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Assessing the Interface between Natural Resources, Salafi–Jihdi, and Extremist Groups in Africa since 2009: The Case of Chad and Mozambique

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2024

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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Zicina, Siyakudumisa . (2024). Assessing the Interface between Natural Resources, Salafi–Jihdi, and Extremist Groups in Africa since 2009: The Case of Chad and Mozambique [Master`s dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg]. WIReDSpace. https://hdl.handle.net/10539/45702

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Assessing the Interface between Natural Resources, Salafi–Jihādi, and Extremist Groups in Africa since 2009: The Case of Chad and Mozambique.

by

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A minor dissertation submitted to the Wits School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand in *partial fulfilment* of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Supervised by Dr Michelle Small

Student Declaration

I, *Siyakudumisa Zicina,* declare that this minor dissertation, entitled:

"Assessing the Interface between Natural Resources, Salafi–Jihādi, and Extremist Groups in Africa since 2009: The Case of Chad and Mozambique"

is my own work and is submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree *Master of Arts (MA) by Coursework and Research Report in International Relations*, offered by the Department of the International Relations, School of Social Science, Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I declare that it has not been submitted before for any examination in any other university. I further declare that all secondary material that I used are duly acknowledged and referred to.

Signed:

Siyakudumisa Zicina.
Johannesburg, March 2024

Acknowledgements

Owh, Uyingcwele yengcwele! UnguThixo onenceba! Ndiyabulela Mzali Nangel' ithuba!

I am eternally indebted to all those that have supported me during trying times towards the completion of this dissertation. I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Michelle Small. Your unwavering support, patience, perceptive insights and constant encouragement have been reassuring and instrumental in getting me towards the finish line.

I owe untold gratitude to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) for financing my Masters studies under the scholarship-internship programme run in partnership with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). I am also grateful to the Institute for their valuable experience, guidance and helpful comments throughout this challenging journey. Special thanks goes to my mentor, Ms. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos.

To my family – I am eternally grateful for your unyielding support, encouragement and believing in me: *ndibamba ngazo zozibini Mandungwane, Gungu, Bhejula!* I am profoundly thankful to my mother, Andiswa Zicina, for her unwavering support, sacrifices and prayers that kept me going against all-odds. Thank you, 'Ma Andie' for allowing me the freedom to purse my dreams, despite the challenges.

To all my siblings, cousins, and friends please find your part within this piece of work. I hope someday it will serve as a source of inspiration. To all my friends in academia, I appreciate you guys! Special thanks goes to Tshidi, Shaun, Keanen, Kopano, Kuhle, Xolisa and Tyrone. Thank you for encouraging me to 'Pusha-Spun' when I felt like giving up. Very special thanks must go to my 'bestie-westie', Dr Atlegang Mashilo. Yours has always been a jovial presence, Ausi. Thank you for keeping me sane throughout this journey.

Finally, I give thanks to the almighty God for his grace, blessings, and strength that made the completion of this dissertation possible!

Abstract

The catastrophic Salafi–Jihādi attacks of September 11th, 2001, marked the beginning of a vicious cycle of violent extremism across Africa. Since then, Salafi–Jihādi movements in the continent have proliferated in ways unimaginable: from the Sahel, Horn of Africa to Southern Africa. Qualitatively designed, this study examines causal variables that allowed resource-rich African countries to be incubators of Salafi–Jihādi extremism. This inquest is guided by the following research question: *what role does Salafi–Jihādi play in starting, perpetuating, and sustaining armed conflict in resource rich states?* Thus it explores how Salafi–Jihādi, local extremist groups and the presence/absence of natural resources motivates violent extremism. This investigation theoretically isolates the 'greed-vs-grievance theory', instead it aligns itself with the social movement theory to examine conflict in southern Chad and northern Mozambique. This means that other than leaning on a theory that explains the causes of intrastate conflict through the greed-grievance narrative, this study reconsiders the approach in light of insights gleaned from behavioural theories, in particular, the social movement theory (SMT). Thus, the study embraces a theory that seeks to explain why social mobilization manifests (Salafi–Jihādi extremism) maintaining that the SMT provides an interdisciplinary understanding of the causes, dynamics, and nature of intrastate conflict. Other than offering similar but different causal variables, this study finds that the outcome variable – Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa materialises from different paths. Variables of ideology, natural resources (scarcity/abundance), illicit activities, foreign actors (colonial powers/private military actors/transnational Salafi–Jihādi groups) and domestic socio-histographies (past-in-the present) were significant factors that resulted into glocal conflicts (expansionism/ separatism) in Chad and Mozambique. In spite of the findings, the study infers that Salafi–Jihādi extremisms within the African continent are movements that occur on the basis of equifinality. The study recommends for dismantling colonial continuities, promotion of good governance, religious coexistence, and youth empowerment.

Keywords

Ansar al-Sunna, Boko Haram, Chad, Glocality, Mozambique, Natural resources, Salafi–Jihādi, Violent extremism

Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islāmic Maghreb
CIVE	Countering Islamist Violent Extremism
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
IR	International Relations
IS	Islāmic State
ISIS	Islāmic State of Iraq and Syria
ISWAP	Islāmic State West Africa Province
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihād
LNG	liquefied Natural Gas
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PMC	Private Military Company
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SMT	Social Movement Theory
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Q.	Qurʾān (***Q.*** used as an acronym of Qurʾān in this study).

Terms

9/11	is a shorthand term that emerged after the suicide terrorist attacks spearheaded by members of al-Qaeda that occurred on September 11, 2001.
Ansar al-Sunna	a Salafi–Jihādi violent extremist group based in northern Mozambique and active within Cabo Delgado province.
Boko Haram	a Salafi–Jihādi violent extremist group based in northeastern Nigeria operating within the borders of Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Mali.

Colonial Continuities	the continued political, economic, and military presence of a colonial master within a former colony.
Glocality	a social phenomenon that occurs as result of local and global factors; can also be linked to transnationality.
Modus operandi	a Latin term used to describe an individual's or organisation's habitual method of procedure or doing things.
Natural resources	embrace a broad array of categories from air, land to plants, among others. Here, natural resources refers to any raw material that falls within the categories of mineral and petro-resources (oil and gas).
Salafi–Jihādi	describes a Sunni-Islamist ideology often manipulated to justify violent extremist initiatives aimed at establishing an Islāmic Caliphate[1].
Violent Extremism	describes beliefs, attitudes and behaviours that condones violence. Violent extremists, thus, are those who commit ideologically motivated violence to attain several goals, mostly politico-religious authority, and superiority.

Translated Words[2]

al-da' awa	missionary work/persuasion
Allāh	God: the most merciful Creator and sustainer of the universe, the Provident, the lawgiver who is immortal and omnipresent.
al-nafs	'self' often appearing within the Qurʾān.
al-sāhāba	companions.
al-salaf al-sālih	righteous predecessors.
al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya	Salafi–Jihādi.
al-tarbiyah	concept of Islāmic education. It necessitates Muslims to focus on 'tafsīr' during the upbringing of their children.
al-walāʾ wa-l-barā	phrase that came up with the Kharijites meaning loyalty (al-walāʾ) and disavowal (wa-l-barā).
Bid'ah	innovation in religious-related matters is mostly rejected.
fī Sabīl Allāh	within the path of God (*Allāh*).

[1] Terminologies that describe this ideology vary from Salafi–Jihādism (e.g. Ranstorp, Ahlerup & Ahlin, 2022), Jihād-Salafi (e.g. Karagiannis, 2014) to Salafi–Jihādi (e.g. Berti, 2010). This report has adopted the latter term due to the way in which the term reads in Arabic: al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya.

[2] Considering variations within literature in spelling Arabic doctrinal words, this report uses the most common spelling (Chapter 2, also see Bonney, 2004).

Ḥākimiyya	the sovereignty of God (thus: divine governance). It explains the Islamist worldview that advocates God (*Allāh*) as highest form of not only religious, but that of political authority (politico-religious authority).
Jihād al-Akbar	the greatest Jihād.
Jihād al-bil-sayf	struggle with the sword.
Jihād al-faasiqeen	struggle against corrupt Muslims.
Jihād al-Kuffār	struggle against unbelievers.
Jihād al-munafiqeen	struggle against hypocrites.
Jihād al-tarbiyah	striving for education and intellectual growth (also linked to Jihād bil lisan that concerns itself with spreading the teaching of Islam.
Jihād ash-Shaytan	struggle against Satan.
Jihād bil qalb	often considered as the 'greatest Jihād', these are efforts associated with the Jihād of the heart.
Jihād bil yad	fighting against evil with action. It necessitates Muslims to have morals of choosing to do the right and combating what is wrong including injustices with action.
Jihād bis saif	armed fighting in the way of God (*Allāh*) or holy war.
Jihād	holy war, struggle.
Juhd	efforts aimed at preventing harm or bringing benefits.
Kafīr	unbeliever (singular).
Khalīfah	head of the Muslim state (Khilāfah/ Caliphate).
Khilāfah	Islāmic transnational polity that unites political and religious authority as a form of governance.
Kuffār	unbelievers (plural).
Manhaj	systematic method or path of upholding and performing deeds.
Qurʾān	Holy book of Islām (central religious text in Islām).
Salaf	pious predecessor or ancestors. These are the first three generations of Muslims: starting with the generation of Prophet Muhammad (the companions/al-sāhāba), the followers (tabiʿun) marking the second generation and then the followers of followers (tābiʿū al-tābʿīn).
Salafī	one who emulates and follows the practices of the first three generations of Muslims (companions, tabiʿun and tābiʿū al-tābʿīn). There are three groups: traditionalists, reformist as well as political-literalists Salafīyyah.

Salafīyyah	Islāmic doctrine and Sunni revival movement that calls for Islāmic renaissance: thus, it requires the emulation of Salaf as a righteous way of practicing Islām and life.
Shahada	oral profession of faith (i.e. *'I bear witness that there is no God but Allāh, Muhammad is the messenger of Allāh'*). It includes behavioural actions of martyrdom.
Sharīʿah	Islāmic law.
Shīʿa	minority independent faith community within Islām.
Sunnah	traditions and practices that were established by Prophet Muhammad
Sunnī	largest faith community within Islām that draws from the Sunnah traditions and practices.
Tafsīr	exegesis refers to the 'interpretation' of the holy Qurʾān.
Takfīr	excommunication: the charge of unbelief 'kafīr' levelled against apostates within the Muslim faith. It occurs when a particular Muslim declares another Muslim as an infidel or unbeliever.
Tawḥīd	monotheism. The belief that there is only one God (*Allāh*): the Creator, the Provident, the Lawgiver.
Tazkiyya	alludes to the 'purification of self'.
Ummah	Muslim society following certain schisms in Islām.

Table of Contents

Student Declaration ..... ***i***

Acknowledgements ..... ***ii***

Abstract ..... ***iii***

Keywords ..... ***iii***

Acronyms ..... ***iv***

Terms ..... ***iv***

Translated Words ..... ***v***

Table of Contents ..... ***viii***

Table of Figures ..... ***x***

Chapter One: Preliminary Remarks ***1***

1.1 Upsurge in Wars of Ideas? Background and Introduction 1

1.2 Literature Review: Trends, Causes and Types 3

1.3 The Problem Statement 9

1.4 Research Question 9

1.5 Research Aims 9

1.6 The Rationale: Searching for a Nexus 10

1.7 Theoretical Framing 10

1.8 Research Methodology 14

1.8.1 'When less is More? Case Selection 15

1.8.2 Operationalisation of Variables 18

1.8.3 Data Sources 18

1.9 Ethical Considerations 19

1.10 Chapterisation 19

Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework – Theorizing African Violent Extremism ***20***

2.1 Introduction 20

2.2 Understanding Changing Armed Conflicts in Africa 20

2.2.1 Salafi–Jihādi: The Best of Both Worlds? 20

2.2.2 Understanding Violent Extremism 25

2.2.3 Glocality: Where Local and Global Intersect 26

2.3 The Resource Curse? Overview and Theories 26

2.6 Chapter Conclusion 28

Chapter Three: Searching for the Nexus – The Case of Chad ***29***

3.1 Introduction 29
3.2 Setting the Scene: Chad Battling Glocal Conflicts? 29
3.3 The Actors: Understanding Boko Haram 30
3.4 Discussion: Unearthing Variables and 'Butterfly Effects' 33
3.4.1 Variable One: Ideology 33
3.4.2 Variable Two: Natural Resources 36
3.4.3 Variable Three: Illicit Activities 37
3.4.4 Variable Four: Expansionism/Separatism 38
3.4.5 Variable Five: Foreign Actors 39
3.4.6 Other Variables 40
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 42

Chapter Four: Searching for the Nexus – 'The Case of Mozambique' ***43***

4.1 Introduction 43
4.2 Setting the Scene: 'Latest Salafi–Jihādi Hotspot' 43
4.3 The Actors: Understanding Ansar al-Sunna 44
4.4 Discussion: Unearthing the Variables 47
4.4.1 Variable One: Ideology 47
4.4.2 Variable Two: Natural Resource 48
4.4.3 Variable Three: Illicit Activities 50
4.4.4 Variable Four: Expansionism/ Separatism 51
4.4.5 Variable Five: Foreign Actors 52
4.4.6 Other Variables 55
4.5 Chapter Conclusion 59

Chapter Five: Analysis, Conclusion, and Recommendations ***60***

5.1 Introduction 60
5.2 Overview of the Study: Horrors of Salafi–Jihādi? 60
5.3 Evaluation and Research Findings 61
5.3.1. Overall Evaluation 61
5.3.2 Research Findings 64
5.4 Limitations of the Study and Avenues for Further Research 66
5.5 Recommendations: People, Politics and Progress? 67
5.6 'The Epilogue?' Closing Remarks 68

Bibliography ***69***

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Trends in Militant Islamist Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa 2
Figure 2: Salafi–Jihādi Movement in Africa 2
Figure 3: Violent Extremism and Associated Salafi–Jihādi Groups in Africa since 2000s 15
Figure 4: The Sixfold Pillars of Salafi–Jihādi 24
Figure 5: Glocalism 26
Figure 6: The Four Stages of Social Movement Theory ..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Figure 7: Boko Haram's Glocality 29
Figure 8: Boko Haram's Salafi–Jihādists 30
Figure 9: Increased Brutality 34
Figure 10: Change in Transnationality 35
Figure 11: Climate Change Inflaming Resource Scarcity & Terror? 37
Figure 12: Time's Up, France? 40
Figure 13: Chad, Among the Poorest? 41
Figure 14: Map of Mozambique 43
Figure 15: Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādists 44
Figure 16: Ansar al-Sunna's Increasing Violence since 2017-2020s 46
Figure 17: Because of Ideology 47
Figure 18: Aboud Rogo Mohammed 48
Figure 19: Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādists Pledging Alliance to ISIS 52
Figure 20: Illustrations of Ansar al-Sunna's Glocality 53
Figure 21: The Nexus between Gas Exploration Projects and Salafi–Jihādi 53
Figure 22: First Variance, Insider-Outsider 63
Figure 23: Second Variance, From Within 64

Chapter One: Preliminary Remarks

"…the question is not whether we will be extremists, but; the question is, what kind of extremists we will be…"
—Martin Luther King, JR[3]

1.1 Upsurge in Wars of Ideas[4]? Background and Introduction

September 11, 2001[5], a day that changed the world, marked a new age in terrorism, one propelled by transnational Jihādism. The al-Qaeda coordinated attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center and Pentagon qualified as the deadliest terrorist assault on the United States in its history. George W. Bush, President of the United States at the time, responded to the terrorist attacks with a global 'War on Terror', authorising the use of US-led force internationally against transnational Jihād in general and al-Qaeda specifically. The Bush administration adopted a multifaceted approach that included tools of diplomacy, military counterinsurgency, intelligence gathering, off-site rendition and detention, interventionism in states that harbour terrorism, and the use of international law (Rice, 2004, p. 134). Yet, transnational jihādism has been gaining global prominence: various insurgent groups around the world, especially in Asia and Africa, are joining the movement of holy war against foreign infidels.

Kaldor (2013, p. 162) argues:


"For Jihādism, then n military 'War on Terror' functioned as a magnet to unite them against U.S crusaders".

Thus, the 'War on Terror' united Jihādists in Jihādism. Whilst the U.S and NATO forces understood the global 'War on Terror" as a 'Just and Noble War' (Brown, 2005), Jihādists saw the invasion of Afghanistan as an attack on Islam, emboldening their mission to save 'Islām from foreign heathens' (Cortright, 2011, p.28). Solomon (2016) argues that if we are to understand the rise of Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa we need to examine the role of religion and how Islām specifically has been manipulated to feed into pre-existing grievances and insurgencies. 40% of Africans are Muslim (Kettani, 2010), with the majority being Sunni Muslim, whilst Shia Muslims are in the minority. Existing literature has shown that the Sunni branch of Islam tends to be the most radicalised, although most Muslims practise the religion peacefully (Lynch, 2008, p.1; also see Sharma, 2016, p.9 –17). The majority of Salafi–Jihādi extremist organisations in Africa are Sunni and embrace the notion of Salafi–Jihād[6] (Hayat Alvi, 2019). Salafi–Jihādi extremist organisations are largely concentrated in six theatres on the African continent: *North Africa* (e.g. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya with Sudan being a transit area), *East Africa* (e.g. Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire), *West Africa*

[3] Quassim, Cassam. *Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis.* Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2021. (*emphasis added*)
[4] "Wars of Ideas", is a phrase borrowed from Andrew Glazzard, Sasha Jesperson, Thomas Maguire, and Emily Winterbotham's work on conflict, violent extremism, and development in Africa (Glazzard et.al., 2018, p.5).
[5] Hereinafter referred to as 9/11.
[6] It describes a Sunni–Islamist ideology that gives tutelage on righteous ways of being a Muslim (explained in detail in Chapter 2).


(e.g. Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Benin), *Central Africa* (e.g. DR Congo, Central African Republic) *the Sahel* (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad) and *Southern Africa* (e.g. Mozambique, at the time of submission). These facts can be cross-referenced with Parez's (2023) work on Figure (2). Clearly *Sunni-inspired* extremist conflict is one of the most widespread and pressing security threats of the 21st century for the African continent. Trends reveal that Sunni-inspired violent extremism in Africa have been on continuous spiral since the 2010s (Figure 1). Such burgeoning trends of Salafi–Jihādi extremism are evidenced within Figure (2).

Figure 1: Trends in Militant Islamist Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: African Center for Strategic Studies (2021, p. 1).

Figure 2: Salafi–Jihādi Movement in Africa



Source: Parez (2023, p. 1).

While Figure 1 instantiates the surge of militant Islamist violence and reported fatalities in Africa since the early 2010s with Chad and Mozambique, Figure 2 demonstrates the trends of Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa since 2020 with criteria per category from transit zone, terrorist cells to low and

active escalating conflicts in the continent. Many countries, including our cases, belong to the low and active escalating conflicts showcasing the proliferating effects of violent extremism in the continent. Thus, Marc (2021) argues that transnational Jihādi groups such as al-Qaeda and its ideological offspring, Islāmic State of Iraq, and Syria (ISIS) alongside their affiliates are thriving in Africa. While al-Qaeda has three affiliates in Africa (al-Qaeda in the Islāmic Maghreb, Jamat'at Nasr al-Islām wal Muslimin, al-Shabaab and Ansuru), ISIS is gaining prominence driving the Salafi–Jihādi conflict apparatus with its affiliates (ISIS-Somalia, ISIS-Libya, ISIS-Greater Sahara, ISIS-Sinai, ISIS-Central African Province, ISIS-DRC, ISIS-Mozambique). The question that remains is:

What are the variables that enabled Africa to be a global epicenter of Jihād violence?

Pre-existing violent conflicts in Africa have already created fertile grounds for the spread of Jihādism. Since independence, Africa has endured conflicts ranging from liberation wars, civil wars, insurgencies, ethnic and identity-based conflicts, piracy, and resource conflicts. Africa is a resource-endowed continent. The continent contains a variety of resources from renewables such as water, fisheries, forestry, and farmland to non-renewables such as diamond, gold, crude oil and liquified natural gas. The latter seem to play a significant role in triggering intrastate conflicts (Maphosa, 2012). Dreher and Kreibaum (2016) claim that there is a correlation between natural resources and insurgencies in Africa, which raises the question as to whether there is any effect of natural resources on Salafi–Jihādi. Before engaging in such an analysis, it is necessary for this study to understand what is known about natural resources-conflicts, Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa.

