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HISTORY WORKSHOP

AUTHORITY AND DEVELOPMENT
LEADERSHIP, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICAN URBAN AREAS

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AFRICANA

Authority and Development:
Leadership, Development and Democracy in African Urban Areas

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Introduction

This is a comparative study of social organization, leadership, development and democracy in Kwamashu and Lindelani. Specifically, the study seeks to know how it is that the leadership in the squatter camp (informal settlement) of Lindelani is able to solicit funds for and create a climate within which development projects are implemented whilst the leadership in the township (formal settlement) of Kwamashu seems unsuccessful at doing the same.

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Kwamashu and Lindelani are adjacent areas north of Durban. Kwamashu is a formal township and Lindelani is a squatter camp into which Kwamashu and surrounding areas overflowed around 1983. The curious development in the past ten years is that there has been almost no significant basic infrastructural development in Kwamashu while Lindelani had schools, creches, and even a football field, amongst other things, built in its area. The obvious question is; how is it that a squatter area can have more basic infrastructural development than a formal area?

Normally, the prevalence of violence features as one of the explanations for the inability (or the hesitancy) to implement development projects and decisions. Indeed, there are numerous reports of road construction and electrical installation companies which have lost tools, materials and even lives while trying to implement development projects in Kwamashu.

Another answer, which follows from the first, is that development organizations - pressed for evidence of "successes" - are reluctant to risk their resources in areas where they may

lose tools, materials and endanger lives. Consequently, they fund projects in those areas where their efforts are less likely to be hampered; i.e. areas where they can show immediate results. Some of the major reasons for the choice of "disciplined" areas, are that the "project level" as opposed to the "metropolitan", "regional" or "national level" of development burdens most developers with the provision of essential services (such as peace-broking, skills training etc.) which are not be part of their mandate.

While they may be a grain of truth in the foregoing arguments, they, however, still beg the question; why is it that disturbances which hamper development and discourage development organizations occur more in Kwamashu and not so much in Lindelani?

Another somewhat different argument used to explain the "successes" of Lindelani over Kwamashu is the relationship between leaders in Lindelani and officials in the Kwazulu administration. This relationship is said to favour the extension of services towards Lindelani and away from Kwamashu. While this study recognises the positive effect on development owing to the relationship between the type of leadership in Lindelani and its ties to the Kwazulu administration or, conversely, the negative effect owing to the relationship between the contested leadership in Kwamashu and its relations with the Kwazulu administration, it argues that it is the peculiarity of the Kwamashu leadership, more than the effect of ties to the Kwazulu administration, which creates an environment within which those implementing development projects are harassed and

attacked.[1]

In making that claim, this study argues for a relationship between the type of authority and prospects for development. To help us conceptualise relations within these two areas, it is important to review briefly what some students of power, authority and development have said on these issues. Towards this purpose, we shall commence with investigating relations within constitutions presided over by individuals and then relations within constitutions presided over by groups of people.

On the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

First, as will be clear later, most relevant, for our purposes of looking at constitutions presided over by individuals, is Socrates's analysis of the origins, methods and effects of *tyranny*.

According to Plato, in his description of different "constitutions", Socrates explains why one form of "constitution" emerges and why it falls. He claims that *tyranny* originates from "too much *democracy*". A *democracy*, he maintains, is a government where "all are set free to do as they wish ... to go to the devil in their own way"[2]. This state of things, however, does not last long. People get tired of "the lawlessness of liberty which has become licence". They then gather together and appoint a "strong man to restore order". The strong man then brings together -

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[1]. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the partial effects of each of the independent variables. Such an analysis has to await a more statistical enquiry.

[2]. This and other statement attributed to Socrates are found in Book VIII of Plato's The Republic.

with people's approval - "bodyguards or a private army" with the purpose of eradicating lawlessness in society. Without people's awareness a *tyranny* gets established!

Nevertheless, reigning over a *tyranny* is not bed of roses; "the tyrannic man ... is a slave to fear, want, every sort of misery and every sort of wickedness". The tyrant is ever concerned about possible coups and assassinations. This makes some tyrants - the wise ones - moderate their reign with behaviour akin to "kingship", in the Aristotelian sense.

