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Developing a Framework of issues to consider an African understanding of Resource Nationalism, taking its Colonial history, Sustainable Development and Politics into account

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A research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Engineering.

Harare 2019

DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Science in Engineering to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other University.



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(Signature of Candidate)

....22nd... day of ....April...., ..2019.....

(day) (month) (year)

ABSTRACT

The lack of consensus among key stakeholders in conceptualizing resource nationalism in Africa has contributed to conflict among the stakeholders, negative impacts on returns to investment, constraints on supplies of resources and limited the positive impact of resource extraction on human and economic development. Six African countries provide an insight into how colonialism, post-independence politics and the sustainable development agenda have contributed to the current conceptualization of resource nationalism. The purpose of this study is to develop a framework of issues to consider in developing consensus on an African understanding of resource nationalism. The major findings of this study are that resource nationalism is not a post-colonial phenomenon, that tools of resource nationalism used by countries have both increased and become similar over time, that economic considerations are surpassing political ideology in influencing resource nationalism and, that resource dependent countries have seen more consistent reduction in inequality over time.

Key words: Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, resource nationalism, sustainable development, politics, mineral policy.

This research is dedicated to my wife, Memory.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Context

The developed world understanding of resource nationalism is based on the perceived harmful effects of resource nationalism on supplies of resources to international markets. It is also key to note that there is, among developed countries, a general consensus on the understanding of resource nationalism. This understanding is best evidenced by the United Kingdom (UK) Government's definition of resource nationalism as "anti-competitive behaviour designed to restrict the international supply of a natural resource" (UK Government, 2014:2).

The United States of America's (US) military in turn views resource nationalism as a risk to supplies of resources such as oil which are critical to the USA's economy (Webb-Vidal, 2006). It has identified platinum group metals, cobalt, chromium and manganese as strategic minerals found in Southern Africa whose supply could be affected by resource nationalism (Burgess, 2010). As a testament to the consensus in understanding, US mainstream media describes resource nationalism as a host government's attempt to obtain more benefits from its natural resources in a manner that is often detrimental to the private sector and ranges from outright expropriation to more creeping kinds of appropriation like higher taxes or tougher regulations (Morris, 2014). The Economist (2012) however notes that some developed countries have in recent times engaged in what they themselves call resource nationalism, for example Australia's super tax and the UK's additional taxation of the profits of oil companies in the North Sea.

Academics from developed countries share a consensus that resource nationalism is detrimental to private sector interests. They also agree that resource nationalism is not unique to developing countries as OECD countries such as Canada and Australia practice it (Bremmer and Johnston, 2009) but it is only harmful when practiced by developing countries (Stevens, 2008). Professor James Otto describes resource nationalism as a rebalancing of interests in natural resource projects in a manner that benefits society and host governments at the expense of investors (Otto, 2013) while Harvard's Justin Dargin notes that resource nationalism is a form of protectionism that is based on propaganda around neo-colonialism and imperialism in developing countries (Harvard Kennedy School, 2011). An academic from Canada's Queen's University, Stevens (2008) notes that resource nationalism has two cogs: (i) restricting the private sector and (ii) host governments exercising increased control over the management of the natural resources in their countries. The Royal Institute of International Affairs (popularly known as Chatham House) recognizes the legitimate concerns that drive resource nationalism but is worried by the 'clumsy' manner in which some developing countries pursue it (Morris, 2014).

The private sector broadly shares a consensus in its understanding of resource nationalism. It is based on the potential risks to their investments. In a presentation to its shareholders, Anglo American used definitions of resource nationalism that describe it as shifting control over resources from foreign and private interests to host governments and state-owned enterprises, increase in taxes, renegotiation of terms and as a process that ultimately leads to nationalization (Samuel, 2013). A few private sector players do not ascribe to this understanding though, for example Nick Holland, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Gold Fields Limited, has stated that resource nationalism is not only a right but also a duty of every government (Holland, n.d.).

However, what is missing is a consensus on the African understanding of the concept of resource nationalism. Traditionally, resource nationalism in Africa has been understood as resulting from two key factors: (i) rises in commodity prices and (ii) ideological backlash against colonialism (Ward, 2009). However, it has been observed that resource nationalism has been resilient against the post-2008 commodity price bust (Ward, 2009) and that even the bastions of Pan-Africanism and anti-neo-colonialism do not seem to understand resource nationalism as payback for colonialism. The African Review and Zimbabwe's state-run newspaper, *The Herald* use the same definition of resource nationalism found on Wikipedia: '*the phenomenon of sovereigns seeking to assert greater control over and ownership or revenue stakes in the extractive process'* (African Review, 2010; Musengi, 2013; Wikipedia, 2018).

This is despite attempts by African academia and multi-lateral institutions to provide a suitable definition for Africa which does not provide negative connotations to resource nationalism, for example the definition proposed by Cawood and Oshokoya (2013:46) as '*sovereign claim on resource assets by citizens of a mineral-rich country, in which this claim must deliver maximum benefits to them'*. Multi-lateral institutions express a tempered view of resource nationalism, maybe owing to their representation of a multiplicity of countries including both developed and developing ones. The International Energy Forum's definition of resource nationalism is producer nations '*wanting to make the most of their endowment*' (Stevens, 2008).

A small section of developed world academia has lent its voice to casting resource nationalism in a more positive light: Ross (2012) highlighted the significant developmental progress attained from nationalization of oil producing countries particularly those in the Middle East.

Andreasson (2015) notes that before nationalization, oil only contributed 26.3% of Government revenue in Nigeria but after nationalization that share quickly rose to 82.1% in just four years and has never made up less than 60% since.[1]

It can thus be seen that while a substantial amount of useful information exists on conceptualizing resource nationalism, it is to a large extent premised on a developed world or private sector-oriented understanding of resource nationalism. To a lesser extent, there is an emerging conceptualization from a developing world understanding. There is therefore a need to develop a framework of issues to consider in conceptualizing an African understanding of resource nationalism. There is need for a sense of coherence about how Africa's colonial past, evolving political economy and sustainable development planning might add up to a more complete picture of the understanding of resource nationalism.

1.2. Problem Statement

The lack of a consensus among key stakeholders in conceptualizing resource nationalism in Africa has contributed to conflict among the stakeholders, negative impacts on returns to investment, constraints on supplies of resources to international markets and limited the positive impact that resource extraction can have on human and economic development.

1.3. Rationale and Aim of the Study

[1] While this increase in Government revenue is a positive step, it has created an unsustainable dependence on oil amid other challenges such as rent-seeking and corruption

There is a substantial amount of useful information that exists on resource nationalism. It is however typically premised on a developed world or private sector-oriented understanding of resource nationalism. There is a need to develop a framework of issues to consider in conceptualizing an African understanding of resource nationalism, taking Africa's colonial past, evolving political economy and sustainable development planning in to account.

The research seeks to improve the understanding of resource nationalism by uncovering the elements of colonial history, sustainable development and politics that stakeholders need in order to consider a shared understanding of resource nationalism in Africa.

The objectives of the study are:

a) To describe how colonialism, experiences of de-colonialism, neo-colonialism, political institutions in Africa and sustainable development planning shape resource nationalism in different African countries.
b) To explain the successes and failures of resource nationalism in Africa as measured by its outcomes i.e. its impact on poverty, income inequality and unemployment, then compare the outcomes with those of developed world and emerging economies.
c) To describe the key issues that need to be considered by stakeholders when considering resource nationalism. These include reaching a consensus on the definition of resource nationalism, developing efficient mining fiscal regimes and determining realistic expectations of the mining industry.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Understanding Nationalism

Nationalism is defined as a world view that emphasises collective identification with one's nation, self-governance and self-determination (Triandafyllidou, 1998). However, nationalism is also identified with freeing nations from unwanted external influences and is associated with the desire for authoritarian rule (Smith, 1981). Nationalism has several influential critics including George Orwell (1945) who described it as '*power-hunger tempered with self-deception*' while Albert Einstein called it an infantile disease. Nationalism is however on the rise in the USA and across Europe as epitomized by the election of Donald Trump and Brexit.

2.2. Resource nationalism

Resource nationalism is regarded as one of the key risks facing the global mining industry. Ernst & Young rated resource nationalism as the 'biggest risk' for mining globally for two consecutive years, 2011-2012 (Ernst & Young, 2012).

Resource nationalism manifests itself in several ways which include:

- Nationalization of mining companies
- Increased state participation, including through state owned mining enterprises. The state participation can occur through: (i) free carry – whereby the state gets a share of the mining company without paying for it or (ii) contributed – whereby the state pays for the share.
- Increased taxation, particularly through introduction or increase of royalties

- Enforcing in-country beneficiation of minerals
- Restricting export, through among others, export taxes, mandatory minimum prices and quotas
- Mandating use of locally produced inputs
- Reviewing mining contracts
- Requirements for equity ownership by citizens of host countries (Leon, 2013).

There is an argument to be made that resource nationalism, as per Cawood & Oshokoya's definition of it as host governments seeking maximum benefits from resource extraction is a universally agreeable concept. However, it is the 'clumsy' implementation described by Chatham House which lends to the developed world and private sector's conceptualization of resource nationalism as a regressive notion (Morris, 2014). In short, almost everyone agrees with the intended goal(s) of resource nationalism however more often than not the poor implementation of resource nationalism negatively affects capital and supplies of resources to international markets.

Andreasson (2015) argues that colonialism has a lingering impact on Africa which makes effective implementation of resource nationalism difficult. He notes that Africa's national borders are 'artificial' – the result of Europe's *Scramble for Africa* and not a delineation of the original and oft tribally-homogenous kingdoms of Africa. This creates a problem where the sovereignty of many African states is recognized *de jure* internationally but the states themselves lack the *de facto* characteristics of sovereignty. Nigeria provides a prime example where the federal state is so heterogeneous and fractured that it produces societal conflict over the oil revenue (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003) instead of a consensus for prosperity. This conflict manifests itself in corruption, patronage and rent-seeking.

Ward (2009) observes a growing trend in resource nationalism in developed and emerging economy non-producer countries in: (i) their methods of securing their access to strategic resources and (ii) their defensive reactions to investments made by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are built on natural resource revenues in their countries. The latter has generated fears that SWFs and SOEs may be used as neo-colonial instruments by foreign governments (Lee et al., 2012). China's resource for infrastructure (RFI) deals in Africa are a prime example. China has decided to address its insatiable demand for mineral resources by constructing infrastructure for infrastructure-deficient but resource-rich States. These RFI deals often involve a joint venture, consisting of Chinese and African SOEs and the RFI loans often stipulate that a majority of the loan (sometimes at least 60%) must go to Chinese contractors (Jones, 2013). In many RFI deals, the loan is repaid with resources.

However, anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa is growing and is beginning to manifest itself in resource nationalism. The anti-Chinese sentiment is driven by the perceptions that Chinese-built infrastructure is sub-standard (Jones, 2013), Chinese companies engage in labour abuse,[2] and that China's 'non-interference policy'[3] contributes to corruption and human rights abuses by Governments. China has been criticized for continuing to import Sudanese oil during the

[2] In a highly publicized incident, two Chinese managers shot 11 Zambian miners for protesting over wages. (Source: Laing, A. *Zambian miners shot by Chinese managers.* The Telegraph, 2010 [Accessed: 25 October 2017]) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/8073443/Zambian-miners-shot-by-Chinese-managers.html

[3] Two weeks into his Presidency, Xi Jinping was quoted by as saying "China will continue to offer, as always, necessary assistance to Africa with no political strings attached." (Source: Boghani, P & Conway-Smith, E. *China's New President Offers Africa 'No Strings' Aid*. CNBC, 2013 [Accessed: 25 October 2017]) https://www.cnbc.com/id/100593398

peak of the Darfur conflict. The late former Zambian President, Michael Sata won the 2011 elections on a strong anti-China platform, and was quoted as saying "[the current] *Government…has been heavily corrupted by the Chinese*" (Laing, 2010) following investment of US$5 billion by China into Zambia's mining sector (Burgess, 2010).

2.3. Resource nationalism and politics

Over the past half century, Africa as a bloc has moved from colonialism (designed to benefit minority or foreign groups at the expense of the majority groups) to democracy (expected to benefit all population groups and address historical inequities). The African Union has agreed on democracy as the required system of governance in African countries (African Union, 2004). Democracy is based on a system of meritocracy and often embraces capitalism – values that place optimal economic performance at the heart of governance.

In practice Africa's level of democratization has been improving slowly, albeit from a low base with many countries remaining as dictatorships, de facto one-party states and monarchies. This has the implication that national development planning and political strategies are more often premised on redistribution (through patronage) than they are on optimal economic performance. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only one country is adjudged to be a full democracy (Mauritius) while seven are flawed democracies (including Namibia and South Africa) and fourteen are hybrid regimes (Tanzania is one of them) and the rest are authoritarian (including DRC, Guinea and Zimbabwe) (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018).

The first attempt to forge a continent-wide mining policy for Africa was done by the World Bank in 1992 then it developed the Strategy for African Mining which encouraged host

governments to restrict themselves to regulation and promotion of their mining industries. The World Bank supported 30 African countries to develop new mining legislation which were more business-friendly and attracted foreign direct investment (Leon, 2017). However, during the commodity super-cycle of the 2000s these pieces of legislation failed to adequately capture a fair share of rents for governments precipitating a flurry of amendments to mining laws across the continent. In 2009, the AU produced the African Mining Vision (AMV) which advocates for some level of resource nationalism through contract renegotiations and mineral beneficiation (African Union, 2009).

The enduring historical economic inequities in many African countries create an economy that when it performs optimally, produces more returns for investors (oftentimes foreigners and minority groups and particularly so for the capital-intensive mining sector) than those for workers (as they did during the colonial era) and host governments. This creates a situation where economic growth increases income inequality. This inequality is unsustainable and undermines the meritocratic values that democracy is based on (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014).

Thomas Piketty argues that inequality was the main driver of the 'spring of nations', the revolutions that swept across Europe from 1848. He summarizes the central argument behind the revolutions as "*What was the good of industrial development, what was the good of all the technological innovations, toil and population movements if, after half a century of industrial growth, the condition of the masses was still just as miserable as before, and all that lawmakers could do was prohibit factory labour by children under the age of 8*?" (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014:8)

This question rings true today for the political forces that drive the resource nationalism debate: *What is the good of resource extraction, if after a century of extractive sector growth, the indices of welfare show that human development has barely improved beyond what it was before, and all that lawmakers seem to do is give incentives to investors to make more income than Governments and workers*? Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) note that host governments have often been accused by their nationals of being too charitable to foreign investors at the expense of the nationals. The UK Government notes that when mineral rents only accrue to a small group of businesses and individuals, unrest or conflict may result (UK Government, 2014).

Resource nationalism is a knee-jerk politically advantageous reaction by most host governments to this income inequality. It is politically advantageous because investors are often foreigners or minorities while the workers are a key sub-group of the majority of the citizens. Resource nationalism may however only grow governments' revenues in the short term, while diminishing income for labour, profits for investors and governments' revenues in the long-term (Holland, n.d.). Even if policymakers know that resource nationalism will be economically inefficient,[4] they will more often than not pick political advantage over economic efficiency. This is best captured by the words of former Ghanaian President Kwameh Nkrumah to his economic advisor, Nobel Laureate Sir Arthur Lewis:

"*The advice you have given me, sound though it may be, is essentially from an economic point of view, and I have told you, on many occasions, that I cannot always follow this advice as I am a politician and must gamble on the future*." (Murphy, 2006:128).

[4] Not Pareto efficient or not satisfying textbook criteria like the Lindahl-Samuelson condition for the efficient supply of public goods (Hoynes, 2010).

Peter Leon argues that some forms of resource nationalism such as indigenization reflect a social transformation agenda aimed at achieving long-term change in how societies are structured particularly in countries with historical ethnic (particularly racial) inequalities such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Leon, 2013).

To a lesser extent, resource nationalism can be linked to the ever-present spectre of Marxism and Socialism in some liberation political parties that continue to rule in some African countries. Many African countries that became independent during the 1960s implemented socialist policies to their extractive industries in a bid to address the income inequality between investors and host governments that was common in colonial states (Cawood and Oshokoya, 2013). Divesture from these countries followed, leading to subsequent governments reforming their extractive industries' policies to make them more attractive to investment. However, the commodity boom of the 2000s led to a resurgence of the income inequality between investors and host governments and a return of socialist voices advocating for socialist policies.

2.5. Resource Nationalism and Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is defined as "*development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*" (United Nations, 1987:41) Sustainable development is premised on two key concepts: (i) the overriding prioritization of the essential needs of the world's poor and (ii) the restriction on the ability to achieve sustainable development imposed by available technologies and governance systems.

The member states of the United Nations (which include all the countries in this study) adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on 25 September 2015 which seek to address poverty, inequality and environmental risks (United Nations, 2015). It has been noted that mining can make positive contributions to the 17 SDGs through job creation, development of the private sector, tax revenues, development of infrastructure and provision of inputs to the manufacturing, energy and agriculture sectors (UNDP, 2016).

Mining has historically been unsustainable and contributed to the problems that the SDGs have been designed to address – such as degradation of the environment, forced relocations, increase in inequality, resource conflict and illicit financial flows (UNDP, 2016). The emergence and evolution of the discussion around sustainable development since the 1990s, together with the commodity boom that mostly benefitted the private sector at the expense of host governments led to renewed calls for increased state involvement and a search for a contemporary definition of resource nationalism (Cawood and Oshokoya, 2013).

