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The Griqua conundrum: political and socio-cultural identity in the Northern Cape, South Africa

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ethnic and minority groups (1991); others have warned against disregarding ethnicity because of the weight of meaning associated with it for many South Africans (Dubow, 1994; Grundlingh, 1991; Muller, 1991; Pakendorf, 1991). Ethnic sentiments, it has been noted, may work against nation building rather than simply dissolving in its wake:

> (I)n practical terms much of what passes for nation-building (and state-building) in fact necessarily involved nation-destroying, since the ultimate objective is the transference of particularist loyalties to the state and identification with its official nationalism. This in turn often results in a strengthening of ethnic identity on the part of targeted groups and the gradual development of feelings of dissident sub-nationalism (Simpson, 1994: 468).

It is thus not surprising that the African National Congress (ANC) has found it difficult to deal with the multiple expressions of ethnic sentiments and claims that have arisen in the early 1990s (Dubow, 1994: 356). In this chapter I explore one such 'problem' which has developed in conjunction with the democratic and nation-building process upon which South Africa has embarked. In this case, the 'problem' stems, not from one of South Africa's better-known ethnic segments, but rather from its lesser-known - indeed marginal - Griqua populace. Nation-building, for the Griqua people of South Africa, was a matter of being neglected and excluded by the South African government[2] rather than of being included in an embracing project of multi-ethnic heterogeneity. In examining this process, I show how the new government's response to Griqua demands has been shaped by the responses of its predecessor, the apartheid government, in accordance with apartheid notions of ethnicity. The new government, like the old one, repeatedly demanded that the Griqua present a unified front, expressing its frustration when this failed to materialise. Attempted alliances continue to be stymied by factional conflict. The chapter further provides an account of the historical conflicts between organisations and explores Griqua leaders' attempts to overcome this conflict and create unity.

'THE GRIQUA': CALLS FOR ETHNIC UNITY

> The question of whether or not the Griquas constitute a single indigenous 'people' is a moot point... A final factor militating against recognition is the lack of unity, and in fact bitter infighting, amongst the current leaders of the Griqua (Sunday Independent, 22/10/95).

[2] The feeling of marginalisation is not unique to the Griqua people. The coloured farm workers in the Western Cape, with whom I did research before the 1994 elections, expressed a similar sentiment. As we watched the democratic process unfolding on national news broadcasts, they would repeatedly comment that the blacks had Mandela to look after them and the whites had F.W. (De Klerk), but that they had no-one who was actively pursuing their interests and they feared that they would be marginalised after the elections.

In September 1995 President Nelson Mandela paid a visit to Griquatown to acknowledge 'the traditional leaders of the Griqua community' and to pay tribute to 'all the historical leaders of Griqua people' (ANC Press Release, 21/9/1995). Mandela's visit was an exercise which government organisers in the Department of Information and Publicity had initially expected to be unproblematic. They considered A.A.S. le Fleur of the GNC-Kr to be the paramount chief of all the Griqua - it was for this reason that Mandela had specifically requested his presence.[3] The organisers further planned that Mandela would lay a wreath at the monument of Andries Waterboer, the Griqua *Kaptein*[4] of Griquatown from 1820 to 1852. In the minds of the organisers, there was no contradiction between the laying of the wreath and the recognition of Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur. This was to prove a severe underestimation of the complexities of Griqua factionalism, as they began to realise shortly before the event.

The morning dawned bright and clear and the day of the President's visit to Griquatown promised, as usual, to be hot and sunny.[5] Prior to Mandela's arrival and speech, the various Griqua leaders stood around the Griquatown stadium and chatted to each other with an air of what appeared to be friendly congeniality. Watching these leaders at that early point of my research, it was far from obvious who was aligned with whom, or belonged to what faction. After much waiting, Mandela, surrounded by his retinue, finally arrived. As he smiled and waved to the people, I felt the surge of excitement from the crowd. After everyone had settled down, Gertie Pieterse, an old and sickly resident of Campbell, opened the rally with a prayer in the Griqua language. Although Gertie was presumably chosen because of her ability to speak Griqua, it may also have been because, as an old woman and a non-leader, she symbolised greater unity than any leader or male representatives could do. As a woman, however, she also symbolised a broader 'Griqua family' in a way that no man could possibly do (discussed in Chapters Five and Six). Thereafter Mandela addressed the crowd and suggested that Griqua leaders should give up their differences and 'love together, work together, hold hands together'. Mandela continued, saying that the leaders had different strategies that they used to protect their people and it was not up to him to decide who had followed the

[3] Conversation, Johannesburg, M. Levine, 30/9/1995

[4] In English: Captain. I use the Afrikaans term here, which is the same term used when people in the Northern Cape talk about the historical Griqua leaders. Other academics have chosen to use the Dutch spellings of the word - *Kaptyn* (Edgar and Saunders, 1982; Ross, 1974; Schoeman, 1996) or *Kapteyn* (Kinsman, 1989: 26).

[5] Mandela's visit to Griquatown occurred about a month before the local government elections in the Northern Cape which the ANC was not confident it would win. A spokesperson from the Department of Information and Publicity, however, denied that the President's visit to Griquatown was 'a strategy in the National election team' and she suggested that the request to visit Griquatown had come directly from the President.

correct path. Neither would it be fair for him to select a representative on behalf of all Griqua as the question of Griqua leadership was still dividing these leaders: 'Griqua leaders are to have the full status of other leaders in the house of traditional leaders,' said Mandela '... but hurry up and *decide who the leader of the Griqua is*' (my emphasis).[6]



Figure 2.1: Griqua leaders waiting for Mandela's arrival (1995)

This section of Mandela's speech to the Griqua leaders assembled in Griquatown was a direct result of the infighting that had preceded his visit. Objections had been voiced to the proposed wreath-laying ceremony at Andries Waterboer's grave by the organisation known as 'Adam Kok and the Campbell Griqua'. They felt that such an action would be interpreted as official presidential support for the Griqua People's Organisation (GPO) whom they opposed, owing to their perceived status as sell-outs who in the [illegible] had collaborated with the missionaries and sold the Griquas' land rights (see Legassi[illegible] 1969: 483 for support of such a position).[7] According to their logic [illegible]e GPO, w[illegible]h Kanyiles as leader or *Opperhoof*, had represented Waterboer's follow[illegible]ce 1961 when Kanyiles had received his title from Nicolaas Waterboer II (see below).

The matter appeared unresolvable and it was rumoured that Mandela finally decided that if the Griqua leaders could not resolve their differences, he would cancel his visit. As it happened, Mandela ended up laying two wreaths on 'Griqua soil' in the stadium where the [illegible]ally had taken place. The two wreaths were possibly to appease the two most vocal G[illegible]a organisations, namely Adam Kok and the Campbell Griquas and the Griqua National Conference (GNC-Kr) under the leadership of A.A.S. le Fleur. What this relatively small matter must have made strikingly evident to Mandela and his organisers

[6] Formal Address, Nelson Mandela, Griquatown, 24/09/1995
[7] Telephone Conversation, Martin Engelbrecht, 20/09/1995

was that matters of Griqua leadership and factionalism were not going to be easily dismissed. An African National Congress (ANC) press release prefaced his visit and stated that: 'President Mandela and the ANC believe that the *unity of the Griqua people* will allow them to assume their rightful place in the house of traditional leaders in South Africa (21/9/1995, my emphasis). Thus it was that Mandela's visit to Griquatown was, in part, directed towards solving this problem.



Figure 2.2: Mandela greets Cecil le Fleur of the GNC-Kr (1995)

Mandela's visit, however, served to provoke further tensions and anxieties amongst Griqua leaders. Immediately after Mandela had departed from the stadium, frantic and heated discussion took place between the various leaders and their supporters. Now, as people huddled into small groups and discussed their strategies, it was easy to identify the different factions. For the rest of the morning these Griqua leaders remained sharply divided and openly hostile to each other. As if realising and supporting these observations, Engelbrecht, one of Adam Kok's spokesmen, commented that the Griqua organisations had been in the process of reconciliation, but Mandela's speech was going to cause deeper divisions as he had not instructed them on how to choose the leader.[8]

Contrary to expectations and to later press reports (The Electronic Telegraph, World News 28/9/95), Mandela had not been the 'ultimate arbiter' in Griqua affairs; and his calls for unity remained largely unanswered some two years later. Mandela's actions and the enormous effort invested in Griqua unity by the government raised the question as to why Griqua unity was so important. Why did the leaders have to unite? Were these the only terms on which the government could recognise and negotiate with members of an ethnic faction? For at least one Griqua organisation the demands for

[8] Conversation, M. Engelbrecht, 24/09/1995

unity were seen as a strategy to pit the Griqua against each other. Thus Kanyiles, leader of the GPO, argued that the reason the government had called on the Griqua to unite was 'because it doesn't work'. He was suggesting that the government, aware of the immense obstacles to Griqua unification, believed that the constant factionalism between Griqua organisations would give the regime an excuse to ignore Griqua demands.[9]

The reason for the government's insistence on Griqua unity, however, lies not in deliberate scheming on the part of the new democratic government. Rather it must be sought in a web of complexities inherent in the strategies of both the previous and the present government, arising partly in response to the multiple demands articulated by the Griqua themselves. When, in the 1990s, Griqua leaders began articulating their wish to be recognised as traditional leaders, Meiring and Kitching, two government anthropologists, were allocated the 'headache' of sorting out the rival claims. Presumably because of the build-up to Mandela's visit and the uproar over who the President should publicly acknowledge in the wreath-laying ceremony, their report on the history of the Griqua territories was faxed from the Northern Cape Premier's office to the Department of Information and Publicity six days before Mandela's visit. Section Eight of this report, entitled 'Attempts at Griqua Unification', ends with the following text:

> At present there are several organisations that claim to represent Griqua interests. Firstly there is the **Griqua National Conference** (GNC-Ky)[10] led by Mr EMS le Fleur [sic] and the **Griqua People's Organisation** led by bishop PDJ Kanyiles. These organisations have formed an umbrella organisation known as the **Griqua National Council**. Secondly there is a [sic] organisation also known as the **Griqua National Conference** (GNC-Kr) led by Mr AAS le Fleur. This organisation claims to represent the majority of the Griquas. Thirdly there is also an organisation known as the **Griqualand East Pioneers' Council** led by Mr RW Adams. At present the Griquas are claiming their traditional areas of residence. They also demand representation in the House of Traditional Leaders or some form of representation in the various provincial legislatures (Dept. Constitutional Development, 1995: 15-16, original emphasis).

This material had been drawn, largely unedited, from the President's Commission of enquiry into the needs and demands of the Griqua which was conducted 12 years previously by the apartheid government (cf. President's Commission, 1983: 11, 65-69). The lack of recent research was especially obvious as the Griqua National Conference

[9] Interview, Ritchie, Daniel Kanyiles, 31/08/1996

[10] The 'Ky' stands for Knysna and serves to distinguish this organisation from the other organisation, also called the Griqua National Conference, which is based in Kranshoek and is therefore referred to as the GNC-Kr.

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(GNC-Ky) leader Eric le Fleur had died six years before the report appeared and had been succeeded by his son, Anthony le Fleur. Far more importantly, however, these paragraphs provided the rationale for the 1995 report's conclusion:

> (i)t is important to establish which organisation represents the majority interest of the Griqua. To first negotiate with one organisation and then with the other can cause serious problems. It must be brought under [sic] the Griquas attention that *internal division will not support their cause* in any way (Dept. Constitutional Development, 1995: 17, my emphasis).

The idea of Griqua unity and the emphasis on establishing a single representative for the entire Griqua population has been a constant theme in negotiations between the various governments of South Africa and the many Griqua leaders. A corollary to this has been the degree of confusion that government officials have experienced while trying to deal with Griqua claims. Representatives from the Departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture, for example, tried unsuccessfully at one particular meeting to sort out which organisations were represented.[11] My conversations with another government representative from the Public Works Ministry in the Northern Cape revealed a similar degree of confusion, despite his having worked alongside one Griqua leader and dealt with Griqua claims.[12] Part of the reason why government officials found the fractured nature of Griqua organisations and demands so incomprehensible was their own insistence that all Griqua were to be classed similarly and had the same demands. Thus, despite the ANC's attempts to develop a democracy that neither segregated nor advantaged people according to ethnic classifications (Davenport, 1993: 56; Eriksen, 1994: 550; Giliomee, 1991: 36; Grundlingh, 1991: 18), government officials have tended to assume and to speak in a language that automatically reified ethnic differences. 'What do the Griqua want?' was a common question posed at meetings I attended. As the following example shows, there appeared to be an inability on the part of government officials, even those who had not been employed by the apartheid government, to recognise multiple identities and to move beyond an ethnic categorisation that saw all people in a given category as having the same needs and demands.

[11] Public Meeting with Dept. of Land Affairs and Dept. of Agriculture, Douglas, 30/08/1996
[12] Conversation, Kimberley, Gregory Boutoulis, 23/09/1995; 30/10/1995

SCHMIDTSDRIFT LAND CLAIM

Schmidtsdrift was an area of land located between Kimberley and Campbell. In 1969 the 'Tswana people' had been forcibly removed from the area which had become a military training ground belonging to the former South African Defence Force. After 1994, a claim had been lodged for the restitution of this land by the 'Tswana people' who had been moved to Kuruman. The claim had been successful and the land was to be returned as soon as the !Xu and Khwe Bushmen soldiers and their families could be moved elsewhere.[13] In the interim, some Tswana had moved onto the land, erected shanties and were farming goats and cattle.

Many of the people living in Campbell opposed this return of land because they too had lived at Schmidtsdrift, they had also been forcibly removed from the land and sent, not to Kuruman, but to Campbell. At Schmidtsdrift the Tswana and Coloured / Griqua people had lived together as one community but presumably because, in 1969, apartheid legislation separated people according to race, people identified as Tswana were moved to a black location in Kuruman and Coloured / Griqua people were moved to Campbell, the nearest town.

A meeting was held in which the Northern Cape Land Commissioner, Wallace Mqgogi, met with officials from the South African National Defence Force and leaders of the returning Tswana families.[14] Various Griqua people also attended to voice their grievances. Throughout the meeting, Mqgogi posed questions in terms of 'the Tswana' and 'the Griqua'. 'What do the Griqua want?', 'where are the Tswana living now?' and so forth. It was only at the end of the meeting, when he tried to establish a contact address for 'the Griqua' that he discovered that three separate factions were present to represent the Griqua. He never investigated to what extent these factions had differing demands.[15]

Attempts to keep track of Griqua demands were thus hampered by government officials' own expectations that 'the Griqua' had one set of demands that should be articulated through one leader. This viewpoint was not, however, purely a construct in the minds of government officials that stemmed from apartheid thinking. There was another, perhaps more acute, reason why officials constantly sought 'the Griqua leader'. Despite the fact that there were multiple Griqua organisations, characterised by shifting alliances and constant friction, the various leaders couched their negotiations in terms of broad, all-inclusive demands on behalf of 'the Griqua'. Leaders' repeated insistence that

[13] Four thousand-plus !Xu and Khwe 'Bushmen' have been resident in a tent camp at Schmidtsdrift. The adult male 'Bushmen' had been soldiers who had fought for the former South African Defence Force (SADF) in Namibia. When Namibia became independent in 1990, the SADF relocated these soldiers and their families to Schmidtsdrift. These families subsequently purchased a farm near Kimberley and were, in 1998, in the process of moving.

[14] Meeting, Kimberley, 29/09/1997

[15] The Griquas received R14 million in compensation for their portion of the Schmidtsdrift lands in the latter half of 2000. As several Griqua activists not recognised by the Griqua National Forum, including Martin Engelbrecht, submitted claims to this land on behalf of themselves and their followers, the question of how this money should to distributed has led to revived factionalism between the various Griqua organisations and leaders. In response, the government has refused to release any money until these disputes are resolved (conv. Johannes Waterboer, 14/11/2000).

one, or another, of them represented all the Griqua has reinforced officials' belief in their search for Griqua unity. The matter has thus been further complicated in that government officials were not alone in calling for Griqua unity; it is a term which the Griqua themselves advocated and endorsed. In the following section I examine Griqua use of the concept of unification and the divisions and factions that make this unattainable.