1.2 Literature Review: Trends, Causes and Types Comment Overruled

Literature on the nature of armed conflicts in Africa is extensive. The main areas of debates, disagreement, and contention within the literature on armed conflict in Africa relates to trends, causation, types, and resolution approaches, thus:

Wars do End and Resurge![7] Conflict Trends since the 1990s–2020s

While the 1990s witnessed a significant declining trend by some 80% in the incidents and intensity of armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa[8], the early 2000s have shown upswings in armed conflict incidents. Two Large-N studies by Cilliers (2015) and Von Einsiedel (2017) address these changing patterns within African armed conflicts. Cilliers empirically maps out the changing conflict trends in Africa since 1960s, recording that the 1990s witnessed some declining trends in conflict incidents but only for these patterns to be reversed during the 2000s. Von Einsiedel finds that these trends owe to the armed conflict relapse rate that constantly hovered above 60% within African countries. Radil and

[7] 'Wars do End' is a phrase borrowed from Scott Straus' work on the changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa (Straus, 2012, p. 179, emphasis added).
[8] Mack, Andrew and Cooper, Tara. 'A New Peace in Africa.' *Conflict Trends* 4.1 (2008).

Walther, most recent authors, find that armed conflicts in Africa have continuously been on the rise since the 2010s (Radil & Walther, 2024). Von Einsiedel's work elaborates, asserting that there has been a six-fold increase in intrastate conflicts since the 2010s: trends recorded that the continent hosted more than 50 non-state conflicts in 2017, as opposed to 24 violent conflicts that existed during the early 2010s. Various scholars thus approached the question of *causes* asking what causes upward patterns within Africa's armed conflict (Suliman, 1998; Collier, 2000; Smith, 2001; Moe, 2009; Ameru, 2010; Kudakwashe & Bukaliya, 2015; Bizău & Stănciulescu, 2022):

Is it due to gaps between the haves and have-nots: Causation in African Conflicts

African conflicts have often hinged on several factors including ethnic tensions, bad governance, poverty and failed political institutions. Whilst causes of conflict in Africa vary region-by-region, various scholars have understood greed-grievances as the eminent causes of armed conflict in Africa (Collier, 2000, Berdal & Malone, 2000; or recently, Ives & Breslawski, 2022; Joya & Rahimi, 2023). Such causal discourses are found problematic by various critiques (key contributors include McAdam, 1999; Nathan, 2003; Stewart, 2005; Mushed & Tadjoeddin, 2009; Simons, 2014; Bensted, 2011) arguing that the twin-fold causation discourse traps other salient causes of armed conflicts in Africa. Ameru (2010, p. 551) thus explains that conflicts in Africa may have been caused by a multiplicity of factors–all of which should be dissected for peaceful solutions. In this case, Paul Williams (2011) offers a conceptually important book that discusses in-great depth the 'ingredients' of armed conflict in Africa. His work reveals there exists five main 'ingredients' (causes) of war in Africa, namely, ethnic identity, sovereignty, self-determination, government systems and, religion and natural resources. Brosche, Nilsson and Sundberg (2023) argue that causality of African conflicts should not be bottled under these five-fold themes but be understood as being manifold. Their findings, crucial for this research, is that the *causes* of armed conflicts in Africa remains an issue of fluidity and complexity. Such complexities in causation could explain the varying forms of conflict in Africa (Burja, 2000; Gluhbegovic, 2016; Szyna & colleagues[9], 2017; Gilpin, 2019; Malu, 2019):

Typologies: Owing to Complexities?

Conflicts in Africa occur due to different causes. Thus, there exists various types of armed conflict. Scholars, like Gluhbegovic (2016) and Abdi (2024) argue that Africa had and still witnesses(ed) civil unrests, political conflicts, identity and ethnic-based conflicts, border-disputes, resource-based conflicts, terrorism to Salafi–Jihādi inspired violent extremism. Le Billion (2001) adds that resource conflicts manifest as coups d'état, rebellion, succession, and war-lordism. Szayna and colleagues (2017) categorise these typologies as: *one-sided conflicts* (e.g. identity and ethnic-based violence);

[9] Szayna, Thomas S., O'Mahony, Angela., Kavanagh, Jennifer., Watts, Stephen., Fredirick, Bryan., Norlen, Tove C. and Voorhies, Phoenix. *Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers': An Empirical Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections*. Rand Corporation, 2017.

state and non-state conflicts (e.g. civil wars, or political violence); and *spontaneous societal conflicts* (e.g. civil unrests) and *organised societal conflicts* (e.g. terrorism or Salafi–Jihādi extremism). Burja (2000) conceptualises these typologies of armed conflict in Africa in relation to different causes. He finds that varying conditions that exist during the causation phase leads to a certain conflict. These assertions should be cross-referenced with empirical evidence. On natural resources for example, scholars such as Lujala (2010), Maphosa (2012), Dreher and Kreibaam (2016), Bayramov (2018), Osasumwen et. al (2020), Sini et.al (2021) find that mismanagement of 'natural resources' tends to trigger war onset of resource-inspired civil wars. Their works find that natural resources function as a mechanism that triggers, prolongs and finances armed conflict in Africa. Lujala (2010) further highlights that the location of resources is crucial in influencing conflict and its duration: if a resource is located inside a conflicting zone–there are high chances that the conflict duration doubles. In particular, Herbert (2000) claims that it is lootable resources such as gemstones that tend to drive and sustain rebellions. Further, Ross (2006), Humphreys (2005) and Fearon (2005), argue that natural resource abundance motivates armed conflicts in Africa. In their study, titled, *Does Natural Resources Influence Conflict in Africa,* Snow Sini, Samad Abdul-Rahim and Chindo Sulaiman (2021), find that conflicts are a result of the 'resource curse' whereby greed and looting mechanisms leads to armed conflicts in Africa. This idea is central to what is known as the 'greed and grievance hypothesis' by Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2004). Existing scholarship thus provides comprehensible facts that armed violence in Africa takes various forms and dimensions (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014). Recent years thus have shown the proliferation of organised societal conflicts, especially Salafi–Jihādi extremism in sub-Saharan Africa despite ongoing conflict resolutions (Leary 2002; Kepel, 2003; Egerton, 2011; Karagiannis, 2014; Meijer, 2018; Hafez, 2020):

Conflict Resolutions in the Face of Salafi–Jihādi Extremism

Existing scholarship reveals that the past decades have witnessed the failure of international mediation in African intrastate conflicts (Nathan, 1999, p.1 also see Allen, 1999; Jackson, 2001; Jok, 2021). Various Western conflict resolutions such as the 'War on Terror' or the 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in Afghanistan aimed at countering–violent extremism have not resulted into intended objectives. These trends show that international efforts aimed at resolving conflicts in Africa often face a multiplicity of limitations (Murithi, 2008, p.18). Critics like Williams (2011) argues that international conflict resolution initiatives approach African conflicts with 'one-size fits all' approaches neglecting causal complexities. A seminal but under-cited text *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities* (Bozeman, 1976) argues that western approaches towards conflict resolution have often ignored African political values. Instead, Western approaches continue to homogenise African conflict as if they occur in a single country, which oft results in stereotyping (Eze, 2008). Francis (2008, p. 16) argues therefore that to understand African conflict dynamics and possible conflict resolutions,

'dehomegenization of African politics needs to occur. Critics, like Rogers and Ramsbotham (1999) argue that international responses have constantly concentrated on 'militant responses' which are top-down in nature. This research report argues that for international peace operations to succeed in their operations, peacemakers should have an in-depth diagnostic understanding of the problem from concepts, trends to the movement as means to offer forward-looking solutions. Since 9/11, a different phase of conflict emerged entailing the politicization of religious ideology of Salafi–Jihādi with linkages to localised grievances (Chingono, 2014; de Villiers, 2015). Jihādism, according to Brachman (2008) defines a 'holy war' or fighting for the cause of *Allāh* (Khan, 2012). Cook (2009) provides categories of Jihādism such as: Jihād of the hand (or the sword which is military in form); Jihād of tongue (efforts on corrupt society), and the Jihād of the soul (internal struggles with one's own soul). Robinson (2021) further elaborates on these categories of Jihādism arguing that it is the Jihād of the sword that uses armed violence in defence of Islam.

Since 2001, Africa has seen the proliferation of Jihād of the sword. Various studies have attempted to understand the Jihādism in context of Africa. among those scholars is Guido Steinberg and Annette Webber (2015) who make a strong case arguing that Jihādism in Africa is on the rise due to local causes (such as society, economy and the state), regional expansionism (by local transnational Jihādist groups), and international alliances of extremist groups (such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Sunna) to global Jihādi organisations. Alexandra (2021) finds that Salafi–Jihādi groups link themselves to existing local conflicts and seek to construct secessionist–states – thereby gaining influence and territory. While the Salafi–Jihādi base is growing exponentially across the world, evidence relating to what constitutes a Salafi–Jihādi–group tends to be scanty.

Véronique Dudouet and Karin Göldner-Ebenthal (2019, p. 15) meanwhile take a conventional approach in defining Salafi–Jihādi groups and argue that it refers to 'any organised group with a basis command operating outside state control that uses armed force to achieve its politico-religious objectives. These groups usually conform to a particular school of thought within Islam adopted from either Sunni or Shia Islam. While within Sunni Islam, there are four school of thought that inform ideologies and behaviour (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali), Shia Islam informs five distinct school of thought (Jafari, Ismailiyah, Zaiddiyah, Alani and Alevi). The groups that are studied within this research report will include those that adhere to the Sunni Islamic school of Hanbali – which leans on Wahhabism[10] and Salafism. In his article titled *The Virtues of Violence: The Salafi–Jihādi Political Universe,* published in 2014, Chetan Bhatt defines a Salafi–Jihādi group as any *belligerent* group that employs religious rhetoric and extreme violence to advance its objectives. However as

[10] Considered as an ideological and religious movement that can be traced back to Muhammad Ibn AlWahhab (1703–1792), Wahhabi doctrine represents a reformist radical ideological movement within the Sunni Islam.

Moghadam (2008) argues, Salafi–Jihādi groups selectively pick elements from Islām that only advance their narrow theocracy/violent agendas. For the purposes of this research report, the author defines Salafi–Jihādi group as:

a belligerent organisation that uses elements of Islām such as the ideology of Salafi–Jihādi as a program of violent action to achieve its politico-religious objectives, which is, the creation of a Caliphate ruled by the Sharia law.

Such groups in Africa have been gaining dominance over the past years. Scholars, like Moghadam (2009), Karagiannis (2014), and Raineri (2020) demonstrate that Salafi–Jihādi extremism within the Sahel and the Horn have been escalating since 2001. In his paper *Terrorism in Africa: The Rise of Islamist Extremism and Jihādism*, Hayat Alvi (2019, p. 129) demonstrates that African governments tend to provide Salafi–Jihādi groups 'safe haven' from Mozambique to Togo. He finds that issues of limited statehood, poor governance, lack of resource policing porous borders create fertile grounds for violent extremist groups to recruit, indoctrinate and multiply. Heras and Estelle (2020) add on this arguing that years of poor governance and economic underdevelopment has created grounds for violent extremism in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, yet the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the spread of Salafi–Jihādi. Scholars like, Tanchum (2012) and Estelle (2022) find that Salafi–Jihādi groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have made ideological and territorial advancements within the Horn, Sahel and recently, Southern Africa. In the *Horn, Sahel and Rift: Fault-lines of African Jihādi*, Hansen (2021) offers a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing Salafi–Jihādi movements within these regions. He reveals that transnational jihādi groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS transform local violent extremist groups so to maintain their control over resources, influence, and territoriality. The SB Morgen (2021) classifies these trends 'as the search for a Caliphate' as transitional Salafi–Jihādi groups appear to have an expansionist agenda of radical Islām from the Sahel, the Horn to Southern Africa.

Thus, Tabar's (2021) findings draw an 'interface' between Salafi–Jihādi groups operating in the Horn and Sahel to matters of geopolitics, expansionism, or separatism. Existing literature notes that the Lake Chad Basin and Southern Africa have witnessed the proliferation of Salafi–Jihādi extremism (de Montclos, 2018; Hardy, 2019; Sixpence, Makoni & Moyo, 2021; Salihu, 2021; Estelle, 2021; Daniel, 2021). Recent years witnessed Salafi–Jihādi extremism within Chadian (since 2012) and Mozambican–borders (since 2017). Scholars, like Connor (2017), Maza, Koldas and Aksit (2020) argue that the Lake Chad Basin witnesses an upsurge of violent extremism and faces challenges to curb such situations. Griffin (2020) and Locci (2020) argue that overlapping realities have created grounds for the expansion of Salafi–Jihādi extremist violence within Chad. Since 2017, security analysts have observed the spreading trend of Salafi–Jihādi within Southern Africa. Scholars like Chingoutane, Sudumo, Hendrics and van Nieuwkerk (2021) argue within their situational report that

Southern Africa is experiencing its first case of Salafi–Jihādi extremism within Mozambican borders. Jamu and Sabala (2024) show that Salafi–Jihādi extremism has developed, grown and evolved in Chad driven by Boko Haram, in Somalia driven by al-Shabaab, and in Mozambique driven by Ansar al-Sunna. This study concerns itself with variables that resulted into the growth of Salafi–Jihādi within resource-rich Chadian and Mozambican borders:

Towards the Status Quaestionis

While existing literature appears to be cognisant of the evolving nature of African conflicts since the 20th century, explanations on Salafi–Jihādi and religious extremist conflicts in Africa remain scanty. The plethora of seminal publications that emerged since the early 2010's has rather provided reductionist accounts of Salafi–Jihādi and violent extremist insurgencies in Africa (Joffe, 2010; Tanchum, 2012; Bemauer, Bohmelt, Koubi & Spiller, 2014; Cooke, 2016). Arguments on violent extremist insurgencies in Africa tend to focus on a one-sided narrative, which views Salafi–Jihādi extremism as a result of local grievances, political, and socio-economic dynamics. This study seeks to break new ground in the armed conflict debate; averring that the grievance narrative which stands for the argument that intrastate conflicts are a result of certain perceived deprivation should be widen – wherein the role of ideological influences, natural resources and western actors are explored. As it stands, there is strikingly little empirical research on deep ideological roots of violent extremism and its role on the construction of extremist groups in Africa. The question of what ideological motivations influence the transformation of extremist groups from local Salafism to international jihādism or towards a combination of both remains one of the least understood issues within the African intrastate conflict scholarship with almost no detailed research on this. This research report finds existing academic literature on violent extremism in Africa problematic; solely because critical dynamics of glocality are underlooked, especially the narrative that Salafi–Jihādi extremism within the continent manifests due to ideological internation between local and international jihādism actors. What remains a puzzle is a question that Murphy (2017, p.2), poses:

"What if crude oil and gas is the true ideology of extremist groups in Africa?"

Until Murphy, the natural resources dimension has been among the important discourses that has not been tapped into when it comes to understanding contemporary extremism warfare in Africa. Recent studies should start interrogating conflict dynamics that suggests correlation between natural resource discoveries and intrastate conflict onset perpetuated by ideologically driven extremist groups in Africa. Questioning Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa should be accompanied by discourse that uncover variables that have enabled African countries to be incubators of Salafi–Jihādi extremism.

1.3 The Problem Statement

Conflict dynamics in Africa are changing, presenting upswing threats in acts of violent extremism. The geographic footprint of violent extremism within resource rich African states has grown (Omenma, 2019), yet explanations about Salafi–Jihādi groups' capacity to foment and perpetuate natural resource inspired movements remains poorly understood. Violent extremism patterns itself to challenge peace, stability, and progress. This is not only problematic for Africa's democracies, also undermines the hard-won economic development gains. Violent extremism also proves problematic to Africa's global economy (Danjuna, 2021, p. 27). Salafi–Jihādi extremism tends to drive less foreign direct investments inflows (Adelaiyi & Sarwari, 2023, p. 476). Such trends affect Africa's international relations as political instability limits much needed investment within resource rich countries. Instead, resource rich countries such as DR Congo, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, among others, have witnessed successive waves of violent Islamist extremism since the early 2000s. These trends demonstrate that Salafi–Jihādi extremism is gaining prominence within African borders. Yet, existing literature has provided a slender appraisal of the ideological aspirations of religious violent extremism. It remains unclear how the *ideology of Salafi–Jihādi* finds grounds to indoctrinate and turnaround resource-rich communities into 'justice seeking-jihād' movements. What further complicates understanding is how various frantic-complex-fluid factors[11] of Salafi–Jihādi extremism remain under-explored. Thus, the present research report is interested in into interrogating the role of Salafi–Jihādi in driving violent extremism within resource rich countries in Africa since 2009.

1.4 Research Question

The specific research question that this study examines is:

What role does Salafi–Jihādi play in starting, perpetuating, and sustaining conflict in resource rich states?

To complement the primary research question, two subsidiary questions have been generated:

- How should the Salafi–Jihādi ideology be understood and explained in an African context?
- Does the 'greed and grievance hypothesis' still hold water in explaining current conflict dynamics in Africa, and in particular, Chad and Mozambique?

1.5 Research Aims

The aim of this study is to critically analyse the nexus between natural resources and armed conflict perpetuated by Salafi–Jihādi groups in African countries with particular focus given to Chad and

[11] This research report defines such factors as those that are disorganised, consisting of different parts and are everchanging.

Mozambique. In doing so, the study hopes to unpack and understand what other factors exists where natural resources, armed violence, and Salafi–Jihādi groups are present.

The objectives for this study are:

- To examine whether the 'greed and grievance' theorem applies to understanding Salafi–Jihād armed conflict in Chad and Mozambique.
- To unpack what factors are present in violent armed conflict where Salafi–Jihād is present.

1.6 The Rationale: Searching for a Nexus

A new dimension to contemporaneous armed conflict is emerging: one that seeks to replace the secular state with politico-religious authority[12]. This new dimension of armed conflict necessitates academic attention which entails assessing the nexus between natural resources, Salafi–Jihādi and armed conflict in Africa. It should be noted that the point of the study is not to extend the view that Islām is a violent religion but rather discount it by investigating Salafi–Jihādi–*radicalisation* in Africa and its linkage to grievance, greed, resources, and armed conflict on the continent the study paper orients its focus on a particularly *contemporary* form of African conflict, one that threatens to subsume the secular Westphalian African state as we know it. Further, the study contributes to efforts of bettering our understanding on a transnational (in)security that has international ramifications. The study is worthy of attention in International Relations (IR), as it hopes to bring forth, among others, a greater understanding of the complexity and changing nature of intrastate warfare in Africa. Turning explicit attention to the theoretical framing of this research report, the next section will articulate the *theory* to be used for understanding the changing conflict dynamics vis-à-vis Salafi–Jihādi in Africa.

1.7 Theoretical Framing

This study explores contemporaneous intrastate armed conflicts in Africa. Its analysis will draw from two traditions of social sciences: *Greed vs Grievance Theory* and *Social Movement Theory*. The first framework is an intellectual framing associated with the scholarly works of Paul Collier and Ankle Hoeffler (1998, 2000, 2001, 2004). It emerged with intentions to explain intrastate war onset using an econometric model oft known as the 'C&H model' that predicts the outbreaks of civil wars (Nathan, 2008, p. 263). Literature shows that the model understands the outbreak of a civil war due to two dichotomous motivations viz., greed or grievance which marked the 'Greed vs Grievance theory' (Pizzolo, 2020, p. 12). Its Proponents claim that *grievances* appear necessary to initiate civil war within resource rich countries, while *greed*[13] presents itself as a sufficient factor to sustain

[12] Also known as homegrown Salafi-Jihādi insurgency (see Mellen, 2012; Elischer Sebastian, 2021).

[13] Scholars of this school of thought argue that economic opportunities faced by rebel groups, especially where there is resource abundance, instigates the incidence of civil wars, as Collier and Hoeffler (cited in Nathan, 2008, p. 264) noted. The greed argument likens with the *'resource curse'*, that the abundance of resources tends to perpetuate for conflicting situations or the *'Dutch disease'*. The greed argument contends that natural resources[13]

intrastate conflict (Umoh, 2021, pp.299-300). Even though Collier and Hoeffler produced a well-written thesis on greed and grievance causes of intrastate conflicts, understanding complex African conflicts under twin-causation is problematic as other prominent factors such as low-politics, policing on resources, climate change, colonial legacies, or continuities and vast more remain trapped under claims of being insignificant[14]. In his *"Complex Emergencies,"* David Keen (2008, p.24) correctly points out that conflict incidences cannot solely be centred on issues of 'grievance and greed', but there remain complex causes to insurgencies, and these complex factors should be explicated. If Collier and Hoeffler's framework continues to omit other salient factors (Vinci, 2007; Bensted, 2011), then its prowess to explain current complex conflict dynamics should be questioned.

