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A WORLD OF NETWORKS: POWER, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND COLLECTIVE
ACTION IN BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITIES, 1945-1965

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To understand why the late 1960s saw the birth of a social movement able to shake the apartheid regime, it is necessary to take a new look at black politics in South Africa before 1965. Liberal accounts have described it as the triumphal advance of modern nationalism, while Marxist versions have presented it as the unfolding of the contradictions of a modern industrial economy and economic structure. Neither takes seriously the political and social lives of black communities or the semi-developed character of the South African state.¹ Indeed, they have all but ignored the hybrid structures and complex compromises that immobilized elites, the local networks for the control and mobilisation of the masses, or the parochial communications and identities that restricted the capacity to imagine political transformation, much less attain it.

This chapter will therefore look at the workings of the state and the nature of opposition movements in black communities, focusing on 1945 to 1965. It will successively consider state-society relations, the values and practices of organized opposition, the prevalent patterns of political culture, and the dynamics of collective action which they produced. The result is an image of black politics in South Africa quite different from previous structuralist accounts.

The argument here is that black politics before 1965 centered on the exercise of patrimonial power in black communities. The South African state had a weak center and strong periphery, where the lines between public and private were blurred in local networks of influence. These networks formed part of the active, complex social and political life of black communities, in which local elites wielded power through webs of clientelist relations. Cliques within the elites competed through these networks, based on control over resources and decisions in local government and civil society. But power also flowed from below, through the networks ordinary people established in their neighborhoods, hostels, and workplaces to get on with and make sense of their lives. Their members constantly negotiated with the elite over interests and identities. The professional middle classes, for their part, had corporatist bodies, which increasingly identified with popular causes. The whole set of personalized and particularist

relationships was underpinned by the narrow character of the public sphere, in which only a small, literate minority participated fully.

Organized opposition, principally the African National Congress (ANC), was marked by the same relationships and culture influencing the local state. With opposition politics only a small part of community life, even members of resistance groups stood in an ambiguous relation to authority, frequently participating in government-created institutions. As a whole, black political culture was fragmentary, assimilationist, and parochial, and marked by race, class, and ethnicity, with a weak sense of national identity. In this setting, although the socio-political order was undemocratic and repressive, it possessed significant legitimacy, both indirectly through the followings of local leaders and directly through the acceptance of Western values. Even resistance often mobilized through collaborative channels and patrimonial networks. This approach draws on writers on social movements in semi-industrialized societies who explain collective action through community and identity more than interest or structure.²

This description, and its underlying premises, contrasts with the images prevailing in the literature on black political society. The South African state is portrayed as a strong, modern bureaucracy, coherently implementing policy. Administration takes the place of politics. The foundations of power are institutional: state and economic structures and the class composition of black communities. Scant attention is paid local socio-political life, because local elites are seen as powerless puppets without influence or popularity. The black masses are acted upon, by organizations and structures, rather than actors, while the middle classes, capable of choice, are viewed with suspicion as "petit-bourgeois nationalists" and potential sellouts to popular struggle. The only organizations worth analysis are resistance groups, seen as having no serious competition in black communities. Indeed, resistance and collaboration politics are often treated as entities in opposition, retrojecting the 1980s into the 1950s. Political culture is largely ignored. The state is assumed to have had no legitimacy, and grievances are assumed to lead to action in the absence of structural barriers or penalties.

More generally, this chapter is intended to begin to re-politicize our understanding of the workings of authoritarian states and of change within them. States which are merely repressive have been confused with states which are strong (in the sense of possessing autonomy or commanding consensus). Discussions of authoritarian regimes tend to treat politics as

absent, when it just takes refuge in civil society. The existence of sources of power within subordinate groups, competition within subordinate elites, or their continual (if unequal) bargaining with dominant elites, also usually escapes notice. The same holds for the sources of power from below that reside in the organization of daily life, involving a mixture of acceptance, negotiation, and resistance. Finally, there is the dynamism of social and political movements when they, for a time, connect with the dynamism of civil society. By analyzing the political resources available to regimes and oppositions in this way, it becomes possible to understand the ambiguities that restrict challenges to a regime and a society's capacity or self-transformation. It also will allow us to discover in succeeding chapters how changes in the underlying parameters can make possible mass mobilization and regime crisis.

I. BLURRED BOUNDARIES: PUBLIC AUTHORITY, PRIVATE POWER, AND PATRIMONIAL RELATIONS

The overlap of public and private power shaped the social life of postwar black South Africa. It was founded upon linkages between traditional social relations and those of the capitalist economy and colonial state. The expansion of capitalist relations and state authority allowed the extension of patrimonial forms of relations with new resources. This was the origin of the clientelist state in South Africa, as in other Third World societies, where a weak center is linked to the periphery via local middlemen. Despite black elites' exclusion from the central political system, positions of influence in the local state and civil society provided bases for patronage power in their communities. Of course, the existence of such local power structures did not negate racial discrimination at the national level, which the apartheid laws tightened after 1948. Yet neither did an authoritarian racial oligarchy obliterate the vitality of black communities, expressed through formally "apolitical" institutions as well as official bodies. Rather, at the local level the South African state was to a considerable extent colonized by a strong black civil society, a relationship that let it function and enjoy some legitimacy.

By 1945, black South Africa was a complex, highly networked society in which the line between public and private relations was blurry indeed. Ties of family, kin, neighborhood, and ethnicity held wide sway. In the

bantustans (tribal reserves), where two-thirds (check) of the African population lived, chiefs and headmen possessed economic, political, judicial, and religious power. In the industrializing towns, where most Africans were temporary migrant workers or newcomers, homeboy networks linked them to their distant homes, while those settled in town formed new bonds with neighbors and workmates without forgetting older loyalties.³ Squatter camps, mushrooming as the the crowded "townships" reserved for Africans overflowed, were led by men who claimed chief-like powers over their residents. In the permanent urban black neighborhoods, an intertwined elite controlled political, religious, sporting, youth, women's, and welfare groups, whose followings often overlapped. Observing this situation in a township outside Durban, the country's second-largest city, Magubane commented that "the line between the political and the non-political is not easily drawn."⁴

Historically, the overlap between the public and private spheres in South Africa originated in the articulation of market and pre-capitalist social relations under a colonial regime of indirect rule. Conquest, taxation, competition, and conversion knitted together the capitalist and lineage orders. Chiefs and male elders dominated pre-colonial domestic or lineage society -- the economy of the extended family. They received the product and obedience of women and young men in return for land, mates, and ancestral wisdom.⁵ Larger clan and ethnic units were composed of pyramids of lineage segments. After white settlers conquered the South African interior during the nineteenth century, this way of life largely persisted in the reserves, though growing numbers of Africans worked on white farms. With the establishment of the world's greatest diamond and gold mines in the late 19th century, and surges of growth during the World Wars and Depression that pushed manufacturing ahead of mining, South Africa developed a semi-industrialized economy, on a par with Brazil or Argentina. As this occurred, labor for industry came to dominate the productive lives of Africans, when taxation and overcrowding pushed men out of increasingly impoverished reserves to the mines and factories. But their reproduction remained organized on lineage-type lines, even though new resources were being distributed through extended and redefined networks. In addition, Christianity became an important on the spiritual lives of communities formerly dedicated to ancestor worship.

The extension of lineage-type networks with industrialization expanded the nexus between public and private power, as did their absorption into the state and through indirect rule. Most laborers' families remained in the

reserves (13% of the land). They became increasingly dependent on wages remitted from town while living under chiefs holding administrative as well as ritual positions.⁶ Migrants to town re-established the familiar rural order through homeboy networks, while chiefs' relatives were prominent in the new urban middle class, since they could afford secondary schooling. Town dwellers sought houses, jobs, and other favors from such township "big men" with the ear of state or church authorities. As apartheid was implemented, the Africanization of township and bantustan bureaucracies extended the reach of their networks. Moreover, since most blacks were denied the parliamentary franchise, political competition among them was largely displaced into local, often formally private, arenas. Consequently, an elite of male elders, chiefs, and members of the middle class came to allocate both traditional means of subsistence and modern largesse on patrimonial lines. (In such relations, kinship could be real, fictitious, or metaphorical, as in the case of ethnic, religious, and neighborhood groups). As Bayart notes, far from disappearing as industry and cities grew, capitalism's expansion led to the expanded reproduction of lineage-type relations.⁷

As in other Third World societies, the networks linking public and private made South Africa a clientelist state: one in which clientelism was the principal means of administration, participation, and legitimation. In clientelist relations, personal dependency is based on the exchange of goods or protection from the patron for obedience or labor from a client connected by ascription or affection.⁸ In a poor, unequal state, the meagre resources left subordinate groups and the state's limited institutional capacity oblige it to deal with dominated groups via local-level elites who play the role of brokers between the center and their clienteles. Thus, Hofmeyr writes that in rural South Africa, "the Native Affairs Department could never properly institute the full exercise of depersonalized and distant control that a centralized, literate bureaucracy implies. The areas to be controlled were simply too huge, the people in these areas too numerous and too unwilling to be governed." Inevitably, chiefs and headmen possessed considerable power. Even in the townships, administration worked not just by laws and regulations but by informal understandings, often contrary to the rules. (For example, the brewing or use of alcoholic drinks was banned, but tolerated.) The discretion of white officials was thus considerable, providing leverage to black elite members with influence over them.⁹

A clientelist state is a "soft state," with a weak center and strong periphery, reflecting a balance of authority favoring local patrons over a

centralized, rule-governed bureaucracy.¹⁰ The power of middlemen resides in their control over resource allocation at local level, making them indispensable to their communities and the state. They describe their relation to their clients through traditionalist discourses (in Africa, in lineage-type terms) and their clients respond in kind seeking their help (accepting degrees their claims to varying degrees). Such a state, based on paternalism, reciprocity, and redistribution, recalls Weber's idea of the "patrimonial state".¹¹ Individuals' ties to the state derive indirectly from their positions as clients of their patrons, rather than directly as citizens. Political loyalty and participation is based on clan, tribe, area, or patron. Legitimation occurs through these subordinated social relations as much or more as through discourses of modernity and capitalism (freedom and equal exchange). To survive, weak states need strong foundations in civil society giving local elites bargaining power with the state.¹²

Yet while the roots of clientelism lay in civil society, the political positions black South Africans held, though subordinate, influenced the allocation of goods and the exercise of discretion enough to be power sources. In the reserves, chiefs, headmen, and councils of male household heads combined local economic, political, judicial, and religious authority.¹³ They distributed land, increasingly scarce, enforced laws (or allowed violations), and decided disputes. They also rendered important services: aid in getting pension or disability payments, permission to seek work in town, or help for young men to obtain *lobola* (bridewealth) and marry according to custom. Religious roles included sacrifices and other rituals to the ancestors, who had the clan's land, and sometimes witchcraft, too. Many chiefs were well-liked, but there was no mistaking the dependency of their subordinates. Kotze noted, "The structure of traditional social norms and patterns of behavior is still widely applied in tribal areas, and the chief, who is at the apex of this structure, still exercises large influence."¹⁴

Official township political institutions were modernized analogs of the patrimonial forms of rural society.¹⁵ Mimicking traditional institutions, Advisory Boards consisted of older, well-off men, elected by township leaseholders (male household heads).¹⁶ Like urban headmen, the boards allocated resources vital to residents: houses (in short supply), trading sites (the sole legal business premises), secondary school bursaries (gateways to the middle class) and access to municipal sport grounds (the only sites for clubs to play).¹⁷ They also helped residents negotiate the maze of over 100 permits and rules imposed by the white authorities, including those requiring passes (internal passports granting the right to live in town), and lodgers

permits. They could urge officials to tolerate or crack down on shebeens (illegal speakeasies) or home brewing of corn beer (migrant workers' preferred drink). They could report or ignore rent defaulters, numerous in poor communities. From the late 1940s, the ABs organized "civic guards" (anti-crime vigilantes). Most white local governments required residents to submit complaints and requests via the Boards, making them the sold channel for their concerns. And they advised the white councils on township development and rules. Studies of Advisory Boards termed them "brokers" and "go-betweens," the language of the literature on clientelism.¹⁸ Baines' work on Port Elizabeth made the point explicitly: "The highly personalized nature of administration of New Brighton facilitated the operation of a system of patronage and clientelism for the Advisory Board and their supporters."¹⁹

Local black elites could thus dispense patronage, despite their limited formal power, because they had influence. In rural areas, Mayer noted, "Much of the day-to-day administration ... fell to the headmen and sub-headmen, who tended to rely on the support of influential elders in their area." Much the same was true in urban areas. Atkinson reported that in East London, "board members could significantly influence the fate of black residents by offering advice to white officials." Coertze recounts that in Atteridgeville, outside Pretoria, applications for housing and trading sites were screened by AB members, then rubber-stamped by white officials. Nor were these cases unusual: Reyburn describes similar ones in Germiston, Benoni, and Springs, as well as Pretoria.²⁰

Of course, although black South Africans possessed some power, they were still oppressed, for whites had exclusive control of the central state and capital. After the National Party (NP) won the 1948 white election, racial segregation was tightened under its policy of apartheid. The NP was then supported almost exclusively by Afrikaners, descendants of Dutch settlers who formed three-fifths of the white population. Its base, predominantly white farmers, workers, and fledgling capitalists who shared their hostility to blacks, differed sharply in class and ethnic terms with that of the outgoing United Party (UP). The UP largely represented the less overtly racist English speaking minority of whites, including the bulk of the middle classes, and leading mining and manufacturing interests.²¹ NP discourse was marked by a crude white supremacism, contrasting with the UP's more urban segregationism.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, the NP government passed laws to tighten segregation, ensure a supply of cheap, unskilled black labor, despoil the

black middle classes, and control dissent. Apartheid's pillars included the Population Registration Act, which required a record of every citizen's race, and the Immorality and the Mixed Marriages Acts, which extended bans on whites having sex with or marrying Africans to coloureds and Indians as well. The Group Areas Act required each race to live and trade in separate areas and mandated removal of blacks from "white" areas. The "pass" laws, requiring African men to have internal passports stamped with approval before moving to town, were also applied to African women, extended to more cities, and enforced more strictly. Under the Bantu Education Act, the state took over the mission schools, the main source of education for Africans, expanding schooling but lowering standards. "Betterment" schemes to control overstocking in the reserves cost peasants cattle, needed for plowing and *lobola*, while restrictions on black businesses, artisans, and professionals in the cities grew. The parliamentary franchise of better-off coloured men on the white voters' roll, and the separate roll letting middle-class African men elect two members of Parliament, were abolished. The Suppression of Communism Act outlawed the Communist Party and let government restrict individuals and publications. The policies of discrimination, dispossession, and disfranchisement applied against the black four-fifths of the population deepened poverty, restricted social mobility, made official harassment a daily nightmare, and perpetuated a rigid political order more like a colony than an industrializing state. All this could not be effectively opposed by black South Africans in official political structures.

