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HISTORY WORKSHOP

URBAN MANAGEMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN MOZAMBIQUE: A MAPUTO CITY CASE STUDY (1975-1990)

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1.Introduction.

This paper sets out some of the results of field work undertaken during 1992. The research aimed to examine the post-colonial management of Maputo city with a view to gaining an understanding of the problems of urbanization encountered since 1975 and the measures taken by the Government at the local administrative level to meet the many challenges posed by rapid urbanization in a climate of rising popular expectations and shrinking resources.

The main research questions posed related to structures, and to formal participation: how was the management of basic urban services affected by the transition to independence in 1975, and how were local decision-making structures influenced by the programmes adopted by the new government with its emphasis on popular participation? The research involved documentary work centred on the Conselho Executivo[1] and interviews with some key local state personnel.

This paper is an attempt to examine these questions in the light of the conference theme of "Democracy: Popular Precedents, Popular Practice and Popular Culture" and to begin thinking about what the research to date with its particular focus can say about the "politics of the base" in a phase of democratic transition.

The paper begins with a very brief overview of the colonial system of urban administration in order to provide the necessary contextualization for an analysis of the new system introduced by Frelimo after it took power in 1975. It then moves on to look

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[1]The *Conselho Executivo* or Executive Council is the body charged with running the city.

at Maputo's urban administration in transition after independence, situating it within the broader context of the political conjuncture in which Mozambique achieved its independence in the mid-1970's. It also suggests an analysis of the emerging post-colonial state at the local level in terms of the articulation of inherited structures and political culture with the goals and working methods of the liberation movement.

The paper gives an account of the restructuring undertaken, the problems of city management encountered and the solutions attempted, within the context of rapidly contracting resources and disastrous economic decline. These factors seriously incapacitated and disorganized the state at all levels, to the point where crisis management at the local level superceded local administration.

Faced with the unworkability of the systems introduced at independence the ruling party was forced to begin reconceptualizing its methods of administration at the local level towards the end of the 1980's. The various initiatives for reform and their focus are described, and some questions raised about the top-down management of the reform process and the implications for reform of the lack of a strong civic culture. The role of donors, bilateral agencies and the international community in the reform process is also considered, in the context of a state which has become disarticulated, a party which has lost its mass base and a society which is undergoing structural adjustment.

The *Camara Municipal*, Colonial Urban Management and local participation.

It is very difficult to talk about democracy in any sense of the term in the context of the Portuguese colonial system. The colony of Mozambique was administered as an integral part of Portugal, as an "overseas province." Its status was governed by the Colonial Act of 1930 and subsequent refinements in the 1950's and 60's. The general character of the colonial administration was derived from the corporatist and authoritarian, some would say fascist, model of metropolitan Portuguese politics. From the coup of 1926 Portugal became a highly centralized, repressive one party state.

Under the corporatist system which developed, individuals were not directly represented politically. Representation was based on corporate groups comprising established institutions in society such as the Catholic church, the military, professions, industry, banking, employer organizations and trade unions. The basic functions of government were carried out by an administration in combination with advisory bodies.

The system of local administration that developed in the colonies has to be seen in the context of the authoritarian political culture developed from the 1930's under the **Estado Novo** which encouraged strong central control rather than autonomous local government. The Portuguese system of local administration

differentiated between Africans and non-Africans, despite the protestations of apologists for the system that it was not racially based.[2] At the level of the city, African Administration fell under the District Administration, which had far fewer resources at its disposal to provide services for the periurban areas where the bulk of the African population lived in precarious physical conditions.[3]

After the Second World War Africans were governed by the Native Statute (Estatuto dos Indigenas) of 1954 which defined the political status of Africans, their separate legal status and the requirements for obtaining full citizenship through the process of assimilation. The 1961 uprising and the initiation of the armed struggle for national independence in Angola forced a reconsideration of several aspects of colonial policy, and the repeal of the Native Statute theoretically gave Africans the full rights of Portuguese citizens. In the last phase of colonial rule political decentralization accorded greater authority to organs of colonial administration.

By the late 1960's the rapid population growth of both Luanda in Angola and Lourenço Marques necessitated the introduction of "a special regime for large cities" which gave to the colonial capitals the competences at the municipal level of metropolitan cities such as Porto.[4]. In creating the new regime, factors such as population growth, level of urbanization, importance of commercial and industrial activity and the volume of revenues were taken into account.

The city of Lourenço Marques was divided for administrative purposes into **bairros** (suburbs) and these in turn were divided into **freguesias** (parishes). The municipal council, the **Camara Municipal**, was headed by a president, a political appointee nominated by the governor.

Ten municipal councillors and their alternates were elected corporatively by local advisory boards, bodies representing moral and cultural interests, employer and employee organizations, and individual registered voters, with each group electing two councillors.(Decree 48 575: articles 1-9) The council met in ordinary session once a month. Extraordinary sessions could be called by the president or an absolute majority of councillors. The president exercised substantial executive powers, from the drawing up of agendas for council meetings to discipline of employees. The president exercised his executive powers in consultation with the heads of the municipal directorates, whose

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[2]The definitive local study of the colonial city in English is Penvenne, (1981).

