



FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

William Kandowe 546338

Supervisor Dr Norman Sempijja

Co Supervisor Ekeminiabasi Eyita-Okon

Examining the impact of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Democratic Republic Congo—the cases of Operation Artemis 2003 and Force Intervention Brigade 2013.

Research submitted to the Faculty of Humanities in fulfilment of the requirements of the Master's Degree in International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg South Africa

Declaration

I William Kandowe declare that this is solely my own work, and where otherwise appropriate referencing has been made.

Signed-----Date-----

Dedication

To my wife Marjory and my children: Laura Leaza, Lavender Layla and Lee William.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my supervisor Dr Norman Sempijja, co-supervisor Ekeminiabasi Okon, my wife Marjory Muneri, as well as my daughters Laura, Lavender and my son Lee William. I would further like to thank Lyn Brown, Dickson Kamungeremu, Princington, Rudo, Fellowship and Isaac. Further thanks are due to Professor Gilbert Kadiyagala, and Dr Sandi Sithole. , Professor Sheila Meintjes—your assistance with violent and conflict discussion is gratefully acknowledged, and to Dr Roxanne Richter your encouragement strengthened me.

I am also very happy with the following people who worked closely with me during my research: Misheck Mudzengerere; Farai Sankurani; Mum Muneri; Siwach Mandivengerei; Enos Tsikiwa; Mr and Mrs Jervas Mudzengerere; as well as Jervas Nyokanhete.

My friends from Wits University and staff from the International Relations Department, and to all the Masters Students I shared ideas with—thank you. Those whom I worked with I appreciate the work you did during my absence without supervision. Lastly, I acknowledge the organisations and websites which provided information I was looking for.

Table of Contents

Declaration.....	i
Dedication.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv
List of Figures.....	vi
Abbreviations	vi
Abstract	ix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE DRC CONFLICT.....	10
1.1 Introduction.....	10
1.2 Objectives of the study and research questions	13
1.3 Problem statement and rationale	14
1.4 Methodology.....	18
1.4.2 Variables.....	20
1.4.2 Conclusion.....	21
CHAPTER 2 PART ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	22
2.1. UN peacekeeping missions and use of force in peace.....	42
2.1.1 Conflicts on greed, grievance, ethnicity and Colonialism ushers in war recurrence.....	30
2.1.2 Knowledge gaps and value added to literature	38
2.1.3 Conclusion....	39
CHAPTER 2 PART TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE DRC CONFLICT	40
2.2 The Congo Wars 1 and 2.....	40
2.2.1 Attempts and humanitarian crisis in Ituri	22
2.2.2 Post-second Congo War.....	43
2.2.2 General Nkunda off-shoot.....	43
2.2.3 The refusal of EU to assist UN in 2008.....	45
2.2.4 Conclusion.....	46
CHAPTER 3 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS : OPERATION ARTEMIS 2003.....	47
3.1 What were the issues at the heart of the 2003 regional conflict in Ituri?.....	48
3.1.2 Ituri.....	48
3.1.3 Factors necessitated the UN authorisation of Artemis.....	51
3.1.4 To what extent did Operation Artemis meet objectives.....	53

3.1.5 Exploring casualties and conflict in Ituri.....	53
3.1.6 Conclusion.....	58
CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE (FIB).....	59
4 What were the issues at the heart of the 2013 M23 rebellion?	
4.1 M23 rebellion.....	59
4.2 What factors necessitated the UN authorisation of the FIB in 2013?.....	61
4.3 To what extent did the FIB meet its objectives.....	63
4.4 Exploring casualties in eastern DRC.....	63
4.5 Conclusion.....	70
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	71
5.1 Recommendations.....	74
6. REFERENCES.....	76

List of Figures

Figure 1: Underlines the inherent linkages and grey areas between the different categories in peacekeeping.....	29
Figure 2: Number of casualties before, during and after peacekeeping in Ituri 2001-2005.....	54
Figure 3: Number of conflicts before, during and after peace keeping in Ituri 2001-2005.....	56
Figure 4: Number of casualties per year before and during peacekeeping in eastern DRC 2011-2018.....	64
Figure 5: Number of conflicts per year before and during peacekeeping mission in DRC 2011-2018.....	66

Abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
APC	Congolese Popular Army
ASADHO	African Association for the Defense of Human Rights
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CEU	Commission of the European Communities
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECA	Economic Commission of African
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDP	European Security Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FARDC	Armed Force of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR	Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICGLR	International Conference for the Great Lakes Region
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	March 23 Movement
MCDA	Military Civil and Defence Asset
PKMs	Peacekeeping Missions
MLC	Congo Liberation Movement
MONUC	Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OAU	Organisation of African Union
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RCD-Goma	Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy Liberation Movement
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SNCP	National Synergy for Peace and Concord
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNBPU	United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMOC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Abstract

This study set out to examine how effective peace enforcement mechanism of peacekeeping missions has been in conflict-ridden countries, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Consequently these conflicts have led to various interventions, including the adoption of both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement strategies in an attempt to resolve conflicts. However, in the face of humiliation of peacekeeping forces and the continuation of human suffering, there has often been the need to change the mandate of the forces to that of enforcement. The study adopts a mixed method approach – using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. It makes use of a case study method to examine the implementation of peacekeeping in SSA. In addition this study used quantitative data to examine the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in the region. The focus of this study was on the European Union's (EU) Operation Artemis and the United Nations' (UN) FIB, activity in the Eastern Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) to determine their effectiveness in keeping peace in the region. Peacekeeping missions are defined as techniques designed purportedly to ensure peace returns in previously hostile societies. The use of force is considered as the last resort in the UN Charter. The abovementioned operations have continually used force in an attempt to keep peace in the Eastern DRC. Irrespective of the missions' effort, conflict still recurs in the region. The findings of this research show that colonialism, ethnic division, differences over ancestral land, marginalization, greed and grievances are at the core of the conflict in Ituri and the 2013 M23 rebellion. This finding is consistent with that of the literature. The research set out to explain and analyse the political and economic complexities of the on-going Ituri crisis, between Lendu agriculturalists and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups. The literature on conflict and peacekeeping missions in SSA, particularly the Eastern DRC claims that debates around the use of force leans towards stronger support for offensive operations being more successful in achieving peace than non-offensive operations. An example of this is the UN's loss of the city of Goma, which M23 rebels took over with little resistance from the peacekeepers. This thesis concludes that Operation Artemis of 2003 and Force Intervention Brigade 2013 are two interventions built upon and sought to address the limits of the larger UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE DRC CONFLICT

1.1 Introduction

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are concepts which have their origins in the United Nations but are not included in the UN Charter. Peacekeeping at its formation was designed to resolve interstate conflicts, (United Nations Security Council resolution 794) but conflict in Africa continued to evolve and unfortunately, peacekeeping missions have not been able to evolve at the same pace (International Review of the Red Cross 2013). Traditionally, the UN has resisted interference in intra state issues, although this approach has changed with the acceptance of the responsibility to protect individuals and intervene on humanitarian grounds.

Peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing a cease-fire agreed to by two or more former combatants. It precedes in an atmosphere where peace exists and where the former combatants minimally prefer peace to continued war. Boutros-Ghali (1992:11, 28-31) defines peacekeeping as *"the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, involving United Nations military and or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibility for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."* The enforcement concept is closely linked to the UN Charter, because it provides the legal basis for the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

According to (Bellamy 2008) peace-enforcement, like peace-keeping, is a practice of ensuring peace in an area or region. However, peace-enforcement is different from peacekeeping where options, possibly including force are used to bring conflicting parties to negotiations (Bellamy 2008) The concept has however attracted a lot of controversy. While it is an approach to maintaining an existing peace, and can thus only be done by an outside party which is recognized as neutral, this is differentiated from peace-keeping largely in the level of force the outside group is willing to use in response to violations of the established peace. Although the UN aims to rid the world of the *scourge of war*, there have been times when it has attempted to enforce the will of the Security Council. In peacekeeping, force is only permissible when used in self-defense; this is associated with Chapter VI of the Charter that deals with the peaceful settlement of

disputes. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, is provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Karlsrud, 2015).

Peacekeeping is a technique designed purportedly to make sure peace returns in a previously hostile society. It involves the use of military, police and civilians primarily as a model of observing cease-fire among the belligerents. The role of the peacekeepers is to create the conditions that bring about end of hostility between and among parties in conflict. Central to peacekeeping is the mutual observance of the rights and freedom of the people while working to help make sure the lasting peaceful relations in war-ravaged countries are returned and are/sustained (de Coning, Aoi & Karlsrud, 2017). A peacekeeping effort comes before peace enforcement. Peace enforcement in other words is war by another war; force is being used by military personnel in order to bring an end to hostility (de Coning, Aoi & Karlsrud, 2017). These terms peacekeeping and peace enforcement will be used interchangeably. Boutros-Ghali (1992), on the other hand refers to peace enforcement as the actions taken to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. Peace enforcement, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is the use of military means to restore peace in a conflict zone (Bellamy 2008).

The change in nature of violent conflicts in Africa was characterised by more pervasive and intense conflicts. The period from the 1990s saw the transition from interstate conflict to intrastate conflict due to clash of civilization according to Samuel Harrington, mostly due to ethnicity, struggle for natural resources, and more recently an increase for political power.

The end of the Cold War emerged with new challenges of civil wars and violent conflicts both in Africa and other parts of the world. The analysis of the Cold War, influenced by realism, framed armed conflicts and wars in terms of a bipolar model, while smaller conflicts and wars or conflicts of low intensity which were largely a product of bipolarity (Porto 2002). The West was largely unprepared for the task of explaining a new breed of societal conflicts which came to the fore post-Cold War (Porto 2002).

The eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been characterised by chaos and insecurity for more than two decades. The conflict caused by land disputes between the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema resulted in rebel groups fighting in Ituri, an unstable region in north-eastern DRC (Autesserre 2010 and Stearns 2011). The causes of rebellion are multifaceted as it comprises of a number of aspects such as: colonial history, ethnicity, greed,

grievance, scramble for natural resources and marginalization among others. It is therefore safe to argue that there is no single solution to the ongoing violent conflict in the DRC. Two different operations namely, Operation Artemis (2003) under the auspices of the European Union (EU) and Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) (2013-18) under the United Nations have attempted to end the recurrent rebel activities in the region (UN 2010). Owing to the dire nature of the regional conflict, the operations were authorized to *take any and all measures necessary* to protect civilians in terms of United Nations Security Council (UNSC, also referred to hereafter as the Security Council) Resolution 2098 (UNSC 2013).

Irrespective of such interventions, there has been recurrent and increasingly intense internal conflict in the region. The EU and UN interventions have largely been ‘quick fix’ attempts to stop the conflict in the short-term in hopes of also preventing future eruptions (Menodji 2013 and Janik 2013). However, such interventions applied by the EU and UN to long-term conflicts in the DRC have proven ineffective (Tull 2009). Without adequately addressing the foundation of the problem, peacekeeping efforts in the region will continue to be ineffectual.

The research provides background on and discusses the mandates of the two operations, namely Operation Artemis and the FIB. The DRC has historically been a zone of conflict, with colonialists, neighbouring countries and local rebel groups plundering its resources during different periods. Despite having gained independence from Belgium in June 1960 (Young 1986), the DRC’s post-colonial narrative is effectively an extension of colonialism. The hope and aspirations of the citizens for an era that was to address and prioritise the needs of the people have continually been dashed.

The thesis begins by shedding light on the grievances of the rebel groups in the region and the means whereby they have shaped the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC (Meredith 2005). It then looks at the EU and UN peacekeeping operations especially mandated with addressing the crisis in the region. Juxtaposing these two issues, the research then explores the extent to which the use of force particularly by these operations aimed at neutralising the rebels and brings about peace.

The rest of this research is set out as follows: Chapter 1 provides an introduction and background to the DRC conflict, an overview of objectives, research questions, rationale, problem statement, and methodology describes the types of data to be used in this study. The research is primarily

based on qualitative research, however, quantitative data from ACLED is used for specific data, more specifically Operation Artemis, the FIB and their respective mandates; this is followed by Chapter 2 which is divided into two sections: section one gives a literature review evaluating the academic literature relevant to the study. The second section provides the relevant background to DRC conflicts starting from the 1990s. Operation Artemis, MONUC, MONUSCO and the FIB are reviewed, including the remarkable number of reports which have been generated by the latter three structures. Relevant information is drawn into the literature review, and the debate on use of force within UN peacekeeping operations is discussed.

Findings from chapter three will be used to further answer the main research question – it does so by examining the operation Artemis conflict. Chapter 4's findings and analysis answer the research questions by examining the FIB. Chapter 5 concludes by presenting overall findings of the study regarding the eastern DRC peacekeeping mission of 2003, Operation Artemis and the FIB from 2013 to 2018 and gives some recommendations.

1.2 Objectives of the study and research questions

The study's main objective is to identify the causes of the recurring conflict in the DRC, namely the conflict that arose in 2003 in the Ituri region and the 2013 conflict which occurred during the M23 rebellion. This will be done by examining the nature of the conflict, the UN intervention and the resolution process. Thereafter, the research is set out to explain why there has been a recurrence of conflict in the region – why have peacekeeping operations been of minimal to no effect? What are the factors that do not only prolong the conflict but also make it difficult to resolve? The study is also set out to understand the timing of the UN intervention and the subsequent turn of events.

The objectives of the study are to:

- Identify the factors that birthed the conflict in the DRC between 2003 and 2013
- explore the conditions that necessitated intervention by the UN authorisation of the 2003 Operation Artemis and the 2013 FIB action;
- Examine the extent to which Operation Artemis and the FIB met their objectives and how this contributed towards discourse regarding peace enforcement.

The study further sets out to answer the following questions regarding conflict in eastern DRC:

1. What were the issues at the heart of the 2003 regional conflict in Ituri and the 2013 M23 rebellion? This question explores some of the dynamics that characterise the context in which the conflicts in the DRC have occurred.
2. What factors necessitated the UN authorisation of the 2003 Operation Artemis and the 2013 FIB action? The established arguments aim to explain why the conflicts in the DRC have persisted in spite of efforts to resolve them.
3. To what extent did Operation Artemis and the FIB meet their objectives and how does this contribute towards the discourse regarding peace enforcement?

Some of the major post-crisis recovery strategies that have been employed by national and international actors to contribute to transforming the DRC are examined.

1.3 Problem Statement and rationale

The DRC is a central African country rich in natural resources the country has often been a theatre of inter-ethnic conflicts and invasions from foreign armies—including of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Eritrea and Somalia among others since independence (Institute for Security Studies 2006). These countries wanted to benefit from the DRC natural resource while others have to support their relatives or identity through ethnicity. The United Nations Security Council had to instruct some of these countries to pull out of the DRC (AU 2009) while some of the countries had to sign agreements with the DRC government. Despite the signing of a myriad of agreements, peace remains elusive underscored by events in the eastern region of the country and the death toll and displaced persons estimates.

In his analysis of historical causes of conflicts in the DRC, Nest (2006) argues that: *"the pattern of resource-dependence established under Belgian colonial rule, combined with the absence of a democratically accountable regime during the independent era, caused the weakening and fragmentation of the Zairian state"* (Nest, 2006:17).

. The DRC is also known as a conflict ridden country – in fact, has not experienced long periods of peace and stability since the end of colonialism. The situation in the region of the country remains alarming and life threatening; civilians continue to live in hopeless situations away from

their homes as war continues to heat up, and peace remains elusive (Human Rights Watch 2015, 2016). A number of formal conflict resolution initiatives have been launched in an attempt to bring an end to the conflict (Institute for Security Studies 2006; Institute for Security Studies 1999). The work of Shah (2003) indicates that the conflict in the DRC has resulted in an estimated 3.3 million people who have died between August 1998 and October 2003. Slightly more recent figures (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2006) suggested a death toll of 3.5 million (Turner 2006). Theodore (2011) indicates that over five million people have died in the DRC in from causes attributable to the war. The data in that IRIN (2006) indicated that an estimated 4 million people had been displaced as result of armed conflict. In (2013) the data indicated there were some 150 000 refugees and 2.5 million internally displaced persons living in the DRC Central Intelligence Agency (CIA World Fact Book 2013).

As intra states wars increased, they resulted in more demands for peacekeeping operations which have changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement over the years, the principles that underpin them have been subject to shifting emphasis and interpretations in the early 1990s when the increase incidence of the ethno-nationalist civil wars gave rise to grave violations of humanitarian law, pressure on the UN to act to prevent or mitigate these crimes resulted in a downgrading of a consent (which is a requirement for UN peacekeeping). These difficulties were anticipated by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali who in 1992 called for the establishment of *peace enforcement units* to deal with challenges that exceeds peacekeeping. The humiliation that the UN suffered for failing to prevent the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda should never be repeated. In the former case several Belgium soldiers were forced to watch the ongoing massacres and were ultimately killed without being allowed to engage (Prumier 2009) and (Human Rights Watch 1999). These events shocked the international community and lead to a crises where the willingness to enter into peace-keeping operations without the ability to use force is juxtaposed with an unwillingness by nations to enter their forces in potentially hot conflicts which would not otherwise involve them.

In a world where there is always war, a peace enforcer will be in much demand, the instances of violence and atrocity will be high. Even if we eschew the peace enforcer's role, we will not be able to ignore the problems. It is yet another reality of the new world that global events, and especially atrocities, have become tremendously transparent and visible thanks to global

television (Bellany 2008). The atrocities we see of starving children in Somalia, the massacres of civilians by rebels in the DRC, detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina among other war torn countries are difficult to ignore. Given the nature of such situations, peace enforcement may be deemed relevant. The problems that underlay the violence are political and ultimately solvable only through political agreements that cannot be imposed by outsiders. Imposed cease-fires may be the precondition to negotiate political settlements; since the absence of ability or interest in negotiating is why fighting is occurring. Peace-enforcement is a potentially appropriate response, war and not peace describes the situation. The use of force has to undergo expansion to include defense of the mandate and not just peacekeeping.

The UN has been hesitant to get involved in intra-state issues – this has however changed with the case of the DRC. The UN has resorted to the use of force to attain its goals, and as discussed above. A good case in point would be the FIB's success in meeting the objectives of Resolution 2098 implemented under the UN Chapter VII mandate. One of these objectives was to neutralize armed groups that was causing instability in eastern DRC (Mutisi 2015).

