

https://dspace.org/

A radical politics of distribution?: work, welfare and public works programmes in rural Mozambique

Castel-Branco, Ruth Kélia

2021
https://hdl.handle.net/10539/33855

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/

A radical politics of distribution? Work, welfare and public works programmes in rural Mozambique

Ruth Kélia Castel-Branco



Supervisor: Doctor Ben Scully

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Johannesburg, 2021

Declaration

I, Ruth Kélia Castel-Branco, declare that this dissertation is my own work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology) at the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or for examination in this or any other university.



_____

Ruth Kélia Castel-Branco

7 of September 2021

Breaking rocks out here on the chain gang,
Breaking rocks and serving my time,
Breaking rocks out here on the chain gang,
Because they done convicted me of crime.
Hold it steady right there while I hit it,
Well, reckon that ought to get it,
Been working and working,
But I still got so terribly far to go.
I committed crime Lord I needed
Crime of being hungry and poor.

- 'Work Song' by Nina Simone (1966)

We are the bulldozers,
We can cut through dead trees,
We can cut through green trees.
These streets, we need them
There's no reason to complain
They asked you if you wanted streets
You were the ones who said yes.

- Work Song by PASP workers (2017)

Acknowledgements

When I first embarked on this journey, I was warned that it would be lonely. Thankfully, it has been remarkably fulfilling. Immense gratitude to my supervisor Benjamin Scully for his steady guidance, invaluable critique and encouragement throughout the research process. Any shortcomings are entirely my own. Still at the University of the Witwatersrand, I would like to thank Shireen Ally, Devan Pillay, Nicolas Pons-Vignon, Thabang Sefalafala, Michelle Williams, Edwarrd Webster and Imraan Valodia for their support in numerous ways. Throughout, Ingrid Chunilall, Sedzani Malada and Josephine Mashaba offered indispensable assistance (and a few good laughs too). Without funding from the International Centre for Development and Decent Work, it would have been impossible to embark on this journey. I am especially grateful to Christophe Scherrer and Christian Mollman for the global network they built.

The pages of this thesis would have been largely blank without the contribution of research assistants Luísa António, Manuel Chivale, Alima Domingos, Mariano Nguluve, Roda Nguluve, Célia Saíde and Mário Varancha – and the dozens of *camponeses*, local leaders, state technocrats, activists and academics who participated in the research. The idea for this thesis emerged from the contradictions of my own policy work at the International Labour Office in Mozambique. I am grateful to former colleagues Nuno Cunha, Denise Monteiro and Rubén Vicente for indulging me; and Kerry Selvester, Koeti Serodio and Olívia Faite Izidine for prodding when they thought I was going off track. During fieldwork, the National Institute for Social Action offered invaluable support, while the Institute for Social and Economic Studies and the University Eduardo Mondlane provided a welcome academic home.

During the final stretch, the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies offered an engaging academic space from which to write and the Alternactiva collective, a site of debate. A special shoutout to *compas* who pulled me over the finish line: Rosimina Ali, Basani Baloyi, Andrew Bennie, Sergio Coronado, Helena Dolny, Claudia Gastrow, Gilad Isaacs, Fátima Ismael, Ghazal Khashayar, Alicia Hayashi Lazzarini, Marvin Lawack, Yana van Leeve, Thembi Luckett, Thandiwe Matthews, Sandiswa Mapukata, Fikile Masikane, Siphelele Mavuso, Warren McGregor, Boaventura Monjane, Celso Monjane, Elizabeth Ortiz, Caio Simões de Araujo, Sarahí Uribe, Jennifer van Geesbergen, Nina de Wit and Vanda Zitha. Finally, *khanimambo* to my blended family of Castel-Branco's, O'Laughlin's, Locke's and Pinkster-Wuyts'. This thesis is dedicated to Ilundi Wuyts (1979-2018).

Abstract

Over the last decades, there has been a proliferation of cash transfer programmes across the global South, in what Ferguson (2015) suggests is a harbinger of, and an intellectual resource for, a new radical politics of distribution based on citizenship. Ferguson is among a growing group of 'anti-work' scholars who argue for the urgent need to decentre wage-work from the social and political imaginary amidst an increasing crisis of reproduction – and the cash transfers may be one mechanism to do so. The underlying assumptions are that wage-work is no longer a meaningful form of social incorporation and that a continued focus on politics at the point of production amounts to little more than 'productivist fundamentalism', that the notion of a 'rightful share' is an effective basis for political claim-making, and that cash transfers are a powerful instrument to drive forth this distributional politics.

Drawing on the case of the Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) in rural Mozambique, this thesis critically interrogates these assumptions from the periphery of the global economy. Caught in a tailspin of depeasantisation and deindustrialisation, rural Mozambique is the perfect case to demonstrate Ferguson's proposition. However, it also points to its contradictions. First, there is plenty of wage-work taking place and plenty more to be done. Second, despite the gradual expansion of the social welfare system, its evolution has been constrained by a resource-driven development model. Third, in a context where notions of citizenship are highly fragmented, cash transfers have not generated the kind of political traction envisioned by Ferguson.

Ultimately, without production, there is nothing to redistribute or consume. Therefore, rethinking redistribution requires reclaiming production – and that involves struggles over what is produced, how it is produced and for whom. Indeed, although PASP workers complain about the drudgery of labour-intensive public works, they overwhelmingly prefer state support for small-scale agriculture, access to employment opportunities and improved working conditions over an unconditional cash transfer. Unfortunately, in decentring politics at the point of production, much of the contemporary 'anti-work' scholarship has left the terms of capital accumulation unchallenged precisely when it is most urgent to do so. In an age where the lines between production, redistribution and consumption are increasingly blurred, it is crucial to understand how conceptions of class are being reconfigured.

Table of contents

Declaration ii
Acknowledgements iv
Abstract v
Table of contents vi
Acronyms and abbreviations x
Glossary xii
Maps xiv
Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 1
A complex crisis of reproduction 2
A radical politics of distribution 5
Research questions 9
Research approach and site selection 9
Research techniques 14
Power asymmetries and the research process 17
The structure of the thesis and critical arguments 20
Chapter 2: The Future of Work(ers) and 'Post-work' Utopias 24
The making and maintenance of wage-work(ers) under capitalism 26
The changing nature of work with neoliberal restructuring 35
The political possibilities of 'post-work' utopias 44
Conclusion: beyond 'post-work' utopias 49
Chapter 3: The Emancipatory Possibilities of Cash Transfers 51
A technique of discipline: the emergence of social welfare with capitalist development 52
A 'quiet revolution': the proliferation of cash transfers in the global South 58
A win-win or a lose-lose? Public works programmes 63
Universal basic income: a capitalist road to communism? 66
Conclusion: the limits of a radical politics of distribution 70
Chapter 4: The Evolution of Social security in Mozambique 72
'Para o Inglês ver': the abolition of slavery and rise of the Indigenato, 1878-1961 74
From indigenous to rural worker: the end of the Indigenato and the rise of the Rural Labour Code, 1962-1974 84
From rural worker to the 'new man': the universalisation of entitlements at independence, 1975-1989 87
From 'new man' to microentrepreneur: the transition to a market economy and introduction of cash transfers, 1990-2020 95
Conclusion: cash transfers and the contested extension of neoliberalism 102

Chapter 5: Between Authentic and Intangible Work in the Districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè 105
'Employment is not for everyone': an overview of the Mozambican labour market 108
Cobbling together a livelihood in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè 116
'To be a person is to work': the meaning of work in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè 132
Conclusion: beyond the authentic and the intangible 139
Chapter 6: The Contentious Politics of the Productive Social Action Programme 142
A 'Jogo de Cintura': negotiating the terms of the PASP 144
The size and scope of the PASP 149
The PASP as a site of struggle 156
Conclusion: reclaiming the PASP in a global war of position 168
Chapter 7: The Experience of the 'Rebenta Mina' in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè 170
A profile of the 'rebenta-mina' 172
The affirmation and negation of work among the 'rebenta-mina.' 178
'To be quiet is to talk': Practices of power among the 'rebenta-mina.' 192
The redistributive role of the state 195
Conclusion: from a biscate to a proper job 200
Chapter 8: Conclusion 202
There is plenty of work to be done: the contradictions of post-work utopias in rural Mozambique 205
Far from a 'real utopia': The limits of public works in rural Mozambique 208
Rethinking redistribution, reclaiming production in rural Mozambique 212
Bibliography 217
Interviews: 233
Appendices 235
Appendix 1: Research authorisation and credential 235
Appendix 2: Research instruments 237
Appendix 3: Sampling Frame 246

List of tables and figures

Tables

Table 1: A comparison of the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/2017 12
Table 2: Social assistance coverage for workers under the FAST in Mozambique, 1964 86
Table 3: Population dependent on food distribution in urban and rural areas, 1988 93
Table 4: Coverage and quality of social welfare programmes in Mozambique, 2020 98
Table 5: Projected cost of universal basic income in Mozambique, 2020 102
Table 6: Official and simulated poverty rates in Mozambique, 2014/15 and 2015/16 114
Table 7: Occupational hierarchies by quintile in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/17 118
Table 8: Occupational hierarchies by sex in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/17 118
Table 9: Components of the World Bank PASP loan, 2013 147
Table 10: The rights of the public sector employees and PASP workers compared, 2021 ... 152
Table 11:Price table for goods in the market in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2017 180
Table 12: Overview of the Pros and Cons of an Unconditional Cash Transfer, 2016/17 200

Figures

Figure 1: Map of research sites within Mozambique, 2021 xiv
Figure 2: Map of research sites within the province of Inhambane, 2021 xv
Figure 3: Map of the research sites within the province of Nampula, 2021 xv
Figure 4: Effective social security coverage, by population group (%) 7
Figure 5: Map of the field sites within the district of Inhassoro, Inhambane 2016/17 10
Figure 6: Map of the field sites within the district of Ribáuè, Nampula 2016/17 11
Figure 7: Research assistant and participant during a semi-structured interview in Temane, Inhambane, 2017 19
Figure 8: % total employment by sector in sub-Saharan Africa, 1991-2019 39
Figure 9: Value-added as a % of GDP, 1981-2019 40
Figure 10: Picture of enslaved Mozambicans on a French vessel en route to Brazil, c.1882.. 74
Figure 11: Picture of Xibalo workers in the construction of the Oosterlyn c.1894 79
Figure 12:A cartoon of Xiconhoca, a saboteur of the national economy, 1977 89
Figure 13: An example of a food distribution card, Maputo 1989 92
Figure 14: Budget allocations to Mozambique's social welfare system 2011- 2020 98
Figure 15: Coverage of Mozambique's social welfare system 1990- 2020 99
Figure 16: The strict unemployment rate in Southern Africa (%), 2019 109
Figure 17: The distribution of the economically active population in Mozambique, according to the labour process, 2017 109
Figure 18: The sexual division of labour in Mozambique, according to the labour process, 2017 110
Figure 19: Minimum wages in relation to the line of working poverty in Mozambique, 2019/2020 111
Figure 20: Hours worked by sector, sex and geographic location in Mozambique, 2014/15 111
Figure 21: Employment trends by sector in Mozambique, 2007-2017 112
Figure 22: National vs rural monthly expenditures in Mozambique 2014/15 115
Figure 23: Consumption distribution by quintile in Mozambique, 2014/15 115
Figure 24: A comparison of activities by levels of sustenance in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/2017 135
Figure 25: A comparison of activities by degree of autonomy in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/2017 137

Figure 26: A comparison of activities by social recognition, 2016/17 139
Figure 27: PASP coverage by province, 2020 150
Figure 28: Evolution of budget allocations to the social welfare programmes in Mozambique, 2015-2020 151
Figure 29: The institutional architecture for the implementation of the PASP, 2021 154
Figure 30: Steps in the implementation of the PASP, 2021 156
Figure 31: Process for the identification and selection of PASP workers, 2021 162
Figure 32: Process for the definition, design and supervision of PASP activities, 2021 164
Figure 33: Process for administering cash transfer payments, 2021 168
Figure 34: Distribution of PASP workers by age and research site, 2017 174
Figure 35: Distribution of PASP workers by the level of schooling and research site, 2017 174
Figure 36: Sources of sustenance among PASP workers by research site, 2017 175
Figure 37: Sources of sustenance among PASP workers by research site, 2017 175
Figure 38: Picture of PASP workers building a hut in Temane, Inhassoro, 2017 184
Figure 39:Picture of PASP workers clearing roads in Inhassoro, Inhassoro, 2017 185
Figure 40:Picture of an unfinished Frelimo marquise in Minuco, Ribáuè, 2016 186
Figure 41:Picture of PASP workers cutting down a tree in Iapala, Ribáuè, 2017 188
Figure 42:Picture of PASP workers demolishing a house in Riani, Ribáuè, 2017 190
Figure 43: The PASP compared with other activities in of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2017 191
Figure 44:Practices of power among PASP workers in the Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2017 192

Acronyms and abbreviations

CONSILMO	Confederação de Sindicatos Livres e Independentes de Moçambique Confederation of Independent and Free Trade Unions of Mozambique
CWP	Community Works Programme
DFID	Department for International Development-UK
DPGCAS	Direcção Provincial de Género, Criança e Acção Social Provincial Directorate for Gender, Children and Social Action
ELR	Employer of Last Resort
ENSSB	Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica National Strategy for Basic Social Security
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
Frelimo	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique Mozambican Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAS	Instituto Nacional de Acção Social National Institute for Social Action
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística National Institute for Statistics
INGC	Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades National Institute for Disaster Management
INSS	Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social National Institute for Social Security
MEF	Ministério de Economia e Finanças Ministry of Economics and Finance
MGCAS	Ministério do Género, Criança e Acção Social Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action
MGNREGA	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
MISAU	Ministério de Saúde Ministry of Health
MITADER	Ministério de Terra, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Rural Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development
MTS	Metical
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
OTM	Organização de Trabalhadores de Moçambique Organisation of Workers in Mozambique
PASD	Programa de Acção Social Directa Direct Social Action Programme
PASP	Programa de Acção Social Produtiva Productive Social Action Programme
PES	Plano Económico e Social Social and Economic Plan
PSCM-PS	Plataforma da Sociedade Civil Moçambicana para a Protecção Social Mozambican Platform for Civil Society-Social Protection
PSSB	Programa Subsídio Social Básico Basic Social Subsidy Programme

RdM	República de Moçambique Republic of Mozambique
Renamo	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana Mozambican National Resistance
RPM	República Popular de Moçambique Popular Republic of Mozambique
SDAE	Serviços Distritais de Actividades Económicas District Services for Economic Activities
SDPI	Serviços Distritais de Planeamento e Infrastructuras District Services for Planning and Infrastructure
SDSMAS	Serviços Distritais de Saúde, Mulher e Acção Social District Services for Health, Women and Social Action
SETSAN	Secretariado Técnico de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutritional Security
SISTAFE	Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado state Financial Administrative System
UBI	Universal Basic Income
UNAC	União Nacional de Camponeses National Union of Peasants
UNICEF	United Nation Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme


Glossary

Abastecimento	Subsidised food distribution system.
Aldeamento	A settlement scheme established by the colonial regime to control Africans living in strategic regions the countryside.
Aldeia comunal	A settlement scheme established by the postcolonial regime, in an effort to collectivise and control the countryside.
Assimilado	A status of quasi-citizenship for those of African descent, who had met certain criteria, during the colonial period.
Baixas	A low-lying area or natural depression that accumulates water during the rainy season, can be used to irrigate plants during dry periods.
Barraca	An informal stall akin to the South African *spaza shop* or *shabeen*, depending on whether they sell alcoholic beverages.
Biscate	A side-hustle, usually negotiated under conditions of duress, on a task basis, paid in money or in kind.
Boer bean	Pigeon pea, produced as cash crop for export to India, to make dhal.
Camponês/a/es	Portuguese for peasant, but can refer to landless agricultural worker, small-scale farmer and petty capitalists.
Cantina	A small shop in rural areas, often owned by *colonos*, during the colonial period.
Capulana	A multi-purpose brightly-coloured print fabric, worn by women, that can double as a skirt, a scarf, a wrap or used to carry a child.
Cartão de abastecimento	Ration card for the subsidised food distribution system.
Corda	Rope made from the bark of a tree, by soaking young branches until malleable, twisting them, beating them and disentangling them.
Direito consuetudinário	Mandatory manual contribution to the chieftaincy, rooted in precolonial practices and appropriated by chiefs the colonial regime.
Fiosses	Deep-fried, twisted doughnuts.
Ganho-ganho	Day labour agricultural work, performed on a task basis and paid either in wages or in kind.
Guía de marcha	A travel pass, based on the colonial passbook, appropriated by the liberation movement and entrenched as a state practice.
Indigenato	A political system consolidated in the late 19th and 20th century, which legally differentiated between the rights of so-called indigenous and non-indigenous across the former Portuguese African colonies.
Jogo de cintura	Literally translated as a waist game – is frequently evoked in policy-making circles to depict the complex process of negotiation in a context where international development agencies and financial institutions have inordinate power.
Joni	The Tsonga word for Johannesburg, more generally applied to South Africa. A migrant worker is referred to as a Majonijoni.
Kabanga	A creamy fermented drink made from a mixture of maize bran, sugar and water.
Khaapu	Makuwa word for assistant to the chief, rooted in the colonial period.
Laka-laka	Wooden branches used to line the outside of a hut, before covering it in mud in Inhassoro.
Lobolo	Bride wealth. To pay bride wealth is to lobolar.

Loja do povo	Literally translated as people's store, established by the postcolonial state on the site of former colonial cantinas in rural areas.
Machamba	A field, generally no larger than 2 hectares, for agricultural production.
Machamba do povo	A collective machamba, usually on the site of former colonial farms, established by the postcolonial state.
Maheu	A fermentable beverage made of maize meal, flour and water.
Makuwa	The language spoken in much of the province of Nampula.
Malambe	Fruit from the baobab tree.
Mapira	Sorghum.
Matope	A red-coloured clay commonly found in Mozambique.
Mkesh	A mobile-based money transfer service associated with the phone company MCel.
Mpesa	A mobile-based money transfer service associated with the phone company Vodacom.
Mussoco	Hut tax.
Mwene	Makuwa word for chief.
Ndambo	Makuwa word for a natural depression that accumulates water during the rainy season.
Nhemba	Bean similar to the black-eye pea, popular in Mozambique.
Nipa	A distilled drink made from kabanga, sugar and water.
Nyanga	Traditional healer.
Originários	Those recognised to have ancestral ties to the area.
Para o inglês ver	Metaphor, literally translated as for the Englishman to see, it refers to something which appears to be what it is not.
Pau apiki	Wooden branches used to line the outside of a hut, before covering it in mud in Ribáuè.
Permanente	A quasi volunteer who represents INAS at the local level.
Rebenta-mina	Metaphor, literally translated as an armoured truck used to detonate landmines, coined by workers on the Productive Social Action Program to refer to their work.
Refresco	Literally translated as soft drink, it is a euphemism for a bribe.
Sede	The Frelimo headquarters, usually the administrative centre in a village or town.
Vientes	Newcomers, without recognised ancestral ties to the area.
Changana	The language is spoken in the city of Maputo, and provinces of Maputo and Gaza, belonging to the Tsonga group.
Xibalo	Forced labour under the colonial regime.
Xiconhoca	A cartoon character which became a 'floating signifier' for a parasitic, deadweight worker, who lacked class consciousness and operated in cahoots with foreign imperialist forces.
Xitswa	The language spoken in much of the province of Inhambane.


Maps

Figure 1: Map of research sites within Mozambique, 2021




Source: (Geonames 2021)

Figure 2: Map of research sites within the province of Inhambane, 2021



Source: (Mapukata 2021a)

Figure 3: Map of the research sites within the province of Nampula, 2021



Source: (Mapukata 2021b)

Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology

> *Our governance over the next five years will be oriented towards the generation and creation of work and employment […] all Mozambicans should consolidate their culture of work. – President Nyusi (2020)*
>
> *Employment is a question of development; it is not something that you purchase in a store […] We need to teach the youth to innovate and invent what to do for their lives and with their friends. –President Chissano (2020)*

At last years' inaugural address, Mozambican President Nyusi proclaimed job creation the ruling party Frelimo's top priority. Although Mozambique has the lowest unemployment rates in Southern Africa, only 12 per cent of the economically active population derive a livelihood primarily from salaried employment. The vast majority have little choice but to try to cobble together a livelihood from a diversity of paid and unpaid activities on and off the farm (INE 2019). The true extent of unemployment is difficult to discern because even those undertaking the most residual activities classified as 'unknown' are counted as employed in national statistics, and a growing proportion of the population has been relegated to the realm of the economically inactive for reasons defined as 'other'. Furthermore, even those lucky enough to be employed struggle to meet their basic needs (Castel-Branco and Isaacs 2017). With 43 per cent of children suffering from chronic malnutrition and simulated poverty rates hovering between 75 and 80 per cent, it is evident that Mozambique is facing a looming crisis of reproduction (MISAU 2013; Mussagy and Mosca 2020).

The Presidents' announcement reflects the ruling party Frelimo's mounting concern with the political implications of widespread unemployment. However, as former President Chissano alludes to, Frelimo's discursive focus is on entrepreneurial innovation rather than employment generation. Indeed, the phrase 'a culture of work' deployed by the President has been resurrected from its colonial heyday, as political elites attempt to deflect responsibility for the failures of resource-driven development. Whereas in the colonial period, 'a culture of work' was a measure of one's capacity to weather conditions of hyper-exploitation (O'Laughlin 2016), today, it is a measure of one's ability to endure unemployment as an aspiring micro-entrepreneur. However, cyclical rounds of insurgency against the state – most recently by Ansar-al-Sunna in Cabo Delgado – suggest that the chickens may be coming home to roost. Social exclusion, unemployment and state violence have propelled young people into reactionary populist movements (Feijó 2021). In this context, a democratic Left response is critical, and some suggest that a radical politics of distribution may be the answer.

A complex crisis of reproduction

Mozambique's crisis of reproduction is embedded within historically specific processes of resource-driven development. Following the end of the civil war, the country experienced record rates of economic growth, averaging 7.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over two decades. However, as the economy accelerated, poverty reduction stagnated, the number of poor people increased and inequality sky rocketed (MEF 2016). This raised uncomfortable questions about the country's development trajectory for both Frelimo and international development agencies, who touted Mozambique as the vanguard of an 'Africa rising' with the shift to a market economy (Ross 2014). Of course, for the dispossessed and excluded, it had long been apparent that the fruits of economic growth were not trickling down, but out. In 2008, thousands of young people took to the streets in an unprecedented general strike to protest cuts to food and fuel subsidies, low wages, and rising unemployment (de Brito et al. 2015). Although the political discourse subsequently shifted to inclusive growth, the ruling party suppressed debate on the structure of the economy and processes of accumulation, gaslighting the poor for their lack of self-esteem and entrepreneurial fervour (Guebuza 2015).

Castel-Branco (2015) points to three underlying factors for Mozambique's crisis of reproduction. The first is the government's fixation on foreign direct investment to sustain a domestic capitalist class. With the shift to a market economy, the ruling party embarked on a process of 'transformative preservation' (Pitcher 2002), marked by the mass transfer of state enterprises to politically connected individuals. However, many fledgeling privatised firms struggled to compete in globalised markets, leading to widespread bankruptcies and undermining Frelimo's class project (Castel-Branco and Cramer 2003). The government then moved to entice foreign investors searching for land and natural resources, but investments were largely disarticulated from emerging class formations. Under pressure from domestic capitalists to create new business opportunities, the government advanced a second round of expropriation. In exchange for access to mineral and energy reserves, multinational corporations promised shares, board seats and tenders for domestic capitalists. Unfortunately, foreign investment has been largely absorbed by capital-intensive sectors, providing few jobs for the un(der)employed. Indeed, 90 per cent of private investment goes towards the extractive industry and adjacent infrastructures, which account for only 15 per cent of formal employment, despite contributing to 65 per cent of GDP (C. N. Castel-Branco 2017).

The second factor is that the linkages between foreign direct investment and domestic processes of accumulation hinge on economic porosity, underwritten by tax exemptions, licit and illicit financial flows and public debt. Castel-Branco (2015) estimates that between 2005 and 2013, the state lost the annual equivalent of 7 per cent of total public expenditure to tax incentives. Furthermore, the systematic use of transfer pricing by multinational corporations has facilitated both licit and illicit financial flows (CIP 2017). Consequently, the cash-strapped state has been forced to accrue public debt to fund incentives for investors. In 2016, the public debt crisis came to a head with the discovery of $2.2 billion of illicit government-backed loans made by senior officials. The crisis of Ematum, as it was dubbed, triggered the downgrading of the country's credit score, the devaluation of the currency and rapid inflation (Castel-Branco and Isaacs 2017). However, this was just the tip of the iceberg. At the time, Mozambique had a public debt stock equivalent to 120 per cent of GDP, half of which was commercial debt incurred over a decade. The loans were primarily in the form of public-private partnerships for large-scale infrastructure projects associated with the extractive sector and debt repayments (Baloyi 2019). The government used the projected revenues from gas exploration – estimated at $500 over thirty years, enough to quintuple the national budget (Inui et al. 2016) – as collateral though it seems unlikely that revenue forecasts will come to fruition (Hanlon 2021).

The third factor is that the organisation of production requires ultra-low wages and insecure working conditions. Half of the sectoral minimum wages are set below the line of working poverty, based on the assumption that workers can complement their incomes with own cultivation and other informal activities. Notably, the gap in wages between productive sectors (e.g., agriculture, manufacturing and public services) and speculative sectors (e.g., the extractive industry and financial services) has widened – a reflection of the financialisation of the economy (Castel-Branco and Isaacs 2017). Despite subminimum wages in labour-intensive productive sectors, there has been a gradual process of automation in globally integrated firms, contributing to the stagnation of employment. With premature deindustrialisation, the government recast small-scale agriculture as the basis of national development. After all, 67 per cent of the population still derive a livelihood primarily from cultivating the *machamba* (field) (INE 2019). However, small-scale farmers have received little in the way of state support, and less than 5 per cent of domestic investment is directed towards agriculture (C. N. Castel-Branco 2017). Under these conditions, young people are reluctant to embrace the hoe and the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture has dropped dramatically (INE 2019).

Ultimately, the government's fixation on foreign investment has accelerated the expropriation of land and natural resources, undermined the generation of decent work, and undercut the state's redistributive capacity. The countryside, primarily conceived of as a source of surplus for economic transformation and elite accumulation, has been at the heart of this struggle between capital and labour in the face of an authoritarian class project by a centralised state (Bowen 2000). The contradictions are most glaring at the local level. On the one hand, local leaders are responsible for managing the affairs of a domestic capitalist class dependent on foreign investors; on the other, they require grassroots legitimacy to retain and reproduce their political power (Chivangue 2019). The expansion of multinational capital into the countryside has been met with increased resistance, from confrontational tactics such as workplace strikes, public protests, the destruction of property and legal action; to everyday forms of resistance, including absenteeism, theft, rumours, and sorcery (Mandamule 2019). Cast to the margins of society and suspended in 'waithood' (Honwana 2014), young people have become an emerging catalyst of resistance to the political and social order, inspiring the ire of the state.

Importantly, this looming crisis of reproduction is not unique to Mozambique. Across the globe, neoliberal restructuring has given rise to increasingly fragmented classes of labour— variously described as the precariat, the peasantariat, the semi-proletariat— who though dispossessed from the means of production, are unable to sustain themselves through the sale of their labour-power as they become increasingly surplus to the accumulation needs of capital (Moyo and Yeros 2013; Standing 2016; Comaroff and Comaroff 2020). For some scholars, this crisis of reproduction presents a political opportunity to reclaim work from the clutches of commodification (Gorz 1999; Weeks 2011; Ferguson and Li 2018). After all, what is wage-work under capitalism anyway, if not alienating? As Marx (1844) detailed, the commodification of work alienates workers from the process of production, from the product of their labour, from themselves and each other. Common to most proposals for a 'post-work' utopia, is the decentring of wage-work from the social and political imaginary, a repudiation of the primacy of class and a reorientation away from the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. In Southern Africa, proposals for 'post-work' utopias have ranged from repeasantisation, as the semi-proletariat seize control of the means of production through land occupations (Moyo and Yeros 2013); to democratic collectivisation, as producers co-construct solidarity economies based on cooperatives (Satgar 2007); to a radical politics of distribution anchored in new forms of political claim-making based on citizenship (Ferguson 2015). This thesis focuses on the political potential of publicly funded cash transfers in advancing such a radical politics.

A radical politics of distribution

Over the last decades, there has been a proliferation of cash transfer programmes across the global South. Previously dismissed as undesirable, unaffordable and impossible to implement in states with limited capacity, cash transfers have been repackaged as an effective and efficient instrument of inclusive growth (UN 2015). This apparent 'countermovement' in global policy-making (Harris and Scully 2015) reflects a growing consensus that economic growth does not invariably lead to a reduction in poverty and inequality, and indeed quite the opposite may be true; that rising poverty and inequality can stifle growth, while redistributive instruments can stimulate it; that instruments tied to formal employment have limited reach given widespread informality; and that non-contributory cash transfers are affordable at all stages of economic development (Mkandawire, 2001).

For Ferguson (2015), the expansion of cash transfers constitutes a harbinger of and an intellectual resource for a new radical politics of distribution based on citizenship rather than wage-work. Underlying this proposition are several assumptions: that work is no longer a meaningful form of social incorporation and that a focus on politics at the point of production amounts to little more than 'productivist fundamentalism', that the notion of a 'rightful share' is an effective basis for political claim-making and that cash transfers are a powerful instrument to drive forth this distributional politics. Echoing earlier calls by utopian 'anti-work' scholars, from Lafargue (1883) to Barchiesi (2011), Ferguson (2015) argues that it is imperative for emancipatory Left politics to decentre wage-work from the social and political imaginary – and that cash transfers may be one instrument to do so.

Of course, in much of the global South, the racialised nature of colonial capitalism has meant that standard employment relationships have always been the exception rather than the norm (Breman and Linden 2014a). However, Ferguson and Li (2018) contend that despite, or perhaps because of this history, the aspirational power of wage-work became central to the postcolonial project. Influenced by evolutionist theories of capitalist development, many newly independent states adopted a brand of 'high modernism' that denigrated distribution (Ferguson 2015). Unfortunately, hopes of industrial convergence have failed to materialise, and like Mozambique, large parts of the global South are caught in a tailspin of depeasantisation and premature deindustrialisation. In the context of this global crisis of reproduction, utopian visions of 'post-work' futures have gained increasing traction.


The resurgence of interest in 'post-work' utopias also reflects a crisis within the Left. Disillusioned by statist experiences of socialism and sceptical of the viability of class struggle, many Left scholars have turned to reformist roads to communism that sidestep the pitfalls of revolution (Srnicek and Williams 2015; Bastani 2019). Olin-Wright (2010) dubbed these 'real utopias': desirable, viable and achievable reforms rooted in utopian ideals with the potential to undermine the exploitative foundations of capitalism and transform class relations. One of the fundamental reforms proposed was universal basic income. If set above the poverty line, Olin-Wright (2010) argued, universal basic income had the potential to reduce poverty and inequality while establishing a 'reservation wage' below which workers could refuse to work. This, in turn, would give workers greater bargaining power to negotiate working conditions while compensating people for socially meaningful activities outside of the labour market. In other words, by decommodifying labour, universal basic income could incrementally advance a democratic Left project.

Olin-Wright's (2010) proposal provided a vital antidote to the neoliberal workfare politics of the time, which sought to roll back social welfare, privatise public services and propel the poor into increasingly informalised work, under the guise of moral behaviourism and the enforcement of work values (Peck 2001). However, as Burawoy (2020) points out, a 'countermovement' against commodification is only successful if it inspires social forces towards a democratic Left project – and historically, social welfare has been unable to do so. To be sure, it constitutes a site of struggle which reflects the relative surplus value that labour has been able to claw back from capital via the state. And it can certainly shape class relations by reducing commodification and social stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, social welfare has historically been a secondary and supportive institution to economic interests, deployed during times of crisis to preserve rather than disrupt capitalism (Piven and Cloward 1971). Even universal basic income – a seemingly utopian ideal – has found favour with the world's tech billionaires, pointing to its political slipperiness (Castel-Branco 2020b).

Importantly, the cash transfer programmes that have emerged in much of the global South are far from a 'real utopia'. Most are highly targeted, conditional on some form of behaviour modification and inadequate to meet households' reproductive needs. As Figure 5 illustrates, able-bodied adults of working age have been largely excluded, and when included, benefits have been conditional on participation in labour-intensive public works (ILO 2017b). Hailed as a win-win response to the crisis of reproduction, public works promise to provide income

security and strengthen physical infrastructure while allaying decision-makers fears of discouraging a 'culture of work'. Like the workfare programmes of the global North, they are not a cost-effective social welfare instrument. Most are short term, funded by international development agencies, and limited in scope and scale. The value of the transfer is usually insufficient, and the programmes often result in the construction of poor infrastructure. Additionally, the focus on women-headed households has intensified women's work instead of compensating them for socially meaningful uncommodified activities (McCord 2012).

Figure 4: ***Effective social security coverage, by population group (%)***



Source: ILO (ILO 2017b, 20, xxx)

Ferguson (2015) concedes that existing cash transfers do not constitute a 'post-work' utopia but argues that can serve as a political wedge to advance more radical distributive demands such as universal basic income. However, he is rather vague about the constellation of social forces that necessary to do so, focusing instead on Polanyian (1944) evocations of a cross-class institutional spaces made up of political parties, voluntary associations, unions, cooperatives, churches, and family (Polanyi 1944). Class is glaringly absent – a reflection perhaps of his ambivalence towards class as an analytical and political category. However, by overlooking class, Ferguson leaves the processes of power and contestation which underlie the politics of

policy making, underexplored (Nilsen 2020). Drawing on the case of the Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) in rural Mozambique, this thesis extends contemporary debates on the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers to the peripheral corners of the world economy. Funded by a $50 million World Bank credit, the PASP is the only cash transfer programme for able-bodied adults of working age. 'Beneficiaries' receive a monthly 'subsidy' of Mts 1,050 ($14) in exchange for participating in public works for four hours a day and four days a week[1]. In urban centres, the programme was designed to respond to chronic periods of unemployment and lasts for six months, while in rural areas, it was intended to smooth consumption during the lean period of the agricultural cycle and lasts for only four. After participating in the programme for three years, 'beneficiaries' are expected to have accumulated the assets, skills and knowledge to 'graduate' as micro-entrepreneurs (RdM 2012).

The PASP is the most common form of social welfare provisioning for able-bodied adults of working age on the African continent. Yet, much of the debate on the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers has overlooked the experiences of participants in existing programmes, focusing instead on speculative arguments about the merits of universal basic income. It is the contention of this thesis that an analysis of the experience of PASP participants – from state officials responsible for administering the programme to cash transfer 'beneficiaries' – provides important insights about the potential of a new radical politics of distribution. First, it allows us to unpack the accumulated and contradictory meanings of work in a context where wage-work has always been the exception. In other words, a focus on the agrarian South offers new ways of thinking about the relationship between commodified and uncommodified, formal and informal, paid, and unpaid work – as well as between class and other forms of social relations. Second, it enables us to explore the political possibilities and limitations of the notion of a 'rightful share'. In an authoritarian and paternalistic state like Mozambique's, existing cash transfers may not be sufficient to dislodge patronage relations and carve out more expansive conceptions of citizenship. Third, it permits us to analyse the contradictions of a redistributive instrument which has been embraced by a technicist development agenda to abstract from processes of accumulation. After all, Mozambique's cash transfer system has been inordinately shaped by international development agencies – hardy the kind of radical politics that Ferguson (2015) has in mind.

[1] According to the official exchange in February 2021 (Banco de Moçambique 2021).

Research questions

Drawing on the case of the Productive Social Action Programme in rural Mozambique, this thesis extends contemporary debates on the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers to the peripheral corners of the world economy through the following questions:

1. What is the social meaning of work and the relevance of politics at the point of production?
2. How has the notion of a 'rightful share' shaped the design and implementation of redistributive schemes?
3. How have 'beneficiaries' of redistributive schemes leveraged these to advance a more radical politics of distribution?


Research approach and site selection

The thesis uses Burawoy's (1998) extended case method, which is made up of four dimensions. The first is the extension of the researcher into the lives of research subjects through intervention. Although the research process is inevitably disruptive, disruption can disclose critical insights about the social world of research subjects. However, given the asymmetries of power – class, race, gender, language, education, etc.—interventions can constitute acts of domination, so it is important to be reflexive and seek to reduce power asymmetries. The second dimension is the extension of observations over time and space by conducting research at numerous moments and multiple sites, highlighting the voices of those marginalised by local conjectures of power. The third dimension is the extension of an analysis of social processes to an analysis of external forces that capture the changing social structures. The final dimension is the extension of social forces to a reconstruction of existing theory.

The thesis combines the extended case method with a comparative approach, which draws on the contrasting cases of the districts of Inhassoro, Inhambane and Ribáuè, Nampula. The district of Inhassoro is a sparsely populated area – a reflection of its limited agricultural potential and historical patterns of emigration. It has two ecological zones – the coast and the interior – separated by a single-lane highway that connects the North of the country to the South. The coast's sandy soils retain little water; while in the interior, limited fluvial sources constrain agricultural production. The rainy season typically runs from October to March, but in recent years the rains have been so unpredictable that all that seems inevitable is the saying, '*it doesn't*

rain, and when it rains, it's only to destroy'. In 2017, food production was less than one tonne per capita, which is insufficient to meet households' reproductive needs (Table 1). The principal crop is cassava, renowned for its resilience in semi-arid areas. In the *baixas* (low-lying areas) households also produce maize, beans, and horticulture. Animal husbandry is another crucial source of sustenance, with a preference for goats and chickens, which can weather droughts more easily. The primary sources of employment in the district of Inhassoro are the civil service, tourism, and the SASOL gas processing facility (CTD 2011; MAE 2014a; INE 2017a). Within the district, three research sites were selected: the town of Inhassoro, the post of Maimelane and the locality of Temane (Figure 6).


Figure 5: Map of the field sites within the district of Inhassoro, Inhambane 2016/17



Source: Author's field notes, 2016/17. Not to scale.

In contrast, the district of Ribáuè is a densely populated region. With fertile soils, cool temperatures, above-average rainfall and numerous *ndambos* (natural depressions), it is considered the nation's agricultural powerhouse. *'You can plant anything, and it will grow'* insist wide-eyed officials, eager to attract foreign investors. The rainy season typically runs from November to April though has become increasingly irregular with climate change (INGC 2009). In 2017, food production amounted to almost three tonnes per capita which is substantially higher than in Inhassoro (Table 1). While the primary crop is cassava, the district of Ribáuè is also renowned for maize, horticulture, sorghum, beans and sweet potatoes. Besides, small-scale farmers produce several non-food cash crops, including cotton, tobacco, sesame and soy. In comparison with the district of Inhassoro, households rear far fewer animals per capita, though farmers also prefer goats and birds. The primary sources of employment are in agro-industrial processing and fish farming. The civil service, mineral water company Oasis and the tourism sector also provide important sources of employment (MAE 2014b; INE 2017b). Within the district of Ribáuè, three research sites were selected: the town of Iapala, the administrative post of Riani and the village of Minuco (Figure 7).

Figure 6: Map of the field sites within the district of Ribáuè, Nampula 2016/17



Source: Author's field notes, 2016/17. Not to scale.

Table 1: A comparison of the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/2017

	Inhassoro, Inhambane	**Ribáuè, Nampula**
Population	**56 246**	**290,244**
Population density	11.8/km2	46.3/km2
Population growth (2007-2017)	16%	78%
Fertility rate	4.9	6.1
Economically active population (% households)		
Own-account work, on the farm	72.6%	93.9%
Own-account work, off the farm	9.4%	2.8%
Salaried employment	18%	3.3%
Machamba size (% of households)		
less than 1 hectare	39%	27.3 %
1-2 hectares	36%	52.4%,
2-5 hectares	23%	20.1%
5+ hectares	2%	0.2%
Total food production (tonnes)	**54,622**	**847,386**
Cassava	38 092	662,733
Maize	9 451	69,891
Peanuts	3 788	4,714
Beans	925	18,780
Sorghum	858	33,960
Millet	727	1,697
Horticulture	656	41,196
Sweet potato	121	11,319
Rice	0	3,096
Per capita food production (tonnes)	**0.97**	**2.92**
Non-food crops	0	10,788
Cotton	0	4,968
Tobacco	0	1,121
Sesame	0	3,714
Soy	0	985
Animal rearing	**108,021**	**136,479**
Cattle	5,561	1,879
Swine	4,895	1,625
Rabbits	0	590
Goats	53,685	21,362
Sheep	4,910	0
Birds	38,970	111,023
Animal rearing per capita	1.92	0.38

Sources:(MAE 2014b; 2014a; INE 2017a; 2017b; 2019)

Notably, the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè are located differently in the regional political economy. Inhassoro lies at the intersection of long-term trade and migrant labour networks. Indeed, just South of the turnoff to the Sasol gas processing facility are the *madzimbabwe* or circular stone walls of Manyikeni, dating back to the end of the 12th century. At the height of the Mwenemutapa empire, the region drew merchants from as far away as Arabia, China, India, Persia, and Portugal in search of ivory and gold (Macamo 2011). As the Portuguese consolidated control over the area in the 19th century, men began to migrate to the sugar cane plantations of KwaZulu-Natal and the mines of the Rand (Harries 1994). Although formal migrant labour networks have since unravelled, informal emigration continues. Indeed, Inhassoro has among the lowest population growth rates in the country, and only 13 per cent of the population is considered of working age (Table 1). Interestingly, the gender gap has narrowed over the last decades as women too begin to emigrate (INE 2019).

Ribáuè also lies along long-term trade routes, where human caravans carrying ivory would barter with Indian and European traders for textiles, salt, and other goods. With the expansion of the slave trade in the 19th century, inland areas were transformed into corridors of pillage, and human caravans disappeared. To consolidate territorial control and wrest power away from the coastal slaving classes, the colonial state allied with chieftaincies hostile to slaving, then used military power to force them to submit (Chilundo 2001). However, resistance to colonialism was strong and only in 1913 did the Portuguese declare the region pacified. Located above the River Save, the district of Ribáuè had limited ties to the regional migrant labour system. Instead, people were forced to cultivate cash crops and funnelled onto settler plantations (Isaacman et al. 1980). Today, Ribáuè has among the highest rates of population growth in the country due to both high fertility and low levels of emigration (Table 1). Nevertheless, over the last decades, the gender gap has widened as men begin to emigrate to towns and cities in search of better opportunities. In fact, the gender ratios in Inhassoro and Ribáuè are the same – a surprise given the districts' divergent processes of proletarianisation (INE 2019). Critically, the objective of selecting contrasting cases was not to isolate variables from which to generalise, as a comparative case study might attempt to do. Instead, it was to link case observations to an analysis of external forces based on the extended case method (Burawoy 1998; 2009). In other words, contrasting cases allow for a more complete picture of the relationship between labour and citizenship, work, and social welfare, in rural Mozambique.

Research techniques

Most field research took place between September 2016 and December 2017. Once the University of the Witwatersrand approved the ethics clearance, Mozambique's Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Action (MGCAS) issued a research credential (Appendix 1). The research was conducted in five phases: preliminary interviews in the capital city Maputo, a scoping of the rural districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, the first round of rural fieldwork in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, archival research in Maputo and Lisbon, and a second round of rural fieldwork to triangulate data and pursue new lines of inquiry. Research techniques included participant observation, semi-structured interviews, a short household survey and group conversations. Fieldwork was undertaken in Portuguese, Xitswa in the district of Inhassoro and Makuwa in the district of Ribáuè. A team of seven research assistants worked as interpreters, guides, and ethnographic informants. Special thanks to Luísa António, Manuel Chivale, Alima Domingos, Mariano Nguluve, Roda Nguluve, Célia Saíde and Mário Varancha.

Participant observation

Participant observation was central to the research. It involved observing interactions between the various levels of the state and PASP workers for months at a time to trace the social processes taking place. There were several advantages to this approach. First, it overcame the constraints of predefined research instruments. This aspect was crucial since I knew little about the districts under study, and the risk of asking the wrong questions or misinterpreting respondents' reinterpretations was high (Bujra 2006). For instance, when I first arrived in drought stricken Inhassoro, we administered a short survey that asked PASP workers what they had harvested during the previous agricultural cycle. Respondents only reported what they had commercialised – a fact I only realised after extensive observation. Second, participant observation allowed me to triangulate information and gain new insights. For instance, during interviews, PASP workers bemoaned the drudgery of the PASP and lamented that they had to work a four-hour workday. However, through participant observation, it became apparent that they worked on a task basis and set themselves tasks that could be completed within an hour. The PASP involved far less drudgery than initially portrayed and public laments reflected a more complicated politics of claim-making. The more time I spent in the world of research subjects, the more I accumulated these subliminal impressions.

Finally, participant observation helped to chip away at asymmetric power relations between the researcher, the research assistant, and respondents (Geertz 1988). For instance, one day while hulling rice in Iapala, a PASP worker strolled into the courtyard. It was the end of the year, and they were anxiously awaiting their children's exam results. As we casually chatted about the education system, we recalled a children's story taught in primary school. Even though I was an unmarried, white *doutora* – a term used to address those with tertiary education – and she was a married, black *camponesa* (peasant), we found points of connection that helped to demystify 'the other' (Danforth 1982).

Critically, field notes gave me the tools to summon the past into the present (Becker and Geer 1957). These included a log of what was happening, running descriptions and illustrations of settings, personal impressions, and ideas for future research. Notes were taken in a notebook, generally in the evening, though sometimes halfway through the day. These were complemented by other observational tools, including maps identifying key locations, price tables listing the prices of essential goods and services, and a detailed analysis of the agricultural cycle that traced the periods of tilling and planting, weeding, and harvesting (Appendix 2)

The semi-structured interview

The semi-structured interview was another important research technique, which allowed me to explore respondents' realities and motivations (Walker 1985). For instance, PASP workers often argued that the value of the cash transfer was insignificant yet would forfeit working on their *machambas* to participate in the programme. Only by prodding was I able to understand the interdependence between ultra-low-wage work and small-scale agricultural production. To maximise variation, I applied a theoretical sampling frame that reflected the gendered processes of class formation in the countryside (Appendix 3), derived from an analysis of the literature. During the first round of research, eighteen semi-structured interviews were conducted at each of the six research sites. Interviews in Portuguese were voice recorded because of the challenge of taking notes while prodding simultaneously. However, interviews in Xitswa and Makuwa were recorded in writing because participants felt uncomfortable with voice recordings and the process of consecutive translation afforded me the time to accurately capture the information.

The short survey

Before commencing the semi-structured interview, research participants were asked to take a short survey. The purpose of the survey was to collect standardised information which could be compared to nationally representative household data. Survey questions were piloted with research assistants ahead of time to ensure that the wording was accessible and understandable. Most questions were open-ended, and respondents were free to decide on the form and detail of their answer. While this allowed for greater flexibility, it posed challenges in the process of coding and interpretation. For example, some respondents knew precisely how many hectares of land they cultivated, while others could only say how many *machambas* they had. Some were systematic about calculating monthly expenditures, while others were reluctant to do so. How respondents relayed their answer was just as informative as what they said, and this was noted down under observations (Moser and Kalton 1985). Notably, the survey was not representative. It was designed to collect systematic information from respondents who had been purposefully selected for the semi-structured interviews based on theoretical sampling. This approach is in line with the extended case method (Burawoy 1998; 2009).

The group conversation

Group conversations allowed me to tease out points of convergence and divergence, which shed light on social relations. Respondents often asked each other questions that I had never thought to ask and corrected each other when responses went too far astray. For instance, in the district of Inhassoro, young men and women spoke passionately about the cultural significance of the *machamba* and its importance to rural livelihoods. However, none of the participants engaged in cultivation or aspired to do so as their primary economic activity. Throughout the conversation, it became apparent that although they expected to own a *machamba* one day, they hoped to escape the drudgery of manual cultivation. For young men, this entailed earning enough off the farm to hire *ganho-ganho* (day labour) or marrying a skilled *camponesa*. However, young women baulked at the idea that they would be relegated to the *machamba* and hoped to escape patriarchy altogether. By paying attention to the dynamics of group conversations, I was able to gain insights into the social processes at each research site (Kitsinger 1994).

Power asymmetries and the research process

Much has been written about power asymmetries that stem from differences in the social position between the researcher, the research assistant and research subjects. As Burawoy (1998) argues, reflexivity is key to ensuring the integrity of the research process and the quality of the data. This section explores the relationship between the state, the researcher, the research assistant, and the research subjects.

The state

When field research commenced, Mozambique was in the throes of a low-level military conflict between the Frelimo government and Renamo forces. In the district neighbouring Inhassoro, Renamo had reactivated an army base, while in the district neighbouring Ribáuè, it had conducted targeted attacks against coal trains along the Nacala Development Corridor (Strijdom 2016). State security was on high alert and a lone researcher traipsing around the countryside was sure to arouse suspicion. This was particularly true in the village of Minuco, where a prominent Renamo member had been assassinated before my arrival, and the chief had fled the area. To protect myself, research assistants, respondents, and the research process, I went to great extents to fulfil all bureaucratic requirements.

As Monjane and Bruna (2020) argue, rural Mozambique has been the focus of authoritarian policies and practices since the colonial period. One of the instruments of state control is the *Guía de* Marcha (credential). Like a passport, it identifies the researcher and scope of the research, requests the assistance of relevant institutions, and traces the researcher's route through a sequence of dated stamps. Rooted in the colonial tradition of passbooks, it was appropriated by the liberation movement during the struggle for independence and entrenched as a state practice during the civil war (Geffray 1991). Failure to secure a credential can trigger distrust and non-cooperation, the seizure of confidential research materials and the interrogation or detention of the researcher, the research assistant or research subjects.

Given the tense political climate, I secured a credential from MGCAS. Issued by the Ministry, it gave me quasi-insider status and ensured protection from state security. As an official from the National Institute for Social Action (INAS) reminded local leaders in the district of Ribáuè: *'We don't want to hear that she's been handcuffed. She is researching the PASP, nothing*

political'. Despite its benefits, MGCAS' credential positioned me as an associate of the state and shaped how research subjects perceived my presence. Although I emphasised that I was a PhD Candidate at the University of the Witwatersrand, many suspected otherwise and responded accordingly. This was exacerbated by the fact that some chiefs insinuated that I was part of a Frelimo brigade. During the second round of research for instance, I was approached by a Renamo member who suspected that the chief was lying. When I reiterated that I had no affiliation with Frelimo, Renamo members were much more forthcoming.

The research assistant

Research assistants played a pivotal role during the research process. They assisted in identifying respondents, interpreted conversations from Xitswa and Makuwa to Portuguese, operated as ethnographic informants and provided a sounding board for research reflections. In a context where I was unfamiliar with the research terrain and unable to communicate fluently in the local language, they exerted significant influence over the research process (Deane and Stevano 2016). They were also casual workers, bound in an employment relationship characterised by sharp disparities in wealth and social position (Molony and Hammett 2007). Nevertheless, research assistants did not perform a subaltern position any more than I tried to impose one. For instance, in Maimelane, the research assistant insisted that they lead the interviews while I took notes—an approach suggested by Molyneux et al. (2009), which I adopted elsewhere.

Of course, it is crucial to recognise that research assistants are themselves embedded in local power relations. The very fact that they met the requirements for the position—they had to be fluent in Portuguese, literate, familiar with the research site, knowledgeable about the PASP and available to work full-time—meant that they were positioned differently. They tended to have a higher education level, experience working as 'volunteers' on projects, and relationships with local leaders. Notably, many local leaders expected a *refresco* (soft drink) – a euphemism for a kickback – in exchange for allowing the research to take place. With the MGCAS credential in hand, they had little power over me, but that did not stop them from trying to extract a 'soft drink' from research assistants directly. In some cases, research assistants did not mind, for they saw it as a union due of sorts, paid in exchange for protection from unscrupulous employers. Nevertheless, to safeguard their wages, these were never publicly disclosed.

Figure 7: Research assistant and participant during a semi-structured interview in Temane, Inhambane, 2017



Source: the author

Research subjects

Like research assistants, respondents were also embedded in local power relations. Indeed, the sampling frame purposefully sought to capture the classed, gendered and aged nature of rural differentiation (Appendix 3). Positionality mediated the relationship between the researcher and research subjects. Generally, I was perceived as a privileged girl with some access to the institutions of power but without any meaningful decision-making role. Thus, I stood at the intersection of contradictory forms of privilege, which manifested themselves differently depending on the context and with whom I was engaging. For instance, one of my first interviews was with an 18-year-old woman who had just moved to Inhassoro with her new-born child from a remote village. Although she had agreed to participate in a one-on-one interview, she clammed up when I arrived. It appeared that the power asymmetry between the research subject, the research assistant and myself was just too terrifying, and I ended the interview.

In other instances, respondents were very much at ease. For instance, in Iapala, one of the group conversations was with older initiation counsellors, who assumed a mentorship role, explaining in detail my responsibility to *'love your husband',* spurring an unexpected area of research. Group conversations with young women and men also tended to be lively due to our perceived proximity in age, especially in Portuguese. Meanwhile, the MGCAS credential enabled me to navigate the worlds of older (male) leaders that are often out of reach to unmarried Mozambican women. In Iapala, I spent an afternoon with local leaders, drinking beer, learning about the area, and asking questions that could have been considered inappropriate given their social position. Ultimately the more time I spent at each research site, the stronger the rapport and the more reliable the data. Undertaking multiple rounds of research allowed me to chip away at the asymmetries of power, dispel myths and triangulate the various sources of information.

The structure of the thesis and critical arguments

The thesis is composed of eight chapters. This first chapter introduced the research and provided an overview of the research methodology. It embedded the thesis within broader debates about the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers, in advancing a radical politics of distribution based on citizenship that is powerful enough to push back against rising authoritarian populism amidst a global crisis of reproduction. It located Mozambique's crisis of reproduction within global processes of accumulation anchored in a resource-driven development model – a model which ultimately constrains the state's redistributive capacity. After presenting the research questions, the chapter discusses Burawoy's (1998) extended case method and how it was applied in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, paying special attention to the power relations between the researcher, research assistants and research subjects. Importantly, the objective of the comparative approach was not to isolate variables from which to generalise but to link case observations to external forces, extending theoretical debates.

Chapter 2 explores the theoretical and empirical foundations of 'post-work' utopias, weaving together classical theories of capitalist development with debates on the nature of colonial capitalism in Southern Africa. It is divided into three sections: the making and maintenance of work(ers) under colonial capitalism, the changing nature of wage-work(ers) in the postcolonial period, and the emancipatory possibilities of 'post-work' utopias with neoliberal restructuring. It argues that today's fragmented classes of labour exhibit many of the same characteristics as Marx's (1867) reserve army of labour. Even those who seemingly live outside the circuits of

capital are subsumed under capitalism through commodity production and exchange, casual wage-labour, consumption, and taxes. The proliferation of precarious work is not an indication that struggles at the point of production are irrelevant – in fact, they are arguably more relevant than ever. Nevertheless, in an age where the lines between production, redistribution and consumption are increasingly blurred, it is crucial to understand how conceptions of class are being reconfigured beyond the factory floor.

Chapter 3 explores the theoretical debates regarding the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers as part of a broader anti-work politics. It is divided into three sections: the rise of welfare regimes under colonial capitalism, the proliferation of cash transfers across the postcolonial South and the political possibilities of a radical politics of distribution rooted in citizenship. Drawing on a Foucauldian framework, it argues that social welfare constitutes a technique of discipline, historically deployed by the state to enforce social order, and funnel the expropriated into low-wage labour. However, it is also a site of struggle through which workers can claw back concessions from capital. Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognise that a neoliberal international agenda have heavily influenced the proliferation of cash transfer programmes across the global South. Of course, neoliberalism has taken variegated forms across time and space, but it is essential to recognise that it has narrowed the scope of what is considered politically viable (Saad-Filho 2015). Ultimately, the proliferation of cash transfer programmes is as much a product of global restructuring as it is a response to it. Therefore, rethinking redistribution requires reclaiming production.

Chapter 4 explores the evolution of Mozambique's social welfare system. Drawing on a conjunctural analysis (Hart 2018), it traces the nexus between labour and citizenship across four historical periods: the early colonial era, marked by the rise of the *Indigenato* and the emergence of segregated relief funds in booming sectors; the late colonial period, which saw widespread labour and social reforms, including the expansion of provident funds and the introduction of residual social welfare programmes under a fascist state; the postcolonial years, which heralded universalistic forms of social provisioning, as the socialist state stripped away the colonial infrastructures of exclusion; and the transition to a market economy and development of the current social security system. Within each of these historical conjunctures, the chapter compares three 'intersecting contours' (Kenny 2018)—the state's developmental imperative, the labour and citizenship regime, and the nature of social welfare provisioning—to trace the accumulated and contradictory history of social welfare in Mozambique.

Chapter 5 explores the changing nature of work in rural Mozambique. It provides an overview of the Mozambican labour market and traces the various forms of commodified and uncommodified labour in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè. It argues that underlying the elusive categories of 'own-account' or 'unpaid family' worker is a dense web of employment relationships; and evaluates these based on the following criteria defined by respondents: a) sustenance or the ability of an activity to meet their social reproductive needs; b) autonomy or the power to define what activity to undertake, how to undertake it and for whom; and c) social recognition or the perception that an activity involves a socially valuable skill. Shedding light on the nature of wage-work in the countryside enables the identification of the sources of power that can improve the conditions of work and livelihoods.

Chapter 6 provides an ethnography of the PASP. It traces the politics of the programme's design and implementation and explores how national actors have sought to claw back control from international development institutions. In many respects, the PASP is part of a broader trend towards the financialisation of social welfare and 'collateralisation of the poor' (Storm 2018), as the World Bank pushes for the privatisation of state functions, the bundling of cash transfers with financial services and the application of highly complex selection mechanisms geared towards deterring applicants. However, the chapter also illustrates that the PASP is a struggle between the Frelimo government, state technocrats, and local leaders. At each level of decision-making, the PASP is reinterpreted, appropriated and even subverted. The outcome is neither linear nor predetermined.

Chapter 7 presents an ethnography of PASP workers in Inhassoro and Ribáuè and explores the meanings they attach to the PASP. While in Inhassoro, the PASP is widely considered a *biscate* (side hustle), in Ribáuè it is, at least discursively, referred to as a government job. In both districts, the PASP contributes little to households' reproductive needs. The value of the subsidy is simply too low and the duration of the programme too short. In some instances, the PASP undermines food security by shifting time away from the *machamba*. To ameliorate the conditions of work, PASP workers in the district of Inhassoro and Ribáuè have resorted to historically cultivated practices of power, including prayer and patience, song and theatre, the progressive reduction in the work schedule, absenteeism and stay-aways, and worker substitution. While not transformative, these practices have reduced the negative impact of the programme on rural livelihoods.

Ultimately, the case of Mozambique points to the contradictions of 'anti-work' politics and the emancipatory limitations of cash transfers in low-income countries with limited redistributive bases. Heavily influenced by international development agencies, the progressive expansion of cash transfer programmes can hardly be interpreted as a part of a radical politics of distribution rooted in citizenship. The thesis concludes that rethinking redistribution involves reclaiming production. In an agrarian context, this requires a sharper conceptual and political articulation between land, labour and social welfare. Mozambique's resource-driven development strategy has ultimately undermined each one of these three pillars. It has accelerated the expropriation of land, which has historically sustained informal mechanisms of social provisioning; it has driven the casualisation of wage-work, which supported strategies of livelihood diversification; and it has created an increasingly porous economy, constraining the state's redistributive role.

Chapter 2: The Future of Work(ers) and 'Post-work' Utopias

> *Where did the future go? For all the glossy sheen of our technological era, we remain bound by an old and obsolete set of social relations. In this paralysis of the political imaginary, the future has been cancelled (Srnicek and Williams 2015, 2).*

In *Inventing the Future*, Srnicek and Williams (2015) argue for a radical politics for the twenty-first century anchored in futuristic imaginaries of a digital utopian society. Technological innovation, they contend, has created the material basis for unprecedented abundance, with the potential to resolve the problem of scarcity that has plagued the arc of human history. Although disruptive to established labour processes, innovation can foster a new set of social relations, relieving workers from the drudgery of labour and creating new spaces of leisure. Yet, facing the spectre of crisis, the Left has recoiled into a paralysing nostalgia for a bygone era of social democracy, they argue. If progressive social forces are to reclaim popular control over capitalist development, they must reimagine a new common sense centred on full automation, the reduction of the working week and the public provision of an unconditional cash transfer paid regularly to all based on citizenship – or universal basic income.

Srnicek and Williams (2015) are part of a growing group of utopian scholars who argue for the emancipatory possibilities of an 'anti-work politics amidst the spectre of ecological, economic and social crisis (Gorz 1999; Weeks 2011; Barchiesi 2011; Ferguson 2015; Bastani 2019). Utopian imaginaries have long been a part of socialist praxis, though contested by a materialist tradition. Writing in the early 19th century, the founders of utopian socialism paid scant attention to the emerging processes of proletarianisation and class formation, focusing instead on moral condemnations of capitalist development and dreaming up paradisiac futures (Owen 1817). Some sought to model counter-capitalist alternatives through experimental utopian communities, many of which failed. Although Marx and Engels (1848) appreciated the revolutionary potential of utopian thinking—and borrowed extensively from it—they argued that utopian socialists would be better served by engaging in political struggle than wasting their time tinkering with speculative plans, moral arguments, and pilot projects. After all, a materialist analysis demonstrated that the bourgeoisie stood in irreconcilable contradiction to the proletariat – a contradiction that could only be resolved through revolution:

> *The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their surroundings, causes Socialists of this kind [utopian] to consider themselves far superior*

> *to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without the distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class (Marx and Engels 1848, chapter 3)*

As it turned out, revolution did not bring about lasting socialism either. With evolutionist theories of capitalist development debunked and classes of labour increasingly fragmented and fluid, there has been a resurgence of interest in 'anti-work' politics among progressive forces. Although proposals for post-work utopias have emanated primarily from the global North, they have found expression in the global South, where wage-work has always been the exception rather than the norm. Notably, proposals towards 'post-work' utopias vary widely. While some continue to focus on politics at the point of production, such as the reorganisation of food systems as the semi-proletariat seize control of the means of production (Moyo and Yeros 2013), others are oriented towards redistribution alone, such as universal basic income (Ferguson 2015). Nevertheless, common to most utopian proposals is a decentring of wage-work from the social and political imaginary, a repudiation of the importance of class and the proletariat as the revolutionary subject, and a rejection of statist forms of socialism.

