The ethnomethodological approach describes "a range of phenomena associated with the use of mundane knowledge and reasoning procedures by ordinary members of society" (Heritage, 1984b, p. 4). In this approach, aspects of social life which may appear to be mundane and factual are instead understood to be managed accomplishments of locally situated interactional processes and/or practices (Heritage, 1984b). Ethnomethodological enquiry thus analyses situated action in order to ascertain how aspects of society that tend to be taken-for-granted as existing "objectively" are in fact accomplished through people's moment-by-moment actions (West & Fenstermaker, 1995). In relation to parent-child interaction, in particular, asymmetries in the parent-child dyad are not taken as being objectively true; rather they are considered to be interactional accomplishments (Garfinkel et al., 1982). As such, this research investigates the situated conduct of parents and children in the home, exploring the practices children use to get their parents to do things.

Conversation analysis is the specific approach that I use to explore the generic structures and practices of this moment-by-moment conduct (Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2005, 2006, 2007) of parents and children in the home. The methodology explores, in fine-grained detail, the stable and organised patterns of action to which participants in interaction orient (Heritage, 1984b). Conversation analysis is not confined to the study of verbal conversations (as the name may mistakenly lead one to believe) but offers analytic resources for the study of nonverbal multimodal practices in social action (Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013; Kidwell, 2013). Conversation analysis has been used to study young children's verbal and nonverbal actions (such as touch, placement or movement of their bodies, positioning of objects or a change in their gaze) (Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013; Kidwell, 2013) and interactional displays of emotion (involving verbal, prosodic and nonverbal resources such as posture, gesture and facial expressions) (Peräkylä & Sorjonen, 2012). In this study I analyse the multimodal practices of parents and young children using conversation-analytic principles.

In social interaction there is "order at all points" (Sacks, 1984, p. 22; also Keel, 2016) and the analysis of this order or organisation of activity can be equated to Russian nesting dolls; there are multiple layers at which social activity is organised (Clayman & Gill, 2004; Drew & Heritage, 1992), with each layer contributing to the overall structure of the social actions underway while (re)producing social order (Schegloff, 2005). The "inner" levels of the more "micro" details of interaction are that of utterance/turn composition (the specific words selected that compose sentential, clausal, phrasal, and lexical turn-constructional-units that make up a turn at talk), turn-taking (coordinated interaction between participants) and sequence organisation (courses of action realised through interaction) (Clayman & Gill, 2004; Schegloff, 2005). The "outer" levels of the more "macro" details of interaction refer to structural organisation (interactional occasions) and social order/relations (Schegloff, 2006;

Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014). Structural organisation includes the "overarching activity frameworks that organize lengthy stretches of interaction" (Clayman & Gill, 2004, p. 596). For example, Jefferson (1984b) as well as Button and Casey (1984) outlined how stretches of talk can be organised around a topic of conversation (topic-organisation) and Lerner described how stretches of talk can be organised around a story (storytelling-organisation) (1992) or a project (task-organisation) (1998). Task/project-driven activity is directed at an end goal and the completion of said task/project (Lerner, 1998). Task-organised *activity* is action in aid of the completion of a project, while task-organised *interaction* is *social* action organised around the completion of a task or project. Scholars of parent-child interaction (cf. Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013; Lerner & Zimmerman, 2003; Waring, 2019; Wootton, 1981a) point to the need to consider how actions like requests and demands serve a project or task to comprehensively analyse the familial interaction underway, i.e. analysis should consider task-organisation when parents and children are engaged with activities organised around the completion of a task. Social actions and the occasions they reference (re)produce social order as described by Schegloff (2006, pp. 70-71):

> People talk in turns, which compose orderly sequences through which courses of action are developed, they deal with transient problems of speaking, hearing or understanding the talk and reset the interaction on its course; they organize themselves so as to allow stories to be told, they fill out occasions of interaction from approaches and greetings through to closure, and part in an orderly way. I mention this here to bring to the forefront of attention what rests on the back of interaction: the organization of interaction needs to be—and is—robust enough, flexible enough, and sufficiently self-maintaining to sustain social order at family dinners…, in every nook and cranny where human life is to be found.

Consequently, the present analysis looks at multiple levels of organisation in relation to verbal and embodied practices in request sequences in child-parent interaction; including, the components and format of requests, demands, counters and responses; the issuing of requests and demands and what responses are relevant next, and the sequential unfolding of request and demand adjacency pair sequences (including insert sequences and expansion sequences), and how these levels of interaction both reflect overarching project or task-organisation (Lerner, 1998; Schegloff, 2006) and orient to deontic, epistemic and emotional social order and relations (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014).

Since conversation analysis examines social actions in the context of their own making (i.e. there is no measurement of constructs contrived by the researcher), validity refers to how convincing and accurate the analytic claims made about the actions are (Peräkylä, 2004). Importantly, analytic claims in this thesis have been grounded in participant orientations as proposed by Sacks et al. (1974, p. 729; also see Peräkylä, 2004):

> But while understandings of other's talk are displayed to co-participants, they are available to professional analysts, who are thereby afforded a proof criterion (and a search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn's talk is occupied with. Since it is the parties' understandings of prior turn's talk that is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is THEIR understandings that are wanted for analysis. The display of those understandings in the talk of subsequent turns affords both a resource for the analysis of prior turns and a proof procedure for professional analyses of prior turns – resources intrinsic to the data themselves.

Along with an analysis of participants' next turn orientations to prior turns, regular patterns of interaction both in the data (and the literature) are presented alongside deviant cases (cases that deviate from the regular pattern where this deviation is oriented to by participants) to strengthen analytic arguments regarding the former (Peräkylä, 2004; Schegloff, 1996).

Within the context of family interaction, it is possible for analysts (based on normative understandings as members of society) to assume that, based on participants' membership to social categories like parent or child, asymmetries in participant authority, knowledge and competence are relevant to the interaction (Garfinkel et al., 1982; Sacks, 1972). However, in conversation-analytic research, what is contextually relevant is what participants themselves make relevant at any given moment in interaction along with what is consequential for an ongoing interaction (Peräkylä, 2004). Thus, *a priori* assumptions of dyadic asymmetries and participants' (especially children's) capabilities based on their membership to social categories have been avoided, and any claims of contextual relevance of categories are shown to be consequential for the ongoing interaction based on what participants make relevant (Garfinkel et al., 1982; Peräkylä, 2004).

Data

Since social action is contextually oriented (each action is context-shaped and context-renewing), conversation analysis requires that interactions under investigation are considered in the immediate contexts of their production (Heritage, 1984b; Sacks, 1984). Therefore, data for conversation-analytic studies are in the form of recordings (audio and/or video) so as to allow for the repeated and detailed analysis of interactions as they occurred and for other researchers to review claims, thus reducing analytic bias (Heritage, 1984b; Sacks, 1984). Furthermore, the recorded interactions are naturally occurring as they are not contrived for the purposes of research (Heritage, 1984b; Potter, 2002; Sacks, 1984; Speer, 2002).

The data in this study consist of video and audio recordings of parents and children interacting within their homes – nine hours of interaction spanning 13 days. Data are in South African English. The sample of families in this study is a non-probability convenience sample sourced through snow-ball sampling methods (Marshall, 1996). I approached acquaintances

who had young children between the ages of one-and-a-half to five years of age and asked them if they were willing to volunteer to participate in the study and if they knew of other families who might be willing to participate. This age group was chosen due to the overarching aim of investigating young children's interactional practices.

Families who volunteered to participate were provided with smart nanny cameras; I first used the Samsung SmartCam Pro for one family and then used the Samsung SmartCam HD Pro[21] for the other as it had better sound quality with less background noise.

Figure 1: Samsung SmartCams with HD on the left and HD Pro on the right (authors own image)

Although I assisted them with setting up the cameras and smart phone applications on their phones, the recording was participant controlled as they could choose where to place the cameras, how long to have them in their homes, and to turn them off if they wished. Furthermore, they could use the password protected application to view any recordings, check the cameras were working and delete footage they did not wish to share. These discreet

[21] I chose a smart nanny camera which came with a password protected smart phone application, night vision, light enhancement, voice and motion sensors, and audio and video recording to both the application and an SD card.

yet visible and undisguised cameras were voice and motion activated, making for a user-friendly method of gathering mundane everyday interactions, as participants could go about their daily lives unencumbered by the need to turn the cameras on and off. Thus, activities in the home were not contrived for the sake of the research (Speer, 2002); but rather everyday activities were recorded that would take place whether the video camera was there or not. Data were recorded onto secure digital (SD) cards housed within the cameras and after the cameras and cards were removed from the homes, the data were transferred onto password protected external hard drives and the original recordings on the SD cards were deleted.

Though there has been an assumption that the presence of a video camera will influence the interaction being filmed, the systematic study of video data "has confirmed that people do not fundamentally alter what they are doing when they know a camera is present" (Jones & Raymond, 2012, p. 113). In fact, video cameras have been placed (without harm to participants) in playschools and homes for the collection of data for a number of EMCA studies of adults and children (see for example Goodwin & Kryatzis, 2007; Kent, 2012; Kidwell, 2013; Wootton, 2005). Furthermore, we live in the digital age of cellular phone and surveillance cameras that capture video-footage of our daily lives (Best, 2015). Sharing this footage is commonplace and forms part of everyday communication (Best, 2015). Therefore, the recording of everyday activities, such as those made for the purposes of this study, is not out of the ordinary for our time. Interestingly, a day or so into filming, one family messaged me to confirm the cameras were recording correctly and, at the same time, let me know that there would be footage containing nudity because they kept forgetting about the camera as they went about their day (see ethics discussion below for how footage containing nudity was handled). I did not find any footage in which participants oriented to the cameras during an interaction (only engaging with the cameras to set them up, check they were working, change an SD card or take them down).

To recruit participants, I spoke to friends and acquaintances about the research project at social events and posted a request on social media. While some families said they would not be comfortable being filmed (but passed on my request to other families), four families volunteered. One family withdrew because they unexpectedly moved cities, but three families were recorded. One family had a very young baby under one and a half years of age, and I did not find examples of the interactional phenomena investigated here in these recordings, consequently this data is not part of this thesis but will be analysed for other research papers. Two families with four-year-old children volunteered to participate in the study and recorded their daily activities with nanny cameras for as long as they were comfortable to do so. Family S consists of Mark (father), Kate (mother), and Amy (daughter) who was four years old at the time of recording – this family chose to place the camera in Amy's bedroom. Carol (mother), Ben (father), Ella (four-year-old daughter) and John[22] (one-and-a-half-year-old son) are family C who chose to place a camera in their kitchen. See the family trees in the image below.



Figure 2: Family Trees

[22] These are pseudonyms. The discussion on anonymously reporting on the families is included in the ethics section below.

Analytic Procedure, Transcription and Images

The analysis of the data involved repeated and "unmotivated listening" (Schegloff, 1996, p. 172) to the recordings. The initial review involved rough transcriptions of the nine hours of interactions which aided in the identification of potential practices for further investigation. During this initial review, it became evident that the quality of the recordings varied depending on the family members' position to the camera, how loudly they spoke and the volume of background noises. For example, family C often had the radio on in the room and where the radio sounds made it difficult to hear participants, the data were excluded from analysis (i.e. are not part of the nine hours of recordings). Where the quality of the recording was problematic the data was either excluded from analysis or the quality issues are clearly noted in the analysis[23].

Repeated watching of the videos that focused on what the children were doing led to an observation that children make demands of their parents. Consequently, I developed a collection of instances for detailed transcription and analysis that resulted in the analysis found in Chapter 4. On reviewing all the cases of children demanding parental actions within this collection, I noticed that the "look at X" demand was a distinct type of demand that was repeatedly used by the children in the data set. I isolated the "look at X/check X" demands into a subcollection that led to Chapter 5's analysis. During the analyses of demand sequences initiated by children, I came across demand sequences initiated by parents and noticed that children recurrently countered these requests. During the detailed analysis of the counters, I further noticed that different counters led to different sequential trajectories and created subcollections of the two different counters which are outlined in Chapter 6.

As the analysis progressed, each transcript was completed in stages; first a rough transcript was created noting the obvious elements of the interaction; then after a few days'

[23] The implications of recording issues are discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.

break from the transcription process the next level of transcription took place with "fresh eyes and ears"; then, during the write-up of the analysis, the recordings were repeatedly revisited, and the transcripts updated accordingly. This process aided the development and refinement of the collections and subcollections and the choice of excerpts used in the analysis to best demonstrate the phenomena of interest.

Gail Jefferson (2004) developed a transcription system that provides more detail than just the words uttered by a participant, also indicating features of how the talk is produced. These transcription conventions are essential to conversation analysis (Jefferson, 2004). Jeffersonian conventions were developed for audio-recordings and thus focused primarily on representing verbal interaction (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017). Subsequently, conversation-analytic researchers have expanded the transcription system to include symbols for more phenomena and also expanded on the Jeffersonian conventions in order to represent various aspects of visible embodied conduct in transcriptions. Three such techniques involve using transcriptionist comments to describe actions, specialised notational systems, and images (drawings or video screenshots) (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017). I adopt some of these techniques in this study, as video and audio data are represented in this research with comments within the transcriptions and video screenshots/stills/figures. Pseudonyms are used to hide participant identities and disguised stills accompany the transcripts. The transcription conventions can be found in the appendix and consist primarily of Jeffersonian conventions (2004) but are supplemented by additional symbols developed by other authors (Butler & Edwards, 2018; Hepburn, 2004; Hepburn & Bolden, 2017).

In line with Jeffersonian conventions, nonverbal actions are noted within the transcript using transcriber descriptions within double brackets (Jefferson, 2004). The nonverbal actions are also described in detail within the analysis and, in some instances, video stills are provided as further evidence. Each still or screenshot is labelled by a letter of

the alphabet (figure A to X and thereafter figure AA to OO) and the sequential location of the action is indicated by a corresponding letter placed (after the line number and prior to the participant's pseudonym) within the transcript. Thus, the sequential unfolding of both verbal and nonverbal actions is noted in sequence. This method of transcribing visible conduct was chosen because, in comparison with some more detailed methods such as those of Charles Goodwin (1980) and Lorenza Mondada (2006), it is more readable for those without prior training in these transcription methods while still allowing for the sequential unfolding of talk and physical actions to be indicated alongside each other (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017). Furthermore, the interactional phenomena under investigation are verbal (requests, demands and counters) rather than nonverbal – if the focus was solely on nonverbal conduct then Mondada or Charles Goodwin's methods could have been a more suitable choice (Hepburn & Bolden, 2017).

Ochs (1979) notes that researchers' perceptions of adults as dominant is reflected in the use of the term "parent-child interaction" rather than "child-parent interaction" and this can influence what the researcher chooses to transcribe and how they transcribe, with a tendency to emphasise the actions of parents and to look at children's actions as contingent upon them. Since transcription is the demonstration of social order in action (Baker, 2004), mis/underrepresenting children's actions in a transcription and analysis would result in misrepresentation of social order. Thus, it is critical that in the process of transcription, the actions of all participants are represented as accurately and evenly as possible. The aim of this study is to uncover children's practices that have been hitherto unnoticed to better understand the social order within the child-parent relationship, and so particular attention was paid to both children's and parents' actions during transcription and analysis.

Conversation analysis requires that all analytic claims are empirically grounded in the data (Peräkylä, 2004). Since analytic claims are accompanied by data in the form of

recordings and/or transcripts, they are available for public scrutiny. Therefore, the quality of recordings and transcripts are critical for reliable and valid research findings (Peräkylä, 2004). One way to enhance the adequacy[24] of transcripts and analysis is to have other analysts during data sessions or conferences watch recordings and comment on the transcripts' accuracy – much of the data used in this dissertation was presented at an international conference or in informal data sessions as a means of checking the adequacy of the transcripts. Furthermore, the screenshots provide a means to check the validity of claims made about embodied conduct.

The screenshots were created using open-source software. Firstly, to disguise participants' faces to prevent participant identification, a sketch filter was added to the videos in ShotCut, before the stills were extracted. The stills were then edited in GIMP to enhance the outlines of participants to aid visibility of actions on display and to fade the backgrounds to aid both visibility of participant actions and to further enhance confidentiality.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical clearance for this study was obtained from the Human Research Ethic Committee (Non-medical) at University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg with protocol number H16/07/31 (a copy of the certificate can be found in the appendix B, reflecting my maiden name of Rogers). The study raises a number of ethical concerns or possible sources of harm for participants: the research involves a vulnerable population, children under 18, who may be too young to give assent to being part of the study; the nature of the study means that participation cannot be anonymous; and the video data will involve permanent records of identifiable participants' conduct (which may contain private moments or reflect poorly on

[24] The word "adequacy" is used here since no transcript is an exact representation of an interaction, but rather an adequate capturing of the target phenomenon for analytic purposes.

participants). The procedures outlined below served as practices for mitigating these possible sources of harm.

Potential participants received a Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix C) that explained what the purpose of the research was, what was required of participants and what the researcher promised to do. This letter informed participants that participation was voluntary and that should they volunteer to have a video camera in their home the camera(s) would be loaned to them at no cost. The participants were permitted to place the video camera in the positions they chose, to turn the camera on or off at their discretion and to delete any footage they did not wish to share for the purposes of the study. They were permitted to request the withdrawal (without penalty) of any recordings they contributed, at any point in the study up until the submission of the thesis for examination or publication. They were also permitted to keep a copy of the footage they recorded (though none reported doing so). The participants that volunteered were required to provide their contact details (telephone and/or email address) for communication regarding data collection only. These details were saved on a password protected file on a password protected external hard drive.

Participants were given the option to be identifiable (by name or through stills including their faces) or to be given pseudonyms and have their faces disguised to protect anonymity. Participants were informed that they would not be penalised in any way should they choose to be reported on anonymously and at any point in the study up until the submission of the thesis for examination, they were able to choose to be reported on anonymously and have their faces disguised. All but one participant chose to be disguised and as a result I chose to disguise all of their identities so as not to make identification of any family members possible through association.

The nanny cameras to be used in the study came with an application that was password protected. Parents were the only individuals with access to this application while

the cameras were in their homes and the passwords were changed for each family. I accessed the application only after the cameras had been removed and the parents informed me that they were willing to share the videos saved in the application. Parents were asked to delete any footage containing nudity and any remaining sections of videos that contained nudity were deleted. Data are stored on a password-protected external hard-drive, with each video-file also password protected, and the file names anonymised. Though the research was not expected to elicit any concerns requiring counselling, participants were advised to contact FAMSA and/or Lifeline for assistance should concerns requiring counselling arise. Though no such concerns arose, parents were informed that in line with the Children's Act 38 of 2005, should any abuse be suspected, I would consult with my supervisor, seek advice from the university's legal office and, if warranted, report the suspicions to the police.

Each adult participant who volunteered to be a part of the study was required to sign a consent form (see Appendix D). Parents/Guardians were also required to sign consent forms for their children's participation (see Appendix E). The consent form included a separate section for participants to consent to being videotaped and an additional section for participants to consent or decline consent for undisguised stills of their faces being used in reports and presentations based on the study. Children aged one-and-a-half to five years may be too young to understand and sign an assent form. However, parents were asked to explain the research to their children and ask their children, without coercion or penalty, if they understood that they would be filmed and whether they assented to being filmed and if they did not wish to be filmed, they would not participate in the study. The parent/guardian consent form contained a separate section for parents to record their children's assent to being filmed. When putting the cameras up in the families' homes and testing them, the children were told what we were doing but did not show interest in our activities, nor did they ask about the cameras after their parents had originally spoken to them about giving their assent.

