Overpromising and underdelivering: Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation and uneven development

By

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Abstract

Uneven development has characterised Zimbabwe's political economy landscape since the initial days of conquest to the present. Foreign-owned corporations and non-indigenous citizens have commanded the economy from the colonial era to the present, leaving the indigenous majority outside the mainstream economy. Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme is a strategic policy choice responding directly to this widespread unevenness. The purpose of this explanatory study was to examine the structural and contextual factors accounting for extractive industry indigenisation underdelivering upon implementation. Findings show that extractive industry indigenisation's implementation processes, mainly through Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs), are producing largely disempowering outcomes for communities involved. These include the failure to address the uneven development problem in the mining sector, which is fuelling the persistence of uneven development. Findings further show that although the extractive industry indigenisation, may, in some instances, result in the restructuring of non-indigenous private mining capital, this is not correspondingly 'empowering' the disadvantaged indigenous citizens and their communities. Findings of this show that the following factors explain why extractive industry indigenisation perpetuated and maintained uneven development (i.e. in terms of scale, geography, income and wealth): (a) widespread cases of fronting; (b) except the Gwanda CSOT, all CSOTs did not get shares in the foreign mining companies, only seed capital/pledges/donations that are to this day yet to be paid in full; (c) widespread incapacitation (i.e. in terms of financial, human and managerial skills) and corruption in the CSOTs; (d) the security sector companies that got 50% equity in diamond companies operating Chiadzwa are not spreading the wealth around; and (e) the Finance Act of 2018 (No. 13 of 2018) made it optional for the qualifying companies to continue funding (as well as honouring the pledged amounts in full) the CSOTs. The combination of these factors results in further impoverishment of the disadvantaged indigenous people and their communities.

Keywords: uneven development, indigenisation, indigeneity, extractive industry, Zimbabwe, community share ownership trusts, extractive industry indigenisation, and mining capitalism.

DECLARATION

I, Kennedy Manduna, hereby declare that this thesis is my unaided work except where due recognition has been given. The thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in the Republic of South Africa. It has not been submitted in part or full for any other degree or to any other university.

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DEDICATION

To all those who believe in addressing uneven development configurations and empowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens and communities.

To my parents, the utmost influence of my intellectual pursuit and the real source of my inspiration, this thesis is also for you.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	Anglo-American Corporation
AAG	Affirmative Action Group
ABF	Army Benefit Fund
ACF	African Central Federation
AEE	Afrikaners Economic Empowerment
ANC	African National Congress
APAs	African Purchase Areas
BB-BEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Programme
BCSOT	Bindura Community Share Ownership Trust
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Technical Team
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CJT	Compensatory Justice Theory
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CNRG	Centre for Resource Natural Governance
CODESA	Convention for Democratic South Africa
CSOTs	Community Share Ownership Trusts
CZI	Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DA	Democratic Alliance
DDDI	Deceptive, Disenfranchising and Disempowering Indigenisation
DEEC	District Economic Empowerment Conferences
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
ESOTs	Employee Share Ownership Trusts
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
HDI	Human Development Index
IBDC	Indigenous Business Development Centre
IBWO	Indigenous Business Women Organisation
ICA	Industrial Coordination Act
ICFU	Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IEE Act	Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act
IEEU	Indigenous and Economic Empowerment Unit
IFFs	Illicit Financial Flows
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMIEEGM	Integrated Extractive Industry Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Governance Model
IPO	Initial Public Offer Model
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
LOMA	Law and Order Maintenance Act
MDA-A	Movement for Democratic Change Alliance

MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai
MNCZ CSOT	Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba Community Share Ownership Trust
MSOTs	Management Share Ownership Trusts
M-Z CSOT	Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust
NDP	National Democratic Party
NDP	National Development Policy
NEDLAC	South African National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEP	New Economic Policy
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIEEB	the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board
NIEEF	National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund
NIT	National Investment Trust
NP	National Party
NPM	New Public Management
NRDB	National Reconstruction and Development Board
PCEEO	President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
PEPs	Politically Exposed Persons
PF ZAPU	Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union
PPC	Pretoria Portland Cement
RBN	Royal the Bafokeng Nation
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Policies
SDNs	Specially Designated Nationals
SEID	Department for State Enterprises and Indigenisation
SRANC	Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
SRCB	Southern Rhodesia Currency Board
SWF	Sovereign Wealth Fund
TCPL	Total Consumption Poverty Line
TSIPP	Technical Support for the Indigenisation Policy Program
TTLS	Tribal Trust Lands
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	United Federal Party
UIPG	United Indigenous Pressure Group
UMNO	United Malay National Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
VTCs	Vocational Training Centres
ZMDC	Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
ZCDC	Zimbabwe Consolidated Mining Company

ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZDI	Zimbabwe Defence Industries
ZEDC	Zimbabwe Economic Development Council
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZMDC	Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation
ZMDC	Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporations
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZNCC	Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii
DECLARATION iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
DEDICATION vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vii
List of figures xv
PART I 1
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 1
CHAPTER 1 2
THESIS INTRODUCTION 2
1.0. Introduction 2
1.1 A brief history of indigenisation in Zimbabwe 5
1.2 Research problem 10
1.3 Knowledge gap and justification of the study 17
1.4 Research questions and proposition 19
1.5 Research purpose and objectives 20
1.6 Approach to the inquiry 21
1.7 Organisation of the Study 23
CHAPTER 2 28
THE COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL CONTEXT OF INDIGENISATION 28
2.0 Introduction 28
2.1 The colonial uneven and combined development configurations 29
2.1.1 Colonial accumulation by dispossession and the company rule (1890-1923) 29
2.1.2 Economic boom, depression and recovery: Responsible government rule (1923-1953) 35
2.1.3 The Central African Federation and the rising and falling of the imperial economy (1953-1963) 40
2.1.4 UDI and the amplification of imperial primitive accumulation (1965-1979) 43
2.1.5 Imperial mining development and uneven development 46
2.2 Origins and evolution of indigenisation in postcolonial Zimbabwe 48
2.2.1 Emergence and influence of indigenous organisations 49
2.2.2 The institutional and legislative foundations to indigenisation 55
2.3 Key drivers, debates, methods and outcomes of early mining indigenisation experiments 61

PART 2: 65
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND METHODOLOGY 65
CHAPTER 3 66
LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK 66
1.1 Introduction 66
3.1 Three framings of indigeneity: Aboriginality, race, citizenship 67
3.2 Debates around the conceptions and meanings of indigenisation 78
3.3 Competing explanations around the rationales and drivers of indigenisation 84
3.4 Theoretical framework: Accumulation by dispossession 88
3.5 Political (un)settlement: Key themes, debates and drivers 92
3.6 Conclusion 94
CHAPTER 4 95
SELECTED INDIGENISATION COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 95
4.0 Introduction 95
4.2 The Malaysian Bumiputera economic empowerment: Drivers and outcomes 96
4.2.1 The key features of the NEP 99
4.3 The Afrikaners economic empowerment 100
4.5. Broad-based black economic empowerment programme in South Africa 106
4.5.1 Mechanisms for implementing BB-BEE 109
4.5.2 Outcomes of BEE in the extractive industry in South Africa 114
4.6 Comparative analysis of the case countries and strategic lessons for Zimbabwe 119
4.7 Conclusion 121
CHAPTER 5 123
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 123
5.0 Introduction 123
5.1 Research paradigmatic approach: Frankfurt critical theory 123
5.2 Research approach: Qualitative research 126
5.3 Case study research design 127
5.3.1 The subcases: Community share ownership trusts 129
5.3.2 The drivers for choosing some of the sub-cases 130
5.4 Target population and sampling procedure 131
5.5 Data collection methods 133

5.5.1 Documentary analysis 133
5.5.2 Key Informant interviews and non-participant observation 135
5.6 Data presentation and analysis methods 137
5.6.1 Qualitative content analysis 138
5.6.2 Thematic analysis 139
5.7 Contribution to knowledge process 140
5.8 Integrity and trustworthiness of the research 141
5.9 Fieldwork challenges and mitigations 143
5.1 Ethical considerations 145
5.11 Researcher's positionality 145
5.11 Conclusion 146
PART 3 147
FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 147
CHAPTER 6 149
CONTESTED FRAMINGS OF INDIGENEITY IN ZIMBABWE 149
6.0. Introduction 149
6.1. Contentions around framing and practice of indigeneity in Zimbabwe 150
6.2 Interface of indigeneity, indigenisation, expropriation and accumulation 157
6.3 Conclusion 166
CHAPTER 7 167
LOCAL ECONOMIC HUBS OR THEATRES FOR ACCUMULATION? 167
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS ABOUT FUNCTIONS, FORMATIONS AND FEATS OF THE COMMUNITY SHARE OWNERSHIP TRUSTS IN ZIMBABWE 167
7.0 Introduction 167
7.2 An overview of the CSOTs 172
7.2 Disempowering outcomes of the CSOTs 178
7.2.1 Drivers for partial and noncompliance by some qualifying businesses 195
7.2.2 Inherent challenges facing the CSOTs 197
7.4 Conclusion 212
CHAPTER 8 213
THE INTERNAL STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY INDIGENISATION IN ZIMBABWE 213

8.0 Introduction 213
8.1 Business fronting and public corruption 214
8.1.1 Chinese companies exempted from indigenisation 228
8.2 CSOTs as regime survival and accumulation strategies 229
8.3 Deliberate ambiguities, inconsistencies and lack of clarity 250
8.3 Conclusion 263
CHAPTER 9 264
THE BROADER GOVERNANCE STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY INDIGENISATION IN ZIMBABWE 264
9.0 Introduction 264
9.1 Political contestations within the GNU 265
9.2 International contestations and sanctions 273
9.3 Shunning away investment 283
9.4 The involvement of the security sector in the mining indigenisation processes 293
9.4.1 Uses, misuses and abuses of the proceeds of diamonds by the security sector 303
9.5 Conclusion 309
CHAPTER 10 310
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 310
10.0 Introduction 310
10.1 Summary of the Findings 311
10.2 Contribution to knowledge 321
10.2.1 Extractive industry indigenisation as a regime survival strategy in Zimbabwe 321
10.2.2 Neopatrimonialism as the effect (not as a cause) of weak institutions 324
10.2.3 Extractive industry indigenisation is helping to create a strong state, weak and bad society 326
10.2.5 African neopatrimonialism normalising political corruption 329
10.2.6 Undocumented and unpublished extractive industry indigenisation success stories 331
10.3 Recommendations for policy 333
10.3.1 Establishing strong, inclusive and effective indigenisation policy institutions 333
10.3.2 Clear, aligned and consistent indigenisation legal and policy frameworks 334
10.3.3 Establishing effective indigenisation monitoring and evaluation systems 334
10.2.4 Extractive industry indigenisation simultaneously achieving two separate objectives 335

10.3.4 The integrated extractive industry indigenisation and economic empowerment governance model 337
10.4 Understanding Zimbabwe's uneven development architecture within the mining indigenisation discourse 339
10.5 A summary of the drivers for the non-indigenisation of the mining sector and perpetuation of uneven mining development 341
10.6 Areas for future research 343
10.5 Conclusion 344
References 346
APPENDICES 379
Appendix 1: Letter from the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Enterprise Development 379
Appendix 2: Approved Letter from the National Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Board 381
Appendix 3: Ethical Clearance Certificate 382
Appendix 4: Informed consent form 383
Appendix 6: Participant information sheet for government officials 386
Appendix 7: Key Informant Interview Guide 387
Appendix 8: List of Interviews conducted 388
Appendix 9: Supervisor's support letter for data collection 390
Appendix 8: List of Community Share Ownership Trusts and their Registration Numbers 391

List of figures

Figure 1. 1: Mining output growth rate between 2009 and 2016 10
Figure 1. 2: Mining's contribution to the aggregate national exports 10

Figure 8. 1: Zimbabwe's Corruption Rank 178
Figure 8. 2: Perception of Corruption by Institution in Zimbabwe 178
Figure 8. 3: Handling of corruption by the government 179

Figure 9 1: Indigenising the economy versus encouraging FDI 242
Figure 9 2: Ease of doing business in Zimbabwe 243
Figure 9 3: Zimbabwe's competitive index 243
Figure 9 4: Top 10 riskiest places to be a miner 246
Figure 9 5: Complex ownership structures of the Mbada Diamonds 252
Figure 9 6: Complex ownership structures of the Marange Diamonds 253
Figure 9 7: People's perceptions of corruption within the police force 261
Figure 9. 1: Indigenising the economy versus encouraging FDI
Figure 9. 2: Ease of doing business in Zimbabwe
Figure 9. 3: Zimbabwe's competitive index
Figure 9. 4: Top 10 riskiest places to be a miner

Figure 10. 1: Zimbabwe's Corruption Ranking between 2008 and 2018 272
Figure 10. 2: The integrated mining indigenisation and economic empowerment governance model

List of tables

Table 4. 1: Total Graduates by Race: 1959-1970 86
Table 4. 2: BEE elements, weightings and compliance target 97

Table 5. 1: Respondents participated in the interviews 113

Table 7. 1: Status of the community share ownership trusts as of 2013 151
Table 7. 2: Projects Implemented by the Zvishavane CSOT 172

Table 9 1: The $42 billion cost of the sanctions burden 238
Table 9 2: Joint venture ownership structures between the foreign mining investors and Marange Resources 250
Table 9 3: Anjin Investments' executive and non-executive board members 254
Table 9 4: Zimbabwe's aggregate diamond earnings form 2016-2016 258
Table 9 5: Discrepancies between the projected and actual diamond revenues 260
The $42 billion cost of the sanctions burden

PART I
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

In Zimbabwe, the government's usage of the indigenisation programme for political and personal accumulation ends makes it appear that indigenisation is designed to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives rather than broad-based empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Within Zimbabwe's indigenisation processes, the usage is particularly pronounced in the mining sector. The way the government is implementing extractive industry indigenisation is systematically accumulating wealth and power to some through dispossessing others, making indigenisation in the sector a strategic policy choice for the elite's accumulation of both power and wealth.

In setting the stage, Part I of the thesis comprises two chapters. The first chapter sets the stage by discussing the background of the investigation, research problem, research questions, purpose and significance of the study and its layout. The second chapter locates the study within its colonial context. It does so by tracing the history of the country's indigenous citizens' disempowerment, a critical factor that vindicated indigenisation, from the initial days of conquest in 1890 until the end of colonialism in 1980. The chapter articulates how and why the successive colonial administrations' logic constructed and produced racial-based and class-based uneven development architecture.

CHAPTER 1

THESIS INTRODUCTION

1.0. Introduction

Zimbabwe's indigenisation efforts are courting the attention of both opponents and proponents, both within and without the Zimbabwean borders, whose sharp binary narratives on the subject still compete for dominance. The binary narratives inform the debates of policy and academia debate whether empowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens through indigenisation is an appropriate political and economic move. In both camps, enthusiastic adherents support alternative positions, a phenomenon that, on its own right, calls for a close academic inquiry as to how and why such epistemological and conceptual rifts also affect the entire indigenisation debates. On the one hand, the opponents are charging that the populist, redistributive, and vindictive indigenisation programme will only succeed, like what its preceding twin, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), achieved between 2000-2003, in further degenerating the country's distressed economy (Matyszak, 2012 & 2014; Magure, 2012; Ndakaripa, 2017). On the other hand, the proponents believe that indigenisation, as the hallmark of economic independence, is the appropriate response to the overarching 'uneven development' architecture constructed and produced by colonialism and sustained by the postcolonial Harare administration (Matyszak, 2012 & 2014; Ndakaripa, 2017). Uneven development, which Smith (1990, p. 154) says "thy name is war", is one of the central themes of economic geography that means structural economic inequalities at class, geographical, scalar, wealth and income levels (Christophers, 2009). However, in this study uneven development is used with reference to class, income and wealth. By reversing the frontiers of unevenness in the country's political economy, the architects and proponents argue that indigenisation would extricate the disenfranchised indigenous indigents from the clutches of the triple ills of uneven development: poverty, inequality and unemployment (IEE Act, 2008).

Unsurprisingly given the deeply polarised context, the two competing schools of thought reflect the conflict on how key indigenisation stakeholders try to make their interests come first. The key stakeholders with varied interests include the disadvantaged indigenous citizens, the

government, political and indigenous business elites, and the country's international capital. The disadvantaged indigenous citizens regard themselves as the sole beneficiaries of indigenisation, and the ZANU-PF government wants to reproduce itself through the indigenisation proceeds. Further, both political and indigenous business elites want to replace the non-indigenous shareholders in foreign-owned mining companies, while the international capital wants indigenisation laws to be reversed.

Indigenisation rests on the foundation of restructuring capital through swinging the pendulum of owning, controlling and managing both the means and factors of production from the non-indigenous to the indigenous. On the other hand, indigenisation policy implementation rests on achieving the unwritten objective of saving the crumbling and isolated regime from collapsing and enabling the personal accumulation of the political and business elites. The former is well known, while the latter received little scholarly attention. Therefore, it is against this background that this study seeks to fill this scholarly gap by exploring the proposition that the government is systematically using indigenisation, particularly extractive industry indigenisation, to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives. Conceptually, according to Harvey (2003), accumulation by dispossession means the acts and processes of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. It does so through the elites privatising public wealth by expropriating the citizens and the private sector of their land and wealth. In this context, accumulation by dispossession – a concept developed in the context of global capitalism contradictions (Harvey, 2003)- refers to the collusion of government and big business for the continued survival of capitalism by enabling accumulation on the one pole and dis-accumulation on the other. Zimbabwe's political and business elites are expropriating through indigenisation wealth from the non-indigenous mining companies for either personal gains, regime survival or both.

This research has examined the competing explanations and factors for how and why the overpromising extractive industry indigenisation policy choice in Zimbabwe is underdelivering during implementation. The country's economic paradigm shifted from externally driven neoliberalism (i.e. foreign direct investment (FDI) led economy) to the internally driven one shaped by indigenisation (i.e. a neoliberal economy with profound indigenous outlook). According to Matyszak (2014 & 2018) and Simpson and Hawkins (2019), several factors are attributable to

this paradigm shift. First, international isolation due to international sanctions. Second, using indigenisation as a policy choice for strategic 'sanctions busting' intervention, i.e. settling political scores with those western countries that imposed sanctions on the country. The huge fraction of international capital in the country is western. Third, sustaining the elite private personal accumulation to recover the frozen wealth abroad. Fourth, using indigenisation proceeds to save the internationally isolated and crumbling government from collapse at the hands of sinister regime change forces emanating from both within and outside the country's borders.

Inquiring into the indigenisation programme, notably the extractive industry indigenisation, is particularly important for two reasons during this period (i.e. between 2007 and 2017). Firstly, intense debates about the integrity and appropriateness of implementing the indigenisation policy choice in general and extractive industry indigenisation occurred during this period. The outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation that are mostly inconsistent with the goals fuelled these debates. Secondly, the government is sending mixed indigenisation signals to foreign mining companies. In this regard, the government's inconsistencies increased polarity and confusion to the already controversial indigenisation policy within the mining sector. As a result, some non-indigenous mining companies complied with the 51% indigenisation laws while others did not. According to Matyszak (2014 & 2018), the choice between compliance and noncompliance with the indigenisation laws by foreign mining companies were based on which route save their interests more rather than on which broadly empowers the disadvantaged indigenous citizens.

The chapter is made up of the following seven parts: a) the brief history of the indigenisation programme in the country illustrating the background against which and the context within which the extractive industry indigenisation originated and is being implemented; b) the study's research problem illustrating the undesirable state of affairs resulting from implementing the indigenisation programme, particularly the extractive industry indigenisation; c) the study's knowledge gap showing the intellectual paucity in need of redress; d) the research objectives and purpose of the study; e) the proposed research questions and proposition of the study; f) the summary of the approach of the inquiry and the study's theoretical framework; g) the general organisation of the whole study.

1.1 A brief history of indigenisation in Zimbabwe

The resurgence of the resource nationalism paradigm after 2000, particularly after 2005 (Pryke, 2017; Saunders, 2017), notably in the extractive economies of the South, could have ramped up the calls for extractive industry indigenisation. Corroborating with this reasoning while talking about Southern Africa, Saunders (2008, p. 67) says the following:

> The minerals and mining sector in Southern African has experienced a revival in the past decade, with heightened levels of international, regional and occasionally domestic investment coming in the wake of a long commodities boom, new and promising exploration, the privatisation of some state holdings and liberalisation of mining investment codes.

In Zimbabwe, the calls for the sector's indigenisation are further justified because Zimbabwe, a low-income country rich in mineral endowments, naturally attracts huge international capital. It is this political economy of mining capitalism that further configured the uneven development architecture in the sector. According to Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines (2010) and Mazaranye (2016), in 2010 (i.e. before the commencement of the implementation of extractive industry indigenisation), 80% of the mining claims- i.e. both conglomerates and small companies- in the country were owned and controlled by foreign investors. Domestic investment in the sector, mostly artisanal and small scale, accounted only for 10%, while the government, through the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), either in part or in full, owned the remaining 10%. The sector accounts for about 65-70% of the country's exports by volume, making it a huge contributor to its foreign currency, of more than 45% (Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines, 2010). Regarding the sector's contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), before 2010, it contributed about 25% to the national economy (Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce, 2010) and 7% of GDP in 2017 (World Bank, 2019).

Furthermore, the concept of 'natural capital accounting' (NCA) suggests that the exploitation of Zimbabwe's depletable natural resources robs the indigenous people and their communities from benefiting from the natural capital (Bond, 2019), especially if the ownership and control of the means of mining production are in the hands of the foreigners. Conceptually, natural capital accounting is the accounting formula used to estimate and calculate the Net-Present Values (NPVs) of the country's ecological resources (World Bank, 2014; Bond, 2019). World Bank (2014) has noted that, through applying the 'Adjusted Net Savings' (ANS) measure, NCA's related

concept, 88% of African countries tend to be net losers from mining activities. The ANS measure is a formula developed by the World Bank used to track the ecological, educational and economic changes of the wealth of nations (Bond, 2019). So far, Sub-Saharan Africa has lost a conservative estimate of US$100 billion from resource depletion (Bond, 2019). In Zimbabwe, the late President Robert Mugabe clearly understood the implicit meaning of natural capital when he said:

> We dare not let our people down. We are aware that people of ill-will have cast aspersions on our hallowed policy of indigenisation and economic empowerment. Well, it is a set policy, our chosen path to full sovereignty. The premise of the policy is an easy one. Our minerals are a depletable resource. We cannot grow them again once they have been exploited. Consequently, we cannot be bystanders in their exploitation. We need a share, a controlling share in all ventures that exploit our non-renewable natural resources. Where we can, we can go it alone. Where we cannot do so, we seek partners on a 51/49 percent shareholding principle. Genuine partners should find this acceptable (President Robert Gabriel Mugabe's Inauguration Speech, 2013, 13 August).

Scholars have recognised the concept's worth as well:

> Diamond revenue represents natural capital depletion and, therefore, its expenditure should be judicious (Sibanda and Makore 2013, p. 29).
>
> … mining is a disaster unfolding across Zimbabwe. Mining is creating an enclave economy full of white-collar criminals, who make virtually no positive linkages to the broader Zimbabwean economy. They simply deplete our natural capital and provide an inconsequential return (Maguwu, 2016, p. 5).

By calculating the mineral wealth loss using both ANS and NCA, we can realise that the failure to indigenise the extractive industry in Zimbabwe can be seen as a clear contributor to further impoverishing Zimbabwe's disadvantaged indigenous people and perpetuating uneven mining development.

Therefore, it is against this background of economic unevenness in general and mining unevenness in particular, that Zimbabwe had to formally adopt the indigenisation policy by enacting the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (*Chapter 14:33*) (hereinafter referred to as the IEE Act) on March 20, 2008. According to the IEE Act. The primary objective of indigenisation is to empower the disadvantaged indigenous citizens by restructuring capital to benefit those considered indigenous. The indigenisation law came nearly three decades into independence, 28 years to be precise, achieved after 90 years of colonialism, i.e. 1890 to 1980. During colonialism and 28 years into independence, the governance systems systematically disenfranchised the indigenous black majority from meaningfully participating in the country's mainstream political,

social and economic activities. Initially, the indigenisation law required all existing non-indigenous businesses worth at least US$500,000 to indigenise at least 51% of their equity in five years as from March 2010. The law also required new or potential non-indigenous businesses to comply with the set 51% indigenisation equity threshold in five years from the day of starting to operate in the country. Later, specifically for the non-indigenous mining companies, the law required that all non-indigenous businesses with a net worth of US$1 should comply with the indigenisation laws.

It is important to note that the IEE Act of March 2008 is an outcome of various legal and political processes worth considering. In the 1990s, when the indigenisation narrative gained momentum, indigenous organisations interpreted the absence of indigenisation legal and policy frameworks to mean the government's lack of integrity to do the following two important things (Chitsove, 2014). First, empowering the disenfranchised indigenous citizens. Second, restructuring capital through indigenisation, a political settlement choice that would tilt the balance on economic power favouring those considered indigenous while correspondingly disfavouring those deemed non-indigenous. While the concept of political settlements remains disputed, there is a general agreement that such settlements are "[a] consensus between political elites on the rules of the game" (McCandless, 2018, p. 20). Di John and Putzel (2009) argue that such settlements' central characteristic is the forging of an agreement between and among political elites that serves, advances and protects their best interests by agreeing on ways of administering, exercising and distributing political power.

To address the indigenisation policy and legal deficiencies, in March 1997, the government, through the Ministry of Industry and International Trade, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) entered into a technical support assistance agreement, dubbed the Technical Support for the Indigenisation Policy Program (TSIPP), whose aim was to expedite and smoothen the process of indigenisation (Chipika & Malaba, 2011). Further articulating on this, the Technical Support for the Indigenisation Policy Program Zim/97/005/01/97 document argues that the agreement's primary objective was for the government to produce workable strategies of empowering the indigenous citizens. This group forms the most significant fraction of the socially excluded and economically disenfranchised population. Poverty eradication among the indigenous citizens was the ultimate intention of the TSIPP. The Department for State Enterprises and

Indigenisation (SEID), housed in the Office of the President and Cabinet, implemented TSIPP before handing it over to the Ministry of Industry and International Trade in August 2001. The TSIPP was in force from March 1997 to December 2003. Ultimately, the recommendations suggested by the TSIPP Zim/97/005/01/97 document, together with those from Hlatshwayo (2003), played a critical role in shaping the nature, shape and structure of the subsequent indigenisation programme, legislations and regulations enacted and passed by the government. The recommendations proposed that the government adopt economic nationalism laws to give the indigenous businesspeople preferential treatments in all tendering and procurement issues.

The findings, conclusions and recommendations produced by the TSIPP Zim/97/005/01/97 document played a significant role in helping the government in 1998 to, for the first time in the history of indigenisation of the country, finally adopt the '*Policy Framework on the Indigenisation of the Economy*' of February 1998 (Marongwe & Muguti, 2016; Mawowa, 2013; Machinya, 2014; Raftopoulos & Compagnon, 2003; Chipika & Malaba, 2011; Matyszak, 2012 & 2014; Chitsove, 2014). With the policy framework in place, in 1999, the government contracted Intrados, an international consulting firm, to prepare the Trust Deed for the National Investment Trust (NIT) (Marongwe & Muguti, 2016). Again, with the help of the recommendations of the TSIPP document, the 1998 indigenisation policy framework was later revised by the Cabinet in 2004, and the '*Revised Policy Framework for the Indigenisation of the Economy*' was adopted (Raftopoulus, 2014; Chitsove, 2014; Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara & Martens, 2011; Chipika & Malaba, 2011; Matyszak, 2012). The Revised Policy Framework gave a policy position and a legal effect on economically empowering the indigenous Zimbabweans through indigenisation. Consequently, the adopted 2004 revised indigenisation policy framework, and again together with the help from the TSIPP, formed the bedrock upon which the IEE Act of March 20, 2008, and various other supporting legislations were enacted (Marongwe & Muguti, 2016; Raftopoulus, 2014; Chowa & Makuvare, 2013; Machinya, 2014). The contents of the Act and the subsequent indigenisation legislation, Chitsove (2014) argues, served to operationalise the adopted 2004 indigenisation policy.

The parliament passed the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill (hereinafter the IEE Bill) in December of 2007, and the late president Robert Mugabe signed into law (i.e. the enactment of the IEE Act) three months later in March of 2008. In the extractive sector, the IEE

Act effectively began in 2010 with the passage of the General Indigenisation Regulations of 2010. The government implemented the extractive industry indigenisation through a cocktail of policy instruments. These include Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs), Employee Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs), Sovereign Wealth Fund, Youth Development Fund, and Direct Equity Participation. In the extractive industry, the government is implementing indigenisation according to the following legal frameworks: the Constitution; IEA Act; *The Government General Notice No. 114 of 2011 ("GN 114/11"); and The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 21/2010 ("SI 21/10").* According to these legal frameworks, all foreign-owned mining companies had to initially cede, donate or sell, and later dispose of at least 51% of their equity to the indigenous people. Implementation of extractive industry indigenisation saw the government employing a diverse range of approaches, with the CSOTs being the primary approach. With various qualifying non-indigenous mining firms, the government launched 61 CSOTs across the country, one in every rural district, save for Mabvuku-Tafara urban district. However, few recorded significant success stories in their community development endeavours (Dube, 2013; Matyszak, 2014). However, only one company, the Canadian gold company, Caledonia Mining Corporation, fully implemented the indigenisation laws (i.e. indigenising 51% of its equity) in Zimbabwe.

It is important to note that in 2017 the extractive industry indigenisation witnessed a paradigmatic policy turn following the removal of its champion from power, the late president Robert Mugabe. In 2018, by adopting the neoliberal approach- dubbed 'Zimbabwe is open for business'- through amending the IEE Act's Section 3(1) through the Finance Act No.1 of 2018, the government scrapped off the indigenisation laws in all sectors of the economy. The diamond and platinum sectors were the exceptions to the rule. However, in 2020, through the Finance (No. 2) Bill of 2020, the IEE Act's Section 3(1) was further amended to include all minerals under the 51% indigenisation law. According to the Finance (No. 2) Bill of 2020 Section 37(a)

> Section 3(1) of the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33] is amended—
> (a) by the insertion after "extraction of" of 'such mineral as may be prescribed by the Minister in consultation with the Minister responsible for Mines and the Minister responsible for Finance.

The 2020 amendment signalled the return to the pre-2017 indigenisation regime of having the entire extractive industry governed by the 51% indigenisation law. However, in February 2021,

through a Joint Statement by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, the government deleted Section 36 of the 2020 Finance (No. 2) Bill. Part of the Statement reads

> 4. The provision in Section 36 of the Finance (No 2) Act, 2020, to the effect that the Minister responsible for the IEE Act, may, in consultation with the Ministers responsible for Mines and Finance prescribe a mineral, the extraction of which would be subject to 51% shareholding by a designated entity, has been interpreted by some to represent a departure from Government's stated position to open the mining sector to investment without the requirement for 51% of the shareholding being held by a designated entity.
> 5. To enhance certainty in relation to investments in the Mining Sector, and consistent with Government policy, this insertion will be deleted.
> 6. These amendments are designed to buttress the Mantra "Zimbabwe is Open for Business.'

The deletion of Section 36 signalled the end of Zimbabwe's indigenisation regime as this left no sector of the economy under the indigenisation laws.

1.2 Research problem

Since the beginning of its implementation in 2010, Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation has had two less encouraging outcomes. First, the uneven mining development problem persisted following indigenisation (Chitiyo, Dengu, Mbae & Vandome, 2019). First, indigenisation has not been broad-based as it has not benefitted the majority of the targeted groups. Second, through acting as a disincentive to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the extractive sector, indigenisation is decreasing the contribution of the extractive sector to the national economy (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Monetary Policy Statement, 2016; Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe, 2017 & 2018; Malinga, 2018; Zimstats, 2017; Chitiyo, Dengu, Mbae & Vandome, 2019). The sector's overall contribution to the Gross National Product (GDP), national exports, and foreign currency earnings waned between 2009 and 2016. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below illustrate the cumulative decline of the mining growth rate during the period.

Figure 1. 1: Mining output growth rate between 2009 and 2016

Source: Malinga (2018) and Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (2017).

Figure 1. 2: Mining's contribution to the aggregate national exports

Source: Malinga (2018) and Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (2017).

The output (i.e. the volume) of the extractive industry declined from 37.4% in 2010 to 3.1% in 2015 (Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe, 2016). Furthermore, "mining exports which accounted for an average of 55 per cent of total exports between 2012 and 2015 and an average of 9 per cent of GDP between 2013 and 2015 have decreased, spelling doom for the Zimbabwean economy" (Malinga, 2018, p. 86).

However, it should be noted that this overall decline is against the background that the "mining's share of total exports doubled between 2000 and 2008 from 27 percent to 53 percent… Most of this growth was accounted for by foreign-owned mines" (Saunders, 2017, p. 5). Similar sentiments were also shared by Hawkins (2014 & 2009).

However, the effects of all these hit hard the intended beneficiaries of the indigenisation programme, i.e. the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Evidence from the two figures below shows decreased contributions of mining royalties, taxes and community social responsibility to the economy during the indigenisation regime. Deepened poverty, rising unemployment and entrenched inequality that followed showed that mining capitalism through indigenisation was more of a sophisticated way of transferring resources from the haves (i.e. foreign mining capital) to haves (i.e. the political elites and connected indigenous businesses) than an empowering heuristic policy tool. The rich (i.e. the political and business elites) became richer through the same indigenisation accumulation logic that further impoverished the poor. For example, there are many indigenisation deals and promises which to this day remain unfulfilled. The good case in point here is for the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust (M-Z CSOT). When the CSOT was officially launched on 25 July 2012 by Zimbabwe's late president, Robert Mugabe, each of the five diamond companies operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Field committed to pay US$10 million as seed capital to the M-Z CSOT, making it US$50 million in total (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2017 & 2016). To date, only US$400,000 of the US$50 million has been paid to the M-Z CSOT (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2017 & 2016). This situation is notwithstanding the fact that on the day of the launch, the mining companies promised to be deposit US$1.5 million into the CSOT's bank account- the figure displayed on a cheque on the day of the launch.

Although the UNDP Human Development Report (2019) was not specifically relating to the effects of the indigenisation programme, the country's inequality indices rose to the following levels during the indigenisation regime: 27% income inequality, 16% education inequality, inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.435, income share held by poorest 40% of 15.3, and income share held by richest 10% of 33.8. According to the World Bank Data (2021), the poverty headcount ratio increased from 22.5% in 2011 to 30.4% in 2017 to 38.3% in 2019.

The presence of infrastructures and instruments of corruption, collusion, co-optation, coercion, and state capture aided all these (Mawowa, 2013; Simpson & Hawkins, 2019; Matyszak, 2012 & 2014). This situation makes uneven development a 'wicked problem.' Here, McCandless (2013, p. 243) argues that by nature "unlikely to be 'solved'", a wicked problem refers to the challenges of using indigenisation as a policy heuristic tool to address uneven development in Zimbabwe.

Conceptually, according to Churchman (1967, p. B141), whom she sources as the first scholar to talk about wicked problems, such problems are a "class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision-makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing." This study suggests that there are serious unknowns, uncertainties, and indeterminacies in the present conditions regarding indigenisation being the policy instrument to address uneven development configuration in the country.

There is little doubt that uneven mining development persisted following indigenisation. My argument is that extractive industry indigenisation did not result in transferring the ownership of the means of mining production to the intended beneficiaries: the disadvantaged mining communities and indigenous peoples. The fact that from 2010 (i.e. when mining indigenisation began) and now only one foreign-owned mining company, Caledonia Mining Corporation's Blanket Mine, complied with the indigenisation laws of indigenising 51% of its shareholding is telling to the sector's unresolved uneven development. As shown by Table 1.1 below, it is further telling that the ownership structures of many giant international mining companies remained as they were before indigenisation, in most cases 100% foreign-owned. This evidence points to the paradox of the persistence of uneven mining development following extractive industry indigenisation.

Table 1.1: Ownership structures of major foreign-owned mining companies in Zimbabwe before and after indigenisation

Company	Foreign ownership before indigenisation	Foreign ownership after indigenisation	Domestic ownership before indigenisation	Domestic ownership after indigenisation	Government ownership before indigenisation	Government ownership after indigenisation
Zimplats (PGM, copper & silver)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Unki Mine (PGM)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Mimosa (PGM, copper & cobalt)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
How Mine (gold, silver)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Metallon Corporation Limited (i.e. with its three mines: How, Redwing and Mazowe Mines)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Freda Rebecca (gold)	85%			15%	0%	0%
Blanket Mine	100%	49%	0%	26%	0%	15%
Caledonia Mining Corporation PLC	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Bikita Minerals Lithium Mine	79%	79%	21%	21%	0%	0%

Source: Bloomberg Terminal Data for the last six months (2021) and adapted from World Bank (2019, p. 78).

As the focus of this study is specifically on the CSOTs, it should be noted that out of the 60 registered, commissioned and launched CSOTs, only 26 came to life, making 35 white elephants (ZEPARU, 2019; Ndakaripa, 2020; NIEEB, 2014; Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015, 2016 & 2017). It should also be noted that of the remaining 26 functional and operational CSOTs, many are facing

existential threats from the following: the implications of the Finance Act that made it optional for the qualifying companies to continue funding (as well as honouring the pledged amounts in full) the CSOTs; corruption and mismanagement; widespread defaults on seed capital by the qualifying companies; and emerging cases of reverse indigenisation. Furthermore, only a handful of the CSOTs are recording success stories.

Therefore, extractive industry indigenisation, by becoming what Karl Krans said of Freudianism: "the disease of which it pretends to be the cure" (Moyo, 2009, p. 9), generated a social problem that merits close academic scrutiny. Alternatively, others (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018; Matyszak, 2018, 2014 & 2012) believe that extractive industry indigenisation just turned the world of mining capital upside down without necessarily changing its structural fundamentals. The argument here is that extractive industry indigenisation is systematically reproducing the uneven development architecture in the country's extractive industry in new forms, i.e. from racial and non-indigenous forms of accumulation to class-based forms of the same. Corroborating with the preceding while talking about the unresolved national question in South Africa, Alexander (1979) and Motala and Vally (2017) call a situation like this (i.e. of the wickedness of the mining uneven development problem that the supposed extractive industry indigenisation solution is perpetuating it) 'reactionary nationalism.' For Motala and Vally (2017) and Alexander (1979), reactionary nationalism is when postcolonial governments' policies emphasised addressing racialised inequality relations, leaving the structural pillars that constructed, produced and sustained them intact. These are neopatrimonial, predatory, and extractive institutions and systems.

The government adopted the indigenisation programme against the background of an uneven preponderance of international finance capital and white monopoly capital, notably belonging to the white Zimbabweans (known colloquially as the Rhodesians). At the same time, the indigenous people were systematically crowded out of the mainstream economic activities. Many considered addressing these colonial social and economic discomforts through such reverse discrimination policies as indigenisation as long overdue, as the waging of the protracted liberation struggle was for resisting the uneven development configuration (Chipika & Malaba, 2011). However, what motivated this study are the contextual and structural factors that account for the perpetuation uneven development by implementing the very policy intervention designed to address the problem in the first place. Put it another way, indigenisation fell into the pitfalls of that which it

tried to address, i.e. uneven development. Arguably, it could be that the proponents of indigenisation were products of historical uneven development, making it difficult for them to develop policy initiatives that could undo uneven development. This situation is largely because they are socialised to perceive uneven development as an everyday fact of life.

For this reason, this research is questioning the integrity of indigenisation as the appropriate policy instrument that could have extricated the indigenous people from the clutches of uneven development-related challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality. It is also critiquing the trustworthiness of the previous government's radicalised quest to empower the economically excluded and socially disenfranchised indigenous people through indigenisation. Rather than achieving its noted objectives of empowering the marginalised indigenous people and their communities through indigenisation, the policy results appear to have been largely inconsistent with these objectives. The mining sector remains under foreign control and ownership, indigenous people and their communities largely disempowered, and the elite private accumulation of public resources, power retention and saving the internationally isolated government from threatening regime change forces were mainly achieved instead. This situation suggests that nefarious intentions of the extractive industry indigenisation may have been at work. To this end, this study labels Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation as deceptive, disenfranchising and disempowering indigenisation (DDDI). However, this characterisation is not done oblivious to the fact that indigenisation would not have been an inappropriate policy intervention if it had led to broad-based empowerment. This study argues that underneath the indigenisation programme lurks the regime's distinct predatory and accumulative features.

However, the widespread negative outcomes and criticisms of Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation should not overshadow its positive outcomes, although tokenistic and particularistic. Asserting that the country's extractive industry indigenisation outcomes are wholly inconsistent with the goals would be an act of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. To a significant extent, extractive industry indigenisation is restructuring non-indigenous mining capital, empowering the disenfranchised indigenous groups and indigenising the extractive industry. Through the policy instrument of CSOTs, indigenisation made some rural communities owners, managers and controllers of both the means and factors of production in the mining sector. This means that, to a degree, the sector was indigenised and residents empowered. Neither do the

criticisms levelled against the policy serve to take away its nobleness when it comes to empowering the country's disadvantaged indigenous citizens.

Contrary to popular belief, many Zimbabweans across the political and ideological divide were (and are still) not opposing the integrity of indigenisation as the appropriate empowerment policy intervention to address the overarching uneven development problem. Rather, many have critiqued the indigenisation programme on account of its being used as a political settlement strategy to achieve the following two mutually exclusive yet reinforcing objectives. First, personal accumulation for the favoured political and business elites. Second, regime survival agenda (Simpson & Hawkins, 2019).

1.3 Knowledge gap and justification of the study

Indigenisation has taken various forms, turns, drivers, and degrees of success and failures in different countries worldwide. In many countries (e.g. Uganda, post-1994 South Africa, Tanzania, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and Fiji), indigenisation has been explicitly framed as a 'racial redress' strategic economic and political policy choice (Aminzade, 2003; Larson & Aminzade, 2007). Chipika and Malaba (2011), Uppall (2014) and Southall (2014, 2007 & 2004) also share similar views with the preceding scholars. Indigenisation attracts racial undertones because the logic of pre-indigenisation political economies facilitated racial accumulation and racial exploitation, making one race richer at the other's expense. To this end, the need to empower the previously disadvantaged majority races, in many cases the indigenous citizens (i.e. blacks in Africa, Pacific Islanders in Fiji and indigenous Malays in Malaysia) through expropriating the advantaged minority races (i.e. whites and Asians mostly) become the primary and defining driver for indigenisation. According to this perspective, indigenisation processes would address all forms of racial inequalities: income, sectoral and spatial. Framed as such, indigenisation is arguably one postcolonial political settlement strategy explicitly targeting the historically privileged minorities. The notable exception in South Africa is the Afrikaners Economic Empowerment (AEE) during the apartheid regime, whose objective was to resolve what came to be known as the 'white poor problem' among the Afrikaners (Bhorat & Kanbur, 2006). The following are the primary forms of indigenisation various governments across the globe have adopted and implemented: preferential

procurement, employment creation, indigenisation of ownership, indigenisation of human resources, indigenisation of control, indigenisation technology and community development.

In Zimbabwe, the indigenisation scholarship presents indigenisation as a subject of great controversy: courting both critics and exponents. For example, Simpson and Hawkins (2019) write about indigenisation as one of the many regime survival strategies the ZANU-PF government has implemented since 2000. They argued that the distribution of the indigenisation 'loot', notably from the mining sector, reflects more on the primacy of regime survival than economic indigenisation or empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Further to that, other studies examined the relationship between theory and practice of indigenisation (Matyszak, 2012 & 2014; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2015), others examined its relationship with FDI (Magure, 2012; Masunungure & Koga, 2013), while others its relationship with employment creation (Dube, 2013). Also, others were focusing on the ineffectiveness and inappropriateness of its one-size-fits-all approach (Gono, 2011 & 2013), defective legal frameworks (Matyszak, 2014; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2015; Chipika & Malaba, 2011), economic turnaround and citizen beneficiation (Dube, 2013; Chipika & Malaba, 2011) or illegality and ineffectiveness of the CSOTs (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2015; Magure, 2012; Matyszak, 2014).

Furthermore, Ndakaripa (2017) focuses on the role of indigenous civil society organisations (CSOs) in implementing and debating the country's indigenisation policies, particularly between the period 2000 and 2016. Closer to this study is Taylor's (2016). He talks about indigenisation as "a form of deliberate capture by elites connected to state and the ruling party" (ibid, p. 11). While I generally agree with Hawkins and Simpson, I contend that they overestimate the primacy of regime survival and underestimate the competing primacy of private accumulation of public resources by political and business elites.

This study acknowledges the perspectives and debates emerging from the previous antecedent reflections on indigenisation discourses in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, these studies have not sufficiently addressed how and why indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular is being used as a political settlement strategy to achieve personal and political ends. The usage of extractive industry indigenisation as a political settlement strategy to achieve

personal and political objectives makes it an overpromising policy choice underdelivering upon implementation. Outcomes are mostly inconsistent with the goals. Thus, this study builds on these crucial reflections by casting attention on inquiring into this somewhat neglected imperative issue: how and why the government is using the indigenisation programme, in particular the extractive industry indigenisation, as the political settlement strategy for the elite to achieve both political and personal gains. The analysis of the existing literature shows that often extractive industry indigenisation outcomes in Zimbabwe are inconsistent with the goals, leading to the paradoxical perpetuation of the rate of uneven mining development through implementing its antidote, i.e. the extractive industry indigenisation programme.

The question of how and why uneven mining development widened and deepened following the implementation of the extractive industry indigenisation remains unaddressed in the literature. This study is making the case that underneath the indigenisation programme, particularly the extractive industry indigenisation, lurks the neo-patrimonial nature of the ZANU-PF government. Therefore, it is against this background that this study is a welcome attempt to address this intellectual problem.

1.4 Research questions and proposition

The way indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular is articulated in the legal and policy documents project deliberate policy interventions that would empower the country's disadvantaged indigenous citizens. However, implementation shows that extractive industry indigenisation is further disempowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens while benefiting the political and mining business elites. Cognisant of this, this study proposes that the government, in collusion with indigenous and non-indigenous mining capital, uses extractive industry indigenisation to accumulate wealth and power.

The main research question guiding the study is: Why is extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe not producing outcomes consistent with the policy goals?

Several sub-questions flows out of this inquiry. These are:

1. How is indigeneity framed in Zimbabwe and utilised in the country's extractive industry indigenisation?
2. How and why are the indigenous and non-indigenous citizens benefiting and losing from the processes and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe?
3. How are the organic and conjunctural forces accounting for continued extractive industry uneven development under the indigenisation regime?
4. What are the strategic measures necessary for Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation to be a broad-based empowerment policy choice?

1.5 Research purpose and objectives

The purpose of this inquiry is to understand how and why the Zimbabwean government has been using indigenisation as the political settlement strategy, particularly extractive industry indigenisation, to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives. Doing this helps to understand the inconsistencies between extractive industry indigenisation goals and outcomes. Articulation of the inconsistencies makes it possible to make a case that the extractive industry indigenisation has overpromised its benefits yet underdelivering upon implementation. Four research objectives are flowing out from this inquiry are. These are

1. To understand why the policy 'cure' is not producing outcomes consistent with its goals.
2. To investigate the strategic approaches and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe, focusing on the case of CSOTs.
3. To understand how and why indigeneity was used as a criterion for the indigenous to benefit and non-indigenous to lose from the implementation of the extractive industry indigenisation.
4. To recommend strategic measures for implementing extractive industry indigenisation in ways that ensure broad-based empowerment.

1.6 Approach to the inquiry

This study used a case study research design to conduct this extractive industry indigenisation explanatory study. In this qualitative study, the mining sector was chosen as it significantly reflects the contestations of Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme from its inception in 2007 to the present. Also, I chose this sector because "[t]he indigenisation policy overwhelmingly targets the mining sector" (Baissac, Maubrey, van der Merwe, & van Onselen, 2016, p. 16). I used a purposive sampling approach, along with snowballing sampling method, when selecting the units of analysis (i.e. the documents to review and respondents to interview). It is important to note that document analysis was the primary data collection method, with key informant interviews and non-participant observation playing the supplementary role. Qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis are the two data analysis methods used in this study. The former was used to present and analyse data drawn from documents, while the latter data was drawn from the interviews. To ensure research integrity (i.e. of both process and results), the study adopted the following measures developed by Creswell and Miller (2000): triangulation of data collection methods, peer debriefing, consulting external auditor, and member-checking. Conceptually, triangulation of data collection methods means the use of "multiple sources of data" (Fusch, Fusch & Ness, 2018, p. 20). In this study, I triangulated the following methods of data collection while doing my fieldwork: document analysis, non-participant observation and key informant interviews, with the last two played a complimentary role and the first a dominating role. The following ethical protocols guided this study: confidentiality, anonymity, privacy, informed consent, and avoiding harming participants.

To investigate how and why Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation overpromised its benefits yet underdelivering upon implementation, I have designed my theoretical framework on the theoretical insights of David Harvey's 'accumulation by dispossession' concept and theory. The study's theoretical framework is premised on three of the four theoretical pillars of accumulation by dispossession. These are privatisation, state redistribution and management and manipulation of crises. The fourth pillar, which does not apply to this study, is financialisation. There are two motivations for choosing this theory to guide this study. First, many researchers (e.g. Mawowa, 2013; Moore, 2003 & 2012; Magdoff, 2013; Mbiba, 2017) have applied and tested the theory's three theoretical pillars in various sectors of Zimbabwe's political economy, both

colonial and postcolonial. Second, it articulates the subtle expropriation ways used by contemporary states. Many of these ways may appear to benefit the general public while in practice, they are centralising wealth and power in the hands of the elites. Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation is one of these subtle ways. Accumulation by dispossession illustrates how and why the government is stealthily using the set objectives as smokescreens to achieve the unwritten, nefarious ones. Therefore, I am arguing that through using state redistributions and management and manipulation of crises theoretical pillars of accumulation by dispossession, one can reflect the sophistication of exploitation lurking within extractive industry indigenisation processes.

In this study, state redistributions- the redistribution of wealth from the haves to the have-nots- form the centrality of extractive industry indigenisation. This approach represents the government's deliberate intentions of addressing mining inequalities by transferring wealth from rich non-indigenous mining capital to disadvantaged indigenous citizens and communities. In this study, management and manipulation of crises- i.e. the art of handling challenges to one's advantage- is one of the indigenisation programme's nefarious objectives, particularly in the extractive industry. The reason being that indigenisation came a few years after the western international community imposed sanctions on the government following the 2000-2003 controversial FTLRP. In other words, indigenisation, many views it as a retributive policy strategy, came as a response to political, economic, and social crises posed by the international isolation of Zimbabwe's government. Extractive industry indigenisation in particular has since 2010 been an effective wealth recouping strategy for Zimbabwe's Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), whose assets and money governments of the western international community had frozen. These nationals are the 181 individuals, bodies, and entities of Zimbabwe's Government on the list of international sanctions. Important to note is that a significant fraction of the non-indigenous mining capital in the country is western. To this end, critics of indigenisation are viewing extractive industry indigenisation as a strategy to manage and manipulate crises brought forth by international isolation following the imposition of international sanctions. In this study, privatisation means privatising non-indigenous capital into the hands of both the political and business elites in ways that privatise profits and wealth while externalising losses and costs to the general public.

1.7 Organisation of the Study

Part One: Introduction and Context

This part consists of the first two chapters of the study. Chapter 1 presents a thesis introduction. Therefore, it is made up of the following sections: background of the study, research problem, the gap of knowledge and justification of the study, purpose statement, research questions, summary of the methodology, a summary of both theoretical and conceptual frameworks, and organisation of the study.

Chapter 2 locates the indigenisation debates within their colonial and postcolonial historical contexts. It does so by discussing the debates around the genesis, evolution, nature and scope of the colonial uneven development configurations in Zimbabwe, the economic structure that rationalised the need for indigenisation policy post-independence. The chapter reviews the literature concerning the argument that 90 years of colonialism and the accompanying primitive accumulation processes in what, from 1890-1965, was known as Southern Rhodesia and, from 1965-1979, as Rhodesia was dominated mainly by the development of racial, class, and uneven gendered development. However, to systematically review the historical evolution of the uneven and combined development in Zimbabwe, a periodisation level of analysis is used to organise the discussion. The level of analysis has two parts. First, the colonial political economy of uneven and combined development level, with the successive colonial administrations as the sub-levels. Second, the postcolonial political economy of indigenisation level. The second level locates the debates and framings of indigenisation and indigeneity within the postcolonial political economy context.

Part Two: Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, and Methodology

Part two of this study frames the methodological, theoretical and literature imperatives of the work. This study examines the competing explanations and factors regarding how and why the extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe overpromised its benefits yet under-delivering upon implementation. This situation raises critical issues about the government using indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation to achieve personal and political ends. Chapter 3 discusses the competing explanations on the framings of indigenisation and indigeneity. It does so by discussing the conceptual and definitional contestations around the two.

Further, with the aid of selected country case examples, the chapter reflects on the rationales and drivers for indigenisation. The chapter concludes by discussing three of the four theoretical pillars of David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory describe and explain Zimbabwe's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation. The three theoretical pillars are privatisation, state redistributions, and management and manipulation of crisis- the fourth one being financialisation.

To draw lessons and insights for Zimbabwe, Chapter 4 analyses other countries' indigenisation experiences. Cases are drawn from the global, continental, and regional levels. The study inquired into the following case countries: Malaysia, South Africa under apartheid, and South Africa post-1994. The chapter focuses on motivations and models of indigenisation, how the countries fared with implementing it, the challenges they encountered, and the coping mechanisms used to mitigate them.

Chapter 5 analyses the appropriateness of the study's qualitative methodology in inquiring into how and why the overpromising extractive industry indigenisation is under-delivering upon implementation. The chapter also discusses critical theory as a research paradigm informing this study and the use of qualitative research methods, alongside case study research design and research methods used to sample the units of analysis and to collect, present and analyse data. The chapter also discusses the fieldwork experiences, particularly challenges encountered and how they were mitigated. The chapter concludes by discussing ethical considerations and measures adopted to ensure the findings' dependability and credibility.

Part Three: Findings, Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations

This part presents and analyses the findings of the competing factors and explanations regarding how and why the overpromising extractive industry indigenisation is under-delivering upon implementation in Zimbabwe. The chapters explore how the inconsistency between extractive industry indigenisation goals and outcomes raises critical issues concerning the usage of indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular by the government for the elites to achieve accumulation dispossession objectives. It is important to note that integrating the presentation and discussion of findings ensures the flow of the analysis and avoids repetitions that come with separating the two. In this study, the accumulation by dispossession

theory discusses findings on issues where the government is using its monopoly over power in the indigenisation processes. The government's power monopoly makes it possible for extractive industry indigenisation to facilitate elite accumulation by dispossessing the general public.

To articulate the importance of indigeneity debates to this study and situate the study within these debates, Chapter 6 presents and analyses findings of the motivations and factors accounting for the framings of indigeneity in Zimbabwe. In the process of doing so, this chapter discusses issues at the intersections of indigeneity, power, accumulation, and expropriation. The analysis helps to answer the first sub-research question of this study which reads: How are the representations of indigeneity constructed and utilised in Zimbabwe? The two following parts make this: a) people's varied views around the conceptualisations and representations of indigeneity in Zimbabwe, and b) the interface of power, indigeneity, indigenisation, accumulation and expropriation. In this second part, I engaged the accumulation by dispossession theory as the theory talks about how governments can use their monopoly of the use of force to make some groups accumulate wealth and power by expropriating from other groups.

To engage the study research questions around strategic approaches and outcomes of the indigenisation policy, Chapter 7 presents and analyses findings on the case study of CSOTs. The reason being that the government used the CSOTs as the primary policy instrument to implement mining indigenisation. Thus, the case of CSOTs also help to explain how and why the government is using extractive industry indigenisation to achieve political and personal ends. The analysis reveals that extractive industry indigenisation is more for elite personal and political accumulation and less for broad-based empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous majority citizens. The six following parts make this chapter:

- Extractive industry ownership structure following indigenisation.
- Origins, intents, shapes, and forms, and contentious legal frameworks of CSOTs.
- The disempowering outcomes of the CSOTs.
- Drivers for partial and noncompliance by some qualifying companies.
- The inherent challenges facing the CSOTs.
- The positive outcomes of the CSOTs.

In this chapter, I engage the theoretical insights of accumulation by dispossession by analysing how the government is using the established CSOTs as vehicles for accumulation rather than for empowerment and indigenisation.

Chapter 8 more deeply engages my main research question on How are the organic and conjunctural forces accounting for continued extractive industry uneven development under the indigenisation regime? The chapter discusses how the government instrumentalises extractive industry indigenisation to achieve elite private accumulation, regime survival and power retention objectives. The discussion also responds to the third sub-research question of the study, which reads: How are the organic and conjunctural forces accounting for continued extractive industry uneven development under the indigenisation regime? Answering this research question helps to understand the subtle ways through which the patrimonial, parasitic and predatory comprador bourgeoisie (and its associates) ZANU-PF government is using to privately accumulate, through expropriation, public resources.

Chapter 9 deepens the analysis, focuses on presenting and discussing the findings of the following sub-research question: How are the organic and conjunctural forces accounting for continued extractive industry uneven development under the indigenisation regime? This chapter does so by making a case that the governance factors do not provide good infrastructures for extractive industry indigenisation to deliver outcomes consistent with its broader indigenisation objectives. Answering this sub-research question helps to understand the contribution of the governance factors in accounting for extractive industry indigenisation outcomes being inconsistent with the goals.

Chapter 10 offers an overall discussion of the presented and analysed findings. It pays particular question to whether the indigenisation programme has indigenised the mining sector and if the indigenous people and their communities were empowered, or not. Three broad conclusions, with sub-conclusions within them, are made in this chapter. First, implemented more through political settlements, Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation is achieving largely the unwritten objective (i.e. state generating rents for regime survival, elite personal accumulation, and regime reproduction) and less for the policy's set objective (i.e. broad-based empowerment). Second, the outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in the country are mainly undesirable

and disempowering; sharply inconsistent with the founding goal of achieving shared, inclusive and sustainable empowerment of the disenfranchised indigenous citizens. Third, there are largely unreported, unpublished and undocumented positive outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation. The positive outcomes are however, arguably piecemeal relative to their negative counterparts. The chapter concludes by presenting what I call the "Integrated Extractive Industry Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Governance Model (IMIEEGM)". I propose the model offers an indigenisation implementation framework suitable for Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation.

CHAPTER 2

THE COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL CONTEXT OF INDIGENISATION

2.0 Introduction

This study examines the competing explanations and factors accounting for how and why Zimbabwe's overpromising indigenisation programme, notably in the extractive industry, is underdelivering upon implementation. Tracing the developmental trajectories of uneven and combined development from the initial days of conquest through successive imperial administrations to successive postcolonial governments in Zimbabwe allows this study to locate the discourse of the political economy of uneven indigenisation in the country within its historical context. This is done to establish the origins, evolution, patterns, nature, scope, and magnitude of the existing political economy of uneven development and how the debates around extractive industry indigenisation fit into this broader uneven development discourse.

To chronologically and systematically describe and explain the historical evolution of the uneven and combined development in Zimbabwe, a two-part periodisation level of analysis is used to organise the discussion. Combined development, a result of the universal law of unevenness (Ashman, 2009), refers to a kind of development that "arises specifically from the interactive multiplicity of societies" (Rosenberg, 2013, p. 583). Instructive to note is that each part has sub-periodisation levels of analysis within it. First is the colonial period with the following four sub-periodisation parts: the British South Africa Company (BSAC) Rule (1890-1923); the Responsible Government Rule (1923-1953); the African Federation Government (ACF) Rule (1953-1963); and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) Government Rule (1965-1979). Second is the postcolonial period with the following five sub-periodisation parts: the First Decade of Independence-Welfarist Period (1980-1990); the Structural Adjustment Period (1990-1997); The Crisis and International Isolation Period (1997-2009); The Government of National Unity (GNU) Period; and the Post-GNU Period (2009-2017). However, the periodisation analysis style was not chosen unaware of the obvious challenges of overlapping, conflating and intersecting events, processes, and activities. Periodisation analysis style makes it difficult to neatly and independently

categorise the events, processes and activities within the created boundaries. Nonetheless, the periodisation analysis approach is encouraged when one wants to chronologically and systematically arrange the evolutional and historical events and processes of a phenomenon.

2.1 The colonial uneven and combined development configurations

In Zimbabwe, 90 years of colonialism (i.e. from 1890-1980), and the accompanying imperial accumulation processes by the successive colonial administrations, created racial and class uneven development configurations. During this colonial period of configuring uneven development architecture, speculative investments in mines, agricultural land and manufacturing sectors would constantly rise and bust. The constant speculative ebbs and flows would be followed by either systemic capitalist development or intensified economic fallouts. Instructive to note here is that the driving force for configuring uneven and combined development architecture in the colony was for the white settlers to accumulate wealth and power through dispossessing the same from the indigenous Africans. As a result, the colony's political economy reflected a more foreign outlook and the indigenous Africans became economically, socially and politically disenfranchised.

2.1.1 Colonial accumulation by dispossession and the company rule (1890-1923)

When discussing Zimbabwe's colonisation by the BSAC, Bond & Manyanya (2003) caution us to consider the importance of analysing the global context of the time. The conquest of modern-day Zimbabwe in 1890 immediately followed the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, a negotiating forum conducted in Germany's capital, Berlin, aimed at bringing peace and order among the European powers participating in the ongoing Scramble for Africa. The conference's major outcome was the partitioning of the continent by the great capitalist powers of Europe who met in Berlin, which resulted in what is now known as Zimbabwe today colonised by Britain. Zimbabwe's colonisation was done through Britain's arch-imperialist emissary Cecil John Rhodes and his joint-stock mercantile company, the BSAC (Maylam, 2005). According to Phimister (1974), Bond (1998) and Bond and Manyanya (2003), the major objective of the colonial project was to solve the overarching capitalist problem of overaccumulation of capital (i.e. over-production and or under-consumption problems) that had seriously haunted Europe in the late

19th century. Following on from this reasoning, Phimister (1992, p. 7) argues that the Scramble for Africa, and its subsequent partitioning following the Berlin Conference, was primarily motivated by "capitalism's uneven development during the last third of the nineteenth century, particularly the City of London's crucial role in mediating the development of a world economic system." A significant amount of Britain's juxtaposed excess labour and financial capital, which could not be profitably put together without risking falling down the break-even point, found its place in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

What followed the effective occupation of the colony in 1890 is appalling. Through primitive accumulative means, Africans were expropriated of their land, cattle and mines without compensation. To effectively configure the uneven development architecture, the colonial BSAC administration introduced a raft of taxes (i.e. hut, dip tank, grazing fee etc.) and many other brutal strategies as debt peonage for the indigenous Africans. As a result, the pendulum of the uneven development architecture tilted in favour of the tiny colonial white settlers while correspondingly disfavouring the majority of indigenous Africans. Corroborating with this viewpoint, Wild (1997, p. 15) submits that the white-settler farmers did "…not only ousted the African cultivators from the more fertile plateau lands, they subsequently also barred their access to the market by legal means. One reason for this was that they wanted to keep African competition at bay." It is important to note that the threats to their inalienable rights to the land threatened their security and humanity.

To Bond (1998), the colonisation of Sothern Rhodesia by the BSAC showed that Rhodes, who was overeager to invest and had missed the fortunes of the Witwatersrand's gold rush in Johannesburg, had space creation and geopolitical purposes in mind. According to Wild (1997, p. 11), "Rhodes rightly call it [the BSAC) 'a speculative concern', a concern operating under the rules of capitalist enterprise." Concerning space creation and geopolitical purposes, Rhodes is reported to have said the following words to his associates: "If we get Mashonaland, we shall get the balance of Africa." Instructive to note here is that Rhodes' imperial zeal coincided with the British prime minister's imperial intention of the time, Benjamin Disraeli. Disraeli's imperial intention was of "rebranding of Britain's ragbag of colonies and protectorates around the world as the empire on which the sun never set, and Queen Victoria as the Empress of India" (Bourne, 2011, p. 5). The economic impasses created by the overaccumulation of capital in Britain's City

of London (and the large part of Europe) needed quick countervailing measures, which Rhodes' imperialistic adventurism provided at the right time.

However, colonialism was met fierce resistance emerged from both the Shona and the Ndebele indigenous Africans. First, the Ndebele people fought an unsuccessful war of dispossession against the white settlers between 1893 and 1994. The war was in resistance and defiance to colonialism, which resulted in Africans losing their prime fertile ancestral lands, a vast number of cattle and various other belongings. In what Ntshabele (2018), Maylam (2005), Fontein (2016), and Adebajo (2006) call the most heinous land grabs of modern history, Cecil John Rhodes' real estate, in both present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia, totalled 3.5 million square miles and had under him more than two million Africans. Articulating about his pathological love for the land, Rhodes is reported to have said the following words: "I prefer land to niggers", "the indigenous people are like children. They are just emerging from barbarism", and "one should kill as many niggers as possible." This barbarism act earned him a leviathan moniker among the indigenous Africans, calling him the epitome of evil. Between 1896 and 1897, the Shona people, this time together with the Ndebele people, waged another unsuccessful war, the *First Chimurenga/Umvukela*, in resistance to settler colonialism. Commenting on such colonial primitive accumulation processes, Shivji (2008) asserts that primitive accumulation has predation and military as its inherent enablers. However, it is critical to note that in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is only in Zimbabwe where the struggle for land was fraught with violence between the dispossessed African indigenous people and the white settlers (de Nobel, 2016).

Further articulating on the preceding colonial crude accumulation processes, Bourne (2011), de Nobel (2016) and Fontein (2016) argue that the colonisation of Zimbabwe was therefore not quick, easy and straightforward. It was a complex web of political and economic processes that involved massive killings, lies and deceptions, with both the Ndebele King Lobengula and Her Majesty Queen Victoria in the United Kingdom having fair shares of all. To use Marx's (1967, p. 538) words, the colonisation process was that of "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt." Marx (2015[1967], p. 508) further asserts that "And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire." This may testify that primitive accumulation is a double-edged sword that started and finished imperialism, now sustaining modern capitalism.

Rhodes enjoyed an undue financial advantage over Lobengula, which had a strong bearing on Zimbabwe's subsequent colonisation. Bond (1998, p. 21) calls this financial advantage "power of finance capital." Rhodes had easy and quick access to the global finance capital, which at the time was on the verge of devaluation because of the widespread overaccumulation problem in its global centres, particularly in the City of London (Nyamunda, 2017; Arrighi & Saul, 1973; Bond, 1998). It is important to note that Rhodes had befriended the Cape Town-based Standard Bank's General Manager, Lewis Michell. Michell made it much easier for the bank to open its first operating branch in Salisbury only five months after the telegraph line was constructed in 1892 and Bulawayo in 1893, with South African bank notes becoming the currency in the new colony. The telegraph line was important to link the newly acquired colony with Johannesburg (the headquarters of the mining companies and banks) and London (the global centre of finance capital at the time). The first bourses in the colony were then established the following year (i.e. 1894) in Salisbury and Bulawayo, with Mutare and Gweru getting theirs four years later in 1898 (Mabel, 2016).

The land of the indigenous black people was indeed expropriated, both in quantitative and qualitative greater degrees. Commenting on this perspective, Bond (1998) surmises that by 1903 more than ¾ of the company's prime agricultural land was accumulated through dispossession and displacement of the indigenous Africans. To show that the BSAC was a speculative concern with profit as the ultimate goal to be achieved by whatever means necessary, Wild (1997) submits that the expenditures of military conquests, setting up of the telegraphic and construction of the railroad infrastructures, and opening up and administration of the colony were all debited in the company's balance sheet. While the profits accrued in the sale of mining concessions, trading licenses, and land as well as the taxes and levies collected, were all entered on the credit side of the company's balance sheet.

The BSAC, a Chartered Mercantile Company, was searching for gold in the North of Limpopo to establish what was thought to be the Second Rand- another Ophir- meaning gold deposits of similar scale with those found in the Witwatersrand. Writing about the tragedies that would befall the indigenous people following such discoveries, Karl Marx argues that:

> The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting

> of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre (Marx, 1967, p. 533).

However, when the mining economic establishment proved to be less lucrative than expected, the Company turned to agro-business. This situation was essentially to recoup the sunk costs invested in telegraphic, railroad and road infrastructures that had been constructed (Nyamunda, 2017; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). To Bond (1998, p. 31) "Once the mistake was realised in 1894, Rhodes resorted to rampant looting, and ordered the conquered people of Matabeleland and Mashonaland to surrender as many as 200,000 cattle outright, to pay taxes (in the form of crops, cattle and goats), and to submit to forced labour." Henceforth, racial uneven development configuration transcended the next nine decades.

The BSAC administration commissioned several Land Commissions to appropriate land and its endowments from the indigenous Africans. This commissioning was done through systematically allocating fertile land for agriculture to the settler farmers (usually the large-scale farms) and tribal or native reserves, which later on renamed African Purchase Areas (APAs) or Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), to the indigenous Africans. The APAs/TTLs were established according to the Native Reserve Act of 1899 for the intents and purposes of reducing peasant competition and encouraging migrant labour (Sachikonye, 1989 & 2004; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). The first Land Commission, which commodified the agricultural land for the first time in the country's history, was established in Matebeleland in 1894, the Lands Commission of 1894. It suggested the coercive removal of the Ndebele people from their Highveld land around Bulawayo to such less habitual reserves as Gwaai and Shangani. Moyana (1984) described these areas as extremely sandy, badly watered and unfit for both agriculture and habitation. Further to that, Richard Martin, the British Resident Commissioner of the time, decried the indigenous African people's placement in such areas citing the unfavourable habitat and agricultural conditions in those places. However, the BSAC regime went on to evict the Ndebele people, notwithstanding their initial resistance and the denunciation by the British Resident Commissioner on the move.

Subsequently, this resulted in the waging of an unsuccessful 1896-1897 Ndebele and Shona uprisings (*the First Chimurenga/Umvukela*), which was preceded by yet another ineffectual 1893-1894 Anglo-Ndebele war, colloquially known as the war of dispossession (McCandless, 2011).

The indigenous blacks were resisting against "settler brutalities" (ibid, p. 26) such as systematic evictions, looting, raping, killings, expropriation of their ancestral lands without compensation, and forced labour, as well as poor environmental practices (Tsomondo, 1977; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; McCandless, 2011). This, however, signified the preponderance of imperialism primarily characterised by the international monopoly-finance capital in the newly acquired colony. When explaining imperialism Lenin (1986, p. 75) used the following quote uttered by Cecil John Rhodes in 1895:

> In order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.

In 1914, another land commission, The Southern Rhodesia Indigenous People Reserves Commission, was commissioned. The purpose of its commissioning was simple: to further expropriate land without compensation from the indigenous African people. According to the commission's results made public in 1915, it recommended that 6.6 million acres be subtracted from, and 5.6 million acres to be added to the reserves' 20 million acres. Predictably, the more significant percentage of the 5.6 million acres was located in the unliveable places of Chiswiti, Chimanda, Gwaai and Omay. This land division resulted in the formation of 14 new reserves in areas where 2 out of 3 million acres were deemed extremely poor land for agriculture. For McCandless (2011), Palmer (1977) and Chitiyo (2000), by 1920, 114 the reserves were constituted by 8.7 million hectares to house more than half of the indigenous African population. However, 15 million hectares of arable lands located in regions where rainfall is reliable were allotted to only 25 thousand white-settlers, notably the Volk from South Africa.

One unsettling issue to reckon at this juncture is that there was a 'communal tenure system' in the created native reserves. Under this system, the traditional leaders, under the Resident Native Commissioners' authority, were the custodians and stewards of the lands, thereby precluding private ownership of land among the peasants. The implication of this was that land was distributed to the peasants at the mercy of the traditional leaders and without title deeds. Nonetheless, in the European areas, the land was privately owned. The white farmers had title deeds of the land, making it easy for them to use them as collateral security when accessing loans.

Further, some lands confiscated from tribal or native reserves were transformed into game ranches. For example, the creation of a 2.5 million-acre Nuanetsi ranch in Matibi. In the end, the 1914 Lands Commission was credited for its ability to dwindle the size of the native reserves, especially those close to the markets, and correspondingly increasing that of the white-settlers, thereby resulting in the congestion and overpopulation of the remaining reserves (Sachikonye, 2004).

2.1.2 Economic boom, depression and recovery: Responsible government rule (1923-1953)

For Arrighi (1967, p. 6), the "Responsible Government merely meant a greater share of power for the national white classes and by no means their undisputed rule." This self-governing status attained by the colony 33 years into colonialism was a direct antithesis of the BSAC's option of amalgamating the colony with the recently created Union of South Africa, with Southern Rhodesia proposed to be the fifth province of the Union (Mlambo, 1998 & 2014; Berry, 2019; Michel, 2018; Bond, 1998; Bond & Manyanya, 2003; Arrighi, 1967). The other four provinces of the Union being Natal, the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and the Cape. Joining the Union was considered reasonable and strategic by both the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa governments. Despite all these concerted efforts by the BSAC, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom of having Southern Rhodesia join the Union, this move was thwarted by the outcome of the 1922 referendum. The outcome saw 59.4% favouring the responsible government and Southern Rhodesia standing as a separate self-governing colony rather than becoming the Union's fifth province while 40.1% favouring joining the Union, much of them were from Matebeleland. Sir Charles Patrick John Coghlan, a Southern Rhodesian politician who later became the first Prime Minister of the Responsible Government from 1923 until he died in 1927, considered amalgamating with the Union tantamount to making Southern Rhodesia the Ulster of South Africa.

However, joining the Union, according to Arrighi (1967), Nyamunda (2017) and Gann and Gelfand (1964), was considered by international capitalism as a strategic political and economic move. The reason is simple: General Jan Christiaan Smuts, the Prime Minister of the Union of

South Africa at the time, was considered a reliable upholder of the British imperial interests in the region and western international finance capital in general. General Smuts, a one-time chancellor of Cambridge University and a confidant of both Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had unequivocal international statesmanship credibility of upholding Western imperialism with firmness in the region (Dubow, 2008). These credentials made him the more trusted upholder of western imperialism in Southern Africa, hence justifying the idea of Southern Rhodesia joining the Union.

Equally important to note is that the financial interests, which the colony was not enjoying, were the ones Britain, the colonial master, was after (Nyamunda, 2017 & 2016), thus the need for a statesman with credible international credentials like General Smuts to uphold the system as it was. The rejection by Britain of the 1899 ordinance that established the State Bank in 1907, the passage of the Southern Rhodesia Coinage and Currency Act of 1922, and the establishment of the Southern Rhodesia Currency Board (SRCB) in 1938 that gave Britain carte blanche to regulate the monetary and financial systems of the colony testify the primacy of Britain's financial interests in the colony. For example, the Southern Rhodesia coins and notes were printed by a London based company, one Brandbury and Wilkinson Company, and issued, regulated and shipped to Southern Rhodesia by the Bank of England (Nyamunda, 2017).

Thus, with the enactment of the Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) Order in Council of 30 July 1923, which granted the Constitution to the colonial government, the BSAC rule ended on September 13, 1923 (i.e. after 33 years in force). Charles Coghlan's Rhodesia Party-led Responsible Government had to buy the country from the Company for £2.3 million. Instructive to note here is that the granting of the Constitution saw the colony being transformed from a mere protectorate of Britain through the BSAC into a semi-independent nation-state through the Responsible Government status it acquired. However, Britain retained its carte blanche financial and monetary regulatory roles on the semi-governing colony against resurgent sentiments for the colony to have its central bank.

This newly formed Southern Rhodesia nation-state, according to Bond (1998), Nyamunda (2016), Msindo (2016) and Arrighi (1973), only represented the interests of 35 000 white settlers. With the powers vested in its 1923 Constitution, the Responsible Government enacted a series of

draconian racial laws that saw black indigenous people further excluded from the country's political and economic mainstreams (Moyana, 1987; Palmer, 1977). Therefore, by virtue of the force of these laws, the indigenous people were systematically excluded from meaningfully engaging and participating in the economic and political activities of their motherland. To this end, the indigenous Africans were regarded as a source of cheap labour to work in the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors (Chitsove, 2014; Chingozha & Von Fintel, 2017; Mwatara & Swart, 2016). One of these laws is the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, labelled the Magna Carta of white supremacy by Nyamunda (2017), which the Howard Moffat's Rhodesia Party-led government enacted according to the Terms of Reference of the Morris Carter Land Commission conducted in 1925 (Chaminuka and Dube (2017). Europeans considered the Act "a charter, almost a bill of rights in this country [Southern Rhodesia]" (Mosley, 1983[2009], p. 29). It was meant to separate the land of the blacks and whites up to a time when blacks were considered civilised (Berry, 2019; Moyana, 1987; Sadomba, 1999).

The Land Apportionment Act was akin to the Natives Land Act of 1913, enacted and implemented by the Union of South African government. Commenting on the ramifications of the primitive accumulation processes of the 1913 Indigenous people Land Act, Plaatje (2007[1916], p. 15) remarks that "Awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth." The same happened to the indigenous Africans in neighbouring Zimbabwe following the enactment of what Nyamunda (2017) calls the Magna Carta of the colonial administrations, i.e. the 1930 Land Apportionment Act by the Rhodesia Party-led government under the premiership of Howard Moffat. The two land Acts (i.e. the Land Apportionment Act and the Land Tenure Act) restricted the indigenous people from owning and controlling land while confining them to designated Native Purchase Areas (Utete, 2003; Chingozha & Von Fintel, 2017; Mwatara & Swart, 2016).

To this end, much like the South African Natives Land Act of 1913, the 1930 Land Apportionment Act had created, Plaatje (2007[1916]) argues, a political economy of persecution, vagabondage and slavery among the indigenous blacks. In corroboration with this reasoning, Giovanni and Saul (1973), agreeing with Chaminuka and Dube (2017), Chingozha and Von Fintel (2017), Mwatara and Swart (2016), Giovanni (1967) and Mandaza (2016c, 1986a & 1986b), renounce the Land Apportionment Act as the cornerstone and epitome of uneven economic development in

Zimbabwe. For the authors, the Act, as a legal tool for the political economy of economic underdevelopment, was largely based on proletarianizing the indigenous people and relegating some of them, notably women, children, and the ageing, into non-capitalist communities, a fundamental essential for the thriving of capitalism (Luxembourg, 1913 [2003]).

Therefore, according to these pieces of legislation, the whites, who constituted less than 3% of the total population, took 18 million hectares of the arable land in regions where rainfall was reliable (Moyo, Chambati & Yeros, 2019; Moyo & Yeros, 2009; Fitzmaurice, 2015). On the other hand, the blacks were confined in congested low-lying regions where land was arid and infertile, which were largely not suitable for meaningful agricultural activities as they were plagued with unreliable rainfall and tsetse flies (Sachikonye, 1989; Chitsove, 2014). Sachikonye (2004), Chingozha and Von Fintel (2017), and Mwatara and Swart (2016) corroborate these views by arguing that the land allocated to the whites was greater both in quantitative and qualitative terms and located in fertile agro-ecological regions of one, two and three. For the authors, the reverse was the curse for the blacks who were evicted to agro-ecological four, five and six regions. Further, the white settlers' areas were well developed, with sound transport networks connecting to the markets. The government also availed agricultural loans, grants, and subsidies to the farmers in these areas. No doubt, these skewed affirmative action policies contributed to developing an effective white supremacist capitalist agriculture.

However, the impact of these draconian and racial colonial land legislations on blacks in areas such as Belingwe, Chiota, Buhera, Chipinge and Svosve was unbearable, to say the least (Sachikonye, 2004 & 1989; Phimister, 1984; Moyana, 1984). For instance, in Svosve, Buhera and Chiota, the dramatic increase in population caused serious ecological problems. The ecological systems were severely affected due to over-crowdedness and cattle overstocking, and the official response to these problems was compulsory destocking (Sachikonye, 2004). In the words of Vulpen (1983, p. 23), the move "disturbed relations between Africans and agricultural personnel." To further alienate African peasants from meaningfully participating and engaging in agricultural activities, agricultural grants, loans, credit, marketing and fertilizer facilities were made inaccessible to them. This was despite the fact that indigenous blacks constituted about 97% of the total population at the time. Further, race as a determinant factor for political and economic activities at the time was evidenced by the fact that blacks who could afford to buy the land were

given a maximum ceiling of 125 hectares in Native Purchase Areas, usually those lying adjacent to the communal lands. However, in the case of large-scale white-commercial farmers, one was allowed to own an average of 2500 hectares (McCandless, 2011). On this, Moyo and Yeros (2005, p. 23) observe that:

> For its own part, the White agrarian bourgeoisie, some 6,000 farmers at independence, retained 39 percent of the land, amounting to 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-ecological farmland, while one million black households remained consigned to 41.4 percent of the land, or 16.4 million hectares of marginal land. In all, the White minority, at below 3 percent of the population, commanded nearly two-thirds of national income; while the black majority, at 97 percent, took the remaining one-third.

Besides, the Land Apportionment Act had a provision that prohibited the ownership or lease by an African of premises in the European designated areas. As European premises were mostly in towns and cities, no one of African descent was allowed to own or lease premises in the urban areas. This implicitly means that African agricultural produces were not allowed in the urban areas but rather restricted only in their rural set-ups, thus prohibiting to the uttermost their growth. Under the Native Registration Act of 1936, African hawkers were allowed to do business in the African areas and only sell such petty commodities as baskets and curios, while selling such commodities as butter, eggs or chicken was legally prohibited.

The implication of this was that the rate at which native land was depreciating in terms of productivity was equivalent to the rate at which their overall productivity decreased. This decreased their agricultural productivity and production, making them vulnerable to the European predators who were so thirsty for cheap or free labour or both to work in their primitive accumulated large-scale commercial farms and mines. This built-in-to-the-system strategy of decreasing African peasants' productivity became the hallmark of extracting free and cheap labour from the peasants. The African peasants had left with no choice except to sell their labour in order to survive. The colonial Magna Carta (i.e. the Land Apportionment Act) had thus accelerated the rate of imperial primitive accumulation of land and the proletarianisation of the African peasants with the degree of rapidity arguably unprecedented to the history of the country. This exercise had a further corresponding rate of uneven development between these two antagonistic camps: development on one and underdevelopment on the other. With regards to this uneven development, Fanon (1961, p. 39) writes

> The town belonging to the colonised people, or at least the native town, the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire. It is a town of niggers and dirty Arabs.

In contrast, Fanon recounts that the settlers' towns are well-built, brightly lit and well-fed.

Furthermore, to effectively make sure that the supply of African labour was firmly maintained in all sectors of the imperial economy, the distribution of labour was not left to the whimsical ebbs and flows of the laws of demand and supply. Instead, various forms of parliamentary robberies were committed by way of legislating the extraction of labour through enacting such enactments as the Native Registration Act (1936). Marrying this Act with the Pass Law of 1902 made it possible for the newly established Responsible Government to keep the African peasants' wage structure as low as possible compared to their counterparts, the expatriated European wage workers. Overall, the Land Apportionment Act managed to put a permanent wedge between the two racial camps, thereby nipping in the bud all possible economic competitions between the two camps. This situation was primarily because the Act had a provision to the effect that, in the words of Arrighi (1967, p. 42), "In restricting competition in these markets the Land Apportionment Act drew the general lines whereas more specialised legislation tightened the restrictions in the individual spheres." Consequently, systematic prevention of inter-racial competition allowed the Africans 'to decay' while the 'Europeans to flourish' economically.

