

between the two states were to be conducted on the principle of "non-interference in each other's internal affairs".⁷⁷ This meant, inter alia, that relations would be on a government-to-government basis only and that the two governments "⁷⁸ Included in the statement was a reminder of the nonaligned status of Zimbabwe, and a welcoming of relations "with all countries which are prepared to respect its independence".⁷⁹ Harare was making its position abundantly clear: dealings with foreign powers were, as far as was practicably possible, to be on Zimbabwe's terms.

The history behind the final establishment of diplomatic links between Harare and Moscow is instructive for several reasons. It illustrates the distinctly pragmatic and nationalist element in ZANU (PF) and Government thought, an element which at first sight seems to contradict the proclaimed fealty to Marxist-Leninist principles. However, given ZANU (PF)'s historical links with 'renegade' socialist states such as Yugoslavia and Communist China, Mugabe's attitude to Moscow is understandable. For even Marxist-Leninist states must follow their national interests -- and for Zimbabwe, dominance by the Soviet Union is most certainly not in its national interest.

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6.3.3 Foreign military assistance: enhancing state sovereignty?

Also indicative of the Government's nonaligned stance is its post-independence record of foreign military assistance. Prior to independence, ZANU obtained most of its military hardware and training from China, North Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia.⁸⁰ ZAPU, on the other hand, received its weaponry and backing from the Soviet Union. Other nonsocialist backers of the Patriotic Front as a whole, included the Frontline States, the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya.⁸¹ Support from most of these states, socialist and non-socialist, has since 1980 not been significant.

1) Reorganisation of the army: the role of the BMATT

Britain has dominated the foreign military assistance scene since independence. Her military involvement began prior to independence with the 1500-man Commonwealth force that monitored the ceasefire prior to the election. Following independence, a 60-man British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) remained behind to assist with the integration of the three standing armies -- ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the former Rhodesian Security Forces.⁸² Mugabe is quoted as having said that this British presence "Gave us an element in the army that could be relied upon by all parties".⁸³ By late 1980 there were 785 British

servicemen in the country.⁸⁴ BMATT now provided the key personnel at the Harare Staff College, training ZNA captains and majors. The Gweru Military Academy was also staffed by the British. In addition, Zimbabwean officers and NCOs were trained in Britain in the first year after independence.⁸⁵ In 1985 two specialist teams arrived on fifteen-month tours of duty, the first to continue the training begun by the Chinese Military and Training Team (CMATT) with the field artillery regiment, and the second to train the tank regiment and the armoured car regiment.⁸⁶ In February 1986 the BMATT increased its training role with the establishment of a joint BMATT/ZNA course at Nyanga for junior officers in the Mozambican army.⁸⁷ In February 1987, the BMATT contingent still numbered around 44 men.⁸⁸

Communist Chinese involvement in training and equipping the new Zimbabwe National Army dates back to 1983. Up to that point Britain had dominated matters. In that year, about 40 Chinese arrived to train armoured units. They brought with them 36 T-59 tanks to add to the army's complement at that time of eight T-54s and six T-34s. Certain ZNA units have even received training input from both the Chinese and the British. In April 1986, Mugabe reviewed the passing-out parade of a regiment which underwent a period of training under Chinese instructors, followed by a further year of training with the assistance of

the BMATT.⁸⁹

Contrary to usual procedure, however, has been the formation, equipping and training of the elite unit, the Fifth Brigade (or 'Gukurahundi', as it is known to the local populace). In 1981 a 106-man North Korean training unit arrived in Zimbabwe, and was assigned exclusively to the Fifth Brigade. The Koreans brought with them materiel, including ten T-54 tanks, which was also allocated exclusively to the Fifth. The all-ZANLA, all-Shona unit, designed to be the army's only mechanised brigade, operates outside the command structure of the rest of the armed forces. The controversial unit achieved notoriety in 1983 when it spearheaded the Government's crackdown in Matabeleland. The Fifth Brigade is now permanently stationed at Gweru, in easy reach of most areas of the country, most particularly troublesome Matabeleland.

ii) Reconstruction of the airforce

Britain's role in Zimbabwe has not been confined to the army. In a major contribution to the strengthening of the airforce, it supplied several Hawk aircraft in 1982. Airwork, a British firm, has been contracted by the Zimbabwe government to supply 120 technicians.⁹⁰ In 1983 Pakistan entered the scene, a Pakistani training team of 30 instructors and technicians being recruited for the Air Force.⁹¹ It included Pakistan's Air Vice-Marshal Azim Daudpota,

who was given executive command of Zimbabwe's airforce from 1982 to 1985. This period was one of reconstruction as most white airforce personnel had left in 1982, following the detention of the "Thornhill Six", those white pilots accused of involvement in the sabotage at Thornhill Air Base in 1982. By the time Daudpota left, the airforce had commissioned about 40 black pilots.⁹²

While the only reports confirmed by Harare of the purchase of new aircraft pertain to the British-built Hawks, there have been unconfirmed reports of other purchases. According to reports, Chinese-built older-model MiGS have been based at Thornhill for several years.⁹³ That Black Zimbabwean pilots have been trained in China on MiGS is an acknowledged fact.⁹⁴ More recently, there have been reports that Harare is to purchase 12 MiG-29 aircraft from the USSR. Notwithstanding British Foreign office confirmation of the deal,⁹⁵ and similar allegations by UNITA's Jonas Savimbi,⁹⁶ Harare continues to deny the reports, which come in the wake of increasing Zimbabwean contact with the USSR in the military field. It is reported that Zimbabwean airforce personnel have undergone training in the Soviet Union, as well as in North Korea, Pakistan, Rumania, Egypt, Nigeria and Greece.⁹⁷

What is significant about the post-independence path

followed by the Government with regard to foreign military assistance, is its apparent deliberate policy of safeguarding national sovereignty. Perhaps mindful of the state of affairs in both Mozambique and Angola, Harare has chosen its military relationships with care. As with the issue of diplomatic relations, the USSR was once again excluded: post-war military aid from Moscow was specifically rejected.⁹⁸ Furthermore, shortly after independence the Government reportedly also turned down an offer by Nkomo to supply a limited number of tanks and other armoured vehicles previously supplied to ZIPRA by the USSR, as they would render the ZNA dependant on the Soviet Union for spare parts.⁹⁹

6.4 The Operationalisation of Nonalignment: the Ideological Dimension

With respect to the two issues discussed above -- Soviet-Harare diplomatic relations and foreign military assistance -- the Government's proclaimed antibloc sovereign policy of nonalignment appears to have been at work. However, the Marxist-Leninist element appears also to have been operationalised. The nationalistic aspect having been mollified, the ideological thread in Zimbabwe's foreign policy is in the ascendant. This trend appears to have been strengthened by Zimbabwe's worsening security

situation in Mozambique and along the Eastern Highlands border, and the perceived threat from Pretoria.

6.4.1 The warming of Harare/Moscow relations

Having finally accepted Harare's stance on relations between the two states, Moscow set about making up lost diplomatic ground. To some considerable extent, the Soviets did succeed in coming in from the cold. While Mugabe's long-promised visit to the USSR did not transpire until December 1985, relations between the two states appeared to warm dramatically from about 1984.¹⁰⁰ Certainly ruling party and government contacts between the two states had increased. In January of 1984, Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement.¹⁰¹ In August, a CPSU delegation accepted a ZANU (PF) invitation to attend the Second Party Congress in Harare. In February 1985, the posting of Oswald Ndanga, Zimbabwe's first Ambassador to Moscow, paved the way for Mugabe's visit in December of that year.¹⁰² Party-to-party ties were cemented with the signing of a protocol on cooperation between the CPSU and ZANU (PF).¹⁰³ Pravda reported that:¹⁰⁴

"The two countries' leaders reaffirmed the coincidence or similarity of the positions of the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe on the basic international problems of our time".

An agreement was signed on economic and political

cooperation between the two countries.¹⁰⁵ Talks were also held on the possibility of Soviet military aid to Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁶ These appear to have been followed up with the unpublicised visit to Harare of a Soviet defence team in early 1986,¹⁰⁷ and an unpublicised visit to Moscow by Harare officials, reportedly with a view to the purchase of arms.¹⁰⁸ Latest reports are of the planned purchase by Zimbabwe of 12 Soviet-built MiG-29 interceptors, as mentioned earlier.

For their part, the Soviets have actively sought to improve their position in Harare by highlighting recent tension between the United States and Zimbabwe: for instance, the threatened cutoff of American economic aid to Zimbabwe in the wake of Zimbabwe's abstention in the UN vote condemning the shooting down of the South Korean air liner, and Harare's sponsorship of a UN resolution critical of American intervention in Grenada, received wide coverage in the Soviet media.¹⁰⁹ These and other Soviet overtures have certainly contributed to a warming of the relationship between the two states and their ruling parties. However, it is noteworthy that Zimbabwe continues as of December 1987 to publicly support United Nations General Assembly calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

In addition to the consolidation of relations with the Soviet Union, ties have been expanded with other

Soviet bloc states, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East German -- countries which had previously been treated with some considerable circumspection. During a 1983 tour of Eastern Europe, the government-dominated media made much of the growth of friendly relations between ZANU (PF) and the ruling communist party in each state visited.¹¹⁰ A Harare radio commentary of 30 May described the visits as an opportunity to study how socialism was being transformed from theory into practice. More to the point is the particular stress placed on the development of party-to-party relationships.¹¹¹ However, while the ideological affinity cannot be disputed -- Mugabe has frequently placed on record his admiration for "what has been done in all socialist countries"¹¹² -- the nationalist, antibloc element remains; hence, for example Zimbabwe's continued opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

6.5 The Harare Nonaligned Summit

The apex of Zimbabwe's nonalignment policy came in August-September 1986 with the hosting of the 8th Summit and the assumption, by Prime Minister Mugabe, of the chairmanship of the movement for the period 1986-1989. Mugabe's stewardship of the conference provided a glimpse into the operationalisation of Zimbabwean nonalignment on a global scale. For, while

South and southern Africa dominated the proceedings, the traditional concerns of the movement were not ignored.¹¹³

The Harare Summit continued the trend, begun at New Delhi in 1983, away from the position adopted by Castro at Havana in 1979. In his keynote speech, for example, Mugabe directly criticised the US on only two issues, support for UNITA, and for the Nicaraguan Contras. This in contrast with Castro's vitriolic outburst at Havana.¹¹⁴ However, Mugabe did not see fit to even mention Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, or the activities of Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. Moreover, the initial draft political declaration, drawn up by Zimbabwe's UN delegation, contained by the US State Department's count, over fifty anti-US statements (compared with 23 at Havana, and 13 at New Delhi). To be sure, this may to some extent be explained by the fact that, as one European diplomat put it, "the Americans have done more things recently that hit the Third World's sensitivities".¹¹⁵

More to the point, however, is a comparison of treatment, in the summit statements, of global superpower involvement in Third World affairs. Here bias clearly emerges. Text pertaining to the Middle East, for example, includes 13 mentions by name of US involvement, mostly in the form of continued reference to American support for Israel. However, there is a total absence of any mention of Soviet backing for

Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. US involvement in Nicaragua is explicitly examined and alleged to be in violation of international law; Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is not mentioned by name.¹¹⁶

Consistently attacked throughout the conference for its policies in Central America, the Middle East and southern Africa, the USA emerged in the Harare Final Declaration as the chief villain in global affairs. However, within the movement itself, moderation held some sway. North Korea's offer to host the next meeting of foreign ministers of the Nonaligned Movement was rejected, more neutral Cyprus being awarded that honour without even requesting it.¹¹⁷ The Cuban-backed candidacy of Nicaragua as the venue for the next summit in 1989 was equally unsuccessful.¹¹⁸ It appeared that the traditional anti-US attitude of the Nonaligned Movement as a whole did not translate into support for the more radical pro-Soviet states in its midst.

However, in assessing the contribution of the 8th Summit to an understanding of Zimbabwean nonalignment, it is difficult to separate out the influence of Harare on the final declaration. To be sure, the host country may have drafted the initial declaration, but the final draft was approved by an overwhelming majority of states. The principle of consensus on issues only serves to confuse the observer. Moreover,

the Nonaligned Movement has a quarter century of history of, inter alia, (1) general hostility to the United States; (2) a general absence of criticism by name of the Soviet Union, an (3) manipulation of the final consensus decision-making process by the larger and better prepared delegations.¹¹⁹

What can be said is that the Harare Summit continued the drift away from Castro's Havana stance, and back in the direction of nonbloc principles. To be sure, the Soviet Union was seldom castigated by name during the Harare conference, but then neither did it receive an endorsement such as that preferred by Fidel Castro. On the other hand, Mugabe's bias against the United States clearly showed through. In the section of his keynote speech on foreign intervention, for instance, 144 words were devoted to the situation in Central America and the major role therein of the United States. The remainder of that section on nonintervention, which specifically mentioned Afghanistan and Kampuchea -- albeit in passing -- contained no mention by name of Soviet and Vietnamese involvement in these areas. Reference was made only to the presence of "foreign forces" in these areas.¹²⁰

Soviet and Vietnamese intervention, it would seem, is not worth of that attention accorded the United States.

Significantly, however, Mugabe took the opportunity,

during the ceremony of the 25th anniversary of the Movement, to rededicate the Nonaligned Movement to the "authentic and genuine principles of nonalignment",¹²¹ explicitly rejecting doctrines of "spheres of influence and balances of terror",¹²² and recommitting the organisation to fighting:¹²³

"Imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, racism, zionism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, hegemony, interference and intervention as well as great Power (sic) and bloc policies tending to perpetuate the division of the world into blocs...."

The terminology used here is closer to Tito, than to Castro.

In several respects, then, Mugabe's chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement would appear to be consistent with his Marxist-Leninist and nonbloc conception of nonalignment. Staunchly anti-American, Mugabe however continues to maintain his opposition to bloc politics. Moreover, it is certain that Mugabe's primary intention at the Harare Summit was to focus and coordinate action against South Africa. Under Mugabe's stewardship, the strengthening of the nonbloc nature of the Movement is complemented by an increased activism. Mugabe was instrumental in the creation of the AFRICA fund, and in the decision that a group selected foreign ministers would tour Western Europe in early 1987 to garner support for more comprehensive

economic sanctions against South Africa. Both these measures were mooted by Mugabe in his keynote speech at the Summit's outset, and significantly both were approved and put into operation. Mugabe has also let it be known that his activism will include reshaping the operation of the Movement, and its decision-making process. At the Summit's close, he declared that he intended putting the Movement on a more formal basis, and endeavouring to significantly change the organisation's mode of operation by adopting majority, rather than consensus voting, and creating a permanent secretariat.¹²⁴

Mugabe's activist stance is an indication of how seriously he regards the Nonaligned Movement. His avowed intention is to make the movement a more effective force in world politics. Significantly, however, his orientation is a nonbloc one; the nonaligned movement should regain its position as a 'third force' in international politics. That is not to say that the Movement should be neutral or even equidistant in its attitude to world affairs. For while military and diplomatic independence is desirable, Mugabe and his colleagues argue that ideological neutrality is impossible. Zimbabwe cannot, in Mangwende's word, remain neutral on the 'burning issues of the day'. Thus, while Zimbabwean nonalignment is strongly nationalist in the sense that the Government and ruling party are guided by what

they believe to be in the best national interest, the Marxist-Leninist element is everpresent. In the final analysis, the ruling elite is influenced by its interpretation of international affairs as they exist today, and the Party's conception of the global order it envisions for the future. Zimbabwe's policy of nonalignment is thus, at one and the same time, socialist and sovereign.

¹Certainly the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister argues as much -- as do most foreign policy texts. See, for example: Jensen (1982), and Utete, C.M.B. "Foreign policy and the developing state". IN: Ojo, O.J.C.B., Orwa, D.K. and Utete, C.M.B. African International Relations. Longman, London, 1985. pp. 43-51. Dr Utete is Cabinet Secretary in the Mugabe government.

²Nonalignment may generally be defined as "a global policy based on a nation's refusal to participate militarily in the general conflict system by joining either parties to the Cold War" (Choucri, 1957, 339). This policy does not mean a lack of involvement in global disputes. But while nonaligned states are not necessarily disinterested parties, they do not actively participate in the conflict by siding with one group or another.

³Zimbabwean government spokesmen frequently make the point that Harare will not be dictated to on any issue, by any great power. This nationalist element in the declared foreign policy should not be underestimated as a tool in the creation of a national identity.

⁴The heterogeneity of Third World foreign policies is well demonstrated in Radu, M. "East vs South: the neglected side of the international system". IN: Radu, 1981, pp. 3-51

⁵For an illustration of this dispute, see Jankowitech and Sauvart V, 1984. A reading of Castro's inaugural address to the Havana Summit is also instructive. See Willetts, 1981, pp. 216-217. An overview to the debate on the 'natural ally' thesis is provided by Willetts, ibid., pp. 11-14.

