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Title: Why was Soweto Different? Urban Development, Township Politics, and the Political Economy of Soweto, 1977-1984.

by: Jeremy Seekings

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Vorster described the events of 1976 as just 'the whirlwind before the storm', and events since 1984 have confirmed his judgement. But whereas the protests and conflicts of 1976-77 were focussed on Soweto (although they did spread widely across South Africa [1]), the first gales of the 'storm' in 1984-85 largely passed Soweto by. Soweto's schools were relatively unaffected by the school protests and boycotts which swept through the Eastern Cape, Pretoria, the East Rand and the Vaal Triangle in 1984. Soweto's residents were not drawn up into the protests over rent increases which convulsed the northern Orange Free State, Vaal Triangle, Pretoria and East Rand between June and September 1984. When the Eastern Cape erupted in February and March 1985, Soweto stayed generally quiet, as it continued to be when bloody conflict swept the East Rand again in May and June, and the Western Cape and Durban from August. Consumer boycotts in Soweto in the second half of 1985 lacked solid support, and there was only patchy participation in stayaways. In the first nine months of 1985, only 17 people were reported killed in 'unrest' in Soweto, compared to 110 on the East Rand, for example [2]. Soweto's councillors not only clung to office but also continued to live in the township itself, unlike many of their counterparts elsewhere who were herded into fortified compounds or put up in hotels outside of their townships. It was only in the last three months of 1985, and more especially in mid 1986, that protests ceased to be sporadic, transitory and disparate, and overt conflict in Soweto matched that elsewhere in the country. Why?

This paper addresses this question through an examination of Soweto betweeen 1978 and 1984. In so doing it is a very preliminary attempt to explore a broader issue, namely the nature of "quiescence". "Quiescence", or the apparent absence of overt struggle, is a more general phenomenon than overt protest or revolt, yet receives very little critical attention. In examining "quiescence" in Soweto I focus on a range of factors, including: (1) the social structure of Soweto; (2) the state's prioritisation of urban development in Soweto since 1979, its wariness of revolt, and its use of relatively sophisticated policing; (3) the chronic unimportance of the Soweto Council in township politics; and (4) the character of opposition politics and the experience of struggle during the period 1977-84. I hope that this paper begins to illustrate how "quiescence" should not simply be understood in terms of a process (of transformation to protest or revolt) that did <u>not</u> happen, but rather as the outcome of the interaction of a set of processes (including processes of struggle and limited overt protest) that <u>did</u> happen, and that did indeed transform township politics although in ways which led to continued "quiescence" rather than widespread overt revolt.

<u>Soweto's social structure: Differentiation and Incohesion</u>

Greater Soweto covers about 40 square miles, including the administratively distinct but geographically contiguous townships of Diepkloof and Meadowlands ("Diepmeadow") and Dobsonville. The official population census put its population at 869,000 in 1980, but other sources estimate the population to be much higher. The Urban Foundation estimated one million in 1980, civic leader Nthatho Motlana claimed in 1982 that 'everybody' knew that the population was about 1.5 million, and John Knoetze (the chairman of the West Rand Administration Board, WRAB) accepted a figure of 1.2 million that same year. According to the 1985 census 10% of residents are aged 4 or under, 30% between 5 and 19, 11% between 20 and 24, 45% between 25 and 64, and 4% aged 65

or more [3]. In 1978 there were just 102,000 houses in Greater Soweto, mostly the standard 51/6 and 51/9 'matchbox' models. Only 3% of the houses had more than 4 rooms [4]. The severe overcrowding and general poverty of living conditions in what was just seen as a 'dormitory city' were detailed in studies of the 1976-77 revolt, and officially acknowledged in the Report of the Cillie Commission [5].

Whilst overcrowding and spartan living conditions have been widespread in townships throughout the PWV (Pretoria Witwatersrand Vaal region), the social and economic structure of Soweto does have distinct features. First, the sectoral and occupational distribution of employment of Soweto residents is very dissimilar to those on the East Rand and Vaal Triangle (although more similar to the pattern in Pretoria). Household incomes are higher, chances of individual occupational mobility greater, and the possibilities for workplace organisation (whether formal or informal) reduced. Secondly, processes of economic differentiation are particularly marked, and are increasingly reflected in the social geography of Soweto. Together these factors militate against the emergence of a strong sense of community, especially at the level of Soweto as a 'whole' but also in individual townships within Soweto. The effects on political organisation of the changing social structure of Soweto were compounded in the period 1978-84 by the importance of Soweto-wide grievances and the particular responses of political activists. Thus the focus of much political organisation was at a level and in a form in which the prospects for success were poorest.

The most recent phase of the transformation of the political economy of the PWV has involved the growth of the tertiary sector of the economy and of the role of blacks within it. The changing pattern of employment is particularly pronounced in Soweto. Appendix A shows the occupation by economic sector of economically active black people in the Johannesburg, East Rand, Vaal Triangle, and Pretoria areas. The proportion of employees in manufacturing in the Johannesburg area is just 21%, compared to 35% on the East Rand and 34% in the Vaal. The proportion of employees in the service sector is 58%, as opposed to 38% and 37%. Even within sectors there are significant differences. Only 30% of manufacturing employment in the Johannesburg area is in the metals industry, compared to 52% on the East Rand and 61% in the Vaal, whilst light manufacturing (e.g. food, beverage, tobacco, textiles, clothing, footwear, printing and publishing) accounts for a much higher share of employment in the Johannesburg area. The pattern of employment in the Pretoria area is similar to the Johannesburg area in terms of the division of employment between manufacturing and services, but not between different manufacturing sub-sectors.

There are several consequences of this pattern of employment. First, incomes in Soweto are higher than elsewhere in the PWV. The Bureau of Market Research (BMR) at the University of South Africa estimated average household and per capita incomes in Soweto 1985 to be R9,624 and R1,756, and put growth of real per capita incomes at 6.7% pa between 1970-1975, -2.0% pa between 1975-1980, and 5.1% pa between 1980-1985 [6]. These estimates have been criticised as exaggerated [7], but data for relative income levels are more acceptable. Secondly, Soweto residents have differential access to better paying employment, ie that whilst some have such jobs, many do not, and this results in unusually wide income inequalities within Soweto. This I consider in greater detail below. Thirdly, Soweto residents are

employed in less unionised (and less easily unionisable) sectors. Furthermore, Soweto residents are generally employed in much smaller workplaces than their counterparts elsewhere in the PWV, even within the same sector. The average number of black employees in a manufacturing establishment in the Johannesburg area is 29, compared to 56 on the near East Rand, 61 in Pretoria, and 91 on the far East Rand/Vaal area. Even within the metals industry, for example, the average is 31 in Johannesburg, compared to 56 on the near East Rand and 61 in Pretoria [8]. The formation of any collective workplace-based consciousness, yet alone trade union consciousness or organisation, is severely impaired. The absence of trade unions in township politics in Soweto is not at all surprising.

The importance of the pattern of employment of Soweto residents is important because it interacts with residential patterns and the demands placed on township organisations. The fragmentation of the population at the workplace is matched by its fragmentation within the residential areas of Soweto. On the basis of the 1970 population census data, Morris identified some broad differences between areas of Soweto. Soweto's south-western townships (Naledi, Moletsane, Mapetla, Tladi), and Chiawelo, are inhabited by more recent arrivals, Sotho/Tswana and Shangaan-speaking respectively, with slightly lower educational qualifications and incomes [9]. In 1977 Hlophe contrasted commuters on the trains 'the predominantly white-collar middle class districts of Phefeni, Dube and Mofolo' who travelled into Johannesburg's Park Station and jobs in commerce and other services with the commuters from south-western Soweto who took the Booysens-Westgate-Faraday line to the industrial areas of southern Johannesburg. People in the 'higher-income districts' of Dube, Mofolo and Rockville, he wrote, 'were considered arrogant by the rest of Soweto. They were strongly Euro-American in their style of life, and very much concerned with conspicuous consumption'. In Dube, 'Interhousehold relations tended to be distant and noncommittal, in conformity to white suburban living patterns, which Dube residents were trying hard to emulate' [10]. By 1980 Morris was pointing to elite housing areas, both old (Dube South) and new (Beverley Hills, in Orlando West Extension, and Rockville, in southern Moroka), although she emphasised that these remained only small pockets in Soweto as a whole [11]. The 1980 census data reveals uneven incomes and employment patterns, although this unevenness remains limited [12].

