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Trading societies and their networks in Southeast Africa: social and political change on the coasts and in the interiors of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, 1729-1833

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2020
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Trading Societies and their Networks in Southeast Africa: Social and Political Change on the Coasts and in the Interiors of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, 1729-1833

Linell Chewins, 2020

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the influence of European mercantile trade on societies along the southeast coast of Mozambique and its interior during the period 1729-1833. For most of this period, the ports of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane were viewed to be dominated by the Portuguese. European and South Asian traders played a key role in developing trading networks stretching far into the various hinterlands of these ports. Drawing in part on previously unused sources, this study shows the interplay, demands of, and competition between European, Muslim and south Asian traders, and African societies. Trade demonstrates a critical role that the changing dynamics of the export trade in ivory, and later in slaves, played in shaping patterns of conflict and cooperation in the region. And it outlines how the demands of the Indian Ocean network were central to the changes in political and military organisation, which translated into degrees of dominance in the wider region.

Trading Societies and their Networks in Southeast Africa: Social and Political Change on the Coasts and in the Interiors of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, 1729-1833

By Linell Chewins

327901

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by research

University of the Witwatersrand

2020

Declaration

I, Linell Chewins, declare that this PhD thesis is original and is the result of my research and writing. A version of Chapter Six has been published as, 'The Northeastern Factor in South African History: Re-evaluating the Volume of the Slave Trade out of Delagoa Bay and its Impact on its Hinterland in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Journal of African History* 61, 1 (2020): 89-110, with Prof. Peter Delius. I did the primary research and the analysis of the primary documents for Chapter Six, and Prof. Delius assisted me with interpreting this material in the context of the relevant South African historiography and research.

Signed:

L Chewins

Acknowledgements

My first words of gratitude go to Prof. Emeritus Peter Delius who encouraged me to continue research on southeast Africa, and also supervised this thesis. His expertise, encouragement and advice, given over innumerable cups of coffee, guided this work. His inexhaustible patience and willingness to read multiple drafts helped to see its completion. Thanks too to Dr. Andrew Macdonald, my co-supervisor, for motivating me to think broadly about my topic regarding global and Indian studies. He also provided meticulous editing of draft chapters. Thanks also to Prof. John Wright who helped me to hone my arguments around the slave trade and northern Natal. I am grateful to Prof. Mucha Musemwa who, at an early stage, provided unflagging support for this project. Thanks too goes to my undergraduate lecturer Dr. Michael Bratchel, who inspired me to pursue history as a major. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Iain Hamilton who photographed admiralty documents for me. Thank you to the National Research Foundation (NRF) for funding, and to everyone in the History Department who has expressed interest in this project and cheered me on. I am also indebted to all of the archival staff in Lisbon, London, Maputo, Inhambane and Cape Town for their kind and helpful assistance. I also owe thanks to Anita Glintzer, my dear friend, who has been my avid supporter. And finally, most importantly, thanks to my family. Deepest gratitude goes to my husband, Mark, my fierce champion, for his support, and who financed research trips and mountains of books. I have been buoyed up by my inspiring grown-up daughters, Tamsyn, Hayley, Chelsey and Ashley, and granddaughter Tatum who, along with Mark, fed me copious cups of tea and spurred me on when my courage waned. Thanks also goes to my

parents,Amand Petrusa, who instilled in me a love for history. At last, cuddles to my faithful foxy, Favey, who slept in her basket at my feet as I worked.

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
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The Geographical Area of Study

INTRODUCTION[1]

Part One: Themes and Goals

My thesis investigates a region during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which at the time was unmarked by the current political and national boundaries. These political divisions led to limited intellectual cross-fertilisation between researchers of different languages, while entrenching dominant nationalist historiographies. These historiographies downplayed some wider forces at work. The trade networks that had sprawled across belated colonial boundaries are a useful lens through which to analyse the history of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane. The reason for their usefulness is that trade activity illuminates changing relationships between the coast and the interior. This project has developed out of my earlier research on trade between Delagoa Bay and the northwestern interior (1721-1799) in my Masters thesis, which highlighted the coast's connections to its hinterland and the political importance of trade goods to chiefdoms, and more specifically its importance to the prestige of chiefs.

The theme of the importance of trade to societies is broadened in this thesis by looking at commercial activity at Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, from 1729 through to the nineteenth century. I further investigate how trade impinged on their respective hinterlands.[2] During the period 1729-1833, two predominant commodities characterised trade – ivory and slaves. The slave trade eventually overlapped the

[1] My reason for choosing to use the name Delagoa Bay instead of Lourenço Marques throughout this thesis is because the English, Dutch, French and Austrians knew it by the former name. For the sake of continuity, I have used the same even in the chapters dominated by the Portuguese.

[2] L Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa Bay: The Influence of Trade on Political Structures, 1721-1799' (MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2015).

ivory trade, and because of the French demand in the Mascarenes after 1815, came to overshadow the ivory trade, especially at Delagoa Bay. While not all of my thesis is primarily concerned with the slave trade, it contributes to a key controversy in southern African historiography over the origins of state formation and the shock waves of violence and migration associated with the rise of the Zulu kingdom. This polemic has been referred to as 'the Mfecane debate'.[3] The Mfecane, a phase when a series of migrations, violent upheavals, and state building occurred, had been attributed to the military exploits of Shaka, the Zulu King. In 1988, Julian Cobbing called the centrality of the Zulu participation in these processes into question. He offered alternative reasons for the disruptions of local societies, namely the role of

[3]JD Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966); J Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', *The Journal of African History* 29, 3 (1988): 487-519; J Wright, 'Political Mythology and the Making of Natal's Mfecane', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 23, 2 (1989): 272-291; N Etherington, 'The Great Trek in Relation to the Mfecane: A Reassessment', *South African Historical Journal* 25, 1 (1991): 3-21; EA Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, c.1800-30: The 'Mfecane' Reconsidered', *The Journal of African History* 33, 1 (1992): 1-35; C Hamilton, ''The Character and Objects of Chaka': A Reconsideration of the Making of Shaka as 'Mfecane' Motor', *The Journal of African History* 33,1 (1992): 37-63; JD Omer-Cooper, 'Has the Mfecane a Future? A Response to the Cobbing Critique', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19, 2 (1993): 273-294; JB Peires, 'A Paradigm Deleted: The Materialist Interpretation of the Mfecane', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19, 2 (1993): 295-313; J Wright, 'If We Can't Call it Mfecane, Then What Can We Call It?', seminar paper, African Studies Seminar series, presented 29 August 1994; J Cobbing, 'The Case Against the Mfecane', African Studies Seminar series, African Studies Institute, presented March 1984; C Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1995); N Etherington, 'Tempest in a Teapot? Nineteenth Century Contest for Land in South Africa's Caledon Valley and the Invention of the Mfecane', *The Journal of African History* 45, 2 (2004): 203-219; D Wylie, *The Myth of Iron: Shaka in History* (James Currey, 2006); C Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); C Hamilton, BK Mbenga, R Ross (eds), *The Cambridge History of South Africa,* vol. I: *From Early Times to 1885* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

labour needs in the Cape and the slave trade out of Delagoa Bay.[4] Elizabeth Eldredge critiqued his argument by pointing out the absence of a slave trade at the time of Shaka's ascendency. My work addresses her criticism.

For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 'Portuguese' ports of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane, on the southeast coast of Africa, served as points of contact to the wider mercantile world of the Indian Ocean.[5] The demands of the wider mercantile world determined the nature of the commodities supplied from southeast Africa. Traders, defined by Michael Pearson as those who 'exchange one good for another, or buys a good for money with the intention of selling it to someone else', linked the two ports primarily to Mozambique Island, the Mascarenes, Brazil, and ultimately India.[6] Therefore these far-flung oceanic networks helped to shape the political and economic dynamics of the interior.[7]

Despite the profound effect trade had on societies, European presence initially remained weak at the coast, and building their wealth was contingent on the command they had over commercial spaces. Their strategies to gain a measure of control included coercion. But ultimately the crucial element in their successful trade lay in cementing strategic relationships with chiefs. And because European presence was at first weak, African chiefs were able to carve out a central role in the system of exchange, with some successfully harnessing it to enlarge their own followings.

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[4] Cobbing, 'The Case Against Mfecane'.

[5] The Indian Ocean trade network connected the southeast coast of Africa to the trade of the northwestern Indian Ocean, and in the main to south Asia.

[6] M Pearson, *The Indian Ocean,* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 117.

[7] F Bethencourt, DR Couto (eds), *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 89.

THE PRE-COLONIAL TRADE ALONG THE SOUTHEAST COAST OF AFRICA

The Indian Ocean trade network included the southeast African coast well before Europeans entered the *Mare Indicum*. The initial connection on the southeast African coast came not through Arab trade but by traders from the subcontinent of India who could reach the coast by running their ships across the Indian Ocean, touching on islands along the route.[8]

By the seventh century the Indian Ocean trade network reached as far south as Chibuene, the earliest known trading port on the southeast African coast. Chibuene's long-distance trade predated the Islamic trade.[9] Curiously Chibuene, unlike the rest of the east African coast trade, was disconnected from the Persian Gulf trade. The independence of Chibuene's trade from the Persian Gulf trade lends credence to Rangeley's claim that Indian traders came to the southeast across the Indian Ocean instead of crawling south along the coast. Besides, Arab dominance on the southeast coast initially only reached as far as Cabo Delgado, until a dhow blown off course in 1147 found a route further south to Sofala.[10] From the middle of the twelfth century, Arab traders frequented the southeast coast of Africa, but only as far as Sofala. This port became an Arab trading town centred on the gold trade with traders navigating the Zambezi River for about 280 km upstream. Sofalan commerce

[8] WHJ Rangeley, 'The Arabs', *The Nyasaland Journal* 16, 2 (July 1963): 11-25, 14.

[9] M Wood, L Dussubieux, P Robertshaw, 'The Glass of Chibuene, Mozambique: New Insights into early Indian Ocean Trade', *South African Archaeological Bulletin* 67, 195 (2012): 59-74, 71.

[10] WHJ Rangeley, 'The Arabs', 14.

supplied the city-state of Kilwa, the centre of the gold trade between 1250 and 1330.[11]

The nature of the Chibuene trading system shows some similarities to those of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay. For instance, the trading season of all these ports was to an extent determined by the biannual change in direction of the monsoon winds. And as at Chibuene, the bead trade played an important role in developing the Inhambane and Delagoa Bay markets. Trade was in the main consensual, although not without occasional warfare. The key difference between the Chibuene and the later trade at Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, after Portuguese settlement, was an increasing reliance on coercion, in addition to forming strategic relationships to take political control of commercial spaces.[12]

THE SOCIETIES OCCUPYING SOUTHEAST AFRICA

During the period covered in this thesis, the Tonga occupied the coastal belt and immediate hinterland of Inhambane. The Tswa Tsonga lived in the deep southwest of Inhambane and the area northwest of Delagoa Bay. Further west, across the Lubombo Mountains, lay the heartland of African kingdoms. The most important of these was the declining Venda kingdom, which had in the early eighteenth century stretched from the Limpopo to the Crocodile River in the south. To the west lay the emerging Pedi state. These two kingdoms were, at the height of their power, centres

[11] A Schoeman, M Hay, R Browne (eds), *Mapungubwe Reconsidered: A Living Legacy: Exploring Beyond the Rise and Decline of the Mapungubwe State* (Real African Publishers, 2015), 84; A Sheriff, *Dhow Cultures of the Indian Ocean: Cosmopolitanism, Commerce and Islam* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 164, 165.

[12] MV Jackson-Haight, *European Powers and South-East Africa: A Study of International Relations on the South-Eastern Coast of Africa, 1796-1856* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc.,1967), 14.

of intensive farming, ivory hunting, and copper and iron production.[13] The regional and coastal trade networks from the western lowveld and highveld societies joined the trade networks of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay from at least the early eighteenth century.

To the south of Delagoa Bay lay the rich farming and hunting lands of Natal, which became the epicentre of the conflicts that gave rise to a series of major states in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The best known of these is the Zulu kingdom. From the late 1750s demand for the ivory of the Indian Ocean world and later the Mascarene and a degree of the south Atlantic slave trade, drew the southern hinterland of Delagoa Bay and the western interior of Inhambane deeper into trading networks.

The increase in trade, and contest for exotic goods to accumulate power and symbolise hegemony, formed the basis of the subjugation and marginalisation of the Tonga by the Tsonga in Inhambane, and the same of the Ronga by the Zulu at the Bay. Ivory and slaves were in both cases sourced far into the interior, and successful trade was contingent on developing and maintaining trade networks which spanned a multiplicity of societies stretching respectively west and south of these ports.

The reader may wonder at the omission of the Swazi from this discussion. The reason for this lacuna is that the 'Swazi' became consolidated as a state much later than the remit of this research. The proto-Swazi, or Ngwane Dlamini kingdom, had

[13] G Liesegang, 'New Light on Venda Traditions: Mahumane's Account of 1730', *History in Africa* 4 (1977): 163-181. P Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers and the British in the Nineteenth Century Transvaal* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), 11.

not attained the same level of centralisation or militarisation as the Mthethwa, Ndwandwe and Zulu.[14] And after it had become a conquest state under Sobhuza towards the 1830s, it turned its attention to the north, and west of the Lubombo Mountains, and so did not play a decisive role in the Delagoa Bay's hinterland east of the mountain range.

THE BEGINNINGS OF PORTUGUESE TRADE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Portuguese permanently settled the two ports in the eighteenth century, with Inhambane occupied in 1729, and Delagoa Bay in 1799. The demand for ivory provided the first stimulus to expand these two ports, and the lifeblood of the ivory trade was beads, cloth and brass. Goa, the Portuguese-India administrative headquarters, known as *o Estado da Índia*, supplied its subaltern ports with trade goods. From 1752, when Mozambique Island became the capital of Portuguese dominion in southeast Africa, the authorities on the Island were responsible for the supply of trade goods. The expanding market for slaves in the Mascarene Islands and Brazil later added great momentum to trade.

Delagoa Bay and Inhambane were among scores of other east African coastal towns participating in the Indian Ocean trade network, but remained relatively underdeveloped because of the weakness of *the Estado*'s presence in the region of southeast Africa.[15] Besides the inability of the *Estado* to regulate trade directly and to

[14] P Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 24.

[15] R Gray, D Birmingham (eds), *Pre-Colonial Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa Before 1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 15.

regulary provide trade items, its perennial underpayment of trading post officials created an environment for an extensive private trade to flourish. Private trade thrived during three distinct, albeit overlapping, stages. In the sixteenth century gold was the predominant trade item demanded by the Portuguese. From the mid-sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries, ivory became the economic staple. The last phase, the slave trade of southeast Africa, increased in significance from the mid-eighteenth into the nineteenth century.

As at Delagoa Bay, the predominant export from Inhambane was, at first, ivory. But unlike the Bay, where beads and brass were in demand, the Inhambane market desired textiles and beads. The Inhambane trade, from 1507 until 1729, remained 'maritime', which meant that there was no permanent European presence installed at its bay. In the maritime format of trade, an agent-merchant received a concession from the Crown, which granted the concessionaire a monopoly for a limited time. In 1729 the Portuguese established a trading post furnished with a permanent staff. This decision was in part intended to keep an established and flourishing Gujarati Muslim trade out of Dutch hands. From the late eighteenth century the global demand for slaves fuelled the economic engine of southeast Africa, and filled Portuguese coffers with gold and silver coin, bullion that was becoming increasingly scarce in Europe.

The access to coin, barred by the Muslim Ottoman Empire, was a factor in Portugal's invasion of the Indian Ocean. Bullionism was the belief that a nation's wealth and

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For the importance of ivory to Delagoa Bay, see P Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1984).

power lay in the accumulation of precious metals. In 1453 Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks, and occassioned the decline of European overland revenue to the east, and of the Portuguese economy. The Ottoman Empire, having wrested away Europe's gateway to Indian Ocean markets, began demanding exorbitant tributes and taxes on goods in gold and silver, draining bullion and consequently political power, from Portugal.[16] The Portuguese attitude towards Muslim trade was therefore motivated by political and commercial concerns and, more to the point, aimed to exclude Arab-Muslims from the European/East Indies trade.[17] The policy of exclusion through eventually conquering strategic trade sites that were settled, at least in part, by Arab-Muslims (Mombasa and Kilwa, 1505; Mozambique Island, 1507; Goa, 1510), was executed under the pretext of Islam being an enemy of the Holy Faith.[18] Undermining Arab trade was also justified as part of the 'perpetual war between Islam and Christianity'.[19] The political rationale for this persecution was to reduce Arab state revenues and diminish their capacity for war.[20]

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[16] E Erikson, *Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company, 1600-1757* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 85.

[17] Ibid.

[18] I acknowledge that the terms Arab-Muslims and Arabs are vague. For an in-depth discussion about the development of the Sassanid maritime trade networks which formed the basis of the superstructure of Islamic Persian and Arabic trade in the Indian Ocean, see P Malekandathil, *Maritime India: Trade, Religion and Polity in the Indian Ocean* (Delhi: Primus Books, 2010).

[19] KN Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 64.

'The Arab chroniclers of Hadramaut, referring to events of 1502-3, recorded tersely: 'In this year (Radjab) the vessels of the Frank appeared at sea en route for India, Hurmuz, and those parts. They took seven vessels killing those on board and making some prisoner. This was their first action, may God curse them.'' (Chaudhuri, 2005: 65)

[20] Erikson, *Between Monopoly*, 84.

Muslim coastal trading cities came under Portuguese naval fire. Belligerence was a strategy foreign to the existing east African trading towns. As Chaudhuri says: 'The rulers of Sofala, Kilwa and Mozambique Island, of Hormuz, Calicut and Malacca ruled over territories considered the commercial world of Asia as neutral ground where merchants of different nationalities could freely meet without having to pay heavy protection fees.'[21] The Portuguese maritime trade in the Indian Ocean challenged this commercial freedom by using a reserve of firepower with the ambitious aim of establishing a spice trade monopoly, in the name of God and for the Crown, in the Indian Ocean.[22]

As Portuguese land-based trade gradually became settled, the cost and disruptive effects of continued military action became clear. As a result, they formed relationships with local chiefs and trading groups, based on commercial common sense. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the strategy of cooperation, although not completely devoid of coercion, was duplicated at the settlements of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay. Different levels of cooperation and alliances grew out of the personal trade of officials, resident merchants, and private individuals. But as we shall see below, violence remained an important tool that was used towards establishing a desired monopoly for the Crown.

Because of the 'perpetual war between Islam and Christianity' noted above, Arab merchants were more likely to become victims of violent seizures of and cargo.[23]

[21] Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation*, 79.

[22] Ibid., 78.

[23] Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation*, 64. The evidence for this claim is based on Vasco Gama's speech, aimed at the 'Moors': '[N]either trading in pepper, nor bring Turks, nor going to the port of

These actions underscored the fact that the Arab-Muslim threat had less to do with religion than with Portuguese commercial interests in the Indian Ocean trading network. Notwithstanding the maritime skills of the Portuguese, the manoeuvrable Arab Swahili dhows were much better adapted to cabotage – trading along the coast from port to port. The Arab sailors' familiarity with currents, navigational expertise, and knowledge of coastal markets and trade networks which connected the hinterland the ports, also gave them considerable advantage over the Portuguese.[24] Portuguese inability to match or better Arab and Swahili skills at trading, sailing and procuring quality goods, led them to employ intimidation tactics.

From the seventeenth century onwards, the Dutch and English entry into the Indian Ocean markets increased commercial competition, necessitating the Portuguese to collaborate with Arab powers and, more specifically, with the Omani dynasty. For a time, the Portuguese enjoyed an interdependent and collaborative relationship with the Omani because of the expansionist ambitions of the Omani's enemies; the Ottomans and Safavids.[25] To be successful the Portuguese could not afford to have monolithic relationships with Arabs. But as the power of the enemies of the Omani waned, the Ibadi Omani reasserted themselves against the Portuguese and, with the

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Calicut, because for any of these three things the ships which shall be found to have done these shall be burned with as many as may be captured with them'. See HEJ Stanley (ed.), *The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama, and his Viceroyalty from the Lendas da India of Gaspar Correa* (London: Hakluyt Society, 2016), 202.

[24] AF Ventura, 'Estat Modern i Llinatges Locals a Moçambique els discursos de la Legitimatat en una Història d'Imatges distorsionades i Expectatives Incomplertes', (PhD thesis, University of Barcelona, 2004), 45.

[25] P Malekandathil, 'From Slumber to Assertion: Maritime Expansion of the Ibadis of Oman and the Responses of the *Estado da Índia,* 1622-1720', in M Hoffman Ruf, A al Salimi (eds), *Oman and Overseas* (Zurich and New York: Georg Alms Verlag, 2013), 180.

help of the Dutch, the Omani grew into a formidable sea power, becoming the masters of the western Indian Ocean from the 1670s.[26]

In explaining the preferential treatment given to Muslim and Hindu Indian traders, the geographical location of the *Estado da Índia* administration needs to be considered. Sea-orientated Goa was the principal Portuguese territory situated in India, and was central to the commercial economy of the Lusitanian Indian Ocean trading networks, including those linked to southeast Africa.[27] A reason for the preferential treatment of Gujarati merchants was that they were successful merchants, bankers and creditors. The Gujaratis were flush with bullion and had access to ready coin through well-established credit networks, credit they were willing to lend to the perennially cash-strapped *Estado* at a highly profitable interest rate. The *Estado* was constantly underfunded because the King had excluded most private investment.[28] Needless to say, credit was essential to commercial expansion and securing trade goods supplied by commercial firms in India. The Portuguese were certainly loath to antagonise the Gujarati merchants, who were often in command of the financial and commercial spheres of the *Estado*. Portuguese administrators and traders had to maintain and manage relationships with Hindu and Muslim merchants based in Goa, Diu and Daman, which formed part of Portuguese India. Given this context, seizing their ships and merchandise would have been imprudent. But Indian merchants did not completely escape Portuguese intimidation and coercion because *Estado*

[26] Malekandathil, 'From Slumber', 181, 183.

[27] P Machado, *Ocean of Trade: South Asian Merchants, Africa and the Indian Ocean, c. 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2.

[28] Ibid., 60, 61; JC Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 106. This is not to say that there was not opportunity for wealth creation through private trade. See Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade,* Chapter Three.

administrators ordered the purchase of a *cartaze*, or naval pass, for all ships in return for protection from ship seizures by the regular Portuguese naval patrols.[29] And as Portuguese ports sold *cartazes*, customs officers took the opportunity to tax the cargo of any ship applying for a naval pass. Besides taxing the Indian trade, the sale of *cartazes* was a way of controlling and benefitting from the Gujarati private trade. This initial pattern of trade shaped the future of Portuguese Indian Ocean commerce. The Portuguese, always at a disadvantage, remained bellicose towards the Arab trade while favouring the Gujarati as trading partners. The Portuguese dependence on the Gujarati, especially the Vaniya (Hindu) merchants, became acute after the Omanis came to dominate the western Indian Ocean.[30]

Portuguese access to the Indian Ocean markets along the Cape route enabled the *Estado*, especially through private trade, to attain significant commercial growth in south Asia.[31] The metropole's failure to translate the gains of private wealth into a flourishing economy in Europe lay in the fundamental limitations of Portugal's political economy. The reason for this was the country's small population and an even smaller maritime community, which was incapable of adequately servicing an expanding maritime trade system.[32] By the eighteenth century Portugal was still essentially feudal, and burdened by ancient institutions which governed agriculture,

[29] Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation*, 66, 69; P Risso, *Merchants and Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian Ocean* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 115.

[30] Malekandathil, 'From Slumber', 185.

[31] CA Hanson, *Economy and Society of Baroque Portugal, 1668-1703* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1981), 115; Erikson, *Between Monopoly*, 85.

[32] The declining level of sailing skills is illustrated by the anecdote of a captain ordering garlic and onions to be tied to either side of the ship for sailors to identify starboard and portside. See FV de Castro, *The Pepper Wreck: A Portuguese Indiaman at the Mouth of the Tagus River* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2001), 21.

land tenure, and manufacturing, factors all conducive to an undynamic economy.[33] Adding to these woes was the Crown's tendency to spend the returns of the Asian trade on 'dynastic ambitions', i.e. war, resulting in persistent under-capitalisation of the *carreira da Índia* (the India trade to and from Lisbon). By preventing private investment, the Crown placed Portuguese traders in the predicament of being unable to strike a good deal and therefore experiencing diminished profits. Lastly, Lisbon did not maintain a comprehensive accounting system, and the Crown was largely ignorant of purchases in Asia and sales in Europe.[34] The heedless management of the *carreira* from the metropole thus became a significant problem once the Dutch, who were diligent at accounting and determined to make profits, entered the Indian Ocean trade network.

In the eighteenth century, to enhance the power of the state, the Marquis of Pombal, Secretary of Internal State Affairs, and de facto ruler of Portugal during the reign of Joseph I of Portugal, introduced mercantilism to the Portuguese. Eli Hecksher defines mercantilism as a political philosophy in which the principal goal is to maximise the external power of the State, and its distinguishing feature is a set of means to attain the general goal of increasing State power and strengthening State authority.[35] Other principles underlying mercantilism were protectionism, tax imports to shield domestic industries from an influx of foreign goods, adhering to a balance-

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[33] MC Coutinho, 'José de Silva Lisboa: To What Extent a Brazilian Liberal?', in RB Ekelund, Jr, RF Hébert, *A History of Economic Theory and Method*, sixth edition (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2014).

[34] Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade*, 106.

[35] R Findlay, RGH Henriksson, H Lindgren, M Lundahl (eds), *Eli Hecksher: International Trade and Economic History* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 234; Hanson, *Economy and Society,* 109.

of-trade theory, and lastly keeping gold and silver within national borders; or in the case of overseas territories, keeping precious metals flowing into the State coffers. [36]

These precepts of mercantilism underpinned the Crown's expectation that all trade should foremost benefit the metropole, but these doctrines were easier to enforce in metropolitan Portugal. The Crown's relatively weak economic, political and military influence in Mozambique ensured that it did not have the capacity to establish or sustain strong administrative systems, nor an effective military presence in its southeast African ports. This last circumstance led, wherever possible, to trading posts latching on to preexisting political and economic systems to bolster their own power.

From the sixteenth century, Portuguese presence in southeast Africa was restricted to Mozambique Island, Ibo in the Kerimba Islands, Sofala, and Zambesia. In 1800, the limits of this nebulous Portuguese authority were Cabo Delgado in the north and Delagoa Bay in the south. In their settlements along the coast, the Portuguese had a tenuous hold over territories they claimed as belonging to the Portuguese Crown. From 1650, to widen Portuguese authority and presence along the Zambezi River, Portuguese settlers developed a *prazo* system along its banks.[37] Although *prazos* were defined as leased crowned estates and were ostensibly under the authority of

[36] Hanson, *Economy and Society,* 108, 109.

[37] A Isaacman, *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution*; *The Zambesi Prazos*, 1750-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1972), xii. A *prazo* had an overlord who held privileges, that formerly belonged to a chief; had an African population living in its traditional manner on its historic lands, and supported a slave population with diverse origins, loyal to the *prazero*; and had a contractual relationship with the Portuguese Crown. The *prazo* system was in decline by 1730, due to the unstable nature of the system and inter-*prazo* wars. See Isaacman 1972, 18.

the Lisbon administration, the latter struggled to maintain control over the *prazo* trading activities and forms of organisation. The Crown's constant difficulty in stamping its authority on a territory through its administrators is a theme that repeats itself at Delagoa Bay and Inhambane. The small Portuguese population at these two trading stations were both politically and militarily weak, even when Portugal was at the height of her power and economic success. From the end of the seventeenth century, the Crown's eventual economic focus on Brazil contributed to the State's incapacity, or perhaps even neglect, to fund its empire in the southern Indian Ocean.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE SOUTHEAST AFRICAN TRADE

Who were the Portuguese in Africa?

The term 'Portuguese' at Inhambane and Delagoa Bay does not represent a homogeneous European group in charge of the trading posts. The Portuguese included members of the Portuguese elite who were appointed by the Crown to administer the ports. However, the reality of the absence of European women in African (and Indian) trading spaces, claimed by the metropole as Portuguese territory, contributed to the mixed nature of Portuguese society on the southern African coast. The offspring of liaisons with local women – and indeed the women themselves – were baptised and given European names, and regarded as Portuguese by those in situ. These men acted as soldiers in defence of the trading post and filled its administrative posts. Further, Portuguese ships were often manned and piloted by south Asians. Indian merchants also participated in Portuguese

business ventures such as the *Sociedade de Negociantes* (Association of Businessmen).[38] It is clear that the term 'Portuguese' incorporated a variety of people who collaborated for the sake of profit under the Portuguese flag. The tangle of relationships between Portuguese and other actors, including African agents, Indian merchants, and ship-owners, was often shaped by personal commercial interests within the broader sphere of business in the name of the Crown. I therefore use the term 'Portuguese' to describe those who ostensibly represented the metropole's concerns in the ports of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane.

MUSLIMS IN SOUTHEAST AFRICA

When the Portuguese arrived in southeast Africa, they encountered Omani Arabs in charge of trade between Mogadishu and Sofala, and called them *árabes*. The Swahili coast had been settled as far as Sofala by the twelfth century, and had participated in the north Indian Ocean trade in which the Persian Gulf played a pivotal part. Sofala was an Arab settlement whose traders conducted business along the Zambezi River. The Arabs had considerable advantage over the Portuguese in that they were acclimatised, wealthy, excellent pilots, and knew the east African coastline like the back of their hand.[39] The Portuguese, instead of capitalising on these advantages, instead sought to drive Arab traders out. The other grouping of Muslim traders was from India, bringing ambiguity to the term *mouros*. Liazzat Bonate asserts that the Portuguese used the term 'Moor' for Muslims in general, while also applying it to Indians, specifically to those descending from relationships

[38] A Lobato, *História de Fundação de Lourenço Marques* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1948), 83.

[39] Jackson-Haight, *European Powers*, 18.

between Indo-Muslim and local African women.[40] But Edward Alpers maintains that Moors were non-Arabic Muslims, placing Gujarati Indo-Muslims at these ports.[41] These Muslims played a decisive role in the development of trade, particularly at Inhambane, while their participation at Delagoa Bay is less clear.

Both Vaniya and Muslim Gujarati merchants were vital to the Portuguese-African trade because of their key role in Portuguese financial and commercial spheres. The Vaniya were acceptable trade partners to the Omani, and this partnership ushered in the use of Vaniya to conduct trade on behalf of the Portuguese. The Vaniya also freighted Portuguese cargoes to, amongst other ports, Mozambique Island.[42] Their knowledge of both Indian and African markets, and their extensive business networks which defied culture, creed, money, and resources, were essential to Portuguese trade.

[40] LJK Bonate, 'Traditions and Transitions, Islam and Chiefship in Northern Mozambique, ca. 1850-1974' (PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2007), f. 277, 73.

[41] EA Alpers, *The Indian Ocean in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 70.

[42] Malekandathil, 'From Slumber', 185; EA Alpers, 'Gujarat and the Trade of East Africa, c 1500-1800', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9, 1 (1976): 22-44; Machado, *Ocean of Trade*.

Part Two: Historiographies, Sources and Chapter Outline

Southeast Africanist history-writing flourished about 50 years ago, and some themes, like state formation, were briefly revisited in the 1990s. But after the fall of apartheid, historiography in the main focused on more recent history. The selection of secondary literature that is discussed below may be criticised for being outdated. But the outdated material stems from a lack of revision in this field – an oversight which this thesis addresses in part. Nevertheless, the existing secondary literature does provide a framework for understanding the development of trade networks in southeast Africa. In particular the 'Africanist' historical writing that became dominant in the 1960s emphasised the depth of the trade history of the continent and the agency of its inhabitants. A seminal study in this regard is Richard Gray and David Birmingham's *Pre-Colonial African Trade*.[43]

The themes of earlier studies, namely long-distance trade, complex networks, political advancement through trade, and the encroachment of European power, are repeated in my work. Trade networks were often founded on the need for commodities essential to political economies. The trade of one such commodity, beads, directly and indirectly connected far-flung communities across the southeast African interior as far as Botswana.[44] The fact that traders travelled hundreds of kilometres to transact trade at Delagoa Bay and Inhambane hints at the importance of the incoming trade items like beads, cloth, and brass, to the social-political structure of societies near and far. The role of trade goods supplied by the

[43] Gray, Birmingham (eds), *Pre-Colonial African Trade*.

[44] M Wood, *Interconnections: Glass Beads and Trade in Southern and Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2012), 26.

Portuguese and Indo-Muslims stimulated trade, and expanded trade networks in the interior.

Trade also contributed significantly to the prominence and status of chiefs through the accumulation of goods. Wealth in beads, cloth, and brass manilas (arm and neck rings) were both a means of attracting and retaining subjects, and provided a potent symbol of power that underscored hegemony; a pattern I found at both the two ports under review. At Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, the ivory and slave trade brought fierce competition amongst chiefs for preeminence.[45] But the forms of political organisation around trade differed from region to region. Further north, on the east coast of Africa, the rise of Yao chiefs was connected to the expansion of the slave trade despite of the lack of an elaborate administration or a standing army to coerce locals.

Unlike the Yao, an east African people, the Rozvi depended on military, religious and administrative organisation to maintain power in Zimbabwe.[46] Drawing on these forms of power, chiefs endeavoured to create an often imperfect monopoly over trade. Encouraging a trade monopoly served Portuguese interests. By demanding all traders to report to the chief's court before proceeding into the interior to trade, the Portuguese sought to centralise the flow of goods through one chief. The fact that the Portuguese order could not be enforced raises further doubts about the capability

[45] EA Alpers, 'Trade, State and Yao Society in the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of African Society* 10, 3 (1969): 405-420.

[46] SIG Mudenge, *A Political History of Munhumutapa, 1400-1902* (Harare: African Publishing Group, 1988).

of the Portuguese administration and Rozvi military power to create the desired monopoly.

There has been remarkably little research on the trading systems of southern Mozambique since the late 1970s when Alan Smith's pioneering and foundational thesis, as well as that of David Hedges', examined trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[47] These theses were followed by Malyn Newitt's histories of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane in his his general history of Mozambique, which gives insight into the broad themes that shaped these histories.[48]

Pedro Machado's more recent book, *Ocean of Trade*, focuses on the centrality of Gujarati textiles to the commercial economy of Mozambique Island, and how the role of patterns and processes of consumer demand have been overlooked. Machado points to the ability of the Vaniya to drive cross-oceanic exchanges through access to credit, shipping and maritime labour. This point is critical to my work, because the Vaniya – and specifically the Indo-Muslim community – had a large role to play at Inhambane, and to a lesser extent at Delagoa Bay for precisely the same reasons.

Portuguese scholars, too, have written about Delagoa Bay: Alexandre Lobato published *Historia da Fundacão de Lourenço Marques*, *Historia da Fundacão de Presidio de Lourenço Marques* and *Quatro Estudos e uma Evacuacão para a*

[47] A Smith, 'The Struggle for Control of Southern Mozambique, 1720-1835' (PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970); D Hedges, 'Trade and Politics in Southern Mozambique and Zululand in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century' (PhD thesis, University of London, 1978).

[48] M Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (London: C Hurst & Company, 1995).

Historia between 1948 and 1961, in which he examined the political events that influenced trade at Delagoa Bay.[49] The first two publications focus on the period between 1780 and 1800 – from the time the Portuguese established a permanent settlement at the Bay. The four essays contained in *Quartro Estudos*, deal with other periods during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although these works have been carefully researched, they rely exclusively on Portuguese archival sources, which do not draw on wider records of evidence and historical writing, nor do they probe the links to the interior. Nevertheless, these publications remain indispensable to this study, and help to provide insight into the wider dynamics of Portuguese power and trade.

Another Portuguese academic, Caetano Montez, in his *Descrobimento e Fundacão de Lourenço Marques*, published in 1940, discusses a broader period, starting from the sixteenth century and concluding in the early nineteenth century.[50] His work is useful in that it paints a picture of early trade at Delagoa, but it is an imperial history, focusing on the Portuguese role in southeast Africa.

Although Visconde de Paiva Manso was not an historian but an attorney for the Crown, he formulated another apologia for Portuguese presence in Mozambique in *Memória sobre Lourenço Marques* (Delagoa Bay), published in 1870. His descriptions of chiefs' territories gives a snapshot of who reigned when and where, and is useful in establishing a fuller account of the nature of trade at Delagoa Bay.

[49] A Lobato, *Historia da Fundacão*; A Lobato*, Historia de Presídio de Lourenço Marques,* I (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1948); A Lobato, *Quatro Estudos e uma Evacuacão para a História de Lourenço Marques* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1961).

[50] C Montez, *Descobrimento, e Fundação de Lourenço Marques* (Lourenço Marques: Minerva Central-Editoria, 1948).

Benigna de Jesus Lurdina Mateus Zimba's investigation is novel, in that she looks at the role of women in food production and its trade from 1720 to 1830.[51] Her thesis argues that women played an important role in the transactions between African traders, and both Asian and European merchants. She explores the issue of trade protocol, and the ivory trade as a royal prerogative, presenting a model for qualifying the nature of transactions in the interior. Zimba's thesis in part serves as a comparative study to follow similar processes at work in Inhambane, and to determine to what degree trade protocol and royal prerogative were subject to change vis-à-vis the influx of Europeans from the south of the continent.

In 1948 and 1954 respectively, Colin Coetzee published 'Die Kompanjie se Besetting op Delagoa-Baai', and finished his doctoral thesis 'Die Stryd om Delagoabaai en die Suidooskus, 1600-1800'.[52] The first study contains a narrative of the settlement, and the subsequent doctoral thesis expands on his research to include English and Portuguese sources, but it remains an imperial study.[53] Although the focus of the Portuguese and Afrikaans scholars differs, historians of both languages essentially produced studies that focus on European presence, and consequently lack analysis of the role of trade in the societies that occupied the shores of the Bay. A more recent text, 'Bartering Souls: The Factory at Delagoa Bay, 1719-1731', explores the

[51] BdJLM Zimba, 'Overseas Trade, Regional Politics and Gender Roles, Southern Mozambique, 1720-1830' (PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1999); BdJLM Zimba**,** *Mulheres Invisíveis: O Género e as Políticas Comerciais no Sul de Moçambique, 1720-1830* (Maputo: Promédia, 2003).

[52] CG Coetzee, 'Die Kompanjie se Besetting op Delagoa-Baai' (MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1947; *Argiefjaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis,* II (Staatspers, 1984)).

[53] Coetzee, 'Die Stryd om Delagoabaai en die Suidooskus, 1600-1800' (PhD thesis, Stellenbosch University, 1954).

Dutch establishment at the Bay. As a senior thesis for the fulfilment of a Bachelor's degree, it is a superficial analysis of the relationship between the Dutch and an undifferentiated group called 'Africans'. The general discussion of slavery lacks periodisation and is limited to the demand for slaves at the Cape.[54]

A prominent feature of Delagoa Bay's history is the Austrian trade, a subject of interest to Lobato, Smith and Hedges. Hedges addresses the Austrian post that settled in 1777 until the Portuguese expelled them in 1781. Both the latter scholars show the exponential growth of the ivory trade, but only hint at the connection between Austrian trade and the northern Nguni. These studies with regard to the Austrians are in the main Eurocentric. Lobato traces the history of the Austrian settlement in his book *Historia da Fundacão de Lourenço Marques*.[55] And in *Historia de Presidio*, volume I, he discusses the expulsion of the Austrians from a diplomatic point of view.

From the 1960s, some historians grounded in Africanist perspectives pointed to the necessity of integrating the history of the interior of South Africa into a wider and deeper history of the region. Shula Marks, for example, provided an important overview of the history of southeast Africa in 1975 that emphasises the importance of long-standing trade systems linking the interior to the Mozambican

[54] W Holding, 'Bartering Souls: The Factory at Delagoa Bay, 1719-1731' (Senior thesis, Princeton University, 1995).

[55] Lobato, *Historia da Fundacão.*

coast.[56] But this invitation to an expanded research focus has been largely ignored by South African historians.

Aside from Smith and Hedges, there have been very few attempts to explore the sources and processes of the eighteenth century that could illuminate the interconnections in the history of a region undivided by national boundaries until relatively recently. Interconnections across porous national boundaries of the nineteenth century have been successfully explored and are widely cited. Charles van Onselen, Patrick Harries, Alan Jeeves, and Andrew Macdonald have produced studies on migrant labour, but omit the dynamic history of the earlier century's cross-global connections through the Indian Ocean world long before industrialisation.[57] Jeanne Penvenne claims that Delagoa Bay's most dynamic period was the twentieth century, but ignores reference to its earlier history.[58]

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[56] S Marks, 'Southern Africa and Madagascar', in R Gray (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, c. 1600-c. 1790*, vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1975); PhD theses concluded by Hedges in 1978 and embarked on by Harries in 1976 also explored regional histories and archives that straddled national boundaries: see Hedges, 'Trade and Politics'; P Harries, 'Labour Migration from Mozambique to South Africa 1862-1897' (PhD thesis, University of London, 1983); P Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa c. 1860-1910* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, London: James Currey Ltd, and Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1994); and in numerous articles Harries pioneered a more regional perspective and wider ranging use of archival sources, but his focus was mainly on developments from the 1860s.

[57] C van Onselen, *Night Trains: Moving Mozambican Miners To and From the Witwatersrand Mines, 1902-1955* (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2019); A Macdonald, 'The Gold Kings: Sonu Smugglers in Johannesburg, Durban and Lourenço Marques', *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 43, 3 (2016): 483-503; P Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity*; AH Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 1890-1920* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985).

[58] JM Penvenne, *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in Lourenço Marques, 1877-1962* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, and London: James Currey, 1995).

DELAGOA BAY'S SLAVE TRADE IN SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Within the broader focus on trade, the sub-theme of the nature and impact of the slave trade has been scrutinised in recent years. The often heated debates have focused on the slave trade out of Delagoa Bay, especially since Julian Cobbing ascribed to it a key role in the rise of the Zulu kingdom and the concomitant wider turmoil and transformation in the region.[59] But the intensity of these disagreements has not been matched by the depth of research based on Portuguese sources.[60]

In his book, *The Great Treks*, Norman Etherington comments on the common portrayal of South African history as rolling into the interior from Cape Town.[61] The most startling thing about this observation is that he made it more than three decades after the first waves of Africanist history had washed across the country, meaning that the impulse to locate the history of South Africa within wider African processes has had limited impact.

More recent research has highlighted the myriad processes playing out across this terrain and has generated new insights and questions. This research underscores that prior to the 1830s, the northeastern factor was significant for developments in the interior.[62] It is also increasingly clear that the intersection of the force fields of

[59] Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi'.

[60] N Etherington, *The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa 1815-1854* (London and New York: Pearson Educational Publishing, 2001), 33-38.

[61] Ibid.

[62] The term 'northeastern factor' is adapted from the seminal article by I Wilks, 'The Northern Factor in Ashanti History: Begho and the Mande', *Journal of African History* 2, 1 (1961): 25-34. By 'the interior' I mean the area to the north of the Vaal and Mzimtoti Rivers. See, for example, P Delius, 'Recapturing Captives and Conversations with 'Cannibals': In Pursuit of a Neglected Stratum in South African History', *Journal of Southern African Societies* 36, 1 (2010): 7-23; P Delius, L Phillips and F Rankin

these economic poles in the nineteenth century left indelible marks on the history of the region.

These wider issues are subject to ongoing research. Using sources focused on Mozambique illuminates much wider developments and the intrinsic role of the slave trade in bringing about political change in southeast Africa. One of most enduring topics of debate in the history of South Africa since at least the 1960s has been the causes that led to the rise of powerful polities in the northern Nguni area from the late eighteenth century, that ultimately culminated in the emergence of the Zulu kingdom. Initially, the role of long-distance trade connecting the coast to the northeast received some attention and generated important insights. In particular, the importance of a trade in ivory has been revealed, although the periodisation and nature of this trade remained far from clear. In the 1980s, an argument suggesting that the slave trade had played a key role in shaping change also generated heated debate. But both the proponents and opponents of this assertion based their disputations on superficial research, at best.

The discussion of the slave trade out of Delagoa Bay by pioneering historians in the South Africanist tradition is meagre. In 1969, Gerhard Liesegang briefly mentioned the slave trade in an article about Dingane's attack on Delagoa Bay in 1833.[63]

Smith, *A Long Way Home, Migrant Worker Worlds 1880-2014* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014); P Delius, T Maggs and M Schoeman, *Forgotten World* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014); P Delius, 'The Making and Changing of Migrant Worker Worlds, 1800-2014', *African Studies* 73, 3 (2014): 313-322.

[63] G Liesegang, 'Dingane's Attack on Lourenco Marques in 1833', *The Journal of African History* 10, 4, (1969): 565-579. For the basis of this article, Liesegang uses a document held by the AHU, titled

Smith's PhD thesis mainly focuses on the ivory trade, but he also discusses the impact of slavery on southeast Mozambique, and raises the role of slavery as a possible factor in the changes that occurred in southeast Africa. Six years later, Henry Slater omits slavery altogether in his doctoral dissertation.[64]

But in 1981, Harries again flagged the issue of slavery on the southeast coast of Africa.[65] He argued that forms of slavery were not foreign to northern Nguni societies in pre-colonial times and that a significant slave trade had occurred out of southeast Africa, specifically from Inhambane and Lourenço Marques (Delagoa Bay) during the nineteenth century.[66] But he did not relate these points to the debates about state formation in Natal. In 1988 Julian Cobbing, drawing on Harries' work, suggested that a slave trade out of this area had played a key role in the rise of the Zulu kingdom.[67] But interest in a possible slave trade from the Bay waned after Elizabeth Eldredge argued there was little evidence for a trade in slaves out of Delagoa Bay during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. She also accused Harries of conflating data from Inhambane and Delagoa Bay to inflate the volume of slaves traded from the Bay.[68] She repeated these points in 1994, reiterating the view that the political

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'*Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal*' to understand why Dingane attacked the Portuguese fortress, a topic I address in Chapter Seven.

[64] A Smith, 'The Struggle'; H Slater, 'Transitions in the Political Economy of Southeastern Africa before 1840' (PhD thesis, University of Sussex, 1976).

[65] P Harries, 'Slavery, Social Incorporation and Surplus Extraction; The Nature of Free and Unfree Labour', *The Journal of African History* 22, 3 (1981): 309-330.

[66] Ibid., 314, 321, 315.

[67] Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi'.

[68] Eldredge, 'Sources of Conflict', 1-35.

economy of the Zulu was antithetical to slave raiding.[69] Yet her research was mainly based on secondary sources; the primary material that she used, including evidence by the leader of the British naval survey team, Captain William Fitzpatrick Owen, was drawn from *The Records of South-Eastern Africa*, edited by George McCall Theal, whose interests and preconceptions shaped this use of the relevant archives.[70] Despite these shortcomings, Eldredge points to a slave trade post-1823, a finding with which I concur, although I find the omission of in-depth research into the years after 1823 on the topic of slavery at Delagoa Bay startling. Instead, South Africanist scholars focus mainly on the limited selection of contemporary documentation in English and sources rooted in Natal, by engaging in an extended critical interrogation of oral sources.[71]

There have, however, been limited sallies into the possibility of a slave trade out of Delagoa Bay, such as the work of Dan Wylie. Based on fragmentary and circumstantial evidence, he proposed that slaving may have been a significant factor

[69] E Eldredge, F Morton (eds), *Slavery in South Africa: Captive Labor on the Dutch Frontier* (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2009), 147.

[70]GM Theal, *Records of South-Eastern Africa* (*RSEA*), vols. I-IX (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1903).

[71] J Wright, 'Politics, Ideology and the Invention of the Nguni', in T Lodge (ed.), *Resistance and Ideology in Settler Societies*, vol. 4 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), 96-118; J Wright, 'Political Mythology and the Making of Natal's Mfecane', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 23, 2 (1989): 272-291; J Wright, 'A.T. Bryant and 'The Wars of Shaka'', *History of Africa* 18, (1991): 409-425; Hamilton, 'The Character and Objects of Chaka'; C Hamilton, 'Authoring Shaka: Models, Metaphors and Historiography' (PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1993); J Wright, 'Making the James Stuart Archive', *History of Africa*, 23 (1996), 333-350; Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*; C Hamilton, 'Backstory, Biography, and the Life of the James Stuart Archive', *History of Africa*, 38 (2011): 319-341.

in the growth of centralised polities.[72] But he was left wondering whether Delagoa Bay was involved in this increase in trade, or was somehow exempt. In the end, he concludes that slavery from the Bay remains a controversial subject.[73]

On the other hand, Portuguese-reading historians uncovered a great deal about the links between Mozambique and the wider Indian Ocean world with respect to the growth of the slave trade, from the archives in Lisbon and Maputo, yet they rarely strayed beyond the southern and western land boundaries of Mozambique. As a result, although the region lying between the coast, northern Natal, and the escarpment had been a vital zone of movement and economic, political and cultural interaction and exchange, its role has remained opaque within this bifurcated historiography. In this thesis I cite Mozambican sources that indicate connections between the two zones, and so illuminate core issues in South African history.

These investigations generated important insights about the nature of the evidence available, and some of the social processes at work. But, as these scholars noted, the written sources were largely generated by a motley collection of rogues, adventurers and self-serving traders – a less than secure basis for new insights. It was also coloured by a view from the south at a time when many of the key interests and trade connections of the kingdoms lay to the north. The invaluable work of John Wright in editing the James Stuart Archive has made a crucial collection of oral traditions much more accessible, but his determined scholarship could not overcome

[72] D Wylie, *Myth of Iron: Shaka in History* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006), 164.

[73] Ibid., 68.

key limitations of the archive. James Stuart, a magistrate in Natal and Zululand, collected oral material 80 years after many of the events described, that was shaped by explanatory conventions that stressed individuals and internal processes and downplayed external pressures. Notwithstanding the obvious drawbacks of these sources, the archives in Lisbon and Maputo, which contain relevant and contemporary documentation, were ignored. My line of inquiry is novel in that it approaches the debate by analysing events occurring in the northeast, that is Delagoa Bay, to understand political and social change in southern Natal.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE MASCARENES

Critical to an understanding of the processes at work in southern Mozambique is the development of a slave trade to provide plantation labour for the Mascarene Islands. By 1785, the Mascarene trade from Mozambique had come to overshadow the slave trade to the south Atlantic Ocean.[74] The Royal Order of 13 August 1769, which ended the French India Company's monopoly and gave licence to French citizens to trade freely in the seas beyond the Cape of Good Hope, led to the 'unprecedented rise of the slave trade to the Mascarenes'.[75] Another indication of the rise of the slave trade in the Mascarenes is the number of slaves on the islands. The 221 slaves traded in 1735, expanded to 133 000 in 1807-1808.[76] Between the 1670s and early 1830s, one fifth of French slave trading occurred in the Indian Ocean.[77]

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[74] NJ Hafkin, 'Trade, Society, and Politics in Northern Mozambique, c.1753-1913' (unpublished PhD thesis, Boston University, 1973), 26.

[75] JM Filliot, *La Traite des Esclaves vers les Mascareignes au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris: Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outré-Mer, 1974), 62.

