



The Role of Donor-funded programmes on the Quality of Democracy in South Africa: The Case of Delft, Cape Town

Development Studies Research Report SOSS7041A

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Abstract

After the Cold War, democracy was perceived as an ideology which had spread across the world through key mechanisms such as international development aid. In 1994 - South Africa transitioned from the Apartheid regime into a new democratic regime through domestic and international pressure. Over the past 24 years, South Africa has been a beneficiary of international development aid. Since becoming a democratic state, South Africa has continued to enjoy peaceful elections. Despite consolidating the electoral process of a democracy, this research report considered the effect donor-funded democracy programmes have on improving the quality of democracy in South Africa. This research report looked at the actors involved in the distribution of such aid and the challenges civil society face in South Africa's democratic environment. The research showed that donor-funded programmes have the ability to boost human rights awareness and participatory culture however lack the ability to improve poor government responsiveness and accountability at a local level.

CHAPTER 1

1.1. Background

As South Africa embarks on its 25th year as a democratic state, optimism around the country's liberal constitution has slowly begun to dwindle. Despite constitutional provisions for citizen participation as well as accountability, there are still many South Africans who continue to live in the periphery of development. Post-Apartheid, the South African government aimed to take a state-centered approach towards development however policy formation has taken a neo-liberal approach towards economic management allowing market forces to determine distribution of resources (Satgar, 2012). Democracy has been incorporated within the development discourse as there are correlations between the practice of good governance and development (George, 2015). With an economy experiencing low growth, increased levels of unemployment and service delivery protest, citizen participation and government responsiveness must operate concurrently to address local development needs. This research report aimed to gain an understanding on the effect of international development aid on the quality of democracy at a local level and how citizens interpret the quality of democracy through lived experiences.

In the early '90s, South Africa did not negotiate its democratic structures in isolation. Democracy, merged with a progressive free-market economy, was perceived to be the ideal formula for development with global powers using foreign aid and technical assistance to ensure that African states experienced a smooth transition (George, 2015). South Africa's democratic transition was consolidated and foreign aid levels have since decreased with little regard for improvement in the quality of democracy. South Africa saw a gradual decline in net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In 2010, South Africa received US\$1.032 billion in net ODA, which decreased from the US\$1.075 billion in 2009 and the US\$1.125 billion in 2008 (Vickers, 2012). Between 2005 and 2010, South Africa received a net average of US\$882 million in net ODA for strategic additional budget funds to enhance structures, improve governance, innovate new models, open new industries, add value and play an effective role in service delivery (OECD, 2011). The aggregate for net ODA between

2005 and 2010 illustrates even lower levels of aid. Therefore, this research report aimed to investigate the effectiveness of a current donor-funded democracy-related programme in a South African urban township. The emphasis was placed on exploring if foreign aid was improving the quality of democracy by boosting citizen participation, increasing accountability and/or enhancing government responsiveness.

This research report dealt with a donor-funded programme which was administered by a non-governmental organisation (NGO). NGOs have been known to play a key role in political and social movements involving multiple organisations and networks, focused on improving social, political and economic conditions in a country's landscape (Ballard et al, 2005). Despite ODA levels dropping, one cannot assume that all the funds were withdrawn from South Africa. Between, 2005 and 2010, the use of country procurement systems dropped from 44% to 30% (OECD, 2011). Donors have opted to use different distribution channels in a bid to engage in other development projects. The developmental agendas set by donors cut across various sectors however the main focus for this research report was placed on democratic interactions between the state and constituents.

Many development trajectories have occurred across the globe, yet Africa has largely failed to produce developmental states. Mkandawire (2001) argued that African states are often told to minimise their role in the markets, stabilise the economy, privatise the economy, embrace trade liberalisation, practice good governance and democratize the state and society. These objectives are key for development in Africa but in reality, African states have low capacity and autonomy which hinders them from achieving these objectives. Mkandawire's alternative developmental path outlines the need for African states to change the way they define themselves as a 'developmental' state through ideology and state structure (Mkandawire, 2001). In terms of ideology, developmental states in Africa need to define what their underpinning principles are which drive development, the way they intend to promote sustained development, the way they orient themselves around structural changes which affect such development and the understanding of relationships within the international political economy (Mkandawire, 2001). Leadership needs

to provide a clear direction to gain a strong buy-in from civil society, donors and investors. Therefore development is more likely to occur if the state makes it possible for citizens to actively play a role in the decision-making process. This research report aimed to look at the linkages between the state and its constituents whilst understanding factors which hinder the improvement of democratic practices and development.

Government plays a significant role in development planning in Africa today but one has seen the emergence of development agencies and NGOs advising states on their developmental planning. According to Fine (2013), the ‘political school of thought’ argues that the developmental state is key for creating and implementing necessary policies to advance national goals. Thabo Mbeki was a key economist who recognised that South Africa needed to increase investment in order to increase exports and ultimately improve economic growth (Adelzadeh, 1996). Mbeki created Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) as a macroeconomic policy based on the neo-liberal principle that the projected growth rate is near dependent on the ability of government policy to draw private investment (Adelzadeh, 1996). Mbeki emphasised soliciting investment to boost development as he recognised that South Africa could not trade in isolation if it intended to become a prosperous nation. Therefore he sought to gain investment for expenditures on infrastructure such as roads, transportation and housing whilst the state managed social services such as education, health and welfare (Adelzadeh, 1996). Fine (2013) highlights that South Africa undertook this strategy as means to negotiate a neo-liberal international environment, as well as to mitigate the state’s lack of resources. This strategy would reduce government spending on public goods however lower government expenditure would hinder the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Adelzadeh, 1996). The Mbeki Administration is an example of how an African leader can place emphasis on soliciting international aid and investment as a means to improve development. Development aid for democracy-related programmes can help the state in addressing shortfalls in the quality of democracy in South Africa.

The White Paper on Local Government (1998) discussed the RDP and GEAR as strategies which would be implemented under a metropolitan government with the core function of redistributing

resources to impoverished areas in a bid to reduce urban squalor and encourage local economic development for the collective urban region. With the new single-tier metropolitan model for local government, the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) would be called for further recommendations once again. The MDB was required to establish new local boundaries following the 2000 local elections (Cameron, 2005: 331). The amalgamation of municipal boundaries may have helped with short-term strategic planning in 2000 but geopolitical boundaries should be continuously under review due to demographics changing as a result of migration.

When we begin to look at the quality of democracy at a local level, we also need to consider the context in which the democracy-related programme is set in. Lemanski (2007) highlights that Cape Town is seen as an aspiring global city, a popular tourist destination with grand beaches and wine farms. Despite an aesthetically pleasing inner city, Cape Town is brimming with informal settlements, high levels of inequality and remarkable poverty in the outskirts of the city (Lemanski, 2007). The inner city is shielded from the suffering in the periphery through deliberate spatial planning. Most constituents living in the ‘Cape Flats’ depend on government grants, form the lowest bracket of the formal labour market and often receive poor basic services from the state (de Swart et al, 2005). Despite experiencing highly contested municipal elections since 1994, Cape Town has a regular theme of service backlogs in the poorer areas of the city (Swilling, 2010). Constituents in poorer communities bear the burden of an ineffective government. With urban poverty persisting in Cape Town, an improvement in the quality of democracy can be explored by dealing directly with constituents. Therefore this research report aimed to assess a democracy-related programme in the poorer community of Delft, Cape Town.

1.2. Research Problem

International development aid contributed towards transitioning African states into democratic regimes by supporting multi-party elections and providing technical assistance and voter education (Brown & Kaiser, 2007). With over six national elections being held in South Africa during the period of 1994 to 2019, the electoral aspect of democracy appears to have been consolidated.

National elections in South Africa occur every five years with little disruption. Despite frequent elections, the research aimed to understand the lived democratic experiences of constituents. Finkel and Ernest (2005) highlighted that political socialisation through civic education can be an effective tool to enhance democratic values and skills. Civic education develops an environment which creates political competence through political knowledge and enhances political tolerance through participatory methods (Finkel and Ernest, 2005). Citizens should be exposed to civic education from a young age in order to become accustomed to political processes which go beyond elections. Through the improvement of civil society and social capital, accountability can be established between community members and local government officials as a means of ensuring reliable democratic governance (Haerpfer et al, 2009:162). This research report sought to measure the quality of democracy by looking at factors beyond the electoral processes. Moreover, this research report aimed to understand the intentions of donors in democracy-related programmes. The analysis of the quality of democracy will take place at a community level. The report also looked at the effectiveness of donor-funded democracy programmes in improving accountability, building relationships between the state and the local community and understanding if democratic programmes in urban townships can enhance constituents' interests.

1.3. Research Question

A research question is often seen as a vital component to a research report however, the biggest challenge is moving from a broad research topic to a specific research question. Punch (2006) argued that a research question aims to explore a particular component of the research topic and aims to add value in that particular field through set parameters for the research. He further argues that a research question shifts from a research area to a research topic which will explore general research questions and then move to a specific research question. The general research area focuses on the way a democratic state functions to meet the interests of its constituents at a local level.

Having recognised the research topic, the move was to explore general research questions and identify a specific research question. The specific research question for this research report is:

What effect does international development aid have on the quality of democracy in South African urban townships?

This research report was based on the above research question and aimed to accurately breakdown the concepts and explore correlations. The sub-questions for this research report were the following:

- How is international development aid administered in South African communities to improve the quality of democracy?
- What is the local citizen's perspective on the quality of democracy in South African urban townships?
- How has the international development aid aimed at democracy-related programmes influenced the quality of democracy in local communities?

This research report aimed to gain an understanding on the effect of aid on the quality of democracy at a local level and how citizens interpret the quality of democracy through lived experiences.

1.4. Research Objectives

With the research question in mind, one needs to clearly identify the research objectives of the research report. Using the case of the Delft community in Cape Town, this research report aimed to highlight the effect of international development aid on the quality of democracy in South African urban townships.

Moreover, the research report sought:

- To analyse donor-funded democracy programmes and their influence on public participation and citizen-led accountability.
- To analyse the ability of citizens to hold elected officials accountable at a local level.

- To explore local citizens' perspectives on the quality of democracy in South African townships.

The research objectives sought to understand the quality of democracy as a measure which can become worse or a measure which can improve over a period of time. In addition, this research report explored the correlation between international development aid and the quality of democracy.

CHAPTER 2

2.1. Literature Review

A literature review plays a key role in guiding the research report. The body of knowledge provides a base for understanding, an eye on current developments in the research field and it helps identify connections and contradictions in the literature (Bless et al, 2013). This research report used the literature review to gain an understanding on the perception of the international development aid and the quality of democracy.

2.1.1. Development Aid post-Cold War

The end of the Cold War initiated a rapid global wave of democratisation. Communism no longer rivalled capitalism and countries were encouraged to develop under democratic rule by the United States of America (US). The US had re-established its dominance as the global hegemon and sought to engage mainly with democratic regimes to advance economic interests. In 1994, South Africa was one of the first states to experience international democratic assistance with various strategies being used in various states across sub-Saharan Africa thereafter (Bratton, 2009). According to Carothers (2009), there are two overarching approaches to assist in democratisation, namely the political approach and the developmental approach. He argued that the developmental approach values democracy as a contributing factor in the larger process of national development. Economic growth is at the forefront of the developmental approach with democratic practices following in the periphery (Carothers, 2009). The political approach requires states to create political linkages, through institutions, that publicise citizens' policy interests and allow for public participation in the form of interest groups (Cheeseman, 2006). International actors may use either approach as a strategy to assist non-democratic states. This research report looked at the use of the developmental approach for South Africa considering there was no political linkage required with the international development aid.

Carothers (2009) defined the developmental approach as a broader notion of democracy, which aims to target concerns regarding equality and justice and views democracy as a slow, continual process of change involving an interconnected set of political and socioeconomic practices. Various developmental aid packages have been made available to undemocratic regimes across the African continent for purposes of democratisation. Carothers (2009) argued that the developmental approach values democracy as a contributing factor in the larger process of national development and needs to be at the core of state building with political principles following in the periphery. By leaving democratic principles such as effective participation, voter education, final control of the agenda and inclusiveness in the periphery, political actors are separated from citizens and it becomes difficult to hold those in power accountable for their actions and compromises the quality of democracy. This approach has been criticized for being too vague and unassertive, considering that many global regimes have learned to manage democratic reform under the guard of the international community to receive high levels of external political aid whilst avoiding true democratization (Carothers, 2009).