Aristotle describes "kingship" or "monarchy" as the government of that person who governs in the interests of all. He considers this as the best form of government.[3] A tyrant, on the other hand, governs in his own interests. In his words, *tyranny* is exercised as a "mastership" over slaves. He concludes, "It is clear then that those constitutions which aim at the common good are right, as being in accord with absolute justice; while those which aim only at the good of the rulers are wrong".

The need for longevity leads to the need to temper the character of their rule which, in turn, leads tyrants to engage in projects which benefit the people ("common good") or, at least, some of them.

Second, most relevant for constitutions presided over by groups of people is Aristotle's description of *oligarchy*. According to Aristotle, *oligarchy* "occurs when the sovereign power of the constitution is in the hands of those with

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[3]. All statements attributed to Aristotle are excerpted from Aristotle's The Politics.

possessions". It is, in effect, a degenerated *aristocracy*; that is, when the government of the "men of wisdom" governing for the best interests of the state is over-ridden by those whose interests is amassing wealth for themselves.

Like *tyranny*, *oligarchy* seldom occurs in a pure type. It almost always exists in some form as a combination of the Aristotelian *oligarchy* and *aristocracy* - depending on the level of "wisdom" of those in power. This also creates potential for overtures to the masses of people or a segment thereof. It is under these conditions that we can consider a possibility of "development" initiatives from both *oligarchs* and *tyrants*.

However development itself has a logic which affects or is affected by the form of government under which it occurs.

The Type of Regime and Political Participation in Development

The relationship between the type of regime and political participation is best represented in the debate over the *bureaucratic-authoritarian* model. The *bureaucratic-authoritarian* model emerged in the analysis of the relationship between the level of development and the type of governments among Latin American states. At the center of this enquiry was the validity of the hypothesis which posits a positive relationship between democracy and development. It seemed, at the time, as though the type of dependent development in which Latin American countries were engaged had produced the "collapse" of the type of development which depended on the "popular sector". Trade unions, and civic organizations were side-lined as the elites - together with the favoured classes - were brought

to the center to direct, and enjoy the fruits of, development.

A better road-map of the types and nature of states which emerged in Latin America around this time is provided by the Argentine Guillermo O'Donnell. Primary in O'Donnell's enquiry is whether the political structure is "incorporating" or "excluding"; that is, whether the "popular sector" is activated to participate or consulted for inputs in decision-making. In his analysis, he notices frequently occurring "constellation" (types of governments, coalitions and policies) among Latin American states. He notices three types of "constellations"; *oligarchic*, *populist* and *bureaucratic-authoritarian*.[4] Before we enumerate these "constellations", we should hasten to mention that our concern here is mostly on the level of political participation within them.

The *oligarchic* structures are governed by the elites for themselves; government policy is aimed at satisfying the will and needs of the elites. Normally, in such states, the majority of the people are in rural areas and are not yet activated politically. Hence, such states are neither "incorporating" nor "excluding".

The *populist* structure is normally based on multi-class coalition of the urban politicians, elites and working class.

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[4]. Please see the English version of Guillermo O'Donnell's "Reflexiones sobre las tendencias generales de cambio en el Estado burocratico-autoritario" in The Latin American Research Review 13, No.1 (1978). See also David Collier's "Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model" and Albert O. Hirschman's "The turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic determinants" in Collier's The New Authoritarianism in Latin America

The state pursues policies which lead to the rise in wages, are not oppressive to unions, and are generally supportive of the domestic market. *Populist* structures, however, should not be confused with democratic structures, for some structures which are initially *populist* and democratic turn around and stifle democracy when democracy stands in the way of dominant groups within the coalition.

The third and last structure is the *bureaucratic-authoritarian* regime. This structure is dominated by military and civilian technocrats who are in coalition with foreign capital. As such, the policies which are followed are those which give access to foreign capital investment and repatriation of profits. This is the structure which O'Donnell considers emphatically "excluding" and non-democratic.

