Race and the Democratic Alliance: An analysis of the party's performance in elections with specific reference to the 2011 local government elections

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Declaration

A Research Report submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Political Studies, I declare that this is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the requirements of the Degree of Master of Arts by coursework in Political Studies, at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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INTRODUCTION

Are South African elections little more than racial censuses? Do people simply vote according to the colour of their skin – white South Africans vote for 'white' parties, while black[i] South Africans vote for 'black' parties? In addition, what is the influence of class, especially the political impact of the new black middle class? This dissertation will seek to determine the impact of race and growing class cleavages in South Africa, and determine what influences the voting choices of South Africans.

It has often been argued that South African elections are racial censuses, and voters in this country vote due to ethnic and racial loyalties, rather than on policies and programmes put forward by parties. It is clear from research conducted previously that the loyalties of South African voters in previous elections has coincided with their race. As noted, white voters would generally vote for 'white' parties, while black voters would generally vote for 'black' parties. White parties, are by definition, those that enjoy high levels of white support, and generally have large numbers of white people in leadership positions. Black parties would then, by definition, generally be those which draw their support from black people and have predominantly black leadership. Examples of the former would be the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the erstwhile Democratic Party (DP) and National Party (NP). Examples of the latter would be the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

However, there is evidence that this is changing, but that race remains the most salient factor in predicting how people may vote, but the impact of class is becoming increasingly important, and is demonstrated below.

The novelty of this thesis is that the trends at ward level are investigated. This approach, coupled with an overview of the literature regarding post-apartheid elections, and the influence of race and class on these, has not been attempted previously.

In addition, the study of local government elections in South Africa has been relatively neglected. This report aims to fill that gap to a degree.

The report is broken up into three primary sections. The first section examines South Africa's election results since the beginning of majority rule in 1994, with specific reference to firstly the DP, and then the DA, as well as examining – as far as is possible – the racial breakdown of support for the DA, in particular. A short history of the formation of the DA will also be provided. The efforts to by the DA to move itself away from perceptions as a 'white' party, or one that is at worst, antagonistic, and at best, indifferent, to black people will also be briefly examined.

The second section is an overview of the literature of race- and class-based voting in South Africa. This is made up a number of studies and surveys on race- and class-based voting patterns. The rise of the black middle class will also be examined, and what impact this group of people may have on voting patterns and elections in South Africa.

The third section is an examination of a selection of wards from the 2011 municipal elections in order to determine voting patterns, such as race, income, and level of education had, if any. Due to the sheer volume of wards in the 2011 municipal elections (4 273) only wards in the eight metropolitan municipalities will be examined. It is not possible to directly compare election results from 2011 to the 2006 elections, as the boundaries of wards change, due to population changes.

However, to compare results over time, by-elections held since the 2011 elections will be analysed. Again, due to the large number of by-elections that have been held since the 2011 municipal elections, and given the focus of this thesis, only those wards in which the ANC won a ward from the DA, or where the DA gained a ward from the ANC. This will be contrasted against the demographic indicators in those wards, using data from the Census 2011, to see if there is a correlation between race, income, and education levels and the voting patterns within those wards.

An analysis of these by-elections identifies a number of outliers. The coloured rural vote is flagged as something of an enigma. In addition, there are a number of rural wards, with only black voters, where the DA emerged as the most popular party in by-elections since the local government election in 2011.

The best indicator of which way a ward was likely to swing remained race. Because of the nature of South Africa's history, wards with low levels of income and education were overwhelmingly likely to be ones in which black people were a majority, and these wards, in general, returned large ANC majorities. There were a number of exceptions – these were primarily wards in which coloured people made up the majority, but there were a number of other outliers, which are examined below. Due to the nature of this report a more sophisticated analysis of income and education levels was not possible. This ward level data has been retained in an appendix. There would be scope for further study of the impact that education and income levels have on voters, and this would become an increasingly important area of study as the black vote in South Africa continues to fragment (which seems to be the current trend).

The report finds that race is still the primary predictor of how people may vote. Very few majority-black wards return anything other than an ANC candidate while wards with white majorities or pluralities almost universally returned DA candidates. This could also be because of higher turnout among white voters – there is some evidence to suggest that this is the case. Wards where Indian or coloured people formed majorities or pluralities also generally returned DA candidates – implying that the DA is the favoured party among minorities. However, this was not universally so, and the ANC and other parties (such as the Minority Front [MF] in Indian-majority areas) emerged as the leading party occasionally. Nevertheless, there is evidence that shows that this is changing and that while race remains the most salient factor in how people vote, this is being diluted, with other social indicators, such as income, employment status, and level of education all becoming increasingly important. Evidence of this is the DA's good performance in a number of wards where 100% of residents were black (getting over 20% for example in some wards) and the party's performance in a number of by-elections, as noted above.

SOUTH AFRICA'S ELECTIONS – HOW DID THE DA PERFORM?

Evidence from South Africa's various post-apartheid elections indicates that the ANC managed to capture the vast majority of the black vote, with the white vote generally going to the NP (in 1994), being split between the NP and the DP (1999), or being captured by the DA (2004 and subsequent elections). The evidence from elections seems to support this theory, although it is clear that outliers exist, with the DA gaining support sometimes in surprising places. In addition, although South

Africa's two other minority groups – coloured people and Indians – in the majority seem to support the DA – voting patterns in those communities do appear to be far more fluid.

1994

The 1994 election was the founding election of South Africa, in the sense that a new polity emerged from this election (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996, p11). In addition, it was the first election held in South Africa under a common franchise and all citizens over 18 could vote, as there was no voters' roll (Davenport and Saunders, 2000, p567).

The results in this election were as could be expected for one as divided on race as South Africa. Parties that could be considered 'black' drew support in the main from members of that community. Conversely, 'white' parties generally drew their support from white voters. Opinion polls held prior to the election had also indicated that this was likely to be the case.

Prior to the 1994 elections a number of opinion polls were held, which found that support on racial lines for various parties was extremely polarised. For example, a poll held in July 1992 found that only one per cent of white respondents said they supported the ANC or the SACP. However, more than half of whites (56%) said that they supported the NP, with three per cent supporting the DP, and two per cent the IFP. More than a quarter (28%) said they supported a party of the white right – the Afrikaner Volksfront, the *Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging* (AWB or Afrikaner Resistance Movement), or the Conservative Party (CP), while eleven per cent of respondents refused to say who they supported (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996, p79).

Support for political parties among black South Africans showed completely different trends. Sixty per cent of those surveyed indicated that they supported the ANC, 11% expressed support for the IFP, and, relatively surprisingly, some 8% supported the NP. Nearly 20% did not say who they supported while 2% said they supported the PAC. The majority of Coloured and Indian respondents said that they supported the NP. Some 64% of coloured people and 58% of Indians said they supported that party, respectively. Support for the ANC among coloured people was 10% and among Indians, six per cent (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996, p79).

A survey conducted a year later – in July 1993 – showed that things had changed somewhat. This was not because white respondents suddenly indicated that they now supported the ANC, but rather that those who were not sure who would they support, or refused to answer, had increased relatively dramatically. Support for the ANC among whites stayed static – at one per cent – while support for the NP had dropped to 28%. Support for the DP had increased marginally to four per cent, and eight per cent the IFP. Support for the white right had dropped slightly to 26%, while those that were unsure or refused to answer had increased to 33%. Among black South Africans support for the ANC had increased to 68%, while support for the NP was now negligible. Eight per cent supported the IFP, and one-fifth stated that they were unsure of their support or refused to answer (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996, p80).

Among coloured and Indian respondents support for the ANC had increased, to 12% among coloured respondents and 17% for Indian respondents. At the same time support for the NP had dropped to 44% among coloured people, and 39% among Indians. The proportion of those who refused to

answer who they supported, or who said they were unsure was large for both groups, both at 38% (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996, p80).

The actual electoral results showed that these polls were broadly accurate, although the support that extremist or radical parties received was generally lower than that which they received in opinion polls leading up to the election (Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996, p83).

It was estimated that of the ANC's total vote tally of 12.2 million, some 94% (11.5 million) came from by black South Africans. About 500 000 people coloured people voted for the party (4% of the party's total vote). It was estimated that 150 000 Indians and 50 000 whites voted for the party in 1994 (Reynolds, 1994, p191).

Overall there were approximately 14.2 million votes cast by black South Africans (Reynolds, 1994, p190). This means that about 85.9% of black voters supported the ANC – by any measure a phenomenal performance by the party.

The NP had perhaps the most multi-racial vote of any of the parties in 1994, ironically, considering the party's history – introducing the policy of apartheid in 1948. Reynolds (1994, p192) estimated that of the NP's total vote of 3.9 million, just under half (49%) came from white voters, 30% from coloured voters, 14% from black voters, and seven per cent from Indian voters.

The NP was the single largest party among all South Africa's racial groups, with the exception of black South Africans. Support for the NP among whites was about 65%, about 67% of coloured voters voted for the NP, while approximately half of all Indian voters cast their ballots for the NP. Between three and four percent of black voters supported the party in 1994 (Reynolds, 1994, p193). According to Seekings (2005, pp3 – 4) 'working-class coloured voters opted en masse for the NP' while many middle-class coloured voters were more split 'with many supporting the ANC'.

This was the highest proportion of the white vote that the NP had secured in more than a decade. In the three (whites-only) elections held in the 1980s, the NP's support had been decreasing steadily. In the elections of 1981, 1987, and 1989, the NP had won 58%, 53%, and 48%, of the white vote, respectively (Reynolds, 1994, p194). Parties to the left of the NP (in the form of the Progressive Federal Party [PFP] and the DP), and the white right (represented by the CP) had increasingly eaten into the NP's support. However, this trend was reversed in 1994.

For example, in 1987 the CP secured nearly 550 000 votes, equivalent to the support of about 27% of white voters. This increased to more than 670 000 votes (31%) in the 1989 election. However, in 1994 the Freedom Front (FF) – an explicitly Afrikaner party which emerged from various right-wing groups shortly before the 1994 election – won 420 000 votes, meaning it won the support of about 14% of white voters (Reynolds, 1994, p196).

The DP saw a similar decrease in its proportion of the white vote. In 1987 (as the PFP) it managed to secure nearly 300 000 votes, or about 20% of the total white electorate. In 1989 it saw its support jump by nearly 150 000 votes, with 430 000 people (20% of the white electorate) casting their vote for the party. However, in 1994 its support collapsed, with only about 300 000 white voters supporting the party, equivalent to only 10% of the total white vote (Reynolds, 1994, p198). The party would have likely considered this as a failure, losing the votes of more than 100 000 people who previously supported it.

It is clear that, as polls indicated in the early 1990s, the electorate was sharply divided between black and white. The ANC won the support of nearly 85% of black voters, while 90% of the white electorate cast their votes for what could be considered 'white parties'.

The only historically-black organisation other than the ANC which managed to win a relatively large proportion of the vote was the IFP. It was estimated that about 5% of the white electorate decided to support that party (Reynolds, 1994, p194). However, the IFP itself had relatively little national appeal, and drew most of its support from Zulu South Africans (Reynolds, 1994, p194), primarily in KwaZulu-Natal with pockets of support among migrant workers in Gauteng (Reynolds, 1994, p195). It is likely that they may have also drawn support from Indians in KwaZulu-Natal (Reynolds, 1994, p195).

As noted above the overall proportion of the white vote that the DP and the FF had secured was less than in 1994 than what they had achieved in previous (whites-only elections). Johnson (1996, p308) speculates that much of the DP's overall poor performance was due to the fact that its message of liberalism failed to resonate with voters, and was squeezed 'between two nationalisms which admitted very little middle ground'. Furthermore, many white voters who may have previously supported the party may have cast a vote for the ANC (Johnson, 1996, p308).

The FF may have expected to hold on to at least the nearly 700 000 whites who had voted for the CP in 1989, or even close to the nearly 900 000 voters who had voted against continuing constitutional negotiations in the whites-only referendum of 1992. Reynolds (1994, pp195 – 196) speculates that many of these voters may have 'capitulated to the inevitable march of history' and voted for De Klerk and the NP.

1999

The 1999 election was similar to the election of five years previously, with black and white voters being highly polarised with regard to which parties they supported.

Perhaps the most significant event of the 1999 election was that the DP managed to pull itself back from the brink of extinction. In 1994, as noted, the party had only won 330 000 votes, equating to 1.7% overall. In 1999, the DP's primary aim was to replace the New National Party[ii] (NNP) as the biggest opposition party in the country. The party took inspiration from the way in which its predecessor, the Progressive Party, had destroyed the United Party in the 1970s. The DP also increasingly positioned itself as the true opposition in Parliament, rather than the NNP (Welsh, 1999, p92). Furthermore, the NNP was increasingly losing its way. It had left the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1996, and thus, for the first time since it won power in 1948, found itself in opposition (Welsh, 1999, p91). In addition, the DP had, while the NNP had been in the Government of National Unity (GNU) between 1994 and 1996, filled the opposition vacuum in the National Assembly.

The DP's strategy seemed to pay off in the 1999 election. It emerged as the second biggest party, winning 1.5 million votes, or just less than 10% of the total vote. By contrast, the NNP, which had won nearly 4-million votes (20% of the total) in 1994, saw its support all but collapse, winning just over 1-million votes, just less than 7% of the total support of the electorate. The IFP remained the third-biggest party, with nearly 1.4 million votes and about 8.5% of the vote (Reynolds, 1999, p175).

The DP's success came from the large increase in the proportion of the white vote that it secured. In 1994 it won only about 10% of overall white vote. In 1999, it won about 55% of the white vote, with Reynolds estimating that 1.2 million whites voted for the party (1999, p182). The DP and its predecessor parties had probably never polled more than 20% of the vote in all-white elections, so to become the largest party among that community in the space of five years was an impressive achievement (Reynolds, 1999, p182). However, the vast majority of the party's support came from white voters, accounting for more than three-quarters of its support (Reynolds, 1999, p183). Reynolds (1999, p183) somewhat surprisingly estimates that the second-largest bloc came from black voters, with 180 000 black voters (or 12% of the party's total vote) supporting the party. This probably only equated between one and two per cent of the total black vote however (Reynolds, 1999, p182). Reynolds estimates that about 75 000 coloured voters supported the DP in 1999, along with 90 000 Indian voters (1999, p182).

On the other hand the NNP saw its share of the white vote decline markedly. While in 1994 it was estimated that the NP had secured about 1.9 million white votes (about 65% of the total), in 1999, only about 20% of whites voted for the party, equating to about 340 000 white votes (Reynolds, 1999, p185).

The white right also saw its vote fall sharply. Whereas in 1994 the FF had won 420 000 votes, the white right won less than 180 000 votes in 1999. Although in 1999 there was an additional party that could be considered explicitly right-wing or Afrikaner nationalist, in the form of the *Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging* or Afrikaner Unity Movement (AEB), only 173 000 whites voted for either the FF or AEB in 1999. This equated to only about eight per cent of the total white vote (Reynolds, 1999, p187).

The white right (in the form of the FF) has subsequently never reached the highs of 1994. Since that election it has never won more than one per cent of the total vote, and has never had more than four MPs in Parliament (Africa, 2014, p113).

The only other party, apart from the DP, which saw its white vote jump markedly, was the ANC. In 1994, the party had managed to secure about 50 000 white votes – this jumped to approximately 100 000 in 1999 (Reynolds, 1999, p181). This means that roughly five per cent of white voters cast their ballot for the ANC.

The ANC held its grip on the black vote that it had established in 1994. In 1999 of the ANC's 10.6 million votes, about 9.5 million came from black voters. This equates to about 77% of black voters giving their support to that party (Reynolds, 1999, pp179 and 181). By contrast, only about 380 000 blacks voted for one of the two main 'white' parties – either the NNP or the DP. This means that only about three per cent of black voters supported a white party (Reynolds, 1999, pp183 – 184).

The DP made itself the party of choice for white voters in 1999 by embarking on something of a controversial campaign. As mentioned above the DP aimed to distinguish itself from both the ANC, and the NP, and give voters a clear choice. At the same time, the party chose to use a campaign slogan: 'Fight Back!' The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) said that this was an 'inherently conservative message' and that the slogan was a subliminal message calling upon voters to fight 'change' (Welsh, 1999, p97). Kotze (1999, p175) also agrees that many black voters saw this as a statement for white South Africans to 'strike against their newly gained political power'. The

ANC even had fake DP posters made where the slogan was changed to 'Fight black'. The party was ordered to remove these posters, however (Welsh, 1999, p97). Taylor and Hoeane (1999, p136) go so far as to say that the DP 'played a "politics of exclusion"'. RW Johnson (2012) takes a predictably contrarian view and claims that Leon's style of opposition and the DP's 'principled and tough-minded liberalism' resonated with South Africans of all races 'who felt what they needed most in the new dispensation was a level playing field'.

Despite these perceptions, the DP was estimated to have focused between 60 and 70% of its campaigning on the Indian, coloured, and black communities. The party's election manifesto of the time did also not solely concentrate on 'white' or minority issues. The party's election manifesto of that year focused on crime, education, as well as the growing crisis of AIDS (Welsh, 1999, p99). Rule (2000, p235) also states that the DP 'stressed the importance of merit-based good quality of governance without reference to race'. Nevertheless, evidence from the 1999 campaign indicates that, at best, the party only half-heartedly went after the black vote. For example, much of the party's campaigning was via landline telephone, rather than house visits, with black households far less likely to own a telephone than a white household. In 1996 only 11 per cent of black households had had access to a telephone compared to 89 per cent for households (SAIRR, 1999, p186). It is unlikely that the situation changed significantly in the three years up to 1999. Furthermore, the majority of DP posters were placed in white areas, with Tony Leon spending far more time in white, Indian, and coloured areas, than those with large numbers of black voters (Ferree, 2011, pp93 – 94). Ferre also argues that the DP's aim in 1999 was to first capture the white Afrikaans vote, rather than that of black and coloured voters, often through the use of highly-placed white Afrikaans candidates on its election lists (2011, pp149 – 150).

The DP and its leader, Tony Leon, certainly aimed to capture the Afrikaner vote, and other whites who had not voted for it in 1994. While the NNP looked to prove itself as an 'inclusive' party, the DP promoted itself as a party which would protect Afrikaner interests. While the leader of the NNP, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, visited Sharpeville to commemorate the massacre there in 1960 during campaigning in the 1999 election, Tony Leon visited the Vrouemonument, which had been built to remember the women and children who had died in concentration camps during the South African War (Breytenbach, 1999, p122). The party also made what seemed to be a concerted effort to reach out to conservative voters through the candidature of a number of controversial figures. These included Tertius Delport, who was a candidate for the party in the Eastern Cape. He was a well-known conservative who had defected from the NP to join the DP. Another controversial DP candidate was Nigel Bruce, a former editor of a business magazine, *Financial Mail*. While he had been editor of the magazine, he had made some ill-considered comments about black people, which had not endeared him to that community (Ferree, 2011, p93). The party had, under Leon's leadership transformed itself 'from a liberal, English-dominated voice for freedom to a more conservative party offering vocal aggressive opposition to the ANC' which had enabled it to win much of the Afrikaner vote (Plaut, 2012, p247).

The 'Fight Back' campaign, coupled with the aggressive style of opposition politics certainly played a party increase its vote, particularly among Afrikaners. However, it did cause the party to be viewed as hostile to majority rule. For example, Tony Leon's former parliamentary counsellor, Bukelwa Mbulawa, left the DP and rejoined the ANC. She claimed that the party had pursued a strategy of 'numerical growth at all costs' which had been at the cost of liberal and 'noble' principles (Pressly,

2013, p31). Lindiwe Mazibuko, who served as the DA's parliamentary leader from 2011 to 2014 said that the 'Fight Back' campaign had been 'a damaging campaign in the long term' but had done the 'massive short-term favours' (Pressly, 2013, pp161 – 162).

Even before the DP's now controversial (and possibly ill-conceived) campaign of 1999 the party had started attempting to establish itself as a distinct political alternative to the NNP and the ANC. Another part of the DP's strategy was to 'present a clear-cut alternative to what it saw as the ANC's "collectivism"' (Welsh, 1999, pp91). At the same time the party considered the NP 'an amorphous mass in the middle' (Welsh, 1999, p92). This strategy seemed to be paying off. By 1998 opinion polls showed the DP polling higher than the NNP, with the DP also winning municipal by-elections in areas that had previously been Nationalist strongholds (Welsh, 1999, p95)

However, the NP's decline had begun long before the 1999 campaign. While the party had won nearly one in five votes in 1994, its support dipped to just over 18% in the municipal elections of 1995 and 1996. An opinion poll released in October 1998 showed that the party's support had dropped to as low as 13%, with another giving the party only seven per cent shortly before the 1999 election (Breytenbach, 1999, p119). Furthermore, the proportion of whites that identified with the party declined steadily between 1995 and 1999. A poll conducted in September and October 1994 found that 48% of white voters identified with the party. This declined steadily in the period up to 1999. A poll conducted in that year found that only six per cent of voters identified with the NNP. At the same time, the proportion of white respondents who considered themselves 'independent' or refused to state which party they felt close to, increased from 15% in 1994 to 80% in 1999. This rise of a 'swing' voter (although likely to only swing to another 'white party') provided the DP much richer voter pools from which to fish from (Kotze, 1999, pp171 – 172).

As noted above the NNP lost most of its white support to the DP, but it also lost large numbers of black and coloured supporters. The latter had supported the party in surprisingly large numbers in 1994. While it was estimated that in 1994 about 14% of the party's support had come from black voters, in 1999 this had dropped to three per cent. While the DP had hoovered up the party's white support, it is likely its black and coloured support went to the ANC (Breytenbach, 1999, p119). Some of the party's coloured support may also have gone to the DP, which claimed to be fighting for coloured interests (Taylor and Hoeane, 1999, p137).

The collapse of support for the NNP was due to a number of factors. White voters punished the party for what some saw as its capitulation in the post-1994 negotiations, while others were 'shamed by the revelations of the Truth Commission' (Breytenbach, 1999, p119). Furthermore, the party gained a new leader in 1998, following the resignation of FW de Klerk, in the form of Marthinus van Schalkwyk, a relative political unknown (Kotze, 1999, p168). Two former high-ranking NNP officials, Dave Steward and Frik van Deventer also put some of the blame for the NNP's demise at its involvement in the coalition Government of National Unity (GNU) (Southern 2015, p242). However, Van Schalkwyk's relative youthfulness (epitomised by his nickname '*Kortbroek*' or Short-pants), and the fact that De Klerk had been well-liked by large segments of the coloured community saw this further hamper the NP (Breytenbach, 1999, p119 and Kotze, 1999, p169). However, Breytenbach is of the opinion that the party's main problem was that it failed to learn how to cope without power, as well as how to retain its Afrikaans support base while seeking the support of other voters (1999, p119). Ferree (2011, p23) argues that one of the causes for the NNP's collapse

'was the loss of human capital following efforts to diversify candidate lists'. She states that the party's 'aggressive' attempts to recruit candidates from outside the white community alienated a number of its supporters and potential leaders and was 'deeply damaging' to its 'traditional election machinery in the white community (Ferree, 2011, p23).

In terms of how parties were perceived by different race groups, 1999 may certainly have been the most polarised in the post-apartheid period. For example, while in 1994, the proportion of Africans who considered the DP an inclusive party was 30%, this dropped to 10% in 1999 (increasing to 33% in 2004). By contrast, 91% of black voters had considered the ANC to be inclusive in 1994, and 98% had had this view of the party in 1999. By contrast, in 1994 some 60% of whites had considered the DP to be inclusive, with this number increasing to 73% in 1999, and dropping slightly to 72% in 2004. The proportion of coloured voters who considered the ANC inclusive went from 46% in 1994 to 60% in 2004 (after dropping to 41% in 1999). The proportion of coloured voters who viewed the DP as inclusive stayed relatively steady at about a third over this period. Some eight in ten Indian voters viewed the ANC as inclusive in 1994, dropping to 23% in 1999, and increasing to 36% in 2004. Some 41% of Indian voters had viewed the DP as inclusive in 1994, dropping to 29% in 1999, and increasing once again to 46% in 2004. By contrast the NP saw the proportion of people viewing it as inclusive dropped between 1994 and 2004, among all race groups, except black voters. While in 1994, some 26% of black voters had viewed the party as inclusive, this increased to 53% in 1999, but crashed to 23% in 2004 (Ferree, 2011, p32). The growth in the proportion of black voters who viewed the NNP as inclusive in 1999 may have been due to that party's concerted effort to reach out to black voters in that election.

