



Governing for Urban Inclusion?

A Critical Analysis of the City of Johannesburg Migrant Help-desk

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Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my own original work and that none of its sections have been previously submitted for publication or examination.

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Abstract

Globally, right wing populist regimes with violently anti-migrant agendas are coming to power and imposing increasingly authoritarian mechanisms of governing populations. Rapid urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa in particular has put a spotlight on the role of cities in migration and how municipalities handle tensions between incomers, integration with local communities and the needs of expanding numbers of poor and peripheral residents. Johannesburg, synonymous with migration since its beginnings in the 1890s gold rush, is the only city in the country to have designed and implemented an urban migration policy. It is a striking example of a post-apartheid liminal city in which mobility is a marker of precarity or poverty for citizen and migrant alike.

I set out to understand what the creation and operation of the City of Johannesburg migration policy and Migrant Help-desk reveals about the city government's vision in/exclusion. The study was conceived from asking how and why state institutions in post-colonies decide who to in/exclude from their jurisdictions through governing urban migration. Critical assessments of municipal policy in Johannesburg have mainly focused on local economic, planning and infrastructure issues. Migration scholars have mainly focused on the everyday lives of migrants. I look at a social policy from the perspective of the everyday work-life of government officials.

Through analysing official documentation, while drawing on experiences and perspectives of the political principal and officials working in the City of Johannesburg Migration Sub Unit, I explored the municipal imagination of an inclusive urban society. I approached the research from a critical activist perspective, questioning the assumptions government makes towards migration and the conceptions employed to 'manage' mobility. My argument rests on how the policy and office conceptualises the righteous citizen/abject other and how the Help-desk both illuminates these ideas and helps to enact them. I show how increasingly exclusivist discourses are becoming hegemonic yet also contain tensions and contradictions, suggesting the possibility for imagining an emancipatory urbanism.

*I am a partisan, I am alive, and in the conscience of those on my side I feel the pulse
of the future city we are building.*

Gramsci, 1917

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Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
CBD	Central Business District
CoJ	City of Johannesburg
CoRMSA	Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
DA	Democratic Alliance
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
GCRO	Gauteng City Region Observatory
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
JMAC	Johannesburg Migrant Advisory Committee
JMAP	Johannesburg Migrant Advisory Panel
LRMP	Strategizing for a Migrant Help-desk & a Long-run Migrant Policy, 2007
MH-d	Migrant Help-desk
MMC	Member of the Mayoral Committee
NPM	New Public Management

PIM	Policy on Integration of Migrants, 2011
PMM	Programme for Migration Management, 2013
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
SUH	Sub-Unit Head
WP	White Paper on International Migration, 11 March 2017
WP Abr.	White Paper on International Migration, 11 March 2017, Abridged

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Introduction

On 7th August 2019 while South African police (SAPS) were raiding migrant owned shops in downtown Johannesburg, the US immigration police (ICE) conducted a huge raid on a factory in Mississippi. In each case police reported that over 600 allegedly "illegal" migrants were detained. The statements below from South African and US government officials on the raids in their respective countries are practically interchangeable:

"The execution of federal search warrants today was simply about enforcing the rule of law in our state and throughout our great country" (US Attorney, Southern District, Mississippi).¹

"We condemn all criminal elements hellbent on undermining the rule of law in this country and making this country ungovernable. We can't co-govern with criminals, especially foreign nationals who want to turn our country into a lawless banana republic" (Gauteng MEC for Community Safety).²

"Over 600 undocumented foreign nationals" had been detained and taken in for verification of their immigration status and to determine if they were linked to any crimes (Provincial SAPS spokesperson).³

"This is a long-term operation that's been going on." He said raids are "racially neutral" and based on evidence of illegal residency. (ICE Acting Director).⁴

We will continue to stamp the authority of the state. We cannot have parallel governance with criminals, therefore we will continue to squeeze the space for

¹ Al Jazeera, 8 August 2019

² Daily Maverick, 01 August 2019

³ New Frame, 11 August 2019

⁴ Al Jazeera, 11 August 2019

criminals to zero regardless of race, gender or nationality” (South African Minister of Police)⁵

From the US to the UK, India and Australia, right wing populist regimes with violently anti-migrant agendas are winning elections and imposing increasingly authoritarian mechanisms of governing populations. In this late capitalist era of normalised ‘othering’ and discrimination, racial and patriarchal violence, climate catastrophe, global warmongering, growing socio-economic insecurity and exploitation it has never been more necessary to understand - in order to challenge - the current rise and functioning of racist, nativist and associated patriarchal power relations. As the opening quotations above show, this is imperative not only in the global North but also in third world and post-colonial contexts, particularly in South Africa, a country that has so recently defeated apartheid.

Rapid urbanisation in the South (and sub-Saharan Africa in particular) put a spotlight on the role of cities in migration and how municipalities handle tensions between incomers, integration with local communities and the needs of expanding numbers of poor and peripheral residents (UN Habitat, 2018). Moreover, municipalities globally are becoming sites of resistance to increasingly hostile national migration regimes. Cities in the United States that have declared themselves ‘sanctuary cities’ enact policies either formally or informally in practice, that ensure migratory status is not a barrier to service delivery. Some go as far as to “expressly forbid city officials or police departments from inquiring into an individual’s immigration status practice” (O’Brian *et al.*, 2019:4). In the wake of the so-called refugee crisis ‘sanctuary cities’ in Europe and the UK proclaim that they welcome asylum seekers and refugees and many implement policies to encourage integration (Bauder, 2016).

Although the efficacy of sanctuary is contested (Roy, 2019), historical tensions between cities and states have become heightened over contemporary migration as at national level fierce anti-immigration legislation is becoming widespread. This is evidenced by US President Trump’s Mexican wall and Muslim ban in the US, the

⁵ The Citizen, 10 August 2019

United Kingdom Conservative Party government's 'hostile environment' policy for migrants and Prime Minister Modi in India who has gone even further to limit and re-categorise who is an Indian citizen on nativist and religious grounds. Writers on African citizenship such as Mamdani (2001), Herbst (2000), Getahun (2013), Eyoh (2008) and Geschiere (2005) note the ways in which elements of previous social arrangements and previous discourses of inclusion/exclusion from before and during the colonial rupture can persist or evolve through national liberation struggles and impact post-colonial societies, in often contradictory ways.

In South Africa the post-Apartheid notion of sovereignty, aligned to a Western conception of 'national interest' (White Paper on International Migration, 2017), is a powerful dimension in our imagination of (non)citizenship. Born out of the liberation struggle for a unitary state with equal rights for all enshrined in our Constitution, our idea of the South African citizen exhibits stresses of geographical scale and levels of political authority carried over from pre-colonial, colonial and later apartheid era legislation and implementation of urban segregation, forced removals and Bantustans. These tensions continually disrupt the idea of who is within the boundaries and who actually belongs inside or outside the polities, particularly in densely populated heterogeneous urban areas. Johannesburg is a striking example of a post-apartheid South African city. In this urban 'soup' there are hierarchies of difference amongst the citizenry based on relative power related to class, apartheid racial categorisation, ethnic/language group and gender diversities and divisions. It is a city synonymous with migration from its beginnings in the 1890s gold-rush and is the only city in the country to have designed and implemented an urban migration policy making it a pertinent site for a study into contemporary African municipal visions of urban inclusion.

This research project set out to critically analyse the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) Migrant Help-desk (MH-d) from its inception in 2007 to 2018. The CoJ proposed this as a policy response to urban migration, but to date there has been little analysis of its effects on migrants or others in the city. This project set out to understand what the creation and operation of the MH-d reveals about the city government's vision in/exclusion. I posed three questions to guide my research: 1) how does the CoJ

conceive of concepts of inclusion and mobility in official documentation and the imaginaries of officials? 2) how do the relevant officials describe their experiences of the conception and implementation of the Migrant Help-desk? And 3) what discourses inform inclusion and thus exclusion in the City of Johannesburg and how do these embody or depart from dominant discourses?

The study was conceived from asking how and why state institutions in post-colonies decide who to include and exclude from their jurisdictions through governing urban migration. My curiosity arose from having worked both in government and in a civil society migrant rights organisation. I thus approached the research from a critical activist perspective, questioning the assumptions government makes towards migration and the conceptions employed to 'manage' mobility. Although coming from an activist background, I focused my research on the side of power, "the bureaucratic domain of a politico-administrative *regime*" which "operates as a heuristic device for investigating empirically how ruling works, how the lives of people are regulated and governed by institutions and individuals vested with authority" (Smith in Frampton *et al.*, 2006: 55). Through analysing official documentation, while drawing on experiences and perspectives of the political principal and officials working in the CoJ Migration Subunit, I explored the municipal imagination of an inclusive urban society. I focused on the discourses that inform inclusion, and thus exclusion of migrants in the CoJ and how the visions and discourses reflect or depart from dominant discourses. My argument rests on how the policy and office conceptualises the righteous citizen/abject other, where that imagination comes from, and how the Help-desk both illuminates these ideas and helps to enact them.

My research into the municipal imaginary of in/exclusion in Johannesburg reveals how discourses become dominant and congeal into a hegemonic narrative of who belongs and who does not. I argue that indigeneity and xenophobia are two sides of the same coin. The false dichotomy of who is 'in' and who is 'out' arises from ideological imperatives of the state embroiled within webs of power relations in and between the citizen/migrant and the state. To manage migration, state institutions, even at local level, deploy governmental technologies of consent (negotiation) as well as coercion (violence) that are "dialectically entwined and inseparable" (Davis, 2012: 2692). Yet

precisely because coercion and consent function dialectically, the hegemonic discourse is never without counter-hegemonic impulses. Interviewing municipal bureaucrats and exploring the language of policy, politicians and the media brought out tensions and contradictions that unsettle the narrative which is discussed in the following chapters.

Context and rationale

The literature on African urbanism identifies a need within the continent for studies that focus on city level policy and governance in contemporary urban issues (Parnell & Robinson, 2013: 597). Critical assessments of municipal government policy in South Africa, and in Johannesburg in particular, have mainly focused on the impact of local *economic* policy such as Integrated Development Plans; strategic planning, transport and tackling spatial apartheid such as the Corridors of Freedom project; or on issues of land, housing and the built environment (Murray, 2011; Harrison *et al.*, 2014). I explored a municipal *social development* policy. Furthermore, existing studies of migration in Johannesburg do not concern themselves primarily with the perspectives of the municipality or the bureaucrats implementing migration policy (Ludl, 2014; Moyo *et al.*, 2018; Brits *et al.*, 2020; and Makhkulu, 2015) . My research thus adds to empirical studies of migration in Johannesburg focused on the policy response of the city to inclusion. This research was not designed to produce a full impact-assessment of policy implementation. Rather, the Help-desk serves as a heuristic device. It is a way of revealing how local government officials understand the changing nature of the city and immigrant's place in it. Even beyond that, how they understand their role in the broader transformation of South African society and the place of an urban citizenry within it. By analysing policy texts and interviewing municipal employees involved in its implementation I was able to produce insights into how a social development policy intervention on migration is interpreted and delivered to both South African and non-national residents of the city.

South Africa's post-1994 policy approach to migration

The rights-based dispensation adopted by South Africa's first democratically elected government, underpinned by the 1996 Constitution, sought to develop a unitary national South African identity in contrast to the racist and segregationist regime of

apartheid. Apartheid era Acts, covering every sphere of life, were systematically replaced with legislation premised on the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution. In line with these provisions, legislation governing migration - the Immigration Act (2002) and Refugee Act (1998) - are still considered to reflect international good practice, largely favourable to providing protection for refugees and migrants in the country. Nevertheless, amendments to the Immigration Act (in 2005 and 2014) created additional administrative hurdles to obtaining visas and permits. Although the urban refugee regime is still in place, amendments to the Refugee Act, signed into law by the President in 2017 and a further amendment Bill promulgated in January 2020, aimed at further reducing the number of those seeking asylum by limiting asylum seeker rights and protections such as taking away the right to work.

Aside from the acts directly governing immigration, refugees and citizenship, policy language has concerned itself with issues of inclusion, social cohesion and building a nation 'united in its diversity'. However, these terms are used to refer primarily to bridging apartheid racial divides. It is notable that the initial consultations on the social cohesion framework made no mention of migrants, even though framework was implemented after the 2008 outbreak of xenophobic violence. Policy discussions on urban transformation likewise does not address mobility although most urbanization is from South African citizens moving to cities from other provinces⁶. They also do not address the reality of mobility within the city as people are constantly moving in, out and between informal and formal living arrangements due to the insecure nature of work and lack of affordable housing. Government and municipalities use the language of sustainable and inclusive cities that reflect global commitments such as the Sustainable Development Goals such as in the CoJ Integrated Development Plan, 2018/19 yet have not integrated this with the eleven SDG references to migration that note its developmental benefits codified round the demand for "orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration" (SDG 10.7). Neither was South Africa an active state-party in the two-year process leading to the UN adopting its first non-binding international

⁶ According to the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) Data Brief No. 8, in 2015/16 65% of residents were born in the province. Of those born outside the province, 28% moved from other provinces and only 7% came from another country.

migration framework in the two Global Compacts for Migrants and for Refugees in 2018.

Nevertheless, in 2017 the Department of Home Affairs published its first White Paper on International Migration that adopts the issue within UN language of 'migration for development' but simultaneously proposes increased 'securitization' of migration through measure such as regular secondment of SAPS and military police officials to assist in enforcing compliance; establishing deportation centres at provincial level; and even deportation "cost-sharing" bilateral agreements with sending countries (WP, 2018: 77). Throughout the White Paper, the language of development is constantly balanced with that of security. For instance, in the introduction it states: the current policy does not enable SA to adequately embrace global opportunities while safeguarding our sovereignty and ensuring public safety and national security" (WP, 2017: 2).

Writers on African citizenship (such as Getahun, 2013; Herbst, 2000; and Milner, 2009) discuss the tendency for an inclusive attitude to migration in the immediate period post-liberation to become hardened into a more exclusive concept of citizenship over time list. South Africa is no exception (Hobden, 2009). Peberdy (2009:178) states that "The shifts and changes in the construction of South Africa's national identity are...not only revealed by shifts in immigration policies and practices, but also in the language and the imagery used to describe the nation and the immigrant". This explains the seeming paradox between the relatively progressive post-1994 immigration and refugee legislation, whilst at the same time a clear unwillingness to fully accept and implement this legislation coupled with a "high and widespread dislike for foreigners" (Mattes *et al.*, 1999, cited in Kabwe-Segatti, 2008: 57). I was interested in how the language and imagination of the state (under the same ruling party) has changed towards "the nation and the immigrant".

Johannesburg and migration

Johannesburg has a particular history and relationship with migration, born out of the discovery of gold (Davenport, 1970; Parnell, 2002; Rich, 1978). According to Brodie (2008), the last African Kingdom in the Transvaal was finally defeated in 1882 and the

ama-Ndzundza land was distributed by the Boer government in Pretoria to Afrikaner farmers. By 1886, gold had been discovered on some of the farms and on 20 September President Kruger issued a proclamation declaring a “public digging” (Rosenthal, 1970: 144). The population rose from 300 prospectors, farmers and itinerant labourers in 1886 to 3,0000 the following year (Brodie, 2008: 44, 49). Within a decade Johannesburg had become “the biggest city in the country...From the beginning, Johannesburg was viewed as a city of ‘uitlanders’ or foreigners” (Tomlinson *et al.*, 2003: 4).

This notion of Johannesburg as a city of migrants, initially applied by the Afrikaners to the English, was extended to the growing population of black workers who were forced from rural areas to work in the mines. The Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 meant that “by 1933 the whole of the city of Johannesburg had been proclaimed white” (Tomlinson *et al.*, 2003: 5). Black workers were already being forcibly removed to peripheral locations and were considered migrants who had no rights to own, rent or remain in the city once their contract with the mine ended. The apartheid regime continued this policy with the Group Areas Act (1950), destroying the few racially mixed so called ‘grey areas’ that remained, such as Sophiatown, and forcibly removing residents to racially classified townships, evocatively described by Bloke Modisane in his 1963 book ‘Blame Me on History’:

Walking down Good Street and up Gerty Street was like walking through a ghost town of deserted houses and demolished homes, of faded dreams and broken lives, surrounded by rousing memories, some exciting others terrifying...We cherished Sophiatown because it brought together such a great concentration of people, we did not live in it, we were Sophiatown. It was a complex paradox which attracted opposites; the ring of joy, the sound of laughter, was interposed with the growl and the smell of insult; we sang our sad happy songs, were carried away by our erotic dances, we whistled and shouted, got drunk and killed each other (1963: 9).

This was further entrenched by the post 1960 phase of forced removals that tried - albeit unevenly applied - to remove the by then settled township residents out of the

city altogether into Bantustans, rural areas which were designated as ‘homelands’, based on ethnicity as determined by apartheid bureaucrats, for a second time turning “the workforce into a migrant one” (Unterhalter, 1987: 92).

The post 1994 dispensation sought to re-instate the notion of citizenship for all South Africans, black and white. In both policy and imagination, black South Africans were no longer migrants but enjoyed full rights bestowed by citizenship. However, as Johannesburg remains the economic hub of the country it continues to attract those looking for work and economic opportunities. Rural South Africans from the impoverished Bantustans moved back to the city and, increasingly, asylum seekers and undocumented economic migrants from outside its borders – from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique; other African countries such as Somalia, DRC, Ethiopia and Nigeria as well as from further afield such as Turkey and Bangladesh - also seek refuge and/or the chance of a better life. Although most of those born outside Gauteng were from other South African provinces, the apartheid-era derogatory connotation of the word migrant has shifted in national policy and imagination to refer to those from outside the borders of South Africa.

The City of Johannesburg Migrant Help-desk

The ruling African National Congress led the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) since the first post-1994 local government elections in 1996 up until the local elections of 2017 when the opposition Democratic Alliance formed a majority. The migration policy was thus developed and implemented under a stable political regime up until the DA Mayor, Herman Mashaba, took charge in 2017. In 2019 Mashaba resigned and the city currently has an ANC Mayor, Geoff Makhubo. The CoJ Migrant Help-desk and migration strategy is a significant policy model, recognizing that migration is a reality for the city, that migrants have Constitutional rights to services and protection and that migration can be beneficial for development in a city of the South.

The MH-d was established in 2008, as part of a migration policy for the city adopted the previous year, aiming at “making Jozi work for migrants, making migrants work for Jozi” (LRMP). In terms of the city’s migration policy, the Johannesburg Migrant Advisory Committee (JMAC) was established in 2009, and chaired by the Mayor. This

structure includes representatives from non-national community groups and officials from various local government departments, as well as local South African community representatives. The Johannesburg Migrant Advisory Panel (JMAP), established the previous year, brings migrant and local community groups together and raises issues for the agenda of JMAC.

The Help-desk is situated in the Migration Sub-Unit, one of three sub-units (along with Displaced Persons and Children's Services) which form one of the directorates in the Department of Health and Social Development. The political principal is the Member of the Mayoral Committee (MMC) for Health and Social Development. There are Help-desks situated in each of the seven regions of Johannesburg each one staffed by one regional coordinator. A Sub-Unit Head and one administrator are based in the city centre regional office. The Help-desks aim to provide an information and referral service for international and national incomers to the city. The stated objectives of the Help-desk are:

- To develop a service frontline that provides migrants with relevant information on available services;
- Develop and conduct anti-xenophobia awareness campaigns with City staff as well as local communities;
- Establish and maintain partnerships with migrant organisations to identify concerns and address service gaps; and
- Liaise with and lobby provincial government departments on issues relating to migrants.⁷

Despite this policy intervention, relations between the city and migrants remain fraught and a climate of hostility towards non-nationals prevails amongst South African residents of the city and tensions easily erupt into violence. For example, in the first ten days of September 2019 alone twelve people were reportedly killed in xenophobic violence in Johannesburg with widespread looting and destruction of businesses supposedly run by non-nationals reported in various parts of the city. Taking the CoJ Migrant Help-desk as a case study, my research explores the disjunction between

⁷ https://www.joburg.org.za/services_/JoburgCares/Pages/migrant-helpdesk.aspx

policy and practice through the perspective of municipal officials working to implement the policy.

Methodology

In this rest of this chapter I firstly discuss how I designed my research: why I chose a specific 'activist' methodological paradigm and the pros and cons of a case study methodology. Secondly, I discuss my primary and secondary data collection methods. This section includes the key informants I interviewed, the type of interviews I conducted and ethical issues that arose. Thirdly, I outline the process I went through to analyse the data. I refer to critical discourse analysis and briefly introduce Foucault's theory of discourse as a 'governmental technology' elaborated further in the next chapter.

Research design

My study was designed as a qualitative case study as I was exploring "a social setting to understand the meaning of participants' lives in the participants' own terms" (Janesick, 2000: 385). The methodological paradigm of my study bears some relation to 'political activist institutional ethnography', practiced and elaborated by George Smith (Frampton *et al.*, 2006). My work is not ethnographic but shares the premise of Smith that whilst activists are positioned outside of "ruling regimes", social movements confront ruling relations in everyday activism. He proposed that activists are therefore well placed to "investigate the organizing logic of the ruling regimes they oppose" to gain "grounded social knowledge for more effective forms of activism" (Frampton *et al.*, 2006: 9). In the same vein as Smith's studies into the policing of gay men and of AIDS treatment in Toronto, I was interested in understanding how individuals and workplace relations within the *regime* of the City of Joburg Migration Unit reinforced - or subverted - official narratives and prescripts on migration in the city.

The general and specific research questions in my study fit with a case study approach in terms of exploring a specific and unusual policy intervention and how it connects to macro-level policy aims, complex societal contexts as well as theoretical perspectives in the literature. Yin (2009) suggests that a case study model can be applied in order to explain an intervention, its real-life context and complex causal links in real-life

interventions. Neuman points out that case studies use analytic induction and cites Vaughan (2006: 41) who argues that case studies “connect the micro level, or the actions of individual people, to the macro level, or large-scale social structures and processes”. He also notes that case studies “raise questions about the boundaries and defining characteristics of such a case” and are therefore useful in generating new thinking and theory (Ibid: 41). I found that my research into a very specific case of the MH-d did indeed raise questions beyond the confines of migration in Johannesburg and brought up a range of theoretical considerations around discourses that delineate citizen from migrant and the potentialities of governing for urban inclusion which are elaborated in the next chapters.

The question of external validity is where the case study comes under most scrutiny. To deal with this, Ragin (1987) proposes a comparative model of case studies, that can synthesize the generality of large-scale, variable oriented research methods with the case study emphasis on small-scale investigations of complexity. Whilst Ragin’s approach is an appealing way to validate comparative cases, this method was not appropriate for the scope of my single-case study. In contrast, Janesick (2000) argues that as qualitative research aims to bring out a multiplicity of viewpoints, including that of the researcher, the metaphor of a crystal - with its many facets that looks different in different light - helps envisage a qualitative alternative to triangulation and validity in a case study. Janesick (Ibid) notes that crystallization is particularly suited to a single case study, such as my research, and suggests that the uniqueness of a particular case should not be subject to how well it can be generalized but on its internal validity - how rich, full and textured a picture is presented about the individual case.

Data collection

Primary data

Between September and November 2018 I conducted five key informant interviews with CoJ officials currently working at the MH-d and with the elected political principal for the Migration Unit, the MMC for Health and Social Development. I used three foundational policy documents generated by the CoJ: Strategizing for a Migrant Helpdesk: a Long-run Migrant Policy (LRMP, 2007); Policy on Integration of Migrants (PIM, 2011); and Programme for Migration Management (PMM, 2013) as well as the

National Department of Home Affairs White Paper on International Migration in South Africa (2017) as key texts to set in conversation with the interview data. I analysed the text of the address of the President to a joint sitting of parliament following xenophobic violence in 2019. I also selected two media articles dealing with human trafficking as primary data sources as the comments of the interviewees on this issue seemed to reflect a particular media driven narrative. In addition to these key texts, 19 on-line media articles on the themes that arose from the findings served as secondary sources.

For this research project I used what Henning (2004) refers to as ‘unstructured’ or ‘discursively oriented interviews’ and which Johnson (2002) describes as ‘in-depth interviews’. I tried to ask open ended questions, for instance what did they enjoy most about their work, and follow up with questions based on their response to make the interview conversational. This type of interview was ideal for my exploration of the experiences and attitudes of government officials involved in the Johannesburg migration policy as, in line with Johnson, it is used to dig deep into the “values and decisions, occupational ideology, cultural knowledge or perspective” of participants (2002: 104).

Unlike in a standardized interview, in which the interviewer is a ‘neutral force’ (Henning, 2004), Johnson suggests that for discursively oriented interviews the interview serves as an interactive process in which the researcher does not hide their ‘experiential knowledge’ and allows the conversation to flow (Johnson, 2002). I took this approach as I was known to the interviewees, apart from the MMC, through working on joint projects during my employment at CoRMSA, a migrant rights NGO. I was thus able to try and employ a strategy of ‘information sharing’ to build a level of trust between the researcher and interviewees. It was advantageous in creating an atmosphere of cooperation and knowledge exchange and helped to allow the interviewees to more openly express their views on their own work, the work of their organization and especially on the work of other people in the municipality.

The research project obtained non-medical ethics approval from Wits University (H18/07/04). There were no restrictions imposed by the CoJ on recording interviews,

but if individual participants had been uncomfortable to be recorded in their workplaces or if it seemed to inhibit the conversation, then I relied solely on written notes that I took during the conversations. An additional ethical consideration has been how to deal with anonymity. Although none of the participants expressed a wish not to be named in the research, I felt it was more appropriate to use a system of aliases even though it was impossible to completely disguise individuals due to their job title or function within the municipality.

Secondary data

Secondary data sources included additional CoJ policy papers such as the CoJ Human Development Strategy (2009) as well as progress reports to city structures on the implementation of these plans and strategies as well as minutes from JMAC and JMAP. I referred to publications and documentation on migration from a range of South African and international organisations and advocacy sources such as the World Bank 'Moving for Prosperity: global migration and labour markets' report (2018); policy focused reports on contemporary urbanization, particularly in Africa, such as the UN Habitat Annual Progress Report (2018); data briefs produced by the Gauteng City Regional Observatory (2018); and media articles on various aspects of migration in South Africa that were published during the last two years.