[3]The best study of the African administration of the colonial city is Rita-Ferreira A (1967/8)

[4].**Regime Especial das Grandes Cidades. Decree No. 48 575,** dated 12/9/1968, which came into operation in 1969.

appointment was carefully overseen by the provincial and central authorities.

The competences of the **Camara Municipal**, in general terms, included the administration of municipal property, development, public supply, culture, education and social assistance, public health and policing.[5] The **Camara** had an autonomous legal personality and the ability to enter into contracts for development work subject to prescribed limitations.

Decision-making within the Camara Municipal was highly centralized. The order of business for each sitting of the Camara was prescribed by the **Regulamento Geral**, as were the portfolios to be distributed among the councillors by the President. Councillors sat as voting members of the administrative commissions which oversaw the work of the various municipal services.

In concluding the overview of the colonial local administrative system a few key factors which affected the manner of the transition to independence stand out.

Firstly, the administration of the city of Lourenco Marques developed as a dual system; the Camara Municipal for the cement, settler town, and the District Administration for the de facto African areas. Urban segregation was not legislated directly; it was institutionalized and kept in place by racist colonial practices which prevented upward class mobility and increased earning capacity for non-assimilated Africans. The strict enforcement of municipal building standard byelaws ensured that there were very few African property owners in the *foral*, the part of the city with a property register.[6]

Secondly, at independence the technical capacity and competence of the urban Services of the Camara Municipal were adequate for the *foral*, the cement city, only. Urban services for the rest of the city were virtually non-existent, although efforts at upgrading were undertaken in the late colonial period as part of a belated and unsuccessful "hearts and mind" strategy on the part

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[5] Powers and Competences of Councils are dealt with in articles 17-23 of Decree 48 575 of 1968, and are listed in detail. They cover the range of functions normally associated with local level urban administration, ranging from maintenance of parks and gardens through road construction and maintenance to water supplies, public cleansing and waste disposal, markets and abbatoirs and cemetries and licencing. The council also had powers to levy municipal taxes and impose fines for the infringement of local regulations, as well as exercising town planning functions.

[6] For an analysis of the process of class stratification as it affected the mestico and assimilado petit-bourgeoise see Penvenne, J (1982) **The Unmaking of an African Petite Bourgeoisie** African Studies Centre, Boston University Working Paper No. 57

of the colonial administration.

Thirdly, the centralized nature of decision-making at local level was a dominant feature of the system. Municipal legislation was standardized throughout the colony, and came from Lisbon. The President of the *Camara Municipal* was a political appointee of the regime with executive authority. The role of councillors and the administration was highly circumscribed by central legislation and the corporatist principles of the regime. Central political and administrative controls were maintained over local administration at all times.

Finally, in the light of what appears above, and given the nature of the colonial state and its social relations, it should be clear that there was a critical absence of any firmly rooted tradition of democratic citizen participation in local government. Public participation in civil society from the 1930's was dominated by the Catholic Church and the regime-approved service organizations and trade union. Equally critical, and an aspect of the subject which cannot be fully explored in this paper, are the conceptions of democracy and accountability developed by the various forces of resistance to the regime, underground in Mozambique and Portugal, and in exile during the colonial period, and in the prosecution of the national liberation struggle in the countryside.

2.From *Camara Municipal* to *Conselho Executivo*: the transition from Colonial Rule.[7]

The transition from colonial rule to independence was a period of considerable confusion, brought about by the collapse of the colonial state and settler society, political uncertainty over the future, the large scale exodus of settler skills and capital occasioned by this uncertainty, and major expectations of dramatic changes to the everyday lives of ordinary Mozambicans.

Frelimo was able to dominate the transition process because of its political and military cohesion, divisions and uncertainties within the ranks of the Portuguese negotiators which mirrored conflicts within the metropolitan society over the future following the April 1974 coup, and the absence of any organized and credible alternative social force in Mozambique.

Frelimo's programme, developed during ten years of armed conflict with the colonial regime, envisaged a radical transformation of Mozambican society away from exploitative colonial and capitalist social relations. The model chosen for independent Mozambique by Frelimo drew ideological inspiration from the official Marxism of the socialist bloc and its own experience of creating an

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[7]The following section relies for its periodization, and considerable portions of the detail on Pinsky, B (1985) **Territorial Dilemmas: Changing Urban Life** in Saul, J (ed) **A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique.** Monthly Review, New York.

alternative administration in the liberated zones of the north.[8]

For Frelimo the towns were of secondary strategic importance to the countryside where the bulk of the population lived. Towns were regarded as privileged centres which facilitated the exploitation of the rural areas, and as service centres for the colonial economy.

Frelimo was very conscious of the issue of the colonial pattern of urban development and the disjuncture between the cement city and the *canico*, the reed settlements. Analyses redolent of Fanon's contrasted the cement city inhabited by settlers and based on a sophisticated modern capitalist economy, well serviced, and administered by the **Camara Municipal** with the reed houses in which the majority of the population lived with minimal access to basic urban services. The former was the privileged locus of colonial capitalism and potential counterrevolution, the latter the target for political organization and upgrading.