GRIQUA FACTIONALISM:

As will be described in Chapter Three, Griqua organisations have long been 'plagued' by fractured and divisive politics between organisations and leaders (Ross, 1974). The antecedents of Griqua factionalism are located in the Khoi politics existent at the onset of colonialism. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, Khoi leaders tended to have a 'second-in-command' who was often a brother or brother-in-law. When negotiations took place both men would be present. Elphick comments that this 'pervasive pattern of dual leadership may well have been a precondition for the splitting of tribes' (1977: 47). He further argues that stability in Khoi politics was to be found, not in the making of political alliances that were exceptionally fluid, but rather in the feuds. 'In fact, vendettas often gave a certain stability to intertribal politics which counteracted the fluidity of alliances: Khoikhoi changed their allies freely but tended to keep the same enemies for decades' (Elphick, 1977: 55, also see Barnard, 1992). Similar processes occurred during the colonial era and the constant practice of splitting and then establishing alliances has been well documented in historical accounts of the Griqua (Schoeman, 1997).

The phrase 'Griqua unity' seems to have appeared first in the 1920s with the activities of Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur (see below). Thereafter it crops up again and again. The following example, drawn from a newspaper survey of the 1970s, indicates how leaders have to support their interests by becoming involved in these disputes and is remarkably similar to disputes in the 1980s and 1990s.[16]

[16] In 1983 the President's Commission into the needs and demands of the Griquas sparked further conflict as each organisation's leader questioned the leadership claims of other leaders (Sunday Times, 1/05/1983). In 1985 I attended a rally in Griquatown where Pieter Marais, then a member of the President's Council and the leader of the *Volkskongres* (People's Congress) Party, advised the attendees to tell their leaders that they were tired of the discord and feuding. In August 1988 a 'special' meeting was held in Plettenburg Bay which was to address '(u)ltimate unity of the Griquas of South Africa' (DFA, 27/06/1988). Frequently after such meetings it was declared that unity had finally been achieved – only to have it break down a few months later.

GRIQUA LEADERSHIP IN THE 70s

On 27 February 1970 Sonny Leon, a deputy minister of the Labour Party, wrote to the Diamond Fields Advertiser (DFA), a Northern Cape local newspaper, complaining that

> ...whilst the Government has appointed officially a representative of the Griqua people there are a number of other claimants to this position, in the form of other captains and *opperhoofs* (chiefs) ... and at this junction one does not know who to deal with (27/2/70, my italics).

Shortly thereafter, Captain Adam Kok IV, one of the claimants referred to by Leon, called a meeting in Campbell which was attended by 'Griquas from several Northern Cape towns' (DFA 2/3/70). The meeting aimed to solicit support for Kok's call to the government to establish a homeland[17] for the Griqua and their children. Rev. Browers of the Griqua Independent Church (GIC) supported Kok's idea and regretted that Griqua leadership was so divided. 'Let us not go to the Government in groups but in one voice' he requested (DFA 2/3/70).

Ironically, Browers' call resulted in increased public dissent. Kanyiles, another of the claimants referred to by Leon, responded by stating that he claimed 'supreme authority' over all the Griqua of the Northern Cape. As Adam Kok IV had authority only over the Campbell people, Kanyiles declared his meeting, held in February 1970, 'out of order'. Kanyiles questioned why Browers, who complained that the leaders were preventing Griqua people from getting together, had never approached him to discuss this matter. Kanyiles, like Browers, 'longed for the day when the Griquas would be together as one nation. Only then will we be able to approach the Government with one voice' (DFA 4/3/70).

Rev. J. L. Simons, supporter of yet another claimant, commented that Kok's meeting had not been organised through the correct channels. His argument was that the supreme leader of the Griquas, paramount chief Andrew Le Fleur, was the only person entitled to appeal to the government for a Griqua settlement. Simons then accused Kanyiles' organisation, the GPO, of having 'African traditions' and of being 'a very small splinter group' that did not 'represent the Griqua race' (DFA 4/3/70).

This example demonstrates some of the internal divisions and factions. More importantly the example illustrates the necessity for leaders to engage in both the skirmishing and the discourse on unity in order to protect their leadership positions and their chances of acquiring anything from the government. Kok's idea, and his reason for calling a meeting, had been to garner support for a homeland. If indeed he had succeeded, and land had been allocated for Griqua occupation in the Northern Cape, the other leaders would not be able to lay claim to this land without their previous engagement – and this engagement takes the form of infighting and questioning of other leaders' credentials. The demands for land formed a common thread in Griqua negotiations with the apartheid government, as Saks comments:

[17] The homelands, or Bantustans, were tracts of land set aside by the apartheid government for occupation by black people. These homelands were purportedly independent, but individuals still had to migrate to urban areas in order to earn a living and to fulfil the labour requirements of a capitalist and divided society. Increasingly they became dumping grounds for elderly, sickly or unemployed people who struggled to survive in these overpopulated areas (Posel, 1991).

> (t)hroughout the apartheid era, virtually unnoticed by most South Africans, a small Griqua lobby on the political fringes was pressing for the realisation of a receding dream, the statutory recognition of a distinct Griqua National entity and the establishment of a Griqua homeland under the policy of Separate Development (Saks, 1997: 109).

Many Griqua people, especially in the Northern Cape, believed that they might have gained land in this form, especially as the Griqua people of Kranshoek had managed to acquire access to land (Waldman, 1988, see Map 1.3 page 25). Certainly the establishment of a Griqua homeland would have temporarily pacified those Griqua leaders who benefited from it and it might have formalised Griqua negotiations with the government in such a way that the 'problem' of Griqua unity was resolved (see President's Commission, 1983; Waldman, 1988). But the apartheid government steered clear of such investment in the Griqua. Instead, Griqua claims for land were, in the 1980s, re-directed back to the Griqua, who were to prove that they were a 'group', i.e. that they were unified, before the government would respond (Waldman, 1988). In part, this may have been because no one organisation was restricted to a particular area and there were no firm geographical boundaries. By the 1990s, for example, both GNC organisations had members spread throughout South Africa, including the Northern Cape towns of Kimberley, Campbell and Griquatown; the GPO drew its people from throughout the Northern Cape, but especially from Kimberley, Ritchie, Douglas, Campbell and Danielskuil; and Adam Kok V (who had resumed the role played by his grandfather Adam Kok IV) was based in Campbell, but many of his supporters lived in Kimberley. This geographical spread results partly from historical events that shaped the South African political landscape. It also stems from Griqua responses to these events which, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, were characterised by leaders' almost endemic tendency to trek (journey) with their followers, to new areas. This meant that there was no area in South Africa which could be identified as specifically Griqua, and no leader had a following that was confined to specific geographical areas.

That the apartheid government had trouble dealing with the demands of the Griqua is evident in the multiple reports commissioned to research various Griqua issues (President's Commission, 1983: 3). Although its most recent report, by the President's Commission, is remarkable in its ability to explain and trivialise Griqua grievances, the section entitled 'Unity' is more serious in its tone. After a lengthy discussion on the various organisations, their aims, membership criteria and symbols, the text reads:

> (a)pparently, however, the majority of Griqua believe and hope that the divisiveness will one day come to an end, and their unity as a Griqua people be restored, so they may again experience a feeling of freedom, a sense of dignity, self-respect and pride (President's Commission, 1983: 70).

The commission argued that Griqua people understood the factionalism between the various organisations to be a 'domestic' matter. No one who gave evidence to the commission requested that the committee investigate or attempt to resolve the problem of Griqua unity. The commission thus concluded that although the Griqua could be considered a 'cultural community (a people)', they should not take this to mean that they are 'entitled to special preference' (President's Commission, 1983: 71). The commission recognised that the 'majority of the Griquas believe that they have an identity of their own and that they are consequently a separate people by descent' (President's Commission, 1983: 73). The recommendations, however, made no mention of territory or a homeland, emphasising instead the 'preservation and promotion of culture', despite the State President's request that the commission deal with the needs and demands of the Griqua, '*including the need for additional agricultural land*' (President's Commission, 1983: 1, my emphasis). The Commission further considered the Griqua to be 'Coloured' and argued that '(t)he committee therefore does not foresee a constitutional dispensation for this population group separate from the dispensation for the Coloured group' (President's Commission, 1983: 10).

It is clear that the commission considered the Griqua as part of the broader category 'Coloured', and hence as different from African people and not in need of a homeland. It is also probable that by 1983 the government was aware of the political sensitivity and international criticism associated with its homeland policies and did not dare establish any new homelands. In addition, the Griqua had a long history of political involvement with both the colonial government and with the apartheid government. Authorities were generally, although not always, unopposed by the Griqua in matters such as race legislation and even in the enforcing of white privilege. For example, the GPO had openly proclaimed its allegiance to the state during the 1980s (Waldman, 1989). As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the attitudes of the GPO and other Griqua leaders and organisations were, however, ambiguous and while campaigning for a homeland similar to those occupied by black people, they also supported segregation, as these policies had the side effect of preserving coloured privilege (see, for example, Edgar and Saunders, 1982; Griqua and Coloured People's Opinion (GCPO), 13/3/1925; 23/1/1925; 22/5/1925).

To sum up, the above section has demonstrated that both the apartheid state and the various Griqua leaders have endorsed the idea of unity even though they have been unable to resolve the questions of Griqua leadership. It has also shown how the various leaders have become caught up in the need to assert themselves whenever any one of them makes representations to the government. Such assertions, inevitably, lead to further discussions on the relative value of leaders' claims and, in so doing, show up the fractures within Griqua society. In the following section I examine the particular histories of the various organisations and show that the failure to amalgamate is not due to a fundamental incompatibility between different groups and their leaders; rather it is to be sought, in part, in leaders' tendency to trek in search of autonomy and independence (discussed in Chapter Three). It is also to be sought in the historical structures of Griqua governance which allowed the powers of a *Kaptein* to be balanced, or even surpassed, by that of his deputy. The failure to develop unity lies, therefore, in the history of the various organisations, and in the manner in which these histories are culturally manipulated as rallying points to provide leaders with legitimation.

WHO WAS MEANT TO UNIFY?

The organisations that represented the various Griqua people in South Africa were extremely diverse. Some, such as the GNC organisations, were Christian in nature and affiliated to Griqua churches. Others, such as the GPO, did not have any specific religious affiliation, although the leader was a Bishop of the African Independent Orthodox Church in Kimberley. Still other organisations, such as Adam Kok and the Campbell Griqua, had no specific ties to any church, although the grandfather of the current leader had acquired much of his status as a Griqua leader through his position in the Anglican church. Griqua leaders asserted their claims to leadership in different ways; one emphasising his descent and royal lineage (Adam Kok); others stressing that their male ancestors had married into this noble lineage and that God endorsed their claim to Griqua leadership (the le Fleurs); whereas another claimed that he had been officially authorised to assume the position (Kanyiles). Each leader's need to emphasise his particular claim was, no doubt, enhanced by the fact that the state had never indicated by what criteria it judged someone to be a legitimate leader. Thus each individual emphasised the particular conditions that best endorsed his claims. This in turn led each organisation to use and stress historical material differently. In addition, the organisations operated differently. Some organisations employed secretaries and kept extensive records detailing membership and financial contributions, while others emphasised their inclusive nature and did not require members to complete membership forms or pay fees. For these reasons, the material discussed in the following section is of

different types and is, in many respects, not obviously comparable. An exploration of this material does, however, illuminate political differences and goes some way towards explaining the difficulties associated with unification.

Adam Kok and the People of Campbell

After Mandela had addressed the crowds at the Griquatown stadium, he hosted a luncheon at the Griquatown Hotel with the Griqua leaders before leaving Griquatown. Immediately after the luncheon, a flyer was released which caused loud and angry discussions to resume within – and between – the various Griqua factions. On the flyer was a black and white photograph of Mandela greeting *Kaptein* Adam Kok. Above the photograph was written '(t)he Griqua *Volk*[18] of South Africa are proud of *Opperhoof* Adam Kok V, grandson and heir of the staff of Adam Kok IV, who was acknowledged by the old South African Government'.

The flyer had been printed and distributed by Martin Engelbrecht who campaigned on behalf of the organisation known as 'Adam Kok and the people of Campbell' or alternatively 'the Griquas of Adam Kok'. Virtually unheard of before Mandela's visit to Griquatown, the organisation centred on *Kaptein* Adam Kok V, an unemployed school assistant who lived in Campbell and initially appeared as a silent and often drunk figurehead, and his spokesmen, in particular Martin Engelbrecht, who ran the organisation. As mentioned above, Adam Kok V was the grandson of Adam Kok IV, *Kaptein* of Campbell until his death in 1978 (see Figure 2.3). It was Adam Kok IV who had organised the 'out of order' meeting to campaign for land in the Northern Cape in the 1970s (see page 50). After his death, there occurred a period of inactivity as no one assumed the position of *Kaptein* until 1995, when Adam Kok V was 'discovered' by Martin Engelbrecht and convinced to take up his position in Griqua affairs.

It was Engelbrecht who had objected to the laying of the wreath on Waterboer's grave and had requested that Mandela honour the grave of Cornelius Kok II instead (see page 44).[19] This, however, turned out to be rather more difficult than Engelbrecht had initially imagined, as the bones of Cornelius Kok II had been exhumed in 1961 and never reburied (discussed in more detail below). Cornelius Kok II (1778-1858) had been Kaptein of the Campbell lands. His father had been Cornelius Kok I and his grandfather Adam Kok I, the original leader of what was later to become the Griqua people. Adam

[18] The Afrikaans word *volk* translates as 'people' 'tribe' or 'nation'. I have chosen to use the Afrikaans word throughout this thesis as none of the English translations fully capture the Afrikaans meaning of the term.
[19] Telephone Conversation, Martin Engelbrecht, 20/09/1995

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


Figure 2.3: Relationships between Griqua leaders (past and present).

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Kok V, the man Engelbrecht had discovered and was supporting, was the 'great-great-great-great-grandnephew' of Cornelius Kok II.[20] Had it been possible for Mandela to lay a wreath on Cornelius Kok II's grave, this would have been interpreted as presidential support for the Kok lineage. Because, however, such an act was not possible, Engelbrecht resorted to the flyer in order to emphasise Mandela's 'support' for Adam Kok V.

Engelbrecht concentrated on meetings with government officials, academics and outside agencies, and on establishing links with other organisations (see below) rather than on rallying local people. In this organisation, the people of Campbell were seen as Adam Kok's supporters and their loyalty was taken as self-evident. (Indeed, many of the people who had supported his grandfather were now willing to show allegiance to Adam Kok V). The organisers thus made no attempt to compile membership lists: an oversight which led other organisations, seeking to discredit this one, to question whether he had any followers at all.

By December 1997, Adam Kok V had stopped drinking and had taken up the reins of leadership in Campbell. He had recruited a new cohort of spokesmen and workers to support him in his position and had told Martin Engelbrecht that there was no place for him in his organisation.[21] He had also changed his campaign strategy and had invested considerable time and effort in recruiting a support base in Campbell, rather than simply assuming that these people were his supporters. Adam Kok's campaign to recruit support from the people of Campbell relied heavily on religious worship and thanksgiving to God. In this regard, his new strategies of organisation and leadership were more in line with those followed by his grandfather in the 1970s. These strategies were also being used by other leaders in the Northern Cape. Mass rallies, open to all Campbell residents, took place and here Adam Kok and his loyal workers were introduced to everyone present. During the speeches, the organisation's relationship to the government was stressed and the workers' religious positions – pastor, charismatic church leader and so forth – were emphasised. Extensive discussions reminded people of their historical importance and taught them about their Griqua past (discussed in more detail in Chapter Five). As Adam Kok's most serious problem was to regain the allegiance of those people who had joined the GPO during the twenty-year hiatus in Kok leadership (1976 – 1995), it was probably not surprising that he adopted strategies similar to those used by Kanyiles, leader of the GPO.