Nonetheless, despite their exclusion from the central state and the expansion of discrimination, black South Africans were not "powerless," even under the apartheid regime. The situation of South Africa's black elite was like that of the subordinate black elite in Hunter's "Regional City" (Atlanta), a fairly weak interest relative to the dominant white group, yet in a position of strength in its own community.²² In black communities, the local state thus represented both an object whose resources existing cliques coveted and a set of positions of power and influence allowing the formation or reinforcement of networks. By privatizing bits of public authority, black notables complemented the sources of power open in civil society and formed power bases at local level.

II. BETWEEN COMPROMISE AND RESISTANCE: CLIENTELISM AND CORPORATISM IN BLACK COMMUNITIES

In the context of clientelism, political and social life in black communities in the 1940s and 1950s looked largely inwards, centering on factional competition within local elites more than the struggle between black and white. Black politics was usually not oppositional; rather it involved working within state-established channels and civil society. It was based on the social networks linking leaders and followers, through which support was organized, interests expressed, and identities defined. In machine fashion, elites drew support from clienteles, drawing on both public and private resources. These relationships generated loyalty as well as support when the elite identified with the social networks that the rank and file had constituted in their own lives. The politics of the small but growing professional section of the black middle class contrasted, however. They, too, sought to privatize public power, but through corporate claims to equality, whose denial by apartheid encouraged them to identify with the nationalist cause. In general, the era was marked by a politics of ambiguity and unstable alliances, involving compromise more often than confrontation, focusing more on bread and butter issues than abstract legal principles.

The black elite's mediating role was established through various inter-racial relationships, but apartheid put these accommodations under growing strain. The "bonds in the color bar," as Gluckman called them, included the economy, Christianity, schooling, friendship, and political alliance.²³ After 1948, the tightening of segregation and total exclusion of blacks from the central state frayed many of the links between white and black elites. Understandings gave way to bitterness among black notables and professionals. (Prophetically, Gluckman wrote, "If these sorts of links are eliminated, black will deal with white only as authoritarian ruler and employer, always as an enemy, and never as an ally.")²⁴

Yet the networks honeycombing black communities were not simple instruments of domination from above. Crossing older values with new resources produced syncretic political relations and language, through which both elites and masses understood themselves. Beinart describes this in the rural areas:

"Chieftaincy provided the kind of institution and set of symbols behind which rural people could unite at a local level and stake claims to

land and communal rights. Such political and social expressions were of course traditionalist, rather than 'traditional,' their content was constantly shifting. Although rural consciousness took some of its referents from the past, it was shaped by, and sensitive to the new context of colonial rule and administration."²⁵

The same held for the urban elite. The result was to put black elites in an ambiguous position, permanently between compromise with and resistance to the white authorities. The consequence was an ever-shifting set of coalitions among sections of the elite, the black masses, and the administration.²⁶

Within black communities, political conflict was both shaped and moderated by the interlocking nature and shared backgrounds of the black elite. Studies show that a small upper middle class of businessmen, ministers, politicians, nurses, and independent professionals dominated township organizational life. The same people often led political groups as well as sporting, church, educational, and welfare organizations, the key groups in civil society.²⁷ For instance, Magubane presents a table displaying the links and organizational affiliations among Durban's African elite. Of 31 executive members of the Durban and District African Football Association, 14 sat on the local Advisory Board, 6 were active in the ANC (including its future President, Albert Luthuli) and 3 of them sat on the AB, 6 belonged to school committees, 2 were leaders of teachers' unions, and 4 were in other local organizations.²⁸ A typical middle-class leader mentioned by Pauw, Mr. X of East London, was a member of the Advisory Board and the school committee, an official of two sports clubs, a regular churchgoer, and had close friends in both the local ANC and the local chief's court.²⁹ (Among the Indian elite, Kuper reported members could play the role of "sponsors" or "patrons" in as many as 20 associations.³⁰) The strong links within the black elite reflected a variety of connections. These included social ties, common backgrounds and schooling, and ethnicity, as well as organizational, professional, and religious associations.³¹ Family and social connections also linked the rural and urban elites. "Nowhere was there a major clash between the tribal and educated elite," wrote Mayer of the Transkei. "What was typical were the various forms of alliances between them in the various districts."³²

While black-white tensions were present in the background, organized political life in black communities turned on factional competition within the local elite. Research on urban black communities documents how associational life was riven with conflict between middle class cliques.

Nyquist writes of "intense competition within voluntary associations among members of the upper stratum." Of 42 clubs he studied during a year in Grahamstown, four collapsed due to factional clashes, while two-thirds of the rest suffered serious internal conflict.³³ Factional divisions were usually based on personal bonds and competition for resources, not political lines.³⁴ In New Brighton township society, for example, the dominant force was a set of leaders active in the AB, the ANC, and the local Rugby Board. Personal rivalries led to a breakaway from the Rugby Board in 1956-58, healed only after the AB chair intervened.³⁵

The popular bases for elite competition were constructed upon patronage relations, although these ties were neo-traditional rather than strictly traditional. Though membership in the dominant group was based upon middle class position as well as traditional criteria of age, gender, and lineage, those on the bottom included workers, the poor, and squatters as well as women, younger men, and commoners. Moreover, status was not linked just to occupation but to participation in communal and redistributive activities.³⁶ While older forms governed the seeking of favors, the substance of such transactions involved the resources of the local state and organizations in civil society under the control of local elites. Yet the relations often were not the simple purchase of support; ties of clientage were also associated with genuine and even enthusiastic followings when they connected with the neighborhood networks residents had forged in everyday life. Examples included James "Sofasonke" Mpanza, beloved in Soweto from his rise as a squatter leader in the 1940s to his death in 1970, and George Thabe, Sharpeville's political and football supremo.³⁷

The most detailed study of the workings of township patronage and political institutions in this era is Coertze's work on Atteridgeville. He found that the most common patronage practice was promising houses for AB votes.³⁸ Supporters of opposing factions were also rewarded or punished through the allocation of beer brewing permits, vital income sources. (Housewives were asked, "Why did you vote for fools? You must promise now that you will vote for us next time, otherwise we shall not give you the recommendation paper" for beer brewing.) Shopkeepers supporting one group withheld scarce goods from opponents' supporters at election time, giving their own free sugar and corn. The differing factions had their own burial societies, youth clubs, and women's associations. Intimidation also played a part: civic guards, appointed among supporters of the AB members, were accused of harsh action against backers of the "outs."³⁹ The

effect of the various types of power AB members had was described by an interviewee:

"What the resident knows to be a fact is that it does not matter what reasonable request he may have to make from the Administration. If he is not 'in' with the Board, his case never receives consideration. Board members get anything they want in the nature of houses for themselves and their friends and relatives and followers."⁴⁰

Turnouts in Advisory Board elections were generally not very high, reflecting the low-participation, clique-based nature of the institution. In Atteridgeville, around 30% of eligible householders voted in elections for the Advisory Board in the early 1950s. Turnout jumped to 65% in 1955 and 79% later in the decade when elections were fought on contentious local issues.⁴¹ Similar levels of participation were reported on the East Rand. In the big cities with the largest politicized African middle classes -- Johannesburg, Durban, and Port Elizabeth -- turnout ran 10% or less, though there, too, hot local issues could push it up.⁴² Support was the result of personal ties to candidates.⁴³ But clienteles stretched well beyond the few qualified to vote for the AB, including household members and those linked to the elite by other ties. (Thus, in Port Elizabeth and on the East Rand, Advisory Board members chaired political bodies for those who could not vote for ABs.⁴⁴)

Sports clubs, the organizations with the largest followings (after churches) in black communities, illustrate how township patronage reached beyond the AB electorate into civil society. "Big men" of the community elite linked sport, patronage, and politics. The middle-class "patron-managers" funded clubs, offered transport, and obtained grounds, receiving in return a retinue of muscular young men, neighborhood prestige, and political support. Club members also helped players find jobs, board, and lodging. Thus, in Port Elizabeth:

"Sport clubs centered around members of the middle-class township elite, particularly Advisory Board members. These men had resources -- economic, political, and prestige -- to help the clubs. In turn they benefitted from their ties. They were influential, respected figures, both for their power and their sporting prowess in their younger days, despite the fact that there were low turnouts in AB elections."⁴⁵ The same principle applied to other bodies, including religious, educational, and welfare groups.

The key to the strength of elite networks lay in their connections to

neighborhood networks of relationships in daily life. Within each area, intense, personal relations emerged from street life. As Jeffrey puts it:

"Township dwellers in South Africa, residing in identical 'matchbox' houses, on tiny plots of land, have been forced to spend a good deal of their daily lives in the dusty streets. Children begin playing in the streets from a very young age. Football matches and games of hopscotch are regular occurrences. Adults traverse the streets on their way to and from bus shelters and taxi ranks, visiting friends and relatives, and going to church services and football matches. Township street life has always been both vibrant and culturally important."⁴⁶

Neighborhood cohesion was reinforced by the tendency of people of the same clan, ethnic, linguistic, or religious group to settle near each other.⁴⁷ Urban youth had their own area networks, based upon school for the educated minority and neighborhood gangs for the majority of adolescent drop-outs.⁴⁸

How these neighborhood networks linked up with elite networks can again be seen through the case of sport. The best players in several streets would form a team, manifesting area rivalry. These teams were rooted in their areas as both neighbors and representatives, bringing prestige to their area as well as themselves.⁴⁹ Frequently they also had a tribal or regional coloration, reflecting the common origin of team members.⁵⁰ They would seek out the aid of a well-heeled local patron. The result was networks united by shared identity and dependency on members of the local elite, in personal, informal relationships.

In contrast to the clientelist links between notables and the masses, during the 1940s and 1950s the growing professional strata of the black middle classes advanced aggressively modern, corporatist claims. Urbanization, industrialization, and popular struggles led to the bureaucratization of the reproduction of the fast-growing African proletariat, as state intervention in education, health, housing, and welfare increased. Within the large institutions that resulted, the numbers and hierarchy of African professionals increased, while their discretion and influence declined. (As one-roomed schoolhouses gave way to large educational institutions with sizeable staffs, the status of ordinary teachers sank, while only principals and senior teachers remained notables.) The new African petite bourgeoisie justified its status-seeking through its collective function in the community, based on training and knowledge, rather than individual patronage, for which its members usually lacked

means.⁵¹ Educated and articulate, some younger members of this group, especially teachers, made up for their lack of social standing with intellectual vision and political activism. They formulated the Africanist vision: a society reinvigorated by a synthesis of modernity and tradition they would realize. They also advanced vigorous professional claims. Black professionals' salaries had been cut during the Depression and squeezed by inflation during and after World War II, while large classes, poor facilities, and white control also produced frustration. The result was a corporate willingness to fight for professional status, along with a populist demand for recognition of Africans' political rights and cultural worth.

During the 1940s, the two largest professional categories, teachers and nurses, displayed militancy unprecedented for a middle class obsessed with respectability. Led by David Bopape, an East Rand Communist, and A.P. Mda, the future Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) leader, the Transvaal African Teachers Association campaigned for salary raises. The climax was a march of 12,000 teachers, parents, and students through downtown Johannesburg on May 12, 1944, winning significant gains. In Umtata, the largest town in the Transkei, student nurses struck in 1941. Fears of repetitions led to the inclusion of black nurses in the national nurses association (albeit on a minority basis).⁵²

After the NP came to power, the black middle classes faced a government bent on intensifying racial restrictions, while their working conditions deteriorated. As the only classes of Africans able to compete or socialize with whites, they were the principal victims of measures intended to restrict black professionals, repress black political activity, and exclude blacks from contact with whites outside the workplace. Despite this, the numbers of the new petite bourgeoisie swelled rapidly in these years. Between 1946 and 1960, the total number of black professionals rose from 31,400 to 65,700, when it included half the country's teachers and one-third of its medical personnel.⁵³ Yet teacher pay scales remained frozen, while their working conditions deteriorated under Bantu Education policy of larger classes loads. Many also chafed under white authority, reflected in a syllabus considered racist, an all-white school inspectorate, and pay discrimination.⁵⁴ Black nurses also suffered from lower salaries, inferior training facilities, and the segregation of the Nursing Association.⁵⁵ Students faced crowded classrooms, poor food, and dormitories with no privacy, as rapid growth overstretched school resources, and tension with paternalistic whites in charge.⁵⁶ Traders and independent professionals lost premises in city centers under the Group Areas Act. If apartheid provoked

anger generally among blacks, it was worst among young professionals.⁵⁷

In this context, it is hardly surprising that the corporate struggles of black professionals converged with political struggles for nationalist ends. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, teacher groups were politicized by young, militant leaders such as Bopape and Zeph Mothopeng, another future PAC figure. They campaigned against Bantu Education, and many were also ANC activists.⁵⁸ When the Nursing Act was amended in 1957 to segregate nursing bodies, African nurses demonstrated.⁵⁹ African high school pupils developed a new protest repertoire in their rural boarding schools, including class boycotts, arson, and attacks on teachers.⁶⁰ Black university students protested poor conditions and the imposition of segregation at Fort Hare, the only black-oriented university, and became a key source of ANC leaders through the Youth League.⁶¹ Indeed, the new African middle class rose to the fore in nationalist organizations, elbowing the notables aside. (Among the accused in the main political trials of the 1950s and early 1960s, salaried professionals and white-collar workers considerably outnumbered independent professionals and traders, the core of the old elite.)⁶²

The corporate coherence and national-mindedness of many in the professional strata contrasted with the weakness of organization and action in the black working classes. At their peak, black trade unions organised 40% of the African industrial workforce in the mid-1940s, and the greatest strike til then in South Africa occurred in 1946, when 70,000 black miners briefly walked out.⁶³ But black unions declined rapidly after the miners' strike was crushed and the white-led labor movement accommodated itself to apartheid. In any event, only ___% of the entire industrial workforce was organized even at the unions' peak. In the 1950s, the ANC-aligned South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) never claimed more than 50,000 members. Even among unionized African workers, neo-traditional homeboy networks remained the building-blocks of organization.⁶⁴

Indeed, in the postwar era, the limited extent of class accommodation and corporatism distinguished South Africa from other African and new industrial countries.⁶⁵ In non-settler African colonies, the indigenous petite bourgeoisie was incorporated into the dominant alliance. In newly-industrialized countries such as Argentina or Brazil, populist regimes gave a prominent role to urban middle classes and incorporated the unskilled working class into parties and unions. In South Africa, the black middle classes' position worsened after 1948, while working-class incorporation was

limited to whites and the small minorities of skilled colored and Asian workers allowed into their unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act. Liberalizing measures like those elsewhere were considered in South Africa during and just after the war.⁶⁶ But while it is debatable whether Smuts's United Party, itself severely compromised with segregation, would have implemented such measures, the NP's victory in 1948 put an end to their discussion. Without the state-aided corporatist structures that marked populist regimes elsewhere, black workers remained fragmented and parochial in outlook, leaving patrimonial politics more influential in South Africa than in other semi-industrialized countries.