In addition, diverse readings from books and academic articles in the areas of governance; migration; urban studies; political economy; development; Marxist, feminist and discourse theory; and activist methodologies served as secondary data for the purpose of exploring the historical background and developing a theoretical and methodological framework for the research. It was not possible to monitor the media systematically due to time and accessibility constraints, but I collected media articles during the period of this project to give a sense of the elements of the research topic that are seen as topical or 'newsworthy'. The views of the media are also of interest as they report the words of politicians and are, in the way they do this, influential opinion makers on how migrants are perceived and how discourses on migration are (re)generated. The media of course also determines whether and how issues relating to migration are discussed in the public realm and how public opinion is reflected or not in everyday rolling out of migration policy. This provided a mixed

data collection method of interviews and documentary evidence and a triangulated method of analysis typical of critical discourse analysis.

Data analysis

The process I undertook exemplified the view of Blaxter, *et al.* (2001:194), who note that in a qualitative research approach, the process of analysis is iterative, shifting between chaos and order in the quest for structure and meaning. There was certainly a lot of chaos in my analysis process as I tried out a variety of techniques, segmenting and coding the data to draw out meaning from the texts as well as zooming out to get an overview and think about the data as one collection (Henning, 2006). An 'activist' research paradigm, as alluded to above, lead me towards critical discourse analysis approaches which van Dijk (2008: 85) describe as where researchers "take an explicit position and thus want to understand, expose and ultimately resist social inequality". In addition, critical discourse analysis was appropriate for addressing my research question which focuses on the discourses that inform the city government's vision of in/exclusion. Moreover, critical discourse analysis connected with the concepts of governmentality, hegemony and slavery discussed in my conceptual framework in the following chapter. This is evidenced by proponents such as Fairclough (1995), van Dijk (2008), and Couldrey (2000) who have taken up Foucault's understanding of discourse as a governmental technology that both create and is modified by state-civil society power relations within institutions. Fairclough (1995) has used discourse analysis to look at the creation and contestation of hegemonic social forces. Stuart Hall (1996) put critical discourse theory to use in unpacking how Western narratives dominate our understanding of citizenship and belonging.

Initially, I coded the interviews and two of the policy documents and arrived at three broad areas – 'Us and Them', 'Friend or Foe' and 'Management and Control'. I then identified three themes in each area. I realized that a form of textual analysis (Fairclough, 1995: 187) was required in order to delve into underlying meanings in the use of language by the interviewees and the policy documents to draw some conclusions to the first two research questions. The Chapters entitled 'Friend or Foe' and 'Management and Control' are each divided into three sections using key words arising from this process. In these chapters I sought to draw meaning out of the

wording, structure and style of language in my primary data sources to answer the first and second subsidiary questions. However, after looking more closely at the interview data I realized that the issues arising under 'Us and Them' related to broader concepts that I then thought about in relation to the literature and theoretical concepts (see chapter five) in order to address my third sub-question. In the chapter entitled 'Us and Them' I reflected on the data 'intertextually' which, according to Fairclough (1995), moderates language and the social setting. This technique could also be considered 'successive approximation' where "the evidence and theories shape each other as the researcher iteratively considers the data in relation to the research questions and "a framework of assumptions and concepts" (Neuman, 2006: 469).

Outline of chapters

In this chapter I have provided the global context in which tensions arise between the state and city governments in dealing with migration, the gap in the research into this phenomenon in the South African context, my personal interest in this field and outlined the argument that developed out of my study. I then gave an overview of the post-apartheid vision of in/exclusion at a national policy level. Thirdly, I provided a historical overview of the particular role migration played in the birth and growth of the city of Johannesburg. This was followed by details of the City of Johannesburg migration policy and the structure of the MH-d. The fourth section elaborates the methodological approach of my research and the chapter ends with this outline of the chapters.

Chapter two starts with a literature review that indicates where I located my research within ideas and debates drawn from the fields of governance and public administration, urban studies and urban migration. This chapter then elaborates a conceptual framework that provides theoretical lenses through which I have conceptualized my research question; based my methodology; and interpreted my findings and conclusions. I have used a variety of theoretical concepts drawn from Foucault's theorising of governmentality and how discourse functions within governmental power-relations alongside Marxist interpretations of in/exclusion such as Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of slavery, Fanon on post-colonial citizenship and Gramsci's theory of hegemony.

Chapters three and four thematically present and analyse my interview data alongside relevant policy and media articles. The themes in chapter three relate to my first subsidiary research question: How does the CoJ conceive of concepts of inclusion and mobility in official documentation and the imaginaries of officials? In this chapter entitled 'Friend or Foe' I brought together findings relating to perceptions of inclusion and mobility under the headings of integration, xenophobia: fact or fiction? and human trafficking. Themes in chapter four entitled 'Management and Control' relate to my second sub-question: How do the relevant officials describe their experiences of the conception and implementation of the Migrant Help-desk? This chapter is more descriptive as it seeks to draw out insights from how the officials describe their day to day work under the headings of consultations with stakeholders; administration and organization; and policing.

Chapter five builds on my findings from the previous two chapters to addresses my third sub-question: What discourses inform inclusion and thus exclusion in the City of Joburg and how do these embody or depart from dominant discourses? This chapter provides interpretation of theoretical themes that arose from my findings, the literature and my conceptual framework under the headings of national citizenship and local community; mobility and migration; and who governs who in the city. In chapter six I draw conclusions in answer to my research question: what does the creation and operation of the MH-d reveal about the city government's vision of in/exclusion? Finally, I suggest recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

At the start of the literature review I explain three overarching concerns of my study that led me to organise the literature review into the headings of governance and public administration, urban studies and urban migration. The broader concerns raised by my research question around the CoJ vision of in/exclusion and the discourses they employ are discussed in the conceptual framework and the chapters analysing my data (three and four) and interpreting my findings (five).

In the first section of the literature review on governance and public administration I focus on two concepts from the wealth of literature that directly relate to the CoJ migration policy: network governance and New Public Management (NPM). These two points provide a short background to my second sub-question, discussed in chapter four, where I present findings on how the officials that work on the Help-desk view their tasks and the administration of their daily work. In order to locate my first and third sub-questions in the literature I looked at the efficacy of a critical urban studies approach to a city in the South with high levels of inequality and poverty such as Johannesburg. This raised the question of whether there is the possibility for local government to play a progressive role in the interest of the poor and push back against the interests of the private sector in the city. Alternatively, does greater government involvement in the urban space, however well intentioned, add to the exclusion and marginalisation of poor residents? The discussion above leads on to the third section that looks at the delineation between citizen and migrant within the urban underclass and how a policy intervention focused only on migrants might exacerbate differences and trigger conflict in the city. The issues raised here are further elaborated in the interpretation of my findings in chapter six. The conceptual framework in the second half of this chapter draws out and connects key issues arising from the literature review through the lenses of Foucauldian thought and Marxist oriented theorists.

I reference an assortment of theories in the conceptual framework arising from Foucault and the role of discourse within governmental power relations set in dialogue with Marxist thinkers. In this section I formulate my argument that migrant/citizen is a false dichotomy arising from the power relations of the state and the governed population. In order to create and sustain a hegemonic discourse that entrenches divisions between migrant and citizen the state uses techniques of consent and also coercion. Yet this dominant discourse is never fixed and stable but is constantly being unsettled and is therefore open to counter hegemonic narratives. In a time of rampant xenophobia, nativism and racism, it is imperative that a study on governing for inclusion considers the potential for challenging dominant discourses. I therefore use the Foucauldian and Marxist tools outlined in the conceptual framework to develop this main argument as well as to inform particular claims that I make in the remaining chapters.

Literature Review

I started with three broad points of enquiry. Firstly, I was interested in what the state is comprised of: the multiple sites and relations of power within and between government bureaucracies, on the one hand, and the governed population, on the other. Secondly, in how the state relates to migration: how mechanisms of governing seem unable to deal with a mobile population. For example, the idea that governing the city is reducible to providing specific services and that this is only achievable through counting the numbers of people in static locations is at odds with the reality and the needs of a mobile and fluid population such as Johannesburg. Thirdly, and following on from the above, I was interested in exploring the relationship between the state and the mobile subject (both citizen and migrant) at the level of the city: specific locations in which diverse peoples are constantly landing, living and leaving. These three entry points led me to locate my research within relevant literature touching on governance and public administration, urban studies, and more specifically on urban migration, as outlined below. In doing so I am trying to address a gap in the literature looking at the governance of a social development policy from the perspective of the implementing officials. Additional literature is referred to in chapters three to five as it pertains to specific concepts and themes arising from my findings.

Governance and public administration

The CoJ Programme for Migration Management (PMM) (2013:3) states that the programme “is a multi-sector and multi-stakeholder integrated programme for management of migration in the City...The programme will have a number of implementing and executing agencies because of its multi-sectoral nature”. This is a useful starting point for looking at the role of ‘government’ in policy-making within ‘governance’ - a broader network of de-centralized and outsourced networks including local government public sector structures (Rosenau, cited in Weiss 2000). Furthermore, another related concept is the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, in which central government devolves power to local public-sector structures and non-governmental agencies (Milward and Provan, 2000).

Rhodes (1997) sees the ‘hollow state’ as incorporating, *inter-alia* decentralization, privatization, as well as the introduction of private sector ‘managerialism’ (New Public Management - NPM) into the public sector (1997: 661). NPM was promoted in Britain in the 1980s by Prime Minister Thatcher who sought to reduce the influence of the state in the economy, promote the role of the market in efficient service provision, and to run the remaining public-sector institutions along the lines of corporate enterprises. Technocratic neoliberal programmes like NPM gained popularity in Africa as international donors such as the World Bank and IMF put pressure on governments to demonstrate ‘good governance’. Chipkin & Lipietz (2012: 5) point out the influence of NPM not only in developed but also in developing countries during the 1990s, in the latter due to a “post-Fordist” emphasis on redefining “the role of the state in development”.

For Rhodes (1997) the central contradiction in NPM is that it is result-oriented which suits a hierarchical government bureaucracy that delivers its own services, but is at odds with the functions required for managing complex relationships in a network of service providers. The Johannesburg Migrant Strategy is a good example of this contradiction as the policy is premised on multi-stakeholder engagement, yet for its success is still dependent on the ability of officials to successfully ‘steer’ the process. Chipkin and Lipietz concur, but contend that the first democratic government in South Africa was looking for a “retreat” of the myriad race based and Bantustan state

institutions and to “transform” these into a unitary, three-tier government structure, with a mandate to provide services to all. The international push towards NPM promised to hold the remaining apartheid-era bureaucrats to account in terms of the new political mandate through its emphasis on output-based performance management. This also introduced greater participation of other stakeholders, particularly at the tier of local government such that “NPMs bundle of (at times contradictory) precepts were to prove highly influential” (Chipkin and Lipietz, 2012: 5).

Urban studies

Urbanisation in the city of Johannesburg was inextricably linked to gold mining, capital accumulation and the migrant labour system (as discussed in the background to the CoJ migration policy in the previous chapter). Critical urban studies scholars assist in providing a theoretical lens for analyzing “the system, yet historically specific, intersections between capitalism and urbanisation processes” (Brenner *et al.*, 2012: 3). Influenced by the late 1960s and early 1970s thinkers like Henri Lefebvre (1996), Manuel Castells (1975) and David Harvey (1976, 2012), contemporary urban studies proponents try and understand the role of capitalist accumulation and neoliberal hyper-consumption in the creation of an urban poor in the 21st century. Critical urbanists look at Lefebvre's notion of the 'right to the city' and postulate about how the most oppressed can challenge those in power in both private sector and state institutions. In their view local government institutions are as culpable as the private sector in perpetuating inequalities and capitalist modes of production. The analytical lens of critical urban studies as well as the conceptual demand of a universal 'right to the city' resonates in the context of the massive inequality prevalent in South African cities. Yet from this perspective, a study into a municipal policy has a forgone conclusion – there is no room within state institutions to provide a bulwark, let alone to counter state-private sector complicity in wielding power against the poor.

In contrast, Blanco, Griggs & Sullivan (2014: 3130) question the above-mentioned “subsumptive accounts, which over-emphasise the strategic coherence of neoliberal projects”. They “suggest that a full grasp of the politics and processes of neoliberalism demands that we recognize the continued centrality of the local state in the complex spaces that are cities”. Pieterse (2014), as well as Parnell and Robinson (2013) also

take issue with the generalisations and limitations that they find in the critical urban studies literature on critiques of neoliberalism. They propose that cities in the South - and specifically in South Africa - did not follow, nor do they replicate, the same economic history of urbanisation as developed countries. Parnell and Robinson (2013) feel that Southern issues such as 'urban informality', security and the politics of urban poverty is not fully explored or explained by Western critical urban theorists who focus exclusively on critiquing neoliberalism. They wish to add to urban theory with empirical studies of urban phenomena in developing countries as "urban theory must also explain political and policy dynamics at city level". Further, they propose that there are "multiple drivers of urban change" including the state which can play a developmental role "rather than seeing state actions as necessarily tied to the dynamics of capitalist accumulation" (Ibid 2013: 597). These scholars posit the possibility for government interventions to mitigate the effects of rapacious neoliberalism. This opens a space for a critical analysis of South African urban migration policy.

Whilst Pieterse, Parnell and Robinson see the universality of the 'right to the city' in a liberal context unlike the critical urban theorists whose notion of the right to the city is fundamentally transformative, both schools of thought are interested in the survival strategies of the urban poor and the ways in which informal spaces and practices can create alternative centres of power and agency within the formal geographies of the city. This theme is discussed in contemporary literature on urban migration in the next section.

Urban migration

The one-time ambition of the CoJ to fashion Johannesburg as a 'world class African city' emerged from a discourse spread through global city networks. The 'world class city' mantra encouraged municipalities to compete with each other to attract finance capital and private investment for gentrification projects in run-down inner city neighbourhoods. Saskia Sassen (2008: 77) views this strategy as making cities into "urban glamour zones" for global corporate capital and concurrently "urban war zones" for the poor and excluded. Sassen (2013) argues that far from creating a border-less world, globalized neoliberal capitalism is erecting new borders that range from geographic borderlines through which people and goods still move to banks and stock

markets where money is transferred electronically around the world from one 'global city' to another. This in turn creates numerous border management regimes, which facilitate easier cross border transfer for some (capital, global elites) and harsher cross border regimens for others (migrant workers, forced and undocumented migrants).

Following Sassen, it can be argued that the city itself becomes a site of multiple borders and boundaries with various regimes to 'manage' those that are in and excluded. This theory accords with the CoJ migration policy which initially envisaged that the Help-desks would be situated at points of entry such as taxi ranks and train stations, thus imagining physical borders to access the city. Yet the policy also imagines invisible borders such as systems to categorise and count residents in order to 'manage' the population and the rights and provisions to which they are – or are not - entitled.

Agamben's (1998: 134) theorising on the normalisation of zones of "exception" – spaces within the jurisdiction of the state but outside the rules of the polity and Bauman's work on 'liquid modernity' and the new un-rooted underclass (2013) resonate particularly in the urban South African context. The legacy of apartheid spatial geography has trapped a new underclass into ghettos and ever-growing shack settlements that expand the former apartheid-era townships into zones largely outside the provisions of the state. Landau (2015) looks at the dynamics at play in these peripheral urban zones. He notes that the state is not completely absent as residents in informal and semi-formal settlements still make claims and engage with the state (2015: 5). In this vein, Neocosmos (2010: 14) posits that the citizen is "passive" because even when participating in service delivery protests, these demonstrations are not anti-state or outside of the state as residents are demanding services that will include them within governmental apparatus. These protests are therefore within the hegemony of citizen-state relations of power. Landau (2015: 17), however, suggests that the state is no longer 'sovereign' as there are other webs of power and poles of authority that emerge in these liminal spaces.

Landau and Freemantle (2016) discusses how the urban edges are zones of mobility. As Murray (2008: 122) argues "the fight for freedom of movement against apartheid

segregationist laws that determined where one could go on the basis of racial classification has a very different substantive meanings for citizens of the new South Africa who are distributed unequally across the class spectrum. For the property-less and jobless the freedom to choose where to go has been reduced to perpetual movement, or the necessity of moving from here to there". Apartheid attempts to deny the freedom to choose where to go were never completely successful. Battles between the white urban municipalities and the mines over who had the responsibility to provide shelter for migrant male workers plus the (illegal) movement and settlement of black rural women to urban areas created a history of resistance through squatter movements that staked a claim to land in around towns and cities (Stadler, 1970; Bonner, 1990).

Thus colonial land appropriation and the ensuing migrant labour system has left a legacy of complex multi-local identities for a black working-class population, historically excluded from the white city yet simultaneously 'illegally' urbanizing, while retaining and re-making relationships to rural areas (Murray, 2008: 123). In the post-apartheid era, everyone has the right to move freely. But lack of affordable housing, mass unemployment and job precarity has made movement for the "new poor" or "underclass" (Bauman: 2000) into a paradoxical marker of 'un-freedom' – the inability to purchase stability. Without the possibility of fostering a secure urban subjectivity, freedom of movement has not translated into a sense of urban inclusivity for millions of black South Africans.

Peripheral urban zones are also far from homogeneous spaces. The majority of people moving to cities in South Africa are from other parts of the country. This in itself is a diverse population from different ethnicities. Due to the spatial divisions of apartheid, they have probably not previously interacted across localities, languages or cultural mores. Furthermore, many cross-border migrants end up in the mix, also seeking economic opportunities and cheap accommodation. The additional vulnerability associated with not having citizenship – a South African ID number – further limits opportunities for employment, housing and access to services for non-nationals. Liminal zones on the urban peripheries and in the CBD are the most viable choices for non-national migrants who are forced to navigate life without attracting the attention

of state authorities that could detain or deport them. Bauman (2000, cited in Barmaki, 2009: 259) has a pessimistic view that “ghettos are no longer spaces of solidarity and community spirit” but of “social disintegration, atomization and anomie”. In contrast, Landau (2009) shows that connections and differences are constantly being produced and re-made. Urban estuaries, are, perversely, both spaces of confinement and mobility, open air prisons yet productive spaces.

Research into everyday lives in marginalized urban areas show that various ties and communities form between individuals and across differences, for instance in churches, mosques, business dealings and economic exchange. These might be temporary or formed around a specific necessity or activity. For example, Landau as well as Katsaura (2018) have foregrounded pockets and moments of conviviality that speak to the persistence of humanity and cooperation between neighbours and strangers even in the most abject urban circumstance. However, there are factors that militate against a greater or more lasting sense of solidarity amongst the hyper-mobile poor. Kihato’s (2013) ethnographic study into the lived experience of African migrant women in Johannesburg verifies the idea of the city being a space where the most vulnerable (migrant women) can, through their everyday lives and interactions with and against formal rules and state regulations, make a presence. These women “highlight a sense of power that we do not normally associate with people at the political margins of society”. (Ibid: 46). Her findings lead her to view the city as a paradoxical site. While new borders are created by the state to ‘manage’ and create order, there is concurrently a “collapse of the boundaries between orderly and disorderly, governed and ungoverned” (Ibid: 38).

Kihato uses the concept of the “liminal city” which is in a constantly generative state, making and remaking codes, values and identities: “In the liminal city what we define as formal and informal, official and unofficial, legal and illegal are no longer recognisable if we retain strict boundaries between them” (Ibid: 125). What is of particular interest are the questions that Kihato’s findings pose for urban governance in a liminal city: a city that is complicated by the fluidity of migration, often a gateway to other destinations as well as a site comprising a multitude of shifting boundaries.

Kihato (2013) recognises the enormous challenge of the post 1994 South African state to transform the racially segregated, undemocratic, anti-poor and anti-participatory apartheid city. However she posits that the creation of a strong state premised on good governance in which local government is enabled as a “driver of development” (Ibid: 27) might actually produce the informal, illegal and ungovernable spaces it seeks to counter. Under such circumstances identities are made and values created in the most marginal spaces by the most marginal residents: “In the in-between city, political space is configured by the interaction of competing relationships in ways that both fragment and consolidate state authority” (Ibid: 28). This kind of mobility and resistance that is open to migrants is at odds with the CoJ vision with its normative values of integration and social cohesion. This returns to the question of whether the migration policy might be doing more harm than good from the perspective of the lived reality of migrants in the city.

Conceptual Framework

I began my thinking around this project via Foucault’s concept of governmentality as it made most sense as a framework to tie together ideas arising from the literature review on governance, urban studies and migration. Through the process of analysing the data, outlined in chapters three and four, I found that Foucauldian governmentality was relevant for analysing the substance of the data and in addition that his theories on discourse also had utility in finding appropriate methodological approaches, discussed in the previous chapter. However, when interpreting the data, especially in chapter five, I found that a Foucauldian framework had limitations as well. In this conceptual framework, I demonstrate how my engagement with Foucault was mediated through and in conversation with a Marxist tradition, broadly conceived. I have been eclectic in my reading and use of scholars such as Luxemburg, Fanon and Gramsci in order to counter some of the over-determinate strands of Foucault’s thought and think more dialectically. Whether as a guide to overarching arguments or specific claims in the chapters, I have employed a range of tools and concepts that I discuss in the next section.

Freedom isn't free

Governing through governmentality

Foucault (2008: 186) proposes the concept of governmentality, or “the way in which one conducts the conduct of men”, as a framework for understanding the interplay of power relations. In his 1978-79 series of lectures at the College De France entitled ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ he analyses in great detail the historical roots of liberalism and the emergence of neo-liberalism in Germany and the United States. By so doing, he emphasizes the historical structural factors of the political economy that have developed into power relations governing a population not only through coercion, discipline or even through bio-political interventions on the bodies of the population, but also through apparatuses of ‘self-regulation’ (Lemke, 2001: 2003). In this lecture series he is particularly concerned with testing the efficacy of governmentality as a tool for analysing the interplay of these power relations as an apparatus of governing security for the territory and population.

Liberalism, according to Foucault, enables individual freedom, relying on populations to internalize disciplinary techniques so that they largely govern themselves. Yet at the same time it exercises forms of control often unseen by the populace: “Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats etcetera” (Foucault, 2008: 64). Rabinow and Rose (2003: xvii) describe governmentality as “an analysis of liberalism as a mentality of government that depends upon, creates, and constrains free subjects”. The “mentality of government” – governmentality – is exemplified in contemporary neo-liberal governance which Foucault (2003: 244) describes as:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analysis, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as it's principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security...the result of processes through which the state...gradually becomes governmentalized.

Foucault emphasises that the neoliberal art of governing constitutes a range of apparatuses and *savoirs*, (knowledge systems) to provide security and regulation of the territory and the population.

The entity of the neo-liberal state has decreased central control over the exercise of power, but paradoxically is more omnipotent as its power is diffused. Governing the population takes place through a range of institutions such as schools, prisons, the medical-pharma complex and the media in addition to subjects governing themselves through adherence to societal norms generated by the variety of sites of power. Foucault (2003) outlines how even civil society which believes itself to be outside of the state, is unwittingly complicit in regulating society. The dispersal of state power means that the techniques of its rule are often unseen by the population who believe themselves to have freedom and the agency to make choices. I have used the concept of governmentality to encompass this complex web of power relations and the visible as well as the hidden mechanics of governing migration in Johannesburg.

McKee (2009: 473) notes that governmentality has been “heavily criticised for its disregard of empirical reality”. However, several scholars have been inspired by Foucault in empirical research and ethnographic studies ranging from development projects in Indonesia (Li, 1999), local government corruption in India (Gupta, 2006) and local development programmes in Lesotho (Ferguson, 1994). Von Schnitzler (2008) and Roy (2017) both found governmentality useful for framing neoliberal technologies of power and control through specific empirical studies in post-colonies looking at pre-paid water meters in South Africa and rural women’s microfinance groups in India, respectively. McKee (2009) develops Stenson’s (2005,2008) idea of ‘realist governmentality’ as a frame for connecting ethnographic studies with Foucault’s theory to overcome the criticisms she encounters. In my own study into the policy and implementation of a specific local government intervention, the concept of governmentality works to tie together empirical realities: the CoJ policy premised on network governance; the contestation that the officials express towards their role as government within stakeholder forums (see chapter four); and the oblique ways in which a particular discourse on migration is disseminated and entrenches itself in the population.

On the outside looking in

Bringing in theorists and concepts broadly speaking from the Marxist tradition assisted me in thinking not only about how state power does its work, but also why it does so in particular ways and where there might be possibilities to challenge state power. In line with this I brought in the concept of ideology, alongside Foucault's conception of power and governmentality, to understand the ways in which knowledge is produced in the interests of certain classes or strata in society (Gramsci, 1999; Hall, 1976). For Marxists, ideology – the intersection between the economic base of production and the realm of reproduction of ideas and knowledge – is rooted in exploitative power relations. Marx's theoretical perspective was predicated on how the prevailing economic system of capitalist exploitation, with all of its ideological overlays, is not 'natural' or fixed for all time but is historically bounded. Prevailing ideologies can be challenged by subjects with agency. For Marx, the exploited in society potentially have the power, if the subjects collectively exercise their agency, to eliminate exploitative economic arrangements so that a completely new ideological perspective can arise. Therefore existing power relations and the dominant ideologies that sustain them contain the possibility of their own demise, not only theoretically but practically.

For Foucault (1991), there is no dialectical process going on between the ideological realm and the political economy of society. Rather there are a multiplicity of discourses that are created by webs of power relationships and simultaneously co-create, re-create or counter-create networks of power. Discourses are one of the systems through which power circulates (Hall, 1996). Discourses are therefore never neutral and those with more power produce discourses that are taken as the truth, regardless of their scientific validity (Hall, 1996). However, Foucault avoids ascribing ideological intentions to discourses and thus avoids the question of how, in theory or practice, one might effect a fundamental change to the dominant discourses that support the status quo. According to Foucault (1991: 70): "A progressive politics does not make man or consciousness or the subject in general into the universal operator of all transformations: it defines the different levels and functions which subjects can occupy in a domain which has its own rules and formations". Although he revised his view in his later works, in his 1978-79 lectures, where he outlines his theory of

governmentality, Foucault's contention is that agential subjects cannot exist outside of, or external to, the webs of power relations. In other words, agency itself is a product of power.