[76] RB Allen, 'Satisfying the 'Want for Labouring People': European Slave Trading in the Indian Ocean, 1500-1850', *Journal of World History,* 21, 1 (March 2010): 45-73, 55.

[77] RB Allen, *European Slave Trading in the Indian Ocean, 1500-1850*, Indian Ocean Studies Series (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), 19.

Capela and Medeiros argue that by the end of the eighteenth century there was an 'intense and growing demand' for slaves on the Mascarenes, that is, Bourbon (Reunion) and Isle de France (Mauritius).[78] This view is reinforced by Edward Alpers, who names the earliest slave traders in the western Indian Ocean as French merchants from the Mascarenes, who were first to 'never [seek] ivory, and who played a crucial role in the rise of the slave trade during the eighteenth century'.[79] Herbert Gerbeau agrees that the slave trade to the Mascarenes was 'massive'.[80] Discussing northern Mozambique, Pedro Machado highlights the development of the French slave trade from the mid-1700s. He states that by the 1810s, slaves had replaced ivory, gold and silver trades on the northeast coast of Mozambique in the context of the slave trade to Diu and Daman.[81]

It was not only east Africa that provided slaves to the Mascarenes. The Malagasy market 'was a vigorous slave trade until the imposition of French colonial rule at the

[78] J Capela, E Medeiros, *O Tráfico de Escravos de Moçambique para as Ilhas do Índico, 1720-1902* (Maputo: Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, 1987), 19, 20.

[79] EA Alpers, 'The French Slave Trade in East Africa (1721-1810)', *Cahiers d' Études Africaines* 10, 37 (1970) : 80-124, 82,123.

[80] H Gerbeau, 'L'océan Indien N'est Pas l'Atlantique. La Traite Illégale à Bourbon au XIXe Siècle', *Revue Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer* 90, 336-337 (2002) : 79-108, 80.

[81] P Machado, 'A Forgotten Corner of the Indian Ocean: Gujarati Merchants, Portuguese India and the Mozambique Slave-Trade, c.1730-1830', *Slavery and Abolition* 24, 2 (2003): 17-32, 17, 18.

end of the nineteenth century'.[82] A significant slave trade at Madagascar, although occurring after the time limits of this chapter, fed the Mascarene slave trade.[83]

The Mascarene market flourished alongside a wider growing demand for slaves. The French demand rose along with the labour needs of Brazil, Zanzibar, the Comoros, Madagascar, the Persian Gulf, the United States and Cuba. [84] Alpers has shown that 'Moçambiques' (slaves from the Mozambican coast) were in greater demand in Brazil after the British abolitionists limited slavery to the southern hemisphere.[85] From the 1820s, the increased demand for slaves led to Quelimane becoming the most important port for Zambezia, while Inhambane became the most significant slave port for southern Mozambique.[86]

As the number of slavers increased, so did the exploitation of the east African coast.[87] The Treaty of Paris, signed on 30 May 1815, gave France five years to end its slave trade – which, ironically, increased the impetus to trade, evident in the significant number of slaves traded illegally to Reunion. Between 1811 and 1848, 48 900 to 66 400 slaves were smuggled onto the island; a leap in an average of

[82] G Campbell, 'The East African Slave Trade, 1861-1895: The 'Southern' Complex', *The International Journal of African Studies* 22, 1 (1989), 3.

[83] Campbell 'The East', 3; RB Allen, 'The Constant Demand of the French: The Mascarene Slave Trade and the Worlds of the Indian Ocean and Atlantic during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', *The Journal of African History* 49, 1 (2008), 43-72.

[84] Hafkin, 'Trade, Society, and Politics', 68.

[85] EA Alpers, ''Mozambiques' in Brazil: Another Dimension of the African Diaspora in the Atlantic World', JC Curto and R Soulodre-La France (eds), *Africa and the Americas: Interconnections during the Slave Trade* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), 43-68, 43.

[86] Alpers, 'Mozambiques', 44, 49.

[87] JM Filliot, *La Traite*, 166.

1 321 to 1 794 people a year.[88]

After 1818, when the French government outlawed slaving by French-owned ships and declared it a crime, the visibility of the trade diminished. Yet neither French nor Portuguese legislation, nor British surveillance at sea, put an end to the trade.[89]

THE BRAZILIAN TRADE FROM SOUTHEAST MOZAMBIQUE

As with the French slave trade to the Mascarenes, the trade to Brazil escalated, especially after its abolition had been formalised through the Anglo-Brazilian Anti-Slave Treaty, signed on 23 November 1826, which promised to abolish slave trading within three years. The trade escalated exponentially in response to the growth of Brazil's agricultural labour demands on its coffee and sugar plantations.[90] After prohibiting the slave trade in its colonies on 25 March 1807, Britain put increasing

[88] RB Allen, 'The Mascarene Slave-Trade and Labour Migration in the Indian Ocean during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', *Slavery & Abolition* 24, 2 (2003): 33-50. Other works that describe the Mascarenes as a centre of a substantial regional slave network are: G Campbell, 'Madagascar and Mozambique in the Slave Trade of the Western Indian Ocean 1800-1861', *Slavery and Abolition* 9, 3 (1988): 166-193; Allen, 'The Constant Demand', 43-72; Allen, 'Satisfying the Want', 45-73. Slaves were also exported to Madagascar – see Campbell, 'Madagascar', 166, as well as to Diu and Daman' – see P Machado, 'A Forgotten Corner', 17-32. The rise in the slave trade in response to prohibiting legislation appears to have been universal – Benguela serves as an example. See M Candido, *An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its Hinterland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 167.

[89] L Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 71. In the period 1822-1827, an average of 60 slave ships landed in the province of Rio de Janeiro; in 1828, over 110 ships landed 45 000 slaves, and almost the same number landed in 1829. In 1830, 30 000 slaves landed in the first semester of 1830.

[90] S Chalhoub, *A Força de Escravidão: Ilegalidade e Costume no Brazil Oitocentista* (São Paulo: Companhia Das Letras, 2012), 35.

pressure on European countries and Brazil to do the same. In 1826, in exchange for British acknowledgment of Brazilian independence from Portugal, Brazil agreed to abolish its slave trade.[91] Yet, once the deadline of 13 March 1830 to abolish the trade was set, Brazilian trade accelerated, driven by a fear of diminishing profits and the probability of a labour shortage after abolition.[92] This factor increased the demand for slaves on Brazilian soil, and the trade assumed 'terrifying' proportions.[93] Official abolition of slavery drove the trade underground, while increasing its intensity.[94] And because the Additional Convention to the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, added in 1817, limited the slave trade to the southern hemisphere, it created the impulse to find new slave markets – a reality exploited by slave traders – and boosted slaving along the southeast African coast.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF INHAMBANE, THE COAST, AND NORTHWEST INTERIOR

A key academic work on Inhambane, written in Portuguese, is that of António Agusto Cabral, who wrote a history book with an anthropological focus, that focuses on societies and their cultures as its centre of interest, and is situated in the later part of the nineteenth century.[95] In 1966 an article on Inhambane appeared in the journal

[91] Chalhoub, *A Força*, 36.

[92] There was a 'great volume' of slaves imported by Brazil between 1828-1830. See J Rodrigues, 'Outras Experiências no Fim de Tráfico', in *O Infame* Comércio *Propostase Experiências no Final Tráfico de Africanos para o Brazil, 1800-1850* (Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2000), 174.

[93] Bethell, *The Abolition*, 71; Chalhoub, *A Força*, 36.

[94] CEM de Araújo, 'Fim do Tráfico', in LM Schwarcz, F Santos Gomes (eds), *Dicionário da Escravidão e Liberdade* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2018), 232.

[95] A Cabral, *Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indigenas do Districto de Inhambane* (Lourenço Marques: Imprensa National, 1910).

Monumenta by Maria Fernandes, the director of the Mozambican archives. She dealt with the appointments to office at Inhambane, Sena, Mozambique Island and Delagoa Bay during the reign of King Miguel I (1828-1834), and the policies of these officials. Her treatment of Inhambane deals with the famine caused by the invasion of Soshangana. Three years later, Lereno Barradas wrote an article titled 'Terra de Boa Gente Aguada de Boa Paz' (Land of the good people of the water of good peace), about Vasco Gama's sixteenth century exploration of the southeast coast.[96]

In October 1990, the journal *Boletim do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique* published a special issue devoted to Inhambane, posing questions about the colonial presence in the region. Gwyn Campbell explored the structure of its maritime trade during the mid-nineteenth century, while Cândido Teixeira gave an overview of the mid-eighteenth century, dealing with the founding and administrative structures of the town. Bartolomeu Rungo introduced notes on the fortification of Inhambane during the eighteenth century. Gerhard Liesegang presented biographies of three of its residents in the period 1806-1870. These articles are useful for understanding the nature of the Portuguese administration but, with the exception of the Campbell article, the journal contributions are predominantly descriptive.

In this thesis I explore the role of trade between Inhambane and its western hinterland, that reaches beyond the Lubombo Mountains. Early information on the interior west of the mountain range comes from letters to the Council of XVII of the Vereenigende Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) from Delagoa Bay. The trading post,

[96] M Fernandes, 'Apontamentos para a História de Inhambane sob D. Miguel', *Monumenta* 2 (1966): 31-50; L Barradas, *Terra de Boa Gente Aguada de Boa Paz* (Lourenço Marques: Instituto de Investigação Científica de Moçambique,1969).

which the Dutch authorities established at Delagoa Bay (1721-1730), had little success in trade because it struggled to connect to the trade networks of the northwest interior, and its personnel was decimated by malaria.[97] Nevertheless, their brief stay of a decade at the Bay gave glimpses into the patterns and richness of trade connected to the interior that enabled intermediaries to be identified, including the forbearers of groups now described as Venda, Pedi, Phalaborwa, Bakoni and Tsonga.[98]

Shula Marks, Phil Bonner, Peter Delius, Neil Parsons, and Andrew Mason have all stressed the significance of the connection between the northwest interior and the commercial east coast in the mounting competition, conflict, and state formation in the region, a lacuna I will attempt to fill.[99] There are also glimpses in oral sources and secondary literature of the role of long-distance traders, notably the Tsonga, but also traders described as 'Mapalakata', who were most likely south Asian traders. However, until recently, very few attempts have been made to address this trading system from both ends. While the material remains scanty, it is possible to build on the new insights provided by my earlier study of trade at Delagoa Bay from 1721 to 1799.[100]

[97] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 113; Coetzee, 'Die Kompanjie'; Coetzee, 'Die Stryd'.

[98] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa'.

[99] Marks, 'Southern Africa'; P Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires*; P Delius, *The Land Belongs*; N Parsons, 'Prelude to Difacane in the Interior of Southern Africa', in C Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1995), 323-349; A Mason, 'Conflict in the Western Highveld/Southern Kalahari, c. 1750-1820' in C Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath*, 351-361.

[100] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa'.

SOURCES

This project relies predominantly on colonial archival material in the relative absence – besides the colonial papers of Henry Francis Fynn and James Stuart – of northern Nguni language sources. There is sadly also very little archaeological work on the coast to draw from. The most useful material consists of correspondence generated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Portuguese and Dutch officials employed at the trading posts of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane, to their respective superiors. This material does, however, have major limitations. The first concern relates to the identity of the authors. The authors recorded events, circumstances, and interactions with African societies from Eurocentric points of view, producing a biased record of early history. References to African activities are often cursory and were often recorded with curious amusement rather than in a spirit of genuine inquiry. Yet it is nevertheless possible to catch sight of the African world in these letters, glimpses that have previously been ignored in the writing of southeast African history. These first-hand accounts provide valuable information about the elements of trade, and the changes and continuities in trading relationships.

The Portuguese archival sources in the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) in Lisbon are essential to understanding the broader context of southeast African history at the coast and further inland. This archive of the history of Portuguese trading posts along the east coast of Africa is organised into three different sections. Firstly, there are 267 *caixas*, or boxes, ranging in date from 1605 to 1893, which generally contain letters from Governors of various ports to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island; there is a partial catalogue of these boxes available online that describes the contents of each document. The AHU files in Lisbon were in disarray

at the time of Smith and Hedges' research, but a 1980s project, which placed all documents in chronological order, made it easier for me than my predecessors to find relevant documents. By using the AHU, I outline the changing nature of a trading system that connected Delagoa Bay to its southern hinterland, including the northern Nguni states. I explore the development of the slave trade at Delagoa Bay and argue that trade in general, and specifically in slaves, deserves greater emphasis in the analysis of transformations in the region.

The archive also contains a collection of books or codíces; bound volumes of copied outgoing letters to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island. Lastly, there are letters addressed to the Secretário do Marinho e Ultramar (Secretary of the Overseas and Navy), or SEMU, documents.

The SEMU holds letters from Governors of Portuguese settlements, including Lourenço Marques and Inhambane, and letters by other personnel that often touch on events at these ports. The SEMU records also provide telling insights into the operation of the slave trade, including an important list of Portuguese and French ships entering and leaving Delagoa Bay.

The greatest contribution of the SEMU towards an understanding of trade in the 1820s, lies in the documented inquest into Governor Dionizo Antonio Ribeiro's death at the hands of Dingane's generals in 1833. But it is necessary to treat the documents surrounding Ribeiro's death critically. The competition between the trading post and the company was fierce during Ribeiro's term as Governor. A keen

animosity developed between the Governor and the employees of The Exclusive Ivory Commercial Company of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques (EICC). A commission of enquiry interviewed the military personnel about the circumstances leading to Ribeiro's death. The military personnel and the EICC employees' attempts to blame each other allowed the inquiry to penetrate beyond self-serving accounts.

Because of the antagonism between the EICC agent, José Nobre, and Governor Ribeiro, the close account of the events recorded in '*A Guerra dos Reis do Cabo Natal, Maxacana da Matolla, Makasana do Maputo, e mais Regnos Vizinhos ao Presidio*', hereafter *A Guerra*, currently held in AHU CU box 263, as document 80, is possibly biased against the Governor, whom Nobre described as 'despotic'.[101] It is a crucial document showing the events surrounding Ribeiro's death, while illuminating the nature of the relationship between the fort, which served as an official trading post and a commercial company, as well as the relationships between these and the surrounding chiefs. Military personnel manned the fort, while the EICC was a private venture, and rapidly came into competition with a military trading post. This contemporary document should be critically assessed because it holds a single point of view. Yet the inquest documents both complement and corroborate *A Guerra*, supporting its trustworthiness. In 1969, Liesegang treated the Zulu King Dingane's armies' invasion of Delagoa Bay in an article titled 'Dingane's Attack on Lourenço Marques in 1833'. While Liesegang covers the same material that I do, he lists possible reasons for this event without analysis, an oversight I try to correct.

[101] Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino Concelho Ultramarino Moçambique (AHU CU Moç), Caixa (Cx) 262 documento (d.) 80, *A Guerra dos Reis dos Vatua*, f. 34, 36, 38.

The important list of Portuguese and French ships entering and leaving Delagoa Bay, in conjunction with the extremely valuable Voyages Database, which only came into existence in 1999 and were not available to either Smith or Hedges, reveal the considerable number of slaves traded from Delagoa Bay.[102] Equally, neither of these pioneering academics, Alan Smith or David Hedges, had the advantage of reading the invaluable study by José Capela and Eduardo Medeiros on slave trafficking to the Mascarenes based on archival sources found in Lisbon and Maputo, published in 1987.[103] José Capela and Eduardo Medeiros are important Portuguese historians who produced reliable studies on the French slave trade, touching on both Inhambane and Delagoa Bay. Alexandre Lobato is another prominent Portuguese historian whose work centres on Delagoa Bay. However, while both Smith and Hedges mention the commercial Company, their focus is quite narrow. Smith focuses on its conflict with successive Governors, while Hedges mentions it in connection with its agent, José Antonio Nobre.[104]

CHAPTER OUTLINES

The first chapter of this thesis offers a chronological history of Delagoa Bay to lay a foundation for the more thematic approach of Chapters Five, Six and Seven. The chronology follows five periods. The first four periods describe (i) the departure of the Dutch from the Bay in 1730-31; (ii) English trade under the command of Edward Chandler, 1758-1768; (iii) the Austrian period under William Bolts, 1777-1782; and

[102] The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database Voyages, https://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/database, retrieved multiple times, 2017.

[103] Capela, Medeiros, *O Tráfico de Escravos*.

[104] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 243; Smith, 'The Struggle', 281.

(iv) the Portuguese period from 1782.[105] It shows that, in the last period, the ivory supply increasingly came from the south because of the deep involvement of the northern Nguni in providing trade goods. It also demonstrates the existence of conflict, negotiations, and tensions between the Europeans and the societies that supplied them.

Chapter Two focuses on Inhambane – the first of three chapters on the establishment and administration of the settlement, and the crucial role which the Indo-Muslims played in the economic success of this town. It outlines the Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean, and the beginning of their trade at Inhambane. It explores how, when the Dutch threatened to insert themselves into the Indo-Muslim trade network, the Portuguese claimed a monopoly on trade. After the trading post was settled, it was Tonga middlemen who facilitated trade. But the Tswa Tsonga and Dzivi invaded the area from the 1730s, and the chapter analyses how they gradually displaced the Tonga as the primary go-betweens.

In Chapter Three I discuss the development of the Indo-Muslim trading community, which was highly successful in trade. I show why the Indo-Muslims were far more prosperous than the trading post, and why they were a formidable source of competition. The chapter also explores the respective Tonga and Tsonga relationships with traders, and the competition between powerful chiefs for control of the trade.

[105] The Portuguese expelled the Austrians in 1782, and in turn were driven from the Bay by the French in 1796, only to return in 1799.

Chapter Four looks at the nature of Portuguese administration in the town, and the logic of the attempts by Governors to control the Inhambane trade. It also deals with the problem of the trading post having to establish its authority in the context of existing political hierarchies in competition with invading societies wanting to supplant them. It shows how questions of political allegiance complicated trade associations. It further explores how the accumulation of goods influenced social and political shifts in the societies who traded with the Portuguese and Indo-Muslims. Finally, it reveals the connection to the interior beyond the Lubombo Mountains, through Tsonga intervention, and discusses the fragmentary evidence on the slave trade.

Chapter Five describes the societies who lived on the shores and in the deep southern hinterland of Delagoa Bay. It further sketches their political responses to the needs of and demands made by trade. It shows how the Tembe strategically relocated to take advantage of the trade which swung further south, and how this eventually caused a split within the Tembe polity. This chapter also addresses the influence of drought on trade, which necessitated migration amongst northern Nguni lineages towards water sources. These migrations impinged on trade routes, causing conflict over the control of the flow of trade items. I also discuss the economic importance of the Phongola pass, the role it played in conflicts between these northern Nguni lineages, and the connection between centralisation and the slave trade.

Chapter Six explores the slave trade of Delagoa Bay in depth. It reveals who was involved in this trade, and further reveals the political and social ramifications which

the short period of intense slaving brought to those who lived in proximity to the Bay, as well as to those in the deep south.

Chapter Seven is based on the narratives surrounding a Governor's murder. I use this account to relate the deep and critical significance of the *saguate* (gift) to persons of preeminent political status, and how political competition played out in the circumstances of trade.

CHAPTER ONE

DELAGOA BAY: A POINT OF CONTACT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TRADE NETWORK

From the mid-sixteenth century, Europeans came to know Delagoa Bay for its potential ivory trade. This chapter follows the development of the ivory trade at the Bay and argues that during the trading periods dominated by the English (1757-1777) and later, ostensibly by Austria (1777-1782), merchant-traders pumped a mass of exotic goods into the hinterlands to the south. The dynamic English/Austrian period provided the impetus to the supply of ivory and later, slaves, to Delagoa Bay. In addition to the ample distribution of goods, the traders were disinterested in imposing any political authority on surrounding societies, an element which contributed to successful trading during both periods. The promise of prosperity drew societies into the demands of the western Indian Ocean's economy, and in turn stimulated profound political changes, especially in the southern interior of the Bay.

A BRIEF EARLY HISTORY OF TRADE AT DELAGOA BAY

On a trip to investigate economic viability of the rivers of the *Cabo Correntes*, or Cape of Currents, by order of the viceroy in Goa in 1545, Lourenço Marques sailed into Delagoa Bay. In this natural, deep and commodious harbour bay, he discovered that '[ivory was bought] with some beads worth twenty-three copper coins, and sold

for more or fewer a 100 cruzados in India'.[106] Delagoa Bay, therefore, represented a potential treasure trove for the [Portuguese] State.

Before the Portuguese became interested in the southeast coast of Africa, it was a region of Indian rather than Arab trade. While no documentary evidence exists for a previously established seasonal ivory trade by either Muslim or Hindu Indian merchants, there is some tantalising evidence. The Gama fleet came across an agent of a wealthy Indian merchant from Cambay somewhere north of Sofala, who hinted at the possibility of an Indian trade further south.[107] Firmer evidence comes from sites showing signs of the manufacture of ivory bangles and armlets. These pieces of jewellery are 'the largest, most frequent and standardised type of artefact found' at sites in Natal during the seventh and tenth centuries AD,[108] with Natal being further south than the Bay, and thus infers a connection with Delagoa Bay.[109] As ivory bracelets were highly sought-after items in India as bridal jewellery, it might be that Delagoa Bay, as a result of the possible extension of the south Asian Chibuene trade, explained in detail below, had an earlier trade connection to India.

In response to the favourable report delivered by the Marques expedition, the Goan authorities henceforth annually dispatched a ship to collect ivory from the Bay. At first, the Portuguese traded from their ships' decks and on the beaches of the Bay

[106] C Montez, *Descobrimento*, 22. During the sixteenth century the *cruzado* was a silver coin, marked with a cross.

[107] HEJ Stanley (ed.), *The Three Voyages*, 43.

[108] AN Coutu, G Whitelaw, P le Roux, J Sealy, 'Earliest Evidence for the Ivory Trade in Southern Africa: Isotopic and ZooMS Analysis of Seventh-Tenth Century AD Ivory from KwaZulu-Natal', *African Archaeology Review,* 33 (2016), 411-435, 429.

[109] Ibid., 430.

with societies known by lineage of descent, namely the Machaya, Cherinda, Mfumo, Tembe, and Inhaca – all of whom had moved into the Bay area some time prior to the sixteenth century. But from the 1660s, the Portuguese trade voyages to Delagoa Bay gradually diminished to the point where years would pass without a single trading ship calling there.

This neglect may in part have been caused by distractions which the Portuguese faced to the north. Dutch and English companies had entered the Indian Ocean trade network, and Portuguese ships came under fire. Being a small nation, and determined to fight for independence from Spain between 1640 and 1668, had put pressure on their resources: manpower, ships and capital. Besides these challenges, the Omanis, who had become masters of the western Indian Ocean, eventually retook Mombasa (1696-98), which put further strain on precious Portuguese resources.[110] It is reasonable to assume that, in these circumstances, the southeast coast became less of a priority. But even here Portuguese traders were under attack.

A new and hostile Mutapa called Makwombe had come to power, disrupting the core Portuguese gold trade to Sofala.[111] And since the Portuguese tried to politically dominate the Zimbabwean plateau, their attempts to establish a hegemony incited later campaigns in the 1690s by a changamire, known as 'the fatal enemy of the Portuguese nation'. These offenses against the changamire to protect Portuguese interests on the plateau further siphoned off the State's financial resources.[112] Thus

[110] Malekandathil, 'From Slumber'; Hoffman Ruf, al Salimi (eds), *Oman and Overseas*, 183.

[111] DN Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900-1850: An Outline of Shona History* (London: Heinemann,1980), 132.

[112] Ibid., 220.

the decline of the Portuguese state contributed to the neglect and increased obscurity of the Bay.[113]

The increasing activity of pirates in the western waters of the Indian Ocean during the Golden Age of piracy, between 1650-1730, was another factor at play in the neglect of Delagoa Bay. St. Mary's Island, off the northeast coast of neighbouring Madagascar bay, served as a haven for pirates. Nearly every pirate ship that sailed to the Indian Ocean stopped at St. Mary's.[114] The pirates were mostly from English colonies in America, and operated largely from Madagascar.[115] In fact, the problem of piracy became so acute that the Portuguese Crown laid an official complaint with the English government. The Portuguese abandoned trade at the Bay in 1703 after a pivotal episode involving pirates, who set a trading ship alight after looting its cargo, leaving the Portuguese crew to escape on foot to Inhambane.[116] This event marked the end of Portuguese trade voyages to southern Mozambique, and brought the first Lusitanian era at Delagoa Bay to a close.

After almost twenty years of Portuguese absence, in March 1721 a contingent of Dutch sailors sailed into Delagoa Bay to establish a trading post on its shores. However, the ten years of Dutch occupation brought disappointing economic results. The unavoidable embroilment in local chiefs' political manoeuvres, and chiefs'

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[113] E Axelson, *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1969), 1.

[114] KP McDonald, 'Pirate Settlers of Madagascar', in *Pirates, Merchants, Settlers, and Slaves: Colonial America and the Indo-Atlantic World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 106.

[115] A Bialuschewski, 'Thomas Bowrey's Madagascar Manuscript of 1708', *History in Africa* 34 (2007): 31-42, 34.

[116] M Newitt, *A History*, 157.

determination to block Dutch direct access to the interior, lay at the heart of the trading post's failure. Another obstacle to success was the high mortality rate due to malaria among the settlers, which resulted in a chronic shortage of staff. During the first six weeks after arrival, no fewer than two thirds of their men perished. Overall, the Company lost 490 out of the 620 men sent to Delagoa Bay between 1721 and 1730.[117]

Trade was further frequently disrupted by war between chiefs over competition for exotic goods.[118] The rivalry over the access to goods is important to understand in terms of political power amongst local societies, and indeed those of southeast Africa. Political power was contingent on a few factors. These were, firstcomer status, place within the hierarchy of a lineage, the number of subjects a chief commanded, and lastly, his wealth in cattle. The larger a chief's following, the greater his political stature because of the control he could command over a significant contingent of labour and tribute. The display of trade goods was a compelling symbol of power, and so the accumulation of trade goods was an important means of attracting elite subjects through the redistribution of exotic goods. Because of this dynamic, the accretion of trade goods also offered an opportunity for social mobility, as people often defected to the leader who multiplied the greater amount of goods.[119] Specifically in the context of growing lineages, grew that split into new communities, causing competition to grow amongst members of the same lineage for supporters. One such example was Maniça, who had split from

[117] D Sleigh, *Die Buiteposte: VOC-Buiteposte onder Kaapse Bestuur* (Pretoria: HAUM, 1993), 706.

[118] Chewins 'Trade at Delagoa', 113.

[119] Ibid., 103.

Machaya, and became the most powerful chief in the northern side of the Bay.[120] His rise was no doubt linked to his trade relationship with Inhambane, from where traders regularly arrived to exchange goods.[121]

As the trade tempo picked up at Delagoa Bay, competition between chiefs increased, and conflict ensued. The principal suppliers of ivory and some gold from the northwest interior, more often than not lost their trade goods to combatants, and were frightened away, bringing trade to a standstill. Under the pressure of a continued demand for presents from chiefs, and without having incoming ivory and other goods to offset the costs of gifts, the Political Council at the Cape issued an order to dismantle and pack up the highly unsuccessful trading post in 1730. Oppressed and underpaid soldiers deserting for Inhambane in 1727, and the uncovering of a planned mutiny in 1728, were final factors in the trading post's demise.[122] On 12 August 1731, the ships *Snuffelaar*, *Fyneoord* and *Zeepost* evacuated the garrison. By then the fort had been levelled to the ground.

Between 1731 and 1756, after the departure of the Dutch, the maritime trade at Delagoa Bay came to a stop. During this time a few desultory stopovers occurred, mainly because of storm damage, although there is some hint of visits for trading purposes, as we shall see below. The sad state of the trade is suggested by the message local chiefs sent to Inhambane. In 1747 the chiefs, long not having had any contact with Europeans since the Dutch left, sent Governor Melo e Castro at

[120] NA 4373 f. 208. '[Machaya was] strong in numbers'.

[121] For Manhiça's trade with Inhambane, see Montez, *Descrobimento*, 48.

[122] N Penn, 'Great Escapes: Deserting Soldiers during Noodt's Governorship, 1727-1729, *South African Journal of History* 59 (2007): 171-203, 203.

Inhambane an invitation to trade – but it would only be over a decade later that a Portuguese ship arrived.[123] By this time, in 1758, there had been at least eight other ships at the Bay. In 1756, the first of these was the sloop, the *Happy Deliverance*, built out of the wreckage of the British East Indiaman, the *Doddington*, having run aground near Algoa Bay. The crew of the *Happy Deliverance* found Edward Chandler's galley, the *Rose*, engaged in trade.[124] A Dutch ship, the *Naarstigheid*, was dismasted in a hurricane and limped into the Bay on 1 July 1757.[125] And later that same year, the Dutch ship *Venus* sought refuge because of a loose rudder, and found an English and two Austrian ships anchored and engaged in trading.[126] The next year, the *Hector*, an East India Company ship, was dispatched to pick up the 59 survivors of the ship *Doddington* and take them to safety, and in the process acquired over 2 200 kg of ivory.[127] Edward Chandler's presence in 1757 suggests that a trade between Delagoa and Bombay had already been established some time before the *Doddington* arrived.

Because of the constant English demand for ivory, particularly for its Indian markets, coupled with the English merchants' ability to raise credit, the sporadic nature of the trade had changed. The English East India Company (EIC) allowed privately owned merchant vessels to trade in Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and on the east coast of Africa. Another consideration in the acceleration of the ivory trade at the Bay

[123] Smith, 'The Struggle', 157.

[124] W Webb, *A Particular Account of the Loss of the Doddington Indiaman* (London: L. How, 1758), 23.

[125] GM Theal, *History and Ethnography of Africa South of the Zambesi, from the Settlement of the Portuguese at Sofala in September 1505 to the Conquest of the Cape Colony by the British in September 1795*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 158.

[126] Theal, *History and Ethnography*, vol. 3, 155.

[127] Ibid., 156; Smith, 'The Struggle', 158.

was the franchise opened to Vaniya merchants by the Portuguese Crown in 1686. The freedom to trade wherever they liked also benefited Vaniya-English networks because English merchants from Bombay acquired Portuguese passports through the help of Vaniya merchants from Goa, Diu and Daman.[128]

It was under these favourable circumstances created by the EIC that merchant Edward Chandler and his experienced crew, licensed by the Company, and [armed with] Portuguese passports, made their way to Delagoa Bay to exploit the ivory market from at least 1757. Not much else is known about this man, other than that he was the bane of Portuguese business because of his highly lucrative trade. His success is clear from his ability to purchase the *Happy Deliverance* for 2 500 rupees, or 5 001 'money sterling'.[129] Evidence of wide-ranging trade from the Bay comes from the crew of the same *Happy Deliverance* who, when they were still at St. Lucia, saw men from Delagoa Bay trading ambergris and ivory.[130] It could be that these men were either itinerant Indian agents, or independent merchants, or possibly agents employed by Chandler sailing along the coast in small vessels to collect merchandise from designated points, such as the estuary of St. Lucia.[131]

The key to the success of Chandler's country trade was his access to financial networks, possibly through Indian merchants and bankers, which meant he could maintain a supply of a large quantity of quality trade goods, in particular brass items, which were in high demand in the southern hinterland of Delagoa Bay. Besides an

[128] Montez, *Descrobimento*, 83.

[129] Webb, *A Particular Account*, 24.

[130] S Bannister, *Humane Policy: Or Justice to the Aborigines of New Settlements* (London: Thomas and George Underwood, 1830), xxxvii.

[131] For Chandler's Indian agents, see Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 127.

ample supply of goods, the English merchant displayed little interest in political interference, which incentivised the delivery of ivory, not least because of firearms he provided to chiefs. But the greatest contribution to English success at Delagoa Bay was their method of delivering exotic goods in exchange for ivory. From Chandler's trade depot, most likely a palm and reed hut for storing goods on Inhaca Island, longboats were despatched up major rivers and their tributaries to collect ivory.[132] Longboats had the advantage of carrying ten tons of freight, and were defensible. The use of boats disposed of effective local political control over the trade process.[133] This method minimised the cost of transport, reduced the incidence of robbery, neutralised fighting sparked by groups of carriers, and reduced tributes for the sake of traversing territory belonging to diverse chiefs. The most important aspect of the longboat trade was that it dispersed transactions over a larger area, extending the economic reach of trade almost as far as the Mkhuze River, a hundred kilometres into the interior. Consequently, longboats brought the demand for ivory and the supply of brass, beads, and some cloth, to the doorstep of the northern Nguni hegemons, Mthethwa and Nwandwe; a development that would be crucial to political developments in northern Natal, as I show in Chapter Five.

Chandler's success encouraged others to follow suit. As mentioned, the *Hector* encountered three ships anchored for trade in 1758, and a brisk country trade

[132] Smith, 'The Struggle', 163. The Dutch saw the benefits of using this method, but were unable to acquire an adequate number of small vessels to trade as successfully as the ones in Natal did.
[133] Not that the Austrian trade was without its challenges. The trading post was settled during a famine, malaria remained a problem, as did political complications with coastal chiefs who saw the Austrians as subjects. For a broader discussion on these issues, see Smith, 'The Struggle', 182-184.

continued even after Chandler's death.[134] He perished at sea in 1768, ironically while attempting to aid a Portuguese ship stranded off the coast of Sofala. In 1777, the English colours flapping above the house of the commander of the *Hawke* on Inhaca Island was evidence of the extent of the lively, private English trade, and the dominance of English participation at Delagoa.[135]

THE AUSTRIAN COMPANY AT THE BAY

In 1777 William Bolts, an ex-official of the EIC, challenged this predominantly English interest at Delagoa Bay when his men pulled down the British flag and the commander's house, and claimed the economic right to the Bay for the Austrian Crown.[136] By this date, Bolts was considered a pariah in British India. He had previously accumulated £90 000 in six years through private trade, defied the Bengal authorities for two years, ruined an ex-British Governor in litigation and later, in an attempt to revenge himself on the Company for his forcible deportation, set up rival trading posts under the protection of the Imperial Austrian government.[137]

Bolts' commercial goals coincided with that of the Habsburg monarchy's councillors, who wanted to develop Trieste as the largest seaport in their domain in response to the Vienna Treaty of 1731 that prohibited Austrian expeditions to Asia from the Low

[134] S Meisterle, 'Country Trade unter Kaiserlicher Flagge: William Bolts und die Zweite Oesterreichische Ostindienkompanie', *Zeitschrift fuer Weltgeschichte: Interdisziplinaere Perspektiven* 9, 2 (2008): 63-87.

[135] NL Hallward, *William Bolts, a Dutch Adventurer under John Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 144.

[136] Ibid., 144.

[137] Ibid., 3.

Countries.[138] By 1775, Bolts had successfully ingratiated himself with the Austrian royal court. He had obtained Austrian citizenship, the rank of colonel, and had permission to engage in direct trade between the east (India, Persia and China) and Austrian Adriatic seaports as the head of the Trieste Austrian Company. Bolts and his crew sailed in the *Joseph and Thereza* from Livorno, a city situated on Tuscany's west coast, on 24 September 1776. The ship was laden with 'a rich cargo'.[139] The previous presence of an Austrian ship at the Bay in 1758 suggests that previous Austrian interest in the Bay inspired William Bolts' plan to set up trade there. His ship ran aground on a sandbank at the entrance to the English River in March 1777, and in the twelve days the crew spent offloading and repairing the damage, Bolts assessed the economic potential of Delagoa Bay.

What he saw was a territory with potential profits for the taking. He spent the next four months there, laying out ambitious but mainly unfulfilled plans for a trading post: the cultivation of indigo, coffee, pepper, wheat, orange trees, coconut palms and opium, as well as a settlement for 200 Austrians who would require the services of tailors, millers, master builders, carpenters, a doctor, and a priest under the administration of a Governor and three clerks.[140] Part of the plan was to build two forts, as well as a settlement on Inhaca Island. Bolts left the Bay in the winter of 1777, leaving the Austrian commander André Pollet, accompanied by ten men, in charge of the settlement on behalf of the company.

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[138] M Wanner, 'William Bolts and Societé Imperiale Asiatique de Trieste', Prague papers on International Relation', Institute of World Relations (2004): 57-73.

[139] Hallward, *William Bolts*, 142.

[140] Ibid., 142. These requests were ignored by the Austrian government.

Before his departure for India, Bolts signed individual contracts with three chiefs: the Tembe chief Muhari Capella, and two Mfumo chiefs, Matola and Bilene. These contracts promised to secure land in perpetuity for the Austrian flag, claimed free passage for Austrian agents across chiefs' territory, and pledged the surrender of fugitives and punishment of crimes committed against each other.

Although the contracts of all three chiefs were similar, Matola's differed. He had, since the Dutch departure, gained supremacy over the northern bank, and his contract contained two additional clauses – firstly, he promised to cede his suzerainty over Mfumo to the Austrians, placing the northern bank 'entirely under the protection' of the Company, and secondly, in the event of war, promised to keep trade routes open.[141] These two clauses were part of an attempt to keep access to the trade routes from the north and northwest open, which suggests that Bolts expected ivory from these directions.[142]

Bolts was determined to stimulate trade, and unlike the Dutch and the Portuguese, placed relatively limited restrictions on the local chiefs, which allowed them to trade with other nations, thus increasing competition over the supply of exotic goods. The chiefs agreed to first meet Austrian demand, whereafter they would be allowed to do business with any other European traders. This policy not only provided the trading post with an income from port duties payable by any ships other than those flying the Austrian flag, but also stimulated trade. The Austrians, however, had no leverage to

[141] Smith, 'The Struggle', 178.

[142] Carlson claims that the Dutch ivory supply came exclusively from the south, but provides no evidence for this assertion. See SH Carlson, *Trade and Dependency: Studies in the Expansion of Europe* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1984), 146.

enforce the terms of the contracts. Ivory from the interior was supplied in extraordinary amounts because of the steady and considerable provision of desired trade goods presented in exchange. The disinterest of the Austrian trading post in politically subjugating the region was another incentive to supply ivory. Austrian success therefore did not rest on contracts but on their ability to supply abundantly desired goods, and by leaving the chiefs in peace.

For the next four years the Austrian trade post sourced ivory from the northern and southern interiors of the Bay along the two highways of trade, the Nkomati and Maputo Rivers, both of which were navigable for about a hundred kilometres into the interior. What becomes clear is the different demands from markets in the north and the south. While any item could purchase food, ivory commanded a specific supply of goods. During the Austrian period, acceptable articles in exchange for ivory were rum and spirits from Pernambuco, Rio and Bahia; various types of cloth, in particular black cloths six to eight arm's lengths long; large elongated beads the colour of sugarcane; glass beads of various colours; and neck and arm manilas (brass rings). Glass beads, brass arm and neck manilas, and some cloth went south, while the northern trade up the Nkomati River demanded beads and black cloth.[143]

The reason why the English and Austrians traded so successfully to the south was their easy access to highly desired brass goods. By the late seventeenth century, British copper and brass dominated markets worldwide because of regulatory and

[143] Fr. Francisco de Santa de Thereza, '*Plano e Relaçao da Bahia Lourenço Marques'* (1784), University of Coimbra, MS 169, f. 47. Friar Francisco was in Delagoa Bay for twenty months, some time between 1782 and 1784. For the distribution direction of goods, see Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 134.

technological developments that had been achieved without any competition, since Swedish copper mining had declined. It is therefore likely that a greater flow of brass entered the ivory market from the mid-1750s with Chandler's trading activities and his use of inexpensive supplies of British (and Indian) brass goods in exchange.[144] No doubt it was this flood of brassware into Delagoa Bay that drew ivory traders from the south to the upper reaches of the Maputo River where the English and Austrians traded. The ready supply of brass, which was shinier, brighter and more flexible than copper, and workable cold, led to the mobilisation of labour through the *amabutho* (age-regiments) among the northern Nguni to supply ivory in exchange. With cheap access to brass, the English, and later the Austrians, through Bolt's English contacts, were able to develop an extensive brass trade up the Maputo River. The Austrian trade along the Maputo and Nkomati Rivers was immense. Six to seven longboats worked these rivers to collect, besides other goods, ivory, rhino horn, hippo teeth, slaves, ambergris, gold and copper.[145]

By 1781, 5 669 kg of ivory per month per monsoon year had left the Bay.[146] This number is moderate, based on available but sketchy records. In 1779 two ships left with a load of over 18 000 kg, so one can presume that the number of exported tusks was much higher. Even so, this volume of ivory represents the slaughter of 251 elephants. Smith judged the amount of ivory leaving the bay as 100 000 pounds in weight (45 399 kg), in a season, which was on average six months long, pushing the

[144] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 125.

[145] Santa de Thereza, '*Plano e Relaçao',* f. 29, 30.

[146]L Chewins, 'The Relationship between Trade in Southern Mozambique and State Formation: Re-assessing Hedges on Cattle, Ivory and Brass', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42, 4 (2016): 725-741, 731. This number is also dependent on how long ships took to fill their cargoes – at nine months the number rises to 51 021 kg a month.

total of elephants slaughtered to 232 per month. The number assumes a conservative average of 35,8 kg of ivory per elephant, based on the average amount of ivory provided to the Dutch from 1 November 1731 to 8 January 1732.[147] Elephant hunting was labour intensive; men were needed to locate, track, pursue and bring down animals, cut out tusks, and carry their spoils long distances to collection points along the Maputo River.[148]

Ivory came from both northern and southern sources where societies formed age-regiments, probably in response to trade brought to their doorstep, and who also delivered a great proportion of hippo teeth.[149] (Other factors in the rise of age-sets are discussed in Chapter Five). Less is known about the Nkomati trade, since the Austrian sources focused on documenting the trading post's southern connections; an indication of greater emphasis on the southern trade. In the end, the Austrian trading post became a victim of its own success. Its booming trade raised the ire of the Portuguese who, though absent, viewed the Bay as indubitable Portuguese territory. Eventually the Portuguese, provoked by their competitor's highly favourable results, sent an armed ship from Goa – the *Santa Maria* – with 300 soldiers on board, to dislodge the trading post in 1781.[150]

In late 1781, Lieutenant-Colonel Godinho de Mira arrived and seized two vessels flying the Austrian flag and dispatched them to Goa. Mira did not encounter much resistance from the Austrians. Food shortages had weakened these fever-stricken

[147] GM Theal, *RSEA*; 'Dagregister … de Snuffelaar' (Government of the Cape Colony, 1808), 485-503.

[148] JF Walker, *Ivory's Ghosts: The White Gold of History and the Fate of Elephants* (New York: Grove Press, 2009), 67.

[149] Santa de Thereza, '*Plano e Relaçao*', f. 6.

[150] Theal, *History and Ethnography*, vol. 3, 332.

men who were easily overcome, imprisoned, and their fort destroyed. It appears that the longboat trade did not include foodstuffs, so the trading post had to secure food from groups settled in or near the Bay. According to Pollet, the latter only cultivated enough for their own needs, and with no incentive to produce a surplus, the trading post suffered great hunger.[151] The unwillingness to provision the trading post was probably, in part, the result of the anger of Delgoans, because of the loss of their ivory monopoly through the trading post dealings with the Maputo. Moreover, they did not need the provisions trade because they acquired trade goods through ransacking warehouses to make up for this loss, and so withholding food was more likely a form of retribution on their part.[152]

Mira returned to Mozambique Island with news of the successful expulsion of the Austrians. The Island's businessmen were keen to exploit the Bay without involving the metropole. Governor Vicente Maia e Vascancelos resolved to give the monopoly of the Delagoa Bay trade to a group of businessmen based on Mozambique Island. The *Sociedade dos Negociantes* (Association of Businessmen) consisted of six Europeans and six Vaniya men, namely Lacamichande Mutichande, Ponjá Valgy, Galala Ganez, Carvá Malgy, Valgy Amboidas and Gettá Mulugy. They were granted a monopoly of Delagoa Bay's trade for six years, and between them raised a capital sum of 60 000 *cruzados* (silver coins).[153] On 26 November 1781, Joaquim de Araújo was elected Governor of Delagoa Bay.[154] He was, as such, the administrator of the

[151] Smith, 'The Struggle', 182.

[152] For information on 'os indigenas turbulentos andavam praticos roubos nas bangçais dos capitães de navios' (the turbulent natives go robbing the ship captains' warehouses), see Lobato, *História da Fundação,* 48.

[153] Ibid*.,* 83, 85.

[154] Ibid*.,* 105.

Sociedade, tasked with promoting commerce, and keeping honest accounts with the help of a secretary who was appointed by members of the *Sociedade*.

Although the Austrian trading post had been destroyed and officially brought to naught in 1781, the indomitable William Bolts refused to give up on the Delagoa market. Portuguese-India encouraged Indian merchants to trade at Delagoa Bay, opening up an opportunity for Bolts to continue a lucrative trade. With the Governor of India, who protected and supported his interests, Bolts formed a web of business concerns across the western coast of India.[155] Miguel Lima e Souza coordinated the Bombay trade on behalf of William Bolts while acting as Bolts' attorney. Bolts' business contacts created a network of contacts consisting of Indian, English and Portuguese individuals and companies interested in generating trading profits. Because of his contacts in high places, Bolts was able to send a ship named *Santana* under the Portuguese flag to Delagoa Bay 'many times'.[156] The ship was nominally owned by a Goan businessman, Antonio Pereira, to lend plausibility to the letter of credentials signed by the Governor of India, expressly giving the ship permission to trade at the Bay.[157] Although Pereira was Goanese, he belonged to a business partnership that had branches in Bombay and Madras, both of which were English business centres. Pereira, amongst others, was accused of favouring Bolts' interests and using Goanese ships to legitimise trade at the Bay on behalf of the Englishman.[158] But Bolts' plans to exploit the Delagoan trade were brought to a halt by the formation of the *Sociedade de Negociantes*.

[155] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 36.

[156] Ibid., 35.

[157] Ibid., 125, 128.

[158] Ibid., 125.

On 2 April 1782 the *Santana*, under the command of Thomas Burton, sailed into the Bay under Portuguese colours, but clearly resembled a Bombay vessel or 'English' ship.[159] Burton presented a letter of credentials from the Governor of India. But the Governor, Joaquim de Araújo, the administrator of the *Sociedade*, who was suspicious of the contradiction posed by an obviously English ship flying a Portuguese flag, refused to accept the ship's legitimacy. Instead, de Araújo asserted that the *Sociedade* had a monopoly and issued threats to confiscate the ship and imprison the crew, but finally ordered the ship to depart.[160] This incident represents the highly personalised nature of the trade. William Bolts was clearly a business partner of the Governor and Captain-General of India. It appears that Bolts approached the Governor of India with a money-making opportunity that was too lucrative to resist. A letter from Saldanha e Alberquerque, dated 1 August 1783, hinted at the friendly relationship between the Governor of India and Bolts, and warned of the formidable web of interests Bolts had developed on the west Indian coast.

The Governor of India, Frederico Guilherme Sousa's vociferous protest at the expulsion of the *Santana* from the Bay, should be understood within the context of his lucrative relationship with Bolts, and suggests his personal interest in the ship's commercial voyage. The Governor had used his position to support and protect Bolts' commercial interchanges between India and Delagoa Bay, and in view of the fortune that he too stood to make, he safeguarded Bolts' interests.[161]

[159] Santa de Thereza, '*Plano e Relaçao*', f. 35; Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 33.

[160] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 33.

[161] Ibid., 36.

Bolts employed agents to buy and sell, and the financial success of his concerns helped to stimulate commercial activity, which attracted Portuguese individuals such as Pereira and the Governor of India. One such agent was Thomas Burton, who later died under suspicious circumstances on Mozambique Island in June 1782 after having boarded the *Sociedade*'s ship, the *Santissima Trinidade*, in a clear attempt to undermine Bolts' trade at the Bay.[162] In the following year, the Governor of Delagoa Bay, Joaquim de Araújo, poisoned another captain trading at the Bay – a man named Zabocote who was a trader from Portuguese India. At this time, any Portuguese subject had the right to trade in any Portuguese ports by order of the Queen. The poisoning came in response to the ill-fated man's rightful claim to free trade at the Bay, after he used small boats to collect ivory along the rivers. The question is why Araújo clearly ignored the legal right of Zabocote to trade there. It is possible that Zabocote was a Goan agent in the employ of Bolts. Because Bolts' Bombay ships were qualified as foreign traders and were prohibited from trading at the Bay, he employed Vaniya agents who, by order of the Queen, had every right to trade at Delagoa Bay, a ruse Araújo apparently did not fall for.

William Bolts' success was in part due to the synergy in the triangle of trade affiliations, which included Indian, English and Portuguese agents. There was great affiliation between the Indian and English merchants because of the cooperation and financial cross-pollination between these two networks of private trade; each had access to finance and could directly acquire trade goods. On the other hand, underfunded Portuguese traders experienced a threefold blow: having to depend on Vaniya (Hindu) traders as middlemen for access to goods; needing the Vaniya

[162] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 36.

traders' knowledge about markets; as well as relying on their finance to float Portuguese commerce. The Vaniya charged inflated interest rates. Moreover, paying duties at Mozambique Island shrank profit margins. Another setback in terms of profit margins was the inability of the Portuguese traders to adjust their exchange values according to the increasing demands for goods of the interior markets per *arroba* (14.7 kg). This was because the values were determined by *regimento*, or statute. In the circumstances of highly regulated prices, the terms of trade in favour of Indian middlemen, on top of onerous duties, led to Vaniya and English traders dominating the southeast African trade.

The Governor Pedro de Saldanha Albuquerque of Mozambique Island advocated the establishment of a mercantile corporation. The principal reason for this idea was to counteract the virtual monopoly which the Indian merchants – both Hindu and Muslim – held over Mozambique Island and the southeast coast of Africa. From 1782, de Albuquerque had complained about Vaniya merchants whom he described as 'a band of thieves in the guise of merchants', referring to the high interest rates they charged.[163] The Governor-General proposed the expulsion of Vaniya merchants from Mozambique Island and the rivers of Sena, and confiscation of their commercial houses. The proposal included transfer of the latter to 'Christians', that is to the Portuguese traders.[164] The reason for the Governor-General's vitriol was the growing Indian influence, to the point where these men were elected to the municipal

[163] AHU CU Moç, Cx 40 d. 33, Governor and Captain-General Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque to the Captain-Major of Sena, 28 November 1782.

[164] Ibid.

assembly, leaving very few Portuguese left on the Island to influence the economic sphere.[165]

The dominance of Vaniya traders involved in the Portuguese trade circuit motivated the formation of the *Corporação Mercantil* (Mercantile Corporation) in 1783. The logic was to limit Vaniya trade through giving a few wealthy merchants exclusive licence to trade. The corporation's statutes were signed by eighteen European and thirteen Vaniya merchants.[166] Amongst the Vaniya were Lacamichande Motichande, Ponjá Valgy, Carvá Valgy, Gettá Mulugy and Valegy Amboidas – all from either Diu or Daman, and partners in the *Sociedade*.[167] Lacamichande Motichande provides an illuminating example of the members of this association. He was a merchant from Diu with significant commercial interests on Mozambique Island and was, like the other Vaniya merchants, heavily invested in the procurement and importation of Gujarati textiles.[168] As Motichande, Ponjá Valgy was another important merchant who traded at Mozambique Island. His significant trade was evident in the 134 114 *cruzados* in duties he paid over a period of two and a half years.[169] Their knowledge of the markets on both sides of the ocean, those supplying ivory and those consuming ivory, were crucial to their success.[170]

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[165] LFD Antunes, 'O Comércio com o Brazil e a Comunidade Mercantile em Moçambique (séc. XVIII)', http://cvc.instituto-camoes.pt/eaar/coloquio/comunicacoes/luis_frederico_antunes.pdf, 6.