African countries, which have chosen democracy as their desired form of governance, share a common set of problems with regards to development i.e. the need to address: historical socio-economic imbalances, poverty, competing land use needs, economic growth, infrastructure development and industrialization. These have to be solved while ensuring the long-term sustainability of the environment which entails breaking the linkages that connect economic activity, environmental degradation and carbon-intensive energy use.

Ward (2009) identifies four key obstacles to African countries achieving sustainable development:

1. The pre-eminence of economic growth models that do not fully account for human rights, welfare and environmental costs[5],
2. The failure by markets to fully reflect environmental costs in market prices,
3. The entrenchment of income inequality and marginalization of impoverished people and,
4. Governance systems that do not fully reflect environmental costs in market prices, address income inequality and develop contextually-suitable economic models.

Ward (2009) goes on to note that resource nationalism can be a root cause, result and symptom of each these four key obstacles. Ultimately three things drive resource nationalism: poverty, inequality and unemployment. The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) notes that resource nationalism should be understood in the context of supply security concerns, climate change, poverty reduction and sustainable development which are all inter-related (Ward, 2009).

2.6. Summary

The prevailing understanding of resource nationalism is biased towards the interests of the developed world and the private sector. Wilson (2015) notes that the prevailing understanding of resource nationalism is based on economic growth models which do not attempt to factor in the impact of political processes on resource sector governance. He also found that political institutions are just as important as economic considerations in determining how resource sectors are governed.

[5] For example, Simon Kuznet, the Nobel Laureate made a postulation based on France's post-World War II experience that "*Growth is a rising tide that lifts all boats*" (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014).

Therefore, the aim of my study is to uncover the elements of colonial history, contemporary politics and sustainable development that stakeholders need to consider as a shared understanding of resource nationalism is developed in Africa.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

3.1. Research design

The study will employ qualitative research methods, primarily desktop review of secondary data sources and literature review. The study will focus on Sub-Saharan Africa which has a total of 44 countries (population). Of these, 33 are notable mining jurisdictions as judged by their inclusion in the Fraser Institute's Annual Survey of Mining Countries.[6] The study will use discrete data therefore, a sample of these countries was chosen in a non-randomized and deliberate manner. The sample includes six countries with significant economic contribution from mining representing all four regions of Sub-Saharan Africa[7]. There are:

- 2 middle and 4 low income countries,[8]
- 2 countries that are in conflict or fragile and 4 that are not,[9]
- 3 that were granted independence and 3 that went through an armed struggle,
- 3 authoritarian states, 2 flawed democracies and one hybrid regime[10]
- 3 Southern African countries and 3 non-Southern African countries.

These countries are listed in the table below:

Country	**Mining share of GDP**	**Region**	**Income Level**	**Level of democratization**	**Conflict / Fragile**	**De-colonization**

[6] It is important to note that the survey includes 33 countries however only 18 are included in the index.
[7] East, Central, West and Southern Africa regions
[8] As per World Bank categorization
[9] As per World Bank harmonized list of fragile situations (released July 2017)
[10] As measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index

Democratic Republic of Congo	22% (2016)	Central	Low	Authoritarian	Conflict; Fragile	Granted independence
Guinea	26% (2012)	West	Low	Authoritarian	Non-conflict; Non-fragile	Granted independence
Namibia	11% (2016)	Southern	Middle	Flawed democracy	Non-conflict; Non-fragile	Armed struggle
South Africa	8% (2016)	Southern	Middle	Flawed democracy	Non-conflict; Non-fragile	Armed struggle
Tanzania	4% (2016)	East	Low	Hybrid regime	Non-conflict; Non-fragile	Granted independence
Zimbabwe	8% (2016)	Southern	Low	Authoritarian	Non-conflict; fragile	Armed struggle

As part of the justification for choosing these countries, three of them are listed as part of the US's four focus countries with respect to concerns over how their resource nationalism impacts US's long-term security of supply of four key minerals:

- DRC: copper and cobalt
- South Africa: PGMs, chromium and manganese
- Zimbabwe: PGMs and chromium (Burgess and Beilstein, 2013).

3.2. Data sources, collection and analysis

Secondary data analysis will be conducted which is '*any further analysis of an existing dataset which presents interpretations, conclusions, or knowledge additional to, or different from, presented in the first report on the inquiry as a whole and its main results'* (Hakim, 1982). This

allows for drawing out of interpretations and conclusions from a dataset previously utilized to answer different research questions.

Mitchell (2015) and Szabo & Strang (1997) have described secondary analysis as a cost-effective and time-saving method which is not obtrusive to participants. Both qualitative and quantitative datasets will be utilized.

It is key to note that there are two key issues with this data analysis method that warrant attention: (i) that secondary qualitative data may contain biases of the original researchers and (ii) interpreted in a different way by the secondary researcher from the intention of the original researcher. However, it can be argued that these challenges are not unique and are also inherent in situations where teams of researchers work together and say one conducts an interview that his / her colleague has to interpret and analyze.

3.3. Data management

The study will utilize secondary sources of data which will be fully cited. The ethical concern has to do with whether informed consent was sought in an adequate way in the original studies and whether sensitive data was utilized. Judgements will be used with regards to whether re-use of data may violate any contract made between primary researchers and their subjects.

CHAPTER 4: IMPACT OF COLONIALISM, EXPERIENCES OF DE-COLONIALISM AND NEO-COLONIALISM ON RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN AFRICA

4.1. Introduction

This chapter articulates how colonialism, experiences of de-colonialism and the emergence of neo-colonialism have shaped resource nationalism in the six study countries. This sub-section focuses on the pre-colonial, colonial and independence struggle periods. The post-independence eras are covered in sub-section Chapter 5. An overview is provided that summarizes the research findings. This is followed by detailed articulation of findings for each of the six countries with respect to colonialism and de-colonialism. Finally, findings on how neo-colonialism is shaping resource nationalism in the six study countries are detailed in sub-section 7.1.8.

4.2. Key Findings

4.2.1. Overview

Colonialism: The mining sector existed in all the six countries prior to colonialism, with gold, copper and tin being the key minerals produced (Hammel et al., 2000). The mineral output was used domestically and traded with regional neighbours and far-off states for example gold mined in Zimbabwe was transported to Tanzania for trade with Arab traders. Africa's trade with Asians and Europeans led to the evolution of the slave trade which mainly affected Central and Western Africa, including DRC and Guinea, due to their proximity to the slave trade routes. Resource nationalism was also practiced in pre-colonial Africa, with political leaders often levying a tribute payment for mineral production and trade.

The six countries were colonised by different European countries: DRC was colonised by Belgium, Guinea by France, Namibia by Germany, Tanzania and Zimbabwe by Britain, and South Africa by a combination of Dutch and British settlers. Colonization was characterized by discrimination of indigenous people, violence, poor labour conditions and appropriation of natural resources. This increased and racialized inequality across the population and deepened poverty among indigenous people. Forced labour was practiced in DRC and Namibia while migrant labour systems were established in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

As colonies, most of the focus countries industrialized their mining sectors and engaged in resource nationalism (the only exception is Guinea). The forms this took are listed in the table below:

Table 1: Forms of resource nationalism practiced during colonialism:

Form of resource nationalism	DRC	Guinea	Namibia	South Africa	Tanzania	Zimbabwe	**Number of countries**
1. Export duties	X						**1**
2. Nationalizing trade in resources	X						**1**
3. Banning exports to particular countries	X						**1**
4. Establishment of state-owned	X						**1**

mining companies							
5. Establishment of state-owned enterprises to beneficiate minerals				X		X	**2**
6. Taxation			X		X	X	**3**
7. Control of mineral prices				X			**1**
8. Expropriation of mining rights			X				**1**
9. Affirmative action for select population groups				X		X	**2**
10. Quotas or other requirements for local beneficiation				X			**1**
11. Free equity carry for Government						X	**1**
Number of identified forms of resource nationalism practiced	4	0	2	4	1	4	

Exogenous events: Exogenous events, particularly the World Wars, Great Depression and Cold War affected the mining industries and to some extent, influenced resource nationalism.

i. The first World War (WWI) which occurred between 1914 and 1919 impacted the mining sectors and resource nationalism in the study countries in 3 main ways:
    (a) Increased the demand and price for some minerals, for example copper in DRC where production increased by 2,654% between 1911 and 1917.
    (b) Market control of strategic minerals for example Belgian authorities in DRC banned exports of copper to Germany during WWI after Germany invaded and took control of Belgium.
    (c) War veterans benefited from affirmative action policies, for example in Zimbabwe white war veterans were granted mining claims and capital.

ii. The second World War (WWII) which occurred between 1939 and 1945 had similar impacts:
    (a) Market control of strategic minerals for example, the US working with Belgium monopolized the supply of uranium from DRC, preventing Germany and the USSR from accessing it.
    (b) Labour shortages: in Tanzania, widespread conscription of both indigenous and foreign citizens drastically affected the mining sector's labour-force, forcing some mines to close.
    (c) Divesture of investments: Germans disinvested from Zimbabwe's gold mining sector, as it was a British colony and Germany was fighting Britain.
    (d) War veterans benefited from affirmative action policies, for example in Zimbabwe white war veterans were granted mining claims and capital.

iii. The Cold War between the US-led Western capitalist alliance and the USSR-led Eastern communist alliance also impacted mining and resource nationalism in Africa:

(a) Divesture of investments: American investors divested from the key uranium mine in DRC following the country's first post-Independence leader's demand for contract renegotiation. Allegations that he was pro-USSR further strained the relationship and eventually led to his assassination.

(b) Market control of strategic minerals: Gains made by the USSR in a largely socialist 1970s Africa prompted the US to support the white settler regimes of Zimbabwe and apartheid South Africa to maintain access to chrome and manganese, in the process contravening UN sanctions in the case of Zimbabwe. The US also supported the authoritarian Mobutu Sese Seko in DRC to maintain access to copper and cobalt.

De-colonization: The study countries experienced de-colonization differently: DRC, Guinea and Tanzania were granted independence as the 'winds of change' swept over Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, while Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe had to undergo violent armed struggles as minority settler communities held onto power well into the 1980s and 1990s.

Mineral Rents as a share of GDP

The evolving importance of mining sectors in the six study countries is illustrated in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1: Mineral rents as a share of GDP (Source: World Bank, 2017)[11]

4.2.2. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC):

Colonialism:

The modern-day DRC was, from the 1200s, part of the Kongo empire that engaged in trade (including slave trade) with the British, Dutch, Portuguese and French. King Leopold II of Belgium effectively colonised Kongo by establishing the Congo Free State, corporate state controlled through a non-governmental organization, the International Association of Congo.

[11] The spikes in mineral rents generated by Namibia in 1988 and 1989 are anomalous but are corroborated by data in the Bank of Namibia's Annual Report of 1990 (Bank of Namibia, 1990)

The state existed from 1885 to 1908 and its stated purpose was to uplift the local people and develop the area. The Congo Free State however, extracted ivory, rubber and minerals and sold them on the world market. The State committed atrocities in enforcing forced labour on the rubber plantations – some estimates are that 50% of the population was killed! (Hochschild, 2006).

The Congo Free State engaged in **resource nationalism –** imposing export duties on ivory, rubber and other resources traded by entities other than itself in the area. In response to the rise in rubber demand due to the inventions of the car and bicycle, King Leopold issued decrees that forced all indigenous people to deliver all ivory and rubber they harvested or found to the State, effectively 'nationalizing' trade in resources (Hochschild, 2006). The Congo Free State required effective security to maintain its control of the area and its army-imposed rubber quotas which if communities failed to meet, they had to have their hands cut off or be killed. This in turn, incentivized communities to raid other communities for their rubber and hands (to use when they failed to meet quotas) (Cawthorne, 1999). Resource-based conflicts are not a post-colonial phenomenon in DRC.

Due to the international outcry over the atrocities, the Government of Belgium reluctantly annexed the area in 1908 renaming it Belgian Congo (Stanley, 2012). Under Belgian rule, rubber's importance declined. Copper emerged as the key export as demand for copper rose because of World War I (WWI) with production rising by 2,654% from 997 tonnes in 1911 to 27,462 tonnes in 1917. Belgian Congo engaged in forms of **resource nationalism –** primarily banning exports to Germany during the war. Germany, which colonized Belgium during World War I, had been the main export destination for copper before WWI however the British purchased all the wartime output and remitting the revenues to the Belgium government in

exile. Two other minerals were key mining outputs: diamonds and gold. After WWI, the Belgian government privatized state-owned mining companies, particularly the Kilo-Moto gold mines.[12]

During World War II (WWII), 1939-45, Belgian Congo became one of the major exporters of uranium to the US (McCrummen, 2009).[13] The US engaged in resource nationalism in Belgian Congo. The Shinkolobwe mine had the richest uranium ore in the world at the time and the US made efforts to secure its monopolized uranium supply from the mine, preventing Nazi Germany and the USSR from accessing it (Williams, 2016).

De-colonialization: Riots in the major cities in 1959 forced the Belgians to negotiate with Congolese political leaders for the terms of independence leading to the granting of Independence on 30 June 1960 following elections held in May 1960.

The evolving importance of the mining sector to DRC's economy (mineral rents as a share of GDP) is illustrated in Figure 2 below:

[12] Prior to privatization, Kilo-Moto Mines was managed by a Board of Directors in Brussels appointed by Belgium's Ministry of the Colonies

[13] The uranium used in the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki came from present-day DRC




Figure 2: DRC's mineral rents as a share of GDP (Source: World Bank, 2017)

4.2.3. Guinea

Colonialism: The area that is present-day Guinea was on the edges of the major pre-colonial West African empires. Like the DRC, the area was affected by the slave trade and also extracted and traded in gold and salt. France negotiated Guinea's borders as part of the 'Scramble for Africa', making it a territory within French West Africa. During this country, the French developed a mining industry that extracted bauxite, diamonds, gold and iron (Soumah, 2009).

De-colonization: The rise of the Fifth Republic in France under Charles De Gaulle paved way for Guinea's independence on 2 October 1958. Despite adopting socialist policies and cultivating good relations with China and the USSR, Guinea maintained good relations with capitalist countries and received investment and aid from them. The first President, Sekou Toure (1958-84) nationalized land and developed the mining sector (particularly bauxite)

through the state with limited foreign involvement. A ministry responsible for mining was only set up in 1981 (Brabant and Heurzeau, 2016).

The evolving importance of the mining sector to Guinea's economy (mineral rents as a share of GDP) is illustrated in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3: Guinea's mineral rents as a share of GDP (Source: World Bank, 2017)

4.2.4. Namibia

Colonialism: Present-day Namibia had an active mining industry during pre-colonial times (UK Government, 2014). The country was colonized by Germany in 1884 and named South-West Africa. An up-rising by indigenous Africans was quashed through a particularly violent genocide in which 50% of the Nama people and 80% of the Herero were killed (Adhikari, 2008). The German Government introduced in 1905, the German Imperial Mining Decree which granted anyone except indigenous Africans and Coloureds the right to prospect for minerals (Pilgrim, 1991). Many concession companies took up ownership of mining rights.

The German settlers utilized **forced labour** on mines and in doing so banned education for natives, which had been previously provided by British missionaries who had arrived in the country in the early nineteenth century (Odada and Godana, 2002). Diamonds were discovered in 1908 and the *Diamanten Regie,* a Board, was established in 1909 to regulate diamond marketing and special diamond **tax** levied on diamond mining income was introduced.

After its defeat in the first World War, Germany relinquished its colonies to the League of Nations (a pre-cursor of the United Nations) which gave over administration of South West Africa to the colonial South African Government in 1920. The Union of South Africa immediately **expropriated** most existing mining rights through Proclamation No. 59 of 1920 (Odada and Godana, 2002). The Anglo American Corporation of South West Africa took over most diamond mining assets and still exists today as NAMDEB (a partnership between the Government of Namibia and De Beers). The expropriation had the benefit of opening up idle areas held by dormant concession holders to exploration.

De-colonialism: The Union of South Africa introduced apartheid, particularly under the National Party from 1948. This contributed to the rise of African nationalist movements whose agitation for political representation led the United Nations (UN) assuming de-jure rule over the country although South Africa maintained de-facto control. In 1973, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) became the recognized representative of Namibian people by the UN however this was insufficient with regards to actual self-determination of indigenous Namibians and a guerrilla war led by SWAPO ensued. During this period South Africa's Government and South African business illegally exploited mineral resources in South Africa. This was condemned by the UN, which in a 1982 resolution stated:

"*Strongly condemns South Africa for its continued exploitation and plundering of the natural resources of Namibia, in complete disregard of the legitimate interests of the Namibian people, for the creation in the Territory of an economic structure dependent essentially upon its mineral resources and for its illegal extension of the territorial sea and its proclamation of an economic zone off the coast of Namibia*." (United Nations General Assembly, 1982:1)

However, the exploitation continued as exemplified by Rio Tinto's continued mining of uranium, some of which was used in the UK's Trident nuclear weapon program. Under pressure, the South African government negotiated for an interim administration in 1985 with full independence coming in 1990. The UN supervised elections held in 1989 which SWAPO won.

The evolving importance of the mining sector to Namibia's economy (mineral rents as a share of GDP) is illustrated in Figure 4 below. A steep spike in mineral rents in years just prior to independence was witnessed, potentially pointing to accelerated exploitation by mining companies in the last period of South African occupation.




Figure 4: Namibia's mineral rents as a share of GDP in comparison with the Sub-Saharan African average (source: World Bank, 2018)

4.2.5. South Africa

Colonialism:

Mining has been conducted in South Africa for thousands of years, initially for domestic usage such as pottery and manufacture of iron, copper and tin weaponry and implements (African National Congress, 2012), and later on for trade (gold). South Africa was the world's leading producer of gold between 1905 and 2007 (Marais, 2010).

