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SECTION A. PERSON DETAILS

Surname VENTER

Person number 979818

First names HERMANN AUGUST WILHELM

Tel / Cell: 0613419914

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297B Indus st, Waterkloof Ridge, Pretoria, 0181

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Name of Supervisor(s): DR TANJA SAKOTA-KOKOT

Discipline: FILM & TV

Name of Supervisor(s):

Discipline:

SIGNATURE OF STUDENT/CANDIDATE



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**CINEMATIC TEMPORALITY:
AN APPLICATION OF DELEUZE'S CRYSTAL-IMAGE AND THE
SPLITTING OF TIME IN *REVOLVER***

by

HERMANN AUGUST WILHELM VENTER
979818

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ABSTRACT

The research investigates Gilles Deleuze's theory of the time-image as theorised in *Cinema 1: the movement-image* (1986) and in *Cinema 2: the time-image* (1989), focusing, in particular, on the crystal-image. Deleuze views the crystal-image as a multifaceted understanding of time where the present is infused with the past and future. It is this image of the crystal – a reflection of the fragmented and simultaneous intersection of time – that forms the basis of this research. The primary outcome of this study is to create a short film whereby Deleuze's philosophy of cinema could be realised in a practical sense. The film, *Revo/ver*, portrays the memory of a woman as she revisits her childhood home. Memory, as a recollection of experiences of the past in the present moment, demands a non-linear film structure. Deleuze's theories and ideas are infused in the film's narrative structure and content, direction and audio and visual considerations. The film aims to depict a split sense of temporality by offering images that are informed by the past, present and the future. This simultaneous view of different registers of time as it flows through the protagonist's consciousness when she recalls the events of the day her father committed suicide, presents the viewer with time in its pure form akin to our human experience of time. The latter forms the crux of Deleuze's theorisation of the crystal-image which is the primary concern of the theoretical and practical components of this research.

KEY TERMS

movement-image

time-image

crystal-image

memory

ciné-system

cinema

film theory

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In *Cinema 1: The movement-image* (1986) and *Cinema 2: The time image* (1989) Gilles Deleuze theorises the notion of time in film, in particular, the crystal-image. Deleuze's concept of the crystal-image presents a multifaceted understanding of time where the present is fused with the past and future. This research intends to experiment and identify cinematic techniques and concepts which reflects the various facets of the crystal-image for the purpose of producing a short film. The film and the research argue for time that is not clearly defined regarding past, present and future. In line with this, the practical and theoretical components of this research are focused on the expression of memory in the medium of film and serve as an illustration of Deleuze's crystal-image.

The title of the film, *Revolver*, refers to the .38 special used by the man in the film to commit suicide. This weapon is a repeating handgun that operates through its revolving cylinder with multiple chambers that house the bullets. Once the hammer is cocked, a revolver can fire multiple rounds in succession, without having to reload. The cylinder of the revolver resembles the face of a clock with its hands rotating in measured instances. The film shows how memory relies on this repetitive circling of recollections that orbit around a particular event to revolve or turn it over in one's mind. Memory is accessed from experience and utilised in the present. Once memory is used in the present, it recedes back to the past.

1.1 Field of view

The field of view is the visible area that an individual can see through his/her eyes. The field of view in this context refers to the broader visible area that situates the research within a particular context. The cinematic art form

depends on the compression of time within a narrative to tell a story. The manner in which time is employed in film is what sets it apart from other art forms. It is therefore essential to understand how cinematic temporality functions and how this relates to the viewer, to utilise time in a meaningful manner. However, before considering the operation of time in film, it is necessary to gain a more comprehensive understanding of time in general.

David R. Dickens and Andrea Fontana (2002:389) mention that the experience of time and space has undergone a drastic change during history regarding social, political and historical contexts. These modifications of time are linked to social and political transformations that took place during the past. Dickens and Fontana (2002:390) base the history of time, and how it relates to the cultural context, on the writings of David Harvey. Harvey (1989:244) argues that under feudalism, the concept of space dictated everyday life on social, legal and political levels and claims that it was only during the Renaissance that a transition occurred when a wider world had to be represented. Inventions such as the chronometer evoked a scientific notion of time (Dickens & Fontana 2002:390). During the Enlightenment, spanning from the mid-decades of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, time just as nature, needed to be controlled: time was controlled and understood through “scientific prediction” that ensured a sense of control over the future through “political and social regulation” (Dickens & Fontana 2002:390). The ideologies of the Enlightenment influenced the current perception and understanding of time. Time was being explored as a phenomenon and, as a direct result of the cultural context had to be controlled.

The economic and political crisis that plagued western Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century triggered yet another transformation in the notions of time and space (Harvey 1989:260-261): writers and artists wanted to explore time in new ways and aimed to emphasise the transient, fleeting and contingent nature of modern life (Dickens & Fontana 2002:390). In the

period between 1850 and World War 1, new transportation and communication technologies¹, as well as new production methods, implying that time could be organised and controlled (Dickens & Fontana 2002:390). During this transformation philosophical ideas also informed this revision of time: Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (1991 [1896]) explores *durée*, inner time, and its discontinuity with the linear, successive view of time (Dickens & Fontana 2002:391). Similarly, William James (in Sorokin & Merton 1937:616) approaches the idea of "objective" time as "fiction". James (in Sorokin & Merton 1937:617) suggests, "[i]n general, a time filled with varied and interesting experiences seems short in passing, but experiences seem long in passing, but in retrospect short." A non-linear understanding of time is furthermore explored in Frederick Nietzsche's cyclical concept of time, namely the question of eternal recurrence or return. The latter, theorised in *The will to power* (2001 [1913]) and *The gay science* (1882), considers the idea that time is repetitive and infinite where events or memories occur again and again. Here, time is regarded as an eternal process with no beginning or end, therefore diffusing the traditional, linear understanding of the consecutive appearance of past, present and future experiences.

The accelerated experience of life in the postmodern context exemplified by the rapid means of communication (instant communication platforms and super-fast transport) has abolished the conventional notion of time as successive, chronological instances (Dickens & Fontana 2002:393). Frederick Jameson (2003:27) explains that this feature of postmodern life undermines spatio-temporal continuities to the point where space and time become dislocated. For Jameson (2003:16) time has become less visible: "I think it is at least empirically arguable that our daily life, our psychic experience, our

¹ The invention of the telephone in 1876 by Alexander Graham Bell serves as one example of the impact of technological advancements during this period that disrupted the continuity of time and space (Pasachoff 1996:51). In addition, "Richard Maddox's gelatin-bromide dry plate process" invented in 1871 made the capturing of fast moving subjects possible (Lester 2014:313). As a result, the experimental photography of Eadweard Muybridge reached a high point in 1878 when he successfully produced a series of stop-motion images of a running horse, *The horse in motion* (1878) (Lester 2014:313). This experiment gave rise to the development of the moving image and supports Dickens and Fontana's (2002:390) notion that time could be understood and regulated.

cultural language, is today dominated by categories of space rather than categories of time.”

Given the sense of dislocation that Jameson refers to, thinking about time in cinema as a temporal expression of successive instances, does not lend itself to a meaningful reflection of current perceptions of time. Instead, time, especially in our current existence, is more successfully represented by a non-linear and simultaneous expression. Our immediate impressions are filled with memories of the past, and at the same time, we project our hopes and dreams, which we are conscious of in the present, into the future. As such, our present existence splits itself to become a multifaceted instance of time that relies simultaneously on memories of the past and hopes for the future as it collides in a present moment. Similarly, a chronological notion of time also seems at odds with the filmic medium: the nature of film as a medium – the capture of audiovisual images of a particular instance that are crafted to narrate a sequence of events – instead lends itself to a multifaceted understanding of film. Cinematic techniques such as editing, cutting and framing do not support a continuous linear structure as the very nature of these methods undermines an accurate systematic account of events. In line with a preference for a multifaceted view of time, this research argues that to relay human experience or memory successfully, a film should account for a spliced understanding of time.

Jameson (in Dickens & Fontana 2002:390) draws on Jacques Lacan’s theory of schizophrenia – a psychological state where there appears to be a breakdown of the relationship between signifiers – and suggests that the individual in postmodern society is unable to reconcile the “past, present, and future of their own biographical experience”. Similarly, Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1984:25) define this state, largely established through our technologically driven environment, as a “schizophrenic experience” that leaves subjects dislocated from the world. Deleuze and Guattari (1984:41-2) reiterate that experiences are understood as “intensities, becomings [and] transitions.” In this view, our current sense of being in the world, recalling memories from the past to make decisions in the present and project our

hopes onto the future, is not experienced as a linear construct. Instead, our experience of ourselves is often the result of the simultaneity of various realities that leaves us with a fragmented understanding of the world. It is therefore necessary, when conceiving of a film that yields an interior view of a character's consciousness, to reconsider the manner in which time (as it relates to the film structure, the narrative and cinematic techniques and concepts) is approached to represent a deeper understanding of the character and his/her knowledge of his awareness and experience of being present in the world.

In this research, I opt for a non-linear, disruptive expression of time in an attempt to better reflect the characters in my film – their understanding of themselves and their experiences in a contemporary, postmodern paradigm. Deleuze's theory on cinema as set out in *Cinema 1: The movement-image* (1986) and *Cinema 2: The time-image* (1989) provide the theoretical underpinning necessary to create a film that challenges linear notions of time. I use Deleuze's theory of the crystal-image to create a film that merges past and future cinematic time into the present.

1.2 Taking aim: isolating the target

The primary aim of this research is to produce a short film that focuses on the expression of memory and time, shaped by Deleuze's theories of the cinema. In aiming, I isolate the following targets as objectives of the study to realise the purpose of the research. The first objective is to elucidate Deleuze's film concepts, with particular emphasis on the crystal-image, both on a theoretical and practical level. An investigation around Deleuze's crystal-image demands an analysis of both the movement-image and the time image as theorised in the two volumes on cinema.

The second objective revolves around the practical application of these Deleuzian ideas of time and filmmaking. To realise Deleuze's philosophy of cinema practically, I illustrate his views by referring to various examples of

films wherein these ideas are most pertinent. These philosophical concepts (particularly those associated with time, the crystal-image and memory) are practically applied in *Revolver*'s concept, narrative and direction.

1.3 Surveying the field

In surveying the field of literature, I have adopted an exploratory approach to access the concepts and ideas related to the image of time (the crystal-image) and the depiction of memory in cinema. The research is focused on an analysis of Deleuze's ideas around time as theorised in *Cinema 1: The movement-image* (1986) and *Cinema 2: The time-image* (1989). The information learned from the literature will be applied experimentally to the creation of the short film, *Revolver*. Concepts relating to memory, the crystal-image and the representation of time in film are applied to cinematic techniques and the narrative to produce a film wherein time is expressed as a multifaceted concept that leaves its subject dislocated.

