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South Africa at the G20 Table and the Limits of the New Multilateralism

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ABSTRACT

Over the last ten years, global governance arrangements have changed. This is particularly so in the global economic governance arena, which has tended to outstrip political governance. A number of multilateral institutions, alongside the G-8 and the more recently established G-20, focus on issues of economic and financial stability, but these currently operate largely outside the framework of the UN.

Arguments for 'the new multilateralism' claim that the 'old multilateralism', with the UN and its 192 members as the benchmark, was unwieldy and performed poorly by standards of efficiency and effectiveness. Decisions and gaining agreement simply took too long. It is in this context that the G-20 forum arose. A `step up' from the G-8, the forum brings together the most systemically significant economies. Within this grouping, only one country from Africa was selected to participate.

The research questions whether this club or the form of network governance that is expressed through the G-20 is the right one for addressing issues related to economic and financial governance. The UN itself as core `securitising actor' has recognised that human security, as it relates to other challenges such as sustainable development, climate change and poverty, must also inform global collective actions and the solutions brokered in the 21st century. In the same way, economic and financial governance should perhaps take greater account of social outcomes, lending more weight to social justice and equity concerns.

The exclusion or marginalisation of poorer countries, particularly African countries, from decision-making in the multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), means that asymmetric relations of power are reinforced. As a block, these institutions become powerful actors on the world stage, but their lack of

transparency, openness and governance arrangements show them up to be deeply flawed. As long as they remain unreformed, they are defined by their democratic deficit.

A central question within this research is whether the G-20 is any better or can be any better as a soft law, informal forum.

An examination of the deliberative performance of the G-20 will explore these questions and will seek to outline what the implications of its performance mean not for the most powerful, but for Africa which has historically lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of development, the reduction of poverty and widening levels of inequality. The G-20 mandate has been that it should promote financial stability and growth *for all*. (*emphasis added*). Rather than assessing whether the G-20 has been meeting its mandate in terms of technical financial and economic variables only, the research assesses the G-20's performance in terms of equity and social justice. The litmus test in broad terms is whether the forum has helped to progress in any way social issues, such as those mentioned above, in relation to Africa.

If the G-20 remains a forum that relegates Africa to the status of `rule-taker' (as is the case with many of the multilateral institutions, and more particularly the Bretton Woods Institutions or BWIs), then the limits to the `new multilateralism' show that the `new' is very much like the `old'. Currently, only one African country, South Africa, is a permanent member of the G-20.

The research posits that global governance arrangements - where multiple centres of power are often in competition rather than working co-operatively on the same global issues - require a marrying of Type I governance and Type II governance to ensure that equitable outcomes are achieved, and that Africa, in particular, is re-positioned at the table with the rule-makers.

Drawing on Higgott (2004), Type I governance is seen as being governance that is concerned with co-ordinating action efficiently and effectively on a technical level, while Type II governance can be seen to be concerned with the broader social dimensions of decision-making and democratic representation.

As the UN framework is strong on Type II governance, the research will explore recommendations on how the G-20 might be revisioned to bring Type I and Type II governance strengths within the UN framework, so that ultimately poorer nations - excluded currently by the barrier of economic weight within the G-20 forum - will participate and have greater voice in decision-making processes that impact the achievement of broader developmental and social outcomes. Linked to this, the paper explores what mechanisms might be put in place to `bridge' the divide between formal treaty-based organisations such as the UN and informal networks, which are typically unaccountable and lacking in legitimacy by virtue of their exclusiveness. The G-20 is one such network gaining prominence due to its elevation in 2008 to Leaders' level and the global financial and economic crisis of 2008/9.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to the Research on the Group of Twenty (G-20)

This chapter provides a brief explanation on the background of the research. It also outlines the problem statement that guides the study. The purpose of the research and the main questions that the study will endeavour to answer are also outlined. This is followed by the Literature Review (Chapter 2) and a discussion of the Research Methodology (Chapter 3) employed in the study for data analysis and presentation. Chapter 4 presents the analysis of the data collected from a purposive sample of respondents through their participation in a questionnaire focused on the G-20. Chapter 5 makes some recommendations based on the findings.

1.2 Background to the Group of Twenty (G-20)

The Group of 20 (i.e., the G-20) was established in 1999 in response to the Asian economic crisis that erupted in 1997. As a result, its central mandate was to shape the international agenda and to act as an informal discussion forum to promote financial stability and economic growth *for all*[1].

While the G-20 is not the only informal forum established to deal with issues of a global rather than national nature, it is important to note that the G-20 differs significantly from other groups such as the G-7/G-8 which were first established in the 1970s and were representative of industrialised northern countries *only*.

1.3 Multilateral Institutions and Global Governance Groupings in Crisis: An Overview

The G-7/G-8 as a transatlantic forum has increasingly been criticised for not being sufficiently representative, and therefore, reflective of the increasing complexity of a

[1] Whether the G-20 mandate of promoting stability and economic growth for all is being achieved is a question with the research which a trend analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20 will assist to answer. This mandate was ratified in the December 1999 Berlin meeting of the G-20, which was effectively the first meeting of the Group of Twenty. This mandate was expressed in terms of the forum promoting "co-operation to achieve sustainable world economic growth *for all*" (*G-20 History Report:2007*, 17).

changed, multi-polar and diverse globality. Calls for the inclusion of other economies within such a decision-making platform have been made by other systemically significant countries and, in particular, by emerging market economies. But the group or G-7/G-8 club has been slow to change and reconfigure its membership to account for a changed globality[2].

Similarly, multilateral institutions such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have been viewed with varying degrees of scepticism. Their performance in relation to their respective mandates has been variable. The established governance arrangements which drive these multilateral institutions have also come under increasing criticism for still being reflective of 20th century post-war arrangements. With increasingly complex global challenges facing the world, calls for reform have emphasised that global governance institutions must be equal to the challenge of pressing 21st-century problems at the same time that global governance arrangements are more representative and inclusive.

The 21st century has seen a number of challenges coming to a head. Dire poverty threatens global stability and global warming threatens the capacity of the planet to sustain population growth due to unsustainable consumption, polluting industries and the rapid depletion of finite, natural resources. These are among some of the challenges which are too big for individual countries or regions to solve alone. Many of these problems require concerted and co-ordinated action among and between nation states, regions, firms, institutions, and an active globally-minded citizenry willing to subordinate narrow, self-interest in support of the global common good.

[2] The recent L'Aquila Summit in July 2009 made use of the notion of `variable geometry' as a means to deflect from the exclusivity of the club by holding structured dialogue with the + 5 countries of the South and on day three by holding discussions with 30 African leaders on the issue of development and aid. The Summit announced that the Heilingendamm process would continue for a further two years. Given the fact that the process was endorsed by both the G-8 leaders and + 5 emerging economies, the process was renamed as the Heilingendamm – L'Aquila Process. A central criticism of these arrangements has been, however, that the countries that participate in the structured discussions are not considered outright as `equals' and that such arrangements are unsustainable (Davis and Schrumm:2009).

Stiglitz (2002 and 2006) highlights that the multilateral institutions (i.e., the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)) have failed to promote the common good. The IMF with its structural adjustment programmes and demand for rapid trade liberalisation and the opening of markets, as a standard requirement within a package of conditionalities, has helped to increase poverty in countries such as Russia. Across Africa, the cost of paying back loans was at the expense of expenditure on and investment in health, education and social safety nets.

Similarly, the WTO rather than levelling the playing field has further skewed the balance of trade in favour of industrialised nations. While developing countries are required to liberalise their markets and reduce tariffs for goods produced in the industrial countries, trade-distorting subsidies for the agricultural sector in the north are maintained. Far from being developmental, tariffs imposed on developing countries are "on average four times higher" than those placed on developed countries, according to Stiglitz (2006:78).

The WB with its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and structural adjustment Participatory Review procedures has failed to reduce poverty. Richard Pithouse (2007) in: "Producing the Poor: The World Bank's New Discourse of Domination", helps to explain why. He examines the strategies for change identified in the WB's own work: "Voices of the Poor". Rather than questioning macroeconomic policy and political arrangements, the proposed strategies shift responsibility onto the poor "to cope better with the current system" (Pithouse:2007, 442). This lack of consideration of possibilities for structural change, leaves the *status quo* unchanged. Within the *status quo*, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, at speed, through processes of globalisation that continue unmitigated and unmanaged (Stiglitz:2006, 4). In developing countries, where Africa's performance is the weakest, extreme poverty[3] levels have increased. Between 1981 and 2001, Stiglitz reports that extreme poverty levels in Africa have doubled (Ibid., 11)[4].

Another key criticism of the BWIs (i.e., the WB and the IMF) has not only related to their failure to achieve their mandates, but also how they are structured and governed. The WB and IMF, established as part of the post World War II compromise, still favour the powers which emerged from the war as the `winners'.[5] Rapid change and the process of globalisation which has spurred the economic growth of other countries, particularly emerging economies, means that the 20th century power compromise is unreflective of this change. Without reform, these institutions are ill-equipped to deal with global, 21st century challenges which require collective action from a broader group of nations than those originally favoured. Lack of legitimacy and a democratic deficit in governance are criticisms which challenge the value, relevance and hegemony of these institutions.

In broad brush strokes, the above reveals a number of the deficits weighing on the organisation, structure and performance of the central grouping of the world's multilateral institutions. This picture is not, however, without its glimmer of hope. These criticisms are well-documented and an extensive body of academic research supports their validity. Within many of the multilateral institutions processes and/or plans for reform have begun[6]. Increasing pressure for greater representation within a transformed G-8 has resulted in the G-8 plus five or the Heiligendamm Process,

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[3] Stiglitz (2006: 10) uses the World Bank's definition of extreme poverty which is defined as those who are living on less than 1 USD a day. The UN *Millennium Development Report 2009* defines extreme poverty as those living on less than USD 1.25 a day (UN:2009).

[4] The 2009 United Nations *Millennium Development Goals Report* states that an unexpected more 55 -90 million people are being pushed into extreme poverty due to the global financial crisis (UN:20094-8). The majority of those living in extreme poverty are located in sub-Saharan Africa according to the report, where, in 2005, in sub-Saharan Africa extreme poverty levels were comparable to those experienced in Eastern Asia in the 1990s. By the target date of 2015, an estimated one billion people were likely to still be living in extreme poverty if the current rate of `improvement' was not accelerated (Ibid., 7).

[5] Though, in 2009, countries such as China have shown their willingness to augment the resources of these institutions and signalling their willingness to play a greater part within them.

[6] Research respondents within the study from the IMF have highlighted that a great deal of their work is focused on carrying out some of the commitments that have arisen from G-20 deliberations, particularly in 2009.

whereby five emerging market economies, including South Africa, have been invited to participate in selected activities and discussions at the G-8 Summits. Despite this shift, the partial participation of emerging economies within the G-8 has been regarded as insufficient to alleviate the legitimacy concerns that plague the forum. The G-20 contrasts with the G-8 in having these 5 economies and a number of other emerging economies participating as full members.

1.4 The G-20 Rising Star – A New Multilateralism?

In contrast to other groupings such as the G-8, the G-20's competitive advantage is that it brings together both developed and emerging market economies as equals. The expansion acts as a response to questions on the legitimacy of a G-8, for example, which is only comprised of countries from the industrialised north.

The paper will seek to determine whether the G-20, in its current form, goes far enough to close the democratic deficit gap in economic and financial global governance arrangements. The litmus test will be the impact that its deliberative performance has had on Africa. Typified as being a forum for Type I governance (*See* Higgott:2004), where concerns for efficiency and effectiveness trump Type II governance which prioritises broad representation and participation in decision-making - a key question is whether the emphasis on Type I governance within the forum has assisted to pull Africa out of poverty, promote its sustained growth and buttress development? Has the 'new multilateralism' assisted to co-ordinate action at a global level in favour of the most vulnerable or has it merely reinforced the *status quo* of an unlevel playing field? Does the forum truly seek to address global challenges from any other point of view other than narrow self-interest or is the notion of collective self-interest gaining sufficient traction to beneficially impact countries, particularly the most vulnerable, beyond the forum's membership?

Through these questions, the study interrogates whether the G-20 is realising its mandate in working *for all* and whether an emphasis on Type I governance, and the valuing of efficiency and effectiveness as primordial functions, helps to further broader social equity aims at a global level.

The study will examine then the deliberative performance of the G-20 over its ten years of existence against its mandate. An analysis of the G-20 communiqués issued into the public domain will inform a response within the research.

1.5 Problem Statement

Established within the BWI framework[7], the degree to which the G-20 has focused on Africa has not been consistent[8]. A trend analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20 will bear this out and raise the question as to whether the new multilateralism as represented by the G-20 holds out any hope for Africa and, in particular, for the `bottom billion'[9] by furthering developmental outcomes, where other multilateral institutions have failed. The trend analysis may, however, also reveal that the lack of consistent performance by the G-20 may not be unique to issues that have a focus on Africa, but other agenda issues as well.

As well, the research explores whether alignment to the BWI framework undermines the potential of the 'new multilateralism' (as represented by the G-20) and whether the eschewed alternative of alignment to the UN framework might better assist to promote, co-ordinate and manage coherent global policy outcomes that realise the

[7] The *G-20 History Report* (2007) highlights that when the G-20 was being established, 3 options were considered. In the first, the IMFC and Development Committee (DC) chairs would preside over the forum with the heads of these two institutions participating as full participants. The second option, was that the G-7 chair should head the G-20 with the IMFC and DC chairs having observer status. The third option, as the option which was finally selected, saw the establishment of the G-20 with a rotating chair and the IMFC, DC chairs and heads of both the IMF and WB attending as *ex officio members*. It was felt that this arrangement embedded the G-20 within the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) framework, at the same time that emerging economies would also have an opportunity to chair the group (G-20:2007, 18).

[8] In the context of the open and informal discussions that characterise the meetings of the G-20, South Africa, as the only African country in the G-20, had a unique opportunity in 2007 to further broaden the scope of G-20 dialogue to include a general understanding of African policy challenges. However, African policy seminars held in 2007 neither built on previous discussions within the G-20 on Africa, nor were they included in the formal programme of the G-20.

[9] Reference to the `bottom billion' is based on Paul Collier's recent work (2007).

common global good, and which do not merely advance the interests of the most powerful nations.

1.6 Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the G-20's deliberative performance and, more particularly, its performance in relation to Africa. It is posited that the inclusion of South Africa within the forum is insufficient to sway and further the attainment of developmental outcomes of relevance to Africa from one year to the next, however proactive South Africa may have been, for example, by promoting African policy seminars on the sidelines of the G-20 meetings in its year as chair in 2007.

As the 'premier' global governance forum at the moment, the hopes pinned on the G-20 to promote a more, fair, equitable and balanced world order[10] may be misplaced, if it does little else other than reinforce existing, unequal power relations. A reliance on Type I governance more concerned with efficiency rather than representation and inclusion (Type II governance according to Higgott: 2004) is likely to attenuate this situation.

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[10] In a speech given at the Rand Afrikaans University in 2000, just prior to the G-20 Finance Ministers' and Central Bank Governors' Meeting held in Canada , 24-25 October 2000, South Africa's Finance Minister, Trevor A. Manuel, had the following to say with regard to South Africa's participation at the G-20 and the implications of living in an interdependent world, while not all countries were represented at the forum:
"Next week, we go to the G-20 meeting in Canada – a group that includes `systemically significant' countries. Countries like ourselves, influential, although not powerful; countries with a voice; with potential. The G-20 provides us with *opportunity to make allies among the middle powers to engage with the G-7*; to push for structural change in a world where the inequalities are often reinforced by what, in the post-Cold war era, has been a completely lopsided balance of power. We do this for ourselves, but we also need to *engage on behalf of our neighbours*. Because if our neighbours fall by the wayside, we are dragged down too"-
(Minister T.A. Manuel: 2000. *Notes for a Speech to the Seminar on South Africa's Foreign Relations and the Creation of National Wealth and Social Welfare*. Centre for European Study in Africa, Rand Afrikaans University, 20 October) (*emphasis added*).
Stiglitz (2006:83) reframes the challenge, not as being between rich and poor countries, but as being between industrialised, middle-income and poor countries. In relation to a more fair trade regime, for example, he argues that differential treatment, accounting for different economic stages of development, can do much to level the lopsided balance of power.

The study will rely on a trend analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20. The findings of the desk-top study will be triangulated against a purposive sample of respondents involved in a survey on both the promise of the G-20 in addressing developmental issues related to Africa, as well as its limitations. It is hoped that some recommendations in relation to the new multilateralism as represented by the G-20 may emerge and inform future policy research.

Responses may reveal that the direction set by such global governance forums as the G-20 is on the `right track', but requires only minor adjustment. Alternatively, responses may reveal that respondents are of the view that the global governance system needs to be overhauled entirely if the livelihoods of the `bottom billion' are to be improved.

1.7 Research Questions

Through a trend analysis and a structured survey of questions to a purposive sample of respondents on the deliberative performance of the G-20, its composition, structure and processes, the research study seeks to answer the following questions:

1). Against the mandate of promoting stability, growth and development *for all*, what has been the deliberative performance of the G-20, since inception?

2). How does this performance measure up in relation to criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and equity?

3). To what degree, and with what results, has the attainment of developmental outcomes for the poorest countries within the world, including Africa, been a focus of attention within G-20 deliberations?

4). Is there scope for G-20 reform, in terms of the structure and composition of the G-20, so as to better enable the achievement of more equitable outcomes and goals for all, but in particular for Africa[11]?

5). a). Would the alignment of the G-20 to the UN framework better promote the attainment of equitable outcomes in favour of the poorest countries and, African countries, in particular, where the current system of multilateralism has failed?

5). b). If so, what structural policy management arrangements, processes and mechanisms might facilitate such alignment?

6) What are the consequences of leaving the global economic governance system unchanged?

1.8 Importance of the Research

This research seeks to explore the G-20's deliberative performance since its inception through a lens which gives priority to Africa. The forum enjoys a greater degree of legitimacy than, for example, the G-8, but as a forum for multilateral solution-seeking and consensus-building, the G-20 has only one African country participating as a full member.

In April 2009, at the London Summit, the African Union (AU) was invited to the G-20 table as observer, alongside Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, however, this move may be insufficient to address the deficiencies of the G-20 in being a sufficiently representative global governance forum, particularly as both organisations attended the meeting[12] at the invitation of the chair rather than as a standing arrangement.

[11] Progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is currently in crisis, despite a broad understanding that failure to attain these goals is not just a problem for the poor, but for the broader collective within an interdependent and rapidly changing world.

[12] At the Pittsburgh 2009 Summit, the two organisations attended as well, but it is yet unclear whether the invite will be repeated by the South Korean chair in 2010.

According to Higgott (2004), any global governance forum requires a mix of both Type I and Type II governance to be effective. Governance that is efficient and effective matters at the same time that who participates and makes decisions also matters. The research will seek to provide some recommendations on how the G-20, as a form of new multilateralism, could evolve to better deliver against an agenda that promotes economic growth (and development) *for all*. Recognising Africa as part of the solution and an equal partner, rather than merely as a recipient of solutions developed elsewhere by the rich and powerful, will be important ingredients to any reformulation of global governance arrangements.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review

The aim of this chapter is to conduct a literature review to support the chosen research topic on the G-20 as a key global governance forum within the global economic and financial architecture whose original mandate has been to promote economic growth and development *for all*. An understanding of what constitutes effective governance is, therefore, key to any assessment of the deliberative performance of the G-20.

The first section of the literature review focuses then on the concept of global governance and the principles underpinning multilateralism. Given that the recent appearance of the G-20 on the global stage is often seen to represent a new form of multilateralism, the degree to which the G-20 adequately fills a gap in the global policy space and architecture will be explored. As the G-20 is a form of network governance, the characteristics of this type of governance are outlined.

The literature review provides as well an overview of the performance of other multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and WB, so as to inform an assessment of the deliberative performance of the G-20 as a `new' form of multilateralism in context. It is posited that multilateral failures are in part due to a failure to consistently apply principles of multilateralism in support of *all*, rich and poor countries alike. Skewed power relations and the lack of a framework for the broader accountability of the multilateral institutions are weaknesses which distort possibilities for a more equitable global governance architecture to be created.

2.2 The Inconsistent Application of the Principles of Multilateralism

Higgott (2004: 11) defines Multilateralism as "the management of trans-national problems with three or more parties but operating with a series of acceptable generalised principles of conduct'. He stresses that behavior according to the accepted principles of `indivisibility, non-discrimination and diffuse reciprocity' should help to build trust between players, whether these players are of greater or lesser size or strength. Lack of consistency in terms of the application of these principles and the failure to adhere to the concept of `self-binding', especially by powers such as the United States, are behaviours which undermine the multilateral institutions and their legitimacy. Rather than a few isolated examples being the exception, Higgott (2004) stresses that U.S. international policy rather than promoting multilateralism has often been unilateralist in being guided by self-interest. At best, he says the United States has practised a form of `instrumental multilateralism' (Ibid.,19).

These are among the reasons for the current crisis in multilateralism. Unsurprisingly, developing countries, at the short end of negotiated outcomes, have formed a resistance to the global economic institutions which have consistently placed the concerns of more powerful nations, and/or sectoral interests, above those of developing, less powerful nations.

Higgott (Ibid., 21) stresses that what the multilateral organisations should be doing is `enhancing co-operation between participants in an accountable and transparent manner and bridging the gap between 2 types of governance'. He stresses that these `are not for de-linking'. Type I governance is defined by Higgott (2004) as being:

> "The enhancement of effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of global public goods *via* collective action problem-solving", while

Type II governance is defined as:

> "The demand for greater transparency, accountability and representation" or 'enhanced democracy' (Ibid., 10).

He highlights that the application of this two-fold definition of global governance has not been achieved or realised by the multilateral global economic institutions. In the main, Type I governance and its concern for efficient and effective policy-making has dominated or over-ridden concerns for Type II governance. Higgott (2004) says that the aim of the multilateral institutions 'should be to ensure the stability of the global economy - as an 'unalloyed public good' - and provide problem-solving strategies for new stresses on the system as they emerge' (Ibid., 21).

