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# Down-sizing and right-sizing: An analysis of the demobilisation process in the South African National Defence Force

**Mashike, John Lephophotho**

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# Demobilisation-Reintegration Processes in Southern Africa with special reference to Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique

## 3.1 Introduction

This chapter contextualises the issue of demobilisation-reintegration at a regional level. It analyses demobilisation-reintegration processes (DRPs) in Southern Africa between 1980 and 2000 with special reference to Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. These four countries were chosen for two reasons – first, because of their proximity to and past relations with South Africa; second, because they had a similar history. This history has three features. First, in all these countries independence was preceded by an armed struggle, during which statutory forces played a central role in defence of authoritarian regimes. Second, at the end of the armed struggle all these countries created new national defence forces by integrating former soldiers from the different armed groups that took part in the conflict. Third, the process of restructuring the armed forces included the demobilisation of some soldiers and their reintegration into civilian society. While all these represent a regional pattern, there are some differences, which will also be discussed in this chapter. This chapter will show that demobilisation-reintegration in all these countries has rarely involved either effective disarmament or effective social reintegration in the sense of restoring ex-combatants to their communities with demilitarised social identities that involve access to employment and supportive social networks. Instead

many ex-combatants throughout the region have reported a sense of marginalisation and social dislocation. The incidence of banditry means that they have become the targets for much contemporary social anxiety about gun violence.

The discussion of DRPs in Southern Africa is important because South Africa is an integral part of the Southern African region. South Africa and its neighbours share a common history, including 30 years of war. Because of this history, and the proximity of South Africa to these countries, South Africa's destiny, security and prosperity are inextricably linked to those of its neighbours. The region is unique in Africa because of its history of a large, white, settler population. As a consequence, all the countries discussed in this chapter experienced a counter-revolutionary war in which white Rhodesia, apartheid South Africa and colonial Portugal defended settler colonialism. "Those countries not settled directly by white settlers, but which bordered the settler countries, became the Frontline States. Since these states offered refuge for freedom fighters from settler countries, they were often joined in the struggle for the sub-region's liberation" (Olowu, 2004: 6). The end of Portuguese colonialism in both Angola and Mozambique left apartheid South Africa isolated, but did not lead to peace in the region. To defend the last bastion of white political domination in Southern Africa, apartheid South Africa embarked on a programme of regional destabilisation (Landsberg, 2004). This involved the occupation of South West Africa (later renamed Namibia) and repeated military attacks and raids in neighbouring countries, including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

One of the consequences of South Africa's destabilisation programme was the inability of its neighbours to set their national priorities without considering the war against apartheid. "In previous decades, the mantra 'ending apartheid' was integral to the national interest of each of South Africa's neighbours" (Vale, 2001: 20). According to Vale (2001), other states in the region were defined not so much by an interaction of internal forces but by their external attitude towards South Africa. Landsberg (2004) argues that due to its history of regional destabilisation, South Africa cannot avoid engaging the Southern African region. "This destabilisation role has resulted in a situation where countries in the region see South Africa as almost permanently beholden and politically and economically indebted to the region" (Landsberg, 2004: 2).

The analysis of demobilisation-reintegration processes in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique is divided into several sections. The first section focuses on the fundamental elements of a DRP. The argument is that while DRPs are influenced by their different political contexts, four essential operational elements are necessary for the success of a DRP. These are assembly (also known as encampment), discharge, short-term reinsertion and long-term reintegration. Sections 3.3 through 3.6 deal with DRPs in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. These four countries are discussed individually in order to show how the causes of an armed conflict, its nature, its duration and the political context when it is concluded shape the nature and outcome of a DRP. The last section discusses similarities of DRPs in the four countries – first, the absence of gender sensitivity in the design and execution of reintegration programmes, and second, the problems encountered by all the countries in the establishment of new national armies and restructured civil-military relations.

## 3.2 The Fundamental Elements of a DRP

### 3.2.1 The Different Phases of a Demobilisation-Reintegration Programme

There is no blueprint of a demobilisation-reintegration process that can be universally applied. However, there are certain important elements of demobilisation and reintegration that must be included in all demobilisation-reintegration programmes to ensure success (see for example, Ball, 1997, 1998; Colletta, 1997, 2001; Clark, 1995, 1996). An ideal DRP consists of four interlinked phases: assembly, discharge, short-term reinsertion and longer-term reintegration (Ball, 1997, 1998). The first two phases, assembly and discharge, constitute the demobilisation stage, while short-term reinsertion and longer-term reintegration constitute the reintegration stage (Ball, 1997, 1998). Assembly is necessary in order to account for all soldiers and their weapons and, where there is no clear victor, to build confidence between the former warring parties so that each side will remain committed to peace. The assembly phase may be used to achieve some reconciliation and to build a common institutional culture in cases where the peace deal includes the integration of all armed forces to build a new national defence force. While in camps, combatants receive salaries, food, clothing, shelter and medical care. In order to achieve maximum efficiency, combatants are

registered and each receives an identification card and other documents. This allows managers to monitor and record combatants' arrival and departure to minimise desertion, especially with arms (World Bank, 1993). Arms control is important because, as argued in Chapter 2, the availability of small arms and light weapons increases the risk that disputes between individuals may be settled with deadly violence, since most ex-combatants have learned little else than solving problems by using violence (Kingma, 1998). Registration of soldiers is also important for logistical purposes, as it serves as the final tally of who will receive reintegration assistance, for those leaving the military entirely (Clark, 1995).

However, the process of registration and documentation of combatants is often characterised by problems. The main problem is the fact that, almost without exception, it is very difficult to obtain an accurate count of combatants' there are frequently discrepancies with the force totals claimed prior to the start of the demobilisation process (World Bank, 1993). Reasons for the absence of an accurate count of combatants vary. In the case of guerrilla armies, it is often very difficult to give a precise number of soldiers under arms. This is also linked to the problem of definition, since in most cases it is difficult to precisely distinguish combatants from non-combatants during the liberation struggle. Other reasons include military leaders' attempts to intimidate opponents by deliberately inflating the size of the force. Some may under-report as an attempt to keep a portion of their forces hidden outside the camps, "in reserve" to respond to contingencies, as was the case in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996; World Bank, 1993; Porto and Parsons, 2003). The response to a call to assembly areas depends on two conditions. First, it depends on how the military leaders and their subordinates feel in reporting to the camps and their confidence in the peace process. Second, it depends on the incentives offered for demobilisation and conditions in the camps (World Bank, 1993).

The assembly phase is followed by the discharge phase. Soldiers are said to have been discharged after they have handed in their weapons, received demobilisation documents and gratuities, and have physically left the assembly camp (Clark, 1995, 1996; Ball, 1997, 1998). Prior to discharge, soldiers should receive information about civilian life including rights and duties, opportunities and constraints (Colletta, 2001).

Discharge is followed by the first phase of reintegration, which is short-term reinsertion. The concept "reinsertion" refers to assistance in the form of a transitory safety net to help ex-soldiers to settle down (Ball, 1998). Providing short-term monetary or in-kind assistance provides ex-combatants with an important buffer period to think about how they can earn a living in a civilian economy (Clark, 1996). According to Colletta (2001), reinsertion benefits are spread out over a several-month period, roughly equivalent to a single growing season. This is followed by long-term reintegration, which consists of three components: social, political and economic reintegration. Unlike demobilisation, this is not time-bound.

### 3.2.2 Different Forms of Reintegration

Kingma (1998) defines social reintegration as the process though which ex-combatants are made to feel part of and accepted by the community. The attitudes of communities towards the ex-combatants are important and depend on the history of the war and the degree of general reconciliation (Kingma, 1998). For example, in Uganda ex-combatants who did not receive a warm welcome were usually those who were known to have had some sort of problem (such as alcohol, stealing or other criminal activities) before joining the army (Kazoora, 1998). In Mozambique high levels of violence conducted by both RENAMO and government forces against the civilian population in rural areas antagonised civilians. Wilson (1992) argues that violence as used by RENAMO virtually became a cult. As a result of the experience of war-time violence, it appears that people "now support which ever side will protect them, in order to save their own skin" (Vines, 1996: 94). At the end of war, ex-combatants in the rural areas had to undergo cleansing rituals in order to be accepted; this had an impact both on the acceptance by the community as well as on the feelings of ex-combatants themselves. Furthermore, gifts to elders played an important role in the social reintegration of ex-combatants (Kingma, 1998).

Political reintegration refers to a process through which ex-combatants learn to participate fully in the political life of their communities (Kingma, 1998). Political reintegration includes participation in structures such as local councils, schools and local security committees.

Economic reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants build up their livelihoods, through production and/or other forms of gainful employment (Kingma, 2000). Different countries implemented various economic reintegration programmes. Reintegration programmes refer to measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families' (in cases where their families were also displaced) economic and social reintegration into civil society (United Nations, 2000b). The mechanisms included job generation, community development, micro-enterprises, salary supplements to employers, co-operatives, job placement services, training including apprenticeships, formal vocational training, managerial/ administrative training, credit schemes, education, agricultural extension services, veteran/spouse information/counselling and rehabilitation for physically/mentally disabled soldiers (Ball, 1997). Reintegration programmes are part of long-term reintegration and differ from reinsertion benefits, which serve as a transitory safety net. Monetary compensation is one of the central pillars of economic reintegration programmes.

Monetary benefits facilitate the ex-combatants' ability to re-establish lives outside the military by enabling them to purchase needed commodities or to undertake entrepreneurial endeavours, both of which may require a sizeable amount of capital (Clark, 1996). Monetary benefits take the form of either a lump-sum payment or a series of payments. The rationale for choosing lump-sum payment is that it provides an immediately available sum for combatants who want compensation (World Bank, 1993). "The principal benefit of a lump-sum payment is that it is administratively easier to distribute because it is only done once. A single distribution can be done while the combatants are still in one place" (Clark, 1996: 15). Other advantages are that transaction costs can be reduced, leakage better controlled, and beneficiaries can make more flexible use of the benefits (Colletta, 2001). However, experiences from different countries show that most ex-combatants tend to have limited success in investing their lump-sum payments in productive activities (World Bank, 1993). The temptation to spend the entire amount on items and services that will not serve the demobilised combatant beyond the short term is great (Clark, 1996). This is largely due to their lack of, or limited, financial management and investment experience. Demobilised soldiers often make the mistake of seeing themselves as being very rich, and thus lend money to their friends and buy presents for children (Cock, 1993).

The discussion of reintegration programmes in Southern Africa will be confined to economic reintegration programmes, for two reasons. First, economic reintegration programmes are the cornerstone of the reintegration of soldiers into civilian life. As argued in Chapter 1, in the medium and long term, incomplete or ineffective economic reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society may lead to armed criminality by those former soldiers who have no other means of earning a living. Second, scholarly information about social and political reintegration is sketchy, and this makes it difficult to make a regional evaluation of such programmes. It is the contention of this chapter that the choice and design of DRPs depend on a number of factors which include the causes of an armed conflict, its nature, its duration, and the political context within which it is concluded (International Peace Academy, 2002).

## 3.3 The Case of Zimbabwe

### 3.3.1 The Lancaster House Agreement and Demobilisation-Reintegration

Cawthra (1993) describes the war of liberation in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia at the time) as the bloodiest of all anti-colonial struggles in Africa. More than 35,000 Zimbabweans died in the struggle to end white minority rule, following Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965. The struggle for independence ended with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979. The main belligerents fighting against white rule in Rhodesia were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), led by Robert Mugabe, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its military wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), led by Joshua Nkomo. The Lancaster House Agreement established the terms of the Constitution for an independent Zimbabwe, the terms for free elections, and a ceasefire supervised by the British Commonwealth.

In April 1980, the government implemented defence force restructuring, which included the demobilisation and reintegration of all the three combatant groups – ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF). The objective was to build an integrated, professional and ethnically balanced armed force of about 33,000 men and women from the 80,000 to 100,000 available. The majority were former

ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants, with several thousand African troops from the Rhodesian Security Forces (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). The Lancaster House Agreement recognised all three fighting forces as having legitimate claims for incorporation into the new army (Cock, 1993). The integration of the armed forces was a complex task in that it involved amalgamating mutually antagonistic armies, each of which was intact and undefeated at the end of the armed conflict.

Abel Muzorewa had a personal army of 20,000 Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA), nominally under the RSF control. Robert Mugabe's ZANU had over 16,000 ZANLA guerrillas at assembly points, with a further one-third of his force hidden among the civilian population. ZANLA was supported by 500 regular FRELIMO troops and an unspecified number of members of the Tanzanian armed forces. Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU is reported to have moved 5,500 cadres to the assembly points (including some MK cadres), while a smaller group was located in the Bulawayo area. A further force of between 6,000 and 8,000 ZIPRA cadres was still based in Zambia (Rupiah, 1995). It was estimated that guerrilla leaders held back between 10,000 and 15,000 guerrilla combatants across the border as an insurance policy (World Bank, 1993).

However, there were other reasons that made ex-combatants reluctant to enter assembly points. For example, on December 29, the day after the ceasefire was declared, one of ZIPRA's units was surrounded by Rhodesian forces and seven members of the unit were shot dead (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). Other factors that contributed to the complexity were the differences in ethnic and regional composition of the respective armed forces. ZANLA guerrillas came chiefly from the east and were predominately Shona speakers; ZIPRA members came mainly from the west and were overwhelmingly Ndebele but with some Kalanga speakers (Kriger, 2003).