This study contests the *Greed vs Grievance theory* on the grounds that the theory *traps* several factors salient to the development of ongoing conflict dynamics of Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa from organised corruption, mismanagement of natural resources to weak government institutions. Of course various intrastate conflicts have emerged out of greed and grievance. Yet, causality can never be solely attributed to economic reasons of greed or grievances (Keen, 2008). Such discourse traps various causal conditions that are significant during civil war onset. Scholars, like Stewart (2005), Pan (2011) and van Doorn (2013) have critiqued Coller and Hoeffler's work arguing that it traps several factors into the 'tug of war' between causal hypotheses. Yet, its inability to accept grievances as significant factors worthy of igniting armed conflict is problematic. One of the pioneering authors, Collier argued that '…grievance factors are so unimportant […] I think grievance-based explanations of civil war are seriously wrong… (Collier, 2000). These assertions means that the theory generalises armed conflicts on the basis of 'economics is falling short in explaining complexities that exist during armed conflicts. Thus, critics argue that the theory offers reductionist causal accounts on the causes and onset of armed intrastate conflict. Keen (as cited in Ojakorotu, 2018, pp. 373-374) finds that the theory continues to be 'too comfortable with economics or numbers', neglecting the core reasons and opinions that motivates the larger society to opt to join political rebellion. Others like, Bara (2015) argue that 'it's time to abandon the greed-grievance debate'.

The major problem facing the greed-based attempts in understanding armed intrastate conflict is its exclusionary essence. Indeed, as Majeedullah (2015, p. 3) puts it, the greed-based inferences face conceptual limitations due to 'picking and choosing' what might be deemed relevant and quantifiable to the C&H model. Anything that complicates the model such as institutional corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, or weak government structures is disregarded on account of

both generates motive and opportunity for rebels to start a rebellion (Basedau and Wegenast, 2009, pp 37, also see Ojakorotu, 2017, p.368). Rebels take part in conflicts solely for personal economic benefits or material gains.

[14] Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p.564) have argued that factors such as political repression, lack of democracy, ethnicity, and religious polarisation cause grievance-based rebellions. Yet, their regression analyses found these indicators to be statistically insignificant in civil war inception (Zartman, 2011, p. 200: see also Bensted, 2011).

measurement challenges for the C&H model (Bensted, 2011; Keen, 2012). Such selectivity in the face of complexities is problematic. Whether one uses quantitative or qualitative tools of research, acknowledging complexities in research projects that study societal conflicts is necessary as it enables any research project to uncover 'stories behind the stories' (Rashid & Niang, 2021, p.8). Those that are critical of Collier and Hoeffler's work argue that there are too many *other causal* factors that are at play during conflictual climates in resource rich states (Ojakorotu, 2018, p. 374). Clearly the 'greed-grievance' based framework faces various limitations in adequately assessing conflict dynamics of Salafi–Jihādi extremism both in Chad and Mozambique as they present complex causal variables, yet this remains to be seen. The greed and grievance theory has long been used to examine and understand causes of armed intrastate conflict. Yet as the chapter highlighted, that the greed and grievance theory has limitations, such as considering the role of ideology, government, climate change in conflict discourse. It is then instructive that this study provides theoretical alternatives that highlight other factors and strive for the existing theory to be explanatorily sufficient, if at all. Thus, this study will draw from an 'integrative framework' worth of explaining complexities and fluidity that exist around causality of armed intrastate conflicts. Rather than a dichotomous understanding of civil wars, armed intrastate conflict should be understood as complex and diverse socio-political activities with wide ranging histories, actors, and dynamics. To frame this research report, an integrated theoretical framework that draws from Le Bon's (1890s) classical work on collective action and Social Movement Theory (SMT) is employed. The SMT is thus chosen as an integrated framework to examine the complexities and fluidity of social and political movements in conflicts from its inception to conclusive stages. As a theory of action, the SMT assists in understanding the origins, dynamics, and outcomes of Salafi–Jihādi extremist movements. It is a middle range theory bridging between grand-structuralists and micro-theories of social movement. The theory seeks to explain:


"Collectivity acting based on relative deprivation with continuity aimed to stand up against existing institutional status quo characterised by reformist or radical transformative tendencies" (see key contributors, Lang & Lang, 1961; Marx & Weber, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Turner & Killian, 1972; Tilly, 2004; Della Porta, 2006).

The SMT thus provides an integrated framework in which to analyse complex and dynamic social realities of mass action or political movements. It should be noted that the theory draws from three theoretical perspectives: resource mobilisation, political opportunities, and framing[15] that provides an explanation of social movements from identities to outcomes (Beck, 2008, p. 1567). However an extensive exploration of these approaches falls outside the scope of this chapter. Habib and Opuku-

[15] While resource mobilisation concerns itself with the importance of resource availability necessary for the progression of a movement, political opportunities reflect the factors which influence the success or failures of a movement. Framing, then, relates to the process whereby protestors build collective identity and frame how to address their collective societal challenges (McCarthy & Zald, 2001; Meyer, 2004; Melucci, 1995).

Mensah (2009, p.46) in their chapter within *Movers and Shakers* explain that social movement theories' approach understanding mass movements based on a multiplicity of explanatory variables. The framework, as it appears, has the explanatory power of bringing together macro-meso-micro causal factors of social movements (Gunning, 2009, p.165), something that terror studies has not done. The SMT theoretical framework enables the analysis of the entire armed conflict from its inception to conclusive stages. The framework builds on critical assumptions that political movements are not stagnant, instead, they are in motion and can change direction due to internal and external factors, and those *in*-between. It proposes four stages[16] ranging from emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization, through to the decline stage (Christiansen., 2011, p. 16).

Figure 3: The Four Stages of Social Movement Theory



Source: Author (2023).

Figure 6 demonstrates collective action occurring in stages.

Social movements thus develop from something, become framed, they solidify and then they decline. When studying current conflict dynamics in Chad and northern Mozambique the study will appreciate the origins of the ongoing conflicts in these countries, what informed the conflict and is declining or strengthening. As per Rashid and Niang's (2021, p. 6) claims that theories hold a strategic place within

[16] ***The emergence stage*** manifests when ordinary citizens are faced with various societal dissatisfactions. Citizens complain between each other regarding the injustices they face, but they are slow at establishing collective or strategic responses regarding the general sense of discontent. ***The coalescence stage*** witnesses citizens establishing collective identities and beliefs. Thus, this is where clear demands are made. Hopper (1950, p.273) writes that social discontent is no longer uncoordinated, instead it gains structure whereby dissatisfied individuals operate as a collective mass organisation with a strategic outlook. Full 'formalisation' materialises within the ***bureaucratization stage*** where there are higher levels of 'organisationalism' based on coalition strategies (Christiansen, 2011, p. 18). Organisational structure becomes more formalised in the sense that the collective mass movement is compartmentalised with members trusted to carry critical functions. Additionally, those directly involved in the political violence are trained in the militant methods and tactics. ***Decline stage*** marks the epilogue phase within the lifecycle of social movements. While its name may suggest negativity, literature suggests that there are four ways in which social movement could decline: through repression (conflict resolution), co-optation (factionalism or encapsulation), failure (reach the goals) and success (achieved goals).

research that concerns themselves with armed conflict, the SMT's appropriateness and strategic forte emerges through its four stages with which this research report will employ. Thus by 'unfamilarising' the familiar greed and grievance narrative, this research report will present the social movement theory as a more coherent critical framework that acknowledges and appreciates fluidities as well as the complexities about the continent's everchanging dynamics: from the idea of 'Africa Rising' from resource riches to Africa being the 'dark Continent' due to escalating Islāmic fundamentalism and violent extremism. This methodological toolkit will be used as 'guiding theoretical lens' (Rashid & Niang, 2021, p. 7) assisting this research report to provide some level of efficacy in *outing* hidden and other casual factors within armed conflict discourses.

1.8 Research Methodology

Qualitatively designed, this study hopes to employ a case study analysis to explore the nexus between natural resources, Salafi–Jihādi and extremist groups in Chad and Mozambique. The purpose of any research project rests upon its ability to indicate, describe, and explain *variance* or, alternatively, measurable factors called variables, viz., independent, and dependent variables when studying a social phenomenon (Abiodun-Oyebanji, 2017, p.43). While the former variable connotes to phenomenon that brings about change to the presumed outcome, the latter variable constitutes the effect in causal research, argued Diana Panke (2018b, p.7). The conduct of operationalising these variables is discussed on pg. (13). As with other modern studies, this report hypothesizes that:

The greater Salafi-Jihādi ideological presence, the higher the possibilities of violent extremism expansion and glocal[17]*conflicts in resource rich states*

This study begins by explaining the outcome: Salafi–Jihādi driven violent extremism in resource rich states, viz., Chad and Mozambique. To investigate the dynamics of such an outcome, the study will use process tracing as a methodological tool of inquiry. Process tracing connotes to a methodology that aims to *trace* causal mechanisms and *processes* of a phenomenon as it unfolds (Beach, 2021, p.699). Such an understanding of process tracing accords well with Marcus Kreuzer (2010, p.369):

> *"... process tracing puts emphasis on unwrapping the black box of cause-and-effect, investigating unstated causal mechanisms, and exploring underlying ontological assumptions*" (see also Barnett, 2014).

This methodological tool values the process of unpacking hidden facts and it is orthodox on the *evidence* it intends to *trace* for inference (Yan, 2023, p.2). Thus, the nature of data to be collected and scrutinised for inference should be at the forefront, and it fits with process tracing, as George and Bennett (2005, p.6) notes:

[17] A term drawn from Isaac Kfir's (2023) scholarly work.

"... researchers examine interview transcripts, [n]ews articles, historical and archival documents as well as other relevant sources to infer whether the causal process a theory hypothesize is in fact evident in the sequence and values of intervening variables in the studied case study."

This study will attempt to draw casual inference from the identification of causes of outcomes that have already occurred (Mahoney, 2015, p.202). Using process tracing as a methodological toolkit will be advantageous for the purpose of this study as its intentions are to open the *black box* of causality. Process tracing, therefore, will assist the researcher in the quest of identifying *other* underlying factors that have been previously left out in explaining the conflict dynamics in Africa.

1.8.1 'When less is More? Case Selection

The yardsticks for case selection within this research report have been guided by Small-N research. Lieberson (1991, p.307) defines Small-N studies as those that qualitatively analyse a small number of cases. Small-N studies, as Graham, Karmarkar & Ottenbacher (2012, P. 12) put it, are research projects that seek to examine limited numbers of observations or cases using deliberate selection for such cases (as is shown in Figure 3). Researchers using small-N research design have the liberty to observe how the studied subject responds in several complex conditions. Such qualities are crucial for this research report as it seeks to explore several factors/conditions that explain the changing conflict dynamics in Africa and the escalation of Salafi–Jihādi extremism. Figure 3 depicts variables identified within states in Africa experiencing the proliferation of Salafi–Jihādi extremism which informed case selection for the research report. This is one of the most crucial decisions researchers make during the process of designing social science research as it involves the process of arrowing of substantive focus. As several methodologists argue, case selection defines the most crucial component for any research project where researchers decide which cases and how many cases to include to help determine the outcome of research project (e.g. Curtisa, 2000; Korte, 2008; Rohlfing, 2012; Plumper, 2019).

The author uses Figure 3 as the drawing board to select cases, number of cases and conditions for inquiry. The researcher choose cases on the basis of presence/absence in ideologies, natural resources, violent extremism to determine the research findings (how several conditions lead to different outcomes). Presence of certain conditions is demonstrated through bold ticks and asterisks, while absence of certain conditions are demonstrated through bold crosses considering that the study seeks to analyse similarities and differences as well as typical and atypical conditions that exist within African countries battling with Salafi–Jihādi extremism. Chad and Northern Mozambique were chosen on the based of geographical differences (Sahel vs Southern Africa) and similarities of the outcome phenomenon (Salafi–Jihādi extremism) that emerged from differing pathway. Case selection, thus, derived from comparing the variables between countries below with intentions of studying the presence/ absence of conditions leading to similar outcomes.

Figure 4: Violent Extremism and Associated Salafi–Jihādi Groups in Africa the since 2000s

Country & Region	Extremist group	Year	IV's										DV
			Al-Qaida	ISIS	Salafi	*Natural Resources* fossil fuels, or mineral resources or land resources			Separatism*/mergism	Foreign actors	Illicit activities	Expansionist desires	Conflict Local/ Regional
						Looting	Trafficking	Desires to Control/ Manage					
Somalia & East Africa	Al-Shabaab	2006	✓ L. Jihādi	×	✓ Salafi-Wahhabi	✓	✓	✓	×	✓ Expel Western influence	✓	✓	Conflict within local context
Nigeria & West Africa	Boko Haram	2009	×/✓ Suspected links	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	✓ Attacks on foreign energy companies	✓	×	Conflict within local contexts
	BH (JAS -Bakura group)	2016	×	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓*	✓	✓	✓	Conflict within local contexts
	BH (ISIS-WA)	2016	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓*	✓ Attacks on foreign energy companies	✓	✓	Conflict with regional spill overs
Mozambique & Southern Africa	Ansar al Sunna	2015	×	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	✓ Attacks on foreign energy companies	✓	×	Conflict with inter - provincial spill overs
Chad (Lake Basin) & Central Africa	BH (ISIS WA)	2016	×	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓*	✓ Attacks on foreign energy companies & blocking govt. access to energy fields	✓	✓ Outside territorial boarder	Glocal Conflict, with regional spill overs
Libya & North Africa	Ansar al-Sharia	2012	×/✓ Denies links with al-Qaeda	×	✓	×	×	×	×	✓ Expel Western forces,	✓	×	Conflict with a focus on the Benghazi province
Burkina F. & West Africa	JNIM	2017	✓ Glocal Jihādi , governance aims	×	×	×	×	✓	✓	✓ Expel Western forces,	✓	✓ Within the W-Arly-Pendjari complex	Glocal Conflict with governance desires

Source: Author and Supervisor (2023).

Chad and Mozambique have been selected as the cases studies for this research report based on the following five reasons:

- First, since the early 2010's Chad and Mozambique have been experiencing an upward pattern of militant Islamist violence which resulted in both states being 'the theatres of violent extremism', after North Africa and Somalia (Figure 1).
- Second, both are currently battling with Salafi–Jihādi extremism (Carter & Estelle, 2022, p.3). These countries are currently mired in communal violence over the access, if not the control of resources where extremist and Salafi–Jihādi groups have separatist or expansionist desires.
- Three, these states belong to different regions within sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, generalisation about new armed conflict dimensions will be avoided.
- Four, the variation in the religious index and differences in radicalisation processes between two African countries. While Chad is among the two African countries where Shia Islām is most practised, majority of Muslims in Northern Mozambique fall within the Sunni branch of Islām (Copperman, Smit, Sahgal & Clement, 2010, p.21).
- Five, variation in terms of regions (Sahel vs Southern Africa), trafficking, organised criminality, foreign actors, glocality (expansionism vs separatism).

Questioning the origin of variables used for case study analysis is crucial to any scientific research. This validates the credibility of this research report as a study that is grounded in empirical research. This study uses five variables that include ideology (Salafi–Jihādi), natural resources, illicit activities; separatism/expansionism desires and foreign actors drawn from existing scholarship to study different conflict dynamics (for example, ***studies*** by Bonney, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2006; Hellmich, 2008; Karagiannis, 2014; Cui & Glinert, 2016 contributed in the selection of variable one, Salafi–Jihādi; ***studies*** by Le Billon, 2001; Humphrey, 2005; Ross (2006); Maphosa, 2012; Sini et.al (2021) contributed in selection variable two, natural resources; ***studies*** by Adetula, 2015; Sunguta, 2018; Okali, 2019; Botha, 2022; Weiss et.al (2023) contributed in the selection of variable three, illicit activities; ***studies*** by Amaechi & Tshifhumlo, 2019; Tabar, 2021; Sithole, 2022; Bofin, 2023 contributed in the selection of variable four, expansionism & separatism; while ***studies*** by DeVore,2018; Matfess, 2019; Hanlon, 2021; Bukarti, 2022;Ufouma & Eseoghene, 2023 contributed on the selection of variable five, foreign actors). These studies have assisted the author to choose factors that will operate as 'unit of analysis' for this research report. The author operationalises the selected variables as follows:

1.8.2 Operationalisation of Variables

The study will operationalise the variables of ideology, natural resources, foreign actors, separatism/expansionism desires and illicit activities in the following way:

Variable One – Ideology:

Ideology herein is conceived of as, *Salafi–Jihādi that drives Islāmic activism*, and the data that will be used to operationalise the variable is derived from journals such as Islāmic law and Society, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, CTC Sentinel and Wiley Online Library.

Variable Two – Natural Resources:

Resources herein are conceived as, *mineral/petro resource and scarcity/abundance of resources,* and the data that used to operationalise this variable is derived from Elsevier, Taylor & Francis, and others.

Variable Three – Illicit Activities:

Illicit activities in this study are conceived of as, *acts of human and drug trafficking, organised criminality, and looting*, and the data that will be used to measure this IV is derived from sources such as ENACT Africa, UNODC, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, among others.

Variable Four – Expansionism/Separatism:

Expansion or Separatism in this study is conceived of as, *desires and movements of extremist who demand autonomy from the 'secular state,'* and the data that will assist in measuring this IV is derived from sources such as Africa News, All Africa, Press Reader, and other relevant sources.

Variable Five – Foreign actors:

Foreign actors in this study are conceived of as, *foreign energy commercial corporations such as Shell, Total etc., former colonial masters, foreign private military companies*, and the data that speaks to operationalisation of foreign actors is derived from news sources such as AfriLib and Nexis Uni.

1.8.3 Data Sources

This research paper conforms to the tenets of a secondary research[18]or what Makonye (2020) describes as a desktop study. Desktop research refers to a study that relies on and collates pre-existing primary, secondary, and tertiary data (Barry & Ruffell, 2019).[19] There are challenges however in relying on desktop sources given that scholarship is only beginning to appreciate the profundity of studying the nexus between natural resources, ideology, and extremism. This research report does attempt to overcome this limitation by drawing on a wide range of desktop sources.

[18] Scholars such as Bryman (2004, p.23), Chivaka (2018, p.1), Panchenko and Samovilova (2020, p.54) defines secondary research as the *'research'* that uses existing literature studies to uncover answers to a posed research question that is, essentially, different from the original research project (see also Szabo, 1997, p.66).

[19] As primary sources, national documents, speeches, and think tank documents will be used. As secondary sources, scholarly articles, books, and online articles will be used. As tertiary sources, handbooks will be used.

1.9 Ethical Considerations

Researchers carry the ethical responsibility to ensure their investigation minimizes the potential risk for individual harm, to research participants and the researcher (Knight, 2022; Resnik, 2020). This research does not involve human participants and is thus considered a 'no risk' study. The study aims for research integrity by using various secondary credible sources to avoid biased reportage and factual inaccuracies. In addition, the study acknowledges all sources used (Tripathy, 2013).

1.10 Chapterisation

This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides the background, literature review, rationale and significance, research questions and aim, as well as the research method and design. The chapter goes further by setting out the data sources and ethical considerations of this research report. Chapter two foregrounds the centrality of the conceptual framing in the study of contemporaneous intrastate conflicts in Africa. Chapter three and Chapter four ***'Searching for the Nexus'*** serve as case studies where the research report discusses the surge of Salafi–Jihādi armed conflict and evaluate the proposed hypothesis. Chapter five provides an overall evaluation of the cases, findings, recommendations, and overall conclusion.

Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework – Theorizing African Violent Extremism

"If you remain steadfast, Allāh will support you and grant you victory…Know that Paradise is under the shade of the swords".

—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi[20]

2.1 Introduction

Ideologies influence, shape, and justify actors' behaviour. The willingness of actors to use violence during armed conflicts is transpired from idealized binaries of 'us' versus 'them'. Porta (2001, p.12) however argues that ideologies should be understood as enablers rather than a driving force[21]. In the African continent, ideologies have been catalysts for justifying the use of armed violence since the era of nationalist independence movements to civil wars to modern Salafi–Jihādi–violent extremism. Glazzard, Jesperson, Maguire and Winterbotham (2018, p.3), point out that African violent extremists have used various frames, be it religious, political, or socio-economic to justify the fight for territory and control of natural resources such as diamonds, oil, or gas within the continent. The aim of this chapter is to outline and discuss the key conceptual and theoretical debates that explain armed conflicts in resource rich African states in relation to violent extremism and Salafi–Jihādi groups.

First, the chapter defines key concepts of Salafi–Jihādi, violent extremism, glocality and the resource curse. Second, the chapter review assumptions emerging from the seminal works of Collier (2000); Collier and Hoeffler (2000); Le Billion (2001; 2012); and Zartman (2019), to understand the reasons behind intrastate conflicts in resource endowed countries in Africa. The chapter concludes by considering some alternative causal assertions of Salafi–Jihādi extremism wherein particular attention is given to Social Movement Theory.

2.2 Understanding Changing Armed Conflicts in Africa

2.2.1 Salafi–Jihādi: The Best of Both Worlds?

Questions around what Salafi–Jihādi is and who a Salafi–Jihādist is have been asked, debated, and reformulated. Salafi–Jihādi[22], marked as one of the deadliest ideologies of our times, refers to a theological descriptor of 'radical action' drawn from two ideological concepts within the Islāmic tradition, namely Salafism and Jihādism. Salafi–Jihādi is understood in this research report, as:

"…a religious reformist form of Salafism which intermixes its doctrinal creedal heritages with that of military Jihādism to achieve an observable goal" (Kassim, 2015; Wagemakers, 2016; Hafez, 2020).

