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Negotiating towards success in International Crises:

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The North Korean Six-Party talks allows for a clear and in-depth examination of negotiation processes. Negotiation is a vital part of International Relations; it is a process which can prevent conflict from breaking out or continuing. On account of the many occasions that call for negotiations, it is necessary to determine what lends to a successful negotiation. Therefore, by examining the North Korean Six-Party talks which are currently on going and relatively successful, a model for a successful negotiated outcome strategy is being proposed.

The case of
North
Korea and
Iran
(minor
case study)

DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper studies the North Korean Six-Party Talks that began in 2003 and are still ongoing. This negotiation concerned the denuclearisation of North Korea. This is the overarching goal of the Six-Party Talks – to get North Korea to denuclearise. However, each party has their own personal objective that they would like to achieve. The paper discusses the negotiation process by looking at the strategies utilised by the members to achieve their outcomes, as well as the intervening variables (culture and environment) that affect the strategy and outcome of talks.

However, the goal of this paper is to design a model based on the Six-Party Talks to simulate future negotiated outcomes. The paper does not purport that the Six-Party Talks is successful, as this cannot be claimed until the talks come to a close. What it does argue is that the talks have achieved a measure of success, proven by the achievement of two agreements and its continuance. Therefore, the paper believes that the Six-party negotiation is moving towards success. With that said, the paper examines the applicability of the model by discussing it with regards to the minor case study, Iran.

This paper is distributed into six sections. Section One, is the Introduction, it situates the research problem. Section Two and Three, is Chapters One and Two respectively. Chapter One explores negotiations, from the definition of negotiation to the theories applied in negotiation. While, Chapter Two discusses negotiation strategy, by looking at the styles and tactics used in negotiations, as well as the influence of culture on negotiations and the obstacles to negotiating. Section Four and Five, is Chapters Three and Four respectively. Chapter Three is dedicated to the main case study the North Korean Six-Party Talks, it looks at the context in which the talks are occurring, as well as the delegates involved and their objectives for the negotiations. It then discusses the strategies used in the negotiation and then depicts the model. Chapter Four focuses on Iran, discussing the context of talks with Iran by the various concerned parties and following this is the discussion of the model with respect to Iranian talks. The Sixth and Final section, Section Six is the Conclusion which draws a close the discussion of the Six-Party Talks.

INTRODUCTION

“Peace is not the absence of conflict but the presence of creative alternatives for responding to conflict -- alternatives to passive or aggressive responses, alternatives to violence.” –Dorothy Thompson

1. International Crisis

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was designed to ensure the control and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is an important treaty to the international community as it is the only binding multilateral treaty whose goal is to disarm nuclear weapon states. It was open for signatures in 1968 but enforced in 1970.¹ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the agency that enforces the NPT. It does this through inspections and the promotion of safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies.² These inspections are done to ensure that member states are not secretly diverting the nuclear materials for military purposes.³

However, nuclear enrichment has become a contentious issue, whereby not all states are in agreement with the NPT.⁴ Some states that are bound by this treaty secretly conduct operations which are in violations of the NPT.⁵ North Korea was one such state; it was once a signatory but withdrew in 2003,⁶ after breaching an agreement with the US to curb proliferation in 2002.⁷ Other states that have the potential to be nuclear states like Israel are

¹ United Nations, Brief background, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/>, Accessed on 18 November 2008

² IAEA.org, About the IAEA, <http://www.iaea.org/About/index.html>, Accessed on February 10, 2009

³ Goldstein, International Relations, Longman, New York, 2004, p. 251

⁴ Diehl, S.J and Moltz, . J.C.: Nuclear Weapons and Non-proliferation: A Reference Handbook, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2007, pp. 1-2

⁵ For example it was discovered in 1991 after the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution it was discovered that Iraq was secretly conducting nuclear research. It was discovered that they were enriching uranium and designing nuclear weapons. On account of the violation of the NPT the IAEA was commanded to remove, destroy and render all harmless their nuclear weapons capability. This was done around 1998, but Iraq withdrew from the UN and then the IAEA had to stop its work. World Nuclear Association, Iran, North Korea & Iraq –Implications for Safeguards also South Africa, Israel, Syria and Libya, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf73.html>, July 2008

⁶ BBC News, Timeline: N. Korea nuclear stand- off, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2604437.stm>, December 06, 2007

⁷ Global Security .org, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): 1994 Agreed Framework, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-agreedframework.htm>, April 28, 2005

not a part of the NPT. On account of some states believing in having access to nuclear materials for military purposes as a means to defend themselves from suspected threat, the international community as a whole is not in agreement with their perceptions. This is because the states that wish to be in possession are seen as rogue states.⁸ After September 11, 2001 the United States of America (hereafter the US) declared Iran and North Korea as being part of the axis of evil.⁹ This was done in President's Bush State of the Union address in January 2002.¹⁰ They viewed these two nations as a threat to international security, because they expected that weapons such as the ones being controlled by the NPT, in the wrong hands could mean the destabilisation of the world.¹¹

The reference to US is made, because at present the US is a global superpower,¹² whereby its foreign policy greatly influences the foreign policy of other states. The opinions and policy decisions made by the US at times influences other states policy or they garner support. Hence, by the US viewing North Korea and Iran as a threat to international security, then it is understandable why the United Nations, as the international organisation and other states also view them as a threat to international security. As such the case of North Korea and Iran are viewed as an international crisis that needs to be resolved, preferably through international diplomacy.

The 'international crisis' posed by North Korea, is such that the international community has seen fit to engage in finding a solution to the crisis. Out of this crisis has arisen an opportunity for study. The study of the North Korean Six-Party Talks (hereafter Six-Party Talks) allows for insight into negotiating strategies in a cross-cultural situation. This case study is also noteworthy because it is in fact currently the precursor of negotiating with a seemingly hostile state on denuclearising. By studying this case study it will allow for understanding the reasons for its successes so far (this will be clarified later in Section 2.3). Therefore it could be very useful for future cases like Iran. Therefore, this paper's focus is on the possibility of reproducing a successful outcome in the negotiations of denuclearisation.

⁸ Loc. cit.

⁹ Wright, R. "War on Evil," in Foreign Policy, No. 144, Sept-Oct 2004, p.34

¹⁰ Becker, J.: Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the looming threat of North Korea, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. xi

¹¹ Loc. cit.

¹² Goldstein, J.S. Op. Cit. p.99

1.1 Research questions

To achieve the objective of the proposed research study, there are key questions that need to be asked and answered. The questions are listed below:

1. What makes for successful negotiations?
2. What key factor contributed to the North Korean Six-Party Talks measured success?
3. What type of strategies (approaches/styles and tactics) were employed during the North Korean Six-Party Talks?
4. Why did talks (August 2003 – July 2008) occasionally experience deadlock?^{1314 15}
5. Why was the Agreed Framework agreement dissolved?¹⁶¹⁷
6. In what way did being from different cultures affect the parties' ability to negotiate successfully?
7. How were they able to overcome the varying obstacles and barriers during the whole negotiating process?
8. How did the relationship held by the parties affect the talks?

1.2 Hypothesis; Independent and dependent variables

The hypothesis being put forth is that by implementing a certain negotiation strategy (style and tactic), a successful negotiated outcome can be reached. Hence, the independent variable (x) will be the implementation of said negotiation strategy, while, the dependent variable (y) will be the negotiated outcome. There will be two intervening variables, culture (x_1) and environment (x_2) influencing both the independent (x) and dependent variable (y).

¹³ CNN.com, Timeline: N. Korea nuclear dispute,

<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/index.html>, Accessed on 19 August 2008

¹⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Second-Phase Actions for the implementations of the Joint Statement, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/action0710.html, 03 October 2007


¹⁵ KBS World, Six-Party talks resume,

http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/event/nkorea_nuclear/now_02_detail.htm?No=296, 17 July 2008

¹⁶ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-agreedframework.htm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2604437.stm>, Op. Cit.

Figure 1



1.3 Measuring success

The measure of success can differ depending on the author. For this reason it is important to state the reason this paper has claimed that the Six-Party Talks has claim to some success and is moving towards success. As well as being so bold as to offer it as a potential model for future use in similar situations. The thinking is that a negotiation is made up of different stages, phases and rounds.¹⁸ It begs to reason that for the parties to move from one stage, phase or round to another, or to move from a stage to a phase and to a round, there has to be success. That is to say for instance that by moving from phase one to phase two signifies the success of phase one.

The nature of negotiating is to experience both measures of success but failure as well. Therefore, indeed the actual success of the process will be when the final agreement is implemented completely. On account of the few successes made during negotiations at the various stages, phases and rounds, the argument has been put forward that the Six-Party Talks are negotiating towards success. An example of the Six-Party Talks measured success is the Denuclearisation Action Plan of February 2007 (*see* Appendix 10: Denuclearisation Agreement), which North Korea has already began complying with – as part of the deal it has already shutdown its main reactor Yongbyon.¹⁹ The only way this could not seen as a success is if all parties refuse to talk should North Korea not implement agreement or if a war broke out between parties, which is not likely considering the positive momentum of the talks.

¹⁸ Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A. and Wilkenfield, J. *Op. Cit.* pp. 5, 11-12

¹⁹ BBC News, *N Korea talks finish without deal*, <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6907709.stm>, July 20, 2007

The factors that have contributed to the success achieved so far will be discussed in Chapter Three. This chapter will look at the predecessor of the Six-Party Talks, the Agreed Framework. A negotiation which was deemed a successful by the signing of an agreement but was later dissolved. The chapter will also focus on aspects of the Six-Party Talks that were a success and the reason for the positive momentum had by this current nuclear negotiation. It should still be kept in mind that the paper is not claiming to argue the overall success of the negotiations for even that is inconclusive evidenced by the Agreed Framework. Rather it is acknowledging the level at which the talks have reached, what they have accomplished so far and the continued will to achieve their goals.

1.4 Theory

The theory that will be employed is negotiation theory, but specifically verbal theory (non-mathematical theory approach). This theory is ideal for the proposed study, because of the research methods associated with verbal theory. The research methods that typically associate with verbal theory are case studies, historical analysis and interviews with negotiators. In the proposed study the research methods that are being proposed are case studies and historical analysis. Like all theories, the verbal theory has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that it will allow an in-depth analysis of the research subject and contribute to the knowledge base of negotiation. However, it is disadvantageous in that the results cannot be generalised and do not allow for external validation. However, the paper being proposed wishes to apply the model on an external case, therefore removing the limitation put in place by utilising this theory.²⁰

1.5 Case Selection and justification

This paper will incorporate one major case study and a minor case study. The major case study will be the North Korean Six-Party Talks and the minor will be the Iranian talks. The two protagonist North Korea and Iran are both in what the Bush Administration has dubbed the axis of evil. However, they were not chosen because of that, rather they were chosen as case studies because they are the most current contentious talks occurring, but moreover they

²⁰ Nieuwmeijer, L.: Negotiation: Methodology and Training, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, 1992, pp. 15 -16

are relevant to the international system. However, because they are recognised as being a part of the axis of evil it will be relevant to the paper's discussion in so far as the political atmosphere surrounding the parties and the relationship of the parties. The two regions are important to the international arena for varying reasons.

North Korea is located close to Japan and China (see Appendix 2: Map of Korean Peninsula), two key global actors; these two nations are a part of the Asian economy that is host to Taiwan and Singapore, newly industrialised countries.²¹ Therefore a nuclear North Korea poses a great threat to not only the economical stability of the region but the world as well. North Korea is a cause for concern to the US for this very reason.

Iran is a major contributor to a large percentage of the world's oil exports – hence any disruption in oil production can result in economic destabilisation within foreign economies.²² Iran is also geographically located in an area that is of interest to the US. Being located in close proximity to Iraq and Afghanistan (*see* Appendix 11: Map of Iran), two countries where the US used military force, which has taken many lives on both sides and a lot of money.²³ The US has also invested a lot of time and money on the stability of the region and has a close relationship with Israel and Turkey.²⁴ Therefore, it would be in the interest of the US especially under the new administration to prevent further conflict.

These case studies were further chosen because of the need for negotiations. Negotiating is the safer and more diplomatic way to deal with international political disagreements. Especially in a case where the threat of a nuclear war is always a possibility with states possessing nuclear weapons, if tensions are not managed appropriately.

The power also held by these two seemingly small states (geographically and politically) also makes these case studies important to the discussion, especially in terms of North Korea. Knowing the situation in which North Korea is in, economically, socially and politically, it is interesting that they are able to argue from a point of strength and not weakness. On account of this it makes the negotiation occurring important because understandably the negotiations occurring, is being done craftily – due to the tenuous situation. Hence, it allows the

²¹Goldstein, J. S. Op. Cit. pp. 363-5, 497-9

²²Ibid pp.431-2

²³Ibid. pp. 46-8

²⁴Ibid. pp. 110

understanding that if a difficult situation as this can find a successful outcome, other lesser and minor situations can have a similar outcome. Therefore, North Korea is worthy of being studied.

In the case of the Iranian talks, it too is necessary, as it will be used as a test case, to see how the outcomes could be transferred to them, in essence testing a model. For this reason it will be a minor case study, because the bulk of the study is on North Korean Six-Party Talks and not the Iranian talks.

1.6 Methodology

The method of research will be done qualitatively, utilising two case studies, as explained above. The information will be gathered from secondary sources, such as books, journal articles, newspaper articles, legitimate internet sources.