Colonization of South Africa by Anglo and Afrikaans settlers led to the industrialization of the mining sector, influx of Europeans, land appropriation and establishment of the migrant labour system (African National Congress, 2012). The Anglo settlers dominated the mining sector whilst the Afrikaners dominated the farming sector (Berry, 2015). Political conflict between the two ethnic groups in the 1920s was won by the Afrikaners (following a coalition between the National Party and the Labour Party) which increased taxes for mining and introduced tariffs for transporting minerals (Berry, 2015). In 1933, the sections of the ruling National Party (including the then Prime Minister's son) began calling for eradication of foreign control of the mining sector, nationalization of the financial sector and more state intervention in the economy (Moodie, 1975). However, no nationalization was attempted.

The Reunited National Party (NP) won elections in 1948 on an election platform that called for nationalization of mines, breaking down of monopolies, expropriation of land owned by

corporates and increased control of the economy by the State. This Afrikaner leadership of apartheid South Africa practiced resource nationalism through:

- Affirmative action aimed at growing white Afrikaner capital especially in coal mining.
- Establishment of SOEs to beneficiate minerals which include Eskom, Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Iscor, Sasol and Mossgas.
- Price controls for example on coal used by Eskom to produce electricity (African National Congress, 2012).
- The Diamond Act of 1986 which promotes equitable access to diamonds to local beneficiation firms (Jackson and Malesa, 2017).

The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 in which the police killed 69 black South Africans taking part in anti-Apartheid demonstrations led to capital flight as foreign investors left (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). The ANC declared in 1969 that liberation of the country meant disrupting the interests of the key economic players who remained in control of the economy.

De-colonization:

The ruling African National Congress was the key player in the decolonization of South Africa. In 1955 it produced the *Freedom Charter* which stated,

"The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people. The mineral wealth beneath the soil ... shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole." (African National Congress, 1955:1)

During the independence negotiations of the late 80s and early 90s, the ANC rejected privatization of the SOEs created in the mining sector. However, the failure of nationalization

in countries such as Tanzania and the fall of socialism incentivized the ANC leadership to accept free market policies, with Trevor Manuel announcing in 1992 that nationalization of mines was a last resort option (Gumede, 2005). This did not however mean that ANC dropped resource nationalism calls, as the ANC's Ready to Govern manifesto produced in 1992 calls states: "*Policies will be developed to integrate the mining industry with other sectors of the economy by encouraging mineral beneficiation and the creation of a world class mining and mineral processing capital goods industry*" (African National Congress, 1992)

The evolving importance of the mining sector to South Africa's economy (mineral rents as a share of GDP) is illustrated in Figure 5 below. The trend closely mirrors that of the rest of the African continent, largely because South Africa has for most of recent history been the largest mineral producer on the continent.




Figure 5: Mineral rents as a share of GDP in South Africa, as compared to the Sub-Saharan Africa average (source: World Bank, 2018)

4.2.6. Tanzania

Colonialism

Pre-colonial Tanzania was famed for their production of iron and steel. The Haya people are believed to have invented a type of blast-furnace over 1,500 years ago (Schmidt and Avery, 1978). The indigenous people of Tanzania traded with India and Muslim merchants (Shillington, 2013), particularly in gold that was mined in present-day Zimbabwe (Bryceson et al., 2012).

The Arabs were the first to colonize modern-day Tanzania and engaged in slavery and slave-trade. Records show that 718,000 slaves were exported from Tanzania during the 19th century while a further 769,000 were enslaved within Tanzania (Rodriguez, 1997). Slavery was only abolished in the 1890s. Germany conquered modern-day Tanzania (with the exception of

Zanzibar) in the 1888, incorporating it into German East Africa. Zanzibar remained an Arab colony. Germany introduced head taxes in 1898 which forced indigenous people into labour and in 1902 a policy was introduced which set a quota of cotton that each village had to produce for export, however this was very unpopular. A drought in 1905 triggered the Maji Maji rebellion, an uprising of indigenous people against the Germans, which lasted until 1907. The Germans used a scorched earth policy to quash the rebellion, and it led to mass starvation (Illife, 1967).

The Germans explored for gold and found it at Saragura Hill though only limited surface mining occurred (Lemelle, 1986). The Germans established the first underground gold mine, Sekenke Mine in 1909 reaching production of one tonne of gold in 1910 with a workforce of over 700 workers (Kaiza, 2011).

German East Africa became a warzone between German and British armies in the first World War, disrupting mining activities. After the defeat of Germany in World War I, German East Africa was broken up and Tanzania was given to Britain. Britain renamed it Tanganyika. Under British rule, the mining industry was barely developed due to several factors:

- Britain's mandate over the colony from the League of Nations legally required Britain to give precedence to the interest of indigenous people over those of settlers so Britain avoided supporting foreign investment in mining.
- The rise of Hitler in the 1930s led to the re-emergence of German colonial interests and investors assessed that Tanganyika was at risk of being re-colonized by Germany and they shied away from investing in Tanganyika (Lemelle, 1986).

The limited mining activity that occurred was spurred by rising gold prices during the Great Depression and falling prices of agricultural commodities (Bryceson et al., 2012). It included

the Lupa gold rush of the 1920s which saw an influx of European small-scale miners and African labourers from not just Tanganyika but modern-day Malawi, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Dickson, 1925).

In 1929, in accordance with the League of Nations requirements, a Mining Ordinance was introduced which allowed Africans to obtain mining rights. Gold production in Tanganyika rose from 0.5 tonnes in 1928 to 1.7 tonnes in 1934 and peaked at 4 tonnes in 1939 (Lemelle, 1986). Gold contributed 20% of exports in the late 1930s and contributing to tax revenue (Bryceson et al., 2012).

The World War II (1939-45) led to wide-spread conscription leading to labour shortages for mines which initially reduced production and eventually closed mines down. In 1941 prospecting was banned and the difficulty to access supplies further constrained mining activities (Roberts, 1986). Even after WWII many mines remained closed, while others continued to struggle (Chachage, 1995).

Kinyondo and Lange (2016) argue that Tanzania demonstrates why it is important to assess resource nationalism from a political and historical lens.

De-colonization

African nationalism in Tanganyika emerged in the 1950s with the formation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led by Julius Nyerere. It spearheaded a campaign for independence. In 1961, independence was granted to Tanganyika. A revolution on Zanzibar in

1963 led to its independence and it was unified with Tanganyika in 1964 to form Tanzania with Julius Nyerere as President.

The evolving importance of the mining sector to Tanzania's economy (mineral rents as a share of GDP) is illustrated in Figure 6 below.




Figure 6: Mineral rents as a share of GDP in Tanzania (Source: World Bank)

4.2.7. Zimbabwe

Colonization:

Colonial Zimbabwe was built on the success of the pre-colonial mining industry which was famed for its gold, iron and copper production.[14] Resource nationalism was practiced early in the colonial period. King Lobengula negotiated a mineral royalty in the Rudd Concession of

[14] It is estimated that before the 16th century, Zimbabwe was producing 46 tonnes of gold a year which was mainly traded through modern-day Tanzania

1888, an agreement with Cecil Rhodes' agents which provided Rhodes with the mineral rights for the whole country. In the agreement, King Lobengula was to be paid an effective royalty of £1,200 per annum, a steamboat, a thousand guns and a hundred thousand rounds of ammunition (South Africa History Online, n.d.). This was in effect an arms-for-resources deal.

Rhodes obtained a Royal Charter from the British Queen Victoria to exploit this mineral concession and formed the British South African Company (BSAC).[15] The prime objective of the BSAC was to find gold reefs comparable to South Africa's Rand deposits and in order to facilitate the quick discovery of the gold deposits, the Mashonaland Mining Regulation number 1 (1890) was enacted modelled on California's 'finder's keepers' law and giving mining pre-eminence over all other land-uses (Hollaway, 1997). The first large-scale mines were established in 1893 in Mashonaland.

A dispute between the King Lobengula and a Shona chief over tribute in 1893 affected one mine and provided the BSAC with the pretext to wage war against the Matabele whom they defeated in 1894.[16] In 1894 a hut tax was introduced which forced the indigenous people to get into the labour-force (Moore, 2003) and the Mines and Minerals Ordinance was enacted in 1895 (Phimister, 1974). A subsequent uprising in 1896 was defeated in 1897. This allowed the BSAC to dispossess the indigenous people of their land. The mining legislation contained a key element of resource nationalism: a free carry for BSAC of 50% in all mining companies. The law also required that mining companies be listed on the London stock exchange (Hollaway, 1997). This subjugated the mining industry to financial speculation which led to

[15] The first settlers, the Pioneer Column, entered the country in 1890 with each member of the Column promised 15 gold claims.
[16] The white troops were each rewarded with 6,000 acres of land and 20 gold claims.

disappointing results (Bond, 2001). Locals were reluctant to work on mines and wages were thus high.

By the early 1900s, the BSAC came to a realization that there was no second Rand and began encouraging agriculture and small-scale mining. Reforms to the legislation and policies for mining and labour improved the sector's operating environment. In reforming mining legislation, the BSAC in 1903 reduced its free-carry to 30% and allowed individuals and syndicates obtain mining rights without listing publicly thereby reducing the impact of financial speculation on the mining sector (Letcher, 1936). In 1908, the 30% free carry was replaced by another resource nationalism tool, a 5% royalty (Hollaway, 1997) which over the course of BSAC's rule small miners complained about (Bond, 2001). Labour policies to reduce labour costs and enforce indigenous people to work on mines were introduced. Indigenous people were housed in compounds and kept in debt to the mine store so as to keep them in one place (Bond, 2001). Pass Laws were also established to stem the flow of labour to South Africa where wages were higher (Moore, 2003).[17] This spurred the emergence of small-scale mining which by 1914 was producing 40% of the gold. By 1922 however labour was sufficiently available (Arrighi, 1973) and wages had fallen (Bond, 2001). By 1937, the mining industry reached its peak employment levels of 93,700 people (Clarke, 1980).

Both white settlers and indigenous people were conscripted to fight for the British empire in the first World War (WWI), 1914-19. Upon their return from war, white soldiers were

[17] Initially, workers engaged in passive resistance through damaging equipment and tools, fleeing mines for better forms of employment and working slowly. However, strikes emerged at Hwange Colliery in 1912 and at Shamva Mine in 1927. These were, however, violently suppressed by the police and mines sought more pliant migrant labour from Malawi and Mozambique.

encouraged to participate in small-scale mining and provided with state support (Viewing, Phimister and Jourdan, 1987).

Britain annexed the territory in 1923 following a referendum where the white population chose to be a self-governing colony of Britain. The Government of Southern Rhodesia purchased mineral rights from the BSAC for £2 million in 1933[18] and introduced an import substitution programme (Bond, 2001). Under colonial control, the country's mining industry developed to include production of asbestos, chrome, copper, nickel and platinum with investment from several European countries. The production of gold doubled in the two years after the transfer of mineral rights. The increase in profitability of mining led to an increase in resource nationalism, with a special tax being introduced in 1940 (Bond, 2001).

The Germans were particularly active in the gold mining sector. At the outbreak of the second World War (WWII), the Germans whose mother country was fighting Britain, deserted their mines. White settlers and indigenous people were again conscripted to fight for the British empire in WWII. Upon their return, white soldiers were encouraged to participate in the Returned Serviceman's Scheme and took up the dormant mines. Records show that 221 ex-soldiers were provided with training and took up 67 mines at a cost of £840,000 for the State. By 1952, they were producing £25 million worth of mining output (Hollaway, 1997).

However, the mining sector as a whole contracted after WWII from 25% of GDP down to 5%. This was caused by a bust in the international gold price, labour supply shortages as many workers moved to Zambia's copper mines, scarcity of capital and mining equipment (Bond, 2001).

[18] Using a line of credit from Standard Chartered Bank

In 1950, exclusive exploration rights were introduced accelerating the growth of large-scale mining: a state-owned steel making company (ZISCO) and several nickel and copper mines were established. In 1961, the Mines and minerals Act was amended. In 1965, the Rhodesia declared itself independent from Britain under white minority rule, triggering a decade and a half of international isolation, civil war with African pro-independence armed groups and economic stagnation (and eventual deterioration). The civil war eventually led to Independence.

The evolving importance of the mining sector to Zimbabwe's economy (mineral rents as a share of GDP) is illustrated in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7: Mineral rents as a share of GDP in Zimbabwe (Source: World Bank)

4.2.8. Impact of Neo-Colonialism on Resource Nationalism

Ward (2009) observes a growing trend in resource nationalism in developed and emerging economy countries in their methods of securing their access to strategic / critical resources. The use of mineral resources is important for economic development. Countries mostly start of as low-income agrarian societies which use very little minerals, however as they develop their material-intensive sectors such as manufacturing and construction grow up to a point at which demand for new manufactured or constructed goods such as houses, roads and refrigerators begins to slow down. This use of materials is measured using the Intensity of Use (I-U) – the ratio of GDP to material use (Considine, 1990). I-U therefore initially rises and then falls as an economy develops. The I-U for most developed countries peaked during the post-WWII reconstruction when Africa was colonized or newly independent (African Union, 2009).

From around 1984, the I-U for the developed countries fell and global prices for commodities fell, albeit a rising I-U for the 'Asian tiger economies'. From around 2000, the I-U of emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil began rising. China's rising I-U in particular was a key factor in the commodity boom of the 2000s. The emerging economies' rising I-U has brought them into direct competition with developed countries with regards to accessing resources. The world's four biggest economies contribute 69% of global GDP and are the four biggest markets for minerals. They are USA, EU, China and Japan. These are shown in Figure 8 below:




Figure 8: Top four economies in the world and their share of global GDP (Source: World Economic Forum, 2017)

Table 3 shows in detail how these four economies (shaded) dominate the demand side of the market for 15 important minerals. Of the 73 top 5 positions shown, these four economies hold 71% of them, taking up all top 5 positions for alumina, cobalt ore and rare earth minerals.

The four biggest economies are particularly dependent on imports for important minerals. Their governments have identified a combined 51 minerals as critical minerals as shown in Table 5. Of these 51 minerals, only three are critical to all four economies - cobalt, niobium and tantalum. A further eight minerals are critical to three of the four economies and these are: aluminium, chromium, indium, manganese, platinum group metals, rare earth elements, tin and tungsten. To ensure their access to critical minerals, these nations are engaging in demand-side resource nationalism using strategies shown in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Strategies used in implementing resource nationalism by the US, EU, China and Japan

	Strategy	USA	EU	China	Japan
i.	**Encouraging state owned enterprises and private sector players to invest in mining in other countries**			X	X
ii.	**Promoting domestic production of minerals**	X	X		
iii.	**Seeking new supplies from 'friendlier' locations and diversifying suppliers**	X		X	

iv.	**Discouraging resource nationalism in other countries**		X		
v.	**Promoting recycling and efficient use of mineral resources**		X		X
vi.	**Protecting private sector players mining in other countries**		X		
vii.	**Challenging tools of resource nationalism such as export restrictions at the World Trade Organization**		X		
viii.	**Providing education on the retrogressive-ness of some resource nationalism tools such as export restrictions**		X		
ix.	**Entering into long-term supply contracts**			X	
x.	**Loan / infrastructure – for – minerals deals**			X	
xi.	**Avoiding interference in politics of other countries**			X	
xii.	**Disrupting consolidation of suppliers**			X	
xiii.	**Substitution of critical minerals**				X
xiv.	**Stockpiling of critical minerals**				X

These strategies are detailed as outlined below:

USA

The US relies strongly on importation of particular minerals that are important for its economy and defence industry. This is compounded by the fact that since the middle of the previous century, the US's share of global mineral production has declined and so has its share of global mineral consumption, as it faces more competition from other nations (Cameron, 1973). US policymakers recognize this as a strategic vulnerability for the country's security and economy as they can be affected by disruptions to the supply of these minerals through natural disasters, the policies of other nations such as resource nationalism or other events.

In December 2017, President Trump signed an executive order that mandates the US Government to take measures to mitigate this vulnerability through, among other actions, promoting its domestic mining industry and finding new supplies of critical minerals (Trump, 2017). The Trump Administration then released a draft list of 35 critical mineral commodities, shown in Table 5 (Department of the Interior, 2018). The list expands on the 23 critical minerals identified by the United States Geological Service in 2017 (USGS, 2017). US researchers have previously noted that there is a concentration of four strategic minerals in Southern Africa: cobalt, chromium, platinum group metals and high-quality manganese (Burgess and Beilstein, 2013).

EU

As part of its Raw Materials Initiative strategy, the European Union has identified 27 critical materials[19] (shown in Table 5). The strategy has three pillars:

1. Diplomatically engaging mineral producing countries to discourage the use of measures that distort markets and thereby negatively affect the EU's manufacturing sector. Such measures include resource nationalism tools such as export restrictions, price-fixing and laws that restrict investment (European Commission, 2018).
2. Creating an enabling environment for mining within the EU (European Commission, 2018).
3. Promoting recycling and efficient use of mineral resources.

Already, the EU is ensuring rules against export restrictions are included in trade deals that it enters – the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), EU-Singapore FTA and the EU and

[19] 26 are minerals while the other is natural rubber

Central America, and Colombia/Peru FTAs all include clauses on export restrictions.