While Salafism is understood as a Sunni ideology that prescribes the 'righteous way of living' be it in politics or economics (Adraoui, 2023, p. 284, also see Lauzière, 2016; Boukhers &

[20]Quoted from Wright et.al. *The Jihādi Threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Beyond.* Wilson Center. 2017, p. 22.
[21]Cohrs (2012, p.53), problematize the conduct of neglecting ideology when studying war-related phenomenon, as this would mean *we* leave major factors unexplained (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Sanin & Wood, 2014).
[22]al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya (Arabic translation).

Wehrey, 2019), Jihādism is a religious ideology that places much emphasis on 'efforts or endeavours' aimed at exerting earnestly a noble cause in the path of God (*fī Sabīl Allāh*) within society (Bonney, 2004, p. 4, also see Mansoori, 2007; Solomon, 2014). The violent extremist groups that this study examines are those that appear to manipulate the ideologies of Salafism and Jihādism as evidenced through media statements (see chapter 3 and 4). These groups, as Chapter 3 and 4 show, use peaceful tenets of both doctrines and radicalise these to fit their reformist radical behaviour that draws from the Sunni Islamic school of Hanbali. Salafism and Jihādism offer several doctrines which have been manipulated by several radical Islamist fighters with intentions to drive Islāmic revivalism across the globe. However, for the purpose this study, the author focuses on the doctrines of Salafism and Jihādism because these doctrines holds philosophical importance crucial in understanding the conflict dynamics in the selected cases. The groups that are studied within this research report will include those that adhere to the–which leans on Wahhabism and Salafism.

Salafism [*al-Salafiyyah*] explains a Sunni ideology that is derived from the Arabic word *'Salaf'* meaning forefathers, or pious predecessors [*al-salaf al-sālih*], who lived during the first three hundred years of Islam–marked by a righteous emulation of Prophet Muhammad's companions [*al-sāhāba*], the followers [*tabiʿun*] and the followers of followers [*Tābiʿū al-Tābʿīn*] (Wagemakers, 2016, pp.1–20, see also Bonney, 2004; Bangstad & Linge, 2015). The ideology places much importance and adherence on the oneness of God [*tawḥīd*], preaches [*Da 'wa*] the total rejection of religious innovations [*bid'ah*], and advocates for a theological return towards the observance of Sunni orthodoxy and the Global Age of Muhammadian lifestyles (Kassim, 2015, p.156). The intellectual genealogy of Salafism, which dates to the medieval times (Lauzière, 2016, p.23), requires Muslims devoted adherence to the Qurʾānic suras or injunctions and the Prophetic traditions as righteously followed by pious predecessors. Salafism is thus based on a theological originalism, instrumentalising credal theocratic notions to promote religious purity and advocate for the literal interpretation [*tafsīr*] of religious Qurʾānic epithets within modern society [*Ummah*], be it, in politics or economics. Thus, the Qurʾān (5: 44) commends that those who do not rule nor live by what *Allāh* revealed, they are unbelievers' (Cui & Glinert, 2016, p.106). Such an understanding presents Salafism as a methodology [*manhaj*] for the way of life that informs various Salafis whom Wiktorowicz classifies as:

(1) 'Purists' who concern themselves with scholastic adherence of Salafism employing propagation [*al-da'wa*], purification [*tazkiyya*], and religious education [*al-tarbiyah*] so to have a more Islāmic society.

(2) ‘Politicos’ who occupy themselves with matters of public affairs. Thus, they dwell much on being political activists challenging the existing institutional and ideological status quo for an Islāmic State.

(3) ‘Jihādis’ are Salafis who speak of the need to alter secular state through the ‘holy war or struggle’ and establish a Caliphate. Often called armed Salafis, Jihādis see themselves as violent activists rather than puritanical or political activists (Wiktorowicz, 2006, pp. 207-239).

Jihādism [*al-Jihādiyya*] on other hand relates to any efforts one undertakes directed against any object of jihādism appears as ‘any efforts one undertakes, directed against any object of disapprobation using the heart, the tongue, the hands, and the sword (Willis, 1967, p.398). Through Willis work, one can illuminate the four categories of Jihād:

(1) that of the heart [*Jihād bil qalb/al-nafs*] linked to fighting the devil [*ash-Shaytan*].

(2) that of the tongue [*bil lisan*] linked to teaching of Islam [*al-tarbiyah*]

(3) that of the hand [*Jihād bil yad*] linked to fighting evil with action.

(4) that of the sword [*Jihād bis saif*] linked to armed struggle (Solomon, 2014, p.12).

Through these categories one can infer that jihādism functions as an instrument of doing. Under such considerations, Matusitz (2020, p.35), tells us that jihād as a ‘mechanism of doing’ can ideologically materialise into two forms: ‘greater and lesser jihād’, with the first three categories signifying the ‘greater jihād’ while the fourth ‘lesser jihād’ (Goolam, 2006, p.100). Thus, Salafi-Jihādi speaks to a distinct ideology that prescribes ways to a righteous Muslim life’ and provides ‘guides on how to achieve a righteous Muslim life. Mohammed Hafez (2021) offers a detailed description of Salafi-Jihād. He describes Salafi–Jihādi as an ideology that uses religious texts (*tafsīr* of the Qurʾān) and the broader Salafist worldview of ‘Islāmic progression through regression’ to legitimise the application of violence (*Jihād al-bil-sayf*) (Hafez, 2021, p.262).

Salafi-Jihādi, to reiterate, blends a Wahhabi inspired Sunni Salafist fundamentalism with a Jihādist revolutionary program, especially that ‘of the sword,’ so to attain an observable goal of overthrowing unjust secular regimes and expel foreign presences and influence in Muslims societies (Nesser, 2013, p.413). Such an ideology derives its doctrinal heritage from sacred texts (Qurʾān), and the writings of classical Islāmic theologians such as Imam Aḥmad Ibn ḥanbal (780–855), Imam Abū Ja’far al-taḥawi (853–933), Taqī al-Dıñ Aḥmad Ibn Taymıyyah (1263–1328), Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–1792) as well as Sayyid Qutb (1906–

1966) (Kassim, 2015, p.176)[23]. Much of this ideologic mixology unleashed a violent version of Salafism that advocates for the following:

(a) *tawḥīd* [oneness of God or monotheism],

(b) *ḥākimiyya* [*Allāh's* sovereignty, especially in political systems],

(c) *takfīr* [declaring Muslims to be infidels or unbelievers],

(d) *al-walāʾ wa-l-barā* [loyalty to Muslims and disavowal towards unbelievers],

(e) *Jihād* [struggle] (Maher, 2016, p.14, see also Drevon, 2016; Brachman, 2019; Hafez, 2020).


Hafez (2020, p.263) writes that Salafi–Jihādists find it necessary for acknowledging not only *Allāh* as the one God, but also necessitates the recognition of *tawḥīd* as a way of life. The second pillar requires Salafi–Jihādists to place much emphasis on *Allāh* being the ultimate sovereign or one who has sovereign authority towards Muslim societies [*Ummah*] (Shboul, 2018, p.4). So, state secularity in Muslim societies is seen as reflecting the notions of 'kufr' and should be challenged. Thus Salafi–Jihādists, especially those who draw from the 'politicos,' promote the ostensible fundamentalist worldview that Muslim societies should be ruled under *Allāh's* laws (*sharīʿah*). Considered as the apparatus of instrumentalising the use of violence (Hafez, 2020, p.263), the third pillar warrants and permits the engagement in *takfīr* wherein violence is justifiable towards kafir or infidels (non-believers) and secular Muslim states (Kadivar, 2020, p.3). The fourth pillar commands Salafi–Jihādists to love their faith and fellow Muslims, while projecting much hate on enemies or unbelievers. One cannot be neutral in such instances. Thus, this pillar necessitates an undivided loyalty [*al-walāʾ*] Muslims show *Allāh* their religion, and the Muslim society [*Ummah*], while disassociating [*wa-l-barā*] themselves from anything viewed to be un-Islāmic (Wagemakers, 2009, p.3).

Hafez (2020, p.264) elaborates that Salafi–Jihādists should not only hate unbelievers with their heart, but their hate should also be demonstrated outwardly; if needs be, violent means can suffice. The fifth pillar, as Maher (2016, p.16) puts it, 'prescribes the method for the materialisation of the Salafi–Jihādi movement'. In this respect, *Jihād al-bil-sayf* is seen as an acceptable *manhaj* for such revolutionary movement. This pillar insists that Salafi–Jihādists protect their religion, lands, and territoriality against Western crusaders (e.g. foreign actors) through the instrumentalisation of armed violence. Abdullah Azzam's (1941–1989) writings seem to have influenced what appears to be the sixth pillar of the Salafi–Jihādist movement:

[23] With Ibn ḥanbal (780–855), a hadith traditionalist, having lived during the last centenary of the *'Golden Age of pious predecessors'* known as the tābiʿ tābiʿīn (see, Shiraz Maher, 2016, p.6).

Shahada, wherein suicide is euphemistically labelled as martyrdom (Freamon, 2003, p.302). Although suicide is rejected within the Islāmic religion, this pillar emphasises the need for Salafi–Jihādists to embark on self-annihilatory acts or heroic sacrifices or what has been popularly seen as 'suicide-bombing' in *Allāh's* cause as well as the furtherance of Islam. Such intricacy of Salafi–Jihādi is pictorialised below:

Figure 5: The Sixfold Pillars of Salafi–Jihādi



Source: Author (2023).

Figure 4 demonstrates, using colour-coding gradualism[24], how each tenet of the Salafi–Jihādi agenda is misinterpreted to justify the use of extreme violent trajectories. The relational figure appreciates how:

(a) the *tawḥīd* and *ḥākimiyya* pillars of the Salafi–Jihādi ideology incentives for a revolutionary agenda that is relatively less violent (see, the light effects of the reddish colour-coding), while,
(b) the justification for Salafi–Jihādists to capitalise on violent means gradually intensifies from the *takfīr, al-walāʾ wa-l-barā, Jihād* to *Shahada* (see, the darkening effects).

As will be shown in chapters 3 and 4, the use of violence within the Salafi–Jihādi movement is driven by complex factors which radicalise society into various fundamentalists, violent extremists, and Salafi–Jihādi groups who steer violent extremist peculiarities in Africa.

[24] Term used to describe gradual changes in ideological motives to use violence.

2.2.2 Understanding Violent Extremism

Extremism, to begin with, connotes a belief system with attitudes and behaviours considered to be as far outside the norm (Berger, 2018, p.30). This identity holds together not only common beliefs, values, and norms, but also common actions and bonds of solidarity for in-groups. Such extreme political ideologies are seen as impetus which extremist actors instrumentalise to achieve their mandatory observable goals. The increasing violent form of extremism in the past decades underscores the discursive prevalence of the term 'violent extremism.' Violent extremism justifies the use of violence to attain stated goals of societal supremacy, especially in political, religious, and economic settings (Li and Zhang, 2017, p.135). Adherents of violent extremism either threaten or use violence with the hope to change the status quo of the society, from societal norms and governmental policies to state functionality (from secularism to religionism).

What is of particular interest is the fact that violent extremist groups aspire to destroy existing structures such as political institutions using violence and replace these with alternative governance structures that operate according to the principles of a totalitarian and intolerant ideology. Thus, violence cannot be separated from extremism because it constitutes a key instrument to the materialisation of extremist goals (Zicina, 2022, pp.12–13). Islamist extremism refers to a stage of radicalisation advancing to extremism, in the name of, and informed by, an extreme interpretation of Islām justifying the use of violence to achieve stated goals (Rane, 2018, p.167). Such a revolutionary behaviours tends to be driven by the manipulation of the following doctrines:

(1) Islām is viewed as a comprehensive way of life. In this way, the Islāmic religion should be integrated into politics, law, economics, and normatively, into the broader society,
(2) Thus, 'progression through regression is key'. As such, life should be lived as an emulation of the pious predecessors, adhering to the Qurʾān, and the teachings of Prophet Muhammed,
(3) Muslims should distance themselves from Western values and replace them with *sharīʿah* law,
(4) To achieve this, Islamist extremism necessitates a struggle that weaponizes the *Jihād* against corruption, foreign actors, and societal injustices; so to,
(5) Establish an Islāmic State or khilāfah ruled by the *sharīʿah* law in a Muslim secular territory.


(Eraliev, 2022, pp.1170-1171)

Yet, Islamist extremism remains an issue of complexity; the causality and evolution of the movement remains a puzzle (Cilliers, 2015, p.1). What is undisputable is the fact that Islamist extremism is increasingly becoming 'glocalised' where conflict occurs because of internal factors, Salafi–Jihādi dogmas, and external factors within African resources rich states.

2.2.3 Glocality: Where Local and Global Intersect

We are currently facing a crisis that threatens not only the survival of nation states, but that of human civilization. Glocality has become the current state of terror. Since 9/11, observers have witnessed a new trend where ideological extremist groups both in Africa and further afield, marry local with global issues. Glocalism, refers to the interplay between local and global actors and factors (Figure 4) (Anand 2023, p. 1686). Mihr (2022, p. 15) goes on to emphasise that glocalism also denotes a norm diffusion process whereby actors have globally shared norms, attitudes, and behaviour, but locally.

Figure 6: Glocalism



Source: Kfir (2018)

Violent extremists orchestrate glocal conflicts by marrying local issues with a global ideological, transnational Salafi–Jihādi agenda. Conflicts have become glocalised.

2.3 The Resource Curse? Overview and Theories

As early as in the 1700s, Sir Richard Steele noted:

> 'It is generally observed, that in countries of the greatest plenty there is the poorest living…'[25]

Sir Steele's remarks reflect the challenges and inabilities of governments to translate natural resource wealth into economic growth and development within resource-rich countries. Resource discoveries have instead led to economic stagnation, acute poverty, and triggered armed conflicts, especially in Africa. This phenomenon has been understood as the 'resource curse'. Recent studies (Mulwa & Mariara, 2016; Henry, 2019; Hodler, 2023) have showed that state and legal institutional dysfunctions, corruption, and poor macroeconomic management of resource wealth, underscore the 'resource curse' in Africa. While diamonds, copper, oil or gas are often viewed as the inceptors of armed conflict in resource–endowed African countries (Ojakorotu, 2018, p. 368), the emphasised inference within this research report is that resource wealth does not instinctively translate to the *curse*, but rather depends on the following conditions: First, the *actions* taken by government officials to either translate

[25] R. Steele, 'Vincit Amor Patrice', *The Spectator. October 19, 1711,* https://web.seducoahuila.gob.mx/biblioweb/upload/The-Spectator-vol-1%20(1).pdf (accessed August 9, 2023).

resource wealth to improve the lives of the majority of citizens or self-enrich. Second, the independence and quality of *institutions* is instrumental to the management, governance, and distribution of resource wealth. The inadequacy to effectively act and institutionalise resource management dramatically changes resource wealth outcomes for a country. It is worth noting that the first condition may drive desires of taking '*control over natural resources,'* while the second condition builds '*successionist desires'* and it is herein where Salafi–Jihādi is weaponised to fulfil extremist behaviour. As it will become clearer later within the research report, the argument is that there is a need for extremist groups operating in resource rich states across Africa to control resources riches, as secular leaders are seen corrupt and needs to be eliminated through a Jihād. Over the last decade or so, it has been observed that the possession of natural resources leads to conflictual climates (Ojakorotu, 2018, p. 368), yet there is no doubt that resource paucity can also yield to unpleasant outcomes. Le Billion (2001) shows that both *resource abundance* and *resource scarcity* increases the likelihood of armed conflicts. This research report examines how different resource *conditions* leads to armed conflict which is necessary in understanding the fomentation of resource inspired Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa.

Theorising the Resource curse

Studies linking resource discoveries to intrastate conflict in Africa and further afield have drawn from Frustration-Aggression Theory (1930s) and Relative Deprivation Theory (1940s). Yet, since the turn of the 20th century, innumerable scholars have concentrated on the assumptions and perspectives emerging from the *Greed vs Grievance theory* pioneered by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2000). As rehearsed above, the framework offers two opposing theorems:

Of Greed

Viewed through the Machiavellian lenses that 'no profitable opportunity for violence will go unused' (Barton, 2023, p.11), the greed theorem has its basic principles in neoclassical economics. Put simply, the greed hypothesis claims that rebels are motivated by opportunistic reasons where risks and costs suppress benefits. Stated more precisely, the greed hypothesis hinges on the idea that armed intrastate conflict manifests as a criminal-economic enterprise wherein actors participate to satisfy their economic desires[26]. Thus, the greed theorem accepts the idea that economic incentives motivate civil war onset. Opportunities for *control of resources wealth* underpin greedy behaviour. 'Pays and spoils' are usually sufficient to

[26] This suggests that greed inspired intrastate armed conflict emerge as an economic 'war making enterprise' something Charles Tilly's (1985) analysis would point out.

incentivise armed conflict (Brown, 2023, p.55). Traditionally, rebels locate avenues that can finance their rebellion, to either pay its personnel or purchase weapons.

Of Grievance

Proponents of the grievance paradigm argue that structural societal inequalities and collective societal dissatisfactions experienced by the larger peasantry society generates strong desires for individuals to join a rebellion (see key contributors, Gurr, 1970; Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2001, 2004; Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009; Hoeffler, 2011). Grievance upholders believe that collective disadvantages experienced by those 'at the bottom of the society' generate political mobilisation which later becomes a justice-seeking political violence (Brown, 2023, p.56). Rebellion onset is thus understood as a by-product of socio-economic injustices. Dyrstad and Hillesund (2020, p. 1726) finds empirical evidence which suggests that grievance endorsers, especially those in proximity with resource wealth, opt for armed conflict due to their belief that the political realm offers them little opportunities to redress their socio-economic discontent. Such limited opportunities drive the aggravated individuals to mobilise and take up arms and express their grievances, violently. It might be fair to say that the grievance theorem likens with Ross' (2004) relative deprivation purview that social violent demonstrations emerge out of feelings of deprivation, or stated explicitly, denied fair share of resource wealth. The question that should be asked is: does the greed and grievance theory have any explanatory power on the emerging interstate conflicts within resource rich states in Africa? This inquest uses the cases of Chad and Mozambique to infer whether the theory still holds water in explaining conflict dynamics, or not.

2.6 Chapter Conclusion

There has been a remarkable *transformity* of armed intrastate conflict dynamics on the African continent: from conceptualities to theoretical landscapes. The first part of the chapter gave center stage to the key concepts used to describe Islāmic movements in Africa from the nature of Salafi–Jihādi, violent extremism to glocality. The chapter understands the conceptual importance of these terms in understanding Salafi–Jihādi movement and how these offer useful pointers to understand how doctrines meets methods. Cultivating such insights allows researchers to appreciate the role of ideology when studying armed conflict dynamics.

Chapter Three: Searching for the Nexus – The Case of Chad

"…the real dynamics of terror lies within the telling of the story itself."
—Anthony Kubiak[27]

3.1 Introduction

Since the aftermath of 9/11, nation states have been witnessing a new trend whereby local violent extremist organisations evolve into transnationally networked groups. Violent extremism and its proliferation on the African continent have created severe security threats to peace and stability. The internationalisation of these violent extremist groups has also wreaked destruction and heightened insecurity crisis within the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the lake Chad region. While no state is immune to the terrors of violent extremism, countries that border the Lake Chad basin[28] have been embroiled in violent conflicts since the early 2010s. The year 2009 marked the beginning of a meteoric vicious cycle of violent extremism championed by Boko Haram within the north-eastern region of Nigeria that later spilled over the bordering provinces of Cameroon (Far North and North region), Niger (Diffa region), and Chad (Lac and Hadjer-Lamis provinces. Chapter three intends on examining this dilemma by focusing on Chad's southern provinces of Lac and Hadjer-Lamis. Thus, the chapter will engage with and build on the SMT to unpack the overlapping complexities and causal variables that resulted into conflict in Chad's southern provinces.

3.2 Setting the Scene: Chad Battling Glocal Conflicts?




Figure 7: Boko Haram's Glocality
Source: Hoinathy and Tayo (2022, p. 4).