1.7 Literature Review

There are a number of books that critically analyse the situation in North Korea. For instance in Wit et al, *Going Critical*,²⁵ the author exposes the threat of a nuclear North Korea. It also sheds light on the involvement of United States of America and its policy towards North Korea. What makes this book useful to the proposed research paper is the fact that *Going Critical* gives a historical account of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, this will allow for a proper understanding of the environment under which talks began to be understood. It also discusses the initiation of the Six-Party Talks, and even goes so far as to engage the reader by providing a descriptive and informative account of the attitudes and expectations of the parties.²⁶

Like Wit et al, Sigal, whose book *Disarming Strategies*,²⁷ also situates around the 1994 nuclear crisis of North Korea, discusses the threat that North Korea posed during that time.

²⁵ Wit, J.S., Poneman, D.B. and Gallucci, R.L.: *The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Going Critical*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 2005

²⁶ *Loc. cit.*

²⁷ Sigal, L. V.: *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998

He also gives a good historical account of the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, what sets this book apart from Wit et al, is that it is mostly from the purview of the United States of America. He looks at how close the United States came to going to war with North Korea, while Wit et al looks critically at the North Korea crisis. Of course both do discuss the involvement of the United States and the diplomacy exercised.²⁸

While, books allow for academic insights into area of research, the use of articles allow for a more current than dated understanding of the situation as it stands currently. Hence, the research paper will also take advantage of this source of information. An example of this is the article by Cody, *Accord in North Korea Talks: Nations Approve Nuclear Inspections but Still Lack Timetable*,²⁹ it reports the progress that was made during the recent North Korean talks and shares North Korea's willingness to cooperate. This differs from the two books mentioned earlier, where they provided a historical understanding of the situation in previous attempts at reaching an agreement between all parties.³⁰

While it is vital for this research paper to have several texts on North Korea, it is also vital to have several texts on negotiations. Two such texts are, Lewicki et al, *Essential of Negotiations*³¹ and Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge*.³² These two books differ greatly as they satisfy different aspects need for this study. Lewicki's text focuses on the art of negotiation, from the nature of a negotiation to answering how cultural differences influence negotiations. Simply put, Lewicki's book looks at the technical aspects of negotiations.³³ On the other hand Snyder's book also looks at negotiating techniques, but from the aspect of the way in which North Korean's negotiate.³⁴

The former allows for understanding and familiarising oneself with the techniques, approaches and strategies used when negotiating.³⁵ While, the latter allows for understanding the way in which North Korea negotiate, as well as the way the United States found the

²⁸ Loc. cit.

²⁹ Cody, E. *Accord in North Korea Talks: Nations Approve Nuclear Inspections but Still Lack Timetable*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/12/AR, July 13, 2008>

³⁰ Loc. cit.

³¹ Lewicki, R.J, Saunders, D.M, Barry, B and Minton, J. W.: *Essentials of Negotiation*, McGraw Hill, New York, 2003

³² Snyder, S.: *Negotiating the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behaviour*, United States Institute if Peace Press, Washington, D.C, 1999

³³ Lewicki, R.J, Saunders, D.M, Barry, B and Minton, J. W. Op. Cit.

³⁴ Snyder, S. Op. Cit.

³⁵ Lewicki, R.J, Saunders, D.M, Barry, B and Minton, J. W. Op. Cit.

experience in comparison to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). Hence, it not only allows for understanding of the North Korean behaviours but also how the US reaction to their negotiating behaviour.³⁶ These two books will greatly assist the objective of the proposed research area.

Despite the Iranian talks being used as a minor case study, it too will need to be historically situated briefly. However, because of the currency of these talks the source information will mostly be from articles. For instance, Xinhua, in the article titled *Major Countries agree to negotiate with Iran*,³⁷ expresses the renewed hope in reaching an agreement with Iran. They offer a new and improved package that they hope will be attractive to Iran.³⁸ With renewed hope and willingness to cooperate on all sides and attempt is being made to negotiate again, in this case Iran's talks are representative of the North Korean talks previously. Articles such as the one mentioned along with others will allow for understanding of the Iranian situation and allow the model being put forward to be tested.

³⁶ Snyder, S. Op. Cit.

³⁷ Xinhua, Major Countries agree to negotiate with Iran,
<http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6402638.html>, May 3, 2008

³⁸ Loc. cit.

CHAPTER ONE

"Man is an animal that makes bargains: no other animal does this - no dog exchanges bones with another." -Adam Smith

2. Defining Negotiations

A negotiation in general, refers to the execution of a dialogue between two or more people in the hopes of either achieving a particular outcome or to solve a dispute. As such it is a process which is carried out by everyone at one point or another during their lifetime. One can go so far as to say it occurs very often in one's life. The art of negotiations is almost inherent, of course with some people being more talented than others. From very early people begin negotiating. Children negotiate with parents for pocket money, to watch television, or to get out of doing chores; adults negotiate with peers, in choosing the movie to watch on their weekends together, with partners what vacation spot to visit, with bosses on their salary increase, between business associates on a company merger; and at the market to get a lower price on goods. Hence, negotiations is ever present, in various situations both informal and formal, by varying, diverse people, young and old, male and female, of all races, religions and creed.

Essentially it is an element of human behaviour, because of the dependence negotiation places on communication. Negotiation cannot and will not occur if the parties involved do not communicate. Negotiations can be recognised easily, that is to say by people exchanging ideas with intent to change their current relationship and in so doing reach a consensus, they have negotiated.³⁹

However, while negotiations occur constantly, it can be examined in different sectors, for instance a corporate negotiation differs to that of diplomatic negotiation. The difference is evident with the areas in which the negotiation is applied. Hence, corporate negotiations would deal with the mergers of private corporations, contract, hostile take-overs, or anything that needs to be negotiated in the corporate realm. Diplomatic negotiations on the other hand,

³⁹ Nierenberg, G. I.: Fundamentals of Negotiating, , Hawthorn Books, New York, 1973, p. 4

deal with state to state interactions.⁴⁰ For a more traditional definition, diplomatic negotiations stresses the “official, state-to-state exchanges and tend to focus on the role of important, individual players – presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, ambassadors and generals”⁴¹ - to resolve conflict of any sort between the parties. Within diplomatic negotiations the key characters still remain to be states and their leaders.⁴² While, this definition explains the players involved it does not give much depth of understanding of negotiation. However, taking into account the definition by Spoelstra and Pienaar makes negotiations more understandable. They explain it as

“[a] process of interaction between parties directed at reaching some form of agreement that will hold and which is based upon common interests, with the purpose of resolving conflict, despite widely differences.”⁴³

Negotiation is not as simple as their definitions however, because when the subject of negotiation is studied more closely, many questions arise. Some of these pertinent questions were highlighted by Ickle. For instance, in solving conflict is it always best to negotiate? Will negotiating solve the conflict? An also known fact of negotiation is a willingness of both parties to compromise, find a middle ground and to make some concessions. The question in this case however, becomes why and in terms of making concessions, which law will preside? In negotiating both parties enter into the exchange bona fide (good faith), not expecting to win all its objectives, but instead looking for a fair solution. The questions that arise from this is what if one party's objectives is able to be met and who is the judge of 'bona fide' and further more what exactly is 'fair,' how is it measured.⁴⁴

A further consensus might be to solve within a conflict the less controversial ones first because of the belief that an agreement will lead to further agreement. However, could this not simply just compound the problem, making the issues harder to solve? Ickle also raises the question of “what is wrong with successful bluffing?” with regards to the belief that a

⁴⁰ Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A., Wilkenfield, J.: Negotiating a Complex World: An introduction to International Negotiation, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, inc, Lanham, 1999, p.4

⁴¹ Loc. cit.

⁴² Loc. cit.

⁴³ Spoelstra, M. and Pienaar, W. Negotiations: Theories, Strategies and Skills, Juta and Co. Ltd., Cape Town, 1996, p. 3

⁴⁴ Ickle, F.C.: How Nations Negotiate, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1987, pp.1-4

threat a negotiator is not willing to follow through should not be made.⁴⁵ These are some questions that should be kept in mind when negotiating.

Negotiation is not readily described as a negotiation but a talk for the sake of diplomacy, in the political realm according to Spoelstra and Pienaar.⁴⁶ Spoelstra and Pienaar, expounds on this by explaining that politicians prefer the informality of the concept of ‘talks’ as opposed to ‘negotiation.’ As during talks one is merely gathering information and exploring the other parties “views, flexibility and acceptability.”⁴⁷ Politicians or representatives will therefore only refer to the proceeding as a negotiation when the parties are within reach of their objective. This may very well be true, but may not be so in practice as the North Korean Six-Party Talks have long ago moved beyond gathering information and exploration. The parties have also come many times close to their agreement and even recently what is occurring cannot be called anything but negotiations, whereby smaller agreements have been reached. The reference being made here is to the North Koreans agreeing to be open and allow regular inspections and in return the US has removed them from the state sponsored terrorist list.⁴⁸ Hence, the parties in this negotiation are making head way. Therefore the fact that the North Korean Six-Party Talks is still referred to as a ‘talk,’ does not distract from the fact that it is indeed a ‘negotiation.’⁴⁹

2.1 Differentiating between negotiation and bargaining

‘Negotiation’ and ‘bargaining’ can in most cases be seen as interchangeable, however for the purposes of this paper’s study they will not be used interchangeably to reduce the potential for confusion. As was mentioned earlier the key distinction being made between negotiating and bargaining is the level of formality, they stand at two extremes, formal and informal.

By differentiating between ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiation,’ essentially negotiation is being viewed and defined in a more narrow sense. Using Ickle’s explanation “‘negotiation’ is a

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp.1-2

⁴⁶ For example in the Six-Party talk’s case.

⁴⁷ Spoelstra, M. and Pienaar, W. Op. Cit. p. 7

⁴⁸ New York Times, North Korea,

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=north%20korea&st=cse>, Accessed on 28 December 2008

⁴⁹ Spoelstra, M. and Pienaar, W., Op. Cit. p. 7

process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest where conflicting interest are present.”⁵⁰ It is due to the explicitness of the proposals that occur during negotiations that distinguishes negotiation from bargaining. The explicit proposals refer to not only to the terms of agreement, but also the agenda, the ground rules that will apply to the process and the technical and legal issues which are also fundamental to the process.⁵¹

Essentially, negotiation is the exchange that occurs at the negotiation table, however bargaining can occur during the same proceedings by the players. This is usually done within the negotiating hall; it is for this reason why confusion can exist.⁵² Bargaining usually occurs years before the actual negotiation; however it is the negotiation which is marked as a landmark, for instance the Israeli-Palestinian talks under the Clinton Administration.⁵³

2.2 Theories applied in Negotiations

There are a variety of theories that exist and are applied within the realm of negotiations. The theories have been developed by various scholars and theorists to explain the negotiation process. On account of negotiation being heavily reliant on human delivery and influence, two negotiations will never be exactly the same. From this arise different situations that need to be negotiated or that comes from being negotiated.

2.2.1 Exploring Game Theory

‘Game theory’ is not simply a descriptive tool but analytical tool used to explain strategic situations in international relations; it does this through the use of various game scenarios.⁵⁴

It uses mathematical mean to predict bargaining outcomes. It does this by using the games which consists of two or more players, these players then chose alternatively or repeatedly their moves. The moves done by all the players will then affect each player resulting in a

⁵⁰ Ickle, F.C. *Op. Cit.* pp. 3-4

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 4

⁵² Goldstein, J.S. *Op. Cit.* p. 79

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 80

⁵⁴ Snidal, D. “Game theory of International Politics,” in *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 01, 1985, p.26

payoff. These payoffs may either be in the form of money (tangible) or an article of value to the players (intangible).⁵⁵

Two examples of games used under game theory are prisoner's dilemma and chicken.⁵⁶ However, prisoner's dilemma is by far the most popular game theory game studied.⁵⁷ This is known by a 2x2 game and gives good insights on issues such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the Strategic Arms Limitations treaty (SALT).⁵⁸

The understanding for the prisoner's dilemma comes from the story of two prisoner's arrested for a bank robbery, but has insufficient evidence to prosecute them (only possession of a gun), therefore the prosecutor needs a confession. The scenario goes that the prisoner's are in separate interrogation rooms, the prosecutor speaks to the first prisoner and tells prisoner 1 if s/he confesses to the crime and his partner does not then s/he will go free. However, if he does not confess and his partner confesses instead, then s/he will get a long prison sentence, while his partner goes free. The prosecutor also tells this to prisoner 2. What is obvious about this scenario is that if neither confesses they will only be prosecuted for illegal possession of a gun – a much shorter sentence. However, the game assumes the players as selfish only thinking of themselves, hence they both end up confessing and inevitably with a longer sentence than they would have gotten if they did not confesses. This game deals with personal gain and trust, and can be applied to the arms race. The arms race is perpetuated because of a lack of trust in fellow states, but also about personal gain (acquiring arms to protect themselves and make them powerful).⁵⁹

2.2.2 Exploring the Ripeness Theory

The 'ripeness theory' basically refers to the ripe moment in which positive intervention can occur resulting in the success of the conflict situation.⁶⁰ The ripe moment occurs when a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) exists, such as a deadlock. The 'ripeness theory' does not determine the success of the negotiations but rather the point in time that the parties'

⁵⁵ Goldstein, J.S *Op. Cit.* p. 86

⁵⁶ Snidal, D. *Op. Cit.* p.26

⁵⁷ Goldstein, J.S. *Op. Cit.* p.88

⁵⁸ Snidal, D. *Op. Cit.* p.29

⁵⁹ Goldstein, J.S. *Op. Cit.* p.88

⁶⁰ Zartman, I.: *Ripe for resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. ix

perceptions converge. This will then allow for negotiations to occur, but the parties must act on this ripe moment before the time period is over.⁶¹ The reason for reflecting on this theory is the fact that it raises an important point. The point being that in situations of conflict, if the situation is not 'ripe for resolution' then the situation may not be resolved.⁶² While this theory is not the theory being used in the paper for analysing the North Korean Six-Party Talks, it is important to keep in mind. Therefore, in terms of the negotiating proceedings, resolution between the parties cannot and will not be found if the parties are not ready for a resolution.