What can the 1994 and 1999 elections tell us about racial voting patterns in South Africa? The ANC managed to keep its voter base intact, while the DP's growth was primarily due to the poaching of voters from the NNP (Kotze, 1999, p173). Furthermore, a survey conducted in 1999 showed that black voters were the only ones where more than half of those surveyed identified strongly with one party, at 59%. By contrast, 34% of coloured voters said that they identified strongly with a party, with only 21% of whites, and 16% of Indian respondents saying the same (Kotze, 1999, p173).

The ANC's supporters were also overwhelmingly black. Rule (2000, p246) estimates that 93% of all ANC voters in 1999 were black, 5.5% coloured, and one per cent Indian. Only 0.5% of its voters were white. The only other major party which drew so much of its support from one race group was the IFP, with 98% of its support being estimated as coming from black voters (Rule, 2000, p247). Of those who supported the NNP, 42% were white, 36% were coloured, 13% black, and some nine per cent were Indian South Africans (Rule, 2000, p246). By contrast nearly three-quarters of the DP's vote came from whites (72%) some 11% from coloured voters, and seven per cent from Indian voters. Somewhat surprisingly, Rule (2000, p247) estimates that 10% of the DP's support came from black South Africans. The DP's supporters were the best educated with 91% having passed at least Standard Eight, while the ANC's were the least educated, with only 43% having achieved that qualification (Rule, 2000, pp246 – 247).

While the 1999 election showed that that whites, in general, seem to have voted for 'white' parties, while blacks, in general, supported the ANC, the coloured and Indian vote seems to have be more fluid.

Adam Habib and Sanusha Naidu (1999) undertook an analysis of the 1999 election in 'selected suburbs and townships with high proportions of Indian and coloured voters'. Here an interesting pattern emerges. According to Habib and Naidu (1999, p191) voters in areas where the majority of households had an income of above R2 500, voters tended to support the ANC. Conversely, where monthly household incomes tended to be below R2 500, the DP and NNP secured the majority of support. It would thus seem that class considerations, as much as racial ones, influenced voting patterns among coloured and Indian voters in the 1999 election. However, there is something of a paradox here. Habib and Naidu (1999, p194) state that 'conventional wisdom suggests that workers and the poorer classes in society would support parties to the left, while the middle class and more privileged layers would throw in their lot with parties on the right'. This would presumably mean that the coloured and Indian middle- and upper-classes would vote for the NNP or DP, while those in the working class, or with lower income levels would vote for the ANC. The evidence suggests that the converse is true.

Habib and Naidu (1999, p195) argue that working class and poorer Indian and coloured voters were more concerned about their future economic prospects than black voters. They thus decided to support the NNP or DP – parties to the right of the ANC – 'to avoid what they perceive as the erosion of their existing standard of living'. Furthermore, affirmative action did seem to 'adversely impact' Indians and coloured people in lower socio-economic groups. Conversely, this had a lesser impact on the more skilled and educated within those communities (Habib and Naidu, 1999, p195). Habib and Naidu (1999, pp195 – 196) also argue that the 'restrictive' Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy implemented in the mid-1990s 'had the effect of pitting lower income groups within the coloured and Indian communities against those in the African population'. Taylor and Hoeane (1999, p137) also attribute the DP's relative strong showing among the Indian community to the exploitation of 'working class and lower middle class Indian minority concerns about the "dangers" of the ANC's affirmative action policies'.

Overall, however, it seems that the Indian and coloured vote was far more heterogeneous than the white vote. While the vast majority of whites cast their vote for one of the three 'white parties' the vote among other race groups was far more varied (using calculations from Reynolds [1999, pp183, 185, and 187] about 86% of whites voted for the DP, NNP, or FF).

Examining voting patterns in former Indian and coloured areas, it is clear that the ANC fared relatively well among these communities in the 1999 election. In that election the ANC increased its share of the vote in a number of formerly coloured areas, in places as varied as Cape Town, Ceres, and Citrusdal in the Western Cape, and Ennerdale and Eden Park in Gauteng. The party also outpolled the DP in a number of formerly Indian areas, indicating that the voting patterns on these two communities were far more fluid than those of their white counterparts (Taylor and Hoeane, 1999, p139). The ANC also increased its vote share in the Northern Cape in 1999. At the time nearly two-thirds of the population there were either coloured or white. In 1994 the ANC had barely won the province – securing just over 50% of the vote in 1994 – but in 1999 the party secured just over 64% of the vote (Reynolds, 1999, p192; Taylor and Hoeane, 1999, p140).

Parties which explicitly 'underpinned their campaigning with appeals to "black sentiment"' did relatively poorly (Taylor and Hoeane, 1999, p141) in 1999. Examples include the Pan-Africanist

Congress, the Socialist Party of Azania, and to a lesser degree, the United Democratic Movement, the United Christian Democratic Party, and the IFP (Taylor and Hoeane, 1999, pp138 and 141).

The formation of the DA

The DA came into existence in 2000 through a merger of the DP and NNP. This was the formalisation of co-operation between the two parties that had begun after the 1999 elections, when the two parties formed a coalition in order to govern the Western Cape (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005, p167). In 1994 the Western Cape had been one of only two provinces that had not been won by the ANC (the other being KwaZulu-Natal). In the first inclusive election held in South Africa the NNP's predecessor, the National Party had secured 53% of the provincial vote, as against 33% for the ANC and just under seven per cent for the DP, allowing the NNP to govern the province alone. In 1999 there was a large swing away from the NNP. It managed to win 38% of the vote, with the ANC's vote share increasing by nearly ten percentage points to 42%. The DP's proportion of the vote also nearly doubled, reaching 11.9%. No other party managed to win more than three per cent of the vote in the province (Reynolds, 1999, p191). The NNP and DP vote share combined equated to 22 of the 42 seats available in the provincial legislature (compared to the ANC's 18) allowing the two parties to form a coalition to govern the province.

Following this coalition, the DP and NNP held talks in late 1999 to discuss the possibility of forming a coalition to fight the 2000 municipal elections (Leon, 2008, p536). Following a series of negotiations, the NNP and DP, along with the Federal Alliance (a party founded by the erstwhile boss of South African rugby, Louis Luyt), formed the DA in June 2000 (Myburgh, 2007).

Carol Paton described the merger of the two parties as a 'hostile takeover', and Tony Leon notes that the NNP had had little choice in the matter. A Markinor poll conducted in June 1999 had shown that the NNP's support had fallen to about four per cent (Myburgh, 2007; Leon, 2008, p537).

The party fared well in its first election (the 2000 local government elections), but cracks soon appeared. This came to a head when deciding how representation would be determined at the party's first congress. The DP had far greater popular support, while the NNP had a much larger number of signed-up members, and it had to be determined which method would be used to determine the calculation of delegates from each organisation. At the time floor-crossing was not legal and each party would have to (at provincial and national level) ostensibly still function as separate entities (Leon, 2008, p553). The tension over the apportioning of delegates, the attempt by the NNP leader, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, and allegations of corruption around the mayor of Cape Town, Peter Marais, saw the alliance fall apart with the NNP leaving the party. In November 2001, the NNP left the DA and formed a coalition with the ANC (Myburgh, 2007).

2004

The 2004 election saw the DA participate in its first general election. However, following the withdrawal of the NNP from the alliance in 2001, the NNP ran on its own ticket. The DA saw its support increase once again – as compared to the DP – receiving 12.4% of the vote, giving it 50 seats in Parliament. Its best provincial results were in Gauteng and Western Cape, where it won 20.9% and 27.1% of the vote respectively (Booysen, 2005, p142). The NNP, by contrast, fared extraordinarily poorly. The party, which barely 10 years before had won 20% of the national vote, won only 1.6% of

the national vote. It also only managed to win seats in only two provincial legislatures – those of the Northern and Western Cape (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005, p179).

The merger of the NNP and the DP provided the DA with the former's strong base of coloured voters. However, once the NNP left the alliance, it was not clear whether the DA would be able to hold on to the support from working-class coloured communities that it had managed to secure, especially in the 2000 municipal election. In its 2004 campaign people in these communities were a particular focus of the DA (Booysen, 2005, p138). The party did attempt to reach out to black voters to some degree by, for example, launching its election manifesto in Soweto (Ferree, 2004, p21). In addition, the party also made an effort to ensure that it a number of its candidates were black South Africans. In 2004, of the party's 395 candidates for either Parliament or one of the nine provincial legislatures 34% were black. In 1999 only 20% had been black, and in 1994 this number had been 14% (Ferree, 2011, p154). However, its top leadership was not as representative. In 2004 all of its nine provincial leaders were white men and only 19% of its candidates in top five percent of lists were black (Ferree, 2011, p147 and p154).

However, among white voters, the DA's support was secure. Research done in 2003 by the DA, prior to the general election, showed that 66% of whites supported the party. The DA's research indicated that no other party enjoyed the support of more than 10% of white voters (Booysen, 2005, p138). However, the party's supporters were still primarily white. A Markinor survey done in 2003 showed that two-thirds of the party's supporters were white, evenly split between English- and Afrikaans-speakers (Booysen, 2005, p138). Ferree (2011, p6) estimates that about 66% of whites supported the party in 2004, with four per cent casting their ballot for the NNP. Coloured and Indian voters both supported the ANC in greater numbers than the DA, according to Ferree (2011, p6).

The DA's support among black South Africans in the 2004 elections remained tiny. Research conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) estimated that only about 1.7% of black voters had supported the DA in 2004. This was a slight improvement over 1999, when less than one per cent of black voters had supported the DA (Booysen, 2005, p142). However, it was speculated that this increase in support was not due to ANC voters switching allegiance, but rather due to erstwhile supporters of the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and IFP throwing their lot in with the DA. The growth in the DA's black vote came from rural areas in Mpumalanga, the Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal, indicating that this speculation was probably correct (Booysen, 2005, p142). It should be noted that Ferree (2011, p6) using data sourced from the Comparative National Election Project estimates that less than one per cent of black South African voters cast their ballot for the DA.

2009

The 2009 election saw the DA fight its first campaign under the leadership of a former journalist and MEC in the Western Cape provincial government, Helen Zille. She had also served as the mayor of Cape Town since 2006 (Jolobe, 2007, p92). She had won an election for the leadership of the party in 2007, easily winning against two challengers: the leader of the party in the Eastern Cape, Athol Trollip; and the party's federal chairman, Joe Seremane (Jolobe, 2009, p137). The party also aimed to ensure that it was considered as an inclusive party by South Africans, and 'relaunched' the party in 2008 (Jolobe, 2009, 138).

This relaunch seemed to pay dividends. Between March 2007 and March 2008 surveys showed that those who intended voting for the DA in the 2009 elections had nearly doubled, rising from 9.9% to 17.7%. At the same time, the number of black voters who said they admired Zille, rose from 9% to 14%. The proportion among all voters who said they admired the DA leader, went from 15% to 26%. The survey, conducted by the late Lawrie Schlemmer, showed that Helen Zille was also the most popular opposition leader since FW de Klerk (Jolobe, 2009, pp138 – 139).

The DA performed relatively well in the 2009 elections, increasing its vote to 16.7% and winning nearly three-million votes (Jolobe, 2009, pp143 – 144). It was also the first party since the National Party in 1994 to win more than 50% of the vote in the Western Cape (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b, p225).

Although the DA did well in the Western Cape, it performed relatively poorly in what could be considered 'black areas'. The party saw big increases in its proportion of the vote in coloured areas, primarily at the expense of the NP and the Independent Democrats (ID). This was a repeat of the situation in 1994, when the coloured community in the Western Cape had – in general – abandoned the ANC, and voted the NNP. Hamill (2010, p15) states that the DA managed this without 'fanning the flames on inter-communal hostility', as the NP had done 20 years earlier. However, in black areas the party performed poorly. In suburbs in Cape Town where black people are in the majority, such as Nyanga, Philippi, Imizamo Yethu, and Samora Machel, the DA's vote share rarely rose above 1% (Jolobe, 2009, p145). Indeed, the party failed to build on the low levels of support it had managed to secure in 2004, and its vote share even declined in a number of black areas as compared to 2004 (Habib and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2011, pp 195 – 196).

The 2009 election seemed to entrench the DA as the 'champion of the majority of the minorities', while the result saw the ANC largely confirmed as a primarily 'mono-racial' party (Hamill, 2010, p11 and p15). However, some of the DA's success in the province could be attributed to the disarray within the Western Cape ANC. This disorganisation within the provincial party led to it losing many of the gains that it had made in 2004 (Hoeane, 2010, pp146 – 147). The *Mail & Guardian* also attributed much of the party's success in the province to the 'personality and public clout of party leader Helen Zille'. The newspaper also noted that the election result in the Western Cape meant that the party was no longer a 'stuffy party for English-speaking whites' (Hoeane, 2010, p147). The ANC took the DA's win in the Western Cape poorly, with some within the party saying that Zille was racist, and even that the province should be made ungovernable (Daniel and Southall, 2009, p269).

A survey conducted prior to the 2009 election further proved this point. The survey – conducted in March 2009 – understated the support for the ANC and overstated that of an ANC splinter party, the Congress of the People (COPE), but estimated that the DA would receive 15.9% of the total vote – not far off what it received in the election. However, the survey also showed that the DA's support was still strongly concentrated among minorities. While 75% of black people surveyed indicated they were intending on voting for the ANC, only 2.5% said they would vote for the DA. Just less than 16% of black voters surveyed said that they were planning on voting for the ANC breakaway party, COPE. Of white voters surveyed, 71.6% said they were planning on supporting the DA in the upcoming general election. Only 7.8% said they were intending on voting for the ANC, while 9.5% said COPE was their voting intention (Sylvester, 2009, p2).

The DA was also the most popular party the coloured voters who were surveyed. Some 40.7% said they were planning on voting for DA, making it the most popular party among coloured voters. The ANC was the second most popular, with 28% stating that they intended on voting for that party. COPE was also relatively popular among coloured voters, with 15.3% saying they would vote for the ANC splinter. Some 8.6% said the ID – a party formed by Patrica de Lille, former MP of the PAC – was the party that they intended on supporting (Sylvester, 2009, p2).

Support for the DA among Indian voters was also relatively high, with 51.6% of voters in this community saying they would for that party. The ANC was only the 3rd most popular party among Indians, with 14.2% indicating that they would vote for the governing party. Nearly 18% of Indian voters surveyed said that they would vote for COPE (Sylvester, 2009, p2).

According to a report in the *Business Day* in 2009 stated that – according to the DA's own figures – only 0.8% of black voters had voted for the party, compared to the 82.7% that the ANC had managed. Conversely, the DA had won the support of 88.5% of white voters, while the ANC had managed to win only one percent. Coloured people had also largely chosen the DA< according to the report, with 66.7% choosing the DA, as against 11% for the ANC (Ensor, 2014).

An analysis in Booysen (2010, p97) showed that most of the DA's increase in votes in 2009 came from those who had previously supported the NNP or ID. However, a small proportion of those who had voted for the DA in 2009 were formerly ANC supporters. It was estimated that about 4% of the DA's total 2009 support had voted for the ANC in 2004. By contrast, about 15% of the DA's total 2009 support came from former ID or NNP supporters. It was estimated that less than one per cent of those who had supported the ANC in 2009 had voted for the DA in 2004. However, between 13% and 15% of those that voted for the DA in 2004 threw their support behind COPE in 2009, indicating that the DA was as vulnerable to losing votes as any other party (Booysen, 2010, p97 and Booysen, 2009, p107).

2014

The 2014 election saw the DA hold onto the Western Cape, as well as increasing its national vote share to more than 20%. The party won more than 4-million of the 18.6 million votes cast – in 2009 it was just less than 3-million votes meaning that it secured more than an additional million votes (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014a, p27 and Jolobe, 2014, p57).

The DA won 22.2% of the vote in 2014, an increase of more than five percentage points over its result in 2009. Its best result was in the Western Cape where the party's share of the vote went from just over 50% in the 2009 election to nearly 60% in 2014. It won more than 10% of the vote in each province (the first time it had managed to do this), with its second-best result being in Gauteng where it won 30.7% of the vote. Indeed, the DA's results in all provinces were its best yet (Jolobe, 2014, p68). In addition, while in 2009 it had been one of the two leading parties in only three provinces (Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and the Western Cape) in 2014 it was one of the two biggest parties in all provinces with the exceptions of North-West and Limpopo (Daniel and Southall, 2009, pp246 – 268 and Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b, pp197 – 226). It also almost doubled its total number of votes in Limpopo and the Northern Cape in 2014 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b, p197).

It also did well in the country's eight metropolitan municipalities, winning more than 20% in each municipality, with the exception of Buffalo City where it won 18.8%. It won 60% of the vote in Cape Town and 40% in Nelson Mandela Bay, while winning nearly a third of the vote in Johannesburg and Tshwane (Jolobe, 2014, p69).

A relatively surprising development prior to the 2014 election was the endorsement that the DA received from *Abehlali baseMjondolo*, the shack dwellers' movement. The leader of the organisation, S'bu Zikode, said that the movement did not necessarily agree with many of the DA's principles, but that the support was strategic and designed to weaken the ANC (Mottiar, 2015, p117). This indicates that the DA may be becoming a viable option for disillusioned black voters, especially those who formerly supported the ANC.

The DA claimed to have won the votes of 760 000 black voters in 2014, but it was not clear whether this was a major breakthrough, or a small incremental increase in the number of black South Africans that were voting for the party (Jolobe, 2014, p67). This equated to 20% of the DA's total support, meaning that one in five DA voters is black. Amongst black voters it was almost certainly the third-most popular party, after the ANC and the EFF, a party formed by a former president of the ANC's Youth League, Julius Malema (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b, p190). Statistics from voting stations in areas that were formally reserved for black people during apartheid shows that the DA's gains among black voters have been relatively small. Although there has indeed been growth with in some cases the DA's proportion of the vote and number of voters increasing by large amounts, this is normally off a small base, and poses no threat to the electoral dominance of the ANC in these areas (Jolobe, 2014, p68). Nevertheless, Jolobe (2014, p71) argues that the DA's relatively strong performance in 2014 shows that the party has been transformed into a multi-racial one. Schulz-Herzenberg (2014c, p4) estimates that the proportion of black voters plumping for the DA increased from one percent to six percent, a fairly large jump, and as stated, likely making it the third-most popular party amongst black voters.

David Everatt (2014, p14), on the other hand, criticised the DA (particularly in Gauteng) for as it 'struggled to mobilise in the townships and informal settlements'. According to Everatt this was also because the party had 'botched its position on redress and diversity' (2014, p14). Since the election in May 2015, of the party's first black leader, Mmusi Maimane, it seemed that the party's popularity among black South Africans was growing. The DA claimed that its tracking polls showed that the number of black South Africans firmly supporting the party had doubled between May and August 2015. In a high turnout scenario it was estimated that the party could secure up to one-million voters from black voters (Van Onselen and Joubert, 2015). This would seem to indicate that there is some credence to the theory of the racial census. If the election of a black leader for the DA can boost black support by up to 30% it would seem to be an indication that the race of a party leader has, at least, some influence on how people vote.

This election was also one in which the DA made pronounced efforts to reach out to black voters and attempt to change its image. Examples included its explicit praising of ANC leaders who had come before Jacob Zuma. According to Robert Mattes (2014, p172) 'the DA went out of its way to praise his ANC predecessors, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki'. A former senior staff member of the DA who subsequently became a journalist for the *Business Day* and the *Sunday Times*, Gareth van Onselen, criticised the party harshly for doing exactly that. In an article written shortly before the

2014 elections Van Onselen said that the DA was trying to 'reverse-engineer' the legacy of Thabo Mbeki, as well as the party's own stance on the second President of post-apartheid South Africa. Van Onselen argued that leading up to the 2014 election, the DA had ignored many of Mbeki's failings – such as his stance on HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwe, cadre deployment, race, and the arms deal – 'to portray him as a "great leader"'. According to Van Onselen the DA had not portrayed Mbeki or his legacy fairly, but had 'disingenuously painted a one-sided picture of the man in the quest for votes' (Van Onselen, 2014). However, Susan Booysen, makes the point that the DA could not be overly critical of the ANC's early years of government. She states that the DA 'could not risk alienating potential converts by being hostile to the early days of democracy' (Booysen, 2015, p13).

In 2013, Helen Zille had also proclaimed the party's support for broad-based black economic empowerment, but criticised the way that it had been implemented (Southall, 2014, p660). This stance caused some controversy and policy confusion within the party. In 2013, the DA had initially supported an amendment bill to the Employment Equity Act in the National Assembly, subsequently withdrew its support and voted against the bill when it reached the National Council of Provinces (Pillay, 2013). This led to criticism of the party from a number of quarters, and the party was also accused of betraying its liberal principles. The party was harshly criticised by a number of its traditional supporters for its initial support of the bill. James Myburgh, the editor of the *Politicsweb* website and a former DA and DP parliamentary researcher, said that the DA's support for the bill was a betrayal of its history, its supporters and 'indeed the future of South Africa itself' (Myburgh, 2013). The South African Institute of Race Relations also said the DA's support for the bill would be a 'shock' for many of the party's supporters and was also a betrayal of the party's non-racial principles (Marrian, 2013). Tony Leon, the party's former leader, also criticised the bill. He said the DA's ostensible betrayal of liberal principles were similar to the conundrum faced the by the United Party, which had been the primary party of opposition to the National Party, from 1948 to 1974 (Davenport and Saunders, 2000, pp710 – 711). Leon argued that the United Party had tried to appeal to two constituencies at once, attempting to show a conservative face to its rural supporters, and a more liberal one to its supporters in the cities (Pressly, 2013, pp132 – 133). The conundrum faced by the DA was similar – it needed to keep the support of the minority groups, while also building up a base among black South Africans (Pressly, 2013, p136).

An article published in *Business Day* in February 2014 further supported the DA's backing of affirmative action in the context of liberalism and said that concepts such as affirmative action and black economic empowerment were not contrary to liberal principles. The article, co-authored by Randolph Vigne (a former deputy chairman of the Liberal Party) and a South African historian, Merle Lipton, argued that racial redress was 'positive liberalism', rather than 'negative' liberalism, which they said was a 'minimalist form of liberalism (Vigne and Lipton, 2014). They also noted that Peter Brown, the late former leader of the Liberal Party, had said that affirmative action was 'fine in principle' (Vigne and Lipton, 2014).

In early 2015 Gareth van Onselen again criticised the party for what he perceived to be a betrayal of its liberal traditions. He said that the party's failure to celebrate former prominent leaders within the party, such as Helen Suzman, Tony Leon, Colin Elgin, and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, while paying tribute to Mandela, Mbeki, and Steve Biko, showed that the party had turned its back on its liberal founding principles. In Van Onselen's view, the party's embrace of 'Black consciousness, African

nationalism and hereditary royalty' was proof of the DA no longer being a liberal party (Van Onselen, 2015).

A number of commentators criticised Van Onselen for his rather rigid conception of liberalism. Carien du Plessis, writing in *City Press* in 2013, quoted Mmusi Maimane on liberalism. This was in reaction to a blog written by Van Onselen, where he stated that the concept of Ubuntu was incompatible with liberalism. According to Du Plessis, Maimane argued that 'liberalism is about variety' and that issues around identity and community could still be redefined within the ideology. Du Plessis also noted that although the DA did explicitly consider itself a liberal party, it was unlikely that a large number of voters supported the party because they were ideological fellow travellers. She argues that in its election campaigns the DA sold itself as 'as a more efficient government than the ANC, a true non-racial party and one that adheres to the spirit of the Constitution' more than on its ideological credentials (Du Plessis, 2013).

Michael Cardo, a DA MP, has a similar view on liberalism. However, he acknowledges that liberalism has had a chequered history with regard to race relations in the past, citing, for example, the decision of the DA's direct ancestor party, the Progressive Party, to comply with an apartheid law which prohibited political parties with mixed-race membership. This saw the Progressive Party purge itself of its black, Coloured, and Indian members. In addition, he also notes that the Progressive Party was, for nearly twenty years (from its formation in 1959 until 1978) an opponent of universal suffrage, but rather lobbied for a qualified franchise. Nevertheless, Cardo argues that liberalism can succeed in South Africa, and argues that the party should 'refine its policy offer – based on the various strands of liberalism – and concentrate on fixing the economy'. Cardo also states that this is why the DA supported concepts that some considered deeply illiberal, such as affirmative action and broad-based black economic empowerment. The party accepts that opportunity in South Africa is often linked to one's race and circumstances of birth, so this is why the party proposes 'targeted interventions to promote substantive equality by enabling children and youth from disadvantaged backgrounds to access various educational and work opportunities' (Cardo, 2015).