[166] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 120.

[167] Ibid., 121.

[168] Machado, *Ocean of Trade*, 1.

[169] F Hoppe, *A África Oriental Portuguesa: No Tempo do Marquês de Pombal*, *1750-1777* (Lisbon: Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1970), 180.

[170] Machado, *Ocean of Trade,* 7.

In a seemingly contradictory action, the authorities in Goa encouraged Vaniya from Diu and Daman to visit Delagoa Bay as part of the Crown's concession of 1755, which gave all its subjects liberty of trade in any of the Portuguese east African ports. This decision was advantageous to Goa, but not to Mozambique Island and the Sena rivers. These ports could not compete with South Asian traders and received no custom benefits from their trade. The influx of Indian merchants and agents was detrimental to Portuguese profits because Indian Vaniya and Muslim merchants had the advantage of access to working capital, and sourced goods at cost. Furthermore, English traders had the advantage of not having to pay duties in either Bombay or Surat. These financial advantages caused Indian and English businessmen to undercut the Portuguese traders, who had to pay exorbitant custom duties at Mozambique Island where they were law-bound to sign in their cargoes on both in- and outbound voyages.[171]

The train of thought behind the formation of both the *Sociedade* and *Corporação* was to limit the general Vaniya trade by granting these organisations a monopoly. The function of these bodies was in part to thwart the decree by the Queen that any Portuguese vassal may participate in free trade at any Portuguese port, as well as to overcome the prohibition on gubernatorial monopolies.[172] But Mozambique Island was far from Lisbon, and the powerful men in charge could easily flout the law for long enough to accrue considerable wealth. While the official line was that no foreigner may trade in Portuguese waters, illicit relationships sprang up on an individual basis because the opportunities were too profitable to ignore. An illicit trade continued to flourish through personal rather than official connections, which

[171] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 145.

[172] Ibid., 118.

reflected a longstanding pattern resulting from the relatively short terms of office and the low levels of income, which were the lot of Portuguese officials in east Africa.

The *Sociedade*'s private monopoly of the Delagoa Bay trade was vehemently disapproved of by the court and the naval council of India, highlighting internal competition for wealth within the state.[173] It is unsurprising, though, that the partners wanted the *Sociedade* to continue. The seventy *bares*, or 19 278 kg of two seasons' trade brought 10 500 *cruzados* into their pockets.[174] The illegal *Corporação* was abolished in a letter dated 7 November 1785, but the *Sociedade* nevertheless continued to trade [until] 1787, trading 60 000 kg of ivory over its six-year existence.[175] This amount of ivory is significant because, although 12 000 kg was in no way inconsiderable, it represents only 6,25 percent of the Austrian trade. The *Sociedade*'s relative success lay in following a business strategy, which drew on the influence and connections of its Indian associates, to buy for cheap and supply chiefs abundantly in cloth and beads, 'ruining Portuguese commerce', and repelling interior traders from other Portuguese traders, who in any case gave fewer goods in return for ivory.[176]

From 1789 on, a provisions market rather than an ivory market flourished. The provisions trade was specifically focused on the supply of vegetables and beef to an increasing number of seasonal whaling ships. Unlike the ivory trade, the food market, bar the cattle trade, had been unregulated by chiefs, probably because food

[173] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 129.

[174] Ibid., 130.

[175] Ibid., 132.

[176] Lobato, *História da Fundação*, 135.

commanded less in valuable goods.[177] The Inhaca's subjects had sold a range of foodstuffs on board Portuguese ships and at the fort: rice, cabbages, grapes, lettuce, a variety of beans, and sugarcane. [178] The chicken market was substantial, and sold 700 chickens a month.[179]

The ivory trade slowed down to relatively small transactions because the new set of interlopers, namely French, American and English whalers, focused on replenishing food supplies rather than purchasing ivory. Whaling ships represented the only regular traffic to the Bay from 1789. During the period of 1789 to 1804, 120 whale ships visited Delagoa Bay, most of which were British.[180] Because they desired a considerable amount of vegetables, multiplied over a period of up to six months, the fresh produce trade translated into a meaningful profit for the Tembe chief, whose beaches were used for slaughtering whales. The presence of the whalers, who gave copper and iron barrel hoops in exchange for groceries, justified an increase in production. By 1793, cultivation had been expanded to meet the demands of the food trade as well as local needs.[181] Onions were a favourite with whalers, and Tembe's chief cultivated these in large quantities. Consequently, he became the onion king of Delagoa Bay: 'King Sllanghelley richy, very richy man, too much richy e ab plainty ohnyong'.[182]

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[177] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. I, 16.

[178] Ibid., 13.

[179] Ibid., 17.

[180] R Richards, T Du Pasquier, 'Bay Whaling off Southern Africa, c. 1785-1805', *South African Journal of Marine Science* 8, 1 (1989): 231-250, 233.

[181] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 149.

[182] T Boteler, *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia: Performed in His Majesty's Ships, Leven and Baracouta from l821 to l826, Under the Command of Capt. F.W. Owen*, vol. II (London: Bentley, 1835), 45. The Dutch probably introduced the onions to these shores, who

Before the advent of whaling, the King's subjects provided foodstuffs to ships. They accepted strips of sailors' shirts and beads for provisions. But by the time of the whaling era providing meat and vegetables, particularly onions, became the domain of the Tembe chief because of the high status of the copper and iron hoops from the whale oil barrels given in exchange for groceries.[183] By at least 1798, the King of the Water – the chief's food sales manager – ensured royal command over the foodstuffs trade selling vegetables and cattle. The King of the Water sold cattle on behalf of the chief, and sold one or two per day. As an intermediary between the chief and the Europeans, he was tasked to be on the lookout for ships, and approached these to offer the opportunity to trade. The importance of the refreshment trade is plain from the high status which this individual attained. That the King of the Water was almost as powerful as his overlord was manifested in the numerous cattle he owned.[184]

The Austrian period (1777-1782) represented a dramatic escalation in trade goods flowing to the coast, prompted by the traders' willingness to pay 80 arm's lengths of expensive black cloth for 14.7 kg of ivory. The rise of the Delagoa Bay economy became an important cog in the economic machine of Mozambique Island. As a port with great potential to create wealth, Delagoa's commerce was coveted by Indian, English and Portuguese traders. A newly liberated Delagoa Bay from Austrian presence seemed to promise wealth for only a few, since credit remained elusive for

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complained of the lack of 'potelspyse', onions, carrots and potatoes as ingredients for a stew; CA Political Council C406 f. 117.

[183] Zimba, 'Overseas Trade', Chapter 3, 161-173.

[184] WM White*, Journal of a Voyage Performed in the Lion Extra Indiaman, from Madras to Colombo and Da Lagoa Bay* (London: John Stockdale, 1798), 50.

the Portuguese state coffers because of the private and contraband trade. Commercial interest in Delagoa Bay revealed a merging of relationships of potential competitors to generate personal riches. A not unsubstantial trade continued with the *Sociedade* after the Austrians were expelled. However, in 1796 the French expelled the Portuguese, flattening their fort in a roar of cannons, and ended the flow of goods around the Bay and into the interior for the next three years.[185]

The abrupt stop in trade after such abundance in the stream of goods into the hinterland, must have had some effect on the political economy of ivory producing polities further afield. As far as we know, no one but whalers frequented the Bay for this period, and at that only for part of the year, representing a predominantly provisions trade with people around the Bay. The metal hoops of the barrels were sought after items, but to what extent, if any, these were traded to the northern Nguni, is unknown. The Portuguese returned in 1799, reinstated the important ivory trade, and reconnected the southern hinterland to the Bay through chief Maputo, who acted as their middleman and rekindled the involvement of the northern Nguni in Delagoa Bay's commerce.

[185] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol. II, 424.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORY OF INHAMBANE AS A TRADING SPACE DURING THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The purpose of this chapter is to lay out in broad strokes the history of trade at Inhambane. The sources for the pre-Portuguese period are almost non-existent, bar the maritime and sporadic shipwreck accounts of the late fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even then, these reports were related from a coastal point of view, with little information of the deeper interior and its network connecting it to the coast. This chapter will show how the introduction of trade at Inhambane bay during the eighteenth century influenced migrations by Tsonga chiefdoms from the western interior. These migrations affected the political, economic and social order of the inhabitants of Inhambane after the introduction of a Portuguese trading station established, in part, in response to the threat of a lucrative trade by the Dutch that Inhambane provided.

The Cape of Currents marks the southern entry into the treacherous Mozambican channel. Not too far north of it, lies the port of Inhambane, safely ensconced between two sandy headlands. The harbour provided safety for the initially sporadic trade of south Asian ships who relied on year-round currents to navigate the Indian Ocean.[186] The Indian Ocean trade network included Inhambane well before Europeans entered the *Mare Indicum*, but the initial connection to the Indian Ocean

[186] A Rita-Ferreira, *Presença Luso-Asiática e Mutações Culturais no Sul de Moçambique (Até c. 1900)* (Lisbon: Instituto de Investição Cientifica Tropical,1922), 48.

world coast came not through the Arab trade, which ended at Sofala, but by traders from the sub-continent of India.

THE BEGINNINGS OF PORTUGUESE TRADE AT INHAMBANE

In 1497, the Gama expedition, first to round the Cape of Good Hope in search of the East, perceived Inhambane as part of a Tonga 'kingdom', which came into existence after the Tonga invaded the area sometime before the fifteenth century.[187] Inhambane lies about 717 km south of Sofala and 450 km north of Delagoa Bay, and was known as Inhambane, or Dinamba.[188] And until 1544, the Sofala was the southern limit of Portuguese influence on the southeast African coast. In this year, Lourenço Marques, on his explorative voyage down the southern coast of Mozambique, too noticed the Tonga propensity to trade, and the possible advantage of Inhambane to Portuguese commerce.

When the Portuguese started trading at Inhambane, the Tonga were the pre-dominant population of the bay's near hinterland. By the time of the permanent Portuguese settlement, in 1729, traders known as the Macomates, Chopi, and Mucumbas were the principal trading agents oiling commerce between the Save and the Limpopo Rivers.[189] The Tonga, as coastal people, held sway over the swathe of territory along the coast. They inhabited the region from the lower reaches of the

[187] The use of the word 'kingdom' was a Eurocentric interpretation of a society's relationship to a territory. For the Tonga invasion, see Cabral, *Raças,* 18.

[188] According to Agusto Cabral, the name Inhambane is a corruption of the GiTonga word 'ambane', which means farewell. See Cabral, *Raças*, 23.

[189] For a full discussion of the people of southern Mozambique, see AK Smith, 'The Peoples of Southern Mozambique: An Historical Survey', *The Journal of African History* 14, 4 (1973): 565-580.

Limpopo River towards Inhambane, to the mouth of the Save, and were the intermediaries between the interior of the southeast coast of Mozambique and the Indian Ocean trade network.

Unfortunately the information on Inhambane before 1845 is scanty because the bulk of the administrative documents, in the form of letters to the Governor-General on Mozambique Island, were destroyed because of an explosion of gunpowder.[190] But there is enough material, if sketchy, to gain insights into the nature of trade and its effects on Inhambane society. Before a trading post was fixed at the bay, it had been on the periphery of Portuguese officialdom. Individual merchants promoted its trade by leasing its commerce – paying a sum to the Crown for the right to trade for three years, as Calcanagi Velbo did in the early eighteenth century. By the 1720s, the port was included on the route of an annual ship. This annual ship, known as the *barco de viagem* – literally, 'the ship of the voyage' – was dispatched from Goa, then went on to Mozambique Island, and from there down the Mozambique Channel, stopping at trading posts along the shore, such as Quelimane, and the Rivers (the Zambesi delta) to deliver trade items and collect exchanged goods.[191]

The treacherous coast of Inhambane, full of rocky reefs, caused many a shipwreck, and the failure of the supply ship to arrive impeded the economy of the bay. For this reason, a 'Moor', a local pilot, was invariably employed to pilot ships into the bay. This practice was also an indication of the dependence of the Portuguese on the

[190] Cabral, *Raças*, 22.

[191] A Smith, 'Delagoa Bay and the Trade of South-Eastern Africa', in R Gray and D Birmingham (eds), *Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 267.

knowledge of their Indian trading partners.[192] But aside from the risk of a ship being lost at sea, the irregular visits because of the lack of an officially designated Portuguese vessel to freight trade goods, was far more detrimental to Inhambane's Portuguese trade.[193] An annual call at the port depended on the willingness of a ship to sail to and from Mozambique Island to service the port. A later example lies in the *Dois Irmãos*, a slaver that sailed to Brazil between 1808 and 1810.[194] She brought rice, wheat and potatoes for the settlement, and took 40 slaves of Inhambane's residents on to Brazil.[195] Before the advent of the Brazilian trade, there was less traffic on the southern route past southeast Africa, with fewer ships available to stop by Inhambane.

THE DUTCH THREAT

The irregularity of Portuguese ships calling at Inhambane led to lapses in their monitoring of sea traffic. The absence of Portuguese vigilance created an opportunity for the Dutch to encroach on Inhambane from the late 1720s. The VOC was on a perpetual quest to expand its commercial opportunities on the east coast of Africa to compensate for its declining profit margins. The Dutch occupation of Delagoa Bay in 1721 had given them some experience of the wider local market of

[192] The reasons why 'Moor' in this context was unlikely to have been a Swahili pilot, is discussed below. M Newitt, *A History,* 117; AHU Moç CU, Cx 54 d.14 – a letter delivered from the trading post of Inhambane to the Senate in the time of José Ferreira Nobre, June 1787. There was a standing order that ships may only employ experienced mariners, to safeguard against the loss of ships and goods. CR Boxer, *The Tragic History of the Sea* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 9.

[193] Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade*, 202.

[194] Voyages Database, Voyage Numbers 41808, 19208, 49774.

[195] AHU Moç CU, Cx 132 d. 27, João Santos Pinto to the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 16 April 1810.

southeast Africa, and a glimpse of what the interior promised in terms of trade. On instruction of the Political Council situated at the Cape, Jan van de Capelle investigated the commercial potential of Inhambane in 1727 and 1728.[196] It was partly Dutch interest in the commercial opportunities of the port, and their possible encroachment on Sofala's gold trade, that prompted the Portuguese to set up a permanent trading post at Inhambane.

In 1727, Inhambane was ostensibly under Portuguese control when van de Capelle went on a reconnaissance tour to investigate trading possibilities further north, based on reports at Delagoa Bay of trade between the lower Nkomati River and Inhambane. That September, the brigantine *Victoria* sailed into the bay.[197] On their arrival, the crew of the *Victoria* found a seemingly uninhabited space, yet planted with orchards of fruit trees; apple, coconut palms, tamarind, orange and lemon trees, for the benefit of traders.[198] The makeshift Portuguese village was uninhabited at the time. When present in the bay, the Portuguese trade ship lay anchored 'in front of their place'. The village consisted of many empty huts, had a church, and a churchyard that contained a number of graves, all marked with a small white flag, marking the transient nature of Portuguese trade.[199] By the middle of the first week of their arrival, the only people the Dutch encountered were nine black men fishing in two canoes, who probably informed nearby villages of the Dutch presence at the bay.[200]

[196] NA 4371 Journal Jan de Capelle, April-June 1728, f. 5.

[197] NA 4370, Instruction to explore the coast and bays, 18 July, f. 90.

[198] NA 4370, Report of the exploration of Inhambane, 17 November 1727, f. 315.

[199] Ibid., 314.

[200] NA 4370, Journal of the Voyage to Inhambane, September 1727, f. 322.

The *Victoria* crew of 40 to 50 men strong found the people of Inhambane friendly. The Dutch considered trade much easier than at Delagoa Bay, where potential trade was inhibited because of a lack of access to the interior.[201] After exploring the area further, and finding no one to enforce Portuguese authority, the Dutch began a lively trade with the Tonga. The Dutch traded until they ran out of suitable trade items to exchange, namely a range of cotton cloths. The cloths were mainly blue, and white, called photassen. Other popular textiles were white sailcloth, white guinees, blue bafta – all different grades of cotton fabric.[202] The Dutch noticed that for 'big business' or '*groote negotie*' in ivory and slaves, beads were not a popular trade item. These were only accepted for small items and food, like chicken and fish.[203] In the end, the Dutch acquired nineteen slaves and seven, mostly small, tusks. The hinterland appeared open for exploration, with the locals willing to trade prompting the Dutch to promise to return in three or four months.

Bernard Castro Soares, an agent based on Mozambique Island, was appalled to learn of the Dutch intrusion. He learnt of this trespass on a short trading trip to collect trade goods from Nialinge and Tinga Tinga, villages named after chiefs of the same name. He, like his superiors, took the legitimacy of Portuguese authority, and its trade monopoly, for granted. His view was that the Tonga had betrayed their loyalty to the Portuguese through doing business with the Dutch. The Tonga clearly did not share Soares's perspective because they happily traded with anyone who offered

[201] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 57.

[202] NA 4370, Report of the exploration of Inhambane, 17 November 1727, f. 316. Photas are strong and chequered cotton cloths, used as loincloths; guinees are plain coarse chequered cotton; and baftas are fine cotton cloths usually in black or white. See *VOC-glossarium,* www.inghist.nl/rgp/werkbest/vocwelkom.htm.

[203] NA 4370, f. 316.

quality goods. Soares interpreted the Tonga-Dutch trade as treachery, and vowed to mete out punishment, and sent for a force to Sofala. But the Tonga were not easily intimidated and drove off the first army, which had been despatched from Sofala to execute Soares's punishment.

Meanwhile the Dutch were as good as their word and returned in April 1728. When Castro Soares again sailed his ship into the bay and found the Dutch busily conducting trade with the Tonga, he again asserted that the bay belonged to the Portuguese Crown. He also prohibited the Dutch from conducting any trade, other than for necessities: food, water and firewood.[204]

Ignoring what they considered a spurious claim to the bay's commerce, the Dutch continued trading in secret with those from Nialinga, often exchanging goods during the dead of night to avoid the wrath of Soares who, in the words of the locals, 'was jealous' of the Dutch trade.[205] Soares tried browbeating tactics to stop locals from trading with the competition. He offered bribes to sniff out Dutch exchange spots, and alternatively threatened to slit throats should this business continue.[206] But trade in some tusks and slaves still continued on a small scale. In the month they lay at anchor, the Dutch secretly received 24 slaves, mostly women and children, 44 kg of ivory, 63 g of ambergris and 17 kg of wax.[207]

[204] National Archief (NA); Alegemeen Rijksarchief (AR) 4371; Journal Jan de Capelle, April-June 1728, f. 70, 72.

[205] Ibid., f. 77.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Theal, *History and Ethnography*, vol. III, 473.

But rumours of armed black soldiers on the way from Sofala finally put a stop to trade. The villagers of Nialinga fled, and the Dutch returned to Delagoa Bay.[208] After the Dutch had left, Soares determined to punish chief Nialinga for trading with the Dutch, following an established pattern of using violence to accomplish commercial goals. The Nialingas' crime, besides trading, was proclaiming that the territory belonged to the Dutch. They also provided houses, women, wood and water to the ship's crew.[209] Galled by what he viewed as the Tongas' impudence, and too impatient to wait for an army from Sofala, Soares formed a militia of *lascars* (sailors of Indian or Southeast Asia), 200 black men, and *manamazes* (traders), but during the hastily organised expedition, many of his men either drowned or were killed by arrows released from Tonga bows.

Domingo Lopes Rebelo's army finally arrived at Inhambane. The company of 1 500 soldiers, aided by some Portuguese of mixed race, known as *filhos dos pais*, the 'sons of the land', had clear instructions to punish those who had traded with the Dutch. Consequently, the Portuguese force inflicted far-reaching destruction on the Tonga. In the process the army took people prisoner, raided cattle, razed the cultivated fields, and burnt down villages.[210] All those who had traded with the Dutch were killed and their villages destroyed.

For the sake of retaining some trading partners, Chamba, Inhampossa and Tembe were treated with leniency and escaped these atrocities, because the trading post

[208] NA 4371, Journal Jan de Capelle, April-June 1728, f. 84ii.

[209] C Teixeira, 'A Fundacão de Inhambane e a sua Estrutura Administrativa e Governmental nos Meados Século xviii', *Boletim do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Inhambane* 8 (1990): 1-20, 15.

[210] Ibid., 17.

depended on their networks to maintain the trade cycle. In the aftermath of the devastation, the Governor of Mozambique proposed that the Dutch should be driven from Delagoa Bay. The initial plan was to send two ships to expel them, while the army from Sofala would attack from the interior. But because of the prohibitive cost of such an expedition, the authorities abandoned this plan.

Partly in response to Dutch interest in Inhambane, and protective over encroachment on the Sofala's gold trade, the Portuguese authorities decided to permanently settle the port of Inhambane.[211] They believed that the presence of a manned fort, flying a Portuguese flag, would deter rivals.[212] With the blessing of the King, a ship left Lisbon on 12 March 1729, with the new captain-agent João Fonseca Moniz, ten soldiers, and five cannons to expand Portuguese authority.[213]

THE TONGA: KEY TRADING PARTNERS OF THE PORTUGUESE

Tonga territory, inhabited by independent, matrilineal villages, stretched inland along the coast from the Inharrime River, past Inhambane, to the mouth of the Save. In geographical terms, their influence stretched north, along a vast stretch of land, away from Ponta Zavora, to beyond Vilanculos to Nova Mambone. This coastal region formed an intermediary trade zone between the ocean and hinterland societies – the Venda, Shona, Tsonga and Pedi – who held influence over hunting

[211] Ibid., 18.

[212] B Rungo, 'Notas para o Estudo das Fortificações Portuguesas em Inhambane', *Boletim do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Inhambane* 8 (1990): 1-200, 55.

[213] Teixeira, 'A Fundacão', 18.

grounds in present-day Limpopo and North-West provinces.[214] Situated between maritime traders and the interior, the Tonga were in an ideal position to control the terms of trade, the flow of traders and trade goods from the interior, and were in control of the redistribution of goods into the northwest interior.

The Tonga's preeminent role in trade was challenged from 1729, after the Portuguese had settled at Inhambane. The reason for the decline in their preeminence was the Tsonga migrations, which encroached on Tonga territory. The Tsonga groups were intent on replacing the Tonga as the key intermediaries of the maritime trade.[215] Tsonga groups eventually either displaced or absorbed a significant part of Tonga society.

THE TSONGA

'Tsonga' is apparently a relatively new term coined by Henri Junod, denoting a linguistic grouping of societies with closely related dialects.[216] According to his 1912 classification, the Bila, Hlengwe, Hlanganu, Ronga, Djonga and Nwalungu lineages all fell under the umbrella of the category of Tsonga, as six dialectical sub-groupings. His classification of the Tsonga was meant to make sense of different groupings who appeared and sounded somewhat similar. But his analysis is located in the nineteenth century world of Tsonga. There are, however, some continuities flowing

[214] Smith, 'The Struggle', Map, 16. There is very little evidence for the nature of trade prior to 1720.


[215] Smith, 'The Struggle', 114.

[216] HA Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, vol. I, (New Hyde Park, NY: University Books, 1962), 14.

from the eighteenth century. In 1724, the Dutch referred to some traders who came to Delagoa Bay as 'Sanganers'. 'Sangano' is a supposedly corrupted form of Hlanganu. However, taking into consideration that the word 'Tsonga' is pronounced with a silent letter 't' by locals, combined with the fact that the Dutch used the term 'Sanga', suggests that the term 'Sanga' predates Junod's popularisation of the term Tsonga. This group occupied at least the lower part of what is now the Kruger National Park (KNP) from at least the early eighteenth century, as illustrated by the 1725 expedition under the leadership of Francois de Cuiper and Sergeant Johannes Monna, who described the region as 'Sangano'.[217] The records of the location of the Dutch expedition correlate to Junod's twentieth-century map, based on oral history, placing the Hlanganu (Sangano) in the area of the KNP. In 1729, the captain of Inhambane, Bernardo de Castro Soares, gave a detailed account of the commercial and political situation at Inhambane. He made mention of Bila, who had migrated from west of the Limpopo, and who eventually settled at Vilanculos.[218]

[217] WHJ Punt, *The First Europeans in the Kruger Park, 1725* (Pretoria: National Parks Board of Trustees, 1975).

[218] G Liesegang, 'O Sul de Moçambique Revisto Reconstruções de Complexos Políticos no Sul e Centro de Moçambique cerca 1250-1850', https://www.academia.edu/7824191/O_sul_de_Mo%C3%A7ambique_Revisto, 5.



Delagoa Bay and Present-Day Kruger National Park

A sub-Tsonga group, the Hlengwe, who had lived on the eastern banks of the Limpopo River 'from time immemorial', is the largest of the Tsonga groups which expanded east.[219] The Hlengwe were divided into three major lineages, namely the Hlengwe proper, the Tswa, and the Nwanati.[220] The Nwanati further consist of two sections, the Maluleke, and the Makwakwa of Ndindane and Khambane.[221] The Tsonga groups who played the most important role in the history of the Inhambane trade during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the Tswa Makwakwa, and Tswa Bila.

[219] Smith, 'The Struggle', 18; Smith, 'The Peoples', 578.

[220] Junod, *Life*, vol. I, 17; Liesegang, 'O Sul', 6.

[221] Junod, *Life*, vol. I, 22; Liesegang, 'O Sul', 5.

When Tswa Tsonga penetrated Tonga territory in 1729, they took lands from the Tonga and encroached on trade.[222] The Tswa Tsonga fell into the grouping called Landins, the collective Portuguese term for Tsonga and Dzivi hunter-traders. The Landins moved into Inhambane's interior, and came to occupy the interior, from Delagoa Bay in the south to the Save River in the north; from beyond the Limpopo River in the west to the coast in the east, forming the majority of the population of inland southern Mozambique.[223] The Hlengwe-Tsonga pushed in from the northwest, while the Tswa Tsonga encroached on Tonga territory from the south. Just north of the bay lay the territory of Tswa Tsonga chief, Bila-Nculo (Vilanculos), who regularly sent messengers to trade, and dominated trade from the second half of the century. The military push of the Dzivi, originally from a Phalaborwa district, into Bila-Nculo's territory, discussed below, ushered in the nineteenth century and a Tsonga-dominated phase of trade.[224] These movements of Tsonga groups into Inhambane's closer hinterland concurred with the expansion of trade activity, represented by settled Portuguese presence at Inhambane.

Smith has argued that the expansion of the Tsonga was due to the natural spread of expanding households, combined with ecological factors.[225] He suggests that inadequate rainfall and the inability of the soil to preserve water in the north was the

[222] Smith, 'The Struggle', 117.

[223] Ibid., 128. 'The Tsonga word 'landi' is the singular of the pointed stakes fixed in a game-pit to impale whatever falls into it, implying Landins were hunters.' See R Ceunod (ed.), *The Tsonga-English Dictionary* (Johannesburg: Sasavona Publishers & Booksellers, 2017), 84. The Landin groups were also known for being traders, who specialised in elephant hunting. See Ventura, 'Estat Modern', 183.

[224] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença*, Carta 5, Carta 7.

[225] 'Expanding households' refers to homestead mitosis, in which new family units split off from the original and moved away.

reason for the gradual expansion of Tsonga toward Inhambane and surrounding areas.[226] But the rapid expansion of groups of Tsonga from the 'northwest' suggests a more dynamic process.[227] Smith also suggests, somewhat contradictorily, that the 'explosion of the Tsonga throughout southern Mozambique was a continuation of a process which had been transpiring for centuries', but gives no evidence for this process occurring over centuries, other than the reference in Charles Boxer's *The Tragic History of the Sea*.[228] He too uses Soares's document of 1729, a document I sadly have not been able to access to date, to corroborate his idea, saying Bernardo Castro Soares was the first to mention the Landins (Tsonga) in 1729.[229] But in the account of the 1622 shipwreck of the *São João Baptista*, Smith identifies the people as Tsonga who, travelling alongside the Portuguese walking to Sofala, were referred to as 'Kaffirs', and who may well have been northern Tonga.[230]

The migrations from the seventeenth century contribute to a perception of a centuries' long process. But what is clear is the correlation between the Tsonga migration east and an increase in the tempo of trade. These movements influenced the convergence of diverse groups around intersecting trade routes. The pattern of migrations toward trade nexuses was not an unusual occurrence. An earlier Tsonga advance into the Zimbabwean lowveld from the seventeenth century, under Tsovani, Chisa and Mahenye, serves as an example. The move gave these chiefs access to the Pafuri node, which includes its trading post Thumela, the moorings on the Save

[226] Smith, 'The Peoples', 576.

[227] Ibid., 577.

[228] Smith, 'The Struggle', 128; Boxer, *The Tragic History*.

[229] Smith, 'The Peoples', 569, 578.

[230] Boxer, *The Tragic History,* 265.

River, as well as the beginning of the route to Sofala from Chidredzi.[231] Moreover, with the 40 Indo-Muslims settled at Inhambane to trade in 1695, explained in detail in Chapter Four, it is conceivable that Tsonga migrations eastward were to take advantage of the flourishing south Asian trade. Other patterns of migration towards key trading areas, such as the Hlengwe Tsongas' move towards Sofala between the 1750s and 1780s, coincided with the [Portuguese] Crown's decision to offer free trade to all of its subjects on the east African coast, increasing the frequency of trade.

Tsonga migrations into Tonga territory, to an extent, absorbed the latter. One of the reasons the Tsonga found it relatively easy to dominate the Tonga, was the Tonga's form of political organisation. Tsonga groups typically merged into larger units of political organisation, or chiefdoms, from the beginning of the eighteenth century. This change also coincided with an expansion of trade. Also, their growing ability to muster substantial armies gave them a competitive advantage.[232] The Tsonga appearing in force, shouting war cries and brandishing weapons, was often enough in itself to unnerve and defeat their opponents.[233]

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[231] JH Bannerman, 'Hlengweni: The History of the Hlengwe of the Lower Save and Lundi Rivers, from the Late Eighteenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Century', *The Journal of the Historical Association of Zimbabwe* (1980): 1-45, 3.

[232] Smith, 'The Struggle', 19.

[233] SX Botelho, *Memoria Estatistica sobre os Dominios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental* (Lisbon: José Baptista Morando, 1835), 102. The Tsonga were not the only society to muster armies during the eighteenth century; the Rozvi Empire's 'fighting formation closely resembled that of Shaka Zulu'. See SIG Mudenge, 'The Role of Foreign Trade in the Rozvi Empire: A Reappraisal', *The Journal of African History* 15, 3 (1974): 373-391, 378. Pedi power reached its height between 1790 and 1820 under Thulare, whose armies raided across the area between the Limpopo and Vaal Rivers. See Delius, *The Land Belongs*, 15.

Information about the matrilineal and crop-producing Tonga is fragmentary. The Tonga social pattern, in contrast to the Tsonga, and contrary to the Portuguese impression of a Tonga 'kingdom', allowed separate lineages to form villages, each subject to its own chief. This form of political and social organisation militated against the formation of a collective 'political consciousness' and organisation, and was probably a reason for their more limited military cohesion, and thus vulnerability to Tsonga attacks.[234]

In addition to their limited military capacity, their lack of extensive cattle-keeping diminished their social status in the view of societies like the Tsonga, who placed greater emphasis on their herds as symbols of status. The Tsonga perceived the Tonga as 'inferiors, fit for nothing but slavery'.[235] The implication here is that, without large herds of cattle, the Tonga political structure and cohesion did not exceed village level, with minimal social differentiation.[236] Owning large herds of cattle in southeast Africa contributed to social differentiation and more centralised political organisation.[237] As in the case of other southeastern pastoral societies, the degree of extensive cattle-holding likely resulted in Tsonga chiefdoms merging into larger units with several layers of authority – a style of political organisation that made mobilisation of men easier than the fragmented and village level of political, social and military organisation of the Tonga.[238] The inability of the Tonga to withstand the invaders increased their dependence on the firepower of the Portuguese trading post

[234] Texeira, 'A Fundacão', 7.

[235] Smith, The Peoples', 569.

[236] Ibid., 572.

[237] Ibid.; Teixeira, 'A Fundacão', 7.

[238] Ibid., 7

and so, by the nineteenth century, Tonga territory had contracted to around Inhambane.

An additional and possible explanation for the lack of centralisation amongst the Tonga in terms of trade, was the multidirectional nature of the distribution of goods. Living along the coast, the Tonga villages received goods from multiple points in the interior, and had more or less equal access to beaches between the Save River and Inhambane, where a launch could land with goods. Trade items were carried in small vessels by Indo-Muslim traders who were typically involved in cabotage, trading along the coast. With multiple points of access to goods and a decentralised political system, there were limited opportunities to establish control over the passage and redistribution of trade goods, which might have fuelled state formation.[239]

Tsonga chiefdoms to the west, on the other hand, had comparatively limited access to goods from the coast because of comparatively set routes, with fewer points of access to exchange, to and from the coast. Trade routes into the interior were determined by access to water, necessarily routing trade through or in proximity to other societies. Because of the political value of trade items, there was a greater need to control the distribution of goods. It follows that those who came to control the passage of goods had more political power and status than those who did not, because political power was 'inextricably linked to external trade'.[240]

[239] This point is expanded on below in the context of northern Nguni centralisation.

[240] E MacGonagle, *Crafting Identity in Zimbabwe and Mozambique* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2007), 52.

The Tswa Tsonga expanded over a relatively rapid period of a few years, from the southwest, towards nodes of trade. The short duration of time of their movement towards Inhambane is determined by inference. In 1727, when the Dutch came to trade in the Victoria, Soares mentioned only Tonga and Moors involved with exchange. The omission of the Tsonga, as the main suppliers of ivory, might have been because they were further inland. Also, an Indo-Muslim trader, Kambe, settled there and went into the interior to trade. By 1729, the Tswa Tsonga were interfering with the supply of ivory to the post by closing the trade routes into the interior, for the sake of capturing trade. So much so, that in the same year Soares called on Mozambique Island to send a contingent of men to save the economic foundation of Inhambane.[241] In my view, the Tsonga migration can be better explained by the pull of the regular availability of trade goods, made possible by the permanent settlement of Inhambane, which augmented the previously established trade network of south Asians.[242] The Portuguese military resistance to Tsonga groups was motivated by two factors. Firstly, the rapid assimilation of the Tonga by the Tsonga undermined their carefully cultivated political and economic relationships with the Tonga. And secondly, the Tsonga groups being aggressive and well-versed in the interior trade, and in likely partnerships with Indo-Muslims, threatened the Portuguese monopoly.

[241] Bernardo Castro Soares was the first to mention the Landins as Landim [(Tsonga) in 1729. See Smith, 'The People', 569. Smith says the first Tsonga invasions were noticed in 1730. See Smith, 'The Peoples', 578.

[242] After Texeira, 'A Fundacão', 37.

CHAPTER THREE

THE INDO-MUSLIM PRESENCE AT INHAMBANE FROM THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TO THE 1820s

This chapter will show how the Portuguese, who formed a relatively small and close-knit community, struggled to gain a monopoly in fierce competition with Indo-Muslims and their partners, the Landin chiefs. It will further illustrate how successful commerce depended largely on maintaining networks of alliance, in the circumstance of deep Portuguese dependence on the supply of cloth and credit by Indian merchants. This chapter aims to broaden our understanding of the historiography of Inhambane – of the interwoven relationships and the nature of this trading society, beyond the analysis of Smith, who focused on the invasion of the Tsonga.[243]

Before launching into the argument, a few notes on the nature of the sources may be helpful. These sources are primarily letters from the respective Governors of Inhambane to the acting Governor-General of Mozambique Island between 1729 and 1818. These Portuguese documents are biased toward the trading post's commerce, and with what they perceive as 'insults' by, besides the Tsonga groups, the Dzivi, the Tonga, and the Indo-Muslims, all of whom were obstructing Inhambane's trade. This observation was made with little concern about how disruptive the Portuguese were to the preexisting trade. The Indo-Muslims are

[243] Smith, Chapter IV, 'Southern Mozambique in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The Tsonga Invasion of Inhambane', in 'The Struggle'.

referred to as ‘Moors’ in the correspondence, and were largely treated en bloc as a homogeneous, faceless group, with few being individually named. The Vaniya (Hindus) at Inhambane were alluded to infrequently, and were treated much the same as Indo-Muslims, without nuance, and mostly mentioned in the framework of being prejudicial to Portuguese trade. Again, there is little mention of individual traders.

WAS INHAMBANE A SWAHILI OUTPOST?

When the Indo-Muslims arrived at Inhambane in 1695 they encountered the Tonga, who were then the intermediaries for trade in the interior.[244] As I will show, they established kinship and commercial relationships with the Tonga, and over time some Tonga converted to Islam. This pattern of interaction, and the resultant social forms that emerged, are very similar to the processes which shaped Swahili society in northeast Africa. For instance, the emergence of a distinctive language drawing on Bantu dialects and Arabic, the formation of a new, semi-autonomous merchant class, reshaping the entire political balance of east Africa, and the establishment of Islam as the dominant religion, influencing architecture, law and family form, were key elements in the making of Swahili identity. But Swahili identity is far more complex, and it is still debated as to how precisely to distinguish Swahili society. While some argue that being Muslim is the minimum requirement to be part of Swahili society, a requirement that was valid for earlier Swahili communities, Horton and Middleton show that some African societies ‘had an obvious affinity in every respect, except

[244] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença*, 102.

religion, to later Swahili communities'.[245] Despite this much continuing debate about how best to define Swahili societies, there is an important difference between Swahili communities to the north and the Muslim community at Inhambane. Inhambane's Muslim society was of Indian origin.

Despite some similarities to Swahili settlements, it is not accurate to describe the settlement at Inhambane as Swahili. The men who landed at Inhambane in 1695, were from India, and the language that developed through their interaction with locals, though sadly unrecorded, would have been influenced by their Indian dialect rather than by Arabic. Arabic was, however, part of the language mix, because many Muslims have some acquaintance with Arabic through the Qur'an, giving most of them at least a passing knowledge of the language. And since even a modicum of a shared language was an advantage in trade, the use of Arabic would have been of value.[246] Further, Tonga language contains some Arabic loan words, probably through interactions with Arab traders at Sofala. The reason for saying so is that the Tonga north of Massinga orientated their trade towards Sofala, the most southern Arabic settlement on the east coast.[247] The enduring presence of Indian traders along the southeast coast of Africa is also evident in the use of the word *saguate*, a Luso-Asiatic term meaning 'a gift given in homage'.[248] In contrast, Arabs used the

[245] M Horton and J Middleton, *The Swahili: The Social Landscape of a Mercantile Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), 48.

[246] Risso, *Merchants and Faith*, 103.

[247] Cabral, *Raças,*19; Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 7.

[248] The payment of the *saguate* was by no means a novel institution. It was a widespread practice in the ancient world – see M Mauss, *The Gift: Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (New York: WW Norton & Co., 2000) – and the Portuguese had previously encountered the concept on the west African coast. SR Dalgado, *Glossário Luso-Asiático* (Coimbra: Coimbra Imprensa Universidade, 1919), 271. 'Saguate' means gift or present, and comes from the Hindi-Persian 'saughat', meaning

term *curva* for gifts and presents. The point here is not the novelty of the practice of gift-giving, but rather that it took place between Indo-Muslim and African traders.[249]

From 1729 the Portuguese reported '*mouros*', that is Muslims, present at the port, whom they used as agents to trade in the interior. Pedro Machado defines the term *mouro* as either Arab or Swahili Muslims, while Alpers defines *mouros* as 'non-Arab Muslims'.[250] So while traders from the Persian Gulf shaped the history of the northern east African coast, the settlements at Inhambane – as we will see – were more connected to India.

The overwhelming picture drawn from the Portuguese sources – the papers of the Overseas Council, held in Lisbon – is that Inhambane was a Portuguese port, with the Europeans in control.[251] This Eurocentric point of view obscured the powerful and successful Indo-Muslim community that existed side by side with not only the Portuguese-Christians but also the Tonga, and later Tsonga groups. The contemporary European bias was absurd for two reasons. One, because the Indo-Muslim settlement at Inhambane preceded that of the Portuguese, and second, their

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
the same, especially one given on festive occasions or as a symbol of homage. See P Pelliot, 'Sao-Houa, SauГa, SauГat, Saguate', *T'oung Pao*, second series, 32, 4 (1936): 230-237; G Liesegang, 'Dingane's Attack', 570, f. 21; Mudenge, *A Political History*, xix; E Rodrigues, 'Negotiating with the Neighbours: Kingships and Diplomacy in Munhumutapa', in E Woodacres et al. (eds), *The Routledge History of Monarchy* (London: Routledge, 2019).

[249] The word 'saguate' is of Mongolian origin and came to India through Persian traders, from where the Portuguese spread it throughout their ports in the Indian Ocean. See Pelliot, 'Sao-Houa'.

[250] P Machado, 'A Forgotten Corner of the Indian Ocean: Gujarati Merchants, Portuguese India and the Mozambique Slave Trade, *c.*1730-1830, *Slavery and Abolition* 24, 2 (2003): 18; Alpers, *The Indian Ocean*, 70.

[251] Malyn Newitt acknowledges Inhambane as a 'largely' Indian settlement, but focuses only on the Vaniya trade. See Newitt, *A History*, 183.

deep reliance on the Indo-Muslim community.



Map of Chibuene

In 1695, about 40 Indo-Muslims arrived at Inhambane.[252] The term 'Indo-Muslims' refers to Muslim traders from India who, along with Vaniya merchants under the auspices of the Viceroy of India, the Count Alvor, were given the freedom to trade in Portuguese ports. But the 40 traders were not the first south Asian encounter with the southeast coast of Africa. The south Asian trade to Chibuene dated from the late first millennium, reaching the coast across the Indian Ocean, possibly because of their sophisticated ship-building technology.[253] Mark Horton and John Middleton

[252] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 102.

[253] Browne, Hay, Schoeman (eds), *Mapungubwe Reconsidered*, 24; M Wood, L Dussubieux, P Robertshaw, 'The Glass of Chibuene, Mozambique: New Insights into Early Indian Trade', *South African Archaeological Bulletin* 67, 195 (2012): 59-74, 59.

argue that Chibuene was a typical Swahili settlement, resembling sites on the Tanzanian or Kenyan coast, with imported Islamic white-glaze pottery and Muslim burials.[254] A later study showed that 'the site was active here from a time before the Arab Islamic trade', which in any case progressed only as far as Sofala, about 190 km north of Chibuene. These details suggest Indian rather than Arab presence at the trading post.[255]

By 1729, when Inhambane became a permanent Portuguese settlement, Indo-Muslims had been dominating the ivory trade for 35 years, a period in which they had initiated alliances and developed networks into the interior, two factors which underpinned their prosperity. The Dutch encountered this Indo-Muslim network when they went to explore Inhambane from 1728, in the person of Kambe 'the Moor', an Indo-Muslim.[256]

Kambe had just returned from a slaving and ivory expedition and provided the Dutch with lodgings and a place to store their goods.[257] Kambe informed them that the territory was named Tinga Tinga, after the 'greatest chief' in the area, of whom he was a subject.[258] The ready-made trade network was no doubt a very attractive opportunity to tap the riches of the interior. The potential for wealth did not diminish and, 50 years later, in 1779, Baltasar Manuel Pereira do Lago, the outgoing

[254] Horton and Middleton, *The Swahili*, 99.

[255] Wood, Dussubieux, Robertshaw, 'The Glass', 73.

[256] NA 4370, *Journal of Stay at Jao Vaz*, September 1727, f. 310.

[257] Ibid.

[258] NA 4370, *Journal of Stay at Jao Vaz*, f. 310.

Governor-General of Mozambique Island, wrote that the ivory trade from Inhambane amounted to '50 bares' (137 000 kg) per annum.[259]

By the end of the seventeenth century the *Estado* was in crisis. Contributing to its woes were the penetration of the Indian Ocean by the English and the Dutch earlier in the sixteenth century, the sacking of Diu in 1668 and 1678 by Omani Arabs, the perfidious activities of the captain of the castle of Diu, Franco Castel Branco, who monopolised the Diu economy, in addition to the loss of Muscat (1650), and finally the deterioration of the Rivers of the Cuama (Zambezi River), on which the *Estado* very much depended.[260] These events deeply and negatively affected the *Estado*. To inject funds into its commerce the State created, amongst others, the *Companhia de Comércio dos Baneanes de Diu* to exploit private capital.[261]

After Indo-Muslim trade between Gujarat and Mozambique Island had been formalised in 1686, Count Alvor, the Viceroy of India, granted the 'creditworthy' men of Daman and Diu exclusive rights to the Mozambique trade when he formed the joint-stock company, also known as the *Companhia de Comércio dos Mazanes* (Commercial Company of Mahajans), to conduct trade in East Africa.[262] The word 'mazane' is probably derived from the Indian '*mahajan*' (guild). Pedro Machado refers to a *mahajan* as a semi-formal institution, while Ghulam Nadri calls it a

[259] EA Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), Table 2, 105.

[260] LFD Antunes, 'A Crise do Estado da Índia no Final da Século XVII e a Criação das Companhias de Comércio das Índias Orientais e dos Baneanes de Diu', *Mare Liberum* 4 (1992): 143-164, 21-22.

[261] Ibid., 25.

[262] For discussion on the creditworthiness of merchants, see Machado, *Ocean of Trade,* 45.

'corporate merchant body'.[263] The Luso-India Glossário defines a *mazane* as a 'principal person representing a collective' and 'a great man'.[264] In Goa the term was used with respect to a brotherhood of pagoda, a unit of currency in India, yet pagoda can also be understood as a Hindu temple, and it follows that a *mazane* was a member of such a fraternity. In the latter sense of the word it had a Catholic equivalent, the *confraria*, or confraternity.[265] The *Confraria do Espírito Santo Pedreira* is a representative case. It was active during the sixteenth century, and gathered the richest and most honourable merchants in the context of worshipping together, which explains Count Alvor's affinity with the notion of the *mahajan*.[266] The institution of a confraternity, much as the *mahajan*, coordinated and represented merchants who, through religious ritual, established bonds of trust that were expressed in privileged social relationships conducive to building commercial and credit networks. Machado states that:

> Trust was fundamental in enabling business and commercial transactions to occur both between merchants, their brokers and intermediaries and between them and the bankers on whom they relied for the provision of finance.[267]

The *Companhia*'s monopoly over the ivory trade had commercial privileges within the Portuguese trading circuit, which included preferential freight of goods and logistical support services to Portuguese settlements on the east African coast; for

[263] Machado, *Ocean of Trade,* 40; GA Nadri, 'Eighteenth-Century Gujarat: The Dynamics of its Political Economy, 1750-1800' (PhD thesis, Leiden University, 2009).

[264] Dalgado, *Glossário*, 46.

[265] For a fuller and more nuanced discussion of *mahajans,* see Machado, *Ocean of Trade,* 52-54.

[266] JM Pedreira, 'Os Negociantes de Lisboa na Segunda Metade do Século XVIII: Padrões de Recrutamento e Percusos Sociais'*, Análise Social* 17 (1992): 407-440, 413.

[267] Machado, *Ocean of Trade*, 45.

example, the transport of supplies to Mozambique Island. And as a result of the potential profit to be made under the auspices of the *Companhia*, numerous Indian merchants, both Hindu and Muslim from Gujarat, decamped south.[268] In 1687, the first seven Vaniya merchants arrived on Mozambique Island, ready for trade.

Gujarati merchants played distinct yet overlapping roles in the Indian Ocean network, which ensured a heterogeneous group of merchants and agents at work. Gujarati merchants were engaged in a range of activities: shipowners, freighters, inland traders, bankers, brokers and suppliers.[269] These activities often overlapped, and wealthy merchants often engaged in banking and brokering. No one branch of commerce was exclusively held by any one group, because commercial interests transcended religious and sectarian boundaries.[270] Vaniya and Indo-Muslims traders participated in the vibrant shipping activities in the western Indian Ocean, and in southeast African waters.[271] But having said that, the money market and brokering of goods were generally dominated by the Vaniya, while the Indo-Muslims were predominantly involved in shipping and the overseas trade.[272] Despite these apparent specialities, the Indian trading diaspora was an interdependent community, utilising kin and community networks and inter-community economic relations. It was the Portuguese who strictly differentiated between 'Moors' (Indo-Muslims) and 'Baneans' (Hindus), but in fact economically interdependent relationships between Muslim and Vaniya Gujarati merchants and their agents were intertwined based on

[268] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 102. For the argument about the multi-ethnicity of the Company, see Alpers, 'Gujarat', 42. Alpers calls the Company 'multi-ethnic'.

[269] Nadri, *Eighteenth-Century Gujarat,* 52.

[270] Ibid*.,* 57.

[271] Machado, '*Ocean of Trade',* 71.

[272] Nadri, *Eighteenth-Century Gujarat,* 52, 53.

commercial interests. The Vaniya success in procuring a significant portion of Inhambane's ivory trade was because of their commercial relationship with the Indo-Muslim interior network that brought tusks to the coast.[273] There was, however, stiff competition between individual merchants.[274]

For reasons which are unclear, Vaniya traders generally preferred to settle on the north more than on the east coast of Africa, while the Muslims tended to settle further south.[275] At first the latter settled in the hinterland of Mozambique, then gradually occupied the Zambezi Valley, and then Sofala, Chiluane, Mambone and Inhambane, and finally Delagoa Bay. Because of the trust in certain Indian traders, the *Junta do Comércio* (The Board of Commerce) leased the trade of Angoche and Inhambane to the Indian merchant, Calcanagi Velabo.[276] Sadly, nothing else is known about the presence of Velabo at Inhambane. Malyn Newitt suggests that Velabo was responsible for the 'beginnings of Indian commercial interest in the region'.[277] Yet there is evidence that Indo-Muslims had previously arrived at Inhambane in 1695. Newitt further wrote this tantalising sentence: 'Throughout the eighteenth century, Indians were to be a dominant influence in the 'Portuguese' settlement at Inhambane'; but he fails to flesh out what this influence might have been. I I will expand on his point in the sections below.

The monopoly of the company of *Mazanes* occurred during the ivory phase (seventeenth to late eighteenth century) of the east African Indian Ocean trade

[273] Machado, '*Ocean of Trade*', 196.

[274] Ibid*.,* 52.

[275] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 102.

[276] Newitt, *A History*, 162.

[277] Ibid.

network, which was at its height by the middle of the eighteenth century, and was central to the economy of the Island of Mozambique and its mainland networks – a circumstance that quickly accelerated Indian trade and influence at Inhambane. According to Alpers, 'in the mid-eighteenth century [some of the] the ivory trade … came from Sena, Sofala and Inhambane'. Inhambane was thus part of an extended ivory trade network crossing the Indian Ocean.[278]

At Inhambane, looking for new opportunities, the nascent Muslim community began to develop a rural settlement, forming in a crescent from beyond present-day Morrumbene, to Inhampossa's territory.[279] Once they had arrived, they operated in a fashion reminiscent of the Swahili settlements further north. They established trade networks and introduced new crops to the territory.