III. THE NARROW NATURE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The patron-client networks running through black society were both causes and consequences of the fragmentary nature of the public sphere in South Africa. The narrowness of the public sphere, limiting the vigor of public opinion and political participation, is an important aspect of the South African polity in this period. Habermas defines the public sphere as the space where public discussion and criticism of government can occur.⁶⁷ The literature suggests that the strength of public opinion depends on literacy (the capacity to communicate beyond personal contacts), communicative competence (understanding politics) and liberty (free communications institutions such as the press, church, theatres, pubs, etc.).⁶⁸ Public opinion is formed in the public sphere. A narrow public sphere means that public opinion involves few, and that the pressure on government and mobilizing capacity that public opinion represents is weak.

When society is honeycombed with particularisms by illiteracy and parochial social ties, as South Africa was, the public space is narrow. Before the 1950s, two-thirds of African children in South Africa received no schooling at all. In rural areas, where most lived, pagan parents often opposed schooling because Christian missions offered it. Instead, education there centered on age groups, initiation, and traditional gender roles.⁶⁹ In 1951, only around 700,000 out of the country's 10-million adult Africans could read English, drastically limiting their opportunities to learn about or discuss the broader society.⁷⁰ As Touraine puts it, "Rural isolation, illiteracy, urban marginality, and the strength of networks of personal and

family relations limit participation in public life."⁷¹

Reflecting the low level of literacy, newspaper readership in black communities in South Africa was quite limited before the mid-1960s. As late as 1962, only 7% of African adults read a daily paper.⁷² More than eight out of ten read no newspapers at all. Almost all those who did lived in cities, especially Johannesburg, drawn from the narrow stratum of middle-class men. In the bantustans, small towns, and white farms where most Africans lived, newspapers were rare, except in the hands of the occasional teacher, preacher, lawyer, or clerk. In Natal, for example, only one African in 25 read *The Daily News*, Durban's largest paper, in 1962, while the Zulu-language *Ilanga* reached just one in 20.⁷³ Even amid the rows of brick houses and long, low migrant hostels stretching through the townships, only one adult in five read an English-language daily. Nor was the gap filled by electronic media: only 12% of African homes had radios in 1962, usually amid the neat curtains and lounge sets of the urban middle class, while South Africa had no television until 1976. The same patterns prevailed in colored communities, where seven in ten did not read a daily paper and those who did were concentrated in the cities and upper-income groups.

Instead, communication in black areas was marked by the predominance of the oral and vernacular, reinforcing the importance of direct, personal relationships and networks. It was a culture of face-to-face discussions -- between family members, neighbors, and notables in township yards, streets, and shebeens, between clan members, migrants, and chiefs in rural homesteads, between workmates in factories, busses, and farms, between home-boys and indunas in hostels and mine compounds. Describing a Transkeian village in the early 1960s, Beryl Pauw writes:

"News from the world outside comes through visits to town or from visitors or migrants returning from more distant centers. Local persons representing links with the larger society are the headman, who serves as his people's link with the government, the Methodist minister, school teachers, most of them not permanently resident at Mlanjeni, and the white trader."⁷⁴

Even in the towns, the bulk of black people were dependent on the "township telegraph" -- gossip and rumor -- for most of their news. "Mass" communications were also largely oral: political meetings, church services, chiefly courts and assemblies, story-tellers and praise-singers, or the reading aloud of newspapers to the illiterate. These parochial information flows helped underpin the patrimonial character of state and society.

The urban mainline churches, the outgrowth of European missionary efforts, were also relatively weak in the decades before the 1960s. Cite census data here: the low percentage of the black population in urban mainstream churches, and the low proportion of churches in urban areas. This had a two-fold significance for the constitution of the public sphere. Urban mainline churches had far greater resources than either rural or separatist institutions. They were also broader in their orientation: urban congregations tended to be multi-ethnic or tribal, while the cult itself was more universalist in outlook.⁷⁵ The contrast with the rural church was striking. A research report from a Ciskeian village, Gobozana, told how the two churches lacked regular ministers, and one lacked a building. Another, from the Transkei, tells how religion reinforced particularism: church, village, and kinship boundaries all overlapped.⁷⁶

The result of these social and institutional characteristics was the weakness of public opinion, understood as a process of public discussion and criticism of government. For reasons of language and education, urban political meetings were incomprehensible to most rural people or illiterate migrants. As ANC and Communist Party veteran Elias Motsoaledi noted, "They spoke in English -- but English was not the language of the people."⁷⁷ Coertze linked limited media exposure in Atteridgeville in the 1950s to low political awareness:

"[O]nly a few individuals with whom we came into contact tried to keep up with the most important world events or could discuss the contents of important political speeches. Along with the comments of our informants, it was also our own independent conclusion that very few of the residents tried to keep up with or had a good knowledge of what was described to us as "higher politics": the successes and failures of leading figures among the Bantu in urban areas in their efforts to attain integration with whites. ... The influence of the above-mentioned publications still left the readers as spectators on the sidelines of the political arena."⁷⁸

Likewise, Gerhart notes, "Most rural born workers, having little or no formal education, found the workings of a modern economic system far beyond comprehension." She quotes East Rand activist Bopape: "It is regrettable to note that the African people as a whole do not understand the laws that contain the principles of color bar."⁷⁹

Isolation from the wider world was often partly the result of the quest for autonomy by small communities, and the intimacy of bonds within them. Hofmeyr tells how chiefs tried to "oralize" written documents from the

white administration. "Such oralizing can be seen in things like an insistence on oral messenger and oral memory, as well as an attempt to subordinate literacy as the medium of ruling to institutions of public assembly, face-to-face assembly, and personal audience."⁸⁰ Similar effects resulted in urban areas from the inward-looking focus of churches and other township groups.⁸¹ Thus, despite problems such as police harassment, low pay, and day-to-day discrimination, for most blacks, there were few chances to learn about or act on the ties between the broader political world and their own lives before the mid-1960s. Rather, political thought and action centered more on strong personalities and local grievances than ideological themes.

IV. AMBIGUOUS OPPOSITION: BLACK POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The character of organized black opposition in postwar South Africa reflected the relations prevailing within society and state, as well as activists' ideas and experiences. Despite the widespread impression of the ANC as a mass juggernaut in the 1950s, it was largely an alliance of local-level elites, much like other African and Latin American political movements. Involved in patrimonial politics and official structures even as it increasingly confronted the regime, its organization was localistic and uneven, often paralyzed by role conflict. Coloured politics centered on the franchise and local patronage, while small groups of intellectuals quarrelled, ignored by the masses. Indian politics, too, mixed patronage with militancy.

The ANC, the principal African political organization, was the main national network of the African elite through the 1950s. It was established in 1912, two years after the white-ruled Union of South Africa was formed from four provinces: two former British colonies, the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, and two former Afrikaner republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. (Ironically, the ANC was created two years before the National Party, which would become its great antagonist.) In its first decades, the ANC represented the educated middle class and the chiefs. The ANC practiced a politics of dignified petition and protest. Brief exceptions occurred when the Transvaal ANC leadership was caught up in social unrest on the Rand in 1920, and from 1926 to 1928 during the presidency of Josiah Gumede, who was close to the Communist Party.⁸² It reached its nadir in 1936, when it failed to resist the removal of Africans

from the voters roll shared with white and coloured in the Cape. The ANC was patiently revived in the 1940s by Dr. A.B. Xuma, though it remained essentially urban and elitist.⁸³

The ANC set a new course after the NP won the 1948 white election. Apartheid put the older notables on the defensive, while the militant ANC Youth League and Communist Party grew in influence. Led by teachers and professionals, including Anton Lembede, A.P Mda, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, and Nelson Mandela, Youth League backed candidates the leadership at the 1949 ANC conference. They also pushed through a Program of Action calling for strikes and civil disobedience against apartheid and favoring African nationalism. During the 1950s, the ANC led protests and worked closely with the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the white Congress of Democrats. Activists of the banned South African Communist Party (SACP) were prominent in those groups, and to a lesser extent in the ANC.

Yet while the ANC developed a new protest repertoire and allies during the 1950s, its values and aims changed remarkably little. Both the younger white-collar and older notable segments of the elite were products of mission schooling and relatively privileged backgrounds. Christian values informed their political thinking and practices. As Glaser notes, "Although organizations such as the ANC and the Congress Youth League challenged hegemonic cultural notions of racial domination and supremacy, they simultaneously embraced most of the values of the dominant Western culture throughout the 1940s and 1950s: patriarchal family structures; reverence of education; disapproval of drugs, alcohol, and promiscuity; adherence to the law; respect for private property (though of course this did not apply to the Communists who had penetrated these organizations); revulsion of violence; a sense of living for the future rather than for the here-and-now; the work ethic."⁸⁴

Albert Luthuli, ANC President from 1950 to 1967, declared that he sought power-sharing with whites, not black rule. While he favored peaceful protest, this was more for the moral impact of suffering for a cause than its significance in power politics.⁸⁵ His view -- "the road to freedom is through the cross" -- was widely shared. Content analysis of speeches by national and branch ANC leaders during the 1950s showed that language extolling "a martyr-like passive-resistance demeanor" was the most frequently used. A typical example: "We the oppressed people are prepared to sacrifice with our bodies or blood if freedom should be achieved in that manner."⁸⁶ An

emphasis on racial partnership also appeared in the movement's program, the Freedom Charter, formulated in 1955. It proposed a democracy with safeguards for minority groups, social democratic policies, land reform, and public ownership of the country's "mineral wealth, banks, and monopoly industries." (Africanists criticized the document, feeling it reflected Communist influence and rejecting its affirmation that South Africa belonged to both black and white).⁸⁷ So despite the ANC's greater activism and programmatic clarity, it is hard to dispute Adam's view that it was more "a pressure group than a revolutionary movement."⁸⁸

Indeed, the ANC could be viewed as the aggregate of the local followings of "big men," more like the anti-colonial and populist movements elsewhere in the 1950s than a Western or Leninist party.⁸⁹ These leaders drew strength from addressing concerns of their followings, rather than broad ideological issues. Thus Lodge writes that "the movement was built on strong personal loyalties rather than bureaucratic control ... The extent to which the ANC interested itself in questions of everyday life was in the ultimate analysis more important in sustaining its support than its attitudes towards whites, socialism, or the Cold War."⁹⁰ For example, in Brakpan on the East Rand, the Advisory Board was controlled by Communists in the 1940s and the ANC in the 1950s because of the standing, charisma, and following of school teachers who stood for the Board.⁹¹

In fact, in many places, ANC and SACP leaders sought key positions in the local patronage systems, with the access to resources, prestige, and social networks they offered. Cobley pointed to the "great awakening" of Advisory Boards in the 1940s, as a new generation of populist leaders seized the opportunities they presented.⁹² Youth League calls for a boycott of Abs were consistently rejected. During the 1940s and 1950s, ANC and SACP members sat on or on or controlled Advisory Boards in major cities, including Brakpan, Benoni, and Germiston on the East Rand, Soweto, Atteridgeville, Nelspruit, Port Elizabeth, and East London. "This appeared to be a symptom of their popularity rather than their isolation," as Lodge puts it.⁹³ The figures involved were substantial men in their communities. Soweto AB members included ANC National Executive member and trade unionist Leslie Massina and the respected P.Q. Vundla, Brakpan's prominent activist David Bopape, and New Brighton's leading Communist and unionist Raymond Mhlaba. (Similarly, one of the ANC's rare rural bridgeheads, the North Sotho-speaking Sekhukuniland reserve in the Northern Transvaal, came through control of migrant workers' burial societies, the linchpins connecting homeboy networks in Johannesburg

hostels to clans in the villages.⁹⁴) Some activists combined help to individuals case-by-case with mass protest, like populists elsewhere.

