

reply was given by the respondents. The replies were as follows:-

- it was used for minor offences = 159
- the case not investigated or no enquiry made = 102
- every White employee has the right to dismiss a Black employee = 26
- no comments = 143

These responses suggest the procedure was viewed as a coercive measure and not as an instrument to ensure justice was done.

- The report concludes with a number of recommendations for the consideration of the management of the corporation. These recommendations suggest that specific areas where training should be given to the committee representatives and also suggested that an educational programme should be given to all employees to coincide with the elections for representatives. A specific recommendation which was put into operation a year later was that employees be allowed to caucus with their representatives for the meetings. It was suggested that an agenda be drawn up to ensure that committee members had had contact with employees and to give chairmen time to prepare replies for meetings. Whether these recommendations, even if implemented, would efficiently remove the cause of the inadequacy of the committee system is doubtful. The basic issue of freedom of association was not discussed implying it was not relevant to the study. The paternalism is reflected in the belief that by improving the committee system the negative findings could be corrected.
- The committee system was used to bring complaints and requirements to the attention of management, but the evidence suggest that at most this system gave workers the right to a hearing. The analysis did not determine whether in fact something to the satisfaction of the workers was achieved about the items raised. The evidence regarding lack of report back, negative attitude towards elections; mixed attitude towards effectiveness and satisfaction, points to the conclusion that workers did not and probably could not identify with the committee system.

#### 6.4 Summary

Interviews were conducted with fifteen respondents from companies which were known to be leaders in the development of industrial relations policies and practices. In terms of an initial assessment of the data obtained, in particular the approach to recognition of Black unions, and formulation of industrial relations policy, it became apparent that two types of companies could be identified, namely the paternalistic and the free-enterprise types. However, the approach of certain companies was not clearly formulated and a third category was formed, namely the semi-paternalistic company.

The interview schedule contained a number of specific variables namely: industrial relations policy; attitude towards independent Black unions; grievance and disciplinary procedures; plant-based system of representation; training of committee representatives and information. To determine the validity of distinguishing between these three types of companies, the information obtained about each of these variables was analysed in terms of those types. As the above analyses suggest, the distinction between the free-enterprise type of company and the paternalistic type of company is reflected in the information obtained through the interviews. However, the semi-paternalistic type did not always appear as distinct from the other two. As the development of the industrial relations function is still a new phenomenon, companies which are still formulating their approach to those industrial relations variables and experimenting with structures will have to be taken into account. As circumstances alter or confrontations occur it is to be expected that the greater majority of companies falling into this category will become more typically paternalistic, although some might adopt a free-enterprise approach.

The following conclusion can be drawn from the information about the operation of the committee system as discussed and analysed in this chapter. The establishment and maintenance of committees represents the major area of active response by companies to the requirements of a new management function subsequent to the 1973 strikes. But what kind of committees were they?

The categorisation by Hovels based on extensive research, of a classification system of four types of committees, as discussed under the heading "Research Formulation and Methodology", will be used in this assessment. It is to be noted that this system of classification was not available when the research was started and hence the questions of the interview schedule could not be formulated in terms of the main differences. Hence the committees in companies are not classified in terms of those types. The types are used to assess the general nature of committees.

- The marginal works council. The circular letter sent by the paternalistic corporation to the management chairmen of 122 liaison committees contains evidence that increasing numbers of liaison committees tended to generate into marginal bodies. This trend was hastened by:- local management resistance to such bodies; worker apathy because of the belief that it is powerless; worker representatives' mistrust because of lack of follow-up on items raised and lack of implementation of items agreed upon.
- The works council as an organ of management. The preference by companies for the liaison committee structure reveals the objective of creating a system of communication which they could control, i.e. an organ of management. This conclusion is based on the difficulty in report back i.e. little contact with constituents; the initiative taken and maintained in items raised; both chairman and secretary being management representatives; control over training of representatives.

It is to be noted that after the liaison committees had attended to some of the immediate hygiene problems, the worker representatives tended to lose momentum as management introduced items falling under the heading of motivational concerns.

- The works council as an organ of employees. The attempts by workers to exercise their choice in the relevant Act and establish a works committee suggests that in fact workers' leaders wanted to control

the system of representation. However, as seen from the actual number of such committees which were established, this move was successfully resisted by management.

- The works council as an organ of consultation. The attempts by certain companies to establish a two-tier structure with a works committee as caucus body suggests that certain managers were willing to establish a joint consultative body. This was in fact the descriptive term used by the one company which requested a University department to undertake an in-depth study of its employment practices. However, as the findings of that research shows, there are structural problems which prevent this form of committee being established. Certainly, in a situation where the majority of the workers do not enjoy freedom of association, it is not possible to establish a committee through which workers representatives can process independently formulated problems and be able to influence management policy. The evidence regarding the data on the following variables support this contention that joint consultation could not and did not take place:- lack of information; no trade union to monitor and correct the operation of the plant-based committee; no report back; management controlled training of committee representatives; low-propensity for participation, i.e. both willingness and ability, of the workers and management representatives etc.

However, the research did establish that four corporations were developing an industrial relations policy which could facilitate the establishment of a relationship pattern between the independent unions and the company based on mutual acceptance and respect. The implications of this possibility will be explored in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 7

THE TONGAAT, HULETTS AND S.A. BREWERIES PROPOSALS FOR A VERTICAL  
SYSTEM OF WORKER REPRESENTATION

Further insight into the nature of the ideology which the prominent paternalistic corporations developed as a basis for their system of worker representation, was obtained from a series of articles by three companies included in the interview survey. Sufficient details of their policy and approach is contained in these articles to warrant separate analysis.

It was initially postulated that the paternalistic companies, although actively promoting committees, followed a neutral policy towards Black trade unions. But as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, their policy, deliberately or not, was anti-Black trade union. Not only were committees perceived to be effective representative bodies but because of the desire to regularise the manager-worker relation and ensure order and predictability in behaviour, these companies promoted the idea that committees could negotiate wage agreements. Subsequent to the shock of the 1973 strikes, these companies followed a policy of granting regular wage increases. As liaison committees were established it was decided to convey the information regarding the revised wage scales to the committees. From this step it became logical to see the possibility of allowing the committee to "negotiate" future wage increases. Involvement in "negotiations" would enhance the standing of committee representatives in the eyes of the worker. But of greater advantage was the fact that to "negotiate" with committees is less threatening than facing the uncertainty involved in bargaining collectively with an unknown and uncontrolled Black union. This latter alternative involved acceptance of power-sharing, a notion foreign to those who seriously believed they knew best what the Black workers both needed and could cope with. That is, the responsibility of the "wardship" role of the personnel manager over Black workers provided the justification for ignoring the basic issue of worker rights.

The development of these perspectives in response to shock experienced after the 1973 strikes and subsequent emergence of Black unions, led to the conviction that the plant-based committees should constitute the core of the structure visualised for the new industrial relations system.

As wage agreements should not just cover one factory but all factories in that sector, it was assumed that the various committees in the factories of this sector would constitute the base which could be extended vertically and form one co-ordinating body to meet with management representatives. It was assumed that this model would allow for collective bargaining.

The concept of collective bargaining has developed a specific meaning in Western industrialised countries. Although the structures through which such collective bargaining takes place might differ, common processes are necessary to ensure the institutionalisation of the conflict of interests between corporations and labour for the stated period. The nature of the four sub-processes of collective bargaining were analysed in Chapter 1. These processes are referred to by Walton and McKersie as: distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, attitudinal structuring and intra-organisational bargaining.

The necessity for collective bargaining between management and labour arises because of limited resources and scarce status allocation. The process of distributive bargaining settles this conflict of interest between the two parties. But the inter-dependence of capital and labour suggest that there are complementary concerns which can, through problem solving, be identified and resolved through the process of integrative bargaining. Underlying these two sub-processes are activities that influence the attitudes of the two parties, in particular those of their respective representatives, towards each other. Attitudinal structuring which takes place between the representatives of the two parties is this third sub-process. Five relationship patterns can be established ranging from hostility, to aggression, to accommodation, to co-operation and finally collusion. Finally, before an agreement is signed by the representatives a fourth sub-process of activities has to occur, namely, the parties must agree. Consensus must be achieved within each of the two parties and not just by their respective representatives: i.e. intra-organisational bargaining has to take place.

As already discussed the development in personnel management occurred during a period of insignificant labour unrest amongst all workers; a pattern of negotiation between employers' associations and registered trade unions at a highly centralised level of the industrial council

system had become entrenched, and the registered trade unions did not acknowledge the importance of the intra-organisational process, or did not have to use it.

The articles referred to in the following analysis are:-

- Proposals to amend the Bantu Labour Relations Regulations Act put to the Minister of Labour in November 1974 and published in the House Journal of the Tongaat Company. These proposals were presented by the Chairmen of the Tongaat Company, Huletts Corporation and South African Breweries at the September 1974 corporate meeting of the S.A. Federated Chamber of Industries. Although the Anglo American Corporation was initially present at the meetings to formulate the proposals, it subsequently withdrew from the deliberations.
- A follow-up article which appeared in the same journal a year later in the form of a panel discussion on the subject of collective bargaining for the Black worker. Those participating in the panel were: two company industrial relations managers, secretary of a registered trade union, chairman of a works committee and representative of an employer's association.
- An article in the home journal of the Huletts Company on the training of negotiators. Reference is also made to a paper on industrial relations which gives some insight into the assumptions on industrial conflict made by management in its training programme.
- The Training Manual Programme for members of Liaison Committees and Worker Representative Councils prepared by the Personnel Department of the Beer Division - Northern Provinces - of the South African Breweries Limited.

7.1 Using the Committee Base as an Alternative to the Independent Trade Union

The underlying assumption in the proposals by the Tongaat and S.A. Breweries Groups for amending the Bantu Labour Relations Act was that the suggested amendments would "encourage the natural growth towards a more effective collective bargaining process." (Tonga Company, 1975). The recommendations assumed that the committee system, as provided for by the 1973 Act, was an adequate base on which to build a negotiating structure. There were three principal proposals:-

- A two-tier committee system was envisaged to provide for both a works committee and a liaison committee. The proposed two-tier system would allow worker representatives to meet separately in order to caucus and nominate members for a liaison committee allowing for direct dialogue between employer representatives and members of the first tier or the works committee. The two-tier proposal would have the advantage of both the works and liaison committee.
- Representatives from liaison committees in any industry would form a regional co-ordinating committee which would be registered as a negotiating party, comparable with a trade union, and any expenses would be paid from a levy imposed on Black employees in the industry.
- The co-ordinating committee would nominate people to serve, with employer representatives, on a Regional Labour Council, comparable with an industrial council. This council would negotiate basic wages and the conditions of service for a designated industry. It would also register and approve house agreements, and investigate alleged instances of victimisation. Again a levy would be imposed on Black workers as well as employers to finance the council's activities.

How and where do these proposals fall short of Walton and McKersie's analysis? The proposed negotiating structure is based on the committee system and is financed through enforced levies. But committees do not provide membership rights and responsibilities for workers. Committee representatives cannot function as the negotiating party. The fact



that a membership base as a prerequisite for collective bargaining does not exist means that the intra-organisational sub-process cannot be activated. It follows that the distributive sub-process also does not feature. There is no independent leadership to place issues on the agenda or treat matters brought up at meetings as issues, instead of problems. There will be no identification of workers with the agreements and no commitments to the requirements of the clauses.

