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UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E

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by: Ian Phimister

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African Studies Seminar Paper to be presented at Seminar in RW 319 at 4.00 pm on Monday, the 16th August, 1982.

THE MAKING OF COLONIAL ZIMBABWE, SPECULATION AND VIOLENCE 1890-1902.

Ian Phimister

NOTE

This paper does not follow the usual seminar format as it is a chapter out of a forthcoming book by Dr. Phimister.

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THE MAKING OF COLONIAL ZIMBABWE: SPECULATION AND VIOLENCE 1890-1902

Ian Phimister

> 'The relationship between a good or bad share market on the one side and a British Colony in the stage of tender infancy on the other is to be studied, if anywhere, in this country of Rhodesia. Rhodesia is a country which, almost avowedly is intended to be built up, or at least forced upward, by aid of gold mining and land dealing on the £1 share limited liability principle' (*Rhodesia Herald*, 1898)

The immediate genesis of colonial Zimbabwe grew out of the discovery of the main gold reef on the Witwatersrand in 1886. When news of the find reached the diamond mining centre of Kimberley, reaction was mixed. Some entrepreneurs, particularly those bruised in the on-going fight to amalgamate the diamond industry, made their way as fast as possible to the Rand. Others, with much less reason to gamble, like Cecil Rhodes, held back. Rhodes' scepticism, rooted in the recent failure of the Barberton goldfield and the crash of its stock exchange, was confirmed by the professional opinion of his mining expert. 'If I were to ride over these reefs in America', said Gardner Williams, 'I would not get off my horse to look at them'.[1] And when Rhodes finally did act, his luck was as poor as the advice he had previously received. Gold Fields of South Africa Limited, registered in London

at the start of 1887, ended up with the most unpromising sections of the Rand. Returns from the company's first mining operations were so discouraging that Rhodes and his fellow managing director, Charles Rudd, hastily transferred the bulk of Gold Fields' capital into diamond shares. As they pondered their next move, it was clear that the purchase of additional and better Rand properties would be ruinously expensive. In any case, their faith in the new goldfield was shaken. 'We have come to the conclusion', wrote Rudd in August 1888, 'that our best chance of a big thing is to try and make some terms with Lobengula for a concession for the whole of his country'.[2]

The legendary riches of Ophir had long been rumoured to lie between the Limpopo and the Zambesi, and for over twenty years had attracted the fluctuating interest of individual concession - seekers and foreign governments. In 1867, Karl Mauch, an amateur geologist and traveller, regaled readers of the *Transvaal Argus* with descriptions of the 'vast extent and beauty' of the goldfields he had recently seen in southern Zambesia. His account of 'white reefs of auriferous quartz glistening in the sun as they cropped out here and there' was repeated and amplified in Britain, where *The Times* published a Bank of England assay of Mauch's quartz samples showing 1185 ozs. gold to the ton![3] Although the ensuing 'rush' to the Tati district and the 'northern goldfields' of Mashonaland quickly ebbed in the face of disappointing results and staggering transport

costs, and turned instead to the rewards of Kimberley, interest in the 'road to the north' and the 'far interior' never entirely disappeared. It was nourished, at different times and for different purposes, by missionaries, by Rhodes himself, and by British imperial considerations of supremacy and strategy. The German annexation of Damaraland and Namaqualand in 1884 drew Britain northwards into Tswana territory between the Transvaal and the west coast, but official interest in the lands across the Limpopo continued to be muted and fitful. Even Rhodes was equivocal, blowing hot and cold on northern expansion. He thought the evidence of mineral wealth in Lobengula's domains was unconvincing, and in July 1885 described the region as 'fever-stricken' and unfit for settlement.[4]

From 1886, however, the pace of events quickened as developments on the Rand began to transform the face of Southern Africa, in the process dramatically enhancing the importance of the 'far interior'. Glowing reports from visitors to Matabeleland had caused Rhodes to change his mind about the territory's potential even as his Gold Fields company was left on the fringes of the first Rand boom, while at the same time the threat seemingly posed to British supremacy by the magnitude of the gold discoveries in the Transvaal encouraged the Imperial authorities to become increasingly solicitous of Cape colonial aspirations. At Rhodes' prompting, Lobengula was persuaded to sign a treaty

in February 1888 which effectively made Matabeleland a sphere of British influence, and eight months later Imperial officials again cooperated closely with Rhodes' emissaries in securing the Rudd Concession. This grant of 'all metals and minerals situated and contained in my kingdom... together with full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same',extracted with consummate duplicity, was soon afterwards repudiated by Lobengula. His protests, stifled by Rhodes' henchman, Leander Starr Jameson, and delayed by officials in Cape Town , were ultimately ignored by the Imperial Government. Instead, the concession,greatly helped by the pragmatic amalgamation of competing commercial interests and the careful assembly of a prestigious board of directors, was accepted as the basis for the Royal Charter of 29 October 1889. Empowered by the Charter to'make treaties and promulgate laws, as well as to maintain a police force and undertake public works', Rhodes' British South Africa Company lost little time in recruiting an invasion force. To the undoubted satisfaction of Rhodes and his backers, many of its members came from the Rand, then gripped by depression because the mines had struck a refractory sulphide zone from which it was difficult and expensive to recover gold. An initial highly risky plan for a direct assault on the Ndebele was discarded in favour of an expedition to the goldfields of Mashonaland, ostensibly within the terms of the concession, but actually beyond

Lobengula's rule. In June 1890 the 'pioneer column', fortified with maxim guns and a steam-powered searchlight to ward off night attacks, moved warily northwards to the highveld of Mashonaland. There, at the end of September, the column was disbanded and prospectors swarmed into the countryside to locate the 'Second Rand'.[5]

Because it was confidently assumed that 'several new Johannesburgs'[6] would soon be found, Rhodes and the B.S.A. Company thought that actual mining would be far beyond the resources of individual prospectors and syndicates. Development would necessarily be in the hands of large capital and regulations were framed accordingly.[7] For its part, the Chartered Company did not seek direct involvement in production. As the primary representative of financial and speculative capital, the B.S.A. Company set the terms of entry and sought to hold the ring for the operations of industrial and merchant capital; it aimed to provide an administrative and transport infrastructure, but would otherwise take its profits through shareholding in other companies.[8] Under the mining law, both prior right to company flotation and fifty percent of such vendors scrip were claimed for the Charter. It is 'an enormous thing', explained Rhodes to his London Board, as the system 'practically means ... we shall get half the minerals of the country'.[9]

At first, hopes were high as prospectors rushed from one reputedly rich area to another. 'Everybody was going to

make money quickly and everybody meant to meet everybody else at Chicago (Trade Exhibition) - "Chicago '93!"'. Even dogs were called Concession and Syndicate by owners convinced that they were 'made men'.[10] By the third week of October 1890 some 300 men were prospecting the country around forts Salisbury, Charter and Victoria, and the favoured region of Hartley Hills soon bristled with claim pegs. Wonderful reports of Mashonaland began to circulate in the Cape Colony where tales of 'grass ten feet high, of trees sixty feet in circumference, of mysterious ruins' lost nothing in the telling. 'The whole country', it was said, 'was one vast gold-reef'.[11] The B.S.A. Company, anxious to ensure that equally wondrous stories reached investors in Britain, relied on the well-connected Sir John Willoughby to publicise reports of gold reefs 'averaging four feet in thickness, bearing three or four ounces to the ton'.[12] Visitors entering the country for the first time a little later on and struck by the contrast with Bechuanaland, were still more euphoric, 'Here one would never be surprised to come across the roc's egg of Sinbad', wrote the archaeologist Theodore Bent, 'or the golden valley of Rasselas; the dreams of the old Arabian story-tellers here seem to have a reality'.[13]

For many prospectors, though, much of the romance washed away in the tremendous rainy season of 1890/1. Supplies, already irregular because of the inability of the Bechuanaland

Trading Association to cope with the contract won from friends in the B.S.A. Company,[14] dwindled rapidly when swollen rivers cut communication with the south for over three months. The rains brought malaria which was bad enough, but even worse was the perennial menace of horse sickness which came close to leaving the whites with nothing but ox-drawn transport. At Fort Victoria in 1891 travellers could see 'the hundred and fifty saddles placed in rows within the fort, which had once belonged to the hundred and fifty horses brought up by the pioneers, all of which had died of horse sickness.'[15] Nor did the sideways lunge of the Chartered Company for Manicaland in the first half of 1891 do anything much to dispel the gloom settling over the prospectors. Although systematic mining work was severely handicapped by lack of equipment, enough had been done to establish the poverty of local goldfields. There were no alluvial deposits worth mentioning and the numerous shafts and pits left by precolonial Shona mining operations had begun to foster the uneasy suspicion that the 'ancients' had 'picked the eyes' out of the country.

But as the rivers went down, so confidence returned. Fresh gold-seekers poured into the country, certain that they would succeed where others had failed. 'We are having lots of difficulties, but no doubt marble palaces and steam-yachts will be the result of present inconvenience', wrote one young miner. [16] 'Many of the new chums', observed Percy

Fitzpatrick, 'seem to think that it is going to be the Rand game over again, and that all you want is a trap and pair and compass, and then the cheque.'[17] More important, however, was what London and Kimberley capital, prominently represented by Lord Randolph Churchill and Alfred Beit, would make of the new country. And they reached a very different conclusion. Mining experts were sent to various goldfields and when their unflattering impressions became widely known, the country slid swiftly into an economic depression.[18] By November 1891, everything was 'stagnation. Economy the order of the day in every household... The whole concern has the appearance of (an) enormous bladder unduly inflated and suddenly pricked. One might say that the experts were the people who have pricked it'.[19] The London board of the B.S.A. Company, already nervous about the state of the company's finances, saw its shares fall below their par value of £1 for the first time in December. Ten months previously they had been worth over £2 each.[20] With little prospect of fresh capital entering Mashonaland, the Chartered Company found its original capitalisation of one million pounds ludicrously small in relation to the demands being made on it, and teetered on the verge of bankruptcy.