Chapter 4: Children Demanding Parental Action[25]

Introduction

In this chapter I examine instances of young children demanding action from their parents along with their pursuits of parental compliance. Theory and research on parent-child interaction generally make *a priori* assumptions of asymmetry in authority between parent and child, with the parent in a position of authority influencing the passive (or at times resistant) child, but not vice versa. Where children's agency is investigated it is usually done so by investigating their resistance to parental acts of authority (see Corsaro, 2020; Fasulo et al., 2007; Kent, 2012; Kuczynski, 2003; Wingard, 2012). In this chapter, I build on the understanding that young children seek autonomy and challenge authority, not by looking at how they resist the imposition of authority, but rather at how they exercise deontic authority. I do so by examining instances of children demanding actions of their parents and pursuing compliance. I begin this chapter by revisiting some of the literature outlined in Chapter 2 on deontic authority, and request and demand sequences in general and in parent-child interaction, but I do so in further detail.

Deontic Authority

Social actions reflect the order of social relations allowing for action recognition and intersubjectivity, i.e. interactional practices reflect who people are to each other and this order provides common ground for understanding actions (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014). Actions such as declarations or questions may orient to epistemic order and participants' relative rights to knowledge, while requests and demands may reflect deontic order and a participant's right to influence another, and crying can display emotional order and a

[25] Portions of this chapter have very recently been published, see Tam, C. L. (2021). Children's demands for parental action. Research on Children and Social Interaction, 5(1), 12–32. https://doi.org/10.1558/rcsi.18054

participant's right to emotional expression in the momentary relationship (Stevanovic & Koski, 2018; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014).

Deontic rights – who has the right to influence a recipient's impending actions and who is obliged to comply – are negotiated through the complex interplay of deontic status (a relative position regarding a domain of influence, used as a resource for action recognition) and stance (the display of authority over another often in the form of an utterance) (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015). Though participants have pre-established roles and responsibilities in interaction (deontic status), deontic authority (stance) is exercised in the moment – interactionally through actions such as requests or demands; along with recipients' responses to them - whether participants' actions (are congruent and) reinforce or (incongruent and) challenge the distribution of deontic rights (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015).

Requests and Demands

Requests and demands/directives are impositions on the recipient, and the lexico-syntactic form of the utterance reflects the deontic stance of the speaker while displaying the degree of entitlement to ask or tell and the understanding of potential contingencies influencing the execution of the response (Craven & Potter, 2010). Requests-for-action (Thompson et al., 2015) ask someone to do something and make a response of granting or rejection relevant (Craven & Potter, 2010). These requests orient to the recipient's agency by projecting both acceptance and rejection as possible response options and although acceptance is preferred (Schegloff, 2007), there is space for opposition. A prefaced request such as "I wonder if you can help me?" orients to lower entitlement and higher contingency considerations than a request with only the modal verb such as "can you help me?" (Curl & Drew, 2008). However, demands-for-action such as "help me" tell (rather than ask) someone to do something, project and assume compliance will follow, and show little to no orientation

towards a recipient's agency in response (Craven & Potter, 2010; Kent, 2012). Demanding assumes deontic authority over the recipient as well as limited optionality on the part of the recipient as contingencies are controlled and compliance alone is projected (Craven & Potter, 2010; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015). Thus, demands claim that the speaker is fully entitled to direct the acts of another, with low to no orientation toward contingencies that may limit compliance, such as the recipient's will or ability to comply.

Negotiation in Child-parent Interaction

During the course of an interaction, speakers may shift between asking or telling, adapting their deontic claims in an attempt to secure a preferred response (Craven & Potter, 2010; Kent, 2012; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015). This pattern is evident in parent-child interaction, where children's non-compliance with a request/demand recurrently leads to parents repeating the action, escalating from requests to demands, using touch to direct with increased emotional displays and/or the issuing of threats, thereby scaling up the parents' claimed entitlement to direct the child's behaviour and scaling down the child's response options until compliance is achieved, (re)producing normative expectations of parents as authority figures (see Craven & Potter, 2010; Goodwin, 2006; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013; Hepburn & Potter, 2011). This conversation-analytic research on the forms and trajectories of parental demand sequences focuses on circumstances in which the parent is exercising deontic authority over the child. In contrast, I examine instances in which the child, by issuing demands, exercises and tests the limits of their deontic authority over the parent's actions, along with examining how the parent's responses can either reinforce the child's deontic claims or challenge them.

There has been limited conversation-analytic research on the form and trajectory of children's requests-for-action and parents' responses. Wootton found that a child as young as two and a half years of age can utilise requests-for-action of varying syntactic form ("can

you" or "shall we do X") to meet varying interactional exigencies (Wootton, 2005, p. 144). He examined parental responses (of granting, modified granting, non-responsiveness, deferment, softened/outright refusal) to four-year-old children's requests-for-action: in cases of children's continued appeal for a preferred response, the parents escalations involved increasingly negative forms of refusal (Wootton, 1981a). There has been no focused investigation into children's demands for parental action, beyond Waring's (2019) recent exploration of a child role-playing parental demands from the play-as-adult frame. In contrast, I examine instances of children demanding parental action from the child position, along with their methods for pursuing parental compliance.

Parental Demands

Before moving to the focal sequences involving children demanding parental action, I examine an instance of a parent making demands of their child and pursuing compliance. I do this in order to demonstrate that the escalating trajectory seen in the literature mentioned above is also found in my data, thus allowing for a comparison of parental pursuits of children's compliance and children's pursuits of parental compliance. In this first excerpt, father (Mark) and daughter (Amy) are in Amy's bedroom. Prior to the start of the transcript, Mark requests that Amy get on the bed so he can help her change clothes. She climbs onto the bed while holding food in her right hand. Standing in front of Mark, she raises the food to her mouth but drops it.

Excerpt 4.1: S020_20170419_185947

```
01     Amy:  [((leans forward and down towards food))
02     Mar:  [↓Amy >just [wait<//((takes hold of her arms))
03     Amy:              [((briefly raises head))
04           [((lowers head))
05     Mar:  [Let me put your pajamas on
```

```
06     Amy:  (.)//((sits down))
07     Mar:  I'm gonna ↑take that awa:y [if you do not
08     Amy:                             [((standing up))
09           (0.2)//((straightening up))
10     Mar:  (°°listen to me°°)//((releases her arms))
11           [(°°now listen to me, quickly°°)
12     Amy:  [((looks at Mark))
```

As Amy leans forward to pick up her food, Mark tries to forestall her actions with a fast-paced demand ("Amy just wait") and by physically restricting her movement by holding her arms in position. At first, she seems to comply as her head momentarily lifts up but she then lowers it again in pursuit of the food. Mark responds to this lack of compliance by issuing another demand to let him put her pyjamas on. Yet, she continues her pursuit of the food and with Mark holding her arms she sits down by dropping down onto her rear. Mark then further escalates his directive to a threat to take away the food with a sharp intonation; indicating that continued noncompliance will have negative consequences (Hepburn & Potter, 2011)[26]. Before he utters the conditions of the threat, she complies, standing up and facing him with a serious look on her face. Mark, orienting to her compliance, immediately lowers his voice, muttering the (now less relevant) conditions under his breath while releasing his grip on her arms.

Throughout this interaction, both parties are pursuing different and competing projects and are oriented to the completion of different tasks: Amy is attempting to retrieve her food and Mark is getting her dressed. However, over the course of the interaction, Amy's

[26] This threat contains the components of an "if…then" threat as identified by Hepburn and Potter (2011) but is issued in a "then…if" order with the potential consequence (the "then") being issued prior to the conditions of threat avoidance (the "if").

project is sidelined for Mark's project which requires her joint participation, making it take precedence over her individual task. By issuing demands and threats, Mark claims authority to not only direct Amy's actions but to prioritise his tasks and enforce her participation in them. He has secured her compliance through an escalating display of emotion, show of force and deontic claims that are treated by both parties as deontically congruent, reinforcing his high deontic status. Consistent with previous research in this regard, this parental escalation from demands to a threat in the pursuit of the child's compliance (re)produces normative expectations of parents as authority figures over their children.

In the remainder of the analysis, I offer contrasting examples of children demanding actions of their parents, firstly looking at instances where parents comply and then at those where they do not and children pursue compliance.

Children Directing Parents and Parents Complying

In the following excerpts, parent and child are involved in two parallel co-present projects. In excerpt 4.2, the daughter (Ella) is drawing at the kitchen island while the mother (Carol) has been serving food and has picked up a tray and is turning away from the stove.

Excerpt 4.2: C2017_06_22_45a

01	Ell:	Mom check [I drew a ↑se:al
02	Car:	[((turns gaze to Ella))
03		[(0.5)//((approaching Ella))
04	Ell:	[((looks at mom and then back down at picture))
05	Car:	.hhhh [yo:: it's so coo::l//((looking at drawing))
06		[((clank sound))

In excerpt 4.3, the mother (Kate) is gathering Amy's clothes and Amy is getting undressed. Amy looks at her torso and pulls at the bottom of her pyjama top before looking up at her mom.

```
Excerpt 4.3: S017_20170423_103545

01     Amy:  ↑Help me [take °this off°¿
02     Kat:           [((arms unfolding, stepping forward))
03           (1.2)                                          ((Removing Amy's top))
04           Y'can pull it over your ↑head
05     Amy:  £.hh I don't know how to do that£
```

In excerpts 4.2 and 4.3, Ella and Amy issue demands to their mothers, displaying a high authority stance (characterised by high entitlement and low contingency). In excerpt 4.2, Ella demands that her mother look at her drawing, simultaneously inviting an assessment of it; and, in response, Carol momentarily suspends her activity of preparing food to attend and assess[27]. In excerpt 4.3, Amy issues a demand recruiting Kate onto the changing project. In both instances the mothers respond immediately in compliance. These two excerpts demonstrate that children (like adults) may issue demands, not to imitate parental action, but in the pursuit of their own tasks (such as recruiting a parent onto a joint activity or summoning parental attention to their task), thus claiming a high deontic stance over a parent in a particular situated domain. Furthermore, parents may choose to comply, thus ratifying the rights the child has claimed in that moment. Despite the normative expectations of the parent being the authority figure in the dyad, there are circumstances in which children are

[27] This type of demand that draws parental attention to a child's production and invites an assessment is examined in detail in the next chapter.

treated as having the right to claim deontic authority over the parent's actions without any indication of these claims being incongruent with their deontic status: There is a shared understanding of the child's domain of authority – the circumstances in which the child is treated as having the right to demand their parent's attention or assistance.

Within my data, parents recurrently comply with children's demands. However, in a subset of the interactions, parents do not comply, and children utilise a variety of methods in pursuit of compliance and project participation resulting in varied outcomes such as subsequent compliance, non-compliance or conditional compliance.

Children Pursuing Parental Compliance and Participation

In this first case of non-compliance and subsequent pursuit, Mark and Amy are involved in individual parallel projects; Mark was helping Amy find toys but is now looking out of the window while Amy is continuing her search.

Excerpt 4.4: S012_20170417_164003

```
01     Amy:  ↑HA:! [Here is my min yin ee:]
02     Mar:        [((looks at Amy))]
03     Amy:  (.) [↓binionee
04     Mar:      [.hhh//((rolls eyes, looks away))
05           ↑There you go, >˚you got it˚<
06     Amy:  You see, [it's ↑broken [again
07                    [((approaches Mark))
08     Mar:                         [((looks at Amy))]
09           (1.5)//((turns back to window))
10     Mar:  ˚(Goodness) that's not cool˚
11           (0.75)
12     Amy:  ↑Hm:?
13           ↑Look.
14           [It's s'posed to go like this and not that.]
```

15 Mar: [((looks at Amy))]
16 Mm:://((Looks back at window))
17 (0.5)
18 A:h
19 (°Wonder why it's like [this and not that°)
20 Amy: [S:o: maybe glu:e: it o::n
21 (0.5)//((goes to and leans on bed, stomps feet))
22 **A** ↑No:::w
23 (3.0)
24 (°Maybe°/°Daddy°/°Mayddy°) [↑glu:e it o:n ↓no::w
25 [((drops onto knees))
26 (0.75)
27 **B** Mar: Mm:: hm::://((turns into room then back to window))
28 (1.0)
29 Amy: (°for me°)
30 (1.0)
31 ↑Plea:[se Da:ddy:, (for me the glu-)?
32 **C** Mar: [((turns to Amy and takes toy))
33 U:h:m

Figure A Figure B Figure C

The sequence begins with Amy announcing that she has found her toy minion, attempting to draw her father's attention to her task. Her father responds to the announcement by briefly looking at her before raising his head, rolling his eyes and turning back to the window (returning to his parallel project) while acknowledging her find (lines 4 and 5). Amy approaches her father and directly prompts him to look at the toy with "you see", followed by an announcement that registers that "it's broken again". This action may be indirectly prompting him to engage further with the broken toy and possibly be a means of recruiting him to start a new toy-fixing project. He does look at her again, softly mumbling an assessment of the situation (line 10) before he disengages by looking away once more and leaning toward the window. He is responding to the announcement but not the prompt for further action. A moment passes where no additional action is offered by Mark.

With the open-class repair initiator "Hm::?" she indicates some sort of trouble with his (lack of appropriate) response (Drew, 1997). She then continues her pursuit by demanding he "look" closely and provides a detailed assessment of the nature of the break (lines 13 and 14). Together these actions imply that a remedial action is being sought – that of her father fixing the break to make it "go like this and not that". Furthermore, she is orienting to her father as the one responsible for fixing things (the parent) and herself as the one needing

assistance (the child). Though he complies with her demand by briefly looking at her and the toy, he responds to her clarifying assessment with a weak acknowledgment token "mm:" (Jefferson, 1984a) and then looks away, muttering a speculative statement (line 19) that acknowledges her assessment but avoids engagement with the solution she seeks. Though he is complying with the "look" demand, momentarily suspending his parallel activity to pay her attention (cf. excerpt 4.2), he is once again declining her prompts in pursuit of further action and project engagement.

Before her father has finished his utterance, she escalates her pursuit, retrospectively clarifying her previously indirect prompts for her father to fix the toy with the direct suggestion "maybe glue it on" (line 20) as she walks to the bed. The escalation continues with the suggestion transforming into a demand, as she strongly notes the timely nature of the matter with an emphasised "now" while stomping her feet (see figure A, line 22). Mark's response is notably absent during the long silence (line 23); he is declining to respond and to take up her strong suggestion. Amy continues her pursuit saying either "maybe" or "daddy" or "mayddy glue it on now" (line 24) as she drops her knees to the floor. Whether it be a repeated suggestion with a demanding quality (maybe) or an escalation to a demand (daddy), the "now" orients to lower contingencies and assumes limited response options as the fixing of the toy is on her terms. She is further escalating her pursuit of a (preferred) response, taking on a higher deontic stance suggesting a deliberate attempt to work within and "test" deontic boundaries.

Mark, briefly turning his body towards Amy (see figure B, line 27), replies with another weak acknowledgement token which registers what Amy has said but does not commit to either complying or not complying with fixing the toy along with when he might do so (Jefferson, 1984a). So, although her use of the word "now" assumed limited response options, his response inverts her deontic claim, rejects limitations and claims optionality –

actions congruent with a high deontic status. With Mark sitting on the fence with his answer, some time passes in which Mark turns back to the window and Amy mutters what could be a personal appeal (line 29). Still having received no response, Amy makes a very clearly formulated request (line 31) claiming a lower deontic stance, congruent with the high deontic claims Mark is making. Since requests project more optionality (unlike demands that project compliance alone), this request orients to Mark's agency and status. He can comply in a manner that simply grants a request rather than follows an order. Mark, abandoning his project, grants her request immediately after hearing the word "please" by turning to her and reaching for the toy (see figure C, line 32).

Just as Mark did in excerpt 4.1, Amy makes increasingly higher deontic claims in pursuit of Mark's compliance, testing the bounds of her influence over her father's actions. Unsuccessful in the escalating pursuit and faced with Mark reinforcing his deontic status, she shifts from issuing demands to making requests, thus scaling down her deontic claim and aligning with his high deontic claims. Though her actions have attempted to influence and, at times, constrain the actions of her father, it is his actions (or a lack thereof) that have constrained the progressivity of her project.

As we see in excerpt 4.5, shifting from a demand to a request (and, thus, a more congruent stance) does not guarantee success. While Amy is playing with her toys, Mark plays a parallel game where he hides behind the curtain and calls for their dog who then searches for him. Amy is not a participant in the game, only witnessing the end of the game when Mark reveals his whereabouts to the dog. The dog has now left the room, Mark is by the large window, Kate is sitting on the bed and Amy has returned to playing with her toys on the floor.

```
Excerpt 4.5: S018_20170417_171801

01     Amy:  ((looks up at Mark))
```

02 ↑DADDY HIDE!
03 Mar: [((turns torso into room))
04 Amy: [(1.0)//((standing up))
05 °°Hide daddy. Hi[de°°.
06 Mar: [£A↑gain? //((looks at Kate))
07 Kat: (0.5)//((shakes head and yawns))
08 Amy: Yes. Ple:ase can you ↑hide?//((walks to curtain))
09 Mar: °£No my girl it's ov-°.
10 [The ↑games done.
11 Amy: [↑Please just hi-//((moves curtain))
12 **D** Mar: ↑No [Amy ↑listen. The ↑game's fin[ished.=
13 Kat: [Amy [It's over my girl.
14 Mar: =You get one game (>°that's what you get°<)
15 Amy: Can you jus://((pulling out curtain))
16 **E** Mar: [°I'm not doing it again.°//((steps away))
17 Kat: [↑I'm going to make ↑supper.
18 Would ↑anyone like some te:a?
19 Mar: Ja, °(I'd actually like a cup of) tea°.



Figure D

Figure E

Looking up at her father, Amy demands he hide and, thus, repeat the game. He does not offer a verbal response but slowly turns his torso in towards the room, looking towards the family. Standing up, she repeats the demand two more times, though she whispers these repeats, presumably to keep the secret from the dog. Mark then asks "again?" with a smile, delaying his response to her demand – this question both resists the demand and leaves room for later compliance by not immediately accepting or declining it. Though his question is in response to Amy's directive it is addressed to Kate whose direction his gaze moves to – he has nominated Kate as the decision-maker, thereby inverting Amy's deontic claim by shifting authority over his future actions from her to Kate. Kate takes on the decision-making role assigned to her by signalling a rejection with a lateral shake of the head while she yawns (line 7). Amy is now walking to the curtain and has not been privy to this parental exchange. She replies to Mark's question with a yes and, in light of the resistance evident in her father's request, she downgrades her demand to a request involving a "please" and the modal verb "can". The request orients to the growing contingencies reflected in her father's resistance while lowering her entitlement to influence him – she is downgrading her deontic stance. This is the same trajectory from a demand to a request as seen in excerpt 4. However, her request is immediately denied by Mark in alignment with Kate's decision and authority. The decision to continue the game or not has been placed within Kate's domain of authority and not Amy's.

She continues her pursuit, in overlap with his explanation that the game is done, with "please just hide" while preparing the curtain for her father. Both the action and the use of the mitigator "just" suggest she is attempting to manage contingencies – she is not asking him to do much but "just hide" while she does the curtain work. This request is again denied (see figure D, line 12), this time by both parents, along with an explanation as to what her contingency management did not consider (line 14) – the parents' rule of one game only.

Nonetheless, she tries again with another request format ("can you just") as she manoeuvres the curtain into position. Though Amy has not relinquished her deontic claims and attempts to influence her father's actions by pursuing compliance, she does not attempt to move her father's body or issue a threat as seen in excerpt 1; instead, she conducts the less entitled actions of requesting and moving the curtain to her father. However, Mark moves out of reach of the curtain (see figure E, line 16) while declaring he will not play the game again and Kate changes the topic to dinner, showing that the negotiation is over. Her pursuit unsuccessful, Amy relinquishes her attempt to influence her father but pursues the game by wrapping herself in the curtain and taking Mark's place.

Like in excerpt 4.4, her attempts to influence her parents have been restricted by their increasingly negative responses (see Wootton, 1981a) and, in this case, their rules. In contrast with the previous excerpt, the shift from a demand to a series of mitigated requests and, thus, to a more congruent deontic stance, does not result in a preferred response.