[20] Public Address, Prof. P. Tobias, Johannesburg, 20/08/1996
[21] Conversation, Adam Kok, Campbell, 21/01/1998

The Griqua People's Organisation (GPO)

> This organisation is for the welfare of the Griquas, and also to try to have the Griqua recognised as a *volk* of South Africa by all other race groups (Constitution of the GPO, nd.: 1, my italics).

The GPO was founded by the late *Kaptein* Nicolaas Waterboer II, a Griqua leader who succeeded *Kaptein* Nicolaas Waterboer I. Andries Waterboer, Nicolaas Waterboer II's grandfather and one of the historical leaders Mandela wished to honour during his visit to Griquatown, had been elected *Kaptein* of Griquatown in 1820 and ruled over the mission faction (Ross, 1974: 30 – 32, see Chapter Three, pages 94 – 100 and Figure 2.3 facing page 54). He had been young, inexperienced and had little political authority, but his election had been possible because of the collapse of the power of the 'old chiefs' (such as the Koks and the Berends) and the support of the missionaries (Barnard, 1992: 194). In addition to having the support of the missionaries, Andries Waterboer had married one of Adam Kok's daughters, thus becoming a son-in-law of one of the leading families (Breutz, 1963: 35).

On the 3 January 1960, aged 85 (cf. DFA, 4.10.1962), Nicolaas Waterboer II signed a *bemagtingsbrief* (empowerment letter or statement) which read as follows:

> I Nicolaas Waterboer in my capacity as Born and Permanent Griqua *Kaptein* of Griqualand West, Albania and South West Africa Division Certifies herewith That Holder Daniel James Kanyiles was appointed to the rank of *OPPERHOOF* at a *Volkskonferensie* (people's conference) for the Time period of Permanent years (my italics).

Witnessed by the chairman and private secretary and signed in a bold handwriting by 'Kapt. [*Kaptein*] N. Waterboer II', this document provides 'incontestable proof' of Kanyiles' claims.[22] The written document, as Guy has argued, 'establishes authority and precedent in a form independent of spacially restricted, temporally transient, human physicality' (1994: 7 cited in Costa, 1997: 26). Behind this transfer of power lies the ideology that it is possible for leadership to be transferred to sons, sons-in-law and even to unrelated persons. The birthright, and the leadership provided by a *Kaptein*, was meant to be for life. Ross, however, points out that a *Kaptein* could be displaced if he lacked support, especially that of influential men (1974: 33). Indeed, despite this signed document and the unerring support of Nicolaas Waterboer's granddaughter, Kanyiles' claim was often questioned. My version of the document is a faint photocopy that was

[22] Letters of authority and similar questions of authenticity have been posited during the controversy over succession in the 1940s (Costa, 1997: 36).

handed to me by the (non-Griqua) curator of the Griquatown museum. She mentioned a commonly-shared scepticism as to the authenticity of the document, and explained that Daniel Kanyiles' right to lead the GPO was sometimes questioned.[23] Whereas some people said that Kanyiles had made Waterboer drunk before he signed over his powers, others suggested that he had bought the title for a bottle of gin. Many other people, however, have been, and continue to be, prepared to vouch for Kanyiles' 'authenticity', not least his supporters. Kanyiles' alliance – still in place today – with the GNC-Ky led to Eric le Fleur, former leader of the GNC-Ky (see pages 46 and 62), providing a certified copy of Waterboer's statement to the President's Commission in 1983 so that Kanyiles' legitimacy might no longer be questioned (Sunday Times Extra 1/5/1983).



Griekwa Volks Organisasie

ONDER
Gesag van Edele Kaptein
Nicolaas Waterboer II
Gebore en Permanente Griekw
Kaptein van Griekwaland We
Albania en Suid-Wes Afrika
Afdeling

BEMAGTINGS BRIEF

Ek Nicolaas Waterboer in my kapasiteit as Gebore en Permanente Griekwa Kaptein van Griekwaland Wes, Albania en Suid-Wes Afrika Afdeling Sertifiseer, Hiermee Dat Draer Daniel James Kanyiles op n Volkskonferensie van die Griekwa Volk Aangestel is om die amp van te Beklee ,vir die Tydperk van Permanent Jaar

Griekwaland Wes, Albanie, Afrika en Suid Wes

BELEID Persoonsno. 031/80/7037 G

1. Die Griekwa Volks Organisasie is nie n Politieke Beweging nie, en is nie teen die Regering van die Land Gemik nie
2. Hierdie amptenaar moet vir die Welsyn van die Griekwas Werk
3. Hy moet die Edele Kaptein, en alle hoe amptenare Volle eer bewys en Onderdanig wees
4. Hy moet Griekwas Organiseer, en hulle inskryf Asook Vergaderings Hou.

Gegeteken my hand, en Geteken in Teenwoordigheid van Getuies.
Hierdie 3de Dagt van January in die heilige Jaar van ons hemelse vader 19 80.

GETUIES:
1. Kapt N Waterboer II
2. [illegible]

Magistraat Stempel — Gebore en Permanente Griekwa Kaptein

epk

Figure 2.4: Certification of Kanyiles' leadership (see Appendix One for translation)

[23] Conversation, H. Hager, Griquatown, 6/08/1996

Nicolaas Waterboer's granddaughter, Anna Visser, explained why Waterboer had named Kanyiles as his successor:

> Nicolaas Waterboer was meant to receive the *stoel* (lit. chair or leadership position) from his grandfather in the old townhall, but that same afternoon he was arrested for the possession of *dagga* (cannabis). '*Oupa* (grandfather) was very disgruntled' and he called Anna and asked who he should place '*op die stoel*' (in charge) as he could not put a *dagga*-smoker in charge of the Griqua. He then suggested Willem Barnos. Anna said that Willem was political but that Oupa should decide for himself. Oupa then decided to take Kanyiles and Anna agreed with his choice.[24]

Although Anna Visser and her grandfather appear to have considered Kanyiles to be a good candidate because he did not smoke cannabis and was not 'political', Kanyiles had other attributes that would have endeared the Waterboers to him. Being bilingual and having passed Standard Eight in school, Kanyiles was relatively well-educated.[25] In 1960 he was a constable in the South African Police Force and, while it might have been considered a distinct disadvantage in the political setup of a more rebellious people, this positioned him well to negotiate with authorities within the compliant context of Griqua politics. Kanyiles was also a devout and influential Christian, which would have impressed Waterboer, himself Christian, and his father and grandfather the products of missionary influence (cf. Ross, 1974: 30, 32). Indeed, shortly before being chosen as Waterboer's successor, Kanyiles had been nominated – or had chosen himself – as head minister and superintendent of the then newly-established – but now defunct – Griqua People's Church of South Africa (Griqua People's Church of South Africa, 1959: 2).[26]

Over the years that Kanyiles had run the GPO, he had held many meetings in various small towns in the Northern Cape to recruit people to the organisation and established small branches of the organisation in each town. Depending on who had been persuaded to join, the branches responded with vaying degrees of commitment. During the 1980s, for example, Griquatown and Campbell had had particularly active branches where multiple rallies were held. By the 1990s it was people from Danielskuil who were especially committed and who organised activities on behalf of the GPO (see Map 1.1 page 13).[27]

Two other Griqua organisations were active in the Northern Cape and campaigned for support (and one of these, as mentioned, had formed an alliance with the GPO). These organisations, both named the GNC, were somewhat different from the GPO. Whereas

[24] Interview, Anna Visser, Griquatown, 5/08/1996.
[25] Standard Eight is today known as Grade Ten in South African schools.
[26] Interview, Ritchie, Daniel Kanyiles, 01/11/1995
[27] Griqua People's Organisation, Executive Meeting, Ritchie, 31/08/1996

Kanyiles relied on the written word of Nicolaas Waterboer II to authenticate his position as leader of the GPO, the GNC organisations claimed that early in the twentieth century God had instructed the leader, Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur, to mobilise the Griquas that were spread around the country and to form the GNC.[28]

The Griqua National Conference of South Africa (GNC)

The Griqua National Conference of South Africa (GNC) was founded as the 'Griqua Conference' in 1920 with a newspaper called the 'Griqua and Coloured People's Opinion' (GCPO) and with the formation of the Griqua Independent Church (GIC) in Maitland (Jansen, 1976: 4; Leeuwenburg, 1971).[29] Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur, who had done hard labour at the Breakwater Prison and spent time on Robben Island because of his political activities in East Griqualand, formed these organisations after his release. He was born in Herschel on 2 July 1867 and had traveled with his father, who was Lady Kok's secretary, to Kokstad (Jansen, 1976: 4). Here he met and married Rachel Susanah Kok, the eldest daughter of Adam 'Muis' Kok who had established himself as *Kaptein* after Adam Kok III's death.[30] Le Fleur's marriage to Rachel Kok had important consequences for his vocation as Griqua leader. 'Through his marriage, A.A.S. le Fleur came into possession of the Griqua staffs of office, the symbols of political authority' (Edgar and Saunders, 1982: 204, see Figure 2.3, facing page 54). Although he had secured his position in the royal Griqua lineage through his marriage, Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur's vocation, as the leader of all the Griqua people, nevertheless came from a higher source and it was said that God had instructed him to assemble a Griqua nation.[31]

For his followers, Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur's rise as a Griqua leader was thus underpinned by a mythological charter and he later became known either as '*die Knêg*' (God's servant) or '*die Profeet*' (the prophet). He was instructed by God to 'gather together the dead bones of Adam Kok' and this message has been interpreted as a call to rally together the Griqua people and to restore their sense of pride. There are many versions of this event, although they all contain the same basic elements (also see Edgar and Saunders, 1982; le Fleur, 1964; Jansen 1976, President's Commission, 1983; Storrar, 1978). This version was told to me by the *Knêg*'s grandson's wife. According to the legend,

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[28] Conversation, The Crags, John Cloete, 10/12/1995

[29] Conversation, Anthony le Fleur, The Crags, 9/12/1995

[30] After Adam Kok III had died, leaving no heirs and having not identitfied a successor, the tussle for leadership had been particularly intense until his nephew Adam 'Muis' Kok succeeded him (Ross, 1974: 33).

[31] Public Speech, Anthony le Fleur, The Crags, 10/12/1995; Interview, Cecil le Fleur, Vredendal, 23/07/1996.

> Andrew's father was a wagon-maker and one day he sent his son, the *Knêg*, out to look for a donkey. For three days the *Knêg* searched and then he heard a voice call his name. Three times his name was called and then the voice told him that the donkey was just behind the *koppie* (small hill). The voice identified itself as God and told Andrew to 'gather together the dead bones of Adam Kok' (*versamel die dooie bene van Adam Kok*). Andrew doubted the voice as he himself was not Griqua, but again the voice instructed him to collect the bones. He wondered what his father would say, but the voice told him that Lady Kok would die at 8 a.m. the next day as proof of God's words. Andrew told his father, who inspanned the oxen and went to Kokstad. Sitting outside her home (where Lewis Stores stands today)was Lady Kok, clearly in good health. Five minutes before 8 a.m. she experienced a pain and by 8 a.m. she was dead. Then Andrew's father believed him, for as the bible explained, only God could predict someone's death.[32]

During le Fleur's reign as a Griqua leader, he instituted a number of land-settlement schemes that were designed to establish self-sufficient rural Griqua communities. Hundreds of subsistence farmers sacrificed their belongings and joined his treks across the Cape. Many of these journeys failed, as the destitute farmers were hindered by bad climatic conditions and were unable to raise enough money to pay the interest on the property loan (Edgar and Saunders, 1982: 206; Lewis, 1987). Some of the people who participated in the treks remained loyal to le Fleur, and their descendants have continued to demonstrate this loyalty through their membership of the GNC and GIC. Others, bitter about their capital losses and the failures of the settlement schemes, held him responsible. An inquiry launched by the Cape Government resulted in le Fleur being arrested and imprisoned for duplicity, theft and fraud. After his release, le Fleur 'attempted to revive the dream of an independent Griqua homeland, under the unifying symbols of a Griqua identity' (Lewis, 1987, 153; also see Rainier, 1997). This, he thought, would allow the destitute coloured farmers to be economically independent and would establish their self-respect (Edgar and Saunders, 1982; Lewis, 1987, 153). With money that had been collected in the Steinkopf, Komaggas and Leliefontein mission reserves, le Fleur paid the deposits on three farms near Vredendal. On Beeswater, one of these farms, a Griqua settlement developed. Another settlement was successfully established, initially at Robberg, and then at Kranshoek, near Plettenburg Bay. In both these places, the original settlers' descendants still adhere to the Constitutions of the GNC and GIC (see Figure 2.6). They believe that these treks were not intended only for economic gain and that they were therefore successful, keeping 'body and soul together' and the Griqua spirit alive.[33]

[32] Conversation, Sarah le Fleur, The Crags, 10/12/1995
[33] Conversation, Cecil le Fleur, Vredendal, 21/07/1996



Figure 2.5: The *Knêg* (photograph taken in Vredendal, 1995)



Figure 2.6: Grave of A.J. le Fleur, A son of the *Knêg*, at Beeswater (Translation: In memory of our father & Griqua leader)

The *Knêg* died at Robberg on 11 July 1941. Before his death he indicated that his oldest son and grandson were to be his successors.[34] Abraham le Fleur, his oldest son, thus took over the leadership of the Griqua. Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II, Abraham's son and the *Knêg*'s grandson, succeeded his father on 13 July 1951. For a considerable length of time, the organisation flourished as members were recruited and churches were built.

[34] Conversation, Anthony le Fleur, The Crags, 9/12/1995; Interview Veronica Joseph, Vredendal, 20/07/1996; Interview Miena Booyse, Vredendal, 23/07/1996

'*Die Breek*' and the Griqua National Conferences of South Africa

Subsequently, however, a split occurred amongst the leadership of the GNC which later came to be known as *die Breek* (the Break).[35] The rift occurred in 1967 when Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II, grandson of the *Knêg* and, in 1969, *Kaptein* and *Opperhoof* of the GNC, 'fell in love with a coloured woman and deserted his wife' (Dagbreek & Landstem, 17/8/1969). The small, strictly Christian community of Kranshoek, a Griqua settlement near Plettenburg Bay, and other Griquas over whom he ruled, were reported to have been deeply shocked by his actions and Andrew resigned from his position as leader. In his declaration, dated 13 June 1967, Andrew le Fleur stated that 'my domestic affairs and personal matters prevent me from performing my responsibilities properly' and he named his younger brother, Eric Maxwell Seth le Fleur (see pages 46 – 47 and Figure 2.3, facing page 54), as his legal and only successor (Declaration to the GNC and GIC, 13/6/67). Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II later attempted to reclaim his position as *Opperhoof*. Some followers refused to accept him as their leader and insisted that Eric was now their leader. Other followers were happy to revert to Andrew and this led to the final break.[36]

The two rival organisations that resulted from the *Breek* were both called the Griqua National Conference of South Africa.[37] Both claimed to be descended from the original organisation. The one organisation, which I have labelled the GNC-Kr for clarity, was based in Kranshoek, Plettenburg Bay and led by Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II. The other organisation, which I have labelled GNC-Ky, was led by *Volkspresident* (People's president) Anthony le Fleur, son and successor of Eric le Fleur. Although he was based in Knysna, the organisation's headquarters was based at Kurland, The Crags (see Map 1.3 page 25).