The rescue operation which followed took several forms. Subsidies from friends and a vigorous policy of retrenchment first lessened the risk of ignominious collapse and then

provided a breathing space for the Company in the course of 1892. De Beers and Gold Fields of South Africa were induced to make a series of investments, loans and grants which went a long way to keep the B.S.A. Company afloat.[21] Simultaneously, cash expenditure was slashed, causing what was left of the Company's civil administration to be heavily dependent on settler magistrates, field cornets and burgher forces.[22] In its place a system of extravagant land concessions was used both to reward companies and individuals for past services and to encourage speculative interest in Mashonaland.[23] Sir John Willoughby's calculated defiance of the Portuguese at Beira in 1891 was rewarded with 600,000 acres.[24] Dunbar Moodie, who had accompanied Jameson on his abortive mission to Gungunyana of the Gaza, was allowed to carve out a fiefdom of over 60,000 acres in the Melsetter district after his trek to the Eastern Highlands in 1892-3,[25] and equally huge grants were lavished on the Copenhagen (Mashonaland) Company, on Chartered Goldfields Limited, on Moore's Rhodesia Concession, and on others courted by the Chartered Administration.[26]

Steps were also taken to counter the damage done by unfavourable publicity. Doubts were cast on Churchill's competence and journalists were paid to keep the 'New Eldorado' before the investing public.[27] A handbook published in 1892 unblushingly claimed that 'an uninterrupted gold belt extends from the Umtali Valley south-westerly to Victoria, which may possibly prove to be connected with the Tati gold-fields',[28]

while Rhodes himself helped to prepare the B.S.A. Company's annual report which disingenuously described Mashonaland as 'a country with reefs in all directions.'[29] A virtue was even made of the vice of the territory's isolation. The slow and expensive transport system which crippled mining activity wasn't without its advantages. For long periods of time it left the outside world at the mercy of information which reached it along the Company's telegraph line. The melancholy fact that less than 800 ozs. gold were produced in the whole of 1892 was obscured by insistent claims to the contrary. 'Everywhere new finds are occurring daily', trumpeted Jameson in May 1893. 'Crushings everywhere successful. Wonderful developments in every district. Reefs certainly improve as depth increases.'[30]

The overall result of these different policies was to create a highly combustible mixture of settler and speculative interests which was soon ignited by a clash with the Ndebele near Fort Victoria in July 1893. Local whites, embittered by stagnant economic conditions and prospects, were outraged when raiding parties abruptly closed the few working mines and farms by killing some of their labourers and causing the rest to flee. But Jameson, who had hurried down from Salisbury, was moved less by the howls of the settlers for war, than by the fact that the Ndebele near the town were easily shot and dispersed by a small local force.[31] This suggested the possibility of a cheap confrontation,

even as news of the Ndebele raid caused Chartered shares to fall rapidly on the London market. After momentary hesitation, Rhodes and Jameson raised settler columns on the promise of land and mining claims yet to be won, and set out to manufacture a war for the seizure of Matabeleland.[32] As Jameson well knew, 'the getting of Matabeleland open would give us a tremendous lift in shares and everything else. The fact of its being shut up gives it an immense value both here and outside.'[33] With the bulk of the Ndebele army either away north of the Zambesi or incapacitated by smallpox contacted in the same campaign, the invaders had little difficulty in breaking through to Bulawayo. Lobengula withdrew towards the Zambesi where he soon afterwards died. Satisfied that their conquest was complete, dignatories of the B.S.A. Company sat down that Christmas to dine off 'Lobengula's peacocks and a plum pudding sent from England.'[34] 'The whole affair', noted a Chartered employee, had been a 'good piece of business.'[35]

For roughly two years after the end of the war, the B.S.A. Company basked in unaccustomed favour and prosperity. Within months of the conquest it was reported that 'a sum of over half a million has ... been subscribed in cash by independent Companies', and as this trend accelerated in 1895, the number of development companies in the country rose to about 200, while on the Bulawayo stock exchange Chartered shares changed hands at £8.17.6. Altogether, well in excess of £15 million of nominal capital was

registered in this period.[36] Company interest swung westwards and for a while Mashonaland was 'practically deserted'.[37] By August 1894, Bulawayo, whose generous proportions were planned with one eye firmly fixed on overseas sharemarkets, already boasted over one hundred general stores, three banks, twelve hotels, three newspapers, twenty six share brokers and nine solicitors. The whiskey-soaked frustration and wretchedness of the last few years in Mashonaland were swept away as the town's 2000-plus whites, cossetted by the novelty of electric light and buoyed up by tales of successful prospectors who bathed in champagne, flung themselves into 'the fascinating pursuit of easily gotten wealth.'[38]

The boom was almost exclusively speculative as opposed to industrial in character. Although partly based on overestimation of the region's mineral resources, local conditions were intimately dependent on the Rand boom of 1894-5. 'The moment is usually in these matters of much more importance than the thing', observed the *National Review* in 1895. 'It would be much easier ... to sell desert sand for gold reef when a Johannesburg had cleared the way and roused the enthusiasm than to dispose of a Golconda in cold blood and to an uninterested public.'[39] This close association of the two sharemarkets thus enabled speculators to redirect capital for the partial resuscitation of the previously discredited Mashonaland goldfields[40] and allowed the local boom to

continue undisturbed even after the failure of Matabeleland to disgorge a major goldfield. The market was one where insiders made money, and where 'for nine months of each year' the development of the country's gold mines was 'gravely performed by cable and telegraph.'[41]

As 'the real gold mine was at Home, in the pocket of the British Public',[42] no serious attempts were made either to advance railway construction or even to bring most mines anywhere near production. The trick was turned by other means, chiefly by the issue of alluring company prospectuses. It sufficed that thousands of gold claims were pegged and millions of acres of land were alienated to companies such as Sabi Ophir Mining, to the wonderfully named La Concorde and City and Suburban (Matabeleland) Gold Development, and to hundreds more all scrambling for the favour of investors.[43] Perhaps the largest single market coup of the time was pulled off by the inner circle of the B.S.A. Company itself. They had come 'very close to defrauding' their shareholders by keeping the Rudd Concession in their own hands, but this was now sold to the Chartered Company for one million of its shares, an exchange which was worth millions of pounds on the rising market.[44] 'There is a certin deadly fascination in the game', concluded the *National Review*. 'It is so big, so thorough: half a dozen acres of desert land at one end and two hundred thousand pounds of English money at the other... The day of exposure

must come, of course, some time or other; it will be bad ... for people who are in it, but it will be all right for those who have made their pile and cleared out ... That is what they say, and they encourage each other to make the utmost of the golden opportunity. Round the bars of the Maxim or Charter they drink to their friends at home and swear to show them that they "are not out here for their health"'. [45]

Towards the end of 1894, with the boom picking up momentum, Rhodes and Jameson went off to England where their time was pleasantly divided between whipping up the boil and the froth of speculative capital and accepting honours. Rhodes, received by the Queen, drew a crowd which blocked traffic when he congratulated the bemused shareholders of the Chartered Company on possessing a country with 'hundreds of miles of mineralized veins.'[46] For his part, Jameson, newly resplendent as a Commander of the Bath, was feted at a banquet and meeting of the Imperial Institute presided over by the Prince of Wales. Matabeleland and Mashonaland, declared Jameson, not only were rich in gold but were blessed with coal and iron and '100,000 fat, sleek cattle' to prove their pastoral value. 'A happy combination', remarked *The Times* next morning, 'of Canaan, Ophir and the Black Country'.[47] What *The Times* did not know, however, and what Rhodes and Jameson omitted to tell their distinguished hosts, was that some time previously they had realised

that the region's gold prospects were distinctly modest. In August-September 1894, John Hays Hammond, Consolidated Goldfields' famous mining expert, had been invited to inspect Chartered territory in the company of Rhodes and other notables in the B.S.A. Company stable. His visit had emphasised that the real whereabouts of the 'second Rand' lay in the deep levels of the Rand itself - the economic and political implications of which were not lost on his audience - and not in the very different quartzite reefs of Mashonaland and Matabeleland.[48] These would require extensive development work to establish their values, and to meet this consideration, the B.S.A. Company passed new legislation in 1895 which aimed at nudging mining companies into continuous development of their properties.[49]

Tied to this tentative encouragement of industrial capital were further salvoes in the process of primitive accumulation. Because the essential purpose of the Chartered Administration was to provide the minimum conditions for the more or less orderly accumulation of capital, the Company had lost little time in trying to assert its authority over those Shona polities it could reach. An initial policy of seeking treaties with leading Shona paramounts was hastily dropped, however, when it risked exposing the limited extent of the Rudd Concession. The B.S.A. Company instead confined itself to occasional patrols, while consolidating its shaky position against threats from

Portugal and the Transvaal, with the result that the extension of its rule over the Shona was extremely gradual and uneven. To a certain extent, the newcomers, like the Portuguese before them, were simply absorbed into existing political patterns. Some Shona, for example, began involving whites in succession disputes or enlisting their help in raids for cattle, while others such as Mutasa of Manyika maintained an aloof independence by playing on the rivalries of the B.S.A. Company, the Portuguese and in this particular case, the Beningfield Syndicate. Still other rulers, like Chivi and Zimuto in south-western Mashonaland, carefully interposed the Chartered Company between themselves and the Ndebele, as they sought to make good their independence from both.[50]

The other side of the coin, though, was that while the highly localised nature of Shona political and social organisation could provide substantial room for manoeuvre, it also meant that individual groups were vulnerable to the concentration of B.S.A. Company force against them. [51] Intermittent Company challenges to Shona sovereignty in the period 1891-3 were thus more often successful than not, as people in different areas ran foul of the Chartered Administration's growing determination to demonstrate the sacredness of white lives and property.[52] Murder, theft and what the whites perceived as insolence and insubordination were promptly countered by murder and theft on an

intimidating scale, most spectacularly by the para-military police expeditions of 1892. One particularly notorious incident which began with the theft of a white trader's goods, ended with the deaths of twenty-three Africans and the confiscation of forty seven cattle.[53] Near Charter, a large village attacked by white policemen was soon afterwards found to be 'completely deserted, the natives having fled in terror from the outrages committed upon them ... I walked among the silent dwellings, and found in one the decomposed corpse of a woman, apparently about twenty-five years of age. The whole scene was sad and sickening in the extreme'.[54] On yet another occasion, a headman in the Mazoe district who argued that 'his men were not going to (be forced to) work for white men and that if Police came he would fire on them', felt the full weight of 'Chata ro' (Chartered Law). He was arrested, fined three cattle and six goats, and given fifty lashes 'administered in the presence of a good number of his men, besides people belonging to other kraals'.[55]

This struggle to subject the Shona to the Chartered Administration's political will at first had no real parallel in the narrowly economic sphere, where the search for gold and the speculative obsessions of the colonists and companies generated only small and sporadic labour needs. Africans certainly were 'caught at dawn' and forced to work for whites, [56] but in fact more widespread was the

tendency towards accelerated commoditisation, as increasing numbers of people responded to the fluctuating market demands of the settlers. In 1891, Fitzpatrick found the Shona 'anxious to barter and quicker to trade and more eager for business than any native I have yet seen. So keen are they on business', he added, 'and so quick to perceive an opening, that they have broken up fresh ground, and planted double crops this year, in order to supply the rush of the white men'.[57] This trend was sustained in 1892, by which time prices had risen near the towns where the demand for produce was greater, and by 1895 the Wedza district was exporting large quantities of grain to mines in Matabeleland.[58] Before the war of 1893, thousands of cattle were sold by the Ndebele in response to the 'acute demand for slaughter and transport oxen at Salisbury and Victoria'. Traders commonly drove herds of between 100-200 head and this traffic continued right up until July 1893.[59]

As these last examples suggest, merchant capital's penetration of Ndebele and Shona economy and society did not date only from the formal imposition of colonial rule. Its roots were far longer and its effects were already well advanced by the early 1890s. In some places, merchant capital co-existed from lengthy periods with established forms and patterns of regional trade, and it was the interaction of the two which promoted and shaped the spread of commodity relations. Among the Duma of south-eastern/ Mashonaland, for instance,

people living on the highveld who customarily exchanged surplus crops for the artifacts and animal products of the dry lowveld, expanded their grain production in the later nineteenth century when their lowveld customers began offering European trade goods such as cloth, beads and salt which they in turn had obtained through the sale of ivory and cattle to traders from the south.[60] Elsewhere the importance of merchant capital varied greatly from region to region. In parts of the north-east the centuries-old trade in gold and other products with the Portuguese at Tete and other settlements on the Zambesi was in an advanced state of decay by the 1880s. Even so, it was still sufficiently attractive for entire villages to labour at goldwashing sites for several months immediately before the planting season each year. Gold won in this way was usually exchanged for beads, white limbo and guns.[61] This contrasted both with central Mashonaland which remained relatively isolated [62], and with the south-west where the Ndebele conducted an increasingly vigorous trade first in ivory and later in cattle. At the height of the ivory trade, which lasted from at least the beginning of the 1850s until the end of the 1870s, Lobengula sold an estimated thirty tons of tusks to traders over a three-year period; while on one occasion alone during the peak years of the cattle trade in the 1880s, c 2000 head were traded.[63] These commodities, as well as one or two other products, were exchanged for guns and horses, and for an ever-widening range of goods which came to include 'blankets, limbo, tinder-

boxes, knives and cutlery, needles, buttons, thread, crockery, pipes, snuff-boxes, soap,sugar, even pictures and umbrellas.'[64]

