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Eshak, Yousuf Ismail

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"AUTHORITY" IN CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION AND FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

Yousuf Ismail Eshak

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in part-fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Education. Johannesburg 1987

ABSTRACT

Christian National Education has been influential in shaping official education policy in South Africa. Though Fundamental Pedagogics has distinguished itself from Christian National Education by claiming to be a "science" of education, not tied to any particular philosophy of life, this report tries to show it has developed from Christian National Education and has extremely close affinities with it.

From a perspective that emphasises individual autonomy and respect for persons, this report develops a critique of the notion of "authority" in Christian National Education and Fundamental Pedagogics. It examines the assumptions underlying these notions of authority, showing how they assume as "natural" certain political, economic and social relations, and endorse social inequity. Finally suggestions are offered towards formulating principles of "authority" which might allow for autonomy and give recognition to individual worth.

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DECLARATION

I declare that this Research Report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Education at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University.

Y. I. Eshak

21st day of DECEMBER 1987

DEDICATION

To Amina, and our beloved children Zaid, Shireen and Azhar for their support and encouragement. Their help in typing and preparing this report is also acknowledged. To my mother and late father.

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INTRODUCTION

The Shorter Oxford Dictionary's definitions of "authority" include :

1.The power or right to enforce obedience

2.Moral or legal supremacy

3.Power to influence conduct

4.Title to be believed

5.An expert in any question.

Legal definitions in the Oxford Companion to Law include :

1. Power conferred by law

2. Legal power to do acts of a particular kind.

3. Person or body having legal power in a particular sphere

These definitions do not exclude other uses, but there is a strong link between "authority" and "power". Power, provided it is legitimate, is sometimes regarded as "authority". Christian National Education (CNE) and Fundamental Pedagogics (FP) share this notion of "authority" but philosophically there is a crucial distinction between "power", even legitimate "power", and "authority". This distinction is equally crucial in the understanding of "authority" in education.

CNE has influenced educational policy in South Africa, and I intend to show some extent of its influence, and to show that FP and CNE are very closely linked. I propose to develop a critique of their notion of "authority" and its relations with other notions such as "freedom". The conscious and articulated purposes do not sufficiently explain the role of "authority" in CNE and FP in South African political and economic affairs. I plan to investigate this and finally to make some suggestions

towards establishing more equitable principles for "authority" in education in South Africa.

Any proposals about education are based on what is considered worthwhile about the good life life. In Section Five, I intend to explain in a little more detail my view of the good life, but initially I want to state that my critique of "authority" in CNE and FP is developed from a viewpoint that stresses the autonomy of the individual, and the ethical principle of respect for each individual as a person.

Notes:

1.Unless otherwise indicated, emphases are part of the original quotations.

2.Both CNE and FP appear to consider that only males are involved in education. The pronoun "he" is invariably used. I have tried to use neutral terms, but this has not always been possible.

SECTION ONE

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION ON SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION

It is difficult to speak with "any absolute authority about influences which may or may not be at work within the processes which may ultimately lead to statements of policy."(1) In spite of this difficulty, though, there are some indicators that point to the factors that contribute towards the formulation of policy and legislation in education in South Africa on one hand and statements of theory on the other

The influence of CNE cannot be precisely measured, but similarities between CNE policy and the wording and substance of South African education legislation give some idea of its influence. In addition, many writers seem to share the assumption that CNE policy has already been implemented in the South African education system.

CNE derives from an interpretation of Calvinism, not necessarily as interpreted elsewhere, but a South African form of Calvinism that seems to accommodate South Africa's racial policies. I do not intend to discuss the relations between South African and other versions of Calvinism, although it could be mentioned that a common feature of all Calvinism, and CNE, was a close union between the the church and the state, and for practical purposes "all schooling was to be regarded as church schooling."(2) The South African version of CNE was formulated by a com-

mittee of prominent Afrikaners, the ICNO (Die Instituut vir Christelike-Nasionale Onderwys) of the FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings). This committee, the ICNO, published in 1948 the Christelike Nasionale Onderwysbeleid.(3) This will be referred to as the Beleid or Policy.

On 17 November 1948, the congress of the National Party adopted a resolution that the country's education policy should conform to the FAK's version of CNE. As the National Party was, by this time, the ruling party, this resolution could be considered to have become government policy. In the face of protest, the policy was not overtly applied in White education, but aspects of the policy, it has been argued, can be recognised in the Bantu Education Act and the educational legislation of the 1960's.(4)

Articles 14 and 15 of the Policy deal with "Coloured" and "Bantu" education. Article 14, referring to "Coloured" education, states "We believe" the Coloured "can be made made race conscious if the principle of race segregation is strictly applied in education."(5) Article 15 emphasises "the principle of trusteeship, no equality and segregation." The principles in these articles are echoed in the Bantu Education Act. Echoes of the Beleid are also heard in the Eiselen Commission which preceded the Bantu Education Act. The commission recommended that

> (a) Education must be broadly conceived so that it can be organised effectively to provide not only schools with a Christian character but also social institutions to harmonise with such schools of Christian orientation.(6)

This is compatible with one of the main professed ideas of CNE, which intends to propagate Christian values and to Christianise the "Coloured"

and "Bantu". The influence of CNE is also evident in the Education Policy Act of 1967 (Act 39 of 1967), which "made clear reference to the Christian and National character that was to permeate South African education."(7)

Other pointers to the assumption that CNE has been implemented in South African education was an article in the "Transvaler" of November, 1967, which stated that "without the application of the system of Christian National Education, the political history of South Africa over the last 30 or 40 years would have been entirely different."(8) The Broederbond also had among its aims the implementation of CNE in South African education. The FAK, which formulated the CNE Beleid, was a front of the Broederbond, and affiliated to it were "church organisations, women's associations, students' and youth organisations."(9) It made every attempt to apply CNE and its task was facilitated by the fact that every prime minister since 1948 has been a member of the organisation. In 1968, A. Treurnicht was able to assert that "...our Government placed a law of Christian National education on the statute book last year."(10)

It is clear that CNE has been of crucial importance in influencing South African education policy, but there was always resistance to CNE and the changing situation in South Africa led to an adaptation and refining of many of the government's policies and practices. I do not claim that FP was a conscious adaptation, or part of a conspiracy, but I feel that by claiming to be a value free, "science" of education, it has served to make CNE more palatable, and will argue this claim in Section Two.

SECTION TWO

THE LINKS BETWEEN CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION AND FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

Christian National Education was a theory of education designed according to Calvinist Afrikaner beliefs. It was part of the Afrikaner's struggle to achieve control of education. Fundamental Pedagogics claims to be a value-free, neutral "science" of education and asserts that it is the only method which can lead to a true understanding of education. On the surface, the two doctrines appear to be completely different. CNE is explicit about its values. "For the Calvinist, the aim of education is associated with the purpose ordained by God."(1) FP, on the other hand, claims to be a "science dealing with education."(2) The pedagogician is expected to confine himself strictly to "unprejudiced descriptions and therefore must avoid all apparent arbitrary platitudes,...speculative talk and unverified judgements."(3) FP and CNE would seem to be completely incompatible. "Christian Education as a science is a contradiction in terms."(4) But FP is a more sophisticated version of CNE. CNE had long been the focus of considerable resistance, and particularly by being associated with the hated "Bantu Education" had been completely rejected by other groups. It was claimed that CNE had been "developed by Dutch Reformed Afrikaners for the education of Dutch Reformed children (not for the education of other groups)."(5) Yet even in the Beleid, CNE prescribes education for other race groups. The resistance against CNE showed the need for a theory that was easier to defend, and FP as a theory was more marketable than CNE. I do not intend to suggest it was deliberately de-

signed to deceive, but was certainly more defensible. It has a distinction between theory and practice; it can propagate a theory that is universal, yet allow for a particular practice and a ommodate, virtually intact, the divided South African education system. FP replaced CNE as a theory in many institutions, but close affinities between the two remained. "Philosophy of education in South Africa has moved in the space of a few years from pre-occupation with a system of values as stated essentially in the CNE Policy of 1948 to an attempt to approach education from a 'scientific' point of view."(6) At the same time, FP has been regarded as a "philosophic red-herring which distracts attention away from the doctrine of CNE."(7)

By detailing some similarities, I want to show that CNE and FP are essentially the same. In th mparison, I shall use as sub-headings the principles that J. Chr. Coetzee describes as the principles which underlie CNE policy. He mentions these principles as "religious, national and philosophic", and describes these as forming a "unity, a three-in-one or a one-in three."(8) do not accept these terms as being accurate, but will use them to show that both CNE and FP attach the same use and importance to them.