This literature review mainly focused on the time period after 1994. Levitsky and Way (2006) argue that development agencies can use their leverage to create external democratising pressure in addition to economic, political, diplomatic and social ties to ensure that a state's democratic practices continue to improve. Levitsky and Way (2006) argue that, in a post-Cold War international environment, leveraging is seldom effective when it operates in isolation from political linkage despite succeeding in forcing elections or blocking authoritarian regression (Levitsky and Way, 2006). This research report aimed to explore if the development aid had come with conditionality which thus emphasises the improvement of the quality of democracy.

Thad Dunning analysed the relationship between donors and recipient countries. Dunning (2004) identifies various perspectives around the intentions of donor countries and international organisations by exploring if the promotion of democracy was a main priority for donors, or whether geopolitical factors put donors in a position to overlook undemocratic practices and allocate aid to strategic allies. Dunning's (2004) aim was to identify whether democratisation is

viewed as a priority for donor countries and aid recipients or whether important democratic principles such as citizen participation, inclusiveness, political freedom, equality before the law and accountability, are left in the periphery in a bid to pursue economic interests. During the Cold War, foreign donors prioritised strategic allies, which hampered the credibility of donors, in a bid to increase their political influence in sub-Saharan Africa (Dunning, 2004). When the Cold War came to an end, conditionality on the aid was tied to democratisation and open-market policies and Western states, through ODA which was administered by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), began advancing economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa (Dunning, 2004). The DAC is the developmental organ of the OECD and currently has 30 member states which provide an annual submission of required ODA statistics and supply information which describe various developmental aid projects to be included in the Development Co-operation Report (DAC, 2017). Many of the developmental aid packages are a collaborative effort and follow an aligned plan.

Much of the conditionality post-Cold War was aimed at pushing sub-Saharan African states to democratise through elections to help boost economic trade however little conditionality followed thereafter to ensure democratic institutions were strengthened and citizens had an influence in the decision-making process of the state (Lancaster, 2007). The political negotiations in South Africa from 1990-1994 saw international donors tread carefully and facilitated the internal democratic process through development assistance. Various US and European organisations began to set a precedent where wealthy countries transferred large financial resources to other governments, international organisations and NGO) in a bid to improve standards of living in poor countries in the world (Lancaster, 2007). Foreign aid was by no means a long-term project in the early 20th century but post-World War II, there was a spread of foreign aid serving various functions over and above poverty alleviation for rich and poor countries. Aid for democracy did little to improve political institutions or government responsiveness.

Development assistance aims to promote social and economic development. In addition, development assistance gives attention to political institutions, building state capacity and good governance rather than strengthening political contestation and openness (Carothers, 2009). The

development approach aimed to follow the modernisation theory which argues that by improving economic development, the state will essentially be able to sustain its democracy (Norris, 2008). It essentially aims to create a strong developmental platform for countries to construct their own political reform as opposed to prescribing political reform. Norris (2008) argued, in her analysis of the modernisation theory, that economic development is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for democratisation (Norris, 2008). Therefore, based on Norris (2008) and Carothers (2009), South Africa may have experienced high levels of economic growth post-democratisation but one needs to explore if the quality of democracy has improved at a local level.

The end of the Cold War marked a significant moment whereby development assistance to non-democratic states was not effectively used. The decline of geopolitical importance of African states in the post-Cold War era would imply that the loss of such states would result in lower costs for donors (Dunning, 2004). The post-Cold War era was an opportunity for donors to put pressure on non-democratic states and truly engage in democratic reform without the threat of communism and at a significantly lower cost considering the aid was one-sided. The international aid community also needed to improve the availability, quality, consistency and level of detail of information on development assistance to efficiently monitor the use of the aid (Greenhill et al, 2013). Development agencies can be more efficient in tracking financial flows to ensure they are used efficiently. Therefore the foreign aid may have been used as a mechanism to enforce democratic reform. The disintegration of the Soviet Union removed communism as a geopolitical threat to the West however the liberal values of Western donors were not consolidated (Dunning, 2004). Technical assistance serves as a monitoring tool as Gibson et al (2015) highlights that higher levels of technical assistance to Sub-Saharan African countries will reduce the levels of patronage and corruption which erode democratic structures. Democratisation was not pushed as an effective political system in Africa nor thoroughly monitored through technical assistance.

Foreign Aid may have appeared to be a generous offering from developed countries and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), but the amount of foreign aid allocated was often calculated according to Harrod-Domar model. The *Harrod 1939-Domar 1946 model* continues to

be used by IFIs such as the World Bank and International Money Fund (IMF). The model considers the level of investment required to achieve a specific growth rate known as the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) and the level of aid required to fill the 'Finance Gap' needed to meet the necessary annual investment consisting of domestic savings and foreign exchange. In addition, the model assumes a fixed linear relationship between growth and investment and is focused on the short-run evolution of aid (Easterly, 1999). According to Easterly (1999), the level of aid invested aims to provide the developing country with the 'Big Push' needed to reach the necessary growth rate for improved development. A calculated aid model persists today in IFIs and development agencies. Resource allocation is more important than resource quantity whilst recognising that aid and investment are necessary however not sufficient conditions for growth.

Despite the model being mathematically correct, there are further dimensions which cannot be ignored. Scholars argue that if the aid is viewed as a source of permanent income then the optimal response of the country receiving the aid, is to consume the aid rather than to invest the aid (Easterly, 1999: 8). Recipient countries will have an incentive to maintain or increase the 'financing gap' by low savings or high consumption in order to get more aid and if the donor is perceived as soft-hearted, the savings conditions on the aid may be ineffective in changing the recipient's behaviour (Easterly, 1999). The recipient country needs incentives such as stricter political conditionality (monitoring), education and match investment to ensure that there are proper efforts made to follow a specific development programme.

Having recognised the international political economy in which development aid operates, authors such as Stephen Knack have evaluated the effectiveness of the aid on the quality of democracy. Stephen Knack, as a lead economist at the World Bank, has closely followed the correlation between development aid and democracy. Knack (2004) analysed the effectiveness of development aid and democracy and he found that due to the high levels of aid, recipient states were accountable to donors as opposed to their own constituents. Therefore if state officials are accountable to foreign donors, then the aid used for democracy does not promote accountability to the citizens. Knack (2004) identifies that democracy measures tend to be viewed at a state level

when analysed therefore the political system should promote the interests of its own constituents as opposed to the interests of foreign donors. With this approach in mind, one needs to explore if democracy-related programmes funded by international donors are being properly implemented. Moyo (2010) argued that aid-funded democracies have little oversight on regimes altering property rights and economic legislation for personal gain. In addition, aid-funded democracies face challenges in creating economic legislation which benefit the bulk of its constituents while rivalling political party interests and private sector interests (Moyo, 2010). Political reform is likely to experience stagnation following its democratic transition if there are no checks and balances put into place to measure the quality of democracy. From the findings discussed above, it is evident that research is required in the effectiveness of aid from a citizen perspective as opposed to a state or donor perspective considering constituents should be the primary beneficiaries of an improving quality of democracy.

African states face challenges which hinder them from improving the quality of democracy. Brown (2005:183) highlights on African states:

“are characterised by poverty and long-term economic crises, recent independence, a weak and often predatory state, and few institutionalised democratic practices. Other critical obstacles include the lack of rudimentary guarantees of the rule of law...”

The political and economic environment in Africa is hostile and with states often being perceived to be experiencing trade-offs in the international political economy. Brown (2005) stresses that development programmes require medium to long-term arrangements to have a meaningful impact. With instability in a state structure, political conditionality becomes difficult to implement when seeking to advance the developmental agenda (Brown, 2005). Therefore to improve the quality of democracy, it is imperative to engage on a long-term basis and shift the focus from a stable state to a stable civil society.

2.1.2. Development Aid and Democratic Transition in South Africa

Western states used sanctions as well as development aid to pressurise the apartheid regime in the late 1980s. In addition, domestic actors were open to engaging with donors in a bid to assist South Africa to transition into a new liberal democracy (Hearn, 2000). There were positive efforts to integrate South Africa into the international political economy and emphasis was placed on creating stability under a democratic regime. The EU and US, who each administered \$340 million over a nine-year period to civil society organisations (CSOs) before the end of apartheid and for the 1994 elections, provided aid to the new South African state in addition to continue providing funding to civil society at a micro level (Hearn, 2000). Civil society plays a key role in improving the quality of democracy and contributes towards stability by entrenching democracy as a social value. With the quality of democracy improving at a local level, it is more likely to be consolidated at a national level. Friedman (2010) highlighted that a fundamental component of democracy is the assumption that all citizens have an equal right to a share in decision-making. The more that citizens are able to express their needs and beliefs to each other and public servants, the more likely they will achieve their own developmental goals which satisfy the majority of the population (Friedman, 2010:117). Civil society, through the democratic process, plays a key role in identifying local needs and contributes towards the deepening of democracy.

South Africa was closely watched and supported by the international community in the early 1990s. The largest overall foreign donor to South Africa from 1994 to 1999 was the US with a contribution of \$530 million in aid (Hearn, 2000). This further supports the need to investigate the effect of aid on the quality of democracy in South Africa. Aid packages across Africa had traditionally been used to assist national budgets however the core objectives of the democracy-related programmes to South Africa were to assist the political transition and focus on democratic consolidation (Hearn, 2000). This leaves room to explore whether the quality of democracy has improved in South Africa and if development aid has been a contributing factor. Hearn (2000) identified that much of the democracy-related aid was defined as ‘transitional assistance’ with aid levels dropping around the year 2000, having recognized political stability in South Africa. One

can therefore begin to analyse if the quality of democracy has been improved in South Africa following the democratic transition period.

Although the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mainly used NGOs such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) for democracy-related programmes, other international donors used similar approaches to fund programmes. The EU has distributed various funds to civil society in South Africa since 1994 with the majority of funds going to professionalised organisations, such as technical NGOs and think tanks as the EU was supportive of decentralised cooperation with non-government actors (Fioramonti, 2004). The aid introduced a fresh approach towards democracy assistance generally being administered at a local level as opposed to a state level. Although only accounting for ten percent of the EU democracy assistance budget, civil society uses small actors who play an integral part in improving the quality of democracy (Fioramonti, 2004). The actors were accessible at ground level which aids in accountability and the process is more streamlined to make a direct impact at a local level. The EU used the Foundation for Human Rights (FHR) to administer two programmes between 1997 to 2000 and 2001 to 2004 to address inequalities and to promote and entrench human rights values and practices as defined in the Constitution (1996) and the Bill of Rights (1996) (Fioramonti, 2004). Both programmes have supported and improved the dialogue between civil society and the state, as well as increased the capacity of disadvantaged people to participate in the democratic process and to fulfil their political and socio-economic rights (Fioramonti, 2004). Programmes administered through NGOs allow for civil society to feel empowered as individuals learn through a structured curriculum tailored for their needs. This research report aimed to understand whether there was a dependence on the NGO to sustain relations between civil society and the state. Moreover, there was also a need to understand the dynamics of project implementation to improve the quality of democracy.

2.1.3. Development Aid in the International Political Economy

The concept of international development aid needs to be clearly defined. For the purposes of this research report, international development aid will speak specifically to democracy-promoting aid packages which aim to have a positive influence on democratisation in recipient countries (Scott and Steele, 2011). Individual democracy projects have often been directed toward what is now termed ‘democracy promotion’ which looks at strengthening independent judiciaries and democratic institutions with the aid being explicitly provided to promote and support democratic transitions (Scott and Steele, 2011). Knack (2004) argued that the USAID, alone, spends more than \$700 million annually on democracy-related programmes, including voter education, elections support, the strengthening of parliaments, judiciaries and political parties. Dudley and Gitelson (2002) argued that citizens cannot make rational political decisions without sufficient knowledge of the political parties or candidates running for local government. In addition, Lindberg (2004) highlights that voter education can help improve voter turnout and ultimately improve participation through a legitimised political process. The focus will be based specifically on democracy-related programmes funded by foreign donors to South Africa.