The consequences of merchant capital's advance were as contradictory as the spread of commodity relations was uneven. On the one hand, dominant classes among the Shona and Ndebele were strengthened where they were able either to deploy established political and social authority or mobilise existing forms of wealth in order to concentrate accumulation in their own hands as far as possible. Thus the rich, *wapfumi*, among the Duma expanded 'their wealth in land, wives and crops through the acquisition of guns and trade goods and (the making of) alliances with traders.'[65] Mzilikazi, Lobengula's predecessor, monopolised the ivory trade to a considerable degree, the proceeds of which he used partly to increase the volume of trade by intensifying elephant hunting through the issue of guns to his hunters, and partly to reward loyalists.[66] In addition, the prestige of both Ndebele kings, as well as of other local notables extending all the way down to village headmen, was frequently enhanced and flattered with 'presents' from traders dependent on their goodwill.[67] On the other hand, by encouraging commodity production, by gradually dissolving existing social relations, merchant capital tended to upset the balance within and between indigenous class forces.[68] To take an Ndebele example again, in the 1880s Lobengula's authority declined relative to lesser notables who began to amass considerable

private fortunes through sales of cattle.[69] And as wealth and the means of production, primarily livestock and access to the best land, passed into fewer hands in Ndebele and Shona societies alike, so those people threatened by this process began to turn to labour migration. While the very poor, such as those rendered desperate by drought, probably became bondsmen or, more rarely, slaves, much as others had done before them, for the slightly better-off labour migration held out the prospect of arresting or perhaps even reversing their economic decline. For many, it meant returning from the mines of Kimberley and later the Rand with a gun, a few trade goods and the chance of improving their position. For all, it involved an escape, however uncertain and incomplete at first, from 'traditional' authority and obligations.[70] 'It all tends to break up their old notions,' Jameson was told in a letter which could have applied to the Shona as much as it did to the Ndebele, 'so that the longer you can wait, the less compact will be the organisation of the enemy you have to tackle.[71]

Jameson's patience, of course, had lasted only roughly as long as it took to establish that the 'Second Rand' was not in Mashonaland. War had followed and then,as hopes of rich gold discoveries in Matabeleland flared and flickered, both the Chartered Company and the settlers turned to looting the Shona and Ndebele economies. Between October 1893 and and March 1896 anything from 100,000 to 200, 000 cattle were

seized from the Ndebele. Armed gangs of settlers and contingents of B.S.A. Police equipped with maxim guns, roamed across the countryside, taking what they could. Although the invaders were sometimes driven off by a show of force, refusal to reveal where cattle were hidden could end in death, as indeed it did for four women 'shot in cold blood'. As raids of this kind missed too many cattle for the Company's liking, in 1895 it began recruiting so-called native police with the express intention of making 'the cattle levies more efficient'. They were also to assemble forced labour for the mines. By October-November 1895 Ndebele cattle holdings had been reduced to an estimated 74,000 head, and over the next three months these were almost halved again as the B.S.A. Company quickened the pace of cattle confiscation.[72]

The collection of hut tax, first imposed 'illegally' in May 1893, [73] was stepped up as well once imperial sanction was received in 1894. Its collection was 'arbitrary and irregular, appearing more like the levy of a tribute than the collection of a civil tax', as marauding bands of Native Department levies despoiled villages and districts of their crops and livestock. When, for example, the Budya people of the Mtoko district defied the Company's tax collectors, they were attacked by a large Native Department expedition. Villages and crops were burnt to the ground and the tax seized in cattle and goats. Chief Gurupira himself was fined additional cattle and 500 men were taken off to

labour in the mines. In parts of Mashonaland livestock became so scarce by the end of 1895 that the Chartered Administration decided to suspend the collection of tax for three months 'and that thereafter it should not be levied in the form of stock "in view of the fact that at this rate there would be no cattle left to collect in a year or two"'.[74]

Forced labour also became widespread in this same period, particularly from 1895 onwards. By then the demand for labour, although small, constantly outstripped the tiny supply of workers prepared to risk their lives for low wages in the dangerous local mines. In both Mashonaland and Matabeleland the resultant gap between demand and supply was closed as far as possible with labour rounded up by the Native Department. 'I am forcing the natives of this district to work sorely against their will', reported the Native Commissioner for Hartley, as were at least half the Native Commissioners in districts elsewhere.[75] All to often, this was accompanied by violence, including the molestation and rape of women.[76] 'When the white people started the place which they call Selukwe', recalled Nganganyoni Mhlope in 1938, 'the police used to come to our kraals ... and when they recruited us they used to beat us'.[77] Other interested parties contributed their particular skills too. Zulu workers employed by the Tebekwe mine, for instance, were given company rifles and were 'in the habit of raiding the District for Boys and looting on their own account.'[78]

Less enterprising mines who turned to the B.S.A. Company for help, came away with armed African guards for their compounds'[79] and the knowledge that the Native Department sympathised fully with their problems. 'If a boy will not work, or tries to run away', a visitor to the territory was informed, 'the usual thing is to take him to the native commissioner, and have him given twenty-five (lashes) ... the word "twenty-five" said in English to any of the boys was sufficient to make them grin in a sickly way - they quite understood what it meant.'[80]

The manner of capital's penetration thus provided a growing number of Shona and Ndebele with ample cause to resist. It did not, however, significantly subtract from their capacity to fight. Merchant capital's patchy advance had modified existing social relations without decisively altering them, while neither the interests of speculative capital nor the extremely limited resources of the Chartered Administration required or permitted the profound transformation of indigenous social formations. Primitive accumulation was largely confined to looting, leaving the struggle to separate the direct producers from the means of production very much to the future. A crucial consequence of this simultaneity of process was that even as the outlines of new patterns of accumulation and differentiation were sketched by merchant capital, they were overlain by the impact of primitive accumulation which, although uneven in its geographical incidence, oppressed all of the inhabitants in the

areas which it affected. African polities, then, although becoming less autonomous, could still readily muster the political, social and ideological cohesion necessary to resist the colonial net settling unevenly over them.

This was true even of Matabeleland, seemingly conquered in 1893 and left prostrate before the self-styled 'fair-haired descendants of the northern pirates'.[81] On the contrary, the overthrow of Lobengula had left the pattern of Ndebele settlement, their institutions and structures basically intact. As the white hunter Selous later recognised, 'the fighting power and the military spirit of the Matabele was only scotched, not killed.'[82] Outside of Bulawayo and the main roads, the Chartered writ was fitful where it existed at all, especially during 1894. By far the larger part of the country continued to be administered by Ndebele chiefs, *iziduna*, who at first were preoccupied with the need to select a successor to Lobengula. Although one of Lobengula's elder sons, Nyamanda, soon emerged as the strongest candidate, he did not become king until June 1896 because of delays counselled by custom and lengthened by political divisions contingent on the defection of a leading *induna*, Gampu Sithole, to the whites. Nonetheless, as B.S.A. Company raids for labour and cattle intensified in the course of 1895 and early 1896, a series of secret meetings were held at which plans and preparations were made for war.

Opportunity presented itself when the Jameson Raid denuded Chartered territory of police and troops, and a final provocation delivered when rinderpest appeared and Company officials began shooting Ndebele cattle to contain its spread. In the context of all that had gone before, the Ndebele may have mistaken 'the early quarantine measures, which were for them draconian, for the final elimination of their cattle.' Certainly general awareness of the intolerability of the whole existing situation was accentuated by natural disaster. On the 20th March 1896 the Ndebele Rising began.[83]

Within ten days 'not a white man was left alive in the outlying districts of Matabeleland'[84]. Survivors were penned in laagers centred on Belingwe, Gwelo, Tuli and Bulawayo, from where they were powerless to stop the Ndebele, 'all jubilant and shouting now they would have the country to themselves again', from looting stores and recapturing their cattle.[85] During April, the Ndebele tightened their grip on much of the countryside, but even as they did so, the initiative was already passing to the whites. Civil war developed between the followers of Nyamanda and Gampu, and troops and reinforcements sent by the British Government and the B.S.A. Company poured into Matabeleland. By June white counter-attacks were well underway when news reached Bulawayo on the 16th that the Shona had risen.[86] 'To-day a thunderclap has come', wrote Baden-Powell. 'Telegrams from Salisbury ... tell us of murders of whites in three widely

separate parts of Mashonaland. It almost looks as though the Matabele rebellion were repeating itself there. If so, the outlook is very bad indeed.'[87]

Most of Mashonaland's whites were taken completely by surprise and in the first few desperate days of the rising over one hundred settlers were killed. Laagers were hastily thrown up around Salisbury, Umtali and the smaller towns, and stores and mines elsewhere abandoned as their owners either fought their way through to the main centres or were rescued by relief patrols. Triumphant Shona insurgents controlled the main roads between Salisbury, Umtali and Hartley, and in some places made a considerable effort to consolidate their hold.[88] Drifts used by waggons on the road to the Abercorn mine were destroyed, trees were felled across it, and 'at several places empty "bully beef" tins etc., (were) tied on strings and placed across the road, evidently to give notice of the presence of anyone using the road at night.'[89] To the paramounts of central and western Mashonaland, it seemed that 'a successful return (had been made) to the old world of Shona politics.'[90]

It was precisely this 'old world of Shona politics' which crucially influenced the pattern of the Shona Rising. In fact, it was not so much one rising or *chimurenga*, as several local uprisings, *zvimurenga*.[91] The extremely uneven political and economic impact of the Chartered intruders combined with Shona diplomatic and political considerations to bring about an extraordinarily complex and equally uneven response

from Mashonaland's various African polities. Some areas had already been worsted in confrontations with the B.S.A. Company stretching back through the previous six years. Others had successfully resisted the Company's administrative pretensions and escalating tax and labour demands. For example, in the Salisbury district itself, Kunzwi Nyandoro's people capped their refusal to bow before the B.S.A. Company by shooting at tax collectors in October 1895 and by threatening to kill all police and whites in their district in April 1896. But all of them, irrespective of how they had fared against the Chartered Administration, continued to assess their options in other terms as well. Feuds between rival polities, fears of an Ndebele revival, the lingering unity achieved in past alliances such as that which had brought many central Shona rulers together against the Ndebele in 1889, all contributed to the trajectory of the risings. There was certainly no simple correlation between those areas which were subjected to the most intense colonial pressures and those areas which rose.[92]

Consequently, when people in the Umfuli district heard news of Ndebele victories which encouraged them to resolve their clashes with the local police once and for all, their decision to rise 'triggered a "ripple effect" in which Shona communities resisted or collaborated as the news reached them.'[93] A large region stretching far to the north and east of Umfuli, in some instances inspired by mediums of the Kaguvi

and Nehanda *mhondoro* spirits, quickly joined in the fighting, but the rest of the country decided otherwise and remained neutral or actively collaborated with the whites. Among these latter were the southern chieftaincies of Gutu, Zimuto, Chirimuhanzu, Matibi and Chivi, for whom the consequences of an Ndebele victory seemed more serious than the severe colonial pressures which they had already experienced. As a result, the B.S.A. Company, again with the help of Imperial forces, was able to concentrate its strength against selected Shona rulers.[94] In this way, Makoni, one of the leading paramounts, was defeated and summarily executed in August 1896.[95] Pound about this point, too, hostilities very largely ceased in Matabeleland where the Ndebele, short of grain and ammunition, were seduced by Rhodes' promises made at a series of *indabas* between August and October 1896.[96] Although fortune now swung decisively to the side of the whites as different Shona groups were picked off one by one, remaining insurgents nonetheless rejected Company overtures and grimly fought on. In December 1896 a police patrol along the Hunyani river was dismissed by one leader with the remark that 'if the white men would pay *him* hut-tax, he would allow them to remain in Salisbury'.[97] 'I have nothing to talk to the white man about', said paramount chief Soswe in January 1897. 'Go away and remain away'.[98] Resistance therefore persisted in various areas of Mashonaland for most of 1897 - 'you cannot go 8 miles from here (Salisbury) without risking the chance

of being potted at from a kopje'[99] until it was gradually snuffed out as the last centres were starved and dynamited into surrender.