This chapter unpacks contemporary debates about the future of work(ers) and post-work utopias, weaving together classical theories of capitalist development with a historical analysis of the evolution of colonial capitalism in Southern Africa. The first section traces the making and maintenance of wage-work(ers) through racialised and gendered processes of proletarianisation. Like Denning (2010), it conceives of proletarianisation as the outcome of a process of primitive accumulation and the proletariat as those who have been at least partially dispossessed of the means of production rather than the employed. The second section explores the changing nature of work(ers) with global restructuring, financialisation and automation. It argues that today's fragmented classes of labour exhibit many of the same characteristics as Marx's (1867) reserve army of labour. Even those who seemingly live outside the circuits of capital are subsumed under capitalism through commodity production and exchange, casual wage-labour, consumption and taxes. Of course, the reorganisation of production under neoliberalism has been sharply contested by struggles at the point of production, which have become arguably even more relevant than before. The third section explores the emancipatory possibilities of 'post-work' utopias. It concludes that rethinking redistribution requires reclaiming production. In an age where the lines between these are increasingly blurred, it is crucial to understand how conceptions of class are being reconfigured beyond the factory floor.

The making and maintenance of wage-work(ers) under capitalism

Wage-work is not unique to the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, in his depiction of the construction of the Pyramids of Giza in ancient Egypt, Ezzamel (2004) describes a complex system of labour administration that involved the recruitment of thousands of craftworkers paid in bread, beer, and wine. However, Marx (1844) argued that with capitalist development, wage-work became hegemonic, as workers found themselves increasingly alienated from the process and product of production, from themselves and each other. Of course, Marx's theory of alienation was informed by his analysis of proletarianisation in 19th century Britain, which as this section will discuss, did not capture the unevenness of racial capitalism in the colonised world. Nevertheless, his insights into the process of primitive accumulation, class formation and estrangement remain relevant to understanding the nature of capitalist development in contemporary Africa.

With the expansion of commodity relations in the countryside, the British peasantry struggled to hold onto their lands. Driven into debt by the vagaries of the weather and the markets, they had little choice but to cede their fields to wealthier landlords – generally royal favourites who had benefited from preceding rounds of dispossession and could weather the volatility of commodity production due to higher levels of productivity. The Protestant Reformation accelerated the process of primitive accumulation through the enclosure of the Catholic commons and the expulsion of tenant farmers. To survive, (near) landless peasants sold their labour to a budding rural bourgeoisie, transforming their living labour into the labour-power of an emerging rural proletariat. Although the process of primitive accumulation freed the proletariat from the shackles of feudalism and created the surplus necessary to invest in industrialisation, it was a bloody violent affair, Marx notes:

> *The historical movement which changes the producers into wage-workers, appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds [...] But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire (Marx 1867, 875).*

The process of proletarianisation was profoundly alienating (Marx 1844). Skilled crafts were reduced into meaningless tasks, transforming workers into little more than commodities, cheaper than the commodities they produced. The more wealth they generated, the more alien

the product of their labour became, the less they could consume and the less power they had to define the labour process. The second form of estrangement was in the act of production. Here, alienation stemmed from the compulsion to work, from the lack of freedom to decide how to use one's mental and physical faculties. With little power to shape what was produced, how it was produced and for whom, workers were relegated to mere animals whose only moment of freedom was in the private realm of the home. The third form of estrangement was alienation from oneself, one's body, nature and spiritual essence. Conscious life activities were reduced to mere acts of survival. In becoming estranged from oneself, workers also became alienated from each other, as estranged work grew into the primary form of social incorporation. This was the fourth form of estrangement (Marx 1844).

Although violent and alienating, Marx (1847) argued that capitalist development was ultimately progressive. On the one hand, capital's constant quest for new frontiers of accumulation led to unprecedented technological innovation, resolving the problem of scarcity on numerous fronts. After all, the elimination of famines with the agricultural revolution would have been an impossibility without the industrialisation of the countryside. On the other, capitalism was critical in dislodging feudalism and creating the material conditions for a new set of social relations. Inspired by the rise of the Chartist working-class movement in England, Marx suggested that the disparate actions of emerging worker associations had the potential to consolidate into a political struggle lead by a worker's party and bring about revolution:

> *This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a political struggle (Marx 1847, Chapter 2.5).*

However, Marx (1867) also emphasised the contingency of political struggle with the concentration of capital. Capital's quest to maximise the appropriation of surplus value – by extending the working day, reducing the socially acceptable necessary labour time and replacing workers with labour-saving technology – pitted it in an intractable confrontation with labour. While in a first instance, technological innovation increased demand for wageworkers through the cheapening of goods and new opportunities for consumption, the general law of accumulation predicted that employment would gradually decline as machines superseded labour, thrusting the proletariat into the reserve army of labour. Marx (1867) identified four groups within this reserve. The first was the floating reserve, made up of those previously

employed who hoped to find permanent employment once again. In contemporary Mozambique, this group would correspond to the unemployed, according to national statistics – individuals largely in the upper quintiles of the consumption distribution, for whom wage-work remains a realistic possibility in the short and medium-term. The second was the stagnant reserve, which though dispossessed from the means of production, was superfluous to the accumulation needs of capital and cobbled together a livelihood from an assortment of paid and unpaid activities. In Mozambique, own-account workers would make up the bulk of this group. The third was the latent reserve, which had yet to be entirely expropriated and could be pulled in from the countryside during industrial booms and thrust back out during industrial lulls. Today, these could be considered unpaid family workers. Finally, there were paupers. As Engels noted, given the pace of technological change, even the highest-paid worker could become a pauper overnight:

> *Every new advance brings with it loss of employment, want, and suffering. And what a dispiriting, unnerving influence this uncertainty of his position in life, consequent upon the unceasing progress of machinery, must exercise upon the worker, whose lot is precarious enough without it! (Engels 1845, 87).*

Marx's (1867) general theory of accumulation provided a valuable framework for understanding the nature of expropriation, exploitation, and exclusion under capitalism – and how these intersected with the biological, social and generational processes associated with the reproduction of labour-power. Marx argued that labour-power was a unique commodity, reproduced outside the circuits of capital but essential to the appropriation of surplus-value. While every mode of production had its law of population, capitalism was perverse in that it did not assure the maintenance and replacement of living labour. Concerned with self-preservation, households readily assumed this reproductive function, resolving a fundamental tension between the short-term quest to maximise the appropriation of surplus-value and the long-term need to reproduce labour-power for commodity production. While the reproduction of living labour – pregnancy, childrearing, and other forms of unpaid care work – were not necessarily commodified activities, they produced use-values that were essential to the realisation of surplus value (Molyneux 1979).

However, Marx's general theory of accumulation did not adequately explain the relationship between the reproduction of labour-power and the continued oppression of women within the household. For Marxist feminists, the reconstitution of techniques of misogynism with the

elimination of feudal relations represented a strategy to control the reproduction of labour-power and neutralise opposition to the process of primitive accumulation. After all, as Vogel (1983) contended, there was nothing inherently female about social reproduction. While biological differences between men and women created the material conditions for a gender division of labour, the nature of this division was socially constructed and contested. In most instances, women became primarily responsible for the biological, social, and generational work involved in reproducing living labour. However, the terms of this reproductive work hinged on the nature of their incorporation into the circuits of capital (Vogel 1983).

For instance, in her analysis of witches and witch-hunting in Europe, Federici (2004) showed how the enclosure of the English commons and the fragmentation of communitarian regimes led to an upsurge of violence against women in rural areas. Amidst widespread dispossession, impoverishment and resentment, accusations of witchery proliferated. These reflected broader processes of estrangement, marked by women's alienation from nature, themselves, and each other. Older women were targeted because they were most affected by the commercialisation of land and the elimination of customary rights. The bourgeois desire to establish social order amidst the disorder of agrarian transformation – and discipline women into subordinate roles within the household – was behind the proliferation of accusations of witchcraft. The subjects of witch-hunting were paupers, who survived from begging and poor relief, even as they resisted their social marginalisation with their dreams of liberation:

> *Witches were not only victims. They were women who resisted their impoverishment and social exclusion. They threatened, cast reproachful looks, and cursed those who refused them help; some made nuisances of themselves by sudden uninvited appearances on their better-off neighbours' doorsteps or made uncalled for attempts to have themselves accepted by giving small gifts to children (Federici 2018, 19).*

Notably, there has been much debate about the relationship between women's oppression and exploitation under capitalism. Proponents of a unitary approach locate the oppression of women within the capitalist mode of production as a whole, while supporters of the dualist model conceive of women's subaltern position as rooted in their location in a separate sphere of reproduction (Vogel 1983). In her analysis of the intersection between women, race and class, Davis (1983) argues that while a dualist approach may reflect the experiences of white, bourgeois women; it does not speak to the experiences of black, working-class women, whose lives were shaped by the compulsion to work under slavery and colonial capitalism. While

emerging notions of domesticity in the 19th century emphasised white women's role as nurturing mothers and gentle housewives, the impact of the institution of slavery on the organisation of black labour meant that a black woman was 'first a fulltime worker for her owner, and only incidentally a wife, mother and homemaker' (Davis 1983, 5). Of course, Davis's (1893) focus was on black women in the United States – and given the uneven and historically specific nature of capitalist development, her analysis cannot be automatically extended to all women under colonial capitalism. However, it provides a useful framework for conceptualising the intersection between race, gender, and class. Notably, the difference between a unitary and dualist approach is not always clear, and even proponents of a unitary framework often slide into dualist practice (Bhattacharya 2017).

Marx's (1867) political insights were primarily informed by the English experience, where feudal relations were effectively replaced by commodified forms of 'free' even if coerced labour. Yet, as Marx penned his early works, millions of enslaved Africans were bound in relations of chattel slavery. Although Marx (1867) recognised the importance of racialisation in legitimising the process of primitive accumulation, the role of slavery and colonialism remained under-theorised. In his study of the Haitian Revolution, CLR James (1938) illustrated how the institution of slavery catalysed capitalist development. It was on Haiti's sugar cane plantations, he argued, that Europe's first factories were erected; its first proletarians were unfree and unwaged African labourers; and the first working-class revolts were uprisings against slavery and colonialism (James 1938). This point was reinforced by Williams (1944), who traced how the enslavement of Africans in the Americas financed the European merchant class of the 18th century, creating the surplus necessary to invest in the industrial revolution. Under the triangular trade between Europe, Africa and the Americas, colonial capital received a triple stimulus that would become the mainstay of global capitalism until the 19th century:

> *The Negroes were purchased with British manufactures; transported to the plantations, they produced sugar, cotton, indigo, molasses […] the processing of which created new industries in England; while the maintenance of the Negroes and their owners on the plantations provided another market for British industry (Williams 1944, 52).*

Despite the abolition of slavery, the formerly enslaved continued to be subjected to various forms of coercion, blurring the line between chattel slavery and wage slavery (Turner 1995). Racialisation was critical to sustaining successive rounds of 'accumulation by dispossession. By defining one group as existentially inferior and expropriatable, and another as superior and

the rightful heir to expropriation, racial ideology sanitised the violence of primitive accumulation (Dawson 2016). Words played a critical role in this process, reducing the colonised to a status akin to an animal while transforming the coloniser into the epitome of civilised (Said 2014). The Portuguese imperial project for instance, used Christianity to justify the enslavement of Africans, baptising the enslaved before they set sail across the Atlantic in a fantastical performance of piety. From Lisbon to Goa, non-Christians were forced to convert to Christianity, and subjected to the inquisition, punishable by expropriation, imprisonment and death (Havik 2015). While abolitionist movements were (mostly) successful in halting the trans-Atlantic slave trade, they did not put an end to the science of colonisation, buttressed by paternalistic narratives of civilisation. It was during this period, Meneses (2010) argues, that notions of race became cemented, casting Africans as subhuman, lazy, unable to think for themselves – and by extension, self-govern – and the Portuguese as morally, culturally and materially superior. Ultimately, Fanon (1963) explains, colonial discourses robbed the colonised of their land, history, language, culture, and humanity itself:

> *Those hordes of vital statistics, those hysterical masses, those faces bereft of all humanity, those distended bodies which are like nothing on earth, that mob without beginning or end, those children who seem to belong to nobody, that laziness stretched out in the sun, that vegetative rhythm of life—all this forms part of the colonial vocabulary (Fanon 1963, 42).*

Notably, colonial strategies of control were hardly original. In Southern Africa, these included the annexation of land to undermine own agricultural production, the circumscription of Africans to densely populated 'native reserves' with limited infrastructure and services, restrictions on economic activities, the imposition of hut taxes and the introduction of influx control laws to restrict mobility (Harris 1958; Arrighi 1970; Bundy 1979). Church missions played a prominent role in funnelling African women into wage labour because they allayed employers' fears and families' concerns that their daughters would be influenced by urban immorality. In South Africa, for instance, women were channelled into paid domestic work under the guise of domesticity (Ally 2009). While paid domestic work had been a historically male profession, the discovery of diamonds and gold intensified demand for male workers in industrial nodes, creating the impetus for the sector's feminisation. In contrast, in Angola and Mozambique, paid domestic work remained a primarily male profession until after independence, reflecting the undercapitalised nature of the Portuguese colonial state and its weak industrial basis – as well as employers' and families' fears that female workers would be subjected to sexual assault (Penvenne 1994; Chipenembe 2010; V. D. Zamparoni 2017).

Over time, racialised colonial capitalism transformed the African continent into a site of extraction of labour, resources, and rents (Amin 1976). Although Marx (1867) argued that capital's quest for new frontiers of accumulation had the potential to resolve the problem of scarcity, the extractive nature of capitalism in Africa led to a process of 'disarticulated accumulation' driven by the appropriation of surplus-value by a foreign capitalist class, which advanced industrialisation in the metropoles while stifling the emergence of a home market in the colonies (Shivji 2008). As Rodney (1972) concluded, capitalism in Africa failed to perform its historical role, tempering its progressive possibilities:

> *Colonialism did not create a capital-owning and factory-owning class among Africans or even inside Africa, nor did it create an urbanised proletariat of any significance (particularly outside of South Africa). In other words, capitalism in the form of colonialism failed to perform in Africa the tasks which it had performed in Europe in changing social relations and liberating the forces of production (Rodney 1972, 338).*

Although Marx (1867) predicted that commodity production would lead to the disappearance of the peasantry, the process of proletarianisation in Southern Africa did not require absolute dispossession (Denning 2010). Indeed, in his analysis of colonial capitalism, Wolpe (1972) showed how rural areas seemingly outside the circuits of capital contributed to capital accumulation by ensuring the reproduction of labour-power and subsidising workers' low wages through uncommodified activities. During industrial booms, workers were ejected from the countryside into industrial nodes. During industrial lulls, they were propelled back into rural 'labour reserves' to join the young, old, ill and unemployed (Legassick and Wolpe 1976). Initially, the rural reserves provided a reprieve from the circuits of capital, strengthening wageworkers' bargaining position with employers. Over time, however, independent sources of sustenance were viciously attacked, and Africans became increasingly dependent on intermittent periods of wage labour to survive (Scully and Webster 2019). As Meillassoux (1981) outlined, the tentacles of South African colonial capital and the appropriation of surplus value from African labour extended beyond its borders to rural areas in neighbouring countries:

> *The domestic community is indeed the only economic and social system that manages the physical reproduction of human beings, all classes of societies depend, for the supply of labour-power […]on the domestic communities of the colonised countries and its modern transformation, it is the family which produces, not only the physical worker but also this social ingredient essential to the functioning of capitalism and which Marx has called the 'free labourer' (Meillassoux 1981, xiii).*

Taussig (1978) pointed to a similar process in Colombia, where recurring rounds of dispossession forced the peasantry into a hybrid system characterised by an interdependence between wage-labour and non-capitalist modes of production. In Southern Africa, this hybrid system ultimately proved unsustainable (Legassick and Wolpe 1976). The diversification of rural livelihoods created a problem of labour scarcity as men emigrated to industrial nodes and women were forced to assume primary responsibility for food production. Despite the intensification of labour, productivity declined, and consumption dropped. Some migrant-sending households were able to hire seasonal wage-labour, resolving the problem of labour scarcity for some and exacerbating it for others (First 1983). Gradually, the socioeconomic basis of this hybrid system buckled, triggering a crisis of reproduction in the countryside, compounded by the introduction of labour-saving technologies in industrial nodes. The creation of homelands across Africa, ruled under customary law, represented a strategy of colonial control to strip Africans of the possibility of citizenship and deflect demands for political and economic reform onto 'self-governing' territorial authorities (Mamdani 1996). Underlying this strategy of 'decentralised despotism', du Toit (2017) points out, was the dubious assumption that homelands could meet the needs of their subjects:

> *Central to the design of this 'political fix' was the imagined capacity of the communal areas and the structures of rural African social systems to serve as a bulwark against what was, at the time, called 'detribalisation' and the threat of a rapidly growing and unruly population of landless urbanised blacks making demands for social and political inclusion (du Toit 2017, 4).*

While Wolpe (1972) and Meillasoux's (1981) work was ground-breaking – showing how commodity production articulated with uncommodified work, generating a labour system predicated on precarity and informality – their contribution was critiqued for its dualism. Both conceived of uncommodified work ascribed to women as the remnant of a pre-capitalist mode of production rather than the outcome of a process of proletarianisation under colonial capitalism. Like other feminist Marxist proponents of a unitary approach, Mackintosh (1977) saw women's subaltern position within the household as reflective of a broader process of expropriation, exploitation, and exclusion within capitalism. Even the 'traditional' systems of social security described by Wolpe (1972) – the accumulation of livestock, bride wealth, cattle-loans and *stokvels* – were a historical construction tied to the emergence of the migrant labour system.

Lenin (1899) had made a similar critique of dualism in his analysis of capitalist development in Russia. In contrast to contemporaries like Kautsky (1899), Lenin (1899) conceived of the

peasantry as constituent of capitalism and identified three emerging social classes with the penetration of commodity relations: the rural bourgeoisie, which included commercial farmers, land traders, usurers and industrial entrepreneurs; the rural proletariat, who were either landless or near landless and relied on the sale of their labour-power to survive; and the middle peasantry, who were able to make ends meet during good years but could become part of the landless proletariat during bad ones. Despite having retained partial control over the means of production – by reducing consumption, increasing the burden of work, and engaging in precarious wage-work – the peasantry had ultimately become subordinated to the market through commodity production and consumption, seasonal wage labour and taxes.

Lenin's (1899) insights were important both empirically and politically. On the one hand, they were a response to the Narodniks, a political movement of agrarian utopian socialists who had taken up arms in defence of the peasantry in hopes of establishing a self-governing commune en route to socialism. Narodniks were unconvinced by the teleological tenor of historical materialism and argued that the peasantry possessed a pre-capitalist communal logic that made them the revolutionary subject (Chayanov 1925). On the other, Lenin's argument was a response to contemporaries like Kautsky (1899), who argued that the peasantry's historical reluctance to join the Narodniks in revolt against the Russian monarchy clearly showed that they were not the revolutionary subject and must be neutralised. Based on his analysis of class differentiation in the countryside, Lenin (1899) appealed to an alliance between the rural and urban proletariat, based on their shared material conditions as landless labourers. While Russia's worker-peasant alliance was ultimately short-lived, Lenin's (1899) insights generalised socialism to the rest of the world, looping agrarian anti-imperialist struggles into the socialist fold (Rodney 2018), in a way that Wolpe's (1972) and Meillasoux's (1981) dualist analysis would have struggled to.

Furthermore, Wolpe (1972) was critiqued for his functionalism. After all, it was not entirely clear that rural labour reserves did play a functional role in capitalist accumulation. Instead, Mafeje (1981) contended, they had become dumping grounds for the young, old, ill, and un-employed – sites where those who were surplus to the accumulation needs of capital could be left to die. Meillassoux (1981) agreed, predicting that capitalism would ultimately cannibalise the domestic community, taking humanity down with it. However, as Mafeje (1981) also pointed out, rural labour reserves were also sites of resistance to. Indeed, Bozzoli (1983) went

as far as to suggest that the reserves represented a critical site of counter-capitalist struggle led by women around the question of social reproduction:

> *The failure of capitalism to destroy non- capitalism should not be attributed to the particular needs and whims of capital in the Third World, but to the strength of those social and economic systems and the incapacity of capitalism to destroy them [...] capitalism does not 'articulate' with non-capitalist systems as Wolpe suggests, but conflicts with them, often in brutal and bloody fashion. And that conflict takes place, in periods of proletarianisation, around the domestic economy (Bozzoli 1983, 146).*

The following section explores the changing relationship between commodity production and social reproduction with the advent of neoliberalism in Southern Africa – and the political implications of a deepening crisis of reproduction.

The changing nature of work with neoliberal restructuring

> *There is a danger that, unless the precariat is understood, its emergence could lead society towards a politics of inferno. This is not a prediction. It is a disturbing possibility. It will only be avoided if the precariat can become a class-for-itself, with effective agency, and a force for forging a new 'politics of paradise', a mildly utopian agenda and strategy to be taken up by politicians and by what is euphemistically called 'civil society' (Standing 2016, vii).*

In his provocative work, *the Precariat*, Standing (2016) polemically argues that neoliberal restructuring has led to the emergence of a new dangerous class distinct from the proletariat, known as the precariat. In contrast to the proletariat, the precariat is a heterogeneous group that embodies a particular set of social relations rooted in the standardisation of non-standard employment. Global labour flexibility, Standing (1999) has long argued, produced new forms of feminised labour insecurity, characterised by the erosion of minimum wages, poor occupational health and safety conditions, the slashing of social security benefits, weak employment protections, the absence of collective bargaining, limited skills development and opportunities for career advancement, and the dissolution of the prospect of full employment. Although the total number of jobs has not declined, they have become increasingly flexibilised. With prospects for full employment increasingly unlikely, the arc of human history has led to the end of the labouring man (Standing 1997).

Of course, as Breman and van der Linden (2014a) point out, throughout much of history and much of the world, standard employment relations have been the exception rather than the

norm. In the global North, casual, temporary, seasonal, subcontracted, and home-based work was widespread until the 1930s (Jonna et al. 2016). It was only through working-class struggle that precarious workers won the labour and social protections we associate with standard employment conditions today – and those victories were mediated by race, gender, and nationality (Hunter 1997). For instance, in the United States, there were deep fissures between worker organisations that represented unskilled workers in growing industrial sectors and those that represented skilled trades; between those who welcomed black workers and those who rejected them (Fletcher and Gapasin 2008). Yet, as civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. (1967) pointed out, worker organising was far from static. Even though organised labour had been at best an uneven ally of black workers, he emphasised the importance of alliances between progressive forces, including organised labour:

> *The trade union movement [...] despite its potential strength has been an inarticulate giant with an unsteady gait […]. In other mass unions, new leaders have emerged with a deep commitment to broad social issues […] The coalition of an energised section of labour, Negro, unemployed and welfare recipients may be the source of power that reshapes economic relationships and ushers in a breakthrough to a new level of social reform (King Jr 1967, 150).*

Ultimately, Seymour argues, Standing's (2011) conceptualisation of the precariat as a class of its own amounts to little more than a *'cultural meme […] tinged with millennial Weltschmer'* (2012, 1). After all, proletarianisation was a process driven by primitive accumulation rather than full employment (Denning 2010). Indeed, Marx's (1867) very concept of a reserve army of labour – the floating, stagnant and latent reserves, as well as paupers – recognised how the proletariat was absorbed, exploited and then expelled from wage-labour, according to the rhythms of capital accumulation and technological innovation. Engels' (1845) depiction of the working class in England is hardly a rosy picture of standard employment relations. Though disembedded from labour-capital direct relations, the reserve army of labour was subsumed under capitalism and thus contributed to broader processes of accumulation. While rightfully challenging evolutionist narratives of capitalist development, Quinlan (2012) argues, proponents of an 'anti-work' thesis like Standing (2011) have fallen into a 'technologically deterministic and social-agency denying' trap (15), which discounts the importance of contentious politics in shaping what is produced, how it is produced and for whom.

Meanwhile, in the global South, standard employment relationships were generally the purview of the coloniser, not the colonised (Mamdani 1996). In the face of a dual labour regime – which distinguished between the rights of black and white, indigenous and non-indigenous workers – Africans readily resisted proletarianisation, debunking the dogma of the dignity of wage-work. Scully (2016) argues that this detachment from labour was connected to an attachment to the land and other forms of non-wage income, which provided an autonomous basis for sustenance in the context of racialised colonial capitalism. Towards the end of the colonial period, states began to rethink the desirability of a dual labour system in Southern Africa and introduced a series of labour and social reforms (van Niekerk 2013), intended to reverse the process of 'disarticulated accumulation', stimulate a home market and accelerate domestic industrialisation. For instance, in Angola and Mozambique, the fascist colonial state adopted a strategy of import-substitution to attract white settlers (Pereira Leite 1993). As the settler class grew, new industries began to emerge, including beverages, cement, footwear, furniture, glassware, paper, textiles, tobacco, soap and wheat milling (Brum 1976; Wield 1977). By independence, Mozambique was the eighth-most industrialised country in Africa, with higher domestic consumption than exports (RPED 1999). Nevertheless, the dual labour regime remained largely intact, with four-fifths of standard employment contracts attributed to whites (Rita-Ferreira 1967).

With independence, many African countries adopted 'high modernist' ideals, with hopes of achieving industrial convergence and reaching full employment (Scott 1999). Ferguson (2015) suggests that it was precisely because standard employment relationships had been historically limited to the realm of the coloniser, that they acquired an aspirational quality in the postcolonial imaginary – with states of a Marxist persuasion particularly prone to a brand of 'productivist fundamentalism'. However, as the case of Mozambique illustrates, the hyper-focus on production and productivity was also a response to the material needs triggered by the process of decolonisation. After all, the transition to independence was a period of great flux as settlers fled en masse, sabotaging the means of production as they left. Meanwhile, the Apartheid regime halted the recruitment of migrant workers to destabilise the newly independent state (First 1983). Increasing domestic production, the Frelimo government concluded, was the only way to win the struggle against underdevelopment in the face of its white supremacist neighbours. And anyway, many postcolonial states of a Marxist persuasion adopted widespread redistributive reforms, including the nationalization and redistribution of land, the strengthening of public services and other forms of social provisioning.

However, the collapse of socialism and subsequent proclamations of 'the end of history' (Fukuyama 1989) strengthened the hand of capital, transforming postcolonial states into committees for the management of the affairs of a globally networked domestic bourgeoisie. Under pressure from international financial institutions, many African states were forced to undergo a process of structural adjustment, which involved the liberalisation of trade and rejection of state-driven development, the privatisation of public services and rollback of redistributive reforms introduced following independence, and the deregulation of consumer and labour protections (Millar 1985). During this period, Mozambique transitioned to a market economy, privatising almost 1,500 public enterprises, in what the World Bank dubbed the most successful privatisation programme in Africa (Pitcher 2002). Larger enterprises were sold to foreign investors, while smaller ones were sold to politically connected aspiring entrepreneurs, with the goal of fostering a domestic capitalist class.


While postcolonial states had hoped that globalisation would facilitate industrial convergence, trade liberalisation ultimately undermined the ability of countries with a weak comparative advantage to compete in globalised markets (Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer 2003). In Mozambique, for instance, almost half of the newly privatised enterprises went bankrupt within five years due to the lack of state support (Castel-Branco and Cramer 2003). The closure of firms resulted in the loss of half a million jobs and a dramatic drop in union membership from 300,000 to 90,000 between 1990 and 2003 (Artur 2004). Despite widespread bankruptcies and retrenchments, this was a period of rapid economic growth for Mozambique, averaging 7.5 per cent of GDP over two decades. However, growth was driven primarily by foreign direct investment in the extractive sector, which accelerated the expropriation of land and natural resources while generating few jobs and undermining the state's redistributive capacity due to the fiscal incentives required by multinational corporations (Castel-Branco 2015).

The financialisation of the global economy has only further undermined economic development, as investments are reallocated towards speculative sectors, to the detriment of productive ones (Storm 2018). Today, many African countries are in a tailspin of premature deindustrialisation and deagrarianisation (Figures 8 and 9). The World Bank (2019c) argues that the proliferation of digital technologies may provide new employment opportunities for countries in the global South. On the one hand, greater automation can increase productivity, stimulate demand, generate jobs, and improve the delivery of public services. On the other hand, digitalisation may give Southern states a comparative advantage in providing global

services. The role of the state, the World Bank (2019) contends, is to help the un(der)employed to adapt through the flexibilisation of the labour market, the expansion of non-contributory social security and tax reform (World Bank 2019b). However, as Anner et al. (2019) point out, the World Bank ignores how digital technologies have concentrated corporate monopoly power across sectors and geographies, exacerbating the decades' long tendency towards non-standard employment. Rather than invest in capital or hire employees, tech companies have become algorithmic managers, who derive surplus value from the material labour of 'clients' and 'customers', selling their data to third parties for profit (ILO 2021). In addition, early evidence suggests that service work in the digital economy is generally insufficient to meet workers' reproductive needs. Despite emerging forms of worker organising (Velez 2020; Webster et al. 2021), the expansion of digital technologies has ultimately exacerbated labour market segmentation within and between countries (ILO 2021). As Meagher (2020) argues:


> *WDR 2019 spins a narrative that makes increasing labour informalisation look like a path to decent work, targeted social protection look like universalism, downgrading standards of education and health provision look like promoting equality, taxation reforms that shift resources from labour to capital look like investing in people, and a call for greater deregulation of labour look like a new social contract that 'protects people rather than jobs'. (Meagher, 2020, p. 668)*

Figure 8: % total employment by sector in sub-Saharan Africa, 1991-2019



Source: World Bank (2019a)

Figure 9: Value-added as a % of GDP, 1981-2019



Source: World Bank (2019a)

Financialisation has also accelerated deagrarianisation, as global agricultural supply chains become the new frontier of capital accumulation for FinTech corporations. This has resulted in the concentration of industrial agriculture and its reorientation towards the short-term interests of shareholders, exacerbating existing unequal power relations in the food system, increasing farmers' vulnerabilities to the vagaries of nature and the markets, undermining the ability of food systems to meet households' reproductive needs and chipping away at collective action (Clapp and Isakson 2018). Although the reach of FinTech is uneven and contested, Moyo (2011) argues that the subordination of African agriculture to global financial capital has undermined postcolonial states' attempts to increase agricultural productivity and leverage the surplus from the countryside to advance industrial development. Consequently, in Africa, there has been a contraction of small-scale commercial agriculture controlled primarily by men, downward pressure on smallholder cultivation controlled maintly by women, and the intensification of emigration by both women and men to urban nodes (Bryceson 2019). Older women have been 'left behind' in the countryside, offering a fall-back position for migrant household members. However, this strategy of livelihood diversification has increased the burden and intensified violence against older women. Forms of violence include witch-hunting – a reflection of underlying conflicts over land, economic activities and communal responsibilities, amidst the onslaught of neoliberalism (Federeci 2014).

In the immediate postcolonial period, many African states reversed the process of primitive accumulation through the nationalisation of land previously held by colonial capital and its redistribution based on state-organised land-tenure systems. Postcolonial states then moved to modernise agriculture by promoting large-scale commercial farming on the one hand and peasant production on the other. During this period, the chief objectives of agricultural policy, argues Shivji (2009), were to accumulate surplus value and generate foreign exchange through the expansion of agricultural exports to advance agrarian transformation based on state-led industrialisation. However, this strategy hinged on the subordination of large-scale agriculture to global markets and the super-exploitation of the peasantry through the continued use of cheap labour on large farms – sowing the seeds of discontent in the countryside.

In Mozambique, for instance, the postcolonial state converted colonial plantations into state farms, transformed settler farms into popular *machambas* and established a rural marketing board, Agricom, which operated as a wholesaler, buying crops from large private and state farms, and selling consumer goods. The state also advanced a strategy of villagisation, relocating the peasantry to *aldeias comunais* (communal villages) under the guise of socioeconomic progress, but with the desire to reorganise the countryside and erode the power of the customary (Mittelman 1981; Bowen 2000). However, rural households fled communal villages, dragged their feet on state farms and evaded cultivating popular *machambas* (O'Laughlin 1996). Consequently, agricultural production dropped, triggering food shortages, exacerbating the problem of foreign exchange, and creating the political basis for an insurgency against the state. As the war intensified, Agricom became the only link between farmers and the market, imposing unfavourable rates and compounding food insecurity (Cabrita 2001). Informed by a dualist conception of agrarian structures – with subsistence agriculture on one end and commercial agriculture on the other – post-colonial agrarian policy not only struggled to meet its objectives but papered over women's critical role in commercial agriculture (Tsikata 2016).

With structural adjustment, many postcolonial African states disinvested from agricultural infrastructure, including the provision of basic public utilities, irrigation systems, transportation networks, storage facilities, subsidised farming inputs and access to credit (Tsikata 2016). This undermined the productive capacity of small-scale farmers, facilitating the concentration of agrarian capital and increasing the power of commercial retailers (McMichael 2010; du Toit 2017). While agricultural stagnation propelled migrants to urban centres, trade liberalisation led to deindustrialisation, as an influx of cheaper imports outcompeted local producers,

undermining the capacity of cities to absorb a growing urban proletariat. As Wuyts (2001) illustrates, the relative cheapening of wage goods through importation put downward pressure on labour costs. This was compounded by the liberalisation of the labour market and the roll-back of labour and social protections (Cramer, Oya, and Sender 2015), which ultimately forced even formal wageworkers to turn to complementary sources of livelihood on and off the farm. The expansion of the informal economy enabled the diversification of livelihoods, but it also left peasants and workers with few options but to diversify given the declining conditions of work. Drawing on the case of Tanzania, Wuyts (2001) questioned the sustainability of this approach, given the reliance on foreign aid, and the fact that importation was not stimulating domestic production but rather undermining it.

Small-scale agricultural production has been further undermined by recurring rounds of expropriation, with debt playing an important role in 'everyday' forms of dispossession (Li 2010). In South Africa, debt is increasingly tied to the formal financial system (Scully and Webster 2019) and used to finance 'wageless consumption'; much of it for essential services that are in theory publicly-funded (James 2014):

> *The economic integration of what might be called 'wageless consumers' into global capitalism has been, to a significant degree, facilitated by the financialisation of the economy […] Debt in poor communities is not a new phenomenon. What is unprecedented is the significant portion of poor and rural people's debt that is provided by the formal financial system (Benjamin Scully and Webster 2019, 8–9).*

In addition, small-scale farmers have been dispossessed by large-scale projects for agricultural expansion, conservation, and extraction (Li 2010). However, as Hall (2011) argues, the conditions of 'land-grabbing' – or the expropriation of land, water and natural resources – vary widely in terms of the legality and structure of land deals, the role of domestic elites and governments, the response by social forces and the outcomes. While multinational corporations have certainly played a role in the recurring rounds of dispossession, these have generally been in complicity with elites at the national and local level. Land deals vary widely, and include food to food, food to agrofuels, non-food to food, and non-food to agrofuels. Some involve changes in social relations, and others do not; some are redistributive, others formalise inequality and concentrate the power of a rural elite. Social movements, Hall (2011) argues, must take this diversity into account.

For Moyo (2011), rebuilding the African peasantry is critical to addressing the contemporary crisis of reproduction in Africa, and 'accumulation from below' constitutes one strategy of agrarian transformation. As Tsikata (2016) points out, this would require a gender-sensitive reversal of structural adjustment policies through the redistribution of land, the introduction of agricultural subsidies, the reopening of state-owned marketing boards, increased investment in food and agricultural infrastructure, and the reregulation of labour markets. However, what remains unclear is what the social basis of such a political project would be. Bernstein (2010) argues that given the dominance of capital tofay, classes of rural labour have become increasingly fluid and fragmented, encompassing both those who have (partial) access to the means of production and those who do not:

> *Classes of labour in the conditions of today's 'South' have to pursue their reproduction through insecure and oppressive – and typically increasingly scarce – wage employment and/or a range of likewise precarious small-scale and insecure 'informal sector' ('survival') activity, including farming (Bernstein 2010b, 91).*

Drawing on a framework for occupational hierarchies developed by Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing, Lerche (2010) proposes a framework which articulates what is essentially a process – the fragmentation of class in the countryside – with labour-market categories: salaried work, self-employed with and without employees, and unpaid family workers. Critical to this hierarchy is an analysis of income, power, and control over the labour process. While du Toit (2014) argues that we are essentially in a post-agrarian and post-industrial movement, in India at least, most wage-labour and self-employment continue to be concentrated in the agricultural sector (Lerche 2010), begging the question: what are the political possibilities for a 21st-century worker-peasant alliance to reclaim production?

Li (2010) is less optimistic. In a context where places – and natural resources – are considered more valuable to capital than the people who inhabit them, reclaiming the terms of production has become increasingly more difficult. Today, the dispossessed are superfluous to the accumulation needs of capital, despite their subsumption within its circuits. With teleological theories of capitalist development debunked, she argues, it is critical to advance a politics of 'making live', lest surplus populations are left to die. Unlike Standing (2011) however, Li (2010) recognises that there are important continuities between the reserve armies of labour of the 19th and 21st century when the politics of 'letting die' were widespread. And it is precisely because

of the lessons of the past – that the disarticulation between dispossession and labour absorption can be fatal – that a politics of 'making live' is so vital:

> *The class that required proletarians was different from the one that evicted peasants and separated in time by several centuries. Examined retrospectively, it is true that capital and labour encountered each other. But looked at historically, a particular capitalist might struggle to find labour, and not all aspirant labourers could find capital (Li 2010, 70).*

Nevertheless, what remains unclear is the social basis of such a politics of 'making live'. Ferguson (2015) posits that cash transfers represent a political instrument to drive forth a more radical politics of distribution based on the notion of a 'rightful share'. However, as du Toit (2014) points out, much of the debate on politics 'of a rightful share' is rooted in abstract notions of citizenship that are disarticulated from the politics of 'decentralised despotism' which continue to shape the relationship between the state and its subjects in the postcolonial era. For Ferguson and Li (2018), a first step is to decentre work from the social and political imaginary, for only by doing so, can a democratic Left project advance the kind of politics of paradise that Standing (2011) has in mind. The following section explores the political possibilities of 'post-work' utopias.

The political possibilities of 'post-work' utopias

> *'Work' must lose its centrality in the minds, thoughts and imaginations of everyone. We must learn to see it differently: no longer as something we have—or do not have—but as what we do* (Gorz 1999,1).

In *Reclaiming Work,* Gorz (1999) argues for the elimination of 'intangible' labour and the restoration of work to its 'authentic' meaning, as something that we do, rather than that we have. Intangible labour, he explains, is a social construct peculiar to industrial capitalism, which has become hegemonic with global restructuring, even as capitalism moves to obliterate it. His analysis of intangible labour is rooted in Marx's (1844) theory of estrangement. With primitive accumulation, living labour lost control over the labour process; over the ability to define what to produce, how to produce it and for whom. Reliant on the sale of their labour-power to survive, all physical, mental, and emotional effort became mediated by capital. Workers were reduced to cogs in a wheel, their bodies confined by the walls of the factory floor, their creativity undermined by institutionally certified skills and procedures, their lives controlled by new forms of time discipline and their wages continuously squeezed by profit-seeking capitalists. It took centuries of struggle – and several accidents of history – for workers

to be able to claw back surplus value in the form of minimum wages, social security and public services.

However, with neoliberal restructuring, intangible labour has become increasingly hard to come by, as capital reorients investment towards speculative rather than productive sectors, machine learning moves to replace workers on industrial assembly lines and digital technologies extend precarity to the algorithmic realm. As workers scramble to outcompete each other, old forms of exploitation and domination, reminiscent of Engels'(1845) depiction of 19th century England, have become entrenched. If a democratic Left project is to reclaim control over the process of production, it is imperative to debunk the dogma of the dignity of wage-work, to decentre work from the social and political imaginary and to move beyond wage-based society. Doing so, would open new spaces for authentic work – sensory, autonomous and collective experiences that allow for self-realisation by transforming matter into products that bear one's inscription and respond to one's needs (Gorz 1999).

Gorz (1999) is part of this growing group of 'anti-work' scholars who argue for the urgent need to reclaim wage-work from the clutches of commodification amidst the spectre of ecological, economic, and social crisis (Weeks 2011; Srnicek and Williams 2015; Bastani 2019). While proposals have emanated primarily from the global North, they have found expression in the global South where intangible labour has always been the exception (Barchiesi 2011; Ferguson 2015; Dawson and Fouksman 2020). Despite this, wage-work has never been so compulsively invoked as an instrument of social incorporation as it is today – and yet so wholly unable to fulfil this function (Barchiesi 2011). For Weeks (2011), this unresolvable contradiction between the aspiration of an increasingly un(der)employed proletariat and their material reality, creates a political opportunity for advancing 'post-work utopias'. After all, what is intangible labour anyway if not alienating?

Imaginaries of 'post-work' utopias have existed for as long as industrial capitalism. Concerned about capitalism's tendency towards overproduction and the disastrous impact of labour-replacing technology, the successful industrialist Robert Owen (1817) sought to reverse the process of primitive accumulation by setting up 'villages of cooperation'. These self-sufficient agricultural and industrial communities, he proposed, would be structured along cooperative lines, with workers sharing all public facilities, including a kitchen, messrooms, childcare, schools, infirmaries, and gardens. Women would be responsible for childcare, gardening,

sewing and cooking; while men would focus on manufacturing. For Owen (1817) the ideal village size was between 500 and 1,500 people, so as not to reproduce the vices and misery inherent to crowded, urban spaces. His key objective was to halt the degeneration of the poor, by funnelling them into productive labour and saving the next generation from their parents' bad habits. To fund these communities, he proposed that parliament reallocate funds from poor relief:

> *Most of them [the poor] very ignorant; many with bad and vicious habits, possessing only the ordinary bodily and mental faculties of human beings, and who require to be supported out of the funds appropriated to the maintenance of the poor […] In order to effect any radically beneficial change in their character, they must be removed from the influence of such circumstances, and placed under those which, being congenial to the natural constitution of man and the wellbeing of society, cannot fail to produce that amelioration in their condition which all classes have so great an interest in promoting (Owen 1817).*

Unsurprisingly, Owen's (1817) utopian communities were rejected by both workers and the reserve army of labour. Furthermore, he inspired the ire of Marx and Engels (1848), who challenged utopian socialists for their contradictory – nay bourgeois – class position. Ultimately, funds from poor relief were reallocated away from unconditional and universalistic forms of social provisioning, towards a workhouse regime so wretched that the poor preferred to pawn everything they owned before setting foot in a workhouse ((Dickens 1839). Admittedly, the 'Poor-Law Bastilles of Manchester' – as Engels (1845) dubbed them – were not quite what Owen (1817) had in mind. Nevertheless, he persisted, blind to the material conditions of the time and the type of utopian reformist project that was politically feasible.

Another prominent utopian scholar was Lafargue (1883), Marx's son in law who was fortunate enough to be able to live off of Engels' fortune. In his satirical essay, *the Right to Be Lazy*, he decried the French proletariat's embrace of the pseudo-ethic of wage-work. Despite labouring under conditions of wage slavery – for 14 hours a day, in the dark corners of factories, undertaking tasks so fragmented they could hardly be defined as a craft – he lamented, the revolutionary proletariat had taken up arms to demand the right to work and celebrated the introduction of national workshops as victory! The proletariat, he concluded, had given themselves body and soul to industrial capital, betraying their historic mission and propelling society into recurring crises of overproduction and reproduction.

> *Shame on the French proletariat! Only slaves would have been capable of such baseness. A Greek of the heroic time would have required twenty years*

> *of capitalist civilisation before he could have conceived of such vileness…Our epoch has been called the century of work. It is, in fact, the century of pain, misery and corruption (Lafargue 1883, 28).*

Ultimately, Lafargue (1883) concluded, France's self-serving bourgeoisie had successfully deployed religion to uphold the political and economic order, shifting attention towards heavenly rewards and away from earthly demands. If one were indeed to follow the scripture, he jested, laziness would be the order of the day. After all, *'Jehovah the bearded and angry god, gave his worshipers the supreme example of ideal laziness: after six days of work, he rests for all eternity' (Lafargue 1883, 24).* It was imperative, Lafargue (1883) contended, that the proletariat refocus on building a new society, characterised by autonomous and collective work, and a three-hour workday. Not only would that ensure full employment, but it would give people time to engage in peasant dances and leisure classes. This point was further developed by philosopher Bertrand Russel (1935), who argued that the morality of work was endemic to a Slave state, where the toil of the poor in search of heavenly rewards ultimately supported the idleness of the rich, in much the same way that the exploitation of women was recast as honourable. Instead, he proposed a four-hour workday, universal access to the necessities and comforts of life, and leisure time to engage in peasant dances and the like.

Lafargue (1883)'s insights about the relationship between organise religion and an emerging bourgeoisie are relevant to understanding the social meaning of wage-work in contemporary Southern Africa. In colonial Mozambique for instance, the Catholic Church argued that work was a divine vocation and sloth a manifestation of evil. Catholic Mission schools taught African children that hard labour was a form of punishment for their original sin; that after Eve took a bite of an apple from the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil and shared it with Adam, an angry God cursed humankind with a lifetime of hard labour – and women, with painful births (Biblica 2011). By defining even the most drudgery-filled forms of work as virtuous, Catholic Missions hoped to prepare African children for a dual labour regime, characterised by conditions of hyper-exploitation. Following independence, the government moved to collectivise work everywhere: on the factory floor, in the fields, in the markets, in the schoolyards and neighbourhoods. If hard work during the colonial period was seen as exploitative, at independence, it was recast as liberatory – a way of dignifying man, cleansing society of feudal and colonial values, and embracing the 'new man' (Rodrigues and Fauré 2006). Frelimo's experience in the liberation zones during the struggle for independence informed their thinking. There, militants would first go through an initiation ritual where they

would share their life stories and customs, identify the point at which they became politically conscious, and through hard work transform themselves into 'a New Man'. Primary school books juxtaposed work in the colonial past and the postcolonial present: in the past, we worked for them, today we work for ourselves; in the past work was individual, today it is for the benefit all. Lafargue (1883) of course, had a more romanticised idea of collective work, that contrasted sharply with the self-exploitation of the peasantry detailed by contemporaries like Kautsky (1899):

> *Protection of the peasantry does not primarily mean protection of the individual peasant, but rather of peasant property. We have already noted that agricultural wage-labourers are often better off than small peasant proprietors, and that the property less wage-labourers are much more likely to escape their native misery than the peasants, whose property binds them to the soil. Peasant protection does not, therefore, protect the peasant from impoverishment: it protects the fetters which chain the peasants to their poverty (Kautsky 1899, 327).*

Amidst a global crisis of reproduction, there has been a resurgence of interest in utopian imaginaries, including among scholars of Southern Africa. Scholars are especially interested in the political possibilities of 'anti-work' politics in advancing a democratic Left project based on citizenship rather than employment (Barchiesi 2011; Ferguson and Li 2018; Marais 2020; Dawson and Fouksman 2020). To decentre wage-work, they argue, it is necessary to debunk the dogma of the dignity of wage-work, which has permeated our socio-cultural fabric for over a century. As Ferguson (2015) argues:

> *In a world of massive overproduction and widespread poverty, it seems almost embarrassingly apparent that what is needed most is neither more fish nor more fishermen and women but rather better ways of making sure that the abundant yield of this global industry gets properly spread around to those who are, at present not getting their share (Ferguson 2015, 38).*

While Ferguson (2015) makes a convincing case for global redistribution, he says little about how it should take place concretely and therein lies the weakness of much of the anti-work scholarship. It advocates for a shift away from politics at the point of production but leaves the terms of social struggle under-theorised, ultimately falling back on superficial and reformist policies, which benevolent policymakers would presumably implement As Marx and Engels (1848) maintained, while imaginaries carry with them revolutionary potential, they must be grounded in the material realities of struggle. The next chapter examines the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers in advancing a politics of a 'rightful share'.

Conclusion: beyond 'post-work' utopias

This chapter explored the theoretical and empirical foundations of 'post-work' utopias, weaving together classical theories of capitalist development with debates on the nature of colonial capitalism in Southern Africa. It was divided into three sections: the making and maintenance of work(ers) under colonial capitalism, the changing nature of wage-work(ers) in the postcolonial period, and the emancipatory possibilities of 'post-work' utopias with neoliberal restructuring. The chapter advanced several propositions, which frame the debate on the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers as a wedge to advance a radical politics of distribution based on the notion of a 'rightful share' in chapter 3.

The first is that proletarianisation is a process of dispossession rather than employment – and thus, the proletariat include both wageworkers and the reserve army of labour. Although the concept of a reserve army of labour emerged from an analysis of capitalist development in 19th century England, it remains relevant to understanding precarity in contemporary Southern Africa. In Mozambique for instance, the floating reserve would most closely correspond to the unemployed, the stagnant reserve to informal and own-account workers, the latent reserve to unpaid family workers, and paupers to those the Frelimo government accuses of lacking a 'culture of work'.

There have been numerous moments along the uneven trajectory of capitalist development where dispossession has not coincided with labour absorption, triggering crises of reproduction akin to the one we are facing today. Therefore, Standing's (2011) notion of the precariat is perhaps more useful as a polemical rhetorical device in a context where class has fallen out of favour, than as an analytical category. However, in throwing the class baby out with the statist socialist bathwater, and lumping everyone into a multitude, there is a danger of falling into an Owenesque trap, ultimately undermining the emancipatory possibilities of 'post-work' utopias. After all, how do you differentiate between proposals that benefit the proletariat and those that benefit the bourgeoisie?

The second proposition is that total dispossession is not a requirement for proletarianisation – and thus even those who have not been entirely expropriated from the means of production are subsumed under capitalism through commodity production and exchange, casual wage labour, consumption, and the payment of taxes. The racialised nature of colonial capitalism in Southern

Africa, characterised by a dual labour regime and migrant labour system, forced African households to draw on both paid and unpaid activities on and off the farm. This interdependence has continued into the postcolonial period, amidst rising un(der)employment, wage erosion and disinvestment in small-scale agriculture. Yet, forms of interdependence are increasingly unable to meet households' reproductive needs, as evidenced by high rates of poverty and malnutrition. In many respects, whether these fragmented and fluid classes of labour (Bernstein 2006) constitute a new precariat or not, is immaterial. The critical question for a democratic Left project is how to reclaim control over the process of production and the distribution of surplus value.

For some, the response to this looming crisis of reproduction must be anchored in new forms of industrial policy that respond to the consolidation of global value chains and the financialisation of the economy (Chang and Andreoni 2020). For others it involves rebuilding the African peasantry through 'accumulation from below' (Patnaik and Moyo 2011). Notably, accumulation from below still requires state intervention including the redistribution of land, the introduction of agricultural subsidies and marketing boards, investment in rural infrastructure and the regulation of labour markets (Tsikata 2016). For others it requires a politics of 'making live' (Li 2010) and cash transfers have garnered increasing attention as a political instrument to advance such a politics (Ferguson 2015). In all cases, it is important to consider the social basis for political mobilisation around emancipatory alternatives.

The third proposition is that struggles at the point of production still matter. Much of the debate on 'post-work' utopias has disconnected redistribution from production based on the assumption that wage-work is no longer a viable form of social incorporation. However, without production there would be little to distribute and even less to consume. The proliferation of precarious work is not an indication that struggles at the point of production are irrelevant – in fact, they are arguably more relevant than ever before (Breman and Linden 2014). After all, what is produced, how it is produced and for whom remains a site of struggle (Anner et al. 2019). Ultimately, production and redistribution are two sides of the same coin, which must be contested simultaneously. Nevertheless, in an age where the lines between production, redistribution and consumption are increasingly blurred, it is crucial to understand how conceptions of class are being reconfigured beyond the factory floor (Huws 2014). Doing so may help to answer the question: given the balance of forces between capital and labour, what are the political possibilities of a worker-peasant alliance for the 21st century?

Chapter 3: The Emancipatory Possibilities of Cash Transfers

> *Prospects for the Left look bleak […] We believe there is another way forward, a radical alternative to socialism, that combines feasibility and desirability […] If guaranteed income takes the form of a universal grant, unconditionally awarded to every citizen, things are different indeed (van der Veen and van Parijs 1986, 635-643).*

In their influential essay, van der Veen and van Parijs (1986) argued for a utopian transition to communism that bypasses the pitfalls of revolution through redistributive reforms anchored in universal basic income (UBI). Disillusioned by statist experiences of socialism, daunted by capitalisms' ability to save itself from self-destruction, and increasingly dubious about the viability and desirability of class struggle, they proposed a capitalist road to communism embedded in an unconditional cash transfer, paid regularly to all, on the basis of citizenship. Marxist sociologist Olin Wright (2010), took up the baton, suggesting that UBI constitutes an example of a 'real utopia' – a desirable, viable and achievable reform rooted in utopian ideals with the potential to undermine the exploitative foundations of capitalism and transform class relations. For Ferguson (2015), the proliferation of cash transfer programmes across the global South constitutes a political instrument for an emergent radical politics of distribution based on the notion of a 'rightful share'.

However, as Burawoy (2020) points out, a countermovement towards decommodification is only successful if it inspires social forces towards a democratic Left project – and historically UBI has struggled to do so. A key challenge of this brand of 'utopia without class politics' is that it leaves the structure of accumulation unchecked (Ghosh 2011). Given the current balance of power between capital and labour, there is a danger that such a utopian path to communism would lead down a political cul-de-sac. This chapter locates contemporary debates regarding the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers, within a historical analysis of the development of social welfare with proletarianisation. The first section traces the emergence of social welfare in 16th century Europe and how its core tenets shaped social policymaking in Southern Africa. The second explores the recent expansion of cash transfers in the global South as a response to, and extension of, neoliberalism. The third delves into the proliferation of public works programmes to neutralise more radical redistributive demands. The final section returns to the question of UBI, discussing the possibilities and limitations for a new politics of distribution rooted in citizenship rather than employment. Ultimately, chapter 3 concludes, rethinking redistribution requires reclaiming production, and recentring class is a good first step.

A technique of discipline: the emergence of social welfare with capitalist development

In *Surveiller et Punir,* Foucault (1975) details how the modern capitalist state honed precise, transparent and universal mechanisms of control to reduce the cost of punishment. He begins with a grotesque account of the mutilation of a criminal in medieval France. Wearing nothing but a shirt, he is placed on a scaffold and his body torn to pieces with burning pincers, before being drenched in an array of molten liquids and burnt alive. A similar scene is described by Saint Thomas More (1516) in medieval England, where public hangings were customary, even for offences as minor as theft. Weaving between corpses in a central square, he reflects on both the unfairness and ineffectiveness of theatrical acts of violence against the body. After all, for the starving, theft is the last resort, and one that can easily give way to murder, for a thief has nothing to lose by killing the witness, and everything by not doing so.

Given the social and political disturbances caused by public performances of physical punishment, Foucualt (1975) argued, the modern state developed techniques of governmental rationality – or governmentality – to discipline the political economy of the body instead. Techniques of discipline included the enclosure and separation of space to ease supervision, the coding of activities according to levels of complexity to control the rhythm of the day, regimented training to ensure that subjects acquiesced to standardised norms, and intrusive modes of surveillance, correction, and punishment. Although Foucault's focus was on the penal justice system, his analysis can be extended to social welfare provisioning, which has been historically deployed to enforce social order and funnel the dispossessed into low-wage labour. Writing at the height of the enclosure of the European commons, More's contemporary Vives (1526) outlined a proposal for poor relief, which involved the provision of food, shelter, fuel and light; in exchange for the poor undertaking menial and irksome activities. In a letter dedicated to the Councillors and Senate of Bruges, Vives argued that poor relief was essential to securing the legitimacy of the state, enforcing social order, and protecting the private property of the wealthy from the wrath of the dispossessed:

> *Cities originate where, relief being given and received, love takes root in mutual assistance and strengthens itself through the fellowship of men. There, administrators of the city strive to ensure that each man assists others, that no one is oppressed, an unjust condemnation wrongs no one, and that the strong support the weak. Thus, the peace of an entire and united citizenry grows in love each day and endures (Vives 1526, 33).*

To entice the Councillors further, Vives (1526) contended that poor relief would legitimise the criminalisation of begging, which after all, was at the source of labour scarcity. With income from begging higher than wage-work, those expropriated from the means of production had little incentive to sell their labour to budding landlords and industrialists. Amidst global competition, the future of Bruges' silk weaving industry hung in the balance and only child labour could save it. It was imperative, he implored, that the Councillors and Senate cut off competing sources of income such as begging to force boys into silk workshops as apprentices – and poor relief was an efficient instrument to do so.

Key to Vives' (1526) proposal for poor relief, was the distinction between the labour-constrained, who should be cared for in alms-houses, hospitals, and orphanages; the able-bodied deserving poor, who out of no fault of their own had fallen into misfortune and were willing to undertake work in exchange for relief; and the able-bodied undeserving poor, who refused to work and should be condemned as vagrants. To enforce these distinctions, Vives proposed an elaborate system of identification, registration and surveillance that included investigating the origins of the poor's poverty, interrogating their neighbours, and conducting intrusive medical examinations. The poor, he maintained, should be subjected to special rules to ensure that they lived a sober, frugal and industrious life out of sight and smell of the wealthy. Older women, in particular, he warned, must be carefully scrutinised given their predisposition to witchcraft – a common accusation by the budding bourgeoisie against women who resisted patriarchal control, dispossession and detention in the domestic sphere (Federici 2004).

As E.P. Thompson (1963) would later reflect, England's social welfare system was ultimately an instrument of class robbery. It neutralised opposition to the enclosure of the commons. It facilitated the permanent migration of the expropriated to industrial nodes, for they knew that their dependents would be looked after in parish institutions. And it enabled landlords and industrialists to pay wages below the cost of reproduction, by drawing on poor relief to make up the difference (Engels 1845). Under the English Poor Laws, each parish was responsible for levying taxes according to the rental value of homes and land. Poor relief was distributed by the Poor Law overseer, who doubled as landlord, magistrate, labour-recruiter, and wage-enforcer. In agricultural regions, Marx (1867) illustrates, the overseer became a de facto labour broker, facilitating the requisition of rural 'surplus populations' during peak periods of the industrial cycle and thrusting them back into the countryside during industrial lulls:

> *An office was set up in Manchester, to which lists were sent of those work-people in the agricultural districts wanting employment, and their names were registered in books. The manufacturers attended at these offices, and selected such persons as they chose; when they had selected such persons as their 'wants required', they gave instructions to have them forwarded to Manchester, and they were sent, ticketed like bales of goods, by canals, or with carriers, others tramping on the road, and many of them were found on the way lost and half-starved (Marx 1867, 378).*

While poor relief played a functional role in capitalist development, it also reflected the surplus value that the expropriated, exploited and excluded were able to claw back through struggle. England's landed gentry would have much rather locked up and worked the poor in parish prisons. However, concerned about their legitimacy, Members of Parliament thought better of it. Instead, Parliament adopted outdoor relief for most, including the able-bodied deserving poor; and indoor poor relief through alms-houses, hospitals, and orphanages for those with no place to live (Marx 1867, 882). Then in 1795, parishes relaxed the work conditionality through the Speenhamland Law, which established that all should receive a minimum income based on the principle of the 'right to live'. Polanyi describes its universal appeal:

> *Though in principle work was still enforced, in practice outdoor relief became general and even when relief was administered in the poorhouse, the enforced occupation of the inmates now hardly deserved the name of work […] No measure was ever more universally popular. Parents were free of their children's care, and children were no more dependent upon parents; employers could reduce wages at will and labourers were safe from hunger whether they were busy or slack (Polanyi 1944, 83).*

Although the Speenhamland Law was initially supported by rural landlords, emerging urban industrialists, and the landless proletariat, it had unintended consequences. On the one hand, landlords and industrialists leveraged poor relief to lower wages and maximise the appropriation of surplus-value. On the other hand, with the work conditionality abolished, workers had little incentive to take up the ultra-low wage work offered, creating the problem of labour scarcity and declining productivity. Rather than increase wages, the bourgeoisie began to clamour for the repeal of the Speenhamland Law on the basis that it was unsustainable. Owen's (1817) proposal to reallocate funding from poor relief to self-reliant industrial communities must be read in this light. Less than three decades after it was introduced, the Speenhamland Law was replaced by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, which limited relief to the horrid workhouses described in the novel, Oliver Twist (Dickens 1839).

A core element of the administration of the Poor Laws was a national system of parochial registers of baptisms, marriages, and burials (Sretzer 2007). The parochial registers not only protected the private property rights of newly minted landlords but enabled the transparent collection of property taxes and its redistribution through poor relief. Without an effective register and enforcement architecture, landlords would have had little incentive to pay property taxes and the welfare system itself would have crumbled. Extensive registers were a common feature of the bureaucracies that emerged with the rise of industrial capitalism. For Weber (1968) bureaucracies were technically superior due to their precision, speed, rationality, and cost effectiveness: *'The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organisations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production'* (Weber 1968, 973) — even if they ultimately concentrated power in a monocratic head.