The structures which are important, for the purposes of this paper, are the *oligarchic* and the *populist* structures. The *oligarchic* is important because of the tendency for politics of leadership generally and in African areas, particularly. Although the structures investigated in this study are not in rural areas, they have a tendency not to activate popular participation in politics. When they do (i.e. when they become *populist*) they often activate only those segments whose political views are not antithetical to theirs. Often the activation of a group is so that the activated group is used against those groups whose views are inimical to those of the leaders.

Except for the fact that O'Donnell restricts *oligarchy* to an agrarian economy, his oligarchy looks very similar to those described by both Socrates and Aristotle. In his definition of

oligarchy, O'Donnell emphasises the fact that the rulers are the elites who are concerned with international trade of agricultural products. Socrates, for his part, described *oligarchic* people as "money-grubbers". He sees the *oligarchic* person as driven by "pleasure-loving" coupled with "ungenerosity". In the *oligarchic* person, "the desiring part prevails over the reasoning and spirited parts". And Aristotle views *oligarchy* as in existence when the "sovereign power of the constitution is in the hands of those with possessions".

Unlike O'Donnell's *oligarchy*, however, Socrates's and Aristotle's oligarchies arise out of the degeneration of "good government". Socrates sees *oligarchy* as the degeneration of *timocratic* (the honour-loving) government which, itself is a degeneration of *aristocratic* (wisdom-loving) government. And Aristotle's *oligarchy* is a degenerated *aristocracy* (the government of the best men ruling for the best interest of all).

Despite Socrates and Aristotle, experience has shown that there is no one route for the emergence of oligarchy. Oligarchies have arisen out of different situations. Also, as we have said before, oligarchic structures do not occur in the pure types described by Socrates and Aristotle. They normally combine characteristics of two or more forms of government. This is largely due to the dictates of the social climate in which they exist.

Case Studies

1. Kwamashu

The first residents of Kwamashu arrived from Cato Manor, into a not yet completely built township, in 1958. The township was being built by the Durban City Corporation (Corporation) as a domicile for Africans who were working in Durban. Because the Africans were not allowed to buy the houses they moved into, and many of them could not afford it anyway, the maintenance for the township was left in the hands of the Corporation.

From the early 1960s to 1975, the maintenance and provision of infrastructure and facilities was in the hands of the Corporation. Such services included the maintenance of the infrastructure such as the water and sewerage system, the maintenance of buildings such as the repainting and replacement of walls and doors, refuse removal, the sweeping of streets, the cutting of overgrown grass alongside the streets, and the maintenance of roads and bridges.

The provision of facilities included the building of two swimming pools, nine soccer fields, one tennis court, numerous lower and higher primary schools, about three high schools, a handful of creches and children's playgrounds.

As should be evident from their numbers, the facilities were insufficient for the township population. Over and above that, the services provided in these facilities were the barest minimum necessary for the facility to keep its name. For instance, classrooms were barely four walls with windows and a door. They had no electricity and no heating system. Science students were

lucky to have a beaker for science experiments. As a result students had to believe what the books said rather than experiment in the laboratories of their schools.

This state of things obtained well into the 1970s. In 1975, Kwamashu was incorporated into Kwazulu. The provision of services then became the responsibility of the Kwazulu administration. The Kwazulu administration had less financial resources than the Corporation. It also had a different attitude towards housing within its jurisdiction. It allowed residents to buy their houses. The change of ownership relieved the administration of the responsibility to repair houses and to maintain some of the infrastructure. Some of the services which had been provided by the Corporation were "privatised" e.g. refuse removal. This privatisation - which occurred without a public discussion - benefited those who were structurally situated (such members of the "council") to take advantage of such functions.

The movement from one dominant provider of all the services to a multitude of providers of ever smaller services, introduced elements of anarchy in the provision of services. Sometimes refuse is not removed and, when it is removed, only that which is neatly packaged into refuse bins and plastic bags gets picked-up. Consequently, streets are strewn with refuse overflows and no-one seems to have a mandate to pick it up. Also, underground water and sewerage pipes frequently burst and it takes days and, sometimes, weeks, to get them repaired, all the while their contents overflow onto the streets.