2.1.3 The Central African Federation and the rising and falling of the imperial economy (1953-1963)

Between 1953 and 1963, the colony was federated with the other two neighbouring British colonies, namely Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (then Nyasaland), with Southern Rhodesia as the administrative, commercial and financial capital (de Nobel, 2015). This ten-year federation period of the premiership of two United Federal Party (UFP), Garfield Todd (1953-1958) and Edgar Whitehead (1958-1962), according to historians such as Nyamunda (2016, 2017), Cohen (2017) and West (1992), was considered as the most liberal of all the imperial periods in

the country. The federation, known as the Central African Federation (CAF) or the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was a brainchild of the longest-serving Prime Minister in the history of the British Commonwealth, Godfrey Huggins, which he became its first Prime Minister upon formation in 1953. Godfrey Huggins's master plan was to create a federated independent and sovereign state within the British Empire ruled by the white minority, with a tiny number of educated Africans qualifying as voting participants together with the whites (Cohen, 2017; Parkin, 2018; Larmer, 2017).

The ten-year federation period saw the rising and falling of speculative bubbles in Southern Rhodesia as the regional financial, capital-intensive investment, and real estate speculative bubbles rose and busted during the same period (Murphy, 2015; McCandless, 2011; Bond, 1998; Arrighi, 1968; Bond & Manyanya, 2002). However, it should be noted that this 'pendulum pattern' of speculation did not affect, in any way, the amplified rate of uneven development between the colonialists and the indigenous Africans. The indigenous Africans' lifestyles remained appalling, notwithstanding the constant flows and ebbs of speculations. Besides being alienated from their inalienable right to their ancestral lands, Indigenous Africans were still confined in racist conditions. During the CAF government's reign, the colonial and imperialistic vices, which accumulated by dispossession of all forms of their powers and wealth, were still in place.

For Murphy (2015), Cohen (2018), Bond (1998), Mandaza (1986a) and McCandless (2011), the constant bubbling and busting of speculations in the country during the 1950s, caused by the overheating of the international financial capital markets before they were quickly overcooled, meant that unprecedented state countervailing fixes had to be found to nip the problem in the bud. This was against the background of the failure by the temporal and spatial quick fixes of displacing and shifting the local overaccumulation of capital to put at bay the speculative ebbs and flows. In Southern Rhodesia, the overheating was due to the overaccumulation of capital in the financial capital, real estate, and capital-intensive investment sectors. However, it is the financial capital markets crash, aggravated by the copper market crash in neighbouring Northern Rhodesia (modern-day Zambia), that caused the rapid cooling (McCandless, 2011).

When the end of the federation drew near, in 1962, the federation government refused to implement the recommendations made by various commissions of inquiry that emphasised the

need to mainstream Africans into the national economy. The recommendations of the Philip Report of 1962 are one case in point. The situation was further worsened by the federation government's move to adopt and implement the replica of the apartheid South African Group's Areas Act of 1954 (Nyamunda, 2017), which went by a euphemistic name 'policy for community development.' For Nyamunda (2017, p. 756), it was a mere "smokescreen for apartheid, Bantustan, separate development", a segregationist policy in disguise.

The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1950 restricted indigenous people to own an insignificant number of cattle (only six herds of cattle were allowed per household), regulated the acreage, the crops and plants to be planted (Fitzmaurice, 2015). The Act also controlled the distribution and marketing of agricultural products and required the indigenous people to apply for certain husbandry methods to be used in their newly resettled reserves (Raftopoulos, 2003). However, the same legislation allowed white farmers to own unlimited herds of cattle in their vast farmlands. Also, the Grain Marketing Act in 1966 divided the country into different agricultural zones with which all grains were not allowed to be moved from one zone to the other. This exercise had severe economic disempowerment implications among the blacks who were congested in the low-lying arid lands by requiring farmers to sell their agricultural products to the Grain Marketing Board or its agents located in large-scale commercial farms. Related to this Act is the Maize Control Act (1931, 1934), enacted to systematically undermine and manipulate the emergence, development, and growth of the African agricultural activities by taxing it and reinforcing the white agrarian capital by subsidizing it (Moyo & Yeros, 2005). The Companies Act No. 47 (Chapter 192) prohibited blacks from opening businesses as it contained complex registration requirements that ordinary black indigents did not and could possess. The Act also inhibited individual blacks from opening business ventures. It further prohibited directors from borrowing money to pay for the allotted shares.

In the end, a tiny fraction of the blacks opened businesses, thus crowding out the rest of the country from the mainstream economic activities. The Control of Goods Act of 1954 prohibited imports of a certain quantity and types of goods to enter the country. Most of the prohibited goods, Chitsove (2014) argues, notably fit for small scale businesses that ordinary black business aspirants would venture into. On a related note, the Second-Hand Goods of 1954 prohibited the importation of second-hand clothes and other materials, products that were basic for blacks.

2.1.4 UDI and the amplification of imperial primitive accumulation (1965-1979)

By way of following suit what the National Party-led apartheid government in neighbouring South Africa had done a year earlier in 1961, soon after its election victory in December 1962, the Ian Douglas Smith led Rhodesia Front government demanded an immediate 'independence' from London, a request which the London administration unreservedly rebuffed (Nyamunda, 2017 & 2016). The word independence is used cautiously here as it did not denote majority rule but rather to Rhodesian white minority independence from Britain, the colonial power. Responding to British nagging about granting the indigenous people independence and refusal by the British government "to accede to Rhodesia's entreaties for full independence" (Good, 2015, p. 16), the Rhodesian Front led government unilaterally declared its independence from Britain on 11 November 1965 (Berry, 2019; Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2016; Fitzmaurice, 2015; McCandless, 2011; Bond, 1998). For Fitzmaurice (2015, p. 327), the Southern African country became an "independent rebel pariah republic" in the wake of the UDI. On 11 November 1965, the Armistice Day, Ian Smith, the self-proclaimed apostle of Cecil John Rhodes, is reported to have said, "The mantle of the pioneers has fallen on our shoulders to sustain civilisation in a primitive country." Comparatively, although the UDI may be redolent to the cutting of the colonial umbilical cord with Britain on 31 May 1961 by the National Party-led government in the neighbouring Union of South Africa, it is essential to note that in South Africa, the umbilical cord was cut through a referendum while in Rhodesia through a declaration.

UDI was done to maintain the white supremacy governance architecture in the colony, thereby further perpetuating the black indigenous people's subjugation and amplifying the rate of uneven political and economic development in the bifurcated society (Kenrick, 2018; Michel, 2018; Law, 2017). The colonial master Britain then was now pushing and insisting on majority rule, a paradigm shift in the country's political economy the racist white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia was totally against, based on universal suffrage (Nyamunda, 2017; Good, 2015). For Good (2015), by then, only 210 000 whites were controlling the levers of power and economic fundamentals of the country, the logic of which pushed 4.2 million black indigenous people into the social, political and economic margins of the society. Britain, confronted with such a situation, had found majority

rule as both inescapable and inevitable. This situation was largely motivated by the fact that at the time, many colonised "countries across Africa were in the process of demanding, and in many cases fighting for, and attaining, independence" (McCandless, 2011, p. 27).

According to Good (2015), by declaring UDI, Smith wanted to turn the clock of the country's political economy back to the colonial heydays of Rhodes, Huggins, and Whitehead. Unfortunately, he attempted to do that when the African minds were so awakened and demanding, and in many instances fighting, for their independence as soon as yesterday. Also, the colonial master Britain was against the move of continued white minority rule. Consequently, Smith's "not in a thousand years" narrative that the indigenous black majority will rule only lasted for a short period of 15 years. The announcement of the UDI had ushered in the worst racist and white-settler regime that resulted not only in it being ostracised internationally but also in the waging of a protracted war of liberation against two nationalist movements: Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

In the economic front, emerging from the 1950s' and early 1960s' "conditions of economic contraction" (McCandless, 2011, p. 27) or "half-decade of economic stagnation (1960-65)" (Bond, 1998, p. 86) and international sanctions the UDI economy from 1965-1974 witnessed what can be best described as the 'greenhouse' condition for growth and development. Nyamunda (2017, 2016) also echoes similar views on this. The state responded to international sanctions by instituting a raft of sanctions-busting measures such as protectionist policies on the free flow of finance and import substitutions accounted for the extraordinary economic growth witnessed during that time (Michel, 2018; Good, 2015; Bond, 1998; Law, 2017). Priority was given to increasing military and administration budgetary expenditures while the two-strategic extractive economic sectors, namely agriculture and mining, played decisive roles in influencing and determining the national economic policy. However, critics criticised the inward-looking and increasingly *dirigist* economic policies as 'siege economy'. Nyamunda (2017) speaks about Rhodesia's financial bulwark as a critically important factor that allowed the UDI to survive 15 good years of international and UN sanctions when the rebel administration was projected to live only for months, and also for the economic boom witnessed in the country post-1965.

While the over-accumulation related economic slump of the early 1970s hit hard the fortunes of the white settlers who were the owners and controllers of the entire means and factors of production, the black indigenous people were not spared either (Nyamunda, 2017 & 2016; Good, 2015; Bond, 2007; Bond & Manyanya, 2002; McCandless, 2011). Black workers, indigenous and alien alike, in farms, factories and mines were still super-exploited as they were still receiving poor wages and working conditions deteriorated (Law, 2017; Brownell, 2017; McCandless, 2011). Resultantly, the super-exploitation further entrenched and widened the inequality gap between blacks and whites. Also, the UDI government's attempts to free itself from the clutches of this economic depression did not dent in any way the racial uneven development configuration. Thus, as the economic, social and political injustices became insurmountable and intolerable among the black constituencies by 1965, the black indigenous people, through the nationalist liberation movements, started mobilizing to forcefully demand and fight for the end of the racist white minority UDI regime.

Also, the UDI regime's Land Tenure Act of 1969, the embodiment of the Magna Carta's seal of white rule (i.e. the Land Apportionment Act of 1930) (Nyamunda, 2017), outlawed the indigenes from being independent producers of agricultural commodities for trade. The Act disempowered the indigenous people, which made the economy more foreign than indigenous in outlook. The law compelled the indigenes to concentrate on foodstuffs and other essential goods and services not meant for trade but only for consumption purposes. Together with the 1969 Rhodesian Constitution, this Act divided the country into racial areas: the European and the African areas. This "reflected judicially in land apportionment, the electoral and education systems and employment opportunities" (Fisher, 2010, p. 131). It is important to note that this racial border system was not without precedent in the colony's political economy. The colony's political economy of separate development was initiated by the 1898 Southern Rhodesian Order-in-Council, which established two racial administrative structures meant to reflect the land division between Africans and European settlers. At the top of the administrative structures was the Native Affairs Department that administered the affairs of Africans. At the bottom of the hierarchy was the European 'Native Commissioners' who comprised Native Affairs Department's senior staff and the government-subsidised African chiefs and headmen (Fisher, 2010). Africans considered this department as a state within a state as it oversaw their day-to-day lives.

In the final analysis, it can be established that, to a significant extent, the UDI apartheid policies and laws had politically disenfranchised and economically disempowered the indigenous people; for example, their limited voting rights and economic engagements were further reduced (Nyamunda, 2017, 2016). Thus, it is against this background that one may argue that indigenisation's ideological foundations rest on correcting colonial political and economic imbalances bequeathed to the postcolonial government whose distinctiveness was nonindigenous at the commanding heights of the country's economy.

2.1.5 Imperial mining development and uneven development

Throughout the colonial period, "the Rhodesian colonial economy was totally reliant on mining industry in general, and on gold mining in particular" (Phimister & van Onselen, 1978, p. 3). Therefore, it is worth discussing how and why the imperial mining development shaped uneven development. Thus, this section discusses the key themes, debates and actors around mining development during the colonial period. Furthermore, the section also discusses how the colonial mining development shaped and sustained the uneven development configuration in general and mining uneven development in particular in the country.

During the formative years of the Responsible Government mining industry had developed to the extent that in 1924 about 72% of the country's exports were from the mining industry- with gold alone constituting about 46% of all these exports (Phimister & van Onselen, 1978). In Zimbabwe, gold has been the major export earner since then to the present. At the commercial level, gold mining in Southern Rhodesia started with developing two capital-intensive gold mines in 1893 (Phimister & van Onselen, 1978). Thanks to massive investments in the gold mining sector during the initial days of colonialism, gold production and the number of gold mines grew exponentially that by 1920 there were about 295 gold producers- eight of them being large-scale mines and the rest being small-to-medium-scale mines (Phimister & van Onselen, 1978). As early 1905 Southern Rhodesia already had 76 small mines, with each producing less than 1,000 ounces of gold annually. In 1907, the number of these mines had already tripled. Important to note at this stage is that at the time, all the means and factors of mining production, as in all other sectors of the colonial economy, were owned and controlled by the landed white-settlers- with the indigenous black

people providing both cheap and forced labour in the mines. Thus, the exponential growth of the gold mining during this period is pitted against the black labour force in the mining industry of 17,000 in 1906 expanding to 36,000 in 1936 (Mawowa, 2013).

The working conditions in the mines were dangerous to the extent that by 1920 about 2,000 black mine workers had died due to accidents and 18,000 from mining-related diseases (Herbst, 1990). Pneumonia tended to be the major killer due to unhygienic habitations in the mining compounds; before 1911, it had killed about 2,500 black mineworkers. Furthermore, due to unhygienic conditions in these compounds, the 1918 Spanish flue claimed 7% of black mineworkers living in the compounds (Phimister & van Onselen, 1978). Corroborating with this reasoning, Phimister (1980, p. 8), revealed that "At a conservative estimate, pneumonia and scurvy, and to a lesser extent tuberculosis, 'miners' phthisis, dysentery, influenza and syphilis, altogether claimed the lives of an estimated 33 000 black miners between 1900 and 1948." Of the 4,000 black mineworkers who died in the compounds between 1906 and 1908 scurvy claimed 8.3% in 1906, 17.7% in 1907 and 13.5% in 1908 (). Scurvy is

> a disease of the blood, characterised by debility anaemia, with sponginess and bleeding of the gums, bleeding into muscles, and effusions into joints and serous cavities, and the formation of characteristic ulcers, especially on the lower limbs; it is caused by the absence of certain constituents found only in fresh food, and aggravated and precipitated by unaccustomed muscular demand (Phimister & van Onselen, 1978, p. 43).

All this shows that while the colonial mining economy was booming, it was founded on racial unevenness.

Several protests and demonstrations against these dangerous working conditions, forced labour, police brutality, cheap labour and colonialism in general erupted countrywide. Two cases in point described by Phimister and van Onselen (1978)as the 'high water marks' of protest are the 1912 Wankie Colliery Strike and The Shamva Mine Strike of 1927. The former saw 160 of 1,000 workers at the mine on 31 December 1912 coming out on strike, and the latter saw 3,500 gold mineworkers from 12 to 17 September 1927 going out on strike for higher wages (Phimister & van Onselen, 1978). Furthermore, Wankie Colliery witnessed strikes again between 1918 and 1920, and Shamva Mine had a boycott of mine stores in 1920. Despite the state's heavy-handed responses to protests, Southern Rhodesia witnessed about 10 strikes in the mines between December 1925 and October 1925 (Phimister, 1980). The Bushtick Mine had an unrest in 1920

and Globe and Phoenix Mine had a strike in 1920. Bonsor Mine and Ayrshire Mine were among the first newly established mines to witness strikes in 1905 and 1909, respectively.

2.2 Origins and evolution of indigenisation in postcolonial Zimbabwe

Historically, the process of indigenisation in Zimbabwe has a long developmental trajectory; thus the chequered history it obtained. It can be traced from the successive colonial regimes' social, political, and economic injustices. Articulating on this long and conflicted history of indigenisation in the country, Raftopolous (1996, p. 1) writes, "the "indigenisation debate" has been a major theme of political discourse in Zimbabwe for some time." Of critically important to note at this stage is that the rise of an African middle class and establishment of the indigenous bourgeoisie were crucial objectives at the centre of the liberation struggle, even though their political discourses were often cloaked in more appealing populist rhetoric. The seeds of an indigenisation project, which saw the emergence of an African bourgeoisie, were important, though contested, part of the nationalist and liberation struggle ideology. According to Gaidzanwa (1994), the demands for economic indigenisation in the country, as a significant theme that intersects political and economic debates, was more pronounced in the 1990s, although it had started way back during the liberation struggle. The need to restructure capital through indigenisation was motivated mainly by the background that "[i]International finance capital has, since the Lancaster House Agreement, been the major factor in the internal and external policies of the state in Zimbabwe."

However, it was not until the mid-1990s that scholars considered the indigenisation narrative worthy of scholarly attention. It is only after the works of Raftopolous and Moyo (1994), Gaidzanwa (1994) and the watershed conference on the indigenisation of the economy conducted at the University of Zimbabwe's Institute of Development Studies in 1996 that the study of the indigenisation of the economy in Zimbabwe gained more momentum and ground in the scholarly spaces. Since then, the literature on it has burgeoned. Nevertheless, this should not be misconstrued to mean that there were no other scholarly works on the subject prior to these works. It was only after the preceding works when serious scholarly discussions on the indigenisation of Zimbabwe's economy emerged. This period again witnessed the formation of various indigenous organisations, both private and public, initially demanding, and later fighting,

for a paradigmatic shift in the balance of economic power, which was highly and unevenly tilted in favour of the white monopoly capital, both international and local. The advocates and lobbyists for indigenisation took advantage of the dominant neoliberal ideology the world was gravitated towards after its antithesis, the socialist ideology, subsided with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Corroborating with this line of thought, Wild (1997, p. 266) argues that:

> The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, the emergence of a large informal sector of small African entrepreneurs, the break with socialism, the formation of an African proto-bourgeoisie and the established power elite's need to seek new allies, are the background against which attempts were made around 1990 to redefine the role of African entrepreneurship and overcome its historically conditioned marginalization.

Against this background, empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous people through indigenisation of the economy was considered an unavoidable and viable way of addressing the National Question(s) about apparent colonial uneven development imprints. The uneven development configuration was racially constructed and produced to benefit only a small fraction of the population, 3% (Moyo, Chambati & Yeros, 2019; Taylor, 2007; Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Raftopoulus, 1996), of the Zimbabwean society. Further articulating on this Taylor (2016, p. 11) submits that; "A white settler class of fewer than 300,000 at its peak controlled private property and the private sector."

2.2.1 Emergence and influence of indigenous organisations

For the purposes and intentions of redefining and restructuring the asymmetrical balance of capital, the early 1990s witnessed the emergence of an assortment of pro-indigenisation local organisations (Marongwe & Muguti, 2016). These organisations include the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) in 1990, Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU) in 1990, Parliamentary Select Committee on the Indigenisation of the National Economy in 1990, Cabinet or Ministerial Task Force on the Indigenisation of the National Economy in 1991 coordinated by the National Planning Commission. During the time the heated debate on economic indigenisation was anchored on several issues: the differences when it comes to balancing the costs and benefits of indigenisation that were to be incurred and enjoyed by the would-be losers and beneficiaries, respectively; the role of the state in structuring the policy, legal and institutional frameworks governing the affirmative action policy; and how the policy was to be implemented.

Further articulating on the preceding viewpoint that the indigenisation discourse gained more ground following the adoption of the neoliberal ESAP in 1991, Maphosa (1998, p. 185) argues that "the call for economic indigenisation in Zimbabwe gathered momentum after the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991." Fisher (2010), Raftopoulous (1992), and Raftopoulos and Campagnon (2003) also share similar views. ESAP, as an antithetical economic reform to the welfarist socialistic economic model adopted by the government in the first decade of independence, was introduced in a period of rapid economic recession fraught with hyperinflation and high levels of unemployment rates and poverty. The reform measure was rooted in the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm and rested on the philosophy of economic liberalisation (i.e. the Washington Consensus principles). According to these economic modes of thought, governments were required to retreat from performing some of the important economic functions to pave the way for the private sector's participation in the national economic activities (Bond, 2019; Gaidzanwa, 1994). Thie NPM paradigm provided an ideological justification for the government to promote small-scale private enterprise as a vehicle for employment creation.

The environment created by ESAP also provided an opportunity for the Black middle class, speculative indigenous entrepreneurial class according to Gatsheni (2006)- among them veteran business people and high salaried bureaucrats in both the private and public sectors- to lobby the government to remove the historically determined obstacles for participation in business in particular and in the economy in general. For Fisher (2010) and Raftopoulos (1992), the introduction of ESAP in 1991 provided a moral justification for the previously excluded indigenous blacks, who had been systematically denied capital accumulation by the socialist first independence decade, to voice for their participation in the national economy. One easy way to achieve this was through the indigenisation of the economy.

The IBDC became the first indigenous lobbying organisation, formed in 1990 to push for the mainstreaming of the indigenous blacks into the national economy through indigenisation (Ndakaripa, 2017; Raftopoulus, 1996; Maphosa, 1998). Nonetheless, unlike its sister organisations, such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), which were functionally business associations, the IBDC deemed itself to be more of "a nationalist pressure group" (Wild (1997, p. 267) and less as

a business association. The executive board was constituted by individuals drawn from various pressure groups such as the Zimbabwe Transport Organisation, Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union and Women in Business, and some politicians and government bureaucrats. The organisation's promoters were drawn from diverse business backgrounds, but they were strategically located due to their strong political connections. Chief among them were Strive Masiyiwa, Chemist Siziba, Philemon Machipisa, Mutumwapavi Vengesayi and John Mapondera, whom Madanhire (1995) calls the *nouveau(x) riches(s)* for they were pretentious new businessmen. The indigenous organisation's major objective was to pressure the government to allow the indigenous black bourgeoisie class to get resource allocation on preferential terms. Further, to, *inter alia*, lobby for the land redistribution in order to build a strong indigenous middle class in the agricultural sector; deregulation of the legal fraternity to enable blacks to participate in the economy; and government to order the commercial financial institutions to allow indigenous black Zimbabweans access loans at lower market interest rates.

By so doing, IBDC was voicing for capital restructuring to make strategic means and factors of production owned, controlled and managed by the indigenous people. The IBDC, unlike other business associations such as CZI and ZNCC, as well as the international donors and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), had a radical stance on the need to restructure capital through indigenisation (Gaidzanwa, 1996). However, Wild (1997, p. 268) argues that it was the 'elite of African business' that stood to benefit from their economic indigenisation campaign as they

> ...hope that once the noise has subsided and the dust has settled they can grab the debris left behind and piece it together for their own devices. It is an irresponsible exploitation of the nationalist feelings of the African majority and speculation in the erosive effect of nationalist propaganda on white morale.

IBDC did not last long, and its ephemeral existence was attributed to political and governance challenges (Maphosa, 1998). Severe factionalism and politics of succession weakened the indigenous organisation. "The strife was characterised by allegations and counter-allegations of misuse of power, electoral fraud, and misappropriation of funds", Maphosa (1998, p. 186) writes. The Herald (1993), as cited in Wild (1997, p. 272), also share similar views while reporting the financial racketeering and internal infighting within the organisation. It reveals that "[t]he organisation has no reputation and only the most reckless of financial institutions, including that,

are government-owned, will now consider financing anything which carries the IBDC label…members have spent less time putting projects together than squeezing each other's throat." These views were further supported by the utterances of the founding IBDC president, Philemon Machipisa, who, while commenting on factional fights within the organisation, complained that "…members were trying to use their political muscle to dominate the business organization" (Wild, 1997, p. 272). The organisation imploded and ultimately disbanded because of intense factionalism, electoral fraud, racketeering, electoral fraud, and funds embezzlement. Taylor (2002, p. 357) speaks of the indigenous organisation as an appendage of the ruling ZANU-PF and served as a "rentier class." Consequently, this then paved the way for the formation of three other indigenous lobbying organisations: the Indigenous Business Women Organisation (IBWO) in 1994, AAG in 1994 and the United Indigenous Pressure Group (UIPG) in 1995 (Taylor, 2002; Ndakaripa, 2017).

According to Gaidzanwa (2004), Gaidzanwa (1996) and Cheater and Gaidzanwa (1996), IBWO was formed against the background of the gendered nature of indigenisation that discriminated against women in the economic mainstreaming processes. The discrimination was largely because women's participation in such indigenisation lobbying organisations as IBDC and Affirmative Action Group (AAG) was inconsequential (Ndakaripa, 2017). Black businesswomen found themselves at the losing end when accessing loans or any financial assistance from the government geared at promoting indigenous entrepreneurship in the country. For instance, the IBWO cited Z$400 million loan facility put aside by the government for indigenous entrepreneurial assistance, alleged to have been distributed unfairly, favouring masculine entrepreneurs (Gaidzanwa, 2004). Therefore, the group's mission was "to create wealth for all indigenous women through economic empowerment and the removal of financial, social, economic, cultural and political impediments" (Sunday Mail, 1995 cited in Gaidzanwa, 2004, p. 23). However, the IBWO's alignment to the ruling party, evidenced by its endorsement of a member of the ruling party as a candidate for the 1996 presidential elections and its accommodation of some members from the ruling party in its structures, compromised its integrity as an indigenisation lobbying group (Gaidzanwa, 2004; Cheater & Gaidzanwa, 1996).

In July 1994, the AAG was formed against the background of the weaknesses of the IBDC. The AAG adopted aggressive lobbying strategies to ensure that their agenda of making indigenous

black people owners and controllers of both the means and factors of production in the country got into the government's attention (Raftopoulus, 1996). In actuality, the group members adopted a radical philosophy reminiscent of the one used by the American Black Nationalist Movement (ABNM). For example, in a similar statement like the one echoed by Malcolm X, this group had warned that: "Those who wish to become `Uncle Toms' or the House Negroes or the window-dressed or the `Mr. Nice Guys' . . . are using their sense of professionalism to defend the indefensible at the expense of the nation . . . be warned . . . A.A.G. will expose them . . ." Similarly, Maphosa (1998) observes that the outcry of the AAG was on the behaviour of the private commercial banks and other financial institutions owned and controlled by the whites, which was considered sabotaging the emergence, development, and success of an indigenous black bourgeoisie. It has been established then that private commercial banks and other financial institutions in the country seriously compromised the indigenisation of the economy because they systematically denied indigenous blacks from getting financial assistance because of their stringent regulations for one to obtain a loan. "At times the attack has been directed at Whites in general who are perceived not only to be responsible for the economic subordination of blacks but are also perceived to be the 'hidden hand' behind the banks' behaviour", Maphosa (1998, p. 177) further articulates.

The AAG, however, cited banks' institutional racism and lack of collateral security among the indigenous people, which they argued were legacies of colonialism, as reasons indigenous business entrepreneurs were denied financial assistance by the private commercial banks and other financial institutions. The AAG argued that it was mainly because of the colonial relics that made blacks not own any property they would use as collateral to secure loans from financial houses. Commenting on this viewpoint, the founding head of the organisation, Philip Chiyangwa- the late president Robert Mugabe's nephew, said the following just after the founding of AAG: "Affirmative Action is about removing injustices, not about revenge" (Financial Gazette, 1995 as cited in Wild, 1997, p. 273). Around the same time in Tanzania, the president of the Tanzanian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, David Mwaibula, "urged the government to support the Chamber's recommendation that the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1991 be amended to specify that a minimum percentage of all bank loans go to indigenous entrepreneurs" (The Express August 22, 1995, cited in Aminzade, 2003, p. 48).

For close to a century, 90 years to be precise- from 1890 to 1980- indigenous blacks were subdued by successive colonial regimes which enacted colour bar economic empowerment laws, making it difficult for the blacks to make savings that would have been used as collateral security. In July 1994, as observed by Raftopoulus (1996) and Maphosa (1998), a coalition of indigenous lobbying groups made up of the AAG, IBDC, IBWO and Sangano Munhumutapa engaged into massive protests and demonstrations in Harare against what they called 'institutional racism' within the country's lending system. Further corroborating with this analysis, the World Bank (1995, p. 58) reveals the following:

> For example, by 1991, 50% of the population received less than 15% of total annual incomes and about 15% of total consumption, while the richest three percent of the population received 30% of total incomes and were responsible for 30% of total consumption.

Further, one of the black businessmen interviewed by Maphosa (1998, p. 177) states that:

> Our businesses are ailing because banks are racial [...]. The colour of the person determines whether or not he or she gets a loan regardless of how feasible the project proposal is. Whites get preferential treatment because they control the economy of this country.

However, AAG was criticised for unclear organisational values, an unclear economic indigenisation model, and its affiliation to the ruling party. This characterisation rendered the organisation less credible in the indigenisation discourses and suffered a fate similar to its predecessor, the IBDC (Maphosa, 1998; Raftopoulus, 1996). Raftopoulos (1996, p. 5) argues that "indeed, not only is the AAG program similar to that of the IBDC but they appear to be attempting to forge an even closer alliance with the ruling party." Furthermore, the indigenous organisation was criticised for being a representative of ZANU-PF's rentier class that became irrelevant to the fight for economic indigenisation the day its objective of elite private accumulation became apparent (Ndakaripa, 2017; Raftopoulus, 2000). Against this backdrop, in January 1995, another indigenous organisation lobbying for black economic empowerment, the National Reconstruction and Development Board (NRDB), was created "to inject new life and direction into the antagonisation debate" (Raftopoulus, 1996, p. 5). The Board was largely made up of members from both the IBDC and the AAG. The NRDB's major aim was to develop a pragmatic model for the economic empowerment of the indigenous citizenry of Zimbabwe. To achieve this, the Board had technocrats and business moguls, and it vowed to be transparent and

accountable in its dealings, guided by a clear philosophical ideology and not to affiliate itself with any pressure group or political party.

The NRDB questioned the integrity of the government's procedures when disposing of its assets, which it alleged to be surreptitious because blacks were largely unaware of the underhand dealings relating to assets disposal. The underhand dealings led the Board to question the integrity of the antecedent indigenisation lobby groups and the government's commitment to indigenise the economy (Fisher, 2010). For instance, the Board cited the sale of government shares in such public companies as Astra Corporation in National Foods sold to AM, then Anglo-American Corporation (AAC), and those in Delta Corporation sold to South African Breweries. According to the minutes of the Third Meeting of the NRDB of the 31st of March 1995,

> The blacks lack information on what is happening with regards to disposal of government assets. The whole process is not transparent, and the indigenous persons interested in acquiring government assets do not know how to go about it, because of lack of information. The Board should demand a public *modus operandi* on sale of government assets.

However, this was broadly interpreted to mean that the government was dragging its feet regarding indigenisation. The prevailing narratives of the time were centred on questioning the post-independent government's integrity in honouring that which the liberation war was waged for, addressing the land question and freeing the indigenous people from the yoke of the colonialists, both politically and economically.

However, as the NRDB was an amalgamation of members from the IBDC and AAG, its lobbying strategy failed primarily because the groups created it continued, clandestinely, to pursue the interests of their political masters. Thus, members within the Board were stressing different lobbying strategies and models of indigenisation. For instance, "while both the IBDC and the AAG have demanded business deregulation and state subsidies, the AAG has placed greater emphasis on the control and redistribution of white-owned wealth", Raftopoulus (1996, p. 6) writes.

2.2.2 The institutional and legislative foundations to indigenisation

To strengthen the indigenisation momentum, the government established the Deregulation Committee in 1991. The committee was entrusted with the task of examining various laws

inhibiting the emergence, development and growth of indigenous businesses. Later on, in 1993, the Deregulation Project Team was established to investigate legal frameworks that obstructed the entry, development, and growth of the indigenous entrepreneurial businesses in the private sector (Gaidzanwa, 1994 & 2004). The Team was supposed to make recommendations to the Deregulation Committee on how to either repeal, amend or abrogate these pieces of legislation to enable the proliferation and growth of indigenous businesses.

Consequently, by 1994, the former Senior Minister of State, the late Honourable Joseph Msika, the Deregulation Committee chair, reported that the Deregulation Project Team managed to identify 28 Acts of parliament preventing the emergence, development and growth of the indigenous bourgeoisie class. Chief among them include two colonial colour bar land legislations, Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969, both enacted according to the recommendations of the Morris Carter Commission of 1925, were singled out as the most obstructive to the emergence and development of both colonial and postcolonial indigenous bourgeoisie class. This situation was because as the Zimbabwean economy has been agro-based since the colonial periods, indigenous people's removal from their fertile lands and consigned into the Native Reserves, later known as TTLs, meant that they had been systematically excluded from the mainstream economy.

The two Acts further prohibited blacks from owning or leasing any property, including land, in either the lucrative European lands or their congested TTLs. Furthermore, the Lancaster House Constitutional provision of 'willing-buyer, willing-seller' approach to land redistribution exercise, which according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006, 2013) Good (2015) resulted in indigenous blacks accessing land without title deeds, increased this economic imbalance for yet another decade. Under this land redistribution approach, it became challenging to restructure land capital without dealing with some legal complexities. Lack of title deeds among indigenous people meant that there were ineligible to access financial assistance from commercial banks, which were also primarily owned and controlled by the whites. Thus, the financial exclusion nipped in the bud the prospects for the entry, development, and growth of the indigenous businesses (Gaidzanwa, 1996).

Moreover, some of the laws identified by the Deregulation Project Team as obstacles for the proliferation and development of the black business class which the team recommended for immediate priority attention were the following: Public Health Act (Chapter 328), the Companies Act (Chapter 190), the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (No. 22 of 1976), the Factory Act (Chapter 218), the Second Hand Goods Act (Chapter 293), the Rural District Act (No. 8 of 1988), the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 241), the Food and Food Standards Act (Chapter 321), the Income Tax Act (Chapter 181), the Land Survey Act (Chapter 147), the Shop Licensing Act (No. 40 of 1976), the Traditional Beer Act (No. 25 of 1984), the Liquor Act (No. 9 of 1984), the Customs and Excise Act (Chapter 117), and the Banking Act (Chapter 188). Most of these laws were relics of the successive colonial governments (ILO, 1993), racially designed to make it challenging to establish indigenous bourgeoisie. The pieces of legislation made it difficult for the new business start-ups to grow mainly because of tiresome procedures relating to company registration (required by the Companies Act), zoning regulations (required by the Urban Councils and Regional, Town and Country Planning Acts), health and safety issues (required by the Public Health Act) and licensing (required by the Factory Act).

However, it is worth noting that while some of these laws were not enacted primarily to deter the entrance, development, and growth of indigenous businesses, they had provided serious obstacles to the emergence and operations of such businesses even after independence. Further articulating this, Maphosa (1998) opines that the colonial governments deliberately passed these laws to deter indigenous businesses' participation in the mainstream economy, or their provisions were so complicated for a black person to think of starting a viable business. According to Raftopolous (1996), by 1993, very little progress was made regarding deregulating the business environment to strategically position indigenous businesses into the country's mainstream economy.

In September 1994, due to the mounting pressures from various fronts (i.e. from the business community, civil society, interest groups, labour and other government departments and agencies), the ruling ZANU-PF, through its party blueprint, gave its official position on the indigenisation of the economic narrative. The blueprint defined indigenisation to mean "the process of black empowerment aimed at reducing the racial inequality in the ownership and management of economic resources" (ZANU-PF, 1994, p. 2-3). To achieve this, the blueprint

categorically stated that the ruling ZANU-PF intended to create an indigenous bourgeoisie class with patriotism and nationalism outlooks.

The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) tried to make the debates around economic indigenisation more inclusive by attempting to make a corporate strategy comprising of the labour, capital, and the state. According to Raftopoulus (1996) and ZCTU (1996), the labour advocated this strategy mainly because it deemed it a national compromise in which all interest groups and stakeholders participate in policy formulation and decision making and implementation. To this end, the ZCTU proposed creating an inclusive national economic Council, i.e. the Zimbabwe Economic Development Council (ZEDC), that would accommodate all key stakeholders' interests. The Council was reminiscent of the South African National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC).

Further, in 1996 the government established the National Investment Trust (NIT), housed in the Office of the President and Cabinet, whose *raison detre* was to warehouse shares for the indigenous people that would result from privatizing state-owned enterprises (Chowa & Makuvare, 2013). For Mupazviriho (2011), the Trust's establishment was meant to warehouse the equity shares of the hitherto previously disadvantaged indigenous investors, especially those affected by the retrenchment exercise under ESAP. Therefore, the Trust's primary function was to facilitate the indigenous people's entrance and participation in the mainstream economy. A Deed of Trust for the Trust's operationalisation was then established in 1999 (Chipika & Malaba, 2011). In September 2002, the NIT of Zimbabwe Fund was established to facilitate the acquisition of shares from the loss-making state-owned and controlled enterprises to assist the indigenous people in their entry into the country's economic mainstream (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996; Siziba, 1996; Mupazviriho, 2011).

The NIT Fund was also set up in 2002 to assist indigenous black Zimbabweans to acquire the Greenfield projects through bridging finance, management buy-outs, and management buy-ins. The Fund has since been transformed into the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF) following the IEE Act's enactment in 2008. Much like its predecessor, the NIT Fund, the NIEEF's major aims are to avail financial assistance, particularly loans, to the indigenous Zimbabweans for share acquisition and warehousing of shares under the

Employee Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs); Management Share Ownership Trusts (MSOTs); business start-up; management buy-ins; and buy-outs, business consolidation, rehabilitation, and expansion. This should have been implemented through the Initial Public Offer Model (IPO Model), a designated financial mobilisation vehicle to assist ordinary indigenous Zimbabweans, both inside and outside the country, to venture into businesses through partnering with the foreign-owned ones.

According to the IEE Act, mainstreaming indigenous people into the national economy would have gone a long way in spurring social transformation, poverty eradication, employment and wealth creation, and sustainable socio-economic development and growth. Furthermore, the debate on economic indigenisation in Zimbabwe since during the 1990s was premised on creating a democratic environment to facilitate equal ownership, management and control of both the means and factors of production and to promote the emergence of a competitive indigenous black bourgeoisie class that will spearhead sustainable socio-economic development in the country. The indigenisation programme was also meant to promote a self-reliant and self-sustaining development in which there are equal opportunities for all to attain better and satisfactory living standards.

Nonetheless, the absence of standalone legal and policy frameworks that govern the indigenisation exercise was interpreted by many of these indigenous organisations to mean a lack of integrity on the part of the government to walk the talk of empowering the disenfranchised indigenous people through capital restructuring by way of indigenizing the economy (Chitsove, 2014). As a way of addressing the policy deficiency, in March 1997, the government, through the Ministry of Industry and International Trade and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), entered into a technical support assistance agreement, dubbed the Technical Support for the Indigenisation Policy Program (TSIPP), whose aim was to expedite and smoothen the process of indigenisation (Chipika & Malaba, 2011). Corroborating with this analysis, the Technical Support for the Indigenisation Policy Program Zim/97/005/01/97 argued that the major intent of the agreement was for the government to produce workable strategies of empowering the indigenous people, who formed the most significant fraction of the previously socially excluded and economically disenfranchised population. Poverty eradication amongst indigenous people was the ultimate intention of the TSIPP. The Department implemented the TSIPP for State Enterprises

and Indigenisation (SEID) housed in the Office of the President and Cabinet before it was handed over to the Ministry of Industry and International Trade in August 2001. The programme was in force from March 1997 to December 2003. Ultimately, the recommendations suggested by the TSIPP Zim/97/005/01/97 document, together with those from Hlatshwayo (2003), played a critical role in shaping the nature, shape and structure of the subsequent indigenisation policies, legislations and regulations enacted and passed by the government. The trio recommended that the government adopt economic nationalism laws that would give the indigenous businesspeople preferential treatments in all tendering and procurement issues.

The findings, conclusions and recommendations of this technical support agreement played a significant role in helping the government in the ensuing year (i.e. 1998) to, for the first time in the history of indigenisation of the country, finally drafted and adopted the '*Policy Framework on the Indigenisation of the Economy*' of February 1998 (Marongwe & Muguti, 2016; Machinya, 2014; Raftopoulos & Compagnon, 2003; Chipika & Malaba, 2011; Matyszak, 2012 & 2014; Chitsove, 2014). With this policy framework in place, in 1999, the government contracted Intrados, an international consulting firm, to prepare the Trust Deed for the NIT (Marongwe & Muguti, 2016). Again, with the help of the recommendations of the TSIPP, the 1998 indigenisation policy framework was later revised by the Cabinet in 2004, and the '*Revised Policy Framework for the Indigenisation of the Economy*' was adopted (Raftopoulus, 2014; Chitsove, 2014; Kanyenze, Kondo, Chitambara & Martens, 2011; Chipika & Malaba, 2011; Matyszak, 2012). The Revised Policy Framework gave a policy position and a legal effect on economically empowering the indigenous Zimbabweans through indigenisation. Consequently, 2004 adopted revised indigenisation policy framework, and again together with the help from TSIPP, formed the bedrock upon which the IEE Act of 20 March 2008 and various other supporting legislations were enacted (Marongwe & Muguti, 2016; Raftopoulus, 2014; Chowa & Makuvare, 2013; Machinya, 2014). The contents of Act and the subsequent indigenisation laws, Chitsove (2014) argues, served to operationalise the adopted 2004 indigenisation policy.

In Zimbabwe, while indigenisation debates became popular in the 1990s, its foundations in the form of policies advocating for restructuring the uneven economy were laid down in the formative years of independence (Ndakaripa, 2021). Furthermore, while popular in many African countries (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia), it is until the 1990s when the terms such as 'economic

indigenisation', 'indigenisation', and 'indigenous' and 'black economic empowerment' started to feature in Zimbabwe's political economy debates. However, during the first decade of independence, the government used several euphemistic terms pointing to the need to restructure the economy and address the widespread unevenness through indigenisation. These terms include the following: balanced and equitable economic growth, ownership by Zimbabweans, economic liberation, economic independence, local participation and state and local ownership of the economy.

As noted in Chapter 2, in 1980, the ZANU-PF government inherited from the successive colonial governments an uneven economy, i.e. an economy that was to a larger extent dominated by foreign and white capitals. In the 1990s, the term 'indigenisation' was interchangeably used with 'black economic empowerment.'

2.3 Key drivers, debates, methods and outcomes of early mining indigenisation experiments

The colonial history of Zimbabwe's political economy of accumulation began with the white-settlers overestimating the country's mineral resource endowments (Herbst, 1990; Arrighi, 1967). While the extractive industry "quickly lost its electoral base" (Herbst, 1990, p. 142) following this disillusionment, mining remained one of the critical sectors of the colonial economy. However, it is only after 1946 when the multinational mining companies started to dominate the mining industry; before that, small workers between 756 and 3,000 were exploring mining claims in the country (Herbst, 1990). Resultantly, in 1980 the independent black government inherited a highly unequal economy constructed, sustained and perpetuated by the racialised policies and laws of the successive colonial governments. According to Mawowa (2013, p. 60), "Colonial capitalism by its very nature had perpetuated "uneven development" across race and geography." The new government found itself confronted by the shocking reality that 60% of the country's fertile land was owned and controlled by 3% of the population, all whites. In the mining sector, as of 1980 95% of the mining exports were coming from foreign-owned and controlled mining companies (Bradbury and Worby, 1985). Corroborating with these statistics, Saunders (2017), Herbst (1990), Economist Intelligence Unit (1981) and Davies and Burdette (1987) reveal that as

of 1981, more than 90% of the extractive industry was owned and controlled by foreign capital, with many of the minerals exported in their raw form.

Furthermore, Clarke (1980) and Herbst (1990) reveal that out of the 14 mining companies that accounted for 73% of Southern Rhodesia's aggregate mineral output in 1974, only one or two were locally owned. Thus, throughout the colonial period and early years of independence, Zimbabwe's extractive industry was predominantly dominated by a handful of multinational mining companies (Saunders, 2017). The following realities observed by Saunders (2017, p. 1) prompted the need for the indigenisation of the extractive industry during the formative years of independence:

> Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe's minerals sector has been an important source of state revenue, a generator of employment and skills development, a key target of foreign direct investment (FDI), a strong source of foreign exchange earnings, and a provider of upstream inputs to the broader economy.

In support of this, Herbst (1990, p. 148) reveals that "[t]here was certainly no sector of the Zimbabwean economy in which foreign dominance was greater or more well established than in the mining sector."

Consequently, to address the ownership and control unevenness in the sector, which was heavily tilted in favour of the foreign companies, although with mixed results and reactions, soon after independence the government established state-owned mining and marketing entities (Herbst, 1990; Mawowa, 2013; Saunders, 2017). These are the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC)- the designated state-owned entity whose responsibility is to act as the mining operator and mine developer of the state- and Mining Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ)- whose responsibility is to market and sell the country's minerals overseas. The conflicts that ensued between the government and foreign-owned mining companies when the government's first two economic blueprints (i.e. the 1981's *Growth with Equity* and 1983's *First Transitional National Development Plan*) hinted on the need for local participation in the mining industry prompted Herbst (1990, p. 142) to say the following:

> The conflict between the multinaltional corporations, which played an integral role in the development of Rhodesia, and the new socialist government of Zimbabwe is a major political drama. Nowhere is this conflict more evident than in the mining industry, where a few large foreign companies control a strategic sector of the economy that accounts for

> 8,3 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product and approximately 38 percent of its imports.

For example, the government made it clear in the First Transitional National Development Plan (1983, p. 70) its intention to "increasing the degree of domestic, particularly state participation, ownership, planning and control" in the mining sector. However, in an attempt to maintain a balancing act between the need to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and ensure local participation and ownership in the mining sector, during the formative of the 1980s, the government settled for a dual strategy of mining reform (Saunders, 2017). On the one hand, the government encouraged expanded and new investments in larger-scale mining operations through guaranteeing concessions associated with foreign exchange earnings retentions, guaranteeing mining property rights and a friendly taxation system (Dansereau, 2000; Saunders, 2017). On the other hand, the restructuring of the extractive industry ownership structures was to address the following: ensuring the direct impact of state developmental approach; poor representation of the previously disadvantaged indigenous groups and communities; unfavourable working and labour conditions (ibid). As a result, "[w]ith few exceptions, large-scale operations remained under foreign control, while domestic firms were more significant in medium- and small-scale production" (Saunders, 2017, p. 4).

In the 1980s, the Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe (AMZ) and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) were the two civil society organisations advocating for restructuring the extractive industry. However, their advocacy was mostly centred on the following: workers' rights, labour relations issues, training and skills grading, wages, and the sustainability and empowerment of mineworker communities. In the 1990s, their advocacy shifted to social, political and economic debates around social equity, ownership of the factors and means production, unemployment, indigenisation and empowerment (Saunders, 2017).

The increasing number of players, dominance and contribution to the national economy of the artisanal and small scale mining (ASM), particularly starting in the early 1990s, point to the indigenisation of the sector as many of the ASM players are indigenous people (Mawowa, 2013; Saunders, 2017; Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe, 2013). In the 2000s, Zimbabwe's had over 500,000 ASM miners, particularly concentrated in the gold industry and briefly in diamond extraction (Saunders, 2017). However, it should be noted that most of these ASM players are

operating outside the formal economy as they are informal miners, although playing a significant role in the national economy. For the formalised ASM players, by 2008 Zimbabwe had less than 100 small-scale mines, down from about 400 of them before (Hawkins, 2009; Saunders, 2017). However, for other sources, by 2009 the country had about 25,000 registered ASM players, contributing 22% to the national gold production (BCZ, 2011). It should be noted that the huge "difference in numbers reflects different methodologies for distinguishing small-scale from semi-mechanized artisanal operations" (Saunders, 2017, p. 56). Between 2013 and 2015, the ASM witnessed a 441% increase in gold deliveries, reflecting an exponential growth of the sector's output- i.e. from below 4 tonnes in 2013 to 5.4 tonnes in 2015 to 8.8 tonnes in 2016 (Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe, 2016; Saunders, 2017). All these reflect the huge contribution the indigenised mining sector is making to the national economy.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter traced the history of uneven combined development in Zimbabwe since the initial days of conquest to the present. The discussion reveals how and why the colonial political economy of uneven and combined development was racially constructed and produced over time through various successive administrations. Measures, policies and pieces of legislation adopted and implemented by five successive imperial regimes (i.e. BSAC, Responsible Government, ACF and UDI administrations) drove significant imperial accumulation processes that economically, socially and politically disenfranchised the majority of indigenous Africans were also discussed in this chapter. This discussion further reveals the origins, evolution and patterns of uneven and combined development in Zimbabwe. In detailing the origins, evolution and patterns of indigenisation, the history reveals how and why such efforts largely failed to put a meaningful dent on the looming colonially constructed and produced political economy of uneven and combined development in the country.

PART 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND METHODOLOGY

This part consists of three chapters (Chapter 3, 4, & 5). Chapter 3 reviews literature concerning competing explanations on the conceptions and meanings of indigeneity and indigenisation. It further presents the debates around the drivers and taxonomies of indigenisation. The chapter concludes by presenting the theoretical framework of this study, i.e. accumulation by dispossession. Chapter 4 reviews the literature of selected case countries that implemented indigenisation and how Zimbabwe learnt (or should have learnt) lessons from the best and worst cases. Chapter 5 presents the methodology of the study. It articulates the methods and instruments applied in sampling, data collection, presentation, analysis and discussion. The chapter also discusses the measures used to ensure the integrity of data collection and the findings.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK

1.1 Introduction

Since the late 1990s, the role of the extractive industry in Zimbabwe's economy has been increasing. In part, this may be because the contribution of the other two strategic sectors of the economy (i.e. agriculture and industry) has been cumulatively declining since the late 1990s due to several factors. These include the effects of international isolation, high indebtedness, serious revenue challenges, liquidity crunch, and decreased government trust. This may also be due to resource nationalism resurgence in the country, a recent policy paradigm shift in countries endowed with natural resources. The policy paradigm shift is gaining international popularity because it places the indigenous citizens at the centre of development, i.e. the extraction of the natural resource endowments to be done in ways that benefit the indigenous citizens. This makes the mining sector an important economic enabler to lead economic recovery in Zimbabwe. To this end, the country's exports earnings, employment and foreign exchange reserves are predominantly dependent on the mining sector. The government's need to control the mining sector brings us to the contestations of indigenisation and indigeneity in the country. Thus, what makes extractive industry indigenisation and framings of indigeneity subjects of controversy is that the non-indigenous mining capital is not prepared to indigenise. At the same time, since the early 2000s, the government was eager to take total control of the extractive industry through either indigenisation or nationalisation.

The political economy of indigeneity challenges the traditional assumptions of authority and power. It does so by some regarding themselves as the original inhabitants of the land and claims political and economic rights while denying the same to others they regard as nonindigenous and foreign. Its primary objective is to justify the superiority of the indigenous over the nonindigenous through the former othering the latter on account of their questionable indigeneity status. Doing this makes it easier for the indigenous people to claim self-determination through owning, controlling and managing the means and factors of production of their motherlands, thereby

expropriating the non-indigenous- either without or with compensation. Two following parts make this literature review chapter: a) a section discussing the contested framings and conceptualisations of indigeneity; b) debates around the conceptions and meanings of indigenisation; c) competing explanations about the motivations of indigenisation in different countries; and the theoretical framework, i.e. David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory, whose insights of state redistributions, privatisation, and management and manipulation of crises this study rests on.

In this way, organising the literature review chapter helps to understand the strategic importance of indigeneity framing within the context of indigenisation. How indigeneity is framed has a strong bearing on how and why the entire indigenisation processes unfold. Further, the literature review organisation helps to situate Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation contentions within the context of the controversies permeating the broader indigenisation discourses. The organisation further helps to draw strategic indigenisation accumulation similarities and differences while at the same time drawing strategic lessons and insights from different drivers of indigenisation in different spaces and time.

3.1 Three framings of indigeneity: Aboriginality, race, citizenship

The political economy of indigeneity is challenging the modern state's underlying legal and political traditions by considering past cultural foundations as the premises upon which the countries' political and economic priorities should be set (O'Sullivan, 2014). This political economy explains why identity, language and culture are at the centre of indigeneity framings. Articulating this, Maaka and Fleras (2000) note that indigeneity is a political strategy and an emerging theory of justice indigenous peoples use to frame their belonging terms as the original inhabitants to the land. However, arguing from the perspective of shared sovereignties, Byrd and Heyer (2008, p. 233) assert that indigeneity is both a political and legal "site of critical enquiry that contests the exclusive sovereignty of the State to pass and enforce laws, define agendas, establish priorities, articulate patterns of entitlement, or demand compliance by decree if not by consent." O'Sullivan (2014) corroborates this viewpoint by arguing that indigeneity rests on the idea of inclusive sovereignty, whose objective is to guarantee equal rights for every citizen to shape, contribute and determine the destiny and future of the country.

As a result, the terms 'indigenous people' or 'original inhabitants'- *vana vevhu* in Zimbabwe (Mlambo, 2014), *taukei* in Fiji (Ratuva, 1999), *wazawa* in Tanzania (Aminzade, 2003), and Bumiputera in Malaysia (Uppall, 2014)- are subject to political contestations. For indigenisation purposes, their framings, either for exclusion or inclusion, were constructed within and between the contested frames of race, indigeneity and citizenship. Further, indigeneity's mobilisations were framed within the disputed narratives of aboriginality/indigenous, race and citizenship. For Aminzade (2003, p. 44), "[t]hose different frames seek to construct different boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and identify different enemies and threats." Corroborating with this perspective, Larson and Aminzade (2007) argue that the word indigenous is a political contention subject. The reason for this is worth noting. While advocates for indigenisation (mostly those who stand to benefit from it) refer to it to mean original inhabitants, the aboriginals of the land, global human rights advocates refer to it to mean a selected minority at risk from expropriation after being labelled nonindigenous. In most cases, the selected minority is the historically advantaged segment of the population, while those advocating for the term to mean the aboriginals are the dispossessed majority by the previous political and economic processes.

The definition of indigeneity varies in the literature, and there is terminological confusion. Conceptual and definitional illusions around the concept remain a scholarly controversy as a universally acceptable definition, and conceptual consensus of it are yet to be found. Ostensibly, there is still much confusion among scholars and researchers about who constitutes an autochthon, indigenous, original inhabitant, aboriginal, a native, and where and when the concept of indigeneity begins and ends. Similar views were also shared by such scholars as Fisher (2010), Andreasson (2010) and (Muzondidya, 2007). In Zimbabwe, Uganda and Tanzania, for example, the conception of the term has serious racial undertones; its definitions, representations and constructions are mired in both colonial and postcolonial Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance epistemological and ontological contestations (Anzimade & Larson 2007, Aminzade, 2003; Muzondidya, 2007). In the end, predominantly Black Africans (*wazawa* in Tanzania and *vanhu vatema* in Zimbabwe) passed the test of indigeneity, while non-blacks viewed as foreigners exploiting the fortunes rightfully belong to the indigenous black Africans. The non-blacks here are largely Asians, Indians to be precise, in Uganda and Tanzania and whites in Zimbabwe. In

Malaysia, only the indigenous Malays, the Bumiputera (i.e. the sons of the soil), were included in the definition of indigeneity, while those of Chinese origins were excluded (Uppall, 2014).

In Fiji, the indigenous Fijians (i.e. the Pacific Islanders) were included, while the Asians (i.e. the Pakistanis and Indians) and British were excluded (Aminzade & Larson, 2007). The inclusion of the indigenous people (i.e. black Africans in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, the Bumiputera in Malaysia, and Pacific Islanders in Fiji) and exclusion of nonindigenous (i.e. non-blacks in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, the Chinese in Malaysia, and the British and Asians in Fiji) was one strategic political choice the postcolonial governments are using for nation-building, state formation and to achieve national unity. The basis of the country case comparison is worth considering here. The five case countries are former British colonies. During colonialism, the British colonial masters established three distinct racial classes: the Europeans at the top, Asians in the middle and the colonised (i.e. the black Africans, indigenous Malays and Pacific Islanders) at the bottom. Aminzade (2003) articulates this as an inflexible colonial tripartite racial order in which the middlemen minority, the Asians, occupied the intermediate location between the superior Europeans and inferior Africans.

Citizenship also plays a vital role in the understanding of indigeneity. This role draws from the insights of the 'geography of indigenisation' as it seeks to differentiate "between citizens (*wananchi*) and foreigners, and seeks to protect the nation's economy and culture from the threat of foreign domination" (Aminzade, 2003, p. 44). In Tanzania, a noticeable shift of the indigeneity definitional paradigm occurred in the post-socialist dispensation. Citizenship replaced race as the decisive factor for including and excluding people into the beneficiary equation.

Historically, in Zimbabwe, through the 1969 Constitution and the Land Tenure Act, for the first time in the history of colonialism, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) government provided a landmark definition of who was an African and who was not. A European was defined as

> any person who is not an African, and an African, any member of the aboriginal tribes or races of Africa, and the islands adjacent thereto…and any person who has the blood of such tribes and races and who lives as a member of an aboriginal native community (Murphree & Baker, 1976, p. 388).

For Fisher (2010), the colonial regime defined the concept as such to constitutionally divide the country (then Rhodesia) into two hierarchical racial classes: the Europeans at the top and the Africans at the bottom. The division had serious uneven development undertones as it served to reflect "land apportionment, the electoral and education systems and employment opportunities (Fisher, 2010, p. 131). However, important to note is that the colonial indigeneity conception was constructed and produced in such a way that it did not give indigenous status to both races, although Africans the definition considered "the aboriginal tribes or races of Africa" (Quenet, 1976, p. 21; Murphree & Baker, 1976, p. 388). In the words of Fisher (2010, p. 132), "[i]mportantly, while producing Rhodesia in this way as a country with 'two races', the colonial discourse stressed that neither was in a position to claim descent from the 'original' inhabitants of the area." However, Beach (1980 & 1999) and Brand (1976) assert that the only original inhabitants, at least according to the colonial narratives, of Zimbabwe were the hunter-gatherers, Stone Age Bushmen or San people who, according to the same colonial narratives, had been living in the country's central plateau from as far back as 3000 BC. All of them were believed to have since disappeared.

Nonetheless, neither the colonial narrative nor any other narrative answers where they went or how they disappeared. It remains a matter of great controversy and speculation. The same designation of original inhabitants of the land was given to the San and Khoi Khoi people in neighbouring South Africa, most of whom are in the Western Cape Province. According to these narratives, the colonial laws described both Africans and the Europeans as "immigrants to this part of the world, neither are birds of passage—both are here to stay for all time" (Whaley, 1973, p. 31). In trying to justify their claim, European settlers did not deny that some immigrants (i.e. both Shona and Ndebele people) arrived earlier than others (i.e. white settlers) into present-day Zimbabwe.

However, they denied that others' early arrival in the area did not turn them into the original inhabitants of that area. All remain immigrants, and no bigotry or xenophobic sentiments should be extended to others because they are designated as foreigners, non-indigenous, aliens, immigrants or any other pejorative identity as no one can objectively claim aboriginality in the area. Commenting on this, Whaley (1973, p. 31) notes that:

> the Shona, the Ndebele and the Europeans were all migrants, conquerors and settlers and all of them now know no other home. They have established for themselves and their successors the right to remain in this country in perpetuity […] there was never any question of Europeans residing in Rhodesia on a temporary basis in order to develop the land and then hand it back to earlier settlers […] Rhodesia is the permanent and rightful home of people of different origins and backgrounds and does not belong to one race alone.

Equally important to note is that all these immigrants, earlier and later settlers alike, who later on became or claim to be the original inhabitants, settled and thrived in Zimbabwe through conquests (Fisher, 2010; Whaley, 1973). The Shona people conquered the original inhabitants (i.e. the San or Bushmen) before they were conquered by the Ndebele people who arrived during the first half of the 19th century. When the Europeans came in the last quarter of the 19th century, they conquered both the Shona and the Ndebele people.

Emerged from the previous analysis is that conquests of the original inhabitants or earlier settlers transcended the immigrants' effective occupation in the land. Aboriginals waged many unsuccessful wars, many unknown and undocumented, against the immigrants in defiance and resistance to conquests. The few known are those fought between the Ndebele and the Shona tribes upon the arrival of the Ndebele, who fled from King Tshaka during the *Mfecane* in Nguniland circa the 1830s. Other known wars are those fought between the Europeans and Africans (i.e. the Shona and the Ndebele) circa the late 19th century. Flowing from this line of thought is that the Europeans had successfully "fought for and won the land for themselves and future generations during the Matabele Wars and the *First Chimurenga* of the late 1890s" (Fisher, 2010, p. 132). Palmer (1977), Murphree and Baker (1976) and Chennells (1989) also share the same previous sentiments.

Muzondidya (2004) stretches the contentions around the representations, mobilisation, constructions, deconstructions and reconstructions of indigeneity, indigenous and indigenisation even further. He asserts that some well-known black people, with well traceable, verifiable and well-documented history, accompanied and assisted the Pioneer Column- totalling approximately 500 Christianised non-Zimbabwean families (Sundkler & Steed, 2000). In the process, they fought against the Ndebele people alongside the Europeans, earning for themselves a derogatory name: The Cape Boys (Ranger, 1967) among the Ndebele people. Some were recruited as domestic

workers and drivers of the pioneers' ox-wagons (Kunju, 2017), while others were interpreters, translators, and catechists (Nyathi, 2004; Sundkler & Steed, 2000). These people are Xhosa people from South Africa's Eastern Cape Province. They are colloquially known as the Mfengu/Fengu/amaFengu/Fingo people in Zimbabwe. Owing to their unique military abilities in frontier wars Cecil John Rhodes, from around May 1898, invited them more in Southern Rhodesia to further quash and neutralise the belligerent Ndebele people. This reality prompted Reverend Hale in 1894 to say that "The Fingoes are Cape Kaffirs, brought up as part of a scheme by Rhodes to form a cordon of loyal indigenous people around Byo (*sic*). To counteract any hostile movements of the Matebele. They are mostly Christians" (Hist. Miss. HA 4/1/1 & Hale, 1903-1905 as cited in Ncube 2013, p. 24).

The amaFengu played prominent military and auxiliary roles in Zimbabwe's colonisation as they were the ones who withstood the worst of the 1893 Ndebele war of dispossession and 1896-7 First Chimurenga/Umvukela (Ranger, 1967; Khunju, 2017). For example, John Grootboom-a Xhosa scout- bore the brunt of the fiercest Matobo war, leading to the destruction of the Mkwati citadel at Ntabazikamambo on July 5, 1896. In return for their service in aiding colonialism, Rhodes compensated the amaFengu with land, with title deeds, near Bulawayo in the Ntabazinduna area. Further, a 'Fingo Location', a replica of the Fingo Location near Grahamstown (now Makhanda) in the Cape Colony, was established circa 1898-1902 close to the junction of the Mbembesi River and Harare-Bulawayo highway (Ncube, 2013). In the words of Michell (1910, p. 244), Cecil John Rhodes had planned a strategy of "planting a settlement of loyal Fingoes in Rhodesia, with ten acres of land for every adult male." The reaction was an afterthought to the loss of the 10% of the white-settler population during the *First Chimurenga/Umvukela* of 1896-7. The amaFengu, together with the Catholics, are few of those people with patented lands as they possess title deeds they got from the BSAC, making their lands difficult to repossess without compensation. One may argue that the amaFengu, despite being black people, were also colonialists in the strict sense of the word. Their agency of getting themselves involved in the colonial matrix had colonial, imperial and capitalistic interests.

However, these people tend to be absolved from colonialism discourses, and worse, they are considered indigenous people while the people they accompanied and assisted in conquering Zimbabwe are considered nonindigenous. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe even recognised

them as part of the indigenous minority groups in Zimbabwe, and their language (isiXhosa) is recognised as one of the 16 official languages spoken in the country. This reality is notwithstanding the fact that the findings of Khunju (2017) in his first-ever PhD thesis written in isiXhosa reveal that their religion, culture, norms, traditions and songs are of the South African Xhosas, and they even use South African Xhosa classic books in their formative years at school. It is such conflicted indigeneity status that prompted Sir Drummond Chaplin, the Southern Rhodesian Administrator in 1919, to argue that "I am afraid the whole experiment of importing them [Xhosa people] was a mistake" Ncube, 2013, p. 19).

In present-day Zimbabwe, most amaFengu people, one of the few minority tribes in the country that managed to preserve the sanctity of their cultural identity, are found in the Fort Rixon area in Filabusi, Mbembesi, Motapa area in Bubi and Kenilworth. What helped them to have their identity remain undiluted is that the successive colonial administrations allowed the coexistence of tribes and races but proscribed their interdependence (Whaley, 1973). The coexistence was allowed as a tactical way to divide and conquer many but fragmented racial and tribal groups. For Fisher (2010), as far as the Rhodesian successive governments were concerned, racial integration was not allowed.

During the colonial periods, white settlers called themselves indigenous people of Rhodesia. Interestingly, however, some Rhodesians would claim their indigeneity in the land based on the economic and political contributions they have made in bringing civilisation to the country. Commenting on this, one Father Lewis notes that:

> In a single lifetime an almost empty wilderness has been transformed into a thriving, modern western style state…One can not unscramble the past. We inherit it…The European has won his place in Rhodesia, not by conquest, but by his immense contribution to it. His place is his by right, for himself and his children […]. Mr MacMillan's5 [*sic*] winds of change put him under no obligation to pack his bags and go. (Lewis 1973, p. 4, 6).

All these may serve to mean that indigeneity is represented not as a positivist phenomenon whereby it is an 'either-or' kind of representation. Instead, it is highly qualitative and dialectical as it is often a historically and socially mediated phenomenon. Complex social, cultural, political and historical constructions, deconstructions, and reconstructions are involved in indigeneity representations and mobilisations. The reason being that whom one considers indigenous, the next person can choose to consider the same nonindigenous. Nonetheless, this does not mean

that one characterisation or conceptualisation of indigeneity is flawed or weak, and the other is superior and blameless. However, all these depend on where one is standing when framing indigeneity. So, the black people in Zimbabwe, particularly the Shonas, who are claiming to have a God's eye definitional and conceptualisation view, which is, of course, divisive as it is exclusionary, of who is indigenous and who is not have to do a critical rethink as everyone in the country is an immigrant. The difference is only the arrival time.

The final analysis leads us to a Marxist foundational positionality that everything is a product of dialectics. Becoming, or lack thereof, indigenous is not a product of rationality or logical reasoning or processes. Instead, it is a product of dialectical processes through which some people, through back and forth reasoning, frame themselves as 'Self' while others as 'Other.' Flowing from this vantage point, one may argue that both the earlier and later-day settlers in the land have the full and equal rights of inhabiting and owning the land they are in. No one has the right to treat others with exceptionalism and otherness.

However, this dialectical and qualitative view of indigeneity did not go uncontested. The main argument registered by the critics is that the 'latecomers' need to respect and honour the territorial integrity, sovereignty, recognition, self-determination and independence of the indigenous peoples, whom they want to call 'early comers', "whose roots in the territory are deeper and more profound" (Fisher, 2010, p. 133). One cannot, without courting intense criticism and resistance, go and invade a territory where there are people with well organised cultural, socio-political and economic systems and try to legitimatise, through legal processes, his or her indigeneity in the land through claiming that those found on the land are also immigrants as they are early comers. Critics argued that the British conquerors, by framing everyone in Zimbvabwe an immigrant who invaded others at some point, tried hard to justify the primitive accumulation acts associated with their arrival, thereby legitimating and legalising their stay and belonging (and that of their generations to come) in the colonies. For Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis (1995), invasion and oppression lie at the core of the Europeans' history in Africa. The indigenous people's properties, notably land, minerals and livestock, were massively expropriated without (or with little incommensurate) compensation with greater impunity. As if that was not enough, the white colonial settlers either displaced the Africans or expropriated their labour without compensation.

However, the successive colonial administrations had categorically identified migrant workers from neighbouring Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique as nonindigenous. They were classified as aliens. They (and their offsprings alike) were issued with identity particulars with an inscription '*Alien,'* designating their nonindigenous, non-belonging status. Paradoxically, white settlers who travelled from Britain, France (notably the French Huguenots), South Africa, to mention just a few, considered themselves indigenous people. This indigeneity framing may explain how the colour bar dialectical definition of indigeneity was arrived at by the colonial powers-that-be.

Interestingly, we had those who "occupied an unstable middle ground" (Fisher, 2010, p. 135), whom Mamdan (2005) and Muzondidya (2004) call subject races, and were largely identified (and, worse, identified themselves) with the indigeneity and belonging identities of the white-settlers. These people are Asians, Coloureds, Indians and Chinese, who, terminologically, were broadly known in Rhodesia as Asians save for the coloureds. Much like the Europeans, they enjoyed indigeneity, electoral and national service privileges. However, like Africans, they were also discriminated against in terms of schooling, residence and employment (Fisher, 2010).

However, after independence in 1980, the postcolonial government assigned a colonial settler equivalent status to these minority groups (Fisher, 2010; Muzondidya, 2004). Because during colonialism, Asians were identified more with the white-settler identities due to the many privileges they enjoyed because of their middle-ground status. They were bracketed together with the Rhodesians as perpetrators of the criminal pasts. As such, they summarily lost their indigeneity statuses in Zimbabwe, though, much like other Rhodesians, enjoying full citizenship statuses. The reasons given for this by one of the prominent post-independence cabinet ministers, the late Dr Herbert Ushehwekunze, are worth considering here. While addressing the Coloureds and Asian community gathering in 1982, the late cabinet minister alluded to the fact that the two groups are mainly urban-based, designating conspicuously that they "had forged a closer bond through economic ties with the Rhodesians than with the Bantu speakers" (Fisher, 2010, p. 138). The late minister went on to say that the two groups had "lived and worked in the economy" (Ushehwekunze, 1984, p. 15) established by the colonisers. Given the preceding analysis, the two minority groups benefited immensely from the glaring white-black binary, founded on the racialised and exclusionary political economy of uneven and combined development. They were used as the wedge to occupy the middle ground between the two belligerent groups.

Therefore, as privileges were the hallmark of the colonialists (Fisher, 2010; Ushehwekunze, 1984), those benefiting from the colonial establishments had to be justifiably excluded from benefiting from the post-independent establishments. One easy way of doing so was to legitimise their nonindigenous identities in the country to legally and legitimately expropriate them.

To further complicate indigeneity framing in the country, it has emerged that not all coloureds and Asians supported and benefited from the colonial establishments. Some did, but others did not. There are some notables from these two minority groups who passionately opposed colonialism, and they even actively participated in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, much like in the South African context. For example, one Zimbabwean liberation hero of Indian origins, Cde Kantibhai Gordanbhai Patel, who was even accorded the national hero status in 2012 upon his death- whom the late president Mugabe described as "a veteran nationalist and astute politician who belong to a rare breed of a very few courageous non-African revolutionaries in Zimbabwe" (Nhambura, 2014, para. 31).

Similarly, some liberation heroes of English origins such as Arthur Guy Clutton-Brock, who co-founded the Sothern Rhodesia African National Congress in 1957; Dr Timothy Stamps, Robert Mugabe's late health advisor; and Joseph Luke Culverwell, Robert Mugabe's late cabinet minister, were, upon their deaths in 1995, 2017 and 1993 respectively, all declared national heroes in honour of their immense contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe, both before and after independence. South Africa also has such non-African and non-black revolutionary heroes as Joe Slovo and his wife, Ruth First (both of Jewish origins); Helen Joseph (of English origins); Fatima Meer; Navanethem (Navi) Pillay; Ahmed Mohamed Kathrada; a Rivonia Trial defendant- and his wife Barbara Hogan (all of the Indian origins); Denis Theodore Goldberg (a Rivonia Trial defendant of Germany origins); Harold Wolpe (a Rivonia Trial defendant of Lithuanian-Jewish origins); Arthur Goldreich (a Rivonia Trial defendant of Jewish origins) among many. All these serve to complicate further the already complicated situation of characterising indigeneity in Africa.

One of the surprising findings observed by Fisher (2010) in her study of the pioneers, settlers, aliens and exiles in Zimbabwe is the contention around the representations and constructions of indigeneity among the white community, with those born and bred in Rhodesia claiming to be

indigenous while brazenly questioning the integrity of indigeneity of the white latecomers. Berlyn (1967), born and bred in Rhodesian, openly drew a line between her and recent European immigrants during the UDI era. She described them as those "who come to my country to milk it of its wealth and desert it in its time of need" (ibid., p. 87). White people born in the country (or whose parents or grandparents were born in the country) considered themselves indigenous while questioning their fellow whites indigeneity status who had immigrated into the country during their time. More interestingly, during the height of the infamous fast-track land reform programme (FTLRP) of 2000-2003, one white farmer, when asked why daring to stay in Zimbabwe despite the violent atrocities while affirming his indigeneity to the land, was reported to have said "Where else do we go? We belong here. We are Africans, too" (Hastings, 2007, para. 12).

Further to the contentions around the indigeneity representation and mobilisation issue, some black people were invited and recruited by the colonial administrations, notably the Mfengu people from South Africa and Tswana people from Bechuanaland (now Botswana), were considered indigenous people. For these politically favoured minority groups, their colonial identity particulars, unlike those of migrant workers, are inscribed '*Citizen'*, clearly designating their indigeneity in Rhodesia. This framing explains why even to this day, most of the descendants of the migrant workers from the neighbouring countries are still considered aliens while those of the invited and recruited amaFengu and Tswana people are considered mainly indigenous.

In the final analysis, the contentions and complexities around the representations, mobilisations, constructions, deconstructions and reconstructions of indigeneity in Zimbabwe (both pre-and post-independence) took more of a dialectical positionality than an interpretivist or a positivist one. The mediated indigenous identities were largely reduced or collapsed into glaring racial binaries, which saw the Europeans, the colonisers at the helm of the racial hierarchy, "pitted against a largely undifferentiated black, colonised people" (Fisher, 2010, p. 136). Nonetheless, the receptivity of other races, tribes and ethnicities in the grand scheme of indigeneity discourses remained one highly unresolved national question. Between and among races, ethnicities and tribes- in the white communities as well- there were (and still are) glaring doubts and questions, as derogatory and xenophobic semantic attacks and counterattacks abounded, of the integrity and credibility of others' aboriginality statuses.

3.2 Debates around the conceptions and meanings of indigenisation

Indigenisation- *upfumi kuvanhu* in Shona in Zimbabwe (Mlambo, 2014) and *uzawa* in kiSwahili in Tanzania (Aminzade (2003)- is a contested concept that also received conceptual and definitional pluralism. Acknowledging this reality, this study, therefore, conceives indigenisation as both a *verb* and a *noun*. The former concerns the processes and activities followed in making those considered indigenous owners and controllers of both the means and factors of production through dispossessing the same from those considered nonindigenous. The latter is about having the economy reflect more of an indigenous outlook than foreign.

Conceptually, it is generally about capital restructuring favouring those categorised as indigenous people and in disfavour of those categorised as nonindigenous. For Chitiyo, Dengu, Mbae and Vandome (2019), indigenisation programmes are primary mechanisms for promoting local management, control and ownership of the economy. Corroborating with this analysis, Larson and Aminzade (2007, p. 122) assert that "[i]ndigenisation policies are a specific form of affirmative action, granting preferential treatment to certain groups based on these groups defining themselves or being identified as "indigenous" to a particular country." In many countries (e.g. Uganda, South Africa's post-1994, Tanzania, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and Fiji), indigenisation has been explicitly framed as a 'racial redress' exercise (Aminzade, 2003; Larson & Aminzade, 2007). It attracted racial undertones because it generally intends to empower the previously disadvantaged majority races (i.e. blacks in Africa, Pacific Islanders in Fiji and indigenous Malays in Malaysia) through expropriating the advantaged minority races (i.e. whites and Asians mostly). According to this perspective, indigenisation processes would address all forms of racial inequalities: income, sectoral and spatial. Framed as such, indigenisation is arguably one postcolonial policy choice explicitly targeting the historically privileged minorities. The notable exception here is South Africa Afrikaners Economic Empowerment (AEE) during apartheid, whose objective was to resolve what came to be known as the 'white poor problem' among the Afrikaners (Bhorat & Kanbur, 2006).

While presenting a paper on the historic indigenisation and poverty reduction indaba at the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies at the University of Zimbabwe on 24 September

1994, Mike Ndudzo, the then General Manager of Industrial Development Corporation Zimbabwe Limited, defined the concept of indigenisation to mean:

> the process of empowering the majority of native citizens economically through greater involvement and participation in the economic planning process, ownership of the means of production by private indigenous individuals, skills and technology capacity building, development of small to medium enterprises and democratizing business opportunities through access to capital, supplier credits, subcontracting, factors of production, information, technology and markets locally, regionally and internationally (Ndudzo, 1997, p. 4).

However, important to note is that in most African countries, particularly in the sub-Saharan, economic indigenisation discourse went together with the Africanisation of the bureaucracy, which earned different names across the continent. Cases in point are Zambianisation in Zambia, Nigerianisation in Nigeria, Ivorianisation in Ivory Coast, Ghananisation in Ghana, Kenyanisation in Kenya, to name just a few (Ndakaripa, 2017). The Africanisation of the bureaucracy saw expatriates being replaced in both public and private sectors by the indigenous people. In some instances, the words indigenisation, Africanisation and localisation were interchangeably used to mean essentially one thing. In Zimbabwe, the concept of indigenisation presented a euphemism of a fully-fledged economic war on nonindigenous capital. As a standalone concept and practice, it was popularised in Zimbabwe beginning around 1991. An anonymous Zimbabwean writer in the 1990s writes that:

> Indigenisation is not a word, not one found in any standard English dictionary anyway. It is a weapon, a banner, an insult, a new hope, a new inspiration; it is a euphemism for ruder monosyllabic words, it has the properties of a herb, the flavour of the second Zimbabwean decade.

Nonetheless, most post-independence African governments pursued the idea of indigenisation but with considerably varying degrees of success and failure, both in quantitative and qualitative degrees. Indigenisation was part of the grand strategy of nation-building and state-making (Mukwedeya, 2016). To this end, economic indigenisation and empowerment of the indigenous people were considered the necessary policy instrument in effecting the restructuring and redistribution of wealth, which hitherto was significantly tilted in favour of the foreign and non-indigenous capital (Zvoushe, Uwizeyimana & Auriacombe 2017). Indigenisation, as defined by Adebayo (1981, p. 31), entails

> The process by which the government limits participation in a particular industry entirely or part to citizens of the country, thus forcing alien owners either to sell to indigenous entrepreneurs or withdraw from participation in certain economic activities.

Bucheli and Decker (2002) give a corroborating definition of indigenisation. They conceived indigenisation to mean transferring the means and factors of production in the country from those designated as foreigners to those designated as indigenous people. Nevertheless, Chipika and Malaba (2011) give a comradely critique of this indigenisation framing. They charged that Adedeji (1981) remains vague and implicit on the concept of 'citizenship.' In that premise, they argue that he just referred to the fact that 'part of the economy or whole of it has to be transferred to the citizens of a country' whilst turning a blind eye on the unresolved national questions about citizenship, membership, indigeneity and belonging. Whom was he referring to as citizens? Indigenous citizens or the country's citizens, including the former colonisers and their descendants? Are those forced to come to Africa as labourers during the colonial period, for example, Indians in South Africa, part of the citizens? Are citizens by naturalisation part of the citizens he was talking about? Are those who came to Africa running away from persecutions in their countries, for example, French Huguenots who ran away from religious persecutions in France and emigrated to South Africa as early as 1671 and later to Zimbabwe (the Naletale/Nalatale people in Zimbabwe), Botswana and Mozambique, part of the citizens Adedeji was referring to? These national questions remain unanswered in Adedeji's conceptualisation of economic indigenisation.

Put it another way, Adedeji's conceptualisation of citizens or citizenship is not in sync with the discourse of indigenisation and economic empowerment as it holistically classifies everyone considered a citizen by the Constitution as someone to benefit from the affirmative action policies without any recourse to one's race and past socio-economic status. Thus, one may argue that Adedeji's definition did not consider the historical background against which indigenisation's grand discourse is coming from and firmly predicated on.

On a related note, Ijalaye (1981) conceived economic indigenisation as governments' efforts to give indigenous people a greater stake, if not all, in the economic establishment in their respective countries. To this end, economic indigenisation is a process of making the roles, ownership, control, and management of the national economy more indigenous. This concept of economic indigenisation is different from the concept of nationalisation in the sense that the latter is about

the government, and not individuals as in the case of economic indigenisation, taking control and ownership, either entirely or partially, of the properties previously owned and controlled by either foreign or local firms or even both. Against this backdrop, effective implementation of the economic indigenisation process may lead to the empowerment, strengthening, rehabilitation and expansion of the indigenous entrepreneurs whilst crowding-out foreign firms' participation in the mainstream economic activities.

However, the concept of affirmative action conceptualised and practised in Zimbabwe as indigenisation, as a form of empowering the previously disadvantaged indigenous people in a polity started to feature as a standalone concept in the United States of America (USA) in 1961 with the promulgation of Executive Order 10925, signed by the president of the time, John F. Kennedy, on the 6th March 1961 (MacLaury, 2010). Similarly, Sowell (2004. p. 1) defines affirmative action to mean "preferential policies" designed to address the perceived unequal balance of economic power among a country's citizens. The Executive Order 10925's implementing agency, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO), was established with the sole purpose of requiring all government contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, creed, colour, or national origin" (Executive Order 10925). Chipika and Malaba (2011) take a broader view through considering affirmative action policies as general deliberate measures that seek to give the previously disadvantaged constituencies preferential treatments on employment, economic empowerment, higher and tertiary education, among many others.

Nevertheless, upon exportation, especially to the newly independent African states, the term affirmative action metamorphosed considerably as the beneficiaries of affirmative action interventions were largely restricted to indigenous people who considered themselves victims of imperialism's political, economic and social injustices. Against this backdrop, affirmative action has been equated with restitution, compensation, or atonement to colonialism's misdeeds. This characterisation of affirmative action goes without saying that the beneficiaries were to be restricted to the indigenous people who bear the scourges of both colonialism and apartheid for a protracted period of more than four centuries in Mozambique, more than three centuries in South Africa, almost a century in Zimbabwe, 81 years in Botswana to name just a few. To this end, the affirmative action policies in Africa generally and Zimbabwe specifically attracted much

controversy as they were simultaneously criticised and supported from various fronts at national, regional, continental and global scales. On the one hand, such scholars as Fisher (2010) critiqued indigenisation as an affirmative action intervention because it is an instrument of reverse discrimination. They questioned the credibility of an empowerment initiative that empowers 'the Self' (i.e. other sections of society) through accumulation by an appropriation of 'the Other' (i.e. expropriation of properties of those considered not belonging to the society). The otherness and exceptionalism ways in which indigeneity was framed did not consider that the othered has predominantly African origins as they and their forebears were born in Africa.

Also, the present generation of whites did not inflict any harm; neither did they appropriate anything from anyone, unlike what their forefathers did. Another similar argument is that the indigenous Africans who are actual victims of the scourges of colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid are long dead. Hence, they cannot be compensated today; thus, it would be unfair to compensate the present African indigenous generation on their behalf. To this end, applying restitution principles according to the compensatory justice theory (CJT) may be considered unfair and unjust. As observed by Bucheli and Decker (2002), taken together, a probable explanation could be that the present generation of indigenous Africans whom no one has discriminated, disempowered or segregated must fairly compete with other players in the mainstream economy without unaided by preferential treatment. Following on from this analysis, one may argue that jobs, contracts or tenders should be given to the deserving applicant based on the merits and credibility of the application or proposal submitted rather than taking indigeneity (or lack thereof) as the guiding determinant of who should be employed, promoted, selected, awarded a tender or not. They argue that giving preferential treatment to undeserving people or companies on account of indigeneity is the very reason African economies are downswing. The same arguments were presented against indigenisation in Zimbabwe.

