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PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION





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DISCUSSION

DILEMMA

Drew Archibald

South African sociology was recently described as a headless chicken lurching through crossfire (by the way a variant now current has 'chicken' in the plural, thus: 'chickens') while for my own part I feel the chicken description may not quite do justice to the richness and diversity of the contemporary scene (and may even in isolated instances fall short of being fully fair) there's no denying that it captures two of its most important characteristics: frenzied activity, and futility, that is, it economically conveys the opposite of what Hemingway called 'grace under pressure'.

The theme is responsibility, and in particular our responsibility as social scientists in the present South African situation. The thoughts that follow arose out of a seminar in the Wits department on 9th June, 1982 on Eddie Webster's candid and courageous treatment of the problem in a paper entitled "The state, crisis and the university: the social scientist's dilemma" published in the July 1982 (1) issue of this journal. The discussion of the first five categories of response to the crisis is freely adapted from that text.

Webster proposes a 'Social Science of Liberation' that would follow the 'difficult path' between retreat into the ivory tower and full immersion in political action. Its task would be not to ABANDON social science but to TRANSFORM it in such a way as to link it with 'the practical activity of the majority of South Africans'. The 'difficult path' is his solution to a DILEMMA he roots in a distinction, which was

developed by Ossowski in an account of the Polish experience of 'socialism from above', between the methods of social science and the tactics of political struggle. In its present application the dilemma confronts would-be 'LIBERATORS' (in Webster's terms), but a logically similar one confronts others, for example the 'Servants of Apartheid' we are shortly to meet.

He begins by noting the deepening crisis in South Africa and the resultant, prior dilemma faced by social scientists: 'how to respond to the state's overtures for help, while at the same time retaining professional integrity'. He discusses four RESPONSES to this dilemma. His categories yield a TYPOLOGY involving service (roughly speaking) to:

1 Apartheid

2 Realism

3 Retreat

4 Liberation

It should be stressed that he IDENTIFIES the first three, that is, he sees them as he looks about him, so if the cap fits, wear it (of course we have none of them here at Wits). The last he PROPOSES.

Webster's four-fold typology becomes a six-fold one if we now add, first 'Moralism', the rejected parent of Realism, and then what appears for the moment to be the most significant absentee, thus:

5 Moralism

6 Nihilism.

1 'Servants of Apartheid' are those who accept the state's definition of the problem and serve on the numerous commissions of inquiry that have been set up to solve it. Webster notes that they quite often have 'genuine' intentions and do in fact often 'open up space for change' by suggesting reforms such as the legalization of African trade unions, but says that 'in the final analysis, these are Government Commissions. They set the terms of reference and accept or reject the recommendations to fit into Government policy'.

There follow three categories that do not involve the active support of apartheid (by intention at least).

2 'Pragmatic Realism' is the position of those who agree with Heribert Adam that social science must be 'committed', in this case to the downfall of apartheid, but that given the reality of deep-seated group conflict in South Africa, sociologists can maximize their political impact only from positions entrenched firmly within their respective groups. It draws its strength from a hard-headed rejection of the 'moralism' of past would-be intellectual activists who subordinated political effect to 'personal confessions' and declarations of solidarity with blacks that became ends in themselves, and irrational gestures such as the abortive white sabotage movement of the early sixties.

3 Withdrawal into the 'IVORY TOWER' of uncontroversial research. (Or perhaps, withdrawal into the illusion that there is any uncontroversial research.) Webster calls this 'Privatism'. It emphasises the scientist's neutrality and professional role and is reluctant to assume responsibility for the consequences of research.

Webster concludes that none of the first three responses is adequate. Note that this is a HYBRID judgment. (1) and (3) are rejected for their intentions; (1) for having a repugnant political programme and (3) for having none (in effect the same fault) and both irrespective of efficacy. The force of the rejection would indeed, given condemnation of their aims, vary directly with the efficacy with which they were pursued. (2) on the other hand, and by implication also (5), is rejected as ineffective. (2) and (5) are both shortsighted, Realists veering in the direction of timidity and Moralists in the direction of rashness as a result of respectively overrating and underrating the strength of the regime. Liberators should presumably steer a middle course in this respect. (2), (5) and (4) are agreed on ends, at least in the short term.

'Dilemma'

We are clearly moving beyond the original sense of this word, ie a choice between 'equal' evils or between alternatives though 'unequal', both unfavourable. We mean a problem or a 'difficult' choice that we might, following Weber, call 'tragic' in a technical sense, in that to choose is always simultaneously to reject, between two or among more than two INCOMMENSURABLE alternatives both or all of which certainly have costs, if only the 'opportunity cost' of abandoning - for the moment - all others (minimally expressed: the favoured alternative's negation) but all of which offer

advantages, ways of PRISING OPEN THE BLISSFUL FUTURE - or what are we in this for anyway?

The original, or logical 'dilemma' was the result or apparent result of an argument driving an opponent (note) into an intolerable situation. Embarrassing our situation may be, but hardly intolerable, and not even 'special' in the sense commonly urged by those wishing to cut corners of one kind or another. The logical dilemma has 'HORNS' and no way out; Webster's second dilemma has a way out, his 'difficult path' involving the repeated confrontation and resolution over time of 'difficult choices' of the kind outlined above. With very little modification, Webster's first dilemma becomes indistinguishable from his second; though he speaks of the latter as 'another type'. In both cases professional obligations must be reconciled with (voluntarily) assumed extra-professional obligations (commitments made in response to overtures from whatever outside instance). In both cases (or in the single case if we accept the conflation) the problem can be avoided - rather than solved - if we declare ourselves without responsibilities to either sociology or 'action' beyond it. NIHILISM is better viewed as doing so in 'bad faith', that is, without admitting it! The two nihilisms are, however, asymmetrical. It is manifestly possible to be human without sharing, as a COLLEAGUE in the duties and privileges of sociology (indeed it makes for an easier life, and if our uncharitable chicken-viewer has a case, a more dignified one). It is not possible to be no more than a sociologist. The nihilisms are nevertheless equal in hypocrisy. Hijackers threaten us from without, often with the best of intentions; cataleptics just fill office space.

'MORALISTS v 'REALISTS'

The early sixties are the background for all of us, willy nilly, and were more powerfully formative/deformative for some. I declare a personal interest, but then sociology is a personal business. HINDSIGHT is not in principle more distorting than any other perception but has a particular knack of making outcomes look more inevitable than they were. We very soon rearrange a past with its upshot in mind, and in the case of the early sixties in South Africa it's likely that as we review events such as the sabotage movement of the ARM (African Resistance Movement) the forefront of our minds will be occupied pretty exclusively by the consequent, in large measure resultant and in the main effective REPRESSION, the apparatus of which is still in being.

What follows neither condones nor condemns. It is barbarously selective; and from selections one may infer what one pleases. No-one will ever escape selection. Take the standpoint of the would-be intellectual activists of the early sixties. What was then possible no-one can tell. What then seemed possible we too easily forget. We are wise after the event, but they may not have been so foolish before it as we imagine. It is my recollection that at the time some quite intelligent people held beliefs we would now find astonishing. This consideration may abate somewhat the charge of irresponsibility, at least in the sense of wanton disregard of accessible evidence. If the moralists underestimated obstacles to liberation perhaps the realists in their turn overestimated them. Most important decisions are made on imperfect information.

VDR

Voluntarily Diminished Responsibility, in a word 'COPOUT' is neglect of consequences through the subordination of efficacy to a 'principle', a single value, or the force of an emotion. It is what the 'moralists' are charged with and is surprisingly widespread; the current global pillage of the environment is a large-scale example, the 'single value' here being short-term material progress (regardless, in effect, of cost). Every time we do what feels good instead of what will do most good we are guilty of the same thing. It usually takes a little thought to work out what will do most, or even 'more' good, and thinking can be hard work, and takes time.

For us, now, the relevance of VDR is that the difficult choices imposed upon us by Webster's difficult path should be undertaken with care and attention. No-one can ask more, short of prescribing upshots, which we cannot do - AS SOCIOLOGISTS. We can, however, urge upshots as strongly as we like, short of force and fraud. One hitch and one 'out'. The hitch is that we coerce and deceive anyway. The answer is to try to be conscious of this. The 'out' is provided by the well-known 'time dimension' the introduction of which allows us a welcome respite from all this painful tolerance, for I'm afraid there's no restriction on the obligation of tolerance - within the profession, precisely because of the heat and proximity of change. There are no second class sociologists (however privileged or prejudiced). The 'out', then is that we can relax into combat as often and for as long as the pressure of events in our responsible judgment may dictate. We should in other words be ready at all times to ABANDON social science but on no account ever to TRANSFORM it.

Note

(1) Eddie Webster "The state, crisis and the university: the social scientist's dilemma" in Perspectives in Education Vol 6 No 1, July 1982

ARTICLES

THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE?

Wally Morrow

Since at least the latter part of the Nineteenth Century a persistant theme in the argument amongst Whites about Black education in South Africa has had to do with cultural differences and cultural identity. This theme is double-edged (1). On the one hand, there is some appeal in the ideas that one of the important ways in which people differ from each other is in belonging to different cultures, that different cultures each have their own distinctive virtues, and that there is something wrong (maybe even morally wrong) in one culture being imposed on people of another culture. On the other hand there can always be the suspicion that such talk about cultural differences might be mere rationalization obscuring more insidious intent; that it might be little more than the velvet glove hiding the iron fist of oppression. In the sphere of schooling, it might be argued, economic and political realities are such than any schooling system which distinguishes between people on 'cultural' grounds cannot but lead to massive economic and political disadvantages for some of the groups thus identified.

The point can be put in terms of equality. The principle of equality requires not that all people should be treated in the same way but that people should not be treated differently unless relevant grounds for such differences have been provided. The central issue, of course, is which grounds are relevant.

In the sphere of schooling this issue is the site of bitter struggle. A mere list of some of the differentia which have

been cited, and used, as grounds for different treatment in schooling reads like a rollcall of battles which have been fought: sex, wealth, social background, occupational aspirations, religion, interest, age, talent, ability, aptitude, IQ, and so on. I think it is now widely agreed that differences in age are relevant, and that differences in sex are not (2). In England over the past two decades the argument has been that some of the proposed differentia, such as IQ, ability, talent, and the like, cannot be used as a ground for different treatment in schooling as they are themselves the products of schooling, at least in large measure.

In South Africa one of the most blatant differences between people is differences in race. Few (3) would nowadays argue that differences in race should be used as a ground for differences in schooling, however, it is sometimes thought that differences in race parallel what, from an educational point of view, are much more significant differences; differences between cultures. Whether or not cultural differences are relevant to differences in schooling is nothing like a straightforward question. Even before we ask what 'culture' and 'education' are, there is a kind of intuitive plausibility in the suggestion that education and culture are in some ways linked, and that, thus, where there are cultural differences there should be educational differences. This is broadly the line taken by Professor Luthuli (4).

He notes, coolly, that

> The dominating factor in educational philosophy among many Blacks in South Africa today, is the desire to secure equalization of education opportunities for all Black children. (BO pg 59)

and that when it was announced that the Bantu Education Act would be repealed,

> ... the reaction from the Black educationists, parents and those interested in the welfare of South Africa was that 'the new act must be completely new and in no way different from what White students have'. (BO pg 59)

He calls this 'the first interpretation', and he goes on to say:

> Though the first interpretation of equalisation has been sounded clearly by the Black public, the question that the fundamental pedagogicians have to struggle with is:

> how fundamental is such an interpretation? Is it pedagogically founded? For instance, does it take cognisance of the fact that every group of people has beliefs, convictions and attitudes peculiar to that group? There is no doubt every child has a right to be educated yet since education is a process and not a product, it should develop from within a people and the blind emulation of other people just for the sake of equalisation would not be justified in the 20th century, apart from the fact that such education would be pedagogically unsound. (BO pg 60)

To understand why, in Professor Luthuli's view, it would be 'pedagogically unsound' to provide 'the same education' for Whites and Blacks in South Africa, we need to consider his overall position. The framework for his position is pretty simple, and one reason for this is that, unlike most philosophers, Professor Luthuli has few doubts about the transparency of language.

His framework is as follows:

1) The ultimate (overall, universal, cardinal, central, etc) goal (aim, purpose, etc) of education is adulthood.

> ... there is one central and universal aim in all education, viz. ADULTHOOD ... (PF pg 12)

2) But adulthood is an abstract (or formal, or ideal) concept which becomes 'meaningful' only when it 'refers' to a particular people.

> Adulthood and childhood, like education are formal or ideal concepts without any particular meaning except when culturally interpreted and given meaning in accordance with the value scheme of a particular people. (BO pg 32)

3) What is centrally relevant about (distinctive of?) 'a particular people' in this regard is their 'philosophy of life' (or culture).

> A particular philosophy of life ... can briefly be described as the totality of a people's views, beliefs and convictions ... (BO pg 42)

4) From (1), (2) and (3) we can see how it follows that education for 'a people' is intimately linked with their distinctive 'philosophy of life'.