Notably, Weber (1968) argued that the executive of the modern state was not merely a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie as Marx and Engels (1848) polemically suggested. Analysed historically, bureaucracy much like the state, constituted a site of struggle between competing interests, the outcome of which was indeterminate and reflected the relative power of capital and labour (Weber 2013). In his analysis of the development of social welfare, for instance, Polanyi (1944) pointed to a recurring process of double movements towards the commodification of labour in one moment followed by a countermovement against it in the next. Although Polanyi did not delve into the social basis underlying this double-movement – an aspect which would have certainly been a priority for Marx and Engels (1848) – he loosely envisioned a cross-class institutional space, made up of political parties, voluntary associations, unions, cooperatives, churches, and family:

> *For a century, the dynamics of modern society was governed by a double movement […] The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organisation, relying on varying support of those most immediately affected by the harmful action of the market—primarily, but not exclusively the working and the landed classes—and using protective legislation, restrictive associations and other instruments of intervention as its methods (Polanyi 1944, 137-39).*

Polanyi's (1944) analysis of commodification influenced the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), who developed a typology of three welfare regimes to explore how ideologically informed positions on the origins of poverty and the redistributive role of the state, shaped the

decommodification of labour and stratification of society. Social democratic regimes, Esping-Andersen (1990) argued, conceived of the problem of poverty as structural and saw the state as an agent of redistribution. Committed to equality of outcome, welfare benefits tended to be universal and of a high-quality. Consequently, social-democratic regimes exhibited high levels of decommodification and low levels of social stratification. Conservative or corporatist regimes placed a more considerable burden of responsibility for welfare provisioning on the individual and the family. Welfare benefits tended to be limited in scope and tied to formal employment. Therefore, they exhibited lower levels of decommodification and higher levels of social stratification. Finally, liberal regimes perceived poverty as an individual problem and saw the market as the primary actor. Discursively committed to equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome, liberal regimes exhibited the lowest levels of labour decommodification and the highest levels of social stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990).

Although influential, Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology was critiqued on several grounds. On the one hand, its static construction struggled to capture the dynamic nature of double movements. As Piven and Cloward (1971) illustrate, during periods of labour surplus, social welfare has tended to expand to quell social unrest by the expropriated and excluded, while during periods of labour scarcity, it has tended to contract in order to propel the unemployed into low-wage-labour. The regulatory role of social welfare has been particularly important at the bottom of the labour market as it affects the conditions under which low-wage labour can be bought and sold. Of course, as Peck (2001) points out, this relief cycle is neither unidirectional nor predetermined. Rather it is a site of contestation—between labour and capital, the market, and the state – in which the outcome *'is mediated through the vagaries of politics and uncertainties of statecraft'* (Peck 2001, 45).

For instance, in the United States, the rise of the neoliberal state resulted in the marginalisation of the institutions responsible for administering social welfare and the expansion of those tasked with enforcing penal justice (Wacquant 2010). Federal entitlements were replaced with temporary block grants, which limited welfare to two consecutive years and required grant recipients to work for at least thirty hours a week. Though costlier to implement, workfare was popular because it enforced work and work values – and could be leveraged by the state to deter welfare claims, undermine workers' bargaining power, intensify competition for low skilled work, drive wages down and exacerbate labour casualisation (Peck 2001). Meanwhile, the racialised expansion of the penal justice system presented a countermovement against the

successes of the civil rights movement (Alexander 2012), which tapped into a long history of racism in the United States intensified by anxieties created with the advent of neoliberalism, becoming an instrument of poverty governance in and of itself (Soss et al. 2011).

On the other hand, Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology could not be easily applied to the global South, where the racialised nature of colonial capitalism meant that most people were excluded from any meaningful form of social welfare by a dual labour regime and a bifurcated state (Mamdani 1996). Indeed, in much of the colonised South, letting die was a colonial strategy of governmentality: *'Letting die was not an oversight. It was a calculated decision, rationalised in terms of the greater good'* (Li 2010, 80). Seekings (2008) identified three types of welfare regimes in the global South. The first is an agrarian regime, where the majority have at least partial access to the means of production and rely primarily on family networks during periods of crisis. Where agrarian regimes have been successful, land distribution has been coupled with other forms of state support. Where state support has been lacking, agrarian regimes have generally assumed a neoclassical neo-populist character (Byres 2004). Seekings (2008) suggests that the concept of decommodification is irrelevant to agrarian regimes due to the absence of commodification. However, as chapter 2 argued, even those seemingly outside the circuits of capital are subordinated to the market.

The second welfare regime proposed by Seekings (2008) is a workerist or corporatist regime, where access to social welfare is primarily tied to formal employment through social insurance. Seekings (2008) argues that these are more common in advanced industrialised countries, where the state subsidises social insurance schemes for the labour aristocracy while providing only residual forms of social welfare for the poor. He identifies South Africa as an example of a workerist regime, though concedes that it exhibits elements of a third distributive regime – a pauperist regime, characterised by the expansive coverage of social welfare based on citizenship rather than employment. Drawing on the case of postcolonial South Africa, Seekings (2008) argues that its reluctance to embrace universal and unconditional basic income is due to the political power of trade unions, which privilege the interests of a labour aristocracy over those of the poor. However, his argument is rather perplexing given that South Africa has the most expansive social welfare programme on the continent, and that the Congress of South African Trade Unions was the first institution to advance the proposal for a UBI (Scully 2013). The next section explores the proliferation of cash transfers in the global South following failed structural adjustment policies in the immediate postcolonial period.

A 'quiet revolution': the proliferation of cash transfers in the global South

Over the last decades, there has been a proliferation of cash transfer programmes across the global South, in what Hanlon et al. (2010) have dubbed a 'quiet revolution' in development thinking. In 2012, member states of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted Recommendation 202 which stipulates that every country should establish national social protection floors (ILO 2012a); an aspiration which was reaffirmed by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN 2015). Ferguson (2015) contends that the proliferation of cash transfers across the African continent represents a harbinger of and an intellectual instrument for an emergent radical politics of distribution rooted in citizenship rather than expiring forms of social incorporation such as wage-work. Underlying this proposition are several assumptions: that work is no longer a meaningful form of social incorporation and that a focus on politics at the point of production amounts to little more than 'productivist fundamentalism'; that the notion of a 'rightful share' is an effective basis for political claim-making; and that cash transfers are a powerful instrument to drive forth this 'distributional politics'.

However, not all scholars are convinced. On the one hand, most cash transfer programmes are limited in scope, conditional on some form of behaviour modification and insufficient to meet households' reproductive needs. According to the ILO, less than half of the world's population is effectively covered by social security. Coverage gaps are largest in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific—regions with widespread informality and underinvestment in social welfare systems. In Africa, only 17.8 per cent of the population receive some form of income security and benefits tend to be limited to the labour-constrained, including the elderly, children, and people with disabilities. Able-bodied adults of working age have been largely excluded and only 5.6 per cent of Africans in this category have access to benefits – the majority of them, conditional on participation in labour-intensive public works (ILO 2017a). This leads Lavinas (2013) to conclude that cash transfers are an extension rather than a reversal of the neoliberal paradigm – a point reiterated by Fischer (2020).

For instance, South Africa has the most expansive social welfare system in Africa, reaching more than 17.8 million people or a third of its population. While evidence suggests that it has significantly reduced both the incidence and severity of poverty (Satumba, et al. 2017), the system largely excludes the unemployed. Furthermore, the value of cash transfers is insufficient to meet households' reproductive needs. On the one hand, the child support grant is set

below the individual food poverty line forcing households to choose between food and non-food items (Matthews 2020). On the other hand, because able-bodied adults of working age are excluded, recipient households have become 'magnets' for the unemployed, thereby eroding the value of the old-age and disability grants and fostering intra-household tensions over its distribution (Mosoetsa 2011). In his analysis of South Africa's cash transfer system, Barchiesi (2011) concludes that while cash transfers may help the poor in minimal ways, they are ultimately designed to commodify labour rather than the other way around.

On the other hand, the framing of cash transfers as a 'magic bullet' response to the crisis of reproduction, risks abstracting from the processes of accumulation that dispossessed, exploited, and excluded the poor in the first place (Ghosh 2011). As Pons-Vignon and Segatti (2013) point out, the social welfare system in South Africa does little to address the underlying causes of poverty and inequality, while simultaneously entrenching neoliberalism by facilitating the privatisation of basic social services – a point reiterated by Bond (2014) and Prashad (2014). In fact, in Brazil, the celebrated decline in poverty and inequality during the Lula years, was not primarily due to the renowned Bolsa Família programme but to other labour market instruments, namely the national minimum wage (Maurizio 2016). Of course, the relative impact of social and labour protections will vary by country, depending on the nature of the economy and the structure of the labour market. Nevertheless, Ghosh (2011) maintains that responses to the contemporary crisis of reproduction must extend beyond a hyper-focus on cash transfer programmes:

> *Macroeconomic processes are entirely ignored, such as patterns of trade and economic activity that determine levels of employment and its distribution and even the viability of particular activities, or fiscal policies that determine the extent to which essential public services like sanitation, health and education will be provided, or investment policies that determine the kind of physical infrastructure available and therefore the backwardness of a particular region, or financial policies that create boom and bust volatility in various markets. It also means that no link is even hinted at between the enrichment of some and the impoverishment of others as if the rich and the poor somehow inhabit different social worlds with no economic interdependence at all and that the rich do not rely upon the labour of the poor (Ghosh 2011, 854).*

Of course, the extension of neoliberalism into the domain of social welfare has been highly uneven across time and space (M. Molyneux 2008). For instance, Masondo (2018) argues that in a context where the majority of the population never had access to social welfare to begin with, the introduction of cash transfers – regardless of how residual or conditional – represents

an expansion rather than contraction of state provisioning. However, as Saad-Filho (2015) points out, it is also important to assess the extent to which neoliberalism has narrowed the scope of what is considered politically feasible. One example of neoliberalism's impact on the design and implementation of cash transfer programmes has been the transition to digitalised payment systems through the outsourcing of administrative processes to financial service providers, under the guise of financial inclusion, empowerment, and government fiscal savings (Lavinas 2018).

Digitalisation, Ferguson (2015) points out, has created new opportunities for the expansion of social welfare systems in postcolonial states with limited administrative and financial capacity. After all, biometric technology allows for the remote identification, recognition and payment of cash transfers in even the most far-flung areas, dramatically reducing the need for the kind of expansive bureaucracies associated with welfare systems in the global North – and sidestepping the neo-patrimonial state. Indeed, Ferguson (2015) suggests that these new 'techniques of the social' constitute emergent forms of political and technical recognition that provide a counter-hegemonic alternative to the bureaucratic techniques of discipline described by Foucault (1975):

> *Biometrics are often imagined as scary instruments of control at the disposal of a potentially totalitarian state […] But today, under conditions in which labour is in surplus, the poor and cast off may aspire to certain forms of surveillance and enumeration (Robins 2008, 77–99), just as they want to certain forms of biopolitical care (McKay 2012), seeing in them forms of incorporation, recognition, and support that are otherwise unavailable. Here, inclusion in systems of registration and accounting may appear less as an oppressive system of control than as a valued token of recognised membership (Ferguson 2015, 85).*

However, Ferguson (2015) ignores the growing body of literature which points to the ways in which the outsourcing of cash transfer digitalisation has facilitated the financialisation of social welfare, replacing past forms of social provisioning with instruments of credit and debt under the guise of financial inclusion (Soederberg 2014). Across the global South, Torkelson (2020) argues, cash transfers have become a tool of a segregated and monopolistic financial system. Today, approximately one in five programmes are bundled with financial products and distributed through private providers (2017), with detrimental consequences for social development. Ferguson's oversight is particularly perplexing given his past critique of reductive technical solutions to political problems. In his early work on development projects in postcolonial Lesotho for instance, technical language to transform contentious political questions into

technical problems with technical solutions, depoliticising debates and strengthening the state's bureaucratic power in the process (Ferguson 1994). However, because Ferguson (2015) largely overlooks the power relations which underlie the proliferation of cash transfer programmes in the global South, the role of financialised capitalism in shaping the terms of social welfare provisioning remains underexplored (Nilsen 2020).

One of the examples cited by Nilsen (2020) is the outsourcing of cash transfer payments in South Africa. In 2012, the South African Social Security Agency outsourced payment services to the global provider Net 1 UEPS. The company owned proprietary biometric technology that enabled the offline transfer of funds in remote regions using a smart card (Breckenridge 2019). Upon securing the contract, Net 1 UEPS shared cash transfer recipients' confidential information with its other subsidiaries, who aggressively marketed financial products, including high-interest short-term loans and life insurance policies. To circumvent regulations, the company established a parallel banking system, enabling it to make unauthorised deductions (Torkelson 2020). Because recipients could not default on debt, Net 1 UEPS and its subsidiaries bore little risk or incentive to curtail borrowing. As founder Serge Belamant famously said: 'We don't sell technology, we make our money off people who use it' (Fin24.com 2008). Under pressure from civil society organisations, the Net 1 UEPS contract was declared invalid by South Africa's Constitutional Court. However, the contract would take years to renegotiate because the company had effectively locked the Government into an agreement through its proprietary technology (Breckenridge, 2019). Curiously, the World Bank's International Finance Corporation invested $107.7 million in the company after this debacle to support its expansion into the rest of Africa (Torkelson 2017).

Admittedly, Ferguson (2015) concedes that many cash transfer programmes across the African continent are hardly a panacea. Nevertheless, he argues that they serve as a wedge for new forms of political claim-making. However, he is rather vague about the constellation of social forces that could underlie such a politics. Like Olin Wright (2010), he appeals to Polanyian evocations of a cross-class institutional space made up of political parties, voluntary associations, unions, cooperatives, churches, and family (Polanyi, 1944). However, he ignores one of the most powerful social forces behind the proliferation of cash transfers across the African continent: international development agencies. While South Africa's social welfare system is financed by the fiscus, most cash transfer programmes in Africa rely at least partially on external support, giving international development agencies inordinate power over the policy-

making process. These include the World Bank and United Nations institutions; bilateral donors, in particular the UK's Department for International Development (DFID); and NGOs such as HelpAge International and the Friederich Ebert Stiftung (FES) (Seekings 2020).

Devereux and Kapingidza (2020) argue that social welfare has become a battlefield between development agencies' conflicting ideological positions. The ILO tends to advocate for a rights-based approach according to national social protection floors, while the World Bank favours a social risk-management model characterised by highly targeted, conditional cash transfers. All agencies leverage 'soft power' – including knowledge creation, capacity building, financial support and technical assistance – to exert policy influence (Ouma and Adésínà 2019). By instrumentalising clientelism, Adésínà (2020) argues, development agencies have effectively excluded the political class, leveraging imperial power to ram through pre-packaged best practices while ignoring endogenous responses. The result of such 'policy merchandising' is the depoliticisation of social policy, its reduction into segregationist and residual cash transfer programmes, and the weakening of national democratic processes.

The power of development agencies over national policy-making processes tends to intensify during periods of political and economic crisis. With the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, digitalisation gained increasing traction as states scrambled to roll out emergency income-support measures under lockdown conditions. The most prominent venture was the G2Px initiative – a partnership between the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation under the banner of 'payments that empower' (World Bank 2020). The goal was to curate a new 'payment ecosystem', where customers have the freedom to choose between a wide array of competing private providers. Contrary to conventional wisdom on the cost-effectiveness of outsourcing, G2Px conceded that the digitalisation and outsourcing of cash transfers would entail a significant investment of public resources:

> *… delivering on these programmes will require an enormous increase in the capacity of states to implement them, as well as financial resources and the political will to help cushion the impact on people, at least to a degree. These are all formidable requirements, but in countries with the resources and will to do so, the immediate challenge is how to make G2P transfers efficiently, equitably, and at scale (Gelb and Mukherjee 2020)*

Ultimately, the design and implementation of cash transfers is a site of struggle between competing interests in a global contestation over the terms of social welfare provisioning. G2Px is an example of tech capital's attempt to leverage crisis to chart a way forward for a profitable

and contactless future in what Klein (2020) dubs 'disaster capitalism'. However, the drive towards digitalisation is hardly totalising and readily resisted. While development agencies exert inordinate power over the terms of policymaking, the government can claw back concessions by pitting agencies against each other, reflects the former Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community:

> *If one wants access to global financial resources one needs to be a member of the IMF […] They are what they are; they have the kind of positions that they have […] It is up to each country to develop the skills to get what they can […] These institutions will not solve our development problems (Salomão, 2020).*

As Li (2007) points out, the subjects of 'improvement schemes' have historically been active agents in the messy politics of contestation. They may engage in conscious resistance in response to an explicit imposition of power in one moment; seek to negotiate or integrate interventions in another; or engage in feigned acquiescence due to the absence of alternatives or the attractiveness of measures. While the action of developmental actors—state officials, missionaries, scientists, NGOs, and activists—may delimit the space for reforms, the outcome is far more contingent than Foucault (1975) proposes. The next section explores one such site of struggle: public works programmes for able-bodied adults of working age.

A win-win or a lose-lose? Public works programmes

Despite the discursive commitment to social welfare provisioning, able-bodied adults of working age have been largely excluded from emerging cash transfer programmes (ILO 2017b). The exception are labour-intensive public works. Touted as a win-win response to the crisis of reproduction, labour-intensive public works promise to provide socially and politically palatable forms of income security for able-bodied adults of working age while offering skills development opportunities and strengthening physical infrastructure. However, in her extensive analysis of public works across the African continent, McCord (2012) argues that they are not a cost-effective social security instrument. Most are short term and funded by international development agencies on an ad hoc basis; strictly rationed and limited in scope due to high transaction costs; have a limited positive impact on livelihoods due to the low value of cash transfers; undermine alternative productive and reproductive activities given the work conditionality; and result in poorly constructed public infrastructure because of inadequate supervision. Indeed, rather than decommodifying labour, public works programmes strive to do the exact opposite, neutralising more radical demands for redistribution (Barchiesi 2011).

However, the design and implementation of public works programmes vary depending on their underlying assumptions, objectives and politics. Some are conceived of as an emergency intervention to smooth consumption temporarily, while others are designed as a longer-term employment guarantee, with minimal labour and social protections attached (Castel-Branco 2017c). This section profiles two examples of public works programmes in the global South: the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in South Africa and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. Though both expansive, the programmes have been shaped by contrasting political circumstances, have divergent objectives and have thus had different outcomes.

The EPWP was launched in 2003 and is the only social development programme for able-bodied adults of working age in South Africa. Its objective is to provide temporary relief to the unemployed while facilitating access to permanent livelihood sources through job training and placement. EPWP workers perform a range of essential functions including the construction of public infrastructure, community care and child development services, civil services and engagement in microentrepreneurial activities. Because workers are conceived of as welfare beneficiaries, they are not covered by standard labour and social protections: earnings are just over half the national minimum wage; and they do not have access to paid leave, medical benefits and social security (DoL 2012).

As the EPWP has expanded, some critics argue that municipalities have harnessed the programme to circumvent labour protections. Indeed, Barchiesi (2011) contends that: *'The EPWP amounted, in practice, to the elevation of precarious, unprotected employment as a national tool of social inclusion'* (132). However, not all studies have been as damning. In his analysis of the Community Works Programme (CWP)—an extension of the EPWP – Wiltshire (2016) suggests that it provides an essential source of sustenance and socially meaningful work, that holds some sort of intrinsic value. In contrast to the stagnancy of unemployment, public works can give purpose, structure and rhythm to the day. They protect participants from the stigma of unemployment and afford them a certain level of prestige. Their uniform provides them with a sense of belonging, while their training gives them hope for the future. Indeed, public works are preferable to unemployment and farm work, which is temporary, scrutinised and repetitive. In contrast to Barchiesi (2011), Wiltshire (2016) suggests that the EPWP contributes to the decommodification of labour:

> *CWP is also reducing the centrality of commodification by not producing products for sale during working hours but remunerating socially useful work. The CWP thus liberates the unemployed from the domination of labour in society by severing linkages between activities, time, and commodities' value. It unbound social relations from economic relations in rebuilding collective bodies and social solidarity dismantled by insecurity and commodification brought on by neoliberalism (Wiltshire 2016, 14).*

Wiltshire's argument is further developed by Masondo (2018) who contends that the CWP is a potential example Olin-Wright's (2010) 'real utopias'. In contrast to workfare, CWP workers have substantial control over the means and process of production, and the products of their labour. They empower 'the community' to design and implement public works programmes relevant to localised needs. Furthermore, by incubating cooperative initiatives, the CWP promotes a brand of development from below that provides a source of income in the context of structural unemployment that counters the logic of capitalism. Masondo (2018) concedes that the CWP cooperatives are neither fully independent nor productive. Indeed, Nyoka (2020) suggests that some cooperatives are registered in CWP workers' names by local leaders without their knowledge, as a rent-seeking strategy. Nevertheless, Masondo (2018) maintains that cooperatives can succeed if members are appropriately capacitated.

Interestingly, Masondo (2018) contends that while the introduction of a work conditionality in the global North constitutes a contraction of welfare provisioning, in South Africa, where the majority of the population never had access to social welfare provisioning to begin with, it represents an expansion:

> *In the global North, the ELR formed part of the wider ideological onslaught against the established capitalist welfare state – in favour of the 'workfare state' or 'welfare-to-work'. In most parts of the global South, however, there has never been a strong welfare state in the first place to be 'rolled-back', as the majority of the people relied on informal security regimes. The ongoing innovation in the design of the ELR programmes constitutes attempts by governments in the South to protect and promote the livelihoods of the able-bodied adults of working age (Masondo 2018, 5).*

Of course, Masondo (2018) does not address the cost of the road not taken. As Barchiesi (2011) argued, the EPWP was introduced to neutralise more radical calls for redistribution, such as universal basic income. Furthermore, EPWP workers do not seem particularly convinced by the idea that their work constitutes a 'real utopia'. Indeed, throughout South Africa workers have organised protests to demand a living wage and permanent employment (Munshi 2020).

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) was passed in 2005 as an entitlement-based, employment-guarantee programme for households in rural areas. The outcome of years of mobilisation by Left parties, trade unions and informal workers' movements, it guaranteed up to 100 days of paid work for rural households at minimum wage levels. While the impact of MGNREGA has been uneven, studies suggest that it increased the income of poor rural households, strengthened workers' bargaining power, reduced the wage gap between seasonal and permanent agricultural workers, raised wages for permanent workers by determining a 'reservation wage' and improved overall compliance with minimum wages (Menon 2008). Furthermore, Kiran (2011) argues that because MGNREGA is a form of government work, it carries a certain level of prestige. This has been particularly important for marginalised groups, such as *Adivasis* and women. Critically, public audits have enabled communities to hold the local government accountable, demand improvements in working conditions and increased transparency. Li (2010) argues that the success on MGNREGA has been mostly dependent on mobilisation at the local level:

> *The states in which the programme is working well are those that have a track record of distributive intervention, sustained by strong support from the organised left, and traditions of popular mobilisation. The states where these social forces are lacking have not implemented the programme or implemented it in a desultory and corrupt fashion. These tend to be the states with a high concentration of poverty (Li 2010, 84).*

Ultimately, Rose (1995) argues, the questions of employment generation and social welfare provisioning are not mutually exclusive. She suggests that large-scale public works programmes should be linked to other social welfare policies including unconditional cash transfers, unlimited maternity leave, comprehensive health care, affordable housing, and labour market policies that boost income and strengthen working conditions. The following section explores the historical precedent for, and contemporary possibilities of, of one such alternative: UBI.

Universal basic income: a capitalist road to communism?

The idea of UBI first emerged as a response to dispossession and a desire to legitimise the sanctity of private property. Its origins are generally attributed to Thomas Paine, who proposed an annual payment of £15 to all men and women, 21 years and older, as compensation for their expropriation from the means of production (Paine 1797). Notably, the proposed payment was

part of a broader package of reforms that included a universal old-age and disability pension, financed by a state tax administered by a National Fund. Writing during the agrarian transformation, Paine (1797) argued that capitalism had created a landed monopoly whose basis of accumulation rested on the dispossession, exploitation, and exclusion of half of the world's people. In an appeal to the embattled *Directoire* of the French Revolution, he contended that the payment was not only a matter of justice – a form of compensation for their dispossession from their rightful share of land – but politically necessary given the revolutionary fervour against the private property of the wealthy:

> *The contrast of affluence and wretchedness continually meeting and offending the eye is like dead and living bodies chained together […] It is only by organising civilisation upon such principles as to act as a system of pullies that the whole weight of misery can be removed […] In all great cases it is necessary to have a principle more universally active than charity; and, with respect to justice, it ought not to be left to the choice of detached individuals whether they will do justice or not […] When wealth and splendour, instead of fascinating the multitude excite emotions of disgust […] when the ostentatious appearance it makes serves to call the right of it in question, the case of property becomes critical. It is only in a system of justice that the possessor can contemplate security (Paine 1797, 15-16).*

Interestingly, Paine's (1797) proposal applied to both men and women, which was unusual for the time. However, he was mum on the question of a dividend for the colonised and enslaved. This is especially ironic given that the United States was home to more than a million expropriated Native Americans and enslaved Africans (US Census 1793). While Paine was a critic of the institution of slavery, his reluctance to reject the principle of private property accumulated through a racialised process of expropriation limited its scope. The French Directorate never took up Paine's proposal, though they eventually adopted National Workshops akin to the 'Poor-Law Bastilles of Manchester' much to Lafargue's (18883) dismay. While a quasi-UBI was introduced with the Speenhamland Law, its swift replacement with the Poor Law Amendment Act soon after, highlighted the precarity of a countermovement towards decommodification, if disconnected from labour and consumer protections.

Since, the idea of universal basic income has resurfaced during cyclical periods of capitalist crisis. Concerned about the labour-replacing effects of automation in the United States, Martin Luther King Jr (1967) proposed a guaranteed income pegged to the median wage. The problem, he argued, was no longer the organisation of production – which created the conditions for abundance – but how rents were distributed: *We have so energetically mastered production that we now must give attention to distribution (171).* With the collapse of communism, UBI

gained a new lease on life as a radical alternative to socialism that was both morally desirable and economically feasible. Socialist planning, van der Veen and van Parijs (1986) argued, had led neither to abundance nor better working conditions. Instead, they suggested that a universal grant, unconditionally awarded to every citizen as a right, could constitute an alternative path towards communism. Coupled with the deregulation of the labour market – removing barriers to part-time work and the abolition of minimum wages – UBI would spread employment and cheapen labour, making it economically feasible and morally desirable.

Ironically, the resurgence of interest in UBI, has been given a boost precisely by the unravelling of standard employment relationships that van der Veen and van Parijs (1986) propose (Standing and Samson 2003; Seekings 2005; Suplicy 2007; Hanlon, at al. 2010; Ferguson 2015; Marais 2020). Progressive proponents of UBI argue that it would reduce poverty and inequality while establishing a wage floor below which workers could refuse to work. This would give workers greater power to negotiate working conditions and strengthen the social basis of unions. Furthermore, it would enable people to engage in socially meaningful activities outside of the labour market. Its universal character would avoid the costly selection processes and errors of inclusion or exclusion that are endemic to means-tested social welfare programmes. At the same time, its unconditional nature would prevent capital from coercing recipients into ultra-low-wage labour (Castel-Branco 2020).

Of course, conservative critics argue that UBI would amount to an unlimited strike fund, which is what progressive forces hope. Instead, they have tended to deploy a paternalistic discourse – e.g. the poor cannot be trusted with cash for they will squander it on vices – to neutralise popular support for UBI. However, existing experience with cash transfers has widely debunked this argument, showing that most recipients spend the transfers on food, transport, school and medical bills. While conservative critics fear that UBI would fuel a sense of entitlement and dependency, proponents argue that it would empower the un(der)employed to pursue income-generating activities (Castel-Branco 2020). And finally, while critics suggest that it is morally wrong to receive 'something for nothing', proponents maintain that a UBI should be conceived of as a social dividend to which all who inhabit the earth are entitled to, based on the idea of a rightful share (Fouksman and Klein 2019).

However, UBI is a slippery idea embraced by both the political Left and the political right. Progressives are concerned that UBI—if delinked from other labour, social and consumer

protections—could end up subsidising the exploitative foundations of capitalism rather than undermining them. Evidence from existing cash transfer programmes shows that big retailers benefit the most from social grants. In South Africa, for instance, more money is spent on grant payment day that on payday (Vally 2016). Furthermore, as during the Speenhamland Law, capital has successfully leverage public funds to subsidise workers' low wages (Americans for Tax Fairness 2014). Finally, most proposals for UBI have been well below the line of working poverty. Therefore, workers cannot realistically withhold their labour or pursue socially meaningful activities outside of the labour market (Castel-Branco 2020).

Like, any policy, the devil is in the details. Progressive proposals set the value of the transfer at around the individual poverty line; conceive of it as additional to, rather than a replacement for, existing forms of welfare provisioning; and recognise that welfare provisioning is part of a broader set of labour, social and consumer protections aimed at increasing the social wage and improving working conditions. Finally, and critically, they place state administration at the centre of welfare provisioning (Olin Wright 2010). While van der Veen and van Parijs (1986) leave the question of political struggle unexplored, they recognise its importance in defining the terms of redistribution and thus its emancipatory potential. However, they too are somewhat vague about what social forces will drive forth a radical politics of redistribution:

> *The choice of the tax rate […] will be determined by power relationships in the context of current material conditions. It is these material conditions rapid labour-saving technical change combined with compelling constraints on economic growth – that will turn the capitalist transition to communism from a utopian dream into a historical necessity, not in the sense that it will happen automatically, no matter what people think or do, but in the sense that given the material conditions, human rationality can be relied upon to generate, sooner or later, political forces that will bring it about (van der Veen and van Parijs 1986, 652).*

In South Africa, universal basic income was first proposed by the Congress of South African Trade Unions in 1998, backed by a broad alliance of civil society organisations. However, the proposal was opposed by many in government who argued that it was unaffordable, would disincentivise participation in the labour market and create a culture of dependency. Instead, the government expanded other forms of social provisioning, including the Child Support Grant and the EPWP (Harris and Scully 2015). Nevertheless, two decades on, the ruling party's social transformation committee has agreed to a phased implementation of UBI (ANC 2019).

In South Africa, the C-19 People's Coalition – an alliance of over 310 social movements, trade unions, community organisations and non-governmental organisations (C-19 People's Coalition, 2020)– has played a critical role in showing that UBI is fiscally viable and building power around its most progressive versions (IEJ 2021). However, for low-income countries the introduction of UBI may be politically challenging. On the one hand, redistribution requires both adequate production and the efficient appropriation of surplus value by the state. While digitalisation may facilitate the distribution of cash, it does not resolve the revenue-raising challenges faced by states with limited administrative and financial capacity. On the other hand, where cash transfer programmes have been largely driven by international development agencies, their proliferation may in fact not reflect a politics of claim-making at all, but rather policy alliances between the government and development agencies (Buur and Salimo 2018).

Conclusion: the limits of a radical politics of distribution

This chapter explored the theoretical and empirical debates regarding emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers, as part of a radical politics of redistribution based on the notion of a 'rightful share'. The first section located the resurgence of interest in cash transfers within longstanding debates about the redistributive role of the state with capitalist development. Using a Foucauldian framework, it argued that social welfare is a technique of discipline which has been historically deployed by the state – albeit unevenly – to enforce social order and funnel the expropriated and excluded into low-wage labour. However, social welfare is also a site of struggle, the outcome of which is neither linear nor predetermined. As Piven and Cloward (1971) illustrated, during periods of labour surplus, social welfare has tended to expand to quell social unrest; as unrest subsides, it has tended to compel the poor into ultra-low wage-work. In this regard, social welfare's historic role has been as a secondary and supportive institution to the labour market.

The second section discussed the proliferation of cash transfers across the postcolonial South, as a response to and an extension of neoliberalism. It argued that while cash transfers can certainly claw back concessions from capital, the notion that they alone can transform class relations is politically naïve. Indeed, cash transfers in the global South have tended to be highly targeted, conditional on some form of behaviour modification and inadequate to meet households' reproductive needs. In fact, rather than delinking the means of subsistence from the means of production, many have tended to do the exact opposite. Furthermore, the

digitalisation of cash transfers has opened new frontiers of accumulation for financial capital which threaten to accelerate what Lavinas (2018) dubs as the 'collateralisation of the poor'. Finally, across much of Africa, the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers have been undermined by the inordinate power wielded by international development agencies.

The third section focuses on the example of public works programmes. It argues that public works are not an adequate form of social welfare provisioning. Most are heavily rationed and have limited scope, pay ultra-low wages and are too short-term to have a meaningful impact, and result in poor infrastructure due to a lack of supervision. Nevertheless, the nature of public works programmes varies depending on the class politics which underlies them. Ultimately, Ulriksen (2014) argues that delinking public works programmes from social welfare would allow for an analysis of how to improve wages, working conditions and training opportunities on the one hand, and how to expand social security for able-bodied adults of working age on the other:

> *We should be more sceptical about PWPs' social protection role and instead think of the provision of employment opportunities as something outside the area of social protection […]. employment – at least traditionally – is something that falls outside social protection; social protection is instead a mechanism to ensure that people do not fall into poverty in situations where they are unable to work (Ulriksen 2014).*

The final section draws on the case of UBI, to unpack the contradictions of an 'anti-work' politics centred on redistribution alone. The case of the Speenhamland Law provides an important warning to contemporary proponents of UBI: without complementary labour, social and consumer protections, UBI could end up subsidising the exploitative basis of capitalism rather than undermining it. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of historically specific analysis of the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers. The next section explores the evolution of social welfare in Mozambique, tracing the patterns and processes that have shaped state discourse and practice in a country located at the periphery of the world economy.

Chapter 4: The Evolution of Social security in Mozambique

> *Do you know the story of the beggar woman who sits in the same place every day begging? When you pass her, you feel sorry for her; her clothes are tattered, she walks with a limp. But when the sun sets, she takes off her rags, collects her change, heads to a snazzy bar and orders a Superbock [imported beer][…] Some people just don't have a culture of work.* – Former Deputy Minister of MGCAS, National Social Protection Conference (2014).

The National Social Protection Conference is a biannual roadshow organised by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) and funded by international development agencies. Its stated purpose is to raise the profile of the social welfare sector, foster public debate and mobilise resources to expand the fiscal space for cash transfer programmes (ILO 2019a). However, the conference is also an opportunity for development agencies to showcase their support. In the run-up to the event, agencies jostle over whose logo will be included and how prominent it will be, who will offer opening remarks and in what order, and how many front row seats will be allocated to each. For social welfare players, the conference is as high-level as it gets. The guest list includes the President, the Prime Minister, and the Heads of Cooperation, though they are generally replaced by mid-level functionaries at the last minute. Despite the gradual expansion of cash transfer programmes, social welfare remains a peripheral priority for both the government and development agencies.

Perhaps the most engaging aspect of the conference are the debates between state technocrats, civil society representatives and academics, who use the rare opportunity to discuss concrete challenges associated with the administration of cash transfer programmes. Their incisive contributions stand in sharp contrast to the lethargic platitudes of senior government officials—including MGCAS' former Deputy Minister, quoted above. The Deputy Minister's fixation on the beggar woman who drinks *Superbock* – a trope as old as the idea of social welfare itself – reflects the ruling party's ambivalence towards social welfare. In recent years, the colonial idiom 'to lack a culture of work' has resurfaced in the political lexicon as Frelimo elites attempt to deflect from redistributive demands amidst rising poverty and inequality (Chichava 2009). By condemning the wretched for their poverty and lauding the rich for their wealth, elite narratives abstract from the violence of recurring rounds of dispossession that have incited cyclical waves of insurgency against the postcolonial state, most recently by Ansar-al-Sunna.


Despite the ruling party's vacillation on social welfare, the Mozambican government has expanded the social security system. The *Lei da Segurança Social* – Social Security Law – defines social security as a right and establishes two main pillars for its provision (RdM 2007). The first pillar is the contributory social insurance scheme, primarily for salaried workers in the formal economy. Funded by the contributions of workers and employers, it covers approximately 700,000 people (INE 2020). The second pillar is the non-contributory social welfare system, for vulnerable households living in absolute poverty. Funded by national budget allocations, it covers approximately 600,000 households. The most extensive social welfare programme is the *Programa do Subsídio Social Básico* – the Basic Social Subsidy Programme – which provides an unconditional cash transfer to labour-constrained households. The second-largest is the PASP, which provides a conditional cash transfer for able-bodied adults of working age, conditioned on participation on labour-intensive public works (UNICEF and ILO 2020).

Despite the consolidation of a legal framework for social security, only 10 per cent of Mozambicans have access to social security benefits through contributory and non-contributory schemes (Castel-Branco and Sambo 2020). On the one hand, widespread poverty and informality constrain the scope of the contributory social insurance system (MEF 2016; INE 2019). On the other hand, inadequate budget allocations to the non-contributory social welfare system hindered its expansion. This chapter explores the patterns and processes that have shaped the Mozambican government's discourse and practice regarding contributory and non-contributory social security. It draws on a range of archival sources including official government documents, newspaper articles and semi-structured interviews with key informants, to historicise contemporary debates. The first section is set in the early colonial era, marked by the rise of the *Indigenato* and the emergence of segregated relief funds in booming sectors. The second centres on the late colonial period, which saw widespread labour and social reforms, including the expansion of provident funds and the introduction of residual social welfare programmes under a fascist state. The third examines the postcolonial years, which heralded universalistic forms of social provisioning, as the socialist state stripped away the colonial infrastructures of exclusion. The fourth and final section traces the transition to a market economy and the development of the current social security system. Through this conjunctural analysis, the chapter argues that the Mozambican government's seemingly incongruous position on cash transfer programmes is rooted in an accumulated and contradictory history, which can be traced back to the colonial period.

'Para o Inglês ver': the abolition of slavery and rise of the Indigenato, 1878-1961

The Portuguese expression '*para o Inglês ver*' – literally translated as for the Englishman to see – has its origins in the abolition of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century. The metaphor refers to something which appears to be what it is not. Although the Portuguese conceded to British abolitionists in 1858, they prolonged the slave trade for decades through a combination of trickery and avoidance (BO 1858). In the African colonies, the slave trade was officially abolished in 1869 by which point official records suggest that only the occasional slave ship departed Mozambique's shores (Capela 2002). However, as Figure 10 illustrates, Mozambique remained a site of illicit trade for decades, with the complicity of French colonial capital (Newitt 1995). Indeed, the last recorded ship of enslaved Mozambicans set sail for Brazilian shores in 1882 (Ferrez 2016). Moreover, freed slaves remained bound to their former *patronus* as *libertus,* a concept inspired by Roman Law (DG 1869a). Only in 1875 was the status of *libertus* extinguished. However, the formerly enslaved remained under the state's 'guardian-ship', which effectively obliged them to sell their labour to the *patronus* or a colonial enterprise as far afield as São Tome and Príncipe (DG 1875). Only those considered to have mastered a trade or who knew how to read and write were exempt from this obligation.

Figure 10: Picture of enslaved Mozambicans on a French vessel en route to Brazil, c.1882



Source: (Ferrez 2016)

With the adoption of the *Regulamento para os Contractos de Serviçaes e Colonos nas Províncias da Africa Portugueza* – the Regulation for the Contracting of Servants and Colonisers in the Provinces of Portuguese Africa – the *libertus* were finally freed in 1878 (DG 1878)[2]. According to the Regulation: '*No one shall be obliged to contract their services, with the exception of individuals found to be vagrants, who will continue to be obliged to work*' (DG 1878, art 3). Vagrants included those without a means of subsistence or a recognised profession, wageworkers absent from work for more than 15 days, those who refused to undertake the activities outlined in the contract and workers who sought to organise fellow workers. Those found to be vagrants were subjected to forced labour on public works for two years at a rate set by the Governor. To incentivise enforcement, the decree established that whistle-blowers would receive half of all fines collected due to non-compliance (DG 1878).

The deployment of vagrancy laws to exact cheap labour was not unique to the Portuguese colonial project. Yet in Mozambique, vagrancy laws were used to uphold a complex web of formal and informal, legal and administrative controls over citizenship, work and mobility, known as the *Indigenato*. The evolution of the *Indigenato* was piecemeal, uneven, contested, but ultimately totalising. Initially, the obligation to sell one's labour to colonial capital only applied to the formerly enslaved. Indeed, the Civil Code of 1867 (BO 1867) – extended to the African colonies via decree (DG 1869b) – established that citizenship rights applied equally to all regardless of skin colour, religion, race, or sex. Yet, without the capital necessary to meet its colonial ambitions, Portugal's ability to effectively colonise the territories to which it was assigned during the Berlin conference, rested on its ability to compel unwaged and unfree African workers to labour for colonial capital. Following a trip to Mozambique and Angola, the chief architect of the colonial labour regime, Antonio Ennes, concluded:

> *At present, only if they [the colonies] are made fertile by the labour of their populations, will the square kilometres of abundant land, which we acquired with so much effort and retain at such cost, give us and save for us—as they can and must save and produce abundantly—this gold which the credit markets threaten to sell us only at the price of autonomy. This robust labour is bound to remain inert or lax so long as the coconut trees provide coconuts and the sun diffuses enervating heat. It must be given movement and energy, first certainly by stimulating self-interest, but then and always by powerful external stimuli (Ennes 1893, cited in Harris 1958, 18).*

[2] The term *serviçais* refers to Africans contracted for wage-work, while term *colono* refers to Africans contracted to settle concessional lands.

Meneses (2010) argues that it was during this period that a science of colonisation took root, under the paternalistic guise of 'civilisation'. As the colonial state consolidated control over the territory per the terms of the Berlin Conference, abolitionist conceptions of citizenship gave way to a legal differentiation between indigenous and non-indigenous, paving the way for a dual labour regime (DG 1894). Initially, the definition of indigenous was sociocultural rather than based on physical characteristics, highlighting the relative power of the mixed African bourgeoisie (Zamparoni 2008): *'For the purpose of this decree, only those born in the overseas territories, to an indigenous father and mother, and who do not distinguish themselves from their race by their instruction and common customs, are considered indigenous'* (DG 1894, art 10). Over time, the definition of non-indigenous became narrower and narrower, ultimately forcing all of African descent to meet a series of strict requirements to obtain partial citizenship. These included abandoning all customs associated with one's race, fluency in spoken and written Portuguese, monogamy, and holding a profession that was compatible with European' civilisation' – in other words, which provided sufficient income to legally afford housing, food, clothing, and sustenance for their families.

So difficult was it to become an *assimilado* that at the end of the *Indigenato* only 0.7 per cent of Angolans and 0.07 per cent of Mozambicans had *assimilado* status (Duffy 1959). However, even those who managed to secure the status of *assimilado* remained partial citizens: subject to racism, arbitrary corporal punishment and discrimination in the workplace. Furthermore, their status could be revoked if they were found to be practising African habits and customs, and the status of *assimilado* could not be passed onto their children (Penvenne 1994). These changes were bitterly contested by the mixed African bourgeoisie, as the following excerpt by João Albasini in *O Brado Africano* suggests:

> *Portugal deports her unclean, illiterate kubvanas [rabble] here, to live off rural women, must we assimilate to be their equal? [...] If Africans have to pay [for an assimilation document] to prove they are civilised and fit to mix with whites, why not tax whites who are uncivilised and live-in common-law arrangements with Africans (Albasini, 1917 in Penvenne 1994, 65)?*

With the *Indigenato* formalised, the colonial state then embarked on legalising the use of *Xibalo* or forced labour. In 1899 it adopted the *Lei do Trabalho Indígena* – the Indigenous Labour Law – cementing the legal basis for *Xibalo*: '*all indigenous of the overseas Portuguese provinces are subject to the moral and legal obligation to attempt to seek through work the means they lack, to subsist and to improve their social condition'* (DG 1899, art 1). Only

Africans who owned capital, produced goods for export, practised a recognised profession or could prove that they were wage-labourers were considered legitimate workers, thereby devaluing autonomous sources of sustenance. Notably, the use of *Xibalo* labour for private profit was never legalised, and in fact, the Law stipulated that all indigenous '*have the liberty to choose how to fulfil this obligation'* (DG 1899, art 1). Furthermore, because the formal distinction was never explicitly between black and white – and there was a possibility for so-called indigenous to assume non-indigenous status once assimilated – apologists of Portuguese colonialism such as Freyre (1952) painted the Lusophone world as a multiracial tropical paradise. However, as the dissident colonial labour inspector, Henrique Galvão would later describe, Portuguese colonialism was far from benign:

> *The state acts as a recruiting and distributing agent for labour on behalf of settlers who as though it was quite natural, write to the Department of Native Affairs for the supply of workers. In some cases, the situation is worse than pure slavery. Under slavery, after all, the native is bought as an animal, his owner preferring that he remains as fit as a horse, while here the native is not bought, he is hired from the state although he is called a free man and his employer cares little if he is sick or dies (Galvão 1947).*

The local administrator had the power to decide who entered and left the district; what transactions could take place; which professions could be exercised and by whom; which crops could be cultivated and sold; who should be considered for partial citizenship as an *assimilado* and who should be conscripted into *Xibalo* for six months; who should be whipped with a *palmatória* (wooden bat) and who should be deported to São Tomé and Príncipe as punishment (Harris 1958; Penvenne 1994). Both public and private companies could requisition *Xibalo* workers. Private contractors were required to pay a wage, but this generally amounted to little more than 'cigarette money' for the *mussoco* or hut tax. Indeed, in some cases, *Xibalo* workers ditched their deferred wages at the administrator's office to avoid re-recruitment into forced labour (Chilundo 2001). Dimandane, a former mine worker turned pastor in the village of Temane, describes the spectre of fear that reigned in the countryside:

> *We grew up seeing out parents tied up and taken to forced labour. Every year the administrator would enter the chieftaincy and take the census. Bosses who needed workers would also come. The administrator would speak to the chief and the chief would send sepoys to capture you like a vagrant who didn't work. You didn't have to be guilty of anything. Twelve months of hard labour. The little you earned, they would deduct for taxes. And if they didn't find you, they took your wife (Interview with Dimandane 2016).*

It was not unusual for the state to recruit *Xibalo* workers from remote regions and channel them to nodes of accumulation far away. Inhassoro's colonial economy for instance, was limited to fishing, paid domestic work and tourism. Joaquim Alves – a Portuguese boxer turned entrepreneur – was the only prominent businessman. In addition to an animal farm and network of *cantinas*, he owned several beach resorts which promised dazzling coral sands, crystal clear waters and delectable food to wealthy Rhodesian tourists. Nicknamed *xixindzi* – because like a *xindzi* or palm rat he was always on the move, burrowing his head in his beloved car like a rat burrows their head in a hole – he was considered a comparatively better employer than most. However, jobs were limited, and men struggled to meet their legal obligation to work. Many were sent as far afield as Beira to work as loaders on the railway and port complex, or Xinavane to lash sugarcane, or Nampula to pick cotton and build the railroads. Many *Xibalo* projects – in particular the construction of railroads and other public works (Figure 11) – were 'death camps' due to the absence of occupational health and safety standards and adequate equipment (Penvenne 1994; Chilundo 2001).

To implement *Xibalo*, the colonial administration relied on a hierarchy of traditional leaders including *mwenes* (local chiefs) and *khaapu* (assistants). To justify the forced recruitment of workers, they drew on precolonial practices rooted in the notion of the *direito consuetudinário* – a mandatory labour contribution for the chief and chieftaincy (Chilundo 2001). Chiefs who acquiesced to colonial demands were rewarded with the power to protect themselves and their dearest from the violence of colonialism. chiefs who resisted, risked corporal punishment and humiliation, imprisonment, and deportation. Caught between a rock and a hard place, the son of the Inhassoro chief recalls, they had little choice but to collaborate with the colonial regime:

> *Anything the white man said, the black man had to accept. The chief had to track down taxes and if he didn't do it, he would be investigated. The basis of investigation was the palmatória. But the chief had some space for manoeuvre. He would only show the sepoys some homes, while hiding the homes of those he liked, to protect them from registration (Interview with Zacarias 2016).*

Zacarias himself was forcibly recruited into domestic work when he was just twelve. Granted, a highly paid domestic worker not only earned more than most African workers but remained fairly independent (Penvenne 1994). Indeed, through his job Zacarias was able to pursue an education, learn Portuguese, secure the status of *assimilado*, travel to Portugal and land a highly skilled job upon his return. Nevertheless, it also reflects the fact that the power asymmetries were such that he could not refuse to work – or the administrator's daughter's sexual advances:

> *They [employers] treated me well. They bought me clothing and I began to change. They registered me as an assimilado, I was no longer considered indigenous, and I received an identity document […] In 1958, they moved to Portugal. The boss was a pilot for TAP and was absent for long periods. When he was gone, she forced me to be her husband. But it became complicated and I returned to Mozambique. It took 28 days and 28 nights. When I arrived in Beira, I pretended I was a railway worker and was hired as a typist (Interview with Zacarias 2016).*

With few options for decent wage-work, many fled to the mines of the Rand where wages were higher and paid more regularly. Dimandane worked several contracts with the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) from 1954 to 1974. Although backbreaking and dangerous work, he recalls, he managed to accumulate some assets:

> *I worked in the mines, deep underground. I was an engineer, responsible for scouting the underground rivers. It was dangerous work. You had to watch out for the rocks because they could fall. And there were snakes; a serpent that lived in the mine, that could blow fire and kill you […] When we first went, we thought that we were being contracted but actually we were being enslaved. But I bought many things during that time: plates, cutlery, blankets, clothing, a sewing machine, so many things (Interview with Dimandane 2016).*

For some, *Xibalo* was a steppingstone to the mines of the Rand. For instance, Francisco submitted voluntarily for *Xibalo* in order to secure an identity card and be able to apply to WNLA (Interview with Fulani 1981). After lashing cane in Xinavane for six months, he landed a job on the mines and like Dimandane, only returned home at independence.

Figure 11: Picture of Xibalo workers in the construction of the Oosterlyn c.1894



Source: Photo by C.S. Fowler, in Lima (1971, 131)

For the Portuguese colonial state, the labour demand from neighbouring countries was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it attracted much needed foreign exchange from miners' deferred wages paid in gold. On the other hand, it compounded the problem of labour scarcity for colonial capital (First 1983). Eventually, the colonial state opted to barter African labour to advance regional economic interests. In exchange for granting WNLA a monopoly over labour recruitment south of the River Save, the Transvaal Republic and later Union of South Africa, guaranteed port and rail traffic on the Oosterlyn, linking Lourenço Marques to the Rand (Katzenellenbogen 1982). North of the Save, the colonial state leased large tracts of land to the chartered Mozambique, Niassa and Zambézia companies; though it retained direct administrative control over the district of Nampula (Newitt 1995). Yet, even in areas outside of WNLA's recruitment perimeter, men improvised ways to escape the violence of Portuguese colonial control. As a former migrant worker from the district of Ribáuè recalls, there were underground recruiters at plantations, who connected workers to smugglers who would guide them to neighbouring Malawi or Zimbabwe in the dead of night. Once across the border, informal labour brokers would connect them to recruiting agents across Southern Africa:

> *There was an Indian man in Malawi called Carimo. Our wives would prepare the maize and cassava for the long trip by foot. We walked at night because during the day the sepoys monitored the roads. When we reached the river there was this cry, like a child's cry, similar to a bird. The chief of the group would tell us to climb a tree and like a propeller plane we flew to the other side. It was magic. Clandestine resistance and magic. When we arrived in Malawi, we worked on tobacco plantations. If we were a large group, they would send us to Zimbabwe. The bosses from Joni would sometimes recruit for the mines. That was good work. I am sad that I did not go to the mines; for that, you had to be a big man. All this just to flee the suffering in Mozambique (Interview with Interview with Laurencio 2016).*

Of course, for the women who remained behind life became even more difficult. In the district of Ribáuè for instance, the wives of defectors were closely monitored and had to assume the full burden of tax obligations to the colonial state, the labour contribution to the chief, cotton and rice cultivation under the forced cropping regime, all while cultivating food to meet the household's reproductive needs. The introduction of forced cotton and rice production effectively extended *Xibalo* to women. *Camponeses* under a cotton concession were obliged to cultivate fifty meters of cotton each to be sold at below market prices. Regina, a camponesa in Ribáuè, recalls the experience:

> *Cotton was the only product that could be sold. They would come, measure a portion of land and say, 'here you will cultivate cotton'. Each person had to cultivate at least fifty metres; we didn't have a choice. The whites and their*

> *capatazes (overseers) controlled the machambas. If you stopped to rest or left before the bell rang, they would beat you right there in the field. That's why some women boiled seeds so that they wouldn't germinate. They hoped to convince the whites that the soil was not hospitable to cotton […] In Malema, the chief of Namicunha gave directions that anyone who let their seeds germinate would suffer. To this day no one produces cotton there (Interview with Regina 2016).*

With the completion of the railway which crossed Ribáuè, there was a rapid expansion of settler-owned tobacco plantations and demand for labour increased. *Camponeses* were often forcibly recruited when returning from the *machamba* (Navoholo 2010). Forced recruitment was highest, during the most labour-intensive period of the agricultural cycle, further undermining household production of food crops. The Roman Catholic Mission of Iapala was among the most prominent consumers of unpaid labour in the district. Under the guise of teaching African children modern farming techniques, it drew on child labour to cultivate its extensive tobacco plantations (Caramelo 1966). Vanda recalls how girls would hide from colonial administrators and sepoys, to avoid recruitment and the risk of sexual violence:

> *When they came, we would flee to the bush, because some girls were always selected to sleep with the administrator or sepoys. But they caught me and made me go. I was 13 and spent a year in the Mission. In the mornings we cleared the bush, planted and cultivated tobacco. In the afternoon we would learn about the Bible, God's commandments, how to respect our husbands and children and clean. If a boy wanted to marry us, they went there, but they had to work for a year for free before we were freed (Interview with Vanda 2016).*

The expansion of colonial capital in Mozambique, lead to the introduction of short-term social insurance benefits to compensate formally employed workers for workplace accidents. The first scheme was the *Caixa de Socorros para o Caminho de Ferro Portuguez de Lourenço Marques ao Transvaal* – the Welfare Fund for the Portuguese Railways from Lourenço Marques to the Transvaal (BOM 1892). Instituted by decree in 1892, it reflected the growing prominence of the port and railway complex with the completion of the *Oosterlyn* (Katzenellenbogen 1982). It was also an attempt by the Portuguese colonial state to assert patronage among a workforce mainly employed by British capital (Penvenne 1994). The Fund was financed by revenues from advertisements, beverage sales, unclaimed cargo and fines. Members were eligible for short-term funeral benefits, medical assistance, a daily subsidy for well-behaved injured workers and subsidised loans (BOM 1892). Any port or railway worker holding a *Quadro* (permanent) position was eligible to be a member – and indeed many non-European workers initially were, including João Albasini cited above. However, as the colonial state

expanded its influence over the territory, it became increasingly difficult for non-European labour to access such positions (Penvenne 1994).

Following the republican revolution, the Fund was replaced by the socialist *Caixa de Socorros da União Ferroviária* – the Railway Union Relief Fund. Founded in 1911, the Railway Union was a departure from the corporatist worker formations established under the monarchy. Its key objectives included defending its members' economic interests, improving social benefits; erecting libraries, hospital wards, cooperatives; and establishing a provident fund (Capela 1980). However, like prevailing Funds, it was limited to *Quadro* and permanent positions – and by then most Africans had been relegated to backbreaking jobs as casual and *Xibalo* workers. Although African workers did repeatedly strike to demand their incorporation into the Fund, the union's European socialist leadership turned the other way, and they were summarily repressed (Penvenne 1994). Clearly, the Republican promise of liberty, fraternity and equality had come to only apply to a minority of European settlers.

In 1914, the colonial state replaced the Fund with the state-owned *Montepio Ferroviário* – the Railway Workers' Mutual Fund. The Mutual Fund was a mandatory provident scheme funded by workers and employers' contributions based on annual profit shares. It provided the most expansive set of benefits to date, including paid sick leave, a disability pension in case of workplace accidents, a funeral subsidy and survivor's pension for the family, and subsidised home loans. Although members of the Railway Union initially opposed its unilateral introduction by management, the benefits were extremely attractive and militant opposition was soon dispelled (Capela 1980). However, in 1917 the republican state suspended the *Montepio* in response to a general strike for higher wages and an 8-hour workday. Under the pretext of World War I, strikers were rounded up, conscripted into the military, and stripped of their social security benefits. As class struggle intensified, the Fund became a source of leverage for management against militant unionists. Despite or perhaps because of growing state repression, the union's leadership was steadfast in its resistance to building alliances with African workers. Instead, they advocated for the consolidation of the colour bar (Penvenne 1994).

With the acceleration of industrialisation under the fascist *Estado Novo* – the New State – there was a proliferation of provident funds across all sectors of the economy (Capela 1980). Like the Funds for port and railway workers, coverage was restricted to *Quadro* and permanent positions. Furthermore, in comparison with the region, the quality of benefits was generally

substandard and limited to short-term subsidies rather than long-term pensions. This posed a challenge to the colonial state, which was intent on attracting a European settler class. If Mozambique were to compete with its wealthier neighbours for skilled and semi-skilled labour, state technocrats argued, it was imperative that it meet workers' modernist aspirations. After all, settlers in particular, had no extended family or land to return to (ITPASM 1966).

In 1956, the colonial state approved a new labour regime for skilled and semi-skilled workers in the colonies, which included the introduction of a complementary contributory scheme managed by the *Caixa Económica do Montepio de Moçambique* – the Mozambique Mutual Bank (DG 1956). Benefits included both short-term subsidies and long-term pensions. Furthermore, the colonial government introduced the *Abono de Família* – the Family Allowance – a monthly subsidy provided to married workers (ITPASM 1966, 20). However, most African workers were excluded from these measures. The colonial state argued that they did not need benefits because they were migrant workers with 'traditional' safety nets in rural areas. And besides, they did not have the contributory capacity (Quive 2004). Far from the remnants of a pre-colonial past however, 'traditional' forms of social security were the product of a racialised process of proletarianisation (O'Laughlin 2000).

In the late colonial period, militant strikes by African workers and mounting international pressure forced the colonial state to reform the labour and social security system. The debacle surrounding the ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour (ILO 1957) reveals how African liberation movements leveraged institutions of global governance to advance the struggle for decolonisation. In 1959, Portugal ratified ILO Convention 105, with little intention of enforcing it. However, liberation movements called its bluff, and the newly independent government of Ghana filed a complaint with the ILO regarding Portugal's violations in its African colonies. The witness list included Marcelino dos Santos of the *União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique* – the National Democratic Union of Mozambique; Amílcar Cabral of the *Partido Africano de Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* – the African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde; Miguel Trovoada of the *Comité para a Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe* – the Committee for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe; and João Gabriel Du of the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* – the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (ILO 1962). Following an extensive investigation, the ILO's commission of inquiry recommended that the government of Portugal repeal all laws related to the moral obligation to work, compulsory labour, and state assistance to labour recruiters.

In 1961, the colonial state created the *Instituto do Trabalho, Segurança Social e Acção Social* – the Institute for Labour, Social Security and Social Action; introduced a labour inspectorate; repealed all laws associated with the *Indigenato,* and the legal differentiation between indigenous and non-indigenous; and eliminated the legal obligation of African workers to produce value for colonial capital. For the first time in nearly a century, not working for colonial capital was no longer a crime. Indeed, any person who imposed compulsory labour would be liable to imprisonment for up to two years (DG 1962). Yet, subsequent investigations by the ILO found continued evidence of forced labour in Portugal's African colonies (ILO 1966). Their findings helped to build the diplomatic case for an armed liberation struggle and support for Frelimo as the only legitimate representative of the aspirations of colonised peoples in Mozambique. The next section explores the shifting labour-citizenship nexus as Mozambique moved closer to independence.

From indigenous to rural worker: the end of the Indigenato and the rise of the Rural Labour Code, 1962-1974

In the late colonial period, the state introduced widespread labour and social security reforms, to appease both national and international detractors. However, two distinct labour codes remained. 'Skilled' and 'semi-skilled' workers were governed by Decree 1595 (DG 1956). They were paid a monthly wage plus the Family Allowance, were allowed to join corporatist trade unions and their respective provident funds and had the option to contribute to the Mozambique Mutual Bank. In Lourenço Marques, there were 36,461 workers in this category, of which 82 per cent were European, 7 per cent were mixed race, 6 per cent were Asian, and 5 per cent were African (Rita-Ferreira 1967).

Meanwhile, 'unskilled' workers were governed by the *Código do Trabalho Rural* – the Rural Labour Code (DG 1962). They were paid a daily wage equivalent to one-sixth of the wage for skilled and semi-skilled workers, were excluded from membership in trade unions and their respective provident funds and were ineligible for the Family Allowance. In Lourenço Marques, 457,340 workers were governed by this code, all of whom were African (Rita-Ferreira 1967). In many respects, the Rural Labour Code simply replaced the social construction of 'indigenous' with 'unskilled', 'assimilation' with 'skilling', and 'assimilated' with 'semi-skilled' (Guthrie 2018). As in previous decades, the colonial justification for excluding

'unskilled' workers from emerging provident funds was that they did not have contributory capacity due to their ultra-low wages and that their habits and customs made participation in social insurance schemes unworkable. After all, how would schemes be able to calculate the value of a survivor's pension in instances where men had multiple wives (Correia Pinto 1973)?