When taking the number of people who have lost their lives as well as the number of displaced individuals, the use of force can be considered a failure as the numbers increased (Mutisi 2015). The fear being that this intense warfare is of results of war until peace is restored. There is concern that Resolution 2098, the first instance of use of the Chapter VII mandate, is precedent-setting for such use of force. The UN thus needs to be extremely cautious in allowing Chapter VII to be in used to end long-term conflict. The eastern DRC is an example of a region which is characterised by ungoverned areas, warlordism, a poor functioning economy, rampant corruption, and violence, population dislocations such as refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as dissatisfaction from sectors of the population. Inhabitants are vulnerable to lawlessness, criminality, disillusionment and violent upheaval (Gondola 2002, Turner 2006 and Thurer 1999). The country is currently a state torn apart, thus threatening security of the poor; this status is likely to worsen given global trends in failed states (Failed States Index (FSI) 2005, 2007, 2012 and Thurer 1999).

This research study seeks to explore why conflict remains a persistent feature in eastern DRC. Taking into consideration the number of intra-state conflicts that have got out of hand in the region, the research uses the DRC case to answer its main question, that is: What are the central factors that underlie the ongoing violent conflict in the DRC.

The early 1960s ushered in the beginning of African states gaining their independence. Expectations from African populations and the world were of the introduction of freedom from colonial bondage. This in turn was anticipated to translate into stability, development and prosperity. Unfortunately, this has not been the case, with a significant number of African countries experiencing conflicts that have often escalated to war peacekeeping deployments of over 25 missions had been sent to Africa and the largest in size being in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, South Sudan and Mali (UN 2017a). Such circumstances have threatened the existence of these states by destroying their economies and social fabric.

Gurr (1993) contends that many problems facing African countries create fertile ground for the outbreak of conflicts that become difficult to resolve. Contributing factors include political and economic marginalization, greediness and historical grievances, ethnicity, poor economic and other social management policies, underdevelopment, bad governance, external interference and the challenges of redistributing resources for equitable growth in the post-colonial period. Many societies might have experienced conflicts of different magnitudes but the difference lies in how those societies deal with the situations confronting them. In cases where historical grievances are not resolved and resources are not available to the aggrieved parties, war often results (Collier 2011).

The situation for most of DRC's refugees and internal displaced persons equates to a living hell since their basic human needs are not being met. For example, these migrants do not have access to primary health care, the children suffer from malnutrition and many die from starvation (Human Rights Watch 1999). Human rights abuses estimates that 70% of the female population has been raped (Gettleman 2007), and over 10 000 child soldiers of which the majority under the age of 15 years had been recruited (MONUSCO 2013) and (UNICEF 2018) for those living in conflict zones, including occurrences of killings, the involvement of such practices has been well documented (Dag, 2011).

The conflict in south Sudan serves a good case in point on deadly catastrophe brought by these wars also poses a challenge to international peace and security as interstate wars are based on grievances and ancestral land or shrines outsiders will not solve this completely war will always reoccur which will be different from other regions (Deihl 1994). Such lessons of many innocent people killed, mass rape, displaced and refugees can be learned from the relative success or failure of the United Nations peacekeeping missions that have taken place on the continent in recent times.

The research contributes to broad academia and the international relations field; in particular, it provides knowledge on means to address the failures while enhancing the successes of peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere. This study contributes by examining the FIB and Artemis on the conflicts in eastern DRC. The importance of peacekeeping is to end war, strengthen security and human rights to populations of affected areas. Recurring wars show the argument that peacekeeping has failed because it was not properly implemented and managed to address all the causes. The next section covers the methodology and explains how design, data collection and analysis were undertaken.

1.4 Methodology

The study adopts a mixed method approach in examining the implementation of peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa, using the conflict in Eastern DRC as a case study. This approach allows for a combination of quantitative and qualitative measurement. The quantitative analysis is used to examine the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in the region. The use of this particular case study forms the basis of the research as it will not only provide greater insight into the unique factors that differentiate the conflict in the DRC from other conflicts, but the use of a case study will also provide insight into why peacekeeping missions have failed to bring about some form of stability within the region.

Research is defined as “...something that people undertakes in order to find out new things in a systematic way, thereby increasing their knowledge...” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). A research process involves the identification of a particular problem or area of interest, translating that problem into a research problem, collecting data, analyzing the data and reporting the findings of the research. The importance of a methodology to research uses different criteria for solving or searching the given research problem. Various sources use different types of methods

for solving the problem. The section is divided as follows: it begins with discussing the research design, variables, limitations; process tracing and case selection will follow thereafter.

1.4.1 Research design

There are several viewpoints as to why qualitative and quantitative research methods can be combined.

“Both approaches can be combined because they share the goal of understanding the world in which we live. They share a unified logic, and the same rules of inference apply to both. A combination of both approaches provides a variety of perspectives from which a particular phenomenon can be studied and they share a common commitment to understanding and improving the human condition, a common goal of disseminating knowledge for practical use. Both approaches provide for cross-validation or triangulation – combining two or more theories or sources of data to study the same phenomena in order to gain a more complete understanding of that phenomenon (interdependence of research methods) and they also provide for the achievement of complementary results by using the strengths of one method to enhance the other (independence of research methods) (Sale, Lohfeld and Brazil 2002:46).”

The paper used process tracing in order to track the historical events of the conflict in the DRC. The method was used to prove causality between the variables, as it showed that the Independent Variable (IV) predated the outcome and have a causal influence. Dyer & Wilkins (1991) contend that a case study approach to research allows intensive description and analysis of complex and rare phenomena; it can further accommodate in-depth investigation. According to George & Bennett (2005:206) process tracing is “the causal chain and causal mechanism between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable”. The focus for this research was on the causal mechanisms; this was done by conducting an in-depth study to determine whether there is indeed a causal mechanism between possible causes and observed outcomes. In this case, peacekeeping missions are asserted to be the causal mechanism between the causes and the observed outcomes.

This paper used Statistical data sourced from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure the successes of Operation Artemis and FIB. For the purpose of this study

violent conflict is regarded as any conflict whereby at least 1000 deaths are recorded. The number is used as a barometer to check figures increasing or decreasing in the number of deaths – this will be used to measure the success or failure of peacekeeping missions.

The results of this component of the research are used to answer question three. The other two questions were answered through use of secondary data obtained from the internet, journals, and UN reports among other literature searches. The indicators of ACLED are:

- Military death in the battle field;
- Civilian death in the community; and
- Conflicts in the community.

I evaluated the numbers of deaths of civilians and military personnel to verify whether the objectives of the FIB mission were met. I then evaluated the mandates and objectives of the missions to assist with measuring the relative success and/ or failures of the missions. Criteria to be used for this review will be before, during and after the interventions of peacekeepers.

I gathered data on violence and the conflict in eastern DRC. Information sources included UN reports and International Crisis Group documentation. Secondary data was obtained from UN reports and websites, and was further gathered from sources including books, journal articles, magazines and other relevant materials sourced from the African Centre for Strategic Studies. The internet provided a further source of secondary data. The study used process-tracing as a method of data collection, and content-analysis was used to analyse raw data.

1.4.2 Variables

The research involved both independent (causes) and dependent (outcome/s) variables. An independent variable (IV) explains or predicts outcomes on the dependent variable (DV); the intervening variable is one that influences the relationship between the observed variables or IVs and DVs. The DV forms the focus of research and depends on the IV or explanatory variable/s (Gary 2013). The DV (mission success and failure) in peacekeeping and the IV (the use of force in FIB) was used to examine the outcome of peacekeeping if peace prevails it was a success and if war escalates it was a failure. The use of force can be positive or negative and its dependence on time or area was elaborated. The IV (the use of force in FIB) was measured based on the way

in-country (internal DRC) grievances causing conflicts (which results in war) have been addressed or rebels neutralised. The extent to which the use of force can bring lasting peace is evaluated. In other contexts, the UN and African Union (AU) in Somalia and Liberia failed to bring lasting peace, while the use of force is not the solution. Artemis showed restraint in engaging rebels; the extent to which use of force is used to neutralize rebels (that is, is it an important explanatory variable or not in bringing peace) was examined. The DV was measured by evaluating whether the FIB peacekeeping missions in eastern DRC were successful or failures. This was done using ACLED to measure the number of deaths of civilians and deaths of military personnel by evaluating figures to justify numerical values. Although the battles also result in casualties, refugees and internally displaced people, this information is difficult to get on ACLED in eastern DRC. Information drawn from other websites will include that relating to internally displaced refugees in eastern DRC. On case selection the DRC is a befitting case study for this research because the civil war has been ongoing with no permanent solutions or successful peace building. The DRC has been a testing ground for peace enforcement by the UN as shown by operation Artemis and the use of Force intervention Brigade. Therefore it is a viable case study to test the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and the peace enforcement mechanism. It is a good academic area of research which will contribute to ideas of how conflicts may be resolved.

1.4.3 Conclusion

The reoccurrences of conflict in eastern DRC is a threat to stability and development; furthermore, and quick-fixes by the EU and UN have failed to yield lasting peace. The chapter has aimed to set the stage for the study by giving brief overviews of the conflict from 2003 Operation Artemis and the 2013-2018 FIB conflict. The UN mandated the operations to take all necessary measures to protect civilians. The Security Council allowed Artemis and the FIB the conditions necessary to promote and maintain peace in eastern DRC. The UNSC Resolutions or mandates order peacekeeping interventions by the Security Council under Chapters VI, VII or VIII of the UN Charter, depending on the situation on the ground. The resolutions and other relevant data were used to evaluate and review. A case was made for the need to find the causes of the conflicts and future solution to end the war. The first part of Chapter 2 provides literature review to the study where debate on use of force will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2 PART ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW

The chapter begins by discussing UN peacekeeping missions and the use of force to show and explain its origins, what peacekeeping missions are and explain their purpose. It then goes on to examine what the UN peacekeeping missions should be doing versus what they are currently doing. Added to this the chapter will be evaluating peacekeeping missions in international peacekeeping by identifying discrepancies and contrasting views. The chapter will further look into core arguments on peacekeeping discussing the debate on the use of force within the UN peacekeeping missions. The conflicts which are the causes of the recurrence of war are issues on colonial history, ethnicity, Congo Wars one and two, marginalisation, greed and grievance among other will follow thereafter. After peacekeeping missions has failed to maintain peace due to recurrence of war this results in peacekeepers adopting peace enforcement. Having discussed all this, the research will identify the gaps which the research answered in next section of the document.

2.1 UN Peacekeeping Missions and use of force

The United Nations, since its inception in 1945, is tasked with maintaining international peace and security in order to develop relations among nations. The UN is to foster worldwide cooperation in order to solve economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems (United Nations Charter 1945, Francisco Conference 1945). To this end, peacekeeping missions aim to provide security and the political and peace building support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace (UN 1994). Peacekeeping is the end of hostility and bring back peace while peace enforcement is the use of force to end hostility in order bring peace which had been violated.

UNPKO 2004 notes that peacekeeping is one of the cornerstone functions of the UN and was, is and will continue to be an essential tool for creating lasting peace in war-torn societies. The international peacekeeping system has changed in many ways since they were first deployed in 1948; new actors and challenges have emerged and mandates have evolved. The 21st Century has brought enormous challenges to the international community's peace and security—and peacekeeping needs to address many of these difficulties. The UN website (1994) describes the three basic principles of peacekeepers as follows: firstly, consent of the warring parties;

secondly, impartiality; and thirdly, no use of force except in defensive situations. This has changed with advent to protect enabling use force. It can be argued that the peacekeepers previously were effectively kept far from being able to implement peacekeeping; it can be reasoned that physical force is often necessary to establish peace (UN 2017a).

However, the UN's approach to peacekeeping has changed over time, it is therefore important to distinguish between missions conducted pre and post-Cold War era. Given that the main purpose of peacekeeping missions is to "prevent resumption of civil conflict" (Fortna, 2004: 271), peacekeeping, especially that of the UN, has become the most common and sought-after form of conflict intervention (Howard 2008). Traditional peacekeeping was founded on the bedrock principles of impartiality; consent and the non-use of force except in self-defense which led to a lot of UN soldiers being sacrificed and witness atrocities happen (UN 2017a).

The UN has traditionally defined peacekeeping as missions *'involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict'* (United Nations 1990:4). Peacekeeping is a tool of conflict prevention, management and resolution. Peacekeepers are intended to be enablers rather than enforcers (Schmidl 1997). Don Daniel (1997) contends that peace-enforcement is the physical interposition of armed forces to separate ongoing combatants to create a cease-fire that does not exist. Boutros-Ghali (1992), on the other hand uses the term to refer to actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. Peace enforcers will have to be quite different. They will have to be combat troops, since they will be thrust into conditions of war. They will require offensive orientation and equipment to protect themselves in combat and to conduct offensive missions. They will likely have to be bigger in size and will require more logistical support than peacekeepers. The conflict in the eastern DRC has been at the forefront of UN intervention in Africa and the DRC.

Findlay (2009) observes that one of the most vexing issues to have faced the international community since the end of the Cold War is the use of force by UN peacekeepers. Intervention by the UN in Somalia, Srebrenica, Rwanda, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consents to their presence and activities is fragile, and where there is little peace to keep (Schmidl 2007). Complex issues arise in these circumstances—peacekeepers' use of force to protect themselves, to protect their

mission and, most troublingly, to ensure recalcitrant parties' compliance with peace accords. Hansen 2009 wonders if a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers is possible or whether it is simply war by another name.

As observed by David (2014), from the 1990's, the UN began tentatively to cast off its Cold War shackles and envisage a more expansive role for itself; the Somalia and Bosnia debacles in particular caused it to rethink its mandate because many people had died and some displaced (David 2014). The new thinking began to emerge via channels including a series of reports providing deeper thinking about the implications of the Rwanda and Srebrenica cases, as well as with the advent of a new UN Secretary-General in January 1997 of his relevance to the resent study and as reported in the work of Annan (1999b), repositioning was especially apparent regarding the support and need for use of force for protecting civilians from massacres. This was in line with the UN's reaction to its post-Cold War missions, its attempts to learn lessons and implement reforms, and its tentative steps towards a new conceptualization of the use of force in peacekeeping operations (Tharoor 1995).

Samuel Colt in 1873 (reported in Museum of Art 1942:40) contended that peace in the world is attained through force when he said, *"The good people in this world are very far from being satisfied with each other and my arms are the best peacemaker"*. Thus it can be maintained that the only way to prevent war and to enact lasting peace is through overwhelming physical force. The only way the peacekeepers can be successful is if they are empowered to engage the enemy via offensive operations. However, some have argued that peacekeepers ought to be prohibited from implementing this kind of force and crushing those who would do evil. For example, this was the position put forward by (Dallaire 2003)

Furthermore recent history, as reported by Annan (1999) has shown that offensive operations are necessary, with the most obvious example being the Rwandan genocide. During this genocide, a war to the death broke out between the Hutu supremacist government and the Tutsi people. Shockingly, approximately 70% of the Tutsi civilian population had been murdered with machetes by the end of the war, with nearly a million people lying dead (Human Rights Watch, 1999). It can be asserted that an army that refuses to fire upon the enemy is not an army in any meaningful sense; it totally fails to protect even themselves, let alone keep the peace. Such a position is in line with the opinions of Durch (1993). It was observed by Tardy (2011) that the

UN had enlighten from this terrible mistake; when the UN decided to force peace on the DRC, they sent in men trained and authorized to kill. In turn, surprise attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army fell by 75% (UN 2003). Interestingly, historical precedent supports the intuitive position that force brings peace. Collier (2007) contends that when France guaranteed that any rebel groups in its African colonies would be put down with swift and brutal military force, the risk of conflict declined by 75%. This is directly aligned with the UN (2003) finding cited above. This should surprise no one who has even the vaguest idea of human nature. In fact based purely on a moral stance, the mass killing of civilians is clearly unacceptable and thus needs to be stopped by use of force, not negotiation.

It was thus argued that the UN should retreat to doing what it did best, namely peacekeeping. Then Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Kofi Annan, predicted in 1994 that it would 'be a very long time before the UN as an organization takes on a peace enforcement mission and manages it itself' (Los Angeles Times 1994). The UN Commission of Inquiry into Somalia, too, recommended that the UN 'refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states. However, the commission displayed an awareness that abstention from using force altogether was unlikely to be possible, particularly given the UN's continuing involvement in Bosnia. It suggested that if peace enforcement was undertaken, the mandate 'should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force should be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted'(UN 1994:48).

The years subsequent to Anan's statement, there was a further serious failure of UN missions in the DRC (the 2003 MONUC Mission) and South Sudan (UNMISS). There has subsequently been growing awareness within the UN of a widening disjuncture between the expectations placed upon peacekeeping forces and what they can actually achieve (UN 2002). One aspect of the debate relates to the question of how robustly UN missions should operate in enforcing their mandate. In some quarters the resolute use of force is seen as the key to greater success. For example, this is the position held by Tardy (2011, 2016), Bellamy and Williams (2012). However, it can also be argued that peace-enforcing mandates do not necessarily lead to greater success in peacekeeping. The latter opinion is held by authors including Boutros (1992, 1999) and Daniel Don (1996). Bolstering the argument that peace-enforcing mandates do not necessarily lead to improved peace-keeping is the position that the use of force is characterised

by violence and persistent armed attacks on the civilian population; it merely results in an unsatisfactorily brief armistice. It is the opinion of Singer (2009) that such a political approach in fact exacerbates future problems as rebels are spurred on to come up with counter approaches in response to being defeated.