The signature of the transitional government agreement between Frelimo and the Portuguese government, in Lusaka on September 24th, 1974 precipitated the seizure of the radio station by settler elements, disturbed at their exclusion from the negotiations, who called on South Africa to intervene. The failure of the settler manifestation, and the ensuing violence in the city created panic and turned the exodus of settlers into a flood. The majority of the estimated 250 000 settlers left, taking with them the skills necessary to run the economy and the urban areas.

Soon after the initiation of the Transitional Government, Frelimo created the **Grupos Dinamizadores**, as part of a political strategy to deal with a number of growing urban problems in the city : rapid rural- urban migration, rising unemployment, the uncontrolled occupation of abandoned properties, critical food shortages and escalating crime.
GD's were heralded as the concrete manifestation of **Poder Popular**, Peoples' Power.[9]

The city's housing stock was inadequate to meet the new demand, and the lack of basic social services in areas outside the jurisdiction of former **Camara Municipal** aggravated the situation further. In the cement city there was rapid deterioration of available housing stock due to its overutilization, lack of maintenance and rural cultural practices incompatible with urban living, for example the introduction of small livestock into apartments and the indoor use of grinding mortars for food

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[8] For a recent critique of Frelimo's marxism see Michel Cahen (1993) **Check on Socialism in Mozambique- What Check? What Socialism?** ROAPE No 57: 46-59.

[9] The role of the GD's during the transition, and their subsequent incorporation into the state apparatus is a fascinating story waiting to be written.

preparation.

Foreign exchange constraints became an additional problem for urban administration. Urban services such as transport and waste removal suffered severly from a lack of fuel and spare parts for vehicles as well as replacements for ageing stocks, leading to a rapid diminution in the number of serviceable vehicles available. The decline of urban services such as rubbish removal, septic tank emptying, and maintenance of drainage and sewage systems led to the degradation of the urban environment and additional health hazards.

Maputo developed food supply problems when the settler farms surrounding the city, which formerly supplied fresh fruit and vegetables as well as meat, dairy produce and poultry, were abandonded.

In February 1976, following on from independence in June 1975, Frelimo embarked upon a series of nationalization measures which included land and rented accommodation. By so doing the state inherited the management and control of a significant proportion of Maputo's housing stock, which was turned over to the state housing body, APIE, created for the purpose.

Urban unemployment in Maputo had become a major problem by 1976, created by the collapse of the urban economy: manufacturing industry, services, hotels, shops, offices, restaurants and domestic employment all virtually disappeared with the settler exodus and the abandonment of enterprises and loss of other employment opportunities this entailed. In addition the South African Chamber of Mines embarked on a strategy of indigenizing its migrant labour force in the mid-1970's in response to political uncertainty in the region, thus exporting unemployment to Southern Mozambique.

In 1977 Frelimo held its 3rd Congress at which it converted itself from a broad national liberation front into a Vanguard Party guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The party became the only legally recognized political force in the country and assigned itself the leading role in the transition to socialism in Mozambique.[10] The Economic and Social Objectives spelt out at the Congress involved control by the state over the commanding heights of the economy and extensive state intervention.

In 1978 the *Camaras Municipais* and *Cortes Locais* (Local Councils) were abolished and their replacements, the *Conselhos Executivos*, created. The following year, the First National Meeting on Cities

[10] The particular conception of democracy held by Frelimo's leadership did not allow for independent organization outside of the control of the party. Frelimo's dominant working method was based on the polarity of incorporation or exclusion: you were either with or for the party, or against it, and therefore an enemy.

and Communal Neighbourhoods, a gathering that was to prove critical for the future of the cities was called. The aim of the meeting was to analyse the political, economic, financial and social situation of the major urban areas in Mozambique and to propose solutions to the problems confronting them.[11]

In its conjunctural analysis of the political situation, the gathering concluded that the cities at that time were a site of intensified class struggle between the forces of the people led by Frelimo and a range of reactionary enemy forces including infiltrators and individuals compromised by colonialism. The aim of "the enemy" was to destabilize Mozambique's economy and internal order, creating popular discontent, thus undermining mass confidence in Frelimo as the Vanguard Party. The national meeting was confident that the heightened struggle was an indication that Frelimo's line was correct and that what was being witnessed were the death throes of a desperate reactionary force on its last legs.

"We are dislodging the snake from its nest."
(RPM 1979:Resoluçao Geral, Situaçao Politica. p7.)

The General Resolution provided a comprehensive listing of the problems which had emerged in relation to the urban areas; the major issue isolated being the uncontrolled influx of rural population into cities, which placed great stress on already severely limited resources. To combat this a system of controls over movement was introduced : the residence card and the *guia de marcha* to regulate travel between provinces. Control of influx was also seen as a method of tackling the root of many of the social ills being catalogued, such as urban marginality, banditry and prostitution. Attention was given to the rural side of the urban equation insofar as the creation of communal villages and large-scale agricultural projects were prescribed as a method of improving life in the countryside, keeping people on the land and away from the cities.(RPM 1979: 12)

Strong emphasis was placed on the organized participation of citizens as a way of overcoming problems in the towns.[12]

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[11] The meeting considered a wide range of urban issues, and issued resolutions on the following issues: supplies to the cities, the Green Zones, on criteria for the establishment of the area and system of administration of Mozambique's 12 cities, on the population census, the role of Mass Democratic Organizations, on the organization of state administration in the cities, and on the organization of Dynamizing Groups and Communal Neighbourhoods.

