

NATIONALISM WITHOUT A STATE

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM AMONG STATELESS NATIONS

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Declaration

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'H Mayet', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

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Abstract

A political philosophy employed by nationalist groups and parties, revolutionary nationalism, is used to resist the established order and achieve political goals. It is especially prevalent when power is held by a group or party which attempts to oppress and stifle certain identities and nationalities while enabling others. Revolutionary nationalism has been practiced by the people of Palestine and Western Sahara, both when they resisted against their European colonisers, Britain and Spain, and today, as they resist against their occupiers, Israel and Morocco. Forms of resistance practices include popular and organised resistance, as well as violent and nonviolent resistance. Similarities and differences emerge when analysing how each of these occupied populations attempted to resist through means of revolutionary nationalism and these can be examined and compared. Revolutionary nationalism often goes hand-in-hand with the expression of the right to self-determination, the highest form of which is statehood. The aim of this research report is to discern whether or not the practices of revolutionary nationalism give rise to self-determination, even though it has been proven that, in the post-Cold War era, they do not give rise to statehood.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions
BSO	Black September Organisation
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
Frelimo	Liberation Front of Mozambique
Frente POLISARIO	<i>Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro</i>
Hamas	<i>Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʿIslāmiyyah</i>
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
NP	National Party
PA	Palestinian Authority
PAC	Pan-African Congress
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SPLA	Sahrawi People's Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Table of Contents

Introduction	9
Chapter 1: Revolutionary Nationalism	13
Introduction	13
Nationalism	13
Revolutionary Nationalism	18
Types of Resistance	20
Conclusion	24
Chapter 2: Self-determination	25
Introduction	25
Self-determination	25
Statehood	30
Scale of Self-determination	34
Conclusion	36
Chapter 3: Palestine	38
Introduction	38
Historical Background	38
British Mandate in Palestine	38
Zionist Occupation	40
Revolutionary Nationalism	41

Popular Resistance	42
Organised Resistance	44
Self-determination	50
Self-recognition	50
Informal Recognition	50
Formal Recognition	51
Statehood	51
Conclusion	53
Chapter 4: Western Sahara	53
Introduction	53
Historical Background	53
Spanish Colonisation	53
Moroccan Occupation	56
Revolutionary Nationalism	58
Popular Resistance	58
Organised Resistance	62
Self-determination	66
Self-recognition	66
Informal Recognition	67
Formal Recognition	68

Statehood	68
Conclusion	69
Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis	70
Introduction	70
Historical Background	70
Justifications for Colonisation and Occupation	72
Revolutionary Nationalism	74
Popular Resistance	75
Organised Resistance	77
Self-determination	79
Self-recognition	80
Informal Recognition	80
Formal Recognition	81
Statehood	81
Is Revolutionary Nationalism Effective and Sustainable?	82
Conclusion	85
Conclusion	86
Appendix	91
Bibliography	92

Introduction

Revolutionary nationalism is a type of nationalism which was developed predominantly by minority groups in order to counter hegemonic structures of power and disrupt the established political order. The currents of revolutionary nationalism flowed through the depths of the French Revolution, anti-Fascist struggles in Italy in response to the rise of Benito Mussolini, the Cần Vương movement in Vietnam, the rise of Black Nationalism in the United States, and African liberation movements in the epoch of decolonisation. While not quite as strong as they once were, the currents of revolutionary nationalism still flow through the shallows of international waters. Struggles of revolutionary nationalism were carried out for different reasons and had different end goals, though each of these have been remarkably similar as each has embodied the key aspects of resistance. The aims of some struggles were the recognition of identity and rights, while the aims of others were statehood. Each struggle sought different levels of self-determination. This research report outlines the parameters of revolutionary nationalism before applying the concept to the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. The people of Palestine and Western Sahara, in the modern era, have risen up against the colonial powers of Britain and Spain. As European colonialism collapsed, the Palestinian and Sahrawi people have resisted against their occupiers, Israel and Morocco, and continue to do so today.

Self-determination is an incredibly important tenet of revolutionary nationalism and is a fundamental pillar atop which many revolutionary nationalist movements have been built. When a people are denied their right to self-determination, they tend to turn to strategies of revolutionary nationalism. Self-determination is a concept which is rather elusive and perhaps difficult to quantify as it has no finite scale of measurement. For the purpose of this research report, An attempt will be made to develop a measurement of self-determination. Self-recognition will be posited as the lowest degree of self-determination and statehood as the highest, with various other degrees, such as classification as per United Nations principles, assistance from states and organisations, refusal to cooperate with occupiers in solidarity with the occupied, and receipt of humanitarian aid, among others, falling in between. These will be classified as being a part of either informal recognition or formal recognition, with the latter being notably more significant than the former. This research report then attempts to apply these measurements to the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara in order to discern where on the scale they fall in comparison to one another.

While revolutionary nationalism, in conjunction with self-determination, often places an emphasis on statehood as the desired outcome, it does not always come to fruition, particularly in the current political landscape. The aftermath of the Cold War gave rise to a new global order, one which was quick to dismiss both the liberation movements of the twentieth century as well as the bilateral divide at the front of the international stage with each of its allies in the wings. Statehood was, in the post-Cold War era, seen as something which was already granted or gained, not something to be granted or gained. Thus, it was a common belief that states which were already in existence would continue to exist and territories which were not classified as states would continue in that vein.

This research report takes a deductive approach, using the conceptual framework of revolutionary nationalism and self-determination in order to create an analytical approach to the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. The first chapter outlines the conceptual aspects of revolutionary nationalism and resistance, and offers examples of where these concepts were put into practice in order to enrich the discussion. The second chapter delves into the more nuanced facets of self-determination with a specific focus on statehood, offering an overview on each of the theories of statehood, constitutive and declarative. This chapter also creates a scale of self-determination which will be applied to the case studies under scrutiny in succeeding chapters. The third chapter analyses the case of Palestine, first providing an overview of colonisation by Britain and then occupation by Israel. Within this chapter, an analysis of revolutionary nationalism in Palestine is carried out, looking first at popular resistance and then at organised resistance. This chapter also applies the scale of self-determination to the case of Palestine. The fourth chapter examines the case of Western Sahara, first offering an overview of colonisation by Spain and then occupation by Morocco. Within this chapter, an examination of revolutionary nationalism in Western Sahara is carried out, looking first at popular resistance and then at organised resistance. This chapter also applies the scale of self-determination to the case of Western Sahara. The fifth and final chapter brings together the theoretical and practical facets of this research report and purveys a comparative analysis between the two selected case studies, drawing similarities and differences between not only revolutionary nationalism in Palestine and Western Sahara, but also historical aspects of each of these cases, as well as the struggle of each of these populations for self-determination.

Over the course of this research report, attention is drawn to the fact that an analysis of revolutionary nationalism and self-determination in contemporary Palestine and Western Sahara without a historical analysis would be moot. It must be noted that without colonisation by Britain and Spain, occupation by Israel and Morocco would never have taken place. For decades, Palestinian and Sahrawi people have been fighting against and calling for an end to Israeli and Moroccan occupation and while strides have been made, the struggle is far from over. This is evident in the prevalence of Palestinian and Sahrawi movements in existence today and the sheer diversity and force present within these. These movements are far more established and structured than they were several decades ago. Movements in Palestine and Western Sahara which employ ideologies of revolutionary nationalism and strive for self-determination are thoroughly fleshed out over the course of this research report. Strengths and weaknesses of particular organisations and political parties are highlighted and examined, as is the progress made by each of these.

Ultimately, a comparison is made between the Palestinian and Sahrawi struggles in an attempt to discern which of the two is more effective and which tactics have given rise to higher degrees of self-determination, despite neither of the territories having achieved statehood. In so doing, methods of over-time case study, cross-case study, and most-similar case study comparison are utilised. Over-time case study is used when delving into the historical backgrounds of each of the cases, particularly when examining the issue of colonisation by Britain and Spain, respectively, which plagued the territories in the modern age, as well as the beginning of each of the illegitimate occupations of Palestine and Western Sahara. The methods of cross-case study and most-similar case study appear in the fifth and final chapter when a comparison between Palestine and Western Sahara, with a focus on historical background, justifications for foreign imperialism, revolutionary nationalism, and self-determination, is made.

In the post-Cold War era, revolutionary nationalism in occupied territories is counterproductive in the realisation of statehood but does lead to some degree of self-determination. Over the duration of this research report, it is proven that although revolutionary nationalism does not give way to statehood, it is a valuable tool in articulating self-recognition and receiving both formal and informal recognition from the international community. The aforementioned statement is proven by using content and historical analysis. These modes of analysis are utilised by carefully selecting and fleshing out qualitative data found in secondary sources. These methods of analysis have found that the territory of Palestine has made far more progress

in its quest for self-determination through methods of revolutionary nationalism than that of Western Sahara. The former has been both informally and formally recognised on a much larger scale than the latter. Neither of the territories, however, despite their myriad attempts, have achieved statehood.

“Where there is power, there is resistance” (1978: 95), is a statement made by a famous post-structuralist scholar, Michel Foucault, who was, at one point, a staunch Marxist. This quote is used as a starting point for a Marxist theoretical framework which has been applied to this research report. Beyond this starting point, nationalism and self-determination, concepts which are prevalent in an array of political ideologies, will be analysed and examined from a Marxist perspective, drawing left-wing from theorists and academics, from Lenin to Gramsci to Said and others. A Marxist approach has been taken due to the fact that issues grappled with in this research report are largely Marxist in dimension. These include, but are not limited to, revolutionary nationalism and resistance, concepts which Marxist theorists and scholars have focused their writings upon for decades, if not centuries. For the purpose of this research report, however, the Foucault quote will be reworded in order to be read as ‘where there is colonisation or occupation, there is intifada.’ Colonisation and occupation are forms of power, and intifada is not only a form of resistance, but in the Middle East and North Africa, has proven itself to be a form of revolutionary nationalism.

Chapter 1: Revolutionary Nationalism

Introduction

Revolutionary nationalism is a form of nationalism which differs from nationalism in its most traditional form and is essential to this research report. This chapter outlines the parameters of nationalism as well as those of revolutionary nationalism, providing a theoretical background of the concepts which will be applied to the case studies of Palestine and Western Sahara in subsequent chapters. This chapter offers definitions of nationalism and revolutionary nationalism as well as examples of each. There will be a close look at the concept of resistance, a key tenet of revolutionary nationalism, in this chapter which provides examples of each of the various types of resistance. Revolutionary nationalism practiced in the territories of Palestine and Western Sahara will later be examined and classified as either popular resistance or organised resistance and a discussion as to whether they have either violent or nonviolent components to them will be carried out.

Nationalism

Nationalism in its most traditional sense is an ideology which purports that there should be no separation between nation and state, that the two concepts should be congruent in their entirety (Heywood, 2021: 131). There are myriad forms of nationalism with some forms having their roots in the Middle Ages, and others in the eras predating the Middle Ages. The most prevalent types of nationalism are ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism, also referred to as ethnonationalism, entails defining nationalism on the basis of ethnicity. Thus, those who share the same language, religious beliefs, and ancestry are grouped together as a result of these features, and those who do not are treated as inferior or other (Heywood, 2021: 133). Civic nationalism, sometimes called liberal nationalism, is far more inclusive than its counterpart, ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism espouses values of tolerance, human rights, and justice, and seeks to treat all who form part of a nation as equal (Heywood, 2021: 133). Ethnic nationalism is the most volatile form of nationalism, and the form which can lead to tears within the political fabric by espousing racism, prejudice, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (Heywood, 2021: 137). Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is devoid of ethnocentrism and seeks to adhere to values which are now associated with the ideology of liberalism.

Although some states were formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism, factors including colonialism, capitalism, and an array of others have complicated this formation. Japan is an example of a state which was formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism. A majority of those residing within Japan can tie their ancestry to the land and trace it back for centuries, if not millennia. The Japanese, although not homogenous in their entirety, tend to have a common race, ethnicity, religion, and language (Connor, 1973: 87). They are largely Japanese, belonging to either Shintoism or Buddhism, and speak Japanese. There are, of course, exceptions to this, but the majority of those who live in Japan, barring immigrants, are similar, and utilise these commonalities to strive for self-determination. Japan is thus an example of a successful culmination of self-determination on the grounds of ethnic nationalism. The Japanese used their similarities to unify the population and bring about movements for self-determination which ultimately resulted in statehood (Connor, 1973: 89). This, however, took place centuries prior to the contemporary epoch.

A contrasting example to Japan is that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also a state formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breaking up of Yugoslavia in a region already riddled with ethnic tensions, the Bosnian War erupted. The Muslim Bosniacs were at war with the Christian Croats and Christian Serbs, who, despite having a common religion, used ethnicity as a dividing factor. Each of the three groups strived for self-determination and competed with one another for land and power, resulting in a war of massive proportions breaking out in the Balkans (Hartwell, 2019: 93). Ethnic cleansing, genocide, carpet bombing, and the systematic rape of women characterised the Bosnian War which eventually led to the formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, separate to Croatia and Serbia. While ethnic nationalism was key to the struggle for self-determination and state formation, it was also the primary cause of conflict. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates how the self-determination of one group may infringe on the self-determination of another, resulting in friction, which, if extensive, can cause large-scale discord.

Although myriad states were formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism, they have adapted and evolved into states which purport civic nationalism. The case of South Africa, barring violent outbreaks of Afrophobia and xenophobia, is a relatively successful example of civic nationalism. South Africa is a 'rainbow nation' where members of various races, ethnicities, religions, and languages live in harmony. The Constitution of South Africa states that the country belongs to all those who live in it (Sunstein, 1999: 123). Thus, despite coming from

incredibly different walks of life, citizens of South Africa unite under a common notion of patriotism and civic nationalism. South Africans are a largely heterogeneous demographic with black, white, coloured, and Asian people, among others, making up the population, alongside an array of ethnicities. Although Christianity is the predominant religion in the country, other religions are afforded the same rights and privileges. There is no common language in South Africa, but rather eleven official languages. Even though South Africa is in possession of abundant nationalities making it a rich tapestry instead of a homogenous one, all of these come together to strive for self-determination. Thus, South Africa prioritises civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism and attempts to adopt liberal values in order to maintain a sense of harmony between the various groupings that reside within the country.

France was, in the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia, an ethnonational state, yet in the aftermath of the French Revolution which espoused the liberal values of ‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,’ which became the slogan of the revolution, became one focused on civic nationalism. Today, however, although France claims to be a beacon of civic nationalism, this is not entirely the case. Within France, a majority of the citizens are white, French, Christian, and French-speaking. Thus, France exists as a largely homogenous state, albeit one with a fairly liberal constitution. Immigrants, particularly those from countries which were once French colonies, have, over the years, flocked to France. These immigrants, although French-speaking, are black, Muslim, and Algerian, Malian, Moroccan, and Senegalese, meaning that they differ vastly from the majority of citizens in France. As a result of their differences, immigrants to France are treated as inferior, despite the French Constitution stating otherwise (Asad, 2013: 228). They are often excluded from the French struggle for self-determination and seen as undeserving of the privileges afforded to their French counterparts.

Nationalism is always characterised by five key features. The first of these is allegiance. Allegiance is, in essentiality, a pledge of fidelity by citizens to the state. This entails the citizens affirming their loyalty to the state and its sovereign, as well as their promise to maintain the existing order of things (Beran, 1993: 480). The second feature is the aim of independence. Without independence, a nation cannot be classified as a state. A territory that is independent has complete control over its inner workings and is able to exercise self-governance and sovereignty without hindrances being imposed by external entities (Beran, 1993: 480). Thirdly, patriotism is an important aspect of nationalism. Nationalism is bound to a state or defined territory and citizens display admiration and love toward the concept of this state or territory

and being bound to it – this is known as patriotism (Beran, 1993: 485). Self-determination is the fourth feature of nationalism. To be discussed extensively in the succeeding chapter, self-determination is the right for a specific group of people to select their sovereignty and political status as per their own beliefs without any external interference. Self-determination is an incredibly important aspect of nationalism as it directly affects the citizens and the sovereign, and the way that the international community perceives a specific ethnic or civic nation (Beran, 1993: 484). Finally, solidarity is imperative to nationalism. Solidarity can be defined as an awareness of shared interests and objectives which creates a bond of unity between individuals, resulting in the actualisation of ideologies such as nationalism (Beran, 1993: 486).

The most traditional forms of nationalism were associated with whiteness and Eurocentrism and date back thousands of years. Revolutionary nationalism, however, began to emerge in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as anti-colonial and decolonial movements spread across the globe. Nationalism predates colonialism and can be traced back over the course of centuries. It was nationalism which motivated the 30 Year War in Europe (1618-1648) which came to an end following the Treaty of Westphalia. That is not to say that there was only a singular type of nationalism which had no contrasting forms of nationalism in the colonial and imperial epoch, but rather to say that the dimensions of nationalism grew immensely in response to colonialism and imperialism (Cabral, 1979: 13).

The premise of nationalism as a doctrine is to promote and uplift the interests of a nation, often represented by a certain group of people (Heywood, 2021: 131). Nationalist movements often, but not always, strive for sovereignty over what they believe to be their homeland, thus what must become their nation-state. Nationalism purports self-determination as one of its primary facets as nations seek to govern themselves without external interference (Heywood, 2021: 132). The development of a national identity is one of the aims of nationalism, and this is what allows for a community to draw upon their shared characteristics, whether they be culture, ethnicity, language, religion, tradition, or any other social element. Although nationalism is believed to have been historically and socially constructed, its ramifications have been manifold and it has undoubtedly painted thick strokes over the canvas that is the international realm as it is seen today.

Variants of nationalism have been claimed by different groupings across the political spectrum. From left to right, elements of nationalism make an appearance in numerous political ideologies (Heywood, 2021: 135). While it has been shunned by certain factions, it has been

embraced by most and thus integrated into their creeds. While certain circles within Marxist thought have wholeheartedly combined nationalist beliefs with their own political philosophies, others have not. Within Marxist thought, nationalism is sometimes seen as a tool of the bourgeoisie which is used to sow division within the ranks of the proletariat and thus, ensure that class consciousness is never developed and that a working-class revolution never takes place (Munck, 1986: 6). Hence, nationalism is classified as something which effectively hinders the political aspirations of specific Marxists.

Although nationalist ideals may clash with Marxist ideals, this is not always the case (Lenin, 2002: 123). On the one hand, the state, and by extension, ideas of nationalism, are seen as an apparatus of the bourgeoisie, one which the ruling class utilises to oppress the proletariat. On the other hand, however, nationalism can be seen as a tenet of Marxism. One type of nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, illustrates this perfectly. Revolutionary nationalism is a political philosophy whose followers seek to revolt against the existing order and usher in a new order where they have the rights they require, and above all else, the right to self-determination (Lenin, 1977). Revolutionary nationalism is, by any other name, resistance. Tactics of resistance are inherent to revolutionary nationalism, hence their close association. Moreover, Marxism and resistance are inextricably bound. Marxism often grapples with structures of power and their tenets and seeks to develop strategies to resist them, much like revolutionary nationalism does. Thus, Marxism is often affiliated with both resistance and revolutionary nationalism.

According to Lenin, a staunch Marxist, “the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of *national states*, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied” (1977: 8). While Lenin concurs to some extent with many other theorists, Rosa Luxemburg notwithstanding, on the issue of nationalism, he is of the belief if one were to look at the concept of nationalism without being bogged down by the abstract nature of this notion, one would find that it is not quite as bound to capitalism as we have been led to believe (Lenin, 1977: 396). The nation-state has been created to thrive under the contemporary conditions of capitalism, but should capitalism cease to exist, the nation-state will not necessarily cease alongside it. Thus, although it appears that the nation-state and capitalism are mutualistic, this is untrue. The nation-state can exist without capitalism, not in the form as it is seen today, but in a slightly altered form; one in which it would still be recognisable as the nation-state (Lenin, 1977: 396). Self-determination, which is construed to be an integral part of nationalism, is also

only bound to capitalism to a certain extent. That is to say, self-determination is not capitalistic and would be capable of surviving in a world without capitalism.

At the time Lenin penned this particular pamphlet, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, intellectuals across Europe were grappling with ideas of asymmetry between states around the world, and even states within Europe. Countries across the globe were undoubtedly unequal and this resulted in less powerful states developing a dependence on more powerful states. This system of dependency was far more capitalistic than nationalism and self-determination could ever be (Lenin, 1977: 397). Thus, Lenin was a proponent of nationalism and self-determination while simultaneously being a critic of capitalism. Lenin posited that nationalism and self-determination, if practiced while knowing that they were not necessarily tied to capitalism, could liberate weak states from being dependent on world powers (1977: 399). By liberating themselves from powerful states and turning inward, smaller states could eventually liberate themselves from capitalism. The journey to a post-capitalist state would be impossible without nationalism and self-determination.