In addition, it was found that high levels of aid may also reinforce executive dominance in new democracies, as donors often fund the new regime to tackle projects which were not allocated in the budget (Knack, 2004: 253). Roessler (2005) argues that when domestic and external pressure converge in an attempt to achieve a democracy, the current regime is likely to increase repressive activities depending on their commitment to hold power. The research analysed if the regime was willing to compromise on the quality of democracy to ensure they retained power in the following election/transition. With a specific focus regarding development aid, this study explored if democracy-related programmes, funded by foreign donors, have been effective in improving the quality of democracy, at a local level.

2.1.4. Local Government Frailties

Local government had formal provisions within Chapter 10 of the Interim Constitution and was further ratified by the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) in 1994 (Cameron, 1999:85). The new South African Constitution made provisions for local government to exercise executive and legislative authority, granted each municipality the right to govern local government affairs of its community with national and provincial government barred from compromising or impeding local government from exercising its power or performing its functions (Constitution, 1996:86). Metropolitan councils fell under Category A of local government which would essentially be seen as the larger local governing structure and these metros were called City of Tshwane, EThekweni, City of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela Bay and City of Cape Town (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2003:19). Municipal councils would be just as key and would comprise of elected officials with 50% of the councillors elected on a ward basis and other 50% of the councillors are elected on a proportional basis through the party list system (Thornhill, 2008:67). The aim was to create a functional local government who would be elected by its constituents in a bid to move the democratic process closer to the people and improve accountability at a local level. This research report looked at the role of the City of Cape Town in improving the quality of democracy.

The conventional metropolitan model can function as a fully-fledged, elected, area-wide entity which would manage its constituents and deliver basic services to the area (Sharpe, 1995: 13). One can also have non-institutional cooperation with a less hierarchical structure which is reliant on the political ‘hidden hand’ to manage coordination problems or one can have the conventional metropolitan model where there is a hierarchy and certain policies set in certain institutional arrangements (Sharpe, 1995: 13). Metropolitan cities have a much broader scope when compared to a municipality and aim to address even distribution within the region. Considering South Africa’s historical context, legal provisions regarding the structure of local government were made within the Constitution (1996) in order to get a proper buy in from citizens at a local level. Metropolitan cities have defined roles in local government and this research aimed to assess the role of the city in improving the quality of democracy.

Sharpe (1995) argued that there is a general decline in the belief in the institutional capacity to address spatial inequalities and basic services with local governments opting for privatisation and local governance. A further problem is the differences between senior government officials who may still rival local government agenda and hinder the metropolitan area from efficient service delivery (Sharpe, 1995: 22). Metro boundaries may also be difficult to determine as the emphasis of the metro should be at the core of employment and services (Sharpe, 1995: 22). If the metro is not fully satisfied with the boundaries, it may neglect certain areas and create urban squalor. Strategic Planning also does not make provisions for minimum standards to create a sense of common identity among constituents within the metro (Sharpe, 1995: 23). However, even if the strategic planning included minimum standards, it would not account for public control and population density despite having a direct relationship with strategic planning (Sharpe, 1995: 24). One needs to keep in mind these deficiencies regarding conventional metropolitan model when analysing the quality of democracy.

To bring this research report down to a local level, one needs to consider what the literature states about local government structures in South Africa as well as the local political culture. One of the challenges identified at local government is the poor institutional arrangement which makes service delivery and community participation ineffective when aiming to meet local needs (Mathekga, 2006). The democratic institutions used have not emerged through consultation with local community members but rather through an enforced technical design which aims to function as local government (Mathekga, 2006). An example of failed technical design was when water meter installations were completed in July 2001 in the IKAPA area (African townships in the Cape Town municipality) with a flat rate tariff of R10.95 to be charged for consumption (Smith, 2004). Smith (2004: 386) highlights that the City of Cape Town:

“...failed to consider the spatial legacy of apartheid where the highest poverty rates in the city are in high-density households living in township areas with historical underinvestment in infrastructure”.

This may have appeared to be a sound revenue-generating model however the model renders itself ineffective because the citizens could not afford to pay for the water service. The quality of democracy is therefore compromised because the state delivers a poor service knowing citizens cannot afford.

Although local government has its own political autonomy, one must look if there has been abuse of these political powers by public officials. Local government in South Africa has seen the emergence of Clientelism and Patronage whereby there is exchange of public goods and services between elected officials and their supporters (Cameron, 2006: 349). The Auditor-General, which forms part of the Chapter 9 Institutions, found that in 2011 “contracts worth more than R3 million were awarded to councillors and family members” and councillors used their political positions for personal gains, with a sizeable number of people being employed into positions they were not qualified to do (MISTRA, 2013:7). Over and above the financial losses, local government will fail to build administrative capacity. Lack of administrative capacity was identified by Sharpe (1995) as a problem facing metropolitan regions and it is important to understand that Clientelism and Patronage further impede administrative capacity.

Local government is nearest to its constituents and sound leadership is needed for effective administration and basic service delivery. The South African government at a national, provincial and local level has been criticized for ineffective leadership, lack of strategic direction, lack of accountability to the public and poor application of ethical practices (Naidoo, 2011: 46). The Auditor-General found there was an increase of unauthorized expenditure at local government from R4.851 million in the 2010-2011 financial year to R9.788 million in the 2011-2012 financial year (Nombembe, 2012: 77). Local government has experienced funding levels far greater than the apartheid regime but the funds are not being used correctly nor efficiently to benefit local communities. Unauthorised expenditure could be used for redistributive purposes or even making the metro a more competitive city. If public officials fail to provide sound leadership and are not held accountable, the metropolitan model will not be implemented correctly and basic services will not be received by all constituents.

Local government should encourage community participation to identify suitable democratic institutions for community needs. Mathekga (2006) highlights that local government lacks management capacity to effectively deliver services to the community. In addition, Chikulo (2011) argues that there is an insufficient capacity of human resources required to cope with the large number of mandates and the scarcity of qualified staff. He further argues that the shortage of qualified professional and technical staff, creates a major constraint for local authorities in a region. Efforts to improve the management capacity can be enhanced by improving communication between each sphere of government. Therefore national, provincial and local government should evenly distribute human resources to boost capacity and ultimately meet local needs. With a lack of capacity, local government should create a culture where local citizens are encouraged to participate in local projects to gain additional input to improve services. Donor-funded programmes should be well-promoted as they serve as another avenue for community participation. Hicks (2011: 41) highlights that:

“Opportunities for public participation are not sufficiently publicized, nor are they accessible, particularly to marginalized groups such as women...”

That being said, donor-funded democracy programmes provide additional support and knowledge for the state to improve the quality of democracy. These types of programmes need to be properly promoted in order to get proper public participation.

Local government in South Africa should take a technocratic approach in that specific technical skills are needed for specific functions of government. By using a technocratic approach, the emphasis is on results regarding service delivery, constituents are viewed as ‘customers’ and the rights of ordinary citizens to actively participate in the decision-making process are undermined (Mathekga, 2006). The quality of democracy is not solely orientated around the outcomes of the democratic process but rather the ability to influence the actual democratic process. With South Africa experiencing high levels of service delivery protests, Mathekga (2006) argued that this was due to the malfunctioning relationship between communities and local government authorities.

Local government has not done enough to educate citizens about the participatory nature of democracy however citizens have also opted to wait on government to meet their community needs instead of actively putting pressure on local authorities (Mathekga, 2006). Hicks (2011) found that women are crucial for participation as they make a greater contribution at a local level considering many are heads of households or actively involved in informal community projects. Participation must work both ways between local government and the local community. Citizens have the right to influence the democratic process by expressing their concerns to local government and local government has an obligation to actively address community concerns.

South Africa has held more than five elections since 1994 illustrating its ability to engage in procedural democracy. This alone is a huge success but one needs to explore beyond the procedural component of democracy. The quality of democracy can be proficiently explored by looking at the democratic activities of local government. The Constitution(1996) makes provision for local government to operate autonomously and meet the needs of local citizens through enhancing social development and economic growth, integrating and co-coordinating development activities, empowering communities to participate meaningfully in development and promoting the building of social capital (Chikulo, 2011). It is the added link aimed at bringing government closer to its constituents and common characteristics do occur within local government despite many of the challenges being context-based. The South African local government has seen an increase in service delivery such as refuse removal, piped water, electricity, and an increase in formal housing however there are large discrepancies in service delivery between urban and rural areas as well as between urban suburbs and urban townships (Chikulo, 2011). Despite improvements in service delivery, poor households continue to lag behind in access to services causing pockets of poverty and inequality (Chikulo, 2011). Swilling (2013) found that urban townships in Cape Town have substandard infrastructure when looking at education, transport and energy needs. With poorer communities lagging behind, it is clear the democratic process is not being effectively used in these areas. Democracy must be viewed as a continual process which requires active participation among citizens, active engagement with elected officials and active consultation to advance developmental goals. Local citizens need to know that they may hold their elected officials

accountable, at any stage, in a bid to meet their needs. Democracy-related programmes create a platform for marginalized groups to guide local policy framing and long-term planning.

Beyond service delivery, the South African local government also faces coordination challenges. The Systems Act of 2000 obligates local government to establish mechanisms and channels to enable communities to participate but these participatory committees are not functioning effectively or simply exist, conceptually on paper (Chikulo, 2011). The lack of participation affects the quality of democracy as citizens are unable to voice their community needs to their elected public officials. Lack of participation also impedes greater developmental planning and management. A large amount of local authorities are highly dependent on national government despite South Africa having a high degree of fiscal decentralisation, and local government reserves the right to a reasonable share of national revenue as well as generating their own revenue (Chikulo, 2011). Key decisions regarding infrastructure development is often made at a national level and it is the urban poor who will bear the burden of prices rising at rates well above inflation (Swilling, 2013). Elected officials should aim to create lucrative community-based projects to increase revenue and improve infrastructure development catered to meet local needs. Local citizens can actively participate in these democracy-related projects through employment opportunities or community forums provided by local government or donors for the greater development project in the community.

From the research and the literature above, the development approach tends to leave democratic principles such as effective participation, voter education, final control of the agenda and inclusiveness in the periphery, separating political actors from citizens. This makes it difficult to hold those in power accountable for their actions. The post-Cold War era was an opportunity for donors to put pressure on African states to truly engage in democratic reform without being rivalled by communism and at a lower cost considering the aid was one-sided. If state officials are accountable to foreign donors, then the aid used for democracy does not promote accountability to the citizens. Local government should encourage participation to improve the democratic process, to improve service delivery and advance the broader developmental agenda. This research report

aimed to understand the effect of aid on quality of democracy at community level and how it may affect local government frailties or improve government/citizen relations.

2.2. Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework aims to provide clarity on the key variable that will be assessed. Variables can be interpreted in different ways based on the specific context. For the purposes of this research report, the quality of democracy was assessed within an urban township setting. The quality of democracy was viewed through a lens of four indicators in a bid to simplify the assessment.

2.2.1. Quality of Democracy

Various definitions for what the quality of democracy is and one should always clarify as to how one is viewing democracy as a concept. Certain indices such as Przeworski et al argue democracy from a minimalist perspective whereby they view a democratic state as a state which has its government offices filled by contested elections (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). This perspective allows scholars to view democracy as a ‘sortal concept’ which enables them to determine whether a state is, or is not, a democracy. This is in contrast to the perception of democracy as a ‘scalar concept’ which implies the concept has present characteristics which can be used to measure the quality of democracy in a particular state (Haerpfer et al, 2009). Dahl (1985) went beyond the minimalist perspective and argues that the democratic process requires effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion to enjoy full rights of citizenship (Haerpfer et al, 2009). The quality of democracy does not only look at the presence of these democratic indicators but also the calibre of these democratic features at a particular point in time. For the purpose of the research, the quality of democracy was viewed as a scalar concept in order to look for specific indicators in the research field at a given point in time.