Although the Chartered Company had prevailed at the cost of thousands of lives and millions of pounds, the combined effect of its political and military adventures on Southern Rhodesia's infant mining industry was disastrous. The failure of the Jameson Raid accentuated the collapse of the financial boom on the Rand and the ensuing regional depression was greatly aggravated by the impact of the Risings. As a result, the flow of investment capital evaporated along with the value of Rhodesian mining and development company shares.[100] This ruin of the speculative bubble forced the B.S.A. Company to try, much more seriously this time, to foster genuine mining activity. In short, the time had come to curb what critics had slated as 'trading upon the unknown, this traffic in fairy tales, this capitalisation of dreams.'[101] The new situation was to be one in which the large capitalist 'should be encouraged, but only as a mining and industrial factor, not as a speculator pure and simple.'[102]

For this, railway transport was essential and, where it had previously resisted settler clamour for years, the Chartered establishment now authorised the speedy completion of rail communication with the coast. The political and speculative considerations which once had influenced where and how fast the northern and eastern railways were built were

superseded in the period after 1896 by Southern Rhodesia's urgent need for strategic and economic succour. The northern line, the last 400 miles of which were pushed ahead at the startling rate of a mile a day, was opened to Bulawayo in November 1897, and Umtali was finally linked to the East Coast a year later. By the end of 1902, Salisbury had been brought into the system and the two lines joined near Insiza. As the B.S.A. Company had a pretty good idea of the region's mineral potential, railway investments were pared to the bone. The cost per mile of the system was much lower than was usual in South Africa and most British African colonies as track followed watersheds and avoided heavy engineering works whevever possible. Even the bridges were temporary, and the end result impressed travellers as a 'crooked, wandering, flimsy-looking structure.'[103]

Flimsy-looking or not, the railways arrival sparked off a frenzied if shortlived outburst of speculation. Newcomers discovered that the 'element of speculation ... permeates everything'. 'When I was in Umtali', wrote one traveller, 'there was a persistent rumour that Mr. Rhodes ... was seriously ill. It sent Chartered shares down at once, and I met an excited man who had come in from some distance away to wire instructions to Johannesburg to sell his shares at once. "I bought as many as I could", he said, "in anticipation of the boom in Bulawayo when the railway reaches there, but if Rhodes should die they will drop to Heaven knows what,

and I can't risk it"'.[104] 'There was one subject of conversation in Fort Victoria which overshadowed all others', recalled an inhabitant of the time. This was 'the Boom, the great wave of prosperity which was going to sweep over the town, and repay everyone for the trials and struggles of the past.'[105] It was most apparent in commerce and the building trades - Bulawayo somewhat fancifully became known as the 'City of Palaces' as government offices, clubs, churches, schools, hotels and municipal and company buildings sprang up in every direction[106] - but was shared to some extent by the mining industry as well, where spokesmen came forward with smooth words of explanation for the industry's past dismal record and exciting future prospects.

But while the immediate effect of railway construction was to provide occasion and excuse for financial and commercial speculation of greater or lesser novelty, its long-term significance was very different. The provision of cheap and regular transport also marked the effective beginnings of a new stage in which industrial capital rapidly grew in importance. Transport rates came tumbling down from the unbearable levels of £200 and more per ton to which they had been driven by rinderpest, making feasible for the first time the import of mining plant on a large scale. In the same period encouragement of another kind came from a belated attempt by the Administration to enforce the terms of the 1895 Mines and Minerals Act which sought to end the speculative holding of

thousands of mining claims, and after one or two false starts, the industry at long last commenced production. In September 1898 the Geelong, soon to be followed by other mines, began a regular output of gold. Until that point, Southern Rhodesia's capitalist mining industry had produced less than 7000 ozs. of gold, but in 1899 alone over 65000 ozs. were won, and by 1902 annual production had climbed to nearly 200 000 ozs. [107]

No sooner had the mining industry clambered precariously to its knees, however, than it was once more threatened, this time by the outbreak of the South African War in October 1899. Railway communication with the south was disrupted, and as rising transport and mining costs stretched the financial resources of nearly all companies to breaking-point, it became increasingly difficult for the industry to sustain its top-heavy structure. Large sections of it were moribund, paralysed by the conflicting need to confiscate claims and curb speculation without frightening off fresh capital.[108] Such working capital as there was tended to be completely inadequate [109] and incompetent management was rife. 'Managements have been amateurish', lamented the Chartered Company's secretary, 'and for one reason and another circumstances have tended to bring together a business community of far smaller average brain power than exists on the Rand.'[110] Most companies were over-capitalised through speculation, through reservation of shares for the B.S.A. Company and through the

practice of floating subsidiary companies to raise extra cash.[111] But above all, the war precipitated a major crisis between mining capital and black labour.

Once the mines had begun the slow and uneven process of subordinating speculative to productive capital, of moving away from share market dealing towards the actual production of gold, profitability came to depend crucially on abundant supplies of cheap labour. As early as 1895, provincial labour bureaux were formed, along with a central compound in Bulawayo to direct the flow of labour to the mines. This first initiative failed because of the general indifference shown by most companies, and because of heavy financial losses and the impact of the Risings.[112] A second attempt was made in 1899 when the Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia was established, again in two provincial sections. This was rather more successful, supplying over 6000 workers to Matabeleland mines alone in the last six months of 1899. Far more important, though, was the volume of labour supplied by the Native Department.[113] During 1898 and 1899 the size of the produce market open to black agriculturalists was restricted by companies railing some food supplies up from the south.[114] The degree of independence thus enjoyed by the mines from peasant production had two effects. It produced a small supply of workers who had no other means of meeting their own and the state's cash requirements. It also left the Native Department free to raise huge contingents of forced labour.

These levies, together with the Labour Board's contribution were undoubtedly instrumental in the fall of average mine wages from almost forty shillings per month in 1897 to twenty-two shillings by early 1900.[115] But when the war stopped the import of foodstuffs from South Africa, it thrust the mines back into full dependency on peasant grain production. This in turn made forced labour itself somewhat more problematic because of the disruption it would cause to the agricultural cycle, while the larger market also reduced the number of people who had no alternative to wage employment.

In several areas peasant production was already of considerable significance by the turn of the century. The looting carried out by the settlers and the Chartered Company, as well as the devastation caused in the Risings and by rinderpest, had disturbed and in some cases destroyed patterns of indigenous accumulation, but had not arrested the process of commodity production. On the contrary, it was accelerated both where people tried to recoup their losses and by commerce's impelling need to expand into the rural areas. The 'same reckless haste' and speculative extravagance had been displayed by merchant companies in the establishment of large warehouses and shops in the country's towns and villages as had been shown by their counterparts in the mining industry in the palmy days of 1894-5. Many of these ventures, hopelessly over-capitalised and overstaffed, found it extremely difficult to survive in the over-traded conditions which

prevailed in the towns after the Risings. Despite the temporary fillip occasioned by railway construction, several firms abandoned the struggle and went into liquidation. Others, though, discovered their salvation in the 'native trade' and by the end of the nineteenth century the 'best business was done in Kaffir goods, which were sold in wholesale quantities to the traders living outside the towns.' Typically, traders' stock consisted of 'cheap white or coloured calicoes (called limbo), salt, beads, and brass wire, and the natives paid for these commodities with grain, either whole or hand-ground into meal'. The trader, noted one acute observer of the Southern Rhodesian scene, 'always preferred to pay for the grain with the goods in his store rather than with cash, and to receive grain instead of cash in payment of the goods he sold as thereby he gained a double profit'. The result was a rapid increase in the number of traders, most of whom were 'partly or entirely financed by the large commercial houses'.[116]

The proliferation of trading stores simultaneously encouraged and was encouraged by Ndebele and Shona determination to engage in trade. Cultivators in the Insiza district planted a variety of crops in 1897 'considerably in excess of their own requirements with the express intention of trading.'[117] Much the same occurred in Mashonaland a little later on. 'I have heard that certain natives in this district are intending planting considerably more grain this season than in former years', wrote the NC for Mazoe in 1899.[118]

From Mrewa it was reported that 'every year the Natives are increasing their lands so as to have a certain quantity of grain to trade', [119] while around Salisbury where grain production had also expanded, it was 'quite the usual thing for a Native to have Three Gardens. The first he will tell you is for his year's food. The second to make beer of : the third for trade'.[120] Still greater strides were made in south-western Mashonaland where the headstart gained by those regions which had stayed out of the Risings was turned to advantage in the race to meet the large and profitable market created by mines starting up in the neighbouring Selukwe district. 'This year has been a year in every way for the Natives, they have prospered and the Whiteman has not', observed Fort Victoria's civil commissioner in 1898. 'The Native Makalaka... have traded all their surplus grain at considerable advantage to themselves... (and) have done very well with their sheep and cattle.'[121] So well in fact that by 1900 the expanding demand for grain at the Selukwe mines was 'gradually having the effect of placing the natives ... on the high road to prosperity'.[122] One year later, their success was being duplicated in more and more parts of the country as the consequences of the South African War made themselves felt. 'Owing to the interruption of railway communication with the South and the high price of grain occasioned by the war', reported Matabeleland's CNC 'the natives have been able to trade their grain at a considerable profit.'[123]

People who could 'trade their grain at a considerable profit' were unwilling to work on the mining industry's terms, and the labour supply, already uncertain in the months before the war because of falling wages and the high death rate from accidents and disease, now worsened dramatically. The Gutu district, for example, many of whose men had worked and died on the Selukwe mines, switched with alacrity from providing labour to exporting grain. Where the district had once yielded many thousands of labourers, after 1900 'it supplied so few workers that NCs were shy of providing figures at all'[124] In Matabeleland, where the prevailing high prices paid for grain encouraged bigger harvests, the labour supply was correspondingly smaller.[125] 'The natives are agriculturalists', commented one official, 'and do not view the prospect of becoming miners with any enthusiasm. Their present occupation... pays better and is a more pleasant life.'[126] Nor could local mines always rely on labour from those areas which were either unsuited to extensive grain production or too remote from produce markets. People in the Bulalima-Mangwe region who were used to the higher wages of the Transvaal, refused to work on Rhodesian mines when the Rand closed down at the start of the war. 'The supply of labour on the whole has been extremely poor', concluded the NC. 'In fact the attitude of the Natives has amounted to an absolute strike.'[127]

Reinforcing both of these reasons for rejecting mine work was the hostility felt towards the mining industry as the cause and symbol of the country's colonial subjugation.