The institutional and ANC elites not only overlapped; they also shared the political culture of the clientelist state. Noting "the ambiguous character of African opposition during the 1950s," Atkinson's study of East London points out that "both groups were products of patriarchalism, and hence their style of politics were often similar." She adds, "Significantly, there were important points of agreement between 'radical' political organizations (such as the ANC) and Advisory Boards. The implication of this is that the cleavage between the Boards and popular organizations was not unbridgeable (in contrast to the situation of the Black Local Authorities during the 1980s)."⁹⁵ Delius paints a similar picture of rural politics in this era. He cites the case of Moretsele, a chief's son from Sekhukuniland, Transvaal ANC treasurer, and the owner of a Johannesburg cafe where political meetings took place, cumulating traditional authority, political prestige, and modern resources. He also notes that as Sebatakgomo, the rural protest movement in Sekhukuniland, grew in the 1950s by linking into village relationships, it became increasingly North Sotho-oriented in "political focus and flavor," representing less the communization of the countryside than the patrimonialization of the Party.⁹⁶

Organizationally, the ANC, too, had a weak center and strong periphery, like the South African state. With over 300 branches thinly spread over a country the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi, communicating mostly by mail, contact with local leaders was irregular and infrequent. The most detailed analysis of ANC structure in the 1950s, by Feit, concluded:

"Everything encouraged branch autonomy. Control by the higher bodies was largely lacking, and the paths followed by individual branches seem to have been left in the hands of individual branch committees. This meant, in effect, that where branches had a determined and able leadership they were active, whereas branches without such advantages were stagnant, sporadic, or else vanished entirely. ... The extent to which national policy was implemented depended, therefore, upon how well branch leaders understood that policy, and to the extent that it suited what they felt were their local needs."⁹⁷

Delius recently reached virtually identical conclusions. "Many of the rural branches appear to have rested heavily on the initiatives and interests of individual founding members."⁹⁸ The dominance of local leaders reinforced patrimonial politics, as Atkinson notes. "The role of the Advisory Board

was strengthened by the distinctly localistic color of African populism during the 1950s. ... On the one hand, the emphasis on local grievances and goals suited the political style of the Advisory Board and strengthened its links with the ANC; on the other hand, this localism unintentionally sustained the ethos of partriarchalism in the cities.⁹⁹

Impatience with the politics of accommodation led to the break-away of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) from the ANC in April 1959.¹⁰⁰ Its leader was Robert Sobukwe, a 35-year-old African languages lecturer at Johannesburg's University of the Witwatersrand. The PAC attracted those the ANC had neglected: youth, migrant workers, and poorly organized areas. At least in town: at every level, PAC members were ten years younger than their ANC counterparts. It was popular among younger African teachers, and through them connected to school pupil networks, particularly in the PWV and Cape Town regions.¹⁰¹ It won a much larger, informal following among *tsotsis*, the gangs of school dropouts, who were drawn to politics for the first time. Africanism's appeal to migrant laborers derived from rhetoric and social networks familiar to them, while the ANC was largely rooted in the ties and outlooks of permanently urbanized Africans. In other words, the PAC appealed to males on the lower rungs of the traditional and capitalist orders. Openings for the PAC were greatest in the Western Cape and the Vaal Triangle, with weak ANC structures, masses of jobless youth on the streets and a substantial migrant workforce. Migrant workers also spread PAC influence back from Cape Town to their Transke homesteads.

The movement's leaders preached an exclusive African nationalism. Like Sobukwe, they were drawn from the Africanist faction in the ANC, hostile to the whites, Indians, and Communists in the Congress Alliance. The PAC's message was blunt: "If a white man will not obey an African, he must pack and go. African is for Africans alone."¹⁰² Its popularity reflected frustration with the ANC's moderation and non-violence. Sobukwe and his colleagues had long thought the masses so angry that only heroic leadership was needed for repressed rage to explode into mass uprising, and they promised "freedom by 1963." For hot-blooded young men, unable to attain the work or status of adults, anti-white discourse and calls for action had a powerful attraction. "What the PAC was actually saying, or not saying," writes Gerhart, "was less important than the 'language' it was speaking, a language attuned to the mood of youth, in contrast to the more restrained accents of the ANC, 'an organization,' as one PAC man put it, 'of our fathers and mothers.'"¹⁰³ The same held for

migrants, trapped by poverty and passes, and intellectuals attracted for more sophisticated reasons to the movement's romantic evocation of the African past.

While African politics was marked by exclusion from the central political system, the politics of the coloured (mixed-race) minority (___% of the population in 1950) had revolved around it. In the Cape, where _____s of the colored population lived, colored men could vote for parliament under a qualified franchise and serve on provincial and municipal councils. Until the 1950s, in fact, the strongest force in colored politics was not the extra-parliamentary movements, but Smuts's old United Party, which consistently won solid coloured support at the polls. Soon after taking power, the NP announced plans to remove the coloreds from the common voters roll, and did so in 1956. The years from 1948 to 1951 saw a wave of protest in the colored community of Cape Town against the tightening of segregation and the threat to the franchise, but resistance fizzled out in quarrels between the narrow circles of coloured activists in the Communist Party, the African People's Organization (a decades-old and largely spent force), and the Unity Movement.¹⁰⁴

The Unity Movement was the most important extra-parliamentary group in the coloured community.¹⁰⁵ Its principal bases included a section of the teachers -- highly influential in the coloured community -- organized in the Teachers League of SA, along with colored sport administrators (often the same people, due to the role of schools as sport centers). Organized around Marxist educational and cultural activities, it preached boycotting all government-created representative bodies and segregated institutions. Yet while the UM was the most important force among the colored intelligentsia, and enjoyed some support among Cape African teachers, it was largely isolated from the masses by its elitism and rigid boycott position. At the local level, colored politics centered on non-partisan Ratepayers Associations, which acted as support-building patronage organizations for politicians standing for city councils, connecting with other local groups and clan networks within their neighborhoods.¹⁰⁶

The politics of the Indian minority, ___% of the population in 1960, differed somewhat from that of the coloureds in direction and militancy. Concentrated in Natal province, it included a Hindu majority mostly descended from indentured cane-cutters who had immigrated in the 19th century, and a Moslem minority who came as traders, along with a small but fast-growing professional stratum drawn from both groups. Political

organization among Indians began in 1896, when the future Mahatma Gandhi founded the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) to struggle against discriminatory measures imposed by Natal's white minority government. After Gandhi's return to India in 1923(?), communal life was dominated by the conservative, ethnically-oriented trader segment of the elite, which formed the Natal Indian Organization. However, in 1945, a revitalized and radicalized NIC, led by Communists and Gandhians, waged a passive resistance campaign against anti-Indian legislation, which helped inspire the ANC's Defiance Campaign. When government offered Indians two MPs on a separate voters' roll in the 1948 elections, the NIC also organized a successful boycott of the polls. The 1947 "Doctors Pact" between ANC and NIC leaders signalled a convergence between the two groups, formalized in the Congress Alliance of the 1950s. However, while the NIC dominated organized politics, many Indians remained poised between its commitment to non-racialism and the ethnocentrism of the trader/religious elite. Racial tensions were deepened by the legacy of the days when Africans rioted in some Indian sections of Durban in 1949.

The major organized opposition movements, thus, were marked by the same clientelism, elitism, and localism that characterised the state and political society generally. These factors were connected to the ambivalence in the leadership of such movements, opposing government policy yet without aspiring to topple the regime, much less their own position as community pillars. The involvement of ANC (and other) figures in patrimonial relations was the great unmentionable, a hidden transcript jarring with their resolutely modern public discourse, yet it was also the secret that largely animated the movement. In other words, ambiguity in black politics was a consequence both of structures and of values existing within the black communities. The exceptions -- notably the PAC -- sought to rally those excluded by the accommodations and the overlapping systems of authority that ordered black communities, but still operated within the same polarities and universe of discourse.

V. POLITICAL CULTURE

Together, the public-private relation, the nature of the public sphere, and the values and practices of opposition all help mould the political

culture of dominated groups. They influence the content of the hidden transcripts that circulate among them, the submerged networks through which these flow to define sub-cultures, and the shape of the free spaces that allow public interaction.¹⁰⁷ The resulting identities and understandings of community frame the possibilities of collective action. In South Africa, linkages between the public and private spheres were mediated by notable-run clientelism and professional corporatism; a narrow public sphere, largely limited to the middle classes, was associated with weak public opinion; and the values and practices of the opposition were liberalism, patronage, and populism. The black middle class constructed a political identity that reflected its ambivalent self-understanding. This involved assimilationism and shame about its own adhesion to traditional values. The black popular classes built their own political culture based on patrimonialism and localism, a mix of vibrant local identities, ethnic and racial stereotypes, and a sense of inferiority before whites. The social order enjoyed considerable legitimacy thanks to the synthesis of patrimonial and market discourses. Conceptions of citizenship also remained distinct, the middle classes' remaining narrow and oriented towards power-sharing with whites, the popular classes' parochially focused on local communities.

The best-known trait of the political culture of South Africa's black middle classes until the mid-1960s was their desire for assimilation into white society. They blamed the vanquished status of Africans on popular folkways, seeking freedom and power in European culture and techniques.¹⁰⁸ The values of middle-class Africans were deeply marked by faith in gradual change through co-operation with white liberals, reflecting the teachings of English-speaking mission churches and church school education. The hegemony of Western values and the legitimacy of the social order in this group was strikingly demonstrated by a study conducted between 1939 and 1956, which involved over 1,000 educated Africans. Asked how they would react to various conflicts, they overwhelmingly favored Western ethical, legal, and Christian norms, repudiating tribal attitudes, compliance through fear, or non-compliance. Biesheuvel, the investigator, wrote, "On the whole, one finds remarkably little conflict in the minds of educated Africans concerning Western values, and except in the cases [of racial discrimination], no unwillingness to accept these values as the basis for individual conduct, nor to accept the machinery of law as indispensable to social order and good government." Indian intellectuals also identified with Europeans (though they, too, resented segregation).¹⁰⁹ Indeed, the powerful attraction which the dominant white group held for the black middle class was underlined by their view of whites as a reference

group. White fashions and houses were in vogue among them; so were hair straighteners and skin-lighteners. In middle-class homes, it was a severe reproach to say, "Whites don't do that." Among the elite of one Reef township in this era, only two lecture topics drew full houses: politics -- and white manners.¹¹⁰

Middle class striving for whiteness was linked to a sense of class distinction. Mayer reported that "the better-off element in Soweto ... did not identify with the working masses (except for a few politically motivated intellectuals)." A 35-year-old teacher told him, "There is a class distinction between the rich and the poor. It is automatic."¹¹¹ The friends of African teachers and nurses were generally other professionals. Members of the petite bourgeoisie were horrified at being treated like "ordinary folk" when police raided rent defaulters. African nurses were reported to be more hostile to working-class Africans than to whites, while African social workers preferred socializing with white supervisors to African workers. "We feel out of place with the ordinary laborer," one said.¹¹²

The middle classes' rigid class attitudes were probably related to the limited social mobility prevalent before the 1960s. Some 55 of 60 members of Brandel-Syrier's "Reeftown Elite" had professional, salesman, clerk, or businessman fathers. Likewise, Kuper reported that members of the African petite bourgeoisie in Durban were ten to thirty times likelier to have had professional fathers than the African population at large.¹¹³ Most of the few blacks who got to secondary school or university up to the 1960s also came from middle class families.¹¹⁴ The closed character of the middle classes was shown in marriage, too: their spouses were also middle class.¹¹⁵

The outlook of middle-class youth reflected in part the middle-class subculture of which they were a part. Church and rural mission schools kept them under white control and off the streets. Like their parents, if they became politically involved, it was in the ANC, though its Youth League.¹¹⁶ et However, they were also subject to many cultural currents touching other township youth -- in dress, the mass media, etc -- and they, too, shared the tsotsis' anger and impatience with the status quo. In consequence, middle-class youth balanced between two sub-cultures: the respectable world of their parents, and the tsotsi world of their age-mates.

Yet despite class exclusivism, the middle classes were bound to others by kin, ethnic, and patrimonial ties. The middle classes made exceptions to their snobbery for lower-class kin and homeboys. Relationships with them

were reinforced by the contact ensured between the middle and working classes by legal racial segregation.¹¹⁷ Even the educated, Westernized, white-collar group also practiced traditional male initiation and lobola (bridewealth), and they were as likely as the uneducated to believe in the power of the ancestors.¹¹⁸

Such attitudes were more than vestiges of the past: they reflected patrimonial relations involving major investments of resources and influence in participants' lives. Adolescent initiation involved a weeks of traditional education (and frequently, painful circumcision). Lobola made grooms pay months or years of savings to their brides' families, allying the two lineages and creating obligations of redistribution to poorer relations. Belief in ancestral spirits formed the apex of the lineage system: ancestors who had lived on land established their descendants' claim to it, while elders' power derived from their position as the closest surviving family members to the ancestors.¹¹⁹ Alongside Christian practice, the middle classes also made ritual sacrifices of expensive animals and followed other customs intended to propitiate ancestors and mark rites of passage. Such relations reflected the traditional networks of obligation in which they participated, and provided models for neo-traditional forms of clientelism. Thus, for example, Sherwood's survey of African government clerks found that they endorsed middle class values of hard work and sobriety, yet departed from the Weberian ideal of impartial civil servants in their favoritism towards kin and lack of impersonality.¹²⁰

Tension between class and community values generated "culture shame" in many middle-class blacks. Mayer wrote:

"There were often traces of 'negative identity' when educated Soweto people spoke about Western civilization. ... Anxiously uncertain whether blacks would ever be able to catch up with whites, people would speak of 'narrowing the gap. ... The educated often referred to their 'inferiority complexes'"

One Sowetan said, "The Europeans have brought [civilization] to us, and therefore, for historical reasons, they are more advanced than us. They are still superior to us in all fields." Another said, "For us to become truly civilized requires the closest imitation of the Western style in manners, morals and values, the abandonment of all superstitions and witchcraft, and of our traditional attire which was nearly nudism."¹²¹ Likewise, Brett found that among educated young Africans, only a small minority of intellectuals viewed tribal custom favorably, largely for nationalist reasons.¹²² Generally, the African middle class viewed African art and

culture with disinterest. (Revealingly, writer Nat Nakasa proclaimed he had more to say to a white Afrikaner than a visiting Nigerian.)¹²³

In terms of collective identity, the political culture of the black popular classes was extremely diverse. Within a huge diversity of localized networks, discourses circulated, some patrimonial, some Western-oriented. Often more than one could be found together, reflecting the syncretic consciousness of individuals and groups. Coertze's comment on Atteridgeville applies more widely:

"What we have to do with here is not a highly-integrated social unit that serves as a basis for the construction of political power structures. There is just an arbitrarily thrown-together group of residents who show little homogeneity in ways of life and language. There is only a weakly-developed consciousness of themselves as a specific group."¹²⁴

This culture was the produce of influences from above and below. A cacophony of patrimonial discourses was voiced within black communities. In rural areas, kinship ties still dominated social relations.¹²⁵ The dominant discourse was a patriarchal one of respect for age, gender hierarchy, and reciprocity. This was extended to town by migrants' homeboy networks, which maintained rurality-oriented identities, particularly among workers isolated in township hostels or the compounds set up for migrants around the mines. Undercurrents of tension between hostel-dwellers and the more sophisticated city residents occasionally flared into assaults, gang warfare, or disorders, like the clashes that broke out between residents of Dube Hostel and surrounding areas of Soweto in 1957. While permanent urban residents were more open to new associations, they, too, aided clan members who had come to town, extending lineage ties to them through "pseudo-kin" discourse (calling them "sister," "father," etc.) that re-valued clan association.¹²⁶ Even among permanent town dwellers, the language used revealed how older relationships were inlaid into new ones. Forms of address normally used for elders were also applied to young professionals, while at 1950s weddings, bards would sing the praises of the educated as if they were chiefs.¹²⁷ These neo-traditional discourses were expressions of the neo-traditional practices of clientelism prevailing.