The UN does not have its own army but relies on member states for support of its decisions; member countries discourage militarisation—key countries holding these views including Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa (UN 2010). It is interesting to note that there is no clear understanding of how much force will be used in any one instance; the armies involved have to decide for themselves about the level of restraint or otherwise required in a situation (UN 1990). However, It has been shown that offensive operations are more effective than traditional and increase the UN's credibility; an example of this is the situation in DRC's eastern Kivu province which has been plagued by the actions of the M23 militia. This group is extremely dangerous, and as put by Human Rights Watch *"M23 rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo are responsible for widespread war crimes, including summary executions, rapes, and forced recruitment."*(Human Rights Watch 2015:33). This group obviously remains a threat to the civilians in the region despite previous peacekeeping efforts aimed at quelling their hold. It is the opinion of the DRC government that further action must therefore be taken against them (UN2012). The UN peacekeeping forces have unfortunately tried and failed to defeat them while following normal protocols. An example of this is the UN's loss of the city of Goma, which M23 rebels took over with little resistance from the peacekeepers. It can thus be strongly argued (as is the case for authors including Annan (1999b) and Patrice (2011) that offensive operations should be used because they have demonstrated extreme effectiveness when compared to traditional peacekeeping methods.

According to Human Rights Watch (2015) the M23 militia that the FIB defeated in 2013 after the earlier failure of the UN action, was a malevolent group which had committed many war crimes. Since the FIB is an off shoot of the UN, the M23's defeat by the FIB boosts the UN's credibility, specifically as a peacekeeping institution. As observed by UN (2017b) this increase in credibility is very important, because it allows the UN to appear as an institution whose purpose is to create and enforce peace. With this increased credibility, (AU 2009) expresses the

hope that the UN will be more effective in bringing help to greater numbers of people. More nations would then view the UN as an increasingly effective and credible institution (AU 2009).

In the opinion of Tardy (2011), this increase in credibility can only occur if the UN is able to engage enemies in offensive operations, such as the FIB was able to do in Kivu against the M23 rebels. It can be argued that if UN offensive operations were disallowed, the UN would return to the traditional UN peacekeeper image whereby they stand by and watch as people are slaughtered in front of them. The Secretary-General Annan came to a bottom-line conclusion that “impartiality does not—and must not—mean neutrality in the face of evil” (Annan, 1999b). This finding was heavily influenced by the fact that the failures of the UN in Bosnia and Rwanda had happened on his watch, when Annan was head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (Dallaire, 2003).


Much though offensive engagement boosts the credibility of the UN, there is also the concern that the aftermath of such operations also negatively impacts the UN (Dallaire (2003), Boutros (19992), (1999), Don (1996), Singer (2009). Offensive operations are undoubtedly of a higher level of intensity than other UN mandates, peacekeepers using force would most likely be unable to perform such operations without doing significant damage to a country. Once such damage is done, it must be fixed; this responsibility of undoing the damage lies with the peacekeepers themselves. Peacekeepers are then forced to devote their resources to nation-building during the aftermath of a conflict Boutros (1999)

Debates around use of force leans towards stronger support for offensive operations being more successful in achieving peace than non-offensive operations. Besides a greater chance at peace, such operations are also purported to offer increase credibility to the UN. Lending support to the argument for the use of force, by the FIB mission in DRC, the first such offensive in about twenty years, managed to quell the M23 violence UN (2013) and was widely received as a major success UN 2014. While the use of force had already been authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter put into effect in countries with conflicts. The UN nevertheless took a position at that time in relation to peace of remaining neutral and impartial between the warring parties.

In the context of the DRC, the Security Council has played a significant role in deploying peacekeeping missions. However, the intractable nature of the conflicts has hindered progress in resolving these issues. Eastern DRC in particular has experienced continuing violence and

deepening insecurity. As part of its efforts to enhance peacekeeping, the UN transformed MONUC to MONUSCO in 1999, with the new structure having a more robust mandate (Neethling 2011a; Deibert 2013). Establishment of MONUSCO was viewed by the international community and the International

Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has a positive step towards peace in the DRC (Neethling 2011a; Melillo 2013). Unfortunately, despite MONUSCO being the largest and most costly peacekeeping mission in the history of the UN, its deployment during 2003 DRC failed to curb the conflict in the country. Further, although the subsequent FIB intervention which during 2013 succeeded in defeating M23 rebels, the FIB force has since been unable to effectively curb the ongoing conflict and violence in the DRC despite the mandate for use of force. Thus the UN as an organization still struggles with how to bridge major gaps in its approach to the use of force. This continuous dilemma is supported by Thierry Tardy's observation that *"the UN has, since its inception, suffered from the gap between the theoretical aspects of its mandate regarding the use of force and the reality of international politics"* (Tardy, 2007). The UN's 2008 publication 'Principles and Guidelines for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', divides the 'spectrum of peace operations into: conflict prevention; peacemaking; peacekeeping; peace enforcement; and peace building. At the same time it underlines the inherent linkages and grey areas between the different categories as illustrated in Figure 1 below.



Use of force' is most commonly understood as violent means applied by a politically controlled military system. Rupert Smith (2006) defines force as *"the basis of any military activity [and] it is both the physical means of destruction—the bullet, the bayonet—and the body that applies it. It has been so since the beginning of time"*. The Capstone Doctrine makes an important distinction regarding the UN's use of force, in intra-state wars compared to its traditional peace keeping on inter-state wars.

"While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council" (United Nations, 2008b).

Today most UN peace operations are mandated through Chapter VII, and 'robust peacekeeping' has become a staple phrase when talking about these missions. The Chapter states that: "the

Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Chapter VII: article 39). Article 41 relates to sanctions while Article 42 relates to the potential use of military forces. The threats facing humans in current situation do not recognize national boundaries, are borderless and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. The next points will discuss the causes of conflicts which results in war thereby necessitating peacekeeping missions.

2.1.1 Conflicts on greed, grievance, ethnicity and colonialism ushers in war recurrence

Gurr (1970) contends that there is a long-standing position in political science that relative deprivation and the grievance it produces fuels internal violence. Furthermore, identity is also an important aspect to intra-state conflict because ethnic is used to divide people and fight against each other. Rebels are thought by some economists to be opportunistic and their grievances are most often than not seen as deliberately forged is the case in the DRC. Some economists such as Humphreys (2005), Ross (1999) and Le Billion (2011) use the term *predators of productive economic activities*; they believe that rebels are not heroes fighting for a reasonable cause but rather lust for power and loot (Collier 2004). This argument identifies rebels as groupings who use war as a means to exploit civilians; they may further hope for government to commit atrocities which give them an opportunity to fight for a true, or indeed a false cause (Collier 2001). The terms *greed* and *grievance* has been utilised to explain the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC, most notably by (Collier 2004). While greed reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents, grievance denotes the relative deprivation and the grievance it produces fuels conflict (Ross 1999).

Although colonialism has ended, the literature indicates that colonisers still have a way of controlling resources is the case in DRC and other countries which results in wars in Africa being fostered (AU 2009). Donor aid promotes dependence in Africa, and trade via the World Trade Organization (WTO) contributes to resource curse in sub-Sahara Africa (Turner 2009). Added to underdevelopment and poverty, inequality, grief and greed fuel the wars in Africa

DFID (2001). It needs to be asked whether foreign aid has an impact in the fighting that happens in Africa. The DRC situation makes a useful case study since the country was colonised until 1960.

Africa as a whole has many natural resources and unfortunately it remains the poorest continent and the most politically unstable region in the world. Wars destroy lives and infrastructure, and cause poverty. As Tshitereke (2003:80) shows: *“war may sometimes be [a] necessary evil. But no matter how necessary, it is always an evil, never a good”*. Regarding the natural resources themselves, Mahmoud (2004:5) regards these as being *“literally auxiliary means, that is to say mechanism[s], to attain a goal in economy. Resources are natural factors of production that support establishment. Natural resources are gifts of nature”*.

While Mahmoud’s view on natural resources would imply that they bring about strong empowerment, colonialism and the dependent relationship it created between African states and their ex-colonialists. Added to this, external economic and political conditions are named as the main factors to the problem of underdevelopment in African countries including DRC. This following argument was represented by the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) at the AU Summit (2009). They cited factors such as, *“foreign capital arising out of the world capitalist system and the massive capital and resource haemorrhage from the continent”* (Owusu 2003:1655). Africa has seen its fair share of conflict which has in some cases been caused by ethnic-based rebellion against the state, *coup de tats*, varying religious ideologies and so on. However, it is the appropriation and exploitation of natural resources in particular that has been fingered as a leading cause for the wars in Africa (Collier 2011).

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) compare two contrasting motivations for rebellion, namely greed and grievance. They observe that these two impetuses work simultaneously to trigger civil conflict; they interact and no matter which one of the two comes first, the other follows. That is, greed triggers grievance and grievance triggers greed. Explanation from rebel groups is usually what Collier (2007) calls the *“litany of grievances against the government for its oppression, unfairness, and perhaps victimisation”*. Civil wars motivated by greed can be followed by genuine grievances as rebels fight for justice. This victimisation could be focused on a part of the population represented by rebel organizations. Rebel movements in turn are driven by intense

violence, by the severe conditions under which they are surviving or the group they represent (cited in Crocker *et al.* 2007).

It is widely acknowledged that groups like government officials, soldiers and traders use times of conflict as opportunities to plunder conflict periods; violent conflict also creates an opportunity for many to make money that's how rebels and elites take control in DRC. One such way of making income during warfare is by taking money from those whose lives are spared from being massacred (Bruce 2008). War may also lead to inflation which is very profitable for some as there may be trade restrictions from government; officials contravening the law can operate businesses and make major profit (Le Billion 2006). War may also bring about exploitation as people are forced to work for minimal or no wages; such cases have occurred in Sudan and Burma (Berdal and Malone, 2000).

The greed versus grievance competition may, in fact, provide complementary explanations for conflict (Bruce 2008). It can be argued that many rebellions appear to be linked to the capture of resources. For example, eastern DRC's range of mineral resources, diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola, timber in Cambodia and drugs in Colombia all have had rebellions associated with the capture of resources (Collier 2011). According to Collier and Hoeffler (1998), resource rich countries are more likely to return to conflict. This argument can be explained by the resource curse theory, which argues that resource rich countries are more prone to conflict. The ongoing violent conflict in the DRC justifies the resource curse theory.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also contend that civil wars can stem from the greedy behavior of a rebel group who organise an insurgency against the government. Opportunities grabbed by the rebel group can be accounted for by greed and can be disaggregated into financing, recruitment and geography components Humphrey(2005) However, pure versions of the greed hypothesis are, on their own, unsatisfactory explanations for the causes of conflict. Addison, Le Billion, and Murshed (2002) construct a game-theoretic model of contemporary conflict involving the competition for resources combined with historical grievances. In addition to resource rents, grievances also play their part in fuelling conflict by explaining inter-group non-cooperation; they further serve to lower the cost of participation in conflict. Conflict can increase because of heightened intrinsic grievances, or because there are more lootable resources.

Studies by Collier (2011), Hoeffler (1998), Ross (2009), and Le Billion (2001, 2006) have suggested that the availability of natural resources in a particular country directly increases the chances of that country to fall into civil war. Additionally, Collier (2000) found that those countries whose economy largely depends on one agricultural export or natural resource are highly prone to conflict. Le Billion (2006) and Ross (2003) assessed the accessibility of resources both to the government and rebel groups to loot and concluded that the more easily a resource is accessible, the greater the likelihood of war. Point resources like oil or kimberlitic diamonds which are highly controlled are difficult to loot unlike sparse resources like alluvial diamonds and gold which are inexpensively harvested and easily smuggled (Turner 2006). Lutable resources will be more attractive to armed insurgents for control of the territory.

Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) contend that conflict can arise between the government of the day and rebel groups that have the objective of capturing the state or seceding in order to gain control of the natural resources. Humphreys (2005) on the other hand suggests the use of various mechanisms in order to link resources to conflict and the duration of those conflicts like the greed and grievance mechanism, sparse networks mechanism and the weak states mechanism. Le Billion (2001) looks the relationship between conflict and natural resources by emphasising that not only does the presence of resources matter, but also the political and economic environment of the particular country.

The presence of natural resources in the DRC has been central in either fuelling or motivating conflict. As (Le Billion, 2001:562) points out, *“Resources not only financed, but in some cases motivated conflicts, and shaped strategies of power based on the commercialisation of armed conflict and the territorialisation of sovereignty around valuable resource areas and trading networks”*. The DRC is easily the most resource rich-country in Africa with abundance—among other precious minerals—of resources like oil, diamonds, gold, tantalite, cobalt, timber, coffee and pharmaceutical plants. However, the diamonds are believed to have fuelled the war both with the government and rebels who want to control resource-rich areas (Collier 2006, 2008). The United Nations has also recognised the role that resources play in fuelling conflict. For example, a UN report concluded that the conflict in the DRC is mainly about the access, control and sale of key mineral resources (UN 2001).

It is of importance to recognise is the fact that resources generate rent—what economists describe as *profits*—generated from allowing extraction by an external company (Collier 2008). The relationship between the primary commodities and conflict may be explained either by greed to control these revenues or by grievances, such as feelings of ethnic or political marginalisation (Humphreys, 2005). Le Billion (2001) adds that the availability of a resource is not an indicator of conflict but rather, the desires and greed from different stakeholders in the political economy of that resource fuels the violence. The rent generated from the resources provides income to governments and at the same time gives value to being at the reign in government.

A *rentier state* according to Jensen and Wantchekon, (2004) is a state that derives a large percentage of their national income from collecting revenues from external sources and therefore, the internal politics is mostly dominated by the distribution of the resource rent and not ideology. Resource-dependence in Africa can be traced back to colonisation where African economies were integrated into the global economy only through the extraction and export of a particular resource like oil, gold, ivory or agricultural products such as coffee or cocoa.

Major conflict in the DRC began only after decolonisation by the Belgians. The colonisers handed over political but not economic reign to the Africans and so *“the new dominant class based its power on control of the state, while ownership of the economy remained in the hands of the big and foreign mining and plantation companies”* (Iyenda, 2007: 12).

Ross (1999) argues that they become myopic about future windfalls and therefore devote more time on maintaining the status quo. The rent that the government collects provides it with the means to stay in power by establishing clientele relations where citizens are rewarded for support or punished. Clientelist regimes *“can divest themselves of the need of the popular legitimacy by eliminating the need for broad-based taxation of a diversified formal economy, financing a repressive security apparatus, rewarding a close circle of supporters”* (Le Billion, 2001: 567). When citizens are untaxed by their governments, they do not have power over the government and so they have no incentive to monitor their activities and hold them accountable. Furthermore, when the government is not providing them with basic services like health or education, citizens cannot withdraw their support for the government because they have no institution that they can fall back on. These types of governments do not have any need to create working institutions for

its citizens as they do not collect tax from them, so they rather focus on the sectors that pay rent (Le Billion 2011).

For Ross (1999), the rentier states adopt policies that favour the elite over development policies that support the masses and this often provokes social conflict. As the power gap between the citizens and the government continues to rise, so does the level of frustration among the citizens who feel marginalised and because political change or consensus cannot be reached, violence then becomes the only route to generate wealth and power (Le Billion, 2011).

It is important to consider the global context in terms of the origins of the conflict in Africa. The competition between the superpowers during the Cold War has been floated as an important factor in either starting or sustaining the various conflicts that plagued Africa (Porto 2008). They supported the governments, opposition parties, supported overthrowing of governments and even rebel movements. At the end of the Cold War, all these different groups had to find alternative sources of revenue and this financial void left local mineral and other natural resources as the only avenues available to raise funds for most economies (Le Billion 2009). Other than fuelling political violence, the resource revenues led to an escalation of civil wars by providing belligerents with a motive to control of resource rich areas in order to fund their activities (Bruce 2008).

A lootable mineral can be expressed as a *“highly valuable, easily transported and spread over a large territory rather than a small area more easily defended by government troops”* (Le Billion 2009). Besides, Le Billion (2006) argues that in comparison to other manufactured goods, lootable resources require minimal infrastructure and institutions to produce and can be easily laundered through illegal channels. Le Billion (2009) speaks about diffuse resources, which are the resources that are exploited over a wide area by a large number of small-scale resource-users. The DRCs diffuse resources include timber, diamonds and other agricultural products that do not require heavy industrialisation and hence, it is difficult for the government to effectively control the revenues and regulate exploitation operations.

Other activities have revolved around the extraction of natural resources that involve tax evasion, parallel extraction activities, money-laundering and drug-trafficking. The criminal character of

the products and services involved *“as well as the illegitimate violence deployed in this informal economy” has been criminalised* (Le Billion, 2001: 576).

The extraction of activities that would otherwise not be possible in times of peace are engaged in by business interests. These activities exacerbate the instability and conflict in the DRC (Porto 2008). As is the case in the DRC where almost all of its minerals involve extraction, violence is likely to take place with the aim to gain control over rents (Le Billion 2001). In 1997 a coup in DRC against President Pascal Lissouba quickly degenerated into an armed conflict; the conflict was linked to gaining direct control of the oil rent (Verschave 2000). Economic and political self-enrichment is always top priority for the groups competing for political office and *“exacerbation of competitive corruption, withdrawal of the formal state, counter productivity of state violence may ultimately result in the outbreak of armed conflict and collapse of the state”* (Le Billion, 2001: 569).

Secession groups often start by having grievances towards the ruling authority and then seek to delegitimise the government in the eyes of the people by sabotaging them and demonstrating that the government is incapable of providing security, and this is often done by creating a civil war. Some grievances will be associated with the mismanagement of revenues accruing from the renting of the resources; at other times they arise when locals perceive outsiders to be extracting their resources without sharing the wealth or when they are displaced by such extractive activities (Le Billion 2001).

They do not obey the central authority and have the capability to wage war in order to control their commercial interests such as mines, forests or even drug production (Le Billion, 2001). The existences of areas that are not controlled by the central government and their inability to exercise monopoly over the means of violence have given warlords the leeway to control those areas. To ensure monopoly over a territory, warlords resort to violence and creation of fear amongst the population. In Northern Kivu in the DRC, Nkunda, (the former leader of the in the Armed Forces of the DRC is a former leader of a rebel faction) did not call for secession despite his military dominance and capability to create separate states by virtue of his *de facto* control of the area (Reno, 1998).

It was noted by Porto (2008) that weak political institutions have provided the vacuum in which warlordism has been able to thrive. Such weakness in government stems from poor-decision making, flawed electoral systems, corruption and low capacity. These conditions have aided conflict and resulted in a situation where authorities have been unable to protect the country's resources. Adding to these chaotic circumstances, leaders emerging from these processes do not feel accountable to the electorate; there is furthermore the likelihood of having illegitimate leaders who have not been duly elected (Bruce 2008). This lack of legitimacy in the DRC has been accompanied by repression and violence from the leadership in the country (Porto 2008).