2.3 The New Multilateralism: Running in Parallel

If the institutions of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO can be characterised as being representative of an `old multilateralism', the establishment of the G-20 with a less `top-down', network approach to governance can be seen as a new form of multilateralism. Established to work within the framework of the Bretton Woods Institutions (i.e., the IMF and the World Bank) and guided by a concern for creating growth *for all* through economic and financial stability, the forum brings together developed and developing nations. Its activities run parallel to those of the multilateral institutions. Anticipating that the G-20 would eventually be elevated to leaders' level, according to Higgott (2004, 25), this would represent "the major intergovernmental exercise in the new multilateralism"[13].

The forum is, however, currently no less transparent than the institutions of the old multilateralism, with the area of focus being on the international financial system as an area of "high-level specialist knowledge" (Ibid., 27). A concomitant lack of access by other actors, including civil society and international non-governmental organisations, remains a problem in relation to the meaningful realisation of Type II governance within the G-20.

[13] A number of academics over several years have anticipated and weighed the pros and cons of the G-20 being elevated to leaders' level.

Higgott (2004) highlights that in the 21st century, the global financial architecture is more complex in not being 'dominated by a single actor' through `decentralised financial globalisation'. With impetus from the failures of such institutions as the IMF in handling financial crises, such as the East Asian crisis or the transition from a centralised economy to a market economy in Russia (Stiglitz: 2002), a `variable geometry at regional level has emerged largely to offset financial instability' and reduce dependence on 20th century institutions such as the IMF (Higgott:2004, 27)[14].

According to Higgott (2004), the G-20 as a reform and innovation, has the potential to overtake the G-7/G-8 in being more legitimate and more representative as a global governance forum. As such, it could become the "informal steering committee of the world" (Ibid., 29). While the forum is largely `statist' in nature, Higgott asks whether the G-20 might help to progress 'a limited form of Type II governance'. In agreement with Stiglitz (2006), he stresses that the challenges of globalisation require a `more strategic and joined-up approach' (Ibid., 33). According to Higgott (2004), "inter-state co-operation is still at the heart of successful policy-making at global level" (Ibid., 35).

A challenge in relation to the workings of the traditional global governance institutions has been that they have largely been driven by the 'domestic actor preferences' (Ibid., 35) of the most powerful. Greater oversight by developing countries over the BWIs and the WTO through the G-20[15] could help to overcome aspects of the governance deficit, particularly in relation to Type II governance. As such, the G-20 would play a `quasi-legitimating role' in relation to these institutions (Ibid., 34). The G-20, according to Higgott (2004), allows the US the opportunity to 'usher in a new diplomacy, build trust and work *within* the parameters set by multilateralism as an institutional form based on principled behaviour' (*emphasis added*). Without this, Higgott (2004) warns that the new multilateral endeavour could

[14] Higgott (2004:27) includes such forums as the G-20 within this `variable geometry' though not purely a regional grouping.
[15] The G-20 has provided some degree of `oversight' in relation to the IMF and the WB in calling for the reform of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on the issue of voice and quotas.

fail. Elsewhere it has been argued that the G-20 is a circuit-breaker or a catalyst assisting to kick-start or introduce reforms in the BWIs and elsewhere.

By working in parallel to global economic institutions such as the IMF and the WB, the G-20 does not supplant these, but is able to focus on issues both beyond and within their remit. There are limits, however, to the specialist knowledge housed in the forum, particularly if technocrats exclude considerations of equity in the reform agenda. Stiglitz (2002) has criticised the revolving door between, for example, the US Treasury and the financial institutions. Similarly, if the G-20 is made up of the same Finance Ministers and technocrats who sit on the Boards of the IMF, one might well argue that expectations of the G-20 are overly optimistic, as the underlying mind-set and actors within the forum are the same.

2.4 Critiquing the Performance of the Multilateral Institutions: The Globalisation of Poverty

There can be no stronger critique of the performance of the `old' institutions of multilateralism than to provide a brief assessment of how they have performed to reduce poverty; improve levels of trade; and cancel debt in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, so that African countries have the space to support their own development in a sustainable manner.

In Africa, according to the World Bank's *African Development Indicators of 2001* with 1995 as the base year, "the trade index dropped from 158.3 in 1980 to 96.5 in 1999" (Onimode *et al*: 2004, 247). In Sub-Saharan Africa over the same period and with the same base year, exports fell from 121.8 to 89.4 in 1999 (Ibid., 248). Within this time, the growing African debt burden grew to approximately USD 230 billion, while much touted initiatives such as the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative have provided relief for only USD 19 billion (Ibid., 254). Against the backdrop of lower levels of generated income through trade and an increasing debt burden, the capacity for Africa to fund and direct its own development has been weakened rather than strengthened.

A framework that has favoured creditors, promoted wholesale dependence on external sources through structural adjustment and required political conformity to a form of `low-intensity democracy' or what Onimode calls `donor democracy' (Ibid., 235), has undermined development in Africa and 'globalised poverty in the Third World', rather than eradicating or reducing it (Ibid., 24). By this analysis, the BWI framework, within which the `old' multilateral institutions have operated, has been instrumental in exporting an economic model that, rather than promoting growth and development, has driven up levels of inequality and human suffering within the most vulnerable nations. Many of these are located in Africa, where the majority of poor people living in extreme poverty (- Collier (2007) refers to the extreme poor as the `bottom billion' -) are located.

2.5 Network Governance as Intergovernmental Management and Change

As the G-20 is a form of network governance, below follows a brief explanation of how network governance works with its reliance on voluntary agreements and negotiation rather than traditional hierarchies of power.

The issue of change in relation to ' 'new' modes of governance and 'old' forms of government and the interaction between them' has been a focus of study by a number of authors, including Jordan, Wurzel and Zito (2005: 478). They highlight that the term `governance' signifies 'a change in the nature or meaning of government[16]' (Ibid., 479), with forms of governance interacting with government along a continuum. They codify the types of possible interaction as:

1. Complementarity or co-existence;

[16] (Jordan, Wurzel and Zito: 2005, 481) highlight that the core functions of government are "to make law, implement law and interpret law", while the 'essence of governance' is to "focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government."

2. Fusion;
3. Competition; and/or
4. Replacement (Ibid., 481).

The G-20's operation in parallel to the UN framework is often typified as 'beneficial co-existence', however, for the purposes of the research the G-20's operation within the framework of the BWIs sets it firmly in the mode of competition with the UN framework. This form of interaction becomes more pronounced when test cases in relation to the response of the UN to the global financial crisis in 2009 and the response of the G-20 are contrasted. Developing nations given voice in the UN General Assembly have criticised the G-20 for failing to address the global economic and financial crisis as a `human calamity'[17]. Instead, its focus had been on narrow economic variables, without a full appreciation of the social costs of the crisis to the real economy. By the Pittsburg Summit in September 2009, some shifts in this regard are noted[18].

R. A. W. Rhodes (1996), in his work entitled: "The New Governance: Governing Without Government", focuses on the `new' form of governance through the establishment of self-organising networks, increasingly the norm in the context of decentralisation.

Self-organising networks according to Rhodes (1996) share a number of characteristics in common with other forms of governance, so, for example, in relation to `governance as socio-cybernetic systems' there is a recognition of interdependence. Given information asymmetries, and the need for interdependence,

[17] Within the UN General Assembly's draft document for the "Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development" (A/CONF.214/3), New York, 24-26 June 2009, the Assembly states that its purpose is to "achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character" and "to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of [..] common ends" (UNGA:2009, 2). By contrast the 24-25 September 2009 Pittsburg Communiqué indicates that the members had "designated the G-20 to be the premier forum for (their) international economic co-operation"(G-20:Preamble, paragraph 19).
[18] See the UN (2009) "Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System", commonly referred to as the Stiglitz Commission Report, which highlights key shortcomings of G-20 deliberations to-date.

new forms of interaction among actors are required. The single actor or state able to address challenges is supplanted by the 'poly-centric state, multiple centres, blurred boundaries and shared goals' (Ibid., 657-8). Within this context, Rhodes (1996) highlights that socio-political governance requires "patterns of interaction in which political and traditional hierarchical governing and self-organisation are complementary" (Ibid., 657). In the international system, knowledge, expertise and resources are pooled and negotiated by multiple actors to prevent, mitigate and/or address risks and attain a shared goal as a collective.

With self-organising networks and interdependent actors delivering services, Rhodes (1996) highlights that the shift in the role of governance is toward `managing networks' and 'getting things done through other organisations' (Ibid., 658). This characteristic is pertinent to the operation of the G-20 in particular within the framework of the BWIs. As a form of social, inter-organisational (and intergovernmental) co-ordination, "reputation, trust, reciprocity and mutual interdependence" are important (Ibid., 659). Network governance, according to Rhodes (1996), is an alternative to more traditional forms of governing through bureaucratic, top-down hierarchies or the market. Within this alternative, the following characteristics obtain:

1) Inter-organisational interdependence beyond the bounds of government;
2) Regular network member interaction due to the need to pool or 'exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes';
3) 'Game-like interactions with the rules of the game underwritten by network participants';
4) Self-organisation and autonomy where the state often 'occupies a primary or sovereign position[19], but is only able to imperfectly or indirectly steer the network' (Ibid., 660).

[19] In relation to the operation of the G-20, it can be argued that the member states hold a primary position in relation to such organisations as the IMF and the World Bank, which remain *ex officio* members within the forum.

Within an intergovernmental network, 'game management with mutual adjustment and network structuring by changing the rules of the game' become two strategies which help to foster agreement or joint action between the members (Ibid., 664).

Rhodes (1996) highlights that with the rise of networks, governments are challenged to "seek out new forms of co-operation" (Ibid., 666), particularly as formal lines of authority are eroded in favour of the informal and "legitimacy is increasingly marked by ambiguity". At its best, network governance is seen to represent the creation of a form of 'postmodern public administration' where citizens and institutions are empowered to participate. At its worst, the establishment of network governance 'destroys political responsibility, creates networks of privilege and favours established interests' (Ibid., 666). He flags that issues of democratic accountability also arise as 'networks can be open without being accountable' (Ibid., 667). These are criticisms which are important to factor in any appreciation of the work of the G-20 as a form of network governance on the global stage.

2.6 Africa in the Interstices Between the BWI and UN Frameworks

Instead of the principle of subsidiarity being applied across the board and the UN playing the role of highest order co-ordinator in relation to global economic and financial deliberations, a bifurcation between the BWIs, including the WTO, and the UN has deepened.

With the G-20 consciously established to operate within the framework of the BWIs, the G-20's operation over the last ten years appears to have done little to bridge the divide. The legitimacy created through an expanded club that includes (only) one permanent member from the African continent appears equally to be insufficient to shift the balance of power and the underlying paradigm in favour of a `better deal' for Africa. A trend analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20 and its normative outcomes[20] will in all likelihood bear this tentative conclusion out in the research paper.

2.7 A Way Forward

The emphasis of much research and policy analysis in relation to the G-20 thus far has tended to laud the establishment of the G-20 as a significant improvement over an increasingly irrelevant transatlantic G-7/G-8. However, by operating in parallel to the UN's ECOSOC, without reporting into the UN framework and focusing on economic variables over and above a concern for human welfare and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, for example, this new form of multilateralism is in danger of weakening the multilateral system rather than strengthening it. The research will seek to provide some recommendations as to how the G-20 might yet be reformed and its work harnessed to enhance the global governance architecture for the benefit of *all* and, in particular, the most marginalised `bottom billion'.

In the context of the global economic and financial crisis first generated in the United States and the economies of the industrialised north, the need to bring Type I and Type II governance closer together through a strengthened multilateral approach that safeguards and protects global public goods, including human security, is now more urgent than ever.

The Governance diagram below presents the fusion of Type I and Type II governance as an ideal towards which multilateral institutions and lower-order types of governance might strive. Principles of co-ordination, specialisation and subsidiarity assist to promote a framework of policy coherence. In terms of multiple centres of power in a context of contested globalisation, different forms of interaction can be found to operate simultaneously in various combinations (i.e., complementarity, competition, replacement and fusion).

[20] In other words, the analysis will seek to determine whether the G-20 has served to entrench Type I or Type II governance or bridge the democratic and legitimacy deficit by merging the two types of governance.

As such, the diagram below is only intended as a conceptual summary. Linear progression is not intended to be construed:

<u>Diagram 1</u>:



Diagram 1: Type I and Type II Governance Continuum – (*independent adaptation from various sources, including Higgott (2004)*).

A trend analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20 will seek to ascertain whether the `new' multilateralism holds any greater promise than the `old' for Africa in terms of the promotion and realisation of developmental outcomes**.** As well, while the G-20 is a `step up' from the G-8, how Type I and Type II governance considerations might be brought to bear within the forum to support the realisation of more equitable global social outcomes will be explored within the research.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction to the Research Methodology

The purpose of this section is to describe the methodology used in the research.

3.2 Research Approach

The approach to this study will be exploratory and will rely on the case-study research method with an emphasis on content analysis.

As the primary unit of analysis will be the deliberative performance of the G-20, the communiqués issued by the G-20 since inception are important to the research. A trend analysis of the communiqués will assist to answer the questions posed by the research in relation to the deliberative performance of the G-20 and the implications of this performance for Africa and the attainment of developmental outcomes for the poorest countries. The G-20's own founding statements are based on the premise that the forum should promote growth (and development) benefits *for all*.

The results of survey questions using a small purposive sample of respondents will be triangulated against the findings of the content analysis done on the communiqués issued by the G-20 in its first ten years of existence.

Academic research and the statements issued by international civil society groupings and others will assist to contextualise the performance and expectations of the G-20 as a new form of multilateralism. What they say its role in relation to Africa should be will also be explored.

The study will rely on semi-structured interviews which will include a mix of open (qualitative) and closed questions (quantitative). Interviews will be conducted with representatives of five key groupings, namely International Non-Governmental Organisations; international and local experts on the G-20; representatives of multilateral and intergovernmental organisations; representatives or officials who have current engagement with the G-20 and African country representatives.

Respondents who are officials working currently within the G-20 from South Africa will be categorised within the G-20 grouping rather than within the Africa grouping. It should be noted then that the latter category is intended to comprise excluded African countries from current G-20 arrangements. The inclusion of African country representatives within the research is important, particularly given the focus within the research in advocating that Africa is an important part of the solution within any efforts that seek the reform of the global and financial architecture.

Similarly, it can be argued that some respondents categorised within the multilateral and intergovernmental grouping could also be equally located within the G-20 grouping. For the purposes of the research, the proposed categorisation will remain fixed, despite membership overlaps between groupings.

Given the global financial and economic crisis and how it has affected countries throughout the world, there are strong arguments for Africa to be a recurring focus of attention within G-20 meetings. However, a trend analysis of the performance of the G-20 is likely to reveal that little more than scant attention has been paid by the G-20 to Africa and the achievement of broad equitable outcomes at a global level.

The case study method is viewed as appropriate as Leedy and Ormrod (1989: 135) highlight that this method is 'especially suitable for learning more about little known or poorly understood situations'[21]. They highlight that the data within a case study often includes "observations, interviews, documents (e.g., newspaper articles), past records (…)(Ibid., 135). Once data within a case study is synthesised, conclusions drawn from the specific case tend only to be generalisable beyond the case itself on a limited and/or tentative basis, particularly if only a single case is studied (Ibid., 136). This is the case with the current research.

The G-20 as a grouping is still new and the meetings conducted by the G-20 are closed and beyond the public's and/or media's view. It is for this reason that case

[21] (Leedy, P.D. and Ormrod, J.E.:1989, 135).

study-type observations, not possible in the study, will be replaced by an examination of the communiqués issued by the G-20, as well as some of the other documents issued by the forum into the public domain, as the basis for the trend analysis. A trend analysis of the content of these documents will allow the key issues upon which the G-20 has focused, as well as those areas where the forum has been (un)able to reach consensus over the years, to be identified.

The Literature Review (see previous chapter) helps to contextualise a number of issues in relation to an understanding of current trends in global governance, as well as outline thinking on how the performance of the `old' multilateral institutions can be assessed since inception (i.e., the IMF and the World Bank in particular). The Literature Review contrasts a number of differences between the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the UN, where the former in being concerned with technocratic issues is reflective of a form of Type I governance, while the latter, in being fully representative, reflects a form of Type II governance. Proponents of the G-20 as a form of new multilateralism claim that the G-20 brings together efficiency and effectiveness (Type I governance), as well as possibilities for greater representation and participation (Type II governance) due to the fact that significant, systemically important emerging market economies are included in the G-20 club - unlike the G-8. The research questions the degree to which the G-20 can be lauded when currently only one country from the African continent is a full member (i.e., South Africa). Nonetheless, decisions made by the G-20, as a grouping of systemically significant countries in the context of globalisation, will inevitably impact Africa. The lack of voice and participation accorded to Africa through the G-20 remains a concern and suggests that there are limits to the new multilateralism in its current form.

With a mix of closed and open questions, closed questions within the developed interview schedule for the study will use a Likert scale (using a scale of 1-5) to systematically identify whether respondents *strongly disagree* or *agree* with statements related to the topic of study[22].

Statements that elicit strong responses from respondents in relation to the Likert scale may be probed further with requests for open and thick expansion, particularly in the case of face-to-face interviews where there is greater opportunity for a conversation on the G-20.

In relation to the quasi-experimental design of the study[23], a purposeful sample of respondents will be selected and interviewed.

Triangulation within the study will serve to create a form of internal validity, as well as allow the researcher to evaluate respondents' input against the academic literature and other reports or discussion documents that have been issued on the G-20 grouping.

The analysis of the qualitative aspects of the research will allow the researcher to construct a holistic picture of the deliberative performance of the G-20 through a trend analysis of G-20 documents. What respondents have to say about the G-20's performance, how it relates to other organisations such as the IMF, WB and the UN, as well as the implications of Africa's marginal inclusion in the forum will be explored (Meriam: 1998). Tellis (1997:1) highlights that case studies bring out details within a study from the viewpoint of participants. The use of multiple sources of data, over and above what has been issued by the G-20 itself, will help to put the views of these participants in critical perspective.

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[22] It should be noted that research questions within the study are purposivefully leading in the attempt to draw out strong positions and/or statements from respondents.
In some instances, respondents will have strong differences with the flow of questions. For example, in Question 13 and 14 the respondent may disagree that the EU is over-represented in the G-20, and, as a result would leave Question 14 blank.

[23] In quasi-experimental designs, randomness in the selection of the respondent sample is neither possible nor practical (Leedy, P.D. and Ormrod, J.E.:1989, 227).

A mix of qualitative and quantitative aspects of research then is suitable as a research methodology for this study.

3.3 Respondent Population and Sample for Semi-Structured Interviews

As stated above, this study on the limits to the new multilateralism in relation to the G-20 will rely on a closed, non-random sample of participants/officials/academics. Selected respondents with expertise in the international, and economic and financial policy arena will be selected as representative `practitioners', whether located within an intergovernmental grouping, International NGO, an African country, academic think-tank or part of the G-20 membership.

Criteria for the selection of respondents is based either on their ongoing involvement with the G-20 policy agenda as an `included' member of the forum from an organisational or country perspective or from the perspective of being 'excluded'. In broad terms, this includes think-tanks, international NGOs and countries which do not have membership within the G-20, with a particular emphasis on African countries.

The targeted purposeful sample for the study will comprise the following:

Table 1 ***Population Sample Breakdown***

Category of Respondent Selected
1. Policy-makers or officials with involvement in or interest in the G-20 from the perspective of G-20 member countries (at least 6 respondents).
2. Policy-makers or officials with involvement in or interest in the G-20 from the perspective of multilateral or intergovernmental organizations (at least 3 respondents).
4. `Outsider' / Academic respondents or experts who have expertise in the areas under investigation within the study, in particular global governance reform, the G-20, etc. (at least 4 academic / researcher respondents).
5. Respondents from international civil society organisations and/or lobby groups with interest in the G-20 (at least 2 respondents).
Projected Maximum Sample Size: 15

Inasmuch as possible, the researcher will endeavour to conduct face-to-face, once-off interviews, wherever feasible and practicable. Other respondents will be contacted *via* email and sent a letter of request for participation and an electronic version of the interview schedule.

3.4 Data Collection

Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. (2001) highlight that in relation to case study research, the researcher's experience, combined with the literature review, assists to construct the framework for a study. Broad "conjectures" formulated by the researcher at the beginning of the study often "perform the role of 'guiding principles' and assist in structuring the data collection process" (Babbie, E. and Mouton, J.: 2001, 282).

They further highlight that in relation to case study research, the unit of analysis is contextualised with sufficient "information about subjects, setting and data collection and analysis to permit the reader to make judgments about the adequacy of the method" and its replicability (…) The use of multiple sources of evidence in case study research assists to triangulate the findings and represent aspects of thick description (Ibid., 282-3).

As stated above, semi-structured interviews will be used as a ***primary source*** of data collection from respondents who have a current role within the G-20 or to varying degrees either interact with the G-20 from the perspective of a multilateral institution, academic think-tank or International Non-Governmental Organisation or are excluded from meetings and participation on a country basis due to criteria of economic size and weight. In the latter case, African country interviews will be sought through the Embassies and High Commissions with missions posted in South Africa. Similarly, country representatives from G-20 member countries will be approached through the Embassies and High Commissions with missions posted in South Africa, unless direct links with G-20 Officials in these countries can be made.

Data will also be collected from ***secondary sources*** related to the G-20. A simple measure of determining how a common agenda was built and more particularly whether Africa featured in the agenda of the G-20 agenda (See Woods and Lombardi:2005) will be gauged through the frequency with which Africa is expressly mentioned within the communiqués of the G-20, in particular.

In some instances, individual G-20 country or member media statements which have relevance will also be examined.

Academic and comparative research on the G-20 and other international groupings will assist the researcher to evaluate existing global governance arrangements, as well as emerging reform proposals which seek to enhance Type II governance within these arrangements.