However, the preceding argument that the present white generation neither inflicted harm nor dispossessed the present and past generations of indigenous blacks, suggesting that the present white generation must not indigenise their businesses, did not go uncontested. On this, Chipika and Malaba (2011) suggest dissenting views. Their alternative views differ from those presented and advanced against the affirmative action policies favouring restructuring of capital in favour of the indigenous people and disfavour of the nonindigenous. Their main argument is that the

positive discrimination affirmative action policies pursued by post-independent governments can be justified on the account that both wealth and poverty, i.e. economic empowerment and disempowerment, transcend generations. The reason is that there are two distinct groups of people in the country; one benefited (and still benefiting) from the legacies of colonialism, imperialism and apartheid (i.e. the present white generation) and the other suffered (and still suffering) from the same legacies colonialism, imperialism and apartheid (i.e. the present black generation). In their attempt to explain why the situation is like this Chipika and Malaba (2011) argue that the old white generations (i.e. the perpetrators of colonialism) bequeathed their descendants the ownership, control, and management of the means and factors of production, while the old generations of the blacks (i.e. the victims of colonialism) bequeathed their descendants nothing but the ills of disempowerment such as poverty and servitude.

It is against this background that asserting that everyone should compete unaided could be considered unjust as others are starting from a competitive edge where they have almost everything while others are struggling to eke a living, let alone competing in business platforms. Hence, the need and vindication of indigenisation as a plain levelling instrument that could at least raise the bar of the previously disadvantaged communities before they can compete with the previously advantaged and already well off non-indigenous and foreign competitors. In their words, Chipika and Malaba (2011, p. 34) contend that

> In such a context, it does not make sense to argue on the basis of a plain playing field. Instead, there should be a deliberate effort to bring the disadvantaged majority into the mainstream of the economy, before a level playing field is said to exist. This is why there is almost unanimous agreement on the need for IEE in Zimbabwe. Disagreements can be there on the modalities of implementing IEE, but not on the need of it.

Also, many scholars criticised affirmative action policies as inefficient as most beneficiaries lack the requisite technical skills needed to optimally operate private sector business activities. The argument here is that indigenous people are just roped into the ownership structure of the economy on account that they are previously disadvantaged (Bucheli & Decker, 2002). However, this argument may hold water. It is necessary to assert that affirmative action policies do not begin and ends with ownership. Effective affirmative action interventions are holistic as they include ownership, control, employment, management, training, development and many other preferential treatments given to the previously disadvantaged peoples. For example, when it

comes to employment and promotion, the previously disadvantaged qualified people have to be given first preference.

3.3 Competing explanations around the rationales and drivers of indigenisation

In recent times, in countries endowed with natural resources, the extractive industry's immense contribution to their economies is an important factor giving rise to the resurgence of resource nationalism, notably through indigenisation. The explanations for the resurgence are equally competing and telling. Often, the explanations are the drivers for indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. Poverty in the midst of plenty is the first explanation. The indigenous citizens of natural resource-rich countries in general and the residents of the mining communities in particular where international mining capital is undertaking extraction activities are increasingly becoming poorer while non-indigenous mining businesses are getting richer. Such mining capitalism models that allow repatriation of enormous mining proceeds to the sending countries while leaving the host countries' citizens in abject poverty motivate and drive extractive industry indigenisation.

The second explanation is the governments' failure to engage the mining communities when signing mining contracts with the international mining capital. Residents of mining communities are demanding and sometimes fighting for local ownership of the mining claims. The driving force for the residents demanding and fighting for local mining ownership is that the communities and their residents bear the costs of extraction as the mining activities affect the communities and residents most. The third explanation is that mining community members are agitating about the following: how governments are distributing mining revenue; uncertainties concerning land tenure rights of the residents under customary law; and social and environmental impacts of the mining activities on them and their communities. As the debates around how to address the preceding issues rage on, poor indigenous citizens of countries hosting international mining capital are opting for either nationalisation (e.g. in the case of South Africa) or indigenisation (e.g. in the case of Zimbabwe) of the extractive industries.

The rationales for indigenisation are also conflicted. Broadly, two schools of thought competing for intellectual potential emerged from the debates concerning the rationales of indigenisation.

The first one is the view put forth by Hawkins and Simpson (2019) and Ndakaripa (2017) that indigenisation is a populist and vindictive policy that seeks to settle scores with the enemies (both past and present) while destroying the economy (Chigudu, 2019). The second one is that indigenisation presents an effective way of addressing uneven development wrongs as the same were created through similar dispossession processes in the first place, notably through colonialism (Raftopoulos & Compagnon, 2003). Corroborating with the first rationale, Aminzade (2003) asserts that indigenisation rests on anti-foreign and racial hostilities. He argues that the affirmative action policy is a racist policy choice at odds with liberal democracy as it does not respect and protect minority rights. As in Africa the concept of indigenisation became in the 1960 and 1970s when many countries were gaining independence, it was rooted in independence euphoria and nationalist ideological orientations. Thus, indigenisation rested on the idea of improving people's lives and livelihoods through them owning and controlling both the means and factors of production in their respective countries (Ndakaripa, 2021).

In Tanzania, the government altered its radical position on the indigenisation policy following the anti-indigenisation lobbyists, who racialised and denounced the policy (Larson & Aminzade, 2007; Aminzade, 2003). This viewpoint shifted the paradigm from indigenising the economy by dispossessing the Asian citizens towards indigenisation through expropriating non-citizens. Issues relating to regulating international finance capital flow, foreign direct investment (FDI), and free trade took centre stage in the indigenisation policy. However, this had the effects of closing the country for business. International financial institutions (IFIs) cut their support to post-socialist Tanzania following such antiliberal policies (Aminzade, 2007). The foreign donors interpreted indigenisation policies as protectionist policies that promote local industries and shun away international finance capital. For the IFIs and donors, indigenisation in Tanzania thus represented the abandonment of the Washington Consensus neoliberal economic policies.

Regarding the second rationale, indigenisation addresses uneven development wrongs created through the same dispossession processes in the first place, notably colonialism (Raftopoulos & Compagnon, 2003). It is because the previously disadvantaged indigenous people may not understand justice "irrespective of issues about whose ancestors were here first [or] irrespective of any history of injustice that may have attached to the process by which these people came to be side by side in that territory" (Kenrick, 2006, p. 22). The main argument with this perspective

is that today's uneven racial economic imbalances are, to a larger extent, not a creation of the post-independence government but rather a colonial legacy. Bond (1998) articulates this further. He asserts that the successive imperial governments in Southern Rhodesia, with South African and British banking and industrial capital, helped establish a robust white-settler bourgeoisie class. The 4000 rural-based large-scale white commercial farmers and urban-based white industrialists (mainly in the extractive and manufacturing industries) were the class's strategic components.

Concerning employment composition, the early 1990s figures reveal that 63% of private-sector senior management positions were still occupied by whites (Strachan 1993; Raftopoulos & Compagnon 2003). Furthermore, although bureaucracy was Africanised in the first five years into independence and the government gained significant control of the means and factors of production (i.e. through control, co-optation and ownership) (Raftopoulos & Compagnon, 2003), white and international capital were still preponderant in the corporate sector. The international capital was represented mostly by the pervasiveness of such foreign conglomerates as Anglo-American Corporation and Lonrho in the country's economy, particularly in the mining sector, while 70,000 Rhodesians represented local white capital and mostly in the manufacturing, agricultural, and banking sectors (Bond, 1998; Raftopoulos & Compagnon, 2003; Mandaza, 1986). Therefore, it goes without mentioning that this colonial economy was configured in a way skewed against the indigenous Africans.

The implication of this is that these indigenisation policies are hard, yet strategic political settlements former colonies adopted and implemented to address the inherited uneven economic configurations. However, it should be noted that their outcomes could be deplorable if the founding intentions are not economic but rather political.

Furthermore, neoliberalism motivated indigenisation; in some instances, the two are mutually reinforcing, while in others they are mutually exclusive. Commenting on such a relationship between the two, Larson and Aminzade (2007, p. 157) argue that "[t]he contradictions and complementarities between policies of neoliberal economics and racial redress are worked out in manners specific to the intersections of national historical legacies and patterns of political contention." The motivation is direct (whether positive or negative) in some countries while indirect (whether positive or negative) in others. In countries like Tanzania, the motivation for indigenisation was premised on the affirmative action policy being a shield against the exploitative

and redistributive effects of the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s structural adjustment regime. To this effect, racial and citizenship framings defined the indigenisation policy discourses in the country. However, in Fiji, neoliberal economic policies presented opportunities for indigenisation proponents to voice for what Larson and Aminzade (2007) call 'racial redistribution', a term that denotes capital redistribution to address racial inequalities. This led to the simultaneous implementation of both indigenisation and neoliberal economic policies in the country.

Consequently, lies at the centre for indigenisation debates in Fiji are class- and race-based preferences, not race and citizenship, as in Tanzania. In countries like Zimbabwe, the preceding two neoliberal justifications were used by the indigenisation lobbyists to pressurise and convince the government about the need for capital restructuring for the economy to reflect more indigenous distinctiveness than foreign. In the end, race, aboriginality, citizenship, class and race preferences underscore the debates about indigenisation.

In the end, it can be established that the economic model adopted and implemented in these countries soon after independence shaped the understandings, meanings and debates of indigenisation policies. In Tanzania, the post-independence socialist mode of production adopted dictated that indigenisation and neoliberalism policies cannot be pursued simultaneously. In Fiji, the free-market enterprise economic model dictated that the two are mutually reinforcing. In Zimbabwe, the post-independence 'talk left, walk right' political-economic strategy of preaching socialism while implementing capitalism made it easier for indigenisation and neoliberalism to go hand in hand. In countries like Fiji, where the free-market enterprise was adopted as the economic model soon after independence, neoliberal economic policies were pursued "as a means to help advance the goals of indigenisation" (Larson & Aminzade, 2007, p. 155).

The preceding discussions point to a close relationship between neoliberalism and indigenisation, an area that received limited scholarly attention until the early 2000s (Aminzade, 2003; Larson & Aminzade, 2007). The existing stock of knowledge in the subject was inconclusive and sparse (Kenrick, 2006). In part, this was arguably because indigenisation and neoliberal scholars assumed that the two are essentially opposites that they cannot positively influence each other in any way. The reason is that indigenisation focuses on promoting group-based social, economic and political rights while liberalism on promoting individual rights, making the former a left-biased policy

choice and the latter a right-based one. Put differently, indigenisation is largely considered a strategic inclusive policy choice with the major objective of addressing the inequalities created by neoliberal policies.

In the end, the debates around the drivers of indigenisation in almost every case country discussed above illustrate that political and economic marginalisation of the expropriated non-indigenous may not be a result of minority status but a function of indigeneity itself (O'sullivan, 2014).

3.4 Theoretical framework: Accumulation by dispossession

This study investigates how and why the implementation of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe is not achieving the set goals and objectives. To this end, indigenisation, particularly extractive industry indigenisation, can be described and explained as a strategic instrument for the elites' political and personal gains rather than the empowerment of the masses. This competing explanation is due to the following factors: saving the internationally isolated and crumbling regime from collapsing, continuing elite private personal accumulation, and recovering the frozen wealth abroad due to international sanctions. In Zimbabwe, the extractive industry indigenisation that overpromised its benefits while underdelivering upon implementation can be investigated using the theoretical insights of an uneven development theory, i.e. David Harvey's 2003 accumulation by dispossession theory. Conceptually, according to Harvey (2003), accumulation by dispossession is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralizing and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. Using this theoretical framework helps determine how and why the processes and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation are inconsistent with goals. This is because, to a greater extent, extractive industry indigenisation is making the political and mining business elites accumulate both wealth and power through dispossessing (and displacing) both the public and the nonindigenous mining capital.

To this end, the following three of the four pillars of David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory are considered by this study as theoretically explaining the extractive industry indigenisation processes, activities and outcomes in Zimbabwe: privatisation, state redistributions, and management and manipulation of crisis. In this study, the privatisation of nonindigenous mining businesses through indigenisation is largely benefiting the political and local

mining business elites and not the deserving disenfranchised indigenous citizens. For this study, management and manipulation of crisis are when the political elites, using indigenisation as the ruse, accumulate wealth and power by managing and manipulating the country's post-2000 economic, social, and political crises. The government is tactically using the indigenisation programme as a strategic 'sanctions busting' policy choice (Hawkins & Simpson, 2019). The following several overlapping and converging factors created the crises: gross human rights violation, international sanctions; land seizures from the white commercial farmers; and the following economic contractions and political instability. For this study, state redistributions are indigenisation's major aim of transferring the means and factors of production from the non-indigenous people to the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. According to this study, the political and local mining business elites accumulate both wealth and power through these extractive industry indigenisation-based state redistributions. Financialisation, which, according to Harvey (2003), is when financial institutions and markets in the economy increase their size and influence, is not part of this study. Extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe is not in any way financialising the economy; hence the financialisation pillar of the theory is not part of this study.

Accumulation by dispossession centralises and concentrates power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few through the elites privatizing public wealth by expropriating the citizens and the private sector of their land and wealth (Harvey, 2003). Displacing them can also help achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives. Dislocating the public is necessary for accumulation by dispossession to thrive as it is on their lands where capital should be invested (Harvey, 2003). Articulating this, Luxembourg (2007[1913]) speaks of the importance of non-capitalist societies for capitalism's survival and sustainability. The process of accumulation by dispossession is when the elites privatise benefits and profits while simultaneously socializing and externalizing losses and costs to the general public.

Many researchers (e.g. Mawowa, 2013; Moore, 2003 & 2012; Magdoff, 2013; Mbiba, 2017; Moore, 2005) applied and tested the theory in different sectors of Zimbabwe's political economy, both colonial and postcolonial. For example, Mbiba (2017) used accumulation by dispossession theoretical insights when studying the processes and outcomes of urban land grabbing in Africa in general and in Zimbabwe's capital Harare in particular. He emphasised that "how the 1990s neoliberalism and post-1999 Zimbabwe crisis created new opportunities for accumulation of

wealth through irregular and fraudulent transfer of public urban land into private lands, including those in reputable corporate institutions" ibid, p. 213). The theory's insights were also tested by Magdoff (2013) in Zimbabwe's political economy of agriculture and land. One major finding of Magdoff's study is the continued existence of what he terms 'accumulation by agricultural dispossession' in the 21st century in Zimbabwe. Moore (2012) tested the theory's insights in their primitive accumulation variant when illuminating how Zimbabwe's structural and *longue duress* economic and political challenges challenged the conception and understanding of the word 'progress.' Moore's argument with regards to understanding Zimbabwe's recent challenges that challenged the definition of the concept of progress is that

> Historically rooted and specifically applied concepts of primitive accumulation can assist the understanding of the development of Zimbabwe's coercive networks of accumulation and their more recent manifestations, but they do not solve the problems of how to lessen violence and deepen democracy in the short term (Moore, 2012, p. 1).

Furthermore, Moore (2005) tested and applied the theory when studying land rights, racialised dispossession, and legacies of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. He used the theory to interpret the contested politics of situated sovereignties, environmental resources and racialised rule among the poor indigenous farmers of the Kaerezi area in eastern Zimbabwe. The farmers suffered two major land dispossessions. First, the colonialists dispossessed them of their ancestral lands before being forced to relocate to neighbouring Mozambique as refugees during the country's liberation struggle. Second, postcolonial dispossession. After independence in 1980, instead of the post-independence government giving the Kaerezians back their lands, which were already turned into white ranches during colonialism, it turned the land into state resettlement areas. Articulating on the second accumulation by dispossession episode (i.e. the postcolonial one), Moore (2005, p. 189) refers to the continued land dispossession predicament the Kaerezians suffered as "suffering for the territory (*kutambudzikira nyika* in Shona)." According to Moore (2005; Smart, 2007), how post-independence local politics of accumulation, power, identity, entitlement, and geography played themselves out in the land question further tested the theory of accumulation by dispossession. The application of the theoretical insights at the micro-level (i.e. in the Kaerezi area) demonstrates the raging contentions around how land is suffered and fought for, laboured upon and occupied (Moore, 2005; Castree, 2009). In this context, Moore (2005) speaks of the Kaerezians 'suffering for the territory' in three forms:

colonial dispossession and dislocations, fighting for the same land during the Second *Chimurenga*, and post-independence evictions.

Insights from the preceding discussion demonstrate that the theory was extensively applied and tested to understand Zimbabwe's political economy. However, researchers placed more emphasis on the accumulation of land by dispossession. Few exceptions are Bond (1998), who applied and tested the theory in its primitive accumulation variant (Karl Marx's version of accumulation by dispossession) to study the history and political economy of the uneven development of finance in the country. Moore (2005) further applied and tested the theory's perspectives, although in its classical primitive accumulation version, together with those of democratisation and nation-state formation, to illuminate the post-2000 economically distressed and violence-stricken crisis class-stalemate, contested elections, controversial land redistribution programme and succession political battles. Bond and Manyanya (2003) also applied the theory when studying Zimbabwe's economic contraction but with special reference to the exhausted nationalism, neoliberalism and social justice. Mawowa's (2013) PhD is the one close to this study regarding applying and testing the theoretical insights of accumulation by dispossession in the study and understanding of the political economy of accumulation processes and activities in the country's extractive industry. Mawowa's emphasis is on the intersection of and connection between disorder, chaos and coercion on the one hand, and wealth accumulation and retention of political power on the other.

By proposing that Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation is one good example of accumulation by dispossession, this study seeks to test the theory's applicability in understanding the political economy of accumulation concerning the country's extractive industry indigenisation. This application will allow broader indigenisation accumulation by dispossession lessons and insights to be drawn concerning how and why the extractive industry indigenisation is being used for political and personal ends. To achieve this, the study first appreciates the intellectual value of the perspectives from the previous studies that applied and tested the theory in studying and understanding Zimbabwe's political economy and regime accumulation. Nonetheless, while building on these important reflections, this study recognises that the theoretical insights of accumulation by dispossession have never been applied and tested in the study and understanding

of the political economy of indigenisation accumulation processes, notably in the extractive industry.

Therefore, it is against this background of scholarly lack in this regard that this study seeks to apply and test the theory's insights of the accumulation by dispossession in appreciating extractive industry indigenisation's accumulation structural processes. Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation represents one case whereby foreign mining conglomerates, in collusion with the government and the successive colonial regimes, dispossessed the indigenous people of their ancestral land and mining claims. This dispossession is, however, done more subtly. The government used state redistributions, through capital restructuring, to achieve this mining accumulation by dispossession objectives. Further, the government is achieving these mining accumulation by dispossession objectives by privatising nonindigenous mining businesses through indigenisation. Also, the management and manipulation of the post-2000 economic, social and political crisis using indigenisation as a 'sanctions busting' strategic political settlement helps achieve these accumulation objectives. As articulated above, the theoretical insights of accumulation by dispossession in Zimbabwe were extensively used to study how the colonial and postcolonial political economies were established and sustained. Therefore, this study seeks to test the applicability of these insights (i.e. state redistributions, privatisation and management and manipulation of crisis) in studying and understanding how the political economy of mining capitalism under the indigenisation regime is being reconfigured and sustained in the country.

3.5 Political (un)settlement: Key themes, debates and drivers

This section discusses key themes, debates and drivers around the understanding, meanings and application of the political settlements framework. Developed by Mushtaq Khan in the mid-1990s (Khan, 1995), the political settlement, as a standalone analytical tool, emerged as a critique of the existing new good governance agenda and new institutional economics (NIE) (Behuria, Buur & Gray, 2017). Since then, the political settlements framework has been used to describe and explain Africa's prevailing political processes, orders and outcomes.

Although there may be no conceptual consensus on the term (McCandless, 2018), political settlements- or elite pacts- are agreements that result in a state governed by political and

administrative frameworks, both formal and informal, that advance, maintain and protect the interests of the elites (Di John & Putzel, 2009; Khan, 2018, 2010 & 1995). This situation is achieved through the elites agreeing on ways of distributing, exercising, administering and transferring political and economic power. For Khan (2010, p. 4), political settlements are "a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability." According to Di John and Putzel (2009), the political settlements framework dictates that doing this is strategic for serving, advancing and promoting the ruling elite's interests. While corroborating this reasoning, Khan (2018) argues that the political settlements framework helps us understand how political power is exercised, distributed, transferred, and administered. This understanding is critical when it comes to discerning the economic and political outcomes of institutions and policies.

According to Khan (2018 & 2010) and Behuria, Buur and Gray 2017), political settlements have three distinct dimensions. These are how a political settlement is financed, vertical distribution of power and horizontal distribution of power. Horizontal distribution of power entails the "power of excluded factions, relative to the ruling coalition" (Khan, 2010, p. 64-65). The argument here is that the weak excluded coalitions make it possible for the ruling coalition to act in line with a longer time horizon, and strong excluded coalitions only allow the ruling coalition to act in ways that ensure its short-term survival or failure to survive at all in the long-run (Behuria, Buur & Gray 2017). Vertical distribution of power entails "the relative power of higher compared to lower factions within the ruling coalition" (Khan, 2010, p. 65). The argument here is that in situations where the relative power of higher factions are greater than that of lower factions, the coalition tends to have strong implementation and enforcement capacities. As the third dimension of political settlement, how political settlements are financed is the relationships and interactions between the ruling coalitions and the country's economic actors. To identify these economic actors, one has to investigate business ownership structures in different sectors of the economy, and in most cases, the actors with more power tend to straddle in many sectors.

Thus, as a political settlement is "[a]n ongoing process containing specific events such as elite bargains and peace agreements" (McCandless 2018, p.21), in Zimbabwe, the collusion of the state and foreign mining companies is making it possible for the indigenisation's goals to be largely inconsistent with the outcomes. The reason is that although we are more than ten years

into the indigenisation regime, mining communities and disadvantaged locals are still impoverished despite all the great expectations of empowerment through indigenisation. However, this situation is pitted against the state generating rents for regime survival and elite personal accumulation of power and wealth from the mining indigenisation proceeds.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed literature about the competing explanations around the conceptions, framing and interface of indigeneity and indigenisation. It then analysed literature about the debates around, rationales of, and drivers for indigenisation in various countries where it was adopted and implemented. Doing so was fundamental in situating the extractive industry indigenisation contestations in Zimbabwe within the broader indigenisation debates. The chapter also analysed the literature about the different forms indigenisation can take. The chapter concludes by explaining the following three theoretical pillars of David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory as the theoretical investigative tools for this study: privatisation, state redistributions, and management and manipulation of crisis. The chapter also analyses the key themes, debates and outcomes of the political settlements framework. The next chapter discusses the indigenisation experiences of selected country case studies.

CHAPTER 4

SELECTED INDIGENISATION COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

4.0 Introduction

The need to rectify the uneven balance of economic power, particularly in former colonies, has been the recurrent philosophical golden thread informing most public policies in the post-independent governance dispensation across the globe. In these countries, uneven development is manifesting itself in widespread uneven spatial and sectoral development. Thus, the need to address uneven development is coming against the background of indigenous citizens having been excluded from the mainstream economy in their motherlands. This being a paradox that the indigenous people are economically, socially and politically disenfranchised while the nonindigenous are highly included, the postcolonial governments embarked on implementing reverse discrimination policies. These policies were adopted and implemented in the name of indigenisation, whose major aim was to address the perceived unequal balance of economic power between the indigenous and non-indigenous citizens.

In former colonies, indigenisation of the economy and empowerment of the indigenous people are generating contradictions as the processes of capital restructuring are inherently strewn with redistribution complications. Implied is that such affirmative action policies involve the transfer, certainly through coercive measures and without or with inconsequential compensation, of wealth from the 'nonindigenous haves' to the 'indigenous have-nots.' However, most countries that adopted and implemented indigenisation policies tried to balance two critical issues. On the one hand, the need to empower the disadvantaged indigenous citizens through indigenisation. On the other hand, the much-needed foreign direct investment (FDI) is critical to boosting production levels. However, critics of indigenisation initiatives are questioning the integrity of the methodology and timing of adopting and implementing such accumulation by dispossession policies regarding the general performance economy.

Thus, this chapter surveys the literature on other countries' experiences implementing indigenisation policies to address overarching uneven development configurations. The selected three country cases are Malaysia, post-independent South Africa and South Africa during

colonialism and apartheid. The cases' experiences help to draw lessons and insights for the Zimbabwe experience. They, however, witnessed varying degrees of success and failure, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. These concerted efforts in all these country cases are to mainstream the disenfranchised indigenous citizens into the national economy. The governments intend to mainstream indigenous citizens into the economy by making them owners, controllers and managers of the means and factors of production. The only exception here is the colonial and apartheid South Africa's Afrikaner Economic Empowerment (AEE) motivated by what came to be known as the 'poor white problem' in South Africa then. In doing so, the chapter focuses on motivations and models of indigenisation, how the countries fared with implementing them, the challenges they encountered, and the coping mechanisms used to mitigate them. Also, how the affirmative action policies responded to the social and economic problems they sought to redress, the funding formulas employed to finance the policies and the success and failure rates of these policies are discussed in this chapter. Through this analysis, lessons and insights aim to support the development of a strategic framework of indigenisation for Zimbabwe to adopt in its indigenisation efforts. Doing so helps Zimbabwe avoid falling into similar strategic indigenisation pitfalls and capitalise on other countries' strategic strengths.

4.2 The Malaysian Bumiputera economic empowerment: Drivers and outcomes

Scholars widely cite Malaysia as the yardstick against which a successful case of indigenisation is measured. However, the successes are primarily in economic terms as in other fronts like social and political, Malaysia's affirmative action policies attracted a fair share of criticisms. The country recorded indigenisation success stories that restructured the colonially constructed and produced uneven economic balance favouring the indigenous (Uppal, 2014). In 1970, the Malaysian government established the following: close to ¾ of the means and factors of production in the mining and agricultural sectors, 50% of the banking and insurance companies, and 60% of commerce and manufacturing industries were owned, managed and controlled by the ethnic Chinese oligarchies who constituted 37% of the entire population. Thus, in responding to the racial riots of 13 May 1969 against uneven economic balance between the indigenous and nonindigenous, Malaysia's government formulated and implemented a long-term 20-year National

Plan, the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1971. The NEP was to achieve national unity through empowering the economically excluded and socially disenfranchised indigenous Malays.

According to Daniel, Southal and Lutchman (2005), the passage of the NEP blueprint in 1971 signified, to a degree, the sincerity of the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) led government's intention to restructure capital for the benefit of the disadvantaged indigenous people through dispossessing ethnic Chinese oligarchies. The NEP's main objective was to attain national unity by balancing the existing inter-ethnic economic disparities between the Malays (i.e. the Bumiputera of sons of the soil) and the non-Bumiputera, who were mostly Chinese and some Asians. According to the NEP, the government hoped to increase the participation and involvement of the Bumiputera in the mainstream economic activities by giving them a minimum of 30% corporate equity ownership and control by 1990.

Commenting on the equity transfer, Siddique and Suryadinata (1981) and Uppal (2014) contend that the motivation behind this was to establish a competitive Bumiputera bourgeoisie class in the space of one generation. To achieve this, the NEP had two-thronged intentions. First, it aimed at eradicating poverty among races in Malaysia. Second, it sought to restructure Malaysian society's economic structure to reduce, and eventually do away with, the identification of a certain race on the grounds of economic status. Following the end of the NEP's lifespan in 1990, a new affirmative action economic policy, the National Development Policy (NDP), founded on its antecedent's overall goals, the NEP, was adopted and implemented from 1991-2000. Indeed, the NDP was more of a replica of the NEP as both affirmative action policies were largely designed to restructure capital through dispossessing mainly the Chinese nonindigenous oligarchies (Uppal, 2014). To this day, similar affirmative action policies are still alive in Malaysia.

The NEP's regime saw the prioritisation of state capitalism and partial abandonment of the laissez-faire economic style (Siddique & Suryadinata, 1981). NEP represented more of the centrality of state developmentalism, however, in its despotic nature. State developmentalism was instituted as a strategy to accelerate and facilitate capital accumulation to expand the Bumiputera strong middle class. Implementation of the NEP thus saw the introduction of the Bumiputera quota system in government contracts, education, and employment. The NEP also introduced measures for the restructuring of private corporate equity in the country. More importantly, one of the

NEP's major elements was increased expenditure in such critical sectors of the economy as agriculture, education, rural infrastructural development, and social services in the rural communities. Increased expenditures in these areas were considered necessary for the Bumiputera's empowerment. It was in these areas where the bulk of the indigenous people were disadvantaged the most during colonialism.

On the education front, especially higher education, it has been discovered that the Bumiputera were extensively lagging behind and primarily excluded. According to Uppal (2014), the statistics of higher education released by the National Coordination Council had illustrated, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, how the aboriginals were systematically underrepresented and marginalised, particularly in science degree programs. Table 4.1 below shows the underrepresentation and marginalisation of the Bumiputera.

Table 4. 1: Total Graduates by Race: 1959-1970

Degree Program	Malay	Chinese	Others
Bachelor of Arts	1369	1404	608
Bachelor of Science	69	1488	150
Bachelor of Engineering	4	408	41
Bachelor of Agric. Science	40	162	21
Diploma in Education	229	629	216
MBBS	12	108	9
Bachelor of Economics	112	185	31
Total	**1905**	**4381**	**1071**

Source: Abdullah (1997, p. 23).

Comparatively, in Zimbabwe the government adopted and implemented the 'Education for all' policy soon after independence in 1980 (Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture, 2001). This was done against a background of inheriting a highly racialised and uneven education system where "the colonial government made education for white students compulsory and therefore offered universal education, spent as much as 20 times more per white student than the black student" (Kanyongo, 2005, p. 66). Courtesy of these post-independence educational reforms, the government increased the proportion of trained teachers at both primary and secondary levels in a very short period of time. For example, the number of all teachers in the country increased from 18483 in 1979 to 60886 in 1990. Furthermore, these educational reforms saw the number of trained primary teachers increasing from 51.8% in 1990 to 77.2% in 1997 and of trained secondary teachers from 48.1% in 1990 to 89% in 1996 (Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture,

2001). Further to this, Act of Parliament, the government localised the examination system by creating the Zimbabwe School Examination Council (ZIMSEC), whose mandate is to manage and administer the country's secondary and primary education examinations. This reform represented a paradigm shift in the country's examination system as previously the United Kingdom's University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate (UCLES) to set and grade Zimbabwe's examinations.

4.2.1 The key features of the NEP

NEP had several measures to achieve and accelerate Bumiputera ownership and control of the economy and attain national unity. For example, private companies were required to restructure their corporate shareholding thresholds in a manner that would allow the Bumiputera to own and control at least 30%, and to allocate the publicly-listed shares of the listed companies at par value or with nominal premiums given to the Bumiputera (Mokhtar, Reen & Singh, 2013). Further, the NEP compelled companies to establish strategic plans to employ, train, develop, and promote the Bumiputera in all levels of the firm's operations. These plans were strategically set as the pre-conditions for winning state contracts and obtaining the firm's license. The employment quota of the Bumiputera varied significantly with the size of the company. Big companies were required to attain a minimum of 40%. The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 duly enforced this requirement, which provided that all companies with a share capital larger than M$ 100,000 or have 25 employees and above had to be licensed and in compliance with all NEP quota requirements. The NEEP required all commercial banks to lend 20% of their loans to the Bumiputera.

More so, it was provided in the NEP that the Bumiputera be given preferential prices to all government tenders ranging from 2-10%. In addition to this, 30% of all state contracts were reserved for the Bumiputera. The NEP also introduced the ethnically based quotas in the enrolment system at all local universities, and the Bumiputera being the most populous ethnic group in Malaysia, enjoyed the largest share. Furthermore, as provided by the NEP, the government created public enterprises, the Bumiputeras Trust Agencies. These meant to purchase company shares on behalf of the Bumiputeras. The National Investment Trust (NIT),

which morphed into the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF) following the IEE Act's enactment in 2008, is the equivalent of these trust agencies in Zimbabwe. In the issuance of new licenses for vehicle import, timber, milling, insurance, finance, transport, banking, logging, rubber, and tin dealings, much preference was to be given to the Bumiputera. The NEP also compelled private non-Bumiputera companies to employ, train, and develop Malaysian citizens, particularly the Bumiputera. This requirement was done to reflect the multi-ethnic and multiracial configurations of the country's population at all organisational levels.

The government also compelled companies to develop strategic measures with specified timelines to use the Bumiputera distributors in their distribution services to the maximum extent possible, and the minimum turnover on this was set at 30%. Moreover, from 1971 until 2009, all business firms seeking a public listing on the Bursa Malaysia (formerly Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) were asked to first comply with the rule of reserving a minimum of 30% of its initial public offering (IPO) to be purchased by the Bumiputera (Uppal, 2014). All externally owned retail outlets are still required to have at least 30% equity reserved for the Bumiputera. This requirement also requires that all hypermarkets, departmental stores, and supermarkets reserve a minimum of 30% shelf space for the locally produced products by the small-to-medium businesses owned by the Bumiputera.

The NEP and its successor, the NDP, recorded remarkable successes, especially in economic terms (Mokhtar, Reen & Singh, 2013). To a certain extent, the two were also successful on both the political and social fronts. Following the NEP implementation, there have been no more racial and economic imbalances orchestrated riots in Malaysia. In Malaysia, this situation contrasts with her neighbouring Indonesia, which witnessed a horrendous anti-Chinese genocide as recently as 1998 because of widespread racial inequalities.

4.3 The Afrikaners economic empowerment

According to Bond (1998), Afrikaner nationalism was born out of defiance and resistance to the power bloc comprising English-based financial and mining capital and the Cape government. After the second quarter of the 20th century to about 1994, the Afrikaner volk implemented their economic empowerment programmes, termed the Afrikaner Economic Empowerment (AEE)

initiatives. They aimed to address what was commonly referred to as the 'poor white problem' that hit hard on the Afrikaners' constituencies (Terreblanche, 2006; Giliomee, 2003). The following were the key drivers behind the AEE: the acute shortages of resources amongst the volk after being defeated by the British during the Second Anglo-Boer war (now South African war) of 1899-1902; lack of skills among the volk in the age of increasing industrialisation; and decreased reliance on agriculture due to ongoing droughts (Giliomee, 2006). Mazaranye (2016) argues that since the founding of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the volk lagged far behind their British counterparts to own, control and or manage both the means and factors of production, finance, distribution, exchange, and consumption in the country.

The discovery of diamond in Kimberly in 1867 and gold in Witwatersrand in 1886 meant that certain industrial and economic skills were needed to work, manage, control and own the ensuing economic establishments. Afrikaners were principally subsistence farmers without proper economic or industrial skills that could make them fit and comparatively compete in the new economic order presented by industrialisation and the discovery of diamond and gold (Mazaranye, 2016). Commenting on the poor white problem, Sadie (2002, p. 9) argues that the volk had become "foreigners in their own country; vanquished, dispirited and destitute." Mbeki (2009) and Gilomee (2003) also expressed the same sentiments when they argued that the British regarded the volk as too unsophisticated, barbaric and uncouth, thereby not adding value to the new economic regime born out of the discovery of gold and diamond.

So, for the volk to get a comparative edge and a good foothold in the new economic order, the Afrikaner farmers managed to execute organised campaigns in the 1920s to be given preferential treatments such as direct subsidies, tariff protection and state research support (Mazaranye, 2016; Butler, 2007). The Carnegie Commission Report (1932) that investigated the poor white problem discovered South Africa had more than 300 000 extremely poor whites, and many were Afrikaners. The Commission Report revealed that the poverty levels among these poor white South Africans were comparable to those of the indigenous people. These whits had deplorable psychological, health, economic, educational, and sociological conditions. To this end, the commission's recommendations suggested that the white supremacists' racial superiority was at stake, and there was a general fear that this poor white problem could make it easier for the whites to be assimilated into the African culture through the process of Africanisation. For

instance, one of the memos sent to Fredrick Keppel, president of Carnegie Corporation of the time, by the commission had it that there was "little doubt that if the indigenous people were given full economic opportunity, the more competent among them would soon outstrip the less competent whites."

Thus, according to the Commission Report's recommendations, the situation had to be urgently corrected to help prevent miscegenation and racial deterioration by helping out these poor white South Africans from the trappings of poverty. To this end, the Commission Report recommended establishing what it called 'employment sanctuaries' to cater to the poor white workers to replace the indigenous people in all skilled jobs. Furthermore, the commission's report revealed that the volk's purchasing power was comparatively low compared to their British counterparts.

Also, findings of the commission revealed that the level of illiteracy was high among the Afrikaners as less than 4% of their kids were progressing with school and became English proficient, the only official language used in industry and commerce at the time (Mazaranye, 2016; Masito, 2007; Gilomnee, 2003; Mbeki, 1991). The commission's report also revealed that only 15% of the volk's children could proceed with education beyond the 7th grade. Also, Masito (2010) and Adam and Gilomee (1979) have it that during the gold rush period, the volk had the owning and controlling share of only 5% in the financial sector, 1% in mining, 8% in trade and commerce and 3% in construction and manufacturing. The lion's share of the economic stake was owned and controlled by those of British origin. By revealing all this, the 1932 Carnegie Commission report became the foundation upon which the successive 1948-1994 National Party's apartheid administrations were predicated. The National Party campaigned using the Commission's findings before its ascendancy to power in 1948 and justified its introduction of separate development among races, popularly known as the apartheid system.

Therefore, against this background of the volk's indignation, deprivation and indigence, a raft of AEE emancipatory and affirmative action policies and programs were to be adopted and implemented. The National Party government implemented these apartheid policies and programmes to preserve the Afrikaner cultural and language identity, arguably under extinction threats. To this end, the main objective of the AEE policies and programmes was the Afrikanerisation of both the education and social life of South Africa. The National Party

government implemented these policies and programmes under Volkskapitalisme, Afrikaner Nationalism or Broederbond (Giliomee, 2003). At the centre of these programmes were the Afrikaner intellectuals at the University of Pretoria and the University of Stellenbosch, the Dutch Reformed Church, and such organisations as RDB, Federale Volksbelegging and the National Party, which were the implementing organs of these racist and separatist programmes and policies. Through these institutional, ideological and legal frameworks, the initiatives empowered the largely disenfranchised volk economically, socially and politically.

When the National Party assumed power in 1948, most of the state contracts and state procurements and the top executive posts in both government and corporate world were selectively given to the Afrikaners as doing so was considered implementing AEE to the letter. The consequent of this, as argued by Southal (1996) cited in Southall (2007, p. 25), was that the apartheid laws enacted and policies and programmes passed by the National Party-led government were "to systematically promote Afrikaner control and ownership of the economy through affirmative action in the parastatals, deployment of state contracts and patronage to Afrikaner firms and outright political pressure upon English capital."

More importantly, the apartheid government started facilitating the emergence and development of vibrant Afrikaner centred competitive companies in mostly the insurance and banking sectors. As a result, the Stellenbosch Mafia or the Broederbond managed to strategically position itself at the commanding heights of the country's economy in a subtle manner that makes it difficult to dismantle even to this day. This forged economic configuration prompted Julius Malema, the president of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), to argue in 2014 while launching the party's manifesto that:

> Don't undermine the Stellenbosch mafia. They control everything in South Africa… They control the judiciary, they control the economy, they control the land, they control the chain stores, they control the mines, they control the banks… If the Stellenbosch boys don't want you to be anything, you will never become anything in life (Foster, 2014, para. 2).

Malema further contended that both the African National Congress (ANC) and Democratic Alliance (DA) took instructions from this mafia. Under such circumstances, one may argue that the volk became super-rich due to implementing AEE compared to other races in the country, with the indigenous people further pushed into society's social, economic and political margins.

In implementing the AEE policies and programmes, the apartheid government had such draconian legal instruments as the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act. All the successive National Party apartheid administrations deployed this Act to ensure that most top executive jobs in state enterprises were legally reserved for the volk. As read together with the 1944 Apprentice Act, the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act would give the labour minister unfettered powers to reserve specific jobs for certain races of which the certainty was of reserving the well-paying top executive ones to the whites, notably of Afrikaner origins, and the 3D ones (i.e. the dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs) to the native blacks.

However, the original intent of the Act, same as the Southern Rhodesian Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and as amended in 1933, when it was enacted in 1924, was to systematically exclude the black workers in the definition of what constitutes a worker, the colour bar legislation had the resultant effect of systematically relegating black workers into slaves. Furthermore, the government enacted the 1943 Asiatic Act to deal with what came to be known as the Indian question. The primary objective of the Act was to preclude Indians from doing business and trade in Transvaal. As Transvaal was the country's main economic hub, and even of the African continent at large, the Act had the effect of nipping in the bud the nascent Indian enterprises from competing with the white-owned and controlled businesses (Mandla, 2006). Also, the Native Building Workers Act that the successive apartheid governments deployed when implementing their AEE affected the indigenous black people from doing any construction work in white populated urban areas. According to Mandla, all construction works by the Public Works Department, be it skilled or unskilled, in such provinces as Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal were largely reserved for the whites, notably the volk.

There are, however, competing explanations for the success story of the Afrikaner AEE. Among them is that the volk had collaborated with the British to systematically exclude and disenfranchise the indigenous black people from meaningfully participating in the mainstream economy (Terreblanche, 2006). This marginalisation of blacks was done through either proletarianisation or relegated them into non-capitalist societies, and this was made easier through implementing the 1913 Native Land Act. One other competing explanation for the success of the AEE is that after the National Party took power in 1948, various apartheid laws were enacted and implemented primarily in favour of the volk and at the detriment of the

indigenous black majority. This reality led Southall (2006, p. 3) to argue that the National Party "…systematically promoted Afrikaner control and ownership of the economy through affirmative action in the parastatals, deployment of state contracts and patronage to Afrikaner firms, and outright political pressures upon English capital."

Further to that, the apartheid government implemented AEE programmes when the economies were largely closed. Thus, the protected, rather than the globalised, nature of the economic environment then explains the success of the AEE. The other competing explanation for the success of the AEE would be that of the tiny population of the volk, only 10% of the total population, compared to the blacks. Linked to this explanation is that the apartheid government systematically excluded the indigenous black majority to empower the tiny volk population. Indeed, it was the volk empowerment through disempowerment and exclusion of the indigenous black majority. In the words of Bond and Ruiters (2017) and Harvey (2004), it was capital accumulation (i.e. economic empowerment in this case) by the volk through dispossession and displacement of the black majority. More importantly, as Southall (2007) argues, when implementing the AEE, the apartheid government managed to diplomatically integrate Afrikaans language, Afrikaner's culture and education with the economic philosophy encapsulated within their racist affirmative action policies.

According to Sadie (2002) and Gilliomee (2003 & 2006), some of the significant successes of the AEE include the following: many volk privately-owned financial business enterprises were established, such as merchant banks (e.g. ABSA, Standard Bank, FNB), Sasol and Sanlam. Also, various state-owned enterprises were established during that period, and these include South African Airways (SAA), Eskom, Railways and Telkom. In the education sector, the Afrikaner intellectuals and middle class were educated at selected elitist universities, notably Stellenbosch University and the University of Pretoria. The government-mandated the two universities to produce thought Afrikaner leaders (Masito, 2007). Further to that, the apartheid government officially made Afrikaans, the volk's language, one of the two official languages used in commerce, government communication and education. The other one is English. The AEE resulted in the establishment and development of big firms in commerce, energy, manufacturing, construction and mining with strong Afrikaner linkages (Giliomee, 2003; Masito, 2007). Shoprite, Murray and Roberts, Pep and OK are some cases in point in the retail industry. AEE also saw mushrooming

of competitive Afrikaner privately owned and controlled businesses, with some having operations beyond the Republic's borders. These include Rembrandt, Sasol, Old Mutual and Iscor. In statistical terms, before 1948, 89% of the volk population was earning less than R6000 per annum. This percentage decreased to 51% by 1980 following the implementation of the AEE (Masito, 2007). In 1948, less than 10% of the volk earned between R6000 to R18 000 per annum, and following the implementation of the AEE, the percentage rose to 45% by 1980 (Southal, 2007). The affirmative action policy also resulted in 65.2% of the volk occupying what was considered white-collar jobs. All these improvements in the volk's social mobility had significantly reduced the percentage of Afrikaner subsistence farmers as the AEE systematically integrated them into the new economic order of capitalism.

However, AEE was a success story because it was premised on creating and sustaining a political economy of uneven development. The story of the AEE may fit pretty well in Charles Dickens' metaphor of 'A Tale of Two Cities.' On the one pole, there were piles and hips of treasuries (i.e., the AAE benefits to the volk). On the other pole, there were correspondingly piles and hips of tragedies (i.e. the indignation, indecency, woes, privation and dispiritedness upon the indigenous people following the implementation of the AEE). The success of the AEE was premised on committing the very original sin of the political economy of primitive accumulation, which saw massive embourgeoisement of the volk through correspondingly proletarianizing the indigenous black majority. As Marx (1967) warns when referring to the distinctiveness and dangers of capitalism that *'accumulate, accumulate! This is Moses and the prophets!* of *Volkskapitalisme.*

4.5. Broad-based black economic empowerment programme in South Africa

As a racial positive discrimination policy choice, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Programme (BB-BEE) was formulated and implemented against the inherited background of widespread inequalities uneven development architecture constructed and produced by successive imperial regimes (Madi, 1997; MacDonald, 2006). According to Lundahl (1998, p. 26), the only inheritance the independent South African government inherited from the apartheid regime is inequality of "an unequivocal and extreme proportion no matter what indicator is used." According to the Government of South Africa, DTI (2007), Mazaranye (2016) and Lundahl (1998), such a political economy of uneven development, notably the one based on race, was manifestly

seen transcending South Africa's entire walks of life (i.e. politically, socially and economically) at independence in 1994. Like in the context of Zimbabwe at independence in 1980, the access to social security services (i.e. housing, health, education, social security grants etc.) in South Africa at independence was considered racialised. For instance, the Parliament of South Africa (1998) pointed out that by 1994, the poverty index rate in the black communities stood at 95% and 33% among the coloured communities.

Significant racial inequalities were also noticeable in social service provision, income and land ownership. For example, by 1994, 60% of the black communities had no access to electricity compared to only 10% of the white communities (Lundahl, 1998). At the time, the white population of 9.1% owned and controlled 87% of South Africa's land, while the black population of 76.4% (together with the coloureds who constituted 8.9% and Asians who constituted 2.5%) owned the remaining 13% (ibid). Regarding the health of infants, the Parliament of South Africa (1998) revealed that the infant mortality rate within the black community was eight times higher than that in white communities. By 1996, the poorest 20% of all income earners in the country, who were largely blacks, were disproportionately getting only 1.5% of the total income, whereas the top 10%, largely whites, was getting 50% of the country's total income (Lundahl, 1998).

According to Kilambo (2016), by 1992, the big six white conglomerates owned and controlled the lion's share of 87% of the shareholding of the listed companies on the country's bourse. These conglomerates and their shareholding are the following: The Anglo-American Corporation (33%), Sanlam (15.6%), Rembrandt (14.6%), SA Mutual (14.2%) and Liberty Group (4.7%). Furthermore, these conglomerates had numerous auxiliaries in various sectors of the economy resulting in delicate interlocking directorship, pyramid structures and cross-ownership (Kilambo, 2016; Mazaranye, 2016). The indiscriminate uneven development configuration of a dual economy may confirm Bond and Ruiters' (2017) and Bond's (2018) argument that since the initial days of conquest until now, the Southern African region, notably South Africa and Zimbabwe (but South Africa in particular), remains the most unequal region in the world. For Bond (2018), in South Africa, poverty, using the R50/day rate, is standing at 65%, while the inequality rate is the highest in the world (with a Gini Coefficient of 0.63, pitted against soaring unemployment rate (standing at 29%).

Thus, it is against this background of the imperial and apartheid political economy of uneven development that the newly elected black nationalist ANC government found it necessary and desirable to address by adopting and implementing an affirmative action intervention in the fashion of the BB-BEE. Doing so would, perhaps, meaningfully mainstream the socially excluded and economically disadvantaged indigenous people. The affirmative action policy was among the key transformative strategies launched in 1994 by the newly democratically elected ANC government earmarked at offsetting the racially tilted balance of economic power through capital restructuring. According to Mazaranye (2016), BB-BEE was premised on granting black South Africans preferential treatments to have a competitive foothold in the mainstream economy. To this end, the first post-apartheid government blueprint, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), like the Growth with Equity in Zimbabwe, was essentially premised on addressing the inequalities of the past through deracialising the ownership, management and control of the means and factors of production, finance, exchange, distribution, and consumption in the country.

The BB-BEE has three foundational pillars: the Freedom Charter of 1955, the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) agreement documents, and the 1996 South African Constitution. The pillars have one common purpose of addressing the historically constructed and produced political economy of uneven development that saw the indigenous black majority economically, socially and politically excluded. Commenting on the widespread black exclusion, the Government of South Africa's DTI (2013) supported shifting the economic paradigm to ensure social, economic and political justice, stability and inclusion. The government believed that to prevent future social conflicts, past economic injustices should be resolved. To this end, BB-BEE has the following objectives:

- The empowerment of more black people as owners and managers of enterprises. A black-owned enterprise was defined as one that has 51% ownership by black people, with substantial management control of the business.
- Achievement of a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and management structures as well as in the skilled occupations of existing and new enterprises.
- Promotion of access to finance to fuel black economic empowerment.
- The empowerment of rural and local communities through enabling access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills.

- Promotion of human resource development of black people through mentorships, learnerships and internships.
- An increase of the extent to which communities, workers, co-operatives and other collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises, including an increase of their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills.
- Creation of an environment that ensures that black-owned enterprises benefit from the Government's preferential procurement policies.
- Development of the operational and financial capacity of B-BBEE enterprises, especially small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and black-owned enterprises
- An increase the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new enterprises, and facilitate their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training (Government of South Africa, DTI, 2013, p. 7-8).

4.5.1 Mechanisms for implementing BB-BEE

The South African government used a raft of approaches to implement BB-BEE, measured by the B-BBEE Codes of Good Practice. According to the Government of South Africa, DTI (2013), the approaches cover all the seven components of the BB-BEE scorecard. The following are the BB-BEE scorecard components: management control, ownership, skills development, employment equity, preferential procurement, enterprise development, and socio-economic development (including industry-specific and corporate social investment initiatives). Table 2.1 below shows components of the BB-BEE scorecard and their corresponding weightings and compliance targets.

Table 4. 2: BEE elements, weightings and compliance target

Element	Weighting	Compliance Target
Ownership	20 points	25%+1
Management control	10 points	40%-50%
Employment equity	15 points	43%-80%
Skills development	15 points	3% f payroll
Preferential procurement	20 points	70%
Enterprise development	15 points	3%
Socio-economic development	5 points	1%
Total	**100 points**	

Source: Government of South Africa, DTI (2013, p. 10)

BB-BEE has had a fair share of criticisms across many fronts. On the one hand, critics such as Mbeki (2009), Southall (2014, 2007 & 2006) and Shava (2016) are arguing that the favoured political and business clients are extracting rents from indigenisation processes. The extraction

of rents by the elites is being done while the potential beneficiaries (i.e. the deserving poor indigenous people) are systematically left out of the beneficiary equation and thus remain in society's social margins (Southall, 2014; Shava, 2016). Like those of Zimbabwe's indigenisation, BB-BEE critics suggest that this affirmative action policy's primary intent is to create yet another version of the apartheid regime in reverse (Butler, 2005; Marazanye, 2016) as it benefited (and still benefiting) the politically connected. It is crucial to note that critics are not against empowering the disadvantaged indigenous people but rather how the government is administering BB-BEE.

Mbeki (2009) and Bond (2014) have given a competing explanation for this. The two argued that this is largely because the BB-BEE was not invented by the black nationalists like in the case of most African countries. Rather, it was a creation of the "South Africa's economic oligarchs, that handful of white businessmen and their families who control the commanding heights of the country's economy, that is, mining and its associated chemical and engineering industries and finance" (Mbeki, 2009, p. 66). Corroborating with Kilambo (2016, p. 59) further argues that BB-BEE deviated considerably from the ANC's original policy position on the economy. The "ANC's economic policy since the 1955 Freedom Charter had been nationalisation." For the ANC, the nationalisation of the economy was one best way for addressing the overarching architecture of uneven development in the country. The ANC's 1955 Freedom Charter is not ambiguous about this policy position on the economy. It says:

> all peoples shall share in the country's wealth; mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; and all people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture, and to enter all crafts and profession (Alliance, S. A. C, 1955, p. 82).

Since then, the nationalisation of the economy became ANC's linen thread when it comes to its economic policy. This linen thread was evidenced by the reiteration of nationalisation sentiments in successive pre-1994 ANC Conferences held after the 1955 Kliptown Conference that produced the Freedom Charter. These conferences are the 1969 Morogoro Conference, 1985 Kabwe Conference and 1991 Durban Conference. Thus, to co-opt the comrades and persuade them to shift from their long-held nationalisation economic policy position in 1992, the apartheid government created a company (Nail) that would be a flagship of the BEE (Bond, 2014; Mbeki, 2009). The apartheid government created Nail in collusion with the white monopoly capital.

Sanlam, the second-biggest insurance company in the country that was at the forefront of leading the AEE programmes, created Nail together with the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) (Mbeki, 2009). The major objective of these collisions was to strike and conclude Faustian pacts with the leaders of the Black Nationalist movements in the country.

Following Nail's creation, Real African Investment Limited (Rail), with similar co-optation objectives, was also created by the giant Anglo-American Corporation. Through these subterfuges, Faustian pacts leaders of the black nationalist movements, particularly from the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress and South African Communist Party (SAPC), became multi-millionaires overnight (Mbeki, 2009). Massive assets and huge sums of money were transferred to them at zero cost, and their debts to IDC were paid off by Metropolitan Life (MetLife), Sanlam's small subsidiary company, which was given to Black Nationalist leaders at no cost. Commenting on these cooptations, Butler (2007) contends that the BB-BEE was heavily influenced by its antecedent AEE in both quantitative and qualitative degrees. This may be so because the affirmative action policy was invented by the same government that implemented the AEE, the apartheid regime.

According to Mbeki (2009) and Bond (2014), the architects of the financial razzmatazz that ensued after the conclusions of CODESA negotiations had several political and economic objectives they wanted to achieve post-apartheid regime. Chief among them include the following: (a) weaning and appeasing the ANC nationalists from pursuing radical economic aspirations, with the nationalisation of the economy as the most critical; (b) giving the oligarchs influential positions in the forthcoming ANC government so that they may have much influence in economic policy formulation processes; (c) allowing those oligarchs who wished to move the headquarters and shift the primary listings of their companies to do so without hindrances; (d) give the oligarchs and their companies with the right of first refusal of government tenders and contracts; and (e) protect the businesses of the oligarchs against foreign competition while at the same time opening up the rest of the economy. These subterranean collusions, Faustian pacts between the capital, apartheid government and leaders of the Black Nationalist Movements demonstrated how capitalism could reproduce itself with the aid of the pervasiveness of neopatrimonialism. This may give a competing explanation as to how and why the state can play a critical role in facilitating crude accumulation processes while at the same talking left.

Furthermore, Bond (2018) lists what he referred to as the '12 Mandela's economic legacy' deals accepted by the ANC during the CODESA negotiations as pre-conditions for a smooth transition. They point directly to maintaining the status quo of an amplified rate of uneven development. These are:

- The repayment of the US$25 billion apartheid-era foreign debt. This denied Mandela money to pay for basic needs of apartheid's victims.
- Giving the South African Reserve Bank formal independence. This resulted in the insulation of the central bank's officials from democratic accountability. It led to high interest rates and the deregulation of exchange controls.
- Borrowing $850 million from the International Monetary Fund in December 1993, with tough conditions persisting for years. These included rapid scrapping of import surcharges that had protected local industries, state spending cuts, lower public sector salaries and a decrease in wages across the board.
- Reappointing apartheid's finance minister Derek Keys and Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals, who retained neoliberal policies.
- Joining the World Trade Organisation on adverse terms, as a "transitional", not developing economy. This led to the destruction of many clothing, textiles, appliances and other labour-intensive firms.
- Lowering primary corporate taxes from 48% to 29% and maintaining countless white people's and corporate privileges.
- Privatising parts of the state, such as Telkom, the state-owned telecommunications company.
- Relaxing exchange controls. This led to sustained outflows to rich people's overseas accounts and a persistent current account deficit even during periods of trade surplus, and raising interest rates to unprecedented levels.
- Adopting the neoliberal macroeconomic policy Gear. This policy not only failed on its own terms, it also caused developmental austerity.
- Giving property rights dominance in the constitution, thereby limiting its usefulness for redress.
- Approving the "demutualisation" of the two mega-insurers Old Mutual and Sanlam. It was the privatisation of historic mutual wealth for current share owners.
- Permitting most of South Africa's ten biggest companies to move their headquarters and primary listings abroad in the late 1990s. The results are permanent balance of payments deficits and corporate disloyalty to the society (Bond, 2016, para. 9).

While engaging with student activists, the rector of the University of the Free State, Professor Jonathan Jansen, said this about the late president Mandela: "If [former President Nelson] Mandela gets any mention at all, it is as a sell-out, the man who led South Africa into a soft transition that left white privilege undisturbed and black poverty undiminished" (Bond, 2016, para. 1).

Considering the preceding chequered origins of the BB-BEE, it considerably failed to restructure capital, with a handful of politically favoured and strategically located black elite benefited more,

pitted against undifferentiated widespread business fronting. This is fundamental because instead of resolving the national questions about inequality between and among races in the country, BB-BEE is ironically resulting in South Africa having the highest Gini Coefficient globally, especially by race. This level of inequality prompted Bhorat and Kanbur (2006, p. 5) to reveal that following the inequality statistics in the wake of the BB-BEE: "income inequality has increased with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.565 to 0.577 between 1995 and 2000, while on a 1996 and 2001 comparison the Gini rose from 0.68 to 0.73." Bhorat and Kanbur further argue that evidence suggests widespread income inequality and absolute poverty within black constituencies following BB-BEE.

Furthermore, according to the World Bank-sanctioned poverty and inequality assessment report commissioned in 2016 but presented to Minister for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, on the 27th March 2018, there is empirical evidence that the triple challenges of inequality, poverty and unemployment have been deepening since the dawn of democracy in 1994. The report revealed that South Africa is the most unequal society on earth, with a Gini Coefficient of 0.63 in 2015. Such shocking revelations came just after the PricewaterhouseCoopers' findings on Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2018 that revealed that South Africa is the most corrupt country globally, with a platinum honour of having the highest levels of economic crime in the world, scoring a mark of 77%. The World Bank Report (2018) reveals that the number of people living below the poverty datum line increased to 40% in 2015 from 36.4% in 2011. The likely competing explanation for this may be that the implementation of post-1994 affirmative action policies did less in addressing uneven development-related challenges.

Moreover, the report has revealed that high wealth inequality and very low intergenerational social mobility have fundamentally become undisturbed continuities since the days of colonialism and apartheid. The reason for this may be that, by becoming intergenerational, they are systematically passed from one generation to the next, with apparent signs that the situation is perpetuating. As it stands right now, the World Bank Report (2018) reveals incomes, asset values and net wealth of 50% of the country's households are 8%, 5% and 4%, respectively. Inversely, the household incomes, asset values and net wealth of the top 10% are 55%, 69% and 71%, respectively. The report also revealed that the bulk of the locals, notably blacks, are unskilled and

unemployable, pitting the BB-BEE codes on employment equity and skills development. This situation is evidenced by the startling reality that between 2008 and 2014/5, half the country's population was considered chronically poor. During the same period, the report has established that at least 78% of the citizens were considered poor. The startling reality revealed by the report following BB-BEE programmes may serve to attest to the considerable failure of the affirmative action policy on transforming the socio-economic conditions, as per its founding intent, of the disadvantaged ordinary South Africans who are predominantly blacks.

4.5.2 Outcomes of BEE in the extractive industry in South Africa

South Africa has made some remarkable achievements when it comes to indigenising its extractive industry and empowering the historically disadvantaged persons (HDSAs), i.e. the indigenous blacks, Indians and Coloureds). This section presents and discusses the major outcomes of BEE in the South African mining sector. According to Kilambo (2021 & 2016), the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEEA) of 2003 and the Mining Charter of 2002 require the mining companies to give black people preference when implementing the BEE programmes. This is to make the historically disadvantaged persons (HDSAs) owners and controllers of at least 40% of the mining industry. To achieve this, the black people must acquire both mining shares and assets, and the process of doing this starts with them acquiring mining licences. Commenting on the nature and outcomes of BEE transactions in the mining sector, Kilambo (2021, p. 8) the following illuminating statistics:

> By 2012, a total of 6370 licenses were offered to black-controlled entities (50 +1% shares) which included prospecting rights (69.8%; 4446), mining permits (20%; 1274) and mining rights (10%; 650). HDSA partnerships, also referred to as black-empowered entities (those with 25 +1% shares), received 5215 licenses. The majority are prospecting rights (52%; 2724) followed by mining permits (25%; 1329) and mining rights (21%; 1072).

During the same year, 2012, broad-based groups received 1439 licenses. These groups include women, communities and consortiums groups (Kilambo, 2016 & 2021). These licences received by the black people are further divided into 738 prospecting permits, 304 mining rights and 396 mining permits (Kilambo, 2016). Figures 4.5 and 4.6 below show the exponential growth of black-

owned mining companies between 2007 and 2010 (i.e. growing from 67 companies in 2007 to 112 in 2010) and market capitalisation of both BEE and non-BEE companies, respectively.



Source: Kilambo (2021, p. 9).



Source: Kilambo (2021, p. 9).

While South Africa has made great strides in indigenising the mining sector, as shown in Figure 4.6 above, the ownership of the sector is still highly uneven as the BEE companies own only 7.4% (translating to R143.5 billion), while non-BEE companies own 92.6% (translating to R1.8 trillion) (Kilambo, 2021 & 2016). This situation is against the anticipated BEE compliance target of 15% in 2009 and 26% in 2014. It should be noted that of the R143.5 billion market capitalisation of the black-owned mining companies, three companies loom large as they own up to 81.8% of this amount. These are African Rainbow Minerals (ARM), with a market capitalisation of R40 billion; the Royal Bafokeng Resources, with a market capitalisation of R13 billion; and Exxaro, with a market capitalisation of R64 billion (Kilambo, 2021).

While Anglo Platinum later concluded several BEE deals, it concluded its first BEE transaction with the Royal Bafokeng Resources in 1997 (Kilambo, 2016 & 2021). Initially, the BEE deal was a 50-50 joint venture between Anglo Platinum and the Royal Bafokeng Platinum Mine (RBPM), but later on, Royal Bafokeng Resources increased its shareholding to 67%, leaving Anglo Platinum with the remaining 33% (Anglo Platinum, 2010; Kilambo, 2016 & 2021). Table 4.4 below shows concluded BEE transactions in the Platinum Group Metals (PGM) sector.

Table 4.3: BEE deals concluded in the PGM sector

Company	Company Black-owned Companies/	Nature of Shareholding /	Percentage Shareholding Transferred	Where Shareholding Exchanged
Impala Platinum	Royal Bafokeng Nation	Community Trust	13.4	Company level
	ARM	Joint venture	55	Two River Mines
	Marula, Makau+Thubase	Community Trust and companies	27	Marula Platinum Mine
	Inkosi Platinum	Joint venture	51	Inkosi Platinum mine
Anglo Platinum	Wesizwe created in 2003	HOLDCO	16.33	Frischgewaagdleding project
	Mvelapanda Resources	HOLDCO	10.63	Booysendal/North am Projec
	African Rainbow Consortiums	Joint venture	50-50	Modikwa Platinum Mine
	Pelewani Investment	SPV+Consortium	51	Bokoni
	Royal Bafokeng	Community	67	Royal Bafokeng Platinum Mine
	Bakgatla Ba Kgafela	Community	15	Union Mine
Lonmin Platinum	Incwala Resources Created by Lonmin	Community Trust and consortium	18 & 26	Western and Eastern mine and Akanani project
Eastern Platinum	Gubevu Consort	Consortium	26	Barplats Investments. Company level
Aquarius Platinum	Imbani platinum	Joint venture	26	Blue Ridge mine
	Savannah Consort	Consortium	26	AQSA Company Level
Platmin Australia	Corridor Mine	Limpopo Govt.+ Community Trust	15	Smokey Hills Platinum
Platinum Canada	Moepi Group	Community Trust	27	Boyton Investments. Company level

Source: Kilambo (2016, p. 156).

The following Tables further show some of the outcomes of BEE in the South African extractive industry.

Table 4 3: BEE transactions concluded in the gold industry

Company	Black-owned Companies/Partners	Nature of Shareholding	Percentage Shareholding Transferred	Where Shareholding Exchanged
AngloGold Ashanti	Bokamoso Trust	ESOP	1.9	Company level
	Izingwe Holdings	Consortium	0.7	Company Level
GFIMSA	See Figure 6:1 and 6:2	Consortium, ESOP, Individual and JVC	10	South Deep
Harmony	ARMGold but now ARM	Company	14	Company level
	Pamodzi Gold	Company	Assets	Orkney
DRD Gold	EMO Khumo Gold SPV Pty	ESOP, Company	26	Crown, ERPM, ErgoGold
Simmer and Jack	Xelekwa Investment	Company	21.74	Company
Central Rand Gold	Puma Gold Investment	Company	26	Exploration and Recovery
Wits Gold	Tranter Kismet Invest./ Continental African Gold/ Wits Golds Women Trust	Consortium	26	Company
Gold one	Micawber Pty			
Village main Reef	Sun Platinum Holdings/ Ncholo Trust	Consortium	9.1 and 6.69k	Company level

Source: Kilambo (2016, p. 167).

Table 4.5: BEE transactions concluded in the diamond industry

Company	Black-owned Companies/ Partners	Nature of Shareholding	Percentage Shareholding Transferred	Where Shareholding Exchanged
DBCM	Ponahalo Investments	Consortiums, SPV, ESOP	26	Company level
Petras	Sedibeng Mining	Company	26	Kimberley Underground Mines
	Sedibeng Mining and Bokoni Properties	Company	17.65 and 7.65	Sedibeng Mine
	Sedibeng Mining	Company	26	Starting the mine
	Re Teng Diamonds	Company	30	Koffieforntein Mine
	Thembinkosi Mining Investment and ESOP	ESOP/company	14 and 12	Cullinan Mine
	Senaka Diamonds	Company	26	Finch mine
TransHex	Mvela Resources	Company	20.3	Company level
	Mvela Resources	Company	50 and 51	Dwaalkop and Kokerboom
Rockwell Diamonds	Zico and African Vanguard Resources	Company	26 each (52)	Company level

Source: Kilambo (2016, p. 165).

Table 4.6: BEE transactions concluded in the coal industry

Company	Black-owned Companies/ Partners	Nature of Shareholding	Percentage Shareholding Transferred	Where Shareholding Exchanged
Anglo American Plc	Check diagram 6:3			
BHP Billiton SA	Eyesizwe	Company	100	Malta mine
	Kuyasa Mining	Company	100	Ikhwezi, Delmas
	Optimum Coal	Consortium	100	Optimum Colliery
	Riversdale Mining/ Siyanda Resources/Aka Resources	Consortium/ESOP	51	Koornfontein
Xstrata Coal	ARM Coal	Company	20.2	Boschmans/Witcon s-sold mine
	ARM Coal	Company	26	GGV Large Pit
Sasol	Eyesizwe Coal	Company	100	Glisa Colliery
Coal of Africa	Unidentified		26	Vele projects

Source: Kilambo (2016, p. 179).

Table 4.7: Some selected black-owned companies in the coal industry

Black-owned Company	Controlled Collieries
Kuyasa Mine	Ikwezi, Delmas Coal-
Leew Mining and Exploration	Leew Vaalkrantz
Mashala Resources	Wesselton and Geluk Mines, Ermelo, Msukaligwa
Northern Coal	Mimosa mine Polmaise Colliery-Witbank
Riversdale Holdings	Zululand Anttracite at Nongoma
Sumo Coal	Kpermyn Colliery
Sacmh Pty	Ilanga and Umlabu Colliery
Slater Coal	Oaviemore and Mgdalena
Shanduka Coal	Graspan and Side Minera, Rietfontein Mine
Siyanda Resources	Koofontein mines and Gloria section
Stuart Coal	Weltevreden–Delmas

Source: Kilambo (2016, p. 185).

Table 4.8: BEE transactions concluded in other mineral sectors

Company	Black-owned Companies/ Partner	Type of Black-owned Company	Percentage of Shareholding Transferred	Where shareholding Exchanged
Anglo American Plc. (Kumba)	Exxaro	Company	26	Thabazimbi and Sishen Iron Ore
Vedata Resources	Exxaro	Company	26	Black Mountain Mine lead and zinc
Samancor Manganese	Several Black Consortiums +women group	Consortium	26	Company level
Palabora Mining Company	Palabora Copper consortium +Community	Consortium.	26	Company level
International Mineral Resources	Batho ba Rena Consortium	Community/ consortium	28	Samancor Chrome – Company level
Xstrata	Merafe Resources	Pooling and Sharing	20.5	Ferrochrome
	Bakwena ba Mogopa	Community	26	
Assore	Bokamoso Trust	Consortiums	14.1	Main Street 350
	Shanduka Resources	Company	11.6	Main Street 343
	ARM	JVC in Asamang	50-50	Manganese
Richards Bay Minerals	Community/co mpany	Consortium	26	Company level
Lafarge	Consortium	Consortium		Company level

Source: Kilambo (2016, p. 187).

4.6 Comparative analysis of the case countries and strategic lessons for Zimbabwe

The preceding analysis of the three selected case countries' indigenisation experiences shows different degrees of indigenisation successes and failures, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The differentials are attributable to the following country-specific structural and contextual factors: a) the varying indigenisation models adopted and implemented; b) the extent to which the indigenisation models applied threaten FDI and global capitalism; c) the degree of ambiguity of the indigenisation policy and legal frameworks. Zimbabwe needs to draw useful lessons from these country-specific contextual and structural factors. Zimbabwe's policymakers and implementers should capitalise on the strategic indigenisation strengths while avoiding falling into the same strategic indigenisation pitfalls of these three selected cases.

Regarding the model of indigenisation, there are several similarities between the Malaysian and South African indigenisation models. In both case countries, the indigenisation models are gradual in orientation and realistic in nature as they promote win-win situations between the international capital and the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. This gradual orientation of indigenisation models is particularly with regards to the percentage of indigenisation required. In Malaysia, international businesses should indigenise 30% of their shareholding (Mokhtar, Reen & Singh, 2013), while in South Africa, indigenisation of ownership is pegged at 25+1% and has 20 points BB-BEE weighting points (DTI, 2013). The two indigenisation percentages are considered acceptable by the international. Doing business in such indigenisation environments is still profitable. For this reason, the Malaysian and South African versions of indigenisation are not posing serious threats to the strategic interests of both international capital and the global capitalist economy.

This situation is unlike Zimbabwe's context, where the 51% indigenisation threshold threatens the international capital's strategic interests. In the mining sector, Hoyle and Wexler (2018) reveal that due to the 51% indigenisation threshold, Zimbabwe is the riskiest place for foreign miners. Hawkins and Simpson (2019), Magure (2012) and Chitsove (2014) also share similar views. Indigenisation laws require international businesses to indigenise a minimum of 51% of their shareholding. It is important to note that although the post-Robert Mugabe new dispensation government scrapped indigenisation laws from all other sectors of the economy, the diamond

and platinum sectors are still governed by the 51% indigenisation laws. The reason for keeping the two under indigenisation requirements could be that they "are typically regarded as good revenue generators, the Zimbabwe government has decided to retain the indigenisation requirements for diamonds and platinum" (Eversheds Sutherland International, 2019, para. 11). Therefore, the government must balance the need to empower the disadvantaged indigenous citizens through indigenisation and attract the much-needed FDI.

The Malaysian and South African versions of indigenisation are also alike in their skills development as a form of indigenisation. In Malaysia, the NEP introduced ethnically based quotas in the enrolment system at all local universities. The Bumiputera, the most populous ethnic group in Malaysia, is enjoying the largest share, hence boosting skills development among indigenous citizens. In South Africa, skills development has a 3% compliance target with 15 BB-BEE weighting points. The AEE had a somewhat different approach to skills development among the Afrikaners. Afrikaner intellectuals and the middle class were educated at selected elitist universities, notably Stellenbosch University and the University of Pretoria. The two universities were mandated to produce thought Afrikaner leaders (Masito, 2007). Therefore, it is critically important for Zimbabwe to learn from these three case study countries and consider skills development as a strategic form of indigenisation.

Unlike the Zimbabwean version of indigenisation which is entirely equity transfer-based (i.e. 51% indigenous ownership in all businesses in the country), the South African and Malaysian versions have employment quotas as forms of indigenisation. In Malaysia, although the employment quota of the Bumiputera varies greatly with the size of the company, big companies are required to attain a minimum of 40%. In South Africa, the employment quota has two distinct variants: 40-50% managerial control with 10 BB-BEE weighting points and 43-80% employment equity with 15 BB-BEE weighting points. This was duly enforced by The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975, which provided that all companies with a share capital larger than M$ 100,000 or have 25 employees and above had to be licensed and comply with all NEP quota requirements. Regarding the AEE during colonial and apartheid, South Africa Davis (2012) reports that the implementation of the AEE resulted in 65.2% of the white-collar jobs in the country occupied by the Afrikaners. Thus, Zimbabwe needs to borrow a leaf from these three case studies' indigenisation books and consider employment quota as a form of indigenisation. Doing so may go a long way in presenting

a conducive environment for FDI to flourish while at the same implementing indigenisation as international businesses in such indigenisation regimes will still be profitable.

While the three case countries have consistent and clear indigenisation legal and policy frameworks, Zimbabwe's are ambiguous and inconsistent. For example, although the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEE Act) require government departments and international businesses to prioritise procuring from local indigenous businesses, the laws are not as explicit as the Malaysian and South African ones. In South Africa, the compliance target for preferential procurement is 70%, and it carries 20 BB-BEE weighting points (DTI, 2013). In Malaysia, the NEP requires that the Bumiputera be given preferential prices to all government tenders ranging from 2-10%, as well as reserving 30% of all state contracts to them. Further, the NEP required all commercial banks to lend 20% of their loans to the Bumiputera. Also, all externally owned retail outlets are still required to have at least 30% equity reserved for the Bumiputera. This requirement also requires that all hypermarkets, departmental stores, and supermarkets reserve a minimum of 30% shelf space for the locally produced products by the small-to-medium businesses owned by the Bumiputera. It is critically important for Zimbabwe to draw strategic preferential procurement lessons from Malaysia and South Africa. This lesson would work well if Zimbabwe's indigenisation laws recognise preferential procurement as a form of indigenisation, as is the case in Malaysia and South Africa.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter discusses three country case studies of indigenisation: Malaysia's Bumiputera, South Africa's apartheid AEE and South Africa post-1994 BB-BEE. The literature analysis has established that the first two countries recorded significant success, particularly in economic fronts, while the last one is producing mixed results. Malaysia's success is mainly attributable to its culture which is incompatible with corruption, the major challenge accounting for the less encouraging outcomes in post-1994 South Africa. In the case of South Africa's AEE during apartheid, the success is largely, paradoxically, attributed to the systematic exclusion of the majority of indigenous black people and implemented in the regime of dirigiste economic policies. In South Africa, BB-BEE is recording significant success partly because the programme, unlike Zimbabwe, is not based on retributive measures. Further, its indigenisation version is not posing threats to

the international capital's strategic interests and the global capitalist economy in the country. The next chapter presents the research methodology used for this study.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.0 Introduction

The way researchers conduct studies reflects the research philosophy subscribed to (articulated or not), the research design and research approach used, and the research methods and instruments used to sample, gather, present, analyse and interpret data. Such clarity in methods is required to inform the particular research inquiry. This chapter presents and discusses the research philosophy informing this study, the research approach, research design and research methods used to sample the units of analysis and collect, present and analyse data. The chapter reflects on my fieldwork experiences, as well as the challenges encountered and how they were mitigated. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ethical considerations and approaches adopted to ensure research integrity.

5.1 Research paradigmatic approach: Frankfurt critical theory

Critical theory is an appropriate tool for this study as it helps frame the study to critique the political economy of indigenisation, particularly in the extractive industry. It does so by providing ontological, epistemological and methodological frames that systematically question the integrity of Zimbabwe's version of extractive industry indigenisation as the panacea to the widespread uneven mining development problem in the country. The argument for critiquing the integrity of Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation stems from the idea that the findings of the study show that indigenisation's major objectives remain fundamentally unwritten and unspoken, with the written and spoken ones acting as smokescreens. On the one hand, the indigenisation objectives that remain unwritten and unspoken are the indigenisation programme enabling regime survival from the existential threats of regime change and elite personal accumulation of wealth and power. On the other hand, the spelt out indigenisation objectives are to empower disadvantaged indigenous citizens and their communities through indigenisation and address the overarching uneven development.

The underlying motivation for using critical theory in this study is that the theory's epistemological position- one that mixes ideographic and nomothetic approaches (Neuman (2014) - emphasises getting an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon under investigation through uncovering the multi-layered realities underneath the phenomenon. Researchers conduct such studies to change the world for the better; in this case, advocating for an extractive industry indigenisation policy choice that addresses widespread uneven development in the mining sector. In this case, it is getting to the bottom of the extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe. According to Neuman (2014), the findings of these studies are necessary to empower the oppressed with objective knowledge about their oppression so that they may emancipate themselves through revolutionary means. In other words, I chose this paradigmatic approach to investigate the underneath structural processes and factors that would describe and explain how and why the extractive industry indigenisation overpromised yet under-delivering during implementation. In the process, extractive industry indigenisation is perpetuating the very problem of uneven development it sought to address in the first place. I chose Critical Theory to vitiate superficial-level illusions and distortions in understanding Zimbabwe's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation.

In the same vein, this epistemological tool of the critical theory helps the oppressed (i.e. deserving disadvantaged indigenous citizens) with true knowledge to change their conditions for the better. Unlike the interpretivism paradigmatic approach, critical theory's epistemological grounding aims not only at the inquirer gaining an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under investigation through critiquing its political economy. Rather, it also aims at contributing to changing the political economy that established the uneven development in the first place. Articulating on this viewpoint, Marx (1967) argues that many philosophers have missed the point by devoting much of their time and energy to interpreting the world while the point is not on interpreting the world but changing it. In doing so, critical theory acts as an empowerment drive to the less powerful and underprivileged necessary for their emancipation from undesirable conditions. The reason is that the primary aim of the critical theory's epistemological tool is to unearth and expose the underlying hidden truths and myths about a certain phenomenon to improve people's lives. According to Fay (1987, p. 27), critical theory's goal is "to explain a social order in a way that it becomes itself the catalyst which leads to the transformation of this social order."

Further, critical theory's ontological grounding is that of critical realists who view the reality and knowledge regarding the phenomenon under investigation as assorted and stratified, i.e. as multi-layered (Neuman, 2014). These multiple layers of reality and knowledge are the empirical (i.e. the first world), real (i.e. the second world) and actual (i.e. the third world). The empirical reality is that which is observable by our common senses, and in this case, it is the implementation failure of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe. Thus, the empirical layer is the surface level of reality and knowledge of the phenomenon, i.e. extractive industry indigenisation in this context. This situation means that it is that observable reality when it happens in our day-to-day experiences (Alvesson & Skoldeberg, 2009). In this study, these experiences are the processes and activities leading to implementation failures of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe, resulting in outcomes being inconsistent with goals.

However, to the critical theorists, the observable surface empirical reality is the manifestation of the unobservable deeper structural processes and dynamics (i.e. the real or second world of reality) and causal mechanisms (i.e. the actual or third world of reality) that generate and modify the structures. In this case, these are the largely unspoken and unwritten rules and objectives of indigenisation lurking beneath the spoken and written rules of indigenisation. In other words, the empirical reality is just but a reflection of the structural dynamics and power relations operating in its unobservable world (i.e. the real and the actual reality strata).

The structures at deeper levels (i.e. real strata) often do not have direct and instantaneous surface reflections at the empirical level. Instead, they usually lie latent and cause the surface's manifestations either vicariously or themselves emerge and manifest on the surface. Thus, according to the critical theory, the primary purpose of any scientific inquiry is "instead to investigate and identify relationships and non-relationships, respectively, between what we experience, what happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world" (Danemark et al., 2002, p. 21). With regards to this, this study argues that the truth and scientific knowledge about Zimbabwe's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation lurk beneath the veneer of distortions, illusions, false appearances, myths, and ideologies. Corroborating with this reasoning, Neuman (2014, p. 144) argues that the critical theory is based on an explanatory critique premised on "the explanation simultaneously explains conditions (or tells why events

occur) and critiques conditions (or points out discrepancies, reveals myths, or identifies contradictions)" (Neuman, 2014, p. 144).

5.2 Research approach: Qualitative research

The study uncovers the deep-seated structural complexities, factors, motivations, processes and dynamics that may account for how and why extractive industry indigenisation is perpetuating the very problem its implementation seeks to address in the first place, i.e. uneven mining development. The study used a qualitative research approach to uncover these deep-seated structures, a research approach which, according to Yin (2014), is about furnishing answers to *'how'* and 'why' questions. This study tried to answer explanatory questions related to the perpetuation of uneven development in the mining sector following its antidote, indigenisation. The motivations for choosing a qualitative research approach relate to its inherent complexity, multi-dimensionality, thickness, context-bound, in-depth, and nuance (Mason, 2002). Furthermore, the qualitative research approach allowed to inquire a selected unit of analysis, i.e. extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe, in greater depth whilst paying delicate attention to the context, detail and subtle nuances of the phenomenon (Patton, 2002).

Also, the adoption of the qualitative research approach was justified by following what Merriam (2002) outlines as the four major objectives of this approach. The first one is to understand in-depth the processes of a phenomenon. In this case, these are processes relating to the perpetuation of the problem of uneven development following extractive industry indigenisation. The second one is to understand what could account for why the formulated policies are often not the ones implemented; in this case, understanding how and why the formulated indigenisation objectives are not consistent with the outcomes. The third one is to give thick descriptions and explanations to poorly understood and taken for granted phenomena. In this case, I provided thick descriptions and explanations as to how and why the extractive industry indigenisation overpromised yet underdelivering during implementation in Zimbabwe. The last one is discovering hidden structural processes, motivations and factors that may describe and explain the phenomenon under investigation. In this case, these are underlying factors that may account for extractive industry indigenisation's underdelivering after overpromised.

5.3 Case study research design

In this study, I adopted a single case study approach (Yin, 2014, 2009 & 2003). However, the single case has subcases, cases-within-a-case-study or embedded cases (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2010). The selected case study is the mining sector, and the embedded cases are the community share ownership trusts (CSOTs). While the focus is only on the processes and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe, I studied the indigenisation processes and outcomes within the CSOTs. The motivation for choosing the mining sector is that it is in this sector where indigenisation is looming large compared to other economic sectors in the country. The extractive industry being such a strategic economic sector in Zimbabwe, many indigenisation deals are being concluded and implemented in this sector. For example, as of February 2014, the indigenisation implementing agency, the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB), had processed more indigenisation plans (i.e. 464 plans) from the extractive industry as compared to other sectors of the economy (NIEEB, 2014; Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015). The manufacturing sector had 410 plans processed, the finance and tourism sector had 218, while other sectors combined had 376- making a total of 1,459 (ibid). Further, the extractive industry is strategic because of the following reasons:

- Zimbabwe has more than 4,000 gold deposits, 90% of them found in greenstone belts- making the country one of the countries with the richest gold deposits in the world (World Bank, 2019);
- Zimbabwe is home to the world's second-largest deposits of the platinum-group metals (PGMs) after South Africa, with 1,200 tons current reserves and an estimated 7,800 tons in undiscovered resources (World Bank, 2019, Chibememe et al., 2014);
- Zimbabwe is home to huge deposits of diamonds, both industrial and alluvial- with Chiadzwa diamond field, a home to the world's largest diamond deposits (Global Witness Report, 2019; Eastwood and Curnow, 2012), with an estimated capacity to supply 25% of the global diamond market" in 2013 (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2013, p. 5; Chibememe et al., 2014).

- According to the findings of the Zimbabwean Geological survey conducted in 1990, Zimbabwe is home to more than 66 industrial and base mineral deposits (Chibememe et al., 2014).