Indo-Muslim settlers established a Muslim community, focused on trade and cultivation, and used slaves as a labour force. The Indo-Muslims who settled there often resided with various chiefs. The Portuguese comment that Muslims at Inhambane 'were not very zealous and behaved more like Africans', that is following African customs and adopting their language, shows the immersion of a section of the Indo-Muslim community into Tonga, and later Tsonga societies.[280]

Somewhat different historical processes, however, shaped Swahili and Indo-Muslim groupings. The Swahili coast had been settled as far south as Sofala by the twelfth century, and participated in the north Indian Ocean trade in which the Persian Gulf

[278] EA Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 104.

[279] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 111.

[280] Risso, *Merchants and Faith*, 103.

played a pivotal part. Conversely, the Indo-Muslim community started at Inhambane in the late seventeenth century, and was fundamentally part of the Gujarati economy, as seen above in the discussion of the Company of Mazanes.

After the port had been settled, the Portuguese at Inhambane viewed the Indo-Muslim trade as illicit. In their view, these merchants' status was of smugglers, even though they had been given license to trade from the time of the institution of the Company of Mazanes in 1686. The disparaging attitude of the Portuguese at Inhambane was probably in response to their aggrandised notion that Inhambane was the territory of the Crown. So all trade not flowing into Portuguese hands was considered contraband. The Portuguese authorities' negative view sprang from the fact that the Customs Office received little duties from the enviably profitable Indo-Muslim trade. To add insult to injury, the Indo-Muslims barred a key route to Sofala, and dominated the trade in Burronga, a key zone of interchange. The Portuguese saw the exchange point in Burronga as theirs, even though the Indo-Muslims had preceded them there in trade.[281]

THE GROWING INDO-MUSLIM SETTLEMENT

According to Antonio Rita-Ferreira, by 1762 the number of Indo-Muslims had grown to 300, and had settled in large and small villages in a crescent around the trading post that lay on the shoreline of the bay. The Muslims were relatively prosperous small entrepreneurs, landowners and intermediaries who traded with the interior.[282] Three categories characterised the Indo-Muslim community at Inhambane: the

[281] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 63, Governor António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 22 June 1762.

[282] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença*,111.

seafarers, who came and went, '*cabeças de rancho*' (managers of cultivating gangs of workers – most likely slaves), and those who put down permanent roots at Inhambane. Indo-Muslim success lay beyond their commercial abilities. Their villages were productive, filled with coconut palms, surrounded by rice fields and mango tree orchards (rice and mangoes were for export), and large herds of cattle grazed nearby. Dried and fresh fish were available for sale, as well as the goods produced by many craft industries, possibly cloth and baskets.[283] The post also depended on the diligent and productive Muslim villagers for provisions. The picture of Indo-Muslim community emerges as one of an industrious, self-contained community. It was also an educated community – in 1758 there were at least five Quranic schools at Inhambane.[284]

BUILDING NETWORKS INTO THE INTERIOR

The Indo-Muslim agents at Inhambane came from a longstanding culture of commerce and knew that networks into the interior were crucial to successful trade in southeast Africa. For this reason, some merchants chose to settle in various villages of eminent chiefs further inland where traders bought the favour of chiefs with *saguates* – gifts of beads, other trinkets and cloth.[285] Indian agents and their sailors acquired the Tonga language, which further cemented alliances.[286] And in time, these traders incorporated themselves into chiefly families by 'marriage'.[287] The

[283] Ibid.

[284] Ibid.

[285] E Mandivenga, 'Muslims and the Pre-Colonial History of Zimbabwe', *Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 13, 1 (1992): 99-115, 102.

[286] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 8.

[287] Mandivenga, 'Muslims', 102.

advantage of understanding Tonga, along with the practice of cohabitating with the local women, entrenched them further into Tonga society, and allowed the Indo-Muslim community to prosper. As part of these associations, in addition to the usual exchange of a gift, such as ivory, chiefs gave traders high-status women in marriage.[288] It is likely that chiefs allowed traders to pay what, in their minds, would have been a form of *lobola* (bride price) for their daughters, rather than for low-status women. In this way they ensured the offspring of these relationships stayed within the elite. A chief welcomed traders as part of his households because of the prominence this association lent to his homesteads through the acquisition of high-status exotic goods. Chiefs viewed kinship links with traders as direct access to these trade items, signalling guaranteed affluence in the future, which in turn affirmed and shored up their authority. From the traders' point of view, the relationship was not marriage but rather concubinage to guarantee the beneficial value of kinship for the sake of developing trade networks.

The Governor, blind to the absurdity of his view, grumbled that the black people who worked with Indo-Muslims 'were bribed through gifts'.[289] But what the Indo-Muslims were doing was no different from Portuguese conduct, namely giving gifts to obtain what they wanted. Nor were the Portuguese celibate; they too gave gifts in return for women. The difference lay in how they viewed these relationships. While concubinage integrated Indo-Muslims and blacks into familial relationships, and residence at a chief's homestead strengthened kinship bonds, the Portuguese removed their baptised children from the villages, disrupting a potential kinship link to

[288] Personal conversation with Prof. Peter Delius, May 2019.

[289] AHU Moç CU, Cx 29 d. 11, João da Costa Xavier to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 18 May 1769.

a chief.[290] But it was the rate of Indo-Muslim procreation that alarmed Governor de Melo most. He worried that if nothing were done, the 'moors will produce those terrible harmful effects'; that is, by growing in number and strengthening their kinship to locals, they would entrench their economic advantage.[291] The male Afro-Indo-Muslim offspring of these liaisons were named *manamazes*. These men gave Indian traders a key advantage over the Portuguese.[292] Through these agents, and their kinship links, Indo-Muslim traders gained intimate knowledge of local markets and networks, pushing their influence deep into the interior.[293]

THE *MANAMAZES*

A case in point are the *manamazes*, who were the offspring of Indo-Muslims and Tonga partnerships. As a sub-group, the *manamazes* developed into a category of Indo-Afro-Muslim itinerant traders.[294] The *manamazes* were the male offspring from the Indo-Muslim men and Tonga women, before the waves of Tsonga intrusion.[295] These children grew into valuable translators and emissaries.[296] The *manamazes* also acted as agents for the Indo-Muslim agents, and played a significant role in

[290] In 1767, de Melo writes of the twelve Christian children in local villages in 'the power of the Moors and the Bitongas', and that those without country or relatives must be brought to the trading post. AHU Moç CU, Cx 27 d. 59, António José de Melo to the Governor of Mozambique Island, 30 May 1767.

[291] AHU Moç CU, Cx 29 d. 11, João da Costa Xavier to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 18 May 1769.

[292] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 8.

[293] Ibid.

[294] Ibid., 8.

[295] The word 'namaz' refers to the ritual prayers observed by Muslims five times a day. See SR Dalgado, *Glossário*, 98.

[296] AHU Moç CU, Cx 25 d. 36, Governor José Coelho Loureiro to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 14 May 1765.

motivating chiefs to send men to hunt elephant, and wash soil for gold.[297] *Manamazes* strengthened the Indo-Muslim position within trading networks through affiliated homesteads. These homesteads served as trading stations within the interior, known as '*feitorias de mato*' (trading posts in the veld).[298] With their intimate knowledge of the market, *manamazes* were important cogs in the trading machine, and played a dynamic part in the trade network between the coast and the interior.

It appears that the Portuguese had some access to the Indo-Muslim network. But from 1763, the Crown prohibited sending Royal warehouse goods into the interior, and banned the use of intermediaries, such as the *manamazes*, to execute trade. [299] Which is not to say that the decree was strictly obeyed – the network was an enviable source of wealth, accumulating great affluence for African chiefs, the Indo-Muslim traders, and for those who broke the rules.

The trading post did, however, come to employ some *manamazes* as wage labourers. In this capacity they carried goods to the interior, sailed vessels transporting goods along the coast and large rivers, and acted as messengers between chiefs and the trading post, as well as performing 'multifarious kinds of manual labour'.[300] In 1745, the trading post employed fifteen *manamazes*, who were given 35 sets (sets of twenty) of clothes.[301] Unfortunately, the sources are vague in

[297] Mandivenga, 'Muslims', 102.

[298] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 8

[299] AHU Moç, Codíce 1328, 7 October 1763.

[300] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 27.

[301] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 27.

detail, but in time *manamazes* became 'indispensable' to the trading post as a source of labour.[302]

EARLY INDO-MUSLIM AND PORTUGUESE TRADE [303]

The initial, pre-1729 seasonal and maritime nature of Portuguese trade at the port necessitated close involvement with the village of about 48 *manamazes* in the territory of Tembe.[304] The Portuguese captain of the ship, who doubled as a trade agent, saw himself as being in charge of all aspects of trade. His importance expressed itself through the task of overseeing goods being offloaded from the ship, the building of '*cazas de palhota*' (houses of straw) for the ship's crew, and similar structures to serve as 'warehouses'. To set himself apart, and to heighten his authority, he used his large house to receive trading chiefs. But once the actual trading process started, the captain, along with his crew, were relegated to a subordinated position, showing who had de facto control over the Inhambane trade network. Once everyone had settled at the makeshift trading post, the crew split into two. The one group went with the Indo-Muslims into the interior, while the other, with the help of an interpreter, exchanged goods along the coast.[305] Once the former and more prestigious group had left for the interior, the 'black experts' followed as

[302] AHU Moç CU, Cx 25 d. 36, Governor José Coelho Loureiro to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 14 May 1765.

[303] I am indebted to Teixeira for the section on the Portuguese-Muslim collaboration. See Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 8-10.

[304] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 8.

[305] Ibid.,10, sadly from a lost document (the old reference: AHU Moç, DAP, Parecer do Governor de Mossambique Antonio Cardim Froes, em Corrobação da Imformação de Capitção e Feitor de Inhambane Bernardo de Castro, 1 August 1729. This is a 'most useful document' according to Smith, 'The Struggle', 14, which I have not had the pleasure to work through.

porters. The latter group remained behind to participate in trade with homesteads along the coast, a practice ground so to speak, and a space where mistakes in protocol did not have such a great impact.[306]

Thus, from before the inception of the trading post, Portuguese trade was dependent on the Indo-Muslim merchant complex. The Muslims regarded themselves as the merchants and introduced the Portuguese as companions. The porters further bolstered Indo-Muslim status by delivering goods to Indian merchants, and not the Portuguese captain. This pattern also amplified the lowly status of the Portuguese in the trade process. The participation of '*cristãos sem intelligência*' (dumb Christians) hindered, rather than grew, their business.[307] The limited growth in Portuguese trade also had much to do with their paucity of business skills. While Indo-Muslim merchants were schooled in commerce over generations, the Portuguese traders were, in the main, soldiers turned merchants, with minimal or no commercial experience. As a result, they often bungled negotiations and lost opportunities to make profits. The answer to increased Portuguese profits was to employ either *manamazes* or Indo-Muslims as agents to negotiate on their behalf in the interior.[308] One such agent went by the name of Shasha, and lived in the district of Niambani.[309]

The Inhambane networks flowed southwest towards the Nkomati River, and northwards toward Sofala, probably Pomene, where another thriving Indo-Muslim community lived. The network had also spread to the west across the Limpopo River

[306] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 10, 'Parecer do Governor de Mossambique'.

[307] Ibid.

[308] Ibid., 8.

[309] NA ARA 4370, Report of the exploration of Inhambane, 17 November 1727, f. 312.

because, in the 1720s, the Dutch, then stationed at Delagoa Bay, were cognisant of the Indo-Muslim connection. They described traders as being 'black, with long black hair', who annually traded into the territory of Chiremandelle or Thsiendeulu – a Venda chief, described by eighteenth century Dutch records as a source of copper and tin.[310] This description most likely refers to Indo-Muslim traders, because of the mention of turbans. Phalaborwa was known for its copper mines, while tin came from Rooiberg, which was much further to the west. The deep interior contact beyond the Limpopo River contact shows the far westward, trans-Limpopo reach of the Indo-Muslim trade.[311] These long-haired traders travelled on either donkeys or oxen to trade blue and white cotton cloths, mirrors, and blue, white and yellow beads into the current Limpopo province.[312]

The Indo-Muslims' practice of settling in locals' villages and marrying local women where they had 'considerable influence and developed personal followings', vexed the Portuguese.[313] Kambe, who, as we have seen, was part of the Indo-Afro trade network, illustrates how extensive these followings could be. While he resided in Nialinga, he ruled over 22 villages, situated in Tembe.[314] In the eyes of chiefs, the fact that Indo-Muslims attracted their own subjects, allowed Afro-Indian settlements to grow in power and influence. The only answer the Portuguese had to counter the problem of the proliferating, productive, and commercially successful Indo-Muslim community was coercive force. Consequently, the relationship between the trading post and Indo-Muslim communities deteriorated.

[310] Cape Town Archives Repository (KAB) Political Council (PC) CA 417, f. 9.

[311] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 57, 58.

[312] KAB PC C 419, f. 20

[313] Smith, 'The Struggle', 141.

[314] NA ARA 4371, *Journal Jan de Capelle*, April-June 1728, f. 70.

The degree of cooperation that initially existed between Indo-Muslim and Portuguese trading communities gave way to increasing competition, especially after Indo-Muslims established direct lines of communication between Inhambane, amongst other ports, and those of Diu and Daman in India. With the growth of the Indo-Muslim trade at Inhambane, temptation increased to avoid paying duties, either at Mozambique Island or in Portuguese India.[315] The Indian trade became more clandestine, and increasingly diverted financial gain into Indo-Muslim hands, rather than into Portuguese accounts.


By 1769, the Governor expressed alarm at 'a great multitude' of Indo-Muslims firmly settled opposite to the trading post.[316] The community consisted of multiple families augmented by a significant number of slaves, captured by well-armed bands of men, who exchanged muskets, amongst other goods, for ivory and slaves.[317] The size of the community, as well as their self-reliance, was perturbing as it represented significant competition to, and independence of, the trading post. What was more exasperating was the neglect of Indo-Muslims to approach the trading post, though the Portuguese were not opposed to trading with them. The small slave fort of the Indo-Muslim leader, Mungassy Ausiy, located in Muguma (Mguema), symbolised the Indo-Muslims' disregard for the trading post. [318] The fort attests to not only deep Indian involvement in the slave trade, but was another sign of the Indian community's independence from the Portuguese.

[315] Rita-Ferreira*, Presença*, 109, sourced from a letter dated 7 December 1751 (old reference, Cx 3).

[316] AHU Moç CU, Cx 29 d. 11, João da Costa Xavier to the Governor of Mozambique Island, 18 May 1769.

[317] Ibid.

[318] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 63, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 22 June 1762.



The Slave Fort at Inhambane[319]

The Indo-Muslim merchants were dynamic traders, forging amicable and lasting relationships with most Tsonga and Tonga chiefs, enabling them to spend months in the deep interior trading, and expanding their trading networks. The combined

[319] The map is based on a 1729 map, held by the AHU, CArtm 064-00514, and my own research.

factors of expansive trade networks, a seemingly endless supply of goods, and an army of armed slaves, resulted in the successful Indian trade.

Notwithstanding their reliance on Indo-Muslim productivity and trading acumen, the Portuguese continually sought ways to marginalise the Muslim community.[320] Religious pretexts were cited as the need for their removal from, or at least containment at, Inhambane.[321] As early as 1751, using religious prejudice as a pretext, the Viceroy D Luis de Menezes, wrote to the Marquis of Louriçal, pointing out the abomination of the open and public exercise of Islamic rituals, especially at Inhambane, where circumcision, public processions, and other 'detestable' ceremonies were practiced.[322] In the name of Christianity he declared that these abominations must be prohibited in all the King's dominions.[323] Consequently, severe restrictions on the movement of Diu and Daman Indo-Muslims to the southeast coast followed. In the same spirit, the five Quranic schools at Inhambane were declared subversive, and the *capitão-mor* (head of the trading post) deported the five clerics.[324]

It was the mounting resentment over extortion and increasing marginalisation that exploded in the revolts by Indo-Muslims in 1762 and 1776 respectively.[325] In 1762, an Indo-Muslim named Aly Mallata gathered together other Muslims and Tongas to

[320] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença*, 113.

[321] Ibid.

[322] Ibid.

[323] Ibid.

[324] Ibid.,109.

[325] The marginalisation of Indo-Muslims was general policy to curb, unsuccessfully, the profits of this group. See Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 104.

attack the Portuguese settlement.[326] He also had Tswa Tsonga backing for his expedition. But because his enemies forewarned the Portuguese, the crucial Tsonga reinforcements, having knowledge of the treachery, failed to arrive, and the attack ended as 'a complete fiasco' for the invaders.[327]

Later, in a second attack, a group of '*Mulunguanas*' – the offspring between the '*naturaes deste paiz'* (naturals of this country) (i.e. of Mozambique Island), possibly Arab – joined Manasambiana and his brothers to destroy the fort. The *Mulunguanas* and locals, who adhered to 'various cults', conspired with the Indo-Muslim attack on Inhambane on 26 April 1776.[328] They burnt down the Council buildings, and for two days tried to invade the settlement; and with the support of a section of the Tonga, besieged the town for some months. It was only after Mozambique Island sent military aid, a squad assisted by a Tonga chief, Inhampata, that the Indo-Muslims capitulated. The close association between the chiefs and the Indo-Muslims was clearly a military threat to the trading post. To intimidate the chiefs, the Governor

[326] Smith, 'The Struggle', 141. The Moor, Manasambiana, and his brothers, were perhaps part of the plot to destroy the fort.

[327] Smith, 'The Struggle,' 141.

[328] AHU Moç CU Cx 55 d. 58, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos 17 October 1787. The black people of Mozambique Island gave the name *Mulunguanas* to the descendants of Arabs who lived along the coast of Sofala. See WG Randles, *L'Empire du Monomotapa du XVe au XIXe Siècle* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2017), 103. According to Jeremy Prestholdt, the word 'Mulunguana' is a form of the Swahili 'ungwana', used around Sofala, referring to the Muslim elite of the coast. See JG Prestholdt, 'As Artistry Permits and Custom May Ordain: The Social Fabric of Material Consumption in the Swahili World, circa 1450 to 1600', *PAS Working Papers* 3 (1998), footnote 65: 19. Currently, a village named Unguana exists southwest of Pomene; see Google Earth https://earth.google.com/web/search/pomene/@-23.63090154,35.74110873,13.17063656a,292910.55283181d,35y,-0h,0t,0r/data=CigiJgokCZvJjnyw5DhAEZvJjnyw5DjAGSFI68FkjEVAIYxF23l5KVDA, retrieved 16 June 2019.

went on a tour of the mainland to announce a prohibition on associating with the Indo-Muslims and their conspirators, on pain of death, offering a reward of 40 *panos* [lengths of cloths] for the execution of an enemy.[329] He also promised a handsome reward for any information about the leader of the Indo-Muslim community.[330]

The Portuguese from then on derisively called the Indo-Muslims '*mouro conjurados*' (Muslim conspirators). For years after the last revolt, the Portuguese used these rebellions as an excuse to confiscate Indo-Muslim palm groves and slaves. The trading post also demanded a considerable tribute in coconuts from Indo-Muslims in the territories of chiefs Mocuene and Anamosa, who were both loyal to the trading post, while those in the territory of Tembe paid the same in cultivated goods. Both kinds of payments were demanded until as late as 1818.[331] But in 1788, chief Inhammussa, at first a trading post ally, switched sides and became partial to Indo-Muslim interests, and in their defence firmly opposed coercive behaviour from the Portuguese in his territory.[332]

The decision of Tonga chiefs Inhammussa, and the initially loyal Inhampata, to side with the Indo-Muslims, revealed that Tonga loyalty to the Portuguese was far from comprehensive. In truth, the evidence suggests that the choice of whether to side with one or the other – the Portuguese or Indo-Muslims – was based on judgements about potential returns. Of particular importance was the seemingly incessant ability and willingness of Indo-Muslims to provide an abundance of goods, especially of

[329] AHU Moç CU, Cx 55 d. 58, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, 17 October 1787.

[330] Ibid.

[331] Ibid.

[332] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 112.

cloth and guns, items which strengthened individual chiefs' political standing in the greater Tonga grouping.

As Indian commerce grew rapidly from the mid-eighteenth century, it increasingly encroached on what market share the Portuguese had. It also eroded the spurious Portuguese monopoly in India, by diverting profits into Indian merchants' accounts. To stem the damage being done, Portuguese-India placed restrictions on the mobility of Indo-Muslim traders in 1769, curbing Indian migration to the southeast coast of Africa. Restraining Indian maritime movement between Inhambane and India, probably by confiscating ships and goods, lessened Indo-Muslim influence for the decade this ruling was in place, and was to the detriment of their established trade networks, because through their absence kinship bonds broke down. Evidence for the relative success of the ban on Indo-Muslim trade lies in the detrimental effect it had on the trading post's commerce.

As expected, Portuguese coffers showed a considerable increase in profit at first because of the absence of their competition. But the problem of insufficient supply of trade items, inherent to the Portuguese administrative system deeply dependent on Indian suppliers and creditors for the distribution of cloth, soon slowed trade to a trickle. In addition to the difficulties of supply, the Portuguese were unable to harness the strength of the Indo-Muslim network. The reason for this was the trading post's failure to recognise to what degree it had depended on the Indo-Muslim productivity, networks, and agents who traded on their behalf. Simply put, Portuguese authorities' attempts to eradicate Indo-Muslim settlement in Inhambane, and with it access to the interior, slowed the trading post's business to a practical standstill.

The Governor, clearly frustrated by the miserable state of commerce, chose to shift blame to the trading post staff, who were mostly non-white, whom he called a 'disgrace', accusing them of 'corruption and indolence', which typified, according to him, the culture of the port. His opinion reflects the self-interest at work at the trading post – an attitude not unusual in this period, and not limited to the Portuguese, including his own – where any applied effort served the cause of self-enrichment, rather than the prosperity of the official trading post and that of the Crown. Such behaviour is unsurprising, as Governors were chronically under-compensated, which often turned these men to unscrupulous acts and neglect of their duties, hardly unique to Inhambane.

Another reason causing Portuguese business to slow down instead of accelerating as the authorities had hoped, was the installation of *Canarins* (Indians who had converted to Catholicism) from Goa at Inhambane, in the vain assumption that all Indians were interested in, and excelled at, long-distance commerce. The Viceroy encouraged the settlement of *Canarins* at the port to maintain an Indian influence there, likely hoping that business would again flourish and that the *Canarins*' conversion to Christianity would bring loyalty to the Crown and its interests. This assumption was quickly proven overly optimistic. Because *Canarins* esteemed self-promotion in the administrative sphere higher than economic development, they neglected to maintain and expand networks in the interior. State commerce floundered. The process of trade was not even vaguely in their purview. As Rita-Ferreira points out, they preferred the comfort of the fort, occupying administrative

positions in town, which created every opportunity for extortions rather than expanding and maintaining trade networks in the interior.[333]

After 1779, when Indo-Muslim trade was liberated from restrictions, Indian commerce at the port again surged ahead, pulling the fortunes of the trading post along with it. Unfortunately, there are no figures to illustrate surges and slumps, but these are alluded to through comments by the Governor-General complaining, again, of the substantial loss of Portuguese profits the Muslim trade brought. In 1783, Inhambane's Governor, José Ferreira Nobre, acutely aware of their complete dependency on Indo-Muslims and Vaniya resources, cautioned against the 'damage' (*degradação*) of indispensable Moor trade because of the 'great power' they possessed.[334] The Portuguese at Inhambane remained deeply frustrated because their trade, paradoxically dependent on that of the Indo-Muslims for access to networks into the interior, was eroded by the same.

The success of Indo-Muslims, like that of the Vaniya traders, rested on access to an abundance of trade goods, specifically cloth, to supply the interior. The reason Indo-Muslim traders could supply plentiful cloth lay in the pragmatic interdependence of Indo-Muslim/Vaniya communities and their participation in multi-layered networks of finance and credit, and brokerage of cloth with direct links to producers. The interconnectedness of Gujarati credit and supply networks ensured the relatively inexpensive and steady supply of goods (by advancing money to the producers or

[333] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 102.

[334] AHU Moç CU, Cx 42 d. 39, José Ferreira Nobre, 6 June 1783.

buying on the spot at textile markets), allowing Indian traders in general to exchange double the amount the Portuguese could for ivory, and later slaves, for export.[335]

The trading post had difficulty in matching the number of goods Indian traders could exchange because of its dependence on Mozambique Island for trade goods. Trade cloth was procured from Indo intermediaries, who were predominantly Vaniya, operating on the Island. These merchants sold goods on credit at exorbitant interest rates, escalating the cost of Portuguese purchases. Indian interests were unconcerned with the profitability of Portuguese trade, and were indifferent to the quality of the cloth they sold. Governor António Correia Monteiro de Matos complained of damaged, rotten cloth full of holes delivered to the trading post.[336] Financially handicapped, Mozambique Island authorities simply could not meet the expense of apportioning the same amount of cloth to Inhambane as Indian traders could afford.

VANIYA TRADERS AT INHAMBANE

Vaniya traders also made their presence felt at Inhambane by coming and going each monsoon, arriving in their boats piled high with cloth. The abundance of supply meant that Indian traders could afford to give double what the Portuguese were able

[335] Nadri, *Eighteenth-Century Gujarat*, 67; Machado, 'A Forgotten Corner'; P Machado, 'Awash in a Sea of Cloth: Gujarat, Africa, and the Western Indian Ocean, 1300-1800', in G Riello, P Parthasarathi (eds), *The Spinning World: A Global History of Cotton Textiles, 1200-1850* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[336] AHU Moç CU, Cx 17 d. 85, Governor António Correia Monteiro de Matos to the Governor of Mozambique Island, 24 May 1760.

to offer in the interior.[337] The asymmetrical supply of goods caused the Indian trade to overshadow that of the Portuguese. To keep an eye on incoming and outgoing goods, the Governor appointed two officials – the 'Principal Commissioners of the Baneans' (Vaniyas) – to oversee Vaniya activities and gain some iota of control over the booming trade.[338] One of them went into the interior on commercial expeditions, to be eyes and ears for the Governor back at Inhambane. But for all their efforts, the Portuguese remained on the periphery of this thriving trade. The 'clandestine' trade, as the Portuguese called it, caused the price for ivory in cloth to increase by 150 percent between 1766-1790.[339] The ambulatory trade into the interior was so sweeping that the market for Indian cotton cloth became saturated from time to time.[340] The projection of the potential output of the Inhambane market was estimated to be 300 000 kg of ivory per annum, an amount yielding substantial prospective profits.[341] The trading post just could not match the enviable profits of their competitors. And in the context of the undynamic Portuguese trade eclipsed by Indian traders, Portuguese authorities dissolved the Company of Mazanes in 1777.[342]

The dissolution of the company did not rid the trading post of its commercial woes. The Indo-Muslim traders, with access to abundant credit and interconnections, continued to provide a profusion of trade goods, which raised expectations and

[337] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença*, 112.

[338] Ibid., 113.

[339] Ibid., 115.

[340] Ibid.

[341] Smith, 'The Struggle', 241. A bar equalled 20 *arrobas*, and an *arroba* equalled 14.7 kg. Theal, *RSEA*, vol. II, 454.

[342] Newitt, *A History*, 83.

escalated the number of goods demanded in the hinterland. This while financial restraints on the Mozambique Island authorities prevented the relatively slight increase from twelve to twenty *panos* (lengths of cloths) in exchange for slaves and ivory, but did not aid competitiveness in the hinterland. To balance the books, the set price of ivory was twelve to eighteen *panos*; while in the interior, 25 *panos* was the minimum of cloth accepted. This circumstance placed the Portuguese at a severe disadvantage, restricting the amount of ivory they could purchase in what was an abundantly supplied market, captured by the Indo-Muslims and their collaborators – some Tonga, but mainly the Landins: Tsonga and Dzivi groups.

CHIEFS COLLABORATING WITH THE INDO-MUSLIMS

As I have shown in the previous chapter, Tonga allegiance to the Portuguese was far from comprehensive. With Indo-Muslim presence in villages, filling these with cloth and dispersed among Tsonga homesteads, it is easy to imagine a chief on a strategic location of a homestead near or on a trade route, shifting his alliance towards those traders who could promise a reliable and plentiful supply of trade goods.

The Landins who had moved in on Inhambane from the mid-eighteenth century, associated with wealthy Indo-Muslims – associations which underpinned Landin authority. After respective Tsonga and Dzivi chiefs had submitted Tonga territory to their power, these demanded fealty from their new Tonga subjects. This circumstance put pressure of conquered Tonga chiefs to side with their new masters and engage in business with the Indo-Muslim traders. Some Tonga, whose villages

were amongst Tsonga and Dzivi groups, became Landin tributaries out of necessity. The force of circumstance acted to the advantage of their Tsonga neighbours and obstructed Portuguese trade.[343] For instance, they closed the way across the river to a Portuguese trading partner, Tonga chief Macatta.[344] And on the western side of the bay, the Tonga villages of Maxixe openly collaborated with the Dzivi.[345]

The Tsonga chief, Injarra, also acted with the Indo-Muslims, much to the chagrin of the Portuguese. Yet the association between the Muslims and the Tsonga was perhaps not so surprising. As I have shown, the Indo-Muslims spent months in the interior, trading north and west of Inhambane. The incursion of Dzivi and Tswa groups came from the west, an area of Indo-Muslims' commercial influence. It is logical to assume a preexisting connection between these groups, and the pull of wealth drew the Dzivi and Tsonga groups east. The migration of Tsonga societies into Inhambane was an appreciable asset to the Indo-Muslims who gained, through alliances, not only valuable trade associations but also extra warriors in times of conflict.

The competition between the Portuguese and the Indo-Muslims over trade expressed itself in the access to trading goods flowing east out of the deep hinterland to Burronga, home of the Urrongas. The Burronga district, 165 km away from Inhambane, was the trading post's entrepôt, the terminal of the trade routes to

[343] AHU Moç CU, Cx 29 d. 11, João da Costa Xavier to the Governor of Mozambique Island, 18 May 1769.

[344] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 11, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 27 March 1762.

[345] Ibid.

the coast.[346] The reason to assume that the region was a collection and distribution point, was the competition for control of the area. The Portuguese complained of the Indo-Muslims interfering with trade in this Hlengwe-Tsonga stronghold.[347] Dzivi chief Masiye, too, muscled in on the region's trade and selected a strategic seat for his authority. He settled at the 'mouth of the routes' to the principal trading regions, especially the prime route to Burronga.[348] And as his homestead was close to an Indo-Muslim settlement, it is more likely that he was in partnership with them rather than the trading post.[349] Masiye's location at the entrance to the hinterland also allowed him to enforce a steep toll on Portuguese traders passing through his territory.[350] The strength of often exclusive Tsonga/Indo-Muslim networks siphoned off trade that the Portuguese regarded as theirs. But it was not the Tsonga alone who preferred the Indo-Muslims as partners.

A subject and headman of Tonga chief Tinga Tinga, named Conguio, was, in the eyes of the Portuguese, just such an ally of Indo-Muslim traders. The Portuguese took his collaboration with their enemy as justification for 'boldly' taking his people as slaves.[351] To add insult to injury, he hosted Indo-Muslims in his villages. De Matos hypocritically and derisively called these 'sex villages' (*povoaçoens de coito*), alluding to the sexual relationships the Muslims indulged in with Conguio's subjects.

[346] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença,* 237.

[347] Smith, 'The Struggle', 128.

[348] AHU Moç CU, Cx 29 d. 8, Governor João da Costa Xavier to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 15 May 1769.

[349] AHU Moç CU, Cx 19 d. 46, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 28 April 1762.

[350] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 63, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 22 June 1762.

[351] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 49, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 14 May 1762.

Before 1786, Conguio had the largest portion of Inhambane's commercial and agricultural trade.[352] But by the late 1780s, an aging Conguio's fortunes seemed to be on the wane, and the Portuguese suddenly appeared to be his favoured partners. He allowed the Portuguese townspeople to build huts in his territory to serve as a trade goods depot, hoping to increase his status, as his political popularity was on the wane.[353] The post in his territory, according to the Portuguese, did 'good business'.[354] But from the Portuguese point of view, Conguio's loyalty changed when he allowed an Indo-Muslim to trade from his village. Conguio's disloyalty was an 'insult', aggravated by the trader's debt in goods owed to the trading post. He had previously agreed to repay the loan, but was reluctant to make good on his promise and, instead, struck a deal with Conguio. Pointing out the realities of Conguio's situation – as a man of diminishing subjects who had not received goods for some time – he promised to increase Conguio's fortunes by giving part of his goods to the chief.[355] But the Governor destroyed Conguio's village, dashing the trader's prospects to the ground.

Another chief who worked with Indo-Muslims was the powerful Tsonga chief Luango, whose strategy was to gain the advantage of the Indo-Muslim firearms. Indo-Muslim men armed with muskets accounted for his success against his neighbours.[356] With this benefit, Luango's influence exploded along the coast, to the alarm of the

[352] AHU Moç CU, Cx 51 d. 7, Governor Teodoro Santos Pinto to the Governor of Sena, 24 June 1786.

[353] Ibid.

[354] Ibid.

[355] Ibid.

[356] Ibid.

Governor because of his collaboration with 'very powerful' Indo-Muslims'.[357] Luango's force also soon promised to engulf the territory of Frevela, a Tonga chief of equal status to Luango in terms of subjects. The danger was that, should Luango absorb chief Frevela's substantial following, the potential for the widening influence and military capacity of the chief increased exponentially, thereby increasing the reach of the Indo-Muslim trade.[358] Frevela was important to the trading post because he maintained authority over an embarkation point, and was a Portuguese intermediary for the oversight of the import and export of goods. In order to prevent Frevela's surrender to Luango, the Governor proposed sending a force of nine soldiers, armed with guns, to protect the chief.[359]

THE POWERFUL TONGA CHIEF INHAMUSSA

In 1787, the Tonga chief Inhamussa, traditionally a Portuguese ally, exerted his dominance over trade relationships in and around Inhambane through an association with a group of Indo-Muslims. At this time, the trading post's trade was experiencing a downturn and was possibly the reason for Inhamussa's choice of business partners. Business slowed for the Portuguese because of Mozambique Island's embargo on taking goods into the hinterland, a decision that came after repeated wholesale losses of goods in the interior, stalling Portuguese trade.

[357] AHU Moç CU, Cx 51 d. 7, Governor Teodoro Santos Pinto to the Governor of Sena, 24 January 1786.

[358] Ibid.

[359] Ibid.

In this period, the chief travelled north towards Sofala and stopped at Pomene, an Indo-Muslim stronghold. Inhamussa invited Pomene traders to settle in Manja, on the western side of the bay.[360] The Pomene Muslims had the capacity to trade into the interior without fear of losing their goods through theft, probably because of the entrenched Indo-Muslim presence in hinterland networks.

By the end of June 1787, ten Pomene Muslim merchants had settled near the trading post and were fast expanding their settlement. The growing settlement above the beach of Manja, located west of Maxixe, caused the Portuguese great alarm. Governor de Matos was nervous about and suspicious of Indo-Muslims settling in such relative proximity to the trading post. To keep abreast of the situation, he relied on spies to inform him of the Indo-Muslims' intentions and movements, and kept the garrison at the ready in case of a surprise attack.[361]

Inhamussa appeared to be actively thwarting Portuguese trade. He refused to send back the trading post's absconded slaves as all the other chiefs, in the eyes of the Portuguese, were dutifully doing. Inhamussa also withdrew his previously pledged protection for Portuguese traders in his territory, as Manoel José, killed while trading, found out.[362]

Slaves fleeing from the Inhambane townspeople were furtively relocated to villages of Indo-Muslims to fulfil their own labour needs. Each time an Indo-Muslim boat

[360] AHU Moç CU, Cx 56 d. 43, Governor Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 27 June 1788.

[361] Ibid.

[362] Ibid.

passed by the shore in the vicinity of the trading post, they picked up fugitives who waited on the beach. The haemorrhage of the Portuguese slave population enraged the townspeople, and the unwillingness of Indo-Muslims from Pomene to sell slaves back, deepened their anger.[363] They were labelled a 'different kind of enemy'; as the Governor wrote, 'they are restless, fearless'.[364]

With the slow Portuguese trade, the seemingly inexhaustible supply of cloth from Indo-Muslim traders with their ability to trade freely in the interior, shaped Inhamussa's motivation for changing trading partners. It was the logical choice because of their knowledge of manufacturers, procurement, and distribution networks. It was the efficient distribution of cloth of his Muslim allies that Inhamussa found useful in the intensifying competition for power and wealth. From September 1788, according to the Portuguese, chief Inhamussa was constantly 'in rebellion', because he was associating and trading with the Indo-Muslims.

Inhamussa continued agitating against ongoing Portuguese confiscation of Indo-Muslim territory, which the trading post considered justified by the Indo-Muslim rebellion of 1776. One day, in the middle of 1788, a city council judge and his scribe went on a mission to claim some palm groves belonging to the Indo-Muslims in Manja.[365] Inhamussa intercepted their mission and prevented the annexation of the

[363] AHU Moç CU, Cx 56 d. 43, Governor Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 29 June 1788.

[364] Ibid.

[365] Ibid.

palm groves. He also prevented the raiding of the Indo-Muslim village and threatened to kill all the whites carrying goods along the Manja River.[366]

Inhamussa was also progressively hostile to fellow Tonga chief Inhampata, who remained loyal to the Portuguese. Chief Inhamussa attacked Inhampata's homestead, killing his wives and children and taking many others prisoner. But it is his order to slaughter Inhampata's cattle which suggests that slave capture was Inhammussa's real motive for the attack. This last action surprised the Governor, who commented that it was 'contrary to the ceremonies of black people'.[367] The rare cattle killing suggests that Inhammussa planned to destroy the mainstay of Inhampata's subsistence to induce famine, and so produce an impoverished community ready for enslavement.[368] So it appears then, considering the wholesale destruction visited on Inhampata, that the Pomene Muslims, with Inhamussa as their right-hand man, had a slave trade in mind.

Chief Inhamussa destabilised the close interior to the economic advantage of the Indo-Muslims – since a region destabilised by hostilities provided people for enslavement, and in this case for the Indo-Muslim account, a circumstance diametrically opposed to the economic well-being of the trading post trading in ivory. A war to secure Inhamussa's submission to the post started sometime before 3 July 1789, a date which marked the chief's request for peace.[369] This 'request' was presented very much on the chief's own terms, unveiling a man very secure in his

[366] Ibid.

[367] AHU CU, Moç Cx 56 d. 43, Governor Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 27 June 1788.

[368] Ibid.

[369] AHU CU, Moç Cx 58 d. 27, Inhamussa Treaty, 3 July 1789.

political position.[370] The chief's offer was simple: send the customary *saguate* to settle a common accord in order to open negotiations for the settlement of these matters for the sake of public peace and quiet. His messenger added that if this were done, the chief would end hostilities. Inhamussa held all the cards, propped up by the economic and military strength of the Indo-Muslims, highlighting the weakness of the trade post and the precarious authority of the Portuguese.

By 29 July 1789, the Governor, not trusting Inhamussa's request for peace, deployed the entire Inhambane detachment to the territory of Tinga Tinga, to form a buffer between Inhamussa and the trading post's other Tonga allies. But Inhamussa's apparent desire for peace seemed to be a lie. He attacked the garrison stationed in Tinga Tinga in the early hours of the morning, killing three of the Portuguese men. His men did not stop at this assault but went on to do impressive damage, attacking the village of Chicoque, a few kilometres north of Maxixe, possibly to capture slaves. Some fleeing villagers died in a flurry of arrows launched by Inhamussa's army. Not satisfied with this devastation, his men set fire to the interior of Tinga Tinga – another tell-tale sign of slave capturing tactics being the destruction of crops to induce famine.[371]

Inhamussa's behaviour, that is attacking the garrison, can be analysed in terms of political authority. The Portuguese ever presumed themselves to be the highest authority at Inhambane, a view Inhamussa would have been unlikely to share. The delivery of a *saguate* was considered as a token of respect and recognition of

[370] Ibid.

[371] AHU Moç CU, Cx 58 d. 38, Governor Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 18 July 1789.

rank.[372] It is entirely possible that Governor de Matos, playing an ego game, refused to send the gift, and rejected the offer of peace, which he understood to be an insult to the chief and therefore, expecting an attack, stationed soldiers in Tinga Tinga.

The small, under-resourced Portuguese community at Inhambane struggled to gain control over trade in the context of fierce competition with Indo-Muslims and their partners, the Landin chiefs. The success of the trading post depended largely on maintaining networks of alliance in the context of deep Portuguese dependence on the Indian trade. The interwoven relationships between the Indo-Muslims, the Landins, the Portuguese and the Tonga, show a complex economic society, displaying shifting loyalties dependent on the power balance shored up or undermined by the supply or lack of goods.

[372] For a full exposition of the relationship between the *saguate* and political rank, see Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FOUR

A TRIANGULAR COMPETITION FOR WEALTH: CHIEFS, INDO-MUSLIMS AND THE PORTUGUESE, 1729-1810s

This chapter discusses two periods of Inhambane's history. The earlier period, 1729-1760s, focuses on how Governors expressed their responsibility of promoting trade for the State. The later period, from the 1760s, and the 1810s, unpacks the destabilising effect the Tswa Tsonga migration had on Inhambane's trade, and how Governors attempted to gain a monopoly of the exchange of goods in the context of existing local hierarchies. Further, the history of Inhambane has mainly been seen as a primarily Portuguese point of contact with the Indian Ocean trade network. This historiography has obscured their competitors – namely Indo-Muslim traders who partnered with the Tsonga. The previous maritime focus of Inhambane's history concealed the role it played in connecting the regional trading networks in the interior. In particular the role of networks linking the region south of the Limpopo River's curve to the western Indian Ocean world have not been fully appreciated.

GOVERNORS AND PRIVATE TRADE

Since the late sixteenth century the commerce of east African ports was leased to a merchant for a period of three years by the Portuguese Crown. The lessor/lessee model was mutually advantageous. The Crown saw the sale of a lease as a guaranteed income – as a lump sum in the context of being removed from the day-to-day administration of trade. Merchants coveted this enviable right for a monopoly

over the distribution of beads and cloth, and as the factor to become the sole agent for a port's trade. The monopoly, combined with the right to export gold and ivory purchased in the interior, was an opportunity for the lessee to become extremely wealthy – a prospect which no doubt featured in the mind of Calcanagi Velbo, an Indian merchant who leased the Inhambane trade and that of Angoche in 1701 for 11 000 *crusados* each.[373] The Factor model shaped the future logic of control over the flow of Inhambane's trade, and the Governors' tendency to fraudently assume the role of Factor.

The lessee gained the title of *Capitão de Viagem de Inhambane* (Captain of the Voyage to Inhambane), and was responsible for military operations while at sea. Once on land, he managed the *Fazenda Real* (Royal Warehouse) that tracked incoming and outgoing goods.[374] Managing the movement of merchandise had three components – to receive and catalogue trade items from Mozambique Island, ensure the flow of goods from the interior to the port, and then despatch goods exchanged – slaves and ivory amongst others, to the Island.

When Inhambane became a permanent post in 1729, the two aspects of trade, namely voyage and exchange, were decoupled. The *Capitão-mor e Feitor* (Captain-Major-and-Factor), whose title later changed to 'Governor', became a salaried position. His salary, and that of the other administrative staff and troops, was typically a small quantity of cloth and rice, enough for the exchange of provisions to sustain basic subsistence. It was no wonder then, that in managing the lucrative commerce of the trading post, gubernatorial thoughts were not primarily directed to

[373] Theal, RSEA, vol. V, Letter from King of Portugal to the Viceroy of India, 11 September, 1710, 26.

[374] Texeira, 'A Fundação', 20.

enriching the State, and many a Governor arrogated the monopoly of Inhambane's trade to themselves. The combination of monitoring incoming and outgoing goods placed him in a powerful position, with considerable opportunity to line his pockets, to the loss of the State. The pressure on the Governor to fill Mozambique Island's coffers was strong in theory but weak in practice, largely because of the vast distance between Inhambane and its oversight in Lisbon, Goa and on Mozambique Island.[375]

Inhambane's trade occurred in a competitive environment and others, including Indian, English and French traders, were understandably interested in its lucrative commerce. But foreign vessels posed a threat to the Portuguese, or rather the Governor's own personal monopoly. To this end the Governor monitored maritime traffic along the coast by making use of villagers as lookouts, who hurried over to the trading post to tell of any ship's arrival. Once anchored, a high-ranking officer boarded the ship to enquire after its identity, the purpose of its approach, and to assess whether it posed a threat. But the primary reason for going aboard ships was to prevent foreign ships from trading freely.[376] If the officer suspected contraband aboard a ship, a guard made a thorough search.[377] These functions gave the Governor considerable leeway to make some profit on the side by extracting bribes, or even summarily confiscating a ship's cargo.

[375] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 20. A *capitão-mor* was typically responsible for the administration of a district and had military and civil authority.

[376] Ibid., 23.

[377] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 22.

During the Pombaline era (1750-1777), the Lisbon government promoted Inhambane's status as that of a town, and in 1763 it became known as the Vila de Inhambane.[378] As part of the Marquis of Pombal's mercantile reforms intended to divert greater wealth to Lisbon, Inhambane was provided with a larger set of officials. These officials had the responsibility to grow the town's economy and were accountable to broader authorities.[379] Any given group of men who set out from the Tejo River tasked with the administration of trading posts, may have left with good intentions to serve the King, but turned into 'tyrannous despots' as soon as they rounded the Cape of Good Hope.[380] Their national sensibilities and loyalty to the Crown incrementally dissipated the further the Cape of Good Hope disappeared into the distance. Once installed, they resisted the instructions and orders from the metropole as the need for self-preservation and greed grew. For these reasons, the men who were placed in charge of ports constantly undermined Pombal's plan to increase profits for the metropole through smuggling. Smuggling was prejudicial to Lisbon because of the deficit in duties paid to Mozambique Island, whose Governor had the same strategy of exploiting the State, which ultimately resulted in a shortfall in payment to the Crown. To make up for the deficit, officials on the Island put pressure on subordinate ports, such as Inhambane, to pay their custom dues. But town officials continued to subvert all orders because of the vested interest in trading

[378] The Pombaline era was characterised by the dictatorship of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Marquis of Pombal, who introduced wide-ranging reforms. The Marquis of Pombal was the Secretary of Internal Affairs of the Kingdom during the reign of Joseph I of Portugal, from 1750-1777, and the de facto head of government for this period.

[379] JL Cardoso and AM Cunha, 'Enlightened Reforms and Economic Discourse in the Portuguese-Brazil Empire, 1750-1808', *History of Political Economy* 44, 4 (2012): 620-641, 627.

[380] A Lobato, *História da Fundação,* xii.

on their own account. This dynamic provided a powerful counterweight to serving the trading interests of the metropole and that of Mozambique Island.

The matter of Luis Francisco Fonseca's house, in 1764, provides a striking example of how residents looked out for profit-making opportunities, and of the tussle between Mozambique Island and Inhambane's officials for a stream of income. Before Governor José Coelho Loureiro could execute the order to construct a building complex to accommodate housing for the new set of officials, the Royal Warehouse was a crude hut made of palm leaves, and served as an official office.[381] The new complex was to consist of a council chamber, a jail, and rooms for other official business.[382] Da Fonseca saw an opportunity to gain an income from the metropole, and so he let his house for council meetings. The Governor-General denounced this practice, pronouncing it improper, and ordered the next Governor, Antonio José de Melo, to purchase the house for 360 *panos*, presumably to ensure that the rent flowed to Mozambique Island's account. [383]

The authorities' misgivings about the Municipal Council's integrity was clear, specifically with regard to the town's scribe.[384] As part of the Pombaline reforms, scribes were placed under extra scrutiny, and for good reason, because the scribe's duties were critically important. This official was in charge of all incoming and outgoing correspondence, archiving documents, kept the town's official records and, most notably, recorded the duties payable to Mozambique Island. His was a pivotal

[381] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 28.

[383] Ibid., 30.

[383] Ibid., 30.

[384] Ibid., 28. The twelve officials were a judge, three councillors, a solicitor, a scribe, two weight-and-measure inspectors, and three health officials assisting a surgeon.

office and open to pressure to defraud the State. The Governor-General literally invoked the fear of God in his contract by demanding that the appointed scribe swear on the holy gospels that he would execute his job well. But even the threat of the wrath of heaven appears to have been insufficient to keep some scribes honest.[385] Enhancing Inhambane's oversight by adding a municipal council, ironically increased tensions between Inhambane and Mozambique Island rather than producing efficient governance of trade and duties, because the members of the council further drained the pool of profit before it reached Lisbon. In response to Mozambique Island's pressure to produce returns, the Governor bewailed the small pool of candidates available for service as the reason for poor administration and dismal surplus. During the mid-1760s the population stood at 144, with 59 men between the ages of fifteen and 60. Out of necessity, the Governor protested that he had to appoint 'merchants, pilots, unmarried, and ignorant men', blaming their incompetence for the financial mismanagement of the town and the disappointing revenues payable to Mozambique Island.[386]

The tendency of Governors to take advantage of the port's trade to augment their salary remained a perennial problem. In order to counteract Governors trading privately, the Royal Decree of 14 April 1785 ordered the strict prohibition of any Governor's involvement in trade for his own account.[387] One Governor who ignored this decree was Theodore Santos Pinto, who participated in the slave and ivory trades. His successor reviled him for having the gall to allow a French ship to 'scandalously' and openly trade at Inhambane 'with prohibited goods', probably

[385] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 24, 28.

[386] Ibid., 30.

[387] AHU Moç CU, Codíce 1349, 21 August 1789.

guns.[388] The evidence for his successful ivory smuggling in collaboration with the Indo-Muslims is more detailed.[389] He chose the 'good' ivory (the best tusks) for himself and acted as a prominent middleman between the large number of black people from the interior (sadly it is not clear exactly who they were) and the Indo-Muslims, making large profits in the purchase and the resale of tusks.[390]

The problem with trading on the side, and brazenly with Royal goods to boot, was that it presented a challenge to balance the books. Justifying the town's budget was a continuing headache for any Governor. Military expenses were often the greatest portion of the town's budget, and an easy way to inflate expenses. These costs were usually for the outlay of gunpowder and ammunition supplied to chiefs who gave auxiliary troops for planned hostilities. The Governor had to clear any expenditure with the Viceroy of India, and messages would follow the cumbersome Inhambane-India-Mozambique communication circuit. Later, when Mozambique Island became independent of the *Estado da Índia* in 1752, the Governor-General authorised Inhambane's expenditure, and the Governor-General of Mozambique Island acquired autonomy and, in principle, great authority over all administrators of trade posts.[391] But even the simpler Mozambique Island-Inhambane channel of communication slowed down decision-making, leaving the men in charge of Inhambane little option but to make their own decisions and to justify the expenses

[388] AHU Moç CU, Codíce 1349, 20 December 1787. Capela, Medeiros, *O Tráfico de Escravos*, 19.

