

**A Study of African and Western Epistemic Intuitions and
Implications for Decolonisation**

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degree of Doctor of Philosophy.**

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several overlapping, fluid strokes that form a cursive, somewhat abstract representation of the name.

Nolwandle Ayanda Lembethe

Dedications

To Enhle Lembethe

For teaching me kindness, patience and fortitude.

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Abstract

Discussions surrounding decolonisation in academic spaces in South Africa took a turn in 2015 when student protests forced the academy or academic landscape to revisit its relationship with Eurocentrism. This had far reaching consequences, as institutions of higher learning began to interrogate different aspects of academic culture including knowledge production. My thesis looks at decolonisation from an epistemic lens by principally interrogating the use of epistemic intuitions and their relevance to the decolonisation project. By examining experimental philosophy as a methodology, my research provides some meaningful ways in which we can broaden our understanding and use of epistemic intuitions. I draw on different ways scholars in feminist theory have extrapolated methods from lived experiences and epistemic standpoints of epistemically marginalised groups to point out the marginalizing nature of experimental philosophy. The contribution that my thesis makes to knowledge then is that it helps to show how and why experimental philosophy should be made more inclusive to worldviews that have been otherwise marginalised by dominant research methods.

Table of Contents

<i>Introduction</i>	<i>8</i>
Decolonialisation and Africanisation.....	8
Epistemology	10
Knowledge, Intuition and Africanisation	12
Outline of Chapters	15
References	17
<i>Chapter One.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Decolonisation and Africanisation</i>	<i>18</i>
Introduction.....	18
Fees Must Fall: Two Weeks in October 2015	18
Phases of the Colonial Epistemic Legacy	20
Decolonising the Mind: A Move From the Centre.....	22
Decolonisation as a Process of Africanisation.....	26
Conclusion	29
References	30
<i>Chapter Two.....</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Intuitions, Experimental Philosophy and Decolonisation</i>	<i>32</i>
Introduction.....	32
Justified True Belief.....	32
Reflective and Intuitive Judgements	32
Experimental Philosophy.....	35
Critique of Experimental Philosophy.....	40
Intuitions and Decolonisation	41
Conclusion	43
References	44
<i>Chapter Three</i>	<i>46</i>
<i>Research Findings.....</i>	<i>46</i>
Introduction.....	46
Data Collection	46
Methodology.....	46
Results	48
Age	48
Education	49
Ethnicity.....	49

Socio-economic Factors.....	50
Limitations of my Research	51
References	52
Chapter Four	53
<i>Interrogating Science and Methodology.....</i>	53
Introduction.....	53
The Universality Theory	53
Conceptual Engineering.....	55
The Problem of the Cataloguer	56
Conceptual Engineering: De Novo or Re-engineered Epistemology	60
Conclusion	63
References	64
Chapter Five	66
<i>Re-imagining Methods in Experimental Philosophy.....</i>	66
Introduction.....	66
Method, Methodology and Paradigms	66
A Move From the Positivism Paradigm	67
Sensuous Knowledge.....	69
Black Feminist Epistemology	69
Standpoint Theory and Strong Objectivity	72
Indigenous Knowledge Systems	73
Conclusion	76
References	77
Conclusion.....	79
References	83
<i>Bibliography</i>	84
<i>Appendix 1</i>	90

Introduction

Having seen the ways in which the real-world impacts on our epistemic judgements, I became motivated to do some research on the ways in which we reach those epistemic judgements. My curiosity is more about the ways we make knowledge claims about the world around us, especially in the decolonisation space. The need to decolonise has moved from discussions to practice, and in doing so we need to find methods and methodologies that will be inclusive to the changing environment.

Decolonisation can be understood as process of decentralising Eurocentric knowledge systems and creating spaces that symbiotically feed into epistemic reservoirs from worldviews that would otherwise have no epistemic credibility. In the process of decentring Eurocentric epistemologies, Africanisation can be viewed as an injection of African perspectives that would bring to light epistemologies that have been side-lined or entirely exterminated. The re-introduction of these epistemologies could foster a renewed sense of belonging and decrease alienation amongst scholars and students within institutions of higher learning.

The positivist tradition and by extension, colonisation created a system on which the only credible ways of knowing are those that are deemed valuable to the scientific community. Under the guise of objectivity, the scientific method has given epistemic superiority only to claims that fit the dominant narrative. As such, methodologies that have been deemed neutral have been utilised in research that has real world consequences for those it does not include.

In the following section, I will present an introductory discussion into decolonisation, Africanisation and the correlation to epistemic intuitions. I will look at how epistemology has generally been understood, I will conclude by giving an overview of the structure of my thesis.

Decolonialisation and Africanisation

Decolonisation has become a buzzword that has gained more traction in recent years newly spurred on by the “fees must fall” movement of 2015 where students from various universities in South Africa protested for a number of reasons, among them being the high cost of tertiary education, the curriculum which they felt alienated them and also campus spaces that still revered colonial powers with their statues being on display on university and college campuses.

According to Oelofsen (2015), decolonisation is the process of change that colonised countries undergo upon gaining freedom from their colonisers. In an epistemological sense, decolonisation can be seen as a process of removing hegemonic colonial epistemologies that impinge on the inclusion of minority members formally not epistemically recognised by university institutions. These are members of society formally colonised and marginalised from access to resources and opportunities to participate in knowledge production. Because the main mandate of colonisation is to propagate the superiority of the coloniser, and promote the destruction of ‘native’ epistemologies and ontologies, decolonisation aims to redress the injustice suffered by those who have historically been excluded.

Decolonisation calls on modern day tertiary institutions to confront certain legacies of the past that heralded themselves as superior to others. Decolonisation especially of institutions of higher education challenges what should be considered knowledge and the tools that are used in knowledge production. It also challenges the normative idea that knowledge claims can only be made sense of through the Western lens.

In a sense, decolonisation aims to centre the African experience in much the same way as Afrocentricity has done. By definition, Afrocentricity aims to “[reposition] the African person and African reality from the margins of European thought, attitude, and doctrines, to a centered, therefore positively located, place within the realms of science and culture” (Appiah and Gates, 2010: 66). Even though Afrocentricity centers African agency, it does not aim to hold any superior position to any other lived experience:

Afrocentrics have expressed no interest in one race or culture dominating another; they express an ardent belief in the possibility of diverse populations living on the same earth without giving up their fundamental traditions, except where those traditions invade other people’s space” (Appiah and Gates, 2010: 70).

From the Afrocentric perspective comes Africology, the study of African phenomena from an Afrocentric perspective (Conyers, 2004: 640). By looking at the way of life in the past and present and learning from those phenomena that defined African existence, we can begin to compose a picture of African ontology and epistemology where the lived experiences of Africans are centered. Studies that have had a deliberate focus on African experiences have commonly not been taken as rigorous enough to be taken as a discipline on their own. There is

a push back to “examining African culture from an Afrocentric perspective as well as the approach of understanding African phenomena using alternative research tools of content analysis to measure culture and the retention and survival of culture under the scope of Africology” (Conyers, 2004: 648). This reluctance stems from the hegemonic centering of Eurocentric perspectives within disciplines and institutions of higher learning.

Africanisation then becomes the process of infusing African epistemologies and ontologies into curricular in higher institutions. It is the process of easing the alienation that both students and staff experience through measures where they can see themselves represented as valid knowers and valid producers of knowledge. The work being done here is one where we decolonise in order to Africanise, we remove that which is foreign and replace it with that which is familiar. It is a deliberate effort in Africology, to engage with African phenomena from an Afrocentric perspective.

Epistemology

Epistemology is the study of knowledge; it is the search for a universal truth principle. Epistemology is the search for the nature of knowledge, i.e., what it means to know something and extent of knowledge, or how much we can say we know, if anything at all. There are three kinds of knowledge; the first being procedural knowledge, or “know-how”, for example knowing how to type, or drive a car. The second kind of knowledge is knowledge of acquaintance. This is knowledge of familiarity – for example, you know your neighbour. The third kind is propositional knowledge: “a proposition is something that can be expressed by a declarative sentence, and which purports to describe a fact or a state of affairs, such as dogs are mammals, $2+2=7$ ”. Statements that are declarative do not have to be true (for example, $2+2=7$), but rather propositional (Truncellito 2012).

Propositional knowledge will be the main aim of my study. There are two types of propositional knowledge, namely non-empirical or a priori knowledge that does not require any prior experience, and empirical knowledge or a posteriori knowledge which can only be knowable with experience. A priori knowledge would include “knowledge of abstract claims (such as ethical claims and or claims about various conceptual matters” and a posteriori knowledge would be knowledge of “colour or a shape of a physical object” (Truncellito 2012). Epistemology aims to find out what the nature of propositional knowledge is and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be met for one to *know* something. Traditionally,

epistemology has had three conditions for propositional knowledge, namely justification, truth and belief. These three conditions, commonly referred to as JTB, have largely been taken to be both necessary and sufficient for a proposition to count as knowledge.

Belief as a condition for knowledge is necessary because “if one has no belief about a particular matter, one cannot have knowledge about it” (Truncellito 2012). I can have the belief that my friend Lerato has bought a new red car, this belief must be part of my knowledge base, but it does not necessarily mean it is true. This leads to the second condition of knowledge, which involves that truth is our correlation of the outside world and our inner mental state. We want to think what we hold in our inner mental states is in fact what is true in the world outside of our mind. For a belief to be knowledge it must also meet the truth condition. If we say that there is no such thing as truth, as sceptics do, then it implies that there is no such thing as knowledge. If I have a belief that Lerato bought a new red car, in order for that proposition to be knowledge, it must be true. In order to ensure a proposition is knowledge “it must be arrived at the right way” (Truncellito 2012) or justified. Knowledge acquisition must utilise sound reasoning and solid evidence. Justification is both necessary and sufficient, for if I have sound reasons or solid evidence (I have seen Lerato’s new red car) for believing that Lerato has in fact bought a new red car, then it can be said that I have *knowledge* that Lerato has bought a new car.

How knowledge is validated, however, is tainted with the colonial past, because science and knowledge from the West is taken as the only gospel, with no need or desire to include any other methods. In 2015, a student from the University of Cape Town, South Africa made a startling proclamation for the decolonisation of science. This claim was met with ridicule, if not outright dismay. Western science, as it is known in institutions of higher education, is seen as an infallible theory that is universal and necessarily the same everywhere all the time. The truths of science are taken as law and as such cannot be removed of any undue influences, or infused with any African episteme. However, it is precisely this notion of the universality of science that necessitates the call to decolonise it, for if scientific and mathematical principles are necessarily universal and everywhere all the time, then it goes without saying that conceptually those scientific principles existed before colonialism. It is taken for granted that it was colonialism that introduced scientific principles to African epistemologies. However, it is my contention that scientific conceptual principles existed in pre-colonial times; for if they did not, that would imply the cosmic impossibility of the laws of nature not existing in Africa

until the advent of colonialism. Conceptually, mathematical and scientific principles existed within language and as such within society. Conceptually, African epistemologies had an understanding of numeracy, and as such it is a fallacy to imply the non-existence of mathematical concepts within African cultures.

Our reliance on science and the empirical method has created a void for the possibility of other methods of enquiry being valid. This influences how the epistemic process and institutions of learning give the green light to certain epistemes. If the scientific method is to be incorporated into epistemology it needs to take heed not to inadvertently incorporate colonial nostalgia into the fray. As such, epistemology needs to conceptually re-engineer itself in such a way that Africanisation and decolonisation are taken seriously.

Knowledge, Intuition and Africanisation

Propositional knowledge that meets the JTB criteria is taken to be true everywhere, all the time, sufficiently and necessarily, in much the same way as mathematical and scientific principles are taken. If the main concern of epistemology is the search for absolute truth, that truth cannot only be true sometimes, but it must be true always and everywhere. The idea of decolonising or Africanising epistemology then becomes problematic; for if propositional knowledge is a universal fact, how is it to be particularised? Kai Horsthemke is of the view that although education can be Africanised, knowledge cannot, since education is the production and dissemination of knowledge, whilst knowledge must be “anchored objectively by the truth condition [and] what may be relative is the justification required or expected” (Horsthemke 2004, 583). For Horsthemke, procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance can be Africanised, but Africanised propositional knowledge would imply truth is relative – and that in itself is problematic, for “truth is neither a matter of personal belief nor of social or cultural consensus” (Horsthemke 2004, 584). Africanisation of knowledge and the Africanisation of education must be considered separately, for to argue that Africans have different intuitions about knowledge would imply that there are many truths that are relative only to Africans. If this is the case, then knowledge is not possible, for knowledge is a search for a single truth.

Africanisation understood in this way is to miss the crux of decolonisation. The dispute is not with propositional knowledge, but rather with the ways in which propositional knowledge is arrived at. Propositional knowledge’s search for truth, therefore, it is not the issue, the issue, however, is how the search for truth is executed. Horsthemke claims that although the

justification condition can be Africanised, truth cannot. However, it is my contention that Africanisation is the recognition that African epistemologies have been systemically excluded, and what we understand as truth has therefore been arrived at improperly. In other words, propositional knowledge as it is traditionally taken, has been short-changed by the lack of inclusion of other epistemologies. As such, it is not only the dissemination of knowledge that needs to be Africanised and decolonised, but also notions of what we consider epistemic truths. By crippling certain epistemologies and elevating others, truth has in effect been compromised. Approaches and “projects in African philosophy have as their aim the restoration of health lost in the colonial heritage of violent oppression and exploitation, through exploring truths articulated within the context of Africa” (Oelofsen 2015, 135). What this essentially also means, is that there is one truth which we are all looking for, and that the idea that there are Western truths is as false as the idea that there are African truths. However, there are contexts in which the idea of what Oelofsen has called *philosophy-in-place*, or philosophy “from my place, my context, and my phenomenal world [or attentiveness] to particular situations and contexts can bring to light universals, a new way of looking at concepts” (Oelofsen 2015, 139). Oelofsen has called this the philosophy of healing, where “the methodology is to start from the individual’s particular place.” (ibid.)

The aim of my research is to understand to what extent decolonisation and Africanisation can contribute towards our understanding of propositional knowledge, especially regarding the use of epistemic intuitions. Intuitions can be defined as “processes that take place inside individuals without being controlled by them ... without the individual’s attending to what justifies this modification” (Nagel 2012, 498). By this definition, “epistemic intuitions are the basic source of evidence concerning our epistemic concepts [of knowledge]” (Nagel 2007, 802). When we judge a truth claim to be valid, part of our reasoning process is intuitive, in that we make snap judgements regarding the validity of certain propositions. One example of the use of intuitions was provided by Edmund Gettier, when he challenged the validity of JTB as knowledge. Gettier used thought experiments to dispel the relevance of JTB. One such thought experiment is the Smith and Jones case:

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e) and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.

But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job. (Gettier 1963, 121)

From the above example (to which I will refer as the Gettier case) it is clear how, intuitively, (d) is false, although Smith is justified in believing it. The Gettier case brought into disrepute the use of JTB in epistemology, and legitimised the use of intuitions as tools for the attainment of knowledge. Jonathon Weinberg, among others, think that using intuitions as a normative standard is false and erroneous, and that intuitions are diverse and differ according to the variables at one's disposal. According to Weinberg *et al.*, one's socio-economic standing, ethnicity and nationality – amongst other things – can affect how one uses their epistemic intuitions; and if intuitions are diverse, then the use of intuitions becomes redundant in the search for truth.

As a methodology, experimental philosophy has the potential to assist philosophical enquiry by tapping into the lived experiences of those who have been traditionally marginalized. This can be done by allowing those knowers to be active participants within knowledge production. Although x-phi is not traditionally viewed as a philosophical methodology, and it is a relatively new method within philosophy, x-phi can lend itself to conceptual analysis in a deeper way

through data collection and analysis. The conceptual philosopher, according to Knobe and Nichols,

toils to put together his set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept of interest, let's say pencil. But then, when he presents his results, it inevitably happens that some guy in the back of the room gives an example of an object that meets all the conditions but isn't a pencil. This sends the philosopher back to his study to make some adjustments in his definition" (Knobe and Nichols, 2008: 4)

Where a conceptual philosopher would rely on their intuitive process, an x-phi philosopher would rely on responses from participants and data. X-phi (as I will be using it) does not aim to do away with conceptual analysis. And as Knobe and Nichols put it "no one is suggesting that we boot out all of the moral philosophers and replace them with experimentalists, nor is anyone suggesting that we do away with any of the methods that have traditionally been used for figuring out whether people's intuitions truly are right or wrong. What we are proposing is just to add another tool to the philosopher's toolbox" (Knobe and Nichols, 2008: 10).