Another set of particularist relationships existed in the separatist African churches, growing rapidly during the postwar era. Centered on faith-healing and witchcraft, for many city dwellers they filled a social vacuum left by the decline of the chiefs' authority. Church leaders took their place, re-arranging families into tightly-knit units that encapsulated the

private lives of their followers. These churches deliberately kept their followers out of the public sphere, accepting apartheid.¹²⁸ Even adherents of missionary or mainline churches among the masses lived a syncretic religious existence. Most continued to accept the ancestor cult in their private lives, with the values and power relations implied, while universalistic Christian discourse governed public relations with other church members.¹²⁹

Another, powerful form of identity centered on of ethnic, linguistic, or racial distinction. These discourses were presented as outgrowth of patrimonial relations: the discourse of "kith and kin" stretched from the lineage to ethnic, linguistic, or racial groups through a common ancestry and past, real or mythical. In this way, ideas and practices emphasizing lineage or clan solidarities, such as lobola, initiation, or the ancestor cult, also expressed ethnic solidarities. Much the same was true of the neighborhoods, friendship networks, and voluntary associations working-class Africans formed, often on geographic, linguistic, and tribal lines. (So important were these networks that in Atteridgeville, even among the second generation in town, showed that most knew little about neighbors belonging to other tribal groups.)¹³⁰ Such bonds were reinforced by activities organized by tribal authorities. The annual celebrations of the Xhosa-speaking Mfengu and Rharhabe groups in and around East London offer an example. Pauw argues that these factors kept alive a consciousness, albeit latent, of past tensions between the sub-divisions in each ethnic group, while towards other Africans, they maintained an awareness of difference and a degree of disdain.¹³¹ (Something similar occurred among South African Indians, where horizontal castes fused into a vertical hierarchy of ethno-linguistic and status groups.¹³²) So pervasive and mutually reinforcing were the various patrimonial values and practices -- the traditional and neo-traditional aspects of family life, religious activity, and ethnic identity -- that Mayer dubbed them "the old Black Consciousness."¹³³

Tension between members of different racial and ethnic groups made stereotyping a prominent cultural feature. These stereotypes were premised on a normative discourse regarding white, Western, capitalist culture as superior. For blacks, the result was cultural shame and self contempt. Although the "old Black Consciousness" was widespread, so was ambivalence about it. Sowetans professed scorn for African customs and "old fashioned" beliefs. Yet the more they insisted on the modernity of their material culture -- brick houses, European dress, and the like -- the

more they betrayed anxiety about it. "In 1965 we found Soweto blacks still caught in a painful dilemma, complaining that whites regarded them as culturally inferior and yet admitting that they were," Mayer wrote.¹³⁴ A tendency to "play the fool" before whites reflected such internalized prejudices. Gerhart noted: "For many Africans, the only way to cope with the brutality of race relations and with the cultural disorientation of the urban adjustment was to internalize the role and personality which white stereotyped perceptions imposed, that of the stupid but good-natured child, dependent on superior white 'parents' for constant guidance."¹³⁵

Similar attitudes were noted among coloreds in Cape Town by Stone: "Lower-class coloreds have tended to view themselves as the dependent, outcast stepchildren of the whites, and to bewail their rejection by whites. ... Negroid elements are denigrated and white aspects idealized."¹³⁶ Finally, both Indians and coloureds looked on Africans with fear and disdain¹³⁷. Africans, for their part, resented these middlemen -- strongly, in the case of Indians, perceived as aliens, less so in the case of coloureds, towards whom a degree of kinship was felt.

Self-contempt among blacks went together with admiration for whites, particularly English-speakers. A distinction was made between Afrikaners, seen as ignorant bigots responsible for apartheid by electing the NP government, and English-speakers, who were seen as employers, liberal, tolerant, and fair. (This was also how the English-speakers saw things.) Mayer comments:

"This distinction seems to have played a critical part in preventing total black-white polarization and confrontation. For the postulated contrast between the 'good' English and Jews and 'cruel' Afrikaners seems to have served, in the case of many working people, as a barrier against a fusion of the [market-based] class and [racism-based] pariah models [of South African society.] In 1965, while acutely aware both of their low wages presumably paid by Englishmen and of their pariah status in the wider system (dominated by Afrikaners) somehow they didn't seem to put two and two together. They did not blame the low wages on the wider system and the way it loads things in their employers' favor."¹³⁸

Rather than blaming apartheid for their poverty, blacks blamed themselves (for ignorance, laziness, etc.) Thus, while black workers held racial and ethnic stereotypes, politically one could "speak of a lack of political awareness or even lack of political sense. At this level, they seemed willing to see themselves in the role of a normal working class in a capitalist

system, and to ignore their abnormal position as unfree labor."¹³⁹

Thus, despite anger at racial discrimination, the broader social order was legitimated syncretically, through discourses describing the articulation of traditional and modern social relations. Glaser notes:

"[I]t is dangerous, particularly before the 1960s, to underestimate the extent to which the hierarchical order was maintained through the cultural elements of hegemony. ... [C]ommon ideological threads in mainstream Witwatersrand [African] culture throughout the 1940s and 1950s can be listed as follows: adherence to the law (albeit often reluctantly and with striking exceptions in the cases of pass and beer brewing laws); respect for private property; rejection of violence; acceptance of the work ethic; respect for schooling and education; patriarchal family arrangements; respect for elders; prudent living for the future; adherence to religion whether in the form of Christianity, ancestor worship, or hybrid faiths."¹⁴⁰

Likewise, in rural areas, the persistence of chieftaincy and lineage-type forms reflected a response to the state bureaucracy and industrialization by adapting older discourses and relations.

While these discourses helped legitimize the status quo, they were not mere mystifications. White domination and black poverty were keenly decried -- but in private narratives of misfortune circulating locally, without causal connections. Popular responses to these problems were usually individualistic rather than collective, framed in the language and practice of patrimonial relations. This reflected the outlooks of subordinate groups and the consciousness-lowering impact of the patronage linkages they maintained with more powerful elements. Gluckman's work on Zululand revealed how subordinates (women, young men, and commoners) skilfully played off chiefs against white administrators.¹⁴¹ Such phenomena led Beinart to conclude that "the metaphor of articulation has some value if it is turned on its head -- that is, if the balance of power between articulating forces is reconsidered and greater allowance is made for changes in the African communities, and for analysis of politics and consciousness." In this view, the preservation and extension of lineage-type relations through migrant labor was as much the choice of Africans as of mineowners.¹⁴² Likewise, Mayer described how members belonged to separatist churches, because, while insulating them from the larger community, they formed a refuge from its anomie.¹⁴³ In short, traditionalist relations, while involving subordination, also involved negotiation over identity, resources, and valued social ties.

One group -- urban black working-class youth -- did not share in the value consensus of this era. Educated, jobless township youth suffered both traditional (age-based) and modern (market-related) subordination. While their parents worked, urban African adolescents (particularly young men) developed their own world and codes in the tsotsi subculture. Tsotsis were youth gangs growing out of neighborhood friendship networks, which included most urban school dropouts.¹⁴⁴ (Similar groups among coloreds were known as skollies.) They inverted the dominant cultural values, rejecting elders' authority, the work ethic, manners, delayed gratification, and sexual restraint. The gangs detested middle-class, "scuze-me" africans: what they wanted, they took. Tsotsis had their own styles -- in the 1950s, narrow-brimmed hats and wide-legged trousers -- and their own language, tsotsitaal, based on Afrikaans. Tensions between tsotsis and their elders sometimes became violent, as in East London's East Bank township in 1958, when grown men first attacked gangsters, then any young males.¹⁴⁵

Despite the existence of marked generational tension, however, urban youth remained atomized rebels without a cause. As noted above, they were little involved in politics before the rise of the PAC. (During the 1950s, their political role was limited to occasionally adding muscle to the enforcement of boycotts and protests.) Their political views were unsophisticated and based on experience of poverty, discrimination, and white power. "For the most part," Glaser writes, "tsotsi cultural resistance was unarticulated, incoherent, inconsistent. It was gut level and angry."¹⁴⁶ (In the rural areas, tsotsi sub-culture had only limited impact. Schooling remained scarce in the country, while traditional education, stick fighting and age groups, prepared young people for lives revolving around chieftaincy and migrancy. However, groups of primary-schooled youths called indlavini mimicked the tsotsi subculture in some respects.)¹⁴⁷

Turning to the conceptions of citizenship and community within black political culture, those of the middle classes were elitist and qualified. The assimilationist perspective of middle class blacks implied political objectives limited to power-sharing with whites, expressed by the ANC. As Gerhart puts it:

"[I]t is important to note that the great majority of educated Africans, through the 1940s and beyond, continued to adhere to a basically liberal conception of social and political goals as well as to an evolutionary view of change. What most Westernized Africans wanted ... was the fulfillment of the paternalistic promises of trusteeship: unfettered opportunity to assimilate European culture and learn

modern skills, opportunity to demonstrate African competence and to be accepted, however gradually, as equals in a common, competitive society. The right of whites to lead the way was generally assumed: the African sought simply the right to be included as a 'junior partner' in the white man's ruling councils, until such time as he was ready to play his full part as an equal.¹⁴⁸

In surveys, many middle-class Africans supported basing voting rights on education, disfranchising most blacks.¹⁴⁹

Similar attitudes were widespread in colored and Indian communities. Among coloureds, the principal issue in the 1950s was retaining the qualified, non-racial franchise, underlining the centrality of the discourse of assimilation. The Indian elite, for its part, split into two wings. One was collaborationist, inward-looking and compromise oriented, led by high-caste property-owners and represented politically in the Natal Indian Organization. The other elite group, ascendant from the mid-1940s, was composed of outward-looking professionals and trade unionists, organized in the Natal Indian Congress, a body allied to the ANC and influenced by the Communist Party.¹⁵⁰ Although the years after 1948, which marked the rupture of the accommodations that had largely marked relations between the black and white elites, saw the black elite increasingly come to endorse militant means of protest, they did not shift towards radical ends.

Mass conceptions of community were marked by the localism of collective vision and action. The narrow horizons of rural politics struck many observers. Lodge says that though rural conflict was widespread between 1940 and 1965, "it was largely a parochial affair." Kotze, applying Almond and Verba's categories to Transkei's political culture, characterized it as "largely parochial with very limited participant orientations."¹⁵¹ Concern about the bureaucratic role of chiefs and migrant labor did not transform a world-view shaped by the lineage order, patrimonial discourse, and local concerns into nationalism, as Beinart notes:

"It cannot be assumed that rural people in the earlier decades of this century saw [political unity] as their paramount aim. The evidence suggests that their political responses were often particularist and often separatist. Though aware of the system which gave rise to their grievances, they tried to establish local autonomy rather than to challenge and capture the state. They were not necessarily available for nationalist struggles, or class alliances which sought equal rights within the country as a whole."¹⁵²

Describing the growth of Sebatakomo in the Northern Transvaal, Delius

notes a "significant section of the membership believed that national issues were of doubtful importance and that 'we are only talking about Sekbukumiland, that is our own place.'"¹⁵³

Urban political culture, too, tended to be parochial and personalist, centered on patronage, individual followings, and local demands. In Atteridgeville, Coertze wrote, "support for a particular party had more to do with the following of persons than support for particular party principles. Whenever a leading figure from one faction goes over to the other, a group of personal followers goes together with him."¹⁵⁴ Awareness of elite politics, such as debates within the ANC, was limited to the small literate stratum, reflecting the narrowness of the public sphere. Coertze notes:

"We were told that the objectives of the ANC are consciously kept out of township politics because the average resident has no understanding of the 'bigger issues' and 'higher politics' in which the movement is involved. The purposes of the ANC, our informants stated, can only be understood by educated people such as teachers, municipal clerks and others who are concerned with more than local affairs and regularly read their newspaper. ... Between the aspirations of the leaders and the disposition of the residents, there is a decided gap."¹⁵⁵

Although frustration at poverty and discrimination exploded into riot at times, and political awareness varied within the popular classes, on the whole conceptions of community among black South Africans were limited and narrow before the 1960s.

The nationalist sentiment existing in urban black communities in the 1950s was weak, overlaid on more local loyalties. Pauw noted that in East London, "The attitude of the majority of townspeople towards the contrast between tribalism and an inclusive Bantu nationalism is one of compromise: the ideal of the different tribal groupings moving closer together finds considerable support, but a significant degree of tribal consciousness and pride is retained."¹⁵⁶ Likewise, Coertze noted a broader vision of a South African fatherland in Atteridgeville, but he ethno-linguistic identities remained powerful.¹⁵⁷ Beinart describes how a 1950s ANC activist synthesised nationalist and parochial outlooks, much as others syncretically combined modern and traditional religion. His "shift to broader nationalist and class-conscious positions in the 1950s ... was by no means a total turnabout. He took with him some of the ideas, values, and networks that had been central to his previous experience; these were overlaid with, or meshed with, his newly developing political ideas."¹⁵⁸ Moreover, the

"nationalism" referred to above was African nationalism. It was neither an inclusive black nationalism (bringing together coloureds, Indians, and Africans) or an inclusive South Africanism for all races. (If coloureds and Indians had "nationalist" aspirations, these were for integration into the white South African nation.)