[389] AHU CU Moç Cx 56 d. 49, Governor Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos to the Captain-General of Mozambique Island António Manuel de Melo e Castro, 30 June 1788.

[390] Ibid.

[391] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 20.

incurred post facto.[392] Another avenue for creative accounting was attributing expenses to bogus work done by soldiers. This pattern of administration for personal gain continued into the nineteenth century, leaving the port's official commerce in shambles.

In 1815, the incoming Governor António Correia Monteiro de Matos wrote to the Governor-General alerting him to the 'deplorable' ruin of the trading post. The town was in disrepair and its economy shambolic. The reason for these appalling conditions, he claimed, was his predecessor, Governor Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, who appeared to have given in to the adage, if you cannot beat them, join them, and signed up for a partnership with some Indo-Muslims to smuggle ivory and slaves, and develop cultivation in the interior, no doubt to augment his meagre salary. Being underpaid in the presence of such wealth proved to be an irresistible temptation for many.

The behaviour of de Carvalho was not that unusual, nor endemic to Inhambane. The financial needs of officials often compelled the use of Asian intermediaries, and the inclination to amass wealth often formed the basis of Portuguese and local merchant partnerships.[393] As for Carvalho, he inserted himself into the feared network of Pomene Indo-Muslims, discussed in Chapter Three. His close collaboration is evident in that they were part of the Governor's, or more precisely the Crown's, military payroll. He paid '*milícias e Ordenanças, Mouros e Cafres*' (militia and orderlies, Moors and blacks). The Governor, to mark his close and trusted

[392] AHU CU Moç Cx 21 d. 45, Captain-Major and factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 5 May 1762.

[393] Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation*, 66.

relationship with them, also invited Indo-Muslims from Pomene to live at Inhambane.[394]

This unlikely relationship between de Carvalho and the Indo-Muslims started when a group of Indian men approached the Governor in early 1813 with a request. They wanted assistance in regenerating cultivation in the interior. The appeal to the Governor was to assist in reestablishing a village named Mucunguni, sixteen kilometres outside of Inhambane.[395] The village had earlier been devastated through English slave trading, and had consequently suffered a famine that lasted seven years.[396]

Before this time of devastation, the village had been a vibrant community alive with cattle, producing rice and vegetables. And being commercially astute, the Indo-Muslims perhaps saw a business opportunity in reviving the village as a provisions market for monsoon traders. The Governor justified his involvement in an Indo-Muslim scheme to Mozambique Island by explaining that it was an opportunity for promoting wheat, barley and cassava cultivation, which would relieve the Island from the responsibility of provisioning Inhambane.[397] Self-sufficiency was a notion in line with Pombaline ideals, adding weight to his argument for redeveloping the village.

[394] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 66, Governor Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 27 March 1813.

[395] Ibid.

[396] Ibid. AHU Moç CU, Cx 146 d. 98, Governor Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 20 July 1814.

[397] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 77, António Severiano Monteiro de Matos, 1 April 1813.

The townspeople were less convinced of Carvalho's apparently noble intentions. Their unhappiness stemmed from the Governor's decision to divert valuable trade goods, namely 600 *panos* to build 25 houses, and that to their nemesis in trade, an Indo-Muslim community. This building project included a house for the Governor.[398] The Governor divided the area into parcels, giving one each to men prominent in the administration of Inhambane – the *patrão-mor* (leader-in-chief) Vicente Antonio Rosa, José Carreca Monteiro do Matos, the Sargento-Môr da Praça (Sergeant-Major of the Military Square) and the adjunct of the same, as well as the Adjunct of the Militia, Antonio Leveniano Monteiro de Matos. These men represented the military leadership of Inhambane, and so the Governor effectively moved Inhambane's leadership into the interior. The six guards stationed at the village received salaries from the State. Carvalho was clearly committed to the project because he built a house in the meadow that he took for himself (*para mim hum varzia*).[399] His dedication to developing an Indo-Muslim community was moreover apparent in his habit of living in his village house from Monday to Sunday, hastily hurrying to Inhambane on Sunday mornings to keep a very distracted eye on official business.

Another change occurred at this time, possibly linked to the growing Indo-Muslim trade. The embarkation point shifted from the beaches of Tonga chief Frevela, a trading post ally, to the lively port of Morrumbene, an Indo-Muslim stronghold.[400] The Governor therefore participated in radically undermining the trading post's

[398] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 66, Governor Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 27 March 1813.

[399] Ibid.

[400] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 34, Governor Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 3 March 1813.

commerce, and like the Landin chiefs, based his decision on the far more profitable association with the Indo-Muslims.

MANAGING TRADE RELATIONSHIPS WITH TONGA CHIEFS

Of course, the revenues paid to Mozambique Island depended on trade with the local chiefs in any case. It was therefore a vital responsibility of the Governor to maintain open commerce with chiefs, known as the *resgate* (exchange). Fundamental to the *resgate* was the *saguate* (gift) or the annual tribute payment, which oiled the relationship between chiefs and the trade post at Inhambane. The *saguate* payment was an ancient practice along the east coast of Africa.[401] The *saguate* was critical to a trade relationship because it was fundamental to reaffirm the political hierarchy within and amongst African societies. The *saguate* not only underscored a chief's position in the social-political order, it also enhanced his ability to attract adherents through its value for redistribution. A chief passed part of the *saguate*, usually a collection of exotic goods such as knives and silk shirts, on to other important men to secure loyalty, especially during a time of war.

But because the *saguate* was allocated to only a few select chiefs at Inhambane, the tradition interfered with the established political pecking order and promoted competition amongst chiefs. The *saguate* recipients were 'the great', and 'the great' could, through favouritism, distribute the greatest number of cattle and trade goods. And as colonial practice typically ignored existing power structures but rather privileged those they regarded as most useful, they disregarded the broader power

[401] Teixeira, ' A Fundação', 23.

dynamics within a territory, creating a tendency towards disorder in the interior. A Governor chose chiefs to be part of the *saguate* circle on the basis of their promise and capacity to guarantee trouble-free trade. A qualifying factor was a chief's proximity to trade routes and the subsequent connections into the interior. Those groups and leaders who were excluded from these opportunities had good reason to be resentful of the insiders, not least because of being left out of the feast of the year, the *banja*, where a *saguate* was bestowed on the chosen few, known as the *fumos*.

At the annual *banja*, the Governor wined and dined Tonga chiefs, who came to town for three days. A *fumo* was a chief who had been elected to 'be smoked'. The form of this ritual investiture sadly remains unclear. After a Governor had 'smoked' a chief, he was accepted as a '*filho da feitoria*', or son of the trading post. This title denoted him as a trusted ally who had been accepted as the authority in a territory.[402] The annual gathering of the *fumos* usually occurred during the early months of the year, June being the latest date for the occasion. The date of the celebration depended on the arrival of the provisions ship despatched from Mozambique Island. Although it might be postponed due to the late arrival of the provisions ship, the importance of the *saguate* and the celebratory *banja* to political standing, mandated the annual gathering. The *banja* was a lavish affair, full of merry-making and gift-giving. In 1745, the *saguate* that each *fumo* received included twelve long-sleeved, open-sided shirts of Chinese origin, twelve calico caps, twenty Flemish knives, and one measure of

[402] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 34.

pepper. By at least 1753, the Mozambique Island warehouse supplemented the above list with a cap and cloth from Surat, and a textile called '*tucurim chicoria*'.[403]

The Governor, to defray the costs of the feast, required *fumos* to contribute to the festivities. For example, in 1784 Muhembe supplied three cows and the sorghum for *pombe*, a fermented drink.[404] In this particular year, Mozambique Island supplied wine for the occasion. When the annual ship arrived, it announced its arrival by a single cannon shot, alerting the *fumos* to the imminent *banja* and the delivery of the *saguate*.

A key moment of the gathering was when the *lingua de estado*, or state Interpreter, stood up to speak. He delivered the *fala de banja*, or speech of the *banja*, aimed at the *fumos*. This lecture was ostensibly in the interest of the Crown, but was really an attempt to control the behaviour of the chiefs.[405] It was no accident that the captain of the garrison attended the lecture, providing a mute promise of reprisal should anyone stray from the demands set out in the speech. Because a *fumo* was in a reciprocal relationship with Inhambane, he could call on military support from the Portuguese against his enemies. This military support considerably strengthened chiefs' authority.[406] And it served as a tacit weapon to enforce the faithfulness of their subjects. The *fumos* were distinguished from the *mucuzambos* (headmen), who

[403] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 36. Tucurim was a textile traded at Mozambique Island during the eighteenth century. See EA Alpers, 'Indian Textiles at Mozambique Island in the Mid-Eighteenth Century', *Textile History* 48, 1 (2017): 31-48.

[404] Ibid.

[405] Ibid., 38.

[406] Ibid., 34.

were minor chiefs, and subject to a *fumo*.[407] *Mucuzambos* maintained ties with the Portuguese by remaining faithful subjects to their *fumos* and not absconding to the leadership of a Tsonga chief. In 1762, headmen Mululune and Xamane of the Tonga chief Tinga Tinga required Portuguese intervention. These two men had behaved aggressively towards their fellow Tonga neighbours, who were possibly in collaboration with the Tsonga, raining arrows onto their villages.[408] This suspicion of a forbidden collusion with the Tsonga is interesting because of its implications: the Tsonga were often the business partners of the Indo-Muslims, and this shows how tenuous the trading post's hold over the Tonga was as a whole.

Thus, the Portuguese kept nominal control over the immediate hinterland by buying the loyalty of the chiefs in alliance with them, who in turn were responsible for keeping their subordinate adherents in check. Swift retribution followed the 'disobedience' of leaving a *fumo*'s authority. In 1766 the Portuguese executed a headman and razed nine of his villages for such 'disobedience', and forced the headman's homestead to pay an annual tribute to the town.[409] By establishing these *fumo* alliances, the Portuguese maintained a patchwork of treaties with societies in the near-interior in order to protect their commercial interests.

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[407] Ventura, 'Estat Modern', 188. *Mucuzambo* had a different meaning in Zambezia. Newitt's *mocuazambo* denotes 'an African official' who [heard] more difficult cases in [the *prazo*-holder's] name; see Newitt, *A History*, 233. In 'Glossary of African Terms', in AF Isaacman, B Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: The Zambesi Valley 1850-1921* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), xvii, *mukazambo* means a male slave leader.

[408] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 45, Captain-Major and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 14 May 1762.

[409] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 35.

These treaties formed the core subject of the translator's lecture, a reminder of the exclusivity the Portuguese demanded. The lecture extorted the chiefs to maintain unity and to stay faithful and obedient to the trading post. This meant that chiefs had to consult with either the interpreter or the Governor to mediate in any complaints, regarding trade or the behaviour of the Portuguese agents. This rule was supposed to prohibit consultation with any foreigners. From 1787, with an accelerating slave trade, the Portuguese urgently admonished chiefs not to tolerate the presence of foreigners, particularly the French, in their territories, but to arrest them, and deliver them to the Governor. The state interpreter devoted the rest of the speech to procedure and conduct. The chiefs should open routes, and lower their bows (avoid warfare) at the arrival of the annual ship. The people should live peacefully, devote their time to agriculture, sell goods to Inhambane, and provide labour to collect wood and help with building repairs.

The concept of *banja* was not of Portuguese origin. It probably sprang from a widely distributed custom in eastern Africa. For instance, in Ethiopia feasting was 'an act of political consequence', gathering together people from all social spheres, and where a 'big man' partly gained his preeminent status through the number of guests dining at his expense.[410] The Swahili concept of feasting was a means to gain social leverage.[411] Jeffrey Fleisher points out that the Swahili have historically performed

[410] I Orlowska, 'Feasting and Political Change: Tafari's Ascent to Power and Early 20th Century *Geber*', *Annales de' Éthiopie* 28 (2013): 45-47, 45, 46.

[411] Gerhard Liesegang equates '*banja*' with the word '*bandla*', in Liesegang, 'O Sul', 18. My attempts to communicate, via email, with Prof. Liesegang to discuss his interpretation have gone unanswered.

feasts through which they negotiated and contested social power.[412] Ritual feasting on Madagascar played a similar role. As Jane Hooper states:

> By inviting Europeans to feasts that included valuable foods such as freshly slaughtered cattle and white rice, the leaders were consciously asserting their domination and access to supplies of food while also acting as gracious hosts to their guests.[413]

The *banja* at Inhambane was also a politically charged event, but there are important differences to the other forms. The *banja* differed from the Ethiopian multisocial political feast in that it was reserved exclusively for an elite, namely the Tonga chiefs. In the case of the Malagasy feasts between Europeans and chiefs, the Europeans were the guests and Malagasy chiefs were clearly those in power. In the case at Inhambane, it was the local chiefs who were subordinated to the Portuguese, who in turn supplied food, alcohol and gifts. The common denominator of all the feasts, however, is a display of a hierarchy. But as the Tsonga grew in power, the *banja* reinforced an artificial ranking, placing the less powerful Tonga over the formidable Tsonga.

THE PROBLEM OF ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY AS OUTSIDERS

The Portuguese had two ways of stamping their authority onto the hinterland in order to advance their primary goal of turning a profit. The first was, as we have seen,

[412] J Fleisher, 'Rituals of Consumption and the Politics of Feasting on the Eastern African Coast, AD 700-1500', *Journal of World Prehistory* 23 (2010): 195-217, 195.

[413] J Hooper, *Feeding Globalization: Madagascar and the Provisioning Trade, 1600-1800* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017), 123.

securing loyal allies for the trading post through the *saguate* payment, thereby creating Portuguese authority by proxy. The other way of asserting the trading post's rule was through military force carried out by the garrison. The garrison consisted of a troop, usually of 40 to 50 men, armed with muskets and at least one cannon, which enacted the salutary displays of bloodshed and destruction. The troop and their weapons, in the words of one commentator, 'produce[d] respect' for the town.[414] The power of theatre and spectacle of, albeit sporadic, military expeditions executed by soldiers dressed in black served, not always successfully, to intimidate and coerce surrounding chiefs.

In 1810, Governor Caminha articulated the importance of a garrison clothed in uniforms to maintain authority. He was concerned that the lack of uniforms and shoes undermined the authority of his military personnel.[415] Given the high status of wearing cloth, or clothes, it is no surprise that uniformed troops were respected. The uniforms were cut from black cloth, called *zuartes*.[416] Societies around Inhambane and further afield likely associated black cloth with the relatively powerful, musket-toting military, and is a possible explanation why black cloth became so desirable as a symbol of power at Inhambane as well as further inland.[417] In fact, by the early nineteenth century, Governor de Carvalho writes that he needed nine to ten thousand cloths, mostly black.[418] Black cloth had the equivalent buying power as the

[414] AHU Moç CU, Cx 132 d. 24, Governor José Joaquim Felipe Caminha to the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 10 April 1810.

[415] Ibid.

[416] Ibid.

[417] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 49, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 18 March 1813.

[418] Ibid.

prized hoes imported from Sena, which 'sold very quickly'.[419] Eventually black cloth became so desirable in the interior that Inhambane's townspeople were unable to buy ivory without it.[420]

Baptised Tonga men made up most of the garrison, a circumstance that raised doubts for Governor de Matos over their efficacy in the battlefield. He was concerned about the lack of Portuguese recruits. Not being European made the soldiers, in his view, 'incapable', which could be a liability in the chaos of action.[421] He requested the capital, Mozambique Island, to send 'proper' Portuguese not only to fill the garrison but also 'to circulate' in the interior, so increasing Portuguese presence there.[422]

But with or without uniforms and with or without 'proper' Portuguese troops, the tiny garrison was hardly capable of enforcing Portuguese control over the vast interior of Inhambane. So, at times, its numbers were augmented by the odd ship's crew or by employing *manamazes*.[423] In 1762, when the *Miguel o Anjo* was at anchor, the captain generously offered his crew to help 'punish' the Indo-Muslims, who were encroaching on the trading post's commerce. Governor de Matos gathered *manamazes*, his garrison, and the ship's crew to strike at chief Conguio, being an Indo-Muslim collaborator. But by far the most effective way of establishing sporadic

[419] AHU Moç CU, Cx 146 d. 36, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 25 March 1814.

[420] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 49, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 18 March 1813.

[421] AHU Moç CU, Cx 54 d. 13, Municipal Council of Inhambane, 14 June 1787.

[422] Ibid.

[423] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 11, Captain and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 27 March, 1762.

military leverage was to augment the garrison with local warriors of chiefs loyal to the trading post. Governor de Carvalho's expedition in 1815 is a telling example.

His operation was a massive undertaking in a territory a significant distance to the north, a situation that Governors generally avoided. But in this instance the Portuguese army would eventually execute military operations as far as the vicinity of Vilanculos.[424] The army of about 200 men, armed with rifles and bow and arrows, needed 120 porters to carry the food, equipment and ammunition for this mission.

A Tsonga chief and trade ally, Makwakwa, made a large force available to de Carvalho when he needed to oust the powerful group known as Tevim, who obstructed the post's trade. To get rid of this thorn in his flesh, the Governor summoned chief Makwakwa and his political network by sending gifts. Subsequent to a conference, they provided warriors for his expedition.[425] In April 1814, over the course of 30 days, and assisted by two columns of Makwakwa's men and those of his political network, the Portuguese laid waste to the land south of modern-day Vilanculos.

In the remorseless march from village to village, the army covered 166 kilometres as it devastated villages, crops and herds, and drove people out of the countryside,

[424] AHU Moç CU, Cx 148 d. 71, Governor of Inhambane, Caetano Serejo de Carvalho, to the Captain-General and Governor of Mozambique Island, 19 July 1815. The reason for this deduction is the mention of camping at a lake some distance from the 'Aruores' or Bazaruto Islands. There are no other islands off the coast between Inhambane and Vilanculos.

[425] AHU Moç CU, Cx, 146 d. 105, Governor of Inhambane, Caetano Serejo de Carvalho to the Captain-General and Governor of Mozambique Island, 24 July 1814.

conquering the territory of Tevim.[426] In the end, the Governor oversaw a scorched earth policy that covered about 926 square kilometres, set 4 000 fires and burnt down 285 villages.[427] The success of the expedition of 1814 would have been impossible without chief Makwakwa's warriors. The fact that de Carvalho's ally was Tsonga and not Tonga, also attests to the dominance of Tswa Tsonga influence in Inhambane's trade during the nineteenth century.

LANDINS SET THEIR SIGHTS ON INHAMBANE

From the 1730s, the first wave of Landins – the collective term used by the Portuguese for Dzivi and Tswa Tsonga – approached Inhambane, just after the Portuguese had established a permanent trading post in 1729.[428] A second period of movement in the latter half of the eighteenth century correlates with French slaving activities on the east coast of Africa, that most likely included Inhambane.[429] The 'heyday' of the French slave trading during the eighteenth century in east Africa (1785-1794) concurred with increased conflict between Tonga and Landin groups around the town.[430]


[426] AHU Moç CU, Cx 148 d. 71, Governor of Inhambane, Caetano Serejo de Carvalho, to the Captain-General and Governor of Mozambique Island 19 July 1815.

[427] AHU Moç CU, Cx 148 d. 71, Governor of Inhambane, Caetano Serejo de Carvalho, to the Captain-General and Governor of Mozambique Island, 19 July 1815.

[428] Smith, 'The Struggle', 117. Chapter Four of Smith's dissertation, titled 'Southern Mozambique in the Eighteenth Century: The Tsonga Invasion of Inhambane', gives a detailed account of Tsonga migration into Inhambane's interior.

[429] Alpers, 'The French Slave Trade', 82.

[430] Ibid.



Map of Inhambane in the 1810s

Alan Smith explains the expansion of the Landins as based on the fission of family groups, gradually moving into the interior.[431] But the correlation between these waves of expansion with their concomitant violence, and the expansion of trade at Inhambane, cannot be ignored. As shown above, the Portuguese decision to settle at Inhambane was in response to the threat to trade by the Dutch intrusion. This was

[431] Smith, 'The Struggle', 128.

not their only reason for the urgency behind founding a trading post. The growing and profitable Indo-Muslim business that had developed over a generation and was ripe for the picking, is an overlooked element in the telling of Inhambane's history. So, the arrival of the Indo-Muslims, who distributed copious amounts of cloth at the end of the seventeenth century, was probably part of the pull factors of earlier Landin migrations into the region.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, a Tswa chief named Bila (also known as Vilanculos, Bila Nkulu) dominated the economy of Inhambane.[432] He regularly sent his '*manacumates*' (also spelt *macomates*) to the trading post.[433] The *macomates* correspond to the Chopi group, who were from the Limpopo Valley, and were clearly the middlemen between the Tsonga chief and the suppliers from the rich elephant hunting grounds beyond the Lebombo Mountains.[434] The *macomates* acted as traders, emissaries and ambassadors for Bila. Bila's location and influence over the flow of ivory and dominance of the market enabled him to monopolise the trade. Governor António Correia Monteiro de Matos advised Mozambique Island that it was prudent to keep friendly relations with Bila, even if it was costly.[435] But between 1759 and 1762, a Dzivi chief, Macia (Masiye), intolerant of Bila's dominance, led offensives to drive him out.[436] From the end of the 1760s, Masiye would remain in command of the flow of goods.[437]

[432] Liesegang, 'O Sul', 9, 10.

[433] AHU Codíce 1310, f. 166, 20 November 1755.

[434] Smith, 'The Peoples', 568.

[435] AHU Codíce 1310, f. 166, 20 November 1755.

[436] Rita-Ferreira, *Presença*, 76. The Dzivi, also referred to as Matives, Modives or Mazives, were a Sotho group that moved from Mpumalanga during the first half of the seventeenth century.

[437] AHU Moç CU, Cx 19 d. 46, Captain-Major and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 28 April 1761.

After defeating Bila, Dzivi chief Masiye settled his homestead where he could carefully monitor the confluence of trade routes from the different regions of the interior.[438] As mentioned previously, this was at the 'mouth of the routes' to the principal trading regions, especially the prime route to Burronga, an ivory trade depot.[439] His homestead formed a terminus for traders from the north east and west interior, and for the Portuguese agents from the coast. His location at the entrance to the hinterland also allowed him to enforce a steep toll on Portuguese traders passing through his territory.

Here he 'extracted the best and most important goods', probably to trade to Indo-Muslim agents who were settled nearby.[440] These years of war between Bila and Masiye had a serious impact on the trading post because long-standing trade connections through Bila were lost. As a result, the Portuguese had to turn to other chiefs willing to offer their territories as springboards into the interior and offer a stable alliance.

As we have seen, alliances with some Tonga chiefs through the *banja* disrupted the established political hierarchy of Inhambane. Before the Tsonga, the previous prevailing political order was relatively simple. The Tonga were the predominant trading partners of the Portuguese, and their society was relatively stable. But the

[438] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 45, Captain-Major and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 3 June 1760.

[439] AHU Moç CU, Cx 29 d. 8, Captain-Major and Factor of Inhambane, João da Costa Xavier, to the Captain-General and Governor of Mozambique Island, 15 May 1769.

[440] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 45, Captain-Major and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 3 June 1760: 'extraiam os melhores e mais importantes dos mesmos generos'; Cx 19 d. 46.

Tswa and Dzivi migrations disrupted this relationship. The pull of allegiance into three directions, towards the Portuguese, the Indo-Muslims and the Landin chiefs, besides leading to violent incidents which disrupted trade, put pressure on the loyalty of *mucuzambos* to their *fumos*.

From the 1760s, the Tswa and Dzivi incursions penetrated deep into Tonga territory, both absorbing Tonga villages and establishing new settlements amongst them. Either way, the Tonga had to submit to victorious Tsonga or Dzivi authority. This development upset the Portuguese relationship with the Tonga because the latter were obligated to pay tribute to a Landin chief, which implied primary allegiance. The Tswa chief Cumbana's expansion illustrates this point. He subordinated Tonga *fumos* to his authority, whose allegiance had previously been promised to the Portuguese Crown through the 'smoking' ritual. The Portuguese were likely to have considered the fealty to others as a threat because it potentially undermined their economic foundation and their military strength. But because the Portuguese saw themselves as the ultimate authority around Inhambane, it blinded them to the predicament of many of the Tonga, who were expected to maintain their first allegiance to the trading post. The Portuguese made ineffectual attempts to minimise the influence of Landin chiefs by ordering Tonga chiefs to solve their political dilemmas through either the Governor, or the state translator. But because *fumos* were not bridled autocrats over their headmen, and often helpless in the face of aggressive Tsonga invasions, they found it extremely difficult to minimise the acquiescence of headmen to the belligerent Landins. The Tonga chiefs were militarily weak, unable to protect their subjects, and were incapable of persuading headmen to maintain their loyalty to the Portuguese.

The two headmen, named Muarambo and Bomgo, of the Portuguese ally, chief Chamba, are an example. In the early 1760s, the Dzivi chief Ticane, situated west of Maxixe, overran the expansive and fertile villages of these two men who initially fled.[441] But in the longer term, their dislocation became untenable, and in the absence of any forthcoming material military help from Chamba (or the Portuguese), the two headmen quietly changed their loyalty and agreed to pay tribute to chief Ticane to live in peace. The Portuguese disregard for and ignorance of the nature of African political processes in which loyalty would axiomatically swing to the most powerful chief in the area, explains the surprise of the Governor over the Tonga's quiet acquiescence to the situation while engaging in bartering with Ticane's subjects.[442] The difficulty of the Tonga's easy resignation to Landin chiefs presented the Portuguese with a political problem, with economic consequences. The Tonga allegiance to Landin chiefs drew the former into an Indo-Muslim/Landin trading relationship, undermining Portuguese trade. [443]

The Portuguese encountered the same difficulty in terms of their relationship with the Dzivi. The Dzivi were a preeminent society in Inhambane during the nineteenth century. From the Dzivi point of view, the status of 'smoked' chiefs elevated the Tonga *fumos* above the social standing they deserved. The centralised, cattle-owning, spear-wielding and iron mongering Landins looked down on the Tonga. This

[441] AHU Moç CU, Cx 19 d. 41, Captain-Major and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 27 April 1761.

[442] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 11, Captain-Major and Factor António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 27 March 1762.

[443] AHU Moç CU, Cx 150 d. 24, the Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 2 July 1816.

was because the Tonga were matrilineal, decentralised, and fought with bow and arrow, all characteristics which painted them as inferior in the eyes of the Landins. This perceived inferior status should have disqualified them as the Portuguese's primary allies. According to this paradigm, the lower-status *fumos* were paradoxically part of a select few, and through the *banja* accumulated status-bearing trade items in competition with a Dzivi chief such as Luango – a paradox which in Luango's mind justified action against some Tonga homesteads.

The Dzivi also used the 'smoked' status as a way of causing conflict with impunity. When the Governor Santos Pinto complained to chief Luango about the 'disorder' (conflict) in his territory, Luango was at pains to point out to the Governor that it was a 'smoked' Tonga chief who was causing chaos in the interior. And as this chief 'did not belong to him', that is, was not loyal to him, he had no control over his behaviour, implying the Portuguese responsibility for the interior's disarray.[444] In another case, a 'smoked' chief, Burzulate, in Luango's opinion, revealed a bloated sense of status through his audacity in burning Luango's villages.[445] These examples of blame-shifting were symptomatic of the continual destabilisation of Inhambane territory, since the assertion of power over trade remained a perennial problem. Needless to say, war between chiefs was always bad for business. Conflict led to traders being denied unencumbered passage, and to the confiscation of goods, resulting in a loss

[444] AHU Moç CU, Cx 54 d. 33, the Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 30 June 1787.

[445] AHU Moç CU, Cx 54 d. 29, Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 29 June 1787.

of profit for the trading post. They also apprehended any porters who were viewed as trespassers. Consequently, the flow of ivory to the town stopped.[446]

CHIEFS AND ACCUMULATION

The drive to house depots in respective chiefs' territories shaped the battle lines drawn over trade. The advantage to a chief of housing a warehouse was the opportunity to accumulate goods through tribute paid by both buyers and sellers. Competition over this privilege was likely another motivation for increasing hostilities around Inhambane.

During the early 1760s, Governor de Matos had to engage with hostile forces on two fronts. On the one side was the Tswa chief Injarra, who settled his village in the dense bush south of Inhambane, and made forays into Tonga territory, specifically those Tonga who were loyal to the Portuguese, serving as middlemen for the ivory trade.[447] On the other, Tswa chief Mapamane invaded and drove off the Tonga chief Macumba to gain his *mafurra* trade with the Portuguese.[448]

The Dzivi also strategised to gain control of the exchange of goods. Masiye, his brother Mapamane, and a nephew, Luango, chose to relocate to just beyond Morrumbene, which was a lively point of Indo-Muslim trade. And because Masiye

[446] AHU Moç CU, Cx 132 d. 26, Governor José Joaquim Felipe Caminha to the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 13 April 1810.

[447] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 11, Captain and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 27 March, 1762.

[448] Ibid. *Mafurra* is the valuable oil extracted from the fruit of the tree *Trichila emetica*, or Natal mahogany.

considered all trade – small and large – as his, he spent time 'ravaging' Bugada (the coastline north of Morrumbene). Any transaction done without his involvement incurred his wrath. One could not trade as little as a chicken 'without a thousand hostilities' from Masiye, de Matos wrote.[449] Particularly galling [to de Matos] was Masiye's collaboration with the Indo-Muslims. An Indo-Muslim trader, Cashimbo Daugi, residing with a Dzivi headman, undermined the trading post's trading opportunities by convincing Masiye to apprehend Portuguese traders and tie them up to prevent them from trading. [450]

Perhaps because there had been a lull in the Indo-Muslim trade, Masiye's attitude seems to have changed towards the Portuguese during the early 1760s. He sent an embassy with the customary gift of a tusk to celebrate the arrival of the annual ship. His invitation to trade was clear. There was much ivory in his land, his emissaries declared. Although de Matos described Masiye as 'evil, perverse and full of crimes', the large amount of ivory swayed his decision, and he considered the offer to trade. To prove the point that he was not a man to be trifled with (and so, by extension, Portuguese authority), he displayed the military strength of the trading post to Masiye's ambassadors. In a theatrical show of smoke and fire, coupled with the din of the exploding gunpowder of the garrison's muskets and the ship's cannons, the Governor illustrated the consequences should Masiye break the ground rules of trade.[451]

[449] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 11, Captain and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 27 March 1762.

[450] Ibid.

[451] Ibid.

Chief Conguio's amenable business relationship with the Portuguese came under threat in 1786 when Luango, Masiye's nephew, vigorously attacked the Conguio chiefdom at a nexus of trade routes. It was not a coincidence that the attack came during a period of abundant and profitable trade. According to the Portuguese, Luango's aim was to 'possess the country' and 'freely rob' the territory.[452] Conguio eventually had little choice but to appeal to the authorities at Inhambane to negotiate with Luango to relent in his advance. The Governor at Inhambane had talks with the Dzivi leader, who clearly had 'no respect for the [authority of] the trading post', because regardless of numerous diplomatic interventions, which demanded giving Luango large *saguates* each time, hostilities continued in the valuable territory of Conguio.[453]

Military intervention, by providing Conguio with nine armed soldiers, appeared to be the only option to protect Portuguese prosperity. But Conguio's status as an 'unsmoked' chief disqualified him from the trading post's protection as stipulated by Mozambique Island authorities. The reason for this proviso was a matter of expense, because Mozambique Island had to carry the cost of each military expedition, and by limiting the number of *fumos*, the Governor-General placed a limit on Inhambane's expenditure. Arguing in Conguio's favour, the then Governor, Santos Pinto, supported Conguio's 'smoking' because of his military aid to the previous Governor Joaquim de Araújo.[454]

[452] AHU Moç CU, Cx 51 d. 7, Governor of Inhambane, Teodoro Santos Pinto, to the Governor of Sena, António Manuel de Melo e Castro, 24 June 1786.

[453] Ibid.

[454] And as we have seen, 'smoking' was a formal ritual that would initiate him into the coveted circle of *banja* chiefs.

The request to formalise the trading post's relationship with Conguio was not born out of warm feelings toward the chief, but was a strategic decision based on the mounting threat of the Indo-Muslim network to the trading post's wealth. And as Luango gave the Indo-Muslims increasing favour, the cause of his 'obstinacy and rebellion', he advanced their trade rather than that of the Portuguese.[455] Trading at a profit was challenging at the best of times, even when peace and tranquillity reigned.

Luango had another profitable location in his sights, that of Tonga chief Frevela, located further north, whose homestead was another terminus for goods. The Luango threat was all the more menacing because of his ties to the Indo-Muslim network that supported him in his conquest.[456] The Portuguese tried to stem his advance through negotiation, but again talks with the chief became increasingly expensive because each negotiation had to be opened with a gift, as the abiding custom of negotiation was that it 'was impossible without giving favours [trade goods] each time'.[457] The negotiation with Luango for peace on two fronts, namely the territories of Frevela and Conguio, placed a double burden on the trading post's account and ate away at its profits. Each fresh round of negotiation required yet another request for goods from Mozambique Island, with the Island authorities viewing these constant demands from Inhambane with resentment. But more important was the looming threat of Luango's quest, in collaboration with the Indo-Muslims, to establish a monopoly of Inhambane's trade.

[455] AHU Moç CU, Cx 51 d. 7, Governor of Inhambane, Teodoro Santos Pinto, to the Governor of Sena, António Manuel de Melo e Castro, 24 June 1786.

[456] Ibid.

[457] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 49, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 18 March 1813.

The Portuguese /Indo-Muslim enmity spilt into the interior where Portuguese agents were robbed. By 1768, the high level of theft in the interior, by both black and Indo-Muslim people, motivated the Governor-General to place a prohibition on carrying goods to trade posts set in the hinterland where the Portuguese force could neither 'defend nor protect' their interests.[458] Merchants, trading on their own account, bypassed this law by furtively sending their own blacks, probably slaves, or else paid agents to trade in the interior. The agents travelled at night to avoid official detection, and waited for those from the interior to meet them. Local townspeople and peripatetic merchants had little concern for the interest or the profits of the State, and continued furtive trading. In 1768, in desperation, and to deter the habit of nocturnal trade, the Governor flogged two of these black agents.[459] The same circumstance persisted into the nineteenth century. In 1813, two residents of Inhambane, at a time when little ivory came to the post, took goods into the interior to trade with the Dzivi. But as usual the price was higher there than at the trading post, and for all their effort, and despite buying 120 kg of ivory, the Governor imprisoned them for disobedience on top of giving too much cloth per tusk.[460] The higher number of cloths given in exchange put pressure on State resources by raising the expectations of being given more for less in the interior. This practice of disobedience often had damaging economic consequences for the trading post. Losing trading goods meant that agents could not buy merchandise, and left merchants unable to satisfy creditors on Mozambique Island.

[458] AHU Moç CU, Cx 39 d. 62; an order of the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Pedro Saldanha de Albuquerque, 24 September 1782.

[459] AHU Moç CU, Cx 28 d. 49, 29 May 1768.

[460] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 65, the Governor of Inhambane, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 27 March 1813.

Trying to persuade those from the interior to approach the coast proved to be a challenge. This was because these sellers did not want to carry the cost of tribute demanded by chiefs en route, and so refused to draw near to the coast. But by not sending goods into the bush, the Portuguese lost connections to the interior and therefore lost touch with the market.[461] In 1768, Governor de Melo lamented the loss of opportunity because of the abundance of ivory available that year.[462]

Chief Masiye also found the Governor-General's prohibition vexing, because the lack of goods reflected on his status, and he urgently sent word to de Melo to allow goods [to be] carried into the interior. The Governor refused. Masiye's son then sent a tusk to open negotiations. Again, the Governor refused. Masiye responded with an ultimatum. If the Governor did not allow goods into the interior, he would ban the purchase of food for the trading post at Morrumbene. The Governor, resolute in his obedience to the law, returned the tusk that accompanied the message and withdrew from Morrumbene. This circumstance placed the Governor in a predicament. The only way to resolve the situation was through battle, and so he sent 40 to 50 men to punish Masiye for his threat to prohibit food sales. The scenario above was not an exception; the sources are replete with punishments through expeditions.[463] Yet Portuguese influence over chiefs remained tenuous. They could only maintain some leverage through sporadic shows of military power, which were not always successful, and the Portuguese were never fully in control of the entire hinterland. And from the evidence, it is clear that the Portuguese were only as strong as their

[461] AHU Moç CU, Cx 28 d. 49, the Governor of Inhambane, António José de Melo, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Baltasar Manuel Pereira do Lago, 29 May 1768.

[462] Ibid.

[463] The earliest expedition of its kind was the force sent from Sofala to punish those at Inhambane who traded with the Dutch in 1727.

alliances with chiefs loyal to them. Mutual military help, and most importantly the distribution of goods to chiefs who in turn redistributed these to strengthen their own political networks, formed the basis of these alliances. From the nineteenth century, new opportunities for the trading post opened up.

TRADING WITH SOCIETIES IN THE WEST OF THE LIMPOPO

Perhaps because of the difficulties of trading with the Dzivi, the trading post turned its attention to the south, where the Tswa chief Makwakwa resided. During the 1810s, Makwakwa persuaded the Governor, Caetano José Serejo Carvalho, of the value of the trade west of the Limpopo.[464] Because of the potential economic benefits of an alliance with Makwakwa, Carvalho came to the aid of the chief who was under attack by the Tonga chief Inhamussa. Inhamussa was another contender for control over trade. While the Portuguese might have welcomed Inhammussa's attacks for producing slaves in the past, by this time the Governor and the townspeople at Inhambane were anxious to tap into the riches of the western interior: 'copper, an abundance of iron, ivory and gold'.[465] They reasoned that by providing this assistance to Makwakwa, they would gain him as their ally and could therefore tap into the connections he had beyond the Limpopo River. The Portuguese also believed that a show of military strength would gain them influence and respect in the world beyond the river.[466]

[464] Inhambane's orientation to the Limpopo River is east/west due to its curvature to the southeast.

[465] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 40, the Governor of Inhambane, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 12 March 1813.

[466] Ibid.

The Mkwakwa were part of the Nwanati, also known as Makhambane, who had moved closer to Inhambane from either the area of Lydenburg (Mashishing), or the lower Limpopo basin some time during the eighteenth century.[467] It is more likely that Mashishing and the lower Limpopo basin were on the migratory path of the Makhambane, as they migrated from Feca westwards (more on Feca later).[468] The other half of the Nwanati/Makhambane group were the Maluleke. The Maluleke strongly identified as hunters.[469] They describe their ancestors as 'great hunters', which finds a parallel in the description of the Venda, who in turn called their ancestors elephant hunters.[470] And as the Maluleke and Nwanati/Makhambane were related, it explains Makwakwa's ability to secure access to trade routes into the deeper interior, especially those to the ivory fields beyond the Lubombo, through his Nwanati peers.

The interaction between Makwakwa and the Portuguese was, however, not new.
At first, another Tswa chief, Boane, appears to have been an intermediary between Makwakwa and the Portuguese.[471] This situation gradually changed as the Governor and Makwakwa became mutually supportive in times of danger, coupled with the Governor's prompt and abundant presents in thanks. One of these gifts was a *cabaia*. This garment was a wide-sleeved shirt, open on the sides. Makwakwa

[467] Liesegang, 'O Sul',13.

[468] *Ibid*.

[469] A Ekblom, M Notelid, R Witter, 'Negotiating Identity and Heritage through Authorised Vernacular History, Limpopo National Park', *Journal of Social Archaeology* 17, 1 (2017): 49-68, 58.

[470] Ibid., 58; HA Junod, *The Life*, *vol.* I, 22.

[471] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 40, the Governor of Inhambane, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 12 March 1813.

ordered one in a 'rich, heavy, blue (silk or linen) damask'.[472] This sartorial choice pronounced Makwakwa as a very important person within the local political and economic network, linked to a distant place named Feca, which the Governor was eager to exploit.

Gerhard Liesegang talks about a geographical area called Vecha, which appears to be the same as Feca. He describes the area as lying in a mountainous area between the Limpopo and the Nwenya (Crocodile) Rivers[473], placing the location of Feca in the heartland of the Pedi kingdom. The origin of the Makwakwa from Nkuweni-wa-Mbingadzi, referring to the Lydenburg district, further strengthens the connection to the Pedi kingdom.[474] Finally, the term Bvexa, corresponding to Feca/Vecha, is the Xitonga name for the Sotho.[475] And because the Mkwakwa chief's ancestors came from Feca, this explains his connections to the Pedi west of the Limpopo.[476]

Governor Carvalho's eagerness to link Inhambane to Feca prompted his three requests to Mozambique Island for a large shipment of rum and butter in as many months. These goods, he explained, were sure to open the route to this territory. The Governor proposed trade relations with Feca to the Governor-General on the basis

[472] AHU Moç CU, Cx 146 d. 105, Governor of Inhambane, Caetano Serejo de Carvalho, to the Captain-General and Governor of Mozambique Island, 24 July 1814.

[473] Liesegang, 'O Sul', 13. The Maroteng Pedi kingdom reached the height of its power and prestige under Thulare from the end of the eighteenth century. His armies raided north into the Zoutpansberg, west as far as Rustenburg, and south all the way to the Vaal River. The Pedi played a prominent intermediary role between metal producing societies in the lowveld and societies to the east and west. See Delius, *The Land Belongs*, 15, 17.

[474] Liesegang, 'O Sul', 13; MD Mathebula, 'Genealogy and the Migration of the VA Ka Valoyi People of the Limpopo Province, South Africa' (PhD thesis, University of Limpopo, 2018), 82.

[475] MD Mathebula, 'Genealogy', 82.

[476] Liesegang, 'O Sul', 13

of the guaranteed safety of agents and their goods. Once the shipment arrived, an expedition led by retired Lieutenant Colonel Rogue Jose Gracia, a Goan, delivered the gift. The most likely motivation for Makwakwa's willingness to divulge the wealth of a territory beyond his own, was to gain wealth and prestige as a middleman. The relative military strength the Portuguese brought to the table broadened his power base in the area, an asset he needed to bring his rebellious nephew, who had come together with Inhamussa, into submission.[477]

Over time, de Carvalho deepened his relationship with Makwakwa. By the time his successor, Luis Correia Monteiro de Matos, had taken over as Governor, the ties between Inhambane and Mkwakwa were well-established. Makwakwa had become a demonstrably reliable ally of the trading post. The mutual military assistance and open trade between the two localities formed the basis of the contract between the trading post and the chief. The Portuguese promised to lend their arms and men to any war Makwakwa needed to fight, while in turn Makwakwa pledged his protection of merchants and their goods along the way, as well as warriors to repel Inhambane's enemies. Chief Cumbana was just such an enemy who closed the routes traversing his territory to the Dongue traders and killed trespassers on sight.[478] The Dongues (probably the Djongas), were from the south of the Olifants River.[479] They brought cattle, chickens, wax, oil, honey, and wooden bowls and

[477] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 40, the Governor of Inhambane, Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and the Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 12 March 1813.

[478] AHU Moç CU, Cx 150 d. 52, the Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, 4 July 1816.

[479] HA Junod, 'The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal', *South African Association for the Advancement of Science* 3 (1905): 229-231, 224, 242.

wooden grain stampers for sale.[480] Cumbana's obstructive behaviour and complete disregard for Portuguese authority made his punishment essential [for them].[481] With Makwakwa's help, the Portuguese troops attacked Cumbana with great success.

An illustration of the reciprocal nature of the Portuguese-Makwakwa relationship occurred in late-March 1813, when another embassy from Makwakwa arrived. This time he wanted help against a recalcitrant uncle who had been giving him trouble for twenty years. Carvalho promised assistance on condition that he sold the town 80 head of cattle and 200 gourds of butter at a reasonable price, while reiterating his usual request to secure the trade routes. Gifts for war flowed both ways.

Another important aspect of the relationship with Makwakwa was the protection and support he gave to the *patamares* (messengers) who operated overland between Delagoa Bay and Inhambane. He fed them and gave the runners an escort through the bush. Not only did he lend these men support, he did so without demanding payment, indicative of the goodwill existing between the trading post and the chief.

Announcing the arrival of the annual ship to the people of the interior was Makwakwa's responsibility. As soon as he had received five tusks, the customary gifts as part of a diplomatic mission, serving as a sign of the ship's arrival, he made the message known far and wide, which encouraged the delivery of goods from the

[480] AHU Moç CU, Cx 150 d. 52, the Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, 5 April, 1816.

[481] Ibid.

interior.[482] As we have seen above, he had links to the kingdom of Feca, which was the source of metals and ivory, and it appears slaves too.[483] Makwakwa became the main source of ivory and slaves, generated from west of the Limpopo River.[484]

THE SLAVE TRADE AT INHAMBANE DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The sources on the slave trade at Inhambane are scanty and fragmented. It is also the nature of the sources that is responsible for the vague designations of 'Portuguese', 'Indo-Muslims' and 'English' involved in the slave trade here. That there was a significant slave trade at Inhambane for the French and Brazilian trade is clear.[485] How and from where exactly the slaves for its market were obtained is far more obscure. Slaves for the trade were generally bought by agents for coastal merchants, or kidnapped.

The Portuguese documents between 1760 and 1833 seldom refer to the process of slavery at Inhambane directly, yet slavery was part of the backdrop at Inhambane during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The most evocative suggestion of the slave trade here by Indo-Muslims was the Moorish stone fort on the coast, in the

[482] AHU Moç CU, Cx 146 d. 105, Governor of Inhambane, Caetano Serejo de Carvalho, to the Captain-General and Governor of Mozambique Island, 24 July 1814.

[483] AHU Moç CU, Cx 148 d. 85, Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, 22 July 1815.

[484]Ibid.

[485] Capela, Medeiros, *O Tráfico de Escravos,* 19.

territory of Maguema, of which very little is known.[486] Unfortunately, there is as yet no further evidence around the details of this fort.

The culture of slavery pervaded life at Inhambane. This pervasion is evident by the random enslavement of people. In the context of the normalisation of slavery, it appears that anyone could arbitrarily claim ownership over another. For instance, a person could be given in recompense for the loss of goods, even when he or those around him were not directly responsible for the theft. A man – a son of a chief and an agent – went into the interior to trade with a few goods. He was robbed, and to appease his creditors he convinced his father to relinquish a mulatto and one of his own sons as slaves.[487]

In another incident, in the early nineteenth century, a Muslim woman, named Aiça, bought a woman from the Governor for 70 *panos*. Slaves were typically bought in the interior for eight *panos*, and the elevated price of almost ten times as much might have indicated her beauty. Aiça took her home as a free woman, most likely as a servant. She became enslaved when Aiça's father impregnated her 'in the mother's house'.[488] This unfortunate and unnamed woman later died in childbirth.

Other proof of slavery at the port was the ongoing negotiation with chiefs to free fugitive slaves. The townspeople had trouble holding onto slaves, who frequently

[486] AHU Moç CU, Cx 21 d. 63, Captain and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, 22 June 1762.

[487] AHU Moç CU, Cx 143 d. 72, Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, 31 March 1813.

[488] Ibid.

escaped and found refuge in nearby villages. One such village was that of Mutemana. Another village of refuge belonged to Zanguza pequeno.[489] Needless to say, the Portuguese expected any chief to return these refugees, and fully expected to exchange them for some goods, an expectation which was often disappointed. Sizeable numbers of refugees presented an opportunity for some to gain independence. A brother of Mutemana took 148 slave refugees and made off with them, establishing a homestead of his own.[490] Zanguza pequeno was willing to return Inhambane's slaves, but at what was then considered outrageous terms of exchange. He demanded 30 *panos* and a flask of wine for each slave returned.[491]

THE FRENCH SLAVE TRADE AT INHAMBANE

Slaves became a major economic factor in east Africa 'until well into the eighteenth century'.[492] French traders in search of slaves were from the Mascarenes, who were the first to 'never [seek] ivory'.[493] This is an important point, because it shows the French commercial interest in slaves alone, despite the scant documentary evidence for the French slave trade for the late eighteenth century period. It is therefore likely that any evidence of French trading indicated their demand for slaves. The documentary evidence for a French presence exists in snippets of information. By

[489] AHU Moç CU, Cx 148 d. 72, Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, 20 July 1815.

[490] AHU Moç CU, CX 143 d. 54, Governor Caetano José Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 22 March 1813.

[491] AHU Moç CU, Cx 148 d. 72, Governor of Inhambane, Caetano Serejo de Carvalho, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique, 20 July 1815.

[492] Alpers, 'The French Slave Trade', 82.

[493] Ibid.

the 1780s, the French trade with chiefs along the coast threatened Inhambane's trading post's own trade.[494] The admonition issued to local chiefs verified the level of threat perceived by the trading post. They were warned at the *banja* not to allow *Mafutres* (the local term for the French) to trade on their beaches, or else be punished as 'traitors of the Crown'.[495] Oblique evidence for French presence on this part of the coast lies in Governor Santos Pinto's salvage of bits and pieces of rope, some chain and two anchors – all useful to the trade post – from a French shipwreck off the Inhambane shoreline.[496] And in June 1788, a French ship's captain asked for two anchors from the annual ship, *Josè de Sousa a Brittos*, testament to French activity along Inhambane's shoreline.

The most compelling evidence, however, for French slaving activity at Inhambane, was the rudimentary settlement they initiated. The location of this settlement at Morrumbene is telling because it was a dynamic point of exchange at the centre of the Indo-Muslim trade, and marked the end of the route into the interior that went beyond the Limpopo River.[497] Here some French had cleared a space, hoisted the French flag and erected accommodation for 53 itinerant traders.[498] During the 1810s,

[494] Capel and Medeiros argue that by the end of the eighteenth century, there was an 'intense and growing demand' for slaves on the Mascarenes, i.e. Bourbon (Reunion) and Ile de France (Mauritius) Islands. See Capela, Medeiros, *O Tráfico de Escravos*, 19, 20.

[495] Teixeira, 'A Fundação', 38.

[496] AHU Moç CU, Cx 54 d. 39, receipt of a delivery to the trading post of Inhambane by the interim Governor, Teodoro Santos Pinto, 31 June 1787.

[497] AHU Moç CU, Cx 132 d. 27, João Santos Pinto, Governor-General of Mozambique, 16 April 1810.

[498] AHU CU Moç Cx 54 d. 28, Governor of Inhambane, Luís Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Meneses, 28 June 1787.

a significant number of slave traders operated in the interior.[499] The French clearly wanted to establish their sovereignty there, to take advantage of the supply of slaves available from the interior.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the foreign competition for the slave trade had grown to such an extent that it alarmed the Governor. So in 1788 the Governor recommended that they should build a small wooden fort, protected by cannons, on the small island of Mafurrene to ward off armed foreign ships approaching to trade.[500] It was not only French ships that came slave trading. Inhambane's slave supply was attracting other slavers' attention. A skirmish between Indo-Muslims and English sailors over the slave trade occurred on Muguma's beach.[501] By the turn of the century there was a hint of Americans joining the trade. For example, in 1807, James William required 80 slaves and was willing to pay 150 silver coin per slave.[502] While there is no evidence for William purchasing slaves, the availability of slaves for sale is evident.

It is likely that increasing levels of slavery had wider effects. Newitt states that prolonged drought produced 'warfare, endemic banditry and mass migrations', but he does not consider the extent to which slavery contributed to this state of affairs.