⁶See Supplement 001 to the Foreign Broadcast

Information Service Daily Report, Middle East and Africa (hereafter cited as FRIS-NEA) V, 170-176. pp. 3-11 September 1985

7 "The foreign policy of Zimbabwe" Supplement to the Public Service Bulletin 2, 2, 1985. p. 4. This stance has also been variously termed 'positive neutrality' and 'active nonalignment'

8 Kuimba, M. "Deputy minister spells out foreign policy of Zimbabwe" The Herald 30 May 1980

9 "Diplomats should be honest and truthful -- Mangwende" PS 931/81/RM. 4 November 1981. p. 3

10 Ibid.

11 ZIMBABWE. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The foreign policy of the Republic of Zimbabwe, lecture delivered by the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cde. Witness P.M. Mangwende, to diplomatic trainees at Ranch House College, Harare 6th June 1986. Harare. p. 36. Mimeo obtained by this writer from the Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

12 ZIMBABWE. House of Assembly. Hansard 23 July 1981. col. 800

13 Kangai, K.M. "Zimbabwe and Nonalignment" Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) XXXIII, 762. 1982. p. 15

14 Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende" PS 330/83/AM 12 May 1983. p. 4

15 Zimbabwe won't mortgage its personality -- Premier" PS 3/84/PR. 3 January 1984. p. 7

16 Zimbabwe to stand firm on foreign policy -- Mangwende" PS 330/83/AM. 12 May 1983. p. 7

17 The foreign policy of the Republic of Zimbabwe... op. cit. p. 35

18 ZIMBABWE. House of Assembly. Hansard 8 October 1980. col. 1255

19 Ibid.

20 ZIMBABWE. House of Assembly. Hansard 13 June 1980. col. 83

21 Ibid.

22. "The foreign policy of Zimbabwe" Supplement to the Public Service Bulletin 2, 2, 1985. p. 4

23. The extent of this pluralism is increasingly being recognised. A 'Marxist Regimes Series', for example, has recently been established for the express purpose of exploring the increasing diversity of Marxist regimes. For further comment on this trend, see the editor's preface to Somerville, 1986, pp. v-vii

24. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, V, 1984. p. 582

25. The phrase is most commonly used by the Yugoslav delegation.

26. Interesting insight into this ideological battle may gleaned from a reading of the FBIS-MRA Supplement 001 on the 1985 Nonaligned Ministerial Conference at Luanda, Angola. See FBIS-MRA v, 170-176. 3-11 September 1985

27. For a brief introduction to the variety of foreign policy stances adopted by self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World, see: Wiles, F. The New Communist Third World. St Martin's Press, New York, 1982. A similar introduction to the states of the Eastern Europe is provided by Padu, M. (ed.). Eastern Europe and the Third World. Tanager Publishers, New York, 1981. The heterogeneity of the foreign policy positions of the Eurocommunist parties is outlined in my 'Sheep in wolf's clothing or wolf in sheep's clothing? an exploration of the nature of Eurocommunism'. Honours dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1984

28. Maruziva, D. "Freedom of Belgrade for Mugabe" The Herald 11 November 1981

29. Malley, S. "An interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe" AfricaAsia August 1986. p. 8

30. "PM address at Gandhi banquet" PS 290/86/BC/MA. 19 May 1986. p. 3

31. NONALIGNED MOVEMENT. Keynote address by the Honourable Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Comrade R.G. Mugabe, on the occasion of the inaugural ceremony of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. HAR-077, Harare, International Conference Centre, 1 September 1986. p. 16

32. For statements illustrative of the stances of

these states on this issue, see: FRIS-MEA V, 170-176. supplement 001

33 See, for example, Jazic, Z. "There are no natural allies or permanent enemies" Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) XXXIV, 792, 1983. pp. 78-80. Dr Jazic was then Ambassador in the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat.

34 "Comrade Nyagumbo addresses commissars on the NAM and the tactics of USA imperialism" Zimbabwe News 17, 9, September 1986. p. 2

35 Ibid., p. 3

36 Ibid.

37 "Main objectives of the NAM today" Zimbabwe News op. cit., p. 23. A revised version of this article appeared in Notes 48, 1986. p. 2

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Nyagumbo, M. "Political effects and implications of non-alignment for Zimbabwe" op. cit., p. 25

41 Silovic, D. "The summit of nonaligned nations in Harare next August" ZN 17, 2, 1986. p. 17. Originally published in Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) XXXIV, 5 October 1985. pp. 4-6

42 "Insight into the Non-Aligned Movement" Zimbabwe News 17, 7, July 1986. p. 21

43 "ZANU calls for stronger solidarity with socialist countries" ZN 10, 6, 1978. p. 33

44 Makamure, K. and Ncube, W. "The non-alignment (sic) and the struggle against counter-revolutions" Zimbabwe News 17, 9, 1986. p. 15

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., p. 16

47 Nzombe, S. "The contribution of the Non-Aligned Movement to international law" Ibid., p. 13

48 Ibid., p. 14

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 "The Non-Aligned Movement and the struggle of the newly-free countries for economic independence" Zimbabwe News op. cit. p. 11

53 Ibid.

54 "The NAM: Zimbabwe's task ahead" Zimbabwe News op. cit. p. 4

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto, 1985. p. 24

58 See, for example: Maruziva, D. "Mugabe and Ceausescu sign pacts" The Herald 18 November 1981; Maruziva, D. "Mugabe signs four pacts with Sofia" The Herald 20 November 1981; "PM paves way for Yugoslav accord" The Herald 13 November 1981; Mutasa, D. "PM meets Hungary's party chief" The Herald 20 May 1983; "Cooperation pact signed with Prague" The Herald 26 May 1983; "Mugabe plans to visit Soviet Union this year" The Herald 30 May 1983

59 Chikerema, C. "Nyagumbo hails Soviet aid to freedom fight" The Herald 1 March 1986

60 For a brief history of aspects of this rivalry, see Martin, D. and Johnson, P. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981.

61 Shamuvarira, N.M. National Liberation Through Self-Reliance in Rhodesia, 1956-1972. Ph.D., Princeton University, 1976. pp. 549-550

62 Ibid., p. 550

63 Ibid., p. 552

64 Ibid.

65 Somerville, K. "The Soviet Union and Zimbabwe: the liberation struggle and after". IN: Nation, R.C. and Kauppi, M.V., (eds.). The Soviet Impact in Africa. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1984. pp. 199, 202

66 Ibid., p. 200

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., p. 201

69 At the conclusion of the Lancaster House Conference in December 1979, the Soviets gave ZAPU US\$60 million worth of arms. The shipment included SAM-7 missiles, artillery up to 120mm, armoured vehicles, recoilless rifles, light weapons and ammunition (Africa Contemporary Record 1981-1982, p. B863). Given the antipathy then prevailing between Mugabe and Nkomo, and the Soviets' history of 'meddling' in Zimbabwean nationalist politics to the detriment of the ZANU cause, this action could only have further blackened the Soviet leadership in the eyes of the ZANU leadership.

70 Ibid., pp. B863-869

71 The following discussion owes much to Somerville, op. cit., p. 195-220

72 ACR 1979-1980, p. A28

73 Somerville, op. cit., p. 205

74 Ibid., p. 207

75 Ibid., pp. 207-208

76 ACR 1980-1981, p. B973

77 "Zimbabwe, Soviet Union to set up relations" RE 118/81/CN. 20 February 1981, p. 2

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Somerville, op. cit., p. 200

81 Nelson, H.D. (ed.). Zimbabwe: A Country Study. The American University, Washington D.C., 1983. p. 277

82 Ibid., p. 275

83 Ibid., p. 276

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 "SMATT's training role is increased" The Herald 17 February 1987

87. ibid.

88. ibid.

89. Summary of World Broadcasts. MR/8222/B/10. 2 April 1986

90. Africa Confidential 24, 16, 1983. p. 6

91. ibid.

92. Drew, R. "Ex-guerrilla heads air force" The Star 14 April 1987

93. ibid. Also: "Zimbabwe sends group to negotiate arms, aircraft deal" The Star 12 March 1987

94. Drew, op. cit.

95. SA may strike at new MiG-29s, says report" The Star 4 May 1987

96. Zim pilots training for new MiGs -- Savimbi" The Citizen 11 May 1987

97. Drew, op. cit.

98. Nelson, op. cit., p. 277

99. ibid.

100. It is instructive to compare the content of messages of congratulation sent to Moscow by Harare on such occasions as the Soviet National Day, the election of a new CPSU General Assembly, and the anniversary of the October Revolution. The tone of these messages has warmed considerably since the early 1980s, almost to the point of eulogy. See, for example: "PM hails Soviet-Zimbabwe cooperation" The Office of the Prime Minister 1046/82/AC/SN 8 November 1982; "Premier congratulates new Soviet leader" PS 91/85/SC/MA 16 March 1985; "Premier congratulates Soviet" PS 559/85/MA/GR 7 November 1985; One such message, issued in the wake of Mugabe's first visit to Moscow, is particularly laudatory. See: "Premier congratulates Gorbachev" PS 167/86/SD/LD 13 March 1986

101. "Moscow's strategy in southern Africa: a country by country review". Background 21 July 1986. p. 7

102. Soviet reportage of the visit is given in Current Digest of the Soviet Press XXXVII, 49, 1986. pp. 10-12

103 ibid., p. 11

104 Current Digest of the Soviet Press XXXVII, 49, January 1 1986. p. 12

105 ibid.

106 "Premier discusses military aid with Kremlin leaders" The Herald 5 December 1985

107 Drew, R. "Soviet missions visit Harare" The Star 24 February 1986

108 "Zimbabwe sends group to negotiate arms, aircraft deal" The Star 12 March 1987

109 Campbell, 1987/88, p. 20

110 See, for example: Mutasa, E. "PM meets Hungary's party chief" The Herald 20 May 1983; "Cooperation pact signed with Prague" The Herald 26 May 1983; "Mugabe plans to visit Soviet Union this year" The Herald 30 May 1983

111 ACR 1983-1984. p. B907. Also: SWR ME/8429/B/4. 29 November 1986

112 Ngangura, M. "Zimbabwe: under ZANU's umbrella" Africa Now December 1984. p. 26. At a press conference held on his return from his 1983 10-day visit to Eastern Europe, Mugabe described the trip as an "historic visit". Mugabe was "highly impressed" with the level of socialist achievement he had seen in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary. The ZANU (PF) leader stated that the inhabitants of Eastern Europe:

"...are happy people, who have not been affected by the recession in the West, largely because their educational foundations ensure that there is no unemployment".

("Mugabe plans to visit Soviet Union this year" The Herald 30 May 1983)

113 This discussion will keep to a minimum coverage of issues concerning South and southern Africa, as these will be dealt with at greater length in chapter 6

114 See footnote 4 of this chapter

115 Gunn, G. "The nonaligned summit: behind the

rhethoric" CSIS Africa Notes 63, 25 October 1986. p. 3

116 NONALIGNED MOVEMENT. Draft Political Declaration. The Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. Harare, 1-6 September 1986. NAC/CONF.8/Doc.I. 26 August 1986. Mimeo

117 Gunn, op. cit. p. 4; "A touch of reality" The Economist 13 September 1986. p. 46

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid., p. 1

120 NONALIGNED MOVEMENT. Keynote address by the Honourable Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Comrade R.G. Mudabe, on the occasion of the inaugural ceremony of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. HAR-007. Harare, International Conference Centre. 1 September 1986. p. 9

121 NONALIGNED MOVEMENT. Speech by the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Honourable Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mudabe, at the commemorative ceremony of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the movement of non-aligned countries. HAR-078. Harare, International Conference Centre, 1 September 1986. p. 9

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid., p. 8

124 Meldrum, A. "High hopes in Harare" Africa Report 31, 6, 1986. p. 62

Chapter Seven: Ideology and the Regional Dimension
of Zimbabwean Foreign Policy

This study would not be complete without a look at Zimbabwe's regional foreign policy, her relations with the countries and institutions of southern Africa. The context is important, for here one may glean further insight into the ideology/foreign policy nexus relating more specifically to the workings of ideology on a state confronted with its 'core values' and its immediate physical environment. It must be asked whether the ideological input is different when applied to the state's policies towards its geographic neighbours. If so, how is it different, and why? For a line of argument often put forward by writers who would downplay the importance of ideology in politics, particularly foreign policy, is that states frequently exhibit 'less-ideological' behaviour when they are confronted with core or survival issues. This, the argument runs, is clear evidence of the largely rhetorical, and thus insubstantive nature of ideological pronouncements in the international arena, pronouncements which are not really believed and which are accordingly abandoned when need be.

At the outset, however, the limitations of this

chapter should be made explicit. This chapter seeks to examine the foreign policy behaviour of Zimbabwe with regard to the southern African region. It is, however, beyond the scope of this brief discussion to survey the seven-year history of Zimbabwe's foreign relations with respect to each of the states in the region, the regional organisations and groupings such as the Frontline States (FLS), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), and the states and international organisations outside the region which play a role in regional interaction.

For this reason, the chapter will of necessity focus on discrete issues and aspects of Zimbabwe's foreign policy, albeit ones of central importance to the regional foreign policy of Zimbabwe.¹ Moreover, while focussing on particular -- and, it should be noted, seminal -- issues in Zimbabwe's regional policy, the discussion will endeavour to place these in the wider context of Zimbabwe's regional policy and her foreign policy as a whole.

The analysis will centre on Zimbabwe's relations with the two states in the region which are the focus of Harare's regional policy, South Africa and Mozambique. A brief rationale for the selection of these two issues follows.

Zimbabwe's preoccupation with South Africa is well known, and scarcely needs elaboration here. Suffice to say that South Africa is high on the foreign policy agenda of all the black-ruled states of southern Africa, if not Africa as a whole -- and as this chapter will argue, Zimbabwe's involvement is preeminent amongst the FLS.² Zimbabwe/South Africa relations are, however, too extensive to be gone into in their entirety; the chapter will focus upon the period 1980-1982, and on the issue of economic sanctions. Of course these cannot be analysed and understood in complete isolation. Interlinkages between them, and with the wider context of Zimbabwe/South Africa interaction will, wherever necessary, be introduced into the analysis.

As regards Mozambique, Prelimo, the ruling party of that country, has strong links with ZANU (PF) dating back to 1970. As the analysis will attempt to show, this relationship has, if anything, deepened since independence and has come to form the cornerstone of Zimbabwe's relationship with her FLS partners. Certainly, the Zimbabwean government publicly proclaims as much, and since 1980 has demonstrated that commitment in a number of ways.

Before turning to the question of Zimbabwe's regional foreign policy, several further problems concerning an

analysis of this nature merit consideration, problems whose existence in themselves perhaps reveals something about the nature and working of ideology in such circumstances. The most basic questions centre around the problem of how to discern the workings of ideology in Zimbabwe's regional foreign policy. For 'idealist' considerations aside, there are a good number of 'materialist',³ aspects to the relationship between Zimbabwe and its neighbours, aspects of a more concrete and enduring nature such as territorial contiguity, landlockedness, transport links, historical ties, trade relationships, and so on. These make difficult the analyst's task in attempting to ascertain, understand and explain the workings of the less concrete ideological variable, but are factored out to the detriment of the analysis.

Accordingly, before examining those issues in Zimbabwe's regional policy outlined above, a brief discussion of the materialist dimension is in order. It is argued, prima facie, that these conditions influence the ideological variable -- a conclusion reached by Vladimir Lenin himself some seventy years ago -- and should, accordingly, be taken into active consideration as contributing to our understanding of the impact of ideology on foreign policy. They do not rule out the ideological variable (though not a few observers imply, or seem to imply this) for, as just mentioned, Lenin himself argued for the continuous and

intimate interrelationship between theory and praxis.⁴ However, what these crosscutting influences may do is render that much more difficult the analyst's task of identifying the ideological variable. Given Mugabe's ideological predilections, and his prominence in foreign policymaking, one may reasonably assume that ideology is a component part of Zimbabwe's foreign policy towards South Africa. Problems may be encountered, however, when one attempts to probe further the ideological input.

7.1 Zimbabwe in southern Africa: the Materialist Dimension

Twenty years ago, Larry Bowman (1968, 231) commented: "For far too long, events in Southern Africa have been viewed in a discrete manner, with little consideration given to the interaction of the countries concerned". Bowman proceeded to argue a case for regarding southern Africa as a subordinate state system. This conceptual approach has since gained considerable currency. Indeed, it provides the conceptual starting point for this analysis of the historical, economic and geographic linkages of southern Africa. The discussion will be brief, for numerous competent analyses of these factors and the relationships amongst them already exist;⁵ this brief discussion serves merely to provide a framework for the analysis to follow.

7.1.1 Zimbabwe in southern Africa: the ties that bind

The ties between Zimbabwe and South Africa on the one hand, and Zimbabwe and Mozambique on the other,⁶ may be categorised into historical, political, economic (chiefly trade and transport), and security issues. Of course these are not entirely discrete categories, and the analysis will reflect this interconnectedness.

The historical ties between Zimbabwe and South Africa stretch as far back as September 1890, the year of the white settler occupation of Mashonaland. The British Government was at that time reluctant to acknowledge any responsibility for the new territory, and thus the administration of Rhodesia for the next 33 years fell to Cecil John Rhodes' British South Africa Company.⁷ The original Pioneer Column trekked north from South Africa, marking the beginning of a 'south-north' rivalry which, for Colin Vale (1981), accounts for much of the tension which has since characterised relations between South Africa and its northern neighbour. Another historical factor which, Vale suggests, is of considerable significance when explaining the relationship between the two countries, is the Boer-British rivalry. For Vale:

"Relations between today's Zimbabwe, even under a black government, and South Africa, still governed by the descendants of the Boers, are still largely determined by that conflict". (p. 358)

It should not be forgotten, amidst the current wave of

accusations and counteraccusations regarding South Africa's alleged 'destabilisation' activities, that South Africa has a history of intervention in Rhodesia dating back to the early 1970s. Like Prime Minister Mugabe, Ian Smith suffered the economic, strategic and political realities of being a small, landlocked state in a region dominated by an economic and military regional superpower.