After ex-combatants had entered assembly areas, signs of division in the Patriotic Front (PF) (a coalition of ZANU and ZAPU) started to emerge which led to the arrest and detention of ZAPU officials. Some ZIPRA guerrillas, embittered and fearing for their lives, left the assembly points feeling that the struggle had been betrayed by the peace settlement, and that by resuming the military action they could regain the advantages they had held before the ceasefire (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). Rumours started spreading to the effect that "the ZANLA soldiers at the Llewellyn barracks

were planning to shoot their ZIPRA comrades on the grounds that they were hostile to the new Zimbabwe, and were in league with the 'dissidents'… Fighting broke out, and the shooting between [ZIPRA and ZANLA] soldiers continued for over a week. Over twenty ZIPRA soldiers were arrested" (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990: 43). On November 9 and 10, 1980, heavy fighting broke out between ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers leaving 55 people dead, 550 injured and 2,000 homes damaged. Between February 7 and 10, 1981, at one assembly point alone, 197 people were killed; another source put the death toll at 300 ex-guerrillas and 1,600 homes damaged (Kriger, 2003).

There were problems other than the guerrilla faction fights. Several assembly camps faced severe shortages of drinking water and food. The shortage of food, especially meat, led some ex-combatants to threaten the use of violence. "At one time the guerrillas gave an ultimatum that unless meat arrived within twelve hours they would return to the bush" (Kriger, 2003: 60). At Papa assembly point, guerrillas took the camp monitors hostage in anger over the lack of meat (Kriger, 2003). This confirms the assertion that it is important to provide for the needs of combatants at assembly points (Clark, 1995).

While at assembly points, soldiers received allowances equal to the salary of African privates in the former Rhodesian forces. Payments started in mid-May 1980 and were retroactive to March 1, 1980 (Kriger, 2003; Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). In February 1981, Parliament approved Z$28.8 million for the Ministry of Defence; of this, Z$19 million was meant to increase the pay of the integrated members of ZIPRA and ZANLA as well as for monthly allowances for those members who were still in camps awaiting demobilisation. The pay would thereafter be based on the rank of each soldier. Under the new system a commander in the army and at the assembly points would receive Z$552 per month, battalion and division commanders over Z$150 per month, and privates Z$100 per month (Kriger, 2003). The process of paying the allowances was riddled with fraud; some individuals had three different combat names and collected three different allowances (Kriger, 2003).

One of the weaknesses of the demobilisation-reintegration process in Zimbabwe was the absence of effective disarmament. Kriger (2003) observes that the Soviet Union

increased arms transfers to ZAPU during the transition period, to the value of US$60 million, and continued to supply arms after the election. There were further reports that both ZANLA and ZIPRA leaders hid arms during the transition period (Kriger, 2003; Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). "The arms were hidden not just in case the ceasefire collapsed and the guerrilla forces needed to resume the war against the Muzorewa government, but also as an insurance policy against whatever new political dispensation would emerge from the election" (Kriger, 2003: 53). In May 1980, the Joint High Command (JHC) directed that each guerrilla could retain one personal arm but had to return surplus small arms to the national armoury. The plan was for guerrillas to recover and place hidden arms at the assembly points, and to send heavy weapons from assembly points to Llewellyn, Cranborne or Inkomo barracks (Kriger, 2003). The weapons were guarded by the British monitoring force, and later transferred to the National Armoury for use by the remaining military (World Bank, 1993). However, since the strategy relied on persuasion and consensus, it had limited success (Kriger, 2003).

At the beginning of 1981, there was a call for arms to be surrendered to government armouries, and amnesty was granted to civilians and soldiers who did so (Rupiah, 1995). In February 1981, following fighting among guerrilla factions, the ruling ZANU-PF party unilaterally declared that it would disarm the encamped guerrillas. This reversed the earlier JHC policy to let the guerrillas keep their personal arms until they had been integrated into the new national army. ZIPRA cadres resisted forcible disarmament, revealing their hostility to the ruling party and too their own leaders (Kriger, 2003). ZIPRA commanders refused to order their cadres to hand over their arms. Their argument was that disarmament should apply only to urban areas where there was a danger of civilians being involved in shooting incidents. Later, in March 1981, three national army soldiers involved in disarming ZIPRA soldiers at the Mushumbi Pools camp were killed by two ZIPRA members (Kriger, 2003: 95).

Despite the end of the liberation struggle, some of the weapons remained outside the borders of Zimbabwe. Prime Minister Mugabe signed a defence protocol with Zambia on January 20, 1981, according to which all ZAPU war material still in Zambia would be delivered directly to the Zimbabwean Government. There was also an agreement with Botswana that dissidents from Dukwe refugee camp, their arms and weaponry,

and the mines that they had cached, would be handed to the Zimbabwean Government on July 3, 1981 (Rupiah 1995). Early in 1982, about 35 caches of arms including AK47s, SKS rifles and bazookas were discovered on two farms owned by ZAPU (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990; Rupiah, 1995). According to Nyathi and Hoffman (1990), it was general knowledge that both ZANLA and ZIPRA leaders instructed their respective groups to hide weapons. The absence of proper disarmament led to some banditry by members of both ZIPRA and ZANLA. Guerrilla crime against civilians included robberies and shootings (which often started as arguments at bars). ZIPRA dissidents attacked government agents and projects in Matabeleland and Midlands, while ZANLA members were engaged in attacks on police stations in the east and northeast of Zimbabwe (Kriger, 2003).

Very few people voluntarily left the military in 1980. When it became clear to the government that more people had opted to remain under arms than required, a Demobilisation Directorate was established under the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. Its aim was to demobilise and assist in the placement of ex-combatants in the public and private sector as well as to offer skills training for those wishing to create their own employment opportunities (Rupiah, 1995). By the end of 1982, more than 25,000 soldiers had taken advantage of the demobilisation incentives, while by June 1993 a total of 35,763 demobilised soldiers had gone through the Directorate for technical assistance, contracts and further training (Rupiah, 1995). Both ZIPRA and ZANLA members resisted demobilisation; neither group was willing to accept the authority of Demobilisation Directorate officials from the opposing army (Kriger, 2003). Another factor that complicated the process was the pronouncement by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe that every guerrilla would have an opportunity to join the new integrated army, regardless of the cost (Kriger, 2003). Different reintegration programmes were implemented and may be classified into five categories – monetary benefits (monthly and lump-sum payments), vocational training, formal education, income generation and job placement.

#### *3.3.1.1 Monetary Benefits*

Soldiers who were demobilised through the Demobilisation Directorate received $185 a month each for up to two years to enable them to reintegrate into civilian society. When introducing the monthly allowance very little, if anything, was done to assess the extent to which society at large was prepared to reabsorb ex-combatants. Some ex-combatants had practical problems such as not having a place they could call home, either because they had lost their families or because they were simply not welcomed back (Musemwa, 1995). The Poverty Datum Line estimate in December 1980 was $128, which made the monthly income of $185 appear to be a lot of money (Musemwa, 1995). The Poverty Datum Line estimate is used to measure people's economic condition based on the assumption that they already had a "decent" shelter and a few other basic necessities. "However, [many] ex-combatants were people who had just come from the 'bush' and were starting a new life from scratch. They therefore required more than $185 to meet their objective needs in order to live in a condition of basic physical health and social decency" (Musemwa, 1995: 46). Another problem with monetary benefits was that while ex-combatants had their own expectations about the future, many of their families looked up to them for an improvement in their lives. According to Musemwa (1995), in order to meet the compelling demands of social decency, some ex-combatants used the $185 they received every month to buy clothes. Others used it to pay school fees for their children and young siblings. Very few managed to engage in projects requiring capital, despite being encouraged by the government to form co-operatives (Musemwa, 1995).

Due to the inadequacy of monetary benefits and the limited success of other reintegration programmes (discussed below), ex-combatants in Zimbabwe failed to achieve full economic reintegration. In 1989, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) was formed to address the plight of demobilised combatants. Negotiations between the Zimbabwean government and ZNLWVA bore fruits when the *War Veterans Act* (1992) and the *War Victims Compensation Act* (1993) were enacted. The late enactment of the legislation was a response to the potential threat that liberation war veterans might destabilise the country. The *War Victims Compensation Act* made provision for the creation of a War Victims Compensation Fund. "In theory, all proven ex-combatants who had been injured

during the liberation war were entitled to financial compensation on a scale proportional to the severity of their injuries. In practice, however, the system became increasingly chaotic in the period 1993-1996" (Chitiyo, 2000: 20). There was controversy over differing official and grassroots definitions of war veterans, interventions by the ZANU-PF party hierarchy, falsified injury claims and a general lack of accountability (Chitiyo, 2000).

Senior politicians and government officials in Zimbabwe, some of whom had never been near a war zone, looted the fund, siphoning off about R900 million in eight months (*Electronic Mail and Guardian*, 15.08.1997). Many Cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament and others closely connected to President Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF party claimed more than half of the US$36 million War Victims Compensation Fund. This included 46 senior government officials and President Robert Mugabe's brother-in-law, Reward Marufu. In April 1997 Marufu, who was about to leave for a diplomatic posting in Canada, was said to have a 95 per cent disability and was paid Z$821,668. Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri was mentioned as having a 20 per cent disability valued at $138,664 (*Electronic Mail and Guardian*, 04.04.1997). Corruption worsened to the extent that "some of those who applied for compensation were 23 years old, which would have made them six years old at independence" (*Electronic Mail and Guardian,* 22.04.1997). Due to the high rate of corruption in the payment of benefits, the War Victims Compensation Fund was suspended in April 1997 pending an investigation – a move which led to demonstrations by war veterans.

At the ZANU-PF summit in Mutare in September 1997, President Robert Mugabe bowed to pressure from the war veterans. He announced a once-off gratuity for each war veteran of Z$50,000 and the provision of a life pension of Z$2,000 per month (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). However, the payment came at a huge cost to the Zimbabwean economy and was characterised by fraud. It is estimated that by January 1998, the state had paid Z$106 million in monthly pensions to war veterans, and the figure was rising as more and more came forward to make claims. In February of that year, Z$109 million was paid out. Since "the criteria used were loosely worded, over 4,000 claimants were soon discovered as frauds… Unfortunately, some of the monies hastily paid out have been irretrievably lost". (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000: 76).

The ongoing demands of liberation war veterans alienated those who were previously sympathetic to the plight of former soldiers. One such person was Judith Todd, a former director of the Zimbabwe Project Trust which helped former soldiers to form co-operatives. In 1987, she was committed to the idea of ex-combatants as a special group; ten years later, in August 1997, when she was no longer the director of the Zimbabwe Project Trust, "she publicly berated ex-combatants who had just won war service pensions for behaving as a specially deserving group…" (Kriger, 2003: 151). In September of the same year, she again berated the ex-combatants by arguing that

> Zimbabwe's political leadership has placed too much emphasis, verbally, on the role of ex-combatants. A war affects everyone, particularly in the rural areas. It is not helpful to the overall development of a community to assert that one group (the ex-combatants) is more important than any other. This leads . . . to ex-combatants believing years after conflict has ended, that they still have the right to special resources from the state and this, in turn, stirs up resentment in other sectors of the community, especially amongst the unemployed school leavers... (Judith Todd cited in *The Zimbabwe Independent,* 05.09.1997).

Judith Todd based her argument on various reintegration programmes that had been implemented by the government and by non-governmental organisations (NGO). These included income generation projects, vocational training, formal schooling and job placement, all of which are discussed below.

#### *3.3.1.2 Income Generation*

While soldiers were still at the assembly areas, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) launched Operation of Soldiers Employed in Economic Development (Operation SEED) through the Joint High Command. Operation SEED was aimed at creating agricultural opportunities through state enterprises that had been closed down during the war (Rupiah, 1995). The plan was to provide basic skills to combatants waiting to be discharged or waiting to integrate into the ZNA, and at the same time to increase military units' self-sufficiency in terms of food and basic services (World Bank, 1993). According to Rupiah (1995), the projects were supervised by senior ZANLA and ZIPRA personnel. State enterprises which were established under Operation SEED included the Tilcor Agricultural Project which involved 6,500 men, and the

Silalabuhwa Irrigation Scheme Estate, which absorbed 4,000 ex-ZIPRA personnel. Other state enterprise were Middle Sabi which received 4,000 ex-combatants, the Copper Queen project which absorbed 2,000 ZANLA members to prepare the ground for cropping and resettlement, and Umfurudzi Estate which was allocated an unspecified number (Rupiah, 1995).

Other income-generation projects were established with the assistance of the Zimbabwe Project Trust (ZIMPRO), which had originally been established in London during the war of liberation. Its role then had been to assist refugees who had fled the country and were living in camps in the Frontline States. After independence, ZIMPRO was invited by the government of Zimbabwe to assist in the demobilisation programme (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). In its first four years ZIMPRO disbursed Z$4million, organised training and education for co-operative members and sponsored inter-co-operative communication including the collective cooperative's newspaper, *Vanguard,* and their federal organisation, the Zimbabwe Marketing Producers Co-operative Organisation (ZPMCO), later renamed the Organisation of Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM). It also handled grants for ex-combatants' co-operatives for some externally-based agencies (Kriger, 2003). The Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided ZIMPRO with Z$2.7million for a three-year education programme for the collective co-operatives, beginning in 1983 (Kriger, 2003).

ZIMPRO helped ex-combatants to establish 100 co-operatives, which employed former combatants and provided relevant training (Musemwa, 1995). One of these was *Vukuzenzele* (which means wake up and do it yourself), established by disabled freedom fighters (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). *Simukai* (which means stand up and be counted), established in 1981 by Andrew Nyathi and other ZIPRA ex-combatants, was identified as one of the most successful co-operatives in the history of co-operatives in Zimbabwe (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). When it was first established, members ran a butchery in a rented building, but by 1990 Simukai co-operative owned 1,760 hectares of land. Nyathi and Hoffman (1990) state that by 1986 the co-operatives' assets had increased to around Z$318,000, and that 75 per cent of the surplus was reinvested. In August 1986 Simukai opened a crèche for the children of

its members; the co-operative also had a school staffed by volunteers, some of whom were visiting from abroad (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). Simukai co-operative is reported to be the first Zimbabwean co-operative to produce export-quality cattle, which earned a gross income of Z$100,000 in 1988-1989. Other achievements included the following: in 1983 the co-operative sold 80 pigs a year but by 1988-1989 it earned over Z$60,000 in this area; the grinding mill earned over Z$10,000; the store on the farm raised nearly Z$80,000 in the same period (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990).