G-20 discussions of a financial and economic nature are often characterised as being highly complex. However, 'within the context of societal trends of differentiation and integration that result in lengthening chains of interdependence', Walters (2004) in his critique of governance, identifies how 'the process of 'complexification' divests governance activities and arrangements of their political content' (Walters:2004, 41)[24]. This critique will be tested through respondents' positions on whether African countries, other than South Africa, should be included in the G-20 and whether the G-20 should engage more with International Non-Governmental Organisations and non-member countries, to become more open, transparent and accountable.

3.5 Data Analysis and Presentation

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[24] William Walters (2004: 40-41) speaks of a `meta-narrative of complexity' within the 21 century which assists to promote the status and primacy of, for example, financial and economic experts and country officials, such as Finance and Trade Ministers, over and above other potential participants and decision-makers within current global governance arrangements. As the prevailing, largely uncontested `common-sense', in Gramscian terms, the exclusion of others such as civil society organisations is rationalised as `natural' and `inevitable'. Other players are simply assumed to not have any expertise or understanding of 'complex', technical financial and economic issues (*sic*.). By such accounts, `events and governance arrangements are depoliticized, when they should be seen as questions of power' (Ibid., 41).

Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. (2001: 283) highlight that in relation to case study research, a typical challenge for researchers relates to "the amount of data collected for each case study" and that "clear conceptual categories for the empirical data" must be developed to provide focus to findings.

As stated above, the research paper will seek to determine the deliberative performance of the G-20 through a trend analysis that will largely be conducted as a desk-top study.

For the purposes of the research, an exhaustive trend analysis is deemed to be beyond the scope of the study. As well, trend analysis along these lines has been done elsewhere, particularly in relation to the G-8 (See Hajnal:2007).

On a comparative level, and in line with research elsewhere, the general normative thrust of the G-8 and the G-20 will be assumed to be similar and underpinned by the same paradigm (i.e., that of neoliberal democracy).

Research elsewhere has shown that these institutions tend to diverge from the policy positions of developing countries as co-ordinated within the G-77, for example (See Kirton:2005).

The format of the trend analysis table to collate and organise information is as follows:

G-20 Performance	**2008**	**2009**	**-Brief Commentary**
Issue / Collective Action Problem			
Communiqué 1 -			
Communiqué 2 -			
Etc.			

2. Global Assessment and Commentary on the Deliberative Performance of the G-20: ______________________
3. Concluding Remarks: **3.1 Normative**

3.2 Structural
3.3 Internal Governance Arrangements

The above table emphasises three main areas which may require reform, depending on the outcome of the global trend assessment of the G-20's performance. Using the litmus test of whether the G-20 has assisted to promote equity, growth and development *for all*, and for Africa more particularly, recommendations on the normative, structural and/or internal governance arrangements of the G-20 may be proposed.

The continuity of policy issues from one year to the next will be interpreted as showing not only their intractability, but the degree to which the G-20 views these as important and requiring of resolution.

In relation to the questionnaire data, closed questions relying on the use of a Likert scale of 1-5 (with one showing strong disagreement and 5 showing strong agreement), will be collated to identify the mean or average response of respondents overall. This will then be compared to the average responses of groupings, namely the mean responses of: 1) the International Non-Governmental grouping, 2) the Academic respondent grouping, 3) the Multilateral or Intergovernmental grouping, 4) the G-20 member grouping (excluding G-20 participants at an organisational level such as the IMF), and 5) African country respondents (excluding South Africa as a G-20 member). As the purposive sample of respondents is anticipated to be relatively small, the calculation of standard deviations in relation to responses will not be deemed valid. As well, further comparison between the groupings, at a sub-group level, will not be deemed valid, as the small number of respondents within each grouping would not make this exercise meaningful. The Likert-questions forming the basis of this analysis are Questions 1, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24.

In total, there are 11 Likert-type questions within the interview schedule developed for the study. Findings will be presented in graphic form, with an analysis of optional qualitative responses for the same questions enriching an understanding of respondents' positions and thinking.

Similarly, the interview schedule includes 4 closed YES/NO-type questions. The same approach will be used to collate responses. The questions which rely on YES/NO-type questions are Question 2, 4b), 10 and 11a). Findings will be presented graphically, with an analysis of optional qualitative responses for the same questions enriching an understanding of respondents' positions and thinking.

Over and above the above, the inter-relation between a number of cognate questions will be drawn out. For example, Questions 1-3 can be considered to be related.

Similarly, the largely open questions related to the G-20's performance (Questions 7, 8, 9 a), 9 b), 15, 16, 4a), 26, and 27) must also be considered in conjunction with one another, at both a global respondent level and at the level of respondent groupings with a view to identifying any trends and/or differences between groupings.

Cognate questions related to the accountability of the G-20 forum include Questions 6, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 19, 20, 21, as well as potentially Question 27 which is a largely open question which provides the opportunity for further elaboration on any issues related to previous questions or the G-20 more generally.

Cognate questions related to the composition of the G-20 and issues of representation include the following: Question 5, 10, 11 a), 11 b), 12, 13, 14, 17, and potentially Question 27.

For the purposes of this research, Question 27 is considered to be the only question which might straddle each of the above broad groupings of questions by line of inquiry. A broad analysis of responses in relation to the above lines of inquiry, namely:

1. The degree to which the G-20 fuses Type I and Type II and is underpinned by broad social democratic values and a guiding concern for equity and social justice,

2 a). The performance of the G-20, and

2 b). The performance of the G-20 in relation to Africa,

3. G-20 accountability,

4 a). G-20 composition and representation and more particularly,

4) b). Openness to an expansion of the G-20 to allow for greater African representation at the level of country or region or both, and

5) Any other issues raised for considerations by respondents.

In relation to the open question responses received, general trends identified against the above lines of inquiry will be interpreted more impressionistically than the process utilised for the closed questions.

3.6 Validity and Reliability

Respondent input to questionnaires; existing literature on the G-20 and the performance of the `old' multilateral institutions; and reference to critical and academic sources on the work and progress of the forum will assist with the process of *explanation-building*, that is "a specific kind of pattern-building", used in case study research, according to Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. (2001, 283).

The members of the G-20 forum, when assessing their own effectiveness through the 2007 G-20 History project, have tended to lean towards a positive evaluation of their own engagement. This report excluded the opinion of non-member countries as well as the voice of International Non-Governmental Organisations and academics. Other more critical sources would have, in all likelihood, highlighted that while the forum had increased representation through the establishment of a broader `club' of nations than the G-7 or G-8, the current forum had yet to succeed in promoting the interests of countries outside its membership. As well, as the report did not assess the G-20 in terms of a focus on developmental outcomes or how its performance might impact the African continent and/or the poorest nations in the world, the current research differs significantly from the previous study.

The process of triangulation will, therefore, be important in creating reliable findings within the study, as it will allow the researcher the opportunity to critically `unpack' differing responses on the performance of the G-20 as a new form of multilateralism. Recent tests of the forum's effectiveness have included its response to a global economic crisis and whether demonstrable support has been shown not only to emerging market economies within the forum, but to the African continent on such issues as Aid Effectiveness and the promotion of growth and development. This is given that the G-20 was established to promote global growth and development *for all*.

Two further moments bear some consideration in an assessment of the deliberative performance of the G-20. The first is related to whether South Africa as chair of the G-20 in 2007 managed to promote an African agenda which maintained momentum beyond its year as chair or whether the furthering of this agenda was overtaken by other forces at play within the global arena.

The second relates to the 2008/9 decision to elevate G-20 meetings to Leaders' level. An assessment of the G-20 deliberative performance must consider whether the fluidity with which this development occurred and current arrangements weaken the forum's ability to generate momentum for policy outcomes introduced by one chair to the next. Leaders are themselves under pressure to perform against election promises in democratic societies. As a result, they may be inclined to introduce issues of relevance to their domestic publics, while these same issues will have little relevance for a broader global polity.

3.7 Limitations of the Research

As stated above, the research, limited to a case study of the G-20's deliberative performance using the communiqués issued by the G-20, and responses from a small purposive sample of respondents will be exploratory. The purpose of the study is to determine the degree to which the G-20 as a new form of multilateralism fills a democratic deficit by bringing both Type I and Type II governance together.

The findings of the study may have some generalisable value by identifying limitations to the new multilateralism and areas where reform efforts could usefully be directed.

It is a tenet of the research that Africa must be included as part of the solution within global governance forums, participating in policy-making processes that have bearing on the continent. The failure to-date by the `old' multilateral institutions to promote developmental outcomes for poor countries and for Africa, in particular, exacerbates the challenge of extreme poverty and government and market failures.

Increasing calls for the establishment of greater coherence in the system of global governance are considered by exploring whether the alignment of the G-20 within the UN framework might promote such an end. It is proposed that alignment and closer co-operation between forms of informal network governance and formal treaty-based organisations and, in particular, the UN would help to promote Type II governance arrangements and address the democratic deficit inherent to self-selected, exclusive clubs such as the G-20.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS

The aim of this chapter is to present the research findings of the study. The chapter is comprised of three parts. In the first section an overview of the deliberative performance of the G-20 is provided. In section two, the findings of the questionnaire conducted with research participants are presented and in section three some conclusions and general trends from the research are highlighted.

4.1 The Deliberative Performance of the G-20

This section provides a brief overview of the performance of the G-20 since its inception. The purpose of the analysis is to identify any trends that may be discernable from an examination of the communiqués issued by the G-20 since it was first established in 1999. It should be noted that this analysis is not intended as an exhaustive, in-depth study of the deliberative performance of the G-20, but rather one which is designed to identify indicative trends at a general level only. As such, communiqué issues highlighted will differentiate by year whether these have a largely technical financial and economic focus or may be characterised more broadly as being concerned with the social, developmental and/or equitable outcomes.

Key questions being answered by the overview analysis are the following:

1) Which issues are deliberated upon by the G-20 from one year to the next?
2) How might this performance be characterised in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the G-20 in reaching agreement among its members?
3) To what degree is the G-20 through the issues it addresses concerned with broader issues of social justice and equity? In particular, to what degree and with what results have developmental outcomes been a focus within the work of the G-20 and to what degree has Africa been on the G-20 agenda?

4) From the trend analysis on the deliberative performance of the G-20, what recommendations might be made with regard to the focus of the G-20 in future?
5) Based on the above are there any preliminary recommendations to be made on the structure, composition and internal governance arrangements of the G-20?

Below follows a brief overview of the deliberative performance of the G-20, on the basis of issued G-20 communiqués from the Leaders' level (See Annexure 3 for a cursory overview of communiqués from inception).

The overview of the deliberative performance of the G-20 below at Leaders' level will have a particular emphasis on the G-20's response to the 2008/9 financial and economic crisis.

TABLE: OVERVIEW ANALYSIS OF THE DELIBERATIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE G-20 - SUMMIT COMMUNIQUĚS ONLY

1. Issue / Collective Action Problem	2008	2009	OVERVIEW COMMENTARY
Communiqué 1 – Leaders' Level, Washington, 15 November 2008 A. The Crisis as an opportunity for the G-20 to restate its commitment to an `open global economy'	X		As the repercussions of the global financial and economic crisis begins to be felt, the G-20 meets for the first time at Leaders' level in Washington under the auspices of the Bush administration at the end of the Bush Presidency. It is highly debatable that, without the crisis emanating from the United States, the United States would have agreed to a G-20 at Leaders' level. As such, the elevation of the G-20 to Leaders' level is to be understood as being consistent with the United States' general foreign policy of `instrumental unilateralism'. At the first meeting at Leaders' level, the G-20 indicates that it is "determined to…. achieve the needed reforms in the world's financial systems" (G-20 Communiqué, 2008, November 15, paragraph 1). The direction of these reforms are immediately circumscribed as being in line with `market principles, open trade and investment [..], regulated financial markets' (Ibid., paragraph 2). According to the G-20 here, the neo-liberal agenda is `essential for poverty reduction' (Ibid.,). Poverty reduction is never taken as a project in and of itself or in its own right, but rather as a presumed `by-product' of pro-market policy action. Within the communiqué, the crisis is referred to as `severe market disruption' (paragraph 4), as opposed to a human calamity that will push 55-90 million people into extreme poverty (See UN MDG Report 2009). On the causes of the crisis, as a largely regulatory omission or `deficiency' (paragraph 5), the G-20 says that some `market participants' in some advanced countries' took risks and were `excessively leveraged' and some `policy-makers, regulators and supervisors didn't appreciate or address the risks adequately' (paragraph 3). The G-20 then goes further to say that `financial institutions should bear responsibility for the turmoil and regulators should co-operate at an international level' (paragraph 8). As a result of this `turmoil', `emerging economies were beginning to be adversely impacted' (paragraph 6). The G-20 agrees that `a broader policy response is needed … to avoid spillovers and support emerging market economies and developing countries' (paragraph 7). Here, as elsewhere, reference to emerging and developing countries is `tagged on' as a form of legitimating rhetoric to buttress the neo-liberal project as `inevitable'. Mention of the poor and/or the `most vulnerable' appears within the communiqué immediately after overt statements of support for the liberalisation project (paragraph 14). According to the G-20, 'free market principles, the rule of law, private property, open trade and investment, competitive markets, regulated financial systems, etc. have lifted millions out of poverty and raised the global living standard' (paragraph 12). (See Sen (2006) who critiques this common argument). No mention is made of the millions pushed into extreme poverty by the same system and widening inequality gaps between rich and poor. Despite a broad recognition of regulation failure in the lead-up to the crisis, the G-20 also warns against `over-regulation, which would result in a further contraction in capital flows, including to developing countries' (paragraph 12). Capital to developing countries is not presented as a firm policy choice, but as the result of the vagaries of the market.

B. Principle – Policy Alignment	X		The G-20 outlines the principles to which policy measures it will support will adhere. When not read against the neoliberal project underpinning all G-20 action, these principles appear benign: `Strengthening Transparency and Accountability, Enhancing Sound Regulation, Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets, Reinforcing International Co-operation and Reforming the International Financial Institutions' (paragraph 9). Most would argue that these are necessary, but it is the direction and the how that requires more open deliberation and the deeper consideration of alternatives. Importantly, the G-20's consideration of principles of transparency/accountability is with reference to financial institutions, not itself as a governance forum. The principle of international co-operation is with reference to regulators, rather than towards a commitment towards a broader framework of multilateralism and it is with this understanding that the G-20's use of the word `multilateralism' in last paragraph of the communiqué is to be understood (paragraph 16).
C. The G-20 as Financial Systems Reformer	X		Within the communiqué, the G-20 abrogates for itself the `role of financial systems reformer' (paragraph 11), as somehow the forum best placed to deal with such `systems reform', notwithstanding the crisis and its failure to contain it. In the role of task-master, it calls for the IMF and FSF to work together `to better identify vulnerabilities' and for the FSF to be `expanded urgently', repeating the call made a week earlier at the Brazil G-20 meeting (paragraph 9). Through the co-ordination of the Troika, Ministers are tasked with, among others, to avoid `pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy', `review compensation practices' and `define the scope of systemically significant institutions' (paragraph 10). Trade Ministers are called on to complete Doha. At a moment of crisis, these are far from being far-reaching reforms and given the statement of commitment to the neoliberalist path, the next crisis is, as many have argued, already in the making.
D. MDGs and Development Financing	X		As stated above, mention of the MDGs and the `most vulnerable' helps to soften statements of intent to pursue the liberalisation project with vigour. Within the Washington Communiqué, the MDGs and mention of the Financing for Development UN conference (Monterrey) is made immediately after the G-20's focus on the WTO. While reaffirming commitments and principles, emerging economies are urged to make commitments (paragraph 14), seemingly in recognition that they increasingly have more in common with developed nations than developing. All other matters of concern are swept into the penultimate paragraph of the Washington communiqué. Here, as elsewhere, the G-20 prefers to make cursory mention of a number of social challenges than not at all. 'Energy security, climate change, food security, the rule of law, the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease' are challenges to which the G-20 states that it is `committed to addressing' (paragraph 15). Such statements, however much they are devoid of detail or potentially in conflict with the neoliberal project, assist to hold criticism of the G-20 in check.
<u>Communiqué 2</u> – Leaders' Level - London, April 2 2009 A. A Green Recovery and Jobs		X	Within the G-20 Leaders' Summit Communiqué there is a perceptible shift in G-20 rhetoric. For the first time, the crisis is acknowledged as `affecting the lives of women, men and children in every country' (paragraph 2). The G-20 states that `at the heart of recovery must be the needs of hard-working families, *not just* in developed countries but in emerging markets and the poorest countries too' (paragraph 3) (*emphasis added*). The G-20 says that it will seek to `save or create millions of jobs which would have otherwise been destroyed' (paragraph 6). It then states that it `recognises the human dimension of the crisis and will seek to build a fair and *family-friendly* labour market for both women and men' (paragraph 26) (*emphasis added*). While it is unclear what a `family-friendly labour market' is, the G-20 welcomes the principles proposed at a Rome Social Summit and the London Jobs Conference. It also calls on the ILO to `assess actions taken and those required for the future' (Ibid.,). Growth will be `stimulated and will focus on the most vulnerable' (Ibid.,). On the basis of the principles reconfirmed at the previous Summit, the G-20 says that it will `build an inclusive, green and sustainable recovery' (paragraph 4) that takes

			into account the `interests of future generations' (paragraph 3). `Fiscal expansion in the order of USD 5 trillion by the end of 2011 will accelerate a transition to a green economy' (paragraph 6) and `a transition to making use of clean, low carbon technologies' (paragraph 27). In relation to climate change, the G-20 says it is `committed to addressing the threat of irreversible climate change, through the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities' (paragraph 28). It goes so far as to *already commit to reaching agreement* at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, before any process of engagement with others on the issue is undertaken (See Walters (2004:43) on a world without enemies within the new political vulgate). Whether the G-20 in any way lives up to this commitment will be discernible at the end of 2009. In the Pittsburgh Summit Communiqué (September 2009), the G-20 indicates that it `recognises the challenges of populations suffering from energy poverty' (paragraph 29) and endorses the principle of `common but differentiated responsibilities' in line with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
B. Resource Commitments Made		X	In line with previous statements that the IFIs require resources to address the shocks of a crisis, the G-20 commits `USD 750 billion to the IMF, including USD 250 billion to support new Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocations, USD 100 billion for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), USD 250 billion for trade finance over the next 2 years and additional resources through the sale of gold for concessional financing for the poorest countries' (paragraphs 5, 17 and 22). Of the above, an `immediate USD 250 is pledged to the IMF's New Arrangements to Borrow' (NAB) (paragraph 17) and the sale of gold is estimated to reap USD 6 billion in `concessional finance over the next 2-3 years' (paragraph 25). By contrast, only USD 50 billion is committed to the WB to `support social protection, boost trade and safeguard development in low-income countries, developing countries and emerging markets' (paragraph 25). The US bail-out of individual banks was larger than the latter allocation to the WB. Despite a reaffirmation of `a commitment to the MDGs and keeping ODA commitments relating to Aid for Trade, debt relief and Gleneagles pledges, *especially in support of sub-Saharan Africa*' says the G-20, its paltry contribution to `mitigate the social impact of the crisis' pales by comparison to the resources thrown at the IMF (Ibid.,) (*emphasis added*). This is the only reference to sub-Saharan Africa within the communiqué.
C. The WTO and Pledges Repeated Against Protectionism		X	As in previous meetings, a conclusion to Doha is urged. As well, despite the G-20's failure to not implement protectionist measures, it states that it will `promptly rectify any such measures and extend its pledge to not engage in protectionism to the end of 2010' (paragraph 22). It tasks the WTO monitor and report the G-20's progress here on a quarterly basis. Based on its projections that a conclusion to Doha would `boost the global economy by USD 150 per annum', the G-20 promises to engage in a form of WTO activism by raising the issue of Doha in `all international meetings' (paragraph 24). Here, as elsewhere, the models that the G-20 uses to make decisions and/or conclusions are not available for scrutiny. In the meantime, in the US, the stimulus package is underwritten by `buy America' clauses.
C. FSF to FSB		X	The name of the Financial Stability Forum is changed to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and its membership changed to more or less replicate the membership of the G-20, including the European Commission and Spain. The FSB is to work with the IMF and the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) and report to Finance Ministers before the next G-20 summit on issues such as oversight of Credit Rating Agencies and `systemically important hedge funds', compensation schemes and the development of global accounting standards (paragraph 15). (See the `Stiglitz Commission report' (UN:2009, September 21) on how such reforms do not go far enough). Strengthened financial supervision and regulation is in support of `business and citizens'(paragraph 13). In this G-20 topology, business comes first, then citizens. Similarly, the reform of the IFIs (see below) is to assist `members and shareholders' (paragraph 20).