Ideology apart, then:

"the history of the southern African political subsystem has cast South Africa and Zimbabwe in competitive roles from which neither can escape" (*Ibid.*, p. 371).

A more recent but no less important element in this competition is the economic factor, specifically trade and transport. During the pre-UDI colonial period, Rhodesia's international trade was largely with Europe, and was mainly directed through the Mozambican port of Beira. UDI and the imposition of economic sanctions against Rhodesia changed all this. During the UDI/sanctions period (1965-79) trade increased with and through South Africa. Trade patterns were the first to shift: while in 1965 Britain was Rhodesia's main trading partner, by 1980 trade with South Africa had become three times as large as that with any other single country.⁸ Rhodesia's transport dependency on South Africa increased dramatically during this period as, following the closure by the new Pretoria

government of the Mozambican border in 1976, South Africa became Salisbury's only link with the outside world. Indeed, it is often forgotten that the direct link to South Africa via Beit Bridge was only opened in 1974.

Thus in 1980, Robert Mugabe became Prime Minister of a country more heavily dependent than ever before on South Africa for trade and transport. South Africa's share of Zimbabwe's external trade in the period August-November 1980, was 35% of the imports and 19% of the exports (Grundy, 1982, 172). Nor is this the full extent of South Africa's economic influence. According to one estimate, South African firms own at least one third of Zimbabwe's capital stock.⁹ This, is of crucial importance to an economy so dependent on foreign capital.

7.2 Zimbabwe/South Africa Relations

7.2.1 The first two years: the establishment of a modus nonvivendi?

In our search for an understanding of the motive forces behind Zimbabwe's policy towards South Africa, we turn first of all to the first two years of independence. For Mugabe's frequent post-independence protestations of a desire for coexistence with Pretoria have often, if not usually, been interpreted

as a mark of hi. political (and ideological) moderation.¹⁰ For its part, Pretoria's response to this apparently conciliatory attitude is regarded as patently unreasonable.¹¹ It is this 'unreasonableness', many observers would argue, that underlies the worsening of relations between the two countries; one need look no further to understand, and sympathize with, Harare's policy towards its minority-ruled neighbour.

Our purpose in all of this is not to apportion blame. For it should be realised that, simply by adhering to their minimal positions, South Africa and Zimbabwe were bound to come into confrontation.¹² It is, instead, to attempt to discern behaviour on the part of the Zimbabwean government which might distinguish it from the other black states in the region and which might indicate the presence of ideology. The starting point of this analysis is that while no black state in Africa approves of South Africa's internal political dispensation, the African states do differ in their attitude towards and dealings with Pretoria: the diplomacy of Malawi's Hastings Banda, for example, differs in a number of significant respects from that of President Kaunda of Zambia.

Mugabe's initial statements on Zimbabwe's policy towards South Africa are interesting for their conciliatory tone and air of reasonableness. For in

1980, Mugabe frequently expressed a willingness to coexist with his southern neighbour. In his first interview with a South African newspaper following his return to Rhodesia in January 1980, Mugabe outlined his planned relationship with Pretoria if ZANU (PF) won the February general election. While stating the necessity for political change within South Africa, Mugabe argued that this was primarily the responsibility of the South African population, though support from Black Africa would be necessary. However, he was at pains to point out, "We cannot place our country in a position where the independence we fought for can be destroyed overnight".¹³ Mugabe stated his unwillingness to offer bases to the PAC and ANC, arguing that "The existence of our country as an independent state would be jeopardised. We cannot take too great a risk".¹⁴

As for trade and other economic relations with Pretoria, these would continue. In Mugabe's words:¹⁵

"Our view is that differences in political and ideological orientation should not prevent trade and economic relations between countries".

The continuation of diplomatic relations, however, would have to be examined. "see whether it [the question of diplomatic relations] serves the humanitarian principles that we stand for".¹⁶

In early March 1980 Mugabe, as Prime Minister-elect

went so far as to state:¹⁷

"We would want South Africa to regard us as her good neighbour in the same way that we intend to regard her as a good neighbour in the sense of the right of mutual coexistence between us".

This, he reportedly argued, should take the form of refraining from interference in each other's affairs, and from aiding and abetting those forces which sought change "either here or in South Africa".¹⁸ This is in clear contradiction to his statement, before and since, on support for the ANC and PAC.

In April, Mugabe stated:¹⁹

"We will pursue a policy of non-interference in each other's affairs...We would hope that South Africa would reciprocate and not resort unduly to hostile acts against us. We are pledged to peaceful coexistence with it. we are opposed to the politics of South Africa, but we do not regard the people of South Africa as our enemies at all".

This separation of the political from the economic was indicated as early as 1978 when, notwithstanding his stated condemnation of apartheid in the same interview, Mugabe said with respect to bilateral relations with South Africa, "it cannot be expected that over night (sic) we will sever [economic] relations with it [South Africa]. It will take time. We will, therefore, in that respect be pragmatic".
(Mugabe, 1983, 193-194)

Soon after his electoral victory, Mugabe publicly stated:²⁰

"Our policy will be one of good neighbourliness, and we want South Africa to regard us as our good neighbour in the same way as we intend to regard her as our good neighbour...in the sense of mutual recognition of the right of coexistence between us".

One year later Mugabe's position was essentially the same:²¹

"...to maintain trade relations with Pretoria....We would hope that South Africa would reciprocate and not resort unduly to hostile acts against us. We are pledged to peaceful coexistence with it. We are opposed to the politics of South Africa, but we do not regard the people of South Africa as our enemies at all".

For many observers, Mugabe's assurances of moderation should be taken in good faith and at face value. Some welcomed Mugabe's stance,²² others were less happy.²³ Still others, however, have questioned that assumption of sincerity itself, some of this latter group even suggesting an element of distinctively Leninist pragmatism to be at work.²⁴

It is this latter viewpoint which this analysis seeks to develop. For it is surely not splitting hairs to ask, given Mugabe's oft-stated commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology, what he means by such phrases as "noninterference" and "peaceful

coexistence", the latter being a term which in the Marxist-Leninist lexicon has a distinct, class-based content. In his first address to the United Nations as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Mugabe included in his enumeration of the five principles guiding Zimbabwe's foreign policy, "positive nonalignment and peaceful coexistence among countries having different socio economic (sic) systems";²⁵ a phraseology more familiar to the East Europeans than to the governments of Western Europe. Moreover, a number of the assurances appear vague and ambiguous. Mugabe preaches "Noninterference in each other's internal affairs", yet publicly supports ANC and PAC efforts to alter the political status quo inside South Africa, in addition to urging OAU support for these groups.

This writer would suggest that Mugabe never regarded Zimbabwe's policy towards Pretoria as anything but peaceful coexistence in Marxist-Leninist terms. That is, as a means whereby South Africa's position could be undermined without recourse to armed conflict which, almost inevitably, would be to Zimbabwe's disadvantage.

In this connection it is perhaps instructive to note the tone and content of Mugabe's first speech as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe to the Organisation of African Unity, eleven weeks after attaining that position.²⁶

"Must this organisation [the OAU] continue to be a forum for paying no more than lip-service to the aspirations of the people of South Africa?

Now that the question of the independence of Zimbabwe has been settled, must not concerted meaningful action be taken to buttress our frontier, and must the OAU not come to the aid of the Frontline States with substantial military support so these States (sic) are enabled both to defend their territorial integrity and to effectively give support to the national struggle inside South Africa?

...Now that we have only South Africa and Namibia to rid of colonialism, Zimbabwe wishes to propose that a definite concrete program of supportive action be worked out at this conference."

Certainly, the moderate face presented to Pretoria was absent here. So too were the protestations of "good neighbourliness" and mutual recognition of political differences. Consistent with this statement to the OAU, is a report that Mugabe had stated in October 1980 that, if African countries could devise some way of protecting Zimbabwe against military attacks by South Africa, he would permit military bases on Zimbabwean soil for operations against South Africa.²⁷ One is left with the distinct impression that Mugabe's moderation is more a response to the prevailing situation than an attitude based on political or philosophical conviction.

For as Geldenhuys (1982,157) observed as early as

1982, "Zimbabwe gradually became increasingly outspoken in its support for the "liberation struggle" and in its condemnation of its neighbour's domestic political order". Simon Jenkins noted in 1983 that Mugabe "Accepted the status, and the jargon, of southern Africa's leading Marxist".²⁸

Certainly, Mugabe's attitude towards South Africa should not be taken out of context. Given South Africa's internal political dispensation, Mugabe's own political beliefs, and the increasingly 'activist' regional policy on the part of Pretoria,²⁹ the two countries were bound to clash.

Harare, however, little helped matters. Notwithstanding Mugabe's continued public protestations of moderation, Zimbabwe's southern Africa policy became increasingly activist. Not content with frequent -- and 'routine' -- pledges of support for SWAPO, and the inauguration of a Zimbabwe/Namibia solidarity week, Harare quickly became a centre of diplomatic pressure on South Africa.³⁰ In keeping with this activist role, the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister in 1981 became chairman of the OAU Liberation Committee.

One important element in all of this seems to be Mugabe's personal ideological beliefs. Certainly, as evidenced in the following brief account of episodes in Zimbabwe/South Africa relations, Mugabe's attitude

towards Pretoria has been hardline; some would say foolish, given South Africa's regional preponderance, others might describe it as principled.

A defining characteristic of Zimbabwe's policy towards South Africa is the continuing ban on ministerial level relations with Pretoria. The stipulation was made by Mugabe following the break off in diplomatic relations in 1980. Zimbabwe is the only FLS state to insist on this; even Marxist Mozambique does not conduct its relations with Pretoria on this basis. While this issue cannot be said in and of itself to be evidence of the working of ideology (for Mozambique does not follow suit), it is certainly indicative of the hardline attitude of Harare, particularly when judged against the policies of other black states in the region. At time of writing, Harare's refusal to treat with South African ministers continues, despite a number of efforts by Pretoria to pressure Harare into capitulation, efforts which have been to Zimbabwe's economic cost, as the following section shows.³¹

The first episode occurred only one month after the breakoff in diplomatic relations, when the South African Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation limited cover on new exports to Zimbabwe to 25%. The move was intended to force the Zimbabwean Government to make a high level request for the reinstitution of full

insurance cover. Zimbabwe refused.

Then, on 24 March 1981, Pretoria served the required one year notice that it would abrogate the bilateral trade agreement which had been in force since 1964. It is perhaps no coincidence that this move came two weeks after Zimbabwe voted in favour of a United Nations General Assembly resolution on sanctions against South Africa. Again Pretoria demanded minister-to-minister renegotiation of the agreement, which Harare refused. Only in March 1982, less than two weeks before it was due to expire, did South Africa extend the agreement.

Migrant labour was the next issue of contention. As with all the states in the region, Zimbabwe has migrant labour working in South Africa. While Zimbabwe has always had fewer labourers than any other state in the region, with the exception of Zambia, migrant remittances were still worth about Z\$25 million to Zimbabwe at independence.³² Notwithstanding this economic fact, Zimbabwe ended formal recruiting of new migrant miners by Wensela, the main South African recruiting agency, in February 1981. According to one report, this decision was taken as Zimbabwe did not want to continue a government-to-government recruiting agreement.³³ While the Zimbabwean government intended that this relationship be phased out (those already working in South Africa were free to continue

doing so), Pretoria ordered the Zimbabwean migrants to leave at the end of their contracts, apparently following a statement by Zimbabwean President Canaan Banana that these workers were employed in conditions of "slave labour".³⁴ By 1982, there were few Zimbabwean migrants working in South African mines.

The southern African transport infrastructure has become an important factor in the worsening relations between Harare and Pretoria. Given South Africa's long-standing dominance of the system (see Figure 2), this situation has worked largely to Pretoria's advantage. Indeed, the South African government has long demonstrated an awareness of its transport leverage in the region, and a willingness to use it for political and strategic purposes.³⁵ In 1975, for example, deliveries of diesel fuel and other supplies crucial to the counter-insurgency operation were deliberately slowed down in an effort to get Ian Smith to release from detention a number of black nationalist leaders as part of Vorster's 'detente' initiative.³⁶

The first significant move against independent Zimbabwe was in 1981 when Pretoria ordered the withdrawal of twenty-five locomotives from Zimbabwe when their leases ran out in April of that year. Unfortunately for Zimbabwe, this occurred at a time when local farmers needed them to move a bumper grain

harvest to market. Moreover, more than half of Zimbabwe's own locomotives were out of commission for want of technicians to repair them. Zimbabwe indicated unofficially her need to lease forty-five additional locomotives from South Africa. Pretoria indicated a readiness to accommodate Harare's request, providing that such a request was made at ministerial level.³⁷ Zimbabwe was again not forthcoming. The deadlock continued, and Zimbabwe experienced further economic difficulties: exports were delayed so that they missed the boat, much Zimbabwean traffic had to be routed via the longer and more expensive Port Elizabeth line, instead of through Durban, and fuel imports were often delayed. At one point, fuel reserves in Zimbabwe fell to as low as two days supply, a restriction was placed on the operating hours of petrol stations in Zimbabwe, and informal rationing of large fuel users was imposed. A lack of diesel disrupted the collection of the bumper maize harvest, and delayed ploughing for the following season's crop. Notwithstanding this (at its peak in August and September 1981 the transport crisis was costing the country Z\$ 5 million per week in lost exports, according to the Zimbabwean Transport Minister), the Zimbabwean government continued to refuse ministerial level discussions. Finally, in November 1981, South Africa backed down and agreed to lease 26 locomotives to Zimbabwe.³⁸

The final example of Zimbabwe/South African 'transport

diplomacy' to be examined is the so-called 'month of the hawks', December 1982. For it was in that month that South Africa's economic hold over Zimbabwe was most clearly demonstrated. Commandos landed at the port of Beira and blew up most of the oil depot there. Destined for the pipeline to Harare, the oil amounted to ten weeks supply being valued at \$12 million. The alternative rail route for oil, from Maputo via the Chicualaecuala line, was also sabotaged, leaving Zimbabwe with domestic fuel stocks sufficient for only two weeks. Zimbabwe faced economic ruin. Pretoria offered to help out, with the now-usual proviso that ministerial-level negotiations take place. Zimbabwe refused this demand yet again, and South Africa backed down.³⁹

The incidents outlined above illustrate something of the highly adversarial relationship existing between Harare and Pretoria. Zimbabwe's behaviour in the face of South African trade and transport hegemony has been consistent;⁴⁰ ministerial level contact has been refused at some considerable economic cost to Zimbabwe.⁴¹ But, more than this, the manner in which landlocked, newly independent Zimbabwe went about antagonising a militarily and economically superior neighbour surely indicates, if not ideology at work, then the existence of a high degree of radicalism, albeit arguably a principled radicalism. It is difficult to isolate an ideological radicalism of a

Marxist-Leninist nature. For Mozambique, Zimbabwe's closest Marxist ally in southern Africa, has on a number of occasions dealt at ministerial level with South Africa. This fact, however, is hardly sufficient grounds for dismissing Frelimo's claims to being Marxist-Leninist. What can be said with certainty from all of this is that, in its dealings with its southern neighbour, Zimbabwe has been neither as moderate nor as pragmatic as some of its admirers (and detractors) would suggest. Without forgetting South Africa's own considerable impact on the region since the early 1980s, there is a strong element of radicalism in Zimbabwe's policy towards South Africa. This should be borne in mind as we turn to examine the other major issue in Zimbabwe/South Africa relations: Zimbabwe's role in the continuing campaign for international economic sanctions against South Africa.

7.2.2 The sanctions campaign against South Africa

Today one of the most vociferous advocates of universal mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, Zimbabwe initially adopted a very different line at independence. Mugabe's public position for the first two years after independence was that, while Zimbabwe would not oppose attempts to impose sanctions, it could not afford to participate owing to its geographic position inherited economic dependence on South Africa.⁴² The Zimba' an government went so far as to issue a press statement

in December 1980 explaining its abstention on voting on United Nations General Assembly resolutions relating to, inter alia, mandatory sanctions and an oil embargo against South Africa. The statement, by Ellis Mashingaidze, then Zimbabwe's ambassador to the UN, argued that the "national interest of Zimbabwe dictated abstention".⁴³ As far as the efficacy of such an initiative was concerned, Mugabe's position at the LC convention conference in 1982 was that a total commitment by the West to the imposition of economic sanctions was essential else the exercise would be worthless.⁴⁴

By 1986, however, the Zimbabwean Prime Minister was arguing that any bid to bring about change in South Africa without imposing economic sanctions would be futile, and Zimbabwe itself would be the regional leader in the sanctions initiative.⁴⁵

This shift in attitude is at least partially explained by events within South Africa itself and the southern African region since 1980: The 1984 state of emergency and its reimposition in 1986 not long before Howe's visit, the failure of the EPG mission to South Africa, the May 1986 SADF raids on Harare, Gaborone and Lusaka, MNR activity in Mozambique rendering almost ineffective Zimbabwe's attempts at economic disengagement from South Africa, sabotage in Zimbabwe widely attributed to South African military elements,

and so on. Mugabe was not alone in hardening his stance towards Pretoria.⁴⁶ However, Mugabe has far outstripped his FLS peers, Marxist or otherwise, in his commitment to sanctions, a commitment which appears to fly in the face of the fact of a high level of economic dependence on South Africa. Pragmatism in this regard is low, if almost nonexistent. Moreover while many if not most, observers have argued that Zimbabwe's sanctions policy is largely, or predominantly reactive, this writer intends to demonstrate the considerable extent to which Mugabe has attempted to match reaction with action.