Some of the services which were not privatised are not

provided any more. The two swimming pools have not been functional for more than ten years. The tennis courts have been destroyed by disrepair. Rusted marry-go-rounds in the middle of bushes bear a grim testimony for what used to be children's playgrounds. The football fields are no longer looked after and the area covering one of them was sold (by members of the "council") to developers for the building of houses.

The shortage of funds has also affected the quality of schools and, as such, the quality of education. Schools have to raise their own funds for facilities and for extensions, such as the building of new classes. As such, the extent to which the school has facilities correlates with the resourcefulness of the principal. The differential resourcefulness of principals is evidenced by the striking disparities in classrooms, quality of teachers and equipment between different high schools.

Since the mid 1980s, little or no development has taken place in Kwamashu, excerpt for sporadic development of roads and electricity connections which are now and then disrupted by attacks on the developers.

Township Leadership, Development and Democracy

The question then is how one accounts for the changes. At the beginning, the administration of Kwamashu was presided over by the Township Manager. Most of the finances were grants from the Durban City Corporation and the rest were raised from rents and rates. The township manager was assisted by the "council system" which played an advisory role on community matters. The

council system was supposed to represent the interests of the residents. But since the council system had no teeth - the township manager dictated policy - residents did not rely on it and few participated in their elections. This system was, in O'Donnell's words, "excluding".

Without participation by residents, the councillors became a clique dominated by the business interests in the township. At the point of incorporation into Kwazulu, the "council system" was given more powers to raise and collect rents and rates. It also had power to sell vacant land for development. As such, against the interests of residents, they allowed "foreign" capital to dominate township businesses such as shops, petrol stations, and land and real estate development. It is openly acknowledged that some of the fancy vehicles in which some of the councillors drive were kick-backs from such deals.

When Kwamashu was incorporated into Kwazulu, most councillors committed their areas without consultation with residents. Such decisions and opposition to them resulted in the friction and violence which engulfed Kwamashu in the 1980s as township residents demanded the right to choose their own representatives. Out of that conflict, a civic organisation was born, late in the 1980s. The civic claims to represent the interests of the residents who did not want to be incorporated into Kwazulu.

However, since the 1980s violence did not result in the outright victory of any group, we have a situation of "dual power" in Kwamashu; the civic and the council system. While the civic seems to enjoy popular support, it is, however, unable to

deliver resources since the purse is in the hands of the Kwazulu administration which looks unfavourably to the existing civic organization. In order to boost support for the councillors, funds are allocated for projects that councillors propose but such funds are not made available for projects proposed by the civic. This climate fosters an environment within which those invited to implement development projects are seen as taking sides. Hence when they are attacked, few people either defend them or offer themselves as witnesses to such attacks.

As a result, many development projects in Kwamashu have either been postponed or cancelled. It is no wonder therefore that one still witnesses the unremoved scars of the 1980s violence, such as the burned down shops and houses. Most recreational facilities remain in disrepair and in need of major renovations. Over and above that, the upgrading of the infrastructure is hampered by attacks on those installing new or extending old electricity lines and poles as well as attacks on those improving the condition of roads.

Also, the conflict between the civic and the council system is having a negative effect on the civic claims of operating democratically. Since public meetings called by the civic are either attacked or threatened with attack, people tend not to avail themselves for such meetings. In cases when people are afraid to attend public meetings, it becomes difficult to maintain that decisions taken by the civic are representative of the wants of the population.

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In sum, the initial administration of the Corporation was

able to push through its development programs without much consultation and discussion. The people were shut out of the decision making process and their "representatives" - the council system - did not have a mandate and could not alter or block the wishes of the Corporation.

During, and after, the incorporation into Kwazulu, the *oligarchic* tendencies of the council system began to crystallise. The powers of the township manager's office (who, from then, was an African) were severely curtailed to a point where the township manager was only useful in as much as he could give technical information and advice. While the new order pretended to be both *populist* and "incorporating", those who were "incorporated" wee those whose views did not differ much from those of the council. The civic and their supporters were shut out of the decision making process.