[12]The transition period is very marked by the organizational and mobilizational style of politics, with the militaristic overtones derived from the war of national liberation. Frelimo's conception of democracy was Leninist; (some would go further and say Stalinist) its conception of development was in terms of a forced march. Frelimo sought in this phase to extend its control

Citizens were to be organized at a number of levels. At the local level the *Grupos Dinamisadoras* were to be the link between the Party and the state. The creation for the first time of Frelimo party committees at the city level gave the party the tool to directly intervene in the process of the creation of GD's at the local level, as well as to monitor the security arrangements organized by the army involving the People's Militia, and the enforcement of controls over movement into and out of cities.

The Mass Democratic Organizations- the OMM and OJM, and the Production Councils, were structured to follow the direction of Frelimo and to operate under the principles of democratic centralism. They were effectively part of the state aparatus, with a task to perform in the organization of the **Grupos Dinamizadoras** and their work.

The City Assembly was called on to adopt a plan of action for the creation of *Bairros Communais*, communal neighbourhoods, with a clear demarcation of functions and allocation of tasks. Basic supplies for the *bairros* were to be monitored through organs of popular control and organized through a network of people's shops, private traders and consumer cooperatives created on a pilot basis, to ensure the equitable distribution of a guaranteed basic minimum of consumer items at controlled prices.

The dominant discourse regarding the former administration stressed its destruction in order to build new structures and organization.

> "In order to do this it is necessary to totally destroy colonial structures and to eliminate the accompanying bourgeois mentality, securing state control and new forms of organization for the population living in the cities."

The General Plan of Action for the years 1979/80 outlined by the **First National Meeting** was designed to consolidate popular power in the city, under the slogan "Organize the Cities and Communal Neighbourhoods to consolidate popular power".

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the review of the transition period. Firstly, there was a very rapid collapse of the colonial state and settler society during the transition period, and with it collapsed the former basis of accumulation founded on the colonial economy. The unintended consequences of this dramatic collapse were very far reaching for the fabric of urban life in Maputo. The problem facing Frelimo in this phase was how to salvage from the collapse enough of the former structures in order to maintain order and meet the basic needs of the urban population. At same time Frelimo was committed to making a revolution in which the rural areas took precedence.

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over every aspect of civil society.

Cities took second place in the party's scheme of priorities.

Critical decisions for the future of the urban areas and for local government were made in the transition period. The colonial *Camaras Municipais* were abolished as unsuitable instruments for the creation of new cities, because of their class basis and because of their limited technical and geographic jurisdiction. New instruments were created which relied in part on continued popular mobilization for their effectiveness, and which were subordinated to the control of the dominant single party.

The administrative structures, and the political culture that emerged, were an amalgam of the old order that Frelimo was sworn to destroy and the new that was pledged for the future. The continuities in urban administration were very striking. The head of the local administration remained a political appointment, and the degree of control by the central government over local administration introduced by Frelimo consolidated and took to its logical conclusion the colonial system. Forms of representation, whilst not being corporatively organized, were also carefully structured by Frelimo.

Dominant during the transition phase, the language of rupture with the past and the plans to create new cities organized on very different principles from the old were more a reflection of desire than capacity, and effectively masked some very striking continuities both in structure and practice.

3.Crisis Management: 1980-1987.

The decade of the 1980's began on an optimistic note in Mozambique. The transition to independence had been chaotic, and almost immediately thereafter the country had become embroiled in the Zimbabwean liberation war, at considerable cost. However in 1980, with Zimbabwe's independence the prospects for peace and rapid development in Mozambique seemed greatly enhanced.

The government declared the 1980's the decade of the conquest of underdevelopment, and launched an ambitious large-scale ten year plan, the **Plano Prospectivo e Indicativo**, which emphasized three main themes: the socialization of the countryside, rapid industrialization and the training of the country's workforce.(Francisco: 1992) However, the decade which began with such high hopes for rapid social and economic advances ended up as a nightmare of spreading societal breakdown.

Both rural and urban populations became the victims of the collapse, which was caused by the escalation of war, natural disasters such as droughts and floods, a crisis in production and financing, lack of foreign investment and economic policies which relied on administrative implementation and aggravated existing economic imbalances.

The Maputo City Executive Council.

The structural framework for the new CECs and their responsibilities had been laid down in detail at the First National Meeting of Cities and Communal Neighbourhoods in 1979. The CEC was to be the executive arm of the local Popular Assembly. Its task was to oversee the directors of each of the central government agencies operating in the area. Law 7/78 defined the CEC as composed of the President; the Director of *Apoio e Controlo* (Assistance and Control); Director of Order and Security; Director of the Implementation Commission of Production Councils; Director of Internal Commerce; and Representatives of Social Sectors.