Owing to its geostrategic location and porous borders, Chad has been a victim to spillover violence of non-state armed organisations based in Nigeria, Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya (Dizolele & Strouboulis, 2022). It remains among the countries within the Sahel

[27] Anthony, Kubiak. "Spelling It Out: Narrative Typologies of Terror". *Studies in the Novel*, 36.3 (Fall 2004): 300.
[28] Which includes Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.

touched by the wave of Salafi–Jihādi extremism that originated from bordering countries (Dickow, 2022, p. 147). One Salafi–Jihādi group that has caused havoc in Chadian borders has been Boko Haram. The International Crisis Group (2017, p.11) finds that Boko Haram's first attacks in N' Djamena's were influenced by actions taken by the Chadian army which launched intervention against Boko Haram. History has shown that attacks on Salafi–Jihādi groups only strengthens Jihādists in their Jihād (e.g. War on Terror, see Kaldor, 2013). Thus, various communities including those in N'Djamena, Baga Sola, and Lake Chad witnessed extremist attacks ranging from beheadings, drive-by-shootings and suicide bombing between 2015–2016 killing several civilians (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. 12). Although Boko Haram's glocality has been limited due to functionality of the counterextremism operations under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the group has shown some resiliency as violent extremism attacks in the country have been on the rise since 2018 (Hoinathy, 2019).

3.3 The Actors: Understanding Boko Haram



Figure 8: Boko Haram's Salafi–Jihādists
Source: Akum & Samuel (2020).

Whatfor?

"We want to re-emphasise that our main objective is the ***restoration*** *of the sharīʿah legal system in line with the teachings of the holy Qurʾān. We want the Nigerian Constitution to be abrogated and Democracy suspended, and a full-fledged Islāmic state established…"* [29]

Restoration of a *Khilāfah* that ruled through the *sharīʿah* law has and continues to cause instability in the lake Chad basin. The notion of restoration comes from the fact that societies within this region have existed for centuries under an Islamic *Khilāfah* ruled by a *sharīʿah* legal system in line with the teachings of the holy *Qurʾān* that dates back to the 15th century. After over three centuries, Usman Dan Fadio's[30] greatest Jihād of 1804 against the corrupt

[29] Hussein, Solomon. *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015, p. 90.
[30] Usman Dan Fodio was a Fulani scholar who launched a religious war (Jihād) in northern Nigeria in 1804 that lasted for six years. This religious movement led by Fadio has been influential in Nigeria's ongoing conflict

Hausa kingdoms (*Jihād al-faasiqeen*) that established the Sokoto empire continues to influence Islāmic activism and revivalism in northern Nigeria. The idea to wage a holy war (*Jihād*) of unification between religious and political authority to establish an Islamic Caliphate has always attracted vibrancy in northern Nigeria–which later spilled over the Lake Chad basin, especially in Chad. The country is battling with effects of Salafi–Jihādi extremism that originated from northern Nigeria. It is therefore crucial for this research report to trace 'wherefrom' of the Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Chad to understand these conflict dynamics fully. Thus, Nigeria's fourth Republic (1999) marked the beginning of a localised Salafi–Jihādi revivalist movement that gradually transformed into a radical transnational secular movement officially known as Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihādi or Boko Haram. The group emerged during the early 2000s and has earned the title 'world's deadliest terror group' (Mohammed, 2014, p. 9).

Brief History

Rising as a charismatic leader within two major Salafi–Jihādi groups[31], Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram during the early 2000s. Even so, there exist several accounts about the origins and nature of the sect. One account traces Boko Haram's foundation back to 1995 when Abubakar Lawan established Ahlusunns wal'Jama'ah hijira (Muslim Youth Organisation) as a revivalist sect at the University of Maiduguri and went on exile leading to Yusuf's rise into leadership (Comolli, 2015). Another account claims that the group came to existence through the efforts of Aminu Tashen Illimi during the 1990s who inspired various students, including Yusuf at the University of Maiduguri to defer their studies and follow radical Islāmic teachings of a foreign preacher. Oluwaseun and Olanrewaju (2019, pp. 70-71) reflect on how the preacher countlessly advocated that 'Western education contradicts Islāmic principles' during his surmons. Perhaps these teachings can explain Yusuf and Boko Haram's revivalist and conventional Islamist worldview.

Somehow or another, Boko Haram emerged from the vibrant culture of Islāmic activism within northern Nigeria alongside Yusuf's 'charisma' during the *al-Sharīʿa* advocacy movement that spanned from the 1990s through to the 2000s. While there exists speculations regarding its formations, this research report accepts that Boko Haram emerged from Islāmic revivalism and the proliferation of Islāmic fundamentalism[32] in Maiduguri, Nigeria during the

dynamics motivating Islamic activism and revivalism that later spilled-over to Chad provinces with the aims of restoring the Sokoto empire that ruled through a *sharīʿah* legal system (Moumouni, 2021).

[31] Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition ('Izala Movement') and Ahlus Islam.

[32] Hero (cited in Shboul, 2020, p. 627) defines Islāmic fundamentalism as a religious ideology that seeks to return to the traditional teaching of Islām. As such, they seek to reform their societies through means of literally

turn of the 20th century with Yusuf at the fore. Such conflict can be understood as a social movement that emerged out of 'memory politics', a term that the author uses to describe the crisis in northern Nigeria conceptualised as:

the need and creed to establish a governing system that incorporates politico-religious authority as was done during the mediaeval times of Prophet Mohammed or Usman Dan Fadio's Caliphate.

Prior to starting a movement of 'memory politics', Amaechi and Tshifhumlo (2019, p. 18) argue that Yusuf was a vibrant reformist Islāmic preacher who participated in television and radio religious interviews, travelling across the northern region advocating for *al-sharīʿah* nd representing the Muslim Youth Organisation with which he aligned and later became a protégé of Ja' far Adumu, one of the leadership figure within Ahlus Sunna. Widely known as a Salafist scholar and preacher, Adumu has played a critical role in molding Yusuf as a Salafist scholar and preacher. Yet, his efforts resulted into different outcomes including Yusuf's radical nature, anti-secularism and reformist extemist. Indeed, differing *manhaj* and ideological standpoints between Yusuf and Adumu strained their relations since the early 2000s[33]. Vehemently disagreeing with his mentor, Yusuf used his surmons within the Ndimi Mosque advocating for radical initiatives against democracy, western education, and secularism. Scholars such Brigaglia (2015) and Ameachi (2019) argue that just like any jihādists, Yusuf viewed western education, secular state and democracy as *haram* (unlawful and antithetical to Islam) and required radical militant interventions of Jihād. These radical sentiments have been instrumental in crafting the Yusuffiyya movement (first *al-da' awa*), the 2009 uprisings (second *al-da'awa*) and the birth of Boko Haram (inception of Salafi–Jihādi extremism).

The histories have paved a way for conceptualities: Boko Haram can be understood as a radical Salafi–Jihādi violent extremist group that draws from Islāmic revivalism (Usman Dan Fadio's greatest Jihād) seeking to wage Jihād against the secular corrupt Nigerian government to re-establish the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate as a model of governance. Thus, the group promotes a Salafi–Jihādi version that makes it 'haram' for Muslim societies to take part in any social, economic or political activity that is associated to the secular state or the West. Yet, Boko Haram's rejectionist-extremist orientation originates from somewhere, as Omeni (2022, p. 175) argues that the group's Salafi–Jihādi movement does not exist in a

applying the religious fundamentals and principals of early Muslims (Al-Salaf) in modern day societies by establishing an Islamic State ruled by sharīʿah law.

[33] While Adumu and Yusuf advocated for the adoption of al-Sharīʿah in northern Nigeria, they differed on efforts of enforcing Islāmic law. Adumu believed that altering of the secular system and the purification of Islam could be achieved without the use of radical Jihād (purists Salafis), while Yusuf saw the propagation of radical Jihād necessary for al-Sharīʿah (jihādist Salafis).

vacuum, instead it owes to various factors, conditions and variables. The next section will use the SMT to discuss variables that have allowed Boko Haram's glocality in Chadian borders.

3.4 Discussion: Unearthing Variables and 'Butterfly Effects'

3.4.1 Variable One: Ideology

Secularism and Western civilisation has always been seen by Boko Haram as 'haram' and needs altering. These reformist ideological beliefs paved grounds that justified for a Jihād, as Yusuf once argued:

"…We follow the rules of Muslims according to the book (Qur'ān) and the Sunna, even if they are unjust, iniguitous and do wrong, as long as they do not command rebellion against Allāh…This is our proclaimation and we announce it to Ummah (Muslim Society). We call the people to reform the creed, application of Law and to Jihād" (Omeni, 2022, p. 183).

These beliefs have been the ideological driver of the *al-da' awa* phases that gave birth to the Yussiffiyya movement and Boko Haram after it was ostensibly crushed by Nigerian forces in 2009. While observers thought that the movement was repressed and crushed – having reached its declination stage, literature shows that Boko Haram was regrouping, recruiting, radicalising and getting further training (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho & Onapaja, 2012, pp. 46-47). This study argues that the third *al-da' awa* phase emerged after the death of its founder, Yusuf Mohammed. This phase saw the bureaucratisation stages of the organisation where the group was crafting its operational structure, clear objectives, tactics and targets, thus:


"We will slaughter and kill you, for Allāh says if you meet infidels ('Kuffār') in the battle, cut off their necks" (cited from Barkinando, 2016).

Determined to drive its reformist Jihād in Nigeria, Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf's successor, publicly averred:

> *"Do you think think this Jihād is over. Rather it has just began"* (Pham, 2012, p. 4).

Since these statements were asserted, Boko Haram has become a metaphor for (in)security in the Lake Chad region driving terror through the manipulation of Salafi–Jihādi. As Boko Haram was re-entering the world of 'Kuffār', it began with its puritanical efforts by releasing hundreds of prisoners in Bauchi State, Nigeria in the 7th July 2010, some of whom were part of the radical sect. With its Salafi–Jihādists released from prison, Boko Haram cordinated several violent attacks increasing its influence, brutality, and death-toll across the Lake Chad region (Figure 13). Ideological commitments have played a critical role in Boko Haram's glocal conflict. Yet, its ideologiocal relations with other transnational jihād organisations caused the movement to expand towards neighbouring countries.

Figure 8: Increased Brutality



Source: Matfess (2019, p. 10).

Oluwaseun and Olanrewaju (2019, p.80) describe how Boko Haram furthered its internationalisation by pledging formal allegiance to al-Qeada during the early months of 2010. With its alliance, the leader of AQIM publicly stated during an *Al-Jazeera* interview that:

"We [AQIM] will provide Boko Haram with weapons, training and other support to ensure that it expands it own reach into sub-Saharan Africa…" (Maingwa et al, 2012, p. 48).

Burkati's (2022, p. 5) work reveals that the group received noticeable support from AQIM during the mid-2010s including an amount of more than $77, 000 USD and ammunition for the furtherance of its jihād. These developments saw Boko Haram upgrading its modus operandi. Such trends show that transnational Jihād groups play a critical role in perpetuating local extremist movements. Indeed, the radical sect unboxed a new tactical method of suicide bombing ('Shahada'[34]) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices as per the 16th June 2011 attack on Nigeria's police headquarters in Abuja (Maingwa et al., 2012, p. 48). In 2015, Boko Haram shifted from a transnational allegiance to al-Qeada towards an international allegiance to the Islāmic State (Bukarti, 2022, p. 6). Figure 10 indicates these trends from an undisclosed audio message written in arabic translated to mean:

> *"Shakau, leader of Boko Haram announces and pledge allegiance to ISIS's deceased caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi"* (Bukarti, 2022, p.6).

[34] Showcasing the influence of sixth Salafi–Jihādi pillar (Chapter 2). This pillar has been influenced by the idea that 'a good jihād is a dead jihād'. Thus, the year 2014 marked the beginning of Boko Haram's new layer of terror that used women against their will to be suicide bombers (Warner & Matfess, 2017; Peasrson & Zenn, 2022). Such a genderised tactic could explain the Chibok crisis that saw the kidnapping of more than 270 teenage girls from a Christian school (Kuffār).

Figure 9: Change in Transnationality



Source: Bukarti (2022, p. 7).

These ideological connections saw a new trend emerge that speaks to glocality where local and transnational actors facilitated greater cooperation for attaining a common Islamic Caliphate goal. Shortly after Boko Haram pledge alligiance with the Islāmic State (a transnational Jihādist group), the local extremist group started expanding its terror towards countries within the Lake Chad especially, Chadian communities in N'Djamena from Lac, Hadjer-Lamis, Chari-Bangirmi, Moyo-Kebbi Ouest to Logone Occidental regions. Perhaps ideological reasons to all of this should be exposed. Omeni (2022, p. 185) qout es Yusuf's statements who averred that:

"O Allāh! We desire to be under one banner, although it is necessary to consider closely before this…"

The reformist beliefs that seek to re-establish the Islāmicates[35] that existed within areas that cover Chad, Niger and Nigeria before the arrival of Western crusadors have been driving (in)security within the Lake Chad region. Despite conflictual climates within resource-rich societies of southern Chad, Matfess (2019) argues that most of the violence recorded in Chad stemmed from battles between Chadian troops and Boko Haram highlighting the robustness of the Chadian security sector. However, radicalising Chadian societies has proved to be difficult for Boko Haram's glocality and expansionism (Idrissa, 2017; Elischer, 2021). Reasons to these realities should be explored. This study draws on Helga Dickow's (2022) work in this regard. She argues that Chadian Muslims perceive reformist movements as obsolete and entirely contradictory to real notions of Islam. Another major reason stems from the history of religious coexitence between Christians and Muslims (Dickow, 2022, p. 152).

[35]Coined by Marshall Hodgson during the mid–1960s, Islāmicate is term associated with regions wherein Muslims are culturally dominant. The term reflects Muslims presence within a region, be it in Africa or Asia.

This has been holding Chadian societies together, thus they have proved not being prone to Boko Haram's radical *tafsīr* (tutulage), radicalisation and indoctrination. Yet, ideological trajectories that have linked Boko Haram and transnational jihād groups provided Boko Haram confidence, strength and desires for territoriality within African localities that possess natural resource riches. After Boko Haram's internal tensions[36] that resulted into its splinter, the two groups were driving different movements: while the Islamic State West Africa Province often known as as Boko Haram–ISWAP focused on gaining the trust of local communities and fighting secularism across nortehrn Nigeria and further afield (Sampio, 2022, p. 13), Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, colloquilly known as JAS, continued with its search for territoriality in resource rich communities, especially in societies within the Lake Chad basin.

3.4.2 Variable Two: Natural Resources

Conflicts between Muslim nomadic herders and Christian peasants in Chad over mineral resources or *scarce resources* such as water and land have created platforms for Boko Haram's glocality and desires for territoriality. While JAS continued waging armed conflict towards citizens in Nigeria and Chad, Boko Haram–ISWAP used conflicts over scarce resources to gain influence as a 'governance actor.' Malik Samuel (2019) writes that the group has waged its glocality fighting to secure trade routes to ease transportation of resources. Having done this, Boko Haram set state-like structures in rural areas with 'limited statehood' such as Abadam, Kukawa, Guzamala, Marte and those in the Lake Chad region that generate revenue from fishing, trade and agriculture acting as a 'guarantor' of safety, stability, and opportunities (Samuel, 2019; International Crisis Group, 2017). Salafi–Jihādi extremist groups have encouraged the resumption of farming, fishing, and trading where fishermen, farmers and traders are all expected to pay taxes for protection (e.g. fish dealers pay US$ 2.8 a day for safety). These trends show that links between Salafi–Jihādi groups, natural resources, territoriality, and economics exist.

Climate change has created further 'safe havens' for extremist groups such as Boko Haram to recruit fighters and strive to fulfil their desires of taking control over localities with resources scarcity The phenomenon continues to inflame Boko Haram's Salafi–Jihādi movement and

[36] The group faced ideological differences during 2016 when one of the senior commanders, al-Barnawi accused Shekau of being too extreme and misinterpreting the Salafi–Jihādi tenets (Bukarti, 2022, p. 11). While Shekau was waging a jihād against unbelievers including Muslim civilians, al-Barnawi argued that such brutality is unjistifiable and should be revisited (*takfīr*). These rivarly tensions saw the group split into two factions: one aligned with the Islāmic State and called itself as the Islāmic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), while the other became independent with rivavilist tendencies such that it returned to its formative name (Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihādi (JAS)).

threaten human and economic insecurity within the Lake Chad region. Although climate change is not linked to extremist groups, Skah and Lymmouri (2020, p. 7) argue that climate change acts as an accelerator-of-fragility triggering resource tensions between herding, farming, and fishing communities. Severe droughts since the 1970s have decreased water resources crucial for fishermen, farmers and traders (Viens, 2019). This drying pattern has seen several citizens being displaced and having others falling within the 'poverty-unemployment trap' losing jobs (especially agriculturists or fishermen). Such conditions impacted the region's food and economic security leaving many seeking employment or ways to generate money and feed families (Brown & Vivekananda, 2019). Boko Haram, be it JAS or ISWAP exploits these vulnerabilities promising many unemployed citizens' economic prosperities:

"We [Boko Haram] will give you good lives…You will have everything…They told me that If I wanted to eat, I'd have to go and fight' (Chason, 2023). 'They [Boko Haram] promised me to get all what I want when I joined the group …" (UNDP, 2023, p. 111).

Thus, if not addressed, climatological factors will continue to inflame a vicious cycle aiding Boko Haram's terror and horror (Figure 11).

Figure 10: Climate Change Inflaming Resource Scarcity & Terror?



Source: Carlesi (2022, p. 5).

3.4.3 Variable Three: Illicit Activities

Organised crime: banditry, cattle rustling, armed robbery, human and drug trafficking continue being the oxygen for Boko Haram's Salafi–Jihādi extremism (Adetula, 2015; Okoli, 2019; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2022). The group has been sustaining its movement since the emergence stage from activities that show signs of

criminality[37]. Years of *organised criminality* including smuggling, banditry, cattle rustling and the movement of licit items such as small arms, ammunition, vehicles, and pharmaceuticals in the region cultivated enabling grounds for Boko Haram (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2022, p. 17). Adisa (2021, p. 12) records that the group has survived on multiple criminal dealings from cash-in-transit bank robberies, kidnapping for ransom to trafficking illicit weapons and drugs. Boko Haram's spokesperson, Abu Qaqa publicly claimed responsibility for bank robberies in Nigerian states during 2011 (Olojo & Tayo, 2022, p. 9). The group also extorts 'protection fees' from ordinary citizens within areas it controls (cross-reference on variable two). Revenues obtained from these criminalities are used to purchase ammunition and bombs (Abdulmalik, 2019). Perhaps the need for 'arms' can be summed up from Shekau's aversion:

"We pray to Allāh to allow us to act upon our statements and safeguard the weapons besides us' ....May Allāh…put into action what our mounts have uttered" (Omeni, 2022, p. 183).

Violent extremism thus thrives on finances generated through illicit activities. *Terrorist financing* has been the burgeoning factor aiding the spread of Salafi–Jihādi extremism within the Lake Chad basin. Because of the idea of a 'lasting and expanding caliphate', *transnational organisations* such as al-Qaeda and ISIS have been financing local extremist groups in Africa including Boko Haram since the 1990s. The fatal financial transactions of several *faceless Salafi–Jihādi apologists and businesspersons* have resulted into the group's evolution, tactical strength, and resilience (Weiss, O'Farrell, Candland & Poole, 2023, p. 13).

3.4.4 Variable Four: Expansionism/Separatism

Expansionism

With desires of advancing his radical tutelage, Yusuf relocated to Kanama camp alongside his followers during the early 2000s to start a new sect devoted to ousting the secular state (Amaechi & Tshifhumlo, 2019, p, 19). These developments marked the beginning of expansionist desires of Boko Haram. Indeed, as Oluwaseun and Olanrewaju (2019, p. 70) put it, adherents of the Yufissiyya movkements alongside Yusuf moved to Yobe State where they settled outside Kanama with intentions of establishing a secluded muslim society (*Ummah*) governed through *al-sharīʿah.* While Mohammed (2014, p. 13) understands this period as the first *dawah* phase, it can be marked as the emergence and coalesence stage with the Yusufiyyah movement concerned with intensive proselytisation, recruitment, indocrination and radicalisation of its fighters (transformig non-believers 'Kuffār' to believers through

[37]Since its early years, Boko Haram has stolen several ammunitions from police institutions with the aim of accruing ammunition for the furtherance of its terror (Uzodike, Whetho and Onapaja, 2012, pp. 46-47).

'tawḥīd' and '*ḥākimiyya'* and advocating for *Jihād al-bil-sayf*). Perhaps al-Qaeda has been instrumental here: the organisation has publicly stated that it funded the Salafi–Jihādi extremist group so that it expands it's own reach into sub-Saharan Africa (cross-reference variable one). Tabar (2021, pp. 58-61) links these trends to geopolitics and territoriality, claiming that Salafi–Jihādi extremist groups such as Boko Haram are striving to expand and gain territorial control over localities with limited statehood, acting as 'quasi states as shown in variable two.