It is not a correct impression to come away from this study with the impression that all the councillors were, in Socrates's words, "money-grubbers". There were some whose "aristocratic" tendencies could have been unleashed, only if they worked under different conditions. These, however, were the absolute minority. The majority, indeed, had tendencies towards "money-grubbing". One monument to their "money-grubbing" is the restriction and closure of the Kwanashu cemetery in order to sell land to developers. The Kwamashu residents are now faced with having to bury their dead either 15km away, at Molweni, or to find a place in town; where the services are more expensive.

Regarding the prevailing conditions, however, both the council and the civic are partly at fault. The logjam on

services created by the confrontation between the civic and the council system makes one wonder whether the best strategy for a democrat, in battle against adversaries, is to block development - at all costs - even if that development is aimed at helping the people one claims to represent.

It is important to notice that the paralysis created by the confrontation between the civic and the council system has, in turn, created an environment within which there was no power which dominated. Consequently, no group was powerful enough to limit, constantly and effectively, the liberty of its nemeses. Hence the relative freedom which was enjoyed by the Kwamashu residents - i.e. before the March 1994 assault. (Even though Kwamashu is reputed to be an ANC stronghold, the truth is that many Inkatha supporters lived in Kwamashu during this time without fear of being attacked or expelled. They, however, may have been restricted from wearing or proselytising Inkatha paraphernalia in certain areas.)

2. Lindelani

Lindelani is a Zulu verb meaning - to more than one person - wait a little while. It is claimed that this was the promise given, by the Kwazulu administration, to the people who had begun squatting in the area then known as Emachobeni. The promise was that of services and recognition of the community. The promise was made to squatters who were demanding proper houses and services. They had already claimed what they saw as vacant land and were establishing make-shift shacks, some constructed out of wood, some out of corrugated iron, some out of cardboard boxes

and some out of wattle and daub.

The birth of this new community was, however, not without pains. Elements of the Hobbesian state of nature began to rear their ugly heads. The scramble for a piece of land where ownership was signified by, among other things, grass knots, cleared areas, handkerchiefs and coloured paint, led to squabbles over title as those who came late removed the signatures of those who had a prior claim to land. In such contests, women became the chief victims as men made claims over lands already bearing women's signatures.

Also, from the beginning, before the area was electrified, great concern was expressed over the high rate of crime - mostly theft of building material and building tools as well as the rape of women living alone. Theft had got so prevalent that people hesitated to leave their shacks without anyone looking after them; even during the day. Women could not walk alone at night without fear of harassment.

Added to these concerns, the community was unsettled by rumoured threats of imminent removal by the Ntuzuma township administration. The ground on which they had settled had been designated for the expansion of Ntuzuma township; section A, C, and D were to be built on it. The threat was ominous, given what was known to be established methods of removing people who either squatted illegally or lived on lands which had been designated or redesignated. In fact, at one time, the police moved in to and demolished some shacks. From then, building took place in the evening and at night.[5]

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[5]. See also C. Fourie's 1986 study of Lindelani.

In the classical Hobbesian resolution of the "state of nature", the community "conferred all their power and strength upon an assembly of men" which was supposed to protect them from one another and was supposed to protect them from invasions by "foreign" powers.[6] The community got together and chose a committee which was to address their concerns over crime and was to represent them in resolving the uncertainty of the status of their area.[7]

The committee was indeed successful - not without some brutal methods - in lowering the level of crime and increasing the feeling of safety. Over time, after doing away with the opposition, one man, Mr Thomas Mandla Shabalala, emerged within the committee as the chief decision-maker. He consolidated his rule in a manner which resembled an African local authority. He had *izinduna* who, in turn, had their own messengers and "community police". The community police were subdivided into "police units" who patrol the area and some guard over the leader's house.