1.3.1 Bergson's understanding of time

Bergson's theories of time and memory serve as the building blocks for understanding Deleuze's philosophy around cinema. *Time and free will: An essay on the immediate data of consciousness* (2001 [1913]) is Bergson's Doctoral thesis, first published in 1889, wherein he introduces his concept of duration – a theory of time and consciousness. Duration provides the cornerstone for Bergson's theories on memory. Duration is also a crucial element in the unpacking of Deleuze's arguments of time in film, and in particular, the notion of the crystal-image which is in itself an image of duration.

Matter and memory (2001 [1908]) was written in response to *The maladies of memory* (1881) by Théodule Ribot who argues that memory is located within a specific part of the nervous system in the brain and therefore material.

Bergson opposes the demotion of the spirit to mere matter as he argues that memory is deeply spiritual in nature. *Matter and memory* explores the human ability to retrieve memories from the past and project these onto the future while being fully aware in the present moment. The notion of memory, as theorised by Bergson, serves to illuminate Deleuze's ideas around the time-image as well as the crystal-image.

Melissa Clarke's article *The space-time image: The case of Bergson, Deleuze and Memento* (2002) is also employed in this study to assist in the understanding of Bergson's notion of time and space concerning memory and how this impacted on Deleuze's ideas. Clarke explores Bergson and Deleuze's views concerning the actual and the virtual, the recollection of the past in the present and memory in her article. These ideas are associated with the practice of filmmaking by Clarke by referring to the film, *Memento*. Clarke's article offers insight regarding the theorists' philosophies of film, and the mind is portrayed in film. In the context of this research, Clarke's illustration of theoretical concepts in film also assists in the application of philosophical concepts such as the crystal-image and memory, in the practical outcome of this study.

In *Thinking in time: an introduction to Henri Bergson* (2006) by Suzanne Guerlac Bergson's ideas around motion, time and change are explored to offer a broader understanding of the relevance and application of these ideas to cultural and new media studies. These ideas put forward by Bergson are pivotal in unlocking Deleuze's theories on cinema.

1.3.2 Deleuze's cinema theory

Deleuze's theorisation of cinema is captured in two volumes that are considered seminal sources in the philosophy and theory of film. The books function as a system to describe and analyse film as Deleuze (in Colman 2011:14) explains that an image is a system of interrelated elements – “a set of relationships of time from which the variable present only flows”. Sets, such

as the frame – a closed set, cut-off from the world – create, through its relationship with other elements, a movement-image, the whole – a system referred to by Felicity Colman (2011:13) as the ciné-system. Colman (2001:22) states the following about Deleuze's ciné-system: "Deleuze is in pursuit of a methodology that will enable him to adequately describe the breadth of types of images that cinema produces." Colman's writing on Deleuze is used to offer clarity and provide insight into Deleuze's complex ideas and philosophies.

Deleuze's system develops from this taxonomy of cinema and is made up of sets of images that form a whole through their relationship to each other. The system is open and able to change when it comes into contact with other systems. Colman (2001:25, original emphasis) continues,

[...] this cine-system is not THE system, rather it is a procedural system – an open-ended practice of making concepts. The Deleuzian system is designed to be used, abused, extended or reconfigured.

Deleuze published *Cinema 1: the movement-image* in 1986. The book explores mostly pre-war cinema in the West and focuses on the movement-image – a series of successive images that presents a chronological sense of time. Deleuze explores three cinematic elements which he identifies as the frame, the shot and montage, the latter being responsible for creating the illusion of movement. This first volume on cinema considers the spatial action associated with film. Movement-images are deemed indirect images of time.

Cinema 2: the time-image was published shortly after its precedent in 1989. In this volume, Deleuze focuses on temporality and theorises the time-image. Adopting much of Bergson's ideas, Deleuze considers time and memory in the context of film. Deleuze (1986:11) argues that instantaneous image – immobile sections of movement – are before movement-images, then time-images, that is duration-images, change-images, relation-images and volume-images, are beyond movement-images (Deleuze 1989:271). Time-images are images that reflect time in itself and are defined as direct and indirect images

of time. Direct time-images are what Deleuze (1989:78-79) refers to as crystal-images that express time in themselves. Deleuze's cine-system and in particular his theories on the crystal-image is employed in this study to create and analyse the short-film, *Revolver*.

1.4 Outline of chapters

Chapter One provides an introduction to the research through highlighting the research question and intent, the background to the study and a review of the literature. This chapter contextualises the survey in the field of cinema and clarifies the purpose of the study.

Chapter Two introduces Deleuze's theory of cinema as theorised in his seminal volumes, *Cinema 1: The movement-image* and *Cinema 2: The time-image* as it lays the theoretical basis for the research. The chapter offers a concise overview of the movement-image which extends to the time-image. Deleuze's notion of the crystal-image as a multifaceted sign of time is the focus of this chapter. The chapter also explores how these ideas are realised in the practice of filmmaking by referring to some examples of film.

Chapter Three offers a practical application and exploration of the crystal-image and memory as it is expressed in the film, *Revolver*. This chapter focuses on the use of cinematic and narrative techniques and concepts employed to realise my film that represents the recollection of a woman and offers a reading of the Deleuzian understanding of time.

Chapter Four provides a conclusion of the ideas and concepts relating to the crystal-image, time, filmmaking and memory as explored in this study.

CHAPTER TWO

DELEUZE AND THE TIME-IMAGE

This chapter elucidates Deleuze's cinema theory as put forward in *Cinema 1: the movement-image* and *Cinema 2: the time-image*. The discussion is focused on the model of ciné-philosophy or ciné-system that Deleuze presents in these volumes. As a means of illustrating and clarifying Deleuze's cinema philosophy, I also offer examples of selected films throughout this chapter. The practical application of Deleuze's ideas also relates directly to the creative outcome of this study - the creation of the film, *Revolver*. The short film is analysed and discussed according to this Deleuzian ciné-system. In addition to this, Deleuze's theorisation of the crystal-image offers alternative ways of thinking about the representation of time in film. *Revolver* portrays the memory of a woman which highlights time as an integral aspect of the film. The ideas put forward by Deleuze is concerned with how the medium of film shapes the functioning of perception, memory and thought. As such, the research explores these Deleuzian concepts to assist with the portrayal time (integral to the process of recollection) in the creative work.

This chapter starts with an investigation into the concepts and systems associated with the movement-image and refers to the frame, shot and montage. Next, the time-image is presented to consider Deleuze's theory of cinematic time. Deleuze's analysis of the crystal-image, a time-image *par excellence*, ends the study's theoretical discussion. Throughout the examination, reference is made to Bergson's philosophy of time and memory as it informs Deleuze's theorisation of both the movement-image and the time-image.

Deleuze relies strongly on Bergson who aims to develop philosophies regarding the nature of reality, being and the world that are in tune with the scientific progress of his time. Deleuze's theories of film are considered philosophy and this, as in Bergson's case, is used to describe his ideas of the

world. Both theorists consider our daily actions and thoughts as controlled by a sensory-motor schema – the motor responses prompted by sensory stimulation; an action followed by a reaction that regulates our being. For Deleuze, the sensory-motor schema, in the context of his cinema philosophy, is the illusion of unity created by the fast repetition of images on the screen that relays dynamic movement. The sensory-motor schema defines the movement-image. Deleuze and Bergson also refer to another mode of perception and thought – that of memory or recollection. In this sense, time is not linear or chronological as in the sensory-motor schema, but rather a simultaneous existence of the past, present and future. This constitutes the time-image in Deleuze's theory of film.

Deleuze's idea that everything could be considered an image is also derived from Bergson's theories and an essential aspect of understanding his philosophy. The use of an image in both theorists' works does not refer to a visual picture, but much more. Bergson (2001:36) explains that all the "things" that appear in the vast expanse are "images" in and of themselves that move, interact, overlap and accumulate. These "things" make up the universe (Bergson 2001:36). Similarly, Deleuze (1986:58-59) explains that the image is the movement of matter – all the way down to the basic structure of small atoms that vibrate. The universe comprises an infinite set of images which makes up this "plane of immanence." The image is, therefore "*flowing-matter*" which is mostly the movement-image (Deleuze 1986:59, original emphasis).

2.1 The creation of motion in film: the movement-image

Motion pictures, as suggested by this name, mainly projects a series of images on film in rapid succession onto a screen using light. The illusion of smooth, continuous movement is created through the optical phenomenon of persistence of vision. Deleuze's theories on movement aim to analyse and explain the occurrence of motion in the filmic medium. The movement-image is identified by the way in which temporal and spatial progression unfolds.

This sequence is regulated by the sensory-motor schema and implies linear and chronological time.

Deleuze's movement-image is developed from Bergson's critique of cinema: Bergson (in Deleuze 1986:57) prefers a model of movement where things regularly change without a "point of anchorage" or "centre of reference". This flowing sense of movement leads Deleuze (1986:60-63) to a "plane of immanence" made up of a set of movement-images where everything reacts with everything without a central point of reference. The plane of immanence is, therefore, infinite sets of images each with infinite possibilities whereby these images could be reconfigured. The latter forms the basis of the movement-image. Here, the image on the screen is a relational whole – a "plane of immanence" that alters itself through movement or through time-based events (such as a recollection) that changes the condition of the moving-image (Deleuze 1986:63).

Deleuze (1986:2) explains that film operates as "false movement" as the camera films movement or duration. Therefore, the film does not offer "an image to which movement is added" but instead gives a movement-image – "it does give us a section which is mobile, not an immobile section + abstract movement" (Deleuze 1986:2). These movements are parts of the whole movement or an "infinite set" – "a mobile section, a temporal section, a perspective" (Deleuze 1986:59). In essence, film does not capture still images to which movement is applied, but it instead captures movement that takes place in front of the camera. The film compresses time to offer a mobile image.

The change from one form to another creates movement-images of change (Deleuze 1986:4). Deleuze (1986:8) summarises Bergson's third thesis:

[N]ot only is the instant an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration, that is, of the Whole, or of a whole. Which implies that movement expresses something more profound, which is the change in duration or in the whole. To

say that duration is change is part of its definition: it changes and does not stop changing.

Therefore, through the addition of a new section into the whole, the whole changes which open up the possibility of an infinite whole (Deleuze 1986:10). For Deleuze (1986:59), following Bergson, the assemblage of moving images could be considered as a “metacinema” – a mechanism of the universe. As such, every image we can imagine as made by movement shapes an “infinite set” (Deleuze 1986:59). Thus, “[w]e find ourselves in fact faced with the exposition of a world where IMAGE = MOVEMENT” (Deleuze 1986:58, original emphasis). He (Deleuze 1986:68) ascribes three varieties of images to film: action-images, perception-images or affection-images.

Movement is viewed as a duality: on the one hand, there is a relation between the parts and the whole, while on the other hand, the parts relate to the whole, which also changes the whole. The duality of movement suggests that objects of cinema “are united in duration” (Deleuze 1986:11). Deleuze’s critique and utilisation of Bergson’s third thesis reveal the aspects of the framing of the movement of this duration, which *Cinema 1: the movement-image* discusses through the frame, shot and montage.