Before any comparisons are made, one thing needs some clarification. FP usually counters criticism by stating that its critics have failed to distinguish between pre-scientific, scientific and post-scientific phases. Pedagogicians charge that critics "... disregard the conviction of these advocates that Christian National Education and Calvinism are post-scientific matters."(9) It becomes necessary to examine these distinctions. Du Plooy and Kilian (10) describe these distinctions: Pre-scientific knowledge is "unsystematised, unreliable, uncontrolled,

subjective, inaccurate and imperfect. It is part of the life-world, the point of departure for practising science. Scientific knowledge is unprejudiced of nature, supplemented by the findings of other scientists, rationally or intellectually obtained, accounted for, acquired in a methodical way, generally accepted as being valid, communicable and intelligible." When scientific knowledge is applied, when it is used as the method, but the life-views of a particular group are propagated, this becomes the post-scientific phase. The distinction seems very straightforward, and nothing is considered to be problematic. It assumes that "facts" are "facts" and indisputable and that a very clear distinction exists between facts and values, theory and practice. FP ignores a whole area of disagreement the idea that facts are bound up with some concept of rationality. Many argue that rationality is not universal, and "different groups and cultures order their experience by means of different concepts. Schemes of concepts provide grids on which to base belief."(11) To some extent "facts" are theory-laden and our perceptions dictate our "facts". A practice cannot be entirely independent of theory.

FP's distinction between the pre-scientific, the scientific and the post scientific moments presents extensive problems. The difficulties are compounded by FP's failure to distinguish the phase in which particular statements are to be categorized. Many statements are made by pedagogicians as assertions of "scientific fact" but are extremely contentious if viewed as such. The following is an example: "where authority rules there is love and emotional security, where the course of events is determined by an authority who is sympathetic, there one finds regularity and courtesy...What else is discipline but the spontaneous, constant and the communal readiness to answer...demands made on the individual and the group." (1.). This is made as a statement of "fact"

and not as any kind of theory. FP tries to say that its critics fail to see that some of its statements are post-scientific, but some of these are offered as scientific statements. To show these similarities between CNE and FP, I have used Coetzee's principles as headings, as these are fundamental to CNE.

The Religious Principle

Article 2 of the Beleid states that "religion should determine the spirit and direction of...all other subjects" and "all instructions...shall be founded on the Christian basis of the life and world-view of our nation." Coetzee affirms that "The religious basis of the C.N.E. policy then is the reformed Calvinistic religion...we believe and confess the self sufficiency and the Absolute Sovereignty of God the Creator...He is the Creator, Ruler and Provider."(13) In FP, the need for religion is regarded as essential though the form of the religion could differ. "For whether a person or a nation worships the Christian God or a natural phenomenon...his religious inspiration will dominate his life...determining for him, his chosen scale of values."(14) This statement would indicate that FP is not bound to a particular religious belief but as a value-free "science" accommodates all beliefs. But this kind of statement is not frequently made, and more often Christian values are stressed. That many existential phenomenologists are atheists does not present any problems to F.P. "Some existential phenomenologist are atheists...the God who is rejected by these atheistically orientated philosophers is not the Christian God...The phenomenologists conclude above all that man is sustained by faith."(15)

Emphasising that religion is essential in FP, Gunter(16), in describing "Human nature in general" maintains that "human nature will basically always remain the same," and that religion is an inescapable part of a human being. "Man's complete conquest of evil and his salvation from sin are possible only though Divine grace." There is no indication that these statements are "post-scientific"; they seem to be regarded as universal. Du Plooy and Kilian, also in FP, writing as pedagogicians (17) state as a "scientific fact" that the child has to "align himself to a standard (norm) which is accepted as correct in a small family or a large society and the educand's adherence to such a norm will at once indicate his willingness to become a proper being."

The findings of FP are remarkably similar to the views of CNE. "... the Christian Pedagogician ..constantly sees the concept world as God's creation. And for the idea that the world produces man, he reads: God creates or brings man into the world in the sense that God is the being who, as a supporter of the world, brings forth man."(18) This view contradicts the notion in FP that a pedagogician must bracket his "philosophy of life" for the period of his scientific research.

The National Principle

Another principle stressed by Coetzee is the "national principle." The word "national" is given an arbitrary meaning in CNE. A nation is not regarded as a group sharing a geographic area, but takes into account colour and language. The Afrikaner are regarded as a nation. "By the National principle," Article 1 of the Beleid explains, "We understand love for everything that is our own." Article 3 expands, "...love for one's

own may effectively become valid in the entire content of the teaching and all the activities of the school." The meaning of "national", except for this kind of brief description, seems to be taken as understood. "We accept that people differ fundamentally in national matters."(19) FP also assumes the meaning of "national" to be unproblematic, and its attitude to the "national principle" is very similar. "Today, especially when many thinkers are trying to efface national boundaries to establish a homogeneous world community (collectivism),...it is becoming even more essential to note the various national aspirations which every nation envisages for its children. A strong national consciousness is after all a condition for sound international relations."(20) "Education with a national character, like the South Africa system, wants to convey norms and values peculiar to that character. In this regard the endeavour of White South Africa is to preserve its identity."(21)

It is interesting to note the shifting meaning of "national". With CNE "national" was limited to "Afrikaner" while FP, which came after political dominance had been achieved, extended "national" to include all Whites. It seems difficult to accept the kind of definition attributed to "national". Does it mean culture, or is colour, or language or political agreement the determining factor? Morrow questions this kind of definition in terms of Zulu education.(22) How does one determine a White nation, or for that matter any other nation in a community such as South Africa?

The Philosophical Principle

Coetzee uses the term "philosophical" to describe another basic principle of CNE. The use of the term is peculiar. It seems to have no relation to

the usually accepted use of the term. It is assigned a completely arbitrary use. There seems to be little that is "philosophical" in the "third very important basic principle underlying our C.N.E. Policy"(23) which includes the four agencies which have an interest and or a right in the education of the child: they are the home, the church, the state and the school. Article 8 of the Beleid also emphasises these agencies: "We believe the home, the school and the church are three places in which our nation is bred...they must complement one another so that each gets his right share in the forming of the child." FP does not refer to these agencies as the "philosophic principle", but refers to the "interwoven social structures", (an echo of CNE terms) and these structures "which have a task and a responsibility in education" are "the school, the family, the state, the church and the teaching corps."(24)

CNE describes the relation of these agencies as being equal. "We reject in principle any domination of our schools by the state, the church or the home. The C.N.E.school should be free to function within the limits assigned to it by our principle of sovereignty in its own orbit. This freedom, however will not be thought of as absolute but only as relative, as freedom under authority. But the C.N.E. school does not exist by itself away from all contact with the state, church and the home...it is interwoven."(25) FP's view is similar. "The principle of sovereignty in its own sphere is seen as the norm or idea for the reciprocal coherence between the various social structures and educational institutions." Both FP and CNE have similar views about the roles of these institutions.

The Home

CNE avouches, "We believe and confess that the child is the child of the home and it is the interest, duty and right of the parents to educate... the children given to them by God...they must decide on the foundation, aim and spirit of their children's education."(25) FP's view is similar, "The parents...must accept primary responsibility for the education of their children...they influence the underlying character of school education to reflect their religious moral and cultural views." (26) But in spite of this emphasis on the importance of the home, in practice the home does not always have this right. The "Coloured" or "Bantu" parents do not have the right to determine the foundation and spirit of the education of their children. The power of the state overrides the wishes of the parents.

The State

The state is assigned the responsibility for organising school education. The Beleid declares that "the state must see to it that in school life law is valid and is maintained", and see to it that "scientific" teaching is provided (Article 8(5)). Coetzee(27) argues that "the state is deeply concerned for its own existence and preservation in the cultivation of its youthful members... The young citizen must also receive a civic education and the state must take care that such training is given to the child, knowledge of state affairs, obedience to the state rule,etc." FP expects that "The state should see that all its citizens receive adequate and essential education for the existence, survival and development of the national community...should arrange matters such as mother-tongue education, compulsory subjects...according to national needs and

the community's philosophy of life."(28)

In these "philosophical" statements, the idiosyncratic use of the term "philosophy" rests on controversial assumptions which go undefended. The state is the organised community. All the interests represented by the state, the conflicts and struggle for dominance are ignored. It is assumed that there is consensus about "national needs". There are also questions about expressions such as "survival and development of the national community"and "civic" education.