#### *3.3.1.3 Employment and Job Placement*

It is often difficult for ex-combatants to find existing jobs, both in the private and public sectors. In Zimbabwe, one reason for this was that a considerable number of the unemployed ex-combatants lacked the necessary educational requirements. Participation in the armed struggle was not regarded as a qualification for employment, although it was considered an advantage in security-related jobs (Musemwa, 1995). Second, following independence the government set the minimum educational qualification for civil service employment at 5 Ordinary Level (O-Level) passes of C or better. Musemwa (1995) argues that many ex-combatants joined the armed struggle before attaining O-Level certificates because of the Rhodesian Government's discriminatory educational policy. Others left school prematurely when they were recruited for training. Another major obstacle was the private sector's reluctance to employ ex-combatants. In 1989, the government made a proposal to provide special subsidies to parastatals and private companies that employed more than five per cent of ex-combatants in their workforce. This was rejected by the private sector as being contrary to the ideas of a free-market economy. Furthermore, some employers believed that ex-combatants would import revolutionary tendencies to the workplace (Musemwa, 1995).

Contrary to Musemwa's (1995) observation, Kriger (2003) argues that ex-combatants received preferential treatment in the allocation of some jobs. The ruling party created civil service and local authority posts for ex-combatants who could not meet the formal educational requirements for government employment; it gave priority employment in the bureaucracy to qualified ex-combatants, and provided for rapid promotions in the public sector (Kriger, 2003). ZANU-PF, through the personal intervention of cabinet ministers and through the Demobilisation Directorate, tried to

encourage recruitment of guerrillas in both the private and public sectors. The "party often used threats and intimidation to obtain positions for its guerrillas… The Health Ministry employed health cadres, recognised their medical experiences during the war, and created posts for them even when they failed evaluation tests to work as medical assistants" (Kriger, 2003: 157 - 158). By 1988 1,700 ex-combatants were working as municipal police. Some government departments had directives to accelerate promotions for ex-combatants. By 1993, the Prison Service had promoted 143 of 419 ex-combatants (Kriger, 2003).

#### *3.3.1.4 Vocational Training*

Vocational training was implemented as one of the reintegration programmes in Zimbabwe. This was based mainly on the fact that most ex-combatants possessed few marketable skills. A survey of 5,000 encamped combatants revealed that three-quarters of them either had never been employed (52 per cent) or were unskilled (23 per cent) (World Bank, 1993). Most of the combatants expressed interest in technical/vocational training, as opposed to formal academic education. This was common among older soldiers and more senior ranking combatants (World Bank, 1993).

Vocational training was offered, among others, by the Danhiko School which was established by an American woman in 1981 and officially registered as an independent secondary school. In 1983 it established vocational programmes, offering intensive training in garment making, furniture design and upholstery to ex-combatants (including the disabled) recruited directly at assembly points (Kriger, 2003). Ex-combatants had to undergo one year of training and one to two years of training and production. The school served as an alternative to Polytech, which required formal education as a prerequisite for entry (Kriger, 2003; World Bank, 1993). For several years, ex-combatants constituted the majority of the student body; they were sponsored by the government through the Demobilisation Directorate (Kriger, 2003). By 1993 the school served both ex-combatants and civilians (World Bank, 1993).

Another institution which offered vocational training was Mupfure Self-Help College, which was established by the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production

(ZIMFEP). The college was established in 1986 to provide skills training for ex-combatants. The college had no formal entry requirement for its two-year programmes in agriculture, building, textile design and carpentry (Kriger, 2003). Tuition was free and the college offered living allowances to combatants undergoing training, which were enough to cater for their individual needs. The allowances initially came from the sale of produced goods because the Demobilisation Directorate failed to provide the money promised for living allowances. The direct consequence of this was that trainees became preoccupied with production, thus compromising training (Makanya, 1993). Later allowances from donors enabled students to visit their families. Most of the funding came from HIVOS, a Dutch agency. In its first year it enrolled about 60 ex-combatants and thereafter on average 140 students per year, increasingly non-combatants (Kriger, 2003).

#### *3.3.1.5 Formal Schooling*

Apart from vocational training, there was a formal education programme targeted at former combatants who wished to complete their education. A survey had revealed that fewer than 20 per cent of former Zimbabwean guerrillas had more than a primary education and that 13 per cent had no formal education (World Bank, 1993). The Zimbabwean government established two special schools for ZIPRA veterans and five for ZANLA veterans. The veterans were offered room and board at special schools, and places within the regular school system. However, less than 10 per cent of ex-combatants opted to complete their education. Many had family responsibilities, which put pressure on them to try to obtain remunerative employment. Some were embarrassed (due to their age) to sit in the same class with children (World Bank, 1993).

### 3.3.2 An Evaluation of the Demobilisation-Reintegration Process in Zimbabwe

According to the World Bank (1993), one of the ways to evaluate the success or failure of demobilisation-reintegration processes is to analyse the political, security and economic outcomes of such processes. The argument is that it is difficult to determine how the political, security and economic situation would have evolved in the absence of a DRP. “In Zimbabwe the demobilisation of the three armies and the integration of the remaining combatants into a new national (although fractionalized

and larger than planned) army could be regarded as a success in the medium-term using security and political criteria. The tendency towards organised violence was reduced…" (World Bank, 1993: 9). Measures that can be used to evaluate the success of a DRP include the extent to which resources are put into the exercise, and planning and execution of the programmes (Motumi, 2000). Using this approach, Motumi (2000) concludes that Zimbabwe's DRP was a success because those who had been part of the armed conflict, especially former liberation movement combatants, were provided with some form of assistance by the government. "That such assistance provided did not go towards meeting [the full requirements of ex-combatants], or even when it almost did, it was squandered, should not be seen to be a problem of the authorities" (Motumi, 2000: 38).

The approaches to evaluation by both the World Bank (1993) and Motumi (2000) are flawed. As the discussion above indicates, the DRP did not reduce the tendency of ex-combatants to resort to violence. Liberation war veterans' use of violence in addressing the redistribution of land provides evidence of the prevalence of violence in post-independence Zimbabwe. To argue that the failure of assistance to meet the full requirements of ex-combatants is not the government's problem is to ignore the central aim of reintegration assistance. Reintegration assistance is not only about making a political statement. It is meant to assist ex-combatants in such a way that they become fully independent. This is the main weakness of the reintegration programmes in Zimbabwe. During a parliamentary debate in 1995, "It was estimated that 35,709 ex-combatants had been demobilised by 1988 and between 15,000 to 25,000 were without employment" (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000: 75).

Apart from the high unemployment rate among ex-combatants, almost all income-generation projects, including Operation SEED, collapsed or were on the verge of collapse by the beginning of the 1990s. Rupiah (1995) identifies a number of reasons to explain the collapse of Operation SEED. First, the projects were not supported or even understood by the politicians. Second, the projects were introduced while combatants were still oriented to fighting and in need of time to adjust to being "farm workers". Thirdly, resignations from the new army and the arrival of new appointees made it difficult for the national army to implement the project. Lack of infrastructure and bad planning also contributed to the collapse of the project. "Projects suffered and

faltered from a lack of planning, supplies and implements. In most Brigade [Education with Production] areas there were no vehicles or telephones and other communication facilities available to enable proper liaison with the project zones" (Rupiah, 1995: 30). The collapse of Operation SEED is also attributable to poor administration and the low level of participation by ex-combatants, which is estimated at one-fifth of the target population. Operation SEED was launched despite the fact that surveys conducted while soldiers were still encamped pointed out that only 4 per cent of the combatants were interested in agricultural work (World Bank, 1993).

Musemwa (1995) offers a number of reasons for the low level of ex-combatants participation in Operation SEED. Although Operation SEED was presented as a military exercise and as part of the struggle for national prosperity, the ex-combatants perceived the whole exercise as a ploy by the government to deny them a chance to join the ZNA. Thus ex-combatants viewed it with suspicion, and there was nothing in the programme to motivate them. The Rhodesian propaganda machinery, which was still intact, played a significant role in discrediting and misrepresenting the objectives of the operation. For example, it propagated the idea that the ex-combatants would simply be given seed and hoes and sent to the rural areas to be left to their own devices (Musemwa, 1995; Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990).

Despite the reported success of co-operatives (see for example, Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990; Rupiah, 1995), by 1987 many co-operatives had collapsed. Those that continued to function (including Simukai co-operative) had not lifted ex-combatants from the very low standards of living they had hoped to escape (Kriger, 2003). It is estimated that by 1988 only 5,866 ex-combatants remained in co-operatives. Of the 310 collective farming co-operatives (combatant and non-combatant) in 1992, a parliamentary committee found fewer than 30 actually operating well (Kriger, 2003). Members of the Vukuzenzele co-operative, despite the donation of land and considerable support from NGOs, received Z$40 monthly in 1988. "In 1992 the members of another much-vaunted 'success' co-operative, Simukai, were earning the minimum wages of agricultural workers" (Kriger, 2003: 155).

A number of factors led to the failure of ex-combatants' co-operatives. The biggest problem facing co-operatives was the drought that hit Zimbabwe between 1982 and

1984 (Musemwa, 1995). Since most of the ex-combatants involved in co-operatives invested all their resources in agricultural implements, they had nothing to fall back on. The attacks on farms in Matabeleland and other parts of the country by some disgruntled former ZIPRA fighters who had deserted the ZNA also impacted negatively on the running of co-operatives (Musemwa, 1995). Outside Matabeleland, ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered ZANU-PF's violent wrath, and experienced difficulties in forming and sustaining co-operatives and obtaining training where ZANU-PF had control (Kriger, 2003; Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990). Other co-operatives collapsed due to under-capitalisation because, as Musemwa (1995) observes, despite government's commitment to co-operatives, it had minimal resources to establish co-operative ventures which were competitive and profitable. Other constraints emanated from a lack of general ancillary services such as preferential credit, technical advice, pricing schemes, market contracts, foreign exchange, etc. (Musemwa, 1995).

Rupiah (1995) identifies other problems which affected the viability of ex-combatants' business ventures. He notes that most of the ex-combatants lost thousands of dollars to unscrupulous dealers. In one case some demobilised soldiers paid Z$33,000 for a business that was valued at Z$15,000. In another, ex-combatants paid Z$77,000 cash for a business worth Z$12,000; the seller left Zimbabwe immediately after receiving payment. In some cases, ex-combatants bought businesses in locations that were so poor that they were forced to abandon them (Rupiah, 1995). Some ex-combatants bought insolvent businesses, which led to legal battles over inherited bad credit. For example, members of Simukai co-operative bought Harlech Farm, owned by Mr. Du Plessis, who was heavily indebted to the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). "This meant, so we were told, that we had been sold a farm by someone who strictly speaking didn't own it" (Nyathi and Hoffman, 1990: 102). As a consequence, there were plans to auction the farms despite the fact that former ZIPRA combatants had paid a deposit of $40,000. Another problem facing co-operatives was that the shortage of cash after initial deposits also led to some serious viability problems for business ventures (Rupiah, 1995).

## 3.4 The Case of Namibia

### 3.4.1 **UN Security Council Resolution 435 and Demobilisation-Reintegration**

The struggle for independence in Namibia was ended through a peace agreement signed in December 1988 by Angola, Cuba and South Africa. (For events that took place before the peace agreement see among others Du Pisani, 1981, 1986.) The main belligerents in the struggle for independence were the South African Defence Force (SADF – because of South Africa's occupation of the then South West Africa), locally recruited South West African Territorial Forces (SWATF) and paramilitary groups, and People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) which was the military wing of the South West African People's Organisation's (SWAPO) based in Angola (World Bank, 1993). In Angola, PLAN was supported by Cuban forces, hence Cuba's participation in the peace agreement. The 1988 arrangements to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 led to the cessation of hostilities, the return of some 50,000 exiles, the withdrawal of South African forces and Namibia's first democratic elections (Preston, 1997). Namibia's transition to independence took place under the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). UN-supervised demobilisation was initiated as a condition for the transition to independence. UN Resolution 435 stipulated the demobilisation of PLAN, SWATF and Koevoet (the paramilitary unit of SWATF), and the withdrawal of the SADF.

PLAN fighters in Southern Angola had to register at certain camps. It was then that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) repatriated at least 22,000 ex-PLAN fighters (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). On April 1, the day the transition was to come into effect, almost 2,000 PLAN guerrillas poured into Namibia from Angola in violation of the ceasefire agreement in an attempt to avoid encampment (World Bank, 1993). UNTAG had no presence in northern Namibia, which compelled the UN Special Representative to allow South African forces to repel the "invasion" (Cock, 1993). The absence of UNTAG was due to a decision of the Security Council to cut costs by reducing the force (UNTAG) from 7,500 to 4,650 men. South Africa inflicted substantial casualties on SWAPO guerrillas, who claimed to be headed from bases in Angola to assembly points within Namibia (Griffiths, 1996). Although the incident was attributed to differing interpretations of the ceasefire agreement, it threatened to

destroy the transition before it commenced (Griffiths, 1996). However, transition was never derailed, and the UN-supervised elections took place in November 1989. SWAPO won the majority of votes. The last South African troops left Namibia and the country celebrated its independence on March 21, 1990 (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). Thus, in contrast to Zimbabwe, Namibia celebrated independence without a national defence force, since all forces were demobilised prior to independence. "The challenge of creating an integrated armed force (thus decisions of whom to demobilise) was not central to the establishment of peace; it arose only after independence had been declared" (World Bank, 1993: 15). Namibia was originally committed to a national army of 10,000 based on "economic sustainability" (Cock, 1993). Military integration with the assistance of 57 British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) officers took place on the basis of parity (50-50), with recruitment on an equal basis from among demobilised former PLAN and SWATF members (Du Pisani, 1991; Dzinesa and Rupiya; 2005).