Many fundamental pedagogicians are agreed that for education to be meaningful and relevant, it should reflect a philosophy of life of the people concerned. (BO pg 105)

Education is ... to induct the young into the accepted, collective philosophy of life of a particular people. (BO pg 42)

The great task of the teacher attains fulfilment in the aim of formative education, namely the guidance of the child as not-yet-adult member to adult membership along a specific path laid down by a particular philosophy of life. (BO pg 110)

Particular education goals and ideals will thus of necessity differ according to a people's philosophy of life. (BO pg 112)

In studying Black orientated education, it is necessary then to observe at once that Blacks have their own philosophy of life. (BO pg 52)

This means then, that education for the Black child must be Black-orientated in theory and in practice with regional emphasis where necessary. (BO pg 52)

... the driving force behind the intrinsic aim of Zulu education is a Zulu philosophy of life. (BO pg 31)

5) Finally, given the framework so far, we can see how 'a philosophy of education' will come to be conceived of as an expression of a particular 'philosophy of life'.

... it almost becomes a tautological exercise to argue about the connection between a philosophy of life and education. (PF pg 25)

It stands to reason that a people's philosophy of education must be in accordance with their philosophy of life. (BO pg 112)

Put in simple terms, philosophy of education is the application of the fundamental principles of a philosophy of life to the work of education. (PF pg 8)

It is thus obvious that the philosophy of education - which is the application of the fundamental

> principles of a philosophy of life to the work of education - must be clarified, thought through and articulated. (PF pg 78)

This framework is supplied by Pedagogics (5), which, Professor Luthuli insists, is a science. Echoing convictions whose source is no mystery, Professor Luthuli says that, '... despite all difficulties a very successful attempt has been made to elevate Pedagogics to a scientific status.' (BO pg 8) Subsequently he adds that:

> One of the most important scientific developments in the Philosophy of Education has been the distinction between Pedagogics as a science and an education doctrine as precipitation of a particular philosophy of life. (BO pg 47)

He says that his concern is with:

> ... a philosophy of education which is broader than Fundamental Pedagogics as part-discipline of Pedagogics. (BO pg 17)

But he adds that:

> It must, however, be pointed out that pedagogic principles are universally valid and any philosophy of education will have to conform to those principles. (BO pg 17)

This kind of deference to a particular framework of thinking is acutely anti-philosophical. One central characteristic of a philosophical enterprise is its refusal to regard any authority (scientific, philosophical or otherwise) as beyond the reach of critical scrutiny. For philosophy there is no inner sanctum sacrosanct against investigation and, maybe, revision. To think of 'philosophy' as the icing on the hard cake of fact is to misconstrue its tasks and nature.

But I shall not be directly concerned, here, with trying to show in what ways Professor Luthuli is mistaken about philosophy (6). What I shall do is to investigate Professor Luthuli's framework with the intention of undermining his ground for thinking that it would be 'pedagogically unsound' to provide 'the same education' for Whites and Blacks in South Africa. I shall conclude with a few tentative remarks about the relevance of cultural differences to differences in schooling.

Professor Luthuli takes as the starting point for his framework the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood. This is a doctrine which has a powerful hold on the thinking of those who have come under the sway of Pedagogics (South African style); it is put forward as an unargued, but indisputable, truth. I think it is both false and misleading.

It might be said that in calling the suggestion that the aim of education is adulthood a doctrine I am loading the dice against it. It is put forward, after all, as a scientific finding. This claim seems to me extremely doubtful, but instead, here, of trying to explore what on earth could be meant by 'scientific' in this context I shall merely suggest one possibility which raises serious doubts about this claim.

Imagine someone saying that the aim of childhood is adulthood. We would have problems in trying to understand what he could mean by 'aim'. In what sense of 'aim' could the aim of childhood be adulthood? It is certainly not the purpose of childhood, maybe it is the goal of childhood (or its goal)? What is going on here is fairly clear. This way of talking seems to be a confused groping after the idea that the two words 'childhood' and 'adulthood' are correlative - in the sense that we understand each in terms of the other. And if this is a correct diagnosis, then the assertion that the aim of childhood is adulthood does not reveal a remarkable (scientific?) discovery but is simply a misleading way of making a point about the semantic relationship between two words.

Similarly, one might sometimes wonder whether those who so confidently, as if it were an indisputible truth, assert the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood, have ever paused to consider whether this 'scientific truth' might not be simply a trivial consequence of their thinking of the study of education as Pedagogics.

But, leaving aside its status, I think that this doctrine generates a misleading conception of education. This can be seen by considering two of the implications it seems to carry. The first is that it implies that education can take place only during childhood, and the second is that it seems to imply that education can at some stage be said to be complete.

That education can take place only during childhood rests on two assumptions, both of which are open to doubt. The first is that education can take place during childhood, and the

second is that education cannot take place during adulthood. The former is at least controversial; the latter is, plainly, false.

Consider, for example, an epistemology which contends that language not only plays a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge (language as a means of communication) but also that the acquisition of language provides the paradigm for the acquisition of knowledge (in a large measure, language as constitutive of knowledge.) Prior to the possession of language it is not possible for a person to say anything (as opposed to responding in a semi-mechanical way), and nor is it possible for her to have that kind of consciousness which is possible only for those who have language (a dog cannot, today, expect to see his master the day after tomorrow.) But the capacity to speak for herself, and the kind of consciousness towards which I have broadly gestured here, are two of the characteristics of what it is for a person to be educated. However, the acquisition of a (first) language, as it necessarily cannot involve the person's own judgement, must be a matter of training as opposed to education. One might put the general point in saying that the possibility of education depends on prior training. As a result, the possibilities for education during childhood are, to this extent, limited.

One might also make this general point in terms of conceptual schemes, or in terms of ideology (7).

The possibility of a person being imaginative or inventive, or capable of critical thought and objectivity, or in general possessing that kind of flexibility and discipline of mind and behaviour which is a criterion for what it is to be educated, presupposes the possession of the relevant conceptual schemes. But human beings are not born with conceptual schemes, they acquire them only gradually in interaction with those who already possess them, thus the possibilities of their education are at every stage bounded by the extent to which they already possess the relevant conceptual schemes. We can, thus, expect that the kind of education which is possible during a normal childhood is, by comparison with what is possible later, at best only a good (or poor) start.

An argument leading to the same kind of conclusion might be made in terms of ideology. Very roughly the argument would be that ideology is a necessary condition for any articulate thought or discursive modes of consciousness at all, and that education is post-ideological (education consists in emerging out of ideology, in escaping from its grip and coming to

appreciate it for what it is). But as we can make no sense of the idea of escaping from ideology unless we are already caught in its clutches we must, again, conclude that the possibility of education arises not near the start of a person's life (during childhood) but only gradually, as she comes, if ever she does, to a deeper and more articulate realization of the ideologies which make her the person that she is.

Although I have barely sketched out the kinds of argument which would be involved here, I have, at least, indicated that there are reasons to doubt the bald assumption that education can take place during childhood. However, whatever is said on that issue, the assumption that childhood is the only stage of a person's life during which her education can take place is, plainly, false. If it were true that once a person has attained adulthood then education is no longer possible for her then the concept of adult education would be self-contradictory (8). But this does not appear to be the case.

There is a way of escape from this difficulty (of how to provide a non self-contradictory account of adult education if one starts off from the premise that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood), and this is to say that 'adulthood' must be interpreted not in a 'natural' (biological?) sense in which every normal human being, provided she lives long enough, will reach adulthood, but in a sense which enables us to say that some people who are physiologically and anatomically adult (mature?) are in other respects not adult. One would then be in a position to say that when one says that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood it is in relation to these 'other respects' in which a person might be said to be adult that 'adulthood' is to be understood, and adult education then becomes a matter of teaching physiologically and anatomically mature people how to be adult in these 'other respects'. Clearly a great burden now rests on what one goes on to say about these 'other respects' in which a person might be said to be 'adult'.

I think that this way of escape is one which Professor Luthuli (implicitly) takes. He says, for example, that the phenomenon of education is ' ... a universal cultural phenomenon and ... a specific form in which the universal idea is expressed by a specific people.' (PF pg 1) (my emphasis) And presumably this has the consequence that 'adulthood' is a cultural as opposed to a biological phenomenon. In line with this he also says that education ' ... is one of the main means whereby any individual ... progresses to maturity or adulthood.' (BO pg 25) Later in

the book he says, confusingly, that ' ... education is of great importance, in fact fundamental as a means of achieving adulthood. Education is the only means of achieving progress to maturity or adulthood.' (BO pg 116) (emphasis in original) And, of course, if education - as opposed to 'natural development' - is either the main, or the only, means of achieving adulthood then it seems that we must interpret 'adulthood' in a non-biological sense, in terms of 'other respects' in which a person might be said to be adult.

Furthermore, Professor Luthuli sometimes links 'adulthood' with 'responsibility'. He says, for example, that philosophy of education ' ... points the way ahead and ... poses questions which, when answered, give guidelines to the way to be walked to responsible adulthood.' (PF pg 8) And he commends Professor CFB Nel for pointing out

> ... that as responsibility is a cardinal aspect of adulthood, the real task of education in South Africa and among Blacks as well, is to guide the young toward the interpretation of their essential freedom in making responsible choices in accordance with the philosophy of life of their respective societies. (BO pg 106)

Thus Professor Luthuli seems to think that 'another respect' in which a person might be said to be adult is in terms of 'responsibility'.

A great deal now depends, of course, on the account which Professor Luthuli is going to give of the concept of responsibility (this concept stands at the centre of a whole web of profound philosophical problems.) But I can find no place in his two books at which he explicitly turns his attention to this task. He does, however, express opinions about related issues, and one's suspicions might legitimately be aroused. For instance, in a revealing passage (which, incidentally, provides a fairly typical example of the problems one faces, even at the most superficial level, in understanding what Professor Luthuli is saying), he says that:

> A child's understanding must never be limited by any human being and one finds a discrepancy between what the child must learn and what he actually learns. This is an important source of conflict and must be viewed with great concern. Many an authoritarian society is breeding rebellious spirits in children who later reform the educational system that offended them, thereby

> subjecting culture to change. There is no doubt that such rebeliants are at work in Soweto, at Kwa-Mashu and Gugulethu. (PF pg 31)

One might wonder whether there is any difference between a 'rebeliant' and an 'agitator'. And from this kind of example, and the generally paternalistic (authoritarian) tone of his account of education, one can gain the distinct impression that, when it comes down to it, Professor Luthuli is committed to an account of 'responsibility' in terms of 'conformity'. And if this is so, and if the ultimate aim of education is said to be responsible adulthood, then it does not sound as if it can be education which is being spoken about. Conformity can hardly be said to be an aim of education.

But there are other problems, and I shall mention them before I move on to a consideration of the second implication of the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood - the implication that education can at some stage be said to be complete.

One such problem arises out of Professor Luthuli's two-tier account of education. The distinction between the 'scientific' framework and the 'cultural' filling is crucial to his account. Keeping this distinction clearcut is central to his defence of his people against the kind of cultural imperialism prevalent in, and typical of, colonial schooling systems. In Professor Luthuli's position the ground for argument about the framework is radically different from the ground for argument about the filling - although there is some doubt about whether there is much room for argument in Professor Luthuli's understanding of either sphere. The framework is insulated against criticism by the claims that it is 'scientific', 'universally valid' and so on, and the filling (the philosophy of life of a particular people) is insulated against ('outside') criticism by the claim that only a member of 'a particular people' is in a position to spell out the philosophy of life of those people. Professor Luthuli says, for example, that ' ... no group or individual is able to interpret the philosophy of life of another people objectively unless he is part thereof.' (BO pg 80) On Professor Luthuli's position any person who rejects a 'universally valid pedagogic principle' must simply be naive or ignorant (like a person who, wishing to send a rocket to the moon, fails to accept scientific truths about the earth's gravitational forces.) Because the 'universally valid pedagogic principles' are supposed to be independent of any particular philosophy of life, and quite neutral between them, it cannot be the case that the rejection of such a

principle could be based on a different 'philosophy of life'

But now the problem is that as soon as one starts to spell out 'other respects' in terms of which 'adulthood' is to be understood in the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood one runs the constant risk of incorporating into what is supposed to be a universally valid framework the prejudices of one particular 'philosophy of life'. How can Professor Luthuli be sure whether his notion of 'responsibility' belongs to the 'scientific' framework or his 'cultural' filling? Is my rejection of the link between education and 'responsibility' (when 'responsibility' is understood as 'conformity') merely the counter-suggestibility of a scientific ignoramous or is it the incomprehension of a cultural outsider? Presumably a Zulu who lives in Soweto who agrees with my rejection would be dismissed as a 'rebeliant'; but what about a Zulu at the University of Zululand? The problem is that the claim to scientific status is all too easily deployed as a device for lending phoney legitimacy to controversial opinions, and for putting an end to critical reflection.