Revolutionary Nationalism

Nationalist ideals often seek to maintain and replicate the existing hierarchy within communities and societies (Heywood, 2021: 131). Revolutionary nationalist ideals, however, seek to overturn the existing hierarchy and are employed by the marginalised and downtrodden, or even by minority groups who are of the belief that the hierarchy overlooks or oppresses them (Cabral, 1979: 18). Examples of revolutionary nationalism can be found across the globe and can be traced back over centuries. Revolutionary nationalism was popularised by resistance movements in the face of oppressive and tyrannical regimes, including those of colonisation and occupation. Revolutionary nationalism, like resistance, is not a political doctrine but commonalities can be found in different instances of revolutionary nationalism as they are carried out by different nationalities around the world (Davidson, 1986: 32).

There is no singular type of revolutionary nationalism as each type occurs in response to a specific regime (Davidson, 1986: 17). Instances of revolutionary nationalism have been documented on multiple continents and have spanned several historical epochs. It was extensively examined by Amílcar Cabral, a scholar and intellectual who looked at liberation movements in Africa during the twentieth century. Cabral concluded that many of these liberation movements had within them key aspects of revolutionary nationalism. In the mid

and late twentieth century, waves of decolonisation washed over the African continent and the indigenous population began to seize power from their colonial overlords and shed systems of decentralised despotism (Mamdani, 2018: 56).

In Africa, decolonisation became the weapon of choice taken up by the masses. Kwame Nkrumah who Cabral cites as a source of inspiration and “the strategist of genius in the struggle against classic colonialism” (Cabral, 1979: 115), paved the way for a canon of literature on resistance and revolutionary nationalism in Africa, along with an array of other scholars and intellectuals. Cabral and others fleshed out the ideologies of Nkrumah and those who came before him. Cabral, in particular, synthesised the ideal of revolutionary nationalism. To Cabral, the nationalism he believed in and fought for was always one of a revolutionary nature (Davidson, 1984). He projected this affirmation onto all anti-colonial, nationalist struggles in Africa. While a fight for self-governance and sovereignty were revolutionary in their own right, according to Cabral, liberation in Africa would have to move beyond the nation-state, a Western concept, to be truly revolutionary (Davidson, 1984: 23). Cabral was a devoted follower of the doctrine of Pan-Africanism and sought to bring this creed to fruition using different strategies of decolonisation which he described in his writings.

The liberation movements in Africa were headed and carried out by the indigenous population who sought to regain control over their land which had been colonised and occupied by European powers in the aftermath of the Scramble for Africa (Davidson, 1986: 37). At the Berlin Congress in 1884, Europe set its sights on the African continent and between themselves, carved it up, all while paying no heed to the communities and societies which resided on the continent. After agreeing on how to divide the continent, states in Europe began to violently colonise and occupy the territories they had chosen for themselves (Wirz and Eckert, 2004: 141).

Colonisation may be difficult to define given the complex dimensions introduced by the contemporary global political system. One might be quick to dismiss the colonial monster and its many, many tentacles as a relic of the past, an extinct creature. Colonisation has, however, indeterminably altered the lands it was carried out on and is still alive and well today. The other half, perhaps the crueller half, of the coin of colonisation, settler colonialism, too ran – and still runs – rampant (Wolfe, 1999: 15). This research report posits that settler colonialism is crueller than colonisation because while the latter exploits the land, the former exploits both the land and its inhabitants. That, however, is not to say that colonisation does not affect the people.

Settler colonialism entails the displacement of the indigenous people in favour of an incoming population who has no ties to the land they will settle on. “Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (Wolfe, 1999: 48). Hence, above all else, settler colonialism focuses on usurping territory from the indigenous population.

The notion of occupation is undoubtedly tied to that of imperialism, and imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism (Lenin, 1999: 1). Imperialism is inherently anti-Marxist, as is occupation. Belligerent occupation is, in effectuality, a transitory stage. This, however, is not always the case (Benvenisti, 2008: 634). Occupation can be a salient feature of the political fabric of a state but is, ideally, supposed to give way to annexation or collapse in its entirety. Occupation occurs either without a formal claim of sovereignty or with a contested claim of sovereignty. This claim can be contested by either the indigenous occupied population or other states and international bodies (Roberts, 1984). The notion of legality often plays a role with regards to occupations, yet due to the absence of a world government, occupations can rarely be governed or controlled by external powers unless the occupier explicitly allows for this, which, once again, is hardly ever the case (Benvenisti, 2012: 18). Essentially, there are countless reasons as to why territories are occupied, all of which are convoluted and complex, and hardly ever clear cut (Benvenisti, 2008: 647).

Resistance and revolutionary nationalism, arise in response to colonisation and occupation. These are, however, not the only reasons that resistance and revolutionary nationalism burgeon but are the reasons that this research report focuses on. Colonisation and occupation can be described as the abuse of power by one group at the expense of another, and as Foucault said, “where there is power, there is resistance” (1978: 95). This famous quote can be reworded and read as ‘where there is colonisation and occupation, there is revolutionary nationalism.’

Types of Resistance

There are different types of resistance which arise in response to different forms of power. Resistance is, effectively, organised by members of civil society in order to disrupt the workings of the government which the members of the resistance believe is illegitimate. This could be in response to an oppressive government or an occupying power. Resistance is not a compact concept, there are many types of resistance. Even though the aims of many resistance movements are to overthrow the existing political hierarchy, there are a number of ways in which this can be done (Ebert, 1991: 291).

Popular resistance is typically comprised of civilians who seek to interrupt the political order. Rarely are these individuals ever a part of political organisations. They are simply members of civil society who are disgruntled with the power structure and seek to articulate their frustrations with the government (Tripp, 2021: 9). Popular resistance occurs in the forms of pickets and protests to government buildings and departments, civil disobedience, and the use of social media. It may also occur in the form of destroying government property, attacking or assassinating government officials, or violent riots. Popular resistance involves ordinary citizens of a country striving to liberate themselves from an oppressive system. This liberation movement often aligns with the processes laid out by international law (Tripp, 2021: 13).

A remarkable example of popular resistance is that of Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi. In 2010, frustrations were burgeoning across the Middle East and North Africa in response to autocratic regimes and economic strife (Rosiny, 2012: 3). A street vendor in the region of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, Bouazizi was among the millions of civilians who were bearing the brunt of dictatorships and a plummeting economy. He had repeatedly had his wares confiscated by Tunisian police who had accused him of trading illegally (Dutta, 2013: 139). As a vendor, trading on the street was his only source of income and being abused by the police on multiple occasions resulted in Bouazizi becoming incredibly stressed and frustrated. In order to display his exasperation with the situation, Bouazizi doused himself in gasoline while standing in front of the governor's office and set himself alight. This act of self-immolation was one of the most notable acts of resistance carried out over the course of history (Rosiny, 2012: 6). Bouazizi was hospitalised but the burns on his body were incredibly severe, and he did not survive; he passed away at the Ben Arous Burn and Trauma Centre. The self-immolation of Bouazizi was photographed and shared on social media. He trended not only in the Middle East and North Africa, but around the world. Later, it would be said that by setting himself on fire in a display of resistance, Bouazizi was the accelerant which would set alight the region, bringing about the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Arab Spring (Dutta, 2013: 148).

Organised resistance, like popular resistance, involves members of civil society (Shaw, 2009). The one key difference lies in the name. While the popular is resistance is fairly decentralised, its counterpart is far more organised (Lilja et al., 2017: 40). In order to topple the overarching power system, members of civil society mobilise and form organisations which provides the resistance movement with a significant amount of structure. The formation of organisations, however, is accompanied by its own set of complexities and difficulties. While resistance

organisations often have the same final goal in common – overthrowing the current governmental structure – the means to the identical end differs substantially. This difference is often because of ideological rifts (Shaw, 2009: 102). As a result of this disjointedness, many liberation organisations are formed in the face of a single oppressor (Lilja et al., 2017: 43). Organised resistance has been found around the world in myriad forms, and while it can occur in manners similar to popular resistance, it is more centralised.

In South Africa, under the apartheid regime, organised resistance became a key aspect of the liberation movement. The African National Congress (ANC) emerged as an organisation which called for the collapse of the National Party (NP) which sought to uphold the racist laws it had put into place (McKinley, 2018: 29). The ANC was not the only organisation which was created to challenge the dominance of the NP. Other organisations such as the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and others also joined the anti-apartheid movement (Lissoni, 2009: 288). The reason so many parties participated in the struggle was because each party differed along ideological lines and in so doing, created their own organisations. To an extent, each organisation had their own successes in resisting the racist apartheid government. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, is a superb example of organised resistance. Existing as an underground movement for some time, MK adopted methods of guerrilla warfare as it strived to resist apartheid in the mid and late twentieth century (Lissoni, 2009: 293). MK coordinated attacks against the apartheid government in a manner in which popular resistance would never have been able to. It has been argued by some that the daring nature of MK cadres contributed substantially to the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa (McKinley, 2018: 33).

Both popular and organised resistance can be nonviolent in form. Nonviolent resistance emphasises achieving political goals and advocates for peaceful protests and non-cooperation without violence or even the threat of it (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013: 272). Despite being conflated with civil disobedience, nonviolent resistance differs from the aforementioned concept as a result of the connotations attributed to each of the notions. On one hand, civil disobedience is an act which effectively violates one or multiple laws of a country or polity and is carried out intentionally, and one which the actor knows will result in repercussions from the state and its sovereign (Lang, 1970: 156). Civil disobedience is not necessarily nonviolent; thus, it cannot be conflated with nonviolent resistance. Acts of nonviolent resistance do not always violate the laws of a country or polity, are not always carried out across a country, and

the actors are not always aware of the repercussions that they will have to face from the state and its sovereign (Lang, 1970: 156). Nonviolent resistance is also referred to as passive resistance or pacifism (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013: 271).

The Eastern Bloc is rich with examples of nonviolent resistance. During World War II, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were swallowed by the Soviet Union and integrated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Neither of the three states were particularly satisfied with this integration but were too weak to fight against the USSR (Brokaw and Brokaw, 2001: 19). In 1988, during the Cold War, mass gatherings took place across Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania where members of civil society would loudly sing protest songs, calling for the end of the Soviet regime in their countries and their liberation from the USSR. While this event alone did not lead to their exit from the USSR, it can be seen as a contributing factor (Brokaw and Brokaw, 2001: 23). *Samizdat*, literally translated to mean ‘self-publishing,’ was widely practiced across Eastern Europe in order to evade censorship. The Soviet police controlled the literature, which was circulated around its Republics, and in order to avoid them, in an act of nonviolent resistance, members of civil society from journalists to novelists to poets would practice *samizdat* (Yakushev, 1975: 186). Writers would publish their own works in secret and circulate pieces of their work, not only around their own countries, but around the entirety of the USSR.

Violent resistance often occurs in response to violent regimes. Colonisation, which goes hand-in-hand with imperialism and occupation, is an extremely violent process, hence “decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon” (Fanon, 1961: 56). While nonviolence has its place in the resistance, the logic of organisations is to employ violent resistance in order to achieve faster, more substantial results. This does not always happen. Often, in response to violence, the oppressor strikes back at the resistance even harder than before (Scholz, 2007: 38). Although sometimes, violent resistance does achieve the outcomes of the organisation or population. Therefore, violent resistance is not a predictable path on which to tread (Scholz, 2007: 39). The formation of violent resistance is often, but not always, organised. Although individuals may carry out violent resistance, perhaps in the form of attacking a high-level government official who is a part of an oppressive regime, it is more likely to be organised rather than popular. An organisation has within it more power and resources than an individual, and thus is able to carry out acts of violent resistance with more ease. Often, those who seek to

resist an oppressor in a violent manner form militias which coordinate attacks on the government as they seek to uproot or invert the political hierarchy (Scholz, 2007: 44).

During the Mozambican War of Independence, tactics of violent resistance were utilised. The war was an armed conflict between Portugal, which had seized the country in the Scramble for Africa, and the Liberation Front of Mozambique, also known as Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, or FRELIMO, as the latter sought to achieve independence from their colonial overlords (Jentzsch, 2022: 25). When calls for self-determination were not heeded by the Portuguese, Mozambicans turned to fighting against their colonisers in a bid for independence. Although the Portuguese were better resourced than the Mozambicans, they were not expecting guerrilla warfare from FRELIMO during what became known as the Carnation Revolution, which saw Mozambican freedom fighters attempt to overthrow the colonial power (Jentzsch, 2022: 29). The coup, which culminated in independence in 1975, saw measures of extreme violence taken by resistance forces as they fought against colonialists. The Mozambican War of Independence ended in a ceasefire and finally led to the exit of the Portuguese from the country, but not without the loss of hundreds of lives, the injury of thousands, and extensive damage to infrastructure which was already poor to begin with (Jentzsch, 2022: 47).

Conclusion

Revolutionary nationalism and resistance are bound to the quest for self-determination by stateless nations, yet an analysis of these notions would be incomplete without an examination of nationalism and its central facets. The theoretical concepts grappled with in this chapter have set the scene for ensuing chapters. Nationalism has been around for centuries and has played a role in altering the international sphere in its own right, as has revolutionary nationalism. Revolutionary nationalism can be tied closely to resistance which has many forms, some of which will be fleshed out over the duration of the subsequent chapters of this research report.

Chapter 2: Self-determination

Introduction

Self-determination can be seen as an expression of a national consciousness or a national identity, and thus, can be perceived to be an expression of nationalism. For the purpose of this research report, self-determination is incredibly important as it will provide a scale upon which cases of territories can be measured. This chapter defines self-determination and discusses the contestations which have emerged surrounding the concept by providing an overview of the issues alongside examples. A debate on self-determination and statehood is also presented. Ultimately, this chapter essentially discusses self-determination in a way which develops a scale on which the case studies of Palestine and Western Sahara can later be measured.

Self-determination

A political ideology which is inextricably bound to nationalism as well as revolutionary nationalism, self-determination is a key principle of contemporary international law and is classified as a *jus cogens* rule. This means that it is a peremptory norm from which no derogation is allowed (Saul, 2011: 613). The particulars of self-determination are clearly outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, and it is seen as an inalienable human right. Self-determination, under international law, states that all people, regardless of their identity, are entitled to equal rights and equal opportunities and are allowed to freely choose their government, sovereignty, and status of statehood without any external interference (Moore, 1997: 906). The self-determination of nations is rather similar to the self-determination of individuals. It is essentially the ability to exercise free will without any external encumbrances. Over the course of history, self-determination has emerged as an issue which was, and still is, difficult to resolve as a result of the overarching issues of colonialism, imperialism, and occupation which undoubtedly serve as impediments to the achievement of self-determination by certain nations (Saul, 2011: 630).

Extremely convoluted, self-determination contains within it an array of inconsistencies. Although there are certain criteria which self-determination is inseparable from, certain definitions extend upon the concept, while others do not. The core principles, however, are essential. Self-determination is the process whereby a group of people, in a majority of cases, a nation, in possession of a certain degree of political consciousness seek to form a state and

select a sovereign government (Saul, 2011: 627). According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), self-determination is bound to statehood only in the aftermath of colonialism and imperialism (Coleman, 2010: 66). If a nation was not subjected to the horrors of colonialism and imperialism, they would still be granted the right to self-determination, but this right would not be bound to statehood. A nation of this nature would be granted the right to live peacefully within the boundaries of an already existing state with democratic principles. These nations would have their identities protected and would not be discriminated against but would not be granted their own sovereign state.

This concept can be easily illustrated when looking at the case of South Africa. The Afrikaner people in South Africa have been granted the right to self-determination, but not to statehood. Within the borders of contemporary South Africa, the Afrikaner identity is protected, and Afrikaners do not experience extensive discrimination. The Afrikaners, however, do not have their own state, despite having actively pursued the Volkstaat. This is due to the fact that the Afrikaner people were at no point in time actively subjected to colonial and imperial ventures by foreign powers. Thus, despite being granted the right to self-determination, this right is not linked to that of statehood (Ramutsindela, 2001: 59).

Self-determination can be seen as advantageous because it can be utilised to implement social justice, it protects the national culture, and is an expression of collective autonomy. The aforementioned facets serve as advantages because it has been determined that states are likely to thrive when they embrace a single national group (Saul, 2011: 619). A common quest for self-determination, above all else, creates trust between citizens on the basis of commonality. The development of harmony and trust between citizens allows for them to solve problems collectively, to support redistributive principles of justice, and to practice democracy (Moore, 1997: 909). While self-determination does not always equate to state sovereignty, it does allow for the recognition of international obligations and duties of justice. Self-determination may be used to justify secession; however, this is only in cases where the government fails to meet the requirements of a certain nation (Moore, 1997: 912). All people have the right to independence and self-determination, but not all have the right to statehood. Secession is a drastic measure, a last resort, to which not all nations can turn. Should all nations have sought secession on an arbitrary basis, the international stage would be smeared with thousands of microstates which would be unable to sustain themselves.

Kosovo was, perhaps, a drastic example which resulted in a form of secession when Kosovo was declared independent of Serbia (Cismas, 2010: 531). This took place in 2008 and occurred due to the fact that separatist movements called for an independent state in the face of widespread discrimination and oppression faced by ethnic Kosovar. The Serbian government was opposed to this, but the newly formed Kosovo was quickly recognised as an official state by world powers, including the United States, Western Europe, China, and others, effectively rendering Serbia powerless (Cismas, 2010: 531). In their new state, Kosovar finally found themselves rid of Serbian persecution. Kosovo is one successful example of secession, and although the state is not recognised by all and still has not achieved fully-fledged membership at the United Nations, it exists as a space for ethnic Kosovar to practice self-determination. While there have been many attempts at secession around the world, a majority of these have been incredibly unsuccessful, with only very few working out in favour of the oppressed population.

The history of self-determination is fairly extensive and complex and can formally be traced back to the American Revolution and the French Revolution but likely predates these seminal events. Succeeding revolutions across Europe and the Treaty of Versailles, which sought to address dilemmas which emerged in World War I, as well as the decolonial movements in the aftermath of World War II all drew heavily upon the notion of self-determination (Tamir, 1991: 566). It can be argued that, at one stage, empire and self-determination were diametrically opposed. Thus, the imperial conquests which characterised the modern age, and still rear their head from time to time, are essentially antagonistic to the concept of self-determination. The Russian Empire, Austrian-Habsburg Empire, Ottoman Empire, Qing Empire, as well as Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, conquered lands, colonised peoples, and took over systems of governance with little concern for the self-determination of the nations they affected during their imperial ventures (Tamir, 1991: 572). In anti-imperial struggles, nations affected by these empires drew upon principles of self-determination in their attempts but often failed as they were weak compared to the empires which conquered them and could do little to retaliate. Colonial ventures carried out in later years by various world powers also had no concern for the self-determination of the nations which they brutally colonised and occupied. In the Scramble for Africa and the Great Game, African and Central Asian nations were overpowered by European states despite employing tactics of self-determination. Therefore, although the history of self-determination is rather vast, the history of the quelling and quashing of self-determination is just as vast, if not even more vast (Tamir, 1991: 589).

Self-determination is a highly contested concept. Despite being bestowed upon all by the United Nations alongside other international and transnational organisations, this theory is not always put into practice. Minorities in certain countries are repressed and therefore unable to exercise their right to self-determination. Hence, while all people should have the right to self-determination, this right may fail to materialise for some, or, should it materialise, it is stolen away (Castellino, 2021: 41). The waters around the right to self-determination are often muddled, particularly because some groups are of the belief that their self-determination can only come at the expense of the self-determination of another group (Corn tassel, 2008: 106). This brings to the fore an especially difficult dilemma. If the self-determination of one nation impedes the self-determination of another, which nation is entitled to carry out their practices of self-determination at the expense of the other? Moreover, who is it who determines which nation receives priority in its respective quests for self-determination? These are convoluted questions to which there is no simple answer but to which there is precedent – in the past, history has observed certain nations prioritising their self-determination in favour of that of another nation, and whether the international community has chosen sides in this debacle and if so, which side it was that they chose (Castellino, 2021: 47).

An example of the prioritisation of the self-determination of one nation over another is that of the United States, a controversial case. It has effectively weaponised American nationalism, which is predominantly white, masculine, and middle class as it seeks to quash other forms of nationalism and the calls for self-determination from the Native American and African American nationalists, calls which have repeatedly fallen on deaf ears (Karuka, 2017: 83). Native Americans can trace their legacy back to the land prior to the arrival of Christopher Columbus and the Mayflower and seek to secede from the United States. Ever since the arrival of European colonisers to the United States, the indigenous population experienced extreme hardship and strife (Washburn, 2005: 779). The federal government eventually agreeing to recognise tribal sovereignty to a certain extent is insufficient as the Constitution of the United States still does not recognise Native Americans as independent, nor the reservations designated for Native Americans as truly belonging to them. As a result of being oppressed and treated unfairly for centuries, Native Americans now seek to establish an independent homeland, Aztlán, named after the land of the Aztecs. Aztlán would encompass part of Mexico and a portion of the South-Western United States, and its creation would allow Native Americans to freely practice self-determination (Washburn, 2005: 779).