The next excerpt demonstrates another method for exercising influence that children in the data set recurrently utilised, shifting from demands to doing whining, and in this case, the outcome of the demands is conditional compliance. In excerpt 4.6, Amy is getting dressed into her pyjamas under her mother's supervision.

Excerpt 4.6: S013_20170421_200430

01	**F**	Amy:	Can you help me?//((hands up in front of face))
02		Kat:	Pants off please
03		Amy:	TAKE #off my [dres-#//((climbs onto bed))
04		Kat:	[You. Can. Take. Your. Own. Pants.
05			Off.//((singing voice))
06			(.)//((closes blind))
07		Amy:	#I can't take my.h dress off#
08		Kat:	Take your pants off pl[ease//((walks to cupboard))

09 Amy: [#↑I can't [↑take=

10 G Kat: [((turns to Amy))

11 Amy: =↑my ↑↑dr[ess off#

12 Kat: [↓Take your pants off first=

13 Amy: ((starts taking pants off))

14 Kat: =and >then I will help you< with your dress

Figure F

Figure G

Amy's request for her mother's help is prefaced with the modal verb "can", thus orienting to an unproblematic request characteristic of high entitlement and low contingency (Curl & Drew, 2008). At the same time, she emphasises the need for assistance by raising her hands up in front of her face (see figure F, line 1) enacting helplessness and limited competence (Butler & Edwards, 2018). Instead of replying to the request, Kate counters it with a request of her own; "pants off please" reversing the order of constraint, making a response from Amy relevant (Schegloff, 2007). This unprefaced request displays higher entitlement (Curl & Drew, 2008) and thus an upgraded display of deontic authority in comparison to Amy's prefaced request – challenging Amy's deontic claims. Kate is not only countering Amy's request but her helpless stance by telling Amy to take her pants off with no indication of possible contingencies or difficulty in completing this task.

Amy pursues her mother's help, countering her counter and escalating to a clarifying demand to take off her dress (line 3) that claims a higher authority stance – challenging the distribution of deontic rights that Kate has claimed. The prosodic delivery of the demand displays frustration in not having her request answered. This negative affective stance is characteristic of doing whining – a canonical children's resource for complaining (Butler & Edwards, 2018; Kidwell, 2013; Schegloff, 2005). This action orients to troubles (both Amy's supposed need for help and her mother's lack of compliance) making a remedial response relevant (Kidwell, 2013). Kate once again counters and declines to help, reasserting Amy's competence by asserting that Amy can take her own pants off. She does this with a playful sing-song voice and contrasting tone. By displaying a more positive affective stance she disaffiliates from and inverts Amy's negative affective stance (Butler & Edwards, 2018). Furthermore by not complying with or even recognizing Amy's claimed authority, she inverts the child's high deontic claim, which she treats as incongruent with her own status as the authority figure in this domain.

Amy continues to pursue a remedy but not through deontic action such as an explicit request, demand or threat as parents are found to do in pursuit of children's compliance. Instead she asserts she cannot take off her dress, orienting to her restricted competence while escalating her display of frustration, making a parental remedy urgently relevant under an implicit threat of escalating negative affective stance should a remedy not be forthcoming. Thus, she downgrades her deontic stance through a display of frustration that reflects her limited authority and competence, thereby aligning with her deontic status as a child. While simultaneously heightening her affective stance and aligning with her affective status by doing whining (an affective resource that leverages the child's right to receive parental care and assistance by invoking parental responsibility to provide it), she is utilising category-bound (Sacks, 1972) interactional practices to manage her social position and leverage her

corresponding rights in pursuit of her goal. She has not only shifted action types from a request to a demand to a pleading assertion but has shifted between social order types from deontic to emotional (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014).

Kate then repeats her request to take off the pants in a neutral tone (line 8), inverting Amy's affective stance once again, and again reifying her own status. Her goal frustrated further; Amy follows through on her implicit threat to escalate unpleasantries by displaying heightened frustration with a high-pitched declaration of incapacity suggestive of the need for an immediate remedy. Before she has finished, Kate turns and gives Amy "the look" (see Figure G, line 10) (Kidwell, 2005; see Keel, 2016)[28] and upgrades to a stern demand, telling Amy to take her pants off first and then she will get help with her task. This conditional compliance puts an end to the negotiation (cf. Waring, 2020). Though Amy is aligning with her child rights to emotional expression (i.e., her affective status), the negative affective stance risks parental sanctions. On receipt of the sanctioning gaze and tone of voice along with a remedy, Amy immediately complies (prior to the rest of the conditions being uttered) by removing her pants.

When her attempts to direct her mother's actions were unsuccessful, Amy tried an alternate strategy to that seen in the previous two excerpts, shifting from acts that reflect deontic order (demands) to those that reflect emotional order (doing whining) and are congruent with her category-bound affective status as a child. Throughout this interaction there has been a struggle for the rights to not only direct each other's actions but to direct the

[28] Kidwell investigated how very young children differentiate between a caregiver's looks; there is a look that constitutes a mere shift in gaze and "the look". "The look" is a sanctioning act on the part of the caregiver that indicates an aspect of the child's conduct requires modification. These looks require that children investigate their own conduct for the trouble source so they can choose to curtail the problematic actions or to continue with them.

undressing project. The discrepancy over taking off the pants or dress first, and who does so, is a contest for project ownership that Kate wins by making the remedy Amy seeks conditional on her compliance with Kate's task. There is no evidence of mishearing pants versus dress; rather Kate is consistently (even in conditional compliance) reclaiming her higher deontic status in this domain - her rights to influence the order of the steps Amy should follow in getting undressed. Although Amy gets the assistance she has demanded, it is under parental terms. As in excerpts 4.4 and 4.5, the parent reinforces their deontic status by using their responses to restrict the child's actions, reclaim authority and bring the negotiation to a close.

In the final excerpt for this chapter, the child pursues her denied request, not by downgrading her deontic claims to align with her child status, but by escalating affective claims as a wronged party. In excerpt 4.7, Ben (father sitting on the right-hand side of the image), Carol (sitting on the left-hand side of the image, behind Ella), Ella (sitting on a stool on the left-hand side of the image) and John (one-and-a-half-year-old son, sitting between Ben and Carol and sometimes on Carol's lap) are eating supper around the kitchen island. During the interaction, Ella's back is to the camera, at times momentarily blocking the view of Carol, so their gaze and facial expressions are not always fully available for analysis. Ella, after drinking from a water bottle (see figure H) and lowering it to the table, looks at her father.

Excerpt 4.7: C2017_05_22_48

01	**I**	Ell:	Can ↑you [find the lid plea:se?
02		Ben:	[((briefly looks at Ella))
03		Car:	(.)//((turns to look at Ella))
04			[Hm: that lids been thrown away=
05		Ell:	[((turns to look at Carol))

06 Car: =Mommy threw that lid away
07 Ell: ↑Why?//((tapping bottle on table))
08 Car: [((picking up John and pulling him onto her lap))
09 [(0.2)(Come on/boy)
10 Cos I knew you didn't need it
11 [(0.2)//((Pushing chair back. Scraping sound.))
12 Joh: [heh heh
13 Ell: But mo:m
14 Joh: [awa
15 Ell: [#I wa:nted it#
16 Car: (0.5) //((Shakes head laterally)
17 We don't have a lid that can fit on [Ella
18 Ken: [eJa: (.)
19 [(°not one that can fit°)
20 Ell: [↑No
21 °Agh°
22 Then (0.2)
23 I'm gonna pour water in the lid and then drink my
24 warer (.) out the lid
25 Car: ((Moves chair forward. Sound of chair scraping))
26 We ↑don't have a lid
27 (1.2)
28 Let me wipe your nose¿
29 Ell: #(Ma:m)# ((muffled speech))
30 ( ) ((Carol possibly wiping
31 #Come o::n# ((muffled speech)) Ella's nose))
32 (0.5)
33 Car: [((moving chair closer to table. Scraping sound.))
34 Ell: [JUST LOOK [for °it°
35 Car: [ELLA ↓I know we don't have a lid my sunshine

Ell: (.) #MOM::EE::#

#EH:::#

Car: Mm: mm:://((shakes head laterally))

(0.2)

Joh: Ah

(0.4)

Car: [((Places hand in front of face))

J Ell: [~Maa:um why is it you gumpy with me when you don't have a lid~

Car: I'm not grumpy with you my angel ↑pie.

Joh: [((Knocks plate loudly))

Car: [>I'm just afraid that I know I don't have a lid, so there's not really any point< in ↑looking for ↑one

Car: (2.5)//((looks in Ben's direction who drops food))

K Ben: Would another kind of lid (.) be alright?//((picks up food))

(1.0)//((takes bite of food))

Ell: Ye::es

Ben: ((turns round to look in cupboard))



Figure H



Figure I



Figure J



Figure K

Ella, looking in the direction of her father, asks "can you find the lid please". The format of the request is indicative of high entitlement and low contingency. Though Ben makes momentary eye contact with Ella midway through her request (see figure I at line 01) before his gaze returns to his plate, he does not halt his activity of eating or respond in any other manner. Carol responds (line 4) in his turn, denying Ella's request and, in contrast with Ella's low contingency request, asserts contingencies that prevent its granting. Carol then establishes epistemic primacy (Raymond & Heritage, 2006) over the lid's whereabouts with a claim of first-hand knowledge of its fate (line 6). In complaint, Ella asks why and, thus, seeks an account for her mother's objectionable actions while interrogating her mother's choice to throw the lid away. Carol explains with another assertion that she knew Ella did not "need" the lid (line 10) again claiming epistemic authority over the matter at hand (Raymond & Heritage, 2006). Ella, however, responds with a "but"-prefaced counter-assertion (Heritage, 1984a) that she wanted rather than needed the lid – making this a personal matter on which her mother should not have made a decision (see a similar example in Waring, 2020, p. 123).

Delivered with a whining prosody, this complaint orients to emotional rather than epistemic order acting as a remedy-solicit (Kidwell, 2013), placing her mother at fault for this upsetting situation and, thus, making her responsible for a solution. Ella is making claim to being a wronged party. Treating Ella's complaint as continued pursuit of the lid, Carol denies culpability and provision of a remedy while dismissing Ella's negative affective stance by shaking her head and reorienting to epistemic (rather than affective) order by clarifying the contingency - there is no lid that can fit the bottle (line 17). Ben then reinforces Carol's actions with an affirmative "ja" (Afrikaans for yes or yeah).

At first Ella responds in disagreement with a fast paced and loud "no" (line 20) in overlap with her father's confirmatory assertion. Subsequent to both parents' assertions of not having a lid that fits, Ella abandons the whining prosody, explaining that she can "then" use "the lid" as a vessel for the water, i.e. it does not need to fit – she aligns her project with the no-fit contingency. However, Carol responds by reasserting that they "don't have a lid" so Ella's request still cannot be granted.

Over a second passes without a response from Ella. Carol changes the subject and course of action by demanding Ella let her wipe her nose. Though the camera angle does not show the actions clearly, the body positions and Ella's muffled speech suggest she has complied with her mother's demand allowing Carol to wipe her nose. However, during the nose-wiping process (lines 29 to 32), Ella continues and escalates her pursuit of the lid by issuing a summons ("mom") followed by a complaining demand ("come on"). Both deontic and emotional social relations are at play. This is followed by a loud clarifying demand to "just look for it". Despite her mother's claims of contingencies preventing compliance, Ella's demand orients to a lack of contingencies with the use of "just". Her dismissal of contingencies as barriers to compliance displays heightened entitlement to have her demands met. Not only are these deontically incongruent claims that dismiss Carol's epistemic claims,

but Ella's heightened display of frustration and demanding tone again place Carol at fault and as responsible for supplying an immediate remedy. Ella's demand is interrupted and halted by Carol, who matches Ella's volume to both sanction Ella and secure the turn as Ella subsequently lowers her voice. In response to Ella's dismissal of contingencies preventing compliance, Carol reclaims epistemic primacy with the reassertion "I know we don't have a lid my sunshine" (line 35). Carol mitigates her response with the affiliative address term "my sunshine". This affiliative address term at the end of the turn possibly acts to neutralise her initial display of frustration and invert Ella's negative stance.

Ella continues her pursuit (lines 36 to 38) with "mommee" that is more than whining and acts as a sanctioning complaint that again points to Carol as being at fault for the situation and responsible for a solution. This pursuit and stance are sanctioned by Carol, who directs her not to continue her actions with "mm mm" and a shake of her head, claiming authority over Ella's actions. Ella does not comply with her mother's demand but, instead, in a heightened display of frustration, explicitly accuses her mother of being grumpy ("gumpy") and at fault ("you don't have the lid") in a wobbly, nasal, pre-crying voice (Butler & Edwards, 2018). This escalated complaint serves to counter-sanction Carol for her negative affective stance, thereby reclaiming her wronged status. During this complaint, Carol raises her hand to her face (figure J at line 43) in a show of exasperation and, thereafter, dismisses Ella's accusation that she is grumpy. Although Carol's tone of voice displays irritation, she again attempts to neutralise her negative affective stance by calling Ella "angel pie". She then accounts for her lack of compliance with an explanation that there is no point looking for a lid she knows is not there – she is sticking to her epistemic claims.

Ella does not respond, and without an indication of acceptance or actions of further pursuit, a continued stand-off is possible. Carol's torso and gaze move in Ben's direction, possibly appealing to him to intervene. Though Ben does not overtly acknowledge Carol's

gestures, he proposes an alternative solution by asking if "another kind of lid" would "be alright" (line 50; figure K). Ben is formulating the proposal as an alternative solution rather than a conflicting one; he is complying with Ella's demands for a resolution in light of being wronged, however, he does not bring Carol's epistemic claims or deontic authority into question while doing so. After a second, Ella agrees to this compromise, but this agreement is accompanied with a continued emotional display of being upset and wronged.

As in the excerpts 4.4 to 4.6 above, the child attempts to influence her parents' actions and, in the face of noncompliance, pursues compliance with a variety of strategies. Unlike in excerpt 4.5, she does not relinquish her pursuit in the face of consistent noncompliance and parents' explanations of contingencies. Like in excerpt 4.6, she shifts from a deontic to an emotional order in her pursuit of compliance, but dissimilar from excerpt 4.6, she continues her pursuit despite sanctions, choosing to counter-sanction her mother instead of complying. Instead of pursuing her demand, she is now pursuing a remedy as a wronged party. Ultimately the shift from deontic to emotional claims leads to some degree of success in having her demands met. In the face of non-compliance, she does not adjust her actions to become more congruent with her deontic stance; rather she continues to demand parental action on the grounds of being wronged – her mother threw away a lid she now wants and her demands are based on the need to rectify this parental breach in accountable expectations (Wootton, 2005). Ella's pursuit embodies the wronged party status, thus invoking emotional order as she claims heightened rights to display emotional distress, which she treats as trumping whatever limitations there may otherwise be on her deontic authority. Her claim to these emotional rights does result in her father attempting to comply with her demands and, thus, she has some degree of success with this strategy. What might be considered deviant or, as Wootton (2005) describes, "spoiled" behaviour on the part of the child through a developmental lens, is clearly a locally constructed negotiation of rights across epistemic,

deontic and affective domains in response to an accountable parental breach in the child's expectations.

Discussion

Young children can actively test the boundaries of their influence, exercising deontic authority over their parents by issuing demands of them and pursuing compliance. Though there are normative expectations that the parent is higher in authority than the child, parent or child may be considered as the authority of a particular domain at any given time. It is problematic to assume static asymmetries of authority in the parent-child dyad, as the analysis demonstrates how the distribution of deontic rights relative to domains of influence are negotiated *in situ*.

As seen in excerpts 4.1 and 4.6, and the noted literature, parental pursuits of children's compliance routinely follow an escalating trajectory that reinforce the parent's higher deontic status. Excerpts 4.4 to 4.6 demonstrate a similar trajectory of escalation when a child pursues parental compliance. However, the parent's responses to the pursuit orient to the child's actions as incongruent with their lower deontic status, reinforcing the parent's authority over the child and restricting the progressivity of the child's project. In response to the parent reifying their own authority and restricting the child's agenda, the child may, in continued pursuit, perform more deontically congruent actions by utilizing category-bound interactional practices to manage their social position (such as shifting from demands to requests or doing whining). In the end, as seen with epistemic status and stance (Heritage, 2012), deontic status trumps deontic stance as both parent and child are (re)socialised into a shared understanding of the distribution of deontic rights in momentary domains of influence. However, not all pursuits are continued claims to deontic rights; as in excerpt 4.7, the child pursues a remedy to a problem rather than compliance to a demand, thus orienting to emotional rights.

In this chapter, I have identified methods young children employ to exercise authority in interaction with their parents: they take high authority stances by issuing demands of their parents and, in cases where parents do not comply, children can pursue compliance and, in their pursuit, can manage their limited authority in particular domains of influence by utilising category-bound interactional practices.

Chapter 5: Children Demanding Parental Attention

Introduction

In this chapter, I investigate children's use of a particular type of demand as a method they can employ to garner parental attention to solicit assessments of their productions. Conversation-analytic studies of very young children (one to three years of age) have demonstrated children's awareness of and engagement with adult's attentional focus; they monitor parents' attention in relation to their own sanctionable acts (Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2006) and they establish joint attention through attention-organizing practices such as showing, pointing or providing assessments of objects (Burdelski & Morita, 2017; Filipi, 2009; Keel, 2016; Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007; Searles, 2018). Importantly, these studies show that establishing joint attention is an interactional accomplishment and "a necessary feature of potential or actual engagement, and the range of activities that presuppose and emerge out of engagement" (Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007, p. 609). Since a key feature of parent-child interaction within the home is that parents and children, though co-present, are often engaged with different tasks (Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013, 2018; Keel, 2016; Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007), parents and children consistently encounter the challenge of redirecting each other's attention and establishing the joint attention necessary for engagement. For parents wishing to have their children perform a task, establishing joint attention through verbal (e.g. a summons) and/or embodied (e.g. manoeuvring the child's body) means is crucial for orchestrating directive sequences (Goodwin, 2006; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2018). Young children wishing to secure their parents' attention can, among other things, deploy demands like "look at *X*" or "check *X*" (as shown in the previous chapter's excerpts 4.2 and 4.4). In this chapter, I take a closer look at this type of demand as a child's method for establishing joint attention to garner an affirming assessment of their production.

Joint Attention

Joint attention has received significant consideration from scholars interested in children's language and social development (Akhtar & Gernsbacher, 2007; Moore & Dunham, 1995) and refers to co-present parties' simultaneous focus on or engagement with a common environmental element (Baldwin, 1995) along with an awareness of their mutual attending (Tomasello, 1995). Scholars have continued to grapple with the question of how to measure joint attention while distinguishing gaze direction from joint focus or mutual engagement (see Akhtar & Gernsbacher, 2007; Moore & Dunham, 1995). Psychological sciences have typically investigated joint attention between parent, child and object in laboratory settings, treating joint attention as a psychological phenomenon without consideration as to how joint attention is achieved in interaction, thereby impeding the study of joint attention as a fundamentally social phenomenon (Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2006, 2007).

Kidwell and Zimmerman (2006, 2007), in the tradition of conversation analysis, emphasised the need to study joint attention in natural settings and to investigate how joint attention is accomplished in interaction, specifically "how one draws and sustains another's attention to an object, and thereby renders it observable?" (Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007, p. 594). Like in other studies of joint attention, they addressed the key question of intersubjectivity (how it can be known that participants have a shared experience or understanding of what they are attending to and why), but rather than arguing for a specific operational definition of what constitutes joint attention as a shared experience to allow for its measurement, they examined everyday interactions and participants' orientations to physical objects and the social implications of attending to them that reflect a shared understanding. They found that in instances of very young children showing objects to an adult, both adult and child orient to the showing as requiring a response from the adult beyond the

establishment of mutual attending. Thus, Kidwell and Zimmerman (2007) demonstrated that establishing joint attention is more than a perceptual act but is interactionally organised (see Keel, 2016; Searles, 2018; Sittonen et al., 2021). Similarly, I examine how young children establish joint attention through the demand to "look at *X*" or "check *X*" and what participants orient to as a relevant next (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973).