Mitchell Dean raises a similar concern with the over determination in Foucault's thinking. Dean (2002) proposes that governmentality continues with, but fundamentally must also go beyond, "a focus on those power relations conceived as the direction of conduct and the shaping of choice". I agree that one needs to conceptually step outside of power relations in order to "gain an intelligibility of governing in liberal democracies that is no longer fundamentally liberal (Ibid: 135). In order to do this, Dean proposes "Agamben's thesis that sovereign power is becoming indistinct from biopolitics" (2002: 134). Agamben cautions against ignoring the very present "sovereign decision on bare life" that impact upon "welfare of the poor, rights of refugees or indigenes, environmental catastrophe" amongst others. Agamben extended this thinking to propose that what had been considered as exceptions in liberal democracies such as concentration camps, refugee camps and migrant detention centres, places that designate those detained as excluded *homines sacri* to which juridical ethical norms do not apply, have become so normal that we are living in an age of exception: "In our age all citizens can be said, in a specific but extremely real sense, to appear virtually as *homines sacri*" (Agamben cited in Lemke, 2005:7). I concur as the South African state frequently resorts to making bare life decisions on the 'new poor' through limitations, controls and forms of coercion and obligations, relying on threats etcetera" (Foucault, 2008: 64). These decisions can be in the form of non-provision of vital services such as healthcare or sanitation; arbitrary enforcement of laws and regulations; or through ineffective day to day policing while police readily opening fire on citizens during legitimate protests.

The possibility to take an externalized view of governmental power relations proposed by Agamben firstly highlights the extent to which direct coercive governance continues to take place within biopolitical networks. Secondly, it opens up the possibility that power relations are not only self-generating networks but might also be driven by ideological imperatives. "Sovereign decisions on bare life" (Agamben, 1995: 83) point towards power being exercised through exploitative relations. Initially I thought

Agamben's argument would be more pertinent to a study of officials working in Home Affairs as their remit is exactly to make 'bare life' decisions through issuing documentation – or not – thus determining who is 'in' and who is 'out' of the polity.

A long history

The utility of governmentality is its explanatory power to uncover, collate and name the way in which a neoliberal state employs governing technologies and governs through complex and diffuse webs of power relations. But as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, I found that governmentality has limitations when it comes to conceptualising the possibility of resisting the power of dominant narratives. I explore the possibility for affecting change from outside of governmentalist power relations. To this end, in the rest of this chapter I draw from various sources to introduce ideas around 'bare life', ideology and hegemony. I consider these concepts with reference to slavery, colonialism and post-colonial / post-apartheid views of in and exclusion in the next sections of this chapter.

The shadowing history of slavery and virtuous citizens

Luxemburg (2013) uncovers how slavery/exclusion has been foundational to inclusion within political polities in communal agrarian societies, cities, city states, the formation of empires and thus contemporary national and regional territories.⁸ She charts the specificities of certain communal 'mark' societies, where economic developments propelled communalist social relations towards class-based power relationships and expansion through economies based on trade with the foreign 'other'. Concurrently in these societies, the polity defined itself through an inherent contradiction of excluding

⁸Luxemburg, unlike Engels, posits that slave economies developed prior to private property. This leads her to investigate pre-capitalist societies around the world, exposing various forms of slavery. I find this useful firstly, as it does not simply reduce exploitation to capitalism; secondly as it allows one to consider pre-colonial societies as varied and complex sets of power relationships; and thirdly it allows for consideration of what factors propelled some societies towards exploitative class relations.

its own productive force – the figure of the slave – a non-human object that was foreign to the polity. This brings to mind later regimes of migrant labour in South Africa (see chapter one) where the Apartheid architects tried by all means to exclude the rights of citizenry for the workforce on which they depended for extracting their gold-profits.

From a contemporary Marxist feminist perspective, neo-liberal global migration follows this contradictory logic. As Tithi Bhattacharya puts it in an interview on social reproduction theory:

“Reproduction of the working class within the family is not the only way that the working class is reproduced within a social context – immigration and slavery are two of the main ways in which people are forced into a nationally bounded site as the workforce”⁹.

Therefore, even where receiving states might welcome workers, they do everything to exclude paying for the reproductive cost of labour afforded to citizens by restricting migration of dependents, as well as access to healthcare, education and other provisions and protections. Other examples of this are the short-term work permits linked to specific employers such as the ‘kafala system’ used by the Gulf States to recruit domestic and construction workers from Africa and Asia. Another case would be the Filipino government’s arrangements for the provision of temporary visas for women migrating as care workers. Luxemburg’s work on slavery is thus useful for countering dominant discourses of national sovereignty by forcing us to re-think our historical assumptions of citizenship.

In her history of political economics, Luxemburg (2013) moves on from a discussion of slavery by illuminating and bringing into focus the impact of European colonial expansion on the colonized people. The capitalist era’s colonial rupture was decried

⁹ <https://www.tithibhattacharya.net/social-reproduction-theory> (accessed 9 March 2020)

by Luxemburg as violently tearing apart communalist 'mark' communities¹⁰, disrupting their indigenous long historical processes (Ibid). She states that in Europe the process of transformation from mark societies was "a slow, gradual and unnoticeable process" (Ibid: 249). Conversely, where Europeans conquer territory in the "so called savage and semi-civilised lands" such as the Americas, India, the East Indies or Africa (Ibid: 248) or "the mere settlement of a few European trading colonies in these countries" (Ibid: 249) it is always "a sudden and violent catastrophe" (Ibid: 248). The indigenous societies are robbed of their lands and "made either into wage slaves, or slaves pure and simple...if they are not just exterminated" (Ibid: 249). In addition to land grabs, slavery and genocide, the Europeans weaponized Christian ideology to underpin their colonial endeavours (2013: 158; 208). Following the European carve-up of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884, the dominant discourse of the 'rightfulness' of nation states with clearly demarcated borders was exported to the African continent, even as the European powers were carving out territories on the continent for their own possession.

I don't want to give the impression that Foucault ignored the impact of colonialism. His theorising of biopower as a technology of regulating and disciplining populations through categorising individuals and groups on seemingly biological criteria "casts a new light on the relations between the liberal government of the metropolitan territories and the exercise of colonial government over populations conceived of as naturally, biologically, constitutionally, morally and ethnically distinct" (Rabinow and Rose, 2003: xi). Biopower resonates with anti-colonial scholars such as Stuart Hall's expose of the discourse of the 'West and the rest' (1996) and Edward Said's work on orientalism (1978). Both Hall and Said in different ways foreground how mechanisms of colonial governance created an often contradictory, yet hegemonic understanding of colonised people that persists in contemporary views on race and the Third World 'other'. These ideas are complimented by Luxemburg's historical counter narrative as the following examples of the so-called European refugee 'crisis' and xenophobia in Johannesburg demonstrate.

¹⁰ Luxemburg (2013) identifies 'mark' communities as pre-capitalist communalistic arrangements of societies

Migrants drowning while crossing the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe today are not generally seen as part of a long history of subjugation through colonial rule, slavery, de-humanisation, under development and neo-colonial interests – the flip side of European development. They are generally regarded as unwelcome ‘others’ that should stay home and sort out their own problems. Reintroducing Foucault is useful in understanding how this discourse works to create and sustain normative narratives of citizenship and inclusion – as well as counter narratives - and the entwining of biopolitical discourses within governmental apparatus. Returning to Agamben is helpful to bring a focus on the presence of sovereign power within the governmental mix which is foregrounded in contemporary in/exclusions in this so called ‘European refugee crisis.’ We see clear bare life decisions being made by the EU when it stopped maritime rescue missions as well as various states’ criminalising their own citizens that undertake migrant rescue in the Mediterranean Sea. Gramsci’s thinking on migration from the south to the factories of northern Italy led him to reverse the viewpoint of the migrant as the alien, centering the narrative from the perspective of the migrant (Agustin and Jorgensen, 2016: 25). If we do similarly with the case of migrants drowning at sea we can say that the European response to the migrant boats is ‘alien’ in its inhumanity thus challenging a hegemonic racist and anti-migrant discourse.

After reversing the notion of the migrant as ‘alien in the European refugee ‘crisis’, a similar point can be made regarding ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens. Luxemburg (2013) notes that while ancient Rome added a juridical aspect to citizenship, Aristotle had already added a moral dimension – the “good citizen”. This, Aristotle suggests, is a prerequisite of the men that hold property and participate in the political processes of the polity – the “virtuous” citizen (Politics, Book Three)¹¹. Moral superiority was one trope that runs through later slaving societies and was engaged by 19th century colonialists to dehumanize the ‘rest’ (Hall, 1996). Much of the current discourse around cross border migrants in South Africa contains remnants of this Western discourse of civic virtue: The DHA rejects the majority of asylum claims as unfounded or manifestly

¹¹ <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html> (accessed 09 March 2020)

unfounded implying that the majority of asylum seekers are perjurers; migrants are not worthy of receiving services, worse they are illegal and/or do illegal things (for example: *Sowetan Live*, 2 December 2016; 702, 8 March 2019; *The South African*, 2 August 2019). This discourse has the perverse effect of casting citizens as “virtuous” even when they are perpetrating violence against outsiders. Indeed, the needs and aspirations of the local poor are disregarded in practice by much of the political leadership yet when it is politically expedient they are created as virtuous, law abiding citizens through promulgating the negation of these traits in outsiders.

Not yet Uhuru in the post colony

The South African Constitution now confers a liberal and progressive human rights framework applicable to all in its territory, yet the question of citizenship remains confounded by class and power relations. Aristotle’s ‘good citizen’ was, notably, a property-owning man. While no country any longer views gender or property ownership as criteria for citizenship, it’s worth noting that the majority of contemporary South African citizens are neither property nor land-owning, nor men. Yet, as mentioned above, South African citizens can be cast as the ‘virtuous’ citizen in contrast to the criminal outsider.

The struggle to declare citizenship for all in a unitary South African nation and state has not changed the relations of property or land ownership although there is now the legal possibility for social mobility that is not predicated on race classification. The continuation of class relations post-Apartheid must be recognized as having a bearing on the notion and the discourse of in/exclusion as articulated within the state and between citizens and state. This does not mean reducing in/exclusion to purely economic factors. Indeed, the intersectionality of race and class in relation to citizenship in post-colonial Africa is well described by Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963).

Fanon elaborates on how post-colonial states in Africa morph from liberatory and inclusive to providers of economic accumulation for individuals and their interests. He identifies the post-colonial national bourgeoisie as a rapacious and greedy elite who are still at the mercy of colonial capital – loans and investment – which they do not

directly control and thus fail to develop into a stable class. Whilst it continues to use the rhetoric of nationalism, in fact this “thin” class (Fanon, 1963: 166) does nothing productive to serve the interests of the nation as a whole.

The party of liberation comes to serve as a means to jobs in the administration and the state bureaucracy to serve as a power base, sometimes linked to ethnic or regional allegiances, for individual interests. In many cases these frictions are exacerbated by the legacy of colonial interests (Mamdani, 2001). In South Africa, apartheid’s divide and rule between black ethnicities and between so-called ‘Coloureds’, ‘Indians’ and ‘Bantus’ plays out in contemporary subaltern tensions. Added to this, corruption, cronyism and “Old rivalries that were there before colonialism, old inter-racial hatreds come to the surface” (Fanon, 1963: 157). Fanon says that as the national unity of the independence struggle becomes increasingly fractured it becomes more acute for the elite to appeal to a national identity in order to hold it all together against the anger of the masses who start to feel betrayed:

The peasant who goes on scratching out a living from the soil, and the unemployed man who never finds employment do not manage, in spite of public holidays and flags, new and brightly coloured as they may be, to convince themselves that anything has really changed in their lives (1963: 169).

... From nationalism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked, and in fact the government... commands them to go, thus giving their nationals satisfaction. (1963: 156).

The above two quotes summarise the argument that Fanon makes in which he discusses the way that the ideology of national liberation becomes racist (or xenophobic) towards other Africans as, in the face of internal rivalries and anxieties, autochthony becomes an identifier and the criteria for making claims on the state. In this political and economic context Fanon describes how the activist of the liberation struggle becomes “the empty title of citizen” (1963: 171). In line with Fanon, Neocosmos (2010: 140) describes post-1994 South African national identity as

“passive citizenship”. He argues that post-1994 the agency of the urban population during the struggle for liberation in the 1980s was demobilized by a state-centred conception of nationalism in which “state prescriptions, founded on indigeneity, have been allowed to dominate uncontested in conditions of an overwhelmingly passive conception of citizenship” (Ibid: 11). According to Neocosmos the human rights framework of the Constitution, , “contributed to this passivity” (Ibid: 11) as “the politics of agency are substituted by appeals to the state for redress” (Ibid: x). Yet continuing inequalities means that not everyone has equal access to call upon their rights.

Gramsci (1999: 215) poses the concept of “passive revolution” or “a revolution without a revolution which some have applied to analyse the negotiated settlement that ended apartheid. In this situation, according to Gramsci (Ibid), there is a necessity for subaltern consent in order to affect a fundamental, yet at the same time moderate transfer of state power. Neocosmos (2010: xii) applies this in the South Africa context: “As in other cases of post-colonial transition in Africa, the hegemony of xenophobic discourse is to be sought in the character of state consensus”. In order to maintain control over a society riddled by frictions and factions, as elaborated above, the state discourse projects the migrant as the social deviant: the migrant brings disease and crime and embodies illegality whilst using resources that impoverish citizens. This point leads back to considering Foucault, particularly his studies of prisons, mental health and sexuality. He looks at the history of how social deviancy is constructed and how what we consider mad, bad or dangerous to know changes over time. Deviancy thus functions as a biopolitical technique to regulate and discipline the population.

In the current conjuncture the migrant is constructed as a social deviant, a ‘*homo sacer*’ Agamben’s (1995) figure of a person constructed by society as the excluded in order to draw a boundary around the jurisdiction of the included. However, as the benefits of inclusion dwindle, citizens are in a state of precarity, ever fearful of being cast as deviant, unwanted, unable to sufficiently consume and cut adrift. Whether citizen or migrant, the poor have become a “class of people who are beyond classes and outside the hierarchy, with neither a chance nor need of readmission” (Bauman, 2000, cited in Barmaki, 2009: 259). This creates fertile ground for racism, nativism and xenophobia. Yet as referred to in the literature review there are points of conviviality

and humanism among those 'outside the hierarchy'. In this chapter I have argued that the binary of citizen/migrant is a construct to serve class interests. I have also argued that for every dominant discourse there are contesting counter hegemonic discourses. Thus there is the potential to challenge the prevailing ideology and its governmental apparatus.

Conclusion

In the literature review I firstly flagged network governance as pertinent to the way in which the CoJ policy envisages the role of government and other stakeholders in its migration policy and how the South African government administration has been influenced by precepts of New Public Management. Secondly, I considered a critical urban studies approach and noted the critiques of this approach for reading cities and the role of local government in the global South that have been made by some African urbanists. In the last section on urban migration, I looked at the mobile citizen and cross border migrant as an urban underclass, living on the periphery of the regulated city. Here I considered what categorizing this underclass into citizen and migrant means for governing a liminal city.

The section on urban migration ends with Kihato's proposal that governance, through formalizing informal practices, can itself produce the very un-governability it set out to eliminate which served as a provocation for my research: could the municipal imagination of integration and attempts to implement their vision through a policy intervention have the obverse effect? In relation to my third sub-question, if the discourses employed by the CoJ embody dominant discourses, is the policy and functioning of the Migrant Help-desk actually contributing to exacerbating tensions in the city? If so, should we return to the critical urbanists view that I dismissed earlier in this section, to ask: is local government so complicit with corporate interests that it is untenable for policies to ameliorate, let alone present a challenge, to the ravages wrought by corporate capital? These issues are revisited in chapter five, where I interpret my findings.

Building upon ideas raised in the literature review, I proposed in the conceptual framework that citizen/migrant is a false dichotomy. Yet it forms a powerful and

foundational fulcrum of state-formation – without the included citizen there is not state and without the excluded migrant there is no citizen. However, states based on exploitation are inherently unstable. For example, the South African citizenry is the most unequal in the world, a veritable ‘state of exception’ in which the majority are economically precarious and psychologically unsettled. The new underclass is tenuously connected to the polity, moving to and through the city but excluded and unwanted in formal urban spaces. In the informal edges, citizen and migrant share everyday experiences. In these liminal zones, fractures and divisions take on a greater significance when related to marginal proximity to rights and resources of the state. Micro-power struggles are mobilized by the state in an effort to affect a hegemonic discourse through which to enumerate the population into in/excluded, or deserving and deviant.

I conclude that conceptually re-inserting class and colonial exploitation into explorations of neo-liberal governmentality enables us to locate the ideological imperatives within webs of power relations that congeal into hegemonic narratives. This hegemonic discourse is, however, flexible, remaking itself as power relations between the state and civil society fluctuate. This opens space to imagine the potential for consciously pursuing counter hegemonic strategies to the foundational, yet false, citizen/migrant binary of the state. So by illuminating the forces and discourses at play in Johannesburg can we find within this liminal city a path towards a “genuinely humanising urbanism”? (Harvey, 1976: 314).

CHAPTER THREE: FRIEND OR FOE?

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss findings related to perceptions of inclusivity and mobility from analysis of my interview data, CoJ policy documents and related media articles to address my first research sub-question: How does the CoJ conceive of concepts of inclusion and mobility in official documentation and the imaginaries of officials? I have approached this question through what I call the lens of ‘slavery,’ discussed in the previous chapter, which posits the duality of in-exclusion. The chapter is divided into

three sections, focusing on how the CoJ conceives of integration, xenophobia and human trafficking, themes that I derived from the subjects raised in the interviews with the officials in the Sub-Unit and from the policy documents. Each of the three sections reveals how national and, in some instances, international language on migration intersect with CoJ policy and the experiences of the officials. With Foucault in mind, I analyse how discourses around inclusion and mobility in the city are developed, create meaning and direct the practice of the Help-desk officials.

Integration

National government context

“The policy on international migration will reflect how our nation of 55 million people will relate to the rest of the 7 billion humans who share planet Earth”
(White Paper on International Migration, 2017: 1)

The White Paper on International Migration (WP) drafted by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) includes a section on “Management of the integration process for international migrants” for the first time in South African migration policy. It summarises the purpose of this as: “to establish a secure, strategic and integrated approach for the integration of bona fide migrants into communities” (2017: iv). In spite of using the word integration twice in one sentence, the document does not give any indication of what is meant by this concept. The use of “bona fide migrants” in this opening announcement of an integration policy is typical of the underlying suspicion, hostility and authoritarian tendencies in national policy discourse on migration whilst simultaneously attempting to acknowledge the legitimate presence and the rights of non-nationals. This contradictory policy-speak is not new. Neocosmos (2010: 80), referring to the 1999 Green Paper on Immigration, says that it is “clearly restricted by both conceptual and legal constraints... [accounting] for the contradictions between its democratic intentions and genuine attempts to liberalise migration policy on the one hand, and its fundamentally nationalist-statist preoccupations and concerns on the other.” (2010: 80). This can equally be applied to the 2017 White Paper.

It is worth flagging here how national policy relates to the global migration climate and how this permeates, or otherwise, to city level discourses. The language of the Global

Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD), the UN process that resulted in the adoption of the Global Compacts for Migration and on Refugees in 2018¹², is directly reflected in the DHA's 'Vision 2030': "South Africans embrace international migration for development while guarding sovereignty, peace and security" (WP, 2017: 34). The two elements: development and security have underpinned the international consensus (minus the US which pulled out of the process after the election of President Trump). There was of course much contestation in the negotiations between states on where the focus should lie and on how much emphasis to give to inclusion of the UN human rights framework, a position pushed strongly by the parallel civil society process.

Naturally, Western countries wanted a more restrictive migration regime driven by their perception that migration is primarily a threat to security yet also a source of cheap labour. Sending countries such as Bangladesh played an active role in the negotiations, pushing the World Bank's (2018) supposedly 'win-win' line that labour is needed in wealthier countries while remittances sent home from migrant workers are developmentally beneficial to the sending country. This deeply neoliberal conception sees migrants purely for their economic value: precarious workers accruing little reproductive cost to receiving countries. In addition, it individualizes poverty alleviation as migrant remittances keep populations in sending countries afloat so that Western countries can continue to slash overseas aid budgets and bypass the governments of developing countries. The South African government took little interest in the GFMD process but the language in the White Paper embraces the development/security discourse with the occasional inclusion of human rights.

At first glance, the focus in the White Paper on developmental benefits of migration to South Africa and the continent in "overcoming the legacy of colonialism and building a prosperous and peaceful and united Africa", (WP, 2017: 35) looks like a benevolent policy direction. However, the table of contents reveals that "management" is the key word in the title to all eight central chapters outlining the policy and strategic

¹² The non-binding Global Compacts are the first ever UN migration frameworks.

interventions being proposed. Management, in international migration discourse, is a euphemism for states to exercise direct sovereign power over their territory through borders and biometrics as well as bio-power over the population through discretionary, rather than simply administrative, visa and permitting regimes.

This can be summed up by the phrase in the White Paper integration section: “Sovereign states have a right to determine which foreigners can become part of the community either on a temporary or on a permanent basis. In doing so, the migration policy shapes the future composition of their populations” (WP, 2017: 73). What this telling phrase shows is that whilst there is indeed an ongoing contestation between security and development with regards to global debates on migration [as identified by Polzer (2005) and Neocosmos (2010) in the South African context], in fact the way in which the debate enters policy forms two sides of the same coin. The contestation itself produces a narrative of migration requiring strong state management of borders and populations to reap the supposed benefits and minimize the feared risks. In contemporary international migration discourse this ‘managerialism’ is the sheepskin cloaking the neo-liberal wolf.

The section of the White Paper on integration begins by outlining who is excluded from integration “due to the temporary nature of their stay in the country”, namely those on short-term visas and asylum seekers who, it is stated, “have temporary status while awaiting the outcome of adjudication” (WP, 2017: 73). Delineating temporary from permanent migrants excludes the possibility of ‘integration’ for the majority of non-nationals living in the country. Asylum seekers can wait up to a decade or more for their status to be determined. Furthermore, recent amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Acts propose further restrictions on the routes to permanent status for refugees and for those on various temporary visas. According to the White Paper: “there should be no automatic progression from residency to citizenship in law or in practice” (WP Abr., 2017: 6). Here we can see the way in which national policy, drafted by DHA bureaucrats, restricts eligibility for inclusion/integration even as it attempts to recognize that “our chances of peace and prosperity are far greater in a world where states cooperate and their citizens are free to travel, work, study, research, enjoy

culture and build relationships” (WP, 2017: 2). This duality is reflected at the municipal level.

COJ discourse on integration

The CoJ policy entitled Integration of Migrants (PIM) follows the same linguistic pattern, beginning with celebrating the diversity and cosmopolitanism of the city, but immediately following this with a long list of things that incomers need to do including: “learning the language, understanding the socio-cultural context of the host society, and respecting and complying with legislative and community frameworks” (PIM, 2011: 8). In contrast, the local residents need to do two things: “accept the situation and facilitate the process of integration by breaking down barriers” (PIM, 2011: 8).

Schrover and Schinkel (2013: 1134) observe that contemporary migration discourse posits ‘society’ as a static entity in which integration is a “personal and one-sided process a responsibility of, or requirement on, migrants only”. In the quote in the paragraph above from the South African White Paper, the conception of society is named as “the community”. This term is problematized in chapter six. The point here is that “the community”, used frequently in the municipal discourse to mean those who are not migrants, stands at national policy level for ‘society’, conveying Schinkel’s (2018: 3) point that integration implies a false narrative of a stable homogeneous entity throughout the national territory into which migrants must assimilate. The CoJ policy says that “integration should be understood as a two-way process” (PIM, 2011: 8) yet the burden is without doubt on the side of the migrant.

In general, the officials I interviewed took pride in the role the Help-desk plays in facilitating integration although none of them gave any indication of what integration meant to them beyond the rather vague concepts of ‘social cohesion’ and living in peace and harmony. Respondent C stated: “most of the work that I do is running programmes in our communities and sensitizing the issue of social cohesion and integration of migrants into our communities”. Contrary to the emphasis in the CoJ policy on all the things migrants must do in order to integrate, this respondent stated that most of her work focused on the two elements required of the locals: accepting the situation and breaking down barriers.

Another interviewee (SUH) reflected the CoJ policy phrase that integration is a two-way process:

Our role is just to assist migrants to integrate into local communities and we also assist local communities to embrace migrants and welcome to their communities, so that the [inaudible] social cohesion and people live side-by-side in peace. We do anti-xenophobic programmes that will ensure people live in peace and harmony. We've got a lot of programs that we run towards achieving that goal (respondent SUH, 2018).

In this statement we again can see that there is a greater emphasis on the programmes the Help-desk runs to convince the locals to accept migrants than on convincing migrants to integrate. We can thus infer that contrary to the weighting of actions to be undertaken by each side as stated in the policy, when it comes to implementation it is a harder task to persuade the locals of the necessity for integration and perhaps it is here that the integration challenge lies. The reluctance of locals to embrace integration of outsiders also points back to the unspoken divisions within South African society where everybody has suspicions about whomever they perceive as the outsiders in their space.

Another of the respondents considered the re-integration of migrants back into the city following the 2008 xenophobic attacks as the biggest success of the Help-desk:

The biggest success of the Help-desk is the integration of migrants in particular in Joburg city following the 2008 xenophobic attacks as the biggest success of the Help-desk the city was able to integrate migrant communities back to following the 2008 xenophobic attacks but we were able also to engage further with communities to find out what happened in the form of seminars, dialogues, workshops and there were findings out of it that led to the existence of the Migrant Help-desk going forward (respondent F, 2018).

This respondent takes pride in the role the Help-desk plays not only in re-integrating migrants but in ongoing work to realise peaceful communities and uncover the causes for xenophobic violence. The notion of re-integration of people displaced by the 2008 attacks is part of the understanding this official has of integration. The term 're-integration' was popularly used by government and non-governmental agencies at the time of the 2008 attacks. Similarly, for this official, the discourse of the day implied that there were integrated communities prior to a sudden outbreak across the country of anti-foreigner violence.

Since 2008, whenever there have been outbreaks of xenophobia, the 'solution' put forward by all concerned role-players has revolved around ideas of community dialogues aimed at 're-integrating' displaced migrants back into communities. The municipality along with various NGOs and emerging migrant community groups share this governmental discourse. However, focusing on re-integrating migrants presents local neighbourhoods as stable in the same way that the nation is presented as such. It skirts the serious fractures within communities and the power relationships that play out in local level environments, particularly in spaces existing in liminal relationship to the authority of the state.

A debate is raging amongst migration scholars in the *Comparative Migration Studies* journal around research on 'integration' in Europe which throws up some pertinent points in trying to understand what the term means to South African government policy makers and officials. Schinkel (2018) posits a provocation to researchers to *inter alia* challenge the common-sense notion of Migration. He argues that the field of research which measures levels of migrant integration is based on a flawed premise in which migrants are both invested with an "individualized responsibility" to integrate but that this also "extends to all members of the 'group' to which that individual is considered to belong" (Ibid: 4). At the same time 'society' (he is writing about the Netherlands) is taken as a homogenous construction in which "white citizens are not researched or described in terms of integration" (Ibid: 4).