[499] AHU CU Moç Cx 131 d. 124, Governor of Inhambane, José Joaquim Felipe Caminha, to Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, António Manuel de Melo Castro e Mendonça, 23 March 1810.

[500] AHU CU Moç Codíce 134, 9 January 1788. Mafurrene, closer to Morrumbene than the Inhambane fort, would have been strategically placed to monitor the Morrumbene coast and ward off foreign ships approaching to trade.

[501] AHU CU Moç Cx 23 d. 44, Captain and Factor of Inhambane, António Correia Monteiro de Matos, to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 24 May 1763.

[502] AHU CU Moç Cx 120 d. 89, João Santos Pinto to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 20 September 1807.

[503] The scorched earth policy of Inhamussa, which set people on the run and left them destitute, was perfect fodder for slavery. Comparative evidence shows how slave raiding had a 'calamitous impact' on catchment areas and reduced once prosperous, cattle-filled and populous regions to desolate spaces. We also have evidence of the case of English slave raiders who brought desolation to a fertile, cultivated village near Inhambane.[504]

Evidence also exists of the slave trade becoming the primary pursuit of traders and their agents, who persistently neglected cultivation. Governor João Santos Pinto highlighted the problem of famine in 1807, when he lamented the unwillingness of the residents of Inhambane and the surrounding inhabitants to engage in agriculture.[505] But the failure of the larger population of Inhambane neglecting to plant sorghum and 'other produce' may also have been a consequence of a lucrative slave trade, as suggested by Governor Pinto's statement that it would be 'better to have a smaller slave traffic and eat well'.[506]

While the details of slavery at Inhambane are either absent or hazy, the extant evidence poses tantalising questions. For example, it poses questions around the role of chiefs in slavery, and their willingness to provide refugee [status] to fugitives; as well as the function of slaves in challenging a political hierarchy, either as a

[503] M Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique, 1823-1831', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, 1 (1988): 15-35, 18.

[504] R Segal, *Islam's Black Slaves: The Other Diaspora* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 151, 152.

[505] AHU CU Moç Cx 120 d. 89, João Santos Pinto to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 20 September 1807.

[506] Ibid.

source of wealth accumulation or a pool of ready-made subjects to establish individual independence. In any case, the slave trade of Inhambane deserves further investigation.

CONCLUSION

Inhambane was a link in the trade circuit, connecting the south and northwest to the Indian Ocean trade network. While ostensibly an official Portuguese port, it was a profitable location for personal trade, to the detriment of the State. But success in trade was contingent on establishing and maintaining beneficial relationships with the Tonga chiefs. Tswa Tsonga and Dzivi invasions absorbed a proportion of Tonga as subjects and challenged these relationships, turning Tonga allegiance to the Landins who were Indo-Muslim partners, increasingly influential in the economic sphere. The competition among chiefs to gain a monopoly of trade echoed the Portuguese Indo-Muslim conflict. For the Portuguese and Indo-Muslims, such a monopoly brought higher profits, while for the Tonga and Landins it promised greater political influence through the accumulation of subjects and through distributing largesse. While the Inhambane trade was initially an ivory trade, it is likely that the slave trade quickly gained momentum from the late eighteenth century. The role of Tswa chief Makwakwa as middleman for the ivory trade and slave trade, suggests that societies beyond the Lubombo also experienced violent upheavals. The Dzivi expansionist policy to gain command of the various warehouses, too, should be considered against the wider backdrop of increasing slavery, accelerated by the French slave trade. This question is explored more fully in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSES TO THE DEMANDS OF TRADE IN THE SOUTHERN HINTERLAND OF DELAGOA BAY, 1757-1820s

This chapter will show how trade goods influenced societies to the south of [Delagoa Bay], socially and politically. This influence specifically affected the Tembe adjacent to the Bay, and the northern Nguni further south beyond the Lubombo Mountains, where a process of military and political centralisation was unfolding. In the past, historians have suggested a range of factors contributing to these processes, including trade. But the nature and the role of trade has been poorly understood. Fresh evidence has provided a much fuller account of how the mechanism of trade from Delagoa Bay worked.

As noted in the first chapter, the English country trade, and later the Austrians', penetrated further south than the previous Portuguese trade ever had. From 1777, the reason for the far geographical reach of the Austrian trade was the use of longboats to collect goods upriver. The use of longboats was an important innovation because it pushed the centre of trade away from the coast and into the southern interior. Thus over half of the Austrian trade occurred in the upper reaches of the Maputo River. In this region, the Maputo chief was an important middleman for the northern Nguni trade and, as Andre Pollet, the commander of the trading post commented, the Maputo 'secures our communication with the Nguni'.[507] The trade between the Austrians and the northern Nguni was mutually beneficial. Through the ample supply of brass neck and arm rings, items especially in demand in the south,

[507] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 141.

apparent in the sample inventories drawn up by the Austrian station commander, the Austrians were heavily invested in the northern Nguni trade ivory trade.[508]

Tembe chief Mangobe was the self-proclaimed 'most important merchant of amber and ivory'.[509] The shift in the volume of trade so far inland was a likely motivation for his relocation closer to the market. Consequently, Mangobe became the first Tembe chief to live so far to the south, in the area of present-day Changalane.[510] To keep control over the vast southern hinterland, he installed his sons in the north and southeast. Nkupo II had the northern province, stretching from the southern shores of the Bay, Mabhanyele was stationed at the new capital, while Maputo settled in the area southeast of the Maputo River.[511] The last son, Ndumu, was situated west of the Maputo River.[512] The relocation of the Tembe capital, eventually and effectively divided this society into northern and southern groupings, with the southern Tembe represented by Mabhanyele, Maputo and Ndumu. The southern clan rose into ascendance under Maputo after the northern Tembe's chief Muhari had succeeded Nkupo II.[513] The southern Tembe kingdom assumed the name Maputo, while the north retained the name Tembe. And because of their independence from Tembe, Maputo and his brother Mabhanyele concluded their own contracts with the Austrians, independent of Tembe Muhari, who continued to claim nominal chiefship

[508] J Gump, 'Ecological Change and Pre-Shakan State Formation', *African Economic History* 18 (1989): 55-7, 134.

[509] Theal, *RSEA*, vol. VI, 477.

[510] I've derived this location from information given in M Mathebula, 'Some Notes on the Early History of the Tembe, 1280 AD-1800 AD', *New Contree*, 78 (2017): 42-57.

[511] Maputo was also known as Mabhudu, and Mapanielle as Mbhanyele.

[512] Mathebula, 'Some Notes', 51.

[513] Ibid., 54. The reason for Muhari's diminishing status was probably due to being too far removed from the southern Tembe in bloodline.

over the two brothers. The Austrians traded through these two sons of Mangobe, and depended on these men as middlemen between themselves and the northern Nguni.[514]

That Mabhanyele and Maputo continued to grow in power after their father died in 1760, suggests that their political strength grew out of the hinterland trade relationships. The Maputo trade included, but was not limited to, the exchange of European beads, brass goods, and cloth, in exchange for ivory, cattle, sheep, shields and mats with neighbouring societies.[515] As discussed in the previous chapter on Delagoa Bay, the Portuguese expelled the Austrians in 1781, and the private *Sociedade dos Negiociantes* replaced the lucrative Austrian trade. Their charter expired in 1787, after which the trade tempo faltered, because trade passed into the hands of the authorities on Mozambique Island. Consequently the supply and quality of goods diminished. Trade came to a complete stop for three years after 1796, when the French expelled the Portuguese from the Bay. By this time the drought, known as the Mahlathule, had gripped the region for two years.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DROUGHT AND TRADE

Drought and environmental degradation have often been cited as reasons for the collapse of states. Yet drawing on the patterns of abandonment of Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe, the declines of which scholars such as Innocent Pikirayi have delineated, it is possible to see the link beyond drought to the eventual evacuation of these trading sites. Some argue that both trading centres, occupied by agro-

[514] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 141, f. 50.

[515] Ibid., 142.

pastoralists which supported an elite, succumbed to environmental changes, possibly leading to their demise.[516] But this hypothesis has been challenged in relation to Mapungubwe.[517] A more feasible argument for Mapungubwe's downfall was the shift in trade routes further north. As for Great Zimbabwe, the reason for its decline lies in the 'diffuse, individual participation in gold mining and trade, which undermined the state's political power', again a link to trade rather than drought.[518] In both cases, rerouting of trade necessitated the consequent departure of Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe's elite, in part because of their dependence, like those at Delagoa Bay during the eighteenth century, on exotic goods besides cattle to sustain their followings through the redistribution of prestige items.[519]

Historians have also drawn a connection between drought and state formation in southeast Africa, saying that drought necessitated centralisation for the sake of defence. To this end, historian Jeff Guy argued that the ecological crisis produced the need for cohesion within Nguni groups to mobilise labour for production and defence against external enemies and the 'starving marauders, [who] tried to seize

[516] TG O'Conner, GA Kiker, 'Collapse of the Mapungubwe Society: Vulnerability of Pastoralism to Increasing Aridity', *Climatic Change* 66 (2004): 49-66; JH Bannerman, 'Ecological and Other Factors in the Rise and Fall of the Zimbabwe State' (conference paper, University of Zimbabwe, 23-27 August 1982); PS Garlake, *Great Zimbabwe: Described and Explained* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1982); PJJ Sinclair, 'Chibuene: An Early Trading Site in Southern Mozambique', *Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde* 28 (1982): 149-64.

[517] Brown, Hay, Schoeman, *Mapungubwe Reconsidered,* 32.

[518] I Pikirayi, 'The Demise of Great Zimbabwe, AD 1420-1150: An Environmental Re-appraisal', in A Green, R Leech (eds), *Cities in the World, 1500-2000* (London: Routledge, 2018), 10.

[519] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa'. For a more general argument on this point, see Delius, *The Land Belongs,* 18.

food stores'.[520] Therefore centralisation, he posits, rose out of competition for and conflict over food, and compelled the need to protect villages' grain stores, which then required social coherence in societies under environmental pressure. On the other hand, literary historian Dan Wylie characterised drought by the breakdown of social, political and economic institutions, and not their cohesion.[521] Charles Ballard echoes the notion of social disintegration as a consequence of the severe and prolonged drought, which accompanied by warfare, raiding, migration, and cannibalism, led to political and economic centralisation.[522] Ballard and Guy's association of climatic crisis with political cohesion contradicts an accompanying phenomenon posed as a consequence of drought – migration. Ballard asserts that 'the famine drove entire clans or sections of chiefdoms to abandon their homes and migrate elsewhere in search of food'.[523] Yet political centralisation did indeed occur amidst the suggested breakdown of society.

The entire southern region of Africa experienced cycles of drought from 1794 to 1802.[524] We can assume that southeast African societies were well-acquainted with drought and that they were familiar with extended dry spells, and consequently had a set of coping strategies: grain storage, livestock use, hunting and foraging; practices they would have maintained even in periods of plenty. The Mahlathule drought was characterised by a pattern of consecutive dry periods for eight years, leading to a

[520] J Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1981), 9.

[521] Wylie, *Myth of Iron,* 54.

[522] C Ballard, 'Drought and Economic Distress: South Africa in the 1800s', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 17, 2 (1986): 359-378, 364.

[523] Ballard, 'Drought', 370.

[524] Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique', 19.

significant loss of population and cattle.[525] But even if drought led to consolidation of political power, the process of political centralisation in question had started earlier than the occurrence of the Mahlathule. The simultaneous centralisation of the Mthethwa, Ngwane and Nwandwe appears to have occurred from the late-1750s when the English and later the Austrians' longboats picked up products of the hunt over a hundred kilometres inland, near the Mkhuze River.[526] This circumstance agrees with Hedges' proposal of a 'much earlier' emergence of Ndwandwe chiefly power, that is before 1780, much earlier than Wright's suggestion of the year 1800.[527] Hedges' proposition is plausible because of Chandler's successful trade, who initially represented the English ivory trade from 1757. It is feasible that this trade stimulated some centralisation earlier. This periodisation suggests that the process of centralisation can be associated also with trade rather than drought alone, and was in progress long before the 'Shakan Revolution'.[528] This of course does not mean that environmental factors were not influential, but it does suggest that their influence should not be overstated. Indeed, a more general weakness in the debate about political centralisation in this region has been a tendency to resort to monocausal explanations of the kind that often thrive in the absence of evidence, and wither when new sources are found. My contribution in focussing on trade does not seek to suggest it is the only causative factor, but that it should be given greater attention in the process of closer periodisation and developing a multicausal approach.

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[525] Newitt, *A History*, 253.

[526] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 123

[527] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 158; J Wright, 'Turbulent Times: Political Transformation in the North and East, 1760s-1830s', in C Hamilton, BK Mbenga, R Ross (eds), *The Cambridge History of South Africa: From Early Times to 1885*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 211-252, 23.

[528] Ballard, 'Drought', 363.

By the turn of the nineteenth century, the fifth year of the dry cycle, the situation in northern Natal had no doubt become dire, particularly in the face of the diminishing number of cattle. Consequently, because of the Mahlathule it was, as Charles Ballard points out, 'clearly unjustified to see cattle as the pivot of the economy'.[529] Diminishing cattle herds posed a major threat to the political standing of chiefs because large herds were symbols of political and material power.[530] Preeminent chiefs who suffered cattle losses had an incentive to bolster their status and power by accumulating exotic goods – in addition to raiding for cattle – to maintain and gain subjects.[531] Beads, brass, and to some extent cloth augmented prestigious herds. Underscoring the importance of brass to the political economy, one of James Stuart's informants remembered this period as 'a time when brass became more important than cattle'.[532] And to obtain brass in exchange for goods that Europeans wanted, control over hunting areas became essential.

[529] Ballard, 'Drought', 368.

[530] Pedi chief Sekhukhune's succession illustrates the political value of cattle. To underscore his valid ascension to leadership, he paraded the cattle of his predecessor Sekwati before the company of mourners. See Delius, *The Land Belongs,* 83.

[531] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 86, 101.

[532] C de B Webb, J Wright (eds), *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples* (JSA), vol. I (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1976). For the primacy of brass in northern Nguni political culture, see CG Kennedy, 'Prestige Ornaments: The Use of Brass in the Zulu Kingdom', *African Arts* 24, 3, Special Issue: Memorial to Arnold Rubin, Part 2 (July 1991): 50-55, 94-96, 51; and Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 123-125.

EXPANSION OF THE NORTHERN NGUNI GROUPS

From at least the 1750s, Mthethwa Dingiswayo's father, Jobe, was involved in the Delagoan market through its middleman, the Maputo chief.[533] Jobe had previously grown into prominence by extending control over some neighbours, possibly through his access to exotic goods.[534] But more importantly, as a supplier to Maputo, he had consolidated Mthethwa control over the critical confluence of the Black and White Mfolozi Rivers. This site was a prime hunting ground, with natural features forming a bottleneck into which animals were driven towards pitfalls.[535] After Jobe's death in the late eighteenth century, Dingiswayo continued trade alliances with Maputo Makasane.[536]

The desire to gain control over hunting areas, and later to secure water resources during the drought, motivated the three phases of the Mthethwa expansion. Carolyn Hamilton calls these 'distinct phases', but in the absence of other sources of dating, uses a rough chronology for the period 1750-1818.[537] Under Khayi, the early Mthethwa expansion came into the Mfolozi-Mhlatuze area, 'uniquely advantageous for elephant hunting', and included the assimilation of different groups.[538] The

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[533] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 196.

[534] C Hamilton, 'Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power in the Early Zulu Kingdom' (unpublished MA, University of the Witwatersrand, 1985), 110.

[535] M Hall, 'Shakan Pitfall Traps: Hunting Technique in the Zulu Kingdom', *Annals of the Natal Museum* 23, 1 (1977): 1-12, 1.

[536] J Stuart, DMcK Malcolm (eds), *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1986), 7. As for the timing of Jobe's death, see Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 183-93. Gaining proximity to hunting areas to supply the Delagoa Bay's southern market, as well as access to the gateways to trade routes, was an important factor in the expansion of lineages, in addition to the need to secure water sources during the drought.

[537] Hamilton, 'Ideology', 103.

[538] Ibid., 111.

second phase involved Mthethwa Jobe pushing northeast beyond the White Mfolozi.[539] The significance of the movement northeast was possibly to gain control over the famed hunting grounds at the confluence of the White and Black Mfolozi, which forms a natural and effective game trap, described above.

The third phase of expansion under Dingiswayo occurred during the 1790s, and was to the south of the White Mfolozi into a region of higher rainfall, necessary in a time of drought. This placed them in conflict with the Qwabe, not least because of the Qwabe chief harbouring Mawewe, Dingiswayo's half-brother and a contender for the Mthethwa throne. Hence the move south might not only have been to take advantage of the grazing veld in a region with higher rainfall, but also because of the demand for cattle at Delagoa Bay, as suggested by Hamilton, following Hedges. But this particular shift in the nature of trade, that is from cattle to ivory, has been called into doubt.[540] The demand for slaves is a more persuasive explanation for a change in the nature of trade. And therein lies the significance of the capture of the Mhlathuze drifts, adjacent to what is now Richards Bay, which was a possible and viable exchange point for slaves. Dingiswayo's expansion south into Qwabe territory therefore had perhaps less to do with a shift in interest from trading to pastoralism, as Hamilton suggests, but with an attempt to secure access to a seaport market and the south-Atlantic trade at the Mhlatuze River mouth.[541] It is also likely that, because of her emphasis on the great drought, Hamilton compressed Dingiswayo's exploits into the period between 1794-1802.

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
[539] Ibid., 123,

[540] Chewins, 'The Relationship', 731.

[541] Hamilton, 'Ideology', 126. A small Brazilian trade operated along the coast between 1760-1770 – see LFD Antunes, 'O Comércio com o Brasil e a Comunidade Mercantile em Moçambique (sec. XVIII)', *Dimensões* 19 (2007): 2-9, 5. This river mouth is currently the port of Richards Bay.

The third phase of Mthwethwa expansion during the early eighteenth century also involved moving west into the interior between the Mfolozi and Mhlatuze Rivers, into which the Buthelezi chiefdom was also expanding.[542] Even without the possibility of the Buthelezi moving into the area, the intrusion of the Ndwandwe chiefs Soshangana and Zwangendaba, interested in the water-rich areas to the east, encroached on the Mthethwa trade route to the north, threatening Dingiswayo's access to the Maputo trade.

[542] J Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries: A Critical Reconstruction' (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989), 161; Hamilton, 'Ideology', 127. Wright finds the alleged movement of the Buthelezi dubious.



Delagoa Bay and its Southern Hinterland in the 1820s

THE *AMABUTHO*: INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

During the prolonged drought, all the five major northern Nguni ruling lineages – Dlamini-Ngwane (the proto-Swazi), Mthethwa, Ndwandwe, Qwabe and Hlubi – of which the Ndwandwe and the Mthethwa were the key rivals, would have faced similar challenges, that is competition over water resources and some means to maintain their followings.[543] In such a combative environment, chiefs needed an effective form of coercion.

The *amabutho*, or age-regiments, which were initially, and essentially, the royal working and fighting force, only in time became associated with political centralisation. Age-regiments typically herded a chief's cattle, worked his fields, and built his homesteads. But increasingly, age-regiments became more militarised. Max Gluckman argues that the regiments were formalised in response to overpopulation and the struggle over resources during the drought.[544] Hedges, on the other hand, contributes the rise in importance of the age-regiments to the sharp decline of the ivory trade, which was replaced by a cattle trade that involved raiding, necessitating a militarised *amabutho*.[545] Henry Slater associates the *amabutho* with centralisation, but not as a destructive force, rather as one to gather tribute.[546] While there was no doubt a complex intersection of forces at play, the military mobilisation of age-

[543] The royal line of the Ngwane were the Dlamini, who became the nucleus of Swazi society. Dlamini III settled around the Phongola River where it cut through the Lubombo. They were defeated by the Nwandwe during the early nineteenth century, precipitating their move north, from where they operated mainly, at first, as raiders of the Tsonga west of the Lubombo. See P Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires*, 9, 10; Delius, *The Land Belongs,* 29; Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 158. The Swazi were therefore not players as traders in Delagoa Bay's commerce - see Chewins, 'Trade and Politics', 108.

[544] Guy, *The Destruction*, 8.

[545] The cattle-raiding theory has been refuted – see Chewins, 'The Relationship', 736-740.

[546] Slater, 'Transitions', 268.

regiments, in view of the dwindling trade goods and the need to bolster prestige, was perhaps, in part, to police the prosecution of trade and keep the exchange of goods firmly under a particular paramount's authority. Slater's view of the change in military organisation, which ensured that warriors were directly dependent on the paramount and so destroyed their loyalties to 'intermediate power holders', also chimes with this approach.[547] And as the accumulation of trade items became an increasingly important way of acquiring preeminence, the militarised age-regiments became the core of centralised states' power. The pressure to acquire trade items is also a plausible explanation for age-regiment systems being developed at much the same time by the Ndwandwe and the Mthethwa, as well as the Maputo.[548] The apparent simultaneous rise in importance of the *amabutho* throughout the region appears to have been connected to trade, because during the late 1750s, the period of the English country trade at the Bay, Khondlo Qwabe had two regiments; Zwide Ndwandwe had four; Magaye of Cele had five; while Matiwane Ngwane had three.[549] Age-regiments could act as hunting squads for part of the year to accumulate ivory, and be ready for the trading season at the Bay that opened in December – well after the planting season – and lasted six months till June. They could also patrol trade routes, enforce royal power and provide security from attack.

This periodisation lends support to the idea that age-regiments underwent further elaboration and transformed into permanently mobilised regiments, forming a standing army that was so important to the emergence of more powerful states.

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[547] Ibid., 278.

[548] RJ Kloppers, 'The History and Representation of the History of the Mabudu-Tembe' (MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2003), 32.

[549] Gump, 'Ecological Change', 62.

Sustaining power would have been especially significant from the late-1780s when, partly because of climatological conditions, and partly because of the wealth of goods drying up, there was growing pressure to accumulate brass and beads in exchange for ivory.

TRADE AND CONFLICT

The trade route between the Maputo and the Mthethwa polities followed a course along the strategic corridor along the coast. During the late 1770s the Mthethwa chiefdom, as we have seen, controlled the southern portion of the coastal route towards Delagoa Bay, then under Jobe, Dingiswayo's father.[550] This route accounted for two thirds of the Austrian trade via the Maputo to the Mthethwa.[551] But there was potentially another route to northern Nguni territory. This route ran southwest through the Lubombo Mountains and the Phongola River pass. On the western side of this pass stood Zwide Ndwandwe's capital, Magudu.[552]

On the eastern side of the pass stood Maputo Mbhanyele's homestead. In 1778, Mbhanyele was keen to engage in business with the Austrian fort in areas named as

[550] Hedges, 'Trade', 178, The oldest residents in the land could claim some paramountcy in an area, however trade – providing a way to accumulate trade goods – had the power to overthrow this position of first-comers; see Newitt, A *History*,154; Smith, 'Struggle', 223.

[551] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 141.

[552] Nwandwe history prior to the nineteenth century has been lost due to the breakup of the kingdom after its defeat by Shaka, which destroyed the royal elite, and with it the process of transmitting memories of the kingdom's past. See J Wright, 'Rediscovering the Nwandwe Kingdom', in N Swanepoel, A Esterhuyzen, P Bonner (eds), *Five Hundred Years Rediscovered: Southern African Precedents and Prospects* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008), 217-238.

'Lukôtt' and 'Huâmolaô'.[553] The implication was that he wanted an Austrian presence in Lukôtt and Huâmolaô, proposing the establishment of a trading post there. These areas provided direct access to the Phongola pass, connecting Maputo Mbhanyele territory with that of the Nwandwe, west of the Lubombo Mountains. Mbhanyele's proposal is perhaps an indication of his possible political aspirations to supersede his brother, Maputo Makasane, as the principal trader in the wider territory of Maputo, and more significantly, by forging an alliance with the Ndwandwe.

Mbhanyele's offer, viewed in context of the pressure from his brother Maputo Makasane's expansionist policies, was a strategic one. Firstly, a trading alliance with the Nwandwe would strengthen Mbhanyele economically by throwing off his brother Makasane Maputo's control over the extent to which he could trade. By limiting Mbhanyele's trade, Maputo also curtailed his brother's potential political ascendency through limiting his economic prosperity. Further, Austrian firepower in the deep south would prop up Mbhanyele's military strength, gaining him further political traction. Mbhanyele's offer to the trading post to gain access to the Ndwandwe would therefore place him in direct competition with the Maputo-Mthethwa alliance. Pollet comments that obtaining this territory would make it easy to secure 'the entrance on both sides of the river Maputo, a part of the river that secures our communication

[553] AHU India, Cx 351, f. 51, Bolts to Pollet, 11 February 1778. '*Não achareis difficuldade em segurar a entrade de ambos lados do Rio Maputo, e uma parte o rio que segure a nossa comunicação com os Hottentotes*'. The phrase 'Hottentotes', also written as 'Hollentontes', or 'Orantontahs' was used to refer to the northern Nguni. See WFW Owen, *Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar*, vol. I (London: Richard Bentley, 1833), 79; Boteler, *Narrative of a Voyage,* vol. II, 51.

with the ‘Hottentotes’’.[554] This pass was therefore of utmost strategic value. Mbhanyele’s offer to sell land to the Austrians hints that the Nwandwe were possibly in indirect communication with the Austrian fort, through Mbhanyele. But direct communication between the Austrian trading post and the Ndwandwe would have posed a considerable economic risk to the coastal Maputo-Mthethwa route. The picture that emerges is that of two competing polities, the Mthethwa and Nwandwe, vying for control of the Delagoa Bay trade.

It is reasonable to assume that Makasane Maputo, together with Dingiswayo, were concerned with securing their trade and preventing the diversion of goods south through the Lubombo Mountains. The answer lay in eliminating the prospective Mbanyele/Zwide trade. This concern goes a long way to explain Dingiswayo and Makasane’s collaboration in overthrowing the latter’s brother Mbhanyele, thereby cutting off the Austrian trading post’s potential, and direct contact with Zwide’s Ndwandwe on the other side of the pass.

It may be that trade was also at the heart of some conflict in the coastal regions of northern Nguni territory at this time. In the early 1800s, Dingiswayo might have seen the Qwabe as a threat to the seaboard trade, as he requested military assistance from Makasane to vanquish the Qwabe, whose territory lay on the coast, south of the Mahlatuze River. Makasane arranged musket-carrying soldiers from the Portuguese

[554] AHU India, Diary, Cx 351, f. 51, Bolts to Pollet, 11 February 1778. Here Andre Pollet uses the term ‘Hottentotes’, meaning the inhabitants of the territory beyond the pass, who were the Nwandwe. Later, in 1823, the Portuguese Governor, Lupe de Cardenas, would propose a Portuguese trading post along the same pass, an offer that Shaka declined; see TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, 6 October 1824.

fort to bolster Dingiswayo's army.[555] In return, Dingiswayo promised to direct all his ivory through Makasane on the way to the market at Delagoa Bay.[556] Makasane, in partnership with Dingiswayo, held influence over a swathe of land north of the Mkhuze River, that stretched from the Bay's shores to the Phongola pass, and included the eastern coastal region of Natal, giving these two men dominance over the main trade routes into the northern Nguni heartland.[557]

The Maputo trade centre was relatively close to the upper basins of the Mkhuze, Bivane, and Msunduze Rivers. This region was home to Nwandwe chiefs Zwangendaba, Nxaba (who had close connections to Zwide's royal house), and Soshangana. These chiefs profited from the Maputo River trade independently of their overlord Zwide, and thus threatened his political standing.[558] Zwide's consequent attack on Zwangendaba, possibly in response to this threat, failed. Zwangendaba was the victor in this conflict, and with it secured the southern part of the coastal trade route.[559]

As we have seen, the second route into northern Nguni territory, which passed through a narrow neck in the Lubombo Mountains, exited near the strategically

[555] Stuart, DMcK Malcolm (eds), *The Diary*, 7. While there is controversy around the veracity of the *Diary,* especially over his accounts of Shaka, Wylie calls the 'Historical Introduction', from which I have quoted, 'solid' and 'detailed'. It is also difficult to see what purpose inventing this information would have served.

[556] Ibid., 7.

[557] Dingiswayo also attacked Matutwene during this period, an attack that was likely in alliance with Makasane. See Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 189. For a more complete discussion of the centrality of trade goods to political power, see Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 69-88.

[558] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 165.

[559] Ibid.

placed Ndwandwe capital Magudu, an entry point that was under the control of Zwide until 1819.[560] Soshangana's territory represented the other major centre of Ndwandwe power, located between the Mkhuze and Msunduze Rivers.[561] These lowlands were a key contact point between Soshangana and Delagoa Bay trade, and threatened Zwide's potential monopoly over and Dingiswayo's dominance of trade. It then seems likely that from the 1810s, these men – Zwide, Soshangana, Zwangendaba, Dingiswayo – all of whose power and status rested, at least in part, on controlling trade, came into increasing competition with each other over the control of the flow of prestige goods. So, ambition to control the trade route north along the eastern coast provided a credible motivation for the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo, and later the Zulu Kings, Shaka and Dingane, to subordinate the societies inhabiting the tract of territory adjacent to the Lubombo Mountains in the west and near the coast in the east.

THE RISE OF SHAKA

Shaka had served in one of Dingiswayo's *amabutho*, and had distinguished himself in battle. After his father Senzangakhona's death, Shaka, followed by some Thembu, Qwabe and Langeni men, came to Zulu country with Mthethwa support. The cattle came ahead of his arrival to proclaim his power, and provided a means to establish

[560] Ibid., 158.

[561] Ibid., 161.

his patronage.[562] As significant as his assumption of a chieftainship was, it took place in the context in which leaders had long struggled for power over trade.[563]

In 1817, Zwide attacked Dingiswayo, possibly to gain the Mthethwa's famed hunting zone between the Black and White Mfolozi Rivers. The reason for this assumption is that later, Shaka's 'acquisition of the Ndwandwe [was because] it contained, notably between the two Mfolozi's, some excellent hunting ground'.[564] In the power vacuum that resulted from Dingiswayo's defeat, 'disturbances broke out in all directions … and presently the whole country was upside down'.[565] With Dingiswayo dead, the position of Maputo Makasane's new trade partner was wide open, with the likely candidates being Soshangana Gasa, Nxaba Msane, and Zwangendaba Jele, who were situated on the trade route to Delagoa Bay. Zwide pushed south and southeast to curb the growing autonomy and economic independence of these men.[566] It was particularly Soshangana's occupation of the tract of coast from St. Lucia to Delagoa Bay, with a potential link through Makasane to the Portuguese trade [post], which posed a threat to Zwide's potential hegemony over trade.

Dingiswayo's death created opportunities for new alliances and antagonisms within the context of trade. It prompted, for example, Zwangendaba and Nxaba's initial

[562] Wylie, *Myth of Iron*, 145.

[563] Ibid.

[564] AT Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, Containing Earlier Political History of the Eastern-Nguni Clans* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929), 217.

[565] Wright, 'Turbulent Times', 226.

[566] Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', 109.

support of Zwide against the incipient house of Shaka.[567] But there were other tensions in the Ndwandwe clan. Just before the attack against Shaka took place, Zwangendaba and Zwide were involved in a 'great dispute', resulting in Zwide's defeat. Zwangendaba took him captive, but shortly after released his prisoner.[568] That Zwangendaba could defeat Zwide suggests that the leader's support base was weakening. By Zwide's own admission, he lost against Shaka because 'he was an old man', a phrase that was more likely a metaphor for declining influence.[569] Even his son Sikhunyana, who was Shaka's age, refused to follow his father because of his waning support.[570] John Wright has argued convincingly that the breakup of the Nwandwe polity was more likely due to internal competition than an attack by the then fledgling Zulu kingdom.[571] I would add to his point that it was quite possible that the contest for diminishing trade goods, exacerbated by the Portuguese trading post's limited supply of often sub-standard goods, fuelled these internal struggles.[572]

When Shaka struck the fateful blow at Zwide in 1819, he set the disintegration of the Nwandwe into full motion. In the aftermath of the conflict, Zwide relocated northwest to the upper Komati River, and from there moved to settle on the Steelpoort River in the heartland of the imploding Pedi kingdom, another major trade route running west to east to Delagoa Bay. [573] Zwangendaba and Soshangana successively moved

[567] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 165.

[568] Ibid., 164.

[569] Personal communication with John Wright, *JSA*, V, 79. Almost a century earlier, paramount Magaia on the north shore of Delagoa Bay, declared an 'old man', lost followers to his younger rival Mateke, distinguished by his control of trade. See also NA, 9153, f. 72.

[570] Webb, Wright, *JSA*, vol. I.

[571] Wright, 'Turbulent Times', 226.

[572] Webb, Wright, *JSA,* vol. V, 79.

[573]Omer-Cooper*, The Zulu Aftermath*, 33.

north towards Delagoa Bay by 1821, probably to avoid another overlord in the person of Shaka, and followed the money north to Delagoa Bay, where slaves were in increasing demand.[574]

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CENTRALISATION AND THE SLAVE TRADE

Much has been said about the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay in the existing literature, omitting the role of an early, simultaneous and nascent slave trade. The slave trade is also an aspect largely neglected in considering state formation, with the notable exception of Julian's Cobbing work. But there is more evidence that suggests that a growing slave trade, in addition to the ivory trade, involved the northern Nguni placing increasing importance on the militarisation of the growing number of age-regiments, which in turn contributed to state formation.

There is disagreement over whether elephant hunting required large numbers of military regiments. The Mthethwa were famous for using pitfall traps to capture game, including elephant. According to Slater, this was a 'sophisticated approach which could be carried out by small groups of people.[575] But there is ample comparative evidence that ivory production prior to the widespread introduction of firearms needing 'increasing sophisticated co-ordination of large numbers of men', like that started by Mthethwa Jobe.[576] Comparable evidence from east Africa

[574] P. Delius, *The Land Belongs*, 22-3.

[575] Hamilton, 'Ideology', 111; Slater, 'Transitions', 132. No large-scale labour organisation was necessary; see Hall, 'Shakan Pitfall Traps', 10.

[576] Hamilton, 'Ideology', 116. For labour requirements of the ivory trade, see A Roberts, 'Nyamwezi Trade', in R Gray, D Birmingham (eds), *Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and*

suggests that the ivory trade required large numbers of men, not only as pit excavators and hunters but also as porters. Regimental involvement would also have ensured royal control at a time of growing demand for imported prestige goods. It is hard to imagine why this would not be the case in that context. The *amabutho* were trained in hunting and warfare and, as I have indicated above, were also involved with trade.[577] Even if elephant hunting did not demand a great labour force, the *amabutho* were increasingly centralised and militarised. While both Slater and Hamilton note the militarisation of the *amabutho*, neither consider the possibility that a growing slave trade contributed to the evolution of the *amabutho*.[578]

In 1784, a modicum of evidence for some slave trade after the Austrian trade comes from the Carmelite friar, Franciso de Santa Thereza, who wrote that the 'English', traded captured slaves – '*aprehendidos em Guerra entre elles*' (captured in war between them).[579] His sentence is somewhat ambiguous. He was probably referring to conflict between local societies (it is unclear who the 'others' were). In any case, the Austrian trading post's slave trade was the envy of the Portuguese. Slaving occurred in such a number that the Secretary of the Marine and Overseas Ministry (1777-1795), Martinho de Melo e Castro, counted the loss of Delagoa Bay's economy to the Austrians as serious because of the '*considerável número de escravos que posia fornecer*' (the considerable number of slaves it could supply).[580]

Eastern Africa before 1900 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*; J Illife, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); SJ Rockel, *Carriers of Culture: Labor on the Road in Nineteenth-Century East Africa* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2006).

[577] Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 196,197.

[578] Slater, 'Transitions', 278, talks about the 'change in military organisation'; Hamiton, 'Ideology', 122, refers to increasing militarisation.

[579] Santa de Thereza, '*Plano e Relação*', f. 30.

[580] Lobato, *História da Fundação*, 34.

The possibility of some slavery, in conjunction with competition for the ivory trade and the environmental shocks, makes it likely that, long before Shaka was born, a heightened level of violence was introduced to the deep southern hinterland of Delagoa Bay.[581] The musket-bearing English, with the Austrians following in their footsteps, account for a degree of violence for at least 23 years, from 1758-1781, in the interior, stimulated in part by the capture of slaves, and competition for the ivory trade along the upper reaches of the Maputo. The demand for slaves pushed the trade south and into the ambit of Delagoa Bay. Portuguese-Brazilian slavers expanded the trade at Delagoa Bay during 1803-1814 to avoid French corsairs further north.[582] From 1815, the treaty of Vienna limited slave trading to the southern hemisphere, which gave fresh impetus to the slavery in the southern port.[583]

THE SLAVE TRADE AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Kidnapping has historically been a principal source of slaves. But at the Bay, from at least 1823, Portuguese Governors provoked war to produce slaves, as did Governor Lupe de Cardenas. His successors continued this practice of provoking wars between local chiefs to produce a surplus of slaves.[584] At Delagoa Bay then, slaving was associated with conflict. Capturing slaves was a violent process, and the ruthlessness of Zwide's assaults is telling and suggestive of slave raiding. In contrast

[581] Wylie, *Myth of Iron,* 44.

[582] Harries, 'Slavery', 313.

[583] The National Archives of the UK (TNA) Admiralty (ADM) 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven,* to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 11 October 1823.

[584] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven,* to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 June 1824. The leap in time from 1731 to 1823 is explained by the long hiatus of trade at the Bay until 1757, whereafter the dominant item in demand was ivory, until the shift towards slaves from the 1820s.

to Dingiswayo's raids, which took only a portion of their cattle and led to incorporating people with lineages intact, Zwide, according to Bonner's account of the formation of the Swazi state, obliterated his victims by destroying the material bases of life. There is also evidence that fertile river gardens were annexed, and entire populations were forced into flight.[585] This strategy of annihilation closely resembles the modus operandi of chief Inhamussa at Inhambane, discussed in Chapter Four, that left people destitute, and vulnerable to be conveniently rounded up as slaves.

Slaving in southeast Africa was doubly profitable. Firstly because slavers gave relatively large amounts of beads and brass for slaves. Shaka seems to have profited greatly from trade, evident in the prevalent use of brass manilas amongst the Zulu. In 1822, the merchant Henry Francis Fynn noticed a preponderant use of metal ornaments on his arrival at Shaka's camp. He reports: 'Regiments were passing by and on distant hills, interspersed with regiments of girls, decorated in beads and brass with regimental uniformity'.[586] His 150 wives, 'Each wore a head dress of black feathers, and four brass collars fitting close to the neck.[587] These riches might have been derived from the ivory trade, but Shaka's interest in hunting elephant appears to have been on the wane, as he only killed 28 beasts in 1823.[588]

The second benefit of slave raiding was the acquisition of cattle of those enslaved. The tactic of destroying the mainstay of survival of a group of people, thereby

[585] Bonner, *Kings*, *Commoners and Concessionaires*, 23.

[586] Stuart, Malcolm (eds), *The Diary,* 71.

[587] J Bird, *The Annals of Natal, 1495-1845,* vol. I (Pietermaritzburg: P Davis & Sons, 1888), 77.

[588] T Arbousette, *Narrative of an Exploratory Tour: To the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope* (Cape Town: AS Robertson, 1846), 146.

inducing famine, also created desperate individuals ready to offer themselves as slaves. It was the same strategy that Shaka's regiments would use in 1823 at Delagoa Bay.[589] There is a significant body of evidence that an increasingly prominent and lucrative slave trade overshadowed the ivory trade from the early nineteenth century until the total eclipse of the ivory trade in the late 1820s. This slave trade reoriented the nature of trade and refashioned the dynamics and patterns of power.

[589] WFW Owen, *Narrative of Voyages to explore the shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar* (Richard Bentley, 1833), vol. I, 80.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SLAVE TRADE OUT OF DELAGOA BAY AND ITS IMPACT ON ITS HINTERLAND DURING THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

DELAGOA BAY AND TRADE

As we have seen, Delagoa Bay has long been known for its ivory trade, and elephant tusks remained a significant economic staple for the region until the spike in its slave trade. The Portuguese initiated the European involvement in the ivory trade from the Bay in 1544, but this commerce remained limited and erratic for many years. From 1761, however, the demand created by the sought-after goods supplied by the English country trader, Edward Chandler, accelerated the trade.[590] Delagoa Bay remained part of a brisk country trade even after Chandler's death in 1768.[591]

From 1777, William Bolts' immensely successful venture under the auspices of the Austrian Crown led to a surge in the ivory trade supplied, in the main, by northern Nguni groups. The evidence suggests that the introduction of beads and brass goods deep into the interior was instrumental in deepening the involvement of the northern Nguni in the ivory trade.[592] After the Portuguese reestablished a trading post at the Bay in 1799, ivory remained a sought-after product, with brass goods in

[590] The country trade refers to independent English merchants, many of them ex-servants of the Company, licensed to trade in the Indian Ocean no further than the Cape of Good Hope; see A Bulley, *The Bombay Country Ships, 1790-1833* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), 1. According to Portuguese records, Chandler plied his trade at Delagoa Bay for seven years; see AHU Moç CU Cx 28 d. 49, report of Antonio Joze de Mello, undated.

[591] Meisterle, 'Country Trade', 63-87.

[592] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 117.

most demand in exchange. Despite Portuguese attempts to exclude them, English traders initially maintained a significant ivory trade between the Bay and India, but the trade halved in the following year – a decrease that coincided with the start of the Napoleonic Wars and the consequent French naval presence in the western Indian Ocean.[593] The failure of the ivory trade from the southeastern coast to fully recover after the Napoleonic Wars coincided with the increase in the slave trade.

A SHIFT IN DEMAND FROM IVORY TO SLAVES

The first evidence of a relatively small European slave trade lies in the Dutch documents from the period 1721-1731. Over the ten years of their trading post's existence, the Dutch traded 257 slaves.[594] The Dutch, disappointed by the slow trade, inquired why. The chiefs gave the absence of wars as the reason for the lack of captives.[595] The interlinked themes of the presence of war, violence, and a slave trade persist throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

From 1769, the establishment of a plantation economy on the Mascarene Islands, and the growth of a trade to Brazil from 1815, led to a significant increase in the demand for slaves from the east coast of Africa. Especially important in relation to Delagoa Bay was the British-Portuguese agreement of 1815, which included the Bay as a legitimate slave market.[596] This treaty encouraged increasing numbers of Brazilian slavers to visit the southeastern coast of Africa. That the increased demand

[593] Lobato, *História do Presídio*, vol.I, 125.

[594] Sleigh, *Die Buiteposte*, 715.

[595] Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 27.

[596] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 11 October 1823.

for slaves coincided with the upheavals in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region of the 1810s, merits further discussion.[597]

I argue that slavers, both Portuguese and French, saw Delagoa Bay as a source of slaves during this period because of their apparent interest in the Bay. The sources are thin on trade in the pre-1820 period, and the evidence is mainly circumstantial. The absence of effective Portuguese control and record keeping for most of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries makes it impossible to approximate the scale of the trade. The fragmentary evidence is nonetheless suggestive that some trade existed.

Unfortunately, as much as the ivory trade is detailed, little is known of the process of slavery, other than that captives were in demand along the Maputo River. In either case, the willingness to engage in the scale of trade demanded implies two things: one was the high value these societies placed on beads and brass; [the other was slaves].

The demand for slaves, in combination with the imperative accumulation of brass and beads, probably called for a change in military tactics. While not all slaving was achieved by warfare or raiding, and kidnapping was historically a major source of slaves, the case at Delagoa Bay appears different. Here armed conflict played a

[597] Wright, 'Turbulent Times', 224; J Wright, 'Political Transformations in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries', in C Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand Press, 1995), 168-169.

significant role in procuring slaves. The Portuguese Governor Lupe de Cardenas provoked wars between local chiefs, which produced a surplus of slaves for sale.[598]

At Delagoa Bay then, slaving was associated with war. Capturing slaves was a violent process. As mentioned previously, while Dingiswayo incorporated people, leaving lineages intact, and took a only portion of their cattle, Zwide, according to Bonner's authoritative history of the formation of the Swazi state, obliterated his victims' by destroying the material bases of life.

Slaving in southeast Africa was doubly profitable. Not only did slavers exchange their captives for beads and brass, but they also acquired the enslaved people's cattle. Not only cattle were seized; fertile river gardens too were annexed, and whole populations were forced into flight.[599]

In 1785, another glimpse of the earlier slave trade appears through the activities of the crew of the French ship *Thélèmaque*. Portuguese military staff, doubling as traders, assisted the ship's crew to attack the people of Chief Capela of Tembe. The expedition backfired when locals killed four Frenchmen and imprisoned the rest of the party, but the captors later ransomed them back to the fort. Yet the visit of the *Thélèmaque* was not as unsuccessful as the loss of men might imply.[600] The ship left Delagoa Bay after a stay of two months, with 1 275 kg of ivory, and apparently some

[598] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven,* to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 June 1824.

[599] Bonner, *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires*, 23.

[600] Lobato*, História do Presídio*, vol. I, 127, 128.

slaves, because the two interim Governors on Mozambique Island made the handsome sum of 9 000 *cruzados* in commission on the sale of slaves.[601]

Besides the case of the *Thélèmaque*, other fragments of evidence exist for a slave trade out of Delagoa Bay. The renowned slaver, Joaquim José da Costa Portugal, visited Delagoa Bay a few times in his corvette in search of slaves during the late eighteenth century.[602] In 1814, Governor Teodorico Ramos auctioned off eighteen slaves at the Bay.[603] Thomas, the captain of the *Perseverança*, was in Delagoa Bay in 1818 to purchase slaves. And in the same year, the annual official trading ship from Mozambique Island came to fetch ivory, rhinoceros-horn, and slaves from the port.[604] It is interesting to note that Eldredge mentions the absence of the annual ship prior to 1823, but ignores the fact that it had been in the Bay in 1818. And, of course, the annual ship was far from the only channel to export slaves.

This evidence suggests that the potential for profits from the slave trade, coupled with the high French demand, had prompted an as yet unquantifiable slave trade at the Bay.[605]

[601] Ibid., 128.

[602] Ibid, vol. II, (Imprensa Nacional 1961), 13.

[603] AHU Moç Cx 146 d. 68, Letter of Governor Teodorico José Pereira Ramos, 20 June 1814.

[604] TNA ADM 1/2269, Report, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, 'The Portuguese Settlements and the Dominions of the Eastern Coast of Africa', 15 April 1823. Owen wrote this report from Simon's Bay, after his departure from Delagoa Bay, 7 August 1822.

[605] Capela, Medeiros, *O Tráfico de Escravos*, 19.

THE SLAVE TRADE OF THE 1820s

On 5 July 1821, during the Governorship of Caetano Costa Matozo, Chief Nyambose from the region south of St. Lucia, attacked Chief Capella of Tembe with an army 8 000 men strong.[606] His aim was to secure cattle, beads and brass neck and arm rings. Later in the same month his son arrived with the same demand, also directed at the Portuguese.[607] Clearly, groups living in the south, including the area beyond the Phongola River, viewed Delagoa Bay as a source of wealth.

One of these groups was the Vatua (in Portuguese) or Vatwah (in English). The earlier use of the term generally referred to those who spoke a language that included clicks. During 1822-23, however, when Zwangendaba, Soshangana and Shaka were in the Bay, the term Vatwah designated the Zulu. To the present-day historian, Zwangendaba and Soshangana are known as Ndwandwe, Zwide's erstwhile followers, and certainly not Zulu. To contemporary observers, however, Zwangendaba was the uncle to Shaka.[608] And Soshangana was also perceived as Zulu, as in 'Chinchingane and his Zoolos … attacked Mr Vidal and his party'.[609] These observations might be because of the similarity the northern Nguni showed in dress, weapons and language. Or their identification might have to do with the fact that Soshangana and Zwangendaba were seen as 'untethered proxies [of Shaka Zulu] allowed to accumulate non-bovine booty in return for fealty'.[610] The missionary

[606] AHU CU Moç Codíce 1393, Letter from Governor Matozo to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 11 July 1821.

[607] Ibid.

[608] Owen, *Narrative of Voyages*, vol. I, 80. There is no equivalent discussion in T Boteler, *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery,* vol. I.

[609] Owen, *Narrative of Voyages*, vol. I, 126.

[610] Personal communication with Benedict Carton, 27 November 2018.

William Threlfall identifies the King of the 'Bratwah' as Shaka.[611] Dan Wylie dismisses Threlfall's association between the Zulu and Vatua, because he says 'only one account makes this identification'.[612] Yet according to British naval captain WFW Owen, the Portuguese also identified 'Chaka the young king [of those] … called Vatwahs or Olontontes'.[613]

The apparently interchangeable use of Vatua, and Massuitys, Izitis, and Mapsitis, becomes explicable when location is taken into consideration.[614] The term Vatua seems to indicate the origins of people moving north as being from the south. But when the Nwandwe started moving north of Delagoa Bay, the Portuguese attached a different label to them, calling them Izitis, who invaded the northern beaches ('*Izitis que andavão roubando nas praias do norte*') close to the fort.[615] The Governor at Inhambane gathered a force to repel the '*inimigo Massuittys*' (enemy Massuittys),

[611] The National Library of South Africa (NLSA), Cape Town Campus, MSE 13, slide 31.

[612] Wylie, *Myth of Iron*, footnote 82, 551.

[613] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 June 1824.

[614] The Portuguese used the term Mapsitis in 1830. The Mapsitis claimed that Dingane sent them and their families to look for copper mines and bead trees. As they were 'despatched' along with their families, it is unlikely that the Zulu king sent them. Invoking Dingane's name may have been intended to make groups wary of challenging them, knowing full well that Shaka had died. The letter, written in 1830, states that they left four or five years before (1824/1825), went via Delagoa Bay, past Inhambane, to Sofala. From there they turned to Quissanga, inland of Sofala, and turned home via Uteve, north of Sofala. They ravaged the countryside as they went, stealing cattle and copper bracelets, and taking women, killing anyone who opposed them. In 1830 they were back home. Despite the invocation of Dingane's name, insinuating Zulu affiliation, the group was likely to have been the Nxaba Msane, who had settled above the Save River. There is no record of a large group of people tracing their steps back to Natal past Inhambane and Delagoa Bay during 1830, or after, when they were 'already back home' ('*já da volta o seu pais*'). AHU Moç CU Cx 238 d. 19, Letter from Francis Miguel Rodrigues Nunes to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 4 August 1830.

[615] A Lobato, *Quatro Estudos*, 107.

who had invaded the northern hinterland of Delagoa Bay in 1824.[616] So there appears to be some differentiation between those who moved north, and the Zulu. It is worth noting that the ex-Ndwandwe were called both Vatua while in Delagoa Bay and Izitis/Massuittys/Mapsitis (a term associated with Zwide) further north, while the Zulu were only ever called Vatua.[617]

Portuguese sources also elaborate on Vatua/Zulu identity in the mid-1830s as a result of the murder of Governor Antonio Ribeiro in 1833 by Dingane's generals; see Chapter Seven. The Zulu army is identified as the Vatua from the coast of St. Lucia, and from '*terra no Natal ao sul do rio Santa Luzia*' (land of Natal south of the St. Lucia River).[618] The reason for assuming the Vatua were Zulu in this instance is the nature of the relationship between chief Maputo Makasane and the Zulu, described below.