What of the other two sub-processes? The two companies are heavily involved, in terms of personnel and financial resources, in training of committee representatives. The content of this training is to view industrial relations as problem-solving inter-action and to use behaviour modelling techniques as means for preparing committee members for their task. This task is defined in terms of management perception of the economy, the society and hence its value system. The emphasis on the integrative sub-process and concern with the attitudinal structuring process suggest a refusal to come to terms with, or prepare for the reality of, the other two sub-processes which are required.

Hence the approach adopted by management is to assume that conflict between committee representatives and the labour force is either not a relevant issue or is of such a complex nature that it will hopefully remain latent.

Has the impact of the 1973 strikes been forgotten? It is true that registered trade unions, except for some industrial unions, do not hold report-back membership meetings to ensure approval of agreements negotiated by the executive committee. This failure to activate the intra-organisational sub-process is understandable because registered trade unions:

- are not representative of the total labour force and hence have no power base as the working class is divided;
- have used the scarce value and privileged status of their members as a weapon against employers to achieve desired wage increases and improvements in benefits;

- have not faced a membership crisis or no-confidence motion in leadership because the standard of living has improved;
  - are still in the highly centralised stage of union development where leadership, once elected, takes the decisions;
  - have kept membership informed, without asking for approval of the outcome of negotiations, through union journals.
- The following editorial comment in the S.A. Typographical Journal is pertinent to the argument. 'The procedure of negotiating an agreement under the industrial council system is often misunderstood and members, especially immigrants from the United Kingdom often suggest that a report back should be made before an agreement is concluded'. (Editorial, S.A. Typographical Journal, 1977).

An effective system of representation for Black workers cannot be structured on this pattern of centralised activity for two reasons, namely: the impact of black consciousness and the concerted efforts by employers and the authorities to entrench the work-place committee system.

## 7.2 Rejecting the Trade Union Concept

The assumption that the committee structure serves as an effective negotiating base is disquieting because of the pressure put on committee members in terms of the role as 'representatives' that they are increasingly required to play. In a follow-up article to the proposals discussed above a panel discussion was used to relate recent developments in the emerging negotiating structure to the sugar industry. (Tonga Company, 1976).

These developments mainly meant the admission of Black committee representatives to the industrial council meeting scheduled for 1976, on the assumption that they could act as a negotiating party. Their presence was felt to be necessary because it was argued that 'truly representative' meant, 'all their desires and aspirations are represented and not just the view of the Blacks in one mill or company'. There was no debate in the panel discussion on the intra-organisational sub-process

or on the reality of the distributive bargaining phase. The principal concern of management was to define the mutual objective of labour and management, 'which should be a thriving and prosperous industry, through which benefits would flow to shareholder and worker alike'. Whether the value system of the existing socio-economic framework enables workers to operate from the same power base as the shareholders or employers was not discussed. It was apparently assumed that the 'representatives' are truly representative, i.e. that they do reflect the wishes and aspirations of Black workers. Yet is it not true that these very 'representatives' are failing to report back effectively and need management's support?

Mr. Hanafey, Head of the Bantu Labour Unit of the Steel and Engineering Federation of South Africa analysed some typical problems facing the operation of committees. In three of the four case studies quoted, the report-back failure or difficulty was identified as a reason for the 'blockage' of the committee system (Hanafey, R., 1976). It is significant to note that because of a fear that the report-back would unleash misunderstanding and reaction, if not unrest, the S.A. Breweries Group has included specific instructions regarding report-back procedures in the training programme. The Chairman of the liaison committee who is a management representative "prepares the report-back document", and the committee representative is told to report the information "exactly as it appears in this document and to make sure everybody gets the same information". Furthermore, they must "ask their views on the information and make a note of them." These points could then be raised at the next meeting. This structural control over the performance of committee representatives demonstrates the extent to which they are made extension of managerial control. More importantly, the give-and-take of intra-organisational bargaining and the dynamics of leadership cannot be expressed and therefore representatives cannot develop as responsible leadership of the collectivity of workers. The process of institutionalisation of conflict cannot occur.

The only contribution during the discussion under review made by the chairman of the works committee was to the effect that a good understanding with management of mutual problems has been achieved and hence we (i.e. presumably the committee) 'would not like to see trade unions come onto the scene'.

What was also significant was that the panel discussion did not follow up the suggestion made by one participant that 'the Black man's search for himself for dignity and self-reliance', meant that committees were rejected as 'dummy' bodies and that industrialists would be forced to accept Black trade unionism. In spite of this, management argued that the union was not essential to collective bargaining and that the 'industrial committee' (the equivalent of the co-ordinating committee discussed above) served the best development purpose.

The secretary of the registered trade union maintained that the power base of the workers was effectively divided. His statement that 'my union is opposed to the formulation of liaison and works committees to represent workers in the industry' was not followed up.

Even if the theme of development and extension of the present system stressed by the employer representatives was valid, the question of why the facets of two sub-processes were not discussed remains unanswered. The necessity of working towards a stage where the workers as union members have their own independent body, was evaded. On the other hand, the chairman of the works committee received tacit support for his rejection of trade unionism. Management rejected the trade union because it could be used 'by far-left socialists as a political tool' and the hope was expressed that 'collective bargaining (could be kept) within the family' while an industrial committee was seen as more desirable than a 'nationally organised trade union'.

The plan to have a Black worker representative present during negotiations at the industrial council level, which this discussion presaged, was duly put into operation. An agreement was concluded in November 1976. The event was lauded as a 'milestone in the history of the sugar industry'. The representative of the manufacturers' association said the Black worker representative 'had made a major contribution'. (Sunday Times, 4/5/1976 and 28/11/1976).

Detailed information would be required to judge whether any of the four sub-processes were activated. The fact that four Black representatives were elected (and two appointed by the Department of Labour) is no guarantee that the distributive and intra-organisational bargaining processes took place. Election is only one side of the coin. The key

prerequisite of collective bargaining is that it should be carried out from a membership base. The dynamics of labour relations, reflected in the intra-organisational phase, require that demands for a new agreement be formulated in terms of a mandate received from members and that the agreement be approved by members, either at branch level or shop steward meetings.

It is apparent that these requirements were not met for this agreement and hence there could be no commitment to the terms of the agreement from the workers in the sugar industry. The authority structure is still based on coercion and not consent. In terms of the structure established, the objective of the Tongaat proposals, namely that 'the black representatives hold themselves accountable for breaches of agreements', is an unrealisable expectation. The linkage between representatives and workers has not been legitimized, and the peace obligation not internalised as it cannot be imposed.

According to reports the new agreement provided, for the first time, for a 2.5% bonus for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This improvement was welcome. But in terms of the dynamics of industrial relations there is no guarantee that the labour force regards this as sufficient or that the new agreement 'provides a buffer against industrial unrest'. How did the labour force participate in the decision-making process? What distributive bargaining took place? It is the workers, as union members, who must judge whether their representatives had made a 'major contribution'. Once the employer starts making this judgement then the relationship pattern enters the sphere of collusion.

The mechanism of distributive bargaining requires labour's representatives to set specific targets for various items on the agenda. These aims obviously involve employers in direct costs if they are met.

There is, for labour, a resistance point below which no agreement would be acceptable. The union's membership should, ideally, give their representatives an indication of the resistance point when giving them their mandate. In the case cited, workers may well have accepted a lower bonus, of say, 2%, if they had participated in the decision-making process. Trade unionism is not necessarily or primarily a question of economic gain but rather the more elusive issue of the quality of people's lives.

Any attempt to limit a bargaining system to the committee structure will, in all probability, accelerate the rejection of the plant-based committee system by the Black workers. Management is concluding agreements with representatives whose functions are basically an extension of those of the personnel department. Hence the allegation made above that a relationship pattern based on collusion is being forged between management and committee representatives. As a result the relationship between management and the labour force as a whole will be based on latent hostility. This hostility is controlled or contained by repressive legislation. But this makes aggression an ever present reality.

Finally, it does not follow that because registered trade unions have not activated the intra-organisational, and to a certain extent the distributive process, that Black workers will adopt the same posture as members of the registered trade unions.

### 7.3 Is Negotiation Only Problem Solving?

The third article under review deals with the training of managers as negotiators 'as prerequisite for the maintenance of good labour relations.' (Vogel, T., 1976). Negotiation is seen as an occasion where the 'representatives' of the parties interact in an explicit attempt to reach a jointly acceptable position on one or more decisive issues. But the implication of being a 'representative' and the dynamics of resolving 'issues' is misunderstood.

The argument of the article focusses on what happens at the negotiating table. This is why there is no qualification of the statement that 'negotiation takes place between equals' although the labour party side is unequal. This silence is understandable because the question of the 'power', or lack of it, in the structure of the registered trade union or the committee, is completely ignored. It is facile to take the trade unions in South Africa, as well as committee members, to task for neglecting the use of 'information' such as economic climate or changes in the labour market. Where can they acquire such information? Have the registered trade unions a membership strong enough to provide financial resources to allow for the purchase of information and expertise?

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coercion and other power tactics and recognises the 'dice are loaded in favour' of Whites and can lead to 'friction' but suggests that a 'new approach to negotiation is to consider it as a problem-solving process'; i.e. in terms of the integrative sub-process. Significantly the industrial council system is seen as an organisational structure which facilitates this emphasis. This assessment supports the view that the industrial council system is not conducive to distributive bargaining and explains why overseas trade unionists believe that it has made trade unions ineffective. The industrial council system, as it has developed, weakens trade unions as it carries out functions which are normally the responsibility of the union.

Whereas it is undoubtedly essential to introduce integrative tactics in negotiation (identify the problem, look for alternatives, make a choice), it is unfortunate that the danger of assuming that this alone constitutes collective bargaining is not dealt with in the article. By all means aim to 'move negotiating' in terms of the interaction across the table out of the mode of warfare and win-lose situation. But do not thereby deny the reality of the distributive phase nor hope to get away from facing the reality of the intra-organisational phase. The article under review mentions the fact that a negotiator is not 'present on his own account'. But to assume that his membership base is a 'third party' and that all this means is 'preparation before negotiation' rather than the necessity for approval of a proposed agreement after the negotiation of a settlement and before it is signed, is naive or possibly reflects lack of experience with the implications of unorganised collective behaviour. A legal agreement signed by committee representatives does not ensure consensus from the labour force nor willingness to abide by the terms of the agreement. The legal sanction of such an agreement might make it work, but this means that so-called peace in industrial relations reverts back to a system of management by coercion and not consent. The necessary authority of management is not legitimized and managerial power remains the dominant value.

#### 7.4 Can Worker Leaders be Trained by Management?

What concept of the nature of labour-management relations underlies these approaches - particularly the proposals put to the Minister of Labour?



The personnel managers of these companies deny that there is inherent conflict between employers and labour. In fact, instead of regarding distributive and integrative bargaining as complementary sub-processes they are perceived as alternatives. It is maintained that the distributive process is not appropriate and nor is it productive; i.e. the reality of limited or scarce resources is denied and it is assumed that the basic issue of distribution of the wealth produced can best be resolved through problem-solving.