Mugabe's sanctions campaign kicked off at the October 1985 Commonwealth Summit at Nassau, where his hardening stance brought him into direct confrontation with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. On his return to Harare, Mugabe stated that the Frontline States had decided they would no longer press for international assistance before backing sanctions.⁴⁷ Mugabe conceded that the Frontline States were inviting damage to their own economies, but asserted that such suffering was part of any revolution. Zimbabwe, he declared, was committed to playing a part in resolving the South African situation.

As one of six leaders chosen to review the 1985 Nassau sanctions package (Zambia was the other southern

African representative), Mugabe joined the call for tougher measure, following the August 1986 Commonwealth minisummit. At the Summit itself, a sanctions package was agreed upon including a ban on air links with South Africa, and on imports of coal, iron and steel from the Republic.⁴⁸ Indications were that the package would be implemented in November or December 1986.⁴⁹ Following the summit, a Zimbabwean Cabinet committee was set up to investigate the implications of a policy of sanctions.⁵⁰

South Africa responded to all of this tough talk by introducing import licences for Zimbabwean goods, instituting lengthy customs searches for the purpose of "gathering statistics" on all Zimbabwe- and Zambia-bound goods crossing the Limpopo river, and imposing a 125% bond requirement payable in foreign exchange on all goods crossing Zimbabwe in transit for Zambia.⁵¹

The next chapter in the sanctions campaign was at the sixth Nonaligned Movement Summit in Harare in August-September 1986. As Mugabe himself put it, the meeting was "to a very great extent...a southern African summit",⁵² designed to focus international attention and pressure on South Africa. However, at two meetings convened just prior to the summit -- one of the Frontline States and one of SADCC -- problems with the sanctions drive were much in evidence.

Journalists at the scene reportedly described both meetings as acrimonious.⁵³ Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland -- the southern African states most dependent on South African transport links -- expressed great concern about the effect of possible retaliatory border closures by South Africa.⁵⁴ Even more than on previous occasions, Zimbabwe and Zambia were left to make the pace. Thus the FLS and SADCC communiques issued after the two meetings neither presented new sanctions proposals nor fully endorsed the Commonwealth sanctions package.

At the opening of the Harare Summit Mugabe took a fairly tough line with regard to Zimbabwe's stance on sanctions. At a press conference he reiterated a previous commitment to Zimbabwe's implementation of the Commonwealth package by the end of that year, adding that his government would also apply any additional sanctions adopted at the Nonaligned Summit, even if this necessitated cancelling Zimbabwe's recently renegotiated trade agreement with South Africa.⁵⁵

However, it was perhaps with the recent FLS and SADCC discord fresh in his mind that, while urging the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions, Mugabe's keynote speech at the Summit's opening went on to suggest that, until these were implemented, members of the Nonaligned Movement should

adopt "voluntary selective sanctions".⁵⁶

It would not however be correct to interpret this phraseology -- as some observers did -- as a sign that Mugabe was backing down. For a number of concrete suggestions relating to the sanctions drive were presented by the Zimbabwean delegation at the summit. Moreover, by the summit's close these had not only been endorsed, but moves had been made to implement them. Thus Mugabe's opening speech included a call on the Nonaligned Movement to consider *sending a team of foreign ministers to visit Western capitals in order to canvass for the adoption of comprehensive and mandatory UN sanctions*, while the "Special Declaration on Southern Africa" proposed the establishment of a 'solidarity fund' for southern Africa to be used 'to provide emergency assistance as well as long-term assistance for infrastructural development in order to lessen their [the states of southern Africa] dependence on South Africa'.⁵⁷

The fund was established and renamed the *Action For Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid (AFRICA)* fund. India was designated fund chairman, with Zambia as vice-chairman. Zimbabwe was included as one of the remaining committee members.⁵⁸ In keeping with Mugabe's suggestion, a team of foreign ministers led by the then Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Witness Mangwende and including most of the members of the

AFRICA fund committee, was charged with visiting Western Europe and North America to further press the case for sanctions against South Africa.⁵⁹

The timing of these measures was important and deliberate. For the US Senate and House of Representatives had both passed a sanctions bill which was awaiting presidential ratification, while the European Community was preparing to decide on its own sanctions package. The tour was intended to coordinate these and other sanctions measures within the UN framework.⁶⁰ Thus there was a very real chance of such Nonaligned moves impacting on the sanctions drive; the measures taken could not be written off as mere posturing.

The FLS disunity on the sanctions issue continued during the Summit. A series of meetings took place at which a number of less-than-enthusiastic positions were adopted.⁶¹ Only Kaunda publicly supported Mugabe.⁶² Machel's address to the summit failed even to call explicitly for sanctions.⁶³ Again, Zimbabwe and Zambia were taking a stance none of their Frontline partners was willing to emulate.

The Summit concluded, Mugabe continued with his national sanctions campaign. At a Zimbabwean Cabinet meeting on 14 October, Mugabe pushed through a decision to cut air links with South Africa in the

following month.⁶⁴

It is at this point that Kaunda, Mugabe's erstwhile staunch ally on the sanctions issue, appeared to have second thoughts. For according to reports, Mugabe failed to implement the air links ban on schedule because of disagreements with Kaunda and Botswana's President Masisi.⁶⁵ One commentator noted:⁶⁶

"PM Robert Mugabe continues to toughen his stance against Pretoria at a time when his Frontline State partners -- led by President Kaunda of Zambia -- are pulling back"

At year's end, Mugabe's customary televised New Year address to the nation was delayed for over two hours, while Kaunda failed to deliver his. It is suggested in some quarters that Kaunda, also supposed to announce a ban on air links, pulled out at the last minute.⁶⁷ As regards Mugabe, accounts differ. One commentator has it that Mugabe and Kaunda agreed, at their December 31 meeting at Kariba, to postpone indefinitely the imposition of sanctions.⁶⁸ Another report alleges a New Year's Eve confrontation with Mugabe by a group of ministers led by Minister of Home Affairs Enos Nkala. This group, the report goes, forced Mugabe at the last minute to change his New Year's address and delete the announcement of an air links ban.⁶⁹ Certainly, this would explain both Mugabe's failure to announce the scheduled ban, and the officially unexplained delay in the televising of the speech.⁷⁰

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"PM Robert Mugabe continues to toughen his stance against Pretoria at a time when his Frontline State partners -- led by President Kaunda of Zambia -- are pulling back"

At year's end, Mugabe's customary televised address to the nation was delayed for over an hour while Kaunda failed to deliver his. It is suggested in some quarters that Kaunda, also supposed to announce a ban on air links, pulled out at the last minute.⁶⁷ As regards Mugabe, accounts differ. One commentator has it that Mugabe and Kaunda agreed, at their December 31 meeting at Kariba, to postpone indefinitely the imposition of sanctions.⁶⁸ Another report alleges a New Year's Eve confrontation with Mugabe by a group of ministers led by Minister of Home Affairs Enok Nkala. This group, the report goes, forced Mugabe at the last minute to to change his New Year's address and delete the announcement of an air links ban.⁶⁹ Certainly, this would explain both Mugabe's failure to announce the scheduled ban, and the officially unexplained delay in the televising of the speech.⁷⁰

Notwithstanding the apparent reconsiderations at year's end, the sanctions campaign did not halt on either the regional or the international levels. A two-day meeting of the AFRICA fund, held in January 1987, produced a R1.5 billion plan designed to enable the Frontline States to survive comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.⁷¹ By 1987, the fund totalled \$330 million, the two largest contributions being from the Soviet Union (US\$100 million) and India (US\$40 million).⁷² In its capacity as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Movement, Zimbabwe called in April for the convening of a session of the UN Security Council, the purpose of which was to consider a draft by the African group calling for the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa.⁷³

However the major event of the sanctions campaign in 1987 was the threat to trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa which emerged in mid-July. The threat materialised amid reports of Zimbabwe's worsening economic plight: increasing unemployment, drastic cuts in foreign exchange allocations (55% across the board to the commercial sector⁷⁴), increasing defense expenditure, drought, and looming debt service commitments.⁷⁵

The sequence of events appears to have begun following

a mid-July meeting between Mugabe and Kaunda at which it was agreed that the two states could not cut air links with South Africa.⁷⁶ Kaunda, however, raised the issue of Zambia's diversion of its copper exports from South African routes, pointedly asking what Harare was doing to match that move. On his return to Harare, Mugabe ordered an investigation into a trade ban against South Africa.⁷⁷

Private sector business leaders were then summoned to be told two different versions of what was intended. One version was that there would be an immediate ban on all South African imports and exports, the other that a ban on most trade, with the exception of transit traffic, would be imposed from the beginning of 1988. There was no government consensus on either of the two policies, and over the next ten days a series of Cabinet meetings on the issue was held. Meanwhile, businessmen began receiving export licences for the second half of 1987 stamped "not valid for specified countries" (these being South Africa, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan). The outcome of the Cabinet meetings appeared to be defeat for Mugabe's total trade ban, but the uncertainty continued. Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) President Dawn Yaunton circulated a confidential memorandum (with the approval of Acting Trade and Commerce Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa) warning of further government measures.⁷⁸ Dated July 31, the memorandum

reported that the government was to start a "programme of economic disengagement from SA" with immediate effect.⁷⁹ The government would use the bureaucracies of import and export licences to ensure that private enterprise diversified both sources and markets away from South Africa.⁸⁰ Government was to establish two committees to monitor compliance with this policy, and to ensure that the Beira line was being utilised to the full extent of its capacity.⁸¹ At a closed-door meeting on August 3rd between the Mashonaland Chamber of Industries and officials of the Trade Ministry, companies were strongly advised to seek alternative trading partners to those then sourced in South Africa.⁸² One prominent South African business source commented that Mugabe's commitment to sanctions emerged unshaken and indeed that, as far as the principle was concerned, there apparently existed no division within the cabinet; the disagreement was solely one of timing.⁸³

Mugabe's high profile stance continued at the October Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Vancouver, Canada. The pre-summit package of measures contained -- at the insistence of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania -- a draft clause calling for "the universalisation of measures already taken".⁸⁴ Furthermore, Zimbabwe was one of eight countries nominated at the conference to further the action programme agreed upon by the leaders. Included in this 'Okenagan Statement' was a

call for the "wider, tighter and more intensified application" of sanctions.⁸⁵

To be sure, the Zimbabwean Premier continues to play a central role in his country's policy towards South Africa. His personal political predilections are accordingly of considerable importance. This is not, however, to ignore the general input of other members of the ruling party and the government. This writer has, on close analysis, found ideological formulations to be seldom expressed in statements designed for external (i.e. international) consumption. Analysis of the South African situation provided in Zimbabwe News,⁸⁶ however, is of a more clearly Marxist-Leninist nature. The conflict in South Africa is frequently presented as having both a racial and a capitalist dimension; the envisaged post-apartheid system must be not only non-racial, but socialist in orientation. South Africa is often described as the "sub-imperialist" extension of international capitalism and imperialism, that is, of the Western powers led by the United States. On occasion, these states have even been referred to as the "capitalist conspiracy". Nothing daunted, one writer suggested that "final victory is in line with the laws of social development".⁸⁷ However, for victory to be attained, the two major classes in the conflict situation, the workers and peasants, must be mobilised. In keeping with his strong grasp of Marxist-Leninist

revolutionary theory, Mugabe has advised those involved in the struggle in South Africa to avoid the inevitable "contradictions" that arise in the course of all such struggles, and to adopt instead a 'united front' strategy.⁸⁸

"...whatever front there is in South Africa, which is confronting the Boers, let that front be part of the democratic front as such -- the wide front. Let there be no contradictions. Whatever contradictions exist within the progressive movement, those for now should not be allowed to ruin the smooth unfolding of the struggle. Time will come when these contradictions will be attended to and this will be after the struggle has been won".

This appeal to opposition groupings within South Africa has clear implications for Zimbabwe's policy towards South Africa. United front strategy calls for a common alliance based usually on broad political and nationalist grounds. The Marxist-Leninist element within the coalition bides its time, content to conceal its ideologically-inspired agenda until the attainment of the nationalist objectives of the coalition. In this case, these include the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of black majority rule. It is at this point that, for the Marxist-Leninists, the real struggle begins, as this element attempts to gain control of the broader nationalist movement and to embark upon the implementation of an ideological agenda. Mugabe's

statement begs the question of whether he and his government are utilising the same tactics in their policy towards South Africa. It would seem reasonable so to assume, given the ideological proclivities of the ruling party.

7.3 Zimbabwe/Mozambique Relations

Relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique are, in many respects, really ZANU (PF)/Prelimo relations. For the special relationship between the two countries which exists today has its roots in the cooperation established between the two parties as early as 1970.⁸⁹ This cooperation was a major factor in ZANU's eventual victory; the lengthy and sparsely populated border with Mozambique enabled ZANLA to expand its guerilla infiltration.⁹⁰ Moreover, notwithstanding occasional Mozambican government intervention in ZANU factionalism during the 1970s (at one stage Mugabe himself was detained by the Mozambican authorities), Prelimo trained ZANU cadres, rendered considerable diplomatic support to ZANU, while towards the end of the bush war (1978-79) Mozambican soldiers fought alongside ZANLA within Zimbabwe itself.⁹¹ Mugabe and Machel appeared to strike up a strong personal friendship which endured until the latter's death in October 1986.

This cordial relationship between the two parties and their respective leaders continued after 1980.

Zimbabwean ruling party and government spokesmen have since independence frequently enumerated the various factors which go to make up the basis of the rapport between the two states.

Ideology appears to play its part in cementing this relationship, at least insofar as it is invoked in this connection. In 1979 Mugabe (1983, 199-200) spoke thus of Mozambique's attainment of independence:

"Here, the invincibility of the combined power of the People was once again tested and once again, it triumphed. Mozambique is therefore a shrine attesting to the power and glory of the broad masses of the people once their eyes are opened and their will properly directed by a selfless, dedicated leadership"

Mugabe went on to speak of the "victories... of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Vietnam, and Cambodia" as "impressive victories...our victories" (*Ibid.*, 200).

However, Mugabe and his colleagues have frequently attributed the relationship between the two neighbouring states not solely to ideology, but also to a common history, shared boundaries, even blood ties and a common cultural identity.⁹² In a speech to inaugurate the Zimbabwe/Mozambique 'friendship week' in June 1980, the then Prime Minister traced the common historical roots between the Mozambican and Zimbabwean peoples back to the common kingdom of

Monomatapa, arguing that the two only became separated because of the efforts of Portuguese and British colonialism.⁹³ Only in the 1970s, Mugabe argued, were the common bonds regained:⁹⁴

"It was only through the common nature of our anti-colonial struggle and the common character of our national and political objectives that we once again discovered each other as not only allies and brothers in a common struggle, but as geographical, historical, traditional and even ethnic members of one family".

In 1987, Mugabe's message had little changed. Speaking at a commemorative rally for the late Machel, Mugabe reiterated the basis of Zimbabwe's special relationship with Mozambique, exhorting his audience to appreciate:⁹⁵

"...how the revolution of Mozambique became our revolution and vice versa and how our independence became inseparably intertwined with that of Mozambique".

Mugabe concluded:⁹⁶

"But this is as it should be, for the reality of our geography, common colonial history, cultural ethnicity, oneness of our destiny, and identity of our ideological direction, have combined in impelling us towards the unity of minds, hearts and deeds".

Neither are such professions of support confined to the Zimbabwean leadership; both the late Samora Machel and his successor, Joaquim Chissano, have publicly

shared Mugabe's sentiments.⁹⁷ Indeed, Machel apparently conceived of this relationship in terms of an eventual federation of the two states, an idea to which his successor has since alluded.

These public statements of support have been matched by close cooperation since 1980 in a number of fields. Mugabe's first official visit as Prime Minister to an African country was to Mozambique. Numerous meetings have since been held, covering many sectors of cooperation, with the emphasis being on security, trade and transport⁹⁸ -- shared priorities for both states.⁹⁹

Since 1980, it has been an active policy of the Zimbabwean government to reduce its trade and transport dependency on South Africa.¹⁰⁰ The desire to avoid or ameliorate a situation of dependency is a natural one; Mugabe is no doubt mindful of South Africa's ability -- and demonstrated willingness -- to use economic pressure on Zimbabwe -- both before and since independence -- as well as his having to go along with Machel's demands in 1979 that he attend the Lancaster House Conference, or forfeit ZANLA bases in Mozambique.

However, the policy of rerouting trade routes is also part and parcel of Zimbabwe's regional policy with regard to the feasibility of the imposition of

economic sanctions against South Africa. The stated intention is to reduce Zimbabwe's -- and Black southern Africa's -- dependence on South Africa so as to facilitate the imposition of sanctions and minimise the economic damage thereby incurred by the Frontline States. Hence the signing, in January 1981, of a five-year pact to further, inter alia, defense and economic cooperation between the two states (Nelson, 1983, 225).

Realignment of fuel and trade routes was instituted soon after independence. By the end of 1981, some 27% of general trade and 35% of petroleum products, mostly petrol, came through Mozambique, the bulk of it via the Maputo rail link.¹⁰¹ In 1982, more than half Zimbabwe's imports and exports moved via Mozambique.¹⁰² In 1983, however, this trend was halted. Increased Renamo attacks on the Maputo line forced a reorientation of trade through South African ports. By mid-1984 the line was again closed.