Scholarly information about disarmament in Namibia is sketchy. As stated above, all armed forces including the paramilitary forces established by South Africa were demobilised prior to elections, and UNTAG confiscated their weapons. However, much of the war material and semi-automatic firearms continued to be held by combatants from different armed factions after their demobilisation, since they created arms caches during the transitional period (World Bank, 1993). The number of weapons held back by ex-combatants is not known. To address the problem of the proliferation of light weapons, the Namibian government announced an amnesty period for the surrender of unlicensed weapons. This period was followed by heavy penalties for possession of illegal weapons (World Bank, 1993).

There were no reintegration programmes to provide short- to medium-term assistance to ex-combatants after discharge. Reintegration was simply subsumed within the broader process of repatriation, which applied to all Namibian exiles in Angola. Those PLAN fighters who wished (or were assigned) to return to Namibia under the UNHCR repatriation programme were required to hand in their weapons to UNTAG and agree to return as civilians. After discharge from assembly areas, PLAN ex-combatants were entitled to the same reinsertion benefits as the civilian refugees (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996; World Bank, 1993). The rationale for

reinsertion assistance for SWAPO returnees, including PLAN ex-combatants, was that many lacked food and shelter on their return and would need a modicum of security if the election process was to proceed smoothly. Thus, all repatriated refugees including PLAN cadres received "several months' stock of dry food, basic household goods, cooking facilities, bedding, agricultural tools and seeds, and housing construction material" (World Bank, 1993: 67). No structured long-term reintegration programmes were planned prior to the demobilisation process. It was assumed that, with the excitement of independence, reintegration would simply happen (Kingma, 1998; World Bank, 1993). Those managing demobilisation assumed that reintegration would be unproblematic and that people would return to their places of origin and resume the lives they had led before the war (Preston, 1997).

In this sense the Namibian process was not a demobilisation-reintegration process, but a dispersion. "Dispersion occurs when the government in power disbands ex-combatants [very often] of the opposition geographically over a short period, often without any kind of compensation, in order to reduce political tension." (Ejigu and Gedamu, 1996: 23). Although dispersion is questionable from the social, political and economic point of view, there may be short-term political advantages (Ejigu and Gedamu, 1996). In Namibia, the political advantage was that combatants were literally scattered throughout the country, and this allowed transition to independence to proceed smoothly (World Bank, 1993). Reintegration programmes were instituted sixteen months after demobilisation (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). Reintegration programmes were introduced as a response to the threats of civil disorder and the knowledge that ex-fighters of various factions had access to arms caches in different parts of the country (Preston, 1997). There main reintegration programmes, targeted mainly at ex-combatants, were implemented; they included monetary benefits, job placements and vocational training.

#### *3.4.1.1 Monetary Benefits*

The government of Namibia introduced lump-sum payments to compensate demobilised soldiers. In March 1991, the South African government agreed to make available to the government of Namibia the sum of R36 million (US$1= ZAR 2.9 at the time), to be targeted at former combatants. This was to be divided equally between PLAN members and former defenders of South Africa (former SWATF and Koevoet

members) (Preston, 1993b; Preston, 1997). The Namibian government wanted to divide the money into three – R12 million as a gratuity to former SWATF and Koevoet members, R12 million in payment to former members of PLAN who were still unemployed, and R12 million to be invested in training projects for people of either group. The South African government was unwilling to invest in the training project and withdrew the allocation intended for that purpose (Preston, 1993b). The Namibian government divided the remaining R24 million among ex-combatants of each side. N$1,400 was made available to each unemployed ex-combatant who had been in active service at the time of the implementation of Resolution 435 (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996; Preston, 1993b). The objective of this policy was to address the basic needs of the neediest ex-combatants. However, it would take another seven months before the government embarked on the payment procedures (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996).

Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996) observe that major problems occurred when the government began to disburse the cash payment to PLAN ex-combatants. The majority of PLAN ex-combatants did not have Namibian identification cards and PLAN, typical of a guerrilla army, lacked reliable records on its fighters. In the autumn of 1990, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Defence requested PLAN ex-combatants to register their names in order to receive the demobilisation gratuity. However, for various reasons, not everyone managed to register. “Ex-combatants may not have been able to travel to register, showed up at the wrong collection points, may not have been aware of the need to register, or may not have fully understood the meaning of the word ‘gratuity’ in the announcement for registration” (World Bank, 1993: 61). As a consequence, a committee of former commanding officers was established to act as a verification mechanism. However, the lists drawn up by the verification committee were still incomplete, which led to unrest among PLAN ex-combatants who were excluded. In 1995, the registration process was repeated. About 32,000 PLAN ex-combatants presented themselves for payment. However, only 16,080 were finally confirmed by the verification committee. This was due to the fact that in April 1991 the Ministry of Home Affairs went to Northern Namibia to issue temporary identity cards to ex-combatants who had already registered in order for them to be eligible to pick up their payments at banks. However, under pressure,

officials allegedly gave 30,000 testimonials to people who had not previously registered and thus were not on the "master list" (World Bank, 1993).

An unknown number of individuals who were not ex-combatants received their severance pay of N$1,400 while a significant number of eligible PLAN ex-combatants did not. The Ministry of Defence's estimates of eligible ex-combatants who did not benefit range as high as 40 per cent (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). The criteria used by the verification committee are not known. It is estimated that a total of 24,650 ex-combatants received their severance pay. Furthermore, not all PLAN ex-combatants received the full amount of N$1,400 because "government had run out of money when it was our turn" (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996: 145 – 146). Those who did not receive the money (but were convinced that their claims were genuine), and those who considered the payment to be inadequate, embarked on street demonstrations, including a siege of a bank at Grootfontein. However, the protest died down after the minister responsible "promised to do something" – a promise he never fulfilled (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996).

SWATF officers were eligible for pensions financed by South Africa. The combination of relatively high salaries and the post-discharge salary payments seemed to suffice for many SWATF draftees to re-establish their lives as civilians (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996).

#### *3.4.1.2 Employment/Job Placement*

Many former combatants and other returnees could not find jobs for various reasons. These included a lack of knowledge of how to go about finding employment, lack of access to job information, and delays in reaching prospective employers once information became available. The lack of funds to cover the cost of transport to job interviews was another obstacle. Other problems included lack of fluency in English or Afrikaans, failure by employers to recognise qualifications and experience obtained in countries abroad (especially in Eastern Europe, Cuba and parts of Africa), and employer discrimination against returnees in general on account of their assumed support for SWAPO (Preston, 1993a).

To deal with the problem of unemployment, a major proportion of skilled returnees were absorbed into the public sector, which led to a 50 per cent increase in public sector employment between January 1989 and February 1991. This was contrary to the government's commitment to restrain the increase in civil service for budgetary reasons (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). Since most of the non-military public sector jobs required qualifications, some ex-combatants were excluded from job placement and this led to some discontent among those affected. Consequently a number of less qualified PLAN ex-combatants were provided with jobs (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996).

Unlike the public service, the private sector was extremely biased against former guerrillas. Most veterans had settled in the north while the majority of job opportunities were in the South. This meant that information about available jobs did not always reach ex-combatants. In cases where information did reach them, the lack of resources such as travel money constrained their ability to travel from their home regions to regions of employment (World Bank, 1993).

#### *3.4.1.3 Vocational Training*

Ex-combatants benefited from an internship programme for artisans in specific companies to deal with the problem of lack of experience. The internships were sponsored by the Otto Benecke Foundation, which placed candidates on three-month internships with private companies (World Bank, 1993). The programme benefited both the companies and the ex-combatants. The latter gained valuable work experience, while the former enjoyed free labour after an initial training phase and the opportunity to assess prospective employees without incurring future obligations. The Foundation identified ex-combatants' skills shortcomings and directed them to appropriate specialised training programmes (World Bank, 1993).

However, the major source of vocational training was the Development Brigade (DB), which was established to offer vocational training to ex-combatants. The objective of the DB was to cater for the needs of unemployed ex-combatants who, due to their lack of formal education, could not apply to other government training centres (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). The Development Brigade was meant to become self-financing by undertaking commissioned work (Preston, 1997).

The DB training programme was meant for longer-term benefit to those who took part. According to Preston (1993b), the scheme was to furnish participants with skills in agriculture and construction, and had two aims – first, to provide sufficient skills to generate income to meet the basic needs of participants; second, to fill skill deficits in the labour market. The training was to take place over two years through the execution of commissioned projects. It was designed to involve minimal periods of classroom learning, and was not to be oriented to the provision of certificates for theoretical learning but at skill development through practical experience (Preston, 1993b, 1997). The aim was to train 7,500 participants as construction workers and 10,350 in agricultural production. It was expected that on completion of their training, graduates would be assisted to find employment to start their own businesses with loans from the proposed Land Bank (Preston, 1993b, 1997).

The DB failed to meet its target and the total number of former soldiers who enrolled with the DBC is disputed. Preston (1993b, 1997) argues that while 16,000 former fighters were eligible to join the DB, only some 4,000 people joined the Brigade's twelve centres in its first year of operation (Preston, 1993b, 1997). Meanwhile, Shikangala (1995) argues that only between 2,000 and 3,000 trainees received places in the DB during its first year of operation due to inadequate funding. The inadequacy of funding led some brigade members to organise a march in 1992 to register their increasing frustration with the government's inability to provide them with support or jobs (World Bank, 1993).

The Development Brigade started as a division of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. In 1992, it was converted into a parastatal – the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC). This was because of the lack of adequate funding and lack of managerial expertise (Shikangala, 1995). As a parastatal, the DBC continued to perform badly. By the end of 2001, it was clear that it was not profitable. As a result of the poor performance of the DBC, the Namibian government embarked on a process to covert some DBC subsidiaries to operate as independent entities and others to be merged with other parastatals. In May 2002, the government of Namibia reported that it had made good progress in its efforts to transform the Development Brigade Corporation's subsidiaries into companies before the wind-up of the DBC was completed (*The Namibian,* 31.05.2002).

### 3.4.*2* An Evaluation of the Demobilisation-Reintegration Process in Namibia

According to the World Bank (1993), the success of a DRP can be more accurately assessed by keeping in mind the government's initial priorities. Designers of Namibia's DRP were more concerned with disarming combatants and returning Namibians to their home territory than the provision of targeted reintegration programmes (World Bank, 1993). Based on the programme planners' priority of satisfying the pre-conditions for elections, which included the complete demobilisation of the armed forces, the programme could be regarded as a success. This is in spite of the subsequent problems with high unemployment among demobilised soldiers (World Bank, 1993). By mid-1992 unemployment among former combatants was estimated at 73 per cent among ex-SAF soldiers and 77 per cent among ex-PLAN soldiers (Preston, 1993a, 1997). The high unemployment rate among former combatants confirmed the argument that the DB was never intended as a training programme, but instead for a fixed period it served to remove and contain war veterans from the community. "By paying them a small regular stipend [of R50 a month], SWAPO could claim that it was fulfilling part of its promises to them" (Preston, 1997: 466).

In 1994 the DBC served over 6,000 ex-combatants who were mainly trained to work in construction despite the estimate that only 1,200 of them would eventually find employment in the construction sector (Du Pisani, 1994). Between 1992 and 1996 three batches of ex-combatants graduated from the DBC (the number of those who dropped out is not available) – 400 in 1993, 500 in 1994 and about 1,600 in 1995. "From the last batch of graduates, 20 percent [had] been placed with companies, 40 percent joined DBC resettlement schemes, 15 percent [were] employed or self-employed in small businesses, while the remaining 25 percent were unemployed and inactive" (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996: 161). The DBC also acquired land to resettle graduates, especially from the agriculture trade, to become commercial farmers. A total of 640 ex-combatants (40 per cent of the graduates) were resettled in this way (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). However, there were problems with soil fertility and difficulties of local reintegration when surrounding communities were of different ethnic origin (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996).

The DBC faced a number of challenges. First, the DBC centres suffered regular resource deficits, to the extent that training was almost entirely classroom-based; even that was minimal because of lack of training materials. Due to the lack of training and poor living conditions, quite a number of trainees dropped out. Second, DBC certificates were not standardised with government vocational directives. Consequently, the private sector did not accept the DBC certificates (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). It was evident that if the desperate situation of former soldiers was not addressed, they could become a source of political instability (Du Pisani, 1994). "Until late 1995, there were sporadic incidents as frustrated veterans demanded assistance to realise their potential and contribute usefully to reconstruction" (Preston, 1997: 469). In response to joblessness, former PLAN soldiers mounted a number of demonstrations demanding jobs. In the third quarter of 1998, 780 protesters, mainly ex-fighters and former Namibia exiles, camped out in Zoo Park and vowed to stay there until all of them had been given jobs (*The Namibian,* 11.08.1998). After three weeks of protests, the Namibian Protection Service (NPS) offered employment to at least 100 of the ex-combatants. The company promised to return with more offers of employment when jobs became available. However, ex-combatants said that they would not return home until everyone had been offered a job (*The Namibian,* 11.08.1998).