Ethnic African Americans, too, seek secession from the United States. Ancestors of the African American population were forcibly removed from their homelands on the African continent and had to undergo a perilous journey to the United States which caused the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of passengers on ships (Onaci, 2012: 14). Once they arrived in the United States, they were forced to work as slaves on plantations or in houses where they were abused and overworked, so much so that thousands more died. Those who survived the epoch of slavery, along with their descendants as well as the descendants of those who did not survive, were then forced to endure the Jim Crow era which saw the codification of extremely racist laws in the United States. As a result of the oppression faced in the past, African American nationalists are calling for the creation of what they call New Afrika (Onaci, 2012: 17). New Afrika would be populated by African Americans and be under African American control, allowing them to practice self-determination free of the people who once played an active role in their abuse and oppression. The United States has failed to heed the many calls from Native Americans in particular, as well as African Americans as they fight for their self-determination in the face of white, masculine, middle class American nationalism. Therefore, the self-determination of the one, white Americans, has been prioritised over that of the others, Native Americans and African Americans (Karuka, 2017: 95).

When contrasted against other issues, it appears that self-determination is irreconcilable with an array of ideologies. In the twentieth century in particular, self-determination was the cause of a number of conflicts, especially as decolonisation swept across the globe and minority groups within states began to seek secession (Toft, 2012: 582). These movements resulted in sporadic bursts of violence around the world and while some were successful, some are yet to be resolved. Territoriality has presented a massive predicament to the realisation and actualisation of self-determination. Oftentimes, a nation ties itself to a delineated territory over which it has sovereignty allowing it to determine their political status. Nationalism often has territory as one of its inherent characteristics and the absence of a territory causes a stumbling block to appear in the path of the quest of a nation for self-determination (Toft, 2012: 588). Self-determination, as per the definition within the constraints of international law, is inextricably bound to territory and cannot be practiced in its entirety without it. Thus, arises the question: can a nation exercise self-determination in the absence of a defined territory? Historical precedents have illustrated that this is, in fact, possible despite being somewhat more difficult as national self-determination does not always entail state sovereignty (Toft, 2012: 597).

A nation which practices self-determination in the absence of a nation state is that of the Kurdish people. Kurdistan is not an official state, but a territory in which a majority of the Kurds reside, spread across Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey (Kaya, 2015: 16). Kurdistan is not recognised as a state by the international community, nor any of the countries across which it spans, yet the Kurdish people still exercise national self-determination in parts of the territory which they occupy (Çakmak, 2015: 23). There exists a Kurdish government called the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq, which has on multiple occasions called for the sovereignty of the Kurdish people but is yet to succeed in its aims. Nonetheless, the PUK strives for the actualisation of self-determination for the Kurdish population and has succeeded in gaining seats in the Iraqi Parliament and gaining partial recognition for Iraqi Kurdistan in the North of the country (Kaya, 2015: 16). Although Iraqi Kurdistan is technically a province of Iraq and not its own sovereign state, recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan by the government of Iraq was a massive achievement for the Kurdish people who seek to do the same in the states of Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Kurdistan is a noteworthy example which illustrates that national self-determination is not necessarily tied to a formally recognised territory and can be practiced in its absence (Çakmak, 2015: 128). The Kurdish people have, for decades, called for Kurdish sovereignty over the region and despite not having been granted sovereignty, have still, to some extent, practiced self-determination in the enclaves within which they reside across the Middle East. Although acts of self-determination have been branded as illegal by the governments of Iran and Turkey, and Kurdish people have experienced persecution around the region, Kurdish nationalism has persisted and small albeit significant gains have been made in the actualisation of Kurdish self-determination (Çakmak, 2015: 131).

Statehood

Self-determination is not a homogenous concept, but one which exists in varying degrees, the highest of which is invariably statehood (Haklai, 2015: 463). Different degrees of self-determination can, in the contemporary era, be achieved by different nations who seek these out on the basis of ethnicity, faith, or an array of other commonalities. Movements for self-determination among certain nations can culminate in statehood. Statehood, however, is not an arbitrary classification, but a rather complex one under the constraints of international law (Crawford and Crawford, 2006: 9). In order for a territory to be classified as a state, it has to fulfil certain criteria. Failure to fulfil these criteria results in failure to achieve statehood and gives way to the creation of a stateless population. As per the requirements of the Montevideo

Convention of 1933, which are affirmed by the declarative theory of statehood. In order to be a state, a territory must be in possession of a permanent population, a defined territory, a functional government, and the ability to conduct international relations (Dugard, 2021: 94). All four of these criteria must be met in order to attain statehood. In contrast, the constitutive theory of statehood posits international recognition as the primary requirement for achieving statehood.

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States codified the declarative theory of statehood and integrated it into customary international law (Dugard, 2021: 95). The declarative theory of statehood differs significantly from the constitutive theory of statehood, the latter of which claims that a territory can only be classified as a state if it is formally recognised by another state or multiple other states. The constitutive theory of statehood was developed in the nineteenth century (Erman, 2013: 144), while the declarative theory came decades later. Today, the international community fails to adhere strictly to either theory when analysing issues of statehood but takes a more politically nuanced approach. On occasion, states which meet the criteria of either theory still find themselves classified as stateless due to the politics at play in the contemporary era.

The first criterion outlined by the declarative theory of statehood is that of a permanent population (Grant, 1998: 404). This is a complicated requirement to meet because the Montevideo Convention does not explain how small or large the population has to be, only that it has to be permanent (Grant, 1998: 404). States such as China and India meet this criterion as each of these countries has a permanent population of well over one billion. The states of Nauru and Tuvalu also meet this criterion despite each having populations of only approximately 10 000 each. A majority of stateless nations are able to meet this criterion due to the fact that it is not especially specific (Grant, 1998: 405). Most stateless nations have a permanent population with some having a diaspora alongside this. The Circassians are the exception. As a result of the Circassian genocide carried out by the Russian Empire, surviving Circassians fled to the Middle East and Central Asia where they reside today as a diaspora only. Hence, Circassians fail to meet the first criterion for statehood (Catic, 2015: 1691).

The second criterion as per the declarative theory of statehood is that of a defined territory (Grant, 1998: 409). Land is the cornerstone of a state, and thus in order to be classified as a state, a territory must be clearly defined as belonging to a particular nation. A territory must have clear borders and must not be disputed (Grant, 1998: 409). It must belong solely to the

nation which claims it and have no claims laid to it by any other nations. Defined territories are what represent states on maps and in diagrams. The region of Jammu and Kashmir, while a defined territory, is not classified as belonging to the residents of the region, but part of it belongs to India and another part of it to Pakistan (Tavares, 2008: 282). Thus, it does not meet the second criteria for statehood as a result of its defined territory being disputed between states, among other reasons.

The third criterion outlined by the declarative theory of statehood is that of a functional government (Grant, 1998: 413). A government is the highest form of authority within a state and is in possession of physical control over not only the citizens, but also over the administering of territory. If a state is unable to control its own territory, it does not have a functional government, but rather a government which is dysfunctional; one which is unable to administer the lands under its sovereignty (Grant, 1998: 414). The government of the Uyghur people, for example, has not been entirely functional and has only managed to gain a limited amount of control over the Xinjiang region in China as a result of its own failures and its inability to secede from China (Bhattacharya, 2003: 375). Due to the fact that they do not have a centralised and functional government, the Uyghur people do not meet the third criterion of statehood.

The fourth and final criterion as per the declarative theory of statehood is the ability to conduct international relations (Grant, 1998: 419). In order to conduct international relations, a nation must engage with the international community and must be able to exchange diplomats and ambassadors with other states. In order to do so, not only would a nation have to be, at least to a certain degree, recognised by other states, it would also be required that no external entity claims the capacity to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the territory (Grant, 1998: 419). The Cham people, despite being indigenous to Vietnam, are only recognised as a minority group and have no official representation in the Vietnamese government, nor any governmental departments. It is the Vietnamese government which makes the foreign policy decisions on behalf of the Cham people. Although the Cham people have a fairly amiable relationship with the Vietnamese government, they lack the ability to conduct international relations (Dawson, 2016: 4) and thus, fail to meet the fourth criterion for statehood.

If a population meets all four of the criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention, it is formally classified as a state in the contemporary era (Grant, 1998: 425). This classification, however, has proven to exist far more in theory than in practice. Thus, a chasm between the

constitutive theory and the declarative theory is exposed. There is no theory which is more correct than the other, nor is there a theory favoured in the international sphere. Rather, a combination of both theories is used when recognising statehood. This, however, is both arbitrary and subjective, and while some states and bodies may favour the former, others would favour the latter. Thus, a series of asymmetries, a majority of which are effectively irreconcilable emerges. These allow for some light to be shed on the complex practice of recognition. A state is awarded an array of rights and privileges which are not afforded to territories which are classified as stateless. At present, there are 193 states which are formally recognised as members of the United Nations, with several populations being deemed stateless as a result of not meeting any number of the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention. Even if a state meets one, two, or three of these criteria, it will not be classified as a state, and only can be deemed so if it meets all four of the criteria (Grant, 1998: 427) and is recognised by the international community. As a result of these stringent confines, many populations fail to meet the requirements of statehood and are thus classified as stateless. Sometimes, it may appear that a territory meets all four criteria, yet still fails to be classified as a state by the United Nations. This is for a number of reasons, predominantly political ones, such as states with veto power refusing to allow a territory to formally become a member. This issue illustrates one of the problems within the declarative theory. That is not to say that there are no problems within the constitutive theory, which has proven itself to be inefficient at certain junctures. It can thus be deduced that it is not enough to use just one theory in the recognition of states, but a combination of the declarative theory and the constitutive theory.

Igboland has a permanent population, thereby meeting one of the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention. The territory of Igboland is highly disputed by Nigeria and far from defined. In fact, an attempt to determine the finite borders of Igboland would likely heighten tensions between the Igbo people and the government of Nigeria. Absent from Igboland, too, is a functional government and the ability to conduct international relations; two requirements of which the territory falls short (Onuoha, 2013: 17). Therefore, Igboland cannot be classified as a state, despite meeting one out of the four requirements. Guam has a permanent population and a defined territory, thereby meeting two of the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention. A functional government and the ability to conduct international relations, however, are not present in Guam. The United States governs over the territory and conducts international relations on behalf of Guam (Na'puti and Hahn, 2020: 19). Therefore, Guam cannot be classified as a state, despite meeting two out of the four requirements. Taiwan is in possession

of three criteria for the classification of statehood. It has a permanent population, a defined territory off the coast of Mainland China, and a functional government in the form of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan, however, is not entirely capable of conducting international relations on its own and falls under the banner of Mainland China at the United Nations and other transnational organisations (Bartmann, 2008: 114). Therefore, Taiwan cannot be classified as a state, despite meeting three out of the four requirements.

193 states around the world are *de facto* states as well as *de jure* states. This means that they exist both in reality and in law (Berg, 2007: 201). Today, there exist states which are only one of the two, not both. Somaliland, for example, is a *de facto* state; it exists in reality, it has a designated territory, a population, and a partially functional government. It cannot be denied that Somaliland has attempted to position itself as a state in the international system, however, it fails to meet the legal requirements of statehood (Arieff, 2008: 60). At present, there are no states which are only *de jure* but not *de facto*. Over the course of World War II, however, certain governments, while in exile, conducted diplomatic relations with the Allied Powers despite their countries having been invaded and occupied by the Axis Powers. As a result of these relations, they were effectively classified as being *de jure* states (Blay, 1993: 275).


Scale of Self-determination

There are different degrees of self-determination, but there is no scale, no yardstick or thermometer or calliper, upon which self-determination can be measured. For the purpose of this research report, an attempt has been made to create a scale upon which self-determination can be measured. Self-determination is not a finite concept and is, essentially, one which is subjective. As a result of these characteristics, self-determination is incredibly difficult to quantify.

This research report puts forward the notion that there are four degrees of self-determination. The smallest and perhaps the most insignificant degree of self-determination is that of self-recognition (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 442). Self-recognition will undoubtedly bring about unity for a number of different reasons and serve as a unifying factor among the population. The next degree of self-determination is that of informal recognition from external parties and states (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 447). While this recognition is not written in stone by any means, it assists in paving the way for formal recognition, which is the next degree. Formal recognition necessitates the recognition and acknowledgement of certain nations by other states and parties

and being cast in a role on the international stage (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 453). The final degree of self-determination, and the most significant, is statehood (Haklai, 2015: 467).

Degrees of Self-Determination



All populations striving for self-determination practice self-recognition, for without the latter, the achievement of the former would be impossible. A majority of the Rohingya from the Rakhine State in Myanmar have been expelled in an act of ethnic cleansing by the Buddhist majority against the Muslim minority and are scattered across the subcontinent, with some still residing within the borders of their homeland as an oppressed population. Although they practice self-recognition, the Rohingya are neither informally nor formally recognised as a nation of their own and are thus not awarded the privileges afforded to nation states (Sejan, 2022: 44). Northern Cyprus is not a formally recognised state but is seen as a province of the Republic of Cyprus which is under Turkish occupation. Therefore, Turkey is the only state which recognises Northern Cyprus as a sovereign nation (Stephen, 2013: 579). Not even the United Nations classifies Northern Cyprus as a state, yet there are states which once formally recognised Northern Cyprus as independent, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, who withdrew their initial recognition and now recognise Northern Cyprus only informally (Ker-Lindsay:

2017: 446). The Vatican City, more commonly referred to by the name of its government, the Holy See, is a formally recognised state but a state which has only observer status at the United Nations. Thus, despite being recognised formally by a majority of states around the world, it has not been fully and formally recognised by the several transnational organisations which hold a considerable amount of influence around the world (Duursma, 1994: 80). There are, at present, 193 states which have achieved the final and highest degree of self-determination, which is statehood. Despite the statehood of certain nations being disputed, for example, the statehood of North Korea is not recognised by South Korea and that of South Korea is not recognised by North Korea, these territories are still states and their status of statehood cannot be easily altered (Altenberger, 2013: 7).

The expression of a national identity is presented differently by different nations. One commonality is that of a united front in a quest for self-determination. This entails a similar, but not identical, aim toward building a national consciousness. This can be done in numerous ways, but typically involves the finding of common traits between members of a nation. These could be a common race, ethnicity, religion, and language with regards to ethnic nationalism, and a common homeland and participation in society with regards to civic nationalism (Heywood, 2021: 133). In the past, the former appeared to outweigh the latter, but at present, it appears that the latter is dominating the former.

Self-determination is an incredibly complex and convoluted ideal which is presented differently in countries across the world. As a result, the scale of self-determination developed in the preceding paragraphs is incredibly broad and lacks uniformity. Self-determination is not at all a homogenous concept and is thus difficult, if not impossible, to quantify fully. The scale, however, as a result of its wide range, can be universally applied and will be utilised in succeeding chapters as attempts are made to quantify the degree to which the right to self-determination is practiced in Palestine and Western Sahara.

Conclusion

The measurement of self-determination is an incredibly difficult task due to the fact that it is not a concept which can easily be quantified. This chapter, however, has discussed the more nuanced aspects of self-determination in relation to nationalism and revolutionary nationalism, and the manner in which self-determination is exercised, first as self-recognition, in order to

give rise to informal recognition, formal recognition, and eventually, statehood, the highest degree of self-determination.

Chapter 3: Palestine

Introduction

Palestine is not a state in the international system but exists as an occupied territory. This classification is extended to the Gaza Strip and a portion of the West Bank, and includes the territories captured by the Apartheid State of Israel in the Six-Day War which took place in 1967. Historic Palestine has an incredibly complex history which can be traced all the way back to the Bronze and Iron Ages and the Biblical Epoch. Its history was always under scrutiny and is still heavily disputed today. Revolutionary Palestinian nationalism and resistance have characterised the contemporary landscape of the Levantine region and they are some of the most prolific and progressive instances of revolutionary nationalism in the current age. This chapter begins by discussing the historical background of the occupation, followed by a close analysis of revolutionary nationalism and self-determination in Palestine. The different forms of resistance in Palestine will be examined, and their techniques will be analysed.

Historical Background

Historic Palestine is documented to be one of the first sites of civilisation in the world with artifacts found in the area dating back to the Bronze and Iron Ages. It has also existed as a site of conquests. Over the course of its history, the lands presently known as Israel and Palestine have seen a takeover by the Ancient Egyptians, the establishment of Judea and Samaria, invasion by Babylonians and Persians, the Hellenistic period, the entrance of the Roman Empire, the Byzantine era, occupation by Muslim forces, the entrance of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the British Mandate, and the creation of the State of Israel which allowed for occupation by Zionist militias (Khalidi, 2020: 18). For the purpose of this research report, it would be impossible to discuss the various events which shaped Historic Palestine, hence, for the sake of brevity, only the events of the twentieth century and the twenty-first century will be fleshed out.

British Mandate in Palestine

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a majority of the lands in the Middle East were under the control of the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, systematic revolts against the Ottomans, coupled with the losses suffered in the Balkan Wars and the Great War, saw the

Ottoman Empire being driven out of the Gulf and the Levant (Khalidi, 2020: 27). Instead of independence, however, came the entrance of the British and the French, who carved up the Middle East in a manner which can only be described as arbitrary as per the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Thus, Arab states were colonised once again with no say in their sovereignty and although the faces of the colonisers changed, their methods barely differed at all. While the contemporary Middle East undoubtedly has remnants of Ottoman colonialism running through it, it was inarguably British and French colonialism which played the most significant role in shaping the Middle East as it is known today (Pappé, 2022: 7). British forces invaded Historic Palestine in 1920 and British occupation was granted legitimacy by the League of Nations in 1922 when it formally came to exist as a British Mandate. Those residing in Historic Palestine opposed the British invasion just as they had opposed the Ottoman invasion but were rendered powerless against one of the most distinguished colonial powers in the world. At the time, the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea was inhabited by ethnically Palestinian Arabs who made up a majority of the population, as well as an array of minority groups, including Jewish Arabs (Khalidi, 2020: 39). These groups banded together in an attempt to resist British colonisation but were ultimately unsuccessful as all uprisings were immediately stopped in their tracks.

Prior to the invasion of Historic Palestine by the British, the Balfour Declaration was signed. The 1917 Agreement outlined the potential for a Jewish homeland to be established in Historic Palestine (Pappé, 2022: 9). The creation of a solely Jewish state was imperative given the struggles Jewish people had faced across Western and Eastern Europe, as a result of their ethnicity and religion. Antisemitism in the form of discrimination and pogroms were on the rise in Europe and the Balfour Declaration sought to allow for the Jewish population to exist in a space away from the rising tides of antisemitism. In the Balfour Declaration, it stated clearly that this space would be created in Historic Palestine (Khalidi, 2020: 32). This, however, was not always the case, and the idea of a Jewish safe haven was first expressed with Kenya in mind. Kenya, a British colony at the time, was offered by the British to the Jewish people but later withdrawn. In the late 1800s, many contrasting ideas about the location of the Jewish homeland emerged, both from the Jewish people and the British, however, it appeared that a majority of individuals favoured the idea of Historic Palestine above all others. The Balfour Declaration proved to be especially useful in the aftermath of World War I when Jewish people migrated out of Europe en masse after experiencing unparalleled strife and hardship. Millions of Jewish people were flung around the world, with a majority settling in

Historic Palestine in the 1940s. This development paved the way for the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 (Pappé, 2022: 16).

Zionist Occupation

Zionism is a political ideology which has been associated with Judaism, so much so that today the two appear to be inseparable. This, however, is not the case. The former is an ideology which advocates the creation of a Jewish homeland and Jewish self-determination at the expense of an entire population, while the latter is an Abrahamic religion (Kahlidi, 2020: 12). Thus, the conflation of the two, while widely practiced, is erroneous. Theodor Herzl, the man known as the founding father of Zionism, established the movement at the end of the nineteenth century in response to the discrimination Jewish people were forced to endure in Europe (Pappé, 2022: 23). Herzl, determined to gain the support of influential figures, wrote to Cecil John Rhodes, the notorious coloniser of Southern Africa. In his letter, he asked Rhodes for support, stating that Zionism “is something colonial” (Halbrook, 1972: 103) and not all that different from the conquests carried out by Rhodes himself. This is perhaps the most accurate definition of Zionism, in the words of its founder himself – “something colonial” (Halbrook, 1972: 103). While Herzl was deciding where the Jewish homeland would be established, scores of Jewish people began migrating to Historic Palestine, particularly from Eastern Europe, in a bid to avoid pogroms which specifically targeted members of the Jewish faith (Khalidi, 2020: 77). Ethnic Palestinians rejected these initial waves of migration and in the 1930s, as Jewish migration to Historic Palestine began to increase rapidly, and carried out the Great Revolt. This is one of the first and most formative instances of revolutionary Palestinian nationalism. These waves of migration aligned closely with the plan of action proffered by Herzl (Pappé, 2022: 39). Herzl had, in his ideologies, particularly those outlined at the First Zionist Congress in Basel, insisted that members of the Jewish faith be provided with a safe homeland to which all believers could migrate and live in peace. In the twentieth century, this insistence came to fruition.