When seeking to measure the quality of democracy, one should subject the political system to a democratic audit. According to Baker (1999: 27):

“...the object is not to reach a single verdict on whether or not the whole regime can legitimately be called democratic, but to determine by empirical observation how democratic it is in its various parts”.

The research aimed to break down the uniform mould associated with democratic regimes and analysed how each single indicator was performing at a given time. By looking at specific indicators to measure the quality of democracy, one can then begin to look at the degree at which a state has democratised as well as indicate which components need to improve for the betterment of the political system. The quality of democracy measures the existence of institutions in a certain area as well as the performance of those institutions in terms of their outcomes (Baker, 1999). Democratic practices are only the means not the end as they do not assure that political rights and civil liberties are fully experienced by the citizens (Baker, 1999). This research report measured the quality of democracy at a community level to gain an understanding of the lived experiences in the Delft community.

Although an increasingly debated topic, Munck (2016) gave a well-rounded perspective on the quality of democracy. He highlights that one of the pivotal thoughts to consider during conceptualization is that the quality of democracy operates as a continual phenomenon which can improve or decline at a given point in time. By actively pursuing democratisation, states and donors subscribe to actively improving the quality of democracy. The quality of democracy includes elements about accessibility to government offices beyond the electoral component of democracy however there is much disagreement regarding the enlargement of the concept to include the process of implementation of government decisions, the outcomes of the political process and the specific characteristics of the quality of democracy (Munck, 2016). One of the more applicable characterisations of the quality of democracy is the prevalence of individual liberties, freedom of association and of opinion, competition, participation, representation, restrictions of power imposed by the constitution, transparency, rule of law and government capacity (Munck, 2016). Despite its complex nature, the quality of democracy allows researchers to view institutional

arrangements as well as the protection of civil and political rights. The research also allows for context-specific views on the quality of democracy to emerge. The quality of democracy is about the emergence of freedom from political oppression despite living under a government and laws, as well as the value of equality, in the sense that every person holds an equally weighted opinion in front of the state and law (Munck, 2016). The research aimed to put the citizens' interest first regardless of elected officials holding power and aims to promote an equal society. A high quality of democracy has the ability to foster individual generalised trust and political support through greater transparency, improved accountability and efficient local governance (Buhlmann et al, 2011). This research report looked at the prevalence of freedom of association and of opinion, participation, representation, accountability and state capacity in South African townships. The research further explored if they align with citizens' perspectives around the quality of democracy.

Despite many states subscribing to democracy as a form of governance, it is necessary to analyse how deep democracy runs as well as assess the quality of democracy. This research report follows Beetham and colleagues' (2008) "Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide". The authors of the book follow an assessment framework set by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). International IDEA aimed to assess democracies in a manner which departs from country ratings and external pressure to a decisive assessment based on national task teams led by governments or civil society and academic institutions (Beetham et al, 2008). The citizen would be placed at the heart of democracy, prioritize protecting the rights of constituents and assess the process and outcomes affecting the quality of democracy (Beetham et al, 2008). The key indicators of the quality of democracy include:

1. Citizenship, law and rights
2. Representative and accountable government
3. Civil society and popular participation
4. Democracy beyond the state (external influence)

Beetham et al. (2008) is aligned to Morlino (2004). Morlino (2004) argued that the quality of democracy improves when mechanisms are in place to maintain rule of law, protect civil rights,

allow civil society to engage in matters with freedom and equality as well as illustrate to the international community that government officials can be held accountable whilst managing political responsibility. The quality of democracy focuses on accountability, social engagement on legislative matters, political discipline, public participation and mutual respect between citizens and elected officials (Geissel et al, 2016). Beetham et al (2008) four indicators form an assessment framework when analysing the quality of democracy as they allow for freedom to engage in deeper topics under each indicator.

2.2.1.1. Citizenship, law and rights

With South Africa pivoting through six national elections, one can see that the procedural aspect of democracy is well-maintained. According to Liebenberg (1999), as a call of duty, the state needs to encourage social citizenship through creating a sense of belonging, prioritizing well-being and preserving socio-economic rights. Despite regular elections taking place, one needs to look at the preservation of citizen's political and economic rights. It aims to put the citizens' rights first regardless of elected officials holding power and aims to promote an equal society. Citizen, law and rights are the first pillar of the framework as they look at the ability of the state to guarantee equal rights of citizenship to all through its constitutional and legal processes (Beetham et al, 2008). The Constitution must be viewed as a key feature for a democracy as it is used as a reference for the institutional arrangement around the democratic process and preserves basic civil and political rights. Civil and political rights were measured based on asking people questions regarding their basic human rights and their perception of how their rights are protected. This feedback was provided from the perspective of those who had been and had not been exposed to a donor-funded democracy programme to account for the counterfactual.

2.2.1.2. Representative and accountable government

When promises are made to citizens, it is necessary for government officials to deliver. Accountability as a separate indicator is devoted to integrity in public life and ensures the trustworthiness of public officials to their citizens (Beetham, 2008). Dahl (1985) identified equal

votes, effective participation, voter education, final control of the agenda and inclusiveness as key characteristics of an accountable government. Through improving these characteristics, a state can proactively improve the quality of democracy. This needs to be an inclusive process whereby the majority of the population are participating through competition. Political officials are representatives of the masses and thus must consult their people in the decision-making process, otherwise stand the risk of being fairly removed from office through the electoral process. This research report assessed how frequently participants met with elected officials, how responsive elected officials were as well as the transparency of elected officials.

2.2.1.3. Civil society and popular participation

When seeking to analyse the quality of democracy, it is necessary to understand the importance of civil society and citizen participation. Civil society puts forward the plight of the poor whose everyday hardships show their disenfranchisement when compared to those in a position of privilege (Bayat, 1997). Participation contributes to the development of civic virtues, citizens' feeling of being influential on the state and contributing to their community improvement (Michels, 2011). Participation also contributes to a greater legitimacy of decisions and producing outcomes that are acceptable to all (Michels, 2011). By improving the levels of participation, public decisions can be made in a democratic setting to benefit the majority of citizens at a local level. The quality of democracy need not only improve how the state functions but Michels (2011: 279) highlights that the quality of democracy must also aim to:

“give citizens a say in decision-making, contribute to the inclusion of individual citizens in the policy process, encourage civic skills and virtues, lead to rational decisions based on public reasoning and increase the legitimacy of decisions.”

Through active participation, citizens improve the clarity of their needs to the state and ultimately ensure public officials are constantly seeking to improve the way in which they deliver services to local communities. When many voices engage in participation, individual social conditions are factored in and produce outcomes which benefit the majority of citizens (Purvis & Hunt, 1999).

Participation does not only include the election period, it also includes decisions being made at a local level which affect the day-to-day service delivery.

The current Internet environment creates opportunities to involve and empower citizens in campaigns, directly contact representatives and government (Effing et al, 2011). Social media such as WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter are regularly used by young people and create a platform for citizens to express their grievances (Effing et al, 2011). The more that citizens and the state engage, the more likely the quality of democracy will improve. Social media can create awareness regarding key community needs and hold elected officials accountable in the public eye. This research report looked at the levels of commitment to the democracy programme, willingness to engage in community forums and how well public participation was promoted.

2.2.1.4. Democracy beyond the state (external influence)

It is always necessary to factor in external influence when one seeks to measure the quality of democracy. When one looks at the assessment of democracy, in any global survey of democracy, the democratic standards are set by key international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations (UN) (Beetham et al, 2008). As much as democratic practices appear to come from internal formation, external pressure is put on states to democratize in a particular manner. With an interest in development aid, one needs to view how donors create external pressure for democracy-related programmes. In addition, this research report looked at the demands of foreign donors such as proposal structure, frequency of reports and feedback from each of the project participants.

Ultimately, this research report aimed to give a democracy-specific perspective on international development aid and a citizen's perspective on the quality of democracy. By looking at four indicators relating to the quality of democracy, the research assessed where the democracy-related programme excelled as well as look at the shortcomings of the programme. This research report used a specific case to apply these four indicators in a bid to measure the quality of democracy.

CHAPTER 3

3.1. Research Design: Delft Cape Town Case Study

This research report used an explanatory case study design as a framework. It is necessary to understand that a 'case' is essentially the unit of analysis in which we seek to collect information to gain further understanding about the research topic (de Vaus, 2001). A well-designed case study will not solely look at specific constituent elements but rather seek to create a holistic picture whereby information is gathered from a series of multiple levels (de Vaus, 2001). The case study used in this research prioritised local communities and the role that development aid from foreign donors had played in impacting the quality of democracy in communities.

It is also important to understand which orientation the case study analysis will take as a strategy. There are two types of approaches which can be used for a case study analysis. The case-oriented approach aims to take into account significant historical outcomes by linking evidence together in manner which is sensitive to the historical context and offers limited generalizations to gain some particularity (Ragin, 1987). The case-oriented approach aims to understand each specific case for its intrinsic value and aims to find what is unique about the case being studied (Ragin, 1987). By contrast, the variable-oriented approach is theory-centred whereby it is less concerned with specific outcomes from a case but rather concerned with exploring relationships between specific variables within societies or countries to gain universality (Ragin, 1987). It is focused on a set of social forces that are components of a particular context. The focus is on covering more cases in a more generalised manner to develop a universal theory that can be applicable to many cases (Ragin, 1987). This research report took a case-oriented approach in order to understand the specific case for its intrinsic value and to find what is unique about South Africa's democratisation.

This research report explored a single case study in Delft, Cape Town. Delft is situated approximately 34 km east of Cape Town, and approximately 7.5 km from Bellville. As per 2011 Consensus, Delft has a population of 150 030 and it was established to be one of Cape Town's first mixed race township including 'coloured' and 'black' residents with 51% Coloured and 46% Black

African with 3% "other" (Statistics South Africa, 2011). The dominant first languages are Afrikaans and Xhosa while English is widely used as second language, only 24% of residents have finished their matric qualification (Statistics South Africa, 2011). The Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation had conducted a pilot programme from January 2016 to March 2017 which aimed to improve Participation, Monitoring and Accountability (PMA) in Delft, Cape Town (Black et al, 2016). The programme funders and partners included the Government of South Korea, Participate, the Institute of Development Studies, UNICEF and UNDP (Black et al, 2016). The PMA programme focused on group of highly marginalised citizens who were committed to working towards a safer and more inclusive city and promoted a dialogue between these groups and representatives of government about how to address violence, insecurity and safety (Black et al, 2016). By looking at this programme after completion, this research report assessed the impact of the donor funded programme on improving participation, monitoring, accountability and ultimately the quality of democracy. The programme was selected as it was less than five years old, it was solely funded by international donors and its main objectives speak to improving the quality of democracy.

3.2. Methodology

This research report was conducted using a qualitative methodological approach based primarily on existing literature centred on development and democracy and the presence of foreign donors in South Africa; project documents; and primary interviews with project officials, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The research looked specifically at the funding for the PMA programme received from are the Government of South Korea, Participate, the Institute of Development Studies, UNICEF and UNDP (Black et al, 2016). To operationalise the quality of democracy, the research report used three qualitative methods namely key informant interviews, focus groups and document analysis. The aim was to use multiple data sources in the research field to produce a better understanding of the quality of democracy in Delft in addition to understanding how aid through the project influenced the quality of democracy.

3.2.1. Data Collection

Data was collected from individuals who participated in the PMA programme and from those who did not participate in the programme. The double data collection was used to address the counterfactual. A comparison was required to understand the way in which the quality of democracy was viewed from both inside and outside the PMA programme. For the purposes of this research report, a ‘project participant’ refers to those who participated in the programme and a ‘project non-participant’ refers to those who did not participated in the programme.

1. Key Informant Interviews

Qualitative interviewing is seen as a somewhat guided conversation which allows the researcher to draw on the true meaning of what is being conveyed by the participant (Warren, 2002). The research conducted a series of four key informant interviews over 2018 interviewing the following participants:

- A PMA project manager on 9 January 2018.
- A Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation employee who was not actively involved in the PMA programme on 7 February 2018.
- A local community leader who participated in the PMA programme on 11 May 2018.
- A local community leader who was a non-participant in the PMA programme on 11 May 2018.