## 3.5 The Case of Angola

### 3.5.1 Introduction

The demobilisation-reintegration process that commenced in Angola in 2002 following the death of *União Nacional para Indepêndecia Total de Angola* (UNITA) leader, Jonas Savimbi was the third since 1990. Two previous attempts to demobilise and reintegrate soldiers into civilian society (first in 1991-1992 and then in 1994-1998) failed and the country twice returned to civil war. As this section will show, in both cases the failure to sustain peace was mainly due to the lack of political commitment on the part of the government of Angola and UNITA, and also due to the absence of effective disarmament. This section focuses on the first two attempts at demobilisation-reintegration and not the 2002 process. The main reason for this is that this chapter focuses on demobilisation-reintegration processes that took place in

Southern Africa between 1980 and 2000. The 1991 demobilisation-reintegration process followed the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accords and thus will be referred to as the *Bicesse Process,* while the second one is referred to as the *Lusaka Process* after the Lusaka Protocol which brought it into existence.

### 3.5.2 The Bicesse Process and Demobilisation-Reintegration

The government of Angola and UNITA signed the Bicesse Peace Accords in May 1991. The Accords stipulated the encampment of both UNITA and government troops within 60 days, the creation of a 50,000-strong joint armed force, the demobilisation of surplus UNITA troops and their reintegration into civilian society (Cock, 1993; Porto and Parsons, 2003; World Bank, 1993). From an estimated total of 200,000 men in arms on both sides, the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) would be composed of 20,000 soldiers from FAPLA (the military wing of the MPLA), the government's army, 20,000 soldiers from FALA, UNITA's army, an air force of 6,000 and a navy of 4,000 (Porto and Parsons, 2003). The multiparty elections, scheduled for September 1992, were dependent on the formation of the FAA, although completion of disarmament and demobilisation were not insisted upon (Porto and Parsons, 2003).

A number of institutions were created to oversee and verify the processes. First was the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM), which was composed of the government and UNITA. Troika members – Portugal, Russia and the United States – held observer status. Second, an Inter-ministerial Office to Support the Demobilised Military of Angola (GIAMDA) was created by presidential decree on November 15, with the aim of establishing a broad programme for the reintegration of former combatants (Porto and Parsons, 2003). The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Accords, including organising the elections. However, the responsibility for compliance with the Accords lay firmly with the two parties, thus limiting UNAVEM's power to intervene in the process (Porto and Parsons, 2003).

Contrary to Porto and Parsons, Stedman (2001) argues that implementers did not call the parties to account for violations of the Accords for fear that condemnation would hinder their ability to act as impartial brokers. UNAVEM was also limited by the lack

of adequate resources. The initial budget was US$132 million for seventeen months, compared to UNTAG's budget of $383 million for a twelve-month period in Namibia. UNAVEM was staffed by only 350 military observers and 126 police observers (Porto and Parsons, 2003).

There was insufficient time for proper planning and implementation. Inadequate monitoring of the movements of combatants, a poorly controlled leave policy, and inadequate registration and documentation procedures resulted confusing figures about the number of combatants (World Bank, 1993). The encampment and registration of both government and UNITA troops was never completed, and it was not known exactly what UNITA's fighting strength was at the end of the war. Although it claimed force levels in the region of 75,000 this number may have been inflated for strategic reasons. On the government side, a significant number of troops either "self-demobilised" after registration or went AWOL. About 12,000 government troops are believed to have gone missing from October 1991 to February 1992 (Porto and Parsons, 2003). "The discrepancy between the previously identified number of combatants in the two forces and the actual number of UNITA and MPLA forces in the assembly camps motivated the government to declare that only those present in camps as of a certain date plus those authorised to be absent would be considered eligible for demobilisation compensation packages" (World Bank, 1993: 29).

The demobilisation of troops did not begin until almost a year after the signature of the Accords in March 1992. Although both the government and UNITA revised their combined total troop strength to 151,930, by February 12 only 61 per cent of the troops were assembled. This corresponded to 50,44 per cent of government troops and 93,75 per cent of UNITA troops. Due to incomplete registration of the troops scheduled for demobilisation, only 10,402 had been demobilised by September 1992. On the government's side, a total of 123,887 FAPLA troops had been demobilised. UNITA combatants were demobilised directly without first being incorporated into the existing FAPLA, since the objective was the creation of unified FAA (Porto and Parsons, 2003).

The Bicesse Accords contained a "triple zero clause" which prevented both parties from acquiring lethal material (Modde, 2004; Porto and Parsons, 2003).

Consequently, the government and UNITA agreed with the troika of observer countries that the United States and the Soviet Union would cease all supplies to any parties and would encourage other countries to do likewise (Porto and Parsons, 2003). However, the Bicesse Accords were unable to deal with existing weapons. Reports on the poor quality and limited quantity of weapons stored at assembly points indicated that both FAPLA and FALA were storing hidden weapons for potential contingencies (World Bank, 1993) On the government's side (as was the case in Mozambique), many of the troops that "self-demobilised" took their weapons with them when they left, resulting in a rise in incidents of banditry and crime, particularly in areas around the camps (Porto and Parsons, 2003).

Disarmament was the responsibility of the army that held the weapons. "UN officials reported that in some cases, combatants at the assembly points awaiting demobilisation were given their guns back on the understanding they were used only to hunt for food, fearing that tens of thousands of hungry soldiers could turn to violent crime if provision were not made for them" (World Bank, 1993: 30). Modde (2004) observes that neither timetables nor target numbers of collected armaments were specified, leaving much to the discretion of the commander in charge of the assembly area. The Bicesse Accords made provision for personnel in assembly areas to access the armaments, which "meant that even though weapons had been locked away, the military commander could quickly retrieve them in the event that either side decided to break the ceasefire" (Modde, 2004: 22-23). Porto and Parsons (2003) argue that the slow rate of disarmament during the Bicesse process may be an indication of both a lack of seriousness or confidence between the belligerents as well as their reluctance to hand over weapons which could be sold for profit in a situation characterised by lack of employment opportunities.

Soldiers who were demobilised received a demobilisation package (including money) valued at $100 (equivalent to five months' salary) and a clothing kit. Planned reintegration programmes, which included financial support and professional and vocational training, were never implemented due to the resumption of armed conflict (Porto and Parsons, 2003). "The elections in Angola were the trigger that caused the breakdown of the Bicesse Accords" (Modde, 2004: 16). The MPLA won control of the National Assembly but a run-off for the Presidency was required between the

MPLA's candidate, José Eduardo dos Santos, and UNITA's candidate, Jonas Savimbi. However, UNITA rejected the election results and took up arms (Ball and Campbell, 1998). Thus the demobilisation which had begun was reversed (World Bank, 1993).

The proliferation of weapons among the civilian population, the decline in law and order and the slow progress in extending the central administration added to the instability (Porto and Parsons, 2003). This is because the proliferation of weapons makes it difficult for war-torn societies to recover from war and establish societies governed by the rule of law (Clark, 1996). The peace process in Angola collapsed due to lack of commitment from UNITA and the government. They were "unwilling to co-operate with each other and maintained secret armies in violation of the Bicesse Accords" (Kingma, 1998: 12; 2004a: 138). Modde (2004) observes that the demobilisation-reintegration process was poorly implemented because by the time of the elections only a token number of soldiers from either side had begun the long process of returning to civilian life.

### 3.5.3 The Lusaka Process and Demobilisation-Reintegration

In November 1994, after two years of intense armed conflict in Angola, the government and UNITA signed a peace accord, the Lusaka Protocol. The Lusaka Protocol *inter alia* reaffirmed the validity of the Bicesse Accords, re-established a ceasefire, and provided for disarmament of all civilians, national reconciliation and the completion of the electoral process (Ball and Campbell, 1998; Vines, 1999). New institutions were created to facilitate these processes. The Institute of Ex-Military Personnel (IRSEM) replaced GIAMDA under the Ministry of Reinsertion and Social Assistance. A Joint Commission was formed consisting of government and UNITA, as well as Blodin Beye, a UN representative who was the principal mediator of the Lusaka Protocol. Another new creation was a technical committee to supervise and advise on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, as well as the formation of the joint armed force (Porto and Parsons, 2003). UNAVEM III was responsible for overseeing the demobilisation and integration of the armed forces as well as decreeing when the conditions were appropriate for elections to be held. This time, it was staffed by 7,000 peace-keeping troops in addition to the 350 military observers and 126 police observers (Ball and Campbell, 1998; Porto and Parsons,

2003). On July 1, 1997, UNAVEM III was replaced by the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) (Ball and Campbell, 1998; Porto and Parsons, 2003). The assembly of UNITA troops, planned for two to three months in early 1995, commenced only at the end of 1995 and was not completed until December 1996 (Ball and Campbell, 1998). Very few key UNITA troops entered assembly areas, and most of those in camps were civilians (Porto and Parsons, 2003). A total of 62,000 UNITA troops were expected to enter the assembly areas. However, in December 1995 UNITA suspended the demobilisation process for two months in protest at government's seizure of UNITA-held territory. Due to pressure from the international community, UNITA agreed to increase the number of troops registering. By July 1996, when the joint army officially came into existence, 70,600 UNITA troops had been assembled, but it was believed that the majority were civilians, about 4,799 were underage and 10,728 were disabled (Porto and Parsons, 2003). The registration and disarmament of residual UNITA personnel was completed on December 22, 1997; a total of 78,886 had registered, of which 8,607 were underage and 11,051 were disabled. Of these, around 26,000 deserted either during the headcount or demobilisation itself (Porto and Parsons, 2003).

When war resumed in 1992, both the government and UNITA abandoned the "triple zero clause", which led to an astronomical increase in weapons procurement on both sides. Disarmament during the Lusaka Process was ineffective. It is estimated that less than half of the UNITA soldiers surrendered functioning weapons when entering the quartering areas, and many turned in no weapons at all (Ball and Campbell, 1998). No heavy weaponry was handed in, and it was clear that UNITA was retaining significant arms supplies (Porto and Parsons, 2003). The Lusaka Protocol required the government to disarm the civilian population from February 2, 1998 (Vines, 1999). This was because, as fighting resumed following UNITA's rejection of the election results, "anything up to a million AK-47s were handed out in Luanda alone, and few had been recovered. In August 1997 the government suspended the process, however, citing UNITA's reluctance to disarm. The process was to resume once the normalization of state administration had been completed, but this never happened" (Porto and Parsons, 2003: 31). The government received weapons, including tanks and artillery, in May 1995. Meanwhile UNITA continued to receive supplies and weapons via Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Congo-Brazzaville

(Porto and Parsons, 2003). Zaire provided rear-base facilities for UNITA in the late 1980s and early 1990s and continued to collaborate with UNITA through supply lines for weapons and equipment and functioned as a marketing route to Antwerp and elsewhere for diamonds (Vines, 1999).

By May 1998 a total of almost 50,000 UNITA troops had been demobilised, of which 5,059 were underage and 10,771 disabled. This was out of a total of 76,360 registered as eligible for demobilisation. After the integration of 10,880 into the FAA, over 25,000 remained (Porto and Parsons, 2003). The process was beset with difficulties. Demobilisation was to take place on the basis of a final headcount conducted two weeks before the commencement of demobilisation. Soldiers not present were considered deserters, and around 26,000 UNITA soldiers were registered as deserters after some delays (Porto and Parsons, 2003). Reports emerged that UNITA was regrouping, forcibly recruiting and even training in Jamba. Attacks frequently attributed to bandits escalated in 1998, and human rights abuses and attacks on both sides were common.

UNITA continuously delayed honouring its side of the Lusaka Protocol obligations. Thus, in December 1998, President dos Santos stated that the only path to lasting peace was the total isolation of Jonas Savimbi and his movement. He further called for the termination of MONUA's mandate and an end to the Lusaka Peace Process (Vines, 1999). In the same month the government launched a military offensive in central Angola, followed by UNITA's counter-attacks.

### 3.5.4 An Evaluation of the two Demobilisation-Reintegration Processes in Angola

The two demobilisation efforts in Angola following peace agreements in 1991 and 1994 "clearly show that demobilisation requires cessation of hostilities and political will of all parties if it is to succeed and contribute to peace and security" (Kingma, 1999: 3). As Vines (1999) observes, UNITA used the relatively peaceful environment following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol to rebuild its military, busting sanctions with a vengeance during 1996 and 1997. Thus, by 1998 UNITA was ready for renewed war and was busy training and forcibly recruiting soldiers. This is attributable to UNITA's sale of diamonds, which provided it with around US$1

billion during the Lusaka peace process. According to Vines (1999), without this wealth UNITA would have found it difficult to rebuild its military. Clearly UNITA never disarmed, although it made official statements that it had done so. It was only prepared to play along with the Lusaka peace process as long as its key strategic interests were not threatened (Vines, 1999).

The presence of a functioning state and legal system is one of the central requirements for successful disarmament and peace-building (Kingma, 1999; Stedman, 2001). "Where there is a lack of a functioning state to provide individual security, or where the police force is believed to be 'owned' by particular groups and is unwilling to provide impartial justice, then disarmament will be extremely difficult. In such circumstances, individuals and groups turn to gun ownership as a means of self-protection" (Stedman, 2001: 17). In Angola the state was not fully present in all areas of the country. While the Lusaka Protocol was signed in 1994, by April 1, 1998, only 80 per cent of the 335 localities held by UNITA had been brought under government control (Vines, 1999). In this scenario successful disarmament and peace-building was impossible. This is because upon the return of the ex-combatants and their dependents to the areas where they wanted to (re)settle, internal security problems, including lack of material and physical and legal security threatened the ex-combatants as well as others. Thus it is necessary to have a stable state that is able to guide and secure this sensitive process (Kingma, 1999).

Although UNITA can be blamed for not keeping to the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, the UN and the international community carry much of the blame for doing little to see a better implementation of sanctions. The Angolan government also contributed to the inevitably of another round of war (Vines, 1999). This is because it continued to procure weapons systems throughout the Lusaka peace process, an action that did not enhance the confidence of UNITA. According to Vines (1999), after UNITA handed over territory to the government in 1998, the government hardly invested in these areas but rather intimidated and harassed their populations. This provided UNITA hard-liners with irrefutable proof that the government was not serious in its reconciliation rhetoric. The result was a collision course which even the best mediators would have found difficult to stop (Vines, 1999).