Schinkel (2018) identifies this skewed power relationship in the scholarship as neo-colonial and based on the racist trope of a stable white normalcy into which the

ethnised 'other' is required to submit. CoJ integration policy wants to see education programmes for newcomers on arrival that will make it incumbent on migrants to "understand the culture of the host country, duties, rights and obligations and knowledge of the law emphasizing zero tolerance to crime" (PIM, 2011: 18). The examples from interviews and the CoJ policy quoted above seem to support Schinkel's (2018) viewpoint as "the community" or "the locals" are used to create a discourse of a homogeneous South African society of citizens, similarly to the Dutch example. The imagined idea of a cohesive South African society is stated in policy as if it exists, glaringly omitting the racialized peculiarities of the South African situation.

A refutation to Schinkel is posed by Rinus Pennix (2019) with her thesis that migration policy can be studied differently to the substantive question of integration. She uses the term "process of integration" to unsettle implied stasis of the host society (Ibid: 9). I suggest that the way the officials talk about the integration programmes they undertake shows how a normative policy discourse, amplified by the media permeates into how residents of the city relate to the concept of integration. And this in turn reflects in studies that try to quantify integration in the city¹³. Thus, it is impossible to formulate a way of measuring integration, as proposed by Pennix (2019), that is independent of the way the term is used and its meaning in policy and public discourse.

Xenophobia: fact or fiction?

National government context

"We don't want xenophobia in our country. It's not a good characteristic to have," (Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Naledi Pandor, 14 August 2019. *Sunday Times*).

The post 1994 state has an ambivalent attitude towards identifying xenophobia in the country. Hostility towards those considered outside of the nation has gone hand in hand with the discourse of building a unitary South African identity, yet the government

¹³ This is evidenced by data on perceptions of integration in the GCRO *Quality of Life Survey No. IV: Social Cohesion*, February 2018

has sought to downplay or deny the presence of xenophobic sentiment. This denialism first surfaced publicly during Mbeki's presidency when South Africa underwent an AU African Peer Review process, a 'good governance' country self-assessment that Mbeki himself played a leading role in instigating on the continent. The civil society input to the 2007 South African report raised the issue of xenophobia as an emerging point of conflict. Mbeki would not acknowledge this as a governance challenge although the following year was marked by the first widespread outbreak of xenophobic violence in which 70 people were killed, making international headlines.

Despite the 2008 attacks, the government has refused to acknowledge xenophobia. More recently this denialism has persisted through promulgating the narrative that violence against non-nationals is purely criminal and is not targeted against anyone based on their nationality. President Ramaphosa said: "The violence was being spread by people with criminal intent, South Africans are not xenophobic. South Africans have always lived side by side with people from other nations" (4 April, 2019, *Sowetan Live*). In this formulation, the state denies that 'the people' (South Africans) are xenophobic but acknowledges that they might act criminally.

When challenged, government and ruling party representatives claim that the attacks are not xenophobic because it is "illegal" migrants and not all migrants that are the targets of attacks. They are, in effect, condoning attacks on "illegal" migrants who are understood to be criminals due to their "illegal" status. Thus a confusing discourse has developed in which the denial of xenophobia by politicians is in itself xenophobic. A further discursive sleight of hand the government employs is stating that they are clamping down on "illegal" migrants because 'the communities tell them'. Here the state is blaming its own actions (such as raids on migrant shops) on the people. This discourse suggests that the government is not xenophobic, it is just doing what the people demand, but as we have seen above, the people also cannot be xenophobic.

CoJ discourse on integration

The CoJ policy documents are also ambivalent in their use of the word xenophobia. However, both in policy documents and in the interview data there is a greater acceptance that xenophobia exists than in national government pronouncements. The

Anti Xenophobia and Common Citizenship Programme formed part of the municipal IDP for 2005-2011. Here there is acknowledgement at city level of xenophobia and indeed the Johannesburg municipality was subsequently impacted by the 2008 attacks, being the level of government that had to directly assist the displaced. Curiously though, the Migrant Help-desk LRMP strategy report of 2009 notes that the phrase “‘Anti Xenophobia’ carried unnecessarily negative connotations and should be replaced in all public awareness materials with phrases emphasising inclusiveness, tolerance and diversity” (LRMP: 2009: 31). The argument being that ‘anti-xenophobia’ excludes the necessity of public awareness for internal as well as cross border migrants. This puts the omission of the word xenophobia in a positive light. However, the double negative makes the sentence actually mean that *anti* xenophobia, rather than xenophobia itself, carries “negative connotations”. This might be semantic, but in the light of historical denial of xenophobia by government, I suggest it demonstrates at best confusion over the term and at worst a desire to erase the concept completely.

The implications of the words “inclusiveness, tolerance and diversity” proposed in the document to replace xenophobia will be discussed further in chapter five. Here I wish to focus on the uncertainties and implications around the use of the word xenophobia in official discourse as the interviewees reflect similar uncertainties and equivocation as the policy documents. The word xenophobia was very present in the interviews, with the MEC plus four of the five officials all mentioning the word at least once. Amongst the officials their comments ranged from acknowledgement of themselves having held xenophobic sentiments to denial of its existence.

The quotation below is the only example I found of someone using the word xenophobia in relation to their own attitudes towards migrants. As respondent SUH had worked for DHA he makes a distinction between the mandate of the Help-desk, to provide assistance regardless of status, with the direct management and control over bare life exercised by national government: “documentation, no documentation – deportation”:

When I was with Home Affairs, there you’ve got a mandate to enforce the law, there’s legislation, there’s policy, there’s all regulations, and sometimes you

don't even realize that you tend to be xenophobic because when you think of a migrant you think of documentation, no documentation – deportation, but when you come here, you realize you can deal with whoever, even those who are illegal, you can still interact with them and they can feel free to come to us anytime just to get advice until their issues are sorted (respondent SUH, 2018).

His quotation is worth dwelling on as it reveals firstly, how discourses on migration differ within different levels and contexts of government, but more significantly, how day to day work practices within governmental technologies and discourses co-create each other. These technologies are exposed as creating the migrant either as an object, legitimised or otherwise, through the actions of officials in DHA issuing (or not) a piece of paper: “when you think of a migrant you think of documentation” or as a humanised subject, “even those who are illegal you can still interact with them.” The clause “they can feel free” stands in complete contrast with the statement describing his DHA experience where migrants were un-free, de-humanised to the point that he describes it as producing personal xenophobic sentiment.

For respondent C the presence of xenophobia is read as a spatial issue. In the quote below, she feels that xenophobia is present in some areas of the city and not others:

You know, I've had issues in Snake Park, Doornkop and Sol Plaatje, but you know it's more of the criminal activity, but because it's locals and foreign nationals, we all say its xenophobia. But when I was in Region F we had issues there and people were placed in Jeppe Police Station and that sort of thing (respondent C, 2018).

She makes a difference between the informal settlements in Randburg where she currently works and the inner city (Region F). In the latter case, where police raids are frequently carried out, she implies that foreigners are unfairly arrested and suggests that this could be considered xenophobic. In Randburg though, where attacks are perpetrated by the people and not direct interventions by the police she considers as “more of the criminal activity”. Her comment reveals that as well as the place where the incidents occur it is also the actors (state or residents) and the type of actions

(raids or attacks) that influences her notion of whether or not there is xenophobia. In another interview, respondent F related the term xenophobia to the victims and the different spaces that they occupy in the city:

you can further discuss it to suit us to say we don't deny the fact that there's xenophobic instances on the ground, but now if you go back now to the terminology – what is xenophobia, practically, who's supposed to be affected, because trust you me, in the very same scenario, if you can check the nationalities that were affected and the type of business that they are doing, you could understand that there was no xenophobia in Soweto. It's only the Ethiopian, Bangladesh, Somalis that were affected who tend to have mushrooming spaza shops. We've got Zimbabweans who've got spaza shops, they are migrants – they were not affected. We've got Mozambicans who run spaza shops, they are migrants, they are foreigners, they are not affected (respondent F, 2018).

This respondent veers between acknowledgement and denial in once clause. It is not clear why he claims there was “no xenophobia in Soweto” although the nationalities he mentions next as targets are more prolific in the CBD where he works. Spatiality was important to the previous respondent as she linked the areas where incidents occur to the type of perpetrator - the state or the people – which determined for her the presence or otherwise of xenophobia. Respondent F, on the other hand, spatially maps nationalities and connects this to whether there is xenophobia or not. He claims that Zimbabweans and Mozambicans are not affected. Yet during the interview he referred often to the 2008 attacks when these nationalities clearly were victims. . Indeed, he justifies the existence and roll out of the Help-desk with reference to 2008:

“If you remember 2008 so called xenophobic attack it was very bad but through the Migrant Help-desk the city was able to integrate migrant communities back to... but it was not only integration process but we were able also to engage further with communities to find out what happened in the form of seminars,

dialogues, workshops and there were findings out of it that led to the existence of the MH-d going forward” (respondent F, 2018).

The fact that he prefaces “xenophobic attacks” with “so called” indicates a profound uncertainty over the term as the 2008 events have become popularly known as “xenophobic attacks” more so than any subsequent incidents. These quotations from respondent F exemplify the confusion over the term xenophobia. We can clearly see how officials are grappling with using the term xenophobia to describe real life events.

Respondent F (and others) seemed to need to use the term but at the same time wanted to downplay its relevance:

But once again the word xenophobia – it’s a very painful term - at the same time if you go somewhere somehow as an organization and say you are working on xenophobia it’s not going to be the same as if you are going to say I’m working on community challenges which is looting and that... If we were to do an anti-xenophobia workshop ...they are not going to get the majority of youth. But if you partner it with maybe skills development or job recruitment, that is going to now gain momentum (respondent F, 2018).

Here the respondent explains how he believes the ‘communities’ relate to the word xenophobia. His view is that the ‘communities’ react against the word. Starting his point with the clause “xenophobia – it’s a very painful term” adds emotional emphasis to his view that ‘communities’ feel unfairly judged by government interventions that use the word xenophobia. It is hard to determine from this quotation if the official is conflating his own confusion over xenophobia with what he ascribes to the community.

Nevertheless, according to him, in order for the Help-desk to carry out their mandate of community workshops discussing xenophobia, they need to “partner it with “community challenges” mentioning issues aimed at addressing unemployment such as “skills development or job recruitment” in order to attract the local youth to attend. He says that ‘the communities’ do not want to accept the concept of xenophobia as a motivating factor for attacks on non-national businesses but rather “challenges which

is looting and that". In other words, communities in which looting of non-national businesses occur deny that it is xenophobic but, according to this respondent, are prepared to admit to criminality within their ranks. Other respondents, even respondent SUH who had acknowledged his own xenophobic sentiments, also make a binary distinction between xenophobia and criminality:

It's not like people wake up and say today we are going to attack migrants and we're going to do xenophobia or something like that ... It will start as a protest against a municipality to say we need water, we need electricity, we need roads, we need this service delivery But in the process, when they protest, along the way, they loot the shops of the migrants, they attack them and the whole thing looks like it's xenophobia, But sometimes it's just other people, it's just a criminal act, but then they take advantage of the protests, the peaceful protest and they start attacking other people just because they want to have their stuff there, just to loot their stuff (respondent SUH, 2018).

This respondent elaborates a scenario of how criminality erupts during service delivery protests. He considers such protests as raising legitimate demands as shown by the emphasis placed through repetition of the phrase "we need...". It is as though the looting of foreign shops in the course of these protests is accidentally xenophobic: "when they protest, along the way, they loot the shops of migrants, they attack them". He acknowledges that migrants become targets, and although "it looks like xenophobia" the respondent argues that "it's just other people, it's just a criminal act". In this case the interviewee breaks down the 'community' into legitimate "peaceful" protesters who are taken advantage of by criminals in the community who "want to have their stuff, just to loot their stuff".

The intersection between service delivery protests and looting of non-national shops was raised for the third time by respondent B. While her comment can be classified in the denial category, she was the only interviewee that complicated the either criminality or xenophobia binary:

because I think people have become tired of using the word xenophobic, it's now a matter of looting, it comes down to the same thing, it's called service delivery, but service delivery is not just for the normal South African. Service delivery is for everybody. So if a simple issue like that gets sorted, I think we'll have less problems (respondent B, 2018).

Although she feels that people are tired of using the word xenophobia she understands xenophobia and looting as coming down “to the same thing” – dissatisfaction with government's failure to provide basic services which, for her, should be provided “for everybody” suggesting migrants are part of the community even if they are not the “normal South African”. This inclusive view of migrants can be contrasted to the comments made by the MMC. She also acknowledges the existence of xenophobia, but rather than seeing migrants as rights holders alongside South Africans, as respondent B does in the quote above, her concern is maximising what migrants can contribute to the city:

I think what I've always challenged our migrants on is that they need to start asking themselves, how they can contribute towards building the city, and almost feel like that is what the locals want to see and hear, because if you look at what is at the heart of xenophobia, it's this idea that people just come into the country and they take jobs, they take women, they take land, houses, and it's almost as if locals want to see people coming into the country or into the city and contributing towards its development and contributing towards the economy and towards job creation, and they don't see that happening. (respondent MMC, 2018).

As a politician from the Democratic Alliance (DA), the majority party in the Johannesburg Metro, she does not put the blame for xenophobia on local government failures. She acknowledges the existence of xenophobia and lists the common negative tropes against migrants with the repetition of what they “take” to explain why “the locals” hold xenophobic views. However, the MMC puts the onus onto the migrant to dispel these negative impressions: “they need to start asking themselves, how they can contribute towards building the city”. And she continues to speak on behalf of “the

locals” in saying that “it’s almost as if locals want to see people coming into the country or into the city and contributing...and they don’t see that happening”. She imputes an underlying positive attitude towards migration onto ‘the locals’, if only migrants were willing to make an effort to demonstrate their utility. She goes on to elaborate on what the municipality can do through the Migration Sub-Unit to deal with xenophobia:

For instance, some of the NGOs that we started working with recently, they’ve got this brilliant idea of skills transfer initiatives between locals and migrants, to counter xenophobia, and that is brilliant. Having common spaces where locals and migrants can develop together and where locals can almost benefit from migrants.

...Yes, so that is in our plans, those are the things we can do to improve on the existing policy, countering xenophobia initiatives are ongoing within the migration subunit, there’s dialogues between locals and migrants, and all kinds of other awareness initiatives that the sub-unit drives. That is something that I support (respondent MMC, 2018).

The phrase “where locals can almost benefit from migrants” shows she is not totally convinced of the line she has been elaborating regarding the beneficial aspects of migration as if she was trying to convince herself of her position whilst speaking to me. I am sure that she felt she had to acknowledge xenophobia during the interview as she knew that I had worked for a migrant rights organisation. At the same time, she had to avoid linking xenophobia to service delivery failures. She thus talked herself into believing that ‘the locals’ were intrinsically welcoming if migrants could prove their value. She goes on to promote the work of the Migration Sub-Unit, their dialogues and other “countering xenophobia initiatives”, even though the policy disavows using the phrase “anti-xenophobia”, discussed earlier, as it contains “unnecessarily negative connotations”. However, once she feels compelled to acknowledge xenophobia, she has no choice but to refer to “countering” it, trapped in the linguistic paradox created by the policy document.

Human Trafficking

The Sub-Unit Head mentioned that the officials can choose the themes for the awareness programmes that they run and I was surprised that four of them mentioned human trafficking as a priority issue for conducting awareness programmes in communities. The SUH said: “We see human trafficking growing...And we need also to do awareness programmes, just so that they will be aware”. However there is no evidence that trafficking is growing in South Africa (Yingwana *et al.*, 2019: 74). Two respondents linked trafficking with human rights:

We do engage with schools, we do. More especially on issues of human trafficking, human rights but obviously...it's national and provincial...a ... partnership thereof... (respondent F, 2018).

I know that we need to, have sensitization in terms of human trafficking and human rights education, but we don't have a strong enough support system (respondent C, 2018).

In these statements trafficking is connected to violations of human rights although it is not clear if the officials felt that migrants were the trafficked victims or perpetrators or potentially either one, or if they felt the ‘problem’ involved local migrants or cross border migrants or both. There is a danger that all human rights abuses involving mobile populations, either as victims or perpetrators, are taken as an indication of trafficking. This can lead to disallowing the agency of migrants or of sex workers in communities or, in the instance raised by respondent B, denying the agency of child migrants by believing they are necessarily trafficked:

Now that we are embarking on this training and information sharing, people are starting to realize and understand. Sometimes they say it was kidnapping, a child was kidnapped, but now they are able to with this information that we are giving them, they are able to link it to say you know, we've come across something in our community and maybe we need to investigate deeper. So I think it is more of an eye-opener now (respondent B, 2018).

The respondent says that due to their training on trafficking “with this information we are giving them, they are able to link it...to say...maybe we need to investigate deeper”. Expanding on this, she reports on the use of the word “kidnapping” by people in the training and suggests that identifying missing children as potentially trafficked, rather than kidnapped, will help people to activate a proper investigation. This is a good example of how the global prioritisation of trafficking legislation has resulted in the South African national government domesticating trafficking as a high priority for law enforcement. The police receive training in uncovering trafficking even though there is no evidence to suggest it is a priority crime and while little attention is given to police training in other high priority areas such as domestic and gender-based violence, handling cases of missing persons or indeed, xenophobic attacks.

Furthermore, although the respondent’s comments do not indicate that she is consciously advocating this strategy, she is in fact encouraging people to use the word ‘trafficking’ in order to leverage a proper investigation into a case of a missing child that otherwise would likely be ignored by the police at local level. On the one hand, this creative use of ‘trafficking’ to obtain attention from law enforcement agencies might be successful and it might also encourage people to be aware of potential child abuse. On the other hand, introducing a fear of something so generally ill-defined can create unnecessary moral panic and provide an excuse to unfairly accuse people, possibly migrants, and involve the state authorities in a punitive response.

The trafficking discourse exemplifies how the migration narrative has become entangled with concerns over criminality, illegality and morality through the conflation of sex work with trafficking (Chapkis, 2003; Palmery and De Gruchy, 2006; Yingwana, *et al.*, 2019). Sex work brings in a gendered dimension to the issue. Although children were mentioned as victims of trafficking by two respondents, women were only directly referred to by the Sub-Unit Head:

Because of poverty levels and unemployment, you see a lot of people falling prey to syndicates with the promise that they will get jobs, but at the end they either sell drugs or they are being trafficked to other countries. You see prostitution being run in those [inaudible; 25:27] and a lot of children

disappearing as well. Yes there was another guy, I think he was from Pakistan, they found kids in the boot, they were taking them to a particular house, and when they got there they found other children as well. So apparently they were going to be trafficked. It is becoming a huge problem as well. Children being trafficked, women being promised a better life and in the end, they become prostitutes, or they sell drugs (respondent SUH, 2018).

Here it is unclear if the respondent is referring to South Africans “falling prey to syndicates” run by non-nationals – such as the “guy, I think he was from Pakistan” referred to later on – or if he is referring to migrants being trafficked into the country. This is typical of the trafficking-migration discourse which creates the crime of “trafficking” but complicates who is the victim and who is the perpetrator. Trafficking also confuses a range of actions. In the last sentence of the quote, drugs and prostitution are entwined with the suspected trafficking case he refers to, through which he conflates a range of activities - drug dealing, child abduction or missing children and sex work - into the amorphous category of “trafficking”.

This respondent associated children with women as ‘innocent victims’ who fell prey to promises of a “better life” yet they ended up “prostitutes or they sell drugs”. In this respect trafficking does the work of a paternal state showing care for helpless victims. However, feminist migration scholars have alerted us to the ways that the legal concept of trafficking might appear to be victim-centred, creating sympathy for ‘innocent’ migrant women and children and the abuses they suffer, while actually serving as a “a soft glove covering a still punishing fist” (Chapkis, 2003:924).

Aggregating women and children in the context of migration, as the Sub-Unit Head does in the last sentence of the quote, leads to misunderstanding the different requirements for providing protection regimes for either category (Bhabha, 2004). Moreover, it normalises the infantilisation of women, denying agency to both women and children and extends regulatory capacity of the state over them. More fundamentally though, taking ‘women-and-children’ as a unitary vulnerable migratory group gives credibility to reactionary narratives of ‘saving’ the innocents through limiting their mobility with more restrictive migration regimes and addressing violence

against women and children in general through harsher punitive measures. (This is similar to recent calls in South Africa to bring back the death penalty or to castrate rapists as a response to femicide.).

Feminist scholars have cautioned that in the West, the narrative of saving innocents feeds ‘white saviour feminists’ who decry Third World women’s oppression due to their culture or religion, from a position of supposedly culturally neutral superiority. Third World feminist scholars have also encouraged us to situate the contemporary trafficking discourse in our history of gendered colonial practices (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Palmary and De Gruchy, 2006;).

“Children being trafficked, women being promised a better life and in the end they become prostitutes or they sell drugs”, uttered by a CoJ Migration Sub-unit manager in 2019 encapsulates present day moralism steeped in the racial and gendered history of the city. This righteous moralism is rooted in the early gold rush days of Johannesburg, when women moving into cities were equated with decadence, illegality and vice (Palmary & De Gruchy, 2006). In the racialized context of South Africa, black women in urban areas have embodied contradictions of colonial sexual morality versus capital’s requirement for labour without the cost of social reproduction. For example, the ways in which gender dynamics play out in the mix of traditional practice and colonial Christian morality; in the mobility between rural and urban contexts; and in the complex relationship with colonised black masculinity (Bonner, 1990; Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2012; also Palmary and De Gruchy, 2006).

The narrative that equates sex-work with trafficking is exemplified in the words of Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, former government Minister and Executive-Director, Embrace Dignity, an NGO working against trafficking: “We seek to abolish the system of prostitution which supplies the demand for sex work” (*Weekend Argus*, 24 August 2019). The article notes that the South African anti-trafficking legislation de-linked prostitution and trafficking, but that Embrace Dignity sees the issues as “inextricably linked” and should be dealt with together.

The officials' concern with trafficking provides another example, as with the points made in the section on integration, of how international policy discourse gains traction at national and municipal levels of government policy in the South African context and how the global trafficking discourse becomes localised in the minds of the CoJ officials. Respondent C explained that the Migration Sub-unit had received training on human trafficking from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and that they distributed IOM anti-trafficking leaflets. I collected a leaflet at the Region F office produced by the IOM Southern African Counter-Trafficking Assistance Programme. It is written in Portuguese and although I have not translated the text, the visuals only depict women. The cover picture shows a woman sobbing into her hands with her face hidden, clearly designed to be understood as a trafficking victim. Respondent C said "I work closely with Resh from IOM. And she keeps us up to date when she is in the country, on what is happening". The same respondent went on to say:

then we focus on human trafficking. That has been rife in the news at the moment and not many people in our communities understand it. I've been doing a lot of human trafficking awareness in the communities as well (respondent C, 2018).

This respondent identifies trafficking as "rife in the news at the moment" and thus she feels it is a priority area for focussing training to make sure "people in our communities understand it" based on the training and information she says the officials obtain from the IOM. Palmary and De Gruchy (2006) explore the role of the IOM and global governance in the promulgation of the South African Prevention and Combatting of Trafficking in Persons Act (TiP Act, 2013). According to these authors, the IOM positioned itself as leading on counter-trafficking in the late 1990s, driven by a post-Cold War panic over the migration of women from Eastern Europe to the West predominantly as sex workers through trans-national syndicates.

The officials enjoyed the attention given to the Migration Sub-Unit by IOM which explains their enthusiasm for holding their own trainings on trafficking as well as their conflation of various actions under the rubric of trafficking. The South Africa IOM office was established in the late 1990s and "Despite there being no South African data,

counter-trafficking was established as one of the first areas of programming for the South Africa office, around 2003” (Palmary & Gruchy, 2006: 11). They assert that the evidence produced by the IOM office of trafficking being a problem in South Africa was in fact based on repackaging existing crimes under the heading of trafficking.

The US, driven largely by the wide-spread influence of Christian fundamentalists’ anti sex-work and anti-migrant politics put pressure on countries to sign on to The Palermo Protocol (2000) which provides the international framework and accepted definition of trafficking (Sharma, 2005). South Africa signed, ratified and domesticated anti-trafficking legislation while the US promulgated its own legislation which includes an annual grading of other countries based on their actions towards combatting trafficking. It is worth noting that at the time there was no rights-based UN international migration framework as the IOM only became part of the UN system in 2016 when negotiations began on the first migration frameworks (two non-binding Global Compacts on Refugees and for Migration, 2018). The Palermo Protocol was thus developed as an addition to the existing Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. This makes explicit the link between crime, national security and migration at international level.

I am not sure if trafficking can be described as “rife in the news at the moment” as respondent C claimed, but her comment led me to look for media reporting on the issue. I found two South African media articles on trafficking in one month in 2019. The first dated 26 July is from the *Weekend Argus* (WA) and the second, 29 August, was published in the *Mail and Guardian* (M&G) on-line edition. The WA article does not give any context – a specific incident or report published – for reporting on trafficking in South Africa. It does however have a sensationalist headline: “Fear mounts as slavery, human trafficking on the rise in SA” above a photograph of a woman talking to someone in a car which is presented so that the reader understands this is a sex worker soliciting for work. The context given in the M&G article is that the US Trafficking in Persons report has been recently published in which South Africa is ranked “on the tier-two watch list for the second consecutive year”.

The WA article quotes three anti-trafficking NGOs: A21, Embrace Dignity and S-CAPE, a safe house for victims “that brings a holistic restoration to women coming out of trafficking and exploitation”. From government, the article interviews the manager of the SA National Human Trafficking Resource Line and the Hawks spokesperson for the Western Cape. The article opens with the assertion that “trafficking is a \$150billion (R2.3trillion) industry” although no source of this statistic is provided. A lot more statistics follow, such as “Only 1% of human trafficking victims are ever rescued” (A21) and “Of the 18 rescues it assisted on, 14 were for sex trafficking cases, two were for labour trafficking and one for child trafficking and one forced labour/debt bondage” (Manager of the National Trafficking Resource Line). The language of “rescue” by the NGO and the government agency reinforces the trafficking discourse of innocent victims, mainly women, forced into prostitution, in need of ‘saving’ (most likely their souls need saving as well as from their materially exploitative conditions).