The "Look" Demand

Instances of very young children telling their parents to look at something can be found in past conversation-analytic work on parent-child interaction that investigated children's methods for garnering joint attention. Filipi (2009) found that children, aged approximately 10 months, use pointing as a means of starting a conversation and gaining parental attention with minimal vocalisations (also see Keel, 2016). Later on, children aged 15 to 18 months use less pointing and more vocalisations. Vocalisations for both age groups included "look" which Filipi (2009, pp. 125-135) characterised as an "attentional vocalisation". Similarly, Keel's (2016) examination of very young children's (between two to three years of age) assessments and their pursuit of parental responses provided an example of a child who, after not receiving a parental response to an assessment, pursues a response by obtaining his mother's attention with "look mom" before repeating the assessment (see page 95). Keel (2016) characterised this action as a summons that brings the referent into the epistemic domain of the parent to allow for a response. Furthermore, Davidson (2009) investigated practices for establishing talk when parent and child are engaging with an image on a computer screen. On two occasions the child of almost three years of age uses "look" to draw attention to an aspect of the image on screen. The analysis did not engage with these actions in depth, but like Keel and Filipi, characterised the "look" as a summons. In general, the author noted that the child utilises pointing with a finger or cursor, along with summons and directives, to get the attention of others and to draw the attention to an aspect of the

image (Davidson, 2009). These previous conversation-analytic studies of children's practices have noted that children use "look" as a summons to establish joint attention, but this action or the parental responses were not the primary focus of their investigations. As characterised in the previous chapter and the recent article by Siitonen et al. (2021) (in their investigation of Finnish family members telling one another to "kato/look" during outdoor activities), the "look" or "check" utterances are demands/directives – they direct the recipient's attention by telling them to do something, which displays a high entitlement to influence another's actions and projects compliance without an orientation to contingencies that may prevent such (Craven & Potter, 2010).

Searles (2018) investigated how a young child (aged three years and six months) showed objects to remote adults during video-mediated interactions and how these acts of showing were collaboratively produced by child and adults. In two examples, the child says, "Look it Daddy?" or "Look it Gama?" to draw attention to an object (a dress or plant) that she then shows the remote adult by physically holding it up. Like the previously mentioned authors, Searles characterises the "look" utterance as a summons to garner attention for the showing of the object - the physical movement/manipulation of the object to make it visible. The utterance is characterised as a prompt or pre-show followed by the physical showing of an object that provides the observer with visual access to the object. The focus of the analysis was on the physical act of showing rather than the utterance (labelled a summons) that draws attention to it, while also engaging with the responses from the adults. Importantly, what Searles (2018) observed was that in response to being shown an object, adults either identify the object in the case of unnamed objects or positively assessed named objects. Searles (2018) suggests (in the context of video-mediated interaction) the showing act is designed to get a response of naming or assessing, while I argue that the "look" utterance (in face-to-face interaction) initiates this sequence resulting in an assessment, where the act of showing the

object may or may not form part of the sequence in the case of in-person interaction. I propose that, in my data with young children and their parents, the "look at *X*" is more than a summons to gain attention or a pre-showing (as showing is not the next action in my data set). Furthermore, while at face value this action appears to demand parental attention (that parents look at *X*), this is not the ultimate goal of the action. Rather, joint attention, as secured through the demand, is required for an assessment of an assessable object or action, with the assessment being the ultimate goal of the action. In this chapter, I examine previously undescribed ways in which children utilise a particular type of demand to not only summon parental attention but to solicit parental assessments.

Assessments

Knowledge is shared and produced *in situ* through actions like making assessments (Burdelski & Morita, 2017). Assessment activities orient to both affective and epistemic orders (Burdelski & Morita, 2017): by making an assessment, a speaker displays a positive or negative affective stance toward the assessable (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992; Sidnell, 2014; also Keel, 2016) while also making an epistemic claim of access to, and knowledge of, the assessable (Pomerantz, 1984; also Keel, 2016). In the limited conversation-analytic studies of assessments in adult-child interaction, adults use assessments like "dangerous" to warn children against an activity (Burdelski, 2015) and children as young as two years old initiate interaction with a parent by offering an assessment that makes a parental response relevant (Burdelski & Morita, 2017; Keel, 2015, 2016). Keel (2015, p. 22) explained that "young children treat assessments as important tools with which to (re-)engage others in social interactions and to build up a shared understanding or evaluation concerning the world they are encountering and/or the activities they are engaged in". In this chapter, I investigate how children use the "look at *X*" demand to (re-)engage their parents in interaction in order to solicit parental assessments of their productions, and to construct a shared understanding of

their proficiency in task production; thus aiding their skill development and sense of competence. It is not just any assessment that the child is seeking; rather it is one that shows appreciation for the object that the child has called attention to (the assessable object).

Analysis begins with an investigation of the "look at *X*" demand as a means of securing parental attention to garner an affirming assessment of a child's production. I examine what this demand accomplishes in child-parent interaction; what the demand does at the sequential level, what it reflects about the order of social relations, and what it does for the participation structure of activities-in-progress. I also investigate instances of children pursuing a specific parental assessment, an occurrence of a parent responding with a question rather than an assessment, and an instance of the demand being used to perform an alternative action. Together this collection of cases provides evidence that these specific demands are a method that children can use to pursue affirmative assessments of their productions from their parents to gauge their task proficiency.

Eliciting an Assessment

In the excerpts to follow the child demands the parent "look at" or "check" something they have produced, and the parent complies. In the first excerpt (5.1)[29], Ella (the daughter) is drawing at the kitchen island and Carol (the mother), who has been serving food by the oven, has picked up a baking tray, while Ben (the father) is standing behind Ella (figure L).

Excerpt 5.1: C2017_06_22_45a

01		Ell:	Mom check [I drew a ↑se:al
02	**M**	Car:	[((turns gaze to Ella))
03			[(0.5)//((approaching Ella))
04		Ell:	[((looks at mom and then back down at picture))
05	**N**	Car:	.hhhh [y]o:: it's so coo::l//((looking at drawing))

[29] This excerpt is number 4.2 of the previous chapter; however, I examine it in more detail here.

06 [((clank sound))]

Figure L Figure M Figure N

With both parents present, Ella demands her mother's attention with "Mom check". On hearing the directive, her mother complies and turns her head to look in Ella's direction (figure M at line 2). Ella continues her utterance with an announcement that she "drew a seal" – drawing attention to her production. With this information of what to "check", Kate walks over to Ella to examine the referent (figure N at line 5) (Pomerantz, 1984). With her gaze on the drawing, she provides Ella with a show of amazement (thus making an embodied display that she is attending to the picture) and a positive assessment of the drawing (line 5). Ella has secured her mother's attention that is followed by an affirmative assessment of her production (a drawing). Carol, choosing to comply with Ella, only momentarily suspends her food-serving activity to examine and assess, before resuming it. The child demands the parents' attention and the parent examines the production by looking, without the child taking the additional step of holding up the drawing or bringing it to the parent, as in the case of Searles (2018) examples of video-mediated interactions. Consequently, the demand (rather than the showing) initiates the sequence resulting in an affirming assessment. Furthermore, "check" it is not a summons or pre-showing but a demand for action on the part of the parent.

In excerpt 5.2, Kate (the mother) walks into the room with Amy (the daughter) following behind her. Amy demands that Kate look at her as she has placed her headband over her eyes like glasses. This time it is an embodied action that the child is producing and drawing her mother's attention to, rather than an object like the drawing in the above excerpt. The excerpt begins with Amy demanding her mother's attention (but she is out of camera view at this point).

Excerpt 5.2: S009_20170417_153148

01		Amy:	↑Look at me [ma me::	
02	**O**	Kat:	[((turning torso, moves hair))	
03			(0.2)//((stops walking, turns and looks at Amy))	
04	**P**		(°Monkey°)	
05			((Turns back and continues walking))	(0.5)
06		Amy:	((enters room wearing her headband as glasses))	
07		Kat:	You: ar::e a mon::key:://((singing))	
08		Amy:	(0.2)//((taking off headband))	
09			Mon::key:: mon::key::	
10	**Q**		You: ar::e a mon::key::	((putting headband on head,
11			Monkey monkey monkey	singing))
12			Monkey monkey monkey	

Figure O

Figure P

Figure Q

Amy (off camera) directs Kate to "look" while informing her what to look at with "at me mommy". Kate complies with the demand by turning around and moving her hair behind her ear and out of her eye-line to look at Amy. After looking, Kate responds verbally, possibly saying "monkey". Then, turning back and walking into the room, she calls Amy a monkey which in this specific context suggests that her behaviour is silly. She says it in a singing voice that frames her assessment of Amy as playful. Amy comes into camera view, revealing that she has placed her headband over her eyes like glasses and, presumably, it is this playful action with the headband that she wished her mother to see and assess. Amy repeats her mother's song, thus orienting to her mother's assessment as positive – she was being playful and was seeking and has received affirmation of such. While Amy places her headband back on her head to use it as it is intended and continues to sing, Kate looks for something in the cupboard. As with the previous example, the child has momentarily secured her mother's attention along with an affirmative assessment of her actions by issuing a "look at *X*" demand. The mother only momentarily suspends her activity of walking into the room to comply with the child before turning back around and continuing her course of action.

In these two cases and recurrently in the data, when parent and child are co-present but their attention is on different tasks, the child establishes joint attention with the parent on an assessable object (a child's production, whether it be a physical object or embodied conduct) by directing their attention with "look at X" or "check X" - momentarily bringing their parents' attention to the progression or completion of their task. Note that in each case, along with the demand to look/check is an informing/announcement ("at *X*") that tells the parent what they are looking at or checking, such as "at me" or "I drew a seal": The child's utterance follows the formula of *demand (look/check) + informing (at X)*. In this way the child's utterance serves to direct parental attention to a particular production (of a silly use of a headband or the drawing of a seal) and, now with access to the production, the parent routinely complies by examining and providing an affirming assessment of the object/action of interest. In these cases, participants are treating this *demand + informing* practice as eliciting the respondent's gaze to allow for an examination and affirming assessment. The use of this practice calls attention to something the child has produced or is doing and is designed to bring about a specific outcome – a positive assessment. This practice sets in motion a coupled pair of responsive actions with attending being required for assessing.

Tarplee (1993) and Filipi (2009, p. 135) found that when very young children who are progressing in language acquisition make verbal productions, their parents provide affirming responses as locally relevant next actions. In this way, the parents monitor and guide their children's language development (Filipi, 2009; Tarplee, 1993). Similarly, the young children in my data, who are participating in tasks and progressing in task proficiency, are actively seeking their parents' assessments of their productions to monitor their own development. In this sense, by seeking the parents' assessment and praise for their production, children orient to themselves as apprentices developing skills and parents as proficient and knowledgeable authorities on these skills.

In excerpts 5.1 and 5.2, the child brings the parents' attention to the referent and, with this access, the parents are able to provide an affirming assessment of it (Pomerantz, 1984). The assessment in the form of praise displays a positive affective stance toward the assessable, while also claiming knowledge of what makes for a positive production ("cool" drawing or monkey-like behaviour). By providing the assessment, the parents claim knowledge of the production (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Raymond & Heritage, 2006); and by praising it, knowledge of what makes for a good production/competence. Through this demand-assessment sequence, normative expectations of parents' epistemic status as knowledgeable and developed figures and children's status as developing apprentices are (re)produced. However, the degree of specificity that the informing provides indicates different degrees of what the child expects the parent to know – indicating whether knowledge of the assessable is within the parent's domain of knowledge. In excerpt 5.1, the informing component is specific, thus minimizing any potential trouble in recognising the assessable object and placing little burden on the parent to be informed or figure out what needs to be assessed while potentially indicating that the parent is not expected to know what the assessable is (i.e. the assessable is not obviously knowable). However, in excerpt 5.2 the informing "at me" is more oblique, thus leaving it up to the parent to be informed about what it is about Amy that is assessable or newsworthy. In the next section, children pursue specific assessments from their parents.

Pursuing a specific assessment

Conversation-analytic research on young children's actions has demonstrated that children can choose to pursue adequate responses from their parents when these are not initially forthcoming. Wootton (2007), Butler and Wilkinson (2013) and Keel (2016) demonstrated that young children (around two years of age) can choose to pursue an adequate response to a request or assessment by repeating themselves and providing additional

information. In the next two excerpts, the children pursue adequate responses to their "look" demands by repeating the demand (+ informing) and adding additional information to secure a specific noticing and affirmative assessment.

In excerpt 5.3, the child directs the parent to look without an informing component, which is followed by an expansion of the sequence. Ella is filling a sock with alphabet-shaped pasta at the kid's activity table that is located just outside the kitchen area where Carol is putting food away in the cupboard.

Excerpt 5.3: C 2017_06_20_14

01		Ell:	[Mom
02		Car:	[((turning away from cupboard))
03		Ell:	Check
04	**R**	Car:	(0.2)//((looks at Ella, raises eyebrow, walking to counter))
05		Ell:	I've got a great idea//((walking to kitchen))
06		Car:	Ja::? ((looking at Ella, picking up items))
07		Ell:	I've got the best (.) ever [sock
08			[((holds out sock))
09	**S**	Car:	(0.5)//((looking at it))
10			↑Wo::wah: °and [tha-° //((turning to counter))
11		Ell:	[Check how coo::l
12	**T**	Car:	(1.75)((bends over to look more closely))
13			.hh That is rea:lly awesome [Paa↑paa
14			[((turning away))
15		Ell:	[((turning away))
16			DAD
17		Ben:	Ja?
18		Ell:	I'VE GOT AN IDEA



Figure R

Figure S



Figure T

Ella, standing up from her table and turning to face her mother, summons her "mom", who is in the process of turning away from the cupboard. Ella directs Carol to "check"; and Carol, now facing Ella, complies by jutting her head forward and looking at Ella (see figure R). Ella's initial summons and demand did not include an informing ("at X") (as seen in excerpts 5.1 and 5.2) or a physical showing of her production, and Carol's response orients to this missing information as she raises her eyebrow, thus displaying her lack of access to the referent – access to the referent is required to make an assessment of it (Pomerantz, 1984). In turn, Ella informs her mother that she has "a great idea" while moving towards her – embedded in this informing is an assessment that her idea is great and, thus, worthy of a positive assessment. Still requiring further information to respond, Carol prompts Ella to elaborate ("ja?" meaning yes/yeah in Afrikaans). Ella explains with a more informative assessment of her own production that she has "the best ever sock". This assessment is an extreme case formulation ("best ever"), that justifies her pursuit of her mother's attention and response (Pomerantz, 1986). On reaching her mother's side, Ella holds out her sock for inspection. By showing the object, she is again making a response from her mother relevant – a response that would indicate an understanding of what she is being shown (Kidwell &

Zimmerman, 2007; Searles, 2018). Carol now has epistemic access to the referent and can provide an agreement/assessment (Pomerantz, 1984). As seen in the previous two excerpts where the parent first attends and then assesses, Carol leans forward to see inside the sock (see figure S) and displays amazement with "wowah". She continues to speak ("and tha-") while turning back to the counter and away from Ella. Ella, however, secures the turn (Sack et al., 1974), drawing her mother's attention back to her production by directing her again to "check" and informing her "how cool" while further opening up the sock for a closer inspection. Carol, abandoning her utterance, turns back to the sock, leans down further and takes time to examine the sock more closely, even touching it (see figure T). Thereafter, Carol offers an affirming assessment of Ella's creation, with a noticeable inhalation of amazement and "that's really awesome", thus treating Ella's re-demand and personal assessment as an indication that her previous examination and assessment were inadequate. Nearing the end of her second assessment, both Carol and Ella turn away from each other orienting to a satisfactory ending to the interaction (see Searles, 2018) – the second assessment aligns with Ella's own assessment that she has "a great idea" and "the best ever sock", demonstrates an understanding of what Ella is showing (Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007) and is treated as adequate by both parties. Ella moves off camera to show her father (who is in another room) the creation.

Throughout this interaction, both parties orient to "check" as an action seeking more of a response than the gaze from the parent. Unlike excerpts 5.1 and 5.2, the child does not initially follow the *demand + informing* formula: the lack of an informing component may indicate that Ella assumed that her production would be obvious to her mother on sight and places the burden on Carol to be competent and informed or to become informed – a task Carol takes on by seeking clarity.

In excerpt 5.4, Amy is wearing a new dress and leggings that have heart shapes on them. Kate is brushing Amy's hair as they discuss the hearts on her new outfit. Amy has both her hands in the heart pockets of her dress and her gaze follows Mark throughout the forthcoming interaction. Mark walks into the room, unaware of the prior heart-outfit conversation. Mark has just opened the blinds of the small window.

Excerpt 5.4: S006_20170422_074931

01		Mar:	[((walking backwards))
02		Amy:	[↑£L:ook [at me ↑Da:d£
03	**V**	Mar:	[((looks at Amy))
04			[>Mmhmm< ((turning to other window))
05		Amy:	[Look ↓dow::n at me
06	**W**	Mar:	I must look down?//((Opening curtain, looks at Amy))
07			(0.2)//((looking at each other))
08			[>Hello?<
09		Amy:	[No yo:u must look down
10		Mar:	Okay//((closes cupboard door behind him))
11			And then what//((opens curtain))
12			£And say hello?£//((looks at her and smiles))
13		Amy:	°No:°
14			°You must° loo::k [down
15	**X**	Mar:	[((cocks head, frowns))
16			(0.8)
17	**Y**		[((head shifts down, opens eyes wide))
18		Amy:	[£Cos of ma ↑hearties£
19		Mar:	(0.5)//((moves eyebrows))
20		Kat:	°>She wants you to notice her hearts<°
21	**Z**	Mar:	Ah hoh hoh//((laughs, smiles))
22			Oh I see//((rubbing eye))

```
23          I saw the hearts tho=on your top (.) before
24          and they [look awe- ((walking towards her))
25     Amy:          [>AND<///((lifting knee up))
26     Mar: a:nd on your knees
27          (0.5)//((scratches neck))
28     Amy: [Mm ((looking down at outfit, smiling))
29     Mar: [They look ↑l:ove lee:
```

Figure U

Figure V



Figure W

Figure X



Figure Y



Figure Z

Mark is undertaking the task of opening the curtains and blinds in the room. Though the camera view is of the back of Mark's head, the orientation of his head suggests that, after opening the blind of the small window, he is looking in the direction of Amy and Kate but possibly with his gaze just above and beyond them towards the door (see figure U). As Mark takes a step backwards, Amy demands he look at her with "Look at me Dad". Like excerpt 5.2, the informing component "at me" lacks specificity, thus leaving it up to Mark to be informed about what it is about Amy that is assessable or newsworthy, and suggesting that the assessable is obvious and within his domain of understanding. While continuing to walk backwards, his gaze immediately shifts to her in compliance (see figure V). Upon reaching the other window, he turns to it as he responds with the minimal acknowledgment token "mmhmm" - orienting to Amy as the current speaker who will elaborate further, while acknowledging Amy's demand and indicating a willingness to comply (Jefferson, 1984a). An assessment has not been offered in response as in excerpts 5.1 and 5.2. Amy simultaneously clarifies her demand, becoming a little more specific with "look down at me", continuing her pursuit of an assessment.