Since 1980, geographical inequalities have probably increased significantly, although I am unaware of evidence to assess this. Certainly the state's housing policy has allowed the accelerated development of (relatively) elite residential areas, including Selection Park (in Pimville) and Prestige Park (in Diepkloof) [13]. The effects of differentiation have been acknowledged. It was reported that the new Selection Park residents were accused of being 'snobs, who have changed their attitudes so drastically that they no longer seem part of the community', and other Sowetans say that 'they have lost all the warmth one never misses elsewhere in Soweto', they only know each other by the posh cars they drive. Selection Park residents see themselves as 'still swimming in the same waters with every other black', but admit that other Sowetans view them differently:

> 'Everybody talks about us being "token" blacks. There is resentment. Looking back, I wish I hadn't moved to a middle-class area, because of this credibility problem. I am seen differently from when I was living in a regular neighbourhood in Soweto.' [14]

It is important not to overemphasise the differences between different parts of Soweto. The housing shortage, for example, inhibits residential mobility and the emergence of income-defined areas. But differences, in the context of the sheer size of Soweto, encourage the formation of more local rather than Soweto-wide consciousness, and weakens Soweto-wide cohesion. Even at a local level, cohesion is reduced by increasing inequalities, together with patterns of employment.

Data for household incomes are generally unreliable, but most surveys concur on the following trends: (1) Between 1970 and 1985 average household and per capita real incomes in Soweto rose, although whether by much is disputed; (2) they did not rise smoothly, and even average incomes fell during the late 1970s; and, most importantly in terms of the social structure of Soweto, inter-household income distribution grew more unequal. According to the BMR surveys, the proportion of households with income below R4,000 pa (in constant 1985 prices) rose from 14.4% in 1975, to 21.3% in 1980, to 23.2% in 1985. The proportion of households with incomes above R12,000 pa (also in constant 1985 prices) fell from 14.7% in 1975 to 9.3% in 1980, but rose to 25.1% in 1985. The proportion of households in the lowest income group had risen by half again, whilst the proportion of households in the top income group had risen by well over half again, over the same ten-year period. [15]

Widening income differentials could be due to a high rate of in-migration, with new arrivals swelling the proportion of poor households until their incomes also begin to rise. However, it is not clear that rates of in-migration to Soweto before 1985 were higher than elsewhere in the PWV, and surveys consistently show that most adult Sowetans have been resident for a long time [16]. It seems more likely that widening income differentials are due to differential access to the broadly burgeoning employment and entrepreneurial opportunities in the area. Between 1975 and 1985, earnings of Soweto residents employed as professionals or skilled labour rose very rapidly, whilst unskilled labour earnings fell in real terms, and unemployment rose [17]. The size and high incomes of Soweto also provide a wide range of opportunites for entrepreneurial activity. According to the BMR, the proportion of average household income coming from 'net profits' more than trebled between 1975 and 1985, rising from 3.7% to 12.3% [18]. The number of business licenses in Soweto rose from 1293 in January 1983 to 2345 in January 1981 and 2948 in January 1984 [19]. A study of Moroka found that only 9% of people working in the 'informal sector' were licensed [20]. There were an estimated 3,000 hawkers (mostly in food) and 4,000 shebeen-operators in Soweto [21]. In many cases entrepreneurship was a means of survival at a time of high unemployment and (for many households) poverty incomes, but for some households entrepreneurial activity has provided very great wealth. At the extreme are the estimated seven millionaires in Soweto, including Ephraim Tshabalala (Mayor in 1984, whose interests include a a filling station, a dry cleaning business, shops, a cinema - used for Sofasonke Party meetings, and a nightclub; and sugar cane and wattle farms in KwaZulu) and Richard Maponya (whose

interests include a dairy, a butchery and other shops, a service station - Mountain Motors, reputedly the biggest in the Southern Hemisphere, and a massive supermarket complex in Dube) [22].

Income distribution in Soweto appears to be more uneven than in other parts of the PWV, although the differences seem to be getting less over time. Appendix 2 provides comparative data for Soweto and other areas. Uneven, and increasingly uneven, income distribution does not necessarily lead to social incohesion. But in South African townships in the 1980s uneven income distribution combined with the other factors above to reduce any sense of 'community'. It also meant that material grievances (or at least grievances with a substantial material content) such as rent, busfare, and price increases had an unevenly important material effect and consequently provided an uneven impetus to political mobilisation and protest. The occupational pattern in Soweto also influenced (although clearly did not determine) the form which organisations and protest took, as I shall discuss below.

The Character of Township Politics

The social structure of Soweto provides more of an impetus for a local rather than Soweto-wide sense of 'community', although even the former is inhibited. Indeed, support for a wide range of political organisations in Soweto is very unevenly spread across the area, and their strength tends to be concentrated in particular parts. However, the nature of some key grievances (local government, education, rents, the housing shortage), the existence of a nationally-aware political intelligentsia, and the national importance of Soweto, provide an impetus to Soweto-wide organisation, ie at a level which is at something of a disjuncture with the townships' social structure.

Soweto was the first black township in the PWV to have its own radical civic organisation: the 'Committee of Ten' (Co10), established as the 'Soweto Local Authority Interim Committee' in late June 1977, which transformed itself into the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) in 1979. The Co10 became the executive committee of the SCA, and kept the name even when the committee membership was changed in 1982. The name was finally dropped in December 1984, when the SCA executive was substantially restructured in style as well as personnel.

At a workshop held in June 1984 to develop organisational skills the SCA was frank in its critical appraisal of its organisational failures, especially since 1980. The workshop identified the SCA's campaign against rent increases in 1980-81 as a key event:

> 'There was great support for the civic at this time and many branches were set up. The people were asked to boycott the rent increases, which was successful in some areas. The Comm. of 10 took the case to court to stop the increases. And, in the meantime, support began to dwindle. The civic did not have the strength to sustain the campaign. Communication and report backs to the people did not take place and demoralisation began to set in...'

The minutes later record that 'in taking the matter to court, we took the struggle out of the hands of the people'. Later:

> 'The weaknesses of the rents campaign, the failure of the court case and our lack of report back to the people, resulted in demoralisation. For some of the people, it meant that the civic

> cannot do anything for them. There seemed to be fear to report back to the people after we lost the case. We need to deal with failures. We take up issues, when its over, it fizzles out like a candle.'

Other weaknesses identified included 'poor coordination of the work of the civic', the lack of an office, 'loss of membership and dwindling branches' (especially since 1981), and popular perceptions of the SCA: 'at a mass level, the people think that the civic is a "benefit society" (welfare)'. On the structure of the SCA:

> '... members felt that there was a lack of communication between branches and the Comm. of 10. The feeling was that issues were often raised at local level and that the Comm. of 10 does not hear them... Members felt that branches were not very effective.'

And on perceptions of the leadership:

> 'The point was made that the community saw the comm. of 10 as professionals. As educated people who are apart from them. It was felt that the civic leadership should be more mixed and that there should be a place for the "Ordinary man" in the street to serve the people.' [23].