D. BWIs Reform and Reporting		X	By contrast to the extensive mention of the BWIs and the WTO within the communiqué, the UN is called on to `work with other global institutions, to establish an effective mechanism to monitor the impact of the crisis on the poorest and most vulnerable' (paragraph 25). The UN General Assembly conference in June 2009 is already planned at this stage. The G-20 sets itself up as a `global co-ordinator' here. At the time of the conference, very few G-20 leaders participate in the more multilateral and inclusive process conducted by the UN on the crisis.
E. A crisis response through forceful and commanding language		X	The London Communiqué of 2009 is one filled with the sense of a forceful `determination to turn words into action' (paragraph 29) and a sense of the superlative. In its own assessment, the G-20 indicates that the measures it is undertaking, to address `the greatest challenge in modern times', are on an unprecedented scale' (paragraph 2 and 5). The G-20's core belief or starting point in terms of bringing about `a global solution for a global crisis (paragraph 2) is that "prosperity is indivisible" (paragraph 3). What this means in real terms is truly anyone's guess. 55-90 million people pushed into extreme poverty by the global financial and economic crisis in 2009 are testament to the `divisibility of prosperity' in the context of widening gaps of inequality.
<u>Communiqué 3</u> – Leaders' Level - Pittsburg, 24-25 September 2009 A. The G-20 as `the Premier Global Governance Forum'		X	Continuing the trend of previous communiqués as a form of myth-making, the G-20 begins the Pittsburgh Leaders' statement with a preamble that suggests that the G-20 has all but `solved' the global financial and economic crisis (Preamble, paragraph 5). In the preamble to the Communiqué (paragraph 19), the designation of the G-20 as `the premier forum for international economic' *by the G-20* is, therefore, presented as a `natural' outcome of G-20 action. The G-20's own self-election to this status is not questioned by the membership and, in line with this thinking, the communiqué goes on to call on various actors to report back to it by the next meeting. As such, the Pittsburgh communiqué should be read as a text of power consolidation and empire-building (Walters:2004). The presence of the ILO and the UN at the meetings appears to have resulted in more mention of social issues, but the overall drive towards trade and market liberalisation is not diminished. As above, the G-20 calls on others to address various issues such as food insecurity (paragraph 39) without pledging additional commitments. Mention of `historic commitments to the MDGs and Gleneagles', among others, are repeated almost verbatim from previous communiqué with the addition that the commitments should extend `to 2010 and beyond' (paragraph 37). Within the communiqué, the following actors are called on to report to the G-20 on their respective areas of concern: Energy and Finance Ministers on phasing out fossil fuel subsidies in the medium-term, where the removal of subsidies is set to increase the costs of fossil fuels beyond the reach of the poor – the action is nonetheless being pursued as a disincentive to fossil fuel use (preamble, paragraph 24 and 25 and communiqué paragraph 29); the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank, to report on energy subsidy options; the IMF to the G-20 and the IMFC on issues of surveillance, in particular in relation to the G-20 countries themselves; Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to report on a mutual assessment process on the basis of IMF surveillance reports; the FSB to report to Finance Ministers and Governors, particularly on issues of non-co-operative jurisdictions and to initiate peer review by February 2010 (paragraph 15); commodities futures regulators to report on trader positions in oil and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to `report on G-20 progress in avoiding market manipulation that leads to price volatility' (paragraph 28); Finance Ministers to report back on climate change financing (paragraph 33); G-20 Employment and Labor Ministers to meet in early 2010 and to report on discussions with labour and business (paragraph 47); the WTO, OECD, IMF, and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (<u>UNCTAD</u>) to continue to report publicly and on a quarterly basis (paragraph 48); Trade Ministers to `take stock' of Doha (paragraph 49); Finance Ministers to report regularly to the G-20 and the

			IMFC on global developments and risks (Annex on sustainable growth, paragraph 4). In the G-20 conception of international co-operation and 'lengthening chains of interdependence' (Walters:2004), broader forums of multilateralism are called on to `report into' the G-20 rather than the other way around at this stage. The IMFC also gains a certain degree of `pre-eminence'. In response to the questionnaire presented to respondents within the research, one participant aptly summed up the barrier to bringing the G-20 within the framework of the UN as being: `political power and the psychology of clubs' (multilateral/intergovernmental respondent grouping, respondent no. 4). This psychology and self-satisfaction in its power is no where more evident in the history of the G-20 than in the Pittsburgh Communiqué 2009.
B. Low-Income Countries		X	The Pittsburgh Communiqué (2009) is exceptional in the history of the G-20 in mentioning Low-Income Countries (LICs). It `notes with concern the adverse impact of the global crisis on low-income countries', but recognises the UN's Global Impact Vulnerability Alert System'. The G-20 states that this system `will help *our* efforts to monitor the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable' (paragraph 34) (*emphasis added* – see above discussion).

2. Global Assessment and Commentary on the Deliberative Performance of the G-20

The above trend analysis shows the G-20 endeavour as a project of neo-liberalism.

Larner W. and Walters, W (2004:8) in their work "*Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces"*, help us to understand what such a project entails. They say that since the late 1980s, neoliberalism has come to be characterised by:

"(P)rojects of domestic governance -- most notably the post-war new regime of Keynesian welfarism. Here neoliberalism is associated with a series of developments across the fields of economy, society, politics and culture. These include policies such as privatisation, deregulation, trade liberalisation and marketisation; economic phenomena such as the rise of transnational corporations and the power of global financial markets within capitalism; institutional developments such as the growing prominence of international economic institutions (IMF, WTO, etc.); and ideological shifts such as the valorisation of the market over the state. Today neoliberalism is used to denote nothing less than the fundamental restructuring of the world political economy over the last 30 years." (Larner, W and Walters, William (2004:8).

In this context, reference to `neoliberal globalisation' has gained currency (Ibid.,). In the valorisation of the market over the state, other actors, and/or any explicit concerns for equity, social justice and broad developmental goals, in their own right, the G-20's deliberative performance to-date is strongly in the realm of Type I governance. Development is generally mentioned as an afterthought and poverty is due to developing countries' failure to harness the market or a question of the market not yet reaching the poor so that they can benefit from it. The skewed balance of power between rich and poor countries is not in question as the governance discourse decentres the notion of `enemy' and `any struggle between systems of ideas striving for hegemony' (Walters:2004, 37). Instead, `the enemies of governance are non-political: corruption, disorder, distrust, bad governance, etc.' (Ibid.,).

Deliberations in terms of Africa are only noteworthy by their absence. The G-20's mention of NEPAD can generally be understood in terms of `expanding the frontiers of the market' through FDI.

3. Concluding Remarks on the G-20 Trend Analysis of Performance:

3.1 Normative

Emerging market economies included within the G-20 adopt in some instances, as highlighted above (see also Annexure 3), explicit anti-developmental positions. As such, the much lauded inclusion of emerging economies in an expanded G-7/8 club and their frequent conflation with developing economies outsiders is misplaced. The direction of assimilation is clear. The placement of development issues on the agenda, such as the Gleneagles Commitments, appears to be driven largely by developed nation agendas and the desire to show domestic publics that they are doing something on this front. Here `doing' is confused with mere pronouncements.

Even in 2009, when USD 750 billion was dedicated to increasing the resource base of the IMF, only a fraction was dedicated to the World Bank, despite a growing recognition that the fallout from the global financial and economic crisis would be borne by the most vulnerable and those living in extreme poverty. An overarching concern for equity and social justice is not what drives the G-20. Stimulus packages and bail-outs to banks have far exceeded the GDP of many developing countries and despite some recognition of the impact of the crisis on the poor, ODA commitments are not generally increased nor a portion of stimulus packages dedicated to development.

3.2 Structural

The initial emphasis within the first G-20 communiqué that the G-20 should operate within the framework of the BWIs has been progressively strengthened, most notably in 2009 with the resource allocations provided to an unreformed IMF and World Bank. Where the UN and/or the World Bank and/or the IMF have any overlapping competencies, the G-20 will expressly choose to work with the BWIs and will elide mention of the UN. In the aftermath of 9/11, the G-20 calls on members to ratify UN resolutions on the financing of terrorism. In this crisis, reliance on the formal treaty-based organisation is made.

The lead up to the 2009 climate change conference in December 2009 is another key moment when the G-20 places its reliance on the treaty-based organisation. Until 2009, the G-20 has favoured voluntary action by member states and has generally failed to `call its members to order' when commitments to anti-protectionism, limited reporting, etc. are not implemented. It has yet to be seen whether the signaled US shift and openness towards `embracing multilateralism' in 2009 will be strengthened and carried out consistently. The `buy America' clause in the US stimulus is one contradiction, among others.

3.3 Internal Governance Arrangements

If there were concerns prior to 2008 that internal processes within the G-20 had not consolidated sufficiently to promote policy continuity, the developments of 2008 have attenuated this. The G-20 is currently in a state of flux. In 2009, the grouping met more often at Ministerial level than any other year. At the end of 2008, with the first Summit meeting called by Bush, a Leader and Sherpa track modeled on the G-8 was created. However, at the same level no Troika structure has been established.

As well, it appears that the original rotational system set out in previous years by the G-20 has been turned on its head. The traditional rotation between developed and emerging economy has been disrupted with the first 3 Summits held in the US (2x) and UK (1x) and the next Summit to take place in Canada before the Seoul meeting later in 2010. In 2011, France is expected to host the Summit meeting. In the case of both Canada and France, G-20 meetings will be hosted by these respective countries in the same years that they host the G-8. At the same time that some claimed that `the G-8 was dead', post-Pittsburgh, the cycle of recent past and upcoming G-20 Summits suggests some degree of G-8 `capture'.

Despite increased attention on the G-20, the G-20 seems reluctant to formalise internal governance processes beyond the above. In all Summits, host country and meeting chairs invited countries and organisations at their discretion. This saw the G-20 grouping expanded to include representatives from the ILO, the UN, Spain, Netherlands and others. Whether the same list of countries will be repeated in 2010 is not yet clear. However, once countries such as Spain and Netherlands have been invited to the G-20 it is anticipated that they will not want to give up their participant/observer status. The EU ratification of the Lisbon Treaty augurs the possibility for EU representation within the G-20 to be limited to the Presidency, but neither the G-20 nor the EU has made such an announcement.

4.2 Questionnaire Findings

Below follows a description of the findings of the questionnaire conducted with five categories of respondent. Information related to the closed questionnaire within the study is disaggregated by Respondent grouping-type and compared to the overall mean response to each question (*See Annexure 2 for details*). The total number of respondents participating in the research is 24. The overall response rate was 19%.

As the study is an exploratory one, respondents' identities remain confidential.

The mix of question responses obtained from the above 5 groupings of respondents are grouped in terms of cognate questions. The general thrust of these questions is as follows:

A) Responses to questions related to a characterisation of the type of governance exercised by the G-20 (i.e., Type I / Type II);
B) Responses related to the accountability of the G-20, as well as its alignment and operation within a broader multilateral framework;
C) Responses related to the composition of and representation within the G-20 with a specific emphasis on possibilities for greater representation and voice for African countries, as the one group that is most under-represented within the G-20;
D) Responses related to the performance of the G-20, and in particular the relevance of the forum's performance for Africa. Policy areas which the G-20 could usefully focus its attention on in future are also highlighted here.
E) Any other issues raised by respondents.

Analysis in relation to the above categories of enquiry within the research follows.

A. QUESTIONS RELATED TO G-20 GOVERNANCE

Question 1 - 46% of respondents overall agreed that the G-20 fused both Type I and Type II governance and that it was certainly a `step-up' from the less representative grouping of the G-8.

However, 21% of respondents strongly disagreed that the G-20 sufficiently brought both Type and Type II governance together in its operation. Not unsurprisingly, the International NGO grouping was more critical of the G-20 than other groupings in relation to this question.

The average response for this Likert-type question was 3.8, while the average response for the International NGO grouping was 3.3.

One respondent from the multilateral grouping indicated that improvements against a G-7 or G-8 were not difficult, but that the real competitor for the G-20 was the IMFC, given that the G-20 by comparison is not sufficiently representative.







<u>Question 2 -</u> On the question as to whether the G-20 is too focused on narrow financial and economic variables over a concern for social considerations, equity and social justice, respondents overall were equally split on the issue.

50% of respondents said that the G-20 was too focused on narrow financial and economic variables with a technocratic orientation and 50 % of respondents disagreed.

Within respondent groupings, for the international NGO grouping, 2 out of 3 respondents said yes (66.7%), while 33.3% said no. The academic grouping had only 33.3% of respondents answering the question in the affirmative, while the African country's response was a solid yes.





<u>Question 3</u>

In response to the open question probing how Type II governance might be enhanced in the G-20, the response from the African-based NGO was the exception to the rule in underscoring that the neo-liberalism orthodoxy of the G-20 needed to be questioned, engagement with civil society broadened and engagement with the UN for its transformation undertaken. This would be in favour of a broader majority and membership, instead of `kow-towing to the most powerful'.

The international NGO stressed that Africa needed to be part of the solution for any global recovery, with a Summit held in Africa to re-affirm its relevance, and the AU included within the G-20. Other respondents provided similar responses stressing the need for the AU to be included as well as other regional organisations. The absence of developing and low-income countries within the G-20 was sharply criticised.

A number of academics highlighted that given the G-20's history and composition at Finance Minister level, it was unsurprising that there had been a focus on narrow financial and economic variables and considerations. The elevation of the G-20 to leaders' level promised to change this.

Respondents within the multilateral grouping criticised the G-20 for treating development issues and broader social considerations as a `side show'. References to Doha were ritualistic.

A number of G-20 countries called for reporting to the UN and obtaining feedback from the UN on the views of non-G-20 members to promote a broadened agenda driven by concerns for social justice. Another respondent within the same grouping mentioned specifically working with UNCTAD, the UNGA, and ECOSOC. A few stress that the G-20 has been progressively evolving and that while it had not had a focus on the human dimensions of development, this was changing. Others within the same grouping have indicated that social equity concerns are not drivers within the G-20 and need not be as the G-20 is comfortable with its mandate as it stands.

The African country respondent was particularly sceptical with regard to whether G-20 countries operating within the forum would be motivated by anything other than narrow self-interest. There was insufficient change within the forum to `topple the apple-cart' and Western powers were too strong within the G-20 in relation to other groupings or regional blocs.

B. QUESTIONS RELATED TO G-20 ACCOUNTABILITY

Question 18 - Despite a number of responses in question 3 whereby respondents indicated that greater alignment and/or links needed to be made by the G-20 to the UN, this question which explores whether there should be reporting mechanisms that facilitate G-20 reporting and feedback into the UN's ECOSOC, responses overall were more ambivalent to this option.

29% of respondents overall agreed that such mechanisms should be put in place to enhance greater G-20 accountability (in relation to Likert-scale option 4), while this percentage response was matched by 29% of total respondents strongly disagreeing with this option. A further 17% of respondents selected option two within the Likert-scale in disagreement. Taken together, however, less than 50% of respondents overall (i.e. 46%) were against such a mechanism.

Similarly, there were only 46% of respondents responding overall in the affirmative (i.e., through the selection of Likert-scale options 5 and 4).

8% of respondents were either undecided or open to the creation of such mechanism but did not overtly view it as necessary but a `value-add'.

The African country respondent was strongly in favour of the option, whereas only 2 out of the 10 G-20 country respondents were strongly in favour of this. Notwithstanding this, 50% of respondents within the G-20 country grouping were in favour of this.

3 out of 6 respondents within the academic grouping were against this (selecting option 4) or 67%, while 67% of respondents in the International NGO grouping favoured the option.

Only one respondent within the multilateral/intergovernmental grouping emphatically saw this as an `excellent idea'. Predictably this respondent was not a representative within a Bretton Woods Institution.

The overall average or mean response for the question was 2.9.

The key emerging criticisms in relation to the negative responses were related to the ineffectiveness of the ECOSOC. As such, reporting to it was not deemed credible. A number of G-20 country respondents indicated that the G-20 was not accountable to anyone in multilateral terms. It was an informal grouping which dealt with issues of concern to its members.







Question 22 - With regard to whether efforts to improve global governance coherence should include the IMF and the World Bank renegotiating their relationship agreements with the UN, 38% of respondents overall strongly disagreed. A further 8% were not in favour and selected the less inflected option 2.

A large percentage overall (i.e., 29%) were either ambivalent or undecided in relation to the option. 21% of the grouping overall strongly agreed and 4% agreed.

With the average overall being 2.6, the International NGO grouping (with an average of 3.7) and the African country grouping (with an average of 3) were the only 2 of the five whose sub-grouping averages were slightly higher than this mean.

The academic mean score of 2.3 was the lowest of the five sub-groupings. Within this grouping, only one of the 6 strongly agreed, while 50% were against.

67% of International NGO respondents (in selecting either Likert-option 4 or 5) were in favour of such renegotiation.

Predictably the 2 respondents within the multilateral grouping from the BWIs were strongly against the option, while the representative from the more socially-oriented multilateral was strongly 'for'. The representative from the intergovernmental organisation stressed that the renegotiation should not be one sided. A priority was that each institution should, however, realign its mandate and areas of focus.

Within the G-20 grouping 40% of respondents were strongly against, while 20% were strongly 'for'. The African country respondent was neither in favour or against, but said that there was not much use in such a move as multilateralism in general was `controlled by a few countries'. Such a negotiation would not change this, he said within the interview process conducted for the study.







Question 23 - On the question as to whether the G-20 should be more closely aligned within the framework of the UN rather than the Bretton Woods Institutions, 21 % of respondents overall strongly agreed and 21% simply agreed (option 4). When option 5 and 4 responses overall are taken together, 42 % of respondents agreed.

By contrast 33% of respondents overall strongly disagreed and 8% disagreed. When option 1 and 2 responses overall are taken together 41% of respondents disagreed, with the margin of those in agreement overall differing by only 1%.

17% of respondents overall were ambivalent and/or undecided in relation to the question.

With an overall mean of 2.9, responses from the African country grouping (through the selection of option 5[25]) were by far above the norm, followed by the International Non-Governmental Organisation.

Both of these groupings are currently excluded from participation within the G-20. As such, the favouring of a much more broadly representative arrangement is predictable and can be explained in terms of lack of power in relation to existing arrangements.

67% of respondents within the International NGO grouping were in favour, while only 33% of respondents in the academic grouping were in favour. Within the latter grouping, 67% of respondents were strongly against.

Within the multilateral grouping, 50% were in favour of this arrangement (selecting option 4), while 25% were strongly against.

Within the G-20 country grouping, 30% were in favour (20% were strongly in favour and 10% selected option 4), while 30% were strongly against. The fact that 40% selected option 3

[25] The respondent in fact responded with a 4.5 (not an option per se in terms of the Likert-scale). Previous reservations of the entire multilateral system by this respondent have already been document. The value was, therefore, rounded off for purposes of consistency between respondents.

suggests that a good number within the grouping were open to persuasion on the merits of the proposal. One respondent in line with similar questioning, indicated that the G-20 did not need to report with regard to its deliberations over and above issued communiqués and that the US was itself also `very careful in terms of whom it would report to'.

Open responses, however, critically revealed that the UN needed to be reformed and that it currently was not effective. In this regard, a number of respondents turned the question on its head. Change efforts, in short, needed to be on both sides.







Question 24 - Question 24 within the questionnaire pushes the envelope in querying whether there should be a permanent Secretariat created for the G-20 and whether this Secretariat should be located within the UN system. As a result of this, responses to this question were particularly rich and varied in relation to the open portion of the same question.

Criticisms of the UN by respondents have already been noted above, so it is not surprising that 49% of respondents strongly disagreed with this option. The question of permanence was also questioned by respondents, in particular those respondents who had direct involvement with the G-20, either currently or in the recent past.

The overall average between responses was 2.1. The average for the International NGO grouping and African country grouping differed in relation to this score by having higher mean scores, 3.3 and 3.0 respectively.

Only one academic within the academic grouping supported the question, but recognised that the G-20 was reluctant to engage in any formal arrangements. Overall, within the academic grouping, 83% of respondents were strongly against the proposal.

Many were particularly emphatic on the issue of the Secretariat's impermanence, saying that the lack of a permanent Secretariat was `by design and not by accident'.

Some, however, conceded that some form of `quasi-Secretariat' was needed, while another suggested that the G-20 could look at a Secretariat that functioned over a time span of not more than three years to maintain momentum and its project management like goal-orientation.

One in particular saw value in an emerging proposal that a Troika Sherpa needed to be established now that the G-20 had been elevated to Leaders' level.

Currently, there was a great deal of fluidity and lack of consolidation in terms of G-20 internal processes and governance. After 3 summits at Leaders' level (between 2008/9) this had not yet been addressed, other than on an *ad hoc*, meeting by meeting basis with a great deal of discretion accorded to summit meeting chairs, outside of any Troika arrangement *per se*.

One participant within the academic grouping said that there should be no blurring of boundaries between formal (treaty-based) and informal groupings or organisations. Any such blurring would be counter-productive.

Within the multilateral grouping, where there was a 50/50 split between responses (i.e., with 50% for and 50% against, options 2 and 4 respectively), one respondent in particular indicated that the G-20 would in all likelihood at some stage merge with the IMFC. According to this respondent, the IMFC was a much more representative body, given its constituency system, as well as highly capable in being able to take on any co-ordinating and/or Secretariat role. The respondent predicted that this would be the direction the G-20 would move towards, once the quota and voice reforms and Board structure and composition issues had been finalised.

Another participant indicated that the G-20 played a valuable role in being outside of the UN system and that this should remain unchanged. Its purpose was to build consensus and was currently doing this fairly effectively.

Within the G-20 country grouping, 50% of respondents were strongly against locating the G-20 within the UN and the development of any type of permanent Secretariat. Only 10% of respondents within this grouping were in favour of such a proposal. Among those against, a number raised the concern that such a move would create more bureaucracy and that this was undesirable. It was generally felt that the G-20 had functioned well without a permanent Secretariat and that the creation of bureaucracy was likely to hinder this. The ECOSOC and UNCTAD, were two options proposed for provisional Secretariats, only if necessary. Another respondent within the same grouping mentioned the ECOSOC as being merely a `talking shop' and 'not a decision-making forum'.

The African country respondent selected option 3 in relation to the Likert-scale saying that the UN was large enough already to deal with the same issues as the G-20 and that he did not believe that it was necessary to create an additional structure. Rather than suggesting the G-20 merge with another structure, such as the IMFC or the UN, in this instance it was suggested that the G-20's functions should be overtaken by the UN. Not least because the G-20 was captured by a paradigm of `high mass consumption'. This fact was an indictment of the global governance system more generally.







C. QUESTIONS RELATED TO COMPOSITION AND REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE G-20

In contrast to the above line of questioning where questions explore whether there should be closer linkages between the UN and the G-20 - with greater requirements for G-20 reporting in to a broader, 1st order multilateral organisation to remedy its inherent lack of full representation, lack of accountability and democratic deficit – the line of questioning below explores whether the UN and/or regional groupings other than the EU, in particular the AU[26], should have permanent seats within the G-20.

This line of questioning is followed by an exploration as to whether, given Africa's current under-representation within the G-20, other African countries should be included in the G-20 (either instead of or to complement additional regional representation from the continent).

The questioning assumes that the `principle of differentiation for those *in markedly different circumstances*' should replace the `principle of reciprocity for and among all countries – regardless of circumstances'[27] (Stiglitz:2006, 83) (*emphasis added*).