There are, of course, other interpretations of what happened during the *Breek*. Some people told me that it had been necessary to weed the *vrottes* (rotten ones) from the organisation.[38] Others said that the younger brother, Eric le Fleur, had abused Andrew's trust and had broken away with a small group of followers. According to them, the *Breek* was a fight over leadership and positions of power within the organisation.[39] Still others said that the *Breek* had been about something completely different (but they could

[35] Interview, Mr Arendse, Kranshoek, 11/12/1995
[36] Conversation, Anthony le Fleur, 9/12/1995
[37] Andrew le Fleur initially called his organisation the Reformed GNC which operated for a short period before dropping the word 'reformed' and once again using the name GNC.
[38] Interview, Mr Arendse, Kranshoek, 11/12/1995
[39] Interview, Kate Cloete, Kranshoek, 12/12/1995,

not identify what) as Andrew's first wife had died before he became involved with his current wife.[40] In 1995, some people still described the *Breek* as the worst thing that had ever happened to the Griqua.[41]

The two organisations have remained rigidly opposed to each other while retaining similar versions of history. The organisations celebrated the same ritual holidays (except that the GNC-Kr celebrated Andrew's birthday and the GNC-Ky celebrated Eric's); they had very similar flags (the only difference being the position of the *Kanniedood* (lit. cannot die) or aloe, and its green background) and they were both affiliated to a GIC. Both organisations have campaigned in the Northern Cape and have small followings in Kimberley, Campbell and Griquatown. The GNC-Kr recently held an elaborate ceremony in Griquatown during which Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II acknowledged Andries Waterboer, nephew of the leader Nicolaas Waterboer who chose Kanyiles to succeed him, as the leader of the Griqua people in Griquatown (discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, also see page 57).




Figure 2.7: One of the GNC flags (the green band appears next to the masthead on the other

These two GNC organisations, Adam Kok and the People of Campbell, and the GPO were the primary organisations operating in the Northern Cape. There were other Griqua organisations in South Africa, such as the Griqualand East Pioneers' Council mentioned earlier, which did not have any particular interests in the Northern Cape and

[40] Conversation, Valerie Mentoor, Vredendal, 20/07/1996
[41] Interview, Mr Arendse, Kranshoek, 11/12/1995

have therefore not been included here. Despite the repeated calls for unity made by the Government, and the repeated claims on the part of the various leaders that unity has been achieved, by 1997 there was no evidence of any widespread Griqua solidarity. In order further to examine the question of Griqua unity, it thus becomes necessary to focus on smaller, less obvious, acts of unification.

IS NO UNIFICATION TAKING PLACE?

To suggest, as the above section does, that the various Griqua organisations were all rigidly opposed to each other, is not completely accurate. It has long been recognised among the various Griqua leaders and their supporters - who have occasionally taken steps to act upon this knowledge - that it would strengthen their cause to unite with other Griqua organisations. As early as 1926 the GCPO (the mouth piece of the GNC) stated that without unity they would never be able to move forward:

> This is the soil of unity. Let us strive to arrive at the soil, therefore we alone must work at unity and thereby amalgamate. Together with one order and council. Come, then the white population can better assist and understand us, because then they can deal with us as a unity. Let each person preach unity, because 'unity is strength'[,] this is what we lack, therefore start immediately (GCPO, no. 4, 5/2/1926).

Conditions were different in 1926 and this quotation has to be seen in the context of the British annexation of the area east of the Drakensburg where Adam Kok III had died in 1875, leaving no designated successor; and of Griqualand West where the 'old chiefs' had collapsed in 1820 when Andries Waterboer was elected as Kaptein (Edgar and Saunders, 1982: 203, Ross, 1974: 30). In the 1920s there appear to have been no rival Griqua organisations. Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur, initiator of the GNC, the GIC and the GCPO, was thus at this stage the only leader mobilising for a sense of Griqua identity. He was, in 1926, leading a group of destitute 'coloureds' to settle in the Eastern Cape. These migrations resulted in the Griqua settlements of Kranshoek, Knysna, Kurland, Vredendal and Plettenburg Bay (Edgar and Saunders, 1982: 219). While there is no direct link between this early desire for Griqua unity and the more recent claims discussed in this paper, the philosophy of le Fleur and the writings in the GCPO continued to influence both GNC organisations and to be referred to in public meetings.

One consequence of the rhetoric of unity is that all leaders felt a need to conceal the conflicts between them at a formal level. All the leaders knew that I was aware of the conflicts between organisations as they themselves had informed me of these issues.

Informally, and on an individual basis, we would discuss the conflicts, the different agendas and demands of the various leaders. My entry into meetings where the question of unity was on the agenda was, however, occasionally disallowed when leaders were keen to mask the frenzied negotiations necessary to achieve such an end. Repeatedly, informants said to me that it would not do to have one organisation approach say, the United Nations, on behalf of the Griqua and then have another organisation do exactly the same on behalf of the same people.[42] Unity was felt to be necessary, not only to meet the basic condition for negotiation set down by the government, but also for the receipt of land or money in the name of the Griqua cause. Should people, organisations or governments decide to give money to the Griqua then these donors were entitled, it was thought, to expect some sort of controlling body to administer such funds. Indeed the lack of a controlling body was seen to be the cause of losing funds: in 1996 the GPO lodged a claim for £1.4 billion (then roughly equivalent to R10 billion) against the British Government for the loss of lands in Griqualand West during the colonial regime (DFA, 9/10/1996). Shortly thereafter, the National Land Reform Pilot Project received R116 million from Britain and Denmark for land reform in South Africa (van Tonder, June 1996: 10). GPO members felt that this was 'guilt money' that should have been paid to the Griqua, but was not because there was no organisation representing all Griquas.[43]

The problem was thus as follows: although Griqua leaders repeatedly said they intended to create unity, no consensus could be reached between the various organisations. The biggest bone of contention, as indicated by the following conversation between Cecil le Fleur of the GNC-Kr and Martin Engelbrecht who, at that stage, represented the Griquas of Adam Kok, was the relative status of the leaders and hence of the groups of followers.

Le Fleur:	The Griqua Executive Council (of the GNC-Kr) has invited Adam Kok and some of his leaders to become part of this, but they have not accepted..... Our invite still stands, they can come and discuss it with the GNC. They can be assimilated into our organisation and have representation.
Engelbrecht:	On what level?
Le Fleur:	Adam Kok is one of the traditional leaders and can be appointed as leader out of the GNC.
Engelbrecht:	That doesn't answer my question, on what level?
Le Fleur:	Not on the same level as paramount chief le Fleur. He is the National leader and he inherited that position from history (SABC interview in Griquatown, directly after Mandela's speech, 23 September 1995).

[42] Conversation, Valerie Mentoor, Vredendal, 20/07/1996; Conversation, Martin Engelbrecht, Johannesburg, 22/11/1995; Griqua meeting, Mr Plaatjie, Douglas, 30/8/1996. Public Meeting with Dept. of Land Affairs and Dept. of Agriculture, Douglas, William Wellam, 30/08/1996

[43] Public Meeting with Dept. of Land Affairs and Dept. of Agriculture, Douglas, William Wellam, 30/08/1996

The discussion reproduced here, between representatives of the GNC-Kr and of the Griquas of Adam Kok, over the relative status of their leaders represents only a small fraction of what has been a continuous debate. Various criteria were brought to bear when representatives assessed their leaders' status. As discussed above, Griqua leaders themselves most often cited their historical claim to leadership. It was thus because of the document signed by Nicolaas Waterboer that Kanyiles had a claim to leadership in the Northern Cape (see page 57), it was because of his ancestral lineage that Adam Kok argued that he was entitled to be a Griqua leader (see pages 54 and 55). Anthony le Fleur and Andrew le Fleur claimed their status from their great-grandfather's marriage to Rachel Susanah Kok (see page 59), as the Kok lineage in East Griqualand had no male descendants, and they asserted that they were God's messengers, a legacy from the original message that God gave to Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur.

Anthropologists at the Department of Constitutional Development (DCD), who had been responsible for the selection of traditional leaders of South African homelands during the apartheid era, and who were to resolve 'the Griqua problem', believed that the rules of succession for 'the Griqua' had been laid down in 1813 when Rev. John Campbell visited Griquatown.[44] They recognised, however, that the rules established in 1813 had not been adhered to and that, not unlike succession rules in Tswana society, these rules had proved to be exceptionally adaptable, allowing contenders opportunities to challenge prescribed leaders (cf. Edgar and Saunders, 1982: 207; Comaroff, 1974). The anthropologists therefore searched for other criteria such as historical continuity, involvement in cultural affairs, religious leadership, the relative size of the various Griqua organisations and the frequency of Griqua meetings to determine which leaders they thought should be recognised by the government.[45] In considering this matter, it is useful to turn to Costa's examination of Zulu succession during the 1940s which demonstrates how native administrators were able to manipulate rules of succession to achieve their own ends (1997: 19). He illustrates that whereas 'the history of the kings themselves... points more to individual ability than predestination' (1997: 31) with political support being the principle factor; the native administrators used the rules of succession as a judicial tool in order to select their chosen leaders and, in so doing, to resolve political dilemmas (1997: 33, 42).

[44] Interview, Johan Meiring, John Kitching, Dept. of Constitutional Development, Pretoria, 6/11/1995
[45] Interview, Johan Meiring, John Kitching, Dept. of Constitutional Development, Pretoria, 6/11/1995

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Costa's argument can be applied to the question of Griqua leadership and unity: after Griqua leaders demanded that they be accommodated in the House of Traditional Leaders, the anthropologists did a brief fact-finding tour of South Africa and visited all the areas where claims to Griqua leadership were being voiced. At this stage of negotiations they were, I would argue, searching for one leader who would represent all the Griqua in South Africa and they explored all the possible criteria mentioned above. As suggested by Costa, these criteria were open to manipulation by both the anthropologists and the claimants and this is particularly evident in questions concerning the size of the organisations and the membership numbers. As the various claimants tried to meet these anthropologists' demands and to establish their credentials, they too began to stress organisational size.[46] The secretary of the GNC-Kr thus laid considerable emphasis on membership figures relative to the GNC-Ky, proudly indicating that theirs was the bigger, more important organisation. Other organisations, lacking detailed membership lists, made their claims on the basis of locality. Engelbrecht, at that point speaking on behalf of Adam Kok V and the Campbell Griqua, claimed that Kok represented all the people of Campbell.[47] Similarly Kanyiles argued that all the people in Griqualand West should be considered to be Griqua and under his leadership as he had jurisdiction over the whole of Griqualand West (cf. Waldman, 1988: 56). He was, however, also conscious of the need to demonstrate membership and a GPO newsletter instructed committee members actively to recruit new members and 'sign them up'.

The battle over the relative status of the various leaders was perhaps best reflected in the titles that they assumed for themselves. Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II was known by his followers, by Mandela and the anthropologists at the DCD as the *Opperhoof* (paramount chief).[48] In keeping with this term, the GNC-Kr has insisted that Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II be recognised as the leader of all Griquas resident in South Africa.[49] Anthony le Fleur, leader of the breakaway GNC-Ky, was referred to as the *Volkspresident* or people's president. He explained that his grandfather, the *Knêg*, had been known as the *Opperhoof*. But, because the term *Opperhoof* was unique to the original holder of office, those succeeding him in the GNC-Ky were termed *Volkspresident*. Anthony made no claim to represent all the Griquas of South Africa and was concerned primarily with his constituency. However he, like all the other leaders, refused to consider the *Opperhoof* as being his leader or

[46] Interview, Kate Cloete, Kranshoek, 12/12/1995.
[47] Conversation, Martin Engelbrecht, Griquatown 24/09/1995
[48] Interview, Johan Meiring, John Kitching, Dept. of Constitutional Development, Pretoria, 6/11/1995; Interview, Kate Cloete, Kranshoek, 12/12/1995
[49] Conversation, Melissa Levine, Johannesburg, 30/09/1995

holding any position senior to him.[50] Kanyiles, when he was installed as leader of the GPO, was referred to as *Kaptein* and the signing ceremony recognised him as *Opperhoof*, or paramount chief, over the Griquas in the Northern Cape.[51] Adam Kok V retained the title *Kaptein*, which was the title held by his forefathers who were the accepted leaders of a collection of people residing around Campbell. The word *Kaptein* means captain when translated into English and Ross defines the concept 'captaincy' as referring to all societies which elect a leader until death, but which limit the leader's powers, and which recruit members on a broad 'non-ascriptive basis'. 'In one sense, therefore, a "Captaincy" is a particular type of constitutional monarchy; in another, it holds many of the features of a republic' (Ross, 1974: 30). Clearly there is no longer any special governance for Griqua people in South Africa, although the authority of the *Kaptein* harks back to an earlier era. As there was no 'hard and fast' way of ranking Griqua leaders in terms of their relative status, the government anthropologists experienced tremendous difficulty in determining who should lead the Griqua.[52] Furthermore, as shown above, the titles adopted by these leaders were open to manipulation and, for example, when Martin Engelbrecht attended the Khoisan Conference in Cape Town and it became clear that he was no longer regarded by Adam Kok V as his primary spokesman, he assumed the title 'Chief Martin Engelbrecht' in order better to assert his own position.

The constant calls for Griqua unity by the governments of South Africa and the references to Griqua factionalism led to a situation where all Griqua leaders and organisations were expected to work together and to select a single leader in order for unity to be achieved. This expectation by government officials went together with a conviction that no such co-operation has existed to date. It has operated to conceal the organisational links which do already exist and the occasions when various Griqua organisations have worked together. For example, a memorandum requested by Mandela had to be drawn up by all concerned parties. The memorandum was co-ordinated by the GNC-Kr and called for the implementation of measures that could allow for the formal recognition of Griqua identity, the restitution of land rights and Griqua 'representation in the provincial *Houses of Traditional Leaders* and also in the *Council of Traditional Leaders* at central government level' (Memorandum to Nelson Mandela, 1995: 4, original emphasis). Finalised and signed in Beaufort West on 21 October 1995, the memorandum is prefaced with the statement that it was 'consensually-determined' by representatives of all the Griqua organisations (Press

[50] Conversation, Anthony le Fleur, The Crags, 9/12/1995
[51] Interview, Daniel Kanyiles, Ritchie, 31/07/1996
[52] Interview, Johan Meiring, John Kitching, Dept. of Constitutional Development, Pretoria, 6/11/1995

Release of GNC-Kr 29/8/1996). Kanyiles explained that after fighting for many years, the Griqua leaders had been brought together by the preparation of the memorandum, to achieve unity and further the interests of the Griqua.[53] This is a statement that I have come to hear over and over during the course of my research. Each time some of the leaders worked together, it was seen by them as a move that would bring them closer to the unity they were expected to achieve. Similarly, there were occasions when leaders consciously decided to suppress their differences and collectively present their demands. When, for example, the American Ambassador visited Griquatown to hear about the problems experienced by Griqua people resident in the small towns of the Northern Cape, local representatives of the GPO, Adam Kok and the Campbell Griqua, and the GNC-Kr held a private meeting in which they decided to put aside their differences and to support each other's needs and requests.[54]

From this it appears that processes of unification have occurred, but that they have not sufficiently fulfilled the government's criteria for unity and were therefore not recognised. An amalgamation occurred, for instance, between the GNC-Ky and the GPO in 1980, resulting in the formation of the Griqua National Council (GNR, see page 46). This new organisation was intended to serve as a mouthpiece for the Griqua and to represent them to the Government. It was created because it was felt that Griqua organisations and followers needed more unity. The constitution of the GNR states as its two aims:

> 4.1 The council sets as a goal to call to nationhood and to unite all Griquas and Coloureds in the Republic of South Africa.
> 4.2 to cultivate fatherland love and pride as well as an idea of national unity (GNR Constitution, 1981: 1).