2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

With limited time within the research field, focus groups allow for numerous perspectives on various topics at a single point in time. For this research report, the following FGDs were held:

- One FGD with 4 project participants in the PMA programme on 6 February 2018.
- One FGD with 4 project participants in the PMA programme on 7 February 2018.

- One FGD with 4 project non-participants in the PMA programme on 8 February 2018.
- One FGD with 4 project non-participants in the PMA programme on 9 February 2018.

3. Document Review

As a means to understand how the PMA project was structured, I aimed to engage in document analysis. Upon request, the project manager had given me access to the proposal of the project, quarterly reports to donors and an annual report presented to the general public. These documents formed a key part of my analysis in understanding the administrative processes and challenges when conducting a democracy-related programme, the progress made by the programme, as well as verifying if the reports correspond with the data emerging from the qualitative interviews and focus groups.

3.2.2. Data Analysis

The data for this research report was processed through thematic analysis with a combination of critical discourse analysis. Thematic analysis refers to extracting emerging themes and linking key commentary in the form of short expressions, ideas or concepts arising from in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and/or documents (Rabiee, 2004:657). From there, I aimed to identify common themes across all units of data. Fairclough (2012: 458) argues Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) looks at:

“representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries – representations of how things might or could or should be.”

This research report used CDA to analyse the administrative nature and intended outcomes of the programme. The paper then sought to understand if the discourse of democracy-related programmes is aligned with the perceptions of the participants and non-participants regarding the quality of democracy. Therefore the research report dealt with recurring themes pertaining to the quality of democracy in the literature in addition to understanding the processes which lead particular outcomes affecting the quality of democracy.

The key informant interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. I looked at recurring subject matter in each key informant interview and aimed to link common themes to other units of data. The FGDs were recorded and transcribed for analysis. I looked for recurring subject matter in each participant and non-participant FGD. I then looked at common themes in the participant FGDs, common themes in the non-participant FGDs and common themes across all FGDs. As a means to understand how the PMA project was structured, I engaged in document analysis. As mentioned above, the project manager had given me access to the proposal of the project, quarterly reports to donors and an annual report for the general public. These documents formed a key part of the analysis in understanding the administrative processes, the challenges when conducting a democracy-related programme as well as the progress made by the programme. The documents were also used to triangulate the data emerging from the key informant interviews and FGDs.

3.3. Ethical Considerations

Ethics played a major role when conducting research. As a researcher, one must aim to avoid the abuse of people's rights when conducting research (Bless, 2013). Researchers need to be aware of their own perspectives as well as the perspectives of the respondents as they shape the meaning of the answers given in the interview. The main ethical consideration I aimed to avoid was to propel a particular perspective on my respondents regarding how they should view the quality of democracy. Another ethical consideration I kept in mind was getting my respondents to voluntarily participate without offering some form of financial reward. Respondents might be under the impression that I am from a research company and may seek some incentive to engage in the research. Once I had engaged my participants, I ensured they gave consent to the research being conducted as well as ensured that they felt safe regarding the confidentiality of the information given. Participants were afforded the opportunity to read my interpretation of their responses prior to submission. If they were not happy, I reworked the responses to match their own words.

3.4. Limitations to Proposed Research

Researchers tend to encounter difficulties when in the field. A limitation I found difficult was the language barrier with the participants. Delft citizens speak a mixture of different languages and one would want the participants to engage in a language they feel comfortable in. With English being a second language for most of the participants and non-participants, I used a local to help translate colloquial slang. Another limitation I encountered was participants who were unable to afford to come to the central meeting spot because of transport costs. Some of the participants were unemployed and it proved costly to come for an interview for no monetary return. The taxi violence in Delft also made it difficult to maneuver in the research fields. I would always call participants before entering the field and I conducted my research during the day. The distance between Johannesburg and Cape Town also made it difficult to frequent the research field. I scheduled my interviews well in advance and made sure communication channels were always open between myself, participants and non-participants.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The Participatory, Monitoring and Accountability (PMA) Programme

This chapter will look at findings and discussions related to the four specific indicators of the quality of democracy identified within the conceptual framework. Beetham et al (2008) supplied the following four indicators as a key guide to measure the quality of democracy:

1. Citizenship, law and rights
2. Representative and accountable government
3. Civil society and popular participation
4. Democracy beyond the state (external influence)

These indicators were used to conduct an assessment on the objectives promoted by the PMA programme in a bid to improve the quality of democracy. The PMA programme was designed as a township-specific democracy-related programme. It was created to use action-learning to boost participation from marginalized groups in townships and enhance accountability through improved responsiveness and answerability (Liedeman, 2015: 2). The aim was to drive citizens in Delft to ask questions and expect answers. The PMA proposal aimed to intensify citizen-led accountability, allow citizens to gain access to key decision makers, stimulate relationships between government officials and constituents and boost local responsiveness through citizen action (Liedeman, 2015: 3). The PMA programme undertook a citizen-centric approach which allowed for public participation, relevant needs to be put forward by the community and localized activism.

Delft is an interracial urban township in an area referred to as “the Flats” of Cape Town. “The flats” has high levels of violence and crime with police being perceived as an inefficient state institution who contribute directly to the levels of violence in the township (Black et al, 2016). Delft is no stranger to donor funded projects with the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation (SLF)

running various projects such as “Gender, Violence and Agency” which was completed in 2014 as well as “Making All Voices Count (MAVC)” running from 2016 (ongoing) (SLF, 2017). Participants and non-participants have been involved in various community projects and the climate is familiar with research-based work with direct interventions in the community.

The PMA programme aimed to get a broad range of participants who would engage in interactive workshops, digital storytelling and engage in dialogue events with city, provincial and national representatives in a bid to improve insecurity in townships (Liedeman, 2015). The programme looked at working with young people, self-defined citizen activists, community leaders, members of the Community Policing Forum (CPF), members of the Neighborhood Watch and where possible, members of the Delft Police Station (Liedman, 2015: 5). The programme looked to interlink participation and accountability between citizens, high ranking government representatives and local organisations operating at the grassroots level.

4.1. Citizenship, Law and Rights

4.1.1. Citizenship

Citizenship is often viewed from a liberal perspective. Gudavarthy (2006: 39) stressed the following:

“It is assumed that while the liberal idea of citizenship implies a singular identity with universalistic aspirations, identity politics necessarily entail particularism and fragmentation”

Citizenship aims to drive constituents towards common goals to gain a sense of unity despite individualistic interests. From observations in the research field, it is imperative to understand that the citizens are survivalist in nature due to the high levels of violence and crime. One of the key outcomes the PMA programme achieved was improving community networks by creating a Delft Community Safety Group (Black et al, 2016). The project manager stressed the following in his interview:

“Well we first started by giving Delft Community Safety Group members cell phones to record any acts of crime or violence in the community to try get substantial evidence to take to the police to open cases. The police are often the ones involved in the violence in Delft and cases go nowhere when they reported. The aim was to create ammunition to curb the crime and violence in Delft as well as create a culture of community response to community needs through citizen-led accountable.”

Source: Key informant interview with PMA Project Manager conducted on 9 January 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

By simply creating a Delft Community Safety Group, there were improved community networks. Community members from FGDs had encountered or communicated with PMA participants who were also Delft Community Safety Group members. These networks aimed to achieve a common goal of ridding the community of violence and crime. By creating common goals at a local level, citizenship can improve by showing citizens that they can link up and tackle community needs amongst themselves (Gudavarthy, 2006). Carothers (2009) defined the developmental approach as a broader notion of democracy, which looks to target concerns about equality, justice. He further views democracy as a slow, continual process of change involving an interconnected set of political and socioeconomic practices. The Delft Community Safety Group targeted the justice factor as per the developmental approach and democratic practices such as effective participation begin to occur in the periphery. FGDs found that the community was using the Delft Community Safety Group WhatsApp group to communicate crimes as well as informal meetings in small groups to discuss any incidences in the area. In the June 2016 donor report, it was found that, “In addition to workshop events, the group is in communications outside of the workshop space by the use of a WhatsApp group on their phones. This has proven to be a powerful tool for mobilization of participants to attend further workshop (Liedeman, 2016: 1). The use of social media has allowed participants to buy into the PMA programme and encourage participation outside SLF spaces.

However, as a critique, one does sense that political actors are separated from citizens making it difficult to hold those in power accountable for their actions and compromises the quality of

democracy. In the collective digital story “Gangsters in Uniform”, a citizen seeks to report a crime against a police officer however there are no other visible police driving in the community and local councilors are not available to address the matter. Citizens, local officials and the police in Delft all operate in isolation from one another which illustrates a lack of interconnectedness and a weaker quality of democracy. The PMA programme looked at working with young people, self-defined citizen activists, community leaders, members of the Community Policing Forum (CPF), members of the Neighborhood Watch and if possible, members of the Delft Police Station (Liedman, 2015:5). Through the FGDs, it was clear that the PMA programme managed to rally youth, local activists and members from the Neighborhood Watch as project participants. Local councilors and local police did not get involved in the PMA programme illustrating a separation between the state and constituents.

Despite the survivalist nature of Delft citizens, there is a sense of hopefulness amongst community members. . This became evident in the FGDs where project participants and regular community members shared that they felt there was room for improvement in Delft and were willing to participate in future democracy-related programmes. Many of the participants used phrases such as “*we want to see change*”, “*we believe in our community*” and “*we want to save our youth*” in the FGDs. One participant stressed the following:

“Everyone wants to make Delft better but people are scared. It’s bad because they scared of the police and the gangsters. The gangsters and the police are big bras [friends].”

Source: Project participant from FGD held on 6 February 2018.

Another project non-participant from an FGD highlighted that:

“We wanna [want to] make Delft better. If we can just stop the crime.”

Source: Project non-participant from FDG held on 8 February 2018.

Project participants and non-participants were adamant on improving their lived experience in Delft with many believing that there is room for change. High levels of positivity toward the

community were seen in all four FGDs. By collaborating through common citizenship, the community can target specific universal goals in a bid to improve the quality of democracy.

Knack (2004) identified that democracy measures tend to be viewed at a state level when analyzed thus the political system should promote the interests of its own constituents as opposed to the interests of foreign donors. Citizens in Delft are interested in higher levels of participation however, according to project participants and non-participants, discussions amongst state officials need to stop occurring in isolation in order to allow constituents to be a part of decision-making process and advance their interests. One of the project participants said:

“Even if we wanna [want to] do a meeting, the police always stop us. We report everything in the [Delft Safety Group] DSG WhatsApp group. They [councillors] don’t even want us to use the hall.”

Source: Project participant from FGD held on 7 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

Local councillors are hindering citizens from using public resources to hold community meetings and the police are hindering citizens from holding community meetings in public spaces. Citizenship may aim to represent universal aspirations but should also factor in how social standing influences individual decision-making (Guduvorthy, 2006). When many voices engage in participation, individual social conditions are factored in and produce outcomes which benefit the majority of citizens (Purvis & Hunt, 1999). Ultimately, citizenship improves as community outcomes are universal in nature. When citizenship improves, democratic processes begin to be trusted again and the quality of democracy strengthens for most citizens.

Despite attempts to improve citizenship, the PMA programme faced challenges beyond the setup of the programme which hinder the improvement of the quality of democracy. An SLF employee argued that it is difficult to coordinate a universal citizenship:

“There is a lot of complexity when seeking to understand the motivations of people who engage in such programmes. It is genuinely difficult to understand individual agendas. You can have an

upstanding community member participate in the programme but their intentions could be obscured by family dynamics. Some participants are under the impression they will receive jobs whilst others participate to boost their reputations in their communities. It all depends from person to person.”

Source: Key informant interview with independent Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation Project Manager conducted on 7 February 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

Haerpfer et al (2009) identified the quality of democracy as a ‘scalar concept’ which implies that the concept has characteristics which can be used to measure the quality of democracy in a particular state. With individuals seeking different outcomes, it becomes difficult to interpret a universal improvement in the quality of democracy. Sustainable Livelihoods Foundations as well as foreign donors may feel they have produced expected outcomes regarding the quality of democracy but assessment should be based on expected outcomes for participants which should have been set before programme rollout. Regular community engagement will help gain clarity on the universal goals for the Delft community members and improve citizenship.