More recently, efforts to upgrade the Beira Corridor route have been intensified. The port of Beira itself is now undergoing a ten-year development. In September 1987, the Chairman of the Beira Corridor Group (BCG) claimed in the Group's first annual report that the corridor now carried a volume of traffic amounting to 20% of regional traffic and 30% of Zimbabwe's overseas trade. According to the Group's managing director,

Zimbabwe's dependence on South African ports had declined from 75% to 68%.¹⁰³ At year's end BCG officials reported that the Chicualacuala line would reopen for limited traffic in February 1988.¹⁰⁴

7.3.1 Security

Inseparably intertwined with the transport factor is security. For in large part it is the deteriorating security situation within Mozambique which has confounded attempts to reopen and secure rail, road and pipeline links in that country. Moreover, the Zimbabwean authorities have come to link the continued survival of Zimbabwe itself with the internal security situation in Mozambique. Mugabe in 1987 explained this connection thus:¹⁰⁵

"Our existence as an independent sovereign state is very much dependent on the security of the Beira Corridor, especially with the impending sanctions against South Africa and that country's attempts at strangling the economies of the states in the region".

As early as 1980, however, Mugabe was arguing that "we [the Zimbabwean government] regard the integrity and independence of of our state as inseparable from that of Mozambique".¹⁰⁶ Cooperation between the two governments on security issues can be traced back to as early as January 1981, when a defense agreement between the two states was signed allowing for, inter alia, Zimbabwe to send troops into Mozambique when deemed necessary for mutual defence.¹⁰⁷ Mnangagwa

Reportedly described the pact as regarding an attack on one of the two countries as an attack on the other.¹⁰⁸

By the end of 1981 there were reports of joint Zimbabwe/Mozambique military operations inside Mozambique against Renamo.¹⁰⁹ In 1983, the Zimbabwean troop presence was stepped up to a permanent force of two to three thousand men stationed along the 300-kilometre length of the Beira Corridor in an effort to protect it from attack. Renamo forces, however, continued to lay siege to the urban centres of Mozambique, and to have a virtually unhindered run of the rest of the countryside, operating in 1982 in six of the country's ten provinces.

In 1985 Zimbabwe substantially upped its military commitment to Mozambique. Mugabe told the Zimbabwean Parliament in August that that up to 30 000 troops -- at that time 75% of the ZNA -- would be deployed if need be. The hitherto defensive role of the Zimbabwean presence in the Beira Corridor would be dropped for a more assertive and geographically wider role, including joint offensives with Mozambican forces against Renamo.¹¹⁰ In point of fact, a joint offensive began in July culminating in the capture, on August 28, of the Renamo headquarters Casa Banana.¹¹¹ By this time, 7000 ZNA troops were reportedly stationed in Mozambique.¹¹²

In an interview granted shortly after the capture of Casa Banana, Mugabe put an ideological complexion on Zimbabwe's increased involvement in Mozambique.¹¹³

"If the government led by President Samora Machel falls, then we know that the enemy will have succeeded in creating a reactionary regime in Mozambique and reversing the socialist trend that is in motion there".

At the same time, practical considerations entered the equation, Mugabe pointing out that "our most natural harbours are the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo". Renamo attacks on the transport infrastructure had to be countered for economic as well as ideological reasons.

The conflict in Mozambique intensified in 1986, as did Zimbabwe's involvement therein. In February Renamo was apparently as strong as ever following the recapture of Casa Banana.¹¹⁴ Amid continuing references to the general ineffectiveness of the Mozambican army,¹¹⁵ came reports that the Zimbabwean presence had been increased to 12 000 troops.¹¹⁶ Within Zimbabwe itself, August saw the first intake of recruits for the planned Sixth Brigade of the ZNA. According to Mugabe, the unit was being established "to enable us to meet the demands in Mozambique. We just have to help the Mozambicans. Its a 'do or die' situation..."¹¹⁷ There were also reports of a

cooperation agreement between Renamo and Ndabaningi Sithole's ZANU party to take up arms against the Zimbabwean government.¹¹⁸

In October Renamo went on a renewed offensive, capturing five towns in rapid succession.¹¹⁹ Military and security chiefs from Zimbabwe and Mozambique held toplevel talks in Maputo to discuss the rapidly worsening security situation. Three days later, on October 19, Machel died in an air crash. Harare immediately accused the South African government of complicity in the death of Machel, and there were renewed recriminations against Malawi's President Banda for his alleged support for Renamo and South Africa. In Harare, student riots caused damage to the South African trade mission, the Malawian High Commission and the offices of Air Malawi.¹²⁰ At a memorial rally for Machel, held in Harare at the end of October, Mugabe repeated his accusation that "The Pretoria assassins have once again gunned down a son of Africa",¹²¹ while on the same platform Enos Mkala attacked President Banda.¹²²

"He wishes he was born white
...He has a slave mentality
but his few soldiers cannot
stand against the combined
forces of Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe".

On November 6, against a backdrop of Zimbabwe's leading role in efforts to persuade Banda to end Malawi's alleged support for Renamo and to join Zambia and Zimbabwe in economic sanctions against South

Africa, South African Foreign Minister Botha released to the media a document allegedly found in the wreckage of Machel's aircraft which purported to be the verbatim record of a meeting held in Maputo on October 16 between the Zimbabwean Ministers of State for security and defence, the army commander, and other senior politicians and military men, and Machel. The document centred on ways of increasing the pressure on President Banda, and appeared to record a plot to overthrow him.

While doubt has been expressed as the authenticity of the document (only an 'abridged' version of the 'original' was ever released), the contents thereof appear consistent with regional events and attitudes: the hostility towards Banda, the reports of support in the region for the Malawian Freedom Movement (MAFREMO), the most active dissident movement in that country.

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe's tough stance on regional issues was demonstrated again in Mugabe's response to Renamo's 'declaration of war' on Zimbabwe.¹²³

"The MNR has not declared any war at all. That is not an MNR voice. It is a South African voice which has spoken through Renamo".

Mugabe went on to state that, as a "creation made by South Africa", Renamo lacked any identity of its own. It was merely an arm for South Africa's regional

destabilisation.¹²⁴

Zimbabwe continued its offensive against Renamo on the military level as well with strikes in early 1987 against Renamo bases close to the Malawian border; the ZNA's deepest strikes into Mozambique since the beginning of its offensive in 1985. In February, five towns which had been in Renamo hands since October of the previous year were recaptured.¹²⁵

Renamo, for its part, in June opened a new chapter in the conflict with its first raid inside Zimbabwe itself.¹²⁶ This at a time when a UN spokesman in Harare confirmed the existence of forty to fifty thousand Mozambican refugees inside Zimbabwe.¹²⁷ There were also reports of 1 500 Sithole men fighting alongside Renamo in Mozambique, in a followup to the unity pact reported the previous year.¹²⁸ On August 25 Renamo reportedly took the fight to the ZNA itself, with the first reported attack on the Zimbabwean army on its own soil.¹²⁹ At year's end, there were reports of a resurgent Renamo tightening its grip on Maputo, and almost-daily attacks by Renamo inside Zimbabwe. The Eastern Highlands region of Zimbabwe had become a virtual militarised zone with the 5000-strong Sixth Brigade operating along the border in an effort to counter Renamo infiltration. Harare's military commitment to Mozambique was now costing in the region of US\$500 000 per day.¹³⁰

However, Zimbabwe's deepening involvement in Mozambique, and the resilience of Renamo, did not at time of writing appear to cause Harare to question its commitment. If anything, relations between Harare and Maputo were firmer than ever by the end of 1987 -- at least at the leadership level.¹³¹ Following the death of Machel in October 1988, Mugabe's reaction was particularly outspoken. A series of countrywide commemorative rallies were organised by ZANU (PF), at which the common links between the two states were again stressed.¹³² In an exclusive interview granted to, and published in, The Herald, President Chissano referred to his predecessor's ideas for a federation between the two states.¹³³

In early February, Chissano made his first state visit to Zimbabwe. The Herald devoted half of its front page and an editorial to the visit.¹³⁴ The itinerary included a public rally in Harare at which both Mugabe and Chissano reiterated the ties between the two states.¹³⁵ ZANU (PF) also appeared firm in its support; most of the 1987 issues of Zimbabwe News contained at least one article covering relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The February issue gave extensive coverage to Chissano's visit.

7.4 Conclusion

If one understands ideology as making people act in a way or ways they would not otherwise do, then it is not easy to point to a distinctly Marxist-Leninist ideological influence on Zimbabwe's foreign policy towards Mozambique and South Africa, particularly the latter. For as the conflict in southern Africa has intensified, the lines of support have become ever more multiplex: a growing number of West European states, for example, are providing economic and diplomatic support for the Preliro government, the United Kingdom going so far as to also supply military training for the Mozambican armed forces. The United States, for its part, has resisted pressure from within the Republican Party to extend to Renamo the kind of diplomatic and military support that is given to UNITA in Angola. The USA has in recent years taken the lead amongst Western states regarding the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa, while Britain's Margaret Thatcher has for three years resisted considerable Commonwealth pressure to implement sanctions. To further complicate matters, aspects of Zimbabwe's policies towards Mozambique and South Africa may be plausibly understood in terms of motivations other than those which might be provided by a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Zimbabwe's desire to reduce its reliance on South Africa by means of increased routing of goods through the port and rail infrastructure of Mozambique does make considerable

economic and strategic sense; states are not often content with a situation of their dependency. For its part, Zimbabwe's hardening stance on the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa has been shared by as unlikely a group as 35 US House Republicans who in 1985 published a letter to the South African ambassador in Washington threatening sanctions unless a firmer stance was taken to end apartheid. It is, this writer concludes, difficult to point to any one aspect of policy as proof of a Marxist-Leninist element in Zimbabwe's foreign policy towards South Africa. This, however, is not to say that a case cannot be made for such an argument.

Regarding Mozambique, Zimbabwean government and party spokesmen do, as we have seen, express their support for the Frelimo government in ideological terms -- but such expressions are usually only in local contexts; for obvious reasons Harare does not justify to the West its military involvement to Frelimo, and an attendant appeal for more Western support for Mozambique, in terms of "the defense of the (Marxist-Leninist) revolution". To be sure, Harare recognises and cites plausible economic reasons for its support to Mozambique -- and there is no reason not to accept the sincerity of these arguments. Significantly, however, these arguments are bound up with the ideological bond of common political and socio-economic objectives. It is this latter bond

which, according to Mugabe, provides the basis for the rest.

Statements of support for Frelim. have been matched by a considerable political, diplomatic and military commitment. Moreover, Zimbabwe's attitude appears as of late 1987 still to be one of seeking a military solution to the problem of Renamo insurgency, notwithstanding reports that even within Zimbabwe itself it is believed that Renamo cannot be dismissed as a mere tool of the South African government and lacking any significant degree of local popular support. It is here contended that, if one is to take Harare's protestations of ideological commitment to Maputo at face value, then it is to a high degree the utilisation of Marxist-Leninist analysis of the Mozambican situation which permits the Zimbabweans to regard Renamo not as an expression of a degree of popular discontent with Frelimo policies, but as a 'destabilisation agent' of the South African government which itself is the regional agent of 'Western imperialism'. It is, moreover, this ideological prism which justifies increasing Zimbabwean involvement in the defense of what the Zimbabwean ruling party and government regard as the legitimate government of Mozambique, seen in terms of the defense of the "socialist revolution" in southern Africa from "reactionary forces".

With regard to South Africa, it is easier to pinpoint the radicalism of Zimbabwe's policies, than to isolate and identify a distinctively Marxist-Leninist content. For it is difficult to identify either analysis of the South African situation in Zimbabwean government publications of a Marxist-Leninist nature, or policies towards the Pretoria government radically different from those adopted, regardless of ideological orientation, by other Western and Third World states. Many states, by no means all of which could be regarded as even radical socialist, go along with Zimbabwe's calls for the abolition of apartheid and its substitution by a policy of black majority rule. Similarly, most states reject what Mugabe has publicly termed the "semantics of reform" currently being practiced by Pretoria, have intensified their calls for the institution of economic sanctions against the Republic, and regard the ANC and PAC if not as the 'authentic representatives of the South African people', then at least as groups with considerably more legitimacy than that accorded them by the South African government.

What can be said with certainty is that there is a high degree of radicalism in the Zimbabwean government's policy towards South Africa, as evidenced by positions taken and policies adopted which are considerably more hardline and less pragmatic than those adopted by Zimbabwe's FLS peers. The sanctions

issue and the policy on ministerial-level dealings with Pretoria are cases in point. Mugabe in particular appears to have taken political principle, as he sees it, to extremes with the attempted 1987 trade embargo on South Africa. His public position appears also to have radicalised: at a July 1986 public rally to mark the tenth anniversary of the Soweto riots he declared: "...the only language the Boer will understand will be the language of the gun...the more of them you kill, the nearer you get to your goal."¹³⁶ However, in an earlier discussion it was shown that ruling party policy, as derived from data gleaned from Zimbabwe News, is more clearly ideological.

While this writer has not been able to locate sufficient data to confirm, in terms of the criteria for verification outlined in chapter 1, that Marxist-Leninism influences to any significant extent the policy of the Zimbabwean government towards South Africa, this writer would contend this is indeed the case for the following reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, it appears unreasonable and illogical to consider government policy towards one particular issue, country or region as being uninfluenced by considerations which appear in terms of this study to be so important to Zimbabwe's foreign relations as a whole. One can surely draw inferences from Zimbabwean government policy statements on other issues of significance to Harare's foreign policy. Moreover,

references in party literature indicating a Marxist-Leninist element to be at work do exist. This is of no inconsiderable importance given both the high degree of correlation between party and government elites, especially with regard to foreign policy, and the proclaimed role of the ruling party in giving policy direction to government. This writer would, accordingly, attribute the generally radical, but not clearly Marxist-Leninist nature of Zimbabwean statements on the South African situation to two factors: a tendency on the part of the Zimbabwean elite to focus on the racial element in the conflict with South Africa; and their willingness, on the international plane, to refrain from terminology and analysis which might alienate existing, and possible future support for the South African cause. The issue is one of style, not substance. Certainly, a willingness to practice such a tactic has been a characteristic of Marxist-Leninist groupings the world over; for this reason alone it cannot be discounted. Mugabe's advocacy of united front tactics cited earlier would appear to indicate that, for the Zimbabwean Premier at least, there is a hidden agenda at work.

In sum then, ideology's role in Zimbabwe's policy towards southern Africa is an important one, as it is in policies discussed in previous chapters. Zimbabwe does not appear to be any less ideological in its own

backyard; indeed, its policy towards Mozambique is increasingly identified and justified in ideological terms. Those who would ascribe this solely or largely to attempts by the Zimbabwean ruling party and government elites to in this way appeal to the sentiments of the Zimbabwean population forget that Mugabe and others continue to bemoan the lack of progress in ideologising the masses since independence.¹³⁷ Ideology appeals to the elite in Zimbabwe, not the populace. That, despite this lack of ideological awareness amongst the general population, the elite in Zimbabwe continues to couch its policies in southern Africa in Marxist-Leninist terms -- even when it could plausibly justify such policies in more pragmatic strategic and/or economic terms (and indeed does so to the outside world) -- is significant. This is surely important evidence of the belief in Marxism-Leninism on the part of important sections of the elites of the ruling party and government in Zimbabwe.

¹Here, however, certain methodological problems arise, important when one attempts to explain foreign policy behaviour and its underlying motivations. Albeit in a slightly different context, Jenkins and Chittick (1975, 79) alert the foreign policy analyst to "the problems of what to do with information that, though originating in continuous foreign policy environments, is made discrete through categorisation." To adequately explain foreign policy behaviour, that behaviour should first be understood in the context of the relationships amongst the acts of a given state towards another. For:

"To fail to place discrete acts in the context of the total amount and distribution of behaviour that one state sends to another is to fail also, necessarily, to tap the basic orientation underlying the sending of any particular act." (*Ibid.*, p. 82; my emphasis)

For this reason, the discussion will endeavour to place the issues under scrutiny in the broader context of Zimbabwe's foreign relations.

²See my "A Marxist's rise to power in southern Africa" *The World and I* September 1987 pp. 194-199

³In this case, 'materialist' refers to enduring physical factors; 'idealist' to more transient factors

⁴For a brief discussion of this philosophical point, see my "Soviet foreign policy: ideology or power politics?" *International Affairs Bulletin* 11, 2, 1987. pp. 44-61

⁵See, in addition to the sources used in this chapter: Callaghy, 1983; Carter and O'Meara, 1982; Rotberg, *et. al.*, 1985; Grundy, 1974; Clough, 1982

⁶This is not to overlook the relationship between South Africa and Mozambique, which will be considered in this analysis wherever relevant.

⁷Meredith, M. The Past is Another Country. Andre Deutsch, London, 1979.

⁸Hanlon, J. Beggar Your Neighbours. James Currey, London, 1986. p. 199

⁹*Ibid.* Grundy's article provides an excellent introduction to the political economy of southern Africa, and in particular South Africa's dominance thereof. For details of South African private sector involvement in Zimbabwe, see Hanlon, *op. cit.* pp. 199-218.

¹⁰For one observer, there was no doubt that Mugabe was "proffering ... the hand of friendship". (*Anglin*, 1980, 692). Another described Mugabe's stance towards Pretoria as a "reasoned and moderate position" (Good, 1984, 364).