But there is another problem. As soon as one says that 'adulthood' is to be understood in some non-biological sense it becomes incumbent on one to give an account of what this sense is. And as soon as one engages on that task one is implicitly claiming that there are conceptual links between education and whatever these other senses of 'adulthood' are said to be. But if the centrally important issue is what the links are between education and other concepts, why on earth dog-leg via 'adulthood' - which is in any case said by Professor Luthuli to be a 'formal' concept, without 'any particular meaning except when culturally interpreted' (BO pg 32)? To do so simply faces one with a range of manifestly artificial problems generated merely by the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood. It would seem much more satisfactory to abandon the doctrine out of which the problems arise than to fish around for a solution to save the doctrine. Why not, in other words, simply abandon the doctrine and try to think about education unencumbered by such inhibitions?

For instance, I think it is fruitful to explore the relationships between education and concepts such as freedom, emancipation, liberation, flexibility, critical thought, objectivity, discipline, authority, rationality, knowledge, truth, autonomy, and morality. (Incidentally, I think that whatever relationships there are between education and these other concepts, and amongst these other concepts, are neither

'scientific' nor exclusive to any particular 'philosophy of life'.) But there is no a priori link between 'adulthood' and these other concepts and to try, driven by the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood, to forge such a link is highly likely, as I have been trying to show, to limit one's understanding of the issues, and to hinder one's investigations.

The doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood hinders one's investigations in a particularly insidious way. It encourages one to think that education can at some stage be said to be complete. This is the second general implication of the doctrine on which I shall comment.

To put it bluntly, anyone who says, or thinks, that it can ever be said that someone's education is 'complete' is expressing a failure to understand what education is. Maybe he thinks that education is the same as schooling and that once a person has a Std VIII certificate, or a Matric, or a BA, or an M Ed, or a Ph D, then that is the end of the road as far as his 'education' is concerned.

But this is an error, a person's education can never be said to be complete - and this is not because teaching is so irremediably inefficient that the end can never be attained but because of the kind of thing education is. What kind of thing is that? Well, there is a long story to be told, and the best I can do here is throw out a few hints by listing a series of contrasts. 'Being educated' is not a destination or a terminal state (like 'being dead'); it is more like a direction or a way of living. An 'educated person' is not someone who has found a secure resting place; rather she is someone who can reflect critically on her life and the conditions of her existence (including her society and her 'culture'.) An 'educated person' is not a source of the truth, nor does she 'make pronouncements'; by contrast she is a person who can make a disciplined and committed contribution to a particular kind of conversation which has as its ideal the discovery of what is true. Education 'opens out a person's head' (9) and exposes the foundations of one's life to critical scrutiny; education does not fill one's head with certainties, and nor does it solidify the foundations of one's life in unassailable concrete, immune from revision.

But maybe the main thing wrong with the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood, and the implication that a person's education can at some stage be said to be complete, is that it is tangled up with a deeper doctrine about authority. In brief this doctrine is that there are certain people (the authorities, professors, 'senior staff'

etc) who have privileged access to the truth (including moral truth), and that the task of 'education' is for the authorities to transmit the truth to the 'not-yet-adults' in society. This doctrine about authority is thoroughly hostile toward the idea of education, and it is a doctrine which pervades Professor Luthuli's account of education. Consider, for example, the following set of assertions, scattered widely through the two books:

> ... the main duty of educators is to guide boys and girls along the correct tract to adulthood. (PF pg 5)
>
> ... education has the object of influencing the not-yet-adult in such a manner that he accepts the beliefs of the adults. (BO pg 26)
>
> Education has a specific purpose and aims at leading and moulding an individual towards the acceptance of a certain philosophy of life which will be similar to that of the educator or of the education authorities who determine the education policy. (BO pg 111)
>
> The changes in Black education seem not to have been in agreement with the essential nature and function in society - which is to transform and indoctrinate towards an accepted image of man. (PF pg 67)

One might wonder whether these are 'universally valid pedagogic principles', or whether they are aspects of a particular 'philosophy of life'; either way they are a frontal attack on the idea of education. If they are said to be 'universally valid pedagogic principles' all we can say is that, in that case 'universally valid pedagogic principles' should be vigorously opposed by anyone who is interested in education. On the other hand, if they are said to be expressions of a particular 'philosophy of life' (not a 'unique' 'philosophy of life' as the sentiments expressed in these assertions are widespread, particularly in South Africa) then we can conclude that such a 'philosophy of life' cannot comprehend the idea of education.

In general I, thus, think that if it is education one is concerned with then the doctrine that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood is not merely counter-productive but exercises a perniciously distorting influence on one's reflections. And this knocks out the main pillar of the framework of Professor Luthuli's position. But there are further features of his framework which, equally, do not stand up to critical scrutiny. I shall, here, briefly highlight a fatal difficulty in the distinction between the

'scientific' concepts of the framework and the 'cultural' concepts of the filling and pass a few skeptical remarks about the idea of 'a philosophy of life'.

I have already discussed one kind of problem about the distinction between the framework and the filling. That problem is that if this distinction is important in one's thinking (as it is in Professor Luthuli's) then one needs a criterion to make it. Without a criterion (i) the classification of any assertion as part of the framework or the filling becomes an arbitrary matter, and all assertions can be rendered unassailable by a simple bit of footwork, and (ii) one can never be sure whether some particular element of one's thought is really a 'universally valid pedagogic principle' or whether it is merely the prejudice of some particular 'philosophy of life'. But this problem arises within the acceptance of the distinction and merely points to a necessary condition to get it to work. There is a much more fundamental problem, this is the problem of whether we can make any sense of the distinction at all.

Professor Luthuli thinks, as we have seen, that framework concepts such as 'adulthood', 'childhood' and 'education' are 'abstract', 'formal', or 'ideal'. And in explaining what he means by this he says that these concepts are 'without any particular meaning except when culturally interpreted and given meaning in accordance with the value scheme of a particular people.' (BO pg 32) But if this is indeed the case then how on earth can we know what the relationships are between these concepts? In particular, how can we know that 'education' and 'adulthood' are related to each other in a way which licences us to say that the ultimate aim of education is adulthood? Concepts with 'no particular meaning' can have no particular relationships. If 'having a particular meaning' depends on being 'culturally interpreted and given meaning in accordance with the value scheme of a particular people' then being related to each other in a particular way must also depend on this condition. The 'universal' category seems to evaporate, leaving us simply with the 'cultural' category.

What is extraordinary is that Professor Luthuli himself supplies us with the materials for this result. As we have seen, he thinks that education is 'a universal cultural phenomenon' (PF pg 1), a few pages later he says that:

> Whenever the concept of education is used, it is always mentioned either with reference to certain people or from a cultural point of view. (PF pg 9)

But if this is the case then the concept of education cannot be used in the 'universal' framework. If it is used there then we are faced with the most obvious confidence trick. If it is true what whenever the concept of education is used, it is always mentioned with reference to certain people or from a (particular?) cultural point of view, then anyone who uses the concept in the 'universally valid framework' is blatantly dignifying a particular cultural conviction with universal compulsion.

Couple this with the claim that the framework is 'scientific' and an awful prospect is revealed. To say that the framework is 'scientific' is to imply that it is impartial between, for instance, various 'philosophies of life' and political beliefs. But if there is doubt about whether the framework and the filling can be kept distinct, and about whether the 'universal' category exists at all, then serious doubts are raised about whether the framework is as inert as Professor Luthuli thinks it is. If what I have argued is correct then there simply can be no such thing as a framework of thinking about education so abstract (so vacuous) that it is indeed neutral in the required way. Surely Professor Luthuli cannot be so politically naive as not to have his suspicions aroused? I shall pick up this issue again in what follows. I want, first, to raise some problems about the idea of 'a philosophy of life'.

The idea of 'a philosophy of life' plays a key role in Professor Luthuli's thought. It is one of the central organizing ideas in his conception of education ('The curriculum is ... in fact the people's philosophy of life in practice.' (PF pg 81)), in his characterization of the tasks and nature of 'philosophy of education' ('In studying a philosophy of education it must be kept in mind that one is dealing with a philosophy of life.' (BO pg 30)), and in his vision of the role of a philosopher of education:

> The very function of the philosopher-educationist or philosophy of education is in fact to objectively articulate the assumptions that are made and the common views that are held, in order that relevant education objectives may be formulated for and by society. The proper functioning of education in society is dependent on this translation and articulation of the dormant philosophy of life as a philosophy of education by educators and educationists. (PF pg 2)

Professor Luthuli uses the phrase 'philosophy of life' in many different contexts throughout both his books, and he says many different things about 'philosophies of life'.

This raises a problem. He seems to have difficulty in getting the idea of 'a philosophy of life' into clear focus, but, nevertheless, he is convinced that it is extremely important.

I have doubts about whether, in Professor Luthuli's work, 'philosophy of life' is a coherent idea at all. I shall try to bring out the grounds for my doubts in terms of two problems, one of which I shall call the 'ownership' problem, and the other of which I shall call the 'content' problem.

Professor Luthuli says that 'In studying a philosophy of life of any people, it must be observed that there are as many philosophies of life as there are people.' (PF pg 84) What does this mean? Say we ask: How many 'philosophies of life' are there (just to keep it simple) in South Africa? What reply would Professor Luthuli give? He might say that there are two 'philosophies of life'; a Black philosophy of life and a White philosophy of life. Certainly the phrase 'a Black philosophy of life' is repeatedly mentioned in Professor Luthuli's works. He says, for example, that ' ... Black education should be rooted in a Black philosophy of life and only in this way will Blacks establish to their youth who they are.' (BO pg 35) On the other hand he might say that there are about ten 'philosophies of life' in South Africa.

He talks of a 'Zulu philosophy of life' - indeed he sees his role as a Zulu philosopher of education as that of spelling out the Zulu philosophy of life and applying its fundamental principles to the work of education - and presumably he would also want to talk of a Tswana philosophy of life, a Venda philosophy of life, a Xhosa philosophy of life, and so on. On this way of identifying and sorting 'philosophies of life' there is of course a problem about the Whites. Presumably Professor Luthuli would want to say that there is an English philosophy of life, and an Afrikaans philosophy of life, and maybe there is a Greek philosophy of life, and a Portuguese philosophy of life?

But maybe Professor Luthuli would want an even more finely-grained classification. He says that ' ... education for the Black child must be Black-orientated in theory and in practice with regional emphasis where necessary.' (BO pg 52) and he seems to have problems about how to fit Zulus in Soweto into his scheme. So, maybe he would say that there must be about a hundred 'philosophies of life' in South Africa. There might, for instance, be an Ingwavuma 'philosophy of life', an Empangeni 'philosophy of life', an Ulundi 'philosophy of life', a Soweto (Zulu) 'philosophy of

life', a Soweto (Sotho) 'philosophy of life', a Northern Suburbs (Johannesburg) 'philosophy of life', a Waterkloof 'philosophy of life', a Bloemfontein 'philosophy of life', and a Kuils Rivier 'philosophy of life' (with regional emphasis where necessary.)

But even such a classification scheme might not be in line with Professor Luthuli's understanding of the issue. From some of the things he says about 'philosophies of life' it would seem that he would want to say that there must be about 30 000 000 'philosophies of life' in South Africa. He tells us, for example, that:

> On the basis of his educational experiences, the unfolding personality acquires a personal philosophy of life with rational and irrational dimensions. (PF pg 77)

And he also tells us that 'Every man has a philosophy, whether or not he has deeply reflected upon it and circumscribed it.' (BO pg 51) (On the other hand maybe the problem is simplified by the fact that only 'men' are mentioned here - maybe there are, in fact only 15 000 000 'philosophies of life' to contend with?)

One further detail we should take note of is that in Professor Luthuli's understanding of 'philosophy of education', as 'philosophies of education' correspond with 'philosophies of life', there must be as many 'philosophies of education' as there are 'philosophies of life'. 'No philosophy of education will be meaningful without being rooted in ... philosophy of life ... ' (BO pg 18) Thus, if we ask how many 'philosophies of education' there are in South Africa we must say that there are two, or ten, or a hundred, or 15 000 000 (or 30 000 000.)

I suspect that, when confronted with this 'ownership' problem, Professor Luthuli would say that the root criterion for the identification of 'philosophies of life' is to be sought in terms of the notions of 'a people' or 'a society'. He indeed most commonly uses the phrase 'a philosophy of life' in conjunction with the phrase 'a people', as in 'the philosophy of life of a people'. As an articulator of a particular 'philosophy of education', he sees himself as the spokesman of a particular people, and he says that ' ... it is the task of the educational philosopher to articulate a philosophy of education on the basis of what he discovers as dormant views in the heart of society.' (PF pg 75) But this either turns out to be circular, or it simply relocates the problem which re-emerges in precisely the same form on the new ground.