The Nature of the Child

Other suppositions are shared by CNE and FP, among these what is described as "the nature of the child" and views about the relationship between the child and the adult. Both doctrines have shared views about "the nature of the child." Article 4 of the Beleid:"We believe that through the Fall sin has penetrated by means of heredity to later generations and that the child as the object of teaching and education is therefore a sinful and not a sinless being...that God, out of his grace made a contract with the believing generations...therefore the act of teaching must treat a child of believing parents as a believer...that in the child's condition of unripeness, his dependence, his ablity to learn by experience, his docility and his imperfection lie the possibility of all teaching and education." FP declares the child to be "...initially very **unfinished and uncomplete**...He comes into the world completely clumsy, unskilled, ignorant, injudicious , inexperienced, incompetent, undisciplined, irresponsible , and therefore very dependent. As a human child...he is one-who-ought-to-be-different."(29)

If one accepts that communities have the right to educate the children of their members in terms of their beliefs, it could be said that supporters of CNE are entitled to educate their children in terms of their fundamentalist Calvinist beliefs. There could be no objection if CNE were applied to believing children only, but it is, in spite of objections, applied to people with other beliefs. FP professes to be "scientifically" neutral, and this neutrality should ensure that there are no presuppositions about human nature. While Christian belief may accept that human nature is essentially evil because of the Fall, other religions do not necessarily share this view. The Islamic view is that human beings are born free of sin, and are accountable for their actions only after puberty. The Hindu belief describes a person as being punished or rewarded by the form of life in the next reincarnation, but guilt is not carried further. A person does not start life by being naturally sinful. These statements are particular views about the essential nature of humankind and not universally accepted. Yet they are stated as facts. "Education is not capable of assisting man to transcend the bounds of his creatureliness, to cure him of tendency towards moral evil and to save him from his sins. Not even the best education in the world can change him as radically as this."(30) There are other assumptions in FP that are similar to CNE. A human being is "by nature inclined to evil...Man's complete conquest of evil and his salvation from sin are possible only through Divine grace...because he has become imbued with the spirit of Christ."(31) "Basically man is a religious being."(32)

The pedagogician usually answers charges of propagating CNE by claiming that such statements are "post scientific", but these statements are not

qualified in any way, and appear to be assertions of "facts." It is difficult to conceive of the "scientific" reflections that could lead to these "post scientific" conclusions. They are made as "objective" statements, and are not problematic in any way.

In looking at the notions of "authority" in CNE and FP, a number of other similarities will be evident. On the basis of what has been said though there is adequate justification for the conclusion that FP is a more refined version of CNE.

SECTION THREE

NOTIONS OF "AUTHORITY" IN CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION AND FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

The Beleid mentions the word "authority" a few times, but there is no detailed account of it. Assumptions are not explained or explored in any way. This is acceptable as the Beleid could be regarded as a statement of principles, but what does appear unacceptable is that the use of the term is not clear or consistent.

Article 7(1) states: "We believe all authority in school is authority borrowed from God and that it places great responsibilities, duties and rights on both the Christian teacher and the child. We believe the aim of all discipline should be the Christian and National formation of, preservation of, the child (vormingen behoud), the welfare of the community, and above all the glory of God." Article 8(7) continues: "The school must be free to work independently and self-determinantly within the limits placed upon it. But this freedom must not be thought to be revolutionary; it must be freedom under authority...the state as the authority for legally obtaining financial means must take upon itself the chief part in defraying the school expenses. The control of the school must in the first place be in the hands of the parents."

In these two articles the term "authority " could mean legal entitlement or right, power to correct and discipline, suppression by a higher power, legally appointed agent, controlling power. In these sections of the Beleid there is a conflation of meanings and there is no attempt to dis-

criminate in any way regarding the different meanings of the term. Gluckman (1) describes Coetzee as summing up CNE's idea of authority as

a) God is the absolute authority to whom man owes total obedience

b) God has delegated his authority to man

c) Children must obey their parents, their teachers and all others with authority over them but only in the Lord.

"God has given Man a written Law which teaches him to practise only what is pleasing to God...most important of all...obedience." The fifth Commandment enjoins us to honour our father and mother and this is extended to mean we should honour and obey "those whom God has exalted to any authority over them, and render them honour, obedience and gratitude."

"Authority" in the sense of compulsion is also implied in some of the terms used in the Beleid, such as "should" and "must". These are frequently used and, by implication, are not suggestions but imperatives. The following are some of the terms used (emphases are mine):

Article 1 "We believe that teaching and education of the children of white parents **should** occur ... We believe the principles **must** both become fully valid in the teaching and education of our children... National principles must be under the guidance of the of Christian National principle - the National principle must grow from the Christian root..."

Article 2 "We believe religious instruction **should** be the key subject in school. It **must** determine the spirit and direction of all their subjects...It **must** not merely be a knowledge of the subject."

These examples are from the first two articles only, and the terms are used frequently throughout the Beleid. Implicitly, the Beleid becomes the authority, and tries to apply a form of moral compulsion. Wilson(2) concludes that "a moral decision must derive ultimately from the interest which one finds in trying to live according to it...In the case of schooling, then, compulsion is no less moral, than the schooling itself." The moral compulsion of CNE would be justified if everyone shared an interest in CNE, but if the values are rejected, then it would be difficult to justify compulsion.

"Authority" in CNE seems to emphasise the idea of control and power, but, as stated, the uses of the term are not explored. In FP "authority" is considered as an essential educational category, but though its necessity is repeatedly stressed, its uses are not regarded as problematic in any way.

In writing about "authority" the question of sources needs to be mentioned. In CNE, the Beleid is obviously a prime source. The explanations of Prof. J Chr. Coetzee, an authority on the Beleid, can be regarded as authoritative. I have also used the University of South Africa's study guides in use before the introduction of FP. A good argument can be made that the guides are explaining CNE notions. FP has no such single source as the Beleid and among FP writers there are differences, but these are generally minor differences. Most of the writers I have referred to are usually quoted extensively in FP writings.

To bring about some degree of clarity I have grouped notions of "authority" under subheadings. At the same times these subheadings make similarities evident.

The Bases of Authority

CNE is based on a particular religious belief, and the source of its authority is the Reformed Calvinistic religion. This is a version of Calvinism as interpreted by Afrikaner theologians, and includes certain views on race which do not seem to be part of original Calvinism. It also stresses fundamental acceptance by faith of the bible as authority for the way of life to be adopted by the Afrikaner. It also "highlights election and predestination and...stresses the concept of original sin...and discipline, narrowly conceived as an essential and basic means of education."(3) In FP, authority is a basic educational category. "Without the exercise of authority, an educational situation does not come into being."(4) Authority, in FP, is the "conditio sine qua non of education. Without authority, i.e. without the exercise of authority, (i.e. discipline) in one way or another on the part of the adult for the good of the adult-in-the-making...and the acceptance of and obedience to authority by the latter...an educational situation, an educational action and education as a consequence are impossible and unthinkable."(5)

There is a good example of the kind of conflation of notions prevalent in FP. Authority is regarded as essential, as a "conditio sine qua non", but authority is then equated with the "exercise of authority", which is then equated with "discipline." All these notions are not the same. "Authority" is a complex notion and should be recognised as clearly distinct from "discipline". "Authority" is part of a rule-governed way of acting. Winch(6) feels that a relation of authority is an indirect relation between two persons with an established way as an intermediary. This implies

that there is a right and wrong way, and this creates the need for "authority". When there is doubt or difference, authority is needed to point the right way. Where agreement to establish what is right is lacking, then someone is in authority to decide what is right. Authority may also establish who the person is who must decide. To decide what is correct one depends on a tradition, a special relation to an established way. CNE and FP have different views about the notion of authority. Authority seems to be a kind of power vested in a person or institution. In CNE there is very little examination of the notion itself, and there is much greater emphasis on its uses as power or control. Du Plooy and Kilian(7) explain the FP view of authority as coming from "auctor"(Latin) and means originator, causer or doer; a writer or an author. Auctoritas (Latin) has amongst others, the meaning of authorisation, full power, authority, an influential person even security. Augeo (Latin infinitive augere) can mean to strengthen, to enrich, to help to protect, to guide, to encourage. The basic constituents of authority are listed as "allowing to be told, to be addressed, to be charged (or called upon), obedience, acknowledging authority, living up, to authority, subjecting (one'sself) to the authority of norms." The writers specifically exclude as a sterile connotation force, suppression or punishment, yet all these constituents stress the idea of being obedient or controlled and except for "norms" does not consider the idea of following rules. Peters(8) also refers to authority as being derived from "auctor" and "auctoritas" and quotes Lewis and Short to the effect that the auctor brings about the existence of any object or promotes the increase or prosperity of it, whether he originates it or gives it greater continuance or prominence. Auctoritas, a producing, invention or cause can be exercised in opinion, counsel or command, but Peters stresses that while this explains the philology, all authority cannot be adequately conceived in this fashion. As Winch does, Peters also

sees authority as part of a rule-governed way of doing something. Authority presupposes following a rule, an appeal to an impersonal normative order or value system.

Winch says of authority that it is "intimately connected with some of the most central issues in philosophy."(9) But FP does not offer any real kind of clarification of it, and one is not clear about any assumed differences between authority and other notions, such as power, control and punishment.

The Need for Authority and its Importance

CNE regards authority as essential because its religious belief describes human nature as being corrupt in its entirety. "Man's predilection for evil permeates his whole being."(10) Human beings can never rid themselves of this inborn predisposition to evil. Education can mitigate this evil but not eradicate it. The grace of God is required for education to be efficacious, and this grace can only be obtained by a "glorification of God through positive obedient relationship with Him."(11) The Fifth Commandment enjoins us to honour our father and mother, and CNE extends this to include the idea that we should honour and obey "those whom God had exalted to any authority over them and should render them honour, obedience and gratitude."(12) CNE demands submission to those in authority on the basis that God has appointed them to positions of authority but obedience must be "in the Lord" which is interpreted to mean that submission to earthly authorities is only a step towards honouring the Supreme Authority.(13) This idea of authority makes obedience a fundamental part of education. CNE is quite emphatic about obedience. The in-

vocation of the Fifth Commandment makes obedience a matter, not of educational utility, but a relig'ous action.