The workshop also highlighted many of the strengths of the SCA. But this exposure of its weaknesses is particularly important as it helps explain the character of township politics in Soweto in the early 1980s. The top-down organisational structure of the SCA, its legalistic approach to the 1980 rent increase, and its lack of strong organised roots at a local level, together with the experience of failure in 1984, and of inactivity in the face of rent increases in 1981 and 1983, reduced the likelihood of the SCA providing direction and effective leadership during 1984.

The leadership of the original Co10 was drawn from the better-off sections of the population: businessmen and professionals. It was elected at a meeting of about sixty prominent Soweto figures, and included: three businessmen, including the chairman of the Soweto Traders Association; six professionals, including a doctor, a school principal, a deputy-principal, another teacher, a priest, and a social worker; and the tenth member was employed by the South African Council of Churches. It is unsurprising that the leadership was widely seen as distinct and conservative, even for some time after major changes were made of the executive in 1982 and 1984. [24]

Throughout the period 1977-84 the Co10/SCA was concerned with both civic and national political issues. In 1977 the Committee of Ten drew up an alternative, and not very radical, blueprint for the administration of Soweto [25], and in 1978 and 1983 it successfully opposed elections to the Community/Town Councils. But its civic concerns generally comprised periodic convulsions caused by the announcement of rent or busfare increases. The Co10 was originally thought of as a temporary body, for the purpose of drawing up an alternative blueprint for Soweto [26], and the Co10 thereafter seems to have lack a sense of direction yet alone a plan of action. The anti-election 'campaign' of 1978 was very piecemeal (see below), and until 1979 the Co10 was ineffective in its opposition to rent increases, failing to mount any significant opposition in December 1977. An anonymous report in Work in Progress criticised the Committee of Ten as having 'dissolved into a "newspaper/public platform" party'. The report alleged that the municipal blueprint did

not provide for any political participation, that mass rallies were seen as the means of public ratification, and that the Co1O was not concerned with mobilisation or organisation [27].

There is clearly some truth in these allegations. The Co1O did not organise locally, and (as the SCA later admitted, see above) it was widely regarded as inaccessible. At the same time, however, Motlana himself was enormously popular in Soweto [28]. The Co1O itself began to face up to its organisational problems when further rent increases were announced in September 1979. It recognised that it could not provide the necessary organisation and direction, and decided to transform itself into a new SCA. The SCA was launched at a well-attended two-day conference in Orlando West. Its first task, it declared, would be to give residents a chance to discuss the rent increase in a public meeting. However, the Soweto Councils suspended the increase in the face of popular opposition (including from councillors and Inkatha). [29]

In July 1980 another rent increase was proposed. This immediately gave rise to some protest on the streets. For example women from Mofolo South demonstrated. Thousands of angry residents turned out in protest when Koornhof visited Soweto in October 1980. The SCA's response, together with AZAPO, was to call for a boycott of the increase whilst contesting the legality of the increase in court. The rent boycott was unevenly supported, but even in areas where it was at first partially successful it seems to have been gradually broken after eviction notices were sent out and township superintendents were instructed to apply in court for authorisation to recover rent arrears through attaching and selling household property. The legal case was dismissed with costs in the Rand Supreme Court in December. [30]

The failure of the anti-rent increase campaign led to an extended period of little activity by the SCA. In an interview in 1982, the Co1O chairman Nthatho Motlana claimed that the SCA was still 'as active as ever', but then contradicted himself admitting that it had not been so active because (he said) there had been no immediate issues facing residents. No annual conference was held in 1981. Rent increases were very ineffectively opposed. At the 1982 SCA annual conference Motlana said that 'the period between 1980 and December 1982 have not been easy ones for the civic association', emphasising increased repression and harassment. A new Co1O was elected, including five new members (including Amos Masondo and Popo Molefe, both dynamic unionists). In December 1982 the SCA resolved to campaign against any elections held under the Black Local Authorities Act, and in 1983 provided the impetus for an Ad Hoc Anti-Community Council Committee which campaigned for an election boycott. [31]

But the entire 1980-84 period was later shown to have been marked by inadequate organisation and activity. Membership fell and several branches collapsed (including in Moroka, Dlamini, Emdeni, parts of Meadowlands, Dube and Chiawelo); the Orlando East branch was set back when two executive members joined the Soweto Council in 1983 [32]. Only in 1984 did the SCA begin to tackle the problems of organisation in Soweto. At the SCA meeting of 25 March, the 'revival' of branches in Meadowlands, Orlando East, and Dube was discussed [33]. At the meeting of 8 April the revival of the Tladi-Moletsane branch was discussed [34]. Organisational workshops were held in June and July. The minutes of these workshops and of the SCA's meetings throughout the year reveal the increasing concern of its members with addressing

localised issues, such as against water cuts, Putco routes, water and electricity meter reading, and electricity bills, learning from the local successes of some of the SCA branches in campaigning over local issues [35]. By August the SCA was already at an advanced stage in planning an Annual General Meeting in December, had drawn up plans for a restructured executive, and noted the need for a policy document [36]. The official report on the December AGM described it as the most significant in the SCA's history not only because of the 'far-reaching decisions' taken and the context of widespread protest, but also because it was 'well attended and dominated by the organisation's grassroot membership'. Reveallingly, the report stated that the two most significant issues in the AGM were (1) the nature of a civic organisation, with it being emphasised that a civic organisation did link local issues with political contradictions, but did not play a political (ie national political) role, and (2) 'deliberations made it very clear that the Committee of Ten should be replaced by structures that can more easily facilitate rank and file participation in the organisation'. Only two members of the old executive committee (Motlana and Masondo) were re-elected. [37]

An increasing focus on local issues was encouraged by the emergence of the United Democratic Front, to which the SCA affiliated (amidst some confusion, and despite the reservations of some members) in October 1984 [38]. Especially after the changes in leadership in December the SCA executive had very strong links with the UDF.

Whilst the rhetoric of a grassroot-orientation should not be taken as a reflection of practice, it does indicate both a newly deepened sense of direction and a recognition of the inadequacies of SCA activity since 1979. The practices of the SCA show strong continuities as well as changes from late 1984. Members of the SCA, for example, increasingly involved themselves in attempts to resolve the growing educational crisis through the formation of a Soweto Parents Committee (which later became the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee, SPCC) along the lines of the Black Parents Association and Committee of Ten of 1976-77 [39]. But the reorientation of civic leadership did facilitate the organisational developments that led to both the emergence of street committees (in some areas) and the rent boycott in 1986 [40].

The SCA only began to bridge the gulf between Soweto-wide and more localised organisation during 1984. No other political organisation or movement came close to doing the same. Some did not establish local structures, although their support was often locally concentrated, whilst others remained localised, often with thin support.

AZAPO established a Soweto branch soon after its launch in 1979. Its first chairperson was Popo Molefe, later SCA secretary and UDF general secretary (Molefe resigned from AZAPO in early 1981) [41]. AZAPO in Soweto remained in the shadow of the Co10/SCA, with which it maintained a curiously ambiguous position until early 1984. It failed to establish local branches (although it had significant support in areas such as Dhlamini, Phiri and Senaoane), but participated as a minor partner in various campaigns (against rent increases in 1980, Republic Day and busfare increases in 1981, the BLA elections in 1983). Several members of the initial Committee of Ten were prominent former leaders in the Black Consciousness movement: the Rev. Mashwabada Mayathula had been the first chairman of the Black Persons

Convention (BPC), Fanyana Mazibuko had been BPC national secretary, Ramsey Ramokgopa had been on the Transvaal BPC executive, and Tom Manthatha was a former BC stalwart [42]. From about 1979 tensions grew between AZAPO and the emerging 'Charterist' camp, with AZAPO concerned with the ideological prominence of the ANC, the leadership of the Release Mandela Committee (Aubrey Mokoena, an enthusiastic Charterist, and the expelled AZAPO president Curtis Nkondo), and the organisational influence of white and indian leaders in black politics. But in Soweto the CoIO/SCA steered some kind of a middle path, embracing members with different ideological affiliations. In 1984, however, relations between AZAPO and the UDF soured dramatically, with strong attacks on the latter at the fourth AZAPO Congress in January [43]. By mid-year there was a strong movement within the SCA to affiliate to the UDF, which it finally did in October [44].