It is clear that the DA has something of a tortured relationship between staying true to its liberal routes, and accepting some necessary policy interventions – especially in a South African context – which may be illiberal, or at odds with the views of some within the party. Nevertheless, it seems that the party has been relatively pragmatic, and accepted that classical liberalism of a small state, with a focus on the individual, may not be suited to South African realities. This has led to the party adopting some policy stances that would not normally be considered compatible with a liberal party. However, if the DA wants to continue to be a party of government, rather than just opposition, these sorts of compromises that may be at odds with liberal ideology are inevitable.

LOCAL ELECTIONS

Local elections in South Africans tended to reveal similar voting patterns similar to those in general elections. In general, the ANC fared slightly worse than it did in national and provincial elections but not overwhelmingly so.

2000

The 2000 election was significant for a number of reasons. It was the first election held after 'intensive institutional and fiscal reform'[iii] of local government (Lodge, 2001, p21). It was also the first election in which the DA participated in. This was the first time in which elections would be held for the new local government entities such as the six metropolitan municipalities. For example, the ten towns of the East Rand became one 'uni-city', known as Ekurhuleni. Other examples included Uitenhage falling under one municipality with Port Elizabeth, to form the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, while Tshwane (which includes Pretoria) would incorporate commuter townships and suburbs (Lodge, 2001, p21).

The new municipalities would not have any 'boroughs' or sub-divisions, and would all be run by unitary governments. Furthermore, voters would be represented by ward councillors, who would compete in first-past-the-post type elections. At the same time voters would receive a second proportional representation ballot, where voters could vote for a party. Seats in municipal councils would be evenly split between ward councillors, and those elected on a PR ticket. People living outside the six metropolitan municipalities would receive another ballot paper to elect district councils, along with their municipal councils (Lodge, 2001, pp21- 22).

The DA also broke with the negative campaign strategy which its predecessor, the DP, had used in 1999. The new party's slogan in the 2000 municipal election was 'For All the People', rather than the divisive 'Fight Back!' of 1999 (Lodge, 2001, p29). The party made a concerted effort to reach out to black voters. According to Lodge (2001, p29) one-third of its budget was allocated to the 'black voting market'. It also recruited a number of ANC activists, as well as people with a record of civic activism in the black community, including a former deputy mayor of Soweto (Lodge, 2001, p29).

The party's manifesto also seemed to be aimed at people in lower-income brackets. For example, the DA (like the ANC) promised a free 'lifeline' supply of water and electricity. The DA's manifesto also that it would increase the numbers of low-cost municipal housing available for rental, as well as stating that it would supply free anti-retroviral drugs for HIV-positive women at municipal clinics (Lodge, 2001, p30).

However, despite what seemed a concerted effort to reach out to black voters, the DA's PR candidate list in Cape Town – the only city in which it stood a realistic chance of governing – was telling. There were no black people among the first 30 PR candidates on the party's list for the city (Lodge, 2001, p30). The fact that Cape Town was the only major city where the ANC faced a serious electoral threat was emphasised by the relatively meagre effort that the governing party put into ward-level publicity in other cities (Lodge, 2001, p31).

During campaigning the ANC was not shy to attack the DA on its relatively flimsy credentials as a party that really cared for the plight of poor black South Africans. In early December 2000, former President Nelson Mandela, warned a crowd not to be 'misled' by the DA, a party which he claimed only cared for black people on the eve of elections. He also said that 'no white party' could govern South Africa (Lodge, 2001, p34).

The results were not overly surprising, the ANC secured easy victories in four of the country's six metropolitan municipalities (Johannesburg, Tshwane, East Rand, and Nelson Mandela Bay), but somewhat surprisingly, won only more than 50% of the vote in Nelson Mandela Bay. It emerged as the biggest party in Ethekwini, with 47% of the vote (Lodge, 2001, pp40-41).

The DA – as expected – won Cape Town, with 54% of the vote. It fared relatively well in all the country's other metropolitan municipalities, winning a quarter of the vote or more in each. Its best performance outside of Cape Town was in Tshwane, where it was secured 35% of the vote (Lodge, 2001, p41).

The DA subsequently lost control of Cape Town in 2004 when councillors aligned to the NNP crossed the floor to the ANC (Seekings, 2005, p3).

The ANC secured 59.9% of the total vote nationally (in terms of the PR vote), with the DA winning 22.4%. No other party won more than ten percent of the vote, with the IFP faring best, managing 9.1% of the total vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p104).

Much of the DA's support was due to the relatively high turnout of white voters. It was estimated that about 70% of eligible white voters cast their votes and that only 50% of eligible black South Africans voted. Turnout was even lower in the coloured community, with only an estimated 45% of coloured voters casting their ballots (Lodge, 2001, p41). In Johannesburg turnout was also higher in wards where average incomes were high (Lodge, 2001, p42). Overall voter turnout was low, at 48.1%. Only three provinces (Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, and Western Cape) had turnouts above 50% (Netswera, 2012, p78).

However, the DA did seem to have something of a minor breakthrough among black voters. Examining election results Lodge (2001, p41) notes that although the ANC still won handsomely in Soweto, the DA managed to secure something of a beachhead in the area. The DA won up to five percent in a number of Soweto wards, and won nearly 20% of the vote in Johannesburg's Ward 32, in Orlando East. Overall, the DA won about 11 000 votes in Soweto (Lodge, 2001, p42). The party also, surprisingly, won more than a quarter of the vote in the Jeppestown hostel, with the ANC candidate only coming third (Lodge, 2001, p41).

The DA also fared well in areas that had been reserved for coloured and Indian people under apartheid, such as in Lenasia and Eldorado Park (Lodge, 2001, p42). There was a similar pattern in KwaZulu-Natal. In Pietermaritzburg the DA won all nine of the city's wards which had a majority Indian population (Lodge, 2001, p43). Overall, the DA maintained its support among white voters, while making further gains among coloured and Indian voters. Although its support among black voters remained low, it managed to establish a presence in at least some, Johannesburg townships (Lodge, 2001, p45).

The DA did relatively well in the 2000 election as it was 'a highly effective mobilisation unit', and did well in ensuring that its supporters made it to the polls (Jolobe, 2007, p83). In addition, the party 'focused on local issues in the particular areas that the DA campaigned in' which contrasted with the ANC which 'had focused on issues of local government in the abstract and failed to produce elections materials specific to the areas they campaigned' (Faull quoted in Jolobe, 2007, p83).

2006

The 2006 election saw the DA give up many of the gains it had secured in the previous elections. Its overall support fell from 18.8% to 13.2% (Russon, 2011, p82). In 2000 it had achieved support in double figures in each province (with its best result being in the Western Cape where it secured 49.9% of the vote), it fell below ten per cent in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, and

North-West (Russon, 2011, p80). Its best provincial result was in the Western Cape where it won 40.2% of the vote. Gauteng was the only other province where it was more than a quarter of the vote, securing 26.8% (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p106). In the six metros it emerged as the biggest party in only one metro, that of Cape Town, where it won 42.3% of the vote, and secured 90 of the 210 seats on the city council (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, pp109 - 110), a not-inconsiderate reversal compared to its election result in that city six years previously, when it had won more than half of the vote in the city. It was the second biggest party in all of the other metros, with its support ranging from 16.9% in Ethekwini to 30.7% in Tshwane (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, pp109 - 110).

By contrast, the ANC saw its national vote share increase, and was easily the biggest party in each of the six metros, with the exception of Cape Town. Apart from that city, the only other two metros where the party failed to secure above sixty percent of the vote were eThekwini and Tshwane. In those two metros it won 58.9% and 57.3% of the vote respectively. In Ekurhuleni it won 61.3% of the vote, in Nelson Mandela Bay 67.6% of the vote, and in Johannesburg 62.7% (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p109). In terms of the national vote, its support went from 59.9% in 2000 to 65.7% (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p104). It failed to win more than 60% of the vote in only two provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, where it won 48.3% and 40.2%, respectively. In KwaZulu-Natal it was still the single largest party. It won more than 70% of the overall vote in each of the other seven provinces, with the exception of Gauteng, where it won 62.3% of the total vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p106).

As in 2000 no other party won more than 10% of the vote, with the IFP being the best performer among the also-rans, winning 7.6% of the vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p104).

Jolobe (2012, p135) states that the DA had done fairly well in the first two elections that it participated in following the split from the NNP. However, he argues that the DA had 'reached a ceiling' and had 'simply consolidated opposition and minority constituencies and could not attract African votes in significant numbers' (Jolobe, 2012, p135).

Turnout was, like 2000, fairly low, with less than half of registered voters turning out at the polls (the official turnout was 48.0%). Turnout was only above 50% in four provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Cape, and Western Cape) and in one metro (Nelson Mandela Bay, where turnout was 56.1%) (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, pp96 – 97).

The DA secured its first major electoral breakthrough in 2006, when it headed a coalition to govern Cape Town. In that city no party secured a majority of seats, and a coalition would have to be formed to govern the metro. The DA held 90 of the 210 seats, the ANC 81, with the ID being the third-largest party, with 10.6% of the vote and 23 seats. The other sixteen seats on the council were shared between seven parties. The ACDP held seven, the Africa Muslim Party (AMP) three, the UDM two, and the FF+, PAC, United Independent Front (UIF), and Universal Party (UP) one each (IEC, 2006).

This meant that there were four options for the city. A grand coalition between the DA and ANC could be formed, the DA could govern in alliance with the ID, the DA could govern without the ID or the ANC and seek the support of the other smaller parties, or the ANC could govern with the ID and the support of one or two small parties to reach the threshold of 106 seats necessary to govern (Jolobe, 2007, p92).

The DA managed to secure a very narrow majority through co-opting the smaller parties into a coalition. The DA secured the mayoralty, with Helen Zille winning the position, and the ACDP and FF+ being awarded with the positions of deputy mayor and speaker respectively (Jolobe, 2007, p92).

The DA was certainly aware of its failure to draw the votes of black South Africans. Ryan Coetzee, at the time a senior strategist within the DA and a former MP, noted that the DA 'failed to demonstrate care for the concerns of the African electorate'. He also argued that the party was 'too preoccupied with the concerns of existing DA constituencies' and not those that concerned black South Africans particularly, such as anti-black racism, education, unemployment, and poverty (Jolobe, 2012, p135).

2011

Prior to the 2011 municipal elections the DA was boosted by the agreement by the ID to merge with the DA. The ID, which had been formed by a former prominent member of the PAC, Patricia de Lille, made its South African political debut in 2004. It performed credibly in that election, securing nearly 270 000 votes, or 1.7% of the total vote, enough for seven seats in the National Assembly. It also managed to win seats in the Gauteng, Northern Cape, and Western Cape provincial legislatures. However, in the subsequent election in 2009, its support dropped relatively significantly, and it only managed to win just over 160 000 votes, equivalent to 0.9% of the vote, and enough for four seats in the National Assembly (Jolobe, 2012, p137 and SAIRR, 2009, pp720 – 723).

In 2010 the party decided to 'build an alternative political force' that would be 'greater than the sum of (the smaller) individual (opposition) parties'. The ID began negotiations with the DA, and it was decided that the parties would formally merge in 2014. However, in the 2011 municipal elections the ID fielded no candidates (all running on the DA ticket) and De Lille was indeed, one of the faces of the DA's electoral campaign (along with Helen Zille and Lindiwe Mazibuko) (Jolobe, 2012, pp137 – 138). De Lille had, following the agreement to merge between the ID and DA, joined the Western Cape provincial cabinet, and following the 2011 municipal election, became the mayor of Cape Town (Jolobe, 2014, p58).

In 2011 the DA recovered somewhat from its poor performance in 2006. In 2011 it won 22% of the vote, compared to the 15% that it had managed to secure in 2006. Furthermore, it emerged as the single biggest party in the Western Cape with 58.1% of the vote (compared to 40.2% in 2006). It also won more than 10% of the vote in seven of the eight other provinces (Limpopo was the only exception). In 2006 it had won less than ten per cent of the vote in four provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, and North West). Outside of the Western Cape it fared best in the Free State and Gauteng, where it won 20% and 33.3% of the vote respectively (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p106). Of the eight metropolitan municipalities (Buffalo City [East London] and Mangaung [Bloemfontein] had become municipalities on just prior to the 2011 municipal poll) it won Cape Town outright with 61.2% of the vote. It won more than 20% of the vote in each of the eight metros, with its best performance outside of Cape Town coming Nelson Mandela Bay, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, and Tshwane. In each of those municipalities it won more than 30% of the vote, and had managed to win 40.2% of the vote in Nelson Mandela Bay (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p109 and Mkokeli, 2011)). The party also secured absolute majorities on 17 municipal councils (Jolobe, 2012, p133). The majority of the councils that it won outright majorities in were in the Western Cape, although the party retained its majority in Baviaans in the Eastern Cape and Midvaal in Gauteng (Jolobe, 2012, p142). The party also said that it had won at least 133 wards that had previously been

held by the ANC (Bosman and Du Toit, 2012, p100). However, only nine of these wards could be considered '100 per cent black' (Plaut, 2012, p251).

As had become the pattern in previous elections, the DA further consolidated its vote among minorities, but once again struggled to break into the black vote. This was despite the DA moving further away from its image as a party for stuffy English-speaking white liberals, and the party even launched its electoral manifesto in Kliptown, Soweto, where the Freedom Charter had been adopted in 1955 (Jolobe, 2012, p140). Its campaign slogan: 'We deliver for all' was also an attempt to position itself as a party for all South Africans (Moyo, 2012, p369). The DA also attempted to link itself to South Africa's struggle history, and in her final campaign address Helen Zille claimed that the DA was the only party that was 'working hard to build on Madiba's legacy' of 'diversity, delivery and reconciliation' (Jolobe, 2012, p141). Jolobe even goes so far as to say that the 2011 campaign marked a turning point for the party, as it attempted to 'firmly secure a centrist ideological ground, with a left-of-centre rhetoric' (2012, p141).

The 2011 election was also notable for the DA increasingly positioning itself as a party of government, rather than of opposition. The party also placed itself as one that could 'guarantee clean, accountable and efficient government', with a focus on service delivery. This was seen by the DA as a weakness of the ANC, and the word 'delivery' appeared 21 times in the DA election manifesto launch speech, as compared to five in that of the ANC (Prevost, Kotze, and Wright, 2014, p62).

Seethal (2012, pp12 – 13) also notes that black DA politicians were prominently used in an attempt to make inroads into the black community. Lindiwe Mazibuko, the party's then-parliamentary leader was one of the party's three faces (along with De Lille and Zille). Its candidate for major of Johannesburg was Mmusi Maimane, who had grown up in Soweto. Mbali Ntuli, at the time the leader of the party's youth wing, also 'reached out to young black voters' (Seethal, 2012, p13 and Pillay, 2014).

Although the DA – in general – struggled to make any major breakthroughs among black voters, it secured a number of important beachheads. For the first time it won councillors in Port St Johns and Matatiele, and also won a ward in Frischgewaagd – a ward which did not have one white voter (Moyo, 2012, p368). The DA also won a ward in Tswaing, which had been an ANC stronghold for some time. Worryingly for the ANC, the DA had not campaigned particularly hard in the ward and only put forward its candidate two weeks before the election (Twala, 2012, p210). However, the ANC regained that ward in a by-election held in 2014 (see below).

The DA also held on to the coloured vote in the Western Cape. Twala (2012, p206) speculates that the poor performance of the ANC in the Western Cape could be attributed to comments of Jimmy Manyi, in 2010 (*Mail & Guardian*, 2011). He had said that – in the context of employment equity – there was an 'overconcentration' of coloureds in the Western Cape. This was widely perceived to be a racist statement and he was even rebuked for it by a senior ANC leader and government minister, Trevor Manuel (Twala, 2012, p206). It was also speculated that the political interests of black and coloured working-class communities in the Western Cape were diverging, something which the ANC had failed to deal with (Twala, 2012, p206).

Jolobe (2012, p143) also speculates that the DA relatively good performance in 2011 was due to higher turnout by its supporters, compared to the ANC. Turnout was highest in the two metropolitan municipalities in which the DA fared best, namely Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay (2012, p143). Prevost, Kotze, and Wright concur (2014, pp60 – 61) noting that the DA's impressive performances in Nelson Mandela Bay were due to the fact that DA supporters were more motivated to vote than ANC supporters. Indeed, voter turnout was highest in the DA-stronghold of the Western Cape, where 64.4% of registered voters in the province turned out to vote (only two other provinces – Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal had voter turnout above 60% and it was as low as 50.1% in Limpopo) (Seethal, 2012, p15). Much of the DA's impressive performance could thus be explained by a higher turnout of its supporters, rather than through achieving a breakthrough among black voters. However, turnout in 2011 was the highest to date in local government elections in South Africa. Overall turnout was 57.6%, not having been above 50% in 2000 or 2006. In addition it achieved above 50% in each province, and above 60% in KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape, and the Western Cape. In the prior two elections turnout had not exceeded 60% in any province. Turnout had only been above 50% in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, and Western Cape in 2000. In 2006 these three provinces again saw turnout above 50%, but were this time joined by KwaZulu-Natal (Netswera, 2012, p78). Schulz-Herzenberg (2011) speculates that this increased turnout was due to a number of factors. She suggests that dissatisfaction with the government led to a higher turnout among voters. Another factor is that the campaigns of the main parties in the 2011 election had more in common with a national election, serving to drive up interest and therefore voter turnout. Finally, she says that 'a re-energised opposition bloc' helped see an increase in turnout of opposition party supporters. She argues that this trend had begun in 2009, and the DA and COPE had been the biggest beneficiaries (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2011).

Jolobe (2012, p143) shows that in wards won by the DA in Cape Town in both 2006 and 2011, support for the party increased significantly, with the number of votes for the DA sometimes nearly doubling. This was the case in majority-white and majority-coloured wards, with the increase in the latter partially explained by the merger of the DA and the ID, which had drawn most of its support from the coloured community (Jolobe, 2012, p143).

However in wards where a majority of voters were black this was not the case. Jolobe (2012, p145), in an analysis of selected wards shows that the DA's vote in majority black wards remained small, and in some cases dropped in comparison with 2006. Fakir and Holland (2011, p1 145) uncovered a similar phenomenon. They examined the performance of the DA in seven areas which they call 'African townships', areas which, according to Fakir and Holland, have remained relatively racially homogenous. The evidence from the seven townships (Mdantsane, New Brighton, Alexandra, Soweto, KwaMashu, Gugulethu, and Khayelitsha) showed that while support for the DA increased this was normally off a very low base. The DA's best performance in the areas examined by Fakir and Holland, was in Alexandra where then party secured 7.5% of the total vote in 2011 (compared to 3.8% in 2006). In Mdantsane the party won 2.5% of the vote in 2011 (0.6% in 2006); in New Brighton the DA secured the support of 2.3% of voters (0.3% in 2006); in Soweto it won 5.6% (2.5% in 2006); in KwaMashu 0.7% (0.6% in 2006); in Gugulethu some 3.4% of the voters in the area supported the DA (3.4% in 2006); and in Khayelitsha its support was 6.7% in 2011 (0.9% in 2006).

Something similar happened in Nelson Mandela Bay. In that municipality, not only did the DA manage to get its supporters to the ballot box, there was a swing away from the ANC to the DA in

the coloured community. The DA was helped by its merger with the ID, but many coloured voters in the DA no longer felt that the ANC was their political home and thus supported the DA (Prevost, Kotze, and Wright, 2014, p70 and p72). However, in wards with a majority of black voters the DA did less well. Although the party in general managed to improve on its performance in 2006 (often by focusing on the coloured community in many black-majority wards) the party failed to make any real breakthrough, despite 'serious service delivery problems' in many of these wards (Prevost, Kotze, and Wright, 2014, p76).

RACIAL AND ETHNIC VOTING PATTERNS

From the above it would certainly seem that South Africans vote very largely along racial lines. The ANC has captured the majority of the black vote, and while one could argue that the white vote has been more fluid (moving from the NP to the DP and then DA), white voters have not voted for parties which are not 'white' in any significant numbers.

Do the ANC and DA fit the model of what can be considered 'ethnic' parties? However, firstly we need to determine, what we mean by ethnic groups. According to Mattes and Norris (2003, p1) ethnic groups are people who are linked 'by kinship and family, language and dialect, tribal customs and local communities, as well as shared religious faiths'. Ethnic parties are common in societies which are polarised between people of different ethnic and racial groups. Much work on these types of parties and how they arise was done by Donald Horowitz. Although Horowitz studies what he calls 'ethnic' conflict, in his view 'ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers "tribes," "races," "nationalities," and castes' (1985, p53). Horowitz (1985, p291) is of the opinion that although the countries of the West suffer from ethnic cleavages, these often 'co-exist with other historic sources of conflict'. He uses the example of Belgium, which suffers from ethnic tensions between the French-speaking Walloons and the Flemish, who speak a dialect related to Dutch. Despite high levels of tension between these two groups, two other major issues – around class and religion – often pre-empt issues of ethnicity there, tempering ethnic conflict to a degree (Horowitz, 1985, p19).

Although South Africa is divided along ethnic, language, and to a lesser degree religious and regional lines, it is clear that the primary fault line in South African society is that of race. In Horowitz's view conflicts between race groups are not substantially different from those based on ethnic lines. This means that one can use Horowitz's definitions of party based on ethnicity to determine whether the ANC and DA are indeed 'ethnic'-based parties.

Horowitz (1985, p291) defines an ethnically-based party as one which 'derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group'. Using this definition, the DA and the ANC could possibly both be considered 'ethnic' parties (especially if we substitute 'race' for 'ethnic').

Identity voting is not unique to South Africa with 'census elections' being recorded in other African countries, Europe, and Asia. Recent examples of elections that are similar to the South African 'racial census' election have been Bosnia and Iraq (Ferree, 2011, pp25 – 26). Lijphart, quoted in Ferree (2011, p5) notes that democracy can be 'unstable in the face of fixed majorities'. Groups that are 'permanently' locked out of power (in the case of South Africa, white South Africans and to a lesser

degree Indian and coloured South Africans), become disaffected. Lijphart states this means that they be more likely to 'pursue violent means of influencing the political system'. In addition, political parties that are not threatened at the ballot box (such as the ANC at present) because of what Ferree calls a 'captured constituency' may also indulge in undemocratic behaviour, or behave irresponsibly (2011, p7). She states that such a party may enrich itself at the expense of the public and follow policies at odds with the wishes of the electorate. A society with 'swing' voters is thus likely to see relatively regular changes in the governing party and may prevent issues such as clientilism that plague one-party dominant countries.

Most research has shown that it is clear that black voters generally vote for the ANC and white voters for the DA. Ishiyama (2012, 744), using Afrobarometer data found that the DA was the party of choice for at least a plurality of white voters. At the same time, the ANC was also the most popular party among the other ethnic and racial groups surveyed – these were Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Tswana, Tsonga, Swazi, Zulu, Indian, and coloured South Africans. This does not necessarily mean that a majority of that group's respondents said they supported a particular party, but at least a plurality.

Ishiyama's research shows that neither the DA nor the ANC could be described as 'ethnic' parties (although they could both probably be considered 'racial' parties to varying degrees). Ishiyama defines 'ethnic' parties as those whose support comes overwhelmingly from one ethnic group (in this case a party is defined as ethnic if between 85% and 100% of its support comes from one group). Parties can also be described as 'potentially ethnic' parties if between two-thirds and 85% of their support comes from one ethnic group. In South Africa only one party is defined as 'ethnic' or 'potentially ethnic' – the IFP. According to Ishiyama, more than 85% of the party's support comes from Zulus. Surprisingly the FF+ is not listed as an ethnic party (Ishiyama, 2012, p778).

However, this does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship – black voters do not simply vote for the ANC because it is a 'black' party. Rather 'black people may vote for the ANC because of policy, information, class or interest, but not simply because they belong to a particular group' (Garcia-Rivero, 2006, p59).

Ferree (2011) notes that there are a number of theories of racialised voting patterns, and why people do vote the way they do. The first of these is expressive or identity voting. According to this theory of voting patterns, voting is seen as a 'means of expressing group allegiance' (Ferree, 2011, p34). In a country where voting patterns such as these are the norm, there are likely to be high levels of ethnic or racial tensions as the ethnic or racial minority is likely to be locked out of power or governance structures into perpetuity. The second pattern identified by Ferree is what she calls 'Politics as Usual'. Here votes are cast as in any normal democracy – voters choose the party or candidates whose policies they agree with most and 'ethnicity/race plays no direct role in shaping behaviour' (Ferree, 2011, pp35 – 36). Here any correlation between race and voting is 'accidental' (Ferree, 2011, p39). The third pattern of racialised voting identified by Ferree is 'Race/ethnicity as Information', which has elements of both the first two explanations of racialised voting. Here voters use 'cognitive shortcuts' to determine which candidate or party to support. This can be explained as follows: with a shortage of other clues, people will assume that those who are members of the same group as them (whether a racial or ethnic group) will have similar aspirations and goals, and thus 'tie

their individual interests with those of the group' (Ferree, 2011, pp37 – 38). Race is used as an informational cue for voters, and parties are not supported due to any emotional attachment.