The circularity can be brought out as follows: we will use distinctions between 'peoples' in order to identify (and count) 'philosophies of life'. Thus, in answer to the question: How many 'philosophies of life' are there in South Africa? we will first find out how many different 'peoples' there are in South Africa. But how will we find that out? Well, what is distinctive of 'a people' is that they have 'a philosophy of life' in common. But this is manifestly circular, 'a people' and 'a philosophy of life' are identified in terms of each other, and we have no independent criterion to solve the problem of how many of either we will say there are. A way out of this circle is to find independent criteria for the identification (and thus, the counting) of 'peoples' or 'societies'.

Professor Luthuli has a shot at finding such criteria. He says that:

> Society can be said to imply having something in common, such as sharing the same language, similar beliefs and convictions, in short, the same culture or way of life. The term community is often confused with the term society. In the community everybody, that is adult and children, are included. For instance, mention could be made of a South African community, but it would be incorrect to speak of a South African society.
>
> A society is a certain type of group whose members are socially conscious of their mode of life and their common aim (adulthood) which unite them. (PF pg 20)

For present purposes we can ignore Professor Luthuli's curious distinction between 'community' and 'society' (except, maybe, to wonder how that distinction allows us to talk of 'a South African community' but not of 'a South African society', and to note that his intuitions seem to tell him that our future lies in the hands of our children.) What criteria does he, here, offer us for the identification of 'a society'?

'Having something in common' is, of course, irremediably vague, and it allows for countless, criss-crossing classifications. Any predicate applicable to persons, and there is a huge number of such predicates, could be used to generate its own classification scheme. Think of some: 'is 1.6 metres tall', 'owns a motor car', 'has an interest in the fortunes of Kaiser Chiefs', 'has a head', 'lives in Gugulethu', 'can run a standard marathon in less than 2 hours 20 minutes', 'speaks three languages'. 'has read The Bible'.

'thinks that Pedagogics is a science', 'is brave', and so on and so on. A person might be 1.6 metres tall, own a motor car and live in Gugulethu, but not have an interest in the fortunes of Kaiser Chiefs, nor speak three languages etc. Another person might be 1.6 metres tall, have read The Bible, think that Pedagogics is a science, but he might not own a motor car nor live in Gugulethu, etc. Clearly the possibilities are multifarious. But Professor Luthuli, of course, is not suggesting that 'having something in common' is the criterion for identifying 'a society', rather, this is an announcement of the programme.

The criteria Professor Luthuli suggests (in the quotation above) are: 'sharing the same language', '(having) similar beliefs and convictions', '(sharing) the same culture or way of life' and '(being) conscious of their mode of life and their common aim (adulthood)'. Three comments are appropriate here. In the first place, it is not indisputible that any one of these criteria would yield unambiguous classifications. 'Similar beliefs and convictions', for instance, is unlikely to help one to distinguish clearly enough between people to help us to decide whether we should say that there are two, or ten, or a hundred groups of people in South Africa. Similarly, something like a 'way of life' would surely, lead to our saying that there are many different groups of people, not clearly distinguishable from each other, except at the extremes; 'ways of life' are likely to share many similarities, even if they might be different from each other in various ways, and the picture which would emerge from this criterion is more likely to be that of a web of 'ways of life' shading gradually into each other and overlapping in many ways than that of a neat set of pigeon holes. This remark applies, equally to 'culture'; and even 'language', which might, superficially, look more promising, runs into the same problem. Academies might define languages as having clearcut boundaries, but on the ground, in the streets, languages are seldom pure. The general problem here is that none of these criteria, on their own, depends on anything homogeneous enough to yield the kind of clear-cut classification scheme of 'peoples' (or 'societies') which Professor Luthuli needs to get his show on the road.

In the second place, one might propose multiple criteria (maybe in the hope of taking account of the complexity of human beings and human practices), but this leads to the problem that one's classifications would criss-cross and overlap even more seriously. What I mean by this is that a person might be classified as belonging to group A (Zulu speaking) as far as his language is concerned, to group B

(middle-class affluent) as far as his way of life is concerned, to group C (Rhema church) as far as his beliefs and convictions are concerned, and to group D (loyal Anglo-American employee) as far as his aim (image of adulthood) is concerned. Another person might be classified as belonging to group B (Afrikaans speaking) as far as her language is concerned, to group B (middle-class affluent) as far as her way of life is concerned, to group A (Reformed Church) as far as her beliefs and convictions are concerned, and to group E (faithful wife) as far as her aim (image of adulthood) is concerned. Clearly the possibilities are enormous. The problem is, are these two persons to be classified as belonging to the same overall group?

Indeed what sense does the phrase 'the same overall group' have at all? There are simplifying ways of coping with this problem - that is of giving sense to the phrase 'same overall group' - some of these are 'traditional' in the 'South African way of life' (for instance, skin colour), some of these are part of more recent political rhetoric (for instance, 'nations'), and some of these are part of a Marxist analysis of society (for instance, classes.) What these strategies have in common is that they regard a single criterion as over-riding (as determinant in the last instance), and all other (possible) criteria as subsidiary or irrelevant.

In the third place, recalling that the search is for criteria for the independent identification of 'peoples' or 'societies' so that we can say how many 'peoples' there are in South Africa and thus answer the question of how many 'philosophies of life' there are, the risk of circularity is ever-present. Criteria such as 'sharing the same language', 'sharing similar beliefs and convictions'. 'sharing the same culture or way of life', and so on, sound suspiciously like elements of a 'philosophy of life'. But to the extent that this is so, the problem remains unsolved. Professor Luthuli says that ' ... every group of people has beliefs, convictions and attitudes peculiar to that group.' (BO pg 60), and this sounds as if it might be a criterion for distinguishing between groups of people. But then he also says that 'A particular philosophy of life ... can briefly be described as the totality of a people's views, beliefs and convictions ... ' (BO pg 42), and so the criterion turns out to be 'philosophy of life', and the 'ownership' problem is back with a vengeance. Professor Luthuli says that ' ... a particular society and a particular philosophy of life are one and the same thing.' (BO pg 46), but in this case we can't tell how many 'philosophies of life' there are until we decide how many 'societies' there are, but we can't tell

how many 'societies' there are until we decide how many 'philosophies of life' there are. Maybe we should abandon the pretence that the issue can be determined by serious theoretical investigation, and admit that it comes down to political expediency. The 'authorities' will tell us how many 'philosophies of life' there are in South Africa, and we can all obediently get on with the task of 'articulating' and 'objectifying' these various 'philosophies of life'.

Let us now briefly consider the 'content' problem. The question is: What, in Professor Luthuli's account, is a 'philosophy of life' about? He gives lots of answers to this question. The problems are whether these various answers are compatible with each other (ie is Professor Luthuli's idea of 'a philosophy of life' a coherent idea at all, or is it simply a rag-bag of 'important things'), and whether some of the answers he gives might not be in conflict with his view that any 'philosophy of education' will have to conform to 'universally valid pedagogic principles'. (see BO pg 17)

Professor Luthuli says that:

> In studying a philosophy of life of any people, it must be observed that there are as many philosophies of life as there are people. Some are superficial, others are profound. This means the philosophy of life involves, inter alia, definite choices between distinctive points of view. It is these 'definite choices' which are or should be reflected in the school curriculum. (PF pg 84)

So, a 'philosophy of life' involves 'definite choices'. But then he also says that curriculum changes:

> ... must be interpreted by a philosophy of life of a people and take place in accordance with the guidelines of those unchanging principles which interpret the true nature of an individual and his society. (BO pg 27)

But how can the question of 'the true nature of an individual and his society' be a matter of choice (definite or not)? Surely Professor Luthuli does not want to say that we can simply choose from amongst the competing answers to the question: What is the true nature of an individual and his society?

There is a similar difficulty about trying to say both that 'philosophies of life' are particular to particular peoples, and that 'philosophies of life' have to do with 'eternal truths', 'ultimate causes', and 'what is fundamental in all

areas of thought.' Although they belong to the same general way of thinking, the two words 'absolute' and 'relative' make uncomfortable bedfellows. Professor Luthuli says both that: 'A particular philosophy of life ... can be briefly described as the totality of a people's views beliefs and convictions ... ' (BO pg 42), and that: 'Though a philosophy of life may be said to constitute a special kind of theory, one of its underlying principles is that it is concerned with what is fundamental in all areas of thought.' (BO pg 19), and that ' ... the chief purpose of a philosophy of life is to formulate, interpret and explain all reality in terms of ultimate causes ... ' (BO pg 19), and that: 'Philosophy of life comprises principles which are eternal truths ... ' (BO pg 15) Whatever we might want to say about these old metaphysical chestnuts we, surely, do not want to say that the kinds of answers given to them mark out distinctions between different 'peoples'. Labels like 'materialism', 'realism', 'idealism' and 'pragmatism' might be the names of distinguishible metaphysical stances, but they are not the names of different 'societies' or different 'peoples'.

Before I move to a more promising thread in Professor Luthuli's conception of 'a philosophy of life', I want, in passing, to make two comments.

The first is that, having got hold of the idea that a 'philosophy of life' is a set of answers to questions about 'what is fundamental in all areas of thought', 'eternal truths', and 'the ultimate causes in terms of which to explain all reality', Professor Luthuli lurches towards religion. He says that: 'Religion can be said to be the pillar upon which the philosophy of life of a people rests.' (BO pg 49) Without wishing to offend Professor Luthuli's (or anyone's) religious sensibilities, let me put my cards on the table. In my view religion trivializes metaphysical questions by providing simplistic answers to them, and it clouds moral issues by associating them with the unknowable. But, whether I am right about this or not, to say that religion is the pillar of a philosophy of life is to appeal to a criterion for the division of 'peoples' which cuts right across all the criteria we have previously considered. Furthermore it provides a competing account of the phrase 'the same overall group' and would assign the other (possible) criteria to different subsidiary and irrelevant statuses. And what about those people who are not 'believers'? Do they have no 'philosophy of life'?

The second is that if Professor Luthuli wants to say that 'a philosophy of life' has to do with 'what is fundamental in

all areas of thought' then he lands up with a massive contradiction in the very heart of his position. If 'a philosophy of life' is concerned with 'all reality' then it cannot be said that it must conform to 'universally valid pedagogic principles'. What we have in view here, again, is the unhappy relations between the framework and the filling. Either 'a philosophy of life' has to do with 'what is fundamental in all areas of thought' and Pedagogics, including Fundamental Pedagogics, will have to take its chances along with everything else; or Pedagogics is 'scientific' and 'universally valid' and 'philosophies of life' will have to limit their scope to what is left over once Pedagogics has done its work. Professor Luthuli (and others) simply cannot have it both ways at once.

But there is a more promising strand in what Professor Luthuli says about 'philosophy of life' - this is the strand of morality. It is, unfortunately, badly tangled up with other elements of his conception of 'philosophy of life' and there are serious problems about its compatibility with some of these other elements - I am now thinking of the elements of relativism, religion and metaphysics. One has to work hard to bring the moral strand clearly into view.

Consider the following (pruned): ' ... a philosophy of life is concerned with what should be.' (BO pg 20); 'The philosophy of life is so definite that it determines inevitably and fundamentally every concrete decision made during the life of an individual and of society.' (BO pg 20); ' ... it provides the members (of a society) with a set of guiding principles for their conduct in general.' (BO pg 19); 'It can be argued further that the chief purpose of a philosophy of life is to ... establish for the individual a scale of values for human conduct.' (BO pg 19); and;

> A clearly defined philosophy of life is essential and fundamental to education, because through all social changes and shifting standards of life values a well defined philosophy of life offers valid criteria for interpreting and evaluating life and its meaning. (BO pg 14)

This sounds like morality. We still have quite a long way to go before anything like a coherent theory of morality can emerge out of these few scattered remarks, and one task of such a theory would be to disentangle morality from metaphysical encumberances, and to expose the relativist stance in morality for the incoherent nonsense that it is (10), nevertheless, in this aspect of his thought I think

Professor Luthuli's intuitions are taking him in the right direction. One might characterize his enterprise as that of trying to complement Fundamental Pedagogics with a theory of morality. This is a kind of half-hearted protest against the mistaken idea that one could understand education from a non-moral point of view. It is a pity that Professor Luthuli's protest remains half-hearted. What he needs to do is to eject the framework, to overcome his fascination with the illusory idea of 'universally valid pedagogic principles', and to work out in more detail the secular, universalistic, non-authoritarian morality which he so tantalizingly glimpses in talking about Black humanism, and what it would imply for education.

> In terms of this philosophy of life, the purpose of ... education and that of the school curriculum is to mould the young to strive to belong to and serve humanity. ... His individuality is respected in so far as it relates to his fellowmen, be they black, yellow, brown or white. For man is only man through other men. (BO pg 36)

(The word 'mould' jars in this context.)

Professor Luthuli discusses the Eiselen Commission and Verwoerd's notorious 1954 speech:

> According to the policy statement of the then Minister of Native Affairs, Black education was to be designed so as to be in line with national policy, one to which the Blacks were vehemently opposed. (BO pg 91)

The pattern of this thinking is familiar: Framework by Pretoria, Filling by locals. There might be something seductive about this - accept the Framework and you will achieve (some) freedom; here is a way of wresting freedom from captivity. But Blacks refused to buy it. In Professor Luthuli's words, they vehemently opposed the 'national policy', ie the Framework. We might say that they refused to be seduced by the offer of limited freedom, as they realised that the Framework would render it insignificant.