For all that the Chartered Company might warn African leaders that 'they might as well understand once and for all that this is a whiteman's country and that the white man's object was to get the gold out of the ground',[128] there were always some who withheld their assistance if they possibly could. 'The grown up people look upon the discovery of gold as the cause of the loss of their country to themselves', explained the missionary Prestage. 'They are unwilling to cooperate in the development of what they consider their great misfortune. No doubt this impression tells also of the young men.'[129] Shona insurgents, too, specifically objected to settler exploitation of the country's gold. Two white prospectors whose camp was surrounded by followers of the 'rebel' Mapondera, recalled the demands and remarks flung at them: 'Who gave us permission to come up and wash gold and sink pits? The gold was theirs; the district was theirs; they did not want anyone in the country sinking shafts "magodi". Curses on the English at Salisbury'.[130]

Thus confronted and frustrated inside Southern Rhodesia, mining capital was obliged to look elsewhere for its labour needs. Sporadic attempts were made to obtain workers from across the Zambesi, but these first efforts frequently ended in failure. A 'large number of Barotses and Zambesis' recruited in mid-1901 'caused a heavy loss to the companies engaging them. The expenses of bringing them down and getting them to the mines amounted to upwards of £2 per head, but owing

to the absence of any pass regulations ... the natives deserted in large numbers month by month with absolute impunity.'[131] As the Chartered Administration lacked the means at this point either to tap northern labour reservoirs systematically or to contain the high desertion rate, it instead instituted a desperate and exotic search for indentured labour in the Red Sea area, and rather more predictably, for Indian and, later on, Chinese workers.[132] None of these schemes were successful, and the industry's problems ballooned when in swift succession the Labour Board collapsed under the weight of excessive administrative charges and provincial rivalry, and the British Secretary of State for the Colonies barred NCs from involvement in labour recruitment.[133] By early 1903 it was estimated that the demand for labour exceeded supply by some twenty five percent.[134]

Lack of labour affected the mines in a number of ways. If they weren't forced to close down completely, plants were run well below capacity which pushed up working expenses and eroded profitability. The Globe and Phoenix mine, which was responsible for a large proportion of Southern Rhodesia's gold output, operated in fits and starts throughout 1901 and the early part of 1902. Its future success, reported the mine, depended to a great extent on a solution to the labour problem, 'as with an inadequate supply the working expenses increase roughly 15 percent'.[135] Mines which tried to reduce their labour needs by mechanising underground work also found

that their costs went up. The experience of the Criterion mine was typical. An air compressor erected 'because of the uncertainty of the native labour market' was expected to 'add to the mining cost, as the reefs are rather small to allow machine drills to work economically.'[136] Particularly worrying for the industry as a whole was that wages began to rise as individual mines sought to attract and retain what labour was available. From twenty two shillings per month at the start of 1900, wages increased to roughly thirty shillings in March 1901 and to over forty shillings a year later.[137]

Attempts by mining capital to reduce wages stirred up an unprecedented degree of worker resistance, including strike action. Although not unknown, strikes and work stoppages had previously been rare on Rhodesian mines. In 1895 Shona labourers on a small mine refused to work on night shifts arbitrarily introduced by their employer, and in 1899 miners at Selukwe 'struck work until they could be given the food they had been promised'.[138] At the Sable Hill mine in 1898 management interference with workers' private possessions brought the mine to a standstill. 'On a certain day', reported the investigating official, 'Mr Bennet, having noticed that meal etc was being wasted went through the kit of one lot of boys and found some candles, matches, & meal which they ought not have had in their possession. On going to a second hut, the boys came up brandishing "kerries" &

speaking very excitedly, saying they had bought the things in Salisbury. Mr. Bennet thinking that he had better not interfere further because he was unarmed and alone, went away.'[139] As defiance of any kind was usually promptly and severely checked - in the case just cited the two 'ring-leaders' were 'punished' and the rest reprimanded by the NC, after which they were all 'paid to date and dismissed' - black workers quickly appreciated that discontent was more safely expressed in less direct ways. Forced labour, harsh discipline and armed compound guards were countered by 'desertion, disobedience, absence without leave, malingering and the like.'[140] At the Geelong mine, for example, someone with a grievance against the company hit back by killing one of its oxen. The ox 'was found dead in the kraal and ... on the beast being cut open and examination made it was found that a piece of rough stick about six inches long and rather pointed at both ends had been forced up its fundamental orifice and injured the intestines etc. thus causing death.' 'I made every endeavour to discover the perpetrator of this outrage', concluded the local NC, 'but up to the present have failed to do so.'[141] A determined 'go-slow' in 1899 by African miners on the Red and White Rose mine, where conditions shocked even hardened members of the Native Department, drove the management to despair. 'Many of them go underground and simply will not make any attempt to work ... Merely refusing to give the boys tickets for the shifts wasted is useless and is of no value to us', complained the mine

manager.[142]

But as the supply of labour worsened after the turn of the century, so the bargaining position of black workers improved. Defiance became more open, not least because a considerable proportion of the African workforce now comprised experienced miners who had been on the Rand before the outbreak of war. They were singularly unimpressed with Rhodesian wage rates and even when wages were rising in 1900, communicated their dissatisfaction to other mineworkers. Any moves by mineowners to evade or withhold what the workers regarded as their due, were countered by direct action. When the Blanket mine failed to provide its workers with enough meat on Christmas day 1902, the ensuing disturbance 'culminated in police intervention and the arrest of four miners.' Workers at the Imani mine were no less assertive in similar circumstances. They 'refused to work on the 26th December, as they had received no present of meal on Christmas Day. There was no brawling; the natives simply left the compound and went into the bush; the next day they resumed work as usual.' And when mineowners reduced wages in November and December 1901, workers took immediate counter-action. Matabeleland's labour supply, little enough as it was, 'fell off so markedly that the old wage rates had to be re-introduced within a matter of weeks.' At the Dunraven mine starting pay was cut 'but as the natives would not work for more than one month, the wages were again raised to the usual scale',

while at the nearby Camperdown mine 'all the natives ... refused work, and left the mine in consequence of the recent reduction of wages. After some difficulty they were persuaded to return to work, the wages having been again raised to the old rates.'[143]

Because most mines 'could not afford to run the risk of adopting a reduced scale of wage, as the margin of profit was so small that it did not allow of their running the risk of stopping the battery,'[144] mining capital was forced to back down. Wages were left untouched, even though marginal mines were closing and profits falling on those still working. Meanwhile, sentiment in the London money market had hardened: 'The argument of the thinking man in the city is this: "You have in Rhodesia say ten mines trying to produce gold and pay dividends ... (but) not one of these ten milling companies has been able to run for twelve months without having to hang up the whole or some part of their (crushing) stamps for want of labour to keep the mill going, and development ahead of the mill ... Show me that the labour can be obtained and then we will see about the capital"'.[145] The London Wall headquarters of the B.S.A. Company, although it continued to manipulate the market whenever it could[146], privately concurred. 'Want of money for the mines', later stressed the Company's secretary, 'has been induced by want of labour.'[147]

Mining capital's crisis magnified its other problems. The many rights and fees reserved to the B.S.A. Company

under the mining law weighed more heavily on the industry in its weakened state then they had done in its profligate youth, and the resulting discontent, swelled by the Administration's inability to resolve the labour problem, found expression in opposition to Company rule.[148] Early in 1902 the B.S.A. Company was attacked in the widely-read *Mining Journal* which argued that the Company had 'failed to attract settlers, and mining adventurers have certainly been deterred by the extortionate system of royalties'. 'If any gold discoveries were made which precipitated a rush into Rhodesia', predicted the Journal, 'no free mining community would submit without bloodshed to the exactions of their present landlord ... The success of the Colony would inevitably mean the sweeping away of the Company.'[149] As similar sentiments were shared by many in the settler electorate, all of the candiates returned from the mining province of Matabeleland in the Legislative Council elections one month later were opposed to the continuation of the Chartered Administration.

The forum occupied by mining capital in 1902 was a key part of the administrative and political reconstruction imposed on the B.S.A. Company by the Imperial Government in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid and the Risings. Left to their own devices, Rhodes and Jameson had created a wasteland in the north of smouldering villages and burnt-out farm houses, while in South Africa their intervention had enormously aggravated the very divisions and suspicions which British policy and, indeed, Rhodes himself, had

formerly been at pains to allay. The policy of the past decade whereby Imperial interests were secured through support for the ambitions of the Cape and of Rhodes in particular had been revealed as bankrupt, forcing Britain to intervene in order to contain the shockwaves detonated by the spectacular climax to the whole reckless and impatient Rhodesian adventure.[150] The Chartered Company was promptly stripped of independent control over its military and police forces and placed under the surveillance of a Resident Commissioner answerable only to the High Commissioner for South Africa.

The fact, however, of the British Colonial Secretary's own complicity in the intrigues against the South African Republic was a significant indication that the old assumptions on which Imperial policy had been based were breaking down. The Transvaal was rapidly outstripping the wealth and power of the Cape, Natal and Rhodesia combined. Thus while the failure of the Raid was most embarassing politically for Britain, both the Colonial Secretary's interventionist sympathies and the weight of British patriotic opinion, outraged by the German Kaiser's congratulatory telegram to President Kruger of the Transvaal, precluded drastic action being taken against the B.S.A. Company. Nor was the Treasury keen to assume the considerable expense which the administration of Mashonaland and Matabeleland would involve. 'At all costs,' urged Lord Selborne, 'we must ... steer clear of saddling on

Her Majesty's Government any responsibility in the public mind, direct or indirect, for the finances of the B.S.A. Company.'[151] In any case, added South Africa's new High Commissioner, Lord Milner, 'Treasury principles would starve Rhodesia - that is one great reason for keeping the Company up.'[152]

But even though the Charter was left basically intact, 'decent government', as Milner put it, was vital. 'Peace and order are absolutely essential.' Southern Rhodesia 'must settle down now, for another couple of years wasted over native troubles will retard development, make the Company bankrupt and', he warned London, 'throw an impecunious undeveloped country bigger than France upon your hands.'[153] The B.S.A. Company, too, had concluded that its future interests would best be realised through the establishment of an efficient, responsible administration. Quite apart from its other consequences, the 'jolly, reckless spirit of adventure, which aims at making a million in half an hour and then clearing home to Piccadilly',[154] had produced an utterly chaotic administrative situation. 'Everything official here is in an absolutely rotten condition', observed William Milton, the Company's Chief Secretary, shortly after his arrival in September 1896.[155] 'Between outselves', wrote Milner to Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, '(administratively) it is a bad story. On the one hand, land was alienated in the most reckless manner to Companies and individuals, on the other hand a lot of unfit people were allowed to exercise power,

or at any rate did exercise it, especially with regard to the natives, in a manner which cannot be defended ... and the rebellion was largely due to it. *Now* the Company ... recognize this themselves - they *almost* admit it - and they are certainly trying to get things right.'[156]