Since the area was not policed officially, the community "police units" patrolled the streets at night and "arrested" anyone contravening the established code of conduct. The arrested person would be brought to the leader's residence where he or she would be tried and then sentenced. The sentence was normally a warning or a number of lashes on the person's behind, depending on the crime.

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6. Please see Thomas Hobbes's "Of Common-wealth" in his Leviathan

7. C. Fourie refers to this group as "vigilantes", p.7

While more can be said about the brutality of the methods used by the Lindelani leadership to create peace and, indeed, a lot has been written on this issue[8], what has been overlooked is the ability of the leadership to summon development agencies into the area and to create a climate within which development proceeds without interruption from residents. One example of such ability was the agreement between the leadership in Lindelani and Murray and Roberts for the construction of buildings in the area.

It is undeniable that the favouritism from the Kwazulu administration plays a large role in funding and procuring development projects and organizations; after all, Mr Shabalala is a member of the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly and a member of Inkatha's Central Committee.[9] But the Kwazulu administration does not create the order in Lindelani; this is done by the leadership in Lindelani. The authority of the leadership in Lindelani is such that no one can either oppose or dare to disturb development agencies. Such actions result in lashing, exile and worse.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Lindelani has had a rapid development of the infrastructure and provision of services. It boasts a tarred main road which leads to smaller dirt roads, a creche, 1 L.P. and 1 H.P. schools, an electricity, plumbing and building training centre, a handy-crafts centre, a gardening course run by the Department of Manpower, 2 soccer

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[8]. See for instance, A de V. Minnaar's "Mafia Warlords or Political Entrepreneurs? Warlordism in Natal", Pretoria, 1991.

[9]. See A. de V. Minnaar, p.9

fields, a stadium and numerous informal playgrounds, numerous vegetable stalls and shack shops. This is more than one can say about any informal area. This level of development rivals and tops that of many of the formal townships.

Squatter Camp Leadership, Development and Democracy

While the foregoing may point to the successes of the leadership style in Lindelani, the successes of the style have not come without some costs. To begin with, the clamping down which was imposed following the rise in crime also created a climate within which dissenting voices were silenced. And, when the leadership in Lindelani allied themselves with the, then, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, the area became hostile territory to those squatters who either owed allegiance to rival political parties or were apathetic. As a result, large migrations out of Lindelani were witnessed. At the same time, however, there was also migration into Lindelani by those who favoured Inkatha.

Because the remaining population had been pacified and conveniently "incorporated" (in O'Donnell's terms), the leadership could expect minimum opposition from the people. As such, development projects, in the area, had to be approved by the leadership. In most instances, such approval was based on forms of gratuities paid to the leadership.[10] A monument to the exclusion of popular participation in discussions regarding development projects and land-use in Lindelani is the permission granted to some companies to use a part of Lindelani as a waste

[10]. It is argued that it was a dispute over this form of gratuity which soured the agreement between the Lindelani leadership and Murray and Roberts.

dump. The health and environmental consequences of that decision are yet to be ascertained.

In any area where the leadership excludes the population at the initial stages of any deal democracy is jeopardised. Despite their overtures towards *populism*, it is not at all clear that both Lindelani and Kwamashu forms of leadership are trustful of true democracy. Normally, people are invited to participate in decisions once the leaders have demarcated the boundaries of discussion and decision-making. It is no consolation, therefore, to argue that, as long as the decision is beneficial to the people, it does not matter by whom it is made.

Typologies in Repression

Squatter Camps: Repression and Exclusion

It is not accidental that leadership in squatter camps, in the recent period, has been characterised by repression. Normally, people arrive in such areas with different ideas of how to live in the new community. Some arrive with ulterior motives of preying on others. It becomes therefore imperative that a structure - to which most should owe allegiance - be set up. Since, at the beginning, force becomes necessary to rid the area of "unwanted elements", either through suppression or through exile. It is this use of force which colours the form of leadership in most squatter areas, even when the need for the use of force has subsided.[11]

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[11]. Normally, the qualities called for in the leadership at the initial stages of a squatter settlement are not the same as the qualities which become essential once stability has been attained.