The Soweto Youth Congress (SOYCO) was formed in July 1983, as one of a number of youth congresses formed in response to the decision of COSAS to restrict itself to school students. SOYCO held regular and well-attended meetings, but does not seem to have played a central role in township politics as a whole. Unlike the SCA, SOYCO affiliated to the UDF prior to its launch in August 1983. [48]

The weakness of student organisation in Soweto remains something of an enigma. In 1983 there had been educationally-related protests in a number of Soweto schools (especially at Ibhongo High in Dhlamini, Progress Secondary, and Orlando High), and there were a few further protests in 1984 (principally at Ibhongo again) [49]. Furthermore, two members of the COSAS national executive were from Soweto (Kenny Fihla and Jabu Khumalo). Yet there were COSAS structures in only a few Soweto schools, and there were very few protests in Soweto in comparison with Pretoria, the East Rand, or the Eastern Cape. COSAS itself recognised the weaknesses if its organisation. For example, in April 1984 a Transvaal Regional Meeting noted that 'the branches were facing problems which were contributing towards weakening the organisation in the Transvaal', the first two problems listed being '(a) lack of direction and coordinating on the issues to taken [sic] branches, (b) lack of constant communication between the branches and Executive' [50]. Ibhongo High may well have been atypically well organised and militant in part because Dhlamini is an AZAPO stronghold, and the ideological debates between COSAS and AZASM (the Azanian Students Movement) constructively fuelled general student mobilisation [51]. Besides the absence of strong Soweto branch organisation, two further factors that might help explain the quiescence of Soweto students were their relatively good employment prospects compared to other regions (although they were still poor) and the reluctance of Soweto students to boycott classes, many of them having lost at least two years in 1976-77. It is also unclear how widely provocative issues such as the age limit were being enforced.

Finally, it is unwise to dismiss conservative political movements. In Soweto these included Inkatha, the Sofasonke Party, the Makgotla, and the Russians. The scale of support for Inkatha is difficult to estimate. Opinion polls suggest a constant decline in support for Buthelezi and Inkatha in the PWV, from 28% (1977) to 17% (1981) and just 5% (1985) [45]. But Zulu-speakers predominate in Soweto, and Buthelezi continues to attract large crowds to his annual rallies in Soweto. In April 1984 10,000 people gathered to hear him speak, and in November 1985 between 15,000-30,000 were reported to have packed Jabulani Amphitheatre for a 'prayer meeting for unity' led by

Buthelezi [46]. In 1979 Inkatha claimed 20 branches and over 1,000 paid-up members - a credible claim. But in 1982 it claimed 67,000 members (and 8 branches, in Zola, Emdeni, Dube, Senaoane, Mofolo, Orlando East and West, and Dhlamini), and in 1983 claimed 120,000 members in 29 branches. Inkatha's membership claims are generally very suspect, and these Soweto figures are completely implausible. Inkatha did take up various local campaigns (including shack demolition and rent increases) but remained a minor participant in Soweto politics. [47]

Sofasonke clearly enjoyed support among some sections of the population, especially elderly Zulu-speakers and in Jabavu (widely acknowledged as a Sofasonke stronghold) and among squatters in Orlando East. In 1984 Sofasonke implausibly claimed a registered membership of 180,000 in 33 branches. In 1981-83 Sofasonke worked with the local branch of the SCA in opposition to shack demolition in Orlando East, and its leading role in that campaign was probably a contributing factor to the demise of the SCA branch [52]. The popularity, albeit limited, of Sofasonke was illustrated in the December 1983 council elections (see below). Support for the makgotla and the Russians (which might overlap) is difficult to assess. The former are said to have some strength in Naledi, and the latter in Phiri and Mapetla. In 1982 the Soweto Taxi Association was alleged to have used Russians in a series of bloody clashes with the Naledi Taxi Association, who used 'Zulu vigilantes', in a struggle for taxi routes [53]. In December 1986 Russians in Phiri and Mapetla clashed with 'comrades' who overzealously sought to enforce the 'black christmas' lights out campaign. Many young residents fled the area as the Russians cleared it of 'comrades'. [54]

The Role of the Soweto Councils in Township Politics

I have elsewhere argued that, in other PWV townships, changes in economic, social and moral relations within the community during the period between 1977 and 1983 underlay and shaped subsequent popular protest. The township 'community' was increasingly fragmented and recast. Two processes were particularly important in this. First, economic and social differentiation (see above). Secondly, the reorganisation of local government in the townships with the establishment of Community and later Town Councils transformed local political relations. In some townships, members of Advisory Boards and even Urban Bantu Councils had some limited support as intermediaries (or patrons) between residents and local authority. The members of the new Community Councils initially inherited this support, but they were increasingly seen to abuse their extended powers, for example over the allocation of housing, to enrich themselves and a few supporters to the detriment of their supposed constituents. The nature of patronage relations changed, and councillors came to be seen as less accountable and unacceptably corrupt. The imposition of recurrent rent increases widely underlined the perceived violation of 'community' obligations and responsibilities. Many of the protests of 1984-85 began as protests against such violations. Hostility to the councillors was often compounded by the conspicuous overlap between councils and recently-acquired affluence, with new economic and political relations consequently being recast together. [55]

In Soweto, possibly uniquely in the PWV, the Community and Town Councillors unambiguously lacked any significant legitimacy or support from the outset, and they never constituted an important reference point in Soweto politics. The absence of newly bitter popular anger against them in 1984 seems to have been an important factor in the relative 'quiescence' of Soweto.

The widespread ambivalence to the Community and Town Councillors in Soweto resulted primarily from the circumstances of the Councils' establishment, but was compounded by the actions of the councillors in office and the continued opposition to the Councils from important local political organisations. The three Community Councils in Greater Soweto (ie the Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow Councils) were established in late 1977 after the collapse of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council (UBC) in June 1977. The Community Councils were widely regarded as just remodelled UBCs, especially since many of the leading candidates in the elections were prominent former Urban Bantu Councillors, including the last two UBC chairmen, Edward Thebehali (who had been chairman during the rent debacle) and Amos Makhanya. Candidates for election to the Community Council therefore inherited the ambivalence and hostility formerly felt for the UBC. Support for the UBC had fallen steadily from its establishment in 1968, with the average poll in elections being 32% (1968), 21% (1971) and 14% (1974), as the UBC came to be seen as the 'Useless Boys Club'. The UBC finally collapsed in the face of popular recognition of its impotence, after protests organised by the Soweto Students Representative Council succeeded in having WRAB suspend a rent increase when the UBC's own 'protests' had failed. [56]