Extending this argument in relation to the fact that the majority of the world's extremely poor reside in Africa (See the *UN MDG Report* 2009), the concern to reverse a growing gap between Africa and the rest of the world (i.e., developed and middle-income and economies) on this front should ensure that Africa is part of the solution. Africa's substantive participation in forums where decision-making and deliberation to do with the global economy, in particular, will, it is assumed, only make such forums more robust, outcomes more equitable and the governance space more open to alternatives.

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[26] Given Africa's under-representation within the G-20 with South Africa as the only permanent member from the continent having full membership within the grouping since inception.

[27] The latter principle is the principle upon which the WTO is founded. Stiglitz (2006: 83) indicates that one simple reform in relation to the world trade system "would simultaneously simplify negotiations, promote development, and address the inequities of the current regime. Rich countries should simply open up their markets to poorer ones, *without reciprocity and without economic or political conditionality*. Middle income countries should open up their markets to the least developed countries, and should be allowed to extend preferences to one another *without extending them to rich countries*." (Ibid.,) (*emphasis added*).

<u>Question 10</u> - In relation to question 10, 50/50 split between respondents overall was in evidence with 46% of respondents agreeing that there should be permanent seats created for the UN and the AU within the G-20[28].

46% of respondents said no to this question and 8% of respondents did not provide a closed question response.

It should be noted here, however, that a number of respondents problematised the question. In some instances, their NO[29] was nuanced saying that the UN should have a permanent seat within the G-20, but the AU should not.

For those against the AU's representation within the G-20, reasons for their objection related largely to the ineffectiveness of the AU. Some indicated that the AU was not a `truly regional economic bloc as the EU was and for this reason did not merit inclusion within the G-20 on a permanent basis'.

Similarly, there were some respondents who favoured the inclusion of the AU, but not the inclusion of the UN, for the same reason.

Among the qualified YESs, 1 Yes was received in favour of the UN and AU attending permanently at the level of summit track only and not the Finance Minister track. At Finance

[28] One respondent did not select a closed question option for this question, but previously in relation to question four said the following:
"Over time it would be good to strengthen Africa's presence, either by adding one or more African countries or by having a strong regional representation. But this should only be done by reducing over-represented regions (especially Europe, maybe Latin America), ***not by increasing*** the number of countries at the table" (respondent 1# from the academic grouping) (*emphasis added*). If the weight of the open response for question 4 is taken into account, then the % of respondents overall agreeing with question 10 is not 46% but 50%.

[29] The closed question options could arguably have been created as 2 separate questions.
4 YESs were qualified in favour of a yes for the AU *only*. 1 said yes to the AU plus additional regional groupings from Asia, Latin America, the Organisation of American States (but not the APEC).
Among the qualified NOs received for this question, 1 said no to the UN, but yes to having the UN Secretary-General `on the margins' of G-20 meeting, as is the case with the G-8.

Minister track, it was recommended by the same respondent that regional banks, such as the African Development Bank and others, should be included.

Among the explicit NOs to both the AU and the UN, reasons given were that neither reached consensus within their ranks. For this reason, their inclusion would merely make consensus within the G-20 more difficult. 1 indicated that it would be better to `kick out the EU' than bring other regional groupings into the forum, favouring efficiency over a trade-off between broader representation, participation and equity.

Another explicit NO to both stressed that there should be a formal moratorium on any changes to G-20 membership for the next five years. Membership discussions would distract the G-20 of its focus on the global economic and financial crisis and other areas[30].

Among the explicit YESs received for this question, one respondent stressed that regional representation should also be complemented by the inclusion of other non-G-20 members and small states (Respondent # 4, multilateral/intergovernmental grouping).

Within groupings, 100% of respondents within the International Non-Governmental grouping answered yes to this question.

50% of respondents within the academic grouping responded in the affirmative to the question, while 33.3% said no.

Within the multilateral grouping, 75% of respondents said no. The preference of one of the NOs within the multilateral respondent grouping is answered elsewhere in the questionnaire (Q 4a), through one of the opened ended questions, where he says that one country from Africa in the G-20 is sufficient. In Q25, the respondent criticises the UN for being an expensive organisation with lack of leadership.

[30] Here the G-20's self-selected and self-defined purpose is taken as being `inviolable'. `Others' (Spivak:1996) are presumed to be `irritants', who would drag the forum down if they were to be allowed into the ranks of the G-20 (*sic*).

In terms of opposition to question 10, after the multilateral grouping, the G-20 respondent grouping ranked second in this regard. 60% of respondents within this grouping responded NO, though 2 of these can be counted as qualified NOs (see above). One indicated that the host country and chair of the G-20 in a given year should invite either the AU or NEPAD (rather than the UN) to the G-20 on an *ad hoc* basis for the year. A precedent for this had already been set in 2009.

The one respondent who did not select either the Yes or No option provided in the question, said that the ILO had already been invited to the UN. Their presence was important in the G-20. He agreed that interaction was needed between the G-20 and formal treaty-based organisations, but was undecided as to whether this should translate into a seat at the table. Organisations outside the G-20 played an important role. However, he questioned what the G-20's legitimacy was vis-à-vis the treaty-based organisations.

The African country grouping respondent was fully supportive of AU/ UN inclusion. Greater representation for Africa was important.





<u>Question 11 a) -</u> As to whether additional permanent or rotational seats for other African countries, other than South Africa, should be included in the G-20 63% of respondents overall agreed that there should. 4% were undecided and 33% said No.

In terms of respondent groupings, the responses for both the International NGO and academic grouping were mirror images of their responses for the previous question (i.e., 100% of respondents within the International NGO grouping said Yes, while 50% of respondents within the academic grouping said Yes, 33.3% said No and 16.7% left the response blank. The response for one of these respondents has already been discussed, but informs the respondent's position for this question as well. He has stressed that this is not a pressing issue now, but should only be considered overtime (i.e., both representation for African countries and regional bodies) and with the *proviso* that other over-represented regions should be reduced first.

In relation to the multilateral grouping, respondents were split with 50% in favour and 50% against.

In relation to the G-20 country grouping, 60% were for and 40% were against. Among the NOs in relation to this question, some respondents maintained that criteria of economic weight should not be changed. One said that 'if one plays with the lower limits, one has to question how this will impact representation in economic terms' (Respondent # 5, G-20 country grouping). A rotational system would change the criteria of economic weight. The example of the UN Security Council was mentioned as one where the body was struggling to come up with meaningful arrangements that included permanent and rotational seats.

Similarly, another respondent within the same grouping said that South Africa was the only economic powerhouse that merited a place within the G20. `As it stands, its economy is still one of the smallest within the G20'. The respondent here, and elsewhere within the questionnaire, is consistently against any G-20 expansion[31].

Among the YESs within this grouping, one yes had already been previously qualified by the need for a moratorium on changes to G-20 membership for the next five years. Eventually, however, it was suggested that regional representatives should attend G-20 meetings on a permanent basis as regional observers. This needed to be complemented by rotating increases in country representation for Africa.

Other YESs within the same grouping said that representation by other African countries was necessary `despite South Africa's excellent work' to-date. Another stressed that not only African countries should be included but others as well. The same respondent stressed in the following question that other countries, such as Chile with an economy that was a good example, should be brought into the G-20 at the same time. Respondents' answers in this regard brought in additional dimensions of pacing and sequencing into the discussion as

[31] A deeply ironic position from a `newly included' G-20 country. See the Åslund, Anders critique of the G-20 in the *Financial Times* (2009, November 26), where he questions both the `gate-crashing' entry of this country into the G-20 and a general G-20 failure to address the entry of the country within its ranks. A clear gap within the G-20 since its elevation to Leaders' level is its lack of a Troika structure or internal governance steering committee at Leader or Sherpa level. After a year of Summits, this issue is yet to be addressed by the G-20. Åslund (Ibid.,).
Edward Luce (2009, September 25) highlights that "international co-operation always adds, never subtracts". Some would argue that the G-20 has not `added' enough, only a minority to-date have argued that the forum is already a dangerous global excess (- nothing less than `international gang rule' -) that must be scratched entirely. Before further damage is done, the pacing of this should be immediate (Åslund:2009).

additional factors for consideration.

The African country respondent answered in the affirmative and added that 2 additional rotating seats should be created. These could go to African countries which had comparative economic weight within their regions. South Africa had economic weight in the SADC, for example, while Nigeria, accounted for approximately 70% of GDP in West Africa.





Question 11 b) - For the closed answer, multiple choice question, 33% of respondents overall agreed that other African countries should be included within the G-20 on a Permanent basis. 25% of respondents indicated that they favoured a rotational system of inclusion, while 21% of respondents favoured a mixed option of additional rotational and permanent seats.

Excluding the 21% of respondents overall who did not make a selection in relation to this question, 79% of respondents overall overwhelmingly supported the extension of membership to Africa within the G-20 favouring either permanent, rotational and/or a mix of permanent and rotational arrangements.

In relation to the 21% of respondents overall who did not make a selection between the three presented options for this question, in all five instances, it should be noted that the same respondents in the previous question responded NO to including African countries.

As such, neither of these 5 responses can be interpreted as meaning that respondents are undecided. Instead, each of these responses is blank because participants have not changed their stance in any way in relation to Question 11 a), and the 3 presented multiple choice options for this question only allow for responses which affirm African country representation.

As such, respondents have objected to the underlying suggestion within the question that African countries should have some form of representation within the G-20. Blank responses here should, therefore, be re-termed in this instance as meaning: `None of the above'.

Within the International NGO grouping, there was a three-way split between each option with 1 respondent favouring Permanent, one Rotational and one Mixed or Both.

In relation to the academic grouping, only the first two options were favoured. 50% favoured Permanent inclusion, while 33.3% favoured Rotational. For the one respondent who did not select an option, the open-ended response explained that he was not in favour of any arrangement that would take away country authority[32]. The respondent further emphasised that institutional memory was important within the G-20. Here the implication is that rotational systems would undermine this. Other academic respondents affirmed that Permanent seats were `less awkward' than rotational seats and that in line with G-20 philosophy there should be a minimum of bureaucratisation.

Within the multilateral grouping, 50% of respondents favoured a mixed system. One stressed that inclusion should include a menu and package of options with due consideration to the nature of interaction and the policy focus.

Within the G-20 country grouping, 40% of respondents favoured the permanent option. 20% favoured the Mixed option, while 30% did not make a selection. In the latter case, all these responses had the force of a `None of the above' option, as per their open responses for other related questions and the optional space for commentary within the same Question (11 b)).

In comparing groupings, a number of G-20 country respondents were particularly harsh in this question. One asked what contribution a country like Malawi or Burkina Faso would make in relation to financial regulation. The scope of the G-20 focused then on issues of a high technocratic nature. The response also suggests that inclusion should be based on criteria related to market robustness. Only if a country had such a market could it participate. `Developed' markets are assumed to be the benchmark to which `developing' markets should aspire[33]. As well, despite globalisation, an appreciation of the interdependence between markets, among other things, is lacking. A developing country participating in the forum would have to follow the

[32] Here the response is understood as meaning that if additional countries were included, others might need to be removed.
[33] In the context of the global, economic and financial crisis in 2008/9 and a fragile global `recovery', this supposition seems hollow.

agenda of the developed (and emerging nations) and would have to participate on a technical level only.

The African country respondent favoured a Mix.





Question 12

Among respondent answers for the type of selection criteria to be used when including additional African countries within the G-20, over and above South Africa, the following was proposed:

- GDP (3x) and foreign trade levels, population (3x), resources, and governance -- among others;
- importance and relevance to political/economic issues being discussed;
- Nigeria (3x);
- Contribution to economic growth in a region;
- Influence or significance in a region (3x);
- peace-keeping role that the country plays in a region through the UN/AU, for example;
- Strength of the economy and/or state of economic development;
- human development indices, geographic size;
- National stability in politics, economics and social matters;

One respondent indicated that there were no objective criteria. Geo-politics determined who was included.

A number indicated that they were not in favour of expanding criteria for membership.

Another respondent said that 'the G20 was not yet ready to propose objective criteria to be placed on the table.' The respondent went on to say that `The moment one sets criteria and institutionalises it, one automatically excludes[34]. What do we look at? Who decides?'

Another respondent rationalised why poorer countries should not be included in the G-20. She said that 'if poorer countries were included in the G20, these countries would be taken as tokens given the power relations between countries. Most G-20 countries spoke for themselves, this was a fact. South Africa, however, had a degree of two mindedness. It raised African issues. As the G20 excluded other countries, the challenge was how to make sure that poorer country issues were addressed'[35].

Another respondent indicated that there should be a permanent seat for SA and the AU + another African country member seat. This seat should be rotated between the African regions each year.

[34] As if this had not already happened within the G-20. (*See* Anders (2009) for a strong critique of the G-20's democratic deficit.

[35] Here one assumes that the respondent means that the challenge is one for South Africa speaking on behalf of others. The inclusion of poorer countries, by the provided argument, is not a consideration.

<u>Question 13 –</u> In response to the question as to whether the EU and European countries were over-represented in the G-20, respondents across most categories of respondent groupings within the study strongly favoured the option of Strongly Agree. 42% of respondents overall favoured this option. 29% of respondents flatly agreed. By combining the results for responses where either option 5 or option 4 within the Likert-scale was selected, one finds that 71% of respondents overall agreed.

21% of respondents overall selected the middle ground option 3 within the Likert-scale, while 8% of respondents overall Strongly Disagreed.

The average overall for the question was the highest among all responses received through the questionnaire.

In relation to responses from the International NGO grouping, each respective respondent selected either option 3, 4 or 5 in relation to the Likert-scale.

In relation to the academic respondent grouping, 50% of respondents selected the Strongly Agree option, while 17% of respondents selected option 4. 17% selected the Strongly Disagree option 2.

In relation to the respondent who strongly disagreed, he said that, `as a purely economic/financial forum, one could defend the inclusion of all European states. However, if the G20 was to be considered more of a political forum (a possibility in the future), then there would have to be more inclusion of states which were relevant to the various political topics discussed at the summits.' He suggested that inclusion should, therefore, be on an *ad hoc* rotational basis, (in future).'

Respondents from the multilateral/intergovernmental grouping, 50% of respondents selected option 3, while 25% selected option 4, and 25% selected the Strongly Agree option.

Within the G-20 country grouping, 50% selected the Strongly Agree option, while 30% selected option 4. 10% selected option 3 and a further 10% selected the Strongly Disagree option. Within the African country grouping, the respondent agreed that yes they were (option 4).







Question 17 - In terms of question 17 with a focus on the internal governance management structure of the G-20 (i.e., the Troika), 41% of respondents strongly disagreed that there should be permanent seats for the UN and the AU within such a governance structure. 21% disagreed, 13% were neutral. A combination of responses in the negative shows that 62% of respondents overall are against such an option.

8% of respondents overall Strongly supported the option and 13% agreed by selecting the less inflected option 4. 1 respondent out of 24 overall did not make a selection, saying that there should not be a seat for the AU, but one for the UN only (Respondent # 4, academic grouping).

The average mean score for the question was 2.14.

The International NGO grouping by comparison with the overall mean score had a mean score of 3 with options 2, 3, and 4 selected respectively.

67% of respondents within the Academic grouping strongly disagreed with the option, while one supported the proposal by selecting option 4. The mean score of this grouping (1.6) was the lowest in comparison with other respondent groupings, followed by the score of 2 for the G-20 country grouping.

50% of respondents within the multilateral respondent grouping strongly disagreed, while 25% selected option 3.

One respondent who had strongly disagreed with the proposal presented in this question supported his response by saying that the question was `completely nonsensical'.

The one respondent within the grouping who had strongly agreed qualified his response by saying that `there was merit in there being no permanent representation in the Troika, as it was responsible for management overall.'

In relation to the G-20 country grouping, 80% of respondents disagreed with the proposal (40% Strongly Disagreed, 40% Disagreed). One respondent Strongly Agreed (10%) and 1 selected option 3. The respondent who strongly agreed qualified the response by saying that the UN should be there, but the AU included only if the governing structure included other regional bodies.

The respondent who selected option 3, elsewhere in the questionnaire has strongly opposed any G-20 expansion of the G-20, particularly for Africa. It is assumed that the same would apply to the Troika. As such, the selected 3 has the force of an option 2 (as Disagree). If this re-weighting is accepted, based on the responses provided by this respondent to cognate questions elsewhere in the questionnaire, 90% of G-20 country respondents disagree with the proposal (i.e., 50% Disagree and 40% Strongly Disagree).

One respondent within the grouping who had strongly disagreed with the proposal indicated that such an option might allow for `some degree of tactical strengthening, but that the option shouldn't be explored at this time.'

The African country respondent agreed with the proposal, but in the open-ended portion of the question stressed that `the G-20 was a talk-shop which was influencing the global financial and economic architecture. At the root of the problem was the model of "must buy", where everything was monetised'.







D. QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE G-20 AND OUTREACH

Question 15 - In response to the question as to whether the G-20 consistently or regularly has low- and middle-income economies on the agenda, 54% of respondents overall selected median option 3 within the Likert-scale provided for the question.

25% of respondents overall disagreed that low- and middle-income economies were regularly on the agenda of the G-20. 21% agreed that they were.

In relation to this question, the majority median preference for option 3 can be accounted for, at least in part, by the inherent limitations of the question originally posed. In this instance, the question lumps emerging or middle-income economies with low-income countries[36] and reveals the degree to which respondents themselves differentiate between the two.

The average score overall for the question was 2.96. The lowest mean score among respondent groupings was 2.5 (from the multilateral/intergovernmental grouping), while the highest average score of 3.3 came from the G-20 country grouping.

International NGO grouping respondents respectively selected option 2, 3 and 4, in relation to the provided Likert-scale, resulting in a three-way (33.3%) split between options.

With regard to the academic grouping, 66.7% of respondents responded by favouring option 3 within the Likert-scale. A 2:1 ratio for this option prevailed in comparison with the Disagree option (where only 33.3% of respondents selected option 2).

In relation to the multilateral respondent grouping, 50% of respondents selected the option 2 in disagreement, with the remaining 50% of respondents selecting the more moderate option 3. (See above discussion with regard to limitations of question referring to `low-income **and** middle-income/emerging', as such the selection of option 3 can be interpreted as meaning `both'. Extending this thinking, a selection of option 4 can be interpreted to mean `yes, both').

[36] For the purposes of this question, reference to `low-income countries' is understood as being a blanket reference to `small states', `developing', `poor' and/or 'Highly Indebted Poor Countries' (HIPC). In general, the usage of `low-income' is meant to act as a differentiator between countries in `markedly different circumstances' (Stiglitz:2006, 83) in comparison with `emerging' or `middle-income economies'.
In relation to some G-20 country responses (above) on questions of African representation, respondents have said in no uncertain terms that South Africa is essentially `lucky to have a place at the G-20 table at all when its economy is so small'. Presumably, here, South Africa is being compared with both developed nations and other emerging economies, but is an `underweight'.

Within this grouping, the respondents from multilaterals having direct experience of the G-20 rated the focus of the G-20 here favourably (i.e., as not having a skewed focus on one type over the other).

By comparison, the remaining two multilateral/intergovernmental respondents, from more openly representative and/or socially democratic institutions than the BWIs and/or the G-20, essentially disagreed that low-income **and** middle-income country challenges received the same amount of` air-time' within the G-20.

One of the two respondents expanded their response in support of the above reading saying that 'some (low-income) issues were included (in the G-20 agenda), but (these) typically were where *the interests of the G20 membership had some overlap*, for example, financial stability' (*emphasis added*).

In relation to the G-20 country grouping, 50% of respondents selected Likert-scale option 3, as meaning `both' in the context of this question. 40% selected option 4 in flat agreement. Taken together, 90% of G-20 country respondents have a fairly positive view of the inclusive scope of the G-20 agenda. Given that there are no low-income countries in the G-20, this posture can be understood in terms of a `liberal benevolence', not necessarily or solely defined by narrow self-interest.

The one respondent within the G-20 who selected option 2 and disagreed, rated the G-8 more favourably here than the G-20. He said that 'low income countries were on the agenda of the G-8, as history had shown, but to keep a low-income and LDCs-related issues on the agenda needed constant political support. This was *not always natural* and needed to be fostered' (*emphasis added*). The frankness of this response went against the G-20 norm and/or `group think' for this question.

The African country respondent selected option 3 for this question, but he qualified his middle position saying that low-income country issues might be there on the agenda, `but did they carry the day?' He very much doubted this. Any assumption that they did needed to be `taken with a bathful of salt'. He gave the example of AGOA as a window for developing countries to export to America, the sale of these goods at low-cost was in the interests of the United States.







Question 16 - In relation to question 16 which asks respondents whether the G-20 has Africa on its agenda consistently, 50% of respondents overall Disagreed by selecting option 2. 25% of respondents selected option 3 as a middle ground response neither committing negatively or positively in response to the question. 13% of respondents overall Strongly Disagreed that Africa was on the G-20 agenda, while 8% of respondents agreed and 4% of respondents overall Strongly Agreed.

When one combines the results received for those who selected option 1 and option 2, 63% of respondents overall disagreed that Africa was consistently and/or regularly on the G-20 agenda.

The average score overall for this question was 2.42. Of all the groupings, the multilateral/intergovernmental grouping was most harsh in its assessment of the degree to which the G-20 had Africa on the agenda. The average score for this grouping was 1.75, followed by the academic grouping with an average score of 2.17.

The grouping with the highest average score (i.e., 3) was the African country grouping in this instance, but the question was qualified in the open-ended portion of the question. The respondent indicated that Africa might be on the G-20 agenda `but to what use?' In his view, this was nothing but `window-dressing'. Importantly, he was of the view that African leaders needed to take much more of a leadership role in relation to Africa.

The average score for the G-20 country grouping was 2.8, while the average obtained in relation to the International NGO grouping was 2.3.