On 15 May 1948, the State of Israel was created. This coincided with the systematic expulsion of approximately 750 000 ethnic Palestinians and the razing of close to 500 Palestinian villages in what became known as *al-Nakba* (the catastrophe) (Khalidi, 2020: 42). Zionist militias were responsible for the systematic displacement of Palestinian men, women, and children and the destruction of their villages. The creation of the State of Israel would have been impossible without the exodus of close to one million ethnic Palestinians, one of the most prolific acts of

ethnic cleansing in the modern era (Pappé, 2022: 47). Swathes of land in Historic Palestine were seized in an attempt to create room for incoming Jewish settlers, millions of which took up residence on land which once belonged to Palestinians. With a significant proportion of Palestinians displaced around the Middle East and North Africa, those remaining within the borders were unable to combat Zionist forces, despite a multitude of attempts at resistance. Thus, ethnic Palestinians who remained in the State of Israel in the aftermath of *al-Nakba* were treated as second-class citizens and still are seen as inferior today (Khalidi, 2020: 44).

In 1967, the Six-Day War took place between Israel and a coalition of Arab states which included Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. After close to a week of severe fighting, Israel emerged victorious, seizing parts of the West Bank and the Golan Heights as trophies and expelling thousands of Palestinians and Syrians from these territories (Pappé, 2022: 93). This defeat became known as *al-Naksa* (the setback). Israel, although victorious, seized these territories illegitimately and still occupies them today, despite this occupation being in contravention of International Law (Khalidi, 2020: 97). The United Nations classifies the lands seized by Israel after the War of 1967 as being illegally occupied. The international body, however, has stressed time and time again that the borders before the Six-Day War be considered as official. Palestinians who reside in the West Bank live under Israeli occupation and suffer greatly in comparison to their Jewish counterparts (Pappé, 2022: 71). They face the risk of arbitrary imprisonment, and as of late, the risk of irrational eviction, both of which are entirely unjustifiable. Moreover, Palestinians are subjected to checkpoints which infringe on their right to freedom of movement, and those who live in the West Bank of the boundaries of the State of Israel are not allowed into the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip is known as the largest open-air prison in the world and those who reside within it are subjected to extreme difficulty should they desire to leave the Strip (Khalidi, 2020: 129). Thus, disregard for the freedom of movement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and enforcing the inhumane conditions they must live under is in transgression of International Law.

Revolutionary Nationalism

Palestinian nationalism is revolutionary in its entirety (Franjieh, 1972: 56). It seeks to overturn the existing hierarchy of power and implement a new order which is far more democratic, and which does not position Palestinian people as second-class citizens, but as a nationality which is awarded the same rights as their Israeli counterparts. Revolutionary nationalism is practiced

in myriad ways across occupied Palestine, with the two most common manners of practice being those of popular and organised resistance.

Popular Resistance

The First Intifada and Second Intifada saw the rise of popular resistance in Palestinian civil society. Although popular resistance arose in response to the initial entrance of Zionist forces and settlers in 1948, it grew gradually over the years and although full of crests and troughs, peaked during the Intifadas of the late 1980s and early 2000s. Loosely translated, the word ‘intifada,’ means ‘to be shaken’ or ‘to shake oneself,’ which is exactly what occurred in occupied Palestine during these uprisings (Said, 1989: 24).

The First Intifada began in the Jabalia Refugee Camp when a vehicle belonging to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) crashed into a car filled with four Palestinian civilians, all of whom were killed (Shikaki, 2002: 89). The event occurred on 9 December 1987 and the Israeli state denied that the crash was a coordinated one. Nevertheless, responses from Palestinian civil society came in the form of civil disobedience as they protested the illegitimate occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which began 20 years earlier, during the Six-Day War (Shikaki, 2002: 89). During the revolt, Palestinian civilians from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and beyond actively targeted the IDF and Israeli Police by barricading certain areas in Occupied Palestine, throwing stones and even Molotov cocktails at soldiers and police officers, and damaging Israeli infrastructure by repeatedly defacing it with pro-Palestine graffiti. Although there were several interventions from Palestinian organisations over the course of the First Intifada, a majority of the acts of resistance and revolutionary nationalism were carried out by Palestinian civilians who had no organisational affiliation whatsoever (Naser-Najjab, 2020: 66). Palestinian civilians also engaged in several suicide bombings. Other key aspects of the First Intifada were the general strikes which occurred across Historic Palestine, not just the territories which were illegally seized in 1967 (Naser-Najjab, 2020: 69). Across Palestine and Israel, Palestinians boycotted the Israeli Civil Administration, particularly in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Palestinians also orchestrated an economic boycott which was characterised by the refusal of Palestinians to work as labourers in Israeli Settlements and in Israeli factories and production plants. Many Palestinians also refused to pay taxes during this time and did not drive cars with Israeli license plates (Pressman, 2017: 522-524).

In response to the actions coordinated by ethnic Palestinians in the First Intifada, the State of Israel deployed approximately 80 000 IDF personnel who descended swiftly and harshly upon the occupied territories (Karkar, 2007: 10). These soldiers used disproportionate force to break up and shut down displays of revolutionary nationalism by the Palestinian people, including firing directly at peaceful protestors, shooting with the intention to maim, and employing a lethal amount of force (Karkar, 2007: 10). In the first year of the five-year, nine-month long Intifada, Israel killed well over 300 Palestinians while only 12 Israelis died as a result of the violence. IDF soldiers adopted brutal tactics which included beating Palestinians, including women and adolescents, with clubs, and firing semi-lethal plastic bullets at protestors. Although exact numbers are unclear, it is estimated that Israeli soldiers and police officers killed approximately 1 600 Palestinians during the First Intifada, and that 180 Israelis – just a fraction of the Palestinian victims – died throughout this period (Nasrallah, 2013: 81). After running its course, the Intifada officially came to an end on 13 September 1993. The Intifada gave way to the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), neither of which were the desired outcomes of the Palestinian popular uprising. The PA was supposed to take control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as per the Oslo Accords, yet this venture effectively failed as a result of Israeli interference and corruption, among other issues (Dana, 2015: 2). Thus, the Intifada had to be violently suppressed in order to bring the revolt to an end (Nasrallah, 2013: 85). Ultimately, the First Intifada was characterised by asymmetrical warfare as the Israeli state had significant financial and strategic advantages and Palestinians could not compete with these.

The Second Intifada, also referred to as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, occurred several years after the first and began on 28 September 2000 (Moghadam, 2003: 67). The 2000 Camp David Summit is often credited as being one of the primary triggers of the Second Intifada, which, in July 2000, was supposed to provide a sustainable solution to the Israeli occupation of Palestine but essentially failed to do so. Revolutionary nationalism and violent popular resistance reached a peak in September of that year when Ariel Sharon, who was the Prime Minister of Israel at the time, entered into the compound of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, surrounded by droves of soldiers and bodyguards (Moghadam, 2003: 69). His visit sparked an array of protests in the Holy City which were quickly shut down by Israeli soldiers and police officers who used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse protestors. For the duration of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Palestinians deployed a range of tactics, from suicide bombings and the opening of gunfire to the throwing of stones and the launching of homemade rockets (Moghadam, 2003: 90). The Second Intifada

was distinguished as being significantly more violent than the First Intifada. The rise in suicide bombings and the opening of gunfire can be attributed to the fear of failure on the part of the Palestinians and their reluctance to face suppression by Israeli forces, both of which took place in the First Intifada (Araj, 2012: 212). Approximately 3 000 Palestinians were killed by Israel over the four-years and four-months of the Second Intifada, while 1 000 Israelis – one third of the Palestinian casualties – died during this time (Araj, 2012: 218).

In order to quash the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which was proving to be far more violent than the First Intifada, IDF personnel and the Israeli police employed extensively violent measures (Araj, 2012: 223). Soldiers and police officers fired directly at groups of civilians and carried out strategic killings which targeted prominent figures of the popular resistance movement. Israeli forces also made use of military tanks and sophisticated aerial weaponry for which the Palestinian resistance had no equivalent (Araj, 2012: 224). Thus, the Second Intifada, again, saw Israel make use of tactical and strategic advances and Palestinians, in a desperate show of resistance in the aftermath of the failures of the First Intifada, turning to suicide bombings. The Al-Aqsa Intifada eventually came to an end in 2005, in the wake of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit. During the Summit, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), and Sharon came to an agreement in a bid to bring the violence to an end. Both leaders stressed the importance of peace over the duration of the Summit and affirmed their support for the Road Map for Peace Process, a plan which had been set into motion by the United States in 2003 (Swart and Solomon, 2003: 92). Coming years showed that the promises made at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit were moot and although violence quelled for a short while, soon enough, each of the warring sides betrayed their undertakings (Swart and Solomon, 2003: 100). Ultimately, the Palestinian uprising was suppressed for a second time, and despite the violence within the borders of the West Bank decreasing in the aftermath of the Second Intifada, Israel constructed the West Bank Fence and West Bank Wall to reduce the movement of the Palestinians (Araj, 2012: 228). Israel also withdrew from the Gaza Strip. Although this appeared to be a victory to the Palestinian people at the time, it was not, as Gaza soon became “largest open-air prison in the world” (Chomsky, 2012: 9).

Organised Resistance

The first act of organised resistance in Mandatory Palestine was the Arab Revolt in Palestine, also known as the Great Revolt, which began in 1936 and ended in 1939. The Great Revolt first began as an act of popular resistance when members of civil society across the British

Mandate of Palestine began to rise up against the British administration and its policy which allowed for Jewish immigration with the goal of establishing a 'Jewish National Home' in Historic Palestine (Suwaed, 2020: 74). Palestinians called for their independence in the face of British colonialism and imperialism which had allowed for the Jewish population in Mandatory Palestine to burgeon to 320 000 from just 57 000. Palestinians also protested the confiscation of territory from the *fellahin* (farmers) who had relied on their land as a source of livelihood. Just days into the uprising, the Society for the Defence of Palestine recruited militiamen from Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq to defend Palestinians from the British forces and incoming Jewish immigrants (Suwaed, 2020: 78). The Arab Higher Committee emerged as a political party which represented the ethnic Palestinians in Mandatory Palestine and endorsed the Great Revolt. Thus, the Society for the Defence of Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee were the first two organisations to engage in organised resistance in the British Mandate of Palestine. 1936 saw a mass strike occur across Mandatory Palestine. Beginning in Nablus, the strike spread like wildfire across Historic Palestine and was coordinated by local committees and trade unions (Suwaed, 2020: 80). In tandem with the General Strike began an armed insurrection. The insurrection started sporadically but quickly became organised as ethnic Palestinians targeted strategic locations, such as Mosul-Haifa oil pipeline which was bombed repeatedly and Jewish settlements which were attacked from time to time. Both the British Army and the Police Force of Palestine sought to brutally suppress the Great Revolt, particularly the General Strike and the armed insurrection, and to some extent, succeeded in doing so as the strike, which began in April, came to an end in October (Suwaed, 2020: 81).

A year after the Great Revolt began, in 1937, the Central Committee of National Jihad in Palestine, a newly formed organisation, entered onto the scene. This group was founded by ethnic Palestinians who were exiled by British forces and aimed to provide those fighting on the ground with assistance in the form of advice and funding. The fact that a majority of their members were in exile, scattered across the Middle East and North Africa, served as a massive stumbling block to the Central Committee of National Jihad in Palestine as they struggled to coordinate strategically and make a significant impact (Suwaed, 2020: 85). The Revolt lost momentum by 1938, and by 1939, it was fully suppressed by the British Army in tandem with the Palestinian Police. The suppression of the Great Revolt essentially paved the way for mass waves of Jewish migration from Europe which peaked in the aftermath of World War II when Jewish people fled from Europe due to the unprecedented suffering they faced in Nazi Germany

and surrounds during the Holocaust. Historic Palestine became a beacon of safety for Jewish people who lived as oppressed minorities their entire lives (Suwaed, 2020: 89).

After the creation of the State of Israel and *al-Nakba*, ethnic Palestinians found themselves becoming increasingly marginalised in their own homeland. This marginalisation served as fertile breeding ground for resistance movements to begin sprouting. An array of resistance organisations which sought to combat Israeli occupation were formed in the 1950s and 1960s. The largest of these is the PLO (Hamid, 1975: 101), which is comprised of multiple groupings; two of which carry the most weight – Fatah, founded in 1965 (Davidson, 2009: 2), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), founded in 1967 (AbuKhalil, 1987: 361). These parties each hold multitudes within them yet have one common goal: the liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state. For a majority of the twentieth century, Fatah and the PFLP, under the banner of the PLO existed as the largest resistance organisations in Palestine (Hamid, 1975: 101). Hamas (*Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmiyyah*), an organisation which is entirely separate from the PLO, emerged in 1987 and was preceded by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (Hroub, 2013: 254). While the organisations under the PLO are secular in dimension, Hamas adopts a far more Islamist approach.

More than the initial occupation which gave way to the creation of the State of Israel, the Six-Day War ignited the resistance movement in Historic Palestine. Fatah, founded two years before the War and the PFLP, founded the year of the War, used the fact that the occupation of Palestinian land by Israeli forces in the aftermath of *al-Naksa* was illegal to further their causes and recruit members into their organisations (Hamid, 1975: 102). Fatah and the PFLP grew exponentially and eventually, became resistance organisations which flourished across the country and intervened in all struggles affecting Palestinian people at the hands of the Israeli occupation. Methods of resistance were both violent and nonviolent, but primarily the latter in the case of Fatah (Davidson, 2009: 3) and a mixture of both in the case of the PFLP (AbuKhalil, 1987: 363). Hamas was founded two decades after the primary constituents of the PLO and took a rather different approach. Unlike its more secular counterparts, Hamas advocated for violent resistance in order to drive Israeli settlers out of Historic Palestine (Hroub, 2013: 258). Divisions within Palestinian resistance were fragmentary and perhaps, it could be argued, weakened the liberation movement instead of strengthening it.

Fatah is best known for its role in the Battle of Karameh in 1968 where the organisation employed tactics of guerrilla warfare as it carried out attacks on Israeli troops and settlers. The IDF attacked Karameh, a poorly equipped Palestinian village, filled with Fatah members and refugees (Terrill, 2001: 92). Much to the dismay of the IDF, Fatah held their ground, fighting back fiercely alongside the Jordanian Army which resulted in the rapid withdrawal of occupation forces. Fatah also played a role in attempting to stop Israeli forces from committing the Sabra and Shatila Massacres and invading Lebanon but were unsuccessful in their endeavours (Terrill, 2001: 96). Fatah is associated with Yasser Arafat who was one of the founders and the leader of the party until he died in 2004 (Sayigh, 2001: 49). Arafat was known as one of the members of Fatah who assisted in brokering the Oslo Accords which saw him and his party engaging with Israeli officials and signing an agreement which sought to bring peace to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The signing of the accords by Arafat and Fatah were seen as a betrayal to the resistance movement of Palestine and some of the tenets of the agreement, particularly those which would assist ethnic Palestinians, are yet to come to fruition (Sayigh, 2001: 53). In the aftermath of Oslo and the passing of Arafat, Fatah has advocated for nonviolent resistance, unlike the PFLP and Hamas.

Although Fatah is left leaning, the PFLP is far more to the left of the spectrum than its counterpart under the banner of the PLO. Two figures who characterised the PFLP were George Habash, its founder, and Leila Khaled, a Palestinian feminist best known as an aircraft hijacker (AbuKhalil, 1987: 370). A radical organisation, the PFLP pushed forth ideals of Pan-Arabism, and although it still does, the organisation is far weaker than it once was. The PFLP draws clear distinctions between itself and other member organisations of the PLO on the basis of ideological differences. The influence of the PFLP has shrunk greatly over the last few decades, but at its height, the organisation was a formidable force (AbuKhalil, 1987: 369). The most noteworthy acts of resistance and revolutionary nationalism carried out by the PFLP were the hijackings of civilian aircrafts. In 1970, the PFLP hijacked four planes carrying civilians and forcibly landed them in a desert near Zarqa, Jordan. The hijackers quickly released a majority of the hostages and kept only hostages which they believed to be of strategic importance, such as Rabbis and chemists. In response to this drastic act, the Jordanian government, in tandem with the Israeli state, launched attacks on the PFLP (Carlton, 2005: 42). A Marxist-Leninist and secular organisation, it espoused progressive ideals and offered a sharp and critical analysis of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The PFLP fought for the liberation and autonomy of Palestine and did this by targeting Israeli soldiers and security guards rather than settlers,

whether they were in public locations, aboard flights, or at overseas venues. A majority of their attacks against occupying forces took place prior to 2000, after which the party declined significantly (AbuKhalil, 1987: 377). Although the PFLP has been held responsible for several suicide bombings, it has stated clearly that it does not advocate for attacks of such a nature.

The Black September Organisation (BSO) was a radical Palestinian organisation which collapsed in the late 1980s. It was responsible for what can, perhaps, be described as the most daring forms of organised resistance and revolutionary nationalism carried out by Palestinians against their occupiers. The organisation derived its name from the Black September conflict, also known as the Jordanian Civil War (Singh, 2015: 135). The BSO was established when members of Fatah sought to avenge the deaths of Palestinian fighters and did so by targeting Jordanian leaders and armed forces alike. The organisation grew in size and militants from organisations such as the PFLP and Sa'iqa, as well as others, were quick to defect from their mother bodies in order to join. These targeted attacks eventually led to the capture, torture, and assassination of Wasfi Tal, the Prime Minister of Jordan in 1971 (Singh, 2015: 138). The following year, a second, and even more consequential attack was carried out by the BSO. The Munich Olympics took place in 1972 and a number of Israeli athletes were set to participate in the Games. The international contest was marred when members of the BSO took nine Israeli participants hostage, killing two Israeli athletes and a German police officer in the process. The athletes who were captured were killed over the course of several days (Singh, 2015: 140). The Munich Massacre drew international attention because of the staggering nature of the attack and resulted in Israel, led by Golda Meir, fiercely pursuing and assassinating attackers. Operations launched by Israeli forces debilitated the BSO, murdering a significant proportion of their leadership, culminating in the disintegration of the organisation (Seely, 2014: 386). The BSO committed acts of resistance and revolutionary nationalism which were essentially unprecedented in Palestinian history but paid an incredibly high price in the end.

Hamas is a radical Palestinian nationalist organisation which has adopted Sunni-Islamist and religious fundamentalist positions. An acronym of *Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-'Islāmiyyah*, translated to mean Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas is perhaps one of the most prolific Palestinian resistance organisations (Tamimi, 2007: 99). Newer than other Palestinian political organisations, Hamas has made significant strides in the 34 years of its existence, the most noteworthy of which is that it serves as the ruling party in the Gaza Strip. Prior to Hamas, the largest Islamist party in Palestine was the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which, after years

of internal strife, collapsed and gave way to Hamas, which was affiliated to the international body of the Muslim Brotherhood until 2017, when it made the decision to exist as a separate entity (Alijla, 2021: 437). Ruling over Gaza, in which approximately 2 million ethnic Palestinians reside, Hamas practices acts of resistance in various manners, a majority of which involve firing rockets at areas surrounding Gaza occupied by Israeli settlers, a majority of whom are protected by the Iron Dome and rarely hit by fire from Gaza. Hamas, although primarily concentrated in Gaza, has forces across Historic Palestine, all of whom carry out actions mandated by the organisation (Tamimi, 2007: 104). Ethnic Palestinians who pledge allegiance to Hamas and are able to find their way to populous cities and settlements often attempt to carry out attacks in the forms of bombing vehicles used for public transport and ambushing soldiers and settlers (Tamimi, 2007: 102). Some Hamas members participate in suicide bombings. The military wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, coordinates attacks but is fairly separate from the political wing of the organisation (Tamimi, 2007: 100).