But Professor Luthuli's criticism of this Framework is somewhat different. He says that ' ... it was politically orientated and not pedagogically founded.' (BO pg 91) A masterstroke! Subsequently he says that 'The only pitfall of Black education was the lack of correct foundations (BO pg 94) A 'politically orientated' Framework we won't accept; a 'scientifically founded' Framework we must.

Professor Luthuli's own position can be summed up as follows: Framework by Pretoria, Filling by locals (eg Luthuli) Pretoria will provide the 'universally valid pedagogic principles' and various locals will translate them into 'meaningful' educational policies in terms of their various 'philosophies of life'. What I have been trying to show is not so much that the Framework is not scientific (11) but that it is not even right.

Professor Luthuli says that it would be 'pedagogically unsound' to provide 'the same education' for Whites and Blacks in South Africa. I have investigated the framework of thinking which underpins this view and have tried to show that it cannot survive critical scrutiny. I do not think that Professor Luthuli has shown that it is 'pedagogically unsound' to provide 'the same education' for Whites and Blacks in South Africa.

I shall conclude with a tentative suggestion. Professor Luthuli thinks that his work will contribute to schooling policy. As his references to manpower and technical training (see, for instance, BO pg 115) show, he half-realises the truth that schools are embedded in the economic and political structures of society and schooling policy needs to reflect that.

Schooling policy in South Africa has generated, sustained and perpetuated appalling inequalities. Maybe, at the end of the day, there is something in the idea that education and culture are somehow related to each other, but we still need to try to work out more clearly what this relationship might be; and, what this might, in the end, have to do with schooling policy we cannot tell. Thus, faced with the gross injustices of schooling policy in South Africa, to worry on at a possible culture-education link sounds a bit too much like fiddling while Rome burns. In some circumstances it is counter-productive to allow arguments about schooling policy to get muddled up with arguments about education.

Maybe the 'pedagogically illinformed' Black public who articulated the 'first interpretation' of equality of educational opportunity (education for Blacks must in no way be different from what the Whites have) at least had their eye on the right ball. Maybe we need to learn how to understand the sense of the slogans: 'Separate cannot be equal', and 'There can be no normal education in an abnormal society'.

Notes

(1) This is similar (and probably related) to the sharply conflicting responses to Tuskegeeism. Se JK King Pan-Africanism and Education and the papers by Maureen Friedman and Wally Morrow in Perspectives in Education, Vol 3 No 2 (Sept 1978) and Vol 3 No 3 (Dec 1979), respectively.

(2) I am not here saying that formal agreement that, for instance, differences in sex are not a relevant ground for differences in treatment in schooling, is all that is needed. To become effective such agreement needs to be incorporated into the details of practice. Feminists are right to insist that formal agreement is at best a starting point, and might even be used as a smokescreen to hide real differences of treatment.

(3) Some of the 'few' I am referring to here are politically influential in South Africa.

(4) Professor PC Luthuli is the Professor of Philosophy of Education, and Head of the Department of Philosophy of Education, at the University of Zululand. His two books are (a) The Philosophical Foundations of Black Education in South Africa, Durban: Butterworths, 1981, and (b) An Introduction to Black-Orientated Education in South Africa, Durban: Butterworths, 1982. In the remainder of my paper I shall refer to (a) as PF, and to (b) as BO.

(5) Professor TA Viljoen wrote the programme: 'Pedagogics, which is ... an autonomous science ... provides the opportunity for people holding different philosophies of life to establish their educational systems on the truths revealed.' TA Viljoen & JJ Pienaar Fundamental Pedagogics, Durban: Butterworths, 1971, pg 94.

(6) In the end I think that the major problems in Professor Luthuli's position arise out of his conceiving of himself as doing philosophy but having a mistaken understanding of what this involves.

(7) I take it that a crucial characteristic of ideology is that it is linked, in some or other way, with the economic structures of society.

(8) One might have hoped that a Professor of Philosophy of Education at the University of Zululand would have a

great interest in adult education. (see James Moulder "The Education of Adults" in Perspectives in Education, Vol 4 No 1 (Aug 1980).)

(9) The reference is to something said by Jomo Kenyatta.

(10) See Bernard Williams Morality, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, for a brilliantly concise (pgs 34 to 39) exposé of moral relativism.

(11) See DB Margetson "Pedagogics in South Africa: the mystification of education" in Beard & Morrow (eds) Problems of Pedagogics, Durban: Butterworths, 1981; and PA Enslin "The role of Fundamental Pedagogics in the formulation of educational policy in South Africa" in P Kallaway (ed) Apartheid and education: the education of Black South Africans Johannesburg: Ravan (forthcoming)

THE WORLD OF WORK: ITS IMPACT ON CURRICULUM PLANNING (1)

Tony Morphet

1 Introduction

The paper sets out, by reviewing selected educational and other literature, to describe the impact of the demands of the labour market in industrialized countries on the systems and practices of education. The argument focuses on the contradictory demands imposed on education from the outside: on the one hand students need to be fully developed and on the other they need to be brought to accept their failure. These demands arise out of the hierarchical structure of the labour market and out of the nature of low level industrial work. The contradictions are examined at three levels, (a) in the educational system and structure; (b) in the development of educational theory; (c) within schools. The relevance of the general argument to South Africa is suggested and the significance of the argument for curriculum planning is commented upon.

'Curriculum' has proved itself to be a flexible and resilient concept. Its role in modern educational thinking and practice has been rich and fruitful, particularly in the way it has provided the conceptual framework and support for innovative ideas and practices. Its very flexibility has, however, brought with it problems. One of the more important of these is that the concept has acted as a shield used in protecting the autonomy of educational work. The notion of curriculum design and development has unwittingly nurtured the sense that education has the capacity to construct its world on its own terms - curriculum design being an exclusive process through which the interests, pressures, concerns and demands of the larger world are transformed into specifically educational matters. This paper attempts to re-examine the pressure points at which the world of work meets the curriculum designer. The argument will proceed through three stages. The first will attempt to show how the world of work acts on the structure and management of education as a system, so providing the curriculum designer with the structural context for his work. The second examines the responses made in educational theory to the pressure. The third will focus on the pressures falling on implementation of curricula within the school itself.

2 The world of work and the educational system

Explicit concern with the working world has re-emerged as a major theme in educational writing only relatively recently and it is useful to ask why this should be so. Why is it, for example, that during the later 1950s and 1960s that theme should have yielded to the near exclusive concern with the school as the instrument of cultural transmission with its focus directed towards the relations between the school and its community context in which the influences of social class factors, language, the family and the disadvantaged background were pre-eminent? The answer, as always with such broad questions, lies in the complex processes of social history which can only be hinted at in a short paper, but the general directions of such a possible answer can be suggested. Briefly put, the answer is that during the '50s and '60s the education system was by and large fulfilling the basic demands imposed upon it by the economic system of production, distribution and consumption. The expanding economies of the West and the effects of decolonization in the Third World provided a strong demand pull for labour on the schooling system which generated the sense of a reasonable fit between education and work. It was this that allowed the 'cultural' theme to emerge as a dominant concern in educational thinking both through sociology and through curriculum studies. (2)

Recognising this should not, however, blind us to the fact that existing schooling systems in the USA, in Britain and particularly South Africa, had already been powerfully moulded to fit the demands of the economy for labour. Each of these three systems, and most evidently in South Africa, were stratified in order to fulfil their allocative functions. These strata or divisions between public and private, state and private foundations, black and white, grammar and secondary modern, or however they are described, are the historical products of the particular struggles over access to the various levels of the labour market. It does not need to be emphasized that the curriculum resources available to each stratum of a system differ drastically in every respect; thus curriculum design, used in the broad sense of the phrase, was already powerfully curtailed by the educational structure created by the system of production and distribution.

The pattern of stratified educational systems effecting a rough allocation of girls and boys to all-but predetermined positions in economic life offers some of the crude evidence of the impact of the world of work. The impact, however, is sharper and more intense when seen in the light of education's traditional commitment to the humanist ideals of equality, fulfilment or personal development. Harold

Entwistle (3) puts the conflict clearly:

> Humanistic educational conceptions like 'full personal development', 'realization of individual potential' and 'education of the whole man' cannot be unpacked concretely in a way which excludes man the worker.

It has been, precisely, one of the difficulties of much curriculum work that by focusing on the cultural inheritance it has attempted to 'unpack' the humanistic traditions by excluding man the worker.

Man the worker is one essential concept confronting curriculum studies but closely allied to it is the larger, more daunting concept of the labour market.

The powerlessness of traditional humanist thinking in this confrontation is vividly demonstrated in Mary Warnock (4). Having argued that work and the desire to work is, along with 'virtue' and 'imagination', as part of 'the good life' she puts the question directly:

> How are schools to tell what it is that will help a child to satisfy his desire to work?

Her answer:

> This is not really very difficult. Schools must, to a certain extent, sink their scruples and consent to listen to what it is that the outside world demands.

and

> Schools must, if they are not to fail in their duty, consider the state of the market.

'Duty' to whom?, is a relevant question.

The economist, JK Galbraith (5), puts the point from the opposite perspective:

> It is the vanity of educators that they shape the educational system to their preferred image. They may not be without influence but the decisive force is the economic system. What the educator believes is latitude, is latitude to respond to economic need.

Curriculum studies arise within the available latitude and all too frequently flatter the vanity of the educators to which Galbraith refers.

In order to explore the force of the contradiction between the world of work and education we require some clearer sense of their relation within market societies. CB MacPherson (6) notes penetratingly the manner in which the great nineteenth century liberal theorists encountered the problem.

> He (JS Mill) held that men were capable of something better than the money grubbing and starvation-avoiding existence to which Benthamism condemned them. He rejected the maximization of indifferent utilities as the criterion of social good and put in its place the maximum development and use of human capacities - moral, intellectual and aesthetic as well as material productive capacities.
>
> With John Stuart Mill and Green this market morality is rejected. The goal is no longer the maximum material utility of men as they are but the fullest development and enjoyment of men's faculties. This was a finer vision, and a democratic one. But they failed to deal with the inconsistency between this vision and the necessary requirements of the market economy.

The contradiction between work (the demands of the market economy) and education (the development of human capacities) is plainly identified at the heart of Mill's thinking. The contradiction remains unresolved. It has, in fact, become both more extended through the professional development of educational studies, and more acute through the more intensive organization of the labour market.

Three conditions basic to 'democratic' market societies are impossible to ignore. The first is that there is no command or authority system which allocates labour to the various sectors of demand in the economy. (This, of course, is only partially true of South Africa.) The second is that the system of production, organized through private contract and for profit, is in fact, structured in a powerful hierarchical order with power and authority located at the apex and exercised downwards. Thirdly, the state, directly dependent upon the system of production for both revenue and support, has only limited means to control the exercise of private power and must act to ensure the long term viability of the production system. This third condition has become more evident and widespread as a result of the concentration of power in the hands of a few large corporations (7).

These three conditions throw into sharp relief the position of education. Pre-eminently, it is the institution

responsible for the allocation of labour.

> In industrial societies it is the educational system which is concerned with the selection, training and allocation of personnel to their adult occupational, economic and status positions. (8)

Furthermore, such allocations are made only in terms of the existing hierarchical structure of the labour market dominated as it is by the private capital production system. Finally, the State acts to regulate both the supply of labour and the structure of the market to ensure the long term success of the production system as it is.

Thus it is not difficult to see that the education system is riven by contradictory demands. It is responsible for the fulfilment of Mill's vision of the development of human capacities and at the same time it is shaped by the State to carry out the selection, training and allocation procedures as they are defined by the pyramid structure of private industrial production.

Moreover, as Braverman's (9) decisive study makes plain, the notions of 'work' and 'skill' have, through job fragmentation and technical rationalisation, suffered a systematic degradation at the hands of 'management' and the corporation. Braverman leaves no room for doubt that the vast majority of jobs from the bottom to the middle of the labour pyramid amount to an effective deformation of human workers. Thus, 'development' and 'deformation' both stand high on the educational agenda.

3 The responses of educational theory

Responses developed within educational theory to the contradictions posed by the world of work vary a great deal, though it is possible to detect at least three basic value positions underlying the analyses given and the proposals that are made for their resolution. These value positions are of immediate importance to curriculum studies since they constitute traditions within which curriculum innovations may be developed.

The most obvious of the three traditions of response constitutes the conservative position. Conservatives define the problem posed by the world of work as failure within educational thought and practice. The argument put at its briefest is that education has an inadequate awareness of its true and real ends and as a consequence education is seduced

into allowing itself to be used as the means and instrument of non educational ends.

