BLACK WORKER CONFLICTS ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES : 1973-1982

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

JOHANNESBURG

1985

ABSTRACT

This thesis develops an anthropological and historical explanation for various forms of violent, collective conflicts involving Black migrant workers on South African gold mines between 1973 and 1982. The study aims to account for a resurgence of conflict during this period, one which represented the ten years immediately preceding the historic advent of organized trade union representation for black workers on gold mines.

The methods employed include a survey of 282 recorded conflicts to identify trends and variations, accompanied by the in-depth analysis of thirteen case studies, viewed in their particular community settings. These cases are analysed by means of a model of the phases of conflict episodes to identify their repertoires, or patterned features.

Three distinct kinds of conflict are identified, namely confrontations arising from the dependency, on the part of foreign-born workers, on migrant labour to the mines; internal clashes between different worker groups stemming from certain communal and political tensions; and encounters between Black employees and White mine managements regarding wages, working and living conditions.

These conflicts are discussed in terms of various theories of social conflict and collective action. Firstly, certain conflicts could be traced to changes in both the internal, institutional setting of mines and in the wider, socio-political environment of Southern Africa, particularly political developments in labour-supplying regions. Secondly, certain structural employment conditions generated tension between workers and employers, but the incidence of collective action arose mainly from reforms and changes to these work and living conditions which brought about perceptions of progressive deprivation. Thirdly, particular features of the social structure and organization of

individual mine communities could be associated with the mobilization of factional groups, including strains (inconsistencies) in the structure of norms and role expectations, and stresses generated by the absence of certain organizational procedures for the resolution of conflict.

The thesis concludes by emphasizing the importance of diachronic trends in conflict, as well as the phases of specific episodes, in revealing the underlying motives and characteristics of the participants and in accounting for the origin, form, intensity and outcome of collective action in any national, industrial or communal setting.

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university.

Tribesmen armed with sticks, knobkieries, pipes and chairs attacked one another, killing, maiming and leaving in the wake of battle hundreds of smashed windows, a wrecked canteen, a damaged brewery and dormitories. A large bird aviary in the middle of this "arena" containing peacocks and doves, was left untouched.

Rand Daily Mail : 13th February, 1974.

Rioting... broke out shortly before midnight. Thousands of rands damage was caused to mine property... Thatched - roofed recreation huts were burnt down, trees broken and hundreds of windows smashed. Bird cages in the hostel grounds were broken into and birds killed.

Rand Daily Mail: 16th January, 1975.

Popular disturbances... provide an opportunity to investigate the ideas and beliefs of otherwise largely inarticulate sections of the population.

J. Stevenson (1979): Popular Disturbances in England: 1700-1870.

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PREFACE

The incidence of contemporary conflicts on South African gold mines has been the subject of much speculation and argument since the first violent encounters were reported in the public media in the early 1970's.

For various reasons, however, reliable information on mine conflicts has not been readily available for analysis by observers outside the industry.

Within the industry, research funding has been provided by the various mining Groups for the investigation and resolution of human problems on mines by the Human Resources Laboratory of the Chamber of Mines Research Organization. The present thesis is based on information collected by the author in the course of conducting a series of formal projects on mine conflicts as a member of that Laboratory.

The scope of the present thesis embraces all known conflicts involving Black mine employees which took place between 1973 and 1982. The study is an attempt to provide a comprehensive record and interpretation of these events in the absence of any other reliable and systematic body of information available on the subject at present.

In the course of compiling and analysing this information, it has been necessary to draw on the findings of numerous research projects of the Human Resources Laboratory. The author's joint co-operation with other members of the Laboratory in various projects over the years has been invaluable for the present study. Acknowledgement and thanks are extended in this respect to Peter de Bruyn, Peter de Vries, Duncan MacArthur, Pat McAllister, Eva Mclaren, Allan Momberg, Victor Nikani, John Parsons, Cathy Peart, Jerry Radise, Neville Robertson and Alec Wainwright.

[illegible] extended to various mining Groups, which

based, gave their approval for various research projects on mine conflicts and provided the financial support for the activities of the Human Resources Laboratory. The help of the Human Sciences Research Council in awarding a grant for the thesis, is also acknowledged.

Finally, thanks are extended to Professor W.D. Hammond-Tooke, who supervised the thesis and provided much - appreciated support and encouragement over the years, as did members of the Department of Social Anthropology, University of the Witwatersrand.

Thanks are also extended to Zelda Moneron, for the outstanding typing services rendered.

Some of the material presented in this thesis, particularly that found in chapters four and five, was previously published as a chapter written by the author for a volume edited by Philip Mayer, titled Black Villagers in an Industrial Society.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHCM	:	Association of the Home Countries of Migrants
BCP	:	Basotho Congress Party
CMAR	:	Chamber of Mines Annual Report
CMU	:	Council of Mining Unions
CUSA	:	Council of Unions of South Africa
DPO	:	Departmental Personnel Officer
ERB	:	Early Return Bonus
HRL	:	Human Resources Laboratory
ICU	:	Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union
LLA	:	Lesotho Liberation Army
MLO	:	Mine Labour Organizations (up to 1975)
MSP	:	Mine Security Police
NUM	:	National Union of Mineworkers
PA	:	Personnel Assistant
SALC	:	Southern African Labour Commission
SAIRR	:	South African Institute of Race Relations
SAP	:	South African Police
TEBA	:	The Employment Bureau of Africa (1976 onwards)
VRG	:	Valied Re-engagement Guarantee
WNLA	:	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association

A Note on References to Individual Mines

A convention has been adopted in the thesis to refer to events on individual mines by noting the geographical region in which these mines were located. Annexure One presents a key to the identity of the individual mines in these defined regions.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. SOCIAL CONFLICT IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY

(a) The Isolated Masses : Mining Communities in South Africa

Mining industries throughout the world have often shaped the future of the various countries in which they were located. The mining industry in South Africa is no exception, having vitally influenced the legal, political, social and economic structure of the country (Wilson, 1972). Gold mining, for example, was the first industry to experience unionization of its White labour force, an event which helped to shape the character of industrial relations and the subsequent pattern of political developments in the country as a whole.

Despite the impact which mining populations have made on different societies, they have often remained an "isolated mass" (Kerr and Siegel, 1954:191), living in their own separate communities and doing specialized work requiring skills that are not easily transferable. Mine communities accordingly possess many of the characteristics of "total institutions", such as prisons, military garrisons and mental institutions (Goffman, 1961).

This apparent isolation of mining communities from the rest of society is also evident in South Africa. Gold reefs were discovered in previously uninhabited regions, such as the Witwatersrand and the Orange Free State, requiring the development of self-contained communities to exploit the metal. Although these various gold fields have subsequently become surrounded by urban settlements and secondary industries, they remain distinctive and separate in various respects. Black mineworkers, for example, are accommodated in barrack - type hostels and lowered every day to labour in an underground work environment. These

particular social and work settings tend to shield mineworking populations from public scrutiny.

The continuing reliance on migratory labour in the gold mining industry implies also that the transitory work force is poorly integrated into established urban populations. Migrant workers remain tied, of necessity, to the milieu and influence of the predominantly rural regions in which their homes and families are located. These factors tend to set migrant mineworkers apart from Black urban dwellers, sometimes resulting in tension and conflict between the two groupings.

White mine authorities, for their part, have also remained largely autonomous in their decision-making and policy formulations, often believing that their particular engineering and human problems are more complex than, and certainly different from, those of other industries and concerns. Until recently, for example, the mining industry was exempted from provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act as far as negotiating machinery for Black employees was concerned. Before trade union rights were extended to Black migrants in the countrywide labour reforms of 1979, the mining industry had been able to shield its Black labour relations from developments taking place in secondary industry and elsewhere. In 1983, the mines became the last major employer (with the exception of agriculture) to recognise Black trade unions.

Throughout the industry's hundred-year history, labour conflicts on mines have been obscured behind the walls of mine hostels and in the underground stopes. The wave of conflicts which took place in the 1970's and 1980's, in particular, have bewildered outsiders and insiders alike with their apparent complexity and ferocity. Black mineworkers, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the work force, continue to resemble an isolated mass, seemingly involved in obscure internal clashes and spontaneous encounters with individual mine managements behind the gates of the total institution.

b) Conflicts on Gold Mines in the 1970's and 1980's

The starting point of the current era of labour conflicts involving Black mineworkers can be traced mainly to a violent work stoppage on a Carletonville mine in September, 1973. The local South African Police were called, and in the ensuing confrontation 11 workers were shot. The reverberations of the so-called 'Carletonville shootings' were heard around the world: Australian dockworkers refused to handle South African cargo, potential foreign investments were curbed and the shootings were partly instrumental in bringing about South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations General Assembly several months later.

Although the Carletonville incident was not wholly representative of subsequent conflicts which took place throughout the gold mining industry, it came to be regarded by industry management and the public alike as the symbolic end of an older era of labour relations and the beginning of a new chapter in the mining industry's history. In popular terms, the Carletonville shootings marked the appearance of a new tide of Black anger and frustration in a reputedly docile and submissive industrial labour force.

Approximately five months after the Carletonville incident, i.e. from February 1974 onwards, the Orange Free State goldfield was the scene of particularly violent rioting between different worker groups, which left 35 workers dead.

The industry's management was itself bewildered by the origins and intensity of these conflicts, whereas public concern and speculation mounted in the country as a whole. As a result of this growing concern, the President of the Chamber of Mines made a special ministerial visit to Cape Town in February, 1974 to discuss, inter alia, the so-called faction fights on the Free State mines. The (then) Minister of Mines (Koornhof) spoke at that meeting of the need for a "scientific"

investigation into the relationships between the two groups involved in the clashes (1).

The Presidential entourage also had an audience with Prime Minister B.J. Vorster, who declared that the riots were "most unlike the Bantu... we think we know the Bantu, but we really don't" (2). In an oft-quoted statement which echoed that of the Prime Minister, a C.I.D. officer investigating the Free State riots stated: "I don't know why they are beating each other to death. Management doesn't know, and I'm damn sure they don't know themselves" (3).

The response from the Chamber of Mines to these early conflicts was to announce in 1974 a major research drive to "husband" human resources in the mining industry and inquire into the sources of friction on mines (SAIRR, 1975).

After further outbreaks of conflict in early 1975, it was suggested in the news media that the Chamber was "irresponsible in the extreme if they are not doing everything in their power to discover the reasons and remedies for this unrest" (4). When a number of particularly violent riots erupted on the Natal collieries later in 1975, leaving 31 dead, public opinion and pressure indicated that nothing less than a full judicial commission of inquiry was called for. In Parliament, Dr. G. Jacobs crystallized the question in the minds of the public when he noted that "...we have been having riots of this nature for years. However, there is a new dimension in the sense that there is a fury, a cruelty and a passion that has never been known before and that causes us concern" (5).

An interdepartmental committee of inquiry appointed by the government in early 1975 was criticized in Parliament on the grounds that government officials lacked the expertise to investigate psychological factors and inter-group relationships, and that no Blacks were represented on the committee (6). The mining industry, meanwhile,

conducted a number of its own investigations, but their findings were seldom, if ever, disclosed to the public and the media.

The phenomenon of mine conflicts presented a major challenge to social scientists in South Africa. A few sociological and anthropological studies were conducted over the years by various investigators in an effort to throw light on the conflicts, notably those carried out by Moodie (1980) in collaboration with the Agency for Industrial Mission (1976), Pearson (1975) and Horner and Kooy (1976, 1979), the latter focusing specifically on newspaper reports of mine conflicts. Horner subsequently noted that it was difficult to obtain adequate information on events and that the investigations of the various mining houses were not ordinarily available to outside researchers (7).

With the expansion of the research organization of the Chamber of Mines after 1974, an opportunity was presented for the intensive and extensive investigation of mine conflicts. A number of studies were initiated within the Human Resources Laboratory, an organization created to investigate the human problem in the industry. The present investigation is based on material collected on mine conflicts by the author in his capacity as a research officer in that organization.

The chief aim of the present thesis is to describe and analyse an estimated 282 recorded conflicts which took place on gold mines between 1973 and 1982. The choice of this particular time period was motivated by the need to document a critical period in the industry's labour history in which the Black labour force became involved in an intense series of inter-group clashes, mobilizations against management and other kinds of encounters, dating mainly from the 1973 Carletonville incident.

This time period is significant because it represents the last ten years of "pre-organized" labour relations on gold mines as far as Black

mineworkers are concerned. During 1982 Black trade unions began recruiting on mines, culminating in the signing, during 1983, of a recognition agreement between the Chamber of Mines and the CUSA - affiliated National Union of Mineworkers, signalling a new era of formalized labour relations in the industry.

The present investigation can be seen as tracing the immediate background to this new phase of organized labour relations, hopefully serving to indicate the kinds of issues and trends which may continue to influence the form and outcome of conflicts involving Black workers in the industry's future.

c) Social Conflict in Industry

The various conflict situations which form the subject of the present investigation invariably took place on mine property and involved members of the mines' Black industrial work force. Most of these conflicts could also be described as conventional encounters between employer and employee in disputes concerning wages, working and living conditions on mines.

Many other distinct types of collective conflicts have also taken place on gold mines, including inter-group clashes between different segments of the Black mineworking population and conflicts apparently arising from political and economic dependency on mine wages on the part of certain foreign migrant groups.

The kinds of theoretical questions and issues which are posed to assist in exploring the origin and significance of these various forms of conflict on mines, depends largely on how such conflicts are initially categorized. The scope of the analysis also hinges on the extent to which conflicts in industry are regarded as distinct from other forms of collective action in national and communal settings.

The fact that the conflicts in question have taken place in a work

setting suggests that they could be categorized as "industrial" conflicts and analysed accordingly. This categorization would imply that an explanation for the origin and form of mine conflicts would be rooted in the actual work conditions and relationships prevailing on mines. This orientation has been termed the "institutional" approach to industrial conflict (Shalev, 1980:27). This approach, represented for example in the work of Ross and Hartman (1960), views conflict in relation to the internal organization of collective bargaining in a particular industry and the nature of the relationship between management and employee. Ross and Hartman accordingly associate the apparent "withering away" of strike action in most industrialized countries between 1900 and 1956, with the development of institutionalized, centralized, national collective bargaining in these countries.

Ross and Hartman's thesis that strikes were withering away in the context of the growth of industrial democracy, was, however, clearly disproved by the subsequent pattern of strikes, which showed no such decline (Hibbs, 1978:162). Internal institutional features alone have also failed to adequately account for strike trends in other studies (Korpi and Shalev, 1979).

Analysts of industrial relations and conflict have increasingly adopted a broader approach to their subject matter by moving away from the institutional model to a Marxian - inspired perspective which views industrial relations "as an element in a totality of social relations of production" (Hyman, 1975:ix). The emphasis has shifted to a political model in which the strike becomes an instrument in the hands of the working class, applied in a struggle over the distribution of resources and access to the "national structure of power" (Shorter and Tilly, 1974:8). In countries where labour's interests are strongly represented in the political area, the distributional struggle shifts away from the

market place. Where political institutions replace industrial bargaining, declines in strike activity can be identified (Hibbs, 1978; Korpi and Shalev, 1979).

Although the political model also has its limitations (Shalev, 1978; 1980; Korpi and Shalev, 1979), this theoretical development in the analysis of industrial conflicts clearly underlines the need to view work place struggles against the background of wider socio-political struggles and the distribution of power resources in the society.

In this wider theoretical framework, it may be useful to regard industrial conflicts as instances of "collective actions" (Snyder, 1975) and analyse them as a form of social mobilization. Social historians for their part, view strikes as one of a number of types of collective violence associated with struggles for power in emerging nation-states (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Tilly et al, 1975).

There are distinct advantages associated with regarding industrial conflicts as forms of collective action within the wider theoretical perspective of social conflict. Firstly, industrial conflicts can be viewed against the background of broader socio-political struggles in the society, a perspective which is of special value in the South African context of Black wage labour in a White-dominated society.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it becomes possible to pose important theoretical questions informed by the findings and generalizations emerging from studies of other conflict settings. Certain critical issues which have been debated in various studies may be relevant to other instances of social conflict, irrespective of the particular context in which they are expressed. Some studies of national strike trends, for example, are devoted to testing questions and issues emerging from broader historical studies of social mobilization and collective action (Snyder, 1975).

The present study is founded on the assumption that a broad

sociological, anthropological and historical approach is necessary to unravel the range and complexity of industrial conflicts on South African gold mines.

The following section will accordingly outline briefly the general approach adopted in a number of studies of social conflict and collective action, the underlying assumptions of conflict theories and the extent to which general theories of social conflict can be relevant to the analysis of specific conflict settings.

(d) The Study of Social Conflict

Few notions seem more appropriate for understanding the dynamics of contemporary societies, than the idea of conflict. The histories of many nations could at times be described in terms of the patterns of conflict in which they were involved, including internal civil disturbances and external military exploits.

Nineteenth-century history, in particular, is dominated by accounts of popular rebellions and class struggle, whether at national level or in the nationalising processes associated with the formation of modern national states (Tilly et al. 1975).

The contention that all social phenomena can be understood in terms of a fundamental struggle between man and his human and natural environment, has preoccupied philosophers for much longer, but has achieved special prominence in the modern era with the philosophy of Marx. The Marxian approach has become associated with a particular kind of social theory which has been categorized, alongside others, as "conflict theory", as opposed to Parsonian theories which proceed from the premise of cohesion and order (Rex, 1981). But, as Skidmore (1975) has pointed out, this broad grouping of theories which all claim to have something to say about conflict has the effect of concealing important differences and giving the impression of essential similarity.

In view of the broad applications which the term social conflict enjoys, it could be argued that it has come to refer more to the subject matter of a given investigation, than to any specific theory or analytical perspective. The one feature which various theories of conflict do seem to have in common, is the categorization of subject matter into Weberian ideal types. Much of the analytical process is devoted to comparisons and contrasts between various types of conflict, in an effort to penetrate to the underlying meaning and significance of conflict situations.

The features of conflict which are used to define the characteristics of a general type include the apparent "cause" of conflict, the nature and intentions of the groups involved (whether social, political, religious or economic), the means employed by these groups to achieve their aims (including the severity of such means), as well as the outcomes, or consequences. The impact of conflict on existing social and power relations, and its role in accelerating (or otherwise) the process of social change, are some of the considerations relevant to such outcomes.

The types of conflict generated in this way reveal a wide variety of social actions, ranging from international armed warfare to the everyday interpersonal tensions evident in a business organization, or domestic family unit.

A distinction is usually drawn, however, between social conflict referring to an aggregate of individuals and conflict involving individuals in specific personal relationships (Oberschall, 1978). The concept of role conflict, for example, is usually excluded from inquiries into social conflict. The specifically <u>social</u> basis of such conflict also suggests that they should be kept distinct from other more global types, such as international armed conflict. Social conflict can be defined as involving groups of interacting people in collective

mobilizations in the pursuit of certain political, economic, religious or other goals (Oberschall, 1978:291).

Within this broad category, an extensive vocabulary of descriptive terms has been developed by historians, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists, each term indicating a different type of conflict or conflict situation. Three broad types can be identified, namely national, industrial and communal conflicts.

Certain terms, firstly, refer to various national upheavals with a political character, such as "popular disturbances" (Stevenson, 1979), "crowd" actions (Rude, 1981) "collective violence", "political violence", "conspiracy", "internal war" (Gurr, 1970), "collective action", and "popular rebellion" (Tilly et al, 1975) and of course, "revolutions" (Goldstone, 1982).

There are, secondly, various kinds of industrial conflicts, for which a variety of terms have been developed, such as "rolling strikes", "sit-down strikes", "wild cat strikes", "lockouts" and so on (Aaron, 1972).

Finally, anthropologists have examined conflicts emerging in small-scale community settings, including "feuds" (Gluckman, 1956), "primitive warfare" (Meggitt, 1977), "factions" (Beals and Siegel, 1966) and "disputes" (Roberts, 1979), among others.

This profusion of terms to denote specific types or variations within the broader category of social conflict, is often regarded as indicating differences in degree of emphasis, rather than denoting distinct social phenomena. Gurr writes, for example, that:

> The properties and processes that distinguish a riot from a revolution are substantively and theoretically interesting.... but at a general level of analysis they seem to be differences of degree, not kind (Gurr, 1970:5).

Gurr goes on to note that there has been a convergence of findings relating to causal factors in different types of political violence,

which underlines his general argument.

One practical difficulty with the assumption that all forms of conflict can be regarded as being on some kind of great continuum, is that similarities are emphasized over differences. The distinction between conflicts of an essentially political kind (as in Gurr's discussion of "political violence") and those which are not necessarily linked to overt political strategies, can become blurred. There should always be a burden of proof imposed on the investigator to demonstrate that a riot in an institution, or even a work strike in industry, contains elements of political intent. It would be dangerous to regard all riots and strikes as necessarily revolutionary in character, for example.

There is also some truth in the claim that riots and revolutions have been placed on the same continuum of collective actions, for reasons of methodological convenience. Goldstone (1982) argues that theorists who wanted to test their generalizations about revolutions needed to draw on large numbers of events. Because there have been relatively few major revolutions in modern history, these general - theory scholars sought to include revolutions within the framework of more common events. A general theory of collective political violence began to develop.

This does not imply that the search for such a general theory is invalid, but that social analysts should be wary of glossing over vital differences in the expression of various forms of social conflict. Each instance of conflict is more fruitfully analysed in situational terms, accounting in this way for specific contextual features. This approach should, at the least, be the empirical starting point if any general theory of utility is to be developed at all.

The dramatic diagnoses and generalizations to which theories of conflict lend themselves, particularly monocausal, deterministic

approaches, remind the investigator that it is important to consider a range of alternative explanations for given conflict situations, and to correctly identify the type of conflict being studied.

There is a need, of course, to avoid being exposed to another danger, that of particularizing conflict situations to the extent that they become anecdotal, and that a general treatment of social conflict becomes nothing more than a list of idiosyncratic accounts.

In an effort to strike a balance between these extremes, it is necessary to examine the purpose of theory itself. Why should general theories of social conflict be relevant to a given investigation at all? Skidmore (1975:2) observes in this respect that

> The strength of theory is in its ability to bring a great deal of thought and information to bear on a specific problem or set of problems, and thereby go far beyond unsystematic thought in the detail and precision of subsequent concept formation and manipulation.

The present investigation of conflicts in the mining industry in South Africa is informed by this perspective. A number of various theories, arguments and findings will be synthesized from historical and anthropological sources. Specific questions and issues will then be formulated to assist in penetrating to the underlying origins and significance of various kinds of conflict on gold mines in South Africa, and in correctly identifying the particular kinds of conflict with which we are dealing.

Before an analysis is made of mine conflicts, therefore, a brief survey of historical and anthropological approaches to social conflict will be outlined in an effort to highlight the issues and considerations that should form part of the inquiry.

2. HISTORICAL STUDIES OF CONFLICT

The historical approach figures prominently in studies of social

conflict. The broad sweep of these studies, which embrace periods of hundreds of years and locate conflicts within the context of major shifts in the political and economic growth of nations and countries, provides an important backdrop to conflict studies pursued by other investigators. The historical record essentially provides the material on which theories of social conflict have frequently been based.

(a) Solidarity and Breakdown Theories

An important study typical of those which attempted to relate popular rebellion to major structural changes in the societies in which they occurred, was that carried out by the Tillys (1975). In this work, trends in collective action in France, Italy and Germany between 1830 and 1930, were linked to patterns of industrial growth, urbanization and the centralization of power in the emerging modern state. The authors conclude that these centralizing processes, while not accounting directly for the frequency and trends in collective violence, set the broad conditions for subsequent struggles for power. In their analysis, they weigh up two rival theories which have been applied by various investigators to explain the incidence and pattern of collective violence, namely the "solidarity" and "breakdown" theories, as they are commonly called.

The breakdown theory, represented for example in the work of Smelser, argues that the social disorganization produced by rapid social and industrial change in emerging states results in "anomie", frustration and insecurity because of the dissolution of traditional relationships and values, culminating in disorder (Oberschall, 1978). The solidarity theory, on the other hand, views collective violence as an outcome of the struggle for power in the emerging state. The emphasis in the solidarity approach is on the collective resources available to participants to effectively mobilize popular resistances

and discontent. Solidarity theorists argue that individuals and groups suffering from acute misery and disorganization, and being "marginal" to and repressed by, other organizations and power structures (the breakdown thesis), are unlikely to be able to mobilize effectively in collective actions. The Tillys (1975) note that one seldom encounters uprooted, marginal and disorganized people in collective violence. Their analysis favours the solidarity thesis in accounting for major, long-term trends in the incidence of collective action in industrializing states, as do a number of other studies (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Snyder, 1975; Oberschall, 1978; Useem, 1980).

The applicability of the solidarity thesis to long-run trends in collective action has been convincingly demonstrated in investigations of industrial conflicts, as opposed to other forms of conflict. The phenomenon of strikes, although constituting a major part of collective actions in the history of emerging states, also lends itself more easily to quantitative analysis because such data have been relatively systematically collected in those countries. Where "national labour relations systems have moved towards increased size and stability of union membership", such membership is a measure of labour's organizational capacity for collective action and is not surprisingly, "a significant predictor of the frequency and size of industrial conflict" (Snyder, 1975:274-275).

Findings of this kind can be interpreted as lending support to Marxian conflict theory, by stressing the importance of organizational - political factors in accounting for the incidence of collective actions.

b) Marxian Conflict Theory

Central to Marxian conflict theory is the notion that the ultimate source of conflict is to be found in a struggle for power. Such a power struggle is viewed as "the most fundamental social process of all", with

the actual power relationship between the parties constituting "the most fundamental social fact" (Rex, 1981:113,103).

According to the classical theory, mobilization of the working classes against the employer or capitalist can only be achieved if the masses develop class consciousness as a basis for forging unity and solidarity. The organizational capacity or power to engage in conflicts is derived chiefly from class consciousness itself. Before there is any class conflict, there must be an awareness on the part of a given worker group that it constitutes a specific class "in and for itself", thereby generating the required solidarity to effect mobilization.

Whereas classical Marxian conflict theory regards class consciousness as an essential means for mobilizing revolt, such consciousness is also regarded as the inevitable expression of material forces. The real emphasis in the theory is on the material conditions of conflict, in so far as revolutionary consciousness emerges when a given society's productive forces have become restricted by existing social and property relations and ideological formations (Tucker, 1972:4-5). The failure of such conditions to promote conflict and power struggles is accordingly traced to "false consciousness", maintained through the ideology of the ruling group. Marxian conflict theory is therefore at its strongest when it is concerned with identifying the kinds of "objective" productive conditions and relations associated with different forms of (class) conflict.

These conditions can be traced, in the Marxian scheme, to the basic antagonism between wage labour and capital, which assumes the form of a built-in contradiction lying at the heart of all conflicts in the political economy of the market and capitalist society. Since the capitalist treats wage labour as a commodity, a fundamental conflict of interest emerges in which wages are regarded by employers as a cost of production and by labourers as a reward (Hyman, 1975). Workers' jobs

are consequently at the mercy of economic and technological factors, resulting in layoffs during slumps, replacement of labour by new productive techniques, and so on.

Conflicts in industry are also viewed as a reflection of class divisions in the wider society. The wealthy exert a political influence in society and this small minority owns the means of production: "An unceasing power struggle is therefore a central feature of industrial relations" (Hyman, 1975:26).

It is not the intention here to explore in detail the Marxian approach to conflict, but merely to outline the broad dimensions of the theory and its potential role in providing explanations for mine conflicts. These broad elements will be compared, in subsequent sections, with other theories of social conflict, where appropriate, followed by the formulation of specific questions and issues which will guide the actual analysis of conflicts on mines.

c) Popular Disturbances and Social Justice

Although "objective" productive conditions and relations are seldom ignored by sociologists and historians, authors such as George Rude (1981) and John Stevenson (1979) regard popular disturbances and the actions of the crowd as of intrinsic interest in themselves. These popular movements have been analysed in terms of their membership and composition, the main motives and aims of the crowd, the role of forces of repression and the consequences of crowd action. The main emphasis is on the intentions and aims of the participants, because popular disturbances "provide an opportunity to investigate the ideas and beliefs of otherwise largely inarticulate sections of the population" (Stevenson, 1979:3).

E.P. Thompson's (1968) work in particular represents an eloquent attempt to rescue the forgotten individuals, the "faces in the crowd"

from historical oblivion. Central focus is given in his analysis to the emerging class consciousness of the participants in the English labour movement from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Thompson argues that the formation of class awareness should be seen as a social and cultural phenomenon in its own right, as an historical relationship rather than as a "thing" produced by objective forces or relations. Consequently, the emergence of early associations, such as the London Corresponding Society, and the crucial influence of radical ideas contained in Tom Paine's 'Rights of Man", occupy central place in Thompson's account.

This emphasis on the participants' own emerging motives, beliefs and awareness has resulted in attention being given to the ways in which the populace develop a notion of social justice, and more importantly, the conditions under which it is regarded as being violated, culminating in moral outrage (Barrington Moore, 1978). The fact that certain social, economic and political inequalities, judged by modern standards, could persist for centuries and yet not lead to rebellion or revolution, indicates that it is important to examine these perceptions and the ways in which such perceptions may change. This includes considering why men sometimes do not rebel but accept their "social contract" with existing powerholders as part of the natural order of things. The capacity to accept suffering and obey given authority, as well as the conditions which may assist in undermining this sense of the "inevitable" and accepted order of things, are Barrington Moore's (1978) chief interests. In his analysis, Moore identifies several critical events and developments which may act to break the "stranglehold of inevitability" surrounding poverty and suffering in a given historical situation.

The idea of the social contract, revived by Barrington Moore, is alien to Marxian thinking because the former accepts the possibility that a given contract can be acknowledged as legitimate by the

participants, irrespective of the presence of objective repressive conditions, or exploitative elements in such a contract.

There is a broad distinction in historical studies between the identification of objective, material conditions in the economic and political structure which may promote conflict and the assessment of popular conceptions in a sociological sense as important factors in explaining and predicting social action.

(d) Relative Deprivation and Social Mobilization

Studies of conflict as a form of social action attach special importance to perceptions, since the way in which people perceive their situation, and changes in that situation, will affect the kinds of collective actions in which they may become involved. In this framework, social conflict and discontent is often traced to the emergence of relative deprivation, which has been emphasized by scholars with a mainly psychological orientation. These latter investigators have also attempted to identify factors which may instil a perceived sense of injustice and deprivation, but concentrate on those formed specifically in relation to other groups or to past conditions in the collective memory of those involved.

The relative deprivation thesis is regarded as an aspect of the "breakdown" theory of social conflict because the level of discontent, rather than organizational capacity, is viewed as the driving force behind popular rebellion (Oberschall, 1978; Useem, 1980).

According to the relative deprivation theory, social disorganization or dissolution of traditional or existing community structures leads to a sense of discontent, although culture contact and sudden changes in economic prosperity may also have the same effect (Goldstone, 1982). The basic idea is that conflict occurs when there is a gap between peoples' expectations and their actual achievements, or in

other words, when expectations cannot be met by the (restricted) "capabilities" of the society (economic or otherwise - Gurr, 1970). The resulting negative discrepancy leads to frustration, followed by aggression and eventually, by "political violence". Perhaps the clearest expression of this idea is provided by Davies' so-called "J-curve". According to this scheme, revolutions "are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal" (Davies, 1964:520). The society's earlier capacity to produce benefits fosters an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs, resulting in disillusionment when these capabilities (suddenly) fall short of expectations. Gurr (1970) describes Davies' example as "progressive" deprivation and outlines a number of other variations in the model.

The relative deprivation approach has come in for some criticism from various writers. The Marxian approach, for example, is not easily reconciled with the idea of relative deprivation because the latter theory emphasizes perception of misery, rather than any objectively defined misery, as the major determinant of conflict and revolt. Apart from the reductionist element in the idea of relative deprivation, which regards group behaviours as the sum of individual frustrations, the theory is also seen as suffering from many of the shortfalls of breakdown theories in general (Oberschall, 1978; Useem, 1980). These criticisms stem generally from the solidarity theorists' claim that collective action is not an anomic release of tension, but a purposive, political act (Oberschall, 1978). Their general argument is that discontent is unlikely to lead to revolution if the discontented are unorganized and lack resources (Goldstone, 1982).

The particular form of relative deprivation allegedly resulting from disorganization produced by rapid social change is most vulnerable to this argument, because the population is likely to be weak in

organizational capacity at this time. Oberschall therefore rightly concludes that societal breakdown may be "associated with the generation of discontent, but its main impact on conflict is by way of the costs of mobilization and collective action" (1978:306).

It should, however, be pointed out that these criticisms may relate only to that particular form of relative deprivation associated with societal breakdown and change. This criticism will certainly be expected to hold when it is essentially loss of organizational capacity itself which constitutes a group's major deprivation. Deprivations associated with other causes, such as sharp economic downturns could, theoretically, still constitute an important part of the explanation for a given conflict situation, provided these changes are not also associated with some weakening of the capacity to organize revolt on the part of those involved.

There is also a need to avoid being trapped in a tautological argument regarding mobilization of discontent. Clearly, if any discontent is to be translated into collective action, there will need to be a mobilization of some kind, however limited in scope. The relative deprivation thesis should not be discounted simply because mobilization of the population was successfully carried out. Mobilization necessarily involves the translation of group goals into action and these goals in turn are formulated from shared discontent, and hence from common perceptions of injustice. These perceptions, in turn, can sometimes include an element of felt deprivation, real or imagined.

That the objective presence of real deprivations alone is not sufficient to generate revolt, is evident in those periods in human history when misery was rife, and revolt rare, or non-existent (Barrington Moore, 1978). There may also have been periods when certain groups not only experienced misery in objective terms but they also

discerned that they were unjustly persecuted, lacking only the means for mobilizing these sentiments.

What the breakdown and solidarity theories do seem to indicate, despite their divergent assumptions, are the two crucial conditions without which rebellion, revolt or revolution is unlikely to occur, namely a perception of injustice or deprivation and the capacity to translate this disaffection into (political) goals backed by organizational resources.

The relevance and applicability of both approaches can be appreciated by referring to a widely held contention that social groupings seldom mobilize discontent when experiencing extreme deprivations, but rather when conditions are believed to be improving or when reforms are being undertaken (Davies, 1964; Barrington Moore, 1978; Goldstone, 1982). Not only do these improvements remove the sense of "inevitability" regarding conditions previously borne in silence, but, in the solidarity theorists' terms, they also imply greater organizational capacity to effect mobilization. They provide greater "social and cultural space" within which to manouevre (Barrington Moore, 1978:482). The actual rebellion itself may, in the penultimate stage, be sparked off by a sharp reversal of a current milieu of reform, in the manner described by Davies (1964). This flashpoint, Goldstone (1982) notes, could be a political crisis in government, or an environmental disaster, such as famine or drought.

A number of recent quantitative studies have, in fact indicated that both solidarity and deprivation theories may be applicable in accounting for trends in collective violence. Snyder (1975), for example, examined strike trends in three contries (France, Italy and the United States) over long time periods (up to 100 years) and found that, "given the organizational capacity, expectations - achievements gap explanations of fluctuations in collective protest perform well"

(1975:275). Useem likewise, in a study of the Boston anti-busing movement, concludes that discontent did play a significant role in accounting for protest: "Both solidarity and a form of discontent, relative deprivation, contributed separately and substantially to the variation in the anti-busing movement support and participation" (Useem, 1980:367).

It is not the intention here to attempt to reconcile the various theories of social conflict outlined above. An appraisal of these theories does have utility, however, because it assists in sharpening one's appreciation of fundamental issues and questions which conflict theories attempt to address. It also clarifies distinctions between different kinds of conflict and can therefore avoid the risk of loose and imprecise categorization, where employed. The ability to proceed with the formulation and manipulation of (new) concepts appropriate for the understanding of a given conflict situation is also rendered more rigorous and systematic, as Skidmore (1976) has observed.

In the following section, an attempt will be made to assess several implications of the previous discussion for the analysis of conflict in the South African mining context. The aim in this respect will be to formulate a number of question and issues which the investigation will need to consider.

Implications of Historical Studies

The mining industry in South Africa is an interesting case study in assessment of the breakdown - solidarity debate. In the past, mineworkers did not enjoy the opportunity for combined action related with formal union organization. The various legal, political and social controls which characterize the recruitment and barracks accommodation of migrant mineworkers, indicate that opportunities for collective action have also been restricted. Yet, throughout the

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In the following section, an attempt will be made to assess several implications of the previous discussion for the analysis of conflict in the South African mining context. The aim in this respect will be to formulate a number of question and issues which the investigation will need to consider.

(e) Implications of Historical Studies

The mining industry in South Africa is an interesting case study in the assessment of the breakdown - solidarity debate. In the past, Black mineworkers did not enjoy the opportunity for combined action associated with formal union organization. The various legal, political and social controls which characterize the recruitment and barracks accommodation of migrant mineworkers, indicate that opportunities for informal action have also been restricted. Yet, throughout the

industry's history and especially in recent years, workers have mobilized periodically in strikes and confrontations with mine managements.

If the solidarity thesis (the organizational capacity to effect mobilization) is an important predictor of conflict in other Western countries, and is best indicated by the presence of union organization, how are we to account for the incidence of collective labour action in the "pre-organized" labour situation on mines? Can one talk of a capacity for informal organization of resistance which has been developed at the "grass-roots" level of interpersonal relationships on individual mines?

Turning to the "breakdown" thesis, namely that (perceived) misery breeds revolt, we need to consider also whether the incidence of worker protests can be traced to the dissolution of traditional relationships and values, or to certain changes and developments which encouraged a perception of relative deprivation. Can the outbreak of conflicts be accounted for in terms of the emergence of a sense of injustice and the workers' realization that their conditions in life were not inevitable, but could be overcome? If there were times when Black mineworkers perceived that their situation was unjust, how did they organize their protests, despite the presence of controls in the institutional setting of mines?

Marxian conflict theory, in its turn, is of special relevance to the mining industry in South Africa. Objectively speaking, conditions in the labour-intensive and dangerous mines have always posed difficulties and dangers for mine employees. Yet for many years, Black mineworkers did not mobilize in opposition to these conditions. Was this due to pragmatic acceptance, "false consciousness", lack of internal solidarity or subjection to effective labour controls? What factors have affected the development or inhibition of worker

consciousness among Black mineworkers? Can the incidence of work stoppages and strikes be traced to changes in worker consciousness?

Can conflicts on mines be understood in terms of a fundamental clash of interests between wage labourers and capitalists? What kinds of conflicts of interest can be identified and do they reflect class antagonisms in the political economy of wage labour?

The conflicts which will be examined in the light of these various historical theories involved the mobilization of informal, grass-roots relationships in relatively isolated and self-contained mining communities. These encounters also took place in the absence of formal trade union organization for the expression of the working interests of Black mine employees. For these reasons, it is necessary also to examine anthropological theories of conflict, which focus specifically on community tensions between interacting sets of people in particular social settings.

The following section will present an outline of the anthropological approach, followed by the formulation of questions and issues for consideration.

3. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO COMMUNITY CONFLICT

(a) Functional and Processual Models

Anthropology has traditionally concerned itself with the study of small-scale societies and communities whose apparent "fixity" and cohesion was the chief focus of explanation. The emphasis was placed on the normative, integrative elements of social life. As Worsley (1961:28) puts it: "the problem of order was considered to be logically prior to the problem of change". The analysis of normative systems approximating equilibrium and characterized by countervailing forces, checks and balances was founded "... on the premise that societies must

be in a stable condition, or trying to return to such a state, in order to survive" (Beals and Siegel, 1966:ix).

This premise is a reasonable one, identifying as it does the fundamental quest for order and continuity in society, but it does imply that the presence of divisive conflict may either be underplayed or judged as necessarily having some kind of functional significance or purpose.

In an account of "rituals of rebellion" among the Zulu and Swazi, Gluckman (1954) argues that ritual insult and contempt directed at the king contribute to social unity and cohesion. The very fact that excesses can be committed with impunity against supreme authority serves only to emphasize the durability and cohesion of the social order. Gluckman does note, however, that such rebellious ritual can only safely occur "within an established and unchallenged social order" (1954:20).

Societies which are characterized by feuding relationships have also been viewed in basically functional terms. They have been seen to be held in check by cross-cutting ties and conflicting allegiances between the relevant groups, thereby ensuring that the "peace in the feud" is maintained (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Gluckman, 1956).

It would clearly be unwise to ignore the fact that certain countervailing forces in a community can assist in ensuring that relationships do not break down into confusion and anarchy. The crucial point, however, is that conflict can have both functional and dysfunctional implications (Beals and Siegel, 1966). It would therefore be misleading to approach given instances of conflict with the chief intention of demonstrating their functional significance for the communities in which they are found. It is for this reason that a writer such as Hallpike (1977) finds it more important to discover how conflict is <u>generated</u>, rather than regulated in Papuan society. He also observes that certain conflicting allegiances of the kind which are

claimed to keep feuding relationships in check, may in themselves generate further conflicts. Turner (1957) has also described how certain "social dramas" lead inexorably to the fission of Ndembu villages, despite the influence of cross-cutting allegiances, conflicts of loyalties and ritual appeals to common values.

The basic challenge to orthodox functionalism arose when anthropologists first turned their attention to complex societies, particularly the racially and culturally heterogeneous societies of Southern Africa (Worsley, 1961). It became evident that these societies were held together largely by sanctions of power and were characterized by divisive cleavages and conflicts between different racial, ethnic and regional sub-groupings.

Anthropologists developed new terminologies and theories to describe the dynamics of these complex, heterogeneous societies, but also began to re-examine their assumptions about those small-scale, elementary communities which were formerly characterized as stable, fixed and in a state of functional equilibrium. In both cases, there was a new concern for describing the conflict process itself by analysing events, their onset, progression and outcome (Beals and Siegel, 1966). For such a "processual" analysis to be meaningful, however, it was still regarded as necessary to relate events and conflicts to the structure of rules and values of a given community (Turner, 1957).

Aside from this common interest in the dynamic process of social relations, anthropologists working in small-scale rural communities and urban-industrial complex societies respectively, developed distinct terminologies and explanations to account for the specific forms of conflict they observed. In outlining and evaluating the anthropologist's contribution to the question of social conflict, it is necessary to briefly examine these various sources in the literature.

(b) Studies of Primitive Warfare

One notable feature of many accounts of conflict in the anthropological literature is that they are usually to be found within a wider description of the community which includes other activities, events, relationships and values. There have been few studies, for example, which have concentrated exclusively on rebellions and revolutions from the anthropological perspective (Worsley, 1961).

The subject of "primitive" warfare has, however, received some attention, particularly in recent years with the publication of numerous monographs on warfare in Papua and New Guinea (Meggitt, 1977; Hallpike, 1977), and South America (Chagnon, 1977). Warfare has been defined by Malinowski as an "armed contest between two independent political units... in the pursuit of a tribal or national policy" (quoted in Otterbein, 1973:923). Warfare has been distinguished from feuding in that the former is armed combat between political communities, whereas feuding is combat within a given political community (Otterbein, 1973).

Certain writers have adopted a psychological approach in explanations for warfare and aggression (Fried et al, 1967) and have also at times extended this to a psycho-biological level, such as Bolton's controversial claim that hypoglycaemia (or low blood sugar) is a primary cause of aggression in the Andes (Lewellyn, 1981).

The ecological approach, on the other hand, has been more widely applied to such conflicts. The pressure on limited land resources in particular, has been linked to warfare among the Mae Enga (Meggitt, 1977). This kind of argument has been criticized because it fails, for instance, to consider why disputes over land should necessarily lead to fighting in one society and yet be resolved by talking and other means in another (Roberts, 1979:161).

Accounts of warfare and other extreme forms of group violence are

valuable as a basis for comparison between societies experiencing different kinds and degrees of conflict. The categorization of a given conflict situation as an instance of war, for example, can lead to illuminating comparisons, although such a categorization needs to be carefully considered before employed. The extent to which a meaningful comparison can be drawn between warfare in New Guinea and violent inter-group conflict among Black mineworkers in South Africa will be considered in the current analysis.

(c) Disputes and Village Fission

Most of the anthropological literature on social conflict has dealt with less manifestly divisive and extreme forms than warfare, such as the disputing process in community politics and law (Epstein, 1974; Roberts, 1979). The manipulation and re-interpretation of existing norms to serve the interests and aims of the disputing parties is an important feature of the disputing process. The extent to which such norms are precise or ambiguous can be linked to the degree of flexibility available to the disputants in such manipulations (Roberts, 1979).

Disputes relating to processes of village fission, such as those associated with succession to political office (Mitchell, 1956; Turner, 1957), are especially informative sources of anthropological theories of conflict. An important finding of several of these studies has been the appreciation that a fundamental source of social tension can be identified in contradictory expectations or requirements in the normative rules of a given society. The actual rules governing succession to political office, for example, may in themselves be contradictory in that they support different heirs, or operate uncertainly (Gluckman, 1954:25).

Turner's study of Ndembu village fission provides an illuminating

account of how contradictions in the actual principles governing village society can result in conflicts or "social dramas". In the Ndembu context, the principle of maternal descent governing succession to office and inheritance of property conflicted with the principle of virilocal residence. The men of the village experienced a contradiction between their role as husbands wishing to retain their wives and children with them and their role as brothers and uncles who wished to retain the allegiance of their sisters, without which they could not find a village or press their claims for headmanship within their villages (Turner, 1957:xviii-xix). The implication of these features of the structure were a high rate of divorce and village fission, which took place frequently in the aftermath of divisive social dramas. These schisms were often unavoidable despite the deployment of redressive mechanisms in the form of rituals, which attempted to stress the over-arching values of the community as a whole.

Beals and Siegel (1966:70) have described conflicts of this kind within the broader concept of "strain", which is "...measured by the frequency with which individuals find their expectations defeated in various types of situations". Strain arises when the cultural tradition, which is composed of a set of prescriptions for action, fails to provide an appropriate response for a given problem situation or cannot predict the outcome of a situation. Strain can therefore come about through inadequacies in the cultural tradition, which accordingly lacks the means for providing appropriate actions, or through actual inconsistencies in the structure of values itself, in the way described by Turner and others.

Beals and Siegel distinguish <u>technological</u> strain in the relation between the community and its external environment (eg. crop failure), <u>social</u> strain in the organization of duties and rewards, in the transmission of cultural values to new members or the transfer of

authority, and ideological strain, in which the beliefs of society are themselves in conflict, such as the conflict between hierarchy and equality, and between dharma and kharma in Indian society (Beals and Siegel, 1966).

(d) Factions and Social Change

When an indigenous community becomes exposed to external forces and influences in circumstances of (rapid) social change, new sources of divisiveness and conflict are introduced. In Africa, colonial penetration and foreign rule were associated with population increase, land shortages, the introduction of new agricultural techniques and the increasing involvement of community members in wage labour. Conflicts over the accession and control of dwindling land resources in particular, placed great strains on traditional authority relationships and rules of inheritance (Gulliver, 1961).

Beals and Siegel (1966:108) maintain that these new pressures exploit the inherent strains already present in existing communities, resulting in "stress", which they define as "unprecedented events or as problems that cannot be handled by ordinary means".

People in these circumstances eventually abandon traditional methods of running the community and resort to new means for resolving conflicts. These changes lie at the base of the emergence of factionalism.

Factional conflict is defined by Beals and Siegel as originating in the interaction between internal strains (generational, hierarchical, mental, sexual, etc) and external stresses ("foreign" money systems, job markets and production techniques). Factions are therefore political formations associated with change, or with relationships between different groupings in a complex society, and which are involved in a conflict for power and resources. They represent new and shifting

political alignments recruited on diverse principles (Nicholas, 1966).

Several writers have tended to apply the term faction to purely internal conflicts within a given community not necessarily exposed to external conditions of change (Nicholas, 1966), such as village fission. On strictly definitional lines, factions should not be descriptive of the (political) actions of existing corporate groups (Nicholas, 1966). There is also the danger that the term can be robbed of its specificity by being applied to a range of disputes and cleavages in a given small-scale community, although it is possible to make a distinction between "schismatic" and "pervasive" factionalism, defined essentially in terms of the extent of disruption involved, irrespective of the social structure in which such divisiveness is present (Beals and Siegel, 1966). Boissevain (1974), for his part, notes that factions are often linked to situations of social change, but argues that factional conflicts merely increase in such situations because there is an increase of new resources.

It is not the intention here to contribute to the debate on factionalism, but merely to outline the range of terms, concepts and theories developed by anthropologists to account for conflicts in different kinds of societies. The present survey of the literature indicates that the general shift in anthropological thinking has been away from a functional approach to one devoted to exploring a range of dynamic social processes which could be described as informal, as opposed to formal mechanisms of social control in established frameworks of authority. A great variety of these informal "coalitions" have been described in recent accounts, including "action-sets" (A.C. Mayer, 1966), "cliques", "gangs" and of course, "factions" (Boissevain, 1974:171 ff).

What these terms and concepts share is an essentially political view of conflict as an expression of competition for access to and

control over scarce resources. Such an approach has also informed the study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict (Barth, 1969; Despres, 1975; Skinner, 1975), which will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.

The struggle to secure economic resources or other valued goods, such as status, may be carried on through processes of exchange, transaction, competition or conflict, the underlying aim being the acquisition of power. Boissevain notes in this respect that in every conflict situation "there is an asymmetrical relationship between those with more and less power... there is a built-in dynamism which can lead to change, for the competitors seek more power" (1974:223/4). Violent conflict may be the means for a less powerful group to secure certain resources.

The broad framework of power relations as a basis for the analysis of conflict is particularly relevant in the context of industrial wage labour in the mines and towns of Southern Africa. Not only is there an asymmetrical power relationships between White employer and Black employee, but there is evidence of an ongoing struggle amongst employees themselves to secure scarce and valued jobs and wages.

Numerous anthropologists have analysed conflicts in urban African communities and industries in Southern Africa, notably Epstein (1958), Gluckman (1961), Cohen (1969), P. Mayer (1971), Kapferer (1972) and Harries-Jones (1975). One important finding of many of these investigations has been the appreciation that the regional and cultural affiliations of certain employee groups can be an important resource for solidarity and mobilization in securing a livelihood or occupation in the towns. Cohen (1969) provides an account of how the Hausa in Nigeria secured a monopoly in long-distance cattle trading by utilizing their customary links with other Hausa in a process of political ethnicity. Harries-Jones (1975) describes how the network of home-boy ties served

as a basis for developing grass-roots political mobilization in Zambia.

Perhaps the most illuminating account, however, is Epstein's (1958) analysis of the involvement of Africans in new conflicts of interests and a struggle for power in the (then) Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt. One important source of conflict was related to the attempted perpetuation of the "traditional" authority system of tribal elders as a means for the representation of the grievances and problems of industrial mineworkers. New values and norms had, however, been embraced by the workers which represented a different set of interests and relationships, resulting in the eventual abolition of the Tribal Elder system.

These new industrial interests, in their turn, could be linked to the emergence of new cleavages, specifically between workers in higher paid and lower paid jobs, respectively. This occupational cleavage eventually brought about a division in the ranks of the African Mineworkers' Union, and was accentuated by the broad overlap of tribal and regional affiliations with specific occupational categories. The lines of an emerging class structure were therefore coinciding with tribal divisions (Epstein, 1958:236).

(e) Resume: The Anthropology of Conflict

To summarize: anthropological studies of social conflict have identified different degrees of disruption in social conflict, ranging from everyday disputes in community politics and law, to armed conflict and warfare. The types of communities studied have also varied, ranging from indigenous rural villages to urban labour barracks. Some studies have concentrated on traditional conflicts, such as village fission, whereas others have traced conflicts arising in circumstances of social change, in the form of factions and other coalitions. There has in this respect been at least one attempt to explain both kinds of conflicts

within one comprehensive theoretical framework, namely the interaction between internal strain and external stress outlined by Beals and Siegel (1966).

Anthropological studies have also focused on different levels of interpersonal and inter-group conflict. An important feature of the anthropological approach is that both these levels can be viewed in terms of a common theoretical framework. "Atomistic" conflicts, such as divorce and homicide and "schismatic" conflicts between social groupings (Beals, 1961), can both be ascribed to the same set of underlying strains in the social structure of community values, as in Turner's (1957) account of the sources of divorce and village fission among the Ndembu.

The chief contribution of the anthropological approach to conflict lies in the fact that it provides a framework for viewing different forms of conflict in terms of a basic account of the social structure and organization of a particular community.

Broadly stated, the anthropological approach is usually grounded on the intensive observation of a primary group of people in a specific community setting, the members of which are in close personal contact in daily life (Firth, 1961:44). The size and degree of inclusiveness of such communities does vary to some extent: a rural village is usually not as large, complex and differentiated as an urban residential area, but anthropologists still strive to make their theoretical conclusions and explanations meaningful within the context of interacting people in a specific social situation. The analysis rests essentially on the "unit of personal observation" (Firth, 1961:49), whether such a unit is a dispute involving members of a village's sub-lineage, the recruitment of individuals into a leader's faction, or the phases of a work strike in an urban factory or labour barracks.

Secondly, the actual conflict episodes emerging in a specific

social setting are viewed in terms of an ongoing sequence of events and processes taking place over time. A conflict event is not regarded as an isolated occurrence, but is assessed in relation to a series of past events which may be relevant to the current situation. This concern with the processual aspects of conflict extends also to the dynamics of a specific event or situation, which may also include within it a series of distinct phases.

The third feature of the anthropological approach involves the linking of conflict episodes and processes to the social structure and organization present within a specific community or social field. The social structure includes the values, rules and prescriptions which regulate interaction, including political authority and institutions. The social organization, on the other hand, includes the actual interpersonal networks and relationships, the "concrete activity" carried out within the constraints of the social structure (Firth, 1961:75). The sources of inconsistency or strain in the norms and values of the social structure, as well as those emerging as a result of the divergence of social organization from the structure, are important areas of inquiry for anthropologists interested in conflict.

The analysis of structure and organization in a given social situation or community is also accompanied by an investigation into the relationship between such a community and its external environment, which may include other communities. This involves the appreciation of a given social setting as a unit in a wider system of relationships (Gluckman and Devons, 1964). The various influences and constraints operating in this wider society may be important sources of stress and conflict, and their impact on a given social structure, or cluster of relationships, needs careful assessment.

Finally, anthropological accounts of conflict also include an appraisal of the cultural framework of values of the people involved,

both in terms of its relevance in explaining why certain groups engage in conflict, and also in terms of how the members of such groups view their own involvement, and the meaning which such conflict may have for them. The emphasis on culture therefore includes the shared framework of meaning employed by members of a group to explain their actions to themselves (and others). A fairly wide definition of culture is being applied here, one which embraces the collective interests being pursued by a given group in the course of a struggle to achieve shared goals. These collective interests and shared meanings can embrace religious, political, economic, occupational or class goals and values.

The focus of an anthropological inquiry into social conflict, therefore, is on the processual phases of confrontations emerging between interacting sets of people in a specific community setting. Particular conflict episodes are examined to identify basic cleavages and differing (cultural) interests within the community and the influence of the social structure of norms and values on the incidence and form of such conflict, including likely inconsistencies and contradictions in the social structure which may assist in generating tensions within the community. The influence of the wider system of relationships in which a particular community is located is also assessed in this respect.

(f) Implications of the Anthropological Approach

This review of anthropological literature on conflict suggests a number of important questions and issues that will be considered in the actual analysis of industrial conflicts on mines.

Can it be claimed that mine conflicts are functional in any sense? Have work stoppages and confrontations with management resulted in positive outcomes, or a clarification of shared and divergent interests? Have the frequent inter-group clashes among mineworkers contributed in the long term to the development of wider solidarity within their ranks?

How are we to describe and define inter-group conflicts among Black mineworkers? Are they best seen as instances of warfare, feuds or factional coalitions, or do they represent a unique form of conflict?

Can various forms of industrial conflict be linked in any way to certain inconsistencies in the rules and prescriptions governing mine work and hostel living? Does the institutional structure fail at times to provide appropriate responses for its members when they are confronted by a given problem situation, or wish to communicate views or grievances? Can the actual phases of conflict episodes reveal inconsistencies or contradictions in the formal social structure on mines for the handling of employer - employee relations?

Can various forms of industrial and social conflict on mines be accounted for in terms of a single comprehensive account of the social structure and organization of mining communities?

How do the participants in work stoppages and inter-group conflict phrase the meaning and significance of their actions, and what form do shared cultural interests take within the context of industrial efforts and rewards?

How are mobilizations of mineworkers achieved in the context of asymmetrical power relations between White management and Black migrant workers? What kinds of informal, grass-roots groupings are mobilized in the hostel community? Does the mobilization of these groupings alter the existing power relations on mines, or provide the powerless with access to new resources or opportunities?

To what extent are mine conflicts an expression of external political conflicts in the wider South African context? Do external political events and processes have any kind of influence on the incidence and form of conflicts on mines?

These various questions and considerations arising from anthropological studies, as well as those identified in historical studies of conflict, will be addressed by means of the methodologies

4. METHODS, SOURCES AND AIMS

a) The Case Study and Survey Methods

There are essentially two ways in which conflict analysis can proceed. One approach, employed most often by anthropologists, involves the intensive scrutiny of a selected number of case studies of conflict, viewed in their specific social settings. The other approach has more in common with survey - type studies in which a large number of cases are analysed for common features and patterns. These latter cases are invariably less detailed, and are often analysed independently of the specific social contexts from which they have been extracted.

Both approaches have their inherent advantages and disadvantages. The case study approach has the advantage of being able to penetrate deeper into the actual dynamics of conflict situations and explore their significance within a specific community context, including their links to other events and processes, as well as to the social structure, the norms, values and social relationships influencing the participants in conflict. The difficulty with such an approach is that the representativeness of the actual cases analysed cannot be established within the wider population, nor can a broader, overall pattern of conflict be discerned which may indicate major shifts and trends taking place within the population over time.

The survey approach implies that the broader patterns can be identified, making it possible to assess the influence of general economic, social and political conditions and events on the incidence of conflict over time, and also to trace historical developments in the patterns of conflict. The disadvantages include the fact that it is not easy to link the expression of conflict to concrete social settings, including such processes as the mobilization of personal networks. It is also less easy, in these impersonal surveys, to discern popular

conceptions of conflict and the meanings which people ascribe to their actions.

There is no easy reconciliation between these two styles of conflict studies, a fact recognised, for example, by the Tillys, who observe that "...it is hard to find a mind or a method capable of dealing both with the richness of the individual case and with the common properties of many cases" (1975:14).

b) Sources and Methods Used in the Present Study

The present investigation has attempted to combine both the case study and the survey approach in a certain manner. This was done, firstly, by compiling a record of all known mine conflicts and systematically recording the detail of evidence available on each case and secondly, by conducting a number of in-depth investigations into specific cases, analysed within their particular social settings.

The survey record, firstly, was built up by tracing 282 cases of conflict on gold mines recorded for the period 1973 to 1982. A variety of sources were consulted to ensure that most, if not all of the conficts could be included, such as the reports compiled by individual mine managements and forwarded to their Group head offices; reports prepared by the Liaison Division of the organization which recruits Black employees for mine work (The Employment Bureau of Africa - TEBA), and which routinely investigates conflicts involving Black workers on mines; the central records and correspondence of the Chamber of Mines; investigations commissioned by the government, individual mining Groups and the Chamber's Research Organization; and newspaper reports.

Other investigators, notably Horner and Kooy (1976; 1979), have relied exclusively on newspaper accounts in the preparation of a diary of mine conflicts. This has also been the case for certain historical studies, for example those conducted by the Tillys (1975). The Tillys claim that a continuous run of a national newspaper is a more reliable

source than archival information or standard historical works (1975:16). Specifically excluded from their study, however, were those conflicts taking place within total institutions, such as prisons or garrisons. Although such conflicts were not necessarily seen as relevant to their study, conflicts within enclosed environments are less likely to be reliably and consistently reported in the public media. A popular demonstration or riot in the streets of a city is obviously more visible and accessible to journalists and reporters, than a work stoppage or demonstration behind the walls of an institution.

Many conflicts, including strikes and inter-group clashes on mines, were not reported in the South African press during the 1970's and early 1980's. A comparison of the number of incidents reported in the national press with that obtained from internal sources indicates that only one third of all recorded conflicts were reported in the press (Table 1). With hindsight, it is clear that newspaper reports of conflicts taking place within the enclosed institution of mines and hostels are a poor guide to events in these settings.

Table 1 EXTENT OF PRESS REPORTAGE OF CONFLICTS ON GOLD MINES: 1973-1982

Type of Conflict	Number of Cases	Number Reported in Press	Per cent Reported in Press
1. Workers vs management	158	37	23,4
2. Workers vs workers	88	48	54,5
3. Other conflicts[1]	36	12	33,3
Total	282	98	34,8

1. "Other" conflicts refer to those arising from the Malawian repatriations, the Lesotho deferred pay disputes and several miscellaneous conflicts.

The emphasis, accordingly, was on obtaining information from a variety of sources, particularly those existing within the industry

itself. In the scrutiny of these records and the collection of detailed observations, special attention was paid to eyewitness accounts reported in the documented cases, including those of mine management, staff and various officials who were of necessity present at, or intimately involved in, the many incidents which form the basis of the present inquiry.

The observations made by these persons were distorted in several respects, particularly in terms of the emphasis on security considerations and on the more superficial, common-sense "causes" of conflict. An attempt was made to reduce the influence of such bias by comparing different accounts of the same events in a process of corroboration, confirmation and the exclusion of unconfirmed reports and claims.

The documented evidence was also scanned to extract information on the views and opinions of Black employees involved in conflict, provided such information could be shown to be authentic. Of particular relevance in this respect were the findings of investigations conducted by the Liaison Division of the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), which regularly interviews Black employees discharged after conflict situations. The Liaison Division occupies an intercalary role between management and the Black recruits supplied by its organization, and, if anything, has on occasions adopted an employee-oriented view in its dealings with mine managements.

Apart from the collection of basic information on all known instances of conflict, the second major methodological approach involved the execution, over a number of years, of several in-depth investigations into social relations and conflict on various mines.

The first of these studies was conducted on a mine in the Eastern Transvaal goldfield over a four-month period in 1976. This investigation consisted of participant observation in the mine's hostel, focusing chiefly on the social networks of the residents evident in

various leisure-time activities, particularly drinking friendships (McNamara, 1980). During the fieldwork period, a number of cases of conflict were documented, particularly one inter-group clash which had taken place just prior to the commencement of fieldwork, as well as others occurring during fieldwork. The emergence of these conflict situations were accounted for in terms of the social networks, cultural values and occupational interests of the regional groups present in this specific social setting.

A second, shorter period of fieldwork was carried out in 1978 on a mine in the Orange Free State for the purpose of collecting additional information on drinking networks for comparison with the first mine. This second network study also went further to identify friendship patterns and their formation in the underground work situation, as well as to assess the influence of labour turnover and room accommodation policies on the social and working friendship of migrant mineworkers.

These two network studies together provide a descriptive account of mine community relationships which form an important part of the models and explanations for various kinds of conflict taking place in the industry as a whole. Information on the friendship networks of mineworkers is particularly relevant, for example, in the analysis of inter-group clashes.

A number of other consultancy-type investigations carried out at various mines are also relevant to the current analysis of mine conflicts. The author was part of a four man team drawn from the Human Resources Laboratory which visited three gold mines in 1977, including two in the Orange Free State and one in the Transvaal, with the aim of identifying factors affecting the popularity of individual mines in the eyes of Black workers. This study was important in that it identified the main priorities of Black employees regarding their work goals in mining. Information was also obtained from available records regarding the occupancy of different jobs by different regional and language

groups. The information collected on the two Free State mines is particularly relevant to the analysis of inter-group conflicts which took place in this region in 1974.

Another study in which the author participated as part of a three-man team, was commissioned in 1978 to investigate the underlying causes of a violent conflict between workers and management which took place in May that year on a Free State mine. This study yielded important findings regarding organizational difficulties associated with hours of work, travelling time, hoisting arrangements and the provision of meals and services for Black mineworkers, which are relevant to analyses of work stoppages.

In 1978, also, the author undertook to probe the origins of a violent inter-group clash which took place two years previously on a platinum mine in the Rustenburg area. The social problems associated with the accommodation of male migrants in large, single-sex hostels was explored in this study and involved, inter alia, a detailed analysis of assaults and homicides which took place around the mine in the period preceding the outbreak of conflict.

In 1979, a team of investigators including the author carried out an intensive investigation into the origins of a violent work strike on a newly-developed gold mine on the West Rand. A wide range of research techniques were employed which made for a comprehensive account of the conflict, and which yielded many important findings relevant to the organization of both new and established mines in the industry.

Although the studies outlined above are most relevant to the current investigation, other findings of recent research by the Human Resources Laboratory into mine organization, procedures and practices and attitudes of Black employees will also be drawn on in the course of illuminating the origin and form of various types of conflict in the industry.

c) Types of Explanation and Negative Evidence

There is a general division in the analysis of conflict and collective action between "causal" explanations on the one hand, and "purposive" explanations, on the other (Tilly, 1978:6). The causal approach attempts to identify forces and conditions acting on a given population or situation in an effort to account for different behaviours in different situations. The purposive approach, on the other hand, concentrates on the interests and aspirations of the actors themselves and tries to explain the particular choices and means employed by them in collective actions and the outcomes of these actions.

This division corresponds largely to methodological differences between the 'objective' approach, with its emphasis on material conditions in accounting for conflict, and the 'social action' approach, which focuses on the subjective meaning and consciousness of the actor himself (Rex, 1981; Jackson, 1977).

The causal-objective approach has been most vigorously applied in quantitative, long-run analyses of collective action in relation to major forces and conditions, such as economic prosperity and business cycles, wages, union membership and so on. Studies of this kind, such as those carried out by Snyder (1975), Shorter and Tilly (1974) and Hibbs (1978), make use of multivariate regression analysis, among other techniques. The present investigation was not in a position to make use of such methods, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the time period analysed is too short (ten years) to result in any reliable long-term predictions. Secondly, the information on the unit of observation itself, namely the dependent variable of conflict incidents, is not sufficiently representative to justify such an exercise. This is chiefly due to the fact the individual mines were not legally required, during the period in question, to report conflicts involving Black mineworkers to any central governmental division (such as the Department of Labour) on a routine basis, as is the case with conflicts involving

White union action. There are therefore no standardized records of disputes and strikes, their duration, numbers involved and so on, with respect to Black mine employees. Thirdly, the South African data on economic factors and business cycles are not always reliable. Data on unemployment among Blacks in South Africa, for example, are notoriously difficult to estimate from year to year and if utilized in quantitative analysis, would be misleading and give a false impression of rigour which the information itself does not possess.

The aim of the present investigation with respect to the influence of material conditions on conflict will accordingly be limited to presenting evidence on a variety of likely forces and influences and assessing their usefulness in explaining the conflicts in question in a qualitative sense through the critical weighing of evidence. Various competing explanations will be evaluated according to three main criteria of good theory, as outlined by Skidmore (1975:42). These include the question as to whether a given explanation has the required "logical purity", widest scope of application and ability to satisfy curiosity.

Such a causal explanation for the incidence of conflict should not be developed without also attempting to identify situations or time periods in which conflict has not taken place. There is a need to weigh up the significance of "negative evidence", particularly that kind described in terms of the "non-occurrence" of events (Lewis and Lewis, 1980).

In the current analysis, therefore, attention will also be given to the features associated with certain mines, regions and time periods in which conflict has not been recorded. It is also necessary to identify those specific groupings not involved in confrontations of various kinds, such as particular regional and occupational groups, and to isolate the peculiar features of such groups for comparison and contrast. It is also important to identify certain social, political

and economic influences which in theory may be relevant in accounting for conflict but which in practice do not appear to be related.

Although the relevance of certain causal-objective explanations for the incidence or non-incidence of conflict will be explored, the present work is chiefly concerned with a purposive explanation developed from observation and analysis of the interests and actions of the participants involved in conflicts.

To develop such an explanation, the analysis focuses on the conflict process itself, namely the onset, progression and outcome of conflict episodes. An attempt will be made to demonstrate that an account of the conflict process, as opposed to an account of its apparent underlying causes and conditions, is crucial for an understanding of the nature and significance of industrial and social upheavals. By scrutinizing the phases of actual conflict episodes, it is possible to identify the issues articulated by the participants, the means employed by them to mobilize sentiment, the influence of various institutional factors on the tactics and scope of such mobilization and on the severity and intensity of conflict. The focus is therefore on the institutional expression of conflict, and the influence of the internal social structure on the form and outcome of conflict episodes, with due regard for the influence of certain external conditions in the wider, socio-political environment.

The conflict process is important because it reveals certain "repertoires", or patterned characteristics of group values, intentions and collective actions (Tilly, 1980). In nineteenth-century riots, for example, the burning of effigies and storming of institutions of authority revealed the values and aims of participants and the dominant symbols around which mobilization was effected.

In an effort to identify such repertoires of group action in the mining industrial context, a phase model of the conflict process will be applied in the analysis of conflict situations. This task will assist

in identifying the common features of conflict situations for comparison and analysis and also in providing a framework for tracing various repertoires of collective industrial action.

The following section provides an outline of an anthropological model of the conflict process which will be applied in the present study.

d) An Anthropological Model of the Conflict Process and its Application to Industrial Encounters

Those social scientists who are concerned with maintaining an "empirical" approach towards their subject matter would be expected to view social phenomena, such as conflict, in an "inductive" way. The concrete details of the phenomenon being investigated would impress themselves on the observer, who would then faithfully record the pattern so revealed, if any.

This rather simplistic view of social research seems to leave no opportunity for the application of a theoretical model to the phenomenon under investigation. Without digressing into the philosophy of social science, it should be appreciated that all thinking involves the application of models, and that so-called empirical observation is also guided by a sense of relevance which centers on the object of interest, ignoring or excluding other phenomena, and which also operates from certain questions or assumptions, however rudimentary.

It is this "rudimentary" nature of common-sense empirical observation that presents the greatest danger, one which can be illustrated in relation to the problem of conflict. It can be argued that any rudimentary conception of conflict would include an appreciation of the fact that it is composed of a number of stages or phases. At its most elementary level, such a common-sense model may commence with a state of equilibrium subsequently disturbed by an event

or "flashpoint" which is instrumental in leading to a clash between groups of people, or a "riot". This state of conflict is then seen as being eventually followed by the restoration of order. The most primitive conception of conflict, therefore, is guided, intuitively or otherwise, by a model composed of a "pre-conflict", "conflict" and "post-conflict" phase.

Common-sense models of this kind are often crude and overly simplistic. At the same time, the use of a model is an essential feature of analysis. In the case of conflict studies, the failure to use any kind of model, however simplistic, is likely to result in a description of a range of apparently idiosyncratic case studies, each with a unique appearance on the surface. Unless a common set of ordering principles is applied to such information, it will not be possible to conduct a comparative analysis based on the common features of all conflicts, and unlikely also that a theory of conflict as a social process will be developed at all.

The usefulness of a model lies in its ability to order information and assist in identifying such common features for systematic comparison. A good model will be able to do this without also distorting original patterns in the phenomenon and should be seen as a way of ordering the description of conflict episodes for comparison with others.

A number of different kinds of models of the conflict process can be extracted from the literature on social conflict and collective behaviour. Smelser's (1962) theory of collective behaviour, for example, is concerned mainly with identifying different types of such behaviour (e.g. the panic, the craze, the hostile outburst). In the course of describing these types, he makes use of a set of criteria that assist in the analysis, namely structural conduciveness, strain, crystallization of belief, precipitating factors, mobilization for

action and social control. These various aspects of conflict could be applied to denote specific temporal phases of conflict, although Smelser's original intention was to identify the defining features of collective behaviour rather than outline the stages of the conflict process.

Thomas (1976) presents a process model of dyadic conflict which employs mainly psychological concepts in depicting events within a conflict episode, namely frustration, conceptualization, behaviour, others' reaction and outcome. This model was designed mainly to assist in intervention and problem-solving within business departments and between individuals in organizations and as such, is less appropriate for analysing group conflicts and related sociological processes.

Filley (1975) has also presented a model of the conflict process comprising antecedent conditions, perceptions of conflict, manifest behaviour, conflict resolution or suppression and aftermath. This model is oriented to devising means for the resolution of "interpersonal" conflict, rather than group conflict, and hence also employs psychological constructs to assist in identifying changes and developments in the subjective thought processes of individuals.

This brief outline of alternative conflict models is not exhaustive, but it does indicate that models are invariably tailored to suit the different kinds and levels of conflict being considered (for example, dyadic, interpersonal or group conflict) and also vary in terms of the specific questions being explored by investigators from different disciplines.

The present investigation is not concerned with dyadic, interpersonal conflict, whereas interest in the perceptions of the actors is confined to those attitudes which are articulated and expressed in collective conflicts, rather than those which reflect changing subjective states.

For these reasons, an anthropological model of micro-political community conflicts in small-scale social settings was chosen, mainly because this model is explicitly devoted to identifying temporal phases in the group conflict process. The underlying assumptions of this model and its related definitions will accordingly be described in some detail.

The anthropological model to be applied here has been developed within the context of the analysis of political processes in small-scale communities. Political activity in these communities has been described in terms of a patterned sequence of phases which are the basic units of such political activity (Swartz, Turner and Tuden, 1966:38).

Turners' (1957) description of the phases of social dramas in Ndembu society was the first anthropological attempt to outline such a model of the political process. The phases first defined by Turner have been refined to some extent in subsequent publications (Swartz, Turner and Tuden, 1966; Swartz, 1969). These authors believe that the delineation of phases in political activity make it possible to achieve greater depth and clarity in the study of changing systems, for each phase has its own characteristics in different socio-cultural systems and each system exhibits its own style of conflict resolution.

The first phase consists of the "mobilization of political capital", in which the respective groups build up support for their own positions. Various techniques may be employed, including influence, threats, promises of reward, lobbying, infiltration, espionage and so on (Swartz, Turner and Tuden, 1966:32).

The mobilization phase is followed by a "breach of regular norm-governed social relations" (Turner, 1957:91). In the African village context, a breach may be indicated by a quarrel between husband and wife, sometimes including assault, the serious illness or death of a member and an accompanying witchcraft accusation, and so on.

Through such a breach of the peace, the major parties intend to precipitate a "crisis", which is the third phase of the political conflict process. The crisis is described as a "momentous juncture or turning point in the relations between components of a political field", during which covert antagonisms become visible (Swartz, Turner and Tuden, 1966:33). During the crisis, the breach can widen and extend to some dominant cleavage in the social relations to which the conflicting parties belong, such as different lineage segments (Turner, 1957:91). The crisis, in other words, is a phase of overt antagonistic actions conducted by emerging rival groups.

In the fourth phase, various "countervailing tendencies" can emerge to moderate the crisis. Certain conflicts of loyalties and cross-cutting ties may bind the members of rival factions and these can act to inhibit the development and extension of social cleavages, as Gluckman (1956) has so ably described. Countervailing features of this kind have been regarded as particularly common in small-scale, weakly centralized societies which enjoy widespread agreement on basic values (Swartz, 1969).

The next phase consists of the "deployment of adjustive or redressive mechanisms" (Swartz, 1969:18). These mechanisms may be introduced to heal the breach and range from "personal advice and informal arbitration, to formal juridicial and legal machinery, and to resolve certain kinds of crisis, to the performance of public ritual" (Turner, 1957:92).

There seems to be little substantive difference between the last two above-mentioned phases, in that both involve the deployment of various kinds of countervailing forces and mechanisms to moderate the crisis. The two phases have in fact been described as "closely related" by Swartz (1969:18).

The final phase in the process has been described as the

"restoration of peace" by certain authors (Swartz, 1969:18; Swartz, Turner and Tuden, 1966:37). In Turner's original formulation, however, the final phase was not given a specific term but was denoted by the outcome of the drama or conflict in which there was either a "reintegration of the disturbed social group or ...the social recognition of irreparable breach between the contesting parties" (Turner, 1957:92). The outcome of a social drama may, for example, be the secession of a segment of the village and the founding of a new village by the disaffected group under a new headman. Although peace may be restored in a technical sense as a result of the ending of overt hostilities, the original social relationships may have been irreparably breached during the drama, as in the case of village fission. It is therefore not always appropriate to describe the final phase in terms of a "restoration", since the outcome of certain social dramas may be antithetical to a complete restoration of social relationships.

The final phase may, for this reason, be more satisfactorarily termed the aftermath, or the adjustment period of political activity. The latter term seems more appropriate, because the final phase of political activity describes various outcomes of the deployment of various adjustive or redressive mechanisms implemented during the previous phase. All outcomes of conflict can be regarded as adjustments of some kind of another, without having to impose a value judgement by the use of the term. Village fission, for example, may be regarded as a particular kind of practical adjustment to a given conflict situation which should not necessarily be regarded as inferior to, or less desirable than, the reintegration of the original community. The final phase of conflict, therefore, consists of a description of the nature of the social and individual adjustments effected to resolve the conflict in different ways.

Clearly, some kind of evaluation can, and should be made of how

successfully such adjustments have been effected according to various criteria, but the point is that such an evaluation should not be incorporated in the observed phases of actual conflict episodes. In the present analysis of industrial conflicts, an evaluation will be made of how successfully mine disputes are resolved once an empirical outline of conflict phases has been carried out.