The political culture of black South Africa before the mid-1960s was thus highly compartmentalized by class, locality, personal loyalties, language, and race. Middle-class culture was marked by assimilationism and elitism, that of the popular classes by personalism and localism, while cultural shame and ethnocentrism were shared by all. A weak sense of African national consciousness was overlaid on particularistic loyalties, while radical ideologies of social change found few supporters. These characteristics of the political culture, and the structures, practices, and values that helped produce them, had a profound influence on the nature of mass mobilization and the capacity for social transformation existing in black communities.

VI. PROTEST, MOBILIZATION, AND REPRESSION

The postwar era saw black popular mobilizations of an unprecedented scale and vigor, but protest was neither widespread nor radical enough to represent a real menace to the South African regime. Centered on elite personalities, many themselves compromised with the system or willing to, they activated the leaders' followings and connections. Militant local subsistence struggles, while intense, were limited in scope and duration. National protest campaigns knitted together the supporters of local elites, mobilizing through their networks and loyalties more than through issues. The result was a response that was unequal, spasmodic, and largely urban. It could hardly have been otherwise, given the organizational, leadership, and strategic weaknesses of the ANC and other black groups. The type of collective response engendered by populist protest, like that in AB elections, is what Touraine termed "participation without representation": mobilization centered on personalities and identities, unmediated by parties and ideologies. The 1960 Sharpeville crisis, the greatest 1950s-style protest, also demonstrated its limitations -- while foreshadowing certain phenomena that allowed 1970s protest to transcend them.

The story of black South African politics in the 1950s is conventionally told as a series of mobilizations and protests organized by the ANC as part of the national struggle against the apartheid regime. It begins with the 1950 May Day strikes against the banning of the Communist Party and the 1952 Defiance Campaign of civil disobedience against apartheid legislation, which marked the ANC's shift from an elite to a mass party. These were followed by a series of single-issue campaigns. Those in urban areas including opposition to removals and Bantu Education, as well as general strikes in 1957 and 1958. Rural resistance included women's opposition to the extension of the internal passport laws to them and conflicts around cattle culling and grazing land fencing under "betterment" schemes. Resistance to apartheid reached a crescendo in the Sharpeville crisis, before pitiless repression crushed it.

Yet the protests of the 1950s must be kept in perspective. They were poorly coordinated and symbolic actions, rather than a strategically-developed threat to the regime. The Defiance Campaign resulted in just 7,000 arrests, of which more than two-thirds took place in the towns of the Eastern Cape, the ANC's heartland.¹⁵⁹ The movements against the imposition of passes on women, the establishment of Bantu Education, and forced removals of blacks were localized, limited to a few areas.¹⁶⁰ While the general strikes received substantial if varying responses in Port Elizabeth, Durban, and Johannesburg, they involved only about - % of the African non-farm workforce, and just - % of the total non-farm workforce.¹⁶¹ ANC membership peaked at 100,000 after the Defiance Campaign, but it plunged by two-thirds within a year, nearing its peak only at end.¹⁶² So no more than % of adult Africans ever belonged to the ANC in this era (though its influence stretched well beyond its membership). In short, as Meer writes, the image of massive resistance "ready for the final plunge" can only be "observed by abstracting the motifs of rebellion scattered through a tapestry, which otherwise speaks of reasonable peace and quiet."¹⁶³

When it did occur, the force of collective action emerged from civil society, through the mobilization of concerns and networks in specific areas or groups, more than from organizational initiatives or nationalist ideals. In the leading study of black politics in the 1950s, Lodge notes:

"Much of the direct action and popular unrest of the decade took place outside the scope of formal organizations, and the energy of local and national politicians was often absorbed by the effort to bring localized subsistence related popular movements within the ANC's

orbit. In certain centers the ANC's local presence as a community organization responding to local sources of discontent was of greater significance to local people than its national program of activity. ... In these circumstances the particular ideological orientation of the ANC leadership may have mattered less to ordinary people than the organization's performance in bread-and-butter struggles."¹⁶⁴

Indeed, the collective actions which truly involved mass participation were usually not called by national political organizations, but emerged out of subsistence concerns and local initiatives and leadership. The most prominent among those were the squatter movements of the 1940s and the bus boycotts of the 1950s.¹⁶⁵ Any one of those movements involved more people than the Defiance Campaign did country-wide.

The patterns of mobilisation in 1950s ANC campaigns also reflected the involvement of local elites and the followings to which their networks were connected.¹⁶⁶ Lodge reports, "The consequences of [organizational] difficulties were ... that effective campaigning often had to depend on local initiatives and therefore on the personal qualities of local leaders to a much greater extent than would have been the case had an efficient administrative machine existed. This was not always to Congress's detriment ... [b]ut it did mean that campaigns were localized and uneven in impact."¹⁶⁷ For instance, in Brakpan, effective beerhall and bus boycotts depended on the ANC-run AB, whose members enjoyed wide followings.¹⁶⁸ Similarly, the greatest strike of the era, the 70,000-strong African miners strike of 1946, was based on migrant worker homeboy networks more than formal union organization.¹⁶⁹ In the rural areas, political mobilization focused largely on chiefs and chieftaincy.¹⁷⁰ The reason why ANC campaigns consistently received their strongest response in Port Elizabeth may well lie in a particularly dense set of networks and elites. These included the ANC, the SACP, trade unions, the AB, and a popular rugby board.¹⁷¹

Yet the dawn of the 1960s brought a sense that the pace of political change was quickening. Independence had begun to sweep across Africa after Ghana gained its independence in 1957. Political turbulence had broken out in nearby Rhodesia and Malawi. Rural Natal had been agitated by protests in 1959. Riots flared in Paarl in the Western Cape in December and in Cato Manor, Durban in January 1960. In February, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warned the white parliament in Cape Town that the "winds of change" were blowing through the continent. Responding to the mood, and conscious of PAC competition, the ANC planned an anti-pass campaign for March 31. To one-up his rivals, the PAC's Sobukwe

called on his followers to present themselves for arrest without passes ten days earlier.

The PAC protest on Monday, March 21, 1960, received a large response in only two areas: the Vaal Triangle and Cape Town. In Sharpeville, a crowd of 30,000 gathered outside the police station. Panicked policemen opened fire, killing 69 people and wounding 183. At a meeting that evening in Langa township, Cape Town, police opened up on 10,000 people outside a hostel, killing two, injuring 17, and triggering a riot. As the news of the Sharpeville and Langa tragedies spread, the whole country was shaken. A moral and political Rubicon had been crossed. Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd assured Parliament, "We shall remain in power in this white South Africa," but his grip looked increasingly shaky. In Cape Town, Africans went on general strike. On March 25, 2,000 marched to police headquarters there. They dispersed only when police suspended the hated pass laws, a major victory, soon extended country-wide.

A week after the shootings, a one-day general strike called by the ANC and PAC received a remarkable response. Between 85% and 95% of African workers in Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth heeded the call, as did others in the Vaal Triangle and in up-country Western Cape towns. Some 50,000 people attended the Langa victims' funeral that day, and there were riots in Soweto that night. In the following days pass-burning and unrest spread to East London, Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State, and a few smaller towns. But the most dramatic scenes took place in Cape Town, where the stay-away continued. On Wednesday, March 30, 30,000 Africans marched, "twelve abreast, dressed in their workmen's shirts, trousers, and coats," along the highway curving around Table Mountain to downtown Cape Town. Their leader, Philip Kgosana, was promised a meeting with the Minister of Justice before the crowd dispersed. (He was arrested when he returned for the interview). Over the next four days, thousands of Africans tried to march into Durban, as a stay-away began there, too. During the week of March 28, many South Africans thought they were witnessing the start of a revolution.

Two weeks later, it was all over. On March 30, government declared a State of Emergency, which would last five months, and police detained 1,500 leaders of the black opposition. The next day, after the huge Cape Town march, the authorities cordoned off the townships there to starve out the general strike. On April 8, the ANC and PAC were banned. In the days which followed, protest petered out in most centers. Nonetheless, the

regime's triumph was costly. The domestic legacy of Sharpeville included prolonged recession due to capital flight and loss of business confidence. International condemnation was also widespread. South Africa had to leave the British Commonwealth in 1961 and the United Nations imposed its first sanctions against the country, the voluntary arms embargo of 1962.

The killings at Sharpeville and Langa represented moments when moral issues focused narrowly in one spot: they became simulacra, revealing the violence underlying white domination in South Africa. The massacres demonstrated that the regime no longer observed the rules of non-violent protest. For a moment urban blacks also refused to hold back. Their expressive outpouring of rage and grief grew as the system's brutality seemed unable to contain it. Lodge's comment on the march of the 30,000 applies to events throughout the period: it was as much the result of the growing groundswell of political confidence among Cape Town Africans, as a reaction to the police cruelty that morning.¹⁷²

The large-scale involvement of urban youth in political protest for the first time was an important factor sustaining the post-Sharpeville mobilization, and one with particular significance for the future. "Task forces" of tsotsis helped the PAC enforce general strikes and steal or distribute supplies in the Cape Town and PWV areas.¹⁷³ Tens of thousands more weighed in informally, beating up strike-breakers and police and joining disturbances. There was also an upsurge in school pupil protest, with at least 17 incidents reported in 1960-61. Unlike 1940s student revolts, which were quarrels over food and discipline in rural Cape boarding schools, the outbursts were political and spread to the towns and the Transvaal. (Several resulted from South Africa's declaration of a republic on leaving the Commonwealth on May 31, 1961.)¹⁷⁴ The mobilization of tsotsis and pupils pointed to the emergence of a new force, the youth, with the potential to reshape township politics.

But after Sharpeville, organized black politics was overshadowed by the shift of the newly-banned opposition movements to armed resistance. The armed struggle against apartheid began on the night of December 15, 1961, when the ANC's newly-formed military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe ("The Spear of the Nation," abbreviated MK) launched the first of over 300(?) attacks that would take place over three years. MK struck against government offices, power lines, security forces and pro-government chiefs.¹⁷⁵ The government's headaches worsened in 1962 when Poqo ("We alone"), the larger, less disciplined armed wing of the PAC appeared.

By 1963, however, beefed-up government intelligence services, the detention of thousands of activists (frequently tortured under interrogation), and stiffer penalties for political crimes bore fruit, aided by the movements' own security lapses. When exiled PAC leader Potlako Leballo announced plans for a Western Cape rising at a press conference in Maseru, Lesotho, local police raided his office and passed their findings to the South Africans, resulting in 3,000 arrests, the quashing of the insurrection, and the collapse of Poqo. MK was dealt a shattering blow when police raided its headquarters in Rivonia, a northern Johannesburg suburb, picking up almost its entire High Command, including Walter Sisulu and other top ANC and SACP leaders. (The ANC's most prominent leader after Luthuli, Umkhonto commander Nelson Mandela, had been held in August 1962.) The subsequent "Rivonia trial" of the MK leaders and their imprisonment for life became a cause celebre, but MK's centralized organization never recovered from their loss. Within the country the military wings of the ANC and PAC had been smashed and their organizational networks reduced to bare threads by 1965.

Why did the exceptional mobilization after Sharpeville not endure? The decapitation of the ANC and PAC through detention of national, regional, and even many local office-holders reduced the movements to the mobilized local followings of local elites. Yet the community elites, schooled in the give and take of patronage politics, were unlikely candidates to lead a risky revolt. Furthermore, the movement lacked institutional support in civil society. There were no politicized bodies to provide resources, shelter activists, or absorb leadership networks on a large scale. (Collective action endured longest where these did exist, in the hostels and homeboy networks of migrants in Cape Town and Durban.) There were also no sympathetic mass media and few other spaces for communication with followers, while the narrowness of the public sphere limited the diffusion and comprehension of complex events and circumstances. Moreover, neither the ANC nor PAC had a strategy to exploit the crisis or to function efficiently underground. The ANC's organizational steering capacity had always been limited, while the PAC's was virtually non-existent. (Even the PAC's three Cape Town branches had no contact with each other during the week after March 21.)

At the mass level, the sense of political opportunity which had flowered briefly was crushed by increasing repression, which broke the movement's momentum. Local networks and identities that had sustained mobilization were in any case inward-looking, given the weakness of collective consciousness at a city-wide or country-wide level. This was

underlined by the absence of a sustained response in most rural areas, smaller towns, and even cities. The movement was also badly weakened by the lack of response from the colored community in the Western Cape and the Indians in Natal, whose support would have been crucial there. In sum, the crisis of 1960 represented the ultimate example of the postwar mode of political action in black communities -- while offering a hint of the role youth could play in defining a new one.

CONCLUSION

The image of postwar black politics presented in this chapter contrasts in several respects with the received one. Popular accounts of black politics describe generations of resistance, progressively gathering force. Even scholarly work has contributed to this impression by treating resistance politics as the only worthwhile object of study. Yet, as Lodge acknowledges, "The dramatic quality of postwar African resistance has sometimes led it to being understood as posing a considerable threat and obstacle to the state's policies. Certainly this was the way the ANC and its allies were frequently pictured in government propaganda, but this should not be confused with the actual extent of opposition mobilized by nationalist organizations."¹⁷⁶

Nor should it be confused with the full gamut of black political and social life, in which resistance was only one, relatively limited element.