## 3.6 The Case of Mozambique

### 3.6.1 The General Peace Agreement and Demobilisation-Reintegration

The civil war that started after independence in Mozambique ended in 1992 when the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (National Resistance Movement of Mozambique – RENAMO) and the FRELIMO-led (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*) government signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA) on October 4 in Rome (Kingma and Sayers, 1995; Lundin *et al*., 2000). The two parties agreed to stop fighting, demobilise their respective armies and create a smaller national army. It was "intended to be a non-partisan, career based and professionally trained volunteer army drawn from the forces of both former protagonists" (Stephen, 1995: 58). The United Nations was mandated to oversee a twelve-month process that involved monitoring the ceasefire, the cantonment of troops and their demobilisation and, finally, facilitating their reintegration into society. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) was established to take responsibility.

The Commission for Reintegration (CORE) was established and was responsible for the overall demobilisation-reintegration process (Lundin *et al*., 2000). The demobilisation-reintegration process was to be funded from resources made available through a Donor's Conference on May 28, 1991 (Stephen, 1995). In terms of practical implementation, the Demobilisation Technical Unit within UNOMOZ monitored and co-ordinated demobilisation, while the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) chaired CORE, the forum for co-ordinating reintegration assistance (Clark, 1996). However, the demobilisation process was protracted for various reasons. These included disputes between the government and RENAMO negotiators and UN delays in approving troop deployment and the budgets to support them (Alden, 2003; Clark, 1996; Griffiths, 1996; Vines, 1996). The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Aldo Ajello, arrived in Maputo in October 1992 with the first team of military observers, but UN forces only arrived in late 1993 (Lundin *et al*., 2000).

Delays of up to a year resulted from disagreements over the location and number of assembly points, mutinies among both RENAMO and government troops, and a slow training schedule for members of the new armed forces (Griffiths, 1996; Vines, 1996).

The cantonment of Mozambican troops was problematic in that it was difficult to obtain data on the number of soldiers due for assembly. Alden (2003) estimates that assembly involved approximately 63,000 government troops and 30,000 members of the opposition forces. However, Griffiths (1996) observes that while RENAMO claimed 21,000 troops, western military analysts estimated that the number was fewer than 15,000. Meanwhile the government gave estimates of its troop strength at between 60,000 to 150,000 while foreign military analysts estimated that the government had fewer than 50,000 active soldiers (Griffiths, 1996). In total, 49 assembly points were designated and jointly administered by UN observers and representatives from FRELIMO and RENAMO (Alden, 2003; Griffiths, 1996; Lundin, *et al*., 2000; Vines, 1996).

However, once soldiers were assembled more problems arose. The absence of pledged goods (soldiers' needs in assembly areas) and the prolonged nature of the process led troops to stage a series of disturbances in the assembly areas. For example, it is estimated that by December 1994, Mozambique had only received 28 per cent of promised cash needed to continue demobilisation payments (Stephen, 1995). There were schemes to bring formal literacy and teaching programmes to the camps, as well as multi-media-based schemes for introducing the ex-combatants to the actualities of civilian life. "Little of any substance from these programmes was to materialise on any significant scale prior to the dispersal of ex-combatants from the concentration centres…" (Stephen, 1995: 62). Clark (1995) observes that in Mozambique, devising ways to educate the soldiers in the assembly areas was less important than figuring out ways to get them into, through and processed out of the camps as quickly as possible. Boredom and frustration were the main problems, and it was better to process them in and out before they got bored than to come up with a solution for their boredom (Clark, 1995).

The boredom and frustration of encamped soldiers manifested themselves in various ways. These included attacks on UN officials, taking UN hostages in the camps, blocking major roads in the area or looting in neighbouring towns. In some cases RENAMO generals were assaulted by disgruntled troops (Alden, 2000). In government camps, six incidents were reported in January 1994, 13 in March and 36 in May; in RENAMO camps, 12, 21 and 31 incidents were reported in the same

months. "Between April and September 1994 the UN reported 374 violent incidents involving demobilised soldiers. At first these tended to be sparked off by poor facilities; later on they reflected the frustration of the combatants anxious to be demobilised" (Vines, 1996: 153). There was apparently some "self-demobilisation" where soldiers, impatient with the pace of demobilisation, drifted off home. This meant that RENAMO could not contribute the number of troops it specified to the new army (Griffiths, 1996).

Problems went beyond the assembly areas. For example, in late August 1994 demobilised RENAMO soldiers in Sofala province kidnapped the Minister of Construction and Water, João Salamão, and detained some 200 people at a road block, demanding transport back to their home areas (Vines, 1996).

Demobilisation ended on August 15, 1994. According to Lundin *et al*. (2000), the exact numbers of demobilised combatants differ slightly depending on the reporting agencies. "The figures provided by UNDP are believed to be the most accurate, since they are based on the donor's monitoring system including the last payment made to the demobilised combatants in January-March 1997" (Lundin *et al*., 2000: 182). Griffiths (1996) states that by late September 1994, about 52,108 government troops and 18,227 RENAMO soldiers had been demobilised. By March 1997, a total of 92,890 combatants had been demobilised, of which 70,910 were government soldiers and 21,980 RENAMO fighters. Of the demobilised combatants 1,380 (1.5 per cent) were women (Lundin *et al*., 2000).

One of the major shortcomings of the demobilisation-reintegration process in Mozambique was the absence of effective disarmament. During the armed conflict both Russia and China supplied light weapons to the ruling FRELIMO, while RENAMO received weapons from Rhodesia and later from South Africa. Kenya provided ammunition in the late 1980s, and Portuguese, German, American and Gulf sources also provided weaponry (Vines, 1998). Disarmament as part of demobilisation was implicit in ONUMOZ's mandate. A demobilised soldier was defined as someone who had "handed over the weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation in his possession, has been registered and has received the relevant identity card and has received the demobilisation certificate" (*General Peace*

*Agreement*, Protocol IV). However, as Vines (1998) observes, disarmament was complicated by the fact that both parties deliberately ordered that weapons be hidden. Weapons handed over to ONUMOZ observers by military personnel were inadequate, and there was suspicion that both sides were involved in establishing illegal weapons caches (Alden, 2003). This was because not every soldier arrived at an assembly area with a weapon as had been envisaged. In December 1992, Francisco Manwire, then President of ADEMO (war veterans' association), warned that many ex-soldiers had not surrendered their weapons. "Without adequate special treatment for the demobilised, we will cause more wars… We sincerely do not mean to threaten, but the demobilised could disrupt the elections and even the Government" (Stephen, 1995: 65).

Some soldiers belonging to the regular armed forces allegedly stole weapons and then sold them on the black market (Vines, 1998). The reluctance of former combatants to surrender weapons was attributed to the lack of economic opportunities and the absence of censure for the possession of weapons (World Bank, 1993). The link between the lack of economic opportunities and possession of guns is evident in the words of two former combatants in Vines' (1998) study. One stated that guns made good business and that he had sold some weapons to dealers from "Joni" (Johannesburg, South Africa).[3] This confirms the reports that "weapons from Mozambique found their way to South Africa's townships and fuelled the factional fighting there in the run-up to the elections" (Griffiths, 1996: 476). Another former ex-combatant stated that guns could mean food, and that before the elections ex-combatants handed in bad weapons in order to avoid hunger (Vines, 1998).

ONUMOZ failed to effect proper disarmament partly due to its weak mandate regarding disarmament (Vines, 1998). The operation's mandate failed to provide a clear definition of what disarmament should entail or the criteria for its success. The United Nations also failed to provide ONUMOZ with the necessary resources to deal with disarmament and to ensure that weapons were properly collected and decommissioned. The UN Ceasefire Commission was unable to verify 40 per cent of RENAMO's arms caches (Griffiths, 1996). Realising that the government's

[3] While most South Africans refer to Johannesburg as Jozi, the Tsonga-speaking people of Limpopo and Mpumalanga Provinces as well as the Shangaans from Mozambique refer to it as Joni.

disarmament programme was not succeeding, the Christian Council of Mozambique began offering basic goods in return for arms. However, this had only a marginal effect (Stephen, 1995). In 1995, INTERPOL reported that some 1.5 million AK-47s had been distributed to the civilian population during the course of the war in Mozambique. The government distributed tens of thousands of AK-47s to civilian militia units in 1982 and some of these were never returned (Vines, 1998). Incidents of demobilised soldiers selling weapon to criminals and/or using the weapons themselves in violent criminal activities have been reported on many occasions (Chachiua, undated). The sale of weapons and/or their use in criminal activities was due to the failure of reintegration programmes, which included monetary benefits, vocational training, job creation and income-generation projects.

#### *3.6.1.1 Monetary Benefits*

Originally the government of Mozambique agreed to fund a monthly cash subsidy for six months. However, following the UNOHAC Consolidated Programme of November 1993, the international community pledged a further US$47 million to fund the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) (Stephen, 1995). The major donors were Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Finland, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Germany, the United States and the World Bank (Lundin *et al*., 2000). Thus, demobilised soldiers received cash subsidies for a fixed period of 24 months. "Six months was to be the responsibility of the Government and 18 months of the international community" (Lundin *et al*., 2000: 183; Vines, 1996: 152). The programme was implemented by the local office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Donors agreed to monthly cash subsidies because no reintegration awaited ex-soldiers at the time, and there was a concern about the potential destabilising effect of unemployed ex-combatants (Clark, 1996). They were also concerned about the inability of the economy to absorb so many ex-combatants in such a short period (Lundin, et. al, 2000).

The assumption was that monthly payments were a "safety net" that would ensure a guaranteed income over a lengthy period (Alden, 2003). they also provided an income that could not be spent all at once, and it was hoped that this would keep former combatants from being seen by host communities as parasites. It gave ex-combatants an opportunity to contribute to household incomes, thus making them part of the

family (Lundin *et al*., 2000). An assumption was that it would allow sufficient time for social networks to be established (or re-established), and that these would provide employment opportunities and other sources of livelihood (Alden, 2003). "Monthly payments were equivalent to the basic pay received by each soldier at the time of demobilisation, for all but the lowest rank… The common soldier (47,681 individuals) received 75,000 meticais per month" (Lundin *et al*., 2000: 184). Initially there were some difficulties with the payment of the monthly benefits as "some banks refused to honour the cheques made out by the UNDP and thus ex-combatants frequently lost their cheques or did not receive them complete…" (Mutschler, 1995: 30). The Mozambican bank, *Banco Popular de Desinvolvimento* (BPD), was responsible for making payment to ex-combatants in the various districts (Alden, 2003: Clark, 1996; Lundin *et al*., 2000).

From January to March 1997, the UNDP supposedly made final RSS payments, namely a lump sum of 600,000 meticais (about US$52), to all ex-combatants regardless of their rank. "This payment was made possible by an unexpected surplus in RSS funds due to savings and the devaluation of the meticais" (Lundin *et al*., 2000: 184). However, about 1,800 demobilised soldiers had lost their demobilisation identity cards and as a consequence could not receive their money through the BDP branches (Lundin *et al.*, 2000).

#### *3.6.1.2 Vocational Training*

The International Labour Office (ILO) and the UNDP implemented the Occupational Skills Development (OSD) project to provide vocational and entrepreneurial training to ex-combatants, and to encourage self-employment projects. This was based on the fact that the Mozambican labour market could not absorb large numbers of ex-combatants. The project also provided tool-kits to ex-combatants and other people in need (Lundin *et al*., 2000). The programme started out very slowly, but by May 1995 it incorporated 56 training courses in which 800 veterans participated (Mutschler, 1995). The underlying belief was that former combatants, some of whom had known no other life than living off the land, lacked the necessary skills to find gainful employment. It was thus assumed that formal training in skills such as carpentry was needed (Alden, 2003).

During 1995 the World Bank developed the Provincial Reintegration Support Program (PRSP) to support existing reintegration initiatives. The pilot PRSP was developed in the provinces of Manica and Nampula. The two main components were the training fund and an employment fund. The overall objective of the PRSP was to facilitate the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and – to a lesser extent – other vulnerable groups (World Bank, 1997). The training fund was meant to complement the ILO-assisted contract training scheme and was worth US$500,000. The fund concentrated on informal sector apprenticeship training, granting to mostly master craftsmen, small and micro-enterprise employers up to six months salary-equivalent and materials in exchange for taking on an ex-combatant as an apprentice (World Bank, 1997). The informal apprenticeships scheme moved the training provision closer to the point of employment, stressing learning by doing and allowing for the acquisition of technical as well as business skills on the job. Planners assumed that while this approach did not guarantee employment in and of itself, it would place the trainee in an environment which increased the opportunity for informal business skill acquisition (World Bank, 1997).

#### *3.6.1.3 Employment/Job Creation*

The Provincial Fund (PF) was aimed at creating short-term jobs (and, if possible, long-term jobs) for demobilised soldiers. It also attempted to minimise security risks through the rapid employment of as large a number of ex-combatants as possible (World Bank, 1997). It was supposed to offer a "quick-impact model" to facilitate the social inclusion of demobilised soldiers in their communities and to provide economic stability (Lundin *et al*., 2000). The PF was originally funded by USAID in six provinces and in Maputo, and by the Federal Republic of Germany in the other four provinces of Tete, Manica, Sofala and Inhambane (Mutschler, 1995). It later received more funding from Italy, Canada and the World Bank.