The above outline and clarification of the different phases of the political process indicate that two minor modifications need to be introduced so that a workable model can be operationally applied to actual conflict episodes: the first involves the collapsing together of the phase denoting the emergence of countervailing tendencies with that of the deployment of redressive mechanisms, which are closely related and possibly difficult to differentiate in practice; the second modification involves the application of a different term to describe the final phase in the model, namely the term "adjustment", which can cater more effectively for various outcomes than the term "restoration of peace".

A five-phase model will accordingly be applied in the current investigation, namely mobilization of support, breach of the peace, crisis, deployment of redressive mechanisms and finally, adjustment. Figure 1 provides a visual outline of the theoretical model and the modifications introduced for the present study.

In the actual application of this political phase model to conflicts on gold mines, it has been necessary to interpret the different phases in terms of the particular conditions, circumstances and styles of conflict resolution present in this industrial setting.

The way in which the particular character and style of mine conflicts differs from other socio-political contexts is clearly crucial in the comparative analysis of social conflict and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of micro-political processes.

FIGURE 1 : THE APPLICATION OF A THEORETICAL MODEL OF POLITICAL PHASE DEVELOPMENT TO CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY

1. THEORETICAL MODEL: (After Turner, 1957; Swartz, Turner and Tuden, 1966; Swartz, 1969).

MOBILIZATION OF POLITICAL CAPITAL	BREACH OF NORM-GOVERNED RELATIONS	CRISIS	COUNTERVAILING TENDENCIES / REDRESSIVE MECHANISMS REDRESSIVE MECHANISMS	RESTORATION OF PEACE

2. APPLICATION TO INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS:

BREACH OF THE PEACE	MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT	CRISIS	PHYSICAL TERMINATION / REDRESSIVE MECHANISMS REDRESSIVE MECHANISMS	ADJUSTMENT

Swartz notes in this regard that :

> Empirical investigation is needed to establish the sources of variation in the length of time for the whole series to occur and to determine the conditions under which the phases appear "out of order" (e.g., breach of the peace or even crisis before the mobilization of political capital). The temporal separation of the various phases needs to be closely examined, since each phase can occur separately or several phases can ...occupy fields in a single arena simultaneously. Studies aimed at examining the sequences of phases in a number of different social and cultural settings are needed as is work directed towards increasing our understanding of the processes which are included in each phase (Swartz, 1969:19).

The sequence and duration of phases, as well as the particular processes which take place in mine conflicts, are described in the course of the analysis. It is necessary however, to clarify and define the ways in which this model has been applied to industrial conflicts and to briefly outline the phase sequencing which has been empirically identified because it provides the basic framework for the analysis of conflict situations.

The first point to note is that the format employed here for application to industrial conflict situations commences with the breach of the peace as the first phase, followed by the mobilization of support (Figure 1). In the empirical analysis of mine conflicts, it was observed that this sequence occurred most frequently. The fact that the conventional sequence of phases in the political model is reversed in mine conflicts is of theoretical significance and will be given due attention in the course of the analysis.

The first phase, namely the breach of peace, refers in the present setting to the overt causes of a given conflict situation. In the case of conflicts between workers and management, a low wage increase or excessive hours of work for example, are examples of breaches of the peace. In the case of violent clashes between different worker groups, the assault or murder of a member of one group is a common immediate breach leading to conflict.

The mobilization of support is interpreted in terms of the recruitment of social or occupational networks for the purpose of assembling factional groups, crowds and gatherings. Special attention is paid to the tactics employed to muster such physical groupings for industrial action, such as the picketing of shifts. The emphasis in the current analysis, therefore, is on the physical mustering of human groups, rather than on the accumulation of political "capital" and influence, which is stressed in the classical model.

The crisis phase, defined as the occurrence of overt antagonistic actions between emerging rival groupings, is regarded in the present analysis as the period during which actual hostilities take place, including the destruction of property and facilities and the carrying out of violent acts on other persons. The crisis phase accordingly provides the opportunity for recording the details of such hostile actions. Physical consequences of clashes between different worker groups, for example, are considered as aspects of the crisis phase in such conflicts.

The crisis should not, however, be seen as consisting exclusively of violent acts. It also serves to document the nature of the confrontation between mobilized groups which emerges at the height of a drama. In the case of conflict between workers and management, for example, confrontations sometimes arise, at which time workers make certain demands, refuse to work or demand repatriation. Such features of the confrontation are also regarded as aspects of the "crisis" phase.

In the application of the phase model to actual conflicts, it was necessary to utilize the crisis phase mainly to document the actions of Black employees in conflict, whereas the actions of management and security forces are documented in the succeeding phase as redressive mechanisms. This approach proved useful in tracing the dialectical interactions between management and security forces on the one hand, and Black employees on the other. Where security action itself may have

further aggravated hostilities, the consequences of such action are included in the crisis phase, for example, the death or injury of a mineworker as a result of security action.

With respect to redressive mechanisms, a fairly wide definition is employed here to embrace actions ranging from physical tactics to terminate conflicts, such as the use of police and security forces, to the calling of meetings betwen workers and management to discuss problems and have grievances aired. The intervention of arbitrators, such as the Liaison Division of the recruiting organization (TEBA), is also documented as a redressive mechanism. In Turner's definition, formal judicial and legal machinery are also redressive mechanisms. In mine conflicts in the 1970's and early 1980's, few formal procedures for conflict resolution were available to mediate relations between management and employee, such as formal negotiation procedures involving trade unions. The kinds of informal procedures employed in the "pre-organized" labour situation are accordingly of importance and can be identified during this phase of conflict.

One of the few "legal" interventions evident in mine conflicts is the arrest of individuals for eventual prosecution. The steps taken in this respect are also recorded as redressive mechanisms.

The use of physical, security actions in the halting of industrial conflict episodes differs greatly from the kinds of mechanisms employed in African villages to resolve community conflicts. Tactics employed in the termination of mine conflicts, such as police action, arrests and the throwing of teargas, contrast starkly with the subtle, countervailing influence of cross-cutting loyalties and network ties emerging in a small-scale community setting (Figure 1).

For purposes of analysing conflict episodes, however, it was not found necessary, or even useful to distinguish different kinds of redressive mechanisms and regard them as separate phases of conflict.

These finer variations are invariably a reflection of the particular conflict situation being examined, and should not detract from the broader, universal stages of the political phase model which serve as a basic structure for the comparative analysis of conflict within which such variations can be identified.

There are also procedural and definitional difficulties associated with making finer distinctions between different kinds of redressive mechanisms. It is often difficult to clearly distinguish physical tactics from other kinds of mechanisms because they are often jointly employed with different degrees of success. The mere presence of security forces on a mine, for instance, may influence the outcome of other redressive mechanisms, such as meetings between management and employees. A physical ending of hostilities and a return to work may, for example, be essential before any other kind of mechanisms can be be employed, such as meetings and investigations of grievances.

The nature of the redressive mechanisms employed, whether physical or consensual, are also usually reflected in the final phase of conflict, namely the adjustment. In this phase, the various outcomes of conflict are documented, including the results of the deployment of various redressive mechanisms in the previous phase. The outcome of legal actions and prosecutions, for example, are indicated in this final phase. More importantly, the final phase documents the eventual return to work of employees. Also important are the numbers and status of these employees who resigned or were discharged from the mine for repatriation to their regions of origin. The extent to which repatriation took place is one basis for an evaluation of the success of the redressive mechanisms employed during the conflict.

It could be argued, particularly from a management perspective, that repatriation itself is a redressive mechanism. In the present analysis, this term is strictly confined to describing the nature of the mechanisms

employed to resolve an immediate conflict situation between different industrial interest groups with a view to the restoration of the work and domestic routine. Repatriation, whether voluntary or obligatory, is regarded as one outcome of the application of such mechanisms, and is hence described as an adjustment of the situation. Where a number of workers requests repatriation in the aftermath of a violent clash between different worker groups, such a request is regarded as a valid adjustment by that victimized group of what they perceive to be an intolerable situation. It nevertheless remains true that such an adjustment is consequent on the absence or failure of other redressive mechanisms to successfully reintegrate the social community.

The adjustment phase accordingly documents various outcomes of conflict and provides an opportunity to assess the nature and extent of such adjustments. Also included in the adjustment phase, therefore, are those investigations conducted by various interested parties, particularly management, to identify the apparent causes of conflict and take remedial action to improve conditions or effect an adjustment. Atlthough an investigation can also be regarded as a form of redressive mechanism, such investigations are usually not relevant to the immediate resolution of conflict between mobilized groups in a conflict situation and are hence substantially different from the mechanisms applied to resolve the dynamics of confrontation itself.

An assessment of the adjustment phase of conflict also includes reference to information on the subsequent climate or atmosphere at a given site of conflict, where available. The fact that numerous or isolated acts of aggression may still be taking place in the aftermath of conflict are important in indicating the extent of adjustment affected.

Finally, it is important to note that this particular application of a political phase model to industrial conflicts serves mainly to document features of conflict situations and identify patterns in the process of

conflict. It is therefore oriented mainly to a "purposive", rather than a "causal" model of conflict, as defined earlier. Valuable insights can, of course, be gained regarding the overt causes of conflict, or the explicit grievances aired. The model is not intended, however, to penetrate to the underlying causes of conflict which may be influencing the incidence of a great number of different conflicts. Such as assessment needs to be made at a different level, drawing, where relevant, on specific cases. It could be argued for example, that mine conflicts, viewed historically, are seldom adjusted in the fullest sense of the term, especially in the absence, during the period of study, of a formal employee organization representing employee interests.

The extent to which such an argument can be made will be considered in the course of the present analysis. All that the model attempts to do is document identifiable phases in the actual conflict process in an effort to establish, from a comparative basis, the existence and forms of various patterns in such a process. Such patterns, it is argued, are of theoretical significance and should not be ignored in any investigation of social and industrial conflict.

e) Definitions Employed in the Analysis of Conflict Situations on Gold Mines

It is important to clarify and define the ways in which this model of the conflict process has been applied and the types of conflicts which qualify for inclusion, particularly as certain of the definitions employed reflect special issues and considerations relevant to the setting of mine conflicts. The extent to which these definitions diverge from those employed in other conflict studies, notably those of Tilly (1978), will be noted and explained in the course of the discussion.

The main focus here is on Black workers on gold mines and the various social, political, economic, ethnic or occupational

confrontations in which they become involved during their work careers on mines. Excluded from the study, therefore, are those conflicts involving the employees of sub-contractors on mines and non-mineworking populations in mining regions.

The present inquiry is also confined to conflicts involving groups of employees, as opposed to those taking place between individuals. The conflict situations which qualify for inclusion in the present study, therefore, are those in which a mobilization of at least ten (10) individuals has been recorded for at least one such opposing group. The choice of this particular numerical demarcation is to some extent arbitrary, but is nevertheless a necessary step. In practice, very few borderline cases were encountered or excluded, since most conflicts in the present account involved the mobilization of hundreds and in some cases, thousands of mineworkers.

In other studies of collective action, at least 50 persons must have been involved in a mobilization to qualify for inclusion, on the grounds that larger groups are more likely to be reported in the media (Tilly, 1978:248). In the present study, the mobilization of smaller groups of workers against management is an important characteristic of labour relations on mines, partly because of the influence of institutional controls, and such cases are therefore retained in the analysis.

Whereas the mobilization of at least ten individuals in a confrontation situation was a definitive requirement for inclusion, no stipulation was made with respect to the presence or otherwise of violent physical conflict. It was not necessary for violent conflict against persons or property to have taken place in order for a given mobilization of people to be considered as a "conflict situation". Great variation in the severity of different kinds of disputes and encounters can be identified, but all such cases are regarded as valid conflict situations insofar as each denotes a confrontation between certain interests, goals

and intentions on the part of different occupational, social or political groupings.

The fact that the occurrence of violence was not a defining feature of valid cases also differs from the definitions employed by Tilly (1978). For Tilly, the crucial criterion in his study was the "violent event", on the grounds that violent events "tend to be better documented than their non-violent counterparts" (Tilly, 1978:245). Although this argument is not necessarily being disputed here, the occurrence of nonviolent protest on mines is of special interest in the present study because it represents one fairly common form of collective action, and also indicates that not all encounters between management and workers are violent in nature.

In the course of documenting conflicts with the aim of estimating the frequency of occurrence of different types in different regions and on different mines, it was necessary to place certain operational boundaries on the unit of analysis. Three main criteria were applied in this respect, namely the geographical factor (the spatial location of conflict), the temporal factor (the occurrence of conflict in time) and the conceptual factor (the particular type of conflict involved).

The <u>geographical</u> criterion was applied by recognising distinct socio-political communities in which particular labouring populations reside or work, such as specific hostels or mine shafts. Conflicts taking place simultaneously in two different hostels on the same mine property are consequently regarded for purposes of analysis as separate conflicts at separate sites or locations. Tilly (1978) on the other hand, regards conflicts at different communes as one "event", provided there was an overlap of personnel across the two situations. On mines, such an overlap is not easy to assess, and does not detract from the fact that two distinct confrontations took place at two distinct locations.

The delineation of <u>temporal</u> boundaries is also necessary in

distinguishing between separate conflict situations. In certain cases, sporadic conflicts or actions may take place over a successive number of days, with a period of quiet often evident on intervening days. Such actions are regarded here as constituting a single conflict situation which happens to be spread out over an extended time period. In yet other situations, however, conflict may have taken place during a given time period, followed a week later by a renewed outbreak of the same kind of conflict involving essentially the same parties. There may have even been a time interval of several weeks or months between such outbreaks. It is necessary for these different outbreaks to be regarded as separate events to avoid distortion in assessing the duration of particular conflict episodes.

In distinguishing particular conflict episodes over time, it is necessary to define some kind of temporal cut-off point. In the present investigation, a time interval of more than three days between two outbreaks of conflict between the same groups at the same location is regarded as the basis for recording each such episode separately. This definition is more flexible than Tilly's stipulation of "continuous interaction" (1978:250), which, if applied to mine conflicts, would greatly inflate the number of conflict cases, since each successive mobilization or regrouping action of Black employees in a particular encounter would have to be regarded as a separate conflict situation.

With respect to the application of <u>conceptual</u> boundaries in delineating conflict situations, it has been considered appropriate to regard conflicts diagnosed as different in type and form, as distinct cases, even in situations where such distinct types take place simultaneously at the same site or location. In situations where certain dynamic interactions are evident between such distinct types, these interactions can be noted in the course of recording each case. A work strike, for example, may have assisted in precipitating an inter-group

clash amongst workers. The breach of the peace precipitating such a clash is accordingly traced to the work strike situation itself.

The recording of different types of conflicts as distinct cases is necessary mainly to obtain frequency counts of such different types precipitated by different breaches of the peace. This procedure makes it possible, for example, to survey all cases of inter-group conflict and identify the different factors which precipitated such conflicts. Unless each particular type of conflict is isolated as a distinct case, such an analysis cannot easily be made.

These various theoretical definitions were applied in the course of systematically diarizing each of the 282 conflict situations which make up the empirical base of the present study. To carry out this diarization, the various phases of the conflict process outlined earlier were set out in terms of a visual framework to facilitate quantification and comparative analysis. Annexure Two provides details on the rules and procedures employed in the insertion of information into this diary framework, and presents one complete case entry as an illustration of the application of the method.

f) Thesis Outline

The present account of contemporary conflict on gold mines will commence with a broad outline of the historical pattern of conflicts recorded since the 1880's, the years in which gold was first discovered and exploited on the Witwatersrand. The aim of this section will be to place contemporary conflicts in the 1970's and 1980's in historical perspective.

Following the presentation and assessment of this historical record, a broad overview will be provided of the contemporary situation on gold mines and in the country as a whole. The different forms of conflict which took place in the 1970's and 1970's will be broadly distinguished

and an indication given of the nature and scope of the analysis to be applied in each case.

Subsequent chapters in the thesis will deal specifically with each of the major forms, or kinds of conflict identified. Each chapter will be preceded by a brief outline of the relevant social, economic and political context associated with each basic type of conflict. Conflicts involving "foreign" worker groups, for example, will be preceded by an account of the origins of migratory labour from different countries and regions and the conditions prevailing in each. Similarly, work strikes and protests will be preceded by a description of working and service conditions on mines, and so on.

Spcial attention will be paid in each chapter to the actual sequence of events associated with various forms of conflict. The aim in this respect will be to uncover certain patterns and processes occurring over time which could not otherwise be discerned and which will be shown to be indispensable in developing an explanation for the origins and form of the conflicts in question.

The preservation, as far as possible, of the "true" chronological order of events, is informed by Barrington Moore's contention that one should not force the facts of history through a conceptual sieve to test certain hypotheses. He points out in this regard that

> Historical facts have a certain patterned relationship to each other that such a procedure would obliterate and destroy. It is the task of the investigator to elicit this pattern through careful and critical attention to the evidence (Barrington Moore, 1978:xvi)

The final chapter will conclude by drawing together the various findings of previous chapters and assessing them in the light of the various historical and anthropological theories of social conflict and collective action outlined earlier in the introduction.

The main argument or thesis being pursued in the present investigation will then be set out. The various methodological and

conceptual advantages of focusing on the phases and repertoires of the conflict process, and the diachronic patterns in the incidence of conflict, will be summarized in this respect.

NOTES

1. COMGU (1), 1974: Presidential Visit to Cape Town - Report of Interview with Minister of Mines, 20 February 1974.
2. COMGU (1), 1974: Presidential Visit to Cape Town - Report of Interview with Prime Minister, 22 February 1974.
3. Sunday Times: 9.3.1975.
4. The Star: 7.1.1975.
5. Hansard, No. 5, Column 1969: 5 March, 1975.
6. Rand Daily Mail: 4.3.1975.
7. The Star: 25.7.1980.

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT ON GOLD MINES - 1889 TO 1982

1. ORIENTATION AND AIMS

The present investigation will commence with a brief account of conflicts which have taken place since the advent of gold mining in South Africa. This historical outline will aid in assessing whether conflicts in the 1970's and 1980's were in any way unique, or merely the contemporary expression of enduring features of the industry. There is also a need to place contemporary conflicts within the broader historical record of fluctuations in collective action in the industry. The extent to which conflicts in recent years represented a resurgence of conflicts after a period of relative industrial peace, is one important question in this respect.

The historical account will, accordingly, commence in 1889, the year in which the Chamber of Mines was founded, three years after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand. To assist in presenting this account, an attempt has been made to diarize all known instances of past conflict. This diary has been based mainly on published secondary sources, particularly the Chamber of Mines Annual Reports (CMAR). A great deal of vital information is missing from this early period, both in terms of the number of events for which some record exists and in terms of the detail of information available on known cases. The diarization presented in Annexure Three should therefore be treated as a provisional guide to conflicts in the early years of gold mining, one which may become more representative as historians conduct further investigations.

2. CONFLICT ON GOLD MINES PRIOR TO 1973

a) The Anglo-Boer War and Chinese Labour

Since the first gold mines started production on the Witwatersrand in the 1880's, mobilization for different forms of industrial conflict has been a recurring feature among Black workers. The earliest conflicts on record were described in 1892 as "drunken brawls", allegedly sparked off by excessive consumption of alcohol over weekends (4th Chamber of Mines Annual Report for 1892:52). Further reports of "faction fights" are recorded in the 1890's in the Chamber reports.

One of the first recorded strikes by Black workers, on the other hand, took place at Crown Mines in 1896 in protest against a reduction of wages from 59 to 44 shillings per month (8th CMAR for 1896:166). When 50 mining companies forged an agreement to reduce wages in October of that year, it was anticipated that "there may be disturbances at some of the mines", (8th CMAR for 1896:164). The Government Superintendent of Natives, a Mr. Cronje, was sent out to visit several mine compounds and address their inmates:

> The impression made was favourable, and the reduction in wages was established without any serious trouble. The only difficulty that occurred was in connection with the strike at the Crown Reef Company, this, however, only lasted two days (8th CMAR for 1896:166).

Apart from this relatively isolated occurrence, the industry's first experience of a true strike "wave", or series of successive confrontations taking place in a distinct time period, were those recorded for 1902 (Annexure Three). These strikes and confrontations took place partly as a result of the reduction of wages after the Anglo-Boer War and partly because of allegedly poor treatment on the mines (Moroney, 1977; Warwick, 1978).

A second, distinct, strike phase followed soon after in 1904 and

1905, instigated by newly-recruited Chinese labourers who were dissatisfied with wages, work conditions, safety and supervision by police and headmen (15th CMAR for 1904; 16th CMAR for 1905; Annexure Three). Another important feature of this period was the occurrence of several clashes between Chinese and Black workers. Conflicts involving Chinese ceased after they had all been hastily repatriated by February, 1910.

b) The First World War, White Miners and the Colour Bar

In May, 1907 the first strike of White miners took place at Knights Deep mine (18th CMAR for 1907). In the ensuing years, further strikes by Whites occurred, accompanied by pressure put on the Chamber by the government of the day to employ more Europeans underground. Lengthy negotiations on the Mines and Works Act were initiated to restrict certain occupations to Whites. These moves were resisted by the Chamber, which wanted the emphasis placed on "competent" persons (23rd CMAR for 1912).

The conflict of interests between the Chamber and White labour in this respect was aggravated by the circumstances of the First World War (1914-1918). The war had resulted in increased working costs on mines and the withdrawal of Whites who enlised for active service, and it soon became apparent to mining companies that cheap, Black labour would be required to replace highly paid, unskilled European labour if certain mines with lower grade ore were not to be faced with closure. The White mineworkers, for their part, vigorously opposed these actions and demanded, inter alia, the dismissal of "Coloured" drill sharpeners (29th CMAR for 1918).

The Black mineworkers themselves had apparently been watching these developments and also began to engage in collective actions to protect their own interests. A few strikes by Black workers took place from

1913 onwards, when the colour bar was being devised, but these were merely the prelude to the third major historical strike wave involving Blacks, which reached a peak in 1920 and was related partly to the question of the job colour bar on mines.

In 1918, the year in which White miners pressed for dismissal of Coloured drill sharpeners, there were a number of strikes by Black workers. A commission was appointed and found, inter alia, that an important grievance was "...the inability of a native employed on a mine... to rise in earnings beyond a certain very limited point" (29th CMAR for 1918:70).

A public meeting of "non-European" workers was held in the Pilkington Hall, Johannesburg, on the 20th June, 1918 to protest the White mineworkers' demands for the dismissal of Coloured drill sharpeners. The meeting forged a resolution which was forwarded to Malan (Prime Minister) and the Chamber of Mines. The resolution stated, inter alia:

> We contend that we have taken our part honourably in this present world conflict, and consider that we are entitled to the right to live in this land of our birth; that this attempt to deprive the Coloured people of their living will most surely hinder recruiting amongst our people. We are therefore determined, in face of these facts, to advise our people not to go to the front, as liberty and freedom does not seem to be for the sons of South African soil in spite of their loyalty (29th CMAR for 1918:117).

This resolution reveals that Black South Africans' sense of social injustice was aroused. Despite the fact that they were volunteering for service in the First World War, their livelihood and opportunity in the country they were serving was being threatened.

It is important to note, however, that this sense of injustice was confined to issues relating directly to employment and did not appear to extend to other social and political issues preoccupying Black South Africans at that time. The 1919 campaign in the Transvaal to resist the pass laws, for example, left the mines untouched, as far as collective

action was concerned (Roux, 1964:120).

The Chamber eventually agreed to maintain the existing ratio of Coloured to White drill sharpeners on mines, but further Black strikes took place in 1919 and 1920. The Chamber claimed that the (February) 1920 strike, which affected 21 mines for eight days and involved 71 033 workers (31st CMAR for 1920:67), had been inspired by the actions of White mineworkers at that time:

> There is no doubt that the natives have viewed with considerable impatience the increase of pay to the European workers and that they are feeling very strongly that they also should obtain an increase (31st CMAR for 1920:88).

The pressures from Black employees for wage increases could have been stimulated by the successes of the White miners, but this should not be regarded as the "cause" of the conflicts. The war had resulted in an economic depression which forced commodity prices up and was accompanied by alleged exploitation at the hands of traders on mine property. The main character of the conflicts at this time involved the boycotting of stores by Black mineworkers (Bonner, 1979). The 1920 strikes, therefore, contained a number of related grievances, including exploitation by traders, high price of commodities, low wages and finally the imposition of job colour bars, which also had an effect on potential earnings.

Wage increases for Black mineworkers were not granted, however, because the Chamber believed that the strikes were spurred on largely by the activities of the White workers, and also because Blacks allegedly enjoyed an alternative rural subsistence income. The Chamber was, unfortunately, also restricted by the government and White workers in its attempts to cater for Black employees' "legitimate aspirations for a higher class of work" (30th CMAR for 1919:69).

The Black strikes of 1918-1920 clearly perturbed the industry, which began to take steps to deal with a "new phenomenon... a native

strike in the true sense of the word" (30th CMAR for 1919:69).

The first, immediate action was to request the Minister of Justice to maintain a larger force of mounted police in close proximity to Johannesburg, because it had become apparent "that the force of mounted police was totally inadequate to protect the law abiding section of the native labourers" (30th CMAR for 1919:90). The February, 1920, strike was later broken up by the placing of police cordons around each compound (Roux, 1964).

The second action was a long-term strategy to "make greater use of experienced native labour in semi-skilled occupations" by retrenching "superfluous and redundant" Whites (32nd CMAR for 1921: 146,134). The Chamber accordingly denounced the "status quo" agreement regarding drill sharpeners and declared its intention of retrenching 2 000 Whites in such jobs as drain cleaning, pump attendence, sanitary service and waste-packing. The result was an "attempt at revolution" on the part of White workers on the Rand (32nd CMAR for 1921:68), which came to a head in the strikes of March, 1922.

During this crisis period of the "Rand revolt", Black mineworkers themselves were involved largely as onlookers and also at times as victims of White racial sentiment, being frequently attacked by White strikers (Roux, 1964:150). The apparently passive behaviour of Blacks after 1920 continued through the Rand revolt and endured into the late 1930's, representing one of the few quiet periods in the history of Black industrial action in the mining industry. This quiet period could be accounted for partly in terms of the effective security action employed to terminate the 1920 strike. The increase in strength of the police force on the Rand after the strikes may have played a role in curbing industrial action by Black employees during the twenties and thirties. The post-war depression, however, probably also dampened worker action on mines in these years.

This period of industrial peace in the mining industry, as far as Black employee action is concerned, contrasted strongly with the heightened political and industrial activity involving Blacks which was taking place elsewhere in Johannesburg and Natal. The twenties were characterized by the emergence of the I.C.U. (Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa), under the leadership of Clements Kadalie. There were several strikes in other industries on the Reef and in Natal, but the activities of the I.C.U. apparently had little effect on the isolated and self-contained mining communities (Roux, 1964:173).

The only conflicts which were recorded as having taken place on mines in the 1930's consisted of one violent inter-group clash in January, 1930 which resulted in the death of 12 Black mineworkers (41st CMAR for 1930) and a "disturbance" in 1937 in which a compound manager was killed by a missile (48th CMAR for 1937). There are no records of any Black worker strikes as such, despite the apparent efforts of the Communist Party to organize mineworkers in 1931 and 1932 (Roux, 1964:334). This is perhaps not surprising in view of the widespread unemployment in the early and mid-1930's when the mining industry enjoyed a plentiful supply of labour.

c) The Second World War and the African Mineworkers' Union

A few strikes and protests have been recorded for 1940 and 1944 (Annexure Three), which can be regarded as the first steps towards the fourth major strike wave in the industry, namely those of 1946. These strikes were significant and far-reaching, linked as they were to the emergence of the first (unrecognised) union for Black mineworkers. Once again, it is necessary to look for the roots of the 1946 strikes in the preceeding years of the Second World War (1939-1945).

During the war itself, various Presidents of the Chamber paid tribute to the Black labourers whose "bearing was highly gratifying" in

uncertain times characterized by the circulation of "propaganda" through the mines (51st CMAR for 1940:64). This was probably a reference to leaflets distributed in 1940 by a certain Dadoo, an Indian doctor who opposed Black support for the war in the light of their lack of democratic rights in the country (Roux, 1964:306).

In the meantime, active steps were being taken to unionize Black mineworkers by members of the Communist Party. In August, 1941 a conference was held to inaugurate the African Mineworkers' Union. The leaders of the Union, however, deliberately refrained from organizing strike action during hostilities to avoid hindering the war effort (Wilson, 1972; Roux, 1964:337).

The fact that the mobilization of mineworkers was proceeding during the war years with the assistance of the organizing capacity of external leadership, did not necessarily imply that there were no substantive grounds underlying the strikes, which broke out after cessation of international hostilities. Shortages of foodstuffs, particularly meat, had resulted in severe cuts in mineworkers' rations. Successive presidents of the Chamber paid tribute to the manner in which the cuts were accepted, but the mineworkers' deprivations remained real and were accentuated by low wages which had remained relatively unchanged since the First World War (Wilson, 1972). Accordingly, in August 1946, 76 000 Black mineworkers went on strike for four days on numerous mines, with a wage demand of 10 shillings per day.

The Chambers' reaction was to dismiss the strike as being "provoked by agitators" (57th CMAR for 1946:58). The action taken by the authorities included measures for physically terminating the strike, which resulted in the deaths of at least 12 mineworkers. Swift action was also taken against the Union's leadership, which was arrested to appear later in a lengthy trial which resulted in imprisonment for most of the accused (Roux, 1964:341).

The Chamber also refused to recognise the African Mineworkers' Union, claiming that it was "outside the comprehension" of most Black employees (Chamber of Mines, 1946:8).

The 1946 strike actions were certainly the most ambitious, and probably the least successful (from the workers' point of view), in the early history of the industry. They were also followed by a long period during which there was very little industrial activity among Black mine employees. Only a few protests or strikes have been recorded for the 1950's and 1960's (Annexure Three), suggesting that the legal and disciplinary action of the Chamber and the State in 1946 may have silenced Black mineworkers for a time, crippling their organizational capacity for industrial action for many years. This observation may need to be qualified, however, in view of the post-war depression which may have also restricted worker action on mines.

Subsequent political developments in South Africa, such as the Defiance Campaign of 1952-3, appeared to have had little influence on Black mineworkers, partly because of their institutional isolation and partly, perhaps, because of the lack of any organizational base at this time.

The 1950's and 1960's were, however, characterized by the occurrence of at least seven inter-group conflicts, most of which took place on the (then) newly-developed far East Rand goldfield.

d) Resume of Observations : 1889-1972

Before the contemporary context of conflict is discussed, it is necessary to briefly summarize some of the more important preliminary trends and findings emerging from the account of early conflicts presented above, particularly confrontations between management and Black workers.

Firstly, the circumstances and timing of the two major strike waves

of 1920 and 1946 suggest that perceived deprivations linked to various international conflicts constitute an important part of the explanation for these conflicts. These deprivations arose from the fact that the world wars rapidly altered the value of wages and the quality of living conditions on mines.

The emergence of strike action immediately after the World Wars was a feature of most industrialized nations. Hibbs (1978:157) notes, for example, that

> Most nations experienced strike explosions towards the end or just after the end of the World Wars as labour sought to defend its war-time organizational gains, to resolve the shop-floor grievances that had accumulated over the long period of 'discipline', and to preserve real wages in the face of war-generated upward movements in prices.

In the South African context, an additional factor contributed to post-war strike actions by Black workers, one linked to their social and political status in the country. The fact that Black South Africans rendered service in international conflicts, and yet were denied opportunities for industrial advancement as a consequence of the imposition of the job colour bar, was particularly important in engendering a sense of moral outrage, manifesting itself in industrial conflicts. This sense of injustice was also aroused when White miners alone received increases - the pattern of industrial action of White miners was therefore also relevant to the attitudes and actions of Blacks in the sense that perceived deprivations were evident in the contrasting fortunes of the two racial and occupational segments of the mine labour force.

Secondly, two unusually quiet periods punctuated the relatively continuous record of sporadic strikes and protests throughout the history of the industry, namely the 1920-1940 and 1950-1970 periods. The fact that both these quiet periods were preceded by strong security action in the termination of post-war strikes, including the increase in the police force in 1920 and the arrest of union leaders in 1946,

suggests that the implementation of labour controls has had an influence on patterns of collective action in the mining industry.

Both these quiet periods, however, were also characterized by post-war economic depressions, making it difficult to assess whether poor organizational capacity or adverse economic conditions can be linked to the decline in worker action during these periods. Snyder, in his classic (1975) study of strike trends in the United States, found that a similar post-World War II decline in strikes in that country were attributable to economic factors. His overall conclusion, however, still supported organizational - political factors as the main long-term predictor of strike trends. This apparently contradictory conclusion is based on Snyder's finding that the determinants of strike activity can, in themselves, change over time, as illustrated by the fact that economic indicators performed poorly in predicting pre-war strikes, but performed better for the post-war period in the U.S.A. (Snyder, 1975:274).

On balance, the decline in worker action in South African mines after both World Wars is not difficult to understand in view of a combination of depressed economic conditions and restricted organizational capacity.

The third observation emerging from this survey of early mine conflicts is that they appear to have taken place largely independently of political developments in South Africa. The anti-pass laws movement of 1919, the emergence of the I.C.U. in the 1920's, and the Defiance Campaign of the 1950's did not appear to have affected mineworkers to the extent that they undertook industrial action to support these broader political goals from an industrial base. Where mineworkers actually mobilized, the aims of the collective action were restricted to specific industrial grievances and problems. External developments, such as world wars, were relevant only insofar as they had an impact on

mineworkers' economic circumstances and livelihood.

The final observation with respect to 'classical' conflicts between management and black workers, is that the process of developing an organizational base to represent employee interests in dealings with management appears to be heavily dependent on outside assistance. The African Mineworkers' Union of the 1940's, for instance, was conceived and built only with the aid of interested parties from outside the mineworkers' own ranks. This fact suggests that either the institutional and social controls present on mines, or the lack of internal solidarity of the Black mineworking class, prohibited the spontaneous development of worker organization from within the industry. This issue is also relevant to the more recent history of the industry.

As far as inter-group conflicts amongst mineworkers are concerned, these too seem to have taken place on a frequent basis throughout the industry's history, although the information on these conflicts seems incomplete. Such clashes have apparently taken place with some regularity at Christmas time every year. During the years of the Second World War and probably in other years also, the South African Police advised the Chamber in November of each year of the "annual searching of compounds for dangerous weapons and liquor in order to minimize the likelihood of compound riots at Chistmas and New Year" (1).

These various observations of worker-management confrontations and inter-group clashes in the early history of the industry have been outlined here to provide a background to recent conflicts in the 1970's and 1980's. The intention has not been to exhaustively investigate earlier conflicts, a task which could not hope to be achieved in such a brief manner. This information is relevant only in that it may help to illuminate conflicts in recent years, on which the present thesis is chiefly focused.

3. THE RESURGENCE OF CONFLICT ON GOLD MINES IN THE 1970'S

a) Conflict and Change in Southern Africa since 1960

In the preceding section, it was observed that there was very little industrial mobilization involving Black mineworkers during the 1950's and 1960's. This passivity was traced in part to the suppression of the African Mineworkers' Union and also in part to post-war economic conditions.

In the wider South African arena, there was considerable activity in the mid-1950's organized and inspired by the newly-formed South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The Sharpeville crisis of March 1960, however, was followed by widespread action against Black nationalist movements (Lodge, 1983).

The 1960's were consequently relatively tranquil, with few industrial or political upheavals involving Blacks within the country as a whole. Those developments which could be discerned were taking place within the context of revolutionary exile politics and limited guerilla activity (Lodge, 1983).

This approximately fifteen-year period of industrial peace throughout the country was broken dramatically by the Durban strikes late in 1972 and in 1973. The Durban strikes in textile and other concerns set the tone for a new era of labour relations, playing an important role in bringing about the eventual appointment in 1977 of the Wiehahn Commission into Labour Legislation.

The years following the Durban strikes were characterized by increasing levels of conflict in South Africa, notably the Soweto revolt of 1976 and its aftermath. Countrywide school boycotts, the founding of new Black political organizations and an intensification of guerilla attacks on targets within the country could be discerned in the 1970's

and onwards. Black trade unionism enjoyed dramatic growth and secondary and commercial industries in the country experienced a resurgence of strike activity.

In the Southern African context, the process of political change in neighbouring countries was accelerated, with Black nationalist movements fighting protracted wars and finally securing political independence in a number of countries on South Africa's borders, notably Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

b) An Overview of Contemporary Conflict on Gold Mines

Closely accompanying these various national and international upheavals and processes of social change in Southern Africa in recent years was a marked resurgence in collective conflicts on South African gold mines. These conflicts represented the first sustained and widespread incidents since the 1946 mine strikes, breaking out after a twenty-year period of relative industrial peace on the gold mines.

A variety of apparently distinct forms of conflict took place during the 1970's and the early 1980's, each of which exhibited a particular character which set it apart from conflicts in earlier periods of the industry's history. Instead of the mass strike actions recorded for 1920 and 1946, the 1970's and early 1980's witnessed the fluctuating incidence of frequent, brief encounters between workers and management on individual mines.

The contemporary conflicts also included a particularly intense series of internal clashes between different worker groups. Although such clashes have been a characteristic of past eras, the contemporary record indicates that a protracted, violent struggle has been taking place, one which rivals other time periods and indeed finds no clear counterpart in the early history of the industry.

A third kind of conflict has also been evident in recent times,

namely the emergence of disturbances and incidents apparently associated with (changes in) the employment status of "foreign" migrant workers drawn from various countries and states in Southern Africa, particularly Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique. These conflicts seem unique in the industry's history, in that no obvious parallels can be drawn with events in earlier time periods.

Each of these distinct kinds of conflict are associated with particular questions and issues, each calling for separate, detailed investigation to explain their origin and significance, without losing sight of likely inter-relationships between the different types identified.

Conflicts involving Malawians, Lesotho citizens and Mozambicans, for example, seem to have been closely related to political and other events taking place in the home countries of these migrant workers. A more detailed assessment of these events and their influence on the actions of foreign worker groups in the mining industry seems to be called for in unraveling their significance.

There were also numerous conflicts involving Black Rhodesian mineworkers in the 1970's, which could be linked to political developments in their home country. For various reasons, Black Rhodesians remained largely isolated from other workers and exhibited a high degree of group consciousness. Their distinct behaviour in the industry underlined the need to examine processes of political and social change in Rhodesia in an attempt to account for their particular reactions to the industry and the conflict in which they became involved.

Internal clashes between different worker groups, for their part, appear to have been linked at times to certain external events. Generally, however, they suggest the incidence of a relatively continuous struggle between different migrant worker groups within the

gold mining industry. The frequent incidence, in particular, of clashes between Sotho and Xhosa-speaking migrant workers, requires special attention in this respect. Inter-group conflicts on mines clearly deserve serious investigation in their own right, calling for a close examination of the socio-economic and political features pertaining to certain mining regions and to the industry as a whole in an effort to identify the particular conditions giving rise to such conflicts. Most of these clashes are also not easily regarded as outcomes of a struggle to achieve wider solidarity in conflicts with mine managements, although such instances can be identified and will also be examined.

Finally, the incidence of strikes and confrontations between workers and mine managements also deserves special consideration. The kinds of issues which have sparked off these confrontations and the types of mobilization tactics employed, need to be described and analysed in relation to internal conditions on mines as well as to external events and influences.

One important question related to conflicts between mine managements and workers is the fact that these encounters took place in the aftermath of the introduction of certain changes and reforms in wages, working and living conditions in contemporary times. There is a need to account for the fact that conflicts took place despite the introduction of apparent improvements in conditions on mines.

The various forms of contemporary conflict outlined above sometimes occurred simultaneously or influenced each other in complex ways. Despite their complex interactions, it is still possible to identify broad patterns in the occurrence of each. These general patterns provide the basis for the sequencing of chapters in the present thesis.

The early years of the 1970's, for example, were dominated by conflicts and disturbances associated with the actions of certain foreign worker groups. In the aftermath of these events, there was a

substantial change in recruitment strategies in the industry. As a result of these changes, a new source of foreign labour was obtained from Rhodesia, as it was known at the time, and for the next few years, the activity of Rhodesian recruits was a major theme and issue in the industry.

Accompanying the arrival of Rhodesian recruits was an influx of recruits from within South African territory. Coinciding with, and following on their arrival was a marked increase in inter-group conflict. Although conflict of this kind had taken place on a relatively frequent basis since the early 1970's, this form of conflict assumed dominance in the mid-1970's. Thereafter, a decline in inter-group conflict was evident.

Sporadic outbreaks of work stoppages and strikes had been taking place on a frequent basis since the early 1970's, but these conventional forms of industrial conflict between Black workers and mine managements became dominant by the early 1980's. The increasing prominence of these encounters closely preceded the founding of the Black National Union of Mineworkers in 1982, at the end of the period under review.

In the course of describing and analysing these different types of conflict in terms of the broad periodizations outlined above, an attempt has been made to achieve a working balance between chronological sequence and thematic unity. On the one hand, each chapter can be viewed as a largely self-contained and comprehensive theoretical treatment of a particular form of conflict. On the other hand, the material in each chapter is presented in a sequence which is intended to correspond in general terms, with the chronological reality recorded. In numerous instances, however, this sequencing of themes could not be made to correspond with the sometimes arbitrary occurrence of events. Where appropriate, these chronological lapses are noted, as are any observed inter-relationships between the forms and types of conflict

identified.

To assist in giving due consideration to the chronological sequence of events within the context of a thematic analysis, an event diary was compiled of developments within the industry, in the labour-supplying regions and in South and Southern Africa. This event diary was collated from a number of sources, including industry files and correspondence, the annual surveys of the South African Institute of Race Relations and newspaper reports. This summary of events was utilized in the course of the present study to ensure that major internal and external developments were not overlooked in accounting for specific events on mines, and is provided as an annexure to this volume for general reference purposes (Annexure Four).

NOTE:

1. UC Box 1345: Labour Unrest Files.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEPENDENCY - MALAWI, LESOTHO AND MOZAMBIQUE

1. FOREIGN LABOUR ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES

The employment on gold mines of Black workers from certain countries outside the borders of South Africa has been an important characteristic of the industry's labour force since the earliest times. Migrants have been recruited from various countries in Southern and Central Africa since the discovery of gold, including Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Within the South African region itself, certain countries encircled by South African territory have also provided a source of labour, such as Lesotho and Swaziland.

The presence of so-called "foreign" labourers on South African gold mines can be traced to labour supply problems experienced over the decades by a rapidly expanding labour-intensive industry. Various explanations have been put forward to account for labour shortages on gold mines over the decades. One immediate problem was that the Witwatersrand where gold was first discovered, was a treeless, inhospitable area with no indigenous population and mine owners were obliged to look further afield for labour (Gemmill, 1961:291). The indigenous Black populations in the South African region were also largely economically self-sufficient pastoralists and agriculturalists at the turn of the century, and had no great need to work on the mines. The Transvaal Labour Commission of 1903 concluded that European occupation of the territory was too recent to have brought "any great change in the conditions governing the native occupation of the soil", and that "industrial habits" were unlikely to develop among Black farmers unless a

"great modification of these conditions has been brought about." (14th CMAR for 1903:cliii).

The means by which this "great modification" of the Black farmer into a wage labourer was engineered has been exhaustively documented elsewhere (Wilson, 1971; Bundy, 1979) and will not be repeated here. The important issue in the present discussion is the fact that the Black populations of the South African region were not compelled, during the early part of the century, to accept the wages offered by mines.

The low wages paid by the mines were particularly relevant to the labour supply problem. These low wages were the outcome of a monopsonistic recruitment policy introduced by the companies which formed themselves into the Chamber of Mines in 1889. The Chamber was brought into existence to ensure that mines did not compete with each other for labour. It was feared that such competition would have resulted in the closure of many mines working a lower grade of ore which were not able to pay the wages offered by richer companies (1st CMAR for 1889:9-10). The Chamber acknowledged in 1893 that the resulting low wages were an important reason "which induced the natives of the Northern districts to remain in their kraals rather than seek employment on the mines" (5th CMAR for 1893:3).

When the Chamber succeeded in actually reducing the level of wages on several occasions, the supply of labour deteriorated further. The Chamber observed in 1897, for example, that "...in consequence of the notice of the coming reduction of wages, there was a considerable exodus of natives" (9th CMAR for 1897:114).

These various factors obliged the industry to seek beyond South African territory for workers willing to work at the wages offered by the mines (Wilson, 1972; Elkan, 1980; Stahl, 1981). The size of the recruitment area became an important variable in efforts to meet mine labour requirements, thereby resulting in a high proportion of workers

from areas designated as foreign countries. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) was formed in 1901 after the Anglo-Boer hostilities had further aggravated labour supplies, and proceeded to develop a recruitment infrastructure extending from Mozambique to Central Africa.

The mining industry did not ignore the potential of local recruitment, however. After the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) was formed in 1912, workers from within South Africa's borders migrated to the mines in increasing numbers. This increase in the local labour supply could be attributed to the fact that the proletarianization of Black farmers was underway as a result of the progressive imposition of taxes, appropriation of land, and so on (Bundy, 1979). These local wage labourers had also not as yet been strongly attracted to the emerging manufacturing industries which at that time were paying wages similar to those paid on mines. In the 1920's and 1930's, when mining wages comprised over 80 per cent of these offered in the manufacturing sector, the proportion of South African workers in the mining industry was around 50 per cent (Parsons, 1979:56).

From 1940 onwards, however, the South African economy underwent rapid industrialization and diversification. The large increase in labour demand was associated with rising African wages (Stahl, 1981:22). From this time, mining wages fared poorly in relation to those paid in the manufacturing and construction industries, dropping steadily to 33 per cent of the wages offered by these sectors in 1970. This decline in the competitiveness of mine wages was accompanied by a reduction in the proportion of South Africans in the industry, which had fallen to 22 per cent by 1972 (Parsons, 1979:56).

The Chamber of Mines was once again obliged to look outside South Africa's borders for additional labour recruits prepared to work for the wages offered. The proportion of foreign workers in the mining industry

increased accordingly, accounting for nearly 80 per cent of the total work force by 1973. The number of Malawians, for example, rose from less than 70 000 in 1969 to over 100 000 in 1973 (Table 2). In that year, Malawian labour alone represented 30 per cent of the total labour force, with Mozambique accounting for 22 per cent and Lesotho for 20 per cent (Table 2).

The dependence on the part of various governments on South African gold mine wages became something of a political embarassment for Black Africa after 1960. The progress made during the 1960's towards political independence of many African countries after decades of colonial rule could not easily be reconciled with continuing dependence on the economy of the South African White minority regime. Certain countries which previously supplied labour to South Africa halted recruiting soon after becoming independent. In 1961, for example, Tanzania achieved independence and in that same year, cancelled its recruiting agreement with WNLA (Wilson, 1972:106). Zambia followed soon after, halting recruitment to the mines in 1966, two years after independence (Stahl, 1981:26). Malawi, however, stood firm under the pressure for disengagement, continuing to allow the recruitment of its citizens for South African mines ten years after attaining independence in 1964. The labour supply from Mozambique also remained unaffected for a time, partly because it was one of the last African countries to gain independence in modern times (i.e. 1975). Lesotho, for its part, became independent in 1966, but remained geographically isolated from the political influence of the "front-line" Black states of Southern Africa and being a landlocked, small and mountainous country, remained almost totally dependent on the earnings of its citizens on South African mines.

By the early 1970's, then, the foreign countries of Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho had not yet attempted to break their labour ties with South Africa, or utilize these ties as a source of political

Table 2 TERRITORIAL ANALYSIS OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF BLACK EMPLOYEES ON GOLD MINES, MEMBERS OF THE CHAMBER OF MINES : 1971-1982

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
South Africa	86 868	78 742	81 375	77 350	101 553	143 509	189 106	204 318	215 577	233 088	240 082	239 065
Lesotho	64 056	67 046	76 403	72 169	75 397	81 973	92 026	91 278	94 379	96 309	98 228	95 731
Botswana	20 498	19 873	20 352	17 047	17 440	19 871	20 267	17 647	17 645	17 763	17 539	16 659
Swaziland	5 640	4 778	4 826	5 168	7 356	9 948	9 335	8 269	7 976	8 040	8 872	9 294
Mozambique	95 430	80 243	83 390	80 740	91 369	67 439	36 922	35 234	38 995	39 539	40 094	42 544
Malawi	92 782	106 379	109 731	94 728	22 875	494	3 495	17 910	15 033	13 569	12 937	13 565
Zimbabwe	3	3	2	3	2 437	15 939	18 653	11 984	7 643	5 770	2 968	112
Other Areas	5 270	4 531	2 747	2 780	3 419	3 334	3 664	2 154	1 875	1 409	1 337	1 217
TOTAL	370 547	361 595	378 826	349 985	321 846	342 507	373 468	388 794	399 123	415 537	422 057	418 187

Source: Chamber of Mines Annual Reports

influence. The 1970's, however, were to witness major developments and changes involving migrant workers from these countries and their respective home governments. These developments were associated with various forms of conflict and violence on mines.

2. THE MALAWIAN REPATRIATION

a) Malawi's Economic Situation

Malawi has a long history of migratory employment in other African countries, particularly Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa (Coleman, 1972). In 1936, the Government of Nyasaland, as it was known then, concluded an agreement with WNLA for recruiting its citizens for work on South African gold mines (Stahl, 1981). Since that time, Malawians have worked on the mines, eventually constituting 30 per cent of the total labour force by 1973.

Economically speaking, it seemed unlikely that Malawi would ever be able to reduce its dependence on the earnings of migrants in South Africa. Malawi's economic dependency stemmed partly from the fact that its wage employment sector was developing too slowly to absorb the growing number of workseekers produced by the change from a subsistence to a money economy (Coleman, 1972). Workseekers accordingly moved to the higher rates of pay available in South Africa. The resulting shortage of labour in Malawi contributed, in turn, to the failure of estate agriculture (Coleman, 1974:97).

Ten years after Malawi's independence in 1964, the country took stock of its economic situation and the progress made in the first decade. Early in 1974, a seminar was held at Chancellor College, University of Malawi, to discuss Malawi's economic future (1). In a paper delivered at the seminar, Coleman explained that:

> ... potential development may be hampered by the level of migration. Any reduction in the overall level of migration would certainly reduce the flow of foreign exchange which Malawi now receives but, at the same time, it would reduce dependence on what might be considered a particularly unstable export commodity (Coleman, 1974:97).

The chairman of Malawi's Tea Growers' Association told those present at the seminar that Malawi needed the manpower which was presently working in South Africa. This statement referred to one of Banda's major objectives after independence, namely to restore confidence in the tea industry (Thomas, 1975:42). Without substantial economic development within Malawi, however, it seemed unlikely that the country could attract its labour back home. Early in 1974 the Chamber of Mines Research Organization conducted a socio-economic survey of Malawi, which concluded that Malawi seemed destined to remain dependent on mine wages for many years to come (McAllister, 1974).

Yet, by the end of 1974, it was clear that President Banda of Malawi was determined to recall Malawian citizens from South Africa and harness them for a major drive to rebuild the home economy. Coleman's earlier prophecy seemed in this respect to have been realized. He had observed that:

> The advent of political independence may go some way in breaking the self-reinforcing spiral of migratory work since it is clear that the present massive dependence upon sources of work outside the country can only be countered by governmental efforts to make better use of Malawian labour within Malawi (Coleman, 1972:46).

b) <u>The Francistown Air Disaster and its Aftermath</u>

The opportunity for withdrawal of Malawians by "governmental efforts" was presented in an unexpected form. On the morning of the 4th April, 1974, a DC-4 Skymaster aircraft transporting 80 Malawians back home after a work tour on the mines, crashed near Francistown airport. Only 6 Malawians survived the crash (2), which was later found to have

been caused by replenishment of the aircraft with the incorrect type of fuel. Four days later, the Office of the President and Cabinet of Malawi telexed WNLA Johannesburg indicating that the acceptance and recruitment of Malawians for mining work had been temporarily suspended until further notice. President Banda also insisted that subsequent repatriations be flown only by Air Malawi from South Africa's international airport (3). On the 18th April, President Banda confirmed his decision to withdraw Malawians permanently from the mines (4).

The initial repercussians in the industry were minimal: the ban on flights had the effect of delaying the repatriation of a number of Malawians from a Carletonville mine on Thursday, 18th April, 1974, two weeks after the crash. On this mine, Malawians demanded repatriation, fearing an attack on them by Xhosa workers after Sotho workers had left the mine as the result of a Sotho-Xhosa clash a few days before (5). The severity of this earlier clash, which left 10 dead, could help to account for the Malawians' nervousness, as could an outbreak of violent inter-group conflict between Xhosa and Sotho in the Free State two months earlier.

In the months that followed the air crash, management in the industry took the first steps to recruit more workers from other sources, notably Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa. In July, 1974, discussions were held at ministerial level to consider the recruitment of Black Rhodesians (6). The "political complications" arising from dependence on Malawian labour had been raised several years earlier in 1969 by Gemmill, of WNLA,(7) but little action had been taken in this respect until after the air disaster.

A number of attempts were also made by the industry to restore relations with Malawi and maintain a flow of recruits from that country. In August, 1974, the President of the Chamber suggested to President Banda that he allow a trickle of workers back to the mines, but received

a "very negative" reaction. The Chamber President then offered to advise on the exploitation of minerals in Malawi, a suggestion which Banda received very positively, but which did not alter his attitude on the re-employment of Malawians for mining work (8). A meeting was also held in Malawi in September at which the Chamber President and the head of the Mine Labour Organization heard complaints from Banda regarding treatment of workers on mines (9). In October, the Chamber President outlined improvements that were planned, including ensuring a high standard of international transport for workers, but these were also to no avail (10).

In November, 1974, the Chamber President announced a new recruiting drive in the Black townships of South Africa (11). The success of this campaign rested on the pulling power of wages in the industry, which had been increased substantially from 1973 onwards.

c) Conflicts involving Malawian Nationals: September 1974 - March 1975

The announcement of the local recruiting drive came in the wake of renewed disturbances involving Malawians in the last few months of 1974. In September, fighting broke out between Malawians and Xhosas at a mine on the Central Rand, resulting in the injury of 12 Malawians. The Malawi Government Labour Representative later sent to TEBA Liaison Division a copy of a letter addressed to the District Commissioner, Mzimba (Malawi) written by a Malawian mineworker:

> Dear Father, I wish to let you know that your boys working at (the) mines will all be killed and by the time I am writing you there are 4 boys who are killed on 15th September .... Mainly I am asking help from you that can it be better all of your boys to die here? because of money and we are not cared prophesy (sic) ... because they say Malawians are no more coming here to Johannesburg ....Please try a new method to help your boys back to Malawi .... Yours faithfully, boy of the above mine (12).

This somewhat garbled message made reference to one of the many rumours circulating in the industry regarding the withdrawal of

Malawians, and also illustrates the fears which Malawian workers expressed at the time regarding attacks by other worker groups.

A few days later, Malawians and Shangaans clashed at another mine on the Central Rand and towards the end of September, Malawians mobilized at a platinum mine new Rustenburg, demanding repatriation after three Xhosas had stolen a Malawian's sombrero and inflicted a minor wound (13). Later the next month (October), a Malawian was assaulted at a shebeen outside an East Rand mine, whereupon 1600 Malawians mobilized, attacked other workers and refused to work (14). The Malawians demanded repatriation, claiming to be afraid of Sotho workers, but were eventually encouraged to return to work after a week-long strike in which a total of 31 workers were injured, mainly Shangaans.

Towards the end of October, approximately 1000 Malawians on a Carletonville mine mobilized after a fellow national was fatally stabbed at a film show. The Malawians refused to work and demanded repatriation, fearing an attack on them by Xhosa workers. Approximately 500 Malawians later marched to the WNLA Depot in Johannesburg and by November 7th, close to 1 000 had been repatriated. A rumour had apparently been circulating to the effect that Malawians on mines would become stateless persons if they did not return home by the end of 1974 (15).

Conflicts involving Malawians also continued to take place on platinum mines in the Rustenburg area. Early in November, approximately 200 Malawians demanded repatriation from one platinum mine after a Pondo had fatally stabbed a Malawian in an argument about a radio (16). That same month, Malawians clashed with Mozambicans on two occasions on the Central and East Rand and on a West Rand mine, about 800 Malawians gathered to demand repatriation after rumours that Malawians had to return home by a specific date, the 16th December, 1974 or lose their citizenship (17). Nine similar incidents took place on other mines on the Witwatersrand in subsequent months.

The Malawian disturbances reached a climax on a platinum mine near Rustenburg in December, 1974. This case is of special interest because it provides further evidence for tension between Malawians and other workers and the Malawians' evident insecurity and anxiety associated with the unexpected change in their employment situation on South African mines. The case is also significant in that it describes the emergence of certain spontaneous mobilization tactics developed by Malawians in the course of the conflict which are relevant to the general analysis of worker mobilization being developed in the present investigation.

The following case study has been compiled from reports by TEBA's Liaison Division (18), evidence presented to the government commission on mine riots (McKay, 1975) and reports prepared by mine management (19).

> Sunday, 15th December: At 17h45, a group of Malawians were returning to their hostel. One of the Malawians urinated near the hostel gate, whereupon a Pondo tribal policeman on duty reprimanded him and requested his company number. The Malawian refused and the policeman caught hold of him by the wrist to note the number on the band, and after the Malawian resisted, attempted to cut the band off with a pocket knife. Several other Malawians then attacked the policeman and one Malawian was stabbed in the face by the policeman who then fled. The injured man was taken to the dressing station for treatment.
>
> A large group of Malawians returning from a soccer match and another from tribal dancing displays heard a rumour of the death of a Malawian. The crowd joined other Malawians at the dressing station, hurling cold drink bottles, stones and coal at the station, offices and bar. The Malawians also hurled challenges at Pondo workers. The hostel manager and indunas talked Pondos into ignoring the taunts and a mine security policeman threw teargas among the Malawians.
>
> The Malawians dispersed, then reassembled and attacked the kitchen and the rooms of the Malawian, Shangaan and Tswana indunas, burning the Shangaan induna's personal goods in the process. Security reinforcements were called from a neighbouring mine and order was restored by 22h30 using tear gas and two riot vehicles. Mine security patrols continued throughout the night.
>
> Monday, 16th: (Day of the Covenant, or Dingaan's Day): The Malawians put up notices on the bar and kitchen buildings: "Listen you Malawians, tomorrow you must not work. The one who goes to work must know that he is not a Malawian and he must be killed. These Europeans do not want to send us home. You must know that

there are many bad things done here at (the mine).." (translation).

Later that day, (+- 17h30), a Malawian known as Mandevu started blowing a whistle outside the offices and other Malawians gathered near the bar, singing and blowing whistles. Taunts were thrown at the Pondos and the crowd looted the rooms of the Shangaan induna and Malawi tribal representatives. Furniture was burnt and a tribal representive assaulted. The Malawians then threw taunts at a team of Pondo tribal dancers returning to the hostel, who later retaliated by staging hit-and-run attacks on Malawians who fled to their rooms and locked the doors. The Pondos broke the door locks and looted Malawian rooms.

The mine security police tried without effect to fire tear gas at the small groups of Pondos and the South African police arrived later, restoring order by 22h00. Two Malawians were found killed, and a third died later in hospital. At least 79 men were admitted to hospital, 77 of whom were Malawians.

Thursday, 17th: In the morning, several hundred Malawians gathered in front of the administrative offices refusing to work and demanding repatriation.

The Mine Labour Organization (MLO) was called in to assist and a representative addressed the Malawians and asked for representatives. This request was unsuccessful and Malawians started packing their belongings, throwing mine equipment down in front of the offices and gathering on the lawns. Other Malawians moved into the fields surrounding the hostel.

Wednesday, 18th: Malawians from the other hostel on the mine joined those already in the fields. Approximately 3 500 Malawians were now on strike. The entrance to the hostel was blocked by the strikers who jeered at other tribes going to work. At 10h45, Malawians started to march to the main road, but were halted by mine security forces. Later in the afternoon, workers returning from shift became dissatisfied because absentees had taken first place in the kitchen's food queues.

A senior management representative and the Malawi Government Labour Representative had discussions with 50 strikers' representatives who raised a number of complaints. The representatives claimed that there were too few Malawian police in the hostel in relation to their numbers. They also wanted to be housed in larger groups and complained that the concession store was too far away, making them vulnerable to attack on route by Pondo workers. They also requested compensation for loss of personal property after Pondos had looted their rooms. The Malawians alleged that management had stood back and allowed Pondos to loot their rooms, that the original incident involving the Pondo tribal policeman was prearranged and that arms had been issued to the Pondos.

Management agreed to increase the number of Malawian police, group Malawians in their own section of the hostel and set up a small store in the hostel, but the Malawians insisted on repatriation. Management told Malawians to move to the football field and indicated that food would be brought out to them, especially since discontent was arising in the food queues within the hostel. Those waiting to return to work were welcome to enter the hostel. Several men shouted that they wanted to be sent back to Malawi,

picked up their belongings and moved to the football field.

Thursday, 19th: In the morning, management addressed Malawians on the field urging them to return to work. Food was sent out, but was either thrown on the ground, or left untouched. Approximately 500 men were persuaded to return to the hostel during the day.

Friday 20th: In the morning, food was again taken out to the men but was left uneaten. The men had now spread out amongst the surrounding thorn trees and had constructed tents from blankets and a large quantity of plastic sheeting which had been taken from a shaft bank. In the late afternoon, management and MLO representatives under police protection approached the men in the encampment. Attempts were made to persuade the men to return to work and guarantees were given that police protection would be provided for those leaving the encampment. The Malawians were adamant that management should depart and that they would only be satisfied with an immediate return to Malawi. Officials noticed that the men had organized a number of control points interspersed within the encampment which were demarcated with flags. Leaders had been appointed who were wearing makeshift orange plastic badges on their shirts. These leaders moved around the crowd stopping others from moving to the mine trucks waiting to transport workers and their belongings back to the hostel. Several Malawians who had escaped from the encampment were escorted back to fetch their kit at the camp and some were assaulted by camp leaders.

Saturday 21st - Sunday 22nd: About 200 men returned to the hostel, and from Monday 23rd onwards more men returned, some of whom were assaulted and had their belongings knocked off their heads. Many men had also started to buy provisions at the local stores.

During the following days, the men in the encampment showed less animosity to management and were under the impression that everyone would be repatriated after Christmas if the strikers held out for another day or so.

By Friday 27th, however, another 600 had returned to the hostel. That same night, a heavy thunderstorm washed out the camp and on the following day, there was a steady stream of men returning to the hostel, assisted by men from other tribes who helped carry their belongings such as sewing machines, hi-fi equipment and bicycles. After the Malawians had been regrouped into separate accommodation in the hostel, the men settled back into normal recreational activities on the week-end, with little evidence of inter-tribal animosity. Repatriation of Malawians continued in a "normal manner" on expiry of individual contracts in subsequent months.

This chronological account of conflict can be broken down into a number of phases, as defined in the introduction. An outline of these phases serves to identify the underlying repertoires, or patterns of conflict and assists in focusing on critical issues requiring explanation.

The breach of the peace, or breach of norm-governed social interaction, commenced with an altercation at the hostel gate between a Malawian and a Pondo tribal representative which resulted in assault and injury. Viewed in isolation, the incident seemed relatively trivial in that a minor misdemeanour had been committed and the interpersonal aggression which followed did not lead to loss of life.

Soon after the breach, there was a mobilization of support, or mustering of social groupings in the form of a crowd of soccer spectators, after the circulation of a rumour of the death of a Malawian. A series of further mobilizations followed in subsequent periods, effected by the posting of strike notices, the blowing of whistles and finally, by a mass gathering on a sports field where an informal leadership and organization emerged to maintain solidarity in the Malawians' ranks.

Each of these mobilizations were followed by periods of overt hostility between mobilized groups, described as the crisis. During these crisis periods, there were attacks on mine facilities and induna's quarters, clashes with other worker groups (notably the Pondos) and finally, the voicing of persistent demands for repatriation.

The redressive mechanisms employed to adjust the situation and restore normal routines, were initially confined to security action, but later involved negotiations and discussions between management, representatives of the recruiting organization and the workers themselves, including their informal spokesmen. In the final stages, a fortuitous thunder shower also played a role in redressing the situation.

In the final phase of adjustment, or outcome of the conflict, the Malawians returned to the hostel with their belongings and were accepted back by other worker groups.

A number of questions arise from this outline of conflict repertoires which require attention. At the outset, it is necessary to

consider why the Malawian work force responded so directly and strongly to a breach of the peace of an apparently minor nature, and why certain exaggerated rumours circulated among the Malawians.

The protracted nature of the conflict also deserves attention, characterized as it was by a number of successive mobilizations and the development of spontaneous and informal tactics for the maintenance of group cohesion.

Finally, it is necessary to establish why the crisis, or the high point of the conflict, was focused on mine indunas and Pondo workers.

The immediate issue, of course, concerned the enforced repatriation of Malawian citizens from the mining industry, and their initial reaction to this development. The above case illustrates the Malawians' deep-seated fear that they might lose their citizenship should they not return to Malawi by the end of the year. It has not been possible to trace the source of these rumours, which had begun circulating in the mines in September of that year. The Malawians' actions on the mine in question can, however, be traced to a visit by the Malawi Minister of Labour, a certain Mr. Deleza, nine days before the outbreak of conflict. The main cause of the trouble, in the opinion of senior management, was the "nationalistic feeling inadvertently engendered by the style of delivery and the contents" of the Minister's speech which had "whipped up the nationalistic and patriotic feelings of the Malawians" (20).

The minister's emphasis on national patriotism may have been interpreted by Malawian workers as implying that they should return promptly to their home country, unless they wished to appear unpatriotic in the eyes of their government. This insecurity could help to explain their apparent over-reaction to the altercation at the hostel gate, one which presented Malawians with an opportunity to effect a general mobilization and demand immediate repatriation.

This concern and determination was vividly illustrated by the

lengths to which the Malawians went to prolong their demonstration and maintain unity in their ranks. The creation of the encampment and plastic shelters and the development of informal organization under the guidance of a readily visible leadership core, complete with orange plastic badges of rank, underlined the Malawians' inventiveness in what they perceived to be a crisis situation.

The crisis for Malawian mineworkers arose from the fact that there were few employment prospects in their home country, coupled with acute land shortages (Thomas, 1975). Malawians also faced the prospect of looking for scarce employment at wages which had been kept at a constant, low rate for unskilled workers since 1966 (Thomas, 1975:44).

The extent of the difficulties faced by Malawians on their return is illustrated by the fact that President Banda later allowed the South African mines to re-engage Malawians with past mining experience. The number of Malawians on gold mines rose again from a few thousand men recruited in 1977 to approximately 13 000 by 1982 (Table 2, on p. 91).

A puzzling feature of the crisis phase in the above conflict was the hostility displayed towards indunas and tribal representatives. On two separate occasions, the Malawian crowd attacked, looted and burnt the rooms and property of the Malawian, Shangaan and Tswana indunas and tribal representatives. The fact that the conflict was sparked off by the actions of a Pondo tribal representative who apprehended a Malawian at the gate, could help to explain the antagonism towards the representatives in general. The main difficulty with this explanation, however, is that the rooms of the Pondo tribal representatives were left untouched. The ethnic status of the Pondo tribal representative, as opposed to his job status, seemed more important to Malawians, who viewed his actions in terms of a broader struggle with Pondo workers in general.

Another likely explanation for the attacks by Malawians on their own tribal representatives could be traced simply to their dislike of the

particular representatives which had been appointed over them as domestic disciplinarians and counsellors. During the actual disturbance, Malawians had complained that there were too few representatives for their group, which suggests that Malawians may have desired the appointment of new representatives.

Another possible explanation for the tension between Malawians and their representatives could be linked to the political climate associated with the actual repatriation of Malawians. The Malawian induna, as an authority figure representing the Malawian presence on the mine, would be expected to be loyal to his home country and his President, whereas the Malawian workers seemed unhappy at losing their jobs in the mines and were fearful of the consequences of ariving home too late and of having their citizenship apparently annulled by the Life President.

This tension between Malawian nationals and their home government many have been translated into resentment against the representative authority vested in the Malawian induna.

Although these arguments are speculative, the emergence of tension between Malawians and their tribal representatives does indicate one important fact, namely that mine conflict situations can contain a variety of different cleavages and issues, which manifest themselves in complex ways during actual hostilities. There was even an indication of certain worker grievances against management, hinted at in the anonymous notices posted during the conflict, which referred to the "many bad things" done at the mine.

A more important feature of the crisis was the cleavage evident between Malawians and other workers, particularly Pondos. The incident at the gate involving a Pondo tribal representative and the subsequent gathering at the dressing station, where Malawians hurled challenges at Pondos, suggested that they were particularly sensitive and fearful of this group. The Pondos were quickly singled out as the chief threat to

Malawians, the latter also claiming that the action of the Pondo tribal representative was prearranged and designed to provoke the Malawians.

Malawians later taunted and goaded a group of Pondo tribal dancers into attacking them. The Malawians' bravado in this respect could be traced in part to their numerical superiority on the mine. Of the 12 681 Black workers employed on the mine in June, 1974, close to half were Malawians (21).

The Malawians' hostility to Pondo workers should, however, be viewed in the light of developments on other mines in the region during the preceding three months. In two separate instances, the Malawians were the victims of aggressive threats and attacks by other workers. These included the stabbing of a Malawian by three Xhosas at another platinum mine in the region three months earlier and the fatal stabbing of a Malawian by a Pondo at a neighbouring mine one month before the strike in question.

A number of similar assaults on Malawians had also taken place on gold mines during these months, as described earlier. Although most of these incidents were followed by Malawian mobilizations and not by further group aggression on the part of Xhosa and Pondo speakers, the events do indicate the existence of certain tensions between the Malawians and other worker groups which require explanation. The Malawians' persistent claims on different mines, that they were in danger of attack by other workers, should also not be dismissed entirely out of hand. The Malawian repatriations reveal an undercurrent of political tension between local and foreign worker groups on mines and also sketch the context in which such tensions originated in the contemporary record. This theme will be developed in the course of the present analysis.

The Malawian disturbances, which reached a climax at the end of 1974, were followed closely by the outbreak of conflicts involving Lesotho Nationals on mines in January, 1975. Before examining these

conflicts, a brief account will be given of economic and political aspects of labour migration from Lesotho to assist in explaining the origin and form of these conflicts.

3. THE DEFERRED PAY RULING AND LESOTHO MINEWORKERS

a) Economic and Political Aspects of Labour Migration from Lesotho

The history of Lesotho's economic situation has been described in terms of its deterioration from a productive granary for maize, wheat and sorghum, to a poverty-stricken labour reserve heavily dependent on migrant remittances (Murray, 1981).

Although people had sought work as migrants on the Kimberley diamond fields after 1867, this migrant work was 'discretionary' in character, and many Sothos actually exported grain to the diggings (Murray, 1981:11).

After the disastrous 1930's, when wool prices collapsed and the country experienced an "exceptional" drought, large numbers of migrants left Lesotho and sought work in South African towns and mines (Murray, 1981:15). Dependency on migrant earnings increased again after the Second World War, and became concentrated in the mining industry. Referring to mining, Eckert and Wykstra note that "...since World War Two Lesotho's vulnerability to economic and political factors affecting a single segment of South Africa's economy has increased substantially" (1980:4).

Lesotho's dependence on the mining industry in particular as a source of jobs and wages, increased greatly after 1963. This was due to the fact that residents of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland were declared prohibited immigrants by the South African authorities in 1958, a decision later entrenched in the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963 (Stahl, 1981:29). The Act prohibited Blacks from the former High Commission

Territories from entering South Africa except for work in certain specified industries, essentially mining and agriculture. In 1963, border control posts were established to control the entry of Lesotho nationals into South Africa (Murray, 1981:27).

Partly as a consequence of this legislative change, the number of Lesotho workers employed on South African mines more than doubled between 1963 and 1977. By 1975, approximately four out of every five Lesotho migrants were employed on mines (Murray, 1981:19-20), and nearly 70 per cent of total household income came from migrant remittances (Eckert and Wykstra, 1980:13).

With close to half of its able-bodied population employed outside Lesotho (Eckert and Wykstra, 1980), it was clear that were South Africa to "...close her frontiers to prospective migrants ...in Lesotho there would be severe distress" (Elkan, 1980:596).

Eckert and Wykstra concluded in 1980 that "Lesotho's migrant employment is now much more dependent on developments in the mining industry than previously" (1980:4).

The legal restrictions on the mobility of "foreign" Lesotho workers which confined them to mining employment in South Africa, coupled with their heavy economic reliance on migrant remittances, indicate that a politically motivated withdrawal of Lesotho workers from South African gold mines along the lines of the Malawian repatriation was not a realistic option for the Lesotho government.

At the outset, the Government of Lesotho had revealed no intentions of withdrawing its citizens from mining work. On the contrary, the Lesotho government had frequently sought the industry's assurances that it would not cut down on recruitment in Lesotho in favour of South African labour. At a meeting held between MLO, the South African authorities and the Lesotho government in September, 1974 at Maseru, the Lesotho government referred to a feeling of uncertainty prevailing in the

country about future employment in South African mines. Mention was made of the various public statements put out by the industry about the need to increase the number of South African Blacks employed on mines. The industry representatives responded by assuring the Lesotho government that Lesotho mineworkers would always be welcome in the mines (22).

A month later, Chief Jonathan, Prime Minister of Lesotho, met with the chairman of a major mining Group to obtain a similar assurance that it was that Group's policy to continue to use Lesotho labour (23). Having received that assurance, the Lesotho Premier then indicated to the executive that a system of compulsory deferred pay would be introduced in the near future. The Chief was evidently attempting to assess whether the introduction of this scheme was likely to jeopardize future employment for his citizens.

The mining executive noted later that the industry "would have to be careful that we are not shouldered with the blame" because the Lesotho Government was keen to tie deferred pay to the total employment package for Lesotho recruits (24).

Whereas President Banda of Malawi had secured a return to Malawi of his able-bodied labour force to rebuild the home economy, Lesotho's solution to halt the self-reinforcing spiral of dependency and migration was to devise a means of ensuring that the earnings of its citizens were directed to Lesotho, rather than spent in the Republic of South Africa. The government accordingly introduced legislation to provide for the compulsory remittance of 60 per cent of each worker's earnings back to the Bank of Lesotho.

The implementation of the compulsory deferred pay ruling for Lesotho mineworkers from the 1st January, 1975, resulted in a violent and protracted protest on the part of these mineworkers. The form this conflict took, the basis for the mineworkers' protests against the legislation, and the impact of the conflict on industry management and

other worker groups, will be explored in the following section.

b) The Lesotho Deferred Pay Disputes: January, 1975

On the 11th December, 1974, the details of the new scheme were communicated to all mine managers in the form of a circular from the general manager of the Mine Labour Organization. The regulations stipulated, inter alia, that 60 per cent of each employee's monthly pay would be paid into the Bank of Lesotho, to be refunded to the employee on his return to Lesotho. An employee could, however, authorize for up to half of the amount deferred to be paid to his dependents in Lesotho (restrictions on the amount available for deferment to the families were later lifted). The deferred deduction did not apply to the period of time an employee remained on a mine after the expiry of his formal contract period, although this loophole was later closed by subsequent legislation in 1980.

The news was communicated to the Lesotho workforce on certain mines during the last week of December via the indunas, tribal representatives and isibondas (hostel room representatives). On other mines, the communication was confined to senior Black employees to assist them in answering any questions put to them by the workers (25).

And in-house inquiry by one mining Group concluded, inter alia, that poor or inconsistent communications played a role in the conflicts. Chief Jonathan himself later criticized the communications procedures, which he claimed were incomplete, inaccurate and made a mockery of the new scheme (26).

After a time lapse of several days in some cases, during which rumours were rife, workers started reacting to the news once it had become "official", or after they had heard Chief Jonathan's radio broadcast on Sunday, 5th January, as well as other later broadcasts which referred to the eruption of strikes on other mines (27).

The first conflicts and protests commenced early on the morning of Wednesday, 1st January on a Free State mine. Sotho workers attempted to stop others from going to work and demanded to see Chief Jonathan (28). The men were eventually encouraged to return to work after the general manager had agreed that the hostel manager would put their complaints to the Lesotho Government. A similar incident took place that same day at a Carletonville mine, where about 1500 Sothos gathered outside the hostel manager's office, picketed the night shift and refused to go to work the following day (29). The chief induna at the mine telephoned the Lesotho Prime Minister to report on the problems which were emerging on the mine. At a mass meeting in the dance arena, the general manager asked the men to await the results of the planned delegations to Lesotho, after which the men returned to work.

On Friday 3rd, mining officials met Chief Jonathan in Lesotho to present mineworkers' complaints, including the allegation that the men would not receive interest from the money. The Lesotho Premier explained the scheme, including the fact that 5 per cent interest would be paid on deferred wages.