Economies that depend on natural resources are prone to be affected by 'the Dutch disease'. This comes about because of the high rent generated from the export of natural resources; the value of the national currency then appreciates and so all focus shifts to this sector and this leads other sectors like manufacturing or service sectors to shrink (Le Billion 2011). Because of this boom, both capital and labour shift towards the resource sector (Ross, 1999). The fluctuation of prices of resources in the international markets may then cause economic shocks and depression. Humphreys (2005:511) writes that "this could cause instability and dissatisfaction within groups that suffer from the shocks as these economies are likely to be dependent on a small number of commodities for their export earnings".

In harsh contrast to the situation of elite people involved with control of resources, poverty is intense for the majority of people in Africa including in the DRC. It is observed by Singer (2009) that there is no doubt that poverty has been central to the failure of most African states. This is evidenced by the rise of nations' instability and the eruption of civil wars coinciding with resource exploitation by those in power in a number of African countries (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). According to DFID (2001) poverty and associated underdevelopment has pushed many African countries into conflict that in turn it remains a dominant factor in driving fragile states to failure (Porto 2008). The tensions are addressed by Collier's greed and grievance concept (Collier 2001).

The fact that the DRC has become a fighting ground with the rise of colonialists, rebels, and neighbouring countries plundering its resources at different times has threatened the population of the country. The conflict has hampered food production, hence causing food insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (2017) and Democratic Republic of the Congo Humanitarian

Fund (2018) contend that 82% of the population of DRC are undernourished and points out that 30% of all children in DRC suffer from malnutrition. Adding to the unrest in the country are droughts and shortages of irrigation equipment and water. According to Oxfam (2006) food shortages emanate from lack of investment in agriculture and delayed reaction by the international community to funding developmental projects. Thus, some of the root causes of the country currently having a difficult in moving out of poverty and underdevelopment

According to Chibber, (2004:7) the failure of developmental states in Africa was caused by their inability to set up the correct institutions to bring about development. East Asian states did not experience the land dispossession that has been experienced by some African states such as South Africa and Zimbabwe (Evans 2010:46). This may have set African states at a disadvantage as land ownership is an issue in much of sub-Saharan Africa.

2.1.2 Knowledge gaps and value added to literature

The literature review contained in this Chapter (Chapter 2: Part One) and the preceding chapter which outlined the background to the DRC conflict (Chapter 2: Part Two) has provided some pointers to causes of the reoccurrence of conflicts in DRC. There are gaps in the literature with regards to; recurrence, despite relatively intensive and well-sourced interventions by the EU and UN. Understanding the causes of this lack of success could assist in settling on-going disputes in the DRC and elsewhere.

While the causes of conflicts in eastern DRC have been explored and frameworks have been developed notably the first Congo war 1 (1997 to 1999), Second Congo war (1999 to 2003) and the current eastern DRC war shows, little research had been devoted to why these conflicts have been reoccurring despite several agreements signed (including the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999, Sun City Agreement 2002 and DRC government and rebel leaders 2009). There is little literature linking both the study of Artemis and FIB on peacekeeping and peace enforcement processes. According to Porto (2008:46-47), Africa has in the past been the location of high-intensity conflicts, with casualties ranging from 4 to 6 million people per annum on the continent. Bearing in mind that conflict has been higher than in any other region in the globe (DFID 2001) this needs to be addressed to prevent more trouble in the future.

2.1.3 Conclusion

The chapter has presented a literature review focused on the conflict situation in DRC covering the 2003 and 2013–2018 conflicts. The review has revealed the debate on use of force in peacekeeping within the UN. It was in this context that the review has sought to advance the case for the study's quest to contribute to the conflict-prevention discourse; on finding effective means of stopping nascent violent conflicts from turning the war more violent. Channels for forestalling the failure of DRC government forces in protecting civilians were also reviewed in the literature. Greed and grievance, colonialism, ethnicity, natural resources were shown in the literature to have added to the conflicts. The intervention by EU in 2003 was reported to have provided a temporary reprieve, which created favourable conditions for finding a solution to the political, social and economic crises. However, this was short-lived as there was a vacuum left with the departure of the Ugandan forces. Rebels then took advantage of the situation and war escalated again. In the case of the 2003, this was undertaken in a manner that allowed the use of force and depended on EU strategy. The intervention later undertaken by the FIB in 2013 was assigned also to disarm all rebels and defeat M23 rebels in order to protect civilians. The two missions managed to protect civilians and defeat rebels initially. In contrast to the 2003 intervention by EU the FIB was permitted to use all necessary means. This represented a major departure from any previous peacekeeping actions. However, such use of force was shown in the literature to be controversial with many sources concluding that this approach in fact bringing in more troubles of war. Key gaps in the literatures, which were identified in the form of causes of reoccurrence lies in, colonialism, grievances and inequality. The history of the DRC is discussed in the following Chapter 2 part two in order to provide an understanding of the factors contributing to recurrent war in the country.

CHAPTER 2 PART TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE DRC CONFLICT

2.2 The Congo Wars 1 and 2

The influence of neighbouring countries has been central to the conflict in the DRC. The conflict has primarily been centred in the eastern region of the country, with Ituri often being described as the bloodiest corner of the DRC. This has led to an ongoing succession of wars in the country, notably commencing in 1996 with the conflicts, followed by the First Congo War in 1997-1998 contributed to the outbreak of the war to continue later. The Second Congo War occurred during the years 1999-2003. The sections below give further detail and context to the period covering these wars. The 1994 Genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda led to a civil war, which resulted in Hutu refugees, fearing revenge of Tutsis, crossing into Zaire. The counterattack of Hutu forces into Rwanda from Zaire in turn resulted in the Rwandan invasion of Zaire. This led to the First Congo War, during which Zairean opposition leader Kabila, with Ugandan and Rwandan military support, replaced Mobutu as head of Zaire in 1997. Zaire was renamed the “*Democratic Republic of Congo*” (DRC). Shortly thereafter, the Second Congo War broke out, when Kabila refused his former allies Uganda and Rwanda the spoils of the First Congo War. The invasion of the eastern DRC by Uganda and Rwanda prompted retaliatory invasions by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1998 on behalf of Kabila’s government. In the absence of national authority, good and efficient governance (whose criteria have been described by Maria Bordas) mass killings, rape, torture, displacement, mutilation and cannibalism took place in Ituri.

National rebel groups such as the Congolese Liberation Movement (*Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC*), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération, RCD-ML*) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma, RCD-Goma*) were supporting local militia in their conflicts as a way to expand their own base of power in the DRC transitional government or perhaps even to derail negotiations. These national groups, as well as local ethnic groups in Ituri, were still supported in some cases by the Ugandan, Rwandan and DRC governments in 2012 (UN 2012). Figure 2 below provides a summary of the conflict and role players during the latter part of the Second Congo War (2001-2003).

Despite three peace agreements purportedly ending the five-year-old Second Congolese war in late September 2003, fighting in north-eastern DRC intensified in late 2002 and early 2003. In early May 2003, hundreds of civilians were slaughtered in the town of Bunia and tens of thousands of others were forced to flee. Some sought shelter near the United Nations compound desperately looking for protection from the violence. While the international community focused on the town of Bunia, massacres continued in other parts of Ituri away from media attention. As one witness described it, *Ituri was covered in blood*. This can be argued to be indicative of the relative level of conflict in different parts of the DRC at that time.

Human Rights Watch (2003) estimates that at least 5 000 civilians died from direct violence in Ituri between July 2002 and March 2003. These victims are an addition to the 50 000 civilians that the United Nations estimates died there since 1999. These losses are just part of an estimated total of 3.3 million dead civilians throughout the Congo over the period 1996 to 2003 (Theodore 2011), a toll that makes this war more deadly to civilians than any other since World War II (Theodore 2011).

These armed groups committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law on a massive scale in Ituri over the period 2002 to 2003. Assailants massacred unarmed civilians, often solely on the basis of their ethnicity, killing scores and sometimes hundreds of civilians in each attack (Human Rights Watch 1999). These victims were of Hema and Bira ethnicity. Over a ten-day period assailants carried out a well-planned operation, systematically slaughtering and often torturing civilians in house-to-house searches and executing hospital patients still in their beds. Many other massacres, especially those that occurred in more remote areas, were never even reported.

It was not only people of Hema and Bira ethnicity who were targeted. Armed groups including the Lendu, Mai- Mai and FNI also committed summary executions, forcefully abducted persons whose whereabouts remain unknown and arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained others, some of whom they subjected to systematic torture. Survivors told Human Rights Watch researchers that the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots conducted a man-hunt for people of Lendu ethnicity in retaliation and other political opponents shortly after taking power in August 2002 (Human Rights Watch 2003). Many Lendu were arrested at that time, while others fled or went into hiding, afraid to walk openly in the streets of Bunia.

As the war intensified during the period 2000 to 2003, the forced recruitment of children increased so dramatically that observers described the fighting forces as “armies of children” (Ted Dag 2011). The complex mix of local, national, and regional conflicts also exists to the south of Ituri in Northern and Southern Kivu on the eastern border of DRC. Here civilians have suffered from massacres and other grave abuses (Human Rights Watch 2003). In fact the continuation of this kind of local level combat endangers the peace process throughout the country and beyond; thus the remainder of the country is also vulnerable to such conflicts (CIA World Fact Book 2012).

Until around 2003, the conflict in Ituri had been largely ignored by the international community. Despite information to the contrary, some UN member states and UN officials viewed Ituri as merely a *tribal war* not related to the broader war in the DRC (Goris *et al* 2004). Between 1999 and April 2003 the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) had only a small team of fewer than ten observers covering this volatile area of some 4.2 million people (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004). The next point will explain on the peace attempts which were followed in trying to bring peace to eastern DRC.

2.2.1 Peace attempts and humanitarian crisis in Ituri

In 1999, the UN Security Council authorized 90 peacekeepers to assist in promoting the Lusaka peace agreement that had been reached by the six involved countries and provided for an interim authority to be established in Ituri (Hendrickson, R.C. *et al.* 2007). Yet violence continued and the peace agreement was widely disregarded, while fighting and massacres continued. Following the six-day war between Rwanda and Uganda, in 2000 the UNSC Resolution 1291 approved deployment, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, sending 5 537 peacekeepers from the UN into Congo, called MONUC to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire (UN 2002).

When MONUC deployed its first contingent in a very limited manner with one senior political advisor, one political officer, one civil affairs officer and one humanitarian officer to the rebel-held East in 2001. Finally an accord was signed between Presidents Kabila and Kagame of Rwanda in 2002 to withdraw Rwandan troops from the DRC, once Rwanda’s security concerns were addressed. This was followed in October 2002 by the withdrawal of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops that had supported the DRC government (UN 2002).

The Second Congo War which began in 1998 pitted the DRC government, supported by Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, against several rebel movements backed by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. In 1999 the major parties to the war signed the Lusaka Peace Accords, resulting in the deployment in 2000 of a United Nations force (MONUC) to monitor arrangements for ending the conflict (UN 2002). But the accords were not respected and the DRC was in effect divided among four regimes, each of which depended on foreign troops to survive. After further negotiation, the DRC government reached an accord (New York Times 2008) on future political arrangements with two of the three major rebel movements, the MLC and RCD-ML. Known as the Sun City Accord, the agreement was signed in April 2002 without the signature of the third important rebel movement, the RCD-Goma. After further international pressure and shuttle diplomacy, the government of the DRC signed bilateral accords with Rwanda (July 2002) (DRC v Rwanda 2006) and with Uganda (September 2002), (DRC v Uganda 1999-2005) paving the way for withdrawal of their troops. The Rwandan soldiers left in October and Ugandan troops began withdrawing soon after, although some stayed on (UN 2005).

The Security Council on 30 May 2003 authorised the European Union (EU) to intervene in the Ituri region of the DRC. This was due to failures of the DRC government forces to the fighting that had erupted between the Hema and Lendu militias following the departure of Ugandan troops, creating a vacuum (UN, 2003:1-2). The European Union had previously called for a resolution to end the violence in Ituri in December 2002. The Security Council demanded firmly the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from Ituri. Uganda agreed in 2003, and withdrew its forces in a chaotic fashion in May 2003. This security vacuum was not filled and the Lendu and Hema tribal militias started fighting each other in Ituri's regional capital, Bunia, over control of land and resources, which resulted in a humanitarian disaster. United Nations investigators reported massacres from February 2003; at the same time some 500 000 to 600 000 people were displaced throughout the region (UN 2003).

2.2.2 Post-second Congo War

2.2.2 The General Nkunda off-Shoot

Crisis rocked Bukavu in 2004 due to fighting between forces loyal to Colonel Jules Mutebutsi and General Prosper Nyabiolwa. The two sides were wrestling for control of Bukavu, the capital

of South Kivu Province which shares borders with Rwanda. Although theoretically integrated into the Congolese army, Mutebutsi was affiliated to rebels from the Congolese Rally for Democracy (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD)) based in Goma, North Kivu (International Crisis Group 2004). In mid-2007, North Kivu experienced low-level combat between government forces and troops led by renegade Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda. Nkunda, who was an RCD commander during the Second Congo War, was integrated into the Armed Forces of the DRC (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) the regular Congolese army—and promoted to the position of general after the Pretoria Agreement was signed in 2002 (Rift Valley Institute 2012).

The aforementioned low-level combat in 2007 was the result of tensions that followed Nkunda's defiance of FARDC orders to leave North Kivu (where he was stationed) and his subsequent capture of Bukavu. Following his defection, he proceeded to form the National Congress for the Defence of the People (*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP) in December 2006. The rebellion escalated into a major confrontation that exacerbated long-lasting animosity between Tutsi, Hutu and other groups. Clashes resulted in the deaths of thousands of fighters and civilians, and the forced relocation of more than 2.6 million people (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2013).

The complexity of the conflicts in eastern DRC stems from the fact that all the actors have legitimate grievances but, at the same time, are responsible for extensive human rights violations. Many Congolese and foreign armed groups have continued operating in eastern DRC; groups and allegiances are formed along community and patrimonial lines, with some aligned to Rwanda and Uganda as a result of support received in the past (Enough Project 2012). In March 2012, forces of the March 23 Movement (*Mouvement du 23-Mars* (M23) rebelled when General Bosco 'the Terminator' Ntaganda led a mutiny of soldiers from the FARDC (Rift Valley Institute 2013). The Rift Valley Institute (2012) contends that the M23 at its peak reportedly had an estimated 1 500 to 2 500 combatants who fought the Congolese army in Rutshuru, North Kivu. The M23, an extension of the CNDP rebellion (under another name), was powerful because it was allegedly backed by Rwanda, with heavy weapons, troops, recruits and territory (United Nations Security Council 2012).

This formed the nucleus of the two rebel groups to come, which would have such a powerful and continuing impact on security in North Kivu: the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP, National Congress for the Defence of the People) from 2006–2009, then the M23 (UN 2010). Perhaps in response to these defections, the CNDP came to rely increasingly on recruits from Rwanda and forced recruitment in local schools, which undermined their internal cohesion and reputation (IRIN 2013). The Rift Valley Institute (2012) contends that in April 2012 hundreds of FARDC soldiers abandoned their army posts. The mutineers were linked to Bosco Ntagana, wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. On 6 May 2012, a press release announced that a new politico-military movement known as March 23 (M23) has been formed. Its aim was to revive a peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009 between the Congolese government and the CNDP. As a result FIB was created to neutralise, defeat and disarm M23 and other rebel groups in eastern DRC in order to protect civilians. More of FIB and M23 is discussed in chapter 5.

2.2.3 The refusal of EU to assist the UN in 2008

The UN invited the EU for assistance since the UN was not fully equipped to fight the rebels in 2008. The European Union (EU) contributes towards the United Nations peacekeeping forces and in 2003 the EU launched Operation Artemis in Ituri eastern DRC this was the first military involvement under resolution 1484. Justaert and Keukeleire, (2009:14) contends *“that the eastern DRC was brought into turmoil by General Nkunda’s rebels who attacked government troops in 2008 resulting in threatening peace and security of the area. The UN asked the EU to quickly respond to the situation by bringing in troops to bring order and it was unfortunate that the EU deployment to the crisis never materialised. The EU since then has not sent any army in the DRC”*.

The EU member states decides on the actions it can take on an international scale. For instance, although the EU helped the UN out in 2003 and 2006 it was not willing to do so in 2008 when MONUC became overwhelmed by General Nkunda’s forces in Eastern DRC. Over 200 000 people were displaced in the course of the crisis, which had been building since August, and there were significant anti-UN riots. The EU’s rapid action in eastern DRC in 2003 and the delayed or non-action of 2008 means the end of military involvement in the Sub Saharan African

(SSA) conflicts. This led the UN to invite the FIB and authorise it under resolution 2098 to defeat and disarm the rebels in 2013 after many wars of rebels killing civilians.

2.2.4 Conclusion

The origins of the current woes of war-torn DRC lie in its bloody colonial past and its rich endowment of natural resources. The Hema, Lendu, and other ethnic groups that serve as proxies for governments and rebel movements also seek to set agendas that serve their own interests. They are skilled at playing off the various outside rivals and change sides as their interests dictate. The counterattack of Hutu forces into Rwanda from Zaire in turn resulted in the Rwandan invasion of Zaire. This led to the First Congo War, during which Zairean opposition leader Kabila, with Ugandan and Rwandan military support, replaced Mobutu as head of Zaire in 1997.

The 1999 to 2003 war in Ituri followed and was a complex web of local, national, and regional conflicts that developed after a local dispute between Hema and Lendu was exacerbated by Ugandan actors and aggravated by the broader international war in the DRC. Until around 2003, the conflict in Ituri had been largely ignored by the international community. Many peace treaties were signed to end war but with failure. The rise of more rebels took advantage of using ethnicity to divide tribes for their advantage. The next chapter will discuss the findings and analyse them. The next Chapter three discusses the findings and analysis of (Operation Artemis). Broadly, the research examined the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions (PKMs) and peace enforcement in quelling the conflict in the Eastern DRC. As earlier stated in this report, the use of force in PKMs, initially intended to be the last resort in the UN Charter, has been the strategy most mission employ in conflict-ridden areas in sub-Saharan Africa. To this end, this research examined PKMs in the Eastern DRC namely, Operation Artemis to determine their effectiveness in keeping the peace in that region. For the purpose of this research, the effectiveness of the missions was equated to the reduction in the number of deaths in the region. If there was a reduction in deaths, this research deemed the mission successful, if reverse was this case, it was considered a failure.