Opening the first of two curtains, he asks, "I must look down?" and turns to look at her with an expression of confusion (see figure X). A moment passes without a response as

Mark walks backwards alongside the window, keeping his gaze on Amy. He responds with a greeting ("hello?") but his questioning intonation indicates his uncertainty about the adequacy of his response. Amy simultaneously replies with "no you must look down": her rejection of his responses indicates that he is indeed misunderstanding her in some way. She does not provide clarity in her explanation but instead repeats her instruction, placing the burden on Mark to know what she is referring to once again. Despite indicating he does not know what she is asking of him, she orients to the situation as obvious and within his epistemic reach[30].

Mark indicates compliance with "okay" while looking down at her and simultaneously closing the cupboard door. He continues to pursue clarity by asking what the next action should be ("and then what?"), suggesting and asking if it is to "say hello" as he opens the last curtain. He does this with a big encouraging smile. Both parties are orienting to the informing demand as soliciting more than Mark's gaze: Amy, having secured his gaze, continues to repeat her informing demand, thus seeking more than his gaze; and Mark is indicating a willingness to comply, while orienting to the incomplete nature of his gaze response by asking what comes next. Amy's informing suggests that by looking down at her the news will be self-evident, while Mark's uncertainty regarding his next response suggests it is not. Amy has had her hands in her heart pockets throughout the interaction, which may be a way of showing her father what to look at, thus attempting to bring attention to the referent – this, however, is only speculation as her hands have been in her pockets since her

[30] In Searles (2018) examples of video-mediated interaction, minimal informing is provided but the burden of clarity is not placed on the remote parent. Rather the child includes a showing - the child uses the formula *demand (Look) + minimal informing (it) + summons (Daddy/Gamma)* following by overt/explicit *showing*.

mother and her spoke of the hearts prior to Mark's entry to the room and there is no overt orientation to the pockets or raising of them in a showing action.

Amy responds "no" to his suggestion and repeats that he "must look down". Now with the curtains open, Mark stands still, no longer splitting his attention between Amy and the curtain task. In an exaggerated manner, he cocks his head to the side and frowns to display confusion and prompt further information-giving (a similar embodied response to Carol's need for more information in excerpt 5.3). Amy now has her father's undivided attention and compliance with her demand to look, yet a clarifying response is not forthcoming. Mark moves his head slightly down, opening his eyes wide in exaggerated compliance, as Amy provides some clarity ("because of my hearties"). However, he displays continued confusion by moving his eyebrows up and down, prompting Kate to intervene with an explanation that Amy wants him to "notice" the hearts. All parties, including Kate, are orienting to the need for an assessment in response[31].

With the referent clarified, Mark laughs in relief before issuing a change-of-state token "oh" (Heritage, 1984a; Searles, 2018) indicating receipt of new information. He indicates he now understands what is being asked of him ("I see") before accounting for the confusion – the hearts are not news to him as he has already seen them. He then provides the affirmative assessment that Amy has been seeking. However, his explanation indicates he has seen the hearts on her top without reference to those down on her knees. Amy prompts him to notice more, with "and" as she lifts her knee up. He complies with her prompt, including the hearts on her knees in his assessment. He emphasises the affirmative nature of his assessment by stressing "lovely". With the assessment complete, the sequence comes to an end (see Searles, 2018).

[31] See Searles (2018) discussion of a co-present parent orienting to an assessment as missing from the remote grandmother after a showing.

In this excerpt, the initial *demand + (vague) informing* receives a look but not an assessment in response; the look alone is treated as inadequate and the assessment as missing. This interaction and the pursuits it engendered demonstrates that the informing demand is treated by both the child and parents as a solicitation of more than the respondent's gaze and attention. Joint attention on the exact assessable object along with an affirmative assessment of the newsworthy production is required as a response. Access to the exact referent requires more information, which in this case is further information but in other cases could be resolved through showing (see Searles, 2018). It is possible that Mark is not recognising Amy's outfit as a production while Amy is treating it as one since it was her choice – in excerpts to follow I revisit how parents' use the nature of an object or action as a resource for understanding what the "look at X" action is requiring of them. The child actively pursues an affirmative assessment and places the burden of being informed about the assessable object firmly on the parent. The lack of an assessment is treated as an accountable action, both in the continued repetition of the demand in pursuit of a suitable assessment and in Mark's accounting for the omission by explaining that the newsworthiness of the referent was at issue.

The use of this practice calls attention to something the child has produced or is doing and is designed to bring about a specific outcome: in these circumstances, a positive assessment with a preference for praise (Pomerantz, 1984) is the conditionally relevant response[32] (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 19-21; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) to the "Look at X" demand.

[32] To establish conditional relevance of the assessment as a response, I have shown how the assessment routinely follows the demand and attending but also how, when an assessment does not follow the demand, it is treated as missing/absent. See Keel (2016) for a discussion on young children's orientations to conditional relevance when their initial assessments are not responded to by their parents.

In the excerpt to follow, what the parent should look at and appraise is clear (unlike the previous two excerpts), but what the referent actually is and, thus, its a*ss*essability (rather than a*cc*essibility) is in question. After examining the referent, the parent responds with a question about the production rather than an assessment of it, indicating a potentially negative stance towards the production while redirecting the burden of a response onto the child.

Responding with a question

The interaction in excerpt 5.5, takes place sometime after that of excerpt 5.1. Ella has continued to draw what she categorises as "sea creatures" and Carol is now sitting next to her at the counter with John on her lap. After Ella draws each creature, she instructs her mother to check her drawing and (as in the previous excerpts) attendance followed by praise is recurrently offered by Carol in response. However, on this occasion, after Ella demands her mother's attention, Carol asks a question about the referent rather than offering an assessment. As the sequence begins, Ben is cutting and serving chicken while Carol is moving John (her son) from her lap to the chair next to her.

Excerpt 5.5 C2017_06_22_46

01	Car:	Wait Johnny sit on your chair	⎫
02		[Let me get Ella a tissue	⎪ ((Carol putting John
03	Ell:	[>Mom check< a bi::rd (0.2)	⎪ on his chair))
04		A bi:rd (0.5)	⎪
05		on a::s::tick//((looks up and down))	⎭
06	Car:	((turns to look at Ella's page))	⎫ (0.5)
07	Ell:	((looks up and down))	⎭
08	Ell:	Here//((points with pencil))	
09	Car:	↑How's a bird [end up on a stick?	
10		[((pushes chair back to stand))	
11	Ell:	[No:::	

12 Joh: [((raises arms))
13 Car: [((picks up John, turns to Ella))
14 Is it like thi-
15 **AA** OH
16 like is he sitting on it?=
17 =hs=Perched on it
18 ((exits camera view))
19 Ell: Ja:::
20 Car: Mm hmm [(like w-)
21 Ell: [Like birds ↑do:
22 ↑like they
23 (0.2) ⎫ ((Ella perches on stool))
24 **BB** They sit like[this ⎭
25 Car: [Ja like they perch on it
26 Ell: Ja:
27 (0.3)//sitting down))
28 [°you see like°-
29 Car: [((enters camera view with tissue))
30 (4.0)//((wipes Ella's nose))
31 Can you blow out of there yet Ella?
32 Ell: Mom?
33 Car: Mm:?
34 Ell: (0.2)//((climbs off chair, exits camera view))
35 Ben: There [Ce ce//((puts plate on island))
36 Ell: [Do you [know ha- how (.) ⎫
37 Car: [Thanks ((Ben getting cutlery,
38 Ell: how moves plate in front of
39 Car: [((sitting down)) Carol))
40 [>We need knives and forks here<
41 Ell: perch on (.) sideways sticks? ⎭
42 Car: (0.2)//((adjusting John on her lap))

43 Ye::s?

44 Ell: That's what my bird is doing//((returns to chair))

45 Car: That's awesome my sweedie ↑pie

Figure AA

Figure BB

Ella, with her gaze on her drawing, summons her mother and directs her attention to the drawing of a bird. This takes place while her mother is talking to John and moving him off her lap onto a chair. With Carol's utterance complete, Ella reissues the informing and expands on it by explaining it is a bird on a stick, while briefly looking up to check if Carol is complying. Carol, having completed her task of moving John to the chair, then looks at the drawing in compliance. With Carol's attention secured on the drawing for some time without a response, Ella looks up briefly and then down again, pointing to the page and indicating "here" (clarifying where the parent should look rather than showing/manipulating the object)[33]. Ella is treating Carol's lack of response as an indication that she is not looking at

[33] Searles (2018) argues that by showing objects to remote adults during video-mediated interactions, the young child demonstrates interactional competencies. These findings support this assertion by demonstrating that children, who are co-present with their parents in shared surroundings, utilise a "look at X" directive alone and resort to showing as a means of clarity when an assessment is not forthcoming. Whereas children communicating with a remote adult through video conferencing can adapt their actions to manage the

the correct drawing on the page, but her lack of response could be indicative of an imminent dispreferred response. With the referent clarified, Carol responds with a question about how a bird came to be on a stick. By responding with a question in this manner, Carol indicates confusion regarding the production, which prevents an assessment. This is an insert sequence that is initiating repair (Schegloff, 2007) which indicates that Carol is trying to resolve trouble that is preventing her from providing an assessment that is conditionally relevant[34].

Ella now needs to clarify the production for Carol. Ella's "no" suggests Carol has misunderstood her. Carol then offers an alternate explanation but stops mid-utterance to signal she now understands with "oh" (see figure AA) as she asks if the bird is sitting on it, correcting "sitting" to "perched". Ella agrees and expands her description of how birds sit, even physically demonstrating how they sit (see figure BB). Carol agrees with this explanation and demonstration, but in light of Ella's continued use of "sit" reissues the correct term "perch" – educating Ella and prompting her to edit her language use, thus making relevant an epistemic asymmetry between parent and child (Keel, 2020). With this corrective utterance, parent and child are placed within "categories of the developmental scheme" with the child as a developing language user/learner and the parent as competent language user/teacher (Keel, 2020, p. 165). Ella agrees and continues with a further explanation which is cut short by Carol wiping Ella's nose. Carol then attempts a topic change, asking Ella about her ability to blow her nose, but Ella does not reply to this question. Instead, Ella pursues the missing assessment by countering her mother's question (Schegloff, 2007) with a summons said in a questioning tone (line 32). Carol responds with

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restrictions of remote video-mediated communication by pre-empting the need for clarification by including a showing with the demand.

[34] See Searles (2018) extract 2 where the grandma responds with a question rather than an assessment, only providing the assessment after receiving a clarifying answer to her question.

the acknowledgement token "mm:?" that encourages Ella to continue speaking. Ella returns to the bird topic by asking her mother if she knows how birds perch on sideways sticks. Ella is now utilising the terminology proffered by Carol – she is accepting her mother's correction of her language use. Ben puts a plate on the table and draws Carol's attention to it with "there Cece" (line 35). However, Ella carries on with her conversation, despite Carol's attention being drawn to the plate as she replies with "thanks". With her mother's agreement that she knows how birds perch on sideways sticks (line 36), Ella brings attention back to the drawing by noting that that is what her bird is doing. Ella is pursuing more than her mother's agreement, pushing for understanding that would allow for an assessment and praise. Ella has treated her mother's questions as an indication of a misunderstanding to be rectified. She adapts her explanations, adopting her mother's terminology and redirecting attention back to the production in her pursuit of praise. Throughout the interaction, and despite the intervening nose-wiping and plate-giving sequences, Ella has oriented to the maintenance of a conditionally relevant assessment in response to her demand, and once this is achieved the sequence comes to a close.

After receiving a "look at X" type demand, the parent who is under the obligation to respond with an affirming assessment but faced with a questionable production can indicate trouble in assessing the production with a delayed response in the form of a question. By questioning the production, the parent claims a lack of assessability (they have access but not understanding) (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Pomerantz, 1984). By asking a question, the parent redirects the trajectory of the sequence, offering partial compliance, but mitigating and avoiding articulating the dispreferred response of a negative assessment (Pomerantz, 1984; Schegloff, 2007) by placing the burden of a response to a question on the child (see Sacks, 1995). Learning, however, is not neglected, as the act of questioning the child's production orients to it being problematic and, in repairing the trouble, the mother takes the opportunity

to teach the child the correct term for birds sitting on a stick, through the repeated use of the term "perch", until the child adopts it in her own explanation (see Keel, 2020). Here we see how the parent and child orient to the developmental scheme, treating the parent as teacher and child as learner.

Though the "look at X" demands found within my data set recurrently require praise as a response for a newsworthy production, it is possible that children will issue "look at *X*" demands within contexts that do not lend themselves to assessment seeking and provision. Searles (2018) argues that some showings orient to identification (not assessment) of the object as the relevant response. In Searles' example of a showing requiring identification, the response is a very affirming identification of the shown object "oo: look at those dresses" (2018, p. 105). Siitonen et al. (2021) point out that "kato/look" can be used to accomplish different actions including noticings, showings, and prompts in their investigation of families using this directive during ongoing joint activities to bring attention to a visually accessible objects in their surroundings (not a child's production as is the case in this chapter). In the excerpt to follow, the child uses the demand to establish joint attention for an alternative purpose (i.e. the additional action that the demand carries can be different depending on the context that it renews and shapes (Heritage, 1984b)). The same practice (the "look at X" demand), can be used to implement more than one type of action (Schegloff, 1997). Participants can use features of the context within which the practice is produced to respond with a conditionally relevant action (Schegloff, 1997).

An alternative action

Mark and Amy discuss what book to read for story time and Mark says that it should not be Asterix and Obelix as they have finished that one. Amy agrees and Mark leaves the room. Amy then looks for a book in her bookshelf and takes one out as Mark re-enters the room.

Excerpt 5.6: S063_20170420_192042

01		Mar:	[((walking into the room))
02		Amy:	[((pulling a book out of the shelf))
03	**CC**		£>Look at< [this: one:::£//((turns book over))
04		Mar:	[((clears throat))
05	**DD**		>Should we °read° this one?<//((grabs and looks at book))
06		Amy:	mm ↓yeah ((said in a deep voice))
07		Mar:	Astrix the lee: gin airy

Figure CC

Figure DD

Amy is removing a book from the shelf as Mark enters the room. Amy directs her father to "look at this one" i.e. the book she is suggesting for story time (see figure CC). Within the context of choosing a book for story time (where a similar book in the series about

Asterix has already been deemed an unsuitable option), this demand serves to propose a book choice and elicit confirmation of its suitability rather than to elicit an assessment of a newsworthy production. While directing him, she turns her body away from the shelf and into the room while flipping the book over. Her eyes stay on the book. Though she turns away from the shelf, toward her father, she does not move the book towards him in a showing action but keeps it at her eye level as she flips the book over looking at the cover. Mark complies with her demand by looking at the book, briefly gripping it to take a close look at the cover before releasing it as he walks past (see figure DD). In this way, he shows the book to himself. He seeks clarity that she is proposing this book for story time, which Amy confirms. He then reads out the title, identifying the book (Searles, 2018) while possibly confirming it is a different story about Asterix. They then continue to discuss the title of the book and settle down to read it. The "look at *X*" demand projects compliance with look, examination of the book and acceptance of her choice (within the limitations previously established) as the preferred actions. Neither party orients to an assessment as missing but rather treat the demand as a proposal of a book choice requiring an affirming acceptance of the choice.

As seen in excerpt 5.6, not all "look" demands that are accompanied with an informing announcement are solicitations of affirming assessments. Rather, the context within which the "look" demand is issued shapes what it will elicit. Thus, the directive can be used to establish joint attention for parental engagement with various interactional projects both being shaped by, and shaping, the context (Heritage, 1984b). Within contexts of children showing their productions to their parents, the *look demand + informing of a newsworthy production* by a child is a resource they can utilise to elicit praise to gauge their task proficiency. Parents may orient to the kind of object being shown in ascertaining what kind of response they should offer – the nature of the object is a local resource parents can refer to in

designing an appropriate response. In excerpt 5.6 it is evident that Amy is showing a choice and not a production, hence Mark responds by confirming her choice. This may shed light on the troubles in excerpt 5.4; part of the trouble Mark may have had in determining an appropriate response is that Amy's outfit had not been shown to be a production and was seen as more of a clothing choice. So, the contextual element of whether there is something recognisable as a child's assessable production seems to be an important resource for parents in figuring out what the relevant response to the demand is in any given case.

Discussion

These findings add to the growing body of conversation-analytic studies of children's attention-organizing practices. When child and parent are co-present but occupied with different tasks, children can utilise the "look at X" demand to bring their parents' attention to the progression or completion of their task so as to garner a positive assessment of it. This practice follows the formula of *demand (look/check) + informing (at X)* and makes two responsive actions conditionally relevant, with attending being required for assessing and a preference for a positive assessment. However, this practice can perform alternative actions depending on the context of the production, as participants orient to contextual factors, like the nature of the object being shown, in their design of a response. In cases where attention is drawn to a child's production, the practice is performing an action of seeking an assessment. Whereas in circumstances where attention is being drawn to a choice, confirmation of the choice is the relevant response.

I build on the work of Tarplee (1993) and Filipi (2009, p. 135) who demonstrated how parents monitor and guide children's language development by affirming their verbal productions. In my data, parents affirm children's task proficiency through positive assessments of their productions. However, in these cases the children are actively seeking parental monitoring by initiating these interactions and by pursuing what they deem to be

adequate responses when these are not initially forthcoming. By utilising this practice, children orient to the developmental scheme with themselves as apprentices in development and parents as knowledgeable authorities on the productions they are being asked to assess. The degree of specificity of the informing component of the demand indicates how informed the child thinks the parent is about the referent, with oblique informings placing the burden on the parent to be informed. Furthermore, parents claim knowledge of the production by assessing it, and knowledge of what makes for a proficient production by praising it. When a production is found wanting or questionable, parents can avoid a negative and dispreferred assessment by querying the nature of the production, thus redirecting the burden on the child to clarify the production and/or improve on it. Consequently, normative expectations of parents' epistemic status as knowledgeable and developed figures and children's status as developing apprentices are (re)produced to varying degrees. These findings align with Raymond and Heritage's (2006, p. 680) understanding that "the management of rights to knowledge and, relatedly, rights to describe or evaluate states of affairs can be a resource for invoking identity in interaction".

Overall, children exercise agency in their interactions with their parents by actively seeking and pursuing parental assessments of their productions, effectively monitoring their own competence or task proficiency by reference to their parents' knowledge claims thereof. Consequently, they reinforce normative asymmetries of competence in the parent-child dyad.

Chapter 6: Children Countering Parental Requests

Introduction

As families go about their daily lives, parents and children encounter the challenge of getting one another to participate in a multitude of tasks (Siitonen et al. 2021). Negotiating these, often parent-led, tasks like eating dinner and getting dressed is "central to the organization of family life" (Goodwin, 2006, p. 518) and has received a fair amount of attention from conversation-analytic scholars (for examples of task negotiation in the home see Aronsson & Cekaite, 2011; Fasulo et al., 2007; Goodwin, 2006; Sirota, 2006; Waring, 2020; Waring & Yu, 2017). In this chapter, I examine sequences of negotiation in parent-child interaction, with a focus on children's negotiation strategies of countering parental requests. I outline two types of counters; one challenges the participation structure of the task proposed by the parent's action, while the other redirects the course of action to an alternative task.

Request Sequences

Requests ask something of a respondent, and different types of requests ask for different things as there are, among others, requests-for-*permission*, requests-for-*action*, and requests-for-*information* (Thompson et al., 2015). Furthermore, the syntactic format of a request displays the degree of entitlement to ask and possible contingencies preventing granting (Curl & Drew, 2008). Though granting is the structurally preferred response to a request, the act of asking projects granting or rejection as possible response options, thus orienting to the respondent's agency in making a choice in response (Curl & Drew, 2008; Schegloff, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 4, parents trying to get children to do something may issue requests escalating to demands, which orient to even less agency in responding and full authority to influence the respondent. For example, in a scenario where a parent wishes a child to get dressed, a request formatted as "I wonder if you could get dressed" versus "can

you get dressed" versus "get dressed please" versus "get dressed" are all designed to get a child to do something. However, they display increasing degrees of entitlement to ask, shifting from asking to telling, decreasing orientation to possible contingencies that prevent granting and, consequently, orienting to less agency in responding to the imposition through their heightened authority over the respondent.