On the week-end following this Maseru meeting, conflict erupted on a mine in the Klerksdorp region. Between Sunday, 5th and Thursday, 9th January, this large mine (+- 33 000 Black employees) was the site of at least five distinct encounters between Lesotho workers and mine managements, as well as two violent clashes between Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers, resulting in a total of 13 deaths. These various conflict situations on the mine deserve closer attention for various reasons. They illustrate the nature of the demands made by Lesotho citizens, the basis for their protest and the way in which industry management became drawn into the conflict and eventually assisted their employees in later negotiations with the Lesotho Government. They also provide clues regarding the involvement of certain political interests

and the means by which such interests were mobilized to bring about a confrontation with Lesotho's ruling political party. Finally, a detailed assessment of the course of the conflict assists in understanding how other worker groups, notably the Xhosa speakers, became implicated in the struggle and clashed with Lesotho workers.

The following account of events is based on a variety of sources, including reports kept by TEBA Liaison Division, the mining Group inquiry cited earlier, a number of reports prepared by mine management (30), the government inquiry into mine riots (McKay, 1975) and newspaper reports (31). The first section of the mine to be affected was the South hostel:

> Sunday, 5th January: At 07h30, the Sotho induna was approched by 100 isibondas (room representatives) who requested an explanation for the new legislation. The men demanded to see the hostel manager who was then contacted. The hostel manager arrived and addressed the men, who wanted an audience with Chief Jonathan himself.
>
> The MLO was contacted and the organization's Sotho linguist arrived and addressed the isibondas at 13h45. The Sotho workers stated that they were afraid their money would be squandered or used to pay teachers' salaries in Lesotho. Later the MLO representative addressed +- 2500 Sothos in the dance arena, and informed them that the new system would only take effect on new contracts and that the mine was prepared to negotiate with the Lesotho Government on the workers' behalf. The MLO representative noticed supporters of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) in the crowd, became surrounded by workers on the arena floor and walked slowly away from the meeting.
>
> Four workers had been assaulted during the proceedings and as the meeting dispersed, hundreds of Sothos stormed and looted the bar. One Swazi worker was trampled to death, the barber shop, tailor shop and paraplegic center were set alight and the kitchen was looted. At 15h00, 20 mine security personnel and 14 dogs partially restored order with the help of tear gas. About 200 militant Sothos then confronted security personnel, who withdrew and were later reinforced by the South African Police who arrived at 18h00.
>
> At 21h30 that night, night shift workers were picketed at the kitchen and 5 picketers were arrested.
>
> Monday, 6th January: At 03h30 in the morning, the day shift was picketed at the kitchen and on the way to work. A Tswana worker was assaulted at the kitchen. By 09h00, all the Sotho workers (+- 2 000) gathered on the lawns in front of the administrative offices. The MLO representative addressed the gathering and asked the men to trust Group management to take their grievances to the Lesotho government. The crowd then dispersed.

Later that afternoon (17h00), a Lesotho government supporter was clubbed to death on the lawn in front of the administrative building. At about the same time, a group of armed Sothos approached the back of the hostel and according to reports, a local gang leader by the name of Kimberley blew a whistle as a signal for their attack on Xhosa and Pondo workers in the hostel. Xhosa workers were confronted on their way to the kitchen and violent clashes broke out, leaving 3 dead and 18 injured. One of the dead was a Black security guard and the two others were Sotho workers. The SAP separated the fighting groups with teargas and dogs.

The entire Sotho labour force then ran out of the hostel and congregated around the mine garages. Later that evening, about 600 Tswanas joined the Sothos at the garages and the men camped out for the night. At the nearby bridge which forded a river, the police set up a guard to stop an exodus of men who might have attempted to return home.

Tuesday, 7th January: At 06h00 the next morning, the MLO representative and the hostel manager appealed to men at the garages to return to work. A food transporter arrived but no food was eaten. At 09h00, pay was arranged for those awaiting discharge. About 900 men walked to the railway station.

Wednesday, 8th January: At 06h30, the remaining Sothos and 600 Botswana citizens were taken to the station, bringing the total number discharged to 3 012. On Thursday, 9th January, the SAP withdrew.

While these conflicts were taking place at the South hostel, conflicts also erupted at the No. 1 North hostel on the mine:

Sunday, 5th January: Hostel staff was placed on alert as a result of activities at the South hostel and Sothos from the South hostel were denied entry into the North hostel. Later that night, at 22h00, whistles and noises were heard from Sotho rooms inhabited by ndlamu dance teams. Two hours later, the SAP arrived with 40 men and dogs. About 150 Sothos confronted the police, who retreated and were chased back to the main gate where teargas was thrown. The crowd then dispersed to the rooms.

Monday, 6th January: The Sothos came out of their rooms beating tins and bins. Other workers were frightened to go out of their rooms to work because of the noise. At 10h30, the SAP entered the hostel to confiscate weapons and were again confronted by advancing Sothos. Teargas was thrown and the SAP retreated. A Sotho tribal representative was killed and the entire Sotho labour force gathered on the sportsfield. At 13h30, the men told the SAP that they wanted a meeting. A meeting was held near the kitchen between the hostel manager and 50-60 Sothos. Spokesmen were selected and the hostel manager advanced to the sportsfield. The men were asked

to form a negotiating committee without success. At 15h00, the crowd demanded repatriation and the withdrawal of the SAP. During this time, Sothos looted the kitchen and bread room and at 15h45 a guard was placed on the kitchen.

Tuesday, 7th January: No Sothos went underground and 450 mobilized outside the administrative office, demanding discharge. At 09h00, the hostel manager met with spokesmen, who indicated that the Sothos wanted a mass meeting in the dance arena. The meeting was held and isibondas sat with their room groups, as management had requested. The general manager met with the Sothos in the arena at 11h00.

That night, around 21h00, Sotho workers gathered round the arena, led by ndlamu dancers. The Xhosas massed in front of their own rooms and a clash took place in which 7 men were killed (five Sothos and two Xhosas). At 21h20, the SAP separated the fighting groups.

Wednesday, 8th January: The Xhosas did not go to work, the SAP patrolled the hostel and by the end of the day, close to 3 000 Sothos had been repatriated.

Thursday, 9th January: The Xhosas did not go to work and at 14h30 a mass meeting was held in the arena between Xhosa workers, the general manager and the hostel manager. The Xhosas complained that the Sotho induna took part in the attack on the Xhosas, that the Sotho tribal police did not try to stop the fighting, that the SAP used teargas on Xhosas only and that the Sothos had obtained their weapons from outside the hostel. Management promised to provide protection for the Xhosas.

A further three incidents took place at three other hostels on the mine which resulted in injuries and the looting and damage of the kitchens and beerhalls at two of the hostels. Another 1700 Basotho (and Tswanas) took their discharge. There were also conflicts at a Far East Rand gold mine belonging to another mining Group, and several encounters on collieries in the Witbank area and the Klerksdorp area, as well as three further disturbances in the Free State up until 16th January (32).

The two detailed case studies presented above reveal certain repertoires in the phases of conflict which need to be isolated and examined.

The breaches of peace clearly involved a major change in the employment conditions of Lesotho citizens for which they seemed largely

unprepared.

The wide range of mobilization tactics employed revealed, in their turn, the intensity of the Lesotho workers' concern. These included numerous mass meetings in hostel arenas, gatherings on lawns, at garages and on sportsfields. Specific mobilization tactics included the picketing of shifts, whistle blowing, tin beating and the recruitment of dance and football team networks. More significant, however, was the role apparently played in mobilization by supporters of the Basotho Congress Party.

The features of the subsequent crisis periods of overt hostility included attacks on hostel facilities and looting of mine property, assaults, clubbings and clashes with Xhosa-speaking workers. The main feature of the crisis, however, was the demand, by Lesotho workers and others, for discharge from the mines.

The conflicts were redressed through the actions of security forces and negotiations by management and representatives of the recruiting organization with striking workers and their spokesmen. One particularly important redressive action was the undertaking, by mine managements, to convey workers' grievances to the Lesotho government.

The adjustment phase, or outcome of the confrontations included the repatriation of a number of workers.

Certain aspects of these repertoires of collective action require explanation, particularly the intensity of the Lesotho workers' reactions to the change, their reasons for launching attacks on mine property and picketing of work shifts, and their involvement in clashes with other worker groups. Special attention also needs to be paid to the emergence of a comparatively unusual technique of redressive action, namely the involvement of industry management in conveying workers' grievances to their home government.

c) The Politics of Dependency: Lesotho Mineworkers and the Basotho Congress Party

The deferred pay disturbances were described by the industry as a "political demonstration against Jonathan" in which the South African mines had become the "battleground of Lesotho politics" (33). To assess the accuracy of these statements, it is necessary to examine the evidence. The fears and complaints which the workers articulated were suggestive of doubts concerning the political uses of mineworkers' deferred wages. Some Lesotho nationals feared that Chief Jonathan would use their wages to build up a private army to maintain control. There were also complaints that taxes had been raised in Lesotho and school fees not lowered, as promised. It was also rumoured that the deferred money would be used to pay teachers' salaries in Lesotho, or alternatively, that the government was planning to build a new hotel with mineworkers' money, as it had allegedly done with teachers' pay (34).

These fears and grievances certainly suggest a political conflict with the Lesotho government over the intended use of its citizens' earnings, as well as a lack of consultation on the matter of deferred pay. The political dimension of the conflict is more clearly evident, however, in the activities on the mines, of Lesotho's opposition party, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP). As described earlier, BCP supporters were reportedly present at a mass meeting on a mine.

The BCP's role was also evident in the presence, at one conflict, of Kimberley, who resided on a farm near the mine, where he kept a shebeen and supplied mineworkers with dagga, liquor and prostitutes (35). Kimberley has been described by an official in the recruiting organization as the "Chief Whip" for the BCP in the area and was regarded as a member of a so-called "Russian" gang (36). TEBA's Liaison Division reported evidence that the object of the gangs was to cause confusion

among Sotho mineworkers who would then be discharged, providing an active core of local dissatisfaction against Chief Jonathan and also disrupting mining in South Africa (37).

As early as 1967, there were (unconfirmed) press reports of a BCP campaign against Chief Jonathan which was "to be carried out with the aid of Basotho workers in South Africa and there was even talk of organized sabotage on South African mines where Basotho mineworkers are employed". The idea was to enrol Lesotho mineworkers in the BCP and eventually, through sabotage and disturbances on mines, to get Jonathan's regime into disfavour with the South African government (38).

Although these various conspiracy theories seem speculative, the role of the mines in Lesotho's political struggle was certainly taken seriously by the Lesotho government. In a speech given by Chief Jonathan at Tlalinyane's, Leribe on the 14th September, 1968, the Chief complained that government supporters were victimized by certain mine indunas and clerks "who also seduce our people in the mine to engage in politics and acts of subversion, such as to cause the derailment of trains" (39).

After Chief Jonathan's seizure of power during the abortive election of 1970, a state of emergency was imposed, to be lifted only in 1973. The BCP, under its exiled leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, continued with the struggle. In January, 1974, the BCP attacked police stations in Lesotho (40). Towards the end of that year, the mine recruiting organization's district manager for Lesotho reported rumours that a strong contingent of Sotho mineworkers would invade Lesotho over the December holidays and overthrow the government. Sothos coming home had their luggage thoroughly searched at the border posts of Lesotho (41; Annexure Four).

The fact that the deferred pay legislation was introduced within a month of these developments goes some way in explaining the mineworkers' mistrust and their violent reaction to the scheme, which they may have viewed as an attempt to neutralize the strength of BCP opposition on the

mines.

Further information on BCP activities on mines has come to light in recent years. A security officer at a Klerksdorp mine who had come to enjoy the trust of a BCP secretary at one of the hostels, reported in 1980 that there was a BCP committee at each hostel, that the supporters attended regular meetings in Soweto and Orlando, Johannesburg and that money was collected at each hostel for food and uniforms. The BCP colours were black, green and red, and supporters carried knobkieries adorned with these colours as a means of identification. The BCP informer also claimed that the majority of Sothos on mines were BCP supporters. Certain indunas on mines were spies for Chief Jonathan and these spies sent the names of supporters to the border posts, where they were searched for arms and explosives (42).

In the course of one of the deferred pay disputes outlined above, a chief induna telephoned the Lesotho Prime Minister from the mine offices to report on developments, confirming that certain indunas supported the Lesotho government and exercised that support in the mining context.

In the light of the above evidence, it seems clear that the mining industry became implicated in the internal political conflicts of Lesotho as a result of the fact that the gold mines provided an opportunity for opposition supporters to develop and maintain an organizational basis which was largely shielded from retribution and repressive action by the Lesotho government. The conflicts outlined earlier indicate that Sotho ndlamu and mohobello dance teams, as well as football teams, played a supportive role in the grass-roots mobilization of BCP supporters on mines.

The mines not only provided a protected organizational base for opposition activities, but also implied that Lesotho citizens on mines could mobilize wider support for their grievances by implicating industry management in their struggle. During the deferred pay disputes, Lesotho

mineworkers frequently attempted to obtain the support of industry management in their struggle with Chief Jonathan's government. The workers were successful in that at least one management-led delegation travelled to Lesotho to bring the mineworkers' grievances to the attention of the Lesotho government.

This delegation and a number of other worker-led delegations to Lesotho were the outcome of the workers' earnest desires to get an audience with Chief Jonathan. In virtually every conflict situation, the Sothos demanded to talk to the Chief. On one gold mine in the Far East Rand, this desire was dramatically expressed after the mine authorities relayed Jonathan's radio broadcast over the hostel's public address system (43). Sotho workers were under the impression that the Chief was actually present in the administration offices, and became hostile when the Sotho induna told them he was not on the mine.

In a number of the dispute situations recorded, it appeared that Sotho workers engineered work stoppages and attacked hostel facilities as a means of bringing their plight to management's attention and, furthermore, to put pressure on management to take up their grievances. In an effort to defuse the immediate conflict situation and to ensure a return to work, various mine managements undertook to approach the Lesotho government. The Chamber of Mines also became drawn into the situation and agreed to send a telex from the President of the Chamber to the Prime Minister of Lesotho, calling on the Lesotho government to suspend the deferred pay legislation, failing which the industry would refrain from recruiting Sothos under contracts associated with compulsory deferred pay. The telex was sent on the 8th January. The Chamber had second thoughts the following day, however, realizing that it would not help the industry if Lesotho modified the legislation, because this would indicate to workers that they could use the industry for political ends (44).

Certain individual mines, however, had already given an undertaking to their employees that they would approach the Lesotho government on their behalf. The first delegation to Lesotho was that undertaken by mining Group executives and mine officials on 3rd January, as mentioned earlier. On the 13th January, another delegation had an audience with the Lesotho Labour Commissioner at the Labour Department Office, Maseru. Present at the meeting were the MLO Lesotho Manager, the MLO Sotho representative who had assisted in the Klerksdorp mine conflict, a hostel manager, two Sotho indunas and one team leader from the Klerksdorp mine. Certain allegations were discussed, including the fear that workers could only draw their deferred wages after five years. After these fears were allayed, the three Black delegates agreed that political agitation was the cause of the disturbances (45).

A third delegation, involving only black representatives, originated in a mass meeting of Sotho workers at a Carletonville mine on Thursday, 9th January. At the meeting, a decision was made to send a delegation to Lesotho. The delegation had an audience with the Lesotho Minister of Commerce on the 15th January in Maseru. The Minister approved the fact that the men were not led by Whites like the other delegations. He remarked that "...the Boers have a vested interest for keeping your money in the Republic of South Africa", but agreed to modify the ruling, unfreezing 30 per cent of deferred pay for workers still on contract. On their return to the mine, the delegation reported back to Sotho workers, and the concession was well received (46).

The deferred pay disputes also had an impact on relationships between Lesotho workers and other worker groups on mines, particularly the Xhosa and Pondo speakers. The impression that could be gained from the Klerksdorp conflict described earlier was that the Sothos attempted to gain the support of the Xhosas in their conflict with Chief Jonathan. Although certain requests for support may have been made during the

conflicts, it is more likely that the clashes with Xhosas were seen as tactically necessary by Sotho worker leadership, as the following evidence suggests. In the first conflict at the South hostel, Sotho strikers had massed on the lawns on the Monday morning. The MLO Sotho representative was successful in getting the crowd to disperse after asking those present to trust management to take their grievances to Jonathan.

The immediate effect, however, was a winding down of the crisis. In an apparent effort to prolong the conflict and maintain a tactical advantage, a group of armed Sothos gathered behind the hostel later that afternoon and on Kimberley's whistle signal, entered the hostel and confronted Xhosas on their way to the kitchen, an action followed soon after by a violent clash between the two groups in the early evening. In his report on the clash, the general manager of the mine described the events after the meeting between management negotiators and strikers on the Monday morning, and noted that:

> The impression was that, despite the continuous agitation amongst the crowd, the negotiators had convinced a great number of Basothos to go to work. The subsequent events indicate that once the organizers realized that the strike might be partially broken, they started a faction fight against Xhosas at 5p.m. (47).

An additional aggravating factor which may also have increased tension between the two groups, was the damage apparently inflicted by the Sothos on the property of the Xhosas while the latter were at work on the morning before their clash (48). This action could be viewed as a tactical provocation on the part of Sotho workers, designed to encourage retaliation and prolong the conflict.

In conclusion: the Lesotho deferred pay disputes revealed an underlying political struggle between the mineworkers and the Basotho Congress Party on the one hand, and the government of Chief Jonathan on the other. Lesotho mineworkers appeared to interpret the matter of

compulsory deferred wages in a political light as an action designed to curb their own economic self-sufficiency and resources and bolster that of the Lesotho regime.

The conflicts signalled another phase in the long-standing political struggle being waged since the late 1960's between the BCP and the Jonathan regime. An important organizational base of this struggle had become located on mines, in that the BCP enjoyed the support of most of the Lesotho mineworkers and benefitted from the protective isolation provided by the industry's hostels.

The mineworkers themselves were also anxious to maintain control over their own earnings, and accordingly attempted to translate their economic dependency on migrant wages, and hence their entrenched representation in the mining work force, into a source of political power. Their crucial role in the mine production process and the serious financial consequences of a work stoppage, combined to encourage mine and industry management to assist Lesotho workers in seeking the withdrawal of the legislation.

Their struggle, however, remained largely ineffective with respect to the issue of compulsory deferred pay, although the apparent benefits of such a scheme for their country's own economic future may have become clearer to mineworkers after their contact and discussions with Lesotho government officials.

Whether or not Lesotho mineworkers were eventually reconciled to compulsory deferred pay, one important initial difficulty of the scheme can be identified. This difficulty was the fact that Lesotho's domestic economy could not accommodate the increased purchasing power associated with increases in (deferred) wages, inevitably resulting in a growth of imports (Eckert and Wykstra, 1980:11). The extent to which this problem was appreciated by Lesotho nationals at the time of the introduction of compulsory deferred pay, could not, however, be ascertained.

Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of the Sothos' actions during the dispute was the occurrence of at least two violent clashes with the Xhosa-speaking worker group. The Sothos' relations with these other workers, already strained as a result of a number of violent clashes on Free State mines ten months earlier in February, 1974, deteriorated further as a consequence of implicating Xhosas in their protest.

This particular outcome of the dispute suggests that the structure of migratory labour, and its associated economic dependency, can sometimes undermine co-operation and solidarity between different worker groups. When a particular group of migrant workers attempts to further its regional (political) goals by drawing on the power available to it in the work place of the industrial metropolis, other worker groups may be drawn into the struggle. The fact that these other worker groups do not always share the same particular problems, or are implicated in another group's tactics, implies that conflict between these different groups is likely to occur and general worker solidarity may be weakened.

The Lesotho deferred pay dispute of early 1975 was followed closely by the emergence of a further crisis in the industry involving yet another foreign worker group, namely that from Mozambique. Once again, it is necessary to outline the historical background to the emergence of migratory labour from Mozambique to assist in understanding the particular conflicts involving workers from this region.

4. MOZAMBICAN LABOUR AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

a) The Origins of Migratory Labour from Mozambique

The most important original source of migratory labour to the gold mines was Mozambique, particularly the Southern areas of that country. Some time before active recruiting commenced, Mozambican workseekers

walked from their homes to the mines of the rand, despite the problems of distance, terrain, banditry and exploitation encountered on route (McNamara, 1978a).

In 1901, the newly-formed WNLA secured an agreement with the Portuguese authorities and established its first recruitment network to draw men from Southern Mozambique. The agreement was later revised by the Mozambique Convention of 1928 (Stahl, 1981:31).

The origins of migratory labour from Mozambique can be traced to a variety of factors originally unrelated to the organization of recruitment itself. The early slave trade up to the 1860's and the presence of Nguni raiders in the 1890's forced many Mozambicans to flee their homes and seek a refuge and livelihood elsewhere (Webster, 1978). There were also frequent famines, locust plagues and rinderpest epidemics which impoverished the population and obliged them to seek work.

After the 1890's, the actions of the Portuguese authorities began to play an important role in encouraging Mozambicans to seek employment in South Africa. In an effort to ensure that the local plantation economy was provided with labour, the Mozambican authorities introduced hut taxes and labour regulations which obliged all able-bodied natives to work. Many Mozambicans travelled to the South African gold mines to evade these shibalo obligations (Harris, 1959).

Certain anthropologists (notably Harris, 1959 and Webster, 1978) have also suggested that the impetus for migration could be traced in part to traditional inheritance rules and the particular character of the social system. Among the Tonga- Shangaan, for example, the sons of a headman were ranked according to order of birth and the position of their respective mothers in the polygynous household. On the death of the head, the cattle herds passed to the senior heir, leaving the junior brothers in a state of dispossession for a great part of their lives. These men quickly accepted migrant wages "...as a welcome alternative to

the struggle to win status through the traditional mechanisms" (Harris, 1959:57).

A similar form of adelphic succession has also been described for the Chopi of Southern Mozambique (Webster, 1978). Webster has also argued elsewhere (1977) that the Chopis' shallow lineages and spread of marriage alliances were associated with a marked degree of individuality expressed in the seeking of 'big man' status. A 'big man' achieved wealth and position by forging marital and other kinds of alliances. This emphasis on individuality and achievement of status also encouraged young men to become migrant wage earners, instead of waiting many years for advancement and wealth in the traditional system.

The sexual division of labour has also been associated with migratory movements. In the agricultural tasks, Tsonga men were expected to undertake the brief, heavy work of clearing virgin fields. The women, in turn, carried out the longer tasks of hoeing, planting and weeding, thereby freeing the men from agricultural work for long periods (Harris, 1959:57).

The combined effect of these various economic, political and social factors, help to account for Mozambique's long history of migratory labour to the gold mines. In 1904, there were close to 45 000 Mozambicans on gold mines, representing over 50 per cent of the total labour force (14th CMAR, 1903:52). By 1975, Mozambicans numbered 90 000, or 27 per cent of the total (Table 2, on p. 91).

In the course of this long tradition of mining work, the Mozambican mineworker developed a reputation for being a "natural miner" with an "adventurous" spirit which inclined him to underground work. He was also generally regarded as a "tried and faithful" employee (Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 1923:1-3).

These trusting qualities were evident in the comparatively low rate of desertion of Mozambican workers. In 1913, less than one per cent of

the total Mozambican labour force deserted the mines per annum, a rate lower than all other worker groups (24th CMAR for 1913:554).

Despite their long-standing reputation for faithful service, Mozambican workers began to feature in a number of conflict situations in the 1970's, including work stoppages and inter-group clashes. These conflicts on mines coincided with a series of political events and developments in Mozambique, culminating in the achievement of independence from Portuguese rule in mid-1975.

b) Mozambicans, Mine Conflicts and Political Change : 1974-1975

The first contemporary signs of worker unrest involving Shangaan-speaking Mozambicans as a distinct group can be traced to the Malawian disturbances. Malawians and Shangaans clashed on four separate occasions on Central and East Rand mines between September and November, 1974. Very little information is available on the causes of these minor clashes, although they could be accounted for mainly in terms of the Malawians' own tactics to secure repatriation. One strike by Malawians at an East Rand gold mine also had the unfortunate consequence of obliging Shangaans to do additional work as a result of the depletion of underground gangs. Immediately after the Malawian strike, 1000 Mozambican workers staged their own protest, refusing to work until they had been granted a pay rise of R5 to R7 a day. The strike was subdued with teargas and dogs and 142 Mozambicans were repatriated (49).

That same month (October, 1974), Mozambican and Malawian team leaders had been involved in a series of three strikes on a Klerksdorp mine, protesting the low wages and other service conditions offered to team leaders. Evidence presented to the McKay Commission by the mine's hostel manager indicated that the Shangaans were influenced by FRELIMO successes in Mozambique (50).

In November and December of 1974, Mozambicans were also involved in

two clashes with Xhosa and Pondo-speaking workers, respectively, which resulted in the death of three Shangaans. At least 100 Mozambicans were repatriated after one of the clashes. In November also, 580 Shangaan novices refused to work on their arrival at an East Rand mine after being in contact with a large number of Malawians awaiting repatriation at the labour depot in Johannesburg (51). The Malawians may have alarmed these novices with accounts of the poor conditions at this mine. A Mozambican mineworker interviewed by the Maputo-based Centre of African Studies reported that he, a novice in 1975, had been told by "old miners" at Mzilikazi (the WNLA depot) that anyone going to that mine was "finished" (First, 1983:103).

The activities of Malawians appeared to have been an unsettling factor for Mozambicans in late-1974, but this alone does not help to explain the Mozambicans' clashes with other worker groups and their sudden prominence in several wage strikes at that time. It is important to note that the timing of the Mozambicans' actions were closely linked to external developments in Mozambique. From January, 1974 onwards, FRELIMO intensified operations with a series of attacks on railways and white farms (SAIRR, 1975:102; Annexure Four). Months later, in April, 1974 a military junta overthrew Caetano's regime in Portugal after the resignation of General Spinola. The General had written an account of the war in Mozambique which was instrumental in bringing about the eventual withdrawal of Portugal from the erstwhile colony (SAIRR, 1975:99).

On 25th June, 1974, 7 returning mineworkers were fatally shot by guards at the Ressano Garcia border post in a dispute over exchange rates (SAIRR, 1975:287). On the 7th September, the Portuguese and FRELIMO's Machel reached an agreement for a ceasefire and independence. That same day, White residents of Mozambique staged an abortive counter-coup in Lourenco Marques, followed in October by clashes between FRELIMO and

Portuguese commandos in the town (SAIRR, 1975:109-111).

The October clashes in Mozambique coincided closely with the wage strikes initiated by Mozambican mineworkers in the East Rand and Klerksdorp regions. This close parallel between the activities of Mozambican mineworkers and events in Mozambique became evident again later in the period immediately preceding the achievement of independence for that country in mid-1975. On 3rd June, 1975, 134 Quellimanes claimed they were too tired and wanted repatriation. Later that month (13th), 600 Mozambicans were involved in a disturbance on a Witbank colliery, an event linked by industry management to the impending independence of Mozambique (52).

Mozambique achieved its independence under a new FRELIMO government on 25th June, 1975, amid rejoicing and celebration. The desire for repatriation on the part of certain Mozambicans mineworkers two weeks earlier, may have been related to the need to attend the celebrations. Mozambicans may also have feared consequences similar to those experienced by Malawians during their repatriation. No clear evidence could be traced to support this possibility, however.

The impact of Mozambique's independence on the social and political milieu of the gold mines became evident towards the end of 1975 in the form of a series of inter-group clashes at a long-established East Rand mine. This gold mine had been severely affected by the Malawian repatriations. In June, 1974, 56 per cent of the labour force was Malawian in origin, a situation drastically reversed by June, 1975 when Malawians accounted for only 4 per cent of the total. The Malawian domination was more pronounced than most other gold mines, but there were also a number of Mozambicans on the mine, making up 30 per cent of the total in June, 1974. After the new recruiting drive into Mozambique in 1975, however, the mine's "East Coast" labour force became proportionally larger than any other mine in the industry, including those which were

also once heavily dependent on Malawi. By June, 1975, fully 72 per cent of the labour force was Mozambican in origin. This intensified recruiting drive in Mocambique coincided closely with the success of Frelimo and the securing of political independence in that country.

Between September and November, 1975, Mozambicans clashed violently with other worker groups on the mine on at least four occasions. It is necessary to examine these conflicts in more detail to demonstrate how politico-national conflicts in the wider Southern African context can be relevant to conflicts on mines. The cases are also of special significance in that they reveal the way in which certain Mozambican mineworkers interpreted and applied their new-found political inspiration in an industrial context, and the way in which other workers reacted to these developments.

The setting in which the conflicts originated consisted of an open area outside the hostel frequented by mobile shebeens. The shebeen owners, operating from vans, sold various liquors, including methylated spirits at 50c per bottle (53). The shebeens seemed to be under the control of Sotho "Russian" gangs who were also allegedly waylaying and robbing other mineworkers, including Shangaans, on their way back to the hostel (54).

On Sunday afternoon, 7th September, Xhosa workers clashed with Shangaans near the shebeens and the fighting spread to the hostel. Twenty-nine men were injured in the fighting which was quelled by the SAP and MSP with teargas.

On Wednesday, 10th september, 35 new Mozambican recruits, part of a batch of 100 that had arrived earlier, refused to work and walked back to the TEBA depot. The men were later encouraged to return to the mine.

The following week-end, these tensions culminated in a fatal clash between Sothos and Shangaans originating in the shebeen area. This case, presented below, was compiled from the files of TEBA Liaison Division,

and a set of interviews conducted by the Human Resources Laboratory one week after the incident:

> Saturday, 13th September: As workers came off shift in the early afternoon, a Sotho worker was told by a Shangaan underground policeman that the Sothos and Xhosas would be attacked outside the compound that day. All men with five-letter numbers (Sotho, Xhosa, Pondo, Pedi, Tswana) would be the targets.
>
> Later that afternoon, several young Shangaans and Sothos outside the hostel engaged in fighting over girl friends, apparently stemming from certain taunts and insults. Around 16h30, a crowd of Shangaans attacked Sothos and others on the road leading to the hostel. The crowd then ran to the hostel offices and attacked a young Zulu worker who had sought refuge inside the offices. Teargas was used to dispel the crowd and 11 injured men were admitted to hospital.
>
> Sunday, 14th September: Shangaan workers were reported to be walking around the hostel announcing the time of their intended attack. At approximately 16h30 trouble was reported in the bar area and a group of Sothos armed with broken branches, forced entry into Shangaan rooms. Twenty-five Shangaans and 5 Sothos were injured. Sothos also attacked Shangaans outside the hostel, resulting in one death and 14 injuries. Teargas and dogs were employed to halt the conflicts in the evening.
>
> Monday, 15th September: The MLO's Sotho-speaking inspector walked around the Sotho rooms and heard their complaints. A number of security precautions were later introduced, including the placing of a riot van and 5 dogs at the main gate. The SAP also arrested 17 liquor sellers outside the hostel. One hundred "South African" workers mobilized and requested transfer to other mines. The men were addressed by the hostel manager, who offered to arrange transfers to the South-West hostel on the mine, but emphasized that those refusing to work would be sent home. The cheering men accepted the offer of transfer.
>
> Tuesday, 16th September: A total of 180 men refused to work and were discharged.

Less than two months after these events, the mine experienced two further clashes involving Shangaans and other workers. On Tuesday, 4th November, at 18h50, a Shangaan was stabbed outside the hostel and died later at the medical dressing station. Certain Shangaans became involved in a clash with Xhosas and others near the dressing station and outside the hostel, bringing the death total to 3. Approximately 50 workers

(Xhosa, Pondo, Sotho and Rhodesian) requested transfer to other hostels. A few days later, a minor clash took place between Shangaan and Bhaca workers after a Bhaca had stabbed a Shangaan in a dice game.

The detailed case study outlined above was the more important of the various conflicts and commenced with a breach of the peace outside the hostel at certain shebeens, taking the form of fights over girl friends. The actual mobilization took place outside the hostel and the crisis was characterized by violent clashes between different worker groups, with the Shangaans the initial aggressors. The conflict was redressed through security action and the efforts of the MLO representative. A feature of the adjustment was the repatriation of South African workers.

It is necessary to attempt to account for these repertoires of conflict, particularly the significance of the shebeen setting, the aggressive actions of Shangaan workers with respect to other worker groups and the eventual departure of certain workers of South African origin.

The main encounter and several other incidents noted above could be traced partly to the social tensions evident outside the hostel in the shebeen setting. The fact that the presence of women was associated with the clashes is not difficult to understand. Prolonged sexual deprivation and a shortage of women in the hostel environs appear to foster competition among male migrant workers. Although these tensions may have played a role in the conflict, the fact that the Shangaans planned their attack on other workers suggests that a deeper, underlying motive for their actions should not be ruled out.

Following these clashes, workers and mine management identified a particular section of the Shangaan population as the aggressors. The antagonists were apparently drawn from the new, young recruits who had arrived on the mine since the beginning of the year to replace Malawian losses. These men had come through the Pafuri recruiting office in

Northern Mozambique and were described by certain workers as "Makirimanes" (i.e. from Quellimane), but most commonly as "Mabellbottoms", because of their mode of dress. These young recruits were described as wearing high-heeled shoes and being "urban" in life style and militant. They were also reported to have used pro-FRELIMO slogans. One management observer described these new recruits as "...tsotsi types from towns specially recruited by Samora Machel to get them off the streets..." (55).

Sotho and Xhosa workers interviewed by the Human Resources Laboratory one week after the clash, complained that they had been abused and insulted in the underground cages (man hoists) and stopes by the "bell-bottoms" who also told other workers that the mine was a Shangaan mine and that they would have to leave (56). The TEBA Liaison Division also reported that certain workers had been told by Shangaan police "boys" and others that the Shangaans intended to get rid of other tribes at the mine (57).

The evidence indicates that it was not the mass of Shangaan workers that wished to transform the mine into a "Shangaan mine", but only the young "bell-bottoms". Certain of the older, more experienced Shangaan employees did not identify with this action and claimed in interviews that they had lived harmoniously with other tribes until the arrival of the new recruits (58).

The confrontation and attempted takeover was couched in terms of a clash of values between younger, progressive workers and older, conservative men, a category which included the older Shangaan mineworkers. The young Mozambicans were reported to have harshly categorized all other workers on the mine as "blanket" people. This categorization was evident in an interview with a Mozambican migrant worker from the affected mine, conducted by the Centre of African Studies, Maputo and recorded by First (1983:106):

> As time went by, we came to realise that the boss-boy was not well disposed to Mozambican recruits in general. The reason was that a group of young Mozambicans had come to this same mine earlier in 1975. They had created problems and became very unpopular. The group called itself the 'Bokani' (bandidos). These bandidos had gone to the mines from Maputo. They went as a big group and they had been bandits here in Maputo before independence. After their arrival at (the mine) they started boasting about Mozambique's independence by shouting some of the Frelimo slogans. In the process they formulated a new slogan which drove the Xhosas and Sothos up the wall, and this slogan was 'abaixo blanket!' (abaixo means 'down with'). Our boss-boy, we discovered, was Xhosa, and he gave us a long lecture on the 'Bokani' problem as our introduction to the work underground. The boss-boy said: 'You Bokanis are trouble-makers. You obviously think this is your home, but you are making a big mistake. When we are out in the compound you keep saying 'Abaixo blanket, abaixo blanket!' ...Why? What do you expect us to do? Do you expect us to abandon our traditions and give up our blankets?'

This conflict between the "bell-bottom" bandidos and the "blanket" people, denoted a clash of political values between the younger, progressive FRELIMO supporters and the older, conservative and experienced mineworkers. The young recruits were clearly inspired by the recent change of political fortune in their home country. The bid to make the mine the "home" and sole preserve of Mozambican workers was clearly carried out by these same new recruits.

The evidence suggests that the young Mozambicans applied their new-found political confidence and energy by attempting to appropriate the jobs of other workers and by extension, the mine itself. The actual takeover as such took the form of a demonstration against other workers which reaffirmed the numerical superiority of Mozambicans. The incidents also led to a number of men in the minority groups taking their discharge, indicating that the demonstration and threats had had the desired effect.

The actions of the young Mozambicans were not inconsistent with the historical character of migrant labour from Mozambique. From the earliest times, younger men became migrant workers to secure the wealth and status they could not easily secure in the context of exclusive

inheritance rules. These enduring ambitions in mining work, coupled with the emphasis on individuality in the kinship system described by Webster (1977), may have been heightened by the political successes of FRELIMO in recent times and applied in an attempt to appropriate the job structure of a South African gold mine. The Mozambican mineworkers' long-standing reputation for "adventurousness" seemed to have been expressed in a new and unexpected way, transformed by the process of political change in contemporary Southern Africa.

This same transformation, however, was to play a role in eventually narrowing down job opportunities for Mozambican workers on South African gold mines. The initial intensification of recruitment in Mozambique after the Malawian repatriations was destined to be short-lived. In 1975, the new FRELIMO government commenced with the printing of new passports and the reorganization of the issue procedure, including a reduction in the number of immigration officers authorized to issue travel documents (First, 1983:58). The delays encountered in this respect resulted in a temporary drop in the supply of labour from Mozambique.

By the time the labour flow had been restored, the Chamber had already embarked on a programme of recruiting South African workers, partly to avoid being too vulnerable with respect to labour from other African countries on the Northern and Eastern borders. After 1975, the industry was no longer prepared to take on novice Mozambicans, confining recruitment to experienced men with valid re-engagement guarantees (VRG). The VRG had been introduced in the industry in November, 1975, partly to assist in the control of the flow of labour from Mozambique. The number of Mozambicans on Chamber mines declined from 118 000 in 1975 to 48 000 the following year (Table 2, on p. 91). Since that date, their number has remained at a fairly constant level, representing approximately nine per cent of the total labour force. As a result of this reduction, it

became unlikely that Mozambican migrants would again exert any major influence on the social and political milieu of gold mines in South Africa.

5. CONCLUSION : FOREIGN WORKERS AND THE POLITICS OF LABOUR

In the preceding sections, an attempt was made to outline certain conflicts associated with the mining industry's reliance on labour from the countries of Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique. This historical dependency on "foreign" labour sources, itself a product of the wage and employment policies of the industry, implicated mine managements in the process of political change and development undergone by these countries in recent years.

Certain changes and developments in the economic and political affairs of these various labour-supplying countries were associated with strained relationships between employees from these regions and the management of the industry. These same changes also sparked off tensions between the different migrant worker groups which made up the labouring population on mines.

Each of these countries attempted to come to terms, in different ways, with their self-reinforcing spiral of economic dependency on migrant earnings in South Africa and the various political problems and issues associated with such dependency. In the case of Malawi, the country's premier took the opportunity to withdraw his citizens from mines in an effort to rebuild the domestic economy, after it was believed that a shortage of local labour had undermined the progress of the country during the first decade of its political independence.

The Malawian withdrawal took the mining industry largely unawares and dramatized the extent of their vulnerability with respect to foreign sources of labour.

Numerous gold and platinum mines experienced protracted work

stoppages as a result of the Malawian workers' fears regarding perceived threats to their citizenship should they fail to return home on time. The men were also clearly uncertain about their employment prospects in Malawi's domestic economy.

Whereas Malawi's "solution" to the problem of dependency on South African mines involved a near-total withdrawal from the industry, the government of Lesotho had to consider other alternatives, being heavily dependent on the mine wage economy. Consequently, steps were taken to ensure that a greater proportion of the earnings of its citizens would be deferred back to Lesotho to strengthen the home economy. In opposing this move, Lesotho mineworkers attempted to exploit their latent political power at the work place. Certain mines became the battleground between the regime of Chief Jonathan and the opposition Basotho Congress Party, which had developed a following and an organizational network on South African mines. Lesotho mineworkers were also successful at times in drawing mine and industry management into a supportive role during negotiations with the Lesotho governments.

These events served to strengthen industry managements' resolve to reduce its dependence on labour from designated foreign countries. By the time Mozambique achieved political independence in 1975, the industry had already embarked on a strategy for the recruitment of local South African labour by late-1974. Although the mines experienced a few work stoppages which coincided closely with political conflict and change in Mozambique, the industry acted to avoid future problems by restricting further recruiting in that country. The new government in Mozambique, for its part, did not demonstrate any obvious intentions of withdrawing its citizens from the mines. Apart from certain administrative problems which temporarily reduced the supply, FRELIMO's socialist government seemed intent on adopting a different strategy in relation to its embarrassing dependence on South Africa. FRELIMO's "solution", at least

initially, was to embark on a programme of pressure and influence to secure improvements in the condition under which its subjects worked on mines. First reports, for example, that the new government addressed returning mineworkers on a campaign to improve conditions on mines and the transport of men to and from their homes (First, 1983: facing p. 97).

After this time, a more broadly-based strategy began to emerge, spearheaded by the International Labour Organization and the labour-supplying states themselves. The South African Labour Commission (SALC) was formed in 1978 and comprised Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its aim was to achieve co-ordination among the various supplying states and ensure that South Africa did not exploit their internal differences (59).

At the Lusaka conference on migratory labour in Southern Africa, held in April, 1978, a Charter of Rights for Migrant Workers was drawn up. The Charter listed rights of association, movement and residence, and the right to a "decent" standard of living (in First, 1983: Appendix Five).

The Association of the Home Countries of Migrants (AHCM) was also formed by the International Labour Organization. In April, 1979 Stahl and Bohning proposed a fifteen-year strategy for the eventual withdrawal of the Association's citizens from migratory work in South Africa. The strategy included measures to ensure that countries providing labour were first adequately compensated before withdrawal was effected (Stahl and Bohning, 1981).

These general strategies, however, were developed at a time when the mining industry had already come to appreciate the problems involved in remaining dependent on far-flung sources of labour in other African countries. By the time these various countries had moved to co-ordinate an overall strategy in relation to their dependency on South African mine wages, the proportion of "foreign" workers in the industry had dropped

significantly. From 1974, when the percentage of foreign labour from Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland was close to 80 per cent, the numbers of workers from these countries had declined to 47 per cent in 1978, the year of the Lusaka conference. Conversely, the proportion of South African workers reached 53 per cent in that year and increased thereafter to 57 per cent by 1982 (Table 3).

Table 3 PROPORTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS IN THE GOLD MINE LABOUR FORCE: 1971 - 1982

Year	Total no. employed	No. of Black South Africans[1]	Per cent of Total
1971	370 547	86 868	23,4
1972	361 595	79 742	21,8
1973	378 826	81 375	21,5
1974	349 985	77 350	22,1
1975	321 846	101 553	31,6
1976	342 507	143 509	41,9
1977	373 468	189 106	50,6
1978	388 794	204 318	52,6
1979	399 123	215 577	54,0
1980	415 537	233 088	56,1
1981	422 057	240 082	56,9
1982	418 187	239 065	57,2
Total	4 542 472	1 890 633	41,6

1. The number of Black South Africans in this table includes those from the independent national states, including Transkei, Ciskei and Bophutatswana, as well as those in non-independent homelands.

Source: Chamber of Mines Annual Reports.

Although the proportion of foreign workers in the industry remained fairly constant since the mid-1970's and still constituted an appreciable segment of the total (over 40 per cent), it is clear that the supplier

countries were not able in time to fully exploit the heavy dependency on these sources experienced by the industry in earlier years. Once it had become clear that the mines were successfully 'internalizing' their labour supplies, the strategy of foreign labour supply countries shifted mainly to the creation of local employment opportunities and rural development (Stahl, 1981:40-43).

Whereas industry management was able to partly extricate itself from its political vulnerability on certain foreign labour supply sources in recent years, the real brunt of the earlier conflicts associated with such vulnerability was borne by the Black mineworking population itself. During the Malawian disturbances, there were numerous fatal clashes between Malawians and other worker groups, associated partly with the formers' desire to be repatriated. During the deferred pay disputes also, Lesotho mineworkers attempted to draw other workers, notably Xhosa speakers, into their protest. It was clear that the inter-group clashes which took place between these groups were engineered by Sotho workers to gain certain tactical advantages in their efforts to involve the industry in the struggle against their home government.

In the case of the Mozambicans also, the inspiration which migrant recruits from that country derived from the political successes of FRELIMO, was a relevant factor in an attempt to violently remove other workers from one gold mine and make it the sole preserve of Mozambican workers.

For their part, mineworkers from within South Africa's borders appear to have resented the fact that the mines were dominated for so long by workers from foreign countries, thereby denying local workers much-needed employment. In interviews conducted in 1975 by the Human Resources Laboratory, certain Xhosa-speaking men were reported to have stated that they resented non-South African blacks because they did not pay taxes. They claimed also that mine property, as part of the

Republic, was their land and that "foreigners" should not be permitted to work on mines (Mahlatji and Robertson, 1975:5).

This resentment was already evident in the 1950's and 1960's, when a number of violent clashes took place on mines between "tropicals" (mainly Malawians and Angolans) and South African workers (mainly Pondos and Xhosas), resulting in 10 deaths in three incidents (60). In one case, reference was made to the "general attitude" of "union" natives towards "tropical" workers (61).

The chief outcome of the industry's dependence on foreign labour sources was that the conditions were created for violent conflict between different sections of the Black mineworking population in the 1970's. South African workers were not only drawn into the tactical actions of foreign worker groups or subjected to the changing aspirations of these groups, but also expressed their own resentment against foreign migrants. These factors together constitute an important part of the explanation for many of the inter-group clashes on gold mines, which will be subjected to further scrutiny in a later chapter.

The turbulent years of 1974 and 1975 did not, however, mark the end of conflicts associated with the employment of workers from countries outside South Africa's borders. In an effort to replace the labour losses brought about by the Malawian withdrawal, the industry had not only intensified recruiting for a time in Mozambique and embarked on a programme to recruit South African labour, but it also turned its attention to Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The recruitment of Black Rhodesians from 1975 onwards introduced a new phase in the mining industry's contemporary history, one which became associated with a new pattern of conflict. These conflicts were directed mainly at mine managements, but again implicated other worker groups on mines. The origin and form of conflicts on mines involving Black Rhodesians is the subject of the following chapter.

NOTES:

1. Malawi Labour File (Compiler B. Pachai), 1975, Human Resources Laboratory.
2. COMNL 2/1974: Tropicals - Malawi Aircrash: Telex 4th April 1974: WNLA Johannesburg to WNLA Lilongwe.
3. COMNL 2/1974: Tropicals - Malawi Aircrash: telex 8th April 1974: WNLA Lilongwe to WNLA Johannesburg.
4. Rand Daily Mail: 19th April, 1974.
5. Rand Daily Mail: 17-19th April, 1974; The Star: 15th April, 1974.
6. COMNL 1974: Rhodesia: Report of Meeting with Dr the Hon. P.G.J. Koornhof, Minister of Mines and Senior Representatives of the Government Service, Pretoria, 15 July 1974.
7. COMNL 1974: Rhodesia.
8. COMGU 3/1974: President of Chamber of Mines to Minister of Mines: 22nd August, 1974.
9. COMNL 2/1974: Tropicals - Malawi Aircrash: Aide Memoire for Prime Minister, 14th November, 1974.
10. COMGU 3/1974: Minutes of Meeting - Chamber President and M.L.O. Head with President Banda, 31st October, 1974.
11. The Star: 19th November, 1974.
12. TLD: Labour Unrest Files, 1974.
13. COMGU A-D 1974; The Star: 11th October, 1974; Rand Daily Mail: 11th October, 1974; 12th October, 1974.
14. RMLU: East Rand Proprietary Mines, Limited - Report on Malawi Disturbance, South West Compound, October, 1974.
15. The Star: 22nd October, 1974; COMGU 3/1974.
16. JCI Labour Unrest File 1974-1976: Report on Disturbance at Amandelbult, Tumela Hostel - 2nd November, 1974.
17. McKay Commission, Annexure Three: 85,89-90.
18. TLD: Labour Unrest Files 1974-1976: Memorandum on Riot at Bafokeng South Mine, December, 1974.
19. U.C. Box 2083 - Strike by Malawian Mineworkers of Bafokeng South Mine, December 17-28, 1974; Report on Incident Involving Violence on the Mine, 15-16 December, 1974.
20. U.C. Box 2083 - Consulting Engineer to Deputy Government Mining Engineer, 7th April, 1975.
21. M.L.O. Position of Companies: Number of Bantu in Service as at 30th June, 1974.

22. RM LU: Memorandum to President, Chamber of Mines from Chairman, Rand Mines, Limited - Recruiting in lesotho, 12th September, 1974.

23. COMGU 1975.

24. AACGRD Box 251.992: An Inquiry into the Disturbances on Anglo American Gold Mines - January, 1975:6-7.

25. AACGRD Box 251.992: Inquiry into Disturbances, ibid: 69-70.

26. Rand Daily Mail : 10th January, 1975.

27. AACGRD Box 251.992: Inquiry into Disturbances, ibid: 70.

28. AACGRD Box 975: Diary of Deferred Pay Dispute - Free State Saaiplaas mine, 1st January, 1975.

29. The Star: 3rd January, 1975; Rand Daily Mail: 4th January, 1975.

30. AACGRD Box 1009: Report on Vaal Reefs Labour Disturbances: January, 1975, by Deputy Managing Director (Gold Division); AACGRD BOX 865: Comments on Strike and Disturbances by Basotho Employees at Vaal Reefs South Hostel, Jan 5-6, 1975, by General Manager; Report on strike and Faction Fight of Basotho Mineworkers at South Vaal Hostel, Jan 5-6, 1975, by General Manager;

31. The Star : 9th January, 1975; Rand Daily Mail: 10th January, 1975.

32. McKay Commission, Annexure Three: 80,95-97.

33. AACGRD Box 251.992: Inquiry into Disturbances, ibid: 62.

34. Rand Daily Mail: 11th January, 1975; AACGRD Box 251.992: Inquiry, ibid: 55,60.

35. AACGRD Box 251.992: Inquiry, ibid: 54.

36. TEBA Monthly Report for November, 1982: Report of Liaison Division.

37. TLD : Memo of 20th April, 1979 : Basotho Russian Gangs.

38. Dagbreek and Sondagnuus: 26 February 1967.

39. COMNL - Lesotho, General 1967

40. Rand Daily Mail: 3rd October, 1981.

41. MLO Monthly Report for December, 1974.

42. TLD: Memo: General Manager to Gold Producers' Committee: 20th June, 1980; Memo: Basotho Congress Party and Lesotho Liberation Army, by Chief Liaison Officer, 11th July, 1980.

43. McKay Commission, Annexure Three: 95; UC Box 2083.

44. COMGU 1975.

45. AACGRD Box 805: Report on Delegation to Lesotho Labour

Commissioner regarding recent strikes and faction fights at Vaal Reefs, 13 January, 1975, at the Labour Department Office, Maseru.

46. AACGRD Box 1009: Meeting between Western Deep Levels Delegation and Lesotho Minister of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Tourism, at Maseru, 15 January, 1975; Box 251.992: Inquiry, ibid: 46-47.

47. AAGGRD Box 865: Comments on Strike and Disturbances by Basotho Employees at Vaal Reefs South Hostel from January 5 - 6, 1975, by General Manager, 15 January, 1975.

48. COMGU 1975.

49. COMGU 1975.

50. A-V: Report on Labour Unrest and Wage Dispute, October, 1974, Hartebeestfontein Gold Mine, by general manager; McKay Commission, Annexure Three: 89.

51. Rand Daily Mail: 18th November, 1974; COMGU Inter-Dept. Committee of Inquiry: Incidence of Faction Fighting on Mines of the Goldfields Group since January, 1974; COMGU (E-K), 1974.

52. COMGU 1975.

53. COMGU, E-K, 1975.

54. TLD Labour Unrest Files, 1975; COMGU, E-K, 1975.

55. Special Report to the Human Resources Panel, 1975: Disturbances on ERMP Gold Mine, compiled by N.L. Robertson, Human Resources Laboratory; Note in margin of copy of Special Report in Labour Unrest Files, Rand Mines Limited.

56. HRL Report, ibid.

57. TLD Labour Unrest Files: 1975.

58. HRL Report, ibid.

59. Noticias: Maputo - 24 October, 1980.

60. U.C. Box 1345, 1964; U.C. Box 2083, 1966.

61. U.C. Box 1345, 1956.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RECRUITMENT OF BLACK RHODESIANS - THE POLITICS OF CULTURE

1. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

Of all the territories supplying labour to the South African gold mining industry, the country previously known as Rhodesia stood out in sharp contrast to the others. Whereas Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique were predominantly agricultural and pastoral economies with low living standards and little industrial activity, Rhodesia ranked second only to South Africa in degree of industrialization and urbanization in the sub-continent of Southern Africa.

Rhodesia's pattern of economic and social development closely resembled that of South Africa, and its Black population had also undergone similar experiences with respect to incorporation into an urban-industrial wage economy. In certain respects, pre-independence Zimbabwe had even forged ahead of South Africa, for example, in the progress made in the unionization of Black employees and in the country's experiments with social reform.

To assist in explaining the Black Rhodesians' reactions to mining work in South Africa, it is necessary to present a brief outline of Rhodesia's economic, social and political history and the experiences undergone by its Black population in the course of that history.

a) Settler Domination : 1890-1952

After the conquest of the Shona and Ndebele in the 1890's, there was an influx of settlers into the country. From that time onwards, the White settler community developed restrictive legislation to segregate the races geographically and in employment (Weinrich, 1973). Large-scale

expropriations of cattle and land, imposition of taxes and the levying of forced labour were speedily introduced and were for the most part responsible for the first African uprisings of 1896-97 (Phimister, 1978a).

The newly-developed gold mines of Southern Rhodesia exposed local Africans to harsh labour conditions underground and in the compounds. Partly as a result of the low profitability of Rhodesian mines, by comparison with those on the South African Rand, the wages offered by these small mines were particularly low and the facilities sparse and primitive. The compounds were crowded and the food poor, leaving mineworkers vulnerable to disease. In 1918, for example, 7 per cent of the total labour force died in an epidemic of Spanish influenza (Van Onselen, 1978a:4).

During these early years, Black Rhodesians had already come to recognise that the mines of Kimberley and the Rand in South Africa offered more lucrative employment and better conditions, and many workers migrated to these centres (Phimister, 1978a). During the Great Depression of the 1930's, the Southern Rhodesian mining industry was obliged to reduce wages and increasing members of Africans moved southwards, resulting in a labour shortage in the country (Phimister, 1978a:33-34).

In these early years, workers on Rhodesian gold mines developed a common worker consciousness through their shared experiences of difficult and dangerous underground and compound conditions. This growing consciousness was also built on the workers' awareness of the better wages and conditions which prevailed on the Rand's gold mines (Phimister, 1978a; Van Onselen, 1978a). In absolute, and in relative terms, Black Rhodesian mineworkers came to recognise their underprivileged status, an awareness culminating in several major strikes, including the Wankie colliery strike of 1912 and the Shamva strike of 1927 (Van Onselen,

1978b; Phimister, 1978b).

At first, Africans were prohibited from joining trade unions by the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, which excluded them from the definition of employee (Dorsey, 1975). After the Second World War, Rhodesia experienced an upsurge of industrial protest in the form of the 1945 railway workers' strike and the general strike of 1948 (Clarke, 1975).

The post-war economic boom, however, heralded a new potential for change in that the demand for African semi- and skilled labour was increased. Then, in 1953, the Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed, and an era of social reform was initiated.

b) The Period of Federation : 1953-1963

The post-war economic boom, and the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, combined to generate a "radical change in the social, economic and political policies of Southern Rhodesia..." (Dorsey, 1975:36). A new policy of partnership was instituted, entailing a move away from segregation, relaxation of petty discrimination and limited integration of certain facilities.

Although the franchise system already provided for limited African representation in Parliament, these qualifications were not lowered to extend African political participation. The philosophy of partnership was based on the premise that Blacks first needed to make economic and material progress before further political development could be initiated (Dorsey, 1975). Money was accordingly allocated to education, health and agriculture. Education in particular received priority, starting with the Kerr Commission into education in 1951 and the setting up of a five-year plan for increased enrolment in schools. Expenditure on education rose from 1,6 per cent of the 1950 national budget to 5 per cent in 1960

(Dorsey, 1975:43).

On the industrial front also, certain reforms were introduced. From 1951 to 1963, wages were increased and there was a rise in real earnings, assisted in part by the generation of jobs through foreign capital investments (Dorsey, 1975).

The federation structure also assisted in encouraging the legalization and recognition of African trade unions in Southern Rhodesia. From 1950 onwards, there had been a growth of railway unionism in Northern Rhodesia, encouraged and supported by the post-war British Labour Government of that territory (Turner, 1975:73). In November, 1952, the Northern union amalgamated with the Southern Rhodesian Railway African Employees' Association (headed by Joshua Nkomo). This amalgamation assisted in protecting the Southern branch of the Rhodesian Railway African Workers' Union behind the legal status of the Northern Rhodesian branch (Turner, 1975:86-87).

By the mid-1950's, African railwaymen in the Rhodesias had learned that they could successfully challenge a European-controlled industry, provided they had political support and assistance from Government. They had also developed the organizational and negotiating expertise necessary for carrying on trade union activities (Turner, 1975:91).

In 1959, African unionism in Southern Rhodesia was made legal by an amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act (Clarke, 1975). After 1960, the Industrial Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) became heavily involved in unions in Rhodesia, providing financial support and sometimes intervening to discourage Black unions from becoming too closely allied with the aspirations of Black nationalist politicians (Brand, 1975). The labour movement, however, continued to lend its full sympathy to nationalist aims, with union activities serving as a training ground for certain leaders, notably Joshua Nkomo.

These first steps towards educational, social and industrial reform

in the Federation period were short-lived, however, being brought to a halt by a resurgence of White conservatism.

c) UDI and Guerilla War : 1962-1976

In the elections of 1962, the Rhodesian Front Party under the leadership of Ian Smith, defeated the moderate integrationist policy of the United Party. The country moved rapidly to reinstate segregationist policies and reduce expenditure on African education, resulting in declining school enrolment (Dorsey, 1975). The collapse of Federation in 1963 was followed by Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in November, 1965.

From 1964 onwards, African nationalists had already started to leave the country with the eventual aim of waging guerilla war, with UDI itself serving as an "unintentional declaration of civil war "(Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 1982:16).

The first "contact" of the war took place on 28 April, 1966, when ZANU guerillas attacked White farms. From 1967 to 1968, guerillas shifted their attention to urban targets, but were successfully repulsed. The resulting complacency of White Rhodesians left them unprepared for the ZANLA offensive of December, 1972 which had followed an arms build-up in North-Eastern Rhodesia (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 1982).

The Rhodesian authorities moved to impose collective fines on villages harbouring guerillas and by mid-1974 had established protected villages, formed by the uprooting and stockading of rural communites. National service was increased and extended to Coloureds and Asians.

By 1974, Rhodesian authorities appeared to be in control of the situation, but the advent of detente after the fall of the Caetano Government in Lisbon implied a loss of advantage when Portugal requested Rhodesia to avoid hot pursuit raids into Mozambique to knock out guerilla camps (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 1982).

After the Victoria Falls summit of August, 1975 between Smith and Black nationalist leaders, the Rhodesian forces again gained the upper hand when a number of splits were evident in the nationalist movements. The South African authorities, however, began to pressure Smith for an internal settlement, fearing that the escalation of the Rhodesian war would attract more Cuban troops into Southern Africa, in addition to those already present in Angola (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 1982).

After Rhodesian troops carried out a series of raids into Mozambique in 1976, Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa began to withdraw logistic support for the war and indicated to Rhodesia that it should accept the principle of Black majority rule (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 1982).

On the 24th September, 1976, Smith went on nationwide television and conceded that majority rule in Rhodesia was inevitable. In November, 1977, the first moves to an internal settlement were put into motion and on 1st June, 1979, a transitional government was instated under Bishop Muzorewa. Zimbabwe achieved independence on 17th April, 1980, under Prime Minister Robert Mugabe (Annexure Four).

d) Implications : The Aspirations of Black Rhodesians

This brief account of Rhodesia's history prior to the achievement of Zimbabwe's independence, has highlighted various developments and events which stimulated the social, economic and political aspirations of Black Rhodesians.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, African workers developed a crude consciousness of common hardships in the mines of Southern Rhodesia, a consciousness heightened by their awareness of the better conditions prevailing at that time on South African mines.

In the Federation period, an attempt was made to prepare Africans for entry into a political partnership, mainly through educational

reforms. African workers also became increasingly experienced in union organization during this period. They had also had to cope with frequent internal splits and leadership struggles and came to learn the value of reconciliation in the trade union movement, having to battle to forge worker unity in the 1950's (Turner, 1975) and again in 1974, when union leadership fell out over the question of registration (Davies, 1975).

The political, social and economic aspirations of Africans, stimulated by the Federation period, were followed by the rise to power of the White Rhodesian Front, the collapse of Federation and the declaration of UDI. A sense of disillusionment on the part of Black Rhodesians seemed evident and was reflected in the ensuing civil war. These developments conformed closely to James Davies' theory of revolutionary aspirations, which emerge when a period of social reform is followed by a sharp reversal (J. Davies, 1964:520).

The eventual outcome of this particular social history was the generation of high aspirations among Black Rhodesians. A survey conducted in 1970 among African school pupils found that their life aspirations were uniformly high, a phenomenon linked in the study to "rapid social changes" taking place in the country at the time (Dorsey, 1975:168).

As a result of the skill demands of the industrial system and the franchise qualifications in the Rhodesian constitution, African school pupils had come to appreciate that education was indispensable for economic progress and political privilege. African school leavers had not only adopted life-style goals comparable with those of White youth, but they had also accepted the European as their reference group (Weinrich, 1973:113; Dorsey, 1975:42). Marshall Murphree noted in 1975 that:

> Rhodesian Africans, through processes of education and participation in the society's socio-economic structures, came in large measure to espouse the goals and values (of) the "civilized way of life" (Murphree, 1975:6).

On leaving school, however, the educated African encountered restrictions which hampered the utilization of his skills. Of a sample of school leavers analysed in 1970, over 50 per cent were found to be unemployed (Dorsey, 1975).

By 1975, redundancies were already taking place in industries which had been crippled by the protracted guerilla war. It is therefore not surprising that the beleagured Rhodesian Government accepted South Africa's proposal in mid-1974 to recruit Black Rhodesians for work in the South African mines.

e) Negotiations for Recruitment of Black Rhodesians

As early as 1967, the Chamber of Mines had requested the recruiting organization to look into the possibility of recruitment of surplus labour from Rhodesia (1). The question of Rhodesian labour was raised again in 1969 when it was realized that the industry would be in serious difficulties should "political complications" affect the supply of labour from Malawi (2).

In April 1974, when it had become clear that Malawi was intent on withdrawing its citizens after the Francistown air crash, the recruitment of Rhodesians was raised again in the Chamber (3). It was agreed that the South African Government be the first to approach the Rhodesian authorities and the Chamber President accordingly communicated with the Minister of Mines. The Minister was advised that "current developments" in Malawi and Mozambique, the two largest suppliers of labour, necessitated a search for other sources of labour. The President also indicated that the provision of work for Rhodesian Blacks "may ease certain of Rhodesia's own internal problems" (4).

The request was taken up by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Chamber was advised later in the year that the Rhodesian Government

had agreed to the recruitment proposals (5).

The General Manager of the Mine Labour Organization accordingly travelled to Rhodesia and met with the Ministry of Labour in September, 1974. The General Manager reported that there "seemed to be some eagerness for us to commence operations in the urban areas around Salisbury... there were many unemployed in the area" (6).

The fact that the recruitment negotiations had been conducted at governmental level implied that the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines was not involved. Towards the end of 1974, the Rhodesian Chamber complained that it had not been consulted and that it was opposed to the plans in view of its own labour shortage (7). In a subsequent meeting between the South African Chamber and its Rhodesian counterpart, the Rhodesian Chamber expressed its hope that the recruitment would be confined to unemployed men in urban areas who had no previous mining experience (8).

After the Rhodesian Minister of Mines publicly advised Rhodesian mineworkers not to go to South Africa, the President of the Associated Mineworkers Union in Rhodesia criticized the Minister for supporting the idea of a "captive" labour force in Rhodesia at lower wages. Whereas South African mineworkers started work at R1,60 per shift, Rhodesian mineworkers earned only 26 cents (9).

The pressure from the Rhodesian government and the Rhodesian Chamber eventually prevailed, however, in that the MLO was encouraged to commence the recruiting of urban, unemployed men. The President of the Rhodesian Chamber warned the South African Chamber President that the indigenous, unemployed men in the urban areas of Salisbury and Bulawayo were not interested in mining work, finding it "too hard" and preferring the "bright lights" (10).

By the end of 1974, the agreement for recruiting 20 000 men per annum was signed. Rhodesian workers were to be taken on for 12 to 18 month contracts, and would be required to defer 60 per cent of their

wages back home after the first three months. Recruits were also told that they would receive $1.33 for each eight-hour shift, as well as free accommodation and medical treatment (11).

A recruiting office was set up at Msasa, although recruits tended to stream in from all over Rhodesia, including the war-ravaged North-Eastern areas (12). The number of Rhodesians on the mines reached a peak in 1977 of over 18 000, with their numbers declining in subsequent years (Table 2, on p.91).

This brief account of the negotiations and arrangements for the recruitment of Black Rhodesians illustrates the fact that the decision to accept the South African mining industry's proposal was political in nature, conducted at ministerial level without consultation with the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines. The Rhodesian Government was involved in an intensive counter-insurgency campaign and was anxious to take some of the pressure off the urban areas by directing unemployed Blacks to South Africa's mines. The implications for the mines were that they were poised to receive a consignment of recruits who were educated, with high lifestyle aspirations and who were also politically conscious and aware that their country's liberation could not be too far away. At the time of their first introduction to the industry, FRELIMO had already achieved major military successes in Mozambique, and the White Rhodesian authorities had lost some of their grip on the war as a result of the detente initiatives promoted by Portugal after the fall of Lisbon.

From the outset, the industry experienced difficulties with Black Rhodesian recruits and a new pattern of conflict ensued, which deserves detailed examination.

2. CONFLICT INVOLVING BLACK RHODESIANS ON GOLD MINES : 1975 TO MID-1977

a) First Encounters with Mine Management and Other Workers

The first batches of Rhodesian recruits arrived from January, 1975

onwards and were allocated to those mines in the industry which were less popular with local South African workers. The working and living conditions on these mines were poorer than others in the industry, obliging them to recruit a higher proportion of novices as a result of being less successful in retaining their experienced labour.

The less popular gold mines were concentrated mainly on the East Rand, Carletonville and West Rand, with the more popular mines located in the Orange Free State, Klerksdorp and Far East Rand. Rhodesian recruits became heavily concentrated on the less popular gold fields, particularly the East and West Rand (Table 4).

Table 4 DISTRIBUTION OF RHODESIAN MINEWORKERS IN DIFFERENT MINING REGIONS: JUNE, 1976

Major Mining Region	Average No. in Service	No. of Rhodesians	Per cent of Rhodesians
Far East Rand	19 903	414	2,1
East Rand	36 423	5 151	14,1
Central Rand	14 485	806	5,6
West Rand	55 059	4 481	8,1
Carletonville	64 466	1 830	2,8
Klerksdorp	86 777	1 843	2,1
Orange Free State	116 690	1 305	1,1
Total	393 803	15 830	4,02

Source: MLO Position of Companies as at 30th June, 1976.

By June, 1976, nearly 14 per cent of the underground labour strength of mines of low popularity was Rhodesian in origin, as opposed to 3,7 per cent of the strength of mines of medium popularity and less than 1 per cent of that of highly popular mines (Table 5).

Table 5 PROPORTION OF BLACK RHODESIAN RECRUITS ON GOLD MINES ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF POPULARITY

Degree of Popularity[1]	Total No. in Service[2]	Total No. Rhodesians	Per cent Rhodesian
High	119 139	886	0,7
Medium	81 886	3 003	3,7
Low	77 564	10 689	13,8

1. The popularity of a mine is derived from a ranking of the percentage of novices recruited, combined with an inverse ranking of the percentage of experienced employees who return to their original mine within the period of valid re-engagement. The data were obtained from an analysis of recruits taken in between January and June, 1976.

2. The figures are based on the total number of Black employees in service underground as at 30th June, 1976 (Source: Mine Labour Organization: Position of Companies).

The Rhodesians' allocation to unpopular mines had important consequences for the nature of their response to the industry, as will become clearer in the course of the analysis. The Rhodesians also became a numerical minority on most of the mines to which they were allocated. With the exception of one mine, which by June, 1976 had 4 500 Rhodesians, most of the other mines to which Rhodesians were allotted received between 70 and 1 200 men each. The average size of Rhodesian groups on individual mines was approximately 600 in June, 1976.

The first problems associated with the arrival of the new recruits early in 1975 arose from an apparent divergence of the actual conditions encountered from those which had been outlined at the time of attestation in Rhodesia. One mine in the Klerksdorp region reported that the Rhodesians

> ...regarded themselves as superior to South African Blacks and had claimed that they should not be required to pay for working clothes, as they had been led to believe that these would be provided free of charge. They had complained about the beds and the underground working conditions which were not meant for town Blacks. Considerable trouble had also been experienced in the acclimatization centre where the Rhodesians had refused to undergo

the acclimatization procedures, with the result that other tribes were being affected and discipline was breaking down (13).

With respect to acclimatization, the men had claimed that they were found to be fit for underground work before their departure and had been assured that no further tests would be required to prove they were capable of such work. The Rhodesians had also discovered that Europeans did not undergo acclimatization and were quick to use this fact to strengthen their argument. The men had also been told that they would work an eight hour day, but were not warned about the extra time spent travelling to and from the actual working place (14).

Soon after lodging these and other complaints with the management of the mine in mid-February, certain tensions emerged on this same mine between Rhodesians and other mineworkers. One evening in late February, a Shangaan worker propositioned a Rhodesian to engage in sodomy while the men were relaxing at a shebeen outside the hostel. A minor clash took place, after which 3 Rhodesians were arrested (15).

At a mine on the West Rand, a similar encounter took place between Rhodesians and other workers in March, 1975, also sparked off by an improper suggestion, made this time by a Xhosa worker in the hostel bar. Banter followed between Xhosas and Rhodesians, after which a Xhosa drew his knife and stabbed blindly, wounding two Rhodesians. The Rhodesians mobilized and demanded blood, but hostel staff arrived and arrested the Xhosa assailant (16).

At another mine on the West Rand, a number of Rhodesians complained about the food, stating that they did not want to eat samp and mealie meal and wanted tea with fresh milk and butter on their bread. They were also not keen to learn Fanakalo, the Zulu-based lingua franca of the mines (17).

In July, 1975, 90 Rhodesians on yet another West Rand mine engaged in their first strike and refused to go underground, claiming that team

leaders sent them into the worst parts of the mine. A week later, Rhodesians on this same mine were involved in a fight with Xhosa and Sotho workers, after which 100 Rhodesians refused to work. Eventually, 10 men were repatriated (18).

The events on this mine were similar to those which took place at the Klerksdorp mine described earlier. In both cases, Rhodesians had complained about poor working and living conditions, and were subjected soon afterwards to the hostility of other worker groups.

These first encounters between Black Rhodesian recruits, mine management and other worker groups reached a climax in the form of a series of fatal clashes between the new recruits and other workers, particularly the Xhosa and Pondo speakers, on several different mines between August and September, 1975.

The conflicts were similar in that they all represented the expression of acute dissatisfaction on the part of other worker groups, with the apparent superiority and disdain for others evidenced by the Rhodesian workers.

The first of this series of violent encounters took place on a gold mine on the Far East Rand. This case was compiled from reports by hostel management and TEBA Liaison Division (19), as well as from information collected by the author while conducting fieldwork in the affected hostel approximately ten months after the incident (McNamara, 1980):

> Tuesday, 19th August: At approximately 18h00, A Xhosa-speaking worker visited a hostel room inhabited by Rhodesians and requested to buy eggs. The residents of the room stated that they had nothing to sell and the visitor left. At 18h30, the Xhosa visited the room again, accompanied by several friends and wanted to buy meat. The Rhodesians stated that they had none, whereupon the Xhosa pointed to meat in evidence in the room and demanded that it be given to him. The Rhodesians told him that the meat was their own ration and evicted the Xhosa from the room after a short scuffle. The visitor was also pelted with coal as he departed.
>
> Several Pondo workers in a nearby room came out and assisted the Xhosa visitor and his friends by throwing coal at the Rhodesians. One Rhodesian was also stabbed in the head, whereupon the

Rhodesians sought refuge in their room. The room was besieged by a group of men who threw coal and broke the windows. A Rhodesian worker was stabbed in the hand while holding the room door closed.

The Xhosa induna and several tribal representatives arrived on the scene and the induna ordered the men to stop fighting. The induna then looked inside the room to check for casualties. The crowd, meanwhile, had recognised the Rhodesian tribal representative among the other representatives and shouted: 'There is another Rhodesian'. The man broke away from the ranks of the other representatives and fled, but was caught and assaulted with knives and branch stumps torn from the trees within the hostel. The Xhosa induna moved in and shielded the injured man with his arms, then left the victim with the Pondo induna and returned to the activities outside the Rhodesian room.

Shortly thereafter, the Pondo induna went to fetch a stretcher, whereupon the assailants returned and continued their assault on the injured Rhodesian.

At 19h50, the hostel manager and mine security police arrived and the workers present were ordered to disperse to their rooms. The men refused to disperse and threw coal at the hostel manager. Teargas was thrown and the men returned to their rooms. A weapons search was conducted and at 20h15 the SAP arrived and arrested three Xhosa speakers. The Rhodesian tribal representative died later that night of his injuries.

Wednesday, 20th: Approximately 200 Rhodesians (i.e. the majority) mobilized and refused to work. They were addressed in a hall by the hostel manager and told of the arrests of the three Xhosas and the presence of the SAP. The Rhodesians responded by wanting repatriation.

The Rhodesians later held a meeting on the hostel lawn and were ordered to disperse. Six men were arrested.

Thursday, 21st: All the Rhodesians refused to work and were joined by 44 Malawians and 16 Mozambicans. An MLO representative arrived and addressed the Rhodesians, who were noisy and aggressive. Mine security personnel and dogs were stationed outside the hostel and the Rhodesians were ordered to disperse. The men collected their passports together and left them in a box at the administrative offices. Hostel management later called in the brother of the dead Rhodesian tribal representative to identify "ringleaders" from the passport photos.

Friday, 22nd: All the Rhodesians, 48 Malawians and 32 Mozambicans again refused to work. They were addressed in a hall by the MLO representative who told them that they could be repatriated but not transferred to other mines. The Rhodesians were then interviewed individually in the offices, and 145 were eventually repatriated, with 66 returning to work on the mine.

The application of a political phase model to the above conflict

situation indicates that the immediate breach of peace was brought about by the persistent demands for food made by Xhosa-speaking workers. The Xhosa visitor had also mobilized several friends by the time of his second visit, a group augmented by Pondo workers who had been attracted to the scene by the noise and activity.

Following this mobilization of Nguni-speaking workers, the confrontation reached a crisis stage in which violent attacks on Rhodesian workers took place, with fatal consequences. The repeated attacks on the Rhodesian tribal representative indicated that his assailants were intent on bringing about his death, illustrating the intensity of their hostility towards Rhodesians. Another later crisis feature was the demand for repatriation on the part of the Rhodesian workers and a number of workers from other regions.

The conflict was redressed by security action, a weapons search and liaison by an MLO representative. The adjustment involved the return to work of some Rhodesians and the repatriation of the majority.

These particular repertoires of conflict deserve explanation, particularly the significance of the requests to buy food, the violent intensity of other workers' hostility towards the Rhodesians and the desire for repatriation on the part of Rhodesians and certain workers from other foreign countries, notably Malawi and Mozambique.

To clarify these repertoires, it is necessary to examine developments in the months preceding the conflict. Soon after the arrival of the first Rhodesian recruits to the mine in April, 1975, tensions became evident between them and other workers which were associated with their newness to the industry and the lack of previous contact between these different groups on South African mines in recent years. Established residents on the mine initially mistook the Rhodesians for Malawians sent to replace those who had left and began calling them Manyasas, or men from "Nyasaland". The Rhodesians

interpeted this term as an insult and were involved in several fights underground over the use of the name (McNamara, 1980:324).

Later, however, the true identity of the Rhodesians became known. Certain Rhodesians had claimed that they were none other than freedom fighters currently liberating Rhodesia from White rule. A joking rivalry apparently developed between Rhodesian 'terrorists' and Xhosa 'faction fighters' at this time (20).

The Rhodesians also stood out from other workers because of their fluency in English, leaving other workers puzzled that they did not speak a 'Black man's language'. The Rhodesian workers regarded themselves as 'Black Englishmen' who had adopted the British culture in a country where apartheid and tribalism were not evident (21).

In the underground work situation, Black Rhodesians were reported to have been unwilling to take instructions in Fanakalo from their Black supervisors, preferring to converse directly with White miners in English. The team leaders could not understand these conversations and resented this undermining of their authority (22). Rhodesian workers also claimed to have been the victims of frequent assaults by their White supervisors. After their clash with the Xhosas, they complained to TEBA that they were frequently assaulted underground by Whites and others and that their cases were not dealt with.

Apart from their use of English, the Rhodesians' tastes in food also set them apart from other workers. They had refused on several occasions to eat the food supplied in the hostel kitchen and several of their number were repatriated on the grounds that they were "food faddists". They refused, in particular, to eat a certain delicacy comprising offal mixed with vegetables, preferring to buy food at the local store. Other residents began to observe that "...these people think they are too good for the food" (23).