11 Much of the continuing flood of "destabilisation literature", for example, implies -- if it does not state as much -- that the blame for worsening relations between South Africa and the Frontline States can be attributed, almost in its entirety, to South Africa. See, for example, Joseph Hanlon's oft-cited study, Beggar Your Neighbours (James Currey, London, 1986).

12 For one thing, they appear to have mutually incompatible conceptions of national security.

13 Dumbutshena, T. "Mugabe's views on the future" Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 25 February, 1980.

14 Ibid. Mugabe was no doubt mindful of the cost incurred by Mozambique for its offering bases to ZANLA during the bush war.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 "Mugabe spells out policy on South Africa" Sunday Mail 9 March, 1980.

18 Ibid.

19 SWE ME/6 381/B/5 27 March 1980. Also: The Herald 26 March 1980 (cited in Bowman, Bratton and Murapa op. cit., p. 338).

20 Anglin, D. "Zimbabwe: retrospect and prospect" International Journal XXV, Autumn 1980. pp. 691-692

21 "Zimbabwe, a year old: anxious over South Africa" New York Times 1 February 1981. Cited in Bowman, Bratton and Murapa, op. cit. fn. 34, p. 353

22 For one observer, "The firmness of his [Mugabe's] assertion of the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and the frequency with which he reaffirmed it, marked his declaration out as a commitment of immense significance". (Anglin, 1980, 692). The then US Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose, was equally laudatory. (Nelson, 1983, 228)

23 Astrow (1984), for example

24 See Lawrence, P. "The two front runners" Rand Daily Mail 14 February 1980; Saxena, S. "Zimbabwe: from 'internal settlement' to independence" IDSa Journal XIV, 1, 1981. p. 95. For an account and

analysis of Mugabe's first year in office suggesting that the Zimbabwean Prime Minister is guided above all by an "ideological pragmatism", see: Kunert, D. "Zimbabwe: prospects one year after elections" Position Paper 4, 4, 1981.

²⁵ZIMBABWE. Ministry of Information and Tourism. "Prime Minister addresses United Nations August 26, 1980". September 1980. p. 16.

²⁶ZIMBABWE. Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism. "Prime Minister's address to the OAU" July 1980. pp. 5-6

²⁷Geldenhuys, 1982, 157

²⁸Jenkins, 1983, 23

²⁹There is considerable agreement -- amongst observers of widely differing political persuasions -- that South Africa was, by the late 1970s, moving towards a more militarily confrontational strategy ("pro-active defense", Simon Jenkins called it) of dealing with what was perceived in Pretoria as an increasingly hostile hinterland. Thus even Pik Botha, commonly regarded as one of the more 'diplomatic' of the current South African foreign policy elite, was frank in publicly expressing his distaste for the new Zimbabwean regime (Geldenhuys, 1982, 157).

³⁰Bowman, et al., p. 339

³¹This section draws heavily on Hanlon, 1986, pp. 185-199

³²Hanlon, op. cit., p. 186.

³³Ibid. Also: Langellier, J-P. "Zimbabwe: the chains of independence" The Guardian 3 January 1982.

³⁴Lelyfeld, J. "Is South Africa helping Mugabe to fail?" New York Times 10 April 1981. Jenkins (1983, 23) also reports that Mugabe criticised Zimbabwean migrant workers for seeking employment in South Africa.

³⁵See, Geldenhuys, 1984, pp. 153-155

³⁶Jaster, R. "South Africa's narrowing security options" Delphi Paper 159, 1980. p. 116.

³⁷Jaster, 1985, 117.

³⁸According to Robert Jaster (1985, 117), this

resolution of the conflict owed much to US government pressure on Pretoria.

39 Jenkins (1983,24) alleges that the dispute was only resolved after a meeting between the South Africans and a Zimbabwean government minister in Botswana. If true, it would be the first and only ministerial-level meeting between the two governments. This writer is not able to find any corroboration of this on the part of the Pretoria administration who would almost certainly play up such an achievement. According to the Head of the Zimbabwe desk in the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there has been no official ministerial contact between the two states since 1980. (discussion with Mr L. Labuscagne, Pretoria, 13 January 1987).

40 It is worth remembering that at that time over 80% of Zimbabwe's exports and imports transitted via South African ports, roads and railways. For a brief but illuminating illustration of Zimbabwe's tenuous economic position vis-a-vis South Africa, see: Arnold, G. "Zimbabwe: escaping South Africa's coils" New African February 1988. pp. 34-35

41 According to one Zimbabwean observer South Africa's 'railway diplomacy' had, by the end of 1981, already cost Zimbabwe Z\$100 million in delayed exports (Patel, 1988,49).

42 "Zimbabwe 'no' to sanctions now -- Mugabe" The Herald 20 March 1981

43 "Stand on UN resolutions clarified". Press Statement 828/80/JEP. 29 December 1980. p. 2

44 FRIS NEA V, 024, p. U4. 4 February 1982

45 "Howe's SA mission a waste of time --PM" The Herald 11 July 1986

46 A group of conservative Republican Party members in the USA -- ideologically far removed from the Zimbabwean Premier -- made similar demands on Pretoria to reform else they would be forced to support sanctions against the Republic. This common policy standpoint was motivated by different reasons, of course. It serves to illustrate something of the methodological difficulties in a study of this nature; it is not enough to know the nature of a particular policy, one needs to ascertain the underlying rationale. This is often easier said than done.

47 Drew, R. "Now Mugabe sticks his neck out over

sanctions" The Star 1 November 1985

48 The banned materials reportedly constituted 17% of Zimbabwe's imports in 1986. (Valley, P. "Frontline consensus on sanctions has crumbled" The Star 1 April 1987)

49 Drew, R. "Nail-biting time for Zimbabwean business-men". The Star. 15 October 1986; Gunn, 1986, p. 4.

50 Drew, R. op. cit.

51 Gunn, 1986, p. 4; Morna, 1987, p. 56. South African action against Zambian transit traffic was no doubt prompted by a Zambian decision in August no longer to route its copper exports through South Africa.

52 Malley, S. "An interview with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe" AfricaAsia no. 32. August 1986. p. 9

53 Gunn, 1986, p. 5

54 Ibid.

55 Gunn, 1986, p. 5; "Sanctions overrule SA trade pact -- Mugabe" The Star 22 August 1986

56 Keynote address by the Honourable Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Comrade R.G. Mugabe, on the occasion of the inaugural assembly of the eighth conference of heads of state or government of Non-Aligned countries. Harare, International Conference Centre, 1 September 1986. p. 14

57 Quoted in Gunn, 1986, p. 5

58 The remaining six members of the Fund Committee are: Algeria, Argentina, Congo, Nigeria, Peru, and Yugoslavia. Details of the Fund, its objectives and operation may be found in "NAM fund opens new front against South Africa" The Herald 10 September 1986

59 For reportage on the tour, see Chikerema, C. "Mangwende pleads for sanctions against SA" The Herald 28 November 1986; and "Britain holds out against SA sanctions" Sunday Mail (Harare) 2 November 1986

60 Chikerema, C. "Mangwende pleads for sanctions against SA" The Herald 28 November 1986

61 D'Oliveira, J. "Secret sanctions plot" Sunday

Star 7 September 1986

62. "Tearful Dr Kaunda asks again for sanctions" The Citizen. 3 September 1986.

63. D'Oliveira, op. cit.

64. "Zimbabwe: facing sanctions" Africa Confidential 10 December 1986. p. 7

65. Ibid.; "SA's neighbours gear up for possible air embargo" The Star 1 March 1987. There have even been reports of Zimbabwe's neighbours, amongst them Botswana, gearing up to capitalise on the anticipated air embargo.

66. "Sanctions set-back?" Financial Mail 19 September 1987.

67. Kaunda's reticence is almost surely related to the December food riots in Zambia, symbolic of the country's parlous economic position, and which probably served to bring home to Kaunda the fact that his hitherto hardline policy on sanctions might affect his domestic power base.

68. "Sanctions postponed indefinitely -- researcher" The Star 10 March 1987.

69. "Zimbabwe: the realities of leadership" Africa Confidential 19 August 1987. p. 1

70. Of course, the possibility exists that Kaunda had communicated his decision to postpone a ban, and that Mugabe had intended to press on regardless thus necessitating a last-ditch effort by Nkala and his colleagues.

71. "Frontline states devise 'survival' plan" The Star 27 January 1987. The plan anticipates a retaliatory economic blockade by South Africa, and proposes, inter alia, the development of reliable alternative trade routes, stockpiling of food and other essentials, including storage of 150 000 tonnes of grain.

72. Patel, 1988, 56.

73. "Zimbabwe calls for UN sanctions" The Star 8 April 1987

74. "Threat to firms in Zimbabwe" Business Day 18 February 1987.

75. See, for example: Hawkins, T. "Zimbabwe's fortunes are now beginning to fade..." Business Day 25 March 1987; "Cutting allocations" Financial Mail 13 February 1987; "Zimbabwe faces tough two years" Business Day 15 May 1987; "Zimbabwean economy is stagnating -- report" The Star 29 May 1987; "Zim business gloom deepens" The Citizen 25 June 1987; "Economic shock waves hit Zimbabwe" Sunday Star 28 June 1987.

76. "Mugabe succumbs to reason" Financial Mail 7 August 1987 p. 26-27. Unless otherwise indicated, the following account draws upon the above report.

77. "Zimbabwe in new bid to cut SA trade links to the bone" Argus (Cape Town) 23 July 1987

78. Hartnack, M. "Mugabe set to choke SA trade with red tape" Business Day 4 August 1987

79. "Zimbabwe starts to sever SA link" Business Day 6 August 1987

80. Ibid.

81. Drew, R. "No secret sanctions plan, says Zimbabwe" The Star 6 August 1987

82. "Zimbabwe again pulls back from SA sanctions" EASA: Trade and Investment in Eastern and Southern Africa 1, 11, 1987. p. 1.

83. "Mugabe succumbs to reason" Financial Mail 7 August 1987 p. 26

84. Robertson, M. "Sanctions? What sanctions?" Sunday Times 11 October 1987.

85. Ingram, D. "In Lusaka next week, a new Commonwealth push on SA" Weekly Mail January 29 - February 4, 1988.

86. This discussion is based upon a reading of the following articles: "The South African situation" Zimbabwe News 16, 7, November 1985. pp. 9-10; "Racist elections" Zimbabwe News 18, 4, April 1987. pp. 26-27; "The South African worker -- an explosion under apartheid" Zimbabwe News January 1986; "The progressive world focusses on southern Africa" Zimbabwe News 18, 9, September 1987. pp. 31-32

87. "The social conflict in South Africa" Zimbabwe News January 1986. p. 23

88. "President and First Secretary addresses the masses on Soweto Day" Zimbabwe News 17, 7, July 1986. p. 2

89. An account of the origins of this cooperation may be found in Martin, D. and Johnson, P. The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981, pp. 14-20). Since independence, however, ZANU (PF) has used its leading position over Government to emphasize this special relationship with Frelimo, and to extend it to the populace of Zimbabwe as a whole. It is but another example of ZANU (PF)'s attempts to make its political culture and history the national ones. Thus following the death of Machel in October 1986, it was the party not the government which decreed a series of commemorative rallies to held country-wide.

90. Contrast this with the northern border with Zambia where the Limpopo river and climatic conditions made incursions difficult.

91. Lopes, M. "Robert Mugabe Prime Minister, Zimbabwe" Africa Report January-February 1986. p. 75

92. See, for example: "Prime Minister addresses banquet -- August 5, 1980". Press Statement 490/80/RH. 6 August 1980

93. "Prime Minister inaugurates Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Week". Press Statement 384/80/SFS 23 June 1980. p. 2

94. Ibid.

95. Samora's death inspires (sic) revolution -- PM" Press Statement 134/87/SG/SN/RN. 16 March 1987. p. 2

96. Ibid.

97. See Chissano's speech as reported in "Unity the key to our joint peace: Chissano" The Herald 3 March, 1987. For other statements by the Zimbabwean leader, see: SWB ME/6493/B7 - 8, 9 August 1980; FBIS V, 245 22 December 1981. pp. U2 - U4

98. For example: "Beira talks last 3 hours" The Herald 24 May 1980; "Mugabe-Machel Umtali meeting". Press Statement 520/81/DB 14 July 1981

99. Machel played a major role in pressurising Mugabe into attending the Lancaster House talks, in

large part because Mozambique could no longer sustain the economic price it was paying for support and sanctuary for the ZANLA cadres. A stable Zimbabwe was vital to Mozambique's survival. (Serfontein, H. "Machel's influence lay behind ZANU assurance to whites" The Sunday Tribune 9 March 1980). Machel is reported as having said as far back as 1970:

"Some of us, when we look at the situation in Mozambique, realise that if we liberate Mozambique tomorrow, that will not be the end. The liberation of Mozambique without the liberation of Zimbabwe is meaningless".

(Thompson, 1985, 13).

100 Trade and transport have featured high on the agendas of talks between the two states ever since Mugabe's first visit to Mozambique in May 1980.

101 Bowman, Bratton and Murapa, op. cit. p. 343

102 Hanlon, op. cit. p. 193

103 BIU Country Report Zimbabwe, Malawi no. 4, 1987. p. 26.

104 "zim rail link to re-open soon" Citizen 11 December 1987

105 "Beira link is lifeline PM tells DPRK" The Herald 22 January 1987

106 "Prime Minister inaugurates Zimbabwe-Mozambique Friendship Week" Press Statement 384/80/SPS 23 June 1980. p. 4

107 "Zimbabwe's First Five Years" BIU Special Report no. 111 November 1981. p. 13

108 "Trouble along the border" New African March 1981. p. 34

109 FBIS MEA V 7 December 1981. p. U3

110 Raath, J. "Zimbabwe readies for possible closure of S African trade routes" The Christian Science Monitor 26 August 1985; "PM on Mozambique offensive" The Herald 9 September 1985

111 "Zimbabwe army joins push against MNR rebels"

The Citizen 9 September 1985

112 Raath, J. "Mozambique held by Mugabe's troops"
The Times 13 September 1985

113 Lopes, M. "Robert Mugabe Prime Minister,
 Zimbabwe" Africa Report January-February 1986. p. 75

114 Meldrum, A. "Zimbabwe holds back its troops" The Guardian 1 March 1986

115 ibid.

116 ibid. According to one correspondent, ZNA troops
 at one stage numbered 15 000 men (Ndavi, V. "Securing
 corridor strains Zim's military resources" The Botswana Guardian 8 August 1986

117 Malley, S. "An interview with Prime Minister
 Robert Mugabe" Africa no. 32, August 1986. p. 14

118 "A group to fight Mugabe" Sunday Times 24 August
 1986

119 "Zimbabwe poised to take on MNR rebels" The Star
 16 October 1986

120 There were similar incidents, directed against
 both South Africa and Malawi, in Maputo on November
 4. SIU Country Report Zimbabwe, Malawi no. 1, 1987.
 p. 27

121 "Mugabe vows MNR will never take over
 Mozambique" The Citizen 27 October 1986

122 ibid.

123 "SA threats will not stop us warns PM" The Herald 6 November 1986

124 ibid.

125 SIU Country Report Zimbabwe, Malawi. 2, 1987. p.
 10

126 Jacobs, D. "First major raid on Zim by MNR
 rebels" Sunday Times 21 June 1987

127 ibid. A brief account of Renamo cross-border
 incursions since June is given in Mallett, V. "A new
 bush war threatens the Eastern Highlands" Business Day
 25 September 1987

128 L'Ange, G. "Mugabe may face a new challenge" The

Star 2 February 1987; "Jo'burg businessmen linked to Sithole's guerrilla army" The Star 25 June 1987

129 Maier, K. "Sucked slowly into the vortex called Mozambique" The Christian Science Monitor 23 September 1987

130 Vernon, K. "MNR tightening its grip on Maputo" The Star 6 January 1988; Maier, K. "Sucked into the vortex" South February 1988 p. 38

131 There have been a number of reports of discontent between Zimbabwean and Mozambican forces on the ground in Mozambique. The Zimbabweans are reportedly fed up with Mozambique's military inefficiency, while some Mozambicans reportedly resent Zimbabwean 'imperialism' -- development of the Beira Corridor in sharp contrast to the surrounding territory. For reports of Zimbabwean dissatisfaction with Frelimo's ineffectiveness, see: Raath, J. "Forty-mile strip of Mozambique held by Mugabe's troops" The Times 13 September 1985; Meldrum, A. "Zimbabwe hold back its troops" The Guardian 1 March 1986; Ndoyi, V. "Securing corridor strains Zim's military resources" Botswana Guardian 8 August 1986; For a report of Mozambican anger at Zimbabwean 'imperialism', see: "The dream becomes a nightmare" Sunday Times 12 April 1987

132 For the full text of Mugabe's speech to the Rufaro Stadium, Harare rally, see: "Samora's death inspires (sic) revolution -- PM" Press Statement 134/87/SG/SN/RN 16 March 1987.