The Group Personnel Manager of S.A. Breweries, Mr. D. Sutton, when elaborating on the Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals at a National Development and Management Foundation Conference in November, 1975, explicitly stated that, "acceptance of the wider concept of joint problem solving as the essence of labour relations will eventually lead to elimination of the term 'collective bargaining' with its emphasis on conflict and confrontation, from the vocabulary of labour relations." (Sutton, R., 1975). This assumption can be challenged not only in terms of developments in management-labour relations in other industrialised countries, but more specifically as it ignores the heritage of institutionalised violence towards Black workers in employment practices.

The industrial Black worker has been excluded from the definition of 'employee' for more than half a century and his union has not been involved in the decision-making process regarding wages, social security benefits and working conditions, nor has he had a chance to seek redress for industrial injustices. How can it be assumed that a period of distributive bargaining, even in the win/lose sense, is not structurally a reality in the years ahead?

Sutton assumes that the committee system provides the right of association. This suggests a refusal to recognise the implication of membership rights and responsibilities as being the crux of freedom of association, a quality which the committee structure cannot provide.

Irrespective of the legal requirement, communicating decisions are not how agreements become binding amongst workers. A trade union deals with the collectivity and, if organisationally effective, institutionalises consent to an agreement and can apply sanctions to make it binding. The regional co-ordinating or industry committee and its representative cannot

apply sanctions on the workers and cannot claim the latter consented to an agreement and hence assume a moral obligation that it must be adhered to. In other words, committees cannot institutionalise the peace obligation, for they are not a party to such an agreement as their contribution does not extend membership rights to workers.

Sutton's model of industrial relations ignores the crucial significance of strike action as a basic right which at least the 1973 amended Bantu Labour Regulations Act provides for (even though in a difficult form to realise). To be legal a strike has to be organised. What organisational procedures in terms of legal advice, strike ballot, organising pickets, strike funds, information about a strike decision etc., can be set in motion by a committee of full time employees?

Sutton also states that "decision and agreements reached in the committee must be communicated to individual members of the labour force". The reason for emphasising communication to the individual member and not the labour force as a collectivity is not explained. Is it a matter of communicating the decision or reaching acceptance of the terms of the agreement by the workers as union members? Sutton is following the ideology of Boulwarism developed by General Electric in America, which had as its objective the undercutting of the union by emphasising the management-employee axis. (Northrup, H., 1963).

Not only was this alternative model to independent unionism developed, but a manipulative approach was devised to ensure committee representatives held the 'correct' attitude and displayed the 'right' behaviour. It was felt necessary that these committee representatives did not adopt a win/lose strategy towards industrial relations. Consequently, considerable resources and manpower were made available through the personnel departments to provide training courses for these committee representatives. Training of committee representatives in committee procedures is in itself sound, although the question of who conducts these sessions must be seriously considered. However, the training modules devised by S.A. Breweries and subsequently adopted by other companies had as their stated aim a change in attitudes of

the representatives. What change and how was this to be achieved?

In 1975 the Goldstein/Sorcher approach to training of supervisors was increasingly being used in South Africa. The objectives of this approach are to increase supervisory behaviour effectiveness through improving interpersonal skills. This behaviour modelling technique is based on the assumption that attitude training, i.e. instilling new attitudes of behaviour in people is counter productive because of a defensive response which only strengthens existing attitudes. In order to teach new attitudes the training concentrates on the new behaviour which when practised to a stage of over-learning causes an attitude to change in order to support the new behaviour (S.A. Breweries, Personnel Department, 1976).

The new behaviour is taught through modelling and role play in terms of given requirements. The modelling is achieved through the showing of a film or through the trainer identifying the specific key behaviours required. The role play gives practice and rehearsal in the specific behaviour of the next models. Through praise as positive reinforcement reward or constructive feedback, social reinforcement of the new behaviour is achieved.

Goldstein and Sorcher point out that by viewing the modelling display, the trainee observes and identifies with a new behaviour which he learns through practice. The reward or social reinforcement he receives motivates him to repeat such behaviour and satisfies any query he might have why he should so behave. The social reinforcement can also be achieved through case presentation and positive comment from observers. (Goldstein, A., and Sorcher, M., 1974).

The authors state that this applied learning technique can equally apply to a variety of situations involving people in an occupational role. A list of applications of this learning technique is given. It does not include teaching worker representatives a specific set of behaviours.

Although the position of worker representatives is not an occupational role, South African Breweries felt justified in using this technique of behaviour modelling in their training programme of

committee representatives.

The authors state 'If a person is somehow helped to behave in a way that may be inconsistent with his beliefs and is rewarded for doing so, there is a high probability that he will change his beliefs to make them consistent with his new behaviour'. This raises two questions:- what attitudes held by committee representatives needed to be changed and what should the new attitudes be?

The basis of the new attitude which management required to be instilled can be deduced from the key behaviour patterns in the training manual. There is, however, no explicit statement in the documentation by the corporations where they spell out what is perceived as 'wrong' with the current attitudes of committee representatives. However, this can be deduced from the comments of the Personnel Manager. The recurrent theme in the articles examined is that negotiations should not become a situation of confrontation and that conflict between management and labour is not inevitable and in fact counter-productive. Furthermore, the expression of win/lose attitudes in the management-union interaction is viewed with abhorrence.

At the time when these proposals were formulated corporations had no experience with committee representatives and could not therefore base their assumption that they would display 'wrong' attitudes. There was no statement at all that these assumptions were based on a reading of behaviour of registered unions. Considering the reactionary response from managers to their perceived reading of the British situation it can be concluded that the personnel managers were transferring their perception of the attitudes and behaviour of British unions to the South African situation and were hoping to pre-empt the pattern of British industrial relations, the blame for which is said to lie with the unions and their leaders.

Support for this assessment that the present aspects of the British situation is being superimposed on the South African situation is the belief that 'productivity bargaining' offers the solution to industrial relations. The concept of productivity bargaining as a mean of breaking through the impasse between management and unions was

developed in Britain and is specific to the programmes introduced in that country.

In a paper given in 1977 entitled 'An Alternative Base for Labour Relations', Sutton stated: "In other words the present pattern of labour relations, confined almost exclusively to collective bargaining in which the emphasis is on conflict, confrontation and the win/lose syndrome, SHOULD BE REPLACED BY PRODUCTIVITY BARGAINING IN WHICH THE EMPHASIS IS ON DIALOGUE AND JOINT PROBLEM SOLVING". (Emphasis in original: Sutton, R. , 1977).

To achieve this change, negotiation should be decentralised and occur at the level of the specific factory or plant. Furthermore, the concept of "inherent conflict of interest between the parties" which inevitably results in alienation and eventual hostility between the two parties, must be replaced by a concept of mutual interest "in which joint effort is recognised as being the essential ingredient for future survival".<sup>f</sup> (Sutton, *ibid.*).

The idea of productivity bargaining is taken out of context, the only aspect being similar to the development of this concept in Britain, is that the bargaining be located in the factory or plant. It is significant that throughout these formulations the concept of labour as an independent party is not recognised. Thus the fundamental issue of between whom the bargain is supposed to be reached is ignored.

The concept of a productivity bargain was developed in order to break through the problem of restricted practices which had become part of the regulating process of British industrial relations. As Fleeman

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<sup>f</sup>In this article, the terms integrative and distributive bargaining are quoted but they are presented as alternatives and as two types and not as complementary sub-processes. This mention of these two sub-processes might be a consequence of the corporations' concerned being aware of the criticisms levelled against them as a draft outline of this analysis had been sent to one of the personnel managers involved in the S.A. Breweries/Tongaat deliberations.

points out, companies turned to productivity bargaining in order to answer the threat of wage claims, demarcation problems and requirements of flexibility in the usage of labour. "For many years there seemed to be no way through these intractable and defensive barriers until productivity bargaining showed that there was a way, because restrictive practices can be listed and the benefit for everyone of their removal can be demonstrated". (Fleeman, 1970, p.64).

But a change in emphasis towards productivity bargaining does not eliminate the need for independent parties. Furthermore, productivity bargaining retains a mixture of distributive and integrative sub-processes; a bargain has to be struck i.e., the question of costs remains crucial and hence there are still issues to be resolved; and this requires effective intra-organisational bargaining. The financial correlation implied in productivity bargaining leads to information being required on the fixed costs of the bargain; the costs which vary with productivity; and the benefits of increased productivity. Fleeman also stresses that before a productivity bargain can be considered, the union representation must be considered both in terms of numerical strength and shop steward's influence. "If there is a significant trade union membership, it is in the company's interest to ensure that it is well organised and well represented for it must be recognised that the additional strains introduced by productivity bargaining are proportionately as great for unions as for the management and the constituents of the shop stewards should have the opportunity of attending regular departmental meetings". (Ibid., p.74).

These considerations support the assessment that management was not basing the need for behaviour modelling training on actual 'wrong' attitudes of the committee representatives, but on pre-supposed attitudes they would display. This implies that the use of behaviour modelling techniques for the training of committee representatives becomes a manipulative strategy by management to retain control over the labour force.

The programme for training in negotiating skills is sub-divided into six frames of reference. These frames describe the behaviour

in terms upon which the committee representatives should model themselves, and are:

1. General Reference Frame for Liaison Committee operation.
2. Individual Participation in Group Problem Solving.
3. Preparing your Case.
4. Case Presentation.
5. Negotiation.
6. Communication.

A total of 28 (in another document 39) sub-statements indicating what behaviour committee representatives should model themselves on are listed under these frames of reference.

A key behaviour frame of reference of five statements for worker representatives' chairmen, and a key behaviour frame of reference of six statements for report-back procedures are also included.

The basic emphasis is that committee representatives should regard every agenda item between themselves and management as a joint problem solving exercise.

Before this assessment of the training programme is continued it is important to reiterate that joint problem solving as a sub-process of collective bargaining and complementary to distributive bargaining is directly relevant to the reconciliation process of the labour-management relationship. However, if it is used to deny the reality of the distributive bargaining process and is enforced on elected representatives of workers, it requires to be criticised. It is apparent that Sutton regards the distributive and integrative bargaining sub-process as mutually exclusive.

The following key statements in the frame of reference highlight the nature of the behaviour which the training programme holds up as a model:

- focus on the problem not the individual;
- try and turn each situation into a joint problem solving exercise;
- avoid inflexible stances and leave room for manoeuvre when submitting or reacting to a demand;
- avoid threatening any other member of their contribution at the cost of their participation;
- make sure you have all the facts pertaining to the problem and understand them;
- negotiate on the basis of talking with the other side and don't be apologetic or threatening towards them;
- start on common ground and always build on what is good for both parties;
- determine the most reasonable position you should reach when the negotiation is concluded;
- negotiate on the basis of talking with the other side and avoid the use of histrionics and threats;
- ask for and listen attentively to his reactions to your information;
- avoid emotional reactions to what he says.

Other themes are repeated in these frames of reference. Thus representatives are urged to:

- make sure you identify the problem exactly for yourself in the light of the group objective;
- be positive towards the group conclusions.

These exhortations require the representatives to identify with the representatives of management. The reference group is not the workers who elected them. This is apparent from the other themes, namely:

- if you need help to feedback to the work-force, ask for it (i.e. from management)
- if appropriate, assist the other side to prepare its report-back to its members.