As was the case in two other conflict situations noted earlier, the

Rhodesians' rejection of certain working and living conditions generated hostility on the part of other workers. The Rhodesians' apparent sense of superiority indicated by their sophisticated tastes in food, smart clothes (including sunglasses and sports jackets) and their use of English, appeared to have contributed to tension between them and other, conservative workers who were less educated and predominantly rural in origin.

The Nguni-speaking group, in particular, appear to have assumed responsibility for testing the reputed prowess of these sophisticated freedom fighters, culminating in the clash described above. The Xhosa's original request to buy food from the Rhodesian room may have been linked to the issue of food tastes for which the Rhodesians had become notorious. More importantly, however, it was interpreted as an insult by the Rhodesians, who claimed later that the Xhosas were deliberately trying to belittle them by requesting food, since this implied that they were being categorized as women, or wives (24).

The Rhodesians' allegations that they were being regarded as women by the Xhosas suggests that the Xhosas and others associated the Rhodesians' sophisticated dress and food tastes with that of women. By describing the Rhodesians in this way, they were able to project for themselves an image of masculinity and virility (such an intention could also be inferred from those instances described earlier when other workers made sexual advances on Rhodesian workers in shebeens and in bars).

The clash at the above mine made it clear to the Rhodesians that they were unpopular with other workers. They were also equally unpopular with mine management. The hostel manager had come to believe that they were unsuitable for mining work by virtue of their obvious sophistication and education and was reluctant to retain their services. The Rhodesians claimed that the hostel manager had said that "all he had to do was let

loose the other tribes on the Rhodesians and they would all be eaten (killed)". As a result of these fears the majority of Rhodesians took their discharge after the clash. The fact that certain Malawians and Mozambicans also wanted to be discharged suggests that the conflict had been extended to include other 'foreign' workers. Although no clear evidence could be traced to support this possibility, this theme was evident later on another mine which experienced a similar conflict involving Rhodesians and Xhosas that same month.

At this second mine in the Carletonville area, the Rhodesians had also become unpopular with other workers and with management. The Rhodesians were reported to "...ridicule, molest and ignore authority and when addressed in Fanakalo they reply in English and laugh at other people, including indunas" (25). Representatives of TEBA Liaison Division also noted that other tribes on the mine were "...thoroughly tired and fed up with the indiscipline... (of) the Rhodesians" who "threw their weight about" (26).

When a Rhodesian molested a Pondo worker on an underground station by pulling his chest clothing, the Pondo stabbed the man, who was later hospitalized. Rhodesians mobilized in a hall and refused to work. The following day, a Tswana worker was assaulted by Rhodesians, and a clash took place which lasted twenty minutes and resulted in the death of 3 Rhodesians. Soon after, a Malawian worker off shift was seen running to the hostel offices but was intercepted by a Bhaca worker and killed. Once again, a worker from another foreign country had been implicated in conflicts involving Rhodesians and others (27).

Hostility towards Rhodesians in the Carletonville region came to a head a few days later at another mine where Rhodesian workers were physically penned in a hall by other workers who demanded that all the Rhodesians be sent away from the mine. Approximately 200 Rhodesians were eventually repatriated (28).

Soon after this series of encounters, certain mining Group representatives suggested to the Chamber that the "experiment" to recruit Rhodesians be discontinued "...in the light of all the trouble and in view of their arrogance and general behaviour." The Chamber eventually agreed to continue with recruiting (29).

In October, however, members of the Chamber stressed the need to obtain permits to recruit Rhodesians in tribal trust lands, rather than in urban areas because of the latter's unsuitability (30). By January, 1976 the Chamber agreed to recruit from the Fort Victoria area, rather than around Salisbury and Bulawayo (31).

Towards the end of their first year on South African gold mines, Rhodesians were involved in another fatal clash with Pondos on a West Rand Mine. A Rhodesian worker had approached a Pondo tribal representative on duty at the hostel gate and lodged a complaint of assault against four Pondos. The tribal representative took no action when the four Pondos arrived, whereupon the Rhodesian assaulted the man with a poker. A clash took place that evening in which one Pondo was killed (32).

The Rhodesian mineworkers' first year on the gold mines was clearly fraught with conflict. In this first period, they had been involved in eight clashes with other workers and at least three work stoppages against mine management. They had also frequently communicated a wide range of grievances without necessarily mobilizing in collective action. Several conclusions can be drawn regarding the Rhodesians' first contacts with the industry, which can be summarized briefly before proceeding.

Firstly, Rhodesian recruits were involved in several protests in which they claimed to have been misled, at the time of recruitment, about the working and living conditions to which they were to be subjected on the mines. Although certain inaccuracies were contained in the information they received, it is also clear that the Rhodesians were

unprepared for mining work and desired a higher standard of working and living conditions than that available on the less popular mines to which they had been allotted. It is also likely that they had specific expectations of South African mines, which had enjoyed a long-standing reputation in Rhodesia for better working conditions. Their allocation to the less popular mines in South Africa implied that these expectations would not easily have been met.

Secondly, there were a number of confrontations between Rhodesians and management, which were followed soon after by clashes with other worker groups. This correspondence of events indicates that the Rhodesians' rejection of certain conditions and standards on mines generated hostility on the part of the established worker groups. The reason for this hostility can be traced in part to the high visibility of the Rhodesians, whose exclusive confrontations with management distanced them from others and made the group a ready target for aggression.

Thirdly, it is clear that the various confrontations between Rhodesians and other worker groups were largely attributable to the image which Black Rhodesians projected of an intelligent, educated and politically aware group which believed that it was entitled to superior treatment. Their sophisticated food tastes, well-dressed appearance, fluency in English and rejection of traditional tribal authority figures clearly enraged other groups who were less educated and largely rural in origin. The conflicts were phrased in terms of a confrontation between different life styles and values, with the stereotypes which each group had of the other playing an important role in this respect.

This conclusion may give the impression that these clashes had their origin in "cultural differences" between the groups involved. It should be remembered, however, that the Rhodesian workers were a new group to the industry in recent times and that there was clearly a lack of prior contact and familiarity between them and other workers which could

account for the presence of superficial, categorical relations. There was also an absence of cross-cutting friendships and common values between the respective groups. These various problems can be traced to the underlying influence of changing recruitment policies in the industry and the associated turnover of labour which appears to undermine co-operation between different mineworker groups (McNamara, 1980). The fact that most of the inter-group clashes in which Rhodesians were involved, took place within the first year of their arrival, bears out this contention.

b) Conflicts Associated with the Underground Environment and Conditions of Service

Whereas the Rhodesian mineworkers' first year in the industry was characterized mainly by violent clashes with other worker groups, the following year (1976) saw an escalation of confrontations with mine managements. No less than sixteen confrontations took place between Rhodesian workers and management in 1976, whereas only four clashes with other worker groups were recorded in that year.

In January, 1976, a Rhodesian worker assaulted a White miner, whereupon 55 Whites on this Free State mine went on strike, demanding assurances for their safety, but soon returned to work after informal talks with management (33). Two weeks later, Rhodesians on this mine lodged several complaints with management, including the allegation that their pay was deducted when they appeared as witnesses for the defence (presumably at the hearing arising from the assault on the White miner?), lack of overtime pay, and that team leaders wanted "sex affairs" (34). The problem of sexual assault underground was also raised in interviews with twelve Rhodesians conducted by the Human Resources Laboratory in August, 1975 (Robertson, 1975:5).

The emphasis on poor treatment underground, especially by Black team

leaders, was a reflection of the fact that Rhodesian recruits were employed mainly as labourers in the least skilled underground jobs and were accordingly subjected at times to arbitrary treatment and sexual abuse by their Black supervisors. The Rhodesians' confinement to unskilled, lowly paid work in the mines was a consequence mainly of their relative inexperience, by contrast with established worker groups. There was also a certain reluctance to promote Rhodesians into more responsible work on certain mines (35). Rhodesians on the Far East Rand mine described in detail earlier had also complained to TEBA in late-1975 that they "could not get responsible jobs on the mine". On this particular mine, most of the Rhodesians were still lashers (rock shovellers) sixteen months after their arrival and not one man in the sample analysed (n=43) had been appointed to the coveted post of team leader (McNamara, 1980:330).

A set of interviews with twelve Rhodesians in late-1975 recorded their belief that they could not better their positions on the mines (Robertson, 1975:3).

An important consequence of their unskilled labourer status on the mines was their direct exposure to hazardous conditions in the underground stopes. Certain of the mines to which Rhodesians had been allotted were also among the most hazardous in the industry. One East Rand mine, for instance, employed the greatest number of Rhodesians and had a fatality rate of 1,59 per 1000 employees in 1976, higher than the industry average of 1,38 (36).

The Rhodesians were highly sensitive to the problem of accidents underground, especially when one of their own fellow Rhodesians was killed or injured. Between March 1976 and February 1977, Rhodesians were involved in no less than seven work stoppages as a direct result of the occurrence of accidents underground, or in one case, because of their fears of working in a deep and dangerous shaft.

The problem of accidents even affected recruiting at times. As early as June, 1975, a few months after recruiting commenced in Rhodesia, an accident on a Carletonville mine was reported on the front page of the Bulawayo Chronicle, resulting in a reported decline in recruitment in subsequent months (37).

Of the six fatal accidents which led to work stoppages by Rhodesians, four of them involved the deaths of Rhodesian workers. Between 12 and 500 men mobilized on these different occasions and refused to work. In one case, they also demanded a day of mourning after a fellow national was killed in a pressure burst underground.

On two occasions, the question of the repatriation of deceased mineworkers was raised by Rhodesian workers. An ex gratia payment of R250 had been made in one case to the mother of the deceased. The victim's fellow workers also collected R400 together to assist in the repatriation and burial of the body, but the amount proved insufficient and the men demanded that the mine bear the extra cost involved. This was refused, and 70 Rhodesians marched to other hostels on the mine to get support, but were denied entry to these hostels (38).

In another instance, Rhodesian workers had demanded that the body of a fellow national killed underground be repatriated, but were told by management that the next-of-kin should make this decision. As a result of terrorist activities in Rhodesia at the time, however, it had not been possible to contact relatives and the body was buried on the mine (39).

Since this time period, the industry introduced a fatal accident and illness insurance scheme in 1981 which made provision for the payment of an initial R720 to assist with funeral expenses, an amount advanced from a total award equivalent to twice the deceased's annual salary. At the time of the Rhodesians' presence in the industry, however, no such scheme was in operation and the Rhodesians had quickly detected this inadequacy in arrangements for assisting relatives of the victims of mine accidents.

They had also claimed that they had been assured at the time of attestation in Rhodesia that any men dying on the mines would be brought back home for burial.

It is clear from this evidence that Rhodesian workers had not only expressed their dissatisfaction with underground conditions and treatment by supervisors, but had also focused their attention on certain formal conditions of service in the industry. Table 6 summarizes the main grievances and problems raised by Rhodesian workers during their stay in the industry and clearly reflects this concern and consciousness of perceived inadequacies in service conditions.

Acclimatization procedures also continued to be unpopular among novice Rhodesians in 1976. At an East Rand mine, a batch of Rhodesian recruits experienced fainting fits in the acclimatization centre and were told by other workers that they were suffering from "demons". During that month (June), a total of 700 Rhodesians were repatriated from the mine after refusing to work (40). A Rhodesian sub-induna on another mine further east of this mine claimed that the management of the mine had not provided an adequate induction for Rhodesians on their arrival. The men's first introduction to the mine had been the acclimatization centre which, in the words of this informant, had been used as an initiation into mine discipline, even as a form of punishment (41).

Although this allegation could not be substantiated, it is clear that the industry regarded the Rhodesians as lacking in discipline and being unsuitable for mining work, and certain mines may have attempted to enforce strict discipline in various ways on the arrival of new recruits from that country.

During the time period in which Rhodesian workers focused their attention on certain working conditions, they attempted on several occasions to enlist the support of other worker groups in their protests. As noted earlier, Rhodesians marched to other hostels on one mine in

Table 6 GRIEVANCES RAISED BY BLACK RHODESIANS IN 23 CONFLICT SITUATIONS WITH MINE MANAGEMENT AND IN VARIOUS OTHER MEETINGS AND DEPUTATIONS: 1975 TO MID-1977

Category of Grievance	Details of Grievance	No. of times raised	
Underground Conditions and Treatment	Fatal accident underground	6	
	Deep and dangerous conditions	1	
	Dislike underground work	1	
	Long travel times underground	1	13
	Assaults by Whites	1	
	Boss boys want sex affairs	1	
	Sent into worst parts of mine	1	
	Victimization by other workers underground	1	
Conditions of Service	Dislike acclimatization procedures	3	
	Want assistance with repatriation of body	2	
	No double pay for Sunday work/ no overtime pay	2	
	Boots and clothing not provided free	1	12
	Restrictions on air transport of luggage	1	
	No remittance facilities	1	
	Don't like Fanakalo	1	
	Complaints not investigated	1	
Hostel Conditions and Treatment	Insufficient food of poor quality	6	
	Treatment/Representation by Tribal Reps	3	11
	No mattrasses as promised	1	
	Dislike transport in troop carriers	1	
Wages	Low wages/increases		2
Other	Missing fellow worker	1	2
	Pay deducted when witness for defence	1	

March, 1976 to get support for their demand for repatriation of a deceased worker, although it was not clear whether they intended to mobilize other workers or other Rhodesians at these hostels. The previous month, however, Rhodesians mobilized with Mozambican workers on an East Rand mine to complain about poor food. In May, 1976, Rhodesian lashers on this mine held a meeting in the hostel arena to protest their dissatisfaction with wage increases, claiming to represent Sothos and Shangaans in their action (42). Earlier, in March, a number of Black South African workers told journalists of the Friend newspaper that "workers from Rhodesia came to their lodgings at the mine compound after work and incited them against the mine officials". One of these workers also stated that South African workers never caused trouble underground but that they "got influenced by members of other tribes and ethnic groups that were not South Africans". These same workers claimed that they had resisted this incitement and "were not interested to talk to other Black miners from outside our borders" (43).

The extent to which the Rhodesians assisted in stimulating worker awareness in other groups is an important consideration in the present study. The evidence available suggests that the Rhodesians' direct efforts in this respect were isolated and ineffective, although their actions could have set a precedent for other workers in later periods.

c) The Crisis Deepens

Coinciding with, and following closely on the Rhodesians' series of encounters with mine managements over poor underground and service conditions, clashes with other worker groups continued to take place, albeit with lesser frequency. These clashes, to be outlined ahead, indicate that Rhodesians remained poorly integrated into the labour force and that, if anything, the original cleavages had widened.

Rhodesians also remained unpopular with industry management, which

began to take active steps to restrict the recruitment of Rhodesians. The various difficulties encountered by the industry in the first year of the Rhodesians' presence on mines had already obliged the Chamber of Mines to agree in March, 1976 that their recruitment be restricted in favour of South African workers (44).

In February, 1976, when Rhodesians assaulted other workers and molested Xhosas going on shift at a mine on the Central Rand, the general manager had indicated that he "could quite easily do without these workers" (45), a sentiment shared by many others, including other Black mine employees.

Whereas Rhodesian workers were largely the victims of aggressive attacks by other worker groups in the first year of their arrival, they emerged later in some cases as the aggressors, as indicated by the previous case. On this mine, Rhodesian workers had not only molested Xhosas going on shift, but had also entered their rooms and caused damage. Later, Xhosas assembled with the intention of marching on the Rhodesians, but 600 Rhodesians were transferred out of the mine for eventual repatriation at their own request.

Several months later, Sotho workers clashed with Rhodesians on a West Rand mine after a Sotho had urinated into the beer mug of a Rhodesian and the latter had punched his intimidator, who had to be taken to hospital (46). Although no lives were lost in the subsequent clash, there was widespread looting of 42 Rhodesian rooms, partly as a result of the belated response of mine security forces. Members of the TEBA Liaison Division noted that the destruction of the rooms "must have been over a considerable period of time ... in daylight". The TEBA officials had also not been able to establish what the mine's security police were doing at the time (47).

After the Rhodesians had been temporarily accomodated in the mine's security barracks, TEBA requested that pickets be placed to guard the

men's property in their rooms. The mine security division failed to place any pickets and looting took place again later. These developments, according to TEBA representatives, served to erode Rhodesians workers' confidence in management's willingness to protect them.

The failure to provide adequate protection of the property of Rhodesian workers suggests that management was no longer sympathetic to these workers and had tacitly allowed other worker groups to loot the rooms of the Rhodesians. Although such a claim cannot be fully substantiated, it is clear at the least that there was some negligence in the maintenance of the safety of Rhodesians and their belongings, and also equally clear that Rhodesians had become highly unpopular with mine management.

After another incident on the East Rand, when 800 Rhodesians refused to work following a clash with other workers in the hostel bar, the relevant Group representative made it clear to the Chamber that the mine no longer wanted Rhodesian workers. The representative claimed that "they were not producing rock at all and all the Black labour troubles at the mine could be attributed to them. They were nothing but troublemakers who did not wish to work and the mine would be glad to be rid of them" (48).

Rhodesian workers also remained unpopular among other workers. In October, 1976, a rumour was reported from a Central Rand mine that the Xhosas were planning to loot the property of foreign workers (mainly Rhodesians) in the coming months (49). The behaviour of Rhodesians towards mine authority figures also aroused tensions with other workers.

In November, 1976, Rhodesian workers on a platinum mine were involved in a confrontation with their tribal representatives who had arrested a man for not paying a debt. The man was held in the tribal representative's room and handcuffed to a chain around the room's stove

which was "burning strongly" at the time. The representatives were assaulted and their room later burnt down. About 60 Rhodesians then staged a walk-out of the hostel, but when they attempted to return the next morning, they were intercepted by other workers who threatened them with assault.

The following day, a Rhodesian worker was approached by a team leader underground who talked to the man in a "very aggressive manner". The team leader and certain of his friends referred to the fight in the hostel the previous day and asked the Rhodesian how it had progressed. They then warned the Rhodesian not to report for duty the following day. Another Rhodesian worker claimed to have had a similar conversation with his team leader, who had asked him if he had had a good fight the previous day and was then warned that he would be killed if he returned to work. A team leader was also reported to have grabbed the testicles of a Rhodesian undergound (50).

This evidence once again indicates the complex interaction between the Rhodesians' confrontations with management and their relationships with other workers on the mines. In this particular instance, Black team leaders became hostile towards Rhodesians after the latter had been involved in a clash with tribal representatives. These events suggest that the Rhodesians had again become highly visible as a result of their exclusive confrontations with mine authority figures. Rhodesian workers had also developed a particularly poor relationship with Black team leaders on the mines as a result of their reluctance to converse with these supervisors in Fanakalo. Their group visibility, combined with their notorious rejection of mine authority roles, including Black supervisors, help to explain the hostility displayed by team leaders on the platinum mine.

In March, 1977, Rhodesians on a gold mine on the Far East Rand were involved in a fight outside the bar in which a Sotho worker was injured.

The next morning (Sunday), a Sotho team leader was observed taking down the room numbers of Rhodesian workers. In the subsequent fighting, 2 workers were killed (one of them a Rhodesian). Three months later, Sothos and Xhosas combined against Rhodesians on an East Rand Mine after Rhodesians had stabbed a Sotho and a Hlubi worker (51).

The incidence of these various conflicts during the Rhodesians' second and third year in the industry, indicate that the Rhodesians remained poorly integrated into the social and work milieu of the mines. This was vividly illustrated at the Far East Rand mine, the site of one of the Rhodesians' first encounters with Xhosas, described in detail earlier. Ten months after this clash, it was observed that the Rhodesians kept strictly to themselves. When they met in the hostel bar for a drink, they invariably clustered a number of tables together in one section of the bar area in an effort to maintain group security and a measure of social distance from others (McNamara, 1980:314,329). The Rhodesians on this mine had also expressed a desire to be accommodated together in their own separate section of the hostel.

As far as mine management and other workers were concerned, the former repeatedly expressed its reluctance to continue to employ Rhodesians, whereas different worker groups (such as the Sothos and Xhosas) had even combined on one occasion to chase Rhodesians from the mines. There was also some evidence for the emergence of an alliance, albeit tacit and informal, between mine management and other workers, expressed in the form of a negligent attitude to the safety of the Rhodesians and their property in one inter-group clash.

Throughout their stay on the mines, Rhodesian workers gave the impression of being motivated by an independent set of values and interests, pursuing their own struggle to secure better working and living conditions for their particular group. The relevance of certain political developments in their home country in stimulating this

distinctive attitude is an important consideration in this respect.

d) Political Change in Rhodesia and its Influence on Rhodesian Mineworkers

As noted earlier, Rhodesian workers were recruited in the atmosphere of detente after the overthrow of the Caetano government in Lisbon and major military successes of FRELIMO in Mozambique.

In the middle of the Rhodesians' first year in the industry, Mozambique achieved political independence. Soon after this development, Prime Minister Ian Smith met Black nationalist leaders at the Victoria Falls Summit of August, 1975. This important event, which must have suggested to Black Rhodesians that a negotiated peace and independence could not be too far away, did not have any direct impact on the collective actions of mineworkers from that country. Rhodesian mineworkers were in fact involved in an intense struggle with other worker groups that same month, which was unrelated to these events.

In September, 1976, Ian Smith announced on Rhodesian television that Black majority rule was inevitable in the country. The broadcast did not seem to exert a direct influence on Rhodesian mineworkers in South Africa. In December, 1976, however, a Radio Zambia broadcast had warned Rhodesians on the mines that those not at home when the country became independent would lose their citizenship. The broadcast, which echoed the rumours surrounding the Malawian repatriations, unnerved 100 Rhodesians on a West Rand mine. The men refused to work, but returned to the job after two days (52).

Although Rhodesian mineworkers were not directly affected by the Victoria Falls summit and Smith's television broadcast, there was evidence for the presence of a number of guerillas amongst the recruits. In June, 1976, Goldfields Mines and Industry Security Services claimed that a large percentage of Rhodesian recruits were trained in guerilla

warfare and had been sent to the mines as a reserve force "safe in the background" ready for action when required (53).

By the beginning of 1977, it seems, this reserve force had already been brought into action. In February, 1977, an article appeared in the Rand Daily Mail, refering to the claim that Rhodesian mineworkers were being recruited by a certain Gilbert Ngwenya to fight for the Zimbabwe Peoples' Army (ZIPA). At least 400 recruits were allegedly being flown out each week to Lusaka for this purpose (54).

That same month, a Rhodesian mineworker on a Far East Rand mine was presented to TEBA Liaison Division wearing a shirt inscribed with the following slogans:

FRONT CHEST	:	Oh Black People of Zimbabwe the way is open to Zi...M...Go
BREAST POCKET	:	Peace in Africa Remake the World People of Africa
FRONT LEFT SIDE	:	Too Many People are Suffering Bulawayo is my City
BACK SHOULDER PORTION	:	Just because I was born Black, I will fight for Majority Rule for My Nation Oh! Young Fellows create the Nation, go to Terrorism abroad our Black nation is Suffering Fight for ANC Zimbabwe

In May, 1977 a slogan was painted on an underground station on another Far East Rand mine and recorded by TEBA:

> Whites stop colour bar Mr. Smith is now a Cabinet Minister in the RSA. People of Zimbabwe wont stop fighting against Colouration.
>
> We Sons of Zimbabwe

These various expressions of political change were not directly associated with organized action or protest on the part of Rhodesian workers on mines. The rapid moves towards an internal settlement in Rhodesia in November, 1977 could also not be linked to any collective

worker action on mines.

The evidence does indicate, however, that Rhodesian mineworkers in South Africa were clearly inspired by the guerilla struggle taking place in their country. Such an inspiration seemed to be relevant, in a general sense, to their collective actions on the mines, while not necessarily accounting directly for specific events.

Collective action on the part of Rhodesian mineworkers declined after March, 1977, despite the fact that there were still over 11 000 Rhodesians employed on mines during 1978. The reason for this decline can be traced mainly to the fact that recruitment in tribal trust lands had intensified after January, 1976, implying a reduction in the number of those more sophisticated and educated workers from the urban areas of Rhodesia. After February, 1977, moreover, the industry agreed to recruit only men with valid re-engagement certificates (55). This decision implied that only those Rhodesians with clean service records were given the opportunity to re-engage in later years.

From 1979 onwards, the number of Rhodesians on mines dropped sharply to approximately 7 000 men. Soon after Zimbabwe achieved independence in April, 1980, diplomatic relations with South Africa were severed and in February, 1981 TEBA's recruiting permit was withdrawn by the Zimbabwe government (56). By 1982, there were virtually no Black Zimbabweans on South African mines.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

a) Worker Solidarity and the Politics of Culture

During their relatively short stay in the South African gold mining industry, Black Rhodesians were involved in a variety of encounters with mine management and with other mine employees, Black and White. At least 9 Rhodesians lost their lives in clashes with other workers, with 4

fatalities occurring among the latter.

In the years between 1975 and 1978, when the numbers of Rhodesians in the industry were at their highest, they were more frequently involved in confrontations with mine management than any other worker group. During these four years, Black Rhodesians made up four per cent of the total labour force, yet were responsible for 30 per cent of all conflicts with mine authorities. Expressed another way, the conflict rate per 1000 Rhodesian workers was 1,52, as opposed to 0,15 for all other workers (Table 7).

Table 7 BLACK RHODESIANS AND OTHER WORKERS: CONFLICT WITH MANAGEMENT PER 1 000 EMPLOYEES - 1975 TO 1978 (GOLD MINES)

Black Rhodesians			All other workers		
Average No. in Service [1]	No. of Conflicts	Rate per 1000	Average No. in Service [1]	No. of Conflicts	Rate per 1000
15 111	23	1,52	355 611	53	0,15

1 The average number of Black employees in service was calculated by averaging labour strengths as at 30th June each year for four years.

Perhaps the most important underlying reason for this over-representation in mine conflicts can be found in the particular social, economic and political heritage of Black Rhodesians. The outline provided earlier of Rhodesia's recent history clearly indicated that these men had developed high aspirations in life which could be traced to the degree and nature of their incorporation into Rhodesia's educational, social, economic and industrial society. This history was marked, in particular, by an era of social reform, the imposition of reactionary White rule and the onset of a protracted guerilla war of liberation.

The Black Rhodesian mineworkers recruited at the height of this war and in a period of major social change in Southern Africa (notably the independence of Mozambique), were clearly endowed with social and political aspirations.

The real significance of the Rhodesians' actions, however, should be looked for in the way in which these aspirations were transformed and heightened as a result of their particular experiences in the South African gold mining industry.

At the outset, their expectations and aspirations were largely frustrated as a result of being allocated to the less popular mines in the industry with poorer working and living conditions. The new recruits also discovered that conditions on the mines were not as had been indicated at the time of attestation. The Rhodesian recruits were also allocated, as novices, to unskilled, manual labour in the underground stopes. Rhodesian workers, as a rule, were better educated than other workers and clearly capable of more responsible work (Table 8).

Table 8 AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS SCHOOL ATTENDENCE OF BLACK MINE RECRUITS BY REGION OF ORIGIN : 1976

Region of Origin	No. of Recruits[1]	No. of years of School Attendence	Average No. Years of Schooling
Mozambique	246	365	1,48
Botswana	579	1 030	1,78
Swaziland	385	1 013	2,63
Lesotho	1 185	3 276	2,77
Cape Province	4 138	14 105	3,41
Natal	714	2 542	3,56
Transvaal	1 210	4 809	3,97
O.F.S.	331	1 438	4,34
Other	269	1 202	4,47
Rhodesia	915	5 091	5,56
TOTAL	9 972	34 871	3,5

1. The table is derived from information on schooling levels of a sample of recruits passing through the various test centres in the industry between May and October, 1976.

Despite their obvious talents and education, the Rhodesians' relative inexperience and the general scarcity of semi-skilled and supervisory job on gold mines, resulted in their being confined to menial work at the lowest rates of pay on most mines.

With respect to wages, Rhodesians also faced a problem peculiar to their group in the form of the unfavourable rates of exchange of the Rhodesian dollar against the South African rand. Rhodesian workers were very conscious of this liability, raising this issue during the HRL interviews of 1975 (Robertson, 1975).

Rhodesians were also exposed to considerable work dangers, being allocated to some of the more dangerous mines in the industry. As novice workers, moreover, they were subjected to greater risk than experienced workers. Past research in the industry has shown in this respect that novice recruits are at highest risk in underground work (Bettencourt and Jensen, 1970).

These various factors together implied that the working interests of Rhodesian mineworkers became largely distinct from those of other, more experienced workers, many of whom had secured better paid, less strenuous and safer work over time.

The Rhodesians were also more conscious, as a group, of certain inadequacies in their service conditions, than other workers. Their advanced level of worker consciousness was derived partly from their particular social and political aspirations and educational levels. It also seems to have been stimulated by the contrast between their original expectations of the mines and the eventual reality which they encountered. The Rhodesians' high socio-economic aspirations seemed in this respect to have been transformed into worker consciousness as a result of their exposure to unskilled, dangerous work on the less popular gold mines in the industry.

The fact that the Rhodesians' worker consciousness was peculiar to their particular group and that their working interests were largely distinct from those of other workers, implied that they were obliged to mobilize separately for the protection and promotion of their exclusive interests. This factor also helps to account for the unusual frequency

with which such mobilizations were carried out.

The Rhodesians' cultural identity also achieved a new significance in the mobilization process. Their particular cultural boundary, in Barth's (1969) and Cohen's (1969) terms, became organizationally relevent to occupational and other divisions in a local-level context of social and political formations controlled by others. The "cultural stuff" within the Rhodesians' ethnic boundary, such as their dress, tastes in food and language usage, came to correspond with a distinct set of working and living interests. In an effort to forge and maintain group solidarity, Rhodesian workers drew on their common attachment to this particular social, cultural and political heritage. The depth of this solidarity was evident at those times when one of their fellows had been killed in an underground accident and the Rhodesians had refused to continue working until proper arrangements had been made for the repatriation of their deceased colleague.

These responses indicate that the Rhodesian workers' shared heritage assumed the form of a political culture of support and resistance in an industrial context of migratory employment. The Rhodesians' experiences and action can be understood in terms of a complex interaction between their peculiar social, educational and political heritage and the nature of their exposure to the mine industrial environment. This interaction was not unlike the process undergone by immigrant groups in American history, which entered the country at the lowest levels of the "opportunity structure" (Hannerz, 1974:37). The resulting interaction between the "cultural legacy" of these groups and their common occupational and residential status, encouraged the "emergence" of ethnic boundaries in American society (Johnston and Yoels, 1977:732; Yancey et al, 1977).

On South African gold mines, the mobilization of Rhodesian workers by means of a political culture, also resulted in the projection of a

visible, emerging ethnic boundary which attracted the hostility of other mineworkers.

From the time of their arrival on the mines, the Rhodesians were already a distinctive group with particular modes of dress, tastes in food and language usage. The lifestyle of the Rhodesians was clearly that of the urban milieu, as opposed to the predominently rural origins of most mineworkers. The clashes in which Rhodesians became involved with other worker groups can be traced in part to this distinctive image of sophistication and apparent superiority, particularly in the period of initial contact. In this first period, the newness of the Rhodesians was inevitably associated with the adoption of superficial stereotypes in interaction, together with the absence of inter-group friendship and poorly formulated common working values.

The ongoing occurrence of sectional mobilization on the part of Rhodesian workers appeared, moreover, to have reinforced and accentuated this cultural distinctiveness over time, rather than ameliorated these divisions in anyway. In subsequent periods, the Rhodesians remained poorly integrated into the social milieu of the mines. Clashes between them and other groups remained a feature of their interaction and could be traced to the continued visibility of the Rhodesians' political culture in their separate and exclusive confrontations with mine management.

The impact which the Rhodesians exerted in the mining industry clearly revealed the influence of their particular historical, political, social and educational background on the quality of their relationships with White mine managements and other Black workers. Their particular experiences on the mines also resulted in a reinforcement of their group identity, with further adverse consequences for the quality of these relationships.

An additional source of tension can also be traced to the foreign

status of Rhodesians and the perceived threat of their likely domination on mines, as was the case for Malawians and Mozambicans. The Xhosa group's threat cited earlier, to loot the property of foreign workers, is an important indication of these underlying tensions in relation to Rhodesian workers.

The experiences of Rhodesian migrant workers in the mining industry represent a particular era in that industry's history which has been the subject of separate, detailed consideration in the present chapter. This should not imply, however, that the Rhodesian labour experiment was an idiosyncratic phase or special case with little or no practical or theoretical significance for the general pattern of conflicts being analysed in the present study.

The conclusions drawn above regarding conflicts involving Rhodesian workers have certain important implications for the present analysis of collective worker action on mines.

b) Implications of the Rhodesian Labour Experiment

The experiences of Rhodesian mineworkers reveal in the first instance, the ways in which worker consciousness may originate in a migrant worker group. The crucial factor appears in this respect to be the nature of that group's educational, social and political heritage which may have developed in the home area of that group. The degree of acceptance of certain industrial work conditions in a migratory labour economy seems to be dependent partly on the nature of the cultural and political socialization which workers receive in their home countries or communities. The extent to which this heritage becomes part of a political culture, however, is dependent on the nature of the collective experiences which the migrants undergo in the urban work setting, particularly those which are shared by that group and are not necessarily experienced in the same way as other groups.

Secondly, the activities of Rhodesians underline the significance of common cultural and political values in assisting in the mobilization of a particular interest group. The strong group solidarity of the Rhodesians was due, in large measure, to the fact that they shared a common lifestyle and set of values through which a common set of aspirations could be mobilized.

Thirdly, the job experiences of Rhodesians revealed the importance of common subordination of a given group in a particular occupational structure as a decisive factor in generating ethnic distinctiveness and conflict. When different linguistic and cultural groups are also distinguished occupationally, ethnic boundaries are reinforced and the visibility of a particular group is enhanced in the course of mobilizing to defend these particular working interests. This finding is of special relevance to the analysis, in the following chapter, of clashes between other worker groups.

Finally, the fundamental impact which Rhodesian mineworkers had on work and social life on the gold mines raises the question of the extent to which these employees assisted in stimulating a common worker consciousness in other workers, or in setting a precedent for combined worker action in later years. In the course of the above account, certain evidence of direct incitement and attempts to obtain wider support was presented.

Certain indirect effects of the Rhodesians' presence should also be considered. The hostility towards Rhodesians on the part of the Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers, for instance, was sufficient to encourage them to mobilize in a joint attack. Events of this kind may also have assisted in forging wider working unity in a later time period.

This issue and the others mentioned here, will be given consideration in succeeding chapters.

NOTES

1. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974.

2. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974.

3. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974.

4. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974. President of the Chamber to Minister of Mines: 24th May, 1974.

5. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974 - Note for the Record by Manager of Chamber of Mines: 13th September, 1974.

6. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974 - Note of Meeting with the Ministry of Labour, Compensation House, Salisbury: Thursday 26th September, 1974, by General Manager, M.L.O.

7. The Star : 5th November, 1974.

8. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974 - Note on Meeting with Officials of the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines in Salisbury: 13th November, 1974.

9. The Star : 4th December, 1974.

10. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1974 - President of Rhodesian Chamber to South African Chamber President: 5th December, 1974.

11. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1975 - Address to Rhodesians at time of Attestation in Rhodesia.

12. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1975 - Memo from General Manager (MLO) to Board of Directors.

13. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1975.

14. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1975 - Circular No. 110/75 to Technical Advisory Committee : List of Refusals, Complaints, Objections, Claims Lodged, etc by Rhodesian Recruits who arrived from 10th February, 1975 onwards, Hartebeestfontein Gold Mining Company, Limited.

15. TEBALD - Unrest Files for 1975.

16. JCI - Unrest File: 1974-1976

17. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1975.

18. UC Box 2129.

19. Report on Incident Involving Rhodesian and Nguni Tribesmen in Main Hostel, Winkelhaak Mines Limited, by chief hostel manager: August, 1975; Memo on Conflict by TEBA Liaison Division.

20. Interview with 'Tero' Crosby, instructor of engineering aides, Winkelhaak Gold Mine: 11th July, 1976.

21. Interview with Elliot Chuchu, Rhodesian sub-induna, Winkelhaak Gold Mine: 10th July, 1976.

22. Chief hostel manager, Winkelhaak gold mine, personal communication: January, 1977.

23. Interview with Wilfus Ngcitshane, senior training school clerk, Winkelhaak gold mines: 10th July, 1976.

24. George Kamba, TEBA Liaison Division, personal communication : 1977.

25. RMLD : Memo - Black Unrest on Blyvooruitzicht : 22-24th August, 1975.

26. TEBALD: Memo on Labour Unrest at Blyvooruitzicht : August, 1975.

27. RMLU: Memo on Black Unrest - Blyvooruitzicht, 22-24 August, 1975, Rand Mines Limited: Mining Division.

28. TEBALD: Memo on Unrest at Doornfontein G.M., August, 1975.

29. COMNL - Rhodesia: 1975.

30. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1975.

31. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1976.

32. TEBALD: Memo Unrest at Libanon Gold Mine, September, 1975.

33. The Star : 15th January, 1976.

34. TEBALD : Labour Unrest File, 1976.

35. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1976.

36. Accident Statistics : Prevention of Accidents Committee, Chamber of Mines, May 1977.

37. MLO Monthly Report for June, 1975 : Tropical Areas Administration.

38. COM - Blacks - Discipline : 1975-1976 file.

39. TEBALD : Labour Unrest files, 1976.

40. TEBALD: Memo to General Manager, TEBA on Rhodesian Mineworkers, 30th June, 1976.

41. Interview with Elliot Chuchu, Rhodesian sub-induna, Winkelhaak gold mine: 10th July, 1976.

42. TEBALD: Labour Unrest Files, 1976.

43. The Friend : 5th March, 1976.

44. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1976.

45. TEBALD : Labour Unrest files, 1976.

46. JCI : Minutes of Faction Fight in Black Hostel Commencing Saturday 21st August, 1976 - Western Areas G.M. Co. Ltd - Elsburg Section.

47. TEBALD : Memo Manager (Liaison) to General Manager TEBA : 25th August, 1976.

48. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1976.

49. TEBALD - Labour Unrest files, 1976.

50. TEBALD - Report on Interviews with Rhodesian workers of Wildebeestfontein platinum mine : 1-3 November, 1976.

51. TEBALD - Unrest Files for 1977.

52. COMNL - Blacks - Rhodesia : 1976.

53. JCI - Labour Unrest Files : Goldfields, Mines and Industry Security Services - Manager to Consulting Engineer : 11th June, 1976.

54. Rand Daily Mail : 5th February, 1977.

55. COMNL - Rhodesia : 1977 - Memo to General Manager of MLO from Technical Advisor of Chamber of Mines re recruiting restrictions: 3rd February, 1977.

56. COMNL - Blacks - Zimbabwe (1981).

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MOBILIZATION OF INTER-GROUP VIOLENCE: COMMUNAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT AMONG BLACK MINEWORKERS

1. INTRODUCTION

a) Faction Fights on Mines : Myths and Misconceptions

The incidence of so-called "faction fighting" on South African gold mines has attracted great interest and attention on the part of academics and the public alike. These clashes between different worker groups, often ethnic in their outward form, present a special challenge to anthropologists and other social scientists in South Africa.

Part of this challenge lies in the need to counter the sometimes crude, common-sense explanations evident in the conventional wisdom of the White South African public. Certain Whites have tended to view such conflict as a confirmation of their belief that Blacks are inherently savage, inferior and incapable of reconciling their internal differences. Such racially oriented explanations have held sway partly in the absence of a definitive explanation by social scientists. Indeed, certain social scientists have propagated views which seem only to confirm the validity of these deep-seated beliefs and stereotypes. In his book, 'Tribe to Township', Dr Peter Becker presents a view of 'tribal man' which formed part of the evidence considered by the Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry into Mine Riots (McKay Commission) in 1975:

> Although kind, hospitable and basically happy, tribal man, sensitive as he is to situations that kindle flames of doubt and fear within him, is often slave to emotion (Becker, 1974:177; Quoted in McKay, 1975:13).

The same commission heard evidence from Dr Van Warmelo, government ethnologist, who elaborated on the alleged behaviour of tribal people:

> Tribal members... are closely bound by traditions, customs, etc., and as soon as something occurs to affect a tribal fellowman, the tribal feeling comes to the fore and the tribe will then either defend or revenge its colleague. The ethnic differences among Bantu tribes still exist and tribal fights ... occur ... wherever Bantu of one ethnic group come into contact in large numbers with Bantu of another group or tribe (McKay Commission, 1975:8).

In its official response, the Chamber of Mines was in general agreement with the commission's findings on the causes of mine faction fights, adding that:

> ... much of the trouble can be ascribed to the unpredictable contrariness of human nature, in most cases possibly inflamed by excessive drinking, compounding the inclination of many Blacks to become violent at the slightest provocation (1).

A popular example of the kind of provocation believed to trigger such conflict was volunteered by a certain Mrs. S. Meyer of Germiston, who wrote to the Chamber in April, 1975, claiming that:

> The Bantu male will kill anybody who insults or injures his mother or grandparents, at a good guess I would say that most of the mine fights have started by the one insulting the other's mother, research will prove me right (2).

It should be clear that these various "theories" of mine faction fights outlined above are rooted in certain assumptions which Whites in South Africa hold about Black people. These arguments all assume the existence of a primordial tribal sentiment characterized by spontaneous, collective expressions of primitive justice and retribution.

The chief difficulty associated with this crude and simplistic view is that the mere incidence of conflict between different groups of Blacks is sufficient to give it face validity. This problem is apparent from the fact that the conclusions drawn above, particularly those presented in the government commission, were reached independently of any intensive analysis of the conflicts in question.

Turning to the viewpoints and theories of anthropologists,

sociologists and historians, it is clear that there have been few attempts to account for these conflicts in a comprehensive manner. Horner and Kooy's (1979) review of newspaper reports of mine conflicts draws certain conclusions, but the authors note that the available information is inadequate.

The absence of a detailed and reliable body of information implies that the many theories and arguments put forward over the years by academic observers have been largely speculative and hypothetical. One popular view relates mine faction fights to 'divide and rule' policies in hostel accommodation and tribal representation (Horner and Kooy, 1979:13), whereas another regards the clashes as arising from attempts to secure cross-ethnic solidarity in workers' encounters with mine management, or alternatively from the deprivations of social life in the male-only hostel institutions (Kirkwood, 1974; 1975). Inter-group clashes have also been put down to an unusual form of industrial sabotage in a pre-union setting in which the workers' aim is to destroy the components of the production process, including other workers (Webster, 1974:13). Tribal fights on a Namibian copper mine have even been described as a "rejuvenation ceremony of brotherhood", designed to reaffirm common worker values and goals (Gordon, 1977:242; 1978).

Few of these theories, particularly those relating to events on South African gold mines, have been formulated on the basis of a detailed examination of specific conflicts within their particular social, economic and political settings. The only thorough investigations available on inter-Black conflicts in Southern Africa include Epstein's (1958) account of inter-group relations and tensions on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, and van Onselen and Phimister's (1978) analysis of the 1929 Bulawayo location faction fight in Southern Rhodesia.

It is clear, however, that there has as yet been no definitive analysis of contemporary inter-group clashes on South African mines and

that there is a need to critically evaluate the relevance and usefulness of the many hypotheses put forward over the years to account for these conflicts.

There is also a need to identify those factors which may affect the solidarity of the Black mineworking class. The extent to which Black mineworkers have been able to present a united front in their dealings with mine management, and the likelihood of their eventually constituting a meaningful (political) force in the future of the industry and of South Africa as a whole, are also important considerations.

The frequent occurrence of inter-group conflict in the contemporary history of the mining industry suggests, at the outset, that the internal solidarity of Black mineworkers has been relatively weak and afflicted with numerous internal cleavages. The extent to which these cleavages have widened or narrowed over time deserves attention in this respect. Certain implications and conclusions arising from this analysis will be relevant to a succeeding chapter dealing specifically with collective action against mine managements.

b) Resume : Conclusions Drawn Thus Far

In the course of the preceding chapters, the sporadic emergence of internal conflicts between certain worker groups was noted from time to time. During the Malawian repatriations of 1974, for example, there were several outbreaks of conflict between Malawians and other workers, partly as a result of the insecurity of the former and their desire to return home promptly to avoid a perceived threat to their citizenship. In the case of the deferred pay disputes of 1975, Lesotho nationals on mines implicated Nguni speakers in the tactical aspects of their protest. Certain Mozambican workers, for their part, had been inspired by political developments in their home country in 1975 and had clashed on occasions with other workers in the course of attempting to take over the

job structure of one mine. The recruitment of Rhodesian workers was also associated with instances of inter-group conflict. These conflicts were traced chiefly to the emergence of an ethnic boundary of solidarity and support among Rhodesians in the context of their subordination in the working and social environment of the less popular gold mines in the industry.

An underlying theme of many of these particular expressions of inter-group conflict was the apparent cleavage between workers from designated foreign countries and those from within the South African geo-political region. A certain amount of qualitative evidence was put forward which suggested that "local" workers from within South Africa, including the various (independent) national states, resented the presence on mines of workers from "foreign" territories, particularly Malawi, Mozambique and Rhodesia. Over one third (38 per cent) of all inter-group conflicts in the period studied could be accounted for in terms of a broad geo-political division between local and foreign worker groups (Table 9).

Table 9 INTER-GROUP CLASHES INVOLVING FOREIGN AND LOCAL WORKERS: 1973-1982

Geo-political groups[1]	Number of clashes	Per cent of total
Local vs Local	44	50,0
Foreign vs Local	34	38,6
Foreign vs Foreign	8	9,1
Not recorded/unknown	2	2,3
Total	88	100,0

1. According to this classification, foreign workers are defined as those originating from Malawi, Mozambique and Rhodesia; and local workers as those originating from within the South African geo-political region, including the (independent) homelands and the former High Commission Territories (Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland).

An apparent exception to the social categorization of foreign migrants was the Lesotho worker group. It will be recalled that Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers joined forces on certain occasions to attack other workers from countries beyond South Africa's external political boundaries. There was also no direct evidence to suggest that local workers, notably Transkeians, regarded Lesotho nationals on mines as unwelcome foreigners, although this question should receive further consideration.

The relationship between Lesotho mineworkers and those from the Cape and Transkei does, however, seem distinct from all other relationships within the mineworking class in that they have been involved in a protracted struggle since the early 1970's, which rivals all other inter-group conflicts in frequency and severity. Fully half of all conflicts of this kind recorded between 1971 and 1982 involved local workers only, as indicated above in Table 9, most of whom originated from the Transkei and Lesotho. When viewed in terms of linguistic status, the overwhelming majority of these particular conflicts involved Sotho speakers, sometimes supported by Tswanas, in inter-ethnic clashes with Nguni-speaking workers, including Xhosas, Pondos, Zulus and Swazis (Table 10).

The present chapter addresses itself primarily to these various forms of inter-group conflict on mines in the conviction that they deserve separate and undivided attention in their own right. The present chapter will provide a chronological and thematic account of these conflicts through the 1970's and 1980's. The account will refer briefly to those cases already detailed in previous chapters in an effort to relate them to the general pattern of inter-group conflict being developed here.

Table 10 INTER-GROUP CONFLICTS INVOLVING SOTHO AND NGUNI-SPEAKING MINEWORKERS: 1973-1982

Category[1]	Linguistic Groups[2]	Number of cases		Per cent of total
1. Inter-Ethnic:	Sotho vs Xhosa	21		
	Sotho vs Pondo	5		
	Sotho vs Xhosa/Pondo	5		
	Sotho/Tswana vs Xhosa/Pondo	2		
	Sotho/Tswana vs Xhosa	1		
	Sotho vs Zulu	1	39	88,6
	Sotho vs Zulu/Swazi	1		
	Sotho vs Pondo/Swazi	1		
	Sotho vs Other	1		
	Xhosa/Zulu vs Others	1		
2. Intra-Ethnic:	Bhaca vs Bhaca	1		
	Pondo vs Pondo	1		
	Xhosa vs Pondo	1	5	11,4
	Sotho vs Tswana	1		
	Zulu/Swazi vs Xhosa/Pondo	1		
	Total		44	100,0

1. The categorization of inter-and intra-ethnic conflicts has been made on the basis of a broad linguistic distinction between the Sotho and Tswana-speaking peoples, on the one hand, and the Nguni-speaking peoples, on the other.

2. The order of presentation of the linguistic groups involved in inter-group clashes is not an indication of the identity of the aggressive party.

Inter-group conflict has invariably taken place within mine hostels or in their immediate environs. Many of these encounters can also be associated with specific features of the institutional environment of mine hostels, as will be demonstrated in the course of the analysis. It is therefore necessary at the outset to provide a brief description of the social milieu and formal organization of hostels in the industry

before an examination is made of the conflicts emerging within this setting.

Tensions and problems in the underground work setting have also been relevant to certain inter-group clashes. Reference will be made to certain aspects of working conditions in the course of the analysis, with a more detailed outline of these conditions being reserved for a later chapter focusing specifically on worker-management conflicts.

c) The Social and Organizational Milieu of Gold Mine Hostels

In the 1970's and 1980's, there were approximately 40 active gold mines affiliated to the Chamber of Mines, with an estimated total of 100 hostels serving these mines. The sizes of these hostels varied, accommodating between 2 000 and 10 000 residents in each, with an average size of 4 000.

The age of these mines, and their respective hostels, varied greatly, as did the conditions and facilities provided by the different mining companies. A few mines on the Witwatersrand which first declared gold at the turn of the century were still active in the 1980's, whereas every decade since the 1930's has seen the sinking of new mines, with the newest ones declaring gold in the late 1970's. The physical facilities of older hostels differ substantially from those built in recent years, although periodic attempts have been made to upgrade the former.

The older, "compound" - type structures are one-storey buildings in which the outer rows of rooms also serve as a perimeter boundary, often in the shape of a hexagon or square. The newer "hostel" - type structures are usually two storeys high and made up of separate, self-contained dormitary blocks, with all the blocks often encircled by a perimeter fence or wall. The latter structures are most commonly to be found on the Free State mines, which were developed in the early 1950's.

The food facilities in compounds and hostels also vary, with the

former containing one large central kitchen and dining area, whereas the newer hostels provide decentralized services through the provision of smaller dining halls which serve separate room blocks, with the emphasis on attention to the individual resident and improved services. Barbecue facilities are also often provided for different room blocks, providing an opportunity for residents to cook their own food.

The newer hostels also provide change house facilities, one for each room block, whereas most of the older compounds do not provide such a facility for workers returning from underground duty.

In a few of the oldest compounds, residents are accommodated in large, 50-man rooms, although most now provide beds for between 16 and 20 residents per room. The newer, hostel-type structures accommodate between 8 and 12 ordinary workers per room. The older compound rooms feature a coal stove in the centre, as well as concrete bed bunks, whereas the newer hostels make use of electric heating, steel beds and internal room dividers for additional privacy.

The communal nature of mine hostel life is particularly evident in the rooms, where residents spend a considerable amount of their leisure time, especially during the week after each day's strenuous work. Certain everyday, interpersonal tensions are evident in hostel rooms as a result, stemming largely from the lack of personal privacy. Problems such as noise, drunkenness and petty theft are responsible for the fact that a significant proportion of assaults on mines (27 per cent) take place in hostel rooms (Table 11).

In the past, most mines accommodated residents in rooms on a tribal or ethnic basis. This principle sometimes extended to a whole block of rooms, although certain mines scattered these ethnically homogeneous rooms throughout the hostel to avoid the concentration of one ethnic group in one specific area or block. Since the eruption of widespread inter-group conflicts in the early 1970's and onwards, certain

Table 11 NUMBER OF INTERPERSONAL ASSAULTS IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND WORK SETTINGS OF ONE MINE AND ITS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS: 1975-1977

Place of Assault	Number of Assaults	Per cent of Total
At work/underground[2]	285	29,4
Hostel rooms	269	27,7
Hostel area	242	24,9
Outside hostel	125	12,9
Other	50	5,1
Total	971	100,0

1. The data were obtained on a platinum mine.
2. The number of assaults at work exclude those in which White employees were involved.

mines embarked on a programme of accommodating residents in room blocks corresponding to underground work sections, often integrating the rooms in these sections on a non-tribal basis. Black hostel residents have reacted with mixed feelings to room integration and the emphasis has shifted in recent years to individual choice.

The tribal principle in hostel management is also evident in the tribal representative system, comprising indunas appointed from the ranks of tribal policemen. The system is representative only in a numerical sense, in that the number of tribal police allocated to a particular ethnic or regional group is on a proportional basis. The induna representing the largest group in the hostel is also usually granted the title of chief induna. The status and authority of indunas is therefore largely a function of the numerical size of the groups over which they exercise responsibility in the hostel (Momberg and McNamara, 1977).

The induna-tribal representative system forms part of the management function, exercising discipline, control and cleanliness in the hostel. Tribal police, for example, are stationed at certain key points in the

hostel to maintain law and order, particularly the gate, kitchen and bar. Indunas also provide a counselling service for individual residents. During week-ends and on week nights, the induna is the effective authority, or "hostel manager by night".

In recent years, and particularly since the outbreak of conflicts on the mines, the emphasis has moved away from the induna system for various reasons, mainly as a result of the need to provide new channels of communication for a better educated work force from within South African territory. Other kinds of personnel roles have been introduced into hostels to cater for urban, better educated residents and there has also been a growtn in the number of works consultative committees on mines to cater for work-related, as opposed to domestic matters. The room prefect, or isibonda, still continues to provide a form of upward communication of domestic matters in liaison-type committees, but these have diminished in importance on certain mines.

The system of White hostel management has been described as paternalistic, in that the hostel manager acts as a counsellor and disciplinarian for hostel residents and exercises responsibility for their accommodation, feeding and welfare, including recreation. The hostel management function has also undergone significant changes in recent times, partly as a result of the repeal of sections of the Master and Servants Ordinances, resulting in a substantial reduction in disciplinary powers with respect to the enforcement of contractual obligations. The hostel manager has also forfeited a certain amount of status and authority over the years, with certain key activities taken over by the mines' personnel function and certain professional agencies (notably, the catering services).

A variety of recreational facilities are provided for mine workers, with the formal emphasis on sport, cinema and television, tribal dancing, canteen and beerhall facilities. The industry's cinema and television

circuit, in particular, has become more active in recent years, with the TEBA Media Division providing regular film and video entertainment for an estimated viewing audience of 200 000.

The hostel beerhalls are also well patronized, particularly on week-ends. The concentration of people and the availability of alcohol in the beerhalls or bars imply that assaults in this setting are a relatively frequent occurrence.

Black hostel residents on certain mines have complained that there is "nothing to do but drink" (McNamara, 1980). A set of interviews conducted in 1977 found that drinking was ranked by residents as their most common leisure-time activity, followed by visits to local townships and shopping (De Vries and Gunther, 1978).

The activities of shopping and visiting out are popular among hostel residents partly because they provide the opportunity to leave the confines of the hostel on week-ends after spending most of the working week within its walls.

Of the 40 active gold mines, approximately one third (13) are situated within 5 kilometres of a Black township and are also surrounded by White farm land, with the remaining two thirds being encircled only by farms. These local farms and townships are visited by mineworkers on week-ends, mainly to make contact with local women and to frequent shebeens. The presence of alcohol and prostitutes in these outside settings has been associated with the incidence of numerous assaults over the years (Table 11, on p.195).

The practice of visiting home on week-ends has also become more prevalent in recent years with the introduction of the eleven-shift fortnight, which has given mineworkers occasional Saturdays off. The problem of distance and transport costs, however, imply that there are still constraints on such visits. Where the mines are reasonably close to workers' homes, as is the case for migrants from Lesotho working on

the mines of the Orange Free State, such home visiting has become fairly common. In 1980, over 60 per cent of a sample of 100 men on two of these mines reported that they had visited home on week-ends at least once during the previous six months (Laburn and McNamara, 1981).

This brief outline of the social setting of mine hostels highlights certain important institutional features which are relevant to the accounts of conflict to be discussed ahead. Of particular importance in this respect are the everyday tensions of communal life, particularly in the hostel rooms and beerhalls, and outside the hostel, at the shebeens in local townships and on farms.

Also important are certain features of formal hostel management, particularly the tribal representative system, which has been associated with certain conflict situations and the emphasis on ethnic affiliation in room accommodation and certain recreational activities, such as tribal dancing. The extent to which inter-group conflict can be traced to this principle of hostel management requires careful consideration.

Finally, it is clear from the above description that a variety of living conditions prevail on mines and hostels in the industry, and that there have also been a number of improvements to the quality of life of hostels, as well as certain changes in hostel management functions during the period under review. The extent to which these changes can be associated with changes in the incidence and form of conflict, also deserves attention.

An attempt will be made in subsequent sections to provide an account of inter-group conflicts in rough chronological order, with due regard for conceptual and thematic continuity.

2. THE ORANGE FREE STATE CLASHES : FEBRUARY - AUGUST, 1974

As was noted in an earlier chapter, inter-group conflicts on gold mines have been a relatively common occurrence over the years. Several

clashes between local and foreign worker groups took place in the 1950's and 1960's, and there were also two violent clashes between Sothos and Xhosas on the Klerksdorp gold field and on the East Rand in 1972, which were linked to rivalry between liquor gangs (3).

In February 1974, however, violent conflict broke out on several gold mines of the Orange Free State. These conflicts could be distinguished from earlier conflicts by their severity, concentration and frequency.

These clashes will be the subject of separate, detailed scrutiny in the following sections, commencing with a brief outline of the social and demographic setting of the gold field in which they took place.

a) The Demographic Context: The Orange Free State Goldfield

In 1974, the Orange Free State goldfield comprised of ten gold mines, seven of them owned by one mining Group. Close to 100 000 Black workers were employed on these mines and accommodated in 24 hostels and compounds in the region. Almost half (+- 47 000) of the workers on these mines were migrants from Lesotho, with approximately 30 per cent being drawn from South African territory, particularly Transkei and the Cape Province.

In June 1973, workers from the former High Commission Territories (mainly Lesotho) outnumbered South African workers (mainly Transkeians) on the Free State mines by nearly 2:1 and in one case by as much as 4:1 (Table 12).

The numerical domination of Lesotho citizens on Free State mines was a consequence of their close geographical proximity to Lesotho, combined with the high degree of dependency on mining work on the part of Lesotho nationals, who had little other choice of work in view of their 'alien' status in South Africa (as outlined in chapter three). The dependency on the part of Lesotho nationals on these mines also implied

Table 12 RATIO OF MINEWORKERS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FORMER HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES ON GOLD MINES OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE : JUNE, 1973

Name of Mine	Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland	South African territory	Ratio LBS : SA
Freddies	1 782	620	2,9 : 1
Free State Geduld	5 667	2 270	2,5 : 1
Free State Saaiplaas	2 522	550	4,6 : 1
Harmony	8 176	6 233	1,3 : 1
Loraine	1 394	1 269	1,1 : 1
President Brand	6 143	3 575	1,7 : 1
President Steyn	6 166	3 514	1,7 : 1
St Helena	3 419	1 766	1,9 : 1
Welkom	4 694	3 695	1,3 : 1
Western Holdings	3 743	3 945	0,9 : 1
Total	43 706	27 437	1,6 : 1

Source: MLO Position of Companies: Number of Bantu and other Coloured Persons in Service as at 30th June, 1973.

a high degree of stability of the labour force in terms of long work stays and regular returns to the same mines after periods of leave. A number of Free State mines were also among the most popular in the industry, in view of the higher wages offered, their relative youth (+- 30 years) and the greater use of mining technology underground (such as winch-driven rock scrapers) which implied that the work was less labour - intensive than many other, older mines in the industry.

Of the ten major mines in the region, eight mines and seventeen hostels were situated immediately around the circumference of the town of Welkom, between 3 and 8 kilometres from the city centre. Located on the eastern edge of the town was the Black township of Thabong. Its proximity to the main town implied that Thabong was also situated next to a number of gold mines, shafts and hostels (Figure 2). The proximity of




FIGURE 2 : Distribution of Gold Mines and Hostels in the Welkom Area (circa 1974)

Thabong to one gold mine, in particular, was to play a role in the conflicts on that mine, the site of the first violent clashes in the region in February, 1974.

b) Conflicts on Free State Gold Mines: February to August 1974

Between the 6th and 23rd January, 1974, three Sotho workers were murdered by certain Xhosa-speaking workers on the roads and access routes between Thabong township and a mine near its North-Eastern border (4). Four Xhosas were arrested for the murder of one of these men. One Xhosa confessed to the killing and the remaining 3 were released from gaol. The latter were subsequently discharged by the mine, a development which was viewed in a serious light by Sothos on the mine who felt that the Xhosas had got off "scott-free" for their actions (5). By the 4th February, it was already rumoured that the Sothos would retaliate. Less than a week later, conflict broke out at the mine's number two shaft hostel, itself situated less than two kilometres from Thabong township. At almost the same hour, conflict also commenced at the mine's number one shaft hostel a little further away. Both cases will be detailed below, based largely on the mine's own inquiry and report, a report by a mining Group executive, evidence presented to the McKay Commission (1975) and newspaper reports (6):

Number two hostel :

Thursday, 7th February: 16h15 - A report was lodged that certain Sotho residents of one room block were making threats at Xhosas from another room block because the Xhosas were frying food on the barbecues provided for the Sotho residents' room block. The conversation overheard was: "We must fix these Xhosas who come to this block. What are they doing here? They kill us over weekends and still come to our blocks to fry their mealies."

After receiving this report, the hostel manager instructed the indunas to tell the men in the Xhosa room block to fry their food on their own barbecues. That same day, two Xhosas told a Sotho in the hostel bar that the Xhosas were going to 'clean up' any Sothos found in Thabong on the coming Saturday.

Friday, 8th: Two Xhosas were sent to mine security and the SAP for questioning. Rumours began to spread that the Xhosas would attack the Sothos on the road from the township.

Saturday, 9th: 11h00 - Weapons searches were organized at both hostels. A number of lesiba sticks used for tribal dancing by the Sothos were confiscated by the Sotho and Xhosa indunas, but were allegedly not destroyed. That evening, at about 21h45, a group of Sotho residents broke out of the hostel through the main gate, damaging the hostel manager's car parked outside. The hostel manager was also struck with a stick. Later, at 22h00, a crowd of Sothos arrived from the direction of Thabong township (apparently with reinforcements) and found the main gate locked. The men climbed over the hostel wall and clashed with Xhosas in the vicinity of the kitchen and canteen, which were damaged.

The SAP arrived at 22h30, but did not enter the hostel.

Sunday, 10th: 06h00 - The SAP conducted a weapons search and hostel residents laid down their arms. The SAP withdrew at 11h00. At 16h00 that afternoon, fighting broke out again in one room block and the SAP were recalled, entering the hostel to keep the tribes apart.

Monday, 11th: The morning shift did not go underground. At 09h00, the hostel manager and the Sotho induna addressed approximately 1500 Sothos in front of the kitchen. The Sothos demanded that they or the Xhosas must be discharged and also demanded the release of certain Sothos arrested by the SAP on Sunday. At 10h00, the Xhosas were addressed by management and six delegates indicated that the Xhosas wanted to be repatriated.

During the day, Sotho workers started leaving the mine, with 3600 discharged by evening.

Tuesday, 12th: The morning shift did not go underground. At 08h15, the hostel manager addressed the Xhosas and told them that men not prepared to work should go home. At 09h00, the Sothos were also addressed. Later that day, at 17h30, a joint meeting of delegations from the two groups agreed to stop the fighting.

The Xhosas were later reported to have accused the Shangaans of not helping them against the Sothos and Shangaans began arming themselves that evening. The SAP re-entered one hostel.

Wednesday, 13th: The morning shift was poorly attended, Xhosas and Sothos started leaving the hostel and the SAP withdrew.

Number one Hostel:

Saturday, 9th: 11h00 - Weapons searches were conducted and lesiba sticks confiscated by the indunas. Later, in the evening, the Sotho induna allegedly told Xhosa tribal representatives not to guard a side gate into the hostel. The Sotho induna then opened the gate and let a crowd of Sothos into the hostel area. The Sothos, led by their induna, advanced on the Xhosas and by 22h00 the Xhosas had retreated to the main gate and then went out of the hostel. The Sotho sub-induna closed the gate to prevent clashes between Xhosas on the outside and Sothos on the inside. The Xhosa sub-induna

arrived at the gate from inside the hostel and was set upon and killed by Sothos. About 50 Xhosas outside the gate started throwing bricks at the Sothos within, who were also throwing bricks, but these activities were halted after the arrival, at 23h00, of the SAP and the chief hostel manager.

The remaining Xhosas inside the hostel had barricaded themselves in their rooms, but one Xhosa was killed after allegedly being wrapped up in blankets and set alight. The SAP attempted to assist Xhosas by pulling them out of the rooms through the outside windows.

Sunday, 10th: 01h15 - A message was relayed over the public address system calling those residents requiring protection to the front of the hostel. About 100 residents spent the rest of the night on the front lawns. At 06h00, a weapons search was conducted and the men surrendered their arms. At 11h00, the SAP withdrew, leaving a small detachment outside both hostels. The rest of the day was quiet.

Monday, 11th: No one went underground, and at 11h00 the Xhosas were addressed by management. The men demanded that either they or the Sothos should be discharged. Later, at 15h30, the Sothos were addressed by management and a delegation from the Lesotho government.

Tuesday, 12th: The morning shift was poorly attended, although most of the Xhosas went underground. At 10h00, the Sothos were addressed by management and the Lesotho government delegation and at 16h30, the Xhosas were addressed by representatives from the Transkei and Ciskei. After hearing reports that fighting had broken out at the other hostel, certain Xhosas attacked Sothos who were being processed for repatriation near the main gate. Ten Xhosas were later disarmed. At 20h00, certain Malawians wanted to go home and the SAP re-entered the hostel.

Wednesday, 13th: 08h30 - The Malawians were addressed by a WNLA representative and told that they would have to pay their own fares home if they wanted repatriation. Most agreed to stay on the mine, but Sothos and Xhosas continued to leave the hostel.

Thursday, 14th: The SAP withdrew after conducting a weapons search.

In both cases described above, the breach of the peace arose from the murders on the way to Thabong township. The release and discharge of three Xhosas accused of one murder constituted a major breach of norms in the eyes of Sotho workers. Their dissatisfaction with the outcome of formal legal procedures and mine management's apparent disinterest, led to the Sothos taking their own action to redress the perceived wrong. This hostility was expressed after certain Xhosas had attempted to use the barbecues in the Sotho workers' section of the hostel.

The subsequent mobilization tactics of the Sothos clearly indicated

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that they were the aggressors in the actual conflicts at both hostels. It was also apparent that the Sotho induna had assisted in the mobilization of his group by letting the men into the hostel through a side gate and joining them in the attack on the Xhosas. The conflict reached a crisis stage in both hostels with the deaths of 10 men (8 of whom were Xhosas) and the injury of at least 100. Six hostel rooms were gutted and piping removed from the ablutions as a source of weapons. Other features of the crisis were refusals to work and demands for repatriation on the part of both groups involved.

The conflicts were redressed by security action (including weapons searches) and mass meetings between workers, management and various government representatives. The initial adjustment consisted of the mass repatriation of 66 per cent of the mine's labour force, of whom the bulk (4479) were Lesotho nationals.

This analysis of the conflict process highlights certain issues which require further explanation, particularly the significance of the murders near Thabong, the severity of violence during the clashes, and the mass repatriation of the Basotho. Before an attempt is made to explain these features of the conflict, it is important to note that a similar pattern of violence and repatriation was repeated on other mines in the area in the days and months following the ending of overt hostilities at the original gold mine. These events and managements' responses will first be sketched out an attempt made later to analyse and account for the conflicts in the region as a whole.

On Saturday and Sunday night, the 16th and 17th February (three days after the first outbreak), Sothos and Xhosas clashed at another Free State mine Northwest of the town, leaving 14 dead and 38 injured. The clash had taken place after some of the workers involved in the first clashes had been moved to this mine (7). The police moved between the groups to halt further conflict and mine management later accommodated

Sothos and Xhosas in different hostels. The following Wednesday, workers gathered in the veld between the hostels and advanced on the main street of Welkom town, where they mingled with Whites, but were driven back by the SAP. Later, about 2000 Sothos prepared to attack 300 Xhosas, the men being armed with sticks, pipes and cool-drink tins filled with concrete and fitted with hooks for gripping in the fingers (8). A senior information officer from the Ficksburg Department of Information, a certain Mr. T.C. Muller, had been brought to the mine and he went into the group of Sothos and shouted:

> 'Children of Moshesh, grandchildren of Mokhachane who were carried on the back in a rhebuck pickaback skin, I greet you!' The words went through the Sothos like a shock wave, and dead silence descended on the compound. Standing very straight and in a powerful voice the lean Mr. Muller addressed the 2000 Sothos around him. After he had spoken, a deafening cry of peace burst out. The Sothos dispersed and many left their weapons behind (9).

This curious incident suggests that the charisma of the official in question alone averted potential conflict. It should be mentioned, however, that close to 3000 Sothos were repatriated after this event. As with other clashes during that time, Sotho workers seemed particularly keen to secure repatriation and perhaps for this reason, were successfully dissuaded from further conflict. There were more repatriations on a third Free State mine at the same time, where over 5000 men took their discharge after a clash in which one worker died (10). The situation on other mines in the region was quiet but tense, and on one mine the SAP presented a show of force to discourage further clashes (11).

The management of the major mining Group in the area began to hold meetings with the Lesotho government, the Minister of Mines and the Prime Minister of South Africa, to discuss the conflicts.

Management's first direct action was to hold an inquiry into specific grievances which arose during the disturbances at the mine which

experienced the first clashes. The committee met in late February and early March, to consider evidence regarding certain allegations made by Lesotho nationals, Xhosa speakers and others. These included the complaint by Sotho workers that management did nothing about the acquittal of the Xhosas accused of murdering their fellow workers, the allegation that hostel management was biased in favour of Xhosa speakers, the alleged failure on the part of the Sotho indunas to destroy the confiscated lesiba sticks and the role of the indunas in the conflict (12).

The committee specifically excluded from the inquiry any questions relating to the underlying causes of the clashes, wishing to avoid further repercussions, although certain Black delegates expressed their dissatisfaction with this decision in view of the need to avoid such conflicts in future. The committee's findings and suggestions were directed mainly at the apparent need to review the induna system, although it was also suggested that better amenities be provided on mines to avoid movements into the local townships.

Industry management's second response to the problem arose from an idea proposed by Black employees on some of the affected mines that a meeting be arranged between the leaders of the various groups to plead for peace. During the Chamber's ministerial visit to Cape Town in late-February, it was agreed that steps be taken to invite representatives of Lesotho, Transkei and the Ciskei to attend a meeting in Welkom at which such a plea would be relayed to mineworkers (13).

At a meeting in March at Pretoria between the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development and industry representatives, the Secretary expressed the government's concern about the planned meeting of 100 Sotho and 100 Xhosa-speaking workers. It was felt that such high numbers of the "rival" factions in one place could lead to trouble, and the number was accordingly reduced to 50 for each group (14).

Two meetings were eventually held at two Free State mines. Present were Lennox Sebe (Chief Minister of Ciskei), George Matanzima (Transkei Minister of Justice), Chief D.M. Seeiso (a member of Lesotho's royal family), the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for the Free State, the district's police commandant, general managers of the mines, representatives of the Chamber and the MLO. The different mines in the area also sent delegations of Black employees (one mine sent 65 senior Blacks to a meeting). During at least one meeting, "seating areas for the various mines were cordoned off, thus preventing the mixing of tribesmen from the mines" (15).

Although the meetings were held without mishap, another violent clash took place 26 days later on the mine which experienced the original clashes. Xhosa workers apparently mocked Sothos at a tribal dance practice on Saturday, 6th April. That night, the two groups clashed and mine security was called in. Dogs were deployed, and both groups went into their rooms, but not before one Xhosa had been killed and 10 injured (mainly Sotho) (16).

The following week-end, severe fighting broke out between Sothos and Xhosas at a gold mine in the Transvaal, after Pondos had murdered a Sotho worker outside the hostel. Late that evening (Sunday), Sothos locked several Xhosas in three rooms, poured paraffin inside and set the rooms alight. Three workers were killed (two of whom were Xhosas) and on the following Tuesday night, a further clash took place in which 7 workers were killed and 40 injured, bringing the toll on this mine to 10 dead and 70 injured. At least 1400 Sotho and 400 Xhosa workers were repatriated (17).

The fact that this clash in the Carletonville region took place a week after the resurgence of conflict on the Free State suggests that relationships between Sothos and Xhosas had become strained in other gold fields as a result of the Free State conflicts. This likelihood is also

supported by the fact that the breach of the peace in the Carletonville clash involved a homicide by Pondo workers, yet the murder resulted in a clash between Xhosas and Sothos. This particular outcome suggests that the aggrieved Sothos directed their hostility towards a group with whom relations were already strained as a result of the Free State clashes, namely the Xhosas.

In the Free State, relations between Sothos and Xhosas remained delicate during the remainder of 1974. In August of that year, four months after the most recent outbreak, renewed fighting broke out one of the mines which had hosted a peace conference. This clash seemed to have had its origins in the earlier conflicts because it broke out in the absence of any specific breach of the peace, such as an assault or homicide. The conflict stemmed instead from rumours that Sothos from other hostels would converge on one hostel on the mine and attack the Xhosas. A Sotho worker later claimed that he saw a Xhosa pushing weapons under a hostel gate from the outside. At 21h00 that some night, when the hostel room lights were routinely switched off, whistles were blown and there was noise and shouting from the interior of the hostel. A room block housing mainly Xhosas was attacked and windows were broken. The SAP arrived, fired shots into the air and used teargas bombs on the crowd, which dispersed. The Xhosa induna's accommodation and several Xhosa rooms were set on fire. Three Xhosa workers were killed and 73 injured. The following day, fighting broke out again, but the SAP dispersed the Sothos with teargas and there were no further casualties. Approximately 500 Xhosas took their discharge (18).

c) Women, Jobs and Politics on the Free State Mines

The above account of events indicates that between February and August, 1974, Sotho and Xhosa workers clashed on seven distinct occasions, leaving 35 workers dead and 315 injured. Close to 20 000

workers had been repatriated, most of them Lesotho nationals. S these conflicts took place on the Free State gold field, with one additional clash being recorded for the Carletonville region.

These conflicts can be traced, directly or indirectly, to the series of murders of Sotho workers near Welkom's Thabong township in the first month of 1974 and the violent encounters which followed immediately on these actions.

The murders themselves were linked by certain observers to competition over women in the township. One theory, propagated in the press (19), was that the Sothos enjoyed privileged sexual access by virtue of the fact that the township women were also Sotho-speaking, as was most of the local Black population (Horner and Kooy, 1979). The Xhosas had apparently resented this situation and had taken to attacking Sotho workers returning from the township on weekends (Kirkwood, 1974:35).

The ethnic affinity of Sotho-speaking women for Sotho mineworkers should not, however, be overemphasized. According to an ex-resident of Thabong, the prostitutes in the township were more interested in the financial status of their clients and were willing to form a liaison with any worker with ready cash (20).

From the financial point of view, Xhosa-speaking workers were a disadvantaged group, being largely confined to unskilled occupations at lower pay, whereas Lesotho nationals were employed mainly in better paid, supervisory positions on the Free State. Table 13 indicates that in 1977, 11,8 per cent of Lesotho nationals were represented in supervisory positions, as compared to only 4,5 per cent of Transkeians and Ciskeians. Conversely, most of the latter were to be found in the manual labourer posts (39,8 per cent), whereas proportionally fewer Lesotho workers were present in these jobs (8,0 per cent).

Table 13 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF BLACK EMPLOYEES IN DIFFERENT JOB CATEGORIES ON ONE FREE STATE MINE (1977)[1]

Job Categories[2]	Lesotho		Transkei/Ciskei		Other[3]	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Supervisors	94	11,8	23	4,5	10	12,3
Mechanicals	320	40,1	113	21,9	18	22,2
Stope Team	320	40,1	174	33,8	24	29,6
Labourers	65	8,0	206	39,8	29	35,9
Total	799	100,0	516	100,0	81	100,0

1. The distribution was calculated by examining work record cards in an 18 per cent sample of different production sections on the mine, as at June, 1977.
2. This general classification comprises supervisors (including team leaders), mechanicals (including machine operators, winch and locomotive drivers), stope team members (including timber support and maintenance) and labourers (mainly lashers).
3. "Other" workers in the sample included those from Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland, Natal and the Orange Free State.

Source: MacArthur et al, 1978:45.

Although these data were obtained three years after the conflicts in question, the situation at that time was probably worse, in view of the fact that Transkeians and Ciskeians have since made greater advances into better jobs in later years as a result of the industry's policy to recruit and retain workers from within South Africa, and reduce dependency on countries such as Lesotho.

The over-representation of Lesotho nationals in the better paying jobs was a consequence of their regular work patterns. Their acute economic dependency on the mines, as outlined in chapter three, had resulted in long work stay periods (up to 14 months on average in 1974, compared to 10 months for South African workers) and regular returns to the same mine within the required re-engagement periods (50 per cent of Lesotho returnees re-engaged in this way on two Free State mines in 1976/1977, as opposed to only 20 per cent of workers from the Cape

Province).