A fuller understanding of black politics before the mid-1960s would note the profound ambiguities and contradictions then prevalent. In the semi-industrialized racial oligarchy which South Africa represented after World War II, the interplay of public and private power constituted the foundation of a clientelist state and social order. Most black political activity took place within voluntary associations and officially-recognized institutions; it was usually compromise-oriented and accommodationist. This was associated with an extremely limited public sphere, in the sense of institutionalized opportunities for the formation of public opinion. The values and practices of organized black opposition, in particular the African National Congress (ANC), also bore the stamp of the society in which they developed, blending patronage, personalism, and populism. The political culture within which black political actors operated was marked by an extensively networked, somewhat aloof elite with a guilty desire for

assimilation into white society. Among the vast, marginalized masses, political passions were intense but parochial, with a weak sense of a common national identity and destiny. These were the foundations of the black politics that Steven Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement would challenge.

NOTES

1. Particularly telling is the absence of references to the literature on community power structures or clientelism and patronage, staples of analysis elsewhere of local or Third World politics, in writing on black South African politics. See Craig Charney, "From Resistance to Reconstruction: Towards a New Agenda for Political Research on South Africa," Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. __ (1990), and Chapter One of this thesis.
2. The most influential works here have been Alain Touraine, La Parole et le Sang: Politique et violence en Amerique Latine (Paris, Editions Odile Jacob: 1988), and Sonia Alvarez and Arturo Escobar, The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy (Boulder, Westview Press: 1992)
3. In 1946, only one-fourth of the 201,000 Africans legally in Johannesburg, the largest city and industrial center, were permanently settled there. Even in 1955, 86% of the Africans in East London, an Eastern Cape regional center, had not been born there. L.I. Venables, "The Relations of a Municipality with Its African People," Race Relations Journal, 1946, p.51; B.A. Pauw, The Second Generation (Cape Town, Oxford University Press: 2nd ed 1973), p.xvi.
4. R.D. Coertze, Atteridgeville: 'n Stedelike Bantoewoonbuurt (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council: 1969), p.332; Bernard Magubane, Sport and Politics in an Urban African Community: A Case Study of African Voluntary Organizations (MA Thesis, University of Natal/Durban: 1963), p.viii.
5. Claude Meillasoux, Maids, Meals, and Money (New York, Cambridge University Press: 1982?), Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labor Power in South Africa," Economy and Society (1972), vol.1.

6. Nancy Charton, "Black Elites in the Transkei," SOURCE?, and Philip Mayer, "The Origins and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies," in Philip Mayer, ed. Black Villagers in an Industrial Society (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1980), p.42.

7. "If it is obvious that the capitalist mode of production and its political expression, the authoritarian state, have subordinated pre-existing modes of production and organization in order to function, it is no less true that historical systems of inequality and domination have in turn assimilated to the capitalist mode of production and its political expressions, and through them have been reproduced in renovated and widened forms." Jean-Francois Bayart, "Clientelism, Elections and Systems of Inequality and Domination in Cameroon," in Guy Hermet et. al., eds., Elections Without Choice (London, Macmillan: 1978), p.82.

8. Roquie defines clientelism as "a relationship between two parties of unequal status, an exchange of non-homogeneous goods and services, and an interpersonal relationship based upon particularistic criteria regulating this exchange." Pitt-Rivers termed it a "lopsided friendship": inequality and reciprocity are both present, within a discourse justifying each. Alain Roquie, "Clientelist Control and Authoritarian Contexts," in Hermet et. al., op. cit., p.23. See also Jonathan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review, vol.64 (1970) and Peter Flynn, "Class, Clientelism, and Coercion," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol.12 (1974).

9. Isabel Hofmeyr, "The Spoken Word and the Barbed Wire: Oral Chiefdoms versus Literate Bureaucracies," Unpublished Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1992, p.3; Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.302.

10. On this point, see Joel Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1989?) and Christian Coulon, "Systeme politique et societe dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, vol.22 (1972). Case studies include Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Clans, Clienteles, and Communities," in Saints and Politicians: The Making of a Senegalese Peasant Society (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1975), Joel Barkan, Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania (complete citation).

11. "Patrimonial domination is thus a special case of patriarchal domination -- domestic authority decentralized through assignment of land and sometimes of equipment to sons of the house and other dependents. ... We

shall speak of a patrimonial state when the prince organizes his political power over extrapatrimonial areas and political subjects -- which is not discretionary and not enforced by political coercion -- just like the exercise of his patriarchal power." Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol.3, (New York, Bedminster: 1968), pp.1011, 1013. On clientelist legitimation in Africa, see Craig Charney, "Political Power and Social Class in the Neo-Colonial African State," Review of African Political Economy, no.38 (1987), p.49ff.

12. "Just as the structures of the state in a concrete formation present, under the domination of one type of state, structures which come from other types, these structures often participate, under the domination of one type of legitimation, in other types of legitimation; specifically, in previous dominant ideologies, corresponding to classes which are no longer the politically dominant classes. ... The gap between a type of state and the dominant legitimacy in a form -- corresponding to different political forms - - is particularly striking in the case of developing or decolonizing countries, in Africa for example, where the establishment of 'modern' states is constantly dominated by traditional ideologies." Nikos Poulantzas, Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales (Maspero, Paris: 1968), p.242.

13. D.A. Kotze Traditionalism in African Local Government: With Special Reference to the Transkei and Lesotho, PhD Thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1968, pp.275-8. See also Jeff Peires, "Continuity and Change in Ciskei Chiefship," Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1977, pp.17-18.

14. Kotze, Traditionalism, op. cit., p.277.

15. Doreen Atkinson terms the philosophy of township administration "patriarchal," and the term certainly fits the elected township Advisory Board (AB). Cities and Citizenship: Towards a Normative Analysis of the Urban Order in South Africa, with Special Reference to East London, 1950-1986, PhD Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1991, p.105ff and 164 ff. The analogy between township and traditional institutions is also noted in Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.367.

16. In Johannesburg in 1946, the AB voters' roll comprised one-fourth of the permanently urbanized African adults, and 6% of the total adult African population. Venables, "The Relations," op. cit., p.51.

17. On the roles of the ABs, see Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., pp.294ff, Michael de Jongh, Interaction and Transaction: A Study of Conciliar Behavior in a Black South African Township, PhD thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1979, pp.73-4, Lawrence Reyburn, The Urban African in Local Government (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations: 1960). Magubane, Sport and Politics, op. cit., p.18, and Clive Glaser, "Public Enemy Number One: Crime and Policing in the Era of High Apartheid," Seminar Paper, Post-Graduate Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1992.

18. See, for example, de Jongh, Interaction, op. cit., p.103, and Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.295.

19. Gary Baines, "The Contradictions of Community Politics: The African Petty Bourgeoisie and the New Brighton Advisory Board, 1923-1952," Unpublished paper, History Dept., Rhodes University, Grahamstown, n.d., p.11.

20. Kotze stressed the difference between chiefs' formal and real authority: "Although traditional leaders have only subordinate and delegated administrative powers they are in closer physical proximity to the majority of the population than any local and central government institution. This fact, together with the religious, judicial, and quasi-judicial duties, and decision-making powers in domestic tribal matters attached to chieftainship, and traditional leaders' powers of land allocation, increased the administrative authority of traditional leaders above the level to which they had been assigned administratively." Traditionalism, op. cit., p.2. Similar points were made about township administration by Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.356, Atkinson, Cities and Citizenship, op. cit., p.159. Reyburn, The Urban African, op. cit.

21. Dan O'Meara, Volkskapitalism: Class, Capital, and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1983), ch.15, and Rene de Villiers, "Afrikaner Nationalism," in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1971), vol.2, ch.8.

22. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press: 1953), ch.4.

23. Max Gluckman, "The Bonds in the Color Bar," in Custom and Conflict in Africa (Oxford, Blackwell: 1956), pp.138-9.

24. ibid., p.165.

25. William Beinart, "Chieftaincy and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa, ca.1900-1950," Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol.19, 1985, p.94.

26. Gluckman, "The Bonds," op. cit., 154-9.

27. Among these, see Leo Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie (New Haven, Yale University Press: 1965), p.101 (Durban), Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, Langa (Cape Town, Oxford University Press: 1963) (Cape Town), H.J. Swanepoel, Die Andeel van Bantoe aan Stedelike Bantoeadministrasie in Johannesburg (MA Thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria: 1973), pp.133,199 (Soweto), Mia Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1970), (Germiston), Thomas Nyquist, African Middle Class Elite (Check publication details) , p.93 (Grahamstown).

28. Magubane, Sport and Politics, op. cit., pp.22-3, 29.

29. Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.187.

30. Hilda Kuper, Indian People in Natal (Durban, University of Natal Press: 1960), pp.90-1.

31. de Jongh, Interaction and Transaction, op. cit., p.72.

32. Philip Mayer, "The Tribal Elite and the Transkei Elections of 1963," FIND REST OF CITATION, p.301. For example, five of eight factional leaders on the Atteridgeville AB were close relatives of chiefs (as well as connected to the ANC). Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.369. See also William Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland (Johannesburg, Ravan Press: 1982), p.137ff, Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., p.97, and Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., pp.76-7.

33. Nyquist, African Middle Class Elite, op. cit., p.205. See also Magubane, Sport and Politics, op. cit., pp.26-35, Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., pp.105-9, Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.175, Martin West, BOOK ON INDEPENDENT CHURCHES, ch.5, and Kuper, Indian People, op. cit., p.85.

34. Thus in Atteridgeville, an informant told Coertze that "the two [AB] parties call for the same things, just the improvement of conditions in the locations -- that's all." He attributed the division between them to personal

rivalries between leaders. Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.315.

35. De Jongh, Interaction and Transaction, op. cit., p.221. Many of the same individuals would be involved in another split in the 1970s that played a key role in the growth of militant opposition politics there through the formation of the KwaZakhele Rugby Union (KWARU). See Chapter Seven of this thesis.

36. An East London resident defined a "big name" (amagama amakhulu) in the township as "a man who knows how to maintain discipline, who assists every person who is in difficulty, who works hard." Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.178. See also Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., p.53.

37. Alf Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfields," in Doug Hindson, ed., Working Papers in Southern African Studies, vol.3 (Johannesburg, Ravan: 1983) and Ian Jeffrey, Cultural Trends and Community Formation in a South African Township: Sharpeville, 1943-1985 (M.A. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1985), ch. _.

38. Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.324. Reyburn also mentions widespread threats by Advisory Board members to evict rent defaulters who did not support them, The Urban African, op. cit., p.10

39. Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., pp.357, 345, 332, 324.

40. ibid., p.357.

41. ibid., p.343.

42. Reyburn, The Urban African, op. cit.

43. Those who voted tended to be more recently arrived from the rural areas and more traditionally oriented, seeing the Board as analogous to the rural chief's council. Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., pp.323, 344.

44. These included "vigilance associations" and committees which organized mass meetings. See Baines, op. cit., p._, and Hilary Sapire, "African Political Mobilization in Brakpan in the 1950s," Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989, p._.

45. Mike Xego, Interview, Port Elizabeth, May 19, 1992. This was confirmed by former KWARU President Mono Badela, Interview, Johannesburg, (date) 1992. See also Jeffrey, Cultural Trends, op. cit.

pp.211-2; Wilson and Mafeje, Langa, op. cit., (cited Jeffrey 209), and Magubane, Sport and Politics, op. cit., p.53.

46. ibid., p.69.

47. ibid., pp.64-6, Cecil Manona, "Small Town Urbanization in South Africa: A Case Study," African Studies Review, vol.31 (1988), p.103, Kuper, Indian People, op. cit., p.102.

48. Jeffrey, op. cit., pp.____, and Clive Glaser, Anti-Social Bandits: Juvenile Delinquency and the Tsotsi Youth Gang Subculture on the Witwatersrand 1935-1960, M.A. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, ch.5.

49. Jeffrey, Cultural Trends, op. cit., pp.111-20.

50. Thus the Amazulu football club was linked with rural Zululand, while Bush Bucks players and fans were from Pondoland in the Xhosa-speaking Transkei. Magubane, Sport and Politics, op. cit., p.28, and Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.72, describes similar phenomena.

51. Of course, individuals often participated in patrimonial relations with obligations to their families or neighbors, in addition to their corporatist roles. On these issues generally see Craig Charney, "Janus in Blackface: The African Petite Bourgeoisie in South Africa," Con-Text, vol.1 (1988), pp.14-20.

52. Jonathan Hyslop, "Teachers and Trade Unions," South African Labor Bulletin, vol.11 (1986), pp.91-2, Shula Marks, paper on nurses in SA, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 198?, pp.15-18.

53. Union of South Africa, Population Census (Pretoria, Government Printer), 1946, 1960.

54. Hyslop, "Teachers," op. cit., pp.____, and Philip Vilardo, "Contemporary Conflict in Black Teacher Politics: The Role of the Africanization of the Apartheid Education Structure, 1940-1992," Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1992, pp.4-9.

55. Marks, op. cit.

56. Jonathan Hyslop, "Food, Authority, and Politics: Student Riots in South African Schools, 1945-76," in Stephen Clingman, ed, Regions and Repertoires: Topics in South African Politics and Culture (Johannesburg, Ravan: 1991), pp.91-97.

57. Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., p.163.
58. Hyslop, "Teachers," op. cit., pp.92-3, and Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, pp. .
59. Marks, Nursing, op. cit., p.25, and Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (London, Longman's: 1982), p.145.
60. Hyslop, "Food, Authority, and Politics," op. cit., p.86.
61. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., p. .
62. ibid, pp.101, 104, and Gail Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley, University of California Press: 1978), p.391.
63. Brenda Luckhardt and Ken Wall, Organize or Starve.
64. Beinart writes that "such forms of consciousness, and networks, were the very means by which workers organised themselves and were intrinsic to the development of worker consciousness." Beinart, "Worker Consciousness," op. cit., pp.298 and 306. See also T. Dunbar Moodie, "The Moral Economy of the 1946 African Miners Strike," (complete citation)
65. See David Kaplan, Social Dynamics (199) COMPLETE CITATION and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in James Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press: 1977).
66. Prime Minister Jan Smuts and his deputy, Jan Hofmeyr, promoted the position of the black middle class, and spoke of black representation in Parliament. Official recognition of black trade unions was also proposed by the Fagan Commission.
67. Jurgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere," in Steven Seidman, ed., Jurgen Habermas on Society and Politics (Boston, Beacon Press: 1989).
68. See Kenneth Baker, "Public Opinion as Political Invention," in Inventing the French Revolution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1990), pp.169ff, Elizabeth Eisenstein, article in American Historical Review, 1968 and Jurgen Habermas, Communications and the Evolution of Society (Boston, Beacon Press: 1979), pp.116-29.