Over and above Palestinian political parties, the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) Movement is another example of organised resistance in Palestine. Founded in 2005, the movement encourages the boycott of Israeli institutions and products, the divestment from Israeli businesses and companies, and the sanction of the Israeli state (Barghouti, 2021: 113). The BDS Movement makes use of only methods of nonviolent resistance and is a worldwide phenomenon which draws from the lessons of Apartheid South Africa (Barghouti, 2021: 113). The apartheid regime in South Africa came to an end for a number of reasons, one of which was that the international community boycotted South African institutions and products, divested from South African businesses and companies, and sanctioned the South African state. The fact that the BDS Movement uses only nonviolent methods differentiates the movement from other forms of resistance in Palestine. Moreover, it adds an entirely new dimension to the field of resistance and brings to the fore concepts ignored by other movements. The BDS Movement has had several successes as its resistance has given way to the boycott of institutions like Ben-Gurion University and products, like Ahava cosmetics. It has also resulted in conglomerates boycotting businesses like Sabra and companies like Elbit Systems, as well as certain states, such as South Africa, moving toward sanctioning Israel by seeking to downgrade their Embassy (Barghouti, 2021: 119).

Self-determination

Palestinian self-determination is limited greatly by the Israeli occupation of swathes of land which once belonged to ethnic Palestinians. This, however, does not hinder the desire of Palestinians to achieve greater degrees of self-determination in the face of an international system which does not recognise Palestinian statehood, but has granted the territory a measure of both informal and formal recognition.

Self-recognition

All populations striving for self-determination practice self-recognition, for without the latter, the achievement of the former would be impossible. This statement rings true when analysing the Palestinian case. Self-recognition from Palestinians with regards to their own self-determination comes in the form of brandishing flags, donning the traditional Palestinian garb, and calling for the right of Palestinians to return to what was once their homeland. Political consciousness is evident in all Palestinian practices of self-recognition. One exemplary instance of Palestinian self-recognition is that of the watermelon. During certain uprisings and revolts, Israel banned the Palestinian flag from being flown, and as a result of this, Palestinians began to carry slices of watermelon wherever they went (Liliani, 2013: 4). Although this served as a source of frustration to Israeli soldiers, there was not much that could be done and banning the carrying around of pieces of fruit would be nigh impossible. The locally-grown watermelons were the same colour as the Palestinian flag – red, green, black, and white – and thus became a symbol of self-recognition when the official symbol of self-recognition was banned (Liliani, 2013: 4). This is just one example of the many forms of self-recognition practiced by Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Informal Recognition

Under the banner of the PA, Occupied Palestine has diplomatic missions (Badarin, 2021: 1277). Of the 54 countries in Africa, 26 have Embassies representing the State of Palestine within their borders (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). Within the Americas, a majority of the diplomatic missions deployed by the State of Palestine are concentrated in Central America and South America due to the close ties between Israel and North America (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). There, however, exists Special Delegations from the State of Palestine in Canada and Mexico. Asia is undoubtedly the continent with the highest number of Embassies

representing the State of Palestine, with these being spread out across Central Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and the Indian Subcontinent (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). In Europe, it is Eastern European countries which have Palestinian Embassies within their borders. Western European states, however, have either Palestinian Missions, Special, or General Delegations (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). Australia has one single Palestinian General Delegation (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). Therefore, by hosting Palestinian diplomatic missions in their countries, hundreds of states provide the State of Palestine with informal recognition and recognise Palestinian self-determination (Badarin, 2021: 1281).

Formal Recognition

In October 1974, the United Nations recognised the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian population and permitted the organisation to participate in plenary sessions concerning the question of Palestine. Just one month later, the PLO was granted non-state observer status by the United Nations (Barakat and Amouri, 2022: 3). This allowed the PLO to participate in all sittings of the General Assembly as well as other gatherings of the United Nations. In 1988, the General Assembly passed a Resolution which formally acknowledged the Palestinian Declaration of Independence and instead of designation of 'Palestinian Liberation Organisation,' the occupied territory was then referred to as 'Palestine' within the system of the United Nations (Barakat and Amouri, 2022: 4). Under the supervision of the PA, in 2011, Mahmoud Abbas applied for the membership of Palestine within the United Nations. The next year, the State of Palestine was granted non-member observer state status as per a Resolution passed by the General Assembly. In 2012, too, it was decided that the territory of Palestine would, from there on out, be referred to as the 'State of Palestine' in all official documents and sessions of the United Nations (Barakat and Amouri, 2022: 17). Each of these decisions made by the United Nations effectively formally recognised Palestinian self-determination.

Statehood

The territory of Palestine, despite often being referred to as the State of Palestine, is not a state. There are myriad reasons for this classification. The fact, however, remains. Palestinians, despite striving to practice each and every form of self-determination, are yet to achieve the highest degree of it. Statehood is an elusive concept, and despite 138 countries in the international system recognising the right of Palestinians to self-determination and ultimately,

statehood, it has not achieved this pinnacle of self-determination (Farsakh, 2021: 329). On a multitude of occasions, Palestine has attempted to join the United Nations as a fully-fledged state, yet certain states have refused its ascension. These include several states in Western Europe and Oceania, and particularly the United States and United Kingdom, both of whom utilise their veto power to prevent Palestine from joining the United Nations (Sarsar, 2004: 459).

The Montevideo Convention of 1933 has explained that a territory must meet four requirements if it is to be classified a state. A territory must have a permanent population, a defined territory, a functional government, and the ability to conduct international relations (Dugard, 2021: 94). Approximately seven million Palestinians reside within the boundaries of Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories (Nijim, 2022: 9). This constitutes a sized permanent population. The defined territory of Palestine is highly disputed. According to the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and a portion of land in the northern region was assigned to the ethnic Palestinians while the remainder of the land would constitute a Jewish State (Falah, 2005: 1342). Although much of this land is under illegal occupation at present, it cannot be denied that Palestine has a defined territory. The third requirement is that of a functional government. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are defined by two separate entities, respectively Hamas and the PA (Sayigh, 2010: 8). Despite each of these organisations containing within them flaws and multiplicities, each serve the purpose of functional governments. Palestine has proven its ability to conduct international relations on multiple occasions. Palestine is an observer state at the United Nations and has diplomatic ties with dozens of countries (Irfan, 2020: 31). Despite this, Israel has essentially taken control over Palestinian foreign policy, significantly hindering strides attempted to be made by Palestinian foreign policy makers. Hence, Palestine does not meet the four requirements of statehood as per the declarative theory, despite being widely recognised under the constitutive theory.

Conclusion

The occupied territory of Palestine does not exist as a state in the contemporary international system but aspires toward statehood. Palestine is a territory which is rife with different forms of revolutionary nationalism, from popular to organised resistance, both of which are violent and nonviolent in dimension. Fighting for the right to self-determination through myriad avenues has become a key tenet of Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. Heavily

contested, the self-determination of Palestinians, despite being partially sponsored by international law, is yet to come to fruition in its entirety. Revolutionary nationalists, both within the occupied territories and around the world, are working tirelessly to ensure that Palestinian self-determination becomes a reality. Indeed, where there is occupation, there is intifada – this could not be truer in the case of Palestine.

Chapter 4: Western Sahara

Introduction

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), more commonly known as Western Sahara, is an enclave in North-West Africa which is classified as a non-self-governing territory within the international system. This classification extends to approximately 20 percent of Western Sahara, while the remaining 80 percent is occupied by Morocco, a neighbouring country. Over the course of centuries, the land of Western Sahara has been heavily contested by various communities, from the nomadic Amazigh to the Spanish colonists and the Moroccan occupiers. Resistance to incoming forces has been commonplace within Western Sahara and endures today as Moroccan forces occupy a majority of the territory. This chapter begins by delving into the historical background of Western Sahara, taking a look at Spanish colonisation and the Moroccan occupation. It then offers an analysis of revolutionary nationalism within the territory, examining both popular and organised resistance carried out by the Sahrawi people. Lastly, aspirations for Sahrawi self-determination are discussed.

Historical Background

Prior to the contemporary era, Western Sahara was populated by Amazigh tribes who traversed the territory as nomadic hunter-gatherers (Hart, 1998: 28). In the aftermath of the Berlin Conference and the Scramble for Africa, Spain acquired swathes of land in North-West Africa, including the territory of Western Sahara, all of which, in the colonial era, came to exist as Spanish Sahara. In the post-colonial epoch, Spain exited Africa, leaving behind Western Sahara in its wake (Kalicka-Mikołajczyk, 2020: 36). Morocco and Mauritania, both of which border Western Sahara, competed for control of the territory, with the latter eventually ceding to the former after suffering massive losses. Thus, Western Sahara came to exist as the last colony in Africa in the age of decolonisation, and still continues to exist in this very vein today (Smith, 2005: 553).

Spanish Colonisation

The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century saw European powers dig their claws into territories in the global South, each with the aim of beating their competitors and creating colonies which they could both exploit and reign over. In 1884, the

Berlin Conference saw the coming together of European states as they discussed their plans for the colonisation of Africa and the carving up of the continent which culminated in the Scramble for Africa. Spain was one of the countries in attendance at the conference and once colonial conquests began, was able to seize a significant portion of land in North-West Africa and successfully created a Spanish protectorate in the area in 1884 (Kalicka-Mikołajczyk, 2020: 37). The Spaniards took control of the region from Cape Bojador to Cape Blanc, including the provinces of Río de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra (Marks, 1976: 7). Spain extended its foothold in Africa over the years, starting with Western Sahara and then setting its sights on Cape Juby and Spanish Ifni, parts of Morocco which it gained control over in 1912. All of the territory belonging to Spain came to be known as the Spanish Possessions in the Sahara, or simply Spanish Sahara, which existed from 1884 up and until 1975 (Sampedro Vizcaya, 2019: 34).

It has been discerned that the early inhabitants of Western Sahara were the ethnonational groups of the Bafour and Serer. The Bafour are no longer in existence as they were absorbed by other groupings such as the Wolof, Tuareg, and Fulani, all of whom are native to the region (Hart, 1998: 49). The Serer still exist, but are found predominantly in Senegal, the Gambia, and Mauritania, and no longer live in Western Sahara. At the time of Spanish colonisation, Western Sahara was occupied by indigenous Sahrawi Amazigh Tribes, descendants of whom reside within the borders of Western Sahara today (Hart, 1998: 30). The Amazigh tribes are closely intertwined with Beni Hassān who migrated to North Africa from the Arabian Peninsula in the tenth century (Hart, 1998: 41). To the Spanish, the North-West Coast of Africa was an incredibly strategic location which could be used to extend their sphere of influence. Not only was it populated by several ports, it was also close to Spain, allowing for easy travel and transportation of goods (Shelley, 2004: 18).

Over the course of Spanish colonisation, Sahrawi people, a majority of whom spoke the Hassaniya language, a Bedouin dialect of Arabic, as a result of their close ties to the Beni Hassān, attempted to revolt against invading Spaniard forces, and although fierce and determined, were ultimately unsuccessful (Hart, 1998: 39). At first, stiff revolutionary nationalism was employed by the indigenous population although the resistance front slowly but surely began to fall apart. Spanish colonialists were incredibly well-equipped in comparison to the native hunter-gatherers and quickly halted any attempts at insurrection in their tracks. After World War II, waves of decolonisation washed over Africa and colonial powers left the continent. By 1956, Morocco had been granted independence from Spain and by 1975, Spanish

Sahara had been dismantled in its entirety (Shelley, 2004: 11). Morocco was able to gain independence from Spain prior to other Spanish colonies in the Sahara due to an agreement signed between Spain and France as the European powers exited the country. In 1956, Spain and France simultaneously dismantled their protectorates over Morocco and retroceded the territory to Moroccan royalty. Spain, however, continued to occupy surrounding territories, all of which were far less powerful than the Kingdom of Morocco (Ipek, 2020: 51).

Moroccan Occupation

Morocco gained independence from France by 1956. Ever since becoming an independent state, Morocco had laid claim to Western Sahara but was unsuccessful in competing with Spain for the territory for approximately 20 years and only made real headway in gaining control over the territory in 1975, when Spanish forces formally left the African continent (Sampedro Vizcaya, 2019: 17). On 14 November 1975, following a trilateral agreement between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania, the Spanish formally handed Western Sahara over to the two North African states which hurriedly divided the territory between themselves. Morocco gained control over two-thirds of Western Sahara which it sought to integrate into itself as its Southern Provinces, while Mauritania gained control over the remaining one-third of Western Sahara, dubbing it Tiris al-Gharbiyya (Mundy, 2009: 222). By the beginning of 1976, all traces of Spanish Forces had disappeared from North-West Africa with Morocco and Mauritania emerging as the dominant regional powers in the wake of the exit of the Spaniards (Mundy, 2009: 223).

Tiris al-Gharbiyya only existed until 1979, when Mauritania withdrew from Western Sahara due to extensive clashes with Morocco and pressure to leave from Algeria (Mundy, 2009: 228). Thus, with Mauritania gone, Morocco seized the opportunity and took control over the remainder of Western Sahara but was only able to successfully capture 80 percent of the land. The remaining one-fifth was held by indigenous Sahrawi people who fought for control of their territory against incoming Moroccan forces (Shelley, 2005: 9). In order to hold off the indigenous population, Morocco constructed a sand berm, to create a wall between the warring factions. From 1979 until 1991, Moroccan forces and Sahrawi guerrilla fighters waged a battle against one another for the control of Western Sahara (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 3). In 1991, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire between the Moroccans and the Sahrawi, and although there is essentially no winner in the event of a ceasefire, it was clear that the Sahrawi had

suffered losses far greater than those suffered by Morocco, the victor of this battle (San Martin, 2004: 654).

The United Nations declared that both Morocco and Western Sahara would have to participate in a referendum and sign a settlement plan in 1992 (San Martin, 2004: 659). These would detail the options Western Sahara had, integrating with Morocco or affirming its independence. Morocco stalled for five years until 1997 when the Houston Agreement came into existence, which sought to revive the referendum and settlement plan which had become obsolete. The Houston Agreement culminated in the Houston Accords which adopted the framework of the original Settlement Plan put forward by the United Nations in 1991 and was eventually signed by both parties (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2004: 52). In 2000, the Baker Plan was put into action when James Baker, a special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United States visited the opposing sides of the territorial dispute and sought to bring about peace by creating the Western Sahara Authority, an autonomous body which would give rise to a solution (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005: 183). This, however, failed as the King of Morocco deemed the plan to be outdated and thus impossible to implement in 2002. In 2003, following the rejection of the Baker Plan and the Western Sahara Authority, the Baker Plan II was devised and garnered worldwide support, including that of Western Sahara (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005: 188). The Baker Plan II differed significantly from its predecessor, the Baker Plan I, for an array of reasons. The second plan aimed to hand Western Sahara over to Sahrawi leaders for a period of five years, whereas the first plan was aimed at allowing Sahrawi self-determination to be practiced within a territory governed by Morocco (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005: 189). The plan was endorsed by the Security Council of the United Nations, the Algerian government, and the Polisario Front, but rejected by Morocco, and thus, fell through.

By 2004, the Baker Plan II had essentially failed, and the new King of Morocco affirmed his convictions to integrating Western Sahara into Morocco (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005: 202). Up and until today, Morocco has expressed no interest in the referendum and continues to occupy Sahrawi land. Over the years, the conflict as a result of the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara has seen crests and troughs. Fighting has broken out intermittently since the signing of the Houston Accords, often with Morocco as the aggressor (Shelley, 2005: 107). The Moroccan occupation had been largely condemned by the international community, but in 2020, when the Abraham Accords were making their way

across the Middle East and North Africa, everything changed. The Abraham Accords are a set of agreements struck between Israel and four states in the Middle East and North Africa, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco. The Accords were mediated by the United States and all parties involved benefitted significantly from the normalisation deal (Yossef, 2021: 1). As a result of the Accords, the United States struck a deal with Morocco declaring that it would recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara if Morocco recognised Israeli sovereignty over Palestine and established diplomatic relations with Israel (Singer, 2021: 449). Morocco agreed and subsequently, gained support from the United States which immediately recognised Moroccan control over Western Sahara (Singer, 2021: 450).

Revolutionary Nationalism

Ever since the entrance of Spain into North-West Africa, the Sahrawi have practiced revolutionary nationalism in myriad ways in an attempt to gain independence from their colonial overlords. These have continued into the contemporary era, against the backdrop of Moroccan occupation. Tactics of popular resistance have been employed by Sahrawi civilians while tactics of organised resistance have been employed by the Polisario Front as the Sahrawi population attempted to, and still attempts to, gain independence (Martin, 2005: 571).

Popular Resistance

Three intifadas, or uprisings, have been splashed across the landscape of popular resistance in Western Sahara, the first against the Spaniards and the second and third against Moroccan forces (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 11). Popular resistance appeared to be almost inherent to the Sahrawi people. As soon as the Spanish Forces entered the territory, modes of resistance were turned toward by a majority of the population as they sought to drive out the colonisers, as were they turned to when Morocco effectively took over the place of Spain in the aftermath of the exit of the European power (Kalicka-Mikołajczyk, 2020: 39).

The Zemla Intifada took place on 17 June 1970 (Lakhal, 2012: 46). Events began when *Harakat Tahrir*, or the Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Wadi el-Dhahab, an organisation which disbanded that very year, called for an audience with the Governor-General of Spanish Sahara, José María Pérez de Lema y Tejero (Lippert, 1987: 51). What started as a peaceful reading of a list of demands and goals in response to Spanish colonialism in the territory soon turned violent. Mid-demonstration, the audience was dispersed by Spanish police

forces who attempted to arrest the leaders of the *Harakat Tahrir* movement under the order of the Governor-General (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 14). Demonstrators in the audience resisted this attempt and began throwing stones at the police, which then led to the entrance of the Spanish Foreign Legion, a militia aligned to the Crown of Spain. The Legion opened fire on demonstrators, and although accurate numbers are unclear, it has been calculated that approximately eleven Sahrawi civilians were killed as a result of this attack (Lippert, 1987: 58).

The attack itself, alone, became known as the Zemla Intifada, yet in the days and weeks following the demonstration, members of *Harakat Tahrir* were hunted down by the Spanish Foreign Legion (Allan, 2016: 648). Although the leaders of the movement went into hiding, several were caught by Spanish Forces and subsequently imprisoned. Controversy arose when one of the commanders of the movement, Muhammad Bassiri, disappeared after he was jailed and was nowhere to be found. Suspicious members of *Harakat Tahrir* claimed that he was assassinated by the Spanish Foreign Legion and until today, it is unclear as to whether or not he was killed by Spanish Forces (Allan, 2016: 649). The Zemla Intifada may have seen the collapse of *Harakat Tahrir*, but did not see the collapse of Sahrawi resistance (Lakhal, 2012: 50). Suppression and abuse witnessed during the Zemla Intifada paved the way for a rise in popular resistance against Spanish forces. Anti-colonial sentiments grew among the general population, as did support for the armed struggle (Allan, 2016: 649).

The exit of Spain and the entrance of Morocco was a tumultuous time in Western Sahara as the territory was in a state of flux and was never able to predict what was coming next. When Morocco began to annex Western Sahara in 1975, popular resistance was fairly strong, but it was the forces of organised resistance which countered Moroccan hegemony over the territory, alongside the pockets of popular resistance forming across Western Sahara (Porges, 2019: 133). The war between Western Sahara and Morocco, and for four years Mauritania, saw a burgeon in tactics of guerrilla warfare against incoming forces as Sahrawi civilians actively fought against Moroccan forces, until the construction of the sand berm, and Mauritanian forces, until their withdrawal in 1979 (Besenyő, 2017: 30). The sand berm, also called the Moroccan Wall, brought about a stalemate of sorts as it placed a firm barrier between the warring parties and served as a hindrance to active combat. The Moroccan Wall was manned by troops, many of whom were attacked by Sahrawi snipers and guerrilla fighters (Porges, 2019: 141). The construction of the sand berm, coupled with the mass deployments of troops,

placed economic strain on Morocco, which, although supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and France, began to face financial strife (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 19). The Sahrawi resistance, although receiving support from Algeria and on occasion, Libya, too, found this sort of combat unsustainable (Mundy, 2017: 74). The ceasefire of 1991 eventually led to the quelling of popular resistance fronts in Western Sahara.

This trough did not last long. In 1999 the First Sahrawi Intifada began and lasted for five years until 2004 (Barca and Zunes, 2009: 160). The beginning of the Intifada was brought about as a result of protests beginning in the areas of Western Sahara under Moroccan control and in the rump of the territory which was, and still is, under Sahrawi sovereignty. In July 1999, King Hassan II of Morocco, a leader who had pledged reform across the territory, died. His promises of democracy passed away with him, and toward the end of 1999, it was clear to the people of Western Sahara that their political troubles were far from over (Fernández-Molina, 2019: 411). It must, however, be noted that King Hassan II, was a brutal leader who ruled over both Morocco and its occupied territories with an iron fist, and although he made promises, it was clear that he was, in no way, determined to keep them (Maghraoui, 2001: 73).