4.1.2. Upholding the Rule of Law and Knowledge of Human Rights

The PMA programme made a profound contribution towards helping participants realize the importance of upholding the law through storytelling. Digital storytelling about lived experiences was used to illustrate relationships between law and justice in addition to improving accountability aligned with the law (Black et al, 2016). “Being Young in Delft” was a digital output, from the PMA programme, about a youngster who experiences the hardships of Delft and ultimately turns to a life of crime and gangsterism in a bid to survive. The youngster ultimately gets arrested and reflects on the need to uphold the law despite difficult circumstances. Through digital storytelling, upholding the law was stressed as a democratic value needed in any community. Therefore the quality of democracy will improve with respect for legal processes.

Not only did the digital stories stress upholding the law, they also engrained participants’ human rights through the process. Through active learning, PMA participants were less likely to allow the

police or local councilors to violate their rights. A key informant highlighted her enjoyment from the digital stories as well as the knowledge learnt from the storytelling:

“Yes. Yes. That was great! “Gangsters in Uniform” and that stuff. I know my rights from that stuff. Our rights is all we have.”

Source: Key informant interview with participant conducted on 9 May 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

Digital storytelling helped relay the importance of participants’ human rights. Despite a greater knowledge of human rights, there was nothing to suggest that participants, when compared to non-participants, were more likely to uphold the law.

Traditionally, the police have been used as a state institution to monitor and uphold the law. With high levels of crime and violence in Delft, it was prominent in the FDGs that there is lack of trust in law enforcement. In September 2016, a two-day workshop was conducted to illustrate to participants how to engage in Citizen Based Monitoring (CBM) (Liedeman, 2016). Thirty-one murders occurred in Delft in August 2016 due to increasingly violent interactions between two well-established gang factions therefore key stakeholders were required to address citizen concerns (Liedeman, 2016). Slow police and state response forced citizens to do their own monitoring. The PMA programme trained citizens to conduct CBM.

Over and above formal participant training, the PMA programme created a platform for participants to engage with key policymakers and lawmakers. Following the thirty-one murders in August 2016, the project manager, along with another project lead, accompanied by three project participants representing the SLF PMA Delft Safety group attended an international conference co-hosted by the University of Cape Town (UCT) Safety and Violence Initiative (SAVI) and the Global Campaign for Violence Prevention (Liedeman, 2016). Liedeman (2016:1) found that the event:

“allowed for networking and engagement between PMA participants and other stakeholders who they would usually not have access to, for example, mid-ranking government officials,

academics/researchers in the safety and security field, as well as other CBOs and CSOs working on similar issues, but located too far away in other parts of the country”.

The democratic institutions used have not emerged through consultation with local community members but rather through an enforced technical design which aims to function as local government (Mathekga, 2006). The democratic mechanisms used to advance citizens’ interests should be put forward by the citizens themselves with support structures from the state.

4.1.3. Protecting Political and Social Rights

One of the key political processes in a democratic state is the occurrence of elections. When looking at reports to donors, the PMA programme placed little to no emphasis in assisting the electoral process. The project proposal showed that the PMA programme targeted a social issue namely citizen-led accountability for violence and crime in the Delft community as well as mechanisms to engage the poor and most marginalized in the local decision making process (Liedeman, 2015). In August 2016, local elections were held across the country with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Despite Liedeman (2016) highlighting levels of violence in Delft during the time, the elections generally ran smoothly with incidences occurring being gang-related as opposed to political affiliations. Carothers (2009) found that development aid aimed to promote social and economic development. He further stressed that donors should place attention on political institutions, building state capacity and good governance rather than strengthening political contestation and openness. The quality of democracy is likely to improve by targeting specific social and economic challenges such as crime, violence, service delivery and job creation. South Africa has well-established voting processes at a local level but lack state capacity and good governance to improve the quality of democracy. The quality of democracy cannot improve if social and economic conditions remain the same.

Citizens need to know their own rights in order to recognise violations. The PMA programme aimed to improve the awareness of rights through storytelling, action-learning in workshops and participatory monitoring in order to address a lack of accountability and transparency (Liedeman,

2015). The project participants were directly involved in monitoring the Delft community by recording any illicit activities on cellphones and creating evidence to hand over to the police. Moreover, rights violations could be explained through lived experiences and in specific scenarios acted out in the digital stories. The programme produced two collective stories, “Gangsters in Uniform”, “Being Young in Delft” and twelve individual digital stories (Black, et al, 2016). There was a sense of confidence from PMA project participants in the FGDs. Project non-participants were reluctant to discuss issues affecting their community. One of the community leaders who participated in the PMA programme found that she was more confident when she encountered policemen:

“In the beginning, I didn’t want to speak up against the police even though I did know that what they were doing was wrong. But once we started doing the storytelling and realising that our rights are being abused, I started to want to speak out against the police and what they were doing. I felt I had a voice and it mattered. When you hear everyone’s stories, you realize you not alone and if we stand together, we can protect each other and protect our rights.”

Source: Project participant in FGD conducted on 6 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

The PMA programme allowed for participants to feel empowered as they were becoming more familiar with their rights and sharing their grievances. This rights-based approach corresponds with the two (EU funded) programmes administered by the Foundation for Human Rights (FHR) between 1997-2000 and 2001-2004 to address inequalities and to promote and entrench human rights values and practices as defined in the Constitution (1996) and the Bill of Rights (1996) (Fioramonti, 2004). A rights-based approach ensures a certain level of knowledge is passed on to participants and aims to reduce the dependence on the NGO administering the programme. The participants in the PMA programme had an attitude change as they were confident enough to address community issues. Improving knowledge of political rights directly contributes to the improvement of the quality of democracy as the PMA participants were actively seeking for local councillors to fulfill their political responsibilities. Knowledgeable citizens make better decisions come elections as they understand the democratic process when seeking to address current

community needs. The rights-based approach does contribute positively to the quality of democracy.

It is also important to watch how state institutions operate in a bid to maintain citizens' rights. Roessler (2005) argues that when domestic and external demands converge in attempt to achieve a democracy, the current regime is likely to increase repressive activities depending on their commitment to hold power. In all four FGDs, the police were predominantly seen as an oppressive state institution with many PMA participants and non-participants having violent encounters with the police. One of the project non-participants explained a specific encounter he experienced with the police:

"I remember one night when I first moved to Delft back in 2010. I was walking home from the shop when a police van pulled over next to me. The policemen asked where I was going and searched me forcefully. I didn't do anything, I didn't have anything and they still wanted to search me. They were rough with me and said 'We don't trust you laaities [small boys]'. They didn't care that I was innocent. They were just looking for kak [trouble]."

Source: Project non-participant from FGD conducted on 9 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

The police were perceived as unequal before the law as they regularly violated community members' rights and were not prosecuted. In the FGDs, PMA participants argued that they regularly received death threats from police for trying to record their criminal activities on their cellphones. Roessler (2005: 209) found that:

"State violence, which falls into the illegal and illegitimate realm, is an abuse of power that occurs when the state employs coercion to regulate opposition to its authority and policies."

The use of violence to suppress opposing views and community meetings will compromise the quality of democracy as this marginalizes freedom of expression and freedom of association.

The PMA programme struggled to get a universal goal for the community of Delft. This would hinder the citizenship needed to improve the quality of democracy. The programme excelled in

creating human rights awareness through various participatory methods such as digital storytelling and interactive workshops. Project participants gained a good understanding of the importance of upholding the rule of law however they were not necessarily less likely to break the law. The police weakened the quality of democracy as many participants and non-participants had violent encounters with the police. The police regularly violated citizens' rights and failed to hold criminals accountable. This illustrates the repressive nature of the police as a state institution.

4.2. A representative and accountable local government

The PMA programme was assessed on outcomes aligned to the indicators that influence the quality of democracy. The key indicator for this section will look at the links between locally elected councilors and citizens as well as the ability to respond to community needs.

4.2.1. The Importance of Voter Education

The 2016 local government elections was underway in the same year the PMA programme was launched by the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation. Lindberg (2004: 62) stresses that:

“at democracy's very core the electoral process enacts an important kind of distributive justice with regard to power and authority”.

The local electoral process allows citizens to choose their preferred candidate to represent their needs at a local level. The PMA programme aimed to intensify citizen-led accountability, allow citizens to gain access to key decision makers, stimulate relationships between government officials and constituents and boost local responsiveness through citizen action (Liedeman, 2015: 3). Despite various participatory methods used in the PMA programme, there was a lack of emphasis placed on voter education prior to the 2016 local government elections. The citizens lacked knowledge about local councillors, the implications of local government elections and their ability to hold elected officials accountable for their actions. There is an imbalance of power which sees marginalized groups silenced and voter education manuals can provide information such as the registration process, election-day procedures, obtaining voter identity cards and choosing candidates that best represent the citizens (USAID, 2000). The PMA programme missed an opportunity to guide participants on how to elect representative and accountable councilors.

Dudley and Gitelson (2002) argued that citizens cannot make the rational political decisions without sufficient knowledge of the political parties or candidates running for local government. They further argue that citizens need to view their vote as a form of buying power in a political market. Therefore by making uninformed decisions, the quality of democracy in Delft is compromised due to local councillors not truly representing their constituents.

With little emphasis placed on voter education, there is a lack of interest in the electoral process. There appeared to be a lack of sentiment regarding the importance of voting from the FDGs. Participants appeared to be divided on the electoral process with neither side presenting clear arguments for nor against voting. One of the participants argued:

“What is the point of voting? These councillors are so corrupt, they do nothing for our community. I been in Delft for almost twenty years and I haven’t seen any change in the community. We vote for these mense [people] and they do fokkol [nothing] for our people. Why must I then vote?”

Source: PMA project participant from FGD conducted on 6 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

This was further echoed by a non-participant in a separate FDG. When asked if elections give the people control over governments and their policies, she argued:

“For them, they just wanna [want to] give their friends jobs. I don’t trust the local councillors. I rather look after my family because they do nothing for me. I rather do my own thing.”

Source: Non-participant from FGD conducted on 9 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

Through the findings, it appears as though the problem is not the electoral process but rather the local councillors who emerged victorious from the election. By allowing citizens to engage in specific voter education forums, political conversations, networks and habits can form to strengthen underlying civic beliefs (Gastil, 2004). A high quality of democracy has the ability to foster individual generalised trust and political support through greater transparency, improved accountability and efficient local governance (Buhlmann et al, 2011). Therefore, knowledge alone on the electoral process and political parties may not improve the people’s trust in the representatives but it is likely to restore trust in the voting process.

All Delft community members in the FDGs identified the youth (ages eighteen to thirty-five) as a vulnerable group due to high unemployment, high levels of substance abuse and a high school drop-out rate. Finkel and Ernest (2005) highlighted that political socialization through civic education can be an effective tool to enhance democratic values and skills. Civic education develops an environment which creates political competence through political knowledge and enhances political tolerance through participatory methods (Finkel and Ernest, 2005). Civic education produces knowledgeable youth base who will make an informed decision come elections as well as improve accountability through the same participatory methods exercised in school. The PMA programme had approximately four to six youth participants out of eighteen participants (Black et al, 2016). Early intervention was difficult for the PMA programme considering many moved to a life of gangsterism due to poverty and unemployment (Black et al, 2016).

4.2.2. Representative and Accountable Government

The Constitution (1996) made provisions for local government to exercise executive and legislative authority, granted each municipality the right to govern local government affairs of its community with national and provincial government barred from compromising or impeding local government from exercising its power or performing its functions. Metropolitan councils fell under 'Category A' of local government which would essentially be seen as the larger local governing structure and these metros were called City of Tshwane, EThekweni, City of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela Bay and City of Cape Town (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2003:19). Municipal councils would be just as key and would comprise of elected officials with 50% of the councillors elected on a ward basis and other 50% of the councillors are elected on a proportional basis through the party list system (Thornhill, 2008:67). The aim of policymakers was to create a functional local government who would be elected by its constituents in a bid to move the democratic process closer to the people and improve accountability at a local level. The metropolitan model will serve as the structure for assessment in a bid to see if elected officials are being held accountable at various local levels.