2.1.1 Deleuze’s cinematic elements

2.1.1.1 The frame

In *Cinema 1: the movement-image* Deleuze describes three levels of interpretation in film. The first of these, frame and shot, framing and cutting, make up the essential components of the whole. Colman (2011:39) explains that the framing of the movement-image corresponds to “film style, cinematography and the mise-en-scène (costumes, props, set, lighting, editing, sound, acting method), the rhythm of the moving shots.” The frame is a closed system or set, as Deleuze (1986:12) refers to it, a part of the world

that is cut-off and isolated. Deleuze (1986:18) explains that the act of framing involves the “art of choosing the parts” which ultimately become part of a set – a closed system. For Deleuze (1986:59) Bergson’s “infinite set” allows this closed system to change.

The frame is a slice or instance of movement in time, carved out of the totality of the film (the whole). It can be considered in terms of what it communicates to the viewer and thus serves an “informatic” purpose through means of the elements or sub-sets that are included in the frame as well as that which is not included (Deleuze 1986:18). The latter is referred to by Deleuze (1986:18) as the “out-of-field”. It is also an “optical system when considered in relation to the point of view, to the angle of the framing” (Deleuze 1986:18).

The frame imposed by the camera isolates a closed set of elements. Deleuze (1986:14) considers the screen as the “frame of frames” which, regardless of a close-up or panoramic view maintains a “common measure for that which has none.” This “deterritorialisation of the image” serves to detach the image from the world and its context as images of different sizes are ultimately projected on the same screen in the same frame (Deleuze 1986:15). In this sense, film also displays close-up and long shots in the same spatial dimensions offered by the screen. This aspect allows different shots to provide meaning other than merely relaying visual information of that which is visible.

Ingmar Bergman’s *The silence* (1963) portrays the emotional relationship between two sisters. The frame isolates the two sisters from the world to emphasise their association (*Figure 1*). Here, the structure of the door offers a window into the frame of the screen. Bergman’s filming through an open door illustrates the idea of frames within frames. The vertical lines of the door and post frame the composition to provide a limited or narrow view. While this technique offers a visually exciting image, it also provides insight into the distance between the sisters.



Figure 1: The principle of frames within frames, The silence, 1963. (Fin de Cinéma [sa]).

2.1.1.2 The shot

Cutting determines the shot which, in turn, establishes movement within the closed system (Deleuze 1986:18). Deleuze (1986:23) explains that, much like a collage¹, the selected parts are put together to create a shot. As such, the function of the shot – a sequence of frames – is to regulate “bodies, parts, aspects, dimensions, distances, and the respective positions of the bodies” that make up a set in the image (Deleuze 1989:23). Each isolated frame offers its slice of the world without necessarily having a shared link between them. The shot is the intermediary between the frame and montage, always comprising two aspects: the shot – a close-up shot, long shot and tracking shot – expresses the relationship between elements in the set or the frame and it shows change in relation to the whole (Deleuze 1986:19).

¹ The metaphor of collage is explained by Jean Epstein (in Deleuze 1986:23) when the shot is compared to a Cubist painting in which “all the surfaces divide, truncate, decompose, break apart, as one would imagine them in the thousand-faceted eye of an insect.”

The shot or plan is an optical system that is made up of frames or sets (duration) which determines the whole and translates into change. The shot suggests an “out-of-field” which could be a longer or larger sequence as it is integrated into the whole (Deleuze 1986:18). As a result, two things happen: movement changes in nature as the movement of the film sequence is different from the movement undertaken by the camera or the editing process. The “out-of-field” is understood as denoting two different aspects: firstly, it refers to that which is physically not present in the frame or set such as a person, framed by the screen, having a conversation with another person that is off-screen. The second aspect refers to that which can be derived from the various sets as it relates to the whole such as an idea, feeling or anticipation that is present but not visible on screen – “neither seen or understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present” (Deleuze 1986:16).

The shot provides a temporal perspective which “acts like a consciousness” with the camera being the cinematic consciousness, able to approximate human or non-human aspects while remaining autonomous (Deleuze 1986:20). Deleuze (1986:20-22) argues that this autonomy makes the illusion of movement in the shot possible and, as such, “the shot is the movement-image.” Therefore, through the “out of field” implied by the shot, continuity is created between various frames and the entirety of the film through the suggestion that the screen extends beyond its physical limits, both in its literal sense and conceptual awareness.

2.1.1.3 Montage

The third cinematic element namely, montage², is derived from French and implies ‘assembly’ or ‘editing.’ However, montage, in the sense that Deleuze

² The process of montage is traced back to avant-garde art movements such as Cubism. Cubist artworks juxtaposed various points of view and materials in its collage and assemblage techniques. Sergei Eisenstein, a Soviet filmmaker, considered the use of montage as a principle of composition. Although the process of montage is extensively explored in Eisenstein’s films, his most important contribution to the term is found in *Towards a theory of montage* published in 1937 wherein he sites examples of montage as it appears in

invokes the term does not only refer to the process of editing where various shots are placed next to each other to create a narrative, but also involves the connection between any and all images. For Deleuze (1986:30) the process of montage is the “composition, the assemblage [*agencement*] of movement-images as constitution an indirect image of time.” The movement-image stands as an indirect representation of time as time is subordinated and communicated through movement created through the sequential images. While the shot creates a movement-image within a closed system, montage creates a whole when shots are combined. As such the whole is determined through montage – “continuities, cutting, and false continuities” (Deleuze 1986:29). Montage is movement – either the mechanical activity brought about by the mobility of the camera or movement created through the editing process (Deleuze 1986:24-28).

Montage is considered through its three forms: “the alteration of differentiated parts, that of relative dimensions, and that of convergent actions” (Deleuze 1986:31). Colman (2011:59, original emphasis) explains the purpose of montage as one of the most critical elements of cinema:

The technique of montage enables the relational variation of the movement-image to express multiple positions in space and show how these may vary, or depict how images might change in what we understand as historical, cultural, geo-physical or chronometric time. Through montage, divergent aspects of an image are brought into proximity, are linked together, through direct and indirect cinematographic techniques (of which matters of perceptual capacity are just as important to consider as formal techniques). The result of which is the ‘whole’ that Deleuze speaks of – meaning the specific type and form of relational *consistency* of the whole of a filmic world.

Through the editing of shots (the process of montage) movement is linked together to communicate change over time whether linear time or a historical

a variety of art and literature forms. Eisenstein’s considerations of montage in cinema - the various levels of complexity it involves - largely informs Deleuze’s theorisation of montage (Pozzato 2018:22).

period. Different aspects of images are brought together through montage. This combines indirect images of time (movement-image) with direct images of time (time-image) through various editing and the conceptual implications of any and/or all images. Montage, therefore, produces the whole – the unity of the film's world or context.

2.1.2 *Three types of movement-images*

The assemblage of moving images (the process of montage) creates a cinematic environment where images equal movement. Here Deleuze (1986:66) identifies three variants of movement-images namely, perception-images, action-images and affection-images. Deleuze (1986:78) points out that every film has at least one type of image as its dominant image, but relations with multiple images can be formed through montage. He (Deleuze 1986:78) uses an example where spatially determined shots can correspond to varieties of images: “[...] the long shot would be primarily a perception-image; the medium shot an action-image; the close-up shot an affection-image”. Deleuze (1986:78) continues that these movement-images create a point of view on the whole of the film: the movement-image offers

[...] a way of grasping this whole, which becomes affective in the close-up, active in the medium shot, perspective in the long-shot – each of these shots ceasing to be spatial in order to become itself a reading of the whole of the film.

Since the screen displays all images regardless of their size in the same format, shots (depending on their distance from the objects it frames) convey affect or influence the reading of these images. This relates back to the deterritorialisation of the image as it is taken out of its context of the world. In this sense, whether it a long, medium or close-up shot, the screen recontextualises the objects it frames, and we are not able to measure these in space as everything is reduced to the size of the screen. The shot then can no longer be understood to offer a reading of space. Instead, the use of these

shots infers upon the whole an affective interpretation. These shots, therefore, provide specific types of movement-images. For clarity, the three varieties of movement-images are considered briefly.

2.1.2.1 Perception

The audio-visual assault on viewers' senses gives form to thoughts and ideas within the context of the worlds that these images create. The images produced by the film medium is organised into various genres and stylistic conventions. These categories are perceived through that which is revealed or portrayed and that which is excluded from the filmic world. Perception in the Deleuzian sense is understood as an element of the movement-image which shows framed ideas or perceptions of that which is visible on the screen (Colman 2011:65). These framed ideas or perceptions are functions of both the viewer's mind (his/her cognition and understanding of the image) and the perception-image (Colman 1986:69). Deleuze (1986:62, original emphasis) notes, however, that there is a second situation that may produce perception – that is formed by a “*double system, of a double regime of reference of images.*” This dual method of reference of images suggests the “complementary” motion that happens in the movement-image: the image in itself and the image as reflected by a “living image” (Deleuze 1986:62). The combination of these two images produces a perception-image.

The scene in *Murder on the Orient Express* (2017) directed by Kenneth Branagh shows the train as it enters the station (*Figure 2*). Within this sequence, the image of the train (the image in itself) has manifested itself through a series of movement-images (the living image). This, in turn, brought forth movement of the people standing nearby (affect) which yields a perception-image.



*Figure 2: A perception-image, **Murder on the Orient Express**, 2017. (Murder on the Orient Express official trailer 2017).*



*Figure 3: A scene where the character addresses the camera directly, **Alfie**, 2004.*

In the introductory sequence of Charles Shyer's *Alfie* (2004) the main character, Alfie, addresses the camera directly when he presents himself and his world to the audience (*Figure 3*). Alfie's (the living image) perception of himself (the image in itself) and his interaction with his immediate environment paints a picture of himself and his world. These statements and actions produce a perception-image. In this instance, the double image is reversed

which gives rise to the idea of cinematographic consciousness. Deleuze (1986:20) contends that cinematographic consciousness is only present in the camera which is “sometimes human, sometimes inhuman or superhuman.” It does therefore not include the subjectivity of the viewer, the protagonist in the film or anybody else, as cinema does not intend to illustrate things.

Colman (2011:75, original emphasis) explains that Deleuze’s film theory emphasises that the “act and activity of *being* is a perception and perspective.” Films bring images and concepts into being and “react upon” them (Colman 2011:76). Deleuze (1986:61) continues that the dual system of the perception-image is found on the “plan of immanence” (cf. section 2.1).

The camera captures “an assemblage of enunciation” – a series of images that articulate an idea or concept – which produces two kinds of “acts of subjectivation simultaneously” (Deleuze 1986:71). These two poles of movement – subjective and objective – forms the subtractive phase of the perception-image (Colman 2011:70). To overcome the complex relationship between a cinematographic perception and external subjectivity, Deleuze developed the notion of the “being-with” the camera (Colman 2011:71). This type of perception-image corresponds to the way in which we perceive the world around us as human beings. The subtractive phase implies that the viewer only “perceive the thing minus” that which is of little or no interest to him/her (Colman 2011:70). Perception-images could be considered as three types: solid perception (normal human perception), liquid perception (where images flow together) and gaseous perception (the pure vision of the eye of the camera).