The increasingly prominent and lucrative slave trade slowly started overshadowing the ivory trade from the early nineteenth century, until the latter's total eclipse in the late 1820s, which increasingly directed goods to those who could supply slaves.

[616] Ibid., 111.

[617] The Magakala Pedi recall a leader called Switi, a corruption of Zwide, who settled near the Steelpoort Valley with his followers, and Maroteng Pedi recall Chief Sfete living in the Steelpoort Valley – a key trading route to Delagoa Bay. See Delius, *The Land Belongs*, 22.

[618] AHU SEMU L1 Moç 1284 Cx 2 d. 1, Report from Alexandre Thomaz de Morreau Sarmento, 8 June 1835, Lisbon.

THE INVASION OF THE BAY

By 1822, and probably before, invaders from the south understood that slaves were also in demand in the Bay.[619] Zwangendaba (Loon Kundava according to Owen), sold cattle, hoes, and most importantly slaves, to the Portuguese fort.[620] When Zwangendaba settled in Matola's territory on the north bank of the Bay, people in all directions, including the Tembe under chief Capella, suffered his depredations. But with Shaka in hot pursuit, Soshangana and Zwangendaba could not 'rest long any where'.[621] The invaders then moved further north, decamping to the Nkomati River at a place called Mamaloong at the river mouth.[622] The short-lived conflict engulfed the surrounds of Delagoa Bay, leaving nothing but 'desolation and famine'. Owen commented that the Governor could have prevented their suffering if he had intervened, but that he did not. The nonchalant attitude of the Portuguese authorities towards these hostilities is telling. It indicates that they were at peace and on good terms with the raiders who ravaged the chiefdoms around them.[623] Their attitude is unsurprising, given that as slave traders they were likely to have been the main beneficiaries of these battles. Historians have commonly viewed Soshangana and Zwangendaba's move north as an attempt to escape Shaka's violent orbit.[624] This may have played a part, but in my view, historians should give greater weight to the pull of an expanding supply of trade goods flowing from the slave trade.

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[619] According to Threlfall, 'Zwide turned the Vatua out of the country, and they have been trying to find [one] another for two or three years', suggesting the presence of the Nwandwe at and around Delagoa Bay from 1820; see School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Archives, University of London, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Archive (WMMA) MMS, Letter from Willian Threlfall to unknown, August 1823.

[620] Owen, *Narrative of Voyages*, vol. I, 80. Zwangendaba was supported by over 5 000 subjects.

[621] Ibid.

[622] TNA ADM 1/ 2269, Description of Delagoa Bay, Alick Osborne, surgeon of the HMS *Leven*, 1822.

[623] Owen, *Narrative of Voyages*, vol. I, 80.

[624] Wylie, *Myth of Iron*, 245.

In 1823 Governor Cardenas was deeply involved in the slave trade, and there is evidence that he was in contact with Shaka.[625] The Governor was supposedly in 'dread' of Shaka and eager to please him.[626] In reality, however, it was probably the Governor's desire for profit that prompted his fawning attitude to the Zulu King. In the same year as Shaka's destructive forays, the Governor added to the plight of locals, instigating conflict between local societies, 'provok[ing] wars between the different tribes of the natives for the sake of getting slaves for cheap'.[627]

In 1823 Shaka Zulu's army was present in Delagoa Bay. The report of the disembowelment of a Portuguese priest in September of the same year by Shaka's men places Zulu presence at the Bay just before the arrival of a slave ship.[628] In late 1823, Owen claimed that the Vatwah 'spread panic and terror in the hinterland'.[629] These raiders were in all probability Zulu, as Soshangana and Zwangendaba had by this time moved north, away from the Bay. The Zulu army's presence in the Bay therefore coincided with peaks in the slave trade when the trade was 'hotting up rather than cooling down' at the Bay.[630] Their depredations were so severe that

[625] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 June 1824.

[626] Owen, *Narrative of Voyages*, vol. I, 255.

[627] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 June 1824.

[628] TNA, ADM 1/2269, Report, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, 15 April 1823. The slave ship belonged to Vincente Thomas Santos. Details of this slave trader below.

[629] 'Estas terras achão todas perseguidas pellos Vatuas he hum inimigu que tem espalhadus terrors panicus por todos estes sertoens' (These territories are persecuted by the Vatuas and an enemy that has spread panicked terrors in all these hinterlands) – Lobato, *Quatro Estudos*, 106. Zwangendaba, moved northeast along the coast, 'northward of the river *Mannise*' [Nkomati River]; see Omer-Cooper, *The Zulu Aftermath*, 57; G Liesegang, 'Nguni Migrations between Delagoa Bay and the Zambezi, 1821-1839', *African Historical Studies* 3, 2 (1970): 317-337, 323.

[630] Etherington, *The Great Treks*, 172.

surrounding chiefs begged to be subjects of the Portuguese Crown so that they might qualify for protection from the fort.[631] In the wake of the Zulu army's scorched earth strategy, famine gripped the area, producing large numbers of destitute people who could be enslaved relatively easily and cheaply. The oversupply of slaves was such that it depressed the trading price – the market price for slaves fell to a few shillings a person in 1823.[632]

Although the coincidence in the timing of raiding and trading is suggestive, it does not provide conclusive evidence of Zulu leaders selling slaves to traders, but when placed in comparative context it becomes somewhat more telling. Northern Nguni groups, in common with most other societies in the region, took captives in wars and raids, with young women and children especially prized. Attackers often killed men, leaving very young children and the elderly to fend for themselves. Men of high rank were on occasion ransomed by their relatives. The primary motivation was to accumulate concubines and swell regiments, but there is evidence that after the initial processes of consolidation and the emergence of markets for slaves, some states were prepared to sell captives. With Shaka entrenched in power and his armies taking captives far from the kingdom's heartland and close to a booming slave trade in Delagoa Bay, it is plausible that the Zulu sold some captives to European traders through chief Makasane as middleman.[633]

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[631] Lobato, *Quatro Estudos*, 106; SOAS Archive, WMMS, MMS, Letter from Willian Threlfall to unknown, August 1823.

[632] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 June 1824.

[633] Delius, 'Recapturing Captives', 7-23; Delius, *The Land Belongs*, 34-37, 126-147.

But even more importantly, the activities of the Exclusive Ivory Commercial Company of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques (EICC) led to further escalation of the slave trade and levels of violence. The dramatic increase in the slave trade from the mid-1820s therefore coincided with the move of Soshangana and Zwangendaba closer to the source of trade (Delagoa Bay and Inhambane), while the power and raiding reach of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka grew rapidly. The major upsurge in the volume of trade took place after 1826, and was connected to the EICC – a venture that has not enjoyed the attention it merits from historians. [634]

THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE EXCLUSIVE IVORY COMPANY OF INHAMBANE AND LOURENÇO MARQUES[635]

Vincente Thomas Santos, who was co-founder of the EICC, was not new to the business of slavery. He had frequented the waters between Mozambique Island, the Mascarenes and Brazil since 1817, and was aware of the lucrative possibilities of the growing Brazilian and Mascarene slave markets.

Born in Lisbon, he became a sailor at the age of fourteen and, over a career of 32 years led numerous slaving expeditions. Santos first served as a pilot for the renowned merchant José Nunes da Silveira, who dealt in slaves and other goods.

[634] Both Smith and Hedges do mention the commercial company in passing. Smith focuses on its conflict with successive Governors, while Hedges mentions it in connection with its agent, José Antonio Nobre. See Hedges, 'Trade and Politics', 243; Smith, 'The Struggle', 281.

[635] The fort was the official Portuguese trading post, manned by military personnel, while 'The Exclusive Ivory Commercial Company of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques' was a private venture that came into competition with the fort.

Santos carried his first known shipment of 273 slaves, bought at Mozambique Island, across the seas for his employer, to Maranhao, in 1817.[636] But, being an ambitious man and well-connected to the trade networks of Bourbon Island and Brazil, he became a trader in his own right. He bought da Silveira's ship, the *Delfim*, in 1826. And later he also purchased the brigantine *Maria Theresa* at an auction of the Public Deposit Board of Lisbon, from where he sailed directly to buy slaves at Inhambane.[637] Santos's activities and networks tightened the links between Delagoa Bay and the booming Brazilian slave trade.

Santos made an appearance in Delagoa Bay in 1823, the same year as Captain WFW Owen, who was on a survey journey to map the east coast of Africa from Algoa Bay. He reported that after his ship, the HMS *Leven*, had left in September 1823, Santos sailed into the Bay, and three years later the EICC started trading.[638]

Santos and his partner, Carlos Baptista, chartered the EICC in Lisbon in 1824, proclaiming the venture to be in line with Portuguese policy to expand trade in Africa.[639] The purpose of the EICC (hereafter called the Company) was ostensibly to stimulate economic growth and advance the settlement of Delagoa through trade. The Company had the blessing and protection of King John VI of Portugal, while the

[636] The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (TASTD), https://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/database, Voyage ID 46445.

[637] J Capela, *Dicionário de Negreiros em Moçambique, 1750-1897* (Porto: Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto, 2007), electronic edition, http://www.africanos.eu, 104. This Board received deposits of any valuable goods to auction off to generate revenue for the city.

[638] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 June 1824.

[639] Capela, *Dicionário de Negreiros*, 13.

Company of Merchants of Lisbon supported the charter because its interests lay in the development of new markets for their goods.[640] But the Company's name belied its primary purpose, which was trading slaves. Its establishment facilitated a significant growth in the trade. Stating the intention of the Company to trade exclusively in ivory legitimised its existence, and served as a front for its core business. It flourished in the context of the ambivalent attitude of the Portuguese towards their pledges to abolish slavery. Despite his promises to the British to promote the abolition of slavery, the King of Portugal waived the Company's import duties on slaves by charter – thus, in practice, promoting the trade.[641] A large factor in the Company's success was its ample and consistent supply of trade goods, explored further below.

The Company had a significant trade with the French.[642] Slaves were sold to the French ships *L'evrier*, *Jan Belier*, *São João*, and *Spiegel*, among many others, which frequented the Bay every two months.[643] The *L'evrier* was given permanent access to the Bay to supply provisions to the residents, and in return shipped slaves

[640] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284, Cx 2 d. 1, Letter From Jozé do Nascimento to the Military Governor of the Mozambique Province, 20 January 1835.

[641] Ibid.

[642] The greatest contribution of the SEMU for understanding trade in the 1820s lies in the documented inquest into Governor Dionizo Antonio Ribeiro's death at the hands of Dingane's generals in 1833. These documents complement the close account of the events recorded in 'A Guerra dos Reis do Cabo Natal, Maxacana da Matolla, Macasana do Maputo, e mais Regnos Vizinhos ao Presidio', currently held in AHU Moçambique (Moç) Conselho Ultramarino (CU), box (Cx) 263, as document (d.) 80. This contemporary document shows the events surrounding Ribeiro's death, while illuminating the nature of the relationship between the fort (which served as a trading post) and the commercial company, as well as the relationships between them and surrounding chiefs.

[643] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284, Cx 2 d. 1, Letter From Jozé do Nascimento to the Military Governor of the Mozambique Province, 20 January 1835.

northeast.[644] Other ships associated with the slave trade were the *Maria Theresa*, as well as the *Eliza*, *Flumenencia*, *Agua do Brazil*, *Amelia*, *Mariana*, *Maria Segunda*, *Industria*, *Trintão Pequeno*, and lastly the *Zefiro* that went to Brazil 'many, many times'.[645] Santos commanded the state-owned ship, the *Dom Estavão de Ataide* to transport his own slaves to Brazil, refusing to freight anyone else's captives.[646] It is therefore clear that during the late 1820s Delagoa Bay produced a large number of slaves for the French and Brazilian markets.

The slave trade was prodigiously profitable. Two or three Spanish dollars bought a slave at the Bay, but French ships in turn bought slaves with goods worth ten times the original price.[647] Santos's real profit, however, lay in freighting his own consignments of slaves, selling each slave in Brazil for 150 to 200 Spanish dollars – a substantial profit margin.[648] Plantation work was not the only source of work for slaves. In Brazil, slaves also built houses, herded livestock, and did domestic work.[649] Young boys and girls were especially desired for the latter duties, and demand for them was high. A rare fragment of evidence gives a breakdown of the

[644] F Santana (ed.), *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, vol. I (Lisbon: Centro Histórico Ultramarino, 1964), 359, 360. The food supply was a perennial problem at the Bay, with the annual ship often ending its circuit at Inhambane.

[645] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284 Cx 2 d. 1, Letter from the Governor of Delagoa Bay, Caetano da Costa Matoza, 18 November 1834.

[646] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284, Cx 2 d. 1, Letter From Jozé do Nascimento to the Military Governor of the Mozambique Province, 20 January 1835.

[647] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, to Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty, 9 October 1823.

[648] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284 Cx 2 d. 1, Letter from the Governor of Delagoa Bay, Caetano da Costa Matoza, 18 November 1834.

[649] A Carreira, *O Tráfico Português de Escravos na Costa Oriental Africana nos Começos do Século XIX: Estudo de um Caso* (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, Centro de Estudos de Antropologia Cultural, 1979), 62.

slave inventory; it shows that 59 percent of a cargo of 140 slaves were children – boys and girls.[650]

TERROR AT DELAGOA BAY

From the late 1820s and into the 1830s terror reigned at the Bay. Santos executed the Company's first slave raid in KaTembe (or Tembe territory) in 1826 with the help of Chief Makasane Maputo. From the ship *Maria Thereza*, Santos fired a few cannon shots, signalling the charge of Maputo raiders toward the Tembe River. The fleeing Tembe were either killed or captured. After the attack, Santos disembarked and, surrounded by his armed escort, conferred with a few of Makasana's men. A few months later Makasana returned with a force of 25 000 men; this time the army was a mix of Maputo and Vatua (probably Zulu) soldiers. The raiders adopted a burnt earth approach, killing those who resisted, setting fields and huts alight, and taking captives. The Company, through Santos, was deeply implicated in this event.[651]

The reason for assuming that the Vatua were Zulu in this instance, is the collaborative nature of the relationship between Makasane and the Zulu at the time. The Maputo had a history of partnering up with the northern Nguni, as in the case of the exclusive partnership in the ivory trade between Makasane and Dingiswayo for

[650] Biblioteca da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, Res-5-A, Cx 7 d. 309, 'Delfim', 'Lista de Escravos, Traziddos pela Bergantim *Delfim* de Moçambique para serem Vendidos em Perambuco', 20 October 1820.

[651] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284, Cx 2 d. 1, Letter From Jozé do Nascimento to the Military Governor of the Mozambique Province, 20 January 1835.

the benefits of trade.[652] Evidence for the Maputo and Zulu meeting daily to discuss 'matters necessary to settle', suggests that this link continued in the 1820s.[653] But fuller collaboration came only after the 'Vatiwahs' overcame the Maputo.[654] The Vatua then 'settled here by agreement'.[655] It appears, then, that Shaka established a group, about 100 kilometres up the Maputo River from the Bay, probably to monitor the flow of goods, as Makasane's homestead was a lively trading post.[656] As with the case of Dingiswayo and Makasane, the Zulu provided the trade goods. At this time the primary demand was for slaves. The Maputo were the main slave traders, earning wealth in beads, brass and cloth, part of which passed on to the Zulu as tribute.

But it was not only the Company which raided for slaves. From the mid-1820s, João Francez, a partner of the new Governor, Dionizo Antonio Ribeiro, had a retinue of local men, called 'black smugglers', to aid in capturing an unknown number of slaves. And if the Company's unit of men is a representative example, these retinues were well-armed with guns and ammunition. The trading post had a garrison of 50 to 60 soldiers employed for the same purpose, recruited locally by the Portuguese.[657]

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[652] Stuart, Malcolm (eds), *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, 7. Makasane provided military assistance to Dingiswayo to vanquish the Qwabe, by requesting musket-carrying soldiers from the Portuguese fort . In return, Dingiswayo promised to direct all his ivory through Makasane on the way to the market at Delagoa Bay.

[653] British Library, ADD MS 33837, Letter dated 1 May 1823, author and recipient unknown, f. 33.

[654] SOAS Archives, WMMS, MMS 17 01 01 008, William Threlfall to unknown, August 1823.

[655] Ibid.

[656] To illustrate how seriously the Zulu took transactions and retaliated in violence, Big George is a case in point. He took a tusk without payment, and 25 'Bratwahs' killed all his relatives in the region of the upper Maputo River; National Library of South Africa (NLSA), Cape Town Campus, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary (WMMS) Microfilm Collection, MSE 13, slide 31.

[657] TNA ADM 1/2269, Report, WFW Owen, Captain of HMS *Leven*, 15 April 1823.

Avoiding capture and enslavement was probably a strong incentive for their cooperation. Chiefs and headmen were also coerced into slaving operations. A chief named Moleke had promised to provide slaves, and had accepted the chains and shackles for this purpose. But when an officer from the trading post, Brancamp de Mello, called to collect slaves, he had none to offer. The poor man thought he could appease the agent by offering ivory. De Mello shunned his offer and Moleke ended up in the same shackles given to him to restrain the promised captives.[658]

Payment in goods and liquor provided a strong inducement for collaboration. The copious amounts of alcohol, known as *aguardente*, that the Company supplied was a key element in their success because it could 'buy anything'.[659] To the chagrin of the Governor, the Company ignored the prices paid for slaves set by the authorities on Mozambique Island, and fixed its own, much higher rates, pricing the trading post out of the market.[660] While the Company had a reliable and reasonably priced supply of trade goods, the trading post was dependent on a chronically erratic and expensive supply of beads and brass supplied from the financially beleaguered Mozambique Island. Because of the Company's generous payments in beads and brass, much merchandise from the south was available for purchase, which a close reading of the evidence suggests mainly comprised slaves. The Company, which was 'careful to only buy slaves', used longboats to fetch slaves along the Maputo River. A key

[658] AHU CU Moç Cx 227 d. 20, *Memoria*, written by Antonio Jozé Lamego Cabral, Captain of the Commission, 26 July 1830.

[659] AHU Moç, Cx 263 d. 80, 'A Guerra dos Reis do Cabo Natal'.

[660] AHU CU Moç, Cx 262 d. 134, Letter to the CU, unknown author, 25 August 1832.

trading point was a tent set up on the river's banks, about a hundred kilometres south, where a 'principal ferry' shuttled goods and people back and forth.[661]

The insertion of the Commercial Company into the Bay's market disrupted the open communication the trading post had with chiefs, local and remote, and disturbed the ivory trade. The Company's presence brought disorder and dissension among the chiefs – perfect conditions for slavery – and created chaos in the Bay area.[662] It sent out agents to establish 'new trade routes', a practice which probably involved additional or new groups of people in the trade. So far no records – neither of the modus operandi of the agents, nor of the number of slaves they secured – have been found. But in 1827 a slave raid, probably on the Tembe, was so successful that Santos had to leave four cannons behind to make space on his ship for his human cargo.[663]

The picture that emerges from the mid-1820s is that, at times, bands of Makasane's men, armed with muskets, terrorised the Tembe. At other times, the Maputo '*com combinacão com os negros de Certoens*' (in combination [with the] blacks of the hinterland), helped to conduct slave raids.[664] The '*negros de certoens*', were most

[661] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284 Cx 2 d. 1, Letter from João Alexandre de Almeida, Major-Adjutant of Government Orders, 18 February 1833. For the reference to the ferry, see The British Library, ADD MS 33837, Letter dated 1 May 1823, author and recipient unknown, f. 32. For the tent, see SOAS Archive, WMMS, MMS, Letter from Willian Threlfall to unknown, August 1823.

[662] AHU CU Moç, Cx 262 d. 134, Letter to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, undated, possibly 1832; AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284 Cx 2 d. 1, Letter from the Governor of Delagoa Bay, Caetano da Costa Matoza, 18 November 1834.

[663] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284 Cx 2 d. 1, Letter from the Governor of Delagoa Bay, Ceatano da Costa Matoza, 18 November 1834.

[664] AHU CU Moç, Cx 262 d. 134, Letter to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, undated, possibly 1832. The Maputo and Zulu representatives had regular meetings at chief Makasane's

likely Zulu as they were a dominant military power in the southern interior. The Company's dungeon served as a holding space for the unfortunate souls before embarkation.[665]

THE SLAVE TRADE IN NUMBERS

As we have seen above, Delagoa Bay was of increasing interest to slavers from the 1790s, and the numbers went up over the ensuing decades – but it is only from the mid-1820s that credible evidence about of the scale of the trade exists.

The total number of slaves exported from Delagoa Bay directly to Brazil in the years from 1829 to 1833 was 8 675.[666] Bourbon Island was the other significant market for the Company. Slaves left the Bay for Bourbon Island every two months. With the average cargo of 542 slaves, filling six loads a year, this amounts to 3 252 slaves a year. Calculating the Bourbon trade over three years, by four ships of the Company's existence, the number jumps to 39 024. Capela and Medeiros show the number of slaves taken to Mozambique Island from Delagoa Bay as 16 000 for the period 1827 to 1830. This bring the number of slaves shipped out of the Bay to over 63 000, which excludes the slaves carried away in French ships that frequented the Bay.

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homestead, discussing commercial matters; see *The British Library,* A detailed description of the sea coast from the Cape, ADD MS 33837, f.33.

[665] AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284, Cx 2 d. 1, Letter From Jozé do Nascimento to the Military Governor of the Mozambique Province, 20 January 1835.

[666] The sum of slaves was calculated by cross-checking of ships listed in the SEMU with the number of slaves these loaded, as recorded in the Voyages Database – see table below. The extremely valuable Voyages Database, which only came into existence in 1999, and was therefore not available to either Smith or Hedges, reveals the considerable number of slaves traded from Delagoa Bay. See The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (TASTD): https://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/database.

Thus, at the very least, the slave trade extracted tens of thousands of people from a relatively small population over less than a decade. Conservatively calculated, the number of slaves exported annually between 1827 and 1835 was 12 738. See table below.

Slave Numbers Exported from Delagoa Bay

The sources concur that a principal source of the supply of slaves to the Company in this period was raiding by the Vatua, or Zulu, acting in league with Portuguese slavers. Dingane's relationship with the slave trader Anselmo Nascimento deeply implicates Dingane's armies in the slave trade.[667] For example, Dingane accepted gifts in return for permission to slave in territory where societies were tributary to him.

The attacks of the Vatua were predominately on the Tembe, which Owen estimated had a population of approximately 50 000.[668] An explanation for their vulnerability probably lies in their previous defeat by the Maputo, an offshoot of the old Tembe lineage. In addition, the Tembe were the least militarised society in the region because of their focus on cultivation.[669] The capture of the 'thousands and thousands', as we have seen above, depleted the population of the Tembe.

[667] AHU CU Moç, Cx 239 d. 92, Letter to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, Paulo José Miguel de Brito, 30 October 1830. Anselmo was called 'a bad man' for calling the Vatua to war against him. The slave trader's motive for this friendship, therefore, was likely assistance in warfare, relying on Dingane's army to raid in the territory of Matola for the purpose of capturing slaves.

[668] TNA ADM 1/2269, Letter, 18 April 1823. Owen estimated Tembe population to be 50 000 people.

[669] AHU CU Moç, Codíce 1393, Letter from Governor Matozo to the Governor-General of Mozambique Island, 11 July 1821.

TASTD ID Number[670]	Year	Vessel Name	Number of Slaves
987	1829	Maria Theresa	282
1002	1829	Fluminense	674
1007	1829	Mariana	558
1019	1829	Amália	800
1022	1829	Dezenove de Março	638
1104	1830	Águia de América	599
1107	1830	Fluminense	678
1184	1830	Elisa	534
1228	1830	Elisa	519
1292	1833	Zefiro	455
1445	1835	Paquete Africano	269
5015	1829	Dois Irmãos	475
40772	1831	Zefiro	475
46425	1832	Oriental	691
46463	1830	Flor de Mocambique	514
900136	1830	Lourenço Marques	514
		Sub-Total	8675
		Slaves Delagoa Bay to, Reunion and Mauritius, 1827-1830[671]	16 000
		Slaves shipped to Bourbon Island every two months a year for three years per four ships[672]	39 024
		TOTAL	63 699 slaves

Tembe territory was 'almost depopulated because of slave raiding'.[673] The Matola were a target for slave raiding and, like the Tembe, were numerous.

[670] The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database gives the number of slaves embarked at Delagoa Bay.

[671] Capela, Medeiros, *O Tráfico de Escravos*, 41.

[672] Vessels shipped slaves to Bourbon Island every two months '… e outro mais exportação para Ilha Borbon dous em dous mezes …', AHU SEMU L1 Moç, 1284, Cx 2 d. 1, Letter From Jozé do Nascimento to the Military Governor of the Mozambique Province, 20 January 1835. Taking the average number of slaves embarked at Delagoa Bay, following the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database figures, the average load of slaves per ship destined for Bourbon Island was 542 per voyage. While there is no evidence for exactly how many ships did this circuit, we know of at least four; see table above.

[673] CJA Teixeira, 'Descripção dos Rios da Baia Lourenço Marques, 20 September 1838', *Arquivo das Colónias* 11 (1918): 61-65, 62. Capela, *Diconário de Negreiros,* 191-192.

It appears that from 1831 the supply of captives fell, probably because of the dwindling population of the Tembe, who had been the main victims of the trade. There is also little evidence that Shaka or Dingane sold subjects from the heartland of the Zulu kingdom into slavery. As with many other slaving states in Africa, relatively weak and less centralised neighbours were the prime source of captives. And in this instance, the sources of slaves lay to the north of the kingdom and close to the main market for them at Delagoa Bay. Based on the evidence that is now available, the participation of the Zulu kingdom in the trade seems rather like the pattern of Swazi involvement in the slave/inboekeling trade from the 1840s to the 1870s.[674] During the period of rapid expansion and wide-ranging raiding, the Swazi state was prepared to trade significant numbers of slaves to the Boers and to Delagoa Bay. But their involvement diminished as the main dynamic of the kingdom shifted towards the consolidation of power in its central regions, and raiding declined in the face of mounting resistance from the Pedi kingdom and other chiefdoms in the region.[675] By the 1830s, the Zulu kingdom was also entering a period of consolidation. It also had an alternate source of wealth because English traders, who could supply the trade goods Dingane desired and who were interested in ivory, not slaves, were by then well-established at Port Natal.

CONCLUSION

37 years ago, Harries provided a compelling critique of the idea that the northern Nguni, including the Zulu, had a ‘natural aversion to both domestic and export forms

[674] Delius, *The Land Belongs*, 35-38, 137-138, 146; P Bonner, ‘Factions and Fissions: Mswati’s Early Years’, in *Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires*, 47-64.

[675] Harries, 'Slavery’, 309.

of slavery'.[676] To this day, historians have not systematically tested this insight against the evidence for the nature and impact of trade relationships between Delagoa Bay and its southern hinterland. Instead, both the endorsement and rejection of his insights has been based on, at best, superficial research, and coloured by the more polemical aspects of the 'Mfecane' debate. One of the reasons for this failure to build on his insights has been the inability or unwillingness of the historians to engage with documentary material in Portuguese.

This chapter, on the basis of in-depth archival research, provides a detailed, differentiated and periodised account of the trading systems linking Delagoa Bay and its southern hinterland. Within this framework, the role of the slave trade has been underestimated. There is evidence that the booming demand for slaves in Brazil and on the Mascarene Islands had a major impact on this region. The scale of that trade is difficult to establish before the 1820s because it was, by and large, an illicit trade, and not systematically recorded. But what is clear is that Eldredge's assertion that there was no significant trade prior to 1823 is, at the very least, questionable. There is evidence of an increasing, though at present unquantifiable, slave trade in the early decades of the nineteenth century. It gathered pace in the early 1820s, and expanded exponentially with the intervention of the Exclusive Ivory Commercial Company of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques after 1826. Local warfare and systematic raiding by armed retainers of the Company and the Governor provided some of the supply, but regiments from further south raided into the Bay area, creating prisoners for sale. In the 1820s, during Shaka's rule, there is strong evidence that Zulu regiments participated.

[676] Ibid.

I argue that between 1828 and 1833, the Tembe population of Delagoa Bay was subjected to intense slaving, with the help of Zulu armies. Over 63 000 people were shipped from the Bay to either the Mascarenes or Brazil. Conservatively calculated, the annual number of slaves was over 12 742 – many more than the 2 000-3 000 slaves a year postulated by Cobbing and Wright.[677]

The main source of captives were militarily weak societies, like the Tembe, lying to the south of the Bay. But as political authority was consolidated in the expanded Zulu state, the numbers of captives offered for sale dwindled, and the price rose steeply. This pattern is comparable to the expansion and then contraction of the Swazi trade in slaves to both the Boers and Delagoa Bay in the period 1840-1876.

Further research is needed to fully reconstruct the slave trade at Delagoa Bay and to expand the understanding of its linkages to wider transformations in the region. But slavery can no longer be ignored or consigned to the margins of research and debate. This chapter also gives an indication of the insights that can be gained by a systematic engagement with archives holding records on the history of Mozambique. More in-depth research on these sources can transform our understanding of the central processes of change in the interior of South Africa from the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER SEVEN

[677] Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi', 504; Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', 202.

AN INFERIOR *SAGUATE*! A THREAT TO DINGANE'S STANDING: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF GIFT-GIVING ON THE POLITICAL HIERARCHY OF SOUTHEAST AFRICAN POLITIES

Early on the morning of 13 October 1833, the Governor of the Delagoa Bay trading post, Dionizo Antonio Ribeiro, was led naked into a cattle kraal in the presence of a great crowd. Here the Zulu Chiefs of War, despatched by King Dingane, pronounced a list of accusations against him. Afterwards he was led to the edge of the Espirito Santo River, first shot, then sliced open with an assegai, whereafter his heart was ripped from his chest.[678]

The murder of the Governor has been treated, mostly in brief, by several historians, namely George McCall Theal (1908), José Justino Teixeira Botelho (1936), Alexander Lobato (1961), and John Omer-Cooper (1966). Omer-Cooper mentions the event in passing. Botelho and Lobato give an outline of events, while Theal's brief analysis of the murder gives Soshangana a prominent role in events, an analysis rejected by Gerhard Liesegang, saying that Theal overestimated Soshangana's importance in the political processes at Delagoa Bay. Some historians who deal with southeast African history during the nineteenth century have not thought the incident worthy of mention. For example, recent research on Dingane by Sifiso Ndlovu does not touch on the incident.[679]

[678] AHU Moç Cx 262 d. 80, *Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal*, f. 51.

[679] SM Ndlovu, *African Perspectives of King Dingane kaSenzangakhona: The Second Monarch of the Zulu Kingdom* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

There is an important exception to this pattern of cursory attention, in Gerhard Liesegang's 1969 article, titled 'Dingane's Attack on Lourenco Marques in 1833'. Here he provides a far fuller account of Dingane's attack on the Bay. In it he poses the important and central question of why Dingane ordered the Governor's execution. Liesegang drew on documents held at the *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino* (Archive of the History of Overseas [Ports]) (AHU) in Lisbon, including a key document named '*Guerra dos Reis do Cabo Natal, Maxacana da Matolla, Macasana do Maputo, e mais Regnos Vizinhos ao Presidio'* (War of the Kings of Cape Natal, Mashakane of Matola, Makasana of Maputo, and Other Rulers in the Fort's Vicinity), hereafter '*Guerra*'.

The Company's agent José António Nobre, who had written the manuscript, was tried and acquitted on Mozambique Island on the charge of instigating the Governor's murder. His acquittal was presumably based in part on the day by day account he provided of events during the spring and winter of 1833. While written by an obviously self-interested party, it was drafted shortly after the events, and provides important insights into the commercial and political circumstances at the Bay.[680] However, it is problematic to rely so heavily on a single source. While Liesegang judged it as 'reliable', the inquest into Governor Ribeiro's death provides corroboration for Nobre's view of events.[681]

The inquest documents are held by the AHU in a collection named SEMU, *Secretária do Estado da Marinho e Ultramar* (Secretary of the Overseas and

[680] AHU Moç Cx 262 d. 80, *Guerra*.

[681] Liesegang, 'Dingane's Attack', 565-579, 573.

Navy).[682] The inquest documents echo the manuscript on the nature of the triangular relationship between the fort (which served as a trading post), the surrounding chiefs, and the Company, which operated out of the Bay from 1826. But it is the interviews with the military personnel that ultimately validate '*Guerra*'. Because of the attempts of everyone involved to blame each other for the turn of events, it allowed the inquiry to penetrate beyond self-serving accounts.

Liesegang relies somewhat on Henry Francis Fynn's diary (he quotes from it five times). The diary has been critised as largely unreliable because of its constructed nature, Fynn's exaggeration of the depopulation of the southern coast of Natal, his frequent contradictory remarks, and finally his characterisation of Shaka as a bloodthirsty maniac.[683] However, the perspectives that Liesegang draws from Fynn are confirmed by the primary Portuguese documents mentioned above.

After a narrative account of the preceding events, Liesegang tentatively concludes that there are four possible reasons for Dingane's action against the Governor. It may have been Governor Ribeiro's northward expansion policy, his disrespectful attitude toward king Dingane, his inability to meet the King's demand for a *saguate*, or lastly, the Governor's relationship with Soshangana, the Ndwandwe chief who had

[682] The record of events is found at the SEMU, which holds letters from Governors of Portuguese settlements, including Lourenço Marques and Inhambane, as well as letters of other personnel that touch the administration of these ports.

[683] Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi'; D Wylie, ''Proprietor of Natal': Henry Francis Fynn and the Mythography of Shaka', *History in Africa* 22 (1995): 409-437.

moved north of the Bay in the 1820s, and was forming the Gaza Empire in southeastern Mozambique.[684]

While all these points, tentatively stated, have value, they skirt around the core of the issue – that of the competition for gaining and maintaining preeminence in the hinterlands of the Bay. This weakness is rooted in a deeper methodological problem, namely that lists of factors influencing events do not provide an adequate explanation for them. Fundamental to persuasive historical analysis of causation is the intersection of a range of forms of causation through time. This chapter aims to provide a more dynamic, periodised and multicausal explanation than has been provided previously.

From the records it is clear that Ribeiro was in a relationship with Soshangana, and it was in the matter of a *saguate* that he lacked caution in treating Dingane. One of the core issues that Liesegang neglects to explore in depth is that of Dingane's power and dominant position linked to, and underscored by, gift-giving. This omission is no doubt because he did not have access to the findings of subsequent research that has pointed out the central role that chiefs played in the exchange of goods; and, more pertinently, the status of a relationship with traders, which played out not as a chief and subject, but more as that of equals.

To set the seal on their bond, the traders presented a gift or *saguate* of brass items and beads to the chief-principal-dealer, who at this stage was Dingane.[685] This

[684] Liesegang, 'Dingane's Attack', 578.

[685] South of Delagoa Bay prestige items were beads and brass, while north of the Bay, beads and cloth were the primary goods in demand.

ritualised exchange is distinguished from the normal process of trade, i.e. the exchange of ivory and slaves for beads, brass items and some cloth. The *saguate* was the prerogative of the King, and a vehicle to accumulate prestige trade items essential to the political economy of societies in southeast Africa. Trade goods such as beads and brass items, and the sought-after neck and arm brass rings (manilas) were vital to bolster the authority of a king or chief. This was certainly true for King Dingane.

Liesegang places his article in the context of the ivory trade, while dismissing the slave trade out of the Bay with a single sentence: 'Slaves were important for Lourenço Marques from about 1825 to 1831'.[686] By glossing over the slave trade, Liesegang fails to see the role of Soshangana as party to the sale of slaves at Delagoa Bay.[687] Drawing on many of the same primary sources as Liesgang, my research into the nature of trade in Delagoa Bay has alerted me to the prominence of the *saguate* in establishing and sustaining political hierarchies.[688] While the Zulu state maintained fundamental sources of power over land, people and trade, the *saguate* served as a powerful symbol to legitimise this power. This perspective also enables me to provide a fuller analysis of the interplay of the factors that shaped this event.

Ribeiro's tenure as Governor at Delagoa Bay occurred during the reign of the Zulu King Dingane – who had come to power through political intrigue, which led to the

[686] Liesegang, 'Dingane's Attack', 567.

[687] L Chewins, and P Delius, 'The Northeastern Factor in South African History: Reevaluating the Volume of the Slave Trade Out of Delagoa Bay and its Impact on its Hinterland in the Early Nineteenth Century', *The Journal of African History* 61, 1 (2020): 89-110.

[688] L Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa'.

murder of King Shaka in 1828. By this time, Shaka had brought the hinterlands of Delagoa Bay into the Zulu kingdom's orbit of tributary chiefdoms. Having the right to tribute resulted in the annual dispatch of Zulu tribute collectors, who collected the expected gifts under threat of death – 'if they did not pay, we stabbed them', was the comment recorded.[689]

The right to tribute continued under Dingane's reign. But the arrival of the Secretary of the Saguate of Twelve Moons was part of a somewhat different bond between the King and the trading post, and was shaped by a somewhat different understanding of the nature of the relationship.[690] The Portuguese interpretation of the *saguate*, was that it underscored an equal and reciprocal relationship between the trading post and King Dingane. Shaka and Dingane may well have seen the *saguate* as a variation on the forms of tribute they received from subordinates, but the *saguate* was more than an economic asset; it was a significant symbol of power. The Governor's decision to divert Dingane's *saguate* to another contender for over-lordship, namely, Soshangana, revealed the political significance of gift-giving. Giving the *saguate* to an enemy represented a threat to the Zulu King's political standing.

Soshangana was a significant cog in the regional political machinations to gain political ascendency. To continue making profits, the trading post and the Company were dependent on the military power of chiefs to assist in the process of slave capture, and they sustained this relationship through the distribution of gifts. This process occurred in a slower, yet still viable, slave trade because of the diminishing

[689] Webb, Wright, *JSA*, vol. I, 'testimony of Bikwayo kaNoziwana', 64.

[690] AHU Moç SEMU, L1, Cx 2 d. 4, Governor of Lourenço Marques, Dasio Rodrigues de Vasconcellos, 9 October 1834.


cohort of captives. By 1833, the trading post had to compete with the Company for the shrinking pool of slaves. Ribeiro saw the answer in slaving to the north of the Bay, which in effect required a new military partner. The natural choice was Soshangana, the hegemon to the north, towards Inhambane. To maintain his military relationship with Soshangana, while placating Dingane, Ribeiro needed a steady flow of goods. But the neglect of the trading post by Mozambique Island undermined the plans of the Governor and his partners. And in these circumstances of economic pressure, Ribeiro, in a gross miscalculation, diverted riches to the north, potentially swinging the balance of power to the north.

In the 1820s, the trading post – known as a *Presídio*, or fort-prison – comprised a small fort, and prison, commanded by a major with the title of Governor; a captain; a lieutenant; as well as 50 to 60 black soldiers.[691] It was of a not inconsiderable value as a source of ivory, with the potential of delivering 20 000-30 000 kg of tusks annually, in addition to a slave trade.[692] Yet the officials on Mozambique Island neglected provisioning of the trading post, partly because of a shortage of ships to

[691] ADM 1/2269, WFW Owen, 'Portuguese Settlements and Dominions of the Eastern Coast of Africa', 15 April 1823.

[692] Ibid.

service all its ports, least of all the backwater of Delagoa Bay.



Chefina Isle, Governor Antonio Dionizo Ribeiro's Refuge

Recognising the logistical difficulties of supplying goods to Delagoa Bay, the authorities included a clause in the Company's charter of 1825, obliging it to freight foodstuffs and other supplies from Mozambique Island to the trading post. And so, in this way, Mozambique Island absolved itself from the duty of delivering goods to Delagoa Bay. But it gradually became clear that the director of the Company, Vincente Thomas Santos, felt little moral obligation to fulfil these promises. The constant shortage of food forced the trading post personnel to buy essential goods from English traders, whaling ships, and French slavers. The perennial under-provision of the post gave the Company great competitive advantage, but the most crucial shortage – gun powder and ammunition – came to play a key role in Dingane's ability to enforce his authority over the trading post and order the murder of the Governor. But far the most dire consequence of the under-provision of trade goods stemmed from Ribeiro's attempt to play off two powerful rulers against each other in an attempt to bolster his own economic and political position.

GOVERNOR DIONIZO ANTONIO RIBEIRO

Ribeiro's term of office illustrates the nature of the world of trade at Delagoa Bay, partly shaped by the chiefs who held sway over the territory. These powerful men were ranked in a social hierarchy determined by two factors. The first was the prestige of a ruling lineage; and the second was a chief's military strength. the accumulation of trade goods bolstered both aspects. The dynamics of wealth and power were governed by a complex set of rules around the protocol of gift-giving to chiefs, who were interested in accumulating their own riches because 'ostentation was power', illustrated by the hundreds of thousands of glass beads encrusting the

poles of Dingane's main hut.[693] At the centre of this order stood the trading post, which was, in the main, manned by military men turned merchants. They were the middlemen between their close and dominant neighbours, and Western mercantile interests.

In October 1829, Ribeiro stepped ashore at Delagoa Bay, which at the time was a thriving slave port. He was the replacement for José Antonio Teixeira (July 1828-September 1829), who had been suspended for conducting a fraudulent slave trade, and not paying duties on his merchandise to Mozambique Island. Governor Teixeira's sin was not the slave trade itself, but the fact that, in neglecting to pay over the duties due at Mozambique Island, he undermined the economy of the capital. The possibility of amassing wealth through slavery at the Bay was tempting. He and his son, Custudio José Antonio, who was a former captain of a slave ship in employ of the Company, had made the handsome and personal sum of 30 000 gold coins over the fourteen months of José's tenure.[694] Ribeiro was no doubt eager to make a similar fortune, and joined Teixeira aboard his ship the *Mariana* for dinner. While supping together on the eve of the ship's departure they ignored the cries of the African parents who lamented their children's imprisonment aboard the ship.[695]

Unlike Ribeiro, Teixeira had seen an opportunity in the activities of the Company. His son, Custudio, had an association with Santos, who in turn was well-connected to the insatiable Bourbon trade. Teixeira's relationship with Santos provided

[693]Wylie, *Myth of Iron,* 58; Chewins, 'Trade at Delagoa', 103.

[694] AHU CU Moç Cx 227 d. 20, 'Memoria,' Antonio José Lamego Cabral, Captain of the Commission, 26 July 1830.

[695] Ibid.

connections to the slave trade network, and the latter's considerable fleet of ships focused on the southeast route that encompassed the ports of Delagoa Bay and Inhambane. Teixeira no doubt took advantage of his son's connection with and knowledge of the Mascarene trade, and the relatively high traffic of Santos's large fleet, which was continuously employed in two trade circuits, one to the Mascarenes and the other to Brazil. The first linked the southeast African coast to the Mascarenes where slaves were sold for coin that could purchase trade goods desired in southeast Africa. A round-trip took two months. The second followed a route to Brazil and then onward to Lisbon, a voyage that took seven months.[696] These maritime circuits represented the flow of slaves to produce commodities such as coffee and sugar, which were carried to the metropolitans of Portugal and France. The steady movement of Santos's fleet across the globe provided an almost constant stream of trade goods to the Bay for the use of the Company, and ensured sustained purchasing power for Governor Teixeira and the Company at the Bay. Ribeiro, however, was in competition for the ivory and slave trade, through the corrosive practice of confiscating the Company's goods and using these for his personal trade.[697] He justified his behaviour with the notion that the presiding Governor had the exclusive right of trade at the port.

As with most Governors of the east African Portuguese ports, it was clear from the outset that Ribeiro was intent on enriching himself. Ribeiro was committed 'from the first hour of his government' to defrauding the Crown, and stole from the Royal

[696] Biblioteca da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, Res-5-A Cx 5 d. 4, 'Delfim', f. 16, 'Illustração a Conta da Tomaz dos Santoz', Mozambique, 16 April 1816.

[697] AHU CU Moç SEMU, L1, 1284, cx 2d. 4, Alexandre Thomas de Morraes Sarmento, 8 June 1835.

Warehouse to purchase ivory and slaves for his own account.[698] As noted above, the intention to become wealthy through a port's trade was not an unusual attitude and, what is more, it had the tacit approval of the Crown. As an example, when Sebastiao Xavier Botelho received his appointment to the Governorship of Mozambique Island, the King said: 'Now you see I am your friend – make money and take care of yourself'.[699] There was, however, one caveat to this injunction, which was not to undermine the metropole by neglecting to gather duties on the sale of slaves, and to collect the same on imported trade goods for the sake of the Crown. On Mozambique Island, the import duties amounted to ten and a half Spanish dollars per slave – seven and a half for the Crown, and three to the Governor. In this way, a Governor-General could enrich himself, while keeping the capital's economy ticking over. By not charging duties, however, a Governor could attract slavers to the Bay who were always happy to increase their profit margin. Ribeiro's ambition followed the exact route decried by the capital: increasing his own wealth by not collecting duties for His Majesty.[700]

Santos's previous involvement in the slave trade as an employee of the successful merchant of slaves and other goods, a man called José de Nunes Silveira, gave him the invaluable experience and helpful contacts that ensured a full-scale operation at the Bay.[701] Yet the new Governor had no intention of taking advantage of Santos's

[698] AHU CU Moç Cx 227 d. 20, 'Memoria', Antonio José Lamego Cabral, Captain of the Commission, 26 July 1830.

[699] FT Texugo, *A Letter on the Slave Trade Still Carried On Along the Eastern Coast of Africa, Called the Province of Mosambique* (London: J Hatchford and Sons, 1839), 7. Texugo was an abolitionist and his word might be doubted here. However, the Crown did appoint Governors to their posts.

[700] AHU CU Moç SEMU, L1, 1284, cx 2 d. 4, Alexandre Thomas de Morraes Sarmento, 8 June 1835.

[701] José de Nunes Silveira was a well-known merchant who employed Santos on his first slave expedition from the southeast coast of Africa to Rio de Janeiro in 1816; see D Richardson, FR da

connections, nor of sharing the market with his commercial neighbours. He was of the firm view that the trading post and its income were his personal fiefdom. He demonstrated his rapacious nature a few days after his arrival in late 1829, when the brig, *Agua do Brazil*, arrived with 'many goods [with which] to buy slaves'.[702] These goods were promised to the commander of the bark, *Conde de São Sebastião*, yet the Governor and his accomplice, the Factor of the trading post, seized the goods by force.[703] It took the soldiers of the Fort a day and a night to offload the ship of uniforms, barrels of beads, brass rings, casks of *aguardente*, and biscuits. The goods were so bountiful that they filled the warehouse and overflowed into the Military Commander's house. The beads, the most precious goods of all, were kept in the Governor's house, placing him in a position of direct oversight of any exchange with the chiefs. Under the cover of darkness, the Governor divided these valuables between himself, the scribe, and another accomplice of his, a French agent known as João Francez.[704] Beads were in great demand by local suppliers of slaves, and this haul provided the three men with great buying power.

Ribeiro's behaviour did not endear him to the owner of the *Ágiua do Brazil* and *Conde de São Sebastãio*, who was no other than Vicente Thomas Santos, the director of the Company. His confiscation of Santos's goods sparked the animosity between the trading post and the Company. The Governor's ill-considered act eventually had tragic consequences. Ribeiro's career had a disgraceful start

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Silva (eds), *Networks and Trans-Cultural Exchange: Slave Trading in the South Atlantic, 1560-1867* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), 185.

[702] AHU Moç CU, Cx 227 d. 20, 'Memoria', Antonio José Lamego Cabral, Captain of the Commission, 26 July 1830.

[703] Ibid.

[704] Ibid.

because of his avarice and outright theft, which turned Santos into a powerful enemy. Ericeira, the Captain of the *Conde de São Sebastião* and rightful recipient of the confiscated goods, gave Ribeiro a withering dressing down. He accused him of being a thief, stealing revenue from His Majesty, and declared him an utter disgrace to the uniform. He threatened to report events to the Mozambique Island authorities and to insist on Ribeiro's replacement. But the next day the Governor sent the old Royal Warehouse Factor, Fortunalto, and Captain Brancamp to intercede for him. Disarmed by the diplomacy of the older man and the flattery of the younger, Ericeira forgave Ribeiro for his reprehensible behaviour.[705]

A few days after this event, the *Flor de Moçambique*, another slaver, sailed into the harbour from Rio de Janeiro. The Governor, clearly unrepentant, again had the ship's cargo offloaded at night without exacting any duties. The Governor and the Factor bought slaves with the goods, and the *Ágiua do Brazil*, having returned, received the shipment of slaves belonging to these two associates, as well as that of the other inhabitants of the fort, including the agent, João Francez. But greed interfered with the relationship between the Governor and Factor, eventually causing a rift. Ribeiro's soaring ambition caused him to extend his exclusivity on the slave trade. In the brutal and cut-throat world of the slave trade, he excluded the Factor and proclaimed, as Governor, his personal and exclusive use of the launches belonging to the State to fetch slaves. This new regulation removed the Factor's means of carrying on a trade. Within a few weeks of his arrival, the Governor had not only established a monopoly of the trade but also made a tidy profit at the expense of someone else's goods. Ribeiro almost certainly, just as Teixeira, had sent the

[705] AHU Moç CU, Cx 227 d. 20, 'Memoria', Antonio José Lamego Cabral, Captain of the Commission, 26 July 1830.

fort's armed soldiers on expeditions to capture slaves. And like Teixeira before him, likely punished the men severely if they failed to deliver.[706]

Ribeiro's ruthless character is further illustrated by his treatment of an unnamed third sergeant. He had paid this man 40 Spanish dollars to poison Lt. José de Sequeira, for reasons unknown, and after the deed had been done, he betrayed his henchman and threw him in prison, with the intent of sending him to Mozambique Island under the charge of murder. The man, however, escaped to Mfumo. As this incident shows, the Governor ruled the fort through fear, in part instilled in the populace by harsh and capricious punishments. He was not beyond imprisoning individuals for the smallest reason, and/or shipping them off to Mozambique Island under some trumped up charge.[707] The Military Commander, Francisco Luis de Meneses, lived in terror of Ribeiro for this reason.[708] Because of his brutal, coercive and unscrupulous approach to government, Ribeiro was called 'despotic'.[709] The Governor's brash approach made him financially successful in the narrow world of Delagoa Bay. But his corrupt practices increasingly drew critical scrutiny as the precarious status of the fort became clear. As we have seen, Santos was in care of the port's provisioning. But with the deepening animosity between the Company and Ribeiro, the delivery of the lifeblood of the trading post, namely foodstuffs and trade goods with which to pay the *saguate*, dried up.

[706] Santana (ed.), *Documentação*, vol. I, 939.

[707] Ibid., f. 16

[708] Ibid., f. 16

[709] Ibid., f. 36.