In relation to the International NGO grouping, 66.7% of respondents selected the Disagree option in the Likert-scale (i.e., option 2), while one respondent selected option 3. The latter respondent highlighted that more needed to be done in terms of having Africa on the G-20 agenda. She said that “(t)he G20 could host an upcoming summit on the continent to draw more attention to African challenges and highlight Africa as part of the solution.”

Another respondent indicated that “The priorities of Africa and other developing countries are marginal in the G-20 agenda”.

In relation to the academic grouping, 50% of respondents Disagreed and 16.7% of respondents Strongly Disagreed (i.e., by selecting option 1). 33.3% of respondents selected option 3. Two respondents indicated that the G-8 had a much better track record than the G-20 in terms of having a focus of Africa within its agenda. One indicated that the focus on Africa was more recently the result of South Africa’s efforts.

The respondent who selected the Strongly Disagree option said that

“(T)he G20 cannot be reasonably expected to focus on Africa [as…] the G20 membership includes advanced and Emerging Market economies. Their common denominator is on trade and financial flows. Accordingly, the G20 response has so far focused on macroeconomic and financial stability.”

Another respondent indicated that “Africa hadn’t been the source of instability in the global economy, so it hadn’t been a focus.” The focus had been rather on those countries that had caused the crisis and were a matter of `international concern’.

In relation to responses received from the multilateral/intergovernmental grouping, 75% of respondents Disagreed and 25% Strongly Disagreed. The respondent from the intergovernmental (non-BWI) grouping that had selected option 1 said that `there was no evidence of Africa being consistently on the agenda of the G-20’.

Within the G-20 country grouping, 40% of respondents selected the Disagree option, while 10% selected Strongly Disagree. Both options 3 and 4 attracted 20% of respondents respectively, while the remaining 10% selected Strongly Agree. A comparison between groupings shows that the selection of option 5 (Strongly Agree) is a selection that goes against the norm of responses for this question.

One respondent who selected option 3, said that "before the crisis, Africa was not on the agenda very often. Since the crisis, Africa has been on the agenda more often. It needs to remain on the agenda going forward. The same applies to the G8."

Another who selected option 4 said, "it is on the agenda, but more emphasis should be given to development policies to help Africa and other developing countries to recover and expand their economies."

As elsewhere, it is the G-20 country grouping that has tended to rate its performance and agenda focus more positively than other groupings.







Question 4 b). - On whether the G-20 had sufficiently engaged with African countries as non-G-20 members, the majority of the purposive sample responded by saying No. 66% of respondents overall said No, while 21% said Yes and 13% did not make a selection.

The International NGO grouping was unanimous (100%) in its selection of option No. One respondent said that '(t)his had not been the case and no impact had been felt in African political economies. Initially, the G-20 concentrated much of its efforts on advocating for multilateral policy arrangements that were mainly favourable to the industrial countries." Another said that it was unclear 'how Africans and the world's poor would be part of or counted within G20 deliberations'.

In relation to the academic grouping, 50% of respondents said No, while 33% said Yes and 17% did not make a selection. The latter respondent indicated elsewhere in the questionnaire, particularly in relation to questions 19 and 20, that as the G-20 was an informal grouping, it did not need to engage with non-member countries and/or civil society groupings as other more formal and/or treaty-based multilaterals did. As a result, the respondent's leaving this question blank is related to his rejection of the notion that the G-20 should have outreach and/or engagement with non-members.

In relation to the multilateral grouping, the respondents within this group were 100% in agreement by selecting the No option for this question. One of the respondents within this grouping said "the G20 has virtually ignored Africa. Africa isn't going to be engaged with the G20 process without some form of constituency representation. I don't think most of the continent is comfortable with South Africa 'speaking for Africa'. Its problems, as an emerging market, seem a long way from those in most African countries." Another said that `even where a few African leaders had been invited, there was no serious discussion. Engagement was inadequate'.

50% of respondents within the G-20 country grouping said that African countries were not engaged within or through the G-20. The attendance of Africa (i.e., Egypt over and above South Africa as a G-20 member) recently had been more an accident, as its invite was due to its being the chair of the IMFC.

Echoing some of the responses given by multilateral/intergovernmental respondents, one said that '(T)here was a query with regard to the quality of the engagement with Africa'. On the other side of the coin, 'Africa needed to step up and needed to make its agenda clear.' Another respondent said that `Africa had governance issues and that its commitment to improve this situation was in question'.

A number of respondents said that South Africa needed to do more to engage with non-member African countries and feed their views into the G-20, while some said that the only way to have a greater focus on Africa within the G-20 was through increasing African membership within the G-20.

One of the South African country respondents indicated that there were plans to increase African engagement in advance of the Canadian Summit through the holding of a colloquium which would include the African Economic Research Council (AERC) and others. This was activity that South Africa was taking on through its awareness of and sensitivity to being the only permanent African country member within the G-20. Work with the C10 was informed on this basis, as was a workshop held in March 2009, prior to the April London Summit, which included academics.

As with the blank responses discussed above within the academic grouping, one respondent left this question blank in disagreement with the notion that the G-20 should engage in any outreach (this is on the basis of responses to questions 19 and 20). One respondent left the question blank, because he said that a response here was inconclusive. The work of the G-20 was `still in progress'.

The African country respondent said No, Africa was not engaged within or by the G-20. According to him, `African issues were peripheral to the core interests of the main powers within the G-20. The issues which emerged within the G-20 were those which were of interest to the OECD and Western countries.' He went further to say that `occasionally the issue of Aid would come up, however, whether they would carry out commitments had yet to be seen. As well, Aid was tied'. He gave examples, where, throughout history, 'narrow interests had prevailed. The G-20 was no different' in this regard, he said. In relation to an example of Canadian development aid, '70% of this was already spent in Canada, before reaching the country it was to support in Africa.' Very often the approach was to `use others to address the problems that they had created'. He gave the example of Nigeria as a regional power that had been used to keep peace in Liberia for at least 5 years, at great expense to the country.





Question 19 – Question 19 is closely related to question 4 b), but is more open in not being specifically focused on Africa. As a result, responses for this question are slightly more moderate by comparison with 55% of respondents overall saying that they disagree that other countries (outside of the G-20 membership) are sufficiently engaged. Within this number, 47% Disagreed and 8% Strongly Disagreed. Only 8% of respondents overall said that non-member countries were engaged by the G-20 in anyway. 33% selected option 3. No respondents selected the Strongly Agree option (i.e., option 5) and 4% of respondents left the question blank.

The average score for this question was 2.4. The multilateral/intergovernmental grouping had the lowest mean score of 1.5, followed by the score of 2 for the African country grouping.

Within the International NGO grouping, 66.7% of respondents selected option 3, while 33.3% of respondents selected option 2 (Disagree). One respondent within this grouping said, "we would like to see more engagement with non-member countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa".

In relation to the academic grouping, 50% of respondents Disagreed (option 2). 33.3% of respondents selected option 3, and 16.7% of respondents left the question blank.

The one respondent who left the question blank in the open-ended portion of the question explained this by saying that, the consideration was `not applicable to the G-20, as an informal group. It was made up of member countries and multilateral organisations and it was the primary concerns of these countries and organisations that helped to drive the group. If it were to diffuse this focus, it would lose relevance and life overnight', said the respondent.

Within the Multilateral/Intergovernmental grouping, 50% of respondents selected Strongly Disagree and the other 50% of respondents selected the Disagree option.

Among the open-ended responses, respondents highlighted that the lack of a permanent Secretariat for the G-20 probably hindered this. One respondent said that 'many countries were uncomfortable with other countries speaking for them. If G-20 decisions were to be binding on others in anyway, a representation system that made those decisions legitimate to other countries was needed.' Here, as well as elsewhere within the questionnaire, the respondent stressed the value of the IMFC's constituency system.

Another respondent within the grouping stressed that `inadequate thought had been given by the G20 to engagement with non-members. A detailed menu of options needed to be considered, decided upon and implemented.'

In relation to the G-20 country grouping, 40% of respondents Disagreed, while another 40% of respondents selected option 3. 20% of respondents selected option 4 as the Agree option within the provided Likert-scale.

Here as elsewhere within the questionnaire, the G-20 grouping tended to have a more favourable view of its own action than other groupings.

Notwithstanding this, respondents said that `the G-20 could do more here' or that `this was not top of the agenda for the G-20'. One respondent said that `closer links with the UN could be one way to remedy a lack of engagement with non-member countries'.

Another respondent said that `the G-20 was biased towards technical thinking and without a permanent Secretariat any outreach was on a country basis rather than by the G-20 itself'.

Other respondents rated South Africa favourably for `being inclusive and undertaking outreach with its neighbours'. The respondent questioned whether South Africa should continue doing this, when other G-20 countries did not do this. Another respondent rated the 2009 Pittsburgh hosts favourably for outreach both prior to and after the Summit, as well as at the UN. The respondent said that `future hosts should follow this example'.

In relation to the African country grouping, the respondent disagreed that non-member countries were sufficiently engaged by the G-20.







Question 20 - In relation to the question on whether the G-20 engaged sufficiently with International NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), 41% of respondents overall Disagreed and 13% Strongly Disagreed. Taken together, 54% of respondents overall said that the G-20 did not engage with International NGOs and/or CSOs sufficiently.

25% of respondents selected option 3, while 13% of respondents overall agreed that the G-20 did engage NGOs and CSOs. 4% strongly agreed and 4% left the question blank.

The average score for this question among the groupings was 2.5. In comparison to this, both the International NGO grouping and the African country grouping had average scores of 2.

Within the International NGO grouping, 100% of respondents selected the Disagree option. Respondents within this grouping were generally in agreement that `civil society actors were not taken into consideration generally'.

Within the academic grouping, 33.3% of respondents disagreed and 33.3% of respondents selected option 3. 16.7% of respondents selected option 4 (Agree) and 1 respondent left the question blank.

One respondent said that such activity was `not applicable to the G-20 as an informal organisation without structure. As such, it could not be expected to engage civil society. This was up to its members.'

Another respondent said that engagement with civil society was `not a priority' at the moment. The one respondent who went against the norm, in this instance, said that `G20 governments tended to care about public opinion and the views of NGOs. Because of this, and the role that NGOs played in shaping public opinion, outreach was done.'

In relation to the multilateral grouping, each of the 4 respondents selected a different option. One selected Strongly Disagree (25%), one selected Disagree (25%), one selected option 3 (25%) and one selected option 5, Strongly Agree (25%).

In relation to the last response, the force of option 5 needs to be compared with the open response for the same question. The respondent for this question said `there is no case for NGOs and civil society engaging with the G-20 [..]. There is no Secretariat that can conduct routine contact.' As well, the respondent said that he thought that `NGOs and CSOs had less legitimacy than the G-20.' As such this response does not have the force of a Strongly Agree, but rather the sense that the respondent disagrees with outreach to NGOs and/or CSOs.

Another respondent said that such outreach `had not been a mode of engagement by the G-20' and that 'it was unlikely to become one, given the G-20's nature'.

In relation to the G-20 country grouping, 20% of respondents Strongly Disagreed and 30% Disagreed. In combination, 50% disagreed that the G-20 sufficiently engaged civil society and International Non-Governmental Organisations.

A further 30% selected option 3 and 20% Agreed (option 4).

One respondent said that `domestic audiences were particularly interested in the G20. This had not been the case with the G8 summits. The G20 was attracting greater attention and engagement from civil society than ever before, but engagement was not evident'.

South African respondents were critical of other G-20 countries which did not engage civil society, unlike the case currently with South Africa. It was felt that other G-20 countries could learn from the South African example.

One respondent who rated the G-20 favourably here said that it was `unclear' what engagement was needed. As such this response does not have the force of an Agree, but rather the sense that the respondent disagrees with outreach to NGOs and/or CSOs.

The other respondent who selected option 4 for this question appears to have been strongly influenced by the Pittsburgh consultation process. The respondent recommended that each G-20 chair and/or host should follow a similar process to the one conducted in Pittsburgh.

In relation to the African country grouping, the Disagree option was selected. The respondent added that the G-20 was `a lot of hot air'. `NGO groupings published reports which were critical of the G-20, but these were not having effect, as the G-20 was dominated by big powers. Global peace and the equitable distribution of resources was not what the G-20 was about.'







Question 7 - Question 7 was an open-ended question which asked respondents to expand on the notable successes of the G-20 in terms of its deliberative performance.

Responses included the following:

- Openness and dialogue between different countries with different political systems (2x);
- Unity of purpose (2x), consensus formation, global co-operation and common objectives;
- The ability to generate significant new resources for the IMF (5x), World Bank, the African Development Bank and other IFIs (2x);
- Stabilising and reviving commodity prices (2x) and improving transparency in commodity markets, helping revive financial flows and confidence (2x);
- Preventing global financial and economic collapse by managing the crisis (2x) to recovery;
- Checking contagion (2x) to Emerging Markets;
- Stimulus measures (2x);
- Creating an exit strategy for stimulus measures (3x), avoiding premature exit;
- Breaking the logjam between developing and developed nations in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit and reporting on financing options;
- In principle agreement on the need for IFI/BW reform (3x) and, in particular, quota reform (6x);

- In principle agreement on the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies (2x) (but without any enforcement mechanism);
- Encouraging the adoption of Standards and Codes/greater surveillance needed (3x);
- The SDR allocations to increase global liquidity (2x);
- Addressing crises (but loses momentum outside of crisis moments);
- Admitting that the crisis was due to unregulated globalisation;
- Consensus on high bank / financial sector salaries and bonuses (/compensation) (2x) and FSB principles;
- The FSB as a legal entity;
- More restrictive rules for the financial sector;
- Tax havens – work needs to be done here;
- Recognising the social dimension to globalisation and a human development agenda;
- Agreeing a framework for strong, sustainable, global growth;
- Recognition of interdependence and collective self-interest (2x)– leading to defining multilateralism in a practical way;
- Inclusion of the G-24 and elevation to Leaders' level;
- Surpassing the G-8 in importance;
- With agreement, the G-20 could lend impetus to discussion on intractable issues in the UN[37];
- Calls to avoid protectionism and complete Doha.

In relation to the above, the top three issues out of some 28 + issues are related to:

- BWI quota reform mentioned 6x;
- The dedication of resources to the BWIs (5x); and
- Working on an exit strategy and agreeing that BWI reform is needed in terms of governance and other reforms (3x).

[37] This is listed as an aspirational possibility rather than on the basis of any particular intent of the G-20 in this regard.

With the exception of the resources dedicated to the BWIs through the London Summit in 2009, all of the top 3 mentioned successes are not yet completed. Respondents are, however, willing to give the G-20 the benefit of the doubt.

Question 9 b) - In relation to the question on which policy areas merited the attention of the G-20 in future, respondents drew attention to the following areas:

- Demand for the democratisation/reform of the UN (2x);
- Finding real alternatives to neoliberal globalisation;
- Trade liberalisation (3x) and a more united position in relation to the WTO (3x);
- Achieving the MDGs, addressing poverty and social and equity issues, human development (3x), economic development (3x) and financing for development;
- Monitoring commitments to Africa;
- Delivering on commitments to achieving more balanced (3x) and inclusive growth and implementing an effective mutual assessment system;
- Delivering on commitments to phase out energy subsidies for fossil fuels;
- Striking a balance between the needs of developing and developed nations;
- Ensuring that IFIs have sufficient resources;
- Implementing the food security (4x) initiative;
- Taking bold action on climate change (9x) and moving away from carbon capture and storage technology;
- More explicit consideration of capital controls in the case of hot capital flows and asset bubbles;
- Regulation for international investment;
- Aid and aid effectiveness, including technical assistance for climate change adaptation, access to technology (2x) and compensation for poorer countries;
- Energy security (2x), a focus on renewable and/or alternative types of energy (2x), clean energy, energy efficient technology and technology development;
- Job creation;
- Developing the institutional framework for the supervision of international financial markets;

- Risk mitigation and catastrophic risk mitigation insurance products for small states;
- Reform of the BWIs (3x);
- Other areas that are already being focused on by the G-20 to continue;
- Education;
- Healthcare and reducing infant mortality;
- Addressing diseases such as HIV and AIDS (2x), malaria and water-borne diseases that are preventable;
- Communications;
- Agriculture in the interests of smaller countries.

In relation to the above, the top 3 areas that respondents recommended the G-20 to focus on in future included:

- Climate change (9x);
- Food Security (4x);
- Work to do with trade and/or trade liberalisation (3x) and the WTO (3x);
- The reform of the BWIs (3x);
- Human (3x) and economic development (3x);
- Balanced and inclusive growth (3x).

Notably, in terms of policy recommendations, respondents suggest, in the main, that the G-20 deal with issues that are more socially-oriented. In the lead-up to the Copenhagen climate change conference, climate change and energy issues are top of mind for respondents.

Only one respondent problematises the neoliberal paradigm within which the G-20 is framed.

Note, as the analysis above covers main themes, responses for a number of open questions have been considered in conjunction with the above[38].

4.3 Summary of Findings

4.3.1 Normative

Both the analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20 and the analysis of responses received from participants in the research show the G-20 to be unwavering in its adherence to market principles and neoliberalism. The paradigm to which the G-20 is committed to furthering is, however, never questioned.

A `market first' approach is in dissonance with broader issues of social equity and justice and this is, in the main, picked up on by the International NGO and African country respondent groupings, though also in areas by the multilateral/intergovernmental grouping. The G-20 respondent grouping in the main has tended to have a fairly uncritical view of its own performance, though in areas such as engagement with African and non-member countries it agrees that it `can do more'. The Pittsburgh Communiqué (2009) talks about the need for `critical players to be at the table', but `after the crisis', not now (paragraph 18). This echoes the response of one of the G-20 country respondents in the research who on the question as to whether there should be an expansion of the G-20 to include non-member countries, especially African countries, said `yes, but not for the next 5 years until the G-20 has finished dealing with the crisis'.

[38] In particular, questions 5, 14, 6, 21, 25, 27, 4a, 8, 26,

It appears that the Pittsburgh Summit Communiqué (2009) of all G-20 communiqués has captured the imagination of many of the participants in the research, as the most mentioned communiqué within answers. The communiqué is the longest of all G-20 communiqués (with some 9,253 words, including the preamble). It is also the communiqué which makes most mention of issues such as jobs, poverty, fuel subsidies, climate change, food insecurity, the UN and the impact of the crisis on LICs, at the same time that it stresses its commitment to liberalisation (paragraph 49). If participants have had this tick-all-the-boxes communiqué `top of mind' when responding to the research questionnaire, fairly positive responses to questions which ask whether LICs have been on the G-20 agenda (Question 15) or whether the G-20 focuses on broader social considerations and human development goals (Question 2) are explained.

The trend analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20 shows that this has been far from the case. The analysis shows that the G-20 has been very good at spinning a uni-directional narrative on its own performance through its communiqués. The G-20 presents itself as being the `core actor' in a broader multilateral landscape, always on top of every issue, *including issues not yet tackled*[39]. At the time of the crisis, the G-20 extends the stated frontiers of its power as `the premier forum', Pittsburgh 2009.

However, for all its posturing, the G-20 failed to recognise the impending global financial and economic crisis and/or to do anything in advance of its `spillover effects' being felt the world over. The Pittsburg Summit's tasking of its `relevant Ministers to explore a new crisis facility to protect LICs from future crises [..] and protect the investment plans of middle income countries' (paragraph 36) underscores the fact that the G-20 has not done enough as the (self-selected) `premier' forum and that the next crisis is already in the making. The cost of the current crisis has

[39] So for example, in advance of the UN Conference on Climate Change, the G-20 has already committed to reaching agreement in the Summit, prior to Summit dialogue and engagement (See above with reference to the London Summit Communiqué, April 2009).

been 55-90 million people pushed into extreme poverty according to the UN in 2009. The G-20 calls its failure to see the extent of the crisis as a `diagnostic miss' (*G-20 Working Group 3: Reform of the IMF*, final report, 4 March 2009, paragraph 73).

4.3.2 Structural

On whether there should be closer alignment between the G-20 and the UN, research respondents, and particularly G-20 country respondents, strongly resisted this. Many referred to the UN as `unwieldy', `inefficient', `expensive' and over bureaucratised. These respondents would tend to praise the G-20 in comparison for its `efficiency and effectiveness', its informal nature and ability to reach consensus. A number flatly said that the G-20 was not accountable to anyone else other than its members and that as such it didn't need to `report into' any other forums. Some agreed that closer co-operation could potentially further the achievement of broader social outcomes, though social equity and justice was not the purpose of the G-20. A number of participants agreed with UN attendance that stayed `on the margins', while others who might be characterized as being more socially democratic in nature favoured G-20 reporting into and/or exchange within the ECOSOC.

No participants mentioned the recommendations of the UN Stiglitz Report (2009) *per se*, with its recommendation for a Global Economic Council (GEC) to be formed and supported by a forum of international experts and advisors on financial and economic matters. Within such a formation, the G-20 could require the participation of the chair or the Troika, but would also be based on whether the G-20 was recognised by the UN, given its `soft law' status. The silence on the Stiglitz recommendation suggests that either the G-20 had not seriously considered it or already favoured another option. The responses of a few participants suggested what this option could entail, highlighting that a modeling of the IMFC's constituency system was `the answer' to the G-20 democratic deficit. These same participants suggested that ultimately the G-20 would merge with the IMFC. Consistent with the trend analysis of the deliberative performance of the G-20 since inception, the G-20 consistently favours policy options and actions which place it firmly within the framework of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). G-20 calls for the reform of the BWIs themselves and the fact that these institutions remain unreformed has not prevented the G-20 from shoring up their resources.

Respondents who gave more balanced responses in relation to whether agreements needed to be re-negotiated between the IMF and WB with the UN, said that the process should be a mutual one requiring the reform of both, rather than the reform of one without the reform of the other.

In terms of questions related to who should be at the G-20 table, a number of respondents said that the G-20 was focused on financial stability and growth, as well as the reform of `systemically significant' institutions. It was this argument which was used to rationalise why poorer countries, by virtue of lack of global market participation and/or financial market sophistication, would not add any value to such issues if they were to be included in the forum. Few respondents, save for the African country respondent, unpacked such arguments as questions of power and an unlevel playing field being in the interests largely of developed nations. Where G-20 country participants assumed a `natural' G-20 benevolence and action in the collective interest (at least of the group), the African country respondent was much more skeptical of the G-20 acting out of any other motivation other than self-interest.