The Intifada officially started when Sahrawi university students staged a sit-in at al-Zemla Square in El-Aaiún, demanding scholarships to Moroccan Universities and attracting the attention of United Nations personnel who were staying at Najir Hotel, which overlooked the square (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 22). The students were not alone during the protest. They were joined by mineworkers, political prisoners, and members of civil society. The sit-in lasted 12 days and came to an abrupt end when Moroccan forces attacked protestors, beating and arresting demonstrators and driving some civilians out into the desert (Allan, 2016: 653).

Less than a week later, members of the popular resistance in Western Sahara organised another protest, during which they called for independence as well as a referendum (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 22). Demonstrations akin to these took place over the remaining months of 1999 and 2000 and saw the arrests of hundreds of Sahrawi protestors. Activists from Western Sahara accused Moroccan armed forces of maltreatment and torture which they endured during their detainment (Allan, 2016: 656). Protests occurred sporadically and spontaneously over the next few years in a similar fashion to those which took place in 1999 and 2000. Despite peace agreements, such as the Baker Plan I and the Baker Plan II, emerging during these years, instability plagued the territory (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005: 186). A significant development which occurred during these years was a proposal from the United Nations to

grant self-determination to the territory. Resolution 1282, passed by the Security Council in 1999, officially called for the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people, and although it was adopted, not much changed on the ground (Pabst, 1999: 71). This served as a spark to the fire of resistance which was raging among the popular front in Western Sahara and encouraged their desire to drive Moroccan occupiers out of their territory (Omar, 2008: 43).

At the end of 2004, when the waves of the First Sahrawi Intifada were crashing, the Second Sahrawi Intifada made its way to the shores of Western Sahara (Barca and Zunes, 2009: 157). The First Sahrawi Intifada did not technically come to an end, but was immediately transformed into the Second Sahrawi Intifada, also known as the Independence Intifada, the May Intifada, and the El-Aaiún Intifada, which began in May 2005 (Barca and Zunes, 2009: 158). The Second Sahrawi Intifada began in the capital of Western Sahara, El-Aaiún, when relatives of a Sahrawi prisoner accused of dealing drugs and insulting the Moroccan monarchy, were dispersed violently by the police. Relatives of the prisoner were protesting his transfer to a prison in Agadir (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 28). The police brutality faced by relatives of the prisoner sparked consistent protests in El-Aaiún in subsequent weeks and these soon spread across Western Sahara, reaching the towns of Smara and Dakhla. These uprisings took place in tandem with protests carried out by Sahrawi university students living in the Moroccan cities of Agadir, Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, and Rabat (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 29). Moroccan Police Forces attempted to quash these demonstrations. While the police were successful and were able to quell these protests, pro-Sahrawi sentiments were still in the Moroccan air, and these were seen through sporadic pro-independence protests led by Sahrawi nationals living within Moroccan borders (Barca and Zunes, 2009: 166).

The Second Sahrawi Intifada was marred by its first death in October 2005, when a Sahrawi man, Hamdi Lembarki, was killed as a result of police brutality while in the custody of Moroccan forces (Lamamra, 2015: 39). At the same time, hundreds of pro-Sahrawi, pro-Polisario Front protestors were arrested, a majority in Morocco. Over 30 well-known Sahrawi activists were also arrested by the Moroccan police, despite several of them not having participated in the demonstrations which took place over the course of the latter half of 2005 (Hoh, 2010: 41). The arrested Sahrawi nationals participated in a hunger strike which lasted 50 days before coming to an end for fear of the health and wellbeing of the political prisoners. In the aftermath of the hunger strike, the activists who had participated in the initial actions were all imprisoned for terms ranging from six months to three years (Hoh, 2010: 44). The pro-

Polisario activists were arrested for a variety of reasons, including membership of illegal organisations, damage of public property, rioting, and inciting unrest. Some of the prisoners were abused and tortured by their captors which sparked serious human rights concerns across the globe (Stephan and Mundy, 2009: 32).

The end of the Second Sahrawi Intifada saw the establishment of the Gdeim Izik protest camp in 2010, which is sometimes referred to as the Third Sahrawi Intifada, despite being far less impactful than the First and Second Sahrawi Intifada (Dann, 2014: 52). According to Noam Chomsky, the month-long protest at Gdeim Izik was one of the seminal incidents which occurred in the Middle East and North Africa in the months leading up to the Arab Spring, in tandem with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid (Lamamra, 2015: 41). At the beginning of 2011, again, protests broke out in El-Aaiún and Dakhla in Western Sahara. These were related to the Gdeim Izik protests and drew from the Arab Spring revolutions in the neighbouring countries of Tunisia and Egypt (Lamamra, 2015: 41). The sit-ins and protests which flared up across Western Sahara in 2011 were acts of popular resistance and further revealed the pro-Polisario sentiments hiding in plain sight in Sahrawi civil society (Dann, 2014: 55).

All three Intifadas carried out by Sahrawi nationals, within and out of the confines of Western Sahara took place as a result of popular resistance. A majority of the participants in the Zemla Intifada, the First Sahrawi Intifada, and the Second Sahrawi Intifada were not formally affiliated with resistance organisations (Allan, 2016: 659). Popular resistance grew immensely in refugee camps in the aftermath of mass displacement of Sahrawi nationals by Moroccan forces. Popular resistance still remains a salient feature in Western Sahara, and among Sahrawi men, women, and children who reside in the neighbouring countries of Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco (Zunes, 2006: 51).

Organised Resistance

The Polisario Front, or Frente POLISARIO (*Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro*), is the primary organ of resistance in Western Sahara. Formed in 1973, the Polisario Front, with strategic and tactical support from the nearby state of Algeria, has fought for the independence of the Sahrawi people, first against the Spaniards and then against the Moroccan forces (Seddon, 1989: 133). What began as a rebel movement morphed into the leading Sahrawi nationalist liberation movement. The Polisario Front has its roots in the

Embryonic Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, a formation created by students at Moroccan Universities who attempted to organise and call for an end to Spanish colonisation (Hodges, 1983: 45). The movement initially failed to garner governmental support, and thus reconstituted itself as an armed rebellion in Western Sahara, which was called Spanish Sahara at the time (Hodges, 1983: 47).

In 1973, the rebel movement was formally constituted as an organisation which sought to launch an armed struggle against occupying Spanish Forces. At first, the Polisario Front was made up of university students, Sahrawi nationals who had served the Spanish forces, and a handful of Mauritians (Hodges, 1983: 45). At its inception, the Polisario Front attacked *Tropas Nomadas*, groups of Sahrawi militiamen who worked for the Spaniards, seizing their land and weapons (Paul et al., 1976: 17). The Polisario Front grew in strength and militiamen began to desert the *Tropas Nomadas* and join the rebel organisation in their fight against the colonisers. By 1975, the Polisario Front was made up of approximately 800 men and women fighting for the liberation of Western Sahara, but it has been suspected that the organisation had access to a far larger network at the time (Chatty, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Crivello, 2010: 70).

The exit of Spain and the entrance of Morocco and Mauritania simply saw the occupiers of Western Sahara take on different faces and identities while employing similar tactics to those of their predecessors. In 1976, Morocco took over Saguia El Hamra and Mauritania took over Río de Oro (Bookmiller, 1991: 64). In response to these occupations, in February 1976, the Polisario Front began to wage a fierce guerrilla war against Morocco and Mauritania in the hopes of retrieving their land (Besenyő, 2017: 28). While fighting this guerrilla war, the Polisario Front simultaneously provided aid and assistance to Sahrawi civilians leaving their homes out of fear of being attacked by the Royal Moroccan Air Force which carried out bombings on the Sahrawi refugee camps of Umm Dreiga, Tifariti, Guelta Zemmur, and Amgala (Balduino, 2015: 4). With nowhere to go, the Polisario Front relocated Sahrawi refugees to areas in and around Tindouf, a region in the west of Algeria. In these years, the Polisario Front burgeoned as thousands of refugees joined their ranks and both Algeria and Libya provided the liberation movement with funds and weapons (Borshchevskaya, 2019: 62). By the end of 1978, the Polisario Front had grown exponentially. Thousands of armed soldiers were at their disposal and instead of camels, they made use of 4x4 vehicles which they captured from Moroccan Armed Forces. The Polisario Front opted for sophisticated assault rifles, also

captured from Moroccan forces, to replace their muskets, many of which were from the nineteenth century (Paul et al., 1976: 20). Tactics of guerrilla warfare were the main asset of the Polisario Front. Members of the armed wing of the movement used hit-and-run tactics and sprung surprise attacks on opposition forces in Morocco, Mauritania, and Western Sahara (Paul et al., 1976: 21).

In 1979, Mauritania had suffered losses to both Morocco and the Polisario Front and withdrew from Western Sahara after signing a peace agreement with the Polisario Front in which it recognised Sahrawi sovereignty over the territory. Tiris al-Gharbiyya, which was once under Mauritanian control, was quickly annexed by Morocco (Besenyő, 2017: 41). The Moroccan Wall, built in the mid-1980s, changed the dimension of the conflict indefinitely. The sand berm was massive and spanned approximately 2700 kilometres, dividing Western Sahara into two portions, the larger of which was controlled by Morocco and the smaller of which was under the administration of the Polisario Front (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 19). The sand berm served as a huge obstacle to the war as neither side was able to directly contend against the other. Despite the hindrances brought about by the sand berm, the Polisario Front continued to carry out artillery strikes, but the fact that the berm was in favour of the Moroccan forces could not be overlooked. The sand berm enclosed the economic hubs of Western Sahara, such as the capital city of El-Aaiún, as well as Bou Craa, and Smara, blocking the Polisario Front from entering these with ease. At present, Morocco is in control of these hubs, and the Polisario Front in control of the liberated territories east of the sand berm (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 20).

The ceasefire spearheaded by the United Nations, as well as the Baker Plan I and the Baker Plan II failed to broker peace between Morocco and the Polisario Front (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005: 188). While overt fighting did not take place on a large scale since 1991 when the ceasefire was first called for by the United Nations, the ceasefire was eventually broken in November 2020, after almost 30 years of covert war (Besenyő, 2021: 641). The Polisario Front, upon finding out that Morocco utilised force to remove peaceful Sahrawi protestors blocking a road to Mauritania, declared that they would resume their military operations against their occupiers. In early 2021, members of the Polisario Front attacked the Moroccan berm using commando-style tactics, to which Morocco responded with brute force (Mundy, 2022: 63). Since the ceasefire was broken, clashes between Morocco and

the Polisario Front have been on the rise, with Morocco emerging victorious in a majority of these.

The Polisario Front is a left-wing organisation which has one primary objective: the liberation of Western Sahara from Moroccan control. On multiple occasions, the Polisario Front has affirmed that it is strongly against terrorism, stating that it is vehemently against civilian attacks. The organisation went as far as sending condolences to Morocco in the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca bombings which saw the death of 45 people, 33 victims and 12 suicide bombers (Healy, 2011: 69). The attackers clearly targeted non-Arab and Jewish-owned businesses in a series of attacks which devastated not only the city but the entire country. Even though Morocco was an enemy of the Polisario Front, as a result of the occupation underway in Western Sahara, the organisation offered its sincere condolences to Morocco. The Polisario Front has stated consistently that it is committed to achieving the liberation of Western Sahara by any means necessary, armed struggle notwithstanding. It has made it clear that even though it advocates for armed struggle, this does not include an armed struggle against unarmed civilians, but only against armed occupation forces (Healy, 2011: 69).

The Polisario Front does not exist within a vacuum. The organisation has, since 1975, received unwavering support from the government of Algeria in the form of financial aid, arms, and even food. Algeria has also played a role in training Sahrawi guerrilla fighters. Compared to Algeria, other surrounding countries are not as involved in the conflict and are fairly neutral when it comes to the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara (Zoubir and Ben-Abdallah Gambier, 2005: 193). Since its exit from Western Sahara in the late twentieth century, Mauritania has not attempted to involve itself again. Despite the territory of Western Sahara being of significance to North-West Africa, most countries in the region have chosen to back neither Morocco nor the Polisario Front and maintain a sense of neutrality.

Presently, the Polisario Front has an armed wing, as well as several wings which are more concerned with the political and bureaucratic aspects of the occupation, such as organisations within the organisation focused on women, youth, and workers, as well as the General Popular Congress (Makhmutova, 2021: 144). While each of the branches of the Polisario Front actively works toward the liberation of Western Sahara and the freedom of the Sahrawi people, it is the armed wing, the Sahrawi People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which has made the most progress in doing so. The SPLA has no navy or air force but is in possession of an army with a fair amount of reserved personnel. At the time of the war with Morocco, prior to the ceasefire, men

and women over the age of 18 from Sahrawi refugee camps were required to undergo military training, yet at present, this practice has ceased (Makhmutova, 2021: 149).

When the Polisario Front began as an organisation which lacked structure in 1973, members had to see to it that they were able to acquire their own armaments and equipment in their revolts against Spanish Forces. However, by the time they struck a deal with Algeria in 1975 as the Polisario Front sought to counter Moroccan occupation, they were able to accrue weapons and other technical gear with the assistance of Algiers, and from time to time, sympathetic parties in Libya (Borshchevskaya, 2019: 62). During the period of the war with Morocco, the SPLA, under the banner of the Polisario Front, received tanks, armoured vehicles, towed artillery, rocket launchers, guns, missiles, and radars from the USSR, North Korea, and China through Algeria and Libya (Borshchevskaya, 2019: 62). All of this military equipment was deployed against Moroccan invaders as the Sahrawi people fought for control over their land.

Over the course of its existence of close to 50 years, the Polisario Front has fought tirelessly, first against Spanish colonisation and then against Moroccan occupation. The liberation of Western Sahara and the freedom and independence of the Sahrawi people is the primary objective of the organisation, and this has been made clear on multiple occasions. The key aim of the Polisario Front, currently, is to take back the 80 percent of the land which is under Moroccan control and integrate in into the 20 percent of the land which is under Sahrawi administration (Healy, 2011: 69).

Self-Determination

Sahrawi self-determination is oftentimes obstructed by Moroccan claims to Western Sahara, yet this does not suppress it in its entirety. The people of Western Sahara attempt to achieve various degrees of self-determination down several avenues and while sometimes successful, often fail to do so. A majority of actors on the international stage overlook Sahrawi self-determination and although this negatively affects the progress made by the people of Western Sahara, it does not stop them from trying to gain measures of both informal and formal recognition (Smith, 2005: 558).

Self-recognition

Self-recognition is effectively the first step a nation would take toward the final goal of complete and holistic self-determination. The Sahrawi population, both in Western Sahara and in the diaspora, practice self-recognition in an array of ways. In Western Sahara, people raise their flag, despite being barred from doing so, and call for the return of Sahrawi refugees from the camps in Tindouf, Algeria. One of the main aims of self-recognition for the Sahrawi people is that of the recognition of their homeland, which they have affirmed is for all the people of Western Sahara and should be free of foreign invaders (Farah, 2010: 30). Political awareness is an important factor of Sahrawi self-recognition. One of the traditions among the people of Western Sahara which reflects this is that of storytelling and maintaining an oral record of history and self-recognition. For decades, historical accounts and stories have been passed down from generation to generation, creating a rich narrative of self-recognition. These are incredibly important to Sahrawi people as, without a homeland, they struggle to practice methods of self-recognition tied to territory. Over and above this, Sahrawi people sing folk songs and wear traditional clothing to assert the fact that they recognise themselves and are striving toward higher degrees of self-determination (Farah, 2010: 31). Morocco has tried to quash these traditions but has often been unsuccessful in its attempts. While the occupying power can confiscate flags, it cannot stop the tradition of storytelling which is still prevalent in the territory and the diaspora.

Informal Recognition

Western Sahara has entered into diplomatic relations with several states, despite Morocco aiming to stop these from progressing. A majority of states on the international stage, however, do not conduct diplomatic relations with the Sahrawi people, primarily because they have close ties with Morocco, but also because Western Sahara is a small territory with a miniscule economy and no sway in the international arena. Officially, Western Sahara is represented by the Polisario Front, thus, it is members of the Polisario Front which represent the territory in diplomatic missions abroad. There are no foreign diplomatic missions represented within the borders of Western Sahara, despite the territory having maintained amicable relations with several states around the world. Currently, Western Sahara has representation in the form of diplomatic missions in 12 states, seven of which are on the African continent: Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). Within Central America and Latin America, Western Sahara is represented in four countries:

Cuba, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). In Asia, Western Sahara only has a diplomatic mission in one country on the subcontinent: India (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). Thus, despite 45 member states of the United Nations officially having recognised Western Sahara, the territory has only deployed diplomatic missions to twelve of them.

Formal Recognition

Within the United Nations, Western Sahara is not awarded the privileges typically awarded to states, nor is it ever referred to as a state, but rather, a territory. In 1963, when portions of North-West Africa were still under Spanish administration, Western Sahara was classified, by the United Nations, as a non-self-governing territory. The United Nations does not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Sahrawi territory; however, it does not see Western Sahara as an official state, even today. Since 1963, the United Nations has not changed the classification of Western Sahara, despite significant developments, such as the exit of Spain and the entrance of Morocco, taking place in the territory (Corell, 2010: 272).

Statehood

Although the territory of Western Sahara aspires toward achieving statehood, the highest form of self-determination, it is yet to do so. Western Sahara may have made significant strides in the decades after Spain left the Sahara, but many of these have been both overshadowed and undone by Morocco and its occupation of a majority of Sahrawi land. The Polisario Front has, from Algeria, been calling for statehood to be bestowed upon Western Sahara and although the organisation has been unsuccessful in its endeavours, it continues to do so tirelessly (Farah, 2010: 30). Thus, despite 45 states in the international arena recognising the state of Western Sahara, the territory has not achieved statehood.

In order to be classified as a state, the Montevideo Convention claims that a territory must meet four requirements. If a territory has a permanent population, a defined territory, a functional government, and the ability to conduct international relations, it is formally a state (Dugard, 2021: 94). Western Sahara is sparsely populated, with approximately 500 000 indigenous Sahrawi residing within its borders (Zunes and Mundy, 2022: 1). Despite the low number, this can still be classified as a permanent population. According to the Polisario Front and several others, with the exception of Morocco, Western Sahara has a defined territory (Zunes and Mundy, 2022: 1), thus meeting the second requirement. The Polisario Front effectively serves

as the government of Western Sahara but is not fully functional due to the fact that a majority of its structures are based in Algeria (Borshchevskaya, 2019: 63). Therefore, Western Sahara fails to meet the third requirement of statehood. Although Western Sahara conducts relations with certain states and even has embassies in some countries, it is not officially a member of the United Nations and cannot entirely conduct international relations (Barreñada-Bajo, 2022: 1255), only partially meeting the fourth requirement. Moreover, it is Morocco which takes charge of the foreign policy of Western Sahara. Thus, since Western Sahara fails to meet one of the four requirements and only partially meets another, it cannot be classified as a state. According to the constitutive theory, Western Sahara cannot be classified as a state because only very few countries recognise the right of the Sahrawi people to statehood.

Conclusion

Despite failing to achieve the status of statehood on numerous occasions, Western Sahara is filled with sentiments of revolutionary nationalism, all of which point in the direction of achieving statehood. Organised resistance, combined with myriad types of popular resistance, some of which have been violent and some nonviolent, have all called for the Sahrawi people to be allowed to exercise various degrees of self-determination, first under Spanish colonisation and then under Moroccan occupation. Western Sahara is yet to achieve formal and informal recognition before being granted statehood, yet this does not deter revolutionary forces among the Sahrawi population. The status of Western Sahara has always been a heavily contested one, and now even more so, but this only fuels forward revolutionary nationalism in the occupied territory. Western Sahara is under occupation, and where there is occupation, there is intifada.

Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis

Introduction

The cases of the Palestinian and Sahrawi people are remarkably similar. Both Palestine and Western Sahara are territories in the region encompassing the Middle East and North Africa, both are under belligerent occupations by powerful countries which wield far more influence than they do, and both are seeking independence and sovereignty, despite having been denied these on multiple occasions. A stark similarity between Palestine and Western Sahara, and one which has been focused upon for the duration of this research report, is that of the revolutionary nationalism employed by the indigenous people in each of these territories as they are forced to endure and live under military occupation. Palestinian and Sahrawi people, alike, have turned to various modes of resistance, from organised to popular, and violent to nonviolent, each with various degrees of success. This chapter compares and contrasts these tactics of revolutionary nationalism and resistance, as well as the degrees of self-determination achieved by the people of Palestine and Western Sahara.