For these reasons, Lesotho nationals were invariably selected for promotion to supervisory positions and came to enjoy a reputation as 'professional' mineworkers. Their over-representation in these jobs at the time of the 1974 clashes implied that Lesotho workers enjoyed higher earnings and hence, greater access to the attentions of township women. Xhosa-speaking workers may have resented this state of affairs and were themselves further away from their own wives and families than Lesotho nationals, since the latter were able at times to travel home to Lesotho on long week-ends.

The sexual deprivation of Xhosa workers did seem relevant to the conflicts, but this fact alone does not adequately account for the bitter enmity between Sotho and Xhosa throughout the region, evident in the fact that a number of violent clashes took place on several mines in this gold field. There is a need in this respect to account for the violent severity and concentrated frequency of the clashes in the region as a whole, including the failure of peace - keeping efforts on the part of certain national leaders and the Basotho workers' tendency to seek repatriation after most of the encounters.

In identifying the underlying sources of hostility between the two groups on most mines in the regions, the issue of job domination by Lesotho workers on these mines is of particular importance. Xhosa-speaking mineworkers returning home after the clashes were reported to have complained of this domination to MLO district managers in the Transkei and Ciskei. The district managers noted that the Free State mines were popular among mineworkers and that "feelings of jealousy" were apparent among Transkeians and Ciskeians (21). The Ciskei district manager also reported that returning workers had claimed that certain threats by Sotho workers had "... started once the Basothos had obtained numerical superiority on the mines. Later these general threats became

personal at gang level... with perhaps a Mosotho boss boy in charge resulting in the inevitable tribal friction" (22).

To assess the significance of this report, it is necessary to examine assaults in the underground work situation. In the underground work teams, environmental stresses and production pressures are associated with frequent assaults, perpetrated most often by Black and White supervisors. Table 14 indicates that in 1976/1977, 23 per cent of all assaults underground were committed by Black supervisors, despite the fact that they constituted, on average, roughly 10 per cent of the total Black underground work force on the Free State Mines.

Table 14 JOB STATUS OF ACCUSED IN UNDERGROUND ASSAULTS ON TWO FREE STATE MINES[1]

Accused	Number	Per cent
White Supervisor	65	23,6
Black Supervisor[2]	64	23,2
Black Worker	147	53,2
Total	276	100,0

1. The data were collected for the period January, 1976 to May, 1977.
2. Black supervisors included team leaders, station marshals and onsetter's assistants.

Source: MacArthur et al, 1978:57.

It is clear that Black supervisors, mainly team leaders, committed frequent assaults on work team members. It is also clear from Table 13 reported earlier, that Sotho speakers were over-represented in team leader posts and Xhosa speakers were over-represented in labourer posts. The result of this correspondence was that assaults involving Sotho-speaking team leaders and Xhosa-speaking team members were comparatively frequent, as indicated in Table 15.

Table 15 ETHNIC STATUS OF ASSAILANT AND VICTIM IN WORK ASSAULTS BY BLACK TEAM LEADERS ON BLACK WORKERS ON TWO FREE STATE MINES[1]

Job and Ethnic Status		Number	
1. Sotho Team Leader on	Xhosa worker	15	
Xhosa Team Leader on	Xhosa worker	10	32
Other Team Leader on	Xhosa worker	7	
2. Sotho Team Leader on	Sotho worker	9	
Xhosa Team Leader on	Sotho worker	6	18
Other Team Leader on	Sotho worker	3	
3. Sotho Team Leader on	Other worker	2	
Xhosa Team Leader on	Other worker	2	6
Other Team Leader on	Other worker	2	

1. The data were collected for the period January, 1976 to May, 1977.

The distribution of Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers in the higher and lower levels respectively, of the mines' job hierarchies, may also have contributed to inter-group tension as a result of the introduction of a new programme of job evaluation prior to the conflicts. In mid-1973, some eight months before the outbreak of conflict in the Free State, the mining Group which owned most of the mines in the region introduced a job evaluation programme on which wage increases for that year were based. The programme, based on the Paterson job grading system, attached special value to decision-making and responsibility in the calculation of appropriate wage remuneration for specific jobs. Team leader and supervisory posts were consequently ranked highly in such a scheme. Workers within this job category were also awarded proportionally higher wage increases than those in other categories, in an effort to adjust the overall wage curve extending to "White" occupations.

The job evaluation programme and the associated monetary rewards

communicated to employees a measure of their worth and contribution to production in the eyes of management. Where different job categories were also largely occupied by particular regional or linguistic groups, the impression may have been gained that the contribution of specific groups was being evaluated. At least one observer at the time, namely the Lesotho Government Labour Representative, a Mr A.L. Thoahlane, argued that the answer to the violent inter-group clashes of 1974 was linked to job evaluation. Thoahlane reported that the Xhosa and Sotho felt they were being pitted against each other as a result of job evaluation (23).

This overlap of industrial work place divisions with regional and linguistic divisions within the Black work force, seemed relevant to the build-up of tension between Xhosas and Sothos in the years and months preceding the 1974 clashes. These factors, combined with the numerical and occupational domination of Sotho speakers and their access to greater cash earnings and hence, to the favours of women in the area, collectively contributed to the incidence and severity of these encounters.

The domination of Lesotho nationals on Free State gold mines, in turn, could be traced to their effective confinement to the mining industry as a result of legal controls over the employment of 'foreign' workers in South africa, and to the associated stability of their work careers.

Industry management and others, however, have also argued that this domination could be traced more directly to an alleged "territorial possessiveness on the part of Basotho, who regarded the mines on which they worked as being Basotho property and resented the intrusion of other tribes" (24). It was also suggested that Lesotho workers regarded those on shorter contracts as "inferior" and Xhosa-speaking workers also complained that the Sothos had threatened to "show us that the Free State is not the Cape" (25).

Although the "territorial possessiveness" thesis seems to be borne out by the fact that Sotho workers were the aggressors in the clashes, it does not explain the fact that thousands of Sothos took their discharge after the conflicts. Such an action could be regarded as having had the opposite effect, by giving Transkeians and others an opportunity to move into jobs vacated by Lesotho nationals. Certainly, the mass departure of Lesotho workers would have provided the only opportunity for Transkeians to improve their position on these mines in view of the fact that the latter's service records could not hope to compete with that of the professional Lesotho mineworkers.

The Lesotho workers' desires for repatriation can also not be ascribed to any fear of counter-attacks and reprisals by Xhosa-speaking workers. It will be recalled that Sotho-speaking workers outnumbered the former by over 2 to 1 on Free State mines, which helps to account for the greater number of Xhosa deaths during the clashes (20 Xhosas, 6 Sothos, 9 others and undisclosed).

To account for the repatriation of Sothos after the clashes, it is necessary to consider a political explanation. In chapter three, certain sources were cited which suggested that the strategy of the Basotho Congress Party in its struggle with Chief Jonathan's regime in Lesotho was to bring about conflicts on the mines, followed by the mass repatriation of Lesotho nationals who would then proceed to overthrow the government on their return. This 'conspiracy' theory would seem somewhat fanciful in relation to the Free state clashes, were it not for the fact that an attempted overthrow of Jonathan's regime took place one month earlier in January, 1974, when police stations in Lesotho were attacked by the BCP. After the abortive uprising, there was an influx of Lesotho nationals into the mines, followed shortly thereafter by violent conflict with Xhosa speakers (26).

The Lesotho Labour Commissioner told a mining delegation visiting

Maseru after the deferred pay disputes that he had "spent weeks investigating the OFS faction fights and they were (also) found to have a political background" (27). Although the Lesotho Government was particularly keen to ascribe the clashes to political subversion, it could help to explain the "new factor" in inter-tribal fights identified by one mining Group, namely the observation that "Basothos... are electing to return home after each major incident" (28).

The general manager of one of the affected mines was also of the opinion that "political agitation" helped to account for the protracted nature of the conflicts, noting that in one case the leaders were twice reconciled and that in each case the violence was renewed (29).

By December of 1974, the Mines' Labour Organization reported rumours of the imminent invasion of Lesotho and the luggage of returning mineworkers was searched at the border posts (30).

There is little doubt that Lesotho mineworkers have been involved in a struggle with their country's government in recent years. On balance, it would seem that these political tensions contributed only in part to the conflicts, being relevant to the mass repatriations of Sothos. The conflicts themselves, on the other hand, had their origins primarily in the numerical and occupational domination of Lesotho nationals on Free State mines, with its attendent consequences for inter-worker relations in underground gangs and for the economic and social deprivation of Transkeian workers.

d) <u>The Aftermath and the Crisis of Foreign Labour</u>

The inter-group clashes of 1974 in the Free State constituted the first major wave of such conflicts on gold mines in the contemporary record and appear to have generated a feuding relationship between Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers. It will be recalled that an important feature of one of the later clashes in the Free State, was that it took

place in the absence of a specific breach of the peace, involving the immediate mobilization, through rumour, of the groups involved in the first outbreaks of conflict. Insofar as a feud can be defined as the continuation of hostilities between two groups sustained by prior enmity and not necessarily requiring any further breaches of the peace, it can be said that conflict began to assume the form of a feud between Sothos and Xhosas in the region.

The feud also appears to have extended to the Carletonville region in one case in which the actual breach of the peace, namely the murder of a Sotho by a Pondo, did not result in a clash between the groups of which these individuals were members, but between Sothos and Xhosas on the mine.

Yet another clash between Sothos and Xhosas took place on this same Carletonville mine a year later (March, 1975) after a Tswana worker had been murdered in the ablutions by a Xhosa (31). Although it is not possible to demonstrate any concrete link between these incidents and those on the Free State goldfield, it is important to consider the extent to which feuding relationships in the Free State spread to other regions as a result of the movement of workers between different mines in the industry.

This possibility seems to have been borne out in one clash between Sothos and Xhosas on a Natal colliery in May, 1975. In his report on the unrest, a mining official claimed that the trouble could be traced to certain workers who had been arriving on the mine over the preceding few months and who were known to have worked in the Free State mines (32).

The potential influence of inter-mine movement for sustaining inter-group tensions was in fact particularly great in the years after the Free State clashes. Inter-mine transfers and local engagements were higher in 1975 and 1976 than at any other time between 1971 and 1982, as indicated in Table 16.

Table 16 LOCAL ENGAGEMENTS AND INTER-MINE TRANSFERS : 1971-1982

Year	Number	Percentage change
1971	33 626	-
1972	34 833	+1,0
1973	33 893	-1,0
1974	37 304	+9,2
1975	69 849	+46,6
1976	95 981	+27,3
1977	73 773	-23,1
1978	53 565	-27,4
1979	42 881	-20,0
1980	13 108	-69,4
1981	2 204	-83,2
1982	789	-64,2

Source: TEBA Annual Reports for 1980 and 1982.

The damaging effect of the Free State conflicts on relationships between these two worker groups on other mines should be kept in mind in the course of analysing subsequent inter-group clashes in the industry.

Inter-group relations after the Free State events also seemed to have suffered as a result of the Malawian repatriations which took place towards the end of 1974. Also important were the deferred pay disputes of January, 1975, which were particularly damaging to Sotho-Xhosa relations, as described in chapter three. The activities of Mozambican workers after their country achieved independence in mid-1975 also aggravated inter-worker relations on certain mines.

These various upheavals of "foreign" worker groups all took place in the year following the Free State clashes, making 1975 one of the most conflict-ridden in the contemporary history of the industry. The cumulative impact of these events on inter-worker relations should not be underestimated.

The year 1975 also marked the first concerted move to recruit workers from within the South African region. Table 3 cited earlier (p.136) indicated that the number of workers of South African origin rose from 77 000 in 1974 to over 100 000 in 1975, increasing steadily thereafter every year to over 240 000 by 1981. Most of the new recruits were drawn from the Transkei, which made up at least half of the total number drawn from the South African region. Within the Transkeian group, the majority of recruits were from Pondoland, followed by Tembuland (Table 17).

New recruits also streamed in from Lesotho, and for a time from Mozambique and Rhodesia, although the bulk of the recruits came from South African Black homelands and provinces.

The influx of novices aggravated inter-worker relations in various ways, as illustrated, for example, by the experiences of Rhodesian mineworkers described in chapter four. The new recruits encountered other workers drawn from different regions of Southern Africa and were also exposed, for the first time, to the peculiar working and living conditions in the industry, particularly the communal and institutional environment of mine hostels. From this time onwards, new patterns of conflict became evident and will be examined in detail in the following section.

Table 17 ANNUAL NUMBER OF GOLD MINE RECRUITS FROM DIFFERENT REGIONS OF THE TRANSKEI: 1971-1980

Year	East Griqualand[1]	Tembuland[2]	Transkei[3]	Pondoland[4]	Total
1971	5 649	8 860	4 523	14 082	33 114
1972	5 532	10 305	5 635	14 740	36 212
1973	6 232	11 384	7 017	14 902	39 535
1974	6 829	10 245	6 893	15 020	38 987
1975	11 243	17 215	11 306	23 686	63 450
1976	17 033	23 539	15 030	29 658	85 260
1977	25 177	35 596	22 836	37 755	121 364
1978	23 038	28 854	20 352	35 858	108 102
1979	21 108	24 571	19 710	30 475	95 864
1980	9 631	10 701	7 712	12 132	40 176
Combined Total	131 472	181 270	121 014	228 308	

1. East Griqualand includes the districts of Matatiele, Mt Ayliff, Mt Fletcher, Mt Frere, Qumbu, Tsolo and Umzimkulu.

2. Tembuland includes Elliotdale, Engcobo, Glen Grey, Herschel (Sterkspruit), Mqanduli, St Marks (Cofimvaba), Umtata and Xalanga (Cala).

3. Transkei includes Butterworth, Idutywa, Kentani, Nqamakwe and Tsomo.

4. Pondoland includes Bizana, Flagstaff, Libode, Lusikisiki, Ngqeleni, Port St Johns and Tabankulu.

The classification of regions within the Transkei is based on Hammond-Tooke (1975:20).

Source: TEBA "Recruited Labour" Statistics.

3. COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN MINE HOSTELS AND THEIR SOCIAL ENVIRONS: 1975-1977

Between 1975 and 1977, inter-group conflicts took place with regular frequency, mainly on the Transvaal gold fields of Carletonville, Klerksdorp, West Rand and Far East Rand. During this period, three

distinct patterns of conflict could be discerned, namely those conflicts which reflected the activities and aspirations of tribal indunas, those stemming from the tensions of communal barracks accommodation and those related to the presence of shebeens and prostitutes in the hostels' external environs and on local farms. For ease of analysis, these distinct kinds of conflict situations will be discussed in turn and not in strictly chronological order.

a) Tribal Indunas and Hostel Politics

Between June, 1975 and July, 1976, at least four inter-group clashes took place in which certain Nguni tribal indunas played prominent roles, commencing at a mine in the Klerksdorp region.

On this mine, a Tswana tribal representative was stabbed to death after being sent into a room of Xhosa workers to stop a fight. Two weeks afterwards, late on a Saturday evening, the Xhosa induna fetched dancing sticks which he kept in his room and distributed them among Xhosa workers. He then led a "chanting mob" to the rooms of the Sotho dancing team. The Sothos armed themselves with fire pokers, wood hatchets and branches and a clash took place, lasting approximately ten minutes. Two workers were killed and 7 injured. The mine security and South African police moved in and arrested over 200 workers and the Xhosa induna was taken into custody.

The management of the mine subsequently established that the trouble had arisen as a result of the fact that the Xhosa induna had felt that his position and status was jeopardized by the recent influx of a large number of Sotho recruits (33).

These changes in the labour force had come about as a result of the Malawian repatriations. In 1974, nearly half the mine's labour force was Malawian in origin, but by June, 1975 nearly all the Malawians had left and the mine was obliged to recruit novices from South Africa and

Lesotho. The subsequent events indicated that changes in the composition of a mine's labour force had implications for informal authority and power relations in the institutional environment of the mine's hostel. These power relations had altered as a result of the influx of new recruits because the status and rank of tribal indunas is usually a function of the sizes of the groups over which they have been appointed.

The complicity of tribal indunas in inter-group conflict was evident again on another mine in the same region (Klerksdorp), three months later, in October, 1975. This incident started when two Sothos on a bicycle collided with some Xhosas who refused to let them pass on the road. The fight spread to the hostel gate, where a Xhosa induna allegedly handed out dancing sticks. A minor clash took place later between Sothos and Xhosas in the hostel bar (34).

In two successive inter-group clashes on a Far East Rand mine in 1976, one Pondo tribal induna was particularly active. The Pondo induna was reported in February 1976 to be holding meetings in his room. On one Saturday night, Pondomise workers held a dance in his room and that same night, a Sotho worker was killed with a sharp instrument outside the same room. A Pondo ambulance attendent was later found to be in possession of a length of hosepipe filled with sharpened rods. The following week-end, Sotho shaft-sinking workers armed themselves with branches after the Pondomise had held another dance and teargas was used to disperse the mobilized groups.

On this same mine five months later, a gang of Pondomise workers attacked and killed a worker early on a Sunday evening. The Sothos came out of their rooms shouting, whistling and chanting and attacked Pondo rooms. Two Sotho workers later claimed that the Pondo induna was seen "dressed in a white sheet and white shorts and armed with a long sharpened rod leading the Pondos and other Xhosa-speaking peoples in an attack on the Basotho." Sporadic clashes took place on subsequent days,

with the death toll reaching 6. The mine security police later found steel rods in an empty pipe in front of the Pondo induna's room. A total of 1 103 workers deserted and the Pondomise and Pondo indunas were discharged (35).

This particular mine had also been taking on new batches of recruits after the loss of Malawian labour, mainly from the Cape Province. The number of South African workers had increased from 15 per cent in June, 1974 to 28 per cent by June 1975, reaching over 37 per cent of the total at the time of the conflict described above. Many of the new recruits would have been drawn from Pondoland in the Transkei. The Cape Nguni workers were clearly becoming a significant political force on the mine and seemed intent on chasing Sotho workers away, with the Pondo induna playing a crucial leadership role in the conflicts.

These various cases of conflict in which tribal indunas played a significant role, all took place in the immediate aftermath of the recruitment campaign within South Africa's borders following on the Malawian repatriations. The evidence suggests that the indunas representing these growing worker groups became involved in a struggle to consolidate their own groups' dominance and, by implication, enhance their own power and status on the mines.

Certain hostel managers have reported that it is important to tame down the strong jealousies that exist between indunas in their quest for power and leadership (McNamara and de Bruyn, 1975). The conditions for a new leadership struggle on the part of mine indunas seem to have been set up after 1975 as a result of the substantial changes in the composition of the labour force. A new alignment in informal power relations seems to have taken place after that time, with the Nguni indunas in the forefront of their particular groups.

There is also a sense in which the active involvement of indunas in their own tribal groups' struggles with other groups, can be regarded as

a logical extension of their formal role, namely to "represent" their tribe on the mine. The training course provided for indunas on one of the affected mines mentioned above stressed, inter alia, the fact that indunas should "represent the tribe" and "enjoy the respect of workers" (36).

It is also made clear to indunas, on the other hand, that they are part of the management team and that their first loyalty lies with management. A survey conducted in 1975 of the opinions of hostel managers confirmed that most viewed indunas as informants for management. The majority, however, also expected the indunas to continue to act as representatives for the employees in their charge (Momberg et al, 1976).

Tribal indunas on mines appeared from this evidence to have been confronted with contradictory expectations as regards their primary function. Interviews with eleven indunas in 1976 indicated that most (ten) believed that their primary loyalty lay unambiguously with management, implying that they had sidestepped this potential role conflict (Momberg and McNamara, 1977).

Some tension in the induna's role may have been evident at times, however, in view of the continuing expectation from both hostel management and Black hostel residents themselves, that the induna also represent his tribe's interests. This supportive role is exercised on occasions when indunas are called on to act as interpreters and collectors of evidence in cases of assault, theft or minor disturbances involving the tribesmen in their charge. One consequence of this role, while not necessarily intended, is that the induna has acted as counsel for the defence of a member of his tribal constituency in the hearing of cases (McNamara, 1980:322).

For these reasons, certain indunas seem to have come to view their role as one of moral support for the interests of the particular group formally represented by them in domestic hostel affairs and problems.

The cases cited above, in which several Nguni indunas mobilized their own tribesmen in inter-group clashes, suggest that these men may have attempted to reconcile certain contradictory requirements in their formal role and even legitimize their status in the eyes of their fellow tribesmen by leading them into battle with other worker groups.

The peculiar social and political character of the institutional setting of mine hostels is also associated with other kinds of tensions in everyday life which have led to inter-group conflicts in the past, not all of which have been expressed on an inter-ethnic basis.

b) Conflicts Arising from Communal Tensions of Hostel Life

The brief description provided earlier of the social milieu of mine hostels drew attention to various social situations in which interpersonal tensions were evident, such as the hostel rooms and the hostel bar. Table 18 indicates that 70 per cent of all hostel assaults on one mine took place in the rooms, with a lesser proportion having taken place in the bar (8,6 per cent)and kitchen (2,9 per cent).

Table 18 SITES OF HOSTEL-RELATED ASSAULTS ON ONE PLATINUM MINE: 1975-1977

Site of Assault	Number of Assaults	Per cent of Total
Room	269	70,4
Bar	33	8,6
Kitchen	11	2,9
Other /unspecified	69	18,1
Total	382	100,0

The communal nature of hostel rooms is associated with a lack of personal privacy, poor security of private property and conflicts over scarce resources. Table 19 lists some of the apparent causes of room-related assaults on one mine. Those associated with a lack of

privacy include drunkenness (14 per cent), unwelcome visitors (6,7 per cent), excessive noise (6,7 per cent) and interference with individuals' beds (1,5 per cent). Assaults have also been traced to conflict over scarce resources, particularly arguments over the allocation of meat and beer rations (12 per cent) and problems with money and debt payments (2 per cent). The violation and poor security of personal property have also led to assaults, particularly theft (8,9 per cent) and damage to property (1,5 per cent).

Table 19 APPARENT CAUSES OF ROOM-RELATED ASSAULTS IN ONE PLATINUM MINE HOSTEL: 1975-1977

Apparent Cause	Number of Assaults	Per cent of Total
Drunkenness	38	14,1
Arguments over rations (meat, beer)	33	12,3
Theft of food/property	24	8,9
Unwelcome visitors/newcomers	18	6,7
Excessive noise	18	6,7
Debt repayments/money	6	2,2
Requests for food/food selling	5	1,8
Sodomy	5	1,8
Damage to personal property	4	1,5
Interference with beds	4	1,5
Other/undisclosed	114	42,4
Total	269	100,0

In view of the fact that most mine hostels accommodated men on a tribal or ethnic basis in the rooms during the period under review, the majority of these assaults were usually intra-ethnic in character. On one gold mine which made use of an ethnic accommodation pattern, most

of the assaults in one sample (i.e. 58 of 93) took place between residents of the same tribal or linguistic groups (McNamara, 1978b:103).

Although group clashes between tribally or linguistically related workers have been rare, accounting for only 5 per cent of the total, they do illustrate the fact that tensions of communal hostel life, and not inter-ethnic prejudice per se, are relevent to inter-group conflicts in these settings.

One such clash, which had its origin in a hostel room, indicated that the accommodation of men from similar linguistic backgrounds, in this case Tswana and Sotho, was no guarantee of social stability in this communal setting. On a Saturday evening in December, 1975 on a West Rand mine, a Tswana fatally stabbed a Sotho-speaking room mate. A group of Sothos later attacked other rooms inhabited by Tswanas and 34 residents were injured. The following day, Sotho workers demanded the dismissal of their induna who did not listen to their complaints. The Tswanas for their part, gathered and demanded discharge from the mine. In a meeting with management, the Tswanas requested that Sotho speakers be removed from their rooms and refused to work, but resumed work later (37).

The everyday tensions of communal hostel life have also led to conflict between residents and tribal representatives whose duty it is to maintain order and peace in hostels. In one particularly violent conflict on a Free State mine in July, 1976, these tensions accounted for a violent clash between Pondos and Bhacas and their tribal representatives, as well as a clash between Sothos and Xhosas on the mine (38).

This case will be presented in detail below, as an illustration of the way in which communal tensions of hostel life can aggravate relations between residents and hostel staff and between residents themselves, in certain complex ways:

> Saturday, 10th July: 22h00 - the occupants of a room accommodating Pondos and Bhacas were playing a gumba gumba (radio/tape recorder

with amplifier) at full volume and the occupants of surrounding rooms objected. A Pondo tribal representative was called and entered the room, but was quickly "bundled out". The tribal representative went to fetch reinforcements and the room residents armed themselves with sticks. At 22h15, four tribal representatives (two Pondos and two Bhacas) arrived at the room. The two Bhaca tribal representatives entered the room, but were again evicted. The Pondo induna was called and addressed the men from the room's doorway. The room residents complained that the tribal representatives discriminated against them and then stormed past the induna and attacked the tribal representatives. Four representatives and 4 other residents were injured.

Sunday, 11th: 09h00 - The residents of the room went to the hospital to visit their injured mate. At 10h15, the Pondo induna called the men from the room together and the men admitted that they were in the wrong.

Later, three Bhaca workers from the mine's other hostel visited the affected room and an attack on the tribal representatives was planned. The men moved to the bar where the tribal representatives were on duty and sat in the bar planning the attack. The plan was reported to the induna who advised the hostel manager.

Between 30 and 40 Bhacas left the bar and returned from their room armed with sticks and a shovel. The men were stopped at the entrance to the bar by a tribal representative who was then assaulted. The men forced their way into the beer garden, attacked the building and forced open the "Bantu" beer section. A clash took place with other bar patrons and 3 men were killed. At 16h25, mine security police arrived, followed thereafter (17h25) by the South African Police and the fighting groups were separated. At 17h45, "hard" liquor stocks (whisky, brandy, etc) were removed from the bar and four men were arrested.

That night, Bhacas invaded the kitchen, broke locks on the cold room doors and took 3 beef hindquarters, 55 chickens, apples, bread and offal. The cooks present were also "terrorized". Approximately 20 Bhacas then attempted an entry into a Pondo room. Small groups of Bhacas then went around the hostel, threatening those who planned to work on Monday.

Monday, 12th: Many men absented themselves from work, mainly Xhosa workers who were "afraid of being killed". The bar's normal morning session was closed and the SAP arrested twelve Bhacas for the damage to the bar. A group of Xhosas met outside the hostel to get support for Bhacas in their quest to kill the tribal representatives. At 10h30, about 80 Xhosas requested discharge after being threatened by a gang of Pondos that they would be murdered if they went underground in the afternoon. The request for discharge was refused and the mine called in the assistance of TEBA, the Government Labour Officer and the SAP.

At 12h30, Blacks were seen gathering near the mine sportsfields, drinking, dancing, shouting and breaking branches off trees. The SAP proceeded to the fields and at 13h55 started escorting men back into hostel. No attempt was made to disarm the men as they "stampeded" through the entrance. About 80 Pondos who had been escorted back to the hostel demanded repatriation, failing which they would wreck the hostel. At 14h15, the Government Labour

Officer and TEBA representatives arrived. The Government representative told the men they could go home, a statement immediately challenged by the hostel manager. The crowd dispersed because they had been told to go home. Two tribal representatives were later discharged.

At 18h30 that night, men were seen dancing in front of the rooms, armed with sticks. A Sotho worker was assaulted by a group of Xhosas near the kitchen and Xhosas began to tell Sothos not to go to work.

At 19h15, about 50 workers rushed to the office area where mine security and hostel staff were standing. Teargas was used and the SAP returned to the hostel.

Between 20h00 and 22h30, clashes between Sothos and Xhosas took place behind the bar and at the bottom of the hostel near the dance arena. Sotho workers also attacked Xhosa rooms, breaking windows and doors. Certain Xhosas escaped through the room's rear windows and others were battered with sticks and steel piping, leaving 5 Xhosas dead.

Tuesday, 13th: The men took breakfast in their private clothes and did not go to work. Reports of intimidation had been received and two men were arrested by security patrols. At 06h00, about 500 men, mainly Xhosas and Pondos, gathered to demand discharge. A total of 550 men were discharged and a further 18 Xhosas blacklisted after their arrest.

Wednesday, 14th: 07h00 - About 42 Rhodesians and 44 Mozambicans gathered to demand repatriation, fearing further attacks. At 14h00, the men walked to the local TEBA depot, but returned later.

At 10h00, about 250 residents of the mine's other hostel (no. 4 shaft) wanted repatriation, also fearing an attack.

Thursday, 15th: 06h45 - The Rhodesians and Mozambicans at no. 2 shaft hostel gathered again to demand repatriation, but dispersed later. At no. 4 shaft hostel, men gathered to go home and 180 walked to the TEBA depot. The men returned from the depot in time to see a weapon search in operation. Security patrols were also organized, followed the next day by room searches and a reduction in bar serving hours.

The immediate breach of the peace in this protracted conflict situation involved the playing of a radio in one room which was loud enough to disturb the residents of surrounding rooms. The breach also included the expulsion, by room residents, of certain tribal representatives who had been sent into the room to put a stop to the noise. The immediate mobilization of Pondos and Bhacas was directed at the tribal representatives, resulting in a minor crisis situation in which several workers were injured.

Subsequent mobilizations took place, however, and the conflict shifted to the hostel bar. A group of armed Bhacas, supported by individuals from the mine's other hostel, moved to the bar area, mainly because certain tribal representatives were present on duty of this facility. The resulting crisis, however, implicated other hostel residents patronizing the bar at the time.

Another feature of the crisis was the raiding of the kitchen by Bhaca workers who made off with a supply of meat, poultry, fruit and bread.

The focus of the crisis shifted again later and became directed against the production routine when certain workers intimidated others into not going to work on the following day. As a result of certain assaults by Xhosas on Sotho residents, a fatal clash took place between these groups after the Sothos mounted a retaliatory attack.

Another feature of the protracted and complex crisis was the demand for repatriation by Xhosas, Pondos, Rhodesians and Mozambicans at both hostels on the mine.

The conflicts were redressed primarily by security action and the eventual adjustment included the repatriation of a large number of workers and the restoration of the work routine after nearly a week of production losses.

This extended conflict situation cannot easily be categorized in terms of one particular type of conflict. At one level, it could be described as a conflict against tribal representatives who were obviously unpopular with the hostel residents, particularly Bhaca speakers. In the present context, however, no evidence could be found of any specific grievances against tribal representatives on the mine.

At another level, the conflict in question could be described as a work strike, in that a certain amount of shift picketing took place and there was poor attendance at work. The apparent grievance underlying

this work stoppage seemed to be linked to the rejection of tribal representatives on the part of a certain group.

The conflict could also be described as an inter-group clash involving Sothos, Xhosas and others, partly as a retaliation against intimidation arising from the picketing actions of Xhosa speakers.

For the purpose of the present discussion, however, certain features of this complex conflict situation should be examined in terms of the institutional features of mine hostel life. The significance of the noise produced by the gumba gumbas in the original incident should not be underestimated. Such a disturbance of the peace is clearly associated with the generation of social tensions in the hostel's communal environment. The subsequent intervention of tribal representatives and the generalized hostility displayed towards these hostel authority figures also illustrate the problem of room privacy and the residents' resentment of what was perceived as an intrusion into their personal recreational activities in the rooms.

The raiding of the liquor and food stores can also be linked to the institutional nature of hostel living and the formal organization of food services. Meat and beer supplies in particular, are invariably rationed items in mine hostels. Hostel room rations are a scarce resource, and arguments over their distribution have led to many interpersonal assaults, as indicated earlier. The theft of room meat rations was also responsible for a minor clash between Sothos and Xhosas on a Free State mine in February, 1977 (39). In the confusion of a particular conflict situation it is not surprising that hostel residents frequently raid food and liquor stores for these valued and rationed items.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the eruption of conflict in a mine hostel can have a variety of social repercussions in the confined internal environment of these particular institutions. The actions of the Bhacas in invading the bar, for example, led to a clash with other

patrons. The Bhaca, Pondo and Xhosa workers' general dissatisfaction with their own tribal representatives took the form of a violent protest which also eventually implicated Sotho-speaking residents. The enclosed, institutional nature of mine hostels implies that any expression of conflict between two particular parties can exert a ripple effect on other inter-worker relationships, often with fatal consequences.

The same principle could be discerned in another conflict situation which took place a month later on an East Rand mine. This case involved Black Rhodesians, bar tribal representatives and Xhosa-speaking bar patrons. On a Monday evening, at approximately 19h00, the hostel's bar was approaching closing time. Several Rhodesians wanted to stock up on beer supplies before the bar closed, and tried to pass beer over the bar fence to their friends on the outside (hostel bars are invariably fenced off from the rest of the hostel interior on most mines). A Shangaan tribal representative on duty told them to stop this activity and the Rhodesians left the bar. Later, several Rhodesians living in rooms near the bar area started to throw stones over the fence at the tribal representatives in the bar. Some of these missiles struck other drinkers, mainly South African Xhosa speakers. These men mobilized and attacked the Rhodesians, leaving 14 injured. About 300 Rhodesians moved out of the hostel and slept in the veld for the night. The following day, Xhosas threw stones at Rhodesian rooms and a mesh fence was later erected between the hostel sections housing these two groups (40).

Although the hostility towards Rhodesians had its roots in a number of other issues and problems, as discussed in chapter four, this case does illuminate one way in which a particular dispute (in this case, between Rhodesians and bar tribal representatives) can have repercussions on inter-worker relations in general as a result of the communal organization of mine hostels and the confined nature of the hostel interior.

The various cases described in this section have been examined to illustrate the role of communal tensions in hostel life on the incidence of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts. In the following section, the significance of certain social tensions emanating from the hostel's external environs will be examined.

c) Sex and Shebeens in the External Environs of Mine Hostels

In a previous section, the incidence of a number of inter-group conflicts in the early 1970's were noted. These conflicts were traced to liquor selling around certain gold mines.

The Free State clashes of 1974 were also linked to social activities outside mine hostels, namely the frequenting of Thabong township and the establishment of liaisons with local women.

From late 1975 to early 1977, seven conflicts stemming from shebeens, gambling and prostitutes took place on certain gold mines, particularly in the Transvaal. Between September and November 1975, for example, four clashes broke out on an East Rand mine between Shangaans and Xhosas which originated at the shebeens around the hostels. In these areas, a number of cars were parked from which liquor and methylated spirits were beng peddled. Fights broke out over girlfriends in the vicinity of these vans, and there were also reports that gangs of Sotho "Russians" were robbing mineworkers returning to the hostels on week-ends. Shangaans also clashed with Bhaca workers after a Bhaca was stabbed by a Shangaan in a game of dice (41). Although these clashes were also associated with attempts by Frelimo-supporting Mozambicans to chase other workers off the mine (as described in chapter three), they do illustrate the kinds of tensions characteristic of the social milieu in which Black migrant hostel dwellers seek recreation and relaxation on week-ends.

On another East Rand mine, 9 workers were killed after Sothos and

Xhosas combined to attack Mozambicans while the latter were sleeping in their rooms. The clash was traced to the fatal stabbing of a Sotho worker on a nearby farm (42). This event may have been associated with the presence of women on the farm, since local farms have frequently been visited by mineworkers anxious to develop liaisons with women.

Such was the case, for instance, near a mine in the Klerksdorp region. Three dairy farms were located in the area and a number of prostitutes had taken up residence on these farms. The prostitutes were apparently controlled by Sotho-speaking "Russians" who fixed a R10,00 charge. The Xhosa-speaking mineworkers in particular were reported to be dissatisfied with this charge. On a Saturday evening in April, 1976, two Sothos were attacked by Xhosa or Pondo workers. Later that night, a Xhosa was killed on the way to the ablution and a clash followed in which one Tswana was killed and 13 men injured. The situation remained volatile for several days, during which time Pondos and Xhosas tried to stop other workers from going on shift. Further clashes took place and 2 500 workers were repatriated, mainly Sothos. The eventual death toll was 6 (4 of whom were Sotho speakers), with 25 men injured (43).

On another mine on the West Rand in July, 1976, a Xhosa worker was murdered on a nearby farm by a Sotho-speaking individual who was not a mineworker (44). Sothos and Pondos mobilized against each other in the mine's hostel two days later and several workers were injured. In January, 1977 a Carletonville mine experienced a minor clash between Sothos and Xhosas that originated in conflict at a shebeen on a nearby kopje where dice gambling was known to take place (45).

These various cases highlight the fact that certain conflicts between mineworkers can often be traced to local farms and shebeens, mainly because they are host to women and prostitutes. These incidents also clearly reveal the kinds of problems encountered by migrant mineworkers seeking female company in mining regions as a result of

prolonged separation from their own wives, families or girl friends while working on the mines.

The problem of sexual contact, the frequenting of shebeens and the general deprivations of hostel life were vividly expressed in a particularly violent inter-group encounter on a platinum mine in the Rustenburg area in November, 1976. This event deserves detailed consideration not only because of its severity, but mainly because it demonstrates the way in which certain problems associated with hostel conditions could be linked to the frequenting of local shebeens. The case also illustrates the social and strategic problems of larger hostels in the industry and the difficulties which sometimes arise in the development of new mines.

The events described below have been based on reports by mine management, TEBA Liaison representatives (46), and an in-depth investigation conducted by the author approximately nine months after the disturbance (McNamara, 1978c).

The mine was located in an independent homeland (Bophuthatswana) on a flat scrub plain extending North-East from the Magaliesberg mountains. The hostel itself was planned in such a way that it could eventually be transformed into a village for local families when the mine eventually ceased production. For this reason and because of the high capital expenditure entailed by the building of two separate hostels, only one large hostel was built (McNamara, 1978c).

Construction on the hostel began in 1973. By the end of 1976 on the eve of the conflict, the hostel was completed but the interior was sparse and undeveloped. Walk ways and roads were unpaved and lawns and trees had not yet been planted.

The hostel was circular in shape, with rows of rooms extending outwards in the form of spokes in a wheel. The perimeter of the hostel was fenced with diamond mesh wire and in the central hub of the hostel

was located the various facilities, such as the kitchen and bar. Before the disturbance, the accommodation pattern involved the scattering of ethnically homogeneous rooms throughout the hostel so that no single group could become concentrated in any specific section of the hostel.

In the first three years of its existence, the origin of the mine's labour force varied considerably. The decline in labour supplies from Malawi and Mozambique resulted in an increase in the number of workers from South Africa (especially Transkei and the Bophutatswana homeland) and from Botswana and Lesotho. At the time of the disturbance, 47 per cent of the labour force was of South African origin, partly as a result of an influx of these workers from the beginning of 1976. The size of the total labour force had also increased during this time from 8 300 residents in June, 1975 to 9700 by June, 1976.

As a result of the periodic expansion of the labour force, an occasional shortage of room bed bunks was experienced in the unfinished hostel. Certain residents were obliged to sleep on mattrasses on the floor for a time. This problem was aggravated because the upper level steel bunks were avoided by residents in view of the risk of falling, especially when under the influence of alcohol (47). Between 16 and 20 men were accommodated in each room.

In the hostel's external environment and within walking distance, a number of shebeens were located in the open veld under small trees. The most well-known shebeen was called shashalaza (lit: "open space"). Other shebeens were situated some distance away from the hostel in buildings, a few of which were identified in terms of the ruling head of the country of origin of the patrons, such as the Banda and Matanzima shebeens.

In November, 1975 a Xhosa was found murdered with a heart wound at one of the shebeens. In June and July, 1976, three Xhosas were found with fatal stab wounds outside the hostel and at the shebeens. By August, workers had become uneasy and a rumour circulated to the effect

that Xhosas and Pondos were planning an attack on Sothos and Tswanas.

That same month, approximately 100 men gathered ouside the hostel manager's office to demand discharge. They protested the poor quality of food, insufficiency of meat rations, excessive time spent on lashing work underground and poor hostel conditions. The men complained that the gravel roads and absence of cement walkways in the hostel made the interior very muddy in summer. Eventually 38 Xhosas and 24 Tswana speakers were discharged.

The evidence suggests that the increase in the hostel population at the beginning of 1976, coupled with undeveloped, sparse internal conditions and a certain measure of congestion in the rooms, made the hostel unattractive for residents who began to spend more leisure time outside at the surrounding shebeens. In September, for example, hostel management began to notice that large numbers of Pondos had been assembling in the veld at shashalaza shebeen to drink, dance and sing on week-ends.

The consequence of this increased social activity in and around the shebeens and the pressure on these facilities, however, was an increase in homicides in these areas. In addition to the 3 Xhosas murdered in June and July, a Pondomise was murdered near a local post office in September and a Shangaan was found dead outside the hostel that same month.

Between January and September, 1976, there were also at least 16 non-fatal assaults in and around the shebeens. The majority (11) of these took place between individuals of the same language groups. The assaults themselves arose from a variety of petty squabbles, including a fight over a woman, turning down a request to buy another a drink, reneging on a promise to buy another a drink, an argument over money, swearing, robbery and so on.

These social tensions in and around the shebeens came to a head on

the week-end of Saturday and Sunday, 13th and 14th November, 1976. The actual circumstances surrounding the eruption of conflict at the shebeens differed in the various reports (notably those of the police and the mine's indunas). The different versions and the actual time of their occurrence could therefore not be clearly established.

The account of the events at the shebeens should be regarded as illustrative of the kinds of arguments and tensions characteristic of this setting at the time of the conflict in question:

Saturday, 13th November:

Version One: A Pondo patron ordered a beer at one of the open-air shebeens (shashalaza?) and handed over a note for which the shebeen "queen" could find no change. The Pondo then drank his quart of beer (valued at R1,20) without paying for it and the shebeen queen hit him over the head with a bottle.

Version Two: A Pondo and a Tswana were competing for the favours of a Tswana prostitute. Not content to be second in line, the Pondo pushed himself forward and was struck with a bottle.

Four other Pondos and 6 Tswana patrons at the shebeen began to fight with each other after this incident or incidents. Stones were thrown and police arrived later, scattering the crowd and patrolling the area in riot vans.

Sunday, 14th(?): A Pondo was "playing with" and fondling a Tswana woman. A second Tswana woman thought the Pondo was manhandling the first woman or took exception to his actions and attacked him with a bottle. After he had been injured, the Pondo put on a head scarf to hide his wound (presumably to avoid attention), proceeded to the hostel through the main gate, collected several friends together and returned to the shebeen, where the men attacked people indiscriminantly and stones were thrown.

At 16h30, there was a running fight back to the hostel gate, and certain men (either Tswanas or Sothos) were reported to have shouted: "The Xhosas are killing us!". When the running men (estimated to be between 12 and 26 in number) reached the hostel gate, they were apprehended by tribal police and escorted back into the hostel.

Meanwhile, a group of Pondos coming from the shebeen had apparently cut or trampled the hostel perimeter fence on the side nearest the shebeen and penetrated into the hostel, mobilizing Nguni-speaking workers as they moved through the room blocks. As the indunas and tribal police led the apprehended group from the hostel gate into the interior, the party was attacked by Nguni workers emerging from within the hostel. Stones were thrown, the indunas and police retreated and clashes took place within the hostel during the night. Rooms were also looted. Dogs and teargas were used periodically to halt the fighting.

Monday, 15th: Early in the morning, it became apparent that the Nguni group had entrenched itself on the Northern side and the Sotho group on the South, seperated from one another by the central kitchen area.

At 06h15, further clashes took place which were halted by mine security. A riot vehicle containing mine management representatives and the SAP toured the hostel to talk to men. That morning, most workers were not at work and large numbers of Tswanas started to desert. It became evident that numerous residents were trapped in their rooms, on the "wrong" sides of the hostel from the ethnic point of view as a result of the mobilization of Nguni and Sotho on different sides of the hostel. Fires had also broken out in several rooms. These were extinguished and deserters on the roads leading from the hostel were turned back by the SAP.

It was noticed that groups of men had started to transfer themselves and their belongings to parts of the hostel occupied by their own ethnic group. Hostel management and TEBA officials reported a general request from residents that this be allowed to take place. Accordingly, security forces were directed to enter the hostel's central area to provide a barrier between the opposing forces and discourage attacks across the centre of the hostel. Shangaan and Rhodesian residents were also moved into rooms between Nguni and Sotho groups as a further buffer. Trucks were then used to assist in evacuating hostages and transferring them and their belongings to safer sections of the hostel among their own groups. Many individuals lost their personal belongings and underground kit, which could not be recovered during the evacuation, or were looted in the confusion. Weapons factories were raided by the SAP from time to time. Piles of loose rocks and bricks provided a source of "ammunition" as a result of the unfinished building programme. The firewood dump had also been raided by Nguni speakers who had split the longer poles into thin lengths. The coal dump near the kitchen was another source of missiles.

Tuesday, 16th: No one went to work and desertions continued.

At 12h00, a crowd of workers was disarmed. Later, at 17h00, firewood was removed from the hostel. That night, at 20h30, management met with Black team leaders to get men back to work. Towards midnight, crowds started to gather between the rooms and teargas was used to disperse the men.

Wednesday, 17th: Attendance at work improved, with 13 per cent of the total labour force at work. Underground clothes had been issued to those who had lost their kit. Other men began moving out of the hostel with their luggage. At 11h00, management met with the room prefects (isibondas) to encourage a return to work. The Tswana isibondas complained that the Xhosas had told them they would be "sent by telegram to Jesus" if they returned to work. The Xhosa isibondas also complained of intimidation by Sothos on the way to work. Arrangements were made to provide protection for workers proceeding on shift.

At 16h30, the shebeens were raided by the SAP after reports that many mineworkers were frequenting these places during working hours.

Thursday 18th: White employees accompanied Blacks to work and attendance improved. At 09h00, another isibonda meeting was held,

and a rumour reported that Pondos and Xhosas were intimidating Shangaans and preventing them from going on shift.

Friday, 19th: Work attendance improved further and another isibonda meeting was held in the morning.

Saturday, 20th: Most men had returned to work and meetings were held with isibondas and indunas.

This protracted conflict situation which extended over nine days was preceded by a series of related breaches of peace in the months before the disturbance. These breaches consisted of the occurrence of numerous assaults and murders outside the hostel and at the shebeens. Finally, an irate shebeen owner assaulted a troublesome Pondo patron and violent conflict ensued.

Other mineworkers were mobilized after the Pondo assault victim returned to the hostel to fetch his friends. After attacking shebeen patrons, Pondos penetrated the hostel perimeter and mobilized Nguni forces within.

The conflict was characterized by protracted and destructive crisis periods, including clashes at the shebeens and periodic encounters in the hostel interior, coupled with arson and looting. A total of 10 workers were killed, mainly between Sunday, 14th and Monday, 15th. Of the 10 killed, 6 were found outside the hostel in or around the shebeen area. The dead men included 5 Tswanas, 4 Xhosas and one Pondo. Most of the men had died as a result of fractured skulls. Approximately 54 residents were hospitalized (mostly Nguni) and an unknown number given treatment.

Within the hostel interior, various kinds of missiles and weapons were readily available, including stones, bricks, coal and firewood. Use was also made of iron bars, pick and hammer handles and certain weapons had apparently been brazed, welded and sharpened by machinery available only in the mine workshops.

The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that many residents were

trapped in hostile sections of the hostel, and many also lost property and kit. The mine had later to deal with numerous claims for loss of possessions.

Production was also seriously affected. Mainly as a result of the failure to meet contractual obligations for the supply of platinum -based metals and products, the mine was estimated by management to have lost in excess of R10 million.

The redressive mechanisms employed in the conflict included security actions (dogs, teargas, patrols, raids on weapon factories and shebeens), the establishment of buffer groups between the hostile parties, the evacuation of residents, meetings with Black team leaders and room representatives, and the protection of men going on shift.

A return to work was eventually secured six days after the outbreak of conflict, although the mine had lost approximately 3 000 workers through desertion and discharge, of whom 1 282 were citizens of Botswana.

This processual outline of the conflict highlights the need to account for the severity and protracted nature of the clashes and the violent hostility displayed between the groups involved.

At the outset, it is clear that once the conflict had commenced, redressive action was made difficult because of the sheer size of the hostel and the ready availability of rocks and weapons in the interior. These factors help to account in part for the high number of deaths and injuries and the duration of the disturbance.

As far as the original tensions at the shebeens were concerned, the influx of new recruits at the beginning of 1976 appear to have contributed to conflict as a result of increased pressures on shebeen facilities. The influxes may have also stimulated keener competition between mineworkers for the attention of local women. It is also possible that certain nationalistic feelings among Tswana speakers, particularly those from the Bophutatswana homeland, played a role in

aggravating relations between Tswanas and others. One Pondo worker informed his White supervisor that he was told that this land belonged to Tswanas and that they (the Pondos) could not do as they pleased. No other information could be traced to support this contention, however.

In the months following the conflict, management made efforts to improve the hostel interior by paving walkways and planting lawn and trees. The distribution of ethnic groups in the hostel was allowed to remain as it was immediately after the disturbance, namely the concentration of particular groups in particular areas of the hostel, largely because this method was preferred by the residents.

The shebeens were raided frequently thereafter, but the basic social problems of the migratory labour force remained. In the years following the disturbance (1977 and 1978), 2 workers were killed at the shebeens, although repeated raids by the police eventually eliminated these concerns. Off-duty mineworkers began instead to frequent several of the surrounding villages, with further adverse consequences. During 1977, 6 mineworkers were murdered in the villages.

After 1977, senior management, in conjunction with the newly-independent homeland authorities, embarked on a programme for the recruitment of a higher proportion of local Bophutatswana citizens into mining work. The proportion of these employees increased from 12 per cent in 1977 to 26 per cent in 1982, a trend also evident on other mines in the region. This development eased certain of the social problems of mineworkers by virtue of the proximity of many to their homes and families, some of whom lived in villages near the mine.

d) Communal Conflicts, Labour Turnover and Stabilization

The various conflicts described above for the years 1975 and 1977 can be clearly distinguished from other time periods, both in terms of the particular kinds of conflicts identified and in terms of the

concentrated frequency with which they took place during these years.

These various forms of social conflict coincided closely with the influx of new recruits into the industry after the repatriation of Malawian labour. This influx implied that a high proportion of novice recruits with no prior experience of mining and hostel life, entered the industry.

The percentage of novice engagements from South African territory for example, increased from 23 per cent in 1974 to 32 per cent in 1975 and 1976. An increase in novices from Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique and tropical areas (mainly Black Rhodesians) was also evident during these years (Table 20).

There was not only a high proportion of novices in the industry at this time, but the new recruits also had short lengths of stay on the mines. Recruits from South Africa, for example, stayed on average only 7 months in 1975, 1976 and 1977, as opposed to approximately 12 to 14 months in other years.

Table 21 also indicates that the length of stay of Lesotho nationals was lower in the mid-1970's than it had been at other times.

This evidence suggests that the influx of new recruits into the industry and the high turnover of labour associated with shorter work periods could be linked to inter-group conflicts on the mines. The year 1975, for example, witnessed the highest incidence of such conflict in the contemporary record (Figure 3).

A detailed analysis of the actual conflicts which took place during these years has revealed the ways in which such a turnover of labour could stimulate inter-group tensions and clashes. New influxes of labour, particularly from the Transkei, Pondoland and Ciskei, for example, could be linked to the disruption of informal power and status relations among mine indunas and the consolidation of new power relations, particularly by Nguni-speaking indunas.

TERRITORIES FOR GOLD MINES : 1971-1982

Year	Territory of Origin			
	South Africa[1]	Lesotho/ Other[2]	Mozambique	Tropical[3]
1971	17,8	16,4	16,8	55,9
1972	20,3	17,0	16,7	53,6
1973	21,6	15,8	12,7	40,9
1974	23,3	16,7	21,9	45,5
1975	32,7	21,0	27,9	71,4
1976	32,5	18,1	3,7	77,9
1977[4]	29,8	10,2	2,0	24,8
1978	26,2	11,4	0,8	1,4
1979	24,8	10,7	0,2	0,5
1980	24,4	9,9	0,2	0,8
1981	22,1	9,7	0,6	1,3
1982	22,5	10,1	1,3	8,2

1. South African recruits include those from the various provinces and (independent) homelands.

2. These include recruits from the former High Commission Territories, namely Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland.

3. Tropical countries include Malawi, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Angola and South West Africa/Namibia.

4. From 1977, the figures include recruitment for platinum mines and certain other copper and base minerals mines, members of the Chamber.

Source: Chamber of Mines Statistics.

Table 20 NOVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENGAGEMENTS FROM DIFFERENT TERRITORIES FOR GOLD MINES : 1971-1982

Year	Territory of Origin			
	South Africa[1]	Lesotho/ Other[2]	Mozambique	Tropical[3]
1971	17,8	16,4	16,8	55,9
1972	20,3	17,0	16,7	53,6
1973	21,6	15,8	12,7	40,9
1974	23,3	16,7	21,9	45,5
1975	32,7	21,0	27,9	71,4
1976	32,5	18,1	3,7	77,9
1977[4]	29,8	10,2	2,0	24,8
1978	26,2	11,4	0,8	1,4
1979	24,8	10,7	0,2	0,5
1980	24,4	9,9	0,2	0,8
1981	22,1	9,7	0,6	1,3
1982	22,5	10,1	1,3	8,2

1. South African recruits include those from the various provinces and (independent) homelands.

2. These include recruits from the former High Commission Territories, namely Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland.

3. Tropical countries include Malawi, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Angola and South West Africa/Namibia.

4. From 1977, the figures include recruitment for platinum mines and certain other copper and base minerals mines, members of the Chamber.

Source: Chamber of Mines Statistics.

Table 21 LENGTH OF STAY (IN MONTHS) ON GOLD MINES OF BLACK EMPLOYEES FROM LESOTHO AND SOUTH AFRICA: 1971-1982

Year	Lesotho	South Africa[1]
1971	14,6	14,7
1972	12,7	12,9
1973	14,1	12,2
1974	14,2	10,9
1975	11,6	7,8
1976	10,3	7,0
1977	13,5	7,4
1978	13,9	9,5
1979	15,8	12,0
1980	17,6	13,8
1981	17,4	12,4
1982	18,5	13,6

1. Employees from South Africa include those from the provinces, and the (independent) homelands.

Source: Chamber of Mines Statistics.

The influx of new recruits was also associated with adjustment problems and a certain measure of deprivation in that these recruits were exposed for the first time to institutional features of hostels, including the communal tensions within the rooms and the disciplinary actions of tribal police. A number of inter-group conflicts could be traced to these institutional features, including the rationing of scarce food resources, the confined nature of hostel rooms and the hostel interior itself. Conflicts of this kind were concisely summed up by one hostel resident: "If you put a whole lot of cattle together in a kraal and overcrowd them, they will stamp and horn each other" (McNamara, 1980:321).




FIGURE 3 : Trends in Inter-Group Conflict Involving Foreign and Local Mineworkers : 1971 – 1982

Partly as a response to these communal tensions and deprivations, many hostel residents moved out into the surrounding regions during their leisure time seeking relaxation and female companionship, resulting in assaults and homicides in local shebeens and on farms, and leading frequently to violent inter-group clashes. In one such case on a platinum mine, an influx of new recruits was associated with growing tensions in the shebeens around the mine, partly as a result of the growth in numbers of mineworkers frequenting these places, culminating in violent conflict.

After 1977, the labour force on gold mines became increasingly stabilized in terms of a reduction in the proportion of novice recruits and an increase in the length of work stays, as was seen in Tables 20 and 21. Between 1977 and 1979, when the labour force achieved a high degree of stability in terms of work patterns, the incidence of inter-group conflict declined sharply, suggesting a close link between labour stability and social stability (Figure 3). This "stabilization" of migratory employment continued thereafter, with a growing proportion of workers returning to their original mines within agreed periods, especially after 1979 (Table 22).

Table 22 VALID RETURNEES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MINE ENGAGEMENTS FROM DIFFERENT TERRITORIES: 1979 - 1982[1]

Year	Territory of Origin			
	South Africa	Lesotho/ Other	Mozambique	Tropical
1979	36,1	54,1	85,9	74,1
1980	37,3	58,3	89,5	60,2
1981	40,5	57,9	85,5	67,1
1982	49,9	76,3	84,7	52,7

1. The table includes returnees to gold, platinum, copper and lead mines, members of the Chamber of Mines. A valid returnee is defined as an experienced worker who returns to his original mine within an agreed period.

2. For definitions of territorial origin, see footnotes to Table 20.

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1981	40,5	57,9	85,5	67,1
1982	49,9	76,3	84,7	52,7

1. The table includes returnees to gold, platinum, copper and lead mines, members of the Chamber of Mines. A valid returnee is defined as an experienced worker who returns to his original mine within an agreed period.

2. For definitions of territorial origin, see footnotes to Table 20.

These increasingly stable work patterns were due partly to worsening economic conditions in the country and within the industry itself. Certain rural areas began to experience a drought which was to persist into the 1980's and unemployment increased dramatically. The year 1979, for example, represented the highest peak in registered Black unemployment in the period 1971 to 1981.

Table 23 REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT OF BLACK WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1971-1981

Year[1]	Number Unemployed
1971	70 290
1972	N/A
1973	61 296
1974	75 528
1975	71 605
1976	70 429
1977	132 179
1978	145 805
1979	167 384
1980	143 332
1981	119 238

1. The statistics are based on number of Black workers registered at employment offices, as of September each year.

Source: Department of Manpower, Report of National Manpower Commission for 1981, p. 212.

From 1978 onwards, reports from TEBA field offices began to reflect the growing unemployment evident in the rural areas. In that year, the Kwa Zulu office reported an "oversupply of workseekers as has never been witnessed in the province before" (48).

In 1979, numerous field offices were obliged to turn workseekers away. At the Botswana office, prospective recruits had taken to sleeping outside the depot in the evenings prior to recruiting day, and in Butterworth, field staff had to run a gauntlet to their cars as "prospective recruits push their open passports in your face pleading to be recruited." In Lesotho, the front door of the Thaba Nchu office was broken when recruits "desperate for employment tried to squeeze through

in the rush for positions". At the Pietermaritzburg office, workseekers were seen to rush to the office doors at the sound of the telephone in the hope that it represented another order for workers (49).

By 1980, recruitment procedures had been tightened up as a result of the campaign in various areas to oblige mineworkers to pay local taxes before being forwarded to the mines. The payment of cash advances to recruits to assist with these payments was withdrawn (50).

By 1980, then, it had become clear to mineworkers and potential recruits alike that the mines could not provide jobs to novices and that experienced mineworkers were likely to lose their jobs if they failed to return on time to their mines after agreed leave periods.

The increasing scarcity of mine jobs after 1980 provides an important backdrop to the resurgence of inter-group conflicts from that year onwards.

4. THE RESURGENCE OF CONFLICT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER UNITY: 1980-1982

After a period of relative peace between different worker groups in late-1977, 1978 and 1979, a substantial resurgence of conflict took place from 1980 and onwards, both in terms of the number of incidents and the severity of certain encounters.

There were five distinct incidents in 1980, two of which took place on one mine and resulted in a high death toll. In 1981, there were ten incidents, four of which resulted in death and in 1982 there were two clashes, one of them fatal. It is necessary to examine these conflicts more closely in an effort to account for the resurgence of violence during these later years.

a) Indunas and Inter-Group Relations on New and Old Mines

The most protracted and violent conflict of the 1980's took place on a newly-opened Carletonville mine. The conflict was characterized by two successive mobilizations, both of which led to death. The incidents, to be described in detail below, were based on TEBA Liaison Division reports, a report of the TEBA District Manager for Lesotho and various newspaper articles (51).

Sunday, 27th July: 17h00 - A Pondo dance group returned to its hostel after taking part in a dance competition on another mine in the area. The men started to dance at the main entrance to the hostel. The Pondo induna placed himself on a chair in the centre of the gate entrance and the dancing continued. A Sotho dance team, accompanied by their own Sotho induna, arrived and tried to pass through the gate and enter the hostel. The way was blocked by the Pondos who assaulted the Sothos with sticks and threw stones. The Pondo induna also assaulted the Sotho induna with a sjambok.

The Sotho team ran to the rooms to muster arms and reinforcements as did the Pondos. Soon, approximately 150 men were engaged in fighting near the gate and inside the hostel. The Sothos drove the Pondos back to their rooms and then ran back to the gate and went outside the hostel. Mine security forces threw teargas amongst those Sothos gathered outside.

The Pondos obtained additional, more lethal weapons from the store containing gardening implements after allegedly obtaining the key to the store from the Pondo induna. Those Sotho workers still remaining in their rooms were then attacked by Pondos wielding grass-cutters, crow bars and fire pokers. The Sotho rooms were also looted. Eight Sothos and 4 other workers were killed and 23 hospitalized. The chief induna (a Zulu) also had his car burnt.

That night, Sotho workers were escorted back into their rooms. Only 50 of the 400 night shift workers went on shift.

Monday, 28th: Only one third of the 3200 workers went to work. The Pondos remained in their rooms and about 500 Sothos gathered at the hostel gate. A mass meeting was held between the hostel manager, the chief induna and the Sothos. The men denied responsibility for burning the chief induna's car and asked the hostel manager to assist them to retrieve their stolen possessions and to disarm the Pondos. After the chief induna continued to allege that the men had destroyed his car, the Sothos demanded repatriation.

The TEBA Liaison Division later toured the rooms and told workers that management would pay them for a full shift if they went to work before 11h00. Extra underground kit was also re-issued to those in need.

That afternoon, 463 men were discharged, of whom 294 were Sothos. Attendance at the afternoon shift improved, as was also the case for the night shift.

Tuesday, 29th: Most of the work force went underground on the morning shift. That night, at 21h00, a whistle was blown and the Sothos came out of their rooms and assembled. The Pondos also came out. The workers had pulled water pipes, taps and showers from the ablution walls to serve as weapons and another clash took place in the hostel. The Pondos entered Sotho rooms and attacked their inmates. Mine security forces arrived, deployed dogs and teargas and conducted raids in the rooms for weapons.

Certain Swazi workers entered Sotho rooms, attacked residents and looted property. By 21h30, the conflict had been halted, and security patrols moved through the hostel. A further 8 Sothos had died and 27 workers were hospitalized.

Wednesday, 30th: Most of the men did not go to work and up to 1000 demanded discharge, being fearful and having no faith in security measures. The mine's management and TEBA toured the rooms to assure men that workers going on shift would be protected.

By the end of the day, 900 Nguni and 869 Sotho workers had resigned.

Thursday, 31st: An additional 800 workers refused to work and demanded repatriation. All were repatriated and the Pondo induna was discharged.

The breach of the peace in this lengthy and violent encounter took place as a result of the aggressive attitude of Pondo dance team members and the Pondo induna. After the Sotho and Pondo dancing teams mobilized reinforcements within the hostel, a crisis ensued, characterized by severe fighting and numerous deaths. The work routine was also affected and many workers demanded repatriation.

The crisis deepened after a second mobilization took place in which the Pondos were assisted by other Nguni-speaking workers (notably the Swazis). Further deaths were recorded and more work shifts were lost.

Redressive mechanisms included security action, meetings, tours of the rooms and the protection of men going on shift.

Eventually, an adjustment was effected with the repatriation of over 3 000 workers, of whom approximately 1 000 were Sotho speakers. The mine management later reviewed its policy of tribal block accommodation and banned tribal dancing indefinately. The hostel grounds were also grassed and landscaped.

The mine on which this conflict took place had only recently

commenced production. The size of the Black labour force increased from only 751 men in 1976 to 2 590 in 1979. In 1980, the year of the conflict, the labour strength had doubled, totalling over 5 000 men. In the past, the mine had recruited mainly Lesotho nationals who were in the majority up to 1979. In 1980, however, there was an influx of recruits from Transkei which doubled their representation on the mine. On the eve of the clash, there were over 1 200 Transkeians on the mine, as opposed to over 900 Lesotho nationals. With over 1 600 other workers originating from Kwa Zulu and Swaziland, it was clear that Nguni speakers had become the majority group.

This evidence indicates that, once again, influxes of new recruits had brought about a realignment of informal power relations on a mine. The Pondo induna, in particular, had acted in a manner which indicated that he saw himself and his group as dominant. The induna appeared to have moved to consolidate the Pondo workers' status as the premier working group on a newly-established gold mine.

The possibility that the clashes were associated with political developments in Lesotho should also be considered. From early 1979 onwards, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) of the exiled opposition BCP began to mount a new offensive. In April, 1979, the LLA attempted sabotage of a bridge and police post at Leribe to coincide with the ruling National Party's 20th anniversary. In May that year, there were bomb blasts in Maseru and skirmishes in the mountains. In February, 1980, several months before the clash, the LLA intensified its operations with assassinations and bombings (52) (Annexure Four).

The fact that the Pondos, and not the Sothos, were the chief aggressors in the mine clash, tends to discount any possible link between this event and those in Lesotho. Although most of the Sotho workers took their discharge, it was clear that they were in fear of their lives on the mine and at the mercy of the Nguni majority.

On balance, this conflict can be attributed primarily to the action of the Pondos and others, in a demonstration of their new-found numerical superiority on the mine.

The fact that this clash interrupted a period of relative peace in the 1980's, should not be regarded as implying that the work stability of labour in these years did not have a beneficial effect on inter-worker relations. The clash took place on a newly-established mine, manned by new recruits, serving only to confirm the fact that a stable, experienced work force is an important requirement for harmonious relations amongst mineworkers.

The impact of changes in the composition of the work force for hostel social relations was also evident at a mine on the Central Rand the following year (1981), when 3 Sothos were killed in clashes with Xhosas and Pondos after a Xhosa had stabbed a Sotho worker in the hostel. After the clashes, the Sothos complained that they were heavily outnumbered, that the Xhosa chief induna was not impartial and that there was no Sotho induna (53). There were in fact only 380 Lesotho nationals on the mine, as opposed to 2 300 Transkeians, with the former outnumbered by 6 to 1. Their small size as a group also implied that they did not qualify for an induna.

Whereas Malawians and Mozambicans had together constituted 70 per cent of this mine's labour force in 1974, their place had been taken by Transkeians and others, resulting in a realignment of social and political relations within the work force on this mine, with Sotho workers bearing the brunt of the Transkeians' new-found dominance.

b) Social Tensions, Feuds and Solidarity on the West Rand

A certain proportion of employees from Mozambique could still be found in the industry, and in July, 1981, Xhosa workers on a West Rand mine clashed on two occasions with these foreign workers. A Shangaan

team leader had proposed sodomy to a young Xhosa mineworker, who resisted his advances and fell to his death down the shaft. About 200 Xhosas later attacked Shangaans in the bar and gutted three Shangaan rooms. Seven workers were killed (5 of them Shangaans). An investigation by management drew attention to the fact that Shangaans dominated supervisory jobs on the mine, blocking promotional routes for others, particularly Xhosa speakers who were mainly to be found in labourer jobs (54).

Further conflict took place on the West Rand gold field in later months. One clash between Sothos and Xhosas arose from an incident at a local shebeen, resulting in the death of a Xhosa worker (55). Relations became strained on two other neighbouring mines in the area. Two days after the clash on the first mine, Xhosas attacked the Sothos' living quarters on an adjoining mine and one Sotho was killed. The following week-end, Xhosas and Pondos on a third mine in the region came out of their rooms and started grouping in fight formation. After prompt security action, however, the men returned to their rooms (56).

This series of incidents on the West Rand appear to have taken the form of a feud in that the latter encounters had taken place in the absence of any specific breach of the peace. The Xhosas were apparently intent on avenging the death of their fellow countrymen in the original clash arising from the shebeen incident on the mine in the area.

The extent to which this resurgence of conflict was a reflection of the worsening economic situation and the increasing scarcity of mine jobs, is an important consideration. With the survival of men and their families at stake in the drought-ravaged rural areas, the Transkeians in particular seemed to have acted against Sotho speakers in the Transvaal region to assert their dominance and control over the jobs in the mines of this region.

The fact that inter-group conflict had endured into the 1980's also

illustrates the difficulties associated with developing and maintaining solidarity within the mineworkers' ranks in their dealings with mine management. This was clearly illustrated by the incidence, in mid-1982, of two inter-group clashes which took place during the course of a major work strike in the industry.

These clashes also took place on the West Rand, site of other recent clashes, but involved the mobilization of workers from various regions against Mozambican Shangaans as a result of their non-participation in the strike. A feature of the conflict was the burning of three rooms inhabited by Shangaan team leaders (57).

These incidents were among the few clear examples, in the period under review, of inter-worker clashes associated directly with attempts to obtain cross-ethnic support within the workers' ranks in confrontation with management.

The Shangaans' reluctance to take part in the strikes is understandable in terms of their dependency on the industry as foreign workers. Since 1976, when the industry allowed only experienced Mozambican workers with valid certificates to re-engage, these workers had been obliged to avoid open conflict with management for fear of being permanently excluded from the industry.

This imbalance in the degree of dependence on mining work on the part of particular regional groups in the labour force can, therefore, also explain certain instances of inter-group conflict in the contemporary record.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Since 1973, at least 88 encounters between different worker groups have taken place on gold mines. Although a variety of factors have been examined to account for the incidence of these conflicts, it has still been possible to identify certain patterns in their occurrence over time.

The temporal sequence of these conflicts, moreover, frequently provided the key to the kinds of underlying factors generating such conflict.

In the present conclusion, an attempt will be made to summarize the overall pattern of conflict described in the course of the present chapter and consider a range of underlying factors generating tensions and conflict on mines. Finally, certain crucial questions will be addressed in an effort to explain why the conflicts have been expressed in collective, group form, why particular (ethnic) groups have been involved and why the conflicts have often been violent in nature.

a) An Overview: Patterns of Inter-Group Conflict

The record of contemporary, inter-group conflict can be dated mainly from the events in the Orange Free State in 1974. These early clashes were attributed primarily to the entrenched dominant position of Lesotho nationals on these mines and in the better paying jobs. The fact that such domination was particularly evident on the Free State, as opposed to other mining regions, can help to account for the initial outbreaks of such conflict in that gold field.

The Free State conflicts played an important role in generating further hostility between Sotho and Xhosa-speaking mineworkers in that region and on mines in other goldfields. This hostility developed into a feuding relationship in that subsequent clashes took place between the groups which were not preceded by specific events or breaches of the peace involving the members of these groups.

Relationships between Sotho and Xhosa speakers, and between them and other worker groups, were subjected to further tension as a result of the crisis of "foreign" labour supplies in the mid-1970's involving citizens of Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho. Such hostility could be traced in part to certain tactical actions of foreign worker groups, but more importantly, to an apparently long-standing hostility between "local" and

"foreign" worker groups arising from the formers' resentment of the latters' presence on South African mines.

The rapid social and political changes taking place on the Southern African sub-continent also appeared to have aggravated relations between different worker groups. The independence of Mozambique and the war in Rhodesia, for example, affected the aspirations of Mozambicans and Black Rhodesian mineworkers, respectively. The political aspirations and social distinctiveness of these particular groups were associated with a certain measure of hostility between them and other workers.

The withdrawal of foreign labour in the mid-1970's heralded a major change in the social and political character of the industry's workforce, as a result of the influx of a new generation of mineworkers drawn predominantly from the Transkei and other parts of South Africa. This fundamental change in the composition of the labour force could be associated with distinctive patterns of inter-group conflict. Certain conflicts, for example, indicated that a new alignment of social and political relations in the informal life of mine hostels had taken place, with tribal indunas playing a central role in the establishment and consolidation of new relationships of status and authority.

The influx of new recruits also implied a period of adjustment to the social milieu of hostel barracks life. The exposure of residents to the routines of communal accommodation, discipline and the organization of (rationed) food supplies could be linked to interpersonal tensions and group conflict, sometimes originating in everyday quarrels in hostel rooms.

Tensions were also present in the external environs of mine hostels, many of which became evident after the influx of new mine recruits. Partly to escape the perceived deprivations of hostel life, mineworkers sought relaxation and contact with women in local townships and on farms. Several violent inter-group conflicts originated in these settings,

particularly at shebeens, as a result of competition over women and the sale and consumption of alcohol.

The rapid turnover in the composition of the industry's labour force in the mid-1970's also implied a lack of prior contact between different groups, a general absence of cross-cutting friendships and poorly developed common values. The resulting schisms were particularly evident between Rhodesians and other worker groups, aggravated by the former's education, sophistication and greater worker consciousness.

From 1977 and onwards, the new social order on mines became more firmly established, and workers settled down to regular work routines, indicating that a core of career- oriented mineworkers had emerged from among the wave of new recruits. This period of stability in work patterns implied a low rate of turnover and coincided with a period of social peace which lasted at least three years. The industry had also embarked on a programme for the improvement of the quality of hostel facilities and conditions, which could account in part for this decline in communal conflict on mines.

This period of social stability was broken from 1980 and onwards, partly as a result of conflict on a new mine, where the Pondo group and its induna carried out a violent demonstration of status and dominance not unlike those which took place earlier in the decade after new recruits moved into the industry as a whole.

These later years also witnessed a resurgence of conflict between Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers on the Transvaal gold field. The conflicts stemmed originally from tensions at a shebeen near one mine, followed by several other clashes on neighbouring mines. These subsequent clashes took the form of a feud in which the aggrieved parties acted to avenge the death of fellow workers in earlier conflicts.

Other conflicts on the Transvaal gold field could be linked to the minority status of Sotho speakers in this area. Whereas Xhosa-speaking

workers had been, and remained a minority on the Free State gold field, they were clearly dominant in the Transvaal and seemed at times to express this dominance in conflict situations. This struggle for dominance on the Transvaal gold field also took place at a time of worsening economic conditions in the country as a whole, including widespread drought and unemployment.

Finally, the 1980's witnessed a few significant conflicts which reflected attempts by workers to heal their internal divisions in an effort to present a united front against mine management in wage disputes. These solidarity conflicts closely preceded the emergence, in 1982, of formal union representation for Black mineworkers.

b) Underlying Factors in Inter-Group Conflict : A Quantitative Analysis

The outline presented above of the patterns of conflict in the 1970's and 1980's has highlighted numerous underlying social, economic, and political influences and processes which assisted in generating collective conflicts, invariably involving workers of different regional and linguistic origins.

To document these various factors and assess their relative significance, each factor identified was summarized in table form. Table 24 provides the results of a frequency count of these factors, but reports only on those cases in which a particular factor could be concretely demonstrated. The absence of comprehensive information on many cases implies that the table should be regarded as a general guide only.

It is clear from Table 24 that a variety of factors can be isolated to account for the occurrence of inter-group conflicts in the contemporary history of the industry. Although the outward (ethnic) form of the conflicts may have been similar, their particular social, economic and political contexts have differed greatly, to the extent that each

type of inter-group conflict should be regarded as distinct, for purposes of explanation.

Two broad, distinct kinds of inter-group conflicts can be identified in this respect. On the one hand, a number of encounters could be traced to certain tensions and problems associated with the social and recreational activities of a migratory work force in the communal setting of gold mine hostels and in their immediate social environs. At least 25 conflicts (31 per cent) could be linked to interpersonal tensions in the leisure life of hostel residents, including altercations in hostel rooms and in the beerhalls. Furthermore, at least 14 clashes (17 per cent) resulted from tensions outside hostels on local farms and townships. These latter conflicts reflected the problems of sexual deprivation of male migrant workers, the desire to seek relaxation outside the confines of mine hostels and the importance of alcohol in recreational activities. These various forms of communal conflict were particularly common in the 1975-1976 period, coinciding with the influx of new recruits into the industry (Table 24). Specific influxes of labour at this time could also be concretely linked to the generation of tensions in at least eight conflict situations.

On the other hand, a number of other encounters could be ascribed to the actions of specific groups in the pursuit or defence of certain aims and interests and which were therefore political in character. These included a number of conflicts stimulated by events originating outside the industry, such as the Malawian repatriations, the Lesotho deferred pay dispute and the independence of Mozambique (17 Cases - 21 per cent of the total).

Apart from these external political factors, there was also evidence of certain internal political actions in the form of struggles between different worker groups over access to scarce and valued jobs (six cases), the securing of status and dominance on the part of certain

Table 24 UNDERLYING FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN 80 INTER-GROUP CONFLICTS ON GOLD MINES: 1972-1982

Underlying Factors		1973-1974	1975-1976	1977-1978	1979-1980	1981-1982	Total[1]	Per cent of conflict situations
1. Social and communal tensions	Hostel communal living (e.g. room tensions, food rations)	3	10	5	5	2	25	31,3
	Hostel external environs (e.g. shebeens on farms, townships)	3	8	2	-	1	14	17,5
	Labour turnover (e.g. new influxes, changes in supply)	1	5	-	1	1	8	10,0
2. Internal and external political events and actions	External political events (e.g. Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho)	12	5	-	-	-	17	21,3
	Aspirations and activities of tribal indunas	2	4	-	2	-	8	10,0
	Solidarity and support-seeking (e.g. in work strikes)	1	2	-	1	2	6	7,5
	Job domination and job competition	4	1	-	-	1	6	7,5
3. Feuding and ethnic boundaries	Feuds (no apparent breach of the peace)	3	3	1	1	3	11	13,8
	Ethnic boundary visibility (e.g. dancing teams, Rhodesians)	1	4	2	3	1	11	13,8

1. The table reports on factors identified in 80 conflict situations for which adequate information could be obtained (missing cases = 8). The total number of factors identified is greater than the number of conflict situations because more than one factor could be identified in many cases.

indunas and their respective "tribal" groups (eight cases) and efforts to maintain worker solidarity in encounters with mine management (six cases).