Outline of Chapters

My research aims to investigate how we use epistemic intuitions, and to find out whether or not African intuitions differ from those of Westerners; and if they do, what that will mean for decolonisation, and more specifically the decolonisation of the curriculum.

I will begin the discussion with an introduction, where I will give an account of the events in 2015 that gave rise to the Fees Must Fall Movement, which led to a renewed interest in decolonisation. In chapter one I will discuss the colonial epistemic legacy which saw the rise of Western pedagogy within the intellectual spaces of what we now regard as academia. Through the works done by those intellectuals within those spaces, we see how the predecessors of decolonisation brought the conversation to where we are now. I will conclude the chapter with an account of decolonisation as a process of Africanisation.

Chapter two will delve deeper into the role of epistemic intuitions within epistemology. I will discuss how justified true beliefs have played a pivotal role in understanding epistemic intuitions. I will then shift the discussion to experimental philosophy (x-phi) and the critiques x-phi has levelled against the strict use of intuitions in philosophical enquiry. The dialogue will start with the works of Weinberg *et al.* on how the first experimental study has been undertaken,

and the replication studies that followed. It is my intention to also replicate the initial Weinberg *et al.* study, as it has been done with a focus on testing their initial 5 variables, i.e. socio-economic status, age, gender, education level, and ethnicity.

Chapter three will outline my research findings using the same research methods as Weinberg *et al.* I will test the epistemic intuitions of South Africans to find out if there are any pronounced differences in the way we use epistemic intuitions against those of Westerners from the Weinberg *et al.* study. I will end this chapter with a look at whether or not the methodology used by Weinberg *et al.* and x-phi in general is sufficient and inclusive.

Chapter four will focus on whether the methodology currently employed by x-phi (i.e., surveys) is sufficiently nuanced to capture the epistemic intuitions of those not commonly included within epistemology. I will question the use of the language that is used in the survey, and show that there is a possibility that the English language is not as easily cross-translatable into other languages. I will argue that epistemology needs to be reconceptualised to be more inclusive not only with the use of language but also by taking into consideration how the experiences of those in the periphery are excluded. I will contend that the use and reliance on the scientific method – and by extension technology – in x-phi is in itself exclusionary, as these tools tend to be biased.

Chapter five aims to reimagine ways in which x-phi can create more inclusive methods and methodologies. By taking into account the lived experiences of those that are marginalised by the epistemic process of knowledge production, epistemology and epistemic intuitions can gain more insight into a different perspective that has commonly been ignored. By using indigenous knowledge systems we can come to a better compromise for using scientific tools in a way that is inclusive, and more importantly, takes into account the methods, paradigms and methodologies of those previously not included in the scientific method and epistemic validation process.

I will conclude by proposing a way forward for x-phi, and I will examine ways in which x-phi can salvage some credibility and work with those it commonly excludes through digital literacy and use of the scientific method. I will also discuss ways that x-phi can create space for many knowers.

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Chapter One

Decolonisation and Africanisation

Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to give the reader insight into the conversation around decolonisation. I will first begin by looking at the Fees Must Fall Movement, which was a turning point in the decolonisation project in South Africa. I will then discuss the phases of the colonial legacy which is a discussion specifically around the evolution of the African university during colonialism and post-colonisation. Following that, I will give an account of decolonisation from the perspective of Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong'o, leading up to a discussion on differing perspectives of what decolonisation is according to Jonathan Jansen. I will conclude the chapter by giving an account of decolonisation as a process of Africanisation and what that process may entail.

Fees Must Fall: Two Weeks in October 2015

In October of 2015, the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) announced a 10.5% fee increase in tuition for 2016, which generated widespread protest action from students at Wits and around the country. Students from around the country began calling for free education, and mobilised a movement that has been referred to as #FeesMustFall (#FMF). Around the same time as the fee increase protests, students from the University of Cape Town (UCT) had been engaged in protest action surrounding a Cecil Rhodes statue on the university premises, challenging its significance in a postcolonial, post-apartheid South Africa. This became popularly known as #RhodesMustFall (#RMF). #RMF became a significant turn of events for South African universities, as it was the beginning of what Susan Booysen has termed “fallism”, which “should be understood as the reinvigorated process in which the decolonisation project has been renewed in the higher education system and in society at large” (Booyesen 2016, 58). Fallism challenged the status quo of society and spoke to the intersectionalities of oppression within society. According to Booysen, “fallism engages and deconstructs what Anibal Quijano describes as the colonial matrix of power which speaks to the control and colonality of interrelated domains: the economy, gender and sexuality, knowledge and subjectivity, and authority” (ibid). Fallism challenged the 1994 fallacy of an equal South Africa. Fallism became a process of redressing the injustices of the past and the realisation that “the 1994 settlement was just the opening of a door and not an achievement in its own right” (Booyesen 2016, 23). Fallism became a larger conversation, where “students also put on the agenda ownership and

property, and the whiteness and coloniality of much of the character of South African universities” (Booyens 2016, 45). It also challenged what Paul Taylor calls “whiteness”, which “tends to involve a commitment to the centrality of white people and their perspective, the way they see the world is just the way the world is” (Oelofsen 2015, 135). Whiteness normalises the white experience, and the white gaze becomes the only lens through which to view the world. Fallism posited that “a re-imagining of the university structure was not possible without re-imagining the ideological identity of the university” (Booyens 2016, 45).

Fallist movements began to interrogate the injustices of the past and challenged the power structures within universities and society. Feminist ideologies fuelled #PatriarchyMustFall, while #RhodesSoWhite challenged the discrepancies of the racial makeup of institutions of higher learning. Fallism, however, did not begin with the class of 2015, because protests over access to free education have long since plagued Historically Black Institutions (HBI), institutions like Mangosuthu University of Technology (MUT) formerly known as Mangosuthu Technicon, Vaal University of Technology (VUT) and Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), among others. HBIs have a long history of protests against the rising costs of higher education, but it was not until protests took place at Historically White Institutions (HWI) that they gained the most traction. “Fallism brought a discussion that had existed exclusively at historically black institutions of higher learning into the context of historically white institutions” (Godsell & Chikane 2016, 60). The alienation of the students at the HBIs began resonating with students in HWIs, and the lack of access to resources was becoming more apparent to black students in HWIs. The class of 2015 stretched its reach: students were protesting for something bigger than themselves. They were protesting against outsourcing of university workers, access to free education and the alienation of students within their own campuses. Fallism broadened its scope to intersect with class struggles, gender issues, as well as the epistemic alienation of black students. The call to decolonise the university went further than a call to transform the face of universities, as it was to be a complete re-imagining of the intellectual landscape. The demand by the class of 2015 for decolonisation and not the imagined promises of transformation, had the intention of promoting immediate change, as Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh (2016, 84) noted:

Transformation as conceived by the Must Fall movement is largely rejected as a failed project, content with gradual and superficial change. Decolonisation in the context of

the South African academy refers not only to a deeper commitment to eradicating the legacies of colonialism and apartheid, but also eradicating them speedily.

In the following section, the three phases of colonial epistemic legacy and the trajectory that led to the 2015 student revolt will be discussed.

Phases of the Colonial Epistemic Legacy

Fallism is a contemporary reaction to an old problem. Colonial hegemony in epistemic spaces has a long history stemming from the arrival of Europeans on African soil. According to Lynn Hewlett *et al.*, there are three distinct phases of the colonial epistemic legacy. The first phase is the pre-independence and colonial era (1900-1960s). During this period, African epistemologies were eradicated in favour of colonial pedagogy. Eurocentric education policies were used to create an ‘elite’ class of African scholars, who would be used by the colonials in bureaucratic processes. The Francophone and Lusophone colonies assimilated African scholars with the hope of creating “political intermediaries to assist the colony to expand its influence and control” (Hewlett *et al.* 2016, 150). With the systematic eradication of African epistemologies, “education was changed to exhibit the foreign ideology of its coloniser, enforcing new form and content and invalidating the existing established forms of African education” (ibid). With the creation of the elite African scholar, who is well versed in colonial culture and language, and the introduction of missionary schools, the colonial project become well established within African society, colonial languages were enforced as mediums of instruction within missionary schools, and served as social currency to buy a place within the upper echelons of society.

The enforcement of colonial hegemony and languages created a disconnect between the newly-minted African intellectual, and colonial pedagogy. The African scholar began to re-value their place within the established colonial standpoint and began to revolt against it. This marks the second phase of the colonial epistemic legacy, the Nationalist/Post-independence Era (1960-1980s). After World War II, African scholars who had been sent abroad to study at European institutions began to question the validity as well as the hegemonic superiority of European institutions. With the advent of colonial independence in many African states, the African scholars began instilling pride in the validity of African epistemologies. Through Pan Africanism, the African states began the process of self-determination and the African scholars began to mould an African identity that would redefine their narrative. The second-phase

intellectual would “change the Eurocentric perspective in education and decolonise minds” (Hewlett *et al.* 2016, 153). These intellectuals were nationalistic in their approach, as emphasis was placed on the African scholars lived existence in relation to the colonial experience. This phase saw the emergence of nationalistic intellectuals, such as the likes of Léopold Sédar Senghor’s Negritude, the articulation of Kwame Nkrumah Consciencism, Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness and Molefi Asante’s Afrocentrism.

Higher education became a beacon of self-expression for students and intellectuals, as the second-phase intellectuals bridged the knowledge and skills gap left by the colonial exodus (Hewlett *et al.* 2016, 153). As such, access to higher education gave those privileged enough a higher social standing. However, by the 1970s and 1980s steady economic decline in newly independent African countries lead to brain drain within institutions, and university fees were on the rise while infrastructure and resources were declining. This brought students closer to the lived realities of everyday Africans, as students began to make demands on their governments for better and easier access to education, thus prompting students to become political actors. The university institution became more than a place for the acquisition of knowledge: it became a tool for societal critique.

The second-phase university was more focused on external critique of policies and global concerns (such as apartheid, the cold war etc.), rather than an internal critique of the institution itself. This situation did not change until the likes of Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o came along and critiqued the extensive use of colonial languages within African universities and who challenged university institutions internally.

The third phase is the Neo-liberal and “Democratic” period (1980-present). This phase is marked by expansive globalisation, contemporary issues such as increasing poverty, inequality, and privatisation of institutions. Elitism and exclusive access to institutions of higher learning still plagued universities, but this phase is also marked by intersectional demands and diversity in leadership. While the second phase was dominated by men, the third phase strives for gender equality; this phase recognises their strife alongside the needs of those that are marginalised within society. This phase of student protest uses globalisation as a means to an end and utilises technology to its advantage. Yet, in the face of global issues, this phase also critiques internal issues within universities, such as unequal access to education, lack of diversity and

representation within universities and the intersectionalities of class and race which saw students mobilise in solidarity with outsourced university workers.

What took place in the first phase, was the systematic epistemic genocide of African knowledge systems; the second phase was an important renaissance phase that attempted to reclaim and revive African epistemologies and legacies; and the third phase is one of radical transformation, where the African experience is validated within institutions of higher education. The student protests of 2015 are a third-phase movement that demand tangible change. The movement, however, is based on the blueprint of second-phase nationalists such as Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong'o, Steve Biko and Franz Fanon.

The section below will focus on one such second-phase intellectual, Wa Thiong'o, who was one of the few second-phase intellectuals to critically evaluate institutions of higher learning internally. He modelled what in effect would become the project of decolonisation, by suggesting that the epistemic centre needs to be shifted from Euro-America and incorporate marginalised epistemologies and particularities that need to start playing an active role in epistemology.

[Decolonising the Mind: A Move From the Centre](#)

Fallism is the revival of the decolonisation project that was started by Wa Thiong'o (Booyesen, 2016). In his seminal book, *Decolonising the Mind*, Wa Thiong'o challenges the way in which African languages are marginalised within African universities, and how institutions of higher learning have accepted English as the *de facto* language of university education. In 1962, Wa Thiong'o was invited to attend *A Conference of African Writers of English Expression* as a student at Makerere University College in Uganda. What became evident to him at the time, was how the conference would marginalise those who wrote in African languages, irrespective of their proficiency in writing. The question of the use of English within African literature was debated along with the question of what African literature was. Was African literature about the language it is written in, or was it simply a collection of African experiences? For Chinua Achebe, English was the best, and possibly only language he had to write in, and as such, he intended to use it to the best of his ability whilst trying to figure out how “to make the borrowed tongues carry the weight of our African experience by, for instance, making them ‘prey’ on African proverbs and other peculiarities of African speech and folklore” (Wa Thiong'o 1994, 7). This thinking became known as the “fatalistic logic”.

For Wa Thiong'o, the fatalistic logic had greater consequences. Not only did it marginalise African languages, but it also alienated African cultures. Language, as Wa Thiong'o puts it, "has a dual character: it is both a means of communication and a carrier of a culture" (Wa Thiong'o 1994, 13). Colonialism was not only content with the exploitation of its colonies financially, but also "the deliberate undervaluing of a people's culture, their art, dances, religions, history, geography, education, orature and literature, and the conscious elevation of the language of the coloniser" (Wa Thiong'o 1994, 16). The conscious elevation of the colonisers' language as well as their culture had far-reaching ramifications on the representation of the colonised. The colonised began to view themselves as less than the colonisers, and the consequences of the fatalistic logic are still evident today within universities in South Africa. As such, the call to decolonise is just as important now as it was at Makerere in 1962.

Decolonisation can be understood as a process of what Wa Thiong'o calls "moving the centre", or shifting the epistemic centre from a Eurocentric scope to one of plurality. Instead of having one dominant overarching centre, there would be many centres feeding off one another's knowledge base. For Wa Thiong'o, knowledge should be bottom-up, meaning that it stems from the particularities into the universal, from local to global, rather than there being a universal singularity from which all cultures draw from. The idea in universities has been that the accepted universal has been a Eurocentric one, and the "Eurocentric basis of seeing the world has often meant marginalising into the periphery that which comes from the rest of the world" (Wa Thiong'o 1993, 43). Decolonisation aims to move those epistemologies that have been shifted to the periphery closer to the centre, so that those epistemologies may participate effectively within the epistemic process. Moving the centre is not a process of replacing the Eurocentric centre with a particularised centre, but a process of moving those that have been alienated to the margins and periphery into orbit with other dominant epistemologies to create a plurality of centres.

Jonathan Jansen has identified six particular ways in which the decolonisation of the curriculum can take shape. The first is decolonisation as the decentring of European knowledge, which would be an apt description of the process of moving the centre. Wa Thiong'o's call to decolonise the mind can be seen as a challenge to the hegemonic supremacy of European knowledge. Although Jansen likens Wa Thiong'o's project of decolonisation as

the second aspect of decolonisation, namely the Africanisation of knowledge, this categorisation does not seem to fit. Although Wa Thiong'o's project may well be a part of Africanisation, it is primarily a project of decentring of European knowledge as a universal centre of language usage and epistemology.

The second aspect is decolonisation as the Africanisation of knowledge, in which he describes the "hard version of Africanisation", which is what would typically be described as the radical view of Africanisation in which the Eurocentric centre is replaced by an Africanised centre. Here the university curriculum "is and should be about Africans and not about Africans in relation to Europe and the distant West" (Jansen 2017, 160). However, as pointed out by Edwin Etieyibo (and as will be elaborated upon below), Africanisation understood in this radical way is not a view that is dominant in the process of decolonisation. Achille Mbembe describes Wa Thiong'o's decolonial project as a process of Africanisation, claiming that although "Ngũgĩ does not use the term 'Africanisation' he uses the term 'decolonizing' – by which he means not an event that happens once and for all at a given time and place, but an ongoing process of 'seeing ourselves clearly'; emerging out of a state of either blindness or dizziness" (Mbembe 2016, 34). I will be using the term "Africanisation" in a moderate sense, and not in the radicalised sense where one hegemonic centre is replaced by another. Furthermore, I aim to make a distinction between Africanisation and decolonisation, as two distinct processes aiming to meet the same ends. To use the terms "Africanisation" and "decolonisation" interchangeably is to misunderstand their function, especially in relation to the decolonisation of the curriculum.