Milton himself, who later became Administrator, was specifically recruited from the Cape Civil Service by Rhodes to create system and order out of the prevailing anarchy in Southern Rhodesia. 'Zealous in his duty, well versed in official business ... the same type of man as rises to the head of Civil departments in England', he smoothly incorporated Milner's instructions and advice into an overall reorganisation of the administrative structure.[157] By the end of 1897, much to Milner's satisfaction, a 'complete system of administration departmentally organised' was in place, and the following year 'proper civil service regulations were drawn up and put into force.'[158] At Imperial insistence, 'native policy' and the Native Department were singled out for special attention. The 1898 Order in Council stipulated that 'from time to time' the B.S.A. Company was to 'assign to the natives ... land sufficient for their occupation ... and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements'. It also precluded the Legislative Council from imposing any conditions or disabilities not equally applicable to whites on blacks without the previous consent of the British Secretary of State. In addition, Native Department personnel,

their powers, duties, even the districts they were posted to, and indeed 'all questions of native administration' passed under Imperial control.[159]

Anxious as the Imperial authorities were to establish the framework for a 'sound native policy', they were still more concerned to arrest the slide of southern African hegemony away from Britain towards the Transvaal. They wanted to win what Milner called 'the South African game all round'[160]. The extent and nature of British intervention, therefore, was significantly circumscribed by two considerations. 'Nothing is more certain', explained the High Commissioner, 'than that if the Imperial Government were to be seen taking a strong line against the Company for the protection of the blacks, the whole of Dutch opinion in South Africa would swing round to the side of the Company and the bulk of ... British Colonial opinion would go with it.'[161] It had also to be reconciled with the Imperial Government's political strategy of preparing Southern Rhodesia's settlers for eventual self-government and ultimate absorption into a South African federation. Here too, Milner appreciated that the most likely source of 'conflict between local opinion ... and the views of the Imperial Government is the native question.'[162] Deference to settler sensitivities in practice meant that the hard content of British policy was sacrificed to style. As the 'great thing' was to obtain the appointment 'of honourable and capable men as magistrates and native commissioners', existing discriminatory laws,

notably those controlling blacks in urban areas, were consolidated but not repealed. 'The successful government of natives', it was claimed, 'even under the most settled conditions is rather a question of men rather than of regulations, but where administration is still in an embryonic stage as it is in Rhodesia, the character of the administration is of yet more predominant influence.' There was little in this approach which offended the Chartered Administration, and from the beginning of the exercise both Milton and Rhodes, the latter somewhat chastened by his encounters with the Ndebele in the Matopos, 'showed a great disposition to accept' Milner's suggestions on this 'difficult and most important question of the Native Commissioners.'[163]

For quite opposite reasons, the Imperial Government and Rhodes also found themselves in agreement over the issue of settler political representation. The British Government favoured representation because it wanted to tailor constitutional development to fit Southern Rhodesia's eventual entry into a South African federation. It also wished to provide settlers with an arena where they could contest Company policies. They were to constitute an additional check on its freedom of action.[164] There was the risk, of course, which Milner recognised, that 'this representative Council will simply be Rhodes, even more completely than the Company is', and not surprisingly it was precisely this possibility which attracted Rhodes. 'Rhodes is going for it "hot and strong", avowedly with the object of strengthening his own position

in any differences with the Imperial Government', reported Milner. 'They may bully the Company, he says frankly, but they won't dare to bully a representative Council.'[165] Certainly the results of the first elections in April 1899 seemed to vindicate Rhodes' confidence. In Mashonaland, the candidate topping the poll was 'intimately associated with members of the Company's Board and administration', while one of Matabeleland's victors, Hans Sauer, was closely linked to Rhodes.[166] And whenever possible, the B.S.A. Company played on these amenable instruments. 'Your cable saying that the High Commissioner wishes you to postpone the introduction of your Labour and Hut Tax Ordinances has come as a great shock to us', wrote Wilson Fox to Milton in 1901. 'To say we are to wait for the general settlement of South Africa when we are starving for labour is like telling a starving man that there will be plenty of bread after he is dead. However, as we have now got a Legislative Council we may as well have some of the sweets of it as well as the sour, and our particular Sauer will bring in the Bills if you do not, and fortunately we cannot stop him'.[167] Southern Rhodesia, said a letter to the press, was a 'blighted desert of Chartered hirelings', where you 'think and vote with the Rhodes party ... or lose your situation.'[168]

For every occasion that the elected members of the Legislative Council voted 'with the Rhodes party', though,

there were others where they exhibited a disconcerting independence of spirit. Rhodes himself, much as he valued the Legislative Council as a buffer between the B.S.A. Company and the Imperial Government, never thought of it in exclusively instrumentalist terms. Local representation was in fact the minimum price which Rhodes and the Company had to pay in order to re-allign the majority of settlers with the Chartered adventure. Infuriated by the Company's 'failure to protect them and their families' in 1896,[169] most settlers were convinced of the Administration's folly and incompetence. Demands for greater settler participation in government were loudly advanced in Salisbury and supported in Bulawayo where a public meeting unanimously resolved that the 'gaol should be cleared of all its occupants and the Administrator and other members of the Government take their places'.[170] A large part of this protest was soon enough muffled by the promptness with which the B.S.A. Company paid compensation for losses during the Risings, [171] but positive support was only recaptured when Rhodes publicly conceded the settlers' right to a'voice in the affairs of the country'. From the end of 1896 his speeches appealed to a future where there would be a 'semi-responsible body; that was to say, certain elective members in the Council, and finally complete self-government'. As the settlers 'could not expect to have a majority of votes in the Council unless they were prepared to pay the expenditure', for the moment they should be content with some representation

'and through their representatives point out any abuses, preparing for the time when they would have full self-government'.[172] If the Company seriously meant to take 'this excellent course', commented the *Rhodesia Herald*, 'we are far from desiring the abrogation of the Charter, which if suitably modified will provide a golden mean between Imperial red tape and unrestrained financial tyranny and selfishness. Our aim is, after all, sound and wise government'.[173]

Settler participation in the political process, then, promised more than occasional cooperation with the Administration suggested, and became still more unpredictable as the old equation of Company and pioneers dissolved in the second half of the 1890s. This occurred in two overlapping stages. When the Chartered state tried to promote lasting economic development - the interests of capital in general - through intervention against speculative capital and by support for productive enterprises, a certain cleavage opened up between the B.S.A. Company and the many large concerns unwilling or unable to adjust to the new era. At first, it was these latter 'settler' interests which were voiced in the Legislative Council. In 1899, for instance, elected members of the Council, all of whom had 'close connections with the large land-owning companies', opposed

legislation which obliged absentee landlords to occupy their lands beneficially;[174] while in 1902 the Council's newly-elected representatives were extremely critical of the burden placed on development companies by the Administration's mining laws, and even of Chartered rule itself. By this time, however, settler society, although never simply an undifferentiated mass of adventurers,had become noticeably fractured along lines of class and interest. Consequently, the stance adopted against the Land Ordinance in 1899 by the Council's elected members placed them in opposition not only to the B.S.A. Company but also to small settler farmers and their 'independent' allies - generally lawyers, merchants and others not directly employed by big companies - for whom the speculative holding of land was an obstacle to the country's progress.

In fact it was this quite different segment of the tiny settler society who snatched up the opposition baton from mining capital in the latter part of 1902. Their various economic grievances aside, an emotional link tying many settlers to the Charter had snapped with Rhodes' death in March 1902, and in the context of the Peace of Vereeniging at the end of the South African War both accentuated speculation about Southern Rhodesia's political future. In August, a crowded public meeting of the Bulawayo Literary and Debating Society, 'a respected institution to which the majority of Bulawayo's leading figures belonged', had as its motion the abrogation of the B.S.A. Company's Charter.

British instinct, declared Charles Coghlan, afterwards leader of the campaign for responsible government, recoiled from a Chartered institution. The Company's economic record and present policies were bitterly criticised for favouring large and frequently unproductive capital, and the motion was carried with acclamation.[175] All of this was most embarrassing for large capital whose entrenched positions had come under fire. The companies hastily proclaimed that while the community's grievances were serious, they were nonetheless 'capable of remedy' under the existing system. Fearful of unrestricted competition from the Rand for labour supplies, the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines warned that 'annexation to either the Transvaal or the Cape would have a disastrous effect on the progress and prosperity of Rhodesia'. The mining industry, concluded the Chamber, would be 'best maintained and fostered under the Charter until the white community has increased to such an extent as to enable it to demand self-government'.[176]

This belated attempt to calm Southern Rhodesia's troubled waters made little impact, and when the directors of the B.S.A. Company arrived on a tour of inspection in September 1902, they found an 'embittered country'.[177] Large mining capital, even if it shied away from ending Chartered Company rule, was still anxious for changes in the mining law; such economies as it had implemented, along with the post-war depression generally, had created a new constituency of unemployed prospectors and miners discharged by contractors, and they too turned to the Charter for redress[178]; commerce was also depressed; and even the minuscule white

agricultural interest which had benefitted from the war-time exclusion of southern foodstuffs, now complained angrily about high railway rates. Major demands put to the directors thus focussed on the mining law's restrictions, on the old and vexatious question of the percentage of shares reserved for the B.S.A. Company, on railway rates and the high cost of living, as well as on the small number of elected Legislative Council members.

In the event, most of them were conceded. The conjuncture of mining capital's labour crisis, its unwieldy structure and manifest unprofitability, and the growth of settler opposition to Company government left the directors with little choice. Legislation was revised to allow small mines to work for a profit without being floated as companies; the Company's share of vendor's scrip was formally reduced from fifty to thirty per cent; and railway rates were adjusted and reduced in some instances. The directors also agreed to raise the number of elected Legislative Council representatives to equal the number of nominated members. It was a move deliberately designed to defuse the more extravagant settler political movements[179] and to associate influential white residents in the economic and legislative policies of reconstruction. 'We do need their assistance', explained the Company's secretary, 'and want it to be given ungrudgingly'.[180]

1. J.G. Lockhart and C.M. Woodhouse, *Rhodes* (London, 1963), 125; A.P. Cartwright, *Gold Paved the Way* (London, 1967), 17.
2. Cartwright, *Gold Paved the Way*, 23-46. See also E.P. Mathers, *The Gold Fields Revisited* (Pretoria, 1970 reprint), 298, 269; Hans Sauer, *Ex Africa* (London, 1937),
3. *Transvaal Argus*, 3 Dec 1867; H.M. Hole, *The Making of Rhodesia* (London, 1926), 3-4.
4. J.S. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter* (Berkeley, 1974), 40-1. See also R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians* (London, 1961), 202-209; P.R. Warhurst, 'The Colonial Office and British expansion to the Zambesi, 1885-91', unpub. 1979, 6-7; P. Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British* (Westport, 1980), 30-1.
5. Paragraph based on Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, 41-153; Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, 221-43; Lockhart and Woodhouse, *Rhodes*, 141-86; R.Brown, 'Aspects of the Scramble for Matabeleland', *in* E. Stokes and R. Brown (eds.), *The Zambesian Past* (Manchester, 1966), 71-92; J.R.D. Cobbing, 'Lobengula, Jameson and the occupation of Mashonaland 1890', *Rhodesian History*, 1973, *4*, 39-56; P. Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma* (London, 1958), 128; Warhurst, 'Extracts from the South African letters and diaries of Victor Morier, 1890-91', *Rhodesiana*, 1965,114. See also T.O. Ranger, 'The rewriting of African history during the Scramble: the Matabele dominance in Mashonaland', *African Social Research*, 1967, 4; and D.N. Beach, 'Ndebele Raiders and Shona power', *Journal of African History*, 1974, *15*, 4. For discussion of the powers conferred by the Charter, see C. Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965* (Oxford, 1966), 34-6.