GH Bantock expresses the case directly:

> There is too supine an acquiescence in the trend of events; too many educationalists are concerned simply to implement the supposed 'needs' of the industrial-bureaucratic state; and indeed the general level of educational discussion in this country is a national disgrace - it exists far too much in terms of means; fundamental questions concerning ends are sadly neglected. (10)

The conservative position includes not only much of the work in the formal philosophy of education, including Fundamental Pedagogics, but also the work deriving from the specifically cultural critique of industrial society. What links these positions is a resolute attempt to assert educational ends and criteria as the only acceptable base for educational practice.

A less exclusively educational response to the contradictions works itself out into a reformist position. The reformist analysis identifies the roots of the contradiction in the complex and historically produced plurality of the social system. The power and influence of the working world is explicitly acknowledged but it is not seen as finally determining other structures and institutions. It is argued that education has always had, and continues to have an important critical bearing on the structure and process of production. The educational system is seen as one site in which conflicting interests and visions of social life encounter each other. Education articulates a vision of social life and organization in which the fulfilment of human potentials is taken as the central criterion. The reformist position deriving from Mill is distinguished from the conservative by the emphasis it places upon the need for education to carry forward the long term historical struggle to create a properly human society in which production is itself subject to control by human criteria. Educational means and ends are important because it is through them that the meanings of a fuller sense of a human social order are made active in the existing society. (2, 11, 12, 13)

The third position bases itself upon a radical response and analysis. This analysis accepts the determining power of the economic world. Education as a sub-system of the society is seen to be the instrument of the dominant power in the

society and to be required to fulfil the labour and consumption requirements of the system of production. It has no autonomy and is forced to deny its ideals in practice in order to correspond in performance to the hierarchical structures of production. The radicals see the contradictions in education as evidence of the deep cleavages in the society and wish to use education as a site for immediate political organization and action. The value of education is that it makes the contradictions of the society visible to the participants. (14, 15)

Any individual curriculum planner beginning his work must find himself confronted by a value choice expressing its options in terms of the three traditions discussed. He thus begins from a value context defined in response to the contradictions posed by the impact of the world of work.

4 The impact within schools

There must inevitably be within any school at least two curricula - the curriculum as a plan and the curriculum as experience. In examining the impact within schools of the world of work it will be necessary to consider both of these curricula and to ask how they manage the contradictions that have been described above. The contradictions express themselves specifically through the fact that any curriculum as a plan is intended to encourage the development of all pupils but the same curriculum, as experience, must diminish, through failure, at least some of the pupils.

This is the dilemma at the heart of schooling. Earl Hopper (8) focuses attention on this dilemma. An education system in an industrial society must, Hopper argues, 'warm up' all of its students in the early stages of formal education. In order for the selection process to operate most efficiently all students must be encouraged to respond in the fullest possible way to the challenge of academic achievement. (The source of the equality of opportunity argument lies in this requirement.) Thus the gap between curriculum as developmental plan and curriculum as experience is at its narrowest in the early primary stages.

Yet as the selection process begins and the further it proceeds up the school so the gap must widen. It must do so in order for the school to select a minority of successes who may continue their growth towards the apex of the labour market pyramid. The majority must be able to find ways, within the school, of 'cooling out' so that they can accept their failure, leave school and enter the labour market at

the lower levels.

> In other words students must be warmed up and cooled out more or less continuously, successively and correctly with respect to their eventual economic status and mobility goals. This means also that they must be warmed up and cooled out more immediately with respect to their contemporary educational goals which stand for each of these long term adult goals. (8)

Hopper does not detail in curriculum terms what the processes of 'warming up' and 'cooling out' entail but by showing the contradictory requirements placed on a school curriculum he shows how the broad scale system contradictions discussed above make their way into the staff room and the classroom. It is theoretically, and even practically possible, to design a curriculum which consistently encourages and rewards the development of the pupil. What is not possible is the implementation of such a curriculum, because it avoids the essential 'cooling out' function.

One obvious way of managing both functions within the same class year is streaming. In-school streaming is the clear micro counterpart of institutional streaming with the system as a whole. The 'A' class remains well within the 'warming up' process, while the 'C' class is carefully 'cooled out'.

Bernstein's work (16) on educational codes studies the contradiction in closer detail. His distinction between the integrated code and the collection code points to the ways subject organization and teaching styles create particular attitudes to knowledge, competition, assessment, success and failure, as well as establishing different teacher pupil relations. The differences between the codes clearly relate to the functions discussed by Hopper.

A more recent study by Paul Willis (17) using ethnographic methods has thrown a great deal of light on the detailed processes through which students are 'cooled out'

His study opens with two provocative paragraphs:

> The difficult thing to explain about how middle class kids get middle class jobs is why others let them. The difficult thing to explain about how working class kids get working class jobs is why they let themselves.
>
> It is much too facile to say they have no choice. The way in which manual labour is supplied to production can range in different societies from the coercion of

> machine guns, bullets and trucks to the mass ideological conviction of the voluntary industrial army. Our own liberal democracy is somewhere in between. There is no obvious physical coercion and a degree of self direction. This is despite the inferior rewards for, undesirable social definition and increasing intrinsic meaninglessness of, manual work; in a word its location at the bottom of a class society.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of Willis's study since it alone (to my knowledge) brings a sophisticated analytical capacity into direct contact with school processes. Willis focuses on a group of 12 non-academic working class lads (sic) in a secondary modern school in what he calls an 'archetypal industrial town' in the English midlands. The comparative groups consist of two other conformist groups, one in the same school and the other in another secondary modern in the same city.

The substance of the study is that the group begins early in the secondary phase to construct a counter-school culture. Some of the sources of the construct lie within the school (eg failure in class and general rowdiness) and others lie outside in the definitions derived from working class culture itself and from the family. The group refuses the system of basic exchange on which the school depends - that 'knowledge' will be given by the teachers in return for 'respect' from the boys. Instead, their oppositional culture is built upon the idea of 'havin a laff' at the expense of the system. Willis shows how this culture downvalues mental labour and all that that stands for in the school (conforming to expectations) and in the world, and against that sets very high value on manual work. In particular, manual work represents the powerful positives of a man's work, and real work in the real world. The conforming mental labourers in the school are satirically denounced as 'ear'oles'.

The planned curriculum is shown to produce at least two basic experiences. The one shared among the 'successful' conforming boys who learn not only the middle class skills of mental labour but also the middle class assumptions of conformity, responsibility to authority and good manners. The other experience is shared among the 'unsuccessful' oppositional lads who use the planned curriculum as an opportunity to demonstrate and develop their superior manliness, independence and resistance to the pressures of authority.

> In the sense, therefore, that I argue that it is their own culture which most effectively prepares some working class lads for the manual giving of their labour power we may say there is an element of self damnation in the taking on of subordinate roles in Western capitalism. However, this damnation is experienced, paradoxically, as true learning, affirmation, appropriation and as a form of resistance.

The insights yielded by the Willis study counteract the rather static functionalism which permeates not only Hopper's arguments but those of the radical analysts as well. From the Willis perspective it is clear that 'cooling out' is not felt among the boys who suffer the process as a negative or denying experience. Their own creative resources are powerfully employed to redefine and to experience the process as positive and affirmative.

A further result of Willis's study is that it shows that the world of work penetrates the world of education not only through the structuring of the educational system into institutional units and into curriculum procedures, but also through the cultural practices in which the scholars and teachers participate outside the school. The concentration of the sociology of education on the family as the prime source of cultural influence has obscured the ways in which work enters the school through the consciousness and practices of the pupils. The people who take up the positions at the bottom of the labour pyramid are not simply consigned to their places. The society provides means for them to choose those places.

5 The curricula of South African schools

Most of this paper has been concerned with work done in Britain and the United States and their relevance to the South African case has been assumed, perhaps too easily. In one sense the South African case is very much more simple. There is a great deal more institutional coercion of those destined for the lower reaches of the labour market. Dr Verwoerd's notorious statement made at the introduction of Bantu Education made this plain. Although initial reaction to the Verwoerd doctrine focused on the racial determinations in the policy later commentary has concentrated more closely on the manner in which educational legislation was shaped to fulfil the functions of labour supply. The Minister of Education and Training, speaking in 1978, said of the Verwoerd statement:

> Verwoerd's remarks in 1953 had been justified at the time because labour patterns had been different then. In the meanwhile, labour patterns had changed. (18)

The significant recent developments in the South African context are usefully brought together in the report of the De Lange Commission. Without wishing to enquire in detail into the recommendations and arguments of the report the significant emphases are clearly apparent. On the one hand the report advocates a number of steps towards establishing equality of access among all inhabitants thus ensuring a much broader initial 'warming up' base for education. At the same time the proposals for compulsory post basic education, coupled with the very strong stress on vocational and career education, make it clear that through these processes the majority of students will be 'cooled out' into varying levels of industrial labour. The De Lange report is especially interesting in the demonstration it provides of the process of negotiation between the labour interests of the corporate sector of the economy, the interests of the State and the interests of education. The coherence which the report purports to establish between these interests is framed in educational terms demonstrating further the capacity of educational structures to absorb and manage the contradictions inherent in a market society. South Africa may, I think, usefully be seen as a special instance of the general case I have made out in the earlier parts of this paper. The contradictions absorbed into the De Lange Report will be worked out in the future curricula in South African schools - both in the curricula as plans and the curricula as scholar experiences.

It may appear that the thrust of the argument presented in the paper is towards the curtailment of the autonomy of the curriculum designer. This is not in fact so. The purpose of the arguments developed has been to examine the pressures acting on education as theory and practice in order to set more fully and more accurately the terms in which curriculum planning must take place. Implicit in the argument has been the assertion that curriculum design and development is the focal point at which educational traditions, theories and practices formally encounter the influences, pressures and purposes of the other-than-educational world. Curriculum planning requires not merely learning, experience, skill and resolution, it requires also a fully informed and accurate understanding of the real conditions in which it is required to produce active educational practice. The real purpose of the paper has been to make a contribution to such an accuracy of understanding. Its fault is that it is broad in scope and

varied in approach. What good it may have is directed towards establishing the ground rules of the encounter between education and the labour market. The paper expresses implicitly the hope for further empirical research on the terrain of complex processes it passes over in pursuit of its argument.

Notes

(1) This paper is a reworking of a paper given at the Conference on Curriculum Innovation at the University of Cape Town in January 1981

(2) Baron et al (the Education Group, Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies) Unpopular Education, London: Huchinson, 1981

(3) Harold Entwistle Class, Culture and Education, London: Methuen, 1977

(4) Mary Warnock Schools of Thought, London: Faber, 1977

(5) JK Galbraith "The Nature of Employment and Unemployment" (1972) in BR Cosin (ed) Education, Structure and Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977

(6) CB MacPherson "Politics: post-liberal democracy" in R Blackburn (ed) Ideology in Social Science, London: Fontana, 1972

(7) See M Barrat Brown The Economics of Imperialism, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974

(8) E Hopper Readings in the Theory of Educational Systems, London: Huchinson, 1971

(9) H Braverman Labour and Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, 1974

(10) GH Bantock Education in an Industrial Society, London: Faber, 1963

(11) RH Tawney The Radical Tradition, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964

(12) B Simon Studies in the History of Education 2 Vols, Lawrence & Wishart, 1960 & 1965

(13) R Williams The Long Revolution, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961

(14) L Althusser "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in BJ Cosin (ed) Education, Structure and Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977

(15) S Bowles & H Gintis Schooling in Capitalist America, New York: RKP, 1976

(16) B Bernstein "On the classification and framing of educational knowledge" in R Brown (ed) Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change, London: Tavistock, 1973

(17) PE Willis Learning to Labour, Saxon House, 1978

(18) J Kane-Berman Soweto: Black Revolt White Reaction, Johannesburg, Ravan, 1978

INTERCHANGE

THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF TEACHER ORGANISATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES, NEEDS AND PROBLEMS OF TEACHERS

Randall Peteni

Our world is not a beautiful place to live in. The evils which beset the human race seem to grow worse from year to year. Advances made by science often intensify rather than reduce the ills of modern man. Discoveries and inventions which should have helped to improve the quality of life have, by some ironic twist, created many new problems. Progress in the control of disease viruses, for instance, has resulted in a population explosion which is humanity's greatest threat. Greater industrialisation has done havoc on the earth's surface and has transformed what was once a fertile countryside at many a place all over the world into a dismal, barren, ugly desert of uniform municipal houses and monotonous high rise apartments. Many young people reject the moral values and challenge the leadership and guidance of their elders, without offering values or leadership of a higher order. Greed and selfishness prevail in inter-human relationships. Corruption practised by people in high places and in positions of power is invariably imitated by those serving in subordinate positions. This is the kind of world in which the young child has to grow up and try to become a good citizen. What contribution can the teachers' organisation make to resolve the complexities of the South African situation and to help the child become what he ought to be?