Voters may also choose the party they support through a shared sense of grievance. Bratton and Bhavani, quoted in Ishiyama (2012, pp764 – 765) note that 'what also matters in terms of apparent ethnic bloc voting is the position of the group in the social and political hierarchy'. They argue that voters who belong to the ethnic group in power are more likely to 'exhibit ethnic voting', as are those who feel that their ethnic or cultural group is being discriminated against. Other voters will, however, consider the policy performance of the government.

The importance of ethnicity[iv] has not seemed to be a particularly significant issue in South Africa since the turn of the century. There are only two major political parties in South Africa which appeal explicitly to an ethnic constituency – the IFP to Zulus and the FF+ to white Afrikaners – but neither party enjoys anything approaching major levels of support. Both parties' heyday was in the 'new' South Africa's founding election, and neither has reached those levels of support subsequently. The IFP's decrease in support could be attributed to its increasingly moving away from its explicit nationalist stance, its relatively poor performance in areas in which it governed, and the ethnic appeal of Jacob Zuma, especially from 2009 onwards (Piper, 2014, p93). The FF+ also saw much of its support lost to the DP in 1999 with its aggressive 'Fight Back' campaign (which it has not seemed to be able to regain), as well as the likelihood that many of its would-be supporters have simply abstained from voting (Heÿn, 2009, p174).

Analysing racial voting patterns in the 1994 and 1999 general elections, Mattes and Piombo (2001) come to a similar conclusion. They argue that the voting choices that people make are due to a number of complex factors, and due to the history of South Africa there appears to be some overlap with race. They argue that voters of different races – largely because of South Africa's history – receive and access information in different ways, which has an impact on their voting intentions. Achen, quoted by Mates and Piombo, states that: 'Voters do not ignore information they have, do not fabricate information they do not have, and do not choose what they do not want. Thus voters need be neither geniuses nor saints. They are required only to do the best with the information they have' (2001, pp103 – 104). Mattes and Piombo (2001, p104) thus argue that voters receive their information from four sources. The first is 'low information reasoning'. Here voters draw inferences from the information that they have, or they take cues from those that they believe have better information. The second way that voters source information is through looking at the track record of the government, parties, and candidates. A third way of sourcing information is through demographic cues – with no other information cues other than skin colour, accent, or language – with voters using these as clues to determine where they perceive a candidate to stand ideologically or on certain issues. The fourth source of information of voters is through those they live, work, and socialise with, as well as the news media. However, Piombo and Mattes make the point that this information is received through a prism of 'present values, and physiological and material circumstances'. They argue that 'the intricate mix of apartheid legislation ensured that people lived among, worked with, socialized and married within racially homogenous groups'. This has led to the creation of '"information networks" that are largely culturally and racially bounded, internally consistent and offer few cross-pressures' (Mattes and Piombo, 2001, pp104 – 105). They believe that this goes some way to explaining the 'peculiarly sharp voting cleavages' which exist in South Africa.

Evidence shows that this is also starting to change. Between 2004 and 2009 the proportion of voters living in 'homogenous "mono partisan" environments' decreased from 49% to 41%. Over the same period those who interacted with people who held different political views increased from 35% to 44% (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014a, p38).

Some evidence from the United States supports this view. In elections for mayor and city attorney in Los Angeles in 2001, a Latino candidate competed against a white candidate. If one ascribes to theories or racial polarisation with regard to voting, then it would be likely that race would be the primary determinant of how people would vote in these elections, i.e. Latino voters would vote for the Latino candidates, while white voters would vote for the white candidate. Using exit polls it was found that white voters favoured the white candidates, and Latino voters favoured the Latino candidates. However, evidence also showed that there were significant differences in how voters of different races voted, depending on their level of income, as well as how liberal or conservative they professed to be. Although white voters generally chose the white candidates, and Latino voters the Latino candidates, evidence showed that voters were 'motivated by issue-based concerns and not only race' (Abrajano, Nagler, and Alvarez, 2004, pp10, 11, 14).

Changes in the number of voters that could be described as ANC 'partisans' may also indicate that the racial identity theory of voting in South Africa is inadequate to explain how and why people vote the way they do. In 1994, some 60% of the voting-age-population (VAP) self-described themselves as ANC partisans. The proportion of the VAP who considered themselves ANC partisans decreased steadily over the next six years, and by 2000 only 34% of the population were ANC partisans. This proportion fluctuated, showing something of an upward trend, but by 2008, less than half the electorate (48%) were ANC partisans (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009, pp30 – 31). Furthermore, evidence shows that about 44% of black voters could be considered 'independents' indicating that black voters in South Africa are far from being a homogenous voting bloc (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009, p30).

Research into the political views of students at the University of Pretoria in 2006, shortly after the 2006 local government election, found that support for different political parties was split on racial grounds. Over 500 undergraduate sociology and political science students were surveyed, with 60% being black (Coloured and Indian students were considered black for the purposes of this study) and some 40% white. Students were asked to state which political party they felt closest to. Unsurprisingly the ANC was the party that black students felt closest to, with the DA occupying second place among black students. Among white students the DA was the party that they felt closest to. There were some differences among white English-speakers and white Afrikaners. On average both groups stated that the DA was the party they felt closest to, but among English-speakers the ANC was generally the second choice. By contrast, Afrikaners felt closer to the FF+, ACDP, and the ID than the ANC, perhaps indicating that the stereotype that Afrikaners are more conservative than their English-speaking counterparts may hold some water (Schoeman and Puttergill, 2007, p167). Schoeman and Puttergill (2007, p171) argue that the findings show that identity politics (particularly party political identification) is the best explanation for South African voting patterns.

Research into the political views and voting behaviour in three poor communities in South Africa by the Centre for Social Development in Africa, affiliated to the University of Johannesburg, found that race was a relatively good predictor of how an individual was likely to vote. The two organisations

interviewed 1 204 people in the communities of Doornkop and Riverlea in Gauteng, as well as Groblersdal in Limpopo. Black people were the majority of respondents, at 85%, and 14% were coloured. The number of white and Indian respondents was negligible (Patel, 2014, p17). The aim of the research was to determine how social protections benefits (grants in particular) impacted on the electoral choice of voters. The survey – conducted in 2013 – found that 56% of respondents were likely to vote for the ANC and 17% for the DA. No other party was found to have more than one percent support among respondents, but 19% of respondents refused to answer or said they did not know who they would vote for (Patel *et al*, 2014, p31). A number of factors were statistically significant. Black respondents were more likely than others to say they would vote for the ANC (67% of black respondents said they would vote for the governing party, as compared to 35% of others). In addition, older respondents, and those with lower levels of education were also less likely to say that they would vote for the opposition (Patel *et al.*, 2014, p37).

Although it would seem that the primary electoral cleavage in South Africa is one of race there is evidence that ethnic and linguistic considerations cannot be ignored. Analyses by McLaughlin shows that 'ethnolinguistic identities are broadly salient in South Africa' (2007, p435). He shows that the more heterogenous, in terms of ethnic origin and language, the black population of any given municipality is, the better the ANC is likely to do. However, it is not clear why this would be so. As McLaughlin notes, there 'is no immediately obvious association between ethnic groups and ANC opposition'. However, he argues that the reason may be relatively benign. He puts forward the theory that opposition parties may benefit in areas where the ethnolinguistic differences among black voters are minimal, as 'they are able to build support networks and disseminate information more efficiently among individuals who use the same language' (McLaughlin, 2007, p451).

Interestingly, support for the EFF also seemed to, at least to some degree, be based on ethnicity. An analysis by Charles Simkins, found that the EFF performed best in 2014 in wards where Pedi-, Tswana-, or Sotho-speaking people were in the majority (Simkins, 2015).

CLASS AND VOTING PATTERNS

Differences in income levels, as well as what could loosely be called 'class differences' also has some influence on voting intentions in South Africa. Adam Habib and Sanusha Naidu (2006, p83) point out that the 'racial census' theory of South African elections is flawed. They argue that race cannot be treated as an 'independent variable', but that there is also a strong overlap between racial and class identities. It is thus important to examine other factors, such as class identity and incomes. The following section will examine the findings of a number of surveys, showing how political identities and voting patterns are influenced, to some degree, by incomes and class identities. The rise of the black middle class will also be examined, as this (very broad) group is increasingly being seen as an important player in South African politics.

Because of the history of South Africa there are large overlaps between race and class. Sylvester (2009, p3) makes the point that average incomes vary widely between race groups. Using data from the 2005/6 Income and Expenditure Survey of Statistics South Africa, Sylvester notes that average white monthly per capita incomes were nearly ten times higher than the average black per capita

incomes. The average per capita monthly incomes of whites was R7 646, and that of black South Africans R775. At the same time average coloured incomes were about double that of black people (at R1 385), and the average per capita monthly income of Indians about four times higher than that of black people at R2 786 (Sylvester, 2009, p3). He speculated that race was not necessarily an indicator of how people would vote, but rather income levels. He notes that 'issues of race and class cannot be divorced from each other in the socio-economic context of South Africa' (Sylvester, 2009, p4).

Interestingly, work by Eifert *et al.* (2010) also showed that people were more likely to identify in terms of class than race or ethnicity in South Africa. Using Afrobarometer data, they found that, in 2002 most South Africans identified themselves in terms of class or occupation (42%), when asked the question: 'Which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?' (other than national identity). Some 22% of the respondents identified themselves in terms of their ethnicity or race first, and six per cent in terms of their religion. Some 23% of respondents chose 'other', rather than choosing racial, ethnic, class, or religious identity. However, in 2000 the results were somewhat different. In that year 42% of respondents had chosen ethnicity or race as their primary identifier, as compared to occupation or class (15%), religion (18%), and other (24%) (Eifert *et al.*, 2010, p500). Despite the very large differences in proportions of people identifying race and ethnicity as their primary identifiers in 2000 and 2002, the authors do not consider sampling variations to be causing this. They note that Afrobarometer surveys uses the same sampling methodology as well as large representative samples, these may be indications of actual changes in how people choose to identify themselves (Eifert *et al.*, 2010, p500).

Research conducted by David Everatt in 2008 showed that black voters on higher incomes were more likely to not vote for the ANC, than those on lower incomes. Everatt uses data which was sourced from a survey conducted in Gauteng. Survey respondents (all of whom were black) were placed into three income categories – those living in households with an income of R1 500 or lower, those living in households with incomes of between R1 500 and R7 000, and those from households with incomes of R7 000 and higher, and were asked what their voting intentions were. Everatt (2011, p90) considered those living in the highest-income households (those with household incomes above R7 000) as being members of the 'African middle class'. Eighty-one per cent of those in the lowest-income households said that they would vote for the ANC, while 79% of those in households with incomes of between R1 500 and R7 000 said that they intended voting for that party. However, of those in households of incomes above R7 000 only 51% said that they intended voting for the ANC (Everatt, 2011, p89).

COPE was the biggest beneficiary of this dissatisfaction with the ANC. Some two per cent of those in the lowest-income households said that they were intending to vote for COPE, seven per cent of those in the 'middle' income households, and 29% of those in households with incomes of above R7 000. However, the DA was the choice of only a small proportion of respondents. The proportion of those in the lowest-income households said that they intended voting for the DA was two per cent (the same proportion as those who said they were intending to vote for COPE), and four per cent of respondents in the middle category said they were planning on voting for the DA (Everatt, 2011, p89). However, Everatt states that not one respondent from households in the highest-income bracket were intending on voting for the DA (Everatt, 2011, p90). Everatt notes that the DA 'has very little purchase among Africans generally, and none at all among those in the upper-income cohort'.

He notes that while black voters, especially those on higher incomes may be looking for alternatives to the ANC, they are not looking to the DA (2011, p91). Everatt's survey also broke down voting intentions by age group. He found that 'DA support among African youth is also lower than among older African voters, a further worry for the erstwhile national opposition' (2011, p94). Everatt notes that while the DA has succeeded in securing the vote of Indian and coloured voters, it has failed to garner the votes of black South Africans. He argues that the DA is still perceived as a 'white' party, and 'there are very strong feelings among significant numbers of African voters that they simply cannot conceive of voting for a white party' (Everatt, 2011, p96). He concludes by saying that while class is an increasingly important component in electoral dynamics, the influence of race cannot be ignored (Everatt, 2011, p96).

A study into the voting patterns of the black middle class prior to the 2014 elections showed that race was still an important identifier for black professionals. According to the author of the study, Amuzweni Ngoma (2014, p159) 'racial identity still trumps class allegiance among black professionals'. The survey revealed that black professionals generally continued to support the ANC for two reasons. The first was that many black professionals attributed their success, in part, to ANC policies, such as the party's commitment to economic transformation. The second reason was because of 'perceived racism of white-owned businesses' (Ngoma, 2014, pp159 – 160). The survey found that there was still widespread mistrust of the DA among black professionals. Although respondents saw the DA as a party 'committed to good governance' its muddled stance of economic transformation and the belief that the party perpetuated racial inequalities in the Western Cape meant many black professionals would not vote for the party (Ngoma, 2014, p162). The survey also found that a number of black professionals were giving their support to black-led opposition parties, such as the EFF and the UDM, as a strategic move to counter the dominance of the ANC. These respondents still wanted the ANC to govern but felt that there was a need for a strong black-led opposition party (Ngoma, 2014, p165). She concludes by saying that although the black middle class has remained broadly aligned to the ANC 'levels of partisanship have continued to decline among this class as a whole' (Ngoma, 2014, p168).

Gwede Mantashe, the secretary-general of the ANC, expressed his surprise in 2014 that black middle class people would not vote for the party, saying that he found it 'strange for someone in the black middle class to neglect a party that promotes BEE and employment equity' (Booysen, 2015, p27).

Research by Robert Mattes concurred with the findings of Everatt – identification with the ANC was *higher* among younger people, than older ones. Mattes's research (conducted in 2008 and using Afrobarometer data) divided South Africans into five distinct political generations. The first are the Pre-Apartheid generation, who turned 16 before the National Party's victory in 1948. They are followed by the Early Apartheid generation, who turned 16 between 1948 and 1960, and then the Grand Apartheid generation, who entered adulthood between 1960 and 1975. The last two generations identified by Mattes are the Struggle Generation, who turned 16 between 1976 and 1996. Finally the Born Frees are those who turned 16 after 1996 (Mattes, 2012, pp137 – 138).

Overall, of those surveyed, 43% said they felt close to the ANC. However, this was lowest among the Pre- and Early Apartheid generation, with 36% of respondents in both categories saying they felt close to the party. Some 42% of the Grand Apartheid generation felt close to the ANC, compared to 44% of the Struggle Generation, and 45% of the Born Frees (Mattes, 2012, p142).

Research conducted in Soweto in 2006 found that the mean age of those who supported the DA was younger than the ANC, and somewhat surprisingly, the ANC Youth League (which were considered as two separate organisations for the purpose of the survey). The mean age of those who said they supported the DA was early 30s, while the mean age of those who supported the ANC was nearly forty. The mean age of those who supported the party's youth league was about 37. However, less than one percent of the nearly 2 400 respondents said that they supported the DA, compared to 59% who said they supported the ANC. The proportion of Sowetans saying they supported the ANC Youth League rather than the primary party, was also only one percent. No other parties had significant levels of support, but 27% of respondents said that explicitly did not support a political party (Ceruti, 2013, pp267, 269).

Subsequent research by Mattes (2015) found that black people who could be considered middle class were less likely to feel close to the ANC. In addition, this subsequent research (also derived from Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2011) contradicts Mattes's own earlier findings. Younger black respondents were less likely to identify as ANC supporters (framed as a question by asking respondents who they would vote for if an election were to be held the next day) (Mattes, 2015, p679). Although the proportion of respondents that said that they would vote for the DA was small (about 4% of respondents as compared to 90% who said they would vote for the ANC) those that did were far more likely to come from the black middle class. Mattes (2015, p672) defined the black middle class as those who had physiological security – meaning that they never went without the four basic necessities of food, clean water, home cooking fuel, and necessary medical care, and also have a flush toilet or piped water in their home. Black respondents that could be described as 'physiologically secure' were about 2.7 times more likely to say that they would vote for the DA than those who were not physiologically secure (Mattes, 2015, p683).

There are also fairly large racial differences in the middle class, in terms of political views. Mattes (2015, p681) notes that of those group of respondents that could be considered middle class (having a certain level of education and being physiologically secure) was multiracial. About 47% of middle-class respondents were black, 31% were white, 16% coloured, and six percent were Indian. White, coloured, and Indian middle class respondents were all more negative with regard to their views on governmental performance, service delivery, the control of crime and corruption, as well as President Jacob Zuma. While black middle class respondents were more likely than poorer black respondents to say they would vote for the DA, the difference was even starker with regard to white members of the middle class. A white middle-class respondent was 158 times more likely than a black middle-class respondent to say that they would vote for the DA (Mattes, 2015, p683). Black middle-class respondents were also more likely to have been involved in community politics, taken part in a political protest, or have contacted a public official, compared to the middle-class respondents belonging to one of the minority racial groups (Mattes, 2015, p683).

Mattes concludes by saying that although black members of the middle class would prefer the government to prioritise 'higher order needs', such as good governance and protecting the right to self-expression than their poorer counterparts, there remain substantial differences between the black middle class, and their white, Coloured, and Indian counterparts (2015, pp685 – 686).

Roger Southall (2014, pp658 - 659), in an analysis of the black middle class, splits the black middle class into four different groups. The first of these is 'state managers', which he defines as consisting

of senior people in the government, ranging from provincial premiers, senior civil servants, to senior employees of parastatals and other government institutions. The second group is the 'corporate black bourgeoisie', which he defines as those with 'significant shareholdings in major companies and/or who are employed at executive or managerial level in the large corporations which dominate the private sector'. The third Southall terms the 'civil petty bourgeoisie' and is made up of members of parliament and provincial legislatures, public sector middle managers, and professionals and semi-professionals (such as teachers and nurses). The fourth and final group is called the 'black business and trading bourgeoisie' by Southall. This group consists of owners and managers of small and medium enterprises. Southall criticises other analysts for generally only concentrating on the 'core' or 'upper' black middle class. He argues that the potential loss of support is likely to come from the lower middle class – what he terms the 'civil petty bourgeoisie'. In addition, he also notes that many people in the lower middle class may increasingly be influenced by the trade unions, which may also shift their politics somewhat (Southall, 2014, p662). According to Southall (2014, p664) much of the DA's greater share of the black vote 'may have come from the lower rather than the core segments of the black middle class'. Southall concludes that the black middle class is likely to remain broadly loyal to the ANC (Southall, 2015, p666).

Fakir and Holland (2011, p1 152) argue that the 2011 local government election results showed that the DA managed to receive increased support from an 'embryonic black professional class', as well as increasing its support among members of middle- and upper-income groups, regardless of race. In metropolitan areas, at least, 'greater cosmopolitan political identities may be emerging' and may indicate a shift away from 'racialised identity voting' (Fakir and Holland, 2011, p1 152). Seethal (2012, p20) also argues that 'a growing and young black middle class for whom class issues, rather than race, are likely to become dominant' played an important role in 2011, and could see the DA 'seize such political spaces'. Twala (2012, p213) also concurs with these analyses, stating that although the ANC won the 2011 election relatively easily it was clear that 'there was a shift away from the predominantly African party towards the traditionally white but in fact, non-racial opposition'.

David Everatt, in an analysis of the 2014 provincial election in Gauteng notes that it seemed that a number of black members of the middle class abandoned the ANC, for both the DA and EFF. He points out that a poll conducted by IPSOS prior to the 2014 election found that no respondent who said they would vote for the EFF had 'an education level below incomplete secondary education'. Conversely, those with no education or who only had primary education were far more likely to vote for the ANC (Everatt, 2014, p16). Steven Friedman (2014) in his analysis of the EFF's 2014 election performance also notes that forty percent of the EFF's total national support came from Gauteng, South Africa's richest and most urbanised province. Of the nearly 1.2-million votes cast for the EFF, just over 470 000 came from Gauteng (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2014b, p192). Friedman (2014) surmised that it was likely that those who supported the EFF 'were, in the main, not the poor and marginalised but the middle class and connected'. A survey conducted prior to the 2014 election found that the majority of the EFF's supporters were men aged between 25 and 49, most of whom had some secondary school education (Robinson, 2014, pp83 – 84).

A further complication is the rise of inequality among black South Africans, which would seem to imply that the expansion of opportunity that has been evident since the end of apartheid has not been shared equally. A number of black people have experienced rapid upward mobility, as a

growing economy has seen large numbers of black people move into better paying jobs or become entrepreneurs, while others – because of poor schooling and chronic unemployment – 'languish in poverty' (Seekings, 2008, p2). In addition, since the end of apartheid the household incomes of all race groups have grown rapidly. Between 1996 and 2012 average annual household income in South Africa grew by 202%, increasing from R49 245 to R148 496. However, the household incomes of whites grew the most (by 323%) and that of black South Africans the least (by 196%) (SAIRR, 2014, p299). White South Africans, due to historical advantages, such as superior education and more ready access to capital, have arguably benefited the most from the end of apartheid. In addition, this growth in black incomes has probably been less equitably shared than among other race groups. The Gini co-efficient in 2013 was highest among black South Africans than any other race group. The Gini co-efficient is a measure of income inequality with countries, or between groups of people, measured between 0 and 1. The closer to 0 the measure, the less income inequality is present, with a measure of 0 signifying perfect income equality. In 2013 income inequality in South Africa as a whole was 0.62. However, among South Africa's race groups, income inequality was highest among black South Africans, at 0.55. Income inequality among Indians was also fairly high, at 0.52, while income inequality for Coloured people and whites, was relatively low, at 0.40 and 0.43 respectively (SAIRR, 2014, p296). This relatively high inequality among black South Africans is further evidence that economic and other opportunities have not been spread as equitably as would have been optimal.

Donald Horowitz (1985, pp31 – 32), in his study on conflict between ethnic groups, argues that ethnic conflict often supersedes class conflict. This is especially the case in countries where 'ethnic groups are cross-class'. In South Africa, the middle class is increasingly becoming racially mixed, implying that ethnic groups (or in South Africa's case, racial groups) will be the primary identifier. Jeremy Seekings (2008, p7) concurs with this (perhaps unsurprising) finding, pointing out that, as far back as the 1990s, race, rather than class cleavages were identified as the major divide in South Africa. Seekings (2008, pp7 – 8) points to the now famous 1998 'Two Nations' speech of then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, where he argued that South Africa consisted of two nations. One of these nations was 'white, relatively prosperous' while the other was 'black and poor'. According to Seekings the 'implication is that the "national question" – defined in racial terms – has precedence above the "social question" of class-based inequalities'. Seekings also points out that South Africa is in reality made up of three 'nations' – the poor, almost exclusively black; the primarily black working class; and the middle class and elites, which are increasingly multiracial. This means that 'economic stratification and cultural difference no longer correlate neatly' (2008, p7).

Racial cleavages in South Africa seem to be the primary identifiers of how people are likely to vote, but it is clear that class differences are becoming increasingly important. Nevertheless, even within classes, racial differences are prominent. As research from Mattes showed, the political views of the middle class were divergent, based on race. At the same time research conducted by the Centre for Social Development in Africa in Riverlea and Doornkop showed that the political views of poorer people were also split by race – with coloured people more likely to vote for the DA, with black people more likely to vote for the ANC. This can also be seen from research below, which shows that the best predictor of which party a ward is likely to support is the race of the residents in that ward.

SELECTED WARD RESULTS FROM THE 2011 ELECTIONS

To test whether it can be determined if there are any influences beyond race in terms of the voting behaviour of South Africans, the election results from selected wards were examined, against the demographic indicators of those wards. In the 2011 municipal elections there were more than 4 000 individual wards, a number too large to examine for the scope of this project. Therefore, only the wards in the eight metros and the results in these were examined to determine the various voting patterns and whether racialised voting patterns are indeed prevalent. Ideally to test whether voting patterns change over time, the results in these wards would have been contrasted with what happened in the previous election. However, ward boundaries change between each municipal election, meaning that election results in various wards are not strictly comparable. Nevertheless, it is still possible to test results in these wards, though by-elections. By-elections are held when a councillor dies, resigns, or is removed from the post by his party (Independent Electoral Commission). Thus, a number of by-elections are also analysed to determine what the various voting patterns may be. As the focus of this dissertation is on the DA, only wards in which the DA lost or gained a ward were examined.