The third aspect of decolonisation is decolonisation as additive-inclusive knowledge, which Jansen describes as the soft version of decolonisation. Here decolonisation "recognises the value of existing canons of knowledge but asks for recognition of new knowledge and its addition to established curricula" (Jansen 2017, 160). This aspect of decolonisation seems to lean more towards the idea of moderate Africanisation, where existing epistemologies are revised, and an integration of marginalised epistemologies are added to the curriculum. What this aspect fails to do, however, is to critique the relevance of existing canons in the current intellectual climate, instead it passively accepts the status quo with the added compromise of adding other epistemologies.

The fourth aspect is decolonisation as critical engagement with settled knowledge, in which engagement is fostered with existing knowledge bases to attempt to rectify and rethink their

existence within spaces of knowledge. What this aspect brings to the fore is the vital feature of critical engagement. This might seem to be a more acceptable version of moderate Africanisation, where African epistemologies are incorporated into the existing curricula alongside settled knowledge, and the relevance of existing knowledge is interrogated in order to create some semblance of epistemic homeostasis. In a sense, the third and fourth aspects can speak to each other in a meaningful way.

The fifth method of decolonisation is by understanding decolonisation as an encounter with entangled knowledge. Proponents of this form of decolonisation recognise and work within the entanglements that have been experienced by the coloniser and the colonised. Kwame Anthony Appiah would be a sympathiser of this approach, as he stresses the need for African intellectuals to recognise their entanglement within colonial institutions. Appiah (1993, 143) reckons that “Postcolonial intellectuals in Africa ... are almost entirely dependent for their support on two institutions; the African university – and institution whose intellectual life is overwhelmingly constituted as western – and the Euro-American publisher and reader.” Given this, they should work within the perimeters of this entrenchment in order to create a more cosmopolitan outlook. For Appiah (1992, 70) the only way to address the inadequacies of colonisation is to:

First, identify accurately the situation of the modern African text as a product of the colonial encounter (and neither as the simple continuation of an indigenous tradition nor as a mere intrusion from the metropole); second, stress that the continuities between pre-colonial forms of culture and contemporary ones are nevertheless genuine (and thus provide a modality through which students can value and incorporate the African past); and third, challenge directly the assumption of the cultural superiority of the West, both by undermining the aestheticized conceptions of literary value that it presupposes.

The final aspect of decolonisation is the repatriation of occupied knowledge and society. In this method of decolonisation, additive-inclusive is an insult and complete repatriation of knowledge as well as land is given over to the indigenous groups. This aspect can be understood as radical Africanisation, where emphasis is discounted from colonial influences as unwarranted and unnecessary. Against the grain of this form of decolonisation, is Franz Fanon’s critique of national consciousness, where Fanon warns against highly nationalistic outlooks centred on a single identity as that identity falls into the failings of what Appiah calls

“intrinsic racism”, or the notion that there is a “racial essence” upon which identity hinges and it is that essence that sets a particular group apart from the rest. This idea closes off any possibility of a plurality of knowledge, and as such creates group-thinking, in as much as Africanisation implies the incorporation of African ideas and epistemology, it does so critically and cautiously alongside other epistemologies.

The decolonisation project cannot be neatly placed within one of the above-stated aspects. To understand decolonisation in a single vacuum of the above stated is to oversimplify the project of decolonisation. Decolonisation, by one definition, is “the change that colonised countries go through when they become politically independent from their former colonisers” (Oelofsen 2015, 131). By this understanding, to decolonise, is to remove colonial influences from former colonies that are unwarranted or, as Kwasi Wiredu states, that are “undue”. To Africanise is “to make something African” (Etieyibo 2016, 405). If to decolonise the curriculum is to remove undue colonial influences from the curriculum, then to Africanise would be the injection of African influences: “the appropriation, adaption, and incorporation into the curriculum the experiences, practices, beliefs, values, and ways of sub-Saharan Africans” (ibid). In a sense, decolonising should take place in order to Africanise, or as Wa Thiong’o puts it, the weeds should be removed so that many flowers can bloom.

Decolonisation as a Process of Africanisation

As explained above, Africanisation in a moderate sense and not in a radical sense, as described by Jansen, is the process of introducing the curriculum with African thought and experience in a meaningful way. The radical view “requires us to have in the curriculum *only* “African based knowledge paradigms”; that is, knowledge that is sensitive or reflective of the African traditions” (Etieyibo 2016, 405). This view is not plausible and as such is not one which has many advocates. The moderate view is more appealing, as it “requires us to have in the curriculum African-based knowledge paradigms integrated alongside other knowledge paradigms” (ibid). I will be using Africanisation in a moderate rather than radical sense, where Africanisation is understood as the process of integrating African epistemologies within the established curricula alongside other epistemologies, rather than the understanding that the curriculum need only have African epistemologies.

If Africanisation is the process of inclusion of African epistemologies, decolonisation is the process of removing colonial influences that are inadequate to the current intellectual climate.

Mary Carman gives a suitable defence of Wiredu's conceptual decolonisation as a project which "aims to address the way in which foreign concepts and ways of thinking were often uncritically assimilated into African thought and conceptual schemes, largely via the imposition of foreign languages and ways of being onto peoples in Africa as part of colonisation" (Carman 2016, 236). Carman works under the notion of cognitive universals, or "common norms of thought ... such as reflective perception, abstraction, and inference" (ibid). These are universal traits of cognition which facilitate core reflective practices, aiding cross cultural analysis (ibid).

According to Wiredu, concepts are formed through thought and experience, and the colonial experience transferred colonial conceptual schemes to African epistemologies through language, religion and politics. Language translates a concept into society, and a people who share a language, are likely to share the same conceptual schemes, although "not all concepts in language are easily translatable into another language" (Carman 2016, 238). Since colonialism enforced the use of colonial languages, it implies the enforcement of certain colonial concepts, and the destruction of African languages, which entailed the genocide of African concepts. The imposition of colonial languages created linear understanding of conceptual skills, and the isolation and marginalisation of "others", where they exist but are not recognised by institutions of higher education as valid epistemic concepts.

The process of decolonisation is not a process in which colonial influences are entirely eradicated from African institutions. Decolonisation is a redress of past injustices in epistemology, representation of a diversity of concepts, as well as the rectification of spatial injustices within higher institutions, where "[s]patial (in)justice refers to an intentional and focused emphasis on the spatial or geographical aspects of justice and injustice" (Soja 2009, 2). The spaces in which students found themselves inside university campuses did not reflect their lived experiences and as such alienated them from the institutions they inhabit. This "othering" of African students within universities resulted in an angst that led to events such as #RMF, which created a domino effect culminating in the formation of a range of fallist movements. Students of the fallist movements found themselves in environments that discounted their existential relevance and that overemphasised the importance of a colonial legacy that negated the African experience. The defaced Rhodes statue at UCT was a testament to the spatial injustice that students experienced. Space within South Africa at large and at university institutions became a highly contentious issue. Space is a physical manifestation of

a larger issue: the physical spaces that alienate African students at university campuses is a reflection of the epistemologies that also alienate African students.

The need to decolonise the curriculum redresses epistemic injustices that African students face at university institutions. Epistemic injustice is “when someone is wronged in virtue of their capacity as a knower or knowing subject” (Etieyibo 2016, 408). According to Miranda Fricker, there are two kinds of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice: “Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker 2007, 1). This happens when a speaker’s capacity as a knower is undermined by the prejudice of the hearer and “the speaker suffers [by] receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part as is the case when police don’t believe someone because he is black” (Fricker 2007, 4). Hermeneutic injustice is when a person’s “social situation is such that a collective hermeneutical gap prevents them from making sense of an experience which is strongly in their interests to render intelligible” (Fricker 2007, 07). An example is one of women in her workplace in the 1960s who experienced sexual harassment. At that time, sexual harassment was not yet a concept that society had nuanced as a credible experience. Therefore, women did not have the “linguistic tools to make sense of their particular experience” (Etieyibo 2016, 409).

According to Etieyibo, decolonising the curriculum is a moral obligation, and the failure to do so would be perpetuating epistemic injustices. For Etieyibo, hermeneutic injustice is a minimisation of autonomy in a Kantian sense, and as such epistemic injustice “in the context of a non-Africanised philosophy curriculum in universities in Africa ... undercuts the autonomy of Africans” (Etieyibo 2016, 410). A person is only autonomous in as far as “he or she acts according to what he or she takes to be a rational presentation of the way the world is” (ibid). Furthermore, Etieyibo claims that culture plays a key role in the promotion of autonomy, and therefore undermining one’s culture undermines the personal autonomy of a person. Culture is important for the development of self-respect because “there is a deep and broad connection between a person’s self-respect and the respect that is bestowed to the cultural group that he or she belongs to” (Etieyibo 2016, 411). Once a person is prevented from integrating with his/her cultural group in a meaningful way, it undermines that person’s autonomy, thereby making his/her participation in society restricted.

A person's culture is undermined in, at least, three ways. The first is cultural genocide, where a people's culture is destroyed; the second is to prevent people from participating in their cultural practices; and the third is to make a people's culture inferior. If a prerequisite for autonomy is the ability to see the rational representation of the way the world is, then the undermining of a people's culture and restricting their participation in their own culture distorts Africans' view of the way the world is. In a sense, then, "a non-Africanised philosophy curriculum undermines the ability of Africans to make sense of the world due to certain power relations and structural prejudices in the context of knowledge production" (Etieyibo 2016, 412). Having an experience of the world that has been distorted mainly by colonial influences, undermines the autonomy of Africans. This renders the experience of Africans as unintelligible, thus making it difficult for Africans to be epistemic participants.

Another way in which epistemic injustice is committed is through the minimisation of utility, in a utilitarian sense. Utilitarianism is a normative moral theory which aims to promote or maximise utility. In this case, Etieyibo contends that testimonial injustice does not promote utility because a non-Africanised philosophy curriculum gives "a deflated level of credibility to the perspective of Africans or the African tradition" (Etieyibo 2016, 412). Denial of participation of Africans epistemologically deprives society of the human capital of Africans and restricts Africa(n)s participation in the broader world, for "if we take philosophy to be the study of the most fundamental conditions of human existence, values and experiences (objective and subjective) then it is enriched if it includes the African tradition and experiences" (Etieyibo 2016, 413). Etieyibo stresses the need to imbue the philosophy curriculum with African episteme in order to enrich it further. In this way, he is arguing for the *Africanisation* of the curriculum rather than the decolonisation of the curriculum. Of course, there is a symbiotic relationship between the need to decolonise, and the need to Africanise as means to the same ends and not in opposition.

Conclusion

Some scholars, like Jansen, think the project of decolonisation is one of non-sense. According to Jansen, "former white universities, particularly those that identify as liberal, started their transformation of curricular a long time ago" (Jansen 2017, 165). In his view, calls to decolonise undermine the work that certain universities have done in order to make the curriculum more diverse. Moreover, according to Jansen, transforming the curriculum is not an easy process, and "the suggestion that human beings can instantly transform an undesirable

curriculum in order to produce brand new ideals belongs in the realm of science fiction, not serious scholarship” (Jansen 2017, 166). Jansen understands decolonisation as hard Africanisation, with a tinge of nativism where what “the African envisaged is not white or different shades of black. It is unapologetically the black African, to the exclusion of all other South Africans” (ibid). However as argued above, decolonisation is not a project of creating exclusions but rather one of creating inclusion, and as much as certain universities have tried to bring diversity within their curricula, not enough has been done to ensure accurate and fair representation of the nationalities that brand South Africa the rainbow nation it claims to be.

A deeper understanding of the necessity of decolonisation involves looking at colonisation from a more nuanced perspective and understanding how concepts and theories are formed. If decolonisation is understood and a conceptual undoing and redoing as Carman has suggested, then it is worth investigating whether or not cognitive universals apply universally; and if they do, whether that nullifies the claim to the diversity of intuitions made by Weinberg *et al.* For if we reflect, perceive, infer and abstract the same universally, then it is not a far stretch to imagine we intuit the same. In the following chapter, I will take a look at what epistemic intuitions are and how they may differ given differing variables.

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Chapter Two

Intuitions, Experimental Philosophy and Decolonisation

Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to look at how intuitions are viewed in philosophy. This chapter aims to explore what is meant by “intuitions” and how they apply to our understanding of knowledge production. I will begin by investigating how intuitions are traditionally understood in epistemology and how justified true belief (JTB) played a significant role in how knowledge has been viewed. I will then discuss Edmund Gettier’s response to JTB, and how intuitions play a role in what we consider knowledge. This will set the tone for our understanding of epistemic intuitions. I will further focus on reflective and intuitive judgements, leading to a discussion and critique of experimental philosophy. The chapter will conclude by linking the discussion with decolonisation.

Justified True Belief

The search for knowledge has been largely based on justified true belief. In this view of knowledge, a proposition may only count as knowledge if it meets the criteria of JTB (Ichikawa & Steup, 2018):

- i. p is true;
- ii. S believes that p ;
- iii. S is justified in believing that p .

The JTB trinity has been held as the standard in epistemology until 1963, when Edmund Gettier challenged the validity of JTB by presenting counter-examples such as the Smith and Jones case (Gettier case). Gettier’s Smith and Jones case illustrates that although Jones was adequately justified in believing I , intuitively, it is evident that he did not know Jones would get the job even though it can be stated that he knew that the person who would get the job has 10 coins in their pocket. Although Smith met all the JTB criteria, there is still the distinct intuition that Smith does not know who will get the job, even though he is justified and believes that this is true.

Reflective and Intuitive Judgements

The use of intuitions has gone largely undisputed in epistemology and philosophy as a discipline. Epistemic intuitions can be said to be “the immediate or not explicitly inferential

assessment of any claim” (Nagel 2007, 2). Intuitions tend to be conceptual in character rather than empirical, and as such are a priori, but “it is not the content of intuitions that is a priori, but that intuitions as a method of acquiring justified beliefs is a priori. It is a method that does not depend upon empirical investigation or a posteriori experience in order to deliver justified beliefs” (Hales 2000, 137). For Hale, philosophers’ use of and reliance on rational intuition is sufficient and epistemically grounded.

Such use of intuitions means there are certain propositions whose “truths is supposedly apprehended by rational intuition or not at all” (Hales 2000, 138). One such proposition is the following (Hale 2000, 138):

Necessarily, if p is taller than q and q is taller than r, then p is taller than r.

Although the above-stated proposition can be proven empirically – i.e. by showing how p is taller than r – it is clear how it can be intuitively understood that p is taller than r. In standard philosophical practice, use of intuitions to gain knowledge is used commonly, but it raises the question of “whose intuitions are to be relied upon as evidence” (Alexander, Weinberg 2007, 57). Are the intuitions of philosophers more reliable than those of “ordinary” people or what is commonly referred to as “folk epistemology”? Could there be something fundamentally more reflective about the intuitions of philosophers? Does this “elitist” view privilege philosophers’ epistemic intuition over the intuitions of non-philosophers, where “the intuitions of non-philosophers reflect only an understanding of ordinary concepts”? (Alexander, Weinberg 2007, 58). It could be the case that the intuitions of philosophers on philosophical matter are more rigorous because they tend to engage more in reflective judgements than non-philosophers.

According to Machery *et al.*, “a judgement is thinly reflective just in case it results from a deliberation process involving attention, focus, cognitive effort and so on” (Machery *et al.*, 2017, 537). Reflection has a substantive impact on a judgement. The distinction between reflective and intuitive judgement is a matter of process. With intuitive judgements, the agent is unaware of the underlying process that formed a judgement; whereas with reflective judgements, the process is deliberate and conscious where one would “engage in explicit reasoning and devote personal level attention on the ground of the conclusions we reach” (Nagel 2012, 498). According to Nagel, however, both these processes are capable of

producing knowledge in different ways, and both have their advantages and disadvantages. For instance, reflective judgements tend to be ordered and sequential – this means they may take more time to arrive at, but this is mitigated by the fact that they may be more effective in solving complex problems. Intuitive judgements, on the other hand, are able to process large amounts of unassuming information quickly. The intuitive process can quickly answer simple information, for example $2+2=4$, but the reflective process can answer a more complex equation, albeit slower.