S-CAPE states that 90% of residents assisted in safe houses are trafficked from within the country to other provinces and that “Nearly all trafficking cases do not include kidnapping”. This is contrary to the views of the CoJ officials quoted above who connect kidnapped children with trafficking and makes one question what information they receive from the IOM and are giving out in the training they do. Whilst the officials did not specify the migratory status of victims and perpetrators, the S-CAPE statistic de-links cross border migration from trafficking. However, the entanglement of mobility inherent in the trafficking discourse with the popular conception of drugs as an issue of transnational crime, reinforced in the M&G article, can connect migration and trafficking in people’s minds.

The M&G headline: “Trafficking and corruption, collusion nexus” argues that South Africa is stymied in its “laudable efforts” to combat trafficking due to “corruption and official complicity”. This article is an opinion piece written by a former Hawks investigator and uses the author’s PhD research to make a case that “Human trafficking and corruption metastasise and are given oxygen by a complacent response”. He quotes the 2019 US TiP report which gives reasons for returning South Africa to the tier two watch list by accusing the government of a “culture of impunity for offenders, raised concerns over victim protection and inhibit[ing] the government’s

prosecution, protection and prevention efforts". The author provides evidence to corroborate the US TiP findings: corruption from junior officials in the police and criminal justice system to the highest level of officials, politicians and foreign embassies in South Africa, linking trafficking, smuggling, prostitution, the transnational drug trade and corruption: "forced labour and brothels operate with officials' tacit support. Interviewees in my research alleged...complicity by government officials in the transnational drug trade".

Each individual case cited is damning of systemic corruption in the security machinery of the state and the collusion and impunity of the political elite. The rubric of trafficking is helpful in exposing how a range of offences intertwine through local networks combined with "political influence in high-profile investigations and prosecutions". However, in both the media articles and in the statements of respondents, 'trafficking' remains a nebulous term under which a variety of 'vices' are attached to mobility and transnational criminal activities.

Conclusion

This chapter explored my first research question on how the CoJ conceives of concepts of inclusion and mobility in policy and the imaginary of officials. I have pointed to how seemingly benign policy language such as 'integration' is in fact a loaded concept. I have similarly looked at the way xenophobia is used in CoJ policy and by the officials. In this way I have brought out the complexities inherent in discourses around our understanding of the urban population - the entity into which we are demanding the other is integrated - and how this influences how the CoJ apprehends the other. These concepts are shown to be volatile, prone to many and various interpretations. However specific views congeal through power relationships into discourses that become normalised.

The last section looks at how the indeterminate term of term of 'trafficking' embroils mobility in gendered and moralising discourses. The xenophobia and the trafficking discussions also points towards how discourses develop in and through actual practices of governance by the CoJ officials. These examples show how discourses around criminality and illegality encroach into perceptions of mobility and migration.

Thus, law enforcement becomes integral to governing migration. In this way, discursive practices can justify the use of coercive and disciplinary and caring/paternal governmental techniques. The next chapter addresses my second research question, focusing on how the officials talk about their jobs to reveal how governmentalities operate in practice.

CHAPTER FOUR: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

Introduction

Chapter four relates to my second sub-question: How do the relevant officials describe their experiences of the conception and implementation of the Migrant Help-desk? I have grouped together findings associated with the administration of the policy and how the officials perceive their everyday work under the themes of consultations with stakeholders; administration and organization; and policing. Whereas the previous chapter analysed themes that came out of the interviews and policy documents, this chapter is more descriptive. I focus here on presenting the organizational and bureaucratic aspects of the Help-desk and analyse how the implementing officials talk about their jobs. I foreground the voices of the officials and what areas of their work they highlighted in order to consider the Migrant Help-desk as a workplace as well as the point at which policy is implemented. This chapter refers back to literature on network governance, managerialism (NPM), and my discussion on governmentality to reflect on how the everyday actions of bureaucrats support, resist or merely frustrate the policy vision of in/exclusion.

The first section draws attention to how government officials execute policy based on consultation with other government departments and civil society stakeholders. The second section looks at the different physical locations of Help-desk offices in different regions of the city and how this affects client access. The officials talk about various aspects of their day to day work, what they enjoy and are frustrated with in their jobs. In the third section entitled the experiences of the officials alongside policy and media reportage of politicians to draw attention to the regulatory, disciplinary and coercive aspects of how the CoJ imagines and performs its function of ‘managing’ migration.

Consultations and Stakeholders

DHA White Paper stakeholder consultation

At national level, the White Paper emphasizes what it calls a “whole-of-government and whole-of-society” policy approach (WP, 2017: 6). The document states that this is

the “bedrock” for the new international migration policy. As previously discussed, since gaining popularity in the UK and the US under the pro-market, anti-state leadership of Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan respectively, the governance strategy of national government devolving responsibilities to local level government and groups of citizens has become accepted practice. On the one hand this approach seems inclusive, and the White Paper makes a case for migration management going beyond the scope of DHA, recognizing that other government departments have a role to play and that local government and the citizenry are where tensions or integration play out. On the other hand, this “whole of society” approach can be read as DHA abdicating responsibility for one of its core functions by making migration management everybody’s business and coopting local government and the citizenry into ‘managing’ (in other words ‘policing’) those labelled ‘migrant’.

The CoJ officials did not seem to have had any input into the DHA Green/White Paper policy process. Respondent B said that they “stumbled across a lot of discussion the Department of Home Affairs would have, the White Paper and the Green Paper and stuff like that...so if you don’t know these things that’s happening on the ground, by making them a policy, just by taking things from the air, it doesn’t help. It frustrates people all round, right through”. In this quotation she makes clear that there was no attempt made by DHA to include Sub-Unit officials below management level in policy discussions. She went on to say: “Which is things they are not communicating with us, and then you’ll find at that level there is a change made, but provincial they don’t know about it, and we as local we don’t know about it, and that causes tension.” This comment conveys frustration with the gap between policy decisions made at national level and implementation at both provincial and local levels.

At management level, the Head of the Sub-Unit mentioned that the CoJ attended one DHA White Paper consultation:

“There was no coordinated effort from the city to come up with any input, we participated in the process of consultation when Home Affairs came, we went there to listen and get the views of other people, but we did not make any input as a city”.

He was critical of the consultative process both from the side of the city and DHA when stating that “there was no coordinated effort from the city to come with any input” and also that they “went there to listen and get the views of other people. He emphasizes again that “we did not make any input as a city” which seems to be a big frustration from the Sub-Unit Head. However, he did not indicate if there was any attempt made to propose a municipal-wide discussion on the White Paper.

The Sub-Unit Head suggests, without directly saying so, that innovation around policy discussion is constrained by the governmental hierarchy so that consultation at lower levels and other CoJ departments would have to come from the Mayor’s office: “so I guess at a higher level, they must be interacting, because the Mayor, the Minister of Home Affairs, the DG of Home Affairs and there are interactions between the two”. The phrase “I guess” contains resignation that the process was kept at the top level of bureaucrats and politicians. However, it also tries to indicate some trust that the political principles of the City and DHA had a continued engagement on the White Paper policy process. It is the kind of turn of phrase used by government officials to indicate a major criticism of the bureaucratic hierarchy, whilst simultaneously trying to defend it, through adopting an assumption of certainty that processes must have taken place higher up.

In contrast, to the SUH’s confidence that the ‘higher ups’ were consulting the MMC said:

It’s almost as if in drafting of policy there was no consultation across different sectors so there’s agreements on an approach that can work, and as a result there are these policies that are not being implemented because as soon as you start, a department will complain, you’re killing our industry, so nobody does anything. There is a bit of paralysis with regards to migration in the country (respondent MMC, 2018).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the MMC is from the DA. In the interview she consistently followed the DA line of blaming DHA for all migration challenges from national to local levels. What is worth noting here is that the other respondents

(who are not aligned with the DA) corroborate her criticism of DHA for lack of policy consultation. The White Paper itself states that its content “is based on desktop research, interviews and discussions with internal and external stakeholders”. Under the heading of Stakeholder Consultations, six consultative interventions are listed, only one of which was “an intergovernmental workshop with officials from all spheres of government”, which possibly included local government. According to the White Paper, this workshop deliberated on the key policy proposals” (WP Abr., 2017: 10). This possibly refers to the consultation mentioned by the Sub-Unit Head at which, in his view, “they went there to listen...but not make any input as a city”.

The language of the White Paper seems to be at odds with what the CoJ politician and officials experienced. Thus the governance discourse of ‘consultation with stakeholders’ does not seem to have translated into a meaningful interaction on the new policy proposals contained in the White Paper. I would describe this as a discursive “tactic of government” (Foucault, 2003: 245). This device is employed frequently by the ANC national government to give the impression of a holistic approach to policy making. The six examples given in the White Paper of their stakeholder consultations appear in the document to substantiate the claim that they take the input of stakeholders seriously. Yet from what the officials said, the way in which consultations are constructed constrain the less powerful stakeholders, in this case local government. The same pattern was evident with the CoJ stakeholder forums, where in this case it is the CoJ that holds the power over civil society actors.

CoJ Stakeholders and Forums

The CoJ policy describes itself as a “multi-sector and multi-stakeholder integrated programme for management of migration in the City” (PMM, 2013: 3). The word ‘stakeholder’ gained currency in the UK under Prime Minister Tony Blair’s leadership and epitomizes the ‘third way’ politics he pursued (Rose, 2004; Morrison, 2018). Continuing the policies of devolving national government powers, the term speaks to ‘network governance’ in which a range of non-governmental groups and organisations are given some kind of role and input into government decisions. ‘Stakeholders’ has become a frequently used term in the CoJ migration policy discourse. In the context of migration, the term ‘stakeholder’ is useful as it neutralizes citizenship as a

prerequisite for participation. However, on the downside, the term flattens power relations as it includes in its purview business, migrant groups, NGOs and others, all of whom carry relative levels of resources and authority.

The same policy document goes on to state that the programme “will have a number of implementing and executing agencies because of its multi-sectoral nature” (PMM, 2013: 3). The ‘executing agencies’ are envisaged to be NGOs working in the city as elaborated in one of the four Policy Objectives in the PIM: “To develop critical partnerships with civil society organisations in city-level migrant management and integration efforts both as service delivery partners and informants in consultative bodies” (PIM, 2011: 16). The wording here indicates the more neo-liberal governance tenor of this document, which has previously been discussed. The policy envisages civil society as “service delivery partners” indicating the current governance trend of outsourcing service provision to non-governmental role players. The term “civil society” could include the private sector and more often does so at national level. BOSASA, a business consortium, was appointed by DHA to provide services to the Gauteng deportation centre, Lindela. The Zondo Commission into the state capture scandal revealed that they received government funds to provide health and catering at Lindela but that the delivery of these services has been minimal to non-existent (Mail and Guardian, 11 December, 2019).

However, in the minds of provincial and local government, including my respondents, civil society is understood as NGOs. The ‘Esidimeni’ scandal (Dhai, 2018) exemplifies how provincial outsourcing of residential care services to NGOs led to non-provision of those services and, in this case, directly led to the death of service users. Esidimeni notwithstanding, the popularity of NGO stakeholders providing direct services for migrants is a convenient way for local government to obtain outside funding in order to operationalise another of the PIM objectives: “To develop and implement specific programmes and/or administrative regimes to effectively combat intolerance of migrants and xenophobic perceptions of social resource competition / cultural non-compatibility through Socio-cultural integration initiatives” (PIM, 2011: 16). These programmes are the workshops that the Sub-Unit has in its action plan and that the officials implement in their individual performance agreements.

Initially the City did provide financial resources for NGOs to undertake some of the activities in its plan, such as organizing migrant groups and South Africans to participate in sports events and community celebrations. Naturally this led to jealousies amongst those NGOs and community groups that were invited to be put on the CoJ vendor system and those that felt excluded. Even amongst those that managed to get onto the vendor system, there were additional tensions in this relationship, as I experienced working for CoRMSA. NGO providers were unable to deviate from the CoJ activity plan although they had not been consulted on the planned activities. CoRMSA was approached to obtain some funding and negotiated the contract so that we could also pass some of the funding on to migrant community group members of our NGO to do part of the activities, but we were constrained by the programmes already identified by the Sub-Unit.

In addition to an envisaged role as service providers, the PIM policy document describes civil society's role as "informants in consultative bodies" (2011: 16). This is an odd turn of phrase in the South African context as it is reminiscent of the Apartheid government's use of informers, known as *impimpis*, in their war against the liberation movements. Nevertheless, the main CoJ "consultative bodies" for engagement with migration stakeholders are the previously mentioned fora: JMAP (established 2008) and JMAC (established in 2009). The former brings together non-governmental role players whilst the latter, chaired by the Executive Mayor, includes representatives from government departments.

Five of the six respondents referred to JMAP/JMAC, all of them expressing the view that over the last few years these structures had become dysfunctional but that the Sub-Unit was in the process of trying to revive them. Two respondents put the blame on the DA administration: "I think, especially with the new administration, since the saying of all undocumented migrants must go back, it had a huge impact on us. Very, very big. Even that impact is heavy on the JMAP" (respondent B). This respondent was the only one who felt that the DA Mayor's obsession with cleaning the city of "illegal" migrants was impacting directly on their work and clearly felt strongly about it by stressing it had a "huge" and "very, very big" impact. The above statement was

made to explain the declining numbers coming to her office for assistance. But in this quotation, she also states that the DA Mayor's emphasis on removing "illegal" migrants from the city is impacting NGOs and community groups participating in JMAP.

Respondent A also cited the DA administration as a factor in the collapse of JMAC:

When it comes to that, especially towards JMAC, we didn't receive a lot of support from the new administration. Since we had a new administration, I don't remember sitting at JMAC (respondent A, 2018).

Here the reason given for the decline of JMAC is the lack of political will on the part of the Mayor to convene JMAC which has not sat since the DA took control of the city. The MMC explained the collapse of JMAP thus: "But ever since we started, JMAP has not been able to function optimally because initially it was politics, some of the organisations were politically aligned to the previous administration, and so they did not want to work with the current administration." Unlike the two officials, she puts the fault onto the attachment of some civil society non-migrant organisations to the ANC.

The question of the municipality stopping funding for NGOs was mentioned by three of the respondents as a reason for the lack of participation of these organisations in the stakeholder forums. For example, respondent F said: "So now organisations used to receive funding from the CoJ. So that was a pull factor for organisations to come and work with us. But as the time goes by, when that funding was no longer there then organisations start now distancing themselves" (respondent F, 2018). The SUH said: "A lot of them came with the wrong perception that they would get funding, and when that funding doesn't come they pull out". In these quotations the respondents explain the decline in participation at JMAP by NGOs because there was no longer any possibility of obtaining funding.

Respondent B considers the funding issue from the NGO perspective and looks at the make-up of JMAP in terms of "foreign" and local NGOS, suggesting: "There's three local organisations and maybe two foreign organisations, they need to come together and work as one, so that whatever they do together, if there is funding available, it

needs to assist all of them” (respondent B, 2018). This respondent is less cynical about NGOs working with CoJ purely due to funding enticements and presents a ‘solution’ to lack of resources by attempting to pool together, similar to what CoRMSA attempted.

Government budgets indicate the commitment of politicians to policies. Respondent F felt that CoJ is not sufficiently budgeting internally to fulfil its own mandate on migration. The Sub-Unit Head also refers to internal budget reduction by the new administration: “with the city also, because of the constraint on resources, budgetary constraints, somehow could not fund the activities of JMAP, to the level of where we used to see it happening”. The question of fulfilling the mandate of stakeholder consultation forums brought up questions of funding both for NGO participants and for the migration programme within CoJ.

As shown above, some officials felt that NGOs will only operate when money is offered whilst others had an understanding that NGOs have little resources. Others felt that the political will to continue stakeholder consultation had diminished with the DA administration as it was not budgeting for the CoJ part in the process. This highlights a fundamental contradiction in the ‘stakeholder governance’ discourse. National government (in the WP) and CoJ in its migration policy documents can premise their policy on ‘consultative’ governance but cannot implement it without the support from non-governmental actors. Finance, or more precisely the hope that funding is available, is one way of enticing civil society. Not only does this require government to be fully resourcing its own side, but it also begs the question that if government funds non-governmental actors, how do those actors retain independence from government? Government funding civil society to operate as an implementer of government policies exemplifies Foucault’s (2008) contention that civil society is not outside of, but implicated within governing power relations.

As well as funding and budgeting, a number of respondents cited tensions amongst civil society organisations as a reason for the breakdown of JMAP/JMAC. Three areas were highlighted. Firstly, tensions between ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ organisations, secondly tensions between nationalities of the ‘foreign’ organisations over positions on the

committee and thirdly tensions between asylum seekers, refugees and other categories of migrants. The Sub-Unit Head said that there are more 'foreign' than local organisations participating, but that the current Chair is from a South African group: "It is a mixture but mostly it is the migrant groups. We have a few South African NGOs that participate. The chairperson himself is from a South African NGO that deals with migration issues. We do have participation from both local and migrant...I think, like I said, the particular issue is a lot of migration NGOs feel that there should not be a South African heading this, there should be a migrant heading this".

Respondent B felt that the role of the officials was to ensure that local groups don't dominate: "Then in that sense, that's where I'm supposed to come in as a coordinator, I am supposed to, as an administrator, I should ensure that things are being done properly. That the local does not undermine the foreign organization in ensuring that they are being treated properly". This respondent's concern is to ensure that migrants are not undermined by local groups. She supports Rhodes (1997) contention that the role of government has become one of steering governance networks as well as trying to be an even handed referee.

The Sub-Unit Head raised the issue of power struggles due to migrant groups focusing only on issues affecting their own communities:

Some of those challenges relate to, people not having a genuine agenda, and coming with their own agenda, and somehow it is just a power struggle, that you know they see, for example the president or chairperson of JMAP is from Zimbabwe, then his focus will be on Zimbabweans, and neglect the other people. And there's a struggle between other members, who feel they are being left out and not being catered for, and they will withdraw (respondent SUH, 2018).

The nationality of the Chair as a source of tension was also raised by respondent F: "If the Chairperson is Zimbabwean we are likely to deal with Zimbabwean issues only, hence these other issues of migration that need to be looked in to." This speaks to the difficulties of sustaining and growing migrant organisations in the city. Mostly

communities of one or other nationality have come together informally to raise up immediate issues of practical need. There have been efforts by some of these groups to create broader organisations representing migrants from different countries, as well as asylum seekers, refugees and others (Polzer & Segatti, 2011: 201). But apart from the time and resources required, very often the concerns are so personally felt, and people are so traumatized, precarious and desperate that they are not in a position to develop more sophisticated structures. While on paper, the stakeholder committees offers migrants the opportunity to participate in municipal structures, in reality the heterogeneous make-up of Johannesburg's migrants coupled with their organizational challenges, results in them being migrants disadvantaged in term of their representation in political decision-making fora.

Respondent F commented:

When organisations sit on JMAP they start criticizing each other but once again I think the approach, the interest, because if you look at migration you've got organisations that focus on asylum seekers and refugees only...because now we'll have somebody who is the Chairman of JMAP with that mentality or who is a refugee who is now content with this once aspect and who is now going to overlook other issues of migrants (respondent F, 2018).

This concern speaks to issues of documentation and categorization of migrants. It raises the broader question of who the municipality considers to be a 'stakeholder'. The shift in policy from the more generous attitude toward the undocumented (LRMP, 2007) to less inclusive language in the PIM, 2011 which I return to in the next chapter, exemplifies a conundrum in 'stakeholder governance' of migration in Johannesburg. Can a person deemed 'illegitimate' by the state occupy a legitimate space within a stakeholder forum established by the state? Yet this is what the CoJ policy demands. In this sense "subjects are locked into circuits of control through the multiplication of sites where the exercise of freedom requires proof of legitimate identity" (Rose, 2004: 240).

Respondent F goes on to examine the same issue, this time from their own perspective, rather than their perception of how the migrant organisations view the forum as in the quotation above. He acknowledges that the role of the officials should be to administer the forum whereas, due to the issues of participation and tensions amongst the non-governmental role players, they end up leading instead of listening:

Yes, currently I can say JMAP have collapsed. Whoever that is there or whoever sits there we are trying to revive JMAP. But the challenge that we are having... remember the role of the city in JMAP is administration...it needs strong leadership from the organization side. But the unfortunate part is that, at the end of the day, we find ourselves behaving like organisations in reviving JMAP because no organization that seems to be saying we want to take ownership of this platform that the city has given us. Because JMAP is a platform that the city has given organisations to say come forward with whatever serves as a challenge on migration and see how best we can channel it to the relevant department, to the relevant office. (respondent F, 2018).

The problem with JMAP identified here is lack of participation and leadership from organisations. The quote does not specify if it is the number of migrant groups or others that have dwindled but tellingly the respondent says that JMAP is a platform “given” by the city to “organisations” to raise their challenges. The use of the word “given” implies that the stakeholders are not equal partners with government. The organisations are recipients of the platform yet they are supposed to take ownership and “lead”. The platform is supposed to enable organisations to be “informants” – letting government know what the challenges are on the ground – so that appropriate action can be taken. As it is, with the organisations taking a passive role, the official feels that government is forced to act like a civil society group. In effect, the entire premise of the stakeholder forum has been undermined by the refusal of organisations to take charge. In this situation the government has no intelligence from informants on which to act and could just as easily have made their own decisions without consulting anyone.

The example above demonstrates a fundamental contradiction of stakeholder governance. While purporting to be an inclusive mode of governance, 'giving' power over to civil society and insisting on non-governmental actors taking the lead, the CoJ migration policy objective of stakeholder governance actually veils underlying relationships of power. Foucault states: "The fundamental point of anchorage of the relationships, even if they are embodied and crystalised in an institution, is to be found outside of the institution (Foucault, cited in Rabinow & Rose, 2003: 140). Network governance masks the power that the participants bring into the forum. As noted above, migrant groups are at a relative disadvantage. Government carries the most power, but the policy envisages that this is given over to civil society to lead the network. When civil society refuses to take ownership of the forum, it frustrates the officials and creates uncertainty for them on how to implement the policy prescripts.

Administration and Organisation

Bureaucrats in offices

The officials tended to respond that they enjoyed working on the Help-desk. Of course, they were biased towards being defensive towards their job positions and their unit and were most likely responding with what they thought I wanted to hear. However, two of the three that directly answered this question also expressed frustration with recognition of their work and under appreciation from CoJ. Respondent A gave only a positive response: "In terms of our job, I think it's good, but again, it depends on an individual, because, I have got passion with what I am doing, and I don't become happy if you come to my office and you go out with the same stress. It doesn't suit me well. This official was the only one that I observed with a client who he told me later was a woman from Somalia and his personality and the interaction I witnessed fitted with his following comment: "So I really want to see you smiling when you leave my office. Irrespective of whether you get help or what, but when you smile, not because I said a joke, but because of what I said to you and that will assist you".

This respondent's office was in a dusty but well-maintained complex of municipal buildings in Midrand, Region A, next to a busy clinic and close to other municipal services. Numbers of people were queueing to attend the clinic (at least there were chairs provided) or hanging out around the office. Others were walking up the hill from

informal settlements to the municipal buildings that ranged along a paved road on a ridge leading towards a suburban neighbourhood. There was a sense that the Help-desk office, although it was a small unsigned room in the clinic complex, was part of a municipal hub that was well used by formal and informal residents of the area and that the official was well known and popular. This contrasted with the Help-desk office in Region C.

The Region C office was located on an upstairs floor of a municipal building that looked like it had been built to serve a formerly white suburban population prior to 1994. I asked respondent C if clients came to her office as it seemed difficult to find and there was no signage at the building entrance to indicate its presence. She said that people did not come to her office but that she went out to various areas. She liked this arrangement, calling it “free range”, and also cited the freedom to organise your own work and the lack of numerical targets as reasons she enjoyed her job: “We are very free. Yes, exactly, according to your dynamics and your region, the people that you work with, the areas that you work with, we even have dialogues under a tree, we don’t have a venue in certain areas. It’s very lenient or relaxed most of the time – that’s what I enjoy”.

However respondent C then went on to say that on the downside, she felt taken advantage of:

I make sure that I do my job to the best of my ability and because of that I’ve been taken for granted...you wake up and you say I just don’t feel like going to work today, because I’m not appreciated internally. But then you think of the community and the work that you are doing for them and you feel appreciated, and they acknowledge it, they want you to do more. And it’s because you wake up because of them, basically (respondent C, 2018).

In this quotation her job satisfaction is based on who appreciates her and on bad days she is revived by feeling appreciated by “the community” though not by CoJ, her employer. The respondent’s frustration from feeling taken advantage of was corroborated by respondent F, who also started off by saying they liked their work:

I do. I do enjoy my job and it's just that somewhere somehow the challenges somewhere somehow demotivate me. The manner in which it's structured – we still have got challenges with position gaps. Because the job that I'm doing is more of a manager. I'm managing the whole region on migration issues. I must go out, do the outreach, come back, write the reports, do everything – I don't have a person within admin for me (respondent F, 2018).

This respondent was based in Region F, the central office of the Migrant Help-desk in the Johannesburg CBD. The building is designed to be a drop-in centre, well signposted outside and providing a large reception/meeting area with posters on the wall from various government departments and NGOs, such as IOM. However, nobody entered the centre in the three hours I was there on a regular weekday morning. The official reluctantly acknowledged that the numbers of people using the centre had gone down since its inception so that he had to “do the outreach”. This official, and one other, expressed frustration over the limited possibility for job advancement within the MH-d structure as there was only one promotional position, that of the SUH: “I’ll be forever a coordinator looking at the structure because Mr S is the unit head and then us. So, if you project yourself, it can’t be all of us that we want to take that position you understand”. Both respondents C and F felt that for career advancement they would have to look for a position in another CoJ department and leave the MH-d which they didn’t want to do.

Respondent F said:

“Remember, working for government it sometimes condemns our mind in a way, we become comfortable in the comfort zone. It's difficult to leave. So we end up saying just because I've got a job and even in 10 years-time I've got a job so let me just keep on adapting to the yearly increase even if it's just R1000 that changes every year, it doesn't matter [laughter] you get used to it.”

Probing into the officials' feelings about their jobs foregrounded a common complaint among civil servants. Even when the officials enjoyed their substance of the work they

did and believed themselves to be providing a much-needed service, they became “comfortable in the comfort zone”, resigned to the lack of career structure and their lack of power to influence the course of their work. Examples of their forbearance are given in the earlier quotations regarding their lack of input into policy-making and below regarding coordination with other outreach programmes in their regions and subsequent follow-ups.