Santos, as director of the Company, was reluctant to help the trading post, and delayed and avoided freighting essential goods and provisions to Delagoa Bay. The lack of trade goods, specifically of beads, decorative brass rings and cloth, placed the security of the fort and its staff in jeopardy because of their inability to make *saguate* payments, as is explored further below. In November 1832, the Secretary of the administration of Mozambique Island ordered the director to designate one of his ships, the smack *Inhambane*, to transport 'weapons, ammunition, and merchandise' to Delagoa Bay. The delivery of the above was 'urgent and necessary and had to be done with all haste'.[710] Yet Santos prevaricated. His smack needed repairing, he claimed, but he had ordered repairs to be made without delay.[711] In other words, the *Inhambane* was out of commission. Santos was accused of neglect of the port, which he vehemently denied. He was quick to invoke the royal aegis: 'In due time, and at the opportune moment, I will take the same smack and go to Lisbon, and personally present to the King, our Lord, my complaints'.[712]

The lack of goods inevitably resulted in yet another default on the *saguate* payment to Dingane, leading to disastrous results. The Company undermined the trading post's buying power by throttling its access to trade goods and drying up its cash flow. It was a relatively easy accomplishment, as the Company ships freighted goods and provisions from Mozambique Island to Delagoa Bay. The lack of official vessels from Mozambique Island to service the port, that is to carry provisions and trade goods to the Bay, put the fort in a bind. The Company starved the trading post of coin by not paying duties, limiting its ability to purchase goods from European ships,

[710] AHU CU Moç Cx 262 d. 13, the interim Governor of Mozambique Island, 8 November 1832.

[711] Ibid.

[712] Ibid.

as the Company was doing.[713] The Company further out-priced the fort in the market by paying way beyond the official price set on Mozambique Island for goods. And by selling groceries at staggering prices in the Company shop, it put added financial strain on the trading post.[714] Moreover, the dismal state of the fort became apparent when the Governor sent the warehouse Factor to buy goods from the Company as *saguate*, a request that probably chafed at the Governor's pride.[715] From mid-1832, the Governor repeatedly requested goods from Mozambique Island. The fort and its residents continued to languish in a 'deplorable state', he wrote.[716]

In 1832, the Mozambique authorities informed Governor Ribeiro that they were fully aware of the critical situation at the trading post. But Santos still delayed deliveries, pleading the great inconvenience and cost to despatch his small, two-masted boat to Inhambane with supplies.[717] By July 1833, the Governor again lamented the deplorable economic state of the fort because the promised provisions and goods for the *saguate* had still not arrived. Meanwhile, Dingane prohibited trade at the fort for the lack of his *saguate*.

The Anglo-Brazilian abolition treaty, concluded on 13 November 1826, promised to end the Brazilian slave trade in 1830. Abolition threats accelerated the slave trade, as we have seen above. The Company completely abandoned the ivory trade, and expanded its slavery fields to the Limpopo River mouth. It despatched its launches up the Maputo River, and sent a schooner to the Limpopo River mouth to trade

[713] AHU CU Moç Cx 262 d. 134, signed by residents of Delagoa Bay, undated.

[714] Ibid.

[715] AHU CU Moc Cx 262 d. 134, Governor Ribeiro, 28 May 1833.

[716] AHU CU Moc Cx 262 d. 134, the interim Governor of Mozambique Island, 3 July 1832.

[717] AHU CU Moc Cx 262 d. 13, the interim Governor of Mozambique Island, 8 November 1832.

slaves. The Maputo River trade suggests that the Zulu under Dingane were involved in the slave trade, because this river is navigable a hundred kilometres into the interior. In light of the struggling trading post, the Company's prosperity became a source of ill-will between Ribeiro and the Company's agent José Nobre, as the trading post became desperate for trade items to pay *saguates* to Dingane. The *saguate* played a principal role in designating the recipient as the preeminent authority in a territory comprising a vast area, in this instance, Dingane. Dingane demanded the same recognition from these societies, which included the Company and the trading post.

The reception and delivery of the annual *saguate* was a highly ritualised process, heavily invested with political significance. This annual present to a highest political authority was, as we have seen, an outward sign of ongoing friendship, which allowed for amicable trade relations between the Governor of the trading post and a chief. As discussed previously, the ritual of the *saguate*, although differing in substance amongst different groups, had been in practice for hundreds of years along the east coast of Africa. In the case of Dingane, the gift comprised a collection of goods. Beads, cloth and, most importantly, large and small manilas were seen as non-negotiable elements in the payment. For this reason, Dingane sent the Secretary of the Twelve Moons, the head of the annual delegation, who inspected and officially received the *saguate*.[718]

The Portuguese trading post at Delagoa Bay had, since its inception, dutifully paid the required present to the Zulu King, who dominated the territory between the Bay

[718] AHU CU Moç SEMU 1284, Cx 2 d. 4, 9, Dasio Rodrigues de Vasceconcellos, 9 October 1834.

and northern Zululand. But matters became increasingly complicated when the Company, independent of the military trading post, opened for business in 1826 on the same shores. The reason for this increased complexity was the Company's capacity to provide more goods for ivory, and that it could afford a much larger *saguate*, thereby becoming the favoured trading partner at the Bay. The fact that the trading post, which officially represented Portuguese authority, could not match the quality or quantity of goods, diverted trade to the Company. The Governor claimed that chiefs 'disrespected' the trading post by showing an increased preference to trade with the Company, a situation that continued until the 1830s. Reportedly, many inhabitants around the Bay held sizeable amounts of ivory in their homesteads, but would rather let those rot than sell them for the low prices offered by the post.[719]

The sources of the *saguate* goods for the trading post and the Company were their respective suppliers. The trading post was reliant on official support from Mozambique Island which, we have seen, was perpetually in debt, and frequently slow to deliver goods to the neglected trading post of Delagoa Bay. The prohibitive cost of regularly sending a ship prohibited timely shipments to the trading post. This meant that lengthy periods of time would go by without regular deliveries. The perennial lack of provisions and trade goods became a factor in the events that played out in 1833.

[719] Ibid.

THE *SAGUATE* AND DINGANE

At the centre of the *saguate* payment lay the measurement of Dingane's prestige, which distinguished him from other important men. And as the quality of *saguate* payments was commensurate with status, Dingane expected to receive the most glorious of *saguates*. In 1829, an event occurred that illustrated the complexities around the nature of the *saguate* and its recipient.

The first documentary evidence of Dingane's contact with the Bay appears in 1829. Yet, considering the wealth pouring into the port from at least early 1828 through the slaving activities of Santos and the Teixeiras, it is unlikely that this recorded event was the first contact between the Zulu King and the Bay. The documentary evidence of communication between the Bay and Natal resulted from the arrival at the Bay of Portuguese sailors who had been shipwrecked on the shores of Natal. On 26 October 1829, a few weeks after Governor Ribeiro's arrival at the Bay, a Portuguese shallop – a light, coastal sailing boat – the *Adventureíra Africana*, filled with slaves, found itself shipwrecked on the coast of Natal. Dingane extended hospitality to the crew and offered an escort of two warriors to Delagoa Bay. Dingane's representatives ordered villages en route to Delagoa to provide sufficient provisions for the group's sustenance.[720]

The concern over the safe passage of the shipwrecked Portuguese suggests an amicable relationship between the trading post and Dingane. To thank Dingane for the safe arrival of the party, Ribeiro sent a gift of thanks – a *saguate* – to Natal, on 21 May 1830. This present was carried south by Dingane's porters, who were at the

[720] AHU CU Moç Cx 227 d. 20, 'Memoria', Antonio José Lamego Cabral, Captain of the Commission, 26 July 1830.

Bay at the time. The ready presence of Dingane's porters to convey the gift to their King suggests prior, and perhaps regular, communication between the two territories. On 15 July 1830, another gift of thanks, this time from the Governor-General de Brito of Mozambique Island, was despatched to Dingane, accompanied by three soldiers from the fort. After delivery and a long delay, an answer came from the south: Dingane was deeply unhappy with his *saguat*e.

This unhappiness was caused by the *saguate* Anselmo Nascimento had given Dingane. Previously, in April 1830, the *Victoria*, belonging to Nascimento, a slave trader who was involved in the Bourbon slave smuggling circuit, had sailed into the Bay.[721] He gave Dingane a *saguate* to cement their alliance and foster trade. The slave trader's motive for this friendship was to facilitate the slave trade, because he would later invite Dingane to despatch his army to raid in the territory of Matola on the north shore of the Bay.[722] The pattern of slaving at the Bay in this period was the collaboration between a group of armed men, usually the retinues of respective agents, such as Nascimento, and the warriors of a chief. The relationship between chief and agent was symbiotic. Lending out his army as mercenaries for various agents increased the political position of the Zulu ruler, while accumulating wealth.

By the time the Governor-General's gift arrived in Natal in February 1830, Nascimento had been slaving in the Bay for four months and, according to Dingane,

[721] F Santana, *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*, vol. II (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1967), 434, 716; Capela, *Dicionário de Neigreiros*, 191-192.

[722] AHU CU Moç, Cx 239 d. 91, Governor Ribeiro to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 30 October 1830.

the *saguate* he provided was of superior quality.[723] Dingane, disappointed with the Governor-General's gift, had 'ordered all the kings of this continent' to stop trade with the fort, hoping to force Ribeiro to present a *saguate* to his liking.[724] Nascimento's superior *saguate* was a threat to the Governor's income and political position, since he was unable to exceed Nascimento's gift. For this reason, he requested Nascimento's forced removal to Mozambique Island for judgement on 31 July 1830.[725] Anselmo Nascimento, however, continued an intermittent slave trade at the Bay. Ribeiro eventually took him prisoner, and sent him – presumably as a slave – to Mozambique Island on the Company's ship *Zefiro* on 9 September 1831.

The importance Dingane attached to the relative opulence of a *saguate*, highlighted his view of authority. In his opinion, the person who offered the best *saguate* had ultimate jurisdiction over the Bay's trade goods. This assessment is evident in his threats to install Nascimento, and later José Nobre, as Governor, based on the quality of the *saguates* they gave. Until Nascimento's appearance, Ribeiro held this position. In this line of argument, the one who determined the quality and quantity of the *saguate*, the ultimate reflection of deference, friendship and loyalty, was the person who deserved to fill the highest position of authority. Dingane showed little appreciation for European political hierarchy, interpreting matters of state according to his frame of reference, in which a chief ruled absolutely and rewarded those loyal to him with the best goods he had on hand. And because the gift from the Mozambique Island administration was inferior, it reflected on Ribeiro and implied that Ribeiro no longer valued his relationship with the Zulu King. For this reason,

[723] Santana, *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana,* vol. II, 439.

[724] AHU CU Moç, Cx 262 d. 134, Governor Ribeiro, 28 May 1833.

[725] Santana, *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana,* vol. II, 950.

Dingane sent an embassy to the Governor, threatening that Ribeiro become a tributary 'as the other kings were', while requesting a *saguate* equal to that of Nascimento's as proof of their friendship.[726] The invitation was clear: Ribeiro had to choose between remaining the King's friend, or becoming his subject.

Should Ribeiro not comply with the demand, the King promised, he would remove him as Governor and put the slave trader in his place, implying that Nascimento, not Ribeiro was the real authority of the Bay. Ribeiro was quick to return a threat of his own. When Dingane's embassy arrived, Ribeiro pointed out the fort's cannon, hinting at the violent retaliation he could inflict. And to underscore this, he sent Dingane two cannonballs, declaring that these were the only 'beads' he had for the King – in other words, violent retaliation.[727] Ribeiro's aggressive and insulting response suggested that the Governor believed that he was superior to Dingane – a notion which Dingane clearly could not accept.

THE ENGLISH IN NATAL AND *SAGUATE*

When the Governor-General sent his gift to Dingane in thanks, he, in compliance with European social convention, sent a similar gift to the English in gratitude for their hospitality and care extended to the ship-wrecked Portuguese. At that time, the term 'English' referred in the main to the relatively small group of traders who represented white presence in Natal, along with the Zulu refugees attached to them.

[726] AHU CU Moç, Cx 239 d. 91, Governor Ribeiro to the Governor and Captain-General of Mozambique Island, 30 October 1830.

[727] Ibid.

They lived in 'houses of wood with reed roofs', fenced in by a palisade of sticks.[728] But most importantly, their settlement was defended by three cannons. The English traders lived under the protection of their superior firepower, and advantaged by wealth in the goods they supplied. The English cannons were also a possible boon to the Zulu King if the traders were prepared to use them against his enemies. Even so, Dingane viewed these men as subjects rather than equals. By creating a sanctuary for an increasing number of Zulu refugees, the presence of traders threatened the integrity of Dingane's kingdom.[729] Because, as the English were amassing subjects, they increased their status. The Governor-General's gift to them would have bolstered this status at the political expense of Dingane. To prevent damage to his political hegemony, Dingane refused passage of the Governor-General's *saguate* to the English.

THE HEIGHT OF RIBEIRO'S CAREER

At Delagoa Bay Ribeiro set about extending Portuguese authority to the north, which involved the submission of [chief] Matola Maxakane. Maxakane was unwilling to accept 'subordination', which was probably a pretext for slave raiding. For this purpose, Ribeiro resorted to military action. After the attack on Maxakane's people, the chief sent five measures of products from the latest harvest to sue for peace and as a proof of his 'friendship'.[730] But this gesture was meaningless in slave raiding, because slaves were becoming more and more difficult to come by. In the past,

[728] Ibid.

[729] M Wilson, 'Co-operation and Conflict: The Zulu Kingdom in Natal', in M Wilson, L Thompson (eds), *The Oxford History of South Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 352.

[730] Santana, *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana,* vol. II, 950.

Maxakane's Matola territory had always been second in line, after that of Tembe, as a target. It was a populous and fertile region, and both factors were advantageous to the fort. After asserting Portuguese authority in Matola, the fort's residents took advantage of the fertility of the region and cultivated extensive fields. Between December 1830 and May 1831, Ribeiro attacked Matola Maxakane and his son a few times. One attack was with the help of a hundred Vatua, provided by Dingane, and on another occasion, Soshangana came to the Governor's assistance.[731] This occasion might have been the beginning of the Governor's relationship with Soshangana. It was with the help of the latter that Ribeiro eventually raised the Portuguese colours over Matola. It might have been economically expedient to the Governor to seek the friendship of the Gaza kingdom's chief, but it was a major error in judgement to create an alliance with an enemy and potential rival to the Zulu kingdom – a mistake that would later haunt the ill-fated Governor.[732]

The rivalry between Soshangana and the Zulu kingdom was one of a long-standing nature. Soshangana had initially been the enemy of Shaka, who he a 'long time ago rebelled against'.[733] The bad blood between Soshangana and Shaka was probably because of the former's refusal to submit to the latter, after the Zulu King's conquest of Zwide's Ndwandwe. The newly forged friendship between the Governor and Soshangana ultimately threatened the Zulu King's status and honour, partly proclaimed by the trading post's *saguates* received since the early 1820s.

[731] Liesegang, 'Dingane's Attack', 573; AHU Moç Cx 262 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 53.

[732] AHU Moç Cx 262 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 53.

[733] Ibid.

By July 1831, the Governor claimed that the 'entire coast' – meaning the shores of the Bay – was under Portuguese dominion. The reason for his claim was that previously, two lesser chiefs, Cherinda Makodume and Maputo Makasane, 'voluntarily' requested the hoisting of Portuguese colours over their territory, not because they were eager to submit to the fort, but most likely to afford its protection from slaving activity. Makodume sent his embassy several times to make the request. Ribeiro eventually sent a small group of soldiers to do so, but only because the territory of Makodume could supply abundant provisions to the fort. Sometimes, chiefs read the raising of the flag over their territories as a sign of Portuguese protection, rather than as a declaration of submission.

Ribeiro appeared set fair. Nascimento, his rival, was gone, and he had, through military conquest, expanded Portuguese jurisdiction 110 leagues into the interior (610 km).[734] And to top it all, he had a new and powerful friend, Soshangana, on his side. Two days after Nascimento had been removed, on 11 September 1831, Ribeiro declared: 'All the land is in great tranquility, there is not the slightest dissension between chiefs and the previous thefts [from each other] has ceased, all because of the great saguates given'.[735] But Ribeiro's dire error was in the omission of Dingane's 'great saguate', which suggested Soshangana was the primary beneficiary of these great gifts. The symbolism of Ribeiro's gift-giving was clear; it placed Soshangana in the race for political ascendency. The source of the abundant goods at the fort to make up *saguates* is unclear. They might have come from Mozambique Island, but it is more likely that they were a by-product of a flourishing

[734] AHUCU Moç, Cx 260 d. 60, Representation of Lourenço Marques' residents, 30 August 1832.

[735] Santana, *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana,* vol. II, 950.

slave trade to the north. Either way, within a year, the fort's fortunes were substantially reduced, and Ribeiro declared it 'in a terrible state'.[736]

THE PRECARIOUS POSITION OF THE FORT AND THE COMMERCIAL COMPANY

The reason for the 'abysmal misery' that engulfed the fort was partly the doing of the Company.[737] At this time, competition over the diminishing pool of slaves was growing. Up till then Katembe, or Tembe, territory, was the target for raiding. But over the years, supply from the area dwindled both directly though captive taking and as a result of people fleeing to avoid being captured.

Besides experiencing a food and merchandise shortage, the northern coast of the Bay had been overrun by the marauding bands of men unleashed by local chiefs, as well as those of the Vatua, who were 'grabbing each other' as slaves.[738] The precise identity of the Vatua has not been given, but in light of the discussion above, they were probably Dingane's men. By August 1832, due to attacks by Matola, the fort's residents were forced to abandon their fields in the northern interior. As a result, the gains that had been made in pushing Portuguese presence deep into the hinterland, not the least to secure their food supply, were lost.[739]

[736] AHU CU Moç Cx 262 d. 134, signed by residents of Delagoa Bay, undated.

[737] Ibid.

[738] AHU CU Moç, Cx 260 d. 60, Representation of Lourenço Marques' residents, 30 August 1832.

[739] Ibid.

To the relief of the fort's inhabitants, the English ship, *Sandwich*, sailed into the Bay a month later, on 3 April 1833. Fort residents took the opportunity to buy wheat, butter, biscuits, sun hats, iron cooking pots, wine, beer and, most notably, 141 kg of gunpowder. Gunpowder was essential for the capture of people, as well as the security of the fort and its inhabitants. But Ribeiro curiously neglected to buy gunpowder for the fort itself. This oversight would become a factor later in the panicked decision of the Governor to flee to Chefina Island in October 1833. At last, in April 1833, the schooner *Dom Miguel Primeiro* arrived with the long-awaited aid from Mozambique Island. The Governor immediately distributed cloth and beads as salaries to the soldiers, for the purchase of rations.[740]

While the arrival of the *Dom Miguel Primeiro* laden with a rich cargo offered respite to the fort's residents, it led to a further deterioration in the Governor's relationship with Dingane.[741] The ship's cargo included substantial amounts of brass manilas and beads. Dingane's *saguate* was now long overdue since that last unsatisfactory gift sent in 1830. We can be sure that Dingane knew exactly what and how much of each item the crew offloaded from the ship, because 'the blacks keep keen observation', Ribeiro wrote.[742] After the absence of a *saguate* for two years, he expected a large and sumptuous tribute. Instead, Ribeiro sent a paltry nine pieces of black cloth to Dingane. This was another profound error of judgement. Black cloth was highly prized in the north, at Inhambane, but not to the south of Delagoa Bay. Besides being undesirable, the gift was trifling. The gift of unappealing textiles,

[740] AHU CU Moc Cx 262 d. 134, Governor Ribeiro, 28 May 1833.

[741] AHU CU Moc Cx 262 d. 134, List of Cargo of the schooner *Dom Miguel Primeiro*.

[742] AHU CU Moc Cx 262 d. 134, Governor Ribeiro, 28 May 1833, 'os negros estão com olhos muito abertos'.

instead of the far more desirable brass and beads, posed an insult to the King. The question is why, when the cargo offloaded included almost 5 000 brass items and 900 kg of beads, did Ribeiro kept these items back from Dingane?[743] A reasonable conclusion is that he had earmarked the goods for Soshangana, the future King of the Gaza kingdom. It is difficult to believe that Dingane, who was keenly interested in the comings and goings at the Bay and Soshangana's activities, was unaware of the Governor's growing relationship with Soshangana.

A subtle way to undermine the authority of a king was to give a more substantial *saguate* to someone else. Being the recipient of an extravagant *saguate* had the potential of swaying the allegiance of subjects and thereby contributing to potentially swinging the balance of power in favour of the north. When the Zulu King's political prestige was at stake, Ribeiro's alliance with Soshangana was an extreme provocation. The treasure represented by the hundreds of kilograms of manilas and beads lying in the trading post warehouse, undistributed to Natal, strengthened the rationale and inducement for military intervention by Dingane at the fort.

DINGANE'S POWER PLAY

At dawn on 26 July 1833, under the leadership of Dingane's generals, the armies of Dingane, Makasane, Maxakane, and other chiefs invaded the vicinity of the fort. The Portuguese perceived the smoke billowing from the burning villages all around them as an ominous message of the Kings' intention to raze the fort to the ground.[744]

[743] AHU CU Moc Cx 262 d. 134, List of Cargo of the schooner *Dom Miguel Primeiro*.

[744] AHU Moç Cx 263 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 1.

The Governor ordered a salvo of cannon fire at the approaching enemy as a show of force. After a second round of fire, Dingane's generals sent an embassy to the fort. It is unlikely that the insult intended was lost on Ribeiro, because it was a woman – a prisoner of the Zulu no less – who brought this message: 'Dingane, King of the Vatuas, sent to ask Governor Dionizo for a large saguate because his promise is long overdue'.[745] The issue of the non-payment of the *saguate* therefore lay at the heart of the hostilities. Paying up was the only way to appease the King and avoid war.[746] With this preliminary attack, Dingane achieved two goals. The first was to reveal his knowledge of the bounty of goods delivered to the fort, and the second was to expend the gunpowder the fort had.

The Governor urgently called a meeting of the fort's residents and the employees of the Company to discuss the payment. José Nobre said he would not pay a *saguate*, but was more than willing to help protect the fort with all his men and arms. The Commander of the fort, Leitão, who was also in charge of the Royal Warehouse, announced that he was incapable of paying out a *saguate*, although the *Dom Miguel Primeiro*'s cargo was stored in the Governor's house.

Dingane's two generals, Sumiso and Nandua, arrived two days later to fetch the *saguate*. The Commander had to comply, and laid out trading goods for inspection. The size and quality of the *saguate* was highly pleasing, and sure to gratify the King, the royal secretaries announced. With this response, the Governor cheered up, hopeful of a receding threat. But true to his abrasive nature, he exhorted the

[745] Ibid.

[746] Ibid., f. 3.

generals to withdraw their men and leave at once.[747] Some did in fact leave, carrying the *saguate* south, accompanied as usual by a Portuguese soldier. But the Governor was hasty in his presumption that all was well.

Besides the *saguate* controversy, the Governor also defied King Dingane in the matter of Escavel, the fort's translator. A translator's role in establishing trust between parties was crucial. But it was in the economic interest of the fort to create conflict between chiefs, because war produced slaves. To create conflict, Escavel deliberately disseminated false information, sowing suspicion and discontent. Maxakane had declared that there would never be peace as long as Escavel lived.[748] Dingane had demanded the execution of the translator, possibly because he lied to his ambassadors. Ribeiro ignored the King's demand, feeling secure in his reliance on his new ally Soshangana.[749]

The Governor clearly underestimated the degree of communication between far-flung chiefs and the efficacy of espionage carried out at the Bay. When Maxakane retreated, he left spies behind.[750] Additionally, not all of Dingane's men returned to Natal with the *saguate*, and it can be assumed that his subjects present in the Bay kept him informed. A bond of cooperation between the Matola and the Zulu developed with the aim of ousting the Governor. Mustafa Isufo defected to Matola at the end of July, and confirmed the lack of gunpowder and cannon balls at the fort.[751] Ribeiro, oblivious to this development, continued with business as usual, based on

[747] Ibid.

[748] Ibid., f. 12.

[749] Ibid., f. 1.

[750] Ibid., f. 4.

[751] Ibid.

the false premise that he was in control of the political relationships at the Bay, including the one with Dingane.

To Ribeiro's dismay, news of another approaching army came by word of Maputo Makasane's secretaries (messengers) on 9 September 1833. 'War has come upon us with all the power of the world', Ribeiro told the men he gathered.[752] The arrival of Vatua (Dingane's) armies in Maputo signalled Matola, Tembe, Magaia, Cherinda and Muamba to join forces against the Governor. In a panic, the Governor thought it best for everyone, including the members of the Company, to escape to Chefina Island. The Company's agent, Nobre, advised against it. He said: 'It's not possible for me to abandon my post, I'm responsible for it'.[753] Ribeiro ordered everyone to embark to Chefina forthwith, threatening to imprison all who did not obey. Not satisfied with the limited and slow response to his orders, he created a panic, and shouted: 'Embark, embark the enemy is [here]!'[754] In their haste to get aboard the two vessels anchored in the middle of the river, that were ready to go to the island, many drowned in the high swell, because those inside the boats refused to accept any more passengers. The men who could not make it onto a ship returned to the fort and realised the Governor had given a false alarm.

Nobre's strategy for survival in the face of imminent attack was practical. As soon as the enemy arrived he sent an embassy, with a gift, to open talks. And as expected, Dingane's generals responded with a delegation that requested a 'bom saguate' or

[752] AHU Moç Cx 263 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 14, '… veim sobre nóz o podêr do mundo com Guerra …'.

[753] Ibid., f. 18.

[754] Ibid., f. 21.

good *saguate* for their King. Next on their agenda was to enquire why Ribeiro had fled. Nobre wisely pleaded ignorance.[755] Meanwhile, Sergeant Feio, Ribeiro's right-hand man, had returned to the fort to fetch beads, ivory and iron bars, to 'save it from the enemy', adding to the considerable stash of goods the Governor had already taken along.[756] A portion of these goods had probably been promised to Soshangana, to whom Ribeiro intended to flee.[757]

Again, a week later, Dingane's generals arrived at the Company's post asking for a small *saguate*. They said that the Governor was unwise to flee without cause, and demanded a reason for his actions. The Zulu generals raided and plundered the fort and the warehouse, and then took up quarters in the Governor's rooms in response to Ribeiro's failure to give an answer within the 24-hour deadline. The generals announced they had orders to kill Ribeiro, and could not retreat until they had accomplished this goal.[758] On 5 October, the same generals arrived with an 'immense' number of their subaltern officers. Soon after, the generals despatched their secretaries to summon more troops, and some 2 000 men arrived the next day to join Matola's men. Their plan was to travel to Chefina Island with the help of the Company. The Company provided the ships to take Matola and Dingane's army leaders to the island, while the troops waited on land.

[755] Ibid., f. 26.

[756] AHU Moç Cx 263 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 27.

[757] Ibid., f. 53.

[758] Ibid., f. 33.

The Governor received the news of the imminent attack on the island badly, and 'cried bitterly'.[759] The commander of the fort, Leitão, and Lieutenant Menezes, advised the distressed Governor to leave the island as soon as possible. Staying on the island for one more night was a terrible idea, they warned. With no means of defence, because his famished soldiers had fled the island, and the crucial cannon mired in mud and water, his only option was to head for land. That night, in inclement weather, the Governor and six men made for shore. Their aim was to land on the beaches of Magaia and find refuge there.[760] The ill-fated group was captured and taken to the fort at midnight. And while they were marching east, the chief ordered the Governor's cargo of treasure to be offloaded. Bags of golden Spanish dollars, colourful beads, brass manilas and cloth spilled out of the chests.[761]

A contingent of men, comprising Matola, Magaia and Zulu warriors guarded the luckless Governor until seven o'clock, the morning of 13 October. At this early hour, he was taken to a kraal and, in the presence of a large crowd, accused of treachery and usurping Dingane's territory. He was also charged with causing war without reason and sending local people to Mozambique [Island] (as slaves). They also accused him of raising the Portuguese flag in these territories and occupying it with an army without consent. And lastly, he was denounced for sending Dingane gunpowder and cannon balls. These demands suggest that the local chiefs were ready to take advantage of the Zulu presence in the Bay to air their own grievances, hence their significant influence on these events and the ensuing set of accusations.

[759] Ibid., f. 47.

[760] Ibid., f. 45.

[761] Ibid., f. 50.

Ribeiro's assertion of Portuguese military power in territories towards Inhambane and the domain of Soshangana, was a powerful political statement of insurrection. The incident involving the cannon ball was unforgiveable because of the inherent threat to, and dismissal of, Dingane's sovereignty. He was moreover charged with enslaving the local population by stirring up war. Because Dingane assumed sway over Delagoa Bay, those sent to Mozambique Island as slaves were implicitly his subjects, another justification for the payment of a *saguate*. Failure to pay the *saguate* was at the heart of most of these charges, as will be explored further below. After this formality, the people were sent away, and the Governor was executed next to the river. Nobre was elected Governor, a position he refused, but as subsequent events show, he became the de facto Governor of Delagoa Bay.

THE AFTERMATH

The Governor's treasure, confiscated upon his capture, had been left in chief Magaia's care and was later despatched to Natal, claimed as the overdue *saguate*. The scale of the riches carried away was too much of a temptation for Sumiso, one of the King's generals, who appropriated the lion's share of the spoils for himself, and was unsurprisingly later executed for his theft.[762]

As the Zulu were leaving, news came that Soshangana was engaged in battle with Matola Maxakane. Soshangana had previously been summoned by Ribeiro on the promise of riches, before the Governor's escape to the Chefina.[763] And in the absence of Ribeiro's men and their arms, Soshangana was defeated and afterwards

[762] AHU Moç Cx 263 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 59.

[763] Ibid., f. 53.

retreated. After his triumph, Maxakane claimed that the Company fell under his rule and, as conqueror he demanded regular *saguates*. The request for a *saguate* was usually accompanied by a gift of a tusk, but as Nobre bemoaned, was always worth a tenth of the value of the goods Maxakane received.[764] It seems that Maxakane's victory against Soshangana encouraged him to assume Dingane's prerogative, the right to *saguate*. But this was an action guaranteed to cause offence, because Maxakane was, after all, the Zulu King's tributary.

The agent was under pressure from all sides to distribute goods. The constant demands of Maxakane and Dingane presented Nobre with a diplomatic nightmare. Without merchandise to distribute as *saguates*, the safekeeping of the fort and the Company's establishment were in peril. He finally resolved to prevail on Inhambane's Governor to supply him with merchandise to distribute as gifts. For this purpose he dispatched a *patamar*, or messenger – these were typically Indian men – to Inhambane to request goods from the town's Governor. In this case the *patamar*, a certain Babuchique, accompanied by two soldiers, left with the urgent request on 2 November 1833. Some of Soshangana's men captured the group and demanded a ransom for Babuchique's life.[765]

That Soshangana stalled and eventually prohibited the flow of *saguate* goods to Dingane, shows Soshangana's intent to assert his authority over the Bay. As we have seen above, the *patamar* sent with an urgent request for merchandise was apprehended and released on ransom sent by Nobre. On a second attempt, the agent sent a small *saguate* along with the messenger, who left on 14 April 1834, to

[764] Ibid., f. 54.

[765] Ibid., 82.

appease Soshangana. Yet the *patamar* was again detained by Soshangana's men, demanding an extra five bundles of beads, which Nobre promptly delivered.[766] 27 days later, the *patamar* arrived back at the Bay, citing the reason for failing to get to Inhambane as twofold. First, he claimed, was Nobre's failure to request passage; and second was Soshangana's fear of being robbed by the *patamar*![767] Reading between the lines, Soshangana never intended to grant passage to Inhambane. If his interest was purely in accumulating goods, he could easily have confiscated goods on the *patamar*'s return. Clearly, his decision to bar access to Inhambane was connected to his claim to control the trade of Delagoa Bay.

THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN MAXAKANE AND DINGANE

Maxakane's own claim to the Bay's trade, couched in his sense of self-importance, was steadily growing, evident by his behaviour in November 1833. On 4 November, the news of Maxakane's approach caused Nobre to ready the trading post for conflict. But his fears were unfounded, because Maxakane merely arrived with a large contingent of his court to reveal his power, founded on his large number of followers. With his visit he intended to flaunt his wealth and power, and hinted at his preeminence over Dingane, as the group consisted of a 'great number' of princes, princesses and secretaries.[768] Alluding to his very great importance, Maxakane boasted that this was but a small portion of his court. Nobre and Maxakane engaged in a lengthy discussion, which concluded in a peace deal between the two.

[766] Ibid., f. 64

[767] Ibid., f. 82

[768] Ibid., f. 56.

At the same time, Dingane requested another *saguate* from the Company. A group of his subjects arrived with four cows, asking for a 'saguate of Friendship', and stating that the previous gift was considered the 'saguate of War'.[769] Nobre immediately gave over a hundred neck manilas, and 25 bundles of beads. The delegation was not impressed by the gift, declaring it incommensurate with the prestige of their King. Adding 40 more manilas, Nobre apologetically explained that the Company ship had not been by for fourteen months, and that this was all he could manage at that time.[770]

A power struggle between Dingane and Maxakane was slowly brewing over the distribution of merchandise from Delagoa Bay. Throughout January 1834, Maxakane repeatedly demanded *saguates*. These persistent requests for gifts came to Dingane's attention. In early February 1834, after his informants, tributaries, and the chiefs of Maputo and Tembe sent word of Maxakane's constant impositions, Dingane sent a delegation of high secretaries, accompanied by 40 warriors, to enquire about the situation.[771] The nature of the envoy, that is high-status secretaries accompanied by warriors, reflected the import of the mission and implied the status of Dingane, which Maxakane clearly needed reminding of. When Dingane's men requested a *saguate*, Nobre again was unable to give much. The secretaries were aware of the reason for the lack of goods for *saguate*, and underscored the association between receiving a *saguate* and the paramountcy, stating: 'Maxakane has stolen [Dingane's] title with some ivory'.[772]

[769] Ibid., f. 53, 58.

[770] Ibid., f. 58.

[771] Ibid., f. 60.

[772] Ibid.

Nobre was sensitive to the demands of Dingane, even though he had very low stores. He gave whatever he could, in recognition of the King's title. Because the King had declared 'a need for copper', he gave the embassy 40 neck and 80 arm manilas.[773] This gift was given even though the minimal stock was earmarked for the sustenance of the Company employees.[774] Dingane continually tested the agent's integrity by regularly sending a party to enquire whether the ship with goods had arrived.[775] By giving what little he had, and being truthful about the ship's absence, Nobre managed to build trust between himself and Dingane.

Maxakane knew that he was looking for trouble by asking for abundant *saguates*, because he was deeply unhappy with Nobre's deference to the Zulu secretaries, whom he accused of 'complaining about his requests' to Dingane. In his displeasure, he issued a threat to kill Nobre and all the whites at the Bay.[776] Consequently, Dingane ordered five Zulu warriors to stay behind to guard the Company.[777]

Maxakane, in response to the Zulu presence, reduced his demands, in line with his standing.[778] But this change in attitude did not stop Dingane from bringing his rebellious subject to order. In early April, the King sent his high secretary, Seduto, and the latter's brother Manchanfana, accompanied by 150 men to the Bay.

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[773] Ibid.

[774] Ibid., f. 61.

[775] The enquiries after the ship's arrival happened on 27 October and 4 December 1833, and 26 March 1834.

[776] AHU Moç Cx 263 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 61.

[777] Ibid.

[778] Ibid., f. 62.

Manchanfana left for Maxakane with two thirds of the entourage to deliver Dingane's orders. These strictly prohibited any transactions or communication between Maxakane and the Company, which by then had relocated to the fort on pain of death. And further, the order stipulated the removal of Maxakane subjects posted in Mfumo's territory. These orders were given to 'stop the local kings requesting large saguates from the fort, which were intended for the most powerful king in the vicinity'.[779]

Maxakane, unrepentant, insulted Dingane by treating Manchanfana badly, and refused to comply with his orders. On 9 June, a large army of Maputo and Zulu marched to Matola. No attack occurred until 29 June, presumably for the sake of negotiations. The first step, prior to war, was always a negotiation.[780] Negotiations clearly failed, as an attack ensued. Magaia's troops joined in, and the villages of Maxakane were set alight.[781] At ten o'clock, Seduto entered Maxakane's village, only to find it deserted. The chief and his people had fled to Muamba. The army pursued them, and the Matola Maxakane fled the territory. After the conflict, the secretaries of Asane Mfumo came to thank Dingane's generals and Nobre for restoring the land and thereby 're-instating the ancient government [of Mfumo]'.[782]

The invasion by Dingane of Maxakane's territory illustrates the centrality of the *saguate* to the political economy of societies in southeast Africa. The reason for the great importance of the *saguate* was its determining power of status and rank. The

[779] Ibid., f. 64

[780] CA C431, Letter, 22 October 1729, f. 10. For a discussion of the 1720s pattern, see Chewins 'Trade at Delagoa', 105.

[781] AHU Moç Cx 263 d. 80, 'Guerra dos Reis dos Vatuas do Cabo Natal', f. 68.

[782] Ibid., f. 69.

distribution of trade goods to another, potentially powerful leader challenged Dingane's preeminence in the region, and ultimately ended in an attack. Ribeiro's decision to play kingmaker by redirecting valuable goods to Soshangana was a grave miscalculation. The distribution of *saguates* was jealously monitored from the south and Dingane, without hesitation, disciplined those who sought to threaten his accumulation of wealth, his power and his political ranking.

CONCLUSION

The trajectory of southeast Africa's history is fundamentally linked to trade. It played a vital role in shaping the nature of relationships between the coast and the deep interior, and at times caused significant changes in local political hierarchies.

To enrich the *Estado da Índia*, its authorities incorporated Delagoa Bay and Inhambane into the Portuguese trade complex. On the basis of archaeological finds at Chibuene dating to the first millennium, Inhambane appears to have had a longer history of connection to the Indian Ocean network. It had been connected to the Indian Ocean trade network well before Europeans entered the Indian Ocean. The initial connection on the southeast African coast came through traders from the sub-continent of India, reaching the southeast African coast by running their ships across the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese interest in Inhambane grew when, in 1728, the Dutch recognised the value of the already established connections by the Indo-Muslims into the interior. Consequently, Portugal planted a permanent trading post there to protect its sovereignty over trade and territory.

The overwhelming picture emerging from the Portuguese sources is of Inhambane as an essentially Portuguese port. This Eurocentric perspective obscures the crucial role played by the Gujarati Indo-Muslim communities in the political economy of the region. From 1729 they established key connections, first with the local Tonga, and then in the nineteenth century with the invading Tsonga and Dzivi groups, collectively known as the Landins. These middlemen were vital to the emergent trading system in the region. The trading post was a relatively small and close-knit community, in alliance with the Tonga, that struggled to gain a greater share of the

Indo-Muslim trade. The Portuguese demanded exclusive control over Inhambane's commerce. But in reality they were not able to exclude the Indo-Muslims who had established close ties to the Landin chiefs. Successful commerce depended largely on maintaining local networks of alliance, and unable to break these alliances, the Portuguese traders had to, in varying degrees – at least tacitly – acknowledge the vital role of the Indo-Muslims.

The trading post struggled to gain a monopoly over the exchange of goods, while the Indo-Muslims and their partners, the Landins, successfully pursued ample trade opportunities. The trading post's commerce depended on maintaining networks of alliance with Tonga chiefs. These alliances came under threat as the Landins expanded to dominate Inhambane's hinterland. In addition to being challenged by the changing political scene, the trading post had to maintain some equilibrium between deeply depending on the Indo-Muslim society for the procurement of cloth, while competing with the same for a greater market share.

The burgeoning Indo-Muslim trade was directly linked to their ability to supply copious amounts of cloth, and so attracting chiefs into highly profitable alliances with them. The success and strength of their trade lay in their access to credit, close relationships to the sources of cloth supply, and the networks of community and communication they had established over time. Effective communication enhanced their skills as expedition leaders, and allowed them to push their influence deep into the interior where they came into contact with the Tsonga.

The Portuguese Indo-Muslim conflict was echoed in the hostilities between the former and surrounding chiefs for control over trade, because a monopoly meant more control and brought higher profits. For both Landins and Tonga, trade with the Indo-Muslims, who offered more items for ivory and slaves, was the more advantageous alliance to maintain because of the resulting power through distributing largesse, and therefore the accumulation of subjects. The interwoven relationships between the Indo-Muslims, Landins, Portuguese and Tonga created a pattern of shifting loyalties in a world where allegiances could either be shored up or undermined either by the availability or absence of trade goods.

The centrality of goods – in particular the *saguate* (gift of exotic goods) – to the political economy of societies in southeast Africa is especially clear from Dingane's invasion of Delagoa Bay, and the persecution and execution of Governor Ribeiro. The distribution of trade goods was highly important as an indicator of status and rank. Ribeiro's decision to play kingmaker was a serious miscalculation. His error lay in redirecting valuable goods to Soshangana, an enemy of the Zulu King, because of his potential political ascendency enhanced by the accumulation of *saguates*. The distribution of *saguates* was jealously monitored from the south. Dingane did not hesitate to discipline the Governor of Delagoa Bay, who diverted high-status goods to a competitor, and thereby threatened his accumulation of wealth, a significant foundation to his power and political ranking.

The essential role of trade goods in political processes played a significant role in the expansion of the slave trade at both ports. Slavers turned their attention south when the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) inhibited the northwest Indian Ocean trade and

shifted trade southwards. This shift led to an expansion of the Delagoan slave trade. For instance, the threat of French corsairs further north pushed Portuguese-Brazilian slavers to trade directly with Delagoa Bay during 1803-1814. After Napoleon's defeat, the treaty of Vienna (1815) limited slave trading to the southern hemisphere, which gave fresh impetus to slavery in the southeastern ports.

Delagoa Bay came into view as a trading location when Lourenço Marques' expedition in 1544 identified it as a source of ivory. But Portuguese trade there remained at best intermittent. The Dutch trading post (1721-1730), in the wake of Portuguese neglect, saw a decade of slow trade. Exports remained intermittent and sometimes moribund after their departure, until the mid-eighteenth century. The very limited delivery of goods was an important reason why business did not flourish. During the period of the Dutch post, and the limited Portuguese trade thereafter, supply of goods to exchange for African products was sporadic, which resulted in desultory trade. It was the English and Austrian ivory/slave trades (1777-1781) that rekindled Portuguese interest in it – as a business opportunity, and also to defend Portuguese sovereignty over its trade.

Despite the ivory riches of Delagoa Bay, it was only from about the last third of the eighteenth century that the trade became consistent and voluminous. The English private trade of the eighteenth century revived the Bay as a trading locale when Edward Chandler channelled copious goods there. From 1777, the Austrian trade complemented the English trade, adding to the momentum of demand and supply. The Austrian involvement provides evidence for the deep involvement of the northern Nguni in the ivory and slave trades for the sake of beads and brass items.

It is clear that private commerce was far more dynamic than the state-controlled mercantile trade. The reason for this was that mercantilism sought to enhance the power and wealth of the Portuguese State, which proved a disincentive for growing the economy of satellite ports for the sake of the metropole. The success of private enterprises, such as the English private trade, William Bolt's Austrian trading post, and that of the *Sociedade*, show the efficiency of private trade funded by multifaceted networks of business connections in India. A central impediment to State-controlled trade was that the administrators of Delagoa Bay (and Inhambane) were, in practice, more interested in securing returns for themselves than for the Crown. For example, trade after the expulsion of the Austrians at Delagoa Bay did not decline because of the private commerce of the *Sociedade de Negociantes*, which had exclusive rights to the Bay's trade. It had access to a relative abundance of trade items, and therefore was also able to offer more goods in exchange for ivory, and later slaves, than the State – represented by Mozambique Island – could provide.

Delagoa Bay and Inhambane both faced key challenges. At both posts malaria cost the lives of many men. They also had very limited means of coercion. Each post was equipped with a small and inadequate force of armed men, which could launch sporadic raids to enforce Portuguese authority, but could not dominate either territory for any length of time, nor allow the Portuguese to expand their territory significantly from the coast into the interior. For this reason, cooperation with local chiefs was vitally important.

But while both Delagoa Bay and Inhambane shared these difficulties, Inhambane had a significant advantage over the Bay. The continuous settlement at Inhambane, from at least 1695, by a company of Gujarati Indo-Muslims, was conducive to steadily developing and securing a market. And as any market, it grew relative to the supply of goods available for exchange. The Indo-Muslim communities, well-versed in commerce, and through interdependent cross-cultural connections – particularly their commercial connections with the Gujarati Hindu community – could make ample goods available at a good price. The fact that some of these traders settled and initially intermarried with the Tonga, and later with, specifically, the Tsonga, helped to draw the societies inland more deeply into the Indian Ocean trading network. The addition of the Portuguese trading post in 1729 created an increase in supply in trade items to the same societies of the interior – most notably the Tswa Tsonga and Dzivi. The potential to accumulate wealth and power offered by the increased supply of and demand for trade goods, attracted the Dzivi and the renowned elephant hunters, the Tswa Tsonga. [Both societies] moved closer to the coast and came to replace the Tonga, who previously played the role of middlemen. Over time these trade networks became deeply entrenched in the economic and social fabric of the region.

While Inhambane had a settled trade network into the interior, Delagoa Bay had the advantage of a navigable river, the Maputo River, that provided access into the interior. From the late 1750s, longboats fetched goods upstream, which allowed English and Austrian traders to bypass the need for an ambulatory trade, and connected the trading post directly with the Maputo/northern Nguni network in the southern interior.

The combination of ample goods being available, and the relocation of the exchange point into the interior, ultimately rearranged the political hierarchy north of the Lubombo Mountains. The Tembe chief Nwangobe moved his capital closer to the centre of exchange, and closer to the northern Nguni. This move eventually caused a split in the Tembe polity, which resulted in the independence and ascendance of the Maputo. Its dominant position allowed it to forge vital trade and military connections with the northern Nguni.

The shift of the gravitational centre of trade also had political repercussions for the societies beyond the Lubombo Mountains. The accelerated trade, in conjunction with a prolonged drought, stimulated conflict among the northern Nguni chiefdoms. The drought depleted cattle herds, which were the primary indicator of status. In the relative absence of cattle, and with growing competition for preeminence, it is likely that trade goods became a still more significant symbol of wealth and source of power. The resulting drive to control the distribution of trade goods encouraged political centralisation. A key feature of this process was the formation of the *amabutho*, or age-regiments, amongst the Nwandwe, Ngwane and Mthethwa. Drought cycles also intensified competition to secure gardens along the Phongola River, as well as adequate grazing for dwindling herds. The need for gardens and grazing intersected with struggles over control of key hunting grounds and trade routes.

From the 1770s, the Phongola pass, a conduit for incoming and outgoing goods, became politically important. The reason for this was that the pass connected the

northern Nguni to the southern hinterland of Delagoa Bay – through a Tembe middleman, Maputo's brother, Mbanyele – and a lucrative market on the Maputo River. During the late eighteenth century, the Nwandwe chief Zwide kept a close watch over the pass to prevent trade falling into other chiefs' hands. The rivals he was most concerned about were the Ngwane Dlamini. Mbanyele offered the territory to the Austrians – who had superior firepower – probably to gain some political traction, and a military ally against Maputo's expansionist policies.

In the early nineteenth century, Dingiswayo became chief of the Mthethwa, while Makasane succeeded to power over the Maputo. Dingiswayo's ambition to control the trade route north along the Natal coast provided a credible motivation for the Mthethwa, under his leadership, and later for the Zulu Kings Shaka and Dingane, to expand their area of control to include northern Natal across the Lubombo Mountains in the west, and down to the coasts south and east. This expansionist drive threatened the Ndwandwe. Another drought, which started in 1817, again increased the need for exotic goods, and coincided with a fresh round of rivalry between Dingiswayo and Zwide, which resulted in the former's death in 1818. The accumulation of trade goods by Soshangana and Zwangendaba, both royal Ndwandwe chiefs, further placed pressure on the cracks in the house of Ndwandwe by adding to the tensions amongst the Ndwandwe royals. Shaka's strike at Zwide in 1819 provided an opportunity for Zwangendaba and Soshangana, free from their overlord, to explore their own economic prospects. Significantly, these developments took place at a time when there was an increasing demand for slaves.

The demand for slaves, from as early as the mid-eighteenth century, coupled with the demands of African rulers strongly driven to accumulate brass and beads, was probably a key factor in the development of the *amabutho*, who were brought under more direct central control, and became more permanent and increasingly militarised. This made them far more effective as the instruments of powerful rulers in pursuit of slave capture and trade.

Delagoa Bay saw an increase in slave trading during the late 1820s. Between 1826 and 1835, the Tembe population of Delagoa Bay was subjected to intense slaving. Over 63 000 people were shipped from the Bay to either the Mascarenes or Brazil. Conservatively calculated, the annual number of slaves was over 8 000, more than double the 2 000-3 000 slaves a year postulated by Cobbing and Wright.[783] The most crucial element of the slave trade [of this region] is the implied involvement of the northern Nguni in this trade, with all its accompanying violence and consequent upheavals.

Further research is needed to fully reconstruct the slave trade at Delagoa Bay, and to expand the understanding of its links to wider transformations in the region. But slavery can no longer be ignored or consigned to the margins of research and debate. Systematic engagement with archives holding records on the history of Mozambique has much to offer in terms of the insights, processes, and transformation in the wider region. Further in-depth research in these archives can considerably deepen the understanding of the central processes of change in the interior of South Africa from the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century.

[783] Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi', 504; Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', 202.

As with Delagoa Bay, Inhambane's trade had initially been predominantly ivory. But from the late eighteenth century, it is likely that the slave trade quickly gained momentum. And as with the Bay, its hinterland played a pivotal role in supplying slaves to the coast. The Tswa Tsonga chief Makwakwa acted as middleman, who with his connection to societies west of Inhambane beyond the Limpopo River, supplied captives for the slave trade.

Both the involvement of societies well to the west, and that of the northern Nguni south of the Bay, should be considered against the wider backdrop of increasing slavery – accelerated by the insatiable French slave trade – occurring on the southeast coast of Africa (and further north) from 1816. The year 1816 was auspicious for another reason. It was the year that Shaka Zulu became chief, and a serious contender for political power. The heated debate around the violent era attributed to Shaka has had much attention, but very little if any ink has been devoted to exploring the possibility of similar circumstances of violence and displacement prevailing in the eastern parts of South Africa, in present-day Mpumalanga. The possibility of a slave trade beyond the Limpopo to furnish slaves to the coast, reveals a picture – although somewhat dimly for Mpumalanga – of two concurrent slaving areas, with the accompanying violence and displacement which follows slavery, at two ends of South Africa. This consideration provides a new paradigm for historical analysis, and highlights important implications for the historiography of eastern South Africa, begging for more research.

Trade activity, or rather the influx and steady availability of goods, beads and cloth at Inhambane, and beads and brass at Delagoa Bay, had a profound influence on the societies around and beyond these ports, who were involved in supplying goods and people for exchange. This research has sharpened the focus of the economic and social picture of these two locations, revealing a far more complex interconnected network than previously thought. The multiethnic network contributed to changes in the interior linked to the southeastern coast of Africa, by connecting it across oceans to international ivory and slave markets. The dynamics of this interconnected world transmitted pulses of change in two directions. This study has attempted to transcend some of the political and intellectual divisions created by colonial boundaries and languages, which have been entrenched through narrow nationalist historiographies, to capture some dimensions of this wider world.

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