It is also a possibility for reflective and intuitive judgements to work together to produce knowledge, where reflective judgements draw upon intuitive input to produce a judgement and vice versa. The Cognition Reflection Test (CRT), for example, is designed to “measure the tendency to override a participant response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response” (Toplak *et al.*, 2011, 1275). The following question is an example (ibid):

A bat and a ball cost \$1.10 in total. The bat costs \$1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?

If a participant responds intuitively, they tend to respond that the ball costs 10 cents, these responses are classified as cognitive misers, since their response is unreflective. Upon reflection, the correct answer is 5 cents, because by removing the \$1 from the equation and splitting the remaining 10 cent to the bat and the ball, then adding the \$1 more to the bat, it will be evident that the bat costs \$1.05 and the ball 5 cent. If the total is \$1.10, and the bat costs \$1 *more* than the ball, then the ball has to cost 5 cent in order for the total to be \$1.10. If the total was \$1.20 and the bat cost a \$1 more, the ball would cost 10 cents, because \$1 more is \$1.10 cents plus the 10 cents for the ball.

The tendency of our intuitive process is to generate information quickly, which tends to sometimes miss without reflective responses. Intuitive responses tend to also be more useful when engaging in repetitive reflection. The more one process that $8 \times 4 = 24$, the more intuitive it becomes, and the complex process of reflection is no longer required. Both these processes are useful in producing knowledge, even though they work differently. Our ability to cognitively process large amounts of information is an evolutionary advantage. It takes reflective effort to learn how to drive a car, deliberate and conscious engagement, but

eventually, after many years of driving, the process becomes automated in a way that feels intuitive. The intuitive process allows us to cognitively open up space, to learn and process new and more complex knowledge, by putting the bulk of what we already know ‘in storage’, where we can access it with ease and haste when necessary.

Experimental philosophy would contend that the use of reflective, rational or intuitive judgements is erroneous. More emphasis is placed on the empirical *a posteriori*. This is said to produce more reliable results, that are well founded. Below I will discuss the argument from the view of experimentalists and their case studies.

Experimental Philosophy

Using intuitions in this manner within epistemology is commonplace, but recently the use of intuitions in this *a priori* manner has been challenged by those who posit that intuitions can be empirically probed and found to be deficient when it comes to philosophical enquiry. Jonathan Weinberg and his colleagues conducted a study which used experimental philosophy (x-phi) to test whether or not standard philosophical practice and use of intuitions is relevant. Their study was aimed at establishing whether intuitions are homogeneous and whether people from different ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds use the same intuitions when faced with different thought experiments. If people from different backgrounds use intuitions differently, that would prove the diversity of intuitions; and if intuitions are in fact diverse, they are unreliable and cannot be used in standard philosophical practice.

When faced with two theories that are factually similar and we have to decide which of the two is better, it becomes part of the normative project to find out what we ought to do. One such normative project is what Weinberg calls “epistemic romanticism”, or the idea that “knowledge of the correct epistemic norms is implanted within us in some way and with the proper process of self-exploration we can discover them” (Weinberg *et al.*, 2001, 432). This is the standard way in which intuitions are used, by assuming that through some reflective process, we can come to knowledge in the right way. Weinberg *et al.* call this Intuition-driven Romanticism (IDR). By conducting a thought experiment, Weinberg *et al.* aimed to prove that IDR is not a viable option since intuitions can turn out to be diverse and the way in which knowledge is processed by people of diverse backgrounds, depends on certain circumstances and situations.

Weinberg *et al.* try to discern whether “there might be a group of people who reason and form beliefs in ways that are significantly different from the way we do” (Weinberg *et al.* 2001, 435). In their experiment, they tried to determine four hypotheses:

- (1) Epistemic intuitions differ from culture to culture.
- (2) Epistemic intuitions differ depending on socioeconomic standing.
- (3) Epistemic intuitions of people who have been exposed to philosophical study differ from those who have had no philosophical training.
- (4) Epistemic intuitions depend on the order the cases are presented.

According to Weinberg *et al.* (2001), if any of these hypotheses is correct, then it would mean that intuitions were unreliable and as such not necessary or sufficient for knowledge. In their study, they used 89 participants, of whom 23 were East Asians and 66 were Westerners. They asked their participants whether a particular Gettier-type vignette or Gettier cases was an instance of knowledge (factual proposition) or whether it was a belief. One such case was the Bob and Jill car case:

Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of American car. Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe it? (Weinberg *et al.* 2001, 443.)

Gettier cases such as the ones presented above “are cases in which the protagonist [Bob] has JTB but, according to most philosophers, does not have knowledge and Gettier intuitions are judgements indicating that the protagonists in such cases do not have knowledge” (Machery *et al.*, 2017, 646). The finding from this experiment was that the majority of the Westerners concluded that Bob only believes whereas the majority of the East Asians concluded that Bob really knows. This finding thus proves hypothesis 1 and as such IDR is implausible, according to Weinberg *et al.* (2001). Weinberg and his colleagues concluded that based on the fact that Westerners tend to be more individualistic, and East Asians more collective, thus having varying results makes sense. Given that collectivism by its nature promotes “harmony and consensus”, individualistic Westerners “would be inclined to attribute knowledge to people whose beliefs are reliably formed by processes that no one else in their community shares”

(Weinberg *et al.*, 2001, 443). Westerners would be more inclined to rely on causality in explaining the world around them, whereas East Asians will award knowledge status more readily, given the need for the collective to exist in harmony.

In this study, Weinberg *et al.* came to the conclusion that since responses to the thought experiments varied between different ethnic groups, the same set of intuitions cannot be used to justify universal truths. If epistemic intuitions are not universally consistent, they cannot be reliable as a tool for justifying knowledge. If a proposition is true, it must be true, necessarily, all the time and everywhere, and cannot vary on the basis of different factors such as gender, ethnicity or socio-economic standing.

In a separate study, Buckwalter and Stich (2014) tried to show that epistemic intuitions regarding the Gettier cases differed according to gender. Their main case was the under-representation of women within the philosophical academic community in the USA and Canada. Although they have found no causal link between the under-representation of women in academic philosophy, and epistemic intuitions, they identified a pattern that needs to be explored further. According to Buckwalter and Stich, “there are significant differences between men and women in intuitive responses to some philosophically important thought experiments” (Buckwalter & Stich, 2014, 330). These differences, they note, have led to the exclusion of women, and although they concede that there is much work to be done, they insist that most philosophy departments function on the intuitions of men, and as such, women become sidelined and discouraged to engage in philosophical discourse.

In an attempt to replicate this study, Hamid Seyedsayamdost used the same criteria as Buckwalter and Stich, with the exception of using female philosophy students; whereas Buckwalter and Stich used female students who have never done philosophy. Seyedsayamdost found no significant difference between the epistemic intuitions of men and women, and the Buckwalter and Stich study therefore failed to replicate under similar conditions. One important factor that could have led to the failure of replication could be false positives (Seyedsayamdost 2015, 665):

A general point that may be worth pointing out is that to some extent, the failure of replication presented here is not completely unexpected for the following reason. Experimental philosophy is often described as the study of philosophical questions

using the tools of experimental psychology (Alexander, 2012; Knobe & Nichols, 2008; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, 2007). By importing the methods of experimental psychology, philosophers will likely import the problems of that field, and one of the problems that has afflicted experimental psychology for some time is the (likely) high rate of false positive results in the published literature.

This is one of experimental philosophies shortcomings, and the main reason for the incursion of false positives is not enough replication. In another study, by Minsun Kim and Yuan, the Weinberg *et al.* study again failed to replicate. Minsun Kim and Yuan presented East Asian and Caucasian participants with the Bob and Jill Car Case and found no significant difference between the responses of East Asians and those of Caucasians.




Figure 1 Percentage of participants in the NEI [Weinberg *et al.* (2001) study] study and replication studies who “hose “Bob really ”knows” (Kim and Yuan, 2015)

Machery *et al.* (2017) also attempted to replicate the study by Weinberg *et al.* (2001) in *The Gettier Intuition: From South America to Asia*. Their main aim was to test the intuition of participants from 23 countries using a larger pool of participants (2838). Their data was collected from Japan, USA, Brazil and India, and the study was done in 17 different languages via web or data collection companies. Machery *et al.* (2017) found that Gettier Intuition may well be a part of a core epistemology, and a universal way of thinking about epistemic matters. Having considered factors such as gender, culture, age and other social-psychological factors, Machery *et al.* (2017) found that these factors do not play a key role in the intuitions of people – rather, it would appear that reflective judgements are universally applicable. As such, Machery *et al.* (2017) conclude “that experimental studies revealing that unreflective judgments are susceptible to a host of irrelevant factors do nothing to disqualify reflective judgments from playing a role in philosophical argumentation” (Machery *et al.* 2017, 537).

This finding does not, however, mean that the concept of knowledge is universal. It simply means that the more reflective one is, the more one is able to provide a standard philosophical answer despite how one’s characteristics are framed. Greater reflection allows one to think deeper into standard philosophical problems, and this is the case universally. The concept of knowledge and how reflective judgements are used can benefit from experimental studies, but the Weinberg *et al.* (2001) finding that epistemic intuitions differ according to certain framed factors such as gender etc., is problematic not only in its numerous failures to replicate, but also in its implied insinuation that if epistemic intuitions differ according to various factors, then there must be intuitions that are more valid than others, stronger than others and of course better than others. This would be problematic, because what is considered epistemologically valid or stronger, has always been judged using the gaze of one worldview, namely, a Western, white, male lens.

While Buckwalter and Stich (2014) are correct in asserting that philosophy departments may well be discouraging women from participating in philosophical discourse, it may not be that it is because men and women have different epistemic intuitions, but it could be that the validation of what counts as epistemologically valid is biased, and other concepts of knowledge are not taken into consideration. The latter point will be further elaborated in chapter 6, with the case study from the experiences of women in Kenyan institutions of higher learning. In the following section I will discuss a few critiques levelled at x-phi.

Critique of Experimental Philosophy

Experimental philosophy has increased in popularity amongst philosophers as it is thought to concretise philosophic arguments more accurately than intuitions alone. The methodology is aimed at targeting ‘arm-chair’ philosophy, and the use of seemingly unsubstantiated arguments that may be based on false foundational beliefs. Weinberg *et al.* (2001), for instance, are strict or radical experimental philosophers who believe that all use of intuitions should be eliminated from philosophic methodology. Justification for any knowledge proposition must be based on an evidentiary basis and not simply on a priori intuition. Intuitions for radical experimental philosophers hold no epistemic value and as such should have no bearing on epistemic justification and truth.

Matthew Liao has approached the use of experimentalism from a different perspective, in that he has advocated for what he calls “moderate experimentalism”. Whereas Weinberg *et al.* (2001) argue that the use of intuitions as evidence in epistemology should be completely replaced by experimentation, Liao argues that intuitions and experimentalism are capable of supplementing each other where one or the other should falter. According to Liao, radical experimentalism also somewhat relies on intuitions since they also cannot prove without certainty the validity of a truth claim. Should intuitions be based on a reliable cognitive faculty, they can be of epistemic value, “because surveys do not engage in any serious or reflective way with the test subjects, e.g., find out if they are biased or not, the surveys at best capture only surface level intuitions but not robust intuitions”. This is what Liao (2008, 250) calls the “argument from robust intuitions”.

Experimental philosophy faces many critiques, of which many are directed at the integrity of the results it yields. Robert Woolfolk (2013) levels substantive methodological critique at experimental philosophy because it lacks the knowhow and qualitative rigor needed to stand on as its own field of empirical study. According to Woolfolk (2013), the behavioural sciences have through continual development found ways of “avoiding threats to sound inductive reasoning” (Woolfolk 2013, 80), which experimental philosophy has not. Participants are also a key indicator of whether or not a study will yield accurate results, how participants are selected and whether or not those participants understand what is expected of them. Experimental philosophy furthermore relies on opportunity samples such as students on campus, or surveys that only reach a select demography of the population, and such opportunistic sampling is not randomised, and its results cannot speak for the wider

community. This critique was clearly evident in the studies done by Weinberg *et al.* (2001), where the participants were specifically selected from a university campus using a very select and obscure definition of East Asian. The participants were chosen not according to their exposure to East Asian epistemology, but rather by racial category.

Another problem participants may present, is whether or not the participants understood or comprehended the question presented to them. Experimental philosophy relies on survey self-report experimentation, which asks for definitive answers of *yes* or *no*, *believes* or *knows*; and makes no provision for nuanced responses. Experimental philosophy vignettes would yield more substantive results if they used Likert questions (on a scale of 1-10) or used the interview method as a data collection tool, where the answer is not just black or white, but rather has shades of grey. In this way, the reliability of the results can be more accurate.

Replication is the Achilles heel of experimental philosophy, Weinberg *et al.* (2014) failed to replicate, as did Buckwalter and Stich (2014), and this may be attributed to methodology. How questions in vignettes are asked, the question of comprehension and how participants are selected, are all factors that determine whether or not a study will replicate. Experimental philosophy needs to spend more time developing a methodology that is geared towards philosophical questions – a simple yes-or-no survey cannot possibly yield the nuanced results needed in philosophical inquiry. For Woolfolk (2013), research that incorporates more focus groups and ethnographic methods and case studies will produce results that are more accurate and detailed.

Intuitions and Decolonisation

What does all this mean for decolonisation and the epistemological conversation at South African universities? In 1964, Leopold Sedar Senghor famously stated that “emotion is Negro, as reason is Hellenistic” (Diagne, 2018), giving an account of Negritude as the antithesis to Euro-hegemonic discourse on epistemology. Negritude visualised the Negro as the hero of their own story; it is the emotive expression of being that rooted itself in affirming the experience of black people in Africa and in the diaspora. The Negro, according to Negritude poetry, is emotive, intuitive, and understands the world in a way that Europeans cannot. According to Senghor, Europeans are rationalistic and empirical, and it is their tendency to view the world materialistically, whereas Africans view the world spiritually. Negritude as an intellectual theorem existed within its own era and denoted what epistemology meant for the francophone

intellectual. Although Negritude has been questioned for its inconsistencies, it has created a very specific space within philosophy for creating a unique perspective from which to view an alternative from the standard theory of philosophy.

Negritude is regarded as an ethnophilosophical project, which Airoboman and Asekhauno (2012) have criticised extensively, because ethnophilosophy asks the question “Do Africans have a particular way of knowing different from, and inaccessible to non-Africans?” (Airoboman & Asekhauno 2012, 13). Is this way of thinking accessible through many methodologies, including experimental philosophy; or does it require a different methodology altogether that is unique to the African experience? For Senghor, the African mode of knowing is emotive *qua* intuitive, and as such also inherently experiential. This begs the question of whether there could be a particular way of understanding African epistemology that is unique only to those in Africa and perhaps the diaspora. Advocates of Negritude would contend that, “the method through which the African arrives at trustworthy knowledge is intuitive” (Airoboman, Asekhauno 2012, 15).

For some, like Airoboman and Asekhauno (2012), thinking that intuition is what separates African epistemology from the rest of the world, is a cheap grasp at straws. Airoboman and Asekhauno (2012) have criticised the view of African epistemology as peculiar only to Africans as a reactive move, made to create opposition to Western theories of knowledge. Holding Africans as “intuitive as against the British empiricism and continental rationalism” (Airoboman & Asekhauno 2012, 16) is a cheap attempt to differentiate African epistemology from Western epistemology. I do not think that Africans¹ have a unique set of intuitions that set them apart, but I do think there is an experiential dynamic that cannot be overlooked in epistemic methodology – this will be discussed further in chapter 6.

There is a unique history that is shared by those who have been marginalised by the epistemic process. The decolonial project can assist in facilitating a process of Africanising the differing ways Africans either use or produce their epistemic intuitions. It involves understanding of how the lived experiences of those who have experienced epistemic injustice will differ and thus produce epistemologies that are relevant for the African institution of higher learning.

¹ By “African”, I mean those the African continent as well as the diaspora that identify with the languages and cultures of the African continent.