4.2.3. Mismanagement of public funds

Local government is nearest to its constituents and sound leadership is required for effective administration and basic service delivery. The South African government at a national, provincial and local level has been criticized for ineffective leadership, lack of strategic direction, lack of accountability to the public and poor application of ethical practices (Naidoo, 2011: 46). The Auditor-General found there was an increase of unauthorized expenditure at local government from R4.851 million in the 2010-2011 financial year to R9.788 million in the 2011-2012 financial year (Nombembe, 2012: 77). Local government has experienced funding levels far greater than the apartheid regime but the funds are not being used correctly nor efficiently to benefit local communities. A non-participant claimed to have personally known a councillor who received funding and did not complete the funded project:

“I know a councillor who received money for a waste management project and nothing happened. Nothing. What happened to that money?”

Source: Key Informant Interview with non-participant conducted on 11 May 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

Unauthorised expenditure could be used for redistributive purposes to make the metro a more competitive city. The PMA programme overlooked financial maladministration in Delft which could be used for improved service delivery and democracy-related programmes. The programme aimed to enhance accountability in Delft however, it failed to address accountability for mismanagement of public funds at a local level. If the metro is not fully satisfied with the boundaries, it may neglect certain areas and create urban squalor. Strategic Planning also does not make provisions for minimum standards to create a sense of common identity among constituents within the metro (Sharpe, 1995: 23). If there is financial maladministration, Delft has a lower budget to supply basic services resulting in a weaker quality of democracy. Funds allocated to the community end up benefitting a small minority as opposed to the majority.

Although local government has its own political autonomy, one must look if there has been abuse of these political powers by public officials. Local government in South Africa has seen the emergence of Clientelism and Patronage whereby there is exchange of public goods and services between elected officials and their supporters (Cameron, 2006: 349). The Auditor-General, which forms part of the Chapter nine Institutions, found that in 2011 “contracts worth more than R3 million were awarded to councillors and family members” and councillors used their political positions for personal gains, with a sizeable number of people being employed into positions they were not qualified to do (MISTRA, 2013:7). Over and above the financial losses, local government will fail to build administrative capacity. It is important to understand that Clientelism and Patronage further hinder the quality of democracy.

4.2.4. Abuse of Political Power

At a local level, elected officials have various powers which they may exercise for the betterment of the community. A common theme from all the FGDs was the abuse of political power to protect members of the community affiliated to gangs from prosecution. With violence posing a huge threat to community members, this form of corruption would directly undermine the democratic process. A simple example was given by a non-participant in an FGD who stressed how unafraid officials were of associating with gang members. She gave the following examples:

“I had a friend who had her boyfriend arrested because he was abusing her. He was in a gang. The next day we found out that one of the local councillors organized him bail. I’ve also seen the same councillor lumming [associating] with the head of a gang at a ‘chesa nyama’ in Delft. I even know a guy in a gang who gotten bail eight times. How can you get bail different eight times before going to court?”

Source: Project non-participant in FGD conducted on 8 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

Roessler (2005) argued that when domestic and external demands converge in attempt to achieve a democracy, the current regime is likely to increase repressive activities depending on their commitment to hold power. In a bid to hold power in Delft, elected officials have aligned themselves with high profile gangsters in the community. The PMA programme failed to identify

key councillors who facilitate the abuse of political power as these officials continue to hold office. This undermines the quality of democracy because they are no longer serving the majority of the Delft community but rather the elite, who contribute directly towards unsafe spaces in the area.

4.2.5. Lack of responsiveness

Mathekga (2006) highlights that the structure of local government in South Africa is a top-down approach which has implications for accountability. Mathekga (2006) argued that a top-down approach for local government creates a political culture which discourages community participation and leaves elected officials accountable to each other instead of their constituents. This was further highlighted in the interview with the project manager who stressed the following:

“The rot goes all the way to the top. They are corrupt from head to toe. I’m talking from the ward councillor to head of cluster to town council. They get away with it because they protect each other. Do you know how many times I’ve tried to have meetings with these guys? They meet in secret and don’t respond to emails.”

Source: Key Informant Interview with PMA Project Manager conducted on 9 January 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town (Page 3).

The top-down approach at local government makes constituents believe that officials are not representative leaders. Officials were appointed through patronage and creates a wedge between elected officials and constituents (Mathekga, 2006). Delft is no exception with government representatives distant from their constituents. The PMA project manager made numerous attempts to speak to local councillors but there was simply a lack of interest from government. Although officials are legitimately elected, the quality of democracy does not improve because they are not accountable to constituents.

At first glance, one would expect metropolitan governments to be thriving considering their larger tax base and social capital but it is imperative that provincial and national government provide an oversight function for distributive purposes. National and provincial government are required by

law to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities by helping them manage their own affairs and helping them perform functions (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009). An SLF employee argued:

“Government is not able to respond in the right ways at the right time. There is a lack of political will from local and provincial government. The wheels of government turn slowly. The structures are there, the money is there and the officials are there. There seems to be a lack of political will when seeking to solve problems in Delft.”

Source: Key informant Interview with independent Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation Project Manager conducted on 7 February 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

Following the thirty-one murders in August 2016, Project leads, accompanied by three project participants representing the SLF PMA Delft Safety Group, attended an international conference co-hosted by UCT Safety and Violence Initiative (SAVI) and the Global Campaign for Violence Prevention (Liedeman, 2016). There is yet to be any follow-up meetings since the conference which shows a reluctance by high level officials to participate with community members. National and provincial government have failed to cohesively address key community needs in Delft. Elected officials and metropolitan councils fail to take accountability as they continue to shift responsibility. Therefore national, provincial government failed to cohesively address key community needs in Delft and has left government representatives pointing fingers with no individuals or metropolitan councils taking accountability. The inner city is shielded from the suffering in the periphery through deliberate spatial planning. Most constituents living in the ‘Cape Flats’ depend on government grants, form the lowest bracket of the formal labour market and often receive poor basic services from the state (de Swart et al, 2005). The failure to address community needs through coordination will hinder the quality of democracy from improving in areas such as Delft.

4.3. Civil Society and Popular Participation

Civil society forms a fundamental part in shaping the democratic landscape. Civil society puts forward the plight of the poor whose everyday hardships show their disenfranchisement when

compared to those in a position of privilege (Bayat, 1997). Such individuals represent marginalized groups who seek to self-govern however still face poverty, restricting autonomous and informal state institutions as well as official surveillance for rigid social control (Bayat, 1997). The development of civil society relies on sustainable structures which move marginalized groups away from dependence on the state and into a space of autonomous decision-making when shaping their communities. Societies with a weak civil society struggle to distribute key information, mobilize citizens and make political and economic cooperation possible (Haerpfer et al, 2009:163). By allowing civil society to strengthen, marginalized groups can voice their needs through public participation. Efforts to improve social and economic conditions will be more targeted and outcomes will be able to be measured based on the improvement on civil society. This section looked at the PMA programme's ability to enhance civil society as well as boost public participation.

4.3.1. Building a Participatory Culture in Delft

Civic society development is often needed to spread stable democratic attitudes and enhance conventional patterns of participation (Haerpfer et al, 2009: 167). Public participation is seldom a single phenomenon, rather it is a culmination of regular mass meetings and discussions. The PMA programme excelled in creating a participatory culture as the majority of participants in the FGDs attended regular PMA meetings, workshops and action-learning activities. The project lead regularly took attendance to illustrate to donors that participants were engaging regularly in key "activities. Many participants stressed that they were a part of the "whole project". The PMA programme created an environment where participants felt safe and where their opinions could be heard. The regular attendance within the programme showed that the activities were effective and the meetings were an opportunity for one to talk about ways to improve the Delft community.

PMA participants showed a strong urge to participate in community meetings however they were often hindered by the police. Although there was a desire to boost public participation, the participants lacked the ability to mobilize numbers beyond programme members. When a non-

participant was asked if he had heard of any PMA community meetings, he responded with the following statement:

“No I didn’t hear about nothing [any meetings]. It’s also hard to hold meetings in Delft. The police don’t like us in numbers.”

Source: Key informant interview with non-participant conducted on 11 May 2018 in Delft Cape Town.

The PMA participants had a positive participatory attitude however struggled to mobilize numbers to engage in community meetings. The police also continue to be a hindrance to public participation as they often disperse mass crowds. The lack of knowledge about the PMA programme may also contribute towards lower levels of participation when seeking to do community-based activities. The same project non-participant, as mentioned above, stressed the following:

“I didn’t know about this PMA thing. If I knew, I was gonna [going to] do it. I wanna [want to] help Delft.”

Source: Key Informant Interview with non-participant conducted on 11 May 2018 in Delft Cape Town.

Hicks (2011) highlights that failure to advertise a public participation event will result in marginalised groups, like women, to be further marginalised. It is evident that there is room to grow the number of PMA participants but there is a lack of awareness about the programme. People are also more likely to engage in PMA-organised events with greater knowledge around the programme. The youth was identified as a vulnerable group in Delft. If the PMA programme can be administered at a school level, the quality of democracy will improve by showing the youth how to exercise their political and civil rights. They will become accustomed to democratic participatory methods from a young age and their political knowledge will put government representatives under pressure to remain accountable to their communities.

The 21st Century has also seen citizens engage through the use of social media. Citizens have the opportunity to engage official government pages on social media platforms and engage each other on common interests (Effing et al, 2011). Social media has broken geographical boundaries and allows for citizens participate in the online realm. The most prevalent form of social media used by PMA participants was found to be WhatsApp. Each FGD participant was part of the “Delft Safety Group” on WhatsApp and the majority of the communication appeared to be in the group. In a bid to reach out to the broader community, the PMA programme created the “Delft Life Matters” page on Facebook. The page saw the release of the digital story, “Being Young Delft” on the 12th of September in 2017 and the video has received over 18 000 views since its upload. The Facebook page has been used a platform to show the work of the PMA programme however the content has been few and far between.

4.3.2. Civil Society perspectives on the Quality of Democracy

This research report considered the indicators of the quality of democracy in addition to specific perspectives on the quality of democracy. Civil society can be viewed as the driving force for initiatives which aim to grow competitive market economies, boost state capacity to respond to community needs and improve democratic mechanisms which enhance public participation (Lewis, 2002: 572). Civil society’s outlook plays a key role in advancing the developmental agenda as a poor mindset might hinder future community projects from reaching their full potential. Despite the PMA programme excelling in boosting participatory attitudes, the overall outlook on the quality of democracy is negative. Based on the FGDs conducted with participants between the 6th and 7th February in 2018, common words such as “*kak [bad]*”, “*swak [weak]*” and “*a mess*” were used to describe the quality of democracy in Delft. One of the participants stressed that:

“The system fails us every day my man!”

Source: PMA Participant from FGD conducted on 7 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

The PMA participants appeared to view the current democratic mechanisms in place in a negative light. The quality of democracy was seen as weak and failed to improve the economic and social

conditions in Delft. Despite the negative outlook on the quality of democracy, majority of PMA participants from the FGDs were willing to engage in democracy-related programmes.

By including non-participants, the researched aimed to compare if there were differences between those exposed to PMA project and those not exposed. Furthermore, the aim of this research report was to determine whether and to what extent the programme had an influence. The non-participants also failed to provide a positive outlook on the quality of democracy. Based on the FGDs conducted with participants between the 8th and 9th of February in 2018, common words such as “kak [bad]”, “swak [weak]” and were also used to describe the quality of democracy in Delft. One of the non-participants said the following about the quality of democracy in Delft:

“Very weak. Elections is a waste. The councillors are useless and the crime is just getting worse.

Source: PMA Participant from FGD conducted on 8 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

Moreover, there seemed to be a reluctance to engage in future democracy-related programmes from some of the non-participants. Another non-participant said the following regarding democracy-related programmes:

“My bru [brother] do you know how many projects I seen come and go in Delft? Gang [Many]! They do nothing. These people come and go and Delft is the same. We need jobs not these projects.”