A perception-image reveals things as seen by the person who sees it or a person “who forms part of that set” and is marked by various factors such as the “sensory factor”, “active factor”, “affective factor” (Deleuze 1986:71). The perceiver may be either internal or external to the screen; however, the perceiver’s subjective or objective perception of the image shapes its formation (Colman 2011:71). Deleuze (1986:71) explains that the “subjective-image” is seen or experienced by someone taking part or being part of that

which happens on screen. The point-of-view shot (*Figure 4*) in *Rosemary's baby* (1968) directed by Roman Polanski shows an image filmed through the keyhole of Rosemary's apartment as she looks to see who is ringing the bell. This image shows us what the character in the film sees and adds to our perception of that image.



Figure 4: A point-of-view shot, Rosemary's baby, 1968. (Enter Minnie Castevet in Rosemary's baby 1999).




Figure 5: A wide shot of the train moving across the screen, Murder on the Orient Express, 2017. (Murder on the Orient Express official trailer (2017)).

On the other hand, the wide shot of the train moving across the screen as seen from an aerial view in *Murder on the Orient Express* (Figure 5) illustrates an objective-image. In this case, the image is not visible to someone who is who is part of the set; hence an objective viewpoint is pictured. It is important to note that, in some cases, an objective or subjective image may become its opposite as the film reveals its narrative.

“Liquid perception” also functions between varying degrees of objectivity and subjectivity and suggests the perception of images that flow or melt into each other much like a “delirium, a dream, a hallucination” (Deleuze 1986:76). Deleuze (1986:80) explains that a liquid perception-image refers to an image that appears liquefied. In Edwald André Dupont’s black and white film, *Variety* (1925) the scene where the trapeze-artiste oscillates between the crowd and the ceiling (Figure 6) show “a shower of sparks” and a “whirlpool of floating spots” (Deleuze 1986:77). These images create effects of movement that appear to flow and liquefy like water (Colman 2011:73). These liquid images are used to portray affect and, like *Variety*, often serve to disorient the viewer to impart the experience of the trapeze artist.



Figure 6: A trapeze-artiste swinging above the crowd as an example of a liquid perception-image, Variety, 1925. (Kristin Thompson on Variety 2004).

The third type of perception, “gaseous perception”, refers to the perception offered by the “cine-eye” (Deleuze 1986:80) – non-material movement or molecular perception that is not possible for the human eye. Deleuze (1986:80-81) explains:

Everything is at the service of variation and interaction; slow or high speed shots, superimposition, fragmentation, deceleration [*démultipliation*], microshooting [*micro-prise de vue*]. This is not a human eye – even an improved one. [...] it is the pure vision of a non-human eye, of an eye which would be in things.

This type of perception is an objective vision that exceeds the abilities of the human eye – a different kind of camera-consciousness that “moved from a real to a genetic definition of perception” (Deleuze 1986:85). *The matrix* (1999) directed by The Wachowski Brothers offers a good illustration: the scene on the rooftop shows Neo as he dodges the bullets fired at him by one of the agents (*Figure 7*).



Figure 7: A portrayal of gaseous perception-images, The Matrix, 1999. (Matrix trailer 1999)

In slow-motion, the camera follows around Neo as the bullets fly past him. The viewer also sees the striation patterns of the bullets as they speed through the air. This scene offers an enhanced view not visible to the human eye which increases the perception of the protagonist's superhuman speed and abilities. Here, the perception-image changed from a material representation to another kind of perception – that of the molecular. In this sense, it is almost as if the world was slowed down for a few moments to give us insight that is beyond our human capacity of sight.

The image framed by the camera is the camera's perception-image made up of "sets, characters, props – *framing*" (Deleuze 1986:12, original emphasis). But when this framed image is "reflected by a living image" it becomes a perception-image or the whole. Perception-images are therefore signs of a movement-image (Deleuze 1986:68).

2.1.2.2 Affection

Affect is the power or force that prompts actions. The affection-image precedes an action; it forces the perception-image to become an action-image (Colman 2011:81). Colman (2011:81) notes that the analysis of affection-images allows for a focus on the content and styles utilised in a film. Deleuze (1986:102) explains that the affection-images are "power-qualities" pre-empt an event or action "in its eternal aspect." Also, according to Colman (2011:82):

Affect is what will cause the movement from one state to another. The movement and subsequent mixing between any animate or inanimate bodies produce affects [...]. The affect is an intensity that will produce a dynamic expression in a body causing it to alter its composition and its potential trajectories.

For Deleuze (1986:98) affection-images are described as an image that "is not a sensation, a feeling, an idea, but the quality of a possible sensation, feeling or idea." It is essential to understand that the affection-image is not

necessarily a representational image, but instead holds a quality or power for change. Deleuze (1986:98) explains that this power can take place in two ways: as propositional affects (the expression of states) and as actualised affects (expressed relational effects including sound or different types and forms of montage).



Figure 8: A close-up shot of a character, Southpaw, 2015. (Southpaw official trailer 2015).

An affection-image that shows the expression of states is most evident in the close-up image. In the film *Southpaw* (2015) directed by Antoine Fuqua, a close-up shot of the protagonist, Billy conveys a change in his attitude (*Figure 8*): this scene shows Billy in his final boxing match which he needs to win in order to secure custody of his little girl and put his life back together. Here the propositional affects (the change in his attitude) have changed to actualised affects (as registered in this close-up of Billy's face and the word 'hope' written on his mouth guard – both his surname and the hope the character projects for his life to change for the better). Therefore, affection inhabits the

gap – it “occupies it without filling it in or filling it up” and operates between the perception and the action (Deleuze 1986:65).

Initial perception and feeling combine to give rise to action. Affect as the energy that mediates between perception and action could be manipulated through filmmaking techniques such as sound, lighting and other means. What is of importance concerning affection-images is that they form part of the human consciousness – both as it pertains to the world and the cinema.

2.1.2.3 Action

As part of the movement-image system, the action-image is movement that takes place due to perception; it follows a perception-image (Colman 2011:92). Deleuze (1986:141) explains that the action-image boosts energies or power (affection-image) to become actualised:

Qualities and powers are no longer displayed in any-space-whatevers, no longer inhabit ordinary worlds, but are actualized directly in determinate, geographical, historical and social space-times.

The action-image, therefore, indicates the parts of an image: following perception is a “constitutive affect” that pushes perception into activity (Colman 2011:93). Thus, when the screen presents a situation, the action that materialises a response to bring about change in the case portrayed by the screen constitutes the action-image.

Deleuze (1986:155) says that the action-image rests on behaviour. Behaviour follows on from one state to another to respond to a situation to change it or create a new situation (Deleuze 1986:155). This idea of actualisation is central to the action-image. The ciné-system divides the action-image into three forms namely, large, small and the transformation of forms (trans-morphological forms). These forms are presented as conceptual formulas

whereby films may be described as a type of action-image depending on the relation between the situation and the action.

Deleuze (1986:141) explains that realism is made up of “milieux and modes of behaviour, milieux which can actualise and modes of behaviour which embody.” In this instance, the action-image is the relation between the situation and the action and all its variants. Deleuze (1986:141, original emphasis) continues that the *milieu* brings forth qualities and powers, while the qualities and powers become “forces in the milieu.” The *milieu* or situation and its energy “act on the character, throw him a challenge and constitute a situation in which he is caught” (Deleuze 1986:141). In turn, the character reacts to the *milieu* in answer to the situation that ultimately results in the modification of the situation or form (Deleuze 1986:141-142). This is the formula for the large form action image that suggests a *mise-en-scène* that presents a situation (S), an action (A) followed by a modified situation (S') that equals SAS' (Deleuze 1986:142). In other words, the conceptual formula for large form action-images is:

S (Situation) + A (Action) + S' (Situation modified by the action) = SAS'

Deleuze makes reference to three varieties of action-images related to the large form: SAS' suggests the resolved situation is better than the original situation; SAS suggests the resolved situation remained unchanged with respect to the original situation; SAS'' implies the resolved situation has worsened with respect to the original situation (Deamer 2014:65). Therefore, large form action-images always commence with a given situation which prompts action. The action impacts directly on the situation which, as a result of the action imposed upon it, is modified (for better or worse) or unchanged.

The small form action-image moves from “the action to the situation” (ASA') – here “it is the action which discloses the situation, a fragment or an aspect of the situation which triggers of a new action” (Deleuze 1986:160). Therefore, as the film progresses from action to action, the situation slowly “emerges, varies, and finally either becomes clear or retains its mystery” (Deleuze

1986:160). This type of action-image consists of “progressive, linear action” expressed by the main character(s). The actions of these character(s) and our perception of them and how they are affected reveal the “situation of the world” (Deamer 2014:96). David Deamer (2014:96) explains that the small form action-image aims to “uncover the social situation as a function of characterization.” In other words, the actions of the character – the way in which the character is perceived – reveals the situation (the circumstances of her world or the film) which prompts a new action (cf. 3.1.1.2).

The third form of action-image is trans-morphological forms – “deformations, transformations or transmutations” (Deleuze 1986:178). Deleuze (1986:186) makes a distinction between different fields or spaces where the small and large forms “manifest both their real distinction and all their possible transformations.” Firstly, Deleuze (1986:186, original emphasis) refers to cinema forms that express “the physico-biological domain which corresponds to the *notion of milieu*.” These small form action-image films show the movement from action to situation as facilitated by a vector. A vector is a “sign of minute intensive perceptions” (Colman 2011:217) or, as Deleuze (1986:218) define it in the glossary of terms, “a broken line which brings together singular points or remarkable moments at the peak of their intensity. Vectorial space is distinguished from encompassing space.”

Secondly, Deleuze (1986:186, original emphasis) refers to a field associated with large form action-images, where the movement is from the situation to action: “the mathematical domain which corresponds to the *notion of space*.” Deleuze (1986:187) also refers to a third domain “which corresponds to the *notion of landscape*.” The trans-morphology of situations produce new images of thought while action-images, in general, bring forth specific forms of time. It is these forms of time brought forth by the action-image that leads directly to the time-image where time is not a succession of movement, but visible in the image of time itself.

2.2 The time-image

Time-images are images that show a conceptualisation of time that exceeds the sensory-motor schema and linear time of the movement-image. The time-image in film offers viewers a more meaningful portrayal of human existence in time and space. Richard Ruston (2012:68) explains that Deleuze separates films of movement-image and films of time-image regarding how they deal with the past and the present. Where films of the movement-image strive to clarify the past from the present, time-image films question such clarity. Deleuze (1989:37) argues that the “cinematographic image” is not automatically in the present as “there is no present which is not haunted by a past and a future.”