A further amalgamation occurred in September 1996 when the GNR expanded its organisation to include the Griquas of Adam Kok V. The GPO and the Griquas of Adam Kok have also formed an organisation called the United Griquas of Griqualand West. This organisation recently met right-wing Afrikaner separatist Constand Viljoen and other members of the Freedom Front to discuss the possibilities of self-determination. It has also involved itself in the negotiations with the British government and De Beers Consolidated Mines in an attempt to claim the land and diamonds of which the Griqua were dispossessed. A further bid for unity has seen these organisations unite under the banner of the Khoisan Representative Council (KRC), an organisation not restricted to Griqua people but including within its envisaged

[53] SABC footage of the event held on the 1/10/1994.
[54] Griqua meeting, Griquatown, 12/08/1997

membership the !Xu and Khwe 'Bushmen', the Nama, the Korana, the Basters and any other so-called indigenous people in South Africa. The KRC claimed it would represent all these various 'brown people' and become the leading political party or the 'iron fist' in the Northern Cape. Kanyiles envisaged that it would mobilise the coloured vote for 1999 and would allow them to elect their own representative(s) into the Northern Cape government.[55]




Figure 2.8: Adam Kok & the Campbell Griqua amalgamate with the GNR (Martin Engelbrecht receives the GNC-Ky tie on behalf of Adam Kok V, 1996)

Each of the two GNC organisations was thus seeking unity with almost any organisation, so long as it was not the other. Whereas the GNC-Kr had established Northern Cape links with the GPO, the KRC and Adam Kok and the Campbell Griqua, the GNC-Ky went out of its way to align itself with other organisations and people, also based in the Northern Cape but opposed to the GNC-Kr. The leader and his organisers have sought to amalgamate with other minority groups and publicly invited other 'first nations' or 'indigenous groups' to join forces with them and to negotiate for demands through the structures already established by them.[56] The Rehoboth Basters of Namibia were among the first to amalgamate formally with the GNC-Kr in Upington on 23 November 1996 and to establish a 'Joint Griqua Rehoboth Baster Community' to ensure continued co-operation.

The biggest, most stable, division between Griqua organisations was thus between the GPO, the GNC-Ky, the United Griqua of Griqualand West and the Griquas of Adam Kok on the one hand and the GNC-Kr and the Rehoboth Basters on the other. In this respect, Elphick's contention that Khoi stability lies, not in the alliances between groups,

[55] Interview, Daniel Kanyiles, Ritchie, 31/07/1996; Public speech, GVO Executive Committee Meeting, Ritchie, Daniel Kanyiles, 31/08/1996

[56] Address by Mansell Upham on behalf of the GNC-Kr at the Indigenous People's' Symposium, Cape Town, 14/04/ 1996.

but in their feuds, can be shown still to have some analytic value when applied to Khoi-based societies more than 100 years later. As suggested by Elphick's notion, some of the alliances mentioned above, especially those brokered by the individuals Kanyiles and Engelbrecht (such as the alliance between the GPO and the United Griquas of Griqualand West) proved to be short-lived. But what did appear as a rigid boundary and the major stumbling block towards creating unity (as perceived and required by the government) was the divide between the GNC-Kr and the GNC-Ky. The conflict between these organisations can be best viewed through an examination of three particular events:

1. the repatriation ceremony of Cornelius Kok II,
2. the meeting of the United Griquas of Griqualand West with the Freedom Front and
3. a GNC-Kr threat to sue the Kimberley branch of the GNC-Ky and GIC.

These were not the only events that occurred, nor were they necessarily the most important events; but they are reproduced here because the complexities of alliances and feuding are well represented. The examples also demonstrate how factionalism can allow certain leaders to have a stake in the negotiations, but simultaneously to keep a low profile should negotiations turn sour.

CORNELIUS' BONES

In an elaborate repatriation ceremony, held on 20 August 1996, Professor Tobias symbolically 'returned' the bones of Cornelius Kok II (1778 – 1858) who had been *Kaptein* of the Campbell lands. During a ceremony held at the University of the Witwatersrand Medical School, the bones – which had been stored on the same premises – were 'handed' to Adam Kok V, the 'great-great-great-great-grandnephew' of Cornelius Kok II. As discussed in Chapter Four, the bones had been exhumed from Campbell in 1961, partially as a rescue operation as the farmer and land-owner was planning to plough the graveyard, and partially to further the knowledge of physical anthropologists and anatomists (see Dubow, 1995 and Morris, 1992). At the time of the excavation, Tobias and local farmer Basil Humpheys had negotiated with Adam Kok IV, the grandfather of Adam Kok V, before exhuming the bones. Tobias had promised that the bones would be returned and reburied after they had been studied: a promise which was partially fulfilled by the 1996 ceremony (DFA, 3/06/1961)

Immediately after the Repatriation Ceremony, a meeting had been held in which the different organisations had discussed their positions and, although I was refused entry, it appears that they were not able to resolve their differences. Representatives of the GNC-Kr, having attended, photographed, videoed the ceremony and attended the later negotiations, released to the press their condemnation of the 'absence of consultation' (GNC-Kr of SA Press Release, 29 August 1996, 1). The GNC-Kr argued that it was their request to Tobias and the pressure they had exerted on government that had forced Tobias to return the bones, and hence that it was to them, rather than to the relatively-unknown Adam Kok, that the bones should have been returned.[57]

[57] Telephone Conversation, Cecil le Fleur, 20/01/1997

To some extent the matter remained unresolved. Although the bones had officially been 'returned' to Adam Kok, he had, after the ceremony, left them at the University of the Witwatersrand, since plans for the reburial or storage of Cornelius Kok's bones had not yet been made. The GNC-Ky, under the leadership of Anthony le Fleur, had not bothered to send any representatives to the meeting. Given their alliance with Kanyiles and the GPO, and the GPO's alliance with Adam Kok and the Griquas of Campbell, they had not needed to be present at this ceremony. The simmering conflict was thus between *Kaptein* Adam Kok and the GNC-Kr. The government had been approached to mediate the opposing claims, but responded by avoiding the problem altogether. The ceremony and the return of the bones were seen to be a 'private matter' which did not require any government involvement (GNC-Kr press release, 26/8/1996: 4). The repatriation ceremony further reinforced in the minds of government officials, however, how intractable the feuding was.



Figure 2.9: Prof. Tobias at the repatriation ceremony of Cornelius Kok II (photo R. Thornton, 1996)

ENGELBRECHT AND KANYILES MEET THE FREEDOM FRONT

The United Griquas of Griqualand West met with the white Freedom Front party organisation in January 1997 to discuss self-determination. Engelbrecht and Kanyiles were both in attendance at this meeting. The event was televised on the news and the footage used by the South African Broadcast Corporation came from Mandela's visit to Griquatown in 1995 and showed Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II and other members of the GNC-Kr. According to Engelbrecht the SABC had, of its own accord, used old footage without informing the viewers.[58] The GNC-Kr was furious about appearing on television seemingly in consultation with the Freedom Front and Engelbrecht.[59]

The example is a classic illustration of Engelbrecht's style of negotiation. Time and time again he would rush into something, considered radical by other leaders and as something that ought to be

[58] Interview, Martin Engelbrecht, Kimberley, 15/01/1977
[59] Telephone Conversation, Cecil le Fleur, 20/01/1997

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[59] Telephone Conversation, Cecil le Fleur, 20/01/1997

handled with extreme caution or avoided altogether, and later have to deal with the consequences. Although Kanyiles and Engelbrecht had both attended the meeting and had, between them, represented the United Griquas of Griqualand West, it was Engelbrecht who appeared on television news. Kanyiles, a shrewd negotiator, was aware of the possible negative ramifications of such an alliance and forbade the film crew to use any footage of him.[60] After this event, both the Griquas of Griqualand West and the GNC-Kr stated categorically that unification would no longer be possible. In this instance, however, Engelbrecht's outspokenness acted to protect the role of Kanyiles, the GPO and, through Kanyiles, the GNC-Ky. Should anything positive have come from the meeting and should it, perchance, have had a successful outcome, all the linked organisations could now claim to having been part of the negotiations, despite their actual physical absence, because of the complex alliances that had been forged.

WHO MAY USE THE NAME GNC?

One of the most contentious issues discussed at the GNC-Ky's celebration of its 77th anniversary in March 1997 concerned a letter from the GNC-Kr to the Kimberley branch of the GIC. This church had, in 1996, aligned itself to the GNC-Ky after a fall-out with the GNC-Kr. The fall-out had occurred as a result of Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II's accusation that GIC leaders in Kimberley, affiliated to the GNC-Kr, had appropriated church funds. He had insisted on closing the church and showed no regard for any inconvenience suffered by worshippers. The church leaders, uncertain of what to do about this, approached Kanyiles of the GPO. Kanyiles, as a church bishop, a leader in Griqua matters, a man familiar with the laws of the country and an ally of Anthony le Fleur and the GNC-Ky, was an apt choice. He immediately telephoned Anthony and told him what had happened. Anthony responded promptly, driving to Kimberley where, upon his arrival, he reconstituted the church, again as the GIC, under the auspices of the GNC-Ky.[61]

In March 1997, the GNC-Kr objected to the continued use of the names GIC and GNC and threatened the GNC-Ky with legal action. Anthony le Fleur asked his members in the GNC-Ky to contribute their opinions to the discussion. Delia Bailey explained that she had witnessed the *Breek* in 1969 when Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II said '*ek gee my stoel oor aan my broer, Eric*' (I hand my position over to my brother, Eric). Andrew le Fleur, followed by his supporters, had left the hall. Delia had dreamt that Andrew's organisation (the GNC-Kr) now needed to be terminated. Other people also emphasised the need permanently to stop the GNC-Kr and they spoke categorically of 'the evidence', in the form of minutes, documents and witnesses, that was available. Present in the audience were some representatives of Adam Kok and the Campbell Griquas and the United Griquas of Griqualand West. They were strongly in favour of taking the matter to court, although members of the GNC-Ky tempered their radical words and cautioned against such action. The final decision of the GNC-Ky was to wait until the GNC-Kr actually took legal action, which they never did.[62]

In each instance, the multiple positioning of these organisations is evident and it is here that the point about fractured and tenuous alliances becomes visible. Such alliances allowed the different leaders to explore various possibilities without necessarily having to take responsibility for the results. The examples also demonstrate an increasing tension between the two GNC organisations and their affiliated associations. Events,

[60] Telephone Conversation, Daniel Kanyiles, 21/01/1997
[61] Interview, Daniel Kanyiles, Ritchie, 31/07/1996
[62] GNR-Ky Public Gathering, Kimberley, 29/03/1997

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tensions, conflicts and deliberate attempts at obstruction piled one upon another making it impossible to envisage a way out of the dilemma. On both sides of the divide - the GNC-Ky, the GPO, the GNR and the Griquas of Adam Kok versus the GNC-Kr - organisations and individuals have, on the one hand, engaged in behaviour guaranteed to undermine any negotiations or progress towards unity and, on the other hand, tried to claim the 'unity process' as their own initiative.

How then, does one make sense of Griqua politics and the process of unification? An examination of Griqua politics, past and present, provides an overriding impression of political incompatibility. Petty resentments, long-term disagreements and the constant jockeying for leadership positions characterise relations between various organisations. It is clear, however, that a two-pronged process is occurring here. The tendency among Griqua organisations is towards factionalism and the creation of multiple organisations, but the need for leaders to request from, and therefore conform to the requirements of, largely unsympathetic governments and the unending attempts to build up organisational strength has meant that the organisations have constantly initiated processes directed at unity. To use Bailey's terminology, Griqua politics are 'partly independent of, and partly regulated by, larger encapsulating political structures' (1970: 12).

UNITY AS A RELATIONSHIP, AND IN RELATION TO WHOM?

Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated that questions of Griqua unity and political representation are closely linked, both to present and historical circumstances (cf. Wilmsen and McAllister, 1996: 11). As suggested by Gledhill, there is more at stake here than the historical processes of factionalism, resistance to government imposition and the need to request or demand recognition from the same government. Alonso has pointed out that, 'nationalism and ethnicity are constructed reciprocally' and the self-identity of a nation is ensured through identifying 'others' within the nation. It is, in part, the identification of internal others that allows a particular version of national identity to become inscribed as the norm (1994: 390). The process of creating a nation-state thus entails processes of homogenisation (the calls for Griqua unity) and simultaneously, of 'othering' (the insistence on the part of Griqua leaders that they are not merely South Africans). Foster has argued that, '(n)ation-state formation thus entails a (hegemonic) struggle for homogenization that constructs a (contested) border between the central "mainstream" and peripheral, heterogeneous units of the nation-as-community' (1991: 245; also see Williams, 1989). These simultaneous processes of nation-building and ethnic maintenance, taking place shortly after the birth of a new South Africa, can be clearly seen in the processes of negotiation between the various

Griqua organisations and the current South African government. Despite these negotiations, however, by 1997 there was still no clarity on what minority groups such as the Griqua stood to receive, by way of redistribution or compensation for apartheid discrimination.

Throughout these negotiations, leaders firmly insisted on their identification as Griqua. During the apartheid years, they argued, Griqua people were placed in the category 'Coloured' and, as described in Chapter Four, their own identity was ignored. Post-1994, Griqua leaders complained that they were essentially being told that 'they must get out of the coloured bus and into the rainbow bus. It's all the same, there's no difference between the buses, one is called coloured, the other is called rainbow'.[63] As suggested in this statement, being acknowledged as South African or as members of the rainbow nation was not enough for the leaders of the Griqua people. They felt that this, like the apartheid classification of them as Coloured, failed to acknowledge their specific ethnic identity. Their insistence on recognition of Griquaness can be seen, not only as a mobilising strategy, but also as a means of securing their pride and importance within South African political circles. As Eriksen has commented '(m)embers of many minority groups refuse to become assimilated into a majority or dominant ethnic group, and culture, as well as ethnic histories, have become objects of pride rather than shame' (1994: 550). Thus, as Mauzy argues for Malaysia, 'the real problem for democracy has always been the protection of the rights and interests of minorities' (1993: 107; also see Singh, 1993). As already pointed out, this argument is especially applicable to the South African situation where authors have identified ethnic identities as having the 'potential to wreck any nation-building exercise' (Grundlingh, 1991: 25, Coakley, 1993: 18).

In order to understand the processes of negotiation and this insistence that Griqua people be recognised and their political issues addressed, it is necessary to recognise that the Griqua leaders were capable of uniting, and indeed did so on a number of occasions. Their refusal to unite completely was neither related to their inability to do so, nor to their stubborn recalcitrance. Rather, it is necessary to understand their dilemma in terms of their structural position in South African society and in relation to other segments of the population. As emphasised by Gluckman and Evans-Pritchard in their studies of African political systems during the 1940s, unity or alliances were the opposite side of disunity and factionalism and, like studies of nationalism and ethnicity, the two conditions have to be seen in relation to each other (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, 1941; Gluckman, 1940). A critical question - initially posed by Evans-Pritchard in his analysis

[63] Interview, Martin Engelbrecht, Kimberley, 15/01/1997 and Tourism and Heritage Conference presentation, Pretoria, 6/02/1997

of Nuer politics - concerns who the Griqua were expected to unite against. Whereas the governments of South Africa have repeatedly called upon the Griqua to unite and to select one leader who would represent all Griqua, anthropological wisdom suggests that unity occurs in relation to other people, organisations or segments of society and that ethnicity is 'by its very nature an oppositional construct' (Wilmsen and McAllister, 1996: viii). O'Duffy's analysis of conflict in Northern Ireland, for example, suggests that one of the criteria necessary for leaders to engage in accommodative behaviour, is a 'history of compromise, usually facilitated by the existence of a common enemy or threat shared by the communities in conflict' (1993: 132).[64] Similarly, analyses of apartheid South Africa generally understand the unity between Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites as oppositional to the black residents of the country (Giliomee, 1991: 37; Lewellen, 1992: 15). Correspondingly, the ANC is understood to have emphasised black political mobilisation, downplaying local ethnic divisions, because of its juxtaposition to a white racist society (Giliomee, 1991: 38).