The ripeness theory can generally be seen as an analytical tool for the pre-negotiation stage of the negotiations. It is a means to determine whether the parties are in the same space for negotiating and while not predicting a successful outcome, it allows for the possibility.⁶³ Due to this, while theoretically negotiation theory will be employed, it would be remiss to dismiss the plausibility of the ripeness theory and impact that it has on the overall negotiations.

2.3 Players, situation and setting

Within negotiation the players, situation and setting is very important, it is in a sense essential to the outcome of the process. The players in particular, in any negotiation situation are the most important factor. It is most important because without them there is no need for negotiating. Furthermore, the players impact the whole process and outcome of the negotiations by determining the general agenda, strategy, framework and outcome. The players have the ability to stall proceedings, end proceeding, and begin new phases stages, rounds or phases.⁶⁴ If the negotiation process should be looked at like a board game, but with higher stakes as Starkey et al suggest,⁶⁵ whether checkers, chess or monopoly, the operation of the game is not done or determined by the pieces or directions that make up the game, but by the players. In chess the pieces are moved by two people, they determine the strategy to employ to outwit and win their competitor, the same goes for monopoly only with more players. This scenario is also true for negotiations, whether it is negotiating between two parties or multiple parties.

⁶¹ Aggestam, K.: "Enhancing Ripeness: Transition from Conflict to Negotiation," in Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, Zartman, I.W., and Faure, G.O. (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp.272-3

⁶² Zartman, I: Op. Cit. p. ix

⁶³ Aggestam, K. Op. Cit. pp. 272-3

⁶⁴ Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A., and Wilkenfield, J. Op. Cit. pp. 5, 11-12

⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 5

As stated above the players are in a sense the determining factors within any negotiating situation. Other aspects will indeed influence the negotiation process for instance the situation and the setting, which will be discussed later, however these aspects also influence the players and the decisions and choices they make while negotiating, and it is for this reason why it is hard to predict the definite outcome of negotiations. The players while they may come representing states, affiliated to organisations or on behalf of a company they still remain human beings, being ruled by emotions, being able to reason, they carry baggage and in some cases grudges. This all will affect the strategy that they eventually adopt and implement, whether from the very beginning of the process or during the process because one of the variables mentioned suddenly affects them.

The situation of negotiations is also important, as it is relevant to the negotiation proceedings. The situation refers to the events leading up to the negotiations, the historical perspective and the political atmosphere before and during the negotiations. It makes sense that the events leading up to the proceedings would be important to the negotiations. By looking at these events the players/parties are able to determine what their aims and goals for the proceedings are, as well as what strategies they need to implement. It is important because the events leading up to the negotiations illustrate the reason for the parties being ready or calling for a negotiation.

When referring to the historical perspective, it refers to the history between the parties. The international arena is made up of different states that have been interacting for many years, sometimes allies and sometimes foes. Then because of the volatility of the international scene it is important to gauge the relationship had by the various parties, because this will influence the deals made and alliances formed during the negotiations. It is also necessary to gauge which parties are sympathetic to whom; and how smoothly the negotiations occur.

As for the political atmosphere, this is equally important as a part of situating the negotiations proceedings because politics outside of the negotiation sphere can influence the negotiations. This can come from non-governmental organisations that may be in opposition to the negotiation topic tabled, or other states that do not wish for the negotiations to occur. The players involved may even experience sabotage from their own comrades that wish for a

different outcome or wish to slow the proceedings down. As such the political atmosphere can either greatly assist or greatly hinder the negotiations progress and outcome.

The setting of where the negotiations proceedings holds some importance not in terms of affecting the outcome of the proceedings, but in terms of influencing the effectiveness of the proceedings. The setting of the negotiating proceedings is based on the political atmosphere, but also on the parties' tendencies to over indulge in luxuries. Of course the setting can also be chosen based on a need for neutrality, so that the setting holds no sway for either side, in effect reflecting allowing progress.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ For example in the case of the Six-Party talks, China is the host country. Snyder, S. U.S.-North Korean Negotiating Behavior and the Six Party Talks, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, February 28, 2007, p. 6

CHAPTER TWO

“Always choose the way that seems best, however rough it may be. Custom will render it easy and agreeable.” –Pythagoras, c. 500BC

3. Negotiation strategy

Negotiations do not simply begin with the formal exchange of talks also known as the ‘around the table discussion’ or the formula stage.⁶⁷ Rather, considering that negotiation is ‘generally a lengthy and laborious process,’ to quote Berridge, it begins before the formula stage with what is termed pre-negotiations.⁶⁸ Scholars, such as Zartman and Berman have divided up the negotiation process into three stages: pre-negotiation stage, formula stage and the detail stage.⁶⁹ However, there exists also a basic six step approach that categorises six phases to the negotiation process, outlined by Hiltrop and Udall below:⁷⁰

1. Preparing for negotiation : Zartman and Berman’s pre-negotiation stage
2. Developing your strategy: Zartman and Berman’s pre-negotiation stage
3. Getting started: Zartman and Berman’s formula stage
4. Building understanding: Zartman and Berman’s formula stage
5. Bargaining: Zartman and Berman’s formula stage
6. Closing: Zartman and Berman’s detail stage

This outline of the negotiation process takes nothing away from the three negotiation stage accepted by scholars like Zartman and Berman, as noted the six step approach⁷¹ can be further divided into the three stages.⁷² The six step approach simply gives more depth to understanding the structure of the negotiation process.⁷³

⁶⁷ Berridge, G.R.: Diplomacy, Theory and Practice, Prentice Hall, New York, 2000, p. 137

⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 145

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 119

⁷⁰ Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S.: The Essence of Negotiation, Prentice Hall, London, 1995, p. 17

⁷¹ Loc. cit.

⁷² Berridge, G.R. Op. Cit. p. 119

⁷³ Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S. Op. Cit. p. 17

3.1 Discussing strategy

To negotiate, certain techniques need to be employed in order to ensure that the issues being postulated are met by the other parties in agreement or compromise. Negotiating techniques at the core is the creation and implementation of a stratagem. A stratagem is basically enshrinement of the combination of the idea of strategy and tactic. Strategies and tactics may be interpreted as being similar and of no significant difference to the casual observer; however that is not the case. Both the strategy and tactic are linked; the strategy is implemented based on the tactic used. In other words, the strategy is the creation and implementation of a plan within the negotiation process,⁷⁴ or simpler yet it is a “set of behaviours.”⁷⁵ However the strategy is not implemented without a proper tactic, as the tactic is the device that carries out the implementation of the strategy.⁷⁶

A day-to-day example of differentiating strategy from tactic is driving. Ms. J wishes to go from destination A to D. She decides to leave from point A and to arrive at D via C, hence decides she will drive route A-C-D, this is the strategy. To implement this strategy she needs a device, she can walk, take the bus or her own car, she decides to use her own car, this is a tactic. Essentially, if this was a negotiation she would have chosen the most efficient strategy, as route A-C-D is the faster and safer route as opposed to A-B-C-D. The tactic selected by Ms. J was also more efficient, safer, less time consuming and convenient. Hence, in a negotiating situation parties will choose the strategy and tactic best suited to them and their situation.

The negotiation strategy is in reality an overall plan for tackling the negotiations to achieve a specific outcome. Therefore, within a party's strategy it is expected that they plan for the pre-negotiation, the negotiation itself, the closure and all that entails, essentially three stages of the negotiation process discussed earlier.⁷⁷ For instance, the parties think of (and how to react) to the questions that will be asked in the first session; questions that a certain party may ask another party. They also ensure that they have a clear position; and if they are divided amongst team, it is best to select a team leader for the team; and allocate specific tasks to

⁷⁴ Nierenberg, G. I. Op. Cit. p. 147

⁷⁵ Dür, A. and González, G. M. Hard and Soft Bargaining in the EU: Negotiating the Financial Perspective, 2007 -2013, <http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2007/papers/gonzalez-g-12c.pdf>, Accessed on January 15, 2009

⁷⁶ Nierenberg, G. I. Op. Cit. p. 147

⁷⁷ Berridge, G.R. Op. Cit. p. 119

individuals within the team. These are basic strategic questions that need to be asked and actions to be considered when planning the team's strategic style.⁷⁸

3.1.1 Negotiation Styles

When implementing a negotiating strategy the parties involved will inevitably adopt a certain style of negotiating. Students of negotiation differ in the type of style best suited for use in negotiating, as well as the differentiation between the different styles. For instance, Deutsch argues that there are essentially just two types of style, which he refers to as an approach; it is either a competitive approach or a cooperative approach.⁷⁹ However, scholar's Hiltrop and Udall have identified and highlighted five distinctive styles namely: collaborating, compromising, accommodating, controlling and lastly, avoiding.⁸⁰ Scholars like Lax and Sebenius, on the other hand, is for the most part in agreement with Deutsch, in so far as the recognition of two distinct styles (competitive or cooperative). However, they differ by making the point that both styles can be used together.⁸¹

The competitive and cooperative style can further be understood according to Fischer, Ury and Patton as positional and principled negotiation (interest-based bargaining) respectively.⁸² Positional bargaining is competitive, while principled bargaining is cooperative. Principled negotiation is also further differentiated from soft and hard negotiation, because the former is based on cooperation as stated earlier, whereby its principles are steeped in not only looking out for oneself, but for others as well.⁸³

The determinant of the approach used in a given situation is generally dependent upon the nature of the dispute, as well as the goals had by each party. Deutsch also explains that in most cases it will be found that the parties will have interdependent goals. Depending on the temperament of the interdependence shared by the parties, whether positive or negative it will influence the approach taken – corporative or competitive, respectively.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S. Op. Cit. p. 23

⁷⁹ Maiese, M. Negotiation, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/negotiation/>, October 2003

⁸⁰ Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S. Op. Cit. pp. 23-25

⁸¹ Loc. cit.

⁸² Maiese, M. Op. Cit.

⁸³ Loc. cit.

⁸⁴ Loc. cit.

Cooperative negotiation is the approach with a win-win situation, while competitive negotiation is a win-lose situation. Therefore in the interest of parties to a negotiation it would be best to adopt a cooperative approach as the probability of benefiting is higher. Hence, parties to the negotiation should also be cognisant of the goals they choose when entering into negotiations. By having goals that illustrate positive interdependence the probability of having a win-win situation increases, because positive interdependence is structured such that as a party attains its goals the other parties will also attain their goals, hence they are proportional. Therefore, all parties have the capacity to attain the goals they seek, as long as their counterparts also have the capacity to achieve their goals. Conversely, it is a negative independence when the means of achieving one's goal is reduced, due to the other parties' success. This results in the use of a competitive approach, as the only way in which success would be gained is for the loss of the other parties.⁸⁵ A win-win situation is always the reasonable choice; therefore in support of Fisher, Ury and Patton it makes sense that the cooperative approach is an approach that can be used to achieve a successful outcome from the negotiating proceedings.

As discussed earlier, there are other scholars that see the usage of the two styles differently, whereby the two styles (competitive and cooperative) can be used in tandem. Lax and Sebenius, explains this by pointing out that negotiations have both a “‘creating’ and ‘claiming’ value.” This is explained in two stages, stage one is where the negotiators work cooperatively together to create value (“enlarge pie”) and stage two they competitively claim their value (“divide up the pie”).⁸⁶ This explanation for the implementation of both approaches may seem plausible, but is not necessarily so, for one overarching reason, it is unnecessary and therefore cause unneeded complications. When it comes to “divide up the pie” as it were, it does not need to be competitive, it can also occur cooperatively. In fact the division of the pie may work even better cooperatively, because the cooperative approach works on the premise that each party have interdependent goals and because of this they will cooperate.⁸⁷ So because their goals are shared they want a positive outcome and are willing to work on said outcome, hence would work together in such a way that the goals are divided amongst the parties satisfyingly.

⁸⁵ Loc. cit.

⁸⁶ Loc. cit.

⁸⁷ Maiese, M. Op. Cit.

Another consequence of employing the implementation of both approaches is that they do not complement each other, to adopt the colloquial phrase 'it is like pouring water on a ducks back.' What is essentially occurring is that the competitive approach to claim value undermines the cooperative approach to create value, this is known as the "The Negotiators Dilemma:

- If both sides cooperate, they will both have good outcomes.
- If one cooperates and the other competes, the co-operator will get a terrible outcome and the competitor will get a great outcome.
- If both compete, they will both have mediocre outcomes.
- In the face of uncertainty about what strategy the other side will adopt, each side's best choice is to compete.
- However, if they both compete, both sides end up worse off.”⁸⁸

Hence, it does make sense for both parties to adopt a cooperative approach for negotiations, by doing that they are able to ensure joint gains.⁸⁹ Instead of undermining the whole negotiating process in which all parties have invested valuable time, effort, labour and money.