CHAPTER 3 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: OPERATION ARTEMIS

Operation Artemis was there only for six months which was a very short period the research measured conflict death two years before 2003 thus 2001 to 2002 and two years after 2004 to 2005. This gave clear indication of the situation in 2003 when the EU launched Operation Artemis.

The Secretary-General Annan came to a bottom-line conclusion that “*impartiality does not—and must not—mean neutrality in the face of evil*” (Annan, 1999b). This finding was heavily influenced by the fact that the failures of the UN in Bosnia and Rwanda had happened on his watch, when Annan was head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (Dallaire, 2003).

The UN peacekeeping forces have unfortunately tried and failed to defeat the rebels while following normal protocols. An example of this is the UN’s loss of the city of Goma, which M23 rebels took over with little resistance from the peacekeepers. It can thus be strongly argued (as is the case for authors including Annan (1999b) and Patrice (2011) that offensive operations should be used because they have demonstrated extreme effectiveness when compared to traditional peacekeeping methods.

The findings of this research show that colonialism, ethnic division, differences over ancestral land, marginalization, greed and grievances are at the core of the conflict in Ituri. This finding is consistent with that of the literature. The research set out to explain and analyse the political and economic complexities of the on-going Ituri crisis, between Lendu agriculturalists and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups. Focus was placed on the role of land and many other factors which contributed to the escalation of the conflict. It was determined that in Ituri, the mineral-rich land was at the core of the crisis. Implementation of this law in Ituri, and subsequent contestations by food-insecure farmers in 1999, caused the initial upheaval that led to full-scale war with the participation of foreign armies of Uganda and Rwanda.

The methodology explained the approach taken in answering the research objectives and questions set out in Chapter 1. This Chapter provides the results to those questions by examining the issues at the heart of the 2003 regional conflict in Ituri. It further examines the peacekeeping

efforts by Artemis to quell the fighting. This chapter is structured as follows it will proceed by discussing the findings in relation to the research questions posed in chapter one. The first question will discuss Ituri, this will be followed by question two and three thereafter. A conclusion will sum up the chapter.

3.1 What were the issues at the heart of the 2003 regional conflict in Ituri?

3.1.2 Ituri

The second DRC War (1998-2003) escalated conflict pressure because of the huge supply of small-arms that became available from the region. The expansion in the number of well-equipped gatherings added to conflict over land, characteristic assets and ethnic strains throughout the eastern region (Autesserre 2010 and Stearns 2011). The fighting was initiated in a tussle over land in June of 1999. The land in question was close to Bunia, which at that point fell under RCD-ML control. Lendu agriculturalist clashed with Hema agriculturalists who had bought Lendu familial land. The Lendu arrived to graze their animals. The Hema people knew (or imagined) they had bought the land legitimately under the 1973 (Bakajika) land law, and they had the documentation to demonstrate it.

Belgian provincial standards highlighted ethnic divisions between the Lendu and the Hema, by attempting to revamp conventional chieftaincies into increasingly homogeneous gatherings and by favouring the Hema over the Lendu (Autesserre 2008). Indeed, even after autonomy in 1960, the Hema continued as the dominant land- and business-owning class. At the point when the region of Kibali-Ituri was made in 1962, for instance, no Lendu got key positions in the organisation. President Mobutu Seseko affirmed the Hema by giving them board positions related to the cultivating, mining and neighbourhood managerial divisions. These were a feature of his *Zairiaisation* approach. The Hema and Lendu had on the past had small-scale battles over land and fishing rights on a few occasions (Autesserre 2008).

In understanding the conflict in Ituri, the contributing factors are typically seen to have included verifiability of land possession and strains among Hema and Lendu people . These have been fanned by military, business and political interests (IRIN's Special Report, 18 December 2002). With the acceleration of the brutality in Ituri, whole towns and residential areas were assaulted

and control was assumed by associated military and local ethnic armies. An example was the capture of the key gold mining town of Mongbwalu by the UPC in November 2002 (HRW 2003: 23-27). The capture of Mongbwalu speaks to the sort of regional tension which had become the norm whereby whole mineral-rich zones were attacked with military power.

The rise of a Hema business and political elite in Ituri occurred after a time. As Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers contended (2004a:180), although the frontier was more accessible for the Lendu, the Hema had more access to establishments and business. Moreover, the Hema were in higher positions and could rope in Lendu as workers. This picture of elitism does not recognize that most of the Hema were and are agricultural workers and dairy cattle herders. A few Lendu also progressed toward becoming government officials and members of the elite and hence not all Lendu were workers. However, the Lendu elite were far fewer in number and with less power than the Hema elite in Ituri.

The combination of all these causes provided a fertile ground for conflict to breed tremendously. In addition some factors like absence of institutions and governance speeded up the intensity of the causes. The government of DRC has completely lost support and trust of its population as it has failed to deliver the services needed. The lack of development and infrastructure is a clear indication that people lose hope from such leaders. Taking advantage of the situation the warlords and armed groups filled up the vacuum left by government authorities and take their place (Rothberg 2007:86). This resulted in chaos, turning the government into just one of many groups fighting over the legitimate use of force in East-Congo (Raeymaekers et al 2008: 8).

It can be argued that loss of authority and institutions may not result in violence breaking out suddenly but it does allow it to happen. Therefore this explains the events of the DRC day to day activities.

Furthermore, most members of the society live under a one US Dollar a day or are impoverished. As a result, they become easy targets for recruitment by rebel groups.

These social and economic factors cannot be separated from our needs as a result many people are easily recruited by different rebel groups in eastern DRC. The importance of acquiring land and its use is another favourable factor. The desire and need of better life, daily meals and to be able to provide for families added to better shelter results in leaving people with no option but to become a rebel member (Autesserre, 2010:131). The land question to the eastern DRC people is

something which should be considered an important asset to their lives which forms their social security. Having land is an honour yet the majority of the people struggle and long to have the land. Their marginalization and insecurity of the next day created more problems which escalate to more tension. The land is seen as the base for all basic needs and without it life becomes unbearable. Citizens at the grass root level lack most of their basic needs, thus tension increase hence why the land issue has exacerbated in the manner in which it has.

Autesserre (2010:3) contends that ethnicity and more weapons in the region have resulted in propaganda being used to recruit new soldiers. Weapons are used in different ways to obtain freedom, natural resources and control of areas as well as protection. Rebels in eastern DRC belong to different factions (this is due to the different ethnic groups) and take advantage of natural resource and business people to support them. Rebels saw violence as a campaign for their goals to be achieved; they saw violence as an only quick alternative to draw attention.

According to Stearns (2011) many people with weapons usually use them for violence in order to obtain what they want. Barrels of guns have been used to control most of the events and resources. Ethnic divisions can lead to serious wars due to the type of land uses such as a legendary battlefield, a grave yard, or even territorial boundaries and initiation area. Historical grievance of land, water sources, and struggle in controlling mining areas, political gains and natural resources are causes of war at the heart of Ituri.

“[E]thnic identity contributes to violence and war focuses on mass preferences” and posits members of an ethnic group are incited to violence on the basis of cultural differences and historical enmity (Roe 2005:25-26). This analysis is closely roped to claims of ancient ethnic hatreds and the clash of civilizations, and has few pure adherents. Kaufman clarifies how *“mass preferences may be tied to other socioeconomic issues, but manifest in pressure on ethnic leaders for extremist policies that can lead to violence and ultimately ethnic war”* (Kaufman 1996:153). Thomson (2010) ethnicity has been a tool taken advantage of, for many years to divide people and cause a lot of rift against one another. The eastern DRC have lived along with such situations, ethnicity defines the wars and conflicts. Analysing the ethnic divisions in war of Ituri showed even though violence changed over time ethnicity was used to start war among many other causes. Many other groups provided political and financial support or armed forces

deployed for multinational peace operations for example (United Nations, African Union). In addition the actions of the occupying Ugandan army played a major role in the development of ethnic conflict in Ituri. Rwanda and Uganda started the first Congo war (1996-97), outsiders who participated in Ituri during and after the second Congo war (1998-2003) was the Ugandan government.

3.1.3 What factors necessitated the UN authorisation of the 2003 Operation Artemis?

The study finds that some of the factors that necessitated the UN authorization of the operation Artemis were that the EU was able to protect. The EU was ready to carry out the mission without delay, the cooperation between the EU the UN was good, swiftness of France to deploy, the EU had its own interest to protect. France was once involved in Rwanda, it was therefore easy for France to crossover to the DRC as it is a Francophone country France can easily deploy the AU follows EU standards, and the UN saw the threat of neighbouring countries to exploit rich minerals from DRC.

‘Operation Artemis’ is a peacekeeping mission of the European Union (EU) in the DRC. The Operation Artemis mission executed in 2003 was the EU’s response to the civil war in the DRC – up until this operation, international peacekeepers had failed to not only control the ongoing tensions but to also bring some sort of stability. The operation was the very first EU-led peacekeeping force to be deployed in combat; it attempted to restore peace and order in the Ituri Province in north-eastern DRC. The objectives were to promote a humanitarian environment for a three-month period until September 2003, when the UN peacekeeping mission reinforcement known as United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) were due to arrive (Sempijja 2008).

The Operation Artemis mandate was to stabilize Bunia, the capital of Ituri Province, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. This included restoring security to the town and the airport, as well as the establishment of a weapons-free zone inside the town. Almost half of the forces remained at the headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda around 300 km away. The French air force supported the mission with reconnaissance, air support and surveillance in Ndjamena and Entebbe including using Mirage fighters (UNDPK, 2004).

Having discussed the UN resolutions and the background to why the UN authorised Operation Artemis the research will further show that the EU responded to the civil war in the DRC which international peacekeepers had failed to control. The EU attempted to restore peace and order in the Ituri Province in north-eastern DRC. EU military intervention in the DRC was successful as it enabled the UN to reinforce MONUC in Bunia. EU Member States agreed to act in order to show states outside the EU - such as the USA - that the EU as a whole was able to protect. The EU has agreed in order to safeguard its own interest. In analysing Operation Artemis, Sempijja (2008) contends that there was a good example of the relationship between the EU-UN. The political relationship between Brussels and New York has nonetheless improved. The UN allowed France to take control due to the reason that France had once operated in Rwanda on operation Turquoise after the Rwanda genocide. Due to the geography of the area and the fact that the DRC is a Francophone country France can easily deploy another mission in Ituri.

The other reason was the availability and the readiness to carry out the operation needed by the UN. The swiftness of France to deploy troops as compared to other countries. The delay by other member states was not clear whether it was due to the unwillingness by member states or if it was because they were caught up in some other activities elsewhere. France had shown a positive move in Rwanda when she deployed urgently. There is no doubt why the EU has managed to contribute so quickly to the UN in peacekeeping - this is due to the preparedness of member states' capabilities and the heavy machinery for war (Roberson 2007, Sempijja 2008). The African Union, has been classically following the EU in terms of international peacekeeping standards while the EU itself has been utilising the Berlin Plus initiative to take charge and imitate NATO. Thus NATO, the EU and the African Union (AU) follow UN international standards AU (2000); European council (2003); NATO (1999).

Furthermore the research argues that Operation Artemis was successful due to high response of France and the EU's sudden responds to the UN Secretary General's appeal for assistance (Sempijja 2008). The UN had admitted to the difficulties it faced, some of these include the lack of resources and mandate to secure Ituri once the Ugandan troops left there was going to be a vacuum (ibid 2008). The Ituri situation was a challenge as lives were lost daily and a quick responds was highly need which the EU had. The French quickly utilised the request by sending military in support of UN.

The UN had the will to save the lives of people first thus the French's history in Rwanda was a thing of the past; what was needed was to protect Ituri at all costs. Shortly after this, the French and the EU deployed troops – this eliminated the danger in Bunia . The fact that the French had interest in Africa was neutralised by the coming in of the EU on board. Operation Artemis was a good barometer to check the relationship between UN and EU and the communication and cooperation was good which brought success (Sempijja 2008).

Therefore, the EU has shown that it can quickly react once their members back the situation up. The EU-UN cooperation continued in 2003 when, at the behest of the French, a project to re-establish the penal system in Ituri was launched. The pursuit of national interests has been vital to cooperation and conflict between the EU and UN. It can be further analysed that the UN's involvement of France, had identified the French interests and not the African states that wanted to invade Ituri. Thus the UN was uncertain about the intention of neighbouring countries like Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe to exploit mineral resources. The EU and UN were brought closer by the African situation and channels of cooperation proved to be successful (ibid 2008).

The conflict in Ituri is important not just because of the extent of the suffering and destruction imposed on local people, but also because of these links with broader struggles.

3.1.4 To what extent did operation Artemis meet its objectives and how does this impact on the discourse regarding peace enforcement?

Mission success and failure in operation Artemis was obtained by evaluating the effect of peacekeeping operations usually links conflict to the number of casualties in battle field and civilian community. Such an approach is incomplete as security concerns extend far beyond the number of conflict related deaths. Peacekeeping does not mean completely the absence of war but it reduces the number of deaths and violations of human rights. The debate on use of force as previously discussed in literature review shows that war is always dangerous and if possible should be avoided at all costs.

3.1.5 Exploring casualties and conflicts in Ituri

To reiterate, the effectiveness of these peacekeeping missions – Operation Artemis is determined by how well it was able to reduce the number of casualties in the region. The study finds that

there is high number of battle deaths, followed by a high death rate of military personnel, and thereafter is the number of civilians and lastly less number of deaths from the EU peacekeepers.




FIGURE 2: Number of casualties before, during and after peace keeping mission.

Source: Own calculation based on ACLED data. The years are coming with 0, 5 (halves) showing every six months.

The analysis of Ituri 2003 shows that the number of battle deaths is higher at all points than the number of other finding casualties were claimed everywhere as shown on fig 2. There is a deceleration at the end of 2003 until 2004 when the graphs are constant and the graph started rising in an upward trend showing more conflict events had started building up resulting in more death which completely suggests that the longer a mission is deployed results in more conflict if proper solutions are not used in peacekeeping. Short time deployment by the EU will not give accurately what happens after the 2003. Hence it was only a breathing space for a period of less than a year. Initially the 2003 shows sharp rise and suggests peace is totally on demand as war and conflict escalates resulting in more death. That links the literature on the use of force and the grievances which always push people due to ethnicity, where people are encouraged by their background to fight tribal wars on grievances on historical events which once occurred. Issues on ancestral land and natural resources add more hatred there by creating fertile battle grounds.

Marginalization, in obtaining resources escalates conflicts which results in war. Poverty is a weapon that destroys humans socially, economically and psychologically, this will result in anger – angry individuals are easy targets for recruiters .this is primarily due to the idea that becoming a rebel is the only option to attain a better life. Inequality encourages those affected to continue with war in order to get justice. The use of force in peace keeping will never bring peace but escalates the situation. In other words, peace enforcement is a war within another war; heavy weapons have to be used for some time until warring parties will come to a negotiating table. Both sides suffers casualties, there is no silver bullet for rebels and worse civilians are the most traumatised group in war torn regions or country.

Whenever there are peacekeepers affected groups will imagine issues will be equally sorted and there is less fighting. After some time people will realise what they were expecting to get did not happen are left with no option than going back to the bush and start terrorizing communities for their advantage. The government, elites, retaliates by sending armed forces which will engulf the whole surrounding countries in support of their members affiliated to them by ethnicity, religion or grievances as the unrest in eastern DRC had force many people to seek refuge in other countries.

The EU was successful on Operation Artemis as shown in Fig 2 due to the fact that there is a remarkable decrease in the number of death in battle, civilians and the military. Peace keeping is all about protecting civilians and reducing the number of physical harm and death. The sharp drop in numbers across the participants shows how swift the EU has managed to curb violence. Taking into consideration that operation Artemis was launch in a quick and short notice shows how successful and powerful the EU is.

Conflicts are sources of war in eastern DRC, they eventually leads to recurrences of war, whenever one group starts to take over dominance over the other. Conflict seems shows no significant improvements overtime, but a volatile trend. The eastern DRC shows how impossible these conflicts can be resolved as some are historical, ethnicity, colonial and pre-colonial, power struggle by elites, Congo wars one and two.




FIG 3: Number of conflicts before, during and after peace keeping mission.

Source: Own calculation based on ACLED data.

The trends on conflicts start at an average rate in 2001 and goes down to 58 and then had a sharp rise to about 155 which is the .highest rate. In 2003 the increased graph started and decreases and sharp increase number of conflict events tells a story of disputes which were settled, failed to be settled and then the conflicts graduates into serious matters. Hence this indicates that peacekeeping, after a medium period of time is able to curb the number of conflicts, but still struggles to consolidate peace fully.

Operation Artemis was successfully fulfilled the UN mandate of protecting civilians in Ituri. The swiftness of the EU's response to UN request was a very important move to the fulfillment of request as this reduced further massacre if by any chance EU had delayed. However, although the EU missions sent to assist MONUC achieved some success in the short term, the mission did not achieve any long-term results as the war erupted again two years later.

The United Nations peacekeepers United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) were too under-resourced in Ituri to deal with the ensuing violence and inability of humanitarian organizations to provide their services after the withdrawal of Ugandan troops. In order to stop the violence between ethnic groups, the United Nations Security Council authorized in Resolution 1484 the mandate for the multinational Operation Artemis under the leadership of France, which included primarily EU countries, to

protect civilians and UN staff and re-enable humanitarian assistance in Bunia through securing both the city and the airport of Bunia.

UNBPU (2004) criticizes that this was made worse by the fact that a number of military, political and logistical difficulties were amplified by the inadequate resources such as low troop ceilings. The mandate was to stabilise Bunia to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, restore the security to the town and the airport, establishing a weapons-free zone inside the town and increase humanitarian conditions until September 2003, when the reinforcement of the UN peacekeeping Mission, known as MONUC, was supposed to arrive (UNDPK, 2004). Just under half of the forces were at the force headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda around 300 km away. The French air force supported the mission with reconnaissance, air support and surveillance in Ndjamena and Entebbe with including Mirage fighters.