Coordination within Social Development department

The respondents said the entire Migration Sub-Unit meet together once every two weeks and they felt this was sufficient to sustain collegiality and share information. However, formal meetings beyond their Sub-Unit did not seem to take place other than an annual planning session with all three Sub-Units. The Sub-Unit Head explained the scope of the work of the regional coordinators in addition to dealing with individual cases:

Yeah, they've got some kind of a job description/mandate to run the programmes, so it will be like all the regions, they will operate the same way. But they choose where to do the programmes, they choose their own stakeholders, they determine their initiatives and topics - whether they want to highlight human rights issues, whether they want to highlight social cohesion issues, whether they want to highlight anti-xenophobic issues - they decide. And then each region must host an event, at least in a quarter (respondent SUH, 2018).

He said that the Sub-Unit had its own budget, but all of the officials mentioned budgetary constraints as a challenge. The SUH acknowledged that they were not well resourced but that the regional coordinators “try their utmost to perform within the circumstance”. The officials liked the fact that they could determine their own outreach programmes. Each region of the city has a regional manager and it seems that the respondents try to connect with other units within the social development department through their regional structures in order to develop community contacts.

Respondents A and B said they worked with the adjacent clinics to access clients:

Yes, it is just me from the Help-desk and I've got a clinic next door, they will refer their clients, especially those who are undocumented, to me. It is a bit of a challenge for them to go from one office to another because they are still scared of being arrested and deported, that is the issue, but if one goes out to where they stay, they come in numbers to get information (respondent A, 2018).

This official, based in Region A, felt that the referral from the clinic to the Help-desk was in itself an obstacle for clients who are undocumented and that going out into the neighbourhoods enabled them to reach more people. Respondent B found that in her area she used the queues for the next-door clinic as a way of distributing information to people:

I arrange with the clinic, and then I have certain days that I go, and remember they go as the queue goes, so I would like do my introduction, and talking, and doing some intakes from people who had issues on what I've raised ... when I see that grouping is almost finished, then I will start all over again with the newcomers coming in there. And that is how I do it (respondent B, 2018).

In her words: "Yes, what I do is I believe in if Mohammed doesn't come to the mountain, the mountain must come to Mohammed" referring to the same difficulty of people coming directly to see her in her office.

Respondent C said she worked closely with Children's Services in her region, one of the three Sub Units in the department of Social Development. However she expressed that it was not easy as the Children's Services officials had a negative attitude towards programmes specifically aimed at migrants: "So children services deals with all children, migrants and locals, but we don't have the proper link to say 'can you focus on the migrant children a little bit'?...Even the practitioners, they themselves are not willing to, they just say 'no, we don't want to, we're not interested in that sort of information' so I think it's challenging".

Respondent B suggested that the officials in the other Sub-Units needed to be better informed about migration so that they would be willing to collaborate with the Migration Sub-Unit in joint community outreach: “So, it’s also some internal education or sensitization that we need to do, to say “I’m doing migration to focus on the foreign national children, so can I come in and work with your practitioners relating to foreign national children”. Previous sections have noted how the officials feel that there is no coordination or cooperation between levels of government on migration issues.

Whilst the various respondents seem to have developed their own connections with other social development structures, this comment belies a low level of coordination and collaboration even between the three Sub-Units in one CoJ department. The words this respondent puts into the mouth of her sister-Sub Unit officials: “no, we don’t want to, we’re not invested in that sort of information” reflects a similar concern raised by respondent F:

“Because part of the challenges was to have the Migrant Help-desk that says it deals with migrant issues and you go that side and you have a front-line officer who mistreats migrants so there was a contradiction”.

This speaks to how prejudicial attitudes at the root of systemic xenophobia plays into micro level turf wars between local government structures even when one of the Sub-Units is specifically focused on migration in the city. However respondent A noted that health service front line staff treat everyone badly: “Almost everyone is ill-treated at the public hospitals. I would say they would have a certain attitude towards them [migrants], but they’ve got an attitude to everyone, if we have to mention it.” This respondent went on to say that although health service staff have a bad attitude in general, they had a particular attitude towards “them”. Respondent F said that in the beginning of the Help-desk “we used to have front-line staff workshops where we were educating city officials about the existence of migrants in Joburg”. From the comments above, it seems that this is no longer the case and the impact of the Migration Sub-Unit at the level of front-line municipal officials appears to be very weak.

Outreach versus in-take

The officials defended their outreach programmes as seemingly the most useful aspect of their work. Possibly they were also invested in these programmes as they had more control over completion of the target number than on how many individual clients they were able to assist. This made for a realisable key performance indicator in their performance management system. I was able to get the 2018 statistics from the Sub-Unit (APPENDIX II). The total number of 'intakes' across all the regional offices was 499 between July 2017 and June 2018. The SUH informed that: Those that come here to our Desk, they will fill out the intake form and we will record that. So in each region, we will know how many people came to the Desk using the intake form. That is how we determined the numbers have gone down". He explained this decline was due to people thinking "we are just a referral body, and sometimes it is just a waste of time. But some feel they can still use our advice because we give information and so they still come and get the information and sometimes we connect them with the relevant service providers".

Respondent C went further in expressing frustration over the Help-desk only providing advice and referrals to other agencies:

I think firstly it shouldn't be called a Migrant Help-desk, when you say Help-desk, how are you able to help? If someone comes here and they don't have food, can you give them a meal? No you can't. Somebody has a challenge with documents, can you help them? No we cannot. So I would say it should be a Migration Information Desk, or that for me was the first thing that I would change (respondent C, 2018).

Respondent F also mentioned food and documentation as well as assistance with burials as the issues raised up most by clients and the fact that not only can the Help-desk, nor other government departments assist, but most NGOs that they work with also don't provide direct assistance in these matters. Even without target numbers to meet, trying to quantify successful outcomes in these individual cases might therefore cause the Sub-Unit to appear to be under-performing and this, as the SUH mentioned, results in budgetary reduction.

There was no annual target for intakes but the target for dialogues “targeting high risk areas was 48 – and 48 were recorded to have taken place. The “high risk areas” were not specified. It was also not clear if the themes of these dialogues related to the next heading of “New key interventions” under which four themes were listed, each with a target of four. Focus on Local Migration exceeded its target, achieving seven; Labour issues focusing on exploitation only achieved three, Human Trafficking exceeded its target, achieving five and Marriages of Convenience met the target of four. None of these statistics were broken down by region. These were the only Help-desk figures I was able to track down and they notably contain no attempt to measure satisfaction of clients under “intake” or impact of outreach programmes (APPENDIX II).

Respondent F felt that their programmes lacked follow up. He said that they undertake an informational workshop but do not have the chance to address the issues that are raised:

If I go to a certain community and engage with them in the form of dialogue, they will raise issues and those issues **need** to be taken into consideration. So if issues were issues that are economic development based, come the next financial year I must come with the approach of the economic development in addressing the issues that are raised but you find that no, now I divert, that’s why I end up not going to the very same communities because I’ve got pending issues (respondent F, 2018).

By saying that he avoids going back to the same communities because of “pending issues” he is implying that their workshops have a very superficial impact. Indeed, they may have a detrimental effect if there is no follow-up and he wanted to avoid returning to the same group of people as he would not be able to meet expectations he had previously raised.

Respondent F goes on to identify this as a quantitative rather than qualitative approach:

The scorecard says you are supposed to do 10 dialogues again and what is the content of those dialogues? The aim of the dialogue is to find out what are the challenges and when the challenges are raised... so we end up doing a quantitative kind of a sessions rather than a qualitative because qualitative you go and assess you come up with the action plan based on the findings you address them one by one (respondent F, 2018).

The scorecard targets are reflected in the statistics I obtained and relate to the performance management system of each official. He goes on to explain:

My interpretations of the workshop is if we have done 20 dialogues maybe as a unit write reports, now we need to go to the section that talks to challenges and recommendations – we consolidate them, like city wide and come up to say out of these findings – because it will give us the next activities that need to be done for the following year – but this is the unfortunate part that come the next financial year we receive a scorecard as per somebody's....[laughter] you understand? And as I'm saying we are not part of those scorecard developers to say this is what is going to happen. But I know for a fact that our work said to be aligned with the IDP we work according to the IDP (respondent F, 2018).

After a strong critique of the dialogues he pulls back by reassuring (himself and/or me) that even if the senior managers make changes every year that don't allow for really tackling the issues on the ground, their decisions are in line with the IDP of the municipality. The implication is that senior management must know what they are doing and that the work of the Help-desk must be playing a role in the bigger picture of the CoJ. He thus does not allow himself to feel his work is totally in vain even though he is very critical of the way that the regional coordinators are not consulted in developing the scorecards.

Servicing the dead

The officials noted above had criticisms of the score-card and meeting quantitative targets for dialogues whilst not being able to deal in depth with issues raised by people during the dialogues. Not having quantitative targets for individual cases was

welcomed by other respondents such as this comment from respondent C: “And we don’t have numbers, I think that’s what’s different. For example, our children’s services need to reach 500 [inaudible] so we don’t have targets...That’s the best part, that makes you more relaxed and you enjoy it. You’re free range”.

However, they were torn between wanting to see an issue through with a client and the need to refer to other departments where they were unsure that assistance would be provided. Three respondents mentioned their job satisfaction came from resolving individual issues for clients as in this comment from respondent B: “It’s very rare that I would leave a client to go and do whatever on their own, and I always make sure I take a contact detail and I do a follow up, constantly”. This official went on to say: “So I must say, I’ve had for this last financial year, 2017/18, I had in total seven successful cases”. This was the only official that listed a number of completed individual cases. As previously mentioned, the statistics of 499 “intakes” in the same financial year is not disaggregated into what the issues were or whether or not they were resolved.

Respondent B outlined the issues involved in her total of seven successful cases: “One was access to school, one was access to health, I had a burial – two, where I actually got the community, we couldn’t repatriate, so the community buried the people themselves, so that just shows you the inclusivity of the community. And there was two documentations, and I had a rehabilitation too”. The respondent notes the “inclusivity of the community” in respect to the burials but did not elaborate on the extent to which these funerals were assisted by South Africans or fellow non-nationals as she mentioned both the deceased were Zimbabweans. The issue of burials came up with respondent C:

I had a case two weeks ago of a one-and-a-half-month-old baby who passed on. Both of the parents are foreigners and the baby was born here. And the baby was lying in the morgue for two and a half weeks before the case was brought to us and they didn’t have R900 for the burial site, and I stepped in and we had to provide assistance in terms of getting this baby buried. So it’s things like this that are quite emotionally draining (respondent C, 2018).

In all the cases of migrant deaths, the officials had to raise funds from “the community” to assist with burying the person. Official C went on to inform that she had resorted to collecting from her own family and friends in order to resolve the burial for the baby as there was no other option available.

Burial was mentioned as a common problem raised by clients and three instances were mentioned in the interviews regarding administering death. The question of repatriation of mortal remains features heavily amongst migrant communities in the city and I have encountered many anecdotal stories from non-nationals about the difficulties involved in finding resources to release bodies from morgues and make repatriation or burial arrangements. Respondent C said:

I think the challenge for the city is that, for me personally, the issue of social burials, in terms of foreign nationals, has been very challenging for me. And the city does not offer this to migrants. So I’m hoping that on a higher level this can be addressed and hopefully something can be done. Because a lot of foreign nationals have been challenges, and the embassies don’t want to help, and there’s not a lot of organizations that can help, and then we end up doing fundraising. And even fundraising is difficult because times are hard nowadays and not many people will say yes we have money to help the family (respondent C, 2018).

This respondent states that “even the embassies don’t want to help” although she did not elaborate on how she knows this to be true as very often people on asylum seeker or refugee documentation are justifiably reluctant to approach the embassies of their country of origin. In fact, newly promulgated amendments to the Refugee Act (December 2019) prohibit asylum seekers and refugees from requesting assistance from the governments of their home countries. There is a complete absence in the CoJ, DHA or other government policy on issues of migrant death. This can be read as an ultimate form of exclusion and dehumanisation which will be elaborated in the final chapter. It also relates to the question of statistics, a current preoccupation of the CoJ and the political parties in municipal and national leadership.

Policing

Managing numbers

The PIM introduces two concepts into the municipal migration policy that form the “Main areas of Action”. Both are concerned with surveying and enumerating the fluid population of the city. The first is listed as “Reception and tracking for New Arrivals” and the second is “Developing comprehensive Information Management Systems for Dissemination of Information and Data Gathering (PIM, 2011: 18). Under the first heading the “Migrant Help-desk” is listed along with a “Language Centre”, “Orientation Programme for new arrivals”, “Education Programme targeting locals” and “Participation”. Thus we see in this policy document how some existing mechanisms such as the Help-desk and programmes for integration through language learning, have become incorporated into a discourse of “tracking” the migrant population rather than as programmes based on welcoming and assisting incomers.

The second action area contains one item: “a reliable comprehensive database”. The document states that this “needs to be developed in the city over a period of five years. The data base would include everyone who lives in Joburg and would be updated on quarterly basis” (PIM, 2011: 19). The MMC stated in her interview: “To be able to govern, you need a good sense of your population for instance, also your population informs your budget that you receive to be able to render services”. Her statement and the notion of a database of residents envisaged in the PIM appear to be based on a common sense understanding that the government can only provide adequate services on the basis of counting those in need within their territorial jurisdiction. As Rose (2004: 198) says, “numbers redraw the boundaries between politics and objectivity by purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making judgements, prioritizing problems and allocating scarce resources”.

The examples quoted above from the PIM and the MMC also seem like they relate equally, regardless of migratory status. However, the PIM elaborates in the section outlining data gathering: “Spatial Understanding: Need to develop a spatial understand[sic] of the location of migrants in the city and the reasons for choosing to settle in specific parts of the city and not others (PIM, 2011: 19). Even the “reception strategy” outlined in the first “area of action” states that not only will it enable migrants

to find information and connect “to opportunities that will allow them to participate in the active life of communities” but it will also “empower them with the necessary tools to navigate the city, *and track them as they do so* (my emphasis) via the resident database (PIM, 2011: 18). Here we can see that it is not only population numbers that are important to government.

The mobility of the population is an issue for government and, in addition, where and why migrants settle in various neighbourhoods. This sentence conveys the duality inherent in the municipalities migration discourse and reminds of the title of the LRMP: ‘Making Jozi Work for Migrants, Making Migrants Work for Jozi’. On the one hand, they wish to empower ‘them’ to ‘navigate the city’ which implies enabling mobility so migrants can themselves seek out ‘opportunities’. On the other hand, this cannot happen outside of the gaze of the municipality such that the CoJ policy wants to “track them as they do so” as a “main area of action” (PIM, 2011:18).

The officials had differing views of the utility of data gathering and surveillance. Even the Sub-Unit Head did not mention collecting data or implementing the database as a priority action. Respondent F favoured having an integrated population registration database: “If you look at SAPS, SAPS cannot tell if the document is legit or not, hence it is a Provincial government against another Provincial government so DHA – there’s no collaboration. But if you go to other countries, they say – if they punch whatever, an ID, it can link to anywhere – everywhere to the whole country systems – they can tell you’ve been here, you’ve done this”. His concern was around verification of documentation and the difficulties migrants face when other departments such as the police do not recognize legitimate papers. He believes that in other countries “they can tell you’ve been here, you’ve done this” and sees this kind of government surveillance as beneficial for all residents of the city, not only as a prerequisite to enable government to provide services.

Respondent C was opposed to the database policy and the municipal fetish for numbers:

So the city wants to know how many migrants are coming into the city, it's not possible. Even our academic institutors have tried, it's tough. I don't see it as very important. You're not helping in any way, what difference does it make, it's just a figure when you can establish a relationship with StatsSA or the Department of Home Affairs, and they will give you a figure to say 200,000 migrants came from these countries into the city. So that for me, I don't feel is an important thing to be a part of the policy (respondent C, 2018).

Respondant C felt that it was impossible to gather numbers of migrants and that she did not "see it as very important" to do so because "what difference will it make". She did not equate providing a service with knowing the numbers of migrants in the city, unlike the MMC quoted earlier. She emphasised this view during the interview saying that even DHA does not provide statistics of numbers, nationalities or gender of incoming migrants and that: "For me, I need to understand why is that there and how are we going to make a difference once we have those stats". In this quotation she again stresses that the assistance the municipality should provide to migrants is not dependent on the numbers but on the needs of the people in the city.

This official gives an example to substantiate her sense of the futility of data collection – that of the baby that died whose parents could not afford to repatriate or bury, that was discussed in the previous section:

Taking for example – so the child that passed on, the case was referred to me by the area social worker, we assisted, we recorded it, and that's it...I don't know, I just feel as though the information management system I don't know why it was put there, it was put there, but the city is not in a position to make a difference in terms of – yes there are so many migrants that came in, what have we done to make a difference in their lives? (respondent C, 2018).

As someone on the ground, dealing with concrete life and death issues, she cannot see the point of an information management system when she is unable to "make a difference in their lives", in this case to find a formal channel of assistance to the bereaved parents of the baby that died.

Unlike the lower level officials in the Sub-Unit discussed above, politicians have a fixation with enumerating the population and keeping tabs on their movement. Systems for doing this form a key action area in the PIM and the MMC claimed that numerical knowledge of the population is necessary in order to deliver appropriate services to specific population groups. I will analyse the media coverage of one example that demonstrates how numbers are entangled into power relations within migration discourse in the city and that “numbers do not merely inscribe a pre-existing reality. They constitute it” (Rose, 2004: 212). In 2017 the Mayor made public statements on how he was on a campaign to clean up the inner city from crime and grime. He was widely reported as saying that 80% of residents in the CBD were undocumented foreign nationals. This claim was interrogated by Africa Check.

The Acting Spokesperson of the Mayor told them that the figure was based on the Mayor’s experience of attending a raid on one particular hijacked building: “In the instance of the Cape York building, a formerly hijacked building within the inner city, of the 343 residents in the building, 303 residents were identified as undocumented foreign nationals, said the Acting Spokesperson: “That is just over 88% of the inhabitants”. He could not say how the nationalities of the residents were established, referring the reporter to DHA, where the “director of deportations”, told us that they “are unable to say how many undocumented migrants live in a particular building”, including Cape York.” There is no evidence to support this claim as all available statistics from ACMS, GCRO, StatsSA and even a report from the CoJ Social Development department into hijacked buildings cannot find evidence to back up the Mayor’s statistic (Africa Check, 7 September 2017).

Nevertheless, the media picked up on the Mayor’s claim and the belief that 80% of residents in the CBD are undocumented foreign nationals was taken up a few days later by the Deputy Minister of Police, who, after accompanying police raiding a downtown Johannesburg hijacked building, stated in a TV interview: “how can a city in South Africa be 80% foreign nationals... that is dangerous” (EWN TV, 14 July 2017). He went on to say that “in Hillbrow and surrounds, South Africans had surrendered their own city to the foreign nationals” and repeated the statistic of “80%” three more

times in the next half a minute. The government only tried to distance itself from his remarks two years later when the then Foreign Minister, addressing African Ambassadors during the widespread outbreak of xenophobic violence in 2019, said that he would 'recant' (*Daily Maverick*, 2 April, 2019).

But the damage had been done in terms of how a number, when uttered by figures in authority and repeated by print, broadcast and social media, can give credibility to the widespread belief that foreigners, and specifically undocumented foreigners, form a majority of the population of the city. The EWN TV interview with the Deputy Minister was embedded in their on-line news story with the headline 'Do not surrender your land to foreign nationals', another quote from the Deputy Minister. The video of the interview was uploaded on YouTube by EWN and was easily circulated on social media which spread his false claims to a wider audience and over a longer time than the immediate news story. This example demonstrates how statistics are not neutral instruments validating a truth about a population. Reputable sources were ignored in the popular consciousness as numbers have power when spoken by the powerful and disseminated through influential media channels, regardless of their validity. In this way statistics can be used to co-create a false narrative that is widely perceived to be a reality.

Who is here?

Government concern with gathering data goes even further than population numbers, knowing where people move to within the city and making up numbers to create a false perception of the quantitative state of migration in the city. There is a qualitative question built into the desire to count, track and manage the population. It is not just asking 'how many'. Embedded in this question is another question: who are they? The migration discourse from municipal and national government is peppered with references to 'knowing who is here'. The MMC said in her interview: "we also don't know who is meant to be here, and who is not supposed to be here".

In South African government discourse this is read as referring to non-nationals. The Deputy Police Minister, in the TV interview referred to above, said: "these buildings are being occupied and hijacked by people and lunatics that we don't know" (EWN

TV, 14 July 2017). In addition to the use of the word 'lunatic' that ascribes deviancy to migrants, the words "who is not supposed to be here" or "who we don't know" is 'government speak' implying unaccounted for undocumented migrants. This has recently been echoed by the then Mayor of Johannesburg: "But they must also be documented so that we know who is in the country" (*City Press*, 12 August 2019) and the Minister of Home Affairs: "The most important issue is that people who cross the borders have to be documented and known to be around" (*City Press*, 14 August 2019). These two quotes are typical comments showing how the question of documentation has become a preoccupation of national government and the CoJ, particularly the most recent Mayor.

The conundrum is that the immigration and refugee system demands documentation but makes it almost impossible to obtain it. There is no form of documentation available in the Immigration Act for most cross-border migrants. Many apply for asylum, the only way to obtain any kind of documentation. The renewal of asylum permits has become such a challenge due to DHA closing offices, limiting the number of people that gain access to the remaining offices and illegally charging people for services, that many people become undocumented through this process. Furthermore, not only is the asylum system backlogged so that asylum seekers wait years for a status determination interview, DHA then determines that most asylum seekers are in fact economic migrants and, without following due process of status determination, declares 90% of claims to be unfounded or manifestly unfounded.

This has led to a backlog in the appeals process creating a further obstacle to gaining refugee status. Thus the number of refugees in South Africa is extremely small compared to Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia let alone Jordan and Turkey. There is a much larger number of asylum seekers awaiting status determination than refugees. These are people whom the government has not decided on whether they are "supposed to be here" and the DHA proudly rejects most claims. Hence, the narrative has developed that asylum seekers are not "genuine" refugees but wily migrants who should not be in the country, thus conflating asylum seekers with undocumented migrants "that we don't know" and we certainly don't want. The very thing the government is insisting upon in order to know, count, survey, and police – documentation – is simultaneously

withheld so as to create the subjectivity of the 'illegal' migrant. It exemplifies Foucauldian theory of how discourses are not only perceptions of reality, but can be used as a governmental technology to create a reality, in this case, to create the illegal migrant. Moreover, the illegal subject falls outside of the governable population. They cannot be counted, therefore they cannot be known. They are an existential threat and an enemy within holding no human rights, and therefore no rights to be human, similar to Luxemburg's slave (2013) or Agamben's *homo sacer* (1995). The only thing to be done with these abject subjects is to dehumanise them in the everyday and expel them from the territory through deportation or death.

Acknowledgement is made in national and municipal policy of the rights of documented people and distinctions are made between refugees, asylum seekers and various other permit holders. However, these lines are blurred in the day to day interactions that the Migrant Help-desk officials encounter. Respondent B highlighted the double-edged attitude towards documentation:

There's too much cross cutting and there's too much breaking rules because on the one hand this policy says as an asylum you cannot have a business license, as a refugee you can, but then they allow people to trade. There is no consistency and I think one thing I must say is that it ends up confusing people who think they belong in South Africa, because they don't understand it (respondent B, 2018).

The demand that non-nationals comply with business regulations and by-laws is then complicated through labelling migrants and apportioning differing rights regimes to different categories of person. In this way, the documented migrant in everyday life is always on the verge of falling outside of the rules and regulations. PIM states as the fourth Main Area of Action - Orientation Programme for new arrivals: "The aim of the education programme...to understand...duties rights obligations and knowledge of the law emphasising zero tolerance to crime" (2011: 18). Yet the quote from respondent B above demonstrates one of the many ways in which migrants walk a tightrope between legality and illegality in practice.

As in the quote above, the officials are quite sympathetic and understand the difficulties migrants face in staying within the law. The Sub-Unit Head said:

We know that there are those who come with ulterior motives, and those law enforcements must be able to deal with them. It is not us that can say, we can't judge them, if there is evidence, then law enforcement can act against them it's okay, in any case we do not promote or condone people doing wrong things. If there are migrants or as much as locals do wrong things, they must be dealt with. That is how we strike the balance (respondent SUH, 2018).

In this quotation the respondent separates crime from migrants stating that the law should apply to everyone and that to deal with them "it is not us that can say, we can't judge them".

Respondent B echoed similar sentiments: "Like if you talk of crime, crime is a common factor to everybody, everybody do crime, but when the migrant does crime it becomes another situation so why is it if a migrant does this thing it blow out of proportion and becomes something else". She puts it more bluntly than the SUH, stating that "everybody does crime" and it should not be blown out of proportion if a migrant "does this thing". This contrasts with the words of political leaders who, in the aftermath of xenophobic violence during September 2019, have repeatedly linked foreigners to criminal activity.

Analysing the statement of the President to parliament on 24 September 2019, which on the surface condemns the violence against foreign nationals, exemplifies the contrast between the official's statements and national government migration discourse. This quotation from the President's statement contains the essence of the dominant discourse:

One of the issues raised, quite genuinely by communities, is the proliferation of drug trafficking in various localities, in urban and rural areas. Both South Africans and foreign nationals are involved in this. But we also have to acknowledge that there are certain parts of the country where specific foreign

nationals have been identified as the main dealers and pedlars. This needs to be dealt with as a law-enforcement matter, irrespective of the nationality of the individuals involved. The illegal actions of a few must not lead us to turn on all foreign nationals, the majority of whom are decent and law-abiding (The Presidency, 2018)

The opening clause that drug trafficking is “genuinely” raised by “communities”, implies firstly that communities are South African citizens and secondly that they are honest and trustworthy in the issues they raise. The next sentence shares blame for drug trafficking between South Africans and non-nationals. However, by delineating South Africans from ‘foreigners’ he creates an unnecessary division and flags up the fact that foreigners are partially guilty. The third sentence delivers the central message that the drug problem is a problem of foreign nationals. By starting this sentence with “we have to acknowledge” he gives the impression that he really does not want to be saying this, but it is impossible to hide ‘the truth’.

The clause “in certain parts of the country” gives a spatial dimension to the involvement of foreigners in this crime without spelling out exactly where he is talking about. It is likely to be understood to include Johannesburg, as the narrative of foreign enclaves that are ‘no-go areas’ for South Africans in the city has previously been promulgated by politicians. Contrasted to the vague geographical reference, the next clause states “specific foreign nationals have been identified”. He then returns to the fact that nationality is of no importance and that the neutrality of law-enforcement is an effective remedy. But the final sentence re-emphasises the guilt of foreigners through seemingly imploring ‘us’ not to tar all foreigners with the same brush because it is “illegal actions of a few” while “the majority of whom are decent and law-abiding”. This sentence also contains an instruction to ‘us’ not to “turn on all foreign nationals” but leave the matter to law-enforcement which as he has previously said is both effective and without prejudice.