While the colonial state had historically deflected the responsibility for the provision of social security onto the mythological rural extended family, more than a fifth of African urban dwellers had lost claims to land in rural areas by the 1960s (Rita-Ferreira 1967). In response, the colonial state introduced the *Fundo de Acção Social no Trabalho Rural* – the Social Action Fund for Rural Workers (FAST) – for 'unskilled workers' covered by the Rural Labour Code (DG 1963). Funded by workers' unclaimed wages, the Fund was administered by the Institute for Labour, Social Providence and Social Action. Its stated objectives were to ensure social assistance for African households in rural areas facing a crisis of reproduction, to stem rural-urban migration, and to protect urban workers from their 'parasitic' extended families:

> *Free room and board represent an important form of economic support for many workers, especially when they are in charge of a large household. The traditional and well-known obligations of an extended family lead rural people, of different ages and both sexes, to leave their villages at the expense of relatives who assume they are well-off simply because they are contracted in urban centres. Hence situations of irresponsible parasitism are common (ITPASM 1967, 16).*

However, as Table 2 illustrates the Social Action Fund for Rural Workers amounted to little more than a strategy of *'para o inglês ver'*. Forms of assistance included free room and board for children in Catholic Mission schools, where they worked on plantations as unpaid labourers; scholarships for students to pursue vocational and tertiary education; subsidies to skill development programmes and other recreational activities; material donations to assist adults in kickstarting a business or building a home; medical assistance; and short-term benefits in case of invalidity or death (ITPASM 1967). Yet, the Fund was grossly underfunded. In 1964 for instance, the annual government expenditure amounted to US$ 120,000 in 2020 terms – which is equivalent to 0.1 per cent of current spending on social welfare programmes in Mozambique (UNICEF and ILO 2020). Unsurprisingly, the Fund was only able to assist 258 people, six families and 14 institutions that year.

Table 2: Social assistance coverage for workers under the FAST in Mozambique, 1964

Activity	Coverage	Budget (ESC, 1964)	Budget (USD, 1964)	Budget (USD, 2020)
Room and board in Catholic Missions	76 children	52,500	1,830	14,640
Scholarships for vocational training	8 students	14,000	490	3,920
Subsidies for skill development programmes	5 institutions	20,193	705	5,640
Modernisation of equipment	6 workers	15,718	550	4,400
Subsidies for home construction	1 worker	8,000	280	2,240
Access to prosthetics	3 workers	10,450	365	2,920
Short term sickness benefits	21 workers	19,110	666	5,328
Short-term disability benefits	96 workers	61,213	2,135	17,080
Short-term funeral benefits	6 families	14,174	495	3,960
Subsidies to institutions committed to workers' physical culture	2 sports clubs	24,000	835	6,680
Subsidies to folkloric groups	9 groups	15,900	555	4,440
Transport subsidy for needy workers	40 trips	17,137	600	4,800
Legal support for Portuguese citizens, victims of road accidents	7 workers	30,351	1,060	8,480
Subsidies for general education and social promotion of rural populations	Social services	80,000	2,789	22,312
Administrative costs	n/a	7,080	180	1,440
Tax collection	n/a	14,922	520	4,160
National defence	n/a	28,870	1,005	8,040
TOTAL	258 individuals 6 families 14 institutions	433,618	15,060	120,480

Source: ITPASM (1967)

Just two years before Mozambique won independence, the Provincial Labour Secretary, Correia Pinto (1973), made an impassioned case to extend social security to all. Not only would a comprehensive social security system incentivise European immigration, he argued, but it would foster a permanent African working class, which was essential if the colony were to sustain the rapid pace of industrialisation. Correia Pinto (1973) proposed a scheme that combined short-term benefits, such as sickness, tuberculosis, maternity, and family subsidies; with long-term benefits, including a disability, old-age and survivors' pension. Correia Pinto's (1973) proposal was never put into practice. Less than a year after its publication, the fascist colonial state was overthrown, ushering in the transition to an independent and socialist Mozambique.

From rural worker to the 'new man': the universalisation of entitlements at independence, 1975-1989

In 1975, Frelimo was sworn in as the only legitimate representative of the popular masses. The Constitution of the Popular Republic of Mozambique (RPM 1975) established the following objectives: eliminating the structures of colonial and traditional oppression and exploitation, strengthening popular democratic power, and creating the material and ideological basis for a socialist society (art 4). In a reversal of colonial conceptions of citizenship, the Constitution established that all citizens had equal rights, regardless of colour, race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, educational attainment, social position, or profession (art 26). Work was defined both as a right, and a responsibility, for only by increasing production and productivity could Mozambique overcome the underdevelopment brought about by colonialism (art 31). As the following excerpt by first president Samora Machel highlights, Frelimo defined work as an act of militancy, capable of cleansing society of colonial bourgeois and traditional feudal ills, making way for the emergence of the 'new man':

> *The struggle for economic independence entails more than anything else an increase in production. By raising our country's production, we change the nature of the relations we inherited from colonialism…What we manufacture, the way we work, how we discuss and plan production, provides a window into our class consciousness. In our republic where power belongs to the worker-peasant alliance, production is an act of militancy (Machel 1985, 111).*

Despite the emphasis on the primacy of production, Frelimo introduced a series of universal entitlements to increase the social wage, including the expansion of basic public services such as health and education, and subsidised housing and food. Furthermore, the Constitution established the right to social security in case of disability and old age (RPM 1975, art 32) though saw this as a gradual process given the highly fragmented system inherited from the colonial administration.

Yet, the transition to independence was fraught as hundreds of thousands of European settlers fled almost overnight. To sustain production and increase productivity, the provisional government empowered the state to intervene in the management of enterprises where there was evidence of sabotage, decapitalisation, or abandonment (BOM 1975). To administer 'interventioned' companies, the state created *Conselhos de Produção* or worker-run administrative commissions. Initially, the commissions were sites of popular democracy, where rank-and-file

workers could have a say in how to organise production. Workers were split into five departments. Economic issues was responsible for defining and monitoring production targets; social issues oversaw the extension of universal entitlements such as free childcare and transportation, access to social centres and holiday homes, and the extension of universal social security benefits; occupational health and safety monitored working conditions, and ensure that the correct banners were hung during public holidays; cultural issues promoted physical and cultural activities, and offered literacy and professional training. The commission also setup ad hoc, committees of inventors and reducers to improvise replacement parts for sabotaged machinery using local materials. However, it was the department of control and discipline, which had the most power. An autonomous unit, its primary objective was to elevate workers' class consciousness to observe order, report sabotage, accelerate production beyond the 'pace of a chameleon' and ensure that workers' rights were respected (Conselhos de Produção 1977). Through participation in administrative commissions, Frelimo argued, workers would into a class-conscious vanguard of the working class. According to the Inhambane provincial secretary of the *Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique* – the Organisation of Mozambican Workers – this was especially important given widespread sabotage:


> *The production councils were able to conscientise workers to change their behaviour, to leave the colonial mindset behind and assume their class position. The majority of companies in Mozambique were all semi-paralysed by workers acting on behalf of employers. They thought that if they sabotaged activities, they would be rewarded once the owners and managers returned. Others felt that since independence had been proclaimed, they could just come, sit and receive money, when in fact the contrary was true (OTM 2016).*

As Mozambique slid into deeper crisis and labour unrest intensified, administrative commissions assumed an increasingly disciplinary role (Marshall 2016). In retrospect, a former member of a *Conselho de Produção* reflects, there was a contradiction between the commissions' function as enforcers of centralised production targets and vectors of workers' grievances. However, in the context of revolution, this contradiction was not entirely apparent:

> *It was a context of complete revolution, in which the 'we' replaced the 'me'. To be called 'undisciplined' was a disgrace. The relations of production were collective—the interest of the company was the interest of the workers. The role of the worker was to produce wealth, which in turn all would benefit from equally. Wealth was redistributed through wages, access to free hospitals and education, almost everything was free (Interview with Dava 2016).*

While state intervention was initially a pragmatic response to the problems of decolonisation, it became a cornerstone of Frelimo's practice of power (Pitcher 2003). In the quest for legitimacy and hegemony, claim-making was readily misunderstood as a manifestation of the 'enemy within' (Frelimo 1977). Indeed, Frelimo produced a host of propaganda material which dismissed claim-makers as 'professional merchants', who changed job according to working conditions rather than the necessities of the country, thereby fostering instability, undermining production and ultimately national liberation. The cartoon character *Xiconhoca,* in Figure 12, became a 'floating signifier' for a parasitic, deadweight worker, who lacked class consciousness and operated in cahoots with foreign imperialist forces (Buur 2010). Such ideological instruments, Machava (2011) contends, fostered a culture of suspicion and punishment, profoundly disarticulated from the realities of everyday life. And ultimately, Penvenne points out, Xiconhoca *'was a man, created by men to communicate largely with men'* (Penvenne 2015, 30).

Figure 12:A cartoon of Xiconhoca, a saboteur of the national economy, 1977



Translation: 'he's a saboteur of the national economy, does not have class consciousness, is a deadweight in the workshop. In short, he's a Xiconhoca. Source: (FRELIMO 1979)

One of the sources of contention in the workplace was the question of social security. Although most African workers had been excluded from provident funds during colonialism, the dual labour regime was relaxed towards independence and thousands of workers in strategic sectors had stakes in contributory schemes. A handful of private companies, linked primarily to global capital, did continue to administer their own provident funds following independence (ILO 1979). Some nationalised enterprises, such as stevedore companies at the port and railway complex, honoured colonial arrangements on paper but struggled to deliver in practice (CEA 1981). As formerly unskilled workers rose to skilled positions, they expected the same social security benefits that their predecessors had enjoyed. However, as O'Laughlin (2002) describes the restructuring of employment relations at the port ultimately left many workers hanging:

> *There was not sufficient money in the union fund to cover all stevedores, let alone bring in the shore-handlers if a common pool were formed. Elderly stevedores kept on working as guards and cleaners while waiting for the pension to which they had contributed (O'Laughlin 2002, 22).*


Furthermore, complementary schemes like the Mozambique Mutual Bank were nationalised and workers' past contributions redirected to the newly minted *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento* – the Popular Development Bank (BOM 1977) – to provide agricultural credit to farmers (Pateguana 2016). However, for thousands of African workers who had made contributions to the Mutual Bank, this sowed the seeds of discontent and it would take more than three decades for them to secure a meagre compensation from the state (Cumbana 2008). In 1985, the state finally moved to harmonise the various social insurance schemes for formal sector workers. It introduced the right to a disability, old-age and survivor's pension; insurance against occupational accidents and professional diseases; 90 paid sick days and 60 days of paid maternity leave (BOM 1985). Besides, enterprises were forced to take out a group insurance plan with the *Empresa Moçambicana de Seguros* – the Mozambican Insurance Enterprise – though non-compliance was rife. Enterprises — three-quarters of which had been nationalised (Pitcher 2003) – argued that they could not afford to take out insurance given deficits. While the Frelimo government had proclaimed the 1980s the decade of victory against underdevelopment, a combination of failed agricultural policies with the forced collectivisation of the countryside (Bowen 2000), natural disasters including droughts and floods, and the intensification of the civil war brought production to a standstill. The Nampula OTM provincial secretary – a former machinist – recalls the gargantuan effort required, just to feed the cities and ensure the distribution of basic goods in the countryside:

> *From Nampula to Malema [a distance of 280km], it could take 30 days. At the start of each journey, wagons were loaded with water, petrol, railway tracks, military and first aid equipment, and enough food to feed the military convoy. It was normal to depart and find tracks missing. Villagers were forced by Renamo to disassemble the tracks and carry them far away. The risk of an ambush was high, so the military convoy would first search and secure the area. Then passengers would collect the tracks, carrying them on their shoulders, and begin to repair the line. It could take one to two weeks to repair a 1km stretch (OTM Nampula Provincial Secretary 2016).*

Meanwhile in the countryside, displaced *camponeses* struggled to sustain themselves. Dimandane tried to go back to the mines, but WNLA had dramatically reduced recruitment of migrant labour from Mozambique, due to the *Apartheid* regime's strategy of destabilisation on the one hand, and automation in the mining sector on the other. Instead, Dimandane went for military training at the Catholic Mission-turned army barracks in Maimelane, becoming a *miliciano* (militia). For a while he reluctantly worked on the *machamba do povo*: '*There were those who did not want to work. But I thought: 'look it's better to go, when you're in need who will help you.'* Eventually Dimandane had to flee Temane, leaving behind the '*plates, blankets, clothing and sewing machine'* he had bought with his miners' wages. When he returned in 1990, he found his house destroyed, his belongings pillaged, and his fields surrounded by land mines. An old man, he had little to show for his decades of work: no savings, no social security, and no prospects for employment.

Amidst mounting crisis and food shortages, the Frelimo government adopted for universal entitlements such as the *Novo Sistema de Abastecimento* – the New Distribution System. At its height, the New Distribution System provided food to nearly 100 per cent of registered urban and peri-urban dwellers (World Bank 1989). Food was distributed through a network of consumer cooperatives and private retailers who tracked household consumption via the *Cartão de Abastecimento* – Distribution Card (Figure 13). Food rations were set at approximately 1000 calories per capita and included maize, maize meal, rice, pasta, sugar, oil, salt, soap, fish, beans and occasionally other products (World Bank 1989). Residents could purchase subsidised food on a bimonthly or monthly basis. However, with the intensification of immigration from the countryside, the New Distribution System came under increasing strain. In response, the state purposefully delayed urban registration to disincentivise displaced families from remaining in the city. Consequently, urban households came to rely on the informal provision of commercialised food, which became one of the first sources of private accumulation following independence (Mackintosh and Wuyts 1988).

Figure 13: An example of a food distribution card, Maputo 1989



Source: Nhachote (1989)

Meanwhile, in rural areas, the government had transformed colonial *cantinas* into *lojas do povo* (people's stores), where *camponeses* could sell and acquire agricultural produce. However, as agricultural production declined due to the collapse of marketing networks, failed collectivisation policies, growing military conflict with Renamo and natural disasters, food aid became the primary source of sustenance for many in the countryside. The institution responsible for distributing food in rural areas was the *Departamento de Prevenção e Combate as Calamidades Naturais* – the Department for the Prevention and Combat Against Natural Disasters. At its height, the food distribution system provided approximately 40 per cent of rural households with food. Reliance on food aid was higher among those displaced by the military conflict, with 70 per cent of households dependent on the Department. While those affected, rather than displaced, by the military conflict fared slightly better, the majority still depended on some state support (World Bank 1989, 11). Table 3 provides a detailed overview by province.

Table 3: Population dependent on food distribution in urban and rural areas, 1988

	Total population		Dependents on Food Distribution by Group				Total Dependents		
Province	**Number**	**% of total population**	**Urban and peri urban areas**	**Rural**	**Displaced**	**Affected**	**Total Coverage**	**% of Dependents**	**% Provincial population**
Maputo	1,850,000	13	1,246,000	198,000	173,000	225,000	1,842,000	22	100
Gaza	1,200,000	8	91,500	87,500	38,000	658,000	875,000	10	73
Inhambane	1,310,000	9	197,500	152,000	188,000	425,000	962,500	12	73
Sofala	1,242,000	8	255,300	142,000	125,000	195,000	717,300	9	58
Manica	734,000	5	53,000	38,000	93,000	147,000	331,000	4	45
Tete	1,010,000	7	49,300	138,200	97,000	125,000	409,500	5	41
Zambezia	3,078,000	20	227,800	191,200	539,000	365,000	1,323,000	16	43
Nampula	2,943,000	19	330,000	209,200	200,000	536,000	1,275,200	15	43
Niassa	635,000	4	80,000	30,000	199,000	119,000	428,000	5	67
Cabo Delgado	1,134,000	7	69,000	6,000	36,000	79,000	190,000	2	17
TOTAL	**15,136,000**	**100**	**2,599,400**	**1,192,100**	**1,688,000**	**2,874,000**	**8,353,500**	**100**	**55**

Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (1989, 11)

Halfway through the 1980s, Mozambique was forced to declare bankruptcy, join the IMF and embark on the *Programa de Restructuração Económica* – the Economic Restructuring Programme. The Economic Restructuring Programme involved the liberalisation and deregulation of the economy, the privatisation of public enterprises and the reduction of public expenditure. At the time, approximately 8,353,500 Mozambicans relied on some form of state subsidised food. Under pressure from the World Bank and IMF, the Frelimo government cut back the scope of food subsidies in both urban centres and rural areas. However, as a former member of the inter-ministerial committee responsible for negotiating the World Bank's Food Security Strategy recalls, there was concern about the social and political implications of eliminating the various food subsidies, particularly the New Distribution System (Interview with Selvester 2016). In response, the World Bank proposed a highly targeted and residual 'safety net under the guise of equity and efficiency:

> *Given the tight limits on the government budget under the PRE, increased spending on food security interventions will have to be financed largely through a reallocation of public expenditure, rather than increases in aggregate expenditure…budgetary constraints make it especially critical that food security interventions are 'targeted', i.e., designed so that their benefits go principally towards the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population (World Bank 1989, 26).*

The World Bank also proposed the introduction of labour-intensive public works, which they argued were preferable to 'handouts' because of the psychological and social benefits associated with employment. However, the World Bank's vision of employment involved subminimum wages, under the guise of efficient self-targeting. Interestingly, a footnote in the document proposed that wage increases could be considered as productivity increased, which brings into question whether self-targeting was indeed the rationale for ultra-low wages:

> *Wherever possible, these programs should be designed to be 'self-targeting' as otherwise the need to identify those persons who would qualify for jobs, and to exclude those who do not, is likely to be administratively and financially extremely burdensome. Paying less than the minimum wage is one unfortunate but probably necessary 'self-targeting' device to help ensure that only workers from the very poorest households would be candidates for the jobs created (World Bank 1989, 94).*

Following the adoption of the World Bank's Food Security Strategy, the IMF approved an US$85.4 million grant to fund Mozambique's first cash transfer programme: the *Programa do Subsídio de Alimentos* – the Food Subsidy Programme (Abreu 1999). For O'Laughlin (1996), the Food Subsidy Programme amounted to little more than a political smokescreen – a position

corroborated by a former member of the inter-ministerial committee responsible for negotiating the terms of the Food Subsidy Programme:

> *It was a very brutal process. We would receive 50-page documents in English. The Bank put a lot of stuff in there: health, education, agriculture, commerce, subsidies, safety nets. A lot of it didn't make sense. We were at war, no one was farming, we were importing 80 per cent of our grain, we had 3 million people outside of the country, 5 million internally displaced, but here we were discussing increasing agricultural production […] But the undercurrent, which I think none of us realised, was the dismantling of the quite extensive system of subsidies. There was the grain marketing board, the abastecimento system, the subsidies on legumes and grains and wheat […] these were abolished. [The Food Subsidy Programme] was something that they gave to us, to temper outrage, because there was genuine concern that people would starve (Interview with Selvester 2016).*

In preparation for the privatisation of public enterprises, the state created the *Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social* – the National Institute for Social Security – to administer the social insurance scheme for the private-sector (BOM 1988; 1989). The state also moved to eliminate seemingly superfluous programmes such as the Family Allowance which provided minimal benefits to salaried workers in the postcolonial period (BOM 1990). The following year, the state began the process of privatisation. As party elites carved out new political and economic spaces of control– in what Pitcher (2002) has dubbed a process of 'transformative preservation' – half a million workers were either retrenched or reclassified (Pitcher 2007). With little option but to cobble together a livelihood in the informal economy as 'microentrepreneurs', the retrenched found themselves once again excluded from social security schemes. The following section explores how the World Bank's safety-net fared under the weight of structural adjustment and the transition to a market economy.

From 'new man' to microentrepreneur: the transition to a market economy and introduction of cash transfers, 1990-2020

With the mass privatisation of public enterprises and the rise of unemployed 'microentrepreneurs', urban and rural poverty increased (de Brito et al. 2015). In this context, the Food Subsidy Programme shifted from a mere smokescreen to grease the wheels of neoliberalism to a potential response to the social and political fallout from structural adjustment. By 1996, there were 92,300 registered beneficiaries – a rather miraculous feat given the weak administrative bureaucracy. However, an internal audit in 1996 found that two-thirds of the welfare rolls were phantom beneficiaries and the *Gabinete de Assistência à População Vulnerável* – the Office

for the Assistance of Vulnerable People – responsible for administering the programme was disbanded. Ultimately, the neoliberal obsession with cost-efficiency had blinded policymakers to the dangers of a patchy administrative bureaucracy. With hindsight, the Food Subsidy Programme was designed to fail, reflects a former member of the inter-ministerial committee:

> *Nobody liked it. It became a very residual pension for socially acceptable categories – the elderly and the disabled – not what it was first designed for. The Minister of Finance was undoubtedly very much against a cash transfer: he felt it wasn't going to work, that they were going to be lazy, that we must increase production. The money to set up the office was tiny. They gave this tiny office, with three people and no administrative support, responsibility for distributing money. And of course, years later it collapsed in corruption. But that was by design (Interview with Selvester 2016).*

Yet, the Food Subsidy Programme miraculously survived and even thrived. Responsibility for its administration was transferred to the *Instituto Nacional de Acção Social* – the National Institute for Social Action – which introduced a series of additional programmes for able-bodied adults of working age. These included the Community Development Fund, which provided grants to build small-scale infrastructure; the Income Generation Programme, which facilitated access to micro-loans for income-generating activities; and the Benefit for Work Programme which consisted of an 18-month paid internship in the public sector, with the possibility of incorporation into a *Quadro* or permanent position (Quive 2007). Then in 2007, Parliament approved the *Lei da Segurança Social* – the Social Security Law – which established social security as a right: '*All citizens have the right to social security, irrespective of colour, race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, degree of education, social position, parents' marital status or profession'* (RdM 2007, art. 6).

With the consolidation of the legal framework for social security, budget allocations increased, permitting the continued expansion of coverage and improvement in the quality of benefits (ILO, WFP, and UNICEF 2016). An evaluation of the Food Subsidy Programme found that despite its limited coverage, it had the potential to reduce poverty and stimulate the economy by increasing aggregate demand (RdM 2010). These findings in support of an unconditional cash transfer, were bolstered by a negative evaluation of the development programmes, which were found to be an inefficient use of resources. During the years of operation, only 6,275 people had participated in the Benefit for Work Programme and 7,350 in the Income Generation Programme. Furthermore, the programmes were unsustainable, due to an inability to

absorb workers into the public sector and the low repayment of loans (RdM 2010). Together, the evaluations helped to allay concerns about giving 'money for nothing'.

In 2010, the Council of Ministers adopted the *Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica* – the National Strategy for Basic Social Security – a multisectoral instrument for coordinating non-contributory social welfare (RdM 2010). The Food Subsidy was transformed into the Basic Social Subsidy Programme, which provides an unconditional cash transfer to poor, labour-constrained households – the elderly, people with disabilities and people with chronic diseases – equivalent to between Mts 540 and Mts 1,000 depending on the household size. Meanwhile, the various development programmes were merged into the Productive Social Action Programme which provides a seasonal, monthly cash transfer of Mts 1,050 to non-labour constrained households, conditioned on participation in labour-intensive public works (Castel-Branco and Vicente 2019).


The focus on the household rather than the individual was an attempt to ration the number of eligible applicants in the context of widespread informality and limited resources. However, it also reproduced the myth of the unitary household, ignoring how 'cooperative conflicts' shape intrahousehold relations (Sen 1987). Furthermore, by reducing the number of eligible recipients, household-based targeting limited the scope and impact of social welfare programmes (Cunha et al. 2015). The second Strategy foresaw the expansion of cash transfers to 3.3 million Mozambicans and an increase in the value of cash transfers to two-thirds of the poverty line by 2024 (RdM 2016). To finance this expansion in coverage, the Council of Ministers approved an increase in budget allocation to 2.57 per cent of Gross Domestic Product by 2024. However, as Table 4 and Figures 14 to 15 illustrate, budget allocations remain inadequate and in the words of recipients, *'you have to wait for someone to die to enter the programme'.*

Table 4: Coverage and quality of social welfare programmes in Mozambique, 2020

INAS Program	Coverage	Household size	Value of the subsidy	% of the average individual monthly poverty line (2016)
PSSB	445,085 households (unconditional cash transfers labour constrained)	1 person	MT 540	44%
		2 people	MT 640	26%
		3 people	MT 740	20%
		4 people	MT 840	17%
		5 people	MT 1000	16%
PASP	121,557 households (non-labour constrained)	Regardless of size	MT 1050	---
PASD	18,438 households	Regardless of size	Food parcels	
PAUS	7,099 individuals	Regardless of size	Institutional care	--
PASD-Emergency	990,000 households	Regardless of size	MT 1500	---


Source: (Castel-Branco and Vicente 2019)

Figure 14: Budget allocations to Mozambique's social welfare system 2011- 2020



Source: (UNICEF and ILO 2020)

Figure 15: Coverage of Mozambique's social welfare system 1990- 2020



Source: (Cunha et al. 2015; UNICEF and ILO 2020)

Buur and Salimo (2018) attribute the lack of adequate budget allocations to the longstanding practice of *'para o inglês ver'*. In Mozambique, they argue, social welfare amounts to little more than a legitimation strategy to secure continued aid flows. Through an 'international policy alliance' around the symbolic expansion of cash transfers, development agencies and the ruling party have been able to make uncomfortable questions disappear amidst rising poverty, inequality, and corruption. Without international aid, Frelimo's distributional regime would crumble, and the party would struggle to retain its hold on power (Buur and Salimo 2018). However, Buur and Salimo (2018) overlook the contentious politics in policy-making processes, between actors at both the national and international level. Reflecting on the development of Mozambique's social welfare system, the former adviser to the Minister of Gender, Children and Social Action argued that it was the general strikes of 2008 against rising unemployment and the cost of living (de Brito et al. 2015), which ultimately created the political impetus to expand the fledgeling social welfare system:

> *We faced social pressures to respond more efficiently to the problems of more vulnerable groups. Although we had already implemented programmes, there was a call for stronger, broader programmes. At that time, several government members began to understand the concepts better and the positive impact of social protection on improving the populations' situation (Alfai in ILO, WFP, and UNICEF 2016, 15).*

Nevertheless, many within the Frelimo government were reticent about extending cash transfers to able-bodied adults of working age. For state technocrats committed to expanding the social welfare system, the Productive Social Action Programme constituted a political carrot to garner support from reticent decision-makers. In 2011, a pilot funded by the World Bank's Rapid Social Response Fund and the World Food Programme was introduced. Then in 2013, the World Bank approved a low-interest loan of US$ 50 million to finance labour-intensive public works for households in the bottom four deciles of the population (World Bank 2013). As the former National Director for Social Action recalls, securing the World Bank loan was considered a victory for state technocrats because it required convincing the Ministry of Economics and Finance that cash transfers were an investment rather than a cost:

> *Internally, some voices said credit for social programmes was unsustainable because social protection is a cost. Others that it was unsustainable because the state could not absorb the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, we always defended that social security was an investment...We calculated that through the credit, we would reach more beneficiaries, and once the credit expired, the government would not have the courage to abandon those people (Interview with former national PASP director 2016).*

The disbursement of the World Bank loan hinged on several conditionalities, including developing an online information management system, the application a proxy-means-test to identify the 'poorest of the poor' and the outsourcing of cash transfer payments to private providers (World Bank, 2013). To circumvent the World Bank, the state leveraged tensions between development agencies to advance their interests, with varying degrees of success. For instance, when World Bank proposed that the state contract a US-based consultancy firm to design the information management system, it successfully resisted, contracting instead the autonomous public institution *Centro de Desenvolvimento de Sistemas de Informação de Finanças* – the Centre for the Development of Financial Information Systems. With backing from the ILO, it argued that public institutions were more cost-effective and had more significant experience developing and maintaining e-Systems in Mozambique (ILO 2019c). In other instances, such as the outsourcing of cash transfers, the state was forced to give into World Bank demands even if costlier and more complex to produce, explained the Director of the National Institute for Social Action: *'outsourcing is not always cheaper in cost-benefit terms, and in the case of Mozambique, the discussion on outsourcing arose as a condition imposed by the financing agency'* (Faite Izidine 2020, 21). Ultimately, Buur and Salimo's 'international policy alliance' is fraught with contention.

Although social security is a right, only 10 per cent of the population has access to benefits. On the one hand, the social insurance scheme, tailored to workers in the formal economy, is limited in scope. In Mozambique, only 12 per cent of the economically active population are salaried workers (INE 2019). Despite record rates of economic growth – concentrated in the capital-intensive extractive sector – employment has not kept pace with demographic changes. Widespread informality combined with employer evasion mean that no more than 700,000 public and private sector workers are active contributors to the social insurance system (Castel-Branco and Sambo 2020).

In 2015, the National Institute for Social Security extended the contributory scheme to own-account workers, who enjoy the same benefits, but must pay a higher percentage contribution because they do not have an employer (RdM 2015b; 2015a). To date, 52,780 own-account workers have registered with the scheme, but only 11,785 are active contributors, pointing to high rates of desertion (INSS 2020). Constraints include a lack of trust in the state, onerous administrative procedures which undermine workers' ability to access benefits in times of crisis and a lack of contributory capacity (Castel-Branco and Sambo 2020). Contributions are calculated on the basis of sectoral minimum wages, yet the vast majority of own-account workers have a monthly income well below these (INE 2015). Ultimately, to extend social insurance to own-account workers would require cross- subsidisation by the state.

On the one hand, the resource-driven development model hinders its redistributive capacity. To be sure, the allocation of resources to social welfare programmes is first and foremost a political question and current allocations are well below the targets approved by Ministers. However, to introduce an unconditional for all those currently excluded from the social security system – approximately 28 million Mozambicans, at the simulated average national poverty line – it would cost 77 per cent of the national budget and 28 per cent of GDP just in transfers (Castel-Branco 2020a). Of course, proponents of universal basic income argue that resources can be taxed back; though simulations have not been undertaken to explore the extent to which this would be the case in Mozambique given widespread poverty and informality. The fiscal benefits provided to foreign direct investors significantly constrain the country's fiscal space, while licit and illicit financial flows have trapped the state in a spiralling debt crisis. Historically, land and family have played an essential role in subsidising capitalist accumulation by absorbing the full cost of social reproduction. However, amidst a growing crisis of reproduction in the countryside, this has become increasingly difficult.

Table 5: ***Projected cost of universal basic income in Mozambique, 2020***

	Value of monthly transfer (MT)	Unit size	Annual cost (USD)	% of the budget	% GDP
Individuals					
PASD-PE	1,500	28,571,310	7,093,566,621	129	47
Poverty Line	900	28,571,310	4,256,139,972	77	28
2/3 poverty line	600	28,571,310	2,837,426,648	52	19
Households					
PASD-PE	1,500	6,541,215	1,624,025,793	30	11
Poverty Line	900	6,541,215	974,415,476	18	6
2/3 poverty line	600	6,541,215	649,610,317	12	4

Source: R. Castel-Branco (2020a).

Conclusion: cash transfers and the contested extension of neoliberalism

Through an analysis of four historical periods – the early colonial and republican era, the late colonial fascist period, the postcolonial socialist years and the contemporary capitalist moment – this chapter traced the processes and forces which have shaped the social security system in Mozambique. It focused on three 'intersecting contours' (to borrow from Kenny (2018): the state's developmental imperative and conceptualisation of the problem of labour; the evolving labour and citizenship nexus; and the emerging provision of social security.

For the undercapitalised colonial state, its primary concern was how to secure abundant and low-wage African labour following the abolition of slavery. Through the consolidation of the *Indigenato* and the racialised deployment of vagrancy laws, the colonial state delegitimised all autonomous sources of sustenance and entrenched a forced labour regime for Africans. While expropriation was critical to the process of primitive accumulation, total dispossession was neither necessary nor desirable. After all, by preventing a permanent African proletariat from taking root, the state could offset the costs of social reproduction onto the mythical extended family, thereby excluding African workers from emerging provident funds. Far from remnants of a pre-colonial past, 'traditional' forms of social security were embedded within broader processes of proletarianisation.

Towards the end of the colonial period, the state began to explore the possibility of extending social security to African workers. On the one hand, the colonial state was under growing

pressure from national and international social forces to abolish the dual labour regime. On the other hand, with the acceleration of industrialisation, the state became increasingly interested in creating a permanent African working class, severed from the mythical extended family; an extended family, which given the crisis of reproduction in the countryside, was perceived as parasitic by the colonial regime. However, the colonial state stopped short of any meaningful reform. Colonial bureaucrats argued that African workers did not earn enough to contribute to provident funds and pursued lifestyles incommensurate with the logic of social security. Instead, they introduced an *ad hoc* and residual fund that amounted to little more than a strategy of *'para o inglês ver'*.

With independence, the Frelimo government embarked on a revolutionary process of social transformation, which sought to strip away the colonial infrastructures of exclusion. While the state aspired to eliminate hunger, homelessness, and nudity, it struggled to provide universal entitlements. Indeed, it redeployed colonial conceptions of vagrancy in urban centres to deport the urban unemployed to rural areas and to reduce the pressure on universal entitlements (Quembo 2017). Nevertheless, the scope and scale of redistributive measures were far superior to those of the colonial period. At its height, the food distribution system alone covered more than eight million people in both urban and rural areas. However, as the country transitioned to a market economy, the food distribution system was among the first causalities.

The introduction of cash transfers was a smokescreen to grease the wheels of structural adjustment rather than a countermovement against neoliberalism. Nevertheless, cash transfer programmes have gradually expanded, and today more than half a million households have access to some form of non-contributory social welfare. While international development agencies have certainly influenced the design and implementation of cash transfer programmes, programmes have been equally shaped by striking unemployed workers, state technocrats committed to expanding social security, and the Frelimo government officials who though reticent have continued to support their expansion.

However, the resource-driven model pursued by the Frelimo government has undermined the redistributive basis for social security. On the one hand, private investment is concentrated in capital-intensive extractive sectors and adjacent infrastructures, which generate scant employment (C. N. Castel-Branco 2015), and hinder the expansion of social insurance, which in turn has placed an even greater burden on the non-contributory social welfare system. On the other

hand, the fiscal exemptions provided to foreign direct investors constrain Mozambique's fiscal space, while licit and illicit financial flows have trapped the country in a spiralling debt crisis. Whereas in the colonial past, the state offset the cost of reproduction onto the mythical extended family, many rural households today simply cannot meet their reproductive needs (MISAU 2013; Mambo et al. 2018). Indeed, the articulation between land, labour and welfare exposes the tension within the current extractivist model and highlights the limitations of a politics of distribution that ignores the terms of production. Like a kaleidoscope, the following three chapters refract the contemporary relationship between land, work and welfare in rural Mozambique, through the experiences of *camponeses*, state technocrats and PASP workers.

Chapter 5: Between Authentic and Intangible Work in the Districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè

> *No one likes the hoe; it's just a matter of survival. Do you see these sores? My hands are hard. Those who say they like the machamba have machines to plough the land or money to hire people to work for them. They are not camponeses; they are agriculturalists (Interview with Cremildo 2017).*

Cremildo was born in the locality of Minuco, Ribáuè – a mountainous region dotted with granite *ndambos*. His parents are *camponeses*. They cultivate sorghum, cassava, beans, maize, horticultures and peanuts, which they hawk to traders from neighbouring provinces; and tobacco, which they sell to the private marketing company, Sonil. They sent Cremildo to secondary school with their earnings, where he graduated top of his class before migrating to Nampula. In the big city, he bode his time as an unpaid live-in domestic worker, relying on his parents' remittances while applying for jobs in the public sector. Unsuccessful, he ultimately enlisted in the army, but as the military conflict with Renamo intensified, his meagre wage was not worth the risk. When Cremildo was offered a job training security guards at Montepuez Ruby Mining/Gemfields, he took the opportunity to demobilise. However, as news of human rights abuses against artisanal miners broke, Cremildo fled to Iapala to improvise a flip-flop business with the coins he had saved.

Iapala, Ribáuè is a bustling town, split in two by a single-track railway which connects the coal mines of Moatize to the deep-water port of Nacala. On one side is the old colonial centre, whose dilapidated buildings have become grazing grounds for the town's goats. During the late colonial period, it was a hub of settlement and plantation agriculture. A faded poster advertises: *'Iapala: a railway and trucking centre. European Climate. Future commercial and agricultural town. Land for Portuguese families. The settlement already prepared by the government' (INM 1951).* Settlers were mostly former railway workers, who traded in their working-class lives for a shot at becoming landowners. Caramelo (1961) depicts Iapala as a 'wild-wild west' for fortune-seekers, tricksters, gamblers, and prostitutes. However, for most Africans, it was a site of expropriation and hyper-exploitation. Men were funnelled onto plantations; women forced to cultivate cotton and children driven into the Mission schools as unpaid labour (Navohola 2010).

On the other side of the railroad, is the postcolonial market where Cremildo's stall – suggestively named *'Slowly: To enjoy you gotta take it slow'* – sits flush between rows of hoes and neon thong underwear. Though initially lucrative, Cremildo's flip-flop business eventually flopped. He blames the increasingly irregular passenger traffic with the prioritisation of Vale's coal locomotives along the Nacala Development Corridor. The crisis of Ematum only compounded the problem, as the value of the Metical plummeted, the cost of living skyrocketed, and his customers found themselves with less disposable income (R. Castel-Branco and Isaacs 2017). However, it was the dramatic drop in the Boer bean price which finally put the nail in the coffin of his business. After all, his customer base is *camponeses*. Consequently, Cremildo was forced to take up the hoe— and grudgingly so, for his body is ill-prepared for the drudgery of manual cultivation and his sights are set elsewhere.

In many respects, Cremildo is emblematic of Bernstein's (2006) fragmented rural classes of labour, who though increasingly dependent on wages to meet their reproductive needs, have been rendered surplus to the accumulation needs of capital. In less than a decade, Cremildo has swung from student, to unpaid informal worker, precarious wage-worker, self-employed entrepreneur and *camponês* – transcending the boundaries between productive and reproductive, paid and unpaid, formal and informal work. In the end, Cremildo identifies as unemployed:

> *It hurts a lot because it is not normal to study and be unemployed. To get a job on the Nacala Development Corridor, you must pay. That money you were going to spend on food, you use knowing that they will throw your papers in the latrine. Most people are vientes [newcomers]. They speak Changana. The frustration, the desire, it can give you thrombosis. In the time of Samora [Machel], it was good, but now, without money, you don't get anywhere. We need work. Otherwise, we'll become marginals, burn infrastructure, burn everything (Interview with Cremildo 2017).*

In *Reclaiming Work,* Gorz (1999b) argues for the elimination of 'intangible' labour and its restoration into something that we do, rather than that we have. Intangible labour, he contends, is a social construct peculiar to industrial capitalism. Made up of institutionally certified skills and procedures, it alienates workers from the means and the process of production, from the product of their labour, from themselves and each other. In contrast, 'authentic' work is a sensory, autonomous, and collective experience, that allows for workers' self-realisation by transforming matter into products that bear their inscription and respond to their needs. Under global capitalism, Gorz (1999b) contends, intangible labour has become hegemonic – even as capital

moves to obliterate it, triggering a crisis of reproduction. It is high time, he concludes, to debunk the dogma of the dignity of wage-work and move humanity beyond a wage-based society.

Gorz is part of a growing chorus of utopian scholars who see the multiple crises of capitalism in the contemporary period as an opportunity to reclaim work from the clutches of commodification (Weeks 2011; Srnicek and Williams 2015; Bastani 2019). After all, what is wage-work if not alienating? While much of this scholarship has emanated from the global North, it has attracted the attention of scholars of the global South, where formal wage-work has always been the exception rather than the norm. Ferguson and Li (2018) argue that despite, or perhaps because of the pervasiveness of precarious work under colonial capitalism, the provision of intangible labour has become central to the postcolonial project. Caught in a tailspin of deagrarianisation and deindustrialisation, postcolonial states have struggled to fulfil the promise of full employment. They conclude that it is imperative to decentre wage-work from emancipatory politics – and cash transfers are one way to do so.

This chapter engages the growing 'anti-work' scholarship from a peripheral corner of the global South – rural Mozambique. The first section provides an overview of the labour market based on an analysis of official statistics. It teases out some of the contradictions and limitations of national household data on employment, given that the majority have not been entirely dispossessed of the means of production. The second section draws on participant observation and semi-structured interviews in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè – two contrasting cases – to unpack the occupational hierarchies present in the countryside. Using an adaptation of Chen's (2012) model, it explores how gender and class relations have influenced the nature of work arrangements. The third section draws on group conversations in Inhassoro and Ribáuè to unpack the meaning of work. It identifies three broad criteria used by participants to evaluate the meaningfulness of any given activity – sustenance, autonomy, and social recognition – and explores how these apply to the occupational categories discussed in the previous section. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the possibilities and limitations of 'anti-work' politics. Ultimately, rethinking redistribution requires reclaiming production – and in an agrarian context, reclaiming production involves an articulation between the politics of land and labour.


'Employment is not for everyone': an overview of the Mozambican labour market

> *When I was born, no one spoke about unemployment – only the occasional person with a child in the Mission school was concerned with placing their child in the city. With the expansion of education, secondary schools began to unload graduates, whose inclination is not to embrace the hoe. But while work is for everyone, employment is not (OTM Nampula Provincial Secretary 2016).*

During the colonial period, the education system was notoriously deficient, and at independence, 85 per cent of Mozambicans were illiterate (Barnes 1982). In response, the Frelimo government invested substantial resources in expanding public education and today the illiteracy rate hovers at 39 per cent (INE 2019). However, the expansion of schooling also fostered employment aspirations among a born-free generation – aspirations which the state has struggled to contain. As the provincial secretary of the Organisation of Mozambican Workers alludes to, notions of unemployment are ultimately shaped by subjective conceptions of legitimate and illegitimate, desirable, and undesirable work. In an agrarian society, where the majority have not been entirely dispossessed of the means of production and cobble together a livelihood from a diversity of activities, defining who is employed and who is not, is no easy feat. After all, the very notion of unemployment is the product of proletarianisation and capitalist development.


At 3.5 per cent, Mozambique has among the lowest strict unemployment rates in Southern Africa (Figure 16). However, according to official statistics, only 12 per cent of the economically active population derive a livelihood primarily from salaried employment (Figure 17). The vast majority are categorised as own-account or unpaid family workers; the latter, generally *camponeses* or small-scale farmers who cultivate food for household consumption. The structure of the labour market is sharply gendered. Men occupy more than three-quarters of formal salaried positions while women are concentrated in the most survivalist activities, as own-account workers without employees, domestic workers, and unpaid family workers (Figure 18). Given the patchy social security system – less than 10 per cent of the population is effectively covered by social security benefits (Castel-Branco and Vicente 2019) – most cannot afford not to work for at least an hour a week, which is the international threshold for employment (ICLS 2013). Therefore, Mozambique's unemployment rate remains deceivingly low, even though the country is caught in a tailspin of deagrarianisation and deindustrialisation.

Figure 16: The strict unemployment rate in Southern Africa (%), 2019




Source: (ILO 2019b)

Figure 17: The distribution of the economically active population in Mozambique, according to the labour process, 2017



Source:(INE 2019)


Figure 18: The sexual division of labour in Mozambique, according to the labour process, 2017



Source:(INE 2019)


The unemployment rate is not an accurate measure of households' ability to meet their reproductive needs. Indeed, there is an inverse relationship between unemployment and wellbeing. Unemployment rates are highest among well-educated urban youth in the upper quintiles of the consumption distribution; and lowest among rural women, with no education, in the lower quintiles (INE 2016). Furthermore, access to salaried employment provides no guarantee that households can meet their reproductive needs. Nearly half of all sectoral minimum wages are below the line of working poverty (Figure 19) and critical sectors like paid domestic work are exempt from minimum wage legislation (Castel-Branco 2017b). Therefore, most salaried workers work overtime to supplement their meagre income with own-account activities, frequently hiring workers informally to assist them. The only sector where people generally work less than 40 hours a week is agriculture (Figure 20). The seasonal rhythms of cultivation, limited returns of working additional hours and competing reproductive responsibilities mean that working an industrial working week does not make sense, explains a *camponesa* in Inhassoro: '*it's not like in the colonial times when there was a bell, and you would get a beating if you left the machamba early'*.

Figure 19: Minimum wages in relation to the line of working poverty in Mozambique, 2019/2020[3]



Source: Published in the Boletim da República, and compiled by Caldeira (2019)

Figure 20: Hours worked by sector, sex and geographic location in Mozambique, 2014/15




Source: Adapted from Lachler and Walker (2018), based on INE data (INE 2016, 2).

[3] Minimum wages did not increase in 2020. The working poverty line of Mts 5,535 is based on the average simulated individual monthly poverty line and a household of 4.5 people (Mambo et al. 2018).

Although 67 per cent of the population still derive a livelihood primarily from agriculture – compared to the global average of 25 per cent (ILO 2019b) – young people are increasingly reluctant to embrace the hoe (Figure 21). Meanwhile, employment opportunities in the industrial sector have declined. Only 4.5 per cent of the economically active population is engaged primarily in manufacturing, compared to the global average of 22.5 per cent (ILO 2019b). While there has been a slight expansion in the service sector to 12.9 per cent, two-thirds of income-generating opportunities are in the informal economy (INE 2019). Furthermore, a growing proportion of the economically active population is engaged in what the statistical office characterises as unknown activities. Even more worryingly, the proportion of the economically active population dropped from 69.2 per cent to 57.6 per cent between 2007 and 2017 (INE 2019), pointing to a dramatic increase in disguised unemployment.

Figure 21: Employment trends by sector in Mozambique, 2007-2017



Source:(INE 2019)

While national household surveys provide a useful overview of patterns and trends, they struggle to capture the complexity and dynamic nature of labour markets (Johnston 2015). In Mozambique, the survey applies a narrow definition of the household, which excludes those who like Cremildo, migrated temporarily in search of better opportunities but continue to contribute to and benefit from the household. Furthermore, the limitation of the reference period to the week preceding the survey can create a bias in the information provided. For instance, had Cremildo been interviewed during the harvest rather than the planting season, he may have been more optimistic about the state of affairs. Also, the focus on the primary economic activity obfuscates how households cobble together a livelihood. As in much of the postcolonial South, standard employment relationships have been the exception rather than the norm (Breman and Linden 2014b). Indeed, Mozambique's crisis of reproduction is rooted in a racialised process of proletarianisation which created an interdependence between salaried employment and own agricultural production in the context of underdevelopment (First 1983). Therefore, in analysing the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers, it is crucial to understand how rural households cobble together a livelihood.

To capture the complex and dynamic nature of rural labour markets, Cramer et al. (2015) undertook a purposeful labour market survey in three provinces—Manica, Zambézia and Nampula – which are hubs of cash-crop production. They found that many rural poor are landless or near landless, cannot subsist from own production and readily engage in wage-labour as domestic workers, restaurant workers, market vendors and street traders. The absence of trade unions and the poor enforcement of labour and social protections mean that the conditions of wage-work are incredibly precarious. However, because the complexity of rural labour markets is not adequately captured in official household surveys, responses to rural poverty tend to overlook the critical role of labour and social protections. Instead, interventions generally focus on increasing agricultural productivity and improving access to markets, which overwhelmingly benefit wealthier *camponeses* (Oya and Pontara 2015). Nevertheless, O'Laughlin (2017a) points out that purposeful sampling can lead to an exaggeration of wage-work and underestimation of the centrality of the *machamba* for rural livelihoods. While the survey conducted by Cramer et al. (2015) is polemically useful in illustrating the existence of rural labour markets – a fact often overlooked in Mozambique itself (Ali 2017) – it struggles to capture the extent of un(der)employment in the countryside and the dynamics underlying the looming crisis of reproduction.

Mozambique's crisis of reproduction is evident when one looks at official statistics: 43 per cent of infants suffer from chronic malnutrition (MISAU 2013), at least 46 per cent of the population lives below nationally established poverty lines, and inequality is on the rise (MEF 2016). Furthermore, simulations following the crisis of Ematum suggest that the poverty rate increased to 64.8 per cent due to inflation (Mambo et al. 2018). Today, the poverty rates in the provinces of Inhambane and Nampula – where the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè are located – are estimated to be 65 per cent and 74.7 per cent, respectively (Table 5).


Table 6: Official and simulated poverty rates in Mozambique, 2014/15 and 2015/16

	Poverty line 2014/15	**Simulated poverty line, 2015/16**	**Poverty rate 2014/15**	**Simulated poverty rate, 2015/16**
National	47.09	52.21	46.1%	64.8%
Inhambane	45.79	51.96	48.6%	65.0%
Nampula	28.06	32.55	57.1%	74.7%

Source: (Mambo et al. 2018)


Although most rural households derive a livelihood primarily from *machamba* cultivation, they spend a disproportionate proportion of their income on primary goods (Figure 22). At the national level, the monthly household expenditure on food hovers at 20 per cent while this figure is over 50 per cent in rural areas. Astonishingly, households in rural areas spend the same amount of cash on food as the national average (INE 2015). The next section unpacks how rural households cobble together a livelihood amidst this crisis of reproduction. It argues that while the distribution of consumption in the bottom four quintiles of the population is relatively flat (Figure 23), class and gender relations shape the conditions of work – and by extension, its meaning.

Figure 22: National vs rural monthly expenditures in Mozambique 2014/15



Source: (INE 2015)

Figure 23: Consumption distribution by quintile in Mozambique, 2014/15



Source: (INE 2015)

Cobbling together a livelihood in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè

> *It's better to have eggs in different baskets, to be involved in a little bit of everything. When I receive my salary, I take a bit of that money and call those people who don't have anything. To buy maize when you can harvest it from the soil, hai no way! That money I can spend on flip flops. And when I eat, I feel proud because the food I'm eating is the product of my sweat (Interview with Iolanda 2017).*

Iolanda is a primary school teacher in the village of Temane, Inhassoro. She lives a stone's throw away from the region's first gas well, drilled by Gulf Oil during the colonial period. At independence, villagers were tasked with maintaining the wells. However, as the civil war intensified and villagers fled, government soldiers were deployed to protect the wells from Renamo forces. Following the peace accords, the United States hinged food aid distribution on the attribution of gas exploration rights to the Atlantic Richfield Company and Enron. Blocked from South African markets, however, they sold to Sasol which built a gas processing facility and 865-kilometre pipeline to South Africa (C. N. Castel-Branco 2002). When Sasol first began construction, villagers were promised jobs, services and development: *'We moved our homes and opened roads using our own machetes and axes. We didn't have gloves or shoes. Only after we cleared the area did they bring machines to level the ground',* recalls Dimandane (2016).

Unfortunately, the promise of jobs and services never materialised and returning war refugees were forced to pick up the scattered pieces of their lives alone. Tellingly, the District's Strategic Development Plan mentions Sasol only in passing, focusing instead on transforming Inhassoro into '*a privileged tourist destination, renowned for fishing and agro-processing'* (CTD 2011) – a rather poignant objective given the district's limited agricultural potential. Sasol did establish a Community Liaison Forum to hire workers locally (Sasol 2018) Still, villagers maintain that it is little more than a smokescreen: *'the Forum is a way of closing the door. You submit your certificates, you pay a refresco [bribe], you wait, but no one is ever called'.* While the Forum has contracted 600 workers from the surrounding community since its formation, jobs are short-term, low-paid and limited to menial positions such as guards, gardeners, and domestic workers. Meanwhile, villagers remain disconnected from the electricity and water grid. Ultimately, local leaders reflect, resource-driven development inevitably leads to underdevelopment:

> *The government decided that 2.75 per cent of taxes derived from gas revenues should be attributed to the community, but we have no information about the numbers. They think we won't understand because we're poor, but we see which way the wind is blowing. It hurts. Temane will never develop because it is a site of gas extraction (Interview with Temane Neighbourhood secretary 2016).*

Amidst limited employment opportunities, rural households cobble together a livelihood from a diversity of paid and unpaid, productive, and reproductive, formal, and informal activities.

Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, this section adapts Chen's (2012) framework on occupational hierarchies to explore the classed and gendered nature of work in the countryside. Three of the occupational categories – own agricultural production, off-farm own-account work and salaried employment – are derived from the national household survey (INE 2015; 2019). The fourth category – unpaid care work – has been added because respondents in the district of Ribáuè explicitly defined it as work. Within each occupational category, the section triangulates the data from the national household survey with qualitative research from the short questionnaire, semi-structured interviews, group conversations, and participant observation to unpack how social relations shape the nature of activities and the conditions of work (Table 6 and 7).

The districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè are contrasting cases. Inhassoro, is a sparsely populated semi-arid are with a long history of migrant wage-labour, while Ribáuè is a densely-populated fertile region renowned for its agricultural productivity. While Inhassoro produces 0.97 tonnes of food per capita, Ribáuè produces 2.92 tonnes. In Inhassoro, only 72.6 per cent of the economically active population derive a livelihood primarily from agriculture, followed by 9.4 per cent from own-account work and 18 per cent from salaried employment. In contrast, 93.9 per cent of the economically active population in Ribáuè are engaged primarily in agriculture, followed by 2.8 per cent in own-account work and 3.3 per cent in salaried in employment. In Inhassoro the modal *machamba* size is less than a hectare, in comparison with between a hectare and two hectares in Ribáuè, suggesting higher rates of land or labour scarcity in the former. After all, Inhassoro's population is only 56,246, compared with 290,244 in Ribáuè; and the population growth rate differs widely due to higher fertility and lower emigration levels in the latter (MAE 2014b; 2014a; INE 2017a; 2017b; 2019).

Table 7: Occupational hierarchies by quintile in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/17

Consumption Quintile	**Occupational categories**		
Quintile 5	**Own-account on-farm**	**Own-account off-farm**	**Wage-labour**
Quintile 4	*Commercial farmer*	Formalised traders	Formal, permanent (public sector, migrant work)
		Informal, 'skilled' trades	Formal, casual (guards, gardeners and cleaners)
Quintile 3	*Cash crop producer*	Informal, 'semi-skilled' trades:	Casual, permanent (volunteers and local leaders)
Quintile 2		Home-based work	Casual, temporary (*biscate, ganho-ganho*)
Quintile 1	*Food crop producer*		Casual, debt labour

Source: adaptation of a typology by Chen (2012) based on the author's field notes.

Table 8: Occupational hierarchies by sex in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/17

Work categories	**Power, recognition and income**		
	High →		Low
Own-account on-farm	Commercial farmer	Cash-crop producer	Food-producer
Own-account off-farm	Agricultural marketing agent	Market vendor	Home-based producer
Wage work Formal Casualised Biscate Ganho-ganho	Permanent position Community leader Logging Clearing	Casual position Volunteer Construction Harvesting	 Fetching water Weeding
Unpaid care work			Child rearing Cleaning 'The work of loving your man'.
Sex	~~Male~~ →		Female

Source: adaptation of a typology by Chen (2012) based on the author's field notes.

'The machamba is for life': small-scale agriculture

> *A camponês uses ash water to cook while an agriculturalist uses oil. A camponês uses namukokolo [a root], and papaya leaves to wash, an agriculturalist soap. A camponês dies alone; an agriculturalist dies surrounded by people because they know Maheu will be served. When a camponês is accused of a crime, they are first flogged and then interrogated; when an agriculturalist is charged with the same, the judge will judge them in their own home (Interview with Cremildo 2017).*

In the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, most rural households derive a livelihood primarily from manual, rainfed agriculture. Despite a relatively flat distribution of consumption in the bottom four quintiles of the population, the countryside is not devoid of differentiation and class markers abound. How *camponeses* or agriculturalists fare hinges on a range of factors including the environmental conditions, their power to access arable land, the structure of the household and availability of labour, their capacity to mobilise resources to invest in agricultural inputs and their ability to weather the vagaries of the weather, the plagues, and the market. This subsection profiles a commercial farmer, a petty commodity producer and a near landless *camponesa* to trace the processes of accumulation in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè.

Abel is a commercial farmer in the town of Riani, Ribáuè. He recently established a farming colony in a mountainous region of formerly virgin forest on the foothills of Monte Namicunha. Located 55 kilometres away from the town, the trip takes more than a day by bicycle. He identified the land by tracking loggers and got permission from the chief to section it into plots:

> *The only place where there are no machambas, no owners, is up in the mountains, where you have to fight with elephants, monkeys and rats…One day loggers stopped in Riani. From the size of the logs on the truck, I could tell that they were coming from an area of virgin forest. So, I befriended the driver, asked where they were coming from and when they passed through again, I hitched a ride to the forest (Interview with Abel 2016).*

In the upland regions, Abel grows maize, cassava and sorghum. In the *baixas,* he built an improvised dam and irrigation system and cultivates onions, tomatoes, butter beans, sugar cane, bananas and horticultures. With his pension from the armed forces, he hires *ganho-ganho* or day labourers. During the peak period of the agricultural cycle, Abel and his wife live in the colony, which today houses approximately sixty households. Renowned for its productivity, the area attracts agricultural marketing agents from as far afield as Malawi, circumventing the problem of how to transport produce to market. The expansion of rainfed agriculture into previously forested areas—often in tandem with illegal logging—has increased deforestation. In

the last 15 years, the province of Nampula lost half its forest cover, and estimates suggest that the entire province will be transformed into *machambas* within the decade (MITADER 2018).

The government's bid to attract foreign direct investment for agribusiness has only exacerbated the problem of land scarcity. Although projects like Prosavana have been successfully contested by peasants' movements and internationally networked civil society organisations (Monjane and Bruna 2018), they triggered processes of speculation which disproportionately affected those without ancestral claims to the area. Officially, all land belongs to the state, and local communities have the right to use and derive benefit from the land (RdM 1997). Outside of municipalities, the distribution of land is overseen by the chief and their adjuncts according to customary practices. To secure a plot, community members must show that they have been working the land in good faith for a minimum of ten years. Consequently, not all *camponeses* are recognised as legitimate claimants. A distinction has become entrenched between those considered *originários* (natives) and those perceived as *vientes* (newcomers). This distinction is particularly contentious in towns and villages, where land is scarce as *camponeses* move in search of better public services. Rosalina and Roberto fled to Riani during the civil war but are still considered newcomers and must borrow or rent land from the so-called natives:

> *It is challenging to find land. You ask to borrow land from the landowners, the natives, not us who are just passing by, but the originals. Then one day they just come and take it. They don't even use it. It's envy because they see you're producing. They see you bought a plastic chair with the money from the harvest and they just take it. This thing of prohibiting lands, it's recent. It wasn't like this before. It's a problem of money, of development. They can charge Mts 10,000, even Mts 20,000 depending on the size of the plot (Interview with Rosalina 2017).*

Despite these challenges, Rosalina and Roberto have been able to secure four *machambas*: one for cassava which they rent for Mts 200 from the former caretaker of a colonial tobacco plantation turned owner of the land; one for sorghum, maize and *Boer* beans in her ancestral home thirty kilometres away; one for rice, onions, horticulture and bananas in the *baixas* for which they pay a premium price of Mts 3,000; and a small *machamba* near their home, where they plant peanuts, beans, chillies, mangos, guavas and pumpkin. Rosalina and Roberto cultivate their *machambas* together, which is unusual. In the district of Ribáuè, women tend to focus on food crops, while men oversee the production of cash crops. However, how production is organised is the outcome of what Sen (1987) dubs intrahousehold 'cooperative conflicts' – even if men ultimately make the final decision about what to sell, when to sell it and at what price:

> *In each home, each person has their own behaviour. If there's union, they work together; if there's no union, they split up. Some men sell the harvest and spend it all on drink. So, women who do not want to suffer from hunger will cultivate their machambas. But even then, it's still normal in a house to find a man giving his ideas – 'this we cannot eat, we have to eat this' or 'this we need to sell, this not'. Women and men, they both cultivate the machambas, but the man controls everything (Interview with Rosalina 2017).*

In the district of Inhassoro, *machambas* tend to be smaller in size – less than a hectare – and cultivated only by women. Zaida is a single mother of six from Temane. Her husband is a construction worker in Joni, and her children are enrolled in school, so Zaida tends to the *machambas* alone. The clearing and tilling of the *machamba* usually occur in September and October, with planting happening in November after the third heavy rains. Recently cleared fields are planted with maize, followed in the second year by beans and cassava and in the third, by peanuts. After germination, comes the work of weeding, which continues until harvest. Harvest ranges from April to August depending on the crop, the timing of the rains and the quality of the soil.

For Zaida, labour scarcity is a serious constraint. Back when her husband was a migrant mineworker, she could afford to hire *ganho-ganho* during peak periods of the agricultural cycle. However, when her husband switched to construction, remittances became increasingly irregular, and she was forced to turn to 'men of money' for loans. Uncle Manuel – a former mineworker turned *Nyanga* or healer with an extensive fleet of taxis that link Inhassoro to Joni – is Zaida's first port of call. However, asking for a loan is the last resort because interest rates are exorbitant – if repaid in cash they hover at 25 per cent, if repaid through debt labour, they can be as high as 100 per cent. Ultimately, emigration can help stabilise the *machamba.* Still, it can also undermine production – and for Zaida who is HIV positive, the problem of labour scarcity is even more acute, given her wavering physical strength to perform manual cultivation (Interview with Zaida 2017).