3.4.5 Variable Five: Foreign Actors
Françafrique, the curse?

Often accused of pursing neo-colonial policies within former African colonies, France continues to be the most politically active foreign actor in Chad since 1960. DeVore (2018, p. 108) explains that France adopted policies that would preserve its colonial influence 'chasse-garde' securing Paris' access to strategic natural resources within the Francophones located across the Sahelian belt, including Chad. Rather than influencing development, Paris' efforts of being a *postcolonial political father*, major donor, and militant guardian have weakened the Chadian state, argued Powell (2021). While France's military presence, traced back to the 1980s placed Chad at the centre of regional efforts to counter extremism within the Sahel (Ufuoma & Eseoghene, 2023, p. 478, also see Chafer, 2023), its presence supported decades of authoritarian tendencies which resulted into N'Djamena's backwardness, socio-economic and political inequalities.

Economists argue that Paris' *imperial monetary policies* negatively affected the domestic economies of Francophones (Sylla, Pigeaud & Dite, 2021). Yet, the institutionalisation of the CFA Franc as the official currency has not only crippled Chad's domestic economy, but it continues to breed economic underdevelopment, citizen discontent and political instability. Thus, Chadian communities perceive France as a nefarious influential force that needs to be evicted (Sofuoglu, 2022). Louati (2023) records that since 2020 several citizens within N'Djamena took matters into the streets demonstrating against France's long-lived presence in Chad (Figure 12). Such political instabilities emerging from *colonial continuities* cultivate recruitment grounds for anti-secular and anti-Western extremist groups such as Boko Haram. The group can exploit such instabilities to recruit and radicalise various demonstrators to fight an external colonial force that overthrew kingdoms of Kanem-Bornu (reformist struggle with aspects of expansionism to reinstate what existed during the 18th to the 19th century).

Figure 11: Time's Up, France?



Source: Africanews (2023).

3.4.6 Other Variables

"As long as the problem of Darfur or Borno is not solved, you will not have peace within N'Djamena…"[38]

Overlapping Realities: Crisis without borders?

Modern Nigeria and Chad emerge from the shades of Islāmicate polities that existed during the 1800–1900s that were governed by an indigenous governance system intermixed with sharīʿah law (Reynolds, 2001, p. 60, or recently see Last 2021). Reformist adherents including Boko Haram perceive this form of governance as the most sustainable way of governing. Such overlapping histories when cross-referenced with Yusuf's claims of 're-unification' (variable one) paints a picture that justifies Boko Haram's existence in Chad.

Past-in-the-Present: From Coloniality to Present

While the southern societies of Nigeria developed under the influence of British Christian missionaries, Ajayi (2022, p. 32) argues that communities within northern Nigeria transformed into a Muslim society (Ummah) aiming for the purification of Islāmic practices. The colonial trajectories have been a living presence within Nigeria's modern society especially on issues of illiteracy, unemployment to poverty[39]. Chad, on other hand was one of


[38] Lamine Cisse, quoted from Stephanie Hason, "Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic.", *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2006 (emphasis), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sudan-chad-and-central-african-republic.

[39]While Southern Nigeria became the home of 'political hierarchy' experiencing Britian's modernisation, Alme (2016) reveals that Northern Nigeria's conservativism resulted to its exclusion from socio-economic development resulting in a sharp socio-economic divide between the prosperous South and the impoverished North. Of the 86,9% million Nigerians living in absolute poverty, Akiwumi and Onyekwena (2022) point out that while poverty levels stand at 30% in the South, they hover at 60% in the North with Sokoto, Zamfara and Borno being the most affected. Northern Nigeria continues to show the worst human development indicators, globally: from ***poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and underemployment*** (Hoffman, 2014, p. 5). The hostilities and conservativism that Emirs and Islāmic clerics shown towards colonial influence and education can explain why northerners became among the least literate States in Nigeria. Hoffman (2014, p. 5) reports that about 95% of southerners remain literate compared to 15% in the North States. Recent data by the National Bureau of

the poorest Frech colonies. Alusala (2007) reveals that Chad was one of the most exploited and neglected of the French colonies. Indeed, the French enacted policies that classified Chadian regions as 'useful and useless Chad' which served as both a point of progression and repression. While the largely Christian southern regions were viewed as 'useful Chad' due to its arable lands and resources for the colonial state paving way for colonial developments, Aworawo (2016, p. 1) argues that the predominantly Muslim northern societies were classified as 'useless Chad' because of inarable lands and remained excluded from any development. Such policies have created avenues for limited statehood, political instability, poverty, heightened unemployment and corruption despite the fact that Chad remains among the top 10 countries in Africa with oil-reserves (Figure 13).

Years of conflicts alongside sporadic clashes between communities over land rights and resources, corruption, and limited statehood continued. The ***mismanagement of resources*** and ***lack of climate policies*** within the 'authoritarian-like regime' of the late President Idriss Deby worsened socio-economic conditions in Chad. Surprisingly for an oil-producing state, Chad ranks as the poorest country globally, with more than 40% of the population living below the *poverty* line (Figure 17). Of even greater concern is the latest Human Development Index which ranks Chad on the 187th position out of 189 countries (Conceicao, 2020, p. 18). Out of the 9 million Chadians, 70% is considered ***illiterate*** with gendered lens showing that women rank as the highest, 88%. The education scenario puts Chad's among countries with the lowest educational attainments, globally (Le Roux, 2023). While agriculture has been the motor of the Chadian economy, the discoveries of oil-reserves promised job opportunities. Yet, it appears that the 'oil-bubble' of the 2000s failed to operate as a development accelerator (World Bank Group, 2023, p. 1). Thus, nearly 45% of the population in Chad remain ***unemployed*** with more than 60% of young graduates seeking employment (Nyaga, 2024).

Figure 12: Chad, Among the Poorest?



Source: The World Bank (2021, p. 20).

Statistics (cited in Broeckhoven, O'Neil & Bukar, 2021, p.5) placed the Borno State in the northern region as the State with the highest unemployment that hovers around 43% and underemployment rate which sits at 24%.

Tayimlong (2021, pp. 210-219) argues that the overlapping illiteracy, poverty, unemployment, and resource deprivation between Nigeria and Chad creates opportunities for extremist groups such as Boko Haram to flourish. Yet, considering findings on variable one (ideology) radicalising Chadians proves to be challenging. Chad remains as the only country in the Lake Chad region where Boko Haram struggles to gain its Salafi–Jihādi extremist foothold (Dickow, 2022, p. 150). Instead, its suffers from its glocality due to overlapping realities from porous borders and limited statehood.

3.5 Chapter Conclusion

The recurring attacks on resource-rich regions in Cameroon, Niger and Chad show that there are *links* between extremist groups and natural resources. This inference is drawn against the findings of the chapter that evidences Boko Haram's desires to territoriality and control over resource rich societies, as shown through local communities of Abadam, Kukawa, Guzamala, Marte and those in the Lake Chad region including the southern oil-producing communities of Chad. Boko Haram has been attacking Chad with expansionist ideas driven by ideology (reformist unification of Islāmic polities), territoriality and benefits associated with functioning as a quasi-state (gaining financial tax from societies that fund its extremist movement). While the variable of ***ideology*** has been invariably significant as it influences Boko Haram's ***expansionist movement*** that spilled over in Chad, it should be noted that such ideologically propelled desires did not occur in a vacuum but have been influenced by several domestic, meso and macro factors. Notable variables such as ***resources scarcity*** due to climatological vulnerabilities including organised criminality, overlapping socio-histographies, porous borders, foreign actors such as colonial continuities by France along decades of political instability were significant enablers that turned southern oil-rich regions of Chad into battlefield of Salafi–Jihādi extremism. Violent extremism has turned ***glocal*** occurring as a crisis without and beyond borders wherein issues of territoriality, access and control of natural resources take precedence (Tabar, 2021, p. 58).

Chapter Four: Searching for the Nexus – 'The Case of Mozambique'

"…Africa, the continent of paradoxes and extremes…"
—Usmar Tar[40]

4.1 Introduction

When one of the richest 'deposit-pot' of rubies and major gas reserves were discovered in Montepuez and Rovuma basin during 2009 and 2012, respectively, hope appeared on the horizon of the Mozambican populace. Such natural resource discoveries saw massive waves of foreign direct investment that promised socio-economic development for its citizens. These were celebratory and hopeful times. Yet, the rise of Islāmic fundamentalism dramatically changed the post-conflict calculus. Mozambique's socio–political economy changed into one that may best be described through the popular Somali proverb:

> *"Me and my clan against the world; Me and my family against my clan; Me and my brother against family; Me against my brother"* (see Harper, 2012, p.11, or recently, Solomon, 2015a, p. 226).

Chapter four will thus engage with and build on the SMT in understanding the complexities and causal variables that led to the ongoing[41] Salafi–Jihādi extremism in northern Mozambique. The chapter will first set the scene of the phenomenon, then examine the violent extremist actors, followed by the discussion that explores variables and then conclude.

4.2 Setting the Scene: 'Latest Salafi–Jihādi Hotspot'



Figure 13: Map of Mozambique
Source: Cambuza (2023, p. 143).

Mozambique has undergone one conflict after the other since its independence, but the proliferation of Salafi–Jihādi extremism caught Africa and the international community by

[40] Usmar Alhaji, Tar. Introduction: The Frontiers of Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in Africa. In Onwurah, C.P., and Tar, U.A., eds. *The Palgrave Handbook of Small Arms and Conflicts in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, Switzerland, 2021. (*emphasis added*).
[41] At the time of writing and submitting (July 2023–March 2024).

surprise. The northernmost province of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, has been experiencing the surge of Salafi–Jihādi since 5 October 2017 spearheaded by Ansar al-Sunna. Since then, northern Mozambique has constantly been in a state of turmoil. Sinha (2021) argues that Cabo Delgado has become a hub of Salafi–Jihādi extremism despite the rubies and gas discoveries of 2009 and 2012. Various studies have linked these conflictual patterns to the resource curse (Els & Chelin, 2021; Sithole, 2022; Mkuti, 2023; Juma & Sabala, 2024). Ansar al-Sunna has been expanding its influence, strength and terror since it waged the first attacks in Mocimboa da Praia. It began its terror with only 30-40 Salafi–Jihādists and after five years of existence, the group boasted more than 2000 fighters (Juma and Sabala, 2024, p. 66). The causal variables that have influenced the growing presence of Salafi–Jihādi extremism in northern Mozambique should be understood, but the reader should first be directed to understanding the Salafi–Jihādist actors, that is, Ansar al-Sunna.

4.3 The Actors: Understanding Ansar al-Sunna



Figure 15: Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādists
Source: Cengiz (2022).

Whatfor[42]

"We want everyone here to apply Islāmic law …We don't want a government from unbelievers (wa-l-barā), we want a government from Allāh (Ḥākimiyya)…" [43]

Opposing the secular state has been a central element within Ansar al-Sunna's radical movement. Often known as the 'Al-Shabaab', Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādi movement emerged from the northern region of Mozambique during the early 2010s as a non-violent Islāmic organisation. Literature suggests that the movement can be traced back to the 20th century with scholars such as Chingotuane, Hendricks, Sidumo and Van Nieuwkerk (2021, p.

[42] Wherefrom, Whatfor, and Whereto' is a phrase borrowed from Rick Fawn's work (Fawn, 2009, p. 39).
[43] Quoted from Agence France-Presse. 'Extremism in Northern Mozambique Declare Goal of Caliphate'., *Agence France-Presse*, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_extremists-northern-mozambique-declare-goal-caliphate/6187455.html

6) highlighting that it began during the late 1990s. Yet, Martin Ewi and colleagues[44] reveal that the origins of the extremist group operating in Cabo Delgado province can be traced back to the late 1980s. Their research findings suggest that Ansar al-Sunna is somewhat an iteration of a radical Islamist organisation that was established in Nangade district in 1989 with a philosophical doctrine similar to that of Ansar al-Sunna. Since then, the Salafi–Jihādi movement in Mozambique has evolved from its philosophies through to its methodologies.

Brief History

With a determination to justify and promote a radical transnational Jihādi, Ansuru-Islam, later known to be Ansar al-Sunna of Mozambique, began to build new mosques and advocated for the practice of a stricter Islam. The splinter group which considers itself 'adherents to the Tradition of Islam' (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020) was formed in Mocimboa da Praia mostly by young Islāmic scholars, radical clerics, and supported by petty traders and fisherman who lacked formal education and employment opportunities. Such conditions meant that the Ansuru-Islām would not only focus on preaching for the adherence to a stricter form of Islam, but also to oppose the secular 'corrupt' state and anything associated to it (*wa-l-barā*). The sect sought to exclude itself from the secular world: from Western education, state institutions through to the society[45].

Just when the quarrel between the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and the rebel group *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) was showing signs of a 'lull' during the 2010s, the Islamist sect of Mocimboa da Praia concerned with challenging the secular state began to use threats and force to ensure that their radical Islāmic thoughts were adhered to. Realising that its radical Islāmic teachings were not adhered to, Ansar al-Sunna resorted to threats or force. The group reached the stage where the use of violence was justifiable in its Salafi–Jihādi movement (*Jihād al-bil-sayf*). Indeed, in 2015 Ansar al-Sunna attempted to forcefully impose an alcohol ban on the locals of Cabo Delgado province (Adebayo, 2023, p. 28). Such efforts resulted in violence and local police intervened. These developments marked a new phase for Ansar al-Sunna. The non-violent Islāmic sect changed into a violent extremist organisation informed by and following the Salafi–Jihādi changing its *modus operandi*, thus it ventured into Salafi–Jihādi violent extremism two years later (Heyen-Dubé & Rands, 2022, p. 448)[46]. If we are to fuse these trajectories with the Salafi–Jihādi


[44]Ewi Martin, Louw-Vaudran Liesl, Els Willem, Chelin Richard, Adam Yusuf and Boerakamp Elisa Samuel. 'Violent Extremism in Mozambique: Drivers and Links to Transnational Organised Crime'., *Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Pretoria, 2022.*

[45] Just as social movement scholars argue, the movement was in its emergence and coalescence stages.

[46] From 2015 till mid-2017, Ansar al-Sunna began to revamp and modernise their operational structure to fit the radical Jihādist objectives. Darden and Estelle (2021, p.8) argue that the group recruited potential Salafi-Jihādists

ideology Ansar al-Sunna was in a juncture where the fourth pillar (‘*al-walāʾ wa-l-barā*) and the fifth pillars (*‘Jihād al-bil-sayf’*) were deemed necessary for its extremist efforts (see Chapter 2). Since its fourth pillar, the group has been the cause of political instability within northern Mozambique[47], as evidence by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (Figure 16).

Figure 14: Ansar al-Sunna’s Increasing Violence since 2017-2020s



Source: Bukarti and Munasinghe (2020), data gathered from GEM and ACLED.

Over the years, Ansar al-Sunna developed into a sinister Salafi–Jihādi group increasing its reach, target groups[48] and terror. Why has a resource rich Mozambique returned to conflictual climates? Curiously, many researchers, academics and policymakers have attempted to answer this question arriving at the consensus that socio-economic situations have led to Cabo Delgado’s insecurity (see for example, Chichava & Alden, 2020; Els & Chelin, 2021; Sithole,

It also incorporated the Salafi-Jihādists who were followers of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, the leader of al-Hijira in 2016 (Kunaka, 2018, pp. 99-100).

[47] 30–40 Salafi-Jihādists of Ansar al-Sunna launched their first assault in Mocimboa da Praia district on the 5th October 2017. Bussotti and Coimbra (2023, p. 3) reveal that it was during the early hours of day when the district headquarters of Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) and a border guard company became objects of its terror. While others were gunned down, several civilians were beheaded using machetes. Heyen-Dubé and Rands (2022, p. 436) reveal that more than 15 civilians were killed, including two police officers and a community leader. Even though the movement was still narrow in its scope, Ansar al-Sunna managed to destroy various state institutions and occupy Mocimboa da Praia for two days. Mashimbye (2022, p. 64) finds that Ansar al-Sunna has committed horrendous atrocities using machetes beheading several civilians, setting villagers alight, gunning down others and abducting young persons to recruit and radicalise. Even though Ansar al-Sunna kept its extremist attacks relatively low with two to three offenses per month (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020, p. 20), the organisation expanded its terror to six other districts within Cabo Delgado province including Palma, Quissanga, Mitumba, Nangade and Mocimboa da Praia.

[48] Ansar al-Sunna launched several horrendous attacks, including the destructive attacks on six chapels, various ***Christian churches*** (Jihād al-Kuffār) and the oldest catholic mission in Cabo Delgado (Dembele, 2020). These trajectories marked the beginning of a new religious target group, Christians, whom according to Salafi-Jihādists are unbelievers.

2022; Chigudu, 2023; Juma & Sabala, 2024). This section therefore examines causal variables that resulted into the proliferation of Ansar al-Sunna's movement in Cabo Delgado province.

4.4 Discussion: Unearthing the Variables

4.4.1 Variable One: Ideology


'For the Purpose of al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya?'

Unlike its Salafi–Jihādi counterpart operating in Chad, Ansar al-Sunna has shown limited engagement with the media regarding its ideological and philosophical motives. Yet, one of the senior members of Ansar al-Sunna, claimed that:

"Whether people like it or not, we [Ansar al-Sunna] are defending Islām…We are not supported by Guebuza…We are supported by Allāh" (Ardé, Nelson, Rademeyer & Stanyard, 2022, pp. 21-22).

Such statements indicate that Ansar al-Sunna is following a radical interpretation of Islāmic activism in Northern Mozambique so to fulfil its stated extremist agenda or radical jihād cause. Thus, Mozambique continues to face a violent extremist group that has strong beliefs linked to religion (Islām) and manipulates religious ideology (Salafi–Jihādi). Prior to Ansar al-Sunna's Islāmic revivalism that is driving instability in Mozambique, the sect remains a non-violent group that sought for a more Islāmic society. Yet, the imported Jihādist thinking through the Wahhabi religious system that has radicalised several youthful Mozambican men who studied *madrassa* abroad (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019; Morier-Genoud, 2020; Mangena & Pherudi, 2021). Field researchers gathered that more than 80% of their respondents marked *religion-and-ideology* among the key drivers of the Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Cabo Delgado (Ewi et al., 2022, p. 18). Religious *ideologies* of Islām have been exploited to fit the extremist conditions set by Ansar al-Sunna to legitimise their cause and gain support. Research findings show that members of Ansar al-Sunna have weaponised religious ideologies so to achieve their objectives such as the Shari'a law (Ewi et al., 2022, p.28). Various fighters of Ansar al-Sunna have demonstrated their willingness to die for the cause of *Allāh* (al-walāʾ) and for their Salafi–Jihādi movement to live (Figure 17).

Figure 15: Because of Ideology



Source: Ewi et al. (2022, p. 28)

Ardé, Nelson, Rademeyer and Stanyard's (2022, p. 21) report has revealed that various young Mozambicans join the movement with the goal of having Ansar al-Sunna as the *alternative government* (emphasis added). Some of the fighters join the movement being certain that an Islāmic state will set them free from the perceived injustices and it is necessary to fight.

Such theological beliefs have often been championed by *radical clerics* such as Aboud Rogo Mohammed (Figure 18). Rogo has been an influential figure within Ansar al-Sunna's movement with several of his followers joining the unleashing of terror in Mozambique (Ahmed, 2020). Just as Rogo laid grounds for violent Jihādi ideology in Kenya (Ndzovu, 2018), some of his ideas have managed to radicalise some in Cabo Delgado, as three senior members of Ansar al-Sunna appeared citing and popularising the tenets of Jihādi he supported (Bekoe et al, 2020, p. 5).

Figure 16: Aboud Rogo Mohammed



Source: Capital News (2012).

4.4.2 Variable Two: Natural Resource

'From Resource Discoveries to Terror': What's In-Between?

Liesl Louw-Vaudran, senior advisor at the African Union critically raised the following:

"It's almost uncanny…the time of it…that here we have one of the biggest natural gas finds and then you suddenly have an insurgency (Salafi–Jihādi). It's very difficult to not to see a link there!" (cited in BBC News Africa, 2021).

Els and Chelin (2021, p. 106) have attempted to analyse this extraordinary linkage between gas discoveries and surge of violent extremism in northern Mozambique. Their work finds that the resource-rich Cabo Delgado province currently faces the 'unfortunate resource-curse' dilemma. Resource discoveries in Mozambique soon turned into a curse that saw several local citizens being bullied, neglected and forcefully removed to allow foreign oil corporations to start with the explorations and neglected by the FRELIMO government (Hanlon, 2020, p. 7;

Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento, 2022, pp. 11-12). Indeed, one civilian in northern Mozambique noted that:

"All [o]ur land and resource wealth has gone to FRELIMO" (Crisis Group Africa, 2021, p. 17).

Ordinary citizens in Cabo Delgado have been dissatisfied with the elitist capture of all economic opportunities which they believed should benefit the whole society (Ardé et al., 2022, p. 21). Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Cabo Delgado hinges on the resource-linked realities that saw various citizens being part of Salafi–Jihādi extremist movement with aims to eliminate corrupt unbelievers in Maputo who misuse natural resource wealth. One participant from northern Mozambique went on to put matters into perspective, arguing that:

"everything in the South is beautiful and people have opportunities, whereas in the north, we do not have any opportunities, so we must make justice with our own hands" (Lucey & Patel, 2021, p. 17).