THE METROS

This section will examine voting patterns in the country's eight metropolitan municipalities in the 2011 municipal election. Specific reference will be given to the share of the vote gained by the DA in each of the wards and what correlation can be determined with four indicators – race, levels of employment, income levels of the employed, and levels of education.[v] These data was sourced from the 2011 census results.[vi] An income level (of employed people) of R6 000 per month was chosen. Research done by Justin Visagie, an economist, estimated that middle class households would have incomes starting at about R5 600 per month, meaning an income threshold of R6 000 is roughly where the 'middle class' begins (2013, p4). In addition, a matric qualification was identified as the educational cut-off. Higher education is still out of reach of many South Africans (only seven percent of South Africans had a tertiary qualification in 2011 according to census results) making a matric qualification a more sensible cut-off point. The income and education data can be found in the appendix. Party results for each ward was determined by using the PR vote, rather than the ward vote.

The racial make-up of each ward will be referred to, but because of the sheer volume of wards a number of wards will be selected in each metro to examine the other factors – employment, levels of income (of employed people), and the level of education of people who are aged 20 and older. A random selection of wards in each metro will be examined to determine whether there is any correlation between voting and these three indicators. Wards were primarily selected so as to provide a selection of wards which had differing racial demographics – for example, an attempt was made to examine a number of black majority wards, white majority wards, ones that could be considered 'mixed', as well as (when applicable) wards that had coloured or Indian majorities. The results for each ward being studied is also presented below in table form.

One cannot say with certainty that these results are generalisable across the country, but the selection offers insights into trends in a wide range of wards and areas. Wards in metropolitan areas are biased towards DA gains and the selection of metro wards precisely enables us to test whether or to what extent those gains have come from African voters. However metro wards themselves are chosen to achieve a fairly representative sample of different racial mixes, rather than on the basis of DA success or failure.

BUFFALO CITY

Buffalo City, the municipality that includes East London, is a safe ANC city. In the 2011 municipal election it won 69.1% of the vote, and 71 of the 100 seats up for grabs. The DA saw its vote share increase from 12.0% it attained in the 2006 election to 20.3% in 2011, enough to secure it 21 seats on the council (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, pp109 – 110).

Of Buffalo City's 50 ward seats, 31 can be considered overwhelmingly black (those wards where more than 95% of residents were black). The DA's vote in these wards varied from as low as 0.9% to 24.4%, with its vote share in a ward only being above 10% once. The party was the second biggest party in only five wards, with its main rivals for second place being the African Independent Congress (AIC), COPE, and the PAC.

It was not clear why the DA's vote was so high in ward 32. Social indicators were broadly similar to those in other wards.

The ANC was the leader in each of these wards, easily being the party for which most votes were cast. The lowest proportion of the vote cast for the ANC was 67.5%, which was in the same ward in which the DA achieved its best result in 'black' wards. It managed above 70% in each of the other wards, and above 90% in two.

In the remaining nineteen wards the DA emerged as the biggest party in seven wards. Its share of the vote in these remaining 19 wards ranged 21.5% to 88.3%. In the seven wards that the DA won white voters were a majority in three, with coloured voters a majority in two. In the other two wards (three and 15) which the DA won, black residents were a majority of 73.1% and 57.5% respectively. In both these two wards whites were the second biggest population group, accounting for 12.3% and 35.7% respectively. In the other 13 wards (where the ANC emerged as the biggest party in each) which were not black wards (made up of more than 95% of black residents according to census figures) black voters were still the majority in each. This ranged from between 67.1% to 90%. In Buffalo City there was a clear correlation between the proportion of black residents and the proportion of the vote for the DA. The lower the black population and the higher that of minorities (whites and coloureds in this particular municipality) the more votes the DA was likely to win. In addition, no ward could be considered 'white' using the criteria used to determine if wards were 'black' (i.e. more than 95% of the ward being white). The ward with the highest proportion of whites was ward 27, where whites accounted for nearly 70% of the population. This was also the DA's best ward in the municipality, where it won 81.2% of the vote.

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*
26	92.9%	2.1%	98%
32	67.5%	24.4%	100%
33	90.8%	1.4%	100%

Ward 26

In this ward the ANC had secured 92.9% of the vote, its best performance in the municipality. Some 98% of residents of the ward were black people. The DA had won 2.1% of the vote in the ward, coming third behind the ANC and the AIC, which won 2.6% of the vote.

Ward 32

This ward was the DA's best performance in a ward that had a black majority of 95% or higher. In this ward – where 100% of residents are black – the DA won nearly a quarter of the vote, with 24.4%. The ANC was the biggest party, securing 67.5% of the vote. This is still a very large majority but fairly low compared to other black majority wards in the metro.

However, it is not clear why the DA performed so well in this ward. Employment levels are low in the ward, with only 14.1% of people in the ward being employed. In addition, 90.1% of people in the ward earned R6 000 per month or less. Only 14.1% of residents had an educational qualification of matric or higher (see the appendix for further details).

Ward 33

This ward was another where the ANC performed well. Here it secured 90.8% of the vote with the DA coming fourth with 1.4% of the vote, behind the AIC (4.6%) and COPE (1.8%). In this ward all the residents were black.

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*
10	43.4%	49.3%	63.5%
19	22.4%	71.8%	70.4%

Ward 10

In this ward, coloured people accounted for a majority of residents, with 63.5% of residents coming from that population group. Black people were the second-largest group, at 35.4%.

The DA was the biggest party in the ward, but only securing a plurality, at 49.3%. The ANC was the second-biggest party, with 43.4% of the vote.

Ward 19

In this ward coloured people were a majority at 70.4% of the population. Just over a quarter of residents – 27.4% - were black. The DA was easily the most popular party, winning 71.8% of the vote, with the ANC securing only 22.4%.

White-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are white***
27	14.7%	81.6%	68.2%

Ward 27

This was the ward with the highest proportion of white residents in the municipality. In this ward white people accounted for 68.2% of residents, with black residents accounting for 27.8%. The DA won 81.6% of the vote, while the ANC was the second-biggest party, winning 14.7% of the vote.

CAPE TOWN

Cape Town, in contrast to South Africa's other metros, was won by the DA in 2011, having been governed by them in coalition since 2006. However, in 2011, the party did well enough to govern the city without the help of any coalition partners. In 2011 the DA won 61.2% of the vote, compared to 42.3% in 2006. Over the same period the ANC saw its vote fall from 38.7% to 33.2%. The DA's performance was good enough for the party to secure 135 seats on the 221 seat council. In 2006 it had won 90 seats on the 210 seat council, which had resulted it having to govern in a multi-party coalition.

In Cape Town there are fewer wards which can be considered overwhelmingly black than other municipalities in South Africa, with only 24 wards of the 111 wards in the city having wards where more than 95% of the residents were black. In these wards the pattern of votes for the DA was similar to the trend in the other metros. In each ward the ANC was comfortably the largest party, achieving more than 90% of the vote in 20 of the 24 wards. In the other four wards where its vote share was below 90% it still secured more than 85% of the vote. The DA fared poorly in these wards. It only won more than five percent of the vote in two wards (5.5% in ward 37 and 7.7% in ward 35). Despite this, this was still enough for it to be the second biggest vote catcher in 11 of the 24 wards. COPE managed to beat the party into second place in these other wards, except for wards 95 and 96. In ward 95 it only managed fourth place behind COPE and the UDM, and in ward 96 it came third behind the National Freedom Party (NFP).

The pattern was reversed in the other 87 wards in the city, which had different demographic characteristics. Generally, the higher the proportion of white people in the ward, the higher DA support was likely to be. The DA also fared well in wards where coloured people were in the majority, although this was not as pronounced as those wards where white people were the largest

group. In these other 87 wards the ANC only emerged as the most popular party in only nine wards, and in each of these wards black people were in the majority. The proportion of black people in these nine wards ranged (from 50.6% (ward six where it won 57.6% of the vote) to 90.2% (ward 101 where it won 93.6% of the vote). There was only ward in which black people were a majority and the ANC did not emerge as the most popular party. In ward 69 black South Africans accounted for 58.5% of the population, but the DA was the most popular party, with 56.4% of the vote, compared to the ANC's 41.1%. Whites accounted for 33.3% of the population of that ward (with coloured people and Indians accounting for 2.8% and 0.5% respectively). It is thus likely that this was a reflection of a higher turnout of white voters. The ANC was the second biggest party in each of the wards where it did not win, except for one. In this ward (103) the party came third behind the DA and African Christian Democratic Party.

There were 19 wards where white people were a majority. In each of these wards the DA won comfortably, managing above 90% of the vote in 15 of these wards.

In wards in which coloured people were a majority, the DA also tended to win comfortably, although not with margins as high in white-majority wards. There were 48 wards in which coloured people were a majority, and in every single one of these wards the DA emerged as the most popular party. Winning margins in wards with a coloured majority were not as high for the DA as in those with large white populations. However, the ANC did not seriously threaten the DA in any ward with coloured majorities.

Of the three coloured-majority wards analysed below, the highest levels of income and educational achievement was to be found in in which the ANC performed best (the proportion of employed people was broadly the same in each of the three wards below).

Black-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are black***
35	88.6%	7.7%	95.3%
38	93%	2%	99%
98	95%	1.3%	99%

Ward 35

The ANC was the most popular party in the ward, winning 88.6% of the vote. However, this ward was the DA's best result in any ward in Cape Town where more than 95% of residents were black. The DA managed 7.7% of the vote, being the second-biggest party. The proportion of black people in this ward was 95.3%, with coloured people accounting for 3.4%.

Ward 38

In this ward the ANC performed well, winning 93% of the vote. The DA was only the third biggest party, winning two percent of the vote, with COPE managing 2.7% of the vote. Some 99% of residents in the ward were black people.

Ward 98

The ANC did extremely well in ward 98, winning 95% of the vote. The DA won only 1.3% of the vote in this ward, with COPE coming second to the ANC, with 1.9%.

This ward also had a large black majority, with 99% of people in the ward coming from this group.

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are coloured***
12	8.3%	84.9%	92.4%
24	10.8%	90.4%	92.7%
29	24.3%	68.5%	93.5%

Ward 12

Ward 12 was a ward with a large coloured majority – residents from this group accounted for 92.4% of residents. Black people accounted for four percent of residents. The DA performed well in this ward, winning 84.9% of the vote. The ANC was the second largest party, with 8.3% of the vote.

Ward 24

Ward 24 had similar racial demographics to ward 12, with coloured residents accounting for 92.7% of residents. Black people accounted for 6.4% of the population of this ward. The DA again did well in this ward, securing 80.4% of the vote, while the ANC managed 10.8% of the vote.

Ward 29

This ward had similar racial demographics to the above two wards. Some 93.5% of residents there were coloured people, while 4.5% were black. However, in this ward, unlike the other two, the DA secured 68.5% of the vote, a relatively poor performance compared to its performance in the other two wards. The ANC managed nearly a quarter of the vote, gaining 24.3% of the vote.

White-plurality wards

Ward 53

Ward 53 was a ward with mixed demographics – in this ward white people formed a plurality, at 35.3%. Black people were the second-largest group at 32.1%, while coloured people accounted for 26.4%. The DA was the biggest party in the ward, winning over three-quarters of the vote (75.8%). The ANC came second, with 19.9% of the vote.

White-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are white***

70	2.1%	95.6%	79.8%
84	3.3%	94.2%	68.3%
103	1.6%	95.6%	79.1%

Ward 70

This ward saw the DA winning a very large proportion of the vote, managing 95.6%. The ANC was the second-largest party, with 2.1% of the vote. White people formed a large majority, at 79.8%. Coloured people were the next largest group, at 9.3%, while black people accounted for 6.9% of residents.

Ward 84

This ward was another where the DA performed well, winning 94.2% of the vote, and the ANC managing 3.3%. White people accounted for 68.3% of residents in the ward, with coloured people being the largest minority, at 17.7%. Black people were also a fairly large minority, accounting for 11.7% of residents.

Ward 103

This ward saw the DA have one of its best performances, winning 95.6% of the vote. This ward was also fairly unique in that the ANC was not the second most-popular party, coming third behind the ACDP. The ACDP won 1.7% of the vote, while the ANC managed 1.6% of the vote. White people were – unsurprisingly, the largest demographic group in the ward, accounting for 79.1% of the ward's population. Coloured people were the second biggest group, at 14%. Black people accounted for five percent of the ward's population. The ward had high levels of employment with 74.6% of people in the ward being employed. Income levels were high, with only 21.9% of those in the ward having incomes of R6 000 or below per month. Education levels were also high, with 79% of residents having an education qualification of matric or higher.

EKURHULENI

Ekurhuleni is a municipality on the East Rand of Johannesburg, and was formed in 2000, when nine towns were amalgamated, including Benoni, Boksburg, Germiston, Kempton Park, and Springs (Ekurhuleni, 2010, p1). Ekurhuleni was also a fairly safe ANC municipality in 2011, with the party's vote share increasing slightly from 61.3% to 62.2%, enough for 125 of the 202 seats available in 2011. The DA saw its vote share go from 25.9% to 30.1% giving it 62 seats in the council (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, pp109 – 110).

In Ekurhuleni 57 of the 101 wards could be considered almost exclusively black wards, where black people made up 95% or more of the ward. In each of these wards the ANC was the biggest party, with its share of the vote dropping below 70% in only one ward (ward 52 where it secured 63.4% and where the DA came sixth, with 2.9% of the vote, behind the APC, COPE, IFP, and NFP). In these 'black wards' the DA was the second biggest in 41 of these wards, but it exceeded ten percent of the

vote in only one (ward 89). The best performance by any party other than the ANC in a black ward was COPE in ward 12, where it won 20.3% of the vote.

In the remaining 44 wards either the DA or the ANC emerged as the biggest party, with the DA prevailing in 30 of those wards. There were also 17 wards where whites are a majority, with the white population's share ranging from 54.2% (ward 75) to 81.2% (ward 27). In the 17 majority white wards the DA was the biggest party, with its vote share ranging from 71.1% to 89.3%.

In the remaining wards where the DA emerged as the largest party the white share of the population ranged from as low as 0.4% (ward 34) to 46.4%. However, in ward 34, coloured people were a majority in the ward, making up 65% of the population, with black people accounting for 32.2%. The DA won 58.4% of the vote in this ward. This was also the only ward in the municipality where a group other than whites or blacks were a majority.

There was no correlation in terms of race in the other wards. For example, the DA was the biggest party in ward 33, where black people accounted for 74.2% of the population. The DA also emerged as the biggest party in a number of other wards where black people were the majority of residents. The good performance by the DA in ward 33 could possibly be attributed to higher turnout in 'white' areas, as compared to 'black' areas (more detail is provided below). What is clear is that the DA was the biggest party in every ward in which whites or other minorities formed a majority, whether singly or a combined majority with the other groups. In addition, the higher the proportion of minorities in a ward, the better the DA would perform. This is another indication that in all likelihood that minorities in general, and DA supporters in particular, are more likely to vote than supporters of the ANC.

However, in wards where black people are the overwhelming majority of the population, the ANC regularly received above 85% of the vote, and sometimes above 90%.

There seemed to be little difference in these wards, despite differences in incomes, educational qualifications, and employment. However, ethnicity did appear to have played a role. In two wards (ward 12 and ward 52) in which COPE and the IFP performed well, there were – according to census data – high proportions of Sepedi- and Zulu-speaking people, respectively.

Black-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are black***
12	74.4%	3.1%	98%
33	44.2%	45.6%	74.2%
48	93.5%	2.4%	99%
52	63.4%	2.9%	99%
78	81.3%	8.3%	96%
87	93.4%	3.5%	99%
91	42.2%	53.7%	71.5%

Ward 12

This was a ward where the ANC performed relatively poorly, in comparison with other wards where black people made up a large majority. The ANC won 74.4% of the vote in this ward, while the DA won 3.1%. COPE performed relatively well here, securing 20.3% of the vote. Some 98% of people in the ward were black South Africans.

COPE's relatively good performance could possibly be attributed to ethnicity, with 29% of residents in the ward having Sepedi as their home language, compared to 11% in Ekurhuleni as a whole. As noted above, in the 2014 national election the EFF generally performed best in areas with high proportions of Sepedi-speaking people, and this was the case in this ward too. Nearly 30% of voters had supported that party in the 2014 national election.

Ward 33

This was a ward in which the DA emerged as the biggest party, despite there being a fairly large black majority. The DA garnered the support of 45.6% of the ward's voters, while the ANC was just behind at 44.2%.

This could also be explained by differential turnouts between voters living in 'black' or 'white' areas. For example, in two voting districts which include the informal settlement of Angelo, only 24.4% and 38.7% of registered voters turned out, respectively. More than 8 000 voters were registered in these two voting districts, accounting for nearly half of total registered voters in the ward (which was made up of eight voting districts). By contrast in Ravensklip, a suburb that had been set aside for white people during apartheid, turnout was 64.6%. The voting district under which Witfield and Lillianton fall (again, both formerly white areas) turnout was again over 60%, at 62.7%.

It seems evident that the success of the DA in an area where black people make up a fairly large majority, could be attributed to higher turnout amongst DA supporters, who, the evidence seems to suggest, are more likely to be white.

Ward 48

This ward was the ANC's best performance in the municipality. The party achieved 93.5% of the vote, with the DA being the second most popular party at 2.4%. The ward was almost exclusively black, with black people accounting for 99% of the ward's residents.

Ward 52

This ward was where the ANC had its worst performance (where black people accounted for 95% or more of the residents in the ward), winning only 63.4% of the vote. The DA also performed poorly, being only the sixth-most popular party in the ward, with 2.9% of the vote. The APC, COPE, IFP, and NFP all won more support than the DA, with the IFP being the second-most popular party, with 14.7% of the vote in this ward, where 99% of residents were black.

The IFP's fairly strong performance could possibly be attributed to the fact that 49% of residents spoke Zulu as a first language, as against 29% in Ekurhuleni as a whole.

Ward 78

This ward was the DA's best ward in which black people accounted for 95% or more of residents. Here the party managed 8.3% of the vote. The ANC was the most popular party, with 81.3% of the vote.

Black people accounted for 96% of residents, with white people making up three percent of residents.

Ward 87

This was another ward where the ANC performed well, securing 93.4% of the vote. The DA was the second most-popular party, with 3.5%. The ward had a large black majority, with 99% of residents in the ward being black people.

Ward 91

The DA emerged as the biggest party in this ward, despite the majority of residents being black. The DA won 53.7% of the vote, with the ANC managing 42.2%. Black people accounted for 71.5% of the ward's residents, while white residents formed the second biggest group in the ward, at 22.5% of the ward's population.

The relatively good performance is likely due to a higher turnout by white voters, as in ward 33.

Coloured-majority ward

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are coloured***
34	34.4%	58.4%	65.4%

Ward 34

This was the only ward in Ekurhuleni where coloured people formed a majority. In this ward coloured people accounted for 65.4% of the population, with black residents making up 32.2% of the population. The DA emerged as the biggest single party, with 58.4% of the vote. The ANC was the second-largest party with 34.4% of the vote.

White-majority ward

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are white***
27	6.8%	88.8%	81.2%
37	16.3%	80.3%	76.5%

Ward 27

This was the ward where whites had the highest population share in the municipality, accounting for 81.2% of the population. Black people made up the largest minority in the ward, with 12.6% of the ward's residents. The DA was easily the biggest party in the ward, winning 88.8% of the vote. The ANC was the second most popular party, winning 6.8% of the vote.

Ward 37

This was a ward where the DA performed well, winning 80.3% of the vote, while the ANC won nine percent. Whites formed a relatively big majority in the ward, at 76.5%. Black residents were the second-biggest group at 16.3%. The Independent Ratepayers Association of South Africa (IRASA) performed well in the ward, winning 7.4% of the vote

Black-plurality ward

Ward 39

In this ward the proportion of black and white people was almost identical, with the DA emerging as the most popular party. Black people were a slight majority at 46.4%, while white people accounted for 46.4% of the ward's residents. The DA won 69% of the votes in the ward, while the ANC won 27.2%.

ETHEKWINI

Ethekwini is the only metropolitan municipality in KwaZulu-Natal and includes the city of Durban. It was also one of the few areas where the ANC saw its vote share increase between 2006 and 2011 (Ekurhuleni was the only other metropolitan municipality which saw the ANC's vote share increase). The party saw its share of the vote in the municipality go from 58.9% to 62.0%. At the same time the DA saw its vote share increase from 16.9% to 21.8%. Ethekwini had also been one of the few municipalities where a party other than the DA or the ANC managed a significant share of the vote. The IFP had won 11.3% of the vote in 2006, but this dropped to just below four percent in 2011 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p109).

The ANC's performance was good enough for it to win 126 seats on the 205 seat council in 2011, with the DA winning 43 seats (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p110).

The DA had even less traction in overwhelmingly black-majority wards (those where more than 95% of the population are black) than in the other metropolitan municipalities. Ethekwini has 45 wards where more than 95% of the population are black. The ANC emerged as the biggest ward in each of these, and its support fell below 50% in only one ward (ward 39). In this ward the ANC, the NFP, and IFP were the main contenders, each achieving above 30% of the vote, with the DA fourth, with just more than one percent of the vote. In only three wards did the DA finish as high as second, generally being beaten into fourth place by the ANC, IFP, and NFP. In ward 76 it was only the fifth most popular party, with COPE also proving to be more popular than the DA. In only two wards did the DA manage above five percent of the vote (5.4% in ward 4 and 5.3% in ward 98). In addition, there were also three wards where the party could not even break the one percent threshold.

There were also 32 wards where black people were in the majority (with more than 50% and less than 95% of residents being black). In all but one of these wards the ANC emerged as the largest party. In only one ward did the DA emerge as the biggest party – this was in ward 64. In this ward black voters accounted for 60% of residents, with whites (22.8%) and Indians (12.3%), forming significant minorities. In addition, there were two wards where the DA was only the fourth biggest party, coming fourth behind the ANC, IFP, and NFP. In each of these wards black people accounted for nearly 93% of residents.

There was little correlation between income, education, and employment in the DA's share of the vote in these wards.

Two other wards had black pluralities. In each of these wards the DA emerged as the single biggest party. In ward 33 black residents accounted for 45.2% of voters, with whites making up the second biggest group, with 39%. In this ward the DA won 71% of the vote, and the ANC. In the other ward, black residents accounted for 45.1% while 42.5% of residents were Indians, and the largest minority. In this ward the DA emerged as the largest party, but only with 46.6% of the vote, with the ANC winning 36.2% of the vote.

In the 2011 local government elections there were 15 wards with Indian pluralities or majorities. In 11 of these wards the DA emerged as the biggest party. In two wards the ANC was the biggest party, while in the other two the MF was the largest party.

In the three Indian wards analysed below, incomes were highest in the two in which the DA performed best. In the other (where incomes were significantly lower), the DA was the second-most popular party after the MF. The other indicators of education and employment were broadly similar however.

There were also seven wards which had white majorities or pluralities. In these wards the white proportion of residents ranged from 43.3% to 78%. In each of these wards the DA was comfortably the largest party, securing above 77% in each ward.

There was one ward with a coloured majority, and again the DA emerged as the single largest party, with 63.2% of the vote. Some 52.7% of the residents of the ward were coloured, with a third being Indian.

Black-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are black***
1	95.7%	2.5%	98%
4	86.6%	5.4%	97%
39	34.9%	1.1%	100%
98	88.3%	5.3%	97%

Ward 1

This ward was the ANC's best ward in the municipality – winning 95.7% of the vote. The DA was the second-largest party, with 2.5%. The ward was overwhelmingly black with 98% of people coming from this community, although white residents accounted for one percent of residents.

Ward 4

Of wards in the municipality, where black people made up more than 95% of the population, this was the ward in which the DA did the best. The party secured 5.4% of the vote, compared to the ANC's 86.6%. Black people accounted for 97% of those in the ward, with white people making up three percent of the ward's population.

Ward 39

This was the only ward where black formed a majority of 95% or more that the ANC did not get more than 67% of the vote. It received 34.9% of the vote, which was still enough for it to be the biggest single party on the PR ballot in the ward. The IFP received 33.7% of the vote, while the NFP managed 28.9%. The DA won only 1.1% of the vote.