Another chief challenge of agricultural production is the low and irregular rains, particularly in the district of Inhassoro. The agricultural cycle of 2015/16 was bleak. The *baixas* dried up, the grass and trees turned a silvery grey and even the cassava, renowned for its resilience, withered. That cycle, Zaida only produced 540 kilograms of *nhemba* beans, 360 kilograms of peanuts, sorghum, and a few bushels of cassava – hardly enough to fill her silo, let alone to save for seed and sell. Yet desperation soon drove her to market: *'You're scared to sell because*

you need to eat and preserve the seed, but your needs oblige you to' (Interview with Zaida 2017). The agricultural cycle of 2016/2017 proved more promising. The rains came late, but in contrast to years past, they came; and Zaida harvested 1,000 kilograms of *nhemba* beans and 1,250 kilograms of peanuts. Nevertheless, she remains cautiously pessimistic:

> *In Inhassoro, you have two types of agriculture: the agriculture of when it rains and when it doesn't rain. Two years ago, hunger knocked at the door, and we watered the land with our tears. It depends on God. Some years it starts to rain in October, other years not. Now that it is November, it rained in some other places but not here. We have no idea how we are going to survive. But you can never lose morale. You wake up, you go to the machamba, you till the soil, and you wait. If it rains, you sow immediately because this soil dries quickly. You have to manage cultivation yourself. You must cultivate early, to cultivate while you have time. If you don't plant in time, or you stop weeding, and the area becomes overgrown, that's your responsibility (Interview with Zaida 2017).*

The chief of Temane, responsible for leading rainmaking rituals, blames Sasol for the low and irregular rains: *'Before Sasol there was rain, now all we see is smoke. My ancestors are angry. That is why there are so many snakes at the factory. I removed 57 snakes in one day but when I went to Frelimo, not even a thank you. Now ghosts are appearing, and one even beat up a security guard. I told my parents, 'Stop. Don't seek revenge because of the gas'* (Interview with Temane chief 2016). However, Zaida dismisses the chief's explanation as a self-serving attempt to exact financial gain. Instead, she suspects that the irregular rains and poor harvests are the result of air and soil pollution emanating from Sasol's central processing facility. This claim is vehemently denied by Sasol (Sasol 2018). After all, across Mozambique, there has been an intensification of natural disasters (INGC 2009), threatening the livelihoods of those who depend on nature.

Meanwhile, in the district of Ribáuè, the chief challenge of agricultural production is the volatility of market prices. For instance, during the agricultural cycle of 2016/2017, *camponeses* were encouraged to plant the *Boer* bean, which was widely considered an 'unnoticed peasant success story' (Hanlon 2016). However, its only export market is India and that year, India had a bumper crop and imposed import quotas. In the absence of a functional marketing board to guarantee prices, the *Boer* bean's price plummeted from Mts 40 a kilogram to Mts 2.5 a kilogram overnight. Furious, some *camponeses* set their fields alight while others simply let their crop rot unharvested. Rosalina and Roberto produced approximately 1,080 kilograms of *Boer* beans and expected to earn approximately Mts 50,000 but made only Mts 2,500:

> *Agricom told people to cultivate the Boer bean, knowing that there was no market. We borrowed money, opened large machambas, and now we're selling it for Mts 2.5/kg, maize also at 2.5/kg, so that it doesn't rot. Each trader applies the price table they want; the producer does not have the voice to negotiate. People are saturated. Some families burnt their harvest and were arrested. No one likes the machamba. You wake up, you cultivate, you return tired, and you don't receive anything. You become skinny and dark until your back can't take it any longer. Each one has their luck. If you have a terrible year, you lose everything and become poor forever (Interview with Roberto 2017).*

Although most Mozambicans are engaged primarily in own agricultural production, per capita production has declined since independence. Mosca (2017) attributes the stagnation of agriculture to the lack of coherent, intersectoral, public policies that prioritise food production and place *camponeses* at the centre of rural and economic development—despite a Constitutional mandate to do so (RdM 1990). The scarcity of land and labour, climate change, absence of credit for agricultural inputs and vagaries of the market mean that *camponeses* can easily *'lose everything and become poor forever'.* Nevertheless, respondents identified several benefits to *machamba* cultivation. On the one hand, *'the machamba is for life',* for it provides an autonomous source of sustenance that can subsidise workers' low wages. On the other hand, *'it's in our blood'* and functions as a bridge between the contemporary life and ancestral histories. While respondents hoped that their children would escape the drudgery and risk associated with manual rainfed agriculture, this was no more a rejection of the authentic work of cultivation than the desire to retain access to land was a rejection of intangible labour. After all, given the precarity of wage-work, the *machamba* provides a key source of sustenance.

'We eat chicken every day': own-account work off the farm

Like the cultivation of the *machamba*, off-farm own-account work provides an autonomous source of sustenance from which one cannot be fired. However, it can also involve less drudgery and a more regular source of income. Indeed, some activities are so lucrative that own-account workers can *'eat chicken every day'.* Within own-account work, there is significant differentiation, with women generally relegated to less lucrative activities. The sexual division of labour is particularly sharp in the district of Ribáuè, where gender norms curtail women's participation in tasks outside of the home (Humbane 2018). This section profiles an economic agent, a formal and an informal market vendor and a home-based producer, to trace the classed and gendered nature of own-account work.

Celestino is a *'man of money'* in the town of Riani, Ribáuè. He owns a fleet of trucks that transport primary products to the port city of Nacala and vice versa; and a small shop where he sells everything from brightly coloured plastic chairs to petrol. Next to the shop is a small hall, where local Frelimo leaders gather on public holidays. Up the hill, Celestino built several cement rooms to house railway workers on the Nacala Development Corridor line which runs through the town. Next to the makeshift bed and breakfast, he set up a solar-powered mill where villagers can grind maize. In times of desperation, people turn to Celestino for help. Because he does not own *machambas*, he purchases projected agricultural produce at favourable rates instead, in what essentially amounts to an agricultural futures market.

Although Celestino is among the wealthiest entrepreneurs in town – and reviled by many *camponeses* who rely on him to get produce to market – he laments the numerous obstacles faced by rural entrepreneurs. Road access is limited and poorly maintained, which poses a challenge to the transportation of agricultural produce following the rainy season. While the train provided an alternative transportation route, the increasingly erratic schedules with the prioritisation of Vale coal locomotives have undermined trade. Furthermore, the town is disconnected from the electricity and water grid, which constrains economic activities. Finally, entrepreneurs struggle to secure investment due to the volatile agricultural markets on which their customers rely. Ultimately, how own-account workers fare depends at least in part on the nature of markets and the ability to access credit to invest in income-generating activities.

The town of Inhassoro provides more promising business opportunities due to a customer base with diverse sources of income, including remittances from migrant labour. Fátima owns a formal bookshop in the market in Inhassoro, that supplies the district government with office equipment. Her first foray into business was as an informal hawker, trading in *calamidades* (second-hand clothing). A self-proclaimed fashion enthusiast, she would take the taxi to the town of Maxixe, select a few pieces and bring them back to sell. As her clientele grew, so did her stock, and she now purchases bales directly from the port in the capital city Maputo:

> *I knew that I had to do something to start a business. My family helped me. I always enjoyed fashion and began by buying things I liked, bringing them and then selling them for a profit. Sometimes I would pick a piece for myself, and I would get here, and someone would want it. I would have to give it; it's the only way to conquer a client (Interview with Fatima 2017).*

With the income from her *calamidades* business, Fátima invested in a bookshop. When the local government announced a tender for the provision of office supplies, she formalised it and

is now the exclusive supplier of toners, office materials, schoolbooks, notebooks, examination booklets and student cards in Inhassoro. Nevertheless, she has maintained her *calamidades* business because it provides her with a safety net if the tender is not renewed and a steady income stream because government payments are often delayed. Having found a viable way to make a living, she baulks at the idea of working for a formal employer:

> *It's better to be an owner than a worker because you're free and don't have to wait until the end of the month to get paid. The advantage of calamidades is that it's a smaller investment and the money trickles in regularly. Today I am a proprietress. People know me, and I help the state (Interview with Fatima 2017).*

In contrast to Fátima, Isabel produces *kabanga* – a creamy homebrew made from maize bran, sugar and water which takes about three weeks to ferment. After soaking the maize bran in water for two weeks, it is cooked, cooled, sieved and poured into a barrel with sugar. As a Seventh Day Adventist, Isabel is prohibited from consuming and brewing alcohol. However, it is preferable to performing debt labour for a *'man of money'*. Indeed, across both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, *kabanga* production provides an essential source of income for women bound to the home due to competing reproductive responsibilities—particularly following the harvest when *camponeses* have money in their pockets. However, Isabel herself considers it a social vice:

> *Kabanga is a profitable business. You sit at home, you make it, people come to buy it, and you immediately have money in your hands. To conquer clients, you let them build up a debt, because if you don't sell, it rots and you lose your investment, and you know they will always come to pay. But people, hai! They drink until they hit each other. Vomit, break plates, enter other people's homes and threaten them with a machete, beat up their wives and abuse children and the elderly. Drinking does not help in creating friends (Interview with Isabel 2017).*

To reduce conflict between *kabanga* producers and ensure a steady supply throughout the month, women coordinate production. In a good month, Isabel makes between Mts 1,000 and Mts 2,000, depending on whether she can produce her own sugarcane. Nevertheless, she does not have aspirations of becoming a proprietress like Fátima, for: *'Women touch the small things such as kabanga, which help a little bit but change nothing'.* Rather, she hopes that her husband will secure employment at Sasol's Central Processing Facility.

Isabel's son Cláudio shares a makeshift stall with his wife at the market. They sell frozen *malambe* or baobab juice for Mts 5 a bottle, and *fiosses* or deep-fried doughnuts for Mts 1 each.

Food preparation begins at midnight. They purchase the *malambe* from women who do the challenging work of collecting the fruit, cracking open its hard shell and scooping out the spongy white flesh. Then they dissolve the tangy flesh in boiling water and pass the mixture through a sieve to remove the seeds and fibre. Meanwhile, they set about making the doughnuts. Cláudio kneads the dough while his wife twists it into dainty bows and drops them in hot oil. They sell approximately 75 litres of juice a week, which earns them Mts 1,125; 1,000 doughnuts a week, which makes them Mts 1,000. Although the profit margin for the doughnuts is smaller, they have been able to attract a more diverse clientele and increase income by combining two products.

Cláudio is also a tattoo artist, with a heart-shaped tattoo with a cupid's arrow shooting through his forearm. In the past, people used acid from the cashew fruit's pit to scarify their bodies. Today, young people prefer Indian ink. While in Joni, Cláudio learned how to improvise a tattoo machine using a repurposed cd player motor attached to an empty pen with a sewing needle on one end. Tattoos are in highest demand after an afternoon drinking *kabanga* under Isabel's mango tree. Reflecting on his busy life, he says: '*To sleep, provokes illness. It is better to grab the fishing line and go fishin*g'. But one activity which he swears never to repeat is that of an itinerant egg vendor: '*People never saw me as a full person because I was constantly moving. When you have a fixed location, a market stall, people see you, they know you'* (Interview with Claudio 2016).

'To work for someone is to work for free': formal and informal wage-work

According to national statistics, wage-work is far more prevalent in the district of Inhassoro than in the district of Ribáuè. Half of all employment is in the public sector, including the court and notary; the police, prosecutor's office and intelligence services; the district administrator's office: the district services for women, health and social action; for education, youth and technology; for economic activities; and public works and infrastructure. Outside of the district capital, teachers, nurses and agricultural extension officers account for the largest share of public sector employment (MAE 2014b; 2014a; INE 2017a; 2017b; 2019). In Inhassoro, private sector employment is concentrated in the tourism and service sector, while in Ribáuè it is focused on agro-processing and transportation. However, like own-account work, activities vary widely and extend beyond the formal economy. This subsection profiles a civil servant, a

formal employee in the private sector and two forms of *biscates* or side hustles to capture the diversity of employment relationships in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè.

Hélio is a secondary school teacher in Iapala. He earns Mts 7,000 a month, which is just over the line of working poverty. Although his salary has been consistently delayed due to the crisis of Ematum, he teaches sporadically to safeguard his *Quadro* position. To make ends meet, he moonlights as a taxi driver. His car – etched with the words *'I don't sleep'* – was purchased with a subsidised loan for workers in the public sector. In contravention to the law, he installed tinted windows, promising anonymity and discretion in this small, gossip-infested town: *'My customers desire it, particularly for late-night rendezvous. Oh, the things I've seen! But they keep calling because they know I'm trustworthy'.* Hélio works day and night, attending to his classes between shifts. With the money he earns, he hires *ganho-ganho* to cultivate his *machamba*s, whose harvests provide a welcome source of sustenance in times of crisis.

Iláurio works for Sasol in Maimelane, Inhassoro. After completing middle school, he signed a contract with the Employment Bureau of Africa – formerly WNLA – where he was recruited to work in the mines of Rustenberg. Upon returning to Maimelane, he was hired by a Sasol security subcontractor as a guard. The position was initially for three months, then six months, nine months, a year and now permanent. He earns a base salary of Mts 6,516, though, with extra time, he can make up to Mts 16,000 a month. The workload is intense – back-to-back 28 days on and 28 days off – yet he feels lucky: he has one day of holiday a month, three days of sick leave a year, access to the Sasol health clinic and the company contributes to his social security benefits. Like other salaried workers, he too hires *ganho-ganho*. However, Iláurio stresses that he is the exception rather, for the Sasol Community Liaison Forum is largely a smokescreen for local leaders to exact tributes from their subjects. After all, they control the distribution of cash transfers, the allotment of agricultural land and the allocation of casual jobs. The neighbourhood secretary in the town of Inhassoro in particular, is a shrewd political operator, with an unquenchable thirst for *refrescos* who uses her gatekeeping position to extort bribes from community members. When challenged, she simply retorts: *'This is not the time of Samora [Machel] when people did things for free'.*

Despite limited opportunities for formal employment, respondents in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè readily engaged in casual wage-work. The most socially recognised form of informal work is the volunteer, which respondents defined as *'a biscate for people who are social'.*

Volunteers work for non-governmental organisations, international development agencies and state institutions. In Inhassoro and Ribáuè, volunteers include polyvalent officials who work under the supervision of the Ministry of Health to provide basic diagnostic and referral services; literacy educators who work under the supervision of the Ministry of Education to provide literacy training; community committees for child protection, who function as de facto social workers under the supervision of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action; and *Permanentes* who represent the National Institute for Social Action (INAS). However, there is no official data on the number of volunteers, their employers, the types of activities or employment relationships

Contracts range from a couple of weeks to a couple of years, and salaries vary from nothing to 3,000 a month. The intensity of work ebbs and flows throughout the year. Some functions require only a few hours of work a week, while others are almost full time. Because volunteers perform quasi-official tasks that are considered socially useful and hold sway over the distribution of resources, they carry a status closer to a civil servant. For instance, Luísa is a career volunteer in Riani. Her first volunteer position was doing 10-minute door-to-door lectures on HIV, tetanus, and tuberculosis. She worked Monday to Friday and was paid Mts 2,742 a month for a year. Then she was recruited to join the community committee to protect children, where she received a bicycle, bag, t-shirt, hat, notepad, and identity card. Asked who her employer was, she is unable to say. Currently, Luísa is an INAS *Permanente*. She identifies and registers vulnerable households, performs home visits, prepares for and assists in the payment of cash transfers, supervises the PASP and in some instances, represents INAS during district government planning meetings. In exchange, she receives a monthly stipend of Mts 1,000.

Luísa sees all volunteer experiences, whether short term or long-term, paid, or unpaid, as opportunities to strengthen her curriculum and build networks that may lead to future work. While she enjoys the work of a volunteer, she is not blind to its exploitative conditions:

> *The people in front, they sit on us. They recruit us, but they don't take good care of us. They drag us around as though we were their chairs. Each person is fighting to fill their stomachs; once they fill their stomachs, they forget about us. But a volunteer is an animal who has to eat, to bathe...I do the talks because those contribute to our community's health, but I'm not filling out any forms. The nurse uses those forms to do the statistics; she's just preoccupied with getting the statistics from us, so she can send them to the district, to the province, to get money, which they eat alone (Interview with Luisa 2017).*

For Luísa, the solution is two-fold. On the one hand, local leaders must be rewarded for representing volunteers' interests, much as union leaders would. On the other hand, volunteers must learn to bargain with employers. In the absence of collective action by volunteers, Luísa deliberately withholds information to win concessions without compromising villagers' health. While such everyday forms of resistance have not transformed power relations, they have eased work conditions and enabled Luísa to assert her power and dignity.

The least socially recognised form of employment is the *biscate.* A *biscate* is a short-term, informal, employment relationship negotiated under duress, in a context where the worker has little to no bargaining power. Tasks range from fetching to *ganho-ganho* in exchange for food or a wage. Activities are often gendered, with men's work considered more specialised and thus deserving of more pay. For instance, in construction, men who make *matope* (clay blocks) sell each for Mts 50, while women who dig the soil and carry the water to make the blocks are paid a measly Mts 50 a day. Because the going rate is generally set well below minimum wages – *'just enough to buy salt'* – many prefer to be paid in sugar, salt, maize meal, dried fish and homebrew. The lowest-paid *biscate* is *ganho-ganho* or agricultural day labour work, which, as the case of Zaida illustrates, can easily slip into debt labour:

> *A biscate is something you do out of a need to survive, from here to here. You will knock on uncle Manuel's door [and say] 'Uncle, I'm desperate, please help'. If you're lucky, he'll show you a field. To survive from xikwakwas (biscates), you need to have friends. If you do not have friends, you will not get a job. I'm known as poor, so people give me ganho. It doesn't matter if it's big and they only pay you Mts 50, you accept it. Those Mts 50 you earn, you spend at the market on the way home, to buy curry. It's the work of scarcity. I have scarcity, not the person who hires me (Interview with Zaida 2017).*

As Zaida alludes to, cultivating patronage relationships with 'men of money' is the key to success. However, it comes at a cost, as the period of high labour demand coincides with the agricultural cycle's most labour-intensive period. Thus, Zaida is forced to choose between immediate cash at ultra-low rates through *ganho-ganho* and making a long-term investment in her *machambas*. Conversely, the period of lowest demand coincides with the least labour-intensive period. For instance, during the drought, Uncle Manuel had no work for Zaida precisely because the rains had yet to come. Instead, he offered to lend her money, to be repaid through debt labour. When the rains returned, Uncle Manuel called her back. Fearful of souring their relationship, she prioritised his *machambas* over hers, which only cemented her household's dependence on *ganho-ganho*.

Of course, some *biscateiros* do make big money. Maria was an artisanal miner in the town of Iapala, Ribáuè. When her husband died, his family took everything they owned, and she decided to try her luck in the gold mines of 'Colombia' in the neighbouring district of Molocué. She left her children with her aunt, while she adventured a livelihood in the gold-encrusted tunnels of the River Metacusse:

> *We would dig a tunnel, first vertically and then horizontally, with a hoe. It was scary, but what can you do! Then we would wash it in a basin, and the gold would sink to the bottom. It was a good business. People from South Africa, Tanzania, Maputo would buy it. Depending on the day, you could make anywhere between Mts 3,000 and Mts 5,000. When I had saved enough money to build a house, I returned. I had children to look after (Interview with Maria 2016)!*

With the money Maria had earned, she put her children through school, built a house with a zinc roof and furnished it. Today, she relies almost exclusively on the *machamba*, spending no more than Mts 1,000 a month. As she sits in front of the television she bought with her miners' wages; she smiles, proud to have been able to buy back what her husband's family had taken.

The case of Maria notwithstanding, most respondents in Inhassoro and Ribáuè preferred to improvise own-account activities than perform volunteer or *biscate* work. After all, in the absence of de facto labour and social protections, '*to work for someone is to work for free*', explains José, an informal construction worker in the town of Inhassoro:

> *To work for someone is to work for free. Just as the end of the month is approaching, the boss begins to find excuses. They say you were absent and they cut your salary. There is no point in complaining because they will take that money, they owe you and pay them off [the courts, labour inspectors]. You end up being in the wrong. There's no point; it's best just to leave it. You're a different thing, a class of person (Interview with Jose 2016).*

'A woman is like a tree': unpaid care work

There are no official statistics regarding the scope and scale of unpaid care work. Nevertheless, in the district of Ribáuè, respondents explicitly identified household reproductive activities as work. During initiation rituals, counsellors pass on crucial lessons from the ancestors regarding etiquette; the importance of marrying, having children and continuing the matrilineal lineage; child-rearing; household maintenance and the cultivation of food crops; and 'the work of loving your husband'. Failure to follow these lessons not only threatens the stability of the household

but poses risks in the afterlife. Therefore, those who deviate from the norm, are socially rebuffed, explains Ivone, a young woman from the village of Riani, Ribáuè :

> *All human beings should have children. To have children is to make a future. A woman is like a tree. She is born, grows up, reproduces, and dies. A woman's responsibility is to take care of her husband, of her yard and her children. Without care, you do not have a household. I was happy to marry, more so to avoid being called abusive names, being called a whore (Interview with Ivone 2017).*

Julieta is a counsellor in the town of Iapala, Ribáuè. She accepted her calling after 15 years of illness. Using a drum and tin can filled with pebbles, she summons the ancestors to share the key lessons she must pass on to the next generation. Being a counsellor is not a full-time job. On average, she does ten sessions a year. These are generally between November and January, to accommodate for the schoolyear. During these months, the night air is filled with echoes of beating drums emanating from huts across the village. She earns between Mts100 and Mts 300 per child, depending on their age, but her primary source of livelihood is the *machamba* (Interview with Julieta 2017). Initiation ceremonies place a strong emphasis on the art of seduction and sexual pleasure. The objective is to attract progenitors into the matrilineal lineage to ensure its continuation. Women are taught that they must bathe and groom their husbands, cook for them, serve them water, wash their clothes, respect their in-laws, and provide sexual pleasure. During rituals, their upper legs are tattooed with geometric designs, and they are taught how to prepare and manoeuvre their bodies. Although women in Ribáuè live in matrilineal lineages, many of the lessons of initiation rituals subordinate them to men's sexual needs. This subordination is upheld by the threat of violence, the fear of social marginalisation and differential control over material wealth. As Ivone adds:

> *The work of pleasing your husband, it's mandatory. When the woman does not please a man, the man does not feel satisfied; the same way that when the man is not circumcised, the woman is not satisfied. If you refuse, he'll hit you. When you please a man at night, he feels good, and he also thanks you. He will buy you clothes, shoes, a capulana [cloth]. And the woman will say 'Ia, my husband liked it' (Interview with Ivone 2017).*

As Ivone hints at, many women are proud of having mastered the art of seduction. After all, the rituals not only augment women's sexual pleasure but promote a connection between girls and women that transcends patriarchal structures imposed by tradition and religion – a point emphasised by Geigenbach (2003). Nevertheless, the first female chief of the administrative post of Iapala argues that initiation rituals are inherently violent and must be contested: '*This form of submission is a form of violence. Changing conditions require changing norms. We*

need to work with the councillors*, the queens, the masters of ceremonies'* (Interview with Chief of Post 2017).

In the absence of decent employment opportunities, households in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè cobbled together a livelihood from a diversity of productive and reproductive, paid and unpaid, formal and informal activities. Activities are both classed and gendered. For instance, *ganho-ganho* and debt labour are generally performed by households in the first quintile of the consumption distribution; with men assigned tasks perceived to require more effort and skill such as clearing fields and women relegated to tilling and weeding which are poorly remunerated. Households in the second and third quintile generally engaged in survivalist activities such as beer brewing, volunteer work and *biscates*. Those in the fourth and fifth quintile were predominantly salaried workers in both the public and private sector, as well as entrepreneurs and commercial farmers. Importantly, all respondents either cultivated or hoped to cultivate *machambas*, even as they articulated the desire to escape the drudgery and risk of manual rainfed agriculture.

'To be a person is to work': the meaning of work in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè

> *My father's sister was a lazy one. To avoid the machamba she always pretended that she was ill. When it came time to harvest, she had nothing in her fields, and she would come to us with pots to ask for food. One day someone gave her a bitter cassava, and she broke out in an illness that took her to her death. Our parents told us that story to show us that hunger kills. Laziness is an ugly thing. To refuse to give someone something is difficult because you have pity. Still, when you see them coming, you say: they're coming, they're coming, hide everything (Interview with Fátima 2017).*

The phrase *'to be a person is to work'* is frequently evoked in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè. However, as the previous section alluded to, the centrality of work should not be conflated with the dogma of the dignity of wage-work, as theorised by Gorz (1999). Indeed, in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, dominant definitions of work transcended the boundaries between authentic and intangible labour. Respondents defined work as any specialised activity that is socially useful and allows households to reproduce themselves. This included formal employment, market vending, *kabanga* production, *machamba* cultivation and *'the work of loving your man'.* This section draws on group conversations conducted in Inhassoro and Ribáuè to explore the social value of work and the criteria used to evaluate its meaning. After all, while to be a person is to work, not all forms of work were created equal.

On an elemental level, the meaning of work is shaped by the material needs of agrarian life and the social requirements of personhood in the countryside. The manual work of cultivation—ploughing, sowing, watering, weeding, and harvesting—is essential to life itself. Without cultivation, there is no food, without food, there is hunger, and with hunger, there is death. Furthermore, work is essential to sustaining the relationships of reciprocity and mutuality, which form the bedrock of social relations in rural areas. In an agrarian context, one reaps what one sows. Given the fragmented social security system, a failed harvest inevitably burdens family, neighbours, and friends. The praxis of *ubuntu* only goes so far, and laziness is firmly rebuffed for it represents the very betrayal of social solidarity. Given the strenuous nature of manual cultivation, there is a particular concern with building and preserving physical strength. While the physical act of working stimulates the metabolic system, sloth transforms a perfectly healthy body into a decaying, dependent, deadweight object, explains Fátima:

> *Work is the basis of human being's social life. Without work, human life itself has no basis. Each one benefits from their sweat, the sweat of work. If they do not sweat, they gain nothing. Laziness is an ugly thing. When you catch laziness, you lose beautiful things—like food—and end up stealing and getting beat up. When someone is born, and they feed that laziness, the body doesn't develop well. When you sit, your body does not feel well. It feels tired, heavy; the blood does not circulate; you can't breathe properly. To be a person is to know how to work (Interview with Fátima 2017).*

In Mozambique, dominant conceptions of work reflect the accumulated, messy, and often contradictory history of religious doctrine and state practice. For instance, Iolanda, a teacher of Moral and Civic Education in the village of Temane, imparts to her students that work is both a civic and divine duty: *'When God created man, man was given the task of working to sustain himself. To be blessed by God, you need to give yourself through work'* (Interview with Iolanda 2017). The notion of work as God's plan has its roots in the colonial period when Catholic Mission schools taught African children that work was a form of punishment for their original sin. And indeed, while respondents in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè today define both real and intangible labour as legitimate, it is not unusual in fleeting moments to overhear the words: *'I don't work, I'm just a camponês'.*

With independence, work was redefined as a collective activity that involved both real and intangible labour. Whether on collective farms, communal villages, schools, factories or markets, work promised to liberate man from hunger, nudity, and misery. The postcolonial state argued that there was nothing inherently exploitative about work; what mattered were the

relations of production. In a socialist society, the worker-peasant alliance had the power to decide what to produce, how to produce it and for whom. Indeed, work dignified man, by cleansing society of the vices of colonialism and tradition, and creating the basis for the emergence of a 'new man'. During this time fables about work proliferated, putting the stamp of tradition onto socialist praxis. One of the most famous is about a group of wild animals, who facing a drought and at risk of dying of thirst, met to find a solution. After much debate, they decided to dig a well collectively. However, the hare – which is often portrayed as a trickster – refused, claiming that he would quench his thirst with mist instead. Once the other animals had dug the well and soothed their parched throats with its liquid, they decided to guard it to prevent the hare from drinking the water. The first night, the hare tricked the gazelle with honey, slurped the water and soiled the well. The second night, he tricked the monkey and once again defecated in the well. Angry, the animals painted the well with glue, and the next night, the hare got stuck to the well forever.


With the transition to a market economy, the state could not satisfy the triumphalist aspirations associated with collective work. Gradually, work was re-individualised in official discourse, though conceptions of legitimate work continued to include both real and intangible labour. Indeed, any activity became acceptable, including street trading which had been previously reviled as petty bourgeois. The unemployed were recast as microentrepreneurs and a new school curriculum, Notions of Entrepreneurship, was introduced. Its objective, Celestina argues, is to reorient students' aspirations towards the authentic work of cultivation:

> *The idea behind the programme is to instil in the student's mind that they need to produce. They must not be scared of the hoe. Instead of waiting for other opportunities to arise, they must use the hoe to produce what they need to consume. Because employment is not for everyone. Our goal in the education sector is to educate students to not wait for handouts, because otherwise, they will end up as marginals (Interview with Chief of Post 2017).*

Amidst a crisis of reproduction, Mozambique's contemporary bourgeoisie wavers between grand proclamations of the moral value of intangible and authentic work, to manage the expectations of a growing generation of seemingly surplus labour. In this context, work has come to mean pretty much anything at all – as long as it deflects from demands for wage-work and handouts. Whereas in the colonial period, a 'culture of work' referred to one's willingness to labour under conditions of hyper-exploitation, today it reflects the ability to weather unemployment as an aspiring microentrepreneur.

Although work is existentially important in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, not all work is created equal. The remainder of this section compares how respondents in the two districts evaluated the meaningful or alienating nature of occupational categories. While respondents' responses differed according to age, gender and class position, there were some broad patterns. The most important measure is the ability of an activity to sustain households' reproductive needs. After all, the primary purpose of work is to *'fill your stomach'.* Sustenance includes the rate of remuneration, monetary and in-kind, the regularity and security of income, and in a context where people cobble together a livelihood, the opportunity cost associated with a particular activity. Figure 25 compares rankings, according to sustenance.

Figure 24: A comparison of activities by levels of sustenance in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/2017



Notably, the value ascribed to *machamba* cultivation differed between Inhassoro and Ribáuè. This is not unexpected given that Ribáuè is a fertile district renowned for agricultural production while Inhassoro is a semi-arid region with a long history of migrant wage-labour. In a good year, produce from the *machamba* can fill stomachs and silos. However, in a lousy year machamba cultivation can plunge households into poverty – and in the district of Inhassoro there are many bad years. In addition to the vagaries of the weather, the plagues, and the markets, *machamba* cultivation only draws income at the end of the agricultural cycle, forcing households to look for other sources of sustenance during the lean period. Rosalina argues that the reason that the *machamba* ranks so highly in Ribáuè is that there are few alternatives: '*I always dreamt that I would grow up to become a teacher, to live well and be classy. Yet here I*

am today, cultivating. I look at my children, and where are we going?! They're going to be just like us' (Interview with Rosalina 2017).


The value ascribed to own-account work also differs. Respondents in Inhassoro argued that own-account work off the farm is the most desirable occupation because workers can eat chicken every day. Incomes are potentially higher than salaried employment and generated daily, which means that workers do not need to wait until the end of the month. In both districts, own-account activities are mostly residual, *'things which help a little bit but change nothing'.* However, in Inhassoro, there are more opportunities. Men are more likely to trade in sectors which require higher investments but have higher returns such as electronics, while women focus on home-based activities and children on iterant ones. Fátima is the exception. However, had she lived in Ribáuè; her business may have struggled to get off the ground. Ultimately, Cremildo reflects: *'It's hard to gauge which activity will generate most profits. Often, the best-dressed entrepreneurs are thieves.'.*

Within wage-work, rankings varied widely between formal employment on the one hand and volunteer, *biscate* and *ganho-ganho* work on the other. Formal employment in the public sector generally pays lower wages, but positions are permanent, making them more desirable, particularly in Ribáuè where alternatives are limited. In both districts, respondents argued that *biscates* and *ganho-ganho* provided the least in terms of sustenance: remuneration is meagre and paid according to tasks, contracts are temporary and unreliable, and if associated with agricultural work, they take time away from workers' *machambas* during the most critical periods of the agricultural cycle. Volunteer work was considered slightly better because wages tended to be higher when remunerated, defined according to working time and long term. Nevertheless, men tended to shy away from volunteer work, perhaps Luísa argues*, 'because volunteer work needs certificates and men with certificates have jobs.'.*

The second most important measure is autonomy or the ability to shape the labour process. This includes the power to define what to produce, how to produce it and for whom. In both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, respondents identified own agricultural production as the most autonomous form of work. Of course, *camponeses* cannot control all aspects of the process of production: the rains and plagues depend on the whims of God, access to land on those with ancestral ties and the price of cash crops on international commodity markets. Nevertheless, they can decide what to plant, when to plant it, how to cultivate and who to sell it to.

Rosalina and Roberto for instance, prioritise food crops over labour-intensive cash crops like tobacco because the tobacco price set by the marketing company Sonil is too low: *'At the end of the agricultural season they deduct the amount for fertiliser, seed, planters. If you produce too little or if they don't like the quality, you can end up owing the company. My bones are tired of that. The important crops are maize, sorghum, cassava. Rice is a hobby because it does not fill the stomach'.* Figure 26 compares rankings, according to autonomy.

Figure 25: A comparison of activities by degree of autonomy in Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2016/2017



Source: author's notes based on respondent's rankings during group conversations

Similarly, own-account work off the farm is reasonably flexible. It is up to workers to decide what business to set up, where to set it up, and its hours of operation. However, in contrast to the *machamba* where one can consume directly what one produces, the ability to draw income from own-account activities is bound up in the cultivation of a customer base and the production of a product or service. If the customer base is not interested in what is being sold or does not have the income to purchase, own-account workers are left with few possibilities.

Although wage-labour is by its very definition dependent on others, it can be grouped into two categories. Salaried employment and volunteer work tend to offer greater autonomy because workers are generally given the space to define how to undertake a particular activity. This is especially true of those who work in the public sector and are protected by collective bargaining agreements. However, public sector workers are also subject to arbitrary changes in work conditions, including the redefinition of tasks, the relocation to another district and pressure to

campaign for the ruling party. Meanwhile, *biscates* and *ganho-ganho* are considered the least autonomous forms of work. Because it is the work of scarcity workers have no bargaining power and the terms of employment are set by the task. Their performance is closely scrutinised, and any deviation can lead to a deduction in income, which is why many in the district of Inhassoro argue that *'to work for someone is to work for free'.*


The third measure is social recognition, which is shaped by the degree of exertion involved in undertaking a particular activity, the skills required and possibilities for career development, and perceptions regarding its social utility. In both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, the cultivation of the *machamba* is regarded as a productive activity that not only sustains the household but society as a whole. Furthermore, it provides a connection to a precapitalist and precolonial past. As Gérsio, a carpenter from the town of Inhassoro explained:

> *Quality tomatoes do not come from the office. Those little things require significant effort. To cultivate, plant, weed, water, and pick, it takes time to produce. When it comes to the harvest, we feel good, depending on each person's skills (Interview with Gersio 2017).*

Yet manual cultivation also involves hard, physical, dirty labour – and Gérsio at least has no intention of cultivating a *machamba* himself. Instead, he hopes that his girlfriend will become a successful *camponesa*: '*If I have a choice between a woman who works in the office or a woman who works in the machamba I pick the woman who works in the machamba because she is productive'.* While his girlfriend Nubia is pursuing a career in investigative journalism, she expects that once she begins to earn enough, she can hire *ganho-ganho* to cultivate *machambas* and perform her 'traditional' role by proxy. Ultimately the *machamba* is venerated by all but despised by those with little choice but to eke out a living with a short hoe.

Own-account work can carry significant prestige if entrepreneurs are successful and provide a socially useful good or service. It is generally clean and respectable work, provided a worker does not venture into criminal activities. Those located in an established physical space are particularly well regarded. Furthermore, successful own-account workers – *'men of money'* – employ others, provide loans, fund community initiatives and political parties. This extensive network of patronage gives them social recognition. However, those who are unsuccessful can be easily cast out, and iterant workers, in particular, are treated with contempt. Figure 27 compares rankings, according to social recognition.

Figure 26: A comparison of activities by social recognition, 2016/17



Source: author's notes based on respondent's rankings during group conversations

Formal salaried workers are perhaps the most easily recognisable. Often, they have a defined profession and are identifiable by their degrees, badges, and uniforms. Their work is generally considered clean, respectable, and socially useful. Indeed, they may even be protected by labour standards and occupational health and safety requirements. While volunteer workers do not benefit from the same labour and social protections as salaried workers, they often receive training, materials, or equipment, and carry out quasi-official functions considered socially useful. In contrast, *biscates* and *ganho-ganho* are considered the most alienating forms of work. While a successful *biscateiro* may ultimately make more money than a volunteer, they are treated as expendable and their contribution less socially useful.

Conclusion: beyond the authentic and the intangible

> *Our youth are scared to produce. Multi-party democracy is being poorly understood. When we say we have the right to speech, expression, each one does what they think, and when the laws are applied independently of their party, it leads to confusion,* Calado (2017).

Calado is a local Frelimo leader in Iapala, renowned for his long sparkly nails. He made a small fortune by building huts along the Northern Development Corridor ahead of its expansion, then claimed compensation from the mining giant Vale upon their demolition. Like many Party leaders, he is concerned about the political implications of rising rural unemployment and 'marginality'. Of course, the extent of rural un(der)employment in Mozambique in hard to gauge. In a context where the majority have not been entirely dispossessed of the means of production, unemployed identities are intertwined with aspirational notions of legitimate and illegitimate,

desirable, and undesirable, meaningful and alienating work. These are shaped both by an accumulated and contradictory history of religious doctrine and state practice, and the material needs of agrarian life and personhood. In the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, respondents evaluate the meaningfulness of work based on sustenance, autonomy, and social recognition. Legitimate forms of work include both commodified and uncommodified, formal and informal activities. Indeed, at least in rural Mozambique, the dogma of the dignity of wage-work seems far more contingent than utopian 'anti-work' scholars imagine (Gorz 1999b).

Although the chapter did not get us any closer than Cramer et al. (2015) to measuring the extent of un(der)employment, it did reveal the patterns and process which underlie the current crisis of reproduction. Despite record rates of economic growth before the crisis of Ematum, a growing proportion of the population have joined the ranks of the economically inactive amidst a simultaneous process of deagrarianisation and deindustrialisation. Growth has been driven primarily by foreign direct investment in the capital-intensive extractive sector and adjacent infrastructures, which account for 90 per cent of investment but only 15 per cent of employment (C. N. Castel-Branco 2015). In an effort to deflect from the failures of a resource-driven development model, the political elite actively promotes authentic work as a source of self-esteem. Through interventions like the school curriculum, it has refashioned *camponeses* into micro-entrepreneurs. Of course, without adequate state support, this amounts to little more than a neoliberal strategy to preserve the structure of accumulation– a point made by Byres (2004).

Much of the 'anti-work' scholarship romanticises the nature of authentic work while overlooking the self-exploitation which often accompanies it. While respondents in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè argued that *'the machamba is for life',* the vagaries of the weather, the plagues and the markets - combined with the drudgery of manual cultivation – meant that young people, in particular, were reluctant to embrace the hoe. The *machamba* may rank highly in terms of autonomy and social recognition, but it fares less well in terms of sustenance – which is, after all, the primary purpose of working. Historically there has been a semi-symbiotic relationship between migrant wage-work, which helped stabilise the *machamba* and *machamba* cultivation which subsidised workers' low wages. However, this relationship of interdependence has become increasingly fragmented, deepening the crisis of reproduction in the countryside. Notably, the desire to escape the drudgery of authentic work was not a reflection of a delusional love for intangible labour, any more than the desire to hold onto the *machamba* reflected an embrace of authentic work. Indeed, given that standard employment

relationships have always been the exception and households cobble together a livelihood from a multiplicity of activities, the boundaries between authentic and intangible labour were far more fluid than utopian scholars often imagine.

Although national statistics suggest that the majority of the economically active population are either own-account or unpaid family workers, a dense web of wages activities underlie these elusive categories including debt labour for local lenders, *ganho-ganho* and *biscates* for wealthier neighbours, *volunteer* work for the state and non-governmental organisations and casual employment for multinational corporations. The conditions of work are shaped both by class and gender relations in the countryside. Most wageworkers in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè were excluded from minimum wages, paid leave, social security, collective bargaining rights and other labour protections afforded to those in the formal economy. Yet while utopian 'anti-work' scholars have shifted attention from production to redistribution, these evolving forms of exploitation remain unchecked. Even in rural Mozambique – a site at the periphery of capitalist accumulation – there is plenty of wage-work happening and plenty more to be done.

Ultimately, emancipatory politics cannot just work backwards from Marx's theory of alienation to a utopian paradise where authentic work reigns. It must wrestle with questions of political economy at the heart of colonial capitalist development in Southern Africa. However, to do so requires reengaging politics at the points of production and redistribution – and in an agrarian context, this involves articulation between struggles around land and labour. The next chapter focuses on struggles at the point of redistribution in Mozambique through the lens of the Productive Social Action Programme. It explores workers' experiences and expectations with regards to the redistributive role of the state. It concludes with a reflection of the possibilities and limitations of a more radical politics of distribution in a country with a limited redistributive base due to a resource-driven development model.

Chapter 6: The Contentious Politics of the Productive Social Action Programme

It is an early morning in November, and Romão is preparing a supervisory visit. As the delegation head of Development Programmes at the National Institute for Social Action (INAS), he is responsible for managing the implementation of the Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) in the districts of Vilankulo, Inhassoro, Govuro and Mabote. The distances are vast and the roads treacherous, but Romão exudes the confidence of a seasoned traveller. During his twenty-five-year career as a civil servant, he has traversed every track in the region; first as an agricultural extension officer on a bicycle, then as an INAS staffer on a motorbike, and now in a donated pick-up truck inscribed with a fading UNICEF logo. He usually spends fifteen days a month on the road, but with the crisis of Ematum, he has had to improvise ways of getting to the field, for fuel is scarce, transport wanting and per diems improbable. Before hitting the road, he inspects the pick-up truck parked adjacent to an abandoned World Food Programme (WFP) tent, then offers a piece of advice:

> *On the road, anything can happen – a flat tire, an accident, even an ambush. It is best to take off your watch. You'll forget about time and become flexible. That way, when you get to the end of the day, you'll realise you accomplished more than you had hoped (Interview with Romão 2017).*

The PASP is the only social welfare programme for able-bodied adults of working age in Mozambique. It consists of a seasonal monthly cash transfer of Mts 1,050, in exchange for participating in labour-intensive public works for four hours a day and four days a week. In urban centres, it was designed to respond to chronic periods of unemployment and to last for six months a year; while in rural areas it was intended to smooth consumption during the lean period of the agricultural cycle and to last for only four. Poor households, with at least one able-bodied adult, are eligible to apply. Households headed by women or with a large number of dependents are prioritised. After participating in the programme for three years, 'beneficiaries' are expected to have accumulated the assets, skills and knowledge to 'graduate' out of the programme as microentrepreneurs (RdM 2012; World Bank 2013). Funded principally by a US $50 million World Bank loan, the PASP constitutes a site of struggle between the competing interests and ideological positions of international development agencies, the Frelimo government and different levels of the state, in what amounts to a struggle over the terms of social welfare provisioning in the global South.

Much of the contemporary scholarship on cash transfers has overlooked the politics of state administration. While the development of social welfare systems in the global North required vast bureaucracies, digital technologies have dramatically reduced the administrative burden in the global South (Ferguson 2015). Today, cash can be instantaneously transferred from the coffers of national governments to the pockets of the poor – circumventing the neo-patrimonial state. However, underlying these technological fixes, is a dense network of international development institutions, national and local governments, quasi-volunteer community workers, private financial service providers and non-governmental organisations. By rendering this network invisible, much of the contemporary scholarship risks missing the ways in which power is entrenched, contested and reconstituted through infrastructures of inclusion. The casualisation of public sector employment through the privatisation of state functions, the outsourcing of public provisioning and the introduction of labour brokers is just one manifestation of this reconfiguration.

Using the PASP as a lens, this chapter explores the contentious politics of cash transfer administration in Mozambique. It draws on participant observation, semi-structured interviews and group conversations conducted in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, to trace how competing interests and ideological positions are refracted through the various levels of the state. As discussed in the previous chapter, Inhassoro and Ribáuè are contrasting cases. In Inhassoro, the PASP has a more extended history and is funded by national budget allocations; while in Ribáuè, the PASP is financed by a World Bank loan, which has become a vital lifeline amidst the crisis of Ematum. The first section traces the contentious process of designing the PASP, focusing on the relationship between international development agencies, the Frelimo government and state technocrats at the national level. The second section provides an overview of the scope, scale, and architecture of the PASP. The third section focuses on four sources of contention in the programme's administration: the elaboration of an information management system, the application of a proxy-means-test, the selection of activities and enforcement of the work conditionality, and the outsourcing of cash transfer payments to private service providers. With each case, the section traces the repertoires of action deployed by actors at the global, national, and local level.

A 'Jogo de Cintura': negotiating the terms of the PASP

In Mozambique, the phrase '*Jogo de Cintura*' - literally translated as a waist game – is frequently evoked in policy-making circles to depict the complex negotiation process in a context where international development agencies and financial institutions have inordinate power over the terms of social policy. Like a dancer, Mozambican policy-makers must exhibit high levels of flexibility and grace as they circumvent the latest development trends, best practices and conditionalities imposed by donors. This section explores the '*Jogo de Cintura'* in the design of the PASP. It contends that the PASP is a hybrid programme whose outcome reflects the relative balance of power between international institutions concerned about safeguarding the legitimacy of a resource-driven development model, the Frelimo government under pressure to appear to redistribute the fruits of development, and state technocrats who leveraged the global resurgence of interest in cash transfers to strengthen political support for this fledgeling sector.

In Mozambique, cash transfers were initially introduced in response to international and domestic concerns regarding the social costs and political viability of structural adjustment. However, the safety-net provided by the Food Subsidy Programme was grossly inadequate. After all, its primary objective was to neutralise opposition to the abolition of the subsidised Food Distribution System and delegitimise socialist notions of universal entitlements (O'Laughlin 1996). Although the Food Subsidy Programme never covered more than 100,000 people – compared with 8.5 million under the Food Distribution System – it was reframed as a more equitable option because it targeted the 'poorest of the poor'. Of course, identifying the poorest is never easy, particularly in the context of civil war, but the discourse of justice was cynically deployed to paper over a politics of austerity during the transition to a market-economy (World Bank 1989; UNICEF and ILO 2020).

In the 1990s, several precursors to the PASP cropped up including the food-for-asset programme administered by WFP in areas prone to natural disasters, the social reintegration programme for demobilised soldiers implemented by the National Directorate for Social Integration, the cash-for-work programme executed by the District Services for Public Infrastructure and the community development programme administered by INAS. WFP's food-for-asset programme was by far the most extensive. Still, it was critiqued for undermining domestic agriculture by dumping expired food grown in the United States at below-market prices, recalls a former WFP employee:

> *Many asked us why we didn't purchase food domestically. People complained that the corn and lentils from the US were genetically modified; they had been stored for so long that they didn't cook. The MoU exempted us from paying import duties, but the Ministry would often not sign off on shipments. The food would arrive, linger in the port and eventually customs would auction it off to pay for the storage costs. The Minister told us to purchase food locally, but we couldn't because the United states only sent food, not cash (Interview with Former WFP Employee 2016).*

Dumping has long been a feature of US agricultural policy, driven by the market power of agribusiness and oligopolistic terms of trade (Wise 2004). In Mozambique, WFP effectively functioned as an intermediary for US food exports, financed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Although the Mozambican government did not reject food aid outright, it adopted a politics of attrition, ultimately limiting the scope and scale of WFP programmes. Its reluctance was also partially informed by concerns over the organisation's growing influence in the countryside, most notably among community-based organisations that had been roped into logistical suppliers of foreign food aid: *'you had a district administration with no power and a parallel system of WFP tents and cars, with no communication between the two. It was subtle but dangerously corrosive' (Interview with Selvester 2016).*

In the 2000s, following a period of floods and droughts, development interventions shifted to cash-for-work. Perhaps the most prominent was funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and implemented by private enterprises under the supervision of the District Services for Planning and Infrastructure. The programme offered workers four months of work a year, at a level equivalent to the hourly minimum wage (Selvester, Fidalgo, and Taimo 2012). Meanwhile, post-war programmes for demobilised soldiers were absorbed into INAS and extended to rural communities, in a bid to attract war refugees away from urban centres. INAS development programmes included the Social Benefit Through Work Programme, which consisted of an 18-month paid internship in the public sector with the possibility of incorporation into the civil service; the Income Generation Programme, which provided access to micro-loans for income-generating activities; and a Community Development Fund, which provided grants to build small-scale infrastructure (RdM 2010). The former INAS director nostalgically recalls how the programmes transformed people's lives, either through improved access to public services or permanent employment in the public sector:

> *We entered communities, looked for poor people, identified the needs and designed community development initiatives. If there wasn't a school, we built a school. If there weren't cattle, we distributed cattle. The objective was to create opportunities for self-employment through income generation activities. It was transformative…And there are still people employed in health, education. They started with basic work, cleaning, sweeping, the same work as the PASP. And some were integrated into the civil service (Interview with Former INAS Director 2016).*

Despite their seemingly transformative impact, INAS'S programmes were limited in scope. Following the general strike of 2008, an evaluation found that coverage was extremely low due to inadequate budget allocations and structural constraints on the public sector wage bill. Only 6,275 people were enrolled in the Benefit Through Work Programme and 7,350 in the Income Generation Programme (RdM 2010). In response, INAS'Ss development programmes were reformulated into the PASP, approved by the Council of Ministers in 2009 (RdM 2009). However, many within Frelimo were ambivalent about a social welfare programme for those *'who still have the strength to work'*. After all, the dominant line was that poverty resulted from a lack of self-esteem, motivation, and innovation rather than structural un(der)employment (Chichava 2009). Instead, Frelimo elites argued for the creation of District Development Funds – dubbed the 7 million – targeted primarily at the rural bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, INAS maintained that a programme was necessary for the rural proletariat and ironically, it was the World Bank loan which served as a political carrot to expand social welfare to this historically marginalised group:

> *It was decided that we needed to develop more programmes where people could work. Then the World Bank appeared, and of course, they had significant influence, but the essence remained, which was to find a programme where people with the capacity to work could do something of interest to the community and receive a subsidy...When the 7 million were approved, the government said that we needed to concentrate our efforts. But our target group would never have been able to apply for the 7 million. They could not compete, and even if they did, they would have never gotten the funds (Interview with Former INAS Director 2016).*

What the World Bank had in mind was a programme for unemployed youth in urban centres. However, INAS argued that young people in urban areas were unlikely to undertake public works for a subminimum wage. It was more strategic to stem the tide of rural-urban migration by providing income security in rural regions. This position was supported by the Frelimo government, eager to strengthen its political base and patronage networks in the countryside, where most Mozambicans still lived. The World Bank conceded, and in 2011 the PASP pilot was launched with funding from its Rapid Social Response Fund (RdM 2012).

However, the pilot evaluation pointed to a series of challenges: the public works were of poor quality due to a lack of training, materials, and supervision; the level of benefits and degree of coverage was insufficient to address the problem of poverty effectively; the timing of the programme clashed with the most labour-intensive period of the agricultural cycle; graduation proved fantastical given the structure of accumulation (Pimpão and Villanueva 2012). Nevertheless, in 2013, the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) approved a US $50 million low-interest loan as part of a comprehensive credit package tied to the extractive industry (Table 8). A quarter of the loan was dedicated to system strengthening, including the development of an information management system, the reregistration of PASP workers, the application of a proxy-means-test and the outsourcing of the payment system; while three quarters were earmarked for the implementation of the PASP, including the purchase of equipment, the payment of per diems and transportation costs, and of course, the cash transfers (World Bank 2013).

Table 9: Components of the World Bank PASP loan, 2013

Project component	**Amount allocated (US$)**
Institutional strengthening	13,100,000
Labour-intensive public works: rural areas	24,500,000
Labour-intensive public works: urban areas	11,700,000
Contingencies	700,000

Source: (World Bank 2013)

For the World Bank, the PASP was an opportunity to advance its reform agenda, in a struggle over the terms of social welfare provisioning in the global South (Buur and Salimo 2018). Although the institution had played a prominent role in the conceptualisation of Mozambique's first cash transfer, the World Bank had gradually lost policy influence of UN agencies (ILO, WFP, and UNICEF 2016). As Seekings (2020) points out, international development agencies occupy the same epistemic space, but their visions of social welfare provisioning diverge based on their social bases, interests, and ideological positions. Indeed, development agencies draw on an arsenal of tactics, such as elaborating national strategies and studies, supporting capacity-building workshops with generous per diems for national policymakers, and funding for civil society organisations policy influence (Seekings 2020).

With the launch of its Social Protection and Labour Strategy (World Bank 2012), a contender to the ILO's Recommendation 202 on National Social Protection Floors (ILO 2012b), the World Bank moved to reclaim the policy space it had lost – and the PASP proved the perfect proxy to do so. According to Buur and Salimo (2018), the World Bank's chief objective was to disrupt Frelimo's clientelist logic. Unlike previous public works programmes that focused on drought-stricken areas in Frelimo strongholds, the World Bank prioritised poverty criteria that effectively extended coverage to Renamo areas in the country's fertile regions. However, this posed new problems because there is not as prolonged a break in the agricultural cycle in the productive regions of the country. As the former INAS director reflects, the *'Jogo de Cintura'* resulted in a hybrid and at times contradictory programme, which threatened to undermine *machamba* production:

> *The PASP doesn't speak to the rhythms of the agricultural cycle. It's common in semi-arid regions to do that sort of work because they only produce 3 to 6 months of food. But in Zambézia and Nampula, where they produce 12 to 18 months' worth of food, they don't have downtime in their agricultural cycle. So, the PASP will always be competing with some crop. We explained this to the [World Bank] consultant, but somehow it got lost in translation…We didn't cry sufficiently. We ended up accommodating ourselves to the World Bank. It's true that they design the programmes with us, but it's always us trying to influence their ideas, and many times we end up being more influenced by them (Interview with former INAS director, 2016).*

Notably, the World Bank funds were a loan not a grant, to be repaid with interest by taxpayers. Yet, the government was unable to negotiate the terms of the PASP and acquiesced to most conditionalities – at least on paper. Ultimately, the *'Jogo de Cintura'* only goes so far.

The PASP was launched in 2014, in a rather hurried affair ahead of the national elections. However, much like the PASP pilot, its execution has been fraught with obstacles. In addition to the challenges identified by Pimpão and Villanueva (2012), the disbursement of funds and payment of cash transfers has been consistently delayed by the World Bank. This, in turn, has undermined Frelimo's political power at the local level. In 2016, for instance, PASP workers in the district of Mecuburi, which neighbours on Ribáuè, rebelled against INAS, banning them from undertaking any work in the district until they returned with their wages. Facing violent protests and accusations of *'Frelimo thievery',* INAS staff improvised a solution, transferring funds from the old-age pension to pay PASP workers' wages while they waited for the World Bank to disburse the funds.


Buur and Salimo (2018) blame the Frelimo government for persistent delays in the disbursement of funds. To safeguard their distributional regime, the government dragged its feet on the implementation of World Bank conditionalities including the development of an online information management system, the application of a proxy-means-test and the outsourcing of cash transfer payments (World Bank, 2013). However, Buur and Salimo (2018) leave the World Bank's reform agenda unchallenged. While the state shared many of the World Bank's concerns – for instance, the transparent selection, efficient tracking and timely payment of cash transfer recipients (RdM 2010) – they diverged in approach. Ultimately, the PASP was an avenue for the World Bank to advance a neoliberal reform agenda characterised by highly targeted and financialised cash transfers (Meagher 2020). However, as the following sections will illustrate this agenda was resisted, appropriated, and even ignored at the various levels of the state.

The size and scope of the PASP

With 121,557 registered beneficiaries, the PASP is the second-largest social welfare programme in Mozambique. However, coverage remains below the target 700,000 people established by the National Strategy for Basic Social Security 2016-2024 (RdM 2016). Almost 90 per cent of PASP workers live in rural areas, with the remaining 10 per cent concentrated in urban centres. Just over 70 per cent of registered workers are women, though only 10 per cent of households are women-headed (RdM 2020b). As Figure 27 illustrates, there is substantial variation in coverage according to region, which reflects differences in population size, funding sources, and World Bank targeting priorities. For instance, the semi-arid province of Inhambane accounts for less than 3 per cent of the total number of PASP workers, while the fertile province of Nampula accounts for almost 30 per cent (RdM 2020b).


Furthermore, 18 per cent of budget allocations to social welfare programmes are directed towards the PASP (Figure 28). Notably, budget allocations to the PASP declined with the expansion of the *Programa de Acção Social Directa – Pós Emergência* – the Direct Social Action Programme Post-Emergency (PASD-PE) – in response to cyclones Idai and Kenneth. In contrast to the PASP, the PASD-PE is an unconditional cash transfer for able-bodied adults set at a higher value of Mts 1,500 (UNICEF and ILO 2020). While Buur and Salimo (2018) maintain that the PASP is the only programme with real funding, trends suggest that it may soon be phased out.

Figure 27: PASP coverage by province, 2020



Source: (RdM 2020b)

Figure 28: Evolution of budget allocations to the social welfare programmes in Mozambique, 2015-2020



Source: (UNICEF and ILO 2020)

Despite its limited coverage, the PASP accounts for 15 per cent of wage-work in the formal economy, and a third of employment in the public sector (INE 2019; RdM 2020b). In fact, in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, there are four times as many PASP workers as there are public sector employees (INE 2017b; 2017a). Yet because the state conceives of the PASP as a social welfare programme and PASP workers as 'beneficiaries', they are excluded from the labour and social protections afforded to public sector employees (RdM 2012; 2017). For instance, PASP workers receive a 'subsidy' rather than a salary commensurate with the sectoral minimum wage. Furthermore, they do not have the right to paid leave, whether sick, maternity, or holiday leave, or access subsidised medical assistance and social security benefits. In addition, they have no opportunities for professional training or job progression; and no collective organising and bargaining rights (Table 9).

Table 10: The rights of the public sector employees and PASP workers compared, 2021

Workers' rights	Public sector workers	PASP Workers
Sectoral minimum wage	Yes	No
Paid leave	Yes	No
Occupational health and safety	Yes	No
Health and medical assistance	Yes	No
Social security	Yes	No
Security of employment	Yes	No
Professional training and promotions	Yes	No
Conciliation and mediation process	Yes	No
Unionisation, collective bargaining	Yes	No
Strike	Yes	No

Source: (RdM 2012; 2017)

Consequently, the value of the cash transfer is insufficient to meet households' reproductive needs. When the PASP pilot was first launched in 2011, it was set at Mts 650, which corresponded to the lowest minimum wage in hourly terms (Cunha et al. 2015). However, with the devaluation of the Metical during the crisis of Ematum, the real value of the cash transfer deteriorated (R. Castel-Branco and Isaacs 2017). Although the National Strategy for Basic Social Security 2016-2024 proposes introducing a mechanism to review the value of the transfer on an annual basis (RdM 2016), this has yet to be implemented. Instead, the transfer was increased to Mts 1,050 ahead of the municipal elections in 2018, which corresponds to 85 per cent of the average individual simulated poverty line (Mambo et al. 2018). However, the PASP is based on the household, not the individual. Given that the modal household size for PASP workers in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè is between six and eight people, the value of the transfer is grossly inadequate—a point made by a representative of the advocacy group, the Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection:

> *It would be bad to say that the subsidy is insignificant, but it doesn't serve for anything. An empty bag cannot stand up. Selection should be based on the individual and not the household. And the value should be increased to at least Mts1500 (PMSC-PS 2017).*

Justifications abound for setting the value of the transfer at an ultra-low level. The World Bank argues that a subminimum wage is a form of self-targeting for only the desperately poor will apply – even as it recognises that self-targeting is not an effective mode of rationalisation and proposes a complex selection approach instead (World Bank 2013). Also, they argue that it will stimulate PASP workers to engage in complementary activities and prevent an unsustainable dependence on the state; that it will avert labour-market distortions, such as disincentives


to taking up casual agricultural work in rural areas; and that it will ensure greater coverage. Forced to choose between increasing the value of the cash transfer and expanding the programme's scope, INAS has generally opted for the latter, even as it recognises that the amount is insufficient to ensure sufficient coverage (RdM 2016).

The PASP was conceived of as a multisectoral programme, encompassing more than half a dozen ministries and their respective provincial and district services. It is coordinated by INAS, which has 34 delegations across the country, each overseeing between three and seven districts. The delegation director is responsible for liaising with the district government, supervising the registration of cash transfer recipients and administering cash transfer payments. Meanwhile, the district government is tasked with identifying, designing, and implementing the programme (RdM 2012). However, district officials perceive it as an INAS invention and are only begrudgingly cooperative. In response, INAS has seconded point people to the *Serviços Distritais da Saúde, Mulher e Acção Social*– District Services for Health, Women and Social Action – but in the context of the debt crisis, they too are seen as a drain on the district's resources. Indeed, as an INAS point person in Inhassoro remarks, her colleagues have been far from welcoming for she is an outsider, a potential competitor, and a woman:

> *They [colleagues] think that we are an NGO with deep pockets when my per diems have also been suspended. They will call me on a Friday night, when I'm home with the baby, and demand their money. Threats are not lacking. When I received a motorbike to facilitate my movement, they warned me: 'you, girl, you will never ride it'. It is not a safe work environment (Interview with INAS point person 2016).*

According to the General Statute for state Functionaries and Agents (2017), district staff are eligible for travel per diems, and a senior staffer can earn up to double their monthly wage depending on how often they travel. However, with per diems frozen due to the crisis of Ematum, district officials refused to supervise the PASP. Fearful that confrontation will spur evil spells, the INAS point person treads lightly. Rather than requesting assistance from her colleagues, she relies on a network of INAS *Permanentes* or quasi-volunteers.

Figure 29: The institutional architecture for the implementation of the PASP, 2021



Acronym Key:

MEF: Ministry of Economics and Finance
MGCAS: Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action

DPGCAS: Provincial Directorate of Gender, Children and Social Action

SDSMAS: District Services for Women, Children and Social Action

INAS: National Institute for Social Action

PASP: Productive Social Action

SDPI: District Services for Planning and Infrastructure

SDAE: District Services for Economic Activities

Source: (RdM 2012)

There are approximately 3,000 *Permanentes* or casualised quasi-volunteers. Their tasks are to register vulnerable households, undertake home verification visits, prepare for and assist with the payment of cash transfers, and facilitate communication with cash transfer recipients. For their services, they receive a monthly subsidy of Mts 1,000, which is equivalent to the highest tier of the Basic Social Subsidy Programme. However, many *Permanentes* lament that the subsidy is insufficient, given the time required and costs incurred. Therefore, they leverage their position as gatekeepers to access alternative sources of income, explains Maria, a *Permanente* in the town of Inhassoro with an unquenchable thirst for *'refrescos'* or bribes:

> *When a child sees their parents going to the shops and says: 'I want to come with'; and the parent says: 'Stay home, when I return, I'll bring you a sweet', it's natural for the child to expect a sweet. And when they don't get one, the child loses trust and finds one somewhere else. Statutory law may apply in the cities, but here in rural areas, we must follow customary law (Interview with Inhassoro neighbourhood secretary 2017).*

Of course, Maria has no power under the customary. However, as a Frelimo appointed neighbourhood secretary, she has created her own set of rules in Inhassoro and not only defines who is eligible for cash transfers, but also how land is distributed, and Sasol jobs allocated. Her evocation of the customary is an attempt to put outsiders in their place and to circumvent the procedures established by INAS at the central level.