Before the 1994 elections, Giliomee warned South Africans of the strength of ethnic loyalty and argued that it was more constructive to acknowledge ethnic loyalties than to create what he termed a 'false national unity' (1991: 38 - 40). He argued that South African nation-building needed a balance between national and subnational (or ethnic) loyalties:

> (n)ation-building depends on the two main parties finding a balance between national and subnational loyalties. Only when a group is secure in its subnational identity can it fully enter into national political arrangements and help to forge a strong national identity (1991: 42).[65]

In respect of the Griqua, attempts to move in this direction have been made by the current South African government, despite its initial reluctance to deal with Griqua demands. Pressure from Griqua organisations, which had powerful international backing from the United Nations Indigenous People's Forum, forced the Department of Constitutional Development (hereafter DCD) to seek some form of resolution. The first step towards a resolution had occurred a few years previously, when in 1996 the government publicly acknowledged that the Griqua were officially recognised as an important component of South African society. This was followed by the formation of a new alliance, The Griqua National Forum (GNF) in 1998. This organisation, inspired by

[64] Other criteria cited by O'Duffy include elite independence and authority over a well-established following and intra-segmental stability or a guarantee of votes from certain segments of the population (1993: 132).
[65] Also see Lemarchand who argues that what appears to be happening in Burundi is the emergence of a 'limited form of consociational participation based on the belated (and reluctant) recognition that ethnic identity matters', (1993: 166).

the anthropologists at the DCD who were desperate to find some way out of the constant factionalism, was government-established and incorporated key Griqua leaders. It was intended to facilitate unity amongst them and therefore brought the leaders together at regular intervals to discuss what form of constitutional accommodation would be most appropriate. The responsibility of seeking a solution for Griqua factionalism was hence transferred to the leaders themselves and the insistence that unity be the way to resolve this was dropped.

The GNF looked promising right from the beginning. Leaders were at least greeting each other and even if they disagreed during the meetings, there was plenty of time for socialising during meals and in the evenings. Perhaps partly because of the status of the Forum as a government body and partly because the DCD was paying, and leaders thus felt some kind of obligation to try and work things out, no-one ever stormed out of a meeting or refused to engage in further negotiations. Through the GNF, leaders began to examine seriously the question of their constitutional accommodation and, despite the seeming impossibility of unity, to co-operate and work together. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that the creation of the GNF instigated a number of processes that made it possible for these leaders to work together.

First, the creation of the Forum allowed a sorting process that legitimised certain voices and excluded others. Because the organisation was government-founded and sponsored, it was possible to dictate from the onset who could be represented on the Forum. The official criteria were specified as follows: each organisation was allowed only one representative and that position had to be filled by the leader himself. No-one else was to be present at Forum meetings. In addition, in order to be represented on the Forum, each leader had to be able to demonstrate his historical claim to leadership. Acceptance onto the Forum acted as a tacit acknowledgement that these claims were valid. In practice, however, things were not this neat. Although each leader was intended to represent his organisation on the Forum, Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II, perhaps because he was elderly and did not travel well, selected Cecil le Fleur, his father's brother's son, to represent the GNC-Kr at these meetings. Rather strangely, and perhaps because everyone was slightly unclear about what the Forum ought to be, Whellam Whellam from Douglas had no historical claim to Griqua leadership but was granted a position on the Forum simply because he represented some Griqua families who were claiming a portion of Schmidtsdrift. These criteria did, however, provide a means for both the Government and the Griqua leaders to sideline Martin Engelbrecht whose credibility had, by now, been somewhat undermined by his inability to work with

any of the other leaders.[66] Despite the fact that he had established himself as an independent chief after being spurned by Adam Kok, Engelbrecht had no historical claim to leadership. He made a few abortive attempts physically to force his way into the Forum before continuing to pursue other Griqua avenues.[67]

Secondly, although the Forum was a very expensive means of dealing with Griqua demands, this financial investment on the part of the Government was seen as proof of government intentions seriously to address constitutional accommodation of the Griqua.[68]

Thirdly, the Forum broke the impasse between the two GNC organisations in the following complicated manner: the anthropologists had hit upon the solution of the GNF as a means of dealing with a problem that they had not hitherto been able to solve. Prior to establishing the Forum they were under tremendous pressure from the Minister of Constitutional Development to come up with some means of resolution. Now, having advocated the Forum, they were responsible for ensuring that something came of the considerable financial investment. They therefore exerted pressure on the leaders to be active participants, to dictate what each meeting would seek to do and to meet their deadlines. The anthropologists thus handed over the management of the meeting to the leaders and retained the minor role of facilitators. This 'handing over' necessitated that someone be elected as chairman of the Forum and it was here that a major hurdle in the unity process was overcome.

Recall that the Break or *die Breek* of 1969 concerned the leadership claims of Eric le Fleur and Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II. One major advantage of the Forum was that neither of these two protagonists were present on the Forum. Eric le Fleur's position had been inherited by his son, Anthony, and Cecil le Fleur represented Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II. To date, and as Mandela had earlier believed, Andrew Abraham Stokenstrom le Fleur II had claimed paramountcy over all other Griqua leaders. Perhaps for these reasons, but perhaps also because this GNC-Kr was the best resourced, and possibly the largest organisation, and had established many of the international associations which all Griqua leaders had later used to exert pressure on the government, the anthropologists nominated Cecil for chairman. It was, however, precisely this organisational strength and the threat of paramount leadership that prevented the other organisations from supporting such a nomination. As mentioned

[66] GNF meeting with the Dept. of Constitutional Development, Kimberley, 6/12/1997
[67] Conversation, Johan Meiring, John Kitching, Kimberley, 16/11/1997
[68] The DCD funded all aspects of the Forum including transport costs, hotel bills, food, accommodation and the reproduction of paperwork. Conversation, Johan Meiring, John Kitching, Kimberley, 16/11/1997

earlier, none of the other members of the Forum acknowledged A.A.S. le Fleur as paramount chief and they did not want to give him, or his organisation, the chance to engulf them. Anthony le Fleur, leader of the much smaller GNC-Ky, was thus also nominated – and later elected – as chairman. With Anthony le Fleur as chairman and Cecil le Fleur as vice chairman, the new dispensation compensated for the hierarchy of the old arrangement by inverting it. This not only ended the discord between the two rival organisations, it also allowed all the respective leaders to operate without threat to their organisational integrity or leadership.[69]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the scenario envisaged by Evans-Pritchard was achieved in an unexpected way through the creation of this forum. Its successful beginnings encouraged the anthropologists to begin to address other marginal people's demands. In May 1998 the Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr Valli Moosa, thus organised a conference, in conjunction with the Geneva-based International Labour Office, which would examine the question of constitutional rights for vulnerable minorities. He announced that

> the Government had taken the first step regarding the constitutional accommodation of vulnerable communities with the establishment of the National Griqua Forum. Other communities, such as the Nama, Koranna and San, who view themselves as vulnerable communities, have also expressed an urgent need that attention be given to their needs in this regard (Press release, the Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 23 May 1998).

This confidence on the part of government officials to tackle the demands of a variety of other indigenous people who had formerly been classified as coloured, gave the various Griqua organisations something to unite against. As mentioned earlier, Griqua organisations on both sides of the division between the GNC organisations had begun to develop alliances with other indigenous minorities in South Africa. With the threatened inclusion of other minorities represented in a 'new directorate of traditional affairs' (Daily Mail and Guardian, 7/12/1998), it became necessary for the various Griqua leaders to unite against other indigenous communities. Unity of this sort was crucial if the leaders of the Griqua wanted to avoid a situation in which, rather ironically, the incorporation of other indigenous minorities of Khoi heritage also deserving special attention, would lump all these people together and risk reproducing a category very similar to the former apartheid category of Coloured.

[69] GNF meeting with the Dept. of Constitutional Development, Bloemfontein, 24/01/1998

CONCLUSION:

During the apartheid years, Griqua leaders had been placed in the category Coloured and their own identity had been ignored, despite various campaigns to force the apartheid government to recognise them as Griqua. This chapter has concerned the negotiations that took place between 1994 and 1998, the years during which the shaping of the 'new' South Africa was taking place. The chapter has demonstrated that questions of Griqua unity and political representation are closely linked both to present circumstances and to past events. The complex negotiations, the processes associated with the construction of ethnic identities and the way in which Griqua leaders negotiated with state bureaucracy demonstrate the manner in which the construction of local identities is contiguous with processes of nationalism. Resurgences of local identities are not, as has been suggested, threats to national consciousness, but are rather components of that national belonging. As Comaroff has argued, ethnic identities are, above all, relational (1996: 165). This is not to say, however, that ethnic identities are created only by the machinations of the government; rather complex historical processes of intra-ethnic competition act to shape the nature of ethnic / state relationships.

The claims to leadership, the numerous different organisations and the dispersal of the Griqua people throughout South Africa stems, in part, from the political and socio-economic conditions during the colonial era which shaped South Africa's future. Powerful and resourceful Griqua polities emerged during the colonial era, the leaders of which played fundamental roles in the opening up the South African interior and in the protection of colonial interests. These powerful Griqua leaders sought to ensure their political autonomy and independence. In order to achieve this, they trekked to new, 'uninhabited' locations whenever their leadership, political autonomy or independence was threatened, despite missionary attempts to stabilise and settle these Christian Griqua communities. As discussed in the following chapter, these treks – along with other historic processes – operated both to establish and consolidate the Griqua polities developed by aspirant leaders and, ironically, to undermine them, leading eventually to their loss of political power.

CHAPTER THREE
THE BIBLICAL LANDSCAPE:
A HISTORY OF GRIQUA DISPOSSESSION AND STRUGGLE


> *I commended them highly for having relinquished a wandering life and become a stationary people, and said I was happy that they were, from experience, convinced of its utility, and assured them that in proportion to the length of time they remained here they and their children would become attached to the spot and be desirous to promote its prosperity; that they should feel it become a home, of which, while wanderers, they were destitute (Campbell, 9/06/1813, reproduced in Schoeman, 1997: 76).*

Historians have written about the processes during which a proud, wealthy, land-owning Griqua elite came to end up amongst the poorest of South Africans (Shillington, 1985; White, 1977: Broodryk,1977; Marais, 1936/68; Legassick, 1969; Ross, 1974; 1976; Kurtz, 1988; Halford, 1949). In addition, and more recently, various Griqua historians have attempted, through writing, to redress some of the injustices of the past and to develop amongst their followers a sense of dignity and pride. A recent publication, by Doctor William Langeveldt, thus called for Khoisan descendants to know where they came from - in other words, to know their history - and, using that knowledge, to determine their 'place in the new South Africa' (1999).[1]

Notwithstanding the history of dispossession, struggle, and injustice, Griqua people living in South Africa have continued to stress their identity and, as illustrated in Chapter Two, have fought for the official recognition of this identity. They have also continued to emphasise their history and have clung to their pride, despite a long process of dispossession, increasing poverty and proletarianisation. Many of the features salient in and vital to the expression of Griqua identity in Griquatown today stem from the nineteenth and early twentieth century. An evaluation of Griqua history and the processes that have shaped the Northern Cape provides important contextual information and enhances our understanding of Griqua identity at the end of the twentieth century.

[1] Langeveldt's publication is one of a range of newly written, but not as yet published, versions of Griqua history produced by local individuals to further Griqua knowledge and understanding among their communities (see for example, Beddy, n.d., Engelbrecht, n.d.; Jansen, 1976; Jansen, 1996; Le Fleur, 1964). For more discussion on the value and nature of these histories see Waldman (1996) and Umino-Shiotsuki (1997).





Figures 3.1 & 3.2: Graphic depictions of Griqua history (done by Martin Engelbrecht, 1999)

THE ORIGINS OF GRIQUA IDENTITY

Most historians point to the interaction between indigenous Khoisan, slaves, Boer frontiersmen, Africans and European settlers as forming the origins of the present-day Griqua (Ross, 1976: 1, Penn, 1995: 23, Thompson, 1971: 245). Some authors have, however, placed greater emphasis on the Khoi and San elements of Griqua society (Legassick 1969: 95, 105; Halford, 1949: 15). Penn, for example, argues that

> (t)he Griqriqua,[2] who had been under the patronage and protection of the Namaqua, were, by the early eighteenth century, experiencing rapid social disintegration. Those who survived the raids and robberies of the colonists, the 1713 epidemic of smallpox and subsequent drought and stock disease, were either forced to work as servants for the Europeans or to *trek* (journey or migrate) away to the north. In time these survivors would form the nucleus of the Griqua ... (1995: 25).

[2] The name refers to a Khoi collectivity. It has been variously spelt: ≠Karixurikwa (Nurse, 1975: 5), Chariguriqua or Grigriqua (Halford, 1949), Charigurina (Elphick, 1977: 134) and /Karihur (Legassick, 1979: 268).

The history – and subsequent identity – of the Griqua stems from a complex process of identity construction for both coloured and Khoisan peoples and from the interaction of peoples within and between these categories. While the particular construction of Griqua identity is discussed in more detail in the following chapter, the following examination of identity formation at the Cape colony in the seventeenth century provides an introduction to these historical processes.

Within the Cape colony the first slaves had arrived shortly after the landing of Jan van Riebeeck in 1642 from places such as the East Indies, India, Madagascar, East Africa and West Africa (Martin, 1998: 525). As has long been recognised in academic scholarship, these people formed the basis of what would later become the coloured population in South Africa (Martin, 1998: 525, also see Chapter Three). Because of the constant demand for labour, female slaves were encouraged to bear children. In addition, their sexual services were sought after and the Dutch East India Company's slave lodge was frequently visited by sailors and residents (Armstrong, 1979: 87; Elphick and Shell, 1979: 127; van der Ross, 1986: 1-3).[3] Some stable unions were formed as men could purchase their partners' freedom and some fathers sought to provide for their children (Armstrong, 1979: 87). In addition, conversion to Christianity was a means through which slaves and their children, many of whom had European fathers, could acquire their freedom (Legassick, 1979: 74).[4]

During the first few decades of European settlement the different populations resident at the Cape remained distinct (Elphick and Shell, 1979). Slaves, Khoikhoi and Europeans had different religions, cultures, physical appearances and legal standings. By 1795, however, these boundaries had worn down (Elphick and Shell, 1979: 116).[5] It was at this time that the 'current conceptions of Coloured identity were forged' (Goldin, 1987: 157; Armstrong, 1979: 84). Martin has described the situation at the Cape shortly after the turn of the century as follows:

[3] Although Europeans were forbidden access to the slave lodge, Elphick and Shell point out that such legislation was not likely to have been enforced (1979: 126).

[4] Conversion to Christianity as a means of social and economic advancement was not, however, to last. As more people became slave owners, all of whom wished to retain their slaves, baptism ceased to be a means of securing freedom. Increasingly slaves and Khoi dependents came to be seen as fulfilling a natural role and Christianity was equated with white residents of the Cape. The Evangelical revival, in the late 1700s, allowed for people to be baptised, but not for a change in social or economic status (Legassick., 1969: 74 - 5).

[5] A number of processes had contributed to the breaking down of these boundaries. Included among them was the use of the Khoikhoi as wage labourers; the adoption of Christianity or Islam by slaves and free blacks; intermarriage and miscegenation; the freeing of the slaves and the frequent cultural exchanges that took place between all categories of people (Elphick and Shell, 1979: 116)

> Thus by 1838, the population of the Cape colony was made up of white colonists, Khoi-San aborigines and a group of heterogeneous people whose sole common feature was that they were of mixed parentage: descendants of European pioneers and Khoi-San women; of settlers and slaves; former 'free blacks' - i.e. political prisoners deported from the East Indies, and emancipated slaves - former slaves; and all those individuals who could be considered as neither white nor indigenous Africans (1998: 525).