In the aftermath of these communal and political encounters, feuding relations were sometimes generated among mineworkers, particularly between Sotho and Xhosa speakers. At least eleven conflicts (14 per cent of the total) could be described as having taken the form of a feud arising from prior enmity.

There were also several conflicts in which the overt ethnic boundary of a particular group was directly relevant to the generation of hostility, as for example in cases involving tribal dance teams and Black Rhodesian mineworkers.

These various inter-group encounters arising from different communal and political tensions all shared one common characteristic, namely the eruption of physical violence. During the course of the 88 conflicts estimated to have taken place between 1973 and 1982, at least 155 mineworkers were killed and close to 1300 injured. Of the 88 encounters, half had fatal consequences and only 12 were entirely injury-free.

These fatalities and injuries were inflicted through the use of a variety of weapons. They included knives, an assortment of steel implements (including piping, crow bars, rods, fire pokers, hatchets and grass cutters), sticks and tree branches, stones, coal and other missiles and in a few cases, bows, arrows, catapults, molotov cocktails and fire. Some workers were also killed after being thrown from the upper storeys of buildings and from moving vehicles.

These statistics reveal the intensity with which inter-group conflict has been waged on mines in recent years. Clearly the various issues which precipitated these conflicts were regarded in a serious light by mineworkers, being sufficiently important to warrant a mobilization of men intent on inflicting collective violence on other

workers.

The following sections will attempt to account for the collective nature, outwardly ethnic form and violent character of the various communal and political encounters described in the course of the present chapter.

c) Home Friend Solidarity, Cultural Ethnicity and the Mobilization of Collective Reprisals

As noted above, one broad type of inter-group conflict originated in certain social and communal tensions in mine hostels and their immediate environs. Although the presence of social tensions in these settings is not surprising in view of the migratory nature of the labour force and the communal basis of hostel life, the question remains as to why the interpersonal tensions emerging in such a setting should have resulted in collective encounters which were often ethnic in form. To account for the ethnic expression of such social and interpersonal conflict, it is necessary to examine everyday social relationships in mine hostels.

An important context of social interaction, and one in which group conflict sometimes took place, was the hostel bar. A study of drinking networks in the bar of a gold mine hostel on the Far East Rand in 1976, revealed that the majority of week-end drinking groups (39 out of 46) were confined to individuals speaking the same languages. Closer inspection of the network links between drinking companions indicated that at least half were formed between people from the same home village or those who knew each other from home. The remainder of network links were formed primarily between men from the same home districts or regions who had met each other on the mine (McNamara, 1980).

The mine on which these networks were studied accommodated men in rooms on an ethnic or tribal basis. In an effort to assess the impact of room accommodation on hostel networks, a second network study was carried

out in 1978 on a Free State mine which had achieved a measure of ethnic (linguistic) integration in the rooms. On this mine, however, the same pattern of relationships was found, with home friends accounting for 42 per cent of all drinking relations, and only 4 per cent of the links being inter-ethnic in character (McNamara, 1978d).

These two studies revealed that hostel social networks are organized primarily on the basis of common home origins of migrant workers. The fact that these particular network relationships can be found independently of any local variations in hostel organization and accommodation policies, suggest that they are expressions of the migratory character of the mining industry's Black work force as a whole.

The persistence of relationships between people from the same home origins can be accounted for in terms of home friend solidarity. According to this principle, individual migrants who have grown up together in the same neighbourhood, village or township, remain friends in the urban work setting. Some home friendships in the drinking groups studied had developed when boys from neighbouring villages met while tending livestock. Others had attended school together, and played sports such as rugby and soccer.

Their friendships persisted on the mines partly as a result of the fact that these individuals enjoyed particular recreational interests not shared by workers from other regions. These interests were sometimes sufficiently strong as to sometimes divide people who spoke the same languages. Ciskeian Xhosa speakers, for example, were keen rugby players on the one mine studied, an activity which not only distinguished them from Xhosa-speaking Transkeians, but also from other language groups who did not have the same sporting interests (McNamara, 1980:318).

This home-boy cohesiveness should not be confused with tribal or ethnic cohesiveness, as Harries-Jones (1969) has pointed out. The implications of these distinctive networks and recreational activities,

however, is that they become indicators of ethnic affiliation to other migrants, resulting in the generation of categorical stereotypes in interaction (Mitchell, 1970:86-97).

This phenomenon has been described as cultural ethnicity, which appears in a situation characterized by the presence of a number of different language groups with different origins and cultural heritages (Mitchell, 1970; Deshen, 1974; Cohen, 1974; Mayer, 1975).

The most important consequence of the presence of home friend networks and cultural ethnicity in mine hostels, is that there is a general absence of cross-cutting friendships and shared recreational interests between different regional groups. In the event of a violent assault arising from everyday communal tensions involving members of these different network groupings, any mobilization of friendship networks becomes expressed in terms of these dominant cleavages in the structure of personal relationships. Because interpersonal networks are largely ethnically distinct, communal conflict is invariably ethnic in outward form (McNamara, 1980:323).

It should be clear from the above argument that the structure of social relationships between migrant workers from different regional and linguistic origins can account for the fact that most inter-group clashes in mine hostels have outwardly been an ethnic affair. It is still necessary, however, to explain why everyday tensions in mine hostels should be expressed in collective, group form, as opposed to being confined to interpersonal violence. As was seen in the course of the chapter, many collective actions arose as a result of the assault or murder of one hostel resident by another, followed by a mobilization of the groups of which these individuals were members.

This tendency on the part of migrant workers to come to the aid of an aggrieved fellow worker could be ascribed to the intense solidarity evident in the home friend network. Migrant workers have long regarded

the urban work setting as dangerous and hostile, to the extent that they sometimes undergo certain 'rites of departure' before leaving home. These rites stress the community's support for the individual in his venture and the value of his earnings for that community's general welfare (McAllister, 1980). The perceived danger of undertaking migrant work, coupled with the strong community support in the undertaking, imply that friendships between men from home become the most important personal resource and basis of support for migrants in the mine work setting. In the event of an attack on a member of such a network group, the provision of support by fellow workers is not only an act of personal loyalty, but can also be regarded as an expression of the total community support and interest vested in an individual migrant's work task and a reflection of its deep concern for his welfare while working in the urban sector.

The provision of informal, group support in the redress of a perceived wrong is further reinforced on mines as a result of certain difficulties encountered in securing formal, legal means of redress. It will be recalled that the Free State clashes took place after the Sothos believed that certain Xhosa assailants had escaped punishment as a result of the acquittal and discharge of several of the accused.

The origin of this problem can be traced mainly to the fact that assailants on mine property are often not adequately identified. An analysis of 454 assaults on one gold mine revealed that 14 per cent of the assailants were "unknown", most of whom had assaulted the victim outside the hostel (58).

The identification and prosecution of assailants in the gold mine setting has been unsuccessful in many instances, with the most common action being the repatriation of suspects. This problem was also evident in the apprehension and prosecution of men involved in actual inter-group conflicts. Of the 88 inter-group conflicts recorded, participants were arrested in at least 22 cases (or 25 per cent of the total), with an

average of 28 persons arrested in each of these instances, mainly on charges of public violence, looting and disturbing the peace. In eight situations for which information was available, four ended with the acquittal of the accused or the withdrawal of charges, two with admission of guilt and a fine (on minor charges), and two with gaol.

Although the information on prosecutions is incomplete, the figures above reveal the extent of the problem. In one case, 75 men were acquitted in the Boksburg Regional Court after a police witness could not identify the men individually. It was also appreciated that there may have been innocent men among the accused (59). Problems of this kind experienced by the authorities in identifying assailants in inter-group conflict have been due partly to the fact that the overwhelming majority of these conflicts have taken place after nightfall.

It is clear from this evidence that difficulties encountered by the authorities in identifying assailants and punishing acts of violence on mines, provide an important explanation for workers' readiness to resort to collective reprisals for the redress of perceived wrongs and for the emergence of feuding relations in the wake of unresolved conflicts.

The violent character of these conflicts can be attributed in part to the fact that they sometimes took the form of a collective reprisal for a homicide committed against one of their number. Violence can also be regarded as an inevitable consequence of group mobilization in the hostel environment. The confined nature of the hostel interior often had the effect of implicating most of its residents in a particular dispute between certain groups of residents. The large size of hostels could also be associated with the protracted nature of several encounters. The presence of certain social and sexual deprivations among male migrant workers, the high turnover of labour through this setting and the depth of the cleavages in the social networks of migrants, collectively contributed to the intensity and violent severity of communal conflicts

on mines.

d) Job Competition, Political Ethnicity and the Struggle for the Gold Fields in the 1980's

Certain collective actions of a political character have also been described in the course of the present chapter. Of particular importance were those conflicts originating in certain local-level political struggles on individual mines, such as conflicts over access to better jobs and struggles for status and dominance on the part of certain indunas and their tribal groups.

The collective character of these struggles can be accounted for in terms of the fact that group mobilizations are an essential requirement in any struggle for power between interest groups. On the gold mines, these local-level power struggles have often been ethnic in outward form. They can be described as instances of political ethnicity, which arises when particular ethnic groups become "... interest groupings whose members share some common economic and political interests and who, therefore, stand together in the continuous competitions for power with other groups" (Cohen, 1969:192).

In the South African gold mine situation, certain ethnic boundaries have come to correspond with particular economic interests. During the Free State clashes, for example, Xhosa workers on one mine mocked Sothos while the latter were practising tribal dancing. This action led to a violent clash between the two groups, but it would be inaccurate to regard this conflict as an expression of ethnic prejudice. In the Free State, these ethnic divisions coincided with major occupational groupings, and hence ethnic boundaries were appropriate markers of an underlying economic division.

Cohen notes in this respect that:

> Men may make jokes at the strange customs of men from other tribes but this by itself will not lead to serious disputes. If men do

> actually quarrel seriously on the ground of cultural differences it is only because these cultural differences are associated with serious political cleavages (Cohen, 1969:200).

Many inter-group conflicts on South African gold mines can be accounted for in terms of these political cleavages, in which different ethnic and regional groups have been involved in a competition over scarce resources (such as jobs, wages and women). The competition itself has often taken an ethnic form as a result of the fact that different ethnic (linguistic) groups have come to be associated with differential access to these resources (Olzak, 1983; Despres, ed., 1975). On gold mines, this has been due to differences in the extent of (economic) dependency on mine work on the part of certain groups, coupled with legal controls over the employment of "foreign" workers in other industries in South Africa, which consequently became entrenched on the mines in the 1960's and early 1970's.

The mobilization of common ethnic and regional sentiment in the struggle to secure access to industrial resources, has been particularly evident among the Xhosa speakers, or Cape Nguni. An indication of their aggressive intentions can be found by examining the status of the individuals and groups which initiated interpersonal and collective violence. In 25 inter-group clashes for which such information was available, Nguni workers were the assailants in most (19) of the original breaches of the peace which sparked off these encounters. In ten cases, Nguni workers were also the first to mobilize collectively, mainly on an offensive basis, whereas Sotho speakers mobilized first in eleven cases, mainly in retaliation against prior interpersonal aggression on the part of Nguni workers.

These features of conflict repertoires indicate that Nguni workers were not only the first to inflict interpersonal violence, but were also often the first to mobilize for collective violence. Sotho-speaking workers have claimed in interviews that the Xhosa group's aggressiveness

in this respect was "part of the general plan to exterminate other ethnic groups" (Mahlatji and Robertson, 1975:4).

This apparent aggressiveness on the part of Nguni-speaking workers on mines has been viewed by some investigators as a reflection of certain features of the traditional culture of the Cape Nguni (60). The popularity of stick fighting among adolescent youths constitutes an important part of the argument in this regard.

The aggressiveness of the Pondo group in particular, has been traced to the fact that their youthful propensity for stick fighting is not tempered by initiation into manhood, a practice which has been abandoned by Pondos and others (Mayer, 1970; Hammond-Tooke, 1975:18). Young Pondo males consequently do not learn the "lesson" of initiation, which teaches that a man must assert himself with words and not with blows and that the law should take over in disputes between men (Mayer, 1970:xxv).

Although this cultural explanation could, in theory, explain the noted aggressiveness of the Pondo group on the mines (as in the particularly violent clash on a new mine in 1980), it does not explain the apparent aggressiveness of the Xhosa-speaking group in general. Despite the fact that most Xhosa speakers have been initiated into manhood, they have also featured prominently in interpersonal and group aggression on mines.

There is also the fact that Pondo and Xhosa speakers have been working in the industry for decades prior to the contemporary conflicts, during periods when there was little inter-group conflict (for example, the 1950's and 1960's).

It is necessary to explain why conflict increased in recent years on mines, an explanation which requires reference to other factors, apart from purely "cultural" features, in accounting for the timing and occurrence of contemporary inter-group clashes.

The first major outbreaks of 1974 on the Free State appear to have

had their roots in 1963, when Lesotho nationals were declared aliens and obliged to confine their work-seeking to the mining industry. Lesotho nationals became entrenched on the Free State mines in particular, with Xhosa-speaking workers on these mines becoming economically and socially inferior with the passage of time, culminating in inter-group conflict in 1974.

After 1974, the campaign to recruit South African workers was initiated. The wages offered by the mines had been greatly increased to ensure the success of this campaign and to compete more effectively with secondary industry and commerce. New recruits streamed into the mines, mainly from the Transkei. The mines presented these newcomers with the opportunity to earn more money and also to take over the jobs held for so long by foreign workers, most of whom had been repatriated.

Lesotho "foreign" nationals, however, did not withdraw from the industry, remaining substantially entrenched on the Free State. Their presence became bolstered in the course of time by an increase in the number of Sotho-speaking workers from the Free State farms.

The Xhosa-speaking recruits experienced greater success in the Transvaal gold field, becoming the largest numerical group in this area.

Table 25 indicates that by 1980 workers from the Transkei constituted the largest regional majority on the Transvaal gold field, representing 27,5 per cent of the total. Lesotho nationals, on the other hand, accounted for only 17,5 per cent of all workers in the Transvaal, but constituted the majority group on the Free State gold field (36 per cent of the total).

The South African Cape Nguni worker had clearly moved into the industry, particularly the Transvaal, to secure the jobs and wages which became available after the withdrawal of foreign labour and after the substantial wage increases of the mid-1970's.

Table 25 DISTRIBUTION OF MINEWORKERS FROM DIFFERENT REGIONS IN THE TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE FREE STATE GOLDFIELDS (JUNE, 1980)

Regions of Origin	Transvaal Gold Field		Orange Free State Gold Field	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
S.A. Provinces	28 558	10,0	21 444	16,6
Transkei	78 172	27,5	36 510	28,3
Ciskei	12 126	4,3	4 033	3,1
Other Homelands[1]	41 106	14,4	9 159	7,1
Lesotho	49 812	17,5	46 432	36,0
Botswana/Swaziland	25 341	8,9	542	0,4
Mozambique	32 662	11,5	6 998	5,4
Other Foreign[2]	16 702	5,9	3 890	3,0
Total	284 479	100,0	129 008	100,0

1. Other homelands include Kwa Zulu, Bophutatswana, Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda etc.

2. Other foreign countries include Malawi, Zimbabwe and South West Africa.

Source: Chamber of Mines, Position of Companies: Number of Blacks in Service Surface and Underground as at 30th June, 1980.

The securing of such an economic niche had become particularly crucial by the late 1970's and early 1980's on mines. Whereas gold mines enjoyed a long-standing reputation for providing jobs, these jobs had become increasingly scarce after 1978 as a result of an oversupply of labour in the rural areas.

The resurgence of collective violence between Sotho and Xhosa workers on the Transvaal gold field after 1980 should be viewed against the background of the desperate economic circumstances which had overtaken the country, particularly in the drought-stricken rural areas. The aggressive actions of Pondos and Xhosas suggest that they moved to consolidate their position on certain Transvaal mines and ensure control over jobs and wages, which had become increasingly scarce commodities

during this time.

The severity of these encounters and the large number of fatalities, can be understood in terms of the severity of the issues involved, namely a struggle for economic survival on the part of a rurally-based migrant worker population.

These economic struggles represent only one of the many obstacles that have hindered social stability and co-operation within the Black mineworking class in recent years. Despite the presence of these divisive influences, Black mineworkers have often directed their combined energies to securing improvements in their living and working conditions on mines. These efforts have taken the form of frequent, collective encounters with mine managements, which will be examined in the following chapter.

NOTES

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7. Rand Daily Mail: 18.2.1974.

8. Rand Daily Mail: 19.2.1974; 20.2.1974; The Star: 19.2.1974; 20.2.1974; Die Transvaler: 21.2.1974.

9. Die Transvaler: 22.2.1974 (Translation)

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CHAPTER SIX

CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN AN INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: COLLECTIVE ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN BLACK WORKERS AND WHITE MINE MANAGEMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

In the ten years prior to 1982, the South African gold mining industry experienced an estimated 158 collective encounters between Black employees and mine managements. Roughly two thirds of these encounters could be described as strikes in that they affected work attendance, with the remainder taking the form of collective protests and confrontations outside of working hours.

For those social scientists with a Marxian orientation, the incidence of such conflict in industry is not surprising or unexpected. The apparently irreconcilable interests dividing employer and employee in modern industry seem to constitute sufficient grounds for the occurrence of these encounters. Compared to the unique and complex character of inter-group conflict on mines, violent encounters between mineworkers and the owners of their labour power do not seem to present any special problems of explanation, from the Marxian point of view.

In certain respects, however, contemporary worker protest on mines can be regarded as unexpected and worthy of close examination. Whereas the 1950's and 1960's were relatively uneventful, the 1970's witnessed a resurgence of collective worker action on mines. It is necessary to consider why such a resurgence of conflict took place at all, and what factors can be associated with its emergence, in view of the reputed docility of the Black mine labour force in previous decades.

As far as industry management was concerned, there also seemed little justification for certain conflicts. Mineworkers enjoyed certain valued benefits, such as free food, accommodation and recreational

facilities, and had in fact been awarded substantial wage increases immediately prior to the outbreak of the first major strikes early in the 1970's.

Certain outside observers, on the other hand, did not find the incidence of mine conflicts particularly surprising, in view of the obvious lack of representative trade unions for Black gold mineworkers. The consequent lack of adequate industrial communication was seen by these observers as an important reason for the occurrence of these conflicts (Wilson, 1975; Horner and Kooy, 1976). The mere presence of formal union representation, however, does not discount the possibility of conflict between management and employees, although the existence of such an institution for the regulation of employer-employee relations may affect the course and outcome of such conflict. It could even be argued that an industrial work force is unlikely to mobilize successfully to confront management with its demands and secure improvement, unless it possesses the organizational capacity provided by union-type structures.

From this point of view, the contemporary wave of worker protest on mines deserves closer examination, to uncover the ways in which Black mineworkers organized these protests in the absence of any formal employee organization, and in the presence of a variety of institutional restrictions on the mobilization of collective discontent. These institutional controls derived mainly from the concentration of the work force in hostel barracks accommodation and included the policing and supervision of employees in their off-duty hours and the regulation of daily movements of workers from their residential quarters to their work places.

These issues and questions emphasize the need to view mineworker protest as a particular form of collective action which should be subjected to the same analysis as that conducted for other kinds of social conflict. This includes an account of the social, economic and political origins of conflict, the motives and aims of the participants

and the dominant symbols and tactics employed by them in the mobilization of social and occupational groups. The influence of particular institutional features on the form and intensity of conflict should also be assessed, including the characteristics of hostel accommodation and the available communication and negotiation procedures in operation for the regulation of relationships between employer and employee.

The (changing) perceptions and motives of the participants are particularly important, because they reveal the extent to which a common worker consciousness and a shared sense of injustice may emerge to generate collective action.

To conduct such an analysis, the repertoires of particular strikes and protests, as well as general trends in the incidence of such conflict, will be examined for indications of (changing) worker perceptions and the means employed by them in circumventing institutional obstacles over the mobilization of collective discontent on gold mines.

The findings obtained in this analysis will be of particular relevance in the final chapter, which will conclude by setting mine conflicts against a wider, comparative and theoretical background of collective action and revolt.

As will become clear in the course of the analysis, many mine conflicts can be traced to perceived problems and difficulties in the formal and informal organization of mining work and service conditions. Before these conflicts are examined, therefore, a brief description will be provided of working conditions prevailing on gold mines in recent years, including the physical conditions of underground work and the formal conditions of service for Black mine employees.

2. WORK AND SERVICE CONDITIONS ON GOLD MINES IN THE 1970's and 1980's

a) Underground Conditions and Daily Work Routines

During the 1970's and 1980's, approximately 40 gold mine companies

were in active production. Many of these companies operated more than one underground shaft, with a few companies having up to ten separate shafts. The gold mining industry accordingly comprised over 100 separate shafts, ranging in depth from as little as 600 metres to over three kilometres. With a few exceptions, most mines were obliged to acclimatize men for underground work. This procedure was developed by the industry's research organization in the 1950's to counter progressively hotter conditions at greater depth. On some mines, the wet-bulb temperature in the underground working areas was as high as 35°C (wet-bulb), far in excess of comfort and safety levels (It is necessary to acclimatize men where the wet-bulb temperature exceeds 27,5°C). The acclimatization procedure was improved over the years, and by the late 1970's required that men spend three days in an artificially heated room, stepping up and down a raised platform.

Apart from acclimatization, (new) recruits are administered a test for assessing their potential trainability for various underground jobs. The Classification Test Battery (CTB) was introduced in 1972 and provides a basis for placing recruits into one of twelve categories or dudec" ratings, with the better paying semi-skilled jobs being made available to those in the categories 1 to 5. A worker's opportunities for promotion to better paying jobs, such as team leader posts, are heavily dependent on the results of the CTB, and on-the-job experience.

Workers also undergo training in Fanakalo, the mine's lingua franca and in the specific jobs for which they have been selected, before their allocation to underground gangs.

The daily routine of a mine starts with the waking of the day shift at 03h00 onwards through the use of public address systems and sirens. Workers dress and proceed to the kitchens and dining halls for breakfast. Some workers (30 per cent of one sample of 52 men - de Vries and Radise, 1980) don't take breakfast before proceeding underground because they

feel that it is too early for a meal, there is not enough time to eat, or because the food is unpopular.

The journey to the shaft is made on foot, by train or personnel carrier and the men proceed through the "crush" (checkpoint for clocking in work tickets) after picking up their caplamps and batteries. The men then wait for a cage to lower them to their work levels. They may wait up to an hour for a cage and are then lowered to underground stations, proceeding on foot or in underground trains along the tunnel "haulage" to the work sites, or stopes. The men reach the stopes approximately 1 1/2 hours after leaving the hostel (de Vries and Radise, 1980).

Before entering the stope, the Black work team gathers at the "waiting place", to receive work instructions for the day from the Black team leader, who also checks on absentees and the composition of the team. Since 1973, team leaders became authorized to enter the work place and make safety checks before the arrival of the White miner. In practice, the work team usually accompanies the team leader into the stope and commences working from approximately 06h00, onwards. The White miner usually arrives later (up to two hours).

The effective work group consists of 15 to 20 men who make up a stope panel team (a stope comprises a number of work panels). Such a team is composed typically of one panel team leader, several rock drill (machine) operators, winch drivers, timber support workers, general team workers or rock lashers, and the miners' assistant (termed "cheesa" because of his role in handling explosives).

After the White miner (or sometimes the Black team leader) has marked the rock face, the machine operators commence drilling using a pneumatic drill powered by compressed air and water. After drilling is completed, the holes are charged with explosive by the miner's assistant. Ideally, the team may aim for one blast every day, but usually blasts once every two to three days. After blasting, the area is inspected and

made safe by the miner and team leader, who bar down loose or dangerous rock. The area is then supported with timber or hydraulic props, or both.

The broken rock is cleared from the area immediately in front of the rock face (the footwall) by one or two team lashers, who shovel the rock into the path of a v-shaped steel scraper drawn along by an electric winch located at one end of the panel. From this point, the ore is transported in stages to the surface, using tips, ore trains and hoists.

One important feature of the division of labour in underground teams has been the introduction, in the early 1970's, of the stope team concept, whereby job activities are interchanged among the members. After completion of a drilling assignment, for example, the machine operator may be expected to help with the removal of rock, building of timber support packs, and so on.

Three to four hours after the start of the shift, i.e. at 10h00, the men halt work for a few minutes to rest and drink 'jabula' (fermented mealie meal). The work shift continues thereafter, with most men working a 7 to 8 hour day. From 13h00 onwards, the men stop work and travel back to the station to be hoisted to surface. The return journey to the hostel takes somewhat longer at the end of the day (2 1/4 hours on average) as a result of occasional delays in hoisting.

The average working day, including travelling, may last for an average of 11 hours (8 hours work and 3 hours travelling - de Vries and Radise, 1980). The men begin returning to the hostel from 14h00 onwards, where they shower, change and take lunch. After a few hours of relaxation, most men are in bed by 19h00 to ensure that they get up to 8 hours sleep before the early start the following day.

Some mines also operate an afternoon shift from 12h00 onwards and from 22h00 onwards, a night shift goes underground. The night shift is essentially a cleaning operation involving the clearing of rock broken up

by the blast arranged at the end of a day shift, depending on progress made. The night shift is hoisted from 05h00 onwards.

The physical environment underground is characterized by heat, noise, dust, low illumination and hazards. Some underground workers have been afflicted with heat stroke over the years, with an average of 4 fatalities and 14 injuries occurring annually during the period under review. Efforts have been made during the 1970's to cool work stopes by means of the refrigeration of service water for hosing down dust and for circulation through the pneumatic drills. The wet-bulb temperature has been reduced by up to 3°C in this way on a number of mines.

Deep-level mining is also associated with accidents, notably falls of rock and pressure bursts. Most at risk are the machine operators, who are exposed to pressure bursts at the face. The operators are also vulnerable to falls of rock and sometimes sustain hand injuries while drilling.

Falls of ground constituted the most important cause of fatal accidents in the 1970's and 1980's, accounting for roughly two thirds of all fatalities. On average, 559 men were killed annually on the gold mines during this contemporary period, representing 1,2 fatalities per 1000 employees (all causes). This figure remained fairly constant during the 1970's and 1980's, whereas the injury rate showed a noticeable decline from 57,6 per 1000 in 1971 to 32,0 in 1982 (Table 26).

These environmental hazards and conditions, combined with the racial and ethnic mixture of the work force, are associated with instances of absenteeism, assaults and turnover in the underground work teams. In 1975, the proportion of men absenting themselves from work per day on one mine was 1 per cent of the underground strength. This proportion increased after 1975 to 3 per cent on certain mines, mainly as a result of the repeal of legislation governing the enforcement of work attendance (de Bruyn, Momberg and MacArthur, 1976). On one mine, absenteeism on the

Table 26 FATALITY AND INJURY RATE PER 1000 EMPLOYEES ON GOLD MINES (UNDERGROUND AND SURFACE): 1971-1982

Year	Number of fatalities	Number of injuries	Average number in services	Fatality rate per 1000	Injury Rate per 1000
1971	542	24 010	416 875	1,30	57,6
1972	500	23 393	405 109	1,23	57,78
1973	529	23 155	422 653	1,25	54,78
1974	485	22 222	395 963	1,22	56,12
1975	495	18 970	371 097	1,33	51,12
1976	547	20 494	394 978	1,38	51,89
1977	587	19 843	417 260	1,41	47,56
1978	645	20 664	435 261	1,48	47,47
1979	563	19 218	450 532	1,25	42,66
1980	619	17 693	469 825	1,32	37,66
1981	603	15 530	479 003	1,26	32,42
1982	596	15 242	476 295	1,25	32,00

Source: 1971-1980 - Accident Statistics, Chamber of Mines Prevention of Accident Committee.
1981-1982 - Loss Control Survey, Chamber of Mines, Mine Safety Division.

night shift was higher (4,3 per cent) than on the day shift (2,4 per cent), suggesting that the former is a less popular work period, partly for safety reasons.

The assault rate varies from mine to mine, ranging from 1 to 3 cases per thousand workers per month. The chief assailants are the Black and White supervisors of underground gangs (Table 14 on p.213).

A certain proportion of workers desert from the mines annually, partly as a result of these environmental and human problems. During the period under review, between 2 and 10 per cent of the work force deserted from the mines. The desertion rate was particularly high in 1976 and 1977 (over 10 per cent), in the aftermath of the campaign to recruit novice workers from South Africa (Table 27).

The discharge of employees from the mines, both prior to and on completion of their contracts, coupled with desertion, imply a certain measure of employee turnover. This turnover was particularly high (over 100 per cent) in the mid-1970's after the recruitment campaign and the repeal of measures for the enforcement of contractual obligations.

Table 27 DISCHARGES AND DESERTIONS FROM MINES : 1971-1982[1]

Year	Average number employed	Number discharged or rejected	Per cent discharged	Number of desertions	Per cent deserted
1971	406 066	318 719	78,5	10 329	2,5
1972	411 192	325 290	79,1	10 968	2,7
1973	435 671	343 826	78,9	9 279	2,1
1974	414 232	374 664	90,4	10 851	2,6
1975	385 160	442 016	114,8	28 456	7,4
1976	409 134	516 015	126,1	44 150	10,8
1977	435 024	533 521	122,6	49 286	11,3
1978	451 018	460 704	102,1	35 445	7,9
1979	468 776	412 013	87,9	23 672	5,0
1980	485 181	392 336	80,9	24 293	5,0
1981	490 490	405 529	82,7	23 432	4,8
1982	480 200	404 841	84,3	20 615	4,3

1. Source: MLO and TEBA Annual Reports.

This employee turnover was aggravated by further movements of men through underground work teams, as a result of the transfer of individual workers out of these teams for promotion, retraining, hospitalization and so on. These latter movements were found to have doubled that caused by the normal annual discharge of employees (Lawrence, 1970).

By the late-1970's, annual labour turnover had declined considerably, partly as a result of worsening economic conditions in the country. A greater proportion of workers returned to their same mines and even to the same work teams, after periods of leave. In 1978, for example, three quarters of a sample of 40 men on a Free State mine claimed to have returned to the same work team after their annual leave (McNamara, 1978d - see also Table 22, on p.249).

b) Conditions of Service and Communication Structures

An important characteristic of the formal conditions of service for Black employees in the gold mining industry during the 1970's and 1980's

was the fact that they were frequently subject to change and alteration.

Perhaps the most significant of these was the unprecedented wage increases of the early 1970's. After a long period during which the wages paid to Blacks remained unchanged in real terms between 1911 and 1969 (Wilson, 1972), a series of substantial wage increases was awarded from 1972 onwards. Whereas the average monthly wage was only R17 in 1971, this had increased to R250 by 1982, representing an increase in real terms of 400 per cent. The biggest increases took place in the 1973-1975 period, being part of a strategy to compete more effectively in the attraction of South African workers to the mines. In market terms, a 34 per cent average increase was awarded in 1973, followed by 60 per cent increases in 1974 and 1975. The latter represented increases of over 40 per cent in real terms, when viewed against the consumer price index (Table 28).

Table 28 WAGES AND WAGE INCREASES FOR BLACK MINEWORKERS : 1970-1982

Year	Wage per man per annum - market terms[1]	Percentage increase - market terms[1]	Wage per man p.a. - real terms[2]	Percentage increase - real terms
1970	207,82		325,74	
1971	221,20	6,4	326,74	0,3
1972	256,70	16,0	356,03	9,0
1973	349,70	36,2	443,22	24,5
1974	564,82	61,5	641,11	44,6
1975	947,95	67,8	947,95	47,9
1976	1 102,82	16,3	992,64	4,7
1977	1 234,96	12,0	998,35	0,6
1978	1 420,45	15,0	1 035,31	3,7
1979	1 669,63	17,5	1 075,10	3,8
1980	2 036,98	22,0	1 152,79	7,2
1981	2 519,98	23,7	1 238,32	7,4
1982	2 985,11	18,5	1 278,41	3,2

1. The percentage increase in wages represents the average increase in earnings per annum for the total Black labour force, and therefore differs from the minimum wage award publicized each year.

2. Wages in real terms are calculated from the consumer price index, based on the year 1975 (=100).

Source: Parsons 1979:58;
S.A. Department of Statistics
Chamber of Mines Statistics

After 1975, the increases awarded were somewhat lower, but earnings increased steadily (increases were awarded in July each year). By 1982, workers in unskilled job categories were earning a basic wage of between R130 and R150 per month, depending on the mining Group involved. Workers in the top Black production jobs, such as team leaders, were earning a basic wage of between R400 and R480 per month. There was not only a noticeable differential in the wages paid by different mining Groups but also one between job grades, with the higher job categories enjoying larger percentage increases annually as a result of the progressive adoption of a uniform wage structure extending to higher paying, White-held jobs.

Mineworkers are also provided with free food, accommodation and medical treatment, valued at R80,00 per month (market terms) in 1982.

Certain workers also enjoy the opportunity to earn bonuses, particularly machine operators. The number of holes drilled per shift is multiplied by a certain rate in the calculation of bonus earnings. Production teams on certain mines also receive bonus payments, based on the metres advanced into the rock. A number of problems have been experienced with the operation of bonus schemes in the industry. Workers have not easily been able to relate their own performance to the size of the award, with the award itself fluctuating markedly as a result of production delays, accidents and so on. Several changes have been made in recent years to bonus schemes, including in some cases the scrapping of such schemes in favour of a higher, basic wage. Workers have reacted with mixed feelings to these changes, which in some instances have led to conflict.

Various forms of compensation are paid to workers who sustain injuries, disease or death on the mines. Workmen's compensation for work injuries and fatalities is administered within the industry and is invariably awarded with little delay (McLaren, 1982a), although the

government-administered compensation for occupational illnesses (mainly tuberculosis) is associated with certain problems, including delays, difficulties in tracing men, and the loss of essential documentation on the part of employees. In 1979, only 30 per cent of Blacks who were entitled to compensation for chest diseases actually received payments (McLaren, 1982b).

Prior to 1981, the dependents of men dying off-duty on the mines received a R400 ex gratia payment to assist with funeral expenses. In 1981 a contributory fatal accident and illness insurance scheme (death benefit) was introduced to provide full cover (on or off-duty and during paid leave) equivalent to 24 times monthly salary (plus value of food and quarters). A sum of R720 is available immediately to help with funeral arrangements.

From 1975 onwards, the industry introduced valid re-engagement guarantees (VRG), which guaranteed re-employment of a worker after periods of leave. These certificates were, however, issued at the discretion of management to men with good service records. In 1979, a stabilization bonus was also introduced which paid a cash amount to a worker, provided he returned from leave on or around a mutually agreed date. The purpose of these schemes has been to build up an experienced labour force with regular work patterns to aid in manpower planning. These measures, inter alia, have ensured that a highly experienced labour force had been developed by the 1980's, despite the inherent turnover implied by the migrant labour system. The stabilization process, however, has had several adverse consequences for Black employees. The stabilization of senior workers such as team leaders, has implied that very few promotional opportunites become available to employees in lower work categories. Certain mines have also begun to find it difficult to place returnees in their original jobs as a result of the growing oversupply of experienced workers, particularly team leaders.

A number of procedures for the communication and handling of everyday grievances has been established on mines over the years. The oldest system in operation is the isibonda - induna - tribal representative structure described in chapter five. This hostel-based procedure included also the paternalistic role of the White hostel manager. These various roles have over time become confined to the handling of domestic and personal issues and problems associated with food, accommodation, contact with home and so on.

In the early 1960's, many mines set up a formal personnel function for Blacks, embodied in the roles of Black personnel assistant (PA) and the White departmental personnel officer (DPO). The Black PA frequently visits the underground work situation to liaise with workers and their supervisors and also has an office on surface near the shaft where he receives requests for transfer and promotion, wage queries and so on. He also receives complaints of assault and poor treatment, as well as complaints from supervisors regarding disciplinary problems and poor performance of workers. The PA frequently counsels workers accused of absenteeism and other misdemeanours. Approximately five PAs are available for every 1000 workers. The PA's role in the personnel function is essentially a clerical one, involving the administration and placement of men in underground teams. His effectiveness in handling employee problems is limited by the excessive time he spends travelling to and from underground work places (up to 40 per cent of the working day), and by the lack of any meaningful authority and status in dealing with issues, often implying that his advice and suggestions are overridden by production supervisors (Craib et al, 1983).

Issues which are not handled by the PA and other personnel roles (such as labour controllers and DPO's) as well as those affecting groups of workers, are sometimes taken up by worker representatives in a variety of liaison-type consultative committees. In the early 1970's,

hostel-based liaison committees were set up, with the hostel manager in the chair and the representatives elected from room-based constituencies. Although these hostel committees still function, they have been surpassed on many mines by the establishment, since the mid-1970's, of purely work-related committees which entertain problems encountered in the underground work sections. Problems such as shortages of machinery and materials, hoisting delays, poor physical conditions and treatment are raised in these committees, with the meetings chaired by senior production supervisors and officials. The worker representatives are elected from work-based constituencies, although most canvassing and contact with these constituencies takes place in the hostel setting. The ratio of representatives to constituents varies from 1:60 to 1:300 (McAllister, 1981).

Consultative committees may not deal with matters of policy, such as wages and service conditions, although issues of this kind do emerge from time to time. There is also very little prior consultation with employees on proposed changes in work practices and conditions. The emphasis, instead, falls on the downward communication of implemented changes through committees and by means of formal briefing in successive stages down the job hierarchy, with the eventual briefing of Black employees invariably being carried out in the hostel setting as a result of certain environmental and organizational obstacles in the underground work situation.

Although the 1980's have witnessed the emergence of trade union representation for Black mineworkers, the formal institutional structures in operation for communication and the handling of employer - employee relations were confined, during the period under review, to those described above.

c) Continuity and Change in the 1970's and 1980's

As the above account indicates, the gold mining industry in the

1970's and 1980's has been characterized by a variety of changes and developments, including increased wages, modifications to bonus and incentive schemes, and new service conditions. Other changes included the introduction of valid re-engagement and stabilization guarantees, an 11-shift fortnight (1977), and alterations in pay cycles.

Changes and improvements were also introduced into the underground work situation, notably stope cooling and hydraulic methods of rock support. In the mid-1970s there was also a major change in the legislation governing absenteeism at work and the enforcement of contractual obligations, which abolished penal sanctions against absenteeism and the breaking of work contracts. There were also certain improvements to hostel conditions, food and accommodation, as described in chapter five.

On the other hand, certain conditions in the industry remained largely unchanged during the period under review. Progress in the removal of work reservation in the industry was slow, with minor concessions only being accepted by the White Mineworkers' Union with respect to the work responsibilities of Black team leaders and others. The only substantial change in this respect came in 1982, with the removal of Job Determination No. 27, finally making way for the training and appointment of non-white samplers, surveyors and environmental control officers.

Although there were substantial improvements in worker representation through mine committees, these committees did not enjoy negotiating power and the representatives were also unable to ensure that grievances raised were consistently attended. Problems such as poor treatment and assaults, late hoisting and discrimination during hoisting, long hours of work, accidents underground and lack of opportunities for promotion, continued to affect Black employees in the 1970's and 1980's. Many of these issues were relevant to collective conflicts between workers and mine managements during this period and will be examined in

the following sections. Before these conflicts are examined, it is necessary to outline the approach to be adopted in the chapter.

Firstly, it is clear from the material and evidence that mineworkers articulated a variety of problems and grievances associated with work and service conditions in their encounters with management. Secondly, these different issues were raised frequently throughout the period under review, with the workers focusing alternately on one problem and then on another. Certain issues were also articulated jointly with others at times, or separately at other times, on different mines in the industry. It was not possible, for instance, to identify a particular time period during which a particular problem was addressed by workers to the exclusion of all others.

Definite patterns could, on the other hand, be identified with respect to the emergence and progress of specific issues over time, when viewed separately from others. During the 1970's and 1980's for example, workers were involved in a series of conflicts over the question of wages and income, a struggle which can be shown to have progressed through certain, defined stages over time. The same can be said for certain formal conditions of service, as well as conditions pertaining to the underground work environment and to the domestic, hostel environment.

For ease of analysis, and to clearly outline the "natural history" in the emergence and progress of particular issues and problems, the following sections will address different themes of work and service conditions on mines, with the conflicts relevant to each being considered in roughly chronological order. The chapter will conclude by assessing various inter-relationships between these different themes and draw generalizations on the period as a whole.

Four main themes will be addressed in this account of conflict, namely wages and other earnings, formal conditions of service, underground conditions and hostel conditions.

3. WAGES AND WAGE-RELATED CONFLICTS

At least 51 conflict situations (i.e. 36 per cent of the total of 143 cases for which adequate information was available) were related to the question of wages, bonuses and administration of wage payments.

Wage-related problems first arose in contemporary times as a result of the introduction of wage increases for Black workers from 1972 onwards. These increases were relevant to the emergence of a number of severe conflict situations in 1973 and 1974.

These conflicts could be traced to the fact that the wage increases and associated wage policies generated new differentials in the wages paid to different categories of workers and also resulted in anomalies and differences in the actual rates of wages paid by different mines and mining Groups.

The conflicts emerging in the wake of these wage changes will be examined in the next section in an effort to outline their impact on Black employees.

a) Inter-Job and Inter-Mine Wage Differentials: 1973-1975

The performance of different kinds of work on the mines has always been asociated with different earning levels. Team leaders, or "boss boys", as they were formerly known, have enjoyed the highest Black wages in the underground production teams, followed by mechanical workers (machine operators, locomotive drivers and others), and finally, by unskilled team labourers at the lowest wage-earning level.

For many years, a standard differential in these wages was maintained, with fairly fixed intervals between the different job levels. In the early 1970's, however, certain mining Groups introduced a new job evaluation procedure, implemented at the same time as the wage increases of 1972 and onwards. The change was aimed at developing a proper hierarchy of jobs and a uniform wage scale. Wage increases became more closely tied to job content, with special emphasis being placed on

decision-making and responsibility in the calculation of wage awards (the Paterson method of job evaluation).

The implementation of this new wage policy provided the stimulus for the first major industrial confrontation on the gold mines since the 1946 strike.

The first sign of imminent conflict was evident when 200 machine operators refused to go underground at a Carletonville mine in August 1973. The men met with management and complained that they had not received a wage increase awarded to other categories of workers, and management undertook to investigate the matter. Thirty-six men wanted repatriation and were sent back to the recruiting organization. The men complained to TEBA officials that their jobs had been reduced in rank and their bonus earnings cut. They were also made to do other jobs in the stope (the new stope "team" concept) and were particularly unhappy that miners' assistants had been granted a special wage increase. They were also unhappy with the difference in their pay compared to that of team leaders (1).

The problem arose because wage increases were granted to certain work categories in the course of the progressive introduction of job evaluation. The jobs of winch drivers, underground locomotive drivers and loader drivers, among others, had been re-evaluated and special wage increases were awarded which had the effect of narrowing the wage differential between men in those jobs and machine operators. Whereas the wages of machine operators had been increased by 46 per cent over the previous 15 months, the locomotive driver's wages had been increased by 60 per cent (2).

The machine operators were described as being "rather trade union conscious" by management, and had apparently resented the fact that their strenuous and dangerous job, so crucial to production, had been reduced in status in favour of other jobs which the machine operators believed were of lesser importance and which entailed less effort or exposure to

danger, such as the job of miner's assistant (3).

Less than two weeks after the first meeting between machine operators and management, a further meeting took place which developed into a violent strike. This conflict deserves closer examination, because it represented the first major encounter of the 1970's and demonstrated that security forces were poorly prepared to deal with mine riots. The conflict also revealed the way in which a dispute between a particular group of workers and management could implicate other workers in the hostel environment. The case was based primarily on evidence submitted to the government commission on mine riots, and the extensive newspaper coverage of the event, which included reportage on a subsequent inquest into the deaths of five Lesotho nationals during the strike (4).

> Tuesday, 11th September: Mine management held a second meeting with machine operators to report back on their investigation into the men's wage query. The general manager opened the discussion by attempting to explain the principles of job evaluation and the basis for the decision to award more pay to the new job of team leader which had been upgraded from the old 'boss boy' job. Certain wage adjustments had become necessary which did not affect machine operators and it was therefore not possible to award a special wage increase to men in this job. The news was not well received by the men and the meeting became disorderly. The meeting was terminated and approximately 80 machine operators moved to a nearby hill overlooking the mine to hold their own meeting.
>
> At approximately 19h00, this group of men descended from the hill and blocked off the personnel tunnel to the no. 2 shaft crush to prevent the night shift from going underground. Spectators began to gather in the area and stones were thrown. Mine staff tried to restore order, but failed and the South African Police were called at 19h45.
>
> After their arrival, the hostel manager and three indunas approached the crush and asked the strikers to put forward representatives. This request was ignored and stones were thrown at the hostel manager's party, which retreated. Twelve policemen were gathered outside the hostel gate and began escorting frightened workers out of the hostel area.
>
> The crowd within the hostel was reported to be advancing on the administration block on the hostel perimeter and a SAP officer approached the crowd. Stones were thrown and the officer fired a tear gas pistol into the air. The crowd dispersed, then reformed and advanced towards the gate area, throwing stones. The SAP carried out a number of baton charges which were unsuccessful as a result of the layout of the buildings. Teargas canisters were also fired. The police began to fire warning shots into the air and into a wall. An attempt was made to arrest several Black workers approaching from one side,

but one constable was overpowered and injured by a stone.

At about 20h15, the constable's assailant was shot. Police reinforcements were brought in and the SAP and mine officials took shelter in the administrative offices. From the safety of the verandah, the SAP fired into the crowd surrounding the offices.

At 21h00, the liquor store was looted and burnt and carcasses were looted from the meat store. SAP patrols entered the hostel to get the men back into their rooms and halt looting and advanced to the liquor store under covering fire. After the police had moved into the hostel, they became aware of the danger of being cut off and shots were fired at looters and others, after which the SAP withdrew.

Various patrols and weapons searches were conducted in the hostel and calm was eventually restored by 02h00-03h00.

Wednesday, 12th: Truckloads of workers were taken to the SAP for questioning and 18 men charged with public violence. That night, police protection was provided for the night shift. A total of 208 workers were repatriated and the SAP withdrew from the mine on the 18th September.

The underlying breach of the peace in this conflict was the change in wage structures for Black workers. The machine operators in particular resented this change in established wage policies because their own job status was reduced. When it became clear to these men that management was not prepared to change the new policies, the machine drillers mobilized and brought a halt to the work routine. In the ensuing crisis, the SAP were called in and 12 men were killed, 11 of them by rifle fire (one worker was allegedly hacked to death by other workers, although a subsequent inquest found that he had been struck over the head with a heavy instrument)(5).

Within the industry, the actions of the police were criticized on the grounds that they were not equipped, mentally or physically, to quell riots without firearms (6). The action of the SAP officer, who fired a tear gas pistol into the air, was also regarded by mine management as having triggered off a hostile attitude on the part of the crowd of workers. This action also removed the opportunity to close off the personnel tunnel entrance and round up the picketers without bloodshed (7). Apart from the deaths, 28 workers were injured, of whom 16 were

shot. An inquest held subsequently to inquire into the deaths of 5 Lesotho nationals during the strike cleared the police of blame. The magistrate argued that the police had given adequate warning, in that of 200 shots fired, only 30 had killed or injured Blacks (8).

During the inquest, it was revealed that the police were instructed to shoot at the "leaders" of the mobs. In the proceedings, one constable described a leader as a "person with a whistle, dancing and bringing the crowd on". The counsel for the defence was moved, for these and other reasons, to describe the incident as a "shooting expedition" (9).

Another aggravating feature of the crisis was the fact that many hostel residents did not wish to become involved in the conflict and attempted to get out of the hostel area. One mineworker, interviewed by the press, described how he had been sitting in his room when he heard windows being broken. He rushed out and found a mob outside. Soon afterwards, he heard an announcement that the men should disperse, was exposed to teargas, hit on the head by a policeman and shot in the arm after trying to get away (10).

Among the crowd which gathered within the hostel in front of the gate were many men who wanted to leave the hostel, but were forced back by police. Several men in this crowd were allegedly fired at as they tried to get away (11). The hostel barracks setting served, in this way, to increase the severity of the dispute and implicate many innocent hostel residents in the confrontation between strikers and police.

In the course of attempting to redress the conflict, the hostel manager and his indunas were unsuccessful in getting the men to appoint representatives. The conflict was eventually redressed by punitive security action.

In the aftermath, or adjustment phase, the 18 mineworkers charged with public violence disappeared while on bail and the charges were eventually dropped. The mining Group involved also set up a fund to assist riot casualties.

The significance of this strike, the first in the industry's contemporary history, lay in the fact that a conflict of interests had emerged between management and certain groups of mineworkers regarding the criteria on which wages and wage increases were based. Whereas the machine operators believed that the strenuous, dangerous nature of their work required appropriate rewards, management emphasized qualities associated with effective decision-making, supervision and responsibility. Black team leaders accordingly enjoyed better wages, resulting in tension between them and other workers. These tensions persisted and were relevant to other conflicts in subsequent years.

The wage increases of the early 1970's were not only associated with changes in the relative value of different underground jobs, but also with the emergence of differentials between the wages paid by different mines and mining Groups to their Black employees beyond the agreed minimum rate for the industry. These differentials arose partly because of variations in the profitability of different mines. This problem was relevant to a violent strike on a Free State mine in May, 1974. The mine's rates were lower than those of others in the region and when management announced to team leaders on the mine that bonus pay was to be incorporated into a higher basic wage, the team leaders demanded a larger increase in this basic wage. A strike involving 3000 workers took place and the mining Group involved was authorized by the Chamber of Mines to offer a maximum average increase of 12 to 15 cents per shift. The offer was relayed to team leaders but rejected and workers later set fire to a beerhall. The SAP were called after the mine security police could not contain the conflict and one worker was shot (another was beaten to death by fellow workers). Workers later refused to go underground until the pay award was entered on their work tickets (12).

Discrepancies in wages paid on different mines in the Free State led soon after to a more protracted strike on another mine in this region in June, 1974. This mine was one of the larger mining complexes in the

industry, comprising five shafts and employing 20 000 Black workers at the time of the strike. The wages were not only lower than those of other mines in the area belonging to another mining Group, but the wage increases were introduced a month later than expected and the increase itself (10 per cent) was regarded as being too low. The team leader strike a month earlier in the same region was also believed to have stimulated workers' expectations of securing wage increases through strike action. Three hostels on the mine were affected in the later strike, which was one of the most destructive confrontations experienced by the industry in its contemporary history.

The first outbreak of conflict on this mine (at no. 2 hostel) will be described in detail because it revealed the kinds of mobilization tactics employed by mineworkers, the inappropriateness of the induna system in the resolution of industrial grievances and the strengthening of the precedent set for the securing of wage increases through strike action. The account is based mainly on an in-depth enquiry conducted by the affected mining Group (13).

> Tuesday, 4th June: The 10 percent wage increase was implemented and was badly received by the workers. A meeting was held in the hostel's dance arena to organize a strike and was attended by Mozambican workers and Lesotho nationals. Six men who attended the meeting were arrested by mine security personnel.
>
> Wednesday, 5th: A rumour circulated that Mozambican workers were planning a strike for the coming week-end. The Black personnel assistants, indunas and tribal representatives allegedly knew of the strike plans, but did not communicate these to management.
>
> Saturday, 8th: In the morning, a group of Black ventilation recorders met in an office to plan a strike for the coming Monday. That afternoon, the ventilation recorders distributed strike messages on luggage labels in the bar. In the evening another meeting, organized by team leaders, was held in the dance arena and the Monday strike was discussed. Later that night, and on the next morning, 6 ventilation recorders were arrested and forwarded to the SAP. At 19h00, men gathered in the arena to express their resentment over the arrest of these workers.
>
> A crowd of workers advanced on the hostel offices dancing, shouting and blowing whistles. About 500 men gathered on the lawn in front of the offices and broke branches off trees. The bar outlet was surrounded, windows were broken and the beer

garden's concrete furniture and railings were smashed. The bar supervisor and staff took refuge under brewery tanks. The crowd broke into the bar building and set it alight.

At 19h10, the hostel manager tried to address the crowd in front of the offices, but the men were noisy and aggressive and White officials retreated out of the hostel. The crowd attacked the offices, broke windows and ripped the telephones out of the wall. The boot store was then looted and set on fire. The files of employees' long service records were also destroyed in the fire.

The mine security police arrived and the rioters were forced back onto the lawns with teargas. Security forces also made their way to the bar with the help of teargas, but became surrounded and were forced to withdraw to the office block.

At 19h30, the head induna's flat and those of three other indunas were set on fire. Shortly afterwards, the SAP arrived with 50 men. They made their way to the bar and inspected the damage.

Just after 19h30, a certain Mozambican team leader left the hostel with a small group of men after setting fire to the Xhosa induna's flat and proceeded to the no. 3 hostel to obtain further support for the strike. In the meantime, the hall, dry canteen and part of the kitchen at no. 2 hostel were set alight and there was a power failure. The fire brigade arrived to put out the fire in the boot store. The SAP formed a protective arc in front of the offices and launched teargas into the crowd. The crowd retreated into the hostel and hid behind bushes, but advanced again. Teargas and water jets were used, but the wind was blowing in the wrong direction and these measures proved ineffective. At 21h00, missiles were thrown at mine officials at close range and the mine manager was injured in the leg.

At 21h45 a volley of shots were fired over the heads of the rioters. The crowd fell back, then surged forward and four men were shot. The crowd fell back again and dispersed among the rows of rooms. Many residents escaped through rear windows into the veld.

At 23h00, the chairman of the mining Group and a managing director arrived and conducted a tour of inspection.

Monday, 10th: Early in the morning, the men were seen lighting bonfires for warmth. About 1000 men refused to proceed to work. The men were addressed by the mine manager and the police. At 10h15, the crowd was addressed again by the hostel manager and mine manager. Spokesmen in the crowd referred to the mine's lower wages, in comparison to these offered elsewhere, and demanded a wage decision that same day.

Later that day, a meeting was held at the Chamber of Mines in Johannesburg and agreement was reached on the necessity for uniform minimum rates in the industry.

At 16h00, a meeting was held on the mine and about 1500 workers were told that new wage rates had been awarded. The men were also warned that those not prepared to work would be discharged. Food was brought in from other hostels.

> Tuesday, 11th: The workers went underground after the new rates were recorded on their work tickets.

The breach of the peace in this conflict was brought about by the fact that wage rates in the mine had slipped behind those of other mines in the area. The workers were clearly aware of this fact and felt that they were unjustly treated for this reason.

The mobilization for the strike took place over a number of days and included meetings, rumours, and the distribution of strike notices. An anonymous letter was also received by the mine manager threatening a strike and was signed "the children of Mozambique". It was clear that a certain Mozambican team leader played a central role in the strike. He and a group of Sotho workers had proceeded to the no. 3 hostel and entered the rooms. The workers at no. 3 were instructed to meet in the arena, where, according to reports a certain Sotho speaker had told the men:

> Tomorrow we are not going to work. People who go to work will be killed because we know they are friends of the White men... If we see the White men are not listening to what we have to say then we send for weapons and assault them.

The strike also spread to the no. 1 hostel after a group of Sotho workers from no. 3 hostel made their way to the no. 1 hostel. The men, wearing tribal dancing dress, entered this hostel and told residents that they were "women" unless they also helped fight for the increases which had already been awarded.

The crisis period was characterized by extensive damage to the interior of the first hostel involved in the strike. Apart from the destruction in the bar, the fires in the induna's flats, the boot store and kitchen and the attack on the administrative offices, it was also reported that the men had ripped steel urinals out of the ablution walls and cut them up with hacksaws.

At the two other hostels, damage was less extensive, although the canteen, kitchen and bar were looted and the timber stockpile and thatch

shelters set alight at no. 3 hostel. At no. 1, the boot, clothing and kitchen stores were raided and fires started in the boot store and fish frying room. A bonfire of mattrasses was also lit.

Five workers were fatally shot in these various encounters on the mine and one man was beaten to death. Sixty-three workers were injured, at least 9 of whom were shot and 12 bitten by security dogs.

The chief mechanism employed to redress the conflict was management's decision to effect an adjustment to the men's wages. These amounted to a general increase of 70 cents per shift for underground workers and 39 cents for surface workers. Management believed that they had little option but to eliminate wage anomalies, despite the risk of setting a precedent. In the mine's enquiry into the strike, it was clear that the events underlined the "complete absence... of any satisfactory machinery for the conduct of negotiations between management and the Black workers... (The workers) had nobody to negotiate on their behalf and ... accordingly decided to use the strike weapon..." (14).

Against this background and in view of the fact that substantial increases were necessary and further damage and loss of life was likely, it was agreed to award wage increases as a means of redressing the conflict. The extent to which this action set a precedent for further strike action in the industry should be assessed in the light of subsequent strike patterns.

As far as the immediate redressive mechanisms were concerned, it was also clear that the induna system had failed to play a role in the resolution of the issues involved in the strike and that the strikers had also directed their aggression at these men and their living quarters. The commission also questioned the calibre of the indunas and found that they had failed to communicate wage grievances to management. The workers also complained that the indunas blocked their complaints to management. The commission did concede, however, that the indunas may not have conveyed wage complaints because they felt that no purpose would

be served. The indunas assumed, as did the Black PAs, that very little could be done about wage grievances because the rates had been set by management (15).

In the aftermath of the conflict, there were no repatriations of workers, although 10 Sotho workers were found guilty of public violence and sentenced to 18 months each, suspended for three years.

A few days after the conflict, team leaders were given an additional increase of 55 cents per shift to bring them into line with Chamber of Mines minimum rates. After the increase was announced, there were rumours of another strike and threats against team leaders were reported (16). The reason for this increase was later successfully communicated to the workers, but it is clear that the same kinds of tensions noted earlier in the Carletonville dispute between workers and team leaders over pay differentials, emerged again in the Free State the following year.

The problem of inter-mine wage differentials continued to generate conflict in the industry in subsequent months. Four months after the Free State strike, a mine in the Klerksdorp area experienced strikes at three of its shafts. The strikes were linked to the lower wages received by team leaders, in comparison with those offered on other mines in the region. The team leaders also demanded that the maximum rate for their job be paid to all men in the job, and believed that the rate of increments was too slow. Their productivity bonuses had also been incorporated into a basic wage and the men claimed that they had lost money as a result. They also argued that they were now doing "white men's work" and demanded a wage increase.

The reference to "white men's work" can be linked to the productivity bargain struck between the Chamber and the White Mineworkers' Union in June the previous year. Certain concessions had been granted allowing team leaders to enter work areas to make safe prior to the arrival of the White miner (Annexure Four).

At a meeting between 200 team leaders and management, the men demanded R6,00 per shift. Several days later, the Chamber fortuitously announced revised industry rates of pay for Black workers, with effect from 1st December, 1974. This information was conveyed to the workers who demanded that these increases be implemented immediately (October). This demand was refused and violent strikes took place at three of the mine's shafts and hostels, including a sit-down strike at the underground waiting place at one shaft. Two workers were killed, 64 injured and several charged with public violence (17).

In its evidence to the government commission on mine riots, the relevant mining Group was of the opinion that the Black employees might have withdrawn their wage demands, had it not been for the fact that previous riots has resulted in increased financial benefits, namely the events in the Free State (18).

Later, during 1975, two minor disputes took place between shaft-sinking crews and mine management, one in the Klerksdorp region and another at a West Rand mine. Changes in bonus pay had been made which in both cases led to a reduction in earnings and in both cases management offered to raise bonus awards. The offer was refused in one case, but accepted in another (19).

It is difficult to establish with certainty that a precedent had indeed been set for the use of strike action as a means of securing wage increases, but it is clear that a pattern of informal negotiation in conflict situations had emerged between workers and management in the industry after 1974. This new pattern of industrial bargaining can be traced to the original need to correct anomalies in wage rates on different mines. Industry management was obliged to make these adjustments in the interests of a uniform wage policy, but these actions may have suggested to workers that greater opportunity existed in future for informal negotiation with mine managements on the question of mine wages and other service conditions.

From 1976 onwards, the conditions were created for further conflict over the issue of wages in the industry. Whereas the increases in the early 1970's were substantial (over 60 per cent in some instances), the average annual wage increases after 1976 were destined to drop sharply to as low as twelve per cent (Table 28, on p.288). From this time onwards, the annual wage increases were frequently associated with strikes and conflict. Although the question of inter-mine and inter-job wage differentials re-emerged from time to time, workers frequently protested the level of their wages and the size of the annual wage increases in these later years.

b) Wage Levels and Wage Differentials : 1976-1982

In June, 1976, the wage increases for mineworkers represented a 16 per cent average annual increase, compared to 67,8 in the previous year. Before the workers received these increases, a Radio Bantu newscast announced that increases of R7,80 had been awarded. On two Free State mines and possibly elsewhere also, the workers misunderstood this newscast and assumed that the increase mentioned was per shift, whereas the figure represented the minimum monthly increase. Their assumption that the figure represented a daily increase is not difficult to understand in view of the fact that the wage awards in previous years had been particularly high and the workers were clearly expecting this trend to continue.

These men were also employed on mines belonging to the mining Group which had been paying wages noticeably higher than those offered on other mines, which may have reinforced these expectations.

Four distinct strike actions took place on two Free State mines, the first of which will be outlined in detail (20).

> Wednesday, 2nd June: 20h10 - A hostel assistant switched on the hostel's high mast lights after a movie had been screened. Soon afterwards, shouting and noise was heard from the hostel interior. At 20h50, senior management arrived and tried to address a crowd at the hostel gate. The White officials were attacked and assaulted. The workers shouted : "Where is our

money? Why do we only get 25 cents?" Teargas was fired from a support vehicle and the men were driven back into the hostel.

Tuesday, 3rd: No workers reported for duty and at 06h30 shouting was heard and whistles were blown. At 07h40, workers tried to break into the bar and kitchen. The canteen stock, 1000 kg of meat, money and sugar were raided and window panes, crockery and the public address system were damaged. Security forces surrounded the bar and kitchen and three arsonists were arrested. A helicopter was used to address the strikers over a loud hailer but this was unsuccessful because of the noise of the crowd. A meeting was called in the dance arena, where management informed the men that the strike was illegal, that they should return to work by 09h00 and that the increase was the same for all mines. A minimum increase of 30 cents per shift was announced, and an angry cry erupted from the crowd.

By 09h25, the men started to return to work, with the route being cleared by security personnel. By 11h00, 66 workers had demanded repatriation.

Friday, 4th: 104 men were discharged (mainly Xhosa speakers).

At the mine's no. 1 hostel, the night shift was heckled and attempts were made to stop workers from getting into personnel carriers to travel to work. Hostel staff talked to the men and one Xhosa worker shouted: "Don't go to work. There is no money". The man was arrested and the shift went down (21). At another mine in the area, about 500 men gathered in front of the personnel tunnel to stop the night shift from going underground. The following day, 336 men were discharged (mainly Xhosas and Sothos). At another shaft on this mine, the night shift was also picketed and the next day, about 150 men staged a sit-down on one underground level (involving 106 Sothos, 126 Xhosas and 8 others). Eventually 250 men were repatriated (22).

These various incidents all illustrate the workers' disillusionment with the lower wage increases awarded in 1976, which constituted, in their eyes, a breach of a norm which had been established by the large increases of previous years. Various mobilization tactics were employed, including the use of the routine switching on of hostel lighting as a signal for the commencement of the strike, the obstruction of night shift workers and a sit-down strike underground. Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers combined forces on two occasions in these strikes.

No one was killed in the ensuing crises, although two White officials were injured and six work shifts were affected. The strikes were redressed through security action and mass meetings and 690 men were repatriated from the mines involved.

These strikes were different from those which took place in earlier years, in that a number of men were repatriated after each incident (There were no repatriations after the strikes on the Free State mines in 1974). In his report on the incidents, the general manager of one of the mines noted that the "... younger generation of Blacks now coming to work on the mines is definitely not as respectful towards whites (and management) as is the older generation". The manager was referring to the new recruits which had entered the industry during the previous year (1975). These men seemed more prepared to take their discharge and were also no longer obliged to fulfill their contractual obligations as a result of the repeal of relevant legislation.

Although the presence of these new recruits affected the course and outcome of these wage strikes, the sudden decline in the size of wage awards in the industry clearly frustrated worker expectations in general, including those new recruits who had been attracted by the publicity given to the higher wages offered on the mines.

The following year (1977), the average annual wage increases were even lower (12 per cent on average) than the previous year. Three minor confrontations were recorded, one of which was linked to the reduction of bonus pay for shaft sinkers.

Early in 1978, the question of inter-mine wage differentials re-emerged when team leaders on a Carletonville mine protested the fact that their wages were less than those offered on neighbouring mines. The men were found to be earning less than the industry minimum. Most team leaders on the mine were also in the wrong pay category as a result of the faulty administration of service increments. Team leaders obstructed the night shift on two evenings on the one shaft and the day shift on

another shaft. Soon afterwards, the anomalies in the wage structure were adjusted, with workers in the lowest job categories receiving a R1,00 increase and team leaders a R5,00 increase per week. Machine operators on the mine were reported to be unhappy with the higher awards granted to team leaders (23).

In June, 1978, the annual wage increase was a little higher than the previous year (15 per cent on average) and there were no wage strikes. In June, 1979, the increases were somewhat higher (17,5 per cent), but several minor strikes took place on the West Rand, Carletonville and Free State. It is important to assess these strikes in the light of the introduction of general sales tax of 4 per cent the previous year. This tax must have had an effect on the purchasing power of workers who would have been prejudiced by the increased cost of basic foodstuffs.

Three incidents at this time were also linked to an inter-mine wage differential in the Free State. A discussion had taken place in the Lesotho parliament about the wages and work conditions at one large mine, the same mine which experienced strikes in 1974 associated with its relatively low wages. The parliamentary discussion was reported by Radio Lesotho, alleging that the mine paid the lowest wages in the industry. The entire work shift refused to go underground at one shaft on this mine and the general manager toured the hostel with a loud hailer, announcing a 15 per cent increase, with effect from the following month (September). After a brief sit-down at the crush, 215 men were repatriated and the rest of the work force returned to work. At two other shafts on the mine, men refused to go on night shift, but returned to work the following day (24).

In June, 1980 the next year, the average increase was the highest since 1975 (22 per cent) and only one wage-related grievance was recorded in the context of a larger strike over other issues. In mid-1981, the average wage increases were similar (23,7 per cent), but a new contributory fatal accident and illness insurance scheme and unemployment

insurance had been introduced which implied certain deductions from wages. These deductions were not well received, and were relevant to the opposition to the new death benefit scheme, which was linked to five strikes on three mines. At one mine, the annual wage increase was lower than the industry average, and hence appeared lower than that received the previous year, which intensified worker dissatisfaction and led to a brief work stoppage.

The year 1982 witnessed the most widespread and violent wage strike experienced by the industry in its contemporary history. In all, ten mines were affected in the Klerksdorp, Carletonville, East and West Rand and Free State gold fields. Fifteen distinct confrontations took place at different shafts and hostels on these mines in the first week of July.

A broad description of these events will be provided to identify the particular grievances and problems experienced by the workers and the intensity of their feelings towards these issues. The account of the actual conflict process on these various mines also provides important indications of an underlying cleavage within the Black labour force itself. The different confrontations also reveal a variety of mobilization tactics employed by the workers in the strikes.

The new wage increases were announced from Monday, 28th June onwards through isibonda and works council representatives on the different mines. The press, radio and television had also reported that a minimum of 12 per cent had been awarded with different mining Groups paying different increases. Workers on most of the mines affected by strikes waited until the 1st July, at which time they could examine the actual rates stamped on their individual work tickets. Six strikes started on the evening of that day.

At one mine in the Klerksdorp region, White miners allegedly incited Blacks to strike after examining the new rates on their work tickets. The workers themselves were disappointed by the increases and some felt that they were too low for machine operators and other lower paid

occupations.

At 19h15, on Thursday 1st, about 30 blanketed workers armed with steel pipes, sticks and bricks stood in front of the crush at the South shaft of the mine to prevent men from going on night shift. Teargas was used to disperse the crowd. The next day's shift did not go underground and the men were told that those not wanting to work would be discharged. The crowd of up to 400 men shouted "Zonke! Zonke!", indicating that all were prepared to take discharge. The following morning, the shift went down, but about 300 workers sat down on one level and refused to go into the work places. The shift was hoisted early and 342 men were discharged.

At the mine's Eastern hostel, workers wired up the main gate at 19h00 and erected barricades to prevent the night shift workers from proceeding underground. After security forces had fired teargas and unwired the gate, workers broke into the kitchen and stole meat and chicken. The liquor outlet and canteen were also raided. The next day's shifts did not go down and 130 men were discharged.

At another hostel, the main gate was also barricaded early on Friday morning, vehicles were damaged and hundreds of men were arrested. Eventually 328 men were discharged.

Of the 800 men discharged from this mine, 28 per cent (225) were voluntary resignations. Close to half (369) of the discharged men were unskilled team workers, 117 were machine operators and 136 were winch, locomotive and loader drivers. Very few team leaders took part in the strike (31 or 3,8 per cent) in proportion to their strength on the mine (approximately 12 per cent). It was also reported that workers were upset with isibondas and team leaders for accepting the increases (25).

At another mine in the same region, workers at one shaft were also disappointed with the increases shown on their crush cards, and felt that team leaders had received excessively high increases. A protracted underground strike developed. Approximately half (227) of the Thursday

night shift took part in a sit-down strike on an underground station. The workers also barricaded the haulage to prevent others from going into the stopes. Workers also started moving along the level and the onsetters and banksmen at the other shaft became vulnerable to attack. Mine officials and security personnel proceeded underground to stop the strikers' advance. Later, another group of armed officials went underground and blocked off the exits from the shaft area while a second party went to the station to talk to the workers. The men refused to be hoisted and seemed intent on staying underground until the day shift came down when further action could be mobilized. A group of dog handlers were lowered to the station and the men were given an ultimatum. The workers agreed to be hoisted and 227 were discharged (mainly labourers, winch drivers, locomotive drivers and machine operators) (26).

At yet another mine in the Carletonville area, a similar response to the increases was evident, although some men also confused percentage figures with rands, assuming that the 12 per cent increase announced through the media represented R12,00. On the Thursday evening, workers barricaded themselves inside the no. 2 hostel after the conclusion of a film show. Hostel staff tried without success to talk to the men through the gate, but were forced to retreat. Later, the kitchen, storerooms, administrative offices and several vehicles were attacked. The following day, the workers did not go underground, and pamphlets were distributed through the rooms giving men an ultimatum to accept the increases or go home. The men returned to work the following day.

At the no. 4 hostel, the men did not go to work on the Thursday night shift or the following day. The ultimatums were distributed and appeared to have incensed the workers (27), who later attacked the kitchen, change houses, toilet and administrative block. Thirty rooms belonging to Mozambican workers were looted as a reprisal for their non-participation in the strike and one worker was stabbed. The local concession store was also looted and a looter was shot while stealing

blankets. On the Friday evening, an attack was launched on the hostel from the surrounding veld. Security forces were attacked and two riot vehicles and several other vehicles were destroyed.

A strike also took place at no. 5 hostel, where further damage was recorded. On the mine as a whole, 3 men were killed and 1151 men repatriated (mostly Transkeians and Lesotho nationals)(28).

Conflict also erupted on a mine on the East Rand on Friday, 2nd July. The workers on this mine also misunderstood the use of a percentage figure in media announcements and were unhappy that team leaders received a bigger increase. The conflicts at two of the mine's hostels were characterized by extensive destruction of property. At the no. 3 hostel, the kitchen and liquour outlet were looted and set alight, the television room and canteen were looted and the team leaders' mess was damaged. One worker was shot and 250 men discharged. At the no. 4 hostel, workers on their way to the shaft climbed out of the personnel train and ran back to the hostel. Buildings were attacked, the kitchen and beer outlet were raided and set alight, as was the training centre. A fire was also started in the Shangaan induna's room and the hostel residents' property store room was set alight. At one stage, a riotous crowd mocked security units which were firing warning shots over their heads, and were reported to have shouted: "Boertjie, jy skiet mis". Two more workers were killed (one of whom was shot) and 136 discharged, most of whom were Xhosa and Sotho speakers (29).

At a Carletonville mine, the night shift on Sunday, 4th July was stopped from going underground and one Hlubi worker was killed by a missile. The next day, 200 men staged a sit-down strike underground, but the men later returned to surface and 377 were repatriated, mainly Transkeians and Ciskeians (30).

From Sunday, 4th July onwards, workers on a West Rand mine did not go to work for three days at two hostels on the mine. On the Tuesday, an attack was launched on Mozambican workers who had not participated in the

strike. Fifty motorcycles owned by these men were destroyed, and various buildings were set alight. One Sotho worker was killed and another wounded by security forces. The rooms of three Mozambican team leaders were burnt at one hostel, as were two Mozambican rooms at another hostel. A total of 1394 men were repatriated from this mine, including 505 Transkeians and Ciskeians, 375 Lesotho nationals and 274 Botswana workers (31).

There were three further strikes on two Free State mines and one on the West Rand, where another 240 men were repatriated. By Wednesday, 7th July the strike was over on all the affected mines.

In the course of this one week, 48 work shifts were lost or seriously affected on the ten mines, of which 15 were night shifts. Nine men were killed (6 of them by security action) and 13 sustained gun shot wounds. Over 3000 men were repatriated and at least eight hostels were extensively damaged.

These various encounters appeared to have been related to the level of wage increases offered in 1982. The average increase (18,5 per cent) represented a drop from the previous year (23,7 per cent). The effects of inflation also constributed to the problem, in that the wages had increased by only 3,9 per cent in real terms. This figure represented one of the lowest increases in real terms since 1976 (Table 28, on p.288). The 1982 wage review had also been given extensive publicity as a result of the dispute between the White Council of Mining Unions (CMU) and the Chamber of Mines during the preceding months. This dispute had not been resolved by the time Black workers' new wage rates were implemented and there were allegations that White miners encouraged Blacks to strike (32). This action could have been applied as a means of increasing pressure against the Chamber in the negotiations with the CMU, which were concluded on the 6th of July when the Black strike was still active on certain mines.

The relatively low value of the increases in real terms, coupled

with possible White encouragement and misunderstanding of media announcements, help to account for the severity and scope of the conflicts. It was also apparent, however, that certain acts of violence could be attributed to an underlying cleavage within the work force between strikers and non-strikers.

References were repeatedly made to resentment concerning the higher wage increases awarded to team leaders, as opposed to unskilled and mechanical workers. It was also clear from figures on the occupational status of discharged workers that most strikers were unskilled team workers, machine operators and locomotive drivers. Very few team leaders participated in the strike, mainly because they were awarded higher percentage increases (over 20 per cent for categories seven and eight) than workers in other categories. Unskilled labourers in category one, for example, received between 9 and 15 per cent on different mines (Table 29). It was again clear to unskilled and mechanical workers that management rated responsibility over hard physical work and that the best increases had been awarded to "loafers" (33).

During the strikes, a team leaders' mess and the rooms of Mozambican team leaders were attacked. Violent attacks on 30 Mozambican rooms and the property of these workers were also recorded. Forty-four Mozambicans were also injured. The attacks on Mozambican workers were interpreted by management in the industry as "straight tribal" fighting. The media also reported that "Tribalism fans pay rise conflict" (34).

The real issue, however, involved antagonism against team leaders, of whom a substantial number were Mozambicans. An investigation conducted the previous year by a West Rand mine found that of 982 Black supervisory jobs (team leaders and gang supervisors), 591 or 60 per cent were held by Mozambicans, despite the fact that they constituted only 20 per cent of the labour force (35).

ble 29 THE 1982 WAGE AWARD FOR BLACK EMPLOYEES ON GOLD MINES: MINIMUM UNDERGROUND RATES IN RANDS PER MONTH ON THE MINES OF SIX MINING GROUPS

	JOB CATEGORY (With Examples)	ANGLO AMERICAN		ANGLO VAAL		GENCOR		GOLD FIELDS[1]		JCI		RAND MINES (a)[2]		RAND MINES (b)[3]	
		Rands per month	Per cent increase	Rands per month	Per cent increase	Rands per month	Per cent increase	Rands per month	Per cent increase	Rands per month	Per cent increase	Rands per month	Per cent increase	Rands per month	Per ce increa
	Stope Labourer	150,00	15,4	130,00	13,0	129,00	12,2	129,00	9,0	147,00	13,1	150,00	15,3	138,00	13,8
	Maintenance workers	177,00	16,4	149,00	12,9	148,00	12,1	150,00	10,9	175,00	12,9	174,00	15,7	158,00	13,6
	Machine Assistant; Miner's Assistant	208,00	16,9	172,00	13,2	171,00	13,2	174,00	11,5	204,00	14,6	196,00	13,7	182,00	13,1
	Machine Crews; Winch and Loco Drivers	247,00	18,2	198,00	13,1	201,00	14,9	209,00	14,8	241,00	15,3	229,00	14,4	208,00	13,2
5	Loader Operator; Loco and Maintenance Team Leader	292,00	19,2	233,00	13,1	247,00	16,5	273,00	14,8	287,00	15,7	261,00	14,0	242,00	13,1
6	Rig Operator; Artisan Aide	343,00	19,9	275,00	13,2	304,00	17,4	-	-	336,00	16,7	319,00	16,5	284,00	13,5
7	Stope and Development Team Leader	404,00	20,6	324,00	12,9	378,00	18,9	384,00	13,6	394,00	17,6	372,00	18,5	326,00	13,2
8	Senior Stope Team Leader	478,00	21,6	409,00	13,3	467,00	20,7	490,00	20,0	472,00	17,4	487,00	22,0	412,00	13,9

1. The rates paid by this Group were amended in January, 1983, representing new increases of between 2 and 5 per cent for different job categories.