All of the residents in the ward were black, according to the census.

Ward 98

This was the ward where more than 95% of the population was black, where the DA had one of its best performances. The DA managed to win 5.3% of the ward's support compared to the ANC's 88.3%. Black people accounted for nearly 97% of the ward's residents, while Indian people made up 2.2% of the ward's residents.

White-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are white***
10	10.6%	86.9%	78%

Ward 10

This was the ward with the highest proportion of white residents in the municipality. Here white people accounted for 78% of residents. Black people were the largest minority at 15.2%, while Indian residents accounted for 5.5%. The DA won 86.9% of the vote, which was also the party's best performance in the municipality. The ANC secured 10.6%.

Black-plurality wards

Ward 33

The DA emerged as the biggest party in this ward, which had a black plurality. Black people accounted for 45.2% of residents, with white people making up 39%. Indian people accounted for a

fairly large minority, at 9.2%. The DA won 71.3% of the vote, while the ANC secured 22.9% of the vote.

Indian-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are Indian***
48	16.5%	55.4%	77.4%
50	7.1%	47.1%	94%
51	18.4%	36.5%	73%

Ward 48

This ward had a large Indian majority at 77.4%. Black people were the largest minority, at 19.8%. The DA was the largest party, at 55.4%. The MF was the second-most popular party in the ward, at 23.2%, while the ANC accounted for 16.5%.

Ward 50

This ward was the one with the highest proportion of Indian people in the ward, at 94%. Black people were the second-largest group in the ward at 3.6%.

The DA was the biggest party in the ward, winning a plurality of 47.1%, while the MF came second with 41.3%. The ANC won only 7.1% of the vote.

Ward 51

This ward was one of the few where neither the ANC nor DA was the largest party. In this ward the MF was the largest party winning 41.3% of the vote. The DA was the second-largest, winning 36.5% of the vote, while ANC gained 18.4%. Indian people were the largest group in the ward at 73%, while black people made up 24.2% of residents.

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are coloured***
68	11.8%	63.2%	52.7%

Ward 68

This was the only ward in the municipality where coloured people formed a majority. Coloured people accounted for 52.7% of the ward's population. Indian people formed a large minority, with a third of people in the ward coming from this community. There was also a fairly large proportion of black residents in the ward, at 13.4%. The DA was – by a relatively large margin – the biggest party in

the ward, winning 63.2% of the vote. The ANC won 11.8% of the vote, coming third behind the IFP which won 14.7% of the vote.

JOHANNESBURG

Johannesburg was a fairly safe municipality for the ANC in both elections. In 2006 the ANC won 62.7% of the vote in the city, with this dropping slightly to 59.3% in 2011. In 2006 the DA had managed to win 27.1% of the vote in the municipality, increasing to 34.4% in 2011. As in most of the other municipalities, no other party secured any significant support (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p109).

The number of seats available on the municipal council increased by a fairly large number, going from 217 in 2006 to 260 in 2011. In 2006 the ANC won 136 of the available seats, and this increased to 153 in 2011. The DA saw its number of seats go from 59 in 2006 to 90 in 2011 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p110).

Of the 130 wards in the city, just over half were ones where black people accounted for 95% or more of the population. There were 66 wards with black majorities of more than 95%. The ANC was again easily the most popular party in all of these wards, with the exception of one. In only nine of the 66 wards did the ANC's vote share drop below 80%, and in only three wards was its support lower than 70%.

In these wards where the ANC fared relatively poorly, it was not the DA who was benefiting but rather South Africa's two Zulu parties – the IFP and NFP. In the only ward where the ANC was not the most popular party (ward 65), no party secured fifty percent of the vote, with the IFP being the largest party with 38.9% of the vote. The ANC managed 27.4%, with the NFP being a close third at 25.1%. The proportion of Zulu-speaking people in this ward was far higher than their proportion of Johannesburg's population. In addition, 60% of the residents in the ward were born in KwaZulu-Natal, implying that they were migrant workers (more detail is provided below). This could be an explanation for the ANC's fairly poor performance.

The DA generally fared better in these wards than it did in other black-majority wards in other municipalities, securing at least three percent of the vote in each ward. In six wards it also won more than ten percent of the vote, with the party's best performance being in ward 64, where it won 13.5% of the vote. In addition, the party was the second most popular party in 59 of the 66 wards. It was beaten into third place in three wards, with the IFP emerging as the second most popular party in these three wards. In four other wards the DA was the fourth most popular party, with the IFP and the NFP securing more votes than it.

There were also 36 wards where black residents were a plurality or a majority, but accounted for less than 95% of the population. In 16 of these wards the DA was the most popular party, while in the other 20 wards the ANC was the leading party. There was a clear correlation with regard to race – in all wards where black residents accounted for more than 70% of the population (except for one) the ANC was the most popular party. At the same time there were 15 wards where black people were in the majority but accounted for less than 60% of residents – the DA was the largest party in

twelve of these wards. Although the DA was generally the largest or second-largest party in these wards, there was one exception. In ward 61 (where black residents made up 90.5% of those in the ward) the DA managed 9.2% of the vote, but was still only the fourth biggest party. In that ward the ANC emerged as the most popular party, with just under 50% of the vote, with the IFP and NFP securing 26.2% and 13.4% of the vote respectively.

Six of these wards are analysed below and in two of these the DA performed well, despite over 95% of a ward's residents being black. In these two wards income levels, educational attainment, and employment were all higher than in other wards with high proportions of black people. This could be some evidence that those on higher educations and higher levels of education may be supporting the DA, but this is not yet clear (see attached appendix for levels of income, education, and employment in these wards).

There were two wards where Indian people were in the majority. In these two wards the DA was the most popular party, but not overwhelmingly so. In ward nine, Indian people accounted for 77.7% of residents, with the biggest minority being black residents, at 17.1%. Here the DA secured 54.7% of the vote, and the ANC 35.9%. In the other Indian-majority ward – ward 58 – Indians were a plurality at 42.7%, with black people accounting for 37.1% of residents. In this ward the DA won 48.6% of the vote, and the ANC 42%.

In Johannesburg there were three wards where coloured people formed the majority. In these three wards the DA was comfortably the leading party, with more than two-thirds of the vote in each ward. It secured 67.9% of the vote in two wards, and 84.3% in another. In ward 18, where coloured people accounted for 89.9% of residents, the DA won 84.3%, with the ANC managing 11.4%. In ward 17, where coloured people made up 62.8% of residents, the DA won 67.9% of the vote. In this ward, black people were the second biggest group, at 34.5%. In ward 82, where the DA again won 67.9% of the vote, coloured people accounted for 57.5% of residents, with black people once again being the second biggest group, at 25.9%.

There were 23 wards where white people formed a majority of residents. In these wards the DA was easily the largest party, securing at least 70% of the vote in each of the wards. In six of these wards, white people only formed a plurality, but the DA was still comfortably the largest party in each ward.

Black-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are black***
49	92.3%	4.3%	99%
62	79.7%	12%	98.3%
64	78.8%	13.5%	96.3%
65	27.4%	7.1%	97%
91	45.9%	50.8%	61.9%
107	78.5%	10.3%	98.5%

Ward 49

This was the ward in which the ANC enjoyed its best performance. Here the party won 92.3%, while the DA won 4.3%. Some 99% of the ward's residents were black people.

Ward 62

In this ward the ANC won 79.7% of the vote, with the DA winning 12%. The proportion of black people in the ward was 98.3%.

Ward 64

Of the wards in the municipality where black people made up more than 95% of the population, this ward saw the DA's best performance – with the party winning 13.5%. The ANC secured 78.8% in this ward.

The proportion of black people in the ward was 96.3%, while coloured people accounted for 1.2%.

Ward 65

This was the only ward in the municipality which had a black majority of 95% or higher, but the ANC was not the biggest party. Here the ANC won only 27.4% of the vote, behind the IFP at 38.9%. The NFP won a quarter of the vote (25.1%) and the DA managed 7.1%.

Black people accounted for some 97% of residents, with the proportion of coloured, Indian, and white people or being one percent or just below.

The fairly good showing in the ward by the IFP (and to a lesser degree, the NFP) is likely because of the large number of Zulu speakers in the ward. Seventy-two percent of the ward's residents had Zulu as a home language, far higher than the proportion of Zulu speakers in Johannesburg, where only 23% of people speak it as a home language (still enough to make it the biggest single-language in the city). The ward also incorporates the industrial areas of Denver and Benrose, which includes hostels which historically housed migrant workers. These hostels still exist and it is likely that they still house migrant workers from KwaZulu-Natal (Berkowitz, 2015). Furthermore, 60% of the ward's residents were born in KwaZulu-Natal. Only eight percent of Johannesburg's residents were born in that province (with just over half having been born in Gauteng) meaning that it is very likely that the IFP's fairly good performance came from the support of migrant workers, originally from KwaZulu-Natal.

Ward 91

The DA was the biggest party in this ward, although there was a fairly large black majority in the ward. Black people accounted for 61.9% of the ward's population, while the DA secured 50.8% of the vote. The ANC managed 45.9% of the vote. The second-biggest population group in the ward was white people, who accounted for 28.7% of the ward's residents, while Indian people accounted for six percent.

Ward 107

This was another ward with a large black majority, where the DA did relatively well, with 10.3% of the vote. The ANC won 78.5% of the vote here. The proportion of black people in this ward was 98.5%.

Indian-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are Indian*
9	35.9%	54.7%	77.7%

Ward 9

Indian people formed a majority in this ward – the only one in Johannesburg in which this was the case. Indian people accounted for 77.7% of the ward's residents, with black people making up 17.1% of the ward's population. The DA was the biggest party in the world, but not significantly so, winning 54.7% of the vote. The ANC had a strong showing here, at 35.9%.

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*
17	26.4%	67.9%	62.8%
82	27%	67%	57.5%

Ward 17

This ward was one of the three in Johannesburg where coloured people formed a majority. The DA was the most popular party, with 67.9% of the vote, while the ANC secured 26.4%. The proportion of coloured people in the ward was 62.8%. Black people accounted for 34.5%.

Ward 82

Coloured people formed a majority in this ward, at 57.5%. Black people accounted for just over a quarter (25.9%), while white people also formed a fairly significant minority, at 12.1%. The DA was also the most popular party in the ward, winning 67% of the vote. The ANC won just over a quarter of the vote, at 27%.

Indian-plurality wards

Ward 58

This was a mixed ward with a plurality of Indian residents, who accounted for 42.7%. Black people were the second-largest group in the ward, at 37.1%. Coloured and white people accounted for 7.7% and 6.6% of residents respectively.

The DA was the biggest party in the ward, winning a plurality of 48.6%, while the ANC gained the support of 42% of voters.

White-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*
83	9%	86.8%	75.9%
126	10.6%	87.1%	62.9%

Ward 83

This was the ward with the highest proportion of white people in the municipality, accounting for more than three-quarters of the population, at 75.9%. The biggest minority were black residents, who accounted for 17.5% of the ward's residents.

As could be expected the DA performed well in the ward, with 86.8% of the vote. The share of the vote that went to the ANC was nine percent.

Ward 126

This was the ward in which the DA performed best in Johannesburg, winning 87.1% of the vote. The ANC managed 10.6%. White people accounted for 62.9% of residents, with black people making up nearly a quarter of the population (24.1%).

White-plurality wards

Ward 84

This ward was a fairly mixed ward. White people formed a plurality, at 39.3%. Black people were the second-largest group at 34.6%. The proportion of coloured people was 19.7%, while Indian people made up 5.4%.

The DA was the most-popular party in the ward by some margin, at 74.1%, while the ANC managed to win 21.7%.

MANGAUNG

Mangaung was also a fairly safe ANC municipality in the 2011 election, but did not buck the general trend, with the ANC losing support between 2006 and 2011. In the ANC was 72.7% of the vote in the city, with the DA securing 16.2%. In 2011 the ANC's support had fallen to 66.6%, while the DA had seen a fairly large increase, growing to 26.8%. No other party had significant levels of support, with COPE managing 3.3% of the vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p109).

Between 2006 and 2011 the number of seats available in Mangaung grew from 89 to 97. The ANC's seat share remained static at 65 in both elections, with the number of DA seats growing from 15 to 26.

Of the 49 wards in Mangaung, there were 32 where black residents made up more than 95% of residents. The ANC was comfortably the largest party in each of these wards, securing above 90% of

the vote in 12 of these wards. With the exception of three wards, the ANC managed above 80% in each of the wards. In two wards the ANC share of the vote was 73.4% and 78.9%. In one ward (39) its vote share fell below 60%, securing 58.9%. COPE achieved second place with 26% of the vote, while the DA managed 12.7%. This was one of only four wards where the DA managed to secure more than 10% support. Its best performance was in ward 40, where it secured 16.5% of the vote. In ward 41 and ward 43 it secured 10.3% and 13.7% of the vote respectively. In addition, in 11 of the 32 wards where black residents accounted for more than 95% of residents, the DA was pushed into third place, with COPE coming second to the ANC.

Three wards where black people formed a majority are analysed below. In the ward in which the DA did the best (ward 40 with 16.5% of the vote) income levels, education levels, and employment levels were all higher than in the other two wards where it performed worse.

There were also six wards where black people were a majority, but formed less than 95% of the population. The ANC emerged as the largest party in each of these wards, except for one. In the only ward in which the DA emerged as a more popular party than the ANC, the DA won 47.5% of the vote to the ANC's 45.6%. In this ward black people accounted for 73% of residents, with the largest minority being white people, accounting for 21.5% of the population. Whites accounted for a larger proportion of the population in a ward which the ANC won – ward 19. In this ward black residents accounted for 65.7% of the population, while whites made up 22.7%.

There were also two wards in Mangaung where coloured people were in the majority, with the DA and ANC each winning a ward. In the first ward (ward 16) coloured people accounted for the vast majority of the ward (83.3%). In the other (ward 47) the coloured majority was far smaller, at 52% (with black people accounting for 46.3%). In the first ward the DA won fairly comfortably, securing 57.7% of the vote, with the ANC managing 38.3%. The results were almost exactly reversed in the other coloured majority ward, with the ANC managing 56.5% of the vote, and the DA 38.8%. It would thus appear that although coloured people in general supported the DA in Mangaung, this was not overwhelmingly so.

There were nine wards in the municipality where whites either formed the majority or a plurality. In each of these wards the DA was the comfortable winner. In each of these wards the DA's vote share was above 75%. In the only ward where whites were a plurality rather than a majority – ward 20 – the DA won 81.0%. In that ward whites accounted for 48.5% of residents, while the proportion of residents that were black was 42.9%. This would again suggest that the proportion of whites voting was higher than those of black voters.

Black-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are black***
36	94.4%	2.6%	99%
39	58.9%	12.7%	97.5%
40	73.4%	16.5%	99%

Ward 36

This was the ANC's best performance in the municipality, securing 94.4% of the vote, with the DA managing 2.6%. Some 99% of the ward's residents were black people.

Ward 39

This ward was the one in which the ANC fared worst, where more than 95% of residents were black, with black people accounting for 97.5% of residents. The ANC won 58.9% of the vote here, while COPE secured 26% and the DA 12.7%.

Ward 40

In wards where more than 95% of residents were black, this was the ward in which the DA performed best. It secured 16.5% of the vote, while the ANC won 73.4%. COPE also performed well, winning just over eight percent of the vote. Some 99% of the ward's residents were black.

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are coloured***
16	38.3%	57.7%	83.3%
47	56.5%	38.3%	52%

Ward 16

This was one of the two coloured majority wards in Mangaung. In this ward coloured people accounted for 83.3% of the population, with black people being the largest minority at 15.2%. The DA won 57.7% of the vote, while the ANC secured 38.3% of support in the ward.

Ward 47

This was the only other ward in the municipality which had a coloured majority. Here coloured people accounted for 52% of the population, with black people making up 46.3% of residents. The ANC emerged as the most popular party in this ward, with 56.5% of the vote, while the DA won 38.8%.

White-plurality wards

Ward 20

In this ward white people formed a plurality, at 48.5%. Black people were the second-biggest group, at 42.9%. The DA did well in this ward, winning 81% of the vote, while the ANC managed 13.3%.

White-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents***

			that are white
24	6.3%	87.4%	79.6%

Ward 24

This was the ward in which the DA performed best in the municipality, winning 87.4% of the vote, while the ANC secured 6.3%. As the trends have shown thus far, it was primarily a white ward, with 79.6% of the ward being made up of white people. Black people were the largest minority at 16.4%.

NELSON MANDELA BAY

The Nelson Mandela Bay (NMB) municipality went from being a fairly safe ANC municipality to one where the party could barely retain a majority. In 2006 the ANC had managed 67.6% of the vote, but in 2011 this dropped by more than 15 percentage points, with its support falling to 52.1% in 2011. At the same time the DA's support leapt from about a quarter (24.1%) in 2006 to 40.2% in 2011. As in most other municipalities, no other party managed to secure significant support (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p109).

The number of seats available on the NMB council remained the same at 120 in both elections. In 2006 the ANC won 81 seats, with the DA winning 30 seats. In 2011 the number of seats the ANC won dropped to 63, with the number of seats in DA hands rising to 48 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p110).

Of the 60 wards in NMB, there were 28 where black residents accounted for more than 95% of the population. In each of these wards the ANC was easily the most popular party, with its support being above 80% in every single ward, with the exception of one. In this ward (ward 43), the party's support was 73.3%. The DA performed fairly poorly in these wards, only finishing second in one ward (ward 4), where it secured 5.1% of the vote, as against the ANC's 88.2%. COPE came second in all the other black-majority wards, with the exception of ward 43, where the PAC came second. Apart from ward 4, where it finished second with 5.1% of the vote, the party did not manage to secure more than four percent in any other wards. In ward 43 – where the ANC had its worst performance in majority-black wards in the municipality, the DA was only the sixth most popular party, finishing behind the ANC, COPE, PAC, African People's Convention (APC), and the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo).

There seemed to be little correlation between social indicators and the DA's performance.

In wards where black people formed a plurality or a majority of less than 95% the ANC was again the most popular party in all but one of these wards, of which there were eight. The DA's best performance in any of these wards was in ward 40, which had the smallest black majority. In that ward 52.7% of residents were black, with coloured people accounting for 19.7% of residents, and whites for just over a quarter. In that ward the DA won 53.6% of the vote, with the ANC securing 40.4% of the vote.

There were 15 wards with coloured majorities or pluralities in NMB in the 2011 election. In each of these wards the DA was the most popular party. Its support was above 60% in each ward with the exception of one ward. In this ward (ward 38) the DA won 47.7% of the vote, as against the ANC's

46.7%. Coloured people accounted for 51.1% of the residents of the ward, with black people making up a significant minority at 47.7%. There were two wards where the DA secured support of above 90%. In one of these wards coloured people were a plurality at 49.1%, with white residents being a significant minority at 38.6%. In the other ward where the DA won more than nine in ten of the votes cast, coloured people accounted for 89.3% of residents, with black people being the largest minority at five percent.

Two of these wards are analysed below. Although the proportion of coloured residents were similar (89.3% and 88.3%) there was almost a 20 percentage point difference in the DA vote proportions (93.8% to 74.4%). Social indicators were also broadly similar in the two wards, making it difficult to draw correlations.

There were nine wards where white people were the majority in NMB in 2011. The DA was, predictably, the most popular party in each of these wards, securing above 90% of the vote in seven of the wards. In one other ward it won 84.6% of the vote, while in the other it gained 57.8% of the vote. In that ward, whites formed only a plurality at 42.2%. Black residents (28.7%) and coloured residents (28.4%) made up significant minorities. In each of the other wards whites accounted for at least 60% of residents, except for ward 2. In this ward whites accounted for 51.9% of residents. Black people were the largest minority at 35.4%, but the DA still secured 84.6% of the vote.

Black-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are black***
4	88.2%	5.1%	97%
27	92.2%	1.2%	99%
43	73.3%	1.6%	99%

Ward 4

This was the only ward in the municipality where the DA won more than five percent of the vote and where black residents made up more than 95% of the ward's population. The ANC was still easily the biggest party in the ward, with 88.2% of the vote, with the DA managing 5.1%. COPE also performed fairly well, with 4.9%.

Ward 27

This was the ward in which the ANC performed best in the municipality, winning 92.2% of the vote. COPE was the second most popular party, securing 4.9% of the vote, while the DA gained the support of 1.2% of voters in the ward. Some 99% of people in the ward were black.

Ward 43

In wards where more than 95% of residents were black, this was the one where the ANC fared worst in the municipality. Here the party won 73.3% of the vote, with the DA winning 1.6%. The DA was

only the sixth-biggest party in the ward. The PAC, COPE, APC, and Azapo all won more votes than the DA in the ward. The PAC was the second-most popular party in the ward, with 8.7% of the vote.

Some 99% of residents in the ward black.

White-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are white***
2	12.5%	84.6%	51.9%
8	2.5%	96.2%	83.3%

Ward 2

This ward was one where white people were a small majority – at 51.9% - yet the party performed well, gaining 84.6% of the vote, while the ANC won 12.5%. Black people were the second-largest group in the municipality, accounting for 35.4% of residents.

Ward 8

This was the DA's best performance in the municipality, winning 96.2% of the vote, with the ANC managing 2.5%. White people formed a large majority in the ward, at 83.3%. Black people accounted for 8.8% of residents, and coloured people for 5.5%.

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are coloured***
10	3.8%	93.8%	89.3%
29	21.8%	74.4%	88.3%

Ward 10

The DA performed well in this ward, where coloured people formed a majority, making up 89.3% of the population. Black people made up five percent of the population. The DA won 93.8% of the vote, while the ANC managed 3.8%.

Ward 29

The DA managed 74.4% of the vote in this ward, which was a coloured majority ward. Some 88.3% of people in the ward came from that community, with black people accounting for 10.3%. The ANC was the second-biggest party, at 21.8%.

TSHWANE

Tshwane was one of the municipalities where the ANC's support was relatively low. In 2006 the party had won 57.3% of the vote, dropping to 56.5% in 2011. Over the same period the DA saw its support increase by eight percentage points, rising from 30.7% to 38.7%. No other party enjoyed significant support in the municipality (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p109).

The municipality saw a large increase in the number of seats available on the council. In 2006 there had been 152 seats, and this jumped to 210 in 2011. In 2006 the party won 87 seats, increasing to 118 seats in 2011. The DA saw its number of seats grow from 47 to 82 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2012, p110).

There were 52 seats in Tshwane were black residents accounted for more than 95% of the population. The trend seen thus far, remained the same – the ANC emerged as the biggest party by some margin. However, there were no parties to rival the DA as the ANC's main opposition. The DA was the second biggest party in all of these wards. In each of the wards the ANC's support was above 80%, with it managing above 90% in 28 of the wards. The DA only managed more than 10% of the vote in five of the wards, with its best result being 13.9% of the vote in ward 20.

Three of the wards where more than 95% of residents are black are analysed below. In two of these the DA secured more than ten percent of the vote, while in the other it secured only 2.5%. In the two former wards levels of income and education were significantly higher than the one in which the DA had performed poorly. This could again be evidence of growing class divisions and growing support among the black middle class for the DA.

In the single coloured majority ward in the municipality the DA was the largest party, winning 69.3% of the vote, in a ward where 74.4% of the residents were coloured.

Black-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are black***
3	46.6%	47.4%	64.3%
20	80.3%	13.9%	99%
25	94.9%	2.5%	99%
63	81.2%	11.8%	99%
92	45.4%	48.6%	73.5%

Ward 3

In this ward the DA emerged as the biggest party, despite black people forming a fairly large majority, at 64.3%. White people accounted for 27.4% of the ward's residents. The DA won 47.4% of the vote, just more than the ANC's 46.6%.

Ward 20

This was the DA's best performance in a ward where black people accounted for more than 95% of residents. Here the DA managed 13.9% of the vote, while the ANC won 80.3%. Some 99% of the ward's residents were black.

Ward 25

This was the ward where the ANC had its best performance in the municipality, winning 94.9% of the vote. The DA's share was 2.5%. The proportion of black people in the ward was just under 100%, at 99%.

Ward 63

This was another ward where black people accounted for more than 95% of the population (at 99%) and where the DA fared fairly well, winning 11.8% of the vote. The ANC secured 81.2% of the vote.

Ward 92

The DA was the largest party in this ward, beating the ANC by three percentage points, with 48.6% compared to the ANC's 45.4%. Black people formed a large majority in the ward, at 73.5%, with white people accounting for nearly a fifth of residents at 19.7%.