Conclusion

Many philosophers in the West would hold intuition as a primary source of knowledge. According to Hale (2000), the use of intuitions in philosophy should be based on a well-formed foundation. For Hale (2000, 145), “the method of intuition justifies some propositions [and] is epistemologically justified on the basis of nothing other than the method of intuition itself”. The use of reflective intuitions in philosophy as a methodology should not be completely discarded, as reflective intuitions serve a vital role in philosophic inquiry. The Negritude idea that the African way of knowing cannot be empirically studied, however, may be an over statement. Yet, it could also be the case that x-phi is using the wrong methodological tools in its quest for truth as well. To test for diverse intuitions, one would need to have a diverse methodology that takes into account the experience of those who have been on the epistemic periphery.

Gettier intuition may be universal, as stated by Machery *et al.* (2017), but it is also conceivable that philosophy has been viewed from a limited vantage point. To understand epistemology through art is not uniquely African, as much as it not uniquely Western. However, what the project of colonialism did, was to create closed societies, where their pedagogy was hegemonic. The colonials deliberately enforced their epistemology onto the colonies, while closing themselves off from indigenous epistemologies. Epistemology has been viewed from the perspective of closed societies, and created the idea that it is the intuitions of those societies that mattered most. It could be that a single set of intuitions has validated knowledge for so long that it has been taken for granted; and that what has come to be understood as ‘universal’ should remain unchanged, in the same way that Platonic forms reverberate as the foundations of Western philosophy, immutable and eternal.

It is the task of decolonisation to introduce a different methodology of how different intuitions may work. What is of importance, is perhaps not how we arrive at the same intuition, but rather how we define truth, justification and what counts as knowledge. In the chapter that follows, I will attempt to replicate the Weinberg study by using a different demographic, i.e., a South African demographic. Given that Machery *et al.* (2017) have already attempted to replicate the Weinberg study on such a large scale, I am not expecting my results to stray too far from the fold, but it would be interesting to see if a different demographic may introduce new problems or reinforce old ones.

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Chapter Three

Research Findings

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to do an analysis of the data collected through online surveys. The survey was distributed online to participants at universities, as well as outside the institutions. Data was collected from November 2019 to June 2020. The survey follows the same guidelines set out by Weinberg *et al.* (2001) and focuses on the variables that were stated in the original study, i.e. age, gender, socio-economic status, education and race.

Data Collection

Data was collected online via survey. I used Survey Monkey as a data collection tool for ease of use and access for the participants. Due to restrictions imposed by COVID-19, participants were limited to those who could participate online via a survey; thus, the largest sample size was taken from university students, who were between the ages of 18 and 24. The first section consists of a participation information sheet that informed the participant what my study is about and what their participation entailed. The participants were then presented with a consent form, and if they agreed to participate, they also had to provide demographic information. Once participants understood what their role in the study was, they were presented with 5 demographic questions that specifically relate to my research, i.e. the participant's age group, ethnicity, income status, gender and education level.²

Methodology

The participants were then presented with the following vignette:

One day Sipho is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain becomes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature where he is. Sipho is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to think that it is 22 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 22 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 22 degrees in his room.

² See Appendix.

The vignette was used in the original Weinberg *et al.* (2001) study, but I made a few changes to appeal to South African participants. I changed the name from Bob to Sipho, and the temperature from 71 Fahrenheit to 22 Celsius.

This was followed up by a competency question to ascertain whether or not the participant understood what the vignette was asking them:

In the above statement, which is correct?

- a) Sipho is concerned he might have brain damage from the falling rock hitting him.
- Or
- b) Sipho might have estimated the temperature in his room correctly.

Those who answered a) at this stage were disqualified as it is clear they are not entirely aware of the task that they are expected to execute. My study consists of 60 participants who were given the vignettes as a survey online, of the 60 participants, 52 passed the competency question. Those participants who did not pass the competency question could still continue to complete the survey, but their responses were omitted from the study. After the competency question, the participants were presented with the following question:

In the above statement, does Sipho really know that it was 22 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it?

Once I had received the responses from participants, I used Statistica software to interpret the relevant data. Statistica is a data science software solution that offers descriptive statistics, breakdowns and correlations. It is a product that helps individuals with a “complete spectrum of statistical methods, data processes, visualizations and reporting (Statsoft, 2022).

Once those who did not pass the competency test were removed as respondents, I could begin to cross-reference my variables and look at the frequencies of certain responses and could group them into their respective categories.

Results

Age

Of the 52 respondents, 42 were between the ages of 18 and 24; 1 was between the ages of 25 and 35; and 5 were between the ages of 35 and 44. All but 7 of the participants claimed that Sipho only believed it was 22 degrees in the room. Overall, 86.5% of the participants stated that Sipho only believed it was 22 degrees, which shows that irrespective of age, the participants shared the same intuition that Sipho only believed it was 22 degrees in the room. This result is consistent with other studies that have replicated Weinberg *et al.* (2001).

Age	No. Of Responses	Really Knows	Only Believes
18-24	42	7	35
25-35	1		1
35-44	5		6
55-64	2		2
45-54	1		1
Total	52		

Gender

Participants were asked to state their preferred gender and of the 52 participants, 33 identified as female, 18 as male and 1 as binary. There is no significant change in epistemic intuitions, as 84% of female participants stated that Sipho only believes, and 89% of male participants also claimed Sipho only believes. In their study, Buckwalter and Stich (2014) got female participants that were currently working in or studying philosophy.³ They claimed that females would most likely indicate that Sipho knows it is 22 degrees. This they attributed mostly to the marginalisation of females in philosophy and not directly relating to epistemic intuitions. Exclusion in philosophy is a big problem, as people of colour, LGBTQI+ and many others are still systemically and systematically excluded from participating in philosophy departments. Philosophy, and to a large extent much of the research field, is still largely dominated by white males, and I will argue in the next chapter that research methods need to take this into account when research is being conducted. As far as epistemic intuitions go, however, there seems to be no significant difference in how different genders utilise epistemic intuitions.

³ This is because their study aimed to test the epistemic intuitions of different genders as well as the intuitions of participants who have had exposure to, or are currently in the field of philosophy.

Gender	No. Of Responses	Really knows	Only Believes
Female	33	5	28
Male	18	2	16
Non-binary, gender-indifferent	1	0	1
Total	52		

Education

With respect to education, there is no marked difference in the responses of participants with formal or postgraduate education and those without it. The questionnaire did not make a distinction between those who do or do not have a philosophical background, but the majority of participants were taken from philosophy classes or students who have some exposure to philosophy. It is also important to note here that 80% of the participants shared the same epistemic intuition, irrespective of their levels of education.

Education	No. Of Responses	Really Knows	Only Believes
Some secondary education	1		1
Completed matric	37	4	33
Higher education (degree or diploma)	14	3	11
Total	52		

Ethnicity

This is one of the key premises of the Weinberg (2001) study, as the claim that different ethnicities have differing epistemic intuitions. This premise has been dispelled several times through replication. Likewise, in my study, 86% of the participants agreed that Sipho only believes – this again disproves the notion that ethnicity determines epistemic intuitions and confirms that African and Western epistemic intuitions do not differ. This has significant ramifications for decolonisation, because it means that although decolonisation still has the

task of creating equality, inclusion and diversity for marginalised groups, there should not be concerns about differing epistemic intuitions. Although my survey limited ethnicity along racial lines, no distinctions were made with respect to which ethnic group one belongs,⁴ but the results were still definitive.

Ethnicity	No. Of Responses	Really Knows	Only Believes
African or Black	38	4	34
White	13	3	10
Coloured	1	0	1
Total	52		

Socio-economic Factors

The socio-economic factors also did not affect the findings significantly. Again, irrespective of socio-economic standing, 86% of the participants selected the option “only believes”. Despite variations in ethnicity, socio-economic status, gender, age and education level, the vast majority of the participants shared the same epistemic intuition.

Although my participant pool is not representative of the entire population of South Africa, it is still noteworthy that the outcomes of all 5 categories unequivocally fell on the same side, i.e. “only believes”.

Socio-economic Status	No. Of Responses	Really Knows	Only Believes
Student	30	6	25
Unemployed	1	0	1
Between R25 000 and R50 000	6	0	6
Between R10 000 and R25 000	6	0	6
Over R100 000	2	0	2

⁴ One participant checked both white and African. It is not my contention to make the claim that “white” in this case means that the person is African or not.

Between R0 and R5000	4	0	4
Between R50 000 and R100 000	2	1	1
Total	52		

Limitations of my Research

A crucial group of participants in the rural areas could not be reached due to COVID-19 and the lockdown restrictions due to the state of emergency declared by the president of the Republic of South Africa in March 2020.

There were varying factors that made accessing participants in the rural areas particularly difficult, one of which is unstable electrical supply. Intermittent electricity supply to most rural areas in South Africa makes the use of surveys as a research instrument problematic. Access to devices and digital literacy is also an obstacle for this particular group of participants.

Another major factor in the exclusion of this group is their age. The average age of participants from rural areas would have ideally been above the age of 65, which is the group most at risk for COVID-19, and this made face-to-face interactions a challenge. This age group served an important function in my research as they would have been the age group most likely to be least Westernized. The fact that this age group is the most removed from Western culture, could have influenced the findings of the study of knowledge.

This is clearly a drastic and unavoidable setback, but as I will show in the following chapters, the methodology that is used in experimental philosophy needs to be more inclusive for these reasons. Instruments that rely on tools to which people do not have access, are limiting. These instruments also cannot accurately reflect the diverse ways in which people express their epistemological worldview.

The most pressing concern for this study is whether the right methodology was utilised. Although surveys are a popular methodology in experimental philosophy, I do not think they are necessarily the best in probing epistemic intuitions. My research instrument incorporated a section of open-ended questions, and this yielded a lot of interesting responses. One participant, for example, claimed that because there was no thermometer in the room, Sipho could not have

known what the temperature was. This shows that this participant relies heavily on the certainty of the scientific method and believes that an instrument is more likely to give a more accurate prediction. Another participant stated:

I subjectively think that Sipho believes so as he has not seen the rightful thermometer to know if it was 22 degrees. That constitutes a sign of belief, not a sign of knowing since knowing requires proof.

This type of response has the potential to lead to a bigger conversation, that could yield more interesting results. I therefore think individual interviews could be better for getting a more nuanced perspective in the epistemological take in African communities. There is information and knowledge in languages and cultural practices that could give a better perspective. Although it is apparent that epistemic intuitions do not differ drastically, it is important to include certain groups of people in epistemic enquiry when the larger community of knowledge production is studied.

In the next chapter I aim to elaborate on this point and to explore the need to consider more inclusive methodologies in knowledge production. This will not only open up more corridors into other knowledge systems, but will also enrich experimental philosophy and make it more inclusive. Although survey results may be more or less the same, it is important to investigate what results could be yielded through the use of other methodologies as well.

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Chapter Four

Interrogating Science and Methodology

Introduction

Through many replicated studies, the universality of epistemic intuitions is not in question, but what remains, is how we structure the methodology used in order to ensure fairness, inclusion and minimising the prevalence of our biases. The idea that experimental philosophy (hereinafter x-phi) will bring an objectivity to philosophical enquiry that the intuitive process cannot is bolstered by our reliance on the objectivity and neutrality of the scientific process, and by extension the use of technology. In this chapter I would like to discuss the varying ways in which science and technology can marginalise groups that are not represented by datasets. I will begin by discussing the universality theory and semantic primes that are represented by most languages. My aim in this section is to show how epistemic intuitions can be universal, despite differences. It is not a far-fetched idea to claim that every language, and thus every knowledge system, have a consistency in their use of logic, and epistemic intuitions.

In the next section, I outline David Chalmers's idea of conceptual re-engineering and argue that the method through which epistemology is being practised, needs to be conceptually re-engineered. This re-engineering should take into consideration the varying biases that have been used within the epistemic validation processes, and work on being inclusive of other epistemic validation processes and methodologies.

In the section that follows, I look at our reliance on scientific process and how it hinders the re-engineering of the epistemic process. Our unwavering reliance on science and the validation process therein does a particular type of harm to the epistemic process, which x-phi would do well to avoid. I conclude by considering different methodologies that could be of particular significance to the way in which we re-engineer epistemology, especially from a decolonial lens.

The Universality Theory

In the previous chapter, we established that there may be a universality in shared epistemic intuitions, this is also evident in other replication studies. This presents a long-standing issue, in that the use of the term *universal* tends to mean "Euro-Western". However, as we have seen

it is not a reach to claim that there are certain concepts that are shared by all people in all languages that is the claim of the universality theory.

The Universality Theory is the claim that the properties of the English word *know* and by extension the expression “S knows that p” are shared by standard translations in most languages. For Tsai and Len (2018), if it can be proven that there is an epistemic property that can be found in the Chinese verb 知 (“know”) that cannot be found in the English verb *know*, then this would prove the universality theory is wrong. However, since *know* is taken to be a semantic prime, this would prove to be difficult. According to the Natural Semantic Metalanguage program (NSM), semantic primes are words that are cross-translatable between different languages, NSM claims to “have discovered an inventory of irreducible lexical meanings – that are universal or near universal in the world’s languages” (Goddard 2020, 132).

These semantic primes should have a lexical equivalent in every human language, so the verb *know*, which is *ukwazi* in isiZulu, is not only lexically equivalent, but also carries the same epistemic properties as 知 and *know* in English. However, the abstract noun *knowledge*, or *ulwazi* in isiZulu, is not found in every language, and the use of the word *knowledge* is not as prevalent. According to Goddard (2020), it is used commonly in education, philosophy, university studies and encyclopaedias (Goddard 2020, 137) but not in everyday language. Thus, although one may say one “knows how”, or “knows that” in every language, *knowledge* is not a semantic prime.

Many other concepts are not semantic primes either, such as “believe”. In isiZulu for instance, *believe* is *ukukholwa*, which is either spiritually or faith-based and used as a verb to express to *believe in / belief of something ukholwa ukuthi, ukholelwa ekutheni ...* or he believes that *ukholwa ukuthi*. The way in which *believe* is used in English “reflects folk epistemology embedded in modern English ... The word is not semantically simple and it is not cross-translatable” (Goddard 2020,140). The English phrase “I don’t believe we have met”, used in the negative, can be translated to isiZulu as “angikholwa sisake sahlanguana”. However, the phrase “I believe we have met” (“ngikholwa ukuthi sisake sahlanguana”) makes no semantic sense in isiZulu and the use of it in this way is not proper. The appropriate syntax for this translation would be “ngicaba ukuthi sisake sahlanguana” or “I *think* we have met”, which makes more sense, considering that *think* is also a semantic prime and can be cross-translated easily.

For the Universality Theory to hold water, it needs to be fair to all languages, and so it makes more sense if terms that are semantically simple, are used. Goddard claims that “for the purposes of ethno-epistemology, a metalanguage consists of simple cross-translatable words and phrases such as “know”, “think like this ...” and “it is true”. When the vignette in this replication study offers the option of “only believes” (“uyakhola kuphela”), the same lexical problem arises, and the use of *cabanga ukuthi* or “thinks that ...” is more appropriate. Tsai and Lein (2018) make a similar argument in that they also claim that “justified” and “belief” are not universal concepts, and therefore cannot be applied as simply into cross-translations.

From the perspective of semantic primes, the Universality Theory seems unproblematic and even common-sensical. However, another problem arises in that although we may all share the same epistemic intuition to know, how we come to know and the ways we come to know may still be in need of further expansion. Epistemology has been defined as the study of knowledge, and for the most part epistemologists have focused predominantly on how we come to know and what constitutes knowledge. Epistemology itself has seldom been examined or re-engineered. In the following section I will discuss conceptual engineering and the ways in which epistemology can be re-engineered to include those affected by biases.

Conceptual Engineering

Given that knowledge, as well as scientific and university institutions, are going through a period of diversification (and for us here in Africa, Africanisation or decolonialisation), it is necessary to re-conceptualise what we mean by “knowledge” and what we understand about epistemology. The decolonial project has been fraught with setback and inconsistencies, to say the least, but it has also provided an opportunity to make great strides with regard to our understanding of knowledge. The decolonisation of the curriculum needs to focus on what Chalmers calls “conceptual engineering”. The problem of definitions that are set in stone, again arises and will continue to do so as we nuance many concepts that have been taken for granted within Western academia. As noted above, what counts as epistemology might also be in need of some redefining, if not conceptual engineering. Chalmers (2020, 2) is faced with the same dilemma: “I’m officially committed to definitions being rare in philosophy, and more generally to the view that ‘what is X?’ questions are more important than ‘What should X be?’.” What remains a more acceptable outcome turns out to be the latter in order to unpack the former. In the process of building a bridge, for example, there would be a design element, experimentation, evaluation and finally implementation. Once implementation is complete and

it is a functioning bridge, it would still need to be evaluated regularly to ensure that it is intact and if any cracks show up, it needs to be repaired.