2. These include Blyvooruitzicht and Harmony.

3. These include Durban Deep and ERPM.

In the light of this evidence, the attacks on Mozambican workers during the 1982 wage strikes should not be regarded as an instance of tribal animosity, but rather as an expression of their occupational status as team leaders and their associated reluctance to take part in the strikes. It is also important to note that Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers were equally represented among the strikers and had clearly co-operated in the mobilization of support in a conflict in which occupational cleavages overrode other sentiments.

The extent to which these wage strikes were fuelled by inter-mine wage differentials, was also the subject of discussion within and outside the industry at this time. The strikes took place on the mines of two mining Groups which awarded lower percentage increases to unskilled workers than other mining Groups (between 9 and 12 per cent for category one, as opposed to 13 to 15 per cent on other mines - Table 29). Although most mining Groups paid better increases to their more senior workers, resentment of this job differential was most marked on mines which also awarded the lowest increases to less skilled workers. Seven of the fifteen strike actions took place on mines of the Group which awarded a 9 per cent increase to unskilled workers, with the remainder taking place in the Group awarding 12 per cent to these men. The men on the former mines may have been able to establish that their increases were lower than the industry average of 12 per cent announced in the media, but some were also confused by the use of percentage figures in these announcements.

There is also the possibility that workers may not have been able to establish what other mines and Groups were paying before going on strike. Conflict erupted soon after the workers had examined their new rates of pay on their work tickets, and the men could not easily have known what other mines were getting in this short time period (a point made by a senior industry executive)(36).

On at least one mine in the Klerksdorp area, however, workers were aware of the increases offered on the mines of two other Groups in the region. Details of the different rates offered by the different Groups had been published in the press some days before and certain workers were reported to have demanded the same increases given on other mines (37).

On the basis of this evidence, it can be concluded that some workers were indeed aware of the better rates offered on other mines. Workers have also been aware of the existence of such differentials since the early 1970's, and were in all likelihood on the look out for such differentials in the 1982 review. The conflicts were, in the final analysis, confined to the mines of the two Groups which implemented the lowest increases, providing compelling evidence of an informed and rational work force on these mines.

The 1982 strikes suggest that Black mineworkers were more sensitive to wages and wage differentials, and more aware of the real value of earnings, than may popularly have been believed. The pattern of strikes associated with annual wage increases during the 1970's also suggests a close relationship between such strikes and the relative sizes of the awards, indicating that a careful assessment of wages and wage increases had been continuously made by the Black mineworking population in contemporary times.

Black mineworkers not only subjected their earnings to careful scrutiny in recent years, but also focused their collective attention on other formal service conditions, which will be examined in the following section.

4. CONFLICTS ASSOCIATED WITH FORMAL SERVICE CONDITIONS

Between 1973 and 1982 at least 41 conflict situations were linked to problems in the formal conditions of service for Black mineworkers (i.e. 29 per cent of the total). Many of these conflicts (34), emerged as a

result of certain changes in these conditions or the introduction of new service conditions and benefits.

These incidents reveal workers' responses to imposed change on mines, their degree of trust in management and the existence of certain conflicts of interests between workers and mine managements. They also illustrate some of the problems associated with the absence of formal industrial representation for consultation and negotiation between Black employees and mine managements during these years.

The conditions which will be examined include pay cycles and the eleven-shift fortnight, re-engagement and stabilization policies, and death benefit insurance.

a) Pay Cycles and the Eleven - Shift Fortnight

One of the first changes to the service conditions of Black mineworkers was the alteration of pay cycles from 30 to 24, 26 or 28 shifts from 1975 onwards. Instead of being paid for every 30 shifts worked, workers were to be paid after every 24, 26 or 28 shifts worked (depending on the particular procedures in operation). The change was introduced as a result of preparations for the introduction of a five-day week in the industry.

Two encounters between management and workers took place in November, 1975 at the time of the introduction of the new procedure. At one of the incidents on a Free State mine, the change had been explained to the men and a calendar placed in each room indicating the new pay days. Five-hundred workers mobilized one Friday evening, the welfare centre was set alight and an arsonist shot by police. In the second incident on the East Rand, 3500 Mozambicans refused to work. After meeting with workers, management agreed to go back to the old pay cycle on both mines (38). Over a year later, in February 1977, when most mines had implemented the new pay cycle, 15 workers refused to work on a West

Rand mine until the mine adopted a 26-shift pay cycle (39).

These contradictory responses by workers suggest an underlying lack of trust in management. At first, some workers mistrusted the new pay cycle and later, others believed that they were being excluded from the benefit of the system already in operation on other mines. This worker mistrust in management's motives and intentions was vividly illustrated on a platinum mine in February, 1976. When the new 24-day pay cycle was introduced, the old work tickets were used, with the last six shifts on the cards being left blank. The workers thought the last six shifts had been "stolen" by the mine and refused to work (40).

The five-day week was eventually abandoned in favour of an eleven-shift fortnight, which was introduced in April, 1977. The new routine necessitated a make-up on workers' wages to compensate for the fact that the men worked one shift less in every two-week period. Between March, 1977 and April 1982, at least eight confrontations over the eleven-shift fortnight took place on various gold mines. At one mine in the Free State, shift time was lengthened by a half-hour to recoup production losses incurred as a result of having to pay make-up wages to workers. The workers protested the longer hours spent underground, especially when some were on duty on a long Saturday shift while others were "relaxing in the sun" (41).

Subsequent confrontations arose in later years as a result of the fact that Black workers became obliged to "volunteer" for work on their Saturdays "off" on certain mines. The problem could be traced to the fact that the eleven-shift fortnight had been negotiated with the White Mineworkers Union, whereas no such negotiation had been conducted with Black employees. When White miners took their alternate Saturdays off, their Black work teams were broken up and put under other miners who were on-shift on those days. It was also reported that White miners were encouraging Blacks not to work on alternate Saturdays so that the Whites

themselves would not be obliged to "volunteer" for work on these days (42).

The problems reached a head on a Far East Rand mine in April 1982, when additional compulsory shifts were introduced, and workers who refused to work on "off" Saturdays were discharged. The workers' complaints in this respect were also allegedly being blocked by indunas and an unsympathetic hostel management. At midnight on a Friday evening, whistle signals were exchanged across hostel rooms and about 500 workers broke into and set fire to the liquor store, kitchen and administrative block. The Sotho induna's room was also attacked and when two hostel management representatives arrived, one was stabbed in the shoulder and the other's arm was broken. The following day, the entire hostel failed to go to work. Later, management undertook to modify the routine so that alternate shifts would be worked. Eleven men were sentenced to one year in jail after the conflict, but another 13 were released after being represented by lawyers provided by the new Black National Union of Mineworkers (43).

These various confrontations associated with pay cycles and the eleven-shift fortnight illustrate the underlying mistrust of management's motives concerning the introduction of change and the consequences of the uneven unionization of the mine work force, which produced anomalies in work practices on certain mines.

b) Re-Engagement and Stabilization Policies

In November, 1975, the industry introduced a valid re-engagement guarantee (VRG) which was awarded to workers after a minimum of 45 weeks service. Men were entitled to their old jobs back if they returned within a particular time period. In October, 1976, an additional VRG was introduced, with a shorter 26-week qualifying work period.

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experienced workers to the mines. An industry seminar on "stabilization" of labour was held in November 1976 to emphasize this direction.

From February, 1977 onwards, six conflicts on mines took place which were linked to aspects of the stabilization of migrant work patterns. In that month, a group of Tswana workers had not been able to return to their old mines as a result of the expiry of their return dates. The men travelled to the TEBA depot and demanded transfer to other mines, but later returned to work on the mine for which they had been allocated. In May, 1977, 84 workers on an East Rand Mine claimed that their VRGs were not recognised at the recruiting station. It was later found that the men had not produced their certificates at the station, and may have wanted to change their mine, or accompany friends to another mine (44).

As time progressed, the industry began to experience problems in placing returning workers in their old jobs at the same rates of pay. The problem was particularly acute in the case of team leaders. The high turnover of men during the mid-1970's implied that large numbers of men had been trained for team leader posts. When the stabilization of these workers was brought about, and the men returned regularly to their old mines for long work stays, there was an oversupply of trained team leaders for the available jobs in the industry. Team leaders returning to the mines with VRGs could not always be given their old jobs back, and some mines paid these men lower rates on their return, or paid them a full team leader wage for the first month and then reallocated the men to other jobs at lower rates.

In June, 1978, 800 team leaders on a Carletonville mine met management to complain that they were not given their old rates as indicated on the VRGs and that they were demoted after one month's work to jobs such as locomotive or loader drivers. In August, another meeting was held and management indicated that the lower rates were still competitive (45).

On a Klerksdorp mine in June, 1980, 400 team leaders gathered around the kitchen, stopping others from getting food before going on night shift. The road to the shaft was also picketed. Early the next morning, the morning shift was also picketed and fires were started in various buildings. Barricades were erected in the hostel after the SAP moved in on the strikers, and later in the day, TEBA representatives went room to room to talk to the men. The team leaders complained that they were demoted, discharged without VRGs and that their VRGs were confiscated on their return to the mine. The men also claimed that the Early Return Bonus (ERB), introduced in June, 1979 as part of a stabilization bonus scheme, was not paid immediately on their return, but only after one month's work (46).

In May, 1982, confusion over the stabilization scheme was relevant to an "illegal meeting" of workers on a Free State mine, after which the scheme was explained to the men (47).

These various conflicts indicate that the programme for the stabilization of labour on the mines encountered difficulties in the issuing and honouring of VRGs, mainly because of the oversupply of experienced workers, particularly team leaders. Mines subsequently issued VRGs on a highly selective basis to men with good service records, but a conflict of interests between mine management and experienced workers had become apparent in the course of the stabilization of migrant work patterns.

c) Death Benefit Insurance

In June, 1981, the industry introduced a contributory Fatal Accident and Illness Insurance scheme to replace the old ex gratia payment for funeral expenses. The scheme seemed to be an improvement, but at least five strikes took place at the time of its introduction.

The reason for the workers' violent reaction to this new condition

of service, it is necessary to examine these conflicts in some detail.

On a mine in the Carletonville area, a circular was distributed to workers explaining the details of the new death benefit. Confusion arose because the circular made mention of the fact that monthly deductions would take into account the value of food and quarters provided by the mine. A sum of R60,00 was mentioned, and workers were under the mistaken impression that they would now be charged for these benefits and that R60,00 would be deducted from their wages.

The scheme was also intended to apply to all men currently in service unless otherwise indicated. Men not wanting to go on the scheme were instructed to hand in their names, and some workers consequently feared victimization. Another problem was that the scheme had been introduced at the same time as a contributory unemployment insurance fund, resulting in further deductions from the annual pay award implemented that same month.

At 04h00 on Monday morning, 29th June, team leaders draped in blankets to avoid recognition stood along the walkway to the shaft, turning men away from work. The shift was delayed, but went underground, although an underground electrical switchboard was later short-circuited by a crow bar. That afternoon the scheme was re-communicated to the men and the assurances given that R60,00 would not be deducted and that the scheme was voluntary on men's present contract. This information was well received.

At another hostel on the mine, the workers were under the impression that the deductions for the scheme would be daily, and not monthly. At 20h00, on Wednesday, 1st July, the night shift was stoned at a railway bridge en route to work and the shift did not go underground. After some damage was done to hostel facilities, rioters were dispersed with teargas and dogs and the scheme was recommunicated (48).

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quarters was also misunderstood to be a deduction from wages, and several shifts were lost. Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers collaborated in the protest by keeping watch at different exit points from the hostel while preventing one morning shift from going underground (49).

A particularly violent strike took place on a Free State mine after the introduction of the scheme. On this mine, workers were also suspicious when asked to submit the names of those not wanting to go on the scheme, and employees also questioned why they were not covered while on leave and in possession of a VRG. They were also unhappy that contributions were not refundable on discharge. Another source of confusion was the belief among Lesotho nationals that the scheme had been introduced by Chief Jonathan (Jonathan had, in earlier years, criticized the industry for the inadequacy of arrangements for compensating the relatives of deceased mineworkers).

On Saturday night, 12th July, at 20h00, a crowd of men gathered at the kitchen and the night shift was prevented from going underground. Later, the bar, canteen, three dining halls and two change houses were gutted. The post office, several stores, a recreation room and an induna's flat were also razed. Rioters were driven back to their rooms by SAP employing teargas, dogs, batons and riot shotguns. A group of men left by a back gate of the hostel and moved to another of the mine's hostels, setting on fire the Black married quarters on route. Eleven vehicles were also destroyed. Early the following morning, about 700 men were rounded up, meetings were held and the men were warned to return to work. The following day, the shift was well attended.

Problems also arose at another hostel on the mine, including the severe assault of a White hostel official and attacks on hostel facilities. A concession store outside the hostel was also looted, and one looter shot dead (50).

As a result of these five strikes associated with the introduction

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As a result of these five strikes associated with the introduction

of the death benefit in the industry, eight work shifts were affected, and 280 men discharged from the three mines involved.

The death benefit disputes underlined certain inadequacies in communication procedures with Black mine employees. The circulars to workers, for example, were written in Fanakalo and difficulties were encountered in conveying certain complex aspects of service conditions through this lingua franca, which is a mainly instruction - oriented means of communication. In subsequent years, efforts have been made to improve communication procedures on mines and in 1983 unemployment insurance for citizens of independent homelands was successfully and peacefully communicated. The new harmonized Income Tax Act was also conveyed to Black employees in early 1984 without mishap.

The death benefit dispute was not merely the result of poor communications, however. An investigation by one mining Group into the conflicts noted that the workers were presented with a fait accompli and that there was no prior consultation with those who were to be affected by the scheme. The men had many queries about the scheme, but there was little opportunity to discuss these queries with management. Men wanted, for example, to know why they were obliged to join the scheme when some had taken out their own life insurance policies, or were contributing to informal self-help burial societies. They could also not understand why their dependents were not covered as was the case with other insurance schemes, and wanted to know why they were not covered at home while on unpaid leave, but were still mine employees in possession of VRGs (51).

The death benefit conflicts can be accounted for partly by the lack of prior consultation with employees, partly by the timing of the change (at the same time as an annual wage review, which gave the impression that the increase given was now being taken back) and partly by inadequate communication procedures on certain mines.

Many of the conflicts associated with formal service conditions took

place in the wake of certain changes in these conditions, changes which were initiated by industry management. Whereas the workers' responses to these changes could be described as being essentially reactive in nature, many other mine conflicts were expressions of worker initiative in that the men took spontaneous action to address particular problems in their daily work and living conditions on the mines. Special emphasis was placed in this respect on conditions in the underground environment.

5. UNDERGROUND CONDITIONS, HOISTING AND SIT-DOWN PROTESTS

During the 1970's and early 1980's, problems associated with the underground work situation were relevant to at least 45 conflict situations (or 31 per cent of the total number of conflicts). The grievances expressed by workers from time to time included poor treatment and excessive work loads, underground dangers, environmental problems and hoisting delays.

Treatment - related conflicts were recorded mainly in the early and mid-1970's, whereas those associated with work dangers and the environment were recorded from 1976 to 1980. Hoisting-related protests on the other hand, emerged with greater frequency than others, coming progressively to the fore in the 1980's.

a) Treatment and Work Loads

At least seven relatively minor confrontations between workers and management arose as a direct result of alleged poor treatment by Black and White supervisors (allegations of poor treatment were also relevant to several confrontations associated with other grievances). Rough treatment allegedly handed out by a senior White production supervisor, for example, led to a brief sit-down strike by 30 workers on a Free State mine in October, 1973. The supervisor in question was transferred to another work section (52). In July, 1975, Rhodesian mineworkers on a

West Rand mine complained that their team leaders sent them into the worst parts of the mine and 90 men refused to work (53).

In October, 1977, 60 workers were discharged after refusing to work, claiming that men were being assaulted underground and that their cases were not being taken up. After TEBA representatives offered to raise these complaints with personnel officials, the men declined and said that they only wanted their discharge from this unpopular mine (54).

In the early 1980's, isolated incidents were recorded, including a refusal by 18 men to be hoisted after the White miner had overlooked the end of the shift, and a sit-down strike, also by 18 men who had been instructed by their team leader to do additional work after knock-off time (55).

These various incidents were isolated, brief and peaceful protests involving small groups of workers. They indicate that the question of treatment on mines, while by no means unimportant for workers, did not usually constitute sufficient grounds for a major confrontation with management. The problem of safety underground, however, received comparatively greater attention on the part of underground workers in the 1970's.

b) Work Dangers and Environmental Problems

During the period under review, a total of 16 confrontations took place on gold mines arising from underground accidents, dangerous work conditions and environmental problems.

As discussed in chapter four, most confrontations arising from underground accidents or dangerous working conditions were organized by Rhodesian mineworkers in 1976 and 1977 (eight incidents in all). Other workers have also protested about underground dangers and hot working areas on a few occasions.

In August, 1975, 65 Mozambicans demanded transfer to another mine

after hearing a rumour that 500 Malawians were buried underground at an East Rand mine (56). This incident dramatized workers' fears of underground work.

In November, 1977 an air column burst on a Klerksdorp mine and a lift cage was pierced by iron girders, leaving two men injured. Ventilation and water supplies were affected and 300 men refused to work until underground repairs had been carried out (57). The men also complained about the excessive heat underground, a complaint recorded on two other occasions on an East Rand mine in 1977 and 1978, when 30 workers on both occasions refused to work in particularly hot work sections.

In March, 1980 a cage accident on a Klerksdorp mine led to the deaths of several workers and 64 men refused to work and demanded discharge (58).

Although the problem of underground accidents led to a number of minor work stoppages over the years, these were infrequent occurrences involving relatively small numbers of men. The problem of hoisting delays, however, led to numerous violent confrontations and work stoppages and represented one of the single most important reasons for conflict on mines in the 1970's and 1980's.

c) Hoisting Delays and Underground Protests

Delays in hoisting men to surface at the end of the work shift were responsible for at least 25 worker-management confrontations on gold mines between 1975 and 1982. To identify the grievances underlying these incidents and the tactics employed by workers in organizing their protests, various cases of such conflict will be examined.

Most of the protests concerning late hoisting took the form of sit-downs at underground stations. In 1975, such a sit-down protest took place on a Free State mine. This case deserves detailed considerations

in that it illustrates the problem of hoisting delays due to perceived discrimination in favour of White employees and provides an insight into the sense of injustice aroused among Black workers in the face of such perceived discrimination. It also demonstrates the effectiveness of underground protests and the vulnerability of shaft installations to worker action.

The mine in question had been obliged to accelerate production as a result of an underground fire and had taken steps to arrange for blasting as early as possible each day. Accordingly, the White mining shift was lowered earlier and hoisted earlier than usual. Hoisting schedules were revised and implemented. The following day, a team leader reported to the shaft DPO that dissatisfaction had been voiced by Blacks underground about having to work long hours. The DPO arranged for two Black PAs to go underground the next day (Friday) to investigate the complaint (59).

> Friday, 24th October: 14h40 - After the end of the shift, the first cage of Black employees was hoisted from 73 level. A group of Whites arrived on the station and the hoisting of the Black shift was halted to hoist the Whites. The remaining Blacks on the level refused to be hoisted when the cage returned from surface. The two PAs sent underground to investigate hoisting complaints were prevented from hoisting and held hostage, as were certain Black station marshals. The men seated themselves about 20 metres from the shaft and then commandeered the shaft telephone. Contact was made with other Black workers at 76 level (below) and when the onsetter was instructed to hoist Blacks from that level, these workers also refused to be hoisted.
>
> At 15h00, some DPOs were sent down to 73 level to talk to the men. Rocks were thrown at the DPOs as they tried to leave the cage and enter the level. The DPOs returned to the surface. The production manager asked the hostel manager to go underground with his indunas to speak to the men. The hostel manager refused, saying his job was in the hostel and that it was an underground incident which production staff should handle.
>
> Meanwhile, Blacks telephoned the surface and threatened to push a materials car down the shaft. At 17h10, a riot squad with shields was loaded in the bottom deck of the cage, with senior production management in the top section. A security officer and four squad men exited the cage and advanced onto the level, but were immediately stoned and obliged to return to surface after a senior official had unsuccessfully appealed to the men to come up peacefully.

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> The underground pump station was taken over by the workers and water was pumped down the shaft. Another cage of officials went down to talk to the men, but received no response and the officials went to another level to close off the service water feed.
>
> At 19h30, two officials again proceeded to 73 level and spokesmen on the level stated that they wanted to talk to their induna. The induna and two Sotho tribal representatives travelled down, accompanied by the hostel manager, the mine manager and other officials. The induna talked to the men from inside the cage, but the workers sat silently on the station.
>
> The officials returned to the surface and the decision was made to let the men remain on the level until they requested to be hoisted.
>
> Saturday, 25th: 05h00 - The Blacks on 73 level phoned and requested to be hoisted to surface. The men were hoisted peacefully at 06h30 after the day shift had been lowered. On surface, the men were questioned by management and complained that the Whites were lowered after the Black shift had already gone down and that hoisting of Blacks was stopped to bring the Whites out on time at the end of the shift. The workers declined to put representatives forward to discuss the matter further, fearing that the management would simply discharge them. The men then left the shaft area and proceeded to the kitchen for a meal.

The breach of the peace in this incident was brought about by halting the hoisting of the Black shift to hoist a few Whites. An additional problem was that no attempt had been made to communicate the changes in hoisting schedules or the reasons for these changes, to Black employees. Whatever the reason for the early hoisting of Whites, the Black workers believed that they had been discriminated against and were also aware that Whites normally enjoyed a shorter working day, being lowered last and hoisted first.

In a spontaneous action, the workers refused to be hoisted, with the underground station providing a useful site for mobilizing waiting mineworkers. Workers on other levels were mobilized by means of the shaft telephone.

In the ensuing crisis, rocks were thrown at officials, and water was pumped down the shaft. Although the men's tactics were effective, they were obliged to spend the afternoon and night on the station

(approximately 14 hours) after having already worked a full shift underground.

Redressive action by means of security measures proved ineffective and the workers also did not respond to management's pleas and requests. Eventually, the workers themselves requested to be hoisted. Management later took certain actions to adjust the conflict. Changes to hoisting routines were introduced and management resolved to attend promptly to complaints and ensure that Black employees would be advised in advance of any future changes in work routines.

Apart from the problem of discrimination in hoisting, several other protests could be traced to particular administrative problems associated with hoisting procedures. In 1975, for example, a hoisting delay took place on a West Rand mine as a result of the need to conduct a hoist examination. An injured man also had to be hoisted first, resulting in further delay. On their arrival on surface, about 200 workers walked to the mine's other shaft to seek support for their protest, but were dispersed (60). On this same mine several years later in 1979, White winding engine drivers were on a "go slow" strike. The shift was hoisted late on a Friday afternoon and over 600 Blacks on one underground level became angry and pushed four loaded coco-pans down the shaft. Later that week-end, hundreds of Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers attempted to join forces in the hostel to continue their protest, but were dispersed by security action (61).

In 1981, hoisting was delayed briefly on another West Rand mine while shaft repairs were being carried out and 700 workers refused to be hoisted (62). In February, 1982, a new banksman on a Free State mine was unfamiliar with hoisting schedules and 60 men staged a sit-down on the station, but agreed to be hoisted after management assured them that banksmen and onsetters would be informed of the correct schedules (63).

Over the years, the workers' mobilization tactics associated with

hoisting protests were improved from time to time.

In 1981, for example, workers on a Klerksdorp mine had lodged repeated complaints of hoisting delays, discrimination in hoisting and poor treatment by the onsetter. A sit-down protest was apparently planned for a Saturday shift to give workers time to organize further confrontations should the action spread to other shafts. Workers on other levels of the shaft used travelling ways to get to the particular level at which the protest took place, apparently to get enough people on that station. The level selected by the workers was the only one on the shaft without security gates at the station, thereby leaving White officials unprotected. At least 250 workers were mobilized and the men demanded that management come underground to hear their grievance. An official who went down with one party was injured in the face by a steel missile. The workers were hoisted a few hours later after a new onsetter arrived to commence duty. Later, mine management conducted an investigation into hoisting scheduling and set up procedures for monitoring deviations in these schedules (64).

On another mine in the same region several months later, hoisting delays and long travel times from the shaft to the hostel led to a sit-down protest by 1600 workers. The men allegedly planned the action in the bus on the way to the shaft in the morning. At the end of the shift, Sotho team leaders and others prevented men from boarding the cage. Steps leading to higher levels and stations were destroyed. Shaft installations were damaged and a White official struck in the face by a crowbar. When the workers were hoisted 14 hours later at 04h00, they were informed that all would be discharged. The men applauded and made "Black power" signs. On their way back to the hostel, certain shaft facilities were damaged and the hostel kitchen was looted. Over 1500 men took their discharge, including 806 Transkeians, 372 South African workers and 348 Lesotho nationals. Management undertook to investigate

hoisting procedures and transport arrangements (65).

In March, 1982 on a Free State mine, workers were reported to be taking food and provisions in expectation of a sit-down underground. Later, workers refused to be hoisted, but were encouraged to come to the surface several hours later (66).

The successes achieved by Black workers in the mobilization of hoisting-related underground protests encouraged them to employ similar tactics in other disputes with management. During the 1982 wage dispute, for example, sit-down protests were organized on several occasions, as described earlier.

The immediate significance of hoisting problems on mines, however, lay in the fact that delays in hoisting invariably resulted in men arriving late at the hostel. Latecomers in the hostel have often found that hot water supplies in the change house have already been exhausted. The workers also often encountered cold food and shortages of food in the kitchen, and had little time left in the afternoon for personal chores, such as visiting the post office (de Vries, Robertson and McNamara, 1978; de Vries and Radise, 1980). This "ripple effect" of late hoisting on other services and routines has been found to affect men's plans for week-end visits home. In an investigation into week-end visiting, several workers complained that they were sometimes delayed by late hoisting on the day of their departure (Fridays). These and other delays sometimes led to men arriving late at the border posts into Lesotho and being obliged to spend the night outside the gates before entering Lesotho the following day (Laburn and McNamara, 1981).

These various domestic and social repercussions help to account for the intensity and frequency of underground protests against hoisting delays on gold mines. The problem itself seems to have become more acute over the years, with the number of hoisting-related conflicts increasing annually. In 1978, for example, there were three incidents, two each

year in 1979 and 1980, seven in 1981 and eight in 1982. This increase in hoisting grievances has taken place over a time period when mine shafts have penetrated deeper, and the distances from shaft stations to underground working areas increased progressively as the mines became worked out, implying a steady increase in travelling times between hostels and underground stopes.

The impact of underground production and travelling routines on hostel facilities is symptomatic of an underlying tension between production priorities and the provision of adequate personnel and domestic services on mines. This tension has been relevant on occasions to conflicts between workers and hostel management over the years, and will be examined in the following section.

6. CONFRONTATIONS WITH HOSTEL MANAGEMENT AND STAFF

In the period under review, grievances and problems associated with hostel accommodation were relevant to at least 26 conflict situations with management on mines (i.e. 18 per cent of the total). The incidence of hostel-related conflict was comparatively low, when viewed against purely work-related issues. Hostel-related conflicts deserve scrutiny, however, because they reveal some of the problems of hostel life, the responses of residents to various improvements and changes to hostel facilities and conditions over the years and the impact of production requirements and problems on hostel services.

In chapter five, it was shown that various tensions associated with communal barracks accommodation frequently led to clashes between different worker groups in the hostel environs. Many of these same tensions also led to confrontations between hostel management and staff, particularly indunas and tribal representatives. These encounters stemmed from various problems in the provision of food and accommodation in mine hostels, and the reactions of hostel residents to accommodation

policies in general.

a) Conflicts with Tribal Representatives

In 1971 a young Malawian who was "taking food for a friend" from the kitchen of a West Rand mine was intercepted by a Malawi tribal policeman and questioned about the excessive amount of food he was taking. The young man allegedly threw the food on the ground and struck the tribal policeman, who chased the man and threw him down. A rumour later circulated that the tribal policeman had killed a Malawian and 1000 Malawians mobilized and attacked the rooms of the Malawian induna and tribal police (67).

In October, 1974, a Malawian on another West Rand mine jumped the queue at the kitchen and other residents in the queue became unhappy. A Malawian policeman pushed him out of the way, but was attacked by the Malawian resident. After another attack on the Malawian police, the man was apprehended, but close to 300 Malawians wanted to know why the man was arrested, assaulted the induna and his police and set their compatriot free. The hostel manager ordered the men to return to their rooms and the induna's four assailants were discharged (68).

Tribal representatives have also come into conflict with residents in the course of intervening in assault situations in hostels. A group of Rhodesian residents of a West Rand mine besieged the room of one of their own tribal representatives after he had tried to intervene in an assault situation involving a Rhodesian and a Mozambican (69). In another case on a Free State mine, a Zulu resident ran away from the scene of the fatal stabbing of a fellow Zulu by Sotho residents, and was "manhandled" by the Zulu tribal representative. Later all the Zulus from Central Zululand staged a demonstration and 35 requested discharge. It was later established that the Zulu tribal representative was from the South of Zululand, from which most of the Zulu residents had originated.

Men from Central Zululand, however, were in the minority and friction ensued between them and the tribal representative from Southern Zululand (70).

Perhaps the most violent encounter between residents and tribal representatives was one which arose on a Free State mine when tribal representatives entered a room to investigate complaints that a gumba gumba radio was being played loudly (described in detail in chapter five). The inmates attacked the tribal representative, injured five men and later killed several other residents.

These various cases demonstrate how the communal tensions of hostel life often implicated tribal disciplinary figures in clashes with residents. Another underlying reason for tensions between residents and so-called tribal representatives was the rejection, on at least one occasion, of the legitimacy of the representatives appointed for a particular group of residents.

Conflicts between residents and tribal disciplinary figures were recorded mainly for the early 1970's. By the 1980's, there were virtually no further incidents of this kind on mines.

b) Conflicts Arising from Hostel Accommodation and Food Services

Black hostel residents were also involved in several confrontations with White hostel management from time to time. These encounters were particularly frequent in 1976, in the wake of the recruitment of South African and other workers. Rhodesian hostel residents, in particular, clashed with hostel managers over the quality of the food, the availability of meat, poor treatment by hostel managers, and so on.

Other grievances expressed by hostel residents in collective confrontations with hostel management included the lack of adequate accommodation (such as a shortage of mattrasses and beds, which obliged men to sleep on the floor on occasions), and the unavailability of food

and hot shower water for workers coming late off shift.

After 1976, certain mines in the industry introduced substantial improvements to hostel facilities and services. One Group made progress in the decentralization of these facilities to ensure better attention to individual needs. Hostels were reorganized according to underground sections (approximately 700 men per section) with each section being served by a separate dining hall and change house. Instead of walking to a central kitchen, residents could now take their meals in more intimate surroundings close to their rooms. The dining halls themselves were supplied with pre-cooked food transported from the central kitchen in insulated, stainless steel trolleys.

Certain problems, however, became associated with this decentralized catering service on at least one mine in the Free State. There were delays in the replenishment of food by the central kitchen, and the food transported to the dining halls became cold as a result of having to remain available for workers coming off shift during the course of each afternoon of the working week. The food also became unpalatable over this period. The process of relaying food into the trolleys at the central kitchen also tended to break up certain items before their transport to the dining halls.

The problem of late hoisting also compounded problems. Workers arriving late from underground often encountered cold food in insufficient quantities and cold shower water in the change houses. The change houses themselves also suffered from poor security and there were thefts of clothing from time to time (de Vries, Robertson and McNamara, 1978).

These various problems were manifested in a violent conflict on the mine in May, 1978. On a Sunday evening two Xhosa workers went into their dining hall to ask for meat. As was the case on most mines in the industry, meat was a rationed item and workers were obliged to produce

their work tickets, which were punched to denote that rations had been issued. One Xhosa worker in the incident in question produced a work ticket that had already been punched and the dining hall attendent refused to supply another meat ration. The worker's friend removed a piece of chicken out of the trolley and the attendent was assaulted. Other residents in and around the hall were mobilized and windows were broken. Hostel management and security forces arrived, but a small group of arsonists had begun to move quickly from one hostel section to the next, setting fire to the dining hall and change house of each section in turn. The fires which broke out could not easily be extinguished because of the restricted mobility of fire engines on the narrow internal roads and the obstruction presented by high kerbstones in the hostel area. A total of seven dining halls and seven change houses were burnt. Several food trolleys and beer tankers, dishwashing units, television sets, dining hall tables and plastic chairs were also destroyed, as were three rooms of senior Black hostel staff. Over 700 men were discharged, of whom most (500) were Transkeians (71).

An investigation into this conflict was commissioned by the relevant mining Group and certain improvements to catering arrangements were introduced. The immediate significance of the conflict, however, was that hostel residents directed their aggression towards those facilities and installations associated with their daily grievances. Although the residents' actions were violent in nature, they remained rational in that the targets they attacked were directly representative of the issues underlying the conflict.

A similar conflict took place four years later (1982) at another Free State mine, arising from delays in food replenishment in a dining hall. These delays had been brought about by the defective operation of a boiler in the main kitchen. Dining hall furniture and windows were broken and the clothing in several change houses was destroyed (72).

With the exception of the two conflicts described above and the gumba gumba incident, hostel-related grievances were not exclusively associated with major confrontations on mines between workers and management. In cases where hostel grievances were relevant to major conflicts involving violence and large numbers of people, they invariably constituted one aspect of a broader confrontation involving other, more substantial issues, including wages, work and service conditions. Alternatively, hostel-related grievances contributed to an accumulation of a variety of other grievances which collectively resulted in conflict.

One such conflict took place on a newly-established mine in the Carletonville area in April, 1979. This conflict was characterized by an accumulation of grievances and problems, of which many were work-related. The work situation, including production priorities, also had a substantial impact on the quality of hostel services in various ways. The conflict is also important in that it constitutes the clearest illustration of how mineworkers directed their anger at physical facilities and installations which were symbolic of their grievances and problems.

The mine in question had only recently been developed. In an effort to render a record return to shareholders, the mine commenced with gold production 30 months ahead of original schedule and the labour strength was increased from 1400 to 4500 men over the six-month period prior to the strike. The hostel building programme, however, had not been able to keep pace with these changes and there was a shortage of over 700 beds for new arrivals.

The newly-erected dining halls could not cope with the irregular arrival of workers from shift, such as shaft-sinking crews. Problems in the hoisting of men also created fluctuations in demand and late shift workers sometimes received no food. There were also delays in the replenishment of food and resentment towards the meat rationing system.

A new computerized crush procedure had been installed for clocking in men's work tickets, but had not been made fault-proof before its introduction and many men were booked absent when they were at work. The computer was also associated with better controls over absenteeism and the elimination of opportunities for men to clock in but not report for duty underground. Workers began to regard the computer as a means of reducing their earnings and increasing disciplinary controls.

Mine management had also attempted to move away from certain "paternalistic" features of mine hostel accommodation. In the place of the traditional induna, hostel administrators were appointed and provided with offices. These men were not supplied with free beer and meat rations to entertain visitors, as was the case with indunas on other mines. The residents shunned these administrators because they appeared to lack the status and authority of the induna and seemed ineffective. Hostel rooms were also not provided with free beer rations daily, as was the case on other mines.

In March, 1979, one month before the strike, 266 workers from a neighbouring mine were transferred to the new mine to carry out development work. The absence of free beer was resented by these men, whose bonus earnings had also dropped significantly as a result of their transfer. Sixteen of these men were eventually sent back to their original mine after complaining of reductions in earnings.

These various problems and a variety of others also, accumulated in the months before the strike. Other grievances included the arrest of men walking through the White residential area to visit friends on a neighbouring mine, and the absence of wash lines at viewing distance from the rooms, which resulted in thefts of clothing. Most of the men's grievances were communicated through the isibonda councils, but little action was taken because certain requests were contrary to mine policy (for example, requests for the reinstatement of free beer rations and

wash lines near the rooms), whereas others were regarded by management as inevitable consequences of the youth of the mine and the necessity for rapid work development. Employees were consequently asked to accept these conditions until the mine became fully operational.

In April, 1979, the mine experienced a destructive strike, described below. The details of the strike, as well as the account of worker grievances presented above, are based on reports by the mine and the results of an investigation conducted one month after the events by the Human Resources Laboratory (73).

> Sunday, 1st April: Workers arranged a meeting in the bushes surrounding the hostel on the slope of a kopje. Present at the meeting were several non-workers, described as "Russians", mainly unemployed Blacks who lived in the surrounding hills and sometimes entered the unfenced hostel to obtain food.
>
> Thursday, 5th: Several machine operators allegedly told workers in a dining hall of plans to strike. A hostel administrator was told of the plans and a Sotho machine operator was arrested and repatriated.
>
> Sunday, 8th: At sunset, several blanketed "Russians" were seen arriving in a vehicle and entering the hostel. At about 19h40, night shift workers were reportedly being stopped on the way to the shaft. At about 20h00, there was a delay in food replenishment in one dining hall. The dining hall was attacked and windows were broken. Whistles were blown, there was shouting and the hammering of sticks. Workers gathered in the hostel and advanced on the administration offices. Other workers were seen running out of the hostel to escape the conflict. Hostel room blocks were attacked and windows and window frames were broken. The medical dressing station was also attacked. Mine security personnel drove to the hostel, but were forced to retreat from the advancing crowd.
>
> At 21h15, the computerized crush at the shaft was damaged. At about this time, the hostel administrative offices and mine stores were burnt. The change house serving shaft-sinking crews was also burnt. During these activities, security forces, the SAP and the fire brigade arrived and fires were put out.
>
> At 23h15, the hostel beerhall was burnt, and several vehicles destroyed, including the car of one hostel administrator. Security forces were unable to monitor the activities of the crowd because of the building layout and a helicopter ascended to direct teargas into certain areas with the aid of a searchlight.
>
> Many workers moved into the bushes on the kopje behind the unfenced hostel. The helicopter was used to flush men out of the bushes and many workers were arrested. The mine manager

addressed the crowd over a loudspeaker from the helicopter and told the men to assemble on the sportsfield. The manager then drove by car to the sportsfield, but encountered a militant crowd and was forced to re-enter later under police protection.

Approximately 1000 men assembled on the sportsfield. The manager attempted to address the crowd and the men shouted their grievances ("money ... meat every day ... hours of work ... want indunas"). The men were asked to elect representatives the following day and told to disperse.

Monday, 9th: The morning work shift was not attended and at 07h00, the manager gave employees an ultimatum to elect representatives. No representatives came forward and the men were told to go to work in one hour. Many workers moved out of their rooms and gathered silently in the hostel arena. By 10h30, the hostel was surrounded by security personnel and the manager ascended in the helicopter and announced that men not going underground would be dismissed. About 1000 men went to their rooms to fetch underground clothing, but many others assembled in the pay hall to collect their pay and take discharge. Of the 945 men discharged, 495 were from Transkei, and 394 from Lesotho.

Tuesday, 10th: The official opening of the mine was conducted, with police on standby.

It should be clear from the account of the many grievances and problems experienced by the workers on this mine, that a series of breaches of employer-employee relations had taken place in the months before the strike. Certain immediate breaches could also be identified which provided the immediate catalysts. At some time during the week-end of the strike, hostel staff were instructed to remove workers' washing, which had been spread out on the ground in front of the rooms to dry (workers were reluctant to hang their washing in the enclosed yards provided for this purpose because of the problem of theft). The men's clothes were collected together and destroyed.

Just prior to the outbreak of physical conflict, there had been a delay in food replenishment in a hostel dining hall, which assisted in bringing about an attack on the hall. These two events, namely the confiscation of washing and a delay in food supply, provided the immediate breaches which focused the workers' general dissatisfaction, translating them into strike action. The resulting mobilization of

support involved workers of different regions of origins. Transkeians and Lesotho nationals combined forces in a strike concerning common grievances.

An important feature of the mobilization of workers, which included meetings on the kopje, was the role of so-called "Russians". The mine management was of the opinion that the strike had been instigated by these outsiders, who had been seen attending meetings with workers and who had entered the hostel immediately prior to the outbreak of conflict. The TEBA Liaison Division also reported that the Russians allegedly intended to stir up trouble on the mine to avenge the fatal shooting of a gang member by a local White farmer in January, three months before the strike.

The Russians were identified by Black mine employees as urban thugs, ex-mine employees and deserters from mines. The presence of the Russians and the apparently deliberate orchestration of the strike to coincide with the mine's official opening, prompted management and other observers to regard the strike as "more of a political nature than anything else". One daily newspaper also described the incident as a "staking sonder griewe" (strike without grievances), on a mine with the most modern hostel facilities in the industry (74).

The great variety of grievances and problems identified subsequently suggests that these claims can be discounted, without disputing the fact tht certain outsiders may indeed have played a role in mobilizing workers.

The crisis phase of the strike included attacks on various mine facilities, many of which were directly representative of the grievances of the workers, including the dining halls (food delays and meat rationing), the computerized crush (booked absent when at work), administrative offices and the car of a hostel administrator (grievances not attended). The attacks on hostel room blocks could also be

indicative of workers' frustrations with overcrowding in the rooms and a shortage of beds. The hostel beerhall, which was also burnt, was disliked because it was frequently congested and sold unpopular brands of beer.

One change house used by shaft sinkers was also burnt, because these particular workers did not participate in the strike. There were also threats against Mozambican workers a few days after the strike because of their non-participation.

Redressive mechanisms employed to halt the strike included security action (teargas and a helicopter), and the holding of meetings between management and strikers. An adjustment was effected through the return to work of 1000 men and the repatriation of 945. An in-depth investigation of the strike was conducted the following month. During the remainder of the year, the bonus system was improved, wash lines were installed in front of the rooms, the food service was improved and hostel administrators were provided with a meat and beer issue along the lines of the "induna" system. Personnel were also appointed with the responsibility of overseeing communications on the mine.

Legal action was also taken against two so-called "Russians" who received four and six years jail, respectively.

Perhaps the most important issue emerging from the strike, apart from the symbolic attacks on certain grievance - related facilities, was the role of particular agents in assisting Black workers on the mine to develop a perception of injustice about their situation on the mine. The workers themselves were clearly aware of the problems associated with the development of the new mine, but management had frequently asked the men to accept these difficult conditions. Several months before the strike, for example, management sent out briefs to the workers explaining that it was not possible to change from a six-day week to an eleven-shift fortnight, because of the need for rapid development. Employees were

also briefed as to the reasons for congestion in the beerhall and the men were assured that the problem would be overcome once the second tavern had been completed.

For a time, workers appeared to tolerate these conditions, and accepted management's definition of the situation. One month before the strike, however, a group of workers arrived on the mine after having been transferred from a neighbouring mine. These men immediately questioned the unavailability of free beer rations, among other problems. Whereas the mine had operated for some time (in its developing stage) without a free beer ration, complaints about this issue now began to emerge for the first time. The workers' sense of inevitability regarding the conditions under which they lived and worked, began to break down. It was left to the "Russian" outsiders to remove any further sense of inevitable misfortune and encourage workers to strike against these conditions.

This particular strike provides an important illustration of the way in which workers may come to recognise that their situation is intolerable and that they can take action to secure improvements. After the strike, certain improvements were introduced and although problems still remained, strike action in the mining industry had once again ensured that investigations would be conducted and the workers' problems would receive some attention. Once again, an informal renegotiation of conditions had been effected through the medium of conflict.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The contemporary history of the gold mining industry has been characterized by a resurgence of strikes and protests which could be linked to virtually every aspect of the working and living conditions of Black employees. In an effort to describe and analyse these various encounters, it was necessary to distinguish different employment conditions on the mines and trace the pattern of worker response and

action in relation to each.

This did not imply that a broad pattern or trend could not be discerned in these encounters, but that it was necessary at the outset to clarify the various underlying issues and the course of particular disputes before such a trend could be identified.

This broad pattern of contemporary conflicts will be outlined briefly below before conclusions are reached on the conflicts as a whole.

a) An Overview of Contemporary Worker Protest on Mines

The origins of contemporary conflicts between Black mineworkers and management can be traced to the implementation of wage increases and revised wage policies in the early 1970's. These changes altered the established hierarchy of job status and earnings levels within the Black labour force and revealed the existence of an underlying conflict of interests between management and unskilled workers concerning the basis for the calculation of wage awards.

The wage increases of the early 1970's also produced discrepancies in the wages offered by different mines and mining Groups, which resulted in further conflict. After workers demanded parity in wage rates, these anomalies were rectified, setting a precedent for the securing of improvements through informal, spontaneous negotiations in actual conflict situations.

In the wake of these early conflicts, the industry experienced an influx of new recruits from 1975 onwards. Their arrival on the mines coincided with a relaxation of legislative controls over work attendance and the honouring of work contracts, a development which provided further scope for worker action. The most active of the new recruits were the Rhodesian mineworkers, who focused their attention on underground work dangers and formal service conditions, particularly in 1976. The

activities of the Rhodesians could have provided additional evidence to other workers of the increased opportunities for collective worker action after this time.

The new recruits, particularly those from within South Africa, at first reacted poorly to hostel conditions and policies and hostel-related grievances figured prominently in conflict situations in the years 1975 and 1976 (Table 30). Workers in general also responded poorly to the relatively modest wage increases offered from 1976 onwards, in contrast to those awarded in earlier years.

From 1977 onwards, workers turned their attention for a time to underground work conditions and hazards (Table 30). From this year also, various changes in service conditions were introduced and there was also progress in the development of measures for the stabilization of migratory labour flows, which were associated with several conflicts (Table 30). Substantial improvements and innovations in hostel accommodation and food services were also implemented. Certain initial difficulties in the introduction of modernized mine facilities generated violent responses in 1978 and 1979, including mistrust of computers for the monitoring of work attendence and performance.

Several early changes, including alterations to pay procedures, work routines and living conditions, brought about a climate of mistrust of change on the part of Black workers which was to affect the introduction of changes in later years.

In the intervening period between 1979 and 1980, the incidence of conflict declined markedly in a time of deteriorating economic conditions in the country and a growing oversupply of labour for mining work. Those few conflicts which did take place were linked in part to difficulties in the honouring of re-engagement guarantees. The stabilization process signalled a conflict of interests in which the job security of individual workers could not always be maintained in the context of an easily

Table 30 UNDERLYING FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN 143 CONFLICTS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND BLACK WORKERS ON GOLD MINES: 1973 - 1982

UNDERLYING FACTORS		1973-1974	1975-1976	1977-1978	1979-1980	1981-1982	Total[1]	Per cent of conflicts
1. Wages and Bonus Earnings (51 conflicts)	Wage Levels/Increases	-	6	2	3	18	29	20,3
	Mine/Job differentials	9	-	3	3	9	24	16,8
	Bonus payments	5	3	3	2	2	15	10,5
	Administration of wages	5	-	3	3	1	12	8,4
2. Conditions of Service (41 conflicts)	Changes in conditions	6	5	8	3	12	34	23,8
	Communication procedures	1	-	2	2	15	20	13,9
	11-shift fortnight/pay cycles	-	2	6	1	5	15	9,8
	Other service conditions[2]	-	4	0	2	5	11	7,7
	Labour stabilization	-	-	5	1	1	7	4,9
3. Underground conditions (45 conflicts)	Hoisting problems	-	2	4	4	15	25	17,5
	Treatment/overtime	3	3	3	4	4	17	11,9
	Danger/environment	-	6	8	2	-	16	11,2
4. Hostel conditions (41 conflicts)	Food and accommodation	1	7	4	4	2	18	12,6
	Treatment/hostel policies	1	4	1	1	2	9	6,3
	Treatment by tribal reps	2	4	1	1	-	8	5,6

1. The table reports on factors identified in 143 conflict situations for which adequate information could be obtained (missing data = 15).
The total number of factors identified is greater than the number of conflict situations because more than one factor could be identified in many cases.

2. Conflicts associated with other service conditions include death benefit insurance (5), acclimatization (4), training (1) and medical procedures (1).

satisfied demand for experienced labour in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations.

From 1981, an increase in strike activity was again evident, stimulated in part by the introduction of new service conditions (death benefits). The general climate of worker mistrust, poor communications and the lack of prior consultation with employees accounted in the main for these conflicts. Conflict could also be traced to anomalies in shift work routines generated by the involvement of only a part of the labour force (the White workers) in formal negotiations with mining employers.

From this time also, hoisting problems on mines came rapidly to the fore and there was a marked increase in underground protests by Black workers in 1981 and 1982 (Table 30). These tactics proved to be particularly effective for Black employees and were subsequently employed in other disputes, notably the wage strikes of 1982.

The decade of industrial conflict since 1973 ended as it had begun, in the form of the protracted wage strikes of 1982. It became clear that the conflict of interests associated with the calculation of wage awards was still in evidence and that unskilled and non-supervisory workers had not accepted (revised) principles of job evaluation ten years after their implementation. This time period had instead witnessed the maintenance of an internal cleavage within the work force which manifested itself in attacks on Black production supervisors during the strikes.

The 1982 strikes were also the culmination of wage grievances that had been building up since the decline in the real value of wage increases after the halcyon years of the early 1970's. The strikes were among the most severe experienced by the industry in its contemporary history, in that several workers were killed, a record number of strikers were repatriated and more work shifts lost than during any other strikes over this period.

Within weeks of these events, initial moves were made in the

unionization of Black mineworkers, culminating in the first legal strike by the National Union of Mineworkers on eight mines in September, 1984.

It is clear that on the eve of this unionization process, a wide gulf had already emerged between Black workers and mine management, indicated by the persistence of certain conflicts of interests, growing worker mistrust of management - initiated change and the strengthening of worker solidarity painfully achieved after years of internal strife.

This brief outline of trends in industrial conflict on mines indicates that different instances of collective action do exhibit a patterned relationship to each other over time. Other important features of these conflicts can also be discerned by relating them to their institutional setting and examining them as forms of social mobilization.

b) The Origin and Character of Collective Action in the Institutional Environment of Gold Mines and Hostels

The assessment of industrial conflict between employer and employee as a form of social conflict or collective action, provides an opportunity to view work place struggles against the background of wider social, economic and political developments taking place in the society as a whole. This includes an evaluation of the extent to which the conflict can be accounted for in terms of these external developments, or whether they can be regarded primarily as expressions of internal structures and processes in a particular institutional setting. The influence of these immediate institutional factors on the form and intensity of conflict also requires consideration.

Within this institutional setting, it is also important to consider the motives and intentions of the participants and the ways in which they mobilized different social and occupational groupings in their protests. The kinds of social controls employed to prevent or halt such confrontations and the ways in which the participants overcame these

obstacles also deserve attention, as do the outcomes or consequences of conflict.

The resurgence of worker - management conflicts on gold mines in the 1970's took place at a time of political and industrial upheaval in the Black townships and industries of South Africa. Several months prior to the first major dispute in the mining industry in late 1973, a series of strikes and confrontations took place in textile industries in the Durban area. Then, in 1976, the Soweto revolt initiated a new era of township disturbances which continued throughout the remainder of that year, and again in 1977. From 1979 onwards, guerilla attacks took place with increasing frequency in the main urban centres and new Black political organizations became active (Annexure Four).

The substantial labour reforms from 1979 onwards were also associated with the growth of Black trade unionism and increased strike activity in other industries. These reforms finally extended to the mining industry in 1982.

These political and industrial developments could have had some influence on Black mineworkers, particularly through the public media, but it is difficult to provide concrete evidence of such influences. The pattern of conflict in other industries has not always corresponded with that taking place in the mining industry and the grievances involved have often been different. In the months following the Soweto revolt, for example, there were relatively few worker-management confrontations on gold mines. During the dispute over the pensions issue in 1981 in the Eastern Cape and Natal, those few mine strikes which did take place involved particular responses to the introduction of a death benefit scheme. In 1982, however, there were numerous wage strikes in the clothing and motor industries which coincided with wage strikes on gold mines, suggesting that similar economic problems were affecting Black workers in industries throughout the country at that time.

Several confrontations on mines have also been phrased in terms of a wider racial-political struggle. In the course of mobilizing support, workers sometimes categorized management as "Whites", and security forces were referred to as "boers", or "soldiers". Black power salutes were also noted during a few strikes.

A comprehensive analysis of industrial conflicts in South Africa as a whole will no doubt be able to relate them to general social, economic and political processes affecting the Black population in the country. Within the limits of the present investigation, however, such relationships remain speculative.

A distinction should, furthermore, be drawn between the form of industrial struggles, including the extent to which they are phrased in terms of wider political and social divisions, and the factors associated with their emergence in specific industrial settings. It remains possible in this respect to account for the emergence of worker action on mines primarily in terms of developments within the industry itself. These internal developments included the introduction of changes in wage policies and service conditions which both initiated and sustained the incidence of conflict on gold mines in the 1970's and early 1980's. Close to one quarter (24 per cent) of all conflicts could be linked directly to changes in working and living conditions on mines, particularly the earlier incidents. Contemporary conflicts on mines can best be understood in terms of these internal developments and trends, without necessarily discounting the likely influence of the emerging political and industrial consciousness of Blacks in the country as a whole, or of the universal influence of common economic and social processes.

Within the mining industry, Black workers have also been engaged in their own particular struggle, one conducted independently of that taking place in other industries and in the townships. The collective character

of this struggle can be traced to the workers' belief that they needed to mobilize on a combined basis to articulate and redress a variety of perceived grievances and problems on mines. This perceived need arose mainly because existing channels and procedures were not suited for the resolution of many worker grievances and problems, being unable to entertain matters of policy (such as wages and formal service conditions) and often failing to resolve certain day-to-day matters, such as late hoisting. These channels, such as grievance procedures and consultative committees, were also not designed to redress basic conflicts of interests dividing management and employee.

In the course of time, furthermore, it became apparent to mineworkers that collective action sometimes obtained results by creating the basis for the informal renegotiation of employment conditions, as illustrated by the precedent set and maintained for securing concessions in conflict situations.

The frequent recourse to collective action on mines can be seen as a consequence of the inappropriateness of existing institutions for dealing with major issues affecting workers and the absence of a formal structure for the negotiation of conflicting interests and needs.

In this particular institutional context, workers organized confrontations with a view to communicating their grievances and problems and demonstrating that such grievances were shared by a number of people and regarded in a serious light. The communicative element in these confrontations was evident in the fact that workers frequently launched attacks on targets which were symbolic, or representative of their main grievances. These included the rooms of indunas and tribal police, dining halls, underground shaft installations, the property and rooms of non-strikers and supervisors, and so on. The fact that many conflicts were chiefly intended as forms of communication, can be inferred from the large number of confrontations that did not lead to work stoppages. At

least one third of all the conflicts did not result in lost shifts, and hence were not "strikes", in the technical sense of the term. Mineworkers often pointed out to management that they had no intention of striking, but merely wished to convey their problems. Protests over hoisting delays, for example, were not conventional strikes in that they invariably took place after the day's work shift had been concluded.

In the expression of collective discontent, certain institutional controls in mines and hostels did not appear to constitute major limitations on the mobilization of worker gatherings. Certain of these institutional features actually served to facilitate the mobilization process. The hostel barracks method of employee accommodation provided various opportunities for workers in the course of organizing confrontations and strike action. The limited number of entrances and exits, for example, were easily commandeered by small groups of workers, who frequently barricaded or wired up the hostel gates, or blocked off personnel tunnels leading to the shafts. The workers frequently obstructed the night shift in this way and were also able to operate under cover of darkness at such times. The confined and escapsulated nature of hostels also implied that the majority of the residents became implicated in the mobilization process, even in instances where a particular occupational group was involved in a specific dispute with management which was not necessarily relevant to the rest of the work force.

Certain strategic facilities were also located within the hostel institution which were vulnerable to attack by residents. The most important of these were the kitchens and change houses, which were frequently destroyed in strikes. The interruption of food supplies and the destruction of stores and underground clothing in change houses invariably resulted in the temporary suspension of production routines, obliging management to import food from other hostels and to obtain new

supplies of underground clothing before mineworkers could be encouraged to resume work.

In their attempts to terminate hostel disturbances and disperse gatherings of workers, security forces were often confronted with logistic difficulties. The internal layout of hostel room blocks and installations sometimes obstructed security action, reduced visibility and restricted access for security vehicles and fire engines. Workers sometimes constructed barricades of furniture and other materials across major thoroughfares, which further complicated security action.

In the underground environment, workers also experienced little difficulty in organizing sit-down actions on stations to protest hoisting delays and other grievances. Security forces could not easily be deployed onto these stations and into underground stopes. The vulnerability of shaft installations to costly damage and flooding by workers was also demonstrated on several occasions.

The vulnerability of the underground and hostel setting to worker action and the opportunities provided for group mobilization in these institutional settings, help to explain how mineworkers overcame various social and work controls in their protests.

One important obstacle which did appear to hinder worker mobilization at times was the presence of certain regional and linguistic divisions within the work force. During the 1970's and 1980's, mineworkers were involved in numerous inter-group clashes arising partly from the communal tensions of hostel life, and partly from certain (political) struggles over scarce jobs and wages.

These clashes were frequent after 1975, in the aftermath of the influx of new recruits. The presence of these inexperienced workers implied that internal divisions were strongly in evidence. Despite the presence of these divisions, workers were still able to mobilize on a limited, sectional basis. Men from certain regions or countries often

drew on the intense cultural solidarity inherent in their own group to confront management with their grievances. At least half of these regionally distinct mobilizations involved Rhodesian recruits.

Sectional forms of mobilization were also carried out by particular occupational groups which gathered to defend or promote the special interests of their job category, notably team leaders and machine operators. At least 40 per cent (64) of the total number of conflicts with management were sectional in character, whether on an occupational or regional basis, or both. These sectional confrontations declined in the 1980's in favour of wider worker mobilization of varying degrees of inclusiveness (Figure 4).

During these years also the incidence of inter-group clashes declined, accompanied by a noticeable increase in the number of worker-management confrontations (Figure 5). Sotho and Xhosa-speaking workers, in particular, began to co-operate in major work strikes from 1976 onwards. The conflicts in which this co-operation was most marked were usually directed towards matters of common concern, such as hoisting, hostel services, new service conditions and wage increases. In the 1982 wage strikes, Sotho and Xhosa speakers were especially co-operative, despite the fact that these workers had been involved in a minor resurgence of inter-group clashes on certain Transvaal mines the previous year. These inter-ethnic tensions had abated in 1982 in favour of the expression of a fundamental and persistent division between labourers and supervisors within the Black work force.

This broader, job-related cleavage appears to have superseded ethnic divisions by the 1980's, revealing a persistent breach in the wider solidarity of the Black working class on mines, a cleavage which can be traced to wage policies and status divisions within the underground job hierarchy.




FIGURE 4 : Trends in the Scope of Worker Mobilization in Conflict with Mine Management: 1971–1982




FIGURE 5 : Trends in Inter-Group Clashes and Worker Protests on Mines: 1971–1982

The frequent occurrence of sectional and general mobilizations in the course of time implied that the number of workers involved in each case varied considerably. At least 20 per cent of the conflicts comprised 50 persons or less, but there were also several conflicts (10 per cent of the total) which comprised over 1000 workers, a few of which involved up to 4000 men on particular mines.

Some of these large-scale mobilizations can be attributed to the institutional nature of hostel accommodation, which implicated the majority of hostel residents in conflicts. These institutional influences could also be associated with an escalation of physical violence, destruction of property and loss of work shifts in certain cases.

Of the total number of conflicts, at least two thirds (106) affected the work routine and collectively resulted in the loss of a conservatively estimated 120 000 man shifts. Forty per cent of the encounters were also associated with physical violence, 16 of which (10 per cent of the total) resulted in death. A total of 36 workers lost their lives, mainly as a result of security action, but also partly through inter-worker violence. An estimated 467 injuries were also recorded. Roughly half (74) of the total number of recorded conflicts were characterized by the discharge and repatriation of workers (on both a voluntary and involuntary basis). During the ten year period under review, close to 10 000 workers were repatriated back to their homes in the aftermath of confrontations with mine management.

It should be clear from these concluding remarks that certain features of the institutional environment of mines and hostels affected the incidence, form and intensity of conflict between management and Black workers. The institutional structures in operation on mines for handling relations between White employer and Black employee were not designed to accommodate formal negotiations on matters of policy. The

absence of formal employee representation, and inadequacies in existing communication procedures, resulted in the emergence of an informal style of negotiation and communication in conflict situations.

These spontaneous and informal measures of collective action and communication often reached a violent intensity that could be accounted for in part by the absence of other, formalized procedures for addressing conflicts of interests between management and workers on mines.

The nature of the hostel institution, in turn, often contributed to the violent intensity of conflicts by facilitating mass mobilizations which culminated in large demonstrations in the hostel interior and the frequent looting and destruction of food and liquor reserves. The enclosed nature of hostels also served to aggravate conflict, as in cases where the majority of residents became implicated in disputes involving particular occupational or regional sections of the labour force.

Another feature of the institutional environment which enhanced the intensity of conflict was the integration of work and living routines through the use of hostel labour barracks serving undergound shafts. Problems in the work setting, such as hoisting delays, often exerted a negative impact on hostel services, thereby compounding worker frustration and encouraging the transfer of work tensions into the social and recreational life of the mine work force.

These various institutional characteristics together implied that strikes and protests often took the form of violent, destructive riots. The intensity of the conflict and the threat it posed to production and mine installations provided a source of informal power and leverage for workers which led to the securing of concessions and changes on certain occasions. These outcomes of conflict suggest that workers were sometimes successful in their actions, but the costs in lives and jobs had been high. For mine management also, conflict had been a costly affair, having had an adverse affect on production and strategic

installations, but more so because it tarnished the image of the mines at a time when the country as a whole was attempting to promote reform in South African industry.

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2. COMGU - Western Deep Levels (1973): Press Statement by Anglo American Corporation, 12 September, 1973.

3. COMGU - Western Deep Levels (1973); I. Peterson, MLO Inspector, Personal Communication (1980).

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5. Rand Daily Mail : 23.10.1973.

6. COMGU - Western Deep Levels (1973).

7. Rand Daily Mail: 9.10.1973.

8. The Star: 26.10.1973; Rand Daily Mail: 27.10.1973.

9. The Star: 18.10.1973; Rand Daily Mail: 16.10.1973.

10. Rand Daily Mail: 13.9.1973.

11. Sunday Express: 16.9.1973.

12. COMGU: L-R (1975); Goldfields Friend: 30.5.1974; The Star: 29.5.1974; 30.5.1974; McKay Commission, Annexure Three: 78.

13. Committee of Enquiry into the Disturbances at Harmony and Merriespruit Mines: 9th to 12th June, 1974 - Rand Mines Limited (mimeo); COMGU (E-K).

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15. Committee of Enquiry, ibid: 76.

16. Committee of Enquiry, ibid: 90-91.

17. A-V Records: Report on Labour Unrest and Wage Dispute at 4,5 and 7 Shaft Hostels, October, 1974: Hartebeestfontein Gold Mine Co., Ltd - Memo to technical manager from general manager, 9th December, 1974.

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21. AACGRD: Box 251.992 - Black Labour Disputes: Report of an Incident at No. 1 Shaft Hostel on the night of June, 3rd, 1976, by general manager.

22. AACGRD: Box 251.992 - Acting general manager to consulting engineer, 11th June, 1976: Note on Labour Unrest.

23. TEBALD: Report on Unrest at Blyvooruitzicht, April, 1978.

24. COMGU (1979); Report on Unrest at Merriespruit No. 3 Hostel on 20.8.1979 and Merriespruit No. 1 Hostel on 21.8.1979 by Chief Security Officer, Gold Fields Mines and Industries Security Service (Pty) Limited.

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29. GENCOR: Report on the Black Labour Unrest and Rioting on the mine: 2-4 July, 1982 - Loss Control Department, Grootvlei Proprietary Mines, Limited, 23 July, 1982.

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31. TEBALD: Diary of Conflict No. 8/82.

32. TEBALD: Report on Labour Unrest: Buffelsfontein G.M. Co., Ltd, by Senior Liaison Officer, Klerksdorp depot, 5th July, 1982.

33. TEBALD: Memo to the Manager, Liaison Division on Visit to Buffelsfontein, 2nd July, 1982 by Senior Liaison Officer, 8th July, 1982.

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43. TEBALD: Diary of Conflict No. 1/82; Memo on Labour Unrest, Winkelhaak Gold Mine, 26 april 1982; The Star: 13.1.1983; 14.3.1983.

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45. TEBALD: Memo on Unrest at Western Deep Levels, June to August, 1978.

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48. TEBALD: Diary of Conflict No. 4/81; 5/81; Memo to the General Manager, TEBA on Labour Unrest at Blyvooruitzicht G.M. Co. Ltd, by Senior Liaison Officer, 30 June, 1981.

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55. TEBALD: Monthly Report for July, 1982.

56. TEBALD: Labour Unrest Files for 1975.

57. TEBALD: Labour Unrest Files for 1977.

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62. Rand Daily Mail: 22.10.1981.

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68. GENCOR: West Rand Consolidated Mines Ltd: Report on incident at South Hostel on Monday afternoon, 28th October, 1974 by general manager, 1st November, 1974.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

The contemporary history of the gold mining industry has been characterized by the occurrence of three distinct forms of collective conflict involving Black mineworkers. These have in luded the tensions associated with changes in the employment status of workers from the major foreign countries supplying labour to the gold mines, the outbreak of numerous internal conflicts between different groups of workers and a resurgence in work strikes and protests over wages, working and living conditions.

Certain conclusions were reached in the course of examining these different conflicts in separate, detailed chapters. The present set of general conclusions will not repeat these specific findings, but will attempt to assess the significance of the conflicts in the light of the general theoretical and comparative issues and questions raised at the outset of this investigation.

In the first section of these conclusions, conflicts in the internal setting of mines and hostels will be examined against the wider, external field of Southern Africa. This exercise will assist in drawing conclusions on the extent to which various forms of conflict can be accounted for in terms of the institutional setting of mines and hostels, or whether they should be regarded primarily as expressions of developments and changes in the wider socio-political environment.

Secondly, mine conflicts will be assessed against the broader, comparative and theoretical perspective of social conflict and collective action and an attempt made to evaluate the applicability of various historical and sociological theories, to encounters between workers and mine managements. Two broad approaches in the literature will be

contrasted in terms of their explanatory power, namely the causal-objective (Marxian) approach, which stresses the role of objectively determined material conditions in fostering (class) conflict, and the social action approach, which stresses the importance of the emerging awareness, perceptions and motives of the people involved in collective action.

The contribution of anthropological theories of divisiveness and social conflict will also be given attention and an assessment made of their relevance to mine conflicts, particularly the emphasis on social structure, organization and process in small-scale communities. This will be followed by an evaluation of the methodological and conceptual advantages associated with focusing on the dynamics of the conflict process, including patterns in the incidence of conflict and the phases of specific conflict episodes.

1. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WIDER SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON THE INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF MINE CONFLICTS

In the introduction to the present study, it was noted that analysts of conflict in industry have increasingly adopted a broader approach to their subject matter. These observers have argued that conflict in industry cannot be understood solely in terms of the immediate, internal character of the institutional structures present in a particular work setting, but needs to be viewed against the background of conditions and developments in the wider, socio-political arena.

The institutional setting itself has become regarded as an intervening variable, illuminating rather than determining strike behaviour, with such behaviour remaining largely dependent on the structure of power and economic relations in the wider society (Shalev, 1978:481; Korpi and Shalev, 1979:170).

Turning to the phenomenon of mine conflicts in South Africa, it has

been apparent that many such conflicts could, indeed, be traced to developments in the wider Southern African environment. Many other conflicts, however, notably work strikes and protests, originated in certain internal processes.

Firstly, a number of upheavals involving workers from certain "foreign" countries supplying labour to the mines, could be traced to social and political changes taking place in Southern Africa after the colonial era, namely the securing of political independence by several countries which previously supplied labour to the gold mines.

The countries of Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique each attempted to come to terms with their economic and political dependency on the South African migratory wage economy. The different measures employed by these countries (including withdrawal and increased control over migrant earnings), could be accounted for in terms of the particular historical, social, political and economic conditions pertaining to each. These conditions and developments were associated with different forms of conflict arising from the insecurity and change in employment status of workers drawn from these different countries.

Conflicts on mines could also be traced to certain immediate political developments in Southern Africa, notably the civil conflict within Lesotho, the guerilla war in Rhodesia and the independence struggle in Mozambique. Political developments within Lesotho, namely the internal struggle between government and opposition forces, affected the mining industry as a result of its prolonged reliance on the flow of labour from that country. The political and cultural aspirations of Rhodesian workers arising from social change and civil conflict in their home country, were heightened and transformed into a strong worker solidarity as a result of the particular conditions encountered by these recruits on mines. The independence struggle in Mozambique, furthermore, could be linked to several conflicts arising from an influx of recruits

inspired by these political successes.

The industry's long-standing dependence on a variety of far-flung sources of migratory labour was chiefly responsible for exposing it to these forms of conflict arising from processes of political change in the Southern African region. Although these conflicts could be linked to particular external developments, they represented a legacy of wage and recruitment policies maintained since the earliest days of the industry.

Secondly, a number of inter-group clashes could be associated with socio-political developments in the external environment, but many others were the expression of internal, institutional features of hostel life and mining work.

The mid-1970's witnessed the occurrence of certain clashes between local and foreign workers which took place as a result of the upheavals associated with changes in the employment status of foreign worker groups. These conflicts also reflected a long-standing resentment, on the part of local workers, regarding the presence of "foreigners" on South African gold mines.

The majority of inter-group clashes, however, reflected a protracted struggle between workers from Transkei and Lesotho. The first of these encounters in contemporary times could be traced back to an important development in the Southern African political arena, namely the conferring of 'alien' status on Lesotho nationals in 1963 and their subsequent confinement to and entrenchment in, the South African gold mines, particularly the Orange Free State gold field. The resulting economic and social tensions were reflected in violent encounters between Lesotho nationals and Transkeians in that region.

Subsequent clashes between Sotho and Xhosa speakers were fuelled by an influx of new recruits from South African territory in the mid-1970's, worsening economic conditions in the country and a renewed struggle for increasingly scarce mining jobs. The single most important explanation

for inter-group violence, however, was related to certain internal features of hostel life, including the tensions of communal living and the sexual deprivations of a male migratory work force. These tensions encouraged the mobilization of home-based networks of solidarity and co-operation, social formations which were seen to be peculiar to a migratory wage economy.

There was no evidence on mines, however, of intra-tribal feuding or so-called "faction fights" extending from the rural home areas of migrants. Instead, clashes arose from contact between different regional, cultural and linguistic groups in a specific industrial setting characterized by migratory labour turnover, inpermanence and certain deprivations associated with the accommodation of workers in hostels as total institutions.

Thirdly, the 1970's and 1980's witnessed the occurrence of numerous work strikes and protests on mines. The first of these could be traced to certain internal reforms in wages and wage policies introduced by industry management. The conflicts continued to be fuelled by further changes in formal service conditions. In the absence of a formal structure for the representation of Black employees, an informal pattern of conflict and compromise was discerned.

Mineworkers focused their attention alternately on wages, formal conditions of service, underground work conditions and hostel accommodation, protesting specific inadequacies and problems on individual mines. There was little evidence, if any, for the incidence of protests of an overtly political character.

Work strikes and protests in contemporary times on mines reveal certain parallels with the historical experiences of other mining concerns in Europe. The German coal mines of the late-nineteenth century were characterized, according to Barrington Moore, by the "stubborn pursuit of fairly narrow group interests and quite narrowly perceived

grievances" (1978:422). In British coal mines, certain conflicts in the past could be related to internal disturbances in prevailing patterns of status, the distribution of rewards and the actions taken to correct or adjust these rewards (Kelly and Nicholson, 1980:863).

These observations suggest that internal institutional factors may be more relevant to the history of conflict emerging in mining communities than may have been the case for other industries. This historical trend provides some support for Kerr and Siegels' (1954) assertion that the institutional isolation of mining communities has exerted an important influence on the character of conflict in these settings.

It was not only clear that many conflicts, notably work strikes and protests, originated in internal developments, but also apparent that the institutional setting had an important impact on the intensity and severity of conflict. This was evident on occasions when particular groups of workers were able to bring about broadly-based mobilizations in the confined settings of hostels and underground work sites. The severity of many inter-group clashes could also be linked to the large and confined nature of hostel accommodation, as in cases where other residents became implicated in clashes between two particular groups of residents.

The rejection of the "narrow" institutional approach in the literature on industrial conflict has implied that important influences of the internal labour conditions on the origin, form, intensity and severity of conflict may be overlooked, or underplayed. It is necessary to first exhaust institutional explanations before the roots of conflict are traced beyond the immediate setting under investigation.

Whereas the origin of most encounters between mineworkers and management could be traced to internal developments, the character of these conflicts could be attributed in part to divisions and tensions in

the wider society. The racial, political and economic cleavages in South Africa were evident on occasions in the form of a marked power distance between management and migrant worker, a gulf which overlapped with a racial cleavage between White and Black.

The power imbalance associated with this cleavage implied also that changes in service conditions were introduced unilaterally, without prior consultation. The related absence of formal representative structures, while not guaranteeing industrial peace, could be associated with the spontaneous and violent character of many confrontations with mine managements and with the emergence of informal negotiation in the wake of violent strike action.

In conclusion, then, the wider socio-political context of Southern Africa constituted a valuable part of the explanation for the origin and character of certain conflicts on mines, partly because of the industry's dependence on migratory labour supplies, which channelled regional political influences into the mines and partly because the labour force on mines was predominantly Black and the management largely White. The character of the internal institutional setting, however, was significant in accounting for the origin and severity of other conflicts, confirming that it is essential to view work place struggles in terms of both internal and external influences, conditions and events, if a comprehensive assessment of such conflict is to be obtained.

In the following section, attention will be focused specifically on work strikes and protests in an attempt to account for the origins of contemporary worker perceptions of injustice in the institutional setting of mines. The relevance of various historical theories of revolt and popular disturbances will be assessed in relation to mine protests, followed by a more intensive analysis of the internal, institutional origins of conflict through the application of the anthropological concept of social structure.

2. OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS AND SOCIAL ACTION: THE ORIGINS OF INJUSTICE AND PROGRESSIVE DEPRIVATION ON MINES

In the outline of historical theories of social conflict presented in chapter one, a contrast was drawn between theories which emphasize the importance of objectively defined material conditions in the "causation" of conflict, and those "purposive" approaches which stress the importance of popular conceptions in explaining and predicting social action. The best example of the former is Marxian conflict theory, which focuses on fundamental antagonisms between wage labour and capital and the basic conflicts of interests dividing management and worker in industry.

Social action theory, on the other hand, attaches special importance to perceptions, since the likelihood of the populace ever becoming involved in collective conflict would depend on whether they entertained the appropriate perceptions, including the belief that their situation was intolerable or unjust.

The relative explanatory power of these different theoretical frameworks can be assessed against contemporary conflicts on the mines. At the outset, it is clear that certain objectively defined economic and political conditions served as an important background to the emergence of conflict on mines, particularly that between management and workers. The presence of marked racial and class divisions between White mine owners and rightless Black migrants suggested that a high potential for conflict existed in the industry. Working conditions underground were dangerous and living conditions sparse and unattractive. Management exercised supreme authority over workers, with the latter being denied the right, until recently, to associate in organized trade unions, or to ensure that their own interests are articulated through formal bargaining and compromise.

These various conditions clearly set the context for the occurrence

of a protracted power struggle, but for many years there was little overt conflict, particularly in the 1950's and 1960's. The first strikes and confrontations in contemporary times, furthermore, followed closely on the introduction of concrete improvements to work conditions, notably the large wage increases of the early 1970's. These developments throw doubt on the classical Marxist "immiseration" thesis, which specifies that the progressive degradation of the industrial working class will finally reach the point of inevitable revolt.

To account for the emergence of conflict in the aftermath of objective improvements on mines, it is necessary to examine the processes by which workers developed a sense of perceived injustice and translated this perception into collective action. It is necessary to identify, as Barrington Moore does, the circumstances or changes in circumstances which encourage people to create their own standards of moral condemnation. This includes an assessment of the way in which people shake off their sense of inevitability about things and come to "... perceive and define their situation as the consequence of human injustice: a situation that they need not, cannot and ought not to endure" (Barrington Moore, 1978:459).