Previously, the EU had identified 14 critical minerals in 2010 and advocated for the following policy actions:

- Developing mechanisms to protect EU investments in the mining sectors of foreign countries akin to protection accorded to State-backed investors from countries like China.
- Utilizing the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement mechanisms to develop clear legal precedents for securing supplies of minerals in the face of trade barriers, as a measure of improving on current General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) measures which lack sufficient clarity and scope.
- Bilaterally engaging countries engaging in resource nationalism and other policy measures that distort mineral markets in order to discourage such policies.
- Raising awareness, in international fora, of the retrogressive economic impacts of export restrictions (European Commission, 2010).

Table 3: Top 5 importing countries of specified minerals (Sources: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017[20]

Metal	Copper ore	Iron ore	Aluminium ore	Gold	Raw nickel	Platinum	Cobalt ore	Chrome ore	Zinc ore and concentrates	Manganese ore	Rare Earths (2016)	Niobium, Tantalum, Vanadium and Zirconium (2016)	Fluorspar (2008)	Graphite (2016)	Tungsten ore (2016)
1	China	China	China	Switzerland	China	United States	China	China	South Korea	China	USA	China	EU	Japan	USA
2	Japan	Japan	USA	China	USA	Germany	Finland	Russia	China	India	Japan	Spain	USA	USA	China
3	South Korea	South Korea	Ireland	United Kingdom	Germany	Japan	Spain	Germany	Spain	South Korea	China	USA	Japan	Germany	Russia
4	India	Germany	Spain	United Arab Emirates (UAE)	Malaysia	China	Belgium	India	Belgium	Japan	Germany	India		South Korea	South Korea
5	Spain	France	Germany	Hong Kong	India	Hong Kong	Luxembourg	USA	Japan	Norway	United Kingdom	Malaysia		India	Malaysia

[20] Source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017 (https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/7601/)

Table 4: Top 5 producing countries of specified minerals (Sources: USGS Mineral Resources Program, 2018[21]; Investing News, 2018[22])

Metal (Year of data)	**Copper ore (2017)**	**Iron ore (2016)**	**Bauxite (2016)**	**Gold (2017)**	**Nickel ore (2016)**	**Platinum (2016)**	**Cobalt ore (2017)**	**Chrome ore (2012)**	**Zinc ore (2016)**	**Manganese ore (2016)**	**Rare Earths (2016)**	**Tantalum (2016)**	**Flourspar (2011)**	**Graphite (2016)**	**Tungsten (2016)**
1	Chile	Australia	Australia	China	Philippines	South Africa	DRC	South Africa	China	South Africa	China	DRC	China	China	China
2	Peru	Brazil	China	Australia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Kazakhstan	Peru	China	Australia	Rwanda	Mexico	India	Vietnam
3	China	China	Brazil	Russia	Canada	Zimbabwe	Australia	India	Australia	Australia	Russia	Brazil	Mongolia	Brazil	Russia
4	USA	India	Guinea	USA	Australia	Canada	Canada	Turkey	USA	Gabon	India	China	South Africa	Turkey	Bolivia
5	Australia	Russia	India	Canada	India	New Caledonia	Cuba	Russia	Mexico	Brazil	Brazil		Russia	North Korea	Austria
Other	DRC (6TH)	South Africa (7th)		South Africa (7th)				Zimbabwe (7th)					Namibia (8th)		

[21] Source: https://minerals.usgs.gov/mineralcommodityFS/index.html
[22] https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/

China

China dominates the demand and supply of a high number of minerals. Its growth is reliant on secured access to minerals. The country does not have an explicit plan for securing its access to minerals nor an explicit list of critical or strategic imported minerals, so this study utilizes a criticality assessment conducted by Yang et al (2013) and lists the critical minerals in Table 5. China has utilized several policy measures to secure its access to these critical minerals:

- Entering into long-term contracts with foreign companies that supply minerals, for example it has been reported that in 2010, a Chinese company entered into a 5-year agreement to buy almost all the manganese produced in South Africa (Burgess and Beilstein, 2013).
- Diversifying its sources of minerals (Moran, 2010),
- Provision of loans in exchange for access to minerals for example, in September 2017, China and Guinea reached an agreement whereby China would loan Guinea US$20 billion over close to 20 years in exchange for concessions on bauxite i.e. revenues from the bauxite projects will pay back the loan. Guinea intends to use the loan (of which US$ 3 billion was availed in 2017) on infrastructure which includes urban and highway roads, extension of its port, electricity transmission lines and a university. (World Bank, 2017). The loan guarantees three projects:
    i. An aluminium refinery to be built by China Power Investment Corporation, a state-owned enterprise,
    ii. A bauxite mine owned by Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (Chalco),[23]

[23] A listed subsidiary of Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco), key state-owned enterprise with direct supervision from China's Government

iii. A bauxite mine owned by China Henan International Cooperation Group, a parastatal supervised by the Henan Province of China.

- Not interfering in the domestic affairs of host countries, a policy that China has adhered to since 1955 (Pitso, 2015),
- Disrupting consolidation in the supply market as best evidenced by Chinalco playing the white knight[24] in preventing BHP's takeover by Rio Tinto in 2008. At the time, Rio Tinto were the largest and third-largest mining companies in the world, and together with Vale produced 70% of iron ore exports. The merger would have made China's steel industry vulnerable as BHP and Rio Tinto were its two largest suppliers of iron ore (Matthews, Cimilluca and Barta, 2008).
- Supporting its state-owned mining companies to invest in mining projects, for example in DRC, Chinese investment will ensure the country has 9 of the top 10 cobalt mines in the world by 2022, from 6 of the top 10 in 2017. In addition, Glencore agreed, in 2017, to sell a third of its cobalt production over 2018-2020 to a Chinese firm, GEM. Glencore's CEO, Ivan Glasenberg expressed concern over growing Chinese dominance of cobalt mining, demand and end-use. He also noted that given increasing resource nationalism in DRC, Glencore may sell its assets:

  "They may come with a number that blows the lights out. If we get that number, I've got to look after shareholders. I'm not here to look after the world politics, so we would sell it, yes." (Sanderson and Hume, 2018)

  Acacia Mining, Tanzania's leading gold producer has announced that it is considering selling part or all of its Tanzanian assets (Acacia Mining, 2018) following an increase in resource nationalism in the country amid rumours that Chinese investors are interested in buying the assets.

[24] A person or company that comes to the aid of a company encountering a hostile take-over

Japan

Japan is import-dependant for a large number of minerals and in 2012 its Government published the 'Resource Securement Strategy' which designates 30 minerals as strategic to Japan, listed in Table 5 (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2012). The resource strategy recommends the following:

- Investment in mining of critical minerals in other countries.
- Recycling of critical minerals.
- Substitution of critical minerals.
- Stockpiling of critical minerals.

Table 5: Critical minerals by economy (Sources: Interior Department, 2018; European Commission, 2010; Yang et al, 2013)

Mineral	USA	EU	China	Japan	Study countries that are a producer	Other study countries that have unworked deposits
1. Aluminium	X		X	X	Guinea, South Africa, Tanzania	
2. Antimony	X	X			South Africa	
3. Arsenic	X				Namibia	
4. Barite	X	X			South Africa	Zimbabwe*
5. Beryllium	X	X			DRC, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe	
6. Bismuth	X	X				
7. Borate		X				
8. Cadmium			X			
9. Caesium and Ribidium	X					

10. Chromium	X		X	X	South Africa, Zimbabwe	
11. Cobalt	X	X	X	X	DRC, Zimbabwe	Tanzania
12. Coking coal		X			South Africa, Zimbabwe	
13. Copper				X	DRC, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe	
14. Dysprosium				X		
15. Fluorspar	X	X			South Africa, Namibia	Tanzania
16. Gallium	X	X				DRC, Guinea, Namibia, South Africa
17. Germanium	X	X			DRC	
18. Gold				X	DRC, Guinea, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe	
19. Graphite	X	X			South Africa, Zimbabwe	
20. Hafnium	X	X				South Africa
21. Helium	X	X				
22. Indium	X	X		X	DRC	
23. Iron			X	X	Guinea, South Africa, Zimbabwe	
24. Lead				X	Namibia, South Africa	
25. Lithium	X				DRC, Namibia, Zimbabwe	
26. Magnesium	X	X				
27. Manganese	X		X	X	South Africa, Namibia	
28. Molybdenum				X		
29. Neodymium				X		
30. Nickel			X	X	South Africa, Zimbabwe	
31. Niobium	X	X	X	X	DRC	Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe
32. Phosphate rock		X			Tanzania, Zimbabwe	
33. Phosphorus		X				

34. Platinum-group metals	X	X		X	South Africa, Zimbabwe	
35. Potash	X					
36. Rare-earth elements	X	X		X		Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania
37. Rhenium	X					
38. Scandium		X				
39. Selenium	X				South Africa	South Africa
40. Silicon metal		X				
41. Silver				X	Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe	
42. Strontium	X					
43. Tantalum	X	X	X	X	DRC	Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe
44. Tellurium	X		X		South Africa	South Africa, Zimbabwe
45. Tin	X		X	X	DRC	Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe
46. Titanium	X				South Africa	
47. Tungsten	X	X		X	DRC	
48. Uranium	X				Namibia, South Africa	DRC, Namibia, Zimbabwe
49. Vanadium	X	X			South Africa	Namibia, Zimbabwe
50. Zinc				X	DRC, Namibia, South Africa	
51. Zirconium	X				South Africa	

*Ongoing exploration

4.3. Analysis

4.3.1. Colonialism

Resource nationalism in Africa has its roots in resource nationalism practiced by pre-colonial political leaders and that practiced by colonial powers outside and within Africa. During the 18th and 19th century era of mercantilism, the most sought for resources were gold, silver and

spices which were controlled by Portugal and Spain, the most powerful European states at the time. The rise of Britain, France and Netherlands led to conflicts between these emerging powers and the existing powerful states over the resources as the emerging powers sought to gain access to the resources. This was largely done through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose sole purpose was to trade on behalf of the state. Industrialization in the late 19th to early 20th centuries created demand for minerals and petroleum which were mostly found in Asia and Africa sparking the 'Scramble for Africa' and creation of colonial empires where each European state created a monopoly over its colonial resources (Burgess and Beilstein, 2013).

It has been argued that colonialism disrupted nascent modernization of African economies in the 19th century and denied African states the opportunity to develop endogenous institutions and institutional reform processes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). Colonial African states were in the form of

- *Dual economies* whereby states had coexisting and racialized modern (white settler) and traditional (indigenous African) economies. Modern economies were often aimed at exporting goods while traditional ones satisfied local demand. The modern economy benefited from low labour costs as incomes for indigenous African workers were kept low, as the modern economy absorbed labour from the surplus in the traditional economy (Singer, 1999). Legislation around rights to land was critical in creating the dual economies and in ensuring a pool of low-cost labour for among others, emerging industrial mining industries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are regarded as having been dual economies during colonial times.
- *Gate-keeper states* whereby governance of the state was conducted through balancing internal instability against external influencing factors. This was particularly common

in areas where colonial powers mainly sought to obtain resources and used their armies to contain local discontent. However, the colonial powers did not seek to effectively exercise authority over the states nor legitimize their control of them (Cooper, 2002). Gate-keeper states are characterized with post-independence political instability which often led to coups. The DRC and Guinea are considered to have been gate-keeper states.

It has been argued that both models created political incentives for not securing property rights and limited interest in providing public goods (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). The research findings show that:

i. **Resource nationalism was commonly practiced during colonialism**. Five of the six study countries practiced resource nationalism. The exception is Guinea, which was a part of French West Africa, a colony in which mining was not a priority as the French administration's focus was on agriculture.

ii. **The study countries used a limited number of tools to implement resource nationalism**. The study identified a total of eleven tools of resource nationalism that were implemented in the six study countries. In comparison, eighteen tools were identified in the post-independence phases for all six countries. Further, none of the six countries implemented a majority of the identified forms of resource nationalism – DRC, South Africa and Zimbabwe each implemented four forms of resource nationalism while Namibia implemented two and Tanzania only one.

iii. **Taxation was the most common resource nationalism tool used during colonialism**. Half of the study countries taxed their mining sectors i.e. Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

iv. **The resource nationalism tools were markedly different from one colony to the other**. DRC implemented four unique tools of resource nationalism that no other

colony in the study was implementing. Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe each had one unique tool of resource nationalism.

v. **Some of the colonial resource nationalism was in response to exogenous events.** The two World Wars impacted all the study countries as they were part of the European empires that were at war. During the wars, the colonial powers exercised control over which states could buy their colonies' mineral output while after the wars, affirmative action for white war veterans was practiced in Zimbabwe.

4.3.2. De-colonization

The colonial empires started crumbling after the WWII as African states started gaining independence. The European resource conflict gave way to the Cold War between the US and USSR whose arms race was highly dependent on resources such as uranium, chromium, copper, cobalt and iron ore. The importance of resources to the Cold War is epitomized by the words of the USSR's leader from 1966 to 1982, Leonid Brezhnev who stated:

"Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends, the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa."[25]

Gains made by the USSR in a largely socialist post-colonial Africa prompted the US to support the white settler regimes of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to maintain access to resources. With respect to Rhodesia, the USA, through the Byrd Amendment, allowed US companies to contravene UN sanctions and obtain chromium from Rhodesia which was under

[25] Words allegedly said to Somali President Siad Barre in 1973 in Prague (Source: CIA,1980, *From bombers and missiles to minerals)*

UN sanctions. In DRC, the USA backed the dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko against Soviet-backed rebels in Katanga in order to maintain access to copper and cobalt (Burgess and Beilstein, 2013).

All gate-keeper states in the study (Guinea and DRC) were granted independence, while all but one of the dual economy colonies (Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) had to engage in armed struggle to achieve independence. The exception, Tanzania, endured uprising in Zanzibar (a sub-region) for it to achieve its independence. The research findings provide some interesting insights:

The later a nation achieved its independence, the longer it took to implement resource nationalism and the less drastic the initial resource nationalism measures implemented. DRC, Guinea and Tanzania achieved independence between 1958 and 1961, and immediately kept foreign investment out of their mining sectors (mostly through nationalization). Zimbabwe which achieved independence in 1980, initiated resource nationalism almost immediately, however retained private sector participation while establishing state participation in both mining and minerals trading. Namibia and South Africa achieved independence in the 1990s and waited 14 and 8 years respectively before introducing laws and policies that had elements of resource nationalism, albeit very modest resource nationalism.

4.3.3. Impact of Neo-Colonialism on Resource Nationalism

The study countries are comparatively weaker in the mineral markets than the key buyers of minerals. The four biggest economies in the world (USA, EU, China and Japan) dominate the demand for most mineral resources, and China is itself also a key producer of

many minerals. In contrast, the study countries, while significant producers of particular minerals, do not dominate the supply side of the minerals market as much. This disparity, compounded by the dominance of the four big economies in international governance frameworks, makes the study countries much weaker in mineral markets. Bezemer and Jon-A-Pin (2013:110) determined that global integration for African countries between 1984 and 2003 continued to be based on resource extraction rather than other industrial sectors and they maintained that commodity MNC continued to be dominated by MDMs

The study countries are key sources for the handful of minerals that are critical for the majority of the world's biggest economies. While the USA, EU, China and Japan have listed a combined 51 minerals as critical to their economies, only 3 are critical to all four economies. These are cobalt, niobium and tantalum for which the DRC is a key producer[26]. A further 8 minerals are critical to three of the four biggest economies: aluminium, chromium, indium, manganese, PGMs, rare earth elements, tin and tungsten. Guinea is a key producer of bauxite (an ore of aluminium) and holds 27% of the world's reserves. South Africa is by far the largest producer of chromium in the world while Zimbabwe is ranked the 7th top producer of chromium. South Africa also holds the largest reserves of chromium in the world while Zimbabwe has the second largest resource – together South Africa and Zimbabwe hold 90% of the chromium reserves and resources in the world. South Africa is also the leading producer of manganese and holds 29% of the world's reserves of the minerals. Likewise, for PGMs, South Africa and Zimbabwe account for 75% of global production and 93% of world reserves. DRC is one of the top ten producers of tin and holds 4% of global reserves (ITRI, 2016).

[26] Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa and Zimbabwe host sizable deposits of the minerals

The four big economies are increasing implementing strategies to secure their access to minerals that are critical to their economies. It is interesting to note that the economies are each implementing starkly different strategies: the US is looking for new sources of minerals from friendlier jurisdictions including its own territory; the EU is fighting resource nationalism (particularly export restrictions) and promoting domestic production and recycling; China is embarking on a charm offensive in Africa, providing infrastructure and aid in exchange for resources, getting its state owned enterprises to invest in mining and fighting the formation of monopolies in supplies of critical minerals; while Japan is investing in technology to recycle and find substitutes for critical minerals while encouraging its private sector to invest in mining in other countries.

The US and EU are engaging in resource nationalism in DRC. Section 1502 of the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act requires companies registered on the US stock market to disclose to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) when they source gold, tantalum, tin and from DRC and its neighbouring countries, and note whether the minerals are connected to sites of conflict (Wolfe, 2015). The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains make definitions of conflict minerals in the eastern DRC as the 'three Ts' (tantalum, tin and tungsten) and gold. The legislation has been criticized for failing to reduce conflict but rather leading to mine closures, lower mineral prices and ultimately to unemployment and deeper poverty (Raghavan, 2014).

CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS ON RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN AFRICA

5.1. Introduction

Politics is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as the actions that take place in governing a jurisdiction, including seeking and implementing the powers utilized to govern. Politics can also be understood as bargaining and contestation between different groups which have opposing claims to rights, control of the state and its resources (Department for International Development, 2014). These different groups often have principles, doctrines and ideals for how the State should be governed and how society should be organized within it (Jansonn, 1959). These are called political ideologies.