After the freeing of the slaves, from 1834 - 1838, there emerged 'only one class of persons called Coloured' and this category included both Khoikhoi and slaves (van der Ross, 1986: 3). Many of these slaves established connections with the Khoisan populations resident in and around Cape Town in the seventeenth century and 'individuals fleeing their masters had sought refuge among the Khoi-San or African peoples' beyond the boundaries of the colony (Martin, 1998: 525; Legassick, 1969: 164).[6]

Many people had, as early as the mid-1770s, removed themselves from colonial society, because of their desire to escape its restrictions, thralldom and the tendency to treat them like slaves - to which they were increasingly subjected because of their Khoi or mixed status (Legassick, 1969, Penn, 1995: 35) - and in order to establish themselves as an independent state free of colonial control (Halford, 1949: 16). The Griguriqua were joined by escaped slaves, colonial misfits, frontiersmen of various nationalities, rebels and outcasts. This new community, formed on the frontier of the Colony, displayed social and cultural patterns distinct from those practised at the Cape and different to the lifestyle of precolonial peoples (Legassick 1969, 1979: 243). It is in this respect that Legassick has argued that '(i)t is, almost by definition, hard to give an account of the origins of the Bastards as a social group' (1979: 95). The frontier zone was a 'crucible where different races were mixed' and it provided new opportunities for those people not accepted into colonial society (Penn, 1995: 35).[7]

This collection of people known as '*Basters*' or 'Bastaards' - a name that reflected their mixed origins – was later to be identified as Griqua (Penn, 1995: 36). Adam Kok I, their first identifiable leader, is thought to have been a manumitted slave. (Boonzaier et. al. 1996; Halford, 1949; Jansen, 1996; Ross, 1976; Schoeman, 1997). In 1771, he left the Cape Colony and headed towards the Orange River intent upon establishing himself as a hunter. During his travels, he came into contact with the remnants of the

[6] See, however, Elphick who argues that although slaves and Khoikhoi were increasingly 'drawn together' during the eighteenth century, bitter antagonism characterised relations between them (1979: 30 - 33).

[7] Penn argues that the Orange River and its hinterland was previously occupied by Khoi pastoralists and San hunter-gatherer societies who shared the natural resources and co-operated with each other (1995: 22).


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Chariguriqua or Griguriqua who, attracted to his wealth in livestock, accompanied him as his followers (Ross, 1976: 14; Kinsman, 1989: 2; also see Strauss, 1979: 14).[8] As groups such as the Griqua and the Korana moved north towards the Orange River and away from the Cape Colony, they became 'absorbtionist rather than exclusivist, incorporating the shattered remnants of other fugitive groups, or else exercising a type of hegemony over weaker neighbours' (Penn, 1995: 45).

Adam Kok I settled initially at Piketberg (see Map 3.1). Here he initiated a long-standing relationship of protection between himself - and later his successors - and the administrators of the Cape Colony. These actions suggest that it was possible for Khoi groups such as the Griqua to establish relationships with the Cape Colony in the late 1700s and to attract either official sanction and support - as was the case for Adam Kok - or official anger (Penn, 1995: 37). These initial impressions of Adam Kok and his people as 'deserving' of colonial support were, as we shall later see, heavily to influence the course of history. A process had began in which – for the next 100 years – the Griqua were constantly to stress their independence and automony, but simultaneously to undermine their position by relying on the Cape Colony for official recognition and the military support necessary to retain Griqua sovereignty.

During the 1770s the pressure on the ecological resources of the Cape area increased and many *trekboers* (migratory farmers) initiated frequent forays into the interior. At the same time Khoikhoi rights to land and livestock were being eroded as they were increasingly condemned to servitude. As conflict between them intensified into a full-scale frontier war, *Basters* and other colonial Khoi were conscripted to serve in the commandos. However, these people had no commitment to a system that was increasingly denying them access to land and they responded by evading military action and *trekking* northwards. They were joined by other 'Bastaard-Hottentots' who resented colonial control and their servitude (Penn, 1995: 48; Legassick, 1969: 120). The *Basters* and other scattered Khoi were thus forced from the Colony by the 'increasing discrimination against them: they were the victims of a society of growing racism' (Legassick, 1969: 121). To the north of the Colony it was possible to retain a degree of autonomy as there were few whites brave enough to occupy the Orange River area (Penn, 1995: 51).

[8] According on some sources, considered dubious by Ross, Adam Kok is said to have married the daughter of a Chariguriqua chief.



Map 3.1: Places referred to in Chapter Three.

By 1790 the first *trekboers* had crossed the Orange River on raiding expeditions, despite the fact that such activity was technically illegal. The frontier was, however, a zone of lawlessness characterised by anarchy and social turmoil (Penn, 1995: 23). Although there was legislation to disarm those unlicensed to carry weapons, Cornelius Kok - a descendant of Adam Kok and hence on good terms with the Colonial authorities - was able to persuade the *Landdrost* that he and his followers were merely

livestock farmers, who engaged in additional ivory hunting and trading, but who did not partake in raiding expeditions and other 'devious' conduct (Penn, 1995: 62).[9] The missionaries, unlike the *trekboers,* were not restricted to the borders of the Colony. Evangelical initiatives were being felt in the frontier zone by 1703. The London Missionary Society (LMS) missionaries made their appearance in the frontier zone between the years 1779 and 1881 and, under their influence, a reshaping and consolidation of the frontier societies took place (Penn, 1995: 89, 90).[10] At about the same time, *Basters* began to *trek* northwards from Khamiesberg and to settle in the vicinity of the Orange River (Legassick, 1969: 117). This initiated a second process, whereby being Griqua came to be closely aligned with being Christian. The lifestyles of the *Basters* and Adam Kok's descendants, developing in the interior at the beginning of the nineteenth century, were to be strongly influenced by, and associated with, the missionaries for the next 100 years or so (cf. Waldman, 1989). As we shall later see, this relationship between Griqua identity and Christianity also contributed to the loss of Griqua independence. This was partly through the actions of mission converts who declared their newfound ability to preach the gospel and therefore their independence from the missionaries. The downfall was also due to the decreasing power of the missionaries who were themselves too weak to assist their converts during the period of great desperation at the end of the nineteenth century.

GRIQUA POLITICS AND MISSION CHRISTIANITY

Although Schoeman argues that there was no particular demand for evangelisation (1997: 10), there was some continuity between Christianity and Khoi beliefs. Elbourne has suggested that the Khoi

> tended to see Christianity as a particular revelation from a God in whom they already believed, whom they already worshipped, and whom many thought could, and did, intervene in the affairs of humanity (1995: 79, also see Carstens, 1966, 2000; Legassick, 1969).

The *Basters'* desire to live close to missionaries was also based on the misconception that missionaries were the representatives of the Colonial authorities who would protect the congregations they lived amongst (Schoeman, 1997: 9-10). The search for social standing among the Khoikhoi during the eighteenth century had, furthermore, led them to be among the first missionary converts to Christianity (Gerstner, 1997: 29, Elbourne

[9] Kok and his followers did, nonetheless, benefit from the activities of the rebels grouped around Afrikaner and others. Their raiding activities produced many poverty stricken refugees who Kok employed as herders (Penn, 1995: 89).

[10] England experienced an evangelical revival during the second part of the 1700s. This impressed upon British citizens the need to spread Christianity amongst the heathens resident in foreign lands. The London Mission Society, founded in 1795, was a direct result of this evangelical revival (Wilson, n.d. 38).

and Ross, 1997). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the anarchy, warfare and raiding in the interior had 'prepared a far wider and more receptive audience than missionaries Anderson, Kicherer, Kramer and Scholz could have imagined' (Penn, 1995: 90). Many Khoisan had congregated, along with others, at Rietfontein, a semi-permanent LMS mission established in 1799.[11] The mission had provided a place and an opportunity for people to come together and develop a concentrated defence at a time when the social fabric of entire societies was being torn apart (Penn, 1995: 90; Ross, 1976: 15). This social disintegration was fertile ground for Christianity, especially when its spiritual considerations were coupled with prospects of a more stable order: socially, politically and economically (Penn, 1995: 90).

Adam Kok I, having already transferred his authority to his son Cornelius Kok, retired to Khamiesberg (Halford, 1949: 35). By this stage Cornelius Kok was occupying the area later known as Griqualand West and the Northern Cape (Ross, 1976: 14).[12] He and his followers were involved with the missionaries Anderson and Kramer and this 'may be seen as the beginning of what was to become the mission at Griquatown' (Schoeman, 1997:10).[13] The missionaries had traveled with the *Basters* from about 1801 until 1804 when agriculture was initiated at Klaarwater (Kinsman, 1989: 5; Legassick, 1969: 174 - 5). The *Kapteins* were not especially interested in agriculture and tended to leave the manual labour to junior members of their families or to servants and clients. As these people did not have access to hunting, raiding and trading as opportunities to acquire wealth, agriculture was essential for their existence. During this time the number of clients at Griquatown grew rapidly, partly because of the 'absorbtionist' attitude of the *Kapteins* and partly because of their need to secure many clients to look after their vast cattle herds and to cultivate the land. By 1810 this group of servants and clients were sufficient in number to voice critical opposition to the *Kaptein's* reign and, as we shall later see, the resulting conflict led to the downfall of the *Kapteins* (Kinsman, 1989: 6).

The LMS, primarily concerned to ensure religious conversion, was also centrally involved in the political processes at Klaarwater.[14] The LMS missionaries, Anderson

[11] This mission failed as a result of the general harshness of the environment and the lack of interest from the San living in the area (Penn, 1995: 90).

[12] Legassick suggests that their movement into this area stemmed from a desire to escape Afrikaner, an Oorlam dependent who terrorised the frontier zone and introduced more brutal raiding and warfare than had hitherto been experienced (1969: 146).

[13] The Koks had, however, already encountered Christianity of a sort through Stephanos, a 'false prophet' who had fled to the Northern frontier. Here he persuaded the Koks to briefly retain his services as a religious messenger of God (Penn, 1995: 90-91, Legassick, 1969: 148).

[14] Kinsman argues that the Cape Colony believed Anderson had control over the mission station and this assumption spurred him to further engage in secular, administrative tasks (1986: 7). Legassick, however, points out that the

and Kramer, undertook managerial and centralising tasks for the people they ministered to. They did so, in part, because of the 'inadequacies of the pastoral political structure' to which the *Kapteins* were tied[15] and, in part, to facilitate permanent settlement (Kinsman, 1989: 6). Their activities in the political and economic domains were supported by the Colonial Government (Ross, 1976: 15).[16] Anderson – with the sanction of Lord Caledon of the Cape Colony – appointed Adam Kok II, the son and successor of Cornelius Kok, and Berend Berends, Cornelius' sister's son from a wealthy *Baster* family, as the *Kapteins* of Klaarwater (Griquatown) in 1809. These men each received staffs of office and 'replaced' the missionaries as administrators of the fledgling state, although it has been suggested that their power remained slight (Ross, 1976: 15; Legassick, 1969: 187; Kinsman, 1989: 8; Kurtz, 1988: 49; Halford, 1949: 42).




Figure 3.3: Griqua Staffs of Office on display in the Cultural History Museum (1995). Belonging to (from left to right):
Berend Berends (1770 – 1839)
Adam Kok II (1760 – 1835)
Cornelius Kok II (died 1858)

missionaries found themselves in a peculiar position where resistance to - or accommodation with - either the developing Griqua society or the Cape Colony resulted in their activities being seen as politically orientated. Not unexpectedly, therefore, the missionaries tended to side with the colonial authorities, although there were occasions when this was not the case (1969: 154, 155).

[15] The *Kapteins*, and later the *Raad* (or Magistrate's Council) elected at Campbell's suggestion in 1813, administered the pastoral community through their personal influence (Kinsman, 1989: 7)

[16] Majeke is particularly critical of missionary activity blaming them for, amongst other things, causing the Griqua to forsake their 'natural' associates in favour of alliances with the Colonial Government and defusing the powerful Griqua state (1953). Kurtz, in keeping with Legassick, argues that the missionaries 'awkwardly placed between the British Government ... and the Griqua ... , trying to urge constraint on the latter, while trying to obtain concessions from the former and often only antagonising both' (Kurtz, 1988: 8).

In 1813 Rev. John Campbell from the LMS arrived in Klaarwater. During his visit he amalgamated the scattered communities around Klaarwater (renamed Griquatown during his visit) and persuaded the *Basters* to adopt the name Griqua after their Chariguriqua forebears (Ross, 1974: 28; Halford, 1949: 42; Ross, 1976; Wilson, n.d.). This name change 'implied a change in reference-point from the colonial origins of the *Basters* to their claims of indigenous ancestry' (Legassick, 1979: 269). The name change aimed to break down the distinction between those of mixed ancestry and Khoi or 'Bushmen' people and provided a means for the integration of all indigenous Khoi into the Colony (Legassick, 1979: 269). Finally Campbell introduced a system of rule according to which a *Kaptein* was assisted in his role by a council, or *Raad*. In both West, and later East, Griqualand the *Kapteins* possessed considerable degrees of power[17]; but with missionaries usually present as their confidantes and political advisers (Ross, 1974: 27, also see Kinsman, 1989). Christianity was to 'become a core component of Griqua identity' and 'adherence to the church became a marker for allegiance to one or other of the political factions in various Griqua captaincies' (Elbourne and Ross, 1997: 40). Christianity, as a component of Griqua identity and as a marker of social status, has remained a key issue in Griquatown: an issue which is explored in greater detail in Chapter Five.

Campbell, during his visit to Griquatown, attempted to persuade people to erect 'superior' abodes (Halford, 1949: 43; also see Legassick, 1969:158, 173; White, 1977: 31, 88). Believing, in accordance with Anderson and Kramer, that Khoi itinerancy was contrary to a civilised existence, he sought to end the nomadic wanderings of their followers. This was done by encouraging people to build stone houses in the belief that fixed property would lead people to adopt a settled existence. Anderson's great objective was thus

> ... to keep the Institution fixed, and for this purpose he was endeavouring by all possible means to excite a spirit of attention to agriculture, and to wean them away from their attachment to the nomad life. He had already persuaded some of his people to build themselves houses instead of moveable huts ... (Lichtenstein reproduced in Schoeman, 1997: 34).

Although eradicating itinerancy proved to be difficult, the missionaries made gradual progress (Schoeman, 1997: 41, 63). In time, housing, religious worship and nomadism came to be the defining conditions by which they identified their congregations. The

[17] Kurtz argues that the constitution gave the *Kapteins* only limited power and, while undermining the leading families Kok and Berends, it provided the LMS with opportunities to influence the political system (1988: 49). In contrast, Elbourne and Ross suggest that, despite Anderson's involvement in Griqua administration, the LMS missionaries did not wield political influence (1997).

following two examples illustrate how people were typecast by the missionaries. In the first example Lichtenstein is writing about the *Baster* community at Kloof (a settlement nearby the mission station in 1805) and in the second example William Burchell, who visited Klaarwater round about 1811 and 1812, described the settlement. In both cases it is possible to see how the *Basters* (later to be called Griquas) came to be associated with a particular place - Klaarwater (Griquatown) – and, in contrast to the Kora and Bushmen, established or 'civilised' houses.

> The place where we were was inhabited by about thirty families, of which one-half were Bastards, the rest were Namaquas and Hottentots of the Great River, as they are called. The former lived in large, clean huts and were clothed in linen or woollen cloth; the latter lived in dirty pandoks and had skins thrown over them (reproduced in Schoeman, 1997: 39).

> (T)he Koras and Bushmen living within the Klaarwater district cannot be considered as belonging to the establishment, since they show no desire to receive in the least instruction from the missionaries, nor do they attend to their meetings, but continue to remove from place to place, a wild independent people' (reproduced in Schoeman, 1997: 58).