Operation Artemis was the first independent EU mission outside NATO, where its troops engaged in combat and through successful military-civilian cooperation (Hendrickson et al, 2007). EU diplomacy effectively obtained cooperation of neighbouring states prior to the deployment of the IEMF (CEU, 2007). The fact that Operation Artemis was also present in Uganda sent a positive message to Uganda as key actor to improve cooperation (UNBPU, 2004). CEU (2007) argues that the EU is thus acquiring greater credibility on the international stage and affirming its role as a political and military player in the settlement of international crises and conflicts, because the EU showed its ability to act toward a common foreign security policy to promote regional stability by helping to develop a safer world and carry out all the tasks set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (Hendrickson et al., 2007). Solana himself referred to the *EU military progress* due to its ability to secure Bunia's airport, to assist and protect the displaced persons located in the surrounding refugee camps (Hendrickson et al., 2007). Furthermore, it helped MONUC to build onto the safe foundations laid by Operation Artemis (UNBPU, 2004; UNDPK, 2004). Aldo Ajello, the EU special representative for Africa's Great Lakes Region, called Operation Artemis a *big humanitarian, military and political success*, while the operation commander of Artemis, said the force *fulfilled its mission* by restoring security, helping people to return home and restart economic activity due to the determined attitude of the multinational force against aggressive armed groups in Bunia and its surrounding area (Hendrickson, 2007). Operation Artemis, a peacekeeping mission of the European Union in

the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was executed just a few months after the beginning of the Iraq war in 2003 was the response of the European Union to the Civil war in the DRC, which could not be controlled by international peacekeepers. Operation Artemis was the very first EU-led peacekeeping force in combat and attempted to restore order and peace in the Ituri province for a mandate of three months. In the first part, I will focus on the mission itself.

3.1.6 Conclusion

All in all many factors contributed to the existence of the war in Ituri and groups eastern DRC. It is the absence of state authority and institutions that allows it to happen. At the foundation there is the grassroots issue of land, social security, economic opportunities, insecurity about one's future and the struggle to secure basic human needs on a daily basis. Ethnicity has been created into an important issue; it is how people have organised their society and view their world. It is being reproduced on a daily basis and one of the most important propaganda points for mobilization and recruitment by armed groups. And finally consideration on the role of armed groups in society showed that they provide security up to certain extend, finance traders and control part of the economy. They are ingrained in society after all those years of operations. Analysts and peace builders need to accept that the close to five-year-long war in eastern Congo has resulted in such a fragmentation of interests and power bases that Ituri's 'local conflicts' have acquired a life and dynamic of their own. In other words, and to use a term the International Crisis Group (2003) also uses, it is important to understand not only that alliances are continuously being made and un-made, but also that warlords – and those local leaders who serve them – have coercive leverage over the population from which they recruit their militias. In the context of Ituri, I contend that such an understanding can only be achieved via an analysis of the continuous mismanagement of land that has come in the wake of Mobutu's Zaireanization project and the Bakajika law. Chapter four discusses the findings of this research on FIB, mission success and failure on FIB was obtained by evaluating the effect of peacekeeping operations usually links conflict to the number of casualties in battle field and civilian community. Such an approach is incomplete as security concerns extend far beyond the number of conflict related deaths. Peacekeeping does not mean completely the absence of war but it reduces the number of deaths and violations of human rights.

CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE (FIB)

Thus far, the thesis has analysed how the conflict in eastern DRC took two years before the introduction of FIB (2011-2012) and 2013 to 2018 with FIB involved in order to have a clear understanding on impact of deployment.

4. What were the issues at the heart of the 2013 M23 rebellion?

4.1 M23 rebellion

The grievances discussed in the literature review supports the idea that a revolt took place. There were reasons why people rebelled and used violence, it is a way of protesting or seeking independence but it came with a price. On the 6th May 2012 a group of FARDC announced the M23 movement, had been established as a new armed group. The members were former rebels of the Armée Nationale Congolaise or CNDP. The CNDP justified the movement by evoking the Congolese government's unkempt promises that were made when signing a deal to integrate these soldiers into the FARDC on 23 March 2009. Although M23 was the successor of CNDP, it has a smaller support base.

The recruitment pool of M23 was smaller than CNDP's and the movement was less locally embedded. CNDP, at least initially, (Rift Valley Institute 2012) managed to win some support from the Congolese Hutu and Banyamulenge communities, however elites from these communities have continued to withhold their support for M23. To compensate, M23 has reached out to other communities such as the Hema and Lendu in Ituri, but similarly failed to rally them to its cause. Furthermore, Ntaganda replacing Laurent Nkunda as the head of CNDP sharpened divisions within the Congolese Tutsi community and support for M23 has been far from total (Rift Valley Institute 2013). The majority of integrated CNDP combatants claim they were still committed to the peace process concluded on 23 March 2009 with the Kinshasa government and remain within the FARDC. As a consequence, initially fewer than 1000 former CNDP combatants joined M23, while CNDP controlled an estimated 4000 to 7000 troops before its integration into the FARDC at the end of 2008 (Webb 2012). Several events preceded M23's creation. Firstly, severe irregularities during the 28 November 2011 presidential election significantly weakened elected President Kabila's position.

Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo continued to cause countless death and destruction of property thus posing greater insecurity in the entire Great lakes region, with DRC security forces and non-state armed groups responsible for serious abuses against civilians. On the 6th May 2012 a group of FARDC mutineers announced the creation of the M23 movement, a new armed group. The members were former rebels of the Armée Nationale Congolaise / CNDP. The CNDP justified the movement by evoking the Congolese government's unkept promises - promises made when signing a deal to integrate these soldiers into the FARDC on 23 March 2009. Its aim was to *revive* a peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009 between the Congolese government and the CNDP. The document states that the group was coordinated by Colonel Sultani Makenga and formed by former CNDP officers. CNDP officials respond by stating that they were committed to the original peace process agreed on in 2009 (Various Authors: The DRC 2012).

The Rwandan-backed M23 armed group continues to perpetrate widespread war crimes, including summary executions, rapes, and forced recruitment of children into their forces. Numerous other armed groups have carried out horrific attacks on civilians in eastern Congo, including in North and South Kivu, Katanga, and Orientale provinces. Fighters from the Nduma Defense of Congo militia group, led by Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, killed, raped, and mutilated scores of civilians in North Kivu. They include the Raia Mutomboki, the Nyatura, the Mai Mai Kifuafua, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a largely Rwandan Hutu armed group, some of whose members participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Dallaire 2003). The conflict revolved around minerals and poor governance. This research paper looked objectively on the causes of conflict, conflict management approaches and the social economic impact of conflict in DRC and the entire Great Lakes region. Greed and grievance was employed to guide in data collection and analysis. The research paper used qualitative research design and collection of data done through secondary data from already published material on DRC conflict.

The risk of conflict may be higher in low-income countries as the poorest people may feel that they have little to lose from joining a rebel group, making rebel recruitment relatively cheap and easy. Laurent Kabila, former president and rebel leader in the Democratic Republic of Congo, claimed that organizing and leading a rebellion in what was Zaire was easy – *'all you needed*

was \$10,000 and a satellite phone' (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004) the odds a civil war occurred in a low-income country were 15 times higher than in a high income country, while a doubling of per-capita income could halve the risk of civil war.

The location of the eastern part of the DRC in the Great Lakes Region exposes the Kivu province to being affected by any trouble which occurs in neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. It also allows easy penetration of foreign soldiers from neighbouring countries (Rutikanga, 2003). The current political crisis in the Great Lakes region started with the Rwandan and Burundian genocide in 1994, which led thousands of Rwandan and Burundian refugees to find asylum in neighbouring eastern Congo. It is noteworthy that in addition to the hunt for the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, there are also economic factors behind the on-going conflict in the DRC.

Besides Rwanda and Uganda, it is proven that many countries and international corporations are supporting conflicts in the DRC for the exploitation of minerals such as gold, diamond, cobalt and especially Colton, a mineral which was a key component in the manufacturing of cell phones, computers and other electronic devices (Ware 2001). Turner (2007:163) spoke of a United Nations Panel that in 2002 identified elite networks within the Congo, centred on the Rwandan and Ugandan occupation zones and on the Kinshasa government. Eighty-five foreign companies were cited as participating in the illegal exploitation of Congo's resources.

It was evident on the world market that Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda were all competing equally for the exportation of mineral wealth from the DRC. In this regard Lemarchand (2009:254) argues: *"Though both Rwanda and Uganda are bereft of diamond deposits, over the last few years Rwanda and Uganda have exported diamonds worth millions of dollars."* He adds: *"It is from the extraction of Colton, however, that Kigali derives much of the financial wealth needed to prosecute its military operation in eastern Congo"* (Lemarchand, 2009:254).

4.2 What factors necessitated the UN authorisation of the FIB IN 2013?

The factors that resulted in the FIB intervening were to protect civilians, defuse and disarm M23 rebels, the failures of MONU and MONUSCO to restore peace, continuous deadly war in eastern DRC, complexities and constraints that arose in the execution MONUC, implementation of

chapter VII mandate in its totality, strong criticism against UN on transforming MONUC and MONUSCO, lastly the FIB was not restricted to the tradition UN peacekeeping standards.

Given its ongoing struggles with peacekeeping, the UNSC Council Resolution 2098 in (2013) created the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO. The brigade deployed Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania in a fight-back and involved conducting offensive military operations against the rebels. The force was originally conceived by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) with the support of the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The FIB was announced as the first-ever UN offensive combat force intended to neutralize and disarm the rebel groups; their mandate was, furthermore, successfully fulfilled.

“The Brigade would be tasked with preventing the expansion of, neutralizing and disarming armed groups, and would carry out targeted offensive operations, either on its own or jointly with FARDC (Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo)”(Whittle 2015)

It was unfortunate that the largest UN peacekeeping mission once again failed to deter a rebel advance and, in fulfilling its commitment to defend, in this case, Goma.

However, the FIB was the first ever and thus far the only UN-authorized offensive combat force, the brigade was not restricted to the traditional UN peacekeeping standards. When we looked at the historical problematic peacekeeping in the DRC, mainly from the United Nations organisation mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Menodji (2013) explores the complexities and constraints that arose in the execution of MONUC. This was founded in 1999, after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution that would deal with the continuous conflict in the Eastern DRC. This peacekeeping operation, MONUC, was founded under the UN resolution 1279 and was to facilitate ceasefire and peace agreement in the Great Lakes Region conflict of Ituri, Kivu and Dongo (Menodji 2013).

Furthermore, despite the passing of the resolution, a root cause to the continuous war in the Eastern DRC, was the long delay that the UNSC respond to the ceasefire that was signalled in

the Kivu Region (Menodji 2013). It is important to bear in mind that the UN presence in the DRC regulated on Resolution 1258 in 1999, which was comprised of only military observations, before the implementation of MONUC (Menodji 2013). Menodji (2013) notes that, MONUC's mission in the DRC demonstrated the capabilities of UN peacekeeping forces, despite the delays encountered in the execution and a number of constraints in tactical and logistical efforts.

Due to strong criticism against MONUC and its operational tactics which at times seemed unclear, the international community questioned the rationale behind the peacekeeping operation. Consequently, Jaynaert (2016:19) discusses how the UN responded to the world's criticism by transforming MONUC to MONUSCO (United Nations stabilisation mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) in 2010, which shifted its main focus to stability and peace consolidation, although the protection of civilians remained the mission's priority.

It is however important to outline that the UN's MONUC and MONUSCO have both been deemed problematic and on countless occasions, experienced protection crises (Jaynaert 2016: 21). Thus, when it comes to the core focus of the research paper, Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), we have to firstly note that FIB was established in 2013. It was the first ever offensive combat force aimed to carry out targeted operations, that would defuse and disarm the notorious M23 rebel movement and other Congolese and foreign armed groups in the Eastern Region (Janik 2013). What should be noted here, is that FIB was implemented under UN chapter VII mandate, since its role was to neutralize armed groups that were causing instability in the Eastern DRC (Mutisi 2015). It should also be noted that, this was the first time that the UN was to implement a chapter VII mandate in its totality, which includes making use of combat forces and the use of deadly forces against these opposing armed groups (Mutisi 2015).


4.3 To what extent did the FIB meet its objectives and how does this impact on the discourse regarding peace enforcement?

4.4 Exploring casualties in eastern DRC

As discussed previously, the effectiveness of peacekeeping is determined by the reduction in deaths to be successful and increase in deaths to be a failure. The conflict which has caused war in Ituri remains the same or similar to those FIB was addressing. The major issues evolve on

ancestral land, ethnicity, marginalisation, inequality, greed and grievance among others. The FIB has been operating in eastern DRC in an effort to bring peace and protect civilians by defeating the M23 rebels. The findings on the research shows the high number of deaths in the battle, followed by high death rate in civilians, the number of deaths on government forces and rebels' deaths are at locking horns at the same point. The UN forces have the last number of deaths. The major issue of peacekeeping is to restore peace and protect civilians.

Fig 4: Number of casualties per year before and during peacekeeping mission



Source: Own calculation based on ACLED data. Years are coming in full years indicating 12 months.

The war in eastern DRC has proved to be difficult with the sharp rise in the number of battle death as shown in figure 4. It is unfortunate that the highest numbers of deaths are civilians followed by armed forces and rebels. The primary aim of peace keeping is to protect civilians

and with such loss of lives by vulnerable people will raise eyebrows to check if the mission of peacekeepers is being fulfilled or if it has flopped. The number of government forces and rebels death in 2018 has come to a same focal point while civilians' death has sharply risen. The UN death remains below all the armed forces, rebels and civilians. The numbers of conflicts have remained high and are increasingly going up hence the war will not end soon. With casualties on all sides show the war is getting more and more violent.


In eastern DRC, FIB peacekeepers have been deployed for a long time, (2013 to 2018) which is the research cut out period although the war still continues this since then has not led to a visible reduction in violence in fact fig 4 shows an upward rise in conflicts at the end of 2018. This shows mission failure in bringing peace. The negative cases are dominating the scene with the rise of figures in battle death, civilian death, rebels death and government military death which rises and fluctuates and follows that patterns which is unstable. These are rather sobering findings. Peacekeeping missions struggle to deliver in their core field of competence on the promise of pacifying conflicts and creating conditions for a peaceful post Conflict environment.

The challenges that people have on land ownership and territory be it a shrine, grave yard or agricultural land had a lot of misunderstanding when an opponent invades and took it away. Land is the source of most resources and losing the ancestral land will plunge families in poverty. Many wars are fought in eastern DRC are centered on land, power struggle by elites to take control and ethnicity. When wars are fought many lives are lost across all participants. Civilians are the most affected and displaced when wars occur. This connects with the literature showing that due to inequality which breeds poverty, mineral resources, greed, power struggle and grievance wars will always reoccur

People will join different groups in fighting for resources, ethnicity and an effort to improve their lives. As a result this brings the question of how long the war will take, based on history it will not end but can be stopped and restarted again until reforms are done to address all issues which are driving people to join different groups fighting for what belongs to them and those in authority takes advantages of directing events for political and financial gain. The UN has completely failed to fully and the war and some recommendations had been suggested for future use.

The recurrence of war in eastern DRC is due to different conflicts which fuels the breeding of chaos. The eastern DRC is characterised by many different tribes and is an area of rich natural resource where people scramble for these resources. The elite people always want power to be able to control activities, ethnicity is used to divide and bring tension among tribes to fight each other. There are other issues like colonial history, pre-colonial, grievances and marginalisation which causes war to erupt any time resulting in recurrence.

Fig 5: Number of conflicts per year before and during peacekeeping mission



Source: Own calculation based on ACLED data.

The conflicts show a rise at the beginning of 2011 as shown in fig 5 and reached 700 in 2012 it then starts fluctuating with uneven ups and down until 2014. From 2015 to 2016 it was constant and started rising up at the beginning of 2017 and sharply went up in 2018. The graph shows that conflicts are settled in different ways and the fighting people realised there was unfair treatment which pushed them to retaliate causing serious fights resulting in many deaths. The rise of the graph shows that the conflicts were escalating meaning peacekeeping and enforcement have failed. More results in more deaths are highly a sign of failure in peacekeeping.

The UN's robust mission used to achieve success in enforcing their mandate. UN sent FIB in eastern DRC with the aim to neutralise armed forces. Peace enforcing mandates will not always lead to victory. The M23 which was a danger to the population of eastern DRC was defeated and disarmed. The FIB managed to put in place offensive operations in collaboration with the FARDC to disarm militia and rebel forces which were torturing people and killing the civilian population and the state.

FIB's mandate was extended three times by the UNSC; the challenge is what the actual root to follow in peacekeeping. FIB was successful to defeat the M23 which was a position move, the challenge emerged on defeating and curbing the other militias and general peace of the region proved to be difficult. The situation in the eastern DRC remained violent and continues as rebels attack the civilian population. The FIB's intervention fails to make a turning point since its success against M23 cannot be used to justify fully the security situation. Its success was through the use of military force. By the end of 2015 more than 75 armed rebels had been in the country terrorizing civilians (Congo Research Group). FIB had not been able to defeat and disarm other militias including FDLR and ADF. Fighting and defeating of the other rebel groups did not happen for example the FDLR remains the largest rebel group in eastern DRC.

The FIB had been successful with a less margin, the objective of stabilizing eastern DRC; MONUSCO had been in support of the FARDC. It is to a large extent that the question of use of force for more successful peacekeeping is providing unsuccessful in eastern DRC. The use of force comes with high prices and difficulties at times. This is a challenge of war zones either robust or non-robust both claim lives in battle fields and in communities civilians, internally displaced people, refugees and violation of human rights due to rape, destruction of infrastructures and domestic unrest.

The results of robust peacekeeping results in escalating conflict as mandates are being implemented. The rebels' insurgency will not just evaporate, no matter how the military operations are even after the death of group leaders others emerge. Hence, no silver bullet can be able to eliminate the insurgency; new tactics of academic should be implemented. Thus short term solutions must be used to end the war and long term solutions for sustaining peace. The use of force results in collateral damage and civilian casualties increase in numbers than military and the rebels. The peace keeping will lose its credibility due to loss of many civilians when it comes

to ongoing conflicts. High risk of insecurity of innocent people is experienced either against peacekeepers or the population.