The name of the German part of the Provincial Fund was the Open Reintegration Fund (ORF) (Mutschler, 1995). However, scholars tended to treat the ORF as something separate from the PF (see for example Lundin *et al*, 2000). The ORF was established with the primary purpose of creating jobs, and it emphasised different aspects of economic and social integration (Lundin *et al*., 2000). It went beyond considering the reintegration problems of former soldiers, resulting from the

economic and employment situation, to include psycho-social problems confronting the demobilised soldiers (Mutschler, 1995). The programme differed from traditional reintegration programmes in a number of ways. It was not a programme with a specifically determined range of mechanisms. The aim was to support existing activities by donors and non-governmental organisations, churches and enterprises, or to develop new ideas to the advantage of the demobilised soldiers. It was meant to provide a wide range of possible solutions to problems faced by demobilised combatants, taking into consideration the social and economic background of the former soldiers. There was an emphasis on the need to co-operate as closely as possible with the target group (Mutschler, 1995).

The ORF supported income-generating activities such as the establishment of micro-enterprises, labour-intensive public works, the rehabilitation of social infrastructure, and community-based (including NGO) initiatives. It was considered desirable to finance technologically simple and labour-intensive micro-projects with significant community involvement (World Bank, 1997). For example, in 1994, the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) agreed to finance an on-the-job-training programme for 30 demobilised soldiers in Manica province. One-third of the trainees were to become shoe-makers while the remainder were to become shoe repairmen; all were to receive kits and start-up material to help them establish themselves in the informal sector (Ball, 1997). The implementation of ORF projects was left to NGOs, local community organisations, grassroots organisations, and implementing bodies of larger development projects, churches and private enterprises. The projects were conceived as part of the broader community development programme and thus involved other disadvantaged groups such as refugees (Mutschler, 1995). This was meant to avoid a situation in which demobilised soldiers would continue to see themselves as part of a privileged group. To this end there were general guidelines for implementation:

> More than 50 percent of the direct beneficiaries [were] to be former soldiers demobilised within the General Peace Agreement; project activities [were] to serve the community in which these former soldiers [lived or worked]; the projects [were] to create possibilities to establish an own livelihood or jobs and income through the organisation of work for communal infrastructures, social services, production of

> goods etc; rural and suburban infrastructure [was] of priority; projects [were] to be planned in such a way that they may help many demobilised soldiers within the shortest possible time; the direct beneficiaries [were] to play a role in the planning of the project (as far as possible); the project proposals [were] to be based on locally available resources… (Mutschler, 1995: 9).

The ORF was different from other reintegration programmes in that its management was able to react within the shortest possible time (between two days and two weeks), and to provide funding without delay (Mutschler, 1995).

Another important aspect of reintegration was the Information, Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS).

### 3.6.2 An Evaluation of the DRP in Mozambique

Different sources give varying interpretations of the DRP in Mozambique. Motumi (2000) argues that the demobilisation-reintegration process was a success because it was conceived as part of overall community development. He sees the extent to which returning combatants married and settled down in the rural villages and urban communities as an indicator of the success of the DRP. The fact that there have been no return to war or acts of destabilisation since the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992 is a further indicator of the success of the DRP in Mozambique (Motumi, 2000). Another point to support the argument is that a Refugee Studies Programme (RSP) study in 1997 showed that there was little evidence linking former soldiers with armed crime in Maputo (Vines, 1998).

Mutschler (1995) and the World Bank (1997) put forward some successes of the reintegration programmes. According to Mutschler (1995), after ten months of existence, 50 micro-projects were operating in all four scheduled provinces, involving 3,500 contractually agreed demobilised soldiers at a cost of US$600,000 (Mutschler, 1995: 9). The World Bank (1997) also records the “impressive achievements” of the pilot PRSP. It estimates that by early 1997, over 2,100 veterans had received skills training through formal sector training providers and informal sector apprenticeships. Furthermore, about 80 per cent of those who had received training obtained gainful employment. Over 300 employment-oriented micro-projects were financed under the

Provincial Reintegration Fund, reaching over 4,700 direct beneficiaries. The target of about 6,300 beneficiaries had, thus, been surpassed by almost 10 per cent, with unit costs below US$200 (excluding administration overheads) (World Bank, 1997). According to the World Bank (1997) report, almost three-quarters of the trainees were trained through informal sector traditional apprenticeships (training-cum-employment subsidy model) at about two-thirds of the unit cost with the same level of employability as formal sector training.

The extent of the success of the reintegration of demobilised soldiers in Mozambique is disputed by various sources. For example, the World Bank mission of January 1995 reported that "veterans complained about the limited assistance they received from the community in preparing their lands and the low level of group association within the community in general" (cited in Mutschler, 1995: 10). According to the International Peace Academy (2002), most ex-combatants failed to find employment in the area in which they were trained. One of the reasons for this was that, as was the case in Namibia and Zimbabwe, employers, including the government and its local departments, tended to look at ex-combatants as potentially violent people who were likely to disrupt the workplace (Vines, 1998). Another reason was that ex-combatants were asked to either join training courses or to run small businesses that did not match their living conditions. For example, they might have been trained as fishermen where there were no rivers or sea, as electricians where there was no electricity, funded to run small business in fixed small stalls (Baracas) where there was no money in circulation due to the poverty of the community members (Mungoi, undated ).

Similarly, Chachiua (undated) argues that apart from the limited number of demobilised soldiers benefiting from the reintegration projects, the most worrying problem was that the methodology of the projects did not realistically empower the demobilised soldiers. This was despite the fact that the discourse around the programmes emphasised concepts of self-employment, community-based projects and vocational training. The training courses took into account neither the need of the demobilised nor the local conditions (Chachiua, undated). For example, while GTZ believed that there would be a demand for shoemakers and shoe repairmen, no market survey was conducted to verify this. In addition, once training got under way, it was realised that the self-employed shoemakers would experience difficulty in obtaining

raw materials on a sustained basis (Ball, 1997). A second project was thus established to provide the newly employed shoemakers with raw materials at reasonable prices. While no evaluation of the second project exists, Ball (1997) predicted that most of the trainees who attempted to become self-employed would end up concentrated in a small area and that only a few of them would survive in the medium to long term. Another obstacle was that, given their educational profile, less than 15 per cent of the former combatants could realistically prepare a project proposal (Chachiua, undated). Thus, they had to rely on other people to write proposals on their behalf.

Both Chachiua (undated) and Clark (1996) contend that demobilisation-reintegration in Mozambique was a success for the international community because free and fair elections formally ended the civil war. The respective reintegration programmes were conceived to buy temporary stability for the election process. Chachiua (undated) argues that the RSS sought to keep demobilised soldiers in their chosen places of resettlement, and this was clearly stated in official documents of the implementing agencies. It is further argued that reintegration projects did not mean reintegration into families and communities, but were designed to tie demobilised soldiers to the geographical area, all for electoral expediency, which would allow the successful end of the UN deployment (Chachiua, undated). According to this view, demobilisation-reintegration programmes in Mozambique were clearly designed to get rid of the soldiers as actors with military capacities. The most important aim was to ensure that the warring parties had no organisational resources in the form of military personnel to return to war. In the view of ex-combatants, the aim of the projects was to keep them as far apart as possible from each other in order to ensure stable elections (Chachiua, undated).

One of the factors that affected the success of the DRP in Mozambique was the lack of co-ordination of activities. While Mr. Aldo Ajello, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, was deployed in Mozambique, his office did not co-ordinate all UN activities in the country. The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), responsible for reintegration programmes, reported directly to the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs in New York and was under no obligation to co-ordinate or co-operate with broader UNOMOZ objectives (Clark, 1995; 1996). This was due to the nature of the relationship between

the different organisations. For example, while disarmament and demobilisation are generally included in peacekeeping mandates and therefore funded through peacekeeping operations, the reintegration of soldiers into civilian society is often left to other actors, ranging from the UNDP and the World Bank to civil society organisations and international NGOs (Bruchhaus, 1999). This is because different agencies operate on different mandates. In the UN, the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for helping refugees in refugee camps and in their repatriation to their home regions. Once this has been achieved and there is relative peace, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) takes over (Bruchhaus, 1999). However, this does not always involve proper co-ordination.

## 3.7 An Evaluation of DRPs in Southern Africa

### 3.7.1 Introduction

In section 3.2 fundamental elements of demobilisation and reintegration were identified. However, the discussion of demobilisation-reintegration processes in Southern Africa indicated that very few of the fundamental elements were fully considered. All the processes discussed in this chapter were characterised by inadequate planning, and thus there were problems during the implementation phase. Consequently the reintegration programmes in all these countries rarely involved either effective disarmament or effective social reintegration. Another serious flaw was that all the DRPs discussed above were gender blind.

### 3.7.2 Female Ex-combatants' Experiences of Economic Reintegration

Women are not passive victims in intra-state state conflicts, but active participants from inception to resolution (Kumar, 2000). During armed conflict some women take up arms and fight alongside their male counterparts[4] while others join organisations and become mobilisers for war or for peace. Other women may be internally displaced or turned into refugees in neighbouring countries (Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen, 2002). Thus, while some women become victims of war, for others it

[4] In the period 1990-2002, female child soldiers were present in fighting forces in 54 countries across Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Adult female combatants were present in significantly more countries (Veale, 2003).

provides an opportunity "to transform their lives in terms of their image of themselves, their behaviour towards men and elders, and their ability to live independently" (Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen, 2002: 7). Women's participation in wars contributes to the redefinition of their identities and traditional roles (Kumar, 2000). However, when peace comes, women both as ex-combatants and as civilians are forgotten. As Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen (2002) argue, women cannot sustain wartime gains in peacetime. The lack of gender sensitivity is mainly due to the existing gender biases and inequalities in most societies, in which men are often better positioned to take advantage of reconstruction initiatives. Demobilisation-reintegration programmes tend to have a male bias, often focusing on "the young men with guns" (United Nations, 2001).

While the role of female combatants vary widely from one army to another and one country to the next, female ex-combatants all over the world have limited (or no) access to benefits when peace and demobilisation come (De Watteville, 2002). Men find employment more quickly than women in skilled or semi-skilled work. "Although liberation armies were integrated, the market-driven productive enterprises of societies in the process of economic reconstruction may or may not be" (Meintjes, 2002: 69).

In all the four countries discussed in this chapter, there was no gender sensitivity in the design of demobilisation-reintegration programmes. In Mozambique, there were 93,000 soldiers in total, of which women constituted 1.48 per cent. Male ex-combatants were prioritised as they were thought to be a major security threat, but female ex-combatants were not (Date-Bah and Walsh, 2001). As a result of this, in 1994 the veteran's organisation, AMODEG, formed a women's branch in response to the fact that only men's issues were being addressed and to lobby for equal rights for female ex-combatants. Evidence of male bias in Mozambique was that only men were involved in the distribution of resettlement allowances and, therefore, only men received payments. Furthermore, clothes that were distributed as part of the assistance offered during the reinsertion phase only fit men while women were given small wraps. In training and employment programmes, the participation of women was low, skills offered were gender-segregated and little encouragement was given to women's uptake of "non-traditional" skills (Baden, 2001). The government promoted the

participation of female ex-combatants and ex-combatants' wives in labour-intensive programmes. The "Feeder Roads Program" hired 4,500 to 5,000 people; one of its targets was to hire enough women to make up 25 per cent of the total workforce. However, the programme was only able to achieve a participation rate of 14 per cent (De Watteville, 2002). Perhaps this shows the extent to which former female soldiers conform to the expected gender roles of their communities.

As stated earlier, in Namibia reintegration programmes were introduced sixteen months after demobilisation. The lack of proper planning meant that nothing was planned for the reintegration of female ex-combatants. To illustrate the extent to which the needs of female ex-combatants were neglected, the number of female PLAN ex-combatants was not known. Some sources estimate that women made up about 30 per cent of the PLAN soldiers (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996), while others put the estimate at 40 per cent (Kingma, 2004a). However, most of the women do not seem to have fought in combat; more often they provided support services such as cooking (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). While female ex-combatants in Namibia were stratified by education and experience, they were less visible in post-war Namibia. "As leaders in government and the executive they are few. In the community they rarely present themselves as erstwhile fighters, while in the various [reintegration] schemes their numbers are small" (Preston, 1997: 470).

The Development Brigade also did not cater for the specific needs of female ex-combatants (Preston, 1993b). Gender discrimination in economic reintegration continued into the late 1990s. As a result of perceived gender discrimination in employment practices, in August 1998 pregnant ex-combatants and those with small children organised a protest against a decision by Namibia Protection Service Company to bypass them in favour of employing their male colleagues (*The Namibian*, 14.08.1998). In a petition directed at President Sam Nujoma, the women argued that the discrimination that was practised by the company was setting a precedent which other companies would soon follow. According to a press report, 1,932 threatened to remain at Ondangwa Airport until they got jobs. They refused to heed the call to go back home, "give birth to their babies and then come back to look for work" (*The Namibian,* 14.08.1998).

In Zimbabwe, as was the case in Mozambique and Namibia, female ex-combatants found economic reintegration to be very difficult. Meintjes (2002) states that when soldiers returned to civilian life in Zimbabwe they faced many difficulties. "Although they had learned new skills, [female ex-combatants] found it very hard to get a job after the war… Those who had entered the liberation army with little education returned to a life of hardship and few opportunities" (Meintjes, 2002: 67). There were various factors that made reintegration difficult for female ex-combatants. These include loss of access to education during the liberation struggle and losses in health, which refers to injuries and health problems developed during the war (Bop, 2002). For example, one of the former female ex-combatants, Carine Nyamandwe, could not join the co-operatives because of health problems compounded by the fact that she lived in a village far away from the areas in which co-operatives were concentrated (Phiri, 2000).