Thus, the extractive industry sector reflects the contestations of indigenisation from its inception in 2007 to the present. Also, I chose this sector because "[t]he indigenisation policy overwhelmingly targets the mining sector" (Baissac, Maubrey, van der Merwe, & van Onselen, 2016, p. 16). For example, the 2013 Draft Minerals Policy and the statements issued by the country's indigenisation ministry in January 2015 confirmed that the government is particularly committed to indigenise this sector as there is no flexibility about indigenising 51% equity in this sector (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013; Baissac, Maubrey, van der Merwe, & van Onselen, 2016). At the core of the indigenisation programme lies the idea that the indigenous citizens should fundamentally exploit natural resources for the greater good of the same indigenous citizens, notably the disadvantaged ones (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013; Mines and Minerals Act; IEE Act; ZANU-PF Manifesto, 2013; Draft resolutions of ZANU-PF Congress, 2014). I selected CSOTs as my subcases because of the following three motivations: they are the widely used policy instruments for extractive industry indigenisation, the government concluded many mining indigenisation deals through them, and they reflect deep indigenisation contestations in the country.

Conceptually, the case study design is a research approach investigating a contemporary phenomenon, indigenisation in this case, within some real-life context when answering such explanatory 'how' and 'why' questions where I have limited control over events (Yin, 2009 and 2014). In case study research designs, an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon is the primary goal (Neuman, 2014; Stake, 1995 &2005; Merriam 1998, 2002). A subcase is one of the elements found within the broader-case study that can be studied independently but cannot be divorced from the main case (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2010). To this end, I considered this research design suitable for this study as it focuses on inquiring into the structural factors and processes that affected the effective implementation of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe. The reason being that "the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a *decision* or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result" (Schramm, 1971, p. 45). Corroborating with

this reasoning, Stake (1995) argues that the best case study is reflective and patient in nature as it allows researchers to critically examine another view of the case. Nonetheless, Yin (2014) observes that case studies, because of their narrowness in analysis, i.e. by only focusing on solitary units of analysis, are not fit for sound generalisation.

In studies like this one which seeks to get an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon, case study research design has unique strengths over others such as phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and narrative analysis. One critical advantage is that this design helped me provide a detailed historical account of the impact of the underneath structural forces on extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe (Given & Saumure, 2008).

5.3.1 The subcases: Community share ownership trusts

As the subcases of this study, CSOTs are established as vehicles and economic hubs for driving rural economic development. The objective is to make those in the economic, political and social margins of society part of the owners and controllers, rather than bystanders, of both the means and factors of mining production in their respective communities. The establishment of the CSOTs is provided for by the regulatory framework that established them, i.e. the Section 14B (4) of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations of 2010 (SI 21 of 2010). For the Frameworks, Procedures and Guidelines for Implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14: 33) (2016), the CSOTs are established as part of a cocktail of measures for implementing the National Economic Empowerment Strategy (NEES) designed to localise the 10 Point Plan. Thus, CSOTs' purpose was to provide business hubs for the micro-level entrepreneurial activities within the mining communities. To this end, as provided by The Frameworks, Procedures and Guidelines for Implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14: 33) (2016, p. 11), these CSOTs are augmenting the efforts by the District Economic Empowerment Conferences (DEEC) in harnessing "the local natural and human resources… and must engage community members to unlock entrepreneurial potential and effectively establish jobs and spur local economic growth and diversification."

Statistics reveal that 70% of the country's population resides in these same rural areas and is largely economically excluded (Dube, 2013). Statistics also show that 70% of Zimbabwe's total population are youths aged between 0 and 35. The greater fraction of them reside in these rural areas and are, by definition, economically disenfranchised. These rural areas, traditionally known as the reserves, Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) or communal lands, are, together with their inhabitants, neglected by colonial and postcolonial successive administrations. To this end, findings show that in 2010 the government considered it untenable to leave more than 70% of the population outside the mainstream economy, hence established the CSOTs.

5.3.2 The drivers for choosing some of the sub-cases

At this stage, it is important to articulate the reasons for choosing some of the subcases, i.e. some of the CSOTs. The Gwanda CSOT was chosen due to its uniqueness of being the only COST that got the 10% shareholding from one of its qualifying companies, Blanket Mine. Four reasons explain why the Marange-Zimunya CSOT was chosen. First, compared to others, it is the COST that received the largest pledge of its seed capital, i.e. US$50 million from the qualifying companies operating in Chaidzwa Diamond Field (CDF). Second, it is the CSOT whose board of trustees oversees and presides over tapping the proceeds from the world's largest diamond deposits (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2021). Fourth, the corruption cases within the CSOT have been rife, with its offices now closed in Mutare due to lack of money to pay rentals and employees because of corruption (ibid).

The Bindura CSOT was chosen for three reasons. First, one of its qualifying companies, Freda Rebecca Gold Mine (FRGM), is the biggest producer of gold in Zimbabwe- producing 300kgs of gold against the target of 240kgs in May this year (AllAfrica, 2021). Second, two major cases and allegations of business fronting were recorded in one of its qualifying companies, FRGM. The cases are Kenneth Musanhi's Suncraft Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd and Zindico Consortium fronting cases. Third, it is one of the CSOTs that have many positive outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation. The Zvimba-Chegutu-Mhondoro-Ngezi CSOT chosen for three reasons. First, it is the only CSOT that bought shares (i.e. 33% equity) in a private company, Sable Park Estate, after receiving its seed capital from the qualifying companies. Second, it is also one success story

of extractive industry indigenisation as many positive outcomes of indigenisation were recorded in the CSOT. Third, it is CSOT whose board of trustees is responsible for tapping the proceeds from the world's second-largest deposits of platinum-group metals (PGMs) after South Africa.

5.4 Target population and sampling procedure

This study's target population consisted of a collection of people working (and once worked) in and on the spaces of indigenisation, particularly extractive industry indigenisation. The documents they produced while working in these spaces also formed part of this target population. To this end, respondents and documents were extracted and collected, respectively, from the following public institutions: Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (now disbanded); Select and Parliamentary Portfolio Committees for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment; National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) (now disbanded); selected CSOTs. Furthermore, respondents and documents were also drawn and gathered from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party; opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) party; and selected civil society organisations in the country. Selected academics with a strong bias in indigenisation were also interviewed.

In terms of sampling the interviewed respondents and reviewed documents, I used purposive and snowballing sampling techniques to select units of analysis from the target population presented above. The sample of 35 respondents and 40 documents was considered representative enough to respond to the set research questions. Corroborating with 35 respondents and 30 documents as sample sizes, Patton (2002) contend that although there are no standard rules for determining sample size in qualitative research, the recommended should be between 25-40 participants. Corroborating with this viewpoint, Laher and Botha (2012) give us two advises: a) the sample sizes for qualitative studies must not be too small to make it challenging to attain data saturation stage; b) they must not be too big to make it difficult to do profound and meaningful data analysis. Commenting on this sample size, Bertaux (1981) suggests that qualitative researches should have a minimum of 15 respondents. Indeed, I determined this study's sample size by the purpose of the research, that I wanted to know, the time and resources available, data saturation point, and the nature of the phenomenon under investigation (Patton & Patton). I considered this sample

size larger and broad enough to obtain the perceptions, views, opinions, feelings, attitudes, motivations and interests about how and why extractive industry indigenisation overpromised and yet underdelivering upon implementation. The sample of respondents, shown in Table 7.1, allowed me to get necessary clarifications of and capture essential aspects of the phenomenon under investigation that the reviewed documents did not provide.

Table 5. 1: Respondents participated in the interviews

Sector	Number of Respondents
Senior Government Officials	6
Senior Government Retirees	5
Academics	5
Civil Society Organisations Activists	4
Government Department Officials	6
Political Parties	3
Residents	6
Total	**35**

I emphasised more on the richness of the data and depth of analysis extracted from these respondents. This was achieved by ensuring that their views provided the much-needed clarifications in areas where the reviewed documents were not explicit. Having a sample made up of participants and documents drawn from different spaces (i.e. government, civil society, political parties, and academia) helped establish a more representative picture of Zimbabwe's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation. Corroborating with this triangulation of data sources viewpoint, Birks and Mills (2011) argue that triangulation helps ensure analytical rigour and enhance the credibility of the findings.

I chose the two non-probability sampling methods because of their strong emphasis that some respondents and documents are more relevant to and possess the much-needed information of the study than others. I ascertained through using my judgement about the respondents' knowledge, experiences and expertise and documents' information-richness regarding the phenomenon under investigation. Corroborating with this reasoning, Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Babbie (2010) argue that purposive sampling is a deliberate attempt to select certain participants with unique features in the research process. These are the information-rich cases as argued by Patton (1990) and Patton (2002). I used snow-balling, "friendship pyramiding" (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 57), a sampling method to interview respondents and review documents I was referred to by those purposively sampled.

5.5 Data collection methods

In this study, by way of triangulating them, I used the three primary methods of qualitative data collection: key informant interviews, non-participant observation and documentary analysis (Merriam, 2002). However, document analysis was the main method, while key informant interviews and non-participant observation playing a complementary role. The combination of the three data collection methods provided a clear picture of the paradox of uneven mining development in the wake of implementing indigenisation in Zimbabwe's extractive industry. Key informant interviews and non-participant observation data provided the supporting evidence of how and why paradoxes of such nature occurred since 2010 when the government started implementing extractive industry indigenisation. Throughout the fieldwork process, I was guided by such questions as 'what' (i.e. descriptive issues), 'how' (explanatory issues), and 'why' (explanatory issues) (Merriam, 2002).

On the one hand, the 'what' questions captured the descriptive analysis of the phenomenon under investigation. These events and processes may account for how and why the extractive industry indigenisation overpromised yet underdelivering. On the other hand, the 'how' and 'why' questions captured the explanatory analysis of the phenomenon under investigation. This explanatory analysis relates to the competing explanations and mixed factors around the central question. The original data collected through these three methods were integrated with those from the literature review in a way that a new theoretical model on how to strike a balancing act between the need for indigenisation to empower the disadvantaged indigenous citizens, on the one hand, and the need to create a conducive environment for international mining capital to thrive, on the other.

5.5.1 Documentary analysis

Through this method, I conducted data collection by reviewing and analysing relevant primary documents and video excerpts. These included the following: the Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates on indigenisation (online and hard copies); Zimbabwe's daily and weekly papers (Financial Gazette, Standard, The Sunday Mail, The Herald, Daily News, Newsday, Southern Eye); the Constitution and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEE Act); the indigenisation

General Regulations and General Notices; and other various supporting legislations of the policy. Further, mining companies' official documents, a series of resolutions, official speeches, official video excerpts and audio transcripts, policy documents and legislation, official correspondences, ministerial and parliamentary reports as well as cabinet policy statements, statements and speeches of the public officials and political figures, administrative reports, newspapers and letters, memoranda, communique, announcements and minutes of meetings relating to indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation particular were also scrutinised. While I purposively selected some documents, I found others through snowballing, i.e. when some documents or respondents referred me to other documents. I reviewed these to establish an overall view of the country's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation. This review was useful in providing critical background data and in-depth knowledge about indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular.

Conceptually, Mogalakwe (2006) conceives documentary analysis as a qualitative data collection method that focuses on investigating textual data extracted from different primary data sources. Thus, in this study, the process involved gathering, reviewing and analysing primary documents, both printed and electronic, which documented information on Zimbabwe's experiences with indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. I reviewed the documents to understand the following: a) the organic and conjunctural forces that accounted for extractive industry indigenisation not addressing uneven mining development; and b) extractive industry indigenisation overpromising yet underdelivering upon implementation. However, when using this method to collect data, I was guided by four quality criteria formulated by Scott (1990). These are credibility, authenticity, meaning, and representativeness of the documents purposively selected or found through snowballing for analysis.

One major motivation for selecting document analysis as the primary method for data collection is that it is one of the mostly used qualitative data collection techniques (Merriam, 2002) and mostly used in case studies (Yin, 2003). Further, I chose this data collection method because it provided a rich vein for analysis (Yin, 2009). It does so by comparing the findings found in the fieldwork with those of other authorities. Thus, in a way, document analysis helped me to get credible data. This data collection method also brought upfront sensitive information about the failure of the extractive industry indigenisation to address uneven development. Such information

was inaccessible through other means (Yin, 2014), notably through key informant interviews. This data collection method was also advantageous in the sense that documents could be easily and repeatedly retrieved if need be. In terms of accessibility, most of these documents are readily available on the targeted organisations' websites. Also, the fact that the documents were produced not for this study meant that they were unobtrusive.

However, I experienced some challenges with this method of data collection. The information found in the documents was sometimes inaccurate, biased, or incomplete (Guion, Diehl & MacDonald, 2011). I corroborated the data I collected using this method with those collected using key informant interviews and non-participant observation methods to circumvent these weaknesses. Triangulation of the three data sources helped me get trustworthy data as the weaknesses of one method were addressed by the others' strengths.

5.5.2 Key Informant interviews and non-participant observation

With this method, I collected data by interviewing key informants purposively drawn from the government (i.e. NIEEB, indigenisation ministry, CSOTs and parliament), civil society, relocated residents from the mining communities, the ruling ZANU-PF party, academia and the opposition MDC-A. It is important to note that I was also conducting the non-participant observation while I was conducting interviews. I used the non-participant observation method to level out my biases in the key informant interviews method. Non-participant observation helped me identify differences between what the respondents said and what was on the ground (Parke & Griffiths, 2008). Simultaneous interviewing and observing helped me reveal the differences between what participants said and what they were doing or what was happening on the ground.

With this method, I conducted purposeful conversations with key informants to extract relevant data regarding how and why the extractive industry indigenisation overpromised and underdelivering upon implementation. A key informant interview guide guided the conversations. Interviews were open-ended and discovery-oriented. The purposeful conversations allowed me to capture the deep thoughts, feelings, opinions, perceptions, viewpoints and perspectives about the phenomenon under investigation (Boyce & Neale, 2006; Guion, Diehl & MacDonald, 2011).

Although key informant interviews and non-participant observation methods were supplementary to the documentary analysis, the data collected through the two was necessary to provide additional answers to all four research questions of the study.

One fundamental motivation for choosing key informant interviews and non-participant observation methods as supplementary to the document analysis is that the two provided me with the undiluted individual understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Yin, 1994, 2003; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). During the interview, I could probe further to the extent that some respondents would provide unsolicited interesting data which, by and large, might be relevant or irrelevant to the study. Considering its in-depth orientation, for Ritchie and Lewis (2003), key informant interviews (augmented with non-participant observation) has five essential elements that suited this single case study research. The first one is the advantages of combining structure and flexibility. The second is its ability to allow further probing to understand the context and further elaboration. The third one is its face-to-face interaction allowed me to capture non-verbal communications, such as facial expressions essential for deep understanding. The fourth one is the physical encounter with individual respondents allowed deep exploration. The fifth one is its interaction orientation that allows knowledge generation depending on the respondents' ideas, perceptions and feelings. Through this method, face-to-face interaction with individual interviewees with unique extractive industry indigenisation experiences was useful in preparing different themes, categories and meanings rather than specific questions (Stake, 1995). The reason being the in-depth individual perceptions, reactions to findings, opinions, facts and forecasts, feelings and potential solutions to how extractive industry indigenisation can address the problem of uneven development were determined.

Also, I used semi-structured interviews largely because they are one of the most effective methods of collecting qualitative data. The discussions flowed in a non-standardised fashion when I solicited data on key themes to cover issues and questions (Kajornboon, 2005). Furthermore, this data collection method gave me the freedom to word and re-word questions and topics regarding the phenomenon under investigation according to what I deemed fit and necessary in an interview. Thus, structured interviews allowed me to use words and terms I considered appropriate to give or get explanations or ask for clarification. Unlike with structured interviews, which are standardised and where all respondents are asked similar questions, in semi-structured

interviews, I had the freedom to follow the conversational style of discussion and questioning in a way I considered necessary without adhering to a detailed interview guide (O'Leary, 2004; Kajornboon, 2005). The advantage of doing so was that I could probe, explain, and rephrase questions (Kajornboon, 2005).

However, interviews and non-participant observation methods were prone to biases. Participants were aware that they were being interviewed and observed. To this end, they behaved not in their natural settings and expressed what I believe they thought I wanted to hear. Further, I cannot generalise findings gathered through this method to all sectors of the economy where indigenisation is being implemented in the country as I did not interview many respondents. I interviewed only 35 respondents. However, I circumvented these methodological weaknesses by corroborating the data I gathered using these two data collection methods with those gathered using document analysis.

5.6 Data presentation and analysis methods

In this qualitative study, where I used document analysis and key informant interviews as data collection methods, I employed two qualitative methods to present and analyse two datasets from interviews and documents. These are the thematic analysis method (for interviews and non-observation data) and the qualitative content analysis method (for documents). According to Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas (2013), qualitative content analysis, on the other hand, is a data analysis method that involves systematic coding and categorizing of large amounts of documentary data unobtrusively. Systematic coding and categorizing were conducted to ascertain the patterns, frequency, relationships and trends of words used in the texts. (Gbrich, 2007; Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas (2013). On the one hand, thematic analysis qualitative "method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data" (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 79).

While presenting and analysing data using these two methods, I provided rich and thick descriptions and explanations of the findings, considering the references of the literature that inform the study in the first place. As informed by Yin (2014, 2009 & 1994), when doing data presentation and analysis, I systematically examined, categorised, and tabulated evidence to address the initial study proposition. Thus, while using the two qualitative data presentation and

analysis methods in a more inductive way, I identified common themes or recurring threads or patterns that permeate the entire datasets. Doing this involved proper organisation of the data, reading and rereading through it, sorting it out, coding it, developing categories and then themes. The identified themes were analysed on a case-by-case basis in a way that theory is derived from the gathered data.

When analysing and interpreting data using these two qualitative methods, I followed the inductive process Merriam (2002) recommended. The inductive process consists of the following systematic steps: a) prepare and organise data; b) read through data for patterns and trends; c) code or index data based on similar categories and topics; d) apply the codes to develop the themes; e) connect and interrelate themes; and f) interpret the data and report findings. Following these stages was critical in transforming the collected raw data into usable information. However, this was systematically done through the interpretation of the data. This systematic inductive process also has flexible guidelines that I customised to fit my research aims. ATLAS.ti software system was used to help achieve all this.

5.6.1 Qualitative content analysis

To present and analyse data collected through document analysis, I used the qualitative content analysis method, which Bryman (2004, p. 55) calls "the longest established method of text analysis among the set of empirical methods of social investigation". Following what Butler (1998) advises while using the qualitative content analysis method, I hermeneutically and dialectically interpreted textual data collected through document analysis. I conducted qualitative content analysis through systematic coding of the major themes, clusters, categories, and cases to extract deeper meanings and patterns within the purposively selected documents for analysis.

The 'hermeneutic circle of understanding' (Hasanpur, Keyhanpour & Nourozitalab, 2017) was employed to analyse documents containing the phenomenon under investigation. The hermeneutic circle of understanding entails the art of interpreting a text through repeatedly moving back and forth from the specific (i.e. individual parts of a text) to the general (i.e. the whole text) (Butler, 1998). Implied is that the parts of every document containing information of the phenomenon under study were interpreted and understood by reference to the whole

document. Conversely, the whole document was interpreted and understood by reference to its individual parts. In this study, the employment of the hermeneutic circle of understanding in the presentation and analysis of data was justified by the idea that neither the parts nor the whole text would be fully understood, analysed or interpreted without referencing it to the other. Thus, I used the qualitative content analysis method because its hermeneutical and dialectical- i.e. a contradictory process that derives its meaning from opposing sides (Reuten, 2014) or back and forth process of meaning construction- lens helped to extract major themes, patterns, and meanings from different texts with information about Zimbabwe's experiences with indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. Therefore, I used the method to present and analyse data drawn from such documents, pieces of legislation, reports, newspaper articles, official video and audio transcripts relating to the phenomenon under study. Through this method, I first explored the data before recombining the evidence to produce research findings that are practically grounded (Yin, 2014). I followed the three-staged process suggested by Elo and Kyngäs (2008), which comprised preparation, organising and reporting stages. In the first stage, I get myself immersed in the data (i.e. every reviewed document) to obtain the sense of the whole document. In the second stage, I did open coding that enabled me to create categories before "grouping codes under higher-order headings, formulating a general description of the research topic through generating categories and subcategories as abstracting" (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008: 110). In the third stage, I reported the findings by discussing them under the same themes as those I got through thematic analysis.

5.6.2 Thematic analysis

In this study, the data I collected through key informant interviews and non-participant observations were presented and analysed thematically using the thematic analysis method. Like in the case of documents collected using document analysis and presented and analysed using the qualitative content analysis method, interview data were presented and analysed thematically in a case-by-case basis. Following what Rice and Ezzy (1999), Braun and Clarke (2006) and Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas (2013) recommended, to identify themes, I carefully read and re-read the collected interview data. This process was done by examining patterns of emerging themes from the data collected. The themes formed categories of analysis. Through a coding or

indexing system, I grouped the interview data into themes, i.e. collapsing data with similar characteristics and then presented and analysed them on a case-by-case basis. A dialectical analytical framework was employed to extract deeper meanings from the largely contradictory statements obtained from the interviews. However, before analysing the data, I first familiarised myself with the collected data. I did this by immersing myself in it through reading and re-reading the transcribed data. Data transcription was done to come up with major themes, patterns and meanings. This data transcription process also helped me in immersing myself in the data.

Therefore, while presenting and analysing interview data, I logically organised the data, followed by its categorisation into meaningful groups, then interpretation through scrutinizing it to establish major themes, patterns and meaning, and finally generalise where possible (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Thus, I reduced the transcribed data from key informant interviews through summarisation and then organised it into specific cases. I further broke these cases into different categories of similar elements. However, similar cases were combined to form categories of similar elements, and these similar categories were further combined to form major themes of similar characteristics. This process helped provide valuable insights, patterns and meanings relating to how and why Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation overpromised yet underdelivering upon implementation. In the process, it is not addressing the very problem of uneven development it sought to address in the first place.

5.7 Contribution to knowledge process

I followed a systematic way of contributing to knowledge recommended by Rule and John (2011). After identifying and refining themes, I integrated compatible elements extracted from these themes. As a result, I arrived at a proposed indigenisation framework for Zimbabwe to adopt for implementing an extractive industry indigenisation programme that empowers the disadvantaged indigenous people without compromising international capital inflows. The proposed theoretical model is the Integrated Extractive industry indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Governance Framework (IMIEEGF). The framework endeavours to present and explain the critical structural and contextual factors that should be in place if empowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens through indigenisation should be a success story in the country, particularly in the extractive industry. Thus, in qualitative studies as this one, a theory is the result of an

inductive process (Creswell, 2014; Chazuza, 2017) in which high levels of abstraction are grounded in the data and generic themes (Strauss, 1987; Chazuza, 2017; Creswell, 2014). Conversely, at the lower levels of data analysis and discussion, I described and explained the data to achieve higher levels of data interpretations to use them as the basis for theory or new knowledge building.

I systematically conducted this by using the existing literature to interpret themes while using research questions as the guiding frameworks for developing the IMIEEGF. The compatible and generalizable elements gleaned through this process were then integrated to construct new knowledge that demonstrated the relationships between and among the themes undergirding the phenomenon under investigation. It is important to note that I emphasised the recurrent themes throughout the processes of contribution to knowledge and theoretical development. However, the basis for theoretical development and contribution to knowledge was the information this study obtained (i.e. those that emerged from themes) that did not conform to the existing stock of literature.

5.8 Integrity and trustworthiness of the research

I used what Wotela (2017) calls five essential qualitative measures that strengthen qualitative researches. These are credibility, transferability, conformability, dependability, and replicability or repeatability. According to Bryman (2012), all of them are meant to ensure and determine the integrity of the research process, findings, and conclusions.

In this qualitative research, credibility (or truthfulness) appraised the degree to which whether all attributes and themes emanated from the research were technically answering the formulated research questions. Thus, this helps determine if the research appropriately addresses the identified research problem and achieves the research purpose.

Trustworthiness or rigour and "dependability" (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 300) were essential in this study. The two are essential features for credible research. Research trustworthiness is the degree to which confidence in the process, outcomes, interpretations and conclusions of a study are ensured (Connelly, 2016). Dependability means the stability of the findings over time and over different times and conditions (Lincoln and Guba (1985). The reason is that credible

and dependable qualitative research helps to get an in-depth comprehension of a phenomenon that would otherwise be confusing or mysterious (Eisner, 1991). In this context, it is how and why the extractive industry indigenisation overpromised its benefits and yet under-delivering upon implementation. This process of ensuring integrity and trustworthiness in qualitative research, the process called "inquiry audit" by Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 317), was vital in establishing the credibility of both the process (methodology) and results (findings) of this study.

To ensure integrity and trustworthiness, I used various strategies developed by Creswell and Miller (2000). Triangulation of methods of data collection is one of these strategies. Thus, this study triangulated the data collected from two datasets (i.e. data from document analysis and key informant interviews) to establish the credibility, authenticity and accuracy of the research findings. According to Eisner (1991), this is called structural corroboration, which means using multiple data sources to support or contradict the interpretation. In Eisner's (1991, p. 112) words about triangulation, "we seek a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility that allows us to feel confident about our observations, interpretations and conclusions."

Further, I also used a peer debriefing or review strategy to ensure validity. In doing so, I constantly submitted and presented my findings to my PhD peers for their review about the credibility of methods, meanings, interpretations, conclusions, and feelings I employed in the process of compiling the findings. This ensured trustworthiness and dependability of the process, data, and interpretations because my peers asked objective, hard and honest questions relating to these issues.

To further strengthen the research integrity, I also consulted an external auditor regarding the credibility and accuracy of both the process and substance of the research (Creswell, 2009). The consulted external auditor had no connection whatsoever with this study, and hence she examined whether the collected data supported the findings, conclusions, interpretations, and knowledge contributed. Further, to ensure the research integrity, I clarified my background that I have no specified political inclination on Zimbabwe's political formations and processes. Politically, if anything, I would say I am occupying the defensible middle ground between the ideologies of the seemingly parallel ruling ZANU-PF and opposition MDC. I make this clear

upfront because my reflexivity has significant implications on interpreting findings (Merriam, 1998).

Further, I ensured research integrity through member-checking. I conducted member-checking processes by soliciting the views of some of the selected participants about the credibility and authenticity of the findings (Creswell, 2009; Stake, 1995). Conceptually, member-checking is about taking back the gathered data, their interpretations, analyses, and conclusions to the respondents interviewed about the phenomenon under investigation to measure the degree of their credibility. For Stake (1995), this strategy of giving participants a significant role in corroborating and verifying the research process is critical to ensure the credibility of findings. Also, to ensure research integrity, I provided a rich, detailed and thick description of findings that would allow readers to make decisions concerning the transferability of these findings to other different settings (Creswell, 2009).

5.9 Fieldwork challenges and mitigations

Challenges encountered during fieldwork made it difficult for the data collection process to go as originally planned. Firstly, I faced the challenge of the inaccessibility of public offices. In Zimbabwe, indigenisation, particularly extractive industry indigenisation, is generally viewed as a politically sensitive subject matter. This characterisation of indigenisation is notwithstanding the fact that it is in these public offices where most of the much-needed data and respondents for key informant interviews were found. However, when I visited these offices, I partly mitigated the challenge by producing the authorisation letters of entry, i.e. the Ethical Clearance Certificate obtained from the University of the Witwatersrand and the supervisor's recommendation letter.

Secondly, due to the political connotations attached to indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular, I faced the challenge of resistance by public officials. They were very reluctant to disclose and share the much-needed indigenisation information citing the topic's political sensitivity under investigation. Official Secrecy Act that prohibits public officials from disclosing and sharing information considered classified further compounded the situation. However, I managed to partially mitigate this challenge by explaining that the research is purely for academic purposes without any political connotations attached to it. Explaining to them the

political neutrality of the research helped to partially circumvent this challenge. Admittedly, I am carefully using the word 'partially' here because other public officials refused to be interviewed even after I provided them with the explanations of the political neutrality of the research. Some of those who accepted would prohibit me from posing questions they deemed politically sensitive, leading me to get less profound and less credible data that hardly answered my research questions. Often, I was denied audio recording during the interviews. Thus, I faced another challenge of trying to strike a balancing act between effective notetaking and keeping the conversation flowing.

Thirdly, I faced the challenge of the unavailability of targeted key informants for interviews, especially those in public offices. Many would say they are not available or busy with national duties or endlessly postponing the interview meetings until I realised that it might be their best strategy or polite way of refusing to be interviewed. Certainly, many unsuccessful follow-ups (i.e. through phone calls, emails and site visits) to the offices were made with the view of explaining the political neutrality of the research. I would explain the political neutrality of the research by articulating that it is purely for academic purposes. Nevertheless, these challenges were partially mitigated by e-mailing them the interview guides so that they may respond to the questions therein in their spare time. However, the response rate of these emailed interview guides was less encouraging.

Fourthly, I faced the challenge of getting what I would consider unreliable and inconsistent data through these key informant interviews. I attributed this to three reasons, competing for supremacy, of course. First, I interviewed them after numerous follow up messages. The follow-ups would mean that I interviewed them after they had succumbed to my follow-up pressure. Second, many cited the indigenisation's political sensitivity, so they would not want to divulge what they considered confidential indigenisation data. Third, a combination of the two reasons mentioned above. However, I managed to partially counteract this challenge by corroborating and cross-validating this interview data with others collected through document analysis to corroborate the credibility of the data.

Finally, some public documents were only availed to me on strict conditions that I only review them whilst in the official's office. Taking them with me or reproducing them (i.e. either through

photocopying, scanning or taking pictures) were strictly prohibited. They often cited the Official Secrecy Act to justify their refusal to reprint or take them with me. So, I had to use the limited time I had in their offices to glean and write down that which I considered useful for my study.

5.1 Ethical considerations

To ensure that respondents made informed decisions on whether to participate in the research or not, I explained in detail the purpose, nature, duration, methods and means to conduct this academic study (Creswell, 2007). No element of deceit, influence, force, duress, coercion, fraud or overreaching was used to make participants participate in the research. Throughout the research, I protected the identity of the respondents who took part in the interviews. I did this at all times in the interest of respecting confidentiality, anonymity and privacy ethical protocols (Israel & Hay, 2006; & Neuman, 2014). When analysing data, I did not include respondents' names, designations or any information that may link responses with the person. Furthermore, transcriptions of the field notes were saved on a password protected private personal computer. Back-ups of these were saved on the internet through electronic mail exchanges. The same data was also backed up on password-protected multiple external hard drives. During analysis and discussion of findings, I used these backup copies to preserve the original data from corruption and unintended damage (Badenhorst, 2007). Before going to the fieldwork, I first sought permission to conduct this research from research the institutions entrusted with implementing and overseeing the indigenisation as well as from the civil society organisations and academics advocating and researching in the spaces of indigenisation. The Ethical Clearance Certificate from the University of the Witwatersrand and the supervisor's support letter helped me secure these authorisations of entry. The authorisations enabled me to conduct key informant interviews with purposively selected officials from these organisations as well as accessing documents for documentary analysis from the same organisations.

5.11 Researcher’s positionality

My main reason for choosing this topic has more to do with storytelling from a Zimbabwean viewpoint of the critical issues of the Zimbabwean political economy of uneven development in

the extractive industry following indigenisation. I carried out my storytelling exercise with a special reference to why and how the extractive industry indigenisation overpromised and yet underdelivering upon implementation. The reason is that for me, it appears to be misleading, embarrassing and problematic that much of the scholarly work, and public debates as well, about Zimbabwe's controversial indigenisation policy, have been largely conducted by non-Zimbabwean nationals. I strongly believe that the unmitigated answer to the question 'why and how extractive industry indigenisation overpromised and yet underdelivering upon implementation' can only be objectively provided by a Zimbabwean speaking from a Zimbabwean standpoint.

Further, having been served as a researcher assistant in a research project conducted by the Research Council of Zimbabwe in 2013 entitled '*Strengthening the Institutional Capacity for Policy Analysis, Policy Management and Policy Governance in Zimbabwe'*, I found widespread inconsistencies, complexities and contestations around the implementation of the indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. I am the one tasked to research on the indigenisation policy's institutional, legislative and constitutional frameworks to determine whether they are strengthening the institutions' capacity for effective policy analysis, management and governance. The findings of that research revealed that indigenisation institutions then were heavily incapacitated to foster effective policy analysis, management and governance (Zhou, 2014). It is against this background that I found it necessary, through an academic inquiry, to provide an in-depth understanding of how and why the implementation of indigenisation, notably in the extractive industry, underdelivering upon implementation after overpromised its benefits.

5.11 Conclusion

This chapter presented and discussed the methodology used to sample the units of analysis, collect, present and analyse the findings. The methodology was presented by outlining the research paradigm that informed the study, research approach, research design, sampling techniques, and data collection and data analysis methods used. Fieldwork experiences, challenges and mitigation measures were discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, ethical considerations and measures of ensuring validity and reliability of the methodology and findings were presented and discussed in this chapter.

PART 3
FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This part presents and analyses the findings concerning the competing factors and explanations regarding how and why the overpromising extractive industry indigenisation is under-delivering upon implementation in Zimbabwe. This situation is raising critical issues concerning what I call 'the usage of indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular by the government in order for the elites to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives.'

Important to note here is that I did not separate the presentation and discussion of findings. Merriam (2009) advised that combining presentation and discussion ensures a logical and clear flow of the arguments to avoid unnecessary repetitions of the presented data while on the discussion stage. In this study, the accumulation by dispossession theory is engaged in discussing findings on issues where the government is using its monopoly over power in the indigenisation processes.

Chapter 6 presents and discusses issues about contested conceptions and representations of indigeneity in Zimbabwe, i.e. the findings that respond to this study's first sub-research question as this study is about how and why the overpromising extractive industry indigenisation is underdelivering upon implementation.

Chapter 7 analyses findings of the debates about the contribution of one widely used indigenisation policy instrument in the mining sector, i.e. the Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs), in the extractive industry indigenisation processes. In the process, Chapter 7 articulates whether CSOTs were local economic hubs for rural development or theatres for elite accumulation for political and personal ends.

Chapter 8 explores the impact of internal structural and contextual factors on either enabling or hindering the success of extractive industry indigenisation in the country. These factors directly

affect the course and outcomes of the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular.

Chapter 9 examines the impact of governance structural and contextual factors on either facilitating or inhibiting the successful implementation of indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. These factors indirectly affect the course and outcomes of the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular.

Chapter 10, as the concluding chapter, presents and discusses the summary of findings, major conclusions, and recommended measures that, if adopted and implemented, may go a long way in addressing the identified challenges that obstructed extractive industry indigenisation from achieving the desired broad-based empowerment objectives.

CHAPTER 6

CONTESTED FRAMINGS OF INDIGENEITY IN ZIMBABWE

6.0. Introduction

The focus of the study is not on whether the concept and practice of indigeneity in Zimbabwe is a contentious issue or not. Rather, it is about how and why the outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation, notably with regards to Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs), are not consistent with the goals. To understand this, it is useful to explore contentions around the framing of indigeneity in the country. How indigeneity is framed plays a significant role in including and excluding people in the indigenisation beneficiary equation. Thus, describing and explaining the contentions around the framing of indigeneity helps understand how and why it has been framed the way it is, and its subsequent decisiveness regarding either accumulation or expropriation. Therefore, this chapter analyses the motivations and factors that account for the way indigeneity is framed and produced in Zimbabwe. In the process, this chapter analyses issues at the intersections of indigeneity, power, accumulation, and expropriation. Doing this helps to understand why the outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in the country are largely inconsistent with the goals. Therefore, this chapter focuses on responding to the following first sub-research question of the study: How is indigeneity framed in Zimbabwe and utilised in the country's extractive industry indigenisation? While document analysis is the primary data collection method in this study, much of the findings presented and analysed in this chapter were collected mostly from key informant interviews. Interviews were conducted with key informants from government, academia, civil society and political parties. For this chapter, most of the documents I reviewed I got them from the interviewed key informants.

Findings show that indigeneity, as one critical component of the unresolved national questions in Zimbabwe, is a subject of controversy. It raises critical belonging, membership, citizenship, and nativity questions. The following are examples of such questions: who is and who is not an African? Who is and who is not a Zimbabwean? Who belongs to Zimbabwe, and who does not? How the inclusion of some and exclusion of others determined? What and whose criteria are used to determine the inclusion of some and exclusion of others? Who holds the license of

determining whom to include and whom to exclude? Is classism or othering on account of race, tribe, ethnicity, language, culture, social status or any other stereotypical images justified or not? If yes, how and why? If not, how and why? Unfortunately, answers provided to these questions could not come close to resolving Zimbabwe's intractable indigeneity national questions. In one way or the other, the answers refer to some social groups with exceptionalism and otherness.

Findings further show that the 'we/us and them' attitude is looming large within Zimbabwe's social groups. The schism percolates into sensitive racial, tribal, and aboriginality imperatives. The reason is that there appear to be more disagreements than agreements to all of the preceding indigeneity national questions. This reality is notwithstanding the fact that we are four decades into independence, with the country's Constitution suggesting that everyone who lives in Zimbabwe belongs to the country, whether naturally or unnaturally. The Constitution says that we are a united nation in our diversity. However, all these indigeneity contestations can be located and interpreted within the broader political economy of power, expropriation, and accumulation in Zimbabwe.

The chapter is made up of the following two parts:

(a) Contentions around the framing and practice of indigeneity in Zimbabwe,

(b) How the framing of indigeneity determines who should be expropriated with or without compensation.

6.1. Contentions around framing and practice of indigeneity in Zimbabwe

Findings show that the framing and practice of indigeneity in Zimbabwe have had a conflicted and chequered history, whose implications make it difficult to address the belonging national questions. The practice and framing of the concept in the country are multi-layered and slippery. However, findings further establish that the indigenous-nonindigenous binary is not a positivist reality, i.e. an out-there independent empirical reality waiting to be discovered. Neither it is an anti-positivist or interpretivist phenomenon, i.e. a socially, historically, mentally, and politically mediated and constructed social reality. Instead, it is more of a dialectical phenomenon, a social reality framed and produced by the constant back and forth processes of meaning construction (and deconstruction), with contradiction as a determinant. Articulating this, Maaka and Fleras

(1999) note that indigeneity is a political strategy and an emerging theory of justice indigenous peoples use to frame their belonging terms as the original inhabitants to the land.

Therefore, it follows that the dialectical nature of indigeneity in the country makes its framing and practice contested. In Zimbabwe, indigeneity has been receiving what deGrassi (2008, p. 112), while referring to neopatrimonialism, calls "conceptual muddle" on account of its definitional and conceptual pluralism and fluidity. This conceptual muddling makes indigeneity a controversial issue among scholars, researchers, and practitioners of indigeneity and indigenisation. There is still a lot of confusion about the criteria and methods to separate an indigenous from a nonindigenous. Put differently, determining who is and who is not indigenous, notably after colonial distortions, is a difficult enterprise (Mamdani, 2005; 1996). What constitutes indigeneity is itself a subject of competing configurations.

To illustrate the dialectical nature of indigeneity framing and practice, after Independence in 1980, the new government in Zimbabwe started questioning the integrity of white settlers' claims that the San (Bushmen) people are the original inhabitants of the country (Ushewokunze, 1984; Fisher, 2010). As a result, the post-independence government discarded the Rhodesian indigeneity revisionist discourse that the San people were the original inhabitants. Two competing indigeneity explanations emerged following the historical revision by the post-independence authorities that challenged the integrity of the colonial indigeneity narrative. First, to some degree, the questioning exercise rendered it a logical fallacy the narrative that Shona are also immigrants to Zimbabwe. As revealed by the findings, some Shona people believe that they are the original inhabitants of the land called Zimbabwe today, thereby treating with contempt any other counter-narratives or counterclaims to this regard. Second, the Bantu people, by being the first to settle and cultivate the area rather than just passing through the land (Ushewokunze, 1984), "appropriated the mantle of the first people—descendants of the original settlers who by right enjoyed greater legitimacy and priority in the polity" (Fisher, 2020, p. 137).

Also, the claims that the white Rhodesians are indigenes to Zimbabwe were critically challenged and discarded. The historical revisionism exercise reconfigured whites as immigrants, imperialists, settlers, colonialists (Fisher, 2010; Muzondidya, 2005). For one respondent: "*Rhodesians masqueraded as native Zimbabweans when they are in actual fact our worst enemies*" (Interview: PPR1, 07 June 2018). For this reason, in order to empower, through indigenisation, the disadvantaged

indigenous citizens- who are mostly blacks- the government systematically framed white people as foreigners. This framing may explain why such derogatory names as Rhodesians, ex-Rhodesians, Rhodies or ex-Rhodies, rather than Zimbabweans, white Zimbabwean citizens or just white Zimbabweans, are still contemptuously used to refer to white people in and or from Zimbabwe. However, the whites' framing of indigeneity is broader and more inclusive than that of the blacks, which is narrow and exclusive. For the whites, the meaning of indigeneity should not only be construed to being the original inhabitant or black, but all those considered the Zimbabwean citizens- both by birth and descent (Fisher, 2010). These structural and racial differences on indigeneity are contributing to its fluidity, chequered and contentious. Commenting on this while talking about indigeneity contentions in Israel, Mamdani (2020, p. 267) gives the following illuminating reality:

> Jewish indigeneity in Israel is embodied in the Law of Return, which the Knesset passed unanimously in 1950. Under the Law of Return, any Jew is entitled to citizenship upon entering the territory. The person in question need never have set foot there previously; he is effectively native from birth by virtue of being a Jew. In contrast, a Palestinian Arab, even one born in Israel of ancestors who never left the territory, is not considered indigenous.

While there is credible, available, verifiable, and traceable evidence of Bantu migration theory (Lewis, 1973; Ushewokunze, 1984; Muzondidya, 2005; Fisher, 2010), most respondents are of the view that the theory is Eurocentric. Three supporting evidence support Bantu migration theory: first, linguistic evidence- many Sub-Saharan languages are remarkably similar, suggesting a common origin; second, archaeological evidence- speaks of remarkably similar cultural practices and values between Nilo-Saharans and Cushites; and third genetic evidence- speaks of similar and related genes of many of the Bantu speakers (Campbell & Tishkoff, 2010; Ehret, 2002). This genetic, archaeological and linguistic evidence "of gene-flow between Nilo-Saharans and Cushites is consistent with other genetic data that showed the shared presence of an East African-specific mutation associated with lactose tolerance in these linguistically distinct populations" (Campbell & Tishkoff, 2010, p. R169).

The argument for these respondents' rebuttal of the Bantu migration theory is that there is no such historical truth in their history, written and oral alike, suggesting that African southerners migrated from the north of the continent. According to this viewpoint, only colonial and Eurocentric narratives about Africa and Africans say that African southerners came from the

north of the continent. However, other respondents submitted that they have heard about them not being original inhabitants of the land, but they fundamentally disagree with the claims. The submissions of the following two respondents are illustrative to this:

> *How come colonialists who arrived yesterday know the history of this country more precise than us? It really boggles the mind. We have been here since no one knows and for me it's a false colonial claim that tries to put us on the same level with them. They are immigrants and they have to go back to Europe. Simple. Why do they want to capitalise on our guilty of conscience that if we hear that we came from somewhere we may regard them too as legitimate inhabitants of this country? We don't believe in this colonial nonsense* (Interview: SGRR5, 22 June 2018).

> *If those people referred to as San people are us, then we don't have a problem with the narrative sold to us by these imperialists. The fact of the matter is that our history of staying here dates back to thousands of years ago. We started living in this country since time immemorial. They were in Europe during the time the alleged exodus from the North is believed to have happened. During that time the Europeans were primitive savages, how can they got to know about the exodus happening this side when they themselves were not even able to look after themselves. You see how the colonialists constructed lies about us?* (Interview: PPR1, 07 June 2018).

This reasoning was further corroborated by another respondent who argues that "*if it is true that we migrated from the north and settled here in Zimbabwe, by then there was no one in this country and by virtue of that we automatically became the original people of this land*" (Interview: SGOR6, 25 June 2018). To show how the post-independence government has been dialectically framing and practising indigeneity, Fisher (2010, p. 137) argues that "…the colonial era… was re-presented in ZANU-PF's master narrative as an aberration, a time of distortion and dislocation, and whites were configured as colonists, immigrants and settlers." It follows, therefore, that the postcolonial reconfiguration of indigeneity status of those previously considered indigenous may serve to suggest the dialectical and contentious nature of the concept and practice. Like its cousin concepts citizenship and belonging, indigeneity is fundamentally, if not inherently, a highly contested concept fraught with competing epistemological and ontological traditions. The authorities at a given point in time seem to have the sovereign powers of framing these concepts. However, on how difficult it is to tell who is indigenous and who is not, Mamdani (2005, p. 10) poses two important questions: "How do you tell who is indigenous to the country and who is not? Given a history of migration, what is the dividing line between the indigenous and the nonindigenous?" Concerning favouring the indigenous over the nonindigenous, Mamdani (2005, p. 10-11) warns that:

> My point is that in privileging the indigenous over the nonindigenous, we turned the colonial world upside down, but we did not change it. As a result, the native sat on the top of the political world designed by the settler. Indigeneity remained the test for rights.

Furthermore, findings show that what is more unsettling is that the mainstream narrative that African Southerners migrated from the North came into being during the dark moments of colonialism and imperialism. Prior to this, it has been submitted that many African Southerners were unaware of the migration. According to these findings, the Bantu Migration theory is coming against the background of some evidence pointing to the idea that African Southerners have been in Southern regions of the continent since time immemorial. The period this North-to-South Great Exodus is believed to have occurred, i.e. circa 2000 to 3000 years ago, is the time most of the Europeans are believed to be uncivilised (Interview: SGRR5, 22 June 2018; Interview: PPR1, 07 June 2018). SGRR5 goes on to say the time this Great Exodus is alleged to have happened, Europe was populated by "*Primitive and barbaric savages who were even unconscious of the environment they were living in. Now they claim to know what was happening here. Can't you smell some coffee here? I hope you do*."

According to the preceding Afrocentric perspective on indigeneity, the Bantu Expansion theory may seem to be an invented colonial narrative. SGRR5 alluded to the fact that its truthfulness and integrity only exist in black and white, not in practical terms. Therefore, one may argue that it was a colonial, imperial narrative framed to alienate the African Southerners from their inalienable regional and ancestral land. By depicting them migrants too, not Aboriginals, in the land they were found them tilling, hunting, gathering, mining, and doing sundry activities of life, colonialists alienated African Southerners from their inalienable rights of belonging, indigeneity and citizenship to the Southern African region. The startling question the Bantu Migration theory raises, which are yet to be convincingly answered, is: How come the Europeans, who first arrived in Southern Africa circa 15th century, know something important as the great Bantu migration African Southerners were hitherto unaware of? Hence, the theories and hypotheses to that effect may be dismissed as invented colonial narratives designed to justify the perpetual stay of the colonial settlers (the latecomers or later immigrants) in Africa.

Commenting on the issue of invented narratives, Cock (2018), while critiquing and disapproving the integrity of historical accounts of both indigenous Xhosa people and white settlers she received from her family, speaks of one correspondence she founded in Albany Museum in

Makhanda (then Grahamstown). Interestingly, the correspondence referenced her mother. Part of the correspondence reads: "I have come to a conclusion that Mrs Pauline Cock [the writer's mother] is a very unreliable source of settler history. What she doesn't know she simply invents" (Cock, 2018, p. 12). Cock continues:

> Part of what she 'invented' was a consoling narrative held by many descendants of the 1820 settlers who still live in Kowie area, one that tends to idolise the courage and enterprise of the settlers and praise the extension of the benefits of British civilisation to the benighted Xhosa (p. 12).

Cock, a descendant of the white settlers, might be better positioned to unpack some colonial myths. Corroborating with this colonial invention narrative, Shivji (2011) remarks that the post-Vasco da Gama Africa, i.e. an Africa since the last five centuries, represents a tale of the preponderance of the North across the continent. While constructing their own stories, Shivji (2011) argues, the West simultaneously constructed stories of others, notably those for Africa. This goes to the extent that most of what many believe to be African history is actually European history in Africa. However, the constructed African stories are unenviable, one of which is believed to be Bantu Expansion. It is illustrative of primitive savages, vanquished nomads, violent wanderers, and sundry negativities. Stemming from this reasoning, the integrity of the Bantu Expansion theory may be critically questioned.

However, historicists and historians would like to believe that it is critically important for the historical truths, rather than politically motivated and mediated xenophobic, racial, ethnic, tribal and classist divisive and retributive positionalities, to play a bigger role in the framing of indigeneity in Zimbabwe. Commenting on this, one academic respondent said:

> *The issue of having authentic and unauthentic indigenous people between Limpopo and Zambezi is where all problems start. These are mere colonial myths and falsehoods sold to us as a way of dividing and ruling the majority indigenous black people. It wasn't going to be easy for them to continue ruling had the governed were all identifying themselves as citizens of a nation-state rather than as members of a certain tribe, ethnic group or any other identifying categorisation* (Interview: AR3, 13 September 2018).

This was further corroborated by one government respondent who alludes to the fact that it is when the colonialists felt weakened when they invoked the divide and rule policy of magnifying tribal differences between the Shona and the Ndebele. The government respondents challenged the integrity of the methodology used to reach such exclusionary conclusions of having a certain group of people, tribe to be specific, treating others with exceptionalism and otherness. For the

foregoing two respondents, this narrative is built on the firm idea of radically challenging the credibility of our historiographies. Commenting on this perspective, the following two submissions of AR3 are instructive:

> *Most of what is called Zimbabwean history, especially the precolonial one, was not written by black Zimbabweans. It was written by the colonial academics who were mostly whites. What is it that they know about us? This is why they kept on lying that the Great Zimbabwe was not built by the Shona people. Were they here to testify that? Numerous theories were advanced to try and explain a simple thing of who built the Great Zimbabwe. We don't want to be explained by an outsider about who built it. We know ourselves that it is the Shona people* (Interview: AR3, 13 September 2018).

> *The Zimbabwean history was portrayed as a dark violent history of xenophobia where it was a war of all against all. Tribes fighting against tribes. I am not saying this is a lie but the people who wrote about that were not better placed to do so. A lot of exaggerations and distortions were done* (Interview: AR3, 13 September 2018).

In the end, the possible implication of all these may be that the framings of indigeneity in Zimbabwe remain contested. The reason is that the framings seem to be influenced and determined by the ideological groundings of those in power at a particular point in time. Therefore, it follows that the determination of designating one as indigenous or nonindigenous is not casting in stone exercise. As the findings reveal, it may be the practical opening of the proverbial Pandora Box. In any case, the government is bound to create ideologues when it embarks on constructing, deconstructing or reconstructing the indigeneity subject matter. The battles, latent and manifest, are certainly going to be fought between those for and those against the government's action or inaction on the subject matter. Therefore, according to the preceding findings, one may argue that indigeneity is a concept and practice fraught with contentions. It is more of a dialectical phenomenon than a positivist one (i.e. an 'out there' independent reality) or interpretivist or anti-positivist phenomenon (i.e. a socially, mentally or historically constructed subjective reality). Findings show that the phenomenon is less a static, unchangeable independent reality or a product of social, historical, cultural or mental framings. Instead, it is subject to constant dialectical metamorphoses. Central to its mutations is what Karl Marx terms the negation of the negation.

The preceding contestations on indigeneity framings may be suggestive to why Shivji (2009), Cabral (1980) and Mboya (1963) considered the struggle for independence in Africa, both in political and economic terms, as the resurrection of the long-dead African Renaissance political

and economic narrative. This had to come against the backdrop of the subjugation and humiliation the continent has suffered for the last five centuries as a result of slavery, slave trade and colonialism. As Cabral (1980) recounts, independence in Africa was nothing less than "re-Africanisation of minds" (p. xxv) or "re-becoming Africans" (p. xxii). Mboya (1963, p. 13) also shares this sentiment by arguing that independence in Africa meant "the rediscovery of Africa by Africans." All this reflects the intense contestations on the understanding, practice, and application of such concepts as citizenship, indigeneity, nativity, belonging and autochthony in the continent.

6.2 Interface of indigeneity, indigenisation, expropriation and accumulation

Individual countries that implemented indigenisation programs dialectically framed indigeneity based on their peculiar epistemological, ontological, existential, and circumstantial realities. As articulated above, doing so is further complicating the process of framing indigeneity. The result of this dialectical framing of indigeneity is the emergence of two competing schools of thought about indigeneity: narrow and the broader views of indigeneity. On the one hand, findings show that the narrow view holds that those with precolonial roots in the country are the aboriginals, which in most cases are blacks in Zimbabwe. This racial viewpoint of indigeneity is the position taken by the Zimbabwean government. For example, the former indigenisation minister, Patrick Zhuwawo, stated that the IEE Act and other indigenisation laws were enacted largely based on race. According to this viewpoint, the indigenisation laws were enacted to simultaneously benefit the indigenous citizens while harming nonindigenous who are largely non-blacks. To Mlambo (2014, p. 57) the government framed "indigenes in a very narrow way, to the exclusion of other groups that have equal claim to Zimbabwe."

However, on the other hand, the broader view holds that black people in Zimbabwe are also immigrants and argue that arriving first in the land does not make one an aboriginal. Corroborating with this reasoning, Fisher (2010) argues that credible and verifiable evidence still exists that the Bantu people migrated from the north to the south of the continent. This would suggest that black people, especially in South Africa and Zimbabwe, are only early arrivals, first-comers, while white people are late arrivals, latecomers or newcomers. It is important to note that this reasoning raises indigeneity paradoxes. On the one hand, Zimbabwe has the Ndebele

people who invaded the Shona people and settled in their country in 1838 when running away from both Mfecane and Voortrekkers in South Africa. On the other hand, through the Pioneer Column and British South Africa Company (BSAC) under Cecil John Rhodes, we have the British settlers first settled in Zimbabwe in 1890. This reality makes the difference of 52 years between the arrivals of the two groups. Nevertheless, at law, the Ndebele people are indigenous citizens, while the British settlers are nonindigenous.

More interestingly, we have Xhosa people in Zimbabwe who accompanied and helped the colonialists during the Pioneer Column from South Africa (Kunju, 2017; Nyathi, 2004; Sundkler & Steed, 2000; Ncube, 2013). Some of them were later requested by the BSAC government, together with the Tswana people from neighbouring Botswana (then Bechuanaland), to resettle in Zimbabwe. However, the indigenisation laws consider them indigenous people while the white settlers they accompanied and helped are denied indigeneity statuses. In neighbouring South Africa, because of this chequered history of indigeneity in the region, in 1995, white South Africans, through its delegation, forced themselves into the United Nations (UN) Working Group and demanded to be recognised as indigenous South Africans (Chipika & Malaba, 2011). However, the UN turned down their demand. All these points to how deeply contested, slippery, fluid and chequered are the history of indigeneity in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular.

As Zimbabwe chose to go with the narrow view of indigeneity, the IEE Act, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment General Regulations and General Notices, as well as their various amendments, have similarly defined an indigenous Zimbabwean as:

> any person who, before the 18th April, 1980, was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and any descendant of such person, and includes any company, association, syndicate or partnership of which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of the members or hold the controlling interest.

The Policy Study on Economic Empowerment of Indigenous Tanzanians Report prepared by the ESRF and PACE Developments Limited (2001) gave a similar definition of an indigenous person. The Report defines indigenous Tanzanians to mean "all citizens of Tanzania by birth and who are of African origin (natives or blacks) whose origin in the country can be traced back to at least three generations" (ESRF and PACE Developments Limited, 2001, p. viii). As in the case of Zimbabwe, to mainstream the historically disadvantaged indigenous Tanzanians into the national economy, the Report suggested the following affirmative action proposals. First, adopting and

implementing appropriate measures to promote and increase the participation of indigenous small-to-medium investors and entrepreneurs in privatisation processes and capital markets. Second, giving indigenous businesses preferential treatments in all government tenders and procurements. Third, the financial services to provide cheap and easily accessible funds to indigenous entrepreneurs and investors. Fourth, special business and financial training, education and development programs for indigenous entrepreneurs and investors. Empirically, findings show that the above definitions of indigeneity generate more heat than light within the indigenisation dominant narratives, debates, and themes as it is silent about one's origin.

Like in the cases of both Zimbabwe and Tanzania, to benefit from the affirmative NEP and policies, the Constitution of Malaysia defined indigenous peoples as the Bumiputera, loosely translated to mean the sones or princes of the soil. These people are comprised of Aborigines, Malays or Orang Asli (The Federal Constitution Article 160(2)). To this end, an indigenous person was considered as someone who conforms to the Malay customs, speaks the Malay language, and professes the Islamic religion of Islam (The Federal Constitution Article 160(2)). While an Orang Asli or aborigine, according to The Federal Constitution, are those who pass the test of being a Malay Peninsula's aborigine, the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 Section 3(2) defines an aborigine from a parentage perspective. The sees an aborigine as anyone whose parents (i.e. both of them or one of them) speak an aboriginal language, abide by the aboriginal customs, belief systems and values.

However, for the purposes of black economic empowerment (BEE), South Africa's definition of black people is generally wider and generic as it includes those who are considered to be part of the previously disadvantaged groups (Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act). These include the indigenous blacks, Indians and coloureds (Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act).

However, the preceding framings of the definitions of indigenous people did not go uncriticised. Premised on the findings, two schools of thought competing for dominance emerged. On the one hand, one holds that the way the definition of an indigenous Zimbabwean was repeatedly framed in almost every indigenisation statute, although it sounds racially unbiased, has serious racially-biased implications. In the end, the white constituencies are on the receiving end. The claim is

not without justifiable empirical backing, nonetheless. For white Zimbabweans, the word 'indigenous' was insidiously and diplomatically chosen to make it appear as if racial prejudices do not influence indigenisation. However, according to the findings, its attendant innuendos are somewhat to settle both political and racial scores with the previously advantaged or over-advantaged yet now vulnerable white Rhodesians. Commenting on this analysis, Matyszak (2012) contends that excluding white Zimbabweans from the definition of indigenous Zimbabweans serves to mean one thing: the whites do not belong naturally to Zimbabwe. To this end, they should be among those to indigenise their businesses.

On the other hand, findings show that the architects and proponents of indigenisation did not dispute the unfairness transcending the framing of indigeneity in the indigenisation laws. For them, it is a 'justifiable unfairness' act to use AR3's words that connote the same, "*it is a just unjust way of correcting the historical injustices"* (Interview: AR3, 13 September 2018), designed to address unevenness in the economy. According to this school of thought, the uneven development architecture was constructed and consolidated by another unjust governance and political system of the successive imperial administrations. Paradoxically, although unsurprisingly, this uneven development configuration was further consolidated by the post-independence ZANU-PF successive governments. The uneven development configuration was allowed to continue uninterrupted until 2008, when the IEE Act was enacted. Commenting on indigenisation being a justifiable unjust policy instrument, SGRR1 cautions that: "*You can't correct an unjust economic system created by the unjust political system through just means*" (Interview: SGRR1, 20 June 2018). SGRR1 continues:

> *We know that what we have done to define the whites in Zimbabwe as nonindigenous is wrong. That much we know, and we are clear about that. But we also know that the economic system we are trying to correct is unjust. These white Rhodesians benefited from unjust systems, but they are expecting just methods of correcting the unjust system. No!*

According to the precepts of moral authority, this may serve to mean that an unjust economic system constructed legally cannot be corrected justly. Put differently, only unjust legal means might the justifiable means to correct the legally constructed and produced unevenness. For the indigenisation proponents, it is the incumbent government's sovereign responsibility to do what it deems necessary and in the best national and public interests. Their argument is premised on the idea that the government of a sovereign state like Zimbabwe, with full Self Determination and

Recognition statuses, has unrestrained territorial and sovereign powers and rights of either admitting or denying membership, belonging, indigeneity, and citizenship to whomsoever it considers necessary. They argued strongly that during colonialism, the successive imperial administrations were doing what they considered necessary and in what they considered to be in the best national and public interests. However, this resulted in massive expropriation, oppression, and displacement of the indigenous blacks.

Nevertheless, the colonial administration acts were legal and enforceable because they emanated from recognised governments enjoying full recognition, independence, sovereignty, and self-determination statuses. The implications of the acts of the successive colonial administrations had serious uneven development ramifications as they were an indictment to the general populace. Therefore, one may argue that when the post-independence government invoked its sovereign powers and denied the previously advantaged white minority indigeneity status, white people had to at least understand that.

Literature corroborates this narrow viewpoint of framing indigeneity. Chipika and Malaba (2011, p. 29) contend that "indigeneity is about the resurgence of previously conquered majority people who are determined to set their destiny, gain access to and control over natural resources, means of production and access to social services." These definitions could be interpreted to mean reverse racism, however, implicitly. The reason being that whites, Indians, Chinese and Arabs are excluded from the parameters within which indigeneity is framed.

However, the only criterion for one to be considered indigenous in Zimbabwe "was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race" (IEE Act, 2008, p. 2). The meaning of this is that white Zimbabweans formed the second category of those who were to be expropriated through indigenisation. The first category is international capital. However, the narrow indigeneity definition systematically protected the previously advantaged black people. These black citizens, according to these narrow definitions, are not supposed to be expropriated. It is important to note that this reasoning raises painful indigeneity paradoxes. It seems like during colonialism all blacks were disadvantaged. This viewpoint is indefensible because credible, readily available, verifiable, and traceable evidence suggests the contrary. Conversely, credible, readily available, and accessible traceable and verifiable evidence suggests that other non-black (notably

whites) Zimbabweans whose parents were also disenfranchised during colonialism. The disembarrassment was not because of their race but because of the class factor.

More interestingly, others (non-black citizens) were born after 1980 from economically excluded parents and completed their education before competing against the now privileged indigenous black Zimbabweans. These non-black people neither benefited from the post-independent affirmative action policies nor from colonial and apartheid policies of the successive imperial governments. Stemming from this vantage point, one may argue that they do not owe indigenous Zimbabweans empowerment through indigenisation. Unfortunately, they are systematically excluded from the definition of indigenous Zimbabweans, meaning that they should indigenise 51% of their equity and controlling interest of their firms to the indigenous people. Commenting on this viewpoint, Research Advocacy Unit (2011, p. 2-3) poses the following two critical evocative questions:

> To give but one example, for what reason should a white Zimbabwean, born at independence, who has successfully established a business in Zimbabwe after completing his or her education, and after much toil, sweat and competition with ZANU-PF aligned entrepreneurs (who may have gained favoured access to government tenders and scarce foreign exchange) be compelled to transfer 51% of the fruits of his or her labour, possibly, and even probably, to those self same competitors? What debt does he or she owe to the "indigenous" Zimbabweans who will benefit from the transfer of the shareholding?

The Research Advocacy Unit (ibid, p. 3) continues: "Why he or she carry the burden of empowering black Zimbabweans?" All things being equal, it should not be the responsibility of these post-independent born white Zimbabweans to either indigenise their companies or empower the black indigenous Zimbabweans or both. This is especially so when their ancestors were part of the previously disadvantaged. However, because things are not equal and normal in Zimbabwe, they should indigenise their companies to empower the indigenous black Zimbabweans. The fact that they are systematically othered through being framed nonindigenous means that they owed indigenous Zimbabweans empowerment, only to be achieved through indigenising their businesses. As otherness is a condition of disenfranchisement (i.e. political, social, cultural and economic, as well as religious exclusion), the othered white Zimbabweans should, through legal means, be pushed into the margins of the society. Framed other means that you are a scapegoat whom anyone, in this case, indigenous citizens or government, can injure or oppress with impunity. Findings from some documents (e.g. the IEE Act; NIEEB, 2014; Zim-asset,

2013, ZANU-PF Manifesto, 2013) reviewed show that their alien status in Zimbabwe suggest that they are indeterminately indebted to indigenous Zimbabweans. This reality is despite the fact that the colonial racial laws and policies did not disadvantage some indigenous Zimbabweans. Following this reasoning, the only practical way for the nonindigenous to repay the debt is to indigenise their businesses.

In the end, one may argue that Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme is based upon turning the world of ownership and control of both the means and factors of production, finance, distribution, consumption and exchange upside down, but without effectively changing it. This may mean that indigenisation is not premised on levelling the country's uneven development structure. Articulating on this analysis, Taylor (2016, p. 12) remarks that this is "indigenisation by subtraction: zero-sum" while Alexander (2013[1979]) and Motala and Vally (2017) refer a situation like this 'reactionary nationalism.' Reactionary nationalism is when liberation movements, turned governments post-independence, emphasised race relations, which maintained racialised inequalities, instead of addressing uneven development configurations that were caused and sustained by the racial system. This reality makes it appear as if during the liberation war, the nationalists were fighting against *skin colour* rather than against the *system* that made it possible for the racial laws and policies to superintend inclusive policies before independence.

Corroborating with the preceding view of a 'False Start in Africa' (Dumont, 1966), Fanon (1961) on wretched of the earth speaks of pitfalls of national consciousness that replaces race with the tribe as a decisive factor for accumulation of both wealth and power after independence. Fanon argues along these lines primarily because history has taught us that the fight against colonialism is not always in sync with nationalism (Mandaza, 1986). If anything, one can argue that the subtle manner in which the framings of indigeneity and indigenous people in the indigenisation laws promote reverse or counter racial otherness. This kind of framing is when the previously racially othered and expropriated group of people is now doing the same to those who othered it through imperial laws and policies. Indeed, this is a tale of the boot on the other foot. However, racial othering and exceptionalism practised during colonial and postcolonial periods further worsen racial uneven development architecture without necessarily addressing it. Following on from this viewpoint, one can argue that indigenisation, although appearing racially neutral in

outlook, is primarily founded on the foundations of racism and retribution, and secondarily on the need to correct past economic, social and political injustices.

Comparatively, the preceding definitions of indigeneity tend to resonate well with the one given by the 1969 Rhodesian Constitution and Land Tenure Act of the same year when the two legal documents referred to who was an indigenous African and who was a European. However, the framing of an African in these two important colonial legal documents was given to categorically disenfranchise the conquered, the vanquished Africans. The two define a European as:

> any person who is not an African, and an African, any member of the aboriginal tribes or races of Africa, and the islands adjacent thereto…and any person who has the blood of such tribes and races and who lives as a member of an aboriginal native community. (Quenet, 1976, p. 21; Murphree & Baker, 1976, p. 388; Fisher, 2010, p. 131).

Gleaned from this colonial framing of indigeneity is that an African was a member of the aboriginal tribes. The colonial framing is explicit and may further corroborate the findings suggesting that African southerners have been in the continent's southern region since time immemorial. However, important to note is that this colonial indigeneity framing was to effectively othering the indigenous people, rather than venerating their statuses as the indigenous people. The implied meaning of this colonial indigeneity framing is that a European, who was considered as "any person who is not an African", was considered nonindigenous or foreigner in the land where Africans were considered aboriginals. If that was the case, then a contrast has to be made between this framing and the European colonial narrative that bracketed both whites and blacks in Zimbabwe as mere immigrants whose difference is only on their arrival times in the Zimbabwean plateau. According to this colonial indigeneity definition, the Eurocentric theory about Bantu migration from the north to the south of the continent may be considered weak. The reason being that the UDI government had, through its legal frameworks, defined Africans as aboriginals- not immigrants- and framed Europeans as nonindigenous.

To systematically mainstream the disadvantaged indigenous people into the national economy, indigenisation is defined by the IEE Act to mean "a deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, to have an equitable ownership of the nation's resources" (IEE Act, 2008, p. 2). This definition was further supported by the then indigenisation minister, Patrick Zhuwawo, who, when giving a

keynote speech at the Annual Conference of Indigenous Building Contractors, categorically stated that indigenisation is not colour blind. In his words:

> Indigenisation is a policy based on race; that is a fact. It is a policy that specifically seeks to give black people an advantage over white people and the justification is that white people have previously been over-advantaged and we need to be clear on that… I can put it in nice ways…equitable access and so on, but *ndezvevanhu vatema, ndizvozvo* (it's for black people and that is that!) and that is the bottom line… I am the new Sheriff in town, and as the new Sheriff in town all I do is I don't negotiate government policy, I don't negotiate legislation, all I do is implement existing legislation (Zenda, 2015, para. 2).

Section 14 (1) of the country's Constitution also corroborates this indigeneity framing favouring the disadvantaged peoples. It reads: "The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must endeavour to facilitate and take measures to empower, through appropriate, transparent, fair and just affirmative action, all marginalised persons, groups and communities in Zimbabwe." However, this definition is at loggerheads with the one given by the country's judiciary in a 2015 case of *Naval Phase Farming (Pvt) Ltd. & Others v Minister of Lands & Rural Resettlement & Others*. In this case, the High Court judge ruled that the indigenisation law should be free from any racial prejudices as it meant to benefit all Zimbabweans from all facets of life. In this court case, the former High Court judge, Justice Priscilla Chigumba- now Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) Chairperson- stated the following:

> The applicants' papers are permeated with an unfortunate equation of the perceived meaning of 'indigenous Zimbabweans', with Zimbabweans of black African descent… With all due respect to the submissions put forward by the third applicant (Nyambirai), I am unable to agree that either the former or the current Constitutions entrench a policy that agricultural land must not be taken away from a black African Zimbabwean and given to another black African Zimbabwean. I am unable to accede to the contention that land that is already owned or occupied by 'indigenous' (read black) Zimbabweans cannot be said to be land required for resettlement purposes within the meaning of Section 16B of the former constitution. The land reform programme is for the benefit of Zimbabweans from all walks of life. It is blind to race or colour and only bows down to gender balance and diverse community interests.

The High Court's preceding non-racial conception of indigeneity seems to have been heavily influenced by the Supreme Court's precedent case of 2007 of *Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Another v the Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement and Another*. The verdict of the Supreme Court stated that the provisions of Section 16B (2) (a) (i) of the Constitution, when applied, resulted in the acquisition of some pieces of land, was colour and race-blind when it comes to who should be affected during the process of land acquisition.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the competing explanations and structural and contextual factors that determine the drivers for framing of indigeneity in Zimbabwe. Emphasis was placed on how these intersect, conflate and converge with the ways the extractive industry indigenisation is obtaining in the country. Also, the contentious ontological and epistemological premises of indigeneity and indigenisation were discussed in this chapter. Doing all this was critical to illuminate indigeneity framing's centrality in indigenisation processes in general and extractive industry indigenisation in general. This analysis then helped to describe and explain the interface of indigeneity, indigenisation, expropriation, accumulation and power. The next chapter analyses the competing explanations and factors concerning the functions and achievements of the community share ownership trusts (CSOTs) in the country. CSOTs are the most important policy instrument government is using to implement extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 7

LOCAL ECONOMIC HUBS OR THEATRES FOR ACCUMULATION? COMPETING EXPLANATIONS ABOUT FUNCTIONS, FORMATIONS AND FEATS OF THE COMMUNITY SHARE OWNERSHIP TRUSTS IN ZIMBABWE

7.0 Introduction

This chapter analyses the contribution of one widely used policy instrument for extractive industry indigenisation, i.e. the Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs), in achieving the indigenisation 'accumulation by dispossession' objectives. It is important to note that 60 of the established 61 CSOTs are located in the rural areas, i.e. each in all Zimbabwe's 60 rural districts, and 70% of the Zimbabweans reside there. Conceptually, accumulation by dispossession is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. Using this theoretical framework helps determine how and why the processes and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation through the use of the CSOTs policy instrument are inconsistent with goals. Established pursuant to Section 148 of the General Indigenisation Regulations of 2010 and registered by the Registrar of Deeds, the CSOTs' main intent is to provide a vehicle upon which local communities would own 10% of the equity in all nonindigenous mining firms operating in their jurisdictions. Out of the 60 commissioned and launched CSOTs, only 26 came to life, making 35 white elephants. It should also be noted that of the remaining 26 functional and operational CSOTs, many are facing existential threats from corruption, widespread defaults on seed capital by the qualifying companies and emerging cases of reverse indigenisation. Furthermore, only a handful of the CSOTs are recording success stories. In this study, the concept 'local' (local residents) is used to mean a resident of a mining community who is a target beneficiary of the CSOT. In many ways, the locals are actually becoming the losers due to the manner in which extractive industry indigenisation is being implemented

Findings reveal mixed views about the intents, functions and achievements of CSOTs. Two competing explanations about these issues emerged from the findings. On the one hand, as

reflected below, proponents of indigenisation view the CSOTs as local economic hubs or vehicles for spurring rural development. On the other hand, critics of indigenisation view the CSOTs as theatres for elite personal accumulation and huge investments for regime reproduction. As presented and discussed below, the two equally competing perspectives on CSOTs are not without empirical backing that simultaneously affirms and negate their positions. Unsurprisingly, the positive outcomes of the policy are also met with mixed reactions. Critics would like to view the positive outcomes with neopatrimonial lenses, while exponents, with empowerment and indigenisation lens.

This chapter responds to the sub-research question of the study: How and why are the indigenous and nonindigenous citizens benefiting and losing from the processes and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe? The findings presented and analysed in this chapter were gathered from documents, key informant interviews and my own observations playing a complementary role. The reviewed documents were drawn from the indigenisation ministry, the parliament of Zimbabwe, the implementing agency of indigenisation- the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB), political parties. Interviews were conducted with key informants from government, academia, civil society and. In this chapter, I used both content analysis and thematic analysis methods to develop codes and themes.

The chapter is made up of the following seven three parts:

(a) Extractive industry ownership structure following indigenisation.
(b) Origins, intents, shapes, and forms, and contentious legal frameworks of CSOTs.
(c) The disempowering outcomes of the CSOTs.
(d) Drivers for partial and noncompliance by some qualifying companies.
(e) The inherent challenges facing the CSOTs.
(f) The positive outcomes of the CSOTs.

7.1 Extractive industry ownership structure following indigenisation

To illustrate how and why the extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe perpetuated uneven mining development in Zimbabwe, it is important to establish ownership structures within the

extractive industry following indigenisation. The Table 7.1 below shows ownership structures of some of the major foreign-owned mining companies in Zimbabwe before and after indigenisation.

Table 7.1: Ownership structures of major foreign-owned mining companies in Zimbabwe before and after indigenisation

Company	Foreign ownership before indigenisation	Foreign ownership after indigenisation	Domestic ownership before indigenisation	Domestic ownership after indigenisation	Government ownership before indigenisation	Government ownership after indigenisation
Zimplats (PGM, copper & silver)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Unki Mine (PGM)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Mimosa (PGM, copper & cobalt)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
How Mine (gold, silver)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Metallon Corporation Limited (i.e. with its three mines: How, Redwing and Mazowe Mines)	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Freda Rebecca (gold)	85%			15%	0%	0%
Blanket Mine	100%	49%	0%	26%	0%	15%
Caledonia Mining Corporation PLC	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Bikita Minerals Lithium Mine	79%	79%	21%	21%	0%	0%

Source: Bloomberg Terminal Data for the last six months (2021) and adapted from World Bank (2019, p. 78).

The evidence in Table 7.1 above points to the paradox of the persistence of uneven mining development following extractive industry indigenisation as the ownership and control structures of these companies remain pretty much the same after indigenisation.

Furthermore, findings from the Africa Report (2017) have established that by June 2017, the following foreign-owned mining companies in Zimbabwe had not complied with the indigenisation laws: the Duration Gold, ASA Group, Aquarius Platinum, Impala Platinum, Falgold, Metallon Corporation, Anglo American Platinum, and New Dawn Mining Corporation. The two reasons cited for noncompliance are (1) the indigenisation ministry had not approved their indigenisation plans yet, and (2) the companies were still working on getting their indigenisation plans approved. For example, in For example, while in 2010 the then indigenisation minister, Savior Kasukuwere, said qualifying companies had submitted 397 indigenisation plans for approval, only 100 of them had been approved by April 2013 (Saunders, 2017).

For Metallon Corporation (with How Mine, Shamva Mine, Mazowe Mine, Arcturus Mine and Redwig Mine as its operating mines), the "[s]uggested [indigenisation] structure includes 10% employee share schemes, 10% local communities, 10% Nat. Indigenisation & Empowerment Board" (Metallon Corporation, 2015, p. 21), with the "new approved indigenisation structure involves 75% spend on local content" (Metallon Corporation, 2017, p. 23). This situation means that the gold company did not transfer any part of its ownership to either the indigenous people, government or communities under this indigenisation regime, thus maintaining uneven mining development.

According to the Bloomberg Terminal Data (2021), as shown in Figure 7.1 below, in 2010, i.e. before the implementation of indigenisation in the extractive industry, RioZim Limited was owned 100% by 'Unknown' shareholders- who are most likely to be foreigners as the company fought with the government regarding its failure to comply with the indigenisation laws. It was only in 2016 when Zimbabwean shareholders started owning shares in RioZim. Presently, Zimbabwean shareholders own 5.2% equity while Unknown shareholders 88%, with the remainder distributed among the Indian, Zambian, British and South African shareholders. RioZim Limited is one of Zimbabwe's integrated mining companies, which operates the following portfolio of resources: base metals, chrome, coal, diamonds and gold. The company operates Cam & Motor Gold Mine,

Empress Nickel Refinery and Renco Gold Mine as well as holding significant interests in Murowa Diamonds (Private) Limited and Sengwa Colliery (Private) Limited. RioZim jointly owns Sengwa Colliery (Private) Limited on a 50/50 basis with RZ Murowa Diamonds Holdings. It has the following as its subsidiary companies: RioDiamonds (Private) Limited, RioZim Base Metals (Private) Limited and RioGold (Private) Limited.

Figure 7.1: The ownership structure of RioZim Limited between 2010 and 2021



Source: Bloomberg Terminal Data (2021).

Currently, in Lafarge Cement Zimbabwe Limited, the 'Uknown' shareholders- who are also most likely foreigners as the company fought with the government regarding its failure to comply with the indigenisation laws- own 76% equity while the remaining 23% are owned by the Zambian Shareholders (Bloomberg Terminal Data, 2021). Bindura Nickel Corporation is presently 91.94% owned by 'Uknown' shareholders (who are suspected to be Mwana Africa company), 7.77% by Zambian shareholders and 0.29% by the British shareholders (Bloomberg Terminal Data, 2021). Overall, following indigenisation Zimbabwe's extractive industry remains foreign in outlook when it comes to ownership and control.

Blanket Mine- the indigenisation odd one out

Blanket Mine (1983) (Private) Limited (hereinafter Blanket Mine), which accounts for close to 14% of Zimbabwe's industrial gold production (Hubert, 2016), is the only foreign-owned company in Zimbabwe that fully complied with the indigenisation laws (Caledonia Mining Corporation Plc, 2016). To this end, it deserves some discussion on how and why it complied and how its performance and profitability have been following the compliance. Findings from Caledonia Mining Corporation Plc (2016), Hubert (2016) and Caledonia Mining Annual Overview (2018) have established that on 12 September 2012 Blanket Mine fully complied with the Indigenisation laws

and the ownership structure of the gold company was as follows: Caledonia Mining Corporation Plc (hereinafter referred to as Caledonia), Blanket Mine's parent company, owned 49% while the remaining 51% was divided among the following institutions:

- Blanket Employee Share Ownership Trust (BESOT) owned 10%;
- Gwanda Community Share Ownership Trust (GCSOT) owned 10%;
- the National Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF)- now the Indigenous and Economic Empowerment Unit (IEEU)- owned 16%;
- Fremiro Investments (Private) Limited (hereinafter Fremiro) owned 15%.
- It should also be noted that Blanket Mine pay the following to the Government of Zimbabwe: 25% company tax, a royalty of 5% on the value of gold sales, and withholding taxes on payments to non-resident companies- i.e. 15% on management fees and 5% on dividends (Hubert, 2016).

However, contrary to popular views that the entire indigenisation process is a house cards, Caledonia in general and Blanket Mine in particular has been making huge profits under the indigenisation regime. However, it is important to note that there are emerging cases of reversing indigenisation in this isolated success story of indigenisation in the sector. In 2020, i.e. following the amendment of the indigenisation laws, Caledonia Mining Ltd, the parent company of Blanket Mine, increased its shareholding to 64% from 49% by buying back 15% of its shares from Fremiro Investments (Miningmx, 2020).

7.2 An overview of the CSOTs

This section focuses on analysing the origins, intents, shapes, forms and contentious legal frameworks of the CSOTs. To respect the socio-economic rights of the communities where the nonindigenous mining businesses are conducting their mining operations, the Government of Zimbabwe established the CSOTs. Established pursuant to Section 148 of the Statutory Instrument 116 of 2010, i.e. the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) (Amendment) Regulations, 2010 (No.2), and registered as juridical persons by the Registrar of Deeds, the CSOTs' primary intent is to provide a vehicle upon which local communities would own 10% of the equity in all nonindigenous mining firms operating in their jurisdictions. The

proceeds of the 10% shareholding should finance community development projects. As creatures of the Statutory Instrument 116 of 2010, together with the Employee Share Ownership Scheme and Management Share Ownership Schemes, the CSOTs were among many chosen vehicles by the government to implement the indigenisation policy. Furthermore, besides being established in compliance with the set principles of the African Union (AU) Mining Vision (AMV) and International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the CSOTs were further established in compliance with other international and national laws and conventions on protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and their communities. These laws and conventions are shown in Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.2: The international and national laws and conventions that support the establishment of the CSOTs

Name of the law/convention	What the law/conventions says
Article 26 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/295	"1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned."
Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	"All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it."
Article 21(5) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	"State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign exploitation particularly that practised by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources."
Article 2 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	"All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence."
Article 25 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	"Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources".
Section 13(4) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe	"The State must ensure that local communities benefit from the resources in their areas."
Section 14 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe	"(1) The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must endeavour to facilitate and take measures to empower, through appropriate, transparent, fair and just affirmative action, all marginalised persons, groups and communities in Zimbabwe."
Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals Act of Zimbabwe	"The dominium in and the right of searching and mining for and disposing of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gases, notwithstanding the dominium or right which any person may possess in and to the soil on or under which such minerals, mineral

	oils and natural gases are found or situated, is vested in the President, subject to this Act."
The United Nations Resolution 1803 (XVII)	"States and international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles contained in the resolution."

Source: Author's own compilation

However, important to note is that the CSOTs are not unique phenomenon to Zimbabwe. Several countries which implemented affirmative action policies have their variants of what Zimbabwe termed CSOTs. Marongwe and Muguta (2016) and Mawowa (2013) reveal that following the less encouraging socio-economic outcomes of the Breton Woods institutions induced Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) in Asia, the Asian Dragons (i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore) and China used their CSOTs variants as vehicles for rural development. Owing to the economic contractions SAPs created in several countries, Mkandawire (2005) prefers to call them 'structural maladjustment policies.' In these Asian countries, the governments emphasised the rural areas' active participation in economic development (Mokhtar, Reen & Singh, 2013; Uppal, 2014). Like in many African countries, Zimbabwe's mining communities are economically marginalised yet housing huge deposits of the country's natural resource endowments, which mostly non-indigenous mining companies are extracting.

Findings show that capacitating mining communities through CSOTs would go a long way in strategically allowing them to be a decisive factor with regards to the intents and ways for extracting natural resource endowments in their jurisdictions. The argument here is that transparency, sustainability, and accountability issues may be ensured if the communities are part of the mining companies' ownership and control structures doing business in their areas. To this end, according to the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (2014, p. 1), CSOTs "have become the instruments for achieving the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Charter's principle of 'accelerated rural development.'" Similar sentiments of CSOTs becoming viable vehicles for rural community development were also shared by AR1, SGOR2, SGOR6 and SGRR3.