This management controlled report-back provision is reinforced by the specific instruction given in the document entitled 'communicating back to the workforce'. This is achieved by means of the report back document prepared after every meeting. The committee representative is required to "report the information exactly as it appears in this document to make sure everybody gets the same information". Furthermore, although he may obtain the views of workers on the information, he can only make a note of them and is then required to raise them at a subsequent meeting. In other words, he cannot display any leadership qualities but must subordinate himself to the committee and basically act in a neutral capacity.

It is to be remembered that these behaviour patterns are presented as models to Black workers who up to 1973 had no formal system of representation and who are exposed to a system of authority which denies them any right of protest or reaction. These external constraints of the apartheid system make it even more difficult for a worker with no real protection against victimisation to question what he is exposed to during company time.

The social reinforcement is achieved through the use of a visual aid which depicts a 'negotiating metre' whereby trainees can assess their 'success' and effectiveness in displaying the required behaviour during the role plays. The positive or 'green' upper side of the metre is graded in terms of items ranging from mutual trust, self control, listening and talking, rational assessment through to the most desirable state to be in, namely conciliation. The negative or 'red' lower side of the metre is graded in terms of items ranging from distrust, fear, arrogance, naked hostility, to the position which must be avoided at all costs, namely deadlock and disputes. During the training session this metre acts as a warning not to enter the negative or undesirable states. (Keenan-Smith, D., 1976).

The use of this visual aid and the location of items reveals the basic lack of understanding of the power relations between management and labour, a phenomenon which is specifically manifested during collective bargaining.

A pre-requisite of any effective industrial relations system is that the possibility exists for a deadlock to be declared if no compromise between the conflicting interests can be achieved. And if this deadlock is not resolved through mediation and arbitration then the right to strike can be exercised. The display and the exercise of power through the deadlock and the strike action are regarded as essential rights without which the right to organise and the right to bargain are meaningless.

The decision to declare a deadlock is based on a rational assessment of a specific stage reached in negotiations in terms of the definition of the situation of that party. That is, the party decides that there is no further utility in continuing the relationship with the opponent. This decision is neither taken easily nor hastily. It is not taken when the negotiating team finds itself in a negative emotional state, as is suggested by the metre. The deadlock mechanism in fact, is necessary as it acts as a final warning to the opponent that the point of difference at issue is serious and if not reconcilable calls for a trial of strength. During the deadlock stage both parties have an opportunity of assessing their relevant strike costs. The cost of an organised efficient strike is considerable both in terms of financial drain on funds, organisational credibility, public image, future nature of the relationship and usually a strike ballot is required.

The consideration of these factors again highlights the unrealistic assumption being made that collective bargaining is only a problem-solving matter.

The range of behaviour patterns which the negotiating metre dictates and reinforces, denies workers and their leaders their own definition of the situation - or for that matter although rather hypothetical, also the management representatives. The negotiating metre suggests that to declare a deadlock is to be in a worse state than to display open hostility or distrust. The reinforcement of behaviour patterns achieved by the use of the negotiating metre is to deny that negotiators particularly on the side of the workers, operate in a boundary role conflict.

The role performance emphasized is that of maintaining at all costs a relationship with management. The role performance denied expression is acting in terms of the responsibility of having been elected by a constituency as a representative of workers. This objective is also reflected in the control exercised over the report back procedure. Thus the responsibility of the representatives to workers is played down and their loyalty to management, which is confused with loyalty to the company, is reinforced.

It is evident from the above that committee representatives are forced into a collusive relationship pattern with management. This leaves them either the option of accepting this role and using it to their own individual advantage, or withdrawing. The latter option of withdrawal can be either in the form of apathy or aiming to undermine that system.

During the 10 day full-time programme considerable emphasis is placed on role play sessions in order to reinforce the key behaviours. Furthermore, at the start of each day a revision or recall of key behaviours is undertaken for 30 minutes. During the last four days a total of 10 role plays are engaged in.

The items dealt with in the 10 role plays include:

- problem of quality of food and inadequate canteen facilities;
- problem of absenteeism;
- problems arising from requests for transfers being rejected;
- request for an increase in minimum rate of male general assistant to R90 per month;
- problem of staff pilferage;
- request for weekly instead of monthly pay.

The inclusion of the wage requests and the 'mixed' nature of some of the items (that is, having both distributive as well as integrative bargaining features) makes the problem solving approach as the sole mode of interaction, inappropriate.

The problem solving approach to industrial relations training has been adopted by other companies, notably General Mining; was incorporated by the National Development and Management Foundation in its negotiating programme, and has been given to a leading personnel management consultant who plays a key role in the Institute of Personnel Management.

#### 7.5 Assessment

Does the South African Breweries training programme facilitate the emergence of independent worker leaders? The conclusion from the above analysis is negative. The sole emphasis on group problem solving denies the independent evaluation by the worker party of its position. An essential dimension of the collective bargaining process is that each party should evaluate not only the usefulness of its own involvement in the negotiating process but also the utility of the outcome of the bargain in terms of its own definition of the situation. This definition is derived primarily from the objectives laid down in the union constitution as well as the expectation of rank and file members and the leaders.

The activation of this intra-organisational sub-process is denied by S.A. Brewery/Tongaat approach through:-

- the problem solving emphasis to management-worker interaction;
- the controlled report-back procedure;
- the refusal to accept deadlock as a rational mechanism in a situation where the divergent interest cannot be reconciled - even for a specified period;
- the refusal to recognise that the collectivity of collective bargaining implies separate and independent parties;
- the abhorrence expressed by the implication of the distributive bargaining which must result in a win/lose situation.

The Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals are based on the assumption that the relationship between the corporation and the workers is not a power relation. Hence the denial of membership of an independent body in the proposals and the enforced levy on the workers to pay for

the cost of the 'negotiating body' i.e., the Regional Co-ordinating Committee and the Regional Labour Councils.

As discussed, Clack postulates that an industrial relations system should accommodate two components, namely, the human relationship and the labour relationship. From the above analysis of the ideology in terms of which the S.A. Breweries, Huletts and Tongaat corporations formulated their proposals it is evident that only the human relationship was to be promoted. A deliberate policy of preventing the expression of the labour relationship was followed; i.e. the need for workers to circulate their collective interests through the trade union was denied.

The stated objectives of the Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals were to effect a system of representation, the result of which would be:

- Black representatives would help resolve labour disputes;
- Black representatives would hold themselves accountable for breaches of agreements;
- Black representatives would represent with dignity and confidence the workers who elected them. (Tonga Company, 1975).

The application of the Walton and McKersie theory of labour negotiations to the proposals demonstrates that the second objective would not be realised. The requirement of accountability, without constitutional rights of membership choice of an independent body, cannot be achieved as the intra-organisational sub-process is not institutionalised. The demand that an obligation be acted upon without acceptance of freedom of expression of rights is an unacceptable principle in terms of the theory.

The objective requiring that the representatives perform their role with dignity and confidence, appears to have been forgotten when the behaviour modelling approach was adapted to training of committee representatives. The opposite of this objective is achieved through the controlled report-back procedure, and requirement that they only see labour issues as problem solving matters and not items of distri-

butive bargaining.

The procedure whereby the first objective was to be achieved is not discussed in any detail. The institutionalisation of a grievance procedure is not dealt with and nor are specific mediation and arbitration procedures mentioned. It is significant that the corporation felt that the disciplinary code and a type of procedural mechanism required for its application should only be known by management. An index of the institutionalisation of the power relation between a company and the union is the operation of mutually acceptable procedures. It is therefore not surprising that these corporations and their spokesmen, who do not accept that industrial relations constitute power relations, have neglected this area or denied its relevance.

In one of the articles the need for a Labour Court for handling individual grievances is recorded. But this appears to be perceived as a means of preventing the type of disputes which emerged between employers and emerging Black unions on the Witwatersrand area, as recorded in the case studies. These were not individual grievances. Furthermore, Labour Courts should only deal with conflict of rights and as the case studies demonstrated the disputes centred around conflict of interests.

The Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals provide for the Department of Labour to retain the role it had played over the past 30 years. This suggestion overlooked the validity of the conclusion reached by Horrel after her assessment of management - Black labour disputes, that Black workers did not perceive the Department and its officials performing an enabling role nor was it regarded as being concerned about industrial justice. The arrival of the police with, or soon after, the Department of Labour officials, confirmed the perception that they were part of the overall system of oppression. This perception was reinforced by the role, or rather through the lack of it, played by the Department of Labour in disputes such as the Armourplate Safety Glass strike and the Heineman strike.

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suggests that concern felt about the uncertainty of moving towards a system of industrial relations based on consent, brought about a deviation towards a management controlled system of representation. The question is whether these proposals can be regarded as a stage in bringing about freedom of association in industrial relations or whether serious if not insurmountable obstacles have been structurally entrenched in the system devised.

The question requires consideration because the Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals were accepted at the corporate membership level of the S.A. Federated Chamber of Industries (F.C.I.) and subsequently submitted to the Minister of Labour as proposals for amending the Bantu Labour Relations Regulations Act. It was therefore the intention of these corporations that these proposals become adopted as a nation-wide system to be imposed on the relationship being developed between management and labour.

In order to discuss the consequences of this attempt to influence legislation it is pertinent to analyse what happened in another country which developed a system similar to the Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals, and how the parties responded to it. A study of the industrial relations system which was introduced in Spain during the period following the economic liberalisation after 1958 reveals certain similarities with these proposals. This study has been undertaken in depth, but for the purpose of this analysis only a summary is given. (Douwes Dekker, L., 1978).

Subsequent to the 1936 Civil War in Spain, any form of democratic process was denied by the Franco regime. The trade unions which claimed a membership of 2,2 million in 1931 were outlawed and forced into exile.

After World War II Spanish business groups became increasingly envious of the economic miracle in the rest of Europe. A process of economic liberalisation was introduced after 1958 to free the economy from State control and make foreign investment attractive. Spain had



attained membership of a number of international organisations including the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (1951); the United Nations (1955); and the International Monetary Fund (1958). However, this very exposure brought with it increased international debate about the suppressive political and labour laws in Spain and her application to the European Economic Community in 1962 was turned down because of the country's lack of democratic institutions. At the same time the International Commission of Jurists published a study which detailed the extent to which the rule of law did not operate in Spain.

By 1957 the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association had reported on its findings regarding complaints of violation of freedom of association in that country. The ILO governing board asked the Government to honour the following principles:

"(1) Workers should have the right to establish and join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation; (2) such organisations should have the right to draw up their own constitutions and rules, to elect their own representatives in full freedom; to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes; and the public authorities should refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof; and (3) such organisations should not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority". (ILO Report, 1969, p.244).

This was a severe indictment against the Spanish system of vertical representation which operated through the syndical organisations. How did it operate and what similarities to the Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals may be drawn?