133 Chissano foresees future federation with Zimbabwe" The Herald 27 November 1987. It has since been reported that Mugabe remains keenly interested in his late colleague's idea, which would end landlocked Zimbabwe's transport dependence on South Africa. The Zimbabwean government was reportedly preparing a plan for the annexation, with Mozambican government approval, of a swath of Mozambique which would give it an outlet to the sea. (Younghusband, P. "Zimbabwe plots to swallow slice of Mozambique" The Washington Times 21 October 1987)

134 "Mozambican leader begins four-day visit to Zimbabwe" The Star 2 March 1987

135 "Our enemies will not divide us: Chissano" The Herald 4 March 1987

136 "President and First Secretary addresses the masses on Soweto day" op. cit. p. 5

137 Nyagumbo has recently conceded as much. See
"Restructuring the Party" Zimbabwe News 19, 1,
January 1988. pp. 11-12

Conclusion

This study has attempted to explore the relationship between ideology and foreign policy with respect to selected issues in Zimbabwe's foreign policy for the period 1980-1987. The focus of the study has thus been essentially motivational, as it sought to assess the impact of Marxism-Leninism, the official ideology of the ruling party of Zimbabwe, on that country's foreign policy. ZANU (PF) was considered as a collective actor for the purposes of the investigation. While Zimbabwe is considered as a case study, it was intended that, if possible, conclusions of a more comparative value would also be reached regarding the impact of ideology on foreign policy.

In its pursuit of these objectives, the study first sought greater clarity on the meaning of ideology, and on its functions. For it was recognised from the outset that the term ideology itself has been accorded a wide range of meanings. Moreover, how ideology is conceptualised and defined has traditionally impacted on the direction and findings of researches incorporating the phenomenon. This study is of course no exception. For this reason, considerable attention was devoted to attempting to bring greater clarity to the concept of ideology.

Moreover, the study stated clearly from the outset its conception of ideology, one which rejected the more commonly accepted "all-inclusive" definitions. This investigation proceeded from the standpoint that, while ideology is a cognitive phenomenon affecting human perception, it differs from other such influences over the critical issue of choice. This is, generally speaking, particularly true of the more newly independent states of the Third World where adoption of an ideology is a conscious choice. The element of choice means also that not all thought, political or otherwise, is ideological.

Given the emphasis on the importance for cognition of ideology, a closer examination of the cognitive functions of ideology followed, with particular attention being paid to the specific relationship between ideology and foreign policy. The literature examined on the subject was found to reflect a substantial agreement on the issue of the cognitive functions of ideology. Turning more specifically to the question of how the ZANU (PF) elite itself understood ideology, party representatives were found to be in substantial agreement with the conclusions reached earlier.

The research then turned to the question of what constituted the content of ZANU (PF)'s official ideology. A methodology was applied in the collection

and processing of data relating to this issue, with a high degree of success. Having established the general content of the ideology of the ruling party, next to be explored was the specific aspects of this ideology pertaining to the foreign policy of Zimbabwe. The stated assumption was that ZANU (PF)'s ideology of foreign policy cannot be understood in isolation from its more general Weltanschauung, a point of view expressed by the ruling party itself.

It is for this reason that the impact of ruling party ideology on the domestic arena was then examined. This overview of developments within Zimbabwe also served to demonstrate the high degree of operationalisation of ideology, thus indicating that the official ideology was more than mere rhetoric. This fact of course added considerable weight to the ruling party's assertion, still untested at that point, that ideology shapes and motivates Zimbabwean foreign policy. It is to this external dimension that the investigation then turned.

The first foreign policy issue to be considered was Zimbabwe's national role conception. For nonalignment, ruling party and government spokesmen claim, is the underlying principle of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. The second issue to be examined was Zimbabwe's regional foreign policy. The context was seen to be important insofar as the analysis was

venturing closer to home, to where Zimbabwe's core interests were at stake and where, as conventional wisdom would have it, Zimbabwe is least likely to follow an ideologically-based foreign policy. The focus here was on the two states in southern Africa most central to Zimbabwe's regional foreign policy, South Africa and Mozambique.

The investigation arrived at certain conclusions of importance both to an understanding of Zimbabwe's foreign relations and, more generally, to an understanding of the role of ideology in politics.

ZANU (PF) ideology was found to have a profound influence on Zimbabwe's foreign policy in two major ways. Firstly, the analysis of international relations, past and present, by the foreign policy elites of both ruling party and Government was found to reflect both the fundamental assumptions and the tools of analysis of the Marxist-Leninist paradigm. Secondly, the long-term goals and objectives of the foreign policy establishment were found to reflect the influence of Marxism-Leninism. In short, Marxism-Leninism informs the Weltanschauung of ZANU (PF).

Thus upon closer examination of the substance of Zimbabwe's declared nonaligned stance, a Marxist-Leninist world view was found to underlie this aspect

of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. As both ruling party and government policy spokesmen themselves put it, while Zimbabwe may be nonaligned militarily, politically, economically and diplomatically, the Marxist-Leninist proclivities of the ruling party by definition preclude ideological nonalignment. This standpoint was found to underlie both the Government and ZANU (PF)'s understanding of international politics and of Zimbabwe's place in the global arena. International relations are seen to be dominated by a clash between 'capitalism' and 'scientific socialism' -- and Zimbabwe has chosen to side with the latter camp.

However, while Zimbabwe's nonaligned policy is at base Marxist-Leninist in orientation and content, this is not to say that there are not other factors at play which have the capacity to qualify or to flavour such an ideological stance. It is here perhaps that conclusions of a more comparative nature might be drawn from the present study, contributing to our understanding of the impact of ideology on political behaviour. For there has been demonstrated what might best be termed a 'statist' element in the operationalisation of Zimbabwe's nonaligned policy. Notwithstanding its Marxist-Leninist orientation, the ruling party has shown itself to be wary of dealings of the Soviet Union, a state with which it might be expected, prima facie, to enjoy good relations.

Harare's wariness of Moscow clearly reflects the historical experience of the ZANU (PF) elite which confronted in the mid- and late-1970s an obstructionist Soviet Union. It would, however, be incorrect to interpret this paradoxical situation as evidence of Zimbabwe's ideological neutrality, for many self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes have found themselves in a similar situation.

Realising that the anticipated global proletarian revolution was not to be immediately forthcoming, the Bolsheviks in the 1920s opted for a policy of 'socialism in one country'. Since that time, their external relations have reflected a tension between *raison d'etat* and their revolutionary proclivities, with lasting and profound ramifications for relations among Marxist-Leninist parties. For the CPSU's understanding of what would best further the cause of scientific socialism in the global arena has not always accorded with the perspectives of other Marxist-Leninist governments and movements, something Zimbabwe's ruling party discovered to its cost in the 1970s.

For this reason, Zimbabwe has since independence endeavoured to follow a policy of nonalignment, the substance of which would enable the country to be both socialist and sovereign, to be a free agent in its international dealings, albeit one informed by an

ideological Weltanschauung. While Zimbabwe accepts its status as a contributor to the 'world revolutionary process', it maintains that Harare should determine the nature of that contribution.

While Zimbabwe's nonalignment policy, indeed, all of its external relations, are influenced to some degree by other, more traditional state interests, Zimbabwean foreign policy remains at base Marxist-Leninist in orientation. For this ideology informs these more statist interests. Thus it is that in recent years relations between Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union have warmed considerably, while relations between Harare and Washington are at their lowest ebb since 1980. To say that this is due to a heightened perception of a threat from South Africa and the perceived complicity of the United States in South Africa's internal and regional policies, is to provide only part of the answer. For Zimbabwe's ruling party has, since its ideological rebirth in the early 1970s, always been ideologically closer to the Soviet bloc than to the West, its historical experience notwithstanding. This orientation reflects the fundamental ideological view of international relations adhered to by the ZANU (PF) elite, and its chosen ideological allegiances and goals. Thus it is that, while Zimbabwe has endeavoured since independence to establish diplomatic and economic links with many states, regardless of political

orientation, it reserves a special relationship for ties with other, self-styled Marxist-Leninist parties. The chosen ideology dictates that party-to-party relations amongst Marxist-Leninist parties be of pre-eminent importance.

Turning to the regional context of Zimbabwe's foreign relations, a number of important conclusions were reached with regard to the impact of ideology on foreign policy, both with particular respect to the Zimbabwean case, and more generally with regard to the issue of ideology and politics. For Zimbabwean foreign policy was not found to be 'less-ideological' in this southern African context. This was particularly true in the case of relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique where Zimbabwe's increasing diplomatic, military and economic involvement was and is justified in terms of the 'defense of the socialist revolution' in southern Africa from 'reactionary' and 'counter-revolutionary' elements. The special party links between ZANU (PF) and Frelimo predicate such assistance.

It would be inaccurate to regard this stance as mere rhetoric designed for domestic popular consumption. For policy towards Mozambique reflects an ideologically-inspired analysis of the prevailing conflict situation, while ideology also flavours the chosen objectives; Zimbabwean spokesmen place great

emphasis on the shared socio-economic and political goals of the two ruling parties. Moreover, the domestic constituency for such an ideological line of argument is virtually nonexistent. Thus it is of not inconsiderable significance that, rather than explain its involvement in purely military and/or economic terms -- a line of argument which would appeal to a broader audience at home -- ZANU (PF) continues to insist that it is a common ideological bond which underlies all else.

Harare's policy on South Africa, this study concludes, also has a basis in the ideology of the ruling party. Ruling party analyses of the prevailing situation in South Africa, and of related issues, utilise Marxist-Leninist methodology and tools of analysis. The conflict in South Africa is regarded as more than racial in origin; it is a struggle between capitalism and socialism. While the study could not locate sufficient evidence, in terms of the methodology outlined in Chapter 1, to establish beyond reasonable doubt the ideological basis of Government policy on South Africa, that there in fact exists an ideological contribution was inferred from the contribution of ideology to Zimbabwe's foreign policy in general. Moreover, the Zimbabwean Premier himself has advocated the adoption of 'united front' tactics against South Africa. From this it is inferred that the Government's ambiguously radical

stance towards the Republic differs more in style than in substance. It could of course be argued that the lack of available evidence linking ruling party ideology to Zimbabwean Government policy reflects Harare's pragmatism in the form of a willingness to abandon ideological rhetoric when faced with hard choices. Where such a line of argument falls down is that, far from moderating its southern African policy, Harare has adopted a hardline attitude towards South Africa quite out of keeping with the behaviour to be expected from a state willing to compromise. Before concrete conclusions can be reached on this important issue, information is needed on the internal policy deliberations of the ZANU (PF) elite, data to which this researcher was denied access.

Turning to the more general question of ideology and politics, what can be learned from this study? Having established that an ideology is an active component of the behaviour of a specific individual or group -- itself no simple task -- in what way does that ideology impact upon policy?

Given its cognitive functions, ideology, it should be realised, has a fundamental impact upon the perceptions, goals and behaviour of the adherent. As such, ideology becomes an integral part of political thought and behaviour. This input is, it appears,

frequently misunderstood. An Africanist of some considerable note, Gerry Bender (1987, 9), recently prefaced a study of international relations in Africa with the assertion that ideology "has been grossly exaggerated in past explanations of the international relations of African states". In support of this contention, Bender pointed to the willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to shift their allegiances in the Horn of Africa, and the ability of self-styled Marxist states in Africa to maintain alliances with other, ideologically disparate countries. Kurt Campbell's recent and oft-cited study of Southern Africa in Soviet Foreign Policy proceeds from a conception of ideology which, underplaying if not dismissing the cognitive functions of Marxist-Leninist ideology, regards ideological concerns as distinct from, and competing with, strategic, military or economic interests. Thus for Campbell (1987, 48-49), the importance of ideology lies not in the basic and underlying philosophical assumptions which inform the adherent's conception of reality, but in the programs of political action specifically tied to particular historical and socio-economic conditions -- A. Ross Johnson's so-called 'action programs'. Hence Campbell's assessment that the more 'pragmatic' foreign policy towards the Third World of the Soviet Union in the 1980s indicates "the ideologically agnostic approach of the Gorbachev generation"

(*Ibid.*, 49).

The conception of ideology and its role in political life held by Bender, Campbell and others appears to indicate, not only an incomplete understanding of the nature and working of ideologies in general, but of the philosophy and writings of Marxism-Leninism in particular.

While ideology influences, even shapes the adherents' perceptions of their political, strategic and economic interests, of a state's national interest, ideology does not eliminate or negate them. This has been clearly demonstrated in the case of Zimbabwe's nonaligned stance, and its involvement in Mozambique. Thus it is inaccurate to distinguish between 'more ideological' and 'less-ideological' policies. This is particularly true of Marxist-Leninist states, given that ideology's philosophical basis in dialectics, and Lenin's conception of pragmatism. If pragmatism is interpreted as "the absence of long-term goals rooted in ideology" (Ottaway, 1986, 141), then adherents to Marxism-Leninism are not pragmatic. Indeed, it is impossible for a regime to be both Marxist-Leninist and pragmatic by this definition. If, however, what is meant by pragmatism is a regime's ability to slow down temporarily its drive towards the implementation of its long-term goals, then a Marxist-Leninist regime can be pragmatic.

Indeed, not to do so when circumstances dictate is to be unlenient -- and to go against the tenets of the ideology. For as Lenin (1968, 79) himself asserted:

"It is necessary to link the strictest devotion to the ideas of communism with the ability to effect all the necessary practical compromises, tactics, conciliatory manoeuvres, zig-zags, retreats and so on..."

This brief discussion serves to show the importance, not only of an understanding of the input of ideologies in general into political life, but of a familiarity with the doctrine of particular ideologies. Returning to that ideology which was the focus of this study, it is true to say that to be familiar with the ideological underpinnings of adherents to Marxism-Leninism is to gain considerable insight into their Weltanschauung, actions and long-term objectives.

The question of the continued input of ideology into the foreign policy of Zimbabwe is a more complicated and less certain issue. However the strengthening of the trends outlined in Chapter 5 would seem to support the continuing and increasing impact of ideology on Zimbabwean foreign policy. In recent months a number of important developments have taken place on the domestic front in Zimbabwe. The signing of a unity pact between ZANU (PF) and ZAPU brings that much closer what this writer had already

concluded was Zimbabwe's inevitable one-party status. A cabinet reshuffle arising out of that agreement strengthened the position of the ruling party in the Government, bringing in several new members of an avowedly Marxist orientation. Most important for the subject of this dissertation, is Nathan Shamuyarira's move to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given Shamuyarira's personal views, as contained in this study, his senior position in ZANU (PF), his long-standing editorial involvement with Zimbabwe News, and the increasing centrality in Zimbabwean political life of the ruling party, there seems little doubt that the ideology of ZANU (PF) will impact increasingly on the foreign policy of Zimbabwe.

Appendix: What is Marxism?

Kolakowski (1978, I, vi) observes that "There is scarcely any question relating to the interpretation of Marxism that is not a matter of dispute." S.P. Thompson (1980, 181) goes so far as to assert that "Marxism, as an intellectual system, is in a state of crisis. The term 'Marxism' conceals an immense conflict going on between different claimants to the Marxist tradition." Swack (1976, 397) puts it somewhat more strongly, calling our attention to the "sectarianism and viciousness with which self-proclaimed Marxists denounce one another".

Raymond Aron (1965, 1) enlarges upon the difficulty of adequately defining "Marxism". For Aron, Marxism may denote: (1) the ideas of Marx himself, as reconstructed by the historian who seeks to understand them in relation to the man and his times; (2) the ideas of Marx as interpreted by various "Marxist" schools in relation to their own times, their own problems, their own goals; (3) the social movements, the parties in opposition, and the parties in power that claim to be acting or governing in accordance with Marxist ideas.

Aron draws the parallel that "Every movement creates its own Marxism, or reads the writings of Marx in its own way, just as every religious sect has its own way of reading Holy Writ..."(Ibid.).

Writing twelve years later, Ralph Miliband (1977, 5) argues that much the same situation prevails: there is no longer a recognised Marxist orthodoxy towards which general obedience is paid. On the contrary, "the recovery of Marxism [in the West] has involved the proliferation of coteries and fashionable trends, with different sects and schools proclaiming their own version of Marxism as the only authentic one..." (Ibid.). Miliband concludes that "in the end, there is no 'authoritative' interpretation - only personal judgement and evaluation" (Ibid.). In a later work, Miliband (1981, 118-119) even questions the validity of the appellation "Marxism" itself. He points out that Karl Marx himself never referred to his work as "Marxism" because, Miliband claims, "the notion of a complicated system that could once and for all be labelled was altogether alien to his way of thought".

Bottomore (1984) provides a synopsis, from a predominantly sociological perspective, of the development of Marxist thought since 1883. He discerns a "notable revival", since the 1960s, of

Marxist thinking in the social sciences involving, in part, the rediscovery and renewed discussion of earlier thinkers. Bottomore (1984, 65) concludes that there "is now no orthodox" Marxism which can claim to generate infallibly a "correct" political (or party) view of aims and strategies in practical life".

Albert and Hahnel (1978, 13) assert that "There is no single Marxist theory, no one true Marxist theory, and there is no way to know what theory Marx would hold were he alive today." These two writers divide the Marxist tradition into two camps: the "orthodox Marxists" (Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mattick and Althusser) and the "unorthodox Marxists" (Korsch, Gramsci, Sartre, de Beauvoir, and the like). Althusser (1969) claims that in about 1845 there occurred an "epistemological break", which separates the young humanist and historicist Marx, still profoundly marked by Hegel and Feuerbach, from the mature Marx, formulator of an original and rigorous science of society. Berki (1975, 72), however, argues for a tripartite development in Marx's own thought: philosophical humanism, revolutionary communism and scientific socialism.

Barry (1981, 17) argues that the difficulty in presenting Marxism as a mode of analysis lies in the

fact that "there has been a serious dispute in the past two decades as to what Marx's political philosophy and political economy is".¹ He notes that there is an enormous literature on Marx and Marxism, but little agreement amongst scholars as to the meaning of the doctrine. This has been attributed to what Sidney Hook (1975) terms the "ambiguous legacy" left by Marx himself. Labaree (1980, 1) for instance, is bold to claim the existence of "57 varieties of Marx".