The likely explanation for the preceding viewpoint is that CSOTs are considered effective instruments for marshalling a new indigenous economy in the mining communities in which the

rural indigenous citizens are controlling and owning a competitive share of the national economy. By 2013, i.e. two years after the launch of CSOTs in 2011, the government had already established 59 CSOTs covering 93 local authorities across the country's ten provinces. According to the ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013), doing so showed that the beneficiaries of extractive industry indigenisation, notably in the mining communities, are indeed the disadvantaged indigenous people. According to the ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013), this evidence of CSOTs spurring rural economic development is falsifying the claims that indigenisation is an infrastructure for elite personal accumulation of both power and wealth. Table 6.5 below shows some of the CSOTs, their companies and pledges done by the non-indigenous mining companies vis-à-vis the amount received by the CSOTs as of 2013.

Table 7.3: Status of the community share ownership trusts as of 2013 in terms of payment of pledged money by the qualifying businesses

Community	Province	Company	Pledges US$	Received US$	Spent
1. Chegutu 2. Mhondoro-Ngezi 3. Zvimba	Mash West Mash West Mash West	Zimplats Zimplats Zimplats	10,000,000	4,966,000	69,659.94 184,674.00 125 495.00
4. Marange-Zimunya	Manicaland	Marange, Anjin Mbada	50,000,000		
5. Zvishavane	Midlands	Mimosa Murowa	10,000,000 500,000	3,000,000 300,000	1,275,998.00
6. Shurugwi	Midlands	Unki Mine	10 000 000	10 000 00 (2012)	1,772,398.00
7. Gwanda	Mat South	PPC, Blanket Jessie Mine	2,000,000 5,000,000 250,000	1,000,000 (2012) 3,000,000 (2012) 250,000 (2012)	1,261,721.39
8. Umguza	Mat South	PPC	1,000,000	1,000,000	
9. Hwange	Mat North	Hwange Colliery Makomo Resources Chibondo Mines South Mining Hwange Coal Casification	600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 500,000		
10. Bubi	Mat North	Duration Gold Casymn Mine	1,000,000 1,000,000		
11. Lupane	Mat North	China Africa Sunlight	1,000,000 1,000,000		
12. Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe	Mash East	Lafarge	1,000,000		
13. Goromonzi	Mash East	Lafarge	1,000,000		
14. Mabvuku	Mash East	Lafarge	1,000,00		
15. Bikita	Masvingo	Bikita Minerals	500,000		
16. Chivi	Masvingo	Murowa Diamonds	500,000		
17. Masvingo	Masvingo	Renco Lenox Mine	1,000,000 100,000		
18. Bindura	Mash Central	Freda Rebecca	10,000,000		
19. Hwange Bubi Nkayi Binga	Matabeleland North	Hwange Colliery New Dawn Makomo Resources PPC	$14, 000, 000	$30, 000, 000	

Source: ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013, p. 73) and National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (2012, p. 4).

Table 7.4: Status of the community share ownership trusts as of 2020 in terms of payment of pledged money by the qualifying businesses

Name of the CSOT	Amount pledged by the qualifying businesses to the CSOT	Amount received by the CSOT 2012 – 2020 in US$	Amount received by the CSOT 2012- 2020 in ZWL
1. Bikita	1 000 000	193 000	0
2. Bindura	10 000 000	2 200 000	0
3. Bubi	1 000 000	200 000	
4. Chiredzi	-	60 000	0
5. Chivi	500 000	3000 000	0
6. Goromonzi	6 000 000	326 000	0
7. Gutu	-	30 000	0
8. Gwanda	2 200 000	6 982 062	5 000 000
9. Harare-East	1000 000	300 000	0
10. Marange-Zimunya	50 000 000	550 000	5 000 000
11. Masvingo	-	30 000	0
12. Mazowe	-	10 000	0
13. Mberengwa	3 000 000	3 000 000	0
14. Mutoko	3 000 000	77 500	11500
15. Mwenezi	-	60 000	0
16. Shamva	5 000 000	30 000	0
17. Tongogara/Shurugwi	10 000 000	10 000 000	0
18. Umguza	1500 000	1 400 000	120 000
19. UzumbaMarambaPfungwe	1 000 000	333 000	0
20. Umzingwane	30 000 000	20 000	0
21. Zaka	-	30 000	0
22. Zimplats Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba	10 000 000	10 000 000	0
23. Zvishavane	12 000 000	7 300 000	0

Source: Reports from CSOTs, Mumpande & Mvududu (2020, p. 6-7), NIEEB (2014, 10-31), and ZEPARU (2019, p. 4).

7.2 Disempowering outcomes of the CSOTs

Findings expressed mixed sentiments about the establishment, achievements and functions of the CSOTs. Two competing narratives came out of this. Marongwe and Muguti (2016) expressed that the launch of CSOTs in 2011 became the bone of contention in Zimbabwe's political economy. Quite several respondents and documents reviewed also echoed similar sentiments. Central to the contention is the extent to which the CSOTs provide credible and genuine vehicles for empowering the disenfranchised mining communities. However, in this section, I present and discuss the findings of the negative outcomes extractive industry indigenisation has had through CSOTs.

Findings have established that to this day, many of the extractive industry indigenisation promises are yet to be fulfilled, thereby creating hostages to fortune among the disadvantaged locals and mining communities. Widespread partial compliance and non-compliance by many of the qualifying businesses have been cited as the major challenges. For instance, it has been established by the Silveria House Policy Brief (2021) that since the establishment of CSOTs in 2010, there are only two qualifying businesses (i.e. Blanket Mine and PPC Private Limited) that fully complied with the indigenisation law of transferring 10% of their shareholding to their respective CSOTs, i.e. Gwanda and Umguza CSOTs, respectively. The two mining companies did this through the issuance of share certificates to the CSOTs.

Furthermore, in total, the qualifying businesses across the country pledged US$128 million to the CSOTs (Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021, Mumpande & Mvududu, 2020). However, as of June 2018, only 34.3% of it (i.e. US$45.5 million) was paid to the 26 functioning CSOTs, each receiving varying amounts of funds from the qualifying businesses (Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021, Mumpande & Mvududu, 2020). As of December 2016, the 26 viable CSOTs had received US$39, 386 167 while the remaining non-functional 35 CSOTs received nothing (ZEPARU 2019; Mumpande & Mvududu, 2020; Ministry of Industry, Enterprise Development and Commerce, n.d.). The huge discrepancy between the pledged amount and honoured amount is despite the fact that the indigenisation ministry and the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) launched and commissioned the first seven CSOTs with a total value of nearly US$1 billion, US$815 million to be precise, between October 2011 and December 2012 (Mumpande & Mvududu, 2020;

Ndakaripa, 2020). However, as of March 2014, qualifying businesses across the country had pledged US$116.4 million to the 16 functioning and operational CSOTs out of the 61 legally registered CSOTs, with only about US$30 million honoured (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015).

This widespread noncompliance and defaults on the pledges by the qualifying businesses led many CSOTs (i.e. 35 CSOTs) to become white elephants. Commenting on this Silveira House Policy Brief (2021, p. 4) "[a]s of 2018 to date fifty-five (55/61) Trusts are non-operational due to lack of funding from qualifying businesses. This situation effectively means that 90% of the registered Trusts are not operational." As of 2014, only 16 of the established 61 CSOTs were operational and functional (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015; NIEEB, 2014), and as of 2018, only 26 were operational and functional (Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021; ZEPARU, 2019). These 26 CSOTs keep afloat because they managed to invest in various businesses the surplus of what they received from their qualifying businesses. However, it is important to note that these 26 CSOTs received from their qualifying businesses are "not equivalent to the 10% shareholding required by the law" (Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021, p. 4). The case of Mutoko CSOT presents one of the monumental defaults by the qualifying businesses on their pledges. This is shown in Table 7.8 below. It should be noted that MCSOT has SMART (i.e. specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-bound) development priorities. However, they are all remaining a pipe dream due to these massive defaults and widespread noncompliance by the qualifying companies.

Critics view CSOTs as avenues for the political and business elites to expropriate the country's resources undisturbed, as they would be doing so illegally. CSOTs were established pursuant to Section 14B of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations of 2010 (Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010). For this reason, critics are arguing that CSOTs are neither constitutional nor legislative creatures. The reason is that CSOTs' existence as juristic personalities is not provided by either the Constitution or an Act of parliament. This reality prompted the GNU minister of finance, Tendai Biti, who was MDC-T's secretary-general at the time, to castigate the CSOTs as illegal, predatory and elitist entities. In his words, Biti said the following:

> On what legal basis are companies being made to part with US$10 million or US$15 million?... There is nowhere in the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act that compels companies to donate money to a community share scheme or to any farm or to anything;

> so what you are actually seeing is coercion; companies being forced to part with US$10 million or US$15 million (Mlambo, 2013, para. 22-23).

Tendai Biti continued:

> In the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act, you will not find the word community share trust, you will not. Then you come to the regulations, statutory instrument number 30 of March 2010 that was passed or enacted, again, you will not find the name community share trust. So the issue of community share schemes is actually an after-thought which is not backed by the law, the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act. Such that community share schemes don't actually have legal existence vis-a-vis the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act (Mlambo, 2013, para. 25-26).

On the other hand, others believe that Section 14B of the regulations needs to be read together with Section 148 of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33]. According to this line of argument, doing so would make the CSOTs legislative entities. However, critics argue that if this is the case, then the legal standing of the CSOTs is implied rather than explicit. Machinya (2014), Chowa and Makuvare (2013) and Matyszak (2012 & 2014) share similar views as above. The CSOTs are also criticised on account of them being viewed as constitutive elements of regime survival. The argument here for perceiving them as a constitutive part of regime reproduction is that they are viewed as important elements of ZANU-PF's grand plan to canvass and buy votes. Henceforth, the potential and genuineness of the CSOTs as rural development vehicles to improve the impoverished rural lifestyles are questioned.

Nevertheless, indigenisation exponents view the CSOTs as credible vehicles for spearheading shared, inclusive and sustainable development in the mining communities. ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013), a 108 paged manuscript which mentions the word 'indigenisation' and its variants 'indigenise', 'indigenised' and 'indigenous' 245 times, also expresses similar sentiments. To achieve this kind of development in the mining communities, the law stipulates that 10% of the 51% shareholding nonindigenous mining companies should indigenise must be given to the communities through the CSOTs. In terms of their composition, CSOTs are comprised of a Deed of Trust with mostly the Chief(s), representatives from the local government and those from interest groups in the community as the trustees. According to Section 14B (4) of Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations of 2010 (SI 21 of 2010), to ensure that the dividends accrued are bringing positive outcomes to the communities, the CSOTs should ensure

(*a*) the provision, operation and maintenance of—

(i) schools and other educational institutions and facilities and amenities connected therewith, and educational scholarships; and
(ii) hospitals, clinics and dispensaries; and
(*c*) the provision and maintenance of dipping tanks; and
(*d*) the provision, development and maintenance of roads; and
(e) the provision, development and maintenance of water works and water sanitation works; and
(*f*) gully reclamation and other works related to soil conservation and the prevention of soil erosion, and the conservation of the environment generally.

By 2013, the government had launched and registered with the Deed of Trust 61 CSOTs, i.e. one in each of the 60 rural districts in the country and one in Harare's suburb of Mabvuku-Tafara (Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021; NIEEB, 2014; ZEPARU, 2019). However, it is important to note that findings show that of the 61 CSOTs the government launched by the end of 2016, only 26 were operational. The remaining 35 were just symbolic entities. Corroborating with this finding, the Research Advocacy Unit (2014) reveals that of the 58 launched CSOTs by the end of 2013, only 14 managed to come into existence. Commenting on this, The Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015, p. 6) reports that by March 2014, only 16 of the launched 61 CSOTs were "visibly functional." The Thematic Committee Report attributes the anomaly to widespread defaults by the nonindigenous mining companies to honour the pledges they promised to the CSOTs. According to the same Thematic Committee Report, of the pledged US$116.4 million across the country by the nonindigenous mining companies, only US$30 million was paid to the CSOTs by March 2014.

Findings also show that many of these white elephant CSOTs are not legally recognised, rendering them fictitious entities established to appease the poor rural citizens in the country's rural districts. One may argue that doing so would give the ruling ZANU-PF a comparative electoral advantage in the impending 2018 polls (Matyszak, 2017). However, such sentiments are conflicting with those suggested by Chan and Gallagher (2017), Booysen (2012 & 2014) and Raftopolous (2013a and 2013b). They argue that by implementing the indigenisation programme and other affirmative action policies in land, vending and artisanal mining, ZANU-PF actually delivered tangible benefits to the electorate. To the authors, such deliverables, and not widespread deceptions that are alleged to be the founding intents of the affirmative action policies, are the explanations behind ZANU-PF's electoral victory in 2013. More so, according to this reasoning, had the November 2017 non-coup coup (Tendi, 2020) did not happen and Mugabe remained the

president, the successes of the indigenisation programme, particularly in the mining sector, would have been used as the ZANU-PF's comparative advantage for the 2018 general election victory.

Nonetheless, some reviewed documents, for example The Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015, 2016 & 2017), establish that the non-functionality of most of the CSOTs is because of the financial setbacks they suffered because many nonindigenous companies defaulted on their pledges. The Thematic Committee Report showed that about 74.3% of the pledges were not honoured by the nonindigenous mining companies. The financial setbacks are notwithstanding the fact that the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim-asset) blueprint mentioned the CSOTs as the key drivers to achieve its founding goals and objectives. In the Zim-asset blueprint, COSTs were considered one key intervention to achieve poverty eradication goals articulated in one of its four clusters, i.e. Social Services and Poverty Eradication Cluster. In actuality, the Zim-asset blueprint rested on the foundations of indigenisation. The foreword of the blueprint, which the late president Robert Mugabe wrote, states that "Zim-Asset was crafted to achieve sustainable development and social equity anchored on indigenisation, empowerment and employment creation which will be largely propelled by the judicious exploitation of the country's abundant human and natural resources" (Zim-Asset, 2013, p. 6). Nonetheless, against the background of great hopes among the benighted indigenous citizens, the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016, p. 5) reports the following:

> There has been wide-spread concern around the perceived general failure, maladministration and abuse of the country's 61 established CSOTs, including the Marange-Zimunya Community Share Ownership Trust (M-Z CSOT). These concerns arose against a backdrop of various unfulfilled commitments by qualifying businesses to provide capital that facilitate administrative and local development activities as pledged.

Corroborating with this viewpoint, many respondents agreed that the paradox of poverty amid plenty is obtaining in mining communities even after establishing CSOTs. The residents' livelihoods in the mining communities are not improving as expected despite them housing the natural resource endowments of the country. Commenting on this paradox, one respondent remarked that "…*without pretends or what the Marange community should have been the El Dorado of this country had the management of our community share ownership trust was following the dictates of good governance practices*" (Interview: AR3, 13 September 2018).

For example, findings of the Marange-Zimunya mining communities, despite being the home of the world's largest diamond deposits (Global Witness Report, 2019; Eastwood and Curnow, 2012), agree with three of Ali Mazrui's six African paradoxes. First, the paradox of the Garden of Eden in decay. This paradox is against the background that Africa is the richest continent in terms of natural resource endowments yet still considered the less habitable place to live. Second, the paradox of humiliation and contempt. Despite having been endowed with many rare-earth natural resources than any other continent, Africans and those of African descent are the most humiliated people worldwide. Third, the paradox of poverty-stricken millions in the golden continent. To a significant extent, Zimbabwe's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation are epitomising what Mazrui called the African paradoxes. Such paradoxes in Africa prompted Nkrumah (1965, p. 1) to argue, "Africa is a paradox that illustrates and highlights neo-colonialism. Her earth is rich, yet the products that come from above and below the soil continue to enrich, not Africans predominantly, but groups and individuals who operate to Africa's impoverishment."

However, Mazrui's explanations in an attempt to show how and why these paradoxes came into being are not similar to the ones I am giving in this study. For Mazrui, Africa is where it is today primarily because of how the continent is integrated into the global capitalist economy. Nevertheless, for this research, Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular are where they are fundamentally because of predatory characteristics of the successive post-independence regimes and leadership. For example, this study argues that in the case of the M-Z CSOTs, the communities are not meaningfully benefitting from the exploitation of minerals in their areas not because of how Zimbabwe is integrated into global capitalism. Instead, findings show that it is due to the predatory and neopatrimonial distinctiveness of the ZANU-PF successive governments. Findings from the respondents, media reports and reports from the interest groups largely agree that the Marange and Zimunya mining communities are continuing to be in cycles of extreme poverty, hunger and underdevelopment. Most of the residents find it hard to access even the basic services such as clean water, healthcare, proper schools, and a source of fire (many of them are still using firewood as their energy source). Commenting on this, the following submissions of two resident respondents from Arda Transau (i.e. the area where some of the Chiadzwa residents were relocated to following their displacements after the discovery of diamonds in their area) are indicative:

> *Up to now there is nothing we can point which the ZCDC [Zimbabwe Consolidated Mining Company] has done to the Marange area. Our infrastructure; roads, clinics, schools and all are in a sorry state. The company has done absolutely nothing in this regard* (Interview: RR3, 30 June 2018).

> *We thought as a community we were going to benefit from the diamonds discovered in our area. But of all the companies that came here we only benefited small a food handouts [sic] from Mbada Diamonds… only sugar, maize, and kapenta from Mozambique. Only that. Even the roads which they use to come here are not even tarred. All roads in the diamond fields are dust. Our schools, clinics are in terrible state. They have nothing to show that they are in an area where they are extracting diamonds* (Interview: RR1, 30 June 2018).

As findings reveal, all this is being done even though the nonindigenous mining companies are destroying some of the mining communities' physical infrastructures when extracting the minerals without compensating them for the loss. Commenting on this, the following submissions of the two Arda Transau resident respondents are revealing:

> *One of our school, the Primary School called Chirasika, was destroyed upon ascertaining that the place where it was built had diamonds underneath. We were not compensated for that and our children are now walking long distances to go to school in Hotspring only because their school was destroyed by these companies. The government is even quiet about it. The residents close to that school were dislocated against their will and forced to resettle in Arda Transau* (Interview: RR5, 30 June 2018).

> *We did not benefit anything in development terms except the roofing and fencing of Banda Primary School. That is the only benefit we got* (Interview: RR6, 30 June 2018).

Corroborating with reasoning, Sunguro (2019) reveals that the following schools in the Chiadzwa area are not benefiting from either mining explorations or extractive industry indigenisation: Tonhorai primary school, Wellington primary school, Arda secondary school, Mukwada primary school and Chirasika primary school.

For the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016), all this is attributed to the failure of the eight mining companies operating in the area to honour their US$50 million pledges they pledged on the day the M-Z CSOT was commissioned. The nine nonindigenous mining companies are Kusena, DTZ Ozgeo, Gye-Nyame, Anjin Investments, Diamond Mining Company, Mbada Diamonds, Marange Resources, Jinan Investment Private Limited and Rera Diamonds. Each company pledged US$10 million to the CSOT. Also, findings show that the non-indigenous mining companies, in cahoots with the government, promised the relocated families $US1000 each as compensation for displacement. However, according to the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report

(2016), all these promises are to this day yet to be fulfilled. In the case of the displaced residents, it has been reported that the mining companies, colliding with the government, committed two political economy original sins: displacement and dispossession. The two are the accumulation by dispossession tools that stripped off the indigenous people of these communities of their humanity and dignity. According to the protagonist of accumulation by dispossession theory, Harvey (2003), the theory is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. Findings reveal that their (relocated residents) dispossessed ancestral lands represented the totality of their identity. It is where their ancestors are buried, where they performed their traditional, cultural, religious, and ritual rites and farming.

The consolidation of the diamond mining companies operating in Chiadzwa in 2017, though done in the national interests (as per the reasons given by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development), did more harm than good to the Marange-Zimunya mining communities. Findings show that the consolidated diamond company, i.e. the ZCDC, did not honour its promises it vowed to fulfil. Part of the promises is that the ZCDC was to continue supporting the M-Z CSOT and pay the $US50 million pledged by the companies. Further, ZCDC promised to compensate the displaced residents in Arda Transau. However, findings show that these promises are hitherto unfulfilled *in toto.* This default on pledges is against the background that when the government amalgamated the mining companies in 2017, the ZCDC promised to inherit the seven companies' liabilities and assets, including honouring pledges promised to M-Z CSOT (the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report, 2016 & 2017). In the words of the former minister of Mines and Mining Development, Walter Chidhakwa

> The successor company will inherit both assets and liabilities of the merging companies. What this means is that companies in Marange, as is the case, took a position on the community share ownership trust. The new company will take over that responsibility and will, therefore, have to fulfil that pledge (Chigara, 2015, para. 4-5).

According to the findings obtained from the displaced residents, residents' representatives, media reports, and literature, the relocated residents only discovered that they were made sitting ducks after relocation. For the residents, instead of the discovering of diamonds in their area being a blessing to the area and themselves, it came as a curse. The displaced residents lost precisely that which defines their humanity, dignity and identity: their cattle, ancestral farmlands, social

cohesion, spacious places, traditions, graves of their forefathers (which they value most, according to their traditions and customs), the list is by no means endless. The following submissions of the resettled resident respondents are instructive:

> *The situation now is untenable to go by here. When we are to consider how we are eking out our living here the nostalgic feelings will come. Here, as you can see, we are living in an urban set up environment where this small piece of land is the one we are supposed to use for agriculture, construct kraals for our livestock and all. We have been stripped naked my son. The worst part of this is that we heard that the government that sanctioned our relocation is fully aware of how we are eking out our living here. How are they thinking we are surviving here? We don't have anywhere to farm now. What should we do?* (Interview: RR2, 30 June 2018).

> *Let me tell you this my son, our government does not have its people at heart. Ever since I was born, I've never thought of this tragedy we were made to go through by our government only because of the diamond which was discovered in our area. We were made foreigners in our areas of birth by those who come from somewhere else. Imagine an order for our eviction from our places of birth being written and sanctioned by a minister from somewhere else! The worst thing is that when we were relocated here, we were told that the mining companies are going to employ our husbands and our boys. Nothing of that sort come to fruition up to this day. In Chiadzwa we used to have big farmlands, which we inherited from our forefathers. But here now the piece of land which we were given is not even enough for a kraal of our cattle. This is where we are supposed to get everything for our survival. For me what this means is that our government do not even care about us, it only cares for the monies they extract from the diamonds. I won't vote for this government again. I swear with my father* (Interview: RR1, 30 June 2018).

Speaking on the issue of compensation promised to them by mining companies the following submissions by two resettled respondents are telling;

> *When we left our homes in Chiadzwa in 2012 we were promised by these companies to be given $US1000 per family as a compensation for our relocation, you know we lost a whole lot of things. This is what we expected. However, the money did not come as of now. For me it looks like it is not going to come anymore. So, tell me, with the things we have lost none of these companies dared to compensate us. Also, we were promised to be employed by these companies to work as miners in Chiadzwa. This is the reason why we did not resist to be resettled because we thought getting employed is far much better than staying in our areas of birth. Nonetheless, this promise was not fulfilled. This is painful. I think our government must do something to force these companies fulfil their promises* (Interview: RR4, 30 June 2018).

> *Before they relocated us here, we were also told that we were going to be given one hectare plus an addition of another 0.5 hectares of land each as compensation for our land we lost to the mining companies in Chiadzwa. But nothing of that sort has materialised to this day. In fact, that was a lie. Upon arrival we were told to buy the 0.5 hectares. The first ones were sold for $100 and the second ones under what they called More Food for Africa Project were sold for $1000. As for me I can't get $1000, I can't get $100 because I don't have the land to farm* (Interview: RR2, 30 June 2019).

She continuous: "we are not also getting the presidential agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and seeds." Furthermore, as presented by the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016, p. 7), there are

> disturbing reports of the bitter disappointment on the part of families relocated from the Chiadzwa mining fields around the non-remittance of their compensation funds, the inadequate size of the newly allocated plots and their inability to access basic services appeared to constitute unmet obligations on the part of the mining companies.

Still, on the issue of promises of employment, the following submissions of the resident respondents are illuminating.

> *We mistakenly thought that these companies will collaborate with us as in taking us as employees, but we were not employed to this day* (Interview: RR1, 30 June 2019).

> *We were told that our husbands will be employed by the companies but when we arrived here, they were not employed* (Interview: RR5, 30 June 2018).

Findings have shown that the few who were lucky to be employed were later laid off without their salaries paid in full. The following submission by one resident respondent is suggestive

> *Those who were lucky to be employed later on laid off without pay. Some tried to put their cases before the courts, but until now no one has been given his money. Some are owed $US20 000 other $US15 000, a lot of money. No one was paid after these retrenchments* (Interview: RR4, 30 June 2018).

This reality may present the Fanonian wretched of the earth tale of a people who used to walk on top of the precious stones whose discovery came as a curse on their lives. However, the government was complicit in creating this micro resource curse condition as it was at the forefront of making promises it never honoured. In instances where the affected residents protested against such unfairness, the government was quick to invoke its monopoly over the use of force through either reading the riot act or responding with heavy-handedness. One of the never fulfilled promises made by the non-indigenous diamond firms, in cahoots with the government, was paying school fees for the relocated residents' children for five years (i.e. from 2010-2015). Commenting on this, one interviewed Arda Transau resident submitted that: "*when we came here in 2010 we were promised that our kids would not pay fees school fees for five years but from 2011 we have been paying fees for our kids after the promise was not honoured*" (Interview: RR6, 30 June 2018).

One may not interpret all these accumulation by dispossession acts without referencing them to what happened during the initial days of colonialism when the conquered indigenous people were

dispossessed of their inalienable lands before being forced to provide free and or cheap labour in mines. However, in Marange this is occurring four decades into independence. Interpreting these findings through the Frankfurt Critical Theory lens may present a picture of objectifying residents based on their othering and exceptionality status. The residents are othered because they are politically weak and economically disenfranchised.

Following on from this reasoning, one may argue that the harrowing dispossession and dislocation ordeals experienced by the Chiadzwa residents are the worst forms of dehumanisation. However, the active involvement of the government in all these shows how capitalism can use government as its foot-soldier for accumulation by dispossession. Accumulation by dispossession theory is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. Here the government is facilitating the centralising of wealth in the hands of the nonindigenous mining companies by not compelling them to at least honour their relocation and indigenisation promises to the IDPs. The nonindigenous mining businesses manipulated the government's monopoly over the use of force and enacting universally enforceable laws, and forcefully evicted the residents from their ancestral lands without or with incommensurate compensation.

To further articulate this dehumanising act, I will discuss the arguments presented by Nussbaum (1995) on objectification. She says objectification is considered to be there if at least one of the following seven conditions is there. The first is instrumentality– the act of treating people as tools or devices to achieve one's ends. The second is the denial of autonomy– the condition denying one independence or self-determination, i.e. the condition of being determined. The third is inertness– the condition of being treated as lacking in agency, volition or activity. The fourth is fungibility– the act of considering one as interchangeable or tradable with other objects. The fifth is violability– the act of treating a person as an object justifiable to be smashed, broken into or broken up. The sixth is ownership– the condition of being treated as a property that can either be owned, bought or sold. The seventh is the denial of subjectivity– a condition of being unsympathetic to other peoples' experiences or feelings. In the case of the dislocated and disposed residents, five of these conditions may be said to be manifesting, exceptions being ownership and fungibility conditions which could be impliedly interpreted to be in existence also.

In this context, objectification is pitted against the commodification of the basic stuff previously readily accessible free of charge. Included are water, source of fire, rearing of livestock, land and sundry other fundamental constitutionally envisaged basic needs. This reality may represent an act of further marginalizing the already disenfranchised and emasculated rural peasant residents. Writing about such occurrences, Luxembourg (1913) assert that to thrive, capitalism also needs non-capitalist societies. One civil society respondent described this situation as a "*continuation of colonialism after colonialism*" (interview: CSR4, 20 June 2018). Nietzsche (1886) speaks of this: "He who fights with monsters should see to it that he himself does not become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you." Similar causes that led to the 1st and 2nd *Chimurenga*/*Umvukela* tended to be largely the same, causing sporadic protests and demonstrations, organised mainly by the Centre for Resource Natural Governance (CNRG) and Bocha Community Trust, by the Marange residents. The protests are for resisting the forced displacements and accumulation activities nonindigenous mining companies and the government are doing to their area and to them. Chief among these factors include the following: land dispossession; forced labour (as reported by the US Customs and Border Protection (2019) while justifying banning trade in rough diamonds from Marange); relocations to congested reserves of Arda Transau with poor rainfall patterns and habitat challenges; allocated a certain number of livestock to keep; unjustifiable taxes (e.g. hut and livestock taxes, and water and electricity bills in the rural areas); debt peonage; and working without or without commensurate remuneration.

These findings are consistent with the literature also. While critiquing the liberation movements in Southern Africa, Southall (2013, p. 255) argues that the liberation they brought forth is largely of "equality of peoples as 'nations' [rather] than… the equality of individuals." For this reason, one may argue that the liberation struggles waged against colonialism were not against the exploitation of the masses and for the economic mainstreaming of the previously excluded indigenous peoples. Instead, they were meant for elite liberation. This situation is notwithstanding the great expectations potential beneficiaries have in indigenisation in general and in these CSOTs in particular. Commenting on this one respondent, SGRR5 remarks that there is no difference between this government's sanctioned land dispossessions and displacements from those conducted by the colonial governments.

This was corroborated by those who chose to interpret how the indigenisation process unfolded through the lens of game theory. The argument here is that extractive industry indigenisation ought not to be looked at in isolation of the grand scheme of things. Doing so may be misleading and parsimonious for the complex policy crafted and implemented in complex political and economic environments ostensibly to resolve a wicked problem of uneven development. According to Hermans, Cunningham and Slinger (2014), game theory is about rational choices of individuals based on others' movements; the behaviour of others determine their calculated strategies. Thus, considering the Western international community's behaviour to make Zimbabwe a global pariah through the imposition of economic sanctions, game theorists may argue that a few years after Zimbabwe was slapped with sanctions is a calculated move by the Government of Zimbabwean response to international isolation. For one respondent

> *Before you go any further ask yourself these questions: why did the spirit of indigenisation gained traction and momentum after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000? Why did the government take a radical stance on nonindigenous businesses after the imposition of sanctions? Why, after the monies and assets of the top guys in government were frozen abroad, the government started the rhetoric of indigenising the economy? I am posing these questions in a way of not discrediting the nobleness of the policy. No. What I am questioning here is the coincidence of events? Why not in 1980 or any other time before the sanctions? Why?* (Interview: SGRR3, 26 June 2018).

Game theorists maintain that the foundational intent of indigenisation is neither written nor spoken. For them, it was hidden in the ambiguous policy pronouncements. According to this view, the elite intended to recoup their frozen assets and monies abroad. "*What was to be achieved by the policy was said unspoken*", SGRR3 further contended. For the government officials on the sanctions list, indigenisation is a political economy tool for both the government and political elites to recuperate from the ills of what the government refers to as 'illegal and evil sanctions' imposed by Britain and her allies. Premised on this argument, game theorists maintain that indigenisation almost achieved its foundational intent. For example, the threats of full indigenisation of the nonindigenous owned firms, evidenced by ZANU-PF invoking the Fast Track Land Reform Programme motto "go and take what you want, and, if we win, you can keep it" (Research Advocacy Unit, 2014, p. 2), made these companies victims of extortion by the ruling ZANU-PF.

Findings from the reviewed documents, which corroborated with the literature reviewed, are not ambivalent about the fact that many nonindigenous mining companies became victims of extortion. The risk-averse and easily pliable foreign companies, which took heed to the indigenisation threats consistently given by the indigenisation ministry, were extorted, hoping that they will be left unaffected by the indigenisation laws. Among these companies are those which did not comply with the indigenisation laws. These are not limited to the following: The Pan African Mines for the Zvimba-Chegutu-Mhondoro-Ngezi CSOT; Gold Mines, Rocklink, Natural Stone, Ground Rock Gold Mining, Mining, Sulleage, Black Granite and Light Weight Gold for the Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe CSOT; Vumbachikwe Mine for the Gwanda CSOT; Bayrich Mine/Naan-Jiang African Resources and the Conservancy for the Bikita CSOT (The Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015).

It is also instructive to note that some of these foreign mining companies are those which did not honour their pledges in full. Among them are Jessi Mine and Farvic Mine for the Gwanda CSOT and Bikita Minerals for the Bikita CSOT (ibid). The findings by the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (2014) and the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016) on CSOTs also expressed similar sentiments of partial and or noncompliance with the indigenisation laws by some of these non-indigenous mining companies. According to the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015, p. 5), "[c]hallenges encountered in pursuing compliance include a misunderstanding of the programme, resistance by some companies, intransigence, avoidance and politicisation of the economic programme." However, Freda Rebecca Gold Mine for the Bindura Community Share Ownership Trust (BCSOT) is a horse of a different colour. By March 2014, the nonindigenous gold mining company had already paid US$1 million of its pledged US$10 million, which was to be paid in full over a period of 10 years. At the same time, the gold company had already paid another US$1 million to the BCSOT through an advance facility. The CSOT also got another US$1 million from Paza Buster (Pvt) Ltd as well as US$100 000 and US$50 000 from Magobo and Canterbury milling companies, respectively.

However, Zimbabwe's track record of political corruption presented an opportunity for most foreign mining companies, particularly those with strong political connectedness, to corrupt the system to dodge indigenisation. Findings reveal that most of the extorted and expropriated money either found its way in ZANU-PF coffers or was used as largesse by the ruling ZANU-PF

to solicit and canvass votes during the 2013 general elections. This level of political corruption has prompted The Frameworks, Procedures and Guidelines for Implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14: 33) of 2016 to report that "there is rampant non-compliance to the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act…" (p. 27). However, it has to be put on record that the two written down foundational intents of indigenisation are to simultaneously empower the disadvantaged indigenous citizens and indigenising the country's economy. According to this view, the unwritten one is to recoup the frozen monies and assets invested abroad. Therefore, as advised by one of the respondents, SGRR2, when appraising the effectiveness of indigenisation, one needs to do so by comparing the policy's outcomes vis-à-vis its tacit intents. Using the intents spelt out in the policy pronouncements as benchmarks for success or failure would be misleading as they were not meant to be achieved but rather to act as smokescreens. The reason is that the need to implement the policy was neither apprised by the intention of seeing the economy indigenised nor the disenfranchised indigenous indigents empowered.

Stretching from this game theory explanation, several respondents believe that indigenisation's internal structure and constitution were bound to create zero-sum situations upon implementation. As a branch of game theory and economic theory, a zero-sum game is a mathematical principle that hinges on the principle that the gain or loss of utility by one player corresponds to the losses or gains of the same utility by the other (Hermans, Cunningham & Slinger, 2014). Putting indigenisation outcomes into this zero-sum game perspective, the gain of utility (in this case, the proceeds of indigenisation) by the business and political elites corresponds to the loss of the same utility by others (notably the poor deserving indigenous people). The game is termed zero-sum because if all the gains of the game are to be added together and subtracted the losses, the answer will come to zero. Thus, if all the economic gains of the indigenisation are to be added together and subtract the losses, the answer will always come to zero.

Nonetheless, by targeting to empower the mining communities, CSOTs are in line with the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation's (Zim-Asset) objectives of "unlocking economic capacities of the rural communities" (National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board, 2014, p. 1). The same is also captured in Zim-Asset's two clusters of Food

Security and Nutrition, and Social Services and Poverty Eradication. The Zim-Asset blueprint was not only augmenting indigenisation, but the indigenisation programme was more of its foundation. The need to empower, through indigenisation, the disadvantaged indigenous peoples is where the blueprint rested. For instance, the Zim-Asset's cluster on Social Services and Poverty Eradication referred to establishing the CSOTs as the critical drivers for the economic deliverables falling under its ambit. Commenting on this analysis, the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (2014) claims that the CSOTs completed various projects to transform rural livelihoods and lives. These include rural electrification, construction of schools and clinics, drilling of boreholes, rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, among many others. In light of this realisation, CSOTs are considered the engines of rural economic development that would create jobs for the rural people, thereby improving their livelihoods.

Logically, the argument that CSOTs are viable engines for rural development makes a whole lot of sense, considering that mining communities are largely underdeveloped even though mining activities are undertaken there. However, dialectically the argument presents zombie economics of trying to resurrect dead economic ideas to walk among us. The reason is that the integrity of the current structures and constitutions of the CSOTs as the vehicles for transforming the mining communities' socio-economic standards is questionable. Commenting on this analysis, one respondent has it that "*it is common knowledge that all the community ownership trusts Mugabe launched countrywide never lifted any poor Zimbabwean out of the grinding poverty. They rather benefited those who were close to the Big Man himself*" (Interview: AR1, 20 July 2018). The reason is that empirical evidence on the ground about many of these celebrated CSOTs suggests the opposite of the said intent of these CSOTs.

The major intents of the CSOTs are fourfold. First, ensuring that the communities where these qualifying companies are doing business benefit from exploiting their God-given natural resources. Second, including the rural residents into the mainstream economy. Third, strengthening and capacitating the mining communities' role in socio-economic development by making them strategic players in the developmental priorities that affect them. Fourth, making the mining communities the owners, managers and controllers of both means and factors of production by giving them controlling equity in the qualifying businesses operating in their jurisdictions (Dube, 2013). Ideally, doing so would allow the CSOTs to be in a good position to implement their

mandated duties of income-generating, poverty alleviation and youth employment creation projects in their respective communities, and overall development of the mining communities (Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2011). The disbanded Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, in liaison with the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, were to provide supervision, monitoring, evaluation and regulation to the undertakings of these CSOTs.

According to GN 114/11, a Statutory Instrument only applicable to the mining sector, the qualifying companies had to sell or dispose part of the 51% of their equity share to the designated entities; i.e. the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF), CSOT, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporations (ZMDC), ESOT, and Statutory Sovereign Wealth Fund SWF). In doing so, the General Notice emphasised urgency and speed as the essence. Ideally, this arrangement was to curb the accumulation of the 51% benefits to certain individuals or groups while at the same time dis-accumulating the same benefits from others.

Nevertheless, there were legal complications as to whether the General Notice constitutes a law. The instant compliance period required by the General Notice in the mining sector was quite different from other sectors of the economy, where there was a maximum of a four-year compliance period. For example, in the manufacturing sector, the qualifying company was supposed to dispose 26% of its shareholding in the first year, then 10% in the second year, another 10% in the third year and finally the remaining 4% in the fourth year. In other economic sectors (e.g. finance, tourism, educational and sport, arts, entertainment and culture, engineering and construction, energy, services, telecommunications, and transport and motor industry), the General Notices 280 of 2012 provided that compliance with disposing of the 51% equity should be in the first year. The Frameworks, Procedures and Guidelines for Implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14: 33) of 2016 also shared similar sentiments.

The indigenisation, and notably through the CSOTs, is perpetuating rural regional uneven development. The reason is that natural resource endowments are not evenly distributed across all the 60 rural districts in the country (i.e. the differentials or differentiations of nature). Some districts are devoid or less of these natural resources than others, which makes it difficult for the government to officiate CSOTs in these areas. These differentials in natural resources distribution

may further illustrate that indigenisation is more of a political economy of uneven development than shared and equal development. Indigenisation is resulting in selective development. This reality is notwithstanding the idea that the NIEEF and Statutory Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) were established to resolve this regional uneven development problem through cushioning the resource dearth areas. Marongwe & Muguti (2016) agree with several respondents interviewed and reviewed documents about the idea that CSOTs represent the government's failure to decentralise rural development. Therefore, it follows that the idea of establishing CSOTs could be viewed within the principles of pseudo decentralisation and democratic centralism as well as decentralised despotism. How these CSOTs are to spur decentralised economic growth and development in the mining communities is so subtle that it is more on promoting elite expropriation and regime survival than indigenisation for empowering the marginalised indigenous rural people.

In the end, the reviewed documents, for example the 2017 First Report of the Thematic Committee on Indigenisation and Empowerment on the Circumstances Surrounding the Non-Establishment of the Community Share Ownership Trusts in Mudzi and Mutoko Districts, revealed that only one CSOT, i.e. Gwanda CSOT, of the established 61 CSOTs has a share certificate. Some of the CSOTs without share certificates include those that received pledges and seed capitals. Similar sentiments are also echoed by the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015). However, the CSOTs have members who quarterly sit on the boards of the qualifying companies. The possible implication of this is that they are technically unaware of what is obtaining in these companies in terms of profits accrued, dividends to be shared, or losses to be incurred on the simple reason that they are not part of the control and ownership structures.

7.2.1 Drivers for partial and noncompliance by some qualifying businesses

While by February 2014, the indigenisation implementing agency, the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB), had processed more indigenisation plans (i.e. 464 plans) from the extractive industry than in any other sector of the economy (NIEEB, 2014; Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015), compliance has been a challenge. During the same period, the manufacturing sector had 410 plans processed, finance and tourism sectors had 218 while other sectors

combined had 376- making a total of 1,459. As noted in Section 7.1 above, it is important to note that of the 464 indigenisation plans processed by NIEEB by February 2014 only one fully complied with the indigenisation laws, i.e. Blanket Mine, which indigenised 51% of its shareholding. Several factors are attributable to this widespread compliance challenge. Findings from the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2017, 2016, 2015 and 2013) have established that the following factors contributed to widespread noncompliance and defaults to indigenisation pledges by some of the qualifying businesses:

Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the indigenisation laws and policy documents

This is due to widespread lack of clarity, inconsistencies and ambiguities. Coupled with nonalignment of the indigenisation laws and regulations with other laws, the situation was even worse. "For instance, the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment has to rely on other Ministries to ensure compliance, e.g. the Ministry has to get the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to assist them in as far as cancelling licenses with Zimbabwe Investment Authority is concerned" (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015, p. 10);

The politicisation of the indigenisation programme

In most cases, the politicisation of the indigenisation programme in general and CSOTs in particular is to achieve some political and personal agenda.

The absence of legal frameworks to enforce the payment of the seed capital (i.e. donations and pledges).

This situation results in the Indigenisation Ministry, OPC and NIEEB relying heavily on the understanding, goodwill, and persuasion of qualifying businesses to honour their indigenisation pledges. This was further worsened by the delays by both the indigenisation ministry and NIEEB to process the submitted indigenisation plans and subscription agreement documents that aimed at transferring 10% of the shareholding from the qualifying businesses to the CSOTs. According to NIEEB (2014), sometimes it could take more than three months to process these submitted documents. The absence of such compliance legal frameworks gives qualifying companies a *carte blance* of choosing paths of least resistance, i.e. partial compliance or noncompliance at all.

Consequently, CSOTs are receiving varying amounts from their respective qualifying companies. On the one hand, this situation is leading to some CSOTs getting a bigger percentage of their pledges. These include Gwanda CSOT got US$6.7 million, Tongogara CSOT got US$10 million, Zvishavane CSOT got US$12 million and Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba CSOT got US$10 million. On the other hand, this situation is leading to other CSOTs getting a small fraction of their pledges. These include Shamva CSOT got US$30 thousand, Umzingwane CSOT got US$20 thousand, Marange Zimunya CSOT got US$550,000 of the pledged US$50 million and Mazowe CSOT got US$10 thousand (ZEPARU, 2019; Ministry of Industry, Enterprise Development and Commerce, n.d.; Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021; Mumpande & Mvududu, 2020). Furthermore, in 2016 Gutu, Masvingo and Zaka CSOTs received US$36 thousand each from Tongaat Hullett, and Chiredzi and Mwenezi CSOTs received US$60 thousand each from the same company (ZEPARU, 2019; Ministry of Industry, Enterprise Development and Commerce, n.d.). This situation is resulting in increasing uneven regional development as some parts of the country are developing (i.e. those where qualifying companies are choosing to honour full of their pledges). In contrast, others (i.e. those where qualifying companies are not honouring full of their pledges) are not due to lack of adequate finances.

Mixed messages from key ministries and departments

For example, "There is a communication breakdown between the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment and the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development in terms of disseminating information regarding the mining companies that are operating in the country' (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015, p. 11).

7.2.2 Inherent challenges facing the CSOTs

Currency conversion challenges, financial racketeering and poor investment decisions

One critical challenge facing the CSOTs has to do with currency conversion challenges, financial racketeering and poor investment decisions by the CSOTs. For example, the CSOTs that received their pledges following the pronouncement of the Monetary Policy of 20 February 2019 received their money in local currency, i.e. the Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS)

dollars, instead of the US$, the currency that was in when the qualifying businesses did their pledges (ZEPARU, 2019). The Statutory Instrument (33/2019) pegged the RTGS dollar at par with the US$- which was all but a farce as the exchange rate on the ground was dictating otherwise, i.e. the RTGS dollar being weaker than the US$. According to ZEPARU (2019, p. 21), the Statutory Instrument "led to the conversion of the US dollar accounts to the RTGS dollar accounts which has depreciated from US$1: RTGS$6 as at 14 June 2019 compared to US$1:RTGS$1 prior to the announcement of the monetary policy." This currency conversion is hugely affecting the performance, survival and sustainability of many CSOTs as they are now receiving pledges which are less than their original financial value.

The Marange-Zimunya CSOT provides an apposite case here, which The Zimbabwe Independent (2021) argues is collapsing after three years following the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) injected US$5 million to prop it up. While the ZCDC claims that it injected US$5 million as part of honouring its promises of paying the pledges done by the diamond companies to the CSOT before 2014, the accounts of the contractors (e.g. Plutoglass and Abaccote companies), which did the actual developmental jobs in the CSOT's three constituencies, reflected RTGS dollars, and US$ dollars. According to The Zimbabwe Independent (2021), the money reflected in the contractors' accounts under the assumption that the RTGS dollar and US$ dollar were trading on 1:1 basis, as per the Statutory Instrument (33/2019).

For example, the M-Z CSOT awarded Plutoglass two tenders to build classroom blocks at Mutore Secondary School in Vumba and Mazonwe Secondary School in Burma Valley valued at US$146 000, yet the deposited amount was ZW$146 000- which is about US$1,700 (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2021). Apart from currency confusion related challenges, CSOTs suffer from poor investment decisions. For example, due to poor investment decisions Gwanda CSOT, "had its US$2 million locked in MetBank due to liquidity challenges" (ZEPARU, 2019, p. 21); Parliament, 2015, p. 11). Furthermore, the requirements of the vendor financing agreement mechanism CSOTs are using to acquire the required 10% shares in qualifying companies have long-term disempowering implications. For example, after acquiring 10% shareholding in Blanket mine through vendor financing agreement, the Gwanda CSOT had to cede 80% of its future dividends to repay the loan, whose interest was fixed at a staggering 7.25% per year payable

quarterly. Through vendor financing agreement, between 2012 and 2013, Blanket Mine had made an advance payment to the CSOT totalling US$4million against the CSOT's "right to receive future dividend on their equity holding in the mining company" (ZEPARU, 2019, p. 5).

Coupled with company closures, disinvestments, decreased FDI flows and scaling down of operations by some mining companies due to indigenisation laws, indigenisation becomes a disempowering policy choice to the locals and their communities as they were left worse-off. The reason is that capital flight robbed locals of jobs and development these foreign companies champion in the communities, especially through community social responsibility programmes. Commenting on capital flight following indigenisation, Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015, p. 11) stated that "Capital flight negatively impacts on the successful implementation of the indigenization programme."

Political settlements/Elite pacts, widespread corruption and incapacitation of the CSOTs.

One thing that characterises Zimbabwe's indigenisation, notably extractive industry indigenisation, is widespread defaults on pledges made by foreign-owned companies to the CSOTs. The case of diamond companies operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Field looms large here. While there was extensive mining of diamonds in Chiadzwa Diamond Field, the locals and surrounding communities are yet to meaningfully benefit due to widespread defaults by the diamond mining companies on their pledges and commitments they have made to empower the locals and develop the diamond communities. As established by the findings, the widespread defaults are not disconnected from ZANU-PF's broader political objectives of regime reproduction and authoritarian consolidation. This situation makes the political settlements framework the best analytical tool to determine how and why these defaults were planned, implemented and justified thereafter. Although there may be no conceptual consensus on the term (McCandless, 2018), political settlements- or elite pacts- are agreements that result in a state governed by political and administrative frameworks, both formal and informal, that advance, maintain and protect the interests of the elites.

Through political settlements analysis- an analysis about understanding and supporting elite pacts while allowing and facilitating transformation to happen in other sectors of the broader inclusion, the meanings, objectives and patterns of foreign companies' widespread defaults can be

established (Manduna & Muchadenyika, 2021). The ways in which defaults were done and justified affected people's trust, legitimacy, faith and confidence in government, thereby further breaking the already broken social contract. Findings from Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015, 2016 & 2017) have established that the three following key commitments and pledges made by the diamond companies operating in the Chiadzwa diamond field are either not honoured or partially honoured:

- The USD50 million seed capital pledged by the five diamond companies (Marange Resources, Anjin Investments, Jinan Investment Private Limited, Mbada Diamonds and Diamond Mining Company) to the MZ CSOT, each company committed to contribute USD10 million;
- Giving each relocated family USD1000 as compensation fee for relocation; and
- Allocation of adequate land to the IDPs, both for residential and farming purposes.

As in many cases of defaulting, deep contestations abound regarding the drivers and motivations for defaulting. The following are competing for dominance: First, the government is accusing the diamond companies of being dishonest. Second, the diamond companies are accusing the government of sending misleading and mixed messages to the public, in the process confusing both the public and the diamond companies. Third, undue interference of the political leadership, i.e. from both national and provincial levels, in the day-to-day running of both the CSOT and the diamond companies. Fourth, alleged donations (both in cash and materials, e.g. cars) given to politically protected persons (PPPs) within the CSOT structure by the diamond companies contributed to defaulting. On this defaulting driver, Chief Marange, "He emphasised interference by ZANU PF political leadership in the Province led by Mr. Didymus Mutasa, the then Head of Manicaland Province who has since been expelled from the ruling Party" (Parliament of Zimbabwe (2017, p. 13). Fifth, some Chiadzwa residents are accusing the diamond companies of misleading the president, government, CSOT and the public at large by promising pledges and commitments they knew from the beginning that they would not honour. However, as established by the findings, a close look at these contentious reasons for defaulting suggests that lies underneath these contestations between the government and the diamond companies are widespread political settlements entered into between the two parties.

Thus, the collusion between the government and the qualifying companies makes their public disagreements regarding pledges well-thought-out and carefully implemented ruses designed to

hoodwink the public. The public disagreements between the two parties are thus not disconnected from the ZANU-PF government's broader objective of deliberate and strategic ambiguities, inconsistencies and lack of clarity in the policy and legal frameworks of indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. Therefore, it is against this background that I am arguing that the political settlements framework is the analytical and epistemological tool to describe and explain these widespread and systematic defaults, as well as their motivations and drivers. This factor contributed immensely to mining indigenisation disempowering the indigenous peoples and their communities.

There is also a general lack of the required skills and abilities (e.g. financial, management, operations etc) about running and managing CSOTs as going concerns. One factor contributing to this is having traditional Chiefs as heads of these entities. For instance, it has been reported by the findings that "Poor investment portfolios as in the case of Gwanda Community Share Ownership Scheme which had its US$2 million locked in MetBank due to liquidity challenges" (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015, p. 11).

Implications of the Finance Act of 2018 (No. 13 of 2018) on the functions of the CSOTs. The implications of the Act on the continued funding of the CSOTs are harsh. The Act made it optional for the qualifying companies to continue funding (as well as honouring the pledged amounts in full) the CSOTs. This situation means that, in addition to not getting any shares in these qualifying companies, the Act is now denying the communities and locals to benefit from the donations and pledges. While commenting on the disempowering implications of the Act, the Silveira House Policy Brief (2021, p. 2) says, "[t]he Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007 [*Chapter 14:33*] as amended by the Finance Act, 2018. (No. 13 of 2018) has the effect of disempowering communities by taking them back to the time of CSR [corporate social responsibility]." In addition to nonalignment with the Constitution and other indigenisation statutes, the Act disempowered the CSOTs in many ways. First, according to the Silveira House Policy Brief (2021), ZEPARU (2019), Mumpande and Mvududu (2020), the contents of the Act literally prevented the continued capitalisation of CSOTs. The reason is that the Act makes "it makes it optional for investors to support CSOTs, their capitalisation and fulfilling previous financial pledges towards the CSOTs" (Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021, p. 2). Corroborating with this reasoning, Mampande and Mvududu (2020, p. v) argue that

> In March 2018, the amendment to the Finance Act clouded the continued capitalisation of the CSOTs. The provisions of the new Act directed mining companies to work with CSOTs at their own discretion. Thus, the new law somehow reversed the socio-economic development gains enjoyed by communities through the CSOTs scheme.

The Act replaced makes the legal requirement for the qualifying businesses to financially support the CSOTs with the businesses' goodwill to do so. Second, the Act completely excluded qualifying businesses that are not dealing with diamonds and platinum from financially supporting CSOTs in any way, as only those dealing with diamonds and platinum are allowed to do so by the Act. Further to this, the Act says those qualifying companies dealing with diamonds and platinum "*may* support CSOTs if they wish." This situation means that according to the Act, foreign investors dealing with diamonds and platinum are also not obliged to support the CSOTs financially. Third, by rewinding back to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) era, the Act relegated the CSOTs to the status of permanent dependants to the qualifying companies. All said, one may argue that the Act, contravening the Constitution, other indigenisation legal documents, and international conventions on the rights of the indigenous people to benefit from their natural resources, the Act can only be credited on its ability to remove all the legal frameworks that support the continued capitalisation of the CSOTs by the qualifying businesses.

Table 7.5 below shows some of the qualifying businesses that did not honour much of their indigenisation pledges.

Table 7.5: CSOTs with huge discrepancies between the amount pledged and amount paid as of December 2020

Qualifying company	CSOT	Amount pledged in US$	Amount honoured in US$
Farvic Mine	Gwanda	180 000.00	30 000.00
Jessi Mine	Gwanda	500 000.00	250 000.00
Bikita Minerals	Bikita	1 000 0000.00	157 500.00
FredaRebecca Gold Mine	Bindura	10 000 000.00	2 200 000.00
Quarrying Enterprises	Mutoko	1 000 000.00	30 000.00
Zimbabwe International Quarries	Mutoko	1 000 000.00	15 000.00
Natural Stone Export Co.	Mutoko	1 000 000.00	32 500.00
Lafarge	Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe	1 000 000.00	333 000.00
Murowa Diamonds	Chivi	500 000.00	300 000.00
Lafarge	Goromonzi	1 000 000.00	326 000.00
Lafarge	Harare East	1 000 000.00	300 000.00
Murowa Diamonds	Zvishavane	5 000 000.00	3 000 000.00
Five diamond companies (i.e. Marange Resources; Mbada Diamonds; Anjin Investments; Diamond Mining Company; and Jinan Investment Private Limited). Each pledged US$10 million.	Marange-Zimunya	50, 000 000.00	550 000.00

Source: Mumpande & Mvududu (2020), NIEEB (2017), ZEPARU (2019) and Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015).7.3 Positive outcomes of the CSOTs

Although the preceding presented and discussed findings are mostly about the adverse outcomes brought forth by extractive industry indigenisation in general and CSOTs in particular, in this section, I am presenting and analysing the positive outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation is producing through CSOTs. One dominant theme threading the findings is that indigenisation, particularly but not exclusively in the extractive industry, is bringing forth some success stories. While criticisms can be rightly levelled against extractive industry indigenisation, it is critically important to acknowledge the positive outcomes it has been bringing forth since its inception in 2010. While some nonindigenous mining firms may not be complying with the country's indigenisation and empowerment laws, including not honouring their pledges to the CSOTs, it is

crucial to recognise that others have complied and fulfilled their pledges. Significant local development in mining communities is the testament of all this.

Various CSOTs are implementing different community development projects across the country. The development projects range from rehabilitation, maintenance, and construction of physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, dip tanks, clinics, hospitals, schools etc), gully reclamation, and income-generating projects (poultry, piggery and vegetable gardening). Findings show that the projects are significantly contributing to employment creation for the youths, poverty reduction and general wellbeing of the rural residents (Silveira House Policy Brief, 2021; Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2011). All these are directly benefiting the mining communities in many ways. For example, rural development ensures upward social mobility for many, guaranteeing food security, and sustainably managing the environment in the local communities. According to the findings from the Silveira House Policy Brief (2021), in total, the surveyed 15 functioning CSOTs across the country contributed to the following:

- Constructed 10 new science laboratories in different schools;
- Built 144 new classroom blocks;
- Built five new clinics and renovated 19 other clinics;
- Built 34 new houses for teachers;
- Drilled 227 new boreholes and renovated 45 other boreholes;
- Rehabilitated six irrigation schemes;
- Furnished 77 schools and built a vocational training centre in Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe (UMP), the Nakiwa Vocational Training Centre.

I am arguing that these benefits to the local communities should not be ignored. Although to a lesser extent, this study is making a case that CSOTs' development projects across the country are denting the overarching problem of uneven development.

Findings reveal that most of the CSOTs' success stories are highly undocumented, while others are documented but remain unpublished. Cases in point here are community developmental feats of the following CSOTs: Tongogara, Gwanda, Zvishavane, Bindura, Bikita, MNCZ and Umguza CSOTs. Table 7.5 below summarises the major successes of the first three CSOTs.

Table 7.6: Success stories of the Tongogara, Gwanda and Zvishavane CSOTs

CSOT	CSOT Amount in US$ by December 2020	CSOT Amount in ZW$ by December 2020	Projects completed
Tongogara CSOT	10, 000 000	0	**Education sector** – 10 x classroom blocks built, 9 x F14 Teachers' houses built, 1 x Admin block built, 2 x schools fenced, 2 x schools electrified, 1 x blair toilets block built for a school **Health sector** – 1 x clinic mortuary built, 2 x clinics electrified, 1 x Veterinary Office electrified, 1 x F14 Nurses House built. **Water Provision** – 30 x boreholes rehabilitated, 24 x boreholes drilled, 1 x water reticulation system rehabilitated, **Roads Infrastructure** – Purchased own grader, grading roads in all wards, rehabilitated Chirume road **Livelihoods** – installed 2 x irrigation systems for Zunde Ramambo at chiefs Banga and Ndanga, 2 x fenced Zunde Ramambo gardens.
Gwanda CSOT	6, 982 062	5 000 000	**Education Sector** – 5 x A' Level laboratories built and fitted, 1 x renovated Laboratory, 5 x classroom blocks built and fully furnished, 1 x Teachers' house (F14) built, 1 x school computer lab fitted with Solar System, 4 x university students sponsored with scholarships for undergraduate degrees, 2 x students sponsored for teacher training. **Health Sector** – 1 x new clinic built, 2 x clinics renovated, 3 x clinics electrified, Water Provision – bought own borehole drilling rig (drills 70 % for commercial fundraising and 30 % free for community), 2 x clinics water systems rehabilitated, 15 x boreholes drilled for communities **Empowerment Initiatives** – 27 Youth Groups offered loans and 39 group to receive loans, **Enterprise Development** – Have embarked on Income Generating Projects to supplement revenue from mines – (Pen Fattening Project, Micro-Finance Project, Property Investment, Borehole Drilling Project).
Zvishavane CSOT	12, 000 000	0	**Education sector** – 24 x classroom blocks built, 13 x F14 Teachers' houses built, 10 x schools electrified, 8 x schools fitted with furniture entire school, 4 x school fenced, 1 x school laboratory built, 1 x school wholly painted. **Health sector** – 7 x clinics staff house built, 1 x new clinic built, 3 x toilets blocks built for 3 clinics, 2 x clinics fitted with modern equipment, 1 x clinic electrified, 3 x clinics fenced, 35 toilet blocks built across the district **Water Provision** – 49 x boreholes drilled across district **Food Security** – Purchases 5 disc ploughs for 5 tractors for Zunde Ramambo, 1 x Irrigation scheme fended, 1 x irrigation scheme rehabilitated, 1 x irrigation scheme rehabilitation on the cards.

Source: Silveria House Policy Brief (2021, p. 7).

For clarity's sake, I will present and discuss the findings of the successes of some of the CSOTs on a case by case basis.

In Mashonaland West province, the MNCZ is showing some signs of a success story of extractive industry indigenisation. Soon after its launch in October 2011, the Zimplats Holdings' MNCZ CSOT entered into a business partnership with Sable Parks Estates Limited, a Chegutu based chicken company with two distinct operational units: a poultry abattoir and a poultry growing section (WEALTHTALK, 2017). The CSOT "bought 33% equity stake in Sable Park Estate – a Poultry Production, Distribution, and marketing concern inn Zvimba" (Mumpande & Mvududu, 2020, p. 9). The partnership's primary intent was to boost the production of chickens and capacitate the abattoir by taking on board the multiple growers of chickens from the CSOT's jurisdiction. As part of their partnership agreement, Sable Parks Estates Limited conducts, or facilitates the conduct of, various training sessions regularly with chicken multiple growers on how to grow chicken at a commercial level. The company offers various technical support to multiple growers within the CSOT. The support ranges from disease control, biosecurity and diagnosis as well as services like the provision and transportation of necessary equipment, medication, feeders, drinkers, flue pipes and curtaining (SG04; WEALTHTANK, 2017). The company also transports the chickens from the growers to the abattoir in Chegutu. Furthermore, findings show that the company's agricultural extension and veterinary officers provide vaccination services to the chickens of multiple growers regularly. Further, the agricultural extension and veterinary officers also provide growers with the "correct detergents and disinfectants as advised by a Veterinary Company (Fivet)" (WEALTHTALK, 2017, p. 33). In addition, Sable Parks Estates Limited provides growers with management, technical and logistical support training.

As a result of the business partnership, by 2017, "48 small scale farmers from five areas around Chegutu are contributing to the approximately 165 000 birds slaughtered each month" (ibid, p. 33). Commenting on this positive achievement, one respondent revealed the following:

> *Community Share Ownership Trusts became the local economic hubs. One of the shining examples of these is the Zvimba-Chegutu-Mhondoro-Ngezi CSOT where the trust has a partnership with the Sable Company in doing their poultry businesses using the local people as the poultry producers. This is working effectively in reducing poverty as in each community everyone with the capacity to produce chickens, whatever the number- whether the number is small, is allowed to provide to the trust and Sable Company. Living standards of a whole lot of*

> *people is being improved this way because the economy is now open for everyone with the capacity, thus an inclusive economy of this type is facilitating and fostering positive social mobility amongst the previously disadvantaged peoples in the peripheries. Unlike a situation whereby a few poultry producers could be in the industry of poultry, take for example Irvines. Now the sector has multiple growers, which in actual fact is improving considerably the livelihoods of the local people* (Interview: SGO4, 16 June 2018).

Furthermore, the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015) and the Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard (2013) reported that roads, schools, clinics, hospitals, bridges and various other infrastructures were renovated, constructed and rehabilitated in all the CSOT's three districts, i.e. Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu and Zvimba. The parliamentary report and the Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard (2011) further allude that the CSOT drilled and sunk new boreholes in the said districts. Also, the CSOT capacitated the vocational training centres (VTCs) in the districts, notably the Mhondoro-Ngezi VTC, Mashayamombe VTC, and Murombedzi VTC, with computers and constructed new buildings (the carpentry and mechanics workshops). Further to this, the CSOT has what it calls the egg branch that specialises in egg production. By 2016, the egg branch had set up three laying points at three centres in Mashonaland West, i.e. Murombedzi, Mamina and Mashayamombe. The CSOT also influenced Sable Parks Estates Limited to expand its abattoir to cater for slaughtering and packaging of the expanded production base of chicken. Findings also report that the CSOT set up a microfinance unit to support the upcoming indigenous businesses in all sectors with the jurisdictions of the CSOT. Furthermore, the CSOT embarked on citrus and crop production, with the latter there to support the poultry industry. Also, findings reported by Silveria House Policy Brief (2021) have revealed that the following are some of the infrastructure-related successes of the CSOT: acquiring some shares in Sable Sable Park Estate Holdings; constructing an x-ray block Banket; drilling boreholes in the four districts of Zvimba, Chegutu, Mhondoro and Ngezi; built clustered houses; and bought two ambulances and two land cruiser vehicles. In addition to all these, the CSOT had established two companies in its name-making the CSOT an effective going concern.

The BCSOT is one of the extractive industry indigenisation success stories. Since its launch, the CSOT has been implementing various rural development projects that are going a long way to capacitate the rural people, reduce poverty and unemployment rates, and causing a general improvement in the rural people's wellbeing. The findings from the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015) and National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (2014) reported that the

CSOT implemented the following rural development projects: 18 routine road maintenance projects; five health projects; 17 water projects; and five education projects. Further, findings show that the CSOT's projects of motorised grading, drainage formation and routine maintenance of critical roads are considered beneficial to the rest of the Bindura community (Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2013). For example, farmers use them to access the markets, school going kids to go to school, and community members to go to hospitals and access other areas.

In Mashonaland East province, the Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe CSOT is one success story of extractive industry indigenisation (ibid). Findings show that the CSOT constructed the Nhakiwa VTC worth a total of US$3 676 368.00 (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015; NIEEB, 2014). The findings have reported that by 2015 the VTC enrolled about 1000 students. In Matebeleland South province, the Gwanda CSOT shows to be another success story for extractive industry indigenisation. The CSOT constructed and renovated 14 houses at the two clinics in the area, constructed Silikwe Clinic and rehabilitated the irrigation schemes in the area. Also, in 2014, the CSOT disbursed a loan to the tune of US$250 000.00 to the youth-related projects.

The Harare Mabvuku-Tafara CSOT, the only urban-based CSOT, tends to have unique social challenges as compared to the rest, which are rural-based (Silveria House Policy Brief, 2021). To this end, it had established a bursary scheme to cater for the children of the urban poor, and made sure that Danhiko Industrial Training College has a reliable source of clean water. The urban-based CSOT also managed to establish an income-generating project in the form of a waste management facility that manufactures fertilizer from waste products

According to the findings, the Umguza CSOT in Bulawayo province shows some positive outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation. For example, by 2014, the CSOT had drilled and sunk 36 boreholes, with 100 more promised to be drilled and sunk. It is also important to note that the CSOT is using the drilling machine as an income-generating project as it is being constantly hired out for a fee (Silveria House Policy Brief, 2021). These CSOT's outcomes were in addition to constructing the Umguza VTC, where another borehole was also drilled and sunk. VTCs, according to the findings, are critically important to the mining communities considering Zimbabwe's distressed economy with more than 90% unemployment rate. Skills development is helping rural people to engage in self-employment and increasingly becoming self-dependent. All

these positive developments in the Umguza CSOT are a result of the 15 nonindigenous mining companies and one Cement Manufacturer operating in the area that ceded US$5 million as seed capital to the CSOT (NIEEB, 2014).

The Bikita CSOT in Masvingo province painted schools, toilets and teachers' houses. The Zvishavane CSOT in Midlands province was "proactive in ensuring that youth in the local communities of Zvishavane were employed" (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015, p. 8). According to the findings, out of the launched and commissioned 61 CSOTs, the Zvishavane CSOT is the only one that employed the youths. Further, the CSOT implemented the projects shown in Table 9. 1 below.

Table 7.7: Projects Implemented by the Zvishavane CSOT

Social Service and Poverty Eradication			
EDUCATION	**Projects**	**Ward**	**Project description**
	Chinembeure Sec School	18	1 x 2 classroom block and furniture
	Gwemvurechena Primary School	14	1 x 2 classroom block and furniture
	Chivizina High School	17	Electrification
	Zeruvi Primary School	15	1 x 2 classroom block
	Govarizadze Secondary School	6	1 x 2 classroom block
	Mabhaluzi Primary School	6	Fencing of yard
	Mapirimira Primary School	6	Fencing of yard
	Sivanga Primary school	6	1 x 2 classroom block
	Mapirimira Primary School	6	2 x F14 Houses
	Sinami Primary School	3	1 x 2 classroom block
	Chatsitsa Secondary School	10	1 x 2 classroom block
	Mabasa Primary School	8	1 x 2 classroom block
	Venge Primary School	9	Furniture
	Bilashava Primary School	7	Electrification
	Mwezhe Primary School	7	2 x 2 classroom block
	Oreti Primary School	19	1x2 classroom block and with desks and chairs
	Mpumelelo Secondary School	12	2(1x2) classroom block
	Ingome Primary School	12	Electrification
	Wedza School	11	2(1x2) classroom block with furniture
	Mukwidzi Secondary School	5	1x2 classroom block and furniture plus 2xF14
	Svinga School	6	Fencing
	Chirere Primary School	14	1x2 classroom block
	Gwemvurechena Primary School	14	1x F14
	Mabasa Primary School	8	1x F14
	Mpumelelo Secondary School	12	1x F14
	Mpumelelo Secondary School	12	1x Science Laboratory with furniture
HEALTH CARE	Dambudzo/Lundi Clinic	3	Construction of 2x F14 Houses
	Zvegona-Dayataya Clinic	12	Construction of a new clinic
	Mtambi Clinic	17	Electrification
	Transportation of ARVs from Bulawayo to District Hospital	All wards	Lorry to ferry drugs
IRRIGATION	Mabwematema Irrigation	11	Rehabilitation of irrigation scheme, water connection and infield works. At least 250 hectares will be put under production guaranteeing for security.

Source: National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (2014, p. 14).

Also, findings show that the Zvishavane CSOT helped construct the first block at Rupemba Primary School in 2012. Before this development, the school buildings were thatched wooden structures without chalkboards, and pupils were learning while sitting on the floor. Furthermore, the Chomunyaka Dam constructed by the CSOT is going a long way in easing the community's acute water problem. All these success stories are made possible by the paid seed capital pledged

by the qualifying companies, which in total by 2014 was US$38 260 000.00 (National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board, 2014).

Overall, the living standards are improving in the preceding selected CSOTs as several empowerment projects for youths, women, the disabled and the general community are undertaken (Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2011). Also, road, education and health infrastructures are improved in these communities. All said, it can be argued that "[t]he performance of some CSOTs suggests that they are a potent developmental lever for Zimbabwe and they deserve to be legally supported" (Silveria House Policy Brief, 2021, p. 7).

Similarities can be drawn with two South African mining communities witnessing positive development due to the implementation of the BB-BEE in the mining sector. These are Royal the Bafokeng Nation (RBN) in the North West province and Steve Tshwete municipality in Mpumalanga. The RBN is entitled to 22% royalties, totalling US$70 million every year, from all the nonindigenous platinum companies doing business in the North West province (Minerals Resources Department, 2009). RBN owns shares through its investment arm, the Royal Bafokeng Holdings (RBH), in Impala Platinum Mines and Royal Bafokeng Platinum (RBPlats). As a result of this arrangement between the nonindigenous platinum firms and the community, the RNB manages a sovereign wealth fund worth over US$4 billion. In the Mpumalanga province, in 2011 Optimum Coal, created following BHP Billiton's need to secure its BB-BBE credits, partnered with the Steve Tshwete municipality, delivered 100 houses to the deserving poor. The housing provision project cost R13 million. However, all these positive development outcomes in the mining communities are notwithstanding the fact that by 2009 black ownership of mines in South Africa was only 9% (Mawowa, 2013).

However, it is important to note that the foregoing success stories of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe are not presented and discussed oblivious of the glaring weaknesses with regards to the constitutions, structure, and functions of the CSOTs. These include lack of community involvement in and ownership of the CSOTs; CSOTs structured in ways that promote paternalistic and top-down tendencies; strong political interference; and trustees as political appointees appointed by the minister who has strategic political interests to advance and protect.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented and analysed findings about how Zimbabwe is faring with addressing the processes and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation through CSOTs. The processes, laws, institutions and actors actively involved in extractive industry indigenisation in the country are discussed in this chapter. In the process, the chapter showed how and why these processes, laws, institutions and actors are operating and behaving in ways that make extractive industry indigenisation outcomes largely inconsistent with the empowerment and indigenisation goals. Emphasis was placed on articulating how and why the CSOTs are being used as theatres for elite private accumulation rather than local development hubs and vehicles. Doing this further show how the overpromising extractive industry indigenisation strategic political settlement is underdelivering upon implementation. However, it is instructive to note that while, on balance, the outcomes of CSOTs are largely disempowering, this chapter showed that some CSOTs are producing quite positive, empowering outcomes for the disadvantaged mining communities. Jobs for the youths have been created, public infrastructures (i.e. dams, roads, bridges, dip tanks, schools, clinics, hospitals etc.) were constructed and maintained, and income-generating projects were initiated in these mining communities by the CSOTs. Having analysed the processes and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation through CSOTs, the next chapter focuses on presenting and analysing the findings about the internal structural and contextual factors affecting indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular.

CHAPTER 8

THE INTERNAL STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY INDIGENISATION IN ZIMBABWE

8.0 Introduction

Extractive industry indigenisation has since its inception in 2010 been being implemented when Zimbabwe is facing complex, multiple and overlapping crises. These include contested legitimacy of the ZANU-PF government, a broken social contract between the state and the citizens, crumbling social cohesion, widespread inequality, deepened poverty, high unemployment rate, large-scale public and private corruption, and international isolation. However, the disenfranchised indigenous majority initially celebrated the extractive industry indigenisation on the genuine belief that it may restructure mining capital in the country in ways that empower them. Thus, it is against this promising background of extractive industry indigenisation to the disadvantaged indigenous citizens that this chapter seeks to describe and explain the factors accounting for indigenisation outcomes being inconsistent with the goals. These factors include the following: business fronting and public corruption; the involvement of the security sector in the mining indigenisation processes; community share ownership trusts (CSOTs) as regime survival strategies; and deliberate inconsistency and lack of clarity in the legal frameworks.

This chapter responds to the sub-research question: How are the organic and conjunctural forces accounting for continued extractive industry uneven development under the indigenisation regime? It focuses on the internal structural factors whose impact, either directly or indirectly, has determined both the course and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation. The findings presented and analysed in this chapter were gathered from document analysis, with key informant interviews and observations playing a complementary role. The reviewed documents were drawn from the ministry responsible for indigenisation, the parliament of Zimbabwe, the implementing agency of indigenisation- the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB)- and political parties. Interviews were conducted with key informants from government, academia, civil society and. In this chapter, I used both content analysis and thematic analysis methods to develop codes and themes that guided the inquiry.

8.1 Business fronting and public corruption

Findings show that extractive industry indigenisation is revealing three mutually exclusive yet reinforcing forms of large-scale public corruption. The first one is business fronting. The second one is the predatory elements, which Mandaza (2016a, p. 6) calls "parasitic and comprador classes", through legal means, benefiting from extractive industry indigenisation. The third one is nonindigenous mining businesses presenting false ownership structure information on their balance sheets. This third one is being done in the following two ways: (a) including names of mainly black indigenous citizens on the company's ownership structure documents but without their knowledge and consent and (b) including non-existent names of mainly black indigenous citizens on the company's ownership structure documents. I call this fraudulent business fronting. Therefore, this study is making a case that large-scale public corruption characterising extractive industry indigenisation deals the government has since 2010 been concluding with nonindigenous mining businesses is making mining indigenisation under-delivering upon implementation.

According to the findings, large-scale public corruption manifests more in political forms than in any other form, such as legal forms of corruption. Political connectedness and political correctness (or the need to be politically connected and correct) of the mining businesses are playing a significant role in facilitating political corruption. Furthermore, findings show that the large-scale public corruption in extractive industry indigenisation manifests more in grand, systemic, or endemic scales and less in petty scales. In Kenya, large-scale public corruption is a monster president Uhuru Kenyatta called "the foremost danger facing the country" (Khamisi, 2018, p. 11). In Zimbabwe, the theme of large-scale public corruption is further supported by the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank findings. The organisations separately ranked Zimbabwe as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Figure 8.1 below shows Zimbabwe's corruption ranking.

Figure 8. 1: Zimbabwe's Corruption Rank

Source: Transparency International Online Data

Further, as shown in Figure 2 below, the Afrobarometer Round 7 (conducted in 2018) shows that more than 60% of the respondents interviewed said Zimbabwe's government officials are corrupt.

Figure 8. 2: Perception of Corruption by Institution in Zimbabwe



Source: Afrobarometer Online Data

Corroborating with the above Afrobarometer Round 7, Round 6 (conducted in 2014) and Round 5 (conducted in 2012), as shown in Figure 8.3 below, consistently revealed that more than 70% of the respondents interviewed said Zimbabwe's government is poorly handling corruption.

Figure 8. 3: Handling of corruption by the government



Round 7/2018 survey results



Round 6/2014 survey results



Round 5/2012 survey results

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Fighting corruption in government?
Source: Afrobarometer Online Data

Findings show that business fronting, or the "parasitic auxiliary bourgeoisie" as Wild (1997, p. xxi) puts it, nonindigenous mining firms are practising in cahoots with mainly black indigenous citizens, both from inside and outside the government, is one of the three sub-themes that were collapsed to form the superordinate theme of large-scale public corruption. Findings drawn suggest that business fronting or the acts of compradorism, to borrow from the Marxist parlance, characterising many extractive industry indigenisation deals, is reflecting the extent to which the Zimbabwean society, government and state are drifting towards predation. I call this type of corruption 'bottom-up political corruption.' The disadvantaged indigenous citizens often prefer to act as fronts than the non-indigenous mining firms persuading them to do that.

The case of Freda Rebecca Gold Mine Ltd (FRGM), which Zvoushe (2019, p. 289) calls "FRGM's IEE compliance circus", provides a classic case study of dodging indigenisation laws through business fronting. Prior to the implementation of indigenisation, ASA Gold Limited (formerly Mwana Africa Ltd), the former parent company of FRGM, sold 15% of its shares for US$405,000

to Suncraft Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd, the company owned by the local businessman, Kenneth Shupikai Musanhi, who is also the Zanu-PF Bindura North legislator and Zanu-PF Politburo member (Asa Resource Group PLC, 2012; Moyo 2017). However, following the conclusion of the sale agreement, allegations of fronting abound; many people, including employees of FRGM (Zvoushe, 2019's PhD findings), alleging that Musanhi is just but a front who does not own any share in FRGM, the country's largest gold producer. As of October 2021, FRGM's market capitalisation was US$ 65.14 million, and Musanhi's 15% shareholding would translate to mean he owns more US$9 million. However, the pertinent question that flows from this is that: Is Musanhi worth that amount of money? What may further lend credence to the allegations of Musanhi's fronting activity is that in May 2012, FRGM and ASA Gold Limited unilaterally sold 100% shares of both companies to Sotic International without the knowledge or consent of Musanhi or his company Suncraft Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd.

The FRGM, through its CEO, Kalaa Mpinga, is alleged to have fronted a local business consortium, the Zindico Consortium, as the owner of its 26% shareholding (Zvoushe, 2019; Mining Zimbabwe, 2018). Represented by Dr Chikanza, the Zindico Consortium is comprised of the following local businesses: Zindico Resources, Bindura Trust, Minehood Corporation, and Cruciate Investments. The new ownership structure (i.e. Musanhi owning 15%, the Zindico Consortium 26% and BCSOT 10%) would then mean FRGM had successfully complied with the 51%/49% indigenisation laws. Commenting on this fronting strategy of Zvoushe (2019, p. 290) alludes that "Mpinga's strategy was to "achieve" this without necessarily keeping his end of the bargain in practical terms. The 51% would therefore be a mere statement of an intent that never existed." It is important to note that the collusion of FRGM and the indigenisation ministry aided and facilitated the fronting. The reason is that the indigenisation minister then, Savior Kasukuwere, is said to have held some meetings with Kalaa Mpinga whose contents were never disclosed to the public regarding the Zindico Consortium getting 26% shareholding (Mining Zimbabwe, 2018; Zvoushe, 2019). What further lends credibility to the allegations of fronting, in this case, are the following revelations submitted by Mining Zimbabwe (2017, p. 6)

> Zindico's claim appears to be based on a two-year old draft, unsigned agreement which, if signed, would have been conditional upon the approval of the directors of Mwana Africa Plc (the previous name of Asa Resource). The draft agreement was apparently negotiated by Mr Kalaa Mpinga, the then chief executive of Mwana Africa Plc, who appears never to have submitted it for approval to the Board of Directors of Mwana Africa Plc, and it has

not been approved by the Board of Directors. The alleged claim seeks implementation of Zimbabwean Indigenisation laws.

While commenting on FRGM's noncompliance with the indigenisation laws despite its purported compliance through Musanhi's 15% shareholding, Dr Chakanza's 26% shareholding and BCSOT's 10%, the former indigenisation minister, Chris Mushowe, said the following: "[w]ith respect to Freda Rebecca Gold Mine, the completion and finalisation of the compliance with the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act Chapter 13:14, including community share ownership trust have not been fulfilled" (Mushowe cited in Zvoushe, 2019, p. 289).

Another illuminating case of business fronting involves the alleged collision between Bikita Minerals Lithium Mine (BMLM) and a PEP, Dzikamai Mavhaire- who is a former ZANU-PF Politburo member, former minister of Energy and Power Development and former ZANU-PF legislator for Masvingo. Mavhaire was also both the Chairman and board member of BMLM for 15 years. According to Trust Africa (2017), the following BMLM's ownership structure was in line with the requirements of the indigenisation laws: African Minerals Limited from Mauritius controlling 49%; Dzikamai Mavhaire 21%; Bikita Community Trust 10%; Sovereign Wealth Fund 10%, Employee Share Ownership Trust 5%; and the Zion Christian Church Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi, another PEP, 5%. Presently, the ownership of BMLM is said to be as follows: African Minerals Limited from Mauritius owns 55.4%; Amzim Minerals Limited from Mauritius again owns 18.6%; Dzikamai Mavhaire owns 16.0%; and Bishop Nehemiah Mutendi, another PEP, owns 5.25% (Bikita Minerals, 2019 cited in Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2019). What is giving Mavhaire's allegations of fronting more weight is that these changes came soon after the amendment of the indigenisation laws in 2017, which saw only those companies in diamond and platinum sectors required to comply with indigenisation laws. However, "Dzikamai Mavhaire has been accused of fronting for the white owners of the mine. These accusations have not come from independent observers but from his former party, Zanu PF" (Trust Africa, 2017, p. 4). On the grounds of being one of the shareholders of BMLM, in 2021 Mavhaire fought with Paul Mangwana, indigenisation minister of the time, when he wanted the lithium company exempted from complying with the indigenisation laws (Tututuku, 2014). What raised fronting allegations is that BMLM, a subsidiary of Africa Resources (Pvt) (Ltd), holds the world's largest deposits of lithium, i.e. estimated at 11 million tonnes. The pertinent question that remains unanswered is that, can Mavhaire own such a percentage in a company as big as BMLM?

According to the documentary evidence from Global Witness Report (2017 & 2012), the cases of Core Mining Resources and Grandwell Holdings also provide a good example of how the politically exposed persons (PEPs) can be used as fronts by big international companies. Fronting for the Israeli registered mining company, Beny Steinmetz Group Resources (BSGR), Lovemore Kurotwi- a nephew of the late Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) Commander, Vitalis Zvinavashe- owned 46% stake of the Core Mining Resources, the local partner of BSGR (Zim Stones, 2018; Nkala, 2019). Commenting on both corruption and business fronting activities in all this, Zim Stones (2018) said the following:

> *Core Mining was supposed to be a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) of Beny Steinmetz Group Resources (BSGR) who were supposed to bring in $2 billion. But that investment never came. We ended up with Core Mining on its own and a ragtag team of people from South Africa. Mr Kurotwi eventually owned 46% of the company but he is the one who had initially come in and said he was bringing in BSGR. But that never materialized. An audit by Grant Thornton found that no investment was brought by Core Mining. It was on these grounds that we then terminated their licence. Mr Kurotwi never brought a single cent but he is a Zimbabwean. We also discovered that Core Mining did not purchase any equipment.*

Furthermore, Robert Mhlanga, through using his extensive political connectedness as Zimbabwe's retired Vice Air Marshall and Chairman of Mbada Diamonds, is alleged to have fronted Grandwell Holdings through its subsidiary Transfrontier Mining he is alleged to be the owner of (Global Witness Report, 2018, 2017 & 2012; Nkala, 2019). Corroborating this finding, David Kassel, chairman of New Reclamation that owns a 25% stake of Grandwell Holdings, which is the parent company of Transfrontier Mining, revealed the following: "Mhlanga was not a shareholder in Transfrontier, the 49.99% owned by Transfrontier in Grandwell Holdings was controlled by a consortium of Chinese investors" (Global Witness Report, 2017, Nkala, 2019, p. 191). The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy Report (2013) questioned the credibility of the due process followed when both Core Mining and Grandwell Holdings were selected to partner with the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) in the initial two joint ventures. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee Report (2013, p. 14 notes that the joint venture "was not done according to any known precedence, procedures or with reference to any legislation in the country."