The ongoing insecurity of unequal distribution of natural resource wealth as a foundational factor to the ongoing insecurity in Mozambique. Another account brings patronage to the fore. Perhaps patronage came across as the most appealing path for Ansar al-Sunna because 'elites in-control of power in Maputo have access to economic benefits of gas-resources' (Macuane, Buur & Monjane, 2018, p.415). Constant violent extremist attacks within resource communities tend to support this view[49]. Nevertheless, while there are several factors that have caused insecurity in Mozambique, unequal distribution of national wealth across the country has been among the catalyst variables that influenced the Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Cabo Delgado. Indeed, Sithole (2022, pp, 14-15) reveals that one of the senior members of Ansar al-Sunna, Ibn Omar, claimed within a video recording that:

"We occupy the towns (e.g. Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, Quissanga, Mitumba and Nangade, among others) to show that the government of the day is unfair, it humiliates the poor and give the profit to the bosses" (Ardé, Nelson, Rademeyer & Stanyard, 2022, pp. 21-22).

Much of this conflict should be seen as 'justice-seeking' where the need to manage resource wealth through the Shari'a law) is at the fore. Thus, as Ngoenha, Amaral and Nhumaio (2020)

[49] Ansar al-Sunna attacked the vital port city of Palma which is about 10-15 kilometres away from the Afungi complex that houses the Rovuma and Total LNG projects worth US $20 billion on the 25th March 2021, another variable emerged that links the Salafi-Jihādi group with natural resources. About 200 Salafi-Jihādi fighters raided the town of Palma, waging their assault from several sides of the town, an attack that lasted for 4 days. Causality reports reveal that about 1 191 civilians were brutally killed during these attacks, according to journalist Alex Perry. Of those killed, more than 400 were reported missing, 366 were gunned down, 330 were beheaded, 45 drowned (a new tactic of terror used by the group) while 22 succumbed to their injuries (Gould, 2023). The Palma attacks did not only result in casualties, but they forced Total Energy to suspend the construction of the LNG processing plant (Nhamirre, 2023).

put it, the radicalisation of Ansar al-Sunna in Cabo Delgado broke out from resource discovery and mismanagement of natural resources. Yet, Ansar al-Sunna has publicly rejected claims that link its Salafi–Jihādi movement to natural resources arguing that:

"My brothers, make no mistake…We are not fighting, as it may seem, for the wealth of the world (revenues of natural resources)…This is not about Gas" (BBC News Africa, 2021).

However, it has become significantly difficult for scholars to reject the notions that a 'nexus' between Ansar al-Sunna, natural resources and organised criminality exists (Ewi, et.al, 2022; Ndawana, 2023). This is due to the fact that Ansar al-Sunna has been involved in several incidents that indicate criminality. These claims are examined under variable three, below.

4.4.3 Variable Three: Illicit Activities
'When Clandestiny meets Extremism'

Organised criminality in Mozambique has grown exponentially since the 1990s. Northern Mozambique has long been notorious for various illicit activities. Research shows that organised crimes have become politically and economically entrenched within the region (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2020). While it has been involved in the cultivation of, and trade in cannabis, the region serves as a prominent economic corridor for illicit flows of humans, timber, pharmaceuticals, heroin, cocaine, wildlife products, and smuggles gems as well as gold. Whilst Botha (2022, p. 3) outlined that there exists a 'nexus' between organised crimes and extremist groups, Ndawana (2023, p. 100) reveals that Ansar al-Sunna has been benefiting from the existing illicit political economy of northern Mozambique. Although Ansar al-Sunna is not listed as being one of the major criminal players, Sunguta West (2018) argues that:

"Ansar al-Sunna finances its movement from illicit trade of ivory, charcoal, rubber, and timber as well as other illicit goods which involves the interaction of Chinese, Vietnamese, Tanzanians, and other African nationals".

Research also highlighted Ansar al-Sunna has been funding its terror through seizing cash and goods such as ammunition during its violent extremist attacks. The Islamist organisation managed to loot several firearms and ammunition. Njelezi (2022, p.11) argues that the group sought to acquire firearms, grenades, and military uniforms (Mangena & Pherudi, 2021, p. 355). Such criminality has created an enabling environment for Ansar al-Sunna's extremist ecosystem, but the role of *illicit mining* should also be mentioned. According to Ewi et al (2022, p. 37) the illegal mining of, and illicit trade in rubies, has remained the core source of funding for Ansar al-Sunna enabling it to thrive. Marshall (2021) argues that the Islamist group has showed characteristics of being 'more criminal than Jihādi, benefiting from several

illicit income streams. Although several reports highlight the role of organised crime, Ardé et al. (2022, p. 20) reveal that local *businesspersons*, sympathizers, and those afar, including *transnational Jihādists* have likely been providing Ansar al-Sunna with financial support.

Ansar al-Sunna has been *kidnapping for ransom* to finance its terror (Ewi et al., 2022, p. 36). These illicit activities that mix local, regional, and international actors have been the financial source that drives the Salafi–Jihādi movement in northern Mozambique. Another driver has been Ansar al-Sunna's religious, ideological, military, and commercial links with other *transnational Jihād groups* found in Africa and elsewhere (West, 2018). Some studies show that certain fighters have trained or at least received their Islāmic literature from Great Lakes region, Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia, or Saudi Arabia. Such relations contributed to the group's resilience.

4.4.4 Variable Four: Expansionism/ Separatism

Separatism

Ansar al-Sunna made a short-filmed statement addressing local citizens outside the District Administrator's office in Quissanga in March 2020 where it expressed that:

"We don't want the Frelimo flag …you can see the flag that we are using' (as they were referring to the Islāmic State Flag)" (Bofin, 2023).

Sithole (2022) finds that the Salafi–Jihādi extremist group has constantly denounced the legitimacy of the ruling party, FRELIMO and the secular state operating in southern-Maputo. These trajectories have shown that Salafi–Jihādi extremist groups seek territoriality, if not to separate from the secular state in Maputo. Ansar al-Sunna's repeated attacks and short lived 'politico-religious' occupancy in towns such as Palma, Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga show separatist patterns within Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādi movement. Yet, research shows that Ansar al-Sunna has been responsible for cross-border attacks. Vhumbunu (2021, p. 10) reveals that on 14 October 2020, the group carried out extremist attacks on the villagers of Kitaya who belong to the Mtwara region of Tanzania. Such attacks do not only indicate Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādi attempts to separate from Maputo's secular state, but they also provide the study a platform to validate Tabar's (2021) work that links extremist groups in Sahel, Horn and Southern Africa to territoriality, expansionism and separatism. Findings show that Ansar al-Sunna seeks to separate so to gain territoriality. One factor that contemporary studies should not overlooked when studying Salafi–Jihādi extremist groups attempts for territoriality and expansion – is their association with transnational Jihād groups. The author expands on the importance of transnationality under variable five, below.

4.4.5 Variable Five: Foreign Actors

'Transnationality'

Just after a year of existing as a violent organisation, Ansar al-Sunna reportedly pledged allegiance to the caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islāmic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) during the spring of 2018 (Figure 19). The organisation was acknowledged as an affiliate of the Islāmic State a year later. Soon after this, the Islāmic State claimed responsibility for attacks waged by Ansar al-Sunna (Figure 20(a)). Such developments indicated that the Islāmic State was and remains supportive of Ansar al-Sunna's extremist activities in Southern Africa. As with other transnational groups elsewhere, the Islāmic State provided Ansar al-Sunna with multiple benefits including greater opportunities for funding, recruitment, ammunition, and global publicity. Resultantly, the international community witnessed the group's organisational and operational growth: from the number of Salafi–Jihādists to number of violent attacks (Figure 16).

Figure 17: Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādists Pledging Alliance to ISIS



Source: Githing'u and Hamming (2021, p. 44).

While the group was responsible for 6 to 7 extremist attacks per month in 2018, it recorded 16 extremist attacks per month in 2019 (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020, p. 20). An active partnership between Ansar al-Sunna and the Islāmic State could explain the group's sophistication and brutality from 2019 onwards (Figure 16). Indeed, the discovery of manuals titled *Wilayah Mozambique* revealed that there exist some elements of intersectionality between local extremist groups, misinterpretation of the Salafi–Jihādi ideology, military tactics, and the justification of extremism to establish an 'Islāmic Caliphate' (Figure 20 (b)).

Figure 18: Illustrations of Ansar al-Sunna's Glocality




Source: Githing'u and Hamming (2021, p.).
Notes: Illustration (A, left) indicates the first claims from the Islāmic State regarding their first attack in Mozambique in 2019. Illustration (B, right) demonstrates a book on weaponry and describes Mozambique's Islāmic Caliphate.

Foreign corporations inflaming terror

TotalEnergies, Eni and ExxonMobil (Figure 21) alongside the state promised the society that it will also benefit from the gas discovery. It was believed that gas exploration projects led by foreign oil corporations would create more than 55 000 skilled and 100 000 skilled jobs during the preliminary years. And the state made assurances that local citizens would fall under the 'first priority' category and benefit from the jobs promised by the gas projects. Yet, the 'gas bubble' deflated promptly. Poor management of gas resources and the poorly managed displacement projects in Cabo Delgado province have generated grave resentments. Yet, these companies have pushed people from Cabo Delgado who depend on fishing and agriculture even deeper into poverty (Global Oil & Gas Exit List, 2023). The obsession with gas profits has led to the Mozambican government and the explorative companies to neglecting human security of local population. Just as the PSC report noted, neglecting the basic rights, needs and human security of local citizens in northern Mozambique ultimately resulted into the evolution of Ansar al-Sunna. The Islamist organisation has since 2017 been fighting the injustices of being forcefully removed without any signs of job creation or compensation (Figure 21). To its adherents, a 'justice-seeking effort' (Jihād) for an alternative government (Islāmic Caliphate) was and remains the priority.

Figure 19: The Nexus between Gas Exploration Projects and Salafi–Jihādi



Source: Global Oil & Gas Exit List (2023)

Mercenaries and Regional Troops

Private military companies[50] in northern Mozambique have been fighting Ansar al -Sunna since 2019 (Hanlon, 2021, p. 3). When Maputo entrusted the Russian Wagner group (2019) and the South African Dyck Advisory group (2020) to assist with countering strategies of separating 'good guys' from 'bad guys', Ansar al-Sunna became more ruthless than it has been. Its Salafi–Jihādi movement continued to grow in strength despite their presence (Connolly, 2020). Often under-looked when studying violent extremism conflict dynamics, this research report argues that an area of state failure provides violent extremist groups fertile ground to escalate their Salafi–Jihādi movement in host countries. The institutional paralysis from the Mozambican government (e.g. the Mozambican defence force –*Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM)) and PMC's operating within unfamiliar territory (i.e., Wagner and Dyck groups) created an enabling environment for Ansar al-Sunna's to be more sophisticated in its tactics (Zenda, 2022). Under these circumstances, foreign military actors have opened room for Ansar al-Sunna to improve its tactics and wage much sophisticated attacks towards civilians.

Mozambique has since welcomed regional military intervention projects from Rwandan and SADC forces with about 2 800 and 1 900 personnel, respectively (Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento, 2022, p. 15). With the foreign military intervention, local forces have been assisted to restore stability across Cabo Delgado province, especially around the gas explorations, liquefaction, and logistics projects within the Rovuma basin. Since the arrival of foreign troops, particularly the Rwandan and SADC forces, Ansar al-Sunna have remained weak having been scattered around the region, while others have fled Mozambique. While this might not be the case for SADC forces, the Rwandan army came into Mozambique with adequate resources from finances to weaponry to conduct their mission of countering violent extremist movement in Cabo Delgado province (Chingotuane, Hendricks, Van Nieuwkerk & Sidumo, 2021; Rusero & Maisiri, 2023; Columbo, 2023). It is therefore undeniable that Ansar al-Sunna's movement has entered its decline stage where repression based on the use of force by regional authorities persists. Although the intensity of violence de-escalated, Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento (2022, p. 18) finds that Ansar al-Sunna is still in combatant mode with the Nangade, Muidumbe and Macomia districts as objects of its terror. Violent extremist intensity within these districts has been occurring because of poor governance,

[50] The Russian Wagner Group (2019) and Dyck Advisory Group (DAG).

institutional paralysis from the Mozambican government and limited statehood that exist within these districts.

4.4.6 Other Variables

Past-in-the-Present: Wherefrom, Whatfor, and Whereto[51]?

The North-South Divide

Wherefrom? Mozambique was 'discovered' by Portuguese voyager, Vasco da Gama on his commercial trip to India in 1498[52]. Since then, the Portuguese have maintained strong presence within the Bantu localities that would later be known as 'Mozambique' .Portuguese would gone on to establish an inherently weak colonial administration governed by Islāmic leaders, prazeiros, and Western traders in three economic hubs: the northern region peasant agriculture presided over by Islāmic leaders, the larger central region of the Zambezi governed by prazeiros, while the southern region of ancient Gaza kingdom regulated by European traders[53]. Mozambique thus developed based on 'north-central-south' binaries separated by the Zambezi River (Vines, 2020). Such realities have had a profound impact on Mozambique's northernmost province, Cabo Delgado (Marnani, Rahmat & Rangarirai, 2022, p. 11). Without any form of road infrastructure connecting the 1 666 kms from the north to the south region until the 1930s, Cabo Delgado[54] province and the surrounding provinces functioned as rural entities isolated from their capital city, Maputo. If anything, the geographical, societal, economic and political isolation of those in Cabo Delgado province to the whole country has made Mozambique's nation-building difficult; but even worse, it resulted into resentments and anger towards the Mozambican government paving fertile ground for Ansar al-Sunna's indoctrination, recruitment and terror.

'Towards Maputo's Independence'

The realities of the south-north divide saw a revolutionary movement in Mozambique; calling for Mozambique's independence that was waged and centred in the northern region of the

[51] 'Wherefrom, Whatfor, and Whereto' is a phrase borrowed from Rick Fawn's work (Fawn, 2009, p. 39).

[52] Since then, various traders of Portuguese descendent including Lourenço Marques, Antonio Calderia have maintained a presence in Mozambique due to the gold, ivory, and slave trade within the Bantu localities. The Sofala fort was established in the 1500s, at the geographical heart of the country, and became home to commercial settlers or prazeiros, later moving the fort to Moçambique Island. This fort was a major slave trading center and seaport of the 1800s.

[53] These proxies changed from 1891 to 1941 when administrative control was given to chartered companies or International 'leasing companies' such as the Mozambique Company, Niassa Company and the Zambezia Company to administer the colony.

[54] While the southern Mozambicans benefited the most from the liberal administrative reforms of the Portuguese *Novo Estado* that brought education, employment, and socio-economic prospects since the 1930s, northern Mozambicans remained deprived of such prospects. Such trajectories meant that the imperial state neglected the northerners from major developments (Noor, 2021, p. 25) because Portugal saw no 'commercial value' within the northern areas.


country, spreading to central and southern Mozambique from 1969 onwards[55]. Spearheaded by northern Mozambicans alongside FRELIMO, the anti-colonial struggle paved a way for the first Marxist-driven state to operate in Southern Africa (Ntaka, 2023, p. 27). In 1974, the colonial state withdrew from Mozambique after FRELIMO brought its armed forces and status quo to the edge of collapse. On the 25 June 1975, Mozambique gained its political independence but quickly descended into a devastating civil war that lasted from 1977 to 1992 between the rebel group, RENAMO and the ruling FRELIMO. Most Makondes and Mwanis within the northern region believe that the postcolonial government omitted them their significant role in the struggle for independence (Ouassif & Kitenge, 2021, p. 7). Thus, resentments against the FRELIMO government following the end of the colonial rule prevailed. The FRELIMO Marxist-Leninist government's incapacity to promote and sustain development across the country intensified regional inequalities that existed during the colonial times which has paved a way for Ansar al-Sunna's movement in Mozambique.

'Colonial Continuities: South-North Divide'

Several social indicators suggest that regional inequalities within Mozambique have been rising to dangerous levels. With regards to illiteracy, graphic 1 below, demonstrates that more people from the northern region cannot read or write, 52,7% against 22,8% of the southern region. Of the total of 3.2 million persons in Cabo Delgado province, 67% are illiterate (Lucey & Patel, 2021, p. 9), as opposed to the 13,3% within Maputo province. These dynamics explain why most of the elite persons in Mozambique originate from the predominantly Christian southern region (Noor, 2021, p.25). While southerners have better healthcare opportunities within reach (77.6% of its population), central and northern Mozambicans have lower healthcare access of 67.7% and 56.4%, respectively. Even though Mozambique recently recorded a significant reduction in poverty rates from 92.8% through to 71% (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2019, p.4), regional inequalities show that the country is still a fragmented poverty-stricken society. Conshello and Jatula (2021, p. 248) demonstrate that more than 70% of the Mozambican populace is very dissatisfied with their harsh living standards, especially those from the north.

[55] During these conflictual times, war was met with war. Portugal armed forces fought to protect their 'overseas province', while the Mozambicans sought to achieve independence from the colonialist Portugal.

Graphic 1: Social Indicators of Inequality in Mozambique



Source: Prepared by the author, assimilated from the World Bank using the IOF data (2014/2015), the Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (2019/2020), and the UNICEF Mozambique (2022)[56].

The World Food Programme (2022, p.2) finds that food insecurity and multidimensional poverty tends to be higher in the northern provinces than in the southern provinces. At the subnational level, graphic 1 above, shows that more than 60% of the population within the northern region lives in acute poverty, while about 30% of the population in the southern region is poverty stricken. In terms of provinces, Cabo Delgado shows that about 50.03% of its population is poverty stricken, while its southernmost Maputo province shows about 15%. Matshine and Valoi (2019, p.13) finds that more than 60% of the population in Cabo Delgado province still use firewood as source energy; crop farming and hunting as a source of food; and medicinal plantation as source of healthcare.


Regarding employment opportunities, graphic 2 below shows that the rural northern provinces such as Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula have an average of about 77.6% of its population linked to agriculture. Because of Portugal's southward shift that left with educational opportunities, most northern societies remained deprived from getting professional training to either become teachers, lawyers, or nurses. As such, these societies cultivated land so to

[56] Regional rate = $\bar{x} \frac{\sum x}{n}$, where $\sum x$ is the combination of all provincial rates and n is the number of provinces within a region. To illustrate this, regional average rates ($\bar{x}$) were reached as follows:

- combination of provincial rates ($\sum x$) divided by the number of provinces within a region (n) to get the regional average (i.e., Provincial rate 1 + Provincial rate 2 ÷ number of provinces = regional rates per indicator).

feed their families. On the contrary, less than 60% of the population in the southern provinces devote themselves to agricultural activities. Instead, it remains the region with the highest population rate, 27%, that engages in commercial activity, as opposed to the central and northern regions with the least participation in commercial activity, 18.4% and 14.4%, respectively. Other than those who plough large lands for subsistence purposes, unemployment among the youth in the northern provinces of Mozambique is rife (Graphic 2).

Graphic 2: Regional Rates by Main Occupation in Mozambique



Source: Prepared by the author[57] using the IOF data 2014/2015.

'Government Neglect'

One study *Building Youth Resilience to Extremism in Mozambique* by Lucey and Patel (2022) unpacks how historical inequalities, injustices and feelings of resentments have led to the ongoing Salafi–Jihādi insecurity in Cabo Delgado province. Given the country's asymmetrical development, the discovery of natural gas in Rovuma basin saw protective sentiments emerge from the north which claimed that the national wealth from the gas riches should not reach the hands of corrupt southerners. One young man from Montepuez noted that:

"...People in the north have been saying we are working for those in the South ...we have the wealth, and they are getting fat, economically..." (Lucey & Patel, 2021, p. 18 emphasis added).

Seen as the 'beast with seven heads', institutional corruption that materialised since colonial times created feelings of injustice and resentment towards the FRELIMO-led government.

[57]calculated using author's formula (see pg.54).

More than 30% of Mozambicans aged between 18 to 30 years believe that the country's President is corrupt, as are FRELIMO officials (34%) and the police and military forces (51%), as Lucey and Patel (2021, p. 18) noted. The Afrobarometer survey (2021, p.4) found that those between 18 to 25 years feel unheard by Members of Provincial Assembly and Parliament (47% and 46% respectively). Of concern is that more than 50% of the Mozambican youth feel dissatisfied with the FRELIMO-led government because they believe that Maputo is not willing to address their societal needs. One youth in Montepuez stated that:

"We are not heard; no one listens to us…we can arrange audience with the supreme, but we do not receive any feedback or whatsoever" (Lucey & Patel, 2021, pp.18-19).

These exclusionary experiences in relation to unequal distribution of resource wealth, colonial continuities and foreign radical influences that brought Islāmic activism in northern Mozambique provided entry points for Salafi–Jihādists to recruit the youth to be part of the anti-secular Salafi–Jihādi movement within the northernmost region of Cabo Delgado.