The average polls in the Community Council elections in February/April 1978 was just 6% (these percentages are of registered voters, who probably comprise at most a bare majority of technically eligible voters yet alone the total adult population) [57]. As Ishmael Mkhabela, a Black Consciousness-oriented civic leader commented: 'The people have not forgotten the grievances which led them to reject the Urban Bantu Council. The people are tired of voting for useless and ineffective bodies.' [58] Political organisations opposed to the Community Councils emphasised the inadequacy of the Councils' powers, which of course resonated with the popular perception of the Councils as just reborn UBCs. These organisations, including both Inkatha and the conservative Makgotla, also argued that the elections should be boycotted because of the detention of the Committee of Ten and other political activists. Buthelezi told a meeting of 15,000 people in Jabulani Amphitheatre that 'We in Inkatha stand four-square behind the Committee of Ten', and described participation in the elections as 'an act of treachery'. Inkatha threatened to expel any member who stood for election in February, and Edward Thebehali had to announce his resignation from Inkatha when he announced his candidacy. The Soweto Makgotla organisation expelled one of its leading members, Letsatsi Radebe, for participating, splitting itself in the process. In a clear attempt to boost support before the April elections, the Government released Motlana. In response Inkatha announced that members could stand in an individual capacity, but as an organisation it maintained its rejection. [59]

In subsequent elections polls actually rose, although not by much. In two Soweto Community Council by-elections in June 1978, the polls were 13.4% and 14.2%. The average polls in elections for the Diepmeadow and Dobsonville Community Councils in September 1978 were 23.9% and

42.0% respectivly. The polls were clearly higher than during February and April, and I am unable yet to account adequately for this. Further elections to the Community Councils were repeatedly postponed by the Government. [60]

In December 1983 elections were held in Soweto under the new Black Local Authorities Act. A survey conducted in October predicted a 38-40% turnout, Knoetze said a 25% poll in Soweto would be 'reasonable', and The Star predicted a 22% poll. But the actual poll turned out to be just 10.7% in Soweto itself, 14.6% in Diepmeadow, and 23.6% in Dobsonville, making an overall average of 16%. Koornhof claimed that 'although a better voting percentage was predicted... it is an improvement on the 6% election poll of Soweto's Community Council in 1978...' [61]. Soweto was one of very few townships where the 1983 poll was higher than the earlier polls in Community Council elections. As in 1978, the elections were opposed by a wide range of organisations: the SCA, together with COSAS, AZASO, FEDSAW, several unions, and (initially) AZAPO, had formed an Ad Hoc Anti-Community Council Elections Committee, but it is unclear what impact its campaign had. Posters calling for a boycott of the elections were reported to be very visible at train stations and other prominent places, but only 800 people attended the final rally in Regina Mundi Cathedral, which has on several other occasions reached its capacity of several thousand (for example on 16 June anniversaries). Inkatha also came out in opposition to the elections. Whilst Buthelezi and other Inkatha leaders had been indicating since 1980 that Inkatha might or even would participate in forthcoming elections, the suggestion that the Black Local Authorities were a substitute for national political representation caused Buthelezi to reject the elections. [62]

The Soweto Council had, like other councils, raised rents, been accused of corruption, demolished backyard shacks, and evicted rent defaulters. As Motlana had realised in 1979, without new sources of finance the Council would have to rely on:

> '... the iniquitous system of increasing rents... The state will then throw responsibility on the Community Council, which will become the whipping boy. The anger of the people will be diverted from the Government to the unfortunate community councillors.' [63]

It might seem curious therefore that there was even a small increase in the polls. This limited increase seems to have been due, however, to discontent over these very issues. 17 out of 27 contested seats were won by members of the Sofasonke Party (who defeated both the former Council Chairman, Thebehali, and his former deputy, Makhaya). Sofasonke candidates promised reduced rents, leniency towards defaulters, permanent home ownership, and even the abolition of influx control for people born after 1945! The Soweto Council's rent increases, eviction of defaulters, and demolition of backyard shacks, led to some limited support for the populist Sofasonke, which had been formed in an earlier period of crisis over housing (in the late 1940s). Sofasonke councillors including Tshabalala, Edward Manyosi, and Julius Mdlalose had been the most prominent critics of the Soweto Community Council from within between 1978 and 1983, and had (for example) prominently and successfuly campaigned against rent increases in 1981. Two thirds of the 1983 voters were reported to be elderly, amongst whom Sofasonke had particular appeal. The elections

nonetheless constituted a second overwhelming rejection of the Councils. [64]

The State and Soweto

Even before 1976 Soweto posed a particular problem for the state. Its distance from any bantustan and the impossibility of removing it posed administrative problems that required some reform of urban policy even before the revolt of 1976-77 prompted reform as a counter-revolutionary necessity. Before June 1976 the only legislative evidence of urban reform was the reintroduction of the 30-year leasehold scheme. Following the revolt, the urban 'reform process' accelerated. In the case of Soweto, 'reform' involved a very substantial development programme, with Soweto unambiguously prioritised in state policy. More importantly, in terms of the effects on Soweto politics, the state's wariness of further revolt led it to hold back from raising rents to the 'economic' level required to fully finance development (as was state policy). A key factor in the escalation of protest in the Vaal Triangle, East Rand and Pretoria townships during 1984 was discontent over the rent increases that were introduced to pay for urban development and administration. The subsidisation of rents in Soweto reduced the likelihood of both protests and revolt.

The development of Soweto was clearly envisaged very soon after the revolt of 1976-77. An official 'scientific survey' that looked at 'the constraints and vexations among the Black people in that urban area' identified housing, wages, and social amenities as the three most important issues [65]. Connie Mulder, the new Minister of Plural Relations and Development (as the former Department of Bantu Administration had been tellingly renamed), said in January 1978 that he aimed to make Soweto the most beautiful black city in Africa [66], and the following month he told Parliament that:

> 'In my view, nothing will alleviate the political tensions and fever sooner than to attend to these matters at this stage... Consequently I intend giving immediate attention to the drafting of a five-year plan for the urban Black man... '

Subsequent debate revolved around what was to be the key issue in the development of Soweto and other townships over the following decade: the question of money. Mulder emphasised the official position:

> '... there are Black people in our White residential areas and while they are here and are going to be here, it is my ideal to make the circumstances in which they are living as pleasant and attractive as possible for them... But ... no one can obtain facilites and amenities such as these in their residential areas without paying part of the cost themselves.' [67]

Over the following decade state officials repeatedly emphasised that residents should pay the whole cost of development, over time. In practice, however, Soweto's residents paid only part of the cost.

It was not until 1979 that the state's reform plans for Soweto really got underway. This does not seem to have been due to any anti-reformist bias on the part of the 'verkrampte' Connie Mulder, who in his own way was a reformist (although of course he was not prepared to compromise at all over the issue of citizenship). It is possible that the state's lack of decisiveness was due to the general paralysis that affected it during the Muldergate crisis. In 1979, with a new Prime

Minister (Botha) and a new Minister of Plural Relations and Development (Koornhof, who renamed it the Department of Cooperation and Development, CAD), plans for accelerated development proceeded.

In September 1979 Botha visited Soweto and announced that the Government would cancel a R11.5m debt owed by the Soweto Community Council [68]. When the Deputy-minister of CAD, George Morrison, was asked at the National Party Free State Congress why the Government did not write off other townships' debts, he replied that Soweto was 'a showpiece to the world' [69]. The Cabinet decided to 'improve the quality of life' in Soweto (in line with the recommendations of the Riekert Report, and implicitly the forthcoming Cillie Report), and a number of important appointments were consequently made. Manie Mulder, brother of the now disgraced Connie Mulder, resigned as WRAB Chairman in October 1979, to be succeeded by the former Chief Director of the Vaal Triangle Administration Board, John Knoetze. In November, Koornhof appointed Louis Rive, a former Postmaster-General, as head of a special government project to develop PWV townships, especially Soweto. Rive was to chair a new Greater Soweto Planning Council, to include Knoetze and the chairmen of the three community councils in Greater Soweto, and a Soweto Planning Council that included himself, Knoetze and the Soweto Council chairman. Rive was responsible to Koornhof, and reported to the State Security Council. [70]

The appointment of Knoetze and Rive was an indication of both the perceived importance of Soweto and the necessary manner of proceeding with its development. Knoetze had an excellent record in the Vaal Triangle. As recently as September 1979, when rent increases had been suspended in Soweto and strongly opposed on the East Rand, Knoetze boasted that there had been no problem increasing rents in the Vaal [71]. More importantly, the Vaal was the part of the PWV least affected by the events of 1976-77, with only isolated and sporadic incidents (some of which the Cillie Report blamed on agitators bussed in from Soweto!). As Matthew Chaskalson has strongly argued in unpublished work, state administration in the Vaal Triangle had long been considered a model for the rest of the country. Furthermore, as Chaskalson has shown, this success was in part due to the elaboration of 'reformist' state policies at a local level which were only later to be taken up as national policy, in particular providing for substantial private sector involvement in the provision of housing [72].