Deleuze (1989:34-35) continues his discussion of the movement-image in *Cinema 2: the time-image* by referring to montage as the production of an “image of time” through its activity of producing a whole. However, this indirect image of time is denied when there fails to be an affective linkage of perception and action images – when there is a disruption in the “sensory-motor schema” of the movement-image and where time-images act as direct images – “pure optical and sound situations” (Deleuze 1989:40-41). These disruptions manifest as instances of crystals of time – the result of a “mutual image” (Deleuze 1989:69). A crystal-image is, therefore, an image in relation to itself. Colman (2011:136) explains:

Through this exchange of actual and virtual images, the image becomes autonomous and independent of movement, and is a seed of time to be found in all types of environments and expressed in all kinds of screen conditions.

The image of time operates distinctly from linear movement induced by the sensory-motor schema. This image communicates time conceptually in itself. The crystal-image, the cornerstone of Deleuze’s time-image theory is, therefore, a shot that moulds the past and the present, the actual and the virtual. This image is, therefore, a direct image of time that deals with

temporality. Drawing on Bergson's understanding of time that flows Deleuze theorises the time-image. In *Matter and Memory* Bergson views time as a process whereby the past and future penetrate into the present as opposed to a series of discrete instances of presents. This notion of time is in-tune with human perception of time as we perceive the world around us not merely in successive progression, but rely on the past – our memories and recollection – to navigate our way successfully. Deleuze presents explanations for aspects relating to the time-image as understood in the medium of film.

These philosophical terms appear throughout the volume as 'commentaries on Bergson.' These 'commentaries' relate to duration and memory and are employed by Deleuze as "temporal laws" that oversee the numerous features and images that films produce (Colman 2011:6). As these four commentaries on Bergson comprise the characteristics and functions of the time-image, it makes sense to consider Deleuze's ideas in this way. The following section analyses Deleuze's philosophy of time and how this creates the crystal-image. The latter, as mentioned before, is critical to the practical outcome of this study. *Revolver* relies on the crystal-image from its conception to the final execution of the film given its investigation of memory.

2.2.1 *Bergson's four schemas of time and Deleuze's time-image*

Crystals – whether natural or manufactured – are formed through a process of crystallisation that transforms a formless substance out of liquid or gas (Crystallization. Physical Process 2018:[sp]). The method of crystallisation replicates atoms or molecules to create a highly organised structure. The repetition of this process ultimately forms a crystal (Crystallization. Physical Process 2018:[sp]). Crystals uniquely deal with light as they split rays into multiple beams that bounce around on the inside (Crystallization. Physical Process 2018:[sp]). On the outside, crystals also reflect light from its various facets. Deleuze makes use of these aspects of the crystal to explain the image of time and the crystal-image.

Deleuze's 'commentaries' centre on Bergson's four schemas of time. Through his discussion of these schemes, Deleuze reveals his theorisation of the time-image (Colman 2011:137). Bergson explores these temporal schemas to gain insight into the process of memory and our ability to extract memories from the past to use in the present. Our aptitude for recollecting memories, experiences, images and knowledge from the past to utilise in the present is Deleuze's main vantage point for the theorisation of the time-image. In *Deleuze and cinema: the film concepts* Colman (2011:137) similarly organises her discussion of Deleuze's ideas around Bergson's temporal schemas which offers a meaningful way to analyse the time-image. This organisation is used in this section to highlight four important aspects of Deleuze's time-image and crystal-image.

2.2.1.1 The circuit

Deleuze starts his discussion of the crystal-image on the inside of the crystal and focuses on reflection. It is in the way that light enters the crystal, trapped to refract on the inside, that Deleuze considers the image of time. Deleuze (1989:289) relies on Bergson's diagram of the circuit of the actual and the virtual to show how memory immediately follows perception. Bergson (1991:104, original emphasis) notes that:

[R]eflective perception is a *circuit*, in which all the elements, including the perceived object itself, hold each other in a mutual tension as in an electric circuit, so that no disturbance starting from the object can stop on its way and remain in the depths of the mind: it must always find its way back to the object from where it proceeds.

Bergson mentions two kinds of perception. Deleuze (1989:44) refers to perception as "recognition" or "reflection" which he divides into "automatic or habitual recognition" and "attentive recognition" (Deleuze 1989:44). The first, according to Bergson (1991:104), takes place in an almost "accidental"

fashion while the second suggests reliance on a sense of unity between the mind and the image or object it recognises.

Bergson (1991:104-105) explains that of these “circles of memory” (*Figure 9*) A is closest to “immediate perception” as it only contains the object, O, that we perceive. The larger circles, B, C and D, indicate the various registers of perception as our concept or intellect expand with relation to the object, O.




Figure 9: Bergson's circuit of memory (Bergson 2001:105).

Deleuze (1989:289) discusses the “circuit” of the actual and virtual based on Bergson’s ideas of memory as “consecutive to perception” to explain the recollection-image and the dream-image. Within this dynamic circuit, “the past is present” but altered when recalled in the present as it is brought to life or actualised – it is the “actualization of the past” that is the circuit (Colman 2011:137). Therefore, there is not a succession of various objects on the same plane, instead, the object stays the same, but passes through different registers (Deleuze 1989:44). In other words, time is not read as a succession

of movement - the movement of the object as it transforms spatially over time – instead, time is understood conceptually as the object ‘moves’ through different stages of virtuality in the mind.

Deleuze (1989:68) continues that actual images have virtual images that are like a “mirror-image”, indicated by the dotted lines of the schema. Deleuze (1989:68, original emphasis) explains:

In Bergsonian terms, the real object is reflected in a mirror-image as in the virtual object which, from its side and simultaneously, envelops or reflects the real: there is ‘coalescence’ between the two. There is a formation of an image with two sides, actual *and* virtual. It is as if an image in a mirror, a photo or postcard came to life, assumed independence and returned into the mirror and resumed its place in the postcard or photo, following a double movement of liberation and capture.

Here, the mirror-image or reflection is considered as a virtual memory which, in its state of virtuality, reflects the actual, real object through its actualisation. The actual and virtual are distinct from one another but follows each other precisely as a reflection and the object which causes the reflection. This double image that is simultaneously actual and virtual is the crystal-image. The circuit illustrates the crystal-image’s “internal limit of all the relative circuits” – “how we inhabit time, how we move in it, in this form which carries us away, picks us up and enlarges us” (Deleuze 1989:81-82).

A scene shot in the hall of mirrors in *The lady of Shanghai* (1947) directed by Orson Wells shows the protagonists of the film as well as the repetition of the couple in mirrors (*Figure 10*). This example illustrates the mirror-image and circles of memory: the real object (the characters themselves) is reflected in the mirrors where the image becomes a series of virtual images. The image shows the simultaneity of the virtual and the actual. In the same way, memories or knowledge is actualised in the present through various registers of virtuality as it moves further and further away from the real object. The mirror, therefore, shows the double image of the actual image – literally, the

reflection of the couple as it moves through different registers of the virtual reflected by the mirrors.



Figure 10: A scene in the hall of mirrors, The lady from Shanghai, 1947. (Phillips 2015).

2.2.1.2 The inverted cone of memory

The inverted memory cone (*Figure 11*) illustrates the various levels of memory as it becomes actualised in our conscious present. The cone suggests that the circuit of the virtual creates the “little crystalline seed and the vast crystallizable universe” through recollection-images that navigates between the present and the past (Deleuze 1989:81). A seed crystal is a small part of a single crystal. These seeds are activated when placed in a liquid solution to continue the process of crystallisation which ultimately produces a large crystal (Ferlic 2006:[sp]). The circuit of the virtual image creates the memory cone which is the “little crystalline seed” (Deleuze 1989:81). This seed is

formed by recollection-images that appear between the past and present (Colman 2011:38). These recollection-images (or seed crystals), in turn, continue to crystallise the environment which could be a film sequence, a singular image or the entire film. It is through this process of repetition that individual ideas or parts shape the whole.




Figure 11: Bergson's inverted memory cone (Bergson 2001:162).

Bergson (1991:161-162) explains the diagram of the inverted memory cone as follows: S marks the “present perception” while “recollections in their totality” are represented by the base, AB. Deleuze (1989:294) explains:

The point S is clearly the actual present; but this is not strictly speaking a point, since it already includes the past of this present, the virtual image which doubles the actual image. As for the AB, A'B'...sections of the cone, they are not psychological circuits to which recollection-images would correspond; they are purely virtual circuits, each of which contains all our past as this is preserved in itself (pure recollection). [...]. Psychological circuits of recollection-images or dream-images are produced when we ‘leap’

from S to one of these sections, to actualize some virtuality of it which must then move down into a new present S'.

The dynamic movement of the cone suggests that the actual present (S) already includes the past in its present state (its double or virtual image). Our memories are represented as recollections on the remaining axes of the cone that filters down towards point S when they are recalled. These “degrees or modes of actualization” are dispersed between the actual and the virtual and function through relativity (Deleuze 1989:81). The memory cone then explains the crystal-image’s “outer-most, variable and reshapable envelope, at the edges of the world, beyond even movements of world” (Deleuze 1989:81-82). It is, therefore, the seed of time that expands the circuits of the actual and the virtual outwards. It is, therefore, the seed crystals (recollection-images) that crystallise or actualise in various registers to shape a film sequence, an image or an entire film.

2.2.1.3 Dissymmetrical jets

Memory is the aspect of time that extends it into the past and links it with space. There is also a difference between memory and duration: duration is a “pure time relation” whereby we experience time; memory refers to the psychological function of human beings to ‘move’ between the past and the present (Clarke 2002:170). It is then also memory that makes time simultaneous when the past is inserted into the present. Bergson (1959:78-9), in *Time and free will* (1959), explains his view on the succession of time:

It is certainly possible to perceive in time, and in time only, a succession which is nothing but a succession, but not an addition, i.e. a succession which culminates in a sum. For though we reach a sum by taking into account a succession of different terms, yet it is necessary that each of these terms should remain when we pass to the following, and should wait, so to speak, to be added to the others: how could it wait, if it were nothing but an instant of duration?

Bergson's understanding of time, therefore, does not accumulate a sum of instances, but instead, progresses linearly through the present where it can take different directions into the past and the future. Clarke (2002:169) explains that Bergson's revision of time freed it from its inferior position to space to encompass a new notion of time as a multifaceted separation of various kinds that "co-exist as real." In this sense, time exists as "many pasts in relation with many presents" (Clarke 2002:170). It is, in particular, this aspect of Bergson's argument that influences Deleuze's theorisation of time – Bergson's notion of "multiple possible presents" forms the foundation upon which Deleuze builds both his movement-image and time-image (Clarke 2002:171).




Figure 12: Bergson's third schema of the splitting of time as represented by Deleuze (Deleuze 1989:295).

As the past does not follow the "present that it was" but appears at the same time as the present, Deleuze (1989:81) points out that "time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past" in two different directions – one headed for the future while the other recedes to the past much like the light refracted by the crystal. The third temporal schema theorised by Bergson is the "split in two dissymmetrical jets" as Deleuze (1989:81) explains. As the diagram (drawn by Deleuze following of Bergson) (*Figure 12*) suggests, this split tears time open into two paths – "one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past" (Deleuze 1989:81;295). As such, each present moment that presents itself simultaneously recedes to the

past while it projects itself into the future. In essence, each word that I write immediately moves to the past as it is instantly replaced by a new word in a unique moment. At the same time, each word that I write directs itself towards the future as it changes the course of that which follows.