The state apparatus at the city level was defined as : the Office of the President of the CEC; the Directorate of *Apoio e Controlo;* and the Directorates of the city level government agencies. The distinction between the City Executive Council and the state apparatus became blurred quite early on, leading to a confusion of broad governance functions with the state apparatus and local service provision.

The CEC was made responsible for the entire population and territory of the city, something which led to problems in defining its boundaries. It was also responsible for the full range of economic, social and cultural concerns of the population. It was expected that the CEC would not only provide urban services, but would also direct agricultural and industrial production, commerce, food distribution, schools, health centres and other state activities. At a time when administrative resources of finance and skilled personnel were severely limited and contracting, the tasks of local city administration were being broadened both geographically and in terms of the scope of activities to be undertaken.

Such was the confidence and enthusiasm of the policy makers that it was believed that with popular participation harnessed to these tasks all things would be possible. Popular participation was the key to providing the resources necessary to take on this greatly increased responsibility. The CEC was to carry out its new tasks as part of the central state, without local administrative or financial autonomy. The CEC became in effect a local arm of the central state, and in this sense it is incorrect to talk about local government in post-colonial Maputo; it is a form of deconcentrated central administration at the local level.

The City Assembly.

City Assemblies were created for the first time in 1977 following the guidelines presented at Frelimo's III Congress. Candidates for election to the city assembly were elected by universal suffrage from a list approved by the local Frelimo structures. The "highest organ of Peoples'Power at the local level" was designed to direct, guide and render accountable the **Conselho Executivo** in its management of the city.

Assemblies at all levels - national, provincial, district, city

and locality- were given a wide range of tasks, including the "consolidation of national independence, assuring social progress, organizing state power and promoting increased productivity". They were also enjoined to study and publicize the decisions of the III Congress relating to the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance and the construction of socialism.

Particular stress was placed on the planning of economic and social activities and the mobilization of the masses in order to accomplish tasks defined by the state, such as

> "the fight against saboteurs, agitators, undisciplined individuals, and all acts which could prejudice peace and social progress."

Assemblies were to draw on the best experiences of the masses, and to dedicate themselves to the solution of the concrete problems in the lives of the people, in order to guarantee that citizens received effective assistance from state organs without undue bureaucratic obstacles. (Article 4)

In practice, the City Assembly was not an effective organ of democratic oversight due to a number of factors. City Assemblies were supposed to meet in ordinary session every two months, and could be convoked for extraordinary meetings by the President of the Executive Council, the Frelimo City Committee, or a minimum one third of Deputies. Arranging transport for the delegates and the logistics of running the sessions made them a complex organizational process. The sessions were relatively infrequent. It appears that from 1982 Assembly sessions were reduced to one or two per annum, which meant that the capacity for oversight of the business of city management by the Assembly was very limited.

The wide range of tasks that the Assembly was expected to undertake in the limited time available made the work of the various commissions pressured, and of necessity rather superficial at times. The technical complexity of the tasks the Assembly had to oversee would also have taxed the educational and skill levels of many of the delegates present.

The structuring of assembly functions and procedures by the Conselho Executivo right down to the setting of Agendas and the stipulation of a minimum dress code for delegates meant that in practice it was difficult for the delegates to structure debate independently. All Agendas for sessions received prior Party City Committee vetting before proceeding to the Conselho Executivo for its attention.

Assembly sessions were to be public, except where the President ruled otherwise. Deliberations were to be widely publicised, with popular participation in preparation for the sessions, coordinated through the mass democratic organizations. In general, voting in local assemblies was to be carried out by open show of hands, decisions of the assembly being publicized by

deputies at popular gatherings where they were explained, and popular participation encouraged. (Resolution 13/78)

Dynamizing Groups.

The Maputo City Party Committee meeting in special session following the IV Congress of FRELIMO in 1983 stressed the need for better organization and mobilization at the local level in order to deal with the principal problems faced by the city's population, which it defined as the need for defence and popular vigilance, the fight against hunger through increased rural production and combatting the black market through improvements in the organization and control of supplies.

Organizational priorities were to consolidate the party structures in the Urban Districts and *Bairros*, to oversee the creation of District Executive Councils by the City Executive Council, and the motivation of the Dynamizing Groups in their creation of *Quarteirao* commissions. The Party at the level of the City had as its role the control and coordination of a web of local organs, ranging from subordinate party structures through to sections of the state apparatus such as the Maputo garrison and commando, as well as Mass Democratic Organizations like the Organization of Mozambican Women.

Apart from creating the new District Executive Councils and selecting and training their executive personnel, the Maputo CEC had as a further task the responsibility for selection and training of Dynamizing Group administrators. The Dynamizing Groups had by the early 1980's lost their popular mobilizational roots of the transition period and had become a local administrative structure at the level of the bairro, being charged with a wide range of social, economic and cultural tasks.