Participants tended to agree that African countries needed to have greater representation[40] within the G-20 and that the EU was over-represented. A great deal of variation on how representation changes could be effected within the G-20 was in evidence. A number suggested that the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty opened possibilities for the number of EU members within the G-20 to be dramatically reduced, but

[40] The African country respondent said such representation was important. Adapting a Nigerian saying, he said `You can't shave my head in my absence or by proxy'.

that the EU needed to be given time to sort out its representation issues. For many, EU representation within the G-20 was taken as `natural', while regional representation for other blocs was considered to not be in the same league. Some said that once the G-20 considered regional representation for Africa, it would need to expand its membership further to include other counterpart regions from Asia and South America.

In relation to greater African representation within the G-20, a number of participants favoured a mix of permanent and rotational seats with regional and additional African country representation. Criteria mentioned included population size, influence within a region and contribution to peace-keeping efforts within a region. Many agreed that South Africa did not represent the voice of many countries in Africa and that more needed to be done to obtain the input of other African countries, if not through their inclusion by more rigorous South African outreach.

A number of respondents stressed that Africa needed greater leadership and it needed to develop coherent positions on issues, before it would be considered as a credible potential member.

4.3.3 Internal Governance Arrangements

Since elevation to Leaders' level, fluidity in G-20 arrangements has become very much the norm. A number of G-20 country respondents complained of a lack of communication between the Finance Minister track and the Sherpa track.

An emerging proposal is that a Sherpa Troika should be created to give some stability to G-20 arrangements. Research respondents strongly rejected proposals for the establishment of a permanent Secretariat saying that part of the G-20's strength was it short- to medium-term project management and goal orientation. A number agreed that a quasi-Secretariat might assist the G-20 to conduct outreach, but that there should not be a blurring of boundaries between treaty-based organisations, such as the UN and its agencies, and informal forums, such as the G-20.

4.3.4 Policy- Related Areas of Focus

Most participants agreed that the G-20 *could do more* to address social and developmental issues, but that in the view of many, its progress to-date was promising. Several participants were skeptical that the G-20 would maintain any momentum beyond the crisis. Others claimed that the forum was merely a 'talk shop', that allowed for photo opportunities. Its agenda was driven by the richest countries within the forum and Africa was only on the G-20 agenda insofar as the continent was of interest to the developed countries. The trend analysis shows the G-20 to be strongly characteristic of Type I governance. Commitment to addressing the `most vulnerable' is through the market and loans, not grants, from the IFIs and MDBs (See the UN Stiglitz Commission Report (2009)). Also, renaming the FSF is an *insufficient reform* to address `regulatory deficiencies'.

With the UN Conference on Climate Change in December 2009 being an upcoming event, recommendations for greater emphasis on climate change within the G-20 loom large. Many respondents indicated that the G-20 needed to complete actions that related to the reform of the BWIs, in particular. This has been a long-standing issue of the G-20 which is yet to be brought to any satisfactory conclusion. The repeated focus of the G-20 on the same issues, year on year, suggests that it is *far less efficient* than it claims.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

In 2009, when 2 of the 3 G-20 Leaders' Summits have taken place, issues of accountability, representation (inclusion/exclusion) and legitimacy have come to the fore due the informal nature of network governance. Those who are included have tended (and this is confirmed by respondents in the G-20 country grouping in particular) to view the performance of the G-20 relatively unproblematically. The G-20 is extolled for its informal nature, the level of trust that is being built in the group and the ability of the group to reach consensus on issues of a transnational nature which require intergovernmental co-operation. As a soft law body, agreements allow for flexibility and emphasis `best practice', `principles' and `frameworks' and `guidelines' (Helleiner and Porter:2009, 15).

In the blind spot, among others, is the capture of the G-20, though this is true of other forums such as the FSB, the Basel Committee on Banking Superivsion (BCBS), the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), etc. among others (Ibid., 14), all of whom work or are `linked in' to the current business of the G-20, by technocratic elites and the link of financial and economic issues to broader social issues. Helleiner and Porter (Ibid., 19-20) highlight that the `narrowness of experts' focus on the financial industry to the exclusion of others, with mathematical modelling that massively neglected the shadow banking system, excluded reliance on others forms of risk mitigation such as audits.'

Linked to the problem of technocratic capture is "capture of the regulatory process by the very industry it is to regulate" (Ibid., 20). They highlight how the Institute of International Finance worked with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to develop "technical solutions, such as the pro-cyclicality of Basel II or mark-to-market accounting". However, highly opaque public and private risk management systems" have been proven by the crisis to be highly `deficient' (Ibid., 19). They highlight that this capture at a domestic level is replicated at a transnational level resulting in a "transnational technocracy that is non-transparent and unresponsive to the broader public interest" (Ibid.,).

The research at one level through questions posed to respondents has probed to some degree the question as to how the G-20 can be made more accountable, both through `bridging' (Helleiner and Porter:2009, 28) to the more formal, treaty-based organisations, in particular the UN (here used in the research as the current paragon of Type II governance), as well as through changes in representation at the G-20 table. In particular, the question as to whether participation for African countries and/or the region can be enhanced within the forum can be enhanced, particularly given that currently this is the most under-represented region.

The questions have also sought to problematise the fault-lines along which the G-20, and other intergovernmental groupings and/or networks have developed, including `systemically significant countries and/or institutions' to the exclusion of other actors.

Respondents have tended to support the latter option of greater inclusion, voice and representation for Africa, while a number of emerging considerations stress possibilities for greater regional representation within the G-20. Helleiner and Porter (2009) highlight how "powerful states can (often…) manipulate informal settings where there are no clear rules or procedures to protect the weak" (Ibid., 18). Kemal Derviş (2009:27-28) highlights how more "`representative' participants could be elected to represent the regional geographical groups at the UN". The research has explored the potential role of the ECOSOC here to explore how `lines of accountability' might be established (Helleiner and Porter:2009,18).

Despite a great deal of resistance to any aspect of formalisation in terms of broader exchange and dialogue, the financial and economic crisis has underscored that `not being at the table' does not mean that countries and/or others will not be affected by the decisions and discussions which take place at that table. Helleiner and Porter

(2009:16) highlight that `developing country resentment only grew with the unfolding of the crisis, not only because of being excluded from decision-making processes, but because of "the vulnerability of everyone to the poor regulatory practices' at the core of world economy in industrialised countries'. They highlight that even when `developing countries did not adopt international standards, they were affected by them' (Ibid.,).

The research has argued for an international financial and economic architecture that is not only defined by the interests of the `systemically significant'. Amartya Sen (2006), in his work: "*Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*", has said that "Exclusion is as important a problem (…) as unequal inclusion". At one level, he says that `remedying such exclusion, demands "radical departures" in domestic economic policies and also for changed international policies, particularly of the richer countries" (Sen:2006, 133). Changes are needed in terms of `past debt, aid, patent rights, etc. (Ibid.,). The treatment of these issues must be `humane and realistic' he says (Ibid.,).

He argues as well against the notion that if `the poor are getting *just a little* bit richer or better off' that this is good enough (Ibid., 134). He warns that this does not mean that `the poor are getting a *fair* share of the benefits of our inter-relatedness' (*emphasis added*), given that levels of inequality are "getting marginally larger" (Ibid.,).

He suggests that co-operation is better than no co-operation[41], but he argues that `real engagement' needs to focus on the question as to whether the poor can "get a better and fairer deal, with less disparities of economic, social and political opportunities, and if so, through what international and domestic re-arrangements (Ibid., 136). A starting point is `overcoming the institutional failures that continue as a source of inequity in the global economy' (Ibid., 139), as well as recognising global poverty and

[41] The emphasis within the research in terms of exploring possibilities for an expanded G-20 membership has made the same assumption.

inequality as a form of "global violence" (Ibid., 142). The existing levels of `neglect', particularly in relation to Africa, is the result of `asymmetries of power' (Ibid., 144).

A key issue is, however, that `poverty removal' is not pursued `for its own sake', but rather through `appeals to self-interest' and on the basis of `economic reductionism' (Ibid.,). He calls for the `denouncement of equity-neglecting capitalism' (Ibid., 147), the displacement of the "identity disregard[42]" that has underpinned contemporary economic theory and action (Ibid., 23) and a reformed global order, where a search for global justice is undertaken as a matter of urgency (Ibid., 148). He says that this `worldwide discussion' can be facilitated through the involvement of many institutions, including the United Nations, the media, NGOs, CSOs, and others, who have a role in `extending the boundaries of justice' (Ibid., 184).

The G-20 claims currently that it is `the solution' as the `premier forum', however, the trend analysis of its performance has highlighted a number of issues of concern.

For one, the G-20's extended focus from one year to the next in terms of surveillance has not assisted to mitigate the crisis nor provide sufficient warning of its extent in advance of its ramifications being felt the world over. The Stiglitz Commission (2009) highlights that the crisis could have been avoided, but the problem of `technocratic insulation', lack of transparency, lack of accountability, financial capture, lack of representation and legitimacy, are among the many deficiencies in the current G-20 as a form of network governance that appears unlikely to disappear in the short-term (Helleiner and Porter:2009, 15). The trend analysis has shown that `poverty reduction' and/or even the mention of some degree of stated commitment to ameliorating the positions of poor and developing countries has been little more than `ritualistic rhetoric' by the G-20.

[42] Sen (2006) talks of two essential types of reductionism: identity disregard as `ignoring or neglecting entirely the influence of identity with others, on what we value and how we behave'(Ibid., 20): and that of `singular affiliation' which assists to `miniaturise human beings' (Ibid., 185).

Beyond this is the deeper concern that the G-20 has shown itself to be neoliberal project that propounds uncritically the very changes that, on the basis of an unlevel playing field, assist to deepen and grow levels of inequality. The G-20 in its support of yet unreformed IFIs such as the IMF and the World Bank is entrenching further a paradigm of power that leaves developing countries and in particular African countries as the world's `rule-takers'. Even the much touted IMF quota formulas, which the G-20 has assisted to broker, for increased voice and representation for `under-represented' countries (not necessarily developing countries) are based on formulas which maintain the primacy of European countries and the United States as part of a package of post-World War II arrangements.

The reform of one cannot be without the reform of the others. The research has emphasised that there is need for multilateralism in the context of intractable problems which threaten humanity (climate change is one of these).

The treaty organisations are needed, not to further advance the interests of the already powerful, but to ensure that adequate protections are in place and distributive social outcomes advanced in the interests of the excluded, vulnerable and poor and extreme poor. In terms of questions within the research that in any way suggested the need for stronger bridging ties with, for example, the UN and/or the AU, NGOs and African country respondents and some respondents from the multilateral/intergovernmental grouping, respondents almost invariably said yes such a bridge was needed[43]. These responses can be understood in terms of exclusion or in terms of institutions whose mandates are dedicated not to narrow financial and economic issues but to the furthering of broader social outcomes. In the context of

[43] It is not the purpose of the report to determine on a technical basis which among the many emerging options here would offer the best solutions in this regard. The Stiglitz Commission Report's (2009) call for a Global Economic Co-ordinating Committee (GECC) supported by an advisory council or panel of experts has merit. If suggestions that the geographic regions within the UN receive permanent seats within the G-20 through the ECOSOC, for example, the foundation for links with such a UN-based Committee would already be established.

exclusion, these respondents have recognised the important role that the treaty-based organisations can play in terms of speaking truth to power[44].

Those that have not argued for a complete scratching of a forum like the G-20 have at, the very least, called for a bridge between the informal and the formal multilateral and intergovernmental organisations and the establishment of accountability mechanisms which would offset the G-20's inherent democratic deficit, by opening up the discussions to broader scrutiny and including more voices in the development of solutions that seek to realise the `fairer deal' of which Sen (2006) speaks.

As an informal, `soft law' forum, the G-20 can play a role as a catalyst and/or caucus for discussions which need to take place in the UN, for example, but activity which ascribes to itself the status of `core' arbiter or `decision-maker' in the global financial and economic sphere does not support multilateralism, it undermines it.

The last G-20 Summit held in Pittsburgh saw the G-20 calling on more institutions to report back to it than previously, despite its inherent illegitimacy as anything but a soft law governance network.

The trend is a concern as - with the exception of efforts towards the UN Climate Change Conference - the G-20 as `a new form of multilateralism' is not taking the results of such reports and/or their deliberations on intergovernmental issues, as an interim step, to other formal multilateral institutions other than the IMF and the WB, and almost not at all to other actors. Here, the modality is replacement of and competition, rather than fusion with the more socially democratic. As such, in practice the UN is being sidelined by the G-20 on the basis of an obfuscating rationale that argues in circular terms which hide the deficiencies of `technical talks by technical experts' as if such talks by these actors to the exclusion of others was `natural' and `inevitable'.

[44] Luce, Edward (2009) reports Ban Ki-Moon as saying, in relation to his attendance at G-20 Summits in 2009, that `he goes to remind the G-20 that 85% of the world's countries are not represented at their meetings'.

Helleiner and Porter (2009:18) indicate that first steps include creating `stronger Secretariats' which can assist with outreach activities and `boosting the support staffs of bodies that are almost exclusively under the control of developing countries, such as the G-24'. This would assist them to "develop autonomous and effective voices in the bodies in which they participate" (Ibid.,). The further argue that within a set of reforms `countervailing public sector arrangements such as peer reviews need to be constructed along the lines of the DAC Network on Development and Evaluation as applied to the UNDP and UNICEF' (Ibid., 21). In relation to financial regulatory networks, such as the FSB, reviewers need also to be sourced from 'outside the financial policy area', possibly with support of the OECD working with organisations with `more developing country representation' (Ibid.,). The NEPAD experience of transnational peer review in Africa would also be of potential value here.

They argue that, similar to the G-7/8 process, a further countervailing arrangement involving the public sector would be to establish `linkages with non-financial ministries in the G-20 to consult on the broader implications of (financial regulatory) initiatives' (Ibid.,). In addition to this, they suggest that a `small multilateral body could be established to identify problems in transnational regulatory networks' and that competition for projects among public organisations with overlapping mandates could be fostered to promote dynamism and responsiveness (Ibid.,). Other suggestions include restrictions on `the numbers of years before regulators move into private sector lobbying and the reverse and the creation of rules which are non-discretionary and transparent, but which are also limited in terms of what transnational regulatory networks can develop or endorse in relation to their own activities' (Ibid., 22).

They further argue that `mechanisms to enhance the development of `global public interest' or a `global public sphere' ' must also be developed (Ibid., 22) so that outcomes are more likely to be in the `common interest' (Ibid., 23). They say that the UN here could play a leadership role in fostering `global public policy networks with NGO involvement' and `shadow forums or committees could be established with public financing to encourage a requirement for diversity of voice and perspective' (Ibid. 23). As an accountability deficit was `at the heart of the crisis', Helleiner and Porter (2009) argue that there are strong arguments for `strengthening existing institutions - not just the G-20 but all operating within the global economic and financial architecture - and working *with* existing practices in relation to the networked properties of global governance' (Ibid., 24) (*emphasis added*), on one end of a continuum, with more formal treaty-based organisations on the other.

The emphasis within the study has been on the G-20, however, these recommendations are valid not only in relation to the G-20 and/or the IMF and/or the World Bank and/or the WTO, but the UN as well. Respondents have highlighted frustrations with regard to the lack of efficiency and effectiveness of the UN, including the effectiveness of the ECOSOC. It is for this reason that the G-20 appears already to be favouring an expanded role for the IMF, through the IMFC and a reliance on its constituency system, in terms of multilateral economic governance. However, without reform of the IMF which includes a "reweighing of the existing constituencies" such a role would "further strengthen the *de facto* influence [and power] of rich countries [to the disadvantage…] of developing countries" (Derviş:2009, 30).

The direction of this trend, identified above as power consolidation without internal reform that is motivated firstly by concerns for global social justice and equity, is one which must be reversed, if aims of broader global financial and economic stability are to be met and benefits truly shared *by all*, fairly and with a view to closing the inequality and growing (extreme) poverty gaps, particularly in relation to sub-Saharan Africa. The global financial and economic crisis in 2008/9 has shown how tenuous any gains made to-date are.

Though beyond the scope of the paper, the study also points to the problematic of any fusion of Type I and Type II governance which still is only concerned with `halving the number of those in (extreme) poverty'. No reform effort can be complete without a much broader expansion of both the `boundaries of justice' and solidarity. This requires, however, a fundamental revisioning of the underlying paradigm.

ANNEXURE 1

Interview Guide / Schedule

1. The G-20 as a form of new multilateralism fuses together the need for efficiency and effectiveness (Type I governance) and greater inclusivity and representation (Type II governance) than other forums such as the G-8.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):____

2. The G-20 has been too focused on narrow financial and economic issues at the expense of broader social considerations and human developmental goals.

- YES
- NO

(Additional Comments / Optional):

---

3. Type II governance with its concern for equity and social justice can be enhanced in the G-20 in the following way:…

4a). The deliberations of the G-20 to-date have been important for Africa in the following ways:

4b). Africa has been sufficiently engaged in areas where deliberations impact the continent:

- YES
- NO

(Additional Comments / Optional):

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5. The participation of Africa and/or African policy-makers within the G-20 forum can be enhanced in the following way:

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6. The accountability of the G-20 forum can be enhanced in the following way:

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7. Notable successes in the deliberative performance of the G-20 are in the following areas:

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8. Areas where the performance of the G-20 has been sub-optimal or less than satisfactory are the following:

9a). Areas where the performance of the G-20 has been non-existent are the following:

9b). Policy areas that merit the attention of the G-20 in future are the following:

10. A variable geometry for the G-20 would benefit from the creation of permanent seats for the UN and the AU within the G-20:

- **YES**
- **NO**

(Additional Comments / Optional):

11a). A variable geometry for the G-20 would benefit from the creation of permanent (and/)or rotational seats within the G-20 for African countries other than South Africa:

- **YES**
- **NO**

(Additional Comments / Optional):

11b) Other African countries within the G-20 should be included on a:

- **Permanent**
- **Rotational**
- **Mix of permanent and rotational**

basis.
(Additional Comments / Optional):

12. Propositions for the inclusion of other African countries within the G-20 could be based on the following selection criteria:

13. European countries and the EU are over-represented in the G-20.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

14. Representation by European countries within the G-20 can be balanced more equitably in the following way:

15. The G-20 agenda consistently has low- and middle-income economies on the agenda.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

---

16. Africa is consistently on the agenda of the G-20.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

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17. The G-20's Troika should be expanded to include a permanent seat for the AU and the UN.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

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18. The G-20 should create mechanisms for reporting into the ECOSOC of the UN to enhance Type II governance and promote transparency.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

---

19. The G-20 engages sufficiently with non-member countries:

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

---

20. The G-20 engages sufficiently with international non-governmental organisations and civil society groupings:

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

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21. The G-20 could strengthen engagement with non-member countries and civil society groupings in the following way:

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22. To strengthen multilateralism in support of development, the IMF and the WB should renegotiate their relationship agreements with the UN.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

23. The alignment of the G-20 within the UN framework (rather than the framework of the BWIs) would strengthen the coherence of the global governance system.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

24. A permanent G-20 Secretariat should be created and housed within the UN to strengthen the accountability of the G-20 to a broader global public.

Strongly Disagree *Strongly Agree*

1	2	3	4	5

(Additional Comments / Optional):

25. The key barriers to bringing the G-20 within the UN framework are the following:

26. The performance of the G-20 during the 2008/2009 financial crisis can be described as being:

27. Additional comments on the G-20's deliberative performance; its relation to Africa and/or other multilateral institutions; and/or any proposed measures for G-20 reform may be added here:

<*Ends*>

ANNEXURE 2

List of Respondents Participating in the Research - by Institution

A. The International NGO Grouping

All respondents within this grouping have had a focus on the G-20, in particular since the end of 2008/2009

1. Social Development Network – Kenya (SODNET – KENYA)
2. ONE
3. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)

B. The Academic Grouping

1. The Brookings Institute (Research Fellow)
2. The G-20 Information Centre (with expertise on climate change issues)
3. The G-20 Information Centre, University of Toronto
4. South Africa Institute of International Affairs
5. International economist with direct advisory experience to the G-20, working currently within the Whitehouse, but not representing the views of the Whitehouse
6. The Brookings Institute (with expertise on Development, the IMF and G-20)

C. The Multilateral/Intergovernmental Grouping

1. ILO
2. IMF
3. IMF
4. An intergovernmental organisation that includes large and small states[45]

D. The G-20 Country Grouping (*not in order of dataset coding*)

1. South Korea (South Asia/Pacific)
2. Indonesia (South Asia/Pacific)
3. Argentina (South America)
4. Netherlands (newly attending G-20 meetings in 2009) (Europe)
5. South Africa (1 from the Leader (SA Presidency)/Sherpa track, one focus interview with 2 respondents from the SA National Treasury, 1 respondent from the South African Reserve Bank) (Africa)
6. Canada (one reflected in findings from within the Minister track and one face-to-face interview with a respondent from the Leader/Sherpa track at the level of the Prime Minister's office – not reflected) (North America)
7. France (Europe)
8. Australia (South Asia/Pacific)
9. South Africa (See above) (Africa)
10. South Africa (See above) (Africa)

E. African Country Grouping

1. Nigeria

[45] The respondent requested that the name of his organisation is kept entirely confidential.