According to Warikandwa and Osode (2017), much like the BB-BEE in neighbouring South Africa, Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation fails to deliver outcomes consistent with set goals because it is disproportionately suffering from business fronting. However, to curb this problem, the South African government enacted legislation that outlawed business fronting. Despite this legislation, the Black Economic Empowerment Commission's recent findings reveal that business fronting is still an existential threat to effective broad-based black empowerment in South Africa (Paton, 2019). The overall finding of the Commission is that the ownership structures of many BB-BBEE trusts are not genuine. The situation is further worsened in the mining sector by the 'once empowered, always empowered' principle. The principle allows foreign-owned mining businesses to claim to be complying with the BB-BEE laws if the indigenous entities involved have sold their shareholding or interests either to another foreigner or back to the company they were in. This principle is notwithstanding the fact that doing so automatically brings the company's BB-BEE threshold below the legally acceptable 26%.

This study also arrived at similar conclusions of false indigenisation ownership about indigenised firms in general and indigenised mining firms in particular in Zimbabwe. Articulating what business fronting produces, Mkandawire (2015, p. 577) argues that "comprador, petty, or a lumpen bourgeoisie—drone capitalists confined to buying and selling—as opposed to a national bourgeoisie that produced captains of industry." Corroborating with this finding, Fanon (1961) contends that the national bourgeoisie class that took power after independence cannot produce, build and invent; it functions well as a comprador. Further corroborating this finding, Hoogvelt (1979) contends that business fronting stifled indigenisation efforts in Nigeria.

In Zimbabwe, however, the government is reluctant to enact a law that addresses business fronting, and findings show that the problem continues unabated. Critics are interpreting the absence of a legal framework to outlaw business fronting to mean the government is tacitly permitting unscrupulous business dealings by legally allowing business fronting to go unchecked. Commenting on the effects of the absence of enforceable legal frameworks that outlaw business fronting in Zimbabwe, Wild (1997, p. 273) submits that:

> If businessmen and politicians succeed in twisting the law and existing business rules, if they replace the market forces by the forces of power, then everyone will grab what he can, whether he considers that a way of doing business right or wrong. The economy will then simply become the economy of the strongest, not the fittest. Once the legal and

> ethical fabric has been destroyed, Zimbabwe will head towards a Nigerian-type pirate economy.

As Wild predicted in 1997, the Zimbabwean economy is evolving into the Nigerian-type of pirate economy, all largely because the forces of power are allowed to replace the market forces. The significant contribution of the extractive industry indigenisation to this cannot be overemphasised, nonetheless. The immediate result of this problem is the reconfiguration of the uneven development architecture, rather than resolving it as per the indigenisation's founding goal. Through business fronting, potential beneficiaries of extractive industry indigenisation could collide with the nonindigenous mining businesses. The collision makes it appear as if capital has been restructured, and the indigenous people are now are part of the equity structure in the foreign-owned mining businesses. The problem is not only restricted to the mining sector. Instead, findings reported that it permeates the entire indigenisation process in all the country's 14 economic sectors.

Due to business fronting, wealth inequalities continue to widen between rich indigenous people (i.e. the political and business elite) and the nonindigenous, on the one hand, and the disadvantaged indigenous citizens, on the other. One may argue that this is, in part, due to the absence of proper and enforceable legal and policy frameworks to outlaw business fronting. To this end, it may be unsurprising that extractive industry indigenisation is turning out to be the poison that festering the very wound it purported to be the cure of in the first place, i.e. uneven development. Findings show that if business fronting goes unchecked or unregulated, indigenisation policies may not deliver outcomes that are consistent with the goals. This situation maintains an uneven development configuration. One respondent corroborated this viewpoint when submitting the following:

> *The implementation of the indigenisation programme epitomised the evidentiary of wicked policy problems where there are no easy solutions. It was actually an incarnation or embodiment of all the characteristics of wicked policy problems* (Interview: AR, 01 June 2018).

Tacitly allowing unscrupulous business dealings to go unchecked is, in my view, itself complicit in perpetuating uneven development. Zimbabwe's government is not enacting a law to address the problem. In South Africa, the government outlawed business fronting, although not proactively, and the law went a long way in reducing cases of that matter (Warikandwa & Osode, 2017).

Commenting on what considered the unwritten rules of the business fronting game, the remarks of the following two interviewees are illustrative:

> *It is not the lack of logic in our government that they are not thinking of coming up with a law to address the problem. It shows that there is something sinister the government is doing with or through this controversial policy which they don't want to disturb with the law to check who is owning what in which company. A rocket scientist is not needed to explain to us that our gullible, our worst politicians are fronts of international businesses* (Interview: SGOR3, 03 June 2018).

> *Zimbabwe's biggest challenge right now is that of electing, promoting or recruiting dealers in the positions of leaders. We don't have leaders in this country. But we have dealers leading us in this nation. Besides corruption what do you expect from dealers? Before thinking of implementing, or even formulating, any policy we must get our leadership right. We have a serious leadership problem. We are mistakenly interpreting our dear misleaders to mean leaders* (Interview: AR, 01 June 2018).

Mandaza (2016a, para. 12) supports these remarks by arguing that leaders are "a predatory and parasitic class of a comprador bourgeoisie that straddles both public and private sectors." Mandaza carefully calls them comprador bourgeoisie class, a term originated from the Portuguese word 'comprador' denoting an indigenous manager of European businesses in East and South East Asia. The reason is that their wealth is created neither through accumulation nor production. Instead, through compradorial largesse, i.e. handouts given to them as frontmen and frontwomen by international businesses. It is important to note that in Zimbabwe, elite compradorism did not start with indigenisation. Rather, the history of compradorism in Zimbabwe, according to Mandaza (2016a, 1986a & 1986b), predates the country's independence and it is intricately woven and rooted in African nationalism. These compradorial acts reflect what Fanon (1961) says about Africa's post-independence leadership. Fanon said that the mind of the national bourgeoisie that took power after independence is not that of a captain of industry but rather that of a businessman.

Bourgeois compradorism in extractive industry indigenisation is one of the political economy continuities that predates independence. Bond (2006 & 2019) argues that anti-imperialist narratives are often not what it appears to be. The most notable pre-independence case of bourgeois compradorism is the role played by Tiny Rowland through his company LONRHO in compradorising both the ZAPU-PF and ZANU nationalists. The same is believed to have been done to the ANC and SACP nationalists by Oppenheimer's giant Anglo-American Group (Mbeki, 2009; Terreblanche, 2012; Bond, 2014). Terreblanche (2012) articulates such compradorial acts

by calling how the South African economy was discreetly Americanised 'lost in transformation.' Much like in the South African context, which Terreblanche (2012) discusses at length, Mandaza (2016a, 1986) suggests that numerous behind-the-scenes negotiations were conducted by the nationalists' top brass and the nonindigenous conglomerates before independence. The compelling arguments and insights Mandaza (2016a, 2016b & 1986) and Terreblanche 2012) are raising about losing in transformation illustrate the origins, patterns, and developmental trajectory of the political economy of corruption in Zimbabwe and the discreet manner in which indigenisation into the grand jigsaw puzzle of corruption. However, Taylor (2016, p. 12) is of a dissenting view that "Zimbabwe reveals a highly cynical example of elite capture from the very start [from independence]." In the end, all this reveals what Fanon (1961) asserts while articulating the pitfalls of national consciousness that the postcolonial national bourgeoisie class had discovered its historic mission (as each generation must do) and fulfilled it, although in a betrayal way to the national democratic revolution. This generation's historic mission, according to Fanon, is that of being compradors.

Although not in the extractive industry, another illuminating case in point of elite business fronting is the one that involved the former Vice President of Zimbabwe, Phelekezela Mphoko, and Choppies Enterprises. According to Mabuza (2018), while citing the letter written by Choppies Enterprise CEO, Ramachandran Ottapathu, the retail company colluded with the former Vice President and fraudulently entered into an indigenisation agreement with him. This collusion acted as a strategic political settlement avenue that could see the retail company dodging the indigenisation laws of having at least 51% of its equity and controlling interests indigenised. Mphoko, together with his son Siqokoqela Mphoko, were used as frontmen by the retail company. According to the company shareholding structure, the two held 51% of the equity and controlling interests while theirs was only 7%. Part of the letter written by the CEO of the retail company reads:

> The reference of the 51 percent being owned by the Mphokos was done so as to comply with legislation which was put in place by the government which precluded foreigners from owning big stakes in businesses in preference to locals. That legislation is being looked at as we write to you because of the vision that the government has to open up the business sector and promote investment …. We also reiterate that the Mphokos were given the 51 percent shares in an agreement which allows us to buy back the shares as and whenever we want as part of efforts to comply with the law. The Mphokos never invested any cent in the business. We gave

> them the shares on paper. Their 7 percent free carry shares was a way of thanking them for facilitating that we set up business in Zimbabwe (as cited in Mabuza, 2018, para. 16 & 19).

The letter concludes, "The other 44 percent shares were allotted to them (the Mphokos) to add to the 7 percent free carry shares to make it 51 percent. But that is merely on paper," (as cited in Mabuza, 2018, para. 20). Chingarande (2018) shares that Mphoko's Choppies shares were not real; their existence was only on paper for the purpose of enabling the retail company to dodge the indigenisation laws. Prosaically, this enabled the economy to appear as if it is largely indigenised, and the indigenous citizens have the controlling majority in the firms while in reality, it was the other way round. Through using their high offices and powers as forms of private property, the elite are acting as transmission lines between the international capital and their respective nation. To this end, they are stealthily facilitating and perpetuating the maintenance of the status quo characterised by overarching uneven development configuration.

However, because of such unwritten yet grand and systemic elite business fronting, Wakarindwa and Osode (2017) argue indigenisation is achieving little to the highly expectant and highly in needy potential beneficiaries, i.e. the deserving indigenous indigents. The problem of business fronting in extractive industry indigenisation suggests that predation is trickling down from the state to the peripheries. The predatory state (and predatory leadership) in Zimbabwe are producing a predatory society where corruption, in the form of business fronting, is more of an acceptable norm for one to ascend to the top or to get rich.

Commenting on this problem of business fronting, one interviewee submits, "*the worst of all problems is when the disadvantaged peoples, who are set to benefit from this policy, are so credulous and blind to be robbed the wealth that is duly theirs through acting as fronts*" (Interview: SGRR1, 20 June 2018). Having business compradors in place is stifling shared, inclusive and sustainable development while perpetuating the rate of uneven development. This situation is suggestive of having everything changed (i.e. restructuring of capital), yet nothing changed (i.e. although wealth is seemingly exchanging hands, overarching uneven development remains unaddressed). Nonindigenous nationals remain at the commanding heights of the economy, this time around through compradors. Agreeing with this pessimistic view about the progress in Zimbabwe, Gray (2007, p. 151-2) contends that "the whole idea of progress is a paradox, a rocking horse that goes forward and back, forward and back, but stays in the same place, giving only the comforting

illusion of motion." Corroborating with the view of the paradox indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular are creating, Chipika and Malaba (2011, p. 34) caution that:

> Other concerns raised include, the problem of the politicisation of indigenisation, the possibility of ownership 'fronting' by indigenous people in the protection of foreign ownership, expropriation concerns during the transfer of the 51% to the indigenous Zimbabweans and the weak consideration of IEE legislation of the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) and other sectors which the indigenous people are largely involved in.

In the case of the poor indigenous people playing business fronting, findings reveal that this is because the deserving poor indigenous citizens have no capacity to acquire the 51% controlling interest at fair value from nonindigenous businesses. However, this does not mean that they are not conscious that acting as fronts is a sell-out position to the economic indigenisation and empowerment of the country's disadvantaged citizens. Instead, they are finding it worth becoming a comprador and getting something, although small, than to have nothing as a bystander without money to buy the 51% equity from the nonindigenous firms. Findings show that compradors go with the simple logic that 'getting something small out of compradorism is better than getting nothing like a true patriot.' The significant extent to which the state, nation and society had descended into predation is presenting a good infrastructure for business fronting.

The government's failure to adequately finance the implementation of the indigenisation programme has been cited as the main cause of business fronting. Commenting on this analysis, one respondent said:

> *Failure by the government to avail funds to fund the process of implementing the policy, ending up having lots of front people who could just easily be bought by the foreign firms and pretend as if is a local partner while in actual fact he/she has no equity in the company. This was fundamentally because the locals didn't have money to acquire those shares, so opting for co-optation of this sort was at least beneficial for them as they got some money in doing so* (Interview: GDOR2, 03 July 2018).

Drawing comparisons with how the neighbouring South African government is funding its BB-BEE processes, the interviewee continues: "*South Africa was able to fund its own policy. Here the funds were not availed, hence the process became chaotic as many locals were claiming that they are bystanders in the economy of their nation*" (Interview: GDOR2, 03 July 2018).

Furthermore, CSR3, CSR1, AR2 and SGO3, while agreeing with Warikandwa and Osode (2017), suggested that one of the major reasons for the proliferation of business fronting in extractive industry indigenisation is non-performance and under-performance of most of the indigenised firms. For them, such firms under indigenous control, ownership and management are either operating below capacity, scaling down or closing down. Therefore, shareholders are not getting encouraging proceeds out of extractive industry indigenisation. Confronted with such a stark unprofitable reality of having shares in a company yet not accruing dividends, most indigenous people, elite and ordinary alike, opted for the compradorial alternative. This situation is a win-win game between the indigenous and nonindigenous shareholders as the latter would have lost or will lose their shares by disposing of at least 51% of their equity. Also, having contributed nothing to setting up business ventures, indigenous people are finding playing business fronting more profitable and rewarding than becoming an equity holder, which in many instances could not translate into earning dividends. This situation provides good infrastructure for the discontented non-indigenous business owners to constantly search for potential compradors from the pool of potential extractive industry indigenisation beneficiaries. Findings also show that few indigenous fronts receive large sums of money from compradorism, money the government could not offer.

Affirming to the compradorial alternative, one respondent submits that "*Even if I were the one confronted with these two options [i.e. of becoming a front or an equity holder n a nonindigenous firm] I would have chosen becoming a frontman*" (Interview: CSR4, 20 June 2018). The respondent indicated that running a successful business in Zimbabwe, especially when you do not have deep pockets to bankroll the business in the event of a loss, is elusive. In particular, the extractive industry indigenisation is making Zimbabwe an "*anti-business friendly destination to both foreigners and indigenous*" (Interview: SGRR4, 17 July 2018). Thus, hoping to become a businessman in such an environment is an elusive dream for many disadvantaged indigenous citizens. The foregoing narrative of opting for a business fronting alternative prompted one respondent to suggest that Zimbabwean society is fundamentally predatory, transactional and depravity. In the words of the respondent:

> *Their social behaviours are transactional. They are so much inclined to corruption though they publicly renounce it. Their hate for corruption is not for the good of the country. No. It is because they are excluded from the corruption circles. It is an interesting paradox. They hate corruption*

> *when done by others but love it when they do it themselves. You see, their behaviours are fascinatingly corrupt* (Interview: SGRR2, 07 August 2018).

Corroborating with this viewpoint, another respondent submits that the agency of societal members has normalised the abnormal, i.e. corruption. "*The problem is that corruption is now the new normal. It is now the new way of life. People are no longer moralizing it. That is the problem*" (Interview: CSR, 03 August 2018). SGRR4 and SGRR2 further supported this finding by arguing that the intense contestations threading extractive industry indigenisation are not about development or for the betterment of the disadvantaged. Instead, "*It is about joining the bandwagon of looting. The incessant contestations on the programme hinge on whether one is included or excluded in the system. Nothing more nothing less*" (Interview: SGRR2, 07 August 2018). SGRR4 continued, "*There are no people in these fights. People are only used to justify the fights which don't concern them at all*."

In making a case for business fronting, I am not contesting or challenging the integrity of extractive industry indigenisation to address the unequal mining development architecture in the country. Findings show that indigenisation is long overdue, particularly in the extractive industry where international capital plays a decisive role. A sizable number of respondents interviewed and documents reviewed agree on the idea that the government should have embarked on implementing such capital restructuring radical policies just soon after attaining independence. Doing so would have sent serious signals from the outset to international capital intending to invest in Zimbabwe about the government's intention to restructure capital favouring the disadvantaged indigenous people. This reality would have meant that a clear FDI policy should have been set upfront, stating that international investors intending to invest in Zimbabwe should be prepared to indigenise at least 51% of their shareholding.

At the present moment, Zimbabwe does not have a law that outlaws business fronting. This situation may be interpreted to mean that the problem is not a criminal offence, and this could account for its permeating the indigenisation deals. Scholars such as Warikandwa and Osode (2017) consider this a weakness of the indigenisation laws. It appears as if indigenous people are empowered, and the economy indigenised, while the reverse is true on the ground. As such, the status quo of an uneven development configuration is maintained and strengthened.

Findings suggested two recommendations to address business fronting. Non-action or inaction on it would worsen the problem. The first one is strengthening the IEE laws with some anti-business fronting legislation. The second one is enacting a standalone anti-business fronting legislation. A regulatory framework to address the business fronting is one important acid test the government has to pass to prove its sincerity in empowering the disenfranchised indigenous majority through indigenisation. Allowing unchecked compradorism would confirm that the indigenisation policy is not based on empowering disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Instead, it is based on some ulterior motives. According to this study, the ulterior motives are regime survival and elite private accumulation of public resources. Corroborating with this analysis, Taylor (2016 & 2012) and Dawson and Kelsall (2011) agree that the whole indigenisation exercise is a scheme to serve a political purpose. Instead of addressing poverty, inequality and unemployment challenges, as per its founding intent, its implementation has "led to firm closures, displacement of workers, and threats to the economy through sanctions, divestitures and lost investment" (Taylor, 2016, p. 13). Considering this reality, one may argue that addressing uneven development under such an environment where business fronting is tacitly allowed is elusive.

8.1.1 Chinese companies exempted from indigenisation

While all foreign-owned companies with a net worth of at least US$500 000 were required to comply with the indigenisation laws, findings have established that Chinese companies, apart from getting tax incentives and tax breaks, were secretly exempted from indigenisation. One Chinese owned diamond company in Chiadzwa is a good case in point here. In February 2011, the government announced that the company would be exempted from the indigenisation laws (Mining Review Africa, 2011). Another Chinese company exempted from the indigenisation laws is Tian Ze Tobacco (NewsDay, 2011). In a letter dated 4 July 2010 addressed to Tian Ze Tobacco managing director, Shao Yan, the former indigenisation minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, said the following in:

> I refer to the letter submitted to my office on March 8, 2010. Having submitted your proposal, I hereby grant you exemption from full compliance with the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14.33). This exemption has been granted on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding you entered with the Government of Zimbabwe.

Similar findings were also shared by Alao (2014), Chipaike and Bischoff (2019) and Moyo, Nhliziyo and Fayayo (2020). For Chipaike and Bischoff (2019, p. 954), "[t]he Chinese are reported to have been exempted, secretly though, from these stringent requirements of the indigenization law." Corroborating with this finding, Alao (2014, p. 20) states that "there are many complaints over the exemption granted to Chinese mining companies from the community empowerment crusade run by the Indigenisation Minister." While signing the US$700 million loan with former Zimbabwe's Deputy President, Joice Mujuru, in March 2011, the former Chinese Vice Premier, Wang Qishan, hinted that he hoped the Zimbabwean government will the Chinese business interests in the country, i.e. exempting the Chinese companies from indigenisation (Mining Review Africa, 2011). One reason cited for this special treatment of the Chinese businesses is that China has since become the biggest foreign investor in Zimbabwe, with China's Tsingshan invested about US$10 billion in nickel, chrome, coal and iron ore mining businesses (Moyo, Nhliziyo and Fayayo (2020) and US$600 million investment in 2013 alone. Corroborating with this reasoning, African Development Bank Report on Zimbabwe (2018, p. 74) submits that "China has become Zimbabwe's biggest economic partner in Zimbabwe." In 2017 alone, the Chinese investments in Zimbabwe, including joint ventures, amounted to US$292.5 million, with the extractive industry receiving 56% of it (African Development Bank Report on Zimbabwe, 2018). This amount was in addition to more than US$1 billion low-interest loan China gave Zimbabwe between 2010 and 2015, and FDI totalled US$4 billion (i.e. 7% of the country's GDP in 2016) China invested in Zimbabwe between 2016 and 2018 (ibid). This reasoning lends credibility to the argument that indigenisation is more of a sanctions-busting strategy, whose main targets are western companies whose countries imposed international sanctions on Zimbabwe.

8.2 CSOTs as regime survival and accumulation strategies

Findings show that there are essentially two unwritten objectives for extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe. First, generating rents to save the internationally isolated regime from crumbling and collapsing at the weight of indigenisation contradictions, international sanctions, and regime change. Second, personal accumulation for both wealth and power by the political and mining business elites. In this thematic area, I am presenting and discussing the pattern, nature and extent to which the political and business elites have been privately

accumulating wealth and power through extractive industry indigenisation, notably from CSOTs. For this study, the major intent for extractive industry indigenisation accumulation is regime survival, while elite personal accumulation is secondary yet not unimportant. In this section, I am making a case that extractive industry indigenisation has been saving the regime from crumbling and selectively benefiting mostly the political and business elites and their families and associates.

Findings show that contrary to popular beliefs, the Community Share Ownership Trust (CSOT) agreements entered between the government and nonindigenous mining firms are neither for indigenisation of the economy nor empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Rather, the two are premised on regime survival purposes to guard against threatening regime change forces. According to Warikandwa and Osode (2017), some of the CSOT agreements which are made apparent are either ignored or not fulfilled, resulting in many commissioned and launched CSOTs not surviving beyond their launch. In many instances where these agreements were made public, especially at the launch and commissioning of these CSOTs when the President, Minister responsible for indigenisation and CEO of the nonindigenous mining company could be seen flanked on a photo displaying a cheque, the mining company could be instructed by the minister to provide a dummy cheque. The dummy cheque would serve as proof that the money will be or has already been deposited into the CSOTs' bank accounts. Nonetheless, findings have demonstrated that this was done in the full knowledge that the money was not even deposited into the bank account of the CSOT, and it will never be deposited.

Commenting on the issue of dummy cheque from a political settlements perspective, a local think tank that has been conducting indigenisation surveys since the beginning of its implementation in 2010 until now, the Research Advocacy Unit (2014, p. 6), reports that: "The companies were also required to generate dummy cheques of varying amounts, but usually in the tens of millions, to be presented to his Excellency the President on the happy day." However, "[t]he dummy cheques appeared to be precisely that" (Matsyzak, 2014, p. 10) as they "were never honoured" (Matsyzak, 2017, p. 11). Political settlements- or elite pacts- are agreements that result in a state governed by political and administrative frameworks, both formal and informal, that advance, maintain and protect the interests of the elites (Di John & Putzel, 2009; Khan, 2018, 2010 & 1995). This situation is achieved through the elites agreeing on ways of distributing, exercising, administering and transferring political and economic power. This is how delicate and complex

the extractive industry indigenisation's accumulation by dispossession processes are, the acts of concentrating wealth in the hands of the few through dispossessing others (Harvey, 2003). However, this is done in such a deceiving way that it appears as if local communities are being empowered. Findings reveal that nonindigenous mining companies are bankrolling the CSOTs launches. Failure to do so "the letters maintained, would render the company in violation of the indigenisation laws – though of course no provisions were cited to back up the threat, as none existed" (Matsyzak, 2014, p. 6).

Articulating the complex nature of extractive industry indigenisation accumulation by dispossession processes in Zimbabwe from a neopatrimonialism school, the processes can be interpreted to mean the inherent accumulative distinctiveness of the authoritarian and rentier-state. According to the protagonist of accumulation by dispossession theory, Harvey (2003), the theory is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. Thus, this study argues that non-indigenous mining firms' behaviour to finance CSOT launches reflects the entrenchment and ubiquity of neopatrimonialism and predation in the country, rather than the companies' cultural inclinations towards being unscrupulous. Agreeing with this viewpoint of neopatrimonialism, Mkandawire (2015, p. 582) contends that, "The neopatrimonial African state is too anaemic to spread wealth around."

One often-cited case for dummy cheques involves dishonesty deals around the Marange-Zimunya CSOT. For example, according to Warikandwa and Osode (2017), the former Minister of State for Provincial Affairs for Manicaland province, through a signed letter, instructed one of the seven diamond mining companies operating in Chiadzwa to deposit the money meant for the seed capital of the CSOT into a named personal bank account. Documents reviewed corroborated this. One of them is the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016). However, when questioned by the Portfolio Parliamentary Committee on Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, the minister denied the knowledge of such a letter that bears his signature. When the letter with his signature was presented to him, Warikanddwa and Osode (2017, p. 15) reveal, "the same Minister then argued that he could not remember that he had once written such a letter." On this, Khan (2018) argues that the political settlements framework helps us understand how political power is exercised, distributed, transferred, and administered. In this case, this

understanding is critical to discerning the economic and political outcomes of the indigenisation institutions and policies.

Another case illustrating the complex extractive industry indigenisation accumulation by dispossession processes is the one reported by the findings of the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016). The findings of the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report show that the government instructed five diamond mining companies doing business in Chiadzwa to publicly pledge US$10 million each to the Marange-Zimunya CSOT. This makes the pledged amount a total of $US50 million. Nonetheless, of the pledged US$50 million pledged amount, the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016) establishes, only $US400 000 (i.e. 12.5%) was honoured, and the rest (i.e. US$49 600 000 or 87.5%) is yet to be settled to this day. "Out of this figure [i.e. the honoured US$400,000], Mutare RDC in agreement with the communities allocated each ward $5,000 and would go on to agree with their councillor on how to use this money" (Development Governance Institute, 2015, p. 28).

However, what is more worrisome is that on the day of the launch and commissioning of the CSOT, the nonindigenous diamond companies displayed a $US1.5 million cheque, with the former president, the late Robert Mugabe, flanked on a picture holding it with the companies' top executives and the minister responsible for the indigenisation. It is also important to note that of the honoured $US400 000, $US200 000 came from Marange Resources while the other $US200 000 from Mbada Diamonds. This reality means that the other five (i.e. Anjin Investments, Diamond Mining Company, Jinan Investment Private Limited and Rera Diamonds) did not honour anything out of their pledged US$10 million each.

The failure by mining companies to honour their promises is even though pledges and displaying of the cheques were done in the presence of the President, ministers in charge of mines and indigenisation, and many other high ranked government officials. In light of this, this study argues that the government is playing both facilitatory and active roles in extractive industry indigenisation accumulation by dispossession processes. These are about centralising and concentrating wealth in the hands of the few through dispossessing others (Harvey, 2003). Articulating on these roles of the state in accumulation processes while commenting on Zimbabwe's political economy of transition, Mandaza (1986, p. 57) argues that the "state ... appeared the most viable agency for such accumulation." This is resulting in neither

empowerment of the disenfranchised indigenous citizens nor indigenisation of the economy. Following on from this realisation, one may argue that doing so strengthening and maintaining the uneven mining development architecture in the country. This situation reflects the prominence of largely unwritten major intents of indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular in ways pitting the set objectives of empowering the poor indigenous citizens through indigenisation. These findings resonate well with the thesis of this study that indigenisation, notably in the mining sector, was employed as a primitive accumulation tool for two purposes. First, regime survival from threatening regime change forces emanating from both within and without. Second, private accumulation of both power and public resources by political and business elites, whom van de Walle (2007) calls an elite clientele in whose hands the accumulated wealth is concentrated.

The documents reviewed (e.g. the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report, 2016) show that some of these companies which publicly pledged US$10 million each later expressed ignorance of such pledges when queried by the parliamentary portfolio committee in charge of the indigenisation. For example, Anjin Investments, which the former president Robert Mugabe's top Private Secretary, Lawrence Kamwi, said "was foisted on Mugabe by Mnangagwa" (Shumba, 2019, para. 2), is one of those companies cited by the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report (2016) that expressed ignorance of what it had pledged as seed capital to the CSOT. This reality leads us to this important question whose answer is yet to be established: Why does the government allow diamond companies to do pledges that it knows from the onset that they will not get fulfilled? Commenting on this, The the Parliament of Zimbabwe 2016Report submits that the former minister responsible for the indigenisation then, Saviour Kasukuwere, accused these mining companies of "dishonesty" (the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report, 2016, p. 8). Confronted with such a complex and stark reality, establishing the truth between the former minister's position and the companies' position is elusive. The collision between the government and diamond companies is the one causing these confusions. Therefore, this study argues that the confusions of this stark reality are causing neither empowerment nor indigenisation. Instead, the confusion perpetuates (and strengthens) the uneven mining development configuration in the country.

On a similar turn of events, findings show that the diamond companies in Mashonaland East, which publicly presented cheques to the president and the indigenisation minister during the

officiating ceremonies of the CSOTs, "not only abjured the 50 million dollar cheque which had been presented to President Mugabe, they claimed that they had neither heard of the recipient CSOT nor been approached on the matter" (Research Advocacy Unit, 2014, p. 10). Considering this reality, it is instructive to take note of two important things here. First, pledges were not backed by a legal instrument; hence they are voluntary, rather than compulsory, gestures of goodwill offered by the nonindigenous local mining companies to the communities they are doing business in (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015).

The possible explanation for defaulting on the pledges is that honouring them is not an *ultra vires* act. Neither honouring the pledges is an *intra vires* act too. There is no legal basis for compelling foreign-owned mining companies to fulfil their pledges. In the case of the never-functional CSOTs in Mudzi and Mutoko districts, the qualifying companies such as Zimbabwe International Quarries, Natural Stone Export Company, Southern Granite, and others did not either contribute towards seed capital or honour their pledges. They contended that pledges are "not legally enforceable" (First Report of the Thematic Committee on Indigenisation and Empowerment on the Circumstances Surrounding the Non-Establishment of the Community Share Ownership Trusts in Mudzi and Mutoko Districts, 2017, p. 9). These confusions are hitting hard on the country's impoverished indigenous citizens as they are creating a situation that neither empowers them nor indigenises the economy.

Second, the amount of the pledges or the seed capitals is not a cast in stone amount. Instead, it is determined by the business's willingness and capacity concerned to pay it out (ibid). Therefore, the failure to honour the pledges may be interpreted to mean either incapacity or unwillingness (or both) of the businesses concerned, thereby not amounting a contravention with the law. Reviewed documents (e.g. the Parliament of Zimbabwe Report of 2017 about circumstances surrounding the non-establishment of the CSOTs in Mudzi and Mutoko Districts) show that operational challenges are cited as major impediments for the nonindigenous local mining companies not honouring their pledges.

The argument here is that not all the CSOTs received their pledges in full. Very few received, and many did not. For Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015, p. 6), "Only those with operating and compliant companies exploiting their natural resources have received seed capital." Also, after

pledging, the mining companies could choose to be unwilling or declare that it is no longer capable of honouring the pledge, and no one and nothing has the power to compel them to act otherwise.

In the case of the Umguza CSOT, as reported by the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015), four qualifying companies made the following pledges and payments. Firstly, Blanket Gold Mine pledged US$1 million, and the gold mine honoured the whole pledge. In addition to that, the gold mine paid an advance dividend loan of US$4 million to the CSOT. Secondly, Jessi Mine pledged US$500 000 and only paid half that amount. Thirdly, Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC) pledged US$1.5 million and paid US$1.4 million, "the remaining US$100 000.00 was being held by the company pending subscription agreement certificate from the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board" (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015, p. 7). Lastly, Farvic Mine pledged US$180 000 and honoured only US$30 000. The Thematic Report recorded that Vumbachikwe Mine, one of the nonindigenous mining firms operating in the area, did not pledge or pay anything to the CSOT as it is not complying with the indigenisation laws.

Findings report that the CSOT conducts a needs assessment exercise in all the 19 wards in the Umguza district to establish people's needs in each ward. Water challenge stands out as the main need as the district is located in ecological region six where rainfall is unreliable. To resolve this problem, the CSOT, through using the US$1.4 million honoured pledge, bought a borehole drilling machine in 2013. Between 2014 and 2016, the CSOT drilled and sunk more than 250 boreholes across the district. Findings report that the CSOT is one of the few getting dividends from the qualifying companies operating in its jurisdiction. As 70% of the machine was commercialised, with 30% catering for community needs, by the end of 2016, through the drilling boreholes for commercial purposes, the CSOT managed to generate money almost equivalent to the buying price of the machine. This enterprise development initiative is critical for sustainability purposes as most of the money the CSOT is getting are donations from the qualifying companies. The Bubi CSOT also bought trucks and compressor machines as part of its enterprise development initiative to generate money by hiring them to the artisanal gold miners in the area. Findings report too that the CSOT has a butchery in the area whose most of the meat comes from the COST's cattle fattening project.

In the case of Bikita CSOT, the Bikita Minerals pledged US$1 million and only honoured half that amount, while Bayrich Mine/Naan-Jiang African Resources and the Conservancy chose to be non-

compliant with the indigenisation laws (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015). In the case of the Umguza CSOT, the PPC pledged US$1.5 million and honoured US$1 399 700 as of April 2014. The remaining US$100 000 is to be paid off once the subscription agreement documents are finalised. In the case of Zvishavane CSOT, Mimosa Mining Company, a jointly owned platinum company by Impala Platinum and Sibanye-Stillwater on 50:50 shareholding, pledged US$5 million and paid US$6 million, with one million as seed capital (National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board, 2014). Murowa Diamonds pledged US$500 000 to the Zvishavane CSOT and paid US$300 000 to the CSOT.

With regards to the Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe CSOT, Lafarge Cement Zimbabwe pledged US$1 million, and the agreement is that the cement company should pay the pledge in three instalments of US$333 000. However, by April 2014, the cement company had disbursed only US$326 000. Other local non-indigenous mining firms doing business in the area did not even pledge or advance seed capitals to the CSOT. These companies are Gold Mines, Rocklink, Natural Stone, Ground Rock Gold Mining, Mining, Sulleage, Black Granite and Light Weight Gold. Findings are not ambivalent on the fact that of the 61 CSOTs commissioned and launched, only CSOT was able to acquire the required 10% equity and controlling interest threshold in the nonindigenous mining companies doing business in its jurisdiction (ibid). This 10% was received on top of the seed capital the CSOT had received from the qualifying companies and having one member sitting on the boards of the companies.

Further, findings from The Frameworks, Procedures and Guidelines for Implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14: 33) of 2016 show that by March 2014, many of the established CSOTs were fundamentally failing to cater for the socio-economic needs of the youths. The law provided that CSOTs should play a critical role in addressing the youths' challenges, mainly providing them with much-needed jobs. The Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015, p. 8) reports that only the Zvishavane CSOT "was proactive in ensuring that youth in the local communities of Zvishavane were employed." This reality is even though Circular No. 1 of 2013, circulated by the ministry responsible for the indigenisation, had set 10% of the CSOT budget as the minimum to be allocated for youth's socio-economic needs in the local communities. The Parliament of Zimbabwe further reveals that two CSOTs, i.e. Bindura CSOT and Gwanda CSOT, are complying with the Circular's requirement. The two allotted US$100

000 and US$250 000, respectively, towards the socio-economic needs of the youths in their respective local communities. Following on from this reasoning, one may argue that the remaining 59 CSOTs throughout the country either chose the non-compliant route or failed to comply.

In the light of the above analysis of CSOTs not achieving their economic development goals, it can be suggested that extractive industry indigenisation is underfunded while the money generated through it is either embezzled, misappropriated or vanished in the thin air of political corruption. This reality further widens and deepens the uneven mining development architecture between the nonindigenous and the political and business elite, on the one hand, and those on the social margins of the social strata, on the other, with women, the disabled and the youth bearing the brunt.

Following on from this analysis, this study suggests that the behind-the-scenes talks between the local non-indigenous mining companies and the government are neither for the indigenisation, empowerment, nor development of the mining communities. Instead, findings show that they are for the achievement of two important purposes: elite private accumulation of public wealth and power retention. All these are saving the regime from crumbling at the weight of its contradictions, aided by regime change forces and international isolation. Corroborating with this analysis, Mlambo (2013, para. 5) argues that the whole idea of CSOTs is "just a disguise for legalised racketeering by ZANU-PF-connected political and business elites." Mlambo (2013, para. 6) continues, "Allegations of patronage, nepotism and corruption surrounding indigenisation deals, as well as lack of visible development projects in targeted communities reinforce claims the process is more about elections and self-aggrandisement by ZANU-PF officials than genuine empowerment." Documents reviewed, notably Parliamentary Reports on extractive industry indigenisation, reported that the non-indigenous mining companies are making huge profits yet defaulting on their pledges. Commenting on these acts of political corruption as a result of the collusion between the government and international capital, the following submissions of one of the respondents is illustrative:

> *this is how corrupt government officials make large sums of personal money. They create a confusing environment where you cannot blame them for their wrongdoings but in actual fact, they are the ones created it as a way of getting away with the money. The government is fully conscious of what is happening… It is complicit in the act.* (Interview: AR2, 23 June 2018).

Corroborating the preceding viewpoint of the government colliding with the international mining capital, Matyszak (2014, p. 5) contends that "With abundant opportunities for corruption, nepotism, and patronage in the manner the system (some might say deliberately) had been structured, ZANU-PF was susceptible to the criticism, exploited by its opponents, that indigenisation would only benefit the ZANU-PF elite." Tony Hawkins, a respected analyst of Zimbabwe's economic issues, corroborated this viewpoint by cautioning that:

> If the indigenisation is to be tackled through the medium of reserved lists, through soft loan windows for emergent businesses, especially those with the right political credentials and by distorting the operations of the money and capital markets, it would succeed only in creating a feeble aid-reliant economy (The Herald, 1994 as cited in Wild, 1997, p. 279).

Similarly, Mlambo (2013, para. 10), while commenting about the entrenchment of political corruption within extractive industry indigenisation, but with specific reference to CSOTs, submits that "This is a campaign gimmick meant to win votes for the beleaguered ZANU-PF party. The whole idea is like putting lipstick on a pig, something which does not change anything."

Furthermore, findings show that there have been collusions between local foreign mining companies and the indigenisation ministry, particularly on extractive industry indigenisation issues. The collusion is working in favour of both parties but in disfavour of the potential beneficiaries of indigenisation, i.e. the country's disadvantaged indigenous citizens. For example, when the minister in charge of the policy issued the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2011 (General Notice 114 of 2011), the media, particularly the non-state-owned and controlled ones, reported that many nonindigenous companies did not comply with the requirements of the law of having their indigenisation implementation plans approved by the minister in not less than six months. The Parliament of Zimbabwe (2015) reports that by 2014 the ministry's implementing arm, the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB), had processed the submitted 464 indigenisation plans from nonindigenous local mining companies.

Findings show that while non-indigenous mining companies report that they have complied with the law, the ministry responsible for the indigenisation became complicit in the charade, reporting that they have received the companies' compliance particulars. However, evidence from the findings suggests the contrary. Commenting on this collusion from a neopatrimonialism standpoint, Matyszak (2014, p. 7-8) submits that "A symbiotic relationship developed between

the Ministry and companies, whereby the Ministry claimed to have compelled companies to indigenise, and companies claimed to have been so compelled." Corroborating with this, Matyszak (2017, p. 10) contends that "…government pretended to indigenise companies and companies pretended to be indigenised." This presented strategic contradictions.

On the one hand, we had nonindigenous mining companies, which were neither compelled nor complied with the indigenisation regulations, claiming that they were compelled to indigenise, and they had complied. On the other hand, we had the Ministry, the issuer of the indigenisation regulations, reporting that the non-indigenous mining companies complied with laws to indigenise after the ministry compelled them to do so. This thesis argues that the collusion between the government and nonindigenous mining companies was to give a false impression that:

> ZANU-PF was winning the battle against international capital in defence of rights of Zimbabweans to economic empowerment – the fact was that the only compliance demanded of foreign companies contained in the Regulations was the submission of 'indigenisation plans' for ministry approval (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018, p. 291).

What is more surprising is that the ministry issued regulations that it knew from the onset that would never be complied with by non-indigenous mining companies.

Nonetheless, findings are not ambiguous that some non-indigenous mining companies preferred not to comply with the indigenisation regulations that requested them to submit their indigenisation implementation plans. The reasons for this are worth noting here. First, the regulations did not provide punishment for noncompliance; hence the penalty for noncompliance was deemed non-existent and illegal if it would be applied. Second, it was difficult for the companies to submit the plans in the prescribed period before consulting and consenting with the shareholders. Third, some non-indigenous companies considered the indigenisation regulations to be "unimplementable" (Matyszak, 2017, p. 10) due to either or both of the two reasons given above.

This reasoning would imply that there was arguably a tacit motive behind the issuance of these regulations. Findings suggest that the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2011 (General Notice 114 of 2011), are more of a financing strategy for ZANU-PF election campaigns and less on indigenisation and empowerment. Following on from this finding, one may argue that the regulations are not meant to compel nonindigenous mining companies to

comply with indigenisation laws. Rather, regulations are for the political and business elites' unwritten accumulation objectives whose motive is to save the regime from crumbling at the weight of its mostly indigenisation contradictions. These contradictions manifest themselves in two ways: international isolation and regime change forces, both at home and abroad. However, arguing that the extractive industry indigenisation regulations are never implemented or unimplementable would be a misrepresentation of facts. They were implemented but not fully or successfully. Taylor (2016, p. 12) prefers to say they were "incompletely implemented."

However, the foregoing findings do not go uncriticised. Other findings show that the extractive industry indigenisation regulations were meant to compel the impressionable foreign mining firms to comply. According to this viewpoint, doing so would allow ZANU-PF to raise money to finance its campaigns for the impending 2013 general elections. The evidence supporting this view is worth considering here. Findings show that the compliance application envelopes of those few nonindigenous mining companies complied with the regulations gathered dust in the shelves of the disbanded Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (SGOR2, SGOR4, SGRR1, Research Advocacy Unit, 2014). Further, the impulsive with which the indigenisation programme was implemented, notably in the extractive industry, after the 2013 elections may be interpreted to mean that the policy has nothing to do with addressing the national questions about the uneven distribution of wealth. Instead, it may have ulterior motives such as elite preservation, elite private accumulation and regime survival agendas.

However, the indigenisation ministry went on to present those local foreign mining companies that had only submitted their indigenisation implementation plans as fully indigenised companies. On this, this study argues that doing so was predictable and unsurprising. Findings from GDOR3, GDOR1, CSR2 and SGRR2 show that what nonindigenous mining firms had done was just submitting their indigenisation implementation plans to the ministry, outlining how and when they intend to indigenise. It is imperative to note that later on, the lauded successful indigenisation deals the government had reported to have stroke with local non-indigenous mining companies were a charade. However, extractive industry indigenisation's unwritten accumulation by dispossession objectives have been achieved since 2010 when its implementation began. Following on from this reasoning, this study argues that the deals are proving to be less empowering to the disadvantaged indigenous people or indigenising the mining sector. These objectives are achieved

through centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few (Harvey, 2003).

The collusion between the government and local non-indigenous mining companies deliberately saves the regime from collapsing by rewarding the regime rescuers and enablers, notably the security forces. This study arrived at this conclusion by establishing that largely the political and indigenous business elites are indiscriminately benefiting from these extractive industry indigenisation deals. This reality is despite the fact that the less encouraging survey findings by Afrobarometer (2011) about indigenisation showed that about 55% of the respondents disapproved it on account of it benefiting the political and business elites, 26% on account of its corruption-ridden, and 10% on it being ill-timed while 41% approved the policy as a long-overdue emancipatory policy intervention.

To further illustrate this point of collusion between the ministry responsible for indigenisation and the local non-indigenous mining firms, I find it instructive to detour into the indigenisation accumulation by dispossession processes taking place within the country's financial services sector. However, this sector is not the crux of this study yet illustrative for government-business collusion under the guise of indigenisation. One case often cited in the financial services sector involves how the indigenisation ministry accepted the indigenisation plan of Old Mutual. Findings show that the illegal basis upon which the ministry accepted the asset management company's indigenisation implementation plan. Commenting on the matter, Matyszak (2014, p. 8) reveals that the "Old Mutual's indigenisation plan was accepted on the strength of a $10 million 'Youth Empowerment Fund' to be disbursed by its subsidiary, building society CABS, in conjunction with the Ministry, as small project loans to "deserving" youths." The Matyszak (2014, p. 8) continues: "The proposals as to how 51% of Old Mutual's millions of shares were to vest in indigenous Zimbabweans as the Ministry claimed was required, were left obscure and questions in this regard were responded to by vague generalities."

Corroborating with this, Chawafambira (2014) reveals that Old Mutual's US$10 million towards Youth Empowerment Fund, known colloquially as *Kurera-Ukondla Youth Empowerment Fund*, whose trails are unknown to this day (SGRR3), was considered part of its 51% contribution towards the country's indigenisation programme. This situation is against the background that it was unlawful for foreign companies to use monetary resources to acquire part of the 51%

shareholding and controlling interests they were required to indigenise. The deal did not talk about how the company's shareholding structure would be restructured to accommodate the deserving indigenous citizens into the ownership structure. "*It remained, until now, a secret between the government and Old Mutual*" (Interview: SGRR4, 17 July 2018). However, given the entrenchment of corruption in the government, people are left without choice than to speculate that the money was privately pocketed by the ruling party, party officials, and their associates in government. Following on from this reasoning, this study argues that the rejection or acceptance of the indigenisation implementation plans by the ministry was no longer based on the strength of their merits. Instead, the minister responsible for the indigenisation is accepting and rejecting them based on "***who***" rather than "***what***" is proposed in the indigenisation plan" (Matyszak, 2011, p. 5).

To further illuminate ZANU-PF's, rather than the government's, invisible hand in the Old Mutual indigenisation deals, it is important to note that the ruling party even prided itself as the one that supported the creation of the Youth Empowerment Fund. The fund's sole purpose is to empower the disadvantaged youths and women whose projects are innovative and could contribute to the country's economic development efforts (ZANU-PF Manifesto, 2013). "The Fund, run through CABS approved US$6 million out of which US$4,901,788 has been disbursed to support 3,477 youth projects which have created 10,431 jobs at the rate of 3 jobs per project across the country", the ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013, p. 75) reports. The youth fund was coupled with the Stanbic Wealth Creation Fund that allocated US$5,648,000 to 254 youths and created 1270 jobs, with one project creating at least five jobs at the national level (ZANU-PF Manifest, 2013). In the same vein, CBZ had also disbursed US$745,900 to 534 youths and created 1068 jobs, with one project creating at least two jobs (ibid).

Further to that, similar projects were promised to follow once ZANU-PF won the 2013 polls, which it did. However, findings generally reveal that rarely projects of this kind were witnessed post-2013 general elections. In total, the Youth Empowerment Fund was valued at US$10.5 million and was reported to have created 8,691 jobs (ZANU-PF Manifesto, 2013). However, findings show allegations of cronyism, clientelism and predation in the disbursement of these youth funds. Against this background, this study argues that the collusion indigenisation deals between the government and Old Mutual demonstrate a tip of the iceberg of the grand and

systemic corruption that pervades the entire indigenisation process. What is more worrisome is that mostly those loyal to the ruling party, notably those youths and women closely related to the political elites, are the ones writing winning business proposals. This reality is despite the fact that ZANU-PF, through its 2013 election manifesto, denied rumours to the effect that only a few well-connected youths benefited from the youth fund. The fund, according to ZANU-PF, is broad-based and crosscutting.

Findings show that the history, parentage, marriage, and relational background of these fund's potential beneficiaries influence and determine their suitability to be allotted or denied the funds, not the credibility of their business proposals. Commenting on this analysis, Matyszak (2017, p. 11) argues that: "Although billed as a rotating fund, the money was disbursed with a nod and a wink, with no checks on the addresses of the applicants or the viability of the proposed projects." Corroborating with this viewpoint, Matyszak (2014, p. 10) submits that the "deserving" 4000 youths benefited from the fund. It is important to note that amongst the deserving, some are more deserving than others, those whose political correctness is more correct than that of others. Findings reveal that some got freebies, notably those from the Matabeleland provinces and opposition parties, while others are receiving large chunks of money, notably those connected to the political and business elites.

However, findings show a high rate of defaulting among those who took the loan. According to Chawafambira (2014), 72% of the loan recipients defaulted. Many of the defaulters are those who got the lion's share of the loan, i.e. those strategically located politically and business-wise. One frequently cited case of the defaulters involves the young brother of the former indigenisation minister, Tongai Kasukuwere. Kasukuwere was mentioned in various reviewed documents and interviewed respondents as the owner of the company named Rashfin Investments that borrowed $US5000 from the Youth Fund and defaulted. When contacted to comment about the non-repayment of the loan borrowed by his brother, the former indigenisation minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, is reported to have said: "I have got nothing to do with Rashfin. Do you think I can borrow such a paltry amount and fail to service it? My friend, you are free to visit my farm to see if it is not performing well" (Chawafambira, 2014, para. 17). Furthermore, findings show that the youth fund was established as an election strategy to lure the demographic dividend of the youth population to vote for the ruling ZANU-PF.

The case of Zimplats Holdings provided yet another case of collusion between the government and international capital working in favour of both parties but in disfavour of the deserving disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Zimplats Holdings' defiance to comply with the indigenisation laws was received with criticisms from the ruling ZANU-PF, state-controlled media and government at large. However, in 2012, the indigenisation ministry claimed that the giant platinum company had finally agreed to indigenise. The ministry reported that the giant platinum company has agreed to dispose of 10% of its equity to the Employee Share Ownership Trust, 10% to the MNCZ CSOT and the remaining 31% to the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF) (Mataranyika, 2012). The CSOT was to get US$10 million as seed capital on top of the 10% equity, whose "dummy cheque" (Research Advocacy Unit, 2014, p. 8) the former president, while flanked with former indigenisation minister and Zimplats Holdings CEO, was pictured receiving. As a way of further ratifying the deal, the CEO of Zimplats Holdings, David Brown, was quoted saying, "it was pleasing to be able to submit a plan that complies with the legislation" (Mataranyika, 2012, para. 3). However, in 2015, the collusion deal was later repudiated *in totto.* This is probably because after the conclusion of the collusion deal between the giant platinum company and government, the former indigenisation minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, is reported to have remarked that: "There is no deadline on when the finer details of the transaction will be worked out" (Mataranyika, 2012, para. 6).

At this stage, nonetheless, it is worth describing the structure of the Zimplats Holdings indigenisation implementation deal. This is critical to ascertain whether or not it was actionable, pro-economic, indigenisation o the economy, empowerment of the disenfranchised indigenous citizens, and corruption-free. Also, to determine whether it was not concluded in a way that would allow private appropriation of public wealth by the political and business elite. Findings from the reviewed documents show that Zimplats Holdings' indigenisation implementation deal was a win-win compromise between the Zimbabwean political elite and the platinum conglomerate. At the same time, the deal further pushed the lives of deserving disadvantaged indigenous citizens into society's margins. For Hawkins (2013), Chawafambira (2014) and Odendaal (2013), the 2012 Zimplats Holdings collusion indigenisation implementation deal was to be implemented through a US$971 million transaction to be paid by the giant platinum company to the two designated entities: the ESOT and the MNCZ CSOT. The transaction was

to be facilitated by a vendor financing facility with an interest rate of 10% per annum, "repayable from 85% of the dividends of the indigenisation shares" (Odendaal, 2013, p. 6) "declared by the company" (Hawkins, 2013, para. 2).

Considering the above analysis, it is crucial, however, to note that the US$971 million represented 9% of the country's GDP then and it was an additive to the US$12.5 billion offshore sovereign debt, with which more than half was on arrears (Hawkins, 2013; Matyszak, 2012; Jamasmie, 2013). As Zimplats Holdings is 90% owned offshore, this created a problematic situation to the country's already debt trap condition. The company had collateralised its shares against the indigenous debt. While commenting on the collusion deal, Matyszak (2014, p. 8) contends that: "The shares to be acquired by the CSOT and ESOT would be paid for by an interest-bearing loan serviced by dividends accruing from the shares themselves." This reality is despite the fact that doing so violated the rule that a company ought not to bankroll the purchase of the shares from itself. Therefore, this study argues that indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular is neither for the indigenisation of the economy nor the empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Instead, it is for some ulterior motives, which one could argue are regime survival, power retention agenda, and private accumulation of public resources.

The political economy explanation for the ulterior motive viewpoint may lie, partly, on the predatory state leadership's unwillingness to hand over power after losing elections. Further, it also lies, partly, on the government's reluctance to create a successful and sustainable indigenous bourgeoisie class that they regard as having the capacity to "pose a potential political threat to their regimes" (Tangri, 1998, p. 110). Nonetheless, this situation is allowing the neopatrimonial state to reproduce itself in many ways. Preventing the emergence of a strong indigenous bourgeoisie class simultaneously thwarts regime change, facilitates elite personal accumulation and preserves both the elite and the regime. In many countries, the indigenous capital elite has the power and potential to disturb the status quo as they are also entitled to rule the country, hence the justification to nip it in the bud.

When considering that Zimplats Holdings in 2012 was undertaking massive and costly expansionary projects (e.g. the company's Phase 2 expansion project), it meant that the giant platinum company was going to take some years before declaring dividends to the shareholders.

The expansionary projects would have had two negative implications on the potential beneficiaries of extractive industry indigenisation and two positive implications on the giant platinum company. Firstly, the longer it would take to realise dividends meant that the US$971 million would not be availed to the two designated entities, as the deal was based on vendor financing through the dividends accruing from the shares. Secondly, the 10% loan interest rate would favour the giant platinum company and disfavour the potential beneficiaries as due to the longevity of time it would take for the company to declare dividends, the loan would be increasing without tangible benefits potential beneficiaries would have received. Matyszak (2014) establishes that if the pattern at which Zimplats Holdings was declaring its dividends continued unchanged, as shown by the company's market capitalisation and balance sheet, it would take many decades for the deal to be finally paid up. This would have negatively impacted the disadvantaged indigenous potential beneficiaries who are impatient about benefiting from indigenisation.

Conversely, the giant platinum company was going to make a good profit out of that. Commenting on this reasoning, one academic respondent remarks that: "*The implementation of policies as this one had descended us into a primitive state where there is reckless indulgence in huge crude accumulation but without investment. That is why the economy halved between the period 2000 and 2008*" (Interview: AR3, 13 September 2018). For Fanon (1961, p. 151) the economy is evolving into what he refers to as the "artisan economy."

Furthermore, it is imperative at this stage to note that the 31% stake for the NIEEF was to be paid by the government, at a cost ranging between half a billion and $US1 billion. Commenting on the ½ a billion to US$1 billion cost the Matyszak (2014, p. 8) asserts that "an amount that the government could not even come close to raising", considering the country's red ink status since 2000. Corroborating with this reasoning, Hawkins (2013) asserts that assuming that the government was going to pay that amount of money, considering how financially distressed it was then, would be an act of defying both logic and common sense. It was apparent from the beginning that the financially distressed government was not going to honour this deal. The only viable alternative available for it was to convert mineral rights into shares. Through the NIEEB, the government was going to claim sovereign rights, which it did at a later stage, over its custodianship, ownership and stewardship of the mineral rights in the country. Doing so would radically restructure the platinum company's ownership structure, but the platinum company was

not going to accept the deal. However, the way the government intended to purchase 31% equity from Zimplats Holdings got its fair share of criticisms. It was broadly viewed as a direct antithesis to indigenisation's founding ethos, i.e. buying back foreign wealth in the country that was supposed to be indigenised.

In addition to the US$971 million, there was yet another US$500 million the government needed to pay to the giant platinum company to secure the real value of the stake, the money that covers the essentials of the real value. US$150 million was for the mining claims Zimplats Holdings gave to the government in exchange for the empowerment credits, and US$350 million Zimplats Holdings represented in market capitalisation. However, findings show that the financially stricken and corruption-ridden government was not anywhere close to raising that amount. This is despite NIEEB's continued stance that the government was prepared to buy the equity from the giant platinum company. Therefore, it follows that the government went on breaching the deal by converting the sovereign mineral rights into shares, claiming that platinum is for the Zimbabweans; thus, no money has to be paid for indigenisation purposes. In agreement with this, ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013, p. 35) has this to say: "Consequently, there is a need to review, tighten and strengthen the law to, among other things, clarify the fact that indigenous Zimbabweans cannot be expected or required to buy back their God-given natural or economic resources."

Nevertheless, findings show that one contributing factor to the fallout of the collusion deal is the government's inability to pay the agreed amount. Predictably, the government went on to appropriate the vast land of mining claims from Zimplats Holdings. This situation is notwithstanding that the same government had initially agreed to purchase the land from the giant platinum company during the indigenisation deal negotiations. All this was done under the pretext of doing something within the confines of the public interest and public good.

Following Zimplats Holdings' agreement to indigenise, the government encouraged other local non-indigenous mining businesses to borrow a leaf from Zimplats Holdings' book (Matyszak, 2014). However, it is crucial to note that Zimplats Holdings' agreement to indigenise was not done above board, and, more importantly, it was an outcome of the collusion between the government and the platinum company. The deal was concluded in a sophisticated manner that the giant platinum company would never dispose of any of its equity to the disadvantaged

indigenous citizens. This reality is despite the fact that the indigenisation ministry, government at large, ZANU-PF, state-controlled media and even former president, the late Robert Mugabe, were openly declaring that the government managed to pin down the platinum conglomerate and finally came to terms with the indigenisation laws.

Considering that Zimplats Holdings, Unki mine and Mimosa mine are subsidiaries of Impala Platinum in Zimbabwe, findings show that Unki and Mimosa mines took a leaf out of Zimplats Holdings' collusion indigenisation implementation deal book and make a good copy for themselves. Corroborating with the notion that all these collusion deals were for regime survival, power retention and private accumulation of public resources intents and purposes, while commenting about the launch of the Mashonaland East CSOTs, the Director of the Zimbabwe Institute for Democracy contends that:

> …the programme is a vehicle for electioneering and plunder by ZANU-PF. The whole programme is an opportunity for electioneering and selected political elites to continue looting resources in the name of indigenisation. We have not yet heard a convincing testimony on the benefits of these schemes. All we hear are scandals unfolding and this is proof that the programme is designed to benefit a few individuals (Mlambo, 2013, para. 11-12).

In the case of Zvishavane CSOT of Mimosa mine, findings show that the local government minister then, Ignatius Chombo, had, in 2012, instructed five local chiefs, namely Mazvihwa, Masunda, Mapanzure, Wedza and Mafala, to withdraw US$2 million from the CSOT's account and share among themselves. It was reported by Mlambo (2013) that the five chiefs allotted themselves between US$200,000 and US$250,000 each. In addition, they allocated themselves $US5,000 each for sitting allowances for the convened meeting to share the US$2 million. Upon hearing these developments, chiefs of the Tongogara CSOT of Unki Mine in Shurugwi tried to borrow a page from the book of the chiefs of the Zvishavane CSOT and demanded $US5,000 as sitting allowance. However, findings reported that the then indigenisation minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, had to read the riot act in a bid to quash their demands.

Therefore, this study argues that mining companies' failure to honour their pledges was not necessarily because they could not do so. Rather, collusion agreements between them and government-dictated otherwise. The implication of this is perpetuating uneven development configuration amid great hopes that it will be addressed. Community developmental programmes

that would have been kick-started and sustained by the pledged money and 10% equity transfers to the CSOTs are greatly compromised. All these realities may confirm this study's thesis that indigenisation, particularly in the extractive industry, is employed as a tool to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives. According to the protagonist of accumulation by dispossession theory, Harvey (2003), the theory is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. Doing so would achieve two essential regime survival objectives: power retention and private accumulation of public resources by the political and business elites.

Following on from this analysis on the extractive industry indigenisation used as a tool for accumulation by dispossession, two important questions posed by Bates (2008, p. 131) about African neopatrimonialism can also be asked on the neopatrimonial way extractive industry indigenisation is being implemented in Zimbabwe. These are a) "Why is it that African leaders refuse to implement what are obviously 'Good Policies' which other parts of the world have fruitfully adopted?, and b) why do they adopt policies that impoverish their citizens?" Mkandawire (2015) gives an abridged response to the questions that may apply to Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation case: often, government actions are not benevolent in promoting the public good and public value. Rather, they are malevolent for promoting the ruling political and personal interests while further disenfranchising potential beneficiaries of policy interventions. Corroborating with this neopatrimonialism view while arguing from public choice approach Bates (2008, p. 131) contends that:

> Leaders act on behalf of private factions, be they social classes, military cliques or ethnic groups. They engage in economic redistribution, often from the poor to the rich at the expense of economic growth. These are the central policy formation in Africa and their prominence serves to discredit any approach based on a conviction that governments are agents of public interest.

In the extractive industry, non-elite groups, largely the disadvantaged indigenous citizens, are robbed of their empowerment by the political and business elite through such neopatrimonial practices, mixed with public choice practices, whose hybridity produced what Mkandawire (2015, p. 566) calls "a debilitating witch's brew."

8.3 Deliberate ambiguities, inconsistencies and lack of clarity

One other theme that recurred throughout the findings is 'strategic ambiguities', inconsistencies and lack of clarity in the policy and legal frameworks of indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. Strategic ambiguity- also referred to as strategic uncertainty or deliberate ambiguity- means a government's practice to be deliberately ambiguous on certain important policy aspects (Kelsey& le Roux, 2018; Li, Turmunkh & Wakker, 2020). The term is closely related to Henry Kissinger's constructive ambiguity, which means the government's intentional use of vague language in legal and policy documents about certain sensitive aspects for political expediency (Jegen & Mérand, 2014). The pattern of ambiguities, inconsistencies and lack of clarity within these documents raises many questions than answers. As discussed in the preceding themes, findings show that debates and even research on indigenisation are often conducted without a full appreciation of the policy's legal and policy nuances. This reality may suggest about three important things here. Firstly, little attention is being paid to the alignment of indigenisation's constitutional provisions with its legislative, regulatory, and policy frameworks. Secondly, how indigenisation implementers are interpreting the policy's legal frameworks, particularly the IEE Act: whether their interpretations *intra vires* or *ultra* vires. Thirdly, whether what the implementing agencies, mainly the Indigenous and Economic Empowerment Unit (IEEU) - formerly the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) - are doing on the ground is consistent with indigenisation legal and policy frameworks. All said, "the CSOTs and indigenization in general have been hampered by lack of clarity and consistence of policy as well as lack of transparency in their implementation" (Chigumira et al., 2016, p. 28).

While disparaging the strategic legal vagueness surrounding the indigenisation programme as a fudge, Matyszak (2016, p. 3) asserts the following:

> …legislative chaos and confusion around indigenisation arise from Regulations which do not conform to the Act, General Notices which do not conform to the Regulations, and actions by successive Ministers and their underlings which do not conform to all three.

Important to note about these constructive ambiguities and inconsistencies is that the legal disharmony is not only between and amongst policy's legal, regulatory and policy frameworks, but also within them- with many of them considerably contradicting themselves. Raftopoulos (2014, p. 95) calls this "[g]overnment's inconsistent policy positions." Findings suggest that the

main cause of concern is the pattern of lack of clarity, inconsistency, lack of predictability and certainty, and confusion permeating the policy documents. On this, the following submissions of the two National Assembly Hansards are instructive

> *The first issue is that, when it comes to indigenisation, we hear discords* (Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2011, p. 82).
>
> *We need to go with one voice on this indigenisation policy. So far there are conflicts and there is discord in Government* (Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2012, p. 13)

To some degree, the pattern is suggestive of deliberate and calculated legal and policy ambiguities, inconsistency and lack of clarity. This reality presents a conducive environment for uninterrupted, organised and legalised accumulation by dispossession processes. However, the most surprising thing is that we have presidential impulses as decisive forces instead of consistent and clear legal frameworks informing the indigenisation processes. Several presidential speeches on indigenisation (particularly about extractive industry indigenisation), which often contradict each other, are a testament to this. Furthermore, successive and factional ZANU-PF politics influenced the late president Mugabe's choice of indigenisation ministers. The time we are before the next elections is also decisive on how indigenisation is to be implemented, particularly in the extractive industry. This reality is particularly true during the late president Mugabe's last years in office.

Following on from these perspectives, I am arguing that the presidential impulses, as for strategic ambiguities and achieving political settlement objectives, are rendering indigenisation's legal frameworks irrelevant. This provokes the idea that while the government may have unambiguous legal and policy frameworks in place, the logic of neopatrimonialism- evidenced by strategic legal ambiguities, lack of clarity and inconsistencies- guarantees recidivism. Furthermore, findings show that every time either the indigenisation ministry passes a General Notice or a General Regulation, or a presidential or ministerial speech or directive is pronounced, the government's policy position sways considerably. However, this reality is making it challenging to implement indigenisation to its logical conclusion, thereby compromising both the processes of economic indigenisation and empowerment of the disenfranchised indigenous citizens. Therefore, this study is advancing the argument that extractive industry indigenisation is becoming the disease for that it purports to be the cure: widespread uneven development. This reality then put the government's integrity to indigenise the economy for the empowerment of disadvantaged

indigenous people to test. Commenting on this from uneven development school of thought Bond (2014, p. 2) argues that this represents the government's "strategy for talking left while acting right", and Mkandawire (2015, p. 564) from neopatrimonialism school speaks of it as a "vivid vignette of the all-too-often cases of egregious abuse of state resources and power."

Many times, the government keeps on amending important extractive industry indigenisation laws. This situation raises issues about policy predictability, consistency, and clarity. For example, we have CSOTs established pursuant to Section 14B of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010 (as amended in 2013). According to this legal provision, the qualifying businesses are required to 'donate' 10% of their equity to the community through the CSOTs. Section 14B (5) of the General Regulations reads: "The minimum share that an owner of a business wishing to use the qualifying scheme or trust shall donate to a community shall be ten per centum (10%) of the net asset value of the business in question." Although this Section was inserted in 2013, "the [indigenisation] Minister and the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) stated that the law was that it was mandatory for every extant foreign mining company to "dispose" of 10% of "its" shares to a CSOT" (Research Advocacy Unit, 2014, p. 5).

Shifting from requiring nonindigenous mining companies to donate 10% of their shares to disposing them to the indigenous citizens reflects a paradigmatic shift in policy. This situation implies that the indigenisation minister and the indigenisation implementing agency, the NIEEB, could, on a whim, violate the laws they enact with impunity. Also, this is despite the fact that CSOTs came into existence through Amendment No. 2 of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010, effected from the 25th June 2010. Nevertheless, in the space of three years (i.e. from 2010 to 2013), the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010 was amended five times; in many instances, the amendments were so sweeping to the extent of contradicting considerably the original and previous versions. Doing so amplified policy uncertainties, unpredictability, inconsistencies, and lack of clarity surrounding extractive industry indigenisation. Consequently, "Community Share Ownership Trusts and Employee Share Ownership Trusts have not been very successful due to lack of clarity on the indigenization policy" (Chigumira, et al., 2016, p. 48).

It is against this background of the pattern of policy, and legal vagueness and inconsistencies are generating more heat than light it is illuminating that this theme describes and explains the usage of extractive industry indigenisation to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives. According to Harvey (2003), these objectives are achieved through the neoliberal capitalist policies centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. On this perspective, one of the findings looming large is that Section 3(1) (a) of the IEE Act is the most misunderstood provision, yet the most important provision in all indigenisation processes. The provision reads:

> *The Government shall, through this Act or regulations or other measures under this Act or any other law, endeavour to secure that— at least fifty-one per centum of the shares of every public company and any other business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans.*

As the findings show, it is precisely a paradox: having a critically important provision yet the most misunderstood- as it was written in a deliberately misleading language. However, according to how the Section is worded, one may say that it constitutes the point of departure for both positive and negative knowledge we may generate about indigenisation. The reason is that its understanding (or lack thereof) is dividing scholars, activists, the international community, and the country's general public into two hostile camps: opponents and sympathisers of indigenisation. The sharp differences this generates suggests that "*there is no middle ground to talk about*" (Interview: SGOR6, 25 June 2018). The narratives from the two hostile camps are competing for dominance. According to SGOR6, the Section has two important terms: '*endeavour'* and '*at least 51%.'* For the respondent, as well as for Matyszak (2016, 2014 & 2011), the beginning of all understanding (and lack thereof) of indigenisation's major intent starts with the epistemological tool used to interpret these two important terms.

However, findings show that dispassionate and constructive contributions and criticisms to the indigenisation debates in Zimbabwe only come after one has certainly understood the foundational meanings of these two terms. This means understanding the meanings of the two terms according to the intents and purposes of the authors of the Act. Important to note here is that the spirit of the law-based is certainly different from the letter of the law-based interpretation. Without a critical understanding of these two terms, this study argues, many will continue to fall off the edge of meaningful indigenisation debates, and their contributions or criticisms will not only be banal and bland but also amiss and misleading. Hence, the importance

of being on the same wavelength with the Act's authors when they wrote the law before embarking on the enterprise of either criticizing or affirming the indigenisation programme.

It is critically important to define the word '*endeavour.*' What does it mean? SGOR6 gave a simple definition of the term as the act of trying hard to do or to achieve something. Put it another way, it is an industrious effort to achieve something. Following on from this definitional viewpoint, one may argue that the Government of Zimbabwe is endeavouring or striving or trying (i.e. trying hard with an industrious effort) to indigenise 'at least 51%' shareholding of the nonindigenous businesses. Findings show a huge difference between endeavouring to achieve or do something easily or effectively doing or achieving something. According to SGOR6, the phrase "*at least 51%*" literally means from 0-51%. This is because the phrase 'at least' means the maximum. Following this viewpoint, the IEE Act provided that the equity threshold for indigenous Zimbabweans to be indigenised ranges from 0% to 51%, which the government is endeavouring to secure for them. To this end, this critical provision in the Act may be argued to be representing a hidden clause, yet with serious legal, implementation, indigenisation and empowerment consequences.

However, the preceding view that 'at least 51%' means the maximum stands in sharp contrast with that of the late president Mugabe's pronouncement that says the 51% is just but the minimum, a starting point. Also, the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010, is clear that the 51% equity threshold is the minimum equity threshold nonindigenous mining firms should dispose for indigenisation. The General Regulations refer to 51% as the "minimum indigenisation and empowerment quota" (p. 3). The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010 defines the quota to mean "a controlling interest or the fifty-one *per centum* of the shares or interests which in terms of the Act is required to be held by indigenous Zimbabweans in a business pursuant to any transaction referred to in sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(1), 9 and 11" (p. 3). Juxtaposing this definition and the two objectives of the same Regulations may indicate that the 51% equity threshold is the minimum equity threshold indigenous Zimbabweans are legally mandated to own in all nonindigenous companies operating in the country. The two objectives of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010 reads:

> 3. These regulations are framed with the general objective that every business of or above the prescribed value threshold must-

(a) within the next five years from the date of operation of these regulations, or within five years from the commencement of the business concerned, as the case may be, dispose of a controlling interest of not less than fifty-one *per centum* of the shares or interests therein to indigenous Zimbabweans; unless, in order to achieve other socially or economically desirable objectives, a lesser share of indigenisation or a longer period within which to achieve it is justified;
(b) after five years from the date of operation of these regulations, or within five years from the commencement of the business concerned, as the case may be, dispose of a controlling interest of not less than fifty-one *per centum* of the shares or interests therein to indigenous Zimbabweans, unless the business concerned has previously submitted an indigenisation implementation plan together with Form IDG 01 which has been approved by the Minister in terms of these regulations.

In support of the foregoing view that the phrase 'at least 51%' means 51% as the minimum, one former indigenisation minister, Chris Mushohwe, as cited by Karombo (2015), spoke of what he termed 'lucky investors.' According to the minister, these are foreign investors accorded 49% of the equity within their companies. For the former minister's interpretation of the phrase 'at least 51%', 49% is the maximum equity threshold nonindigenous firms should be left with after indigenisation. The former indigenisation minister pointed out that the nonindigenous investors allowed to retain 49% of the shareholding in Zimbabwe are so lucky because, according to the 'at least 51%' law, it can be 1%. Conversely, 51% to be indigenised can be 99%. On this, the former indigenisation minister has the following to say: "So it's not cast in concrete that it's 49%; it can be 1% because [49%] is the maximum [foreign shareholding], and 51% can be 99% because it's the minimum [local shareholding]" (cited in Karombo, 2015, para. 6). While assuming lack of ambiguities on the two important phrases (i.e. *at least 51%* and *endeavour*), Chipika and Malaba (2011, p. 3) argue that the major intent of indigenisation is for the government to "endeavour to secure that at least 51% of the shares of every public company and any other business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans."

Further, ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013, p. 35) corroborates with the 'at least 51% means the minimum viewpoint by submitting that, "While the law is clear that at least 51 percent of the shares or ownership of every public company and any other business across the economy shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans, there has been some confusion and misunderstanding over the modalities for achieving this threshold." The Frameworks, Procedures and Guidelines for Implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14: 33) of 2016 and the 2016 National Budget Statement also echo similar sentiments of 51% shareholding as the

minimum threshold nonindigenous local firms should dispose for indigenisation. The General Notice 114 of 2011 is even more precise about requiring the nonindigenous local mining firms to dispose 51% of the equity to the designated entities (i.e. CSOTs, Employee Share Ownership Trusts, and the National Indigenisation and Economic Fund).

Nonetheless, several respondents raised an interesting dissenting point worth noting here. They advanced that the Ministerial Regulations and General Notices, and presidential statements as well as reports, manifestos, communique, and memoranda, are not legally binding in any court of law. In other words, what they submitted is that these documents are not legal frameworks and should not (and cannot) be interpreted as law in a competent court of law. What is legally binding, according to them, is the Act of parliament, in this case, the IEE Act, and the Constitution. In the words of one respondent drawn from the government:

> *You know we hoodwinked the international community. It is only Zimbabwe which can do things no one can interpret easily. Remember we recently executed a coup yekuti hainzwisisike kuti chii (which cannot be understood what it is). Whether it's a coup or it is not a coup, you can't interpret. But for us we know what it was. Let me tell you, we deliberately make sure that the Act is ambiguous when it comes to the 49/51% threshold issue. You cannot say 'at least 51%' means more than 51 or less than 51. We did that deliberately so that when they sue us, we'll have an escape route of saying "but the Act says at least 51%." What does that mean? We'll interpret it to mean less than 51% when doing so is in our favour and to mean 51% when doing so is in our favour too. Kungwarirana (it is tit-for-tat). They sanctioned us we have to sanction them too that way* (Interview: SGOR5, 07 July 2018).

SGOR5 continued: "*But we make sure that our regulations, notices, speeches, reports, manifestos and all the like are clear that we are taking 50+% of the shares owned by foreigners here. You see how clever we are, right!*" (Interview: SGOR5, 07 July 2018). In support of the foregoing viewpoint another respondent has this to say, "*in any court of law the judge will simply say 'what does the law say' and these regulations are not laws*" (interview: SGO4, 16 June 2018). Important to note here is that government can presume strategic ignorance when if the court of law asked it about these ambiguities, inconsistencies and lack of clarity if doing so advances its political purposes. Indeed, these are necessary deliberate ambiguities, inconsistencies and lack of clarity with constructive intents. Taken together, these findings may suggest that indigenisation, particularly in the extractive industry, is governed by strategic ambiguous legal frameworks. However, these ambiguous legal frameworks are operationalised by equally unequivocal non-legal frameworks (i.e. the General Notices, Regulations, and presidential statements and sundry). Matyszak (2014,

p. 2) prefers to call such ambiguous legal frameworks "(il)legal frameworks." One noticeable example is the one involved in the establishment of the Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs). These were not established by an Act of Parliament nor by the Constitution. Rather, they were established by the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2010, which, according to these findings, is not a law. However, the fact that the Deeds Office established them means that they are juristic personalities. Thus, the intractability of the indigenisation wicked problems in the mining sector began with having juristic persons whose legality or constitutionality are questionable, if not plainly nonexistent.

Linked to these misunderstandings are serious "misconceptions which causes much of the confusion" (Matyszak, 2016, p. 6) around the interpretation of the IEE Act. The interpretation is with regards to which, between the nonindigenous businesses and the shareholders, should dispose the required 51% equity for indigenisation. For Matyszak (2016), the Act did not, whatsoever, require that businesses dispose their shares for indigenisation. In its words, Matyszak (2016, p. 6) argues that "This is *not*, in fact, a requirement of the Act." Matyszak's (2017 & 2016) argument is that it is not the jurist personalities (i.e. the foreign businesses in this case) that own the shares. Rather, shares are individually owned by natural persons, i.e. the shareholders. Businesses only issue shares owned by shareholders. Therefore, the implication of this reality is that businesses cannot and should not dispose the shares they do not own. Only shareholders can do that. Simpson and Hawkins (2018) also shared the same views. Following on from this argument, Matyszak (2016, p. 6) argues that:

> To try to apply this law to shareholders themselves is generally so impractical as to be unenforceable – after all, which of the thousands of shareholders in some of the larger corporations are to be the ones compelled to dispose of their shares to ensure the 51% indigenous holding?

Similarly, Matyszak (2017, p. 10) remarks that "It is well-nigh impossible to draft legislation requiring shareholders in companies to come together and decide which shareholders should surrender company equity gratis to somebody else, and how." According to Matyszak (2017, 2014 & 2016), the Act, which pursuant to the Regulations and General Notices, did not even mention anything to do with requiring shareholders to dispose part of their equity for indigenisation. Corroborating with the preceding analysis, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Report (2015) argues that the act of having nonindigenous mining companies indigenizing at least

51% of their equity has serious negative legal implications. This is because shares are owned by shareholders, not by companies. Matyszak (2014) concurs by arguing that companies have no jurisdiction whatsoever in forcing shareholders to transfer shares to anyone else.

In contrast, the indigenisation laws have no provision requiring nonindigenous shareholders to transfer 51% of their shareholding in their respective companies to indigenous Zimbabweans. This legal loophole renders it difficult to figure out how shareholders should transfer part of their shareholding as this was not legally provided for. This is so because shareholders do not proportionately hold shares; hence determining the number of shares an individual shareholder should dispose for indigenisation is not a less difficult task.

Flowing from the preceding viewpoint, one may argue that it would be an error on the part of the government to try to compel companies to do that which is not in their capacity to do: disposing shareholders' equity to someone else without their consent. Enacting a law to that effect is not less difficult. This may explain why the IEE Act or any other indigenisation legislation did not talk about that or something pointing to that effect. Commenting on this, Simpson and Hawkins (2018) stress the fact that indigenisation's legal framework, particularly the IEE Act, did not provide the fine details on how share transfers should be done. In their words:

> It was also noteworthy that both the Act and the Regulations lacked detail as to how exactly such transfers were to take place, and there was a conspicuous absence of any reference to how designated state bodies were to pay for the shares prior to transfer, raising the possibility – and in the eyes of many operators in the private sector the almost certainty – of compulsory acquisition of majority stakes without compensation (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018, p. 289-290).

Corroborating with this line of thought Matyszak (2014, p. 3) contends that:

> Common sense indicates why this is so. Companies do not own the shares in the company – the members of the company do. The legal title to the shares, and thus the power to treat with the shares (such as to cede the shares) lies with those who own the shares, and not the company, (a separate juristic entity) which issued the shares. A company cannot compel the transfer of stock by a shareholder. The Act accordingly did not provide for this. The Act also could not, as a general policy, seek to compel foreign shareholders to "dispose" of shares so that 51% of a company's equity was held by indigenous Zimbabweans because the problem of how to determine which shareholders are to relinquish the shares to make up the 51% is often intractable.

Premised on the preceding analysis, it is important at this stage to take a detour into one contentious issue in the indigenisation legal frameworks. The contentious issue is about the usage

of the word 'cede' in some of the General Regulations and Notices governing extractive industry indigenisation. Many critics, notably but not limited to the nonindigenous local mining industrialists, criticise the usage of the word on account of the magnanimity connotations around it. They contend that the word does not denote the transactional transfer of shares but rather to charitable giving of shares by the nonindigenous shareholders to the indigenous Zimbabweans. To this end, the word cede is considered by international capital as a euphemism for expropriation without compensation. According to the law, ceding 10% of the 51% equity to the communities through CSOTs is compulsory rather than voluntary. This is despite the government's consistent denial that indigenisation is not based on expropriating properties of the non-indigenous without compensation. However, when the nonindigenous businesses are unwilling to cede the shares, they will be considered not complying with indigenisation laws. The possible implication of this is that the government is subtle in its accumulation through dispossession processes.

Findings show that when the indigenisation minister issued the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2011 (General Notice 114 of 2011), which required nonindigenous local mining companies to have their indigenisation implementation plans approved by the minister in not less than six months, many companies stated that their preparedness to dispose shares for indigenisation. However, this depended on the willingness of their shareholders to do so. Consequently, many did not comply. They cited the prevalence of rampant policy inconsistencies and lack of clarity and predictability as to the major reasons for noncompliance. This is evidenced by numerous amendments to the indigenisation legal frameworks. Elaborating on this, Matyszak (2014, p. 4) argues the following:

> Accordingly, and contrary to what was constantly repeated by policymakers and the media of all ilk as being the effect of the Regulations which were brought into being, the law did NOT require all companies to dispose of 51% of "their" shares to indigenous Zimbabweans. Unable to fathom how a legal instrument could accomplish this, the Regulations simply passed the problem onto the foreign enterprises. So what the Regulations *did* require (though not authorised by the Act), was not the disposal by companies of shares they did not own or control, but the submission by extant companies in Zimbabwe of "indigenisation plans". Through these plans, each foreign company had to propose to the Ministry how *it* intended to ensure the change of its shareholding so that 51% thereof was owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. Only the failure to submit such a plan when called upon to do so was criminalised. There was no legal penalty if the plan submitted was not acceptable to government, there was no legal penalty if the company

> chose to subsequently alter its indigenisation plan, and no legal penalty for a failure to implement the plan.

However, findings show that when the government was confronted by the civil society organisations regarding the legal confusion of indigenisation, the government is reported to have said political means, instead of legal means, will be used to achieve the indigenisation objectives. This may mean that the absence of the legal means would not present an obstruction as the same accumulation by dispossession objectives will be achieved through political means. Commenting on the use of political means to achieve the indigenisation objectives, Matyszak (2014, p.14) submits the following:

> These "political means" turned out to be a flurry of letters from the Ministry to companies containing threats of dire criminal penalties that would be visited upon companies that failed to indigenise - though the Ministry was unable to cite any legislative provision which had been breached by the "offending" company; threatening and abusive phone calls to company secretaries; threats issued in public statements by officials and intimidating visits to business premises by men in black Mercedes.

Matyszak continues

> A failure to indigenise, companies were told, would result in the withdrawal of work permits for foreign staff, labour unrest would be incited, export permits would be cancelled, expatriation of profits would be blocked. The Zimbabwe Investment Authority (although falling under an MDC controlled Ministry at the time) implemented a directive from the Indigenisation Ministry that no Investment Licences were to be renewed unless a letter of compliance had been issued by the Indigenisation Ministry. The Immigration Department at Linquenda House posted notices on its glass windows that work permits would not be renewed without the same letter of compliance (2014, p. 4).