6. The phrase is Eric Walker's; *A History of Southern Africa* (London, 1964), 429.

7. As an inducement to capital, the Mashonaland Mining Regulations No. 1, 1890, embodied the American apex principle, or extra lateral right, which allowed the claim owner to follow the gold reef in all its 'dips, spurs and variations' outside the limits of the claim. By contrast, Transvaal mining law allowed only that gold within the claim boundaries to be worked, hence the importance of deep level holdings.

8. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, 122.

9. LO 8/3/1, C.J. Rhodes to Duke of Abercorn, 31 Mar 1890. All file references are held in the National Archives, Zimbabwe.

10. A. Darter, *The Pioneers of Mashonaland* (London, 1914), 113; J.E.S. Green, *Rhodes Goes North* (London, 1936), 291.

11. R. Blennerhassett and L. Sleeman, *Adventures in Mashonaland* (London, 1893), 26.

12. Mathers, *Zambesia* (London, 1891), 379. See also Green, *Rhodes Goes North*, 231: 'Sir John Willoughby's presence in England at this juncture, hot from Mashonaland, would be a fine advertisement for the Chartered Company. The British public would take anything from a man whose horse had tied for first place in Derby honours'.

13. J.T. Bent, *The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland* (London, 1896), 34.

14. Darter, *Pioneers of Mashonaland*, 177; A.G. Leonard, *How We Made Rhodesia* (London, 1896), 35-6, 57-8, 199, 312.

15. Bent, *Ruined Cities of Mashonaland*, 50.

16. H.H. Romilly, *Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland* (London, 1893), 377.

17. P. Fizpatrick, *Through Mashonaland with Pick and Pen* (Johannesburg, reprint 1973), 61.

18. Lord Randolph Churchill, *Men, Mines and Animals in South Africa* (London, 1893), 234-6; Leonard, *How We Made Rhodesia*, 313.

19. H.Mss. BO 11/1/1, Borrow to father, 26 Nov 1891.

20. Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana and the British*, 87; Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, 267.

21. Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*, 87-88; Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, 263-4; Walker, *History of Southern Africa*, 426.

22. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1967), 60.

23. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, 278.

24. Rhodes wanted to provoke the Portuguese into contravening a *modus vivendi* which guaranteed freedom of access to the interior via Beira, thereby opening the way to further B.S.A. Company aggrandizement in Manicaland. Willoughby was accordingly instructed to ignore Portuguese sensitivities and proceed up the Pungwe River on the tug *Agnes*. When it was objected to Rhodes that Willoughby might lose his life if the Portuguese showed fight, he 'replied in his high falsetto, "They will only hit him in the leg. They will only hit him in the leg ... No, my dear fellow, they will only hit him in the leg"'; I. Colvin, *The Life of Jameson*, 2 vols (London, 1922), vol 1, 185.

25. R.H. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (London, 1977), 36.

26. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, 279-80.

27. Ibid., 264-7. See also J.A. Edwards, 'Southern Rhodesia and the London daily press, 1890-1893', National Archives of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Occasional Papers No. 1* (Salisbury, 1963).

28. *Handbook on Mashonaland. The Country, and how to reach it* (London, 1892), 46.

29. Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*, 88-89.

30. LO 3/1/13, telegram, Jameson to B.S.A. Company, 20 May 1893.

31. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 92-4; L.H. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1965), 113. See also A. Dorey, 'The Victoria Incident and the Anglo-Matabele War of 1893', *Central Africa Historical Association Local Series Pamphlet No. 16* (Salisbury, 1966); and S. Glass, *The Matabele War* (London, 1968), 79-81.

32. *African Review*, 8 July 1893 and following issues. See especially Cobbing, 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, 1820-96', University of Lancaster, unpub. Ph.D., 1976, 355-70; P. Stigger, 'Volunteers and the profit motive in the Anglo-Ndebele War, 1893', *Rhodesian History*, 1971, 2, 11-23.

33. Cited in Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 94.

34. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 341-4, 366-70.

35. Earl Grey, *Hubert Hervey. Student and Imperialist* (London, 1899), 93.

36. B.S.A. Company, *Directors Reports and Accounts ...*, 31 Mar 1894; *Rhodesia Herald*, 30 Mar 1898; S.H. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa* (London, 1938), 157.

37. H.Mss. TU 1/1/1, 'The Rhodesian dawn'.

38. Hole, *The Making of Rhodesia*, 339; *Old Rhodesian Days* (London, 1928), 98-9. For the characteristically sodden state of many settlers in the period 1891-3, see, among others, J. Johnston, *Reality vs. Romance in South Central Africa* (London, 1893); G.S. Fort, *Chance or Design? A Pioneer Looks Back* (London, 1942); and Blennerhassett and Sleeman, *Adventures in Mashonaland*. For champagne baths in Bulawayo, see C. Harding, *Far Bugles* (London, 1933), and S.P. Hyatt, *Off the Main Track* (London, 1911).

39. J.Y.F. Blake, 'Golden Rhodesia - a revelation', *National Review*, August 1897, 844.

40. For Mashonaland miners this meant that a 'great and beautiful change has come over the country and that is that now buyers run after claim holders whilst not so long ago it was the other way round'; H.Mss. DA 6/1/1, J.J. Darling to brother, 13 Oct 1895.

41. *Rhodesia Herald*, 16 Mar 1894.

42. Hyatt, *Off the Main Track*, 114.

43. The number of claims registered jumped from c 46000 at the end of July 1894 to c 156000 on 31 Jan 1898. Most were worthless, as shown by the fact that only 45250 were still registered in 1907. See W.A. Wills and L.T. Collingridge, *The Downfall of Lobengula* (London, 1894), 312; G. Arrighi, 'The Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia', unpub., 5. By 1899, 9.3 million acres were held by companies. See Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 34-8,

44. T. Lloyd, 'Africa and Hobson's imperialism', *Past & Present*, 1972, 55, 146; S.G. Millin, *Rhodes* (London, 1952), 203-5. See also Walker, *History of Southern Africa*, 424-9; and Maylam, *Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British*, 56-8.

45. Blake, 'Golden Rhodesia', 846. See also Olive Schreiner, *Trooper Peter Halket of Mashonaland* (Johannesburg, reprint 1974), 32-4.

46. B.S.A. Company, *Fourth Annual General Meeting 18 January 1895*, 10.

47. Colvin, *Life of Jameson*, v 2, 17-19.

48. J.H. Hammond, *The Autobiography of John Hays Hammond*, 2 vols, (New York, 1935), vol 1, 276-8.

49. Phimister, 'History of mining in Southern Rhodesia to 1953', University of Rhodesia, unpub. Ph.D., 1975, 83-4.

50. Paragraph based on Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 55-6, 61-2; A.S. Nyamatore, 'Mutasa, the British South Africa Company and the African Portuguese Syndicate: the "fight" for Manyika in the 1890s', unpub. 1978; Beach, 'Ndebele raiders and Shona power', 649-50; Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 339-45.

51. M. Tsomondo, 'Shona reaction and resistance to the European colonization of Zimbabwe, 1890-1898', *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 1977, 2, 1, 21.

52. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 64.

53. Ibid., 64-5. See also Mason, *Birth of a Dilemma*, 155-7.

54. Johnston, *Reality vs. Romance*, 260.

55. Cited in Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 67. For 'Chata ro', see S. Samkange, *Origins of Rhodesia* (London 1968), 240. He writes that this has so much become part of Shona oral tradition that 'when one roughs up and subjects a man to particularly unfair and brutal violence the Mashona say "Wayita Chata ro" - "he has practised Charter Company Justice"'.

56. 'We have a great trouble in getting native labour up here, the only way we can do it is to go and catch them at dawn & compel them to work'; H.Mss. MA 9/1/1, Mallet to father, 3 July 1892.

57. Fitzpatrick, *Through Mashonaland with Pick and Pen*, 45.

58. H.Mss. DA 6/3/3, 'Mashonaland as a field for Colonization', 1 July 1892; A 15/1/1, Statist to His Honour the acting Administrator, 23 Mar 1895.

59. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 209-11.

60. R.G.M. Mtetwa, 'The Political and Economic History of the

Duma People of South-eastern Rhodesia', University of Rhodesia, unpub. Ph.D., 1976; as cited in Ranger, 'Reflections on peasant research in Central and Southern Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1978, 5, 1, 111-12.

61. Phimister, 'Alluvial gold mining and trade in nineteenth-century south central Africa', *Journal of African History*, 1974, 15, 3, 448-9.

62. Beach, 'The Zimbabwean plateau and its peoples, 1400-1900', *in* D. Birmingham and P. Martin (Eds.), *History of Central Africa*, 2 vols (London, 1980), vol 1, 71.

63. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 198-202, 207-09. The number of cattle traded on this one occasion appear to have been exceptional; lots of 200 or so were most common.

64. Ibid., 212.

65. Mtetwa, 'Political and Economic History of the Duma', as summarised in Ranger, 'Reflections on peasant research', 112.

66. N.M.B. Bhebe, 'Ndebele trade in the nineteenth century', *Journal of African Studies*, 1974, 1, 1, 93-4; Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 198-200.

67. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 200-03. For one example among dozens, see also E.C. Tabler, *The Far Interior* (Cape Town, 1955).

68. For this and wider discussion of merchant capital, see G. Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment* (London, 1975) 94-5; H. Bernstein, 'Underdevelopment and the law of value: a critique of Kay', *Review of African Political Economy*, 1976, 6, 53.

69. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 211; Bhebe, 'Ndebele trade', 94-5. See also M. Wright, 'The reluctant integration

of Zimbabwe, 1852-1908', *Review*, 1979, 3, 2.

70. Beach, 'The Shona economy: branches of production', *in* R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds.), *The Roots of Rural Poverty* (London, 1977), 56; Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 218 - 19. For the general tendency of 'middle peasants' to migrate in greater numbers than the very poor, see G. Standing, 'Migration and modes of exploitation: social origins of immobility and mobility', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1981, *8*, 2.

71. CT 1/13/10, Moffat to Harris, 6 Oct 1890; cited in Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 216.

72. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 372-8, 380-1; V. Stent, *A Personal Record of Some Incidents in the Life of Cecil Rhodes* (Cape Town, 1924), 46.

73. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter*, 325.

74. Paragraph, including direct quotations, based on Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 74-7.

75. N1/2/2, N(ative) C(ommissioner), Hartley, to C(hief) N(ative) C(ommissioner), Salisbury 30 Nov 1895; C 8547, *Report by Sir R.E.R. Martin on the Native Administration of the British South Africa Company*, 1897.

76. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 379; Stent, *Personal Record of Some Incidents in the Life of Cecil Rhodes*, 40-2; Gann, *History of Southern Rhodesia*, 126.

77. H.Mss. WI 8/1/3, Nganganyoni Mhlope, 1; cited in Beach, 'The rising in South-western Mashonaland 1896-7', University of London, unpub. Ph.D., 1971, 256-7.