The political organization of states consists of the overall structure of the state, the source of the power of government and the ideology of those in power. Types of political structures are separation, federal states, integrated state and administrative state. Types of power sources include democracy (citizens have power), oligarchy (an elite minority have power) and autocracy (power is held by one person).

During the 19th and 20th centuries, the major political ideologies in the world were communism, socialism, conservatism, liberalism and fascism (Heywood, 2003). The 20th century was dominated by a global battle between two politico-economic ideologies: communism and liberalism (capitalism being its economic ideology), epitomized by the Cold War between the USA and USSR (1944 to 1991). However, communism lost to capitalism in the last quarter of the 20th century, particularly due to the collapse of the USSR. The fall of communism also

affected socialism both in its democratic and revolutionary forms, particularly in the loss of faith in central planning of the economy. Many democratic socialists have accepted free market policies espoused by capitalism and liberalism. The victory of liberalism over communism did not however, lead to universal acceptance of liberalism but led to the emergence of ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism, particularly in developing countries (Heywood, 2003).

Given the high levels of inequality and poverty, within the first five years of achieving independence, the majority of the study countries embarked on resource nationalism in an attempt to spread the benefits of natural resource extraction. This included:

Table 6: Forms of resource Nationalism practiced during the first five years of Independence

Form of resource nationalism	DRC	Guinea	Namibia	South Africa	Tanzania	Zimbabwe	Number of countries
1. **Nationalization of the mining sector**	X				X		2
2. **Limiting foreign investment in the mining sector**		X					1
3. **Establishment of state-owned mining companies**						X	1
4. **Establishment of state-owned enterprises to market minerals**						X	1

5. **State participation in mineral beneficiation**						X	1
6. **State purchase of equity in mining companies**						X	1

Post-Independence:

The post-Independence era shows a trend of increasing resource nationalism in the study countries. In addition, there is also an increase in the number of forms of resource nationalism as shown in the table below:

Table 7: Forms of resource nationalism practiced in the post-independence eras

Form of resource nationalism	**DRC**	**Guinea**	**Namibia**	**South Africa**	**Tanzania**	**Zimbabwe**	Number of countries
1. Domestication of mining companies	X				X		2
2. Mandatory free equity for Government / joint venture with a mining SOE	X	X			X		3
3. Right of Government to purchase equity					X		1
4. Export tax / authorisations	X	X		X	X	X	5

5. Export tax for un-beneficiated minerals			X			X	2
6. Export ban on un-beneficiated minerals					X	X	2
7. Reservation of ASM for locals	X					X	2
8. Royalties and other forms of taxation	X	X	X	X	X	X	6
9. Expropriation of mining / exploration rights		X				X	2
10. Review of Mining contracts		X	X[27]		X		3
11. Local Content requirements		X			X	X	3
12. Requirement for community development agreements / community equity		X				X	2
13. Establishment of state-owned mining enterprise			X			X	2
14. Economic empowerment of previously			X	X		X	3

[27] No contracts have yet been reviewed, but legislation changes have made it possible to conduct reviews

disadvantaged population groups							
15. State approval of transfer of mining license			X				1
16. Requirement for local beneficiation					X		
17. Termination of international investment agreements				X			1
18. Ban on international arbitration over mining disputes					X		1
Number of identified forms of resource nationalism practiced	5	7	5	4	10	10	

5.2. Key Findings

5.2.1. Regional political ideology

Regional political institutions have an impact on resource nationalism. It has been noted that regional blocs are increasingly advocating for collective guardianship of natural resources and minimization of competition for resources within the region. The AU's Committee of the Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) held discussions in 2013 on protecting

the member countries' sovereign rights to their natural resources. The UK Government has noted that such collective could lead to increased resource nationalism (UK Government, 2014).

The period of de-colonialism gave rise to many ideological political parties in Africa (Morgenthau, 1964). Socialism was particularly popular and was adhered to in several variations by leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea (Conroy-Krutz and Lewis, 2011) and their political parties: TANU and *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), respectively. Liberalism and capitalism were also adopted by some leaders such as Ivory Coast's Felix Boigny, and many of the early opposition leaders. The escalation of the Cold War at the global level, led to polarized alignment at a regional level and at inter-party level with either the Capitalist West or Socialist East.

In the early 1960s, socialist leaders including Nkrumah and Toure formed the Casablanca bloc which advocated for a federation of African countries. In contrast, other countries formed the Monrovia group that sought retention of national sovereignty but regional economic cooperation. In 1963 the groups formally merged to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Even Zimbabwe and South Africa which in the 1960s and 1970s were ruled by white minority governments engaged in resource nationalism in response to external pressure for them to allow for majority rule. Socialist-leaning leaders adopted nationalization as a means to rapidly deliver economic benefits to previously disadvantaged masses, as is evidenced by the nationalization of mines in Tanzania and nationalization of land in Guinea (Kahn, 2014). Capitalist-leaning countries on the other hand welcomed investment from Western multi-national companies.

The post-Cold War era witnessed a significant decrease in the emphasis on ideology by political parties in most African countries (Conroy-Krutz and Lewis, 2011). In its place emerged politics of personality and patronage, not acceptance of liberalism as might have been expected. However, the rise of the Washington Consensus based on liberalism, after the fall of the USSR, some staunchly socialist parties began embracing capitalist practices. This includes the CCP of Tanzania (formerly TANU) and Namibia's SWAPO.

The formation of the African Union in 2002 saw the continental consensus on democracy as a source of power in the region and an implied preference for free market polices which in turn attracted foreign investors. The rapid influx of FDI led to crony capitalism with political elites in some countries (e.g. in South Africa and Zimbabwe), and social discontent in others which led to the rise of nationalist opposition and/or ethnically motivated violence such as happened in DRC and ruling politicians to implement resource nationalism (Bezemer and Jong-A-Pin, 2013) which has happened in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Many academics have advocated for creating developmental states in Africa which in turn has at its core, the promotion of state intervention and state capitalism (Kahn, 2014). These give the political justification for resource nationalism.

5.2.2. Regional Initiatives

African Union

The AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) have made an argument for state intervention in the economy (UNECA, 2011). In 2009, the AU adopted the African Mining Vision (AMV) of optimization of production, transparency and equity in the

continent's mining industry as a means to generate socio-economic development and sustainable growth (African Union, 2009). The Vision provides a guidance on deriving sustainable development from the mining sector and prescribes actions, some of which are tools of resource nationalism such as local beneficiation and state participation in mining through public-private partnerships (PPPs).

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

DRC, Namibia, Tanzania, South Africa and Zimbabwe are members of SADC, a regional body established in 1992 and comprised of 15 Southern African and Central African countries. In 2000, SADC member states ratified the SADC Mining Protocol which called for harmonization of mining policies in the region among other things. Mining Ministers of SADC countries then approved a Mining Strategic Plan to implement the Mining Protocol. In 2004 SADC adopted a resolution, the 'Harmonization of Mining Policies, Standards, Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks in Southern Africa.' The recommendations of this resolution include some tools of resource nationalism such as: States have a right to purchase equity in mining companies on commercial terms, use of taxes and royalties (including additional profit taxes) to generate revenues from mining, promotion of beneficiation, empowerment of historically disadvantage population groups (UNECA, 2004).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Guinea is a member of ECOWAS, a regional body which was established 1975 and is comprised of 15 West African countries. In 2009 ECOWAS' members adopted a resolution, the 'ECOWAS Directive on the Harmonization of Guiding Principles and Policies in the Mining Sector', to develop a common mining policy which includes tools of resource nationalism such as: state ownership of sub-soil mineral resources, use of taxes to generate

revenues from mining, right of states to take up a stake in mining companies[28], preferential employment for citizens (ECOWAS, 2009).

5.2.2. Democratic Republic of Congo

The DRC has, since its independence, been led by four different leaders with four very different political ideologies. However, they have all been autocratic and democracy has been weak in DRC since its independence. The Cold War and international interest in DRC's resources have been very influential in how resource nationalism has been implemented in the country.

Joseph Kasabvu (1960 - 1965)

The first elections in independent DRC held in 1960 did not produce an outright winner leading to a coalition government where Joseph Kasabvu, an avowed conservatist, assuming the Presidency (a largely ceremonial role) while Patrice Lumumba, a socialist, became the Prime Minister (head of Government). Kasabvu advocated for a federal system of governance while Lumumba preferred a centralized system (Tanner, 1961). In addition, Patrice Lumumba immediately implemented resource nationalism, demanding that the US negotiate a new agreement with his Government over access to uranium in the country. The Belgian owners of the Shinkolobwe uranium mine decided to leave and sealed the mine with concrete.

There was instability from the start epitomized by the occurrence of a military mutiny and secession attempts (with Belgian support) by the two richest provinces, Katanga and Kasai. To mitigate the chaos, the UN deployed peacekeepers while Lumumba asked for Soviet support

[28] The shares will be 'special' and have unique terms applied to them

in fighting the secessionists. The Soviet involvement led to conflict between Kasabvu and Lumumba who each announced that they had fired the other in 1961. Mobutu Sese Seko, the head of the army, interceded on behalf of Kasabvu expelling the Soviets and arresting Lumumba. Lumumba was handed over to Katanga officials leading to his assassination by local political opponents supported by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Belgian government (Weissman, 2015).

A full-scale civil war ensued with the UN-backed Government fighting Soviet-backed pro-Lumumba fighters and the Belgium-backed secessionists until they defeated both in 1963. A rebel movement, of which Laurent Kabila was part of, rose up in the East of the country with support from USSR, China and Cuba however they were defeated by 1964 following the intervention of the UN, US and Belgium on Government's behalf. The end of the war paved way for elections in 1965 which led to a political crisis. Again, Mobutu executed a bloodless coup with Western support in 1965 assuming control of the country.

Mobutu Sese Seko (1965 – 1997)

Mobutu was an absolutist who opposed Communism. He dissolved Parliament, abolished the Prime Minister position, merged provinces, played ethnic groups against one another and created a one-party state. Like Lumumba, he believed in strong central government. The same year, he nationalized the mining industry without compensation and turned the UMHK into a state-owned enterprise (SOE), Gecamines succeeded in continuing mine production: between 1975 and 1990, DRC (then named Zaire) produced between 355 000 and 480 000 tonnes a year. However, poor governance led to limited reinvestment in the mines leading to falling production and by 1996, production had fallen below 30 000 tons a year (Sergeant, 2013).

Mobutu's tenure was characterized by corruption, political repression and economic mismanagement (Nugent, 2004). The GDP of the country fell by 65% from 1967 to 1997 (Gondola, 2002).

In 1991 growing discontent, riots by soldiers and the change of the global politics following the end of the Cold War, forced him to allow for opposition parties to register. He formed a coalition government which was perpetually in crisis while ethnic rebel movements in the east of the country captured large portions of territory. The 1994 Rwanda genocide precipitated a rebel movement backed by Uganda and Rwanda and led by Laurent Kabila which defeated Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, forcing him to flee into exile.

Laurent-Desire Kabila (1997 – 2001)

Kabila was a Marxist who believed in socialism and at one time worked with Che Guevara who described Kabila as having leadership qualities but lacking seriousness. However, as president, his policies were a blend of collectivism and capitalism (Edgerton, n.d.). He immediately suspended the constitution upon assuming power. Despite initial optimism, Kabila continued Mobutu's mismanagement leading Uganda and Rwanda to back a new rebellion against him sparking the second civil war. Kabila found new allies in Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe who helped him fight the rebels. In 2001 Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard upon the instigation of Rwanda.

Joseph Kabila (2001 to date)

Laurent Kabila's son, Joseph succeeded him. He is an autocrat who has engaged in crony capitalism. In 2002, Joseph Kabila's Government, with the support of the World Bank

introduced a mining code[29] that attracted investment into the mining sector (Schoutheete, Hollanders and Jannone, 2016). When the second civil war ended in 2003, copper production had dropped to 9,000 tonnes – by 2014, the output was 1 million tonnes. The mining code was successful in attracting investment however it did not ensure fair sharing of the benefits of the commodity boom. The mining code includes elements of resource nationalism that include:

- Requirement for mining companies be locally registered
- Free carry for the government of 5% or joint venture with a state-owned company (such as Gécamines).
- Export tax of 10%
- Reservation of ASM for DRC nationals
- Introduction of royalties (Le Roux and Bustin, 2017)

Despite surviving two coup attempts, Joseph Kabila restored Constitutionalism in 2005 and reintroduced elections which he won in 2006 and 2011. The 2011 elections were particularly contentious. Rebel activity has been a constant in the east of the country while riots and violent repression of political opposition abound in the rest of the country (BBC News, 2016). Elections were due in 2016 with term limits meaning Kabila's tenure ought to have ended, however they have not been conducted as a new law requires that a census be conducted first.

Amendments to the mining code began in 2011, at the height of the resource boom, and culminated in the signing into law of an amended mining code on 10 March 2018. The amendment's explanatory statement notes one of the three aims of the code is to: "enhance the Government's control over the mining sector" (Schoutheete, Hollanders and Jannone, 2016).

[29] Act No 007/2002 of 11 July 2002

The process of amending of the law has witnessed conflict between Government and industry. The new mining code contains elements of resource nationalism such as:

- The State's free carry (which cannot be diluted) has been increased from 5% to 10% and will increase by 5% every time a mining licence is renewed.
- Indigenization clauses which require 10% ownership of new mining companies by Congolese citizens.
- Increasing royalties from 2% to 3.5% for base, precious and non-ferrous metals.
- Categorizing strategic minerals for which a 10% royalty will be charged.
- Increasing taxes on profits from 30% to 35%
- Introducing capital gains tax on sale of interests in mining companies
- Raise tax charges on imports of mining equipment and machinery
- Requirement for government approval of changes in control of a mining title
- Termination of the 10-year stability clause in the 2002 mining code and introduction of a 5-year stability clause (Asselineau, 2018)

Introducing a 50% tax on "super profits" which are defined as profits made when commodity prices exceed the reference price used in the mine's feasibility study by above 25% (Leon, 2013).

5.2.3. Guinea

Sekou Toure (1957 – 1984)

It has been noted that modern political organization in Guinea is rooted in urban ethnic interest groups. The local French parties introduced indigenous Guineans to Marxism, who in turned began forming political parties, which were divided on demographic lines. The main parties

were the radical communist and anti-colonialist PDG which comprised of trade unions and urban youth, and the moderate BAG which mainly comprised of traditional leaders and senior civil servants. The PDG emerged as the pre-eminent party that led the country into independence, and it suppressed the opposition's power base – traditional leaders leading to opposition parties joining the PDG and effectively creating a one-party state under President Sekou Toure (Kaba, 1977). Political suppression continued to create stability throughout Toure's tenure.

President Toure's implemented a modified form of socialism under which the financial, transport and public utility sectors were nationalized but capitalist control of key economic sectors namely mining, and agriculture was retained (though land was nationalized). President Toure implemented moderate resource nationalism as bauxite mining and processing companies were not nationalised, while the State acquired 49% shareholding in the largest bauxite mining and processing company, an American firm, now ALCOA (65% of profits from the firm went to the State). This allowed Guinea to obtain a US-guaranteed World Bank loan with which Guinea built a new city, railway and port (Kaba, 1977). A French company which drastically reduced operations after Guinea's independence had its assets nationalized and then transformed into a joint venture with a Canadian firm.

Sekou Toure's reign was plagued with political suppression and wealth accumulation by an elite close to the President, including his family. This created social discontent which led to a Portugal supported coup attempt in 1971 which was foiled. Toure escalated repression, political imprisonments and execution in its aftermath. In 1984, Toure died and the military led by Colonel Lansana Conte toppled the PDG from power.

Lansana Conte (1984 - 2008)

Conte implemented authoritarian liberalism. Upon obtaining power, Conte immediately reformed both the political and economic landscape of Guinea. Politically, he dismantled the PDG, suspended the authoritarian constitution (a new one was introduced in 1990), reformed the judiciary, freed all political prisoners and committed to protecting human rights. The new Constitution led to the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1993 with Conte winning the elections. Economically he devalued the currency, promoted the private sector and reduced government expenditure which was welcomed by the IMF and West.

The World Bank and IMF supported Guinea in developing a new mining legislation in 1986 and an investment code in 1987 which reversed some elements of resource nationalism by providing protection against nationalization and retained others such as export requirements and state participation. Limited FDI was forthcoming and the mining code was revised in 1995, further reducing resource nationalism by limiting state participation and reducing the tax burden. This led to increased FDI (Brabant and Heurzeau, 2016). Conte's tenure was relatively unstable with contested elections and referendums, another foiled coup attempt, an unsuccessful assassination attempt, riots, high levels of corruption[30] and resignation by a Prime Minister. President Conte died in 2008 and the army immediately seized power with Captain Moussa Dadis Camara assuming the powers of the Presidency.

Moussa Dadis Camara (2008-2009)

The short-lived tenure of Camara was marked with human rights abuses by state security leading to censure of the Camara Adminstration by the AU, US and EU. In 2009 Camara was

[30] the 2006 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranked Guinea as the second most corrupt country in the world

seriously injured in an assassination attempt forcing him out of power. Camara set up Commissions to revise the mining law and in 2009 the Mines Minister was arrested.

Sekouba Konate (2009 – 2010)

Konate, who was Vice President and Minister of Defence, succeeded Camara as Acting President. He organized elections which restored multi-party democracy in the country. He did not contest the elections and was appointed head of AU's military force after the elections.