Looking at Hiltrop's and Udall's five distinctive styles, it seems to add more options and variety for the negotiator. Furthermore, the styles while incorporating both the competitive and cooperative style, has three other styles which are distinctive to Deutsch's two styles and cannot be easily grouped as Deutsch alludes. Essentially they are independent of the two styles discussed earlier.⁹⁰ The *Collaborating style* refers to the negotiating parties on both sides achieving their personal goals. This is essentially like Deutsches Co-operative approach to negotiating, it is a 'win-win' stance, but requires 'time, energy and creativity.'⁹¹ The *Compromising style* refers to the negotiator expecting to both win and lose, with respect to both goals and relationships while negotiating. Therefore a 'win-win' stance is not possible. The objective of this style is to find a fast and 'mutually acceptable which [will] partially satisfy both parties.' For this style to work the negotiator needs to be both persuasive and manipulative.⁹² The *Accommodating style* is the more selfless style or rather a style of accepting defeat, because the accommodator is in fact yielding. This therefore is a 'lose-win'

⁸⁸ Loc. cit.

⁸⁹ Loc. cit.

⁹⁰ Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S. Op. Cit. pp. 23-25

⁹¹ Ibid. p. 24

⁹² Loc. cit.

stance, whereby the accommodator looks to maintain interpersonal relationships at all costs without concern for the personal goals of the parties involved. Essentially this style allows the other parties to win.⁹³ The *Controlling style* opposed to the accommodating style cares little for interpersonal relationships and more for attaining personal goals at all costs. Hence this is a 'win-lose' stance.⁹⁴ The *Avoiding style* refers to the avoidance of conflict at all costs. This style highly frustrates parties because the overarching theme is evasiveness. With this style neither interpersonal relationships nor personal goals achieved. This style has a 'lose-win' stance or rather a 'leave-lose.'⁹⁵

⁹³ Loc. cit.

⁹⁴ Loc. cit.

⁹⁵ Ibid. p.25

3.1.2 Negotiation tactics

The following are tactics that can be implemented during the negotiation process to complement whichever style is being used.

Figure 2: Negotiation tactics



Source: Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S.: The Essence of Negotiation, Prentice Hall, London, 1995, pp. 30-3, 45-6

3.1.3 Impact of Culture on negotiations

Culture is a concept that is not as straightforward to define as one would expect, it is in fact ambiguous.⁹⁶ A simple definition of culture is its reference ‘to the shared values and beliefs of a group of people.’⁹⁷ However, this tells very little for the purposes of negotiation. A more graphical definition rests on the idea of visitors visiting foreign lands they will be ‘struck by the remarkable variety of customs, manners and forms of social organisation’ developed by the people different to the visitor to conduct everyday affairs.⁹⁸ This gives a sense of what a culture is by differentiating the ways of one person to another in a different setting. This highlights what a culture is very well, but one fitted for negotiating is a definition by Joseph Grew interpreted by Raymond Cohen. Culture essentially ‘rests on shared meaning, permitting members of a group “to perceive, interpret, evaluate, and act on and in both external and internal reality.”’⁹⁹

Considering that the Six-Party Talks consists of six nations from three different regions each with their own wealth of cultural diversity it would seem negligent to ignore the significance of the culture of these states in the way that they negotiate. Elgström posits that culture can indeed affect the negotiation process although because of continued negotiating will not necessarily affect the outcome of the negotiation. Of course, this conclusion is questionable as his case study was on the multilateral talks that generally get carried out within the European Union (EU). While, he clearly explains and investigates what is culture and identifies that states member to the EU have different cultures, they have different judicial, organisational and national cultures. But there still exist states that have far different cultures, cultures which are polar opposite, for instance the US and Japan.¹⁰⁰ This paper holds the view that negotiation is central to international negotiations.¹⁰¹

In negotiating it should be accepted and understood that there exists a human dimension. This is so because as mentioned before the negotiations are carried out by actors, the parties

⁹⁶ Dupont, C. And Faure, G.: “The Negotiation Process,” in Kremenyuk, V. A. (ed), International Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Josey-Bass, San Francisco, 2002, p.47

⁹⁷ Lewicki, R.J, Op. Cit. p.201

⁹⁸ Cohen, R.: Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an independent World, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C, 1997, p.10

⁹⁹ Ibid. p.12

¹⁰⁰ Elgström, O.: “The Role of Culture: A Discussion and Case Study,” in Kolb, D.M. (ed), Negotiation Eclectics, Pon Books, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 36-41, 47

¹⁰¹ Dupont, C. and Faure, G. Op. Cit. p. 47

mentioned. Their actions and inevitably their humanness ultimately determine the outcome of the negotiation process, although some scholars that though the influence is real it is peripheral.¹⁰² This is so because the process depends on the negotiators' willingness to find common ground in order to arrive at a solid negotiated agreement. Therefore, while the actors may not be acting in their individual capacity and instead are acting on behalf of a state, international entity or organisation, they are still human and possess identities of their own which will indeed affect their thought processes. These thought processes are engineered, guided and influenced by one's culture, which comes back to the definition of culture by Cohen.¹⁰³ This then raises the fact that nation's cultures will differ and in so doing when they meet to negotiate miscommunication can occur that can lead to the standstill of the proceeding. Hence it is expected that culture must be discussed when discussing negotiations, because of the great impact it has on the whole process.¹⁰⁴ From this standpoint the paper argues in favour of Faure and Robin, whose theory on culture and negotiating behaviour is based on case studies that show the cultural international negotiating process on three levels: "behavioural, cognitive and identity."¹⁰⁵

With regards to negotiations culture is mostly about perceptions, 'how the parties view the other parties' culture, including stereotypes.'¹⁰⁶ They bring these perceptions to the table and negotiate on that basis and understanding. For instance, many states believe that the US's way of negotiating is arrogant and they that are culturally insensitive. With this belief going into the negotiating room, the party already has preconceptions of the US negotiators and may start to see these aspects and adjust their strategy accordingly. Therefore instead of cooperating they become more difficult. Of course there are certainly cultural aspects of the parties that play a part. For example, the western culture is more extroverted in comparison to the Eastern culture. Hence western negotiators would be more abrupt and direct in their negotiating styles, unlike their eastern counterparts who would be less direct and be more ceremonial. On account of these differences, if they are not understood and taken into consideration while negotiating, the parties will believe that their colleagues are being rude, obstinate or even difficult.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² *Ibid.* p. 34

¹⁰³ Cohen, R. *Op. Cit.* p. 12

¹⁰⁴ Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A. and Wilkenfield, J. *Op. Cit.* p. 65-6

¹⁰⁵ Dupont, C. and Faure, G. *Op. Cit.* p. 47-8

¹⁰⁶ LeBaron, M. *Culture and Conflict*, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/culture_conflict/, July 2003

¹⁰⁷ *Loc. cit.*

For peaceful coexistence to exist within the international system there needs to be a mutual recognition of each actor's culture. This absolute has yet to be achieved in this system however, that is why to some extent conflict still occurs in the system. It makes sense therefore for culture to be taken into consideration when negotiating, as it would be best if all the actors were cognisant of their co-actors culture and willing to come to an agreeable outcome. Hence, if the cultures of each actor is respected and understood to some degree then the atmosphere of the proceedings should be less tense and will allow for progression.¹⁰⁸

On the other hand if the cultures of the various actors are at odds and understanding seemingly impossible then what can be expected of the negotiation proceeding is for it to lose steam or fail. This is because culture plays an important part of basic group and national recognition, both of which are important to the proceedings. An example of this is the Arab-Israeli conflict that has been ongoing for over half a century. The basic group and national recognition are opposing one could say, both groups identity based on their religion Islam versus Judaism. They have struggled in the past to reach a successful outcome because they cannot reconcile their religious beliefs.¹⁰⁹

This is what Lewis refers to as a culture collision. Culture is determined ordinarily by four constructs: family, religion, authority and community. However, being individuals and groups influenced by different experiences, histories and environment it is understandable that the perception of those four constructs are dissimilar.¹¹⁰ On account of this when varying cultures meet it leads to misunderstandings in international relation, this too is purported by Samuel Huntington 'Clash of Civilisations.'¹¹¹ The actors basically cannot or find it hard to reconcile their perceptions of the four construct above, with their co-actors construct thereby leading to failure or stalemate.¹¹²

It is for this reason why it is important for the negotiator to be cognisant of the role that culture plays in negotiating and should try to be as impartial as possible, but also to understand the co-actor(s) culture. Understanding the other actors' culture and cultural traits can also be a boon when negotiating, it can act as the starting point for negotiating in an

¹⁰⁸ Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁹ Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A., Wilkenfield, J. Op. Cit. p. 65-6

¹¹⁰ Loc. cit.

¹¹¹ Huntington, S. "The Clash of Civilizations?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 03, Summer 1993

¹¹² Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A. and Wilkenfield, J. Op. Cit. p. 65-6

international setting;¹¹³ acting as a sort of guide in the way in which the negotiations should be approached.

Different attributes can be assigned to negotiators based on their culture. Take for instance an American negotiator, observers have viewed them as: being good at preparation, communicates clearly, frankly and straightforward, pragmatic as opposed to being dogmatic, having the ability recognise the others perspectives, identifying the negotiation as not having to be defined as a win-lose situation, the concession process is vital to the essence of the negotiation. These represent all their positive attributes, but observers have also viewed negatives attributes as well, which may in turn hinder the negotiation process. They are as follows: “Conflict of intergovernmental agencies,” the negotiation process is influenced negatively by the separation of powers by the US Presidency and Congress, interest groups, like the media hinder process especially when it is time to negotiate finer points impatience, and insensitive to other cultures.¹¹⁴

McDonald a US diplomat and international negotiator posits Lewicki et al, gives an American perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of an American negotiator. The comparison is similar to that of other observers. McDonald argues that the strengths of the US negotiators are there: friendliness, fairness and honesty, flexibility, innovativeness, pragmatism, preparedness and their willingness to cooperate. As opposed to their weakness which are there: impatience, arrogance, poor listening skills, insularity, legalism and their naïveté.¹¹⁵ This shows that the cultural assessments of the way cultures negotiate is congruent and not bias thereby being able to be used in preparation for negotiating. Arguably and supported by the former Ambassador to the US from Singapore Tommy Koh says that the American strengths at negotiating far out way their weaknesses.¹¹⁶

Studies have been carried out to depict the negotiating characteristics of negotiator based on his or her culture. For instance, it has been noted that the US negotiators excel at preparation and planning while the Japanese in contrast excel at being dedicated to the job. It was found that negotiators across cultures share similar traits, however their strengths differed. Again using the US and Japan as examples, they share the following characteristics: Perceive and

¹¹³ Lewicki, R.J., Op. Cit. p.202

¹¹⁴ Lewicki, R.J., Op. Cit. p. 202

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 203

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 202

Exploit power, Verbal expressiveness, Integrity. The Japanese negotiators it is found are stronger than the US negotiators in perceiving and exploiting power; and in their integrity, while the US negotiators are stronger in their verbal expressiveness.¹¹⁷

The data collected on the attributes and characteristics of negotiators based on their culture are important, because it reduces cultural insensitivity and will allow for the cultural gap to be bridged ensuring that the negotiation process is not hindered, and instead negotiators can focus on the issue at hand.

The way in which culture influence the way people negotiate, is a study in its own right, therefore cannot be feasibly covered in-depth in one section of a chapter. However, the purpose of discussing culture and negotiation has been fulfilled for this paper, as it was merely to illustrate the seriousness of the influence of one's culture on negotiations. Therefore, highlighting it importance and stressing the value of taking in the other parties culture as well as your own when undertaking negotiations.

3.1.4 Negotiating Obstacles: situations that cause deadlocks and dissolutions of talks

Negotiations are not a smooth and continuous process; they experience bouts of immobility, which is referred to as deadlocks or stalemates. This does not signal an end to the negotiation process or it being unsuccessful, rather it is to be expected, because of the differences that encompass the negotiating delegates, it is inevitable that their disagreements and grievances arise and cause such obstacles. It should be kept in mind that a negotiation is a variation of problem solving, meaning that there are contentious issues brought to the table solve. Accordingly, there will be deadlocks and stalemates, for a clear picture of a negotiation process one can liken it to a maze. The beginning of the negotiation and the ending are clear, but the problem arises on how to get from the beginning to the ending. While, navigating the path, a player/party will come to a standstill at times, sometimes several times, in the case of a negotiation the party will experience a deadlock or stalemate, for reasons that will be discussed later. From this the party will have to re-evaluate their strategy and take the

¹¹⁷ LeBaron, M. Culture-Based Negotiation Styles,
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/culture_negotiation/, Accessed on July 2003

necessary steps, with reflections on past actions, to find a way to achieve agreement, reach the end of the maze.

Deadlocks as identified by Berridge occur for three general reasons, because:

1. “both parties have widely divergent objectives
2. one party mistakes firmness for rigidity and will not make concessions even to keep the negotiation ‘alive’
3. its used as a deliberate tactic during a negotiation to force the other party to reconsider its position and make concessions.”¹¹⁸

Other reasons why deadlocks or stale mates can occur and often times represent the doom of the proceedings are as follows:

1. Cross-cultural misunderstandings
2. Not recognise bargaining position ¹¹⁹
3. Negotiation strategy is too stringent (playing hard ball)
4. There exists a lack of trust. Hence, this makes making concessions hard. What is evident from this lack of trust is two dilemmas, the *dilemma of honesty* and the *dilemma of trust*. The dilemma of honesty refers to being in a position of being honest but this could lead to being taken advantage of against not being honest, therefore leads to a stalemate, because cannot negotiate with a bad relationship. On one hand, telling the other party everything about your situation may give that person an opportunity to take advantage of you. However, not telling the other person anything may lead to a stalemate. The *dilemma of trust* like the other dilemma leads to being taken advantage of, how much should one trust what the other party is telling you? If you trust the fully this leaves one in a disadvantageous position, but if you believe nothing, again can hinder reaching an agreement. Trust plays an important part in reaching a negotiated agreement.¹²⁰
5. Parties are simply not ready for a resolution, for example the ultimate collapse of the Oslo Accords.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Berridge, G.R., Op.Cit. p. 45

¹¹⁹ Maiese, M. Op.Cit.