Knoetze and Rive were seen, as one business leader put it, as 'pragmatic and flexible' and 'a strongwilled innovator and brilliant administrator' [73]. One newspaper said Rive had made the post office 'the showpiece of efficient state departments', and said he was 'armed with a metaphorical machete to hack away the red tape'; the Financial Mail described him as 'a man with a historic mission', to stop Soweto's kids pursueing their education in Angola or Russia! [74]. The appointment of Knoetze and Rive reflected the Government's perception that the development of Soweto required an approach that could cut through normal bureaucratic obduracy and develop new forms of urban administration and development. Interestingly, both the appointment of Knoetze and the reform of state policy to draw in the private sector were fully in line with Connie Mulder's policy during 1978. Mulder was full of praise for the Vaal Triangle administration, and introduced the legislation providing for 99-year leasehold and site-and-service schemes. He also approved an electrification scheme that was turned down by WRAB, ostensibly because it was too expensive

[75]. Manie Mulder, on the other hand, was widely thought to be opposed to a growing role for the private sector, and was accused of footdragging over development [76].

Senior local state officials shared the Government's identification of the development of Soweto as a priority. Rive described Soweto as 'the mirror of South Africa's soul' (in 1981), and Soweto Council Chief Executive (ie Town Clerk) Nico Malan defended the payment of higher 'allowances' to Mayor Thebehali than the Johannesburg City Council Mayor received by saying:

> 'Soweto is the second largest city in South Africa. The chairman of the council sits in the hottest seat in South Africa and the hottest in the world as far as local government is concerned...' [77].

The private sector also identified Soweto as the top priority for development [78].

The electrification of Soweto had been identified by the Government as a priority since 1978 at least. In March 1979 Koornhof approved an electrification plan (which Rive was to oversee). In October 1980 Koornhof announced an upgrading plan, although not along the lines that Rive had proposed in his report to the Minister. Rive had put 'the lowest possible cost' of upgrading existing infrastructure at R244m, but Koornhof only announced a R150m plan [79]. In practice, inflation pushed the cost up to an estimated R396m by July 1981, and R440m by mid 1983. Figures for the outstanding loans of WRAB and the West Rand councils are provided in Appendix C, Table 2. Capital expenditure on the electrification and upgrading projects was slow to take off, but by 1982-83 was proceeding rapidly. By July 1984, there were almost R300m in outstanding loans on these projects. The state's capital expenditure programme in Soweto fitted state objectives other than just the development of Soweto. First, it provided an economic boost for an area which the state was reluctant to further develop industrially (preferring industrial growth along the Brits-Rosslyn-Pretoria-Bronkhorstpruit axis and on the far East Rand) [80]. Secondly, the government hoped that investment in the construction industry would help to stimulate economic growth without adversely affecting the balance of payments (this was especially important in 1978-81) [81].

Progress was slowest as regards the provision of housing. By 1978 the Government envisaged that employers and township residents should play a major part in housing provision. By 1980 the Government was considering the possibilites for speculative involvement by the private sector. This was recommended by the Viljoen Committee to Investigate Private Sector Involvement in Resolving the Housing Backlog in Soweto in July 1981. The Committee, which included Knoetze, proposed a five-year housing programme, which would provide 55,000 new units (meeting both the backlog and the continued growth in demand). Of these, 13,600 would be built by the state for renting to low-income households, 16,300 would be built by the state for sale, and over 25,000 would be built by the private sector. The cost to the state, including land purchases and the provision of services to new sites, would be almost R500m. The cost to the private sector would be almost R280m [82]. In practice, nowhere near this amount was spent by either the public or private sectors. Appendix E shows housing provision in Soweto. Between 1978 and 1984, only 2302 houses were

built by the state and 2693 by the private sector. The slow progress in housing provision was advanced as a reason for Rive's resignation from the Soweto Planning Councils in 1982 [83].

State policy was that urban development and administration should be financed without recourse to central state subsidisation. State expenditure, and the repayment of capital loans over the long-term, would be financed out of locally raised revenue, for the most part comprising rents and service charges. From the mid-1970s the WRAB ran increasing deficts as expenditure rose, as the profits from municipal beer and liquor sales (previously used to subsidise other expenditure) were falling, and as rentals were not increased to an 'economic' level (see Appendix C, Tables 1 and 3). Koornhof, Rive, Knoetze and other officials routinely stated their commitment to an economic rentals policy. For example, in 1981 Knoetze announced that the existing R30 difference between current and economic rental would be phased out, and claimed that 85% of Soweto households could afford economic rentals [84]. But in practice the Soweto administrators were extremely wary of increasing rents too much or too fast. Rents continued to be lower than their 'economic' levels, and in practice they therefore continued to be significantly subsidised.

Appendix D shows the growth of rents (including all fixed service charges and levies) in Soweto. By comparison, rents in the Vaal were approximately the same until 1982, after which they rose much faster, despite the much higher levels of capital expenditure in Soweto. The subsidy on Soweto rents (ie the difference between the existing and 'economic rentals') was officially put at R30 per month per house in June 1980, R20pm per house in October 1981, and R15pm per house in mid 1983 [85]. To finance these deficits, investments were depleted, debts incurred, and the Government periodically cancelled sums of debt (R11.5m in 1979, and R33m in March 1983) [86]. WRAB received R91m in bridging loans between 1977-78 and 1984-85 (the aggregate for all other Administration Boards was R68m over the same period) [87]. Furthermore, the state also subsidised loans for capital expenditure, paying the first four years' interest on the loans for the upgrading project, and providing low interest loans from other state departments for part of the electrification project.

Conclusion: Soweto, 1984-85

Four differences between Soweto and other townships in the PWV stand out: the social structure of Soweto was unusually differentiated, with a relative lack of social cohesion; good access for some to relatively high income opportunities, the state's prioritisation of urban development and its subsidisation of rents reduced the intensity of material grievances for many residents; the chronic unimportance of the Soweto Council in township politics removed a potential focus for discontent; and the character of opposition politics and the experience of struggle during the period 1977-84 militated against mass protest in the mid-1980s. A fifth factor might be added: the state's use of relatively sophisticated policing. This is very difficult to assess, but it seems on cursory examination that the police in Soweto were better informed, more appropriately equiped, and more restrained than their counterparts in the Eastern Cape or Vaal, for example.