As an alternative to the denial of free trade unions, hierarchical and unitary organisations called syndicates were imposed on the Spanish workers and employers. A syndical organisation was formed for each

manufacturing sector as well as other areas of specific economic activity. The syndical organisation consisted of a representative component and a controlling component. All Spaniards in the relevant production or economic sectors, in other words workers and employers, formed the representative part of the organisation, so that any difference between employers were denied and an artificial unity between them was assumed. Membership, and hence membership fees were compulsory and the whole system operated under the authority of the State. The place of work constituted the basis of this system and through indirect election procedures, representatives of workers and employers were elected for local, provincial and national bodies. This system of representation interlocked into the command component of appointed officials who also operated on national, provincial and local levels, and as administrators, controlled the structures of the syndical organisations and hence the processes of interaction it could accommodate. The duty of these appointed officials at each level was to ensure that the social discipline of the producers conformed to 'the principle of unity and co-operation'.

By 1960, 28 national syndicates, 1400 provincial syndicates and 15 000 local syndicates, of which 4 000 were industrial and service syndicates, were in operation. These bodies represented the command line from the top through which complete control was exercised over the workers and unity was enforced between employers and workers. These figures give some idea of the tremendous bureaucratic structure which was erected to control industrial relations. Amsden observes that the combination of indirect election (i.e. the system of making those elected at one level the electors for successive levels), and appointed officials, constituted an insidious form of control.

"A moment's reflection will indicate the advantages that such a method offers those in control of the organisation; especially where the possibility of fraud and intimidation are not ruled out."  
(Amsden, J., 1973, p. 73).

Through the system of automatic membership 98% of the 9,5 million workers were covered by syndical organisations in 1963. Besides the enforced subscription for the syndical organisation further deductions were made for social security and unemployment funds.

In response to the international criticism, innovations were introduced to this monolithic structure of control but the basic principles of freedom of association were still denied.

The following main changes were made:

- Although provision for plant based consultative committees had been previously made they only became operative from the late 1950's onwards. An examination of the legally defined functions of the committee reveals that the emphasis was on 'making proposals' or 'hearing reports' as well as giving them responsibility for administration of the social programmes. Furthermore, the discretionary powers given to the Chairman of the Committee, who was the employer representative, allowed him to manipulate the agenda of meetings to avoid discussion of certain topics. In 1958, this committee was allowed to negotiate so-called wage agreements.
- In 1963, the Head of the Syndical Organisation indicated that election for local and provincial bodies would be 'fair and open'. The fact that this guarantee, because of increasing protests, had to be given is indicative of the nature of previous elections. Yet after this election, 1 800 of those elected were deprived of their posts, obviously to suppress the emerging independence amongst worker leaders.
- In 1961, in order to ensure co-operation between the elected representatives and the appointed officials it was approved by the authorities that a Syndical Congress be held every three years. The purpose of this innovation in the 'liberalisation' process was to enable the elected representatives to meet in open debate, to participate in decisions relating to social and economic problems; to adopt proposals regarding the investment of syndical

funds; to receive reports on the progress made in implementing decisions; and to adopt proposals concerning future policy. But the Congress still brought employer and worker representatives together as if they belonged to one body with identical interests. It was therefore proposed that a separate Council of Workers and a Council of Employers be established. But this acknowledgement of differences between management and labour was not carried through to any logical extent; i.e. workers were still forbidden to form an association of their own choosing. As it was, the separate councils could only act in an advisory capacity, and had to operate within the total control system.

- The 1958 law on Collective Bargaining listed 17 issues which would become matters for negotiation. These agreements could either be negotiated on a regional basis for a sector or within a company. Final approval of the agreement which had to comply with certain restrictions regarding their effect on prices, rested with the Ministry of Labour.
- In 1964 an Institute of Union Studies was established which had as its function, besides research, the training of the syndicate leaders and the supervision of the form of the teaching on trade union matters. The underlying philosophy was to train new leaders in 'participation' trade unionism and not the old style 'opposition' trade unionism. The argument given was that the old leader was 'a kind of social upstart' who became an expert in passionate harangues, subversive action and violent strikes, and relied on instinct to achieve urgent action because 'just wages were urgent, the covering of labour risk was urgent, and an eight hour day was urgent'. What objectives the new leader should set were not stated apart from an awareness that during the courses the difference between a worker and other members of society was functional and not essential. In 1968 training was given to 142 871 worker members of syndical organisations (Sindicalismo en Espana, 1968, No. 7).
- Until 1962 striking was illegal and carried criminal sanctions. In 1962 a hesitant step towards the right to strike was taken in

that at least the existence of management-labour disputes of a collective nature were recognised and machinery whereby they could be settled by arbitration was established by the State. But the law still did not recognise the right to strike and the employer could discharge strikers if the arbitration machinery was not used.

What was the response of the Spanish worker to these innovations and changes, some of which, relative to the immediate post-war period appeared at first to be meaningful?

- The Franco regime forced the trade union movement to go underground and operate its head office in exile where it gained diplomatic credibility and acceptance by other countries as well as the international trade secretariats and the ICFTU. This meant that the countries of the free world denied the claim by Spain that syndical organisations were equivalent to worker organisation. Their representatives had to operate through Spanish embassies.
- The clandestine or underground organisations became more active after the period of 'economic liberalisation'. The Communist party as well as lay Catholic worker organisations made it their objective to destroy the syndicates. Resistance organisations called Workers' Commissions emerged after the innovations were introduced as a result of the opportunity offered by the so-called negotiating functions of the consultative committees. A strategy was adopted by these different kinds of bodies to fight the syndical organisation from within by obtaining positions on works councils.
- Research conducted in 1967 revealed that more than half the elected members on consultative committees found the structure of the body inadequate both in theory and in practice. Of significance was the assessment by 84% of the council members that

they were placed at a disadvantage in negotiations owing to pressure from the employers' side as well as their lack of training and the partisan attitude of the State appointed officials on the syndical organisations. Both employer and worker representatives agreed that inequality existed in the bargaining situation but differed in their interpretation of it. Employers saw it primarily as a lack of training in industrial relations skills, whereas 72% of council members considered that the main reason for being at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the employers, was due to the lack of support and advice from a trade union. The survey established that the reform measures of the 'liberalisation' period had not institutionalised the relationship between management and workers. To the specific question: "Is opposition to management greater?" 70% of the council members and 30% of the employers affirmed that it was. As the author of the study stated: "the attitude of these workers showed an unmistakable tendency toward increasing the distance separating them from the undertaking toward greater opposition to management and increased hostility". (Barcellona Institute, 1976, p.282).

- The function of bargaining imposed on the consultative committee did not imply that the sub-processes of collective bargaining could be accommodated by that structure. The workers were not members of the committees whose function it was supposed to negotiate on their behalf. However, the so-called collective bargaining mechanism did raise expectations and workers soon realised that they could influence the final wage rates through various demonstration actions. The actions initially emphasized 'go-slows', other incidents to create tensions between management and workers, and 'sit-ins', etc., but increasingly partial and total work stoppages occurred. "The number of working hours lost through strike action became closely linked to the re-negotiations every other autumn, of the majority of collective agreements. In the period, autumn 1971 to spring 1972 when collective agreements came up for renewal, 19 million working hours were lost.

These strike actions became the mechanism whereby collective bargaining was brought to a close". (Douwes Dekker, L., 1978, p. 34).

- The increased incidence of strikes as well as the findings of the Barcelona Institute, demonstrated that conflict was not institutionalised through the syndical organisation. Amsden identified the emergence of two strategies in his analysis of the approaches adopted by the Spanish workers to the plant-based works council structures and the negotiating facility provided by the 1958 legislation. These two approaches, industrial egotism and workers' power are polar types along the same continuum with variations in between.

Industrial egotism refers to a situation in which the workers, or a group of workers in the plant act without regard for the consequences of their action in the factory for other workers. "Workers' power would obtain in the opposite case wherein these actions of worker organisation at the factory level are directed towards gains for the whole working class". (Amsden, J. , 1973, p. 115). Workers in specific jobs who adopt industrial egotism can use their potential influence in the work place structure to make gains for themselves only. This limited scope and isolation sooner or later leads to those involved being controlled by the employer - it leads to the individualist sentiment of each for his own sake. In certain situations, in particular in America, a specific group in a factory use this approach, i.e., those workers who can command strategic skills because they are indispensable (such as mechanics, those employed in the repair shop), or can use grievance procedures to improve their position in relation to other workers. In a specific case study investigated by Amsden, the maintenance shop workers as well as the quarrymen, used their position to extract concessions from the company for their own group only. Amsdens' description of industrial egotism is supported by the findings of Mulder regarding

the testing of the power distance reduction theory. Mulder demonstrated that the establishment of plant-based committees did not reduce the power distance between management and workers. In fact, the committee representatives identified with management. Whether deliberately or not, the plant-based committees were insulated from the labour force and no structures were provided to ensure contact between representatives and the work force. (L. Douwes Dekker, 1978).

What are the similarities between the Tongaat/S.A. Breweries proposals, and subsequent elaboration in particular by the South African Breweries - and the Spanish system as it developed primarily during the 1960 decade?

The fundamental similarities between the two systems is the suppression of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. The corporations in South Africa cannot be directly blamed for the void in which Black trade unions have to operate and the denial of the right to organise, to bargain or strike. But the proposal made by S.A. Breweries and Tongaat for amending legislation were drawn up with the assumption that suppression of workers' rights would continue to exist and that in fact it should be reinforced by the State. Furthermore, S.A. Breweries deliberately withdrew from the debate in South Africa regarding the necessity for freedom of association for Black workers to become a basic value of South African society. This became apparent from its sudden decision to no longer hold discussions with Black trade unions, and its refusal to follow up the initial participation by one of its consultants regarding the establishment of a joint labour-management industrial relations institute. This institute would, and when inaugurated did, accept Black union leadership on its Board of Trustees.

A further similarity is the development of a vertical representative structure based on the plant-based committee. The term vertical is used to describe the structure built up from the committees at the place of work. This approach denies or tries to prevent a horizontal base from being established in a sector. The latter emerges when



workers from a number of factories in the same sector change their status to include that of a union member; i.e., the rank and file members representing the horizontal power axis of a sector which expresses itself through the union structure and which must be involved in the collective bargaining process required by that union's constitution.

The plant-based structure, particularly where freedom of association is denied or its expression not facilitated, becomes an organ of management locked into the hierarchical command structure.

A collective bargaining function is 'grafted' on such committees. It cannot accommodate the process of collective bargaining but simply provides the semblance of workers having acquired that right.

Other similarities are listed below by reference to the relevant provisions or approaches in and of the S.A. Breweries and Tongaat Group proposals:-

- The forced levy to pay for the devised superstructure, namely the regional co-ordinating committees (industrial committees in the subsequently amended Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act), which are perceived as equivalent to a trade union, and the Regional Labour Council which is perceived as functioning as the industrial councils.
- The stress on employers and workers being united, i.e. "is there not merit in keeping our collective bargaining within the family" and what is important is "our mutual objective which should be a thriving and prosperous industry through which benefits would flow to shareholders and workers alike". How this 'flow' is to be achieved or decided upon was not discussed. (Vogel, T., 1976, pp. 5 and 7).
- The denial of freedom of association and of the right to organise; i.e. the inevitability of conflict of interests is denied and hence it is assumed the distributive bargaining sub-process can

be ignored. "The degree of confrontation between the employer and his employee will be diminished in the 'group nature' of council proceedings".