¹²⁰ Loc.cit.

¹²¹ The agreement failed because of Hamas was in opposition. Then President Arafat was practicing both diplomacy with and violence against Israel, hence the acceptance of the military wings opposition. However, after his death the new political authority, opposed to the agreement took over. Herzog, M. “Can Hamas be

6. Third party interference, for instance the media. An example of this is the Lancaster House Conference, where Lord Carrington involved the press by announcing that a successful settlement was imminent, this strategic movement almost resulted in a breakdown of talks, as significant parties also responded using the press to claim that no agreement would be reached. The process was saved by Samora Machel's (a party to the negotiation).¹²²
7. No compromise can be reached, opinions differ.¹²³
8. When the *Right People* are not involved, it can hinder the negotiation and the implementation of the agreement reached during negotiations. For example, those parties left out of negotiation may become belligerent arguing that their views were not taken into consideration.¹²⁴ This is one reason why previous negotiations before Lancaster House conference failed.¹²⁵
9. The people the agreement affect (constituents) are not in agreement with final outcome of negotiators. "Guy and Heidi Burgess call[s] [this] the "scale-up" problem of getting constituency groups to embrace the agreements that negotiators create." By negotiators accepting an agreement which is opposed by the constituents it can and most likely will lead to a last minute breakdown of the agreed terms.¹²⁶

What should have been grasped so far is that negotiation, while common place is not easily mastered; it is a complex maze that needs to be manoeuvred carefully, instinctively and knowledgeably. As such, just as it makes good practice to understand cross-cultural practices, it also makes sense to know of and be aware that sometimes negotiations stall or dissolve. This can happen for a number of reasons, either environmental or social.

Tamed?" in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2006, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org>. Also, in my opinion its failure was further compacted by the Israeli government not acting in good faith. They were to stop the settlement in a disputed territory, but did not.

¹²² Stedman, S.J. "The Lancaster House Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia," in *Pew Case Studies in International Affairs*, p. 38

¹²³ Again the Oslo Accords is an example; the parties disagreed on the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, where they were initially displaced.

¹²⁴ Maiese, M. *Op. Cit.*

¹²⁵ Stedman, S.J. *Op. Cit.* pp. 4-5

¹²⁶ *Loc. cit.*

CHAPTER THREE

“Unless you’re willing to have a go, fail miserably, and have another go, success won’t happen.” –Phillip Adams

4. Negotiating towards success

4.1 North Korea and the Background of the Six-Party Talks

North Korea is located in East Asia, opposite Japan and shares a border with South Korea, China and Russia (see Appendix 2: Map of Korean Peninsula). There exists a clear lack of trust between North Korea and some of the international community in part because of the differing ideology, but also because of the fact that North Korea previously sponsored terrorism and of course currently because of its nuclear activities.¹²⁷

In the early 1960s North Korea began to take an interest in nuclear weapons. This interest escalated into a need after they were intimidated by the US after killing two US soldiers in 1976. The US showed North Korea its might by flying nuclear capable bombers towards the Demilitarised Zone. According to US analysts this act ‘blew [North Korea’s] mind,’ in addition that same year President Carter disclosed the military capability of the US by stating that the US was in possession of 700 atomic weapons in North Korea. The beginnings of North Korea’s nuclear program were discovered in 1980, an American spy satellite detected the foundations of what later became a nuclear reactor. This moment was pivotal for later diplomatic confrontations between Pyongyang and Washington over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.¹²⁸ However, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the forging of better relations between South Korea and, China and Russia was a blow for North Korea as well. It signalled a changing world, a world that seemed to be isolating North Korea and the changing status quo was probably signally being a threat to North Korea. These events and the earlier one mentioned above, honed North Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons.¹²⁹ *(To see the estimated number of nuclear facilities in North Korea and satellite image of nuclear facility see Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 respectively).*

¹²⁷ Sharma, V. State Sponsors: North Korea, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9364/>, June 28, 2008

¹²⁸ Wit, J.S., Poneman, D.B. and Gallucci, R.L.: Op. Cit. pp. 1-2

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 5

In 1989 the then Bush administration discovered a reprocessing plant at Yongbyon South of the five megawatt reactor discovered in 1980. This was a shock, because at the time the US had adopted an isolation policy towards North Korea in the hopes of curbing the capabilities of going nuclear. This policy of course did not deter Pyongyang's interest however. The Bush Administration decided to change the previous policy and adopt a 'comprehensive engagement' policy, which aimed at initiating better relations with North Korea at the abandonment of their nuclear weapon program.¹³⁰ This change of policy can also be thought of as a change in times, as the Cold War was close to its end. The Berlin Wall had collapsed in 1989 and heralded the end of the Cold War; the actual end was the 31st of December 1991 with the dissolution of the state of the USSR under international law.¹³¹

During the Cold War, North Korea was allied with the USSR and China, as opposed to the US. In addition, the Korean War took place during the Cold War. The Korean War occurred between June 1950 to July 1953, with North Korea being supported by the USSR and communist China against the UN forces and the US.¹³² What this suggests is the tension that already existed between the US and North Korea prior to the discovery of North Korea's ever expanding nuclear capabilities. Therefore, the change in relation expected by the Bush administration in 1989 was not going to be neither simple nor easy.

North Korea after much pressure from the international community, especially from the US became signatory to the NPT in 1985. However, Pyongyang failed to sign the safe-guard agreement with the IAEA, an agreement it was compulsory to sign as a member of the NPT, in 1985, but did so in 1992.¹³³ North Korea also signed the joint declaration of denuclearisation, which prohibited Korea as a whole from testing, manufacturing, producing, receiving, possessing, storing, deploying, or using nuclear weapons. It also prevented them

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 6- 7

¹³¹ Center for the Study of Intelligence of the CIA, *At Cold War's End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/at-cold-wars-end-us-intelligence-on-the-soviet-union-and-eastern-europe-1989-1991/art-1.html#rtoc10>, July 07, 2008

¹³² The Naval Historical Center, *Korean War, June 1950-July,*

1953 <http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/kowar.htm>, Accessed on 29 February 2009

¹³³ North Korea was to sign this agreement upon joining the NPT, but it refused to do this. It did not wish to be party to this agreement as it would obligate them to allowing the IAEA to carry out inspections. In my opinion it was also opposed to the agreement as it joined the NPT on account of pressure. Global Security .org, *Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Nuclear Weapons Program*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm>, April 28, 2005

from being in possession of nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.¹³⁴ Despite this, in 1993 the situation seemed to worsen on account of North Korea denying the IAEA access to two specified areas that were suspected of being nuclear waste sites. It also threatened in 1993 to pull out of the NPT, which initiated a two year bilateral talk, between themselves that resulted in some agreements.¹³⁵

The US and North Korea engaged in bilateral talks under the Clinton administration, as mentioned above, after North Korea threatened to pull out of the NPT. Due to North Korea's hesitance to comply with the IAEA, compounded with the announcement of their withdrawal from the NPT, the March of 1993 tensions were high in the Korean peninsula, particularly between the US and North Korea. For this reason international action was taken by the UN pressing upon member states the importance of the necessity for them to encourage North Korea to comply with the resolution passed.¹³⁶ Encouraged by this the US entered into bilateral talks with North Korea in June 1993. After a second round of talks a month later, on the 21st of October in Geneva sixteen months later, North Korea and the US signed an Agreed Framework.¹³⁷

The 'Agreed Framework' committed North Korea to giving up nuclear arming. In return they would be compensated for their loss of their nuclear reactors by receiving a supply full of oil, security guarantees, an end to the American embargo and gradual diplomatic normalisation (specifically the improvement of political and economic relations between North Korea and the US: *see* Appendix 6: Agreed Framework). This agreement was by no means expected to be met quickly but to take a few years.¹³⁸

The US's position and view on the accomplishment of the agreement was that they had negotiated from a position of strength; this is according to then, Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Although, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole differs, he says "[i]t is always possible to get an agreement when you give enough away."¹³⁹

¹³⁴ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm>, April 28, 2005, *Op. Cit.*

¹³⁵ *Loc. cit.*

¹³⁶ The resolution stated that North Korea was to cooperate with the IAEA and "to implement the 1991 North-South denuclearization accord", <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-agreedframework.htm>, *Op. Cit.*

¹³⁷ *Loc. cit.*

¹³⁸ Sigal, L. V. *Op. Cit.* p. 6

¹³⁹ *Loc. cit.*

Dole's account of the bilateral negotiation and subsequent agreement is a more accurate reflection in comparison to Christopher's. North Korea in 1994 was willing to give up nuclear arming. However, it was not willing to do this without incentives. At the time it wanted security assurances from the US, as well as economic and political benefits in return for its denuclearisation. This is essentially a representation of what was agreed in the Agreed Framework at the end of negotiations. However, North Korea did not readily get what it wished for easily.¹⁴⁰

The negotiation between the US and North Korea was not straight forward and it differs greatly from the Six-Party Talks in respect of how it approached North Korea – this will be discussed later. The US were not able to negotiate from a position of strength as Christopher reports, instead the US found itself negotiating with a North Korea that utilised a 'tit-for-tat' strategy, in response to the US's favoured 'carrot and stick' method. What is unfortunate with this negotiation in retrospect is that the US could have easily have used a 'give and take' strategy. This however was not to be, instead Washington insisted on pre-conditions for negotiating with North Korea. They wanted full compliance of the NPT before they engaged North Korea in talks; they also went as far as threatening North Korea with economic sanction and air strikes if they did not comply. This was not a very good way to begin talks. The decision for the US to adopt this style¹⁴¹ made the negotiations harder, but this decision was made because it was believed that giving inducements to North Korea was unconscionable. It was also believed that bribing North Korea would set a dangerous precedent that would undermine further trends to curb nuclear proliferation. Hence, the US adopted a 'carrot and stick' tactic and in turn North Korea being aware of this tactic adopted a 'tit-for tat' tactic.¹⁴²¹⁴³ Nevertheless, both states were able to come to a semblance of an agreement resultant in the Agreed Framework.

However, after years of seemingly good progress in upholding the agreement, it was breached in 2002, with the announcement by North Korea that they were still pursuing

¹⁴⁰ Loc. cit.

¹⁴¹ The US seemed to adopt a controlling style even before negotiations, therefore not even having had the chance to develop inter-personal relations with North Korea. Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S. Op. Cit. pp. 24

¹⁴² Sigal, L. V. Op. Cit. pp. 6 -8

¹⁴³ For more on these tactics read Sigal, L. V. Op. Cit. pp. 6-8, 56, 77, 125-7 and 257-9

nuclear enrichment.¹⁴⁴ North Korea however claims that the dissolution of the agreement was breached before their admission, and that the US was at fault as they also did not uphold the agreement. Despite where the blame lay for the dissolution of the agreement, the fact remains that the Agreed Framework was no longer functional.¹⁴⁵

After the dissolution of this agreement the relations between North Korea and the US as well as in East Asia, was very tense. North Korea continued with its nuclear reprocessing and was very vocal about its activities, defending its right to be in possession of nuclear weapons especially with the view of the US being a threat. It also announced its withdrawal from the NPT on the 10th of January 2003 and on the 24th of February 2003 North Korea fired a test missile in the Sea of Japan and a second missile on the 10th of March. These actions represent how close to war these nations were, nevertheless North Korea and the US had met once during this anxious period. From the obvious willingness from both parties, no matter their wilfulness, they both saw the need for further talks and on the 27th of August to the 29th the Six-Party Talks convened.¹⁴⁶

4.2 The Negotiation

The 'Six-Party Talks' involve: North Korea, the US, China, South Korea, Russia and Japan. These parties all have a vested interest in the negotiations, each with their own objectives. It was no coincidence that these six states entered into negotiations, but rather because of the US's unwillingness to enter into bilateral talks with North Korea again. This is as a consequence of North Korea's breach of the Agreed Framework and declaring that they are still pursuing a nuclear program. The Six-Party Talks began on the 27th of August 2003, this would be the first round of the talks.¹⁴⁷ The Six-Party Talks was organised by China from the initial tri-lateral talks between itself, the US and North Korea it sponsored and from the US demand for wider talks.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-agreedframework.htm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁴⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2604437.stm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁴⁶ Loc. cit.

¹⁴⁷ Loc. cit.

¹⁴⁸ Diehl, S.J and Moltz, . J.C. Op. Cit. p. 30

4.2.1 Delegation

The main players in the Six-Party Talks are the US and North Korea, although the other four parties also have an invested interest in the success of these talks.¹⁴⁹ The states involved have all chosen their lead negotiator based on their expertise.

The US's lead negotiator was Christopher Hill, a career diplomat;¹⁵⁰ he took over from his predecessor James Kelly, both as lead negotiator and assistant US secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs in 2005.¹⁵¹ Hence, both negotiator's chosen by the US have knowledge of Asia Affairs depicted by their portfolio, although Hill's biography shows he has more experience in Europe than in Asia.¹⁵² This has not however seemed to affect the US delegation negatively. This is also supported by the recent announcement under the new Obama administration of Hill's reassignment to be Ambassador to Iraq. As such, as of writing this report word has not yet been heard of the new lead negotiator representing the US's envoy to the Six-Party Talks. Essentially the US as stated earlier is one of two main players in these talks. They began talks with North Korea along with the other four parties to block bilateral talks with North Korea, because of past relationship, already discussed in Section 4.1.1. The US's main interest is concerned with the denuclearisation of North Korea.¹⁵³ The US wants to achieve this objective because it is concerned with the possibility of North Korea possibly selling nuclear materials and technology to terrorist groups or hostile states.¹⁵⁴

The North Korean delegate at present is Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan.¹⁵⁵ He is the successor of the post from Kim Young-il.¹⁵⁶ Having this portfolio like his colleagues shows the area of expertise he is charged. While not as specific as Hill's portfolio - bound to region, it means that Kye-gwan has to avail himself to information in the international sphere

¹⁴⁹ GlobalSecurity.org, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Six-Party Talks, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>, April 11, 2008

¹⁵⁰ AFP, Former NKorea envoy Hill to be Iraq ambassador: US media, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gv0qkMnxynPOjuZy8L6gHtsfUaQ>, February 03,

¹⁵¹ Kelly, J. Pyongyang Talk the talk, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GF23Dg03.html>, June 23, 2005

¹⁵² AFP, Op. Cit.