These factors underlie the general quiescence of Soweto during 1984 and most of 1985. During this period there were only sporadic, transitory and disperate incidents. Throughout 1985 there was very little protest in the Soweto's schools. There was a brief boycott in Ibhongo Secondary School when schools reopened in January, over the exclusion of students because of exam failure or the age limit. During August and early September never more than six schools were involved in protests, at a time when over 150 schools nationwide were being boycotted [88]. On 26 September schools reopened after the September break, but students were sent home at 10am because of the 'climate' in the township: it was the day of the funeral of Bongani Khumalo, secretary of COSAS in Soweto, who had been shot and killed by police on 13 September. From the following day on, however, attendance at Soweto schools was reported to be 'normal' (although school boycotts continued in the Vaal, East Rand, and especially Eastern Cape). Only four out of about 300 schools affected by protests in early October were in Soweto. [89]

From 12 September there were more numerous minor incidents, easily contained by a heavy police presence. Khumalo was one of very few casualties of police action. The Release Mandela Committee called for a stayaway on 17 September, which was partially effective on that day, and petered on the next through poor organisation [90]. The announcement of increased service charges and levies at the end of June seemed to provoke little resistance, but was nonetheless largely shelved in September because of the 'unrest' [91]. 'Considerable support' was reported in Soweto for the 5/6 November Transvaal stayaway - but it was much less than in the Vaal or East Rand [92]. There were at least 24 attacks on 17 councillors, ex-councillors or leading Sofasonke members in Soweto during 1984, but none were killed, and no councillors fled the township. Unlike in the Vaal (and in Soweto in August 1986) these attacks were not made by crowds of residents but rather by individual saboteurs [93].

Considering the size and perceived importance of Soweto, and its history of revolt in 1976-77, administrators and police in the area must have been fairly pleased with what they no doubt took to be the success of their policies. Even in the early 1980s Ministers were claiming that state polices had made Soweto residents happy and content. In 1982 Koornhof said that just two years before Soweto had been a 'stinking slum', but it was now 'becoming an outstanding success story' [94]

Of course, Soweto now seems less exemplary than it did three years ago. School boycotts spread widely through Soweto in late 1985 and 1986, local rent boycotts began in early 1986 and spread Soweto-wide from June, a partial network of street committees was established in some areas, residents resisted the state in a series of bloody conflicts (beginning with the "White City War" of August 1986), and councillors fled the township.

Nonetheless, many aspects of the development strategy in Soweto were later incorporated into more wide-ranging state policy. For example, there appear to be some similarities between the functioning of the Soweto Planning Council in the early 1980s and the Joint Management Committees in Alexandra from 1987; the tolerance of sub-economic rentals has now in principle been institutionalised through the Regional Services Councils; and the senior officials (Steve Burger,

Piet Genis) in Alexandra, widely thought to be a test-case in administration and development now, were formerly officials in the Soweto administration.

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58. RDM 19 April 1978.
59. RDM 14 Nov 1977; 27,30 Jan, 14 Feb, and 24,27,28 March 1978; Mare and Hamilton, op cit.
60. RDM 4 July 1978, ...
61.
62. Popo Molefe evidence, op cit; Speak 1,5 (Sept 1983). Inkatha's earlier support for councils included especially Buthelezi's "Chariots into Battle" speech in October 1980 [RDM 12 Oct 1980, also 28 May 1982]. Several prominent Inkatha members did stand, including Ambition Brown who was surprisingly defeated in the Orlando East constituency, possibly because Inkatha supporters were not registered or enfranchised voters.
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64. On Sofasonke's opposition to rent increases: RDM 13-18 July 1979, for example.
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69. RDM 7 Sept 1979.
70. RDM 24,30 Nov 1979, 19 Dec 1979, 7 March 1980; Sunday Tribune 2 Dec 1979; FM 30 May 1980, FM 'Soweto Survey', pp25,28.
71. RDM 1 Oct 1979; Star 30 Nov 19779. Knoetze was lauded in Parliament by Mulder and other NP M.P.s - Hansard col 6028, 6016-7, 6185, 1 to 3 May 1978.
72. M. Chaskalson, unpublished paper on the local state and reform in the Vaal Triangle in the early 1970s.
73. Nigel Mandy, A City Divided: Johannesburg and Soweto (Johannesburg, 1984).
74. Sunday Tribune 2 Dec 1979; FM 30 May 1980.
75. Hansard, 6018-45, 6185, 1 to 3 May 1978; Hansard, Questions and Replies, col 1206 27 May 1977.
76. Star 30 Oct 1979.
77. RDM (Soweto News edition) 18 Sept 1981; RDM 21 Sept 1981.

78. FM 'Soweto Survey', p3; the Urban Foundation's focus on Soweto is reflected in its publication authored by Pauline Morris (Morris, op cit).
79. FM 17,24 Oct 1980.
80. Prime Minister's Office, Physical Planning Department, Draft Plan for A Spatial Developemnt Strategy for the PWV Complex (April 1981).
81. Horwood 1978 budget speech, Hansard col 3366, 29 March 1978.
82. RP 14/1982.
83. Suzman, in Hansard, col 4927, 21 April 1982.
84. eg Sunday Tribune 2 Dec 1979; FM 'Soweto Survey'', p13;
85. RDM 21 July 1981, 22 Sept 1981; Hansard, Questions and Replies, col 1336, 20 May 1983.
86.
87. Hansard, Questions and Replies, col 1340, 30 April 1985.
88. Cf foornote 49 above.
89. RDM 28 Sept, 3 Oct 1984; Bot, op cit.
90. See RDM 13-27 Sept 1984; also evidence of Sergeant Mong in State vs Baleka and others.
91. SAIRR, 1984 Survey, p392.
92. Labour Monitoring Group, 'The November Stayaway', South African Labour Bulletin 10,6 (1985).
93. SAIRR, 1984 Survey.
94. Hansard, col 5095-8, 22 April 1982.

Appendix A: Occupation by economic sector by PWV area, 1980 - % of economically active population

Economic sector	JHBG	ER	VAAL	PTA
Agric, forestry, fishing	0.6	1.4	5.8	4.8
Mining, quarrying	0.7	6.9	3.8	0.3
Manufacturing	20.6	35.1	34.4	16.5
Electricity, gas, water	0.9	0.8	2.6	0.4
Construction	3.7	3.5	5.2	5.9
Services	58.4	38.2	37.1	62.5
Other	15.2	14.1	11.1	9.8
Services subsectors				
Commerce, catering, hotels	18.5	10.3	9.6	13.3
Transport, communications	3.6	4.6	2.8	5.1
Finance, insurance, etc	3.6	1.0	0.6	1.7
Personal/household services	20.4	14.5	16.4	25.4
Other services	12.3	7.8	7.7	16.8
Manufacturing sub-sectors				
food, beverage, tobacco	2.8	3.6	1.3	2.0
textiles, clothing, footwear	4.6	1.3	0.4	0.6
printing & publishing	1.7	0.3	0.1	0.3
chemicals and other non-metallic products	4.5	11.0	11.3	2.6
iron & steel and other metal basic industries	0.6	5.1	11.3	4.1
metal products	5.5	13.3	9.8	6.7
other	1.0	0.5	0.1	0.2

JHBG: Johannesburg and Randburg census districts, including Alexandra as well as Soweto, excluding Dobsonville. Soweto residents comprise 80% of this category.

ER: East Rand census region, including Katlehong, Thokoza, Vosloorus, Tembisa, Daveyton, and Wattville.

VAAL: Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark census districts, including Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Evaton, Bophelong, and Boipatong (together comprising 74% of the category) and white residential areas.

PTA: Pretoria and Wonderboom census districts, including Mamelodi, Atteridgeville/Saulsville and Soshanguve (together comprising 81% of the category) and white residential areas.

Source: Population Census 1980, report nos 02-80-19 (pp332-341), 02-80-20 (pp538-547), 02-80-23 (pp2292-301), and 02-80-22 (pp467-476).