- The emphasis on controlled - either by the State or employers - industrial relations training to ensure committee representatives display certain defined key behaviours which are acceptable to the corporation concerned.
- The denial of the right to strike, although accepting 'collective' disputes but requiring compulsory arbitration. "Where a dispute is declared the Board would be empowered to appoint one of its members to act as a mediator between the parties", and in the event of unsuccessful mediation, the Minister will institute compulsory arbitration leading to a legally binding order. (Vogel, T., 1976<sup>(\*)</sup>, p.15).
- The controlling role played by the State through the Department of Labour. As shown above the Central Labour Bantu Board would be involved in arbitration and also the registration of the Regional Labour Councils. Furthermore, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of that Council, "would have to be acceptable to the Minister of Labour". (Vogel, T., 1976<sup>(\*)</sup>, p. 14).
- The stress on plant-based 'house-agreements', i.e., emphasis on decentralised collective bargaining. The contradiction implied in a liaison committee consisting of employer and employee representatives concluding such a 'house-agreement' which would become legally binding, is not considered. How can employers of a company conclude an agreement with that company?

The similarities between the South African Breweries and the Tongaat Group approach and the Spanish situation before freedom of association

in terms of the I.L.O. Convention was ratified in 1977, are specific enough to describe those proposals as tacitly implying the establishment of a vertical system of representation.

The implication of reliance on State security to prevent the emergence of other worker bodies is not spelled out by the proposals. However, the provision that the Regional Councils will investigate alleged instances of victimisation implies that workers operating outside that system, who claimed victimisation, could not be assisted. Thus the operation and activities of the State security system as a means to prevent other bodies from emerging, was tolerated.

The proposals for legislative amendment stressed repeatedly the special or unique aspects of the envisaged system of "Black labour relations". This concern probably reflected the awareness that the proposals were manipulative.

It is appropriate to conclude this analysis by quoting the statement by the Black industrial relations officer, which was not answered by the managers, regarding the 'paternalism and arrogance' of excluding Blacks from trade union rights. He stated, "If the African is given the instruments of self-government in his Homeland, is not that an admission that he has come now to a stage where he can handle the affairs of State, and if so, why deny him the institution (i.e. trade union) which is the very essence of self-government in industrial life"? (Vogel, T., 1976<sup>(4)</sup>, p.5).

SECTION DCHAPTER 8PROFILES OF TWO CONSTRUCTED TYPES  
DEPICTING RESPONSES TO UNIONISM BY COMPANIES

The foregoing data and analysis revealed that the Black trade unions which emerged in the 1970 decade faced considerable if not insurmountable obstacles in their attempts to become organisationally effective. In fact it was postulated in terms of the historical analysis made that the labour relations component of the industrial relations system would remain latent. The corollary being that increased attention would be paid to the human relations component. The case study material describing the experience of Black unions in trying to gain recognition supports this assessment. The research findings based on interviews with representatives from leading companies, however, suggested that the possibility existed for Black trade unions to enter the second stage of organisational development through a form of recognition by free-enterprise companies.

Three categories of companies were identified in terms of their response to the growing support by Black workers for trade unionism and resulting formulation of an industrial relations policy by companies. The one category covered those companies who had as yet not formulated a definite policy. Hence consideration need only be given on the implications of the paternalistic and the free-enterprise categories.

8.1 The Constructive Type in Sociological Analysis

It is the purpose of this last chapter to construct from the salient findings derived from research data two types of companies by abstracting certain definite attributes which distinguish them from each other. These types will be useful as a heuristic device to determine probabilities regarding future union-management relations. In addition to the use of the data, case study material describing

a specific attempt of a free-enterprise company and independent union to conclude a recognition agreement, will be referred to. Some of the assumptions underlying general systematic theory will also be brought into the formulation of this typology.

In his exposition of the role of the constructive typology in sociological analysis McKinney points out that the constructed type is an abstraction taken for the purpose of eliminating the details of research by achieving a structured order out of observations, the constructed type makes it possible for statements to be made and verification exercises to be carried out. The constructed type is not found in reality as it accentuates to a logic extreme some attributes or group of attributes that are relevant to a system of analysis. The identification of these attributes will enable profiles to be drawn up of the two polar types of the continuum in terms of which companies have responded to either the demand for union recognition or to the presence of a union in the place of work. The success of this attempt to construct ideal type profiles depends on their use in measuring or comparing concrete occurrences. That is, the one-sided emphasis placed in the description of the two types means that the degree and extent of deviations of actual occurrences can be described if not measured. In this instance the two types of responses by companies, being the polar extremes of the continuum, will serve as a point of reference in the analysis of social reality. (McKinney, J., 1950).

## 8.2 An Overview of the Findings

Before the attributes with which the profiles will be drawn up are described, it is pertinent to present an overview of relevant aspects of the findings.

Two racially discriminatory systems of control have operated in South Africa over the past hundred years. Through the job colour bar the White workers have been assured a privileged position because the Blacks were denied union rights. Through the exploitation colour bar the Black worker was prevented from selling his labour freely and acquiring skills to advance himself.

But although the Black worker was kept apart from the values of the socio-economic system, he was increasingly required as a skilled worker to be part of the production process. The duality of the economic system in terms of racial and corresponding regional development could not be maintained. In the 1960 decade in particular the Black worker was increasingly drawn into the economic system without, however, the commensurate reward and status. Not only did this mean that the separate development ideology could not be achieved but that the denial of industrial justice would lead to a legitimacy crisis as it became apparent to the Black workers as a collectivity, that they were relatively deprived in relation to White workers who could exercise rights and gain improvements in the quality of their lives. The expression of this discontent in the 1973 demonstration strikes was in a fundamental way easier than to build viable trade unions on the momentum generated. However in the broader societal dimension Black consciousness became the ideological dynamic to break through the state of apathy workers had been forced into in the past because of repressive legislation. This determination by Black leaders to earn a place in the organisational network which had excluded them all these years was assisted in the work situation through the operation of workers' educational organisations. A further factor in favour of possible success for the emerging Black unions was the breakdown of aspects of the job colour bar, in particular job reservation.

One of the peculiarities of the industrial relations system, such as it existed, was that the White trade unions had achieved and maintained their privileged position through control over market relations by barring Blacks from entry into specific semi-skilled and skilled job categories. The White trade unions had however neglected managerial relations in the place of work between management and workers. This was the relationship Black workers through organising campaigns and recognition agreements were aiming to influence.

As the analysis showed, the management of companies were not

prepared for such an inroad into their perceived prerogative to unilaterally decide on wages, working conditions and other employment practices. It was therefore to be expected that managers would resist the union penetration into the place of work and resort to unfair labour practices to eject a perceived interfering third party. The increased relevance of the personnel management function developed during the 1960 decade would support the belief that the employer knew best and justify taking coercive and repressive measures. The case studies describing the experience of five trade unions, illustrate the nature of this negative response by companies to a union presence amongst "their" workers. The interviews with the managers from those companies which were attempting to define the new industrial relations function did, however, reveal that certain free-enterprise companies were prepared to enter into a recognition agreement with independent unions. That approach was in contrast to the paternalistic company which resisted such a demand.

However it became clear that the obstacle Black unions faced was not only that of managerial policies and attitudes in defending change but the wider societal dimension reflecting the Government's refusal to agree that Black workers should be allowed to exercise worker rights in the so-called White areas. It is for this reason that the following case study is included in this chapter.

### 8.3 The Problem in Defining a Mutually Acceptable Recognition Procedure

This case study deals with the difficulties experienced by a company and a Black trade union in working out an acceptable procedure to facilitate the recognition process and the interference experienced from the Department of Labour. The company was not included in the survey but is a subsidiary of a free-enterprise corporation.

During 1975, the union embarked on an organising campaign amongst the workers employed by the company and worker leaders

attended seminars. A membership core was established towards the end of that year. An estimated 85 per cent of the workers were accommodated in a hostel. The shop stewards experienced a cautious interest amongst the workers because of fear of intimidation. Details of the industrial relations directive issued by the company to its management became available. It is pertinent to quote from the policy document. Under the heading "Principles" the following items are listed:

"The company's attitude to industrial relations is governed by the following principles:

- The management must have the exclusive responsibility to manage the business, decide on the number of employees required and direct the labour force.
- Keeping the company profitable and productivity high requires the commitment of both managers and employees.
- Successful industrial relations depend on effective practices which enable employer and employee to discuss and negotiate mutually acceptable service and working conditions.
- Misunderstandings and differences will occur between management and employees. It is important to recognise them quickly and resolve them by negotiation; this is best done by an effective grievance procedure.
- Trade unions which are committed to the aforementioned principles can contribute to the success of the company by helping to maintain industrial peace, a motivated labour force and high productivity. Where these sound industrial relations principles are effectively practiced, strikes, lockouts and unrealistic demands are not to the advantage of employers or employees". (P)

In the section on objectives, the need for worker representatives was stressed and the purpose of agreements set out. The agreement would contain a section on the trade union, presumably in terms of facilities and function.

However, a lack of clarity was evident as to who constitutes the worker "party". The following paragraph reflects this confusion:



"The negotiation of agreements may be taken in phases depending on the level of development reached by the committee concerned".

Who constitutes the "committee" is not clear. In other clauses of the directive the term "employee representative" or "parties" is used.

Under the heading "Implementation Regulations" the following procedures and committee structures are included: "works committee"; "negotiating committee" (without clear indication how the concept "collective agreement" is understood or how the union mentioned in the principles would feature); and three sub-committees responsible for productivity, safety and health, and expense and material control.

In order to gain clarity and because the workers mistrusted the document, a number of meetings between the union and the personnel manager at the head office were held towards the end of 1975 when substantial membership was reached. Agreement was reached in principle on the company's willingness to recognise an unregistered independent union and the discussions were continued with the management of the factory.

In February 1976 the union issued a circular to the workers advising them that "the company had agreed that they will be happy to receive the secretary of the union to discuss the problem of the members". Furthermore, the names of the two shop stewards were given, urging workers to join. The heading to the circular was: "COMPANY RECONGISES UNION". This prominent emphasis caused irritation on the part of the management and brought about negative reaction from the Department of Labour.

In June the union issued a follow-up circular, pointing out that the union had facilities but was not recognised. As more workers, 60 in total had joined, a third shop steward was elected. Management asked that the names of union members be supplied.

At a meeting held towards the end of July, the union secretary explained to management that the fear of victimisation of union members by lower level management still prevailed. Management expressed concern that copies of the circular had been found in the possession of workers employed by another company in that sector. During August management reiterated the request that the names of members be supplied. With the consent of the union members employed by that company, the union Executive Committee forwarded the list.

Unfortunately, the personnel department allowed departmental heads access to this list. In certain departments, White section leaders made threatening and deprecating comments to those workers who had become union members. As a result of this attack the hostel dwellers stopped payment of subscriptions. The Personnel Manager admitted a mistake had been made and undertook to prevent this leakage occurring again when confronted by the Secretary about this lack of good faith on the part of management. But the union was unable to maintain the thrust of its organising campaign. Workers withdrew from union activities and turn-out at seminars dropped. The typical, and rational attitude of "wait and see" was adopted by the workers.