ANNEXURE 3: Overview of the Deliberative Performance of the G-20 – 1999-2008

1. Issue / Collective Action Problem	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	OVERVIEW COMMENTARY
Communiqué 1 A. Berlin Germany, December 15-16 1999 – Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision - Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROCS) and Financial Sector Assessments (FSAPs) agreed as a standing item against which G-20 members would report.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
B. Reducing vulnerabilities of the financial system to risk – debt management policies, exchange rate and capital account policies, etc.												
C. G-20 internal governance arrangements	X											
D. Trade liberalisation issues and support for WTO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
E. General support for the IMF/WB	X											
F. -												
Communiqué 2 A. Montreal Canada, October 24-25 2000 – Challenges of globalization, trade liberalisation		X										
B. HIPC Initiative – call made on bilateral donors		X		X								
C. Money laundering, tax evasion, financial abuses		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
D. Infectious diseases		X										

E. Social safety nets to offset liberalisation processes		X										
F. Private sector involvement in crisis prevention and resolution.		X										
G. -												
Communiqué 3 **A. Ottawa Canada, November 16-17 2001** – Terrorist Financing			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
B. – Commitment to UN resolution re the Conventions on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and Against Transnational Organised Crime			X									The action plan on Terrorist financing commits G-20 countries to undertaking domestic steps to ratifying related UN resolutions. This is one key moment in the G-20's history when it shows alignment with the UN on a `hard law' issue.
C. Argentina Debt problem			X									
D. Technical assistance and recognition that the world's poorest are affected by down-turn			X									The G-20 recognises the world's poorest but does not explicitly make any commitments in this regard which would require member countries to increase levels of assistance. Here as elsewhere, the G-20 leaves it to countries to `contribute their share' without specifying what such a share would mean tangibly. In effect, the determination of shares is left to countries' discretion. No monitoring mechanisms are put in place.
E. Doha Development Agenda welcomed			X									
F. -												
Communiqué 4 **A. New Delhi, India, November 22-23 2002** - Development and Aid – support for MDGs, NEPAD, Monterrey Consensus (MC) and increases in international development assistance, recognition in the need for investment in infrastructure and human capital in developing				X	X	X			X	X		The mention of NEPAD in the G-20 communiqué makes explicit mention of Africa for the first time. The emphasis within the communiqué in terms of development assistance emphasises not the social side of development, but rather the usefulness of aid in enabling "poorer nations to build capabilities for exploiting the benefits of more integrated markets, reduce economic distance between nations, and (enhance) greater exchange of global information and knowledge" (G-20 Communiqué 2002, paragraph 8). The reference to the Johannesburg and Monterrey conferences is couched in terms of a remembered "partnership between developed

countries to reduce poverty												and developing countries" (Ibid.,). A reaffirmed commitment to the MDGs will apparently be actioned through shared support for NEPAD, according to the communiqué (Ibid.,). This is the last time NEPAD is mentioned in G-20 communiqués to-date (where there is no mention of NEPAD in the 2007 communiqué when South chaired and hosted the G-20). This puts in question the G-20's commitment to the MDGs, "particularly in Africa" to use the G-20's own words (Ibid.,). See Walters (2004) on the language of `partnership' as co-option and `assimilation' that divests `relational and associational relations of power' of any political content. Within global governance discourse, Walters says that the `assimilationist tendency' 'recognises the poor only from the point of view of possible inclusion within a system of self-management, and does not concede that the poor may have interests which are "fundamentally incompatible or antagonistic to the present order of power". Such a concession would require system re-ordering, at the same time that `politics as struggle or conflict' is flattened and obviated' (Ibid., 36-37). Governance discourse under this rubric is, according to Walters, gaining greater prominence and reflects an `emerging political settlement' which puts into the background "emergent relations of domination, tactics of control, and patterns of authority (Ibid., 42). The G-20 here is a prime example of this. In 2007, the MDGs are mentioned only in the context of fiscal space. The concern is entirely technical to `ensure the best use of increased aid flows including those associated with the Millennium Development Goals' (G-20 Communiqué 2007, paragraph 6). Concern for the MDGs is as an `add on' not even necessarily in terms of achieving them, but in terms of allocating portions of the fiscus to a category of social expenditure and poverty targeting. The concern is more on `efficient expenditure', `rationalisation' and achieving `better spending outcomes' than on achieving social equity and/or redistributive outcomes. The G-20 indicates that it will seek to further `improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure' (paragraph 7).
B. Future of Precautionary facilities – (i.e. the IMF Contingent Credit Line), Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), Collective Action Clauses (CACs), and voluntary code of good practices				X	X		X					See comments above with regard to creditor `capture' of developed arrangements. In 2005, the G-20 Communiqué notes 'progress in an increase in the use of CACs in bond markets' (paragraph 10). Restructuring is framed in terms of it being largely an emerging market 'problem'. The 2008/9 global financial and economic crisis with high levels of debt wracked up

												by developed countries reframes the issue beyond an understanding of debt as a `phenomenon' of emerging market economies and developing nations.
C. Call for need for accountable IFIs and worldwide surveillance of the financial system				X								Necessary, but not achieved to-date with particularly serious social consequences in 2008/9. The UN General Assembly conference of 2009 calls the global financial and economic crisis nothing short of a `human calamity' (UNGA website, 2009).
D. Globalisation – as *not yet* delivering benefits *for all*				X	X							See above. Globalisation `externalities' are merely due to the failure of largely developing countries to `harness' the benefits of globalisation effectively. Walters (2004:42) indicates that the "underlying criterion of global governance is effectiveness: that an issue (can) be managed, a problem resolved; that there (is…) an accommodation of mutual interests." Here, a `failure to harness' is the result of a `lack of effectiveness'. Wholesale system re-ordering or any onus on developed countries to do things differently is not contemplated. See Stiglitz (2006:285-286) for initial reforms which would help to balance the playing field. 9 out of 10 of these initial areas of reform are regularly dealt with by the G-20 without substantive change.
E. Trade distorting subsidies/trade-related technical assistance				X								
F. -												
<u>Communiqué 5</u> **A. Morelia, Mexico, October 26-27,2003 –** institution building in the financial sector.					X							In the wake of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008/9, it can be argued that any emphasis on institution-building in previous years by the G-20 has done little else other than to consolidate financial sector `empires' that, despite causing the 2008/9 crisis, were saved due to the `common-sense' notion that they were `too big to fail'. Stimulus packages using taxpayer money to `bail-out' banks in the crisis in 2008/9 were not accompanied by an open and transparent process nor ultimately fundamental changes to the way in which the financial sector operated. As a result, bailed-out banks were seen to payout huge bonuses to Executives and dividends to share-holders for deeply flawed performance, particularly in the US. (See Stiglitz who has written extensively on previous bail-outs in the American context, as well as Dean Baker on the creditor friendly orientation of the `too big to fail' doctrine (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung:2009, 66-72)). Baker recommends 'limiting the size of the financial industry, making Central Banks more accountable, and increasing the accountability of public officials making

												economic policy decisions '(Ibid.,).
B. First Troika[46] created (Canada, India and Mexico)					X							
C. Call on OECD countries to allow access to bank information					X							
D. Recognising the Enhanced HIPC					X							
E. Call for completion of Doha					X	X	X		X			See above. The repeated calls for a completion of Doha within the G-20 have little more than the force of lip-service. The calls are not accompanied by any problematisation of the Doha `Development Agenda'. The 2004 communiqué mentions 'fair access to markets' without any inflection that this should be particularly for developing country benefit. See Stiglitz (2006) on the use by developed nations against developing countries of rules of origin and anti-dumping enforcement mechanisms to promote their own exports on the basis of the claim that developing countries are competing unfairly. Stiglitz (2006) explains how these rules are skewed in favour of developed nations. In 2005, the G-20 communiqué says that the completion of Doha is "a key contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals". It also calls for completion of the round by 2006 (G-20 Communiqué, 2005). In the 2007, Kleinmond Communiqué (paragraph 4), mention is made of the need to `alleviate poverty, create jobs, improve productivity and spur competition' among other things. Here addressing poverty is only indirectly mentioned in relation to the trade liberalisation project. The strategy for `global poverty reduction is through Aid for Trade (Ibid.,). In the first communiqué of the G-20 at leaders' level, the G-20 instructs its Finance Ministers to complete Doha, stating that it is the G-20 countries which "have the largest stake in the global trading system" (G-20 Communiqué, 2008, November 15). Given the pro-developed country rules of trade at the moment, it can be argued that the developing countries disadvantaged by the system have the largest stake. The emphasis within the G-20 is not to remedy these imbalances, but rather to complete a round that is largely in the interests of developed countries.

[46] Not mentioned in the G-20 communiqué, but within the chair's assessment report within the *2007 G-20 History Report* (G-20:2007, 92).

F.												
<u>**Communiqué 6**</u> **A. Berlin, Germany, November 20-21 2004 –** Demographic challenges and migration – IMF called to review every 4 years the challenges of ageing populations						X	X	X				The concern with `ageing populations' is very much from the perspective of developed nations with higher standards of living and improved healthcare, etc.
B. G-20 Accord for Sustained Growth and G-20 Reform Agenda – As standing items, members report how they apply the principles of the G-20 accord						X	X	X	X	X	X	The G-20 reform agenda remains a standing item within G-20 meetings from 2004. Each year, G-20 members report in one or two paragraphs the focus of their domestic policies which sustain growth at a domestic level. In the 2007 G-20 Communiqué, specific mention is made of the need for `the United States to boost national saving' in relation to global imbalances (paragraph 2). In paragraph 17, it is emphasised that each country 'should choose its development approach, [..] in accordance with its international responsibilities' (paragraph 17). Here, a collective approach to development is fragmented and the emphasis on transnational challenges diluted. Country variation is welcomed, but the thrust of all reforms fall within the same neoliberal paradigm.
C. Surveillance discussions						X	X	X	X	X	X	See above. Surveillance is seen as necessary by the G-20. However, throughout its history up to 2009, it fails to counter in any way what Higgott (2004) calls the unilateralist and exceptionalist foreign policy orientation of the US as `global hegemon'. While the G-20 and/or the IMF and/or the WB more freely criticise the developing world, a `kid glove' approach to the US has been the norm. In 2009, due to the force of the crisis, rather than any change of approach in the G-20, the US agrees to submit to doing a FSAP. In 2006, the G-20 speaks of `modernising and strengthening IMF surveillance' (G-20 Communiqué, 2006). In 2007, the IMF's Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Policies is welcomed (G-20 Communiqué, paragraph 15).
D. "Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets" endorsed from discussions between issuing countries and the private-sector						X						See above.
E. Commitment to the revised FATF Forty Recommendations and FATF Special Recommendations related to Money						X						The issue with regard to the financing of terrorism and money laundering since 9/11 remains a

Laundering and Terrorism Financing – Establishment of EurAsian Group (EAG) welcomed												standing issue for the G-20, particularly given the US `war on terror' under George Bush.
F. Commitment to OECD's standards on the exchange of information for tax purposes.						X	X					
G. UNICTRAL and WB efforts to develop principles and guidelines for insolvency and creditor rights systems commended.						X						The continued creditor orientation has had particularly dire ramifications for the most vulnerable countries during the 2008/9 global, financial and economic crisis.
H. Undertaking to advance regional and global integration, including establishing regional bond and financial services markets, where barriers to FDI are reduced in the financial sector.						X						Financial sector capture and an underlying concern to expand markets in areas where developed nations have advantage. See Walters (2004:42-43) on the need to `decentre governance' by not 'describing it in its own terms. He draws on the work of Hardt and Negri's use of the notion of `Empire' as a "de-centred and de-territorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates… open (and) expanding frontiers." By displacing the dominant narrative of `the spread of markets as inexorable', an understanding of a `new global form of sovereignty' is brought into focus (Ibid.,).
I. – IMF and WB work on mechanisms for financing development welcomed.						X			X			IMF/WB conditionalities are not mentioned and no call for IMF and/or WB reform, despite a growing body of research calling into question the performance of these institutions. In the 2005 communiqué, the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) is welcomed in `helping poor countries respond to commodity shocks'. In the same, the WB is praised for the creation of 'a long-term investment framework for clean energy and sustainable development' (paragraph 3). This is in the context of oil price volatility. In 2007, the WB is encouraged to lend in local currency (Communiqué 9, 2007), where the emphasis remains on lending rather than grants.
J. Oil prices and call for co-operation on oil market transparency, energy efficiency and wider use of alternative sources of energy						X	X	X	X			
Communiqué 7 A. Xianghe, Hebei, China, October 15-16 2005 – Reform of the							X	X	X	X		The G-20 chair of this meeting indicates that the deliberations within this G-20 meeting on BWI led to the conclusion of Stage 1 reforms in the Singapore IMF/World Bank Annual meetings in 2006 (G-20:2007, 104). In this case, the G-20 is said to act as catalyst. However, calls for the

BWIs - statement issued re quota and voting power.												reform of the IMF and WB elsewhere have been long-standing. In the first stage, the proposed quota reforms - limited to calculations which re-weight members based on formulas that ultimately favour the developed countries emerging from WW II - benefit a set of emerging economies within the G-20 in 2006. As such, G-20 participation by emerging economies accrues distinct benefits to these economies, while raising into question whether any reform discussion undertaken by the G-20, as a \`systemically significant' block of developed and emerging economies, will \`trickle down' any benefits to developing countries in future. Any presupposed emerging economy \`solidarity' with developing countries is not evident through these results. In the 2007 Communiqué, the G-20 encourages the \`Executive Board of the IMF to agree all elements of the package by Spring 2008' (paragraph 14). \`Steps towards internal governance reform in the WB are also welcomed (Ibid., paragraph 15). In relation to the \`selection of senior management within both the IMF and the WB', the G-20 expresses its \`strong commitment to selection being based on merit and to reflect the broad representation of member countries' (paragraph 16). These statements of commitment are made *after* both the new IMF Managing Director and World Bank President have been selected along traditional lines of power and historical accident (WB – US and the IMF - Europe). The penultimate paragraph within the communiqué congratulates both for their new positions.
B. Trade protectionism							X	X	X	X		Trade protectionism receives greater attention, however, given that at the time of the worst global financial and economic crisis since the 30's, 17 G-20 members at the beginning of 2009 put in place protectionist measures, the emphasis within the G-20 on the issue is without force. Lack of own member compliance undermines any G-20 statement against growing \`protectionist sentiment'. In the Brazil 2008 Communiqué, when the G-20 is waking up to the global economic and financial crisis, G-20 members are encouraged to resist protectionism. As well, an \`ambitious conclusion to Doha' is called for (paragraph 7). In the first G-20 communiqué at leaders' level held in Washington on 15 November 2008, in response to the crisis, the G-20 indicates that it "will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organisation (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports"

												(G-20 Communiqué 2008, paragraph 13). By the time of the next meeting 17 countries within the G-20 had implemented some form of protectionism, though the communiqué expressly stated that restraint would be for the next 12 months while the ramifications of the global crisis were unfolding.
C. Balanced and Sustainable growth and `balanced and orderly world economic development’							X		X			Low growth and `increasing poverty in *some* developing countries’ is nominally recognised (G-20 Communiqué, 2005)(*emphasis added*). See above the G-20 emerging economy account of `developing countries’ failures to harness the benefits of globalisation’.
D. G-20 Statement on Global Development Issues							X					In response to the UN Millennium Review Summit, the G-20 indicates that it remains "concerned that a number of developing economies may not be able to attain the MDGs without substantial additional support" (G-20 Communiqué 2005, paragraph 6). However, no concrete additional support is pledged. The G-20 states that it will `regularly review’ its ‘shared understanding of [..] aid effectiveness, trade for development, and global partnership for poverty reduction’ (Ibid.,). Notwithstanding, such regular reviews are not in evidence in later communiqués. In 2007, the G-20 held a meeting on the sidelines of the first G-20 Deputies’ meeting to discuss Aid Effectiveness with African policy-makers in terms of the *Paris Declaration*. Aid is presented as a matter of technique-improvement (harmonisation) rather than in terms of unequal relations of power, conditionality imposition and enforcement and creditor-friendliness. As the seminar was not an `official G-20’ meeting, any potential outcomes arising from the seminar are not recorded in the 2007 communiqué. The research assumes then that the seminar remained an exercise in `paradigm maintenance’ (See Kankwenda:2004).
E. Migrant remittances							X					.
F. -												
<u>Communiqué 8</u> - **Melbourne, Australia November 2006** A. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Joint Oil Data Initiative, the International Energy Agency’s								X	X			Private sector capture and orientation. Addressing Climate change reduced to matter of price signals ‘bringing forth investment in new supply, efficiencies, new technologies and the use of alternative and renewable energy sources’ (G-20 Communiqué, 2006). There is no dire sense of urgency here. Within the same communiqué, climate change is only considered in terms of its

World Energy Outlook is noted, energy and minerals price cycles, energy subsidies, resource security and climate change												`economic implications' (paragraph 5). The G-20 here mentions that it recognises the work of `other fora' on the issue, but the UN is not mentioned *per se* (Ibid.,).
B. *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2006)-								X				In an about turn with regard to the previous year's statement of concern that `poverty is increasing in some countries', this year according to the G-20 "Sustained economic growth is delivering rising living standards and *permanent* reductions in poverty" (G-20 Communiqué, 2006, opening second paragraph) (***emphasis added***). The UN *Millennium Development Goals Report (*2009:4*)* underscores just how nonsensical such a claim is, where due to the global financial and economic crisis in 2008/9 an additional 55 – 90 million people are pushed into extreme poverty. The G-20 is perhaps considering the case of a marginal few and celebrating this as a success?
C. Containing inflation through monetary and fiscal policy adjustments								X	X			A focus on narrow financial and economic variables guides policy implementation. The G-20 stresses its 'determination to implement these policies, [..] to *unwind global imbalances'* (G-20 Communiqué, 2006) (*emphasis added*). See Cooper, R. N. (2007) for a much more credible account of global imbalances as being more about the US current account deficit and the financing of American debt by China. To-date, the G-20 has avoided addressing this issue. See above discussion in relation to the G-20 failing to address the US' non-take up of the FSAP.
Communiqué 9 - **Kleinmond, South Africa, 17-18 November 2007** A. Fiscal Elements of Growth and Development									X			An emphasis on creating fiscal space (rather than policy space), as a technical budgeting and expenditure exercise. Within the Communiqué (2007) the G-20 states that economic development requires ` a range of public services […] including social and economic infrastructure, institution-building, and human capital and skills development'. The G-20 agrees here that "it would be useful to explore further the identification of those needs, the *returns to investing in them*, and the most effective ways of implementing policy and institutional solutions to delivering them" (Ibid., paragraph 8) (*emphasis added*). Investment in social infrastructure is assessed on the basis of returns and not necessarily as social investment to attain enhance broader levels of social well-being and more equitable social outcomes.
B. Commodity Cycles												See above (emphasis on counter-cyclicality). Rising food and energy prices are largely mentioned in terms of price pressures, though mention is made of needing to `address rising pressures on health and social security spending'.

C. Building appreciation of the economic and financial policy challenges in Africa									X			Within the Communiqué (2007) the mention of Africa is limited to the introductory paragraph and the fact that debt relief to Liberia is welcomed (paragraph 15). As such, no outcomes related to an appreciation of African economic and financial policy challenges are listed. Discussion within the year in relation to Africa, through 2 policy seminars held on the sidelines of G-20 meetings, is largely limited to the management of budgets and an emphasis on the value of counter-cyclicality. Issues such as conditionalities imposed by the BWIs which require pro-cyclical measures to be implemented, at the expense of the poor and investment in social infrastructure, are not addressed.
D. Agreed need to understand financial crises better.									X			The sub-prime market crash in the United States is at this time rearing its head – The G-20 makes mention of 'financial market disturbances'.
E.												
<u>**Communiqué 10**</u> - **São Paulo, Brazil, 8-9 November 2008** A. Social Inclusion										X		The G-20 recognises that the global financial and economic crisis is serious. Scenario planning seeks to `ensure financial stability [..] and *maintaining* recent achievements in poverty reduction and social inclusion' (G-20 Communiqué 2008, paragraph 1) (*emphasis added*). The G-20 grossly underestimates the social/human costs of the crisis. It reiterates in paragraph 9 that `recent gains in poverty reduction and social inequality should not be *set back* by the financial crisis and global economic slowdown.' It then goes on to say that `Less developed countries would *probably need* more flexibility when it comes to lending' (*emphasis added*). It emphasises that support will be provided to 'countries that have a good track record and sound policies' (Ibid.,). See earlier discussion on `good governance as a mechanism of control. This is particularly ironic in the context of a developed country-led crisis.
B. Elevation to Leaders' level										X		The G-20 welcomes the elevation of the forum to leaders' level as "an important step in enhancing international co-operation" (G-20 Communiqué 2008, paragraph 2). The meeting was scheduled to take place within a week's time, after earlier/extraordinary discussions by the G-20 at the IMF/WB meetings had agreed this.
C. Mitigating the Crisis										X		The emphasis within the G-20 in relation to the global financial and economic crisis is on `mitigating the impact on global economic activity' followed by an emphasis on `minimising the negative social impact on middle- and low-income countries (paragraph 4). The G-20

												`expresses concern that the real economy is affected by the crisis (Ibid., paragraph 7). The G-20 recognises that `commodity price volatility and changes in investor sentiment' impact negatively low-income countries.' Multilateral banks are `encouraged to maintain investment for infrastructure' (paragraph 10), as if this might address all the negative externalities and social costs resulting from the crisis.
D. Credit Freeze										X		The G-20 notes that `capital is flowing back to the centres where the crisis originated and away from emerging and developing economies (paragraph 8).
E. Drawing Lessons										X		The G-20 agrees that it needs to `draw lessons from the crisis and that the IMF should enhance its early warning systems' (paragraph 14). This is a gross understatement of failure at catastrophic proportions.
F. Financial Stability Forum										X		The G-20 wants to see the Financial Stability Forum expanded to `a broader forum which includes emerging economies (paragraph 15).
G. The G-20 agrees its pre-eminence										X		As elsewhere, the G-20's appraisal of its own work is self-congratulatory. Here the G-20 agrees that it 'plays a vital role in responding to challenges facing the world economy'. It also says that it should 'maximize its effectiveness and focus primarily on concrete policy outcomes' (paragraph 16). The statement is made in the context of an extraordinarily empty communiqué issued at the wake of the global financial and economic crisis. The G-20's `effectiveness' here is presupposed as a matter of fact.

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