Appendix B: Comparative income distribution: Percentage of households with income in different income groups in different PWV areas

Table 1

	PTA	WR/ER	JHBG	VAAL
Below R4000 pa (in 1985 prices):				
1975	27.3	22.8	14.4	na
1980	19.1	15.8	21.3	22.7
1985	20.0	19.3	23.2	26.1
Above R12000 pa (in 1985 prices):				
1975	11.1	9.7	14.7	na
1980	15.4	14.0	9.3	10.2
1985	25.1	19.3	25.1	15.9

PTA - Pretoria (sample from Mamelodi and Atteridgeville)
WR/ER - West and East Rand (sample from Daveyton, Dobsonville, Kagiso, Katlehong and Tembisa)
JHBG - Johannesburg (sample from Soweto)
VAAL - Vaal Triangle (sample from Sebokeng, Evaton, and Sharpeville)

Source: Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa (UNISA), 'Income and expenditure patterns of urban multiple households in Pretoria/the West and East Rands/Johannesburg/Vaal Triangle, 1980/1985', Research Reports nos 94.1, 94.3, 94.4, and 94.7 (Pretoria, 1981) and 130.2, 130.8, 130.9, and 130.13 (Pretoria, 1986).

Table 2

Rand per month (current prices)	JHBG	PTA	WR/ER	OTHER PWV
1978: 0-90	12%	6%		
90-170	46	67		
170+	42	27		
1980: 0-110	15%	5%	7%	
110-200	47	54	55	
200+	38	41	38	
1982: 0-130	10%			7%
130-400	52			49
400+	38			44

JHBG - Johannesburg, data for Soweto;
PTA - Pretoria, data for Mamelodi and Atteridgeville.
OTHER PWV includes PTA and WR/ER sample

Source: Markinor, as republished in various editions of the South African Institute of Race Relations' annual Race Relations Survey, 1978-82.

Appendix C: Financial statistics for the West Rand Administration / Development Board and Greater Soweto Councils

This data includes accounts for WRAB (1973-74 to 1982-83), WRDB (1983-84), and the Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow Councils (for the last 7 months of 1983-84). The WRAB/DB data covers not only Greater Soweto, but also the other areas in its jurisdiction including Alexandra, Kagiso, Mohlakeng, Munsieville, and Bekkersdal. There is therefore a slight break in the data between 1982-83 and 1983-84, with data for the later fiscal year excluding the accounts for the Alexandra and Kagiso Councils. If these are included, the 1983-84 data is as presented under "1983-84*".

Table 1: Aggregate income and expenditure accounts

Fiscal year**	Beer/ liquor profits (Rm)	General account surplus (Rm)	Levy funds surplus (Rm)	TOTAL SURPLUS (Rm)	Accum. deficit on general account, end-yr (Rm)
1973-74	3.8	-6.0	-0.2	-2.4	1.8
1974-75	6.3	-8.0	-1.1	-2.8	17.3
1975-76	6.7	-6.3	0.9	1.3	19.5
1976-77	3.5	-7.3	1.3	-2.4	14.8
1977-78	3.0	-11.0	1.4	-6.7	6.8
1978-79	5.2	-9.5	0.9	-3.5	2.7
1979-80	4.1	-11.6	0.9	-6.6	-4.2
1980-81	2.4	-16.5	0.6	-13.5	-18.3
1981-82	4.3	-13.6	0.5	-8.7	-32.9
1982-83	4.7	-22.2	0.6	-16.9	-50.1
1983-84	2.0	-16.8	0.4	-14.3	-66.6
1983-84*	2.3	-18.6	0.4	-15.9	-68.2

"Levy funds" include the Bantu Services, School, Sports and Recreation Facilities, and Community Facilities Levy Funds.

Table 2: Outstanding loans

Fiscal year** (end-yr)	Capital account (Rm)	Housing account (Rm)	Electrification project (Rm)	Upgrading project (Rm)	TOTAL ALL ACCOUNTS (Rm)
1973-74	61.6				61.6
1974-75	64.3				64.3
1975-76	63.6				63.6
1976-77	61.7				61.7
1977-78	7.6	55.5			63.1
1978-79	8.6	59.4			68.0
1979-80	25.3	68.1	20.0		113.4
1980-81	16.1	102.6	20.0		138.7
1981-82	10.9	123.3	89.0	34.5	257.7
1982-83	11.4	195.8	146.0	109.7	462.9
1983-84	306.9		238.5		605.4
1983-84*	307.5		239.5		606.0

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Table 3: Deficits on the provision of electricity and water, and rental and other arrears

Fiscal year**	Electricity supply deficit		Water supply deficit		Arrears (end-yr)	
	(Rm)	(% of revenue)	(Rm)	(% of revenue)	Electricity/water (Rm)	Rents (Rm)
1978-79					0.7	
1979-80	1.8	127			0.8	
1980-81	1.8	69	3.9	61	2.2	1.0
1981-82	0.6	12	2.5	27	3.1	1.5
1982-83	2.7	37	4.2	27	3.4	2.4

Data for other years is not presented in the Auditor-General's reports.

** Fiscal years 1974-75 to 1981-82 were from April to March inclusive; the 1982-83 fiscal year covered the 15 months from April 1982 to June 1983 inclusive, to bring the accounts into line with other government departments; subsequent fiscal years were from July to June inclusive. The 1973-74 fiscal year covers only the 9 months July to March inclusive, after the establishment of the Administration Boards.

Sources:
Reports of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of the West Rand Area Bantu Affairs Administration Board (RP 105/1976, 23/1978, 47/1978, 39/1979, 58/1980, 38/1982, 91/1982, 28/1984); West Rand Area Development Board (RP 35/1985); and the Town Councils of Soweto (RP 54/1985), Dobsonville (RP 52/1985), Diepmeadow (RP 55/1985), Kagiso (RP 51/1985) and Alexandra (RP/53/1985).

Appendix D: Rent series, 1976-84.

"Rent" comprises house rents, site rents, and service charges. House rents vary between houses but were not raised during this period. The following data is for a standard rented 51/6 4-roomed house in Soweto, without a water meter:

	House rent (Rand/month)	Site rent (R/month)	Service chgs (R/month)	TOTAL (R/month)
Dec 1977	3.25	8.00	3.00	14.25
Apr 1978	3.25	9.75	3.00	16.00
Jul 1978	3.25	11.50	3.00	17.75
Aug 1980	3.25	18.85		22.10
Oct 1980	3.25	23.30		26.45
Feb 1981	3.25	27.55		30.80
Oct 1981	3.25	13.32	22.23	38.80
Mar 1983	3.25	13.32	23.73	40.30
Jun 1984	3.25	13.32	29.03	45.60
Dec 1984	3.25	13.32	41.03	57.60
(by mid 1986)	3.25	13.32	45.77	62.34

Households' monthly bills would also include electricity charges and lodgers fees (where appropriate). House rents are slightly lower for smaller houses such as in Klipspruit and Mofolo. 'Rents' are much higher for newly-built houses in, for example, Chiawelo Extension 3, Pimville Zone 7, Jabulani and Naledi. Rents - including site rents and service charges - in Dobsonville and Diepkloof/Meadowlands are set by their respective Councils, and are not the same as in Soweto.

Source: this series is derived from gazetted Government Notices and newspaper reports; the Government Notices were R2234 (Government Gazette 5789, 28 Oct 1977), 1570 (GG 7158, 1 Aug 1980), 2044 (GG 7812, 25 Sep 1981), and 393 (GG 8560, 25 Feb 1983). The 1984 rents figures are based on newspaper reports and may well be incorrect.

Appendix E: Housing Units Built in Greater Soweto

	By WRAB	By private sector	TOTAL
1976	441		
1977	422		
1978	110	210	320
1979	220	171	390
1980	0	420	420
1981	96	457	553
1982	800	904	1704
1983	837	300	1137
1984	239	231	470
1978-84	2302	2693	4995

Source: Hansard, various.