Alpha Conde (2010 to date)

A veteran opposition politician, Alpha Conde won the contentious 2010 elections and has been implementing liberalism and free market policies with an authoritarian hue. His tenure has however been marred by accusations of corruption and election rigging and, human rights abused by the security sector (Global Witness, 2016). Conde made a revision of the mining code his priority and a revised code was produced in 2011. This was at the height of the commodity boom and the code increased resource nationalism through introduction of free carry for the State, requirements for community development agreements and increased tax burden. The President also launched a contract renegotiation process which was concluded in 2016. However, the end of the commodity boom forced a revision of the mining code in 2013 in which the tax burden was reduced.

5.2.4. Namibia

Sam Nujoma (1990 – 2005)

Sam Nujoma implemented free market policies though he is regarded as having grown authoritarian over time. While Nujoma used socialist rhetoric while fighting for independence,

he did not implement socialist policies as President. He however advocated for land reform and wealth redistribution as a means of addressing Namibia's high inequality (Nujoma, 2001). The level of inequality created by colonialism in Namibia is best epitomized by the fact that at Independence in 1990, 0.2% of the population owned 74% of the arable land (Tapscott, 1994). Just after Independence, the Namibian Government introduced the Foreign Investments Act in 1990 and the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act in 1992. The former states that foreign investors cannot be required to provide the Government with free carry or transfer their ownership of a business to the Government or a Namibian citizen. The Diamond Act was introduced in 1999.

Under Nujoma, Namibia began implementing resource nationalism. In 2004, royalties were introduced (Mobbs, 2008). Currently royalties range from 2% on industrial minerals and semi-precious stones, to 10% on rough diamonds, emeralds, rubies and sapphires (Epangelo, 2015). Sam Nujoma served three terms as President and stepped down in 2004.

Hifikepunye Pohamba (2005 – 2015)

Pohamba served two terms as Namibian President under which he continued Nujoma's policies with an elevated implementation of resource nationalism including expropriation of land from white farmers which began in 2005 (BBC News, 2017). In 2008, the Government established Epangelo, a state-owned enterprise to participate in the mining industry then in 2011, the Namibian Cabinet declared certain minerals as strategic minerals.[31] New licences for strategic minerals can only be issued to a state-owned enterprise (SOE) which can then enter into a joint venture with investors. In 2011, the Income Tax Act was amended to make income tax applicable to the sale of mining companies or shares of mining companies. The income tax also

[31] These are: coal, copper, diamonds, gold, rare earth minerals and uranium.

applies an income tax rate of 55% on diamond mining and diamond mining service companies, 37.5% on all other mining companies, both of which are higher than the 33% charged to other sectors of the economy. In 2015, the Cabinet introduced the New Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework which requires companies to sell at least 25% of their shares to previously disadvantaged people.

He fought corruption throughout his tenure and was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Prize for leadership granted to leaders who improve livelihoods and relinquish power in a Constitutional manner. In 2014, the UK High Commission in Namibia noted that the Government has implemented resource nationalism in a pragmatic way which has been both responsive to public demand for it and has had limited impact on investment perceptions (UK High Commission in Namibia, 2014).

Hage Geingob (2015 to date)

Hage Geingob previously served as Prime Minister under both Sam Nujoma and Pohamba. He assumed the Presidency in 2015 and has continued the trend of increasing resource nationalism. In 2016, the Namibia Investment Promotion Act was promulgated to repeal the Foreign Investments Act of 1990. It notes that while existing investment contracts remain in place, they can now be reviewed by the State. The Act also states that investors cannot change ownership or control of an investment or transfer a mining license without approval from Government. The Export Levy Act was enacted in 2016 and came into effect on 1 June 2017. It introduces an export levy of between 0% and 2% for un-beneficiated exports of minerals (International Comparative Legal Guides, 2017).

5.2.5. South Africa

Nelson Mandela (1994 – 1999)

Once an avowed socialist who had committed to the nationalization of mines, Mandela dropped socialism at the eve of Independence and embraced libertarianism and capitalism. At Independence, attained in 1994, South Africa was very unequal with six companies controlling 85% of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Hirsch, 2005). In his five-year tenure, Mandela adhered to the Washington Consensus (Muthien, Khosa and Magubane, 2000) and addressed inequality by increasing social safety nets. He however made no reforms in the mining sector.

Thabo Mbeki (1999 – 2008); Kgalema Monthlante (2008-2009)

Thabo Mbeki is regarded as having had no specific political ideology (Jacobs and Calland, 2003). Under Mbeki, a modern mining law, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) was enacted in 2002 and came into effect in 2004. The law gave custodian of all minerals to the State thereby ending private ownership of mineral rights and implementing the Freedom Charter's call. This conversion was unsuccessfully challenged as an indirect expropriation of mineral rights in 2007 by Finstone Sarl group before the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).[32] The conversion allowed for later implementation of resource nationalism strategies such as the introduction of royalties in 2009 through the Mineral and Petroleum Royalties Act of 2008 which are designed to raise revenue for the Government, encourage beneficiation and target economic rents (Cawood and Oshokoya, 2013). Mbeki lost popularity due to local crises such as his handling of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, crony corruption, the electricity crisis and his political rivalry with

[32] Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01.

Jacob Zuma (Jacobs, 2010). Jacob Zuma successfully challenged Mbeki for the ANC Presidency at the ANC's 52nd Conference held in 2007. At the same Conference, the ANC made a resolution to prioritize the mining sector's developmental and employment impact over profit maximization for the sector (African National Congress, 2012). Mbeki was forced to resign in 2008 and Kgalema Motlante completed his term of office to 2009.

Jacob Zuma (2009 – 2018)

Jacob Zuma described himself as a socialist and implemented leftist policies. These included the introduction of a Mining Charter in 2010 which required that any new mining companies established after 2010 be 26% owned by historically disadvantaged South Africans.[33] He also introduced export permits and export levies for some minerals.

The unequal distribution of the rents generated in the commodity super-cycle (2001 to 2011) precipitated calls for nationalization of mines particularly from the ANC's Youth League and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). However, nationalization was shunned by the political leadership because of the anticipated economic costs (Andreasson, 2015). Under President Zuma, the Government became increasingly populist (Shain, 2017) and introduced further elements of resource nationalism particularly The Protection of Investment Act which was passed in 2015 and gives the President the power to terminate investment treaties. This contravenes the SADC Protocol (Leon, 2017). President Zuma terminated investment treaties with 14 European countries during his term in office.[34] In 2017, a new Mining Charter (the Reviewed Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Charter of the South African Mining and Minerals Industry) was introduced requiring at least 51% shareholding by black South

[33] This refers to a citizen of South Africa who was disenfranchised under apartheid policy, women and people living with disabilities.
[34] In 2012, South Africa was party to 59 investment treaties.

Africans by applicants for a new prospecting right and at least 30% for new mining rights. The Chamber of Mines and seven other applicants challenged the Mining Charter in the High Court and Government, under President Zuma suspended its implementation pending the outcome of the Court case.

Zuma also began the process of amending the MPRDA, however he resigned before it was enacted and before the courts adjudged the Mining Charter case. The amendment of the MPRDA proposed to give the Minister responsible for the mining industry the power to make local beneficiation a requirement for mineral or its product and provide the State with free carry of 20% in all exploration and production rights[35] (Jackson and Malesa, 2017). The proposed new Mining Charter.

Cyril Ramaphosa (2018 to date)

Cyril Ramaphosa was Nelson Mandela's preferred successor and played a key role in independence negotiations. He is both a wealthy mining industrialist and an experienced mining trade unionist. He too has called himself a socialist but has become wealthy through capitalism. Three days into his term of office, on 19 February 2018, President Ramaphosa further postponed the implementation of the 2017 Mining Charter to allow for renegotiation of the Charter among stakeholders (The Presidency Republic of South Africa, 2018).

Despite Zuma's exit, resource nationalism remains rife. This is epitomized by the passing of the Parliamentary motion to make amendments to the Constitution allowing for expropriation of land without compensation on 27 February 2018 (Reuters, 2018).

[35] The State would also have the right to get more shares by purchasing them or through production sharing agreements

5.2.6. Tanzania

Julius Nyerere (1961 – 1985)

The first period of post-Independence Tanzania is known as the ujamaa (African socialism) period during which President Nyerere constructed a national identity for a nation with 130 languages (Engelbert and Dunn, 2013). Nyerere administered a one-party State under TANU. Nyerere did not view minerals and mining as foundational to national development and did not encourage the sector though some mines continued operating and new discoveries of gemstones and gold were made (Bryceson et al., 2012). Geita Mine, which had remained as the last large-scale mine, closed in 1966. Nyerere's Administration became leftist in 1967 codifying its commitment to socialism and Pan-Africanism in the Arusha Declaration. This led to the nationalization of major sectors of the economy including the mining industry which was run by a state-owned enterprise, STAMICO. Contribution of mining to GDP fell from 10% to 2% during this period (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016) while official annual gold production fell from 3.5 tonnes in the mid-60s to 0.01 tonnes in the early 70s. The artisanal mining sector went underground, and it smuggled its gold and gemstone output out of the country (Dreschler, 2001).

In 1979, the Mining Act was passed and with it the Government abandonment its nationalization stance. The Act provided citizens with small-scale mining rights and allowed for large-scale mining only if investors entered into partnerships with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Jonsson and Fold, 2011). The law also required new mining companies to present local procurement plans (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016). In 1983, the Small Scale Mining Policy Paper of 1983 was published which encouraged citizens to supplement incomes by taking part

in small-scale mining. The low agricultural commodity prices and IMF-sanctioned structural adjustment programme eroded incomes from smallholder farming and led to an increase in small-scale mining (Chachage, 1995). The Government also broke up STAMICO's monopoly on gold buying to allow private sector involvement. By 1992, official gold exports were at 4.5 tonnes. Nyerere retired from the Presidency in 1985.

Ali Hasssan Mwinyi (1985 – 1995)

Mwinyi reversed Nyerere's socialist policies, relaxing import restrictions and promoting the private sector (Brennan and Burton, 2007). He introduced a multi-party democracy in 1992 and led Chama Cha Mapinduzi (formerly TANU) to electoral victory.

Benjamin Mkapa (1995 – 2005)

Mkapa is a libertarianist who continued the reversal of socialism, privatizing SOEs and implementing free market policies. His policies were approved by the IMF and World Bank which cancelled some of Tanzania's external debt. The World Bank provided the government with technical assistance to produce the Mineral Policy in 1997, Investment Act in 1997, Mining Act in 1998 and Mining Regulations in 1999. The Mining Act introduced the concept of mining development agreements (MDAs) – contracts that are negotiated between the Government and mining companies (Paget, 2017). These modern pieces of legislation led to an influx in foreign direct investment in the mining sector. In just ten years, gold production had risen to 50 tonnes (Emel and Huber, 2008). The MDAs were however not publicly disclosed, and they are claimed to have included tax exemptions, lower royalty rates and legal protections from Government's arbitrary changes to the MDAs (Paget, 2017).

Despite increase in FDI and output, critics claimed that Government was not receiving a fair share of mining rents, that communities and small-scale miners were not protected from evictions by large-scale mines (Bryceson et al., 2012) and that mining companies had corruptly been granted attractive concessions (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016). The mining fiscal regimes did not capture a fair share of the windfalls that came with the commodity boom of the 2000s as most investors were new and were enjoying a five-year period of VAT and duty exemption. The price of gold more than tripled between 2001 and 2009 however Government revenue from mining remained relatively flat over that period (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016).

Dr. Jakaya Kikwete (2005 – 2015)

Kikwete balanced the free market orientation of Mkapa with the redistributive demands of the public. President Kikwete established the Presidential Mining Review Committee in 2007 which recommended that the state enhance its share of benefits from large-scale mining (United Republic of Tanzania, 2008). In implementation of the recommendation, a new Mineral Policy was produced in 2009 and a new Mining Act was passed in 2010. The Policy and Act introduced elements of resource nationalism which include:

- Increased formalization of small-scale mining.
- Designation of more areas exclusively for small-scale mining.
- Increase of royalties from 3% to 4%.
- Requirement for large scale mining companies to list on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange.
- The right of the Government to acquire shares in all new mining projects.
- Local content requirements which are however weak and unbinding (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016).

The Law and Policy did not assuage the public discontent with the benefits being accrued from the mining sector to the national economy. The Tanzanian Government utilized tax exemptions to attract mining investment however these exemptions were not publicly divulged. By 2012, the tax incentives dished out by the Government across the economy amounted to 4.3% of GDP or USD 1.1 billion (Manson, 2013), equal to the amount of mineral rents generated in Tanzania which also amounted to 4.3% of GDP in 2012 (The World Bank, 2018). At the time, the IMF estimated that Tanzania's tax revenues, which amounted to 15% of GDP, had the potential to be 33% higher at 20% of GDP (Manson, 2013). Kinyondo and Lange (2016) found that there are seven large-scale gold mines in Tanzania of which five were established between 1999 and 2005. Of these five, by 2016, two had never paid corporate tax while the other three only started remitting corporate taxes after 7, 9 and 11 years of operations respectively. VAT exemptions provided to mines also affected their procurement strategies, as they opted for imports as rebates on locally procured goods took long to be processed (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016). This was widely covered in the media thereby generating public discontent.

Dr. John Magufuli (2015 to date)

Dr Magufuli was elected as Tanzanian President in 2015 and introduced widely-praised austerity and anti-corruption measures early on in his term of office. He has socialist leanings (Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, 2016). His key opponent, Edward Lawossa had campaigned on a resource nationalism platform, promising to renegotiate MDAs, Dr Magufuli responded to public discontent with national benefits from mining by:

- Introducing local content legislation in 2015 which however, was adjudged to be relatively weak as the Government sought to appease the public while not discouraging investment (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016).
- Introducing a ban on exports of mineral concentrates in March 2017 (Jamasmie, 2018).

- In July 2017, the 2010 Mining Act was amended[36] thereby increasing royalty rates from 4% to 6%, introducing a free carry of 16%[37] in shareholding for Government and introducing a 1% clearing fee as a levy on mineral exports.
- In July 2017, the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act[38] was passed. It prohibits international arbitration over mining disputes and enacts the ban on mineral concentrates.
- Also, in July 2017, the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-Negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act[39] was passed. It empowers the Government to renegotiate MDAs and effectively revokes existing MDAs.

Following the changes in legislation, the Government accused Acacia, the largest mining company in Tanzania, of understating gold exports and imposed a US$190 billion fine for unpaid taxes and stopped the mine's exports. Faced with a choice between international arbitration and negotiation, Barrick Gold (Acacia's majority shareholder) chose the latter. In October 2017, a settlement was reached whereby the Government of Tanzania would get 16% of the shares in each of the three mines owned by Acacia in Tanzania and US$300 million (Reuters, 2017). By then however, shares of Acacia had fallen by 69% from October 2013 (Jamasmie, 2018).

5.2.7. Zimbabwe

[36]http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/bills/1498723111-EXTRACTIVE%20INDUSTRY%20AND%20FINANCIAL%20LAWS-4.pdf
[37] With an entitlement to purchase 34% more.
[38]http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/bills/1498722623-PERMANENT%20SOVEREIGNTY.pdf
[39]http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/bills/1498722379-THE%20NATURAL%20RESOURCES%20CONTRACT.pdf

Robert Mugabe (1980 -2017)

Independence was achieved in 1980 with ZANU-PF winning the first elections catapulting Robert Mugabe to leadership of the country. A Marxist, Mugabe embarked on socialist policies that included elements of resource nationalism early on in his tenure:

- Establishing a state-owned mining enterprise in 1983, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), which took up struggling copper mines.
- In response to fears of transfer pricing, introducing another SOE, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) to market all minerals.
- Acquiring a controlling stake in ZISCO and in Hwange Colliery, against World Bank and IMF advice (Hollaway, 1997).

Despite these state interventions, the protection of property rights and influence of the private sector over Government's economic policy-making gave investors in the mining sector comfort. Mining shares on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) increased eighteen-fold between 1984 and 1990 (Bond, 2001).

Independent Zimbabwe received modest investment in mining between 1980 and 1993, receiving just US$150 million. An amendment to the Mines and Minerals Act in 1994 creating a mining licence that guarantees a 25-year lease, exemption from selling output through MMCZ and providing fiscal regime stabilization clauses, improved the mining investment climate (Hollaway, 1997). In 1994 BHP invested US$206 million in the platinum sector. This amendment was conducted during the IMF and World Bank recommended Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) which while rationalizing the state fiscal policies and liberalizing the economy, cut public sector jobs and increased poverty. It is estimated that ESAP led to the increase in the proportion of people living below the poverty line from 52.8% to 75.6% (Moore, 2003).

In the 2000s the Government faced by growing domestic criticism for increasing poverty and persistent racialized inequality, embarked on a populist path which included land expropriation and redistribution and, the policy of Indigenization which sought to increase indigenous peoples' equity in private sector firms including mining companies. Policy implementation was poor - the land reform was chaotic and breached international investment agreements and contributed to the collapse of the economy which shrunk by 45% between 1998 and 2008. The Indigenization Act introduced in 2007 was similarly poorly implemented and over the decade, 2007 to 2017 was never fully clarified for the mining sector. The mining sector collapsed in the late 2000s despite this being the period of the commodity super-cycle as the domestic macroeconomic environment was not conducive for business.

Despite the resurgence of the existing mining firms following dollarization in 2009, resource nationalism slowed down new investments. This took the form of:

- Revocation of 469 exploration rights (EPOs) with a requirement for reapplication in 30 days.
- Increases in mineral royalties and other mining fees and levies, in some cases by 5,000%.
- Expropriation of mining rights in the diamond, chrome and platinum mining sub-sectors.
- Requirement for existing mining companies to comply with Indigenization laws by ceding 51% equity to locals.
- Banning exports of unprocessed chrome ore.