Figure 13: A character looks at a Polaroid picture, *Memento*, 2000. (*Memento* 2000)




Figure 14: A character looks at the back of a Polaroid picture, *Memento*, 2000. (*Memento* 2000).

Memento (2000) by Christopher Nolan portrays the story of a man, Leonard, who experiences memory loss. To make sense of his world, he relies on a series of Polaroid pictures that he takes throughout his travels and tattoos

phrases on his body to remind him of important aspects. The Polaroid photos and the tattoos serve as his memory as evident in the scene where Leonard looks at a Polaroid taken of Teddy in the actual present of the film (*Figure 13*). At the back of the Polaroid, he made a note “do not believe his lies” to remind him of what he has learnt in the past (this serves as a recollection of the past) (*Figure 14*). This scene in the film portrays the splitting of time into the past (the recollection-image of the Polaroid) and the present or future. The recollection of the past serves in guiding him in his future endeavours and offers an image of time split in two.

Deleuze (1989:81, original emphasis) concludes: “Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we *see in the crystal*. The crystal-image was not time, but we see time in the crystal.” The crystal-image in film, therefore, shows time as a result of this constant splitting of images – the movement of time into the past and present (offered by the scene in *Memento* discussed above) – where the actual and virtual becomes indiscernible.

2.2.1.4 The event




Figure 15: Bergson's schema of the event (Bergson 2001:143).

The fourth diagram (*Figure 15*) illustrates the event and is discussed in Deleuze's (1989:98-125) "fourth commentary on Bergson." The event is made useful via a graphic representation of memory as it intersects with history" (Colman 2011:139). Deleuze (1989:297) explains that history is "longitudinal" and "pass[es] along the event" where it intersects with memory which is "vertical." Bergson (1991:142-143) says that our virtual and actual perceptions continue along both the horizontal (AB) and vertical (CI) lines which "range our successive recollections set out in time." The point, I, the crossing of the two lines, represents consciousness (Bergson 2001:143). AB shows that which we are going to see and represents space, while CI marks that which we have already perceived and corresponds to time (Bergson 2001:144). Bergson (1991:143, original emphasis) explains that space "preserves indefinitely the *things* which are juxtaposed" while "time in its advance devours the *states* which succeed each other within it." In other words, space preserves our memory while time, as it progresses forward, destroys the present for it to recede to the past. In this sense, space - the longitudinal axis, AB, preserves our memory over time. Here, memory is linked to a particular space and time in history such as from one's time of birth to death, for example. CI, the vertical axis, conversely represents our recollections of the past as summoned up in a particular instance. Point I, therefore, presents consciousness in the present moment. Our memories move up and down this vertical axis as it becomes progressively more virtual.

The schema illustrates the intersection of the "temporal vision" with the "spatial vision" of the event (Deleuze 1989:297). Deleuze (1989:99) discusses Fellini's ideas of a direct time-image:

What Fellini says is Bergsonian: 'We are constructed in memory; we are *simultaneously* childhood, adolescence, old age and maturity.' What happens when we search for a recollection? We have to put ourselves in the past in general, then we have to choose between the regions: in which one do we think that recollection is hidden, huddled up waiting for us and evading us? [...]. We have to jump into a chosen region, even if we have to return to the present in order to make another jump, if the recollection sought for gives no response and does not realize itself in a recollection-image.

Deleuze (1989:99) explains that non-chronological time is paradoxical as it offers the “pre-existence of a past in general”, the “coexistence of all the sheets of past” and a “most contracted degree” of existence. In addition to this, history shows “time as the event” (Colman 2011:139). In *The social network* (2010) director David Fincher tells the story of Mark Zuckerberg through a series of flashbacks to his past. The film’s actual present is set during a deposition (*Figure 16*). Throughout the deposition, the film offers recollections of Zuckerberg’s past that portray his story (*Figure 17*). The film functions, as Fellini explains in the above quotation, through selecting recollections from Zuckerberg’s memory or “all the sheets of the past” as Deleuze (1989:99) explains. These memories are actualised in the film’s actual present.

Deleuze (1989:99-100, original emphasis) relies on St Augustine’s definition of time as a “threefold present” – “*a present of the future, a present of the present and a present of the past*” to explain how time is simultaneously present in the event. The simultaneity of time replaces “successive action” (the movement-image) with a “genuine time-image” (the crystal-image) (Deleuze 1989:101).



Figure 16: A scene during the deposition, The social network, 2010. (The social network 2010).



Figure 17: A recollection of a past event, The social network, 2010. (The social network 2010).

To summarise, the time-image presents an image where time is present or visible. Time, in this sense, relies on the circuit of exchange where perceptions are mirrored or reflected by their virtual counterparts. The simultaneous existence of the virtual and the actual (a double or mirror image) therefore actualise recollections of the past in the present, only to recede into the past again. In the context of a film, the seed of the crystal, shaped by recollection-images as these appear between the past and the present, crystallises the entire environment of the film. The crystal-image also shows time as continually diverging in two directions – the past and the present or future to the point where the actual and virtual becomes indistinguishable from one another. This comprises the crystal-image in which time is in continuous motion.

The crystal-image and the ideas put forward by Deleuze about time are used to shape the creative output of this research. The next chapter explores Deleuze's ideas about time, movement and memory in the context of my film, *Revolver*.

CHAPTER THREE

CRYSTALLISING THE TIME-IMAGE: *REVOLVER*

Deleuze's theory of the movement-image and time-image as presented in Chapter Two can be applied to my practice of filmmaking. This chapter explores these ideas as manifested in the practical outcome of this research – the short film, *Revolver*. The discussion starts with an application of Deleuze's ideas, in particular, those about the time-image and crystal-image, to the concept, form and design of the film. The analysis brings these ideas to the fore as it impacts on the narrative, treatment and directing of *Revolver*.

3.1 Filming the crystal

Deleuze's image of the crystal invokes time in cinema as the simultaneous presence of the past, present and future to the point where these become indiscernible. As such, the present is never free from the past or the future – it is a revolving cycle as referenced by the title, *Revolver*, of the film. The short film interprets the ideas around the crystal-image through its approach to the film's narrative, its structure and its visual and audio considerations. Here, the notion of the present, interrupted by the past and the future, is regarded in all aspects relating to the film. I outline my application of Deleuze's cinema philosophy in my film in the sections that follow.

3.1.1 A narrative of time

Revolver portrays the memory of a woman during a visit to her childhood house. The memory recalls a time when she, as a young girl, discovered her deceased father after he committed suicide. The film depicts the present reality of the woman during which she accesses her memories of the past (those relating to the day of her father's death) and considers a different future

(which is expressed in the painting and the turning back of the clock at the end of the film). The plot is presented in three distinct sections that represent her memory as a dislocated, disjointed and interrupted recollection. As such, the structure of the film is designed to convey Deleuze's (1989:82) crystal-image whereby the woman "inhabit[s] time", "move[s] in it" and is "enlarge[d]" by it.

3.1.1.1 Film structure and narrative

The prologue of the film opens with a wide shot of a home. A little girl runs into the frame towards a house that she proceeds to enter. She is holding a painting in her hand. The film cuts to the interior of the house's kitchen with a table and a chair. On the table are paint, brushes and a container with red-stained water. The little girl enters the shot as she runs into the kitchen and bumps the table at the same time that a gunshot is heard. The film cuts to a top-shot of the corner of the table with the discoloured water as it spills on the floor. The title of the film is introduced. The image fades to black.

Three distinct sections, each separated by a few seconds of black following the prologue. These parts of the film revolve around the actions of the little girl and her father on the day he committed suicide. The actions play out between 11h30 and 12h00 (the time of death) during the day: the little girl paints a picture in the kitchen and runs outside to dry it while, at the same time, her father opens a letter, reads it, stabs the letter opener into it and loads his gun. As the little girl runs back into the house, her father prepares to take his own life. At 12h00 when the gunshot goes off, their narratives collide. These two stories are presented concurrently throughout the three parts to reveal the story from different perspectives and in different time slots.

The first part starts with the clock ticking slower than in real time and the time visible on the clock reads 11h45. The following sequence shows close-up shots of a man in distress, intercut with the little girl running outside in the garden with her painting in her hand. The focus shifts to a garden statue of a

woman as the girl pass in and out of the frame in soft focus. A close-up of the man's quivering hand on the gun juxtaposes the carefree girl as the viewer notices him loading the gun. As he closes the fully loaded revolver, the clock in the background shows that time has passed, and it is almost 11h50. The music and sound design keep building tension. This part ends with the girl running away from the camera towards the house. The screen fades to black.

At the beginning of part two, the clock shows 11h30. We see the little girl at the kitchen table painting a picture. This is followed by a shot of the man in the office, picking up a letter and reading it. The two scenarios are intercut, and parallels are drawn with matching top-shots. As the girl's painting progresses, her father studies the letter that reads 'retrenchment', printed in red. Next, he places it on top of a document stamped with the words, 'final notice'. He seems increasingly distressed – to the point where he stabs the letter opener into the letter in utter frustration. This marks the end of part two. The sequence builds tension through the pace of editing (which has increased), the performance of the man (who is more anxious and agitated) and the sound design (which is more intense and layered). The clock in this part ticks in real time and appears a lot more than in the first part. The clock indicates that part two plays off between 11h30 and 11h45. The film fades to black to signal the end of part two.

In part three, time is passing by at a rapid pace and the seconds are ticking faster (speedier than real-time seconds). The clock is also more visible than in part two, and the speed of the images on the screen change much quicker. These fast-changing shots intercut continuously between the little girl running in the garden and her father preparing to pull the trigger. Again, this time from a different perspective, the man opens the drawer, loads the gun and in very intense close-up shots contemplates suicide. Tension builds to an extreme as the film cuts between the girl running towards the house and her father putting the gun in his mouth. Finally, the clock ticks over to 12h00. The shot rings out, and the girl stops in her tracks as she enters the kitchen. The film then fades to black to end this part.

The conclusion of the film shows the girl slowly making her way to the room from which the sound of the shot emanated with the painting still in her hand. The shots are in slow motion, and the film has now slowed down with silences in the sound design. Here the little girl's present self is introduced as she is match-cut with a woman dressed exactly like her, also making her way up the staircase towards her father's office. The office door slowly opens, and the girl enters. She is not quite sure what to make of the situation and carefully puts the painting on the desk in front of her deceased father. The painting reveals the two of them – her father with his briefcase in hand – and a clock with the time 11h30 on it. Again, the woman touches the table as she recalls the events of that horrid day. Finally, she looks up at the clock and slowly turns the time back to 11h30. The film's end is signalled when the title, *Revolver*, appears on the screen.