However, there are literatures that have argued that because FIB was the first ever and thus far the only UN-authorized offensive combat force, the brigade is not restricted to the traditional UN peacekeeping standards (Cammaert 2013, Mutisi 2015, Janik 2013, Sheeran and Case 2013). Thus, it is argued that it represent more of a counter insurgency operation than a traditional peacekeeping operation (Mincieli 2013). Additionally, scholars such as Whittle (2015), who has dealt with peacekeeping in conflict, argues that the resolution's operative paragraphs creates the intervention on an exceptional basis, without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping.

Two groups of scholarly literatures on one hand argued that, force intervention was a peacekeeping operation that only added a new dimension to peacekeeping by transcending its traditional tenets, notwithstanding the recognition that it transformed the traditional practice of peacekeeping (Mutisi 2015 et al). On the other hand, some scholars have argued that force intervention brigade is not a peacekeeping operation, as it is exceptionally different from MONUC and MONUSCO and should rather be called enforcement, as stated by the UN itself, when it passed out the resolution to tackle the continuous prolonged conflict in the Great Lakes region (Kok 2013).

Debates on contemporary peacekeeping cannot ignore some of its tangible characteristics, and in particular who is doing what in peace operations. In fact, while Western states are the main financial contributors to the peacekeeping budget, they have been largely absent in²⁶ terms of troop contributions since the mid-1990s. Conversely, the developing countries have shouldered the largest troop contributions, and to a large extent to have thus shaped the politics of peacekeeping in the field.

The UN has always had difficulty in reconciling its central role in the maintenance of international peace and security with the idea of coercion (Tardy 2007). The use of force is not absent from UN prerogatives, but the nature of the organization, its broad composition, and the politics within its main organs have made coercion conceptually and practically ambiguous. Robust peacekeeping was at the heart of what, in the early 1990s, was referred to as the 'grey

area' of peacekeeping, an ill-defined activity situated between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Reggie 1993)

The UN and its member states have faced great difficulty in handling this grey area, in terms of both doctrine and operations (Jakobsen 2000). At the core of the matter is the use of force by the military in situations that are not wars. This implies a doctrinal and cultural shift that the UN, states, and their military institutions have long resisted. The concept of robust peacekeeping emerged in response to the failures of the UN in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where peacekeepers were passive witnesses of massive violations to human rights, allegedly because they were not robust enough. Although robust peacekeeping is not a new concept and has been partially implemented in some operations (Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Lebanon), it attracted renewed attention in 2008 to 210 with developments in its conceptualization. To a less this is working, Artermis is invisible and impact of enforcement is a magic discourse. The solution is not working as lasting peace is short lived. In addition the use of force to achieve peace is not always positive but impacts negatively as more neighbouring countries joins the war in support of rebels due to historic grievances and personal interest.

Greed is linked to corruption which also breeds cycles of conflicts by enriching the political leaders, elites or individuals who are responsible for the conflict in the first place, but it can also prevent economic and social stability because corruption networks (by benefitting some at the expense of others) strengthen inequalities and divisions in society. *"In conflict where nepotism or patronage networks exclude vast numbers of the population from decision-making and access to resources, then corruption lies at the heart of society's problems,"* (Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church & Kirby Reiling, 2009:22). This results in rebel groups arising to express their grievances through a war. As conflict unfolds, the political leaders that emerge often find that the easiest way of mobilising support is on an ethnic basis. Thus do the various causes of conflict weaver in and out? War will only end if, and when, and where its causes are removed." (Wilkinson 2000:16). Thus poverty, inequality and security have a direct connection.

Poverty and inequality are usually outcomes of man-made problems as (Weber & Berger 2007) sees it, the complex historical and political dynamics of the pursuit of development as a planned project. Higher income inequality goes with higher poverty, unemployment, health and in general the wellbeing of the country and is a major constraint to development as growth often

comes from the richer segment of the economy and less likely to translate into poverty reduction by trickling down to the poor (Schafer, Haslam and Beaudet 2009). Poverty may force people to rebel as a way to sustain better life, but in the process there will be violent conflict as those in authority retaliate to maintain power. Thus the security of many people is threatened as they live in fear.

“Poverty is the ultimate systemic threat facing humanity. The widening gaps between rich and poor nations ... are ... potentially socially explosive ... If the poor are left hopeless, poverty will undermine societies through confrontation, violence and civil disorder” (Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, 2000b). Resources must be properly deployed to all populations of a country to benefit failure to manage and address the distribution results in conflicts which results in many wars.

4.5 Conclusion

The turmoil in eastern Congo will not stop as long as nothing is done to diminish and break the institutionally sanctioned leverage that warlords have at their disposal. The challenge, a truly longer-term programming challenge, is to plan for the removal of the conditions of insecurity that give warlords their grip on so-called ethnic followers. Data was analysed to determine the number of deaths in the different conflicts and in relation to the use of force.

The barrel of the gun, international economic greed, the ready availability of arms, and the manipulation of symbols of identity are all important aspects of the conflict that need to be contained. At the same time, agricultural reform is needed to bring on the demise of decades of land mismanagement and of its special creation: an army (literally) of socially excluded poor who are unfree, unprotected and ready to commit unspeakable atrocities.

Secure access to land and a share in the massive revenue derived from mining and other commercial activity including livestock keeping - would bring alternatives to a ‘career’ in militia activity. The commitment would be a major contribution to breaking the present cycle of violence, which, without concerted programming action, is unlikely to come to an end. The debate on use of force as previously discussed in literature review shows that war is always dangerous and if possible should be avoided at all costs. The next chapter discusses the conclusion and recommendations to the research.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study set out to examine how effective peacekeeping missions have been in conflict-ridden countries, in sub-Saharan Africa. The focus of this study was on the EU's Operation Artemis and the UN's FIB, activity in the Eastern DRC. Traditionally, peacekeeping missions are defined as techniques designed purportedly to make sure peace returns in previously hostile societies to create the conditions that bring about prevention of hostility between and among parties in conflict. Where the use of force is considered as the last resort in the UN Charter. The above mentioned operations have continually used force in an attempt to keep peace in the Eastern DRC. Irrespective of the missions' effort, conflict still recurs in the region. As a result, this study sharply examines the effectiveness of use of force in peacekeeping, while critiquing the aforementioned operations. The threshold distinguishing impact from effectiveness and from failure is when peace returns and less of the population die while failure comes when the war escalates and many people die. For the purpose of this study, *peacekeeping* is deemed the first step to achieving peace whereas *peace enforcement* is used to restore peace which had been interrupted or failed to continue prevailing.

The objective of the study was to show how peacekeeping and peace enforcement evolves in conflict ridden areas where eastern DRC is the case study. To achieve this, a mixed research method has presented findings regarding the eastern DRC peacekeeping mission of 2003, Operation Artemis and the FIB from 2013 to 2018. Although the missions were pioneered by two separate organisations – the UN and the EU, the strategy deployed and the objective of the missions are similar. For analytical purposes this lends credence to the objective of this research. The literature on conflict and peacekeeping missions in SSA/Eastern DRC claims that debates around the use of force leans towards stronger support for offensive operations being more successful in achieving peace than non-offensive operations. Besides a greater chance at peace, such operations are also purported to offer increase credibility to the UN. Offensive operations are undoubtedly of a higher level of intensity than other UN mandates, peacekeepers using force would most likely be unable to perform such operations without doing significant damage to a country.

The research concluded that there is no one single cause to the war in the eastern DRC. Each factor has contributed to the cycle of deprivation. Colonialism was the root of the breakdown of

Congo, both economically and socially, and the postcolonial era brought forth corrupt leaders, rebel armed forces distinguished by identity hatreds. Lastly, the plundering of natural resources in the Congo by various sources has been central to the ongoing conflict in the region. Each factor is no more significant than the other as they have all contributed to the cycle of deprivation. These factors combined have led to the demise of the Congo and led to Africa's Great War and resulted in an estimated 6 to 7 million deaths since 1965, as in 2013 (Kovalik 2013). It remains unclear whether having a deeper understanding of the causes, will lead to any kind of resolution in the immediate future.

The research has shown that Military victory (when government army takes control) and robust peacekeeping cannot be used to resolve conflict alone. The major root causes of the conflict must be tackled using various approaches to transformation some examples include: state-building, mediation and court settlements. The disputes which emanated from competition for natural resources, as well as historic ethnic tensions results in serious fights (Autesserre 2008). Even though 'fire is fought by fire', to achieve lasting peace in DRC, dialogue must be actively encouraged amongst warring parties. The defeating of rebels by FIB in eastern DRC was a short-term success and provided a breathing-space for a time. However, rebels can reorganise or regroup and attack again. Hence monitoring is very important to provide early warning of conflict likely to emerge so that measures can be put in place to stop it from escalating.

As the FIB has been mandated to neutralise and disarm rebels in eastern DRC and protect civilians, the statistics determined in this study show that the FIB was initially successful but the violence had started to escalate again after defeating the M23 rebels. Thus there is a clear and concerning indication that the war will not end soon and something deeper must be addressed on the causes of the conflicts. There has been, and is ongoing, huge loss of lives from both sides even though the civilians are more affected in most battles fought than the armed personnel. The FIB's future success in peacekeeping whether it will bring future improvements or even prolong the warring is under serious review by the UN. It is unfortunate that the eastern DRC resident population are waiting in hope for peace to prevail so that they can go back to their normal lives. The hope is being eroded by extreme violence which is on-going in the region. Intra-state conflicts totally violate human rights at the individual level and international institutions such as

UN, EU and NATO are drawn to such situations. Intra-state conflicts are the main concern of every actor in the international community.

Peacekeeping also means more successful peacekeeping is likely to be answered in the negative (through the use of force). This is not because the FIB has energetically pursued the objective of “enforcing peace” and has failed, but because political problems quickly piled up to the extent that this called into question the feasibility and wisdom of such an approach. Another problem that has emerged has been the interests of the traditional troop-providing countries, most of which oppose the “militarisation” of UN peacekeeping on account of the risks associated with robust peacekeeping. This issue is unlikely to be resolved. In any case, Chapter VII mandates, which legitimise the use of military force, already grant MONUSCO and other peace missions’ adequate possibilities of defending their troops.

A greater degree of robustness is no doubt necessary in some circumstances, but the idea that the greater use of force will automatically solve the persistent problems of peacekeeping is an illusion. The creation of the FIB points instead more to the problem of inadequate implementation of mandates by peace operations, rather than evidence of the consequences of the lack of a mandate for the use of force. A greater degree of robustness is no doubt necessary in some circumstances.

It would be more promising to ask what MONUSCO and other missions can do to influence the political environment such that civilian populations live in greater security. In that context, the relatively new UN concept of “stabilisation” has not proven to be useful. Neither in MONUSCO nor within the UN system as a whole would there appear to be a shared understanding of what stabilisation means. The concept should either be concretised or abandoned. The results of conflict and casualties before and after peacekeeping are shocking and at times vary with time. Many people had died and the mission was only a success for a short period of time. In the context of Somalia and Liberia, the UN and African Union (AU) failed to bring lasting peace; negotiating for peace could be a means to achieving such peace, while the use of force is not the solution. Artemis showed restraint in engaging rebels; the extent to which use of force is used to neutralize rebels (that is, is it an important explanatory variable in bringing peace or not) was examined.

5.1 Recommendations

This section will make recommendations on how best to keep peace in the Eastern DRC and areas plagued with similar conflict. I acknowledge that the dynamics and causes of conflict differ from region to region or country to country, but my recommendations allude mostly to the effective deployment of resources to address conflict irrespective of the causes and magnitude.

Firstly, the peacekeeping missions should not take too long to intervene in conflicts as many civilians are the most affected than the armed personnel. During times of conflict many civilians die, are abused and displaced. Peacekeeping should identify flash points in a conflict and readdress the concerns of affected populations in order to avoid a recurrence of war which highlights the failures of peacekeeping operations in achieving lasting peace and in preventing future turmoil.

Secondly, the research recommends that warring parties in rich resource countries are affected by unfair distribution where one group has dominance over the other for example the Hema versus Lendu should be encouraged to come to a dialogue where all members involved should discuss their views. The resources benefits should be shared equally in order to address grievances which will results in social-economic problems.

The UN and regional bodies should develop appropriate and contextual cutting-edge conflict prevention, management and resolution doctrine that harmonises the exploitation. As for the conflict in eastern DRC, it is for all the players to realise that outsiders can only help but will never be the total solution to the problems bedeviling the region and the onus lies on all the people of the DRC to discover each other through tolerance and inclusivity accepting the strength that comes from diversity in race and ethnicity as well as in ideas.

There is therefore an urgent requirement to build on what was achieved by the EU and UN and regional boards in eastern DRC during and after operation Artemis and 2003 and FIB 2013 and interrogate all potential conflict areas including in governance, relations between political parties and the state machinery, the succession issue and the after-effects of land reform to come up with sustainable solutions that will minimally guarantee harmony to secure a peaceful and prosperous future for the country in a competitive international environment.

The UN should do more by way of integrating its conflict prevention, management and resolution doctrine with that of continental bodies and regional groupings such as SADC. When conflict occurs, the setting in of stopping it as a result of a change in its structure will not yield success unless there is willingness, resolve, motivation and readiness to pursue win-win outcomes. Intervention can stop a conflict from escalating but the greatest weapon in conflict prevention over time is eliminating the root causes of violent conflict most of which lie in deprivation and unfair practices. Differences and therefore conflict will always be there but if war and strife can be minimised through a global effort to change attitudes, perceptions and practices to gravitate toward equality, tolerance, strength in diversity, fairness, redress and reconciliation as well as sharpening the doctrine for conflict resolution to handle differences with increased positive results, humanity will have made a great stride in civilisation, a feat which seems far from being realised in present times.

The progression in the manner in which peacekeeping is done can be ascribed to the changing idea of the worldwide framework for such activities. Albeit peacekeeping was embraced by the United Nations trying to satisfy the essential target of keeping up universal harmony and security, it was likewise utilized as a way to prevent Cold War superpowers from getting trapped in confined clashes, as it was not about definitive or compelling support of harmony (Melander and Pigache, 2007)

This section presents research's findings advocate a redesign of the Bakajika law that will regard individuals' entitlement to tribal land; such a change will improve security of land tenure. The change in the land law will lessen the probability of a repeat of Ituri's unprecedented crisis. The war in eastern Congo started in late 1996 and caused the death of millions. The eastern Congo for a long time became the world's hidden catastrophe which was disregarded by the media and it was difficult for the region to obtain help. In the earlier years 1999 to 2003, in spite of peace agreements, the situation in Ituri played out as nightmare. It can be assumed that harmony in Congo cannot be a reality without harmony in Ituri. The DRC war ended the lives of between 50 000 and 60 000 individuals; this involved ordinary people being butchered because of their ethnicity (HRW 2003; Amnesty International 2003).

6. REFERENCES

Annan, K. 1994. The soft-spoken economist who runs UN peacekeeping forces. *Los Angeles Times*, Los Angeles. 21 June 1994.

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. 2014. *Resource-Related Conflict in Africa*.

Available from: <http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/resource-related-conflict-in-africa/>. [Accessed 20/05/2018].

Africa Canada Accountability Coalition. 2010. *Land, citizenship and conflict in the Kivus*.

Available from:

http://www.africacanada.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/06/Land_Citizenship_and_Conflict_in_the_Kivus_1.pdf. [Accessed 18 October 2018].

African Union and the United Nations. 2009. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 3 (1) 25-36.

Amnesty International. 2004. On the precipice: the deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri", March 2003, pages 17-19; In: MONUC *Special report on the events in Ituri: January 2002-December 2003*. (S/2004/573), paragraphs 105-112.

Annan, K. 1999. Walking the International Tightrope. *The New York Times*, New York. 19 January 1999.

Autesserre, S. 2008. The trouble with Congo: How local disputes fuel regional conflict. *Foreign Affairs* 87 (3): 94–110.

Autesserre, S. 2006. Local Violence, National Peace? ‘Postwar Settlement’ in the Eastern D.R. Congo. *African Studies Review* 49(3): 1-29.

Autesserre, S. 2010. *The trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of international peace building*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McMahon M. 1997 *Social Constructivism and the World Wide Web - A Paradigm for Learning*.

<http://www.ascilite.org.au/conferences/perth97/papers/Mcmahon/Mcmahon.html>.

Bainomugisha, A and Issaka, M. 2004. *The Role of Civil Society in Peace building in the Great Lakes Region*. “New York: International Peace Academy :1-19.

- Bandura A. 1973. *Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- BBC News. 2012. DR Congo conflict: M23 rebels urged to stop war. , Dated 24 November 2012. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20476677/>.
- BBC. 2013. 'Democratic Republic of Congo Profile'. Available from: www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13283212.
- Bellamy, A. 2008 .et al., *Understanding Peace Keeping*, (London: Cambridge University Press.
- Bellamy, A. and Williams, P. 2009. The West and Contemporary Peace Operations, *Journal of Peace Research*, 46 (1):39–57.;
- Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P.D. 2012. *Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries*, Providing for Peacekeeping No. 1. New York: International Peace Institute. August 2012.
- Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P. and, Griffin, S. 2004. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bertelsmann Transformation Index. 2008. Available from: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/wca/cod/> [Accessed 26 May 2014].
- Bertelsmann Transformation Index. 2006. Transformation DR Congo. Bertelsmann Stiftung. Available from:<http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformationindex.de/index.php?id=91&tt_news=&type=98&L=0> [Accessed 17 October 2018].
- Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. New York: United Nations.
- Cakaj, L. 2010. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: LRA Attacks and Congolese Army Abuses in Northeastern Congo. *Washington: Enough Project*.
- Camdessus, M. 2000. International Monetary Fund. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Washington
- Center on International Cooperation. 2009. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* .Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner: 51–53.

Cheyenne, S. & Kirby, R. 2009. Lilies that fester: Seeds of corruption and peace building. *New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action*, 3 (4), 34-67

DC.

[McGreal, C.](#) 2008. 00.29 BST Fighting for Peace, interview with Laurent Nkunda, *The Guardian*, First published on Fri 16 May 2008.