78. NB 1/1/3, NC Selukwe to CNC, 25 Mar 1898. The events referred to occured before the Risings.

79. NB 1/1/6, CNC to Secretary, 30 Nov 1898, and attached correspondence.

80. H.C. Thomson, *Rhodesia and its Government* (London, 1898), 82. He was told this in 1897.

81. H.Mss. SE 1/1/1, Selous to his mother, 15 Nov 1893; cited in Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 98.*

82. F.C. Selous, *Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia* (London, 1896), 47.

83. Paragraph based on Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 381-6. See also his 'The absent priesthood: another look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-1897', *Journal of African History*, 1977, *18*, 1. The point concerning the conjunction of natural disaster and the rising is taken from Wright, 'Reluctant integration of Zimbabwe', 225.

84.

85. NB 1/1/1, Assistant NC Victoria to CNC, Bulawayo, 18 Sep 1897, with evidence of 'Chibfiri' and 'Wutumberi'; cited in Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 395.

86. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 397-426.

87. R.S.S. Baden-Powell, *The Matabele Campaign* (London 1897), 72.

88. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 269.

89. E.A.H. Alderson, *With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force 1896* (London 1898), 125.

90. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 269.

91. Beach, '"Chimurenga": the Shona rising of 1896-97', *Journal of African History*, 1979, *20*, 3, 419.

92. Paragraph based on Tsomondo, 'Shona reaction and resistance', 20-7; Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 85-6; Beach, '"Chimurenga"', 401-05. See also, Beach, 'The rising in

South-western Mashonaland 1896-7'.

93. Beach, '"Chimurenga"', 420.

94. Ibid., 406-16; Cobbing, 'The absent priesthood', 76-9.

95. For details, see Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 271-80.

96. Cobbing, 'Ndebele under the Khumalos', 409-10, 431-4.

97. Thomson, *Rhodesia and its Government*, 138.

98. LO 5/4/1, Morris to Taberer, 16 Jan 1897; cited in Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 287.

99. H.Mss. MI 1/1/2, Milton to his wife, 22 Mar 1897.

100. *Rhodesia Herald*, 30 Mar 1898.

101. *African Critic*, 5 Oct 1895.

102. *Rhodesia Herald*, 23 Feb 1898.

103. Blake, 'Golden Rhodesia', 847. For discussion and details, see Phimister, 'Towards a history of Zimbabwe's Rhodesia Railways: an essay review', *Zimbabwean History*. (forthcoming).

104. Thomson, *Rhodesia and its Government*, 298-9.

105. Hyatt, *The Old Transport Road* (London, 1914); 73.

106. H. Hensman, *A History of Rhodesia* (London, 1900), 250: P.F. Hone, *Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1909), 315.

107. *The Financier and Bullionist*, 19 Jan 1903.

108. LO 4/1/2, Report by the Commissioner of Mines for year ending 31 Mar 1898.

109. C.T. Roberts, *The Future of Gold Mining in Mashonaland* (Salisbury, 1898).

110. A1/5/5, Wilson Fox to Earl Grey, 26 Oct 1903. For examples, see Phimister, 'History of mining in Southern Rhodesia to 1953', University of Rhodesia, unpub. Ph.D., 1975, 86-7.

111. Among many others, see *Financial Times*, 16 Apr 1902; *Rhodesia*, 13 Jan 1900: and J.H. Curle, *The Gold Mines of the World*

(London, 1902), 105.

112. A11/2/18/8, Memorandum on the Unskilled Labour Problem in Southern Rhodesia, 9 Dec 1901. See also, *Rhodesia Chamber of Mines*, annual reports for 1896-1900.

113. C. van Onselen, *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933 (London, 1976)*, 78, 80. For a case study of one district, see F.J. Mashasha, 'J.H. Williams, Native Commissioner of Gutu, 1897-1902', unpub. 1978.

114. LO 4/1/2, Report by the Deputy Administrator of Matabeleland for year ending 30 Sept 1898. See also LO 4/1/9, Mining Commissioner, Bulawayo, report for year ending 31 Mar 1901.

115. Phimister, 'History of mining', 110.

116. Paragraph, including direct quotations, based on Hone, *Southern Rhodesia*, 308-13. See also, Hyatt, *The Old Transport Road*.

117. NB6/2/1, Statistical Report, Insiza District, for half year ending 30 Sept 1897.

118. N9/4/5, NC North Mazoe, monthly report for November 1899.

119. N9/1/6, Mrewas, Statistical Report by NC for year ending 31 Mar 1900.

120. N9/1/7, acting NC Salisbury, report for year ending 31 Mar 1901.

121. LO4/1/3, Civil Commissioner, Victoria, report for year ending 31 Mar 1898.

122. BSAC, *Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia, 1898-1900*, extracts from the report of the acting Civil Commissioner, Victoria, for the years 1898-1900, 199.

123. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, for the year ending 31 March 1901*, 10.

124. Mtetwa, 'Political and economic history of the Duma people',

371. See also N9/1/5, acting NC Gutu, report for year ending 31 Mar 1899: 'In my District there are Two Hundred & Thirty kraals, every one of which turned out Boys for Selukwe during the Past year, there are not Five kraals out of that number who did not lose a native from sickness contracted in Selukwe, some of them lost up to four & five'.

125. See, for example, NB6/4/4, NC Bulawayo, monthly report for Dec 1900.

126. NBE1/1/2, NC Matobo-Mawabeni and Malema, report for year ending 31 Mar 1901.

127. NB6/4/2, NC Bulalima, monthly report for May 1898; NB6/4/3, NC Bulalima-Mangwe, monthly report for Dec 1899; LO4/1/11, NC Bulalima, report for two years ending 31 Mar 1902.

128. NB6/5/1/2, Meeting in Bulalima-Mangwe district between CNC and Indunas, 19 July 1899.

129. A11/2/8/17, Prestage to Poulteney, 5 Aug 1900.

130. T2/2/16, 'Parleying Held on the Kopje with Rebels and their Remarks', 26 Sep 1901. See also L.Vambe, *An Ill-Fated People* (London, 1972), 176.

131. *Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for year ending 31 Mar 1902.*

132. van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 81-4.

133. Ibid, 79-80; Phimister, 'History of mining', 90.

134. *Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report for year ending 31 Mar 1903*, 34.

135. A11/2/8/1, Rhodes to Milton, 1 Feb 1901, and attached correspondence; *Financial News*, 1 May 1902; BSAC, *Information as to Mining in Rhodesia, 1902*, 172.

136. BSAC, *Information as to Mining in Rhodesia, 1899*, 128.

137. Phimister, 'History of mining', 110.

138. N1/1/9, NC Salisbury to (CNC), 7 Jan 1895; RC3/2/1, NC Victoria to Secretary to Administrator, Bulawayo, 6 Oct 1899.

139. N1/1/3, NC Hartley to CNC, 10 Sep 1898.

140. By 1898 these were common techniques of worker resistance; see NB6/4/2, assistant NC Gwanda, monthly report for May 1898.

141. NB6/4/4, assistant NC Manzamyama, monthly report for April 1900.

142. NB1/1/10, Mine manager, Red and White Rose Gold Mining Company Ltd. to NC Umzingwane, 2 Nov 1899. See the attached remarks by the CNC: 'the natives have been treated in a manner opposed to all principles of humanity and equity'.

143. Paragraph based on van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 218-19; NB6/4/17, Compound Inspector, Division 2, monthly report for Dec 1902; NB6/4/16, Compound Inspector, Division 1, monthly report for Dec 1901.

144. A3/18/30/23, extract, General Manager of the Mashonaland Agency Ltd., Bulawayo, to the Secretary, London, 19 Feb 1902.

145. *Rhodesian Times*, 15 Mar 1901; cited in van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 78.

146. See for example A1/5/3, Wilson Fox to Milton, 15 Mar 1901; 'two leading articles in the "Financial News" this week, engineered by Jones, have also been most useful'; and Fox to Milton, 24 Dec 1901; 'Sauer is in great form. He is talking Lomagundas up to fabulous prices and is making the most of the copper at the Alaska'.

147. A1/5/6, Wilson Fox to Milton, 12 Mar 1904.

148. E. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups in S. Rhodesia, 1898-1923', University of London, unpub. Ph.D., 1974, 61.

149. Cited in Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 63.

150. See Ranger, 'The last word on Rhodes?', *Past & Present*, 1964,

166. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 51-2.

167. A1/5/3, Wilson Fox to Milton, 29 Mar 1901.

168. *Standard & Diggers' News*, 17 June 1899.

169. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 330.

170. Ibid; H.Mss. GR1/1/1, Lord Grey to his son, 15 June 1896.

171. Approximately £350,000 was paid out in compensation to settlers in Matabeleland and Mashonaland; Sims, 'Paladin of Empire', 48. See also, Headlam (ed.), *Milner Papers*, 140, Milner to Chamberlain, 1 Dec 1897.

172. *Rhodesia Herald*, 11 Nov 1896; cited in Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 332. See also Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 61.

173. Cited in Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 333.

174. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*, 61.

175. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 65-6; Gann, *History of Southern Rhodesia*, 143; J.P. Wallis, *One Man's Hand* (London, 1950), 63.

176. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 66.

177. Gann, *History of Southern Rhodesia*, 208.

178. Hone, *Southern Rhodesia*, 264-6.

179. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 67.

180. A1/5/6, Wilson Fox to Milton, 14 Apr 1904.

28: 'recklessness and impatience had been the hall-mark of the Rhodesian adventure from 1890'.

151. C. Headlam (ed.), *The Milner Papers. South Africa, 1897-1899* (London, 1931), 122, Selborne to Milner, 11 Nov 1897.

152. Ibid, 140, Milner to Chamberlain, I Dec 1897.

153. Ibid,

154.

155. H. Mss. MI1/1/2, Milton to his wife, 25 Sept 1896.

156. Headlam (ed.), *Milner Papers*, 140-1, Milner to Chamberlain, 1 Dec 1897.

157. Ibid. See also G. Sims, 'Paladin of Empire: Earl Grey and Rhodesia', *Central Africa Historical Association Local Series Pamphlet No. 26* (Salisbury, 1970).

158. Palley, *Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia*, 137.

159. Ibid, 134, 141; Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 58.

160. Headlam (ed.), *Milner Papers*, 144, Milner to Chamberlain, 1 Dec 1897.

161. Ibid, 178, Milner to Asquith, 18 Nov 1897.

162. Cited in Palley, *Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia*, 141.

163. Ibid, 144, 141; Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 317; Headlam (ed)), *Milner Papers*, 145, Milner to Chamberlain, 1 Dec 1897.

164. Palley, *Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia*, 132; Gann, *History of Southern Rhodesia*, 143-4.

165. Headlam (ed.), *Milner Papers*

166. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 51-2.

167. A1/5/3, Wilson Fox to Milton, 29 Mar 1901.

168. *Standard & Diggers' News*, 17 June 1899.

169. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, 330.

170. Ibid; H.Mss. GR1/1/1, Lord Grey to his son, 15 June 1896.

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175. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 65-6; Gann, *History of Southern Rhodesia*, 143; J.P. Wallis, *One Man's Hand* (London, 1950), 63.

176. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 66.

177. Gann, *History of Southern Rhodesia*, 208.

178. Hone, *Southern Rhodesia*, 264-6.

179. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 67.

180. A1/5/6, Wilson Fox to Milton, 14 Apr 1904.