Permanent housing, by which the missionaries meant square stone houses, was considered necessary to prevent itinerancy and only settled persons were regarded as part of the mission station and under the patronage of the missionaries. A further distinction was, however, necessary: in order to civilise the *Basters*, the missionaries sought to screen believers from 'negative' influences. John Campbell thus complained that 'personal piety' was hindered by people clustered together in huts which prohibited reading and devotion and which encouraged 'all kinds of conversation' (Schoeman, 1997: 101). Two processes were thus set in motion by the missionaries: on the one hand the tendency to identity people 'ethnically' according to whether they lived at the mission or not and, on the other, the need to segregate Christians - later to be Griquas - from unbelievers, mainly Hottentots or Koranas. This sense of place, coupled with a Christian identity, has remained crucially important for people identifying themselves as Griqua and 'of Griquatown' and is further explored in Chapter Five. In addition, as discussed in Chapter Six, the insistence of the missionaries on permanent residence in solid houses finds current expression in ritual and has strongly influenced notions of gender in Griquatown during the late 1990s.

Although the Griqua submitted to the missionaries' demand to settle permanently in Griquatown, they retained a degree of 'wild' independence. As is evident in the previous chapter and in their later history, when particular individuals or *Kapteins* were

dissatisfied with conditions at a particular settlement or with the missionaries' actions, they and their followers would simply *trek* to another place and initiate a new Griqua settlement. At the time of Campbell's visit, however, people's own sense of identity was strongly aligned with the missionaries 'civilising mission' and to be Griqua was to aim towards being recognised by the Colonial Government as independent, 'civilised' and equal to white colonial society (van Vreeden, 1957: 30). As mentioned above, the *Basters'* initial associations with the missionaries were not driven by the need for conversion to Christianity, but rather because a missionary presence was seen as tangible evidence of established ties with the Colonial authorities based in Cape Town. In addition,

> by being baptised and learning to read and write, they hoped to become acceptable to the Christian (i.e. white) community of the Cape and be allowed entry into it, enjoying all the privileges this entailed in a society which was becoming increasingly colour conscious' (Schoeman, 1997: 14).

Thus Griqua, resident in Griquatown, were at pains to stress their adaptation to European and colonial society. Burchell comments, during his visit to Anderson and the Griquatown mission, on the dress of men who wore 'jackets and trowsers' and women 'decently clothed' (reproduced in Schoeman, 1997: 52). These people were, in addition, in the habit of annually visiting the Cape and were fluent in Dutch. Not everyone, however, conformed to the missionaries' ideas about civilisation and authority and, in 1814, the first signs of discord appeared in response to an appeal for military conscripts to serve in the Cape Colony (Legassick, 1969: 201; Schoeman, 1997: 17; Wilson, n.d. 14). The Griquas' refusal to meet this request led to the withdrawal of trade benefits by the Cape Colony (Legassick, 1969: 210). A number of Griqua, now deprived of legal trade with the Colony, moved away from Griquatown and began to reactivate their old, 'illegal' trading relationships with frontier farmers. Discontent was also noticeable within Griquatown. People began to disobey Campbell's laws, exhibited little desire to build or to practice agriculture, and resumed their nomadic ways (Legassick, 1969: 202; Halford, 1949: 37). This resulted in a rebellion in 1815, during which a number of followers left the mission and established themselves at the Harts River. The rebellion 'expressed a spirit of autonomy' and 'played a major role in fostering the process of "democratization" implicit in the replacement of the 'term "Bastard" by the term Griqua for the community (Legassick, 1969: 203, 207).[18]

[18] Although Adam Kok II and Berend Berends had retained their positions as *Kapteins* when Rev. Campbell introduced his system of rule, this new dispensation allowed for more egalitarian administration and undermined the power of these men (Legassick, 1969: 190).

Later known as the Hartenaar rebellion, this event spelt a rejection, not only of the colonial authority and the missionaries, but also of the *Kapteins* and their systems of authority (Legassick, 1969: 203 - 4; 1979: 272; Ross, 1976: 19).[19] Many similar upheavals, expressing resistance, occurred in the years 1815 to 1820 during which time Cornelius Kok I traveled from Khamiesberg to Griquatown in order to still the revolts. Cornelius Kok I was unable to achieve any success and, as a result, he, his son Cornelius Kok II, his grandson, Adam Kok II and their followers – acting according to an established pattern – retired to nearby Campbell to consolidate the Griqua and Christian people already settled there (Legassick, 1969: 208, see Figure 2.3 facing page 54). Actions of this sort were heavily to influence Griqua politics and always to undermine leaders' ability to present a united front. The tendency to deal with dissatisfaction by moving and, in the process, to oppose other Griqua leaders' claims of representation has, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, plagued Griqua politics until the present.

This process of diminishing support for the *Kapteins* stemmed from the redefinition of status and power that was taking place in Griquatown. As Legassick points out, it was no longer necessary to be a wealthy patriarchal leader in order to achieve status. Power in the community could now be associated with one's status in the church. Furthermore, an individual could acquire social standing through agricultural prowess or as a skilled artisan and trader (1969: 210; Kinsman, 1989: 4). Profits from trade meant that some ambitious individuals, previously tied to serfdom as cattle herders for the *Kapteins*, were able to 'free themselves from the web of pastoral society' by engaging in new activities. Such individuals sought to invest their profits in agriculture and were, as such, supportive of the missionaries but not of the *Kapteins* (Kinsman, 1989: 5) Sensing this, Anderson acted independently of the *Kapteins* and further undermined their status. He forbade Adam Kok II from retaliating against the Hartenaar rebels, instead inviting them to return to Griquatown (Legassick, 1979: 272). Not surprisingly, the *Kapteins* were dissatisfied with Anderson whom they saw as overriding their authority and questioning their ability. Events such as this, and other smaller rebellions, alongside the changing power and status relations, presaged the beginnings of a new era in Griquatown in which Christianity came to the fore (Legassick, 1969).

[19] It is ironic that Anderson was implicated in this rejection of colonial values as he was, at that very moment, emphasising to the Cape Colony that the Griqua were 'independent of this settlement and its government' (Legassick, 1969: 204).

THE CHRISTIAN *KAPTEIN*

Anderson, in acting independently of the *Kapteins*, was responding to demands by people, resident in Griquatown, who were opposed to the *Kapteins* and their patriarchal power, but wished to retain the advantages of a missionary presence. Indeed it was Andries Waterboer[20] who encouraged Anderson in his course of action described above and who blamed the *Kapteins* for the rebellion, arguing that they were 'unfit' to lead (Halford, 1949: 44; Legassick, 1979: 273).[21]

The Hartenaar rebellion presaged another change in Griqua political organisation. 'Until this time authority had been, at least nominally, centered around Griquatown' (Legassick, 1969: 214). Furthermore, it was founded on personal, ephemeral alliances between Kok and Berend, whose personal wealth, hunting, raiding and trading activities attracted a following. It was not, as Kinsman points out, an authority based on territorial ownership, but rather on physical prowess within a broadly undefined territory (1989: 3). With the return of the Hartenaars, however, several new centres developed as the disgruntled *Kapteins* moved away: Adam Kok II to Campbell and Berend Berends to Danielskuil. Smaller Griqua settlements also developed on the Harts River and at Hardcastle (Legassick, 1969; 1979).[22] With these developments, Griquatown was unable to re-establish itself as a centre of Griqua authority. Those people who had remained in Griquatown were, generally, of mixed descent and supported the missionaries (Halford, 1949: 45).

Anderson abandoned the mission in 1820 and, leaving Helm in charge, headed for Philipolis (in what is today the Free State). Several months later Helm was joined by the missionary Robert Moffat. Towards the end of 1820 Andries Waterboer was elected *Kaptein* and a new social order was introduced (Legassick, 1969: 223; Schoeman, 1996; Schoeman, 1997: 20; Wilson, n.d. 18). Waterboer's victory again raised the question of Griqua autonomy. Although Waterboer was elected as an 'independent chief' and purportedly without missionary sway, he – like other *Kapteins* – continued to rely on the Colonial Government for the preservation of his polity. Indeed it was these complex relations of military support and recognition on the one hand and assertions of independence on the other that has led historians to conclude that Griqua identity has an indeterminate and ambivalent quality: were the Griqua to be

[20] Andries Waterboer was born in 1789. Whereas Legassick identifies him as having been of 'San extraction with apparently no white "blood"' (1969: 211), Halford describes his arrival in Griquatown, in 1811, as that of a catechist of 'mixed origin' (1949: 37). In 1814 he became a 'native preacher' (Legassick, 1969: 211)

[21] The *Kapteins*, on the other hand, blamed the rebellion on the missionaries, citing especially favouratism displayed by Anderson towards the rebels (Legassick, 1969: 213).

[22] Dispersal was, however, also a suitable means of dealing with the increasing overpopulation and the desiccation of the environment (Legassick, 1969).

recognised as British colonists or as indigenous people of southern Africa (Legassick, 1969: 19-20; Ross, 1974, 42)? As illustrated in the following chapter, this amorphous quality is still associated with Griqua identity, although the parameters have shifted given the intervening years of apartheid and its accompanying racial classification.

Waterboer's reign was the beginning of a new era in which status was no longer the preserve of the patriarchal *Kapteins* and agricultural expansion was facilitated (Kinsman, 1989; Legassick, 1969).[23] During his reign from 1820 till 1856, his authority was enhanced by his conversion to Christianity, the support of the missionaries and his control as the sole authorised distributor of gunpowder (Ross, 1974: 34; Kinsman, 1989). This powerful combination of weapons, missionary support and Christianity allowed for a situation from which both missionaries and Griqua were to benefit. Upon Moffat's later arrival, he sought to distance the mission from its more secular role. By this stage, however, political, administrative and religious roles were deeply entwined. Andries Waterboer's reign at Griquatown coincided with the Mfecane[24] and was characterised by conflict. In 1823 Waterboer, Berend Berends and Adam Kok II accompanied the missionaries John Melville and Robert Moffat in an armed battle to protect the town of Dithakong.[25] This union between the three Griqua *Kapteins* was the only one of its sort and, in later years, the *Kapteins* were to be locked into cycles of competition and alliance that prevented them from presenting a united Griqua front to either the Colonial authorities or the Boer Republics (Peires, 1995: 222). Whereas Legassick argues that such disputes, rivalries and alliances were produced by the frontier conditions, Campbell has suggested that these conditions stem from the political structure of the people concerned (Legassick, 1969: 635; Campbell, 1960: 173 -4). Campbell's argument is supported by the fact that the cyclical process of alliance and conflict has continued to affect descendants of these Griqua leaders. As discussed in Chapter Two, this has made it difficult for the Griqua to establish channels of communication between themselves and the various governments of South Africa during the twentieth century.

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[23] Waterboer enforced herd management through a system of paddocks and fining. He regulated the water supply and, under his supervision, each family that worked a piece of land had access to water 'regulated by law'. He also attempted to increase the available water supply through digging ditches, watercourses and irrigation systems (Kinsman, 1989: 12; also see Wilson, n.d. 130 - 2).

[24] A period of social upheaval and massive dislocation of peoples in the South African interior, attributed to various causes such as Shaka's military expansion, ecological change resulting in severe drought and, according to some academics, increased slave trading.

[25] Also see Cobbing's argument of the Difaquane as a means to conceal missionary involvement in slave trade and raiding activities (1988). This argument has subsequently been revisited and critically evaluated (Eldridge, 1995; Saunders, 1995: Omer-Cooper, 1995; Peres 1995; Hartley, 1995).

The Mfecane, covering the period from 1822 to 1826, was characterised by large scale migrations across the interior of South Africa (Eldridge, 1995: 141 – 143; Shillington, 1985: 12). In an era of demographic upheaval, mass movements of destitute people led to attacks, counter attacks and, in turn, to further migrations across the countryside. People's desperation was fuelled by the fact that there was little opportunity to survive off crops, game and livestock, no t only because of the regular attacks, raids and counter-raids, but also because of severe drought. Both the Griqua and the colonists settled at the Cape border worried about the movement of wretched people across the county and the consequences that might result. Conditions were so bad that, in 1826, Moffat commented that 'the cattle were dying from want of pasture, and hundreds of living skeletons were seen going to the field in quest of unwholesome roots and reptiles, while many were dying with hunger' (Eldridge, 1995: 159).

Notwithstanding the tremendous movement of people, by 1826 the Griqua *Kapteins* and their followers were settled at three distinct centres in Transorangia. Waterboer was settled in Griquatown, Cornelius Kok II at nearby Campbell and Berend Berends and Adam Kok II far to the south-east at Philipolis, although Berend Berends soon returned to Danielskuil and then settled at Boetsap (see Map 3.1). These centres were not the only foci of power and by 1826 various Sotho-Tswana chiefs and their followers were also settled in the area (Legassick, 1969: 379). It was becoming increasingly difficult for Waterboer, and the other Griqua leaders, to assert their hegemony over these peoples. They no longer had a monopoly over firearms and gunpowder and the missionaries were unwilling to help them secure these items (Legassick, 1969, 381). Nonetheless, after the upheavals of the Mfecane, Waterboer attempted to recover and to rebuild his Griqua state. The other Griqua leaders, along with Sotho and Tswana chiefs such as Moshoeshoe and Sekonyela, were similarly seeking to restore order and to assert themselves as leaders (Legassick, 1969: 432).

Waterboer, accompanied by Wright and encouraged by Philip, the South African superintendent of the LMS, wanted to establish himself in the eyes of the Colonial authorities, as the appropriate person to undertake the defence of the northern frontier (Legassick, 1969: 480). Philip also saw Waterboer as a means of developing broader hegemony over Transorangia (Kurtz, 1988: 54).[26] In Philip's eyes, Waterboer was the 'defender of the northern frontier' who had 'saved' Transorangia from devastation by Mzilikazi and from Boer control (Legassick, 1969: 591). In addition, Waterboer was said to be thwarting slaves' attempts to flee across the Orange River and restricting

[26] This vision was, however, limited only to Khoi (or coloured) people and disregarded all Bantu-speaking inhabitants (Legassick, 1969: 610).

colonists from establishing contact with the Banditti. Thus, according to Philip's expansionist ideals,

> (n)o longer were Griquatown and Kuruman to be merely stepping stones to the interior. Griquatown was to become the focus of a great Christian Griqua Republic, controlled by the LMS and controlling all the peoples of the northern frontier (Kurtz, 1988: 54).

Griqua expansion, as envisaged by Philip, required unification between the various Griqua *Kapteins* and Sotho-Tswana Chiefs occupying Transorangia. The growth of the Griqua nation, which was to be an enterprise with uncertain consequences, was attempted through expanding Griqua borders and by subjecting the Sotho-Tswana to Griqua control. The failure to establish alliances between the Griqua *Kapteins*, however, undermined all their attempts to limit white encroachment.

Although Philip wished to implement his plan of Griqua hegemony with Waterboer as the paramount leader, he was forced to acknowledge the distant Philipolis as an independent entity. Philip therefore suggested that Adam Kok II's captaincy be acknowledged by the Colonial authorities and that a treaty, similar to that which existed between Waterboer and the Colony (see below), be entered into (Kurtz, 1988: 58; Legassick, 1969:483). This was part of a process whereby Griqua leaders fought amongst themselves for independence and autonomy, while at the same time relying on Colonial authorities to defend their autonomy. As we shall see, such negotiations were destined to undermine Griqua authority and to facilitate the demise of the Griqua polities. Ironically, it has continued to influence Griqua politics into the twentieth century and, as has been demonstrated in Chapter Two, has led to a situation in which current Griqua leaders attempt, with varying degrees of success, to demonstrate political unity amongst themselves.

In order to facilitate the signing of treaties, Philip represented Waterboer as Christian, respectable and accommodating of colonial values. Chidester has, however, argued that these ethnically mixed and diverse Griqua communities, although maintaining a Christian affiliation, close trading and military relations with the missionaries, were ruled by warlords and armed horsemen (1992: 42; Penn, 1995: 93). Their raiding expeditions were instrumental in the advance of Christian missions, not because they were Christians, but because their attacks in the 1820s and 1830s motivated certain African groups - the Sotho of Moshoeshoe, the refugees known as Mfengu, and the Tswana to the North - to turn to missionaries for protection (Chidester, 1992: 42). A situation had therefore arisen in which the Griqua *Kapteins* competed for Colonial

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