¹⁵³ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁵⁴ Zissis, C. and Bajoria, J. The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/>, October 14, 2008

¹⁵⁵ ABC News, Reports: NKorea wants to send envoy to Washington, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=6625381>, January 12, 2009

¹⁵⁶ China-un.org, The Six-Party Talks Kicked Off, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/ch/t25488.htm>, August 27, 2003

in totality. As the North Korean lead delegate, he is in the second most precarious situation, Hill being first, because the negotiation outcome mainly affects his country. His attitude within negotiations seems conciliatory, meaning that North Korea is open to talks and not to hinder them.¹⁵⁷ With that said, North Korea to many critics, is not perceived as being willing to give up its nuclear program because of its worth to them. Hence, North Korea is not perceived as being conciliatory.

nuclear program because of its worth to them. The Nuclear program acts as a national security element as well as a symbol for the Kim Family Regime. However, they come to the Six-Party Talks to negotiate the possibility of ending its nuclear program, but it is in return for incentives, such as foreign aid and security commitments from the US.¹⁵⁸ North Korea is also interested in a non-aggression policy from the US and to complete two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) promised previously in the Agreed Framework (*see* Appendix 6: Agreed Framework). Previously they also wanted to be removed from the list of states that sponsored terrorism.¹⁵⁹ This was accomplished in October 2008.¹⁶⁰

The Chinese lead delegate is Wu Dawei, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, his predecessor being Wang Yi.¹⁶¹ China plays an integral role in the talks; it is the mediator and host of the negotiations.¹⁶² China has had long relations with North Korea and on account of this relationship they were able to encourage North Korea to enter into multi-lateral talks. China's interest in the success of this negotiation lies in its fears of refugees entering China, as China shares a border with North Korea (*see* Appendix 2: Map of Korean Peninsula). This fear also exists in the case of China using too harsh a strategy against North Korea. Hence, in general, wishes for the general welfare of North Korea, as it acts as a buffer zone between them, China and the US troops in South Korea.¹⁶³

With regards to Japan, the portfolio held by the lead negotiator is Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. Their current lead negotiator is Sasae Kenchiro from the fourth

¹⁵⁷ China-un.org, Fourth round of six-party talks begins in Beijing, <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t204936.htm>, July 26, 2005

¹⁵⁸ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁵⁹ Zissis, C. and Bajoria, J. *Op. Cit.*

¹⁶⁰ BBC News, North Korea talks reach stalemate, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/7774663.stm> December 10, 2008

¹⁶¹ Xinhuanet.com, Full text of joint document of the second session of the sixth round six-party talks, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/03/content_6829017.htm, October 03, 2007

¹⁶² Snyder, S. *Op.Cit.* p. 6

¹⁶³ Zissis, C. and Bajoria, J. *Op. Cit.*

round of negotiations to present; he took over from Yabunaka Mitoji.¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁵ Japan's interest in the Six-Party Talks is mainly to rectify the abductees issue, between itself and North Korea.¹⁶⁶

South Korea's lead delegate is Chun Yung-woo, holds the portfolio of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade like his predecessors Song Min-soon and Lee Soo-hyuk.¹⁶⁷ South Korea's main purpose in the talks is to act as a buffer between the US and North Korea.¹⁶⁸ It also has an interest in the successful outcome of the negotiation proceedings considering it shares a border with North Korea. South Korea's overall interest in the successful outcome of the talks however, is to ensure not having to choose between North Korea and the US. This stems from not wanting a nuclear North Korea or a use of force by the US to prevent a nuclear North Korea.¹⁶⁹ South Korea also does not wish to have to manage the inflow of refugees from North Korea which would cause an economic strain on them.¹⁷⁰

Russia also sharing a border (see Appendix 2: Map of Korean Peninsula) with North Korea also has an invested interest in the outcome aside from being a buffer for US-North Korean relations.¹⁷¹ Typically, because they are interested in keeping an influential presence in Asia, therefore by being a part of these talks they are kept abreast of issues that could impact the region politically. They are also concerned about refugees like China if the situation becomes non-negotiable.¹⁷² it is also able to build a stronger relationship during the negotiations with the other parties. The lead negotiator for Russia currently is Alexander Losyukov; he is the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁷³ His predecessors were Alexander Alexeyev also being host to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs portfolio; Sergei Razov, he was the Russian

¹⁶⁴ China-un.org, Third Round of the Six-Party Talks Opened, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/ch/t140619.htm>, June 25, 2004

¹⁶⁵ China-un.org, The Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks Opens, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/ch/t205156.htm>, July 26, 2005

¹⁶⁶ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁶⁷ Xinhuanet.com, Op. Cit.

¹⁶⁸ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁶⁹ Huntley, W. L. "Waiting to Exhale: The Six-Party Talks Agreement," in Foreign Policy In Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2903/>, October 25, 2003, pp. 3-4

¹⁷⁰ Zissis, C. and Bajoria, J. Op. Cit.

¹⁷¹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁷² Zissis, C. and Bajoria, J. Op. Cit.

¹⁷³ BBC News, At a Glance: The Key delegates,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/03/asia_pac_the_key_delegates/html/6.stm, Accessed on February 12, 2009

Ambassador to China;¹⁷⁴ and Vladimir Rakhmanin,¹⁷⁵ who also was a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The relationship of these players while not friendly, the states which they represented were not strangers to each other. The US for instance has always maintained a presence in Asia since the end of World War II and having good diplomatic relations with Japan. Recently, their relationship with China has also improved from what it was during the Cold War. Considering China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula are all located in Asia and in close proximity to each other they are also familiar with each other. Although the relationship maybe questionable especially between North Korea and Japan and China-Japan. Russia despite being often viewed as a European state is also an Asian state as part of the Russian landmass falls within the region. However, the reason to claim their familiarisation within Asia is that it has an interest in Asia.¹⁷⁶

The relationship between the parties during negotiations is at times distrustful, occasionally tense, but for the most part good. There has been cooperation among the parties, particularly US, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan.¹⁷⁷ China and the US have a good diplomatic relationship that has been advantageous to the talks. The reason being, because they have such a good relationship they are able to work well together and through working together they have been able to get results from North Korea. For instance, during the fifth round second phase (18-22 December 2006), the US and China worked closely together to encourage North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program.¹⁷⁸ This example shows the ways in which good relations among parties in negotiations can work towards a common goal, one that works towards the success of the negotiation process.

There have occurred situations that engendered distrust amongst the parties or in some cases a specific party. An example of this was concerning the abductions of Japanese citizens in

¹⁷⁴ Reuters, Russia changes lead negotiator in six-party talks, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/16/AR2006121601194_pf.html, December 16, 2006

¹⁷⁵ People's Daily Online, The Six-Party Talks likely to extend to Friday, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/6219714.html>, July 19, 2007, p.1

¹⁷⁶ Clinton, H.R. Japan: A corner stone of US Foreign Policy, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117465.htm>, February 17, 2009, Clinton, H.R. U.S.-Asia relations: Indispensible to our Future, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm>, February 13, 2009

¹⁷⁷ BBC NEWS, NKorea talks fail to ease tension, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3290287.stm>, August 29, 2003

¹⁷⁸ Cody, E. "Nuclear Talks With N.Korea End in Failure: Six-Party Process thrown into Doubt," in The Washington Post, A Section, December 23, 2006, p. A12

1970s and 80s.¹⁷⁹ North Korea in 2007 claims to have returned all the abductees they kidnapped to train as spies. Japan however remains distrustful of North Korea believing that they are still imprisoning more of their Japanese citizens.¹⁸⁰ This distrust between the two states is not new, considering the history between the two states.¹⁸¹ However, this situation while not causing a major hindrance in the negotiations still upsets the flow of the process. It was able to do this because Japan said it would not give aid to North Korea until this particular issue was fully accounted for by North Korea.¹⁸² North Korea will not fully comply with the agreement made in February 2007 to reveal the full extent of its nuclear programme until it receives full aid of which it has only received a part. Therefore, Japan withholding aid is surely part of the reason why North Korea has decided to take this stance.¹⁸³ Hence, this is in part how the relationship between states can affect the process. Nevertheless, if tension between North Korea and Japan arises during negotiations the delegates of North Korea understandably will be tense while negotiating other issues with the other states. Therefore, causing the negotiation to go less smoothly than it could have.

The US-North Korea early relationship was in part distrustful and other times tense. For example while discussing North Korea's nuclear programme, North Korea accused the US of undermining the dialogue. It also claimed that the US was still holding a hostile policy towards them despite talks.¹⁸⁴ These accusations, as will be discussed later, were a tactic being used by North Korea to achieve its objective: the freezing of nuclear activities in return for improved diplomatic relations and economic incentives. This resulted much later in the September 2005 agreement (*see* Appendix 9: September 2005 Agreement).¹⁸⁵

However, on account of accusations such as these and the belief in them the talks that started well ended in the opposite. Despite this, the overall first phase of round one, of the talks was seen as positive by parties. Therefore, while the initial relationships were impacting the talks

¹⁷⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3290287.stm>, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸⁰ French, H.W. North Korean Nuclear Talks to Set Disarmament Timetable, but Yield Agreement on Goals, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/20/world/asia/20korea.html>, July 20, 2007

¹⁸¹ Kim ball, D. and Crail, P. Nuclear Ballistic/Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Chronology of U.S.-North Korea Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, <http://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/82>, June 2008

¹⁸² French, H.W. *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸³ Cody, E. "Accord in North Korea Talks: Nations Approve Nuclear Inspections but Still Lack Timetable," in The Washington Post, A Section, July 13, 2008, p. A12

¹⁸⁴ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3290287.stm>, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸⁵ Snyder, S. *Op. Cit.* p. 20

negatively, the parties were still able to achieve some progress. Hence, while the relationship may have slowed the talks it was not enough to interrupt them.¹⁸⁶

In short, parties' relationship is important in the negotiations as they influence the general mood of the negotiations. In turn the mood can and will influence the flow of the negotiations, whether it moves forward quickly, slowly or comes to a standstill.

However, what truly impacts the process are the strategies used by the parties to achieve their agendas.¹⁸⁷ This will be discussed in further detail in the next section.

4.2.2 The Six-Party Talks

The Six-Party Talks is a negotiation characterised by perseverance and cooperation by parties of different political cultures, but brought together by a single overarching endeavour. Despite each party having their own agenda, they all have agreed to talks based on one single commonality - this commonality being the denuclearisation of North Korea.

The Six-Party Talks began in August 2003 and are still ongoing. This means that for the past four years the US, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia have met to find a lasting solution to North Korea's possession of nuclear power. The talks are split into rounds and the rounds into phases.¹⁸⁸ This has basically allowed for the process to stretch to a four year negotiation. However, it may perhaps be a contributing factor to the talks not having been dissolved as yet and also producing two agreements. Having breaks between negotiations allows for the parties to clear their heads and eases tension that may have built up during discussions. Hiltrop and Udall referred to this as an 'adjournment,' which they explain as "probably more useful than any other technique as a means of handling high emotion"¹⁸⁹ However, when explaining the manner in which it should be used, they are speaking about breaks within a session, as opposed to breaks between days of talks. Nevertheless, the view being taken in this paper that Hiltrop's and Udall's view of having

¹⁸⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3290287.stm>, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁸⁷ BBC NEWS, *No progress at North Korea talks*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/6478299>, March 22, 2007

¹⁸⁸ Kwak, T. *Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue Through the Six-Party Process: A Creative Formula*, Paper prepared for presentation at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, March 22-5, 2006, pp. 3-4

¹⁸⁹ Hiltrop, J. and Udall, S. *Op. Cit.* p. 45

adjournments is also applicable in negotiations such as the Six-Party Talks.¹⁹⁰ It also allows the parties to be able to give feedback with their head of states. In between the rounds and phases the varying parties may also hold bilateral talks, simply to confer information or make deals that will be beneficial to their outcomes.¹⁹¹ An instance where the adjournment of the proceeding was useful, was before the convenement of the fourth round of talks. Kim Kye-gwan met with Chris Hill prior to Condoleeza Rice's visit to Asia in July 2005. This meeting signalled a change in US strategy and just months later the Six-Party Talks had its first agreement.¹⁹²

The division of the negotiations in this manner, it could be argued, allowed for the perseverance and cooperation noted throughout the process. Despite setbacks during the negotiations the negotiators always seemed hopeful and expectant of further talks no matter the reason for talks ending. For example, in March 2007 (round six, phase one) he told reporters that "[i]t is [their] strong view that [they] are still on schedule" referring to the flow of the talks. This statement was made regarding the same talks as this statement "[t]he day I'm able to explain to you North Korean thinking is probably the day I've been in this process too long."¹⁹³ Also, in July 2007 (round six, resumption of phase one) Christopher Hill stated that "[he is] of the view that with a little luck we can wrap this all up by the end of the year, but it [i]s obviously going to be difficult," this was after not being able to make North Korea commit to a nuclear disarmament schedule.¹⁹⁴