- Banning exports of unrefined platinum-group metals.[40]

In the last years of his reign, Robert Mugabe, due partly to old age, began losing control of ZANU PF leading to the emergence of intense factionalism. The factionalism was reflected in Government administration. One faction made moves to reverse resource nationalism for example by successfully advocating for the removal of the ban on chrome exports in 2016 and reduction of royalties to rates comparable to those of other countries in the region. However, the other faction advocated for increased resource nationalism, stalling efforts to scale back the Indigenization policy. Mugabe's decision to fire the leader of the former faction and the Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, led the army to intervene and force him to resign in 2017.

Emmerson Mnangagwa (2017 to date)

An advocate of free-market policies, Mnangagwa succeeded Mugabe as President in 2017 and immediately began scaling back on many of Mugabe's policies. His party, ZANU-PF, has noted in its 2018 Elections manifesto that the party's ideology under Mnangagwa is 'socialism with market characteristics'. His Administration revoked the Indigenization policy one month into his Presidency[41] and is currently working on amending the Mines and Minerals Act.

5.3. Analysis

5.3.1. Democratization

[40] This ban has however not been effected and has been postponed to 2019 to allow a refinery to be constructed in Zimbabwe.

[41] It has however been maintained for investments in the platinum and diamond mining sectors.

Democracy has improved in all the study countries since 1975. The qualitative data in the findings shows that democracy has largely improved in the study countries. This is supported by quantitative data as shown in Figure 9. Over the 40-year period (1975-2015), the average level of democratization in Africa has tripled. The highest increases were attained by countries that achieved independence after 1975 (Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) with the bulk of the increases being attained at independence (not after). In Namibia democratization improved by 14% between independence and 2015 and, in South Africa between 1975 and 1994 by 14% and by 33% since then. In Zimbabwe, democratization improved by 1,574% between 1975 and 1980 (when Zimbabwe became independent) but has only improved by 9% between 1980 and 2015. In contrast countries that were already independent by 1975 greatly improved on democracy as independent countries: DRC improved by 160% between 1975 and 2015 and Tanzania by 700% over the same period. This is shown in Figure 9 below:




Figure 9: Levels of democratization in the study countries, 1975 – 2015 (Source: indicator on Representative Government in the Global State of Democracy Indices[42])

5.3.2. Shifting political ideologies

Political ideology has over time become less of a factor in the implementation of resource nationalism in the study countries. The ideology of the study countries has shifted from socialism to a hybrid of socialism that promotes free market policies. This is in line with the AU's ideological shift from socialism to libertarianism. While political ideology, particularly socialism, was stated by political leaders as a key reason for implementing resource nationalism in the 1960s, it is no longer a key reason for implementation of resource nationalism today. It has been argued that in Africa, nationalization was driven more by nationalism than by socialism as countries with a diversity of ethnicities chose to appease all ethnicities by taking control from market-dominant ethnicities and retaining that control in the State which was assumed to be without an ethnicity (Mkandawire, 1994). Chua (1995) has argued that ideologies like Marxism and socialism cannot be the key reason for resource nationalism (particularly nationalization) given that resource nationalism was often implemented without implementation of Marxist policies outside of the mining sector, and in countries were inequality was decreasing, poverty was falling and standards of living were rising. Tanzania under Nyerere is the exception, as nationalization was implemented as part of a broad socialist agenda which included banning private ownership of means of production (Adedeji and Ake, 1981).

[42] The indicator on Representative Government is measured by the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and assesses the credibility of elections, the freedom that political parties have and whether the right to vote is extended to all adults. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/global-state-democracy-indices

Market factors are increasingly becoming a key factor in the determination of resource nationalism policies. The economic merits and demerits of resource nationalism are increasingly become a key reason for introduction and reversal of resource nationalism. One key economic determinant has been the commodity price cycle. By the end of 1994 all the study countries were independent, and their mining sectors were either in decline or dormant.

Over the five-year period, 1988-92 the average mineral rents generated by the six countries was 6.33% of GDP however by end-1994 it had more than halved to 2.45% as shown in Figure 10 below. The price of gold is shown in Figure 10 as a proxy of the commodity price cycle. During the commodity bust (late 1980s into the early 2000s) the study countries reversed resource nationalism. The World Bank provided technical guidance in drafting mining legislation in DRC (enacted 2012), Guinea (1986) and Tanzania (1998) which ended nationalization and encouraged foreign investment. Namibia introduced investor-friendly mining legislation in 1992 while Zimbabwe amended its mining law in 1994 to make it more investor-friendly. South Africa introduced a mining law in 2002 which was investor-friendly and whose only tenet of resource nationalism was the granting of custodianship of the minerals to the State (in line with the SADC recommendation).




Figure 10: Mineral rents as a share of GDP (Source: World Bank, 2017)

During the commodity boom (2003-2012) most of the study countries began reintroducing tools of resource nationalism. The study finds that a total of 18 tools were introduced in the study countries, with the countries introducing 4 to 10 tools each. Taxation was the most commonly utilized tool with all countries utilizing royalties and all but one (Namibia) utilizing export taxes. Four tools were implemented by half the countries: free equity carry for the State, reviews of mining contracts, local content requirements and economic empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups. Commodity price booms often lead to windfalls for investors with marginal increases in benefits for host governments and workers, leading to dissatisfaction for the latter two which feed into calls for resource nationalism (Haglund, 2010). It has actually been found that the risk of nationalization increased following a commodity price boom (Hajzler, 2012). Despite the end of commodity boom, most political leaders held on to their

resource nationalism stances. Despite the end of the commodity boom in 2012, Presidents Kabila (DRC), Conde (Guinea), Pohamba (Namibia), Zuma (South Africa), Kikwete (Tanzania) and Mugabe (Zimbabwe) maintained, and even increased, resource nationalism tools.

5.3.3. Political succession

Leadership succession has been the key driver of changes in policies of resource nationalism and new leaders are more responsive to commodity price cycles than incumbents. The research findings show that during a commodity bust, new Presidents are more likely to reverse resource nationalism than incumbent Presidents, and in a commodity boom, new Presidents are more likely to implement resource nationalism than incumbent Presidents. This is best epitomized by these facts:

- During the commodity bust of the late eighties and nineties, the incumbent Presidents (Mobutu Sese Seko of DRC and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe) largely maintained their resource nationalism stances, while the new Presidents (Conte of Guinea and Mwinyi of Tanzania) reversed socialism and resource nationalism. South Africa and Namibia became independent during the commodity bust and largely kept the mining policies that they inherited. In the current commodity bust, Presidents Mugabe and Zuma increased resource nationalism however their successors almost immediately reversed this resource nationalism upon attaining power (Ramaphosa in South Africa and Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe). It is important to note that despite attaining power during the commodity bust, Presidents Geingob of Namibia and Magufuli of Tanzania have accelerated resource nationalism since taking office, which is itself a response to the commodity price cycle.

- During the commodity boom of the 2000s, the incumbent Presidents (Conte of Guinea and Mugabe of Zimbabwe) did not implement resource nationalism early on. In fact, Conte did not implement resource nationalism while Mugabe only began introducing resource nationalism in the mining sector in 2007. In contrast, Presidents who came to power between 1995 and 2005 implemented resource nationalism early on in the commodity boom (Kabila of DRC, Pohamba of Namibia, Mbeki of South Africa and Mkapa of Tanzania).

Ethnicity has had a profound impact on politics and resource nationalism in the study countries. While literature shows ethnic conflict among indigenous Africans has been a key factor in causing civil wars (Venkatasawmy, 2015) the key ethnic divide in conflicts that lead to resource nationalism has been between majority indigenous ethnic groups and minority groups. This has been exacerbated by the disproportionate distribution of benefits among ethnicities when free-market policies are implemented i.e. in mining, ethnic groups that dominate ownership of mining assets and management positions derive more benefits from the sector. This often leads to rising discontent among other ethnic groups. In the case where such ethnic groups are minorities, this discontent manifests itself as in nationalist movements espousing resource nationalism which often displace the regimes implementing free market policies benefitting the minority groups (Chua, 1995). Chua (1995) argues that market-dominance by a minority ethnic group or foreigners has been the key reason behind resource nationalism. This has not always been a racialized conflict, as white South Africans during colonialism also implemented resource nationalism due to ethnic conflict between the minority English who dominated the mining sector and the majority Afrikaners who were in power.

At independence, African countries inherited economies that had foreigners and minority ethnic groups in control of capital and management of companies. To address this inequality, some countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe introduced affirmative action in labour practices and equity ownership (Bostock and Harvey, 1972). Indigenous citizens believe mineral resources belong to them as they are an asset owned by the nation and they are exhaustible (Borissov and Surkov, 2012). It has been argued that social and political pressure for resource nationalism has emanated from dissatisfaction with the benefits derived from FDI in the mining sector. While FDI has created jobs and generated foreign currency earnings, it has not satisfactorily contributed to technological development, local economic opportunities and infrastructural development for use by other economic sectors (Taylor, 2012).

Workers in the mining sector are a key stakeholder who usually, also want a share of the benefits of commodity price booms. Research shows that workers are often instrumental in driving resource nationalism policy, either as instigators or supporters of policymakers (Bergquist, 1986). In post-colonial Africa, organized labour has often responded to decades of poor labour conditions by advocating for resource nationalism (Paige, 1975). Organized labour in the form of trade unions concentrate the power of labour and are able to influence policy (Solomon, 2012).

CHAPTER 6: HOW SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SHAPES RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN AFRICA

The six study countries are all members of the United Nations. In 2015 the United Nations set Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which focus on developing economies, protecting the environment for future generations and improving inclusivity in societies (Sonesson, Davidson and Sachs, 2016).

6.1. Key Findings

Mining often causes negative impacts that particular SDGs attempt to address, including water pollution (SDG 6), land degradation and impacts on fauna, flora and humans (SDG 15), climate change (SDG 13), economic enclaves and displacements (SDG 1 and SGD 10), illicit financial flows and conflicts (SDG 16), and acceleration of the spread of diseases (SDG 3).

The implementation of policies to achieve the SDGs have provided reason or cemented arguments for some tools of resource nationalism as outlined in the table below:

Table 8: Implementation of SDGs in mining (adapted from Sonesson et al, 2016)

SDG	Options for implementation in the mining sector	Resource nationalism tools
1. Eradicating poverty	• Royalties and taxes	❖ Royalties and taxes ❖ Local content

	• Employment creation and providing equitable access to jobs • Training and apprenticeships • Local content • Preserving access to land	❖ Equitable access to jobs
2. Ending Hunger	• Transparent management of water resources • Sharing infrastructure with agricultural sector • Preventing pollution of arable land and water	❖ Community development agreements
3. Good Health and Well-being	• Strengthening occupational health and safety (OHS) • Campaigns to address Tuberculosis (TB), HIV/AIDS, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and mental health	
4. Quality Education	• Improve skills in local communities • Further training and education for employees	❖ Skills levies

5. Gender Equality	• Equitable access to employment and business opportunities for women	
6. Sanitation and Clean Water	• Conservation and recycling of water • Improved water quality management	
7. Affordable and clean energy	• Improve efficiency of energy use • Promotion of renewable energy	
8. Decent Work and Economic Growth	• Direct and indirect job creation • Promotion of local content	❖ Local content
9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure	• Promotion of local content • Sharing infrastructure with other economic sectors • Promotion of local research and development	❖ Local content
10. Reducing Inequality	• Equitable earnings • Equitable access to opportunities for marginalized populations	❖ Equitable access to jobs

11. Sustainable Communities and Cities	• Mining of tailings and urban waste • Recycling of metals • Harnessing waste energy • Improve land-use • Preserving cultural heritage • Managing urbanization effects of mining	
12. Responsible consumption and production	• Efficient use of natural resources • Minimizing pollution	
13. Climate Action	• Reducing emissions • Supporting climate change adaptation strategies	
14. Life below water	• Minimizing contamination of water bodies • Mining sea floors carefully	❖ Reservation of riverbed / seabed mining for the State
15. Life on Land	• Protecting biodiversity and critical habitats	
16. Strong Institutions and Justice	• Preventing conflict • Respecting human rights	❖ Conflict-free mineral sourcing

17. Partnerships for the goals	• Revenue transparency • Technology transfers • Sharing geo-data	

6.2. Analysis

The study findings show that sustainable development only provides justification for three tools of resource nationalism:

i. Royalties and taxes
ii. Local content requirements, and
iii. Reservation of riverbed and seabed mining for the State.

This follows assertions in literature that resource nationalism can lead to mutually beneficial sustainable benefits from mining for investors and host countries (Cawood and Oshokoya, 2013).

CHAPTER 7: THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN AFRICA, AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD

7.1. Introduction

In order to determine the how successful resource nationalism has been, one has to judge it against the stated objectives of its implementation and the development objectives of the jurisdiction in which it is implemented.

7.2. Key Findings

This study will use development goals as the benchmark to measure the successes and failures of resource nationalism. Different countries have different development goals; however, some goals are generally universal. The study will use the common goals to adjudge success and failure.

7.2.1. Global Development goals

In the year 2000, the 191-member countries of the UN committed themselves to achieving 8 development goals by the year 2015. These goals are known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and were aimed at ending **extreme poverty**, ensuring all children access primary education, promoting equality among genders, reducing maternal and child mortality, fighting malaria and HIV/AIDS, ensuring sustainable environments and creating worldwide partnerships to promote development (United Nations, 2000). In 2015, the UN member countries adopted 17 goals (measured against 169 indicators) for the period 2016-2030. These

are discussed in Chapter 6 above and include reducing **poverty**, reducing **inequality** and reducing **unemployment**.

7.2.2. Regional Development goals

The African Union adopted African Agenda 2063, a fifty-year development plan for Africa which comprises of 20 goals (measured against 78 indicators). These goals include eradication of **poverty**, provision of affordable and decent housing for everyone, development of human capital, value addition and beneficiation of natural resources in Africa, modernizing the agricultural and agro-business sectors, adapting and mitigating climate change, infrastructural development, implementing free trade and visa-less travel, combating youth **unemployment** and underemployment, peace and unity, gender equality and mobilizing resources domestically (African Union, 2015). It is important to note that all the SDGs are reflected in Agenda 2063.

When it was formed as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the organization aimed to promoting cooperation among African countries, defending their sovereignty, fighting the remaining colonialism, ensuring human rights for all Africans, raising living standards and promoting peace (Organization of African Unity, 1963).

7.2.3. National Development Goals

In addition to the global and regional development goals, each of the study countries has its own national development goals. These are detailed for each of the countries below:

DRC

DRC became independent in 1961 but only developed its first national development plan, the *Plan National Stratégique de Développement* (PNSD), in 2017 (KPMG, 2017). Development objectives can however be gleaned from Presidential speeches: In 1960, Prime Minister Lumumba noted in his speech that his Government was focused on establishing social justice, reducing wage **inequality**, ensuring human rights and maintaining peace (Lumumba, 1960), while in the recent past President Joseph Kabila has focused on national reconciliation, peace, job creation, ending corruption, ending **extreme poverty** (Kabila, 2006), reconstruction and modernization (Kabila, 2011). The new mining code that was signed into law in 2018 has three aims: (i) to strengthen Government's control of the sector, (ii) better regulation of environmental and social impacts of the sector and (iii) adapting the mining code to the new tax laws in the country.

Guinea

Under President Conde, Guinea has developed two national development plans for the periods 2013-15 and 2016-2020 (the *National Economic and Social Development Plan)* which aim to protect human rights, achieve strong sustained economic growth, improve human development, reduce **unemployment**, reduce **poverty**, reduce **inequality,** improve infrastructure and reverse deforestation (Republic of Guinea, 2017)**.**

Namibia

Since its independence, Namibia has developed 6 national development plans. The first was the Transitional National Development Plan (1992-1995) which was succeeded by the First National Development Plan (NDP1) (1995-2000) which had four goals: sustainable economic growth, reducing **unemployment**, reducing **inequality** and reducing **poverty** (Republic of Namibia, 2012). These are the only four goals that are common to the succeeding three

development plans namely NDP2 (2000-2007), NDP3 (2007-2012)[43] and NDP4 (2012-2017) (Republic of Namibia, 2012). NDP5 (2017-2022) has four goals: sustainable economic growth, human capacity development, environmental sustainability and enhanced resilience and, good governance.

South Africa

South Africa has implemented two development plans since Independence in 1994. The first, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994-2013) aimed at reducing **poverty**, improving living conditions and reducing **unemployment.** The second, the National Development Plan (2013-2030) aims at reducing **poverty,** reducing **inequality**, reducing **unemployment**, developing infrastructure, reducing the economy's carbon footprint, improving education and healthcare, achieving unity and combating corruption (Republic of South Africa, 2011).

Tanzania

Tanzania has implemented national development plans of varying time periods since Independence. The First Five Year Development Plan (1964-1969) aimed at increasing adult literacy, improving the quality of education, improving agricultural productivity at replacing reducing **inequality** through replacing expatriate workers with Tanzanians. The Second Five Year Development Plan (1970-1974) aimed at reducing dependence on imports by developing a resource-based industry and small-scale enterprises. The Third Five Year Development Plan (1975-80) aimed at increasing linkages between domestic economic sectors.

[43] NDP3 had a total of 21 goals

The implementation of long-term development plans was punctuated from 1980 to 2011 when the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan (2011-2016) was introduced aiming at high economic growth, improving quality of life and reducing **unemployment** (United Republic of Tanzania, 2011). It was succeeded by the National Five Year Development Plan's (2016-2021) objectives are to improve the investment climate, improve economic growth, improve quality of life and reduce **poverty** (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2016).