Submission to authority is regarded as an aim of education.(14) This appears to give education a very unusual aim. An argument could possibly be made for the need for obedience to someone in authority so that the necessary order among, or even docility of, the pupils would permit the achievement of other aims, but to regard authority as an aim suggests that education must inculcate an attitude that makes pupils submissive and encourages the acceptance of authority. With the notion that obedience must be in the Lord, obedience becomes an act of worship or piety. While all these notions are not uncomplicated, "schooling" which has some connotations of training could possibly accommodate "submissiveness" but education implies, even if only to a limited extent, the idea of some independent thought; and unquestioning obedience and "education" would be a contradiction.

The notion of obedience as an act of worship is not consistently stated in CNE but this opinion is held by Van Vuuren, whose view is that "the central problem of all education is the relationship between the use of freedom and authority in education."(15) This importance, it is explained, is "because freedom (to make responsible choices which reflect character) is the aim of education, whilst authority and discipline are aids to the attainment of the ideal."(16) This link between authority and discipline is quite revealing. "Authority" seems to be the exertion of one will over another, and discipline is conceived, quite wrongly I think, as control.The association of authority and freedom is not simple, and needs further examination.

In FP, too, the need for authority appears to rest on what is perceived to be the nature of the child. The child is regarded as being-in-need. It is helpless and in need of support, a dependant, ignorant and inexperienced being who wants to "become self-reliant himself, is in urgent need and asks for assistance, support and guidance."(17) The helplessness or imperfection of the child is a recurring thought. The child is "at first unable to fend for himself and therefore very dependant, clumsy, unskilled, ignorant, injudicious, unexperienced, incapable, undisciplined, irresponsible, etc."(18) But with all these imperfections, the child has an innate desire for someone to control it, or according to FP, for authority. There is an instinctive need for guidance and an unconscious cry for assistance. "The newborn child is...cast adrift in this world; he is uncertain, seeks stability...can be rescued...because of his wanting help. Because he feels this is so."(19) FP considers that there is more in the nature of the child than the search for stability. There is a natural search for "authority". "Fortunately the child is a being who seeks authority."(20) Authority also becomes imperative because of some inborn qualities. "He is by nature inclined to evil and finds it easier to follow the broad way of evil rather than the steep narrow way to goodness."(21) In FP, a pedagogician as a practitioner of the "science" of education is required to reflect on the phenomenon of education and discover its essence. These statements about the child's need for "authority" are made as if they were part of the essence. One can accept that the child is helpless at birth, but that a child seeks assistance and authority and that a child is by nature inclined to evil, are, to say the least, questionable assumptions. Yet these statements are made as if they are empirical, though no substantiation is offered. The contribution of social factors towards shaping behaviour and attitudes is ignored and the child is assumed to exist in a sort of social vacuum. The nature of the au-

thority sought by the child is unclear, but from the context, a form of control is implied. In FP, education seems possible only if there is coercion, overt if necessary but better if it is covert. "The lower or initial limit of education coincides with the stage in a child's life when one can rightly speak of his acceptance and obedience to authority."(22) There is only occasionally an attempt to examine uses or the notion itself. One such brief attempt to examine meanings is Gunter's(23) description of "authority" being "internal" or "external". "Internal authority" is the authority as an expert, as "one who knows". The educator commands greater knowledge and represents what is good and to be achieved. Different from this is external authority, which is justified because the educator is a surrogate parent and a representative of the organised community. Gunter adds that in a Christian community, the educator receives his vocation and task via the parents from God, to Whom he is responsible and from Whom he holds his mandate. Gunter also describes external authority as something that "compels obedience". Though Gunter analyses the meanings ascribed to authority, the analysis is very limited, and external authority can best be described as an exercise in power. The person in power, or the person in authority, seems to be infallible, and any questioning appears to be an act of serious disobedience. The teacher may be "the expert" but even an expert is fallible, and particularly in education, questioning and doubt should not be excluded.

Authority as Expertise

Both CNE and FP consider the person vested with authority to have power and to be an expert. In CNE, the school is a formal, specialist institution for the teaching of the child, which must decide on methods and procedures(24) but the Beleid also insists that the teacher must be "a

man of Christian life and world view without which he is a deadly danger."(Article 9) Although teachers are expected to be trained in the "pedagogic sciences", and the school is assumed to have the expertise to provide proper education, the skill is subject to the Christian life and world view. Education is divided into "three things, a process, an educand, the aim."(25) The process involves teaching which must be of a "good scientific standard."(Article 8:5) Thus, even in CNE, there is an indication that education is "scientific" and the teacher is an expert in the process of education.

While CNE states it indirectly, it is fundamental to FP that education is a "science". Gunter(26) explains that one of the bases of the authority of the adult is "his authority as an expert" because he commands far more knowledge and wisdom, and he represents a specific selection of what is good. His "internal authority or authority of expertise...impels voluntary obedience."(26) Gunter is emphatic that the bearer of authority possesses a larger share of spiritual values. "The child has to accept the expertise of the adult, that the adult's knowledge exceeds the child's. If the child acknowledges the authority of the educator, the child becomes "a privileged child who knows what he does not know in this wide vast world will be made known to him."(27). This is because "The educators in the education or pedagogic situation are experienced men or women."(28) It is axiomatic in FP that the adult is mature. "...the adult who knows, can and is what the child as yet does not know, cannot and is not."(29) The expertise of the adult (or the teacher, the two are often synonymous) apart from any specialised knowledge of subject-matter and methodology, includes a knowledge and understanding of the world, "...comprehension of the world and life in general, the person's grasp on reality."(30)

The child cannot acquire an understanding of the world on its own, it is dependant on the adult for an understanding of the world. The child needs the support of an adult to make responsible choices because "without help the child cannot grasp the meaning of life."(10) The adult is "a person who has knowledge (understanding) of norms and values."(31) Knowledge and mastery of subject-matter are not the complete grounds for authority, but are more in the nature of adjuncts to facilitate the acceptance of authority. They are important because mastery of a subject "quickly earns the respect, trust and esteem of his pupils, and at the same time, their obedience and co-operation."(32) The view of authority in CNE considers the authority to be an expert, an authority as well as the bearer of power, the person charged with controlling pupils. There is no differentiation between these two notions. Winch (33) agrees that, to some extent, the person in authority must have some special attributes that makes the person an authority too, but he does describe the difference. Peters (34) explains the difference by delegating the one as being "in" authority and the other as being "an" authority. Being "an" authority means that a person has a greater knowledge and has a "right" to "pronounce on ..matters because of...special competence, training or insight."(35) Being "in" authority implies having the right to lay down what is correct in general, to apply rules to particular cases or to enforce them. When there is an appeal to a special person as a source, originator, interpreter, or enforcer of rules, the term authority is properly used.(36)

Being "in" authority must not be confused with power, and the distinction between the two will be discussed later. "Authority" involves the appeal to an impersonal set of rules or system, and operates because of an ac-

ceptance of the rules. There must be an "agreement to go the same way."(37) "Authority" assumes that there is a right and wrong way of doing something and the right way has to be determined according to the rules. Being in authority means that "the practises and pronouncements of a certain group shall be authoritative in connexion with the activity in question." Commenting on Peters's distinction, Winch feels that a person in authority is always an authority on something, though being in authority means that the person is an authority on the rules of an activity in which the person has an entitlement to authority. Peters indicates that one may or may not have any formal authority in a subject but may know it well enough so that one's views on the subject command a measure of respect. But both Peters and Winch are emphatic that authority is clearly different from the exercise of power. CNE and FP, though, quite often do see authority as power.

Authority and Power

CNE and FP describe authority in such a way that it includes the exercise of power. Authority exacts obedience, and authority, as power, is limited by certain criteria, particularly the criteria of norms and philosophy of life. The use of compulsion is regarded as being justified and correct.

CNE believes that "all authority in school is authority borrowed from God."(Article 7:1) This precludes any questioning of authority. The article also defines "discipline" as "all the inner and outer actions and influences which work together in order to assure that the behaviour on the part of everybody in the school which shall make the aim of teaching and educating the most effective." Article 8(2) of the Beleid describes

the three places in which the Afrikaans nation is bred; the home, the school and the church and states that each must get "his rightful share in the forming of the child."