In both examples above, tensions were rising. This was as a result of a tactic implemented by the US that was not well received by the North Korean delegates. The tactic used, admittedly by the US, was to freeze the North Korea bank account with the Macau bank. This was done with the hopes that it would pressure North Korea into dismantling their nuclear facilities. However, it had the opposite effect North Korea refused to discuss the very idea of dismantling its facilities until it was able to have access to its 25 million dollars in the Macau bank.¹⁹⁵ As can be expected the talks stalled,¹⁹⁶ however it could have been worse without the

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 39-40

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 40

¹⁹² Snyder, S. *Op. Cit.* p. 10

¹⁹³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/6478299>, March 22, 2007 *Op. Cit.*

¹⁹⁴ Cody, E. "N.Korea Talks Fizzle With No Disarmament Timetable," in *The Washington Post*, A Section, July 21, 2006, p. A08

¹⁹⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/6478299>, March 22, 2007 *Op. Cit.*

¹⁹⁶ *Loc. cit.*

adjournment, the situation could have escalated or rather the talks would have become redundant. Instead, the adjournment allowed the parties to think of their positions and their goals; this eventually led to the resumption of talks in July 2007.¹⁹⁷

Key to the Six-Party Talks has been the strategy employed by the parties, of course many a time it has really been the US (backed by other parties) versus North Korea. Notably about these talks is the implementation of three styles of negotiation, namely the *collaborating*, *compromising* and *controlling* styles (the three Cs).¹⁹⁸ The style most dominant within the Six-Party Talks by all the parties, excluding North Korea was the first C, *collaborating*. This style as was stated earlier in that paper was a cooperative approach, whereby the parties were interested in maintain interpersonal relationships and personal goals (*see* 4.1.1.1 Negotiation Styles).¹⁹⁹ This style is evident with the way in which the US and China worked together to encourage North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program during the December 2006 talks (round 5, phase 2).²⁰⁰ At this point it was evident to these two nations that have a vested interest in the positive outcome of the talks, which includes North Korea dismantling its nuclear program. This is one reason to use the collaborator style in negotiations – when compromise is not an option and commitment is needed for the solution to work.²⁰¹

Despite the collaboration evident between the parties (excluding North Korea) to ensure North Korea's acquiescence, there has been a distinctive *compromising* style evident in the negotiations. This style refers losing a little to win some, it respects both personal goals and interpersonal relationships (*see* 4.1.1.1 Negotiation Styles).²⁰² This can be noted in the December 2006 talks, after signing the first document of the talks in 2005, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon despite China's request not to do so. Neither the US or China had any recourse to pursue, they tried compromising by offering financial aid,²⁰³ but they were rebuffed by North Korea, who refused to talk about their nuclear program anymore.²⁰⁴ At first the US was adamant that it would in no way compromise but later they had no other option.

¹⁹⁷ <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6907709.stm>, Op. Cit.

¹⁹⁸ Hiltrop, J and Udal, S. Op. Cit. p. 24

¹⁹⁹ Loc. cit.

²⁰⁰ Cody, E. Op.Cit. p. A12

²⁰¹ Hiltrop, J and Udal, S. Op. Cit. p. 29

²⁰² Hiltrop, J and Udal, S. Op. Cit. p. 24

²⁰³ Elegant, S. Why the Six-Party North Korea Talks Failed.

<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1572764,00.html>, December 23, 2006

²⁰⁴ Cody, E. Op. Cit. p. A12

They compromised by unfreezing the sum of money from the Macau bank in order for talks to resume, as already stated this was in July 2007.²⁰⁵

The US was also pressured to compromise on the issue of North Korea being allowed to build LWRs. North Korea's position in the talks is that it has the right to peacefully use nuclear energy, while the US position, in direct contrast, is that North Korea should have access to no nuclear energy. The US position also includes the use of nuclear energy for civilian use. South Korea on the other hand, considering it adopts a softer approach than the US, while initially opposing the idea of the LWRs, gave North Korea their support, but it was conditional. They would North Korea's interest in pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, if it joined the NPT and allowed IAEA inspections, but it would not supply two million kilowatts of power to them, since they would be assisting them in constructing two LWRs. During the second phase of the fourth round the US's style began to soften until they no longer objected to the idea of North Korea owning LWRs, they were persuaded by the other parties. This compromise was a major step forward for the talks and China was partly responsible as it drafted the compromise proposal. This was made part of the 2005 Agreement, but tabled to be discussed further (*see* Appendix 9: September 2005 Agreement).²⁰⁶

The compromising style is basically about making concessions and generally speaking the party that made the most concessions would have to be the US. The party that made the least concession would then be North Korea. The US has the highest rank mainly because it has the hardest negotiating style to North Korea, therefore had to make compromises so that the negotiation can move forward. As for North Korea, they are negotiating from a position of strength, as it is the other parties that want it to denuclearise desperately, it simply wants incentives to do this.

This compromise scenario also highlights another reason why the US decided to compromise in the end. Earlier in this paper it was pointed out the importance of taking into account the environment surrounding a negotiation. In fact, the causal diagram being used in this research illustrates how the environment impacts both the strategy employed in the negotiation, but also negotiated outcome (*see* Section 1.2). At the time of this talk the US was experiencing

²⁰⁵ Cody, E. *Op. Cit.* p. A08

²⁰⁶ Kwak, T. *Op. Cit.* pp.2-6

two pressing problems. Firstly, the war in Iraq, the administration was losing considerable support at home. Secondly, because of the slow response Hurricane Katrina by the administration, the president's approval rating was low. Therefore, reaching a modicum of success in these talks would be more than acceptable to the US.²⁰⁷ Hence, the political and social environment in which the US was conducting the talks therefore affected the US's strategy, from being controlling to compromise and then the outcome, by contributing to the September agreement.

From discussing the *compromising* style above, it exposed the use of the *controlling* style by both the US and North Korea. The *controlling* style is a power approach used to achieve one's goal no matter interpersonal relationship, because of the belief that one is in the right (4.1.1.1 Negotiation Styles).²⁰⁸ An example of the implementation of this style is when the US froze the North Korean account, while the North Korean used it by refusing to negotiate on the same issue, at all.²⁰⁹ Using this style is not necessarily always successful, as already shown by the freezing of North Korea's account; in fact it was one reason that talks were stalled.²¹⁰ However, it also fails when being used in a multi-lateral dialogue like the Six-Party Talks, because the party employing the style can be opposed and pressured by the other parties. Example of this is again the case of the LWRs, the US was in strong opposition of North Korean being in possession of them. However, they were persuaded to give in to a softer approach by the other parties.²¹¹

While explaining the different style used during the negotiation above, the varying tactics used were mentioned in passing. For instance, cooperation, by working with the other parties involved in the group, like China, the US is able at times to get better results from North Korea.²¹² This tactic is best used with the collaborating style. Another tactic used was 'putting on pressure' this allows for movement within the negotiations this is best used by the controlling style. For example, the Macau bank issue, by freezing the accounts the US was putting pressure on North Korea.²¹³

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p. 6

²⁰⁸ Hiltrop, J and Udal, S. *Op. Cit.* p. 24

²⁰⁹ Cody, E. *Op. Cit.* p. A12

²¹⁰ Zissis, C., and Bajoria, J. *Op. Cit.*

²¹¹ Kwak, T. *Op. Cit.* pp. 3, 6

²¹² Cody, E. *Op. Cit.*

²¹³ Kwak, T. *Op. Cit.* p. 8

Further impacting the strategy of the parties and in turn the negotiated outcome are the parties' culture. While, not mentioned much in discussing the Six-Party Talks, it exists in the very way in which each party negotiates. Therefore, the way in which the US parties' at times are at a loss of North Korea's behaviour and strategy is a misunderstanding of North Korea's negotiating culture. This has been evident in much of the US's statements on North Korea, for example: 'The day I'm able to explain to you North Korean thinking is probably the day I've been in this process too long,'²¹⁴ or "North Koreans are crazy."²¹⁵ This has not had much of an effect on the talks, because of the negotiation being multi-party and if one party makes a mis-step the others are able to rectify the problem.

The achievement of two agreements from the talks so far, is proof that the NK talks are moving towards success. The strategy has been affected by culture and the environment, but in turn resulted in a negotiated outcome, in those two cases. Both intervening variables are able to either positively or negatively affect the strategy and outcome, their by letting the negotiation process move slowly or steadily. The strategy employed has also been effective in allowing for measured success, by employing the 3Cs approach key to the process.²¹⁶

However, the success garnered so far is also because of the structure of the talks, moving away from the previous bi-lateral talk. Therefore the present talks differ in three ways:

1. A multi-party talk, this allowed for more transparency, verifiability and collective responsibility to the process.
2. China is host and mediator to the process.
3. The other parties, aside from the US and North Korea, act as 'witnesses' and 'jurists' this allows for the movement of the process.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/6478299>, March 22, 2007 Op. Cit.

²¹⁵ Snyder, S. Op. Cit. p. ix


²¹⁶ 3Cs used here to refer to the *collaborating*, *compromising* and *controlling* style.

²¹⁷ Snyder, S. Op. Cit. pp. 6-7

4.3 The Model

From the discussion in Chapter I and II, the model that the Six-Party Talks gives rise to is illustrated below.

Figure 3: Model for multi-party nuclear talks



CHAPTER FOUR

"In today's world there is no such a thing as 'winning and losing' but rather 'winning and learning' only" -Unknown

5. Iran: Some thoughts on a minor case study

5.1 Background of prospective Iranian talks

Iran is located in the Middle East, sharing borders with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Armenia and Azerbaijan (see Appendix 11: Map of Iran). Iran has a very rich, ancient and colourful history, but not one without conflict. The current conflict surrounds the issue of Iran's insistence on nuclear enrichment and Iran's political manoeuvring of becoming the Middle Eastern hegemon. The idea of Iran being in possession of nuclear weapons has already led to the threat of military action. This is despite talk of pursuing a path of diplomacy on both sides.²¹⁸

Iran's situation is similar to North Korea's in some ways but in others they are quite different. Iran began the acquisition of nuclear materials for their nuclear enrichment program after North Korea.,²¹⁹ It was discovered in November 2003 that they had been concealing its nuclear activities for eighteen years.²²⁰ This discovery along with other recalcitrant activities has resulted in tension between the US and Iran, much like North Korea. However, the possibility of future negotiation with Iran is more complex than North Korea because, at least with North Korea there exists a willingness to negotiate. From the past negotiations and offers made to Iran it would appear that Iran is stalling on purpose, as it has used the time to push its enrichment forward.²²¹

²¹⁸ Landau, E.B., Now is the time to talk, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1001243.html>, July 12, 2008

²¹⁹ BBC News, Timeline: US-Iran ties, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.htm, January 16, 2009

²²⁰ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm>, Op. Cit.

²²¹ Landau, E.B. Op. Cit.

Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the US are the six nations interested in halting Iran's nuclear activities.²²² Previously Iran was only engaged in negotiations with Britain, France and Germany, this has been the case since 2003. The US policy towards Iran at the time was consultative, interested in the outcome but not willing to engage Iran directly.²²³ However, this stance changed when the Bush administration allowed a diplomat to join talks. The Iranian position on the talks has been that it has the right to enrich uranium and that the right also includes being able to build commercial-use reactors.²²⁴ This has been a hard argument for the parties to negotiate around. There has been little progress with the negotiations with Iran. Iran has not reacted in the way the parties would have liked, neither to the 'carrots' being offered nor to the threat of a 'stick'.²²⁵ Added to this Iran continues to maintain that it will never give up nuclear technology.²²⁶

The 'stick' has mainly been used by the US, such as refusing to negotiate with Iran until it has suspended its nuclear program.²²⁷ However, in the same year, a number of 'carrots' were offered to Iran in the hopes of enticing them to the negotiating table. The incentives were:²²⁸

- i. 'Improving the six countries' and EU's relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.'
- ii. 'Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.'
- iii. 'Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.'
- iv. 'Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilisation issues.'
- v. 'Work with Iran and others in the region to support confidence-building measure and regional security.'
- vi. 'Support for a conference on regional security issues.'
- vii. "The nations would 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.'"

²²² Washingtonpost.com, Sweetening the Pot for Tehran, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/16/AR2008071602512.html?sid=ST2008071602550&s_pos=list, July 17, 2008, p. A16

²²³ Beehner, L. Iran Nuclear Negotiations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7730/iran.html>, March 16, 2005

²²⁴ Loc. cit.

²²⁵ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/16/AR...>, Op. Cit.

²²⁶ http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.htm. Op. Cit.

²²⁷ Keyes, C. US negotiating with tough stance on Iran negotiations,

<http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/18/rice/index.html>, July 2008; Beehner, L. Op. Cit.

²²⁸ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/16/AR...>, Op. Cit.