Historical Background

The colonisation of Palestine and Western Sahara by European powers, Britain and Spain respectively, were set into motion in the late nineteenth century and accelerated in the early twentieth century. Each of these colonial ventures came about as a result of agreements and accords between European powers which effectively sanctioned the carving up of Asia minor, more commonly known as the Middle East, and the African continent. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed by the British and the French in 1916, split the region of the Middle East between these powers (Khalidi, 2020: 33), with Britain scooping up Historic Palestine, Jordan, and Kuwait as a part of its spoils, and Lebanon and Syria falling to France. Iraq was arbitrarily divided between Britain and France. Spain, among myriad other European states, was party to the Berlin Conference of 1884, which saw European powers lay claim to various portions of the African continent in what came to be known as the Scramble for Africa. As a result of these accords, Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain were all able to seize parts of the African continent which were then placed under their control and effectively operated as their colonies, despite having been previously sovereign territories (Davidson,

1986: 37). The Spanish took control over portions of Morocco and Western Sahara, both of which, combined, were branded as the Spanish Sahara.

Colonial control of both Palestine and Western Sahara came about as a result of agreements signed between European powers with no consultation of indigenous people who were subjected to colonial rule, many tenets of which cost the local populations greatly. Britain served as the colonial overlord of Palestine from 1923 until 1947 (Khalidi, 2020: 30), and Spain served as the colonial overlord of Western Sahara from 1884 until 1976 (Shelley, 2004: 11). Both of these colonial powers severely disrupted the functionality of these territories and indeterminably altered the political landscape of each of these enclaves. Inarguably, both of these colonial ventures paved the way for the subsequent occupations of Palestine and Western Sahara by Israel and Morocco.

In 1947, Britain agreed to exit Historic Palestine, as per prior agreements, including the Balfour Declaration, and, as per the partition plan put forward by the United Nations. Zionist forces then took control over a majority of Historic Palestine in an event which came to be known as *al-Nakba* (Khalidi 2020: 18). These agreements and plans, coupled with the horrific persecution and pogroms faced by Jewish people across Europe, and Eastern Europe in particular, allowed for the mass migration of members of the Jewish faith to Historic Palestine. The Holocaust, a key aspect of World War II, sped up the migration of Jewish people to the Middle East (Pappé, 2022: 9). The War, which ended in 1945, gave way to the partial exodus of hundreds of thousands of Jews, many of whom migrated out of Europe and made their way to the Americas, Asia, and even Africa, with a majority settling in a part of the Middle East in what was, at the time, Historic Palestine. In the three years leading up to *al-Nakba* in 1948, the Jewish population in Mandatory Palestine burgeoned, and eventually gave way to the creation of Israel, fulfilling Zionist aspirations as per the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Khalidi, 2020: 31). Approximately 750 000 ethnic Palestinians were displaced to make room for incoming Jewish settlers, the number of which grew exponentially as the 1950s washed over the region of the Middle East. The displaced Palestinians were forced to live as refugees in the country which was once theirs or in camps across the Middle East and North Africa, where many still reside today. Over the course of its existence, Israel has consistently encroached upon Palestinian villages, particularly those in the West Bank and continued to displace ethnic Palestinian men, women, and children, despite this practice being illegal under international law (Pappé, 2022: 72).

In 1884, as soon as the details of the Berlin Conference were finalised and ironed out, Spain began to make its way to North-West Africa. The creation of Spanish Sahara occurred as a direct result of the conference and the carving up of the African continent by European countries (Sampedro Vizcaya, 2019: 34). Spain took over swathes of land in North-West Africa, positioning the indigenous, predominantly Arab and Amazigh, population as inferior. Spanish invaders opted to occupy Western Sahara for only a short time before returning home, doing so on a rotational basis spanning close to a century. Very few Spaniards chose to stay in Western Sahara, thus almost no settlers remain today, although the descendants of a few still reside within Morocco. Both territories formerly comprised Spanish Sahara but settlers tended toward Morocco due to the fact that it was far more advanced and sophisticated than Western Sahara. As soon as Spain left North-West Africa as a result of the Madrid Accords, Morocco stepped forth as the dominant power (Sampedro Vizcaya, 2019: 17). After defeating Mauritania for the control of Western Sahara, Morocco was quick to exert its control over the territory, using Moroccan settlers and resources as pawns and using its power to subjugate Western Sahara in its entirety. Ethnic Sahrawi people have been displaced and reside in refugee camps, predominantly in Western Sahara and Algeria as a result of Moroccan incursion, while Moroccan nationals have taken over Sahrawi land. Presently, 80 percent of Western Sahara is under the administration of Morocco, yet Moroccan forces have consistently attempted to take control over more of Western Sahara as the resistance movement grows weaker (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier, 2005: 182).

Justifications for Colonisation and Occupation

European powers tended to justify their imperialist ventures using the “Three C’s of Colonialism: Civilisation, Christianity, and Commerce” (Richardson, 1917: 28). To the Europeans, populations who did not adhere to Eurocentric modes of being were the uncivilised, atheistic, Moorish, and impoverished ‘other’. European colonial ventures were often justified by claiming that imperialists and settlers were bringing civilisation, Christianity, and commerce to the rest of the world, whom they believed to be lightyears behind, still in the dark while Europe was basking in divine light. European colonialists were staunchly of the belief that their customs were the epitome of civilisation, that Christianity was the only true religion, and that the European model of commerce and trade was the perfect one. At present, countries which still practice imperialism can no longer use the three C’s to justify their colonialism (Richardson, 1917: 29), but have resorted to other means.

During its conquest of Historic Palestine, Britain essentially practiced all three C's of colonialism. Despite Palestinian civilisation having been shaped by years of colonial ventures, from the Romans to the Ottoman Empire, British colonialists still sought to bring to fruition the British way of life but were not particularly successful in doing so. Palestinian civilisation was well-established and was not open to alterations brought by incoming colonialists (Lloyd, 2012: 66). A majority of the population of Historic Palestine was Muslim, with a small percentage of Jews and Christians residing within the borders of Mandatory Palestine. Britain was not as successful in Palestine regarding Christian missions as it was in other countries. Despite directing its efforts toward Muslims and Jews, as well as seeking to convert Christians from Catholicism to Protestantism, Britain made only miniscule strides in its religious ventures (Kark, 2004: 219). Regarding commerce, Britain was not especially successful either, and faced labour strikes from ethnic Palestinians as they protested against British commercial practices (Suwaed, 2020: 78).

Upon entrance into what was then Spanish Sahara, part of which is Western Sahara today, Spain attempted to carry out the three C's of colonialism. Spain found the civilisation to be incompetent in comparison to their own, which they inarguably saw as superior. The Spanish sought to purvey their own conception of civilisation and were partially successful, as observed in contemporary Morocco, also a part of Spanish Sahara, where Spanish influence is overtly visible. This influence, however, was not as effectively extended to Western Sahara (Tofiño-Quesada, 2003: 147). When the Spaniards arrived in North-West Africa, Islam was the dominant religion practiced in the region. Although Spain often placed a large emphasis on the spread of Christianity during the colonial epoch, it did not focus as closely on this component of the three C's in Spanish Sahara. That is not to say that Spanish invaders did no missionary work at all, rather that Christianity was not the focal point of Spain during the imperial conquest in the land that they had secured during the Berlin Conference (Cairo, 2021: 1535). Western Sahara had, for centuries, used the barter system, but this was overthrown over the course of colonisation in favour of a more conventional, monetary system. Moreover, Spain placed a great emphasis on the natural resources present in Western Sahara and sought to refine and monetise them (Lalutte, 1976: 8).

The State of Israel, which employs the practices of apartheid (Davis, 2003: 1) in order to subjugate Palestinian people, justifies its colonial invasion and occupation using religious lore and scripture. According to the Jewish scripture, the Torah, Jewish people should live in a place

of sanctity. The 'Land of Israel' and the 'State of Israel' are not synonymous. The former is what is referred to in the Torah, a place where Jewish people can live and practice their religion, free from persecution. The latter refers to the contemporary State of Israel which came about as a result of colonial ties and Zionist aspirations (Wolfe, 2006: 391).

Today, Morocco justifies its occupation of Western Sahara by claiming that prior to colonisation by Spain, Western Sahara was formally a Moroccan province. This claim is effectively baseless due to the fact that there are clear differences between not only the people of Western Sahara and Morocco, but the lands themselves. Essentially, Morocco took control over Western Sahara because the former is far more powerful than the latter and aspired to claim Sahrawi land and resources as its own, which it successfully did, despite being in contravention of international law. Morocco has little evidence to back its claims over Western Sahara yet remains an adamant occupier (Smith, 2015: 269).

The ties between Israel and Morocco cannot be overlooked. These were highlighted in 2020 when the United States agreed to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara if Morocco recognised Israeli sovereignty over Palestine (Singer, 2021: 448). Morocco consented to the Abraham Accords, and this agreement cemented the relationship between the two occupying powers in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. Both Morocco and Israel both justified the legitimisation of the occupation of the other, claiming that they did so in order to establish economic and military ties, among others, but it is glaringly clear that each made massive political gains and obtained massive amounts of legitimacy for each of their illegitimate occupations through the Abraham Accords (Singer, 2021: 449).

Revolutionary Nationalism

Revolutionary nationalism is oftentimes a viable strategy of resistance turned toward by people under occupation. According to Resolution 37/43, the United Nations "reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle" (United Nations, 1983). This resolution can undoubtedly be applied to the cases of both Palestine and Western Sahara. Not only are the Palestinian and Sahrawi people struggling for independence, they are also striving for territorial integrity and national unity. The people of Palestine and Western Sahara are still attempting to throw off the yoke of historic colonial and foreign domination by Britain and Spain respectively, as well as rising up against

foreign occupation by Israel and Morocco (Khalidi, 2020: 17; Zunes, 2006: 49). This revolutionary nationalism and resistance takes on many forms, armed struggle included.

Popular Resistance

The intifadas were the most significant and impactful instances of popular resistance which have occurred in the occupied territories of Palestine and Western Sahara. To date, two Intifadas have taken place in Palestine and three in Western Sahara. Each of these have ‘shaken’ the hierarchy in the occupied territories, as implied by the word ‘intifada’.

In Palestine, the First Intifada began in 1987 and was set into motion by an IDF vehicle crashing into a van, resulting in the deaths of four Palestinians. Palestinian civil society rose up against the occupying power, protesting the crash as well as the illegal occupation of the West Bank which began 20 years prior, after the Six-Day War of 1967. The First Intifada was characterised by ethnic Palestinians across Palestine and the State of Israel standing up against the matrix of power. The First Intifada ended in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords (Naser-Najjab, 2020: 62). The accords were brokered by the United States and reiterated the importance of bringing an end to the intifada, both by Palestine and Israel. The Second Intifada, also called the Al-Aqsa Intifada, began in 2000 with one of the causes being the Camp David Summit, which was an insult toward the Palestinians. The spark which lit the powder keg of the Second Intifada was the visit of Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister of Israel, to the compound of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, which immediately led to the eruption of protests (Moghadam, 2003: 68). The Second Intifada ended with the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in 2005 where Palestinian and Israeli leaders met to discuss the importance of putting an end to the uprisings. Both intifadas were extraordinary instances of revolutionary nationalism and resistance in Palestine.

The Zemla Intifada took place in 1970 when the Sahrawi population rose up against Spanish invaders. The intifada began with a peaceful demonstration when Sahrawi nationals sought to read out a list of demands before the Spaniards with Sahrawi civilians in the audience. What began as a peaceful demonstration turned violent when Spanish forces began shooting at the crowd, killing 11 civilians (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 14). The next intifada in Western Sahara, known as the First Sahrawi Intifada, began in 1999, and this time, acts of resistance were directed toward Morocco instead of Spain. The intifada coincided with the passing of King Hassan II of Morocco, who had promised to address the issue of the occupation prior to

his death. The intifada officially began when Sahrawi students carried out a peaceful protest at Zemla Square, demanding scholarships to attend Moroccan universities. The students were joined by Sahrawi civilians who had been directly affected by the occupations (Pabst, 1999: 71). The demonstration lasted 12 days and came to an end when Moroccan soldiers descended on the crowd, arresting some, beating others, and driving remaining protestors out into the desert. A few days after the demonstration was broken up, members of Sahrawi civil society organised rolling protests which spanned several months. These took place sporadically until 2004. It was these protests that, inarguably, gave rise to the United Nations putting forth a proposal which sought to grant independence to Western Sahara (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 22). In May 2005, the Second Sahrawi Intifada, also known as the Independence Intifada, the May Intifada, and the El-Aaiún Intifada, began. The protests endured for months and reached even the far-flung refugee camps and towns in the territory (Barca and Zunes, 2009: 158). The Polisario Front suffered great blows at the hands of Moroccan forces over the duration of the intifada and lost members due to long-term imprisonments and hunger strikes (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 29). The Second Sahrawi Intifada served as a pebble which sent ripples through the pond of the Middle East and North Africa and is classified by some as a seminal event in the Arab Spring (Lamamra, 2015: 41) but overlooked by others.

Ultimately, two Palestinian intifadas and three Sahrawi intifadas allowed for the formation of resistance networks, a chance for the world to see the horrors of occupation, and for strides to be made by indigenous peoples in confronting their occupiers. The darker side of the coin, however, is that thousands of lives were lost across five Intifadas, brutality was normalised, and further modes, and perhaps more violent modes, of occupation were entrenched (Araj, 2012; Barca and Zunes, 2009). Similarities and differences can be discerned between the Palestinian intifadas and the Sahrawi intifadas, with the most glaring one being that the former took place on a much larger scale than the latter. This is for a number of reasons; the Israeli occupation is backed significantly by Western hegemonic powers while the Moroccan occupation is backed on only a small scale. Also, Historic Palestine contains within it sites of religious significance and Western Sahara does not, and there is a clear ethnic difference between Palestinians and Israelis but not one between the Moroccans and the Sahrawi. Far more Palestinians than Sahrawi people lost their lives during the intifadas, and this is due to the fact that the Israeli state was armed to its teeth while its Moroccan counterpart, although wealthy and well-equipped, had far fewer resources (Yilanci, Eryüzü, and Hopoğlu, 2020: 46-47). Threads of similarity can be woven between the popular resistance movements in Palestine

and Western Sahara. Palestinian and Sahrawi citizens have, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, mobilised against their colonisers and occupiers, and the most notable of these mobilisations have been the intifadas, which have shaken power hierarchies, some to their core and others at only a surface level (Karkar, 2007: 10; Allan, 2015: 653).

Organised Resistance

Palestinian and Sahrawi people have, since the beginning of their occupations and even dating back to their colonial epochs, made use of organised resistance and revolutionary nationalism to rise up against oppressive powers. In Palestine and in Western Sahara, over the course of British and Spanish colonisation as well as Israeli and Moroccan occupation, dozens of resistance organisations have cropped up, each with different political leanings and varying degrees of commitment to the struggle for liberation. While some organisations have been short-lived, others have spanned decades. Although the vast ideological differences between resistance organisations tend to create friction within the broader resistance movement, a majority of organisations are capable of finding some sort of common ground to develop ties over, typically that of national liberation.

Many, if not most, resistance organisations which purport sentiments of revolutionary nationalism under colonisation and occupation are on the left of the political spectrum and draw strongly from Marxism and its variants. Marxist theory has, time and time again, stated that the oppressed party seeks to rise up against their oppressor and topple existing hierarchies which place them at the bottom and their persecutors at the top (Marx and Engels, 1967: 1). Organisations in Palestine and Western Sahara have stated, repeatedly, that they are left-leaning and seek to use tactics which are inherent to socialism and communism in their battles against their colonisers and occupiers (Alexander, 2003: 33; Zunes, 1987: 41). Resistance organisations seek to put the theory to practice, and in so doing, embody the ideology of Marxism. This has been seen on a multitude of occasions in Palestine and Western Sahara as oppressed peoples have risen up against their occupiers using resistance organisations as conduits and Marxist and revolutionary nationalist theory as a guiding light.

Palestine and Western Sahara both exist as occupied territories which are rife with resistance organisations, perhaps the former more than the latter. During the era of colonialism when the British and Spanish ruled of these territories, resistance organisations formed almost organically in response to European imperialism. In Mandatory Palestine, the Arab Higher

Committee and the Central Committee of National Jihad in Palestine rose up to defend their land not only from British invaders but also from droves of European Jews who migrated to Historic Palestine with the permission of the British. These two Palestinian organisations carried out the Great Revolt, also referred to as the Arab Revolt in Palestine, in tandem with the Great Strike, as they sought to defend their homeland from outside forces (Suwaed, 2020: 77). Ultimately, these organisations were defeated by the British, who were far more powerful than they were, and this defeat sped up the process of Jewish migration to Historic Palestine. Despite suffering a loss, these organisations paved the way for the tradition of organised resistance which is a staple in Palestine today. In Western Sahara, *Harakat Tahrir*, or the Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Wadi el-Dhahab, mobilised Sahrawi civilians to put pressure on the Spanish forces in their quest for liberation (Lippert, 1987: 51). Despite the fact that this organisation was characterised by tactics of peaceful resistance, Spanish invaders used force against those who participated in the wave of protests which crashed over Western Sahara. Another organisation which fought against Spanish colonisers was the Embryonic Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro. This organisation was founded by ethnic Sahrawi students studying at Moroccan universities who used their platform to call for the dismantling of Spanish colonialism (Hodges, 1983: 45). These organisations paved the way for organised resistance to be woven into the tapestry of Sahrawi history and still exist today.

In the aftermath of the exit of the British and the Spaniards, instead of gaining independence, Palestine and Western Sahara were occupied, a stark contrast to the global trend of decolonisation. While other countries were shedding the yoke of European imperialism, the Palestinian and Sahrawi people found new albatrosses around their necks in the form of Israeli and Moroccan occupation. Thus, just as organised resistance had emerged to counter British and Spanish colonisation, so did it emerge to counter their successors, Israel and Morocco. In Palestine, dozens of organisations made their way to the fore, all with the common goal of Palestinian liberation in the face of Israeli occupation. These organisations varied in size and strategy and each had varying degrees of success in countering Zionist hegemony. By the end of the twentieth century, two organisations had superseded all the others. One of these was the PLO, comprised of organisations such as the PFLP and Fatah, among others, represented the Palestinian struggle and placed an emphasis on the more secular dimensions of the liberation movement (Hamid, 1975: 101). The other was Hamas, preceded by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, and overtly Islamist organisation which sought to use religious tactics in order to

propel forth Palestinian nationalist aspirations (Hroub, 2013: 254). Naturally, friction developed between these organisations, in spite of both having Palestinian liberation as their primary outcome and despite each being left-leaning to a certain extent. In Western Sahara, only one organisation surfaced above the rest and this was the Polisario Front, an organisation which has declared itself to be the rightful ruling party of Western Sahara. The Polisario Front was formed shortly before the Spanish exodus from North-West Africa and has remained a forceful resistance organisation for decades (Seddon, 1989: 133). On the left of the political spectrum, the Polisario Front often attempts to highlight that occupation is not always carried out by Eurocentric, white invaders, but can also be perpetuated by neighbouring states with whom the indigenous population shares many traits, including ethnicity, language, and even a colonial legacy (Chatty, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Crivello, 2010: 66). Despite the Polisario Front headquarters residing in the neighbouring state of Algeria, the resistance organisation controls approximately 20 percent of Western Sahara, and despite continuous Moroccan encroachment, is attempting to widen its sphere of influence by using tactics of both violent and nonviolent resistance (Besenyő, 2017: 41).

From British and Spanish colonialism and imperialism to Israeli and Moroccan occupation, the people of Palestine and Western Sahara have turned to organised resistance as a viable means of defiance against their invaders and oppressors. Organised resistance has proven to be an effective tool for people under occupation and although Palestinian and Sahrawi organised resistance has seen troughs and crests over the years, the strides made by the Arab Higher Committee, the Central Committee of National Jihad in Palestine, the Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Wadi el-Dhahab, and the Embryonic Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro cannot be denied. These organisations have been incredibly influential and have played an instrumental role in giving rise to their successors. Presently, resistance organisations like the PLO, Hamas, and the Polisario Front have tried tirelessly to fight against occupying forces in their quest for national liberation and have made progress in many shapes and forms in doing so.

Self-Determination

Neither Palestine nor Western Sahara have achieved the pinnacle of self-determination for colonised peoples: statehood. According to the ICJ, all people have the right to self-determination. Those who were colonised, however, have not only the right to self-

determination, but along with that, the right to statehood (Coleman, 2010: 66). Neither Palestine nor Western Sahara were granted this right. In the aftermath of colonisation by the British and Spanish, the Palestinian and Sahrawi people were subjected to secondary colonisation and occupation by Israel and Morocco before getting a chance to assert their independence. Thus, the colonial and occupational ventures of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have hindered the Palestinian and Sahrawi people from their right to self-determination and their right to statehood.