CNN. 2008. Democratic Republic of Congo. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/world/Africa/11/13/sbm>.

Cohn, T.H. 2000. The Realist Perspective. *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*. Longman.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 2002. On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 13-28.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004). 'Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars', *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595.

Collier, P. 2007. *War, Guns and Votes*., <http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/war-guns-and-votes-what-to-make-of-paul-colliers-latest-book>.

Crisis Group. Available from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/mediareleases/2004/africa/pulling-back-from-the-brink-in-the-congo.aspx> [Accessed 4 September 2018].

Cropper, S., et al. (eds.) 2008. *The Oxford Handbook of Inter-organizational Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dag, T. 2011. The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments. *Congressional Research Service* 11.

Dallaire, R. 2003. *Shake Hands With the Devil – The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. Knopf.

Daniel, D. C. F. 1997. 'Wandering out of the void? Conceptualizing practicable peace enforcement', eds A. Morrison, D. A. Fraser and J. D. Kiras, *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution* (Canadian Peacekeeping Press: Clement sport,), p.2

Kovalik, D. 2013. U.S. a Factor in 6 Million Congo Deaths'. *Peoples World* (). Available at: Peoplesworld.org.

Daniel, D. C. F. 1996. Jeffersonian/ Wilsonian internationalism and Adamsian dislike of foreign entanglements. Ed. Trevor Findlay, In: *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report no. 12. Oxford University Press: Oxford p. 86.

de Coning, C. 2017. Peace Enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal Distinctions between the African Union and United Nations. *Journal Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(1) 145-160.

de Coning, C., Aoi, C., & Karlsrud, J. 2017. *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats*. New York: Routledge.

Deibert, M. 2013. *The Democratic republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair*. New York: Zed Books.

Democratic Republic of the Congo Humanitarian Fund, 'Humanitarian Fund Annual Report: 2017' (2018),available at

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DRC%20HF Annual%20Report%202017](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DRC%20HF%20Annual%20Report%202017).

Department for International Development. 2001. *The causes of conflict in Africa*. London: Department for International Development.

Derry, S. J. 1999. A fish called peer learning: Searching for common themes. In A. M. O'Donnell & A. King (Eds.).

Di Piazza, F.D. 2008. *Democratic Republic of Congo in pictures*. Washington D.C: Twenty-First Century Books.

Diehl, P.F. 1994. *International peacekeeping*. JHU Press.

Dunn, K. C. 2001. Identity, space and the political economy of conflict in Central Africa. *Geopolitics* 6 (2): 51–78.

Durch, W. J. (Ed.) 1993 *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. The Henry L. Stimson Center: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dyer, W. Gibb, D. and Wilkins, A.L. 1991. Better stories, not better constructs, to generate better theory: A rejoinder to Eisenhardt. *Academy of Management Review* 16 (3): 613-619.

Ernest, P. 1999. Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics: Radical Constructivism.

Food and Agriculture Organisation, 'Food insecurity soars in conflict-ridden Democratic Republic of Congo' (14 August 2017), available at
<http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1028934/icode/>

Fortna, V.P. 2004. *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War*. International Studies Association Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Gary, D. 2013. *Doing Research in the Real World*. 3rd Edition. Sage Publications.

George, A.L. and Bennett, A. 2005. Process-tracing and historical explanation. In: *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. MIT Press, Cambridge: 205-232.

Gettleman, J (2007) 'Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War' New York Times quoting Malteser International, medical service provider.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/world/africa/07congo.html>

Goris S. et al. 2004. The European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa. Available at:
<http://www.assembly.weu.org/en/documents/sessions/ordinaries/rpt/2004/1880.htmln>.

Goulding, M. 1993. The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping. *International Affairs* 69 (3):461.

Gurr, R.T. 1993. Why Minority Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945. *International Political Science volume 14, No 2* :161-201

Gurr, T.R. 2007. Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing communal conflict in the twenty-first century. In: C. A. Crocker (Ed.) *Leashing the dogs of war* Washington: United States Institute of Peace:131-160.

Haslam, P. et al. 2009. Multinational Corporations in *Introduction to International Development*. Oxford University Press.

Hendrickson, R.C. et al. 2007. Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for a Stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy. Available at: <http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo8/no1/hendrick-eng.asp>.

Howard, L.M. 2008. *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Human Rights Watch, 'Democratic Republic of Congo: Events of 2017', available at <https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2018/country-chapters/democratic-republic-congo>, accessed 15 October 2018 ('HRW DRC 2018').

Human Rights Watch Report. 2007. *Democratic Republic of Congo, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu* 19:7.

Human Rights Watch. 2003 *Ituri: 'Covered in blood'. Ethnically targeted violence in northeastern DR Congo* Dated July 2003. HRW: New York:36-38. ;

Human Rights Watch. 2005. :HRW: New York:33–34.

Human Rights Watch. 2012. *DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes*. Dated 11 September 2012. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/11/dr-congo-m23-rebels-committing-war-crimes>.

Human Rights Watch. 1999. Rwanda genocide. Available at: <http://survivors-fund.org.uk/Resources/Rwanda-history/statistics>

Human Rights Watch. 2015. *Democratic Republic of Congo: Events of 2014*. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/democratic-republic-congo>.

Human Rights Watch. 2016. *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Events of 2015*. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/democratic-republic-congo>.

ICISS 2001, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, IDRC, Ottawa.

International Court of Justice. 2006. *DRC v Rwanda* 2006. Available at: <http://www.icjci.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf?PHPSESSID=e70527da06d3e7229a7632e98d806cf3>.

International Court of Justice. . DRC v Uganda 1999–2005. Available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455s.pdf>.

International Crisis Group. 2000. Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an ugly war. Dated 20 December 2000: 57.

International Crisis Group. 2004. Pulling back from the brink in the Congo. Briefing No. 18,

International Crisis Group. 2012. Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed. *Africa Briefing* 91.

International Peace Institute. 2014. *The Security Council and the protection of civilians in armed conflict*.

Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4pp7PUpBII>.

IRIN. 2013. Armed groups in eastern DRC. Dated 3 October 2013. Available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/report/99037/briefing-armed-groups-eastern-drc>.

Jakobsen, P.V.. 2000. The Emerging Consensus on Grey Area Peace Operations Doctrine: Will It Last and Enhance Operational Effectiveness?' *International Peacekeeping* 7(3):36–56.

Janik, R. 2013. Putting Security Council Resolution 2098 in the Democratic Republic of Congo in context: The long way of peacekeeping. Available at: http://www.etc-graz.at/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/ETC-Hauptseite/human_security/hs-perspectives/pdf/files/issue1_2014/Ralph_Janik_-_Security_Council_Resolution_2098.pdf.

Justaert, A. and Keukeleire, S. 2009. Network Governance in ESDP: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.

Karbo, T. and Mutisi, M. 2012. Ethnic conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In: Landis, D. and Albert, R.D. (Eds.). *Handbook of ethnic conflict: International perspectives*. New York: Springer.

Karlsrud, J. 2015. The UN at war: Examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. *Third World Quarterly* 36: 40–54. doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.976016.

Kibasomba, R. and Lombe, T.R. 2011. Obstacles to post-election peace in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: 381–402.

Kok, N. 2013. From the international conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the intervention Brigade.” Available at:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10246029.2013.823793> [Accessed March 16].

Lemarchand, R.2006. Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African Affairs* 106 (422)1-20.

Lemarchand, R. 1964. Political awakening in the Belgian Congo. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lemarchand, R. 2009. *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Long, N. 2012. UN Defends Performance in Eastern DRC. *Voice of America*. Dated 22 November 2012. Available at: <http://m.voanews.com/a/1550868.html>.

M23 For more information,: <http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php>

M23:<http://www.m23mars.org/le-president-runiga-lugelero-dissipe-tous-les-malentendus.html/29>.

Mamdani, M. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Maphosa, S. B. 2013. We Need to Do Better, and We Can: One Group Surrendering is Hardly a Return to Peace and Prosperity *Africa Institute of South Africa number 99* <https://www.africaportal.org>documents>

Mandani, M. 1996. Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Melillo, M. 2013. Cooperation between the UN Peacekeeping Operation and the ICC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*11:763–782.

Menodji, M.H.A. 2013. Problematic peacekeeping in the DRC: From MONUC to MONUSCO Available at: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/181-congo/52244-problematic-peacekeeping-in-the-drc-from-monuc-to-monusco.html>.

Meredith, M. 2006. *The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*. London: Free Press.

Meredith, M. 2005. *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, London/New York: Free Press.

Montagu, A. 1973. *Man and Aggression*. Second Edition. New York. Oxford University Press.

MONUC. 2004. Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003. 16 July 2004 (S/2004/573): paragraph 155.

MONUSCO, 'Child Recruitment by Armed Groups in DRC From January 2012 to August 2013' (October 2013),

https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/131024_monusco_cps_public_report_on_armed_group_recruitment_2012-2013. accessed 17 November 2018;

Mutisi, M. 2015. Redefining Peacekeeping: The force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=192753>.

Mwagiru, M. 1997. The greater horn of Africa conflict system: Conflict patterns, strategies and management practices. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnach215.pdf [Accessed 16 August 2018].

Neethling, T. 2011. From MONUC to MONUSCO and beyond: prospects for reconstruction, state-building and security governance in the DRC. *South African Journal of*

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2004. The Politics of Citizenship in the DRC. Presented at States, Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship. In: *Africa Annual International Conference* held 19-20 May 2004.

Ozveri, D. 2011. The EU's Impact on Congo Conflict through Operation Artemis: An Early Attempt for Crisis Management Capacity? Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1872138;01-11-11

Parsons, J, E. 1942. Catalogue of Loan Exhibition of Percussion Colt Revolvers and Conversions: 1836-1873. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art No 11 PL VI.

Porto, P. and Gomes, XX. 2008. The mainstreaming of conflict analysis in Africa: Contributions from theory. In Francis, D.J. (Ed). *Peace and Conflict in Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Prunier, G. 2004. Rebel Movement and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99). *African Affairs* 103(412):359-383.

Prunier, G. 2009. *Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Prunier, G. 2009. *From Genocide to Continental War* London: Cambridge University.

Reuters. 2012. Congo says M23 rebel demands for Goma withdrawal a "farce". *Reuters*. 27 November 2012. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-congodemocratic-mende-idUSBRE8AQ0G820121127>.

Reuters. 2012. Exclusive: Rwanda, Uganda arming Congo rebels, providing troops - U.N. panel., Dated 17 October 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-congo-democratic-rwanda-uganda-idUSBRE89F1RQ20121017>.

Reynaert, J. 2016. MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian Protection in the Kivus. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D11C9B161C343539C1257847004BF8BF-Full_Report.pdf.

Rift Valley Institute. 2012. Briefing: DRC's M23 rebellion under pressure. Rift Valley Institute. Available at: <http://riftvalley.net/news/briefing-drcs-m23-rebellion-under-pressure#UoIf5uIVaRQ> [Accessed 12 November 2018].

Rift Valley Institute. 2012. From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in Eastern Congo. Usalama Project, Rift Valley Institute. 2012:11;37.

Rift Valley Institute. 2013. Strongman of the eastern DRC: A profile of General Bosco Ntaganda. Rift Valley Institute.

Rift Valley Institute. 2013 Available from: <http://riftvalley.net/download/file/fid/1512> [Accessed 10 May 2018].

Ross, M. L. 1999. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. *World Politics*. 51 (2). 297-322.

Ruddock, J. 2001. *A crocodile in the pool: Tales of a diplomat's wife in the Congo*. Ontario, General Store Publishing House.

Ruggie, J. 1993. Wandering in the Void. Charting the UN's New Strategic Role. *Foreign Affairs* 72 (5):28

Sempijja, N. 2008. Operation Artermis in the DR Congo: Factors why it was carried out by the European Union. Kingston University London

Schmidl, E. A. 1997. Peacekeeping with muscle. In: Morrison, A., Fraser, D. A. & Kiras, J. (Eds.) *Peacekeeping with muscle: The use of force in international conflict resolution*. The Canadian Peacekeeping Press.

Smith, R. 2006. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. Penguin Books.

Solhjell, R. and Rosland, R. 2017. Stabilisation in the Congo: Opportunities and Challenges. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 6(1):1–13, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.478>.

Stearns, J. 2015. *Can Force be Useful in the Absence of a Political Strategy? Lessons from the UN missions to the DR Congo*. New York City: Center on International Cooperation at New York University, Retrieved 26 October 2016 at http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/crg_publication_monusco_en.pdf.

Stearns, J.K. 2008. Laurent Nkunda and the National Congress for the Defense of the People, In: Marysse, S. Reyntjens, F. Vandeginste, S. (Eds.): *L'afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2007-2008*. Paris: 245-267.

Stearns, J.K. 2012. *From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo*. London.

Tardy, T. 2007. The UN and the Use of Force: A Marriage Against Nature. *Security Dialogue* 38(1) :49–70.

Tardy, T. 2009. *Gestion de crise, maintien et consolidation de la paix. Acteurs, Activités, défis* [Crisis Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. Actors, Activities, Challenges], Louvain-la-Neuve: De Boeck: 183–185.

The Guardian. 2010. Leaked UN report accuses Rwanda of possible genocide in Congo. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/26/un-report-rwanda-congo-hutus>.

The New York Times. 2008. Congo Agrees to Peace Deal With Rebels.. Dated 22 January 2008. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/world/africa/22congo.html>.

Theodore, T. 2011. *Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure*. Kindle Edition. New York: Zed Books:59.

Vogel, Toby. 2008. Why Europe Is Split over Troops for Congo. *European Voice*. Dated 11 December 2008. Available at: www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/why-europe-is-split-over-troops-for-congo/63357.aspx.

Tull, D.M. 2009. Peacekeeping in the DRC: waging peace and fighting war. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533310802685729>.

Turner, T. 2007. *The Congo Wars*, New York: Zed Books.

Turner, T. 2006. Independence Day: Fifty Years after Lumumba Speech, DRC's Riches Still Not Benefiting her Children. Carnegie Council. Available at: http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics_online/0046.html.

UNICEF, 'DRC Humanitarian Situation Report–April 2018' (April 2018), https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_DR_Congo_Humanitarian_Situation_Report_April_2018. ('UNICEF April 2018 Humanitarian Report'), p. 2.

UNICEF, 'Thousands of children continue to be used as child soldiers' (8 April 2018), available at <https://ponabana.com/en/thousands-child-soldiers-in-drc/>

United Nations 1994. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on DRC established pursuant to Security Council.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2004. Lessons from Operation Artemis. Available at: <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?>

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. 2003.. Available at: http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping_missions/democratic-republic-of-conngo.htm.

United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. 2004. The lessons of the interim emergency multinational force. Available at: <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php>.

United Nations 1990, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 2nd ed (United Nations: New York

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, UNIDIR/2003/36, p. 105.

United Nations Security Council. 2008. Resolution 1856. (), UN Doc. S/RES/1856. Dated 22 December 2008. Available at: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1856%282008%29.

United Nations Security Council. 2013. Resolution 2098: () Enables 'Offensive' Combat Force to 'Neutralize and Disarm' Congolese Rebels, Foreign Armed Groups. UN Doc. SC/10964. Dated 28 March 2013.

United Nations. 1945. *Charter of the United Nations*. New York: United Nations.

United Nations. 1993. Resolution 885. Investigation of armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties. Appended to UN document S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, p. 48.

United Nations. 1999. Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Signed on 10 July 1999, S/1999/815. Available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/s815_25.pdf (26 May 2014).

United Nations. 2002. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2002/1146. UN/S/2005/30. Available at <http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/DRCbrf050107.doc.htm> from supra n9 at p156.

United Nations. 2008b. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines* ('Capstone Doctrine'). DPKO/DFS, New York, United Nations.

United Nations. 2009. *A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. DPKO/DFS, non-paper, New York

United Nations. 2009. *DPKO/DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping*. Office of Military Affairs. DPKO: New York.

Various Authors. 2012. *The DRC: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform*. Dated April 2012. Available at: <http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/drc-ssr-report-20120416.pdf>.

Vircoulon, T. 2010. The Ituri paradox: When Armed Groups Have a Land Policy and Peacemakers Do Not. In W Anseeuw and C Alden (eds). *The Struggle Over Land in Africa: Conflicts, Politics & Change*. Cape Town: HRSC Press: 209-219.

Vlassenroot, K. 2008. *Armed groups and militias in Eastern DR Congo*. Lecture series on African security:1-15).

Vlassenroot, K. and Raeymaekers, T. 2004. The politics of rebellion and intervention in Ituri: The emergence of a new political complex? *African Affairs* 103(412):385-412.

Vlassenroot, K. and Raeymaekers, T. 2004. *Conflict and Social Transformation in eastern DR Congo* (Ghent: Academia Press,).

Vlassenroot, K. and Raeymaekers, T. 2009, Kivu's intractable security conundrum. *African Affairs* 108(432)():475-84.

Vlassenroot, K. 2013. *South Kivu: identity, territory, and power in the eastern Congo*. Usalama Project Report: Understanding Congolese Armed Groups. Rift Valley Institute: London. ISBN 9781907431258.

Webb, M. 2012. Clashes in eastern DR Congo claim lives. Al Jazeera.

Weber, H. & Berger, M. 2007 "Global Poverty and Inequality" in Richard Devetok, et al. *"An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives,"* Melbourne: Cambridge University Press

Whittle, D. 2015. *Peacekeeping in conflict: The intervention Brigade, MONUSCO, and the application of international law to United Nations forces*. Available at:

<https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/lawjournals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00315000837.PDF>
F. Accessed 16 April 2018.

Wilkinson, P. 2000. *Peace Support Under Fire from Sierra Leon Briefly, Series*, Brussels: International Security Information Service

Wills, S. 2004. Military interventions on behalf of vulnerable populations: the legal responsibilities of States and international organizations engaged in peace support operations. *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*. 9: 387.

Wills, S. 2009. *Protecting Civilians*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
www.oxfordtextbook.co.uk/orc/Jackson_sorensen3e/.

Young, C. 1986. Zaire and Cameroon'. In: Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson (Eds.). . *Politics and Government in African States 1960 – 1985*, 120-149. Stanford/California: Hoover Institute Press