As demonstrated by the analysis in Chapter 4, the authority to influence another is a locally negotiated matter that can challenge or reinforce normative asymmetries in deontic order (the distribution of rights to influence another and the obligations to respond) (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015; Thompson et al., 2015). Requests-for-*action*, like demands, are actions of social influence that display a deontic claim: by asking someone to do something the request is an imposition on the respondent to act (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012, 2014; Stevanovic & Svennevig, 2015; Thompson et al., 2015). By asking the requestee to do something, the requester claims deontic rights to do so; strong deontic claims indicating high entitlement and low contingency, and weak deontic claims displaying an orientation to low entitlement and high contingency (Thompson et al., 2015). On the other hand, requests-for-*permission,* while also invoking deontic order, indicate an asymmetrical relationship as the requester is seeking authorisation from the requestee to carry out an act themselves, thus orienting to the requester as the authority figure on the matter at hand (Thompson et al., 2015; see also Butler & Wilkinson, 2013). Furthermore, with a request-for-*permission*, the requester is the one who will perform the action if permission is granted, i.e. the requestee is obliged to respond but is not under the imposition of fulfilling an action (Thompson et al., 2015). However, requests-for-*information* (sometimes in the form of requests-for-*clarification*) invoke epistemic order (the rights to knowledge) where the requester claims a less knowledgeable position while the requestee is oriented to as being in a more knowledgeable position (Filipi, 2009; Heritage, 2012;

Thompson et al., 2015). These actions and the responses they invoke display a stance that can either reinforce the (deontic or epistemic) status of the requester or challenge it, depending on who is doing the requesting, what the request is asking for, what the requests format displays and how the recipient responds. In this chapter, I examine different types of parental requests and different types of children's counter-responses along with the domains of social order invoked by these actions.

Requests in Parent-child Interaction

Requests have received substantial attention in the conversation-analytic literature. In studies of parent-child interaction, parents' and children's requests-for-*action* (for example Aronsson & Cekaite, 2011; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013; Wootton, 1981a), their requests-for-*information* (for example Busch, 2017; Filipi, 2009) and children's requests-for-*permissio*n (see Butler & Wilkinson, 2013; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2016; Waring, 2020; Wootton, 1981b) have been investigated. However, work on the responses to requests have mostly focused on preference organisation and preferred and dispreferred response options (Waring, 2020). Some exceptions to this include the work of Thompson et al. (2015) on response-formats for requests-for-action, Waring (2020) on parents' conditional responses to children's requests, and Marquez-Reiter et al. (2018) on counter-requests in police-citizen encounters, along with mentions of counter-requests in parent-child interaction by Waring (2020) and Sirota (2006).

Marquez-Reiter et al. (2018) investigated instances of police officers requesting drivers' identification and examined how drivers can respond by countering the requests. They characterise the counter-requests as contestations of police authority (Marquez-Reiter et al., 2018). This research builds on the work of Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) on children's use of "format-tying" in arguments with their peers: children repeat the exact utterance of the prior speaker, using their own words against them during an argument (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987). Waring (2020) notes that children use counter-requests to resist eating

during dinner-time routines, while Sirota (2006) provides examples of both parents' and children's use of counter-requests as bargaining manoeuvres in the negotiation of bedtime routines. Conversation-analytic studies, like those of Waring and Sirota, on family negotiations of parent-led tasks in the home, describe parent-child interactions involving parental requests and demands as a tug-of-war between children exercising autonomy and parents exercising the control necessary for task completion (Aronsson & Cekaite, 2011; Fasulo et al., 2007; Goodwin, 2006; Sirota, 2006; Waring, 2020; Waring & Yu, 2017). These negotiations are potentially key familial arenas of (re)socialisation into social order and relations. Building on these works, the analysis to follow focuses on counters to parental requests; specifically looking at young children's counters as a means of exercising agency during the negotiation of familial tasks, from getting dressed for school to going to sleep.

Insert sequence versus counters

Though I have explained adjacency pairs prior to this chapter, it is worth revisiting these building blocks of sequential interaction to ensure clarity in the upcoming descriptions and analysis of both insert sequences and counters. In interaction, speakers take turns to talk, each turn performing a recognisable action like requesting and granting or demanding and complying (Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2007). These basic building blocks of a sequence of interaction are adjacency pairs, constituting a first pair part/FPP (an initiating utterance) and a second pair part/SPP (a response to the first pair part). In short, sequence organisation operates as follows:

> The basic practice or rule of operation, then, by which the minimal form of the adjacency pair is produced is: given the recognizable production of a first pair part, on its first possible completion its speaker should stop, a next speaker should start (often someone selected as next speaker by the FPP), and should produce a second pair part of the same pair type (Schegloff, 2007, p. 14).

Thus, a first pair part, such as a request, from speaker A, makes a response or second pair part from speaker B relevant next. Sequences are the means by which an activity is accomplished (or not); consequently, a second pair part that furthers that agenda is structurally preferred to one that does not: "The alternative types of second pair parts that a first pair part makes relevant are not equivalent, or equally valued" (Schegloff, 2007, p. 59). Therefore, while granting and rejection are alternative response options to a request, granting furthers the agenda that was set in motion by the request while aligning with the first pair part and is, thus, structurally preferred. However, rejection is a distancing from "the project of the first pair part, and the course of action it is designed to implement" (Schegloff, 2007, p. 60). By structurally dis/preferred, I am not referring to any personal psychological preference but rather to a preferred or dispreferred relationship between the first and second pair parts (Schegloff, 2007). However, not all next actions after a first pair part are a second pair part, as in the case with an insert sequence[35] that seeks clarity on the first pair part, thus deferring the second pair part until clarity is received (Schegloff, 2007).

Excerpt 6.1 below provides an example of an insert sequence where the response to a base first pair part (a demand) is another first pair part (a request-for-*clarification*[36]) that initiates an insert sequence seeking the clarity needed to provide a base second pair part. Carol is pouring frozen vegetables from a packet into a pot but pauses to look at her iPad next to the pot. Ella, standing next to Carol, in front of the iPad, directs her to show her something with "let's see".

[35] See additional examples of insert sequences in excerpts 5.3 and 5.4 in chapter 5 where the referent is clarified before an assessment can be provided.

[36] Filipi (2009) explores requests-for-confirmation in parent-child interaction. These requests fit into the broader category of requests-for-information.

Excerpt 6.1: C2017_06_20_2

01	**EE**	Ell:	Look=let's see//((leaning over counter))
02		Car:	[What do you want to see?//((looking at iPad))
03		Ell:	[((Steps back from counter, looking at Carol))
04			Let's ↑see
05		Car:	What do ya wanna <u>see</u>?//((looks at Ella))
06			(0.2)//((looking at each other))
07		Ell:	[↑<u>Mom</u> *gh*ju <u>know</u> what I wanna <u>see</u>↓
08		Car:	[((Looks at and touches iPad))
09			°No I do[n't°
10		Ell:	[THE VEGGIE::S//((moving right hand up and down))
11		Car:	O:::HW:
12			(0.2)//((Picks up pot. Moves it in front of Ella.
13	**FF**		[Silly Mom//((Works on iPad while holding out pot.))
14		Ell:	[((Looks in pot.))

Figure EE

Figure FF

In the excerpt above, the base first pair part ("let's see") in line 01 (see figure EE[37]) is a mitigated demand (a form of a request-for-*action*) (Fasulo et al., 2007) that is asking Carol to show Ella or include her in something. In turn, Carol issues a request-for-*clarification* on the activity ("what do you want to see"). Lines 02 to 11 are an insert sequence clarifying what Ella wants to see (i.e., clarifying the first pair part)[38]. The base first pair part in line 01 is responded to in line 12 with an appropriate type fitting base second pair part – showing the vegetables (see figure FF). Note that the insert sequence defers the base second pair part but also renews its conditional relevance – a response to the base first pair part is again relevant after completion of the insert sequence (Schegloff, 2007).

Another alternative response to a first pair part, that is not a second pair part, is a counter first pair part that reverses the course of action (Schegloff, 2007). Unlike insert sequences which defer but project the doing of a base second pair part once the matter the insert sequence is addressing has been dealt with, counters "cancel and redirect the sequential force of the base first pair part and redistribute the responsibility for producing a base second pair part" (Schegloff, 2007, p. 99). Counters challenge the discourse identity or the functional roles of the speaker of the first pair part as the requester becomes the requestee (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Marquez-Reiter et al., 2018). In other words, when Speaker A utters a first pair part (like a request), instead of responding (with a granting or refusal), Speaker B can provide a similar first pair part (another request), redirecting the need for a response back to speaker A (Schegloff, 2007). A counter does not *defer* the second pair part like an insert first pair part would, but *replaces* the first pair part of Speaker A. This action serves to reverse both the direction of the sequence and the order of constraint as Speaker A is now obligated to respond. Counters do not orient to responding to Speaker A's first pair part even if, as the

[37] The family's one dog can also be seen in screenshots EE and FF.

[38] Analysis of the insert sequence and the counter it contains are engaged with later on in this chapter.

sequence progresses, the response to it is provided (Schegloff, 2007). By looking at counter-requests in parent-child interactions, I explore the sequential and task-organisation implications of such actions as well as the negotiation of autonomy and authority that they invoke. I briefly examine a parent countering a child's request before focusing on children countering parental requests. Overall, I look at two types of counters. The first type of counter that I examine makes a similar response relevant as did the first pair part (matched counters) and challenges the roles and responsibilities proposed by the task initiated by the speaker of the first pair part. Consequently, these counters can be characterised as practices for opposing the participation structure of a proposed course of action. I then examine types of counters that make a different response relevant than did the first pair part. These unmatched counters change the task trajectory set up by the first pair part for an alternative course of action. Consequently, these counters can be characterised as practices for redirecting a proposed course of action. In essence, I examine two different types of counters: matched and unmatched counters. By "matched" I mean that the counter and it's first pair part are similar actions and by "unmatched" I mean that the counter is a different action from the first pair part.

Matched counters

Schegloff (2007) explains that counters are the same as, or close modifications of, the first pair part offered by a particular speaker. Excerpt 6.2 is an example of a counter provided by Schegloff (2007) (from a presentation by Tarplee in 1991) demonstrating how the counters he examined are the same as, or modifications of, the first pair part they are redirecting. In excerpt 6.2, a request-for-*information* from a child (line 01) is countered by a similar request-for-*information* from the parent (line 02) – the original first pair part and the counter are thus matched request types orienting to epistemic order. The counter reverses the

order of constraint from the parent back to the child who then answers the question they originally posed.

```
Excerpt 6.2: Schegloff (2007, p.17)/ Tarplee (1991)
01   Chi: What's this
02   Mom: er::m (.) yo[u t]ell me: what is it
03   Chi:              [°()°]
04        (1.0)
05        z:e:bra
06   Mom: zebra:: ye:s
```

The child's request-for-*information* displays a weak epistemic stance as the knowledge she seeks (naming the object) is not in her epistemic domain but is in the parents' (Heritage, 2012; Raymond & Heritage, 2006). However, the parent counters the child's request with an upgraded request-for-*information* that demands the child "tell" the answer. This challenges the child's epistemic stance as the counter places the answer within the child's epistemic domain (Heritage, 2012; Raymond & Heritage, 2006). The activity of naming the object that was pursued by the first pair part is still being pursued by the counter but the counter has challenged the distribution of knowledge and, thus, changed who should provide the information. Instead of the mother providing the information, the counter is testing the child's knowledge while suggesting the child has the knowledge to respond herself. The mother, as the competent parent, will judge its correctness, which she does in line 06. There is an orientation here to the developmental scheme, where the child's initial request orients to the mother as the more competent and knowledgeable adult and where the parent's response reflects a teaching stance. As previously noted, at the level of sequence organisation, a counter reverses the sequence and the order of constraint. At the level of task-organisation, this counter, that is the same type of request (an action seeking information) as

the first pair part, reverses who will perform the activity. However, the same activity (name the object) is pursued by both parties, i.e. the roles and responsibilities are negotiated but not the task itself. In fact, all the counter examples Schegloff (2007) provides (see pages 17 to 19) are similar types of requests as the first pair part (they seek a similar outcome – like the provision of information in excerpt 6.1) that challenge the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the completion of a task. Likewise, in the excerpt to follow the child's counter is a similar type of action as the first pair part, in that it makes a similar kind of response relevant.

In the excerpt to follow, the sequence begins with the *parent making a request-for-action* and the *child countering* it with a similar request-for-*action*, thus challenging the distribution of responsibilities the parent has proposed, i.e., who should conduct the activity the parent initiates. In other words, in the excerpt to follow it is a parental request that is countered (rather than child's request as in excerpt 6.2) and it is countered with a matched counter response (like in the previous excerpt). Kate and Amy have been selecting the clothes Amy will wear for the day, placing the various items on the bed. They have chosen a jersey for Amy to wear, and Kate is removing it from the cupboard before initiating the activity of getting un/dressed – see the request in line 02.

```
Excerpt 6.3: S003_20170418_065406
01     Kat:  (3.0)//((Removing jersey from hanger, closing cupboard))
02           [Ka:y let's >get clothes off and get< dressed
03           [((Turns around, walks to bed))
04     Amy:  Ow!
05     Kat:  (0.2)//((Moves mosquito net))
06           ↑Sorry
07           Didtha zip hit you?//((Throws jersey on bed))
08           [((Turns and momentarily looks at Amy))
```

09 Amy: [It did//((walks to bed))
10 Kat: Ah//((Steps forward and back looking at floor))
11 Amy: ((Leans forward, reaches out to touch jersey))
12 THIS hit me
13 Kat: Goodness me//((Looking at the floor))
14 (0.2)//((Stepping over toys))
15 **GG** [Take your clothes off and get dressed ple::as:e
16 [((Walking to cupboard, looking in cupboard))
17 Amy: [he ha he//((Climbing on bed))
18 **HH** .ha~May you help me get dressed~
19 Kat: .hhhh//((Facing Amy, stern expression))
20 Take your clothes off
21 Amy: [((Taking pants off))
22 **II** Kat: [and then we'll see.
23 Please.
24 I need to find your sock.
25 [((Exiting room))
26 **JJ** Amy: [~°ohkay°~//((sitting down))

((Kate using a hand gesture to emphasise each word))

Figure GG



Figure HH



Figure II



Figure JJ

Removing the top and closing the cupboard, Kate proposes "let's get clothes off and get dressed": this mitigated demand-for-action proposes joint participation in the dressing activity (Fasulo et al., 2007). However, during this utterance, Kate has turned and walked past Amy and, while turning, the jersey's zip swung out and knocked Amy on the head. Amy does not respond to the demand but instead to the consequent knock on the head with a display of pain ("ow"). Kate continues her tasks as she apologises and asks if the zip hit Amy. Amy confirms that it did and then points out which part of the jersey hit her. Kate does not treat the knock as a serious matter requiring joint attention and Amy does not pursue the matter further. Kate, now returning to the first cupboard, manoeuvring over toys as she goes, and redirects Amy to take her clothes off and get dressed – using a request-for-*action* that contains a "please" which orients to some agency in responding ("take your clothes off and get dressed please"). The initial mitigated demand-for-*action* (line 02) was suggesting a joint activity ("let's") but this reissued request does not contain the "let's", suggesting it is the sole responsibility of Amy to take off her clothes and get undressed.

Amy does not respond to Kate's re-request-for-*action* but counters it with her own request-for-*action* ("may you please help me?") that is accompanied by a display of emotional distress (see figure GG). Not only is this a request-for-*assistance* but is a remedy solicit (Kidwell, 2013), i.e. her understanding of the participation structure is problematic and

needs remedying. This request orients to lower entitlement and higher contingencies and consequently a weaker deontic stance than the request it is countering. Though the child is exercising agency by making the request, there is an orientation to the limitations of her agency that reduces the degree of challenge/opposition that the counter performs. The order of constraint has been redirected from Amy to Kate, who is again looking for something in the cupboard. She turns to look at Amy while taking a long and deep breath in (see figure HH). She adopts a stern approach as reflected by her serious facial expression, tone of voice and the use of a hand gesture that emphasises each word she utters as she provides a conditional granting (Waring, 2020). The condition in the form of a demand ("Take your clothes off") is immediately responded to by Amy who starts to remove her pants in compliance before the granting element is produced ("and then we'll see"). Kate's response does not guarantee Amy's request will be granted, only that it may be ("we'll see") (see figure II). She then adds a request to the granting that seeks Amy's compliance with her proposed solution. She then explains she is going to find Amy's sock as she leaves the room. Amy answers Kate's request for compliance by muttering a quiet "okay" in a wobbly voice as she continues to undress as Kate leaves the room (see figure JJ). She is complying but her negative affective stance orients to the outcome as unsatisfactory.

Amy has challenged the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the getting dressed task by countering her mother's request-for-*action* with a counter that is a similar type of request – a matched counter-request. This counter not only redirects the sequence and order of constraint from Amy to Kate but challenges the participation structure the mother proposes. Though she is challenging her mother's proposed participation structure, she mitigates the challenge by issuing a counter-request that displays limited deontic authority. While Amy was treating the initial request that suggested joint participation as an indication that Kate would assist with getting undressed, Kate's actions throughout the interaction have

involved her finding the clothes Amy will need to change into. While Amy treats the re-request as a change in participation structure from Kate helping to not helping with getting undressed, Kate has treated her involvement in the activity differently as she is getting clothes while Amy is undressing. The participants use matched counters to resolve the misalignment of expectations regarding the roles each party is undertaking in the un/dressing task.

As seen in the excerpts in this section, matched counters are a resource used by both parents and children to negotiate the distribution of roles and responsibilities for a task. The outcomes of these matched counters are reflected in different levels of interactional organisation. On the level of sequence organisation, they reverse the order of constraint from the second speaker back to the first; and on the level of task-organisation, they challenge the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the task that the first pair part proposed. Furthermore, the turn design of the matched counter challenges the stance and orientation to social order proposed by the first pair part. In other words, while the counter reverses the order of constraint, it challenges the participation structure and the stance proposed by the speaker of the first pair part. As seen above, the child can reduce the degree to which the counter challenges the parent's stance (and, thus, how potentially disaffiliative the action may be) by downgrading the stance they take in the counter – by adopting stances more congruent with their child status, they orient to the parent's status in pursuit of the parental granting and, consequently, reinforce the asymmetrical nature of the parent-child relationship. Importantly, children can use matched counters to exercise their agency in an attempt to complete a task in the way they call for, even if it risks sanctions.

In the section to follow, I examine a previously unexamined practice that children in my data set recurrently use to redirect a course of action. These counters are not the same type of action as the first pair part (they do not seek the same kind of response) and can

cancel the relevance of the activity being proposed by the first pair part for an alternative activity proposed by the counter. Thus, the roles in a given task, or how a task is undertaken, are not being negotiated as is the case with matched counters, but what task should be undertaken is. Unlike with a matched counter, where the relevant roles and responsibilities of completing a task are contested or opposed, unmatched counters replace one proposed course of action with another.

Unmatched counters

First, I return to excerpt 6.1 because although the excerpt was used as an example of an insert sequence, the insert sequence contains a counter.

Excerpt 6.1: C2017_06_20_2

01	**EE**	Ell:	Look=let's see//((leaning over counter))
02		Car:	[What do you want to see?//((looking at iPad))
03		Ell:	[((Steps back from counter, looking at Carol))
04			Let's ↑see
05		Car:	What do ya wanna see?//((looks at Ella))
06			(0.2)//((looking at each other))
07		Ell:	[↑Mom *gh*ju know what I wanna se↓e
08		Car:	[((Looks at and touches iPad))
09			°No I do[n't°
10		Ell:	[THE VEGGIE::S//((moving right hand up and down))
11		Car:	O:::HW:
12			(0.2)//((Picks up pot. Moves it in front of Ella.
13	**FF**		[Silly Mom//((Works on iPad while holding out pot.))
14		Ell:	[((Looks in pot.))