This is also how I would like to view conceptual engineering and by extension as we will see below, epistemic conceptual engineering. Chalmers makes a distinction between de novo engineering and re-engineering, or the distinction between de novo conceptual analysis and creating new concepts and re-engineering as fixing concepts. The distinction between a de novo concept and a re-engineered concept is not clear-cut, as it is difficult to tell at what point something has been redeveloped and what point it is totally new. The ones that stand out, however, are the concepts that we have held for a long time and had the opportunity to rethink. For example, social concepts such as those of race, gender and concepts of truth and belief. According to Chalmers, an example of de novo engineering could be Miranda Fricker's epistemic injustice (as discussed in chapter 2), where epistemic injustice is not a concept trying to fix or replace any other concept. Rather, it is a new way of understanding epistemic exclusion within the established concept of epistemology. Conceptual engineering takes place in the case of both de novo and re-engineered concepts, however.

It is apparent that conceptual engineering needs to take place in epistemology. Some parts of that engineering may be de novo or re-engineered. I will begin by examining the methodologies that underpin epistemology and how those epistemologies can create new conversations within decolonisation. Just as Chalmers was unsure how to define conceptual engineering, the same could be said of epistemology. What we have been made acutely aware of, however, is which epistemologies are superior. This directly correlates with how the question "epistemology" is defined by those with the power to do so. In the next section I will examine the ways in which biases inherent in the scientific process, and by extension in epistemology, lead to exclusion of those that do not fit neatly into the fray.

[The Problem of the Cataloguer](#)

A specific expectation set for science and a certain infallibility is ascribed to it. Once a scientific explanation is given, it is taken for granted that the calculation that it is based upon, is ultimately unbiased. In modern day society, this trust has been placed in technology, where it has once again been taken for granted that the algorithms and coding in modern technology is unbiased, without taking into consideration that the codes behind each algorithm is a human being with biases.

In her book *Algorithms of oppression*, Safiya Umoja Noble tackles the problem of how algorithms categorise information, especially information referring to non-Western people. In 2014, when one would search for “black girls” on Google, for instance, what would show up would be pornographic images of black women, despite the fact that “porn” was not used in the search category. Another bias that showed up in Google searches that was cause for concern, was the fact that the search term “unprofessional hair” mostly showed images of black women’s natural hair. This means that the Google algorithm had a negative bias regarding black women and black women’s hair. This is mainly because Google as an information system is not as neutral as it is to be believed. The algorithm itself is given information by a classification system that is predominately Western. “Western”, according to Noble, is a category that is designed to include the white, male, heterosexual, European, Christian, male, middle-class, able-bodied and Anglo-mainstream (Noble 2018, 141). All things considered, this Western categorisation forms the minority of what in reality constitutes humans. The majority of people are not Western in this sense and are thus excluded as the “minority”.

This is because the system of information classification is not new, and is not unbiased. In 2014, Dartmouth College librarians began to petition the Library of Congress in the USA so that formal documentation could no longer use the terms “illegal aliens” but rather adopt a formal means of communication such as “undocumented immigrant”. This classification of people as “aliens” is a relic of how people of colour were documented in legal documents. African Americans were classified as “the race question”, Asians as the “yellow peril”, Jews as the “Jewish problem” – these classifications were legally used on official documentation. The changes were approved by Congress to the dismay of House Republicans, who claimed “left wing” propaganda was trying to mask the problem of immigration with new terms. According to Noble, “control over identity is political and often a matter of public policy” (Noble 2018, 135). Noble further notes that we are often given objectivity and neutrality as the benchmarks of policy making and information collection, but do not realise that behind each attempt at categorising persons and information is a categoriser that is very much human, with his or her own implicit biases.

How people are categorised, is no different to how information is categorised. Information categorisation may seem neutral, however it is not. Jonathan Furner has noted that the Dewey Decimal System (DDC) itself “underscores the problematic conceptualizations of race and culture... [with] over 80% of its religious section [being] devoted exclusively to Christianity,

even though there are greater numbers of other religious texts and literature” (Quoted in Noble 2018). This discrepancy can also be seen in how people of different races are categorised. In order to address these inherent problems in classification, Furner suggests the following for the DDC:

- admission on the part of designers that bias in classification schemes exists, and indeed is an inevitable result of the ways in which they are currently structured;
- recognition that adherence to a policy of neutrality will contribute little to eradication of that bias and indeed can only extend its life; and
- construction, collection and analysis of narrative expressions of the feelings, thoughts, and beliefs of classification-scheme users who identify with particular racially-defined populations (Noble 2018, 136).

The DDC is only one example of how people are classified and categorised in order to disseminate knowledge. Noble argues that “information institutions and systems, which [...] extend from state-supported organisations such as the Library of Congress to the internet” (Noble 2018, 154) play an active role in promoting Western cultures as dominant and excluding those in the periphery. The problems that the DDC and the Library of Congress created, will inevitably find their way into newer information systems such as Google and the internet. How information is indexed on the web will influence what information is reaching the greater public and how the classification of people is accepted into information systems uncritically, because “classification systems are part of the scientific approach to understanding people and societies, and they hold the power biases of those who are able to propagate those systems” (Noble 2018, 137). Even though we rely so heavily on the neutrality of information systems like Google and libraries, those systems also work with what is inputted into those systems; and “who has access to provide information in the networks certainly impacts whether information can be found and surfaces to anyone looking for it” (Noble 2018, 141).

The biases that are inherent in classifications speak not towards those people who are being categorised, but the categoriser themselves. The person who validates information and knowledge systems, has the power to categorise people as whatever is in their worldview about those people. Thus, neutrality and objectivity boil down to whichever worldview is dominant. The technologies that we rely on to be neutral and objective, like science, are entrenched in

dominant culture, but reliance on these technologies is becoming common, as Buolamwini and Gebru (2018, 1) have pointed out:

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly infiltrating every aspect of society. From helping to determine who is hired, fired, granted a loan, or how long an individual spends in prison, decisions that have traditionally been performed by humans are rapidly made by algorithms.

In 2018, the Gender Shades Project interrogated the use of face recognition. In the project, the 3 most used gender algorithm classifiers were tested, 2 of which have been developed and used by IBM and Microsoft. Najibi (2020) reports as follow on the process:

Subjects were grouped into four categories: darker-skinned females, darker-skinned males, lighter-skinned females, and lighter-skinned males. All three algorithms performed the worst on darker-skinned females, with error rates up to 34% higher than for lighter-skinned males.

This is predominantly due to the fact that databases that collect information are designed for white male audiences. In recognition of this, “IBM and Microsoft announced steps to reduce bias by modifying testing cohorts and improving data collection on specific demographics” (Najibi 2020).

These are the pitfalls that experimental philosophy needs to anticipate and avoid. X-phi should ensure the use of a more diverse data set that is accurate and free of inherent bias. Although epistemic intuitions may not vary much from culture to culture, it becomes important to decolonise the way the scientific method views neutrality because our reliance on scientific and technological systems is increasing. With this in mind, the way in which epistemology and x-phi should re-engineer itself is to be more cognisant of the ways in which neutrality is not as reliable as is commonly thought. Epistemology should re-engineer itself with the recognition that some groups are marginalised by the scientific method, technology, and language. In the following section, I intend to outline the ways in which epistemology has been exclusionary and suggest that in order to make a move towards inclusion, it should be re-engineered to give validity to those methods and knowers that have been operating on the margins.

Conceptual Engineering: De Novo or Re-engineered Epistemology

It has been taken as commonplace knowledge that epistemology is the study of knowledge, and this definition has been a delineation unto itself. However, the decolonisation project has called into question the crucial question of “What is epistemology?” – and not simply “What is epistemology about?”. I argue that we can delineate between epistemology as the study of knowledge, and how we can critique how we approach epistemology through a study about knowledge. Lein and Tsai (2018, 278) offer the following clarification:

Epistemology is the study of the epistemic. Philosophers usually do not give a specific definition of the epistemic, but there is a consensus among them on what can be counted as epistemic: knowledge, justification, evidence, reasoning, rationality, and reliability, among other things. These items are epistemic because, in a sense, they are related to truth in a significant way. Knowledge entails truth. Justification, evidence, and reliability are truth-conducive. Reasoning and rationality are also truth conducive in the sense that good reasoning or the exercise of rationality involves using, say, valid deduction which is truth-preserving.

Experimental philosophy wants to avoid the downsides of intuitive study. The idea is that through the assistance of valid methodology we can avoid many pitfalls that may cloud our objectivity. This is a noble endeavour, but of course experimental philosophy should do well to realise that science itself is not as objective as it seems to be. The scientific method stands as a monolith to objectivity, irrespective of the known fact that science has played a crucial role in the erasure of marginalised communities.⁵ In tandem with this, epistemology has played a key role in the validation of what counts as valid knowledge, who counts as a knower, and what counts as truth. Because the bulk of what we know today as epistemology has been

⁵ An example of this is the San of Southern Africa: the stealing of African indigenous knowledge of local resources such as plants and herbs by Western-trained researchers and Western companies is a contemporary instance of how African indigenous knowledge systems continue to be marginalised. An example of the San and their knowledge of the hoodia cactus plant, which grows in the Kalahari Desert. The original home of the San, it is a vast area of land that cuts across Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. Through observation and experiments, the San discovered that the hoodia cactus has medicinal properties that stave off hunger. Members of generation after generation of the San have thus chewed the plant on long hunting trips. Phytopharm, a United Kingdom-based company working with the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, isolated the active ingredients in the cactus that makes this possible. The company has renamed this property long known by the San, P57, and it has been manufactured into a diet pill that fetches large amounts of money for pharmaceutical companies. The San had to fight to reclaim their intellectual property of the qualities of the hoodia cactus plant. (Chilisa 2012, 28.)

validated as legitimate by a specific hegemonic group of people with a vested interest in perpetuating their own worldview as superior:

Two political criteria influence knowledge validation processes. First, knowledge claims are evaluated by a group of experts whose members bring with them a host of sedimented experiences that reflect their group location in intersecting oppressions. No scholar can avoid cultural ideas and his or her placement in intersecting oppressions of race, gender, class, sexuality, and nation. In the United States, this means that a scholar making a knowledge claim typically must convince a scholarly community controlled by elite White avowedly heterosexual men holding U.S. citizenship that a given claim is justified. Second, each community of experts must maintain its credibility as defined by the larger population in which it is situated and from which it draws its basic, taken-for-granted knowledge. This means that scholarly communities that challenge basic beliefs held in U.S. culture at large will be deemed less credible than those that support popular ideas. For example, if scholarly communities stray too far from widely held beliefs about Black womanhood, they run the risk of being discredited (Collins-Hill 2002, 253).

This validation process is evident in the scientific method. It involves topics that fit the status quo that get recognition and legitimisation by those in positions to do so. This also includes how certain projects are funded and given attention. Generally, they are funded according to the white male hegemonic validation process of justifying a claim. The San were discredited as knowers and were stripped of their knowledge; and only when their knowledge was validated by Euro-Western institutions, was their knowledge-set acknowledged. It is often the case that credibility politics affect which epistemologies are taken seriously. In 2015, during the Fees Must Fall Movement, a student at the University of Cape Town challenged the validity of science – this claim was met with contention. This sparked what would later be termed Science Must Fall (#SMF), which challenged the totalising nature of science within institutions of higher learning. #SMF was based on the notion that science should be viewed from the standpoint of an African worldview, and that the concept of science should be reconceptualised (Harris 2021, 107). If experimental philosophy aims to correct the trajectory that has been incurred by intuitive inquiry, it should be mindful that it does not falsely claim to be objective when it is in fact only viewing scientific inquiry from a single Western prism.

The crux of #SMF was not to remove science from enquiry, but rather to broaden our understanding of how science is not a uniquely Western endeavour. A common example of this is the Pythagorean theorem which states that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a triangle. This theorem was not unique to the ancient Greeks, as the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians were known to have used the theorem: “the Babylonians knew the relation between the length of the diagonal of a square and it’s side ... but this in turn means that they were familiar with the Pythagorean theorem – more than a thousand years before the great sage for whom it was named” (Maor 2019, 06).

The Chinese had used the theorem long before the Greeks. The *Zhoubi Suanjing* – an ancient Chinese text from the Han dynasty that predates Pythagoras – is shown to have used a variation of the theorem:

From the attempt to reason out the physical connection between Heaven and Earth, the author of The Zhou Gnomon further deduces an instance of the Pythagorean Theorem. He used the try square, a carpenters tool, to demonstrate the mathematical relationship among the three sides of a right triangle: “The patterns of these numbers come from the circle and the square. The circle comes from the square. The square comes from the try square. And the try square comes from [the fact that] nine nines are eighty-one. Therefore, fold a try square so that the base is three in breadth, the altitude is four in extension, and the diameter is five aslant. Having squared its outside, halve it [to obtain] one try square. Placing them round together in a ring, one can form three, four, or five. (Tseng 2011, 51.)

This does not invalidate Pythagoras, nor does it mean that the theorem should be removed from the syllabus. It simply means that it needs to be acknowledged that Pythagoras and the ancient Greeks were not the first and only people to have the idea and to make use of it, but that they simply popularised it to what it is known today. Science, has been taught with the supposition that the West engineered the concept of science and all other earlier cultures before were primitive: this is of course colonial propaganda to spur on white supremacy. #SMF may have stumbled on one of the most pertinent concepts that has not yet been challenged, as science has been taken as propositional knowledge that is beyond challenge.

Epistemology has been conceptualised the same way, and it has been taken as common fact that knowledge is derived through the same method. This is a method that has been developed with the misconception that the Euro-Western understanding of the method is the only way to arrive at knowledge. Epistemology needs to be re-engineered to understand the ontological position of those who it has marginalised. The best way to understand epistemology from those on the margins is to interrogate the methods through which knowledge is obtained, and to understand their socio-historical position. In the next section, I will explore how epistemology should reconsider its methodology to include the standpoint and lived experiences of those who have been excluded by the extant epistemic validation process. This requires understanding that those who have been epistemically excluded, marginalised, erased, or discredited have a unique method of developing and disseminating knowledge.

Epistemology needs to incorporate the ways in which language and language use exclude other knowers. If a vignette asks participants whether they “believe” or “know”, it may confuse speakers who would better understand the use of “think” (a semantic prime) rather than “believe”. Epistemology and x-phi needs to also take into consideration the way the digital world marginalises knowers through systemic and digital language. Technology also presents itself with biases towards those who have historically been epistemologically erased.

Conclusion

The multifaceted ways in which people know should be incorporated as valid epistemological methods. The validation process should take into consideration other epistemologies and ways that people come to “know”, be it through literature, music, theatre, or sagacity. Validation processes need to open up in order to facilitate the re-engineering of existing concepts. Methodologies involved in experimental philosophy cannot blindly rely on technologies that are not built around inclusion. Zulu epistemology, for example, exists in a certain way, and x-phi should approach the subject with a certain kind of finesse.

In the following chapter, I will explore how methodologies can be decolonised to include methodologies that speak to those on the margin. Changing the methodology from surveys to interview process would better suit the South African landscape, but even that process requires further decolonisation. In the following chapter, I will focus on how methods, methodology and paradigms can be decolonised to be more inclusive of other epistemologies.

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Chapter Five

Re-imagining Methods in Experimental Philosophy

Introduction

The question of how research is done is also a question of for whom research is done. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Lein & Tsai 2018, 278) asks the question: “Whose method is it anyway?” This chapter will explore this question within the conversation of decolonisation.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017) emphasises that since the enlightenment the question of the rational man has preoccupied philosophers: the Cartesian man that thinks and thus exists has been heralded as the standard for what a rational man is. The creation of a rational man not only lies in creating a rubric for what man is, but it has also created a blueprint for what man *is not*, and for *which* man is not. This way, the other can be created and relied upon to be known constantly as that which is not rational.