The first two sentences set up the message of the third sentence - the majority of drug dealers have been identified as foreign nationals. The fourth and last sentences attempt albeit disingenuously to limit the key message and to establish the virtue of

the law above mob justice. The President's words might seem similar to the quote above from the SUH. However, the difference is in the key message of the text. In the respondent's statement his point is that both migrants and locals commit crime and that evidence-based law-enforcement must take its course regardless of nationality. In the case of the President, the hidden message is that foreigners are drug peddlers. Besides, the power associated with the State President addressing the nation, disseminated throughout all media platforms, gives his discourse authority over the views of a minor local government bureaucrat.

Illegal people

For the undocumented, the logic of the discourse means that it is impossible to live legally if deemed to be essentially an illegal being. The illegal subject, by definition, does illegal things. In fact everything the illegal subject does is necessarily outside of the law. The illegal subject is therefore a criminal. The officials are more sympathetic to the undocumented than the politicians. The SUH pointed out that that there is corruption within law enforcement and that migrants are exploited by criminals:

At the moment enforcement of the law is quite minimal and that also leads to issues around corruption and issues around abuse of power and promoting syndicates that abuse migrants, but also the law should be able to deal with, for example, employers, who abuse migrants because they don't have documents, because they want to pay low salaries (SUH, 2018).

This statement explains how undocumented migrants are victims of crime, as well as victims of corruption by law enforcement and exploitative employers – counter to the government discourse. Respondent F said: “If you can check, you go to the go to the immigration office – just enter the office if you're illegal you're likely to be arrested and deported but if you come to this office, it's a different story. In a way that we find ourselves advocating and lobbying for migrants”. This is another example of the Help-desk officials taking the point of view of undocumented migrants and adhering to the initial CoJ policy to provide assistance regardless of documentary status. Through adopting this position, he feels that the MH-d officials end up “advocating and lobbying

for migrants” given that they face arrest and deportation from fellow government officials.

Respondent F spoke in favour of providing documentation: “Our brothers and sisters are already in the country, so we need to assist them to be documented, the challenge is undocumented economic migrants, not refugees. The only region that has numbers of refugees is region F”. His use of “brothers and sisters” is a common phrase from government, often used prior to making the statement that South Africa is not xenophobic. But in this case the respondent seems genuinely sympathetic, following his comments above that the Help-desk does not discriminate against the undocumented. Respondent B expressed understanding for the reasons people become undocumented: “One thing I realised is that a lot of undocumented migrants, people didn’t become undocumented by choice, and honestly speaking, I have a problem with that. Because if they did not have that delay from Department of Home Affairs, we won’t be having the problem of having so many migrants undocumented.” She points out that DHA creates the very ‘problem’ of ‘illegal’ migrants through their own dysfunctionality.

The MMC uses DHA failures to put the blame for undocumented migrants onto national government:

The biggest challenge is the backlog from Home Affairs with processing people, in fact I was listening to a lady on the radio who grew up in this country and came from the DRC, and she was talking about the backlog, just in regards to appeals. Its’ in the hundreds of thousands with just a few officials that are supposed to deal with that, so many people are undocumented and that creates a problem, they cannot access services, we cannot service them (MMC, 2018).

Here she seems sympathetic to the plight of the woman from the DRC that she cites. She gives the impression of wanting to provide services but being hindered from doing so by the DHA not issuing documentation:

I'm responsible for Health, and I render primary health care services on behalf of the province. The province gives me a subsidy to be able to render the service, and they receive the money from equitable share, from national treasury. Now, how the money gets allocated is based on population stats, so we are chronically underfunded, because there are many people unaccounted for. The only way that people can be accounted for is if people are documented (MMC, 2018).

However, the evidence from DA policy and the utterances of the then DA Mayor indicate that they are no more concerned with documenting migrants than the ANC government, but will also use them as useful scapegoats for service delivery failures. In a TV interview following police raids in the CBD against migrant traders allegedly selling counterfeit goods, the then Mayor stated that "when we plan we plan on the basis of our residents" discounting the undocumented from the category of 'resident'. He elaborated that "between 25% and 39%" of people in the city visiting clinics "have no documentation what so ever and unfortunately we can't send them back" (ENCA TV interview, 12 August 2019). This is another example of disseminating fabricated statistics through the media. He goes on to claim that undocumented people "go from one clinic to the next collecting medication which gets shipped out of the country", yet another unsubstantiated claim but one that feeds into the discourse of illegal people doing illegal things.

"Lindela is exit, bye bye there you go"

Similar to the Mayor's comment that "unfortunately we can't send them back", the MMC complained that DHA does not rapidly implement deportations:

The JMPD is equally frustrated as we are, they can only do so much, they can arrest people, they can remove people, but there's no follow-through, so ideally they should arrest and take people to a centre where people can be people will be processed and a decision will be or a determination will be made by SAPS or Home Affairs on whether they should be deported or what should happen, but none of that is happening (MMC, 2018).

Respondent B took a different view: “Lindela. It’s just like, it’s another dumping spot for people, and to be honest with you, I don’t think as well that people are really doing their homework properly, there are people that aren’t even migrants that end up in Lindela, just because I look at you, and I say you look like one of those”. She goes on to give a story of her former boss: “he got locked up three times, at the very last two occasions, the bigger boss had to go and get him, and he says, yes it was not a nice experience. However, he appreciated it because it gave him a sense of understanding of what migrants and foreigners are going through.” This anecdote from an official talking about another South African local government employee getting arrested three times for being mistaken “for one of those” illustrates how othering others everybody: the government migration discourse turns in on itself. In the final analysis we are all migrants and rights in and to the city are precarious for us all.

Conclusion

This chapter brought out the voices of the officials talking about how they understand their work and do their jobs. With Foucauldian concepts in mind, the first section looked at the interviewees’ views on implementing stakeholder governance, the aspect of policy based on consent, to draw out the micro power relations at the level of its implementation. The second section brings out how the officials feel about their jobs, their colleagues in CoJ, and their clients. Read through the lens of ‘slavery’ and not governmentality alone, the issues raised by officials around burying the dead lead on to the final section in which I argue that migration in the city has become a question of ‘bare life’ decisions, management and control.

In the last section, I return to the theme of how the city engages disciplinary and regulatory techniques of governing migration in concert with consensual policies of networking with civil society. From the use and misuse of numbers to count and categorise the population to detention and deportation, I suggest how a coercive dominant discourse impacts upon the practice of governing migration. I use a seminal statement from the President to evidence how a dominant discourse becomes hegemonic when used in the interests of a particular powerful class. However, the views of the officials demonstrate confusion and contestation around this increasingly

coercive and dominant narrative. These themes are picked up and developed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: US AND THEM

Introduction

In the previous two chapters I presented and analysed my findings through themes that emerged from the data and the experiences of the officials in answer to my first two sub-questions. In this chapter, I interpret the data alongside literature and my conceptual framework to answer the third sub-question: What discourses inform inclusion and thus exclusion in the City of Joburg and how do these embody or depart from dominant discourses? The chapter is divided into three sections that extract specific CoJ meanings of citizen, migrant and governing migration that arose from my data analysis in chapters three and four. These themes map broadly onto the three areas of the literature review: urbanism, migration and governance, respectively, alongside the concepts of Foucault, Luxemburg, Gramsci and others elaborated in chapter two. The first two sections deal predominantly with CoJ discourses that inform 'citizen' and 'migrant'. The last section looks at how these discourses lead to technologies of governing in the city and finally how the city relates to dominant discourses on migration emanating from national government.

In the first section I look at how the word "community" is used by CoJ to signify "citizen" and the reasons for this. In this section I refer back to the findings on integration in chapter three and stakeholders in chapter four in conjunction with literature on communitarianism. Firstly, I look at the citizen/community discourse, drawing from Luxemburg's lens of slavery outlined in chapter two. From this I consider meanings of community and implications for the CoJ vision of an integrated city as well as for countering the hegemonic understanding of integration. Finally, drawing on the Foucauldian concepts of governmentality discussed in chapter two, I consider 'community' as a neo-liberal technique of governance.

Following on from exploring the CoJ understanding of the society in which the other is to be integrated, the second section begins by looking at the municipality's understanding of internal mobility and cross border migrants. Firstly, I find that CoJ

policy has shifted its focus over time which has created confusion over who is eligible for 'integration'. Secondly, I reflect on how this policy-confusion impacts the day to day work of the Help-desk officials referring to findings from chapter three (xenophobia) and chapter four (administration). This section ends by arguing that the policy shift also indicates an ideological shift in thinking around migration. Arising from this, the dominant discourse is thus also shifting towards an increasingly exclusionary attitude. However, through their confusion over policy definitions, the Help-desk officials demonstrate that the dominant discourse is far from 'natural' or 'common sense'.

In the final section I look at how the city imagines its function of governing migration at local level. Using data on the relationship between the city and national government, I interpret the trend away from an inclusive vision of integration in CoJ policy to one that is based on those who are excluded as evidence of an increasing embodiment of dominant national migration discourse. Referring back to findings in chapter three (trafficking) and policing in chapter four, I argue that a hegemonic nativist narrative is in the process of being manufactured within the city. This is happening through the consolidation of a dominant discourse and a move towards more coercive and less consultative mechanisms of governing the city.

National citizenship and local community

Citizen versus community

Only one of the interviewees, the MMC, used the word citizen and only once: "there's a lot of complaints that undocumented migrants are getting RDP houses instead of locals, when you dig deeper you'll find that a *local citizen* will get the house and sell it, willingly sell it, to somebody with money." The CoJ migration policy documents also rarely used the word. It features in documents that mention the Counter Xenophobia and Common Citizenship Programme and when quoting from national legislation (Refugee and Immigration Acts). Apart from this, it is only used once in the Policy Aim of the PIM: "To facilitate the integration of migrants to a level where immigrants have similar participation patterns to the *non-immigrant citizens* in community structures, fulfilment of civic duties, contribute to the economic, cultural, religious and social life/system in Joburg" (PIM, 2011: 16). The concept of 'citizen' within the municipal migration discourse is therefore notable by its absence or is blurry, for what is a "non-

immigrant citizen” or a “local citizen”? This confusion arises at municipal level in part from the use of ‘migrant’ for both local and cross-border incomers, a concept absent from national legislation that demarcates between South African citizenship holders and all others from outside the national borders/not eligible for citizenship.

In addition, the single use of ‘citizen’ in the negative – “non-immigrant citizens” – exemplifies that “For their existence, discourses depend on the elements they exclude” (Schrover & Schinkel: 2013). In ‘the West and the rest’ Stuart Hall (1996) elaborates on this idea to demonstrate how the self-identify of the West produced a regime of truth in its own superiority, justifying its position of power and exploitation through a discourse of ‘othering’ and dehumanizing the rest of the world, the colonies and later post colonies such that the notion of ‘the West’ exists only as the flip side to everywhere/everyone else. Similarly, CoJ municipal language evades the use of ‘citizen’ other than as “non-immigrant”. As Schrover and Schinkel (2013:1125), writing about migration discourses, state: “discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it”. The CoJ evasion of citizenship and use of it only by its negation is a product of a lack of unity as a nation. In this way the term “non-immigrant” constitutes and reproduces our ill-defined understanding of post- apartheid citizenship.

At the same time, “non-immigrant” constitutes a new meaning of the term ‘citizen’ that ignores our unresolved internal apartheid and colonial divisions and focuses on the ‘other’. The discourse of “non-immigrant” can thus be traced through the colonial rupture and Apartheid. This “non-immigrant” discourse forms part of a historical contestation over the definition of a citizen based on its own negation – the exclusion of the other – the ‘non-citizens’. I am not implying, however, that this phenomenon is exceptional to South Africa with its particular settler-colonial past. The extreme long-view and the lens of slavery that Rosa Luxemburg employs allows us to trace the double-edged history of citizen/other in specific societies through an analysis of the global political economy, as I have discussed in chapter two.

Furthermore, the non-use of the concept of citizenship in the CoJ documents and interviews reminds us of Foucault’s injunction that silences constitute discourse as much as words do: “There is no binary division to be made between what one says

and what one does not say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things” (Foucault, 1978: 27). Who has the possibility to speak, about what, and in what authorized or discrete form is in itself “part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses”.

I propose that the singular use of “non-immigrant citizen” in municipal documents and by officials who have authority, yet speak discretely about citizenship, creates an official discourse of silence on the matter at the level of the city. The association of citizen is with inclusion into the state rather than the city. Instead, it is apparent from the interviews with CoJ officials that at the level of the city they use the word ‘community’ to stand in for South African citizens.

The word “community” is frequently used (41 times throughout all the interviews). The ideal “imagined community” that Anderson (2006) explores underpins the post-Apartheid notion of citizenship and influences the discourse of government. In most cases, “community” is used to refer to ‘citizens’/non-migrants/locals for instance: “When I go into a community, and I say migration they automatically think you are meaning foreign nationals” (respondent C, 2018). In this case “community” is used by the official to mean local residents, but implicitly citizens as opposed to “foreign nationals”. The community members, according to the official, understand themselves as all citizens, even if they are local migrants, as opposed to cross border migrants. The fuzziness of how the concept of community vis a vis citizen is used in municipal discourse can be evidenced throughout the interviews such as the following examples: “some of the xenophobic instances are due to a lack of information, the stigmas and the stereotypes that is there in the community so we still further engage them about Africanism, how do they see migrants, why migrants are here, you understand” (respondent F, 2018). In this example the official clearly uses “community” to mean citizen, but following this, speaks of engaging them “about Africanism” as if the community were not themselves African, or that they do not identify as such, and need educating.

In yet another example respondent B says: “where I actually got the community, we couldn’t repatriate, so the community buried the people themselves, so that just shows you the inclusivity of the community”. Here again the notion of “community” is muddled.

She is talking about the difficulty of repatriating a body, so clearly a cross border migrant. Given previous examples of 'community' implying 'citizen', here it seems that "inclusivity of the community" refers to both migrant and citizen as one. Thus the use of "community" is a concept that is used fluidly: from representing the 'citizen' at the level of lived experience in the city to describing an imagined togetherness.

Conjuring up community

In spite of the lack of clarity over what exactly is meant by 'community', the vision of integration of 'the other' into an imagined ideal community persists in municipal policy documents: "One distinct aim has been to develop a city polity [sic] to facilitate the integration of migrants into Joburg communities" (PIM, 2011: 16). This insistence in policy on integration into local communities plus the muddled meaning of "community" expressed by officials points to a co-creating discourse that both reifies identification with 'community' whilst simultaneously creating categories of exclusion. We can see this in the following comment from the SUH:

"So we say, let it be two-way traffic, let city do its part and the community do its part, but the most important thing is to see migrants being integrated into communities if they qualify for documents they will stay within the communities, if they qualify for certain services they will be provided with those kinds of services."

Here the interviewee makes clear that there is a qualifying factor – documents – to be considered in order for the city to "do its part" by providing services. Without documents, exclusion is implied. In addition, once the migrant is considered eligible for integration by the city, by having documents, "the community" must enable integration. Yet the statement that "they will stay within the communities" conveys a meaning of integration that maintains the migrant on the margins of communities, not fully absorbed to the point that migrant and local are indistinguishable.

The notion of qualifying for inclusion but remaining eternally marginalised brings to mind Young's critique of neighbourhood community as an ideal to strive towards. Young (2011) argues that 'local community' ignores differences and enables identification only with those that one feels a commonality. Her argument points to the

fundamental paradox in the words of the respondent quoted above that is rooted in CoJ policy. As an example of this, the first underlying guiding principle of the CoJ PIM is “interculturalism” described as: “strengthening the bonds and positive interaction between people based on the cultural heritage of the host society and the principle of interculturalism” (PIM, 2011: 17). Similar to Schinkle’s argument in chapter three regarding integration in the Netherlands (2018), the CoJ discourse is premised on the desire for migrants to integrate and make conscious efforts to assimilate, but into what? Here the CoJ discourse can be understood to use the elision of ‘community’ to stand in for “cultural heritage of the host society”.

But it is almost impossible to define what “cultural heritage of the host society” means given the multiple and often conflictual cultures and heritages that make up Johannesburg, vying for power and influence in the post-apartheid city. Young (2011) provides one understanding of this paradox over what constitutes the “host society”. She argues that communities are constituted not only by those that are excluded but also those included, yet never fully belonging and on this basis advocating against aiming for the ideal integrated community. This is compelling in the context of contemporary Johannesburg. On the other hand, African communitarians seek to unpack this paradox by using concepts drawn from Southern African pre-colonial knowledge.

Rather than rejecting community as an ideal as Young does, African communitarianism considers the indigenous ontological understanding of ‘Ubuntu’. Various interpretations as “I am because we are; and since we are therefore I am” or “we are, therefore I am, and since I am, therefore we are”. In the former definition, the individual is created by the community. Michael Onyebuchi Eze argues, in the latter case, that the individual and community co-create each other, recognizing that “the other’s uniqueness enriches me” and hence the ‘other’ is constituent of the common good of the community (Eze, 2008: 108,117).

Thus Ubuntu stands in complete contrast to Young’s anti-communitarianism. Conversely to Ubuntu, the trajectory of my discussion suggests that the dominant discourse presents community – or citizen – as ‘I am because you are not’. However, I think Eze’s (2008) thesis on Ubuntu opens the possibility to transform the CoJ

discourse on integration. Rather than envisioning migrants integrating into the “cultural heritage of the host society”, an ideal ‘community’ can be imagined that draws from indigenous theories: a community that is not static, but engaged in a process of jointly being produced by migrant and local towards a mutually beneficial outcome. Hence, there is no need to reject the concept of ‘community’, as Young advocates, for it can be considered as a counter hegemonic discourse, one that is neither nativist nor predicated on exclusion and exploitation.

Community as governmental technique

The CoJ use of the word community demonstrates it is a nebulous and somewhat fictitious category, yet it has become a reality in governance discourses. Rose (2004) proposes that ‘community’ has developed into a neo-liberal concept describing an a-political third social sphere between the state and the private sector. Rose (Ibid) argues that the notion of unitary citizenship, promulgated in the 19th and 20th Centuries, has given way under pressure from increasing diversity in British society. Hence, identification with specific communities is used as a mechanism of governing plural identities within the state. However, the CoJ discourse of ‘community’ does the exact opposite. In our much younger (neo)liberal democracy of South Africa, the discourse of ‘community’ standing for ‘citizen’ is constitutive of a unitary state-building project, rather than a response to pressures of pluralism.

In the South African context, the term ‘community’ as used by the CoJ, envisages South African citizens with a common political subjectivity. It is not used as a means to denote “governing plural identities”, as Rose (2004: 178) describes in the context of Britain (for instance the gay community or the Afro Caribbean community). Yet, due to the adoption of governance methods befitting neo-liberalism - such as stakeholder governance and New Public Management (NPM) discussed in chapter two -, the CoJ discourse also carries some of the connotations of Rose’s ‘third social sphere’. The concept of a ‘stakeholder economy’, articulated and popularized by Tony Blair the year before he was elected Prime Minister in 2007, was for a “society based not on rights but on mutual obligations” (MacIntyre, 1999: 121). It is a ‘rights and responsibilities’ thesis where everyone has the right to participate and benefit in society and the economy, but not without the responsibility to contribute and to do so within the given governance framework. CoJ migration policy aligns with the emphasis on

responsibilities advanced by stakeholder governance. For example, the “multi-sector and multi-stakeholder integrated programme for management of migration in the City” (PMM, 2013: 3) emphasizes the responsibilities of migrants and non-migrant stakeholders in the city (and it has previously been noted that the responsibilities are more onerous on migrants).

In the COJ-PMM responsibility has taken precedence over the focus on migrant rights in the earlier policy. The economic implications of the ‘rights and responsibilities’ mantra advocated by Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ was to retain the Thatcherite doctrine of market efficiency and shareholder value, without completely abandoning the welfare state. The “multi-stakeholder approach” was the brainchild of Klaus Schwab, the founder of the World Economic Forum, who transplanted a management technique into a global governance mechanism centred on business rather than government (Pigman, 2007:9). Stakeholder governance also introduced these supposed market efficiencies into government through privatization, public-private partnerships and administrative reforms such as NPM and network governance, in which state institutions were but one of many implementing agents. Referring back to the data on JMAC and JMAP in the previous chapter demonstrates that the officials reveal ambivalence towards the legitimacy and role of stakeholders, and what their role is within governance networks. Moreover, the seemingly benign term ‘stakeholder’, used in national and CoJ policy ignores differentials in power, politics and resources as if all role players are equally able to be heard, exert influence and take ownership of government processes. Consequently, I claim that ‘stakeholder’ is an ideologically invested term, used in the CoJ migration policy to mask the power relations of a political project. In this way a covert dominant discourse is developed in which migrant responsibilities to the city become the focus over migrant rights in and to the city.

Mobility and migration in the city

Internal mobility versus cross border migrants

The tenor in the policy documents shifted from the initial LRMP strategy document to the PIM adopted in 2011. The former begins with outlining two categories of migrants, internal and cross border. The latter has a section titled “Categories of Migrants” in which local migrants are referred to in passing, whilst the categories of refugees or asylum seekers and the various permits (residence, study, work, retired and medical)

from the Immigration Act are briefly outlined. The last two categories listed in this document are irregular migrants and unreturned exiles and/or legitimate children of unreturned exiles. Of incidental personal interest (as I was born in exile) the document states that this last category are “individuals (or their children born in exile and spouses) who fled instability during the Apartheid era, but did not return once the country had stabilized” (PIM, 2011: 12). If they are people that did not return it is curious that they feature as a category of migrants in the migration discourse of the city. The main point here though is that the idea of internal migrants seems to have been diminished in policy documentation.

Two of the interviewees identified their own experience as internal migrants, moving to Johannesburg from other provinces to take up a job in the CoJ, as influencing their understanding of the difficulties faced by newcomers to the city. One other interviewee said she came to realise that her own history was one of migration after working on the Help-desk. The initial MH-d strategy document has sections on internal migration in which it recognises research showing that the majority of incomers to the city are from other provinces in South Africa. It also notes that: “local migrants tend to be from rural or township areas, have little experience navigating cities, and are relatively less skilled than their city-savvy and business oriented cross border counterparts” (LRMP, 2009: 2).

The respondents citing their own experience as migrants disprove this general categorisation of local migrants being unskilled. Arguably, the majority of local migrants might be unskilled, yet the policy does not articulate any nuances such that it does not consider middle class incomers in its purview of the local migrant. On the one hand, this formulation of rural locals and business savvy and urbane cross border migrants construes the latter as a welcome addition to Johannesburg. On the other hand, “city-savvy” has connotations of shrewdness, knowing how to play and exploit the system which can be construed negatively in a climate of economic desperation.

The officials, as in the examples cited above, seem, on one level, to be aware that migration into Johannesburg is largely from other South African provinces such as respondent F:

“After understanding the pushing and the pulling factors then I understood. I wasn’t aware that when you talk about migrants you aren’t only referring to cross-borders, we also have local migrants, if I’m from one province coming to Gauteng, I am a migrant as well. My mind has changed overall as well”.

And that the main issue for the city is how to provide services to all residents:

“When they plan they need to know what to include in terms of migrants, because migrants are part and parcel of the city. So the city plans can be for electricity, water, sanitary, cleanings and stuff like that, and they must be informed” (SUH 2018).

However as in the previous discussion of citizenship and community, the discourse becomes blurred in practice and the word ‘migrant’ is usually understood as a cross-border incomer. This in turn shifts the perceived ‘problem’ that the city faces towards one of the nationality and thus the legality and limited rights of residents rather than focusing on the actual needs or real patterns of mobility.

The notion that CoJ’s sole function is to provide services, however, creates a conundrum for the Help-desk officials. They have some understanding and acceptance of the fact that there are more incomers from within South Africa than from outside its borders as quoted above and also in this comment from respondent C:

Remember with us, we have our internal migrants and we have our cross border migrants, and that is why when... I go into a community, and I say migration they automatically think you are meaning foreign nationals. When I ask them how many of you were born here and two people only raise their hands, and then they are shocked, then they say no I have a green barcoded ID, I’m a South African. It is giving this information that is actually changing people’s lives and saying stop only looking at people who are coming across the borders (respondent C, 2018).

Yet the focus on the city as a service provider leads the officials into the new tenor of the policy documents – understanding migrants as cross-border incomers who are only eligible for services according to the category they fit into in terms of the Refugee or Immigration Act. In fact, the second policy document (PIM) embodies this paradox. It is titled “Integration of Migrants” yet it is premised on disaggregating cross border migrants with the underlying assumption that certain categories are morally more deserving and legally qualified to receive certain services than others, rather than the “integration” of all incomers into the community/ies of Johannesburg.

The PIM contains a section “Problematizing Migrant Policy: 2010-2011”. One of the four ‘challenges’ mentioned states that “Internal migration (mainly from rural areas) represents a larger (and arguably less economically integrated) flow of new residents into Johannesburg, and this flow is circular over both short and longer timeframes” (PIM, 2011: 13). This formulation is worth unpacking for it illustrates the linguistic paradoxes of CoJ migration discourse. The acknowledgement that larger numbers of incomers are internal migrants is, seemingly, mitigated by the view that they follow a circulatory migratory pattern. We can read this as meaning that ‘integration’ is not applicable as they are temporary residents. Yet, along with the clause in brackets, if taken on face value this would imply that an integration policy should exactly focus itself primarily on local migrants – both in terms of numbers and their greater lack of economic integration.

The quote below from the MMC shows how conceptions of mobility and migration are now focused on the legal status of those on the move which immediately presents migrants as cross border incomers:

And that is our biggest challenge – the fact that – we are not saying that people should not move around, that doesn’t make sense, migration is there to stay, and we encourage migration. South Africa has attracted skills from other countries, if you look at the mining sector. We’ve imported skills from Lesotho, from Mozambique, so we do believe in migration, however we want it to happen legally. We just want a functional Home Affairs, so that we can also know what we are dealing with, we can plan our resources, plan our services and we can be a functionally government. It is really difficult. (MMC, 2018)

Her statement that the mining sector “imported skills from Lesotho and Mozambique (see the history of migration in Johannesburg in the first chapter) instrumentalises migrants as purely economic units and links black migration under apartheid with contemporary black African migration to attract ‘scarce skills’ in a managed way “so we can also know what we are dealing with”. Her comments do not reflect any concern about rights, agency or even of integration. However, the MMC’s discourse does more than re-package apartheid migrant labour tropes. Referencing back to stakeholder governance and Third Way politics reveals that her discourse also functions within a contemporary neo-liberal economic frame. Morrison (2018:171), analysing Blair’s speeches, states that:

“citizenship is articulated as inextricably linked to economic requirements. Inclusion into citizenship becomes, in practice, the fulfilment of the obligation to participate in both labour and consumer markets, in order to enable Britain to compete as a nation within the global economy”.