Zimbabwe

Since Independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has implemented fourteen national development plans which are detailed in the table below:

Table 9: Zimbabwe's post-independence national development plans (adapted from Sibanda and Makwata, 2017)

Policy	**Period of Implementation**	**Key Aims**
Growth with Equity (GWE)	1981	• Sustained high economic growth • Raising incomes and quality of life • Reduce urban **unemployment** • Improve rural agricultural productivity
Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP)	1982-85	• Increasing state participation in the economy
First Five Year National Dev Plan (FFYNDP)	1985-90	• Reducing **inequality** in land ownership

		• Raising quality of life • Reducing **unemployment** • Developing STEM skills • Ensuring environmental sustainability
Economic Structural Development Programme (ESAP)	1991-95	• Reducing budget deficits and subsidies • Reforming the public service and labour laws • Liberalizing trade restrictions and investment • Deregulating prices and marketing of agricultural produce • Social protection for the poor
Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST)	1996-2000	• Support the private sector • Sustainable economic growth • Reducing **unemployment** • Reducing inflation and budget deficits • Reducing **poverty**
Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP)	2001-02	• Reducing inflation • Reform state owned enterprises

National Economic Revival Programme (NERP)	2003-04	• Reducing inflation • Reversing deindustrialization
Macro-Economic Policy Framework (MEPF)	2005-06	• Reducing inflation • Reversing deindustrialization
National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP)	2006-08	• Reducing inflation • Improving food security • Reducing debt levels • Improving investment climate
Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS)	2007-2011	• Sustainable economic growth • Reducing **poverty**
Short Term Emergency Recovery programme (STERP I)	2009	• Strengthening governance and rule of law • Promoting gender equality • Improving social protection • Reversing deindustrialization • Reduce **unemployment**
Short Term Emergency Recovery programme (STERP II)	2010-12	• Sustainable economic growth • Ensuring food and nutrition security • Improving the investment climate • Reversing deindustrialization
Medium Term Plan (MTP)	2011-13	• Development of infrastructure

		• Reducing **unemployment** • Reducing **poverty** • Human capital development • Improving gender equality
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET)	2013-15	• Reducing **inequality** • Reducing **unemployment**

7.3. Analysis

7.3.1. Common development goals

An analysis of the global, regional and national development goals shows that the goals common to the study countries across a significant proportion of their post-independence histories are:

i. Reducing poverty

ii. Reducing inequality

iii. Reducing unemployment

It is interesting to note that the first two goals, namely reducing poverty and reducing inequality, are two goals adopted by The World Bank Group as its Twin Goals that it would use to measure progress in achieving sustainable development by 2030 (The World Bank Group, 2015). This study assesses the impact of resource nationalism on poverty and inequality. Unemployment is left out due to the limitations on the availability of data on

unemployment in Africa. In addition, where available, the data often doesn't tell the full picture on unemployment and challenges in the labour markets of African countries. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines unemployment as the proportion of people in the labour force who do not have a job but are actively seeking one (International Labour Organization, 2018). The World Bank notes that this definition is insufficient in describing the African context as a significant number of people who are out of work are not actively seeking a job as they can't afford to do so or have no hope of securing one (The World Bank, 2009).

7.3.2. Reducing poverty

Globally, poverty has been decreasing for several decades now, with the number of people living in extreme poverty[44] halving between 1990 and 2015 (The World Bank Group, 2015). This decrease has mainly occurred in South and, East Asia and the Pacific – in East Asia and the Pacific the proportion of people in extreme poverty has fallen from 58.2% in 1990 to 7.9% in 2011. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa the proportion of people living in extreme poverty has not fallen as fast, falling from 56.6% in 1990 to 46.8% in 2011 (The World Bank Group, 2015). There are an estimated 400 million people living in extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan in Africa today, 5% of whom stay in DRC and 2% in Tanzania. These two study countries are the only ones that currently have extreme poverty levels higher than the average for Sub Saharan Africa.

The study countries have shown varying levels of progress in achieving the first millennium development goal (MDG 1) which they all signed up to i.e. to halve the population living in

[44] Extreme poverty is defined as living on less than US$1.25 per day (2005 prices) or US$1.90 a day (2011 prices)

extreme poverty. Guinea made the greatest progress, nearly achieving the goal as it reduced the proportion of its citizens living in extreme poverty by 49%. In Tanzania and DRC, poverty fell by 13% with marginal decreases experienced in South Africa (7%) and Namibia (6%). This is shown in Figure 11 below:




Figure 11: Trends in proportions of the population living in extreme poverty in the study countries (Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators)


7.3.3. Reducing Inequality

Inequality is a global challenge that is receiving prioritization in contemporary politics. It was described by former US President Barack Obama as this generation's defining challenge (Obama, 2013) while China's State Council[45] has published guidelines to address inequality

[45] China's Cabinet

(Fortune, 2013). The United States' military observes that resource nationalism has grown in Southern Africa due to politicians' turn to populism as a response to the sub-region's persistent inequality (Burgess, 2010).

The study countries generally have high levels of inequality with Namibia and South Africa having the highest levels of inequality while Guinea and Tanzania have the lowest as shown in Figure 12 below:






Figure 12: Evolution of inequality in the study countries measured using the Gini index[46] (Sources: World Bank, 2018 and CIA, 2018)

Guinea (-1.3% per annum), Namibia (-0.8%) and Zimbabwe (-0.9%) have recorded decreases in inequality overtime, defying the trend across the developing world where inequality has grown by 11% over the period, 1990-2010 or 0.6% per annum (United Nations, 2015).

[46] 0 shows absolute equality while 100 shows absolute inequality

Inequality has remained largely unchanged in DRC where it barely fell by 0.03%. Inequality has increased in South Africa (0.3%) and Tanzania (0.4%) over time, at levels below the average growth in inequality across the developing world.

An analysis of these trends in inequality over time shows an interesting correlation: the more reliant a country is on mining (measured by mining's contribution to GDP), the higher the decrease in the country's levels of inequality over time as shown in Figure 13. The correlation coefficient, r is calculated as -0.38 showing a moderately weak negative correlation.




Figure 13: Correlation between change in inequality and size of the mining sector in the economy for the six study countries

To determine whether this interesting correlation was potentially a causal relationship, a larger sample space was utilized. Nineteen other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where mining industries exist were added, namely: Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali,

Mozambique, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia. With a larger group of countries, the correlation dissipated as the correlation coefficient, r turned out to be lower at -0.1 indicating a weak negative correlation as shown in Figure 14. It remains interesting to note, however, that in all countries where mineral rents contribute more than 3% of GDP, inequality has decreased over time.




Figure 14: Correlation between change in inequality and size of the mining sector in the economy for 25 Sub-Saharan countries including the six study countries (Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, 2018)

The findings show that resource nationalism has a mixed impact on inequality. In half the countries a rise in resource nationalism has coincided with falling inequality: in Zimbabwe inequality fell in the 2000s a period of intense resource nationalism, while in Namibia and Tanzania inequality has been falling as the countries have increasingly implemented resource nationalism. In Guinea, inequality has been falling for two decades despite waxing and waning resource nationalism throughout that period. In South Africa rising inequality has coincided with a rise in resource nationalism as inequality fell between 1995 and 2000, a period when no

resource nationalism was practiced, and began rising thereafter, a period when South Africa began to increasingly implement resource nationalism.

It has been shown that high levels of inequality slow down economic growth, hamper efforts to reduce poverty, cause conflicts and reduce individuals' self-worth (United Nations, 2015). However, inequality can only be addressed if opportunities are made equal through improving gender equality, improving the oversight of financial institutions at a global level and by adopting tax, labour and social protection policies that redistribute wealth (United Nations, 2015).

There is some evidence in literature to show that efforts to reduce inequality through resource nationalism have failed in some countries and succeeded in others. In Tanzania, official statistics show that the local content requirements in the 2010 Mining Act did not lead to any increase in the procurement of goods and services from the domestic market by mining companies, nor did it reduce the number of expats working in the mining sector (Kinyondo and Lange, 2016). In apartheid South Africa, tools of resource nationalism aimed at reducing inequality between the English (together with foreign investors) and the Afrikaner people were a moderate success: reducing the benefits of mining accruing to foreigners as externalization of mining dividends fell to 29% of dividends in 1964 from 47% in 1945 and 82% in 1918. At the same time, subsidies for agriculture (an Afrikaner dominated sector) increased whenever mining revenues increased (Berry, 2015).

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what key issues the stakeholders in Africa's mining industry need to consider if they are to attain a consensus on an understanding of resource nationalism.

8.1. Summary of Chapters

In Chapter 4 it was shown that resource nationalism in Africa is not a post-Independence phenomenon and was commonly practiced before and during colonialism. A unique feature of the resource nationalism practiced in the colonial era is that a small number of tools was utilized, and different countries implemented resource nationalism differently, with taxation being the only tool of resource nationalism implemented in all six study countries during their colonial eras. Exogenous events, particularly the World Wars and the Cold War were found to have a profound impact on the implementation of resource nationalism.

Chapter 5 sought to determine the impact of post-independence governance on resource nationalism by assessing the political ideologies, policies and institutions in the six study countries. The study finds that democracy has improved over time in all the study countries since their independence and the political ideologies of the political leaders and ruling parties have shifted from socialism to hybrids of socialism and libertarianism (particularly with regards to free market policies). It is shown that while political ideology was a key reason for implementing resource nationalism in the early post-independence stages, economic considerations increasingly became the key rationale for resource nationalism. The study also finds that Presidential succession has been the key driver of changes in policies of resource

nationalism and new leaders have been more responsive to commodity price cycles than incumbents. In addition, ethnicity was found to have a profound impact on politics in the study countries and is a driver of resource nationalism.

Chapter 6 assessed the impact that sustainable development has on resource nationalism and ascertained that the concept only provides justification for taxation (including royalties), local content requirements and limiting riverbed or seabed mining – tools of resource nationalism that mining companies and foreign governments are generally not averse to.

In Chapter 7, an assessment was made of how successful resource nationalism has been in contributing to the achievement of common development goals, namely combating extreme poverty and inequality. Resource nationalism has not been effective in reducing extreme poverty. Despite committing themselves to reducing extreme poverty by 50% over the period, 1990 to 2015, none of the study countries achieved this goal with Guinea (49% reduction) coming closest while none of the other countries achieving a better reduction than the average for sub-Saharan Africa (reduction of 17%). The study found that resource nationalism has a mixed impact on inequality. In Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, increases in resource nationalism have coincided with falling inequality while the reverse has been observed in South Africa. An interesting finding is that among 25 Sub-Saharan African countries, all countries in which mineral rents are, on average, higher than 3% per annum, inequality has fallen over the past three decades.

8.2. Key Issues for Consideration by Stakeholders

To achieve the goal of generating consensus among the stakeholders in Africa's mining industry on an understanding of resource nationalism the key issues to be considered (based on the findings of this study) are:

i. ***Adoption of a common definition of resource nationalism***.

In the introduction, this study shows that there is a marked difference in the ways in which different stakeholders in Africa's mining industry define resource nationalism – stakeholders in the developed world and private sector sees it as anti-competitive behaviour, expropriation and a risk to investments and supply markets, while multi-lateral institutions and academia in the developing world have described resource nationalism as an attempt to maximize the benefits derived from resource extraction.

A key first step in generating consensus is in the development of a definition of resource nationalism to which all stakeholders can ascribe to. This study does not attempt to generate such a definition, but three key characteristics of the definition would be to: (a) recognize the sovereign right of governments to a fair share of mineral rents; (b) recognize the concerns of investors and markets related to risks to investments and security of supplies; and (c) a delimitation that excludes illegal and illicit tools of resource nationalism.

ii. ***Development of efficient mining fiscal regimes***

The study finds that resource nationalism is more likely to be implemented during commodity booms when host governments and citizens feel like companies are generating super-profits at their expense. During the last commodity boom (2003-2012), the study countries introduced 4 to 10 tools of research nationalism each. Taxation was the most commonly utilized tool with all countries utilizing royalties and all but one (Namibia) utilizing export taxes.

It is key that governments develop mining fiscal regimes that meet the needs of all stakeholders, primarily: (i) ensure the government gets a 'fair' share of the rents; (ii) ensure investors have confidence in the stability and certainty of the fiscal regime and (iii) ensure markets do not experience supply shocks. To ensure government gets a 'fair' share of rents, fiscal regimes could utilize sliding scale royalties and include capital gains taxes while to provide stability and certainty for investors, fiscal regimes could include stabilization clauses.

iii. Transparency in the mining industry

The study finds that resource nationalism is to some extent, driven by mistrust of the mining industry by host governments and citizens. Further there also exists mistrust of governments' dealings with the mining industry that fuel citizen and opposition politicians' mistrust. This mistrust can lead to political pressure for resource nationalism. One key way to bridge the trust deficit among stakeholders is to engender transparency in the mining sector. This could include transparency around how mineral licenses are awarded, public disclosure of contracts between mining companies and government, public disclosure of payments made by mining companies to governments and, access to information on how governments spend the revenues generated from mining. The Africa Mining Vision (AMV) recommends that governments incorporate the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles and the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) in their mining regulatory frameworks.

iv. Determination of realistic expectations of the mining industry

It is important that stakeholders in Africa's mining industry work together to ascertain realistic expectations of what the mining industry can contribute to economic development. The study finds that reducing poverty, inequality and unemployment are key goals for development globally, regionally and in the six study countries. It also finds that the contribution of the mining sector (and in particular tools of resource nationalism) to these goals cannot be measured easily. It is important that stakeholders set realistic expectations for the mining industry which recognize that the mining sector by itself cannot solve development challenges but can make meaningful contributions towards the same. For the mining companies, it is key that they clearly communicate the benefits of their mining operations to stakeholders.

v. Good governance

Good governance at the international, national (or sub-national) and firm levels are important in addressing some of the drivers of resource nationalism. Internationally, trade laws and pacts, and investment treaties must be crafted in a manner that ensures sustainable benefits to all parties. Nationally, entrenchment of democratic principles and strong institutions can be expected to lead to better management of revenues from the mining sector and better national development planning which includes the mining sector. At a firm level, transparency and avoidance of corruption strengthens the social license to operate and builds trust with stakeholders.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

The lack of a consensus among key stakeholders in conceptualizing resource nationalism in Africa has contributed to conflict among the stakeholders, negative impacts on returns to investment, constraints on supplies of resources to international markets and limited the positive impact that resource extraction can have on human and economic development.

To underline the relevance of this study to the contemporary mining industry; during the time it has taken to complete this research there have been fundamental changes to the resource nationalism in four of the six study countries. In three, resource nationalism has increased: in DRC through revisions to its mining code, in South Africa through the intention to amend the constitution to allow land reform and changes to the Mining Charter, and in Tanzania through introduction of three laws that increased resource nationalism. In Zimbabwe, resource nationalism decreased as the requiring majority domestic ownership of companies was amended and high mineral royalties were reduced.

This study had three objectives. The first was to describe how colonialism, experiences of de-colonialism, neo-colonialism, political institutions in Africa and sustainable development planning have shaped resource nationalism in different African countries. The study found that resource nationalism in Africa is not a post-Independence phenomenon and was commonly practiced before and during colonialism. Further, during de-colonialism and independence, the key reason for implementing resource nationalism has gradually shifted from political ideology to economic considerations.

The second objective was to explain the successes and failures of resource nationalism in Africa as measured by its outcomes i.e. its impact on poverty, income inequality and unemployment. Resource nationalism has not been effective in reducing extreme poverty however it was found to have had a mixed impact on inequality.

Lastly, this study sought to develop a framework of issues that should be considered in developing an African understanding of resource nationalism. Five key issues are identified for consideration, namely:

i. ***Adoption of a common definition of resource nationalism***. The importance of developing a consensus on what resource nationalism is, is paramount and epitomized by two opinion editorials produced in the *Financial Times* one week apart in August and September 2018. In the first, Peter Leon, bemoans the rise in resource nationalism in Africa and defines it as "governments adopting fiscal and regulatory measures to exert greater control" (Leon, 2018). In a response, the head of Mining Shared Value, Jeff Geipel describes resource nationalism as "a completely reasonable trend for African governments to…ensure increased benefits for their citizens" (Geipel, 2018).

ii. ***Development of efficient mining fiscal regimes.*** There is a need to create a win-win situation where investors enjoy a stable mining fiscal framework, while Governments and citizens obtain a fair share of rents over the life of individual mining projects. This can be achieved through developing mining fiscal regimes that efficiently capture rents at various phases of commodity price cycles.

iii. ***Transparency in the mining industry.*** To alleviate the mistrust that breeds upswings in resource nationalism, there is a need to transparently award mineral licenses, publicly disclose contracts between mining companies and governments,

publicly disclose payments made by mining companies to governments and, for governments to publicly account for how they spend the revenues generated from mining.

iv. ***Determination of realistic expectations of the mining industry***. The mining industry makes sizable contributions to economic development. However, the potential for additional contributions from new mining projects is often over-stated by investors and governments thereby creating unreasonable expectations from citizens. As shown in the study, these can lead to calls for resource nationalism.

v. ***Good governance.*** Institutions (at national, regional and international levels) ought to be more resilient, democratic and accountable. This will in turn, create conducive environments for political contestation where resource nationalism is not implemented as a knee-jerk reaction to loss in political popularity.

It is important that further academic work be done on how each of these five key issues can contribute to a consensual understanding of resource nationalism among stakeholders in Africa's mining industry.

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