These included the orientation, coordination and control of Quarteirao[13] Commissions, and assisting in the economic life of the Bairro through involvement in the running of the production and consumer cooperatives. In addition the Dynamizing Groups were charged with assisting in the functioning of health posts and schools as well as organizing residents to fight against the black market by setting up inspection brigades. With the continued influx of population into the urban areas as a result of insecurity in the rural areas the Dynamizing Groups became involved in unofficially allocating land and authorizing construction, despite their legal incapacity. Part of the problem lay in the slowness with which the CEC made available sites for housing. (Jenkins,1991:32)

The Dynamizing Groups generally employed a secretary and one other official, a permanente, the other tasks being allocated to voluntary part time officials. A key function of the Dynamizing Groups was the maintenance of "popular vigilance" as the climate

[13]A *Quarteirao* was comprised of a block of 50-100 houses.

of insecurity brought about by the war spread to the urban *bairros*. The control function of the Dynamizing Groups was underlined in the central role they played in "Operation Production" in 1984 when the government attempted to remove people it defined as unproductive from the city and relocate them to the northern provinces to work on agricultural projects. The Dynamizing Groups performed a document screening function which seriously compromised their ability to mobilize participation after the government called off the relocation exercise in the face of mounting criticism.
The **Quarteirao** was a lower level of organization, based on a grouping of 50-100 houses, and was run on a voluntary basis. The tasks of the **quarteirao** were similar to those of the Dynamizing Groups, but organized at a lower level. They included popular vigilance, activities in the area of health, hygiene, the environment and housing, social work, education and propaganda, culture, sport and recreation and statistical enumeration of residents. (Partido Frelimo, 1984) They were also responsible for the mobilization of the Ten Family units, which were the lowest level of popular organization in the urban areas.

With the growing hardships faced by urban residents and increasing social fragmentation and disorganization brought on by multiple crises it became increasingly difficult to moblize the population effectively. The government lost much sympathy over the way it had implemented "Operation Production" and a certain cynicism over voluntary work and mobilization seems to have taken root by the mid -1980's. Consequently the hold of the party on the urban population was weakened, and its ability to control and direct declined correspondingly.

The lack of autonomy of the **Conselho Executivo** had several profound effects on local administration. Politically, it meant the direct subordination of the city management to the state, and through party control of the state, to the party. Being the capital city, national concerns and priorities were mostly articulated from Maputo, and these were usually translated into directives issued by central leadership which local level structures were expected to implement. The effect was the "capturing" of local level administration by central government in a manner which could on occasions seriously divert effort, energy and resources from local issues to questions of national concern in a manner that was prejudicial to the coherence and effectiveness of local level administration.

The lack of financial autonomy at the local level produced a limited concern with the development of local financial resources or the careful management of available revenue. It also led to the loss of the habit of financial responsibility in decision making, and a lack of focus on institutional development.(World Bank,1991.)

When the CEC was created, virtually all local taxes which had been sources of revenue for the Camara Municipal ceased to be collected, and the CEC became totally dependent on central financial transfers. Resource-generating local activities, such

as water and electricity provision were removed from the control of the CEC and established as autonomous enterprises.

A further feature of the particular legacy of colonial corporatist urban management and its articulation with democratic centralism was that the local forms of representation, for example at the City Assembly level, were structured in such a way as to render them susceptible to central political control. Local participation was organized through indirect elections, where City Assembly delegates were elected by community based representatives organized into electoral colleges.

The overlap of functions between party and state at the senior levels of the local administration was very considerable. The President of the CEC was generally also the President of the City Assembly, in his capacity as first secretary of FRELIMO's city level organization.

Would Maputo's urban management crisis have been less severe if the structures created by Frelimo on gaining power had been different? When looking at city management before its reform phase it is hard to separate out the effects of the structures that were put in place during the transition process and the political decisions made then about the nature of central-local relations and the role of the party, from the effects of the generalized crisis of the city during this period due to the effects of war and destabilization.

It is certainly possible to point to a number of features of the system as it developed and to argue that inherent in them lay the seeds of disorganization, the confusion of functions and levels of administration, lack of local level autonomy at the administrative and financial level, and the drain of personnel from local administration to central government, all of which served to weaken administrative capacity. At the same time it is impossible to ignore the colonial heritage of a dual city, the chaos and confusion of the transition period and the destruction and devastation of the confrontation with apartheid power in the region, and the effects on an already disarticulated urban environment.

5. Local Management and Local Reform.

The introduction in 1987 of the PRE (Economic Rehabilitation Programme) signalled the full-scale adoption of capitalist economic reforms under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank which Mozambique had joined in 1984 after signing the Nkomati Accord with South Africa. The initiation of the Nkomati process unlocked western aid and assistance which had been denied Mozambique until then, and set in train a series of policy shifts and adjustments which have seen the abandonment of socialism as a goal, and the transformation of Frelimo from a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party into a broadly- based party of national consensus.

The Constitution of 1990 provided for political pluralism and

expanded the freedom of expression, association and assembly, thus relinquishing the claim of Frelimo since independence to stand as sole legitimate and legal representative of the Mozambican people in the political arena. Since 1991 the government has been engaged in a comprehensive World Bank driven programme of local reform.

Seminar on the Management of Local Governments.

The first step in the reform process was a seminar organized by the Ministries of Finance, State Administration, and Water and Construction with support from the World Bank and FINNIDA, held in September 1988. The aim was to bring together a range of foreign and local expertise and experiences to reflect on ways in which local service delivery might be improved. The seminar was organized within the context of the goal of PRE to introduce national public service reforms aimed at greater efficiency and cost effectiveness, and was related to the implementation of a World Bank-financed Urban Rehabilitation Project in Maputo and Beira.