Even what are commonly regarded as the most fundamental Marxist units of analysis are not immune from dissent. Hirsch and Fardinian (1981, 11) note that "Within the Marxist tradition, different conceptions of the very basic terms of Marxism (e.g. class, mode of production, social formation, etc) are presently, and have historically been, the subject of constant struggle, conflict and difference". Two self-professed Marxists, Albert and Hahnel (1979, 6) assert that the "Labor Theory of Value, perhaps the cornerstone of the orthodox Marxist economic analysis of capitalism, is simply wrong".

All of this begs the question of the advisability or validity of attempts to give definitional precision to ideologies. Z.D.H. Cole (1975, 104-105) cogently

argues that:

"Socialism cannot be defined in a sentence or a paragraph because it is fundamentally not a system but a movement which has taken, and will doubtless continue to take, diverse forms both from country to country and under the influence of particular theorists and practical exponents. It can be, up to a point, described and characterized, but not defined".

This assessment might be applied equally well to Marxism. Such an approach might even be justified in terms of the dialectic. Kara (1961, 1) argues that "Marxism is an open system that develops in the content of the future development of objective reality and the process of cognition of the world, and, if no attempt was made to develop Marxist theory further, its sense and content would be negated".

In the light of the controversy outlined above, this writer finds himself in substantial agreement with Kolakowski's assertion (1978, I, 3) that:

"...there is no point in asking who is a 'true' Marxist in the modern world, as such questions can only arise within an ideological perspective which assumes that the canonical writings are the authentic source of truth, and that whoever interprets them rightly must therefore be possessed of the truth. There is no reason, in fact, why we should not acknowledge that different movements and ideologies,

however antagonistic to one another, are equally entitled to invoke the name of Marx...."

E.P. Thompson (1978, 103) phrases it somewhat less elegantly, asserting that "to argue for possession of the term 'Marxism' may not be worth the breath that is spent upon it".

It is difficult, in the light of the above discussion, to know exactly what Marxism is. One wonders how, given such definitional controversy amongst Marxists and non-Marxists alike, ZANU (PF)'s claims to Marxism-Leninism might be dismissed. However, while recognising the inherent difficulties in any effort to define Marxism or Marxism-Leninism, an attempt must clearly be made. A core doctrine or definitional minimum must be identifiable, else the use of such "labels" would be nonsensical. There are many variants of Christianity, yet one is still able to distinguish Christians from, say, Hindus. In the same way, there must be a core doctrine which sets Marxists apart from their peers. There must be a definitional minimum by which Marxist may be distinguished from non-Marxist thought.² What must be established are the basic assumptions or postulates which are commonly held by the body of thinkers who have come to be known as Marxist.³ Accordingly, what this writer seeks to do, is to establish the central tenets of the Marxist

as opposed to the Marxian tradition;⁴ those precepts most or all of which may be found, at any one time, in the writings of those who claim for themselves the Marxist label.

I. Identifying the Marxist Tradition

For this writer, Marxism rests upon four main cornerstones, upon which in turn all other Marxist concepts rest, viz:

- (a) Dialectical materialism
- (b) Historical materialism
- (c) The postulate of the class struggle.

a) Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism

Both dialectical materialism and historical materialism can only be understood in terms of the theory of the dialectic and the philosophy of materialism.

Materialism is the doctrine that whatever exists is either matter or entirely dependent on matter for its existence. Materialists are opposed to the philosophy of idealism; in their view, matter is not a product of mind, but mind is the highest product of matter.

The dialectic has been defined as "the theory of the union of opposites" (Carew Hunt, 1963, 42). The dialectical process is one of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The thesis affirms a proposition. The antithesis negates or denies it. The synthesis amalgamates what is true in both the thesis and antithesis and thus brings one a step closer to reality. However, upon closer examination the synthesis is found to be defective and it becomes the new thesis. Thus the whole dialectical process continues. Eventually the Absolute will be reached in which no contradictions exist.

Dialectical materialism is perhaps the most fundamental doctrine of Marxist philosophy. It is concerned with the most general laws of change and development in society and thought. Dialectical materialism is 'dialectical' because it attaches crucial importance to the unity of opposites -- thesis and antithesis -- being resolved in synthesis. It is 'materialism' as it postulates that matter is primary and that the material world alone is real. Consciousness, mind, ideas and thought are, accordingly, secondary or simply reflections or derivatives of the material factors. Dialectical materialism is regarded by Marxists as not only a

theory of knowledge, but also a practical and scientific method for the understanding and revolutionary transformation of society.

Historical materialism may be defined as the application of dialectical materialism to the study of history. Marx argued that the principle that governs all human relations is the production of the means to support life and the exchange of things produced. Hence the ultimate determinant of social change is to be found not in human ideas of justice or truth, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. As the productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production, the proletariat is increasingly alienated and the class struggle intensifies accordingly until a revolution takes place. Revolution was regarded by Marx as an indispensable vehicle of progress.

b) The Postulate of Class Struggle

For the Marxist, class is the primary unit of analysis in human relations. Marx himself loosely defined a class in terms of its relation to the means of production. He argued that all classes are ultimately divisible by two, one of which controls the means of production (the bourgeoisie) while the other (the

proletariat) does not. The antagonism to which this inequitable situation gives rise creates a profound contradiction resulting in class struggle. This conflict is, for Marxists, the operating pattern of history, one which continues until its economic motivation, the existence of private property, is eradicated. Marxism thus views the class struggle as an expression of dialectical materialism.

c) The Theory of Value and of Surplus Value

Following in the tradition of the classical school of British economists, Marx argued that labour is the sole value-producing agency. On this basis he put forward the theory of surplus value such that the value that workers add to their production may be divided into two parts: that which pays their wages and that which is the profit of the employer. Marx termed the latter profit "surplus value", and represented it as fraudulent. From this theory of surplus value Marx deduced three laws:

i. The law of Capitalist Accumulation

Competition eventually forces the capitalist to accumulate constant capital (i.e. labour-saving machinery) in order to produce more goods yet avoid

paying wages for an increased labour force. However, as the ratio of constant to variable capital (i.e. labour) increases, the capitalist's rate of profit falls.

ii. The law of the Concentration of Capital

Under competition the number of capitalists decreases as the more powerful force the weaker out of business and into the ranks of the wage earners. Thus capitalism leads eventually and inevitably to monopoly.

iii. The Law of Increasing Misery

Owing to (i) and (ii) above, the misery of the workers will continually increase. The individual capitalist responds to increasing economic pressure by replacing workers with machinery. The newly redundant workers join the ranks of the unemployed and this enables the employer still further to force down wages. Thus, while production increases the number of wage earners decrease, as do their wages.

Having identified the Marxist tradition, we must now turn to Leninism. For ZANU (PF) describes itself not as Marxist, but as Marxist-Leninist. Accordingly, in order to assess the veracity of such doctrinal claims,

Lenin's contribution to Marxist theory must be outlined.

II. The Leninist Tradition

Leninism as a political doctrine is somewhat easier to pin down and define than is Marxism. Controversy arises not so much over what constitutes Leninism, as over the extent to which Leninism is Marxist in thought and practice.⁵ It is, however, the former which concerns us here: what was Lenin's contribution to revolutionary thought and practice? This input may be divided into five sections,⁶ viz:

Theory of the party

The strategy and tactics of communist parties

The strategy and tactics of revolution

The dictatorship of the proletariat

The theory of capitalist imperialism

Lenin shifted the emphasis from the social and economic prerequisites of revolution, as stressed by Marx and Engels, to political factors. He replaced the 'social revolution' championed by Marx and Engels, with the concept of the 'socialist revolution' to be led by a revolutionary party. In contrast to Marx and Engels, Lenin regarded the possibility of peaceful

transition as the exception, the forcible overthrow in the form of an armed uprising as the rule. His contributions to Marxist-Leninist theory reflect this premise.

a) Theory of the Party

Lenin believed that left to its own devices, the working class could and would develop little more than a "trade union consciousness". And "trade unionism", he argued, "means the ideological enslavement of the workers to the bourgeoisie" (Lenin, 1944, 41). In What is to be done? (1902), arguably the central document of Leninism, he states that "Aside from the influence of the Social-democracy there is no conscious activity of the workers" (Conquest, 1972, 39). Lenin (1944, 27) declared that "Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement". However the workers could not attain an adequate level of revolutionary consciousness by themselves. This must originate from without.

Thus Lenin's theory of the party reflected his stress on the subjective element in the dialectical process. Marx and Engels' dictum "The emancipation of the working class is the task of the working class itself" received considerable amendment. For Lenin, working

class consciousness had to be batted from without. The engine for this, Lenin argued, is the communist party. Both "spontaneity", the belief that, left to themselves, the workers would develop a revolutionary consciousness, and "Khvoetism", which argued that the party should defer to the will of the masses, were categorically rejected by Lenin. In "What is to be done?" he specifically condemned such suggestions, arguing that "all subservience to the spontaneity of the Labour movement, all belittling...of the role of Social-Democracy, means whether one likes it or not, the growth of influence of bourgeois ideology among the workers" (Lenin, 1944, 39).

In Lenin's view, only the communist party, by virtue of its scientific knowledge of society, embodies true proletarian consciousness. In Carew Hunt's (1963, 189) words:

"The party rules because, as the most highly developed section of the workers, it represents what the more backward elements would desire were they sufficiently mature to discern where their true interests lie".

Thus the vanguard party, as "the highest form of proletarian class organisation" (Lenin, 1968, claimed its role by virtue not of popular proletarian acclaim, but of its scientific knowledge of the workings of society. As Lenin (1944, 28) put it, "the

role of vanguard can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by an advanced theory".

Lenin envisioned the party as a small secret organisation composed of a limited number of dedicated, full-time and disciplined revolutionaries. Professional revolutionaries were a must as the proletarian revolution called for continuous and unremitting effort. As their profession was now one of revolutionary work, all distinction between worker and intellectual should be effaced.

The predominantly illegal nature of the work of the organisation necessitated strict party discipline. Even after the October Revolution Lenin (1968, 10) argued that "absolute centralisation and rigorous discipline in the proletariat are an essential condition of victory over the bourgeoisie". Hence the organisation of the party according to the principles of democratic centralism.

Lenin emphasized the distinction to be drawn between the party and the workers as a whole. The latter had a bourgeois mentality which had to be overcome by the proletarian party. Only committed workers could be admitted to the organisation and periodic purges should be conducted to cleanse the party of

undesirable elements, those who were "not completely Marxist and not altogether correct".

b) Strategy and tactics of the communist party

Lenin regarded the proletariat as the only truly revolutionary class. However they lacked revolutionary consciousness, that which had to be cultivated by the vanguard of the revolution, the communist party. If this were to be accomplished, the party's immediate task had to be to establish contact with the masses, to "go among all classes of the people as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators and as organisers" (Lenin, 1944, 75). To accomplish this, "one had absolutely to learn how to work legally in the most reactionary of parliaments, in the most reactionary of trade unions, cooperative and insurance societies and similar organisations" (Lenin, 1968, 14). However, Lenin stressed, such methods were purely tactical: "While you lack the strength to do away with bourgeois parliaments and every other type of reactionary institution, you must work within them" (Ibid., 44).

Not only the workers, but all potential political allies -- no matter how temporary -- should be courted. As early as 1902, Lenin (1944, 21) argued

that "not a single political party could exist without entering into such alliances." All conflict in the ranks of the opponent should be exploited. To gain such allies one should be prepared to make concessions -- without losing sight of one's ultimate goals.

All fighting methods should be perfected. The party should be able to master all forms or sides of social activity without exception....(and) must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another" (Lenin, 1968, 80). Moreover, "victory is impossible unless one has learned how to attack and retreat properly" (Ibid., 14).

Thus tactical opportunism is created to Lenin's theory. He argued that "to reject compromise" on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general...is childishness...." (Ibid., 23). On the contrary, "It is necessary to link the strictest devotion to the idea of communism with the ability to effect all the necessary practical compromises, tacks, conciliatory manoeuvres, zig-zags, retreats and so on...." (Ibid., 79). Every act, every decision should be assessed in terms of its contribution to the revolution.

c) Strategy and tactics of revolution

Karl Marx was almost exclusively concerned with the possibility of revolution in the industrialised countries where, by definition, there would be a relatively large proletariat. Lenin, however, focussed on Russia and, later, other under-developed countries where the capitalist process of proletarianizing the peasants had scarcely begun. Lenin was thus faced with the theoretical and practical problem of attempting to foment revolution in a country in which the only true revolutionary class, the proletariat, was limited in numbers.

However, after the Russian peasant uprisings of 1905, Lenin conceived of this class as having a certain revolutionary potential. He now classified certain sections of the peasantry as "petit bourgeois" and often, though inconsistently spoke of their "bourgeois" quality (Wittfogel, 1962, 354). Henceforth, he argued, the proletariat should lead the peasantry and, along with them, work for a "bourgeois-democratic revolution", resulting in a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". Lenin asserted that "every nationalist movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, for the bulk of the population in backward countries are peasants who represent bourgeois-capitalist

relations". The pre-capitalist relations predominating in all economically backward countries rendered impossible a purely proletarian movement.

In 1920 Lenin elaborated on his two-stage theory of revolution. He argued that the 'backward' countries still had to pass through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, before the proletarian-socialist revolution could be carried out. During the first stage the proletariat might cooperate with the national bourgeoisie (defined as those members of the middle-class who were working for the overthrow of the existing order), but it was imperative that the workers cooperate with the peasantry. Such political developments would serve to acquaint communists with actual revolutionary conditions, to organise peasant and worker groups, and to educate these as to their class interests. In this way the bourgeois-democratic revolution would ease the transition to the socialist revolution led by a worker-peasant alliance. Sufficient support from the peasantry and from the socialist countries would enable the communists to prevent the bourgeois-democratic revolution from leading to a capitalist stage of development. Instead, the backward countries might bypass capitalism, proceeding directly to the Soviet system and, after a definite stage of

development, to communism.

d) Dictatorship of the proletariat

Lenin stipulated that, in the aftermath of the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat is, along with the establishment of the Soviets, one of "the fundamental principles of communism" (Lenin, 1968, 76). The proletarian dictatorship would be the state during the "political transition period" between capitalism and communism. While the bourgeois state would disappear, the state would remain in the form of dictatorial rule by the workers. The coercive functions of the state apparatus would continue, but these would now be exercised by the majority. There would exist "the bourgeois state, without the bourgeoisie!".

Lenin warned that, after the revolution, the class struggle would intensify as the bourgeoisie attempted to regain its lost position. Thus:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat means a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a more powerful enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased tenfold by their overthrow... (Lenin, 1968, 9)".

Lenin argued that "victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long stubborn and desperate life-and-death struggle..." (*Ibid.*, 10). In the fight to eradicate the bourgeoisie, no half-measures could be tolerated. Moreover, the class struggle would take all forms and, accordingly, the bourgeoisie should be combatted on all fronts:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat means a persistent struggle - bloody and bloodless, - violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative - against the force and traditions of the old society" (Lenin, 1968, 30).

Lenin made no secret of the fact that the proletarian dictatorship could, and would, often involve particularly violent methods of oppression of the bourgeoisie. These he excused, arguing that the proletarian dictatorship would be "a million times more democratic" than any bourgeois democracy.

e) Theory of Capitalist Imperialism

According to Lenin:

"Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the domination of monopoly and finance capital has taken shape; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world

by international trusts has begun; and in which the partition of all the territory of the earth by the greatest capitalist countries has been completed".

He asserted that imperialism was the highest -- and the final -- stage of capitalism. Capitalism had forestalled its collapse within the industrial states by 'exporting' itself to backward countries. The imperialist powers sold their products to these states and obtained cheap raw materials from them. In this way imperialist tactics enabled capitalism to delay the consequences foretold by the Marxian laws of accumulation and increasing misery. Far from this latter occurring, the lot of the workers in the metropolitan countries actually improved as they could now be paid higher wages from the "super profits" of imperialism. The exploited peoples of the backward countries in time became the new proletariat.

Capitalism would, however, pay a heavy price for the breathing space thus afforded it. The struggle for markets would gain increasing intensity while the world would polarize into exploiting and exploited countries. The struggle for revolution would no longer be an internal one, confined to single countries, but would internationalise and involve all states. A common front would be created of the peoples of the oppressor countries and those of the

oppressed.

¹See, for example: Katznelson (1981), Silver and Tarpinian (1981)

²Heilbroner (1980, 20), argues along similar lines that "a set of premises exists that defines Marxist thought, so that any analysis that contains these premises can be properly classified as 'Marxist' even if the writer does not identify it as such himself".

³For an elaboration on this point, see: Svacek, V. "The elusive Marxism of C.B. Macpherson" Canadian Journal of Political Science IX, 3, 1976. pp. 395-442

⁴The adjective 'Marxian' pertains directly to Karl Marx, in particular to the ideas contained in his writings. 'Marxist', on the other hand, refers more generally to the system of concepts and practices commonly accepted by the followers of Karl Marx and developed into Marxism. By way of illustration, it has been argued by Reese (1980, 367) that dialectical materialism is Marxist but not Marxian inasmuch as, according to Reese, Marx himself never mentioned the concept; it being Engels who contributed the theory

⁵See, for example, Wolfe (1965) and Rees (1967)

⁶This classification draws heavily on Carew Hunt (1963)

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