Finally, the implementation of the PASP relies on group chiefs. Group chiefs are PASP workers elected by their peers to supervise day-to-day activities. The group chief is responsible for taking the register, distributing, and keeping track of tools, organising daily activities, and improvising occupational health and safety standards. They are paid a monthly transfer of Mts 1,050 for four months a year – the equivalent of other PASP workers. How much responsibility group chiefs hold depends on how engaged the *Permanentes*, INAS staffers and district government officials are with the administration of the programme. In the town of Inhassoro where Maria reigns, for instance, she personally supervised the implementation of the PASP. There, PASP activities involved the construction of roads through homes, yards and *machambas*. Angry, many residents refused to move without compensation, and only Maria could coax them with a combination of incentives and threats, reflects the group chief. The following section explores the contentious relationship between these various actors, through four sites of contestation in the process of implementation of the PASP.

The PASP as a site of struggle

In *Surveiller et Punir,* Foucault (1975) details how the modern state adopted seemingly precise, transparent and universal techniques of discipline to enforce social control and reduce the cost of punishment. Across the global North, social welfare functioned as an instrument of governmentality to funnel the expropriated into conditions of hyper-exploitation – even if it reflected the surplus value that the proletariat managed to claw back on the basis of the notion of the 'right to live'. However, as Li (2010) points out, in much of the global South, 'letting die' was a colonial technique of discipline used to control colonised subjects and ensure a flourishing life for settler citizens (Mamdani 1996). At independence, postcolonial states inherited contradictory forms of governmental rationality and highly fragmented social welfare systems. Today, the Frelimo government's approach to governmentality centres on managing expectations and tempering claim-making by administering imprecise, opaque, and paternalistic practices of power. Rooted in a tradition of *'Para o Inglês Ver'* and refracted through a *'Jogo de Cintura'*, these historically cultivated practices are nevertheless resisted, appropriated, and even ignored, at the various levels of government. Drawing on the case of the PASP, this section explores four sites of contestation – the elaboration of an information management system, the selection of PASP workers and application of a proxy-means-test, the enforcement of the work conditionality, and the outsourcing of cash transfer payments – to unpack how contentious politics plays out during the process of programme implementation (Figure 30).

Figure 30: Steps in the implementation of the PASP, 2021



Source: (RdM 2012)

The development of an information management system

Concerned about the fiduciary risks associated with cash transfer administration, INAS adopted a Lindex-based information management system to track beneficiaries and payments in 1999 (ILO 2019c). This refutes the assertion by a World Bank official in Buur and Salimo (2018), that: 'before the PASP there was no formal register of beneficiaries, no information management system, no formal system to ensure access. There was only faith' (World Bank staffer, 25). Nevertheless, the Lindex system had many limitations. Disconnected from the Internet, there was no mechanism to reconcile or track information at the central level automatically. Cash transfer recipients' details had to be printed and sent via snail mail from the delegations to the offices in Maputo. The sheets were then manually input into a parallel information management system. This posed several challenges: information sharing was generally delayed and often got lost along the way, hindering both the monitoring of cash transfer programmes and budget planning processes; delegations had little accountability to INAS, and central offices struggled to weed out phantom beneficiaries; and cash transfer payment reconciliation was done manually, which created ample opportunities for corruption (ILO 2019c).

In response, the National Institute for Social Action embarked on a process to upgrade its information management system in 2010. The World Bank had proposed that the state contract a US-based consulting firm that specialised in developing web-based systems for conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America. However, with the backing of the ILO and UNICEF, the state contracted the developer *Centro de Desenvolvimento de Sistemas de Informação de Finanças* - the Centre for the Development of Financial Information Systems (CEDCIF) – an autonomous agency responsible for the management of Mozambique's public finance system, e-Sistafe. Initially, the World Bank rejected CEDCIF as a candidate because it did not possess the technical know-how to design and implement an information management system for the administration of cash transfers. Instead, it hired a gaggle of consultants to develop a parallel system for the PASP, paid for by the US $50 million loan (PASP Coordinator 2017).

While the state recognised that CEDCIF had limited social welfare experience, it maintained that with adequate training and technical assistance, national programmers could acquire the knowledge necessary to build and maintain an information management system. Of course, this delayed the development of e-INAS, but it ultimately resulted in a national system, housed

in a public institution, and maintained by civil servants. INAS argued that there were numerous advantages to this approach. CEDCIF already had extensive experience in developing, implementing and maintaining e-Systems for a state with limited financial and administrative capacity; the institution had sustained in-country presence, which allowed for an iterative process of system development rather than rapid-fire consultant visits; programmers were public servants so the state could save on exorbitant consultants' fees; and as public servants, they are bound by national regulations which safeguard confidential personal information (ILO 2019c). With support from the ILO and UNICEF, the state convinced the World Bank to concede, and the parallel database was merged with the new web-based system, e-INAS. By leveraging tensions between international development agencies, the state *'got what it could'*, to borrow from Salomão (2020). However, in the process, substantial resources were expended to appear to comply with the World Bank's conditionalities and ensure the disbursement of payments for PASP workers. There is an opportunity cost to the *'Jogo de Cintura',* and in this case, Mozambican taxpayers ended up footing the bill.

The application of a proxy-means-test

The development of the information management system e-INAS, was politically contentious because it ultimately defined who would be included and excluded from social welfare programmes. According to INAS regulations, all able-bodied adults between the ages of 18 and 59, living in poor households are eligible for the Productive Social Action Programme (RdM 2018). However, with approximately 5.5 million eligible beneficiaries (MEF 2016; INE 2019), the World Bank proposed a complicated selection method to reduce the universe of possible PASP participants, including self-targeting, geographic targeting, community-based targeting and income verification. Given the challenges of verifying income levels in the context of widespread informality, the World Bank extrapolated a series of proxies from the national household survey, that were cross-referenced against applicants' details, to identify the 'poorest of the poor'.

Predictably, the application of selection mechanisms was highly contested. According to the PASP's Operational and Technical Manual, the first step in selecting eligible households is to inform local leaders about the eligibility requirements. These include the district government, the chief of the administrative post and locality, the neighbourhood secretary and *Permanentes*. The district government is responsible for selecting the localities and villages according to

poverty criteria. However, in the absence of readily available and accurate poverty data, the chosen communities often reflect political interests. For instance, in the town of Riani, the chief of the locality opted to include the village of Najiwe – a Renamo stronghold – in an attempt to bring the political opposition closer to the seat of Frelimo power and mend the fissures in the district:

> *In Najiwe, the majority of the beneficiaries were those from Renamo. When the PASP emerged, someone from Frelimo went to register them…Now they come here to the headquarters, and they enter the Frelimo party [he laughs]! They don't do much work where they live because the health centre is here, the secondary school is here (Interview with Riani Chief of Post 2017).*

Even in less contentious political contexts, it is not uncommon for leaders to overlook villages that lack essential public services and are perceived not to have infrastructure maintenance needs. For instance, in the village of Tiane, Inhassoro, the PASP was abandoned because the location was difficult to reach, and district government officials felt it was of little value:

> *Tiane is a remote village, and there was no work to be done. There is no school, health post or market to clean. And the government was scared of the community because they had to travel for four hours to reach 30 people. So, they said nothing was happening there, they withdrew and increased the targets in Inhassoro, where there's a lot of work to be done (Interview with INAS point person 2016).*

With local infrastructure budgets virtually non-existent, PASP workers provide an essential source of free labour to maintain public spaces. Inevitably, this ends up privileging regions with existing infrastructure and marginalising those without.

Once the PASP sites have been selected, local leaders are responsible for identifying eligible applicants and submitting the preapproved list to the locality's consultative council, the administrative post, and the district for approval (RdM 2012). In a context where demand for jobs is far greater than supply, local leaders struggle to reduce the list of eligible participants and end up reinterpreting the guidelines to respond to political considerations. For instance, in the village of Temane, the neighbourhood secretary was only given 69 spaces to fill, creating a potential source of conflict within the community. In response, he established a rotating system in which each household participates in the PASP for one year. Rather than registering a new group of workers annually, the Neighbourhood Secretary ascribes new households to existing names:

> *When the PASP first started, we had many problems. INAS said that only the household registered would be allowed to work. But the demand is bigger*

> *than the spots available, and we came to an agreement with the [District] government, that we would do a rotation. Each family would work for a year. From the Mts 1,300 they received [every two months] they should take out Mts 200, and purchase chickens or goats to sustain them in the following years (Interview with Temane neighbourhood secretary 2016).*

Of course, this arrangement runs counter to the very conceptualisation of the programme. After all, participants are expected to work on the PASP for three years to acquire the assets and skills necessary to 'graduate' as microentrepreneurs. With few illusions about graduation, some local leaders have refashioned the programme to respond more effectively to their communities' needs. While INAS point people cannot openly condone this arrangement, their limited presence on the ground means that they have little choice but to turn a blind eye – after all, local leaders are also part of the Frelimo architecture:

> *Theory is different from practice. You can sit in the office and write the criteria, but you must be flexible in the field. You don't know who is who. For example, in Temane, they rotate every year and assume each other's names. Sometimes they'll slip up and forget. But eish, what can we do? If we remove them, the local leader will end up having problems with the community (Interview with INAS point person 2016).*

Once PASP workers have been preselected, and the local government's list is verified, they are confirmed by INAS using a proxy-means-test. Given the difficulty of ascertaining income in a context of widespread informality, INAS relies on a series of easily observable proxies for poverty, which include assets, housing conditions and agricultural produce (RdM 2012). The data is then input into e-INAS, and preselected applicants are ranked according to need. Once the spots have been filled, eligible applicants are placed on a waiting list. The waiting list also facilitates the fulfilment of annual targets because INAS can immediately fill spaces when they become available (PASP Coordinator 2017). The approved list is then shared with the district and local government. However, as the INAS Director of Development Programmes explains, the proxy-means-test can also lead to exclusion errors thereby undermining the programme's objective. While the proxy-means-test can be recalibrated, INAS relies on World Bank consultants to perform this function:

> *To a certain extent, it helps to prioritise applicants. The proxies are extrapolated from national household survey data and approved by the Ministry [of Economy and Finance]. We select the target number, plus 30 per cent, who are placed on a waiting list. But when we applied the proxy-means-test, almost all the people we registered who meet the eligibility criteria were excluded. So, we ended up not meeting our targets and had to adjust the weights. But the World Bank, because it has the privilege of money, is the only one able to do so (PASP Coordinator 2017).*


Ultimately, identifying the 'poorest of the poor' is like shooting at a moving target, due to the relatively flat consumption distribution in the lower quintiles of the population, the dynamic nature of poverty and the inadequacy of household data. Furthermore, the focus on the household rather than the individual assumes that resources are distributed equally within the household, which is not always the case. While advocates of a proxy-means-test argue that it ensures efficiency and equity in addressing the needs of the most vulnerable, it can trigger conflict, posing an ethical conundrum for local leaders. The neighbourhood secretary in Iapala explains:

> *To register people and then not include them, I don't know why it was like that. They take the list to Maputo, then reduce the number of people, and we who know the reality have no say. [Wellbeing] cannot be evaluated by assets alone. Sometimes the man works, and the woman stays at home. Maybe he built a house, and when he died, the house went to her. Once in a while, someone may pass and deposit Credelec [prepaid electricity]. The way our minimum wage is, it is not enough to provide regular support…It ends up creating confusion. It can even create conflict in a community. People in the community are the ones who know their reality (Interview with Calado 2016).*

To be sure, village selection processes are highly political and tend to reproduce asymmetric power relations. Nevertheless, the application of the proxy-means-test by a *'computer in Maputo'* has proved to be an elusive process which provides applicants with little recourse in case of rejection.

Although INAS has invested substantial resources in developing an information management system capable of applying proxy-means-tests, it does not have the in-house capacity to recalibrate the weightings. Therefore, it has been forced to abandon the proxy-means-test. In practice, each locality is given a target to fill based on budget allocations, willing PASP workers are registered, and following an ambiguous verification process, a list of approved candidates is published. This is not to suggest that PASP workers are not eligible for the programme – given that more than half of the population lives in absolute poverty, they most likely are – but rather to illustrate how a highly targeted system has been resisted, appropriated, and at least temporarily, abandoned.

Figure 31: Process for the identification and selection of PASP workers, 2021



Source: (RdM 2012)

The enforcement of the work conditionality

The PASP is conditional on participation in labour-intensive public works. While there is no preapproved list of PASP activities, they must benefit the majority. Activities can include the clearing and maintenance of tertiary and unclassified roads; the construction of dykes, dams, irrigation channels and drainage ditches; and public spaces such as parks, gardens, and plazas markets, sidewalks and cemeteries. At least 70 per cent of the allocated budget must be directed towards the payment of cash transfers, leaving only 30 per cent for operational costs and investments in equipment. The guidelines stipulate that public works should not damage the environment or have negative social consequences; and in instances where they do, mitigation should be accounted for. Finally, the activities should be included in the district development plans, or at the very least, approved by the district (RdM 2012; World Bank 2013).


The district government is responsible for selecting, designing and supervising PASP activities, in consultation with local leaders. District technical staff are accountable for defining the activities to be undertaken and the technical norms, the number of beneficiaries required, the timeline for implementation, the equipment necessary, the budget, an environmental assessment and a social impact evaluation (INAS 2015). Once the district government approves the list, it is shared with INAS. The operational guidelines stipulate that PASP activities in rural areas should occur during the least labour-intensive period of the agricultural cycle. Still, they also state that the PASP should be implemented during the highest period of food insecurity, which is contradictory. Within each district, 15 per cent of the budget should be allocated to

the purchase of tools and protective equipment; and 15 per cent to compensating the district for administrative costs such as office supplies, vehicle maintenance, fuel, per diems and first aid. In some villages like Temane, the PASP also has an Inclusive Public Works Programme for poor households who are not labour-constrained but have limited labour capacity. Rather than engaging in labour-intensive public works, these workers do door-to-door talks on a range of topics including the prevention and treatment of HIV, malaria, cholera, and tuberculosis; family planning; the rights of children and the elderly; and the importance of wearing long skirts. While some topics are identified by INAS staff and the SDSMAS, workers often also improvise.

In theory, the district government, local leaders, *Permanentes* and group chiefs are responsible for enforcing the work conditionality. The district government generates payment forms based on the group chief's registers, and these are shared with INAS. After processing them, INAS makes the payment. In theory, if workers are absent for more than five days a month, they receive a prorated transfer; and if they do not work more than 15 consecutive days, they can be removed from the programme altogether (RdM 2012). However, this rarely happens. After all, the PASP is a social welfare programme – and it would be a logistical nightmare to try pay workers varying values in cash (Interview with INAS point person 2016).

Indeed, given the low value of the cash transfer, most leaders do not strictly enforce the work conditionality – and in fact, PASP workers have effectively increased the hourly rate by reducing the work schedule. According to the guidelines, the group chief – themselves a PASP worker – is responsible for taking the register. With the tacit permission of supervisors, group chiefs generally register everyone as present. Of course, not all local leaders are equally flexible. Some even oblige PASP workers to work five days rather than four, under threat of expulsion. However, as a general rule, local leaders recognise that the meagre PASP subsidy is insufficient to meet households' reproductive needs and that workers must be given the time off to undertake other income-generating activities. As a local leader and PASP supervisor in Iapala explains: *'It is a question of humanity. It gives them flexibility. If we see that they're tired we let them go'* (Interview with Calado 2016).

Figure 32: Process for the definition, design, and supervision of PASP activities, 2021



Source: (RdM 2012)

The outsourcing of cash transfers

The PASP operational guidelines stipulate that the transfer should be paid monthly. The INAS delegation is responsible for its payment, in coordination with the district government. Workers should be informed at least three days ahead of schedule about the time and place of payment. The payment should be made to the primary or substitute beneficiary, who must sign the payment form upon receipt of the cash transfer. If the beneficiary believes that they have not received the amount agreed upon, they can, in theory, submit a complaint (RdM 2012). However, as the Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection highlights, payments are often delayed and made without prior notice, creating opportunities for corruption. It is not unusual for PASP workers to be far away from the payment posts, on their *machambas*, when an INAS brigade arrives unannounced. In most instances, they receive the payment the following time—whether in a month, two months or three. But in some cases, INAS staff mark them as having received the cash transfer when they have not, explains a representative of the Platform responsible for monitoring cash transfer payments:

> *It can pass three months before they are paid 'because of the situation of the crisis'. And when they are ready, they show up without any notice. Or if they give notice, they arrive late or not at all. You can wait all day under the hot sun, and nothing. Last year, they came, and only half the beneficiaries were on the machamba, but the payment slips were all signed when they returned to the delegation. When we went back to the community, no one spoke up. They thought: 'If I raise a problem, they will remove us from the programme'. And so, we returned, humiliated (PMSC-PS 2017).*

Irregular payments are the result of a combination of factors including delays in the disbursement of funds by the World Bank, budget acrobatics by the Ministry of Economics and Finance

amidst the crisis of Ematum and the logistical challenges of manual payments, explains the delegation head for Development Programmes in the districts of Vilankulo, Inhassoro, Govuro and Mabote:

> *We process the payment sheets and plan the payment schedule, but only after the money is disbursed can we inform the Permanente. Everyone blames INAS, but we can't do anything until we receive the money from the Ministry. Because the Bank refuses to release the funds until we outsource, we end up subjecting ourselves to turmoil…This year the Ministry only allocated funds for three months of the PASP and nothing for administration, petrol, per diems. So, we must improvise – borrow money for gas from here, merge the payments there. And then they have the audacity to demands results (Interview with Romão 2017).*

Even when the INAS delegations receive funds, they struggle to make payments on time due to limited material and human resources. Each delegation covers between three and seven districts, but there is only one delegation head for Development Programmes. Because the areas are vast and the roads treacherous, delegation staff accumulate two or three months of payments to cut costs. Although this is a contravention of the PASP operational guidelines, most PASP workers do not mind. After all, the transfer is so low that it allows them to save enough to purchase something meaningful. But for those rely exclusively on the cash transfer, this poses a problem. Ultimately, the *'Jogo' de Cintura'* by state technocrats, is costly for cash transfer recipients.

The National Strategy for Basic Social Security recognises the need to improve the predictability, accessibility, and transparency of cash transfer payments (RdM 2010; 2016). In 2011, under pressure from the World Bank, INAS launched an international tender to outsource the payment process. However, private service providers were reluctant to bid, given uneven digital penetration, which made electronic payments unworkable; and inadequate infrastructure, which made manual delivery unprofitable. After all, only a quarter of the population has access to cell phones and electricity, and only 4 per cent in rural areas use mobile financial services (INE 2019). However, the World Bank was committed to disrupting Frelimo's 'distributional logic' and saw outsourcing as a critical component of its reform agenda (Buur and Salimo 2018), ultimately holding PASP workers ransom to put political pressure on the state to improvise a solution:

> *INAS first proposed many of the conditionalities [imposed by the Bank]. We've been in this back and forth, not because we don't want to implement these but because they're challenging to implement under current*

> *conditions…For instance, outsourcing is a question of sustainability. How are we going to afford the additional costs of a private service provider once the Bank leaves? How will we manage to continue to pay? (PASP Coordinator 2017).*

Although outsourcing is often promoted as more cost-efficient, outsourced services have generally proven impractical and costly in Mozambique. Indeed, even promoters of government to Payment Systems concede that the shift to outsourced digital payments requires substantial investments (Gelb and Mukherjee 2020). Too often, neoliberal fixation with curtailing the state's size blinds policymakers to the costs of a patchy administrative bureaucracy. Under pressure from the World Bank, INAS developed a hybrid system that outsourced payments in urban centres and continued paying cash transfers in rural areas. However, the hybrid model dramatically increased operational costs. Nevertheless, it was supported by the Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection because they hoped that it would improve services and free up INAS staff to do other work:

> *There are many schemes at the local level, between INAS staff and the Permanentes…Outsourcing can help disrupt these schemes and make payments more efficient and predictable. It may not reduce costs, but it will be more efficient (PMSC-PS 2017).*

However, so far attempts to outsource have proven grossly inefficient. In 2017, the Mozambican-South African consortium Paycode-MozSecurity won a tender to pilot payments in Chókwe, Mabalane and Massingir. It would take more than two years to acquire the necessary equipment and establish the required administrative processes. Biometric registration was only finalised in January 2020, and private providers have yet to pay cash transfer recipients. Meanwhile, the hybrid system increased operational costs. As the INAS director for social welfare programmes reflects: 'outsourcing is not always cheaper in cost-benefit terms, and in the case of Mozambique, the discussion on outsourcing arose as a condition imposed by the financing agency' (Faite Izidine 2020, p. 21). Furthermore, cash transfer recipients were sceptical of outsourcing. Although wary of a state mired in corruption, they were even more suspicious of a private provider contracted by the state to transfer intangible funds through electronic mediums they poorly master (Castel-Branco 2017a). As one cash transfer recipient in the district of Inhassoro remarked:

> *With state employees, there is a disciplinary process. But what about private providers? And with our judicial system the way it is, you'll get there, and they will have lost the paperwork. If the government outsources, it needs to have the capacity to monitor…The problem is not INAS; it is the system. I'm against a bank. There's only one ATM, and if the Bank swallows your card*

> *because you don't remember the code, you have to go to the capital to fetch a new card. Mpesa, Mkesh we don't have here, there's no local provider with the capacity to make a payment. And if it's cantineiros [entrepreneurs], we'll be in real trouble. They'll trick us. They'll force us to purchase their products and increase their price because they have a monopoly. I am INAS's son, and I don't want a stepfather (Interview with Osvaldo 2017).*


Concerns regarding the state's regulatory capacity are not far-fetched, particularly where advanced technologies are concerned. In 2009, the Ministry of Interior outsourced the production of identity documents to the private provider Semlex. At the time, the state argued that outsourcing was necessary because it did not have the technical capacity and proprietary software to upgrade to biometric documents. However, Semlex never made the investments needed – and both the cost and waiting times for getting an identity document increased. Although the contract indicated that citizens' confidential biometric information was the exclusive purview of the state, Semlex controlled the server based outside the country. Ultimately, a lack of transparency in the tender process, a poorly written contract and the fragile inspection of activities undermined the quality of services (Mabunda 2015).

Importantly, Mozambique is not the only country which has struggled to regulate third-party providers. As outlined in chapter 3, the South African Social Security Agency suffered from a similar problem when the institution outsourced payment services to the global provider Net 1 UEPS. Net 1 UEPS had developed proprietary biometric technology that enabled the offline transfer of funds in remote regions using a smart card (Breckenridge 2019). Upon securing the contract, the company shared cash transfer recipients' confidential information with its other subsidiaries, which aggressively marketed financial products, including high-interest short-term loans and life insurance to cash transfer recipients. To circumvent regulations, the company established a parallel banking system, enabling it to make unauthorised deductions. Because cash transfer recipients could not default on debt, Net 1 UEPS and its subsidiaries bore little risk or incentive to curtail borrowing (Torkelson 2020).

Torkelson (2020) argues that cash transfers have become a tool of a segregated and monopolistic financial system, with detrimental consequences for social development. Today, approximately one in five cash transfer programmes are bundled with financial products and distributed through private providers (Clemence and MacLellan 2017). In Mozambique, the World Bank played a pivotal role in the push towards financialisation – all while the World Bank's International Finance Corporation invested $107.7 million in Net1 UEPS *after* the South

African debacle to support its expansion into the rest of Africa (Torkelson 2017). While the financialisation of cash transfers in Mozambique has proven more challenging than the World Bank had imagined, it has not given up. With the COVID-19 crisis, the World Bank pushed for introducing an emergency cash transfer to be paid via e-wallet. Predictably, the operational costs for e-wallet payments are higher – 25 per cent of the budget for electronic payments, compared with 15 per cent of the funding for manual ones (RdM 2020a). It is still too early to tell if and how e-wallet will be operationalised. As of January 2021, nearly a year after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, only 20,000 cash transfer recipients had been paid

Figure 33: Process for administering cash transfer payments, 2021



Source: (RdM 2012)

Conclusion: reclaiming the PASP in a global war of position

Much of the contemporary scholarship on cash transfers abstracts from an analysis of the state's role in the administration of social welfare. Through the lens of the PASP, this chapter sought to reverse this trend by analysing the contentious politics of cash transfer administration in Mozambique. It argued that the design and implementation of the PASP are the outcomes of a *'Jogo de Cintura'* between international development agencies and the various levels of the state. Through four case studies – the elaboration of an information management system, the application of a proxy-means test, the enforcement of the work conditionality, and the out-sourcing of cash transfer payments to private service providers – this chapter illustrated how state technocrats must move like a butterfly and sting like a bee, to borrow from Mohammed Ali, in the face of a much more powerful global development industry.

The chapter highlights the centrality of human labour in the administration of cash transfers. Indeed, particularly in states with limited financial and administrative capacity, the uneven

nature of digital technologies make digitalisation an at best imperfect tool. Indeed, in Mozambique, the administration of cash transfer programmes requires an extensive network of development agencies, national technocrats, delegation and district staffers, *Permanentes*, group chiefs and outsourced casual workers. For the World Bank, the PASP constituted an opportunity to drive forth its reform agenda characterised by highly targeted and residual social welfare, privatised services, and financialised cash transfers. For the Frelimo government, it offered the possibility to consolidate its social base in the countryside. For national technocrats, it was a political carrot to extend social programmes to able-bodied adults of working age, particularly in rural areas. For local government officials, the PASP provided access to free labour for the maintenance of public works and stipends for their supervisory role. And for *Permanentes* and group chiefs the PASP was simply a *biscate* like any other. Ultimately, the design and implementation of the PASP is the outcome of conflicting visions, ideologies, and interests. While it certainly does not represent a countermovement to neoliberalism, it also does not suggest its extension. Instead, it is a theatre of struggle over the terms of social welfare provisioning. The next chapter analyses the PASP from the perspective of PASP workers. It traces how they have attempted to alleviate the drudgery of ultra-low wage-work and explores how participation in the PASP has shaped their expectations regarding the state's redistributive role.

Chapter 7: The Experience of the 'Rebenta Mina' in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè

> *There were so many trees and homes that we had to demolish. We didn't have machines. In the first days, I felt pain because the work of cutting trees is not easy. It was treacherous work. We were the 'rebenta-minas'. (Interview with Zaida 2017)*

'*Rebenta mina'* – an armoured truck used to detonate landmines – is a double-sided metaphor coined by workers on the Productive Social Action Program (PASP). On the one hand, it refers to the drudgery of labour and the disposable way in which PASP workers are regarded. On the other, it points to their crucial role in reclaiming the region from nature's wrath and making the road to further development. It is a hot afternoon in Maimelane and a dozen *'rebenta minas'* have filed into the village square. Clad in *capulanas*, flip-flops and headscarves, they come prepared to build a hut for an elderly man who has been expelled from his home on false accusations of sorcery. Officially, PASP activities are limited to those that benefit the whole community and do not undercut existing trades. However, building a hut is a welcome respite from the hard labour of road clearing. With a limited presence on the ground, the National Institute for Social Action (INAS) has little choice but to acquiesce to local preferences – provided they only use materials gathered in the community forest.

Half an hour later, Jimmy the group chief stumbles into the square, slurring orders in a mix of Xitswa, Zulu, Portuguese and English. Jimmy has been re-elected group chief twice, for he is a skilled builder and keeps the work light. However, he has little *de facto* power to incentivise or sanction workers. Instead, he relies on social pressure and theatrics to entice them into working. Having arrived late, he pretends to drunkenly herd the PASP workers to the construction site with a whip, exchanging laughter and insults as they walk. Once at the site, they split up into groups. One group digs a shallow trench along the house's perimeter to erect the frame, a second hacks *laka-lakas* or tree branches to size, a third beats and twists branches into *corda* or rope, and a fourth ties the *laka-laka*s onto the frame. Uncharmed by Jimmy's theatrics, two PASP workers watch the spectacle with indifference. He beckons them to work, to no avail. '*With no uniforms, those laka-lakas will prick us in all our sensitive places',* they chuckle. Feigning distress, he falls flat on his face and in a Laurel and Hardyesque routine, stands up, dusts himself off and bellows: *'I'm a clown, surrounded by women. But I don't mind; I liked to be bossed'.*

After an hour of work, the *'rebenta-mina'* are ready to knock off. They regroup under the tree, and the chief takes the register. Less than half of the PASP workers are present but none are marked as absent, for they have legitimate excuses: '*They went to the [HIV] control', their child is sick', 'they have a guest at home', 'they had to pound maize', 'they went to the machamba', 'they informed us ahead of time'.* Jimmy reflects on his compassionate approach to supervision:

> *It's good to play; it makes the work more enjoyable. Some people may call it Xibalo, but it's not. Xibalo was rigorous work, from dawn until dusk, every day. If people didn't complete a task, they were humiliated with the palmatória. Today every citizen is free. If they want to sit all day, they can (Interview with Jimmy 2017).*

The Frelimo government argues that the PASP gives those with *'the strength to work'* an opportunity to hone their 'culture of work' and graduate as microentrepreneurs (Cunha et al. 2015). In exchange for labouring for four months a year, four days a week and four hours a day, the *'rebenta-mina'* receive a monthly transfer of Mts 1,050. Of course, few local leaders would agree that *camponeses* who get up at the crack of dawn to cultivate their *machambas* under the scorching sun lack a 'culture of work'. In fact, some suspect that the Frelimo elite who have amassed mass wealth based on rents are the unproductive ones. Nor do most local leaders expect the PASP to address the structural drivers of poverty, inequality and un(der)employment in the countryside. Indeed, for the *'rebenta-mina'* in Inhassoro who have been in the programme for nearly a decade, waiting for graduation is like waiting for Godot. Therefore, the enforcement of the work conditionality is generally performative.

Drawing on research conducted in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, this chapter explores how PASP workers both affirm and negate the work of the *'rebenta mina'*. While the PASP has a long history in Inhassoro, it is still relatively new in Ribáuè, and workers' expectations and practices of power vary. The first section compares the recruitment of PASP workers in the two districts and traces their gender, class, and age composition. The second unpacks how meaning and alienation are co-constructed through participation in the PASP; and discusses how workers rank the programme according to sustenance, autonomy, and social recognition. The third section traces the practices of power that PASP workers deploy to ease the drudgery of work. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the PASP has shaped workers' expectations of the state. Ultimately, PASP workers hope that the programme will evolve into a proper job rather than an unconditional, universal cash transfer.

A profile of the 'rebenta-mina'

> *Here in our land, the chief does not want women in the PASP. He says women don't know how to work and it's better if they till the fields. If the list had not come from Maputo, all the women would have been substituted. He says anyone who misses a day will be removed from the program, but women have many different responsibilities (Interview with Laurinda 2016).*

Laurinda is a PASP worker in the village of Minuco, Ribáuè which lies at the intersection of two unclassified roads marked by a crumbling colonial *cantina*. Next to it are two empty sheds belonging to Sonil, a tobacco marketing company with a concession in the region. Formerly part of the renowned concessioner João Ferreira dos Santos, it sells to Mozambique Leaf Tobacco in the province of Tete (Perez-Niño 2015). Next to the sheds, are two huts: one which the Red Cross built to administer a food-for-work programme in 2004; another which housed the now-defunct *Associação Agrícola de Minuco* – the Minuco Agricultural Association. Laurinda's husband works in the town of Iapala, where he manages a small mill. They tried their luck in the provincial capital Nampula but could not find work and decided to return home to till the soil. In a context where *biscates* are exceptionally hard to come by, the PASP provides a scarce source of monetary income.

In Minuco the PASP is widely perceived as salaried employment and thus the purview of men: *'you work for someone far away in Maputo and earn a monthly wage, while a biscate is paid daily on someone's farm right here'.* This reflects both prevailing gender norms which relegate women to activities within the home and local leaders' subjectivities. Like many local leaders, the chief sees the PASP as a source of unpaid labour for unfunded public works in his jurisdiction. In the past, chiefs would requisition free labour through the *direito consuetudinário* or mandatory labour contribution (Chilundo 2001). With the advent of multiparty democracy, it has gotten harder and harder to do so. Therefore, the PASP fills an important gap in the maintenance of public infrastructure in remote regions. However, unlike other local leaders, the Minuco chief is a keen enforcer of the work conditionality. Indeed, he is so enthusiastic that he forces PASP workers to labour for five days rather than four. Furthermore, the chief prefers to hire men, who he perceives as stronger and more reliable, given fewer competing reproductive responsibilities. While women must fetch water, cultivate the *machamba*, and cook, clean and care for children, men can spend all day on the PASP – and indeed, many do, hopeful that it will evolve into a proper job.

In the district of Inhassoro however, the PASP is dismissed as *ganho-ganho* and relegated to the realm of women's work. While salaried employment is still the exception, there are many more opportunities for casual wage-work and own-account activities (INE 2017b; 2017a). Indeed, men generally prefer to chase the Sasol dream than to join the PASP. After all, a job at Sasol pays enough for households to sustain themselves, provides social security and health benefits inaccessible to most, and comes with social recognition. In a context where the majority try to cobble together a livelihood from a multiplicity of ambiguous informal activities, Sasol is desirable precisely because it is recognisable: workers wear a uniform, carry identifiable tools and are assigned specialised tasks. The PASP, Gérsio explains, simply does not measure up to masculine aspirations in this historic hub of migrant labour:


> *Men belittle the PASP. They say: 'I don't have time for that. What will João say when he passes by'? Most of us end up chasing the Sasol dream and send our wives to the PASP. But do we have a job? No! For men to join the PASP, it would have to pay more; provide a uniform, equipment, identity cards. It would have to reduce the workload (Gersio 2017).*

Young people, in particular, are reluctant to join the PASP. In the district of Inhassoro, the modal age is between 35 and 44 years, though there are variations between field sites (Figure 34). In more remote areas like Temane, a much higher proportion of workers are below the age of 35 – the official the threshold for youth – which reflects the limited opportunities for monetary income in the area. Notably, most PASP workers in the district of Inhassoro never attended secondary school, and in town, more than a third never went to school at all (Figure 35). Nubia explains why unemployed graduates are reluctant to join the PASP:

> *Us young people, we often say that that work is not for us. 'Collect rubbish? That's not dignified for me!' We forget that we're living based on appearances. For the PASP to attract young people, they would have to increase the amount of the subsidy and change the nature of the activity – factories, community radio stations, health centres, office work – something more dynamic (Nubia 2017).*


In contrast, in the district of Ribáuè, the modal age range is between 25 and 34 years, though here too there are variations between field sites (Figure 37). For instance, in remote areas like Minuco, more than three-quarters of workers are below the age of 35; in contrast to Iapala and Riani where the figure is similar to that of Temane. Furthermore, a larger proportion of PASP workers attended and even graduated from secondary school. Amidst limited opportunities, PASP is seen by some as a steppingstone to a better position in the public sector: *'Because I had never had a boss when I heard, I liked it',* explain a young graduate in Minuco.

Figure 34: Distribution of PASP workers by age and research site, 2017



Source: author's short survey, based on INAS data


Figure 35: Distribution of PASP workers by the level of schooling and research site, 2017



Source: author's short survey, based on INAS data.


Finally, almost all PASP workers in the sample identified as *camponeses* (Figure 39), even when they had minimal land (Figure 436). Indeed, most *camponeses* in Inhassoro derived a livelihood primarily from *biscates*. Still, because a *biscate* is widely seen as the most alienating form of work, many pointed to the *machamba* instead. Notably, the *machamba* is not always a residual activity and in some regions of Ribáuè PASP workers had at least three.

Figure 36: Sources of sustenance among PASP workers by research site, 2017



Source: author's short survey, based on INAS data.

Figure 37: Sources of sustenance among PASP workers by research site, 2017



Source: author's short survey, based on INAS data.

In part, PASP workers' expectations of the programme are shaped by the recruitment process. As discussed in the previous chapter, the PASP applies a complex selection mechanism which includes self-targeting, geographic targeting, community-based targeting, and income verification to ration the number of eligible applicants. According to government regulations, all able-bodied adults between 18 and 59, living in poor households, are eligible to apply (RdM 2018). However, this amounts to at least 5.5 million people, which dramatically exceeds budget allocations (MEF 2016; INE 2019). Because the cost of implementing public works programmes is exceptionally high, targeting criteria are especially strict (McCord 2012). According to the guidelines, the poorest households, and households headed by women or with many dependents are given preference (RdM 2018).

However, in practice, each village is assigned a target number to fill, and the local leader registers interested applicants. The recruitment process generally begins with an informational session. In both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, PASP workers first heard about the programme through friends, the *Permanente*, local leaders, and occasionally '*a white man from far away'*. Some workers were recruited door-to-door, most signed up at the Frelimo Party – the name given to the village headquarters despite the formal separation between Party and state. As Laurinda illustrates, registration often takes place in an impromptu manner. Candidates are given very little information about the nature of the work, employment terms, who the employer is or the criteria for selection. Indeed, even local leaders are not always clear about whether INAS is a non-governmental organisation, a state institution, or a private company. After all, in one moment INAS argues that the PASP is a government programme, while in the next that they cannot make payments because the funds come from far away. Furthermore, given the sharply asymmetrical power relations in the countryside, explains Laurinda, applicants are reluctant to negotiate the terms of employment:

> *I saw movement at the [Frelimo] Party, so I ran to see what was happening. When I got there, they said they were looking for ten women because most men were on the list. We didn't know what the work was, or the salary. Those who are desperate for work it's difficult to ask the price. First, you have to do the job and then complain. Otherwise, they'll say, 'you are complicating things, leave!' When we returned, our names were on the list, and we started working. I have no idea why I was selected; many people were left out. Only now I see that it isn't big money (Interview with Laurinda 2016).*

In contrast to orthodox labour market models, where workers are rational economic men and accept or reject work based on self-interest, PASP workers in Ribáuè accepted work with little

knowledge of the conditions for fear of being excluded altogether. Because the PASP had several precursors in the district of Inhassoro – WFP's food-for-work programme, DFID's cash-for-work programme and INAS's community development programmes – workers tended to have more realistic expectations. As Manuel, a group chief in the town of Inhassoro, explains, it was scarcity which drove him to accept this *ganho-ganho*:

> *They told me, Manuel, you have a chance at INAS, but you have to go there now because they have to close the list today. So, I went, I presented myself to the group chief, they accepted, and I registered. I didn't enter expecting to work; I was thinking about the end of the month. I began to imagine, ok, I'll buy 1 kilogram of OMO. At the time things weren't so expensive, and I didn't know that I would only receive in two months. It was really about sustenance. I joined because of suffering (Interview with Manuel 2016).*

According to the PASP guidelines, once the district council approves the applicants' list, it is forwarded to INAS for verification using a proxy-means-test. While the process of confirmation may reduce errors of inclusion, it does little to address errors of exclusion. Indeed, the selection process tends to further marginalise the marginalised – whether women, supporters of Renamo, a rival of the chief or the village drunk. Because the proxy-means-test can be politically divisive, some local leaders like the neighbourhood secretary in Temane have improvised a rotating system. While many consider this fair, for *'the necessity is bigger'*, registered workers are far from pleased even if they quietly acquiesced:

> *My husband worked in the PASP in 2014, but he left to give others a chance. In the beginning, we refused to rotate, but the secretary said that it was time to give others an opportunity: 'The patience which INAS has with us, we should also have that same patience because the necessity is bigger' (Interview with Flávia 2017).*

The focus on the household rather than the individual is another bone of contention during the selection process. Although a pragmatic approach to cull the number of eligible applicants, it is ultimately gender blind and assumes that intra-household resources are distributed equitably (Sen 1987). This is particularly problematic in regions with a long history of migrant labour like the district of Inhassoro, where families were split over a prolonged period. For instance, Teresa was removed from the PASP when her husband returned from South Africa because he received a military pension. However, having spent almost two decades apart, there is more conflict than cooperation in their household, to borrow from Sen (1987). Yet, Teresa cannot afford to move out of the home she has lived in her entire adult life; and her husband refuses to leave. Ultimately, *'the computer in Maputo'* ignores important social dynamics, Teresa argues:

> *When my husband returned from Joni, they removed me. The neighbourhood secretary said that INA has computers that can detect when the husbands receive a pension. But what computer is that one which only identified me; that removed me when everyone knows that my husband doesn't support me. He says the pot is his; the food is his. I can't even produce nipa (Interview with Teresa 2016).*

As this section has illustrated, there is a gap between the conceptualisation of the PASP at the national level and its implementation on the ground. Interestingly, perceptions and expectations of the programme diverged significantly between the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè. Sources of divergence included past experiences with PASP-like programmes, gender norms, and other forms of wage-labour availability. Drawing on three indicators readily used by respondents in the district of Inhassoro and Ribáuè to evaluate the meaningfulness of work –sustenance, autonomy and social recognition – the following section explores how meaning and alienation are co-constructed through participation in the PASP.

The affirmation and negation of work among the 'rebenta-mina.'

> *We are the bulldozers,*
> *We can cut through dead trees,*
> *We can cut through green trees.*
> *These streets, we need them*
> *There's no reason to complain*
> *They asked you if you wanted streets*
> *You were the ones who said yes.*
> (Inhassoro workers, 2017)

It is early morning in Riani, and four dozen PASP workers are busy rehabilitating the roads ahead of the heavy rains. In swift succession, men, women and children, work collectively, cultivating the ground to level the soil, dig up the weeds and straighten the paths. They soon arrive at a hut of *pau apiki* or sticks, built in the middle of what the chief claims is a road. In one fell swoop, workers demolish the hut, its contents thrust aside for the owner to gather and chop up her trees. The neighbours watch on, empathetic but resigned – even offering the workers water. When Riani was first established as an *aldeamento*, the land was surveyed by the colonial regime and the roads demarcated. With the transition to an *aldeia communal* under the Frelimo state, the road markers remained – even as the *cantinas* were transformed into consumer cooperatives and the plantations into state farms. As the civil war intensified, villagers fled up to the mountains and when they returned, the roads had become bush. With little guidance, they erected homes and cultivated *machambas* where they pleased. However, as Riani has evolved from a village to a town, land has become increasingly scarce. Through the PASP,

the chief hopes to reclaim the colonial roads and inject spatial order into this bustling region: *'Here in Riani, there is lots of work to be done'.*

Although the phrase *'to be a person is to work'* is frequently evoked in the countryside, not all work is created equal. The meaning ascribed to work reflects both an accumulated and contradictory history of religious doctrine and state practice; and the material needs of agrarian life and personhood. In the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, legitimate work transcends the boundaries between what Gorz (1999) defines as 'authentic' and 'intangible'. Indeed, valued activities are both paid and unpaid, productive and reproductive, formal and informal. Rather than focus on degrees of commodification, PASP workers evaluated the meaningfulness of work based on three broad criteria: sustenance or the ability of an activity to sustain the household's reproductive needs; autonomy or the power of workers to shape the labour process; and social recognition. This section explores how meaning and alienation are co-constructed through participation on the PASP and compares the programme to the multiplicity of activities discussed in chapter 5.

The importance of sustenance

Sustenance refers to the ability of an activity to fulfil the household's reproductive needs. It includes the level of income, its regularity and reliability, and in a context where households derive a livelihood from a variety of sources, its opportunity cost. Workers on the PASP are paid a monthly 'subsidy' of Mts 1,050, which is equivalent 85 per cent of the simulated average individual poverty line (Mambo et al. 2018); and a quarter of the lowest sectoral minimum wage (Caldeira 2019). As Table 10 illustrates, this is hardly enough to purchase a 25-kilogram bag of maize meal. Although the value of the transfer is defined in relation to the individual poverty line (RdM 2016), the program is designed to respond to the household's needs, as a whole. Because the PASP prioritises households with many dependents, they tend to be larger than the average of 4.5 people. In Inhassoro, the average household size was six people, and in Ribáuè, it was eight. Unsurprisingly, the programme ranks poorly in terms of sustenance in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè – on par with *ganho-ganho.*

The rationale for setting an ultra-low wage is that it prevents errors of inclusion, for only the desperately poor will apply; ensures that PASP workers do not become overly dependent on the state, because they cannot afford not to engage in other livelihood activities; and reduces the risk of labour market distortions (World Bank 2013). Although not explicitly stated, the

distortions envisioned include increased bargaining power for rural workers, improved compliance with minimum wage standards, and a reduction in the wage-gap between casual and permanent agricultural workers. Unlike the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Guarantee Act (Menon 2008), where wages were set above the going rate for casual agricultural labour, the 'reservation wage' established by the PASP is equivalent to Mts 60 a day, which corresponds to the lower end of *ganho-ganho*. Therefore, it is not surprising that PASP workers in Inhassoro characterise the programme as a *government ganho*.

Table 11:Price table for goods in the market in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2017

Item	Quantity	Inhassoro (Mts)	Ribáuè (Mts)
Bread	1 bun	3-6	5-10
Butter beans	1 kg	100	50
Cabbage	1	100	30
Capulana (cheap)	1 piece	250	250
Coal	1 bag	400	200
Dry fish	1 small mound	50	10-100
Maize meal	1 bag (12.5kg)	500	450
Oil	1 litre	100	90
Omo	1 kg	200	120
Onion	1 kg	50	15
Pasta	1 packet	35	30
Peanuts	1 kg	100	50
Rice	1 bag 25 kg	1,100	1,100

Source: author's fieldwork notes

The shift from food to cash has dramatically eroded the value of the transfer. Thus, PASP workers wax lyrical about the food-for-asset programmes, even as they recognise that money has given them greater autonomy over spending. In Inhassoro, workers long for the days when they received fifty kilograms of maize meal, five litres of oil and ten kilograms of beans – which today would be equivalent to Mts 3,500 (Manuel 2016a). Although PASP workers in both districts agree that the subsidy is insignificant, few adventure to suggest a specific raise: *'I cannot say because I was not the one who decided what it should be in the first place', 'it depends on the money INAS has because who decided what it should be in the first place was INAS', 'I hear outside it's more'.* On the one hand, workers fear that if they specify too high a level, they will seem ungrateful and be removed from the program; and on the other hand, if they set too low a level, they will undercut their gains. Instead, workers prefer to let the employer decide—a common strategy among precarious low-wage workers in other sectors, including paid domestic work (Castel-Branco 2012).

A further challenge related to sustenance is the erratic nature of the PASP programme. In rural areas, the PASP lasts for four months a year and is supposed to occur during the least labour-intensive period. However, the programme is also designed to smooth consumption during the lean period of the agricultural cycle, which coincides with its most labour-intensive, forcing PASP workers, to choose between their *machambas* and the meagre PASP subsidy. The PASP does allow for substitutions, and it is not uncommon during planting season, for PASP workers to send children in their place. However, Zaida struggles to juggle competing responsibilities. Reluctant to withdraw from the program voluntarily, she contracted a young girl to take her place, in exchange for the going rate for debt labour:

> *I don't manage to go [to the machamba] because it's boiling by the time I arrive. I can't lie, I didn't get any produce last year. It's demoralising. And the PASP this year came at a difficult moment. It's not that people don't want to work, but they need to go to the machamba. The soils in this region dry quickly. One cannot win against nature. To suffer knowing that you'll get something is best at the end of the month, but it's not easy to continue because I don't have anyone to fill my spot. So, I lent my place. I'm still the one who receives the money, with my ID, but I give her a share of the payment. [I don't leave because] I don't want to feel regret. In the past, they said things that put in people's heads that we would receive something to sustain ourselves after three years. Enough to start a business (Interview with Zaida 2017).*

The opportunity cost of the PASP is further exacerbated by the delayed payments, which prevent workers from hiring *ganho-ganho* to tend to their farms. Official guidelines stipulate that the transfer should be paid monthly (RdM 2012), but in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, payments accumulate over a period of two or three months. The ambiguity regarding the employer's identity means that workers struggle to claim their rights. When workers are registered, they are told that the PASP is a government program; but when payments are delayed local government claims ignorance, arguing that the funds come from Maputo or Europe. Laurinda explains how her hopes of earning an income to hire *ganho-ganho* were shattered by delays in the payment of the subsidy:

> *We are working for the municipality, but the administration is the one that organises the work. That's why I don't know my boss, and there's no way to charge them for my work […] As the days pass you count, day 10, 20, 30. You get to the last day, and you start counting the hours. The stress that comes to your head, working without eating. Then the 30th passes, and you continue to work. It would have improved things if the amount were higher and paid on time. Then I would hire someone to look after the machamba […] If the boss were nearby, the salary would be paid monthly. Like this, we cannot complain. We must just wait (Interview with Laurinda 2016).*

After participating in the PASP for three years, workers are expected to have accumulated the assets, skills, and knowledge necessary to graduate out of the programme as microentrepreneurs. However, graduation has been a resounding failure due to the insignificant level of the transfer, the short duration of the programme and the absence of technical and material support (McCord et al. 2016)– much to PASP workers' disappointment eager to escape the drudgery of the programme. For male workers in the district of Ribáuè, a potential path to graduation could be the promotion of agricultural cooperatives and associations:

> *It would be better if we could join an association where everyone cultivates individually. That way, we could focus on agriculture and animal rearing. Productive Social Action should be about production, not roads. They could distribute water pumps to irrigate the land, fertiliser, a tractor, seed. And we would focus on rearing chickens, goats, cattle; planting fruit trees; cultivating onions (Interview with João 2016).*

Indeed, Masondo (2018) argues that in South Africa, cooperatives constitute the basis for a solidarity economy that counters the logic of capitalism. Mozambique has an extensive network of agricultural associations and cooperatives, some of which are affiliated to the *União Nacional de Camponeses* – the National Union of Peasants – with 86,000 members in 2200 associations and cooperatives (UNAC 2019). However, as Phillip (2018) points out, cooperatives have generally failed to disrupt broader processes of capitalist accumulation; and in Mozambique, they have tended to reproduce power relations in the countryside. Cooperative leaders are usually male commercial farmers, who draw on cooperative structures to access resources to develop activities individually (O'Laughlin 2009). Zaida was part of a fish farming association on the banks of the Govuro river, which collapsed because of poor management, corruption and land conflicts. Today twenty-one cracked concrete tanks, each the size of a large swimming pool, lie empty along the riverbank. The water pumps have long been stolen, and the remnants of the pumping system sabotaged. Zaida refuses to join another association:

> *We dug the project, put water, fed the fish, and gave them rations, we would sell the fish at the market, but those responsible stole the money and disappeared in the middle of the night, and we received nothing. To work in an association is to work for free. It's preferable to get a job where you work on your own. If they said that it [the PASP] was cultivation to produce products, I would not accept it. The chiefs would sell the products, then claim that they could not sell them or sold them at a lower price, and then keep the money like in the association. I don't want that (Interview with Zaida 2017).*

Given the contrasting profile of PASP workers in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, it is perhaps not surprising that PASP workers in Ribáuè are supportive of cooperatives and PASP workers in Inhassoro are sceptical of them.

The level of autonomy

Autonomy refers to the power of PASP workers to shape the labour process. This includes defining what activities should be undertaken, how they should be undertaken and for whom. While INAS does not have a defined list of sanctioned activities, the operational guidelines stipulate that they should be limited to unskilled tasks that do not undercut existing trades and benefit the majority. Acceptable activities include the clearing of tertiary and unclassified roads, the maintenance of public spaces, the construction of public infrastructure using local materials, and the cultivation of local leaders' *machambas. This practice* harkens back to the colonial period. The district government is responsible for defining, designing and supervising activities, in consultation with local leaders and the community. In practice, district government involvement is uneven and hinges on the availability of per diems, particularly in towns and villages outside the district capital. In far-flung regions like the villages of Temane and Minuco, local chiefs and *Permanentes* play a crucial role; and depending on their disposition, may choose to devolve decision-making power to PASP workers or maintain it under their control.

For instance, in the village of Temane where the PASP has been operational for many years, the neighbourhood secretary takes a hands-off approach. Although he initially introduced a rotational system much to workers' displeasure, he has given workers the freedom to decide what activities to undertake and how. After years of practice, there is an established rhythm embedded in the area's semi-arid landscape. As long as the village remains clean and the roads maintained, workers are free to pursue pet projects like building a hut for an elderly man cast out of his house by his children (Figure 38). Zaida details how the experience of building a hut challenged gender norms, taught her new skills, and exposed her to new networks:

> *We came together, sat down and debated how to do it: the house's design, what materials we needed, who would get what. Other ideas we didn't have time to implement but maybe next year. When I built my first house, I felt happy. I never knew that women could build their own homes. Nowadays, I can even tell when a man didn't build his house properly. There's nothing I can't do. I'm more independent. And I made many new friendships because when we're working, we're also enjoying. We sing songs, we joke, we laugh. Even now, we continue to meet (Interview with Zaida 2017).*

Figure 38: Picture of PASP workers building a hut in Temane, Inhassoro, 2017



Source: the author

Much like Gorz's (1999) description of 'authentic' labour, the construction of a hut was a sensory, autonomous and collective experience, that gave Zaida a sense of self-realisation through the transformation of natural resources gathered locally – *laka-lakas, corda*, *matope* or clay, and thatch - into a socially useful object that made a real difference in someone's life. Furthermore, the work itself was accompanied by song, dance, jokes, and laughter (Figure 39). After all, *Xibalo* is a thing of the past, and today's workers are free to sit if that is what they want.

Figure 39:Picture of PASP workers clearing roads in Inhassoro, Inhassoro, 2017



Source: the author

While building a home is an activity that benefits an individual rather than the majority, it is socially acceptable because the recipient is an elderly man considered the victim of an injustice. The activity contributes to INAS's commitment to building homes for the vulnerable, a commitment rooted in colonial notions of social action (DG 1963), which continues to capture the imagination of policymakers today, even if it results in the construction of only a handful of homes a year (RdM 2020b). However, not all experiences have been as rewarding. In the village of Minuco for instance, the chief decided that PASP workers should build a marquise for Frelimo party dignitaries. Unhappy with the chief's decision, workers have dragged their feet, and the marquise remains permanently under construction (Figure 40). Further down the mountain, workers from the Renamo-stronghold of Najiwe were forced to work in the Frelimo Sede or headquarters 12 kilometres away, which exceeds the 5-kilometre threshold established in the regulations. Unfamiliar with the PASP, workers ultimately felt that they had little recourse but to acquiesce to directives from above.

It's a struggle to get to work. We have to leave our homes at 3 am and walk 12km to Riani every day. It would be normal to work closer to home. We would like to work in Najiwe and not in the Sede. But the company is the one who knows what is best (Interview with Orlando 2017).

Figure 40:Picture of an unfinished Frelimo marquise in Minuco, Ribáuè, 2016



Source: the author

In both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, workers had no control over the tools provided. Of the total budget allocated to the PASP, 15 per cent is earmarked for the purchase of equipment, and the district government is responsible for sourcing tools locally (RdM 2012). Tools can include hoes, machetes, axes, rakes, shovels, wheelbarrows boots and brightly coloured yellow vests. However, there are not enough tools to distribute to all, forcing many to work without any protective gear. Estefania is a PASP worker in Iapala's market. With her daughter wrapped on her back, she labours barefoot, picking rubbish from stinky, stagnant water, with her bare hands. Although she suspects that working without tools is having a detrimental impact on her health, she prefers not to bring her own. After all, her hoe has already wasted away, and INAS is not prepared to pay for a replacement:

> *The work is very heavy and very stinky. We are working with rubbish, just like this—no boots, uniforms, helmets, gloves, masks. We work through the rainy season but have no raincoats…All that dust gives us bronchitis, headaches, contamination. And those of us with kids, we take our kids with us, and they're also coughing. There's no medication. It's an indignity (Estefania 2016).*

The seemingly unfair way tools are distributed, inspires further ire among PASP workers, leading some to feel excluded from the programme. The unequal distribution of equipment is particularly controversial when Renamo sympathisers have been recruited to maintain public works in Frelimo areas but given no equipment to do so, thereby sharpening existing social and political tensions in the countryside. Orlando, who is originally from Najiwe, explains:

> *The tools were distributed individually. Some got tools and others not. In a house, you can't dress someone way, and others another way. You have to dress everyone in the same way. Otherwise, they end up feeling like a forgotten child; and wonder 'Since we haven't received boots when it comes to receiving the salary, we won't receive it either'. When there's work, we all go to the same place, we do the same job, but I'm taking my hoe, and that's not normal, I do not like it (Orlando 2017).*

The pilot evaluation of the PASP flagged the problem of inadequate tools and protective equipment. Still, it concluded that equipment was unnecessary (Pimpão and Villanueva 2012), because the work corresponded to PASP worker's regular activities. The evaluation did not take into account that by not providing adequate tools, they were offsetting the cost of capital investments onto PASP workers and eroding the real value of the subsidy in the process. Furthermore, many of the activities, such as felling trees and building homes, required specialised tools and protective equipment. In the town of Inhassoro for instance, a tree fell on a workers' back, and although he survived, he had to be hospitalised for a month. In Maimelane, a worker cut another man's foot with an axe. Because INAS does not allocate a budget for work-related accidents or compensation in the case of permanent disability, workers had to absorb the cost of medical bills. Ultimately, Zaida contends, the equipment provided is too rudimentary for the drudgery of work required:

> *There was no training. The first step was to dig around the tree with a hoe, then to cut the roots with an axe, and after cutting the roots, to pull the tree down. Then we would cut the tree into small bits with a machete, level the ground with a rake, and take the bits home for firewood (Zaida 2017).*

In both the district of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, PASP workers consistently requested better and more equipment. However, INAS contended that they had no control over the purchase and distribution of tools, which is the district government's responsibility. Meanwhile, the district government claimed that they could not purchase and distribute protective equipment because INAS had not disbursed the funds. As the elephants fought, it was the grass that got quite literally, trampled.

Figure 41:Picture of PASP workers cutting down a tree in Iapala, Ribáuè, 2017



Source: the author

The degree of social recognition

Social recognition is the third element which gives work meaning. As discussed earlier, the state views PASP workers as 'beneficiaries' of a social welfare program, who receive a 'subsidy' rather than a salary. Considered something other than employment, they are excluded from the labour and social protections afforded to public sector employees. Furthermore, PASP activities are framed by the state as 'unskilled', regardless of the skill level required; and workers are given no professional training. The assumption is that the activities are part of the everyday. In the district of Inhassoro, the PASP is considered a *biscate*—the most alienating form of work. Although in the district of Ribáuè, it is widely referred to as a government job, the absence of adequate tools and protective equipment reinforces a nagging suspicion that it is indeed, not a job, Orlando argues:

> *Those coming from the outside, they don't know that we're workers. Without uniforms, we could be anyone.…To have a uniform allows you to be recognised. People don't question who you are and what you're doing. Just like a nurse has a uniform, and the patient respects them (Orlando 2017).*

Tools and protective equipment have the power to transform a *biscateiro* into a figure of authority, which as Teresa explains, is particularly important in the context of the PASP, where activities such as road clearing involve the destruction of personal property. According to operational guidelines, a resettlement procedure should be triggered in such instances. However, no funds are allocated for such. Instead, displaced community members are provided with new plots in an extension area. Understandably, this has spurred conflict in the neighbourhood; and given that the PASP is poorly supervised, PASP workers regularly find themselves at its interface. Without a uniform that signals that they are undertaking an officially sanctioned activity, aggrieved neighbours interpret their actions as a personal affront:

> *People did not know there were roads there, so they planted in the streets. When we came to open them, they had not been warned. Noise and confusion were not absent. We would appear, and they would insult us: 'These are the ones who are destroying our homes. This government just destroys, it never pays'. But what could we do? It was our work. We would try to speak to them indirectly through songs and skits. But friends were angry and promised us a beating (Teresa 2016).*

In Inhassoro, houses made of cement blocks would have been virtually impossible to uproot with a hoe, and an a could be circumvented. Consequently, wealthier residents kept their homes, trees, and land, while poorer residents were expelled to the margins, only intensifying conflict.

Figure 42:Picture of PASP workers demolishing a house in Riani, Ribáuè, 2017



Source: the author

As the benefits of road clearing became more apparent, tensions subsided. Today, the PASP is praised for having improved both public infrastructure and people's livelihoods. The clearing of the roads, particularly after the rainy season, has facilitated agricultural produce's marketing. In contrast, the maintenance of public places has relieved villagers from their mandatory labour contribution. Before the PASP, it was not unusual for pregnant women to cultivate the hospital grounds before their check-up, to pay their dues. Today, that work is done by PASP workers. As a market vendor, Inhassoro explains:


> *If someone gets into an accident, an ambulance can easily reach. When products arrive from South Africa, they can be delivered right to your door, instead of having to carry them on your head for everyone to see. Now you don't have to cross other people's plots to get to your own (Interview with Fatima 2017).*

While the PASP is undoubtedly a flawed social welfare instrument (McCord et al. 2016), local leaders, villagers and PASP workers all expressed the desire to have a year-round program. That way, leaders would be assured a permanent number of workers to maintain public infrastructure; villagers would be guaranteed a clean public space without the need to fulfil their mandatory labour contribution; and workers would be assured year-round wage-work, which in turn would enable them to hire *ganho-ganho* to tend to their *machambas*.