The union also suspected security policy interference if not threats. The Department of Labour somehow obtained a copy of the circular and a telephone call was made to the Personnel Manager threatening the companies' contracts with Government departments because of its decision to deal with the unregistered union. The company refused to be intimidated and requested that the matter be put in writing. The following letter was received by the company:

"The Secretary  
"Y"

15-6-1976

"Sir

BANTU LABOUR RELATIONS REGULATIONS ACT 1953  
COMMUNICATION WITH YOUR BANTU WORKERS

Following discussions an Assistant Bantu Labour Officer of this office had with your Personnel Officer, Mr. "Z" on 12 May 1976 when it transpired that your company was

prepared to liaise with "X" union provided that it was representative of your Bantu workers, I have to inform you that:-

(a) the Department would appreciate it if you would utilize the machinery provided by the Act as means of communication and negotiation with your Bantu workers, and

(b) should you have discussions with the Trade Union concerned, you will in fact be dealing with a body which is not recognised, which action might adversely affect the machinery of the Act and lead to labour unrest.

Yours faithfully,  
signed  
Divisional Inspector".

This letter reflects the similar but more emotional contention which this Division of the Department conveyed when it replied to a company which had asked for guidance on committee constitution. On that occasion the Department said that Black trade unions "were repugnant to Government policy". The statement in the concluding paragraph of the Department's letter is in fact more alarming than the previous emotional reaction. There is no evidence that if a company deals with a Black or unregistered union, this could "lead to labour unrest". It supports the belief of those involved in attempting to get Black unions established and recognised, that the authorities only view them as a source of civil unrest.

The company, in reply to the local Divisional Inspector of Labour, said that it had complied with the request as set out in item (a) of the letter. It was further pointed out that the union mentioned had only been provided with facilities to contact the company on behalf of paid-up members, "once the management and legal system (i.e. committee) had failed to resolve the problem". It reinforced the point by quoting from the letter it had sent to the union at the time, namely:

"If your paid-up members should have problems which they feel cannot be resolved through the normal structure, the personnel officials or the works committee, then we are happy to receive a member of your union to discuss the matter".

These incidents brought the attempts between the union and the company to develop a recognition agreement to a halt. As the company indicated to the union in a letter sent during March, 1977: "At present we appear to be experiencing a communications breakdown". This conclusion was reached because an arranged visit had not been kept by the union secretary and furthermore the list of paid-up members had not been forwarded. The banning of UTP personnel in November 1976 and difficulties experienced in maintaining a cohesive Executive Committee may further explain the union's withdrawal. At a meeting held in May 1977 between the union secretary and the company the following matters were discussed:

- the union requested that in future one of the shop stewards should be present at such meetings;
- the question of "making names of union members known to management" would be re-discussed by the union;
- that it be sufficient, if a worker asked for union assistance in processing of grievances, that he produce his or her membership cards;
- the union would - again - forward a copy of the constitution.

No decisions were taken as the management representative said that the matters had to be discussed with the Board of Directors. This was in fact the final meeting.

The case study is relevant as it illustrates the necessary and sufficient conditions which must prevail before a recognition agreement has a chance of being concluded. The major sufficient conditions are:

- the existence of an industrial relations approach, preferably supported by a policy statement, by a company which acknowledges the right of workers to form a trade union;
- a trade union which is organisationally effective, also in terms of:- a secretary who keeps to arrangements made with management; an Executive Committee which can decide on issues; workers who are prepared to free themselves from the fears of victimisation and give considerable majority support for the union;

- experience on the part of both management and union leaders in the stages of union recognition and willingness to hear the other side.

A necessary condition for the South African situation is support from the wider society and specifically from the Department of Labour for the idea that Black unions are legitimate organisations. As one industrial relations manager said: "We are not in the business of overthrowing the apartheid system". Hence, written industrial relations policies contain a clause that the practices should "conform strictly with applicable law and Government regulations". On the one level this necessary condition seems a logical requirement; however, the implications of its fundamental persuasive influence have not been taken sufficiently into account in the analysis of the obstacles facing recognition of Black unions.

#### 8.4 Attributes of the Typology

The typology is constructed with the use of variables or attributes. The attributes will be briefly discussed in these paragraphs before the profiles of the open or free-enterprise type and closed or paternalistic type as described in a comparative table. As will become apparent the attributes relate to each other and the one follows from the other as implied in the conceptual framework analysed in chapter 1.

- Attitude towards industrial conflict. This attribute is basic to the process of institutionalisation of industrial conflict.
- Rights of workers. This attribute deals with acceptance of the principle that if hierarchical authority system of the work place is maintained, then workers should be able to exercise right.
- Process of reconciliation of industrial conflict. This attribute is self-explanatory.
- Instrument. This attribute deals with the instrument through which conflict is to be tackled, the type of work-place structure based on definition of joint consultation established and the approach to conflict of interests.

- Industrial relations component. This attribute relates to the level through which interaction occurs.
- Education of worker representatives. This attribute deals with the attitude towards education and training of worker representatives.
- System theory. This attribute has not been discussed. It deals with two concepts identified by Berrien in his general systems approach to organisations. The organisation as a system has boundaries through which, relatively, inputs and outputs are controlled. Two major inputs are maintenance and signal inputs. The maintenance input is necessary to keep the system functioning or alive and its impact is to bring about increased social interaction between the components of the system. The signal inputs are those to which the system responds and leads to exploration and contact with other systems and thereby enhances the achievements of that system. (Berrien, K., 1974).
- Resistance to change. This attribute emphasises that the demand for change must be defended, but the manner in which the role of defender is exercised is crucial and depends on the concept of power, i.e. is power seen as a fixed sum or is it perceived as expandable?
- Measurement of success of policy. This attribute deals with the criteria developed to determine the adequacy or success of the policy adopted.

# ATTRIBUTES OF TWO TYPES OF COMPANIES AND THEIR RESPONSE TO TRADE UNIONS

Open - free-enterprise company type	Closed - paternalistic company type
Attitude to conflict	Conflict is normal and constructive; through interaction new norms are established and change process facilitated. Power phenomenon of industrial relations is accepted and hence strikes are seen as legitimate but disputes procedure is required.
Rights of workers	Conflict is pathological, its expression destructive, and hence unfair labour practices are introduced. Hence manipulative and coercive methods (informers and security police) are justified; strike handling and other coercive methods are legitimate.
Process of reconciliation of industrial conflict.	Collective rights are seen as impinging on managerial prerogatives. The individual right of workers is acknowledged. Hence labour Court to judge on grievances is promoted.
Institutionalisation of inherent differences by mutually agreed procedural mechanisms to resolve conflict of interest and conflict of rights. Distinction implied between management and the company. Management accountability is implied in the field of employment practices towards workers as a collective entity - process of legitimising of managerial power into authority has to be embarked on. The company is not the sole property of the management and hence the union can be expected to work toward the good of the company. This implies that no contradiction is perceived between union membership and "adherence" to company objectives such as improved productivity; increase in sales; improved quality; safety etc.	Communication between management and the individual employee as well as attitude surveys are central in establishing worker needs. No relevant distinction between the company and management as the latter is sole custodian of the company and responsible to shareholders; hence the welfare responsibility of management to employees. Managerial power is invested in its role responsibility and accountability to workers is not required. The trade union is an external third party interfering in management to employee relations and hence there is no need to establish a relationship with it. The communication channels are enhanced, if necessary, with internal structures but this does not require workers to acquire an additional role.

Open - free-enterprise company type	Closed - paternalistic company type
<p data-bbox="1306 474 1335 625">Instrument</p> <p data-bbox="1209 749 1335 1476">The recognition agreement is the vehicle through which mutually agreed procedures on matters of common interest are agreed to by the parties.</p> <p data-bbox="1016 749 1209 1476">The work-place committee structure of representation will consist of union leaders or have a direct union influence in the election process such as drawing up a list of nominees, i.e. the committee will facilitate joint consultation.</p> <p data-bbox="774 749 1016 1476">The system of wage regulation to remain on centralised level of that sector if it has been the practice in the past. If collective bargaining is decentralised it will still be for minimum rates. In either case the principles of compromise and industrial peace will be implied and obligatory for both parties.</p> <p data-bbox="614 474 716 625">Industrial relations component</p>	<p data-bbox="1209 1594 1335 2318">Considerable resources and personnel; e.g. Black personnel officers, are allocated to ensure success. Attitude surveys enable the company to determine what the workers want.</p> <p data-bbox="967 1594 1209 2318">If some form of procedures are used, the personnel department will play a crucial role in ensuring that "justice is seen to be done". If plant-based committees are established the worker representatives will be required to identify with management perception of company goals and objectives i.e. the committees will be organs of management.</p> <p data-bbox="832 1594 967 2318">The company, if covered by a centralised wage regulating instrument, will pay above the minimum rate or enter into a so-called agreement with committee representatives.</p> <p data-bbox="397 1594 716 2318">Resources and personnel will be allocated to enhance the services rendered by the personnel department in the human relations component.</p> <p data-bbox="397 1594 591 2318">The activities of the trade union operating in that area will be carefully monitored. Any services rendered by the union will be seen as attempts to undermine management and will be countered with a similar or improved benefit or service offered by the</p>



Open - free-enterprise company type	Closed - paternalistic company type
<p>to examine jointly the industrial relations implications for personnel practices such as: job description and job evaluation; bonus schemes; quality of working life; programmes such as job design, restructuring of work groups etc; performance appraisal schemes (if seen as relevant); safety and health measures; change in work techniques; social security benefit schemes; distribution of work loads and overtime, etc. To ensure effective participation by representatives, certain facilities such as time-off, office space, will be granted.</p> <p>Allegiance by workers to the trade union through taking on of union membership will not be perceived to be an act of disloyalty to the company.</p> <p>The notion of paid educational leave will be supported and although a preference will be shown for joint-run courses, the company will allow workers to attend union-run or sponsored courses during working time.</p>	<p>company. The union will be seen to want to attack the loyalty which workers have developed towards the company and management.</p>
<p>Education of union and worker representatives</p>	<p>The training of worker representatives will be perceived to be a company hence management responsibility.</p>
<p>System theory</p>	<p>The focus of attention in accommodating to the change required by the new industrial relations function will be to respond to any signal inputs received through the boundaries of the business organisation and bring about changes in procedural mechanisms.</p>

	Open - free-enterprise company type	Closed - paternalistic company type
Resistance to change	<p>The role of defender of change is accepted, hence the emphasis on free-enterprise system; but it is accepted that this implies power-sharing as power is seen as expandable. Hence new industrial relations practices and procedures will be entered into. The degree to which trade unions will be able to influence managerial decisions will depend on their organisational effectiveness and ability (strategy) of leaders.</p>	<p>Power is seen as a fixed sum and hence it becomes imperative to protect existing status quo arrangements. Thus if, on centralised level, trade unions are to be recognised, preference for parallel unions established by White unions will be shown.</p>
Measurement of success	<p>The success of an industrial relations policy will primarily be assessed through the procedures and processes established with independent unions and whether they are mutually used. This implies that the dynamic of trust - not collusion - as the crucial variable binding the relationship.</p>	<p>The success of the industrial relations policy will be measured through indices such as labour turnover; absenteeism etc., and monitored through content analyses of work place communication systems.</p>

The following comments are to be borne in mind in regard to the above descriptions of the attributes of these two types:

- Underlying the two ideal type responses to trade unionism is the concept of property rights of the company. Property rights range from physical access to the premises to parity influence by worker representatives on policy decisions. This is why the paternalistic company is determined not to grant even physical access to a "third party". There is as yet no indication amongst the free enterprise type that as the relationship develops between the company and the union this will lead to an influence by workers through their representatives on policy decisions of the Board of Directors. However the nascent development of the re-emerged Black unions of the 1970 decade suggests that considerable organisational effectiveness has to be developed and established before workers participation is considered.
- The concept of management requires in-depth study, in particular the implications of a distinction between the functioning of managers and the existence of a company. What is the nature of the legitimacy of managers to manage? Such an analysis would build on the distinction between structural and functional democracy and how they are brought about.
- An undefined area is that of the representative rights of non-union employees and how they can be brought into the decision-making process on domestic matters. Free enterprise companies have not yet formulated a stand on the need for representation, even though limited, in situations where unionism has not yet been adopted by workers. The potential of creating out of the work-place committee a joint consultative organ is dependent on willingness on both sides to perceive it as operating for all employees and not only union members. If the legislation does not clarify the scope or limits of committees it should be made part of recognition agreements.
- Both types imply that management in its approach to the employees are moving away in employment practices, from coercion to consent. However the paternalistic-closed type will, in a crisis, readily revert back to coercive practices.