4.5 Chapter Conclusion

Chapter Four presented a case study analysis of Northern Mozambique using the theoretical lenses of the social movement theory to explain the complexities of the Salafi–Jihādi extremism experienced in Cabo Delgado. The chapter finds that the religious ideologies of Salafi–Jihādi have been manipulated to feed and justify ***separatism*** movement in northern Mozambique. Thus, ideology has been invariably significant in this regard. Findings show that religious ideologies have been weaponised to recruit, indoctrinate and radicalise youth to be part of the 'justice-seeking movement'. It is then air to assume that the ***ideology*** variable has play(ed) a significant role in starting (radicalising ordinary citizens), perpetuating, and sustaining armed conflict as shown in Cabo Delgado province. Regardless of this, the chapter finds that the ability of ideology to influence Salafi–Jihādi extremism is often propelled by several variables including unequal distribution of ***natural resource abundance*** involvement of extremist groups in illicit activities and foreign actors such as foreign oil corporations and foreign private military companies. Findings also infer that ***government exclusion*** of civilians in northern Mozambique since the colonial to the postcolonial period created fertile enabling grounds for Ansar al-Sunna's recruitment and radicalisation. Chapter Four also indicated how radical clerics instrumentalise religious ideologies to ensure that extremist fighters sustain their movement. Clearly the struggle to realise an Islāmic Caliphate continues. This movement has shown that there is an interplay of several variables that can be categorised as micro-meso-and macro factors. These complex variables have been instrumental in escalating the ongoing Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Cabo Delgado province.

Chapter Five: Analysis, Conclusion, and Recommendations

"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster…"
—Friedrich Nietzsche[58]

5.1 Introduction

Out of 70 countries recorded as battling Salafi–Jihādi movements, Chad and Mozambique are constantly[59] placed among the top 20 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2023, p.8). Violent extremism in African borders continues to live through an uninterrupted escalation of terror. We are at a juncture where there is a global geographic shift of 'Salafi–Jihādi extremism' epicenters making Africa a new epicenter. Recorded events linked to Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa have increased to an astounding 17–fold since 2009 (Bacon & Warner, 2021, p. 77). Religious ideologies within the African continent pose a threat to peace, stability, and democracy as they thrust the ever-expanding spread of Salafi–Jihādi movements. The continuity of African Salafi–Jihādi organisations to use religious ideologies to recruit, indoctrinate and radicalise youthful citizens is alarming. Such continuity shows that African localities offer *conditions* that are viable for violent extremist groups and transnational jihādist organisations to gain strength, persist, and multiply. Grasping to *'the-core'* conditions that allow African resource-rich countries to become 'glocal-centers of violent Salafi–Jihādi extremism' has been the key research puzzle that motivated this research report.

This chapter wraps up this inquest as means to provide a sense of closure. This is done by summations, headlining key research findings – with some of the 'gimmicks' being outlined. Overall closure will emerge from insights destined to feed into policy recommendations and the epilogue.

5.2 Overview of the Study: Horrors of Salafi–Jihādi?

As a way of presenting the ever-escalating phenomenon of Salafi–Jihādi extremism, this study investigated linkages between natural resources, ideology and extremist groups across the case studies of Chad and Mozambique. This inquest was disseminated across four distinct chapters. *Chapter One* concentrated on providing general orientation to the research report by discussing the background, introduction, problem statement, research questions and reviewing existing literature around the changing nature of armed conflict in Africa since the 20th century. Literature reveals that armed conflicts within the African continent continues to evolve and revolve. Existing studies insist that the 'evolution' occurs due to complex conditions. Thus scholars have been calling for the 'dehomogenization' in understanding the causes of conflicts in Africa because while factors may seem similar, conditions that caused

[58] Quoted from Jaun Carlos, Antunez. "Salafism: From a Religious Movement to a Political Force." *Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional* 3.1 (2017): 12

[59] Cross-references can be made to the Global Terrorism Index since 2020 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022, 2021 & 2020).

conflictual climates in northern Mozambique differ to those in Chad. Such an observation is timely considering the complexities of Salafi–Jihādi. This means that conflicts that liken Salafi–Jihādi occur due to a pot-of-complex-ingredients. Scholars point out that ethnic identity, sovereignty, self-determination, government system, religion and natural resources all should be understood as ingredients of armed conflict. Existing scholarship contested these 'ingredients' as the sole causers of conflict arguing that causality in African conflicts should not be bottled under these five-fold themes but be understood as being manifold. Understanding these manifold causes leads discourse into understanding types of armed conflicts from *one-sided conflicts* (e.g. identity and ethnic-based violence); *state and non-state conflicts* (e.g. civil wars, or political violence); and *spontaneous societal conflicts* (e.g. civil unrests) to *organised societal conflicts* (e.g. Salafi–Jihādi extremism). The proliferation of organised societal conflicts that draw from religious ideologies (Salafi–Jihādi) fuelling societal instability in resource-rich African countries prompted this research report, as it epistemically asks: '***what role does Salafi–Jihādi play in starting, perpetuating and sustaining conflicts in resource rich states?***'. *Chapter Two* directed the reader towards the 'theorisation of African violent extremism' where conceptualities and theories took precedence. The chapter happened upon the need of a 'conceptual framework' used to describe fluid armed conflicts that are impelled by religious ideologies. Thus the focus was placed on the concepts that define 'Salafi–Jihādi extremism' in Africa and applicability of theories used to explain armed conflicts. Although the 'greed-grievance theory' offers insights in understanding conflicts in resource-rich states, its shortcomings in headlining other salient conditions encouraged calls for a more 'integrative framework'. The SMT's cognisance that armed conflicts occur due to complex factors that are not static, but frantic intermixing local and global factors evinced its relevance and applicability to this study. *Chapter Three and Chapter Four* presented case studies that scrutinised the role of Salafi–Jihādi in starting armed conflict and associated variables within resource rich Chad and Mozambique through the theoretical lens of the SMT.

5.3 Evaluation and Research Findings

5.3.1. Overall Evaluation

How should Salafi–Jihādi be understood in an African context?

Islām, its ideologic tenets aspire for a peaceful religious lifestyle for Sunni Muslims, yet Salafi–Jihādi doctrines tend to be the most exploited ideologies feeding into Islamist violent extremism across Africa, Asia and further afield. This is unfortunate because radical Islamist fundamentalists in Africa and further afield are continuously painting the Sunni-ideology as a religious ideology that advocates for radicality or even worse, violent extremism.

Understanding Salafi–Jihādi in an African context means that one will develop 'perspectives' that hinges on the following:

Salafi–Jihādi is a Sunni ideology that continuously promotes reformity or alternatives in moral, political, societal and economic orders. Thus, it promotes jihād or the holy war against African democracies. This is problematic for the ideology of Salafi–Jihādi even worse for Islām and Muslims. The findings of this research offer counterarguments. The research report argues that understanding Salafi–Jihādi in an African context means that one has to be aware of the following:

- Salafi–Jihādi is a religious Sunni ideology that advocates for righteous lifestyle for Sunni Muslims.
- But it refers to an ideology that has fallen into the hands of Islāmic fundamentalists who manipulate its tenets, doctrinal teachings, and directions in modern society to drive reformist violent extremism.

This study focused on the latter fact. It has found that Salafi–Jihādi extremist movements within the African continent occur on the basis of 'justice-seeking efforts' that stem from domestic variables. Still as any generalisation this conclusion is fully aware that the ideologies of Salafi–Jihādi in Africa take various pathways but arrive at same destination–Salafi–Jihādi extremism:

- The Chadian case shows that Salafi–Jihādi in Africa tends to be manipulated by Islamist fundamentalists so to justify and promote ***expansionist desires***. This has been observable through Boko Haram's movement. In spite of this, findings further show that there exist several variables that provided Boko Haram expansionist grounds such as overlapping Islāmicate histories, porous borders, socio-economic conditions including ***resource scarcity*** due to climate change among others (Figure 22).
- The Mozambican case shows that Salafi–Jihādi in Africa tends to be manipulated by radical Islāmic fundamentalists to justify and promote for ***separatist desires***. This has been observable through Ansar al-Sunna's movement. The Mozambican case also happens to show that unequal distribution of ***resource abundance*** alongside other variables such as colonial continuities, regional inequalities, unemployment among others created grounds for Ansar al-Sunna's justice-seeking movement (Figure 23).

Profiling Salafi–Jihādi through the lens of equifinality demonstrates that there are complexities and fluidities that need to be considered when one studies Salafi–Jihādi from an African context (see Figure 22 and 23). These findings also demonstrate that armed conflicts

within the African continent are constantly evolving wherein an interplay of several 'causal variables' is present. Existing literature and findings expose that Salafi–Jihādi and extremist groups in African context can be understood as a movement that concerns itself with issues of territoriality (khilāfah) in relation to access and control of natural resources. Empirical evidence happens to support this purview especially with Boko Haram's expansionism into the resource-rich communities of the Lake Chad region and Ansar al-Sunna's separatist tendencies towards resource-rich communities in Mozambique.

Figure 20: First Variance, Insider-Outsider

Independent Variable	**Conditions**	***Dependent Variable***
'causes' →	*'amplifiers'* →	*'outcome'*
Emergence stage	***Coalescence Stage***	***Bureaucratisation Stage***
Islāmic activism (ideology)	Porous borders	Spillover-effects
Coloniality	Colonial Continuities	Violence on oil-rich regions
Societal marginalisation	Poverty	Expansionist violence
Regional inequalities	Limited Statehood	Salafi–Jihādi in Chad borders
Postcolonial political instabilities	Poor Governance	***Glocal conflict in Chad (outsider)***
Economic underperformance	Institutionalised corruption	
Ethno-religious violence	Unequal distribution of resource riches (Abundance)	
Expansionist desires	Patronage	
Islāmic revivalism (ideology)	Youth Unemployment	
Nigeria (Insider)	Climate change (***Resource scarcity***)	
	Pre-existing conflicts	
	Violent Democracies/ Authoritarian-democracies	
	Glocality (transnational actors)	
	Organised criminality	
	Salafi–Jihādi (justice-seeking efforts for restoration)	
	Overlapping socio-histographies (Nigeria-Chad)	

Source: Prepared by Author (2023).

Figure 21: Second Variance, From Within

Independent Variable Variable	**Conditions**	***Dependent***
'causes' →	*'amplifiers'* →	*'outcome'*
Emergence Stage	***Coalescence State***	***Bureaucratization Stage***
Pre-existing societal fragments	Limited Statehood	Glocal Separatist –efforts
Coloniality	Poverty	Violence on gas-regions
Regional Inequality (South vs North)	Illiteracy	Salafi–Jihādi in Cabo Delgado
Societal marginalisation	Poor Governance	***Glocality in Mozambique***
Regional Inequalities 'reinforced'	Ethnic resentments	(***Occurring Within)***
Economic malperformance	Youth unemployment	
Exported Islāmic activism	Past-in-the-Present (A Forgotten Cape)	
Mozambique's socio-histographies	Resource discoveries (***Resource abundance***)	
(From Within)	Forced removals (without compensation)	
	Unequal distribution of resource-riches	
	Oil-exploration companies (without job creations)	
	Patronage	
	Radical foreign clerics	
	Climatological factors	
	Organised criminality	
	Illicit mining	
	Trafficking (humans & drugs)	
	Transnational Jihādists (sympathisers)	
	Private Military Groups	
Salafi–Jihādi (justice-seeking efforts for an alternative government)		

Source: Prepared by Author (2023).

5.3.2 Research Findings

'What the Greed vs Grievance Theory Might Have Missed?'

Preliminary findings show that African resource-rich countries have become incubators for Salafi–Jihādi movements where 'glocality' occurs in the form of violent extremism. The study paid particular attention towards Chad and northern Mozambique where it inferred that

violent extremists direct militancy towards secularism, corruption, other religious societies and perceived injustices that can be traced back to coloniality. Religious fundamentalists continue to manipulate religious ideologies to not only justify their violent extremist movements, but to recruit, indoctrinate and radicalise individuals into violent sects, either voluntarily or forcefully (Segell, Kostelyanets & Solomon, 2021, p. 189). Thus, the strength that also serves as a weakness of Salafi–Jihādi lies in its ability to be manipulated to promise radical societal transformations that appear as 'justice-seeking-efforts'.

Findings made another point evident that links natural resources, ideology and extremist groups. It is fair to link Salafi–Jihādi extremist organisations such as Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna to natural-resources. Various studies (Murphy, 2017; Omenma, 2019; Els & Chelin, 2021; Githing'u & Hamming, 2021; Hoinathy & Tayo, 2022) underscore that these extremist organisations have been waging their terrors strategically towards resource rich communities. Salafi–Jihādi has been used to justify 'justice-seeking-efforts' so to have equal benefits ('likens the grievance'), or contest to access, if not control over resources ('likens the greed'). This trend shows the confluence between resources, ideology and extremist groups in Africa. Several attacks by extremist groups towards southern Chad (oil-producing Doba Basin) and northern Mozambique (gas-producing Palma) justified through Salafi–Jihādi suggests that an 'interface' between ideology, extremist groups and natural resource exists.

Another finding reveals that Salafi–Jihādi movements flourish where *'state fragility'* exists. Governments without stable governance, institutions, mired-up in corruption creates power vacuum that allows Salafi–Jihādi groups to recruit, set training camps and spread further afield. Poor governance and limited statehood have created grounds for Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Chad and Mozambique. Indeed, porous borders, corruption, government patronage, underdevelopment and unimplementable climate change policies fuelled violent extremism in these localities driving Salafi–Jihādi's armed conflict apparatus.

A prime finding thus was the nature of *equifinality*. This study happened upon the essence of equifinality where different paths lead to the same outcome variable–'Salafi–Jihādi extremism' (Hunter, Doctor, Allen & Ligon, 2023, p. 37). Findings attest to these facts: while northern Mozambique indicates that Salafi–Jihādi extremism can occur due to internal societal challenges, Chad shows the possibilities that Salafi–Jihādi extremism might occur due to butterfly effects owing to manifold-overlapping conditions (Figure 22 and 23). Such findings indicate that conflict dynamics are constantly changing due to complexities and fluidities. Thus the need to understand Salafi–Jihādi extremism as a movement that breaks out from complex factors that are frantic has been an issue that cuts across all the chapters.

Judging on the above-stated findings, it is fair to assume that the greed-grievance theory falls short in explaining the complexities and fluidities of the ongoing armed conflicts in Africa, and in particular, Chad and Mozambique. Research findings add into the equation that the 'greed-grievance theory' would have trapped most of the salient causal variables to the outcome variable–Salafi–Jihādi movements including the role of ideology, colonial continuities, climate change, poor governance, limited statehood and porous borders. Using the social movement theory that understands violent conflicts as social phenomenon that occurs due to complexities led the study to uncover diverse factors that range from the micro (domestic), the meso (in-between local and global) to macro level (global). Owing to the interplay of these fluid factors, local extremist conflicts have turned into glocal Salafi–Jihādi movements in Africa, as it has happened with Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique and Boko Haram across the Lake Chad region. A conclusion that can be drawn from these trends is that Africa is witnessing a drastic change in conflict dynamics, a change that is explainable as 'glocality' which the 'greed-grievance theory' falls short in explaining.

5.4 Limitations of the Study and Avenues for Further Research

This research report faced three limitations: First, this study emerged seeking to explore contemporaneous intrastate African conflicts, with special reference to violent extremism. Such an exclusionary focus meant that this study is limited to *Islamist violent extremist conflicts* in Africa. Second, researching on Salafi–Jihādi , the trafficking of natural resources, and violent extremism is a sensitive enterprise, as it "potentially poses a substantial threat to those who are or have been involved in it" (Lee, 1993, p.4), thus a decision was made to undertake a qualitative desktop research. Such a research methodology and design limited the study as it relies on existing secondary data. Third, this research report was limited to the cases of Chad and Mozambique in understanding Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa. Several countries within Africa's regions face the hardest trails of violent extremism (Vasiliev, 2021, p. 5). Yet this research report placed its focus within the Sahel and southern Africa region. Whilst its Small-N design gave the study some explanatory power, it has neglected other African countries battling with Salafi–Jihādi such as Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Berkina Faso among others.

In spite of these shortcomings that emerge from research methodology and designs, the findings from this research report suggests for one major methodological avenue for further research: Upcoming studies should put more focus on the research designs when studying the changing patterns of conflict and Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa. Avenues for further research lies on opportunities that arise in adopting a methodological mixology of 'Large-N' and 'Small-N studies' which could increase the data and the explanatory reach of research

projects attempting to understand variables that allow for the proliferation of Salafi–Jihādi extremism in sub-Saharan Africa. Further research that adopts this mixology stand a better chance of exposing hidden 'variables' that cut across regions within the continent and have allowed sub-Saharan Africa to become a 'global epicentre of Salafi–Jihādi extremism'. Further research could use Large-N design to quantify 'other hidden' casual variables in countries battling with Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Africa, while Small-N designs could be employed to provide extensive comparative discussion on the identified 'variables' at play where Salafi–Jihādi extremism is present. Understanding complex 'multifold' variables present during Salafi–Jihādi movements across African regions could not only provide knowledge reservoirs but could also construct diagnostic reservoirs crucial for 'African Solutions to African Problems'.

5.5 Recommendations: People, Politics and Progress?

As it appears, various countries in Africa including Chad and Mozambique have fallen into the 'Salafi–Jihādi extremism trap'. To escape this maleficence, the research report makes the following recommendations:

Of People – Youth Empowerment: often viewed as being part of the problem, involving the youth in countering Islamist violent extremism (CIVE) can enhance strategies aimed at curbing expansion of Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Chad and Mozambique. Curbing the proliferation of Salafi–Jihādi within these democracies requires both governments to adopt and support 'two-way' engagements where voices of the youth are taken into consideration. Thus, developing national frameworks for youth opportunities and engagement in issues of peace and security could ensure that youth radicalisation into Islāmic fundamentalism is limited. Relatedly, the study recommends that Chad and Mozambique prioritise 'youth investments' that can feed into job and skill creation for their communities, especially, youth constituencies. Allocating funds that could create economic opportunities for the youth so to reduce grievances should be priority. Thus amplifying voices and prospects for the youth should be prioritised as this reduces recruitment grounds for Salafi–Jihādi extremist groups.

Of Politics – Governance: a turnaround strategy based on the principles of good governance can feed into forward-looking strategies that could curb the malfeasance of Salafi–Jihādi within the democracies of Chad and Mozambique. The study recommends the following to Chad as far as governance is concerned: (1) the country should address and securitise issues of porous borders; (2) address institutionalised corruption and (3) limited statehood; (4) securitise climate change and resource scarcity. Recommendations made to Mozambique incudes: (1) FRELIMO should address limited statehood in Cabo Delgado province; (2)

address challenges around endemic corruption; (3) prioritise governance of natural resource and equal distribution of these resources; (4) prioritise human development outcomes to build resilience.

Of Progress – Dismantling Colonial Continuities[60]: a necessary prerequisite for sustainable peace in African countries battling with Salafi–Jihādi is to consider ways that strive for dismantling colonial continuities. The study recommends that Chad should ensure that France limits its political and military presences so to ensure postcolonial progress. The study also recommends that Mozambique dismantles political, economic and societal exclusions of those in northern Mozambique because these exclusions fund the justice-seeking movement in Cabo Delgado. Another recommendation that this study makes which serves as lessons for Nigeria and Mozambique is that both countries facilitate programmes that encourages religious coexistence to prevent future radicalisation and recruitment, as shown in Chad (Dickow, 2022).

5.6 'The Epilogue?' Closing Remarks

This inquest broke out from the epistemic need to understand the role of ideology in starting, perpetuating and sustaining conflict in resource-rich states. Thus, this research was tailored around the interface between natural resources, ideology and extremist groups (Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna) since 2009. Using the cases of Chad and Mozambique, the study finds that Salafi–Jihādi either funds expansionist conflicts or separatist conflicts. A very important common 'variable' that the study has found is that the absence of 'governance' be it in the form of limited statehood or porous borders created grounds for Salafi–Jihādi extremism in Chad and Mozambique. The power vacuum provided Ansar al-Sunna and Boko Haram grounds to recruit, indoctrinate and drive their Salafi–Jihādi movement in Mozambique and Chad. Whilst Chad's porous borders allowed Boko Haram's expansionism into its communities, Mozambique's limited statehood within the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado created grounds for Ansar al-Sunna's Salafi–Jihādi extremism. However, several case specific 'variables' along religious ideologies have led to the observable societal movement–Salafi–Jihādi extremism. While the eventualities of the expanding Salafi–Jihādi movement continues to threaten human security of many African countries, they remain a reality to some African democracies (Segell, Kostelyanets & Solomon, 2021, p.185).

[60] 'Dismantling Colonial Continuities' is a phrase adopted from Sidiropoulos and Zicina's (2023, p.11) work on International Reform.

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