Ultimately, the PASP is far from a 'real utopia' as imagined by Masondo (2018) in his analysis of public works programmes in South Africa. In Mozambique, workers have no power to decide on the programme's rate, regularity, or duration. Waiting for graduation is like waiting for Godot, due to the low value of the transfer and short-term nature of the programme, the lack of training and supervision, and the structural limitations of a labour market anchored in a resource-driven development strategy. Furthermore, the occupational health and safety conditions are abysmal, which exacerbates the drudgery involved and undermines workers' social status. In a context where people have little choice but to cobble together a livelihood from a multiplicity of activities, tools, and equipment are a much-prized marker of professional identity.

Indeed, many of the elements which alienate workers from authentic labour – a lack of autonomy, institutionally certified skills and procedures, uniforms – are also the ones which give workers a sense of belonging. This is not to suggest that PASP workers would readily forfeit autonomy over their bodies. In fact, in her study of cane cutters in the sugarcane plantation of Xinavane, O'Laughlin (2017b) describes how workers readily refashioned uniforms to suit their needs. Nevertheless, it points to the importance of material symbols in securing social recognition. Ultimately, the PASP is similar to any other *biscate* in terms of pay and working conditions. However, it is ranked on par with volunteer work because PASP workers generally have more autonomy over their labour (Figure 43). The following section explores the practices of power deployed by PASP workers in Inhassoro and Ribáuè to ameliorate the conditions of work.

Figure 43: The PASP compared with other activities in of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2017




'To be quiet is to talk': Practices of power among the 'rebenta-mina.'

> *They would say, 'oh those are the ones who are destroying our homes'. We just stayed quiet. To be quiet is to talk. To incite them to educate themselves. Soon others began to see patience as a form of courage. Before work, we would pray. 'Dear God, give us the strength, the courage'. And we would sing, 'My God, look at me, I am a sinner, please help me' (Interview with Manuel 2016).*

Manuel is the group chief in the town of Inhassoro. He moved there after being demobilised from the military. The only formal job he ever had was as a soldier, protecting the gas wells in Temane from Renamo forces. Since the General Peace Agreement, he has worked as a casual security guard; constructing pit latrines, making clay blocks and pulling in fishing nets on the side. His wife is a *camponesa*, though she also washes clothes, fetches water and hawks fish for extra cash. For Manuel, being elected group chief was a source of pride. Until then, his neighbours dismissed him as a static fool stopped in time – and he felt that way too. No one even thought to nominate him to a leadership position until the PASP, a programme generally relegated to the realm of women's work in Inhassoro. It was in the field that he was able to demonstrate what one could not see sitting. He attributes his success to his quiet authority, cultivated through years of dedication to the Seventh Day Adventist Church.

This section explores the practices of power deployed by PASP workers to ameliorate the conditions of work in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, In the face of intense community opposition, the drudgery of work and the opportunity cost to other sources of livelihood, the *'rebenta-mina'* drew on historically cultivated practices of power ranging from avoidance to resistance. As Figure 44 illustrates, these practices lie along a continuum of confrontation, from low to high. Although overt confrontation is rare, the tactics leveraged by PASP workers did improve the conditions of work – even if they ultimately failed to transform them.

Figure 44:Practices of power among PASP workers in the Inhassoro and Ribáuè, 2017



The first and least confrontational strategy was to avoid registering for the PASP in the first place. While there is a waiting list to participate in the programme (Cunha et al. 2015), this is mainly due to the limited spots available rather than overwhelming demand. After all, only 4 per cent of eligible participants are registered in the PASP (INE 2019; RdM 2020b). Most PASP workers are middle-aged women in rural areas. While this is partially a function of selection criteria which prioritise women-headed households, it only accounts for 10 per cent of those registered. In regions with a more extended history of proletarianisation, men are reluctant to enlist in the PASP, while young people prefer to try their luck as own-account workers. Furthermore, in Renamo strongholds like the district of Mecuburi, where people are already sceptical of the Frelimo government – particularly given the delayed payment of transfers - INAS struggled to meet targets despite a high incidence of poverty (PASP Coordinator 2017).

Another strategy of avoidance is to be quiet. According to Manuel, the practice of patience is a highly effective way to neutralise opposition in public works programmes' moral economy. Far from passive, the performance of patience requires high levels of self-discipline and affect. Through tropes of virtue and righteousness, PASP workers were able to process their suffering in the face of community opposition and redirect their energies towards completing the task at hand. After all, the work of *the 'rebenta-mina'* was traumatic, explains Angela, a *camponesa* from Maimelane:

> *We were just doing our work, but people would insult us. Many friends got very angry with me. They promised to beat us. Not only was the work challenging but dealing with our neighbours was hard. That's why we often missed work. We would take turns. If I miss today, tomorrow I can't miss so that someone else can miss. (Interview with Angela 2016)*

The second practice of power is feigned acquiescence; feigned because in effect strategies like performative prayer, song and dance are intended to educate, shame and humble power – whether INAS, local leaders or community members. Worker's deployment of metaphors like *'rebenta-mina'*—even where working conditions do not necessarily warrant the term—are mobilising devices, through which workers can highlight the drudgery of the PASP as well as their social contribution, thus reframing themselves as workers deserving of better labour conditions, '*remind leaders of their own humanity'* and secure their consent in reinterpreting the terms of the programme. In a context where even the employer is elusive, it can be more strategic to hint at general allusions than funnel their energies into specific demands. Performative praying is another strategy to evoke humanity, Manuel explains - particularly in the face of

hostility from their neighbours. It acknowledges the other's distress while reminding them of one's own. Song was also useful in drowning out insults and communicating a greater purpose. It was often interspersed with storytelling, once again intended to educate, and shame hostile community members. As the benefits of road clearing became apparent, tensions dissipated, though so did displacements, for the roads had already been cleared.

The third practice of power was the appropriation or reinterpretation of the terms of the programme. Workers have little leverage to collectively bargain with the central government. The rate of remuneration and working time is established by the Council of Ministers, in coordination with the World Bank and INAS. Nonetheless, tardiness, absenteeism and substitutions were used to effectively reduce the workload, increase the hourly wage, and limit the opportunity cost of the PASP. In both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè workers reduced the working time to approximately four hours a week, effectively raising their wage to the minimum wage (Caldeira 2019). Of course, the gradual reduction of the work schedule requires the (tacit) consent of local leaders, and as discussed earlier, not all leaders are equally agreeable. However, with little say over the rate, regularity or duration of the PASP, most local leaders were reluctant to associate themselves too closely with the program lest it backfires. In Minuco, where the local leader exercised significant control over the labour process, he was ultimately forced to flee to Iapala until the delayed transfers had been paid. In fact, he was away for so long that, his village wife removed his belongings from his house in protest. Therefore, most leaders assume a more compassionate approach.

The fourth practice of power is the slowdown or stay away, most frequently in response to the delayed payment of wages. While workers may abstain from publicised manifestations of discontentment—such as organising a protest outside the offices of the chief of the locality or threatening violence against INAS—they do engage in other forms of collective struggle. Although not openly contentious, the stay-away has a marked impact if practised collectively and consistently. Manuel describes how challenging collective action can be, in a context where the employers' identity and the employment relationship is itself unclear:

> *When they [PASP workers] didn't receive, each one had their idea. The drunks, they would begin to agitate people. I would try to motivate them, saying: 'Papa, let's work because one day it will rain [we will get paid]. To be patient is to have courage. Why don't you wash clothes or fetch water to get something to eat'? But they would insult me: 'Do not talk to me because it's not you who pays me', 'You're a sleepyhead, why don't you fight for our*

> *back pay'. '? I didn't say anything because I didn't think there was anything INAS could do [to pay us on time]. Then others would look down on me: 'How do you let them insult you'? (Manuel 2016b).*

Rather than trying to coax PASP workers with theatrics as Jimmy did, Manuel sought to motivate them with the gospel. He argued that patience is a manifestation of our faith in God's timing, God's plan, and God's love. Far from passive, patience is an active response—an act of endurance or persistence, in the face of trials and tribulations. For Manuel, the precariousness of the PASP was an opportunity to perfect his patience. An act for which he believed he would be rewarded, for God is good to those who place faith in Him. Most PASP workers were less grateful for the opportunity to test their faith and preferred to stay away. However, eager to remain part of the programme if it did rain, most would occasionally return to the PASP to check in with Manuel and lend a hand. In rare instances, PASP workers did engage in more confrontational tactics, organising protests and sit-down strikes outside of the locality or municipality's headquarters as was the case in the district of Mecuburi, in Nampula province. However, these were few and far between.

Notably, PASP workers have yet to be organised into a membership-based organisation. The Organisation of Mozambican Workers (OTM), the country's largest union federation, sees the PASP as a positive development (OTM and CONSILMO 2014) but is entirely disengaged from its design and implementation. Rather than perceiving the proliferation of the PASP as a threat to public sector employment, they have supported its expansion into the fastest growing sectors of the economy. The following section explores the extent to which participation in the PASP has informed workers' conceptions of the state's redistributive role and galvanised claim-making at the point of distribution rather than production.

The redistributive role of the state

> *It's good that the government created a biscate, but it would be good if the PASP became a salary. People invested a lot of money in studying, hoping to find a job, and then they couldn't. And we wonder: 'Does the government even see us? Do they see that we're sitting unemployed (Interview with Joana 2016)?*

Joana is a *camponesa* and PASP worker in the town of Iapala. Born on the cusp of independence, she embodies both the hopes and disappointments of a post-colonial generation. As the daughter of a tobacco plantation manager, she had expected to graduate from secondary school and become a public sector worker. However, her schooling was disrupted by the war,

and by the time the political situation normalised, she was pregnant with her first child. Both she and her husband were determined not to let the same fate befall their firstborn, and indeed through sacrifice, they managed to put him through school. Never did she imagine that he too would have little choice but to embrace the hoe. Although the PASP is far from meaningful work, Joana hopes it will serve as a wedge for a more meaningful employment guarantee program. This section unpacks workers' perceptions about the viability and desirability of an unconditional cash transfer.

Like Joana, most PASP workers in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè are sceptical about the idea of an unconditional cash transfer. For some, it is merely too confounding to imagine. After all, it has never happened: *'In Mozambique that is impossible. The government won't accept it'.* While the Frelimo government did provide universal entitlements such as free public services and subsidised food in the post-colonial period, these benefits were always in-kind. And anyway, as the neighbourhood secretary in Inhassoro reminded her constituency, this is no longer the time of Samora when people get things for free – at least not poor people. Once committed to eliminating the structures of exploitation and creating the material basis for a socialist society, Frelimo's discourse today is limited to promoting a 'culture of work' and microentrepreneurial activities. Having had no previous experience with an unconditional cash transfer, most PASP workers suspect that the mere suggestion is a political ploy to phase out the programme altogether. As Isabel, a *componesa* in Temane explains:

> *In my experience, no one receives without working. They would capture you and take you to the police station. I would only agree to it once they bring the amount. Conditionalities are welcomed because we don't want the project to end (Interview with Isabel 2017).*

In a context where the rights of citizenship are rarely regarded—social rights, after all, are not recognised by the Courts (Cistac 1996)—the work conditionality provides a more concrete basis for claim-making than elusive notions of citizenship. Indeed, the state portrays cash transfers as a favour to be grateful to the Frelimo party, rather than a rightful share of the fruits of economic development (PMSC-PS 2017). The notion of cash transfers as an act of goodwill by the Frelimo government is reinforced by the ad hoc nature in which the programmes are implemented. Given the low value of the transfer and the irregular way it is administered, recipients can hardly rely on it as their principal livelihood source.

PASP workers were also unconvinced about an unconditional transfer because they feared that the local Frelimo elite would usurp all the spots on the programme if the work conditionality were abandoned. After all, the ruling party already has an extensive patronage network that trickles down to the lowest governance level (Cortês 2018). Workers in Renamo strongholds like Najiwe were especially concerned that they would be removed from the programme if free money were available. According to Orlando, a *camponês* from the village of Riani:

> *The only reason that the Party hasn't chowed all the money is that they have to work for it. As the saying goes, the goat eats where they are tied, and they like to eat together. So, it's necessary to invent some criteria to at least fool the population or else the Party will only share it among themselves (Interview with Orlando 2017).*

Interestingly, local Frelimo leader in the town of Riani supported an unconditional cash transfer*: 'to receive to work on your machamba as they do in the PSSB would also be very good'* (Interview with Calado 2016). This position marks a departure from Frelimo's main line which centres on the need to cultivate a 'culture of work' among the poor by funnelling them into conditions of hyper-exploitation or residual entrepreneurial activities (Guebuza 2015). Orlando contends that Calado's position is an attempt to enlarge his already expansive dragnet of rent-seeking. However, Calado's lax attitude to the enforcement of the work requirement in the town of Riani suggests a more profound scepticism about the value of programmes like the PASP – even as he recognises their political utility in bringing the Renamo opposition closer to the Frelimo headquarters. Therefore, it is not surprising that he supports an unconditional cash transfer.

Notably, the Frelimo party itself is a site of struggle between conflicting class interests and political realities, which clash across the different levels of government. For instance, in the town of Inhassoro, the local Frelimo leader opposes an unconditional cash transfer on the basis that it will foster conflict and demobilise people from engaging in productive activities such as cultivating their *machambas*:

> *Many people will die. Just down the road, there was a project where they distributed Mts1,500. One man killed his wife to lobolar other women. Another man resorted to magic. Money is the devil. With the PASP, we know where the money comes from and where it goes. We are not poor; we have capacity, which we should mobilise as a country (Interview with Inhassoro neighbourhood secretary 2017).*

Perhaps surprisingly, the neighbourhood secretary's position in Inhassoro is shared by many PASP workers. In a context where the majority live below the poverty line, the need for income support extends well beyond the 121,557 spots currently available on the PASP. The work conditionality justifies the payment of cash transfers to a lucky few but socialises the benefits of the work to all through public infrastructure improvement. For many PASP workers, the programme's conditional nature – even if only applied performatively – protects them from the magical wrath of ill-meaning neighbours. Vanda, a *camponesa* from Riani, argues that while it would be a positive move, an unconditional cash transfer would only work if it were universal:

> *It's not that it's not fair. It's very good. But there will be conflict and death. It's not possible for the whole locality to be given that amount so that people will be left out. And they'll ask 'don't they have blood like me, don't they walk like me? Why didn't I get it? For the elderly, there's no confusion because they don't have the strength to work. But those in the PASP are not poorer than those who did not get into the programme. You would have sorcery, crime, jealousy (Interview with Vanda 2016).*

The fear of conflict is amplified by a concern that an unconditional and universal cash transfer will foster physical and mental laziness, undermining the programme's sustainability. Predictably, this view is shared by many local leaders, state technocrats and better off own-account workers who argue that an unconditional cash transfer is equivalent to *'feeding your children without them washing the plates'.* While many PASP workers acknowledge that the value of the transfer is so insignificant that recipients would be mad to stop working altogether, some are concerned that overtime recipients could become increasingly dependent on state support, which given the state's erratic approach to cash transfer administration, would ultimately put recipients' lives at risk. As Regina, a *camponesa* in the town of Minuco reflects:

> *Without work, there is no life. As time passes, we are going to think that it's our right. We will lose the strength to work, and when the money ends, what will be done? (Interview with Regina 2016).*

The question of sustainability is critical in the context of the PASP, which is funded by a US$ 50 million World Bank loan. PASP workers have already experienced the adverse effects of irregular loan disbursements due to the agency's commitment to its reform agenda. Aware of the contingency of funding, they are unwilling to become mere sites of social experimentation for the latest development trends. The protagonism of international development agencies in the design and implementation of cash transfers has ultimately undermined the possibilities of claim-making. While Mozambicans have called for general strikes to protest the expropriation of land, the rising cost of living, high unemployment and low minimum wages, there has yet

to be a protest to demand cash transfers. Indeed, political debates on cash transfers are primarily limited to backdoor conversations between international development agencies, the state and some civil society organisation. Finally, many PASP workers view their work as socially useful. As Jimmy, the group chief in Temane reflects, the programme contributes to the wellbeing of the community:

> *That work of the PASP, the opening of the roads, who's going to open them? Who's going to build the houses for the elderly? When we build a house for someone, we help someone. Look at the houses. They're beautiful. And you feel good. You're helping others while you are getting help (Interview with Jimmy 2017).*

While the quality of the infrastructure is often dubious (McCord 2012), many hope that this *biscate* can be transformed into a proper job in the public sector, covered by minimum wages, with the opportunity to contribute to social security, and access to occupational health and safety measures. Although the PASP is far from the real utopia imagined by Masondo (2018), work has meaning at both an individual and collective level, which cannot be reproduced through an unconditional cash transfer.

However, if the terms of the PASP are to remain the same, some workers maintain that it would be desirable to receive an unconditional transfer: *'it would be normal. Each person has their luck, just like on the machamba. There are those who go to the machamba every day, but at the end of the year they have nothing'* (Interview with Julieta 2017). In particular, single mothers supported an unconditional cash transfer due to the competing productive and reproductive responsibilities that they already struggle to juggle. As Zelleke points out, the focus on women-headed households only serves to further burden women's heavy productive and reproductive load (Zelleke 2008). If an unconditional cash transfer was universal and supported by the upper echelons of the Frelimo government, Zaida concludes, it would be more desirable than the current approach to the PASP:

> *It would not be a bad idea if it came from above if no one could deny it. Because in fact how it is now, someone goes to the PASP and then they have to go to the machamba It seems like it's a sacrifice, suffering. When someone has strength, even if they receive a transfer, they wouldn't stop working. But to receive sitting is a matter of luck, whereas to receive a salary is a matter of work. The good thing would be for the others to receive it as well (Interview with Zaida 2017).*

Table 12: Overview of the Pros and Cons of an Unconditional Cash Transfer, 2016/17

Pros of an Unconditional Cash Transfer	Cons of an Unconditional Cash Transfer
Would free up time to engage in more meaningful activities like the *machamba* or housework	Never done before
	Could be used as an excuse to phase out cash transfers for able-bodied adults
	Could foster laziness and create dependency on an erratic state
	Would create a conflict unless it was universal
	Would not fulfil the individual and collective function of work

Source: PASP workers in Inhassoro and Ribáuè

Conclusion: from a biscate to a proper job

Across the African continent, there has been a proliferation of public works programmes. Like its siblings, the PASP promises to provide income security for able-bodied adults of working age, strengthen physical infrastructure and enable participants to become autonomous entrepreneurs. And like its siblings, it has been mostly unable to do so. Indeed, in her extensive analysis of public works programmes, McCord (2012) argues that they are of limited value as a social security measure – and the case of the PASP seems to corroborate these findings. In terms of sustenance, the PASP is insignificant. While the programme could play an essential role amidst a looming crisis of reproduction, its impact is limited by the low value of the transfer, the programme's short duration, and the irregular schedule of implementation. The physical distance between workers and the employer 'in Maputo or Europe' also poses a challenge to reclaiming unpaid wages. This is exacerbated in the district of Ribáuè, by the *ad hoc* recruitment process, which rendered the employer invisible. This ambiguity is reinforced by INAS and the district government, who claim not to have decision-making power over the rate, remuneration and terms of the program. Because PASP workers are not organised into a union, they have little recourse. Protective gear and tools have the power to transform a worker into an authority,

Furthermore, the programme's design ultimately undermines agricultural production: it is designed to smooth consumption during the agricultural cycle's lean period, which coincides precisely with its most labour-intensive period. While workers agree that the subsidy is

insignificant, most are reluctant to propose a specific level. After all, the remuneration rate is approved by the Council of Ministers, and neither INAS staff nor the local government have any say. Although workers have some autonomy to decide how to organise day-to-day activities, they have little say over the types of tools or protective equipment they receive. Because the PASP is conceived of as a social welfare program, workers are excluded from labour and social protections afforded to other public sector employees, which in turn contributes to their social status. Ultimately, respondents in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè ranked the PASP somewhere between a *biscate* and volunteer work.

Importantly, workers in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè had diverging expectations of the PASP. In Inhassoro, where wage-work is more common, it was regarded mainly as a *biscate* and the purview of women's work. In the district of Ribáuè, where wage-employment is much harder to come by, it was generally seen as a job and thus the purview of men. Although the PASP is a mediocre programme – and the *'rebenta mina'* described their work as treacherous workers also expressed the hope that the programme could be improved and extended. If the PASP were all-year-round, leaders would be able to count on a permanent number of workers to maintain public spaces, and workers would be assured wage-work throughout the year. If workers were provided with training, adequate tools, and supervision, perhaps they would learn some certifiable skills.

However, to transform the PASP into an employment guarantee requires explicit recognition of the prevalence of rural un(der)employment. In contrast to the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India, the PASP overlooks the question of rural un(der)employment entirely. Of course, this is puzzling given that the programme's very existence points to the fact that *'those with the strength to work'* are unable to meet their reproductive needs. As Ulriksen (2014) argues, delinking social welfare provision from public works programmes can be the first step towards expanding social welfare for able-bodied adults of working age and improving the working conditions on labour-intensive public works schemes.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Despite record rates of economic growth and a rhetorical commitment to employment creation, Mozambique is trapped in what du Toit and Neves (2007) have characterised as a tailspin of depeasantisation and deindustrialisation. The country may have among the lowest unemployment rates in Southern Africa, but this is mainly due to definitional distortions. On the one hand, the national statistics office defines employment so broadly that even the most survivalist, informal, 'unknown' activities are counted. On the other hand, the proportion of the economically active population has declined from 69.2 to 57.6 per cent in the last decade (INE 2019). As Johnston (2015) argues, national household surveys often struggle to capture the complexity of rural labour markets, especially where social welfare systems are inadequate, and most of the population cannot afford not to engage in some activity. Despite the limitations of national household data in Mozambique, trends point towards a looming crisis of reproduction marked by high levels of poverty and malnutrition.

Some scholars suggest that crises of reproduction present opportunities to reclaim work from the clutches of commodification. For Moyo (2011), this involves rebuilding the African peasantry by recentring food-production and expanding state support for small-scale agriculture. For Ferguson (2015), it consists of a politics of distribution rooted in new forms of political claim-making based on citizenship. Indeed, Ferguson suggests that the proliferation of cash transfers across the global South represent a harbinger of and an intellectual resource for an emergent radical politics of distribution. Underlying this proposition are several assumptions: that work is no longer a meaningful form of social incorporation and that a focus on politics at the point of production amounts to little more than productivist fundamentalism, that the notion of a 'rightful share' is an effective basis for political claim-making and that cash transfers are a powerful instrument to drive forth this 'distributional politics'. Drawing on the case of the Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) in rural Mozambique, this thesis interrogated these assumptions and asked the following questions:

1. What is the social meaning of work and the relevance of politics at the point of production?
2. How has the notion of a 'rightful share' shaped the design and implementation of redistributive schemes?
3. How have 'beneficiaries' of redistributive schemes leveraged these to advance a more radical politics of distribution?

In many respects, rural Mozambique is a perfect case to demonstrate Ferguson's proposition. Not only have transition narratives of industrial convergence seemingly failed but Mozambique has an expanding social welfare system, suggesting that even countries with limited financial and administrative capacity can implement cash transfer programmes. Although introduced to grease the wheels of structural adjustment, non-contributory cash transfers have evolved into a national system regulated by government legislation, funded mostly by domestic resources and administered by the autonomous state agency, INAS. Collectively, cash transfer programmes cover 592,179 households and expect to expand to 3.3 million by 2024 (RdM 2016).

However, the case of rural Mozambique also points to the contradictions of Ferguson's proposition. First, as this thesis explored, there is plenty of wage-work taking place and plenty more to be done. While wage-work is certainly not the primary source of sustenance, a dense web of precarious employment relationships underlies the elusive categories of 'own-account' and 'unpaid family worker'. Work remains an essential source of social incorporation, even as it transcends the boundaries between 'authentic' and 'intangible' labour (Gorz 1999). Interestingly, in rural Mozambique, what gives an activity meaning is not limited by its relationship to (de)commodification but by the conditions of work, namely: the ability of an activity to meet households' reproductive needs; for workers to define what to produce, how to produce it and for whom; and for the product of their labour to contribute to the well-being of society. While workers' subjectivities certainly inform worlds of meaning, these are dialectically shaped by the material conditions of agrarian life. In short, even in contexts where wage-work is the exception, politics at the point of production continues to be relevant.

Second, the case of rural Mozambique complicates Ferguson's (2015) proposition that cash transfers are a powerful wedge to drive forth a radical politics of distribution. Admittedly, the PASP is not the kind of universal and unconditional cash transfer Ferguson has in mind. Nevertheless, it constitutes the primary form of social welfare provisioning for able-bodied adults of working age across the African continent (ILO 2017b). Funded by a World Bank loan, the PASP's design has been heavily influenced by the latest development trends. While government officials, local leaders and cash transfer recipients have sought to claw back control through resistance, evasion, appropriation, and feigned acquiescence, these historically cultivated practices of power have not transformed relations between the state and international development agencies. Indeed, in Mozambique, Ferguson's (2015) radical politics of

distribution has been limited to closed-door sessions between development consultants, government officials and civil society representatives in the capital city's most luxurious hotels.

Finally, the case of Mozambique highlights that rethinking redistribution requires reclaiming production. To introduce an unconditional for all those currently excluded from the social insurance system – approximately 28 million Mozambicans, at the simulated average national poverty line – it would cost 77 per cent of the national budget and 28 per cent of GDP just in transfers. While the world may be facing a crisis of overproduction, Mozambique is stuck in a rut of low production and productivity, which undermines the state's redistributive capacity. This is exacerbated by the state's extractivist development model, which absorbs the largest share of foreign direct investment and contributes little to employment and taxes (Castel-Branco 2015). Of course, one could argue that given that the majority of the population has partial access to the means of production, it would be reasonable to set a universal and unconditional cash transfer well below the poverty line. However, the case of the PASP suggests that the more insignificant the cash transfer, the less worthy it is of public mobilisation – especially in a context where social rights are barely recognised and claim-making severely punished.

Notably, the thesis argues that to reclaim production is not to limit politics to the realm of direct labour-capital relations. Instead, it is to pursue a politics which seeks to improve the conditions of both 'authentic' and 'intangible' labour while expanding the social wage. Certainly, politics at the point of production includes the enforcement of labour protections such as minimum wages and social security, the expansion of collective bargaining beyond the factory floor and the adoption of macroeconomic and fiscal policies to stimulate employment creation (Oya and Pontara 2015). But it also involves the promotion of small-scale agriculture through more equitable forms of land ownership, improved access to water and other agricultural inputs, the protection of biodiversity and expansion of extension services, more favourable terms of commodity exchange and investment in public services such as healthcare (Patnaik and Moyo 2011).

There is plenty of work to be done: the contradictions of post-work utopias in rural Mozambique

In *Reclaiming Work,* Gorz (1999) argues for the elimination of 'intangible' labour and the restoration of work to its 'authentic' meaning as something that we do rather than that we have. 'Intangible' work, he suggests, is a construct peculiar to industrial capitalism, which has alienated workers from the means and the process of production, from the product of their labour, from themselves and each other. In contrast, 'authentic' work is a sensory, autonomous and collective experience, that allows for workers' self-realisation through the transformation of nature into products that bear their inscription and respond to their needs. As this thesis illustrated, the making and maintenance of wage-work have been marked by coercion, but it has also involved the consent of the expropriated, exploited and excluded. Gorz (1999) concludes that is high time to debunk the dogma of the dignity of wage-work and go beyond a wage-based society.

Gorz (1999) is part of a growing chorus of 'anti-work' scholars who argue that the global crisis of reproduction presents an opportunity to reclaim work from the clutches of commodification (Weeks 2011; Srnicek and Williams 2015; Bastani 2019). Disenchanted by statist forms of socialism, sceptical about the viability of revolution, and increasingly convinced that politics at the point of production is obsolete, some have become resigned to what Burawoy (2020) defines as utopia without class analysis. Perhaps the most prominent of these 'real utopias' is universal basic income (UBI). Progressive proponents of UBI argue that it not only address the crisis of reproduction but allows non-commodified activities to flourish, thereby transforming class relations under capitalism (van Parijs 2006; Olin Wright 2010; Standing 2017). However, UBI is also supported by a wealth of billionaires who see it as a strategy to roll back labour, social and consumer protections (Castel-Branco 2020a). This contradiction highlights the conceptual slipperiness of superficial utopias that abstract from the processes of accumulation that expropriated, exploited, and excluded the dispossessed in the first place.

Although 'anti-work' politics emanated from the global North, it has found expression in some pockets of the formerly colonised South, where wage labour has always been the exception rather than the norm. Despite, or perhaps because, standard employment relations were historically circumscribed to the realm of the coloniser, Ferguson and Li (2018) argue that they became central to the postcolonial political and social imaginary. However, in Africa, high

modernist transition narratives never materialised, and aspirant wageworkers increasingly found themselves in a state of 'precarious liberation', to borrow from Barchiesi (2011). Echoing earlier calls by northern 'anti-work' scholars, Ferguson (2015) appeals for the decentring of wage-work and a reorientation of emancipatory politics towards distribution. After all, there is nothing innately meaningful about wage-work under capitalism. Interestingly, Ferguson ignores the extensive literature on the meaning of work. Work is not only a source of sustenance that helps to bide the time away but an intrinsically satisfying activity, that affords workers a level of status associated with its perceived social utility (Kaplan and Tausky 1974). Furthermore, workers are not blind promoters of their own exploitation and do resist the drudgery of wage-work through avoidance, absenteeism and strikes (Atzeni 2014).

Drawing on the case of rural Mozambique, the thesis explored the contradictions of 'anti-work' politics in an agrarian context where nearly 90 per cent of the economically active population are categorised as 'own-account' and 'unpaid family workers' (INE 2019). However, underlying these elusive categories, are a multiplicity of waged and unwaged activities. In the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, these included debt labour for local lenders, *ganho-ganho* and *biscates* for wealthier neighbours, *volunteer* work for the state and non-governmental organisations, petty trading and artisanship, casual employment for multinational corporations and migrant wage-work. Most casual wage-workers are excluded from minimum wages, paid leave, social security, collective bargaining rights, and other labour protections afforded to workers in the formal economy. However, because they are not captured in national statistics, they are ignored in policy responses (Oya and Pontara 2015).

Furthermore, the case of rural Mozambique suggests that the dogma of the dignity of wage-work is far more contingent than 'anti-work' scholars theorise. While the phrase 'to be a person is to work' is frequently evoked, the definition of work transcends the boundaries between 'authentic' and 'intangible' labour. For instance, in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, respondents defined work as a specialised physical activity that is socially useful and allows households to reproduce themselves. Legitimate forms of work included the cultivation of the *machamba*, casual and permanent wage-work, petty trading, and reproductive labour such as 'the work of loving your man'. When pressed, some conceded that intellectual and emotional effort could constitute work – but only if socially useful. A schoolteacher or initiation counsellor, for instance, made an essential contribution to society by preparing children for adulthood. A researcher's contribution, however, was far more dubious.

Of course, there were contradictions in the meanings ascribed to work. While small-scale farmers in the district of Inhassoro and Ribáuè emphasised that cultivating the *machamba* was among the most meaningful activities, they often introduced themselves as 'I am *just* a *camponês*'. This incongruity reflects overlapping worlds of meaning, shaped on the one hand by an accumulated and contradictory history of state discourse, policy, and practice; and on the other, by the material conditions of agrarian life. During the colonial period, the state delimited legitimate work to those activities that created value for colonial capital. However, the absence of dignified work ultimately thwarted the dogma of the dignity of wage-work. Following independence, the Frelimo state reframed work as a collective project towards national liberation. It expanded the definition of legitimate work to include small-scale agriculture but continued to criminalise informal activities in urban centres. With the transition to a market economy, legitimate work was extended to all activities. Whereas in the colonial period 'a culture of work' was a signifier of one's willingness to perform exploitative labour for colonial capital, today it is a measure of one's ability to endure unemployment.

Notably, the desire for wage-work was no more a rejection of the 'authentic' labour of cultivation, than the desire to retain access to land was a rejection of 'intangible' labour. In both the district of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, respondents evaluated the value of work based on three criteria: sustenance or the ability of work to meet households' reproductive needs; autonomy or workers' power to determine the labour process; and social recognition. On an elementary level, work was considered essential to life itself: without the manual labour of cultivation there would be no food; without food, there would be hunger; and with hunger, there would be death. Laziness was firmly rebuffed because it undermined the material basis of social solidarity so fundamental to personhood. While most respondents considered the cultivation of the *machamba* to be essential, they hoped that their children would escape the drudgery of manual cultivation. Given the whims of the weather and the vagaries of the market, rain-fed agriculture was simply too risky. In the district of Ribáuè, where the market for own-account activities hinged on farmers' fluctuating incomes, respondents generally preferred public sector employment because it provided a salary. In the district of Inhassoro, where markets were better developed due to the long history of migrant labour, respondents preferred to pursue own-account activities. As one respondent in Inhassoro stressed: *'To work for someone is to work for free… [own account workers] eat chicken every day'*.

Ultimately, respondents in rural Mozambique were not blind promoters of their own exploitation. Indeed, it is precisely because of their resistance to taking up ultra-low wage-work that political elites, commercial farmers, and plantation managers often lamented a 'lack of a culture of work' (O'Laughlin 2016). Contrary to utopian visions of emancipatory politics, there was nothing innately liberating or alienating about 'authentic' or 'intangible' labour. Instead, the meaningfulness of any one activity hinged on the nature of working conditions, which were shaped by contentious (class) politics. While classes of rural labour may be increasingly fluid and fragmented, the countryside is rife with differentiation (Bernstein 2010a). As Cremildo (2017) poignantly described: a peasant uses the ash to wash, while an agriculturalist soap; a peasant toils under debt labour, while an agriculturalist hires *ganho-ganho*; a peasant is subjected to arbitrary violence, while an agriculturalist is protected from it; a peasant dies alone, while an agriculturalist dies surrounded by friends and family.

Despite the dominance of 'authentic' labour in rural Mozambique, respondents in the district of Inhassoro and Ribáuè were ultimately subsumed under the capitalist mode of production – much as the Russian peasantry was at the turn of the 20th century (Lenin 1899). By assuming that politics at the point of production is obsolete, 'anti-work' politics deflects from practices of power that could improve the conditions of both 'real' and 'intangible' labour. Of course, this is not to suggest that politics at the point of redistribution is irrelevant. As Mozambique's first president Samora Machel emphasised, the objective of increasing production and productivity is to eliminate hunger, nudity and homelessness (Machel 1985). For Machel, redistribution hinged on economic development, whereas for Ferguson (2015) the former can exist independently of the latter. The next section explores the nature of social welfare provisioning and the contradictions of a radical politics of distribution in rural Mozambique.

Far from a 'real utopia': The limits of public works in rural Mozambique

Over the last decades, there has been a proliferation of cash transfer programmes across the global South in what Hanlon et al. (2010) have characterised as a 'quiet revolution' in development thinking. Previously dismissed as undesirable, unaffordable and impossible to implement in states with limited financial and administrative capacity, cash transfers have been recast as an effective and efficient instrument of inclusive growth. Ferguson (2015) argues that the rapid expansion of cash transfer programmes across the global South represents a harbinger

of and intellectual resource for a new radical politics of distribution rooted in citizenship rather than expired forms of social incorporation.

However, most cash transfer programmes remain highly targeted, conditional on some form of behaviour modification and are insufficient to meet households' reproductive needs. This is especially true of transfers for able-bodied adults of working age, which are generally tied to participation in labour-intensive public works. Hailed as a win-win response to the crisis of reproduction, public works programmes promise to provide a politically palatable form of income-security that simultaneously strengthens physical infrastructure. However, extensive evaluations of public works programmes across the African continent have shown that they are not a cost-effective form of social provisioning (McCord 2012). Nevertheless, they remain popular among decision-makers because they allay elite fears of fostering 'a lack of a culture of work'.

Although many Left scholars see public works as an extension of neoliberalism, some contend that in the global South, they constitute a countermovement towards more expansive forms of social provisioning. Indeed, Masondo (2018) suggests that they are a potential example of what Olin-Wright (2010) dubs 'real utopias'. In addition to providing income security and strengthening physical infrastructure, public works give purpose, structure and rhythm to the day; foster a sense of belonging and hope for the future; and promote counter-capitalist income-generating alternatives such as cooperatives. While Masondo (2018)'s insight points to the variegated ways in which neoliberalism has been refracted through the state, it is important to recognise how neoliberalism has narrowed the scope of what is considered politically possible. While public works programmes have certainly extended social provisioning across Africa, they have done so by reframing precarious work as an instrument of social inclusion, while neutralising more radical demands for redistribution such as UBI (Barchiesi 2011).

In Mozambique, the PASP is the only cash transfer programme for able-bodied adults of working age. In rural areas it was designed to smooth consumption during the lean period of the agricultural cycle – ironically its most labour-intensive – while in urban centres it was designed to respond to chronic periods of unemployment. In exchange for participating in labour-intensive public works for four hours a day and four days a week, PASP workers receive a monthly cash transfer of Mts 1,050, which is barely enough to buy a 25 kg bag of rice. Activities include the clearing of tertiary and unclassified roads, the construction and maintenance of public spaces and the cultivation of local leaders' *machambas.* After

participating in the programme for three years, PASP workers are expected to have accumulated the assets, skills and knowledge necessary to 'graduate' out of the programme (RdM 2012). However, much to PASP workers' despair, 'graduation' has proved rather elusive, and in many parts of the country, the programme is in its ninth year of implementation.

Today, there are 121,557 PASP workers, 90 per cent of whom live in rural areas (UNICEF and ILO 2020). The programme accounts for nearly a third of the public sector but because they are conceived of as welfare 'beneficiaries', PASP workers are excluded from labour and social protections. Given the conditions of work, it is not surprising that the PASP was ranked among the most alienating forms of labour in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè. However, there were regional differences. In the district of Inhassoro, where the PASP had a more extended history, it was considered a form of *ganho-ganho*. Men generally refused to take up work because it paid 'women's wages', though as women often lamented, they were happy to eat from the same pot on payday. Women workers referred to themselves as the *'rebenta mina',* which can be translated as an armoured truck used to detonate landmines. This double-sided metaphor highlighted both their contribution to their community and their sense of expendability. While workers in the district of Inhassoro had little expectation that the PASP would evolve into a proper job, they hoped that the cash transfer would be increased to Mts 3,500, which corresponds to the value of the basic basket of goods provided by the food-for-work programme. Notably, few desisted from the PASP for fear that they would lose a claim to severance pay.

In the district of Ribáuè, where the PASP was still a novel programme, it was perceived of as a 'job'. Although selection processes prioritised women-headed households, most workers were men. Local leaders preferred to recruit men because they saw them as stronger and more reliable due to fewer competing reproductive activities, and gender norms discouraged women from participating in commodified activities outside of the home. However, men often sent women and children in their place, particularly during the planting season when labour was scarce. Ultimately workers in the district of Ribáuè hoped that the programme would evolve into a proper job and that the value of the cash transfer would reach parity with the minimum wage, which ranges from Mts 4,000 to Mts 12,000 depending on the sectoral determination (Wage Indicator 2020).

Interestingly, young people in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè shunned the PASP. For the PASP to attract youth, they argued, it would have to be cleaner, better paid and provide opportunities for professional advancement. Although 15 per cent of the PASP budget was earmarked for locally sourced tools and equipment, the tools distributed were insufficient and their quality inadequate (RdM 2012). The absence of adequate equipment and training posed occupational health and safety hazards, which was compounded by the absence of medical assistance and benefits in case of workplace accidents. The lack of equipment and training also reinforced a nagging suspicion that the PASP was at best, a *biscate*. It signalled that PASP workers were 'forgotten children' with no authority to implement the mandate they claimed to have.

To ameliorate the conditions of work, PASP workers in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè drew on historically cultivated practices of power including prayer, song, skits, work slow-downs and stay-aways. Through everyday forms of resistance were able to increase the hourly wage by reducing working time. Although the PASP is defined according to time worked, work was organised by the task, and it was not unusual for tasks to take no more than an hour to complete. Furthermore, many group chiefs established an informal rotating system which exempted workers from working every day – though they were rarely marked as absent. Legitimate excuses included: 'They went to the [CD4] control at the hospital', 'their child is sick', 'they have a guest at home', 'they had to go to the *machamba*' and 'they informed us ahead of time'. This arrangement was approved by local leaders who recognised that households needed to engage in other livelihood activities to make ends meet. Of course, not all leaders were understanding. In the district of Ribáuè, for instance, one leader insisted that PASP workers work for five full days a week. However, this was the exception rather than the norm, and workers were overwhelmingly able to improve conditions, even if not transform them.

Interestingly, PASP workers were at best ambivalent about an unconditional cash transfer. In a context where claims to citizenship are tenuous, they felt more secure about receiving 'something for something'. Indeed, the notion of cash-based entitlements seemed so far-fetched that the question itself had to be rephrased: 'what if you received cash from the state for cultivating your *machamba*'? The immediate response was always a version of: 'Something for nothing? We still have strength!'. However, underlying this response was a fear that if cash transfers were unconditional, they could be taken away. In other words, material labour was a much stronger basis for claim-making than abstract notions of a 'rightful share'. Furthermore, in a

context where most people are poor, and budget allocations to cash transfer programmes are inadequate, the work conditionality reduced community conflict and socialised the benefits of the PASP. Local leaders readily spoke about the benefits that the programme brought to the community: 'If someone gets into an accident, an ambulance can easily reach'. (Interview with Fatima 2017). Finally, given the authoritarian paternalism nature of the state, PASP workers felt that if the cash transfer were unconditional, Frelimo Party members would siphon off the bulk of the resources. In short, PASP workers felt that the work conditionality ensured that the benefits of the PASP extended beyond local patronage relations.

Curiously, PASP workers drew on colonial stereotypes of the 'lazy African' to argue for a work conditionality. When prodded, however, most conceded that an unconditional cash transfer would be preferable *if it were universal and defined as an inalienable right*. Indeed, they baulked at the notion that they would become lazy – after all, the value of the PASP was insignificant. Nevertheless, in both the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè, workers hoped that the state would transform the programme into decent work rather than eliminate the work requirement. In her analysis of public works programmes in South Africa, Ulriksen (2014) calls for delinking public works from social welfare provisioning to improve wages and working conditions on public works programmes on the one hand; and to expand social welfare for able-bodied adults of working-age on the other hand. With the COVID-19 Crisis, the Mozambican government approved an unprecedented, *unconditional* emergency cash transfer of Mts 1,500 for able-bodied adults (Interview with INAS Director 2020). Known as the Direct Social Action Emergency Programme (PASD-PE), it is slated to last for six months. Although temporary, it suggests growing political palatability for an unconditional cash transfer. However, the PASD-PE is entirely funded by external resources. The following section discusses the political possibilities of a radical politics of distribution in a state where cash transfers are influenced by international development agencies.

Rethinking redistribution, reclaiming production in rural Mozambique

While Ferguson (2015) argues that cash transfers represent an intellectual resource for a radical politics of distribution, he is rather vague about the constellation of social forces that underlie such a politics. Instead, he turns to Polanyian evocations of a cross-class institutional space made up of political parties, voluntary associations, unions, cooperatives, churches, and family (Polanyi 1944). On the one hand, this brand of utopia without class politics is a reaction against

the class essentialism of orthodox Marxism. On the other hand, it reflects growing scepticism about the usefulness of class amidst increasingly fragmented and fluid classes of labour. However, having eschewed class as an analytical category, Ferguson (2015) struggles to address the question of power, a point made by Nilsen (2020). After all, the terms of cash transfer provisioning are ultimately shaped by the balance of power between (global) capital and labour, and the ways in which these are refracted through the state. The case of the PASP provides some useful insights into the political limitations of such an approach.

In Mozambique, social protection is a constitutional aspiration and a social right. However, each step of cash transfer administration is imbued with (class) struggle. For instance, during the registration for the PASP, people in the district of Inhassoro and Ribáuè were summoned for an activity whose terms they knew little about. Amidst a crisis of reproduction, they were reticent to ask about the conditions of work. As one respondent in the district of Ribáuè explained, power asymmetries run deep in the countryside: 'I was desperate for work...I was afraid they would say you're complicating things, leave!' (Interview with Osvaldo 2017). A coterie of local Frelimo elite were responsible for the selection of PASP workers. Given the limited slots available, only those in good standing were enrolled in the programme. As one professional volunteer remarked: 'to remain in good standing, it is important to 'thank' local leaders' (Interview with Roda 2017). Once admitted into the PASP, the payment of cash transfers was highly irregular, and there was a disempowering level of confusion regarding who called the shots. In high moments, local leaders would stress that the PASP was a government programme, but in low moments they would deflect responsibility 'to the white man far, far away'. In rare instances, PASP workers turned against INAS staffers. In the district of Mecuburi for example, INAS was chased out by furious workers who had accused them of being 'Frelimo thieves'. The following year, no one reregistered for the programme. However, claim-making was generally limited to idle threats against the INAS Permanente, who in the absence of real power, resorted to the mantra: 'sooner or later, the government always pays'.

To claim that the owners of the PASP are white men far away is not entirely untrue. After all, the PASP is financed by a US$50 million World Bank loan. Although the loan will have to be repaid by Mozambican taxpayers, it comes with several conditionalities, including the development of an online information management system, the application of a proxy-means-test and the outsourcing of cash transfer payments (World Bank 2013). Although the state dragged its feet on implementing the conditionalities, the crisis of Ematum gave the World

Bank much-needed leverage to advance its reform agenda (Buur and Salimo 2018). However, as Li (2007) has so beautifully argued 'improvement schemes' from above are hardly hegemonic. In the case of the PASP, the subjects of improvement schemes – whether national governments, local leaders or cash transfers recipients – were involved in contentious politics. Repertoires of action included outright resistance, evasion, appropriation and feigned acquiescence in the face of limited possibilities.

While the World Bank initially envisioned the PASP as a response to urban unrest, the Frelimo government reoriented the programme towards its social base in rural areas. When the World Bank tried to pressure the government to contract an international consulting firm to develop the information management system, the state hired an autonomous agency under the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) to develop the software. When the World Bank imposed a complicated selection method to identify the 'poorest of the poor' the local state adopted numerous strategies to circumvent restrictions. In the district of Inhassoro, a neighbourhood secretary improvised a rotating system which subverted the design of the programme to ensure that all community members would have access to cash transfers. When the World Bank introduced the principle of least eligibility, cash transfer recipients effectively increased the value of the transfer by reducing the hours of work. While this repertoire of action has had little transformative impact, it has the potential to ameliorate the conditions of work.

Although there has been a gradual expansion of cash transfer programmes in Mozambique, many contend that these have amounted to little more than 'a conversation to put the bull to sleep' (Francisco 2013; Buur and Salimo 2018). Budget allocations have been insufficient to meet the targets outlined in the National Strategy for Basic Social Security and the systems of administration remain highly fractured (RdM 2016). Buur and Salimo (2018) maintain that social welfare is a strategy of legitimation to safeguard continued aid flows amidst widespread poverty, inequality, and corruption. They point to an 'international policy alliance' between development agencies and the Frelimo government, which seeks to preserve the ruling Party's distributional regime, by sweeping uncomfortable questions under the rug. Whether one agrees with Buur and Salimo (2018) or not, what is certain is that debates on cash transfer programmes have been limited to closed-door conversations between international development agencies, the state and a handful of service providers. Meanwhile, membership-based organisations—including trade unions, informal workers' associations, peasants' organisations and groupings of cash transfer recipients—have been excluded.

Of course, as Seekings (2020) notes, international policy alliances are not devoid of tension. Across the African continent, development agencies have struggled to exert policy influence. While the World Bank tends to promote highly targeted and residual safety-nets, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) tends to advocate for entitlement-based social security embedded in state institutions. With the socioeconomic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Social Protection approved $79 million to finance the PASD-PE for poor households in urban and peri-urban areas – as well as the province of Cabo Delgado currently facing an insurgency. In contrast to other cash transfers which are paid manually by the state, the PASD-PE is slated to be distributed via e-wallet. Although only 25 per cent of Mozambicans own a mobile phone, the World Bank has tried to leverage this opportunity to outsource cash transfer payment to mobile providers, even though the operational costs are considerably higher than the current system (RdM 2020a).

Some hope that the PASD-PE will serve as a wedge to advance a more radical politics of distribution based on universal basic income. To date, only 2 per cent of Mozambique's national budget goes towards social welfare provisioning, suggesting that it is an opportunity to expand the fiscal space for cash transfer provisioning. However, there is currently not enough fiscal space to introduce a UBI at a significant level. Even if introduced through a dividend derived from the socialisation of multinational capital, (climate) reparations or development aid, it is unclear what role Mozambicans would play in shaping the terms of this politics of distribution. Ultimately, rethinking redistribution requires reclaiming production. While respondents in the districts of Inhassoro and Ribáuè were not opposed to cash transfers per se, they were primarily concerned with state support for small-scale agriculture, the fair distribution of jobs and the enforcement of labour protections.

This thesis critically engaged theoretical debates on the future of work(ers) and the emancipatory possibilities of cash transfers. The objective was not to discredit utopian visions of 'anti-work' futures but rather to extend contemporary debates from the vantage point of those located at the periphery of capitalist accumulation. It was especially interested in three commonly-held assumptions by 'anti-work' scholars: that work is no longer a meaningful form of social incorporation and that a focus on politics at the point of production amounts to little more than productivist fundamentalism, that the notion of a 'rightful share' is an effective basis for political claim-making and that cash transfers are a powerful instrument to drive forth this 'distributional politics' (Ferguson 2015). It concluded that even in contexts where wage-work is the

exception, politics at the point of production remain relevant. On the one hand, there is plenty of work happening and plenty more to be done; and the meaning of work is not determined by the degree of (de)commodification but by the conditions of work. On the other hand, production constitutes the basis of distribution. Without increasing production, a radical politics of distribution will remain dependent on international development aid. Ultimately, the line between production and distribution is not always clear, for they are two sides of the same coin.

Bibliography

Abreu, Alcinda. 1999. 'O Reajustamento Estructural e o Seu Impacto em Moçambique 1982-1997: uma Abordagem Histórica.' Dissertação de Licenciatura, Maputo: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.

Abreu, Dilip. 2014. 'Do Not Dilute NREGA,.' *Economic and Political Weekly, Economic and Political Weekly, Economic and Political Weekly, Economic and Political Weekly, Economic and Political Weekly* 49 (42).

Adesina, Jimi O. 2020. "Policy Merchandising and Social Assistance in Africa: Don't Call Dog Monkey for Me." *Development and Change* 51 (2): 561–82.

Alexander, Michelle. 2012. *The New Jim Crow*. The New Press.

Ali, Rosimina. 2017. 'Mercados de Trabalho Rurais: Porque São Negligenciados Nas Políticas de Emprego, Pobreza e Desenvolvimento Em Moçambique?' In *Emprego e Transformação Económica e Social Em Moçambique.* Maputo: IESE.

Ally, Shireen. 2009. *From Servants to Workers: South African Domestic Workers and the Democratic State*. Cornell University Press.

Americans for Tax Fairness. 2014. 'Walmart on Tax Day: How Taxpayers Subsidize America's Biggest Employer and Richest Family.' Americans for Tax Fairness.

Amin, Samir. 1976. *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism*. Translated by Brian Pearce. First Pr. Thus edition. New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press.

ANC. 2019. "Social Transformation Committe: Basic Income Grants, Social Relief and Food Security." National Working Committee Meeting.

Anner, Mark, Nicolas Pons-Vignon, and Uma Rani. 2019. 'For a Future of Work with Dignity: A Critique of the World Bank Development Report, The Changing Nature of Work.' *Global Labour Journal* 10 (1).

Arrighi, G. 1970. 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianisation of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia.' *The Journal of Development Studies* 6 (3): 197–234.

Arrighi, Giovanni, Beverly J. Silver, and Benjamin D. Brewer. 2003. 'Industrial Convergence, Globalisation, and the Persistence of the North-South Divide.' *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38 (1): 3.

Artur, Maria Jose. 2004. 'Trade Unions in Mozambique.' Friederich Ebert Stiftung.

Atzeni, Maurizio. 2014. *Workers and Labour in a Globalised Capitalism: Contemporary Themes and Theoretical Issues*. 2014th Edition. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Red Globe Press.

Baloyi, Basani. 2019. 'The Financialisation of Mozambique's Roads Concessions: A Spatial-Temporal Fix.' London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Barchiesi, Franco. 2011. *Precarious Liberation: Workers, the State, and Contested Social Citizenship in Post-apartheid South Africa*. Suny Series in Global Modernity. State University of New York Press.

Barnes, Barbara. 1982. 'Education for Socialism in Mozambique.' *Comparative Education Review* 26 (3): 406–19.

Bastani, Aaron. 2019. *Fully Automated Luxury Communism*. Verso Books.

Becker, Howard, and Blanche Geer. 1957. 'Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison.' *Human Organisation* 16 (3): 28–32.

Bernstein, Henry. 2006. 'Is There an Agrarian Question in the 21st Century?' *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue Canadienne d'études Du Développement* 27 (4): 449–60.

———. 2010a. *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change*. Kumarian Press.

———. 2010b. ‘Rural Livelihoods and Agrarian Change: Bringing Class Back In.’ In *Rural Transformations and Development – China in Context: The Everyday Lives of Policies and People*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Bertrand Russel. 1935. *In Praise of Idleness.* New York: St Martin’s Press.
Bhattacharya, Tithi. 2017. ‘How Not to Skip Class: Social Reproduction of Labor and the Global Working Class.’ In *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*, edited by Tithi Bhattacharya. London: Pluto Press.
Biblica. 2011. *The Holy Bible: New International Version*. Nairobi: Biblica.
BO. 1858. *Decreto de 29 de Abril de 1858.*
———. 1867. *Código Civil Portuguez, Aprovado Carta de Lei de 1 de Julho de 1867.*
BOM. 1892. *Regulamento a que se Refere a Portaria Supra Caminho de Ferro Portuguez de Lourenço Marques Ao Transvaal: Caixa de Socorros, de 25 de Junho de 1892*. *BOM*. Vol. 208.
———. 1975. ‘Decreto Lei Nº 16-75, de 13 de Fevereiro de 1975.’ República Popular de Moçambique.
———. 1977. ‘Decreto Lei 6-77 de 31 de Dezembro de 1977.’ República Popular de Moçambique.
———. 1985. ‘Lei Do Trabalho (Lei No. 8/85, de 14 de Dezembro).’ República Popular de Moçambique.
———. 1988. ‘Decreto 17/88 de 27 de Dezembro, que Cria o Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social Como Instituição Gestora Do Sistema de Segurança Social;’ República Popular de Moçambique.
———. 1989. ‘Lei No 5/89, de 18 de Setembro de 1989.’ República Popular de Moçambique.
———. 1990. ‘Decreto 4/2019 de 13 de Abril, Sobre a Taxa Global de Contribuição para o Sistema de Segurança Social.’ Boletim da República, República Popular de Moçambique.
Bond, Patrick. 2014. “Tokenism in South African Social Policy.” *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 86 (1): 48–77.
Bowen, Merle. 2000. *The State Against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Post-colonial Mozambique*. University of Virginia Press.
Bozzoli, Belinda. 1983. ‘Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies.’ *Journal of Southern African Studies* 9 (2): 139–71.
Breckenridge, Keith. 2019. ‘The Global Ambitions of the Biometric Anti-Bank: Net1, Lockin and the Technologies of African Financialisation.’ *International Review of Applied Economics* 33 (1): 93–118.
Breman, Jan, and Marcel van der Linden. 2014a. ‘Informalising the Economy: The Return of the Social Question at a Global Level.’ *Development and Change* 45 (5): 920–40.
———. 2014b. ‘Informalising the Economy: The Return of the Social Question at a Global Level.’ *Development and Change* 45 (5): 920–40.
Brito, Luís de, Egídio Chaimite, Crescêncio Pereira, Lúcio Posse, Michael Sambo, and Alex Shankland. 2015. ‘Revoltas Da Fome: Protestos Populares Em Moçambique(2008–2012).’ Cadernos IESE No. 14. Maputo: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos.
Brum, J.M. 1976. ‘Manufacturing Industries in Mozambique: Some Aspects.’ Maputo: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane,.
Bryceson, Deborah Fahy. 2019. ‘Gender and Generational Patterns of African Deagrarianisation: Evolving Labour and Land Allocation in Smallholder Peasant Household Farming, 1980–2015.’ *World Development* 113 (January): 60–72.
Bujra, Janet. 2006. ‘Lost in Translation? The Use of Interpreters in Fieldwork.’ In *Doing Development Research*, by Vandana Desai and Robert Potter, 172–79. 1 London : SAGE Publications.

Bundy, Colin. 1979. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. University of California Press.
Burawoy, Michael. 1998. 'The Extended Case Method.' *Sociological Theory* 16 (1): 4–33.
———. 2009. *The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition*. University of California Press.
———. 2020. 'A Tale of Two Marxisms.' *New Left Review* 121.
Buur, Lars. 2010. 'Xiconhoca: Mozambique's Ubiquitous Post-Independence Traitor.' In , 24–47.
Buur, Lars, and Padil Salimo. 2018. 'The Political Economy of Social Protection in Mozambique.' Roskilde University.
Byres, Terence J. 2004. 'Neo-Classical Neo-Populism 25 Years On: Déjà Vu and Déjà Passé. Towards a Critique.' *Journal of Agrarian Change* 4 (1–2): 17–44.
Cabrita, J. 2001. *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy*. Springer.
Caldeira, Aderito. 2019. 'Piores aumentos salariais dos últimos 3 anos desmentem fim da crise económica em Moçambique.'
Capela, José. 1980. 'O Movimento Operário Em Lourenço Marques.' *História*, no. 15: 26–37.
———. 2002. 'O Tráfico de Escravos Nos Portos de Moçambique.' Edições Afrontamemento.
Caramelo, Agostinho. 1966. *Fumo*. Povoa de Varzim: Editora Poveira.
Castel-Branco, Carlos Nuno. 2002. 'An Investigation into the Political Economy of Industrial Policy : The Case of Mozambique.' London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
———. 2015. 'Growth, Capital Accumulation and Economic Porosity in Mozambique: Social Losses, Private Gains: Review of African Political Economy: Vol 41, No Sup1.' *Review of African Political Economy*.
———. 2017. 'Crises Económicas e Estruturas de Acumulação de Capital Em Moçambique.' In *Desafios Para Moçambique*. Maputo: IESE.
Castel-Branco, Carlos Nuno, and Christopher Cramer. 2003. 'Privatisation and Economic Strategy in Mozambique.' In *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa*. Oxford: OUP Oxford.
Castel-Branco, Ruth. 2017a. 'Documento Técnico Do Programa Subsídio Social Básico-Velhice.' Maputo: International Labour Organisation.
———. 2017b. 'No Rescaldo Da Liberalização: A (Re)Formalização Do Trabalho Doméstico Na Cidade de Maputo.' In *Desafios Para Moçambique*. Maputo: IESE.
———.2017c. "Social Welfare, Unemployment and Public Works in Rural Southern Mozambique." In *Work, Institutions and Sustainable Livelihood: Issues and Challenges of Transformation*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2020a. 'The Case for a Global Universal Basic Income?' FES.
———. 2020b. 'Universal Basic Income: A Politically Slippery Response to the Crisis of Social Reproduction.' University of the Witwatersrand.
Castel-Branco, Ruth, and Gilad Isaacs. 2017. ''Restauração Da Dignidade Do Nosso Povo': De Salários Sectoriais a Um Salário Mínimo Nacional Na África Do Sul.' In *Desafios Para Moçambique 2017*, 355–78. Maputo: IESE.
Castel-Branco, Ruth, and Lóide da Graca Sambo. 2020. 'Ultrapassando as Barreiras No Accesso à Segurança Social Contributiva.' Maputo: International Labour Organisation.
Castel-Branco, Ruth, and Rubén Vicente. 2019. 'Rumo a Uma Segurança Social Universal Para a Pessoa Idosa Em Moçambique.' Maputo: International Labour Organisation.
CEA. 1981. 'Dossier - Porto de Maputo: Relatório Sobre o Projecto de Investigação Realizados Pelo Centro de Estudos Africanos No Porto de Maputo, 1981.' Maputo: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane | Centro de Estudos Africanos.