The question of how to study the other has always been shrouded in colonialism, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2017, 186) points out: “What is at issue is research as a terrain of pitting the ‘researcher’ with the ‘researched’.” For him, methodology needs to be decolonised as a matter of ethical, political and ontological importance, in so much as it is also a matter of knowledge production. In this chapter, I aim to discuss how the decolonisation of methodology is inextricably linked to the progress of experimental philosophy.

I begin by looking at what methods, methodology and paradigms are. I will then consider methods that have typically been excluded from the epistemic validation process. With reference to the works of Minna Salami and Patricia Collins-Hill, I will give an account of how black feminist rhetoric can further the re-conceptualisation of the epistemic process. I will then explore what indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) can contribute to decolonising methodology.

Method, Methodology and Paradigms

According to Collins-Hill, method is the technique that is used for gathering evidence; for example, interviewing and survey analysis constitute research methods or specific tools that need not be attached to any particular group’s interests (Collins-Hill, 2000). Methodology is a theory and analysis of how research should proceed. Method and methodology have been

intertwined with epistemology, and more specifically questions of who can be a knower, which beliefs can be legitimatised as knowledge and what kind of things can be known (Harding, 1987). Generally, these questions have been asked and answered according to a Western, white male gaze and have by and large excluded women and women of colour as knowers; thus, their techniques of gathering evidence have been excluded in knowledge production.

For Patricia Collins-Hill, a methodology “refers to the broad principles of how to conduct research and how interpretive paradigms are to be applied” (Collins-Hill 2000, 252). However, the methods used to validate knowledge claims must also be acceptable to the group controlling the knowledge validation process (ibid). Paradigms, according to Bagele Chilisa, are ways of describing a worldview that is informed by philosophical assumptions about the nature of social reality (ontology), ways of knowing (epistemology), and ethics and value systems (axiology). A paradigm also has theoretical assumptions about the research process and the appropriate approach to systematic inquiry (methodology) (Chilisa 2017, 820).

For the most part, the scientific method has relied heavily on the positivist paradigm of enquiry, and this has been to the detriment of marginalised knowledge holders. Collins-Hill (2000, 256) thus notes that “[i]t seems unlikely that Black women would rely exclusively on positivist paradigms in rearticulating a Black women’s standpoint”. This is so because the positivist paradigm has largely excluded black women and other knowledge systems on the periphery of the dominant Western paradigm.

[A Move From the Positivism Paradigm](#)

Chilisa (2012, 39) describes positivism as “a position or approach that holds that the scientific method is the only way to establish truth and objective reality”. This approach, she adds, “is based on the view that natural science is the only foundation for true knowledge. It holds that the methods, techniques, and procedures used in natural science offer the best framework for investigating the social world” (Chilisa 2012, 39). Furthermore, positivism relies on data collection through experimental, quasi-experimental, correlational, causal, comparative, and survey designs (Chilisa 2012, 40). However, as a paradigm, positivism lacks depth and overtly reproduces knowledge systems of dominant epistemologies.

Because positivism aims to create scientific descriptions of reality by producing objective generalisations (Collins-Hill 2000, 255), it requires that the researcher becomes a detached

observer. Collins-Hill identifies four requirements of the positivistic method. The first is that the researcher distances him-/herself from their object of study. The second requirement is the absence of emotion from the research process. The third is the removal of ethics and values from the research process. The fourth is commitment to adversarial debates as a preferred method of attaining truths (Collins-Hill 2000, 255).

Positivism informs the empirical method of study, which emphasises that “all knowledge derives from sensory experience, exists relatively uniformly outside of social contexts ... its very validity as knowledge rests on its replicability” (Gurr and Naples 2014, 96). This informs how the bulk of empirical study is done but fails to realise implicit biases of the researcher and the social context of the participants. Reliance on this method assumes a kind of objectivity that masks androcentric biases. Gurr and Naples (2014, 95) claim that this “discredits other ways of learning and knowing, which may rely upon or conjure networks of relationship, community knowledge, and subjective experiences”.

The above discussion of positivism as a paradigm by Collins-Hill and the point made by Gurr and Naples leads one to the conclusion that positivism has failed. Simply put, its failure has to do with the fact that it is a paradigm that was developed to understand the world from the perspective of those it was created to serve, namely white males.

Chilisa recommends that positivism be replaced by an indigenous research paradigm when research is done in African communities. Rather than collecting data through experimental or survey designs, the indigenous research paradigm should be “participatory, liberatory, and transformative research approaches and methodologies that draw from indigenous knowledge systems” (Chilisa 2012, 51). The indigenous research paradigm would gather data using techniques in philosophic sagacity, ethnophilosophy, language frameworks, indigenous knowledge systems, talk stories, and talk circles which would be adapted using other paradigms (such as interpretive and transformative paradigm and positivism). In the following section I will focus on how different paradigms challenge positivism, and how other methods can be employed to facilitate indigenous research.

Sensuous Knowledge

In her seminal work *sensuous knowledge*, Salami constructs an alternate concept of how knowledge can be acquired through emotional intelligence and intellectual skill. This type of knowledge goes against what Salami call “Europatriarchal knowledge” (hereafter, EPK), “a hierarchy-fixated construct of knowledge that was initiated by elite European men as propaganda to solidify their worldviews on a massive scale” (Salami 2020, 16). Given that the scientific method was created by a specific sub-set of people to serve a particular agenda, EPK amasses knowledge in order to dominate; it is rooted in whiteness and perceived rational objectivity. It favours technical knowledge over emotive knowledge, relies on analysis, data, surveys and statistics to validate knowledge processes. Lived experience and emotion are not considered valid methods of enquiry. Salami (2020, 16) argues that “our educational systems are stale ... they claim that emotions – central as they are to life – are incapable of explaining existence”. The rational quest to reduce life experiences into a survey or a spreadsheet is rooted deeply in EPK rationale and does a disservice to knowledge production.

Sensuous knowledge, on the other hand, aims to use the rational with emotive. In respect of some forms of this knowledge, for example, Salami (2020, 19) says that “poetry explains a feeling such as longing in a way the scientific method cannot.” Salami also talks about how dance “describes freedom in a way that mathematics cannot”. (2020, 19). In the positivist paradigm, sensuous knowledge would be classified as emotive and subjective thus removed from what counts as knowledge, but shall be indicated below, there are many iterations of sensuous knowledge that would otherwise fail to meet the positivist criteria.

Black Feminist Epistemology

In her work on black feminist thought, Patricia Collins-Hill (2000, 256) notes that “an experiential, material base underlies a black feminist epistemology”. For her, Black feminist epistemology refers to “collective experiences and accompanying worldviews that U.S. Black women sustained based on ...[their] particular history” (Collins-Hill 2000, 256). It is through science that major breakthroughs happen, but science, the academia and technical knowledge are not accessible to everyone, and those most removed from technical knowledge will use tools nearest to them to make sense of the world. According to Collins-Hill, black women are particularly removed from knowledge production and the epistemic validation process, as such they have employed different methods to create and disseminate knowledge, through lived experience and dialogue. Lived experience challenges the dominant notion that knowledge can

only be acquired through formal education. For Collins-Hill (2000, 258), “many Black women scholars invoke [their] own lived experiences and those of other African-American women in selecting topics for investigation and methodologies used”. Lived experience can create spaces of epistemological growth that relies on direct experience of the world and not through abstractions (Collins-Hill 2000, 258). I take this to mean that x-phi’s reliance on surveys takes away from this in service of abstractions that do not value the ways in which those on the periphery of the epistemic process produce knowledge.

Dialogue as a means for assessing knowledge is another method used by those on the margins of the epistemic validation process. Bell hooks defines dialogue as “talk between two subjects, not the speech of subject and object. It is a humanizing speech, one that challenges and resists domination” (Collins-Hill 2000, 260). Dialogue, for hooks, implies the participation of two or more parties – the speaker and the hearer(s) – in continual exchange of their epistemic positions. Dialogue as a methodology relies on community, as Collins-Hill (2000, 260) points out:

For Black women new knowledge claims are rarely worked out in isolation from other individuals and are usually developed through dialogues with other members of a community. A primary epistemological assumption underlying the use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims is that connectedness rather than separation is an essential component of the knowledge validation process.

The use of dialogue for African Americans has its roots in African-based oral traditions, according to which knowledge is validated through forms of sagacity, where knowledge is orally communicated, used and validated through the community. Dialogue thus relies on a certain connectedness, whereas debate requires one to assert their point in hopes of being right. Furthermore, dialogue opens a space for a richer outcome, one that can be rigorous and emotive.

In an ethnographic-qualitative study, Njoki M. Kamau employs both lived experience and dialogue to archive the experiences of women academics within the major universities in Kenya. Kamau’s (2011, 121) rationale for using this method was “to allow the research participants to identify, describe, question, and analyze the problems they experience in their daily lives both as women and as academics”. The study used the lived experiences of 24

academics and explored how their experience within these institutions impacted on how they become excluded from promotions, positions of power and how they are taken seriously as knowers. Most of the women in these institutions were hired with the intent of increasing the number of women in institutions, but once they were hired, their prospects of growth in their careers stagnated due to a lack of funding and support.

Promotion for these women became harder than their male counterparts, because they were not in the “brotherhood”, as recounted by Regina, a participant whose name had been changed. According to Regina, her promotion had to be facilitated by a male colleague: “Regina tells us that a male colleague coached her on the tips to success. These unwritten rules are not readily accessible to all academic women. Moreover, this dependency on male academics might pose serious threats to women who may seek to establish their own autonomy and independent career paths” (Kamau 2011, 125). More than this, women are viewed as inferior epistemic agents incapable of being knowers in their own right. “Women’s qualifications are under far more scrutiny than those of their male colleagues” (Kamau 2011, 125). According to her, women are also expected to fail; and if they succeed, it is attributed to luck or their attractiveness.

Women were also more likely to be given tedious administrative tasks that took time away from their research. Furthermore, Kamau found that women were excluded from social circles that shared significant information on conferences and workshops, which are vital to their progression. The lack of mentorship also has impact on women, and most often their male counterparts prefer to mentor other males. Angela, another participant, gives an account of how she and a male colleague graduated with their masters at the same time. However, the head of department, who was male, mentored and tutored only her male colleague for promotion. In addition, there is the issue of distrust in the ability of women as knowers, and this has hindered their career progression.

I can also personally attest to the difficulties women face in academia. In an interview for a job that I sat in, a candidate for a position who had excelled academically and was the most qualified candidate for the position, was disqualified on the basis that she promoted black feminism. One of the panel members, who was male, stated verbatim: “We do not need this divisive black feminism babble in our department.” This lived experience has stayed with me throughout my academic life, and it crystalised my position as an outsider in academia. It not

only invalidated the hard work done by the candidate but also my existence as a knowing agent in the institution. Black women face both testimonial and hermeneutic injustice in knowledge production. Confronted with this marginalisation, black women have created alternate epistemologies that give credence to their status as knowers.

This puts black women in a position to adequately challenge EPK, because of black women's ability to be the "outsider-within", where they have had to participate in dominant cultures through exposure to the white world and navigate their subjugated experiences. Accordingly, black women can be said to have become the custodians of dominant narratives and those on the margins.

[Standpoint Theory and Strong Objectivity](#)

Nancy Naples and Barbara Gurr argue that claiming neutrality in research only aims to mask the politics of power at play. For Naples and Gurr (2014, 95), "a feminist re-imagining of knowledge includes efforts to unmask all claims to objectivity as an ideological cover for masculine bias by pointing out the shortcomings, incompleteness and exclusiveness of mainstream history". And the antidote against such shortcomings, incompleteness and exclusiveness, they note, is Standpoint Theory. Standpoint Theory claims "that the knowledge and theories of marginalized populations hold more epistemic authority than the knowledge developed by dominant groups" (Gurr & Naples 2014, 127). The advantage of marginalised groups or minorities, according to Standpoint Theory, is that they have a more complete standpoint on knowledge because of their ability to possess a double consciousness, or the ability to absorb both dominant epistemologies as well as their own marginalised epistemologies.

Sandra Harding argues for strong objectivity, or the "[acknowledgment] that the production of power is a political process and that greater attention paid to the context and social location of knowledge producers will contribute to a more ethical and transparent result" (Gurr & Naples 2014, 120). Strong objectivity advocates for neither classical objectivity nor relativism. Rather it is the acknowledgement that knowledge production takes place within certain power dynamics and social locations and as such is cognisant of the fact that certain groups are not afforded epistemic authority. This places greater importance on the situated knower and "situated knowledge to reflect the importance of diverse ways of knowing for improving the production of knowledge" (Gurr & Naples 2014, 99).

Those with power find themselves in a position where they are given both epistemic authority and epistemic privilege. Epistemic authority is given to those who are in a better position to see the world; those who can give authority to knowledge claims. Epistemic privilege is given to those who are known to be authorities on knowledge production. Gurr and Naples (2014, 102) note:

Epistemic privilege can be provided, enforced, occluded, or restricted in a myriad of shifting social contexts, including race, class, gender, and sexuality; cognitive and physical ability; citizenship; communities of knowledge production and knowledge sharing such as university departments and activist organizations; and so on.

In order for knowledge production to be fair, “[t]he point of view of all those involved in the knowledge production process must be acknowledged and taken into account in order to produce strong objectivity. In this way, knowledge production should involve a collective process, rather than the individualistic, top-down, and distanced approach that typifies the traditional scientific method” (Gurr & Naples 2014, 113). Strong objectivity and Standpoint Theory relate the subject and object of inquiry in knowledge production, in contrast to the scientific method that claims that there is no relation between the two, and where the subject is given epistemic authority.

Those who have been exposed to dominant epistemologies straddle a unique line, where they can have both the perspective of the dominant and the marginalised. As such, the situated knower has a worldview that sees how knowledge is produced by those with epistemic authority and privilege; yet they also in turn possess a greater authority in knowledge production because they have the perspective of both the marginalised and dominant groups. It is this perspective that would provide richer outcomes for epistemology. Epistemology, and by extension x-phi, can no longer claim objectivity without acknowledging power relations and how those power relations interact with other knowledge systems.

[Indigenous Knowledge Systems](#)

Critiques of research methods and methodology in indigenous knowledge have been levelled by indigenous scholars such as Carl Mika (2012). For Mika, method plays a significant role in Western philosophy. It is the assumption that phenomena can be ordered in a very precise manner (Mika 2012). However, from the indigenous Māori perspective, “there is always

greater entity or phenomenon that sits outside of the human self, including his or her thoughtful practice. It waits for discussion beyond each step of the research and sometimes unrelated to the outcome” (Mika 2012, 130). Indigenous method stresses focus on the interconnectedness of people, and nature. It is a holistic philosophy that does not concern itself with rationality as commonly conceived, “thus indigenous holism does not have an issue with the mystical” (Mika 2012, 129).

In this section, my aim is to highlight how IKS can function within the African scope. In her book *Indigenous Research*, Chilisa outlines what is envisioned by postcolonial indigenous research as “a framework of belief systems that emanate from the lived experiences, values, and history of those belittled and marginalized by Euro-Western research paradigms” (Chilisa 2012, 34). For Chilisa, Euro-Western research paradigms are indigenous to Euro-Western societies. This of course is not to say other researchers outside the Euro-Western fray have not contributed successfully to this methodology, but this research paradigm was not created with diversity and inclusion in mind.

Chilisa (2012) goes on to explain that the postcolonial indigenous research techniques should include a process of decolonising the conventional interview method by using indigenous interview methods such as talking circles that are compatible with the worldviews of the colonised other. This can be seen as a way of incorporating the worldviews of those who are marginalised by the dominant epistemological framework as well as recognising that their worldview is one of survival. The marginalised group has had to survive epistemological erasure and adapt other responsive methods of epistemological agency.

This prompts the creation of what Chilisa terms the “third space methodology”, where the worldviews of those formally marginalised by their gender, race, ethnicity, ableness, health, socio-economics status, sexual orientation, sex and so on are given a space to integrate their lived experience into research that is being conducted. Thus, postcolonial indigenous research methodologies “challenge the ideologies embedded in these [positivist] methods and propose ways of decolonising and indigenising the research methods so that the methods are inclusive of locals and indigenous knowledge that are relevant and responsive to the experiences and needs of researched communities” (Chilisa 2012, 43).