69. Mayer, "Rise and Decline," op. cit., pp.13, __, and Delius, "Migrants," op. cit., p.13.
70. Union of South Africa, Population Census, 1951.
71. Touraine, La Parole, op. cit., p.125.
72. National Readership Survey (Johannesburg, Market Research Africa: 1962).
73. ibid. Thus Coertze writes that in 1950s Atteridgeville, "only The Bantu World (then a bi-weekly) could count on a regular and persistent readership. Purchases of the other papers were largely limited to people who were teachers, did clerical work, or had received enough education that reading them posed no problem." Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.370.
74. Beryl Pauw, Report of Research Concerning Bantu Christians and Their Churches in the Eastern Cape and Transkei, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, 1969, p.34.
75. The argument on the institutional resources of the urban church follows Doug McAdam, Political Process and Black Insurgency (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1982), ch. __.
76. Gordon KaTyakwadi, The Development of the Political Party System in the Ciskei, M.A. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1978, pp.177-8, and Pauw, Report, op. cit., p. __.
77. Delius, "Sebatakgomo," op. cit., p.308.
78. Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.370.
79. Gerhart, Black Power, op. cit., p.29.
80. Isabel Hofmeyr, "The Spoken Word and the Barbed Wire: Oral Chieftdoms versus Literate Bureaucracies," Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1992, p.2.
81. Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.175.
82. Philip Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920: The Radicalization of the Petty Bourgeoisie on the Rand," in Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa (London, Longmans: 1982).

83. For instance, in Durban in 1946, the ANC still had under 200 members, most middle class. Edwards, "Swing the Assegai Peacefully," op. cit.

84. Glaser, "Anti-Social Bandits," op. cit., p.1.

85. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.68.

86. Only 20% used anti-white language, while just 11% suggested overt violence -- and this was ANC rhetoric at its toughest. The speeches had been chosen by the government as evidence when it unsuccessfully charged 156 leading ANC figures with treason in 1956. Fatima Meer, "African Nationalism: Some Inhibiting Factors," in Heribert Adam, ed. South Africa: Sociological Perspectives (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1971), pp.141-44.

87. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., pp.69-74.

88. Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination, op. cit., p.113.

89. For African examples, see Donal Cruise O'Brien, Essay on rise of BDS in Senegal, in Saints and Politicians: Essays on Peasant Society in Senegal (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1975) and William Foltz, "Social Structure and Political Behavior of Senegalese Elites," Occasional Paper, Yale University, 1962. For Latin American ones, see Robert Kaufmann, "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict," in Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism, op. cit., and the discussion of populism in Touraine, La Parole, op. cit., Part III, ch.1.

90. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.76.

91. Hilary Sapire writes that "their attraction and strength lay not in their overall political program, but in their role as organizers of local opposition to municipal controls and as champions of the fast-eroding rights of location residents." "African Political Mobilization in Brakpan in the 1950s," Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989, pp.13-4.

92. Cited in Baines, "The Contradictions of Community Politics," op. cit., p.1.

93. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.78. See also Glaser, "Anti-Social Bandits," op. cit., p.11, Sapire, "African Political Mobilization," op. cit., Reyburn, The Urban African, op. cit., Atkinson, Cities and Citizenship, op.

cit., pp.162-3, Baines, "The Contradictions," op. cit., and Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit.

94. See Delius, "Sebatakgomo," op. cit., pp.293-4, and "Migrants," op. cit., p.9.

95. Atkinson, Cities and Citizenship, op. cit., pp.175, 173.

96. Delius, "Migrants," op. cit., pp.7,9, and "Sebatakgomo," op. cit., p.298.

97. Edward Feit, Conflict and Communication: An Analysis of the Western Areas and Bantu Education Campaigns of the African National Congress, PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 1965, p.71.

98. Delius, "Sebatakgomo," op. cit., p.299.

99. Atkinson, Cities and Citizenship, op. cit., p.179.

100. This account is based on Gerhart, Black Power, op. cit., ch.8., Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., ch.9, Glaser, Anti-Social Bandits, op. cit., ch.5, and Muriel Horrell, Days of Crisis in South Africa (Johannesburg, Institute of Race Relations: 1960).

101. Their militant political attitudes were displayed in a survey by Edward Brett in 1960 of African students and young professionals. They preferred the PAC to the ANC (most strongly among school pupils) and felt violence to be both inevitable and likely to succeed. African Attitudes (Johannesburg, Institute of Race Relations: 1963), pp.57-62.

102. Gerhart, Black Power, op. cit., p.218.

103. ibid., p.222.

104. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., pp.39-40.

105. Linda Chisholm, Transformation

106. I owe this point to Jeremy Seekings.

107. These themes are discussed in detail in Chapter One.

108. Meer, "African Nationalism," op. cit., p. ____.

109. Kuper, Indian People, op. cit., p.72.

110. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., pp.113, 227, Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., p.101, 51, and Wilson and Mafeje, Langa, op. cit., p.145.

111. Mayer, Soweto People and Their Social Universes (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council: 1979), pp.33,92-3.

112. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., pp. 107,223, and Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., pp.96,58.

113. Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., p.96 and Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., pp.430-31.

114. See the work of P.A.W. Cook, cited in Peter Kallaway, ed., Apartheid and Education (Johannesburg, Ravan: 1984), pp. __ - __.

115. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., p.230, and Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., pp.83,241.

116. Glaser, "Students, Tsotsis, and the Congress Youth League," Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. __, 198 __.

117. "As for social exclusiveness, family ties were supposed to be immune, and often were. A relative who had risen remained bound to his lower-status kin in the scheme of traditional observances and values. ... But it was also noticed that class did affect social mixing, even among relatives." Mayer, Soweto People, op. cit., p.92. See also Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.179.

118. ibid., p.59, and Pauw, Report on Bantu Christians, p.206.

119. On lobola and the ancestor cult, see Meillassoux, Maids, Meals, and Money, op. cit.

120. Rae Sherwood, "The Bantu Clerk: A Study of Role Expectations," Journal of Social Psychology, vol.47 (1958).

121. Mayer, Soweto People, op. cit., pp.157-8. See also Pierre van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Berkeley, University of California: 1965), p.232, and Meer, "African Nationalism," op. cit.

122. Brett, African Attitudes, op. cit., p.11.

123. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., p.74, Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, op. cit., p.93, and Nat Nakasa, The World of Nat Nakasa,

(Johannesburg, Ravan > 197_), p. __.

124. Coertze, Atteridgeville, *op. cit.*, p.288.

125. "In short," Pauw wrote, "the social network remains essentially close-knit. The Second Generation, *op. cit.*, p.195.

126. Manona's work on Grahamstown shows how the kinship discourse was adapted to integrate newcomers from the same clan. "Whereas in the past members of the same clan had a fairly casual relationship and were expected to give hospitality to each other when necessary, present [urban] circumstances give clan membership greater significance. In a classificatory kinship system ordinary clansmen can be turned into close relatives through a process of putative or fictive kinship. It becomes easy to extend terms which are normally used for close kinsmen -- like father, mother, daughter, son-in-law -- to those members of one's clan on whom you count." Cecil Manona, "Small Town Urbanisation," African Studies Review, vol.31, no.3 (1988), p.103.

127. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, *op. cit.*, pp.124-5, and Brandel-Syrrier, Reeftown Elite, *op. cit.*, pp.96, 119.

128. The classic source on these churches is Bengt Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London, Oxford University Press: 1961). See also Philip Mayer, "Religion and Social Control in a South African Township," in Heribert Adam, South Africa: Sociological Perspectives, *op. cit.*.

129. Pauw found that only 7% of his urban sample in East London did not adhere to the cult. Report, *op. cit.*, pp.194-5. See also Mayer, "Origins and Decline," *op. cit.*, pp.32-3, and Soweto People, *op. cit.*, p.201-05.

130. Coertze, Atteridgeville, *op. cit.*, p.368.

131. "The long-standing hostility between Xhosa and Mfengu has not quite disappeared, even among the townspeople. There is not much open tension, ... but Xhosa townspeople often still regard the Mfengu with suspicion. ... As regards attitudes to other tribes and ethnic groups, there is awareness of linguistic and cultural differences where these exist, and sometimes a degree of disdain." Pauw, The Second Generation, *op. cit.*, p.183.

132. Privileged Gujarati-speakers could be distinguished from the largely working-class Telugu, Tamil, and Hindi groups. Kuper, Indian People, *op. cit.*, pp.39-40, 60. The Hindu-Muslim divide also ran deep among Indians, like the Christian-Muslim split among coloureds

133. Mayer, Soweto People, op. cit., p. .
134. ibid., pp.155, 165.
135. Gerhart, Black Politics, op. cit., p.31.
136. Gerald Stone, "Identity Among Lower-Class Cape Coloreds," in Michael Whisson and Hendrick van der Merwe, Colored Citizenship in South Africa (Cape Town, Abe Bailey Institute of Interracial Studies: 1972).
137. Among coloreds, van den Berghe wrote, "prejudice among Africans has prevented ... a rapprochement, while the internalized feeling of racial inferiority vis-a-vis-the whites, and the adoption of racial criteria of status within the colored community have deeply undermined the self-respect of that group, and further enhanced its color-consciousness." South Africa, op. cit., p.160. On Indians: quote Bhana.
138. Mayer, Soweto People, op. cit., p.31. On similar attitudes among coloreds, see Stone, "Identity," op. cit., p.33.
139. ibid., p.32. Mayer adds, "References in previous literature suggest that the images of 'Boer' and English which I have described for Soweto in 1965 were much the same as had existed for many years," ibid., p.34.
140. Glaser, "Anti-Social Bandits: Culture, Resistance, and the Tsotsi Subculture on the Witwatersrand During the 1940s and 1950s," Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, pp.5,8.
141. "The Zulu were constantly comparing black and white political officers and switching their allegiance according to what was to their own advantage, or by what values they were being guided on different occasions." Gluckman, "The Bonds," op. cit., p.159.
142. Beinart, "Chieftaincy," op. cit., p.93. Elsewhere he adds, "Through such networks, workers could retain contact with home and establish defensive structures at work. ... It is arguable that in the earlier phases of South African industrialization, particularist association at work made self-protection and organization possible, rather than constrained them," "Worker Consciousness," op. cit., p.289.
143. Mayer, "Religion and Social Control," op. cit., p.178. Stone notes parallels among coloured religious sects. "Identity," op. cit., p.39.

144. This account draws on Glaser, "Anti-Social Bandits," op. cit., p.15, and Gerhart, Black Politics, op. cit., p.224ff, and Jeffrey, Cultural Trends, op. cit., on African gangs, and Stone, "Identity," op. cit., p.30ff, on colored gangs.
145. Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.57-8.
146. Glaser, Anti-Social Bandits, op. cit., p.206.
147. Mayer, "Origins and Decline," op. cit., p.59 and _____. and Beinart, article on indlavini.
148. Gerhart, Black Power, op. cit., p.38. See also Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.68.
149. A majority of African teachers surveyed in Durban in 1960 preferred qualified to universal franchise. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, op. cit., pp.178-9. Analysis of essays written by young educated Africans in 1961-62 found that one-third chose the same option. Lawrence Schlemmer, "Black Attitudes: Adaptation and Reaction," p.???
150. Kuper, Indian People, op. cit., pp.51ff.
151. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.290 and D.A. Kotze, op. cit., p._____.
152. Beinart, "Chieftaincy," op. cit., p.95.
153. Delius, "Migrants," op. cit., p.9.
154. Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., pp.323-4.
155. ibid., p.374.
156. Pauw, The Second Generation, op. cit., p.180.
157. Coertze, Atteridgeville, op. cit., p.368.
158. Beinart, "Worker Consciousness," op. cit., p.307.
159. In Johannesburg and Durban, respectively, only 521 and 192 people volunteered for arrest. None did across much of the country. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.52.
160. ibid., chs.4-7, 11.
161. ibid., pp.194-5.

162. ibid., p.75.
163. Meer, "African Nationalism," op. cit., p.140.
164. Lodge, "Political Mobilization," op. cit., pp.314-15.
165. Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfields," op. cit., Edwards, "Swing the Assegai Peacefully," op. cit., Bonner, Lodge. Black Politics, op. cit..
166. This is a persistent theme in the social movement literature, discussed in Chapter One. See, for example, Alberto Melucci, "Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements," in Bert Klandermans, et al., eds., International Social Movement Research (Greenwich, Jai Press: 19__), and Bert Klandermans, "The Social Construction of Protest and Multi-Organizational Fields," in Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven, Yale University Press: 1992).
167. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.76.
168. ibid., pp.180-1, and Sapire, "African Political Mobilization," op. cit., pp.5-6.
169. Beinart, "Worker Consciousness," op. cit., p.296.
170. "Popular movements sometimes bypassed the issues of chieftaincy, but in a number of cases they focused on demands for the reinstatement or elevation of chiefly lineages: Sabata Dalindybo rather than Kaiser Matanzima, Nelson rather than Botha Sigcau in Pondoland. Bantu Authorities were opposed because they seemed to deliver chiefs into the hands of the government rather than because they involved chiefs." Beinart, "Chieftaincy," op. cit., p.96.
171. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., pp.51-5, Baines, "The Contradictions," op. cit., p. __, de Jongh, Interaction and Transaction, op. cit..
172. Lodge, Black Politics, op. cit., p.221.
173. Gerhart, Black Power, op. cit., p.225, and Glaser, Anti-Social Bandits, op. cit., p. __.
174. Hyslop, "Food, Authority, and Politics," op. cit., pp.97-8.
175. The account of the early years of armed action which follows is based on Lodge, op. cit., ch.10, and Howard Barrell, MK: The ANC's Armed

Struggle (Johannesburg, Penguin: 1990).

176. Lodge, "Political Mobilization in the 1950s: an East London Case Study," in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in South Africa (Longmans, London: 198), p.317.