Source: PMA Participant from FGD conducted on 8 February 2018 in Delft, Cape Town.

Despite the negative outlook on the quality of democracy, the PMA programme still managed to ensure that their participants continued to participate throughout the duration of the programme as well as seek to engage in future democracy-related programmes.

Over and above the democratic processes under scrutiny, this research looked at specific socioeconomic needs highlighted by participants and non-participants. There were three socioeconomic needs which occurred as common themes throughout the FGDs and key informant interviews. The three main socioeconomic needs that emerged from the research were reducing crime, job opportunities and improving water and sanitation. The quality of democracy in Delft is

likely to improve by addressing these specific socioeconomic needs. Participants and non-participants sought more tangible changes in their community. Participation allows for specific needs to emerge and problem-solving from local government to occur.

4.4. Democracy beyond the State (External Influence)

This section looked at role players who operate beyond state structure. As mentioned in Fioramonti (2004), development agencies have often used NGOs to take development projects directly into a community. The PMA programme involved a development agency, an NGO and project participants. This research report looked at the interactions of these three key role players and the effect on the quality of democracy.

4.4.1. The use of NGOs for Development Aid Programmes

International development aid donors use various agencies to administer programmes. NGOs often work directly with the poor and are perceived as better suited for local development projects because they prioritise sustainability and participation (Collier, 2000: 115). The PMA programme followed an application process in a bid to secure funding. The project manager highlighted the process as follows:

“... so we basically drafted a proposal (...). We drafted the proposal then sent it through to the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). From there, they helped us edit the proposal and also helped us secure funding from international donors.”

Source: Key Informant Interview with PMA Project Manager conducted on 9 January 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

The Sustainable Livelihood Foundations was the chosen NGO for the democracy-related programme. The NGO used an international intermediary agency to secure funding. The IDS (2019) website highlighted that:

“The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) is a global research and learning organisation for equitable and sustainable change.”.

The IDS essentially inquired across various development aid agencies and secured funding on behalf of the SLF for the PMA programme. Despite gaining access to certified funders, the PMA programme lost part of its funding through consulting fees. The project manager stressed the following:

“We managed to secure \$46 460. But we do take a double knock because of the exchange rate. If the Rand is strong, we get less money but if the Rand is weak, we get more [...]. We [also] have to pay a consulting fee to the IDS for their assistance when securing funds.”

Source: Key Informant Interview with PMA Project Manager conducted on 9 January 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

The PMA programme had approximately 18 participants. Despite securing funds in foreign currency, the funds are too low to give the Delft community the ‘Big Push’ needed to experience real socioeconomic change (Easterly, 1999). The aid levels need to be higher to have a bigger effect.

Despite having a vested interest in the programme, international donors did not interact with participants in the PMA programme. Therefore there is a strong dependency on the project manager to provide necessary updates, reports and research outputs. There was little conditionality on the funding with the NGO deciding how funds were distributed. The project manager highlighted the following:

“The only real conditionality is within SLF. As a rule, if you secure funding, you have to contribute some towards overheads in the NGO. We do help each other where we can but the project will get most of the funding. I do have a colleague who secured funding for a project with USAID. She has slightly stricter conditionality from the donors.”

Source: Key Informant Interview with PMA Project Manager conducted on 9 January 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

The SLF ensures that their other projects continue to operate whilst prioritising the PMA programme. Conditionality on how the aid must be administered is also donor dependent.

Despite numerous attempts to contact local councillors, the PMA programme failed to incorporate state officials. State officials contribute to open dialogue, transparency, relevant information and early intervention can occur before community needs reach crisis management (Williams, 2004: 22). The local councillors were not available for interviews with me as a researcher. State support was hard to come by for the PMA programme but in August 2016, Project leads accompanied by three project participants representing the SLF PMA Delft Safety Group attended an international conference co-hosted by UCT's (SAVI) and the Global Campaign for Violence Prevention (Liedeman, 2016). There is yet to be any follow-up meetings since the conference which shows a reluctance by high level officials to participate with community members.

The PMA programme still managed to create the necessary research outputs. The project manager put forward the following outcomes:

“We managed to publish 11 to 12 digital stories. We got the youngsters involved in the film-making process namely for “Being Young in Delft” and “Gangsters in Uniform”. We managed to organize a few public engagement events where high profile politicians came to hear community needs. And I mean, the community is more confident about expressing their concerns. You could see it as the programme went over time. We also got ‘Delft Lives Matter’ on Facebook.”

Source: Key Informant Interview with PMA Project Manager conducted on 9 January 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

The PMA programme excelled in producing research outputs however an independent SLF employee shared the following:

“The donors were extractive in nature. They were seeking new data instead of actual development. It was short-cited.”

Source: Key informant interview with independent Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation Project Manager conducted on 7 February 2018 in Wynberg, Cape Town.

From the findings above, it is evident that the main beneficiaries were the donors as opposed to the Delft community. The research outputs mainly favour the donors and the SLF within the publication space. The donors also did not do an independent evaluation on the programme nor did they interview any participants once the programme was complete. Regular reports were filed by the project manager illustrating a good paper trail however donors failed to engage with the participants nor the community to understand the need to improve the quality of democracy.

CHAPTER 5

REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSION

Based on this research report, the PMA programme had mixed results. The programme failed to satisfy all four indicators used to measure the quality of democracy however it succeeded in specific elements under each indicator. This section highlighted the successes and failures of the PMA programme in addition to concluding the effect of development aid on the quality of democracy.

The first research objective was to analyse donor-funded democracy programmes and their influence on public participation and citizen-led accountability. The PMA programme encouraged a participatory culture through interactive workshops and digital storytelling which saw participants play a key role in the production of the stories. Despite project participants showing a strong urge to participate in community meetings, the police were repressive as they did not allow local community meetings and often violated citizens' human rights. Although there was a desire to boost public participation, the participants lacked the ability to mobilize numbers beyond programme members. This begins to suggest that the democracy programme concentrated too much on the demand side of democracy at the expense of the supply side of democracy. It is therefore imperative that democracy programmes and interventions should address both the demand and supply of democracy.

The PMA programme struggled to get a common goal for the community of Delft as the project objectives differed from participant expectations. This would hinder the citizenship needed to improve the quality of democracy. The programme excelled in creating human rights awareness through various participatory methods such as digital storytelling and interactive workshops. Project participants gained a good understanding of the importance of upholding the rule of law however they were not necessarily less likely to break the law. The poverty stricken environment in Delft could force participants to engage in criminal activities in a bid to make ends meet.

The second research objective was to analyse the ability of citizens to hold elected officials accountable at a local level. The programme boosted public participation by encouraging participants to express their concerns but had little effect on poor government responsiveness and accountability. Local councillors were inaccessible and poor service delivery persisted. Despite engaging various spheres of government, there was a lack of accountability and political will to address Delft community needs. Although officials are legitimately elected, the quality of democracy does not improve because they are not accountable to constituents. Elected officials were accountable to officials holding higher positions in government in addition to the elite in Delft. Moreover, the SLF was accountable to donors for the PMA programme which contradicts the nature of citizen-led accountability. This finding again suggests critical weaknesses on the supply side of democracy that need to be considered and addressed together with demand for democracy.

The final research objective was to explore local citizens' perspectives on the quality of democracy in South African townships. The current democratic mechanisms in place were strongly viewed in a negative light by PMA participants and non-participants. The quality of democracy was seen as weak and failed to improve the socioeconomic conditions in Delft. Despite the negative outlook on the quality of democracy, the majority of PMA participants from the FGDs were willing to engage in new democracy-related programmes. However, there seemed to be a reluctance to engage in future democracy-related programmes from some of the project non-participants due to the numerous short-term projects occurring in Delft. The quality of democracy in Delft is likely to improve by addressing specific socioeconomic needs. Project participants and project non-participants sought more tangible changes in their community. In this instance, we notice again that as much as there are gains made in promoting demand for democracy. The weak supply of democracy and service delivery have the potential to undo these gains.

Ultimately, this research report looked at the effect of international development aid on the quality of democracy in South African urban townships through donor-funded democracy programmes. The international development aid, through the democracy programmes, boosted participatory culture and human rights awareness. However, the aid had little effect on poor government responsiveness and the lack of accountability. There is a need for donor-funded democracy programmes however the programmes cannot only concentrate on the demand side but should also include the supply side. The programmes must also run over a longer period and at a larger scale in order to improve the quality of democracy in a specific area. Much as the findings of this research cannot be generalized to larger domains, they provide critical lessons that can be applied to similar donor-funded democracy programmes with similar context.

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APPENDIX

Interview questions for Project Participants

1. How did you find out about the PMA project?
2. How long did you participate in the project?
3. What have you learnt from the project?
4. What are the benefits of a project of this nature?
5. Has there been an impact in your community from this project? If so, what impact?
6. Do you feel there is a common citizenship in South Africa?
7. Do you feel government officials and citizens are equal before the law? If yes, why? If no, why not?
8. Do you feel economic and social rights are guaranteed for all? If yes, why? If no, why not?
9. Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies?
10. What are the services needed in your community?
11. Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns? If yes, why? If no, why not?
12. Are decisions taken at the level of government which is most appropriate for the people affected? If yes, why? If no, why not?
13. How would you define the quality of democracy in your community?
14. How would you like to see the quality of democracy improve in your community?
15. Would you participate in another democracy-related programme for your community? If yes, why? If no, why not?

Interview questions for Project (non)-Participants

1. Have you heard about the PMA project?
2. Has there been an impact in your community from this project? If so, what impact?
3. Do you feel there is a common citizenship in Delft?
4. Do you feel government officials and citizens are equal before the law? If yes, why? If no, why not?
5. Do you feel economic and social rights are guaranteed for all? If yes, why? If no, why not?
6. Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies? If so, how?
7. What are the services needed in your community?
8. Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns? If yes, why? If no, why not?
9. Are decisions taken at the level of government which is most appropriate for the people affected? If yes, why? If no, why not?
10. How would you define the quality of democracy in your community?
11. Would you participate in a democracy-related programme for your community? If yes, why? If no, why not?

Interview questions for Project Manager

1. How long was the PMA programme intended to run for?
2. What were implementation phases for the programme?
3. What were some of activities used within the project? E.g. educational workshops, community meetings, pamphlets promoting democratic rights etc. (Please expand)
4. What were some of the challenges faced when trying to implement the project?
5. Was there any involvement from government officials when implementing the project? If so, to what extent?
6. Was there any interaction between foreign donors and participants? If so, to what extent?
7. Was there any interaction between government officials and foreign donors? If so, to what extent?
8. Was there any interaction between participants, government officials, Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation and foreign donors? If so, to what extent?
9. How would you improve the implementation of the project?
10. What is the procedure when applying to foreign donors for funding for democracy-related programmes?
11. How much funding was secured for the Participation, Monitoring and Accountability Project?
12. Was there any conditionality when securing the funding from foreign donors? If so, what?
13. How were the communication channels between yourself and foreign donors?
14. Were foreign donors pedantic about how the project should be implemented or how funds should be allocated? If so, in what way?
15. How long did the PMA programme run for?
16. What were the project goals before implementation?
17. Who were the key participants in the project?
18. What were some of activities used within the project? E.g. educational workshops, community meetings, pamphlets promoting democratic rights etc. (Please expand)
19. What were the outcomes of the project?
20. Was there an impact evaluation done for the project? If so, what was the impact?

21. What resources would you need to improve the project?
22. What limitations do democracy-related projects face at a local level?

Interview questions for the SLF Employee

1. How long do you think the PMA project should run for?
2. Do you think the PMA project met its outcomes?
3. Do you think there is common citizenship in Delft?
4. What resources would you need to improve the project?
5. Were foreign donors pedantic about how the project should be implemented or how funds should be allocated? If so, in what way?
6. What were the outcomes of the project?
7. Was there an impact evaluation done for the project? If so, what was the impact?
8. Could government develop a similar programme for the community?
9. What limitations do democracy-related projects face at a local level?
10. How would you define the quality of democracy in Delft?