These incentives are supported by all the parties and are by far more than what was offered previously in June 2006 and August 2005.²²⁹

Bringing Iran to the table will not be easy, it differs to North Korea in this way. While North Korea seems willing to shut down its enrichment activities in return for benefits,²³⁰ this is not so with Iran. Many a times, Iran has also declared that it will not give up nuclear technology, of course adding that it is only interested in using it for peaceful purposes.²³¹ The fact that the UN and the US still remain agitated and is still opposed to Iran's possession of nuclear weapons.²³² Relations with Iran needless to say are not ideal for a negotiation neither were they for North Korea. However, the North Korean talks are proof that Iran too can reach a negotiated settlement. They have to overcome the same issues like North Korea, state sponsored terrorism and nuclear proliferation.²³³ The questions then become are they ripe for resolution.²³⁴

5.2 Discussing the plausibility of applying the model to another case: Iran

After studying the North Korean case, possibility of Iran achieving a similar success or even going so far as to achieve a successful outcome as is likely for the Six-Party Talks does not seem an impossibility. The reason for making such a bold statement is that Iran finds itself in a similar situation like North Korea. Iran like North Korea is seen as part of the 'axis of evil,' and referred to as rogue states.²³⁵ The major similarity between the two states however is their nuclear activities. Iran and North Korea alike have secretly been researching and building up their nuclear power, and both were discovered by the public and forced to admit to their activities.²³⁶ In the case of North Korea it led to their withdrawal from the NPT,²³⁷

²²⁹ Loc. cit.

²³⁰ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2604437.stm>, Op. Cit.

²³¹ http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.htm, Op. Cit.

²³² [Author Unknown], "Continuing Efforts to Address Iran's Nuclear Program Appear to Yield Little Progress," in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 101, No. 01, January 2007, p. 221

²³³ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm>, Op. Cit.; Sanctions have been imposed on Iran because of these issues.

²³⁴ Aggestam, K. Op. Cit. p. 272-3

²³⁵ Wright, R. Op. Cit. p.34

²³⁶ http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.htm, Op. Cit.

²³⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2604437.stm>, Op. Cit.

Iran has threatened to do so.²³⁸ Nevertheless, despite North Korea's withdrawal, they were able to attend talks to resolve their nuclear program.

With that said, if a state like North Korea with the type of history and relationship it has with most of the parties to the negotiations, can sit and talk, then there is no reason why the same cannot occur for Iran. However, for talks with Iran to occur seriously, it needs to follow the model designed above (*see* Figure 3: Model for multi-party nuclear talks).

Prior to the Six-Party Talks, the US negotiated with North Korea but the agreement dissolved. The Six-Party Talks unlike the previous talk were not initiated by pressure from UN but by North Korea themselves. What this means is that North Korea was in a situation (MHS) which made them be the ones to initiate the idea of talks.²³⁹ The full situation was discussed earlier in Section 5.1.1. What is being put forward here is that the parties were on equal footing in wanting the outcome they are negotiating towards, the dismantling of North Korea nuclear program. This opportunity allowed for the negotiations to begin – the ripe moment.²⁴⁰

For the Iranian talks to occur such that it can move forward there has to exist a ripe moment and this has to be taken advantage of quickly. Currently based on the situation (activities in their region) this will not happen today, but may be close considering the US has a change in administration, that will be received by Iran better than precious administration.

If and when the ripe moment occurs and is taken advantage of, it is not a guarantee for success. The other steps in the model need to be followed. The negotiation should be a multi-party negotiation because this ensures that the protagonist will be more bound by the agreement, this is what the US learnt from the bilateral talks held with North Korea.²⁴¹ Also, akin to the Six-Party Talks, during negotiations the US will be able to depend on the cooperation with other states when negotiating with Iran.²⁴² The prospective parties should

²³⁸ http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.htm, Op. Cit.

²³⁹ Snyder, S. Op. Cit. p. 18

²⁴⁰ Aggestam, K. Op. Cit. pp.272-3

²⁴¹ Snyder, S. Op. Cit. p. 2, 6

²⁴² Cody, E. Op.Cit. p. A12

be: the US, Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and Iran. The reason being, that these parties have already built a relationship with Tehran concerning their nuclear activities.²⁴³

Following this step is the parties understanding the context in which they are negotiating, the culture of the countries negotiating with, the environment negotiating in; this should not be a problem for these talks as the states have already familiarised themselves with each other.²⁴⁴ This then leads to the implementation of the strategy (the three Cs and tactics). Using a combination of styles is best it always for more tactics to be used for the varying situations. The three Cs are best for situation like the nuclear negotiations because they allow for the goal to be in reach and do not undermine it like the other styles (see 4.1.1.1 Negotiation Styles).²⁴⁵

Throughout the negotiation process which will most likely be years (like the Six-Party Talks) adjournments should take place, to allow for tensions that arose during negotiation to be relieved. It will also allow for deals to be thought over and strategies rethought. Adjournments will allow for the parties to persevere and the talks continue despite setbacks.²⁴⁶ During the period of negotiation deadlocks may occur, adjournments will be of great help, but it can be overcome by perseverance and the implementation of a compromising style.²⁴⁷ Therefore, by following the model Iranian talks should have some measure of success like the Six-Party Talks.

²⁴³ [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/16/AR2008071602512.html?sid=ST2008071602550&s_pos=list)

[dyn/content/article/2008/07/16/AR2008071602512.html?sid=ST2008071602550&s_pos=list](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/16/AR2008071602512.html?sid=ST2008071602550&s_pos=list), Op. Cit.

²⁴⁴ Loc. cit.

²⁴⁵ Hiltrop, J and Udal, S. Op. Cit. p. 24

²⁴⁶ Ibid. pp. 39-40, 45

²⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 24, 39-40, 45

CONCLUSION

"Success is not permanent. The same is also true of failure." –Dell Crossword

6. Conclusion

Negotiation is second nature to human beings, however when investigating international negotiations, the negotiations done at this level is more technical. Therefore, international negotiations demand more of its negotiators than habits. It needs understanding, careful examination of the situation and familiarisation of the issue, parties and strategies. Hence, for this reason negotiations is more than the simple definition of it being the "official, state-to-state exchanges and tend to focus on the role of important, individual players – presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, ambassadors and generals"²⁴⁸ - to resolve conflict of any sort between the parties. Rather, in international negotiation the recognising the importance of state-to-state exchanges, as they are the parties involved in international negotiations, then it is:

"[a] process of interaction between parties directed at reaching some form of agreement that will hold and which is based upon common interests, with the purpose of resolving conflict, despite widely differences."²⁴⁹

Nuclear power is a very important political agenda presently on the global platform, discussing its prospects as the best form of non-renewable energy, but what makes it a concern is the possible misuse of nuclear power. Some states already find themselves already nuclear powers, but others are looking to pursue nuclear enrichment. This was made even more worrying because of the fact that they initially kept their nuclear activities hidden from their fellow states. States that fell into this bracket were Iran and North Korea, the two case studies used in this paper. Due to their interest in nuclear power and in the past concealing the fact that they had a nuclear enrichment program, they are not much trusted by the US and the larger international community.²⁵⁰ On account of their nuclear activities they both were urged to be a part of the non-proliferation treaty, of which Iran still remains a member but North Korea left in 2003. The views on nuclear power have made negotiations a key way to manage

²⁴⁸ Starkey, B., Boyer, M.A. and Wilkenfield, J.: Op. Cit. p. 4

²⁴⁹ Spoelstra, M. and Pienaar, W. Op.Cit. p. 3

²⁵⁰ Wit, J.S., Poneman, D.B. and Gallucci, R.L. Op. Cit. pp. 1-3; Goldstein, J.S. Op. Cit. p. 251;
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.htm, Op. Cit.

what they consider as possible greater problem in the future. Having a difference of opinion amongst states possess a power such nuclear weapons is not one where force can be used without thought, it need to be handled diplomatically – with care. For this reason negotiating it is a better option to warfare.

International negotiations are a long and sometimes arduous process with the issues on the table not being easily solved. This is in part because of the many things that affect the process. There is the human effect and should not be ignored, because despite while each party is representing a state they still emote human emotions and are prone to anger. They are also the mechanism for carrying out the negotiations. It is for this reason why the use of adjournments is so important during the process, it is also why the delegates chosen for the negotiations are who they are – individuals familiar with the region concerned and states with which interact. The delegates are of a foreign affairs background and are not simply any public officials or the lay man on the street.

The basic six step approach addressed in Chapter three (*see* Negotiation strategy) is a sort of blue print for negotiating. It allows for the negotiator to be structured in their preparation for negotiating and their expectations. Of the six steps the selection and implementation of a negotiating strategy however is very vital. Each party to the negotiation needs to select a style of negotiating as well as a tactic. A strategy is needed if the party wishes to make any head way in achieving their desired goal, agenda or outcome. For this reason it is important to think carefully of the strategy that will be used in the negotiation before the negotiation process. Of course, this it should be kept in mind that the strategy designed pre-negotiations may have to be adjusted during negotiation, in answer to the other parties' negotiation strategy. An example of this is the US freezing North Korea's assets, this was done to put pressure on North Korea, but North Korea did not respond in the way they predicted from this tactic. Instead North Korea's tactic of stalling won out and on account of this the US strategy had to be altered for the process to move forward.²⁵¹

Within the Six-Party Talks of Hitrop's and Udall's five styles the three Cs were used: *collaborating*, *compromising* and *controlling*.²⁵² They proved useful within the process. They allowed for the parties to implement tactics that while not always welcomed by each other

²⁵¹ Cody, E. *Op. Cit.* p. A12

²⁵² Hiltrop, J and Udal, S. *Op. Cit.* p. 24

created movement within talks. The compromising style is especially important because it assists in overcoming deadlocks.

The case study done on the Six-Party Talks was very helpful it allowed for the creation of a model which seems acceptable for Iran talks as well. If a ripe moment is taken advantage of by Iran and the other parties (US, Britain, Russia, China, France and Germany) the prospects for the talks will already rise. Following the model from thereon, strategies, adjournments, perseverance and compromise will ensure the continuity of the talks, because it ensures that the parties do not lose hope. After all, if all the parties have the same general goal, whether the suspension of uranium enrichment or the dismantlement Iran's nuclear power, it is important that the ripe moment is reached prior.

Overall, what makes for successful negotiations is not conclusive because success is not easily measured. However, what allows for states to achieve some measure of success is a number of things all of which are depicted by the model in Figure 3: Model for multi-party nuclear talks. The North Korean Six-Party Talks while not complete has produced two agreements and is definitely moving towards success and the reason for this has been the parties perseverance, despite the many setbacks over the years because they have kept the goal in mind they continue to work towards their goal – the ultimate success. The entire talks has been important and cannot and should not be looked at in isolation as the successes achieved presently are as a result of work done over the years in the previous talks. The parties have certainly laboured over the negotiations and it is because of the length of the negotiations that cultural differences hardly mattered. The parties have been able to learn about each other although that still that strategy does not sometimes leave the other parties bewildered.

7. Appendices

Appendix 1: Map of Asia



Map of Asia, given a clear topographic view of East Asia. CIA, [Map of Asia](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/asia.html), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/asia.html, January 22, 2009

Appendix 2: Map of Korean Peninsula




An edited map of the Korean Peninsula. CIA, North Korea, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>; CIA, South Korea, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>, January 22, 2009

Appendix 3: Maps of North and South Korea separately



The Map to the left depicts North Korea and the states it borders, while the Map on the right depicts South Korea and the bordering and neighbouring state. CIA.gov, North Korea, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>, January 22, 2009; CIA.gov, South Korea, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>, January 22, 2009

Appendix 4: Nuclear Facilities in North Korea



Representation locations were North Korea is reported to have nuclear facilities. Global Security.org, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Nuclear Facilities, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/other_nuke.htm, October 03, 2006

Appendix 5: North Korea nuclear site



Satellite image of nuclear site in North Korea. Mail Online, [Bush hails North Korea nuclear deal](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-485570/Bush-hails-North-Korea-nuclear-deal.html), <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-485570/Bush-hails-North-Korea-nuclear-deal.html>, 04 October 2007

**AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

- 1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.
 - The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
 - The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
 - As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- 2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.
 - Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
 - Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.
- 3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

- The freeze on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.
 - Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
 - The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.
- 4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.
- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
 - At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

- 1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
- 2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other’s capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.
- 3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear free Korean peninsula.

- 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
- 2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- 3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non proliferation regime.

- 1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.
- 2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK’s safeguards agreement with the

IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

- 3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Robert L. Gallucci
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America,
Ambassador at Large of the
United States of America

Kang Sok Ju
Head of the Delegation of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea

Appendix 7: Six-Party Talks



Top negotiators at Six-Party Talks. From left to right: Alexander Losyukov (Russian negotiator), Chun Yung-woo (South Korean negotiator), Kim Kye Gwan (North Korean negotiator), Wu Dawei (Chinese negotiator), Christopher Hill (American negotiator), Sasae Kenichiro (Japanese negotiator). Xinhua, Joint document of six-party nuke talks released, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/03/content_6824867.htm, September 30, 2007

Appendix 8: Six-Party Talks table layout



Six-Party Talks in progress. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia, First day "important beginning" of six-party talks, FM, <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t67987.htm>, February 26, 2004

Appendix 9: September 2005 Agreement

Joint Statement

Sean McCormack, Spokesman

New York City, NY

September 19, 2005

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005

Following is a text of the joint statement at the conclusion of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, as released in Beijing on September 19, 2005 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing 19 September 2005

The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alexandr Alekseyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this context, to the following:

1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.

The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.

The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.

The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.

China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK.

The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".
6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

2005/T13-28

Released on September 19, 2005

Source: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm>, September 19, 2005

Appendix 10: Denuclearisation Agreement

Media Note

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC

February 13, 2007

North Korea - Denuclearization Action Plan

Statement by President Bush on Six Party Talks

The following action plan was released in Beijing on February 13, 2007 following the conclusion of the latest round of Six-Party Talks.

Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement

13 February 2007

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for action".

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.
2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.
3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.
5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase - which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

2007/099

Source: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, North Korea - Denuclearization Action Plan, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>, February 2007

Appendix 11: Map of Iran



Map of Iran. CIA, [Iran](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>, January 22, 2009

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