Ella starts the sequence (line 01) with a mitigated demand that is requesting action from Carol. However, Carol's response in line 02 is an insert first pair part that defers

granting the request while clarification needed to grant the request is obtained. Ella does not answer Carol's insert first pair part but repeats her initial request-for-*action,* therefore countering Carol's request-for-*clarification*, redirecting the sequence and reversing the order of constraint back to Carol ("let's see" in line 04). Carol answers Ella's request-for-*action* by repeating her request-for-*clarification* (line 05). Ella now answers Carol (line 07) but with a complaint that her mother knows what she is asking for. Carol responds that she does not, and then Ella finally provides the clarity Carol needed to respond to the utterance in line 01, bringing the insert sequence to a close while renewing the relevance of the base second pair part which is provided in line 12.

Carol's request (line 02) and Ella's counter (line 04) are different request types that reflect different domains of social order/relations. Ella's original request-for-*action* (line 01) and subsequent counter-request-for-*action* (line 04) both invoke deontic order, claiming a reasonably strong deontic stance. However, Carol's request-for-*clarification* in line 02 and re-request-for-*clarification* (in line 05) orient to Ella having information Carol does not, thus invoking epistemic order, particularly a weak epistemic stance. Furthermore, Ella's counter not only reverses the sequence and order of constraint but effectively dismisses Carol's request-for-*clarification* in favour of her request-for-*action*. The counter cancels the course of action that Carol's request initiates (seeking clarification), redirecting it back to Ella's original course of action (requesting access). In other words, Ella's counter dismisses Carol's low epistemic stance and, in doing so, the counter effectively functions as a pre-complaint in the sense that it treats Carol as having asked for information that Ella's dismissal suggests she already has. It is on this basis that Ella is redirecting the activity back to the course of action she had initiated. The counter does not challenge the participation structure of the ongoing task (as seen in the excerpts above) but rather redirects the course of action from one task back to another.

In the next excerpt, Mark and Amy have been cleaning up My Little Pony toys in Amy's bedroom before bedtime. Amy is out of camera view until line 09. Mark utters a request-for-*action* that initiates a new activity – getting undressed - and Amy counters his request with a request-for-*information* about a missing pony that redirects the course of action back to cleaning up the ponies.

Excerpt 6.4: S049_20170423_195544

01		Mar:	Can you take your (.)
02			gumboots off pl[ease?
03		Amy:	[>WHERE's< rainbowdash:?
04		Mar:	You already put rainbow da°sh away°
05			(0.2)
06			[.hh I don't know where other rainbow dash is=
07	**KK**		[((looking around))
08			=So will you take your pa- your shoes off?
09		Amy:	(1.2)//((steps forward, leans forward))
10			O:kay://((turns to bed))
11			I know where's//((throws torso onto bed))
12			rainbow da[::sh::?//((turns to mark))
13	**LL**	Mar:	[Got you//((nods at Amy))
14		Amy:	[((taking off gumboots))
15		Mar:	[Kate

Figure KK



Figure LL

Mark initiates the task of getting undressed with a request-for-*action* from Amy to take off her gumboots – a "can you" request that displays a strong deontic stance. Before Mark has finished his request, Amy counters his request with a request-for-*information* – where her pony is – that claims a weak epistemic stance. This counter redirects the sequence and the order of constraint, making a response from Mark relevant and replacing Mark's question with her own[39]. Mark replies to her request by explaining that she already put the pony away. Without a response from Amy (see the time elapsed in line 05), he looks around the room and adds to his explanation that he does not know where the other pony by the same name is either (see figure KK). He then repeats his request for Amy to take off her shoes (line 08). Mark has responded to the counter and engaged with the task of finding the pony before

[39] As Schegloff (2007, p.17) notes, a counter replaces speaker A's first pair part, and, even if further on in the sequence speaker B responds to speaker A, the counter is not orienting to the relevance of a response to Speaker A's first pair part. In this case, Amy may well be wanting to complete the clean-up before starting the next activity that prepares her for bed but the counter is dismissing one course of action for another even if she returns to Mark's activity later on.

reissuing the base first pair part. Amy appears to be complying as she steps forward and leans down to take off her shoes but then abandons that action to answer her own question. She signals that the bed is the answer by leaning on it as she explains she knows where the pony is. She then turns to look at Mark who indicates his understanding with "got you" and a nod (see figure LL). Amy then begins to remove her shoes. Thereafter, Mark summons Kate to look for the pony which turns out to be where Amy was playing earlier in the day - in the other bed in the other room.

The original request (a request-for-*action*) and the counter (a request-for-*information*) are different types of requests invoking different social relations. The deontic stance in the first pair part is not being challenged by the epistemic stance in the counter; rather it is dismissed and replaced. In this way, Amy uses the counter-request to not only redirect the sequence and order of constraint but to redirect the course of action from the undressing task back to the tidying up task. Though Amy was successful in redirecting the course of action momentarily, it only delays the task of getting ready for bed which Mark reignites.

In excerpt 6.5 the parent issues a request-for-*action* and the child counters it with a request-for-*permission*, successfully redirecting the course of action from getting undressed to going to the bathroom. Amy and Kate have just walked into Amy's room – Amy is holding a jersey in her right hand (see figure MM).

Excerpt 6.5: S031_20170417_193500

01	**MM**	Kat:	Okay.
02			(.)
03			Can we please, take our clothes off?
04			[((Moving mosquito net))
05		Amy:	[(0.2)//((Drops jersey, turns around))
06	**NN**		Wee::?
07		Kat:	Okay >[go have a wee<//((walking to cupboard))

08 **oo** Amy: [((Walking towards the door))

Figure MM

Figure NN

Figure OO

Kate initiates the joint activity of getting Amy undressed with a mitigated request-for-*action* in line 03 – mitigated in the sense that the request-for-*action* refers to a joint activity with "we" and "our" (Fasulo et al., 2007), presumably where she will help Amy complete the task rather than Amy completing it alone. Amy does not reply but turns around to face Kate and counters her request with a request-for-*permission* to "wee" (see figure NN) initiating an entirely new course of action. Kate grants permission and Amy walks towards the bathroom (see figure OO). Since this request-for-*permission* seeks authorisation and does not require Kate to perform an action but only provide permission for Amy's next action, this counter-request orients to Kate as the authority figure which is congruent with the mother's initial request-for-*action* and deontic status.

As with previous excerpts 6.1 and 6.4, the parent's first pair part and the child's counter are both requests, but unmatched request types orienting to unrelated stances and alternate activities. Rather than challenging the participation structure of the parent's task as in the case of matched counters, the unmatched counters change the task trajectory for an alternative course of action from the one the parent had initiated with the first pair part. In these cases, the parent grants the counter-request.

In the next excerpt[40], the parent issues a request-for-*information* and the child counters this action with a wholly different first pair part; a "pre" in the form of a summons (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 48-53). Prior to line 31, Ella has been clarifying for Carol why she drew a bird on a stick but this was interrupted by Carol blowing Ella's nose.

```
Excerpt 6.6: C2017_06_22_46
31      Car:  Can you blow out of there yet Ella?
32      Ell:  Mom?
33      Car:  Mmm?
```

[40] I am revisiting a section of excerpt 5.6 from Chapter 5.

```
34     Ell:  (0.2)//((climbs off chair, exits camera view))
35     Ben:  There [Ce ce//((puts plate on island))
36     Ell:        [Do you [know ha- how (.)
37     Car:                [Thanks
38     Ell:  how
39     Car:  [((sitting down))
40           [>We need knives and forks here<
41     Ell:  perch on (.) sideways sticks?
42     Car:  (0.2)//((adjusting John on her lap))
43           Ye::s?
44     Ell:  That's what my bird is doing//((returns to chair))
45     Car:  That's awesome my sweedie ↑pie
```

((Ben getting cutlery, moves plate in front of Carol))

Carol asks Ella if she can blow out of her nose – Ella has had some medical concerns regarding her nose. This request-for-*information* indicates an epistemic gradient, with Ella having information which Carol is seeking (Heritage, 2012; Thompson et al., 2015). Ella does not respond to Carol's request but instead, counters her request with an entirely different action: a "pre" that summons her mother's attention, with "Mom?". With the questioning intonation, this action could also be characterised as a request-for-*attention*. This first pair part of the summons-answer pre-sequence projects a yet-to-be-revealed base sequence to follow (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 48-53). This counter reverses the order of constraint and does not orient to answering Carol's question about her nose in the future. Carol, acquiescing to the new course of action Ella has initiated, gives a "go-ahead response" (Schegloff, 2007, p. 49) in the form of a response token "mmm?" providing Ella with an indication of her attention and prompting Ella to continue (Jefferson, 1984a). With her mother's attention and go-ahead, Ella directs her attention back to the earlier discussion on how birds perch on sticks. She does so by asking her mom to align with the earlier conversation with another pre

- a pre-informing in the form of a request-for-*clarification* ("Do you know how how perch on sticks" across lines 36, 38, and 41). Carol continues to follow Ella's course of action by answering Ella's pre-informing request-for-*clarification* about her knowledge of birds with "yes?". This response indicates an understanding that they are both reengaged with the earlier bird discussion and have a shared understanding of it, while prompting Ella to continue and provide clarity with a questioning intonation. Ella then informs her mother about what the bird in her drawing is doing and her mother provides a positive assessment of it.

Ella's use of a counter-request in line 32 has successfully redirected the conversation back to her drawing and away from her mother's question about her nose. The first pair part is a request-for-*information* and, thus, displays a weak epistemic stance; while the counter is a summons requesting attention that orients to deontic order – the first pair part and the counter are unmatched actions managing different social domains and activities. The counter does not challenge the roles of the information-seeking task and thus who knows what, but instead redirects the course of action in preparation for a different sequence. By countering the parent's request and redirecting the course of action to an alternative task, Ella exercises her agency by pursuing her choice of activity over that of her mother's.

In excerpts 6.1, 6.4, and 6.6 the children are using the unmatched counters to redirect a course of activity from a new one the parents are proposing, back to a prior activity the children are treating as incomplete. The parents comply with these redirects so as to allow for the completion of the prior activity. In excerpt 6.5, however, the child uses the unmatched counter to initiate a completely new activity – going to the bathroom.

Countering with a matched counter potentially initiates negotiations by challenging the participation structure proposed by the parent, which may well be responded to with parental responses (and potentially) pursuits that further restrict the child's autonomy, as seen in excerpt 6.2 (cf. Kent, 2012). However, countering with an unmatched counter not only

redirects the course of action from one task back to another, but the parents' attention from one task to another. In this way children avoid or at least postpone parental pursuits of their proposed tasks. Children not only exercise their agency by doing so but can delay a projected but undesirable activity like going to sleep or, in some other cases, avoid responding to a request altogether (like in excerpt 6.6). This child's resource for not participating in a parent's task is reminiscent of incipient compliance (Kent, 2012) where, in an attempt to retain some autonomy in the face of sanctioning directives, children may respond in an embodied way that projects compliance but delays it: by projecting compliance but resisting the imposition of the parent's directive before complying, an upgraded response from the parent is avoided and the response is reformulated in autonomous terms as it is no longer sequentially adjacent to the directive (Kent, 2012). Similarly, when children use unmatched counters, they avoid the disaffiliative act of an outright rejection of a parental request and the potential pursuits parents may undertake to gain compliance. Instead, they exercise agency by redirecting a parental course of action for one of their own, avoiding sanctions or pursuits (though parents may re-request once the child's task is complete).

Through a developmental lens and without careful examination of these sequences, there is a danger of characterising these children's non-compliant actions as signs of their incompetence, such as being easily distracted or not focusing on their parents' actions. Yet, careful examination of these sequences shows that these actions are practices children can use to exercise agency by pursuing tasks they want to complete while avoiding parental tasks. In other words, they are examples of children's interactional competence in both exercising their agency and managing their social positions.

Discussion

When parents initiate a course of action by making requests of their children, children are obligated to respond, preferably with a response that furthers the parent's course of

action. Instead of responding they can, however, counter the request with an action of their own that redirects the order of constraint from the child back to the parent who is now obligated to respond in turn. Just as there are different kinds of requests, there are different kinds of counters; those that are similar actions to, or match, the first pair part (the parental request); and those that are markedly different actions from, and thus do not match, the first pair part. On the level of sequence organisation, both matched and unmatched counters redirect the sequence and the order of constraint. Yet, at the level of task organisation, the matched counter initiates a negotiation by challenging the participation structure of the task instigated by the parent while continuing to pursue the overall task the parent initiated. However, the unmatched counter redirects the course of action from the parent's task to the child's - effectively cancelling the parent's task and replacing it with an alternative one.

Although parental requests project some room for children to choose a response, the projected choices are limited to granting or refusing. Countering with an unmatched counter allows the child to make choices beyond those proposed by the parental request; while countering with a matched counter allows the child to negotiate how the task will be conducted (or who will do what during the task). As demonstrated, children can mitigate the matched counter by claiming a lower deontic stance than that claimed by the parent in the original request – (re)enforcing asymmetries in the parent-child dyad. In this way, counters provide children with a means of exercising agency during parent-led activities that by their nature restrict autonomy.

As previously mentioned, conversation-analytic studies on family negotiations of parent-led tasks in the home have investigated how children exercise autonomy and parents exercise the control necessary for task completion (Aronsson & Cekaite, 2011; Fasulo et al., 2007; Goodwin, 2006; Sirota, 2006; Waring, 2020; Waring & Yu, 2017). The findings in this chapter demonstrate how children can exercise control over task organisation by negotiating

the participation structure of a task or by redirecting a course of action from a parental one to one of their own, and that they do so by acting in a way that is congruent with their child role – managing their social position by avoiding noncompliant responses with unmatched counters and managing their stances with mitigated matched counters. As with the findings in chapter 4, the analysis in this chapter demonstrates how children work within and test the boundaries of their influence and, in so doing, together with their parent's response, reinforce asymmetries in the dyad.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction

In this chapter, I bring together the findings from Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in a discussion of children's methods for exercising agency and authority and managing their social positions, while discussing the contribution these findings make to the study of parent-child interaction and socialisation. I then reflect on the limitations of the study and data, along with suggestions for future research on the topic of children's methods.

Children's methods for exercising authority and agency

As parents and children go about their daily lives they initiate, engage in and complete various tasks around the home (like getting dressed or undressed, cooking dinner, drawing pictures, cleaning up, going to bed, etc.). In completing these activities, they encounter the challenge of getting each other to do things. Prior EMCA research has primarily focused on how parents get children to do things through the investigation of parent-initiated request-sequences and parental pursuits of compliance through demands, threats and touch, and how children comply with or resist these impositions. While I too focused on request-sequences, I examined how children initiate and pursue a course of action to get their parents to do things, i.e. how they exercise agency and authority in interaction with their parents. When I looked at parent-initiated request-sequences, I looked at how children initiate an alternative sequence by countering their parent's request. I also looked at child-initiated demand-sequences and their pursuits of parental compliance – looking at demands in general, and then, at a specific type of demand: the "look at X" demand. By identifying these previously unexamined practices of demanding and countering that children use to exercise agency and authority in interacting with their parents, I also demonstrated children's methods for managing their social position and, by doing so, how they can orient to the developmental scheme, reinforcing asymmetries in the parent-child dyad.

In Chapter 4, I examined instances of young children testing the boundaries of their authority by issuing demands that claim high deontic authority in the moment, and how, on many occasions, the parents complied, thereby ratifying the child's claims. I also analysed instances of parents not complying with children's demands and how, in these instances, children pursued compliance using a number of methods. In studying these pursuits, I demonstrate how children pursued compliance and escalated claims of deontic authority; but also examined how parental responses to these escalated pursuits restricted the children's response options, ratified parental authority and oriented to the children's actions as incongruent with their low deontic status. Faced with these restrictions, children utilised category-bound interactional practices, like doing whining or lowering their deontic claims, to manage their restricted rights in that domain – reinforcing the asymmetrical authority in that domain of influence. Importantly, the findings in this chapter demonstrated that asymmetries in authority are not static but rather, they are negotiated *in situ* as parents and children claim deontic rights to domains of influence in the home. Children claim and test authority by issuing demands while parental responses either ratify the claims or contest them. These findings have important implications for the study of parent-child interaction and socialisation as outlined below.

As argued in Chapter 2, Sacks and Garfinkel, as well as subsequent EMCA scholars, have argued that common-sense views of adults and children do not consider children's ways of doing things or their competences and that more attention needs to be paid to how children do things (Gan & Danby, 2021; Garfinkel et al., 1982; Keel, 2020; Mackay, 1975; Speier, 1976). They also warned against the adoption of common-sense views of childhood as fact, and suggest studying participant orientations to the developmental scheme rather than adopting it as an analyst's lens through which scientific inquiry is conducted (Gan & Danby, 2021; Garfinkel et al., 1982; Keel, 2020; Mackay, 1975; Speier, 1976). This pervasive

adoption of folklore as fact in the study of children, their relationships and socialisation has prevented analysts from asking important questions about children and their interactions with their parents. Building on this, I drew attention to the need to investigate local contingencies that may shape participant orientations to authority, rather than treating normative expectations of parents as authority figures as fact. The findings in Chapter 4, in particular, demonstrate the value in avoiding folklore assumptions of asymmetries in authority in parent-child interaction and, instead, investigating how deontic asymmetries are local interactional accomplishments. Furthermore, in Chapters 5 and 6, I examined instances in which children and parents orient to the developmental scheme where parents are treated as more knowledgeable figures than are children.

In Chapter 5, I focused on a particular type of demand ("look at *X*" or "check *X*") that children in my data set recurrently utilised. I examined instances of children issuing the "look at *X*" or "check *X*" demand (where X is a child's production like something they drew or an action they were performing), noting that parents routinely responded with an examination and provision of an affirming assessment of the object or action of interest. The utterance contains two components: the *demand (look/check) + the informing (at X)*. When the informing component lacks specificity, more of a burden is placed on the parent to be informed and the production is treated as both assessable and knowable by the child. However, trouble can arise when the parent is not sure of what to assess or if the assessable is a questionable production.

By looking at deviant cases in Chapter 5, I demonstrated how this practice of demanding parental attention can make an examination and an affirming assessment of a child's production conditionally relevant. Not only did parents routinely provide assessments after these demands but, where an assessment was not provided, participants oriented to it as missing. When the assessability of a production was in question, the parent avoided a

negative assessment by asking a question about the production, thus making a response from the child relevant next and placing the burden on the child to make the object assessable. In the process of clarifying the referent, a pedagogical sequence (Keel, 2020; Tarplee, 2010) ensued and parent and child oriented to the relevance of the developmental scheme in their interaction. I also provided an example of a child using the practice to achieve a different outcome – confirmation of a choice. Parents can use features of the context within which the practice is produced, like the showing of a child's production, to respond with a conditionally relevant action. I pointed out that children (by seeking the parents' assessment and praise for their production) and parents (by offering affirming assessments and claiming a knowledgeable position) oriented to the developmental scheme, with children as apprentices in development and parents as developed authorities. These findings, like those in Chapter 4, demonstrate how asymmetries in the parent-child dyad are (re)produced *in situ*. Furthermore, they show how children are active agents in their own socialisation (Goodwin & Kyratzis, 2007; Keel, 2016) as they initiate sequences for seeking confirmation of their task proficiency, not only by issuing the demands but by pursuing "adequate" responses to them. Overall, the findings in this chapter provide another example of an attention-organising practice that is an interactional rather than perceptual accomplishment.