The return of female ex-combatants to their traditional gender roles also made it difficult for them to take advantage of the economic opportunities and reintegration programmes This is evident in the case of another female ex-combatant: "I resigned from diplomatic service to go for further studies in the United Kingdom. I went to Coventry Polytechnic to study business law. Unfortunately, I did not manage to complete the course. I was a mother, student and wife. I decided to come back home" (Musengezi, 2000: 53). In some cases, gender stereotypes were used to deny the advancement of female ex-combatants in the workplace. The experience of Prudence Uriri at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation is illustrative. She was prevented from training as a camera operator even after receiving three letters of approval to become a trainee camera-person.

> …I didn't really get the chance to train as a camera operator, because there was always this argument that a woman can't really go around with a heavy camera carrying the cables and stuff like that, and: 'Anyway we have never had an experience of a woman as a camera person', they would say. But I kept on trying and eventually they approved my application to be a trainee camera woman. But actually it was just a way of shutting me up, because every time there were new recruits, they were men. And they would write me another letter saying when another chance comes we will definitely take you on. So three times it was like this and I had three letters of

> approval to be a trainee camera-person and the chance still never came (McCartney, 2000: 88-89).

Gender stereotypes meant that many female ex-combatants were stigmatised. Most had to hide their military backgrounds and melt into their respective communities (Kuchena, 2000; Musemwa, 1995). A combination of stigmatisation and the lack of information about reintegration programmes led to a situation whereby, twenty years after independence, some genuine female ex-combatants had not registered for demobilisation benefits while others were in the process of doing so (Kuchena, 2000). "It is those who are living out in villages and even some staying in the townships, who do not have this information. Even we, here at Ruwa haven't registered. We do not know how it is done. We want the information first" (Phiri, 2000:13). In terms of land allocation, very few women are allowed to own land; they have to align themselves to their brothers and husbands to gain access (Kuchena, 2000).

Overall, the successes of DRPs are embedded in the process of demilitarisation and post-conflict peace-building. Throughout Southern Africa the establishment of new national armies and restructured civil-military relations have been problematic. A number of factors have made it impossible for post-conflicts governments in the region to establish democratic civil-military relations. First, in all the countries studied, reconciliation was not central to the termination of conflict. As a consequence members of former warring armies were often integrated into a new national defence force with antagonistic military identities intact. This often resulted in skirmishes between former members of different armies. Second was the absence of effective democratic institutions, largely due to political elites' sectarian interests. Third, the persistence of previous civil-military relations between the liberation organisation and its armed wing often hampered the establishment of democratic civil-military relations.

### 3.7.3 Demobilisation-Reintegration Processes and Demilitarisation

The process of demilitarisation in Mozambique was shallow. This was because of two factors, the first being the absence of effective democratic institutions. Democratic control over the military was meant to be exercised by Parliament's Standing Committee for Defence and Security Matters. However, like other state institutions, this committee is still finding its way (Malache, Macaringe and Coelho, 2005). "The National Assembly has yet to achieve the level of stability that allows for democratic competition that is free of suspicion and mistrust. The climate that exists not only hampers the debate on defence but also spills over into the armed forces where despite the appeal for unity and non-partisanship in its ranks, it remains clear who belongs to Frelimo and who came from Renamo" (Malache, Macaringe and Coelho, 2005: 186). These conditions are not conducive to the creation of a democratic control of the military, as those who feel that integration has not been equitable are unlikely to be loyal to democratic institutions. Their loyalty tends to remain with their former leaders who may mobilise them to undermine democratic processes. "There have been mounting reports indicating that many soldiers apparently feel that the process of integration has not been 'equitable' and this dissatisfaction is often referred to as a time bomb that could explode at any time" (Macaringue, 2002: 142). For example, one of RENAMO's demands following the disputed 1999 elections was "equal representation and treatment of Renamo in the army, police, riot police and security police" (*Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, 2001: 2).

The second obstacle to the creation of democratic civil-military relations in Mozambique was the persistence of past civil-military relations. During the war of liberation in Mozambique, there was no distinction between the military wing and other sectors of FRELIMO. All members considered themselves as political–military combatants, which led to the development of a "harmonious and sophisticated civil-military relations made up of the people and their 'armed wing' the people's liberation forces (FPLM)" (Macaringue, 2002:31). This pattern of civil-military relations, according to Macaringue (2002), continued during the one-party post-independence state in Mozambique. The integration of FRELIMO and RENAMO armed forces to form the Mozambique Defence Force (FADM), following the October 1992 General Peace Agreement posed a challenge for the creation of democratic civil-military

relations. This was because the two forces were integrated with their antagonistic militaristic identities intact.

Namibia differed from the other two countries because the Namibia Defence Force (NDF) did not have to integrate opposing armies. The main task was to enable individually contracted fighters from formerly opposing political and military factions to work together. Lamb (2000) argues that by simply focusing on contemporary civil-military relations in Namibia, one's view of the phenomenon is obscured. He traces the power struggle between SWAPO and military leaders over the years. The intensification of PLAN's military operations in the late 1970s led to the emergence of PLAN leaders as influential political forces within SWAPO structures, thus undermining measures of civil supremacy implemented earlier (Lamb, 2000). The imbalance of civil-military relations in favour of PLAN led to the creation of a security (intelligence) organ to dilute the political influence of the armed forces. However, this organ gained much power and influence, to the extent that it almost brought about SWAPO's demise (Lamb, 2000).

The imbalance of power in favour of the security organ continued until PLAN was disbanded. After independence celebrations, the new government formed a new defence force consisting of some 8,000 troops drawn from the former PLAN and SWATF members (Griffiths, 1996). SWAPO, through democratic institutions, established mechanisms for the democratic control of the military. The Constitution specifies that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force, with the power to appoint the chief of the Defence Force, who is the professional head of the NDF.

> The chief of defence is answerable to the president. The president may remove the chief of the defence force from office for good cause and in the public interest, and in accordance with the provisions of any act of Parliament which may prescribe procedures considered to be expedient for this purpose. This is an important mechanism for ensuring civilian supremacy over the military. The civilian-led and [civilian]-dominated [Ministry of Defence] supervises the NDF. The minister directs the chief of the defence force in executing his peace-time roles. The civilian authorities maintain effective control over the security forces. Parliamentary oversight

> is reflected in the National Assembly's scrutiny and approval of the military budget. These are important mechanisms for ensuring checks and balances (Dzinesa and Rupiya, 2005).

Negonga (2002) observes that the principle of the civil supremacy over the Namibian Defence Force as enshrined in the Namibian Constitution has been fully accepted by everyone in the Republic of Namibia. This can be attributed to the fact that the demobilisation of soldiers prior to independence (even though not all soldiers were demobilised) somehow delinked SWAPO from PLAN. Another possible explanation is that the experience of SWAPO with the intelligence organ during the last days of the liberation struggle alerted SWAPO to the dangers of giving too much power to the security forces.

The establishment of a new national army and restructured civil-military relations was more problematic in Zimbabwe than in Mozambique and Namibia. Following independence, the Zimbabwe government established and deployed the Fifth Brigade in and around Matabeleland to crush former ZIPRA members who had deserted the ZNA (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). The Fifth Brigade was unlike any other unit of the ZNA. It was answerable directly to the prime minister and operated outside the normal military chain of command (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002). From 1982 to 1983, the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade, composed of ethnic Shonas, murdered between 2,000 and 8,000 Ndebele in south-western Zimbabwe. The unit's activities included mass murder of whole villages, mass rape and widespread torture (Kriger, 2003). The atrocities of the Fifth Brigade far exceeded the extremely brutal murders, rapes and robberies committed by the dissidents, despite the fact that the dissidents never reached 400 at their peak, and suffered very high rates of attrition (about 75 per cent) through deaths, desertions and casualties (Kriger, 2003).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002) observes that the political developments and the violence in Zimbabwe in the 1980s were the consequences of the failure of the post-colonial state to deal with post-colonial challenges. These were "the failure of the post-colonial state under ZANU-PF to undertake the expected role of peaceful meditation between the competing and contending forces that fought for the independence of Zimbabwe" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 22). As a consequence of the state's failure, the ruling elite

resorted to violence via abuse of the military, which led to negative civil-military relations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni).

The Constitution of Zimbabwe does provide for the democratic control of the military. In terms of the Constitution the president is commander-in-chief and empowered to determine the operational use of the defence forces and execution of military action. He is authorised to declare war or make peace, proclaim or terminate martial law as well as to confer honours. Furthermore, the president appoints the commander of the defence forces, and every commander of a branch of the defence forces, after consultation with a person or authority prescribed by or under an act of Parliament (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005). Effectively, the president's authority regarding the military is limited as he has to act on the advice of stipulated persons or bodies.

The minister of defence appointed by the president manages the political daily functions of the military, and commanders report to him/her and directly to the president in cases of emergency. Parliament provides important military management mechanisms including censoring the defence budget, scrutinising defence expenditure and monitoring the activities of defence forces (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005). However, most of these provisions are not effective. According to Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) despite the legal and constitutional provisions for civilian control, Zimbabwe's liberation era civil-military relations have had a profound impact on the country's current civil-military relations.

> The ideology that political power comes from the barrel of the gun and that the gun is subordinate to the former, is a notion that has since been transferred to the present governmental machinery without fundamental reorientation… this historical legacy also makes for paradoxical outcomes: on the one hand accounting for firmly entrenched modalities of civilian control, but on the other hand responsible for the incestuous and non-transparent nature of civil-security relations that represent resistance to the introduction and evolution of mature civil-military relations in post-liberation Zimbabwe (Chitiyo and Rupiya, 2005: 350-351)

This nature of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe following independence (more especially with the establishment of the Fifth Brigade) was an example of what

Luckham (1998b, 2003) terms civilian control, which refers to the loyalty of the armed forces to a particular set of civilian rulers. This differs from democratic control, which refers to the loyalty of the armed forces to institutions such as parliament. The non-transparent nature of civil-military relations cited by Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) confirms the argument that the creation of democratic institutions do not guarantee democratic governance (Cawthra and Luckham, 2003).

## 3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed demobilisation-reintegration processes in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. It was argued that while DRPs differ from one context to another, there are four essential elements of a DRP – assembly, discharge, short-term reinsertion and long-term reintegration. The first two phases constitute the demobilisation stage while the latter two constitute the reintegration stage. Three forms of reintegration were identified – social, economic and political. Social reintegration is the process though which ex-combatants are made to feel part of and accepted by the community, and may include traditional cleansing ceremonies. Economic reintegration refers to a process to facilitate the participation of ex-combatants in the economic activities of their communities. The last form, political reintegration, refers to the process through which ex-combatants participate fully in the political life of their communities, and includes taking up leadership positions.

The DRPs in the four countries discussed in this chapter took place in different political contexts, and these shaped both the processes and outcomes thereof. In Namibia, armed forces were completely demobilised as a pre-condition of independence. Thus, the country celebrated independence without a defence force. Soldiers were demobilised without any reintegration assistance, with the hope that with the excitement of independence reintegration would happen automatically. The reintegration of former soldiers into society was not conceived as part of their demobilisation. Only those who were repatriated from Angola by the UNHCR received short-term reinsertion benefits. Monetary benefits and the establishment of the Development Brigade both came as an afterthought sixteen months after demobilisation and only when soldiers started showing some discontent. However,

these reintegration measures failed to meet the needs of ex-combatants. Meanwhile, the government attempted to accommodate some ex-combatants in the public service, despite its commitment to a leaner and meaner public service. The private sector was not sympathetic to ex-combatants and is reported to have deliberately discriminated against them.

In Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the peace agreements made provision for the integration of former members of the opposing armed forces and the demobilisation-reintegration of the residual troops. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of reintegration programmes in Angola given the country's relapse into conflict. Reintegration programmes in Mozambique were characterised by poor planning and bad execution. Despite the involvement of international donor agencies, the monthly monetary benefits did not meet the needs of ex-combatants. The vocational training that was provided was criticised for being irrelevant to the needs of the local labour market, while income generation projects failed due to the absence of a proper market analysis and the lack of financial support. Meanwhile the labour market was too weak to absorb demobilised soldiers. In Zimbabwe the DRP was generally poorly conceptualised and badly executed, and thus failed to achieve the proper reintegration of demobilised soldiers. The monetary benefits were inadequate to meet the needs of ex-combatants and the process of disbursing these benefits was characterised by corrupt practices. Co-operatives collapsed due to lack of proper planning, lack of support and the general lack of skills and experience among ex-combatants engaged in such projects. The labour market was too saturated to absorb unskilled ex-combatants, and neither the vocational training nor formal education provided to ex-combatants assisted in their economic reintegration. Hence, in 1997 the government introduced additional financial compensation for ex-combatants. However, Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) argue that because the proper demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers into civilian society has not been carried out, this national problem will not go away and will need to be confronted directly as part of a general demilitarisation of the Zimbabwean society that must come at some point in the future.

As a consequence of the absence of proper planning and bad execution of DRPs in the four countries, a number of weaknesses emerged. First, the process was gender blind and failed to adequately address the specific needs of female ex-combatants. Another

weakness was the failure to link DRPs effectively with disarmament. Lastly, the process of establishing democratic civil-military relations was problematic in the three countries, while in Angola the DRP was reversed twice within a period of six years.

Three factors explained the failure to establish democratic civil-military relations. First, in all the countries reconciliation was not central to the termination of armed conflict. As a consequence, members of former warring armies were often integrated into a new national defence force with antagonistic military identities intact. In Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, this often led to skirmishes between former members of different armies. Second was the absence of effective democratic institutions, largely because of political elites' sectarian interests (Mozambique and Zimbabwe). Third, the persistence of previous civil-military relations between the liberation organisation and its armed wing often hampered the establishment of democratic civil-military relations (Mozambique and Zimbabwe).

The next chapter discusses the historical and political context of the demobilisation-reintegration process in South Africa.