The spirit and direction of the school is to be decided in collaboration "by the parents, the state and the church."Article 8(4). The state must supervise the teaching to ensure it is of a "good scientific standard" It also has the authority to determine the standard and regulate the maintenance of law in the school. Although the school is nominally independent, this independence is permissible only within the limits prescribed, a "freedom under authority", the authority being the parents, the state and the church. There is a hierarchy of "authority" which requires obedience - pupils have to obey teachers who in turn have to submit to the "proper authorities". In FP too, authority is assumed to be the exercise of power, it is seen as a matter of control. The control by authorities is essential because of the innate nature of the child. As mentioned earlier, the child is one who "requires information as to who he is and to what he is proceeding. He does not automatically follow the correct course must be guided, and if necessary, compelled to change his present course and follow the correct course...Compulsion is therefore pedagogically justified."(39) There is an assumption here that the child cannot be right, that education is not a process during which both the child and the teacher may be able to learn. Submission appears to be crucial. "An educator who knows and trusts an educand expects the latter to obey rules, to comply with commands, to surrender himself to his will actively, that is he must have respect for the authority of the educator." (40) It has to be clear that the teacher has the power, the "authority," and is under an obligation to exercise this power. It "is the duty of the

educator not to hesitate and to allow himself to be ordered, but must do the ordering."(41)

This view of "authority" seems to be stated as a "scientific fact," and there is harsh criticism of those who do not see it in the same light. "There is clear evidence that the present youth revolution is an irrational and intuitive revolt against a society which no longer regards the duty to supply protective authority as a meaningful obligation."(42) In these views there is an assumption that the child cannot be right, that education is not a process during which both the teacher and the child may learn, but as Winch (43) points out, "to submit to authority (as opposed to being subjected to power) is not to be the subject of an alien will." What is described in CNE and FP is a form of authoritarianism, which advocates and justifies orders which are backed by inducements or by threats of punishment. In authoritarianism, authority becomes its own justification and practices are not open to question or debate. There is no consultation, authority is vested by God in CNE and by "science" in FP. In both these theories, there appears to be no framework for consensus, and the problem is serious because authoritarianism would appear to be the antithesis of education. Education, for pupils, is very much a process of storage, a "banking process", which regards teachers as depositors or messengers. Given this view, education becomes uncreative mimesis. The authoritarianism of CNE and FP makes them place an undue emphasis on what they describe as "discipline".

Authority and Discipline

CNE considers "discipline" to mean chastisement, punishment or teaching: it implies **guidance** or **education**, the maintenance of order and punishment

for wrongdoing.(44) Discipline is necessary because though a person may desire to do good, often wrong is done instead. Discipline becomes more than punishment or instruction, it is "subjection to observance of the requirements of propriety."(45) Discipline is of two types, from within and from without. Discipline from without is regarded as imposed discipline or discipline applied to groups which the individual may not apply in his own life. Discipline from within is self-discipline, and "amounts to observing inwardly the requirements of propriety, according to values in order of preference" and implies "obedience to the authority of one's philosophy."(46) In FP, the notion of "discipline" is not regarded as being problematic. "...discipline (that is the pedagogic exercise of authority) is the second most important means of education... Exercise of educational authority in order that the child may attain the goal of his education is discipline, in this case pedagogic discipline."(47) In this view, "discipline" is an inextricable part of authority. Authority in fact, in its application in the early age of the child, depends on "discipline", seen as punishment.

Moral philosophy has found the morality of compulsion a perplexing question. Wilson(49) feels that the morality of compelling children to go to school derives from the morality of schooling itself. The compulsion is a moral compulsion and it is a "moral judgement that school is a place where pupils and teachers 'should' go." Wilson is committed to the sort of conclusion reached by Hare "... my decision must ultimately rest on my preparedness in practice to be bound by that decision; to act on it, to suffer the consequences of it and, in short, to try and live by it." This is the discipline which lies in any moral decision. Discipline arises from the "moral compulsion implicit in their own interests in the school activities themselves." The compulsion becomes a matter of pursuing in-

terests in a disciplined way. If the child is compelled without the child's interest being taken into account or developed, then the compulsion is manipulative, the child becomes better schooled, not better disciplined. To pursue an interest is to do what is appropriate to that interest, and to submit to the discipline of trying to understand what is appropriate to that interest. This understanding may require arduous effort, and one may need assistance. This assistance and instruction should be related to teaching. For teaching to take place, order is necessary, but in discipline that order is achieved by the values intrinsic to the activity itself. When there is "control", the order is imposed. Discipline is educative order, and trying to reach appropriate rules when engaged in a valued activity. Discipline does not involve regulation. There can be no discipline over others, what one has is control. The "infant cannot be expected to recognise authority of his own free will. He does so from motives of fear (of punishment)."(48).

The term "discipline" is used frequently in both CNE and PP in relation to authority. Yet the term is assigned many meanings. Authority is quite often seen as an imposition of adult will. "Discipline" is an exercise of power and no attempt is made to distinguish it from "punishment". It is a form of behavioural control, and this control is exercised through fear and hope. Wilson(49) sees discipline as different from control. Control through "discipline" involves compulsion and is directed by values outside the activity itself. Discipline is seen by Wilson as an internal relationship; in a disciplined relationship a person submits "to the educative order of the task in hand." Discipline is within one'sself and there is no discipline over or upon another. "External discipline" is a contradiction in terms. Peters (50) shows a clear line between "discipline" and "punishment". Punishment may be a way of preserving order

but is not to be confused with discipline. Discipline is "rooted in the learning situation."(51) and conveys the notions of submission to rules. "Discipline" is a very general notion, unlike "punishment" which is more specific, and is appropriate when there is a breach of rules, involving the infliction of pain or some unpleasantness, usually by a person in a position of power, who has some right to inflict punishment. Punishment can be retributive. Punishment is not the same as external discipline, and Peters,(52) differing from Wilson, regards external discipline as including command or instruction, but not intentional infliction of pain.

There is some link between "discipline" and "authority" but the important link is the relation of obedience to rules, and to voluntary submission to the demands of the activity or the subject. CNE and FP emphasise discipline as a means of behaviour modification, which is a form of control. Both also regard "discipline" as punishment. The link between authority and discipline serves to focus on the fact that CNE and FP confuse authority with the relations and exercises of "power", and this idea is further demonstrated by the ideas in CNE and FP about the notion of "freedom".

Authority and Freedom

In CNE, there is a somewhat startling notion of freedom. A person is free only when "he is held back by something which protects and compels him to use his freedom within limits."(53) It considers freedom without authority, that is freedom without external restrictions, as not being freedom but pretence. Ideas of freedom that do not also require obedience are seen as harmful "Such 'freedoms' lead to self righteousness, wilfulness and lawlessness."(54) Freedom in CNE is always subject to the

authority of God and a constantly repeated refrain is that freedom implies responsibility. There are also some statements that are questionable. "All philosophies of life agree that complete freedom does not exist."(55) Sartre for one, would disagree. He insists that freedom is inescapable. A human being is "compelled to be free."(56) Freedom can be masked but not destroyed, a person can never cease to be free.

In CNE, a child has to be led to freedom, but this freedom is always "responsible freedom" and to be allowed this freedom, the child has to show he has learnt obedience. Freedom is dependant on obedience. If obedience has not been learnt, no freedom can be allowed as decisions and actions might not be desirable and "responsible". CNE requires that education should mould a child's character in a way that "while heeding conscience, he will practise the virtues of obedience."(57) This emphasis on obedience is constantly re-iterated. "Man is free only when he feels bound to something...absolute freedom conflicts with man's very nature...To prepare for...freedom the child should receive practise in obedience."(58)

FP repeats the idea of the link between responsibility and freedom. It has no difficulty about any conflict between the demands of freedom and authority, as these are not seen as being opposed or mutually exclusive. "Authority and freedom are not antithetical but polar co-ordinates."(59) Freedom can be negative or positive. It is negative when it is "freedom from" and is seen as truly positive when "directed towards observance of standards, obedience and responsibility."(60) Freedom means acting responsibly, and acting responsibly becomes "equated with acting in accordance with set norms and standards."(61) In FP, it seems, freedom can

only be attained by submission. "True" freedom always means obedience to authority and subservience to norms.

Freedom and authority, the extent and nature of human freedom and its limitations, has long been a subject of philosophical consideration. Though Sartre insists on complete freedom, generally philosophers accept some limitations are necessary.(62) Kant's categorical imperative places some restriction on freedom. Human beings should be treated, never solely as means, but always as an end. This limits our freedom and untrammelled action is not permissible, but the limitation is introduced to advance freedom, to ensure that one will is not subjected to another. The utilitarianism of Mill also suggests something similar, a view of moral rules as generalised imperatives with a stress on their reciprocal quality. R. S. Peters describes the "paradox of freedom."(63) Some restriction, such as the rule of law is necessary to ensure that freedom is not subverted, and the weaker is not compelled to submit to the arbitrary will of the stronger. Though there is some limitation of freedom in all these views, there is a crucial difference. In other views, the limitations are introduced to ensure protection for the weaker, and not, as in FP, to ensure that there is obedience to the "proper authorities". In CNE and FP, the term "freedom" is a misnomer. Authority is related to freedom, not a balance of freedom set against mutually agreed rules, but to freedom as obedience, and subservience to authority. FP wants everyone to acknowledge the "proper" authority and be obedient to it. Obedience means "For both the educator and educand...the acknowledgement of human (anthropic) values as educational values."(64) Theoretically the obedience is due to God or to norms, but in practice, obedience becomes due to whoever is being regarded in authority, as the arbiter of the correct norms and values, and this, though the parents and the church are

presumed to have an equal authority, ultimately is the state. "Freedom" in CNE and FP, with this stress on obedience, becomes the antithesis of freedom, and becomes an authoritarian view of education, and not a paradox for the purpose of ensuring freedom as it is in Peters's view.