#### 8.5 Predictive Role of the Typology

The typology requires refinement and this can best be achieved in its application. The predictive role of the typology will operate on two levels. It is to be remembered the typology does not itself represent concrete reality.

On the one hand the typology can be used to assess to what extent the industrial relations policy and practices of a company deviate from one of the two constructed types. If certain practices are not "in line" with the overall profile of a type, the question can be asked if the expression of this attribute does not represent an inconsistency, if not contradiction. That practice would require attention if the objectives regarding the proposed relationship pattern are to be achieved. For example, the continued use by a company following the free-enterprise or open approach, of Black officers would have to be reconsidered. Certainly once a recognition agreement is entered into with an independent trade union the role responsibility of the Black personnel or industrial relations officer will have to be fundamentally redefined as being only of direct relevance to line management and not be "available" to worker representatives. Similarly the operation of the briefing group system will have to be reconsidered, in particular its continuation below the supervisory level of the company hierarchy or command structure.

One of the direct applications of the typology will be in a situation where a company wants to change its approach from one type to another. How easily can such a "jump" be achieved? Probably with considerable difficulty. Careful analysis will have to be given to the company's "performance" in regard to each of the attributes of the profile. The change over in management style will at best be accompanied by tension particularly among middle managers, and in many cases be abortive. This observation is made on the basis that the specific approach adopted has an impact on the workers and their understanding of unionisation and the risks involved in taking out union membership.

On the other hand the typology should serve to identify areas in either the open or free-enterprise type or the closed paternalistic type which indicate possibilities for future development in the relationship between managers and the collectivity of the workers/employees. As already indicated in the early stages of the relationship between a free-enterprise company and an independent

union, the nature of workers' participation will be functional. However what degree of influence can ultimately either the workers through representatives on company boards, or the union, have on managerial decisions and company policies. This requires in-depth study through an inter-disciplinary approach on the concept of company property and ownership of future accumulation of capital.

Other areas of further refinement of the attributes - and inclusion of others - are: the role of work-place committees; the nature of trust in the employment relationship; the operation of democratic principles; the use of the strike or lock-out weapon, etc.

#### 8.6 A Typology of Trade Union Responses to Management

The necessary condition of broad legal and societal support for trade unions identified in this dissertation was achieved when the Government extended union rights to all Black workers (except foreigners) in October 1979. The Black trade unions can therefore now expect success in the demand for recognition from a company. This raises for the union movement the issues of the strategies to adopt as well as the basic purpose of unionism as they enter the second phase of union development. Only in a few countries has the union movement found organisational expression in one federation. It is postulated that unions, in their response to requirements companies lay down will also display differences which can be constructed into a typology.

The foregoing analysis of the divided union movement and the dominant emphasis on race, suggest that difference of opinion will arise regarding the nature of the industrial relations system most desirable to South Africa. The role of the union in the place of work in relation to management functions, will become an attribute in such a typology.

It is postulated that unions will formulate different objectives depending on whether they perceive and experience the function of management in general to be of the closed paternalistic type or open free-enterprise type. Because of the rejection of unionism by the paternalistic company it can be expected that certain unions will reject the basis of the hierarchical command structure of the idea of

the factory and hence deny the possibility for managerial power to be legitimised into authority. These unions and those persons who reject capitalism outright, will also reject the free enterprise approach. Ideals extracted from the concept of structural democracy will be formulated as immediate requirements. The other type of union will accept the relevance of functional democracy as a development sufficiently meaningful while the organisational structure of the unions are established.

Workers do not readily take on the status and hence responsibility of union membership. If management tries to suppress the institutionalisation of industrial conflict, workers will perceive the cost of union membership to be too high. As a result they will slide back into apathy but with an awareness of their relatively deprived position and the nature of industrial injustices they are exposed to. This discontent will become resentment. Such a situation, where rights and responsibilities can not be exercised, leads to possibility for the extreme of worker power to become an objective. Such a situation will result in disorder or anarchy in the work place.

The approach to unionisation of the free-enterprise company will positively influence workers' perception of the nature of union-company relations. The formulation of the concept of the institutionalisation of industrial conflict in chapter 1 offers the possibility for the necessary changes to be made but through a process of mutual regulation of the industrial relationship.

ANNEXURE "A"

Nature of Companies who Participated in the Survey and  
Refused to be Interviewed

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A. Participants

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Sector</u>	<u>Category</u>
C1	Heavy Clay	P
C2	Raw Chemical	F
C3	Primarily Engineering	P
C4	Light Engineering	S.P.
C5	Motor Assembly	F
C6	Engineering	S.P.
C7	Commerce	S.P.
C8	Paper	P
C9	Food	P
C10	Construction	S.P.
C11	Heavy Engineering	S.P.
C12	Primarily Food	P
C13	Food	P
C14	Motor Assembly	F
C15	Engineering	F

NOTE: F = Free-enterprise; P = Paternalistic; S.P. = Semi-paternalistic.

B.	<u>Refusals</u>	<u>Probably</u>
1	Primarily Engineering	P
2	Food	P
3	Chemical	P
4	Motor Components	S.P.

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>PAGE</u>
Table 1. Population Growth in South Africa: Past, Present and Projected.	103
Table 2. Labour Force 1960 - 75 and Projections.	103
Table 3. Economically Active Population.	104
Table 4. Occupational Classification, on a Percentage Basis of the Economically Active Population 1951, 1960 and 1970.	105
Table 5. Percentage of Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Blacks in each Occupation 1970.	106
Table 6. The Educational Level of the Male Labour Force in the R.S.A. 1970	107
Table 7. Racial Percentage Share in Aggregate Income.	108
Table 8. Racial Income per Capita.	109
Table 9. The 1973 per Capita GDP expressed in US Dollars	109
Table 10. Average Wages for White and Black Workers.	110
Table 11. Gross Domestic Product 1975 (US Dollars).	112
Table 12. Registered Trade Unions - 1975.	124
Table 13. Unionisation of White, Coloured and Asian Workers per Sector 1973.	126
Table 14. Industrial Councils Agreements.	140
Table 15. Social Security Benefits Administered by Industrial Councils, 1971.	143
Table 16. Wage Board Determination.	146



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFL	American Federation of Labour
CIO	Committee for Industrial Organisation
FCI	S.A. Federated Chamber of Industries
FOFATUSA	Federation of Free Trade Unions of South Africa
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IPM	Institute of Personnel Managers (SA)
NDMF	National Development and Management Foundation
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions
SEIFSA	Steel and Engineering Federation of South Africa
TUAC	Trade Union Advisory Committee
UTP	Urban Training Project

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- F2 Note for the Record of Meeting between representatives of Premier Milling Company and Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union, 9 May 1974.
- F3 Interview dated 23 June 1976 with representatives of Sweet, Food Workers Union.
- F4 Sworn statement by Mr. L. Kwelemtini, President, Sweet, Food Workers Union 1976.
- F5 Minutes of Works Committee, Premier Biscuit Company dated 24 June, 1976.
- F6 Letter from Premier Biscuit Company to Chairman of Works Committee 26 July, 1976.
- F7 Minutes of meeting of Works Committee and Management, Premier Biscuit Company, 29 July, 1976.
- F8 Letter from Premier Biscuit Co. (Pty) Ltd. to Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union, dated 4 November, 1976.
- F9 Letter dated 19 June, 1974 from D. Sutton, S.A. Breweries to L. Douwes Dekker.
- F10 Letter dated 23 October 1974, from D. Sutton, S.A. Breweries, to Mr. L. Douwes Dekker.
- F11 Letter dated 10 November 1975 from Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union of S.A. to R. Goss, S.A. Breweries.
- F12 Letter dated 10 December, 1975, from D. Sutton, S.A. Breweries to Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union.
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- T4 Report of interview with General Secretary of Union May 1977.
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- T6 Letter from African Bus Services to Transport and Allied Workers Union November 1976.
- T7 Interview with General Secretary, May 1977.
- T8 Letter from Transport and Allied Workers Union dated 15 October, 1976 to United Transport Holdings.
- T9 See T6.
- T10 Minutes of the African Bus Services Co-ordinating Committee, July 1977.
- T11 Report by General Secretary of Transport and Allied Workers Union to the Executive Committee dated February 1976.
- T12 Statement by the Chairman of the Wage Board, Star 13 March 1976.
- T13 Constitution of the PUTCO advisory Committees, 1973.

## 3. ENGINEERING AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION

- E1 C. Nkabinda vs. Raleigh Cycles; Sworn affidavits - Supreme Court papers.
- E2 Interview with representatives from Engineering and Allied Workers Union.
- E3 Personnel Policy statement, Van Leer. 1966.
- E4 Proposed retrenchment statement, Van Leer.
- E5
- E6 Interview and relevant documents, President of the EAWU and Chairman of the Worker Committee, Van Leer.
- E7 Agenda for the Annual General Meeting of the EAWU, 1974.
- E8 Memorandum for the National Iron, Steel and Metallurgical Industrial Council by the EAWU, 1976; proposals for a new wage agreement.



- E9 Letter from Boart and Hardmetals May 1975, to EAWU.
- E10 Minutes of the Works Committee, July 1975 Abercom.
- E11 Letter from Highveld Steel Corporation July 1975, to EAWU.
- E12 Letter from Micro Press Tool, November 1975 to EAWU.
- E13 Statement by Tube Investment on African Trade Union 1974.
- E14

4. LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING WORKER'S ASSOCIATION

- L1 Interview with General Secretary, August 1976.

5. GLASS AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION

- G1 Press statement by Action Committee for GAWU, November 1974.
- G2 Interview with Secretary of GAWU, July 1976.
- G3 P. Njinge v. Pilkington Brothers, Sworn Affidavits - Supreme Court action.
- G4
- G5 Note for the record, meeting between GAWU and Consolidated Glass Works, 5 February 1976.
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- G8 Rand Daily Mail, 2 September 1976.
- G9 Letter from Divisional Inspector of Labour, Johannesburg, August 1979 to Armourplate Safety Glass.
- G10 See G9.
- G11
- G12 See G1
- G13 See G2



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