Simpson and Hawkins (2018) also share the same foregoing views. Equally important to note are the tacit threats the indigenisation ministry was writing on the wall. The threats include unleashing the violent ZANU-PF youth militia to loot nonindigenous businesses. Findings show that this presented a real threat because the looting horrors that occurred during the peak of price controls in 2008 were still fresh in the minds of the local non-indigenous citizens. Also, given the awful roles played by the youth militia in the build-up to the 27 June 2008 run-off presidential elections and during the infamous 2000-2003 FTLRP, which saw the white commercial farmers violently expropriated their farms without compensation, stupefied the nonindigenous businesses. This, in turn, worked in favour of achieving regime survival and private accumulation by dispossession objectives. According to the protagonist of accumulation by dispossession theory,

Harvey (2003), the theory is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. The threats were further coupled by ZANU-PF's well-known history of temperamental dispositions on property rights. All this partly accounts for the very few non-indigenous businesses that dared to question the IEE Act's legality and sundry indigenisation laws in courts (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018).

Further, findings show that there are serious legal ambiguities around extractive industry indigenisation. Articulating on analysis, the confusion one academic respondent equated extractive industry indigenisation with "*flogging darkness or mere groping in the dark*" (Interview: AR1, 20 July 2018). This situation is largely because the extractive industry indigenisation implementers are caught in a precarious position with the following dilemmas. First, not knowing why, when, and how to and not to do what. Second, where to start and where to end. Third, which regulatory, policy or legislative framework to follow and which ignore. Fourth, which, amongst numerous and contradictory presidential directives, to follow and ignore. Another academic respondent equates the somewhat elusive extractive industry indigenisation with "*loosening the Gordian knot*" (Interview: AR2, 23 June 2018). For one civil society respondent, it is because of the existence of "*many meaningless and contradictory statutes, speeches and directives*" (Interview: CSR3, 05 August 2018) and "legal gibberish" (Matyszak, 2014, p. 6) which the implementers need to interpret correctly before starting the implementation process. A case in point for unnecessary complexities and meaningless indigenisation laws is reflected in one legal provision many documents reviewed often cited as an example. It is Section 6(5) of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) (Amendment) Regulations, 2011 (No. 3) (Statutory Instrument 34 of 2011). It reads:

> A business (other than the business of a sole trader) on whose behalf a responsible person has submitted primary documents to the Minister in accordance with section 4 shall not be considered not to have complied with section 4(1) or (2) unless the responsible person also submits the secondary document, either simultaneously with the primary documents or no later than the final day for compliance with section 4(1) or (2), whereupon section 4(4) shall apply to such business as if it had not submitted any primary documents."

Corroborating with the idea of lack of clarity and legal complexities, one respondent from the indigenisation implementing institution submitted the following:

> *There were conflicting pronouncements and legal frameworks within government […] there was too much room for discretion in the application of the law. That is why foreign investors*

> *emphasised clarity and consistency in the laws governing the policy. Everything was left to the discretion of the implementers to interpret* (Interview: SGO4, 16 June 2018).

Commenting in an emphasis tone on how the lack of clarity is characterising the indigenisation process since its inception in 2008, Bagnetto (2016, para. 16) argues that: "Lack of clarity and consensus regarding the indigenisation law, first introduced in Zimbabwe in 2008, is not a new issue." A case in point here is the contradictory indigenisation pronouncements issued by the then minister of finance, Patrick Chinamasa, and the then indigenisation minister, Patrick Zhuwawo. Yamamoto (2016) calls the contradictions between the two cabinet ministers the 'Battle of the two Patricks' while Zindoga (2015) prefers to call them 'More than a Tale of Two Patricks.' The indigenisation policy contradictions between the ministers needed the whole president to address, leading to the younger Patrick (Mugabe's nephew, Patrick Zhuwawo) to publicly concede that he erred in his reading and interpretation of the over-amended indigenisation legal and regulatory frameworks.

The altercation between the two cabinet ministers resulted from the deadline requiring all nonindigenous mining firms to submit their indigenisation implementation plans to the indigenisation ministry. The government had previously set December 31 2015 as the deadline, which the young Patrick was sticking on while the older Patrick (i.e. Patrick Chinamasa, the finance minister at the time) pronounced a different deadline, March 31, 2016. Commenting on the new deadline pronounced by the older Patrick, the younger Patrick, while making a presentation at the Institute of Chartered Accountants Zimbabwe workshop in Harare, declared the following: "Anyone who comes looking for a dispensation, I'll oppose because the legislation has been there for about eight years and people did not take it seriously." It took the late president Robert Mugabe to publicly announce that the older Patrick was right for younger Patrick to apologise and accept that the position he took was wrong. In his words, the young Patrick said: "As I take direction, it's quite possible that I can misinterpret certain things, and I must be able to listen to my boss when my boss explains what I have misinterpreted" (Thornycroft, 2016, para. 5). Nonetheless, their altercation was interpreted, and maybe rightly so, within the succession and factional political battles rocking ZANU-PF at the time. The older Patrick, it is alleged, belonged to the Lacoste/Crocodile faction allegedly led by the incumbent president of Zimbabwe,

Emmerson Mnangagwa. The younger Patrick was a key member of the rival faction, the Generation 40, famously known as G40, allegedly led by the former first lady Grace Mugabe.

In the final analysis, I am arguing that it may be unique for the government to effectively implement a public policy whose legal frameworks are unclear and inconsistent. A raft of contradictory and vague General Regulations, General Notices, and presidential speeches may not constitute a policy framework that could practically guide the smooth implementation of the policy. Many respondents interviewed and documents reviewed cautioned that ambiguities and inconsistencies surrounding indigenisation are the very reason the policy is not witnessing any meaningful traction. Indigenisation is increasingly becoming the source of all the confusion the government, state, and society of Zimbabwe are currently grappling with. However, this confirms what is already known about indigenisation that its foundational intents are rather unspoken and unwritten, with the written and spoken ones acting as ruses to deceive the public.

8.3 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the impact of the endogenous underlying structural and contextual factors on extractive industry indigenisation, leading to its outcomes largely inconsistent with the goals. These factors include the following: business fronting and public corruption; CSOTs as regime survival and accumulation strategies; involvement of the security sector; and deliberate legal inconsistencies and lack of clarity. Emphasis was placed on understanding how the government employs the foregoing mechanisms indigenisation processes to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives. In light of these findings about the internal structural and contextual factors affecting extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe, the next chapters' focus is to present and analyse how broad governance factors are affecting the same.

CHAPTER 9

THE BROADER GOVERNANCE STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY INDIGENISATION IN ZIMBABWE

9.0 Introduction

The previous chapter presented and discussed findings about how and why Zimbabwe's internal structural factors are influencing extractive industry indigenisation to underdeliver its overpromised empowerment objectives. This chapter presents findings and analysis about how the broader governance factors affect the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. The argument in this chapter is that Zimbabwe's governance infrastructures are not facilitating extractive industry indigenisation to deliver outcomes consistent with its broader indigenisation objectives. The associated governance factors are, directly and indirectly, affecting the course of implementing indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular, as well as the functionalities of the internal structural factors discussed in the previous chapter.

The following are the broader governance factors:

- Political contestations within the GNU;
- International contestations and sanctions;
- Shunning away investment.
- The involvement of the security sector in the mining indigenisation processes

Therefore, the focus of this chapter is to present and analyse findings that respond to the following third sub-research question of the study, but with specific reference to the governance structural factors: How are the organic and conjunctural forces accounting for continued extractive industry uneven development under the indigenisation regime? The findings presented and analysed in this chapter were gathered from document analysis, with those from key informant interviews and observations playing a complementary role. The reviewed documents were drawn from the indigenisation ministry, Zimbabwe's parliament, some foreign-owned mining companies, the implementing agency of indigenisation- the National Indigenisation and

Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB)- political parties, newspaper articles and various think tanks in the country. Interviews were conducted with key informants from government, academia, and civil society. In this chapter, I used both content analysis and thematic analysis methods to develop codes and themes.

9.1 Political contestations within the GNU

One critically important theme that emerged from the findings is the way the GNU political contestations affected both the course and outcomes of the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. However, agreements and disagreements are both sharp and strong about the extent, nature and magnitude of the impact. Corroborating with this reasoning, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2011, p. 2) reveals the following:

> The issue of indigenization and economic empowerment has attracted a lot of national debate and interest, and with it also, some misconceptions and misrepresentations of the views of some individuals, groups and institutions, on the subject.

The findings show that what respondent GDOR2 called the 'GNU factor' is one governance factor for extractive industry indigenisation to achieve more of disempowering outcomes and less of empowering outcomes. Overall, findings suggest that the GNU presented a contradiction to the course and outcomes of the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. However, important to note is that during that time within the ZANU-PF camp, there were serious disagreements about the indigenisation policy position, with some arguing the indigenisation programme was scaring international capital while others are viewing it from an autarky perspective.

The GNU or the Inclusive Government is a product of a political settlement that came to be known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) reached between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations (i.e. MDC T and MDC M) after the widely disputed elections of March 2008. Political settlements- or elite pacts- are agreements that result in a state governed by political and administrative frameworks, both formal and informal, that advance, maintain and protect the interests of the elites (Di John & Putzel, 2009; Khan, 2018, 2010 & 1995). This situation is achieved through the elites agreeing on ways of distributing, exercising, administering and transferring political and economic power (McCandless, 2018). The GNU, one of Zimbabwe's unsettled

political settlements (McCandless, 2011; McCandless 'et al.', 2018), was more of a political compromise, whose five-year lifespan was mired in deep political and economic ideological contestations. It was an outcome of intense contestation for power-sharing negotiations between the ruling ZANU-PF and the MDC-T. The ruling ZANU-PF nearly lost the 29 March 2008 harmonised elections to the main opposition MDC-T before unleashing violence on the masses in the build-up to the 27 June 2008 election rerun. Consequently, the opposition MDC withdrew from contesting the runoff polls citing massive intimidation, violence, maiming and systematic killings of its supporters by the security forces. This makes the GNU a delicate and compromised political settlement to settle the unsettled political settlement between the ruling ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. The GNU political settlement is redolent of the first independent government of national unity between the two liberation movements (i.e. PF ZAPU and ZANU), on the one hand, and the colonial ruling party of the time, the Rhodesian Front, on the other. However, the GNU gave ZANU-PF a good reprieve to reconfigure itself.

The political differences within the GNU concerning indigenisation showed that the two MDC formations and ZANU-PF were diametric opposites. They rested on parallel political and economic ideological foundations. On the other hand, before the deposition of Robert Mugabe, ZANU-PF is on record affirming its 'no-going back policy position' on indigenisation. On the other hand, the MDC-T formation, resting on neoliberal foundations, opposed the indigenisation policy because the policy's leanings on the left mean closing the country for business. As there is no politically defensible middle in their sharp binaries concerning the position to take on indigenisation policy ZANU-PF, on the one hand, is supporting both the policy's means and ends. The argument is that indigenisation is the appropriate way of empowering the country's disadvantaged indigenous citizens. On the other hand, the two MDC formations are denouncing the policy instrument -indigenisation - of achieving the noble ends of empowering the economically excluded indigenous citizens.

The GNU two opposition political parties preferred what can be loosely termed 'indigenisation through empowerment', rather than ZANU-PF's 'empowerment through indigenisation.' On the one hand, the former is a gradual approach of supporting the disadvantaged groups of the country through various affirmative action policies such as employment quotas and supporting indigenous businesses through venture capital, crowdfunding, reduced taxation, and low lending rates. On

the other hand, the latter is a radical strategy of redistributing wealth without necessarily creating it, as in the former's case. While the former strikes a balancing act between the need to empower the marginalised indigenous citizens, indigenising the economy and attracting the FDI, the latter compromises all the three by preferring only the first two while crowding out the last one. Commenting on the sharp indigenisation policy differences, one civil society respondent said: "*it was like sharing the same bed but having different dreams. They [ZANU-PF and MDC formations] were like water and oil, they never agreed on a single thing during GNU*" (Interview: CSR4, 20 June 2018).

For example, the enactment of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEE Act) in 2008 met with mixed feelings. As the findings reveal, the radical IEE Act concomitantly delighted the Leftist ZANU-PF while terrified the Rightist MDC camp. Therefore, during the GNU, their indigenisation sharp disagreements had severe complications on the extractive industry indigenisation. For this reason, extractive industry indigenisation became the chessboard for these sharp political and economic ideological contestations between the two MDC formations, but notably the MDC-T, and the ruling ZANU-PF. Commenting on these contestations, one respondent said, "*such differences were the main causes of the near-stalemate on the policy. We failed to agree on the policy position of the indigenisation programme*" (Interview: SGRR4, 17 July 2018).

With this realisation, one may argue that this explains why ZANU-PF fought hard to retain the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment portfolio "during the horse-trading over control of ministries before the signing of the GPA" (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018, p. 288). Similar reasons can be given as to why the ruling ZANU-PF fought hard to retain the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development during the same GNU negotiations. Through this, the ruling party, "the ruining party" to use CSR's expression, enjoyed a comparative political advantage as it could unilaterally (i.e. without consulting the other GNU parties) enact and pass various indigenisation Regulations and Notices that framed implementation of the policy in the mining sector. The same unilateralism on indigenisation also includes the whimsical amending of the extractive industry indigenisation Regulations, Notices and sundry legislations. However, according to one of the academic respondents interviewed, this ideological position means closure. This reasoning is different from the viewpoint of the two MDC formations whose viewpoints were apprised by the neoliberal economic ideological principles. The two opposition

political parties in the GNU wanted to open up the enclaved and ostracised Zimbabwe for business.

Therefore, it is against this background of ideological contestations about indigenisation that an impasse was reached among the principal players of the GNU. The implementation of the policy, particularly in the extractive industry as it is one of the country's strategic economic sectors, essentially became the stage for political and ideological differences. Corroborating with this, Southal (2018) remarks that the indigenisation programme was at the heart of all GNU's political and economic contestations. Agreeing with this analysis, one respondent commented that "*mixed and confusing messages were communicated from ZANU-PF and MDC regarding the policy position of the indigenisation*" (Interview: GDOR1, 09 July 2018). This viewpoint was further supported by another respondent who submitted that:

> *The government started implementing the empowerment policy during the GNU and there were serious conflicting interests between MDC and ZANU-PF over the modalities, strategies etc of how to implement the policy. Biti [the minister of Finance of the time] refused to fund the process of implementing the policy. Funding was also a major challenge. It was not funded at all. Saka yakafa isati yasimuka* [so it was a dead duck] (Interview: SGO4, 16 June 2018).

One often-cited case for these political differences between the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC over the government's position on indigenisation occurred in 2012. The minister responsible for indigenisation (i.e. the ZANU-PF official in the GNU) instructed the local nonindigenous owned banks and other foreign firms to submit their indigenisation plans. In response to this, the prime minister's office, whose head was the leader of the MDC-T, Morgan Tsvangirai, gave a statement intended to nullify the legality and legitimacy of the minister's instruction (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018; Mashavave, 2012). The statement described the indigenisation minister's instruction as serious threats to the recovery of the distressed economy. Part of it reads:

> The Prime Minister would like to inform the public and concerned stakeholders that there is no such government position because no such issue has been discussed and agreed upon in Cabinet. Government has not sanctioned the Minister's actions that are a threat to investment in the country. The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act does not empower the Minister to act and to project an image of a voracious government keen to compulsorily grab almost all institutions and companies in the country (Office of the Prime Minister 2012).

The statement continues:

> The Prime Minister wishes to inform foreign-owned banks, foreign-owned companies ... and private educational institutions including creches, primary and secondary schools as well as institutions of higher learning that should anyone grab their assets, they would be doing so unlawfully… The people of Zimbabwe want massive investment in the country and not self-serving political statements that have nothing to do with the collective position of government.

According to SGRR3 and Matyszak (2016), these disagreements confuse the non-indigenous businesses and potential investors and the implementing agency (i.e. the NIEEB), the general public, and other government departments. The mixed messages originated from the top political heads in the inclusive government, all pointing to different policy positions. The confusion made it difficult for the indigenisation policy implementers to know whom to listen to between the Prime Minister's office or the president's or following the indigenisation statutes, which themselves were also contradictory. For many respondents (e.g. SGO4, SGRR1, SGRR5 and SGOR2), the confusion from these mixed messages is the one reason that made some companies decide to comply with the indigenisation regulations and others decide not to. Commenting on this, one respondent submitted that "*those that complied later on regretted as those which did not comply nothing happened to them*" (Interview: SGO4, 16 June 2018).

On the GNU factor, former minister responsible for indigenisation, Saviour Kasukuwere, the ZANU-PF national commissar at the time, while interviewed by Baffour Ankoma of NewAfrican Special Report about the policy position taken by the two MDC formations on the indigenisation programme, said the following:

> The MDC was formed to oppose land reform. I think I have not encountered the same level of resistance as land reform encountered because no party was formed to oppose indigenisation …Well, what do you expect? It is their DNA, they were born to oppose the people of Zimbabwe, so there is nothing new about it. They were formed to oppose the land reform programme, so naturally they must extend their hatred to indigenisation (NewAfrican Special Report, 2013, p. 50).

The former minister continues:

> The country has been run since 2009 by a government of national unity, making for a coalition of mixed messages, I should add. So foreign companies will come to my office here and say: "Yes minister, we are going to comply with the indigenisation regulations." And then, from here, they get a phone call in the next hour from somebody who tells them: "What are you doing? You are perpetuating Zanu-PF rule. You are empowering Zanu-PF" (NewAfrican Special Report, 2013, p. 50).

The MDC-T party position on indigenisation further supported this viewpoint. The party castigated indigenisation as the strategic mistake towards the path for economic recovery. While giving its disapproval to the indigenisation policy, the MDC-T National Council issued a resolution highlighting its policy position. Part of the resolution reads:

> asset stripping, looting, patronage, clientelism, corruption and self-aggrandisement euphemistically referred to as indigenisation and empowerment…[which] is not demand-driven and in any event is based on a narrow model of transferring shares to a few black elite that can afford them and does not amount to genuine wealth creation and distribution to poor people of Zimbabwe (MDC-T National Council, 2012).

However, this was met with counterarguments from the architects and proponents of indigenisation. They interpreted the MDC-T's anti-indigenisation claims in ways that authenticated the allegations that the opposition party is a western founded, funded and directed proxy establishment. This was so because its negative stance on indigenisation was interpreted to mean that the opposition party is about protecting the white monopoly capital (WMC) or the western multinational corporations (WMC) instead of lobbying for the emergence and development of the competitive indigenous corporations. Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted to mean that the opposition's claims were without merits. Findings have reported that indigenous citizens who benefited from indigenisation, particularly extractive industry indigenisation, are often not the deserving poor but the undeserving rich.

While commenting on the launch and commissioning of various CSOTs done by the former president, the late Robert Mugabe, the MDC-T quickly pointed out the glairing electioneering undertones behind the extractive industry indigenisation. The opposition party said, "ZANU-PF is on a crusade to fleece companies to fund its elections war chest" (Mlambo, 2013, para. 19). These findings are consistent with the literature. For example, Southal (2018) argues that when the 2013 elections drew near, the predatory elements in ZANU-PF, particularly those strategically linked to the security sector and the mining companies, started to voice for the full implementation of the policy.

Emerging from the preceding submissions on the GNU factor is that it was not the nonindigenous businesses that presented an impediment for the indigenisation to realise its set goals and objectives of empowering the disadvantaged indigenous people through indigenisation. Instead, the impediment was the lack of a single government policy position on indigenisation. Scepticisms

among the opposition ranks that implementing the indigenisation was tantamount to empowering and strengthening ZANU-PF's grip on power were also a significant contributing factor to this. However, the reason for the scepticisms is worth-considering. The scepticisms were not products of abstractions but rather empirical evidence on how political and business elites are racketeering and profiteering from the indigenisation deals. These racketeering and profiteering subterfuges are done at the expense of benefiting the deserving rural poor indigenous citizens, who are marginally benefiting from the nonindigenous mining companies operating in their areas. Here, one case is the shady deals entered between the government and nonindigenous mining companies operating in the Chiadzwa Diamond Field in Marange. The deals caused massive displacements of rural Chiadzwa residents. According to the findings, the displaced residents were relocated to the colonial equivalent of Gwai and Shaangai reserves, such as Arda Transau, where they do not have enough land for agriculture (only 400 square metres per family). Furthermore, they are paying water bills at US$4 per month (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2017) in their resettled areas, a basic commodity they enjoyed free of charge before the displacements.

Commenting on this issue of commodification of the once non-commodified basic goods (i.e. electricity and water, for example), one Arda Transau resident respondent had this to say, "*Metered water was introduced to us and because we couldn't pay the bills, the City Council [City of Mutare] had to switch it off, and up to now, we don't have access to water*" (Interview: RR5, 30 June 2018). This situation is against the backdrop that in Chiadzwa, these people had boreholes and wells where they used to get water free of charge. The source of fire was also free of charge as firewood is readily available in Chiadzwa. This reality is suggestive of an overlooked tragic tale of commoditising the once 'commoning' and free basic services. For the displaced residents, the experiences bring painful memories of colonialism and imperialism. Instead of fairly compensating them their boreholes and wells as well as the source of fire, the government saw it fit to allow commodification of the same basic goods. This is notwithstanding that even the Constitution treats access to clean water as fundamental basic human rights. The implication of this may confirm what was already known about the uncaring attitude of the government towards the plight of the benighted masses. The acts of commoditising water and energy sources allow further disenfranchisement of the already disenfranchised rural indigenous citizens. However, these are the same people who should have benefited more from the indigenisation of the nonindigenous

mining firms doing business in Chiadzwa. One government respondent sums it all when she said, "*This pushed them [the relocated residents] into positions and spaces of destitution and vagabondage*" (Interview: SGO4, 16 June 2018). Following on from these submissions, one may say that the discovery of the diamond in Marange and how extractive industry indigenisation was implemented through the CSOTs systematically put the Marange residents into the circles and cycles of poverty.

All this is against the background that the displaced residents had once resided on top of the precious mineral. Therefore, taking this as a point of departure, one could say the opposition had every reason to stop the nonindigenous firms from complying with the indigenisation regulations. Complying with indigenisation implies giving "Zanu-pf an advantage" (NewAfrican Special Report, 2013, p. 52). However, this position, too, is not empowering to the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. However, ZANU-PF interpreted MDC-T's anti-indigenisation position to mean "*the uncalled-for resistance and hatred by the opposition of not wanting to see the people of Zimbabwe empowered*" (Interview: SGRR5, 22 June 2018). In corroborating with this submission, another respondent said that:

> *It is unto the nature of the MDC to be sell-outs. They don't even think of the level suffering Zimbabweans are going through because of the sanctions they invited. Do you think someone who invited sanctions can empathise or sympathise with the poor? They are selfish. They just don't want to see ZANU-PF empowering the people. They know that if the indigenisation succeeded ZANU-PF was going to sweep them in in the 2013 elections. Hence, for their political survival they had to throw aspersions in the policy* (Interview: GDOR2, 03 July 2018).

Premised on the preceding discussion is that the binary between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations created an impasse on the government's policy position on indigenisation. This situation indeed put Zimbabwe at an indigenisation crossroads, a policy crisis that was both conflating and converging at the same time. During the GNU, the binary was too wider to be reconciled as it was rooted not in hatred per se of the individuals in the said political parties. Instead, it was rooted in the political and economic doctrinal differences, one inclined to the extreme left-wing and fascism politics (i.e. ZANU-PF) while the other to the extreme right-wing and democratic politics (i.e. the two MDC formations). It is critically important to note that when the differences are based on ideological creeds, it is difficult to reconcile, as this would suggest that one must abandon their long-held belief systems for a compromise. Findings show that during the GNU, such a political compromise was unobtainable.

In part, the untenable political and economic ideological binary openly manifested in their diametric attitudes towards the indigenisation during GNU, led Zimbabwe's overall human development to plunge. The binary had severe economic ramifications. With regards to human development, in 2010, Zimbabwe was ranked the lowest in the world. The country was sitting at 169 out of the 169 countries surveyed with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.140 in 2010 (Human Development Report, 2010). In 2018, Zimbabwe was ranked 150 out of the 189 countries with an HDI of 0.563 in 2018, which when "discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.435, a loss of 22.8 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices" (UNDP Report, 2019, p. 5). In 2010, the HDI was the lowest since 1980 and, worse still, it was considered lower than the one the country had during the 1970s (Chipika & Malaba, 2011).

9.2 International contestations and sanctions

The effect of sanctions – whether interpreted as comprehensive or targeted or smart or restrictive, legitimate or illegitimate, legal or illegal, warranted or unwarranted, evil or not – on inhibiting extractive industry indigenisation from realising its set goals, is contentious. Sharp divergences, rooted mainly in political and economic ideological differences, could be seen in the findings expressing the impact of sanctions on extractive industry indigenisation. On the one hand, the anti-establishment is of the view that the imaginary sanctions, as according to them, sanctions are mere restrictive measures targeted to certain individuals and companies, "*are of no effect whatsoever to the mess created by the unpopular and never wanted indigenisation",* remarks CSR4 (Interview: 20 June 2018). Notably, since IEE Act's enactment in 2008, the MDC notables vowed to undo by rescinding all its governing laws once they win the polls. For them, the self-acknowledged neoliberals, the indigenisation policy meant closing the country for business. In its 2018 election manifesto, dubbed MDC Alliance SMART Pledge, the MDC Alliance promised to delete all the indigenisation laws and replace them with what it termed the localisation agenda. In its words, the MDC Alliance promised: "[t]otal repeal of the indigenisation and empowerment laws and the creation of a new broad-based empowerment strategy that is premised on localisation" (MDC Alliance Manifesto, 2018, p. 30). This reasoning is in line with its democratic and transformative developmental state economic development model, although criticised as utopian by the ZANU-PF apologetics. Overall, the central contention is that the MDC formations

oppose the indigenisation efforts for regime change purposes while ZANU-PF supports the policy for regime survival purposes.

On the other hand, the government and ZANU-PF are claiming that the success of extractive industry indigenisation is being shattered by the effects of what they would like to call illegal, illegitimate and evil comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on the country by Britain and her western allies. According to this viewpoint, the illegality, evilness, and illegitimacy of international sanctions stem from being unsanctioned by the United Nations. Sanctions are blamed for fuelling regime change in Zimbabwe. Commenting on the effects of international sanctions and regime change efforts by the West through the opposition political outfits on the indigenisation programme in general, the ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013, p. 7) argues that "[n]otably, our achievements have been blighted since 1999 by the twin evils of regime change and the illegal economic sanctions."

The post-2000 Zimbabwe can best be described as a pariah, neopatrimonial and predatory state (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018). On its pariah edifice, the country is a global pariah. This international status was caused by bilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed on the regime, targeted individuals and their companies following the gross violation of human rights and failure to protect property rights during the 2000-2003 land grab without compensation (Mills, Obasanjo, Herbst & Biti, 2019). As a result, the western international community imposed the following international sanctions on the country. First, The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA), enacted by the George Bush administration in 2001. Second, the UK's financial sanctions (i.e. The Zimbabwe (Financial Sanctions) Regulations of the 24th of April 2009). Third, the European Union's (EU) Council Regulation (EC) No. 314/2004, which are annually reviewed. Equally important to note is that ZIDERA was followed by a litany of Executive Orders, regulations, federal register notices and statutes that are operationalising its implementation. For example, Exec. Order 13288 of March 6, 2003, Exec. Order 13391 of November 22, 2005, and Exec. Order 13469 of July 25, 2008. One example of the regulations is the Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations/31 C.F.R. Part 541 issued to implement Executive Order 13288). All these US sanctions by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) were issued pursuant to the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq*.) and the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 *et seq*.) (NEA).

The economic sanctions were imposed after the EU, and the IMF had withdrawn their financial and technical support from the Government of Zimbabwe (Chingono, 2011; Chengu, 2009; Noko, 2011). In spite of the sanctions variably going by such euphemistic names as 'restrictive measures', 'travel restrictions', 'travel bans', 'targeted sanctions' and 'smart sanctions to targeted individuals' the findings from mainly government respondents and documents reveal that the sanctions are comprehensive. The main reason for this viewpoint is that international sanctions are financial and economic. Commenting on this viewpoint, Dendere (2015, p. 18) argues that the enactment of the IEE Act in March 2008 prompted international speculators and market analysts to denounce the Act as the one that "effectively seal Zimbabwe's fate as a pariah to international capital."

However, arguing from the viewpoint of the international sanctions being targeted and restrictive measures, one may argue that the sanctions are giving travel bans and freezing funds and other economic resources only of the Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs). These are certain 181 individuals, bodies and entities of the government of Zimbabwe. So, they are not affecting every Zimbabwean. However, trade restriction sanctions restricting import-export supply from and to Zimbabwe from such countries as Canada and Australia raise concerns as to whether they are still targeted or sweeping. These are hitting hard on the poor ordinary Zimbabweans. For Mills, Obasanjo, Herbst and Biti (2019), the overarching consequent result of these international sanctions weakens the country's financial and economic sectors. International sanctions locked the taps of the international financial capital markets for Zimbabwe.

Nonetheless, the Government of Zimbabwe is surviving the sanctions, although at the expense of the suffering public. The situation between the ZANU-PF led government, on the one hand, and the countries that imposed sanctions on it, on the other, is, as CSR1 put it, is like the decades-long 'Israeli-Palestinian impasse.' Neither of the two parties is too weak enough to be destroyed by the other nor too strong enough to completely destroy the other. The ZANU-PF government, notably post-2000, demonstrates how a competitive authoritarian government can defy the odds of international sanctions without a strong economy. The government has survived almost 20 years against mounting political and economic resistance, both from within and without. Mandaza (2018, p. 7) contends that these are the survival tactics during a period of the "years of the securocratic state."

However, one can argue that the integrity of the western international community as the vanguard of democracy and the rule of law has been put to test in handling the Zimbabwean question. Put differently, Zimbabwe is illustrating the "*democratic hypocrisy*" (Interview: AR1, 20 July 2018) of the North. Findings show that if the Western international community is sincere about sanctioning a rogue government, the same ZANU-PF government would have been slapped with sweeping sanctions during or soon after the Gukurahundi massacre happened from early 1983 to late 1987. According to the Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace in Zimbabwe, & Legal Resources Foundation (Zimbabwe) Report (1997), an estimated number of more than 20 000 of mostly Ndebele speaking people from the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces were butchered in cold blood by the 5th Brigade soldiers trained by the North Korean instructors. The government was not sanctioned for all these atrocities.

Ironically, the Gukurahundi massacre was prosecuted at a time when the British military instructors, the British Military Advisory and Technical Team (BMATT), were in the country assisting with standardizing and professionalising the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres who have been integrated into the national army. The team arrived in the country in 1981 and left in 2001 (Tendi, 2020 & 2014; Mandaza, 2016). Commenting on the irony Sydney Sekeremayi, former minister of Defence, and State for National Security who was the defence minister during the Gukurahundi period, submitted the following while commenting about security sector reforms:

> May I take this opportunity to urge you to remain steadfast against the rhetoric and cheap propaganda by retrogressive forces about the need for security reforms in Zimbabwe. Our security establishment is very professional. The British Military Advisory and Training Team left the country in 2001 after a 20-year stint with our army. They did not complain then, why now? In the same vein, the President's Department held various exchange programmes with other Western intelligence services, among them CIA (the United States' Central Intelligence Agency), BND (Germany intelligence) and M16 (British intelligence) (Mandaza, 2016, para. 3)

Furthermore, Nkomo (2001) and Mandaza (2016) reveal that mostly the white manned former Rhodesian Air Force bases crushed the Ndebele people during the infamous Gukurahundi episodes. One of the civil society respondents preferred to call the Gukurahundi massacres "*several episodes because it consisted of concentrated efforts of genocides*" (Interview: AR1, 20 July 2018). In the words of Mandaza (2016c, p. 21)

> It has to be recalled that, in the early years of independence that also witnessed the internecine conflict between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces at Entumbane and, subsequently, the Gukurahundi episode, this white manned and/or former Rhodesian Air Force was a key instrument in the defeat of ZAPU and its military wing as the Zimbabwean state under Robert Mugabe exorcised itself of any rivals to him.

However, the BMATT chose to remain silent in the face of such atrocities taking place under their noses. No sanctions of any sort, whether bilateral or multilateral, comprehensive or restrictive, smart or sweeping, diplomatic or economic, military, sport or environmental, were even proposed against the rogue regime perpetrating such gross human rights violations. Now, the 2000-2003 FTLRP claimed less than a ¼ of the 1% lives Gukurahundi claimed, with the white people on the receiving end of the massacres and expropriations without compensation. Suddenly, Zimbabwe is transformed into a global pariah. The Western international community slapped the government with sanctions. Findings show that western countries are not in for protecting human rights. Instead, they are there to protect and defend their strategic interests in the country, in this case, the land which had been expropriated without compensation from their kith and kin. In corroboration with this, Bond (2019, p. 2) has this to say, "So his belated, urgent and chaotic land reform- against a few thousand mainly-reactionary white settlers who for a century had controlled nearly all Zimbabwe's good farmland- gained him [Robert Mugabe] permanent hatred from the Western establishment." From this viewpoint, one may argue that it is the land issue, which the ZANU-PF government is said to have failed to protect people's (white people's, to be precise) property rights prompted the North to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe.

Nonetheless, by explaining the hypocritical political behaviour of the western international community within the grand scheme of the geopolitical dimension of the time in mind, one can arrive at a contrary viewpoint. Arguably, the attention was cast on the war tone countries in the region that were yet to attain independence (i.e. South Africa and Namibia) and others reeling from the post-independence civil wars (i.e. Angola and Mozambique). One can also reason that Zimbabwe's Gukurahundi was given a blind eye the same way the 1994 Rwanda genocide was ignored. Much of the focus, then, was on South Africa, the economic powerhouse of the continent where economic uncertainties abound as it was during it was undergoing its transition to democracy. The reason being that at the time, many of the international companies headquartered in the country were threatening to delist from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (Bond, 2019; Mbeki, 2009). Thus, the global attention was on countries in transition rather

than Zimbabwe, which had already attained independence. Also, Mugabe gave an understandable justification for prosecuting Gukurahundi as he indicated that he was trying to avoid a Mozambique or Angola like post-independence civil unrest in the country by ruthlessly dealing with those he considered dissidents.

In the 1980s, the government treated ZAPU, the opposition party of the time, with much brutal force (i.e. systematic killings, detentions, torture, witch hunts, among many others) than he did to the current opposition political party, the MDC. Nevertheless, the government was slapped with international sanctions following the less brutal treatment of the opposition MDC, and nothing of that sort was even proposed when it committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 1980s. The possible, although contentious, answer to this could be after the whole continent attained independence, the focus of the international community shifted to human rights and protection of property rights, the very issues the government failed to do.

The redistributive (and retributive) policies (e.g. the FTLRP and indigenisation) Zimbabwe pursued made the country an epitome of a global pariah. Most countries around the globe, including her neighbouring Southern African Development Community (SADC) member countries, are no longer feeling safe engaging or trading with her. It is almost certain that the continued implementation of these redistributive and retributive policies made Zimbabwe excruciatingly suffer from widespread global isolation, which manifested itself in trade, financial, academic, cultural embargoes, diplomatic ostracism, freezing of financial accounts of the top political leadership and travel bans to the targeted individuals. It is against this background that in 2019, Zimbabwe's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade calculated the costs of sanctions to be over US$42 billion between 2001 and 2019 (Allafrica, 2019; The Herald, 2021; Sunday Mail, 2021; Moyo, Nhliziyo & Fayayo, 2020). The following is the breakdown of the costs according to the ministry's report: a) US$21 billion GDP reduction; b) lost bilateral donor support of about US$4.5 billion per year; c) lost US$12 billion in loans from the international financial institutions (e.g. African Development Bank, IMF, and the World Bank); d) lost US$18 billion loans from commercial loans (The Herald, 2021; Sunday Mail, 2021; Allafrica, 2019). Corroborating with these figures, ZANU-PF calculated what it considered the sanctions burden to the tune of US$42 billion (ZANU-PF Manifesto, 2013). The calculations were done, as shown in Table 6.3 below.

Table 9 1: The $42 billion cost of the sanctions burden

Description	Annual Cost (US$ Million)
Donor support	36
IMF, IBRD and AfDB loans	79
Commercial loans	431
GDP reduction	3,499
The opportunity cost of sanctions for 12 years (2001-2013)	42, 000

Source: ZANU-PF Manifesto (2013, p. 50).

Corroborating with this perspective of international sanctions hugely costing Zimbabwe in socio-economic terms, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights in Zimbabwe, Alena Douhan, put this figure to over US$100 billion. In her words, Special Rapporteur said the following:

> It is reported that since 2001, Zimbabwe might have lost access to more than 100 billion USD in bilateral donor support, international commercial loans, and grants and loans from the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Due to this, Zimbabwe had a reported 34 billion USD funding gap in infrastructure financing in 2017. The inability to generate additional revenue and the country's poor economic performance has limited the government's ability to provide basic social services (United Nations Special Rapporteur Report, 2021, p. 5).

While urging the western international community to remove these sanctions, and also encouraging a "meaningful structured dialogue on political reform, human rights and the rule of law" (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2021, para. 1), the United Nations Special Rapporteur found that:

> Over the last 20 years, sanctions and various forms of over-compliance with sanctions have had an insidious ripple effect on the economy of Zimbabwe and on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, including access to health, food, safe drinking water and sanitation, education and employment (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2021, para. 5).
>
> This situation also limits Zimbabwe's ability to guarantee the functioning of public institutions, delivery of services, and maintenance of essential infrastructure, and undermines the right to development of the Zimbabwean people and impedes the achievement of the sustainable development goals (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2021, para. 5).

In the extractive industry, the Parliament of Zimbabwe (2013) revealed that Zimbabwe's diamonds, particularly those from Marange, are currently sold at 25% less their value because some of the diamond companies (and many other mining companies) in the country are still on the United States (US) sanctions list. As of March 2021, the following are some of the strategic

mining companies that are still on the US sanctions list: the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), Mbada Diamonds, Marange Resources, Oryx Diamonds, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (Zisco). Thus, as over 80% of all international financial settlements are done on the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system (Cross, 2021), American sanctions are making it difficult for the Zimbabwean diamond companies (and the Mining Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) as well) to sell their diamonds at competitive prices at the international diamond markets. On the SWIFT system, the American Treasury Office of Foreign Assets and Control (OFAC) scrutinise all international financial transactions above US$5,000, and Washington had instructed international banks to unilaterally intercept and detain any transaction above this figure going or coming from the sanctioned countries, individuals or organisations.

Further articulating on this, Parliament of Zimbabwe (2013, p. 5) stated that "the sanctioned diamond companies are trading their diamonds through unconventional means because major international banks, insurance companies and couriers do not want to be associated with Marange diamonds." However, the sanctions on diamond companies are notwithstanding the fact that the companies are in full compliance with the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). While commenting on the relationship between international sanctions and indigenisation, Pindiriri (2020, p. 1018) reveals that "The findings rather suggest a harmful impact of indigenization policy on livelihoods. Indigenization policy was more destructive than sanctions, as also shown by leverage plots… Likewise, the poorly-planned introduction of indigenization policy in Zimbabwe magnified sanctions' negative impact."

More importantly, the indigenisation policy, instead of addressing uneven development configuration, indigenisation can be credited for further perpetuating it. Despite being an outcast state, indigenisation policy may be considered internationally unacceptable, the ZANU-PF government continues to implement it. Findings show that indigenisation is one of the survival tactics the global pariah, after suffering from the effects of the 2007-2008 subprime mortgages triggered the Great Recession, would pursue to keep afloat. Commenting on this viewpoint, one respondent contended that:

> *Had it not been these radical policies like land reform and indigenisation ZANU-PF, and Mugabe in particular, would have been removed from power long ago, around 2000. For survival reasons,*

> *the government had to embark on doing something unusual. If the government did not embark on such policies how do you think it was going to keep on surviving under such punitive sanctions? It wasn't gonna be possible. Every sanctioned country has to do something for survival. How are you gonna pay your civil servants if the industry has been killed by sanctions? All that I am saying is that radical policies were employed as survival strategies by a government subjected under sanctions* (Interview: SGRR5, 22 June 2018).

Following on from this reasoning, one can argue that the cases of corruption, money laundering, racketeering and fraud that transcended the indigenisation processes, particularly in the mining sector, are, in part, externally induced (i.e. sanctions induced). According to the findings, you cannot put on sanctions powerful politicians controlling the levers of power and expect them to do nothing to recover the lost wealth and preserve the regime from collapsing. He or she will always do the obvious: massive looting, stealing, plundering and robbing public resources. Transforming rich and powerful politicians into paupers and expecting them to do nothing in return is close to unthinkable. Put it another way, the act of freezing the assets of the SDNs of Zimbabwe outside necessitated an unprecedented rate of both legal and illegal ways accumulation by dispossession, using indigenisation as the policy instrument. Indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular are presenting strategic policy instruments for the political and business elites to engage in accumulation by dispossession. According to the protagonist of accumulation by dispossession theory, Harvey (2003), the theory is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few.

As some findings reveal, the need to recover the frozen assets and finances and protect the regime from crumbling is the indigenisation's primary intent, although remaining mostly unspoken and unwritten. To this end, empowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens becomes secondary. This situation may explain why extractive industry indigenisation is resulting in more of disempowering outcomes than empowering outcomes among the marginalised indigenous citizens. With this realisation, one can now argue that indigenisation, in the first place, was not meant to achieve the set objective of empowering the disenfranchised indigenous citizens. Instead, to save as the strategy for accumulation by dispossession by the elites. Articulating on these unwritten rules of the game, one academic respondent argued indigenisation's "*major intention remained unspoken. However, that it is not spoken out doesn't mean that it is non-existent or not operational*" (Interview: AR2, 23 June 2018).

Therefore, it is important to note that the hidden objective is often more important than the written or spoken out. Concerning indigenisation, its intentions are increasingly remaining unwritten yet more important than those presented in black and white. Unfortunately, this is leaving many in that space where they have to guess the policy's real intention. The actions on the ground that is when the policy is being implemented, notably in the extractive industry, are not pointing to attaining the written down and spoken out policy intentions. The written intentions point to levelling the uneven development configuration by mainstreaming the disenfranchised constituencies in the national economy. Indigenisation of the economy and empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens through capital restructuring is deemed to be the only practical alternative to achieve this. However, what is obtaining on the ground is a shocking contrast. While the policy is indigenising the economy, it is not empowering the targeted beneficiaries.

According to the findings, what the policy is achieving, i.e. the perpetuating uneven development, is originally intended. Unfortunately, we failed to discern this from the onset when the policy was gazetted and passed and when the enabling legislation was enacted. The policy, which the government never implemented according to the plan, or to use Mandaza's (2016, p. 2) words which may connote the same, "remains largely unimplemented", is smartly couched with nationalistic, economic independence, emancipatory, social and economic justice rhetoric. Nonetheless, in the mining sector, it is not yielding anything beneficial among the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. One may argue that it is increasingly becoming a practical manifestation of the proverbial 'tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.'

As early as 2008, that is soon after the IEE Act was signed into law by the former president, the late Robert Mugabe, Marian Tupy, a policy analyst at Cato Institute, castigated the IEE Act. She argues that the Act was "yet another step on Zimbabwe's road to economic suicide" (Dendere, 2015, p. 18) that is designed to "expropriate non-black owners, while providing the ZANU-PF (ruling party) elite with a new source of income. The biggest victim of the Orwellian measure… will be the black majority" (ibid, p. 18). Marian Tupy foresaw the Act as the foot-soldier for accumulation by dispossession for the elites to recuperate from the severe injuries of sanctions that saw them losing most of their externalised wealth. This situation may further confirm the already known elusiveness of contentious indigenisation.

9.3 Shunning away investment

One critically important popular theme that came from the findings is that indigenisation, in its equity-transfer version, means 'closure'. It scares away the much-needed investments, both foreign and domestic alike (Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reforms Agenda, 2018; Vision 2030, 2018). In the mining sector, indigenisation is making Zimbabwe perform poorly in the top five factors international investors look at before investing in the country (Baissac, Maubrey, van der Merwe, & van Onselen, 2016). These are levels of company taxes; quality and cost of utilities; permissiveness of the business regulatory environment; access to transport infrastructure; and tariffs, duties and rules of origin.

Commenting on the issue of business closures following indigenisation, one respondent cautioned that "*investment, foreign or domestic, is like a shy person who doesn't go to where he or she is not loved or feel attracted*" (Interview: AR2, 23 June 2018). The academic continued, "*FDI is just like a fearful and nervous person who shuns where he or she is feeling threatened*" (Interview: AR2, 23 June 2018). Corroborating with this viewpoint that indigenisation made Zimbabwe investment unattractive, Fatehi (1994, p. 187) argues that dirigiste policies create an "unacceptable business risk." In support of this perspective, the findings of Afrobarometer Round 7 (conducted in 2018) and Round 6 (conducted in 2014) consistently showed that more than 50% of the respondents agreed with statement two than they did to statement one. Statement one reads: '*Indigenizing the economy by taking over ownership of foreign-owned companies is the most effective way of creating jobs for all Zimbabweans*.' Statement two reads: '*Encouraging foreign investment would be a more effective way of creating jobs for all Zimbabweans*.' This is shown in Figure 9.1 below.

Figure 9 1: Indigenising the economy versus encouraging FDI



Afrobarometer (Round 7, 2016/2018)



Afrobarometer (Round 6, 2014/2015)

Source: Afrobarometer Online Data.

Pursuing inward-looking economic policies creates a perception that is inimical to the country's economic prospects, especially for the low-income country whose extractive economy is FDI driven. As shown in the two figures below, Zimbabwe's ease of doing business since the government started pursuing indigenisation has been difficult, averaging 162.60 from 2008. It reached an all-time high of 171 in 2011 and a record low of 153 in 2014. In corroborating with this viewpoint of indigenisation making the country unattractive to international capital Shumba and Zindiye (2016) argue that in 2016 Zimbabwe ranked 180 out of 189 countries on the ease of doing business. Concerning the overall attractiveness to international capital, the 2014 report of the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness placed Zimbabwe at 131 out of 148 countries. Corroborating with this, the World Bank's Doing Business Report of 2015 ranked Zimbabwe at 171 out of surveyed 189 countries. This is after the Bank had ranked Zimbabwe at 170 regarding the same in the previous year. On the impact of indigenisation on FDI, the submissions made by The African Development Zimbabwe Economic Report (2018, p. 57) are illuminating:

> Since 2009, the government has attempted to attract FDI through several measures. But barriers such as the indigenization law and economic empowerment laws and limited protection of property rights are significant. BMI ranks Zimbabwe 45 out of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for investment attractiveness because of deteriorating economic

growth, political instability, and doubts over creditworthiness of the government (which does not have a sovereign credit rating).

Figure 9 2: Ease of doing business in Zimbabwe



Correspondingly, the country's Competitive Index recorded an all-time low between 2007 and 2018, averaging 3.22 Points from 2007 until 2018. It recorded an all-time high of as low as 3.53 Points in 2015 and an all-time low of 2.77 Points in 2010. This is shown in the Figure below. The corresponding Competitive Ranking also went up, signifying the significant role indigenisation is playing in making the country business uncompetitive and FDI unattractive. This is also shown in the figure below. All this is hitting hard the mining.

Figure 9 3: Zimbabwe's competitive index

For one reason, Zimbabwe's low competitive index and easy of doing business are more attributed to extractive industry indigenisation. As shown in Figure 9.4 below, the mining sector has been Zimbabwe's major FDI destination for years. So, the fact that many indigenisation deals were concluded and implemented in the sector negatively affected both country's ease of doing business and competitive index as indigenisation by its very nature scares away FDI.

Figure 9.4: Zimbabwe's FDI inflow trends by sector

$ million

Sector	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Agriculture	2.1	444.8	20.8	2.5	10.5	12.7	88.6	12.8
Construction	258.8	120.9	119.8	129.5	33.5	71.6	24.1	106.1
Manufacturing	53.1	670.0	58.1	158.0	646.8	1,936.5	160.4	488.5
Mining	186.1	3,687.3	688.1	214.9	159.7	488.8	156.9	576.6
Services	18.1	128,099.3	41.7	172.4	286.3	263.5	167.5	153.5
Tourism	510.0	1,583.1	1.1	3.4	3.3	0.5	3.3	17.0
Transport	1.7	—	0.2	5.3	2.4	2.6	6.5	0.3
Energy	—	—	—	—	—	424.0	1,692.5	162.5
Total	520.5	6,634.2	929.9	685.9	1,142.5	3,200.3	2,299.7	1,517.3

Source: The African Development Zimbabwe Economic Report (2018, p. 58)

The country's unattractiveness to international capital is further worsened by the rate at which the government repudiated the signed international investment agreements concluded with international mining investors. The landmark case in point here is the Zimplats Holdings deal the government repudiated in less than a year after its conclusion. As if that was enough to project Zimbabwe as an unsafe international investment destination, the government went on to expropriate without compensation the mining claims of the giant platinum company. However, there was almost a consensus from the findings obtained from both interviews and documents that a country like Zimbabwe is the one that should have been doing all sorts of persuasive neoliberal strategies to lure international capital. The country's economy thrives well when it is largely FDI in outlook. These neoliberal strategies are the following ten principles of Washington Consensus: (a) deregulation; (b) privatisation; (c) legal security for property rights; (d) fiscal discipline; (e) tax reform; (f) trade liberalisation; (g) competitive exchange rates; (h) market-determined interest rates; (i) inward FDI liberalisation; and (j) cutting on subsidies. The unattractiveness to international capital is further worsened by the country's inability to access

international capital from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), e.g. from the Official Development Assistance (ODA), World Bank, and the IMF. Mills, Obasanjo, Herbst and Biti (2019), Simpson and Hawkins (2018) and Southal (2018) also share the preceding views.

The consequent result of scaring away international capital is a considerable plummeting of FDI inflows into the country since the inception of indigenisation in 2007. As recorded by Dore (2018) and Bhoroma (2018), compared to its regional counterparts of Zambia, Botswana and Namibia, Zimbabwe, between 2012 and 2016, is the only country that consistently received a yearly FDI flow of less than US$500 million (Kanyenze, Chitambara & Tyson, 2017). Comparatively, in 2014 alone Zambia received US$2.5 billion in FDI flow while in 2015 alone, Botswana received US$1.8 billion, Zambia US$2 billion and South Africa US$6 billion (Kanyenze, Chitambara & Tyson, 2017). However, as shown in Figures 9.4 and Table 9.3 below, Zimbabwe's low FDI inflows relative to its regional neighbours is despite the fact that during the said period, FDI was on the increase compared to the years before. Furthermore, Figure 9.5 below shows the detailed account of Zimbabwe's FDI flows between 2000 and 2016, including the ebbs and flows.

Figure: 9.5: Zimbabwe's Foreign Direct Investment Trends



Source: Chigumira et al. (2016, p. 31).

Figure 9.6: A detailed account of Zimbabwe's FDI flows between 2000 and 2016

Indicator	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Inward flows ($ million)	23	103	166	387	400	400	545	421	319
Inward stock ($ million)	1,238	1,383	1,814	2,201	2,601	3,001	3,546	3,967	4,286
Inward flows (% of GDP)	0.31	1.65	1.76	3.53	3.22	2.97	3.84	3.03	2.35
Inward flows (% of gross fixed capital formation)	2.61	82.58	8.10	18.75	19.22	22.82	29.09	22.97	—
Inward flows (% of world total)	0.002	0.011	0.012	0.024	0.025	0.028	0.041	0.024	0.018

Source: The African Development Zimbabwe Economic Report (2018, p. 57).

Table 9.2: Zimbabwe's FDI inflows relative to its regional neighbours between 2009 and 2015

Country	FDI inflows during the following years (US$ millions)						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Zimbabwe	105	166	387	400	400	545	421
Zambia	426	634	1 110	2433	1810	2484	1653
Mozambique	898	1018	3559	5629	6175	4902	3711
South Africa	7502	3636	4243	4559	8300	5712	1722
Namibia	506	793	816	1133	801	414	1078
Angola	2206	3227	3024	6898	7120	3881	8681

Source: World Investment Report (2016).

As shown in Table 9.3 above, while Zimbabwe's FDI flows seem to be increasing over the years, the increase is very low as it is lagging behind its regional counterparts due to unattractive policies and laws- notably those related to indigenisation. As shown in Table 9.4, the FDI flow in the extractive industry has been declining during the same period.

Table 9.3: FDI flow in Zimbabwe's extractive industry between 2009 and 2016

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Amount in (US$ millions)	6 483	2 694	8 256	4 554	3 361	3 241	1 974	2 966

Source: The African Development Zimbabwe Economic Report (2018, p. 57).

While not ignoring the unattractiveness of indigenisation to FDI, Kondo (2017, p. 142) gives an illuminating reason for Zimbabwe's steady increase in FDI inflow:

> While FDI in Zimbabwe has steadily increased, the highest inflow was the USD 545 million received in 2014. Much of the increase in Zimbabwe could be attributed to FDI increases

> globally, after the global economic crisis of 2008 – 2009. For example, in 2015, FDI to developing countries reached an all-time high of USD 765 billion. This was just under the inflows of developed economies which almost doubled (84% increase), reaching a grand total of USD 962 billion, in the same year. Another reason for the increase in FDI in Zimbabwe was also the focus on greenfield investments in Land-Locked Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) in Africa, such as Zimbabwe. As a result, countries, such as, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi, Malawi and Zambia, were all targets for the expansion of banking services. These inflows were also amplified by intra-Africa investments in communications. In addition, relaxations in the enforcement of the investment quota can also be attributed to the marginal increases in FDI in Zimbabwe.

While in 2009, South Africa and Angola were the only ones receiving more than US$1 billion FDI, in 2015, it was only Zimbabwe with less than that amount- all other regional counterparts had already passed this US$1 billion FDI mark. According to Chikohomero (2019), Kondo (2017) and Matyszak (2017), the answer for Zimbabwe's stunted FDI growth and significant divestments is indigenisation.

As the 2013 ZANU-PF election manifesto had indigenisation as the main agenda, Matyszak (2014) asserts that when ZANU-PF won the polls in 2013, "[n]ews of the outcome resulted in considerable investor flight. The bourse immediately plunged by 21%, its largest fall since 2009. Company closures and retrenchments, shrinking the already small tax base, continued apace." The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) is reported to have lost US$1 billion "in the first week after the election" (Matyszak, 2017, p. 20). The reason for massive capital flight was ZANU-PF's clear intention to pursue indigenisation further, as its 2013 election manifesto was anchored on indigenisation. The country had once witnessed investor panic of this proportion in November 1999 following the news about expropriating the white farmers' land without compensation (Mills, Obasanjo, Herbst & Biti, 2019). However, in defending the indigenisation position on FDI, the former president, the late Robert Mugabe, maintained that foreign investors who are not prepared to come to Zimbabwe and comply with the indigenisation laws are free not bother to come to his country. The implications of all these may be that indigenisation is strengthening the "investor-shy" (Matyszak, 2017, p. 3) status Zimbabwe attained since 2000. The economic crackdown that followed investor panic due to indigenisation led the country's Human Development Index (HDI) in 2010 to be ranked at 154 in the world out of the surveyed 169 countries with an HDI of 0.516. This reality suggests that ordinary people's health, education and standards of living are negatively affected.

Furthermore, the findings show that during the tenure of the GNU, the MDC-T, one of the key three partners in the inclusive government, found itself in an invidious position of trying to attract FDI, on the one hand, and persuading ZANU-PF to discard the investor-scaring indigenisation, on the other. To this end, MDC-T's call that Zimbabwe was now open for business was received with mixed emotions. It was challenging to convince the international community that the country is now open for business under the pretext that the neoliberal MDC-T is a partner in government that was beginning to fully implement the FDI-shy indigenisation programme. Findings reveal that the unenviable position MDC-T found itself in is of attempting to convince the foreign investors that its being part of the GNU, while playing a second fiddle role to the dominant ZANU-PF, could guarantee the respect and protection of private property rights.

As a result, many potential foreign investors adopted a wait and see attitude as they backburned their considerations to invest their monies in Zimbabwe. By way of comparing with other regional member countries, unsurprisingly, Zimbabwe received the smallest fraction of FDI in the region, only US$166 million in 2010, before slightly increasing to US$387 million in 2011 (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018). During the same time, neighbouring Mozambique received US$989 million from FDI in 2010 and US$2.093 billion in 2011, while Zambia received US$1.729 billion in 2010 and US$1.982 billion in 2011 (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018). The small fraction of FDI Zimbabwe received during that time was poured by the most courageous foreign investors who positively saw the GNU as a "good enough governance" (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018, p. xi) system that provided a solution, although a bad one but better than none, to the investment shy Zimbabwe.

The preceding submissions may explain why Zimbabwe was rated by Hoyle and Wexler (2018) in the Wall Street Journal entitled "*Countries Push to Extract More Cash from Big Mining Companies"*, as the most-riskiest place in the world to do business as a foreign miner. Figure 9.3 below illustrates this reality. The case of the granite stone company, Natural Stone Export Company, doing business in Mutoko, Zimbabwe, is illustrative here. According to the findings of the 2017 First Report of the Thematic Committee on Indigenisation and Empowerment on the Circumstances Surrounding the Non-Establishment of the Community Share Ownership Trusts in Mudzi and Mutoko Districts in 2010, the granite company had 1200 employees. More than 40 of the employers were managers. However, by 2017, in the space of only seven years, the employees dropped to 179, with only two managers left. "This was attributed to high costs of

doing business in Zimbabwe" (Parliament of Zimbabwe Report, 2017, p. 7). Former Australian ambassador to Zimbabwe, Matthew Neuhaus, while giving a keynote speech at the international conference on *'Zimbabwe Going Forward: Consolidating the Democratisation Process and Reinforcing Re-Engagement with the Global Community'* held at Rainbow Towers, shared the view that doing business in Zimbabwe is risky. He submitted that "[i]nvesting in Zimbabwe is like swimming in the Zambezi between Crocodiles and Hippos" (SAPES & NED Report, 2014, p. 32).

Figure 9.7: **Top 10 riskiest places to be a miner**

Top 10 riskiest places to be a miner*

	RANKING	
	3Q, 2018	3Q, 2016
Zimbabwe	**1**	1
Venezuela	**2**	2
Tanzania	**3**	73
Democratic Republic of Congo	**4**	6
North Korea	**5**	4
Swaziland	**6**	5
Kazakhstan	**7**	6
Russia	**7**	9
Bolivia	**9**	8
China	**9**	19



Source: Hoyle and Wexler (2018, para. 9).

Verisk Maplecroft, a UK based company that analyses key economic, political, environmental and social risks that affect global business and investors, shared similar sentiments. On its Resource Nationalism Index, the UK based company ranked Zimbabwe as the riskiest place to do mining business by foreign companies. On a related note, The Fraser Institute, a Canadian registered public policy think tank, also ranked Zimbabwe as the most 'uncertain' country when it comes to the policy and legal frameworks governing mining businesses.

All these are because of Zimbabwe's need to control, own, and manage the greater percentage of its natural resources through indigenisation. The British-based *Economist Intelligence Unit,* in 2000 following the implementation of the FTLRP, ranked Zimbabwe as the world's 3rd riskiest FDI destination out of 93 emerging economies surveyed. In corroboration with this, the 2017

First Report of the Thematic Committee on Indigenisation and Empowerment on the Circumstances Surrounding the Non-Establishment of the Community Share Ownership Trusts in Mudzi and Mutoko Districts reports that the costs of doing business, notably in the extractive industry, in Zimbabwe, are high. This was established after comparing Zimbabwe's costs of doing mining business with those of its regional and continental counterparts, where there are tax incentives for the mining companies. Consequently, the high costs of doing mining business are presenting impediments for extractive industry indigenisation to realise outcomes consistent with its goals. High costs of doing mining business in the country due to indigenisation are leading to many non-indigenous mining firms either scaled down or shut down. As shown in Table 9.7 below, this situation is further worsened by comparatively high rates of mineral royalties Zimbabwe's government is charging relative to the regional rates.

Table 9.4: Rates of mineral royalties in Southern Africa

Country	Range of royalties	Variations by minerals
Zimbabwe	1%-15%	-Diamonds 15% -Platinum and Precious stones 10% -Gold 7% -Other precious metals 4% -Base metals and industrial minerals 2% -Coal 1%
South Africa	2%-12.5%	
Tanzania	2%-12%	-Diamonds 5% -Gold and all other minerals 3% -Petroleum and gas 12.5%
Mozambique	3%-10%	-Diamonds, precious metals and precious stones 10% -Semiprecious stones 6% -Base minerals 5% -Coal and other 3%
Angola	2%-5%	-Stones and precious metals 5% -Semi-precious stones 4% -Metallic minerals 3% -Other minerals 2%
Botswana	3%-10%	-Precious stones 10% -Semi-precious stones 5% Other 3%
Zambia	3%-5%	-Precious stones and precious metals 5% -Base Metals 3%
Namibia	4%-5%	-Precious metals 5% -Base and rare metals 5% -Semi-precious stones 4% -Industrial minerals

Source: Saunders (2017, p. 42) and Deloitte (2012)

Therefore, viewed as the resurgence of resource nationalism, the nonindigenous mining businesses are criticising extractive industry indigenisation. They are viewing it as a strategic political settlement designed to stifle foreign investment in Zimbabwe. In a way, the extractive industry indigenisation is blocking the international finance capital from getting into the country. This situation leads to high informalisation of the mining sector as more locals are taking charge in reaction to the economic challenges corollary to massive capital flight, e.g. food insecurity, unemployment etc.

9.4 The involvement of the security sector in the mining indigenisation processes

One key theme that recurred throughout the findings is the significant role played by the country's security sector (i.e. the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) in determining both the course and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe. The security sector's role, notably the military, in the country's political economy predates the 1980 independence, as it dates back to the war of liberation period. Two competing viewpoints about the security sector's involvement in the processes and outcomes of the extractive industry indigenisation emerged from the findings drawn from the reviewed documents. On the one hand, many documents (e.g. NewAfrica Special Report, 2013; UK Parliament Report, 2012; Global Witness Report, 2012, 2017, 2018 & 2019) have established that security was actively involved in the country's extractive indigenisation processes. According to these documents, this sector's involvement is particularly apparent in the diamond sector, in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields in Marange, to be precise. On the other hand, other documents (e.g. Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2012) denied the security sector's involvement in the extractive industry indigenisation processes for nefarious reasons. For example, these documents denied the alleged partnerships between the country's security sector and the foreign-owned mining companies doing business in Chiadzwa, arguing that any information contrary to this is a sheer smear campaign against the government.

According to the findings from the NewAfrica Special Report (2016), UK Parliament Report (2012), Global Witness Report (2012, 2017, 2018 & 2019), the security sector was involved in the extractive industry indigenisation processes in three distinct ways. Firstly, the ZDF has what is termed the Army Benefit Fund (ABF). The ABF was established to enable the ZDF and other

security forces to participate in the indigenisation processes "through purchasing equity in non-indigenous companies using the Army Benefit Fund" (NewAfrica Special Report, 2013, p. 69). The ABF should purchase the said equity in two ways. The first being through purchasing some of the purchased shares or equity by the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF). NIEEF's primary responsibility is to purchase and warehouse shares from the nonindigenous firms to dispose of them to the indigenous Zimbabweans (NIEEB, 2014). Thus, the ABF would also purchase shares from NIEEF. The last one being through security sector personnel, in individual capacities, purchasing the shares from NIEEF as they were also part of the previously disadvantaged indigenous peoples. According to the security sector, this arrangement was going to make sure that the country's economic strongholds are fundamentally in the hands of the indigenous Zimbabweans. Speaking on the same note, the NewAfrican Special Report (2013, p. 70) notes: "This will ensure that the indigenous Zimbabweans control the economic activities in the country."

Secondly, the security sector, particularly the ZDF, would partner with the established 61 CSOTs which were meant to receive the 10% portion of the required 51% equity threshold under the indigenisation laws. As the CSOTs were considered local industrial hubs and economic vehicles to spearhead economic development in the local communities, the ZDF, "especially during times of peace" (NewAfrican Special Report, 2013, p. 70), would partner with the CSOTs in various community development programmes. These include the construction, maintenance or rehabilitation of roads, dams, schools, clinics, hospitals, gully reclamation, among many others. According to this school of thought, doing so would make the security sector an additive beneficiary of the 10% equity allotted to the CSOTs.

Lastly, the security sector had its own mining companies. As established by the Global Witness Report (2018, 2017 & 2012) and UK Parliament Report (2012), the following are the mining companies owned and controlled, either in full or in part, by the security sector in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields: Zimbabwe Prison Services and Partners, Mbada Diamonds, Anjin Investments, Marange Resources, Zimbabwe Republic Police and Partners, CANADILE, Block Wood Mining, Central Intelligence Organisation and Partners, Marange Resources, and Condurango Investments. Those owned in part were joint ventures with either the Chinese, Lebanese, Russian, South African mining investors (Daily Maverick Report, 2021; Global Witness Report,

2017; Muswere, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2009; Partnership Africa Canada, 2012) or Dubai (Nkala, 2019). The Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard (2012) made references to some of these companies when the former deputy minister of Mines and Mining Development, Gift Chimanikire, responded to questions relating to the involvement of the security sector in mining operations in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields. Table 8.1 below shows the joint venture ownership structures between the nonindigenous private mining investors and Marange Resources- headed by retired Colonel Tshinga Dube, who once headed the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) (Global Witness Report, 2012).

Table 9.5: Joint venture ownership structures between the foreign mining investors and Marange Resources

Name of private investor	Name of the joint venture	Marange Resources' stake
Cole Mining and Mineral Resources	Canadile	50%
Grandwell Holdings	Mbada Diamonds	50%
Glass Finish and AFECC	Anjin Investments	20%
Gye Nyame	Gye Nyame	50%
China International Fund and Central Intelligence Organisation	Kusena	100%
AFECC	Jinan Mining	50%
Pure Diam	Diamond Mining Corporation	50%

Source: ZMDC Report (2012) and Nkala (2019)

Table 9.6: Nature of joint ventures between Zimbawe's security sector companies and foreign companies

Companies Operating in Marange
As of January 2014

Anjin Investments Ltd:
50%: Matt Bronze Ltd
A company principally controlled by Zimbabwean senior ranking military official Charles Tarumbwa
50%: Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group
A Chinese based construction company

Diamond Mining Company:
50%: Zimbabwe Mining Development Company (ZMDC)
50%: Consortium of investors in Dubai, UAE

Gye Nyame Resources:
50%: ZMDC
24%: Bill Minerals
A Ghana based company owned by William Essien
20%: Zimbabwe Republic Police Trust
6%: Dantor
A private company owned by Zimbabweans Itai Munyeza and Blessmore Chanakira

Jinan Mining Ltd:
A Chinese based company that has an unspecified joint venture with ZMDC

Kusena Diamonds:
A company allegedly affiliated with Sino-Zimbabwe, a cement company comprised of a joint venture between two Chinese entities and a Zimbabwe government run industrial development company

Marange Resources:
100%: ZMDC

Mbada Diamonds:
50%: Marange Resources
A wholly owned subsidiary of ZMDC
50%: Grandwell Holdings
A Mauritius-registered company affiliated with New Reclamation Group, a South African scrap metal company, controlled by Robert Mhlanga a retired Zimbabwean Air Vice Marshal and former personal pilot to Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe

Sources: Company data, Global Witness, Partnership Africa Canada, Paul Zimnisky analysis

It should be noted that when De Beers left Marange in 2006 after the expiry of its licence, when new foreign diamond companies came to Zimbabwe to mine diamonds in Marange they had to enter into a joint venture with the companies owned by the security sector (i.e. either the CIO, police, prisons or military). The joint ventures- which were on a 50/50 ownership basis- were deemed by the then indigenisation minister, Savior Kasukuwere, as full compliance with the indigenisation policy (Global Witness Report, 2012 & 2017; Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2017 & 2016). As shown in Figure 9.6 above, there had not been a foreign-owned diamond company in Marange with a 100% stake; the other half had to go to the security sector. The only exception here was Marange Resources which was 100% owned by ZMDC.

Joint ventures could have been prized extractive industry indigenisation models that would have afforded the indigenous people huge stakes through Marange Resources' stakes in these foreign mining companies. However, through using David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theoretical insights, a closer examination of what lies underneath these joint ventures unmasks a

complex and opaque 'mining cartel' (Daily Maverick Report, 2021) of elite accumulation. According to the protagonist of accumulation by dispossession theory, Harvey (2003), the theory is the distinctiveness of neoliberal capitalist policies of centralising and concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the privileged few. The findings of several studies conducted by the Global Witness (i.e. in 2012, 2017, 2018 & 2019) corroborate this analysis. Global Witness uncovered documentary evidence about a web of complex ownership structures of the diamond companies operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields. The evidence suggests that the country's security sector owns and controls most of these diamond companies, either covertly or overtly and either in full or in part. Global Witness Report (2017 & 2012) reveals the opaque and complex control and ownership structures of these alleged security sector linked diamond companies doing business in Chiadzwa, with 'beneficial ownership' as the best strategy of choice for this.

Beneficial ownership is when individuals who ultimately own and control a company enjoy the benefits of ownership (i.e. the beneficial owners) without their names appearing on the property's title deeds (Global Witness Report, 2017). For example, the Global Witness Report (2017) and Nkala (2019) believe that a 25% stake of the Mbada Diamonds shares is owned by an anonymous Hong Kong-registered company called Transfrontier Mining. In 2014, Mbada Diamonds, one of the biggest diamond mining operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields, had US$1 billion in market capitalisation, meaning Transfrontier Mining had a controlling interest of $US250 million then. Transfrontier Mining's "ultimate owners are hidden behind a complex web of companies and nominee directors stretching from South Africa to Mauritius, Hong Kong, and beyond" (Global Witness Report, 2017, p. 08).

However, documentary evidence from Global Witness Report (2012, 2017 & 2018), Nkala (2019) and UK Parliament Report (2012) suggests that the former Air Vice-Marshal in the Zimbabwean Air Force and chairman of the Mbada Diamonds, Robert Mhlanga, secretly controls, and possibly owns, Transfrontier Mining. Patience Khumalo, Robert Mhlanga's daughter, was in 2010 appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Mbada Diamonds (Nkala, 2019; Mazulu, 2014). However, other findings (see 8.1) suggest that Robert Mhlanga was just a frontman for Grandwell Holdings through Transfrontier Mining. Figure 8.1 below shows the complex ownership structures of the Mbada Diamonds, and Figure 8.2 shows those of the entire Marange diamonds.

Figure 9.8: Complex ownership structures of the Mbada Diamonds



Source: Global Witness Report (2017, p. 40)



Source: Global Witness Report (2012, p. 13)

In 2010, Grandwell Holdings Ltd, a Mauritius registered company and a subsidiary of New Reclamation Group Ltd that jointly owns Mbada Diamonds on a 50/50 basis with Marange Resources, transferred 49.99% of its shareholding to Transfrontier Mining (Global Witness Report, 2012 & 2017; Nkala, 2019; New Reclamation Annual Report, 2011). However, according to the notes of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy- seen by Global Witness (Global Witness Report, 2018)- Grandwell Holdings Ltd was a fly-by-night company, existing only on paper. Admitting the fictitious existence of Grandwell Holdings Ltd while testifying before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy on 8 February 2010, former Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) CEO, Dominic Mubaiwa, stated the following:

> *[I]t would have been difficult to do due diligence on Grandwell because it is a paper company, registered in Mauritius* (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy notes cited by the Global Witness Report, 2010, p. 13).

In 2009, ZMDC Board Select Committee conducted a due diligence investigation on New Reclamation Group Ltd, Grandwell Holdings Ltd's parent company registered in South Africa specialising in recycling and scrap metal, and found that it has no diamond mining experience.

Figure 9.9: Complex ownership structures of the Marange Diamonds



Source: Global Witness Report (2017, p. 15

Furthermore, through some complex and opaque beneficial ownership mechanisms, Anjin Mining Investments- one of the biggest diamond mining companies doing business in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields- is believed to be owned by the military. Articulating on this viewpoint, Van Schie (2017, para. 13) argues that Anjin Mining Investments is "allegedly owned indirectly by the Zimbabwe

Defence Industries (ZDI), with Jinan Mining… run as an extension of Anjin… potentially providing the Zimbabwean military with still further access to diamond revenues." Corroborating this finding, the Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard (2012) revealed that the former Deputy Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Gift Chimanikire, told the Parliament of Zimbabwe that, through two unnamed holding companies, the ZDI owned a significant portion of Anjin Investments. Findings from the Global Witness Report (2017) have established that there is documentary evidence suggesting that Jinan Mining, yet another diamond company operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields, is being run by the ZDI as an extension of Anjin Investments. It is important to note that Zimbabwe National Army's (ZNA) retired general and Judge Advocate General at Zimbabwe's Ministry of Defence, Brigadier Charles Tarumbwa, is both Anjin Investments' company secretary and CEO (UK Parliament Report, 2012; Global Witness Report, 2017). Table 8.1 below shows the executive and non-executive board members of Anjin Investments.

Table 9.7: Anjin Investments' executive and non-executive board members

Executive board member	Designation	Non-executive board member	Designation
Brigadier General Charles Tarumbwa	ZNA general	Colonel Romeo Daniel Mutsvunguma	ZDF retired colonel
Martin Rushwaya	Ministry of Defence permanent secretary	Morris Masunungure	Retired army officer
Oliver Chibage	ZRP commissioner		
Nonkosi M Ncube	ZRP commissioner		
Munyaradzi Machacha	ZANU-PF director of publications		
Mabasa Temba Hawadi	Former director of Marange Resources		

Source: Global Witness Report (2017, p. 30-31 & 2012, p. 16).

Again, Kusena Diamonds, publicly known to be owned by the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation (ZMDC) on behalf of the state, is alleged to be a CIO owned and controlled company. According to the Global Witness Report (2017, p. 7), "Documents, seen by Global Witness, however, suggest the company [Kusena Diamonds] was set up by the CIO to secure a secret off-the-books source of financing." Direct ownership of mining companies by the security sector that allows off-budget financing of the sector undermines accountability and transparency imperatives as this also subverts parliamentary and civilian oversight of the sector Global Witness Report, 2018 & 2017). UK Parliament Report (2012, p. 2) refers to off-budget financing of the

sector as "financing the parallel government." In addition, off-budget financing of the security forces that makes them less dependent on government budgets and free from all the democratic oversight "gives them a dangerous economic incentive to preserve the power of those who afford them access to these lucrative resources" (Global Witness, 2017, p. 7). Agreeing with this viewpoint of such actions creating predatory state institutions Acemoglu and Robinson (2013, p. 384) argue that:

> Extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, which enrich a few at the expense of many. Those who benefit from extractive institutions thus have the resources to build their (private) armies and mercenaries, to buy their judges, and to rig elections to remain in power. They also have every interest in defending the system.

Therefore, it is important to note that whenever the economic and political interests of the security sector are aligned with those of regime reproduction of the governing party, bipartisan and professional conduct of the sector becomes elusive. By way of predicting what would become of Zimbabwe if off-budget financing is left unchecked, the UK Parliament Report (2012, p. 5) stated the following "If off-budget financing of the security forces is not addressed immediately, regardless of what happens to Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe could soon be ruled by a free-floating securocrat elite: unaccountable, unelectable and unstoppable." Following the overthrow of Robert Mugabe in November 2017, the Zimbabwean state has since been bearing these characteristics of a competitive authoritarian state.

However, while answering the questions in parliament in 2012 about the allegations that nine security sector companies are operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields, former deputy minister of Mines and Mining Development, Gift Chimanikire, denied the allegations. The following are the nine companies: Zimbabwe Prison Services and Partners, Mbada Diamonds, ANJIN, Zimbabwe Republic Police and Partners, CANADILE, Block Wood Mining, Central Intelligence Organisation and Partners, Marange Resources, and Condurango Investments. In denial, the former deputy minister stated the following:

> Mbada Diamonds is a joint mining venture between ZMDC, which is Government and Reclamation Company of South Africa MM. That is the company that has a joint venture with ZMDC. MMCZ does not own any shares in Mbada Diamonds, in fact, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe is a marketing corporation, a parastatal of the ministry or a parastatal that falls under the ministry which is responsible for the marketing of diamonds. Secondly, Canadile was actually replaced by Marange Resources Limited, which is 100% owned by ZMDC and therefore owned by government. Anjin is owned by

> the Chinese and the Government of Zimbabwe where ZMDC owns 10% and Zimbabwe Defence Industries owns 40% shareholding. Hon. Members of Parliament should be alert and be abreast with matters of national interest. It is imperative that hon. members of Parliament understand how Defence Industries are run. Defence Industries are a common practice world over and there is nothing peculiar about it in Zimbabwe because Anjin itself is a defence industry company that is owned by the Chinese, which is in a joint venture with Zimbabwe Defence Industries (Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2012, p. 53-54).

The former deputy minister continues:

> Thirdly, there is a company listed here as Central Intelligence Organisation and Partners. From a ministry point of view, Central Intelligence Organisation and Partners, Zimbabwe Republic Police and Partners and Zimbabwe Prisons and Partners do not have any companies operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Fields. I would advise members that if they have any information contrary to what the ministry is providing to approach the Ministry of Anti-Corruption because it can only be a corrupt practice that the ministry is not aware of. There is the issue of Block Wood Mining. Block Wood Mining, Mr. Speaker, Sir and Condurango, which is the last one on the list, they do not operate at Chiadzwa Diamond Fields, in fact, the ministry is not aware of the existence of such companies. Those are the facts that I have been provided by the Permanent Secretary. It is important to note that there are five operating companies in Chiadzwa Mining Fields, that is Marange Resources (100% Government), Mbada Diamonds (joint venture between Government and a private investor), Anjin (joint venture between Government and a private investor), Diamond Mining Corporation (joint venture between Government and a private investor and Sino Zimbabwe (100% Government) (Zimbabwe National Assembly Hansard, 2012, p. 54-55).

Corroborating with these findings, while confirming Anjin Mining Investments and the Defence Ministry's joint operations, the permanent secretary of the Defence Ministry, Martin Rushwaya, denied the corruption allegations. In his words, the permanent secretary said the following:

> The MMCZ managed the sale of diamonds. Every single carat was sold by the MMCZ on behalf of the company. To say that we were operating in the dark is not correct. All taxes, commissions and fees were collected before the company was given its dues. The final certification of the sale was done by the Ministry of Mines. We have the names of people we were dealing with (Zim Stones, 2018).

The security sector cited the country's economic crisis as the sole reason for involving itself in diamond mining activities (Nkala, 2019; Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy, 2013). Due to the economic crisis, the national treasury could not fund the security operations, hence the security sector's involvement in the mining operations for off-budget finances.

9.4.1 Uses, misuses and abuses of the proceeds of diamonds by the security sector

Findings have established that the opaque and complex web of ownership and control structures of the diamond companies operating in Chiadzwa harboured many unethical business practices. These range from price transfers, smuggling, undervaluing of diamonds (Global Witness Report, 2012 & 2017). Evidence from some of the reviewed documents suggests that Zimbabwe had enough resources from the Chiadzwa diamonds' proceeds to turn around its economy. However, how the security sector used, misused and abused these resources made the prospects of turning around the ailing economy elusive. To illustrate this, the following submissions by the late president, Robert Mugabe, are illuminating:

> *We have not received much from the diamond industry at all […] I don't think we've exceeded US$2 billion or so, and yet we think that well over US$15 billion or more has been earned in that area. […] There has been quite a lot of secrecy […] and lots of swindling, smuggling […]. The companies that have been mining have virtually robbed us, I want to say, of our wealth […]. You cannot trust a private company in that area. None at all* (President Robert Mugabe's 92nd birthday interview with Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation on the 21st February 2016).

What makes the revelation by the late president shocking is that in 2016 US$15 billion equalled 72.9% of the country's GDP. Zimbabwe's GDP then was US$20.549 billion (World Bank online data). Assuming this figure is true, this means that half that amount went to the companies of the country's security sector, yet there is nothing to show when it comes to empowering the disadvantaged indigenous people and the communities. This situation would suggest that mining indigenisation perpetuated uneven development because wealth remained concentrated in the hands of the elites. This is notwithstanding the fact that some indigenous people and companies (i.e. the security individuals and their companies) are now part of the owners of the mining industry, thereby further impoverishing the disadvantaged indigenous people and their communities. However, it is also important to note that "While the credibility of this figure has been widely criticised, it is clear that mismanagement, rampant diamond smuggling, looting and corruption have prevented potentially billions of dollars in diamond money from reaching the public purse" (Global Witness Report, 2018, p. 2).

Furthermore, findings from the Daily Maverick Report (2021) and Global Witness Report (2018 & 2017) corroborate this viewpoint of Zimbabwe losing billions of dollars per year in underhand business activities, but notably in the mining sector, particularly in the diamond sector. The following submissions of the reports are revealing:

Illicit cross-border transactions have cost the country billions of dollars over the last decade. Estimates vary from AFRODAD's conservative estimate of US$570 million a year to the Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission placing the estimate at US$3 billion a year" (Daily Maverick Report, 2021, p. 7).

Billions of dollars of Zimbabwe's diamond money may be unaccounted for. Since 2010 Zimbabwe has officially exported over USD2.7billion in diamonds. Only around USD 300 million of this can clearly been identified in public accounts. Tracking where diamond money is going has been severely hampered by limited public reporting on revenue flows (Global Witness Report, 2018, p. 6).

The end result is that very little of Zimbabwe's diamond wealth has benefitted ordinary people. Since 2010 Zimbabwe has officially exported over US$2.5 billion in diamonds according to official figures from the Kimberley Process. According to the limited available government reporting, only around US$300 million can clearly be identified in public accounts (Global Witness Report, 2017, p. 8).

As reported by the Kimberly Process Statistics, Zimbabwe's total diamond earnings between 2009 and 2016 are shown in Table 8.1 below.

Table 9.8: Zimbabwe's aggregate diamond earnings form 2009-2016

Year of export	Volume of exports (in carats)	Value (in USD)	Govt remittances (in USD)
2009	1,349,172	28,900,799	-
2010	8,424,384	320,237,120	174
2011	7,787,923	422,926,507	80
2012	14,957,649	740,998,085	45
2013	9,564,278	448,635,918	41
2014	6,367,107	480,221,832	-
2015	3,899,385	168,612,483	-
2016	2,322,418	123,314,734	-
Totals	**54, 672316**	**2,733,847,478**	**340,000,000**

Source: Statistics from the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/zimbabwe-0

According to the above findings, between 2009 and 2016, the Government of Zimbabwe, although owning 50% stakes in every diamond company operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Field through the ZMDC, received only 12% of the total diamond export earnings. The complexity and secrecy around the ownership and control of the diamond companies operating in Chiadzwa Diamond Field all this. Agreeing with this viewpoint, the Global Witness Report (2017, p. 18) argues that "A lack of information about revenue flows is the first feature that has allowed Zimbabwe's diamond wealth to disappear. The secrecy that surrounds the ownership of Zimbabwe's diamond companies is the second." The security sector used some of the diamond

proceeds to finance the sector's off-budget operations, while other proceeds were pocketed by the politically exposed persons (PEPs). A case in point here is Robert Mhlanga, who built a £20-million mansion in a holiday coast town of Ballito in Durban in South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province (UK Parliament Report, 2012). In addition to this, in 2012, Robert Mhlanga is said to have bought R185 million worth of prime real estate properties in Johannesburg's upmarket areas of Sandton (Maringira & Masiya, 2012 Corroborating with this analysis, ZELA Report (2014, p. 12) contends that "The general public perception is that the companies mining diamonds in Marange are prejudicing the State of billions of dollars each year and are only benefiting a phalanx of political and economic elites." Global Witness Report (2017) further argues that Zimbabwe's military and intelligence sectors are the real beneficiaries of the country's diamond wealth.

As shown in Table 8.1, there were huge discrepancies between the national treasury's projected and actual diamond revenues.