In Chapter 6, I focused on parent-initiated request sequences where children exercise agency by countering parental requests. In the same way that there are different kinds of requests, there are different kinds of counters to requests. I identified two kinds of counters: matched and unmatched. On the level of sequence organisation, all counters replace the initial request and redirect the sequence so as to make a response from the initial requester relevant next. However, at the level of task organisation, matched and unmatched counters accomplish different actions. Matched counters are a resource used by both parents and children to challenge the distribution of roles and responsibilities for a task while continuing

to pursue the task initiated by the parent – this is a method that children can use to negotiate their role in a task. The unmatched counters, on the other hand, redirect the course of action from the one the parent proposed to the one the child proposes with the counter – this is a method that children can use to avoid the restricted response options of a request, and initiate their own course of action. In the analysis of these counters, I demonstrated how children not only negotiated their task participation and initiated new activities but how they oriented to a limited entitlement to challenge their parents' requests with mitigated matched counters or by avoiding a parent's proposed task by using unmatched counters to redirect a course of action rather than refuse it. Again, the analysis demonstrated how children can orient to the developmental scheme as they adeptly manage their social positions in pursuit of their own task – balancing how they exercise agency within the boundaries (restrictions and allowances) of their position in any particular moment in interaction.

While the analysis in this thesis demonstrated young children's interactional competences as they adeptly exercised agency and authority in interaction, it also showed how limitations and affordances regarding their competences, agency and authority can be realised and managed moment-by-moment in their interactions with their parents. An important finding across the three analysis chapters, was how it is not just adults who reinforce asymmetries and orient to the developmental scheme: children do too. Young children in interaction with their parents are continually (re)socialised into the child category as they (and their parents) test and reinforce boundaries. Where asymmetries in the parent-child dyad have been characterised as part of the adult culture or as an adult ideology (Garfinkel et al., 1982; Mackay, 1975), this analysis demonstrates that children orient to it too and use it as a resource for designing their interactions with their parents. Rather than finding evidence that the adult culture is foreign to children, there was evidence of children sharing and reinforcing this common-sense ideology.

A key question that scholars interested in socialisation have asked is, "How is social order maintained and reproduced?" and a significant criticism of socialisation theories is that they have acknowledged the importance of interaction in the socialisation process but neglected to investigate this "primordial site of sociality" (Schegloff, 2006, p. 70) where social order is (re)produced. However, the findings I have outlined in this thesis provide insights into how parents and children collectively (re)produce social order in context – or at least how children (and parents) are (re)socialised into the normative expectations of their parent and child roles in different domains of family life. Though Parsons' theory of role differentiation focused on personality development, he did state that it is by being part of a system of social interaction that children are socialised into roles (Parsons, 1955). The analysis presented here, suggests that socialisation into social relations (or roles) is an interactional achievement and that the developmental scheme is more than something parents and children orient to but a resource that they use in their design of the actions to navigate social relations. Moreover, it is through claims to epistemic, deontic and affective rights from one moment to the next that children and parents manage and reinforce their social positions.

Overall, these findings contribute to filling the gaps in the literature that I outlined in Chapter 2 while demonstrating the value in avoiding a developmental lens when studying parent-child interaction. In line with contemporary socialisation movements, I have focused on children's methods and attempted to avoid the many pitfalls of classic socialisation theory by investigating asymmetries instead of assuming them. In my investigations of children's pursuits of parental compliance in Chapter 4 and children's use of counters in Chapter 6, I provide insights into the ways in which the three orders of social relations can work together within "an intelligible sequence of action" (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2014, p. 202): within a sequence of action, children adjust their claims not just within an order (lowering or heightening a stance) but by moving between them in an orderly, and dare I say strategic,

way. For example, children pursuing an agenda but faced with opposition can shift from claims of authority that are treated as incongruent by the parent to heightened emotional displays that are treated as congruent with their social position. As Keel (2020) and Danby (2020) recently argued, Sacks and Garfinkel's suggestions for studying children's ways and the developmental scheme provide a powerful analytical and "theoretical lens" (Danby, 2020, p. 152) that brings the child into focus opening up new avenues for investigation. Like the work of Danby and Keel, I hope that this thesis demonstrates the value in adopting this lens when analysing interactions between adults and children.

The findings also extend beyond parent-child/child-parent interaction, contributing to our understanding of social order (building on the work of Heritage, Stevanovic and colleagues) and sequence organisation (building on the work of Schegloff). I demonstrate how participants to an interaction can shift orientations from one order to another from one turn to the next to negotiate their rights to act as they do in the moment, thus making one order more salient than the next from one minute to the next as they pursue a particular outcome. In addition, the findings demonstrate how deontic status trumps deontic stance, as is seen with epistemics. However, since the practice of shifting orientations from one order to another was not the focus of the analysis, focused analysis of a collection of cases in which participants shift across orders, specifically how children leverage affective order in interaction, is needed. In chapter 6, the findings build on Schegloff's work on sequence organisation and counters as well as Thompson et al.'s (2015) work on request types. While Schegloff investigated counters for their role in sequence organisation noting that they are the same or very similar versions of the first pair part, I demonstrate that counters can either match the first pair part in their action type or they can be unmatched and that these different counters do different things at the level of task organisation.

Reflections on the study

By studying the actual practices of two young children and their parents, I have identified possibilities of social practices that young children and their parents *can* use in interaction (Peräkylä, 2004). Within this field of study, generalisability concerns possibilities of social practices, i.e. "the possibility of various practices can be considered generalisable even if the practices are not actualised in similar ways across different settings" (Peräkylä, 2004, p. 297). I have not made any distributional claims, noting rather that if these children can use these methods, then other children in similar circumstances *can* as well. However, I do suspect that in different homes and different circumstances, children and parents may have established and may continue to re-establish different domains of influence. The room for testing boundaries of influence and exercising agency may well be different across families (and generations). I can imagine that in some homes, parents will comply with demands that would not be complied with in others, or children's actions could be sanctioned or overtly treated as deviant in some homes and perhaps not others. However, my conjecture is that children would still have methods for exercising agency and authority and, in so doing, managing their social positions; however, they may well take different forms or be more or less successful. Consequently, further research on young children's methods could identify other methods that children can use or investigate how the methods identified here are used across a range of settings. Since the "look at X" demand can be used for different purposes depending on the context and the object being shown, further research into the nuanced uses of this demand could provide further insights into the local resources that parents use to establish the appropriate conditionally relevant response.

A setting of interest may be the classroom. The work of Theobald and Kultti (2012) has demonstrated that, despite institutional roles of teacher and learner imposing asymmetrical rights in classroom interaction, children do initiate actions. It is certainly

possible that children may use similar methods (demands and counters) for exercising agency and authority with their teachers as I have shown they do with their parents.

Another aspect of the findings which I wish to discuss, is their relation to the children's age group – young children of four years of age. While the analysis demonstrates that four-year-old children can exercise agency and authority in these ways and that they use counters and demands, like the "look at X" demand to influence their parents and to get them to do things, this does not mean that only four-year-old children do these things. I am not making any claims regarding the child's development, only that four-year-olds can and do actually do these things. I cannot say from my data set that includes but two young children whether younger or older children do these things. I also do not wish to give the impression that only children do these things and that these are not practices adults could use. For example, it is certainly plausible that adults in certain circumstances would use the "Look at X" demand to garner an assessment of their own production. Therefore, further research may uncover that these practices are used in interactions with individuals of other age groups. It would be interesting to see if, when these practices are used in interactions with individuals of different age groups, there are orientations to asymmetries in social relations or not.

As mentioned in the methods section, I collected data from an additional family with a younger child (the same age as John from family C). Consequently, I have a lot of data of two very young children, with limited verbal skills, interacting with their parents and I plan on analysing this data to uncover very young children's methods for exercising agency and authority in interaction. In such cases, a greater focus on multimodal aspects of the interactions (including gesture, prosody and proximity to parents and objects) will be necessary.

Gathering data in the manner in which I did for this study – using nanny cameras that were participant controlled - came with a number of lessons learned for future data collection

of this kind as reflected in some of the limitations of the data used in this study. Poor sound quality slowed down the analysis process and made a number of sequences of interaction unusable. Children often spoke softly and with their backs to the camera, and the nanny camera microphones were not able to capture these sounds clearly. An issue with some of the recordings in the kitchen was that the use of the kettle, coffee machine and the radio added background sounds that drowned out the voices in the recordings. If technologically possible, the addition of a high-quality microphone to these cameras would be advisable. Another restriction with these cameras is that they do not follow participants as they move around the house. Sometimes participants will be just outside of camera view or will enter a room mid-sequence which can either render a sequence of interaction unusable or result in some loss of information in the data analysis process. Consequently, the analysis mainly focused on interactions that were relatively static in the sense that interactions involving moving around the house were not analysed. In the case of excerpts like 5.2, it is also possible that something happened prior to Kate and Amy entering the room that could have impacted the analyses of the interaction. To get around this it is possible to add multiple cameras to one or more rooms - if participants consent to such. Despite these limitations, sufficient data of suitable quality was available for the development of collections of interactions for this study. Importantly, the nanny cameras allowed families to go about their lives unhindered by recording responsibilities thus yielding footage of daily activities as mundane as waking up or leaving the house that might otherwise not be captured by a more intrusive method that would lend itself to recordings of specific events like dinner time. Most importantly, this unobtrusive filming method, provided for rich data of children's and parents' practices for working together as they go about their daily lives so as to identify what they actually do and how they do it – specifically how children exercise their agency and authority in interaction with their

parents within their homes by adeptly utilising demands and counters while drawing on the developmental scheme in their design of these actions.

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Appendix A: Transcription Conventions

Transcription conventions used in this thesis are based the symbols developed by Gail Jefferson (2004) to indicate how talk and actions are produced in interaction. In addition to the Jeffersonian conventions, additional symbols used by Butler and Edwards (2018) as well as Hepburn and Bolden (2017) have been used. The symbols and their meaning are indicated in the table below. Within the analysis chapters, transcripts are accompanied by screenshot images labelled as figures. Each figure is labelled by a letter of the alphabet and the sequential location of the action is indicated by a corresponding letter placed within the transcript (after the line number and prior to the participants pseudonym).

Symbol	Representation
(.)	A micropause between utterances or within an utterance
(0.0)	The elapsed time by tenths of seconds
Underline	Stressed sound
CAPS	Loud sounds relative to the surrounding talk
.	Sentence-final falling intonation
?	Yes/no question rising intonation
£	Smiley voice
!	Animated delivery
,	Phrase-final intonation (more to come)
=	Latch, there is no break between the utterances
:	Prolongation of the prior sound The more colons the longer the elongation
-	A glottal stop, or abrupt cutting off of sound
[	The start of overlapping talk
]	The end of overlapping talk
°soft°	spoken softly/decreased volume compared to surrounding talk
( )	Empty parentheses indicate the utterance could not be heard and thus transcribed by the transcriber The length of the space indicates the length of the unclear utterance

(words)	Words within single paratheses suggest uncertain transcription
((words))	Transcriber descriptions often of non-verbal interaction
//	When two transcribed actions are taking place simultaneously but are written linearly
#	Whining prosody or verbal displays of distress
~	Wobbly voice
↑	A shift into high pitch
↓	A shift into low pitch
↑↑	A shift to particularly high pitch
°°	Whisper
><	Increased speed compared to surrounding talk
<>	Decreased speed compared to surrounding talk
.hh	An inbreath The longer the row of h's the longer the breath.
hh	An outbreath The longer the row of h's the longer the breath
gh	A gutteral sound. The sound of phlegm in the throat.

Appendix B: Ethics Approval

Research Office

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)
R14/49 Rogers

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE	**PROTOCOL NUMBER: H16/07/31**
PROJECT TITLE	Conflict and displays of emotion in Parent-Child interaction
INVESTIGATOR(S)	Ms C Rogers
SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT	Human and Community Development/
DATE CONSIDERED	22 July 2016
DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE	Approved
EXPIRY DATE	26 October 2019

DATE 27 October 2016 **CHAIRPERSON** (Professor J Knight)

cc: Supervisor : Professor K Whitehead

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

To be completed in duplicate and **ONE COPY** returned to the Secretary at Room 10004, 10th Floor, Senate House, University. Unreported changes to the application may invalidate the clearance given by the HREC (Non-Medical)

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee. **I agree to completion of a yearly progress report.**

Signature 31 / 10 / 2016 Date

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES

Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet

Protocol Number: H16/07/31

Good day,

I, Catherine Rogers, am conducting research for my PhD in Psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand, under the supervision of Prof. Kevin Whitehead, and I am inviting you to participate in this research. You have been selected as a potential participant because you are a parent with (a) child(ren) between the ages of 1.5 to 5 years of age. The aim of this research is to investigate typical parent-child interactions, with a focus on how parents and young children interact in situations of conflict or potential conflict. In order to study the real-life interactions of parents and children, I will require video footage of parents and children interacting in their homes during normal daily activities such as mealtimes, playtime, and times at which other daily routines are undertaken. The study will focus on everyday interactions, and will not involve speculations about mental processes, nor will it involve any clinical or other psychological diagnoses. The research will contribute to the small but growing number of real-time studies of parent-child interaction, with a secondary aim of providing parents with guidelines for avoiding and/or managing conflicts with their children.

Participation in this study is voluntary and you will not be penalised in any way for not participating. Should you consent to taking part in the study, you should keep this information sheet for your own records. Furthermore, you will be required to provide your contact details (phone number and/or email address so that we can communicate regarding the data collection) and to sign consent forms for yourself and your child(ren). You are also requested to explain the study to your child(ren), and without coercion or penalty for refusal,

give them the opportunity to decide whether or not they wish to be filmed for the purposes of the study. Their response in this regard should be indicated on the consent form.

Participation in the study will not include treatment or payment. For ease of use, small undisguised "nanny cameras" will be provided, at no cost to you, which you will be asked to return when sufficient video footage has been collected (an expected period of one month) or when you choose to stop recording. You will be asked to set the cameras up in a room of your choice in your home and to record a range of everyday activities. You will be permitted to turn the camera on or off at your discretion, and to delete any footage you do not wish to share for the purposes of the study. You can request, without penalty, the withdrawal of any recordings you have contributed, at any point in the study up until the submission of the thesis for examination or publication. You will also be permitted to keep or request to be provided with a copy of any footage you produce for the study. The cameras will come with an application for use on your computer or smart phone for easy management of the recordings, and this application is password protected, thus ensuring that you will be able to control who has access to the footage. I will access the application only after the cameras have been removed from your home and returned to me. I will store the footage in password-protected files on a password-protected external hard drive.

Since video recordings will be collected, it is not possible for participation in the study to be anonymous. The recordings may be reported on at seminars and conferences and/or in a written thesis, academic journals and books, which will be available on the world-wide web. However, should you choose to participate, you can either give consent to being identifiable (in which case pictures and videos associated with your first name and displaying your face may appear in reports and presentations based on the study) or you can choose to be reported on anonymously (in which case your face will be blurred in any pictures or videos in which you appear and a pseudonym will be provided). You can also choose whether

your child(ren) will be identifiable or reported on anonymously. Should you choose to be reported on anonymously, you will not be penalised in any way. At any point in the study and up until the submission of the thesis for examination, you can inform me that you choose for yourself or your child to be reported on anonymously.

Should your participation raise any concerns requiring counselling, you can contact FAMSA on 011 975 7106/7 or Lifeline on 011 728 1347 or 0861 322 322.

Please note that I am obliged to report any suspected abuse or violation of human rights to the police.

You are welcome to contact me should you have any questions or should you wish to request a summary of the research findings. You can also contact my supervisor, Professor Kevin Whitehead (Kevin.Whitehead@wits.ac.za; 011 717 4530) or the University of the Witwatersrand Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) (c/o Lucille Mooragan: Lucille.Mooragan@wits.ac.za; 011 717 1408).

Thank you for your time and your consideration of this invitation.

Kind regards,

Catherine Rogers

(catherinelrogers@gmail.com; 0416138E@students.wits.ac.za; 071 603 8183)

Appendix D: Informed Consent Form

I, _____, consent to participating in the study on parent-child interaction that is being conducted by Catherine Rogers for her PhD in Psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand, under the supervision of Prof. Kevin Whitehead. The purpose and nature of the research have been explained to me, and I understand that:

- Participation is voluntary and there is no penalty should I choose not to participate,
- Participation does not include treatment or payment,
- Participation is not anonymous,
- I will need to provide the researcher with my contact information (phone and/or email) for data collection purposes only,
- I should keep the participant information sheet for my own records and I can keep a copy of the footage,
- The study will be reported on at seminars and conferences and/or in a thesis, academic journals and books, which will be available on the world-wide web,
- At any point in the study and up until the submission of the thesis for examination/publication, I can inform the researcher that I choose to be reported on anonymously and have my name replaced by a pseudonym and my face disguised,
- I can request the withdrawal of any recordings I have contributed at any point in the study up until the submission of the thesis for examination/publication without penalty of any kind,
- The researcher and supervisor are obliged to report any suspected abuse or violation of human rights to the police.

I understand that participation involves:

- Being provided with undisguised "nanny cameras", at no cost to me, which I will set up in a room of my choosing in my home and record a range of everyday family activities involving myself and my child/ren.
- Recording video footage on these cameras, which come with a password-protected application for use on my computer or smart phone, such that I will be able to manage the footage I record,
- Returning the cameras to the researcher when sufficient recordings have been produced (an expected period of one month) or when I choose to stop recording,
- Turning the camera on or off at my discretion and deleting any footage containing nudity or which I do not wish to share for the purposes of the study.

I, _____, consent/do not consent to being video-recorded.

I, _____, consent/do not consent to being identifiable in reports based on the study.

Signed by _____ at _____ on this day _____.

Signature:

Protocol Number: H16/07/31

Appendix E: Guardian Informed Consent Form

I, _____, parent/legal guardian of _____ consent to his/her participation in the study on parent-child interaction that is being conducted by Catherine Rogers for her PhD in Psychology at the University of the Witwatersrand, under the supervision of Prof. Kevin Whitehead. The purpose and nature of the research have been explained to me, and I understand that:

- Participation is voluntary and there is no penalty should I choose not to consent to my child's participation,
- There is no penalty should my child not assent to being filmed for the purposes of this study,
- Participation does not include treatment or payment,
- Participation is not anonymous,
- I will need to provide the researcher with my contact information (phone and/or email) for data collection purposes only,
- I should keep the participant information sheet for my own records and I can keep a copy of the footage,
- The study will be reported on at seminars and conferences and/or in a thesis, academic journals and books, which will be available on the world-wide web,
- At any point in the study and up until the submission of the thesis for examination/publication, I can inform the researcher that I choose for my child to be reported on anonymously and have their name replaced by a pseudonym and their face disguised,
- I can request the withdrawal of any recordings I have contributed at any point in the study up until the submission of the thesis for examination/publication without penalty of any kind,
- The researcher and supervisor are obliged to report any suspected abuse or violation of human rights to the police.

I understand that, for my child, participation involves:

- Being filmed by undisguised "nanny cameras" and that my child has the right to assent or decline to be filmed.

I understand that, as guardian, participation involves:

- Being provided with undisguised "nanny cameras", at no cost to me, which I will set up in a room of my choosing in my home and record a range of everyday family activities involving myself and my child.

- Recording video footage on these cameras, which come with a password-protected application for use on my computer or smart phone, such that I will be able to manage the footage I record,
- Returning the cameras to the researcher when sufficient recordings have been produced (an expected period of one month) or when I choose to stop recording,
- Turning the camera on or off at my discretion and deleting any footage containing nudity or which I do not wish to share for the purposes of the study.

I, _____, consent/do not consent to _____ being video-recorded.

I, _____, consent/do not consent to _____ being identifiable in reports of the study.

I, _____, explained participation in this study to _____. They could/could not assent to being filmed as part of this study. They did assent/did not assent to being filmed for this study.

Signed by _____ at _____ on this day _____.

Signature:

Protocol Number: H16/07/31