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are coloured***
43	25.9%	69.3%	74.4%

Ward 43

This ward was the only ward in which coloured people were a majority in Tshwane, accounting for 74.4% of the ward's residents. Black people accounted for just less than a fifth of the population, at 19.2%.

The DA was the biggest party, winning 69.3%, while the ANC managed just over a quarter of the vote, at 25.9%.

White-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are white***
54	5.2%	89.8%	82.5%
69	7.7%	88.4%	81.9%
98	18.2%	75.1%	57.1%

Ward 54

This was the ward in which the DA performed the best in the municipality, winning 89.8% of the vote, with the ANC gaining 5.2%. There was a large white majority in the ward, with 82.5% of residents being white. Black people were the second-largest group in the ward, at 13.4%.

Ward 69

This was another ward with a large white majority, at 81.9%. Black people were the second-largest group at 12.1%. The DA won 88.4% of the vote, while the ANC secured 7.7%.

Ward 98

This ward was one in which the DA performed fairly well, winning 75.1% of the vote, with the ANC capturing 18.2%. White people were a majority in the ward, accounting for 57.1% of residents, with black people accounting for a significant minority at 45.1%.

BY-ELECTION RESULTS

Between each local government election ward boundaries are changed to take into account changes in population. These boundaries are changed to ensure that the various wards have similar populations. This makes it difficult to do direct comparisons between wards over different elections, although it is still possible to draw conclusions from a single election. Nevertheless by-elections are held from time to time, due to various circumstances, such as the death or resignation of a councillor, or the expulsion of a councillor from the party that holds that particular seat (Independent Electoral Commission). These by-elections allow us to examine changes in party support, but while using census data to examine various demographic characteristics of these wards. Ward demographics will remain fairly static, and allow us to examine what wards where there were changes in party support had in common, in terms of demographics.

In the case of by elections, the ward selection criteria were different, dictated rather by whether the DA made gains or suffered setbacks in given wards relative to preceding nation-wide local elections, irrespective of whether these wards were located (and here the sample includes rural wards). [Perhaps explain why you didn't limit yourself to metro wards in the case of by elections]

As there are a large number of by-elections between municipal elections, with some being uncontested, this section will only focus on specific wards. As this dissertation's primary topic is the DA the focus will be on wards where the DA either gained a ward in a by-election, or lost one to another party. In addition, in the interests of brevity, only wards where the DA lost a ward to the ANC, or gained one from that party, will be considered (with the exception of two, noted below). In addition, in by-elections voters are only given one vote – for a candidate. In local government elections candidates receive two votes, one for their ward candidate, and another proportional representation ballot. Unlike the analysis of the cities, for this section on by-elections only the candidate vote will be considered. In the few by-elections where wards changed hands, it seems that local issues – such as the identity or race of the candidate – played some role in seeing wards changing hands, with national issues taking something of a backseat.

This sample includes rural wards, and is not restricted to metropolitan wards. This was to examine trends outside metropolitan municipalities, and to determine whether the broad findings in these municipalities hold true outside of South Africa's cities. Although an examination of rural wards as done with regard to wards in metropolitan areas is outside the breadth of this thesis, it is also important to examine trends and voting patterns outside the cities. Examining by-elections thus allows for this.

In each of these wards an attempt was made to determine what the issues may have been that led to a change in the party in control of the ward, but this was not always possible.

Between 2011 and January 2016 there were 21 wards where the DA either gained a ward from the ANC, or the ANC gained one from the DA. Of these, twelve were wards in which the seat swung away from the DA to the ANC. In nine of the wards the DA gained a ward from the ANC. One of these wards – ward 2 in Matzikama (Vredendal) – saw two by-elections held. In the first the ANC won the ward off the DA in the by-election held in 2012. Another by-election was again held in 2015, and again the ANC's candidate emerged as the winner.

Furthermore, two wards are included where an independent won the ward in the 2011 local election, and subsequently resigned, to contest the ward on a DA ticket. Both these wards were rural and 100% of residents are black and the DA performed well in each (in one case winning the ward). The good performance of the DA in wards where 100% of residents are black make them worthy of study.

The performance of major parties in the 2014 national election, are also provided to illustrate to what degree a party's performance in a by-election matched its performance in a general election in a particular ward.

7 September 2011

In Merafong City (Carletonville) the DA gained ward 21 from the ANC. In the local government election the ANC's candidate had won fairly comfortably with 55.3% of the vote, while the DA's candidate had secured 39.9%. In the by-election, the DA's candidate support jumped to 51.1%, while the ANC's candidate managed 38.1%.

Turnout in the local election had been 63.3% but this dropped to 44.8% in the by-election.

The majority of residents in the ward were black people, at 62%, with white people accounting for 30%, and coloured people for seven percent.

The ANC maintained its hold on the ward in the national election, securing 42% of the vote, compared to the DA's 38%, and the EFF's nine percent.

7 September 2011

In ward six in Cederberg (Citrusdal) the ANC won a ward off the DA. In the local government election the DA had managed 57.4% of the vote, while the ANC had won 37.4%. In the by-election the ANC secured a plurality with 43.9%, the DA with 39.4%, and the PAC with 16.8%.

Turnout in the local election was fairly low at 49.5%, but jumped to 56.1% in the by-election.

Coloured people formed a majority in this ward, accounting for 76% of residents. Black residents accounted for 13% of residents, while 11% of residents in the ward were white.

The by-election had been forced because the sitting DA councillor, William Abels, had defected to the ANC. He managed to hold onto his seat, but by a small margin. He won only 78 seats more than the DA candidate, out of over 1 700 cast.

The DA claimed that Abels had been a victim of 'Operation Reclaim'. This was allegedly an ANC 'plot' whereby DA councillors were bribed by the ANC to defect, and to force by-elections in 'strategic Western Cape local councils' (Democratic Alliance, 2011).

The DA was the biggest party in the national election. It won 49% of the vote in the ward, compared to the ANC's 33%. The Patriotic Alliance a party founded by a former gangster, Gayton McKenzie, and which aimed to draw support from coloured voters, won 11% of the vote.

5 October 2011

The DA gained ward 31 in Mogalakwena (Potgietersrus) from the ANC. In the local government election the candidate from the ANC had won 53.9% of the vote, while the DA's candidate came second with 38.2%. In the by-election the DA's candidate won 49.7%, while the ANC's candidate managed 46.8%. The rest of the votes were split between four other parties.

Turnout had been high in the local government election, at 61.2%, but dropped to 45.3% in the by-election.

Black people were a majority in this ward with 79% of people coming from this group. White people accounted for 20%.

In the national election the ANC remained the biggest party with 51% of the vote, against the DA's 31% and the EFF's nine percent.

7 December 2011

A by-election in ward 10 in Thaba Chweu (Sabie) resulted in the ANC losing a ward to the candidate from the DA. In the local government election the ANC had won a plurality with 39.2% of the vote, while the DA's candidate had secured 33.6%. An independent did fairly well, securing nearly a quarter of the vote (24.9%) of the vote. In the by-election the DA won 52.6% of the vote. The ANC was the only other party to run a candidate in the by-election, would became necessary because the previous councillor resigned.

Turnout was marginally higher in the by-election than in the local election, being 50.5% and 49.7% respectively.

The ward is one where black people form a fairly large majority, at 68%. White people accounted for 20% of the population.

Despite the DA's success in the ward, it remained firmly ANC in the national election, with that party winning 63% of the vote, to the DA's 27%.

15 February 2012

A by-election in ward 20 in Polokwane saw a ward change hands from the ANC to the DA. In the local government election the ANC had won a plurality of the vote with 47.7%, while the candidate from the DA had managed 41.1%. In the by-election support for the DA's candidate leapt to 62.9%, while for the candidate for the ANC it fell to 34.2%.

While turnout in the local election had been 52.2%, this collapsed to 24% in the by-election.

A majority of residents in the ward were black people, at 64%. Whites made up the largest minority, at 33%.

Another by-election was held in the ward in August 2014, when the councillor, Evelyn Wilson, was elected to Parliament, following the national election. In the second by-election the DA's candidate won 64.8% of the vote, while the ANC's candidate gained 35.2%.

Turnout was even lower in the second by-election, falling to 21.4%.

It is likely that the DA's two by-election victories could at least partly be explained by the low turnout. Research conducted by the HSRC in 2013 by the HSRC found that 88% of white voters had said they intended voting in 2014, the highest among any race group (Roberts and Struwig, 2014, p3). It is likely that high turnout in the national election would have been reflected in other elections, such as by-elections, and this could explain the DA's fairly comfortable win in the by-election.

The ward remained an ANC one in the national election, with the ANC winning 45% of the vote to the DA's 34%. The EFF won 11% of the vote. This would serve to lend support to the theory that white voters were more likely to vote when turnout is low.

19 September 2012

This was a by-election held in ward 88 in Cape Town, and saw the DA gain the ward from the ANC. In the local election the ANC candidate had won 42.6% of the vote, as compared to the 40.7% secured by the candidate from the DA. In the by-election the DA saw its support increase by more than ten percentage points, going to 52.5%. The ANC's vote also increased slightly, rising to 45.8%.

The ward's turnout in 2011 had been 56.3%, dropping to 40.7%. This would seem to support the theory that the DA's supporters are more likely to vote than those that the support the ANC.

In terms of demographics, the ward had a small black majority, with 56.3% of residents in the ward being black. Coloured people made up a significant minority, at 41.7%.

The by-election was held following the death of the ANC councillor. The ANC claimed that the low turnout had benefitted the DA, because their supporters had been more likely to vote. Xolani Sotashe, the ANC's chief whip in Cape Town, said that voting districts which had been won by the ANC in the past, had seen a decrease in voter turnout, while those that had been won by the DA had seen the converse (SABC, 2012). The race of the DA's candidate may have played a role in this. Pat Pietersen, the DA's candidate, is coloured, and may have benefitted from higher turnout in coloured areas. The ward was the only one out of Mitchells Plain's nine wards which the DA had not managed to win the 2011 election (Koyana, 2012).

It was likely that turnout played some role in the DA's victory. In the two voting stations in New Woodlands, a predominantly coloured area, turnout had been 49.1% and 49.4%. By contrast, in Philippi, an area with predominantly black residents, turnout had been much lower. For example, in the two voting stations in that area, turnout had been only 30.5% and 24.8%.

In the national election of 2014 the ANC was the biggest party, winning 51% of the vote, compared to the DA's 40%.

7 November 2012

A by-election in ward 2 in the municipality of Matzikama (Vredendal) saw a DA ward change hands, and swing to the ANC. In the local government election, the DA had won fairly comfortably, securing ten percentage points more than the ANC, managing 52% of the vote, against the 41.8% of the vote that the ANC candidate secured. However, in the by-election, the ANC managed to win 53.4% of the vote, with the DA managing 46.6%, with the ANC candidate winning 200 more votes than the DA candidate, out of nearly 2 400 votes cast. The DA and the ANC had been the only two parties to field candidates in the by-election.

Unusually for a by-election, it had a higher voter turnout than the earlier local government election, with 66.7% of voters turning out in the former, compared to 64% in the latter.

The ward had a large coloured majority, with nearly three-quarters of voters (74.9%) of residents coming from this community. Whites were the second largest group at 19.7%.

The by-election in the ward had been necessitated because the DA councillor, Delina Goedeman, had defected to the ANC, and stood in the ensuing by-election, running on that party's ticket.

Another by-election was held in this ward on 22 July 2015. The ANC managed to hold onto the ward, but only narrowly. The ANC's candidate won three more votes than the DA candidate, out of 2 343. The two parties had been the only two to field candidates. As in the previous by-election turnout had been fairly high in this poll, at 62.7%.

The ward turned out for the DA in the general election, with 52% of voters plumping for that party. Some 43% of voters supported the ANC in the ward in the national election.

30 January 2013

A by-election in ward 10 in Witzenberg (Ceres) saw the ANC win a ward off the DA. In 2011 the DA had narrowly won the ward, with 47.5% of the vote, against the ANC's 38.7%. In the by-election, the DA won only 23.4% of the vote, with the ANC winning 41.9% of the vote. An independent also performed well, gaining 28.9% of the vote.

This ward also saw a higher turnout in the by-election, as compared to the local government election, with turnout being 49.9% and 45.5% respectively.

In terms of demographics, the ward was a coloured majority one, with 71% of residents coming from this community. Black residents were the second biggest group of residents, at just over a quarter.

The by-election was necessary in the ward following the defection of the DA councillor, Piet Waterboer, to the ANC. He ran for his seat again, and retained it on the ANC ticket. Waterboer had been stripped of his DA membership following his failure to pay a compulsory monthly contribution, according to the DA's Western Cape leadership (Gernetzky, 2013).

Another by-election was held in the ward in February 2015. The by-election saw the ANC's candidate emerge as the winner, but with only a plurality. The ANC's candidate won 43.4% of the vote, while the candidate for the DA managed 29.4%. Two candidates also managed to secure more than ten percent of the vote in the ward. These were the candidate from the Democratic Christian Party, who won 11% of the vote, and an independent candidate, who won 12.9% of the vote.

The ANC was easily the biggest party in the ward in the subsequent national election, winning 65% of the vote, to the DA's 26%.

15 May 2013

This election, held in ward 18, in Umzimkulu, saw the ANC secure a seat from an independent. What made this election significant, is the increase in the proportion of the vote that the DA managed in the ward in the by-election, compared to the 2011 local government election.

The ward's demographics was 100% black.

In the local government election an independent councillor, Jabulani Goodwill Chiya, won the ward with 61.5% of the vote. The ANC's candidate had come second, with 37.5% of the vote. The DA's candidate won less than one percent of the vote. What is of significance is that on the PR ballot, the ANC had won 95.9% of the vote.

Subsequently Chiya joined the DA, forcing a by-election in the ward. In the by-election, only the ANC and DA put forward candidates. The ANC won the election fairly comfortably, with just over 72% of the vote.

Both the parties had worked hard at winning the ward, with the then-leader of the DA, Helen Zille, and the treasurer-general of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, Peggy Nkonyeni, campaigning on behalf of each of their candidates (SAPA, 2013). This was also reflected in the fairly high turnout for a by-election at 60.0%, only slightly lower than the turn-out in the local government election, which had been 63.7%.

In the 2014 national election the DA performed relatively well in the ward, managing 20% of the vote, against the ANC's 77%. Compared to the less than one percent of the vote the DA managed in the 2011 local government election in the ward, this could indicate that the by-election – where a fairly popular independent had run on a DA ticket – led to an increase in support for the DA.

22 May 2013

This by-election was held in ward 1 of Nama-Khoi, or Springbok. This was a gain by the ANC from the DA. In the local government election, the DA's candidate had won the ward with 49.8% of the vote, and the ANC secured 46.9% of the vote. Only one other party – COPE – had put up a candidate in the ward. In the by-election, the DA and the ANC were the only two parties to put forward candidates, with the ANC's candidate managing 58.3% of the vote.

This ward also had a higher voter turnout in the by-election, rather than in the general local government election, with turnout being 72.3% and 61.6% respectively.

The ward was a coloured-majority one, with 93.5% of residents coming from this group. White residents were the second-largest group at 4.3%.

There had been heavy campaigning in this ward for the by-election, which was reflected in the increase in turn-out. The likely reason for the focus each of the two parties had put on this particular ward, was because whichever party won the ward, would be in control of the municipality. Prior to the by-election, the ANC had held eight of the council's seventeen seats. The DA held six, and COPE three, and the two parties had governed the municipality in a coalition (Berkowitz, 2013a). The gain by the ANC of the seat, meant that that party would be able to govern the municipality.

The ANC was the biggest party in the national election by some margin. With its 56% of the vote, it had support of sixteen percentage points more than the DA.

7 August 2013

In this by-election in Ward 13 in Oudtshoorn, the DA gained a ward from the ANC. In the primary local election the ANC had won a plurality, at 48.7%, while the DA had managed 34.3% of the vote. The candidate from the Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA) won nearly ten percent of the vote. In the by-election, the DA's support jumped to 54.2% of the vote, with the ANC's dropping to 44.6%.

The swing could have been due to the identity of the councillor. The ANC councillor, Jurie Harmse, had defected to the DA, necessitating the by-election. He subsequently retained his seat in the by-election, on the DA's ticket.

Turnout in the local government election had been 59%. This dropped by ten percentage points in the by-election.

The ward had a large coloured majority, with more than 95% of residents being from this group.

The DA was by some margin the most popular party in the ward in the national election, at 59%, with the ANC coming second, with 32%.

23 October 2013

A by-election was held in Ward 5 in Makhado (Louis Trichardt). This ward was fairly unique, in that the DA's candidate won the ward after an independent had secured it in the 2011 election. However, the DA's candidate in the by-election was the independent candidate who had won the ward on his own ticket in 2011, Patrick Mazibuko (Berkowitz, 2013b).

In the 2011 election he had won 46% of the vote, compared to the 39.5% that the ANC's candidate had won. The DA's candidate won only one percent of the vote. In the by-election, Mazibuko won 38.5% of the vote, while the ANC's candidate managed 32.8%. COPE had also put forward a candidate, who managed just over a quarter of the vote, while the APC's candidate won just over one percent of the vote.

The ward's demographics are not mixed – 100% of residents are black.

In the 2014 general election, the DA won nine percent of the vote, against the ANC's 84%. It is thus likely that the DA's good performance in the ward was thanks, in large part to the candidate that they had put forward. In the municipality as a whole in 2014, the DA won only six percent of the vote, behind the EFF at seven percent, and the ANC at 83%. This would indicate that the DA's support is higher in that particular ward due to local dynamics, it is still not enough to make people change to the party in large numbers in general elections.

29 January 2014

A by-election held in Ward 4 in Matzikama (Vredendal) saw a DA ward change hands and go to the ANC. In the local government election the DA's candidate had narrowly won the ward with 38.8% of the vote. The ANC had won 37.2% of the vote. The candidates from two other smaller, little-known parties also performed well. The candidate from the New Generation Party won 13% of the vote, while the People's Independent Civic Organisation's candidate won eight percent of the vote.

The ANC's candidate won the by-election, but also with a small plurality. In the by-election it won 39.2% of the vote, while the DA secured 36.2% of the vote. The candidate from the Patriotic Alliance (PA), won 23.4% of the vote.

The swing in this election, was likely due to the identity of the candidate. In the local government election, the DA's candidate, Patric Bok, had won the seat. He defected to the ANC, managing to retain his seat, but under a different party banner (Berkowitz, 2014a).

Turnout for the local government election, and the by-election were very similar, at 57.3% and 56.9% respectively.

The ward had a large coloured majority, with 87.4% of residents coming from this population group.

The ANC was the most popular party in the national election, with 46% of the ward's support, compared to the DA's 36%. The PA did fairly well, with 12%, suggesting that McKenzie's party has at least some traction among coloured people.

19 February 2014

A by-election was held in eThekwini in ward 48. This ward changed hands from the DA to the ANC. The DA had won the ward fairly comfortably in the 2011 local government election, securing more than half the vote, with 53.3% of the vote. The ANC's candidate had only been the third most popular candidate in the ward, gaining 15.5% of the vote. The candidate from the MF had emerged as the second most popular candidate in the by-election, with 26.3% of the vote. In the by-election the ANC's candidate won 43.6% of the vote, while the candidate from the DA managed 41.7%. The candidate for the MF managed 11.9% of the vote, suffering a large drop in support as compared to the local government election. Turnout in the local government election had been 57.2%, compared to the 36.1% in the by-election.

This by-election was another necessitated because the ward councillor changed parties, in this case switching from the DA to the ANC. Roy Moodley managed to retain his seat after changing parties,

although his margin of victory was not very large, with only 108 votes separating him from the DA's candidate (Sussman and Berkowitz, 2014).

The ward was one where the majority of residents were of Indian origin, with 77.4%. The second largest group in the ward were black people, who accounted for nearly 20% of the population.

Of interest, is that Moodley's colleague, Ronnie Veeran, had also defected to the ANC from the DA, but he had failed to retain his ward – ward 49. In the local government election he had easily won his ward with 57% of the vote, but running on an ANC ticket he managed only 30% of the vote, with the DA candidate winning 51% of the vote, and the MF 15% (Sussman and Berkowitz, 2014). This ward had an even bigger Indian majority than ward 48 (with 90% of residents being of Indian origin). The other indicators in this ward were fairly similar to ward 48's, with 48.8% of residents being employed, 64% of residents earning R6 000 a month or less, and just under half (49.7%) having a matric qualification.

The DA may also have had stronger party loyalty in ward 49 than in ward 48. In ward 49, in the national election, 74% of voters had supported the DA, compared to only 58% in ward 48.

2 July 2014

A by-election in ward 58 in Johannesburg, was a gain for the ANC from the DA. The DA's candidate had narrowly won the ward in 2011, with a plurality, gaining 48.7% of the vote. The ANC's candidate had won 41.9% of the vote. In the by-election the ANC secured an even lower proportion of the vote, at 33.6%, but this was still enough for its candidate to be the most popular. The DA's candidate won 31.9% of the vote, with an independent, Rickey Nair, winning 27.3% of the vote.

Turnout had been fairly low in the local government election, at 48.8%, but this dropped to 22.2% for the by-election.

Indian residents formed a plurality in the ward, at 42.7%, with black people accounting for 37.1% of those resident in the ward.

The by-election was necessary because the sitting DA councillor had defected to the ANC. The councillor, Osman Cassiem, did not stand as the ANC's candidate however. It was not clear why the ANC's candidate won the ward, but some community members indicated that a perceived lack of service delivery had seen voters changing their allegiance. In addition, a number of community members indicated that the ANC had enjoyed the support of Muslims in the ward, because it was perceived as a party which supported Muslim causes around the world, notably that of Palestine (Mzolo, 2014).

In the 2014 national election the ANC was narrowly the largest party, with 43% of the vote, compared to the DA's 37%.

13 August 2014

This by-election – in ward 40 in NMB – saw the DA lose a ward to the ANC. The DA's candidate had won the 2011 election fairly convincing, with 53.8% of the vote. The ANC's candidate came second with 39.8%. In the by-election the ANC saw its support grow to 50.6%, while the DA's candidate finishing narrowly behind, with 49.2%.

Turnout in the main local government election had been fairly high at 64.3%, with this falling to 48.2% in the by-election.

Black people formed a slight majority in the ward, at 52.7%. Whites accounted for 26% of the population, while 19.7% of residents in the ward were coloured people.

There were claims of dirty tricks in the ward, with a DA MPL, Bobby Stevenson, claiming that the ANC had misused state resources in campaigning in the ward. In addition, Stevenson claimed that the DA had been prevented from using a community hall which the party had hired for a campaign event (Stevenson, 2014).

The DA had been the biggest party in the ward in the national election, winning 47% of the vote to the ANC's 45%.

17 September 2014

The by-election in the municipality of Bitou (Plettenberg Bay) in Ward 7 saw the DA gain a ward off the ANC. In the local government election the candidate for the ANC had won fairly comfortably, with 52.5% of the vote, while the DA's candidate had secured 39.2%. By contrast, in the by-election, the share of the vote that went to the DA candidate was 53.9%, while the ANC's candidate won 46.1%.

Difference in turnout between the two elections was fairly minimal. In the local government election turnout had been 74.6% and dropped only marginally to 72.4%.

Coloured people formed a plurality in the ward, at 41.2%. Other large minorities in the ward includes black people (25.5%), white residents (14.2%), and people who had classified themselves as 'other' during the census (18.5%).

Education levels were also relatively low in the ward, only 34.7% of residents had a matric qualification or higher.

The by-election had been called when the ANC's councillor had resigned following attempts by the party to serve a motion of no confidence on Bitou's mayor, Memory Booysen. The municipality had been governed by a DA-COPE coalition, and this by-election victory allowed the DA to govern the town alone, holding seven of the 13 council seats (Stander, 2014). The DA's win may have been a reaction to what was seen as petty politicking by the ANC in the town (Hampton, 2014).

In the 2014 election, the DA had marginally been the most popular party, winning 47% of the vote to the ANC's 46%.

17 September 2014

This by-election in ward six in Tswaing (Delareyville) was a gain for the ANC from the DA. The election had been close in 2011, with the candidate from the DA securing 49.6% of the vote, while the ANC's candidate had won 47.3%. In the by-election the ANC's candidate's share of the vote jumped to 61.6% of the vote. The DA was the only other party to field a candidate.

Turnout in both the elections was similar – going from 59.7% in the local government election to 55.5% in the by-election.

The demographics in this ward were unique for one in which the DA performed well – 99% of residents in the ward were black.