FP claims to be "scientific", and as part of its "scientific" status, has created a particular use of terminology. The pedagogician is required to define clearly "certain terms used in everyday language with all kinds of confusing connotations. This is an important prerequisite for the practising of authentic science."(65) In pursuit of these scientific terms, pedagogics draws distinctions between words such as "education", which is "the practice, the educator's...concern in assisting the child on his way to adulthood" and "Pedagogics" which is "the science practised by the educationist". There is differentiation between "education" and "pedagogics", between "educator" and "pedagogician", "pedagogics" and "pedagogy". Unfortunately, in its own practice, FP is not so precise about defining terms and explaining its notions. W. Morrow(66) states that there often is conflation of meaning, such as that between "philosophy of life" and "culture" or "philosophy of education" and "schooling policy". While CNE and FP can give their own interpretation to terms or invest them with any meanings desired by them, this is contrary to FP's "scientific" aspirations. FP would want terms, as "scientific" terminology, to be precise and universally valid. This does not quite apply in FP's use of the term "authority", which is a complex notion. Assigning only one meaning is to ignore the complexities of the term.

However, this limited use of "authority" adopted by CNE and FP is indicative of the underlying purpose, conscious or unconscious, of the importance assigned to it. Wittgenstein(67) described the use of language as

part of a language game, and a language game is a specific activity carried on with language. "The restricted forms of language games serve to isolate and highlight the different roles that linguistic expression can play and the purposes for which they may be used." Language is a form of life, particularly of social life, and a particular use of language shows a particular set of social practices.

By using one meaning of "authority", CNE and FP show a particular set of thought and practice. By regarding it as the exercise of power and control, and submission to "authority" as being obedience, there is an elimination of the space that would allow for autonomy and critical thought. It prevents the questioning of underlying assumptions. This means that social and political relations that are to be reproduced remain covered. In the next section I want to examine the notion that "authority" has been emphasised in a particular way because it serves to further certain political and economic interests.

SECTION FOUR

THE POLITICS OF "AUTHORITY" IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION

B. Bernstein states that "How a society selects, classifies, distributes,transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control."(1)

Both CNE and FP see authority as an inescapable part of their educational theories. While these theories regard "authority" as means of attaining "educational" objectives, the educational theories also serve economic and political interests. CNE purports to serve primarily religious beliefs, and emphasises its theistic foundations, based on Calvinism. Its religious foundations are openly declared, and it would be unfair to criticise it for being based on religious foundations. But although it claims to be "a policy for the Afrikaans Calvinistic section of our population" and "was never intended for the English Anglican section, neither for any other Afrikaans religious or philosophical group"(2), it was, in practice, a theory on which all South African education was based and its values were imposed on all. Its theistic basis also concealed political and economic interests. To enforce its views, and to encourage acceptance of them, "authority" was a crucial device. To reduce resistance and questioning of educational practice, "authority" was constantly stressed. According to CNE "Cosmology"(3), God's plan is unknown to man. "God's being is something that sinful man should not ask and cannot know." Submission to authority is what is required and questioning is undesirable. "Absolute truth goes beyond man's intellect." As truth is beyond human comprehension, obedience to authority is essential. This authority be-

longs not only to God, but has devolved on those placed in political authority. "...he will practise the virtues of obedience by realising it is necessary to obey the laws of the land...Not only should the child obey the law but he should uphold it...It should be impressed on the child that resistance to authority...always brings retribution in the shape of punishment." This clearly indicates that educational "authority" is extended to indicate obedience to those in political power, and thus is used to enforce political aims. The obedience required is obedience to the law and yet, in writing that claims to be philosophical, there is no suggestion of any questioning of the justice or rightness of the law or the political power that the child is trained to obey

Only those who have learnt to obey authority, those who have accepted the "proper" values, are deemed to be worthy of gaining any positions. If one obeys the "proper" authority, one learns to lead. "Leadership qualities should be developed by teaching the child that an able leader must have been a loyal follower."(4) But obedience is not limited to the child. The teacher, in a different way, has to be obedient as well. The "correct attitude" is required, and the teacher has to carry out instructions faithfully, even though he might not agree with them. Once the instructions have been obeyed, he should "lodge his objection through the right channels."(5) This objection is, of course, limited to the detail of correctness of the order only and implies an acceptance of the values and the hierarchy and this legitimises the authority. The main framework does not remain open to question. In any kind of mechanical or military activity, this kind of rigid insistence on obedience could perhaps be justifiable, but in the development of intellect, it is out of place. CNE and FP do not regard "truth" as something to be explored. It has already been given, and is to be found within the keeping of those in authority.

The child has to take "realities" for granted and the "facts" are to be considered as independent, not as the the construction of interests, "not as constructed realities realised in particular institutional contexts"(6) or of truth as, according to C.W.Mills being, in its persistence and change, "open to socio-historical relativization."(7) In CNE (and FP) the legitimacy of authority is never in question. It is always assumed to be legitimate "...the legitimacy of 'study objects' becomes built into categories of thought themselves."(8)

The accentuation of obedience serves to ensure conformity within the group as well. Orders have to be carried out and the welfare of the group takes precedence over individual development. In CNE, the group, the "national" has become represented by the state, and the state has been legitimised by God. The power of the state is regarded as the "authority" of the state, and this "authority" must be exercised to perpetuate these powers of the state. "We believe that the authorities must see to it that the education which is given to adults is not damaging to the state."(Article 13)

The idea of "authority" as an exercise of power to maintain interests is particularly evident in Articles 14 and 15 which deal with the education of the "Coloured" and the "Bantu". Article 14 states: "We believe Coloured teaching must be seen as a subordinate part of the vocation and task of the Afrikaner to Christianise the non-white races.. We accept the principle of trusteeship...of the Afrikaner over the non-white. We believe that only when the coloured man has been Christianised can he and will he be secure against his own heathen and all kinds of foreign ideologies which promise him a sham happiness but in the long run make him unsatisfied and unhappy." The values of CNE are to be forced on to others,

and in imposing these values, the "coloured" does not have to consent. The "coloured" is regarded as a child, and if the coloured finds happiness in any other belief, this belief is childish or even worse, a "sham" happiness. The basis of judging the authenticity of happiness seems to be with whoever CNE regards to be the authority.

Article 15 has similar views about "black" education and it also wants the "teaching and the education of the native" to be "grounded in the life and world view of the whites, most especially those of the Boer nation... On the grounds of cultural infancy of the native we believe it is the right and task of the state in collaboration with the Christian Protestant churches to give and control native education."

There is not even a pretence of tolerance, or a consideration that the beliefs of "coloureds" might have any value or that they have a right to create their own understanding of life. The "life and world view" that others must accept must be "especially those of the Boer nation." Other cultures are inferior or immature, and the mature can have domination over them. As the adult has power over the child, the child has to be obedient and accept the control of "authority". The term "trusteeship" implies a relationship of guardianship, of directing and leading, usually for the benefit of the ward. But there is a crucial contradiction in regarding black people as wards. The ward usually comes of age and becomes independent of the trustee, but in CNE's view of "trusteeship" the ward always remains a minor, subject to the control of the trustee. There is no coming of age, no reaching of equality, the trusteeship is designed not for the benefit of the ward but of the trustee. The Beleid emphasises "no equality and segregation" and trusteeship is based on colour and not mental or

physical attributes. Equality of culture, and consequently of treatment or opportunity can never be possible in CNE. A kind of condescending kindness is encouraged, but with an understanding that there is a clear division. "Positive social attitudes should be developed...but...all people can never be equal in the full sense of the word because of profound differences in culture, civilizational maturity, background, level of education, fair treatment of less developed races and cultures should never degenerate into negrophile fraternization with mentally immature groups with a lower level of culture."(9) The separate education acts for the different race groups and the educational legislation of the National Party in the decade of the 1960's, and in particular the National Advisory Education Council Act all appear to show the influence of CNE thought. In the separate education acts "authority" was important to ensure that the "authority" would remain in control. For example, the Indians Education Act, Act no 61 of 1965, spells out in considerable detail the procedure for the discharge of a teacher particularly on account of "misconduct". Misconduct is defined in Section 16 and definitions from (a) to (r) are given in relation to "authority", Section 16(c) states that a teacher commits misconduct if he disobeys, disregards or makes wilful default in carrying out a lawful order given to him by a person having authority to give it, or by word or conduct displays insubordination. The other acts relating to "Coloured" and "Bantu" have generally similar provisions. The definition is so broad that any dissent can be construed as misconduct even if this dissent merely questions the reasonableness of the order, or a gesture expresses disagreement. Any "lawful" order has to be carried out, and by "lawful" is meant anything permitted by law. It need not be of any educational value. Nor are these conditions mere legal conveniences. There have been teachers charged with misconduct for disobedience to "authority" in school. There is the ex-

ample of a teacher who was charged with insubordination for refusing the "lawful order" to "forecast" his lessons.(10) At the subsequent enquiry the presiding officer commented that the teacher was efficient and not lax or "insubordinate" but had to be found guilty as he had not carried out a lawful order. The idea of obedience was crucial, and all other considerations were irrelevant if the order was "lawful".