The seminar was organized around three themes: Drinking Water and Sanitation; Solid Waste removal and Municipal Administration and Finance. Emerging from the proceedings was the view that stronger and more autonomous local governments were needed in order to respond effectively to the crises of the cities and their residents, and to contribute to national development.

A range of service delivery options involving combinations and permutations of public and private involvement were considered, the paramount criterion being effectiveness in carrying out state-defined goals. It was recognized that the development of more autonomous urban administrations involved the reorganization of relations between central and local authorities, and that this was not a simple technical and administrative matter but involved political struggles between the various levels of the state apparatus.

However proceedings at this seminar were designed in such a way as to give priority to the solution of urban crises through a concentration on how resources could be best mobilized and deployed, and the issue of political autonomy was held to be outside of the terms of the debate as structured at the seminar. In other words, the technical and administrative questions were tackled first whilst the thornier issues of the decentralization of political power were set aside until the advent of promised legislation on the matter.

It was recognized that the restructuring of local administrations after independence had dramatically increased their responsibilities without paying due attention to the need for financial resources to carry out the additional tasks. Lack of autonomy produced a limited concern at the local level with developing local sources of finance or husbanding resources, and that the habit of financial responsiblility in decision-making had been lost. (World Bank, 1991)

The discussion on developing financial autonomy for local administrations focussed on the need for the development of appropriate local taxes. The principle that people should pay local taxes, even if they were only symbolic to start with, was seen as important. It was held that urban residents had to learn the obligation to pay taxes for services recieved as part of the meaning of living in the city. The ultimate goal was to enable local resources available through taxation and user charges to progressively approach the level of local expenses.

Interestingly, given the critique of the **First Meeting on Cities and Communal Neighbourhoods** in 1979, considerable reference was made to the need for a retrospective analysis of the extinct colonial camaras in the light of their organization of municipal services, use of municipal decrees, fines and police forces. It was pointed out that the the colonial legislation still stood, and could profitably be reviewed, revised and updated in order to give local administration more regulative capacity.

The first World Bank Urban Rehabilitation loan was devoted to infrastructural projects in Maputo and Beira. Discussions on how to generalize local administrative reform suggested either that the pilot project should be broadened to include other cities, or that the administrative and financial reforms under discussion could be undertaken immediately without waiting for the results of the two city project.

Seminar on the Reform of Local Organs.

The second and current phase of local level reform was marked by the holding of a workshop in November 1991 where a large-scale process of social engineering was set in motion with the eventual goal of rationalizing the development of the urban system of selected cities in Mozambique. The workshop was funded by the Municipal Development Programme of the World Bank and attended by key Mozambican central government and local administrative officials as well as representatives of NGO's, bilateral and multilateral funding agencies. The aim of the workshop was to provide an analysis of the current state of local administration and establish a plan of action for urban rehabilitation. Key documents presented to the workshop for this purpose were the Ministry of State Administration's **Decentralization and the Autonomy of Local Organs** and the World Bank's **Urban Local Government and the Environment Sector Review.**

The Ministry of State Administration document provided an analysis and critique of the current system of centralized control. The document dealt with the political and economic fundamentals of decentralization and autonomy of local bodies; proposals for a new institutional system and its electoral process; and a proposed financial model for local authorities. The document noted that decentralization had become the object of much debate in the context of greater political openness within Mozambique, and that it was often presented as a panacea for all political ills. Adopting a cautious approach, MAE argued

that it would not produce the miracle of substantially increasing the sum of material, human and financial resources available, but it could improve efficiency in the use of scarce resources.(MAE,1991:8)

The document appealed for a suspension of judgements on past experiences of centralized control and noted the difficulty, in making such judgements, of separating out the effects of destabilization from those caused by deficiencies in the system. It also argued that evaluations of the prior period are made all the more difficult due to the fact of people having lived under the illusion of the existence of a state of strong national unity, and ignoring, at least in public discussions, conflicts of interests based on region and ethnicity. (MAE, 1991:9)

The Ministry of State Administration makes the point that when decentralization was first discussed, the economy was still largely based on principles of central planning, and that the new forms of decentralization being discussed are only possible in a market based economy in which the state intervenes minimally.

In prioritizing the cities for the process of decentralization the Ministry of State Administration cautions that even in normal conditions decentralization is a complex and difficult task. It points out that war and the terrible impoverishment caused by it, as well as excessive centralization and the weighty tradition of command administration, inherited from the colonial period, make decentralization a more complex and above all more risky , but at the same time more urgent undertaking.(MAE,1991:86)

Risk of failure is great, and errors could have serious future implications. The economy is fragile, resources are scarce and the country cannot afford the luxury of costly experiments. The maintenance of the previous system was blocking economic and social development and preventing the participation of tens of thousands of people whose conscious participation was fundamental for the rapid overcoming of social misery. Apart from these factors, the critique concludes that in the actual situation where there was a latent conflict between central and local structures it was not possible to maintain the highly centralized form of administration.