3.1.1.2 The image of time in the narrative

The film presents two concurrent narratives – that of the little girl and her father – which converge with the sound of the gunshot. The gunshot the little girl hears defines her situation (S) to which she responds with an action (she follows the sound that came from her father's office (A)); the gunshot marks the action (pulling the trigger (A)) taken by her father in response to his difficult circumstances (S) that ultimately changes his situation for the worse (death (S')). As a result of her great loss and trauma, the little girl's situation (S'') is worsened by the action she took. The action-image in both instances can be defined as a large form action-image, both with the conceptual formula SAS'' (cf. section 2.1.2.3).

The conceptual formula for the little girl is as follow:

S (The sound of the gunshot) + A (Following the sound of the gunshot) + S'' (The death of her father and the trauma she experiences which results in a situation that is modified for the worse) = SAS''

The conceptual formula for the man is as follows:

S (The man's difficult circumstances) + A (He commits suicide) + S" (His death which modifies the situation for the worse) = SAS"

The film also portrays a third narrative – that of the little girl's present self. In this case, the action-image transforms from the action to the situation, or put differently, the action creates the situation. Here, the action (the presence of the woman in the house, walking up the stairs as she once did as a little girl (A)) reveals the situation (the recollection of memories brought to the fore by the space she finds herself in (S)). The situation reveals that the little girl and the woman are in fact the same individual and suggests that the action-images presented in the prologue and the three sections are the recollection of her childhood memories. Therefore, the action (A) discloses her situation (recollections) (S) that triggers a new action (turning back the clock (A')). The small form action-image is made up of continuous, linear action portrayed by the main character in the film (Deamer 2014:96). The way in which the woman perceives and is affected by these actions, reveals the circumstances of her world – the character reveals the situation. It is therefore not the situation that must change, but rather her action (reflecting on this circumstance differently). The conceptual formula that describes the woman's narrative is therefore ASA'.

The conceptual formula for the little girl's present self is as follows:

A (Her presence in her childhood home and walking up the stairs) + S (The recollection of her childhood memory of the death of her father) + A' (The turning back of the clock which is a new action) = ASA'.

Deleuze (1986:158) notes, "what must appear on the outside [the sequences of the little girl and the man in his office] is what happens inside the character [her memory of these events], at the intersection of the situation which permeates and the action [turning back the clock] which is to detonate." The short form action-image appears in disconnected situations with "weak

sensorimotor links” (Rodowick 1997:70). These action-images are able to exceed the movement-image, as the sensori-motor link of the subject is disabled. Therefore the cinematic movement is completed and displaced by the appearance of a direct image of time: a crystal-image.

The small and large form is not merely intended to isolate action, but also contributes to the way in which a character and story are understood (Deleuze 1986:178). *Revolver* employs both of these action-images and therefore creates a “*transforming form*” or trans-morphological action-image (cf. section 2.1.2.3) – the small form (qualitative action) “grafted itself from the inside on the large form” (quantitative action) (Deleuze 1986:180-181).

The time-image appears in *Revolver* as the film disrupts and questions the chronological representation of time through portraying a woman’s memory as she recalls it in the present time. The act of recollecting the past and contemplating possibilities for the future in the present moments mould the actual and the virtual into a direct image of time. This “mutual image” of time as Deleuze (1989:69) refers to it, simultaneously reflects recollections of the past as she visits her childhood home in the present moment and projects multiple possibilities for the future had she been able to turn back time.

Bergson’s four schemas of time, which Deleuze commented on to theorise the crystal-image (cf. 2.2.1) also informs the narrative. The first of these is the circuit (cf. 2.2.1.1). *Revolver* portrays memory as “attentive recognition” as the images recalled by the protagonist are not successive or chronological, but passes through “circles of memory” through varying degrees of actual and virtual (Bergson 2001:104-105). The film portrays the past as the present, and it is this present state that changes the past as it operates through the circuit. These double images or “mirror images” as Deleuze (1989:68) calls them are virtual images that reflect the real (actual). The simultaneous portrayal of the recollections of the past, recalled by the protagonist in the present moment creates a circuit or “double movement of liberation” which is captured crystal-image. This dual movement illustrates the internal relation of the circuits of the crystal.



Figure 18: Woman on the staircase, Revolver. 2018. (Own image).



Figure 19: Girl on the staircase, Revolver. 2018. (Own image).

The conclusion of the film shows the little girl and her present self intermittently (*Figures 18 and 19*). The screen negotiates between them as they ascend the stairway: the sequence shows the little girl's hand as it moves up the railing in the past which abruptly transforms into her present self's hand

that continues sliding up the bannister in the present. Similarly, the inverted cone of memory (cf. section 2.2.1.2) shows how recollection-images pass between the present and the past to produce the “little crystalline seed” (S) and the “vast crystallizable universe” (AB). Point S, therefore, marks the actual present (the woman going up the stairway) while the various AB sections of the cone are virtual circuits that hold our past. These are “pure recollections”, accessed when we leap from the actual present (S) to any of the levels presented in the cone (Deleuze 1989:294). These leaps actualise the virtual to produce recollection-images (the little girl moving up the stairway). The actualisation of her recollections in the present is dispersed between the actual and the virtual.

The narrative also illustrates the idea, put forward by Deleuze (1989:81), that each moment of time tears in two as the present and past to veer off in different directions – the future and the past. The splitting of time takes place throughout the film as we see in the image of the woman recalling memories of her past – summoning them up to the present so to speak. The “gushing of time” that splits into her memory of that day as it surfaces in the present in two – towards the future wherein the present passes while preserving her memory in the past (Deleuze 1989:81,295).

The film indicates that the entirety of this memory plays out between 11h30 and 12h00 on a particular Wednesday morning. The sequence of events take place in a chronological order on this horizontal axis, AB, marked on the schema of the event (cf. section 2.2.1.4). This pole comprises an infinite series of sequential instances and relates to the movement-image of the narrative. These events fit a historical timeline of chronological events that took place during a particular time in a specific place – “the pre-existence of a past in general; the coexistence of all the sheets of the past” (Deleuze 1989:99). On the other hand, the vertical axis, CI, marks the present moment during which the woman recalls her memory of the past. Memory or “the existence of a most contracted degree” (CI) intersects with the event or history (AB) vertically: the recollection of memory draws from the chronological events as they appear in history and disrupts its serial nature

(Deleuze 1989:99). These intersections then present a simultaneous image of the past, present and future – a movement-image transformed into a time-image.

3.1.2 Directing time in film

Given the compelling nature of the audio-visual medium of film, the narrative is not the only aspect where Deleuze's ideas of time should be embedded. The film's direction sets out to connote ideas of memory or recollection and to portray time as multiple, non-linear, disjointed and simultaneous. Aspects relating to the cinematography, editing of the film and visual and sound considerations are all geared to promote the image of time that we see in the crystal.

3.1.2.1 Capturing time



Figure 20: Girl painting in the kitchen, Revolver. 2018. (Own image).

In *Revolver* I employ various cinematographic techniques to convey aspects relating to memory. Firstly, the film uses different shots to reiterate the idea of different perspectives. Recollections are typically incomplete and subjective. The memories we retrieve are partially based on our visual memory and partially constructed or fictional. As the story is conveyed through different perspectives, the viewer is given a multiple views of the narrative and echoes the process of retrieving the past which is given new life in the present.




Figure 21: Top shot of the man in his office, *Revolver*. 2018. (Own image).

At the beginning of part two, a wide-angle shot of the girl painting in the kitchen is shown (*Figure 20*). The camera frames this shot symmetrically as if constructed in the mind's eye after the fact. It is almost too stylised to be real. This kind of picture-perfect approach is also employed in some top shots such as the view from above the man as he is sitting at his desk in his office (*Figure 21*) and the little girl painting at the kitchen table (*Figure 22*).



Figure 22: Top shot of the girl painting in the kitchen, *Revolver*. 2018. (Own image).

Apart from the apparent fabrication of these scenes, the top shots also create the feeling of being suspended above the action as a viewer looking in. As we realise at the end of the film, the woman was not present and cannot know what transpired in the office. As all the events are portrayed as her recollections, memory is expressed as subjective and fabricated and corresponds to the notion of time as it flickers through the actual and virtual circuits (cf. section 2.2.1.1).

I also use a series of close-up shots (cf. section 2.1.2.2) in the film. For Deleuze (1986:87, original emphasis) the “*affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face.*” The face (which could be anything framed by the camera so that it appears larger or fills the screen) has two poles: “micro-movements” and an “immobile plate” (Deleuze 1986:87). The close-up comprises a series of minute movements (such as the hands of the clock framed in the film) on a motionless plane (the face of the clock). Deleuze (1986:88) notes that such images are “envisaged” or “facified” and returns the gaze. Close-ups are therefore affection-images and resemble the energy or power that delivers the perception-image to the action-image. In the film, the

close-up shots of the man's face (*Figure 23*), hands and the gun (*Figure 24*) as well as the ticking clock, contributes to the affect – the energy or power – that prompts the action that the man inevitably takes.



Figure 23: Close-up shot of the man, *Revolver*. 2018. (Own image).



Figure 24: Close-up shot of the man loading the gun, *Revolver*. 2018. (Own image).

Most of the shots in the film are static apart from those where the little girl is running in the garden and when she walks down the hallway with the camera following her. These handheld camera shots result in quivering and out-of-focus images and are used to break with the stable-images decisively. This technique conveys a sense of reality and offers immersion, instability and tension. The handheld camera technique is associated with *Cinéma vérité*¹ or truthful cinema where the audience is made aware of the presence of the camera. Apart from the handheld shots' representation of a so-called truth or subjective experience, Deleuze (1989:23) notes that there is a different kind of camera-consciousness at work. Here, the camera-consciousness is not merely defined by following the movement as the camera moves which allows for "mental connections" instead. With this technique, the mere portrayal of space becomes subordinated to "the functions of thought" (Deleuze 1989:23). This defines an image beyond movement, distinct from sensory-motor associations – a time-image.



¹ *Cinéma vérité* is a technique of filmmaking that originated during the 1950s in France. The term generally applies to documentary filmmaking and makes reference to films wherein the camera rolls without the direct interference of a director. The method generally employs handheld cameras and live sound. *Cinéma vérité* is known for valuing the awareness of the camera and the process of filmmaking to which direct reference are made. This technique is immediate, intimate and 'real' and often contains 'flaws' such as out of focus, shaky or grainy images. The latter is considered to authenticate the film (Cousins & Macdonald 1996:249-250).

Figure 25: Girl running in the garden with lens flare, Revolver. 2018. (Own image).

Lens flare is used extensively in the scenes where the little girl runs in the garden (*Figure 25*). This technique is deliberate and adds to the sense of drama already invoked by the handheld camera shots, offering a subjective perspective. The use of lens flare also contributes to the virtuality of the scene as it enhances the idea of a dream-like state or reliving a pleasant memory. The lens flare disrupts the clarity of the image and simulates the inconsistency in lucidity when recollecting a memory.

Slow-motion is utilised as a cinematographic technique to contribute to the dream-like quality of the scenes of the girl running in the garden. Slow-motion shots, or “gaseous perception-images” as Deleuze (1986:85) classifies these, offers the viewer an objective vision that exceeds the ability of the human eye (cf. section 2.1.2.1). The effect of these shots creates tension through the slowing down of the images as they appear on the screen. While this offers the viewer an enhanced view, the use of slow-motion also disrupts the conventional notion of time.