First and foremost, the teachers' organisation must perform

two functions: as a trade union and as a professional association. The form its trade union function must take is to fight continually for better work conditions and better salaries for teachers. Its success in this form of struggle will be realised in an improved system of education for the country. The recruitment of good teachers in greater numbers than at present will be easier and this will lead to better workers, better technicians, better executives, to intellectuals of greater calibre and to accelerated national development. As a professional association, the organised teachers can make a regular and systematic study of educational issues and help by their research to find solutions to educational and national problems. It should not be the responsibility of bureaucrats alone to undertake research and conduct pre-service and in-service training for teachers. The greater part of this research and training should be done by a strong and well-organised teachers' association. The serving teacher has a deeper insight and more recent experience of classroom conditions than the bureaucrats sitting in remote offices and exercising remote control of education from the capital cities of the country. The solutions suggested by the serving teacher are likely to be more realistic and more capable of application than those of the bureaucrats.

Teachers' organisations can contribute more effectively to national development if they are part of the decision-making process. The concept of power-sharing should not only be extended to include all races and all colours, but should be extended to the organised professions, the organised workers and the organised technicians. The destiny of the Republic of South Africa should not be determined by the politicians alone, but by the politicians working with and taking heed of decisions taken by all organised, non-political bodies. Only when that is done and done effectively will the Republic be a true republic, a democratic state in name and in fact. Organised teachers should play as effective a role in the political process as people in commerce and industry and in other professions and should take as effective a lead in public affairs as other people with similar experience and qualifications. If teachers as individuals and a teachers' organisation as a body are barred from participating as fully in political activities as people in the private sector, then they are reduced to the status of second class citizens. As for Black teachers, their status is reduced to that of third class citizens for they have the colour bar as an additional restriction to contend with. Thus we have in South Africa one bar reinforcing another bar and preventing the country from using for its benefit the talent available in the teaching profession - the most highly educated single group

of any significance in numbers. It is no accident that in many third world countries most of the presidents, prime ministers, cabinet ministers and a large number of public servants were formerly teachers. The trend merely points to the wisdom of involving teachers in the process of decision-making for national development.

The teachers' organisation is well placed to take a lead in matters of national importance because the task of inspiring and guiding teachers belongs to it, and the responsibility of teachers for pupils under their care is almost as great as that of the parents of those pupils. A good teacher assumes full responsibility for the health and happiness of the children entrusted to him. He is constantly on the alert, looking for the best methods of developing the mental faculties of his pupils. The teachers' organisation could help parents who are not developing the potentialities of their children because of lack of knowledge by organising talks to such parents by child psychologists or other people with training and experience in the care of children. The parent must be taught to look to the welfare of the child both before and after birth, and to know that neglect of good advice from qualified people is a disservice to the children and to humanity. When the child grows up, he follows the ways of his parents, and if those ways are wrong, wrong habits are passed on from generation to generation. For these reasons it is important that parents should be helped to practice habits which are likely to promote the physical, mental and spiritual health of their children. Furthermore, the teachers' organisation should urge its members to give thought to the need to provide leisure-time activities for children at weekends and during holidays. Adults seem to be content with organising their own social activities: sport, church meetings, political and cultural meetings, dinners and parties, and visits to friends. On such occasions the children are often left to their own devices. Is it any wonder that they sometimes develop undesirable ways of entertaining themselves? Children's social activities should be carefully planned if they are to be meaningful, and children depend on adults to do this for them, or, preferably, with them.

Education and development has been the concern for many years of the World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP). This organisation has described teachers as 'among the strongest and most potent forces in the world in promoting the well-being of society in all areas, whether urban, rural, industrialised or economically underdeveloped.' WCOTP has issued a directive to all teachers to try to

'achieve through the educational process a world that is more humane, more equitable, more balanced socially and economically.' As agents of social change, educators should contribute to a development process which includes 'cultural and spiritual self-realisation embracing creativity, quality of life, respect for self and others, and the rights of all people.' To reach this goal the education system adopted should enable every person to develop his full potential as an individual and as a member of society. In other words, the attainment of literacy and the extension to all people of equal opportunities to acquire secondary and tertiary education are pre-requisites to national development.

Harmes Zaneti, President of the Teachers' Confederation of Brazil, welcoming the delegates to the 1980 world assembly of teachers, spoke as follows:

> The true development of a society can only come about through the complete fulfilmemt and constant growth of those who are a part of it. A society is only developed when it offers the opportunity to all its citizens of permanent and active participation in its construction ... A society that wishes to be developed must stimulate and protect the liberal human rights of its citizens such as guaranteeing integrity in their relationship with the state, not allowing arbitrary imprisonment, torture and repression, and guaranteeing civic and political liberties such as freedom of expression and freedom to associate and participate effectively in the choice of their leaders.

Political and economic trends in South Africa in the last few years have been extremely disappointing, especially after statements by ministers of state which seemed to give promise of the elimination of discrimination against Blacks. Despite these gleams of light, the repressive laws remain on the statute book. The dark, crowded urban townships remain as bleak and dismal as they have been since last century. The meagre wages of the workers lag far behind the spiralling costs of essential commodities. The crowded classrooms are as crowded and unsuitable for effective learning as they have been for many generations past. The enactment of new laws to control the Black people still remains the main occupation of the White legislators in Cape Town. In this dark and desolate scene the Black man manages to exist. But it is a dismal kind of existence, for he belongs to a disunited, hopeless majority, incapable of exploiting his advantage of numbers, an advantage which could emancipate him economically, politically and socially and raise this country

Does not seem to go as far as de Lange in proposing change: appears, however, to think in terms of a single teachers' organization. Links education with other social dimensions.

to the greatness and the glory to which it is entitled by virtue of its vast natural resources and its healthy climate. Education is doubtless the most effective weapon for the Black man's emancipation.

The kind of emancipation which the teachers' organisation should fight for is that which gives the individual adequate choice of the kind of life he wishes to live, as determined by the resources of the country. Every person, Black and White, man and woman, should be free to choose where to live, what profession to follow, what school or university to attend, what church to belong to. As long as there are restrictions on the individual in these areas, so long will the claim that there is freedom in South Africa be a hollow claim. There are many conflicts in the world today as men and women everywhere seek to reform society, to put an end to the injustices of the past, to outlaw racial and other forms of discrimination, to root out monopolies in commerce and industry and in the control of the natural resources of the country. It is our fervent hope that these conflicts will be so resolved that the world of tomorrow will see a more equitable distribution of natural resources and that education will concentrate on the teaching of true democratic ideals. Teachers and their organisation should promote the full development of society, and meaningful improvement of the quality of life. Furthermore, (the) teachers' organisation should work towards promoting inter-racial, inter-cultural and international understanding and good will, and should have as one of its aims the safeguarding of peace and human rights. Changes in education must include, if they are to contribute to the development of a united South Africa, the extension of equal opportunities for education to all children, the provision of more funds for all levels of education, continual curriculum reform and syllabus revision, job security for teachers, and the dissemination of information to the public on the value of, and the need for, further improvements in education. Many of these goals can be achieved if the teachers' organisation is united and strong and maintains constant vigilance over every aspect of education.

THE NATIONAL EDUCATION UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA (NEUSA) AND THE ROLE OF TEACHER ORGANISATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Michael Gardiner

The major teacher organizations in South Africa are presently fully committed by the historical and political effects of apartheid upon education. Bound by the controlling power of 'recognition' as negotiating agencies for teachers to racially separate education authorities, teacher organizations are confined to concern with matters within separate education systems. The history of these teacher organizations shows that they either have endorsed, or else have failed to challenge in significant ways, the use by the state of education to ramify the ideology and practice of apartheid. Even the federated and conjoined teacher bodies have been concerned largely with domestic issues within the framework of separate education systems.

When the crisis in education developed in the nineteen-seventies, teacher organizations had no basis on which to lead or to express opinion on issues which had become so acute that widespread rioting and deaths by shooting resulted. In addition, these organizations have no power to compel action from political and educational authorities. Decades of compliance with state policy, or unwillingness to articulate forcefully enough the obvious injustices of that policy, have led inevitably to a position where 'recognized' teacher organizations are inward-looking, ineffective in acting decisively on their members' behalf, without a sufficiently dynamic relationship with the communities they serve, with no significant voice in decisions for which their members are held responsible, and no capacity to advance the educational interests of South African society as a whole.

The formation of NEUSA and its current policies has been governed by that general perception of the state of teacher organizations. And it is important to state clearly that NEUSA, because of its non-racial character and stance, does not seek merely to offer an opportunity to transcend the racial restrictions within which controversial teacher organizations presently work. It is the view of NEUSA that the separation of educational thought and action from the social, political and economic factors in a country is as vitiating to appropriate and effective participation in the

development of essential change as has been the division of teachers along ethnic and language lines. It is thus the policy of NEUSA to approach educational questions from a non-racial position within the full context from which those questions arise. This is necessary if NEUSA, and any other body primarily concerned with education, educational practice and the implications of that practice upon society, is to move beyond the anachronistic and timid position of the major teacher organizations. For example, NEUSA regards as enormously important the positive and necessary tensions in the relationships between the demands expressed by teachers, pupils or students, and parents. The concerns of all three groups cannot be considered in isolation from each other. The professional and personal interests of teachers must be considered in relation to the concerns of scholars and the needs of the community. NEUSA does not seek a professionalism for its teacher-members which permits manipulation by authority (as in the infamous example of the South African Teachers' Council for Whites), nor which sunders teachers from being primarily members of a community and its essential concerns.

NEUSA is unambiguous in its view that teacher organizations have a responsibility to lead their members in a campaign for a non-racial education system for all in a society based on political and economic justice. Such a campaign, linking all teachers who share educational and social concerns, can only be undertaken as part of a broader movement in South Africa to shed apartheid and to establish a non-racial democracy. It is understood by NEUSA that the forces which brought teacher organizations to their present position are powerful and daunting. But it is also clear that teacher organizations have resources which they have not used. Self-education about present realities and how they can be challenged is clearly within the scope of such organizations. Initiating clearly defined campaigns to focus upon particular issues, instead of reacting to acts of policy which are implemented after little or no consultation, can be undertaken as self-education proceeds. Deliberate and active co-operation between organizations at local and broader levels can take place without real difficulty. Given present realities, NEUSA encourages dual membership among organizations (until no longer necessary) which should lead to interchanges which have as their aim the assertion by teachers of their rightful contribution to educational decisions.

The recommendations of the De Lange Committee represent only a partial statement about our educational future in South Africa. A number of educational organizations are presently

discussing and shaping their proposals for education in this country's future. It is NEUSA's view that alternatives to the De Lange proposals should be offered, based on historical and present realities and which offer different perspectives on education and society from those assumed in the De Lange Report. Were teacher organizations to come into active interchange on issues of this sort, then teachers could be involved in significant contributions to a future which is currently being left to the state and industry to determine.

NEUSA activity since its formation demonstrates that it is possible and necessary to approach educational issues from a non-racial point of view at a local, practical level, and on a broader basis. Subject workshops and an advice bureau for all teachers are entirely compatible with publications which scrutinise the De Lange proposals, and also consistent with discussions between teachers and teacher organizations in Africa and on other continents. NEUSA believes that as important as the daily, domestic needs of teachers are, it is not only insufficient to represent teachers almost solely in those terms, but to do only that in the hope of accessibility to the ear of the authorities is to permit the abuse of education by forces fundamentally hostile to the interests of society.

NEUSA believes that a re-orientation of teacher organizations is both necessary and possible, and one of its intentions is to play a role in that development in the interests of education and our society as a whole.

PARENTS, POLITICS AND PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL POLICY

Peter Mundell

> If it is believed that the elementary schools will be better managed by the Governor and Council, the Commissioners of the Literary Fund, or any other general authority of the Government, then by the parents in each ward, it is a belief against all experience. - Thomas Jefferson.

The dust and disturbance in education prior to the De Lange Report is beginning to settle. Prominent in the aftermath of unprecedented upheaval, professional and public debate, a potent factor emerges - the parent. Professional associations, such as the TTA, have done well to recognise, even in the early stages of the salary dispute and the events leading up to the HSRC enquiry, the political significance of parent-power in the provision of education. To pretend that parents in general have not been closely associated with all aspects of the classroom since the advent of formal schooling is futile. What I wish to emphasize, more particularly, is the emergent role of parent associations at the management and decision-making level. I am also concerned about the strengthening of ties between teacher associations and combined parent bodies. There are clear indications that the present hierarchical system of school management will undergo considerable modification in the next decade. Community based areas of education, in which both parents and teachers will be expected to contribute substantially to decisions affecting curricula, facilities and policy matters, are expected to materialise. Most teacher associations have been quick to grasp the importance of a third agency in the promotion of educational debate. The movement needs to be examined more closely. The associations to which I will refer are those with which I am most familiar, ie, related to English medium White provincial schools.