While the forms of repression practised by squatter camp leadership are severe, they become even more severe when residents of a squatter area owe allegiance to political parties which are at odds with one another. In most cases, political differences are resolved - not before bloody battles - through the exiling of the defeated supporters of one of the parties. Force continues to dominate relations within the squatter area well after the exiling of the defeated party. In such instances, force becomes the method of keeping people in line.

While it may be difficult to go around or ignore some of the most dictatorial of leaders, processes which either encourage or compel them to function democratically should be put in place. If we fail at this, we would not only be strengthening undesirable forms of leadership, but we would also be failing South Africa on the promise of "democratising the all levels of government and forms of authority."

Township Leadership: Repression and Exclusion

In many of the townships, the "council system" is seen to have colluded with the apartheid regime in the oppression of residents. Such perceptions lead to the rejection of the council system and those serving within it. Invariably, this leads to confrontation between those in the council system and the new leadership representing the disenchanted residents. In the past, the councillors had the support of the state which picked up the gauntlet in their favour. In such environments, democracy loses out as people are forced to join one side or the other in the conflict.

The alternative institutions themselves are born in contentious environments and, as a result, develop dictatorial and repressive tendencies in order to survive assaults from the council system and its benefactors. It is troubling to consider the prospects for true democracy in institutions born in environments and processes which succeed by stifling democratic procedures. And without democracy, how could we have development which addresses the people's needs?

Lastly, the democratic intentions of the civic organisation may not be sufficient to produce the necessary development. The civics may still need to learn the art of raising funds for development, inviting and enticing development agencies and managing development programs. These processes should be free of the increasingly encumbering and unending processes of "consultation" which are staged, ostensibly, to "get the opinions of the people" when, in fact, they are measures through which corrupt civic leadership control development projects and, subsequently, finances accruing therefrom.

Understandably, one of the major reasons for the emergence of individuals who use development to enrich themselves is the high unemployment in African areas. But this should not make us tolerate processes which are stumbling blocks to development when the demand of the provision of services is growing daily. The success to which we are able to resolve these blockages will be the extent to which we can deliver some of the promises of the RDP.

Conclusion

This study analyses the relationship between authority and development. It argues that development has taken place in Lindelani largely because (i) its strong leadership has the support of the Kwazulu administration (ii) the leadership, in order to secure its position and to appease the residents, invites development organizations and creates a climate conducive to the implementation of development projects (iii) save for "informative" sessions, its processes are not encumbered by hearings, discussions, consultation and feedbacks.

In Kwamashu, on the other hand, the logjam between the civic and the council system has paralysed opportunities for development and opportunities for popular participation in development initiatives. Consequently, few and sporadic development initiatives are attempted, mostly without the input from the public. The conflict between the civic organisation and the council system has made it difficult for the civic to operate democratically, despite claims of representativeness. The threat of possible attacks on civic public meetings dissuades people from attending. Consequently, most people in Kwamashu do not even know that there is a civic organisation. Most of those who know, do not know who is in it and where and how they could get hold of them.

We have, therefore, two ostensibly different systems which, nonetheless, as far as democracy is concerned, have the same results. One resembles a mix of *tyranny* and *oligarchy* and the other is a mix of *oligarchy* and *aristocracy*. All the same, they both have, effectively, tendencies towards *exclusion* despite

their efforts at being *incorporating*, albeit, partially. Consequently, development projects - where they occur - tend to be geared to address the concerns of the leadership more than those of the people.

Contrary to those who see the solution (to the administration and development of formerly African areas) in the "rationalisation" of administration, and fully cognisant that, as Max Weber warns against the antidemocratic tendencies of bureaucracy, and with ample evidence from the apartheid era, this study maintains that "rationalisation" alone cannot resolve the problem of authority and development in African areas. It argues, instead, that the lack of representation, consultation and accountability to the people has created an environment within which the conception, planning and implementation of development takes place behind people's backs. Development projects have to be decided, planned and implemented with the participation of the whole community if they are to address the real needs of the people and not just those who claim to be their representatives, whether modern or traditional.