In the 2011 election the DA had fielded a candidate, David Malo, who according to the leader of the DA in the North-West, Chris Hattingh, had practically 'run his own campaign' (SAPA, 2011). Malo was a former ANC member who had run as a DA candidate, after joining the party as an ordinary member (Zille, 2011). This would seem to indicate that some of the party's success in the 2011 election was due to the candidate, and not necessarily because of the DA's brand.

In the general election in 2014, which was held in May – before the September 2014 by-election – the ANC won 78% of the vote in the ward, while the EFF came second with 10% of the vote, and the DA third, with nine percent. This was still the DA's best performance in any ward in the municipality where more than 95% of residents were black. The DA won only above five percent of the vote in only one of the other seven wards in Tswaing. This would seem to indicate that there was still some residual loyalty to the DA, as compared to other wards. In addition, the DA's performance in the by-election (where it won nearly 40% of the vote) also shows that voters may be more willing to vote for an opposition party on local level than at national level.

26 November 2014

A by-election in Ward 2 in Inkwanca (Molteno) saw the DA gain a ward from the ANC. In the local government election the ANC had managed to win 51.8% of the vote, with the candidate from the DA securing 38.4%. In the by-election the DA saw the support for its candidate jump to 51.4%. while the ANC's candidate managed 40.7% of the vote.

Turnout in both polls had been high. In the local government election it had been 67.1%, while it had been 60.1% in the by-election.

Black residents accounted for the largest group in this ward, at 66% of the population. White people were the second-largest group at 19%, while coloured people accounted for 13%.

This by-election had been necessitated because the council had been dissolved following a forensic report which found that maladministration, fraud, and corruption, was widespread in the municipality (Magubane, 2014).

By-elections were held in each of the council's four wards, which had all previously been held by the ANC. Only ward 2 saw a change in party. In two of the other wards the ANC's support held steady, but in ward 3 in the municipality it dropped from 78% to 53%, with turnout dropping only marginally, from 70% to 66%. COPE had been the most successful challenger, winning 39% of the vote (Berkowitz, 2014b).

The ANC had won 56% of the vote in the national election, while the DA had secured 32%.

30 September 2015

This by-election was a gain from the DA by the ANC, and was held in ward 11 of Theewaterskloof (Caledon). The candidate from the DA had emerged fairly comfortably as the winner of the ward in the local government election, with 55.9% of the vote. The ANC's candidate secured 37.2% of the vote. The by-election saw the ANC's candidate win 50.5% of the vote, while the candidate from the DA managed 46.7%.

Turnout for the 2011 election had been 51%, dropping marginally to 49.6%.

Coloured people were the majority of residents in the ward, at 53.2%, with black people accounting for 39.2% of people resident in the ward.

The seat had become vacant after the sitting councillor had died (Quintal, 2015). This was the second by-election held in the ward since the 2011 election. In the first by-election – held in April 2012 – the DA had only barely held onto the seat, winning 52% of the vote. The margin of victory was just 100 votes, out of nearly 2 600 cast (Berkowitz, 2012).

The ward is in the town of Grabouw, which in 2012 had been the scene of violent service delivery protests, often broken down on racial lines (Berkowitz, 2012).

The DA had maintained its status as the most popular party in the ward in the 2014 national election however, winning 47% of the vote to the ANC's 45%.

Results

From the above it is clear that the most reliable indicator of whether a ward is likely to go to one or another party is that of race, particularly in the eight metropolitan municipalities. Wards with large black majorities almost always returned a candidate from the ANC, with a few exceptions. In general, the only parties whose candidates managed to outpoll those of the ANC in wards in which there were large black majorities, were those from the IFP and the NFP (and even this was a rare occasion). This would also suggest that ethnicity and language plays at least some part in the way in which people vote. However, this is likely to only have been relevant in areas where Zulu-speaking form a significant number of residents. Although language was not a focus of analysing voting results for this thesis it is fairly likely that in wards in which the IFP and NFP performed well, included a large proportion of Zulu speakers. For example, the only ward that returned an IFP councillor in Johannesburg in 2011 was one in which the majority of residents were Zulu speakers and from KwaZulu-Natal. This implies that they were migrant workers from that province, and more likely to vote for a party that has traditionally been a Zulu-interest party.

Of the wards analysed the DA emerged as the largest party in a number of wards where black people were the majority. However, in all these wards other groups – coloured people, Indians, or whites – formed fairly significant minorities. In South African elections minority groups (especially white people) tend to turn out to vote in higher numbers than black South Africans, and this is likely to have had an influence on voting results in this ward. In wards where black people accounted for more than 95% of the population the ANC emerged as the biggest party in nearly every ward (except ward 39 in Ethekwini, where the IFP was the most popular party). The DA did not have significant support in any of these wards. However, nor did any other political party, with the occasional exception of the IFP and NFP. However, as noted this is likely to do with the status of these parties as Zulu-interest parties.

A similar pattern holds true for parties in which white people formed large majorities. In all wards in which whites formed significant majorities the DA was easily the largest party, while in wards in which white people formed a plurality the DA was also generally the largest party. In a number of wards in which white people formed relatively large minorities, the DA again often emerged as the largest party.

In wards where coloured or Indian people accounted for the majority of residents, the DA again was generally the largest party. The DA majorities in these wards were generally not as high in wards with large white majorities, but the DA was more likely to emerge as the biggest party in wards in which coloured or Indian people formed the majority. In the eight metros, there were 70 wards where the majority of residents were coloured people – the DA was the biggest party in 69 of these wards. In addition, in the metros there were 21 wards in which Indian people accounted for the majority of residents. In these wards the DA was the largest party in 17 wards, while the ANC was the largest in only two. The MF was the most popular party in two other wards.

In the eight metros race was still the best predictor of which party was likely to emerge victorious. As noted, all wards with white majorities saw the DA emerge as the biggest party. This also occurred in coloured- and Indian-majority wards with the DA emerging as the biggest party in nearly all these wards. In wards where black residents accounted for large majorities (of 95% or more) the ANC was also always the biggest party (with one exception, as noted).

There were a number of outliers in wards where black people formed majorities (but making up less than 95% of the ward's population) with the DA emerging as the biggest party in some of these wards. Although it is likely that the DA has gained some traction among black voters (some wards with large black majorities saw the DA win ten percent or more of the vote) it is more likely that this could be attributed to a higher turnout among white and other minority voters than any major breakthroughs for the DA among black voters. Research by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 2005 showed that black voters were more likely to abstain from voting if they were dissatisfied with their preferred political party. Coloured, Indian, and white voters would generally vote for another party if they were not happy with the performance of their preferred political party. The report by the HSRC notes that '(d)isillusionment with preferred parties would therefore lead to a lower voter turnout rather than a voter shift amongst a large proportion of specifically the African population' (Kivilu *et al*., 2005). Further research conducted in 2013 by the HSRC found that 88% of white voters had said they intended voting in 2014, the highest among any race group (Roberts and Struwig, 2014, p3). It is likely that the trend would have been similar in 2011. This report showed that this was likely the case for the DA's win in ward 33 in Ekurhuelini in 2011, as well as the DA's success in a by-election in ward 88 in Cape Town.

However, the DA's good performance in some wards where the demographics were 100% black (winning wards in Makhado and Tswaing and doing well in some metropolitan wards) for example, shows that black voters may be increasingly viewing the DA as a realistic option. These wards are rare and are certainly still the exception.

From the above ward analysis it does seem that in wards where more than 95% of residents are black, the DA did tend to perform better in those wards with higher levels of income, education, and employment. This could be an indication of nascent class cleavages among black voters, but it is still too early to tell whether this trend will continue.

Although race seems to be the primary indicator of which party a ward will likely support in the metropolitan municipalities, this did not hold true in the by-elections that were not held in a metro. Of the 20 by-elections, three had been held in a metro – in each of these the ANC gained a ward off the DA. One of these was a ward where black people formed a majority, while in another Indian people formed a plurality, and Indian people formed a majority in the final metropolitan ward.

Nine of the by-elections were held in wards where coloured people were in the majority, with seven of these wards seeing a gain of a ward for the ANC from the DA. There were also seven by-elections held in wards where black people were in the majority – five of these wards saw the DA gain a seat from the ANC.

Although these samples are too small to make any solid judgements, it would appear that the dynamics in non-metropolitan areas may be different than in metropolitan wards areas.

This could be seen in the fact that the DA secured ward six in Tswaing. In this ward, 99% of the population was black. The DA had not come close to winning a ward with such a high proportion of black voters in any of the metropolitan municipalities. Although the DA lost the ward in the subsequent by-election it still won nearly 40% of the vote in that by-election. This will have been an encouraging sign for the party, and could be a sign that it is breaking through in black communities.[vii]

It is not clear what drove the electoral dynamics in these by-elections but local issues were very likely to have played a role. The correlation between race was not as clear as in metropolitan municipalities, nor was there a correlation on the other indicators, such as income and levels of education and employment. It does seem that the impact of personalities and individual candidates may have played a significant role in these by-elections. This is also evident from how the victorious party in a by-election, did not emerge as the largest party in the national election. For example, the ANC's candidate may have been the winner in a by-election, but the DA would have been the largest party in the ward, meaning that residents may change their vote, depending on whether they are voting on local or national issues.

CONCLUSION

From the above it would appear that the theory of the racial census does appear to broadly hold true, and South Africa's election results since 1994 it is clear that race is still a salient issue in the way people vote.

It is clear that if one examines the results more closely it seems that racial voting patterns are not as rigid as they first appear.

The DA is still, by some margin, the party of choice among white voters, and the ANC – generally – the party of choice among black voters. The DA also appears to be, as has been noted above, the party of minorities. As the data above shows coloured voters support the DA in relatively large numbers, at least in metropolitan areas. It is also relatively popular among Indian voters, although voting patterns among this group do seem more fluid.

It is clear that the DA has gained some traction among black voters. Between 2009 and 2014 its share of the vote increased by five percentage points, and its total number of votes went up by one-million votes. It is highly unlikely that this increase came only from coloured, Indian, and white voters, as voters from South Africa's other minority communities overwhelmingly (especially in the case of white voters) supported the DA prior to the 2014 election. The DA's own estimates show that it won close to 90% of the white vote in 2014 and nearly 70% of the coloured vote in 2009 (Ensor, 2014), meaning that these communities are very close to a voter ceiling for the DA. Schulz-Herzenberg (2014c, p4) estimated that the proportion of black people voting for the DA increased from one percent to six percent between 2009 and 2014. The party's internal research also showed that since the election Mmusi Maimane as the leader of the party the proportion black voters who considered themselves 'firm' DA supporters also increased.

The DA performed well in a number of wards where more than 95% of residents were black. For example, it won a quarter of the vote in ward 32 in Buffalo City; 13% of the vote in ward 64 in Johannesburg; 16.5% of the vote in ward 40 in Mangaung, and 13.9% in ward 20 in Tshwane. These wards where the DA does well do have higher levels of social indicators than in other wards, pointing to possible growing class divisions among black voters.

The party's performance in ward six in Tswaing, where it won a ward where black residents accounted for 99% of the population (but fairly low social indicators), is also a clear indication that the racial census theory may no longer hold water.

However, it does seem that the DA will face a number of issues as it continues to try to gain black voters. A number of critics have argued (such as Gareth van Onselen and James Myburgh) have argued that the party's support of policies such as black economic empowerment are at odds with the liberal traditions of the party. Others – such as Michael Cardo – argue that racial redress is not inimical to the principles of liberalism. These internal battles may become more pronounced as the DA deals with the consequences of growth, as well as becoming something of a 'big tent' party.

As noted above, the role of class also seemed to have played a role in how the DA performed. Although the DA generally did well in wards with high levels of income and education, these were also wards with high proportions of white voters, which explained the DA's success. As noted, research conducted by Everatt and Ngoma showed that black professionals or members of the black middle class were fairly suspicious of the DA.

Research conducted by Everatt and Southall seems to indicate that people on lower incomes are more likely to consider voting for the DA than those on higher incomes. This is contradicted by findings from Robert Mattes, but it is certainly an area worthy of further study.

Research conducted by Habib and Naidu, and referenced above, also found that coloured and Indian voters on lower incomes were more likely to vote for what could be considered 'white' parties in 1999. Work done by Seekings showed a similar trend with coloured people on lower incomes less likely to vote for the ANC than those on higher incomes. The racial and class dynamics of how people are likely to vote are far more complex than they appear at first glance.

In addition, the performance of the DA in ward six in Tswaing for example (along with other wards such as ward 5 in Makhado), gives further impetus to the theory that those on lower incomes may

be likely to vote for the DA. Residents in these wards had very low levels of income and education, yet plumped for the DA, whether in 2011 or in subsequent by-elections.

Evidence from this report seems to give tentative indications that black people living in metropolitan areas, who enjoy higher levels of social indicators may be more likely to vote for the DA, but it is clear that more research is needed. It may be that these voters may not be 'middle class' as traditionally defined, but are more likely to be blue-collar workers with fairly steady income and employment, at least compared to other residents in their wards. This would fit in with Everatt and Ngoma's research that shows that black professionals are fairly sceptical of the DA, while supporting Southall's hypothesis, that the black middle class would remain fairly loyal to the ANC, while the DA's support 'may have come from the lower rather than the core segments of the black middle class'.

What is clear is that voting patterns, particularly among black South Africans, are certainly not as rigid as they appear at first glance.

Evidence from by-elections shows that the coloured vote in non-metropolitan areas, is particularly fluid. Whereas the vast majority of metropolitan wards where coloured people were the biggest population group saw the DA emerge as the biggest party, this was not the case in non-metropolitan wards. In general, incomes and level of education in these non-metropolitan coloured wards were lower than those in the cities, yet the ANC tended to fare well, often beating the DA in by-elections.

A further area of study could be to investigate the performance of the DA in wards with coloured majorities in metropolitan areas, against those that are in rural areas, or smaller towns. There seems to be an indication that there is an urban-rural divide amongst coloured voters.

Ethnicity also seems to have something of an influence in how people vote. This can be seen in the good performances by the NFP and IFP in Ethekwini (where people are more likely to be Zulu), and the relatively good performance by COPE in Mangaung (where people are more likely to be Sotho). In addition, there does seem to be evidence that EFF voters are more likely to be Pedi-, Tswana-, or Sotho-speaking. This is another area which is worthy of further study.

In conclusion, the race of people is still a fairly reliable indicator of how they will vote. Nevertheless, this is something that must be approached with caution. There is enough evidence to show that issues such as ethnicity, income, education, are whether one stays in a rural or urban areas are all strong influences of how people are likely to vote, sometimes unexpectedly so. The racial census model still broadly holds true in South Africa (at least among black and white voters) but it is clear that this is changing and South African voting patterns are likely to become more fluid, and less easy to predict.

This could be an indication that South African democracy is maturing, and voters in the country are prepared to switch their vote, if they judge it to be in their own self-interest. This has implications for democracy in South Africa – if voters are prepared to switch their vote that means governing parties – whether nationally, regionally, or locally – will need to be aware of the needs of the electorate. It seems that increasingly voters will not be able to be taken for granted which will only have positive implications, as parties will have to ensure that they provide good services and other goods for South Africans.

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APPENDIX – INCOME, EDUCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT LEVELS BY WARD

BUFFALO CITY

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
26	92.9%	2.1%	98%	8.8%	20.6%	27.2%
32	67.5%	24.4%	100%	9.9%	14.1%	14.1%
33	90.8%	1.4%	100%	8.5%	14.5%	15.5%

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*	*Proportion of residents that have an income*	*Proportion of residents with a matric*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*

				of R6 000 or higher	*qualification or higher*	
10	43.4%	49.3%	63.5%	32.5%	34.6%	35.2%
19	22.4%	71.8%	70.4%	39.8%	40.6%	44.4%

White-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
27	14.7%	81.6%	68.2%	63.5%	67.1%	62.4%

CAPE TOWN

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
35	88.6%	7.7%	95.3%	10%	33.3%	40.4%
38	93%	2%	99%	14.8%	37.1%	33.6%
98	95%	1.3%	99%	8.6%	35.6%	42.1%

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
12	8.3%	84.9%	92.4%	18.7%	29.7%	45.9%
24	10.8%	90.4%	92.7%	19.8%	23.2%	44.1%
29	24.3%	68.5%	93.5%	25.1%	31.3%	44.1%

White-plurality wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income*	*Proportion of residents with a matric*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*

				of R6 000 or higher	*qualification or higher*	
53	19.9%	75.8%	35.3%	61.9%	65.3%	58.4%

White-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
70	2.1%	95.6%	79.8%	79.9%	63.5%	58.4%
84	3.3%	94.2%	68.3%	63.8%	65.6%	62.7%
103	1.6%	95.6%	79.1%	78.1%	79%	74.6%

EKURHULENI

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
12	74.4%	3.1%	98%	19%	49%	44.5%
33	44.2%	45.6%	74.2%	28.4%	45.4%	54.2%
48	93.5%	2.4%	99%	18.5%	41.8%	37.7%
52	63.4%	2.9%	99%	8.4%	33%	42.9%
78	81.3%	8.3%	96%	30.4%	45.1%	42.6%
87	93.4%	3.5%	99%	12.7%	31%	35%
91	42.2%	53.7%	71.5%	56.8%	73.3%	63.2%

Coloured-majority ward

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
34	34.4%	58.4%	65.4%	24.9%	37.6%	37%

White-majority wardS

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
27	6.8%	88.8%	81.2%	72.4%	73.1%	72.1%
37	16.3%	80.3%	76.5%	70.6%	71.2%	69.6%

Black-plurality ward

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
39	27.2%	69%	46.4%	60%	62.6%	63.3%

ETHEKWINI

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
1	95.7%	2.5%	98%	17.6%	30.9%	25.5%
4	86.6%	5.4%	97%	14.8%	32.7%	28.4%
39	34.9%	1.1%	100%	7.3%	39.9%	43.4%
98	88.3%	5.3%	97%	24.6%	45.4%	33.9%

White-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
10	10.6%	86.9%	78%	71.9%	78.5%	72.3%

Indian-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents*	*Proportion of residents*	*Proportion of residents*	*Proportion of residents*

			that are Indian	*that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*with a matric qualification or higher*	*that are employed*
48	16.5%	55.4%	77.4%	35%	48.4%	41.7%
50	7.1%	47.1%	94%	42.7%	55.5%	50.5%
51	18.4%	36.5%	73%	11.3%	47.9%	42.9%

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
68	11.8%	63.2%	52.7%	41.6%	44.4%	38.4%

Black-plurality wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
33	22.9%	71.3%	45.2%	59.8%	68.3%	61.3%

JOHANNESBURG

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
49	92.3%	4.3%	99%	14.3%	40.7%	41.5%
62	79.7%	12%	98.3%	19.2%	51.4%	62.5%
64	78.8%	13.5%	96.3%	25.1%	57.2%	59.2%
65	27.4%	7.1%	97%	15%	43.8%	49.9%
91	45.9%	50.8%	61.9%	51.2%	63.6%	63.4%
107	78.5%	10.3%	98.5%	12.7%	43.7%	44.3%

Indian-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are Indian*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
9	35.9%	54.7%	77.7%	47.5%	55.5%	51.8%

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
17	26.4%	67.9%	62.8%	28.8%	34.9%	38.9%
82	27%	67%	57.5%	38.7%	42%	43.6%

White-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
83	9%	86.8%	75.9%	71%	76.4%	73.6%
126	10.6%	87.1%	62.9%	74.7%	80.2%	79.5%

Indian-plurality wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are Indian*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
58	42%	48.6%	42.7%	38.4%	52.4%	48%

White-plurality wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*

84	21.7%	74.1%	39.3%	60.8%	66.9%	66.1%

MANGAUNG

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
36	94.4%	2.6%	99%	6.2%	24.4%	29.3%
39	58.9%	12.7%	97.5%	18.7%	32.6%	31.7%
40	73.4%	16.5%	99%	39.5%	54%	38.4%

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
16	38.3%	57.7%	83.3%	35.8%	39.3%	43%
47	56.5%	38.3%	52%	56.3%	61.1%	55.1%

White-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
24	6.3%	87.4%	79.6%	64.8%	70.8%	67.4%

White-plurality wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
20	13.3%	81%	48.5%	65.5%	73.5%	51.2%

NELSON MANDELA BAY

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
4	88.2%	5.1%	97%	4.7%	26.9%	40.6%
27	92.2%	1.2%	99%	6.3%	22%	25.3%
43	73.3%	1.6%	99%	16.3%	32.5%	23.8%

White-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are white*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
2	12.5%	84.6%	51.9%	60.8%	69.9%	50.9%
8	2.5%	96.2%	83.3%	73.6%	78.8%	68.9%

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are coloured*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
10	3.8%	93.8%	89.3%	39.5%	41.3%	41.4%
29	21.8%	74.4%	88.3%	39.1%	42.6%	38.9%

TSHWANE

Black-majority wards

Ward	*ANC vote*	*DA vote*	*Proportion of residents that are black*	*Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher*	*Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher*	*Proportion of residents that are employed*
3	46.6%	47.4%	64.3%	61.5%	58.4%	54.4%
20	80.3%	13.9%	99%	33.5%	51.4%	38.6%

25	94.9%	2.5%	99%	12.6%	33.1%	36.8%
63	81.2%	11.8%	99%	27.5%	51.9%	50%
92	45.4%	48.6%	73.5%	55%	71.4%	47.1%

Coloured-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are coloured***	***Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher***	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
43	25.9%	69.3%	74.4%	43%	48.7%	54.1%

White-majority wards

Ward	***ANC vote***	***DA vote***	***Proportion of residents that are white***	***Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher***	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
54	5.2%	89.8%	82.5%	67%	72.7%	67.3%
69	7.7%	88.4%	81.9%	77.5%	84.1%	77.9%
98	18.2%	75.1%	57.1%	64.1%	68.5%	65%

WARDS IN WHICH BY-ELECTIONS WERE HELD – SOCIAL INDICATORS

7 September 2011 by-elections

Merafong City, Ward 21

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
38%	35%	54.3%

7 September 2011

Citrusdal, Ward Six

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
16%	23%	54.4%

5 October 2011

Mogalakwena, Ward 31

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
39%	50%	48.4%

7 December 2011

Thaba Chweu, Ward 10

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
20%	37%	60.4%

15 February 2012

Polokwane, Ward 20

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
71%	76%	66%

19 September 2012

Cape Town, Ward 88

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
36.2%	29%	41.5%

7 November 2012

Matzikama, Ward 2

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
36.3%	28.1%	50.7%

30 January 2013

Witzenberg, Ward 10

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
5%	12%	75%

15 May 2013

Umzimkulu, Ward 18

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
14%	12.7%	10%

22 May 2013

Nama-Khoi, Ward 1

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
28%	26.6%	37.7%

7 August 2013

Oudtshoorn, Ward 13

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
29.2%	34.9%	35.9%

23 October 2013

Makhado, Ward 5

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
35%	25.3%	10.5%

29 January 2014

Matzikama, Ward 4

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
20%	24%	51.3%

19 February 2014

eThekwini, Ward 48

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
22.4%	44.3%	41.7%

2 July 2014

Johannesburg, Ward 58

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
33%	42.4%	48%

13 August 2014

Nelson Mandela Bay, Ward 40

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
26.9%	34%	51.7%

17 September 2014

Bitou, Ward 7

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
18.7%	34.7%	52.1%

17 September 2014

Tswaing, Ward 6

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
7%	14%	17.3%

26 November 2014

Inkwanca (Ward 2)

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
23%	29%	50.2%

30 September 2015

Theewaterskloof, Ward 11

Proportion of residents that have an income of R6 000 or higher	***Proportion of residents with a matric qualification or higher***	***Proportion of residents that are employed***
30.8%	26.7%	46.6%

[i] For the purposes of this dissertation, the term 'black' will refer to people of African descent, rather than the generic term for people who are not white, as used by the South African government in official communication.

[ii] Prior to the 1999 election the NP had changed its name, adding the suffix 'New' to its name.

[iii] That is also why the local election held in 1995 and 1996 has not been included in this analysis as the majority of South Africa's municipalities did not exist in their current form in that election.

[iv] Defined for these purposes linked through race and language – such as Zulus or white Afrikaners.

[v] In South Africa – according to census results – the proportion of employed people was 39.4%, while 68% earned less R6 000 or less per month. The proportion of people who held a matric qualification or higher was 39.2%.

[vi] This and all other ward level data was sourced from a website, Wazimap, which broke down the census results by individual ward in South Africa.

[vii] However, it should also be noted that in the national election held in 2014 the ANC was the biggest party in Tswaing's ward six, and the EFF slightly outpolled the DA, securing ten percent of the vote, to the DA's nine percent.