Three important developments have served to accelerate the relevance of community-based controls of education in the RSA. The first is undoubtedly the effect of spiralling costs at national and provincial level. The anomalies and imbalances found with the apportionment of public finances in this regard are well known. It is cold consolation to point them out to White parents. Since the mid-70s they have faced

the prospect of enormous hikes in school fees, parent contributions and tax increases with the certain knowledge that greater demands are yet to come. It now appears to be common policy with all Education Departments that revenue for text books, writing materials and a large proportion of the upkeep and development of school buiidings will have to be funded directly by parents. I am not concerned, at the present, about the justices and/or injustices of this tendency. The implication which I wish to stress in this outline is the 'more pay, more say' concept. Greater say in the management of school matters is a natural and democratic consequence of greater financial contribution. This has been a strong and recurrent theme at meetings organised by combined parent associations in the recent past.

Secondly, it may be pointed out that this tendency is clearly predicted in the recommendations of the De Lange Report. Section 4.17 (Management of Education) makes an interesting and noteworthy comparison between 'centralized forms of control ... which are representative of all the inhabitants of the RSA' and 'decentralized decision-making ... structures ... which ensure ... the greatest possible freedom of parental choice'. (1) In the South African context this may be an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. Parent and teacher associations tend to reflect the divisions already present in our society. Further fragmentation may be anathema to some but it is a tendency not easily reversed. Paradoxically enough, there is a contention that the inexorable tendency towards tighter ties with parent communities have mutual and general sociological benefits which are often unpredictable. Self-reliance, greater awareness, mutual and beneficial interdependence and a growing sense of civic pride and social self-confidence are some of the credits which flow from more closely co-ordinated community systems. I will attempt to enlarge on this theme shortly. Before I leave the De Lange Report, let us see what is envisaged at the third (LOCAL) level.

1 'The greatest possible degree of autonomy should be given to the ... school and parents and teachers should have a major share in decision-making at this level ... to extend the functions and authority, both of the school governing body and of the principal and staff'.

2 'Freedom of parental choice ... can never be absolute and must not constrain the needs or opportunities of others'.

3 'There should be 'groupings' of schools named 'local school districts' ... that would make up units of

management smaller than the region'. (2)

Critics of any move to consolidate, for example, English medium white schools into more cohesive units may point out the following:

a) Parents already have school committees and governing bodies which give them considerable 'say' in the running of these institutions.

b) School boards in their present form give parents considerable representation at the planning level in regional matters.

c) The provisional council, as presently constituted, is a democratically elected body which serves the interests of all White cultural and language groups fairly and equitably.

If, for the purpose of this paper, we assume English speakers to be a minority group with special interests, it is easy to dispel the above assumptions. School committees and governing bodies have severely circumscribed functions and may, for example, not concern themselves with matters related to the curriculum. School boards are advisory bodies. Their recommendations are frequently ignored or overlooked. At provincial level we find that decision-making very often takes place in committee. No access for the expression of minority opinions is either likely or possible at this level. In practice the Executive Committee of the Province and the Director of Education make decisions. Debate, or representation, rarely affect this 'closed shop' arrangement. The editor of a large daily newspaper makes the same point. Referring to the disparity of interests between the members of the council and the inhabitants of the 'central Witwatersrand whose interests it is supposed to safeguard', he says, 'The provincial council is, by historical happenstance, vested with absolute power over the planning of greater Johannesburg and there is no democratic process by which voters in the metropolis can fight TPA decisions. Worse, those decisions can be made in secret and no reasons for them need be given'. (3)

As a result we find that school committees often have to resort to devious, circuitous and time-consuming means to present their case at the level at which it matters. It is precisely in this context that combined parent associations could make their most striking contribution. They are at present considered non-statutory bodies but have in the past few years gained access to the Administrator and the Minister

of National Education to discuss matters of importance, despite their lack of official recognition.

The schools and community crisis in the United States which welled up in the mid-fifties, sparking off social upheaval amongst the underprivileged, set off a chain of reform and rethinking which still characterises urban school policy in the USA today. Billions of dollars worth of research and experimentation have been poured into countless systems and experiments in order to modify, alleviate and reconstitute the educational situation of Negro, Puerto Rican and other minority pupils in poor and deprived areas. Forced and/or administered integration programmes, remedial and compensatory education (on a fiscal scale which makes De Lange's financial projections insignificant by comparison) were introduced, applied and evaluated in the sixties. For American educators and administrators in education the results and setbacks have been traumatic, often tragic.

Marilyn Gittell and others have researched the theme of emerging community control ceaselessly. They have documented the predictable folly and grandoise scale of 'administering' reform in city schools and are at great pains to point out how fundamental to success in education is the involvement of parents at all levels. The growth of a sense of identity amongst minority groups in the ghettos has had striking consequences. 'The murmurs for community control of the public schools in one corner of Harlem echoed a number of profound developments throughout the country - not only in ghettos but among the great middle class as well'. (4) 'Coinciding with an awakening desire among the urban poor is a trend toward decentralisation of services,' she says.

Inasmuch as this viewpoint anticipates that with which we are already familiar in the HSRC report, we would do well to examine events in the USA in the late sixties and early seventies in terms of educational reform. Many issues seen formerly in terms of traditional political ideologies were cut adrift. 'One of the great ironies of the school-community-control movement is that it shatters traditionally clear lines between liberal and conservarive thought'. (5) Quite clearly there is more involved in decentralising educational control than creating amorphous geographic units. In demanding greater autonomy and participation in public education, minority groups may in fact be seeking a way 'in' and 'attaining greater connection to society, not separatism'. (6) Cohesiveness at the community level may be an indispensable factor in the unfolding and realisation of group assets in a mixed population - strange as it may seem to some.

The first attempt by New York City to move towards some form of community control concept led to the formation of the famous Bundy Panel to advise on decentralisation in 1968. It is interesting to note, in the controversy which raged after the publication of the report, how resistant the profession (in this case the United Federation of Teachers) was, initially, to demands which emerged from parents and students. The community-control movement in New York and other American cities was born in the midst of a painful political and social period of time. We do not have to repeat the mistakes. Soweto 1976 came as a bombshell. The question it posed in many minds was whether the issues were really about education or just a form of 'militancy and turbulent, uneasy youth'.

'The answer,' say Gittell and others, 'is rooted in the premise that basic reform of a public institution does not simply consist of apparent improvements in the quality of its professional functions; it depends also, and inextricably, on the strength of the political process through which the institution is governed. The improvement of professional function without democratic processes is technocracy. The failure or short life of many purely pedagogical reform movements in public education may be traced to the absence of participation by parents and community'. (7) It was a hard, bitter and expensive lesson to learn. It is not that parents might be more involved in making decisions about schools; parents simply must be involved. 'Education is one of the most political activities of the human being,' is the way Dr Ken Hartshorne expresses it, and I would endorse Yvonne Bickley's conclusion in a previous article in this journal that 'it (education) is inevitably both a moral (hence social) and a political (hence community) matter.' (8)

The third aspect which relates to the role of parent organisations in the future rests, most decidedly, on the proposed constitutional changes forecast by the Prime Minister in Bloemfontein, this month. References were made to greater autonomy at local level. Greater say in local affairs is in the constitutional pipeline. This prediction highlights the role of parental participation in the provision and planning of 'local' or 'district' schools. This is a healthy and praiseworthy approach. The Cabinet has, however, remained vague about the future composition of provincial or 'regional' administration. Vested political interests play a major part in the present arrangement. It is important to know whether smaller communities will be adequately represented at regional level when changes in the present format come to pass. (A striking example is the existence of at least 400 000 people of Portuguese origin in

South Africa without a single representative on any educational body above the level of the local School Board.) Any entrenchment of the present situation in a new 'Provincial Council' will inevitably exasperate and further alienate the necessary contribution of public-spirited parents and parent bodies.

In 1980, English medium school bodies were asked whether 'education for the entire country should fall under a single ministry and the system of education decision-making and control should be so designed as to ensure effective participation of all interested parties at local, regional as well as national level'. 84% agreed! More importantly, 99% supported the statement that 'a special effort must be made to restore and maintain the role of English Medium Education in the Transvaal.' Clearly, it is a community which wishes to 'opt in'. A quick survey of combined parent associations in the Transvaal shows that, much like their overseas counterparts, they are of comparatively recent origin. The National Federation of Parent-Teacher Associations of the U.K. was founded in 1954. (The Confederation for the Advancement of State Education began as a 'formation of a protest group of parents in Cambridge in 1960' (9) and the wellknown Home and School Council emerged in 1967.) The latter was founded to 'gain acceptance of parents as full partners in the educational system on the lines proposed in the Plowden Report.' (10)

Twenty five years ago, an ex-mayor of Johannesburg, Mr Fotheringham, created the Association of Governing Bodies (AGB) of English medium schools in the Transvaal. Its initial object was to encourage recruitment of teachers from England. The campaign, not surprisingly, did not enjoy official support. The AGB has since turned its attention to a host of problems amongst which the most important are the provision of good buildings and facilities, suitably qualified teachers, and closer links between home and school. Laurie Starfield, the present chairman, is proud to claim a membership of more than 60 English medium schools amongst 70. In January a meeting was convened with the Minister of National Education at which a working committee on recruitment was proposed. It is easy to see why the association between bodies such as TTA and AGB is such a close one.

More recently (1980) we have had the formation of an equally vigorous association to represent school committees which attend to the needs of primary schools. TASC (The Transvaal Association of School Committees) played a prominent role in

the teachers' campaign for better salaries and conditions of service which resulted in the Roé Venter Report (1980-1981). Neither association has yet been accorded official recognition. Together they represent the interests of more than 2 000 000 parents. If the present government is sincere about the intentions revealed in its reaction to the De Lange Report, viz., that 'the provision of formal education shall be a responsibility of the State provided that the individual, parents and organized society shall have a shared responsibility, choice and voice in this matter - principle 6', and, in section 3.4, that 'the Government finds acceptable the principle of freedom of choice for the individual and for parents in educational matters ... within ... the policy that each population group is to have its own school' (11), then statutory recognition of the above-mentioned associations will become a necessary part of any meaningful development of education in the Transvaal.

In summary:

1 The lack of real or meaningful parental participation disfigures and detracts from education.

2 Combined parent associations are at present non-statutory bodies with the potential of playing a more prominent role in educational decision-making at regional and national level.

3 Despite the unaccountable indifference of some educators to the role and relevance of parents in education, teacher associations have welcomed the growth and advancement of parental 'power' in communal matters. As in the case of the Plowden Report, the effect on the De Lange Report is likely to be one of a strengthening of ties between the home and the school, the teacher, the parent and their respective organisations. To those who would advocate a more homogeneous, class-and culture-free pattern of evolution in schools, one would urge a note of extreme caution. Experience, it seems, predicts otherwise. The culture-bound nature of a close community facility such as a school creates countless connections which make its survival necessary and its development possible.

Gittell concludes:

> While civil rights groups have concerned themselves with the integration issue, they are, also, more directly involved than other citizen groups with other matters related to minority groups and compensatory educational needs. Their influence has, however, been of limited

effect. The analysis of power in school policy-making is particularly relevant to the movement for school reform - primarily because the concentration of power in the central bureaucracy in urban school systems is so basic to the lack of responsiveness of the system to changing circumstances and needs, but also because it greatly influences the ability to achieve change. Those in power have a vested interest in maintaining the system, while those who are powerless are striving to effect adjustments to allow their voices to be heard. Community frustration with the public education system has manifested itself in the movement toward the community school, and this movement, of course, fits in with a general effort to achieve a redistribution of power to allow the public a greater voice in the development of educational policy. (12)

Notes

(1) HSRC Provision of Education in the RSA, 1981, pg 193

(2) HSRC ibid pg 201.

(3) The Star "Province - the gap grows", 10 Aug 1982, pg 16.

(4) Mario Fantini et al Community Control and the Urban School, Praeger, 1970, pg 13

(5) M Fantini et al ibid pg 14

(6) M Fantini et al ibid pg 42

(7) M Fantini et al ibid pg 175

(8) Yvonee Bickley Perspectives in Education, Vol 4 No 2, Nov 1981, pg 80

(9) Anne Sharrock Home/School Relations, Macmillan, 1970, pg 101

(10) A Sharrock ibid pg 103

(11) White paper Interim Memorandum on the Report of the HSRC, October 1981, pp 2 - 3.

(12) M Fantini et al ibid pg 76

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Contributions should not ordinarily exceed 3000 words in length, and should be typewritten on one side of A4 paper, double spaced, with ample margins. Two complete copies should be submitted. Proofs will not be sent to authors for correction unless this is explicitly requested.

There is to be no separate 'Bibliography". References should be kept to a minimum. All notes (which includes 'footnotes' and references) are to be numbered consecutively in the text (in Arabic numerals, in parenthesis, on the line of the text), and should be listed at the end of the article, as 'Notes'. Titles of papers or chapters cited are to be enclosed in double quotation marks; titles of books are to be underlined. Examples:

Notes

(1) Carole Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

(2) PF Strawson "Freedom and Resentment" in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London: Methuen, 1974, pgs 15-23.

(3) L Althusser "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in BJ Cosin (ed) Education, Structure and Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, see pg 81.

Substantial quotations (more than about 3 lines) should be indented, shorter quotations should be enclosed in single quotation marks. Omissions from a quotation should be indicated by three dots.

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