One of the methods employed by Chilisa is a decolonised interview method that “valorises the collective construction of knowledge and love and respect for the connections and relationships that participants have with one another” (Chilisa 2012, 176). The common interview method usually takes on the standard view of either an unstructured interview, where the researcher asks general questions in the area of study, or a semi-structured interview where there are general questions as well as general topics to be covered in the interview, and finally the structures or standardised interview where there are set questions the researcher asks participants.

This Euro-Western interview process lacks a certain finesse for understanding how African societies interact with knowledge systems. Chilisa (2012, 177) suggests a decolonised view where the researcher “is accountable to the participants, and the participants are in turn accountable to their communities”. The point is that research should be done in service of the communities researched and not only for the research community, as such the researcher should not hold a superior position to those studied and should be an active participant him-/herself. For Chilisa (2012, 35), the “ethics and value system that define relations and responsibilities of the researchers to the researched should be addressed before ontological and epistemological questions and should drive the research process from formulation of research proposal to the dissemination of findings”.

Chilisa suggests a relational interview method within the postcolonial indigenous knowledge system which is built on the premise that the researcher has a responsibility to its participants. The relational interview method incorporates the life-focused story interview method. In keeping with the principles of a postcolonial indigenous research paradigm, the focused life-story interview method which “invokes relational ways of knowing to enable the use of an interview guide that brings to the discussion ways in which people are connected with one another and the environment, as well as topics absent from the standard vocabulary of academic disciplines” (Chilisa 2012, 178). This interview method allows the participant to tell the life story that they have lived, through these connections with other are made apparent and from this an epistemology can be derived. Similar to Collins-Hill, this method allows for those who have not been able to participate within knowledge production to tell their story of how life makes sense to them in the ways they have had too.

Chilisa (2012, 180) also outlines philosophic sagacity as an indigenous interview method, “from this perspective, the theory of knowledge and questions about knowledge can be found in the wisdom and beliefs of wise elders of the communities who have not been schooled in the formal education systems”. This allows researchers to access a large body of work that is not easily available in current literature. This is an important aspect of indigenous research methods, as it gives a unique glimpse into the thinking of those who are excluded from epistemic validation processes, as well as those whose research methods were not developed to include. Philosophic sagacity allows the researcher to sift through their interpretations and analyse how their perspective couches their epistemological outlook.

In the postcolonial indigenous interview method, the interview would begin with recognising the participant’s relationship with their environment and celebrating their connection. In addition to presenting the participants with relevant documentation, the researcher would also put forth their “relations with other, with the cosmos, and with the topic of research” (Chilisa 2012, 187). This creates a rapport that the researcher is not an invisible entity that is simply there to excavate information, the researcher creates a connection that allows the participants to know that the researcher is a person within the related cosmos.

Cultural symbols used by the participants form a great part of their worldviews. This could refer to “the customs, norms, or behaviours not found in the West” (Chilisa 2012, 97). These cultural symbols form the basis of how participants view the world, and how the world has viewed them. Thus, a researcher who understands these cultural symbols is better suited to conduct research in a manner that is holistic and in synch with the participants.

This method of decolonising the interview method can be applicable to x-phi, instead of presenting vignettes with jargon that is not applicable to their worldview, the interview method would serve x-phi better in not only understanding epistemic intuitions but also their epistemic and ontological worldview. In the next chapter, I outline a way forward for x-phi and epistemological enquiry that is not only decolonised, but also inclusive.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the different methodologies that can be incorporated into the method of knowledge acquisition. I have discussed how incorporating the lived experiences and standpoint of those who have not been able to participate in epistemic validation, can contribute

positively to what counts as knowledge and who is a valid knower. I also discuss the way in which the interview method is better suited for x-phi, and the way in which the interview process should include the worldviews of those being interviewed and how research should be of benefit to the communities being researched.

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Conclusion

I began my thesis with a discussion on decolonisation and the process of Africanisation, and I contend that as part of the decolonisation project, we need to Africanise the methodology of x-phi. Epistemic intuitions may well be universal, in that we all share the same judgements on what is and is not an instance of knowledge. This, however, does not mean that x-phi does not have a responsibility to ensure that the method that has and is being put forward, is not understandable and concise to every participant irrespective of their language use.

By way of rounding off the dissertation, I revisit the outline of the #FMF movement of 2015 in South Africa, which intensified the decolonial conversation particularly in South Africa that had begun to run stagnant. It forced universities to challenge a lot more than just the spaces students occupy: it challenged knowledge from the ground up. Furthermore, it created a space for institutions to look back at how the colonial legacy created a Eurocentric epistemic legacy that dominates through many disciplines. Fallism and decolonisation forced the status quo to reconsider the basics that have been taken for granted. The scientific method had largely gone unchallenged, and its supremacy had become law, but fallism challenged its dominance over the disciplines and that challenge gave impetus to x-phi. Our reliance on technology and the scientific method in x-phi is not entirely bad, but it is certainly not entirely without its problems.

In chapter two, I discuss the Weinberg *et al.* (2001) study which aimed to show how we may share differing epistemic intuitions based on varying factors such as gender or ethnicity, to name a few. The study's aim was to show how differences in epistemic intuitions may be able facilitate a diverse set of truths, but the findings from the replication studies show that the epistemic intuitions we share, may be universal. This may also cause some tension in that *universality* has not always been a neutral term. Because the term *universal* tends to imply *Western*, universalism has gained a bad reputation. What x-phi has done, however, is to show that despite our particularities we all share the same interest in truth and knowledge.

In chapter three, my aim was to replicate the Weinberg *et al.* (2001) study using African participants. Because of the Machery *et al.* (2001) study that had already been conducted, it was unlikely that my results would deviate far from theirs. My study, however, incorporated a section for open-ended responses, which I found to be richer and more nuanced than the survey question. Surveys are not the ideal data collection tool for African participants and other

participants who have largely been excluded by the scientific method and the epistemic validation process – not to mention issues around digital literacy and digital access.

In chapter four, I discussed the ways in which knowledge production and the tools that have been used to get to truth and knowledge, have failed certain marginalised groups. I argue that it would be in the best interest of x-phi to structure questions in a language that is accessible to as many peoples and cultures as possible through the use of semantic primes. The use of the term *believe* in epistemology is a misnomer, because what *believe* means in different languages could be equated to “think”. This minor change will not only make x-phi cross translatable to different languages without losing its context, but it will also make the question less abstract for the participants.

We rely heavily on technology to help us with many aspects of our research methods. I used Statistica in my study to collate data into a sensible cohesive whole. As a tool, Statistica was helpful in reducing the time needed to sort out all the information I had collected. If I were required to translate the vignette into a language with which I am unfamiliar, I might have relied on technology to help me. In this instance, I might have used Google Translate, but (as I discussed in chapter five), there are inherent biases laden into those algorithms. Perez (2019, 125) asserts that:

Cultural stereotypes can be found in artificial intelligence (AI) technologies already in widespread use. For example, when Londa Schiebinger, a professor at Stanford University, used translation software to translate a newspaper interview with her from Spanish into English, both Google Translate and Systran repeatedly used male pronouns to refer to her, despite the presence of clearly gendered terms like “profesora” (female professor). Google Translate will also convert Turkish sentences with gender-neutral pronouns into English stereotypes. “O bir doktor,” which means “S/he is a doctor” is translated into English as “He is a doctor”, while “O bir hemşire” (which means “S/he is a nurse”) is rendered “She is a nurse”. Researchers have found the same behavior for translations into English from Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian and Persian.

The same bias occurs when “ungudokotela” or “s/he is a doctor” and “uyinesi” or “s/he is a nurse” is translated using Google Translate. These biases would not have been identified if those who had experienced this hermeneutic injustice did not object and articulate their

experiences. There is not a shared social interest in understanding the experiences of those who have spent their existence being marginalised by the epistemic process. Those on the margins have created their own methods to express their knowledge claim; be it through dialogue, lived experiences, knowledge that is sensuous, or intellectual skill.

Collins-Hill's (2000, 257) black feminist epistemology encompasses this succinctly. As a black woman sharing her lived experience, she notes that "when you come right down to it, white women just think they are free. Black women know they ain't free". There is a sense here that there is something that black women know that white women do not. There is an experience that stems from a place of knowing what freedom is and is not; what agency is and is not; and the conditions that have to be met to attain such freedom.

Society has given women freedoms but continues to perpetuate microaggressions towards black women that ensure that their freedoms are limited. This was demonstrated by Noble's findings about black women whose way of wearing their natural hair is considered unprofessional. This form of discrimination is well hidden, but those who experience it, do not just "think" it exists; they know it exists and they know it affects them directly: they do not *think* that it does. There is a way in which those on the margins have navigated such hermeneutic injustices and created places of safety within their own communities for their experiences and knowledge claims.

Chapter five looked at the different ways people on the margins have made sense of the world around them. It gives an account of the ways the traditional positivist method have failed those for whom it was never created. I argue here that paradigms need to be shifted, and that methods and methodologies need to be changed in order for the reconceptualisation of epistemology to take place. In order to re-imagine epistemology through x-phi, we need to re-imagine the techniques we use to gather information. By incorporating sensuous knowledge, lived experiences and dialogue in our method, we open up x-phi to a bigger epistemic audience.

From this, I theorise that the best way for x-phi to be more inclusive of difference, is to work within the confines of the spaces in which it finds itself. For Mika (2012), indigenous research within a Māori space needs to work from a place of excess, philosophical enquiry and research should take a holistic approach. It should understand the interconnectedness of things in the world around us. Excess is going beyond the positivistic method and understanding that one's research may take you on an unexpected and less traveled path where "the indigenous self

would be led by all the phenomena of a forest but resist beating a predetermined path through it” (Mika 2012, 132). Mika gives the example of an interviewer who may ask a Māori indigenous elder a question, and rather than answer the question, the elder (who is not necessarily old) may ask, “Why do you ask this question?” This may lead the research to move in a different direction, and “a courageous researcher might ignore the original research question and its method, preferring instead to follow the dark path of speculation” (Mika 2012, 132).

This thread of connectedness is woven throughout many theories of indigenous knowledge systems. For Chilisa (2012, 175) the “postcolonial indigenous worldviews lean toward communities’ togetherness, cooperation, and connectedness”. Giving an account of the Dingaka (diviner) interview process, Chilisa shows how the relational interview method creates a mutually beneficial ebb and flow of information between a client and a diviner. Dingaka are found in most parts of Southern Africa. By using a dine set of bones they can tell what ails their clients and what steps are needed to rectify their problems. During this process, the client is asked to throw a set of bones that represent the experiences and social life of the client. At this point, the dingaka constructs a life story of the client and the client is asked to confirm the stated experiences. Together with the client, dingaka goes back and forth until the crux of the client’s problems is ascertained. This is an example of a post-colonial indigenous relational way of knowing, according to Chilisa (2012, 177) because:

1. In the context of the diviner and the client, there is no absolute knowledge; the diviner and the client construct the story together, guided by an indigenous theory of social life symbolized by the divine set.
2. The divine set symbolizes a complex, expansive, and infinite context within which the interview and construction of the story take place. The complex context in many ways symbolizes the many connections and web of relations that the client has with other people, the land, and the environment. What is important to note is that context is brought to the consciousness of both the diviner and the client through symbolic representations of the environment of the client’s life.
3. The story in whatever form is read and agreed upon. No interpretation occurs in the absence of the three: diviner, client, and symbolic representations.

Chilisa uses the relational interview method to show that the exchange of information and knowledge has no power dynamics. The interviewer and interviewee symbiotically construct a narrative that they are both responsible for. In the context of x-phi, the researcher would present a vignette to their participant and the participant would also be in a position to ask the interviewer questions on their take on the study. Both parties would have responsibility for each other and both parties should understand that the initial question could lead to myriad of other questions and answers. In the traditional interview method, this would not be possible because there would be a set of structured questions already set out by the researcher that structure how the interview should go. In the relational interview method, we could allow for excess, and be less bound to follow the beaten path towards knowledge.

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Appendix 1

Research

Instrument

Participant information sheet

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Nolwandle Lembethe and I am a PhD student Wits University in Johannesburg. As part of my studies I have to undertake a research project, and I am investigating knowledge. My study aims to investigate the use of epistemic intuitions in the acquisition of knowledge, epistemic intuitions are the snap judgments we make about statements that relate to truth and knowledge, for example, the statement “Kim knows there’s a bear outside” and the statement “Kim believes there’s a bear outside” are intuitively different because of the use of “knows” and “believes” and how we have come to know what both words mean.

If Kim has been outside and has seen the bear, and most likely heard it roar, then Kim is justified in saying she knows there is a bear outside as she has enough information to validate that knowledge claim. However, if Kim is inside the house, and hears a roar from a bear, then she most likely believes there’s a bear outside because she does not have enough justification to claim to have knowledge of there being a bear outside.

Why is this survey being done?

Knowing something and believing something have different implications for the study of knowledge and truth. Kim knowing there’s a bear is based on what we hope is proper justification and having all enough information at Kim’s disposal, whereas believing there’s a bear might not have enough justification to believe that statement is the truth. Having knowledge in an epistemic sense, means that knowledge is a fact that has been arrived at in the right way, and in most cases when we are confronted with instances where we decide whether a statement is true or not, we usually rely on our intuition. I aim to find out whether Africans and Westerners use the same intuitions in their acquisition of knowledge. I aim to examine whether or not African epistemic intuitions about knowledge differ from Western epistemic intuitions, and what would the implications of those findings be for the decolonisation of the curriculum.

How long will it take?

As part of this project I would like to invite you to take part in answering a questionnaire. The questionnaire will take around 15 minutes.

What is expected of you as the participant?

This activity will involve reading a short thought experiment. You will be presented with a short extract describing a scenario in which an individual will think they have certain knowledge about a particular situation. You will be asked to determine, based on your own discretion, whether or not the individuals in the extracts know for sure that the information they have is knowledge, or if they simply believe it is correct but not necessarily true.

Benefits of participation

You will not receive any direct benefits from participating in this study, and there are no disadvantages or penalties for not participating. You may withdraw at any time or choose not to answer any question if you do not want to.

Privacy and confidentiality

The questionnaire will be completely confidential and anonymous as I will not be asking for your name or any identifying information, and the information you give to me will be held securely and not disclosed to anyone else.

If you have any questions afterwards about this research, feel free to contact me on the details listed below. This study will be written up as a research report which will be available online through the university library website. If you have any queries, concerns or complaints regarding the ethical procedures of this study, you are welcome to contact the University Human Research Ethics Committee (non-medical), telephone + 27(0)11 717 1408, email hrec-medical.researchoffice@wits.ac.za/ Shaun.Schoeman@wits.ac.za.

Yours sincerely,

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016 910 3476

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Consent Form

Participant consent form

Title of research: A Study of African and Western epistemic intuitions and implications for decolonisation

Name of researcher: Nolwandle Lembethe

I agree to participate in this research project. The research has been explained to me and I understand what my participation will involve.

I agree that my participation will remain anonymous

YES	NO
☐	☐

I agree that the researcher may use anonymous quotes
in his research report

YES NO

I agree that the interview may be audio recorded

I agree that the information I provide may be used YES NO
anonymously by other researchers following this study

Demographic questions

1. What is your age?
 - a. 18-24
 - b. 25-34
 - c. 35-44
 - d. 45-54
 - e. 55-64
 - f. 65+

2. In which population group do you fall?
 - a. Black or African
 - b. Asian or Indian

- c. White
 - d. Coloured
 - e. Other [Please specify]
3. What is your highest level of education completed?
- a. No formal Schooling
 - b. Primary education
 - c. Some secondary education
 - d. Completed matric
 - e. Higher education (degree or diploma)
 - f. Vocational training
4. What gender do you identify as?
- [Open-ended question]
5. What is your households monthly income?
- a. Unemployed
 - b. Student
 - c. Between R0 and R5000
 - d. Between R5000 and R10 000
 - e. Between R10 000 and R25 000
 - f. Between R25 000 and R50 000
 - g. Between R50 000 and R100 000
 - h. Over R100 000

Vignette

One day Sipho is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain becomes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature where he is. Sipho is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to think that it is 22 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 22 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 22 degrees in his room.

In the above statement, which is correct?

- a) Sipho is concerned he might have brain damage from the falling rock hitting him.
- b) Sipho might have estimated the temperature in his room correctly.

In the above statement, does Sipho really know that it was 22 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it?

- a) Really knows
- b) Only believes

Any specific comment you would like to add?

[Open-ended question]