The implication in the education act seemed to be that "authority" exacted obedience, and this notion meant that "authority" could be used to control teachers. Morality or justice did not appear to have great importance. At a particular school, a memorandum was submitted to the education department concerned accusing the principal of financial irregularities. The department conceded that the complaints were not baseless, but in a letter(11) informed the teachers that "the spirit of antagonism towards management staff as revealed by your memorandum cannot but be detrimental to the discipline and general well-being of the school ..You would do well to adopt a more professionally sound attitude and to accord the principal your full co-operation."

In most South African schooling, "authority" is control. There is a hierarchy of authority, and obedience is always required. In the example cited, "authority" is not a question of an arbiter of rules, but a form of power and control, particularly control of teachers. The reason for the exercise of control is rooted in the system of education prevalent in South Africa. The system has been examined from many viewpoints, and there is general agreement with the view that the Nationalists attempted to implement a form of education intended to produce "inferior, non-threatening and tribalistic Africans."(12) The kind of race division in South Africa has been, quite often, linked to its economic system. There

are both Marxists and liberals who argue that if elaborate rhetoric is stripped away, "apartheid" is simply a harsh class system.(13) Marxists have, in attempting to reconcile class and colour differentiation, regarded colour as being only a visible manifestation of class, the whites representing the capitalists and bourgeoisie, and the blacks the proletariat. There are difficulties about this analysis, however, and warnings about implying an economic reductionism(14). Though capital is regarded as a social relation, and ideological and political structures are part of the accumulation process and of labour reproduction, this should not be deterministically assumed. Many contradictions and conflicts are involved and the analysis is quite problematic.

In the initial years of National Party rule, the idea of domination by race was quite explicit. Whites were regarded as superior and laws were unapologetically racist. Political and economic developments, which cannot be examined in detail in this essay, led to more refined and subtler forms of domination. The transition from CNE has been linked to these developments, but again too simplistic a view must not be taken. FP as a theory preceded many of the developments it has been linked with such as the Wiehan and de Lange reports. These reports brought about a change from the explicit racism which existed previously. In the same way, racism was explicit in CNE but not in FP. Bearing these reservations in mind, South Africa's political and economic relations have undeniably undergone some restructuring. There is disagreement about the extent and nature of the process and care must be taken not to read into it a conspiracy theory or a deliberate design. Motives are often not conscious and processes are confused and contradictory. But some developments clearly contributed to change. International hostility and black resistance were among these, as were economic imperatives. The situation of white labour had also

changed. High unemployment had given way to a shortage of white labour. Labour requirements had changed from requiring a pool of unskilled labour to requiring semi-skilled operatives and technicians. Technological advancement and monopolistic capitalism led to capital intensive companies, white farms also became larger and more mechanised. Social order and social requirements also changed. In education, these pressures required that the stress shift to "technicism".

P Buckland (15) describes the ideological shifts in the ruling elite to accommodate changes in the social structure and the emergence of business and the military as power factors. Buckland feels that in spite of an ideological affiliation to Christian National Education there was an "infusion into the education bureaucracy and into education of technocratic ideals." The HSRC investigation under de Lange was an expression of this technicism. The values of CNE were retained, but technological efficiency was stressed. The technicist values of efficiency and control implicit in "scientific" research, "scientific" management and "differentiated education" provides a legitimising basis. FP also serves this legitimising process. It also wraps education in a rhetoric of science that promotes technicist values. Apple(16) argues that systems techniques are systems of control. In FP, the scientism legitimates the existing distribution of control and power. Part of the implementation of this technicism required strong control over teachers and the notion of "authority" in FP serves to implement this control, a control wrapped in the rhetoric of "science".

FP puts forward the idea of a neutral, value-free "science" of education but as Kallaway(17) puts it, FP dresses "up the blatant political chauvinist and racist nature of earlier educational doctrine" and has found

"a language and a structure that would allow the appearance that the study of things educational had been taken out of the market place of ideas - of economic pressures, political conflict and ideological contestation."

There is in FP the assumption that because education is a science, it does not, in its scientific stage, represent any interest at all. But this representation ignores the fact that concepts cannot be viewed in isolation, that it is their context which gives them significance and their use represents a particular cast of thought and frame of understanding. Concepts are embedded in theoretical and political contexts, "legitimisation of social order is...symbolic, and more importantly, hidden."(18) An adaptation of Bourdieu's ideas might be appropriate to give some clarity to claims of "scientific" neutrality. Bourdieu (19) describes how meanings are reproduced, and certain cultural forms are legitimated. The relations of power impose certain meanings and categories. By describing FP as "scientific", its description and concepts are given status, and its meanings are defined as "rational". The relations of power are concealed, education is assumed to be "scientifically" neutral, and its values are not open to question. Ignored is the fact that imposing categories of meaning on the dominated group represents symbolic violence. The supposedly neutral methodology of FP presents the social sciences or education as apolitical(20). Giroux suggests that we should analyse the assumptions embedded in a given educational paradigm. What interests do these assumptions serve? What are the material and intellectual forces that sustain these assumptions?(21)

The notion of FP as a science tries to give a status to the "authority" of experts. Education acquires a paraphernalia of "scientific" accesso-

ries such as I.Q. testing, psychometric tests, "taxonomies". These exert control over and affect children in many ways, and questioning is avoided because what is done is done by "scientific authority". In FP, the school is represented as impersonal. "Pedagogics is the science of the education situation which will reveal the pedagogic phenomenon in its essential structures."(22) This view of the "scientific" professed by FP treats as unproblematic the question of how pupils, teachers and knowledge are organised and how some are in a position to impose meanings on others.(23)

Apple (24) regards schools as institutions interconnected with political and other institutions, and schools often unquestionably act to distribute knowledge and values through both the overt and the hidden curriculum. Though FP implies that authority represented in the schools is "scientifically" based, it ignores that the school is a vehicle through which those with economic and political power shape public policy "(25) When the norms of society control the kind of "authority", the educator is reduced to being an expert of method only, removed from the purpose and nature of education.

B. Parker (26) says that in FP the child has to submit to the authority of the teacher and the teacher to a set of norms laid down by the higher being. The individual must submit to the authority of the State which represents a higher being. For the individual to act freely, the individual must act in accordance with the laws of the state. The stress on obedience makes education a process of submission.

The cruder policy of CNE could not gain acceptance, but the refinement of the ideas as presented in FP show "authority" as a "scientific" part of education, and made acceptance much easier.

Althusser's account (27) of ideological state apparatuses, while not without difficulties, gives an idea of the role of education in reproducing social formations. This reproduction requires not only a reproduction of skills but also a submission to the rules of the established order. If the idea of submission is learnt, there is no need to use repressive apparatuses.

If children in school absorb the practice of obedience, they regard as natural the hierarchy of authority, and it becomes easier to reproduce social formations that perpetuate domination. But "authority" need not be used only for purposes of domination. In the next section I shall outline,briefly, a notion of "authority" that could serve to promote the worth of the individual.

SECTION FIVE

SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS MORE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES OF "AUTHORITY" IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION

The suggestions in this section take as a central idea the worth of the individual.(1) The concern with the worth of the individual means that all are allowed to live "autonomous...lives."(2) I want to suggest principles of "authority" that would allow each person freedom and autonomy and not make one person subject to another's will.

What one considers worthwhile in life will determine one's view of education. Education is inseparably linked to one's conception of the good life. My view of the good life is based on the worth of the individual, the view that the individual is autonomous and entitled to decide on her own conception of the good life.

CNE and FP propose something different from this view. CNE envisages an education that asserts that it is designed to promote the religious views of Calvinist Afrikaners.(3) FP, while aspiring to be a "scientific" study of education and claiming to be neutral, is closely linked to CNE and has a similar vision of the good life. It also allows for a "post-scientific" education based on a particular "philosophy of life."(4) I shall ignore here the peculiar use of the term "philosophy". FP accepts that in South Africa, education must be based on CNE. According to Act 39 of 1967, all teachers in South Africa "must subscribe to a Christian National view of life."(5) The form of the good life determined by these theories leaves

no room for individual autonomy. There is an emphasis on a particular form of "authority" as control to ensure that the individual does not develop a different idea of the good life. "Authority" exacts conformity with a set of norms that are assumed to be correct. In presenting an alternative set of principles of authority, I assume that the ordinary person can make her own decisions. There are "no moral experts on the good life for individuals in detail."(6) No conception of the good life can be arbitrarily imposed on anyone, and no one should be subject to an arbitrary view. The only person to decide is the individual himself.