Chang, Ha-Joon, and Antonio Andreoni. 2020. "Industrial Policy in the 21st Century." *Development and Change* 51 (2): 324–51.
Chayanov, Aleksandr Vasil′evich. 1925. *Theory of Peasant Economy*. Manchester University Press.
Chen, Martha. 2012. 'The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories and Policies'.
Chichava, Sérgio. 2009. 'Armando Guebuza e a Pobreza Em Moçambique.' IDeIAS 12. Maputo: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos.
Chilundo, Arlindo Gonçalo. 2001. *Os Camponeses e os Caminhos de Ferro e Estradas Em Nampula (1900-1961).* Maputo: Promédia.
Chipenembe, Maria Judite. 2010. 'Dinâmicas de Género No Mercado de Trabalho Doméstico na Cidade de Maputo'.' In *Género e Direitos Humanos em Moçambique.* Edited by Nair Teles and J Bras. Maputo: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.
Chivangue, Andes. 2019. 'Narrativas Emergentes Contra a Indústria Extractiva em Tete: Renegociando Instituições Através de Protestos Populares?' In *Tensões e Conflictos Sociais No Campo.* Maputo: Escolar Editora.
CIP. 2017. 'Sasol Continuará a Enriquecer e o Estado Moçambicano a 'Vaca Leiteirra' Exploração de Gás Natural de Pande e Temane, Inflação de Custos e Preços de Transferência.' Maputo: Centro de Integridade Pública.
Cistac, Gilles. 1996. 'Poder Legislativo e Poder Regulamentar na Constituição Moçambicana de 30 de Novembro de 1990.' *Revista Da Faculdade de Direito Da UFRGS* 12: 148–60.
Clapp, Jennifer, and S. Ryan Isakson. 2018. 'Risky Returns: The Implications of Financialisation in the Food System.' *Development and Change* 49 (2): 437–60.
Clemence, Zachary, and Frances MacLellan. 2017. 'Cash Transfers Get an Upgrade: Can We Make Cash Go Further by Combining Cash Transfer Programs with Financial Inclusion?' *FinDev Gateway* (blog). 2017.
Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff. 2020. 'After Labor.' In *Seminar Schedule.* Johannesburg: Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research.
Conselhos de Produção. 1977. 'Resoluções do IV Plenário Dos C.P. Sobre Reestructuração Dos Sectores.' Cadernos dos Conselhos de Produção no 3.
Correia Pinto, Raul Wahnon. 1973. *Previdência e Acção Social Em Moçambique.* Lourenço Marques: Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique.
Cortês, Edson Robert de Oliveira. 2018. 'Velhos Amigos, Novos Adversários As Disputas, Alianças e Reconfigurações Empresariais na Elite Política Moçambicana.' Lisboa: Universidade de Lisboa.
Cramer, Christopher, Carlos Oya, and John Sender. 2015. 'Lifting the Blinkers: A New View of Power, Diversity and Poverty in Mozambican Rural Labour Markets.' In *Rural Wage Employment in Developing Countries: Theory, Evidence, and Policy*, edited by Carlos Oya and Nicola Pontara. Routledge.
CTD. 2011. 'Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento Do Distrito de Inhassoro – PEDDI (2011-2015).' Conselho Técnico Distrital, Governo do Distrito de Inhassoro, Província de Inhambane, República de Moçambique.
Cumbana, João. 2008. 'Sistema de Compensações Para Antigos Sócios Do Montepio Não Reúne Consenso.' *LUSA Agência de Notícias de Portugal*, 2008.
Cunha, Nuno, Ruth Castel-Branco, Ruben Vicente, Anthony Hodges, Luca Pellerano, Kerry Selvester, and Luize Guimarães. 2015. 'Avaliação Da Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica 2010-2014: Documento Síntese.' Maputo: ILO and OPM.
Danforth, Michael. 1982. *The Death Rituals of Rural Greece - Loring M. Danforth - Google Books*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Davis, Angela Y. 1983. *Women, Race & Class*. 1st Vintage Books ed edition. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
Dawson, H. J., and E. Fouksman. 2020. 'Labour, Laziness and Distribution: Work Imaginaries among the South African Unemployed.' *Africa* 90 (2): 229–51.
Dawson, Michael. 2016. 'Hidden in Plain Sight: A Note on the Legitimation Crises and the Racial Order.' *Critical Historical Studies* 3 (1): 143–61.
Deane, Kevin, and Sara Stevano. 2016. 'Towards a Political Economy of the Use of Research Assistants: Reflections from Fieldwork in Tanzania and Mozambique.' *Qualitative Research* 16 (2): 213–28.
Denning, Michael. 2010. 'Wageless Life.' New Left Review, 66. 2010.
Deutsche Welle. 2020. 'Joaquim Chissano defende emprego como prioridade em Moçambique | DW | 15.01.2020.' DW.COM. 2020.
Devereux, Stephen, and Samuel Kapingidza. 2020. "External Donors and Social Protection in Africa: A Case Study of Zimbabwe." In *From Colonialism to International Aid: External Actors and Social Protection in the Global South*, edited by Carina Schmitt, 273–302. Global Dynamics of Social Policy. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
DG. 1869a. *DG No 45, de 27 de Fevereiro de 1869*. Vol. 45.
———. 1869b. *DG No 269 de 19 de November de 1969. Ministério Dos Negócios Da Marinha e Ultramar. Direcção Geral Do Ultramar*.
———. 1875. *Ministério dos Negócios Da Marinha e Ultramar. Direcção Geral Do Ultramar. DG No 104 de 11 de Maio de 1875.*
———. 1878. 'Regulamento Para Os Contratos de Serviçaes e Colonos Nas Províncias Da Africa Portugueza.' Boletim da República.
———. 1894. 'Regimento Da Administração Da Justiça Nas Colónias.' Boletim da República.
———. 1899. 'Lei Do Trabalho Indígena.' Boletim da República.
———. 1956. 'Diploma Legislativo No 1595, de 28 de Abril de 1956.' Diário do Governo, Ministério do Ultramar - Gabinete do Ministro.
———. 1962. 'Decreto n.º 44309 Código Do Trabalho Rural.' Diário do Governo, Ministério do Ultramar - Gabinete do Ministro.
———. 1963. 'Fundo de Acção Social No Trabalho Rural Diploma Legislative No 2368 de 25 de Maio de 1963.' Diário do Governo, Ministério do Ultramar - Gabinete do Ministro.
Dickens, Charles. 1839. *Oliver Twist*. BookRix.
DoL. 2012. *Ministerial Determination: Expanded Public Works Programmes*.
Duffy, James. 1959. *Portuguese Africa*. Harvard University Press.
Du Toit, Andries. 2017. 'Post-Agrarian Biopolitics.' *Development and Change* 48 (6): 1464–77.
Du Toit, Andries, and David Neves. 2007. 'In Search of South Africa's Second Economy: Chronic Poverty, Economic Marginalisation and Adverse Incorporation in Mt. Frere and Khayelitsha.'. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
Engels, Frederick. 1845. *The Condition of the Working-Class in England In 1844*. Independently Published.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. John Wiley & Sons.
Ezzamel, Mahmoud. 2004. 'Work Organisation in the Middle Kingdom, Ancient Egypt.' *Organisation* 11 (4): 497–537.
Faite Izidine, Olivia. 2020. 'Dilemmas of Social Protection in Mozambique in the Digital Era.' Southern Centre for Inequality Studies.
Fanon, Frantz. 1963. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Grove/Atlantic, Inc.
Federici, Silvia. 2004. *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*. 1st edition. New York, NY: Autonomedia.

———. 2018. *Witches, Witch-Hunting, and Women*. Oakland, CA: PM Press.
Feijó, João. 2021. 'Caracterização e Organização Social Dos Machababos a Partir Dos Discursos de Mulheres Raptadas.' Observatório do Meio Rural | Observador Rural No 109.
Ferguson, James. 1994. *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development,' Depoliticisation, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. U of Minnesota Press.
———. 2015. *Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution*. Durham ; London: Duke University Press Books.
Ferguson, James, and Tania Murray Li. 2018. 'Beyond the 'Proper Job': Political-Economic Analysis after the Century of Labouring Man.' Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS): Working Paper.
Ferrez, Marc. 2016. Global Heritages. https://globalherit.hypotheses.org/museu-afrodigital-estacao-portugal/escravatura-e-trafico-de-seres-humanos-ontem-e-hoje.
Fin24.com. 2008. 'Welcome Back, Net1.' Fin24. 2008.
First, Ruth. 1983. *Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant*. Harvester Press.
Fischer, Andrew M. 2020. "The Dark Sides of Social Policy: From Neoliberalism to Resur gent Right-Wing Populism." *Development and Change* 51 (2): 371–97.
Fletcher, Bill, and Fernando Gapasin. 2008. *Solidarity Divided: The Crisis in Organise Labor and a New Path Toward Social Justice*. University of California Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1975. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
Fouksman, E., and E. Klein. 2019. 'Radical Transformation or Technological Intervention? Two Paths for Universal Basic Income.' *World Development* 122 (October): 492–500.
Francisco, António. 2013. 'Envelhecer Em Moçambique: Dinâmicas Do Bem-Estar e Da Pobreza.' Maputo, IESE.
Frelimo. 1977. 'Como Age o Inimigo.' Departamento de Trabalho Ideológico, República Popular de Moçambique.
FRELIMO. 1979. *Xiconhoca o Inimigo*. 1. Maputo: Departamento de Trabalho Ideológico, República Popular de Moçambique.
Freyre, Gilberto. 1952. *Um brasileiro em terras portuguesas: introdução a uma possível lusotropicologia, acompanhada de conferências e discursos proferidos em Portugal e em terras lusitanas e ex-lusitanas da Ásia, da África e do Atlântico*. É Realizações.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. 'The End of History?' *The National Interest*, no. 16: 3–18.
Galvão, Henrique. 1947. 'An Exposé by Representative Henrique Galvão to the Colonies Committee of the National Assembly, January 22.' Historical Parliamentary Archive.
Geertz, Clifford. 1988. *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Geffray, Christian. 1991. *A Causa Das Armas: Antropologia Da Guerra Contemporânea Em Moçambique.* Porto: Edições Afrontamento.
Gelb, Alan, and Anit Mukherjee. 2020. 'COVID-19: How Countries Can Use Digital Payments for Better, Quicker Cash Transfers.' Center For Global Development. 2020.
Gengenbach, Heidi. 2003. 'Boundaries of Beauty: Tattooed Secrets of Women's History in Magude District, Southern Mozambique.' *Journal of Women's History* 14 (4): 106–41.
Geonames. 2021. *Geonames, HERE, Microsoft; Powered by Bing.*
Ghosh, Jayati. 2011. 'Dealing with 'The Poor.'' *Development and Change* 42 (3): 849–58.
Gorz, Andre. 1999. *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society*. 1 edition. Polity.
Guebuza, Armando. 2015. 'Armando Guebuza: Promotor Do Desenvolvimento Social Em Moçambique: Colectânea de Comunicações Do Chefe de Estado (2005 a 2014).' INLD.
Guthrie, Zachary Kagan. 2018. *Bound for Work: Labor, Mobility, and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965*. University of Virginia Press.

Hanlon, Joseph. 2016. ‘Mozambique News Reports & Clippings.’ 329. Open University.
———. 2021. ‘Frelimo Gambled Everything on Gas – and Lost.’ New Frame. April 8, 2021.
Hanlon, Joseph, Armando Barrientos, and David Hulme. 2010. *Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.
Harries, Patrick. 1994. *Work, Culture, and Identity*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
Harris, Kevan, and Ben Scully. 2015. ‘A Hidden Counter-Movement? Precarity, Politics, and Social Protection before and beyond the Neoliberal Era.’ *Theory and Society* 44 (5): 415–44.
Harris, Marvin. 1958. ‘Portugal’s African Wards: A Firsthand Report on Labor and Education in Mozambique.’ American Committee on Africa.
Hart, Gillian. 2018. ‘Relational Comparison Revisited: Marxist Postcolonial Geographies in Practice.’ *Progress in Human Geography* 42 (3): 371–94.
Havik, Philip J. 2015. *Creole Societies in the Portuguese Colonial Empire*. Edited by Malyn Newitt. 1st edition. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Honwana, Alcinda. 2014. ‘Youth, Waithood, and Protest Movements in Africa.’ *African Dynamics in a Multipolar World: 5th European Conference on African Studies — Conference Proceedings*, 2428–47.
Humbane, Jossias Helder Jamisse. 2018. ‘Empregados do Quintal (Male Domestic Workers) in Nampula City: Domestic Work, Masculinities and Multilinearity.’
Hunter, Tera W. 1997. *To ’joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women’s Lives and Labors After the Civil War*. Harvard University Press.
Huws, Ursula. 2014. *Labour in the Global Digital Economy: The Cybertariat Comes of Age.* New York: Monthly Review Press.
ICLS. 2013. ‘Resolution Concerning Statistics of Work, Employment and Labour Underutilisation. Adopted by the Nineteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians.’ International Labour Organisation.
IEJ. 2021. “Social Protection Series Policy Brief #1: Introducing a Universal Basic Income Guarantee for South Africa.” Institute for Economic Justice.
ILO. 1957. ‘ILO C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105).’ International Labour Organisation.
———. 1962. ‘Report of the Commission Appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to Examine the Complaint Filed by the Government of Ghana Concerning the Observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No 105).’ International Labour Organisation.
———. 1966. ‘Special Report by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations Concerning Measures Taken by the Government of Portugal to Implement the Recommendations of the Commission Appointed under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution to Examine the Observance by Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No 105).’ International Labour Organisation.
———. 1979. ‘Planification de La Securite SocialeÇ Rapport Etabli Pour Le Gouvernament de La Republique Populaire Du Mozambique Par l’Organisation Internationale Du Travail.’ UNDP and ILO.
———. 2012a. ‘Gender Equality and Social Dialogue: An Annotated Bibliography.’ Geneva: International Labour Office.
———. 2012b. ‘Recommendation R202 - Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202).’ 2012.
———. 2017a. ‘Programas de Segurança Social Básica No Quadro Da Operacionalização da Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica’ (Chamado Em Diante, o ‘Documento Dos Programas’).’ International Labour Organisation.

———. 2017b. ‘World Social Protection Report 2017-2019: Universal Social Protection to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.’ Geneva: International Labour Organisation, ILO.
———. 2019a. ‘Best Practice Advocacy for Social Protection. Annual Social Protection Week in Mozambique.’ International Labour Organisation.
———. 2019b. ‘ILOSTAT.’ ILO STAT. 2019.
———. 2019c. ‘Melhores Prácticas: O Caso Do e-INAS Em Moçambique. Desenvolvimento Do Sistema de Gestão de Informação Para Protecção Social.’ ILO.
———. 2021. ‘World Employment and Social Outlook: The Role of Digital Labour Platforms in Transforming the World of Work.’ International Labour Office (ILO).
ILO, WFP, and UNICEF. 2016. ‘Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.’
INAS. 2015. ‘Manual Técnico de Trabalhos Públicos Com Uso de Mão de Obra Intensiva.’ INAS.
INE. 2015. ‘Relatório Final Do Inquérito Ao Orçamento Familiar- IOF 2014/15.’ Maputo: Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
———. 2016. ‘Inquérito Ao Orçamento Familiar-2014/15 Relatório Do Módulo Da Força de Trabalho.’ Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
———. 2017a. ‘Indicadores Em Flash: Distrito de Inhassoro.’ Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
———. 2017b. ‘Indicadores Em Flash: Distrito de Ribáuè.’ Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
———. 2019. ‘IV Recenseamento Geral Da População e Habitação 2017: Resultados Definitivos Moçambique.’ Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
———. 2020. ‘2o Boletim Estatístico Sobre Protecção Social.’ Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
INGC. 2009. ‘Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades: Estudo Sobre o Impacto Das Alterações Climáticas No Risco de Calamidades em Moçambique. Relatório Síntese: Segunda Versão.’ República de Moçambique.
INM. 1951. ‘‘Iapala: A Railway and Trucking Center. European Climate. Future Commercial and Agricultural Town. Land for Portuguese Families. The Settlement Already Prepared by the Government.’ Arquivo Nacional Da Torre Do Tombo.’ Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique.
Interview with Fulani, Fracisco. 1981. ‘Interview with Francisco Fulani at the Aldeia Comunal ‘A Luta Continua’, Mesanu Masiya by Alpheus Manghezi, Sipho Dlamini, Salomao Zandamela. CEA. 11.3.81.’
Interview with Salomão, Tomás. 2020. Interview by Olívia Massango of o País: Eu, quando se trata do Banco Mundial e FMI, jogo sempre com um pé atrás, desde a experiência do caju. http://opais.sapo.mz/eu-quando-se-trata-do-banco-mundial-e-fmi-jogo-sempre-com-um-pe-atras-desde-a-experiencia-do-caju-tomaz-salomao.
Inui, Keiichiro, Leandro Medina, Yuan Xiao, Esther Palacio, Christian Henn, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Felix Simione. 2016. ‘IMF Country Report: Republic of Mozambique-Selected Issues.’ Washington DC: IMF.
Isaacman, Allen, Michael Stephen, Yussuf Adam, Maria Joao Homen, Eugenio Macamo, and Augustinho Pililao. 1980. ‘‘Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty’: Peasant Resistance to Forced Cotton Production in Mozambique, 1938-1961.’ *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 13 (4): 581–615.
ITPASM. 1966. ‘O Fundo de Acção Social No Trabalho Em Moçambique 1964-1965.’ Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social em Moçambique.
———. 1967. ‘Modalidade Da Acção Social Exercida.’ Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social em Moçambique.

James, C. L. R. 1938. *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. Penguin UK.
James, Deborah. 2014. *Money from Nothing: Indebtedness and Aspiration in South Africa | Deborah James*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Johnston, Deborah. 2015. 'Disguised Unemployment? Labour Market Surveys, Migration and Rural Employment in Southern Africa.' In *Rural Wage Employment in Developing Countries*, edited by Pontara, Nicola and Oya, Carlos. Place of publication not identified: Routledge.
Jonna, R. Jamil, John Bellamy Foster, Labor, Political Economy Places: Americas, Global, and United States. 2016. 'Marx's Theory of Working-Class Precariousness.' *Monthly Review* (blog).
Kaplan, Roy, and Curt Tausky. 1974. 'The Meaning of Work among the Hard-Core Unemployed.'
Katzenellenbogen, Simon. 1982. *South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railways and Trade in the Making of a Relationship.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Kautsky, Karl. 1899. *The Agrarian Question*. Zwan Publications.
Kenny, Bridget. 2018. *Retail Worker Politics, Race and Consumption in South Africa: Shelved in the Service Economy*. Springer.
King Jr, Martin Luther. 1967. *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?* 1St Edition edition. Boston: Beacon Press.
Kiran, Asha. 2011. *NREGA: A Rural Revolution*. Jaipur: Sublime Publications.
Kitsinger, Jenny. 1994. 'The Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction between Research Participants.' *Sociology of Health & Illness* 16 (1): 103–21.
Klein, Naomi. 2020. "Screen New Deal: Under Cover of Mass Death, Andrew Cuomo Calls in the Billionaires to Build a High-Tech Dystopia."
Lachler, Ulrich, and David Ian Walker. 2018. 'Mozambique – Jobs Diagnostic.' 129408. The World Bank.
Lafargue, Paul. 1883. *The Right to Be Lazy: Essays by Paul Lafargue*. Anniversary edition. Oakland, CA; Chicago: AK Press.
Lavinas, Lena. 2013. '21st Century Welfare.' *New Left Review*, II, no. 84 (December): 5–40.
———. 2018. 'The Collateralisation of Social Policy under Financialise Capitalism.' *Development and Change* 49 (2): 502–17.
Legassick, Martin, and Harold Wolpe. 1976. 'The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa.' *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 7: 87–107.
Lenin, Vladimir I. 1899. *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. University Press of the Pacific.
Lerche, Jens. 2010. 'From 'Rural Labour' to 'Classes of Labour': Class Fragmentation, Caste and Class Struggle at the Bottom of the Indian Labour Hierarchy.' In *The Comparative Political Economy of Development Africa and South Asia*. London: Routledge.
Li, Tania Murray. 2007. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Duke University Press.
———. 2010. 'To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations.' *Antipode* 41 (January): 66–93.
Lima, Alfredo Pereira de. 1971. Lourenço Marques: Administração dos Transportes de Moçambique.
Mabunda, Lázaro. 2015. 'BIs Como Um Exemplo de Como Não Fazer Uma Parceria Público-Privada.' CIP.
Macamo, Solange L. 2011. *Privileged Places in South Central Mozambique: The Archaeology of Manyikeni, Niamara, Songo and Degue-Mufa*. VDM Verlag Dr. Müller.

Machava, Benedito Luís. 2011. 'State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in Post-Independence Mozambique (1975–1983).' *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37 (3): 593–609.
Machel, Samora. 1985. *Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary*. Edited by Barry Munslow. London : Totowa, N.J., USA: Zed Books Ltd.
Mackintosh, Maureen. 1977. 'Reproduction and Patriarchy: A Critique of Claude Meillassoux, 'Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux'[1]:' *Capital & Class*.
Mackintosh, Maureen, and Marc Wuyts. 1988. 'Accumulation, Social Services and Socialist Transition in the Third World: Reflections on Decentralised Planning Based on the Mozambican Experience.' *The Journal of Development Studies* 24 (4): 136–79.
Mader, Philip. 2018. 'Contesting Financial Inclusion.' *Development and Change* 49 (2): 461–83.
MAE. 2014a. 'Perfil Do Distrito de Inhassoro, Província de Inhambane.' Direcção Nacional de Administração Local, Ministério de Administração Estatal, República de Moçambique.
———. 2014b. 'Perfil Do Distrito de Ribáuè, Província de Nampula.' Direcção Nacional de Administração Local, Ministério de Administração Estatal, República de Moçambique.
Mafeje, Archie. 1981. 'On the Articulation of Modes of Production: Review Article.' *Journal of Southern African Studies* 8 (1): 123–38.
Mambo, Félix, Yonesse Paris, Vicenzo Salvucci, and Ricardo Santos. 2018. 'Simulating the Effect on Households' Real Consumption and Poverty of the Increase in Prices That Followed the 2015–16 Economic Crisis in Mozambique.' WIDER Working Paper 2018/61.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton University Press.
Mandamule, Uacitissa. 2019. 'Ferreira Wa Guira: Uma Análise Da História Do Protesto Laboral Nas Plantações de Cana-de-Açúcar a Partir Das Canções de Trabalho.' In *Tensões e Conflictos Sociais No Campo.* Maputo: Escolar Editora.
Mapukata, Sandiswa. 2021a. 'Map of Inhambane, Mozambique. With Rivers Only.'
———. 2021b. 'Map of the Province of Nampula, Mozambique. With Rivers Only.'
Marais, Hein. 2020. 'The Crisis of Waged Work and the Option of a Universal Basic Income Grant for South Africa.' *Globalisations* 17 (2): 352–79.
Marshall, Judith. 2016. 'Mozambican Workers and Communities in Resistance.' *ROAPE* (blog). 2016.
Marx, Karl. 1844. *Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
———. 1847. *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Cosimo, Inc.
———. 1867. *Capital Vol 1*. New York: International Publishers.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1848. *The Communist Manifesto*. New edition edition. New York: International Publishers Co.
Masondo, Themba. 2018. 'Protecting and Promoting Livelihoods of the Excluded through the Community Work Programme: A Comparative Case Study of Munsieville and Bekkersdal.' Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.
Mateus, Virgílio. 2014. 'Discurso de Abertura Pelo o Vice-Ministro Da Mulher e Acção Social.' Presented at the Conferência Nacional de Protecção Social, Ministério do Género, Criança e Acção Social; Maputo.
Matthews, Thandiwe. 2020. 'Traversing the Cracks: Social Protection toward the Achievement of Social Justice, Equality and Dignity in South Africa.' Future of Work(ers) SCIS Working Paper Number 5.

Maurizio, R. 2016. ‘The Consequences of Minimum Wages on Inequality. Evidence for Latin America.’ National Minimum Wage Symposium and Policy Round Table. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.
McCord, Anna. 2012. *Public Works and Social Protection in Southern Africa: Do Public Works Work for the Poor?* Tokyo ; New York: United Nations University Press.
McCord, Anna, Rodolfo Beazley, Ana Solorzano, and Luis Artur. 2016. ‘ICF Social Protection and Climate Change in Mozambique with a Focus on the Role of the PASP: Feasibility and Design Consultancy Final Report .’ Oxford Policy Management.
McMichael, Philip. 2010. ‘Agrofuels in the Food Regime.’ *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 37 (4): 609–29.
Meagher, Kate. 2020. ‘Illusions of Inclusion: Assessment of the World Development Report 2019 on the Changing Nature of Work.’ *Development and Change* 51 (2): 667–82.
MEF. 2016. ‘Pobreza e Bem-Estar Em Moçambique: Quarta Avaliação Nacional. Inquérito Ao Orçamento Familiar 2014/15.’ Ministério de Economia e Finanças: Direcção de Estudos Económicos e Financeiros.
Meillassoux, Claude. 1981. *Maidens, Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Community*. Cambridge Eng. ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Meneses, Maria Paula G. 2010. ‘O ‘Indígena’ Africano e o Colono ‘Europeu’: a Construção da Diferença a por Processos Legais.’ E-cadernos CES, 68-93.
Menon, Sudha Venu. 2008. ‘Right To Information Act and NREGA: Reflections on Rajasthan.’ MPRA Paper 7351. University Library of Munich, Germany.
Millar, Robert. 1985. *Policing the Miners’ Strike*. Lawrence & Wishart.
MISAU. 2013. ‘Moçambique: Inquérito Demográfico e de Saúde 2011.’ Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
MITADER. 2018. ‘Mozambique’s Forest Reference Emission Level for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Natural Forests.’ Ministério da Terra, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Rural, Republica de Mocambique.
Mittelman, James H. 1981. *Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism: Mozambique and Tanzania*. Elsevier.
Mkandawire, Thandika. 2011. ‘Welfare Regimes and Economic Development: Bridging the Conceptual Gap.’ In *Overcoming the Persistence of Inequality and Poverty*, edited by Valpy FitzGerald, Judith Heyer, and Rosemary Thorp, 149–71. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Molony, Thomas, and Daniel Hammett. 2007. ‘The Friendly Financier: Talking Money with the Silenced Assistant.’ *Human Organisation* 66 (3): 292–300.
Molyneux, Maxine. 1979. ‘Beyond the Domestic Labour Debate - ProQuest.’ *New Left Review*, no. 116.
———. 2008. ‘The ‘Neoliberal Turn’ and the New Social Policy in Latin America: How Neoliberal, How New?’ *Development and Change* 39 (5): 775–97.
Molyneux, Sassy, Jane Goudge, Steve Russell, Jane Chuma, Tebogo Gumede, and Lucy Gilson. 2009. ‘Conducting Health-Related Social Science Research in Low Income Settings: Ethical Dilemmas Faced in Kenya and South Africa.’ *Journal of International Development* 21 (March): 309–26.
Monjane, Boaventura, and Natacha Bruna. 2018. ‘Between Populist Rhetoric of Market-Oriented Agricultural Development and Rural Resistance in Mozambique.’ In . International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, Netherlands: Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative.
———. 2020. ‘Confronting Agrarian Authoritarianism: Dynamics of Resistance to PROSAVANA in Mozambique.’ *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 47 (1): 69–94.
More, Saint Thomas. 1516. *Utopia*. Dent.

Mosca, João. 2017. ‘Necessidade Sem a Qual Não Se Sairá Da Crise.’ Observatório do Meio Rural | Destaque Rural No 28.
Moser, C. A., and G. Kalton. 1985. *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*. 1 edition. Routledge.
Mosoetsa, Sarah. 2011. *Eating from One Pot: The Dynamics of Survival in Poor South African Households*. Wits University Press.
Moyo, Sam, and Paris Yeros. 2013. *Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. Zed Books Ltd.
Munshi, Naadira. 2020. ‘Permanent Employment for South Africa EPWP Workers Now!’
Mussagy, Ibraimo, and João Mosca. 2020. ‘Microsimulações dos Impactos da Covid-19 na Pobreza e Desigualdade em Moçambique.’
Navohola, Ernesto Augusto. 2010. ‘Forced Labour and Rural Resistance in the Tobacco Farms in Nampula Province: A History of Rural Change in Mozambique, 1961-1975.’ Dissertation, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.
Newitt, M. D. D. 1995. *A History of Mozambique*. Indiana University Press.
Nhachote, Luís. 1989. ‘Cartão de Abastecimento Da República Popular de Moçambique.’
Nilsen, Alf Gunvald. 2020. ‘Give James Ferguson a Fish.’ *Development and Change* n/a
Nyoka, Nation. 2020. ‘EPWP: Temporary Work, Permanent Casuals.’ New Frame.
Nyusi, Filipe Jacinto. 2020. ‘A Nossa Agenda é Desenvolver Moçambique.’ Presidência da República, República de Moçambique.
O’Laughlin, Bridget. 1996. ‘From Basic Needs to Safety-Nets: The Rise and Fall of Urban Food-Rationing in Mozambique.’ *The European Journal of Development Research* 8 (1): 200–223.
———. 2002. ‘Contingent Identity and Socialist Democracy in the Port of Maputo.’ Institute of Social Studies, Working Paper Series No. 372.
———. 2009. ‘Rural Social Security and the Limits of Associativismo in Mozambique.’ In . Maputo: IESE.
———. 2016. ‘Produtividade Agrícola, Planeamento e Cultura de Trabalho Em Moçambique.’ In *Desafios 2016*. Maputo: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos.
———. 2017a. ‘Rural Wage Employment in Developing Countries: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Edited by Carlos Oya | Nicola Pontara London: Routledge.
O’Laughlin, Bridget. 2017b. ‘Consuming Bodies: Health and Work in the Cane Fields in Xinavane, Mozambique.’ *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43 (3): 625–41.
Olin Wright, Erik. 2010. *Envisioning Real Utopias*. London: Verso.
Ouma, Marion, and Jimi Adésínà. 2019. “Solutions, Exclusion and Influence: Exploring Power Relations in the Adoption of Social Protection Policies in Kenya.” *Critical Social Policy* 39 (3): 376–95.
OTM. 2016. Interview in with the OTM Inhambane Provision Secretary by Ruth Castel-Branco.
OTM Nampula Provincial Secretary. 2016. Interview in Nampula Semi-structured. I2016.NN4.
Owen, Robert. 1817. *A New View of Society*. Free Press.
Oya, Carlos, and Nicola Pontara. 2015. *Rural Wage Employment in Developing Countries: Theory, Evidence, and Policy*. Routledge.
Paine, Thomas. 1797. ‘Agrarian Justice.’
Parijs, Philippe van. 2006. ‘Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First Century.’ In *Redesigning Distribution: Basic Income and Stakeholder Grants as Cornerstonnes for an Egalitarian Capitalism*, edited by Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott. London ; New York: Verso.
PASP Coordinator. 2017. Interview in Maputo.

Pateguana, Carmélia. 2016. 'The Bank of Mozambique: Historical Review from 1975-2000.' Pretoria: University of South Africa.
Patnaik, Utsa, and Sam Moyo. 2011. *The Agrarian Question in the Neoliberal Era: Primitive Accumulation and the Peasantry*. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.
Peck, Jamie. 2001. *Workfare States*. New York: Guilford Press.
Penvenne, Jeanne. 1994. *African Workers & Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies & Struggles in Lourenco Marques, 1877-1962*. Portsmouth, NH : Johannesburg : London: Heinemann.
———. 2015. *Women, Migration & the Cashew Economy in Southern Mozambique 1945-1975*. Boydell & Brewer.
Pereira Leite, Joana. 1993. 'Colonialismo e Industrialização Em Moçambique: Pacto Colonial, Dinamização Das Exportações e 'Import-Substitution'. 1930-1974.' *Ler Historia* 24: 53–74.
Perez-Niño, Helena. 2015. 'The Rise of Tobacco Agriculture in Mozambique: Questions and Challenges for a sector in Transformation.' In *Questions on Productive Development in Mozambique*. Maputo: IESE.
Philip, Kate. 2018. *Markets on the Margins: Mineworkers, Job Creation and Enterprise Development*. Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey.
Pimpão, Alvaro Julio, and Ruben Villanueva. 2012. 'Avaliação de Processos: Projecto-Piloto de Trabalhos Intensivos Em Mão-de-Obra.' Maputo: Instituto Nacional de Acção Social, Banco Mundial e Programa Mundial para a Alimentação.
Pitcher, M. Anne. 2002. 'Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatisation, 1975–2000.' Cambridge Core. November 2002.
———. 2003. 'Sobreviver à Transição: O Legado Das Antigas Empresas Coloniais Em Moçambique.' *Análise Social* 38 (168): 793–820.
———. 2007. 'What Has Happened to Organise Labor in Southern Africa?' *International Labor and Working-Class History*, no. 72: 134–60.
Piven, Frances Fox, and RA Cloward. 1971. *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Social Welfare*. New York: Vintage.
PMSC-PS. 2017. Interview with a representative of the Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection, by Ruth Castel-Branco, in Nampula.
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Beacon Press.
Quembo, Carlos. 2017. 'Poder Do Poder: Operação Produção e a Invenção Dos' Improdutivos': Urbanos No Moçambique Socialista, 1983-1988.' Aliance Française.
Quinlan, Michael. 2012. 'The 'Pre-Invention' of Precarious Employment: The Changing World of Work in Context.' *The Economic and Labour Relations Review* 23 (4): 3–24.
Quive, Samuel. 2004. *Protecção Social em Moçambique*. Maputo: FES.
———. 2007. 'Protecção Social Em Moçambique: Uma Rede Furada de Protecção Social.' DIEMA.
RdM. 1990. 'Constituição Da República de Moçambique.' República de Moçambique.
———. 1997. 'Lei de Terra No 19/1997.' República de Moçambique.
———. 2007. *Lei Da Protecção Social*. Vol. República de Moçambique.
———. 2009. 'Decreto 85/2009: Regulamento Do Subsistema de Protecção Social Básica de Moçambique.' Boletim da República, República de Moçambique.
———. 2010. *Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica 2010-2014*.
———. 2012. *Programa de Acção Social Produtiva (PASP): Documento Base*.
———. 2015a. 'Decreto 14/2015 de 16 de Julho, Concernente a Taxa de Contribuição Dos Trabalhadores Por Conta Própria.' Boletim da República, República Popular de Moçambique.

———. 2015b. ‘Diploma Ministerial Nº 105/2015, de 27 de Novembro - Determina Os Requisitos de Inscrição Dos TCP.’ República de Moçambique.
———. 2016. ‘Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica 2016-2024: Aprovada Na 5a Sessão Ordinária Do Conselho de Ministros.’
———. 2017. ‘Lei No 10/2017 de 1 de Agosto: Estatuto Geral dos Funcionários e Agentes Do Estado.’ Boletim da República, República de Moçambique.
———. 2018. ‘Decreto No. 47/2018 Sobre a Revisão Dos Programas de Segurança Social Básica, Criados Pelo Decreto No 52/2011, de 12 de Outubro, Nos Termos Do Artigo 56 Da Lei No 4/2007, de 7 de Fevereiro.’ Boletim da República, República de Moçambique.
———. 2020a. ‘Plano de Resposta Do Sector Do Género, Criança e Acção Social à Covid-19.’ República de Moçambique.
———. 2020b. ‘Plano Económico e Social Para 2020.’ República de Moçambique.
Rita-Ferreira, António. 1967. *Os Africanos de Lourenço Marques*. I.I.C.M.
Rodney, Walter. 1972. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Verso Books.
———. 2018. *The Russian Revolution: A View from the Third World*. Verso Books.
Rodrigues, Cristina Odete Udelsmann, and Yves A Fauré. 2006. *O trabalho dignifica o homem: estratégias de sobrevivência em Luanda*. Lisboa: Edições Colibri.
Rose, Nancy. 1995. *Workfare or Fair Work: Women, Welfare, and Government Work Programs*. New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press.
Ross, Doris. 2014. ‘Mozambique Rising : Building a New Tomorrow.’ Washington DC: IMF.
RPED. 1999. ‘Structure and Performance of Manufacturing in Mozambique.’ World Bank.
RPM. 1975. ‘Constituição Da República Popular de Moçambique.’ Instituto Nacional do Livro e Disco.
Saad-Filho, Alfredo. 2015. ‘Social Policy for Neoliberalism: The Bolsa Família Programme in Brazil.’ *Development and Change* 46 (6): 1227–52.
Said, Edward W. 2014. *Orientalism*. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
Sasol. 2018. ‘Sasol’s Response to the Mozambique Centre of Public Integrity.’
Satgar, Vishwas. 2007. ‘Neoliberal Restructuring and Primitive Accumulation Labour and the Global Struggle for Cooperative Alternatives.’ *Global Labour University*.
Satumba, Takunda, Amiena Bayat, and Seeraj Mohamed. 2017. “The Impact of Social Grants on Poverty Reduction in South Africa.” *Journal of Economics* 8 (1): 33–49.
Scott, James C. 1999. *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Scully, Ben. 2016. ‘Precarity North and South: A Southern Critique of Guy Standing.’ *Global Labour Journal* 7 (2).
Scully, Benjamin. 2013. ‘Development in the Age of Wagelessness: Labor, Livelihoods and the Decline of Work in South Africa.’ Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University.
Scully, Benjamin, and Edward Webster. 2019. ‘The Countryside and Capitalism: Rethinking the Cheap Labour Thesis in Post-Apartheid South Africa.’ In *Race, Class, and the Post-Apartheid Democratic State*. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
Seekings, Jeremy. 2005. ‘Prospects for Basic Income in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Welfare Regimes in the South.’ Centre for Social Science Research, UCT.
———. 2008. ‘Welfare Regimes and Redistribution in the South.’ In *Divide and Deal The Politics of Distribution in Democracies*. New York and London: New York University Press.
———. 2020. ‘International Actors and Social Protection in Africa, 2000-2020.’ Working Paper, Version 2.2.

Selvester, Kerry, Lourdes Fidalgo, and Nelia Taimo. 2012. 'Transforming Cash Transfers: Beneficiary and Community Perspectives on the Basic Social Subsidy Programme in Mozambique.' ODI.
Sen, Amartya. 1987. 'Gender and Cooperative Conflicts.' UNU Wider.
Seymour, Richard. 2012. 'We Are All Precarious-On the Concept of the 'Precariat'and Its Misuses.' *New Left Project* 10.
Shivji, Issa. 2008. *Accumulation in an African Periphery: A Theoretical Framework*. African Books Collective.
Simone, Nina. 1966. *Work Song*. Nina Simone with Strings. New York, N.Y.: Colpix Records.
Soederberg, Susanne. 2014. *Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry: Money, Discipline and the Surplus Population*. 1 edition. London ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Soss, Joe, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram. 2011. *Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race*. University of Chicago Press.
Sretzer, Simon. 2007. 'The Right of Registration: Development, Identity Registration and Social Security.' History & Policy.
Srnicek, Nick, and Alex Williams. 2015. *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*. Verso Books.
Standing, Guy. 1997. 'The Folly of Social Safety Nets: Why Basic Income Is Needed in Eastern Europe.' *Social Research* 64 (4): 1339–79.
———. 1999. *Global Labour Flexibility: Seeking Distributive Justice*. Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2016. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
———. 2017. *Basic Income: And How We Can Make It Happen*. Penguin UK.
Standing, Guy, and Michael Samson. 2003. *A Basic Income Grant for South Africa*. Juta and Company Ltd.
Storm, Servaas. 2018. 'Financialisation and Economic Development: A Debate on the Social Efficiency of Modern Finance.' *Development and Change* 49 (2): 302–29.
Strijdom, TJ. 2016. 'Renamo Gunmen Attack Train in Central Mozambique: State News Agency - Reuters,' 2016.
Suplicy, Eduardo Matarazzo. 2007. 'Basic Income and Employment in Brazil.' *Basic Income Studies* 2 (1).
Taussig, M. 1978. 'Peasant Economics and the Development of Capitalist Agriculture in the Cauca Valley, Colombia.' *Latin American Perspectives* 5 (3): 62–91.
Thompson, E. P. 1963. *The Making of the English Working Class*. Penguin Adult.
Torkelson, Erin. 2017. 'The World Bank's Role in SA's Social Grants Payment System.' 2017. http://www.groundup.org.za/article/world-banks-role-sas-social-grants-payment-system/.
———. 2020. 'Collateral Damages: Cash Transfer and Debt Transfer in South Africa.' *World Development* 126 (February): 104711.
Tsikata, Dzodzi. 2016. 'Gender, Land Tenure and Agrarian Production Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa.' *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy* 5 (1): 1–19.
Turner, Mary, ed. 1995. *From Chattel Slaves to Wage Slaves: The Dynamics of Labour Bargaining in the Americas*. Y First printing edition. Kingston : Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ulriksen, Marianne. 2014. 'Why Public Work Isn't Social Protection, but Just a Scapegoat– SASPEN Insights.' 2014. http://saspen.org/blog/?p=90.
UN. 2015. 'Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.' New York: United Nations.
UNAC. 2019. 'Membros||Nossos Membros.' 2019. https://www.unac.org.mz/index.php/unac/nossos-membros.
UNICEF, and ILO. 2020. 'Social Action Budget Brief: Mozambique 2020.' Fact sheet. 2020.

US Census. 1793. ‘1790 Census: Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States.’ Philadelphia.
US Congress. 1776. ‘United States Declaration of Independence.’

Van Niekerk, Robert van. 2013. ‘Social Policy, Social Citizenship and the Historical Idea of a Social Democratic Welfare State in South Africa.’ *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 81 (1): 115–43.
Vally, Natasha. 2016. ‘Insecurity in South African Social Security: An Examination of Social Grant Deductions, Cancellations, and Waiting: Journal of Southern African Studies: Vol 42, No 5.’ *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42 (5).
Veen, Robert J. van der, and Philippe van Parijs. 1986. ‘A Capitalist Road to Communism.’ *Theory and Society* 15 (5): 635–55.
Velez, Veronica. 2020. ‘Not a Fairy Tale: Unicorns and Social Protection of Gig Workers in Colombia.’ SCIS Working Paper Number 7, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, Wits University.
Vives, Juan Luis. 1526. ‘On Assistance to the Poor.’
Vogel, Lise. 1983. *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory*. Reprint edition. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
Wacquant, Loïc. 2010. “Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity1.” *Sociological Forum* 25 (2): 197–220.
Wage Indicator. 2020. ‘Salário mínimo - Moçambique.’ Meusalario.org/Mocambique. 2020. https://meusalario.org/mocambique/salario/salario-minimo.
Walker, Robert. 1985. *Applied Qualitative Research*. Gower.
Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Bedminster Press.
———. 2013. *Economy and Society*. Univ of California Press.
Webster, Edward, Carmen Ludwig, Fikile Masikane, and Dave Spooner. 2021. ‘Beyond Traditional Trade Unionism: Innovative Worker Responses in Three African Cities.’ *Globalisations*.
Weeks, Kathi. 2011. *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries*. Duke University Press.
Wield, David. 1977. ‘Some Characteristics of the Mozambican Economy, Particularly Relating to Industrialisation.’ Working Paper, Centro de Estudos Africanos. Maputo: UEM.
Williams, Eric Eustace. 1944. *Capitalism & Slavery*. University of North Carolina Press.
Wiltshire, Anne Hilda. 2016. ‘The Meanings of Work in a Public Work Scheme in South Africa.’ *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy; Bingley* 36 (1/2): 2–17.
Wise, Timothy A. 2004. ‘The Paradox of Agricultural Subsidies: Measurement Issues, Agricultural Dumping, and Policy Reform.’ AgEcon Search. 2004.
Wolpe, Harold. 1972. ‘Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid.’ *Economy and Society* 1 (4): 425–56.
World Bank. 1989. ‘Mozambique Food Security Study.’ Agriculture Division, Southern Africa Department, World Bank Group.
———. 2013. ‘Project Appraisal Document on a Propose Credit in the Amount of SDR 32.5 Million (US$50 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Mozambique for a Social Protection Project.’ World Bank Group.
———. 2019a. ‘Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate) | Data.’ 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS.
———. 2019b. ‘MZ-Social Protection Project (P129524): Implementation Status & Results Report.’ World Bank Group.

———. 2019c. ‘World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work’. World Bank. 2019.
———. 2020. ‘Scaling up Social Assistance Payments as Part of the Covid-19 Pandemic Response.’ World Bank Group.
Wuyts, Marc. 2001. ‘Informal Economy, Wage Goods and Accumulation under Structural Adjustment Theoretical Reflections Based on the Tanzanian Experience.’ *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25 (3): 417–38.
Zamparoni, Valdemir. 2008. ‘Vozes Asiáticas e o Racismo Colonial Em Moçambique.’ *Lusotopie* 15 (1): 59–76.
Zamparoni, Valdemir D. 2017. ‘Gênero e trabalho doméstico numa sociedade colonial: Lourenço Marques, Moçambique, c. 1900-1940.’ *Afro-Ásia* 0 (23).
Zelleke, Almaz. 2008. ‘Institutionalising the Universal Caretaker Through a Basic Income?’ *Basic Income Studies* 3 (3).

Wacquant, Loïc. 2010. “Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity1.” *Sociological Forum* 25 (2): 197–220.

Interviews:

Interview with Temane Chief. 2016. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2016.1
Interview with Abel. 2016. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2016.1
Interview with Angela. 2016. Maimelane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IM2016.1
Interview with Calado. 2016. Iapala, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NI2016.1
Interview with Chief of Post. 2017. Iapala, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NI2016.2
Interview with Claudio. 2016. Temane, Inhassoro. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2016.1
Interview with Cremildo. 2017. Iapala, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NI2017.1
Interview with Rafael. 2016. Maputo, Maputo. By Ruth Castel-Branco. MM2016.1
Interview with Dimandane. 2016. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2016.2
Interview with Fatima. 2017. Inhassoro, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2017.1
Interview with Fátima. 2017. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2017.1
Interview with Flávia. 2017. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2017.3
Interview with Former INAS Director. 2016. Maputo. By Ruth Castel-Branco. MM2016.2
Interview with Former national PASP director. 2016. Maputo. By Ruth Castel-Branco. MM2016.3
Interview with Former WFP Employee. 2016. Maputo. By Ruth Castel-Branco. MM2016.4
Interview with Gersio. 2017. Inhassoro, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2017.3
Interview with INAS National Director for PASD-E. 2020. By Ruth Castel-Branco. MM2020.1
Interview with INAS point person. 2016. Inhassoro, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2016.4
Interview with Inhassoro neighbourhood secretary. 2017. Inhassoro, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2017.5
Interview with Iolanda. 2017. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2017.3
Interview with Isabel. 2017. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2017.4
Interview with Ivone. 2017. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2017.3
Interview with Jimmy. 2017. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2017.5
Interview with Joana. 2016. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2016.6
Interview with João. 2016. Minuco, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NM2016.1
Interview with Jose. 2016. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2016.7
Interview with Julieta. 2017. Iapala, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NI2017.4
Interview with Laurencio. 2016. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2016.4

Interview with Laurinda. 2016. Lupi, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NM5.2016.
Interview with Luisa. 2017. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. I2017.NR1.
Interview with Manuel. 2016. Inhassoro, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2016.6.
Interview with Maria. 2016. Iapala, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NI2016.5
Interview with Orlando. 2017. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2017.4.
Interview with Osvaldo. 2017. Minuco, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NM2017.4
Interview with Regina. 2016. Minuco, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NM2016.6
Interview with Riani Chief of Post. 2017. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2017.6
Interview with Roda. 2017. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2017.8
Interview with Romão. 2017. Vilankulo, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IV2017.1
Interview with Rosalina. 2017. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2017.7
Interview with Selvester. 2016. Maputo. By Ruth Castel-Branco. MM2016.7
Interview with Temane Neighbourhood secretary. 2016. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2016.9
Interview with Teresa. 2016. Inhassoro, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2016.8
Interview with Vanda. 2016. Riani, Nampula. By Ruth Castel-Branco. NR2016.8
Interview with Zacarias. 2016. Inhassoro, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. II2016.9
Interview with Zaida. 2017. Temane, Inhambane. By Ruth Castel-Branco. IT2017.9
Interview with INSS representative. 2020. Maputo. By Ruth Castel-Branco. MM2020.6

Appendices

Appendix 1: Research authorisation and credential

Research Office

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)
R14/49 Castel-Branco

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE	**PROTOCOL NUMBER: H16/06/07**
PROJECT TITLE	Social welfare, public works and rural livelihoods in Mozambique
INVESTIGATOR(S)	Ms R Castel-Branco
SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT	Sociology/
DATE CONSIDERED	24 June 2016
DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE	Approved unconditionally
EXPIRY DATE	04 August 2019

DATE 05 August 2016 **CHAIRPERSON** _____ (Professor J Knight)

cc: Supervisor : Dr B Scully

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

To be completed in duplicate and **ONE COPY** returned to the Secretary at Room 10005, 10th Floor, Senate House, University.

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee. **I agree to completion of a yearly progress report.**

_____ _____/_____/_____
Signature **Date**

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES

REPÚBLICA DE MOÇAMBIQUE

MINISTÉRIO DO GÉNERO, CRIANÇA E ACÇÃO SOCIAL

CREDENCIAL

O Ministério do Género, Criança e Acção Social acolhe com satisfação a realização de um estudo pela Sra. Ruth Castel-Branco, cidadã moçambicana cursando do seu Doutoramento no Departamento de Sociologia da Universidade de Witwatersrand da República da África do Sul, visando conhecer as limitações e oportunidades do Programa da Acção Social Produtiva (PASP) como resposta as necessidades básicas dos agregados familiares com capacidade laboral no meio rural.

Acreditamos que o estudo contribuirá com informações que permitirão fortalecer as estratégias e intervenções do PASP visando melhorar as condições de vida das populações mais vulneráveis beneficiarias deste Programa.

Deste modo, a Sra. Ruth Castel-Branco está credenciada a colher informações nas Províncias de Maputo, Inhambane, Nampula e Cidade de Maputo, podendo realizar entrevistas as entidades pertinentes visando alcançar o objectivo do presente estudo.

Agradecemos antecipadamente toda a colaboração dos parceiros do sector do Género, Criança e Acção Social na partilha de informação necessária e de todo o apoio que vier a ser prestado durante a realização deste estudo.

Melhores cumprimentos,

Maputo, 23 de Setembro de 2016

O Secretário Permanente

/Danilo Momade Bayl

Appendix 2: Research instruments

Participant information sheet and consent form

What is the purpose of this study?
This study analyses the possibilities and limitations of public works programs as an instrument of social protection for non-labour constrained households in rural areas. The study is particularly interested in the experiences and perceptions of the direct and indirect beneficiaries of PASP, as well local leaders.

Who is conducting this study?
The study is being conducted by Ruth Castel-Branco, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand; under the supervision of Dr Ben Scully. If you would like more information, you can contact:

Ruth Castel-Branco	Dr Ben Scully
University of the Witwatersrand	University of the Witwatersrand
ruthcastelbranco@gmail.com	ben.scully@wits.ac.za
+258 82 146 2198 (Power)	+27 71 446 6534

How will the study be conducted?
The study will be conducted through semi-structured interviews of approximately and group conversations. Interviews will last approximately one hour; and group conversations three. Depending on respondents' preferences, interviews will be conducted in Portuguese, Xitswa and Makuwa. Notes and recordings will not be shared and will be for the exclusive use of the investigator.

What are the benefits of participation?
There are no direct benefits. By participating in the study respondents can help to contribute to debates regarding the design and implementation of social protection programs for able-bodied adults

What are the risks of participation?
There are no anticipated risks. Interviews will be undertaken in a safe space and all information shared will be confidential. Interviews notes and recordings will be stored in a password protected database. Information published will not use respondent's real names.

Is participation mandatory?
No. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to answer any question at any moment, or stop the interview, without any negative consequences.

AUTHORISATION FORM

I, _____ confirm that Ruth Castel-Branco has explained the purpose of the research and that I understand its objectives. I understand that participation is entirely voluntary and that I can refuse to answer any question at any time without negative consequences. I understand that the interview will be confidential and that parts may be included in publications. I would prefer to be identified by: ✓ Name, affiliation and research site

- ✓ Affiliation and research site
- ✓ Research site

Name:_____. Date:_____

Signature: _____. Place: _____

Template for Field Notes

Place: _____Date: ____/____/____ Time: ___: ___

Place description: (weather, the layout of the site, relation to other sites, reflexivity)

Layout/map:


Observations (timed):

Emerging themes:

Personal impressions

Reflections for further research:

Template for the Agricultural Cycle



Template for price tables

Name in Xitswa or Makuwa	Name in Portuguese	Price	Quantity	Provenance

Semi-structured interview guide for PASP participants, 2016

Introduce the research

Request authorisation

Conduct short household survey

The application process:

1 How long have you been working on the PASP?
2 Who informed you? Where?
3 Why did you decide to apply?
4 What did you think you were applying for?
5 Were you informed on the terms of work?
6 How did you apply (when, where)?
7 What documents did you have to submit?
8 How did you find out that you were selected?
9 Why do you think you were selected?
10 What was the response of your family members? What about your neighbours?

Working conditions

11 When does the program start and end when?
12 What kind of work do you do? Who decided on the work?
13 How much do you earn? When do you get paid?
14 What are your working hours? Who decides? What do you think of it?
15 Did you get any work instruments?
16 Did you get any training?
17 Do you have any children? Who takes care of your children?
18 What happens when you can't participate?
19 Have you ever had any complaints? Who do you communicate with? What's the response?
20 How could PASP be improved?

What has been the impact of PASP on you and your household?

21 For you, as a person?
22 For your household?
23 For the community?
24 What do you do with the amount you receive?
25 Have you learnt any new skills?
26 Has participation in the PASP allowed you to engage in other income generating activities?
27 Do you think PASP is a useful program? Why or why not?
28 How do you think the PASP could be improved?
29 What if you received a cash transfer, simply for cultivating your *machamba*, because you're Mozambican? (like when you go to the hospital or school; like the elderly on the PSSB).
30 What are your hopes for the future? And those of your children and grandchildren?

Is there anything else you would think is important for me to know?
Are there any questions you would like to ask me?

Semi-structured interview guide for non-PASP participants, 2016

Request authorisation

Conduct short household survey

Semi-structured interviews
1 Are you familiar with the PASP?
2 What is the PASP?
3 Did you apply for the PASP? Why or why not?
[if yes, transition to questions regarding the application process for PASP participants]
4 If you applied, were you selected? Why or why not?
5 If you were selected, did you accept? Why or why not?
[if yes, transition to questions regarding working conditions and the impact on the household for PASP participants]
6 If you accepted, why did you abandon the PASP?
7 If you had the chance again, would you apply for the PASP?
8 Do you think PASP is a useful program for the community? Why or why not?
9 How do you think the PASP could be improved?
10 What if PASP workers received a cash transfer, for cultivating their *machambas* ?
11 Is there anything else you think is important for me to know?
12 Is there anything you would like to ask me?

Semi-structured interview guide for PASP participants, 2017

Introduction: Present study objectives, ask for permission, and identify the respondent

Experience of the PASP
1 How long have you been working on the PASP?
2 What expectations did you have of the PASP?
3 Did the PASP meet your expectations?
4 How has the PASP impacted your other livelihood strategies?
5 How has the PASP shaped relationships with your family, neighbours?
6 How could the PASP be improved?
7 What if you received a cash transfer, simply for cultivating your *machamba*, because you're Mozambican?
8 What role should the state play in ensuring well-being?

Meaning of work
9 What is work?
10 Which activities constitute work, and which don't [refer to a long list]
11 What were the first lessons you learned about work?
12 Which actors shaped how you think about work today? (Family, church, school)
13 What is the value of work?
14 Could this value be replaced by other form of social integration, such as cash transfers?
15 Is there a context where work does not have value? What is an example?
16 Is there anything else you think is important for me to know or would like to ask me?

Semi-structured interview guide for non-PASP participants, 2017

Introduction: Present study objectives, ask for permission, and identify the respondent

Experience on the PASP:

1 Are you familiar with the PASP?
2 Did you apply for the PASP? Why or why not?
3 If so, were you selected? Do you know why or why not?
4 If you were accepted, why did stop working there?
5 How has the PASP influenced households and communities?
6 How could the PASP be improved?
7 What if PASP workers received a cash transfer, simply for cultivating your *machamba*, because you're Mozambican?
8 What role should the state play in ensuring well-being?

Meaning of work

9 What is work?
10 Which activities constitute work, and which don't [refer to a long list]
11 What were the first lessons you learned about work?
12 Which actors shaped how you think about work today? (Family, church, school)
13 What is the value of work?
14 Could this value be replaced by other form of social integration, such as cash transfers?
15 Is there a context where work does not have value? What is an example?
16 Is there anything else you think is important for me to know or would like to ask me?

Semi-structured interview guide state officials, 2017

Introduction: Present study objectives, ask for permission, and identify the respondent

Current situation of the PASP:

1 How many people are currently enrolled in the PASP, by gender?
2 What is the timeline for PASP implementation?
3 What types of activities are they currently undertaking?
4 What is the current value of the transfer, will it be increased, how often is it paid?
5 Have PASP workers received instruments?
6 What is the situation regarding proxy-means testing, outsourcing, graduation, reregistration?

Reflections on the future of the PASP:

7 What has been the impact of the PASP?
8 What have been the challenges of PASP implementation?
9 How could the PASP be improved?
10 Has the PASP strengthened or weakened the other social protection programs?
11 What is the future of PASP?
12 What if PASP workers received a cash transfer, for cultivating their *machambas*?
13 What role should the state play in ensuring well-being?
14 Would it be possible to access the following documents?
15 Is there anything else you think is important for me to know or would like to ask me?

Household survey for respondents, 2016

Code: _____ Place: _____ Date: ____/____/____ Time:____/____

Research assistant: _____ Language: Portuguese / Makuwa/ Xitswa
Name: _____
Age:_____ Sex: F / M

Place of birth: _____ When moved: _____ Why moved:_____

Educational level: _____ _____ Marital status: married/separated/single

1 Household size:

Total number of members	
Adults	
Children	
Dependent adults	

2 Daily routine

	Monday to Friday	Saturday	Sunday	Changes with seasons
Dawn				
Morning				
Noon				
Afternoon				
Dusk				
Night				

3 Agricultural production

Number of machambas: _____ Where: _____

How did they access land? _____ _____

Cultivation

Crop	Planting (Month)	Harvest (Month)	Consume	Sell (Mts)

Animal husbandry?

Animals	Number	Consume	Sell (Mts)

Who cultivates the machambas and takes care of the animals?

Who?	When?	Paid?	Mts?

What are the advantage of agricultural production?

What are the challenges of agricultural production? How could these challenges be overcome?

Would you want your children to be camponeses?
If yes, why?
If no, why not?

4 Other livelihood sources

Type of work	Place	Frequency	Income
Remittances			
PASP			
Hunting and foraging			

5 Monthly consumption

Purchase item	Frequency	Quantity	Cost

Meals a day? _____ Diet?

What happens when cash flow crisis?

6 Participation in community organisations (church, stokvel, cooperative, political party, NGO):

Name	**Function**

7 Observations:

Semi-structured guide for group conversations, 2017

Introduction:

1 Present objectives and ask for permission from participants
2 Introduction of participants (Name, they're, what work they do).

Definition of work

3 What is work?
4 Which activities constitute work, and which don't [refer to a long list]?
5 What activities are performed by women, men and both?
6 Which activities are more desirable, and which are less?
7 Which activities are done by people with more resources and which with resources?

Defining workers:

8 Who is a worker?
9 How do you identify a worker?
10 Who is a boss?
11 How do you identify a boss?

Redistribution:

12 What role should the state play in ensuring well-being?
13 Is the PASP an appropriate instrument?
14 How could the PASP be improved?
15 How could it be replaced?
16 What if PASP workers received a cash transfer, for cultivating their machambas?
17 But when you go to the hospital you don't pay. What's the difference between receiving a free basic service and money?

Appendix 3: Sampling Frame

Key informants for scoping visit, 2016

Maputo	**Institution**	**Role**
	Department for International Development	Social development adviser
	Helpage International	Head of Programs for Southern Africa
	International Labour Organisation	Social protection officer
	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action	Former national director for social action
	Ministry of Health	Former nutritionist
	Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection	Executive director
	National Institute for Social Action	PASP director
	National Institute for Social Action	Former director
	National Union of Peasants	Executive director
	UNICEF	Head of social policy
	World Bank	Consultant
	World Food Program	Former national staffer

Inhambane	Institution	Role
	Delegation of the National Institute for Social Action, for Vilankulo, Govuro, Mabote and Inhassoro	Director PASP coordinator Inhassoro PASP official
	District Directorate for Health and Social Action	Director Social Action Technical Staff
	District Services for Economic Activities	Director
	District Services for Planning and Infrastructure	Director
	government for the Locality of Maimelane	Chief of the locality Permanente
	government of the District of Inhassoro	District administrator Permanent Secretary Former PASP point person Neighbourhood secretary Permanente
	government of the District of Vilankulo	District administrator
	government of the Province of Inhambane	Permanent secretary
	government of the village of Temane	Neighbourhood secretary Permanente
	National Institute for Disaster Management	Director
	Organisation of Mozambican Workers	Provincial Secretary
	Provincial Directorate for Agriculture and Food Security	Director
	Provincial Directorate for Gender, Children and Social Action	Director
	Provincial Directorate for Labour, Employment and Social Security	Director
	Provincial Directorate for Land, Environment and Rural Development	Director
	Provincial Directorate for Public Works	Director

Nampula	Institution	Role
	Civil Society Organisation for the Elderly	Director
	Delegation of the National Institute for Social Action, for Ribáuè, Monapo, Mecuburi and Lalaua	Director PASP coordinator
	District Directorate for Health and Social Action	Director
	District Services for Economic Activities	Director
	District Services for Planning and Infrastructure	Director
	government for the Administrative Post of Iapala	Chief of post Nurse
	government of the Administrative Post of Ribáuè	Chief of post Chief of the locality School headmistress
	government of the District of Ribáuè	Permanent Secretary
	government of the Locality of Lupi	Permanent Secretary Permanente
	government of the Province of Nampula	Permanent Secretary
	government of the Province of Nampula	Permanent secretary
	Organisation of Mozambican Workers	Provincial Secretary
	Organisation of Mozambican Workers	Provincial Secretary
	Provincial Directorate for Gender, Children and Social Action	Director

Sampling frame for individual interviews, 2016/17

	Women			**Men**		
	Young (18-29)	Adult (30-54)	Elderly (55+)	Young (18-29)	Adult (30-54)	Elderly (55+)
Wealthy households						
Middle households						
Poor households						

SAMPLING FRAME FOR GROUP INTERVIEWS, 2016/17

	Young (18-29)	**Adult (30-54)**	**Elderly (55+)**
Men	5 people max • • • • •	5 people max • • • • •	5 people max • • • • •

Profile of research assistants, 2016/17

District	Site	Sex	Age	Current role	Other work experience
Inhassoro	Inhassoro	Male	52	PASP worker	Census taker, retired soldier
	Maimelane	Male	56	Community judge	Community forums, retired soldier
	Temane	Female	42	PASP worker	Health volunteer, literacy trainer, peasant
Ribáuè	Iapala	Female	36	INAS Permanente	Peasant
	Riani	Female	38	INAS Permanente	Health volunteer, literacy trainer, peasant
	Minuco	Female	24	INAS Permanente	Health volunteer, literacy trainer, peasant