Self-recognition

The people of Palestine and Western Sahara, despite having many obstacles in their path, religiously practice self-recognition. Both populations unabashedly wave their national flags, chant for their liberation, and don their traditional dress, even when faced by occupying forces which openly attempt to stop these practices (Liliani, 2013: 4; Farah, 2010: 30). When indigenous populations are hindered from practicing self-recognition and their attempts at expressing their national identity are deemed illegal, they resort to creative methods of expression, as seen when Palestinians carried around watermelons after their flag was formally banned by the State of Israel (Liliani, 2013: 4). Often, indigenous Palestinian and Sahrawi people are stopped from articulating their self-recognition, and in these cases, popular and organised resistance, as well as displays of violent and nonviolent resistance, are used to assert Palestinian and Sahrawi national identity and self-recognition (Liliani, 2013: 4; Farah, 2010: 30). On extreme occasions, Israel and Morocco go as far as putting up their own flags and national symbols on Palestinian and Sahrawi land and sites and these displays are mostly, if not always, met by acts of resistance and revolutionary nationalism from the indigenous populations.

Informal Recognition

Both Palestine and Western Sahara have diplomatic missions around the world, although it must be noted that the former has many more than the latter. A majority of these diplomatic missions are based in the global South (Embassy Worldwide, 2022), many are in countries which have experienced the effects of colonialism and imperialism first-hand, and are sympathetic to the conditions to which the Palestinian and Sahrawi people are subjected. Palestine is represented by the PA and Western Sahara is represented by the Polisario Front. Both territories also have Special and General Delegations, again, with Palestine having these

in far more countries than Western Sahara. At the United Nations, 138 states have recognised the sovereign autonomy of Palestine and 45 states have recognised that of Western Sahara (Embassy Worldwide, 2022). These numbers have fluctuated since the inception of each occupation for a number of reasons, but remain stable at present. In recognising Palestine and Western Sahara at the United Nations, these states have recognised that the Palestinian and Sahrawi people are deserving of the right to self-determination in its entirety but have been denied this liberty on myriad occasions.

Formal Recognition

Palestine enjoys significantly more formal recognition than Western Sahara. Palestine is an observer state at the United Nations (Barakat and Amouri, 2022: 3), while the international body recognises Western Sahara as a non-decolonised territory, treating it as a non-self-governing territory (Corell, 2010: 272). At first, Palestine was referred to as the 'Palestinian Liberation Organisation,' but in 2012, under the leadership of the PA, Palestine began being referred to as the State of Palestine and continues to be called this today (Barakat and Amouri, 2022: 17). Western Sahara, however, was never promoted in the way that Palestine was and does not have the ability to sit in on and contribute toward the General Assembly and other official conventions and meetings of the United Nations (Corell, 2010: 272).

Statehood

Palestine is not a state in the international realm, nor is Western Sahara. At many junctures, each of these territories have strived for statehood but have been unsuccessful in their endeavours. Despite each being recognised by multiple states, neither have attained the classification of statehood. Thus, even though Palestine and Western Sahara are recognised by members of the United Nations, which is a requirement for statehood as per the constitutive theory, neither has formally been classified as a state. Resistance organisations and civil society based in each of the territories have, for years, been calling for statehood to be bestowed upon Palestine and Western Sahara but have failed to garner the support they need (Farsakh, 2021: 329; Farah, 2010: 30). Even though the Palestinian and Sahrawi people have the support of much of the global South, there is virtually no support for these territories in the global North, a hemisphere which holds far more sway than its developing counterpart.

Neither Palestine nor Western Sahara meet all four requirements of the declarative theory of statehood (Dugard, 2021: 94). The first requirement is a permanent population. Palestine has a population of seven million (Nijim, 2022: 9) and Western Sahara has a population of 500 000 (Zunes and Mundy, 2022: 1), each of which is permanent. In doing so, both Palestine and Western Sahara fulfil the first requirement of the theory. The second is a defined territory. Although land in Palestine is heavily contested, Palestine does have a defined territory according to the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (Falah, 2005: 1342), as does Western Sahara (Zunes and Mundy, 2022: 1). Even though their territory is illegally occupied, Palestine and Western Sahara both meet the second requirement. The third is a functional government. The PA serves as the government for West Bank with Hamas having control over the Gaza Strip (Sayigh, 2010: 8), and the Polisario Front serves as the government for Western Sahara (Borshchevskaya, 2019: 63). Even though the Palestinian structures are riddled with issues, they are effectively functional and meet the third requirement. A majority of the structures of the Polisario Front are in exile in Algeria and have little control over the Sahrawi people. Thus, Western Sahara fails to meet the third requirement. The fourth is the ability to conduct international relations. Even though Palestine has proven its ability to establish diplomatic ties around the world, it only does so for territories belonging to Palestine and not those under Israeli occupation. Palestine is often hindered by Israel in its attempts to conduct international relations and has a large amount of its foreign policy shaped by its occupier (Irfan, 2020: 31). Western Sahara is often incapable of conducting international relations and establishing diplomatic ties with other states. Moreover, much of Sahrawi foreign policy is controlled by Morocco (Barreñada-Bajo, 2022: 1255). Therefore, both Palestine and Western Sahara fail to fully meet the fourth and final requirement. Hence, as per the requirements of the declarative theory, neither Palestine nor Western Sahara is a state. As per the constitutive theory of statehood, Palestine and Western Sahara are only recognised by a limited proportion of states in the international sphere.

Is Revolutionary Nationalism Effective and Sustainable in Palestine and Western Sahara?

In the post-Cold War era, the acknowledgement of the right to self-determination is commonplace, but the acknowledgement of the right to statehood is far less frequent and often seen as highly controversial. The struggle for resistance in Palestine and Western Sahara, both popular and organised, however, have stated on a number of occasions that statehood is the

ultimate goal of revolutionary Palestinian and Sahrawi nationalism (Khalidi and Samour, 2011: 14; Badarin, 2021: 1277). Although gaining access to the right to self-determination in various degrees is seen as a significant gain, statehood, the highest degree of self-determination, is the most desirable outcome. Thus, the means to the end in Palestine and Western Sahara is revolutionary nationalism in its many shapes and forms. As examined in preceding chapters, revolutionary nationalism can be popular or organised and violent or nonviolent, but always appears to have a high price, typically in the form of human lives.

Negotiations are not always seen as a viable alternative by peoples under colonisation and occupation. When asked why the Palestinian people refused to negotiate with the Israeli government, Ghassan Kanafani, a famous Palestinian artist and writer, compared a conversation between the occupier and the occupied as a conversation between the sword and the neck (Qutami and Zahzah, 2020: 68). Oftentimes, people under occupation, specifically staunchly nationalist individuals and organisations see negotiation as a betrayal. The Oslo Accords and the Baker Plan in Palestine and Western Sahara were seen as perfidy by certain factions within the revolutionary nationalist movements (Said, 1993: 4; Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 3). Negotiation is always a tense path to wander down as in any negotiation. It is evident that the occupier has the upper hand and the occupied peoples are likely to buckle and settle for far less than they had initially bargained for due to the pressure they find themselves under when in a room with their oppressors (Qutami and Zahzah, 2020: 67). Thus, as has been proven by the trajectory of events in Palestine and Western Sahara, negotiation was, at first, seen as a potential route to take, yet a majority of the negotiations in which the Palestinian and Sahrawi people have found themselves have worked in favour of their Israeli and Moroccan occupiers (Khalidi and Samour, 2011: 14; Badarin, 2021: 1277).

Revolutionary nationalism is not a uniform concept and takes on many different forms ranging from popular to organised and violent to nonviolent. Popular resistance is carried out by civilians who are committed to the goals of self-determination and statehood, despite not being involved in any organisational structures within the occupied territories. Organised resistance takes place within established structures and has a far more concrete pathway to follow than its popular counterpart. Both of the aforementioned forms of revolutionary nationalism can be violent or nonviolent in their practices. The former, however is typically nonviolent and may turn violent, while the latter can be either of the two. When modes of revolutionary nationalism turn violent, it is likely that lives will be lost. This has been best illustrated in the cases of

suicide bombers during the intifadas and the launching of attacks on the vehicles and posts of occupying forces, both in Palestine and Western Sahara (Hage, 2003: 69; Stephen and Mundy, 2006: 8). This, however, is not exclusively the case for violent forms of resistance, and lives, usually those of the occupied peoples, are lost when practicing nonviolent forms of resistance. Instances of passive resistance have led to the loss of lives of occupied peoples. Occupying forces tend to see any act of resistance as violent, even when it is one which is overtly peaceful, such as a picket or protest. Thus, Israel and Morocco have attacked civilians carrying out acts of nonviolent resistance on a multitude of occasions, claiming that they felt that their regime was under attack by peaceful protestors. A prime example of this is the Great March of Return which took place in Gaza. The protest saw Palestinians approach the fences of the open-air prison, chanting for their right to leave Gaza in order to visit the West Bank and other areas in Palestine, as well as foreign countries. IDF soldiers saw this as a threat and actively attacked and shot at peaceful protestors (Jones, 2022: 3). In Western Sahara, peaceful protestors blocked off the road connecting the territory to Sub-Saharan Africa, preventing Moroccan vehicles from passing. The road which the protestors occupied was one of extreme economic importance to Morocco and as a result of this, Moroccan forces launched attacks against unarmed Sahrawi civilians in order to remove them from the road, breaking the 29-year-long ceasefire (Mundy, 2022: 75). Thus, whether occupied peoples resort to violent or nonviolent modes of revolutionary nationalism, they are met with violence from occupying forces which they cannot stave off due to the asymmetrical nature of each of their capacities. Since all acts of revolutionary nationalism carried out by the occupied peoples in Palestine and Western Sahara are met by violence, certain individuals and organisations may be inspired to turn toward violent resistance.

Ultimately, revolutionary nationalism is the most effective and sustainable alternative, despite having its disadvantages. Resolution 37/43 of the United Nations states that it “reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle” (United Nations, 1983). Thus, if any and all means, notwithstanding armed struggle, are available for people living under colonisation and occupation, it would only make sense for the oppressed peoples to use the tools and methods at their disposal in their quest for self-determination and statehood, regardless of the negative implications they may have.

Conclusion

Ultimately, as much as Palestine and Western Sahara are similar, they are also different. Both are cases of occupation in the region of the Middle East and North Africa which came into existence in the post-colonial epoch once their European colonisers had exited the region. Both are under belligerent occupation and face extreme difficulty when attempting to assert self-recognition and self-determination. An important similarity which was highlighted over the duration of this chapter is that of the revolutionary nationalism in Palestine and Western Sahara. Populations of both of these territories practiced popular and organised, as well as violent and nonviolent resistance under British and Spanish colonialism, and under occupation by Israel and Morocco. While Palestine was occupied by incoming European Zionists, Western Sahara was occupied by its neighbouring state, and this is a key difference between these cases of occupation. A similarity, however, is that both occupying countries are far more powerful than the territories they occupy. Another difference is that the case of Palestine garners far more attention than that of Western Sahara and this is for many, predominantly geopolitical, reasons. It can thus be concluded that although myriad parallels can be drawn between Palestine and Western Sahara, their differences must not be overlooked in this process.

Conclusion

In the era in which the world presently finds itself, more than three decades after the end of the Cold War, certain territories are still striving for self-determination and statehood through modes of resistance and revolutionary nationalism, despite not having been granted these rights when decolonisation swept across the globe and myriad territories were granted the right to self-determination and statehood, one after the other. Two such territories, Palestine and Western Sahara, are striving for these rights using methods of resistance and revolutionary nationalism, and although the Palestinian and Sahrawi people have each achieved several degrees of self-determination, neither of these peoples have been granted statehood.

This research report began by outlining the parameters of nationalism in its first chapter. Nationalism is an ideology which has been around for centuries and has been a salient actor on the international stage. Both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism have played a key role in shaping the world of nation-states in which we find ourselves today. Chapter one has then gone on to flesh out the theoretical aspects of revolutionary nationalism, providing examples of the different forms of this practice that emerged, many of which came to the fore over the course of the twentieth century. It then proceeded to explain the different forms of resistance, paying particular attention to popular and organised resistance, as well as violent and nonviolent resistance. Resistance is a critical tenet of revolutionary nationalism and the former is almost inseparable from the latter. A similitude that can be found between many, if not most, of these struggles of resistance and revolutionary nationalism is that all of these uprisings took place against the backdrop of an entrenched hierarchy. The aim of these revolutionary nationalist struggles was to disrupt, and even overturn, these hierarchies, and to a degree, success was achieved in some of these endeavours.

More often than not, one of the aims of resistance and revolutionary nationalism is the right to self-determination, followed by the right to statehood, the highest degree of self-determination. The second chapter of this research report has discussed, at length, the concept of self-determination. Self-determination, while incredibly complex, has a definition which has been agreed upon under international law. It can be defined as the expression of national consciousness or a national identity, and this is often perceived differently by different communities, all of whom have different manners in which they express themselves. The chapter has also developed a scale upon which self-determination can be measured. The scale

positions self-recognition as the least significant form of self-determination. This is followed by informal recognition, and then formal recognition. Lastly, statehood is positioned as the highest degree of self-determination. Several territories around the world are yet to achieve either two, three, or four degrees of self-determination, despite having achieved the first degree. Failure to achieve these has been reflected by the unfolding of events on the international stage.

The third chapter of this research report has focused on the case of Palestine. This began with a narration of the historical background of Palestine with a focus on developments in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Although Palestine has a long and complex history, the last two centuries were focused upon for the purpose of brevity. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East was divided between European powers as per the Sykes-Picot Agreement. As a part of its colonial spoils, Britain was allocated large swathes of land, including Historic Palestine. Under British administration for only a short time, Palestine soon fell into the hands of the Zionists according to the Balfour Declaration, which Britain assisted in brokering. The influx of Zionist migrants from Europe, coupled with the exit of Britain and dwindling Palestinian organisations, led to the creation of Israel, which has been described as an apartheid state, in 1948. Today, Palestinians live under a regime of Israeli occupation which is brutal and makes use of many tactics which characterise and are akin to apartheid. Revolutionary Palestinian nationalism, although present under British colonialism, has burgeoned under Israeli occupation, and has both violent and nonviolent dimensions to it. Chapter three has extensively discussed popular resistance, particularly in the form of the intifadas, and organised resistance, with an emphasis on the largest resistance organisations in Palestine. Lastly, the third chapter has placed the case of Palestine on the scale of self-determination developed in chapter two. Palestine has been able to meet the first criteria due to the fact that it has a permanent population and has met the second criteria because it has a defined territory, according to the plan put forward by the United Nations in 1947. Despite having a very fractured government, Palestine has been able to fulfil the third criteria of having a functional government. The last criteria which explains that a state must be able to conduct international relations is, however, not met in its entirety, thus Palestine has been unable to fulfil all four requirements of the Montevideo Convention, and therefore, has failed to attain statehood.

Western Sahara was the primary focus of the fourth chapter of this research report. Like in the previous chapter, this chapter focused on the developments which occurred in the twentieth

and twenty-first centuries. Sahrawi land has been the site of disputes for years, but these were omitted from this chapter for the sake of relevance. The Berlin Conference of 1884 paved the way for European countries to gain entrance into Africa with colonialist motives. At the conference, the continent was carved up, with portions of North-West Africa falling into the laps of the Spaniards. Spain invaded the region, dubbing the area Spanish Sahara, and imposed colonial rule on the Arab and Amazigh, as well as other indigenous people, for close to a century. After the Madrid Accords and widespread waves of decolonisation, Spain left North-West Africa, but Spanish hegemony over Western Sahara was quickly replaced by Moroccan domination once the North African power defeated Mauritania. Morocco has, over the years, seized control over 80 percent of Sahrawi land, claiming it as part of its southern provinces. Revolutionary Sahrawi nationalism organically arose in response to Spanish colonisation and Moroccan occupation, intensifying in recent years. Revolutionary nationalist practices have been both violent and nonviolent in an attempt to achieve freedom in the face of an oppressive power. The fourth chapter paid close attention to popular resistance, particularly *intifadas*, of which Western Sahara has experienced three, and organised resistance, with a focus on the Polisario Front, the primary resistance organ in the occupied territory. Finally, this chapter has placed Western Sahara on the scale of self-determination developed in chapter two. Western Sahara has a permanent population, and in doing so, has met the first criteria. It also has a defined territory, despite Morocco having laid claim to a large portion of it, fulfilling the second criteria. Western Sahara, however, does not have a functional government as its leadership is effectively in exile in the neighbouring state of Algeria. Moreover, Western Sahara is unable to conduct international relations. Thus, by failing to meet all four requirements of the Montevideo Convention, Western Sahara has failed to achieve statehood.

Parallels can be discerned between historical struggles and those with a more contemporary dimension, including the struggles for a free Palestine and a free Western Sahara. These are compared and contrasted in the fifth and final chapter of this research report. Both Palestine and Western Sahara are in the MENA region, both have been colonised by a European power and the occupied by another, and both have sentiments of revolutionary nationalism on the ground, alongside myriad other similarities. In Palestine and Western Sahara, resistance and revolutionary nationalism first arose in response to colonisation by Britain and Spain, and then changed direction in an attempt to combat belligerent occupation by Israel and Morocco. Thus, these struggles have followed similar trajectories, particularly in the realms of resistance and revolutionary nationalism. In Palestine and Western Sahara, popular and organised resistance

have been woven into the tapestry of the territories for decades, and have taken on patterns akin to one another. In the realm of popular resistance, Palestinian and Sahrawi nationals have risen up in the form of five combined intifadas which spread like wildfire across the occupied territories and saw participation from men, women, and even children. In terms of organised resistance, both Palestine and Western Sahara have been the site of several left-wing, Marxist organisations, albeit the former more than the latter. Over the years, Palestine has had an array of organisations, ranging from the PFLP to Fatah, take up the mandate of organised resistance, and is also home to some fundamentalist organisations, such as Hamas, which have similar but not identical aims. In Western Sahara, the Polisario Front exists as the primary resistance organ, and although other organisations have cropped up over the years, they have been liminal in comparison.


In Palestine and Western Sahara, like in other colonised and occupied territories, revolutionary nationalism and resistance arose inevitably. This phenomenon can, in part, be attributed to the fact that Palestinian and Sahrawi people saw no other alternative when faced with a belligerent opponent. At present, however, when looking back upon the deeply complex situations in each of the territories, it can be discerned that negotiation could have been a viable approach to a certain extent. Yet, when face-to-face with a strongly armed and powerful adversary, negotiation is not always the first tactic which comes to mind, even though there are instances of negotiation which took place in the occupied territories of Palestine and Western Sahara. These instances are best exemplified by the Oslo Accords and the Baker Plan, among others, a large proportion of which have failed. Hence, the rise of revolutionary nationalism in the forms of violent and nonviolent resistance, with the former taking root when the latter appeared futile. Attempts at nonviolent resistance, such as peaceful protest have quickly turned violent following aggression or refusal of acknowledgement from the coloniser or occupier, as seen in the beginning stages of the intifadas in Palestine and Western Sahara, all of which eventually turned violent. Thus, while there are alternatives to revolutionary nationalism, they have failed on multiple occasions in the occupied territories, and it is revolutionary nationalism which has led to the most concrete outcomes, despite the many losses it causes for the colonised and occupied peoples.

Over and above personal interest, the reason for the conducting of this research was the fact that the similarities between the territories of Palestine and Western Sahara are glaring and overarching. Despite this, not much research has been conducted comparing the two cases,

even though they follow similar historical trajectories. Beyond this, almost no research has been conducted comparing revolutionary nationalism in these territories, even though both have experienced intifadas and are pervaded by left-wing resistance organisations. This research report has contributed to field of occupation studies and has not only shed light on the phenomenon of revolutionary nationalism in Palestine and Western Sahara, but has compared and contrasted the aforementioned cases. In so doing, this research report has created a framework for comparing two similar cases of colonisation and belligerent occupation, which, if refined, could assist in allowing for the comparison of other territories which have experienced colonisation followed by belligerent occupation.

Ultimately, as per the findings of this research report, revolutionary nationalism in the form of popular and organised resistance is the most viable option for populations under colonisation and belligerent occupation. Although negotiation has emerged as an alternative, it is hardly as effective. The United Nations, and by extension, international law, reiterates that people under foreign domination are entitled to struggle for independence and self-determination in the way that they see fit, regardless as to whether it is violent or not, and it is exactly this phenomenon which is unfolding in Palestine and Western Sahara. It can thus be concluded that while popular and organised resistance under the banner of revolutionary nationalism do not lead to statehood in the contemporary era, these practices allow for the actualisation of smaller, but not negligible, degrees of self-determination. These include the informal and formal recognition of territories, the significance of which cannot be discounted. Indeed, “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978: 95), and where there is colonisation and occupation, there is certainly intifada.

Appendix



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