This is reminiscent of Foucault’s (2008:292) *homo economicus* where he identifies the economic, as well as the juridical obligations of the neo-liberal subject.

However, in contemporary South Africa citizenship remains a juridical concept associated with the rights outlined in the Bill of Rights in our Constitution. Given the deep levels of poverty and racialized structural inequality, it is harder for government to overtly shift from prioritising rights over the responsibility of citizens to ‘earn’ their citizenship by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps. Although qualifying that, the proliferation of the term “entrepreneur” in government discourse indicates that the requirement for citizens to ‘help themselves’ and not expect to be provided for is gaining acceptability. Where we are already making such demands to be *homo economici* is on migrants and indeed our Immigration Act does just that.

The provisions for permits in the Act is premised on the supposed economic needs of South Africa such as scarce skills and investment. This is evident in the introduction to the White Paper: “The vision must be based on the crucial contribution inward and outward migration makes and will make to growing our economy and to the

transformation of Africa” (WP, 2017: iii). The WP, like the MMC’s comments, envisions the benefit of migration purely in terms of the economic advantage that migrants can bring into the country. In this way, the MMC’s statement exposes the hidden hand of the market in the migration framework. Moreover, the more recent CoJ policy and the WP do not only mirror the World Economic Forum’s “multi-stakeholder approach” to managing migration. These documents also reflect a discourse that is overtly stated in World Bank language on migration. According to their aptly titled report, *Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labour Markets*: “Ignoring the massive economic gains of immigration would be akin to leaving billions of hundred-dollar bills on the sidewalk” (World Bank, 2018: 3).

Muddling meanings making new discourses

I noted in chapter three how the policy shifts from acknowledgement of xenophobia in the city to proposing that the term “anti-xenophobia” be deleted in public awareness materials and replaced with “inclusiveness, tolerance and diversity” as “it carried unnecessary negative connotations” (LRMS: 24). I discussed in chapter three the problematic around the term integration and, by extension, “inclusiveness, tolerance and diversity” inserted into policy without consideration of the host country societal context.

Nevertheless, I want to propose here that, on the one hand, this curious “negation of a negation” (Marx, 2013: 535) does what it purports to do and presents a normative, or even an idealised, vision for the city – one of inclusion, tolerance, community and diversity. Yet on the other hand, the elimination of the term anti-xenophobia also eliminates the word xenophobia and, in so doing, plays into the denialist discourse of national government. The positive vision for the city presented in the statement is not based on a dialectical understanding that would require recognising a problem and presenting ways to tackle it in order to achieve that vision. Nor is it in any way “an inexorable law of nature” (Marx, 2013: 535) that xenophobia will simply disappear if it is not mentioned and is replaced with the words inclusion, tolerance and diversity. Instead, the deletion of anti-xenophobia hides the problem of xenophobia by suggesting removing all references to countering it. Moreover, it is a telling phrase in how governmental discourses are manufactured.

Getting to the roots of governmental discourses has implications beyond specific policy documents or utterances of government officials. Teun Van Dijk (2008: 300) explains critical discourse analysis as preferring “to focus on the elites and their discursive strategies for the maintenance of inequalities”. The use of particular terminology or omitting certain terms defines the population to be governed, and the mechanisms by which various categories of person are to be governed and inequality maintained. In chapter two I have argued against the Foucauldian idea that discourse alone creates our knowledge about real world phenomenon. Rather, power relations imbue certain discourses such as government statements with authority that then gets repeated and reproduced through the media and everyday conversation (Weatherall, 2001). For instance, the media reports quoting Ministers and the President’s statement on the outbreak of xenophobic violence in during September 2019 analysed in chapter three have helped to naturalise a widespread belief that Nigerians are drug dealers (Simone, 2004).

The language used by government embodies an ideology which supports a particular socio-economic trajectory as revealed in the statement of the MMC analysed earlier in this chapter. However, the dominant discourse that cements and reproduces knowledge about the migrant and the community is not static or uncontested. Hegemonic discourse must be constantly reformulated and remade to retain dominance as forces both within structures of state power and those without power in society struggle for domination (Fairclough, 1995: 94-95).

As an example of struggle within the state institutions, the MMC, coming from the official opposition DA, insists on the blaming the ANC for unmanaged and illegal migration through government failure to secure borders. However, the ideological frame to the migration narrative has become pretty much the same in the DA and ANC. Even the comments of the officials - in their confusion over the existence and instances of xenophobia as well as the ambiguity over who constitutes a legitimate client of their services – point to an unsettled migration narrative within the CoJ.

Similar to Foucault’s understanding of coercion and consent in neo-liberal governmentality (discussed in chapter two), Gramsci (1999: 248) says that “the

'normal' exercise of hegemony...is characterised by the combination of force and consent" in parliamentary democracies where force and consent "balance each other reciprocally". Further, that "the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion – newspapers and associations". Looking at media reports and government statements made when migrant shop-keepers fought back against police raids on their businesses in the Johannesburg CBD is a good example. The police frequently raid these businesses supposedly looking for counterfeit goods but in the process they ignore the law, use undue force and confiscate goods that are not necessarily counterfeit without issuing receipts, which are resold for private gain. In August 2019 the shopkeepers had had enough and resisted a raid, throwing stones at the police contingent and forcing them to retreat.

Following this incident, the Gauteng MEC for Community Safety was widely reported as saying: "We can't co-govern with criminals, especially foreign nationals who want to turn our country into a lawless Banana Republic" (*News24*, 1 August 2019). The Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster of national government said in a statement: "An attack on law enforcement agencies is an attack on the state, and the government views this in the most serious light. Blatant disregard for our law threatens national security and the sovereignty of our nation" (*EWN*, 3 August 2019). Calls for the police to use force, for increased immigration raids and stronger border controls (particularly from the then DA Mayor) became 'common sense' responses from government and civil society resulting in a wave of xenophobic attacks (*ANA*, 12 August 2019). Although ten police were charged with bribery, tipping off shopkeepers of planned raids and selling confiscated goods, the more powerful narrative, driven by senior politicians depicted the non-national shopkeepers as the criminals. Here we can see how consent was manufactured to create a hegemonic discourse that enabled the state to increase the use of force and coercion against cross border migrants.

The shopkeepers in the above example contribute to the economy of the city through selling goods in bulk to cross-border traders for resale in neighbouring countries. Research from the Gauteng City Regional Observatory puts this trade in 2015 at around R2.6 billion a year (*Mail and Guardian*, 18 September 2015) including the amount traders spend on food, accommodation and transport while in the city. The

CoJ migration policy initially took a politically liberal position and indeed did look at the positive contribution made to the economy of the city. However, the shift in policy mentioned earlier has seen a change in the dominant discourse to one which demonises the traders (read as all non-nationals) to the point of rendering them not only outside of the *polis* and therefore outside of state protection of human rights, but also as threats to national security. Xenophobic violence does not exist in the minds of the elite as migrants are seen as “illegal”, not only in documentary status, but ‘othered’ to the point of Luxemburg’s slaves or “life that does not deserve to live” (Agamben, 1998: 136).

In the previous chapter I examined the respondent’s challenges in assisting clients with the death of family members. The officials resorted to raising funds in order to help with burials demonstrating a humanity that ran counter to the dehumanisation of migrant life and death. Through the official’s comments and the previously discussed areas of confusion they expressed in implementing policy we can see a form of resistance to normalisation of the ‘state of exception’ in which migrants live and die. In the next section I explore this increasingly exclusionary CoJ vision in relation to techniques of governing the urban population.

Who governs who in the city?

The LRMP (2007: 11) specifies that: “The operational ethos of the migrant help-desk is that there will be, as far as possible, **no service denial based on lack of documentation** and personnel **will not record the citizenship/residency status of a customer**”[original emphasis]. By 2011 the PIM states that “The irregular/undocumented migrants are not the primary target of the integration policy in as far as assisting them to undermine the immigration laws of the country” (PIM, 2011: 12). This shift from a more inclusive understanding that overtly stated it would not discriminate on the basis of migratory status, to the municipality being defined solely as a provider of services, necessitates regulating the population so that it can select who is deserving of these services. Techniques of governance and administration aimed at counting and categorising the population, such as the database of residents in the city which is an aim of the 2011 PIM, and the response of officials have been discussed in the previous chapter. The PIM goes further to state: “The risk of focusing resources on this group [irregular/undocumented] may be an unintentional

consequence of assisting those that the Department of Home Affairs would have regarded or identified as prohibited or undesirable” (PIM, 2011: 12). The municipality is now positioning itself as complicit in combining bio-political technologies - documentation and population registration databases - with disciplinary technologies of immigration policing, arrest and deportation. The city has thus become complicit in making decisions on ‘bare life’.

However, antagonisms persist between an inclusive and exclusive urban vision as the officials struggle to negotiate between what they experience on the ground, their understanding of the service they are providing and the power dynamics between local and national government. Here we can see how a dialectical struggle for a hegemonic vision of inclusion is taking place within the structures of local government and the people who work in the system. As Foucault (2003) reminds us, the relations of power within an institution derives from outside of that institution. National government in the form of the DHA holds the sole power to determine the make-up of the population through issuing or rejecting applications for pieces of paper that authenticate birth, death, identities, marriage and documentation for migrants.

Interpreting the data with the above in mind, one can see how it is convenient for the DA, such as the MMC, to blame it’s supposed challenges of running Johannesburg on the ANC run DHA in national government. But this also reflects issues over spheres of government that arose when the ANC held a majority within the City of Johannesburg. DHA, a national department, has the power to make status determinations and regulate people crossing borders. However, Help-desk officials feel that migration is experienced at city level, leaving them powerless to assist in matters of documentation other than to refer clients to DHA. The officials expressed frustration that there is no point of contact for their clients at DHA so that they feel thwarted in their remit of providing assistance through referral to the relevant service provider:

“There is no, national there is no one, unless if we have seminars and workshops and we invite them to do presentations. Then they respond to some of the questions about migration. We realized that if we as the Desk just refer

people to Home Affairs, and they don't know who to contact there, it is a challenge" (SUH, 2018).

Moreover, they know that the majority of clients are either stuck in the asylum system or do not meet the criteria for any of the immigration permits. Whilst none of the officials openly expressed it, this tension creates an unacknowledged but discernible sense of futility in fulfilling the mission of the Help-desk, most explicitly stated by the SUH:

"We know that we cannot provide the service that they need because we don't issue documents, but at least if we give out information and we let them know that the city is there to provide services for them".

Through an almost imperceptible shift in the policy discourse, the role of the municipality in creating a liveable and convivial environment is diminished and its regulatory function over the population becomes dominant. Lines start to be drawn like an invisible urban border between those that are eligible for services and those without documentation who are deemed 'illegal' and should on this basis be excluded from the city/state:

I think that we don't need to be isolated from Home Affairs, we are all from the government and we need to work with each other. Our brothers and sisters are already in the country so we need to assist them to be documented, the challenge is undocumented economic migrants, not refugees. The only region that has numbers of refugees is region F (respondent A, 2018).

In this comment from respondent A we can see how the officials are caught up in classifying their clients even if they are sympathetic to the fact that "our brothers and sisters are already in the country and we need to assist them to be documented". It also is typical of the frustration over the relationship between the municipality and DHA which was expressed by all but one of the interviewees such as this statement from respondent A:

The Helpdesk is, I would like to say, a bit of a challenge, for a simple reason, our referral system is not taking us anywhere, but we have lots and lots of

clients who are coming to the Helpdesk but because we are a referral office, there is nothing we can do. And our referral letter, or the document we use doesn't carry any weight, especially with the Department of Home Affairs, unless maybe you contact them personally as an officer of this office (respondent A, 2018).

The officials know that many of their clients' problems arise from documentation, or lack thereof, and also know that they are unable to do anything about this as it is only DHA that can issue permits. Furthermore, the absence of any kind of relationship between CoJ and DHA means that even if they refer people to DHA offices, it is likely no-one that will assist them. As respondent A says:

"I will go to the informal settlements, the challenge that I've picked up is that the cross-border migrants who are scared to come out because they think they will be arrested. And if you go to them, and unfortunately, most of the leaders in the community, would say Home Affairs is coming, I always have to make corrections when I arrive."

In addition, the officials seem to know, as in this quotation, that many clients do not qualify for any kind of permit and that if they do actually get to see anyone at DHA, they will be deemed "illegal" and liable for deportation.

Agamben and Dean's proposition also seems to resonate at the municipal level. For example, the utterances of both national and local politicians, such as those of the most recent Mayor of Johannesburg who was prone to blame all the city's ills on 'illegal' migrants, created a conundrum for the officials. The Help-desk officials understood that their remit was to disseminate information to the public regardless of status yet end up facing 'bare life' decisions in their everyday work. If they act on the words of the Mayor and refuse to assist clients that were undocumented they knew they were condemning them to detention and deportation. That means expulsion and quite possibly death if they were returned to their country of origin from which they were fleeing persecution. For example, as one participant said: "for me it is a bit of a challenge for them to go from one office to another because they are still scared of being arrested and deported" (respondent A). Sovereign power, exercised by national

government, is thus intertwined with biopower within governmental apparatus at municipal level. My research has led me to concur with Dean that it is important to acknowledge the continuing existence of coercive aspects of government exercising direct rule on the population albeit embroiled within biopolitical apparatus. Srila Roy (2017) makes a similar argument in her ethnographic study of women's empowerment NGOs: 'Feminist Governance of "Child Marriage" in Eastern India.

The interviewees expressed understanding, sympathy - or even empathy - with their clients. Respondent F cited his long friendship with a Mozambican in his neighbourhood who had helped him with work when he was unemployed before joining the CoJ. The Sub-Unit Head had previously worked for the Department of Home Affairs and said that his views on migrants had changed since joining the Helpdesk: "You realise that being in the MH-d opens your mind, and you realise that these are people as well and they need to be treated like human beings". Respondent B said:

"I started learning about the migration, I started questioning my own life, and then I came to realize my mother was a migrant too and the reasons why she became a migrant, people has this tendency to say I'm not a migrant, I'm not a foreigner, so if everybody in this Gauteng go back. I think this place will be empty, very, very empty."

All the respondents said that working on the MH-d has made them more aware of migration and the issues faced by migrants. Yet they are caught between trying, in good faith, to implement their 'integration' key performance areas and the knowledge that most of the people they are working with should be excluded from the state in terms of national policy.

In contrast to the initial 2007 LRMP, in this section we have seen how the later municipal policy documents have adopted a more exclusionary, suggesting that the city has hardened its attitude towards migrants in line with national government policy pronouncements. Ironically, in spite of its title, the Integration Policy (PIM) of 2011 has a heightened focus on the function of the city as a service provider rather than enabling and enhancing integration in the city. The city, through its 2007 migration policy appeared to be resisting excluding those without the right papers, potentially

positioning itself as a Derridian “free city”, extending hospitality not only to the named foreigner but even to “the absolute, unknown, anonymous other” (Derrida cited in Roy, 2019: 769). This hope was unfortunately short lived as by 2011 the city succumbed to the power of DHA through acceptance of “the risk of focusing resources” on those that DHA consider “prohibited or undesirable” (PIM, 2011: 12).

In the previous chapter I examined the how CoJ has embraced the use of numbers, surveillance and coercion through arrest and deportation as a means to sort the population into deserving and undeserving, included and excluded, legal and illegal. At the same time the implementing officials express ambivalent attitudes towards the mechanisms they are required to employ to fulfil their mandate. They are not entirely convinced that crime in general is caused by migration nor are they convinced of the expanding category of who is considered “illegal”, or the coercive means employed to remove the undesirables from the city.

However, the voices of the officials, whilst holding power over the population as the interface with state authorities, carry little weight within the bureaucracy and none at all at regional or national government levels, as the discussion on stakeholder consultations in chapter four illuminated. The confusions and questions that the officials pose are confined to their own frustrations with their day to day work. They are not given the platform or the authority to influence an alternative vision. At best the officials discontent could frustrate the implementation of increased government disciplinary and coercive mechanisms and disrupt the discourse simply through refusal and prevarication, rather than strategic counter hegemonic resistance.

Conversely, the discourses that are propelling an exclusivist and anti-immigrant hegemony onto the municipality, are emanating from powerful politicians, framed and disseminated by the media. I have given examples throughout chapters three, four and in the previous section of this chapter that demonstrate how the former Mayor, his former political party the DA and, even more influentially, national ANC politicians, Ministers and the state President, are all promulgating an exclusionary narrative that is underpinned by an ideological imperative common to both political parties.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have posited answers to the question of what discourses inform inclusion and thus exclusion in the CoJ, as well as the ways in which they embody or depart from the dominant discourse. I argue that the ideological trajectory of the municipality, similar to national government, is towards a narrative based on exclusion and greater coercive control and criminalisation of migrants. On the other hand, the comments of the officials reveal anomalies in implementation of governmental techniques that are based on a disciplining narrative. These points of departure indicate that for those officials engaged with migrants in the city, the dominant discourse is not necessarily 'common sense'. Although the officials express confusion and ambivalence rather than a strategic counter-hegemonic viewpoint, their comments indicate the potential to counter the developing hegemonic discourse.

As an example, I have briefly mentioned one possible theoretical starting point for developing a counter hegemonic narrative of inclusion-exclusion using Michael Eze's conceptualisation of 'Ubuntu' (Eze, 2008). Yet, theory remains moot unless combined with practice of resistance as "language should be seen as 'refracting' [reality] through the lens of social struggle" (Weatherell, 2001: 65). In the final chapter I will expand on the points raised here to draw some conclusions to my overall research question that asks what does the Migrant Help-desk reveal about the city government's vision of in/exclusion; the implications for governing an inclusive Johannesburg; and raise further questions to consider towards countering exclusionary hegemonic discourses.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

In answering my research question through this study, I have revealed how the discourse around migration in the CoJ has shifted from the inception of the Help-desk in 2007 towards an increasingly exclusionary vision. However, my research has shown that the narrative is unsettled in practice by the officials who expressed points of uncertainty and confusion. Two recent developments help illustrate the point that while an exclusionary imaginary of who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ of the policy is coalescing, driven by national government and political leaders, the CoJ, through its practice, unsettles the dominant narrative.

Firstly, in January 2020 the Refugee Amendment Bill came into force alongside a set of regulations for its implementation. The Amendment Bill adds restrictions for asylum seekers such as the removal of the right to work. These new clauses aim to move away from the urban refugee policy of the initial Refugee Act, remove asylum seekers from urban areas and detain them in ‘processing centres’ in remote border areas until their claim is adjudicated. The regulations which, unlike parliamentary bills, do not get put out for public submissions, contains even more punitive measures. Asylum seekers and refugees will be forbidden from participating in political activities either in South Africa or in relation to their countries of origin. No details are provided as to what constitutes “political activities” but it is stated that contravention of this clause will result in removal of their status and leave them open to immediate deportation or *refoulement* to their country of origin. Technically, these regulations should render illegal the participation of refugees in the CoJ stakeholder forums.

At the same time, the CoJ Migration Sub-Unit, as mentioned in the interviews with the officials, is working to revive its stakeholder fora, most recently planning a workshop with broader academic and civil society participation to relaunch the structures of JMAP and JMAC. The concept note, signed by the SUH, says that “the policy is guided by national legislation, namely the Refugee Act, 1998 and Immigration Act. CoJ, referring to the original Act, justifies its consultative mechanisms with no reference to

the punishing clauses of the recently published regulations. These two current examples of national and municipal policy demonstrate the tensions between city and state raised in my introduction. It is highly unlikely that CoJ will stand up to national government over the provisions in the regulation, counter the emerging exclusionary hegemony, and argue in favour of refugee participation. Indications from my research are that the CoJ is very far from taking a stand to directly resist implementation of the regulations in the manner of sanctuary cities in the US or cities that declare refugees are welcome in Europe and the UK.

However, as my study also reveals through the many instances of uncertainty and inconsistency in the comments of the officials, it is more complex than positing that the city is or should be more welcoming in the face of increasingly exclusionary visions and practices of the national state. In my introductory chapter I alluded to Ananya Roy's critique of sanctuary cities. She describes sanctuary cities as an "intimate entanglement between state protection and state violence" (Roy, 2019: 774). Through Foucault's lens of neo-liberal governmentality, I have similarly pointed out in chapter four and five, respectively, how managerialist governance frameworks such as NPM and stakeholder governance function in the CoJ. These consensual techniques seem to offer mechanisms for inclusion and protection but work in concert with disciplinary and increasingly punitive means of governing. In chapters three and five I have looked at how nativist rhetoric from national government and local politicians foment into influential discourses around citizenship and mobility. As my research has shown, the CoJ has not thus far attempted to counter the developing hegemony of exclusionary state narratives. If anything, CoJ has shifted its own imaginary to accommodate and police exclusion.

Sanctuary cities refuse to cooperate with immigration police but, according to Roy (2019), do not challenge or confront the coercive power of US law enforcement as it operates over the urban – specifically the black urban – population. Like Schinkel's critique of integration in the Netherlands, Roy problematises the municipal imagination of community as a 'White' vision at odds with its own reality. Through my discussion of the history of migration in Johannesburg in the introduction, the contemporary nature of the city in chapter two, discussion on integration in chapter three and

citizenship in chapter five, I have argued similarly that the ideal imaginary of an 'integrated' city in itself belies a false narrative of a static population imbued with Western notions of cosmopolitanism. The discussion on xenophobia in chapter three and mobility in chapter five bring out the opposite side of this discourse – the CoJ imagination of the 'other'.

From Luxemburg's (2013) theory of slavery, I argue that urban exclusion is foundational to urban inclusion in societies based on exploitative power relations. Further, the colonial rupture forced a process of urbanisation that served colonial interests, in various ways enslaving the populations and manufacturing a discourse that created the indigene as the alien. Fanon (1963) presciently elaborates on how this impacts post-colonial African states so that the initial inclusiveness of liberation cements into xenophobic discourses and increasingly exclusionary conceptions of citizenship. In the South Africa context, it can be argued that the majority black population, the 'enslaved', that were alienated and kept outside of the urban polity under Apartheid, now asserts its right to be the inclusive subjects of the state and the city, and views the migrant, the 'metic' of Aristotle's Athens, as the abject alien outsider. The 'other' is thus an existential threat to the promise of a better life for all in the new South Africa.

Moreover, in the current economic climate with growing inequality and unemployment, discourses blaming 'the other' and constructing an 'illegal' de-humanised subject of the alien falls on fertile ground. But defining and 'managing' the 'other' is of course not so simple. There are myriad complexities around enumerating and policing the gendered, racialised and migratory status of a subject. This has been brought out throughout my analysis of the policy and interview data – the section on trafficking being perhaps one of the most striking examples – and informs my argument that the citizen/migrant is a false binary, yet foundational for the state.

As outlined in my introductory chapter on the history of migration in Johannesburg and elaborated in chapter two, in a liminal African city mobility is a marker of precarity or poverty for citizen and migrant alike. The nooks and crevices in which people manage to form connections, albeit brittle ones, in order to survive and build lives are frequently

informal with opaque links to state authority. I thus return to Kihato's (2013) provocation in chapter two: could the municipal imagination of integration and attempts to implement their vision through a policy intervention have the obverse effect? Out of my research I suggest that this could indeed be the case. Interpreting my findings suggest that CoJ policy has shifted toward an exclusionary discourse that is becoming hegemonic. The shift in discourse in turn necessitates a shift toward more coercive means of governing the urban population.

However, the case with which I began this chapter gives a current example of how this is not a linear process. National government is promulgating a raft of legislation to cement the discourse of the migrant as an abject unhuman outside of the polity, punishable with expulsion and risk of death. Yet the CoJ Migrant Help-desk, by reviving its consultative mechanisms, opens the possibility for dissenting from the dominant discourse. This is not transformative, but simply pushing back to maintain the status quo. However, in the context of the global rise of exclusionary politics and authoritarian rule, I suggest that just this small dent in the dominant discourse is welcome, even if only to keep open the space for alternative narratives. Following from Gramsci (1999), dominant discourses gain hegemony in the interests of ruling ideologies. Yet this process is not automatic, and the dialectical contestation of ideas allows for counter-hegemonic discourses to unsettle dominant narratives.

In this way, I would challenge critical urbanists that dismiss the role of local government in re-imagining the city, if for nothing more than opening a space in which more radical possibilities can be imagined. Nevertheless, I agree with the critical urban studies premise that a universal right to a genuinely humanising city requires a counter hegemonic project in practice as well as imagination (Harvey, 1973; Brenner *et al.*, 2012). I will end by proposing a few ways of thinking about inclusive counter-hegemonic narratives for future research.

Migrant rights activists and organisations in Johannesburg have been considering how to move away from a narrative based on asserting the rights of migrants and towards a discourse based on struggles common to all residents in the city. As an alternative to sanctuary cities Roy (2019:775) argues for what she calls “abolitionist” cities based

on the US black radical tradition, calling into question both liberal and cosmopolitan traditions of Western humanism. While this is not applicable in its entirety for the South African context, I propose that Roy's ideas might assist with conceptualising an inclusive counter narrative that draws not only from our own black radical traditions but also makes room for rethinking indigenous non-Western conceptions of inclusion. These ideas could contribute to future research projects that seek to explore power relations in the city and emancipatory alternative discourses in theory and practice.

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APPENDIX ONE

Preliminary Interview Guideline

Possible interview questions are suggested. However, as I will be using in-depth interviews, the questions serve as a guideline.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

How long have you been involved with the Migrant Help-desk/CoJ migration policy?

What do you feel are the positives?

What do you feel are the negatives?

Can you describe your role in the Migrant Help-desk/CoJ migration policy?

Could you describe the most important lessons learnt?

What would you do differently?

Have your views changed over time?

What do you think are the most important ways to take forward implementation of the CoJ migration policy?

Tell me about your views on migration and have they changed since you have been involved in Migrant Help-desk/CoJ migration policy?

Additional questions

Is there anything else you would like to add that has occurred to you during this interview?