This does not imply an unrestricted freedom, because there are always the limitations imposed by others' right to freedom as well. If one person is allowed unrestricted freedom, another person's freedom may be limited. A sacrifice of some freedom is necessary, though this limitation is permissible only to secure freedom. It is very important that any sacrifice be seen as a sacrifice, and not, as FP sometimes seems to see it, as an enlargement of freedom for those who have to make the sacrifice. But even allowing for this sacrifice, it is imperative that there remain a certain minimum area of personal freedom, allowing one to follow what one holds good or right or sacred.(7) To ensure that one person's freedom does not encroach on another's, something external has to set limits, and this can usually be done by rules which define the limits to which freedom may be restrained without affecting the minimum area of freedom that an individual must have.

It becomes necessary for every individual to have a share in the exercise or control of power. This means that "each person is to have an equal share in the exercise or control of power so that no conception of the good life is arbitrarily imposed on anyone, and no one is subject to ar-

bitrary interference."(8) The individual should be allowed access to power at every level, and every institution should allow participation. One way of allowing individuals access to this power would be the introduction of a form of participatory democracy such as suggested by P. White.(9) She details the form of participation by the individual in different areas of life, but I do not intend to spell out the details of the participation here. She also suggests that training for participation in democratic activity can best be done at school.

It is generally accepted that a child must not only be instructed to view a particular form of life as the good life, but needs to learn it by experience and participation. For example, CNE insists that a "Christian character can be be formed only in a Christian milieu" and that the "spirit, the tendency, the instruction and all the activities of the school" should "reveal the Christian philosophy of life when the Bible is accepted in education as the objective and the normative in its widest embrace."(10) FP also feels that there is, curiously in view of its "scientific" aspirations, "no such thing as a neutral education."(11) It is at school, then, that children can learn to respect the worth of others, and education can assist in creating an attitude of concern for others. Children at school can learn about participation in the decision-making process, not only by being told about it, but by a practical involvement. It is "very important not to underestimate the educative influence of a well-run, democratically organized school."(12) Children tend to develop attitudes towards structures which control their lives, and by their participation in decision making, they can learn to be critical, tolerant of other viewpoints and willing to accept having their mistakes pointed out to them, and be prepared to rectify these mistakes, especially if they are wielding power.(13)

Schools can be part of a process to provide "guided experience in decision-making"(14) because it is "the school **par excellence** which can provide such carefully guided practise in participation in decision-making if it shapes its school organisation with that in mind."(15) In learning decision-making children can also learn rules and procedure, and to consider the worth of the individual. They can also learn that "authority" does not mean unquestioning obedience to power structures, that "authority" does not have to mean control. Decision-making would also develop the idea of a moral responsibility and there could be an encouragement for a "concern to do what is right in the context of the whole community."(16) If there is this concern, children will begin to realise that decision-making will impose certain limits on freedom.

The idea of limitation should distinguish between these types of freedom - freedom of thought, freedom of expression and freedom of action.(17) In education there could be no justification for restricting freedom of thought. Freedom of expression requires limitation only to the extent that another person's freedom is not interfered with, and it is not harmful to anyone. There are some difficulties about freedom of action, and restraint is often needed as unrestricted freedom can harm the freedom of others. The strong can impose their will on the weak, and unrestricted freedom can also become a device for maintaining existing inequalities.

FP suggests that freedom is obtained by complete submission to authority, but in my suggestions the individual is required to submit to control only to the extent that greater freedom to all is available. But any freedom should be reduced only when absolutely necessary. The "onus is on anyone

who wants to interfere with another's freedom to justify the interference."(18) The frontier between personal freedom and public control is a shifting line that has to be constantly renegotiated.(19) One of the ways in which it can be ensured that there can be some balance is to have a system of rules by which all must abide. The rules are essential to see that the individual's freedom remains. The rules can obviously not be perfect but there has to be a system of rules. Rules are a necessary part of the protection of individual freedom. They set out limits and are intended to create a system that allows the person to follow what she considers the good life.

Peters(20) distinguishes clearly between "power" and "authority". Authority is linked to a rule-governed way of life and is necessary to bring out the ways in which behaviour is regulated without recourse to power, to force, incentives and propaganda. The "authority" of rules of justice would ensure that, if it becomes necessary to limit or control freedom, it could be done according to the principles of fairness and justice. The crucial difference here is that FP and CNE see "authority" as power and control. Peters(21) argues that "authority" is properly used only in those situations in which decisions about what is correct or incorrect are reached by appealing to some source or "auctor". With rules, "authority" would thus be an appeal to an impersonal set of rules that are formulated to allow the individual the maximum of freedom compatible with the freedom of others.

Individual autonomy can be undermined in many ways, and one of these is too wide a difference in wealth.(22) Marxists argue that inequality cannot be eliminated without public ownership of the means of production. But Strike(23) argues that the traditional Marxist view does not distinguish

between ownership of the means of production and control of the means of production. Some concentration of economic power can be allowed if there are safeguards to make it compatible with justice and fairness. If such safeguards cannot be designed, then justice would require a different economic order. An egalitarian approach to the distribution of economic power would be the ideal, but a range of differences may have to be allowed, if only for motivation purposes. What is important is that each person must have the right "to the basic minimum to cover needs like food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education and so on."(24) The basic minimum should not be "assumed to be a low minimum",(25) and should allow a person more than mere subsistence.

Though the principle of the worth of the individual may not address all inequalities and injustices, it has the intention to correct all. All theories have seen society through particular frames of thought, and even "progressive" theories have overlooked particular injustices, primarily because they were not seen as injustices and no one had thought to question them. Many theories have had to be modified. A commitment to the worth of the individual does not mean that there is perfect justice as one might not have been aware one is committing an injustice, but it does encourage open-mindedness in place of dogmatic adherence to previously held views and also a readiness to question any new problems that may come to light.

While rules assist in ensuring that there is individual autonomy, care must be taken that this does not lead to an unfeeling, legalistic approach. It must also be remembered that "no form of governments can guarantee liberty."(26). Rules need to be supplemented by something in the nature of P White's notion of "fraternity".(27) Genuine fraternal

feelings would not only be "brotherly" feelings although these and sororal feelings would be included, but also feelings of mutual respect, tolerance, and a bond as equals, with all people considered as moral persons, entitled to a life of their own. These feelings of "fraternity" could lead to a more egalitarian system of education, a system that would avoid the hierarchical structure in schools which requires compliance and submission. As "authority" should be based on rules that have been accepted by consent, the right to interpret what is correct should allow room for questioning and dissent. A democratic structure of education and schooling has to be based on agreement and the participation of pupils, teachers and parents, possibly on a pattern suggested by P White.(28) Democratic participation would lead to a democratic organisation of education, and its contents. As the school has to provide a primary good to which all people have a right, it should be democratically constituted. The determination of rules, and the authority in the interpretation of these would be by democratically constituted groups, subject to the provisions of the rules of justice.

White suggests a participatory democracy in the organisation of the school that could allow for the participation of all involved in the school, and who would be party to decisions affecting the school. Children also need to develop an understanding of the role of "authority" and "power" in regulating their lives, and their participation in decision making could be an important part of their development. All participants in the school would know the manner of running the institution. Every individual could have a share in the control of the organisation.

The essential difference between what is suggested here and "authority" in CNE and FP is that in the simplest sense, "authority" in CNE and FP

is a misnomer for control and the exercise of power, while I feel that "authority" is a submission to rules framed by consent. Education is, of course, not isolated from society, and the manner of the exercise of power in education is an extension of the exercise of political power. Any changes in the form of educational "authority" would necessarily require changes in all areas of society. There are enormous problems in creating a functioning, fully democratic system with egalitarian and just institutions, but the authoritarianism prevalent in schools is inimical to education, and even an imperfect attempt would constitute a notable improvement.

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SECTION FIVE

1. I am aware of the problems of this position and the criticisms levelled at at it. In spite of these, I still maintain it as a basic principle, but I do not intend to defend it in this report.
2. White, P. (1983) p.5
3. Coetzee, J. Chr. in Rose, B and Tunmer, R. (1975) p.117
4. Smit, A.J. (1981) pp.104ff
5. Ibid. p.120

6. White, P. (1983) p.10

7. Berlin, I. in Quinton, A. (1968) p.144

8. White, P. (1983) p.9

9. Ibid. Most of the book is devoted to participatory democracy.

10. Report of Provincial Education Commission of Enquiry, 1951, Orange Free State. (Appointed 1946) PP.21 ff in Rose, B. and Tunmer, R. (1975) p.109

11. Smit, A.J. (1981) P.120

12. White, P. (1983) 93

13. Ibid. p.95

14. Ibid. p.96

15. Ibid. p.95

16. Ibid. p.98

17. Peters, R.S. (1966) p.183

18. White, P. (1983) p. 7

19. Berlin, I. in Quinton, A. (1968) p.143

20. Peters, R.S. (1966) p.239

21. Ibid. p.238

22. Strike, K.A. (1982) p.230

23. Ibid. pp 230-244

24. White, P. (1983) p.30

25. Ibid. p.31

26. Carrit, E.F. in Quinton, A. (1968) p.129

27. White, P. (1983) p.70

28. Ibid. p.13

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Author Eshak Y I
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