Table 9.9: Discrepancies between the projected and actual diamond revenues

Year	Treasury's projected diamond earnings	Actual diamond earnings received by the treasury
2010	No projection	US$174 million
2011	No projection	US$80 million
2012	US$600 million	US$45 million
2013	US$70 million	No reporting (IMF reported US$ million)
2014	US$96 million	No reporting
2015	No projection	No reporting

Source: Global Witness Report (2017), ZMDC Annual Reports (2010-2016) and Zimbabwe National Budget Statements (2010-2016)

In the gold industry, the Daily Maverick Report (2021) estimated that Zimbabwe is losing a conservative estimate of US$1.5 billion worth of gold every year through smuggling. The current minister of Finance and Economic Development, Mthuli Ncube, has indicated that 30-34 tonnes of gold, worth between US$1.8 to US$2 billion, are smuggled to South Africa annually (Marufu, 2019; Daily Maverick Report, 2021). Corroborating with finding, the current Home Affairs Minister, Kazembe Kazembe, put the figure of the value of the gold smuggled every month at US$100 million, translating to US$1 billion annually (Netsianda, 2020; Daily Maverick Report, 2021).

All these undermined the efforts to empower the disadvantaged mining communities and indigenous citizens. Contributing 60% of the country's export earnings, the extractive industry

had (and still has) the vital role to play in turning around Zimbabwe's ailing economy and, through the indigenisation of the sector, would contribute significantly in the empowering of the poor mining communities and residents. This huge contribution, in turn, might have played a critical in addressing the country's uneven development configurations between the nonindigenous haves and indigenous have-nots. However, the heavy involvement of the corrupt security sector in the mining industry in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular dashed all these hopes. Available time Afrobarometer series data (shown in Figure 8 below) about people's perceptions concerning the extent of corruption within the country's police force corroborate this analysis.

Figure 9.10: People's perceptions of corruption within the police force



Source: Afrobarometer Online Data

Despite Zimbabwe ranked the fourth-largest diamond producer in 2012- producing close to 15 million carats that year (Global Witness Report, 2017) and in 2013 becoming "the world's single largest producer of diamonds" (ibid, p. 13), the economy did not improve. Understanding all this within the accumulation by dispossession theoretical framework, extractive industry indigenisation was more of an accumulation vehicle for the PEPs and less of an empowerment strategy for the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. To achieve its accumulation by dispossession objectives through the extractive industry indigenisation, the security sector used the following subtle ways: smuggling of minerals; "speculative hoarding of mineral concessions" (The Daily

Maverick Report, 2021, p. 30); price transfers; secrecy around company ownership structures and revenue flow information; undervaluing of minerals; and tax avoidance and evasion tactics. Calling this practice of self-enriching by the country's security sector "goat mentality" (Maringira & Masiya, 2016, p. 368), the authors argue that the security personnel are using their considerable political connections for personal accumulation. The goat mentality comes from Shona idiom: *mbudzi inodyira payakasungirirwa* (a goat browses/eats where it is tied). Thus, metaphorically, the security personnel are browsing or eating where they are tied, i.e. in the Chiadzwa Diamond Field.

Lack of transparency in accounting about the quantities and qualities of the gems mined and sold, and smuggling, as well as the under-valuation of the gems, were most of the contributing factors towards the diamond sector's limited contribution to the national basket. This situation is worsened by the fact that Zimbabwe's diamonds were labelled blood diamonds in world markets. On the issue of under-pricing, the findings have shown that it was not that the international buyers of diamonds swindled our government. Instead, under-pricing was a sly financial racketeering method practised in a sophisticated manner that benefited both parties (i.e. our government and international buyers of diamonds). Commenting on this, Gotora (2012, para 14) writes: "The low valuation lost the Zimbabwe nation considerable money and underscores a price manipulation scheme perpetrated by Indian buyers and their Zimbabwe allies, with whom they are believed to share the spoils." The corruption scandal involving 10 million carats of diamond sold for $US60 million in Dubai is a case in point here. The same carats were later sold for double the price in India's Surat, the world's biggest diamond cutting centre (Gotora, 2012; Global Witness Report, 2012). However, the Global Witness Report suggested that the same carats would have been sold for $US1.2 billion. The Report also reported other two counts of corruption involving 2.5 million carats worth a conservative estimate of $US200 million. The carats were reported to have mysteriously disappeared in November 2011 and another $US300 million diamond sale in 2011, which did not find its way into the national treasury.

Also, Global Witness Report (2012) has established that during Tendai Biti's time as the finance minister, a conservative estimate of more than $US2 billion of taxes from diamond went missing, and no one was officially charged for that. Regarding this corruption scandal, Emily Armistead, Global Witness spokeswoman, submits the following:

> It is not clear where the money is going. It appears there is a mixture of corruption enriching specific individuals and some funds going to security operations. Our concern is that it could be used to fund repression and human rights abuses (Jamasmie, 2013, para. 4).

Nonetheless, due to the diamond deals' opaqueness, no admission or confirmation of financial racketeering was officially made public. Findings have reported that in 2012 alone, businesses operating in the extractive industry failed to pay their taxes in full, only $US40 million of the expected $US600 million was paid to the national treasury, with the biggest mining company, Anjin Investments, paid nothing (Global Witness Report, 2012). Magaisa (2016) shares similar views by contending that the treasury only received a paltry of $US43 million against the anticipated $US600 million. Simpson and Hawkins (2018) also echo similar sentiments. While addressing the 68th UN General Assembly in September 2013, the late president Robert Mugabe cited one top mining official, together with some top ZANU-PF officials, who had accepted a $US6 million bribe from a Ghanaian investor who wanted to get mining rights in Chiadzwa Diamond Field (Jamasmie, 2013). In light of the above findings and analysis, one can argue that the heavy involvement of the security sector in the extractive industry indigenisation processes stifled both the empowerment of the disadvantaged citizens and addressing uneven development.

In the final analysis, Furthermore, as the partnership (i.e. 50/50 ownership basis) between the Chinese diamond companies and Zimbabwe's security sector (i.e. the CIO, Police, Prisons and army) in Chiadzwa was in itself a form of mining indigenisation, the 50% indigenisation proceeds from the security sector did not benefit the disadvantaged indigenous people and their communities. However, the money was used to finance the 2013 elections, regime survival (i.e. keeping the internationally isolated government from collapsing), elite private accumulation. While wealth might have changed hands, i.e. from foreign ownership to the indigenous people and companies- in this case to the security sector companies- wealth remains concentrated in the hands of a handful of elites. This situation speaks of the perpetuation of uneven development following indigenisation, and impoverishment of the disadvantaged indigenous people and their communities.

9.5 Conclusion

This chapter analysed how broader governance structural factors are affecting both the course and outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in the country. The GNU brought in political contestations over the indigenisation programme due to the partners' ideological differences in the inclusive government; ZANU-PF identified itself with the Left while MDC formations with the Right. Sanctions and regime change issues were deeply contested; ZANU-PF supported the indigenisation programme as a sanction busting and regime survival strategy while the MDC formations denied the existence of either sanctions or regime change project. There are contentions over the time during which the government is implementing the indigenisation programme. While some argue that it is advisable to adopt and implement indigenisation programmes during periods of economic meltdown, others view doing so as a dangerous act to the already struggling economy. The competing explanations are between the proponents of indigenisation who argue that implementing it during difficult economic times attracts serious investors, both domestic and international, and critics of indigenisation viewing implementing it during such trying times as an investment scaring course of action. Emphasis was placed on how these factors affect, either vicariously or directly, the course of indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular. Doing this was fundamental in illuminating how the external factors are helping to make extractive industry indigenisation outcomes inconsistent with goals. The next chapter summarises the findings presented and analysed in the preceding chapters, draws conclusions from these findings, and recommends adopting and implementing strategic measures. The chapter further discusses this study's theoretical contribution and areas for further research.

CHAPTER 10

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

10.0 Introduction

The preceding findings chapters presented and discussed thematic issues that describe and explain how and why the extractive industry indigenisation overpromised and underdelivered. The themes that emerged have a great deal of overlap, leading to difficulties in categorizing them neatly and independently within the created boundaries. However, three broad conclusions, with sub-conclusions within them, can be made:

- First, extractive industry indigenisation is achieving more of the nefarious objective (i.e. state generating rents for regime survival, elite personal accumulation, and regime reproduction) and less of the policy's set objective (i.e. broad-based empowerment).
- Second, the outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation in the country are disempowering to intended beneficiaries, generally, and dis-indigenising; sharply inconsistent with indigenisation's founding goal of achieving shared, inclusive and sustainable empowerment of the disenfranchised indigenous people.
- Third, there are unreported, unpublished and undocumented positive outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation, although somewhat piecemeal compared to the negative outcomes. In this study, positive and negative indigenisation outcomes are assessed in line with the ways and extent to which they influence shared, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development, or do not.

Ultimately, this chapter responds to the following final research question of the study: *What are the strategic measures necessary for Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation to be a broad-based empowerment policy choice?*

10.1 Summary of the Findings

Based on the findings' key takeaways, this study reveals five contentious findings about Zimbabwe's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation.

First, Zimbabwe is a deeply polarised and politically divided society. Although agentic beings, due to widespread polarisations and divisions, are, to some extent, making Zimbabwean citizens failing to perceive one thing, event, or situation and logically (or illogically) arrive at similar conclusions. Comparable conclusions were also arrived at by the Mothlante Commission of Inquiry that enquired into the post-31 July 2018 election violent protests and the military's subsequent involvement to quell the 1st of August 2018 demonstrations in Harare (Mothlante Commission of Inquiry Report, 2018). Literature, e.g. Masitera and Sibanda (2018), is also consistent with this finding. The differences are rooted in sharp political and economic ideological orientations different people found themselves fixated to.

To this end, broadly, Zimbabwe has about three competing truths about the country's experiences with the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular: one from the opposition forces, another from the current government, and another from the former government (i.e. Mugabes').

(a) The anti-establishment is of the view that indigenisation is a vindictive redistributive policy that is closing the country for business. It is doing so by scaring away the much-needed international capital, thereby crumbling the economy.

(b) The former establishment (i.e. the previous Mugabe administration) is of the view that indigenisation is an overdue strategic policy intervention to achieve economic independence. According to this perspective, economic independence is the remaining critical component for total sovereignty after attaining political independence in 1980.

(c) The incumbent establishment is of the view that, while it is important for the indigenous people to be at the commanding heights of the economy, it is equally important to appreciate both the costs and benefits associated with pursuing such inward-looking economic policies. With this realisation, this perspective is arguing that a gradual and selective indigenisation approach, rather a revolutionary and non-selective approach, is

necessary. After taking power in November 2017 following Robert Mugabe's deposition, the new administration in Harare amended the indigenisation laws and only left gold and platinum as the only economic sectors to be indigenised.

It is equally important to note that the general public and the media fraternity are correspondingly divided along with the preceding divisions on indigenisation. Therefore, this study argues that indigenisation, notably extractive industry indigenisation, receives interpretational pluralism as reactions and counter-reactions are mixed.

The demonstrated high level of polarity, polarisation, and mixed reactions on extractive industry indigenisation further show the country's entrenched political and social binaries. Henceforth, the truth about the country's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation remains mediated and fluid. This then begs the questions: When and how the truth about the founding goals of and experiences with indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular be told or can be established? Whose evidence about indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular matters?

Second, the processes and activities obtaining in extractive industry indigenisation reflect more of the elite's need to preserve power and reproduce the regime and less of empowering the disadvantaged indigenous people. This means that the way extractive industry indigenisation is being undertaken shows the primacy of regime survival and elite personal accumulation are looming large over empowering the disadvantaged indigenous peoples. Thus, the indigenisation, much like the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2000-2003, reflects more of power retention, strengthening and consolidating policy instrument the ZANU-PF government is using as a reprieve to reconfigure. This situation is against the growing waning of its support base, bankruptcy and international isolation. In the early 2000s, this was against the background of the newly formed opposition party's growing popularity, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). However, through strategic political means, the citizens have been roped into pushing and justifying the governing party's political survival and power retention and strengthening agendas disguised as economic empowerment struggles.

Third, the practices and conceptions of indigeneity are slippery, fluid and dialectical. Indigeneity has political, historical and geographical framings. Hence, the chequered history it is obtaining.

On the matter, the findings show that the country has three competing truths, all with cogent descriptive, explanatory and intellectual potential. As explained in 6.1 and 6.2, these are:

- The wider view of the concept told by those with colonial parentage.
- The narrow view of indigeneity is told by those with precolonial parentage.
- The hybrid view of it, told by those whose parentage is disputed or despised (e.g. the Coloureds and those with one of their parents have non-precolonial origins).

Throughout this study, I have tried to describe and explain the historical and dialectical materialist inclinations around the characterisation of the concept and practice of indigeneity in Zimbabwe. This situation is largely because the superstructures (i.e. political, institutional, religious, ideological, doctrinal, social, and cultural forces) of the concept and practice of indigeneity demonstrate that they are based on the economic base. As the economic base is always dominant in the dialectical relationships between it and the superstructures, it is also decisive in influencing how and why the practice and conception of indigeneity are mediated. Thus, the economic factors account for constructing and producing racialised, ethnic-based, and politicised forms of indigeneity characterisations.

This economic-based framing of indigeneity then accounts for the projection of indigeneity and non-indigeneity within the Self-Other continuum, a social psychology term used to systematically differentiate people's social identities. This projection, however, further polarises the definition and practice of indigeneity in the country. Those with (or consider themselves to have) indigeneity statuses, i.e. the Self, tend to regard themselves as the true apparent heirs of Zimbabwe's economic cake. This framing results in the systematic exclusion of those with (or considered to have) subnational identities, i.e. the Other, from enjoying the same on account of them lacking indigenous pedigree. The tale of the Self, on the one hand, is that of treasuries associated with the expropriation of the Other without compensation. On the other hand, the tale of the Other is that of tragedies, characterised by being expropriated by the Self without compensation.

According to the central argument of the presented and discussed findings of this study, the ZANU-PF government, state, and politics, especially post-2000, can be summed up with this neo-patrimonial description. The neo-patrimonial state has extractive and yet ineffective institutions. When measured against the yardsticks of political and socio-economic inclusivity, stability,

sustainability, growth, development, and empowerment, the state is ineffectual. Public resources, generated through indigenisation, notably in the extractive industry, are either privately accumulated by the elite or used for regime survival and political legitimation. Findings are not implicit in demonstrating that the distribution of the indigenisation proceeds, which one respondent referred to as the 'indigenisation loot', from the extractive industry reflects more of clientelistic than utilitarian tendencies. Often, the proceeds are used for vote-buying by the ruling ZANU-PF.

Fourth, the indigenisation proceeds' distribution depends on the whims of the prince who wields patrimonial power, whose voice, to the extent it is contradicting the statutes, would render the policy's legal frameworks null and void. In one instance, the *Presidential Statement to Clarify the Government Position on the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy* of 2016 took precedence over the indigenisation legal frameworks. An implication of this is that the presidential statements, which oftentimes were whimsical and contradictory, on indigenisation assume precedence over the policy's legal frameworks. Numerous cases even abound suggesting that such indigenisation executive orders are defying even the Constitution. Also, there are several instances where the executive would deny parliamentary oversight on indigenisation issues, notably in the extractive industry. However, this is done at the expense of democracy and empowerment of the disenfranchised indigenous peoples as this cemented the global pariah status of the country, thereby effectively closing Zimbabwe for business. Following on from this, one may argue that neopatrimonialism is providing a fertile ground for predation, parasitic and securocratic distinctiveness of the state.

Findings show that the contentions around the characterisations of indigeneity are far from the integrity (or lack thereof) of one's parentage. Instead, they are political and economic in nature. The same may also go to the lack of nationhood, tribal fundamentalism, politics of identity and belonging. Their characterisations and motivations are not racist, ethnic, tribalistic, patriotic and nationalistic, but rather largely political and economic. Therefore, it follows that in the end, what the findings reveal is that Zimbabwe is at the crossroads regarding the following: the country's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation; the objectives of indigenisation; and the palatability, inclusiveness and integrity of the results of the policy. Further, findings suggest the need for an inclusive approach to the conception and practice of indigeneity. Doing so helps in

reforming the exclusionary forms and shapes of the politics of indigeneity the country has struggled with since colonialism. This could be the first step towards smoothening, democratising and de-polarising the implementation of indigenisation. It would help to settle ontological and epistemological contentions around the conception of indigeneity in Zimbabwe that are far-reaching and deeply entrenched. Such entrenchment contributes to the stifling of inclusive politics and effective processes of indigenisation policies. The fluid conception of indigeneity in Zimbabwe makes it difficult to build bridges across Zimbabwe's multiple, and contentious indigeneity divides.

Fifth, the integrity of the mining indigenisation implementing institutions is contested when it comes to ushering a new economic empowerment dispensation in the country. Critics contend that systematic manipulations of the preceding frameworks in favour of the elite and disfavour of the target beneficiaries are more than apparent. However, the architects and supporters of indigenisation maintain that the policy is witnessing tremendous success stories, mainly and not exclusively in the rural areas where CSOTs are instituted. Their argument is telling. They admit that they are not oblivious of some failure stories of the programme in the Southern African lower-income nation. The supporters of indigenisation are suggesting two critical reasons for the failure stories. First, the impact of opposition voices about indigenisation, which they argue is casting aspersions in implementing the policy. Second, the impact of sanctions on indigenisation, which they believe are comprehensive and sweeping, rather than either smart, targeted or restricted. The indigenisation supporters are also apportioning the blame for the indigenisation failure stories to the regime change agenda. Their argument here is that the regime change project was planned, founded, funded and directed by the North, with the opposition political outfits as mere implementing brigades of this grand plan of unseating the ZANU-PF as the ruling party.

Overall, the findings almost found a confluence on the idea that the degeneration of the Zimbabwean economy came not as a surprise. Following the extractive industry indigenisation, new forms of income and wealth inequality are being constructed. This reality is despite the fact that indigenisation is based on finding mutually beneficial ways of systematically regulating 'the Other' (i.e. the nonindigenous and their businesses) in the mainstream economy for the benefit of the rest. Nevertheless, the study's major findings show that the already amplified rate of uneven development in the country is ironically further perpetuated with the implementation of its antidote, namely the indigenisation. Its negative outcomes in the extractive industry are

degenerating Zimbabwe into an uneven economic development crisis, whose attendant political and social consequences are also uneven. With the benefit of hindsight, the presented and discussed findings show that indigenisation, notably in the extractive industry, is more of a smokescreen than a real empowerment initiative for the disenfranchised general public.

As it stands right now, Zimbabwe's political and economic environments are unstable. On the economic front, according to Bond and Ruiters (2017), Zimbabwe has, since the colonial period, been the second most unequal country in the region, after South Africa. Its current Gini index stands at 39.08%. The high inequality feature is increasingly becoming permanent and fixed in the country. As measured by Gini Coefficient Index, Zimbabwe's inequality levels rose from 42% in 2011/12 to 44% in 2017 to 50% in 2019 (World Bank, 2020). Corroborating with the preceding extreme inequality viewpoint, UNDP Human Development Report (2019) reports the following inequality indices of Zimbabwe: 27% income inequality, 16% education inequality, Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) of 0.435, income share held by poorest 40% of 15.3, and Income share held by richest 10% of 33.8.

Furthermore, according to the World Bank Data (2021), the poverty headcount ratio in Zimbabwe increased from 22.5% in 2011 to 30.4% in 2017 to 38.3% in 2021. It is important to note that 60 of the established 61 CSOTs are located in the rural areas, i.e. each in Zimbabwe's 60 rural districts, and 70% of the Zimbabweans reside there. The World Bank (2020) revealed that, through using the national extreme poverty datum line of US$1.8 per day, Zimbabwe's extreme poverty rose from 23% to 30% between 2011 and 2017. Corroborating with these findings, the UNDP Report (2021) and ZIMSTAT and World Bank (2019) reveal an increase in extreme poverty among the Zimbabweans. This is shown in Figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1: The rise of extreme poverty in Zimbabwe between 2011 and 2019



Source: UNDP Report (2021, p. 7) and ZIMSTAT and World Bank (2019).

This dire and worsening poverty situation in Zimbabwe, particularly in the rural areas where poverty rose from 43% to 51% between 2011 and 2019 (World Bank, 2020), can logically be at least partly attributed to the manner in which the indigenisation programme, especially extractive industry indigenisation. Extractive industry indigenisation was implemented in a manner that did not inclusively share and spread the wealth around. Also, the rise in inequality levels can be at least logically be attributed to the same. For example, in instances where mining indigenisation was done, e.g. in the diamond sector in Marange, the indigenisation proceeds were not equally shared among the citizens. This situation makes wealth remain concentrated in the hands of a handful elites, thereby perpetuating and maintaining uneven development. Thus, despite Zimbabwe's great potential to address poverty due to its huge mineral deposits, especially under the indigenisation regime where the indigenous people and their communities should be owners of both the means and factors of mining production, poverty and inequality levels have been worsening over the last decade.

On the political front, according to Masunungure (2018), Afrobarometer (2018) and Bratton and Masunungure (2018a & 2018b), Zimbabwe is the most politically polarised country in Africa. In

his words, Masunungure (2018, para. 12) argues, "Few realise how deeply divided this country is, even by African standards. Recent empirical evidence from Afrobarometer starkly shows that Zimbabwe possesses the most politically polarised electorate in Africa, the next worst being Uganda, another dominant party electoral autocracy." Concerning corruption, Transparency International and the World Bank ranked Zimbabwe as one of the world's most corrupt countries (see Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2 below). Following on from this reasoning, trying to address the decades-long wicked problem of uneven development through indigenisation is an untenable enterprise. The parasitic, predatory and neo-patrimonial characteristics of the government are presenting negative forces. In the end, the implications of all these may be that the country is imploding politically and economically partly at the weight of the contradictions of the controversial indigenisation policy.

Figure 10. 1: Zimbabwe's Corruption Ranking between 2008 and 2018

Source: Transparency International Online data

Cognizant of the structural and contextual factors presented and discussed in the preceding findings chapters, uneven development remains an unresolved *longue duree* wicked problem in Zimbabwe. This study represents uneven development as a wicked problem not necessarily because of poverty, unemployment, and inequality it generates and sustains. Instead, it is because of the successive failures by the proposed postcolonial affirmative action policy heuristics to address it. In Zimbabwe, uneven development, as it presented itself since the colonial days until

now, assumes the wickedness and elusiveness of the HIV/AIDS virus, i.e. nigh-impossible to do away with completely. Its resistance to solutions is nothing short of spectacular.

Thus, partly as a result of the indigenisation contradictions to the economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has rated Zimbabwe as the second country in the world with the largest percentage of its economy (i.e. 60.64% of GDP) in the informal sector, after Bolivia with 60.2% (Medina & Schneider, 2018). Austria with 8.9% and Switzerland with 7.2% are the lowest in the rating. Such an economy's attendant result is having a Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) standing at $US94,98 per person by December 2016 (Zimstat, 2017). Cumulatively, for February 2017, it was at $US100 and for January 2018 at $US112 (Zimstat, 2017 & 2018). An implication of this may be that for one to be considered not poor in Zimbabwe, he or she needed the above-mentioned amounts to be able to purchase both food and non-food items.

To this end, one can argue that the way the government is implementing extractive industry indigenisation is creating an invidious situation for the marginalised indigenous majority. They are paradoxically further marginalised by administering what was considered the antidote of their disenfranchisement, i.e. indigenisation of the economy. On the one hand, the policy promises to empower, through indigenisation, the marginalised indigenous Zimbabweans, an objective, according to the presented and discussed findings above; it is largely failing to achieve. On the other hand, the application of indigenisation in the extractive industry is creating an impression that Zimbabwe, outside the warzone, is the most unsafe destination for FDI. An intriguing paradox is that, on the one hand, we have a policy that is not empowering, yet in some cases, it is indigenising. On the other hand, the policy is shunning the investors away and compelling the existing ones either to relocate to other countries, scale down or close up the operations.

The foregoing analysis implies that the extractive industry indigenisation is strengthening Zimbabwe's extractive institutions. The logic of doing so is destroying inclusive institutions. However, critically important to note is that strengthening extractive institutions and destroying inclusive institutions is serving the regime from collapsing at the weight of its indigenisation contradictions. Corroborating with this analysis, Simpson and Hawkins (2018) treat the indigenisation programme as one of the strategic political settlement instruments the ZANU-PF led government is using to continue holding on to power even when the odds are dictating otherwise. Political settlements- or elite pacts- are agreements that result in a state governed by

political and administrative frameworks, both formal and informal, that advance, maintain and protect the interests of the elites (Di John & Putzel, 2009; Khan, 2018, 2010 & 1995). To achieve all this, elites must agree on ways of distributing, exercising, administering and transferring political and economic power (Khan, 2018; McCandless, 2019)- in this, the indigenisation proceeds. Thus, it is vital to articulate the political economy of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe within the mutual connectedness of political and economic extractive institutions. The two, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), work hand in glove to preserve the other. In their words:

> Extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, which enrich a few at the expense of many. Those who benefit from extractive institutions thus have the resources to build their (private) armies and mercenaries, to buy their judges, and to rig elections to remain in power. They also have every interest in defending the system. Therefore, extractive economic institutions create the platform for extractive political institutions to persist (Acemoglu & Robinson 2013, p. 384).

In the final analysis, this study argues that by strengthening the uneven development architecture through extractive industry indigenisation, the same results colonialists achieved through imperialist means, the government is becoming the monster it seems to hate the most. Following on from this reasoning, Nietzsche's words can describe the Zimbabwean government with regards to the effects of extractive industry indigenisation: "He who fights with the monster should be careful lest thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee." Therefore, this study argues that the extractive industry indigenisation is perpetuating colonialism architecture when colonialism itself is anachronistic. Similar accumulation by dispossession methods used by the colonialists are arguably the ones the government is using four decades into democracy under the auspices of indigenisation. These methods are deception, robbery, stealing, thievery, larceny, wanton killings, looting, massive displacements and dislocations, expropriation of land, livestock and sundry belongings without compensation. Ironically, this is the same government that came to power through waging a protracted war of liberation against the white minority rule whose successive colonial administrations thrived on accumulation by dispossession. This reality is a sad paradox that triggers painful memories of the aeons of colonialism within the general public. To the disadvantaged indigenous Zimbabweans, this is sad because their own leaders, going by such

decorated names as freedom fighters, revolutionaries and Pan Africanists, are this time around the ones thriving through such accumulation by dispossession processes.

The preceding analysis prompts Gumede (2018) to argue that the indigenisation programme, in general, is achieving negative outcomes not because empowering the disadvantaged indigenous people is a bad idea. Instead, because its implementation is not resulting in the transfer of shares "to blacks already in business, especially in the SMMEs sector – the real black entrepreneurs – but transferred commercially successful assets to political capitalists with no business inclination or skills whatsoever. This undermined, rather than added value" (Gumede, 2018, para. 19).

10.2 Contribution to knowledge

The new knowledge this study is contributing to the existing stock of knowledge is centred on making a case that Zimbabwe's indigenisation policy, particularly in the extractive industry, overpromised empowerment benefits and is under-delivering. According to the indigenisation laws, the programme was adopted and implemented to address widespread inequalities between the nonindigenous haves and indigenous have-nots. Deepening inequalities and further disempowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens are evident following the implementation of the policy in the mining sector. Concerning why the promised indigenisation and empowerment benefits were not realised, this study is making the following six theoretical contributions. The contributions are drawn from the presented and analysed findings in the preceding data chapters and, at the same time, weaved and interpreted within the accumulation by dispossession theory- the theoretical framework for this study.

10.2.1 Extractive industry indigenisation as a regime survival strategy in Zimbabwe

Findings have established that the problem in Zimbabwe that may account for indigenisation achieving largely less empowering outcomes in the extractive sector is not widespread political corruption per se. Neither is it the widespread tolerability of it. The moral economy of corruption (de Sardan, 1999) is not permissible in the lower strata of Zimbabwean society. This is similar in the rest of Africa, where the 2003 World Values Survey established that Africa has the lowest level of corruption permissiveness at the citizen level compared to other regions of

the world (Mkandawire, 2015). Instead, what I may glean from the findings of extractive industry indigenisation failure are the following two explanations:

- Firstly, the ZANU-PF government is more interested in reproducing itself by whatever means necessary and available.
- Secondly, the insatiable appetite of the corrupt political elite- conspiring with the mining business elite- to accumulate wealth and power through privatizing public resources while not investing the proceeds in the country.

While articulating the pitfalls of national consciousness, Fanon (1961) suggests that this may be largely because the distinct characteristic of the national bourgeoisie class that took power after independence cannot produce, build, and invent. This bourgeoisie class is characteristically suitable for compradorial functions, considering its inherent predatory nature. The ZANU-PF government's predatory character makes it difficult to evenly spread the wealth around even though the indigenisation programme is based on capital restructuring and wealth redistribution. Interpreted within the accumulation by dispossession theoretical framework, extractive industry indigenisation, instead of evenly distributing wealth around, is unevenly concentrating and accumulating it in the hands of both the political and business elites.

Findings show that the same extractive industry indigenisation logic that is facilitating the elite private accumulation of wealth (i.e. accumulating wealth through dispossessing it from others) is socialising and externalising the associated losses and costs. My argument for this is that it will be misleading to imagine these as incidental outcomes. A well thought out, and deliberate strategy is causing all this. Findings have established that the government is using three strategic political settlement ways to achieve all these. Firstly, the elites are externalising the accumulated money, including those accumulated through extractive industry indigenisation. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's 2016 Monetary Policy statement shows that in 2015 alone, Zimbabwe lost an estimated amount of US$684 million through individual account transfers, investments, and donations while companies externalised US$1.2 billion. This situation makes it US$1.884 billion the country lost in that year through illicit financial flows (IFFs). Corroborating with this revelation the Global Financial Integrity's 2019 report indicates that between 2004 and 2013, Zimbabwe should have lost about US$2.8 billion through IFFs. This then translates into an average annual loss of US$276 million. Commenting on this, Afrodad (2014) argues that from three sectors of

mining, fisheries and wildlife, the country lost an estimated amount of US$2.83 billion between 2009 and 2013, US$2.7 billion of which is from the mining sector alone. This reality represents an annual average loss of US$570.70 million.

Secondly, the elites are engaging in conspicuous consumption with the accumulated money. Findings have established that the political and business elites benefiting (and benefited) from the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular are building and buying palatial mansions inside and outside the country, buying fancy cars, and living expensive lifestyles. One quick example here is that of one former indigenisation minister, Savior Kasukuwere, one of the country's richest politicians before toppled in a 'non-coup coup' (Tendi, 2020) with the late president Robert Mugabe in November 2017. Kasukuwere built a 50-bedroomed mansion in Harare's eastern suburbs during his tenure as the indigenisation minister.

Thirdly, the elites keep "stashes of foreign currency" (Simpson & Hawkins, 2018, p. x), making it difficult for the accumulated wealth to contribute to the economy. The quick case in point here is that of the former Minister of Finance, Ignatius Chombo, who, when arrested by the army during the fateful night of the 15 November 2017 'non-coup coup', had US$10 million cash in his house. According to Mkandawire (2015, p. 571), the prominent attributes of such a political economy are "insatiable greed and gluttony." Bayart (1993) calls a collection of political sins of this sort 'politics of the belly' whereby the political elite enrich themselves in ways certainly inimical to addressing the national questions concerning inequality, indigeneity and accumulation. This is done through the political elite using their powers as forms of private properties (Clapham, 1985) and privatises public resources in their names (Harvey, 2003).

While commenting on the three preceding ways the government of Zimbabwe is using to achieve accumulation by dispossession objectives through extractive industry indigenisation, Bayart (1993) speaks of excessive greed as an inherent distinct feature of the African political elite. In corroboration with this perspective, Fanon (1961) talks of the dominance of the spirit of indulgence within this postcolonial national bourgeoisie class. The corrupt postcolonial national bourgeoisie class that took power after independence is closely associated with the last stages of the decadence of the western bourgeoisie class, rather than the first stages of inventions and discovery of new worlds of this class. In Zimbabwe, indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular are further perpetuating the social, economic and political

situations that have been destroyed by the following: (a) deindustrialisation due to budgetary constraints for capital investments; (b) ineligible to receive adequate Official Development Assistance (ODA) because of defaulting challenges and international sanctions. This hit hard the extractive sector, where indigenisation is more pronounced. In the end, I am making a case that the combination of the three (i.e. externalisation of the accumulated money, conspicuous consumption with the accumulated money, and keeping stashes of foreign currency) is hollowing out the indigenisation of its empowerment jewel. These findings are in sync with the theoretical insights of Harvey's (2003) accumulation by dispossession theory- the theoretical framework of this study. Accumulation by dispossession framework, the contemporary version of Karl Marx's primitive accumulation framework, suggests that modern governments are using subtle ways of accumulating wealth and power into the hands of the few through dispossessing the public.

In the end, through applying the resource curse concept (i.e. the paradox of plenty), this study argues that the elite indigenisation of the extractive industry- i.e. in cases where the elites got shares in the qualifying companies (Saunders, 2017), and widespread failure to indigenise the mining economy have the following two similar effects: (a) continued impoverishment of the disadvantaged indigenous people and their communities, and (b) the perpetuation of uneven mining development. Either way, the targeted beneficiaries of indigenisation are not benefiting, and uneven development is maintained.

10.2.2 Neopatrimonialism as the effect (not as a cause) of weak institutions

While the argument that predatory or neopatrimonial regimes in Africa favour political corruption for continued survival may be true, I am arguing that Zimbabwe's experience with extractive industry indigenisation provides evidence that may suggest the contrary. Findings suggest that political corruption (or neopatrimonialism in general) is not the cause of the country's weak and ineffective political and economic institutions. Instead, it is the effect of these institutions. Zimbabwe's experiences with extractive industry indigenisation are providing evidence of reversing the arrow of causality between political corruption, on the one hand, and weak and ineffective political and economic institutions, on the other. This situation debunks the previously held epistemological position about Africa's political economy of corruption that the

former causes the latter. However, determining the direction of causality between the two is not a less challenging task.

The African neopatrimonial governance system in general and Zimbabwe's in particular encourages the elite personal accumulation of wealth and conspicuous consumption rather than investments and savings. Chabal (1996, p. 1123) calls this "primacy of display." Corroborating with viewpoint this while commenting about the less encouraging outcomes of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BB-BEE) programme in neighbouring South Africa, Mbeki (2009, p. 61) contend that the implementation of the policy is producing a form of 'black entrepreneurship' made up of "classes of unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists." The classes, many of whose members Southall (2014) and Ransom and Sutch (1988) argue that became capitalists without capital, have strong links with the country's capital. Shava (2016) also shares similar views. This is antithetical to the Weberian Protestant work ethic that encourages frugality, hardworking, discipline, asceticism, modesty, industrialisation, investment, reinvestment, and entrepreneurship (Grytten, 2013; Weber, 2013 [1930]). Certainly, this has had negative implications on investment, foreign and domestic alike. The distinctiveness of African neopatrimonialism gives birth to what Taylor (2012) refers to as a different version of capitalism; embedded within it is a cultural deficiency. As in Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation, massive capital flights and divestitures in response to elite accumulation by dispossession activities are the major outcomes of African neopatrimonialism. These are direct results of a political elite considering access to public offices as a means for wealth accumulation while not investing the proceeds in the country, making the state the stage for the 'politics of the belly' (Bayart, 1993).

The viewpoint of the insatiable greed of the postcolonial African political elite may provide a competing explanation on how and why, after independence, attempted transformations and transitions succeeded largely in freeing only the political elite and entrenching largely their interests. This reality prompted van de Walle (2007) to claim that, unlike in the developed North where 'mass clientelism' commonly enjoys shared and inclusive redistribution of wealth, Africa has generally 'elite clientelism' that concentrates and confines accumulation among itself and business elites. By playing an enabling role to achieve this in Africa, "[n]eopatrimonialism provides a moral cultural gloss that somehow renders corruption understandable and its victims complicit" (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 571). Following on from this perspective, I am making a case that the

combination of neopatrimonialism and elite greed in Zimbabwe is not creating a conducive environment (i.e. institutional, legal, policy and governance frameworks) for extractive industry indigenisation for the empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. A competitive indigenous mining bourgeoisie class is also not emerging because of this. Therefore, this study is making a case that widespread complicit is making it possible for such a disaster to occur.

Furthermore, although the government of Zimbabwe wants to strike a balancing act between the need to implement extractive industry indigenisation and attracting FDI in the sector, the patron-client-based indigenisation transactions that mostly benefited the political and business elites are certainly not providing good infrastructure for investment. This situation also stifles continued operations of the nonindigenous mining firms and sustainable operations of the indigenous companies and organisations (e.g. CSOTs). This situation is largely because the distinct rentier characteristic of the neopatrimonial state is significantly undermining policy predictability, consistency and certainty, and property rights. However, all this is working in favour of the strategic political settlement objective of the indigenisation programme: state generating rents meant for regime reproduction and elite preservation through the personal accumulation of wealth. Conceptually, political settlements are "a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability" (Khan, 2010, p. 4). In this case, the political settlements framework dictates that regime reproduction and elite preservation are strategic for serving, advancing and promoting the ruling elite's interests.

10.2.3 Extractive industry indigenisation is helping to create a strong state, weak and bad society

The insatiable greed for power and riches invariably begets political corruption, clientelism and cronyism. This situation is arguably Zimbabwe's sad tale with extractive industry indigenisation, whose outcomes to the intended beneficiaries may be largely summed up in one word: abysmal. It is more of a tale of treasuries on the political and business elites' pole and a tale of tragedies on the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. Therefore, I am making a case that this is made possible by neopatrimonialism's built-into-the-system dialectical ability to strengthen the state with the same logic that weakens society. While Mkandwire (2015) does not agree with Migdal's (1988) view that neopatrimonialism compromise good governance through creating "strong society,

weak state", arguing that it creates "the sense of bad society, weak state" (p. 573), this study is making a case that neopatrimonialism undermines good governance through creating 'strong state, weak and bad society.'

In this study, a strong state, on the one hand, is a 'balloon suspended in the air' kind of a state (Hyden, 1983). In this study, a strong state is a state that has extractive institutions capable of detecting and thwarting dissent voices yet incapable of championing inclusive, shared and sustainable economic growth and development. On the other hand, a weak society is an emasculated and fearful citizenry incapable of standing for themselves against state repression and exploitation. In Zimbabwe, to some degree, this has been inculcated over the years through the country's history of the political economy of state-sponsored violence and intimidation. To another degree, this has been inculcated by the possibility (if not the certainty) of the state sponsoring violence and intimidation whenever feeling or perceiving threatened. Thus, concerning extractive industry indigenisation, the state is strengthened through simultaneously playing roles of the facilitator, benefactor and beneficiary of accumulation by dispossession processes. Through some mining indigenisation opaque deals entered into by the country's security sector (see 8.4) and the foreign mining companies, the security sector secured for itself "a potentially lucrative source of off-budget financing" (Global Witness Report, 2017, p. 20). Independent financing system of the security sector subverts accountability and transparency at it would be difficult for the democratic oversight of the security sector to take place. According to the Global Witness Report (2017, p. 20)

> This [independent financing system of the security sector], in turn, incentivises these same institutions to preserve the power structures that afford them access to these funds. In Zimbabwe, where security forces are closely aligned to the ruling party ZANU-PF, this arrangement serves both parties by shoring up a system that maintains the security sector's loyalty and the ruling party's power.

All this is making it difficult to create a competitive, strong and sustainable indigenous mining bourgeoisie class. Rather, this makes it possible and expedient to create a lumpen bourgeoisie class with untoward allegiance to the state- the benefactor. Thus, through neopatrimonialism, the government is facilitating (and actively participating in) the processes of accumulation by dispossession. However, it should be noted that the major challenge of insatiable greedy for both riches and power is not necessarily corruption or neopatrimonialism. Instead, it is the debilitating

effects of their continued strengthening and reproduction which makes uneven development architecture a distinct and permanent feature of African societies.

Further, although neopatrimonialism seems to be the problem pervading African governance systems and accounting for the unpalatable policy outcomes, the concern is not neopatrimonialism per se (Mkandawire, 2015). In Asia, for instance, especially in the Asian Dragons, the relationship between neopatrimonialism, notably in its cronyism and corruption dimensions, and economic growth is neither isomorphic nor significant. If anything, the relationship is that of neopatrimonialism positively influencing high rates of economic growth (Mkandawire, 2015). The seemingly intractable paradox here is that the emergence of a competitive indigenous bourgeoisie class in the Asian countries occurred under neo-patrimonial leadership. This makes it one empirical evidence that there is a significant positive correlation between capital formation and neopatrimonialism in some places, while in others, the relationship is neither significant nor positive. If anything, the relationship is inverse. Therefore, it is against this background of mixed results of neopatrimonialism across space that it is imperative to pose this critically important question: How and why neopatrimonialism presented (or still presenting) a solution to some countries' developmental challenges but not in Africa? A similar question was posed by Kang (2003, p. 1) while giving reference to developmental and growth differentials in Asia: "Why did corruption and cronyism impede growth in some Asian countries but not in others." Contributing to this viewpoint, Mkandawire (2015, p. 571) asks: "What is wrong with African neopatrimonialism." In support of the above, in 2000, The Economist asked if Africa has an entrenched institutional flaw that makes it inconceivable and incapable of championing its development.

However, Jerven (2011) blames economists' analytical tools for studying Africa's developmental issues, citing scholarly flaws in their works. According to this study, the preceding are critically important questions to be answered instead of taking a parsimonious position that it is neopatrimonialism that accounts for Africa's developmental and political challenges. In this study, answering these questions is important in establishing the failure by extractive industry indigenisation to address the overarching mining uneven development configuration in Zimbabwe. Thus, I am making a case that while Neopatrimonialism School may attempt to provide a competing explanation about Africa's poor economic performance and political crisis, it is its

inability to provide cogent answers to the previous critically important questions that render its analysis parsimonious, superficial and sometimes misleading.

Therefore, I am arguing that while it may be understandable to allege that extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe is generating more unhappy outcomes for the disenfranchised indigenous citizens, it could be misleading and parsimonious to assert that the logic of neopatrimonialism pervading the ZANU-PF's post-2000 governance is the one to blame. Attributing the disempowering outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation to the logic of neopatrimonialism would be rather an intellectual amiss. Therefore, the assertion that the logic of neopatrimonialism can account for the attainment of the failure of the extractive industry indigenisation to deliver positive outcomes is unwarranted. Admittedly, this conclusion came as a surprise to me.

However, the preceding conclusion does not dismiss the Neopatrimonialism School's epistemological strength in describing and explaining the inherent political and economic problems in Africa generally and in Zimbabwe specifically. However, we must not forget that many of these problems are incorrectly viewed to have neo-patrimonial leanings and origins. To conclude, the subtle way in which extractive industry indigenisation has been implemented in Zimbabwe perpetuates the sector's uneven development problem. This reflects how the politics of regime survival, cronyism, and elite personal accumulation have been playing each other out in the country, perhaps since independence. However, although asserting that extractive industry indigenisation is clientelistic, predatory or neo-patrimonial may be true, neither neopatrimonialism, predation, nor clientelism reflect its *raison d'etre* or origins.

10.2.5 African neopatrimonialism normalising political corruption

The study further makes a case that neopatrimonialism, especially African neopatrimonialism, produces reverse (and yet not necessarily surprising) outcomes regarding political corruption permeating the extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe. Mkandawire (2015) refers to situations like this as the normalcy of corruption that is more detrimental to the policy intervention's original intention. In agreement with this, de Sardan (1999) calls it a moral economy of corruption, while Hyden (1982) calls the same economy of affection. The situation "provides

a moral gloss that somehow renders corruption understandable and its victims complicit" (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 571). In Zimbabwe, where loyalty to authority is a rule rather than an exception, neopatrimonialism produces a people who are not only neo-patrimonial as their leadership but also submissive and complicit in their subjugation and oppression. One interviewed respondent, SGRR2, referred to such citizens as 'doormats.'

Thus, I am making a case that due to neopatrimonialism's logic, the larger consequence of extractive industry indigenisation is inimical to its original intentions, i.e. addressing uneven development problem through empowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens. From this viewpoint, the study argues that the extractive industry indigenisation is presenting a good infrastructure for elite formation and reproduction through the private accumulation of both power and wealth. This situation leaves uneven development-related problems of poverty, inequality and unemployment unaddressed. The thesis this study is making here is that Zimbabwe's invidious experience with implementing extractive industry indigenisation may be attributable to state capture by the political and business elites that enacted the indigenisation policy that is facilitating the generation of rents. This is the objective neopatrimonialism is facilitating and making it easier to achieve.

However, this study is not making this conclusion oblivious of the criticisms levelled against the logic of neopatrimonialism when giving predictive value and credible analytical content to Africa's political processes and economic performance (Mkandawire, 2015). Agreeing with this viewpoint, Hoffman (2018) contends that Neopatrimonialism School neither offers a convincing explanation that predicts Africa's economic outcomes/performance nor explains heterogeneity in the continent's political configurations. In the context of this study, this then begs the following questions: did the government collectively agree to adopt the noble yet impossible to implement indigenisation policy? Were the policy's adoption and implementation a well-thought-out strategy for accumulation by dispossession of both wealth and power for personal and regime survival ends? The findings of this study, however, are more of the latter and less of the former. These findings are consistent with the theoretical insights of David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory- the theoretical framework of this study. The theory suggests that public policies are largely for accumulating and concentrating wealth in the hands of the few business

and political elites through dispossessing the same from the general public (Harvey, 2003; Bond, 2007).

10.2.6 Undocumented and unpublished extractive industry indigenisation success stories

Furthermore, this study is making a case that more often studies conducted on Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation, to use Moore's (2012, p. 1) words, "simply turn celebratory scholarship [of the country's affirmative action policies of the first decade of independence] upside down". This is done without considering (or through deliberately ignoring) the significant positive, intended outcomes extractive industry indigenisation is delivering. This conclusion asserts that such analyses to extractive industry indigenisation are largely reflecting the researchers' anti-establishment and pre-analytical dispositions. At the end of the day, this lands us at 'who is answering the asked indigenisation question' and 'whose evidence matters' kind of a dilemma. The reason being that sharp political binaries are looming large than objective, neutral positions on the policy. The major challenge with these cynical indigenisation scholars and researchers, who are largely neopatrimonialists, is that every outcome of extractive industry indigenisation, including the positive ones, is examined through the neopatrimonialism lens. Therefore, it follows that the policy's positive outcomes are rationalised as the elite's rational neopatrimonial ways of preserving and reproducing the regime by whatever means possible and available.

The argument of the neopatrimonialists here is that neopatrimonialism is omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent among the neopatrimonial regimes to the extent that everything they do has a neopatrimonial bent. As Therkildsen (2017) argues, exponents of the Neopatrimonialism School are making this possible by often taking the school's position as a given without effectively testing its major propositions. This viewpoint can be made worse by those who try to marry Neopatrimonialism School to public choice theory. The result is viewing the state as largely rent-seeking rather than benevolent, driven by the need to behave in the interests of public good and public value. Following on from this viewpoint, I am therefore making a case that while extractive industry indigenisation is getting its fair share of criticisms on account of undesirable (yet arguably intended by the elite) consequences it is producing, it should, in the same breath, get a fair share of affirmations on account of the desirable and empowering outcomes it is delivering. This is

notwithstanding that the positive outcomes are not comparable to their undesirable counterparts.

Extractive industry indigenisation is making tremendous progress in lifting the disadvantaged rural indigenous residents out of poverty, especially through the CSOTs. Cases in point are the success stories of MNCZ, Gwanda, Bindura, and Zvishavane CSOTs (see Chapter 7). This observation about Zimbabwe's improved rural development is in sync with the Ibrahim Index of African Governance Report (2020), which says Zimbabwe is the most improved country in Africa over the last decade with regards to rural development. According to the Report, Zimbabwe improved in this area by +49.4 between 2010 and 2019. Agreeing with this viewpoint, the Mo Ibrahim African Governance Report (2017) revealed that Zimbabwe was the second improved country in Africa with regards to annual average improvements between 2008 and 2014 (improved by +9.8), with Comoros as the most improved with +11.3. The benefits of extractive industry indigenisation through CSOTs and improved water and land access for the rural disadvantaged citizens are the competing explanations for these remarkable improvements.

However, it is important to note that these findings about the positive outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation are inconsistent with the theoretical framework of this study- the accumulation by dispossession theory. The theoretical insights of the theory suggest that the governments across the world, through public policy, are playing important active and enabling roles of accumulating and concentrating wealth and power into the hands of the elites through dispossessing the public (Mbiba, 2017; Harvey, 2003). According to Harvey (2003), governments are doing so through using four ways: financialisation, privatisation, state redistributions and management and manipulation of crises. However, in the case of these success CSOTs' stories, we see the course and outcomes of a government public policy benefiting more the intended beneficiaries of the policy, i.e. the disenfranchised indigenous rural residents and the mining communities, than the unintended, i.e. the business and political elites.

10.3 Recommendations for policy

The above contributions to knowledge and preceding findings chapters show how and why the extractive industry indigenisation is largely not fulfilling its promises. In the end, extractive industry indigenisation attracts a fair share of opponents and adherents, both within and outside Zimbabwe, whose arguments and counterarguments on indigenisation compete for dominance. The reason is that extractive industry indigenisation is increasingly becoming the disease to which it is pretending to be the cure for, i.e. the overarching mining uneven development configuration. The contradictions of extractive industry indigenisation are putting the country at a crossroads, resulting in political, social and economic impasses, both inside and outside government spaces. Thus, it is for this reason that it is critically important for me to suggest policy measures that, if adopted and implemented, may make extractive industry indigenisation a success story. In this case, success story means extractive industry indigenisation striking a balancing act between empowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens of the country, on the one hand, and still presenting the country as a safe destination for international capital, on the other. This study, therefore, suggests the following recommendations:

10.3.1 Establishing strong, inclusive and effective indigenisation policy institutions

Findings presented and analysed in the preceding data chapters have shown that indigenisation implementation failure, particularly in the extractive industry, is largely attributable to weak, exclusive and ineffective policy institutions. These policy institutions are largely predatory, extractive and neopatrimonial in orientation, thus presenting good infrastructures for large-scale public corruption. It is against this background of such extractive policy institutions that I recommend establishing strong, effective and inclusive policy and legal institutions to guard against indigenisation implementation failure and all forms of corruption associated with it. Recommending such institutions is worth considering here: the extractive political, legal and economic institutions, whose neopatrimonial and predatory distinctiveness is a conducive environment for corruption to thrive, are strong, well-thought-out, well-coordinated and well-organised. They conflate, intersect, overlap and converge in more subtle ways while at the same time centrally planned and coordinated. The idea is not merely that the political and business favoured clients are often on avaricious, but rather the sole purpose of their leadership is largely

self-enrichment. Thus, I recommend that to dismantle these structural infrastructures for corruption and indigenisation implementation failure; the government needs strong, effective and inclusive indigenisation policy institutions.

10.3.2 Clear, aligned and consistent indigenisation legal and policy frameworks

It has been established in the preceding data chapters that there is widespread nonalignment, ambiguities and inconsistencies within the indigenisation legal and policy frameworks. This reality is notwithstanding the fact that one critical-success factor for effective implementation of policies is the clarity, consistency and alignment of the legal and policy frameworks. As articulated in the preceding data chapters, Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation laws in Zimbabwe are largely inconsistent, ambiguous and non-aligned to each other. It has been established that this condition is deliberate rather than incidental as it presents a conducive condition for elite accumulation of wealth and power. At the same time, this condition is continuously making implementing Indigenisation difficult and empowering the less provided indigenous citizens elusive. It is thus against this background that I am recommending clear, aligned and consistent Indigenisation legal and policy frameworks for effective mining indigenisation in the country. Doing so improves policy certainty, predictability and consistency.

10.3.3 Establishing effective indigenisation monitoring and evaluation systems

Findings have shown that it is difficult to track, monitor and evaluate indigenisation activities and processes as there are no mechanisms or systems to do so. This means establishing, with a certain degree of certainty, whether the indigenisation is achieving its set goals and objectives is not easy. The absence of mechanisms to track, monitor and evaluate indigenisation implementation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular is undermining transparency, integrity, inclusivity and accountability values. The Indigenisation M&E systems are important to track if the intended indigenisation beneficiaries are actually benefiting and outcomes are indeed consistent with the goals. I recommend this measure against the background that currently, Zimbabwe does not have a standalone indigenisation M&E system.

10.2.4 Extractive industry indigenisation simultaneously achieving two separate objectives

In this study, I tried to answer the following intractable extractive industry indigenisation question: How and why the CSOTs are producing better outcomes in some communities but not in others? Answering this question is critically important in this study, considering the conflicted history, functions and achievements of the CSOTs as policy instruments for extractive industry indigenisation in various rural mining communities. Preceding findings chapters show that of the 61 launched and commissioned CSOTs, only MNCZ, Gwanda, Bindura and Zvishavane CSOTs demonstrated, to a significant extent, success stories in empowering the disenfranchised indigenous people through extractive industry indigenisation. However, this study is making this conclusion conscious of the nature, extent and pattern of the accumulation by dispossession acts permeating the empowerment processes of the disadvantaged indigenous peoples in these mining communities.

Therefore, this study concludes that in these success story cases, extractive industry indigenisation is simultaneously achieving two crucial objectives; one primary and another secondary. The primary one being two-tiered: generating rents for regime survival and personal accumulation for the political and business elites. The secondary one being the empowerment of the disenfranchised indigenous rural residents. The empowerment is through the CSOTs constructing, maintaining and rehabilitating infrastructures (e.g. dip tanks, clinics, hospitals, schools, etc) as well as creating employment for the youths. Within this conclusion, I am further arguing that while the primary objective is predetermined and intentional, the secondary objective is either incidental or arbitrary. Therefore, this conclusion is based on the assumption that beneath the written down secondary objective of empowering the disadvantaged indigenous citizens through extractive industry indigenisation lurks the following two primary objectives: a) saving the crumbling and internationally isolated government from the regime change existential threats; b) elite private accumulation of wealth and power.

However, for those arguing from the Panglossian logic, the disempowering outcomes extractive industry indigenisation is producing, albeit largely unintended and paradoxical, are reflecting the best of what Zimbabwe would produce under the predatory ZANU-PF administration. This view argues that the extractive institutions and legal systems inherited by the postcolonial

administration upon independence (and strengthened thereafter) are inconceivable of producing inclusive, broad-based, and shared developmental outcomes. Articulating on this viewpoint, Mkandawire (2015) sarcastically argues that this is how Africa generally works as its history and traditions shaped it to behave that way.

In the case of other CSOTs, including those that never existed beyond their launch and commissioning, significantly reflect the preservation and strengthening of the status quo, i.e. uneven mining development architecture. The reason being that neither proper extractive industry indigenisation nor empowerment of the disadvantaged indigenous citizens is meaningfully taking place in their respective communities. Corroborating with this analysis, Taylor (2016, p. 13) argues the following:

> To conclude that Zimbabwe's approach to empowerment was inconsistent with business rights is a mammoth understatement. Instead of promoting entrepreneurship, it encouraged predation. Instead of empowering black Zimbabweans, writ large, it further impoverished them. Rather than emphasise the nurturing of business among marginalised communities, indigenisation instead represented a radical—and politically corrupted—reallocation of existing capital.

Most non-indigenous mining firms are not honouring their indigenisation pledges, and the government prefers inaction and non-action responses rather than coercing them to act otherwise. As public policy inactions and non-actions are themselves public policies, the government's 'doing-nothing response' means that it is colliding with the nonindigenous mining capital in not honouring their indigenisation pledges and promises. Consequently, indigenisation's empowerment promises to the disadvantaged indigenous citizens are still largely unmet. However, in all these subterfuges, the unwritten primary objectives of accumulation of power and wealth by both business and political elites and thwarting regime change forces are being achieved. These findings are consistent with David Harvey's accumulation by dispossession theory- this study's theoretical framework. This theory's insights suggest that public policies are largely instruments for accumulating and concentrating wealth in the hands of the elites through dispossessing the general public (Harvey, 2003 & 2004; Mbiba, 2017).

10.3.4 The integrated extractive industry indigenisation and economic empowerment governance model

To address neopatrimonial governance challenges while at the same time restructuring capital to spread the wealth around, I recommend the following economic governance model, the *Integrated Extractive industry indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Governance Model* (IMIEEGM). The IIEEGM is suitable for structural reconfiguration of capital in a typical African neo-patrimonial state, using Zimbabwe's extractive industry as a unit of analysis. The strength of the IIEEGM is that it seeks to strike a balancing act between two contentious modes of indigenisation: indigenisation through empowerment, on the one hand, and empowerment through indigenisation, on the other. The argument this study is making with this IIEEGM is that while the two schools of thought may be competing for dominance, there is a defensible epistemological middle ground. The IIEEGM is resting on the foundation where indigenisation in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular will be socially inclusive in outlook and developmental in orientation. I developed the model through the process of sublation, a dialectical process that hybridises (i.e. sublates) the compatible essential elements of the competing paradigms, in this case of indigenisation through empowerment school, on the one hand, and empowerment through indigenisation school, on the other. Therefore, the model simultaneously empowers the disenfranchised indigenous citizens and provides conducive policy, legal and institutional infrastructures within which the capital logic can flourish, i.e. both domestic and foreign investments. The model is represented diagrammatically below

Figure 10.1: The integrated mining indigenisation and economic empowerment governance model



The model rests on two mutually reinforcing logics. Firstly, strong and effective policy institutions that promote policy predictability, certainty and consistency. Secondly, stopping elite enrichment while promoting broad-based empowerment. Both capital logic and empowerment of the marginalised indigenous citizens favour the predictable, stable, effective and reliable policy, institutional, legal frameworks. I argue that the model will simultaneously address weak institutions' challenges, institutional and policy failure, capital flight, clientelism, and corruption peculiar to African neo-patrimonial countries such as Zimbabwe. The argument here is that the IIEEGM will systematically decrease the discretionary powers and monopoly of the political elite to privately accumulate state resources and use them as largesse to sustain and strengthen their clientelistic networks to continue clinging on to power. The logic of this pro-business and pro-market, yet pro-poor, extractive industry indigenisation governance model is that the few freebies government officials distribute will diminish the state's attractiveness to the local business elite. This makes the business sector shift to more productive, effective, and efficient activities. Implementing the model will go a long way in addressing entrenched neopatrimonialism, one fundamental challenge in Africa generally and Zimbabwe specifically undermining shared and sustainable development (Bond, 2018; 2014 & 2000; Mkandawire, 2015; Mandaza, 2016).

The model suggests that through considering employment as a form of indigenisation and empowerment, as is the case in neighbouring South Africa, the mining sector may be one of the highly indigenised sectors that is empowering many disadvantaged indigenous groups. The Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (2018 & 2017) reveal that of the surveyed mining firms, with the combined total headcount of more than 35000 formally registered employees in the sector in 2018 (and 33000 in 2017), 99% were indigenous black Zimbabweans. 75% of them are drawn from the local communities the mining undertakings are taking place. It is important to note that artisanal and small miners, who are largely indigenous, are not part of the above mining employment statistics.

10.4 Understanding Zimbabwe's uneven development architecture within the mining indigenisation discourse

Uneven development, a Marxian political economy concept, describes the co-existence of advanced economic development and extreme underdevelopment within and between societies

(Harvey, 2011; Bond, 1998). Its distinctiveness is extreme spatial, gender, racial, wealth, income and regional unevenness, both in qualitative and quantitative degrees at national, regional and global scales. Historical human factors (e.g. skewed policies and political instabilities) and physical factors (e.g. natural disasters) are the leading causes of uneven development configurations. Zimbabwe's indigenisation programme was adopted and implemented against the background of widespread uneven development architecture in the country, which saw the nonindigenous capital at the commanding heights of the economy. However, as revealed by the findings, the indigenisation programme's outcomes, notably in the extractive industry, are largely inconsistent with the programme's major objective of empowering the disenfranchised indigenous citizens through indigenisation. While some remarkable achievements of Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation cannot be ignored, the mining sector remains mostly "unindigenised" (GDOR3: Interview, 03 July 2018), and the locals and their mining communities largely economically disenfranchised. The following are examples of some of Zimbabwe's major mining companies that are still 100% owned and controlled by foreigners: Zimplats, Unki Mine, Mimosa Mine, and How Mine. So, here we have an indigenisation programme that neither indigenised the economy nor, significantly empowered the targeted and deserving disadvantaged citizens and communities.

In the country's mining sector, even before the scrapping off of the indigenisation laws in all sectors of the economy in March 2019- save for the platinum and diamond sectors- to allow international capital to own and control 100% of the shareholding, the ownership and control of the extractive industry had not changed significantly from the 1980 ownership structure (Casey, 2020). While many local communities and indigenous people have been empowered in many CSOTs, when it comes to the indigenisation of the sector, only one qualifying business, Blanket Mine, managed to comply with the 51%/49% indigenisation laws (see section 7.1). However, it is important to note that in this isolated success story of indigenisation in the sector, there are emerging evidence of reversing indigenisation. In 2020, i.e. following the amendment of the indigenisation laws, Caledonia Mining Ltd, the parent company of Blanket Mine, increased its shareholding to 64% from 49% by way of buying back 15% of its shares from Fremiro Investments- the local company that bought 15% of Blanket mine in 2012 (Miningmx, 2020). This situation points to reversing the gains of indigenisation in the sector. Furthermore, while Freda Rebecca

Gold Mine (FRGM) claimed to have indigenised 15% shareholding to Kenneth Musanhi's Suncraft Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd and 26% to Zindico Consortium, cases of business fronting abound.

In 1980, according to Bradbury and Worby (1985), 95% of the mining exports were from foreign-owned and controlled mining companies. In 2017, as is the situation now, the sector was still profoundly dominated by international capital, save for the small-scale and artisanal mining sector, which has been 100% owned and controlled by the locals since independence in 1980 (CNRG & ZELA, 2020). These less-encouraging outcomes of extractive industry indigenisation point to the wickedness, durability and unresolved status of the uneven development problem in the country's mining sector in particular and the entire economy in general.

10.5 A summary of the drivers for the non-indigenisation of the mining sector and perpetuation of uneven mining development

Although the indigenisation programme may have empowered many indigenous people and local communities through the CSOTs vehicles, the sector remains foreign-owned and controlled. In a way, where the indigenous people and their communities benefited, it was more of a 'domestication' than 'indigenisation' of the economy in general and the mining sector in particular. In this study, domestication "refers to the empowerment of Zimbabweans who had been previously disadvantaged, directly or indirectly, by racially-determined discrimination; the latter refers only to the placement of control in the hands of nationals of a country' (Saunders, 2017, p. 8). This situation points to the non-indigenisation of the sector following the implementation of the indigenisation programme in the sector. Corroborating with this overall finding, Saunders (2017, p. 6) further reveals that

> …the large- and medium-scale sectors of the mining industry were dominated by foreign-owned mining houses since independence. While the specific ownership and minerals concentration shifted over time, foreign capital was unchallenged as the lead player in terms of production volume, value and investment in exploration, plant and beneficiation.

This makes the situation a paradox- having implemented an indigenisation programme that did not indigenise the economy in general and the mining sector in particular. The following are some of the drivers that led to the non-indigenisation of the sector following indigenisation:

- In exception of the Gwanda CSOT, all CSOTs did not get shares in the foreign mining companies, only seed capital/pledges/donations that are to this day yet to be paid in full;
- Widespread incapacitation (i.e. in terms of financial, human and managerial skills) and corruption in the CSOTs;
- The security sector companies that got 50% equity in diamond companies operating Chiadzwa are not spreading the wealth around. There are allegations that the money is being used for regime survival and elite personal accumulation purposes.
- Business fronting challenges: The three cases of FRGM that involve Kenneth Musanhi's Suncraft Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd and Zindico Consortium; Dzikamayi Mavhaire and the Bikita Minerals Lithium Mine; and Core Mining Resources and Grandwell Holdings in the politically exposed persons (PEPs) were used as fronts are instructive and telling. Fronting raises questions of mining domestication rather than mining indigenisation as many beneficiaries of fronting are PEPs. Also, in many indigenisation deals where shares were transferred to the indigenous Zimbabweans, the beneficiaries are also PEPs- making the process more of mining domestication and less of mining indigenisation.
- Reversing of the gains of indigenisation: The example here is the case of Blanket Mine that bought back the shares it had indigenised in 2012 (see sections 7.1 and 10.4).
- Indigenisation was more of a sanctions-busting strategy that targeted western companies only (as well as those with western connections, e.g. those headquartered in South Africa), leaving those with eastern origins, particularly China, untouched.
- Generally, the indigenisation programme is underfunded. This situation resulted in many empowerment programmes, especially those for women and the youth, poorly implemented or not being implemented at all. For example, in 2011, the former finance minister, Tendai Biti, allocated only US$5 to the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF), and the agency received only US$1.5 million (Saunders, 2017). Again, in 2012 of NIEEF's proposed allocation of US$6.5 million, it US$400,000 by mid-year (ibid).
- Implications of the Finance Act of 2018 (No. 13 of 2018) on the functions of the CSOTs: The implications of the Act on the continued funding of the CSOTs are harsh. The Act made it optional for the qualifying companies to continue funding (as well as honouring the pledged amounts in full) the CSOTs. This means that, in addition to not getting any

shares in these qualifying companies, the Act is now denying the communities and locals to benefit from the donations and pledges.

- According to the natural capital accounting' (NCA) and Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) measures, the indigenous people and their communities are being robbed of their depletable mineral wealth- making remaining worse-off and poorer.
- Zimbabwe's mining revenue has been declining- partly because of low FDI inflows, company closures, disinvestments and scaling down of operations due to indigenisation, notably the extractive industry indigenisation

Thus, the combination of these factors results in further impoverishment of the disadvantaged indigenous people and their communities, as well as the maintenance and perpetuation of uneven mining development in Zimbabwe.

10.6 Areas for future research

- In light of devolution and decentralisation of governmental powers and responsibilities to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities as one critical pillar for achieving Zimbabwe's Vision 2030 of a '*Prosperous and Empowered Upper Middle Income Society by 2030',* CSOTs in every rural district can be the ideal, alternative and complementary devolved and decentralised economic development centres at the district level. At the provincial level, according to the law, we have provincial councils as centres to spearhead socio-economic development in the provinces. Initially, CSOTs were established as both economic hubs and vehicles to foster local people-centred development in the mining communities (NIEEB, 2014). While we may have rural district councils RDCs) as the centres to spearhead local development at the district level, CSOTs, with their effective and inclusive structures, can provide ideal, alternative and complementary devolved and decentralised entities at the rural level. As no study has been conducted to examine the value of having the established CSOTs as credible ideal, alternative and complementary devolved and decentralised economic development entities at the district level, I am recommending future research to be carried out on this. Through using a case study approach of both success and failure CSOT stories, future research on this may illuminate the credibility, value and suitability of converting the already established CSOTs into

alternative and complimentary devolved and decentralised local economic development entities in Zimbabwe.

- Another interesting area that would also be of interest to future researchers is to examine the impact the indigenisation programme has had on the social contract, social cohesion and legitimacy. The level and extent of support the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation in particular have been receiving from citizens are dependent on the level of public support, trust and confidence the people have in the government.
- Further, the drivers for continuity and sustainability (or lack thereof) of indigenisation programmes when governments change would be another interesting area for future research. Change of government is often followed by a policy change. In the context of the indigenisation programme in Zimbabwe, the Government of National Unity (GNU)- between 2009 and 2013- and coming in of the Second Republic following the deposition of Robert Mugabe in November 2017 illuminated this policy paradigm shift.
- Also, the role of business culture- which the findings in the preceding chapters generally established is largely predatory- has had on the successes and or failures of indigenisation programmes. The success or failure of such capital restructuring programmes as indigenisation depends on their receptivity and business culture of their beneficiaries- i.e. the country's indigenous businesses.
- In future, a longitudinal study approach is necessary to assess the extent and scope of success and failure of the indigenisation programme in general and extractive indigenisation through CSOTs in particular. Such a longitudinal approach is important in determining whether indigenous communities and indigenous citizens indeed benefited from indigenisation overtime. A short-term approach to studying and understanding indigenisation, as I did, is not sufficient to determine the efficacy of such huge programmes with far-reaching implications as indigenisation.

10.5 Conclusion

The chapter made six broad conclusions. First, corruption is not the problem per se but its widespread tolerability in both government and society. Second, neopatrimonialism is the effect,

not cause, of weak institutions in Zimbabwe. Third, the extractive industry indigenisation is creating a strong state, weak and bad society. Fourth, extractive industry indigenisation is simultaneously achieving two objectives, one primary and the other secondary. Fifth, African neopatrimonialism is normalising political corruption. Sixth, there are undocumented and unpublished success stories of extractive industry indigenisation in Zimbabwe. Further, the chapter recommended establishing strong, effective and inclusive policy and legal institutions to thwart any form of political corruption in the country. Recommending such institutions is worth considering here: the extractive political, legal and economic institutions, whose neopatrimonial and predatory distinctiveness is a conducive environment for corruption to thrive, are strong, well-thought-out, well-coordinated and well-organised. They conflate, intersect, overlap and converge in more subtle ways while at the same time centrally planned and coordinated. The idea of proposing strong, effective and inclusive institutions is not merely that the political and business elites are often on a feeding frenzy. Rather, the sole purpose of their existence and leadership is largely self-enrichment.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Letter from the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Enterprise Development

All correspondence should be addressed to

"THE SECRETARY"

Telephone: 730081/7; 791823/7 702731
Facsimile: 704116/723765/729311
E-mail: miit@indandcom.co.zw
Telegrams: "TRADEMIN", Harare
Private Bag CY 7708, Causeway,
Zimbabwe

ZIMBABWE

Reference: **NP/33**

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, COMMERCE AND ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT
Mukwati Building
4th Street/Livingstone Avenue
Harare
Zimbabwe

MIN. OF INDUSTRY & COMMERCE (H) HUMAN RESOURCES OFFICE
18 MAY 2018
P BAG CY 7708, CAUSEWAY ZIMBABWE

18 May 2018

Mr Kennedy Manduna
kennymanduna@gmail.com

RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIGENIZATION AND ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT POLICY, 2007-2017

Reference is made to your letter dated 08 May 2018 requesting to conduct interviews on implementation of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy, 2007-2017.

Please be advised that the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Enterprise Development has granted you the permission to conduct your research. Please note that you are required to submit a copy of your final thesis to this Ministry for record keeping.

W. Kaerezi
FOR: SECRETARY FOR MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, COMMERCE AND ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT

cc. Human Resources Department Float

Appendix 2: Approved Letter from the National Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Board

Appendix 3: Ethical Clearance Certificate

Research Office

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)
R14/49 Manduna

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE	**PROTOCOL NUMBER: H18/03/13**
PROJECT TITLE	The Political Economy of uneven development: Implementation of the Indigenization and economic empowerment policy in Zimbabwe, 2007-2017
INVESTIGATOR(S)	Mr K Manduna
SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT	Wits School of Governance/
DATE CONSIDERED	16 March 2018
DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE	Approved
EXPIRY DATE	09 April 2021

DATE 10 April 2018 **CHAIRPERSON** _____ (Professor J Knight)

cc: Supervisor : Professor P Bond

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

To be completed in duplicate and **ONE COPY** returned to the Secretary at Room 10004, 10th Floor, Senate House, University. Unreported changes to the application may invalidate the clearance given by the HREC (Non-Medical)

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee. **I agree to completion of a yearly progress report.**

_____ _____/_____/_____
Signature Date

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES

Appendix 4: Informed consent form

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Wits School of Governance

The Political Economy of Uneven Development: Implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy in Zimbabwe (2007-2017)."

Kennedy Manduna

I …….. agree to participate in this research project. The research has been explained to me and I understand what my participation will involve.

I agree that my participation will remain anonymous	YES	NO	
I agree that the researcher may use anonymous quotes in his research report	YES	NO	
I agree that the interview may be audio recorded		YES	NO
I agree that the information I provide may be used anonymously by other researchers following this study	YES	NO	

…… (signature)
…… (name of participant)
…… (date)

Appendix 5: Participant information sheet for non-government officials (those from civil society organisations and academics).

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Kennedy Manduna and I am a PhD student in Wits School of Governance at Wits University in Johannesburg. As part of my studies I have to undertake a research project, and I am investigating "**The Political Economy of Uneven Development: Implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy in Zimbabwe (2007-2017)."** The aim of this research project is to find out how and why the implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP) in Zimbabwe from 2007-2017 resulted in the achievement of the contrary results by the policy.

As part of this project I would like to invite you to take part in the interview as you are someone working with the implementation and administration of the IEEP in Zimbabwe. The information I may get from you will help understand the extent to which the implementation of the policy had amplified the rate of the problem it sought to address in the first place, namely *uneven development*. This activity will involve answering a few questions and will take around one hour to one hour thirty minutes of your time. With your permission, I would also like to audio record the interview using a digital device.

You will not receive any direct benefits from participating in this study, and there are no disadvantages or penalties for not participating. You may withdraw at any time or not answer any question if you do not want to. The interview will be completely confidential and anonymous as I will not be asking for your name or any identifying information, and the information you give to me will be held securely and not disclosed to anyone else. The collected data will be protected as follows: (1) paper data will be locked in cabinet, (2) electronic data in protected file space (3) the identities of the respondents will not be captured on any of the data collection media.I will be using a pseudonym to represent your participation, in my final research report. If you experience any distress or discomfort, we will stop the interview or resume another time.

If you have any questions afterwards about this research, feel free to contact me on the details listed below. This study will be written up as a research report which will be available online through the university library website. If you wish to receive a summary of this report, I will be happy to send it to you upon request. If you have any queries, concerns or complaints regarding the ethical procedures of this study, you are welcome to contact the University Human Research Ethics Committee (non-medical), telephone + 27(0)11 717 1408, email hrec-medical.researchoffice@wits.ac.za/ Shaun.Schoeman@wits.ac.za

Yours sincerely,

Kennedy Manduna
Email address: kennymanduna@gmail.com
Cell No.: +27621924735 or +263778090698

Or My Supervisor Professor Patrick Bond
Email address: pbond@mail.ngo.za
Cell No.: +27834251401

Appendix 6: Participant information sheet for government officials

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Kennedy Manduna and I am a PhD student in Wits School of Governance at Wits University in Johannesburg. As part of my studies I have to undertake a research project, and I am investigating "**The Political Economy of Uneven Development: Implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy in Zimbabwe (2007-2017).**" The aim of this research project is to find out how and why the implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy (IEEP) in Zimbabwe from 2007-2017 resulted in the achievement of the contrary results by the policy.

As part of this project I would like to invite you to take part in the interview as you are someone working with the implementation and administration of the IEEP in Zimbabwe. The information I may get from you will help understand the extent to which the implementation of the policy had amplified the rate of the problem it sought to address in the first place, namely *uneven development*. This activity will involve answering a few questions and will take around one hour to one thirty minutes of your time. With your permission, I would also like to audio record the interview using a digital device.

You will not receive any direct benefits from participating in this study, and there are no disadvantages or penalties for not participating. You may withdraw at any time or not answer any question if you do not want to. The interview will be completely confidential and anonymous as I will not be asking for your name or any identifying information, and the information you give to me will be held securely and not disclosed to anyone else. The collected data will be protected as follows: (1) paper data will be locked in cabinet, (2) electronic data in protected file space (3) the identities of the respondents will not be captured on any of the data collection media.I will be using a pseudonym to represent your participation, in my final research report. If you experience any distress or discomfort, we will stop the interview or resume another time.

If you have any questions afterwards about this research, feel free to contact me on the details listed below. This study will be written up as a research report which will be available online through the university library website. If you wish to receive a summary of this report, I will be happy to send it to you upon request. If you have any queries, concerns or complaints regarding the ethical procedures of this study, you are welcome to contact the University Human Research Ethics Committee (non-medical), telephone + 27(0)11 717 1408, email hrec-medical.researchoffice@wits.ac.za/ Shaun.Schoeman@wits.ac.za

Yours sincerely,

Kennedy Manduna
Email address: kennymanduna@gmail.com
Cell No.: +27621924735 or +263778090698

Or My Supervisor Professor Patrick Bond
Email address: pbond@mail.ngo.za
Cell No.: +27834251401

Appendix 7: Key Informant Interview Guide

1. Who is and who is not an African?
    - Who is and who is not a Zimbabwean? Who belongs to Zimbabwe and who does not?
    - How the inclusion of some and exclusion of others determined?
    - What and whose criteria are used to determine inclusion of some and exclusion of others?
2. When I mention the word economic indigenisation what comes to mind?
    - When I mention the word economic empowerment what comes to mind also?
    - What are the essential characteristics/features/attributes of economic indigenization?
    - What are the essential characteristics/features/attributes of economic empowerment?
    - In your view, how do you conceive extractive industry or mining indigenisation?
3. What factors are affecting both course and outcomes of the indigenisation programme in general and extractive industry indigenisation?
    - How are they, either individually or collectively, affecting?
    - Were these factors emanated from the internal or external environments or both? Between the internal and external factors which influenced more?
4. In your view, what are the key drivers/motivations that led to the implementation of the economic indigenisation programme on the extractive industry in Zimbabwe?
5. Were/are these drivers or motivations pro-emancipation and empowerment of the general populace?
    - If so, may you elaborate on this? If not so, may you please elaborate on this too?
6. In your view, would you say the implementation of indigenization programme in the extractive industry sector a success story in Zimbabwe? Why do you say so?
7. Overall, would it be it justified to say that the process of implementing economic indigenisation and empowerment initiative in Zimbabwe's extractive industry sector managed to economically indigenise the economy and empower the general citizenry? Why do you say so?
8. Who were the actual losers and beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's extractive industry indigenisation?
    - Did the ***potential*** losers and beneficiaries became the ***actual*** losers and beneficiaries at the end of the game or what?
9. How the implementation of the economic indigenisation and empowerment exercise in the extractive industry sector carried out in Zimbabwe?
10. What are the outcomes/results of extractive industry indigenisation in the country and in the mining communities?
11. Who were the leading actors (i.e. individuals, groups and organisations) responsible for it?
    - What implications did that had on the success of the exercise?
12. Overall, what is your comment on the effects/impact of extractive industry indigenisation on mining uneven development configuration the country?
    - How has been the trend of mining inequality levels in the country and in the mining communities following the implementation of extractive industry indigenisation?

Appendix 8: List of Interviews conducted

Respondent's Code name	Designation & Description	Date
AR1	Senior lecturer at a local university	20 July 2018
AR2	Senior lecturer at a local university and head of local think-tank	23 June 2018
AR3	Senior lecturer at a South African university	13 September 2018
AR4	Senior lecturer at a local university and head of a local think-tank	14 September 2018
AR5	Senior lecturer at a local university	26 November 2018
CR2	Senior researcher at a local think-tank	29 June 2018
CS4	Head of a local civil society organisation	20 June 2018
CSR1	Senior employee at a local civil society organisation	16 June 2018
CSR3	Head of a local civil society organisation	05 August 2018
GDOR1	Senior government department official	09 July 2018
GDOR2	Senior government department official	03 July 2018
GDOR3	Senior government department official	03 July 2018
GDOR4	Senior government department official	06 July 2018
GDOR5	Senior government department official	06 July 2018
GDOR6	Senior government department official	10 July 2018
PPR1	Senior party member in one of the local political parties	07 June 2018
PPR2	Senior party member in one of the local political parties	12 August 2018
PPR3	Senior party member in one of the local political parties	12 August 2018
RR1	Internally displaced resident in Arda Transau	30 June 2018

RR2	Internally displaced resident in Arda Transau	30 June 2018
RR3	Internally displaced resident in Arda Transau	30 June 2018
RR4	Internally displaced resident in Arda Transau	30 June 2018
RR5	Internally displaced resident in Arda Transau	30 June 2018
RR6	Internally displaced resident in Arda Transau	30 June 2018
SGOR1	Senior government official	06 August 2018
SGOR2	Senior government official	06 August 2018
SGOR3	Senior government official	03 June 2018
SGOR4	Senior government official	07 July 2018
SGOR5	Senior government official	07 July 2018
SGOR6	Senior government official	02 August 2018
SGRR1	Senior government retiree	20 June 2018
SGRR2	Senior government retiree	07 August 2018
SGRR3	Senior government retiree	26 June 2018
SGRR4	Senior government retiree	17 July 2018
SGRR5	Senior government retiree	22 June 2018

Appendix 9: Supervisor's support letter for data collection

WITS SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

DATE: 14 December 2017
TO: Zimbabwean interviewees for Mr Kennedy Manduna

Greetings,

This letter confirms that Kennedy Manduna is a doctoral student in good standing at the Wits School of Governance in Johannesburg. He is a Zimbabwean whose research on the Zimbabwean economy will be of the greatest interest both at home and abroad. His PhD Thesis is entitled **"The Political Economy of Uneven Development: Implementation of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Policy, 2007-2017."**

Please give him every opportunity to understand the processes of economic empowerment, during his 2018-19 interviews and data collection.

Please contact me if I can be of any further assistance

Patrick Bond
Distinguished Professor of Political Economy
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Appendix 8: List of Community Share Ownership Trusts and their Registration Numbers

Province	Name of the CSOT/district name	Registration numer
Midlands	1) Shurugwi/Tongogara	MA001205/2012
	2) Zvishavane	MA001232/2012
	3) Kwekwe	MA000238/2013
	4) Mberengwa	MA001233/2012
	5) Gweru	MA001206/2012
	6) Chirumanzu	MA001201/2012
	7) Gokwe North	MA001204/2012
Mashonaland Central	1) Bindura	MA000913/2012
	2) Shamva	MA000914/2012
	3) Mazowe	MA000911/2012
	4) Guruve	MA000916/2012
	5) Mt. Darwin	MA000910/2012
	6) Rushinga	MA000915/2012
	7) Mbire	MA000917/2012
	8) Centenary	MA000912/2012
Mashonaland East	1) Mutoko	MA001181/2012
	2) Mudzi	MA001143/2012
	3) Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe	MA001112/2012
	4) Goromonzi	MA001117/2012
	5) Wedza	MA001108/2012
	6) Chikomba	MA001144/2012
	7) Seke	MA001118/2012
	8) Murewa	MA001109/2012
	9) Marondera	MA001179/2012
Mashonaland West	1) Chegutu	MA001114/2012
	2) Zvimba	MA001121/2012
	3) Makonde	MA001145/2012
	4) Mhondoro-Ngezi	MA001190/2012
	5) Hurungwe	MA001115/2012
	6) Sanyati	MA001120/2012
	7) Kariba/Nyaminyami	MA001119/2012
Matabeleland North	1) Nkayi	MA001129/2012
	2) Umguza	MA000525/2012
	3) Binga	MA000 ----------
	4) Lupane	MA001110/2012
	5) Tsholotsho	MA001128/2012
	6) Bubi	MA001116/2012

	7) Hwange	MA001111/2012
Harare	1) Mabvuku-Tafara/Harare East	MA001039
Masvingo	1) Masvingo	MA001098/2012
	2) Bikita	MA001113/2012
	3) Mwenezi	MA001097/2021
	4) Chiredzi	MA001099/2012
	5) Chivi	MA001095/2012
	6) Zaka	MA001096/2012
	7) Gutu	MA001107/2012
Manicaland	1) Buhera	MA000475/2013
	2) Nyanga	MA000315/2012
	3) Makoni	MA000813/2012
	4) Chimanimani	MA000817/2012
	5) Chipinge	MA000816/2012
	6) Mutasa	MA000814/2012
	7) Marange-Zimunya	MA000759/2012

Source: NIEEB (2014, 8-9) and Mumpande and Mvududu (2020, 30-31).