The Workshop participants divided into four working groups to discuss and make recommendations on the following areas: Institutional and Legal Reforms, Urban Financial Management, Infrastructure, Urbanization and Housing, and Urban Services and the Environment. The working groups were formed with the aim of drafting terms of reference for the second phase of the urban rehabilitation process, which envisages an **Urban Sector Engineering Project.**

The final workshop document with recommendations, which included an endorsement of most of the proposals contained in the World Bank **Urban Local Government and the Environment Sector Review** was then forwarded to the Council of Ministers for approval making it an official document with state authority. The four

commissions set up by the workshop continued with their work and had their terms of reference approved by the Council of Ministers.

The Urban Sector Engineering Project, financed with World Bank credits, involves the four commissions, comprised of national and local officials working in conjunction with specialized consultants, in the preparation, negotiation and implementation of a range of urban interventions. The main objectives are to strengthen the urban management capability of local governments, lay the foundation for investment projects and rationalize the activities of the various agencies in the field.

6.Conclusions.

Local reforms are being initiated at a time of great political uncertainty and transition at the national level. The ceasefire signed in October 1992, the demobilization of former combatents and the preparation for national multiparty elections are high risk processes. The danger of failure and reversion to armed conflict is real, with potentially disastrous consequences for a society and economy already debilitated by the years of war and destabilization since independence.

Transitions by their nature involve shifts away from the previous structures and processes of control, which were known and predictable, towards outcomes which are uncertain. The necessity of reform is accepted in the light of the failures of the previous system, but the reform process itself creates uncertainty, and with it the potential for reversion to old habits in its implementation.

The local reform process, at least in its conceptualization and initial phases, appears to be engineered from above. Reform from above is a risk-limiting strategy by a government faced with the uncertainties of a potentially uncontrolled process of institutional change. In the shift from what is known and predictable to the unknown and unpredictable the temptation to control is very great. What is less certain is the actual capacity to exercise control and oversight of the process.

Having experienced the failure of one set of experiments with social engineering there is an understandable reluctance to engage in what could turn out to be another equally costly failure. However, this time the options available to the government are seriously limited by the circumstances under which the reforms are being introduced. The principal factors structuring the reform process are the disarticulation of the state and the aid-dependent nature of the society.

It is the disarticulation of the state that has enabled forces based outside of Mozambican society, such as the World Bank and the NGO's to play such a central role in the setting of the agenda for reform. The extent to which the reform agenda is being set and the terms of its implementaion laid down by funding

agencies and consultants is very striking.

What is less clear is the actual working out in practice of a possible convergence of interests between elements in the state apparatus seeking both reform and control over the process, and the preference of funding agencies for technocratic solutions provided by consultants and experts. In a resource-starved environment the bearer of resources is extraoridinarily powerful, with an enhanced ability to coopt.
A further factor which serves to limit public debate and oversight of the reform process is the fragility of civil society in Mozambique. Whilst aware of the problems associated with an uncritical use of the notion of civil society, what is being pointed to is the absence of a tradition of independent social organization and participation capable of scrutinizing the actions of the state and defending civic interests[14]. The Frelimo Party might have exercised some monitoring function in the past, but it has lost the popular base it formerly enjoyed.

The market reforms introduced in the 1980's and especially since 1987 have unleashed a set of uncontrolled social forces which have both undermined Frelimo's hold over society and further narrowed its social base. The introduction of reforms is taking place in a context where outside interests largely set the agenda, the state has lost cohesion at all levels, and the party's disciplining role is minimal. Given that the development of civil society is embryonic, the reform process is not being negotiated at any level of society other than the top, where technocratic solutions are favoured.

These factors have implications for the working out in practice of local level developments. The social forces unleashed by PRE and market reforms have made local administration a key area for influence in the process of accumulation at the level of the city. The reforms at local level suit the emergent ruling groups, insofar as there is a trend towards the emergence of local "dictatorships". These are based on local branches of the state apparatus which have become less accountable to the public over time and which exercise an important function in the allocation of scarce resources. Local notables are able to pursue their interests within the bureaucracy through the informal exercise of power. The system worked in this way in the past to some extent, despite the existence of formal structures designed to check the personal use of power. The question is will this system of **personalismo** emerge much more fully in the future in the absence of any operating system of checks on the dominant

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[14]The development of "Civil Society" is a major preoccupation of the many NGO's which have recolonized Mozambique. In the process of their work they have contributed in large measure to the further weakening of the state by their personnel recruitment practices, and have in some instances set themselves up as alternative state agencies.
For an extended critique see Hanlon, J (1991) **Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?** James Currey, London.

interests.[15]

What does seem clear is the need for a functioning and coherent system of urban management which is transparent and accountable in its operations, at such a crucial stage in the development of the city, when a whole range of uncontolled and uncontrollable social forces are making their presence felt in the urban environment. Although the language of class struggle may have disappeared from the public discourse of reform in Mozambique, in reality it still exists, and is being mediated through the reform process.

[15]The development of local interests and power bases in the process of accumulation, and the ongoing struggles of urban dwellers to defend their declining living standards on a daily basis is a rich field for investigation, and some important work is being carried out in this area, for example by the Women and Gender project of the Centre of African Studies, Maputo.

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