How then, did standards of moral condemnation arise on mines in contemporary times? At first, a sense of injustice was aroused in certain workers as a result of the introduction, by industry management, of changes in the established, traditional structures of job status and earnings levels. These changes attached special value to intellectual skills, as opposed to the physical effort and exposure to danger characteristic of a labour-intensive industry. In a revealing comment, Barrington Moore notes:

> What makes human beings angry... is a change in the social principles to which they have been accustomed, or the application of principles that are not suited to a particular kind of activity or set of circumstances (1978:455).

The moral outrage engendered in this way should not be regarded as an indication that mineworkers were resistant to change as such. These changes had taken place in the context of broader developments which provided new standards for workers to evaluate their position in society. New standards of this kind arise primarily through a:

> rapid improvement in a society's capacity to produce goods and services... to make it appear possible to "solve" the problem of poverty... (The) improvement must be enough to make poverty appear as a problem and not part of the natural order of the universe (Barrington Moore, 1978:468).

The substantial wage increases implemented on mines after earnings had remained low and unchanged for over sixty years, played an important role in indicating to workers that the "problem" of poverty could now be overcome.

These very improvements, however, provided the conditions for the emergence of a sense of injustice among mineworkers. The disproportionately high wage increases awarded to Black team leaders incensed the lower paid workers, who believed that their jobs were more difficult and dangerous, and hence worthy of reward, whereas the Black supervisors were regarded as "loafers". In a particularly appropriate passage, Gurr observes:

> If the elite is committed to progress... the benefits of that progress should be evenly distributed. No group... should gain less rapidly than others (Gurr, 1970:352).

This comment is relevant also to the emergence of wage differentials between different mines in the industry, with workers on some mines enjoying better wages than those on other mines in the same regions.

It is clear from these developments that the sense of inevitability surrounding the perceived tradition of poverty among migrant workers had dissolved and the old norms and standards had been abandoned. The economic improvements which mineworkers came to enjoy now provided the

basis for the formulation of new norms and expectations, whereas the emergence of irregularities and anomalies in the distribution of these benefits provided for the establishment of new standards of condemnation.

Barrington Moore identifies another factor which can heighten the sense of injustice in people, namely the emergence of an "activist minority... that promotes... new standards of condemnation". This minority consists most often of outsiders who articulate latent grievances and "do the hard work of undermining the old sense of inevitability" (Barrington Moore, 1978:473). In the present investigation, this "outsider" role was evident on occasions, notably the activities of Black Rhodesian recruits, of so-called "Russian" gangsters in at least one major incident and the presence of the Basotho Congress Party on mines, which played an active role in encouraging Lesotho nationals to resist the implementation of deferred pay for their group. Finally, certain public media, such as the radio and newspapers, played a role in encouraging critical reflections on mining wages, mainly as a result of the information supplied to workers through these media.

Although these various "outsider" roles could be identified in different forms from time to time, mineworkers seemed to need little additional stimulation to take action to redress their perceived problems. A more important requirement for successful action could be noted in another development specified by Barrington Moore, namely the occurrence of certain changes which provide "social and cultural space" and "sufficient force for a challenge to the prevailing hegemony" (1978:482). The "intermittent" character of persecution, or reductions in social controls, provide important opportunities and resources to bring about the effective mobilization of discontent. On South African gold mines, the wage increases themselves could be seen to have provided such an opportunity, by reducing the costs of collective action, offsetting the loss of wages in strikes and the consequences of

dismissal. Another important change which directly reduced social controls was the repeal, in the mid-1970's, of penal santions against absenteeism and contract-breaking on mines. It became more difficult after this time for mine authorities to prosecute absentees and men who refused to work. Soon after the repeal of these sanctions, attempts were made to get strikers to return to work through the use of Regulation 19,1(a) of the Bantu Labour Act, which obliged hostel residents to obey the lawful instructions of the hostel manager. This procedure, however, was declared ultra vires by a regional magistrate soon after it was first employed against Rhodesian workers in a few strike situations in 1976.

The various prerequisites for the development of standards of condemnation and a sense of injustice, including improvements in opportunities for worker action, were generally present on mines by the mid-1970's. New norms and expectations had developed, including a growing consciousness among workers of the value of their labour to employers and their new-found power to secure changes in conditions through conflict and informal negotiation.

In Gurr's (1970) terms, the "value expectations" of the workers began to rise, stimulated in particular by wage increases. Workers began to expect that such improvements would continue to be made in future and were equipped with new standards to evaluate these improvements. The "capabilities" of the industry to satisfy these aspirations, however, declined rapidly thereafter. The substantial wage increases of the early 1970's were not sustained in later years, years which were characterized by a series of wage-related strikes.

These developments conform to Gurr's model of progressive deprivation, a term describing Davies' classic hypothesis that revolutions occur when a period of objective economic and social development is followed by a period of sharp reversal (Gurr, 1970:52-56;

Davies, 1964). Figure 6 outlines the classic model, which is compared to trends in wage increases (Figure 7) and wage-related strikes (Figure 8). The latter two figures indicate that the substantial wage increases of the early 1970's were associated, at first, with protests over the emergence of relative wage differentials. Workers in different jobs and on particular mines found that they had been disadvantaged relative to the progressive improvements being introduced at the time. Later, the size of the annual wage award dropped markedly, followed by a series of strikes over wage increases and wage levels as such. After the progressive improvements experienced earlier, workers' expectations had remained consistently high and the resulting perceived discrepancy in the actual capabilities of the industry to satisfy these expectations, had generated conflict.

These observations and arguments suggest that conflict between Black workers and mine management in the 1970's and 1980's can best be accounted for in terms of a variant of the theory of relative deprivation. The conflicts themselves were initiated as a result of the introduction of alterations in traditional patterns of industrial job status, which is reminiscent of the so-called "breakdown" theory in which change produces social disorganization and conflict. In the mining context, however, the changes in question did not result in the reduction of organizational resources, as might be the case for cataclysmic changes in traditional social orders. These changes, by contrast, served only to increase resources and opportunities for workers who were also able to circumvent the lack of a formal organizational base by making tactical use of institutional features on mines and hostels to facilitate mass mobilization.

These developments confirm the importance of the views proposed by "solidarity" theorists of conflict, who stress the importance of organizational resources as the key requirement for collective action.




FIGURE 6 : The J-Curve Model of Progressive Deprivation




FIGURE 7 : Percentage Wage Increases for Black Mineworkers




FIGURE 8 : Strikes Relating to Wage Levels and Wage Differentials on Gold Mines

In this sense, the theory of progressive deprivation can be upheld, mainly because the changes producing such perceived deprivation did not hamper the organizational capacity for revolt, or result in substantial social disorganization.

In contrasting various theories of conflict, it is clear that each is relevant in specifying different conditions and requirements for collective action. The appropriateness and relevance of these theories also depends on the kind of question one is asking. If there is a need to explain, in broad historical terms, why conflict takes place between different groupings or classes, then the nature of the power structure in society and basic antagonisms between wage labour and capital are important elements in the explanation. The Marxian approach helps in this respect to alert the investigator to the presence of underlying tensions in economic and power relations and the role of market forces in producing conflicts of interests between wage labourers and employers.

The Marxian approach, however, fails to predict accurately when these conflicts of interests are likely to be translated into collective action or to indicate alternative ways in which worker consciousness can arise (except, possibly, through the direct revolutionary actions of an intellectual class). In attempting to account for the actual incidence of conflict, a model of social action needs to be employed, focusing on the perceptions of the participants and the kinds of factors which result in changes in these perceptions, leading to collective action and revolt. According to this approach, worker consciousness was developed on mines as a direct result of the emergence of progressive deprivation. It is also clear that such consciousness was stimulated, rather than stifled, by the introduction of incremental reform in the industry.

Events on mines indicate that conflict can arise when the benefits of social and economic progress are unevenly distributed or when the pace of these reforms is not sustained. These observations have important

implications for the future of South African society as a whole.

3. SOCIAL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL FACTIONS IN MINE COMMUNITIES

In the previous section, the relevance of broad historical and sociological theories of conflict was assessed in relation to mine conflicts. In conducting a wide-ranging theoretical analysis of this kind, there is the danger of losing sight of the fact that the conflicts in question took place in specific social situations involving interacting sets of people. There is a need to make these general factors relevant to the particular community setting in which they emerged and ensure that they can be understood at the level of concrete social interaction at the grass-roots level. It is at this immediate level that the conflict took place, shedding light on the nature of the social structure and organization present in this setting and revealing underlying processes in everyday life.

This anthropological perspective provides the basis for the development of an integrated framework for the analysis of all forms of conflict by relating each to the particular social structure present in the mine community setting.

Before such an assessment is made, it is necessary to consider whether the mine and hostel setting can legitimately be described as a community as such. Le Vine (1961:5) observes that the comparative study of community conflict raises the question of what kinds of units should be used for comparison. The selection of the unit of study has important implications for the study of conflict, since it may determine whether an over-arching system of conflict regulation exists at all in the particular social setting demarcated for analysis.

One set of criteria employed to define the boundary of a particular community includes the presence of a cultural tradition and frequent

interaction (Beals and Siegel, 1966:27). Certain observers may be tempted to argue that the impermanence of the migrant worker population on mines, coupled with the absence of women and the largely instrumental goals of production, indicate that mines lack such a cultural tradition as far as Black workers are concerned. Irrespective of the presence or absence of "typical" community features on mines, however, it is important to recognise that the mine setting is a putative industrial community, characterized by a set of imposed norms and procedures which directly attempt to regulate social and work interaction within its boundary. To evaluate the way in which this structure of norms and rules operates in this regard, it is necessary to define the community boundary to correspond with the "area to which the conclusions of the scientist are expected to apply" (Firth, 1961:48).

The social structure on mines can be identified in the rules and norms governing the relationship between management and employee. In a narrow legal sense, the relationship is formalized by an agreement of service entered into by each recruit. According to the agreement, the employer provides wages, accommodation and other benefits in return for the work attendance of the employee and the fulfilment of his agreed contract period. An important feature of the employer's benefits is that they are provided within the framework of the "total institution" of barracks accommodation close to the place of work.

The social structure is not confined to narrow, legal prescriptions, but also includes a broader "pattern of expectations" (Firth, 1961:31), which may be moral in character and which could be described as forming part of an implicitly recognised "social contract" (Barrington Moore, 1978:9-10). The employer, for his part, expects an employee to be loyal to the company, and work longer hours in emergencies. The employee, on the other hand, expects the employer to uphold certain ethics of fairness, such as granting compassionate leave when requested and not

delaying employees for too long underground after the work shift is over.

These norms and expectations are translated into concrete activity through various forms of social organization, including the allocation of resources and responsibility by means of various mechanisms (Firth, 1961:36-38). On mines, there are certain procedures for ensuring the mutual fulfilment of obligations and expectations, including disciplinary procedures and channels for the handling of worker grievances and problems, such as personnel assistants, worker representatives and tribal indunas.

Some observers might describe the social structure and organization as functional in that it effectively regulates relationships and activities with the minimum of conflict and disorder. For much of the time, the daily activities of a mine can, and do proceed smoothly and peacefully. But the structure contains inherent tensions and inconsistencies, which generate conflict from time to time.

The anthropological study of conflict involves the detailed scrutiny of the social structure for such inconsistencies and contradictions. Beals and Siegel (1966) describe these inconsistencies as instances of strain, which arises when the cultural tradition fails to provide an appropriate response for a given problem situation. Individuals consequently find their expectations defeated in various situations.

Beals and Siegel also distinguish social stress, which emerges when the social structure is presented with problems that cannot be handled by ordinary means, or is faced with unprecedented events. Although the difference between strain and stress is a subtle one which is not clearly distinguished by Beals and Siegel, the distinction is easier to apply in practice. Strain can be regarded as emerging from inconsistencies and anomalies within an existing social structure, such as role conflict, whereas stress can be denoted as these tensions arising as a result of the clear absence of certain structural norms and procedures, or the

emergence of problems outside the scope of such a structure.

Evidence for the emergence of both strain and stress has been uncovered from time to time in the present study of different forms of conflict on mines.

Confrontations between workers and mine managements could at times be linked to strains within the social structure. Certain procedures intended for the resolution of employee grievances contained inherent contradictions. The Black personnel assistant, for example, was expected to entertain worker grievances, but was also involved in counselling and censuring workers accused of disciplinary infringements, such as absenteeism and the failure to obey instructions. The PA also lacked the authority to deal effectively with worker complaints and spent much of his time on unproductive tasks (e.g. travelling to and from underground workings).

Similarly, worker representatives in liaison-type committees were expected to bring worker grievances to the attention of management, but were also often required to convey management policies and decisions to the general worker population, even to act as informants in work strike situations. When the representatives actually succeeded in conveying worker grievances, they lacked the means to ensure that concrete action would be taken to remedy the problems, resulting in declining credibility in their function on the part of their constituencies.

Apart from the presence of such strains within the existing structure, there was also evidence for the existence of stress implied by the emergence of problems outside the scope of the social structure. One such shortcoming was evident in the scope of committee functioning. Although workers were repeatedly encouraged to bring their complaints forward, certain issues could not be entertained, particularly matters concerning employment policy, including wages and formal service conditions.

Whereas the White employees on mines were represented in formal union-type structures, the Black employees were not. The presence of different norms for Black and White workers, coupled with the absence of means for Black employees to raise policy issues, generated stress in the social structure. The absence of an over-arching mechanism to accommodate conflicts of interest between Black workers and management, including the absence of procedures for entertaining policy matters in consultative committees, implied that certain of the workers' grievances could not be resolved within the confines of the existing structure. Lacking an appropriate and recognised means to articulate these issues, workers mobilized against management to renegotiate the social contract on an informal, spontaneous basis. Such mobilizations also took place when workers believed that the norms of the existing contract had been violated, as in the case of hoisting delays, shortages of food, the mines' inability to honour valid re-engagement guarantees, and so on.

Confronted with these spontaneous mobilizations, management was sometimes obliged to adjust elements of the contract, including the granting of ad hoc wage increases. In these situations, there was an implicit recognition on the part of mine management that appropriate machinery for handling these issues was not available. In these unstructured situations, with the normal work routines halted, "... the disputing parties are forced to act in a shadowy area", in which attempts are made to change the terms of the prevailing social contract and where "... there is no generally accepted boundary between morally approved and reprehensible behaviour" (Barrington Moore, 1978:245).

Inter-group clashes within the workers' ranks could also be linked to inconsistencies (strains) within the social structure. Tribal indunas, for example, experienced conflicts in their required roles, being expected to represent their tribe and also to perform certain management functions. These contradictory expectations generated

strain which the incumbents of these roles attempted to resolve. Some indunas went to great lengths to represent their tribesmen by leading them in inter-group encounters, apparently aimed at strengthening the political and economic status of these groups on particular mines.

More important, however, was the problem that the authority figures in the tribal representative system could not easily remain unbiased in inter-tribal disputes and hearings. The tribal representatives were accordingly unable to provide an over-arching function for the regulation of inter-group relations. This jural function was vested in the White hostel manager, some of whom were proficient in only one language (usually Xhosa) and who were sometimes accused of being partisan (McNamara, 1980:329).

The absence of a clearly defined and unambiguous social mechanism for the resolution of inter-group conflict was aggravated by difficulties in formal legal and criminal procedures. The procedures for the conviction and punishment of persons accused of assault or homicide were not always successfully employed as a result of problems in the identification and apprehension of suspects.

The failure of existing legal and social mechanisms to resolve conflict between different segments of the work force generated stress as a result of the emergence of problems that could not be handled through available means. Consequently, worker groups mobilized to redress perceived wrongs through violent self-help.

Additional tensions were evident in the mobilization of such self-help, as a result of a basic feature of the social structure on mines, namely the provision of barracks accommodation in the form of a total institution. The confined nature of the hostel interior served to enhance the intensity and severity of collective action in this setting.

It is clear from these conclusions that both the major forms of collective conflict on mines, namely inter-group clashes and work

strikes, could be accounted for in terms of inconsistencies in the normative social structure and the absence of certain crucial organizational procedures for executing these norms in concrete activity. As a result of these inconsistencies and the absence of over-arching mechanisms in the social structure, various kinds of informal mechanisms emerged to redress perceived inadequacies, namely the mobilization of confrontation and reprisals.

From this perspective, the conflict process itself could be regarded as a form of social organization, also involving the exercise of choices and decisions and the deployment of resources to achieve certain ends in a particular social setting. The development of certain spontaneous forms of social organization to remedy inadequacies in the social structure or resolve problems that could not be handled by conventional means, indicate that inter-group clashes and work strikes should both be described as factional groupings. Factions emerge in situations in which there is a conflict for power or resources which cannot be obtained through traditional, structural perscriptions and means (Beals and Siegel, 1966). The recruitment bases of factions are diverse (Nicholas, 1966), as evident in the fact that groups of workers could participate in a work strike against management, but become realigned at another time in an internal conflict with other groups.

Mine factions, therefore, are situation-bound competitions for power, characterized by shifting and diverse recruitment bases. A variety of these factional coalitions have been noted, each exhibiting marked differences in outward form, ranging from occupational to regional and linguistic networks.

Inter-group clashes in particular, are best regarded as factional coalitions, as opposed to being categorized as armed warfare. Malinowski's idea of warfare as an armed contest between independent political units in the furthering of a tribal or national policy

(Otterbein, 1973), is not easily applied to inter-group conflicts. It would be difficult to view an ethnic or regional group as an homogeneous policy-making unit, for example. Certain tribal indunas did articulate aggressive policies in local struggles for power and status, but such struggles were situation-bound and relatively uncommon. The concept of war also refers to a relatively continuous state of hostility, whereas different ethnic and regional groups on mines were capable of uniting frequently in confrontations with mine managements and of living together for long periods without conflict.

Inter-group clashes also differ in important respects from so-called primitive warfare as practised in New Guinea. The latter, according to Meggitt, are formalized encounters planned by both parties for an appointed day and involving clashes which are rarely fatal, being bound by certain conventions (Meggitt, 1977:17-19). In the event of fatalities, homicide compensations are paid in the form of pork which is eaten during organized feasts. On South African mines, by contrast, inter-group clashes are not governed by such formal ritual procedures. In place of reconciliation and compensatory mechanisms, mineworkers invariably terminate their service and leave the mine in the aftermath of conflicts.

A more illuminating comparison can be made between inter-group clashes on mines and violent encounters between Scots, English and Irish "navvies" employed in the construction of the railways of Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. In one such clash, a Scots policeman was killed after the alleged theft of a watch by Irish revellers at a pub. Hundreds of Scots set fire to the living quarters of the Irish workers (Coleman, 1968: 93-103). Clashes of this kind had their origin in the willingness of the Irish to work for lower wages, and the poor living conditions of the navvies, which contributed to internal tensions among the workers.

Internal clashes of this kind need to be viewed as industrial

factions which cannot be explained adequately without reference to the particular institutional conditions of wage labour present in different working contexts.

The foregoing account of the emergence of industrial factions of various kinds has been based on an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of the conflict process emerging in a specific community and social structure. The present study will conclude by outlining the various methodological and conceptual advantages derived from this scrutiny of the conflict process.

4. THE DIACHRONIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT PROCESS

The methodological approach adopted in the present study was oriented primarily to the identification of patterns in conflict over time, together with the phases evident in specific conflict episodes, as a basis for the development of an explanation for the origin, form, intensity and outcome of collective encounters on gold mines.

The identification and analysis of general patterns in a series of conflicts taking place over time revealed important trends which guided the analysis of specific events. By means of this broad, diachronic approach, it was possible to identify the historical roots of certain important developments in the industry. These included the historical events in Southern Africa which led up to the crisis in foreign labour supplies from such countries as Malawi.

The origin of factional clashes between Transkeians and Lesotho nationals, furthermore, could be traced to legislative changes governing the employment of 'alien' workers in South Africa.

It was also possible to clearly outline important sequences of events with potential theoretical significance, such as the fact that the contemporary wage increases in the industry preceded, and not followed, wage-related strikes by Black mineworkers. With respect to inter-group

clashes, it was possible to trace the emergence of feuding relations in the aftermath of earlier, unresolved conflicts. The entry of a new labour group into the industry, such as the Black Rhodesians, could also be outlined, including the deepening crisis in which they became involved as a result of their protracted disagreements with management and other worker groups.

Another important methodological advantage associated with the diachronic analysis of conflict was the opportunity provided to view these patterns of collective action in relation to corresponding trends in certain economic and political processes. The impact of the progressive stabilization of migratory labour supplies on the decline in inter-group conflict, followed by accelerating unemployment and the effect of the increasing scarcity of mining jobs on subsequent inter-group tensions, were examples of such assessments.

The analysis of patterns of conflict also revealed changes in worker attitudes and tactics of mobilization over time. The way in which precedents emerged for the informal securing of wage increases and other concessions through strike action and the development of worker tactics in the organization of underground protests, were sketched out in this way. A growing mistrust of management-imposed change on the part of Black workers could also be discerned, including evidence for a widening gulf in attitudes and values between workers and management over time.

These general trends in the incidence of large numbers of conflict situations provided a background for the intensive analysis of specific conflict episodes. The present study made use in this respect of a basic model of the phases of conflict situations first outlined by Turner (1957). This model was applied in the in-depth scrutiny of thirteen detailed case studies of different forms of conflict on mines.

This processual approach to the analysis of conflict episodes proved useful for several reasons. At the outset, it focused attention on the

concrete reality of social encounters, which represent the basic phenomena requiring explanation and analysis. The analysis itself rested in this way on a concrete account for which the final explanation needed to remain intelligible and logical.

Secondly, the use of a model of defined phases of conflict provided a common set of ordering principles through which comparisons could be made with other conflicts. The model provided a basic vocabulary of terms for the systematic, comparative assessment of all forms of conflicts on mines, irrespective of the type of conflict involved.

Thirdly, the episodic analysis of conflict situations provided a source of information in its own right, which contributed substantially to the development of an overall explanation. The information revealed in this way included the motives, aims, grievances and problems of the participants, their identity and social characteristics. A detailed analysis of the composition of the strikers in the 1982 wage disputes, for example, revealed that most were unskilled labourers and mechanical workers. This information was vitally important in linking the strikes to the wage awards for different job categories and in accounting for the violent attacks on supervisors during the hostilities.

The conflict phase model also provided information on the basic mobilization tactics of workers and revealed how they overcame certain institutional restrictions on the expression of collective discontent in mine hostels. The influence of certain institutional chracteristics on the severity and intensity of conflict could also be assessed, with particular conflict episodes providing important indications of ways in which collective actions sometimes escalated in the confined internal environment of mine hostels.

Conflict episodes also provided basic information on the types of social, occupational and political cleavages emerging between workers and management and between workers themselves. The nature of these cleavages

provided important clues to the issues underlying the disputes. The kinds of social and physical controls employed in redressing conflict revealed the depth of these cleavages and the extent to which common values and other mechanisms were present to heal the breach. These analyses revealed the extent of the gulf between management and workers, a gulf remedied often by physical methods of conflict termination. The same could be said of many violent, inter-group conflicts which had to be terminated by riot control procedures. Other kinds of situational adjustments revealed the sources of change in power relations on mines, such as the emergence of informal negotiation through strike action.

Finally, the analysis of the conflict process revealed inconsistencies and gaps in the social structure and organization of mines, as well as the absence of crucial over-arching mechanisms for the regulation of work and social relationships. The key to the understanding of many conflicts could be located in certain contradictions or inadequacies in the social structure of norms and values and problems in the social organization of procedures for conflict resolution.

The analysis of the dynamics of particular conflict episodes sets up for the investigator the major questions and considerations for evaluating the origin of conflict and change in a social system. Through the conflict process, it becomes possible to learn about the nature of social and industrial relationships, the extent of shared values in a community, the nature of economic and power relations and the sources of inconsistency and change in the organization of social relations.

The present investigation has been founded on the conviction that an account of the conflict process is crucial for assessing the underlying material antecedents of conflict which, if examined in isolation, would result in an incomplete understanding of the origin, form and outcome of social conflict in any national, industrial or community setting.

ANNEXURE ONE

DISTRIBUTION OF GOLD MINES IN DIFFERENT REGIONS

Region	Names of Mines
Far East Rand	Bracken - Kinross - Leslie - Winkelhaak
East Rand	East Daggafontein(*) - East Rand Proprietary Mines - Grootvlei - Marievale - S.A. Land(*) - Vlakfontein(*) - Wits Nigel
Central Rand	City Deep(*) - Cons Main Reef(*) - Crown(*) - Durban Roodepoort Deep
West Rand	Kloof - Libanon - Randfontein - Venterspost - West Rand Cons - Western Areas
Carletonville	Blyvooruitzicht - Deelkraal - Doornfontein - East Driefontein - Elandsrand - Western Deep Levels - West Driefontein
Klerksdorp	Buffelsfontein - Hartebeestfontein - Stilfontein - Vaal Reefs
Orange Free State	Free State Geduld - Free State Saaiplaas - Harmony - Loraine - President Brand - President Steyn - St Helena Unisel - Welkom - Western Holdings

*Denotes those mines which made their last declaration of gold during the period under review; i.e. ceased production.

ANNEXURE TWO

PROCEDURE FOR THE DIARIZATION OF CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN TERMS OF A MODEL OF PHASES

The detailed information on the 282 conflicts making up the data set for the present study had to be collated from a variety of sources and each event had to be reconstructed to reproduce its constituent sequence of actions and phases. It was necessary to apply a common framework in such a way that it not only faithfully reflected the actual dynamics and idiosyncracies of each individual case, but was also suitable for comparative analysis.

This flexibility was achieved, firstly, by devising a visual format consisting of a series of vertical columns, each representing a theoretically defined phase of conflict, and secondly, by inserting the empirical information into these columns in true chronological sequence, viewed from left to right and in descending order of occurrence. Figure 9 provides an example of one case study diarized in this way. The example illustrates how the actual phases of a given conflict situation can be viewed within a theoretical framework of defined phases without distorting the observed sequence of events in each case.

In the step-by-step diarization of each conflict situation, a number of rules and procedures were applied, which will be discussed in relation to each column in the diary format (Figure 9). The duration of conflict, firstly, was recorded by making a distinction between the time period comprising the "drama" and that period comprising the duration of actual physical "conflict" during such a drama. The duration of the drama was the lengthier of the two time periods and was indicated by the time interval (in days) between the (first) breach of the peace and the eventual adjustment of the situation (restoration of the work and social

FIGURE 9 : EXAMPLE OF THE CHRONOLOGICAL DIARIZATION OF THE CONFLICT PROCESS

DATE AND DURATION	MINE	HOSTEL OR SHAFT	BREACH OF THE PEACE	MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT	CRISIS	REDRESSIVE MECHANISMS	ADJUSTMENT
Fri.24th to Sat.25th October 1975 DRAMA: two days CONFLICT: one night	Pres. Steyn gold mine (A.A.C.) Orange Free State	No. 4 shaft	-Change in blasting schedule:Whites to be cleared early Thurs 23rd:Complaints of long hours u/g Fri 24th:14h40-First cage of Blacks hoisted -Whites arrived on station:hoisting of Blacks halted to hoist Whites	Remaining Blacks on 73 level started sit-down strike at station Shaft telephone commandeered:contact made with Blacks on 76 level WORKERS VS LINE MANAGEMENT	Blacks refused to be hoisted-PAs and u/g police held hostage Blacks on 76 level also refused to be hoisted Rocks thrown at D.P.O.s as they tried to leave cage and enter level Blacks on telephone threatened to push materials car down shaft Blacks stoned security men as they left cage Pump station taken over by workers-water pumped down shaft	Thurs 23rd:Black PAs told to go underground to look into complaints Onsetter instructed to hoist Blacks on 76 level 15h00- D.P.O.s sent down to 73 level -D.P.O.s returned to surface -Prod. Mngr asked hostel mngr to go u/g:hostel mngr refused 17h10- Riot Squad with shields loaded in bottom deck of cage,snr officials on top -Security officer and 4 squad men exited cage and advanced -Security returned to surface -G.M. decision not to use teargas Service water feed closed off 19h30- M.O. and foreman to strikers' level-spokesman stated that workers wanted induna	

FIGURE 9 (CONTINUED)

DATE AND DURATION	MINE	HOSTEL OR SHAFT	BREACH OF THE PEACE	MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT	CRISIS	REDRESSIVE MECHANISMS	ADJUSTMENT
	Pres. Steyn (continued)				Blacks sat silently on station DEATHS : Nil INJURIES : ?	20h30- Induna, G.M., Prod.mngr, Pers.mngr, Hostel mngr, Security Officer lowered to level:induna talked to men from cage Officials returned to surface:decision to let strikers remain on level until they wanted to be hoisted Sat.25th:05h00- Blacks phoned and requested to be hoisted 06h30-Strikers hoisted after day shift had been lowered. After hoisting, men questioned by officials -complain that Whites were lowered late, hoisted early each day	-Four men discharged -Changes in hoisting routine effected - Importance of communicating changes to employees recognised

routine). The duration of physical conflict, where it occurred, was demarcated as that unit of time, within the wider dramatic encounter, during which violence to property or persons took place (in hours, days or nights). The distinction between the drama and the period of physical conflict is useful mainly as one means of assessing the severity of conflict situations.

Another feature of the duration of conflict, particularly in the industrial setting of gold mines, was the effect of conflict on the work routine. Ideally, strike data should indicate the number of man days or man shifts lost in conflict situations, as is the case in studies of labour disputes in other countries (Ross and Hartman, 1960; Shorter and Tilly, 1974).

In the absence of sufficient, detailed information, however, an assessment could be made only of the number of work shifts affected or lost, i.e. morning, afternoon or night shifts. These estimates had to be gleaned from information presented in available records and reports. It was not possible to estimate the number of man shifts affected because of the inpressionistic, inaccurate and often incomplete assessments of the numbers of Black employees involved in mine conflicts.

In an attempt to make a rough assessment of working time lost, a distinction was drawn between the number of shifts "affected" and the number "lost".

In cases where an entire shift did not go underground, this fact was usually indicated clearly in available records, because of the obvious severity and significance implied. Where entire shifts failed to go underground, the number of such shifts "lost" was indicated as such against individual diary entries. Where a particular work shift was characterized by the absence of only a proportion of the labour force, such a shift was logged as an "affected" shift. Generally, the number of shifts lost or affected were conservatively estimated to avoid possible

exaggeration, and should therefore be treated as a general guide only.

The second and third columns of the diary provide for the recording of the name of the relevant mine, affiliated mining Group and geographical (gold field) area, and also the specific shaft or hostel at which the conflict took place. The entries in these columns served to assist in applying geographical/ spatial criteria in the delineation of distinct conflict situations as discussed above.

In the next column denoting the breach of peace, a record was presented of the events leading up to a particular confrontation or encounter between different worker groups or between workers and mine management. Such encounters sometimes had fairly deep roots, stretching back in some cases for a number of weeks, months or even years, including also certain past conflict situations. Where such past events and conditions were clearly relevant, these were summarized as factors preceding the particular breach leading immediately to the conflict situation in question. No systematic attempt to trace past conditions could be made in each case, however, partly because the links were often highly speculative and incomplete. The emphasis in the present analysis was on documenting the sequence of phases within particular conflict episodes. The inter-relationship between different conflict situations, and the influence of various precipitating factors, events and processes in the industry as a whole are clearly relevant, but should not be confused with the immediate objective of diarizing the dialectical patterns of specific conflict episodes.

Of immediate importance, therefore, were the specific events or problems which were directly relevant to the emergence of a particular industrial encounter, such as the grievances articulated by employees. Although certain grievances may only have become evident at some later stage during the actual confrontation, such grievances were assumed to be logically prior to the actual emergence of conflict in that they were

invariably experienced by employees before they were expressed in collective action.

It could, of course, be argued that certain "trivial" grievances were "trumped up" later when workers confronted management with their problems and wished to reinforce their argument. It was not possible, however, to authenticate each and every grievance evident in conflict situations. The grievances, problems and issues which were recorded as breaches of industrial conflict should be treated as indications of workers' perceptions of the difficulties they experienced. The authenticity or otherwise of complaints and arguments should be seen as secondary to their sociological significance in outlining the dimension of worker perceptions, interests and goals in industrial conflict situations.

An attempt has, however, been made to account for such perceptions within the context of a broader outline of the actual work and social conditions existing on mines. It is left to the reader to judge the accuracy or otherwise of the claims of all parties in industrial confrontations against the structural background and description provided in the course of the analysis.

Concerning the second phase, namely the mobilization of support, an effort was made in the diary entries to document the tactics employed by mineworkers in mobilizing support and numbers within their own ranks. This included the preparation or collection of assorted weaponry for use during the conflict. The estimated numbers so mobilized were also recorded in this column of the diary. Also included were the occupational, regional or linguistic status of the groupings so mobilized, where such information was available.

With respect to linguistic and regional categorizations, it is clearly preferable to retain one single system, for example, the regional origin of mineworkers, where relevant, such as Mozambique, Malawi,

Transkei, and so on. Such a classification was, however, restricted by the way in which the groups were originally classified in the available records and eyewitness reports. Attempts to change such classifications can introduce distortion into the data. For example, where reference was made in existing records and files to Xhosa speakers, it would not be accurate to reclassify this group as Transkeian, since there may have also been a number of Ciskeian Xhosa speakers in the mobilized group. Similarly, Sotho speakers cannot readily be assumed to be Lesotho citizens, since many Sotho speakers resided in the Orange Free State and elsewhere. In an effort to avoid potential distortion, the original eyewitness classifications were retained, unless the evidence clearly indicated the regional origins of the relevant group, or alternatively the occupational category.

Also included in the mobilization phase were those events or actions which contributed indirectly to the gathering of people, events which were not necessarily initiated by the protagonists themselves, such as rumours or gatherings for other (social) purposes (for example, sport spectators, film audiences, and so on).

To facilitate immediate recognition of a given type of conflict, a summary statement of the status of the opposed group which mobilized against each other was also inserted in the mobilization column. This summary statement was set apart to ensure that it remained distinct from other items of information, the latter being logged in chronological order to reflect the actual pattern of the conflict process. These items of information were carefully spaced in each column to allow for a dynamic "reading" of the actual sequence of events, in descending order, through the columns of the diary and should not be confused with summary statements.

The different kinds of summary statements in the mobilization column indicated the classification made of the different types of conflict

identified in the present analysis. Included in these types were those denoting "classical" conflicts between Black employees and mine management. Distinctions were drawn within this category between issues and confrontations relevant to line production management, hostel management and staff, or both. Cases of inter-group conflict within the worker population itself were denoted by indicating the social, occupational, linguistic or regional status of the relevant groups.

There were a variety of other conflict types which were less easy to classify, however. In these conflicts, various forms of political and economic dependency on gold mines were expressed, such as conflicts between Lesotho mineworkers and their home government for which the mine environment had become an appropriate arena. Such conflicts were indicated by categorizing the conflict as being expressed, directly, indirectly, against the "mine", rather than against "mine management" as such, to avoid possible confusion.

The next phase of the diary, described as the crisis, comprises the events occuring at the height of the conflict, during which time the adversaries may have clashed, physically or verbally. At one extreme, workers may have confronted management or other worker groups with certain demands, threats, claims or actions. In most situations, workers refused to work, demanded repatriation or shouted their demanded for higher wages, called for the dismissal of certain officials and so on. At the other extreme, the crisis consisted at times of the launching of physical attacks on buildings, facilities or other persons and groups. The crisis phase included, therefore, a documentation of the damage or destruction of property, injuries and loss of life. Where deaths and injuries were incurred, a summary statement was also inserted to this effect at the bottom of the crisis column for each conflict situation.

The crisis phase also indicates the extent to which there was a withdrawal from work and the extent of this withdrawal in terms of the

numbers absent from work. This information provided for a summary assessment of the number of work shifts affected or lost, as described earlier. This summary assessment was inserted into the column denoting the duration of conflict, rather than in the crisis column, as a matter of convenience.

The column denoting the deployment of redressive mechanisms provides an opportunity to document the various remedial actions employed, usually by mine management and security forces, including meetings and interviews at one extreme and the use of teargas, dogs and firearms at the other. This column accordingly provides for the documentation of management's reactions to the conflict situation and the kinds of methods employed to redress the immediate dynamics of conflict between opposing groups.

In the final column or phase, the nature and extent of the adjustments effected were documented, including the various outcomes of conflict. The numbers of men who resigned or were repatriated were documented for this phase, as were the resumption of the work routine and the kinds of actions taken by management to improve or change work and social conditions and facilities, as well as existing security arrangements. Of all the columns in the diary, this last phase should be regarded as being particularly incomplete. It may, for example, have taken management several months to adequately investigate the underlying problems and take the necessary remedial action. Evidence for such action was accordingly difficult to trace and record for each of the many conflict situations.

Broader adjustments at industry level, introduced to redress conflicts, were also apparent, such as changes in labour recruitment policies, room accommodation patterns, wage increases, and so on. These were not easily recorded as arising from specific conflicts, although an attempt was made to document the immediate remedial actions of the employers, where they appear to have been implemented. The nature and

extent of long-term adjustments should be looked for in the general account and the conclusions reached in the study as a whole.

ANNEXURE THREE

CONFLICTS INVOLVING BLACK WORKERS ON GOLD MINES : 1889 - 1972

YEAR	MINE	DURATION	TYPE OF CONFLICT	REASON/CAUSE	STATUS OF GROUPS	NUMBERS	SOURCE[1]
1892	?	?	"Drunken Brawls"	?	?	?	4TH C.M.A.R.
1893	?	?	"Faction Fights"	?	?	?	5TH C.M.A.R.
1896	Crown	2 Days	Strike	Reduction of wages	?	6 000	8TH C.M.A.R.
1897	Henry Nourse, Nourse	?	Factional Clash	?	?	?	9TH C.M.A.R.
(April) 1898	Simmer East, Rose Deep	1 Day	Factional Clash	?	?	?	10TH C.M.A.R.
1899	Lancaster	?	"Fighting"	?	?	?	11TH C.M.A.R.
1902	?	10 Days	Strike	Poor treatment	"Mapoch" Tribesmen	192	MORONEY (1977)
(Jan) 1902	Geldenhuys	?	Strike	Deceived about destination mine	Pedi	448	WARWICK (1978)
(April) 1902	Cons. Main Reef	?	Strike	Wages lower than surface contractor	?	116	WARWICK (1978) MORONEY (1977)
(May) 1902	Geldenhuys	?	"Dispute"	?	Pedi	?	MORONEY (1977)
(June) 1902	Langlaagte	?	Walkout	Poor treatment by compound manager	?	1 100	WARWICK (1978) MORONEY (1977)
(July) 1902	Durban Roodepoort Deep	?	Threat to Strike	Reduction of wages	Mocambicans	700	WARWICK (1978) MORONEY (1977)
(July) 1904	Comet	?	Strike	Explosion killed a Chinese worker	Chinese	?	15TH C.M.A.R.
(Sept) 1904	Van Ryn Deep	?	Versus Chinese Police	Chinese headman given higher wages	Chinese	?	15TH C.M.A.R.
(Sept) 1904	North Randfontein	?	Factional Clash	?	Chinese vs Blacks	?	15TH C.M.A.R.
(Sept) 1904	Glen Deep	?	Factional Clash	?	Chinese vs Blacks	?	15TH C.M.A.R.
(Oct) 1904	Glen Deep	?	Versus Chinese Police	?	Chinese	?	15TH C.M.A.R.
(Oct) 1904	Aurora West	1 Day	Strike	Refuse to work on Sunday; Deductions from wages	Chinese	?	15TH C.M.A.R.
(Oct) 1904	Geduld	?	Strike	Workers refused new boots/oilskins	Chinese	33	15TH C.M.A.R.
(April) 1905	North Randfontein	?	"Dispute"	Low wages	Chinese	?	Richardson (N.D.)
(April) 1905	Jhb Sanitary Compound	?	"Disturbances"	?	Chinese	?	16TH C.M.A.R.
1907	South Randfontein	?	Strike	Contracted for surface work only	Pondo	?	MORONEY (1977)
(May) 1907	South Randfontein	?	Strike	Shifts cancelled	?	60	MORONEY (1977)

YEAR	MINE	DURATION	TYPE OF CONFLICT	REASON/CAUSE	STATUS OF GROUPS	NUMBERS	SOURCE[1]
(July) 1913	Kleinfontein	?	Strike	Blacks in sympathy strike with Whites on mine	?	?	ROUX (1964)
(Dec) 1915	Van Ryn Deep	?	Strike	?	?	?	BONNER (1979)
(Jan - Feb) 1916	Govt Areas	?	Protest	Want dismissal of compound manager	Xhosa	?	BONNER (1979)
(Jan-Feb) 1916	New Modder.	?	?	?	Pondo	300	BONNER (1979)
(Feb) 1918	(Various)	?	"Boycott"	Exploitation by traders	?	?	BONNER (1979)
(July) 1918	Ferreira, Crown, Robinson Deep	?	Protest	Rejection of wage increases, Dismissal coloured drill sharpeners	?	?	BONNER (1979) 29TH C.M.A.R.
(Nov) 1919	Rose Deep	?	March on Jhb	?	?	500	BONNER (1979)
(Dec) 1919	New Modder.	?	"Boycott"	Exploitation by traders	?	?	BONNER (1979); 30TH C.M.A.R.
(Jan) 1920	Knight Central, Wits Deep, New Modder., Van Ryn East, Geduld, Welgedacht, Modder Deep	?	Strikes and "Boycotts"	Exploitation by traders	?	?	BONNER (1979)
(Feb) 1920	21 Mines, including: Simmer and Jack, Glen Deep, Rose Deep, West Rand Cons, Wolhuter, Govt Areas, New Kleinfontein, Crown, ERPM, Springs, Geduld.	12 Days	Strikes and "Boycotts"	Exploitation by traders, low wages, high price of commodities, imposition of colour bar	?	71 033	BONNER (1979); 31ST C.M.A.R.
(Jan) 1930	Crown	?	Factional Clash	Activities of "Shozi" secret society	?	?	41ST C.M.A.R.
1937	Welgedacht	?	"Disturbance"	Compound manager killed	?	?	48TH C.M.A.R.
(March) 1940	Marievale	?	Protest Meeting	Admin. of new time books	Xhosa; Basotho	300	U.C. 1345
(Feb) 1944	New Modder.	?	Strike	Low wages	Dump Contractor Workers	?	U.C. 1345
(March) 1944	Marievale	1 Day	"Riot"	Bonus system, u/g queues	Bomvanas	500	U.C. 1345
(May) 1946	East Geduld	?	Protest Meeting	Food shortages	?	500	U.C. 1345
1946	Modder East	?	"Riot"	Food shortages	?		O'MEARA (1975)
1946	New Kleinfontein	?	Protest Meeting	Food shortages	?	2 000	O'MEARA (1975)
(Aug) 1946	(± 32 Mines) Various	4 Days	Strikes	Low wages; food ration cuts	?	76 000	O'MEARA (1975); ROUX (1974); 57TH C.M.A.R.

YEAR	MINE	DURATION	TYPE OF CONFLICT	REASON/CAUSE	STATUS OF GROUPS	NUMBERS	SOURCE[1]
(June) 1948)	WNLA Compound	27 Days	"Hunger Strike"	Rates of pay, hours of work	?	?	CHAMBER FILES
(March) 1954	St Helena	1 Night	Factional Clash	?	Xhosa vs Nyasa	?	U.C. 1345
(July) 1955	Van Dyk	1 Day	Protest Demonstration	Coal shortages, meat shortages, room searches for beer brewing	?	?	U.C. 1345
1955 (?)	Marievale, Vogelstruisbult	1 Day	Factional Clash	Fight on dirt road between mines	?	13	U.C. 1345
(July) 1956	Libanon	2 Days	Factional Clash	"General Attitude" of union natives and europeans towards Tropicals	Pondo vs Tropicals	?	U.C. 1345
(Oct) 1956	St Helena	1 Day	Factional Clash	Bhacas from different hostels clashed after visit	Bhaca vs Bhaca	?	U.C. 1345
1958	?	?	"Riot"	?	?	?	U.C. 1345
(Jan) 1964	S.A. Lands	2 Days	Factional Clash	?	Pondo vs Nyasa	?	U.C. 1345
(Sept) 1964	Leslie	1 Night	Factional Clash	?	Xhosa vs Barotse (N. Rand)	?	U.C. 1345
(April) 1965	Van Dyk	1 Night	Versus Hostel Manager	Reject old indunas/tribal police, stew & porridge watery, not enough food	?	?	U.C. 1345
(April) 1966	Bracken	2 Days	Factional Clash	Xhosa blocked path on way to store	Xhosa vs Angolans	± 150	U.C. 1345
(June) 1967	Leslie	?	Protest	Low wages, beer poor, assaults by whites, poor treatment by police, liquor selling	?	?	U.C. 1345
(6 May) 1970	Kinross	2 Days	Factional Clash	Assault after argument in hostel	Malawians vs Xhosas	?	U.C. 1345
(5 Sep) 1970	Leslie	2 Days	Versus Hostel Management	Induna's liquor racket; White barman watering down beer	Workers	± 200	U.C. 1345
(1 Oct) 1970	Leslie	1	Versus Line Management	Low wages	Sweeps gang	15	U.C. 1345
(12 Oct) 1971	Western Areas	1 night	Versus Tribal Rep	Assault after man took excessive food	Malawians	1000	TEBA Liaison
(24 Dec) 1972	Vaal Reefs	1 day	Factional Clash	Rivalry between liquor gangs	Sotho vs Xhosa	2000	Die Transvaler (28.12.1972)
(31 Dec) 1972	East Daggafontein	2 days	Factional Clash	Rivalry between liquor gangs	Sotho vs Xhosa	?	The Star (2.1.1973)

ANNEXURE FOUR

DIARY OF EVENTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY, LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS AND IN SOUTHERN AFRICA : 1972 - 1982

1972 - 1973		CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
1972	JAN - MARCH				
	APRIL - JUNE				
	JULY - SEPT				
	OCT - DEC	SOTHO-XHOSA (2) DECEMBER: KLERKSDORP, EAST RAND	NOVEMBER: J.C.I. announces 30% wage increases.	NOVEMBER: Lesotho - 100 mineworkers attend Lesotho Independence day celebrations.	DECEMBER: First National Congress of Black Peoples' Convention - Hammanskraal, Pretoria.
1973	JAN - MARCH	MALAWI - BHACA (1) FEBRUARY: EAST RAND			JAN-MARCH: Strikes in Durban area.
	APRIL - JUNE		APRIL: 30 White miners strike for overtime pay : Carletonville. JUNE: Productivity bargain : M.W.U. concessions re Black entry/making safe in work places.		9-14 APRIL: O.A.U. Conference (OSLO) to consider non-violent means of change in South Africa.
	JULY - SEPT	MALAWI - ANGOLAN (1) SEPTEMBER: WEST RAND WORKER - MANAGEMENT (5) AUGUST - DECEMBER: KLERKSDORP, CARLETONVILLE, O.F.S., WEST RAND	JULY: Wage increases - from R250 (72) to R350 per man per annum.	20 SEPTEMBER: Lesotho declares national day of mourning for 5 deceased mineworkers: ceremony at Maseru Airport with King, Chief Jonathan and A.A.C. officials.	JULY: Gold price increases from $65 (July 1972) to $120 (July 1973). 14 SEPTEMBER: London Financial Times cancels investment survey of South Africa. 15 SEPTEMBER: Australian dockworkers in 24 hour protest against S.A. ships.
	OCT - DEC				8-27 OCTOBER: Inquest into shooting of 5 Lesotho nationals - Oberholzer Magistrate's Court, Carletonville.

1973 SUMMARY: Resurgence in strikes from 71 (1972) to 370 in 1973.

1974	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JANUARY			JANUARY: Lesotho : Police stations attacked by BCP. JANUARY-MARCH: Mozambique : Frelimo intensifies operations with series of attacks on railway lines and white farms.	
FEBRUARY	SOTHO-XHOSA (4) O.F.S. MALAWI - MANAGEMENT (1) O.F.S. MALAWI - OTHERS (1) EAST RAND	19 FEBRUARY: Visit to O.F.S. mine by Lesotho V.I.P.s (unheralded). 20 FEBRUARY: Presidential visit to Cape Town - talks with Minister/P.M. on O.F.S. conflicts. 21 FEBRUARY: Meeting : Welkom - AAC and Lesotho government on O.F.S. conflicts.		
MARCH	SOTHO - MINE (1) O.F.S.	6 MARCH: GPC agrees to keeping Sotho recruits to 25% of complement for AAC. 11 MARCH: Meetings: Transkei/ Lesotho delegations at Western Holdings and Pres. Steyn to plead peace.		
APRIL	SOTHO - XHOSA (2) O.F.S., CARLETONVILLE MALAWI - XHOSA (1) CARLETONVILLE		4 APRIL: Francistown air crash - 74 Malawian Mineworkers killed. 8 APRIL: Pres. Banda of Malawi suspends recruitment of Malawians until further notice.	25 APRIL: Military Junta take over Portugal after abortive coup and resignation of general Spinola. APRIL: I.L.O. recommends major agricultural drive in Lesotho to absorb Sotho returning after O.F.S. riots.
MAY	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (6) O.F.S., FAR EAST RAND, EAST RAND			
JUNE			25 JUNE: Ressano Garcia border post - 7 mineworkers shot by guards in dispute over exchange rates.	

1974	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JULY		17 JULY: Meeting : Min. of Mines, Chamber President, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to discuss recruitment of Rhodesians. JULY: Chamber President announces major research drive of R150 million to husband human resources in mining industry.		29 JULY: Interface convention - Oppenheimer calls for sweeping labour changes.
AUGUST	SOTHO - XHOSA (1) O.F.S.		7 SEPTEMBER: Mozambique - agreement between Portuguese Min. and Machel for cease-fire and independence plans. 7 SEPTEMBER: Mocambique: abortive white counter - coup. 13 SEPTEMBER: Rhodesia: Prime Min. agrees to recruiting for S.A. mines in urban areas of Rhodesia. OCTOBER: Mozambique - clashes between Frelimo and Portuguese commandos in Lourenco Marques. 31 OCTOBER: Lesotho: Chief Jonathan asks Chamber President to give assurances that mines still wanted Sotho labourers.	
SEPTEMBER	MALAWI - OTHERS (4) CENTRAL RAND, CARLETONVILLE EAST RAND MALAWI - SHANGAAN (1) EAST RAND	5 SEPTEMBER: Maseru meeting - Lesotho government, S.A. government delegation and mining representatives to have talks on recruiting in Lesotho. 16 SEPTEMBER: Malawi meeting - Chamber President and M.L.O. head have talks with Banda.		SEPTEMBER: United Nations General Assembly rejects S.A.'s credentials.
OCTOBER	MALAWI - MINE (7) CARLETONVILLE WEST RAND, EAST RAND, CENTRAL RAND BLACK SUPERVISORS - MANAGEMENT (3) KLERKSDORP SHANGAAN - MANAGEMENT (2) EAST RAND	31 OCTOBER: Meeting - Pres. Banda, Chamber President, S.A. Ambassador.		30 OCTOBER: United Nations Security Council vote to expel SA - vetoed. OCTOBER: Repeal of the Master and Servants Ordinances after United Mineworkers' Union in U.S. petitioned against importation of goods produced by indentured labour; repeal of sections of Bantu labour act regarding penalties for breach of contract.
NOVEMBER	MALAWI - SHANGAAN (3) CENTRAL RAND EAST RAND	NOVEMBER: Chamber President announces new recruiting drive in S.A. black townships.	5 NOVEMBER: Rhodesia: Chamber of Mines opposed to recruiting for S.A. Mines - Rhodesian industry not consulted.	NOVEMBER: Gold price at new peak ($ 181).
DECEMBER	WORKER - WORKER (1) O.F.S. SHANGAAN - OTHER (2) CARLETONVILLE	6 DECEMBER: Visit by Malawi Minister of Labour to platinum mines. 23 DECEMBER: Labour agreement signed between W.N.L.A. and Rhodesian Min. of Labour for recruiting Black Rhodesians in urban areas.	DECEMBER: Lesotho: rumours that Sotho Mineworkers will invade Lesotho and overthrow Jonathan. DECEMBER: Zambia - Lusaka conference on future of Rhodesia.	

1974 SUMMARY: Highest incidence of strikes in South Africa (384) during period 1971-1982.

1975	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENT AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JANUARY	LESOTHO DEFERRED PAY (11) O.F.S., CARLETONVILLE, KLERKSDORP, FAR EAST RAND SOTHO - XHOSA (2) O.F.S., CARLETONVILLE MALAWI - XHOSA (1) KLERKSDORP	8 JANUARY: Chamber President telexes Lesotho P.M. to suspend pay legislation. 13 JANUARY: M.L.O. delegation to Lesotho Labour Commissioner. 15-23 JANUARY: Worker delegations from three mines to meet Lesotho P.M. in Maseru.	1 JANUARY: Lesotho Government introduces deferred pay legislation. 5 JANUARY: Lesotho - speech by Chief Jonathan over Radio Lesotho.	
FEBRUARY	SHANGAAN - RHODESIAN (1) KLERKSDORP			
MARCH	SOTHO - NGUNI (2) CARLETONVILLE MALAWI - SHANGAAN (1) EAST RAND RHODESIAN - XHOSA (1) WEST RAND	1-3 MARCH: Natal-Clashes on collieries : 32 dead 5 MARCH: M.L.O. head announces permanent bureau to develop liaison between governments, mine managements and employees.		4 MARCH: Minister of mines announces appointment of inter-dept. committee to inquire into mine riots.
APRIL	MALAWI - MINE (2) WEST RAND, CENTRAL RAND			
MAY				
JUNE	SHANGAAN - MINE (1) EAST RAND WORKER - MANAGEMENT (1) WEST RAND		1 JUNE: Rhodesia - A.N.C. meeting in Salisbury township ends in violence - 11 shot by police. 25 JUNE: Mocambique achieves independence.	

1975	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JULY	SOTHO - XHOSA (3) KLERKSDORP, FAR EAST RAND, — CARLETONVILLE SHANGAAN - MINE (1) EAST RAND RHODESIAN - MANAGEMENT (3) WEST RAND, EAST RAND, KLERKSDORP		29 JULY: Botswana - riot at Selibe Pikwe mine : 1 killed.	
AUGUST	SHANGAAN - OTHERS (7) CARLETONVILLE, EAST RAND, KLERKSDORP RHODESIAN - OTHERS (6) WEST RAND, FAR EAST RAND, CARLETONVILLE SHANGAAN - MANAGEMENT (2) EAST RAND WORKER - MANAGEMENT (7) WEST RAND, O.F.S., KLERKSDORP	26 AUGUST: Chamber T.A.C. - rejection of member proposal to terminate recruiting of Rhodesians - "experiment" to continue.	25 AUGUST: Rhodesia - Victoria Falls summit between Rhodesian P.M. and A.N.C. - Zambia, S.A. present.	
SEPTEMBER		SEPTEMBER: Government report on mine riots fowarded to Chamber President.		
OCTOBER	SOTHO - XHOSA (1) KLERKSDORP	29 OCTOBER: Chamber exec. comm. stresses need to obtain permit to recruit Rhodesians in tribal trust lands, rather than in urban areas.		
NOVEMBER	SHANGAAN - MANAGEMENT (2) EAST RAND, O.F.S. SOTHO - TSWANA (1) WEST RAND	1 NOVEMBER: Introduction of valid re-engagement guarantee (V.R.C.) - 45 week qualifying work period.		
DECEMBER				

1975 SUMMARY : Black mining wages leap during year from R560 to R950 per man per annum.

1976	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY				DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
ANUARY	WORKER - MANAGE-MENT (12) O.F.S., EAST RAND, WEST RAND, CARLETON-VILLE	RHODESIAN - MANAGE-MENT (13) EAST RAND, WEST RAND, KLERKS-DORP, CARLETON-VILLE, CENTRAL RAND	RHODESIAN - OTHERS (2) CENTRAL RAND, O.F.S.	SOTHO - PONDO (1) FAR EAST RAND SOTHO - NGUNI (2) KLERKS-DORP	JANUARY: Chamber executive agrees to recruit Black Rhodesians from Fort Victoria area, rather than urban areas of Salisbury and Bulawayo. 12 JANUARY: White miners on strike at O.F.S. mine after Rhodesian assaulted White miner. 30 MARCH: Chamber Technical Advisory Committee discussed proposal to suspend recruiting of Rhodesians - agree to restrict them in preference to S.A. labour.		
EBRUARY						FEBRUARY: KwaZulu - factional violence in Msinga - 5 killed at wedding (The Star: 17.3.1976).	
MARCH							
APRIL							
MAY							
JUNE						1 JUNE: Radio Bantu announces new wage increases for mineworkers.	16-13 JUNE: Soweto revolt; riots in townships near Pretoria, East Rand, Northern Transvaal, Klerksdorp, Cape Town.

1976	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
LY	WORKER - MINE (2) O.F.S. WORKER - MANAGEMENT (1) O.F.S. SOTHO - NGUNI (3) O.F.S., FAR EAST RAND, WEST RAND			30 JULY: Rioting in townships near Witbank, Middelburg and Carletonville.
AUGUST	RHODESIAN - OTHERS (2) WEST RAND, EAST RAND	31 AUGUST: Further proposal in T.A.C. to suspend Rhodesian recruiting - committee agreed to continue recruiting. AUGUST: Government appoints Franszen Commission to investigate 11-shift fortnight in mining industry.		AUGUST: Marches and rioting in Soweto, Randfontein, Alexandra, Port Elizabeth, Ciskei; Zulu hostel residents attack Soweto residents (24th August). AUGUST: Gold price drops to $100.
SEPTEMBER		SEPTEMBER: Chamber reaches preliminary agreement with M.W.U. on 11-shift fortnight; labour concession also obtained from Union whereby Black team leaders can enter blasted faces on night shift.	24 SEPTEMBER: Rhodesia-P.M. Smith concedes to principle of majority rule in TV broadcast to nation.	8 SEPTEMBER: Further fighting between hostel dwellers and Soweto residents. 15-23 SEPTEMBER: Rioting in Soweto, Johannesburg, Western Cape.
OCTOBER	RHODESIAN - MANAGEMENT (2) FAR EAST RAND, WEST RAND	OCTOBER: Introduction of additional V.R.G. (26-week qualifying period).	26 OCTOBER: Transkeian Independence.	OCTOBER: Rioting in Cape Town/Soweto.
NOVEMBER		NOVEMBER: Industry seminar on stabilization of labour.		NOVEMBER: Township rioting : Western Cape.
DECEMBER	RHODESIAN - MINE (1) WEST RAND RHODESIAN - MANAGEMENT (1) O.F.S. SOTHO - XHOSA (1) KLERKSDORP		DECEMBER: Radio Zambia Broadcast - Rhodesians not at home soon would lose their citizenship. DECEMBER: Lesotho - Transkei border closed by Lesotho authorities.	26 DECEMBER: Cape Township: Bhaca migrants attack township residents - 24 killed.

977	CONFLICTS IN THE COLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
ARY	RHODESIAN - MANAGEMENT (4) EAST RAND, CENTRAL RAND, CARLETONVILLE SOTHO - XHOSA (2) CARLETONVILLE, O.F.S. WORKER - MANAGEMENT (6) WEST RAND, CARLETONVILLE, EAST RAND, O.F.S. WORKER - MINE (3) O.F.S.		JANUARY: Lesotho - Transkei border opened.	JANUARY-FEBRUARY: Soweto, Cape Peninsula - Black school boycotts.
RUARY		2 FEBRUARY: Chamber decision to recruit only Rhodesians with valid re-engagement guarantees.		FEBRUARY: Black Peoples' Convention - Durban Congress - S. Biko declared honorary life president.
RCH	RHODESIAN - OTHERS (1) FAR EAST RAND	MARCH: Franszen Commission on 11-shift fortnight submits report.		MARCH: U.S.A. - Sullivan co-ordinates move for U.S. companies in S.A. to endorse common code of practice to remove discrimination in work.
PRIL		APRIL: Introduction of 11-shift fortnight.		
AY				
UNE	RHODESIAN - OTHERS (1) EAST RAND WORKER - MANAGEMENT (4) EAST RAND, O.F.S., CARLETONVILLE, WEST RAND			JUNE-JULY: Further township unrest and school boycotts in Soweto.

1977	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JULY	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (1) CARLETONVILLE			JULY: Appointment of Wiehahn commission into labour relations.
AUGUST				AUGUST-SEPTEMBER: Countrywide township unrest and school boycotts.
SEPTEMBER	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (3) EAST RAND KLERKSDORP			12 SEPTEMBER: Death in detention of Steve Biko, leader of Black consciousness movement.
OCTOBER				OCTOBER: Detentions of Black political leaders including Percy Qoboza, editor of the World newspaper. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER: Further countrywide townships unrest and school boycotts.
NOVEMBER			NOVEMBER: Rhodesia - P.M. Smith launches move for internal settlement	NOVEMBER: E.E.C. code of employment practice introduced for European business in S.A.
DECEMBER	SOTHO - XHOSA (2) O.F.S.		6 DECEMBER: Bophutatswana gains independence.	DECEMBER: S.A. Urban Foundation and S.A. Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA) produce code of employment practice for S.A. employers.

1977 SUMMARY: Registered Black unemployment increases from 70 429 (Sept. 1976) to 132 179 in Sept. 1977; strikes in S.A. decline from 245 in 1976 to 90 in 1977.

1978	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY		DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JANUARY			JANUARY: Amalgamated Engineering Unions request Chamber to introduce 11-shift fortnight for its members		11 JANUARY: Black Alliance formed between Inkatha, Coloured Labour Party, and Indian Reform Party.
FEBRUARY	WORKER - MINE (1) — WEST RAND				
MARCH					MARCH: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) initiates campaign for recognition of African trade unions, equal rights and lifting of bannings in S.A. 12 MARCH: Graaff-Reinet: Funeral of Dr Robert Sobukwe, First President of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
APRIL	WORKER - MANAGE-MENT (6) CARLETON-VILLE, EAST RAND, O.F.S., WEST RAND	BLACK SUPERVISORS - MANAGE-MENT (2) CARLETON-VILLE	APRIL: Following the scrapping of official gold price by the I.M.F., the S.A. Government starts paying deferred wages of Mozambicans at market - related prices.	APRIL: Transkei breaks off diplomatic relations with South Africa.	APRIL: Lusaka-Conference on Migratory Labour in Southern Africa : Charter of Rights for Migrant workers drawn up.
MAY					MAY: Roodepoort - founding of the Azanian Peoples' Organization (AZAPO).
JUNE		BLACK SUPERVISORS - MANAGE-MENT (1) CARLETON-VILLE			

1978	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
LY				JULY: Introduction of General Sales Tax (G.S.T. - 4%).
AUGUST	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (4) O.F.S., WEST RAND, FAR EAST RAND	BLACK SUPERVISORS - MANAGEMENT (1) CARLETONVILLE	RHODESIAN - XHOSA (1) FAR EAST RAND	
SEPTEMBER				
OCTOBER				OCTOBER: Gold price in new rise to $227.
NOVEMBER				
DECEMBER	BLACK SUPERVISORS - MANAGEMENT (1) CARLETONVILLE	SOTHO - NGUNI (2) FAR EAST RAND, EAST RAND	ZULU/SWAZI - XHOSA/PONDO (1) WEST RAND	

1978 SUMMARY: Mines experienced over-supply of labour; many mines over-complement due to demands for jobs.

1979	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY			DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
NUARY						
FEBRUARY	FONDO - PONDO (1) CARLETONVILLE				FEBRUARY: KwaZulu: factional clashes at Tugela Ferry - 20 killed (TEBA).	
MARCH		WORKER - MANAGEMENT (8) CARLETONVILLE, RAND, WEST RAND		7 MARCH: 6 500 White miners go on strike at 70 mines in sympathy with O'Okiep strikers. 8 MARCH: Gold Producers' Committee declares strike illegal and that miners have terminated employment by their own actions. 9 MARCH: 4 631 miners back at work. 10 MARCH: Unsuccessful call for all - out strike to recoup lost benefits 12 MARCH: Paulus (M.W.U.) addresses miners at Klerksdorp, Westonaria, Carletonville & Rustenburg. 13 MARCH: M.W.U. Executive votes to end strike. 15 MARCH: Chamber reinstates most benefits lost.		5 MARCH: O'Okiep mine Northern Cape - White miners strike over employment of coloured artisans on mine; striking miners' posts filled by coloureds during strike.
APRIL	SOTHO - OTHERS (1) CARLETONVILLE				APRIL: Lesotho - attempted sabotage of bridge, police post at Leribe by L.L.A. - coinciding with National Party's 20th anniversary.	APRIL: Geneva- ILO develops plan for reducing migration dependence in Southern Africa.
MAY					MAY: Transkei - Chief Mpondo Sigcau elected as Paramount of Pondoland - Matanzima refuses to accept vote (Sigcau is opposition supporter) - growing dissatisfaction of Eastern Pondo. MAY: Lesotho - bomb blasts in Maseru, skirmishes in mountains.	5 MAY: Moroka police station attacked by insurgents - 1 policeman killed. 13 MAY: Carletonville area - Russian gangs in clash - 2 mineworkers killed. MAY: First Wiehahn report on labour relations tabled in Parliament.
JUNE		WORKER - MINE (1) WEST RAND		1 JUNE: Introduction of stabilization bonus and leave of absence scheme. 1 JUNE: West Rand: go-slow by White winding engine drivers.	1 JUNE: Zimbabwe - Rhodesia: transitional government instated with Bishop Muzorewa as P.M. JUNE: Lesotho- S.A. Security Police intercept 20 Libyan- trained guerillas passing through S.A. to Lesotho to join B.C.P. JUNE: KwaZulu - factional clashes at Tugela Ferry - 25 killed (TEBA).	

1979	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
LY			27 JULY: Transkei - detention of Chief Sabatha brings widespread protest.	
GUST	WORKER - MANAGE-MENT (4) O.F.S.		AUGUST: Radio Lesotho broadcast about wages and wage differentials in O.F.S. mines.	
SEPTEMBER	BHACA - BHACA (1) CARLETON-VILLE XHOSA - SHANGAAN (1) EAST RAND		13 SEPTEMBER: Venda independence.	10 SEPTEMBER - 15 NOVEMBER: Lancaster House conference on future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 25 SEPTEMBER: Minister of Labour extends eligibility for membership of registered trade unions to migrants and frontier commuters.
OCTOBER				OCTOBER: Gold price increases to $390.
NOVEMBER				NOVEMBER: Orlando Police Station attacked - 2 killed.
DECEMBER			1979: Lesotho - Change in system of land tenure - inheritance now by single heir, provision for sub-letting and setting aside of selected areas for development. 21 DECEMBER: Zimbabwe - cease fire agreement signed. END OF 1979: KwaZulu - mine recruits obliged to pay arrear taxes before attestation.	

1979 SUMMARY: Registered Black unemployment at highest peak in 1971 - 1982 period = 167 384 (Sept. 1979).

980	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JARY			JANUARY: TEBA cash advances to new recruits withdrawn.	25 JANUARY: Pretoria - Silverton Bank siege by 3 guerillas - guerillas and two hostages killed.
RUARY	WORKER - MANAGE-MENT (3) O.F.S., FAR EAST RAND, KLERKS-DORP XHOSA - PONDO (1) WEST RAND		FEBRUARY: Lesotho - L.L.A. intensifies guerilla operations - assassinations, bombings. FEBRUARY: Transkei - factional clashes at Flagstaff - 20 killed (TEBA).	24 FEBRUARY: Germiston Station - Russian gangs in clash - 3 killed; Carletonville mineworkers involved.
RCH		MARCH: General Mining and Finance Corp. takes over Union Corporation Limited - Gencor established (effective from January 1st).		
PRIL		APRIL: C. Motta announces intention to recruit men into Black Mineworkers' Union.	17 APRIL: Republic of Zimbabwe Independence: Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister. APRIL: Transkei - factional clashes in Lusi-kisiki - Transkei Army called in (TEBA).	4 APRIL: Attack on Booysens Police Station. 23 APRIL: Marches by school boycotters in Johannesburg, Durban.
AY		3 MAY: Bus loads of B.C.P. supporters leave Klerksdorp mine to attend meeting in Soweto or Kwa Thema.		MAY: Kwa Zulu- Appointment of Buthelezi Commission.
UNE	WORKER-MANAGE-MENT (1) KLERKS-DORP		JUNE: Transkei- state of emergency declared. JUNE: Bophutatswana - proposals for granting blasting licences to Blacks made public - to be negotiated with M.W.U.	JUNE: Riots and school boycotts start countrywide. 1 JUNE: Sabotage at Sasol 1.

1980	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
LY	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (2) WEST RAND SOTHO - NGUNI (4) KLERKSDORP; CARLETONVILLE; O.F.S.		1 JULY: Transkei - Mine recruits obliged to pay arrear taxes before attestation (TEBA). JULY: KwaZulu - factional clashes in Izingolweni District (TEBA). JULY: Zimbabwe severs diplomatic ties with South Africa.	4 JULY: Putco bus drivers' strike. 24 JULY - 1 AUGUST: Johannesburg municipal workers' strike - 1865 workers paid off from Orlando Power Station and other departments. JULY - OCTOBER: Riots and school boycotts in Western and Eastern Cape (P.E.) Soweto.
GUST			AUGUST: KwaZulu - feuding in Umbumbulu district (TEBA).	
EPTEMBER				14 SEPTEMBER: Formation of new union federation - Council of Unions of S.A. (C.U.S.A.).
OCTOBER	WORKER - MINE (1) WEST RAND			
NOVEMBER	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (1) CARLETONVILLE		1 NOVEMBER: Lesotho - implementation of Deferred Pay Amendment Act (1979) - mineworkers no longer able to avoid compulsory deferment by working beyond official contract period (TEBA).	
DECEMBER				

1980 SUMMARY: Growth during year of Black membership in registered trade unions (1980:56 737)

1981	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
JANUARY	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (1) KLERKSDORP WORKER - SHOP KEEPER (1) KLERKSDORP WORKER - WORKER (4) CARLETONVILLE, CENTRAL RAND, WEST RAND		JANUARY-MARCH: Transkei - factional clashes in Flagstaff: - 55 killed (TEBA).	JANUARY-OCTOBER: 40 attacks by A.N.C. guerillas on police stations, power stations and railway lines. 30 JANUARY: S.A. Troops in raid into Mocambique (Matola). JANUARY-MAY: Strikes in Eastern Cape over pensions issue.
FEBRUARY			FEBRUARY: Zululand - trading store attacked by Guerillas. FEBRUARY: Zimbabwe withdraws TEBA's recruiting permit from Salisbury office. FEBRUARY: Transkei- factional clashes in Lusikisiki - 6 killed (TEBA).	
MARCH	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (1) KLERKSDORP WORKER - MINE (1) CENTRAL RAND	MARCH: Mine Surface Officials' Association (M.S.O.A.) opens ranks to Africans with ministerial approval.		
APRIL			APRIL-JUNE: KwaZulu - ongoing factional clashes at Tugela Ferry (TEBA).	
MAY	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (5) O.F.S., KLERKSDORP, EAST RAND, WEST RAND, CARLETONVILLE		MAY: S.A. Labour Commission holds conference to discuss ways of ending migrant labour to S.A. from Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Mocambique, Malawi, Zambia.	MAY-JUNE: Riots, guerilla attacks in Pretoria and elsewhere to coincide with Republic Day festivals and Anniversary of Soweto Riots.
JUNE				

1981	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (5) CARLETONVILLE, O.F.S., EAST RAND SHANGAAN - OTHERS (2) WEST RAND SOTHO - NGUNI (3) WEST RAND	1 JULY: Introduction of Fatal Accident and Illness Insurance Scheme (Death Benefit)		13 JULY: S.A. Government halts renewal of work contracts of Zimbabweans in the country.
UST			AUGUST: Transkei - factional clashes in Flagstaff- 8 killed (TEBA). AUGUST: Lesotho - bomb blasts in Maseru (TEBA).	AUGUST-OCTOBER: Strikes in Natal sugar industry over pensions issue. 11 AUGUST: Rocket attack on military bases at Voortrekkerhoogte
PTEMBER	SOTHO - XHOSA (1) FAR EAST RAND		20 SEPTEMBER: Transkei - factional clashes in Lusikisiki (TEBA).	SEPTEMBER: Publication of Part 6 of Wiehahn report dealing with Industrial Relations in the mining industry.
CTOBER	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (5) KLERKSDORP, WEST RAND, O.F.S.		OCTOBER-NOVEMBER: KwaZulu - ongoing factional clashes in Mehlomyama area of Port Shepstone - 26 killed.	
OVEMBER	WORKER - SHOP KEEPER (2) EAST RAND		NOVEMBER: Transkei - factional clashes in Lusikisiki (TEBA).	
ECEMBER			DECEMBER: Ciskeian independence.	

1981 SUMMARY: - No. of Blacks in registered unions increases to 259 582;
- Resurgence of strikes from 207 (1980) to 342 in 1981 - mainly pensions-related.
- 280 trade unionists detained.

982	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY		DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
					JANUARY-APRIL: Strikes in Transvaal clothing Industry over wages. JANUARY-SEPTEMBER: Unrest in metal industries over retrenchment
JARY					
BRUARY	WORKER	-			5 FEBRUARY: Death in detention of Dr Neil Aggett - Transvaal organiser of African Food and Canning Workers' Union. 11 FEBRUARY: Nation wide 1/2 hour work stoppage to mourn death of Aggett. FEBRUARY: Australian Council of Trade Unions imposes week-long ban on S.A. Shipping/Air in protest.
ARCH	MANAGE-MENT	(12)			MARCH-MAY: Strikes in East Rand metal industries during wage negotiations.
APRIL	O.F.S.,		APRIL: C.M.U. declares dispute with Chamber over wage demands (C.M.U. demand : 15% - Chamber offer : 8%.)		
MAY	EAST RAND,		MAY: Black Mineworkers' Union (Gen. Secr: C.Motta) granted access to mines - ± 800 members. MAY: Dispute to conciliation - new Chamber offer of 8% rejected by C.M.U.		MAY: Publication of Buthelezi Commission.
JUNE	FAR EAST RAND,		JUNE: C.M.U. dispute again to conciliation - C.M.U. rejects former Chamber offer of 9% (Underground Official's Assoc. and S.A.Tech Officials' Assoc. accept offer).		JUNE: KwaZulu : Minister Koornhof tells KwaZulu legislative assembly that Kangwane and Ingwavuma are to be handed to Swaziland. JUNE: Natal Supreme Court declares planned excision of land from KwaZulu illegal.
	CARLETON-VILLE				

982	CONFLICTS IN THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN LABOUR-SUPPLYING REGIONS	DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA/WORLD
Y	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (18) KLEPKSDORP, CARLETONVILLE, WEST RAND, EAST RAND, O.F.S. — SHANGAAN - OTHERS (2) WEST RAND	6 JULY: C.M.U. and Chamber in agreement of 12% before strike ballot is carried.	JULY: Lesotho - Chief Jonathan's country home attacked; Lesotho Minister of Works assassinated.	JULY-AUGUST: Strikes in motor industries over wages.
		JULY: Annual wage review 12-20% increase given to Black employees.		
		END JULY: Formation of National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)- General Secretary : C.Ramaphosa.		
GUST		AUGUST: N.U.M. starts recruiting on mines.	AUGUST: Lesotho- weapons discovered at home of ex-mineworker.	AUGUST: Abortive coup in Seychelles.
			21 AUGUST: Swaziland - death of King Sobhuza II.	
			AUGUST: Transkei - factional clashes in Tabankulu after murder of headman (TEBA)	
EPTEMBER		SEPTEMBER: First non-white union (FEDCHEM) is granted recognition by Chamber : representing Coloured and Asian surface workers.		SEPTEMBER: Bloemfontein Appeal Court upholds decision of Natal Supreme Court re land transfer to Swaziland
OCTOBER	WORKER - MANAGEMENT (1) WEST RAND	5 OCTOBER: Gold Fields group makes pay adjustment (TEBA monthly report : October).	OCTOBER: Ciskei - 100 men in "sit-in" in Stutterheim office of Teba wanting to go to mines (TEBA).	
		13 OCTOBER: FEDCHEM granted access to mines		
		14 OCTOBER: N.U.M. granted access to gold mines and collieries.		
NOVEMBER		NOVEMBER: Council of Mining Unions (C.M.U.) disbanded - new Confederation of Associations and Mine Unions formed (C.A.M.U.) - Fedchem refused membership.	NOVEMBER-DECEMBER(?): KwaZulu - factional clashes in Malakazi area - Zulu/Pondo conflict (TEBA).	
			NOVEMBER-DECEMBER(?): Transkei - factional clashes in Flagstaff and Lusikisiki - 26 killed (TEBA).	
DECEMBER		4 DECEMBER: Inaugural conference of NUM held in Klerksdorp - claimed membership of 14 000.		
		10 DECEMBER: Chamber announces that registration of unions not required - emphasis on "Significant Representation".	10 DECEMBER: Lesotho - S.A.D.F. raid into Maseru.	
		1982 SUMMARY: Retrenchments on several Gold/ Platinum mines - no. in service declines by ± 18 000 from 1981 total of Chamber Mines.		1982 SUMMARY: - Growth in Black membership in Reg. Unions from 259 582 (1981) to 394 510 (1982) - Countrywide retrenchments : ± 10 000 laid off.

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

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