3.1.2.2 Creating a montage

The process of editing or composing the series of movement-images to constitute an indirect image of time is known as montage (cf. 2.1.1.3). Montage forms images through the dual movement of the actual perception and the virtual object (Deleuze 1989:68). The use of montage in *Revolver* assists in disrupting chronological time that constitutes a non-linear representation of memory. Sequences are broken up and reorganised in this manner to form a whole wherein time is disrupted.

I also employ the technique of intercutting in the film – the insertion of shots from different scenes or narratives into one sequence. Intercutting resembles the process of recollection of the past that is often disjointed, partial and

interchangeable. Here, the film jumps back and forth between the scene of the little girl running in the garden and the scene of the man in his office.

Similarly, the montage of the film also offers different perspectives: part one, two and three relay the same narratives, showing different shots and angles of the same scene are shown each time. This connotes the process of recollection – the revolving nature of memory that plays out diverse aspects of an experience, over and over in one's mind.

The pace of the editing as it speeds up towards part three of the film also contributes to the process of recollection and memory: the film sequences become shorter and are intercut with other sequences more often. The intercutting of the ticking clock enhances the increased speed of the flashing images. The image of the clock appears more and more towards the third part of the film and as its second hand ticks faster and faster, the pace of the editing also increases to build tension.

3.1.2.3 Enhancing memory through audio and visual design

Memories are sensory recollections of events that are often expressed with false or distorted perception. *Revolver* capitalises on this aspect of memory through its treatment of visual and audio elements. These elements are employed to heighten the representation of sensory awareness in the film.

The use of lighting in the film serves to enhance both the representation of memory and the psychological states of the characters through producing affection-images (cf. section 2.1.2.2). Overall, I used light to distinguish the little girl's world from that of her father's: the brightly illuminated sequences with the little girl in parts one to three renders hues in soft tints with low contrast. This brightness of these scenes is juxtaposed by the man's predominantly dark world where the lighting creates a spotlight effect with

extreme contrast. The use of *tenebrism*² or the ‘spotlight effect’ creates extreme tonal shading of dark and light colours where objects often fade into the darkness of the background. The dramatic use of light and dark tones is most evident in the close-up shots of the man in his office (*Figure 26*). Deleuze (1986:92) aligns these highly contrasting images to affection-images which connote the “unity of power and quality” in an expressive mode. The sharp differences in tonal values enhance turmoil or conflict. Here, the man’s face appears to be already partially wrapped in darkness, or the “struggle of the spirit” as Deleuze (1986:112) notes and indicates turmoil he undergoes when contemplating his dire situation. As the little girl proceeds down the hallway in the final part of the film she too enters the darkness. This marks the point where their two worlds collide as she crosses over from a happy to a traumatic childhood memory.



Figure 26: Use of tenebrism in a close-up of the man, Revolver. 2018. (Own image).

² *Tenebrism* is an extreme form of *chiaroscuro* and refers to the extreme tonal differences between dark and light in an image. The term originates from the work of painters such as Caravaggio and Rembrandt and is often visible in films of gangsters and *film noir* (McIver 2016:41).

The use of contrast also extends to the colour palette that essentially comprises warm tones (reds, oranges and yellows) set off by cooler tones (blues and greens) in various shades. Overall the colours appear desaturated and recall the familiar faded images of old photographs. The faded appearance of the colours is intended to evoke the idea of a memory or a dream state as well as a time past.

The sound design of the film also capitalises on the idea of an enhanced state of perception: the combination of sound effects and music creates an almost over-dramatic atmosphere. Sound effects such as the crumbling paper, the letter opener stabbing down on the table and the revolving sound of the cylinder as the bullets are loaded, are enhanced to echo the expression inherent in these actions. At the same time, the sound is almost abstract and in some cases does not strictly relate to the image on the screen such as the sound of a cymbal heard when the little girl dips her paintbrush into the water. The latter does not merely add to the build-up of tension in the film but also makes for a disjointed experience. These sound effects also continue from one world to the next to create a sense of continuity albeit illogical. This sense of dislocation reiterates assertion that memory and time, as expressed in this film, do not follow a chronological trajectory.

I have designed the sound to increase the sense of anticipation alongside the editing of the film. As the story progresses through parts one to three, the audio becomes more layered, intense and paced. However, this progression of sound is continuously silenced to mark the end of each section of the film and restate the repetitive nature of the recollection. Silence is also used in isolated instances, such as the occasion where the little girl stops dead in her tracks after hearing the gunshot. These silences create pauses in the film to highlight the preceding sound as a key component of her memory.

At the end of the film, the woman slowly turns the clock back to offer different possibilities for the future. This action provides a conclusion on film's portrayal of time: the disjointed depiction of the story throughout the three parts of the film, disregard of a chronological successive view of time; the notion that time

could be slowed down or sped up (as the ticking clocks indicate) and the simultaneity of actual and virtual images to the point where they become indistinguishable from one another. Time in *Revo/ver* is not subordinate to movement and space, but instead, appears for itself: a crystal-image.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

Deleuze's cinema philosophy as elucidated in *Cinema 1: the movement-image* and *Cinema 2: the time-image* offers film theory an extensive exploration of the audio-visual medium. This research experiments and identifies with cinematic techniques and concepts, informed by Deleuze, in a practical and theoretical manner: theoretically the study illuminates the Deleuzian ciné-system which is translated, practically, in the narrative structure, directing, treatment and audio-visual elements of the short film, *Revolver*. The film's content is centred on memory and portrays a poignant recollection of an event that took place during a woman's childhood. The film depicts her recollection of this event in the present moment as she visits her childhood home. This fusion of time, where the past is recalled in the present, elicits Deleuze's views of time and, in particular, the crystal-image.

The ciné-system comprises theories of movement and time. The movement-image relates to the way in which the succession of images creates the illusion of movement. Here, time is implied through motion – the spatial progression suggests a temporal shift. The sensory-motor schema regulates movement-images and implies linear and chronological time. Deleuze (1986:11) views movement dually: movement takes place between the various parts, while the parts translate change to the whole in turn. As the camera frames this dual movement, three cinematic elements namely, the frame, shot and montage come into play.

The frame is an instance of movement in time, cut out of the entirety of the film (the whole). The frame of the camera isolates a set of elements while the screen is considered as a "frame of frames" which imposes standard dimensions on the whole which it separates from its context (Deleuze 1986:14). A series of frames, in turn, constitutes the shot. The shot establishes movement within a closed system that articulates the relationship

between the elements in the frame. This relation between the parts shows a change regarding the whole which indicates movement. Conversely, a series of shots constitute a montage. The process of montage is twofold: in its most basic sense, it refers to the technique whereby various shots are pieced together to form a narrative. Montage also implies the connection or relation between any and all images. *Revolver* relies on the use of montage (intercutting and editing) to offer a disjointed and non-sequential narrative. Montage creates movement, and in this sense, movement constitutes an indirect image of time as deduced by the change of space in time.

In addition to the cinematic elements, Deleuze also identifies three variants of movement-images. The first of these is perception-images which, simply put, refers to that which can be perceived on screen. These images articulate an idea or a concept both on screen and in the viewer's mind through his/her cognition and understanding of what the screen projects. Solid perception refers to the way that we, as human beings perceive the world. Images that appear to be flowing or water-like are liquid perception-images. Films that offer a perception that is beyond the capacity of the human eye are gaseous perception-images. The camera frames these perception-images and, when actualised in the mind of the viewer, serve to add to the overall perception of the film.

Affection-images stand between perception and action to portray the anticipation of an event "in its eternal aspect" (Deleuze 1986:102). Affect, the feeling that gives rise to action is not necessarily visible but implied through audio and visual elements in the film. Affection-images are most evident through the use of close-up images. *Revolver* employs a number of these shots to convey the emotional state of the character which gives power to the actions that follow.

Put into action by affection-images, action-images constitute three forms: large form, small form and trans-morphological forms. The memory of the little girl constitutes a large form action-image in *Revolver* which implies that the situation prompts movement – the character's action is in response to the

situation which ultimately modifies it. The narrative of the little girl's present self, however, constitute movement as a result of action. Here her action reveals the situation and prompts further action. This "transforming form" action-image leads directly to the time-image as movement is no longer a succession of instances, but a conceptual manifestation where time is visible in the image itself (Deleuze 1989:180-181). The time-image abandons the sensory-motor schema and linear time for a notion of time that is akin to the human experience of time. Time-images question the clarity of successive time (movement) offered by movement-images.

Memory is considered to be successive to perception. The actual, that which we experience in the present moment, continually loops further and further away from the perceived object as various registers of recollection. This circuit is mirrored in the virtual realm when the past is recalled in the present – brought to life or actualised. Here, time is perceived as the object is transposed through various stages of virtuality. The virtual images constitute a mirror-image or a reflection of the actual image and imply that they always operate with each other just like a shadow that follows an object. *Revolver* utilises this aspect of passing through degrees of actual or virtual through a technique of match cutting. The circuit of the actual and virtual illustrates the internal qualities of the crystal-image and relates to our inner experience of time as human beings. Time, therefore, operates through a circuit of exchange where their virtual counterparts reflect perceptions.

Memory is accessed through the various registers of the past and the present as knowledge or experience is recalled in the present moment. The seed of the crystal is a small part of a single crystal formation. Remembering it in the present activates this seed which crystallises or actualises the whole. The seed of the crystal (recollection-images that appear between the past and the present) is captured by the presence of the little girl's present self. It is her presence actualises time in *Revolver* as it then understood that the film is a memory.

Revolver portrays the recollection of the past while considering possibilities for the future (the turning back of the clock) in the present moment which fuses the actual and virtual into a direct image of time. Here, the crystal-image suggests that time continuously splits in two directions: towards the future and back to the past. Each present moment that presents itself automatically recedes to the past and projects itself towards the future as it changes the course of that which follows. This shows time in the crystal as the actual and virtual becomes indiscernible.

The crystal-image shows time as a simultaneous intersection between the past, present and future. In this sense, the temporal intersects the spatial in a single instant. As Fellini (in Deleuze 1989:99) notes, we are at the same time “childhood, adolescence, old age and maturity” due to our capacity to retain our past experiences through memory which we can access or recall in any present instant. The simultaneity of time replaces progressive change (the movement-image) with a pure image of time (the time-image or crystal-image). The image of the crystal offers a means whereby time in film can be approximated and explored. *Revolver* utilises Deleuze’s notion of the simultaneity of time to tell the story of a woman who recalls aspects of a memory formed in her childhood. The turning back of the clock by the protagonist offers both a conclusion to the film, as well as the study as a whole. It is this moment that renders time as a simultaneous instant where past, present and future are fused as a direct image of time. Her memory actualises events, some fabricated and some remembered. The space that she enters allows her to “inhabit time”, “move in it” and become “enlarge[d] by it” (Deleuze 1989:82).

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